DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume Three: Sec. 15-26
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

SECTION 15: FACILITIES
Detention and Corrections Caselaw Catalog All Rights Reserved
CRS Inc, 925 Johnson Dr., Gettysburg PA 17325 (717) 338-9100 www.correction.org/
The following pages present summaries of court decisions which address this topic area. These summaries provide
readers with highlights of each case, but are not intended to be a substitute for the review of the full case. The cases
do not represent all court decisions which address this topic area, but rather offer a sampling of relevant holdings.
The decisions summarized below were current as of the date indicated on the title page ofthis edition of the
Catalog. Prior to publication, the citation for each case was verified, and the case was researched in Shepard's
Citations to determine if it had been altered upon appeal (reYersed or modified). The Catalog is updated annually.
An annual supplement provides replacement pages for cases in the prior edition which have changed, and adds new
cases. Readers are encouraged to consult the Topic Index to identify related topics of interest. The text in the
section entitled "How to Use The Catalog" at the beginning of the Catalog nrovides an overview which may also be
helpful to some readers.
The case summaries which follow are organized by year, with the earliest case presented first. Within each year,
cases are organized alphabetically by the name of the plaintiff. The left margin offers a quick reference, highlighting
the type of court involved and identifying appropriate subtopics addressed by each case.

1970
U.S. District Court

CELLS
DORMITORIES

Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). State pr~ners challenged
conditions and practices in the state prison system. The district court held that
conditions and practices in the Arkansas penitentiary system, including a trusty system
whereby trusties ran the prison, open barracks system, conditions in isolation cells, and
absence of a meaningful rehabilitation program, were such that confinement of persons in
the system amounted to cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by eighth and fourteenth
amendments. Confinement in an otherwise unexceptional penal institution is not
unconstitutional simply because an institution d(Jes not operate a school, or provide
vocational training or other rehabilitative facilities and services, but the absence of an
affirmative program of training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance
where in the absence of such program, conditions and practices exist which actually militate
against reform and rehabilitation.
Term "cruel and unusual punishment• cannot be defined with specificity. It is flexible
and tends to broaden as society tends to pay more regard to human decency and dignity and
becomes, or likes to think that it becomes, more humane. Generally speaking, punishment
that amounts to torture, when it is grossly excessive in proportion to the offense for which it
is imposed, or that is inherently 1Ulf&ir, or that is unnecessarily degrading, or that is
shocking or disgusting to people of reasonable sensitivity is a •cruel and unusual
punishment"; and punishment that is not inherently cruel and unusual may become so by
reason of the manner in which it is inflicted. (Arkansas Prison System)

1972
U.S. District Court

SEPARATION
U.S. District Court

CELLS
PLUMBING
CHAPEL
PADDED CELL

Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F .Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Juveniles need not be kept
in a separate detention center from adults as long as they are provided with separate
quarters in the county jail. (Coahoma County Jail, Mississippi)
·
Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F.Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), reh'g. denied, 420 U.S. 983
(1974). The use of substandard facilities for punitive segregation, and the practice of
placing inmates in segregation cells without clothing are unconstitutional. Court
ordered that solitary cells be provided with a bunk, water closet, drinking fountain and
lavatory, and be of not less than forty square feet in dimension. An inmate who is
confined in a solitary cell for more than three days shall have a hearing, before an impartial
board, and no inmate shall be confined in solitary for over fifteen days. Court ordered
county officials to include quarters for chapel services in permanent plan for new facilities.
Court ordered that padded cells with hammocks be provided for insane persons. (Dallas
County Jail, Texas)

19'75
U.S. District Court

SEPARATION
SPECIAL CELL

Albertiv. Sheriff of Harris Co., 4~ F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex.1975). No pretrial detainee
shall be housed in the same cell or cellblock with any person who has been convicted
and sentenced. Alcoholic and drug-dependent inmates shall be housed in an
incarcerative environment specifically designed and equipped for the treatment of
withdrawal problems. Jail officials shall establish a separate diversion program for alcoholic
and drug-dependent inmates, including hiring a specialist in drug and alcohol withdrawal
treatment and developing specially equipped facilities. (Harris Co. Jail, Texas)

15.1

1976
U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
ATI'ORNEY-CLIENT
AREA

U.S. District Court
KITCHEN
ATI'ORNEY-CLIENT
AREA

Mitchell v. Untreiner. 421 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). No pretrial detainee may be
housed in the same cell with a convicted person. Facilities-for confidential attorney
client conferences must be established. Restrictions on visiting contribute to-denial of
effective assistance of counsel, ability to assist in preparation of a defense and t.o
secure witnesses. (Escambia County Jail, Pensacola, Florida)
Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). Deterioration of kitchen area
con.tributes t.o finding of unconstitutionality. Use of public hallway for attorney-client
consultation contributes to finding of unconstitutionality. Private facilities must be
provided. (Douglas County Jail, Nebraska)
1977

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY

Anderson v. Redman, 429 F.Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977). Overcrowding is found t.o have
caused a breakdown in prison classification system. Pretrial detainees are exempted
from population limit based on "classification capacity" because detainees are not
classified. However, design capacity is never t.o be exceeded. (Delaware Correctional
Center)
.

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL EXAM

Vest v. Lubbock County. 444 F.Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Sick call is to be held by
a physician at least twice a week. Examination facilities are to be provided. (Lubbock
County Jail, Texas)
1978

U.S. District Court
CEIL CAPACITY

Burks v. Walsh, 461 F.Supp. 454 (W.D. Missouri, 1978). Actions were brought seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of inmates at the Missouri State
Penitentiary. Aft.er a trial limited t.o the issues of overcrowding and unsanitary
conditions, the district court held that: (1) triple celling inmates in 59.2-square-foot cells in
the diagnostic center, in 65-square-foot cells in the administrative segregation unit, and in
66-square-foot cells in the adjustment unit, as well as double celling of inmates in 47.18square-foot cells in the special treatment unit, constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment, but (2) except in such instances, the conditions in
the aggregate which presently existed at the State Penitentiary did not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause of the eighth amendment.
In examining conditions of state penitentiary, the court's inquiry had to be limited to
determining whether conditions at the penitentiary caused inmates to suffer deprivations
of constitutional dimensions. In determining whether conditions at the state penitentiary
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, the district court had t.o be cautious not to
place undue emphasis upon "design capacities" and minimum square footage mandates of
other courts, nor were rn.immum square footage standards of various professional
associations dispositive. Furthermore, in applying the "totality of circumstances" approach
to Missouri Penitentiary conditions, the relaxed amicable atmosphere generated by the
prison administration had to tip scales in favor of the state in areas of doubtful
constitutionality. In the aggregate, and with certain exceptions regarding overcrowding in
certain units, all conditions presently existing at Missouri State Penitentiary, including
but not limited to conditions and qualities of individual cells, showers, toilets, dining halls,
kitchen, windows, temperature, noise level, canteen, recreational areas, laundry service,
ventilation. systems, visiting room, pest control program, prison industries and other
activities, are not intolerable in light of the modern conscience, or shocking to the
conscience of the court, and thus do not violate cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment. The Missouri State Penitentiary is overcrowded but, because it
has so much acreage within the walls, because of the many and varied activities available
to inmates, and because of the relative freedom enjoyed by inmates to utilize recreational
areas and the many activities available to them, the penitentiary, viewed as a whole, is
not now so overcrowded as to be intolerable, inhumane, totally unreasonable in light of
the modern conscience. or shocking to the conscience of the court. Double celling of
penitentiary inmates in 65-square-foot cells in adrnini~ative segregation unit was not
intolerable, inhumane, totally unreasonable or shocking to the court's conscience where
common areas of UDit were very clean and sanitary, individual cells were reasonably clean
and sanitary, and the unit was utilized t.o punish those inmates who committed serious
offenses while conf'med in penitentiary. Double celling of state penitentiary inmates in
diagnostic unit cells measuring 59.2 square feet for period of one to five weeks did n.ot
violate the eighth amendment, in spite of the fact that inmates were confined t.o their cells
for greater portion of day than were inmates in general population, where they could leave
their cells three times daily for meals, once a week to go to can.teen, once a week to go to
movies, and once a week for two hours of gym and where, in addition, much of their time
was occupied by meetings with caseworkers, taking a battery of tests and physical
examinations. (Missouri State Penitentiary)

15.2

U.S. District Court
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY
CEILS
DORMITORY.
MEDICAL AREAS

M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F.Supp. 398 (D. Mass. 1978). In a civil
rights action brought to challenge conditions of confinement at a state correctional
institution, the district court held that: (1) plaintiff prisoners sustained the burden of
proving that incarceration of inmates in protective custody cells, in awaiting action cells
and in institutional holding cells violated eighth amendment standards, but (2)
plaintiffs failed to sustain their burden of proving that double celling in one area and
use of a hospital wardroom for a dormitory violated eighth amendment standards.
Injunctive relief was granted in part.
An eighth amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment is flexible,
drawing its meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
maturing society, and penal measures are to be evaluated against broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency. An equal protection
challenge to a policy under which inmates undergoing classification and placement at
state institutions were single-celled in contrast to double celling during classification at
one institution involved neither suspect classification nor fundamental interest, and a
heavy burden rested with plaintiff prisoners to demonstrate that no rational justification
existed for separate classification programs.
Nothing in the constitution requires prison officials to treat all inmate groups alike
where differentiation may avoid institutional disruption or violence. Actions of prison
officials in separating newly admitted inmates and protective custody prisoners from the
general prison population are subject to a basic due process requirement that such
distinctions be rational rather than arbitrary or capricious, but, on record, that method of
classifying inmates within this particular institution was not shown to be arbitrary or
capricious.
Prisoners failed to sustain burden of proof that dormitory use of a hospital wardroom
violated constitutional rights of inmates who slept therein and failed to show that use of
the wardroom infringed on constitutional rights of inmates to adequate medical care.
(M.C.I. Concord, Mass)
1979

U.S. Supreme Court
DOUBLE CELLING
CEIL CAPACITY

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). Pretrial detainees confined in the Metropolitan
Correction Center (MCC) in New York City challenged virtually every facet of the
institution's conditions and practices in a writ of habeas corpus, alleging such
conditions and practices violate their constitutional rights.
MCC is a federally operated, short-term detention facility constructed in 1975. Eightyfive percent of all inmates are released within sixty days of admission. MCC was intended
to include the most advanced and innovative features of modern design in detention
facilities. The key design element of the facility is the "modular" or "unit" concept,
whereby each floor housing inmates has one or two self-contained residential units, as
opposed to the traditional cellblock jail construction. Within four months of the opening of
the twelve-story, 450 inmate capacity facility, this action was initiated.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of N.Y. enjoined no less than twenty
practices at the MCC on constitutional and statutory grounds, many of which were not
appealed. See, United State Ex Rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y.). The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court decision, See, Wolfish v. Levi.
573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), and reasserted the "compelling-necessity" test as the standard
for determining limitations on a detainee's freedom.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to consider the important constitutional
questions raised by [recent prison decisions] and to resolve an apparent conflict among the
circuits." 441 U.S. at 524: Do the publisher-only rule, the prohibition on receiving
packages from outside sources, the search of living quarters, and the visual inspection of
body cavities aft.er contact visits constitute punishment in violation of the rights of pretrial
detainees under the due process clause of the fifth amendment?
HELD: "Nor do we think that the four MCC security restrictions and
practices... constitute 'punishment' in violation of the rights of pretrial detainees under the
due process clause of the f:afth amendment.• 441 U.S. at 560, 561.
REASONING:
a. [T]he determination whether these restrictions and practices
constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose and whether they appear excessive in relation to that
purpose. 441 U.S. at 561.
b. Ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible
nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees,
convicted inmates, or both..• [W]e think that these particular
restrictions and practices were reasonable responses by MCC officials
to legitimate security concerns. [Detainees] simply have not met their
heavy burden of showing that these officials have exaggerated their ·
response to the genuine security considerations that activated these
restrictions and practices. 441 U.S. at 561,662.

15.3

CLOSING COMMENTS OF MAJORITY OPINION: "[T]he inquiry of federal courts
into prison management must be limited to the issue of whether a particular syst.em
violates any prohibition of the constitution, or in the case of a federal prison, a statute.
The wide range of 'judgment calls' that meet constitutional and statutory requirements are
conf"med to officials outside of the judicial branch of government." 441 U.S. at 562.
GENERAL NOTES: The Court saw this case, a challenge to virtually every aspect of
the operation of a state of the art detention facility, as an opportunity to clarify the
judiciary's role in the operation of prisons. The five-four decision indicates there was no
general consensus as to what that role is, 2!'. how it should be applied. No less than three
possible standards of review are contained in the majority and dissenting opinions: 1) A
"rational basis", subjective test; 2) A balancing of interests test; 8) An objective standard of
review.
Despite J. Rehnquist's statement that "our analysis does not turn on the particulars of
the MCC concept or design," the majority's reasoning frequently looks to that concept or
design for justification of its positions. 441 U.S. at 525. Clearly, the "double-bunking"
holding should be interpreted as applicable only to facilities where:
a) Inmates are locked in their cells a maximum of eight hours a day and have
access to a wide range of activities and programs; and
b) No inmate is detained longer than sixty days.
Situations other than these likely will not fall within the strict holding on this issue.
(Metropolitan Correction Center (MCC), New York)
U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
DORMITORIES

Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F.Supp. 14 (D. P.R. 1979). The institution is found to be
overcrowded. The court orders that the housing shall immediately provide at least
thirty-five square feet of space per inmate and that eventually, standards of seventy
square feet per inmate in cell and fifty-five square feet per inmate in dormitories be
implemented. (Correctional System, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION

Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 27 (1980). In
this opinio:11, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed Mississippi District Court
Judge William Cox1s ruling on what the Fifth Circuit termed a "challenge to nearly every
conceivable facet of the Jackson County Jail at Pascagoula, Mississippi."
The court first noted that the conditions at the Jackson County Jail were not
"uncivilized" or "barbaric and inhumane", as the court had found rulings on the conditions
of other jails.
·
A peculiar aspect of this case was that convicted felons were being held in the jail
while the state penitentiary was being brought up to constitutional standards.
Consequently, there were convicted felons, convicted misdemeanants and pretrial
detainees in the jail. Accordingly, the court, in reviewing the conditions at the jail,
applied different standards depending on whether the inmate was a pretrial detainee or a
convicted felon or misdemeanant.
The court then reviewed the history of corrections in the State of Mississippi and
specifically in Jackson County. It noted that Jackson County officials had spent a
considerable amount of money and instituted several new programs in the last ten years.
In addition, at the time of this opinion, the county was in the process .of erecting a new
jail. After noting these facts, the court made rulings in the following areas.
DISCRIMINATION. The appellate court upheld the lower court's ruling that the cells
at the Jackson County Jail were not segregated. Two bull pens at the jail, however, were
ruled to be unconstitutionally segregated. In response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, the
jail officials had produced documents showing that the large bull pen was "white" and the
small bull pen with "colored.". The jail officials argued that they were not responsible for
the segregation because each new inmate was given the freedom to choose which bullpen
he wished to occupy. The court held that this was not enough, stating: "In the inherently
coercive setting of a jail, it is evident to us that the withdrawal of decision making by the
public officials for only part of the jail (here, the bull pens), amounts to impermissible
racial segregation of prisoners.
OVERCROWDING. Although there had been a serious overcrowding problem at the
jail, the construction of the new jail eliminated any further problem. The court ruled,
however, that overcrowding at the old jail was prohibited.
·
CLASSIFICATION. The court noted that the Constitution does not require that a
classification plan be put into effect, although a court may order such a plan to protect
inmates from homosexual attacks, violence and contagious diseases. The court ruled that
the policies in existence under the Mississippi Code were adequate to protect the inmate.
SANITATION. At the Jackson County Jail, the prisoners were responsible for
cleaning their own cells, and a trusty was to assume responsibility for cleaning the cells
when the inmate was unable to unwilling to clean after himself, There was no evidence of
rodents in the jail. The jail was sprayed for insects once a month tn rniuirniz~ the .
cockroach problem. Sheets and other bedding as well as clothes were cleaned regularly.
Under ~ circumstances, the court found no constitutional violations regarding the
sanitation of the Jackson County Jail. (Jackson County Jail, Pascagoula, Mississippi)

15.4

1980
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY

Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980). The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit ruled that the county jail shall provide 130-154 square feet of space
for four inmates detained more than sixteen hours per day. The same space must be
available where three are held, if they are detained more than one week. (Sebastian
County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F.Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980). The court suggests a five part test
to determine whether overcrowding is unconstitutional:
1. The duration of prison confinement;
2. The degree to which the population exceeds the institution's design
capacity;
3. The size of the living quarters and the number of hours that an inmate
must spend therein;
4. The effects of the increased population on the prisoner's mental and
physical health;
5. The relative permanency of the overcrowding.
The court finds the institution to be overcrowded and accepts the defendants' plan to
relieve the overcrowding without necessarily endorsing any portion of it. (Oregon Stat.e
Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY
NOISE
LIGHTS
VENTILATION
WINDOWS

Huu:binp v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Class action is brought
challenging the constitutionality of numerous conditions and practices at the county
jail. The district court held that: (1) prison authorities' failure to immediately evacuat.e
inmates from any sewage contaminated cell, pending thorough cleaning of cell, violated
constitutional rights of inmates subject to that condition; (2) deficiencies in jail,
including lack of fire escape, absence of windows, lack of necessary fire doors, and
limited number of fire extinguishers amounted to constitutionally intolerable conditions.
Prison conditions for an unconvicted person are to be judged against due process
standards of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and conditions within the penal
institution which are unconstitutional for the convicted person under eighth amendment
review are likewise an abridgment of due process guarantees afforded unconvicted
persons.
The claim that financial restrictions have prevented improvements in jail conditions is
not a defense to constitutional violations.
Although lights were left on all night in the county jail, and there was a high noise
level at night, such were not per se unconstitutional conditions, since inmates could sleep
during the day, and there was no indication that inmates had developed psychological or
physiological problems.
An entirely inadequate ventilation syst.em at the county jail constituted a
constitutionally intolerable living condition.
Deficiencies in the county jail, including lack of fire escapes, absence of windows,.lack
of necessary fire doors, and limited number of fire extinguishers amounted to
constitutionally intolerable conditions. (Clay County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
PLUMBING

Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F.Supp. 504 (S.D. lli. 1980). All cells are to have a working
toilet and sink with hot and cold water. (Menard Correctional Center, Menard, lliinois)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
RELIGIOUS AREAS
RECREATION AREAS
EDUCATION AREAS
VISITATION AREAS

West v. Lamb. 497 F.Supp. 989 (D. Nev. 1980). The lat.est round of litigation
concerning conditions at the Las Vegas Central Detention Facility and Annex has
resulted in a court ordered reduction in the prisoner population. The United Stat.es
District Court for Nevada began hearing complaints about conditions at these facilities
after a class action suit was f"tled in August, 1977. In a series of inquiries since that
time, the court has heard from experts in the field of det.entions and corrections.
These experts inspected the jails and reported that brutal, depraved, cruel. uncivilized and
inhuman treatment of the inmates was occurring. The experts found severe overcrowding,
racial segregation, poor morals among correction officers and inmates alike, regularly
occurring homosexual attacks, inadequate health care, unsanitary conditions, inadequate
food services, no recreational, religious, educational or exercise facilities and poor
visitation facilities.
After reviewing this information, the court stated that if there were any other
correctional facilities available in southern Nevada it would close down the subject jails.
The court found the jails unfit for human habitation and deemed it doubtful that they
could be made fit without gutting and rebuilding. The court stated that a delicate balance
must be maintained between public safety and the confining of inmates in as humane
conditions as possible. It held that public safety must always come f"ll'St and that the lives
and safety of inmates are secondary. The court then ordered that the inmate population
be reduced from 500 to 178 and that jail officials attain this goal within 180 days. The
court then cautioned state judges not to enlarge the population by ordering prisoners to be
housed in the jail after the limit had been reached. (Las Vegas Central Detention Facility
and Annex, Nevada)

15.5

1981

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
CELLS

Heitman v. Gabriel. 524 F.Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1981). Plumbing conditions are cited.
In this case against the Buchanan County Jail, the United Stat.es District Court
ordered that no inm.at.e is to be assigned t.o a cell used as a communal t.oilet, and
ordered the jail's plumbing to be cleaned and repaired. The court also found that the jail
was overcrowded considering all of the conditions, particularly the plumbing and the lack
of out-of-cellblock exercise. (Buchanan County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Hendrix v. Faulkner. 525 F.Supp. 435 (N.D. Ind. 1981), cert. denied. 104 S.Ct. 3587
(1983), aff'd, 715 F.2d 269. The conditions of overcrowding at the Indiana Stat.e Prison
constitute a violation of the eighth amendment in light of the physical plant and limits on
staffing. Therefore, prison officials were required t.o take immediate action t.o ameliorate
the conditions. Contributing to the limited time out of the cell is a sheer number of
in.mat.es. There was testimony that some inmates had not had outside recreation in five
months. However, other conditions at the prison did not rise t.o the level of constitutional
violations. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
CROWDING

Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 {5th Cir. 198l)(en bane). Where the conditions of the
institution have improved but there is nothing in the record which would suggest any
basis for an assurance that the conditions would not change, injunctive relief is
warranted. An injunction prohibiting racial segregation, overcrowding and discipline,
except in accordance with the newly prescribed rules, was entered. (Jackson County Jail,
Pascagoula, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CEIL CAPACITY
DORMITORY
DAYROOM

Lareau v. Manson. 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981). Adopting most of the findings of the
district court. the United Stat.es of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered major
reforms in the Hartford Community Correctional Cent.er (HCCC). dealing generally with
overcrowding. The constitutional standard for the legality of conditions of confinement
is different for pretrial detainees and for convicted mm.at.es. For pretrial detainees, the
t.est is whether the conditions amount t.o punishment without due process in violation of
the fourteenth amendment. With respect t.o convicted inmates, the criterion is whether
the punishment is cruel and unusual as defined under the eighth amendment. Reviewing
the numerous findings of the district court. the appellate court looked t.o the supreme
court case of Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520. Viewing overcrowding at the HCCC as related
to pretrial detainees, the court cited the following standard of whether such conditions
amount to punishment: "It must be shown that the overcrowding subjects a detainee over
an extended period t.o genuine privation and hardship not reasonably related t.o a
legitimate governmental objective." Based upon this standard the court found that doublebunking in cells originally designed for one person, compounded by overcrowded
dayrooms, imposed unconstitutional punishment on pretrial detainees in all cases except
where such hardship was related t.o a legitimate governmental purpose. The court here
found that these hardships promoted neither security nor the effective management of the
institution. Other conditions were even less acceptable. The use of glass enclosed
dayroom (dubbed the "fish tank") as a dormit.ory room housing numerous inmates on a full
time basis was held t.o amount t.o punishment and was thus unconstitutional with regard
t.o pretrial detainees. In addition, the placing of mattresses on the floors of cells t.o
accommodate more inmates and the assignment of healthy inmates t.o medical cells
(sometimes with mentally or physically ill cellmat.es) t.o alleviate overcrowding were held
t.o constitut.e impermissible punishment. The court further stated that the length of
incarceration of pretrial detainees becomes relevant in such determination: "Conditions
unacceptable for week or months might be t.olerable for a few days.• As such, the court
indicated that while double-bunking and overloaded dayrooms might be t.olerable, and
thus constitutionally permissible for a few days, after 15 or so days, they would become
unacceptable punishment. The use of the "fish tank" and floor mattresses, however, were
held t.o constitute punishment regardless of the number of days imposed. Viewing the
conditions as they related to convicted persons, the court pointed out that is was t.o be
guided by a wholly different standard. Here, in order t.o constitute a constitutional
violation, the conditions had t.o be such as t.o amount t.o cruel and unusual puni•hment.
Nevertheless, the court found the overcrowded conditions int.olerable. Noting that the
thirty t.o thirty-five square feet of living space per inmat.e fell far short of the standards
promulgated by groups such as the Connecticut Department of Corrections, the American
Correctional Association, the Unit.ed Nations and the National Sheriffs' Association, and
further noting that the dayroom at the HCCC offered the "relief of a noisy subway
platform" the court held that double-bunking, with respect t.o convicted inmates, was
unconstitutional except where mm.at.es are conf'med no more than about thirty days. As
with the pretrial detainees, the court found that the constitutional rights of the convicted
mm.at.es werf" jmme,liat.ely violated by conf'mement in the "fish tank" and by policies
requiring them t.o sleep on mattresses on the floors and t.o be assigned t.o medical holding
cells for no. reason other than t.o alleviate overcrowding.

15.6

Finally, the court ordered that all newly admitted inmates, with minor exceptions, be
given a medical examination within forty-eight hours of admission. (Hartford Community
Correctional Cent.er, Connecticut)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELLS

Lock v. Jenkins. 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit ruled that having pretrial detainees confined t.o twenty-seven square
foot cells for twenty-two hours a day at the Indiana State Prison constitutes illegal
"punishment" under Bell v. Wolfish. In Wolfish, the Supreme Court found no due process
violations in holding two pretrial detainees in a cell measuring seventy-five square feet.
The Court pointed out that inmates were required t.o be in their cells only seven t.o eight
hours a day and that of the pretrial detainees at the Metropolitan Correctional Cent.er, the
facility sued in Wolfish, more than half were released within ten days, three-quart.ers
within a month, and more than eighty-five percent within sixty days. Therefore, the
Seventh Circuit cited Wolfish because of the amount of time spent by pretrial detainees at
the Indiana institution, an average of about sixty days. The Circuit Court stated:
It seems t.o us that a minimum requirement as t.o cell area should be imposed and
this minimum should be determined flexibly in relation t.o the amount of time
individuals are t.o be kept in the cell...Except where individual circumstances show
the need for more restrictive confinement, (detainees) should be allowed t.o spend
significant periods of each day out of their cells and some activities or programs
should be regularly available t.o them in their time out of cells...
We do not read anything in Wolfish as requiring this court t.o grant aut.omatic
deference t.o ritual incantations by prison officials that their actions foster the goals of
order and discipline. Under the facts before us, we find that the (detainees) in this action
have been denied equal protection of the laws by being held under significantly more
burdensome conditions than convicted prisoners in the absence of any justification of such
treatment of each individual. (Indiana Stat.e Prison, Michigan City. Indiana)

U.S. Supreme Court
CELL CAPACITY
SAFETY
GENERAL
CONDITIONS

Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). In a remarkable 8 t.o 1 decision, the
Supreme Court upheld double celling at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility at
Lucasville. The maximum security facility was built in the early 1970's with
gymnasiums, workshops, school rooms, day room, two chapels, a hospital ward, a
cc>rnrnissary, a barber shop and a library. The physical plant itself is a t.opfl.ight first
class facility. Each cell is sixty-three square feet in area and contains a bed or bunk bed
measuring thirty-six by eighty inches, a cabinet nightstand, a wall-mount.ed sink with hot
and cold wat.er, a flushable t.oilet and a built-in radio. One wall of each cell is barred.
Day rooms are open from 6:30 a.m. until 9:30 p.m., and inmates may pass between these
rooms and their cells for a ten minute period each hour. At the time t.o the trial, the
facility housed 2,300 inmates, two-thirds of whom were serving life or long-term sentences.
Some 1,400 men were double celled. Despite the favorable nature of the plant's design,
the district court found that double celling constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
The Supreme Court reversed, noting: "No static test can exist by which courts determine
whether conditions are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society." Applying those principles t.o this institution, the court found that the evidence
did not support a conclusion that the eighth amendment was violated. The majority said:
The double celling made necessary by the unanticipated increase in prison
population did not lead t.o deprivations of essential food, medical care or
sanitation. Nor did it increase violence among inmates or create other conditions
int.olerable for prison confinement. Although job and educational opportunities
dirninished marginally as a result of double celling, limit.ed work hours and delay
before receiving education do not inflict pain, much less unnecessary and want.on
pain. Deprivations of this kind simply are not punishment.
The Court continued, "We would have t.o wrench the eighth amendment from its
language and history t.o hold that delay of these desirable aids t.o rehabilitation violates
the Constitution." Three justices, Brennen, Blackmun and Stevens, authored a concurring
opinion. It attempted t.o list some of the things which would determine whether a facility
has such poor conditions as t.o violate the eighth amendment. Those conditions are:
- Physical plant conditions: lighting, heat, plumbing. ventilation, living
space, noise levels, and recreation space.
- Sanitation: control of vermin and insect.s, food preparation, medical
facilities, lavat.ories and showers, clean places for eating. sleeping and
working.
·

15.7

- Safety: prot.ection from violent, deranged or diseased inmat.es, fire
prot.ection and emergency evacuation.
• Staffing: trained and adequate guards and other staff, and avoidance of
placing inmates in positions of authority over other inmates.
This majority of justices cautioned that sixty-three square feet of cell space is not
enough for two men. Such conditions, they noted, are a clear signal to legislative officials
that additional facilities must be constructed or inmate populations reduced by other
means. The justices did state, however, that cramped facilities are not unconstitutional
per se.
NOTE: This decision dealt with long-term convicted inmates, not short-term persons
in county and city jails. In some circumstances, pretrial detainees who are still presumed
innocent until convicted have greater rights, such as access to lawyers and courts. On the
other hand, because of the short periods of confinement, a jail facility does not need as
elaborate areas for recreation, libraries, exercise and other services, as required for the
longer term population of prisons. (Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Lucasville)
U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
ANTIQUATED
FACILITY

Smith v. Fairman. 528 F.Supp. 186 (C.D. Ill. 1981), rev'd, 690 F.2d 122 (7th Cir. 1982)
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2125 (1983). Officials at the Pontiac, Illinois State Penitentiary
had been ordered by a federal district court to end the practice of placing two inmat.es
in a cell designed many years ago to house only one person. The order came as a
result of an action filed by numerous former inmates and one current inmate of the
institution, seeking to challenge the prison's policy of punishing inmates who refused to
accept a cell with another inmate.
The district court heard a great deal of evidence on the issue of double celling at
Pontiac. A number of prisoners also testified, describing the problems resulting from the
double celling, such as attacks by other cell mates, loss of property, and difficulty in
practicing their religion. The court made a lengthy comparison between the conditions at
Pontiac and those in Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). The court indicated that
in Rhodes, a case in which double celling was approved, the conditions were markedly
different. The facility in Rhodes was new, relatively quiet and modern, and the inmat.es
were permitted to be out of their cells on a regular basis. In this case, the prison was old
and noisy, and the cells were small. Furthermore, a number of the inmates were required
to spend practically all of their waking hours in their cells.
The District Court noted that Rhodes made clear the point that prisoners need not be
free of discomfort. However, the court said, ndeplorable and sordid conditions cannot be
tolerated. n The court noted that the conditions were so bad at Pontiac that even the
prison's own medical director testified that the punishment meted out·to prisoners was
cruel and unusual. Summing 'lP, the court said: n...the inescapable conclusion is that the
Pontiac Correctional Center is overcrowded, antiquated and has inadequate facilities to
provide significant and constructive correctional programs to the inmates."
The court then ordered submission of a detailed plan calling for the eventual end of
the double celling practices at Pontiac. On appeal, the double celling was allowed. (State
Penitentiary, Pontiac, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
DAYROOM
CROWDING

Vazguez v. Gray, 523 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). Court outlines a response to
overcrowding. The United States District Court found the Westchester County Jail
overcrowded and determined that the proper method of determining a remedy was to
examine the causes of the overcrowding. The court considered and rejected orders
which reduce bail or set a population limit for the institution. Instead, it ordered:
1) that no mattresses be placed on the floor for sleeping,
2) that no more than two persons be confined in a cell,
3) that the use of day rooms for housing for more than five days be
prohibited, and that the court be advised where individuals are kept
in such housing for more than forty-eight hours.
The court approved using dormitories as long as the use complied with state
regulations and as long as the use of the dormitories did not deviate from the plan which
they provided to the court. The court refused to enter a comprehensive order regarding
the general conditions of the institution until the provisions of the initial order had time
to be implemented. (West.chester County Jail, New York)
1982

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY

Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F.Supp. 562 (D.C. D.C. 1982). Double celling of pretrial
detainees is allowed but additional guards are ordered to be placed in each cellblock in
which double-celling occurs. No pretrial detainee is to be confmed in the company of
another inmate in his cell for more than twelve hours per day. No pretrial detainee is to
be double-celled for more than thirty days. (D.C. Jail)

15.8

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY

Glynn v. Auger, 678 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1982). Double-celling is not cruel and unusual
punishment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the double-celling of an
Iowa Men's Reformatory (IMR) prisoner did not violate the ex post fact.o clause. The court
also found that the policy did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
After reaching the highest level of a prison incentive program, the prisoner was
housed in a single cell in a remodeled housing unit of the prison. Due to an increase in
the number of inmates, officials began double-celling a portion of the building. When the
plaintiff objected to this procedure, he was given the choices of being double-celled, being
single-celled in a smaller cell with no loss of privileges or being placed in a lower level cell
with reduced privileges.
The inmate brought suit contending that the double-celling was an ex post fact.o
increase in his punishment. The district court disagreed, also finding that the action was
not a punishment. The inmate then appealed.
The Circuit Court agreed with the lower court, stating: 'The constitutional prohibition
against ex post fact.o law was designed to secure substantial personal rights against
arbitrary and oppressive legislative action, and not to obstruct mere alteration in
conditions deemed necessary for the orderly infliction of humane punishment." Malloy v.
South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 35 S.Ct. 507 (1915).
The appeals court also found that the double-celling did not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. (Iowa Men's Reformatory)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

Gross v. Tazewell County Jail, 533 F.Supp. 413 (W.D. Vir. 1982). The prison inmates'
constitutional rights are violated as a result of overcrowding in a county jail. When
injunctive relief was necessary to arrest the violations of constitutional rights, good faith
on the part of the prison officials was no defense. The fact that state law prohibited or
failed to authorize a part to alleviate a wrong did not excuse a continuing violation of
fundamental guarantees. The U.S. District Court for the western district of Virginia
entered an injunction against crowding in the Tazewell County Jail, finding signjficant
differences between jails and prisons relative to overcrowding.
Responding to claims by officials that the transfer of the jail inmates would only result
in overcrowding elsewhere, the court answered:
It is simply not appropriate to lump all inmates into an abstract category and
assert that overcrowding exists everywhere...A comparison of inmates versus
available beds is not the true index of unconstitutional overcrowding. The
manifestations of such overcrowding in daily life must be considered. Hite v.
Leeke. 564 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1976). It is abundantly clear that extreme
overcrowding in a local jail is of greater practical effect and constitutional
consequence than in a larger institution or a common road camp. Simply stated,
all overcrowding is not equal. Perhaps more importantly, the local jail houses a
high percentage of pretrial detainees...As a matter of common sense and
fundamental fairness, the criminal. justice system must ensure that pretrial
detainees are not housed in more deprived circumstances than those accorded to
convicted persons. Without doubt, the oppressive conditions of the instant case do
not withstand the stricter degree of scrutiny which must necessarily be applied in
situations involving pretrial detainees. Overcrowding in a local jail cannot be
quantitatively equated with overcrowding in a state penal institu~ewell County
Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court

Grubbs v. Bradley. 552 F.Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). Conditions at several
institutions are cited. Prisoners in the Tennessee correctional system brought action
against the state challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement in
several of Tennessee's adult penal institutions.
The United States District Court held that certain conditions of confinement and
practices amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, including: double-celling of inmates
in certain units of the state penitentiary and the Nashville Regional Correctional Center;
conf'mement of any inmate for more than one week in a cell not equipped with hot water;
conf'mement in Block D of the Brushy Mountain Prison and the Main Building at the
Nashville Center; the failure to maintain minimum sanitary conditions in food storage,
preparation and service areas at certain facilities; the failure to protect inmates at several
facilities; the failure to provide mjnima)]y adequate medical care for prisoners; the
conf'mement of inmates in segregation status for more than one week without any
opportunity for exercise at the prison for women. A federal master was ordered and
master plans were required. (Tennessee Correctional System)

C:EILS
PLUMBING
KITCHEN
DINING

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY

Miller v. Carson. 550 F.Supp. 543 (M.D. Fla. 1982). Defendants are found in contempt
for exceeding population limit. The court found the defendants individually and in
their official capacity for exceeding the capacity of the jail which was set in a permanent
injunction. A fine of $10,000 was imposed and fmes in excess of $5,000 per day were
authorized in the event of further violations. (Duval County Jail, Florida)

15.9

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY

Mobile Co. Jail Inmat.es v. Purvis, 551 F.Supp, 92 (S.D. Ala. 1982), aff'd, 703 F.2d 580
(11th Cir. 1973). Defendants are found in cont.empt for failing to reduce population.
The court found the defendants in cont.empt for failing to reduce population. The court
found the defendants in cont.empt for failing to comply with the requirements of a court
order by reducing the population of the Mobile County Jail and established a daily fine of
$5,000 for each day the defendants are out of compliance with the order. (Mobile County
Jail, Alabama)
1983

Stat.e Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY

Bowen v. Stat.e Com'n of Correction, 461 N.Y.S.2d 668 (App. 1983). Double bunking is
not prohibited. A New York court has det.ermined that double bunking in jails is not
per se prohibited, but rather the t.est to be applied was the actual conditions in the cont.ext
of the eighth amendment. Double bunking is not permitted if it would be cruel and
unusual, would involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or would be totally
without penological inspection. The court also indicat.ed that consideration should be

given to whether double bunking would cause deprivation of essential food, medical care,
or sanitation, and whether it would lead to an increase in inmat.e violence or creat.e other
conditions intolerable for prison confinement. (Saratoga County Jail, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
WINDOWS

Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1984),
Pretrial detainees class action suit brings changes. A class action suit was filed
against the Los Angeles County central jail by pretrial detainees. The federal district
court ordered twelve changes after a trial. Three of the changes were appealed by county
officials.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that: low risk detainees were to be
allowed one contact visit per week; detainees would be allowed to be present during
searches of their cells; and the replacement of transparent windows by concret.e enclosures
was justified, Subsequently the United States Supreme Court reversed on the first two
issues. (Los Angeles County Central Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CELL CAPACITY

Union County Jail Inmat.es v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
1600 (1983). Overcrowded conditions are found unconstitutional. Litigation challenging
severe overcrowding at the Union County Jail in New Jersey resulted in a finding by a
federal district court and its special master that the overcrowded conditions at the jail
were unconstitutional. The most serious concern of the court was placement of inmat.es on
mattresses on the floor of one man cells. Rejecting the stat.e corrections commissioner's
request to resolve the problem by double bunking, the district judge ordered the convicted
inmat.es removed from the jail and into the stat.e prison system to which they had been
sent.enced (537 F.Supp. 1009).
In reversing the district court's prohibition against double bunking, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that under the "totality of the circumstances," the double bunking
proposal would satisfy the constitutional prohibitions against the punishment of pretrial
detainees and against cruel and unusual punishment of sentenced prisoners.
In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on Bell v. Wolf'1Sh, 441 U.S. 520
(1979), in which the Supreme Court held that while detainees may not be punished, there
is no punishment where confinement conditions serve legitimat.e nonpunitive purposes and
are not excessive in relation to those purposes. In addition, the court must inquire as to
whether the conditions cause inmat.es to endure "genuine privations and hardship over an
extended period of time. n
Both courts concluded that overcrowding served two legitimat.e purposes: effective
management of a det.ention facility during a stat.ewide prison overcrowding emergency and
the int.erests of stat.e and local government in not releasing inmat.es into the streets.
However, the circuit disagreed with the lower court's f'mding that conditions would still
violat.e the due process rights of detainees because of sheer lack of space and because the
totality of conditions would in any event be unconstitutional.
According to the appeals court, double bunking would resolve the "totality" issue by
providing aclequat.e space for sleeping and would allow for reclaiming large recreation
areas, permitting each inmat.e one hour of exercise each day in the larger space. The
circuit claimed that this recreation period would offset the "cramped and overcrowded
conditions" of the remaining fifteen waking hours, during which square footage per
inmat.e varies from thirty-one to thirty-three and one half square feet. The circuit court
was further persuaded that such conditions were not unconstitutional because they were
convinced that the majority of detainees are confined for no more than sixty days, an
assertion disputed by some local parties. (Union County Jail, New Jersey)
1984:

J.S. Appeals Court
SECURITY
CROWDING

McElvenn v. Prince William County, 725 F.2d 954 (N.D. Vir. 1984), cert. denied. 105
S.Ct. 88. $210,000 is awarded to inmat.es held in jail. A federal jury awarded
$210,000 to approximat.ely 7,000 inmat.es held in the Prince William County (Virginia)

15.10

jail between August 1980 and January 1982. Two months before, the jury had found that
the facility was unconstitutionally crowded, exceeding at times its inmate capacity by 400
percent. Witnesses had t.estified that the facility lacked medical care and security and
was unsafe. Pretrial detainees are t.o receive $170,000 of the award, with the remaining
funds t.o be divided among the sentenced prisoners held at the jail.
Meanwhile, the county has filed its own case against Virginia state corrections
officials, claiming that a chronic backlog of prisoners awaiting transfer t.o state facilities
contributed t.o the jail crowding. The jury had rejected county claims during the class
action suit that state officials should accept or share liability, after U.S. District Judge
Richard L. Williams ruled that state employees are immune under the eleventh
amendment from civil damages in their role as officials. The court continued them in the
case as individuals, but instructed the jury that they were entitled t.o claim they had acted
in good faith. (Prince William County Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
CAPACITY

Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmat.es v. Lanzaro, 595 F.Supp. 1417 (D.
N.J. 1984). Federal court sets cap on New Jersey county jail population and orders
relief for prisoners. Aft.er an extensive review of the conditions at the Monmouth County
Jail, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey has concluded that both pretrial
and sent.enced inmat.es are being denied constitutional rights. The court placed a cap on
the population of the jail and ordered relief in the areas of physical conditions, bedding,
recreation, medical care, classification and visiting. (Monmouth County Correctional
Institution, New Jersey)

1985
State Supreme Court
FACILITY DESIGN

Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County. Mass.• 477 N.E.2d 361 (Mass 1985).
The attorney general filed a complaint seeking an order t.o compel the sheriff t.o accept
into his custody all pretrial detainees committed t.o him by courts of the Commonwealth.
The sheriff then brought action seeking injunctive and declarat.ory relief against the
mayor, city council and commissioner of corrections. The actions were consolidat.ed, and
the detainees and inmat.es were permitt.ed to intervene. A single justice ordered the
construction of a sevent.een story jail and report.ed the propriety of those orders. The
Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County held that: (1) mandamus was available t.o require
the city council to construct the jail; (2) the order requiring fulfillment of the city's
statutory obligation t.o provide a suitable jail did not violate the principle of separation of
powers; and (3) the orders did not violat.e the supremacy clause. (Suffolk County Jail.
Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY

Dohner v. McCarthy. 635 F.Supp. 408 (C.D. Cal. 1985). Inmates brought a class action
suit against the director of California Department of Corrections and the prison
superintendent to challenge the constitutionality of conditions of confinement, and some
inmat.es moved for certification of subclasses. The district court held that: (1) conditions
for certification of subclasses were not satisfied; (2) double-celling, overcrowding, medical
care, sanitation, food, clothing, and safety did not violate the eighth amendment; and (8)
no alleged liberty int.erest in medical and mental health treatment, entitlement t.o work
credits, or visitation rights was violated.
Cells housing two inmat.es, despite the design for one inmate which contained about
eleven and one-half square feet per person when the extra bed was lowered, which
required the inmat.es to crawl over beds t.o travel from one end of the cell t.o the other, but
which were adequat.ely cleaned and ventilated, which had windows, which had a desk and
storage area, and which had noise within t.olerable levels were not unfit for human
habitation, and, thus, the cell itself satisfied the requirements of prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.
The fact.ors relevant in assessing pain inflicted by a minimally sized cell for the
purposes of cruel and unusual punishment clause includes the following: characteristics
of prison population; prison staff's morale; amount of time the inmate has t.o spend in the
cell each day; opportunities available for activities outside the cell; and the ability of the
prison staff t.o be flexible and responsive t.o individual needs and problems created by
double-celling.
The amount of time that the inmates are able to spend away from the cells is a critical
fact.or in determining whether conditions of confinement involve want.on and unnecessary
infliction of pain in violation of the cruel and unusual :p11njshment clause. The
permanence of double-celling of inmates in cells designed for a single inmate is a fact.or t.o
be considered t.ogether with the size of the cells and the opportunities for inmates t.o leave
the cells during the normal routine of the prison life in determining whether doublecelling consti.tut.es cruel and unusual p11nishment. (California Men's Colony, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY

Duran v. Elrod. 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985). Appeals court modifies consent order allows double bunking of prisoners. In 1983 Cook County entered int.o a consent
agreement concerning crowding and conditions of confinement at the jail. The agreement
called for a halt t.o putting two prisoners in small (sixty-four square foot)

15.U

cells in the facility. Later, the County asked for a modification of the order due to rapid
growth in the jail population. The district court not only denied the request but placed a
cap on the number of prisoners which could be housed. As a result, the county was
ordered to release pretrial detainees in reverse order of the size of their bonds. The cap
was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (713 F.2d 292).
A study which was completed by the county showed that many of the released detainees
became fugitives or were rearrested for subsequent crimes. Based on the study, the
county again sought relief from the district court. The motion was again denied.
However, a majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the lower
court and allowed double occupancy of the cells.
The appeals court criticized the county for "foot-dragging" in its compliance efforts and
for destroying its credibility with the lower court. The majority noted, however, that
double bunking in sixty-four square foot cells is clearly constitutional. Denying the
motion, they argued, would punish the citizens of the county rather than the
governmental entity. The public interest in protection against the release of the accused
criminals outweighs the inmates' expectations under the original consent decree. (Cook
County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHT
VENTILATION
SAFETY

Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). Inmates brought an action
challenging conditions of confinement in a state prison system. On remand, 682 F.2d
1237, the United States District Court entered judgment finding conditions in violation
of the eighth amendment and ordered relief; the state appealed. The court of appeals
held that: (1) the change of administration, resulting in defendants named in the action
either leaving officer or changing positions, did not warrant reopening the record on
remand; (2) inadequate lighting, vermin infestation, substandard fire prevention, and
safety hazards in the prison violated minimum requirements of the eighth amendment;
and (3) the order for relief was overbroad in requiring provision of adequate food and
clothing where there were no findings of inadequate food and clothing.
Adequate lighting is one of the fundamental attributes of adequate shelter required by
the eighth amendment. The evidence that the lighting at the state prison was so poor
that it was inadequate for reading, caused eyestrain and fatigue and hindered attempts to
insure that basic sanitation was maintained supported the district court's conclusion that
the lighting violated the eighth amendment.
The plumbing at the state prison which was in such disrepair as to deprive inmates of
basic elements of hygiene and which seriously threatened inmates' physical and mental
well-being amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment.
Vermin infestation at the state prison, considered in light of unsanitary conditions
such as standing water, flooded toilets and sinks, and dank air, was unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the eighth amendment.
The prisoners have a right not to be subjected to an unreasonable threat of injury or
death by fire and need not wait until actual casualties occur in order to obtain relief from
such conditions. Substandard fire prevention at the state prison which endangered
inmates' lives violated the eighth amendment.
Lack of adequate ventilation and air flow which undermined the health of prison
inmates and the sanitation of the prison violated the minimum requirement of the eighth
amendment.
Persons involuntarily confined by the state have a constitutional right to safe
conditions of confinement. Safety hazards found throughout the state prison's
occupational areas, which were exacerbated by prison's inadequate lighting and which
seriously threatened the safety and security of the inmates, created unconstitutional
infliction of pain.
The failure to provide adequate cell cleaning supplies in light of overall squalor at the
state prison violated the eighth amendment. (State Penitentiary, Washington)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
PLUMBING
SANITATION
SAFETY
SECURITY

Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51 (D.C. Conn. 1985). The focus of this complaint was
overcrowding, particularly in the housing unit, which once consisted of open
dormitories. Pretrial detainees brought a class action suit primarily alleging that the
overcrowded dorms increased the spread of disease among them and were
psychologically harmful because of the stress, lack of control over their areas and lack
of privacy.
Most of the plaintiffs proof on the issue was based on comparisons between illness
rates in dormitories and other housing methods such as cubicles or single or double cells.
Testimony did show higher levels of complaints and a higher level of illness among
inmates housed in the open dorms. A doctor testified that the installation of cubicles
could correct many of these problems.
In fact, the defendants had corrected the situation by installing cubicles, rendering
much of the pretrial detainees' complaint moot. The cubicles mitigate the spread of
disease, as well as afford privacy, testified the doctor. He said that the decrease in stress
would likely improve both the physical and mental states of the inmates. Although there
was no testimony as to what effect the cubicles had on ventilation, the court found no
violation on the matter. The barriers were likely to decrease the effects

15.12

of smoking and body odor of other inmates. The inmates complained of drafts if windows
were left open and of stifling heat if left closed. The living units made up of cubicles were
not challenged by the inmates.
The court also found no constitutional violation in that the number of toilets and
showers did not conform to the standards set by the American Correctional Association
(ACA) and by the American Public Health Association (APHA). The ACA advised one
toilet and shower facility for every eight inmates, and the APHA advised one toilet for
every eight inmates and one shower for every fJfteen inmates. The defendants provided
one toilet for every ten to fifteen inmates, and one shower for every fourteen to twentyfour inmates, depending on the housing unit. These figures were nearly twice that
advised. Still, the court found no violation absent a showing that waiting in line led t.o
either physical or mental problems. Sanitary conditions were not challenged.
Although there were certain violations of the health code in the food service in that
maggots.and weevils were occasionally found, the court found no constitutional violation.
With regards to recreational opportunities, the inmates had enough forms of exercise and
equipment available regularly.
For security reasons and for the safety of a correctional officer, he is not permitted to
carry a key to the exterior doors in the housing units if he is working alone. The inmates
claim this and staff shortages would prevent them from evacuating in case of a fire. The
court found no violation, since the correctional officer does carry keys to exit doors that
empty into adjoining units. A door in the laundry room that was supposed to be one hour
fire resistant according to code, did not amount to a constitutional violation. Finally, the
court found no violation in the unannounced entry into the dorms by female correctional
officers, who occasionally see unclothed inmates. (Federal Correctional Institution at
Danbury, Connecticut)
1986

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CELL SIZE

Inmates of Occoquan v. Barr;y, 650 F.Supp. 619 (D.D.C. 1986). A class of inmates
confined at state medium security facilities brought a federal civil rights action seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for deprivation under color of state law of fifth and
eighth amendment rights. The district court held that overcrowding and systemically
deficient conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment justifying equitable relief.
Overcrowding and systemically deficient conditions at state medium security
institutions constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment justifying equitable relief of imposition of cap on a number of inmates at each
facility and requirement of periodic reports indicating what steps were being taken to
address deficiencies. The court ruled:
Accordingly, the Court will order that by June l, 1987, the population of Occoquan
I, II, and III shall not exceed a total of 1,281 inmates, with specific caps set for
each dormitory. This total is based on a formula providing each inmate a total of
95 square feet of floor space for sleeping and day room purposes. If defendants
provide all inmates with opportunities for work, vocational education or other
meaningful programs to eliminate enforced idleness among the inmates, the Court
will entertain a motion to modify the square footage formula to 85 square feet per
prisoner. In connection with the establishment of a population cap at Occoquan,
the Court will also order the defendants to provide the Court with a written report
by January 15, 1987, indicating precisely how they propose to comply with the
population cap.
The plaintiffs contend that an excessive inmate population, deficiencies in
environmental health and safety, food services, and mental health care, alone or in
combination, violate their rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.
The classification of inmates is essential for the prison security. One critical function
of classification is the efficient identification of violent, aggressive inmates and those in
need of psychiatric care, so that they can be separated from the rest of the population.
See, e.g., Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.Supp. 956 (D.R.!. 1977). The classification
system at Occoquan appears to be dangerously overtaxed by the crush of inmates in need
of classification.
Idleness among inmates results in a variety of problems, including heightened tension,
frustration, and violence. The lack of adequate programs can also have an adverse impact
on inmates' chances for parole. There was no disagreement among the expert penologists
that inmates should be engaged in some productive enterprise, properly supervised.
Nonetheless, enforced idleness presents a major problem at Occoquan.
The correctional officers do not supervise properly the sleeping areas of the
dormitories. Correctional officers do not make patrols on a frequent and regular basis, nor
are officers stationed in the rear of each dormitory so as to facilitate supervision of the
living area when inmates are present.
Medical services experts agreed that deficiencies in the medical care delivery system
at Occoquan exist which are likely to cause harm to the inmates. These deficiencies are
systemic in nature, c:oncerning staffing, facilities, and procedures. (Lorton Correctional
Complex, District of Columbia)
15.13

U.S. District Court

HYGIENE
PLUMBING
SANITATION

Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F.Supp. 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). Inmates of a county jail
brought a Section 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of conditions of
confinement. After resolution of some of the conditions complained of, and stipulation
as to others, the district court held that: (1) Prison conditions under which an average
inmate was confined twenty-four hours a day in a physically dilapidated, insect infected,
dimly lit, poorly ventilated area averaging under twenty square feet per inmate, without
any available recreation or diversion other than some reading or letter writing, sharing a
shower which might not have hot water with twelve to fourteen others, sharing a sink and
toilet with three or four others, and possibly sleeping on an unsanitary floor, or within
inches of a toilet, in clothing which may not have been recently washed, constituted cruel
and unusual punishment; (2) In order for the county jail to provide constitutionally
acceptable confinement, population at the main jail facility had to be reduced, regular outof-cell recreation had to be provided, visitation increased, and fire escape plans had to be
co=unicated to inmates and prominently displayed in corridors at all times. (Sullivan
County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION
CROWDING

Reece v. Gragg, 650 F.Supp. 1297 (10th Cir. 1986). A pretrial detainee representing a
class of all present and sentenced inmates held in the county jail brought action
seeking injunctive relief to require that operation of the jail under present conditions
cease. The district court held that: (1) the current operation and condition of the county
jail violated the due process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) due to
unconstitutional conditions at the jail, an injunction was warranted, but would be stayed
under conditions outlined by court.
To the extent that the county jail is unable to segregate pretrial detainees and
sentenced inmates, the higher standard applicable under the due process clause, rather
than the eighth amendment, must be met by the entire facility.
Jail overcrowding for the purpose of allowing the county to house more inmates
without creating more jail space is an impermissible justification for resulting violations of
due process and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Severe overcrowding
combined with lack of area for exercise, lack of separate dining area, inadequate
ventilation, inadequate temperature control, and antiquated and unsanitary plumbing at
the county jail violated due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and
ran afoul of the eighth amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.
(Sedgwick County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHT

Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085 (7th Cir. 1986). Conditions of
the Shelby County Jail in Indiana did not violate the constitutional rights of inmates,
says a U.S. Appeals Court. Inmates at the Shelby County Jail (SCJ) filed a suit alleging
that the totality of conditions and practices at SCJ violated their constitutional rights.
The inmates claimed the jail's twenty footcandles of illumination did not meet minimum
standards. The county's expert, however, took readings in the courtroom which revealed
eighteen footcandles at the judge's bench.

U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN
CELL CAPACITY

Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112 (S.D.Tex. 1986). The Texas Department of
Corrections was in contempt of court for failure to afford sufficient single-occupancy
cells, in failing to assign housing to prisoners according to their respective custody
classifications, in failing to maintain a specified number of personnel, and to deploy staff
in the housing areas, in failing to employ a substantial number of health care
professionals, in failing to meet the needs of the physically handicapped, in failing to
afford prisoners in administrative segregation appropriate housing facilities, and in failing
to build and properly equip recreation yards and gymnasiums. On the whole, the court
found, TDC had been habitually and inexcusably dilatory in complying with the orders in
question. The court noted that contempt represents more than delay in performance or
lack of perfection. It is, instead, failure to accomplish what was ordered in meaningful
respects. Defendants may defeat finding of contempt by demonstrating that they
employed, in good faith, utmost diligence in discharging their responsibilities. Prison
inmates were not required to show that Texas Department of Corrections had violated the
Eighth Amendment or to develop a method by which the Department could achieve
compliance with consent decree in order to support a finding of contempt for violating the
decree. Rather, inmates were required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that
the Department had inappropriately mixed custody classifications or had housed prisoners
not in minimum custody status in dormitories, and had done both, in violation of
stipulations forming bases for district court orders. Motions to modify so as to alleviate or
eliminate conditions or restrictions imposed by prior court order require a clear showing of
grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions. Texas Department of
Corrections' alleged change in philosophy to a belief that dormitories provide adequate,
secure housing for women prisoners in medium and close custody classifications was not
sufficient to require modification of stipulations incorporated in court orders requiring
inmates to be housed with inmates of like classification, in light of the fact that certain
women inmates had been moved to cell housing, and conflicting testimo:cy regarding
appropriateness of dormitory housing for women requiring medium or close custody.
(Texas Department of Corrections)

15.14

1987
U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING

Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1301. A Federal
lawsuit alleging overcrowding was brought by three prisoners in Hawaii. Finding no
eighth amendment violation, the lawsuit was dismissed by the disb-ict court. The decision
was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, which concurreft that an allegation of
overcrowding without additional cruel and unusual treatment does not state a claim.
However, it found these prisoners had alleged more. The prisoners claimed that because
of the increased population, there was "an increase in stress, tension, communicable
diseases, and a high increase in confrontations between inmates." (Oahu Community
Correctional Center, Hawaii)

U.S. Disb-ict Court
CROWDING

Beniamin v. Malcolm, 659 F.Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Temporary relief was granted
to New York City correctional facilities to allow them to cope with the recent increase
in population. However, "no further requests for modification will be granted regardless of
foreseeable or unforeseeable problems which may arise." (Brooklyn House of Detention for
Men and Queens House of Detention for Men)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING

Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1078. An inmate
brought a class action under a civil rights statute complaining of overcrowding and
substandard living conditions. The United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota ordered an end to the practice of double-celling of inmates; prison
officials appealed. The Court of Appeals initially affirmed (799 F.2d 447).
After granting a petition for rehearing en bane, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
held that the practice of double-celling did not evince the "wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain" necessary to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. On
appeal, prison officials contended that the trial court erred in f'mding that double-celling of
inmates at the South Dakota State Prison (SDSP) violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United State Constitution. They also claimed that the district court
erred in using the "rated capacities" of the American Corrections Association (ACA) as a
reference for measuring the permissible capacity of the prison under the eighth
amendment. The appeals court reversed the disb-ict court's order with respect to doublecelling. According the appeals court, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear in Rhodes v.
Chapman that "...when the conditions of confinement compose the punishment at issue,"
those conditions "must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, nor may
they be grossly diSProportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment."
The Supreme Court referred to conditions that are "totally without penological
justification," at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96
S.Ct. 2909, 2929, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), as the kind of conditions that violate the eighth
amendment. According to the appeals court, "•.. as Rhodes and Whitley make clear, the
Eighth Amendment leaves very broad latitude to the states in the administration of their
prisons. '[C]onditions that cannot be said to be cruel and unusual under contemporary
standards are not unconstitutional. To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and
even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society.' Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399. Moreover, the federal courts
traditionally have adopted a broad hands-off attitude toward problems of prison
administration." The court cited Procunier: •... Suffice it to say that the problems of
prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not
readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive
planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all of those reasons, courts
are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration
and reform." Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1807. 40
L.Ed.2d 224 (1974)(footnotes omitt.ed). The appellate panel concluded that, "all of these
observations aptly fit this case.... Even granting that the District Court's factual fmdings
are correct, double-celling at SDSP simply does not evince the 'wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain' necessary to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 347, 101 S.Ct. at 2399....The record in this case falls far short of supporting
the district court's conclusion that the line drawn by Rhodes has been crossed by doublecelling at SDSP. Accordingly, there is no constitutional basis for the district court's
remedial order with reSPect to double-celling." The court also noted that "We have found
nothing in the record or the Disb-ict Court's findings of fact to persuade us that our
conclusions regarding double-celling generally should be different with regard to the
protective custody area of the prison.•
The appellate court noted that the district court's remedy in its f'mal order was based
on compliance with ACA rated capacities, which in turn were based on recommendations.
by the South Dakota penitentiary authorities. 'The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
the proposition that such standards establish a constitutional norm. In Bell v. Wolfish,
the Court stated that 'while the recommendations of these various groups [such as ACA]
may be instructive in certain cases, they simply do not establish the constitutional

15.15

minima, rather, they establish goals recommended by the organization in question.' 441
U.S. 520, 543-44 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1876 n. 27, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In Rhodes, the
court quot.ed the foregoing stat.ement from Wolfish and further observed in regard to
eighth amendment claims that 'generalized opinions of experts cannot weigh as heavily in
det.ermining cont.emporary standards of decency as "the public attitude toward a given
sanction.'•..We need not consider the propriety of the District Court's final order
mandating relief and its reference to ACA rat.ed capacities in view of our conclusion that
on the record before us double-celling at SDSP does not violat.e the eighth amendment."
The appeals court reversed the order of the district court concerning double-celling,
left undisturbed the aff'll'Dlance .of the district court's order rejecting the prot.ective custody
inmat.es' challenge to the additional restrictions attendant to their prot.ective custody, and
remanded the case to the district court and directed it to vacat.e its order requiring SDSP
to cease double-celling and to bring its imnat.e population within ACA guidelines. (South
Dakota Stat.e Penit.entiary)
U.S. District Court
CEU..S
CROWDING

Feliciano v. Colon, 672 F.Supp. 627 (D. P.R. 1987). An order that would give imnat.es
35 square feet of living space was refused modification by a federal court. Issued eight
years ago in Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F.Supp. 14 (D. P.R. 1980), was an order
requiring that each imnat.e be provided with at least 35 square feet of living space. A
federal court denied Puert.o Rican prison authorities' request that it modify this order.
Refusing to accept the argument that all persons presently incarcerat.ed would present a
danger to the community if released, the court stat.ed that prison authorities had failed to
explore alt.ernatives which might include the transfer of imnat.es to federal prisons,
t.emporary housing, or halfway houses. Since prison authorities did not notify the court of
predictable problems in compliance when the inmat.e population had increased faster than
earlier estimates and it became clear the estimat.es were too low, this did not justify
modification of the order. (Puert.o Rico Syst.em)

Stat.e Court
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT

Jensen v. Webb, 520 N.Y.S.2d 971 (A.O. 3 Dept. 1987). A stat.e court ruled that the
prison overcrowding crisis facing New York City fell within the definition of an
emergency situation, justifying an exception to the requirement of an Environmental
Impact Stat.ement and refused to enjoin construction on the basis of any of the other
alleged violations. Because the city had failed to file an Environmental Impact Stat.ement
as required by stat.e and city law, had failed to comply with a city land use
review procedure, had failed to obtain certain permits and were violating the federal
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. Sec. 1251, in operating a septic system, a neighborhood
committee asked a New York Court to enjoin the construction of a correctional facility.
The court ordered a trial, however, on the claimed violations of the other statut.es. (New
York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CElLS
FACILITY DESIGN

Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F.Supp. 627 (D. Puert.o Rico 1987). Puert.o
Rican prison authorities moved to modify stipulation and an order that they provide
each prisoner with at least 35 square feet of living space. The district court held
that: (1) prison authorities were not entitled to relief under subsection of federal rule
allowing modification on the ground that changed circumstances would make further
compliance with order unjust; (2) prison authorities failed to show that compliance would
result in pernicious consequences, and failed to show changed circumstances warranting
relief; and (3) building project undertaken to increase dramatically available beds for
housing did not entitle prison authorities to relief. The possible release of prisoners by
Puert.o Rican prison authorities as a result of compliance with a court order that they
provide each prisoner with at least 35 square feet of living space was not a "pernicious
consequence" of compliance and did not entitle them to relief from order under Rule
60(b)(6); there was little factual support for assertion that all persons presently
incarc:erat.ed in Puert.o Rico would present danger to the community if released, argument
had an undert.one of disingenuity, and compliance would not int.erfere with efforts of
Commonwealth as to enforcement of criminal law or any other policy decision of that
entity. The court ruled that prison authorities should have known that the population
projection figure on which they relied was, in all probability, inaccurat.e, and, even i,f they
did not properly assess information available at that time, they certainly knew by the end
of 1986 that they had drastically underestimat.ed the actual rat.e of growth, but did not
make the motion for relief from the stipulation, informally apprise the court of predictable
problems in compliance, solicit assistance of monitor or seek discussions with plaintiffs'
counsel. (Puert.o Rico System)

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
NOISE

Nilsson v. Coughlin. 670 F.Supp. 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Inmat.es stat.ed a claim under
the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment. The imnat.es alleged there
was raw sewage in the cells, unsanitary dinmg facilities, a constant level of noise that
was physically harmful, a lack of meaningful vocational, educational or recreational
programs, and a host of other conditions. The federal court ruled that a fair inference
could be drawn from the pro se complaint that the prison officials were grossly :negligent
in supervising or, alt.ernatively, in promulgating policies, that caused unconstitutional
conditions. (Sullivan Correctional Facility, New York)

15.16

U.S. Appeals Court
CELl., CAPACITY
SPECIAL CEU,

Tyler v. Black. Sll F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1987). cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1760. On appeal,
a federal court held that: {l) the mass transfer of inmat.e to a segregation unit during
a period of prison unrest did not violat.e due process, but (2) double celling of inmat.es
in small cells with solid "boxcar" type doors was cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Eighth Amendment. The mass transfer of inmat.es to a segregation unit
during a period of prison unrest did not violat.e due process, where inmat.es were given
posttransfer hearings, the warden perceived move as a necessary emergency security
measure, no punitive purpose was involved, and the transfers were purely t.emporary
administrative segregations. However, double celling of inmat.es in segregation unit in
small cells with solid "boxcar" type doors was cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment; inmat.es with history of assaultive behavior were placed in
closed cells for up to 23 hours a day for a period of several months. (Missouri Stat.e
Penit.entiary, Special Management Facility)
1988

U.S. District Court

CROWDING

U.S. Appeals Court

CROWDING
CELl., CAPACITY

Stat.e Appeals Court

RECREATION
AREAS

Albro v. Onondaga County. N.Y., 677 F.Supp. 697 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). The alleged
offender is afforded prot.ection by a due process clause instead of the Eighth
Amendment, which prevents holding a detainee under conditions that would be equal to
punishment. A violation of due process was found to exist when crowded conditions were
found at a pretrial det.ention facility, causing many detainees to sleep on cots in the
walkways and creating a hazard to both detainees and staff. There was no operational
compensation for overcrowding conditions such as adequat.e exercise time, vocational
training, or free time in the dayroom or other open space. Detainees frequently spent only
a free hour on a walkway or in "passive" recreation and were confined to their cells at
least 23 hours a day. The court found correctional staff insufficient to safely respond to
duties. Further, the court also concluded that inmat.es "have ready access to weapons
through the dismantling of their cots.• The capacity of the facility was capped by the
court. Daily f"mes were levied on the county as an appropriat.e remedy for continuing
overcrowding at the det.ention facility whenever the inmat.e population exceeded its
capacity for four days or more. The county was ordered to pay $1,000 per day if the
population reached 213-217, up to $10,000 daily if the population goes over 247. Even
though the plaintiffs had withdrawn the motion for cont.empt, the court kept the power to
punish violations that may have occurred, or might occur in the future. (Public Safety
Building)
Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 {1st Cir. 1988). A pretrial detainee brought action
alleging violation of his civil rights. The federal district court dismissed complaint for
failure to stat.e cause of action, and appeal was taken. The appeals court held that the
pretrial detainee's allegations that he was confined to a cell for 22-23 hours per day for a
27-day period, and was forced to sleep on a floor mattress, were sufficient to stat.e a
Section 1983 cause of action on ground of deprivation of liberty without due process. The
court was troubled by the inmat.e's cont.ention that he was commed to a cell for 27 days
with another inmat.e, during which time he was forced to sleep on a mattress on the floor
of the cell, and his claims that the mattress nearly covered the floor of his cell, and placed
appellant in a position which was in close proximity to the open toilet in the cell.
According to the court, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "double-bunking," that is,
placing two inmat.es in a cell presumably intended for a single inmat.e, does not constitut.e
punishment. This practice, then, does not constitut.e a per se violation of a pretrial
detainee's due process rights. Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at 541, 99 S.Ct. at 1875.
The Court left open the possibility, however, that "comming a given number of people in a
given amount of space in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time might raise serious questions under the Due
Process Clause as to whether those conditions amount.ed to punishment. •• " Id. at 542, 99
S.Ct. at 1875-1876. In Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 {2d Cir. 1981), the Second Circuit
held that double-bunking of pretrial detainees was constitutionally permissible for a
period of no more than 15 days, but that the use of a floor mattress constitut.ed
punishment "without regard to the number of days for which a prisoner is so commed."
According to the court, •Based on the foregoing considerations, we conclude that the
district court incorrectly dismissed appellant's complaint for failure to stat.e a cause of
action." The court ruled, however, that the pretrial detainee was not denied access to
court. The detainee was given periodic access to a law library, and was not
constitutionally entitled to also receive assistance from "persons trained in the law." (New
Hampshire Stat.e Prison)
N.Y. Stat.e Com'n of Correction v. Ruffo, 530 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. 1988). The
New York Stat.e Commission of Correction went to court seeking an order
compelling a county and its sheriff t.o build an outdoor recreation area for
inmates of the county jail and to transport inmat.es to the county's other jail facility for
daily recreation while the :new outdoor recreation area is being built. New York
regulations, the Commission argued, provide that inmat.es be allowed to use recreation
areas for a minimum of one hour a day and further requires that county jails provide
15.17

an outdoor play area of a minimum of 1500 square feet to enable prisoners to engage in
basketball, jogging, handball, weightlifting, calisthenics and other active recreation. The
court found that the Commission had no authority to compel the county to construct a new
facility. Further, the sheriff was not authorized by law to build a new jail or to raise taxes
to fund a major renovation of the old one. The court did, however, grant the Commission
an order directing the sheriff to transport prisoners to the county's other jail each day and
allow each inmat.e one hour of outdoor recreation, not including travel time. (Broome
County Jail, Binghamton, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY

Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 241. The Stat.e
requested modification of a consent decree so as to allow double-celling at new prisons
and also appealed a court-ordered release of 700 inmates. This request was denied by the
district court. The federal appeals court found that the Stat.e had made a good-faith effort
to comply with the consent decree and had faced an unanticipated increase in the prison
population and that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow double-celling--ordering the
district court to modify the consent decree to allow double-celling at the five new facilities.
The appeals court not.ed that the state had embarked on an aggressive program of new
prison construction, involving the spending of over onehundred million dollars, as well as instituting early release programs to alleviat.e
overcrowding. The court also not.ed that there were potential dangers from the early
release of high risk inmat.es- dangers which "far outweigh any imposition on the inmat.es
from double-celling" in some of the "modern, air-conditioned facilities" which have been
construct.eel. The court retained jurisdiction to order further remedies should the doublecelling result in any UDCQnstitutional conditions of conf'mement. (South Carolina
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACILITY DESIGN

Rowland v. U.S. Dist. Court for N.D. of Cal., 849 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988). Prisoners
brought a lawsuit seeking to correct prison conditions. The federal district court issued
a permanent injunction and ordered a monitor to inspect a new prison; prison officials
sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the order. The appeals court held that the district
court was without jurisdiction to authorize a monitor to inspect new prison because the
facility was not covered by its permanent injunction correcting various facility-specific
unconstitutional conditions at the old facility. To establish whether violations existed at
the new facility, a new lawsuit must be brought. The court noted that removing
segregat.ed prisoners from the old facility was one way for prison officials to satisfy the
purpose behind the injunction by removing prisoners from the facility that was found to be
old, overcrowded and dirty and could not have been to subvert or undermine the
permanent injunction. (New Folsom Prison, California)

1989
Stat.e Supreme Court

VENTILATION

U.S. District Court
CROWDING

RECREATION AREAS

Bedell v. Schiedler, 770 P.2d 909 (Or. 1989). An inmate at a women's
corrections center petitioned for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that failure to
provide adequate ventilation and circulation of clean air violated her constitutional rights
against cruel and unusual punishment. The Marion County Circuit Court allowed a
motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the court
of appeals affirmed. The State Supreme Court, reversing and remanding, found that a
hearing was required on the merits of the inmate's allegations.
The court said that the inmate's allegations that she was unnecessarily suffering
clogged sinuses, severe headaches, dry and irritated skin, and a sore throat--and that
those health problems would continue unless ventilation problems were remedied-presented unresolved issues of fact "requiring immediate judicial scrutiny." It was no
basis for dismissal that she had failed to allege: 1) that she had not suffered her ailments
before confinement, 2) that her physical ailments are linked medically to the alleged lack
of ventilation, or S) that she had unsuccessfully sought and undergone medical treatment
to alleviat.e her ailments. These three allegations were not required, since they were all
defenses that the prison might have raised but did not. "Construed liberally," the court
noted, the inmate had alleged that the "environment in which she is conf'med
unnecessarily subjects her to serious health hazards. If prisoners are entitled to
reasonable and necessary medical care, it reasonably follows that they also are entitled to
an environment that does not unnecessarily subject them to serious health hazards."
(Oregon Women's Correctional Cent.er)
Essex County Jail Inmates v. Amato, 726 F.Supp. 589 (D. N.J. 1989). The inmates of
a county jail sued the county seeking imposition of sanctions for the violation of a consent judgment under which the county was to abide by overall population limits and
population limits within sections of the jail, and to afford each inmate an opportunity for
one hour of recreation per day. The district court found that the imposition of fines for
overcrowding based upon the agreed upon figure of $100 per day per inmate was
warrant.ed and the fine for the failure to provide recreational facilities, based on $20 per
day per inmate affected, was warranted despite the claim that exercise
15.18

opportunities could not be provided because of security concerns that prevent.ed the
installation of equipment in each tier. The federal court had authority t.o impose
sanctions for violations of the agreement, embodied in the consent judgment, between
inmates in the county prison and the county providing for maximum levels of occupancy of
the prison and one hour of recreational opportunities per day per inmate as part of the
court's general power t.o interpret and enforce contracts. A prior contempt finding against
the prison for violating the maximum inmate population cap established by an agreement
between inmates and the prison which was embodied in the consent judgment did not
nullify a continued noncompliance with the order by the county. (Essex County Jail, New
Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
DORMITORIES
PROTECTIVE
CUSI'ODY
CAPACITY

Fisher v. Koehler, 718 F.Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd., 902 F.2d 2 (2nd Cir. 1990).
Prison inmates brought a class action against prison officials and others, challenging
conditions of confinement as violative of their rights under the federal constitution.
Following a finding, 692 F.Supp. 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), that violence at the prison
reached a level which violated the eighth amendment, the defendants were given the
opportunity t.o submit a reasonable plan for the court's consideration. The district court
found that the proposed plan t.o reduce violence by staff and inmates against inmates t.o
comply with the eighth amendment would be adopt.ed, with some modifications. The
prison officials would be allowed t.o house protective custody inmates in dormit.ories in
light of plan for exclusion from protective custody of inmates with a significant hist.ory of
violence and for cell housing of inmates whose vulnerability or hist.ory of violence required
their separation. Before the court would limit the prison population by prohibiting the
housing of more than 50 inmates in a dormit.ory, which would have required the .
displacement of approximately 500 inmates, the Department of Corrections would be given
an opportunity t.o reduce the level of violence at the prison t.o a constitutionally acceptable
level by addressing major sources of violence other than crowding. The prison officials
were entitled t.o an opportunity t.o establish that periodic, rather than permanent,
presence of an officer would prove sufficient t.o prevent violence in dormitories consisting
of inmates with little or no history of assaultive behavior.
The appeals court found that conditions at the prison violated the eighth amendment,
and the district court's remedy was properly formulated. (Correctional Institute for Men,
New York City, New York)

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY
CROWDING
FIRE SAFETY
SANITATION

Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F.Supp. 854 (D.D.C. 1989). Inmates
conimed at a state prison brought a civil rights action seeking declarat.ory and
injunctive relief. The judgment for the inmates, 650 F.Supp. 619, was vacat.ed
and remanded, 844 F.2d 828. Upon remand, the district court found that the
prison conditions violat.ed the inmates' eighth amendment rights, even though
the District of Columbia had implement.ed a number of new procedures. The
housekeeping manual was not followed, fire inspection was lacking, new evacuation plans
had not been posted and proper training had not occurred. Sick call had been increased t.o
five days from three days but had not cured other chronic problems. New procedures for
medical problems, and new procedures for medical records transfers and follow-up had
either not been implement.ed or had failed t.o work. The court also found that the housing
of "protective custody" inmates in a block with punitive segregation inmates violated the
protective custody inmates' eighth amendment rights, and inmates with mental health
problems could not be housed with punitive segregation inmates. Officials at the medium
security federal prison were prohibit.ed from exceeding the current population at the
facility pending renovation, and they were required t.o submit a written report on their
proposals for correcting the constitutional violations in areas of sanitation, bathroom
facilities, fire safety, health care, and staffing. The court of appeals also found error with
the court's "continuous resort t.o the standards articulat.ed by professional agencies in
evaluating the constitutionality of the conditions at Occoquan." (District of Columbia's
Occoquan Facility, Lort.on Correctional Complex)

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY
DOUBLE CELLING
CONSENT DECREE

Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 717 F.Supp. 268 (D. N.J.
1989). Imnates brought an action challenging the conditions of confinement in
a county correctional facility which housed both pretrial detainees and
sentenced inmates. The plaintiffs specifically sought t.o reinstate the
prohibition against double bunking in Wings A and B, contained in the consent judgments
of 1985 and 1986, and to reduce the total inmate cap by 24 beds thereby setting the
maximum inmate male capacity of 536. Following an issuance of a remedial order, and an
order of modification on the report of a special master, the public advocate filed a .motion
that would be treated as a request for modification. The district court found that an
overall cap on male inmates was adopt.ed, rather than caps on specific wings. An o~er of
modif'J.Cation was not intended t.o modify the agreement not t.o double bunk specific wings;
and the parties' agreement not to use the county correctional facility to it.s full capacity
was not the basis upon which the district court had t.o modify its factual conclusion
regarding the male population cap for the facility, in the action challenging the conditions
of the facility, in absence of changed facts,
15.19

circumstances or law. The district court set a t.otal cap of 304 male inmates for the county
correctional facility, rather than adopting the master's initial recommendation regarding
caps for specific wings of the facility, as a remedy in the action. The district court's
decision regarding the conditions of the facility was not intended t.o modify the parties'
agreement not t.o use wings t.o what might be their full capacity, and would be amended t.o
omit references indicating the propriety of partial double bunking in wings, where the
correctional officials indicated that the wings had never been double bunked, that they did
not intend t.o double bunk them, and that they did not ask t.o do so, and the officials did
not seek relief from the consent judgment pursuant t.o which the parties agreed t.o prohibit
double bunking of those wings. (Monmouth County Jail, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
CAPACITY
CELL SIZE
COURT ORDER

Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Bd. of Com. of P.R., 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989), cert, denied,
ll0 S.Ct. 15ll. The U.S. Supreme Court has refused t.o overturn a lower court
decision which held the Commonwealth of Puert.o Rico in contempt for keeping
prisoners conf'med in less than 35 square feet of space in violation of a 1987 court
order. The U.S. Court of Appeals had affirmed the decision and found that the civil
contempt order was appealable. The Commonwealth's compliance was not so substantial
as t.o invalidate a finding of contempt, and the Commonwealth's good-faith efforts t.o
comply with the remedial order did not excuse the noncompliance. The sanction of $50
per excess prisoner per day, with a rate increase of $10 per month, was not unlawfully
high, and the Commonwealth was not entitled t.o an oral hearing prior t.o the entry of the
contempt order. (Commonwealth, Puert.o Rico)
1990

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
DOUBLE CELLING
DINING

Harris v. Murray. 761 F.Supp. 409 (E.D. Va. 1990). An inmate filed an action under a
federal civil rights statute, asserting numerous allegations relating t.o conditions of
confinement. On the defendants' motion for ·summary judgment, the district court found
that the dismissal of the inmates various claims was warranted. The inmate's claim that
he was occasionally forced t.o stand while eating due t.o insufficient seating space in the
dining area did not state sufficient facts t.o warrant a finding of cruel and unusual
punishment. Finally, the court found that the double celling of prisoners does not amount
t.o an Eighth Amendment violation where other prison living conditions are
constitutionally adequate; although a cell is designed for one inmate, double or even triple
occupancy is not in itself cruel and unusual punishment. {Nott.oway Correctional Center,
Virginia)

U.S. District Court
COURT ORDER

Shaw v. Allen, 771 F.Supp. 760 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). A class of inmates brought a petition
for contempt, alleging that prison officials were in contempt of previous orders requiring
that conditions of the county jail be in compliance with constitutional standards. The
district court found that the failure of officials t.o bring the conditions in the county jail up
t.o constitutional standards warranted appointment of a receiver t.o operate the jail.
According t.o the court, there was. a dismal history of noncompliance and allowing
additional time for compliance would only likely result in additional injunctions or
contempt proceedings and would offer little hope of anything other than further
confrontations and delays. (McDowell County Jail, West Virginia)
·

·u.S. Appeals Court
DOUBLE CELLING
ANTIQUATED
FACILITY
CROWDING

Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1990). An inmate brought an action
challenging conditions of confinement at the state correctional institution. The
U.S. District Court granted relief and the state and prison officials appealed.
The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the evidence supported a
determination that double-celling violates the eighth amendment in view of
other conditions t.o which inmates were subjected, and an order banning the double-celling
was within the district court's discretion given its determination that the institution was
overcrowded, that the lighting, ventilation, plumbing, showers, and fire safety provisions
fell below constitutional norms, that violence and insecurity were pervasive, that medical
and mental health care were constitutionally deficient, that inmates had limited
opportunities for recreation outside their cells, that inmates were double-celled for long
periods of time, and that inadequate screening before double-celling of inmates resulted in
"fatal pairings". It was not necessary that there be a showing that double-celling itself
caused increased violence, disease, and other negative conditions. The totality of
conditions within the institution must be considered in determining whether conditions of
conf'mement violate the eighth amendment. The constitutionality of double-celling had to
be analyzed in context of the district court's determination, well supported by record, that
almost every element of physical plant and provision of services at the institution fell
below constitutional norms. The district court order requiring state and local authorities
t.o cease double-celling inmates in cell blocks by a specif"ied date, t.o remedy the eighth
amendment violation, was within its discretion, and did not im.perm.issibly invade the
state's prerogative in view of the option available of hiring more guards so that empty
tiers at the institution could be used, as an alternative t.o transferring inmates to other
institutions. (State Correctional Institution, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

15.20

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
SANITATION
VENTILATION

Williams v. White, 897 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990). An inmate proceeding in
forma pauperis brought a pro se complaint against the prison superintendent
under Section 1983. The U.S. District Court dismissed, and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court, vacating and remanding with instructions, found
that the inmat.e's claim was not frivolous. The prisoner assert.ed he was placed in solitary,
punitive confinement for no articulated reason and without a hearing and alleged that he
was placed in a single cell with another prisoner with no hot water and no ventilation or
air from outside and that he was required to use a mattress infest.ed with bugs and
insects. The prison superint.endent can be liable under Section 1983 for operating the
prison with unsanitary and inhumane conditions and can be directly liable if he fails to
properly train, supervise or control subordinates. Dismissals under the in forma pauperis
statut.e on the ground of frivolity are t.o be made early in the proceedings, before the
service of the process on the defelldant and before burdening the defendant with the
necessity of making a responsive answer under Rules of Civil Procedure. (Missouri)

1991
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Kelldrick v. Bland, 931 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1991). Inmates sought to have prison officials
held in contempt for violation of a consent decree. The U.S. District Court denied the
motion, and the inmates appealed. The court of appeals found that the district court
properly refused to hold the prison officials in cont.empt in the absence of a showing of
institutionwide violations, but remand to district court was required for clarification of the
term "available" as used in the provision of the consent decree requiring that inmates be
present during searches of their cells if the inmat.es are "available". In a certain sense, all
inmates are available because they are within the institution but, in another sense, they
may not be available if they are working in prison illdustries, are in classrooms, or are at
meals. (Kentucky Stat.e Reformat.ory, LaGrange, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
HANDICAPPED

Kroll v. St. Charles County. Mo., 766 F.Supp. 744 (E.D. Mo. 1991). On a motion to hold a
county in cont.empt of court for failing to comply with the provisions of a consent order, the
district court found that the county courthouse, government building and administration
building violated accessibility stalldards and federal handicapped laws. The buildings
lacked electronic doors, sufficient space to accommodate wheelchairs, and ramps or
elevat.ors. If the county failed to fund improvements to bring the courthouse, government
building and administration building into compliance with accessibility standards and
federal handicapped laws, the court would consider an imposition of a property tax
increase of 25 cents per one hundred dollars of assessed valuation on all property located
in the county for a period of ten years. It might also enjoin a roll back of local taxes. (St.
Charles County, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SANITATION

McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991). A state prisoner brought a suit against a
warden for alleged violation of Eighth Amendment rights arising from prison conditions.
The U.S. District Court ent.ered judgment in favor of the warden. The court of appeals,
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. On remand, relief was again denied,
and the prisoner appealed. Th~ court of appeals found that the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by his repeatedly having to sleep and live in sewage and
foul water, and remand was necessary for consideration of whether an "extraordinary
circumstances" defense applied and whether causation and signfficant injury were shown.
(Louisiana Stat.e Penit.entiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1991). A prisoner sought relief from dismissal of a
consent decree so that he could file an action for civil contempt _to enforce the decree
regarding the use of emergency segregation cells. The United States District Court denied
relief, and appeal was taken. The appeals court, reversing and remanding, found that the
prisoner was entitled t.o proceed with the action. The fact that the district court had found
compliance with the decree and entered a dismissal order did not justify the denial of the
prisoner's motion for release. The compliance fillding had been issued based on allegedly
erroneous stat.ements by prison officials that the cells in which the prisoner was housed
had been abandoned. (Missouri Training Center for Men)

U.S. Appeals Court
COURI'ORDER
CROWDING

Williams v. McKeithen, 939 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991). A preliminary injunction was
issued by the United Stat.es District Court which ordered Louisiana sheriffs to remove
prisoners held in parish jails pursuant to contracts with the District of Columbia alld
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The sheriffs and the District appealed. The
appeals court, reversing the decision, found that the All Writs Act did not authorize a
preliminary injunction t.o remove all prisoners held in Louisiana parish jails. Even though
the sheriffs had previously agreed to limit the number of prisoners to specuied population
limits, there was no imding that any parish jail was housing inmates in excess of the

15.21.

limits, or that any jail was not accepting or was Ullable to accept Louisiana state
prisoners. The injunction required substantial, uncompensated change in parish jails'
existing operations, and the injunction did not have a close nexus to the underlying order
which limited populations. Even if a preliminary injunction was authorized, the
injunction was invalid where no attempt was made to provide adequate notice of hearing
to the District or the sheriffs. (Louisiana)
1992
U.S. Supreme Court
CONSENT DECREE
DOUBLE CELLING

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748 (1992). A county sheriff filed a
motion to modffy a consent decree requiring construction of a new jail, including a request
to house inmates in single cells in the newly-opened facility. The U.S. District Court
denied the motion, and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, and certiorari
was granted. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the "grievous wrong" standard does not
apply to a request to modify a consent decree stemming from institutional reform
litigation. The Court also found that a party seeking modification of a consent decree
bears the burden of establishing that a significant change in circumstances warrants a
revision of the decree. If the moving party meets that standard, the court should consider
whether the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstances. The
party seeking modification of a consent decree may meet its initial burden of establishing
significant change in circumstances by showing either significant change in factual
conditions or in law. Remand was required to determine whether changed circumstances
warranted modification of the decree. (Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CROWDING

Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113
S.Ct. 1050. In connection with a consent decree governing city jail population levels, the
United States District Court entered a contempt order, and appeal was taken. The
appeals court, affirming in part and vacating in part, found that the entry of the contempt
order was appropriate. However, the sheriff should not have been allowed to override
applicable state laws by conducting early release as state law override provisions were not
the least intrusive option on state government operation. The district court should have
waited to see whether the threat of sanctions would induce compliance or at least have
made a finding that other alternatives were inadequate. (San Francisco Jail, Hall of
Justice, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CAPACITY
COURI' ORDER
CROWDING

Williams v. McKeithen, 963 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1992). A parish sheriff moved to vacate a
district court order directing the inspection of parish jails by a court-appointed expert.
The United States District Court denied the motion, and appeal was taken. The court of
appeals, affirming the decision, found that the federal district court had authority,
pursuant to a consent decree in which the parish had agreed to limit the jail population,
to order the inspection of parish jails by its experts. This was in order to determine the
number of inmates which could be housed in the jails on a permanent basis, the number
of guards and support personnel required in the jails, whether any repairs or other
renovations were required to meet fll'e, health· and constitutional standards, and any other
information which would aid the court in setting population limits at the jails.
(Louisiana)
1993

Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F.Supp. 1382 (D.Or. 1993). An inmate brought a Section 1983
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION action against county officials and the State Department of Corrections, arising from the
inmate's temporary incarceration at the department's intake center which was operated by
the county. The defendants moved to dismiss or for summary judgment. The district
court found that the inmate failed to state a Section 1983 claim for violation of equal
protection by alleging merely that inmates at the intake center were afforded different
privileges than inmates at other Department institutions. The inmate did not allege that
he was personally singled out for disparate treatment. (Oregon Department of Corrections
Intake Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
CAPACITY
CONSENT DECREE

Collins v. Thompson, 8 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1993). Washington State sought to vacate a
consent decree requiring the state to reduce the inmate population at a reformatory to 656,
contending that the decree was consummated in 1987, even though the inmate population
had increased since then. On remand after prior appeal, the U.S. District Court vacated the
decree, terminating the court's jurisdiction, finding that there was no present violation of
constitutional rights of the inmates and that continued supervision would result in the court's
over-involvement in the management of the state prison. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court, aff"ll'ming the decision, found that under the clear language of the consent decree, the
state was only required to reduce the inmate population at the reformatory to 656, not to
maintain the population at that level. The district court properly refused to exercise
continuing jurisdiction pursuant to the consent decree. (Washingt.on State Reformatory)
15.22

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
DOUBLE CEILING

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 12 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1993). The Commissioner of
Corrections moved to vacate a consent decree between a county sheriff, the Commissioner,
and inmates of the county jail after the county sheriff moved to modify the decree to allow
double-bunking of pretrial detainees. The U.S. District Court denied the motion and the
Commissioner appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the
Commissioner was not entitled to have the decree vacated in the absence of adequate record
and in light of the prospect of further proceedings. The approach proposed by the
Commissioner for vacating the consent decree gave insufficient weight to the problem of
recurrence of the constitutional violations. The court could not assume that double-celling
of inmates, contemplated by the county sheriff in the foreseeable future, was clearly
constitutional. (Suffolk County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Johnson v. Robinson, 987 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1993). Prisoners brought a class action
challenging conditions of confinement at Maryland correctional facilities. Upon motion of
prisoners, the United States District Court converted a timetable into a court order, and the
prison officials appealed. The court of appeals, reversed and remanded with instructions.
It found that the district court exceeded. its authority when it adopted the order specifying a
timetable in which Maryland prison officials had to make 83 improvements at prison
facilities. The parties never formally agreed upon duties specified in the timetable, which
added substantially to those accepted by prison officials in the original consent decree.
(Maryland House of Corrections and Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown)

1994
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
COURT ORDER

Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1994), modified, 41 F.3d 212. County jail inmates
brought a class action against county officials challenging jail conditions. Following the
entry of a final consent judgment governing jail conditions, the officials moved for relief
from the consent judgment. The inmates requested that officials be held in contempt for
violations of the consent judgment. The U.S. District Court denied the motion for relief and
held the officials in contempt. The officials appealed. The appeals court, affirming the
decision, found that the officials failed to demonstrate that changes in factual conditions
compelled the magistrate judge to grant their motion for relief from the fmal consent
judgment governing jail conditions. Despite contentions that the new jail housed more
prisoners than the old jail, and received prisoners from different governmental agencies with
diverse criminal. records, and was subject to inspections by governmental agencies, the
officials did not adequately explain how increased inspections and changes in the number and
diversity of inmates affected the workability of the fmal judgment, compliance with the
judgment, or enforcement of the judgment. The court found that the off"lcials failed to
demonstrate that changes in the factual conditions compelled the magistrate judge to grant
their motion for relief. Also, the magistrate judge's finding that county off"icials were in
contempt for failure to comply with the fmal consent judgment governing jail conditions was
neither clearly erroneous nor an abuse of his discretion, where the officials asserted only
substantial compliance with the judgment, admitting to noncompliance in some areas.
(Madison County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
CAPACITY
CROWDING

Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1994). In a prisoner class action
under Section 1983 challenging conditions at a county jail, the U.S. District Court found
conditions to be unconstitutional and granted injunctive relief in the form of a population
cap. Appeal was taken. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that evidence
supported the finding that population exceeding 111 led to denial of basic human needs of
both convicted felons and pretrial detainees. In addition, evidence supported a finding that
the county was aware of the overcrowding and the resulting conditions. Evidence showed
that the county could and had in the past taken some steps to relieve overcrowding, and, even
if a cost defense was cognizable, it was inapplicable in the absence of any evidence that
additional funding was unavailable from taxpayers to address overcrowding. (Angelina
County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
COURT ORDER

Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 848 F.Supp. 52 (W.D.Pa. 1994). In a civil
rights litigation pertaining to conditions at a county detention facility, the district court
found that upon the county's compliance with court orders concerning jail conditions, the
court would relieve the county of the obligation to pay further fines. In addition, fines
already paid would be returned for the exclusive purpose of contribution to jail
construction or drug rehabilitation programs. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY
CONSENT DECREE

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo. 844 F.Supp. 31 (D. Mass. 1994). A county sheriff
moved to modify a consent decree requiring construction of a new jail. The U.S. District
Court denied the motion and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals affll'med and
certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for
reconsideration. On. remand, the district court found that the matter would not be
reassigned to another judge and that the sheriff was not entitled to modification of the

15.23

decree to permit double-bunking. The Commissioner of Corrections appealed. The court
of appeals affirmed. The sheriff subsequently revised the motion to modify the consent
decree to permit double-bunking. The district court found that the proposed modification
to the consent decree, proposing an increase in capacity by double-bunking in 161 cells,
was not tailored to fit the changed circumstance of an increased number of pretrial
detainees. The court found that the consent decree would be modified to allow alteration
of up to 100 cells to permit double occupancy, even though this would impair some
inmate's access to common areas. In addition, the final order closing the case was not
immediately entered. The court provisionally found that it was appropriate to allow a five
year period before closing the case, to allow parties to seek relief from the order. (Suffolk
County Jail, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
SAFETY

McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 1994). A state prisoner filed a Section 1983 suit,
alleging prison officials violated his right under the Eighth Amendment to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment by placing him in a cell within close proximity to asbestoscovered pipes. The U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim,
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court, affirming the decision, found that the
allegations that the defendants allowed asbestos-covered pipes to exist directly outside of
the inmate's cell, and that the defendants told the inmate that they could not transfer him
to another cell, did not establish that the defendants acted with minimum level of
culpability sufficient to trigger Eighth Amendment protection. In addition, the complaint
did not allege facts sufficient to establish that conditions were serious enough to be
considered cruel and unusual, in the absence of an allegation that the inmate was exposed
to unreasonably high levels of asbestos. (Stateville Correctional Center, Joilet, lliinois)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
HYGIENE
PLUMBING
SANITATION

Sanford v. Brookshire, 879 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Tex. 1994). An inmate filed a Section 1983
action asserting cruel and unusual punishment resulting from confinement to a filthy cell
in a county jail for six days without functional plumbing or hygienic supplies. The district
court found that the county jailer and her supervisor violated the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights, for purposes of the inmate's Section 1983 claim, by acting with
deliberate indifference to complaints about filth in the cell and a nonfunctioning toilet and
sink, lack of toilet paper, and a shower head which produced only a thin stream of cold
water. The jailer left the inmate in the cell for six days while a written maintenance
request was processed, and the jailer's supervisor told the inmate he could not receive
cleaning supplies until cleaning day. However, the inmate failed to present any evidence
of actual damages from violation of his civil rights and, thus, was only entitled to recover
nominal damages of one dollar from the county jailer and her supervisor who were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's complaints. (Ector County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F.Supp. 723 (N.D.lnd. 1994). Prisoners brought a class action suit
challenging conditions of confinement at a prison operated by the Indiana Department of
Corrections. The district court approved a settlement agreement involving assignment
and transfer of prisoners, along with improvement of various prison conditions at the
Maximum Control Complex (MCC). The state agreed only to assign prisoners to MCC
under specified conditions and to transfer prisoners out of MCC after a specified period of
time, subject to certain conditions, and agreed to alter MCC conditions in many areas.
The agreement also provided for a decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the
cells. (Maximum Control Complex, Indiana Department of Corrections, Westville,
Indiana)
·

U.S. District Court
ADA • Amer. with
Disab. Act
HANDICAPPED

Torcasio v. Murray, 862 F.Supp. 1482 (E.D. Va. 1994). An inmate brought a suit against
state officials, alleging that his civil rights were violated by prison officials' failure to
provide for his morbidly obese condition. The district court found that the inmate failed to
state an Eighth Amendment violation, except as to the size of the toilet in his cell. The
prisoner, who was five feet seven inches tall and weighed in excess of 460 pounds and had
a girth of 78 inches, alleged that the handrails for the toilet facilities were inadequate to
accommodate him. In addition, the commode was so small that the defendant's groin and
genitals were often submerged in the toilet bowl. The court found that the inmate did
state a cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act (ADA) in connection with claims that
the shower, toilet, pod tables, cell doors, outdoor recreation activities, indoor recreation
activities, location of the housing unit and his cell, and conditions of his confinement in
the infirmary were unreasonable. (Virginia State Prison)

1995
U.S. Appeals Court

CAPACITY
CONSENT DECREE
COURT ORDER
CROWDING

Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1995). Appeal was taken from remedial
orders in an action challenging conditions in a county jail system. The appeals court
found that the stat.e could be held liable for conditions in the county's jail if deliberately
indifferent, and remanded. On remand, the U.S. District Court found the state and county
liable. The county and state appealed and the appeals court affirmed. Subsequently, the
district court denied the state's motion to modify a final order or stay the imposition of fines
and modified conditions imposed in the consent decree. The stat.e appealed and the

15.24

plaintiff-prisoners cross-appealed. The appeals court found that the court order mandating a
maximum inmate population and imposing a fine if that order were violated, based on the extent
of the violation, was not improper. In addition, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding that it could ensure compliance with the population cap order by fining the state for
overcrowding, even though it did not identically fine the county to ensure its compliance with the
court order. The court found the majority of problems at the county jail resulted from the large
number of transfer-ready felons which the state would not receive, and found that the primary
responsibility for the overcrowding crises at the jail lay with the state defendants. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by holding the state responsible for 90% of the costs of the
monitors for the time period after the state entered the litigation. The state's actions in failing to
accept transfer-ready felons were the primary cause of overcrowding in the county's jails and it was
that overcrowding that predominately necessitated the presence of the monitors under the consent
decree. The district court had authority to modify the jail conditions consent decree. (Harris
County Jails, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
SPECIAL CEIL

Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995). Pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners brought an action against pri80.Jl- officials under Section 1983. The
U.S. District Court refused to enjoin prison officials from placing mentally disturbed or suicidal
prisoners in safety cells. The detainees and prisoners appealed. The appeals court found that the
district court did not err in refusing to enjoin the county from ever making use of safety cells for
mentally disturbed or suicidal prisoners. There was ample testimony that some prisoners became
so violent and such a danger to themselves that temporary placement in a safety cell was needed
to deprive the prisoners of all means of harming themselves. The fact that some prisoners who
were violent might be mentally disturbed or suicidal did not detract from the need. The
deprivation of sinks, stand up toilets, and beds for short periods of time during violent episodes was
constitutionally justifiable because the inmates were confined to the safety cells only for short
periods of time. (Kem County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
ADA-AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
HANDICAPPED

Clarkson v. Coughlin. 898 F.Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Male and female deaf and hearing•
impaired inmates sued correctional officials alleging failure to accommodate their hearing
impairments in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
due process, and the Eighth Amendment. The inmates also alleged violation of equal protection
because male inmates were granted access to a sensorially disabled unit, but not females. The
district court found that the defendants violated all statutes and constitutional provisions under
which the inmates had sought relief, warranting declaratory and injunctive relief. The court found
violation of the requirements of the ADA with regard to protection against discrimination and the
location of accessible services, activities and facilities. The court found violation of ADA's selfevaluation obligations, noting that while the department did complete the physical plant and
personnel portions of the self-evaluation, those did not include an evaluation of inmate housing.
The court found that the defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act and ADA by failing to provide
them with timely access to telepbone communication devices, close caption decoders for televisions,
and special alarms to alert them in the event of a fire. The court held that even if all of the needs
of deaf and hearing-impaired inmates were met at a sensorially disabled unit at one prison, the
defendants violated their rights under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA by transferring them to
other facilities for disciplinary, safety ancVor medical reasons. Also, the court found that the fact
that there were more male deaf and hearing-impaired inmates requiring services than female did
not justify the fact that many male inmates--but no female inmates--had access to a prison's
sensorially disabled unit. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

u.s. DiS'lrict Court

Demaio v. Mann, 877 F.Supp. 89 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). An inmate brought a Section 1983
action against officials at a New York correctional facility. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court found that the inmate had no protected liberty interest in confmement
in an unshielded cell. The addition of a plexiglass shield to the cell did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment on the inmate where the shield did not interfere with the air circulation and
the cell was, in all other respects, identical to the standard cell in which the inmate had been
previously housed. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

CEI.LS

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE
CROWDING

Harris v. City of Philadelphia. 47 F.3d 1311 and 1333 (3rd Cir. 1995). In a jail conditions
case, appeals were taken from orders of the United States District Court assessing
stipulated penalties against a city, directing production of a facilities audit required under
a consent decree, declaring the city in contempt and dismissing a motion to modify the decree. The
appeals court found that the imposition of penalties stipulated in the decree to be imposed for a
delay in submitting planning documents "without any further direction from the Court," did not
require notice and a hearing that would be required for a civil contempt sanction. In addition, the
court was·not required to find that there was no good cause for the city's delays for imposition of
the penalties. Any additional cost if a facilities audit was submitted before the physical standards
were approved did not make submission of the audit "impossible.• The court also found that
changes in administrative policy resulting from the election of a new mayor did not permit the city
to unilaterally default on its obligations to the court and other litigants under the consent decree
and did not preclude an imposition of a contempt sanction. In the jail conditions litigation, the
dismissal of the city's motion to modify the consent decree was an

15.25

inappropriat.e sanction for civil cont.empt based on a delay in submitting plans, as the sanction was
not compensatory nor was it denied to have a coercive effect because it had no provision explicitly
permitting the city to refile a motion once the documents were submitt.ed. The U.S. District Court
held the city in cont.empt for failing to comply with an order requiring the city to maintain a 90%
occupancy rat.e in a residential drug treatment facility. The appeals court found that the city was
provided notice and a hearing sufficient to satisfy its due process rights before the district court
imposed a cont.empt sanction of $125,000. (Philadelphia Prison System, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
CELL SIZE

Karacsonyi v. Radloff, 885 F.Supp. 368 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). A federal inmat.e sued a prison official
alleging violation of his constitutional rights by the official's decision to penalize him for not
participating in the lnmat.e Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). The district court granted
summary judgment for the official on issues relating to the IFRP decision, but found that the
inmat.e's placement in a four-person cell which measured approximat.ely 115 square feet (roughly
29 square feet of living space per man) may have amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
depending upon the duration of this living situation and whether it lead to deprivations of essential
needs, such as sanitation. (Ray Brook Federal Correctional Institution, New York)

U.S. District Court
DOUBLE-CELLING

Madrid y. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D.Cal. 1995). lnmat.es brought a class action suit
challenging conditions of confinement at a new high-security prison complex in California. The
district court found for the plaintiffs in the majority of issues present.ed, ordered injunctive relief
and appointed a special master to direct a remedial plan tailored to correct specific constitutional
violations. In the beginning of its lengthy opinion, the court not.ed that this "...is not a case about
inadequat.e or det.eriorating physical conditions ... rather, plaintiffs cont.end that behind the newlymint.ed walls and shiny equipment lies a prison that is coldly indifferent to the limit.ed, but basic
and elemental, rights that incarcerated persons--including the 'worst of the worst'--retain
under ... our Constitution." The court held that the fact that a prison may be new does not excuse
its obligation to operat.e it in a constitutionally acceptable manner. The court held that prison
inmat.es established prison officials' deliberat.e indifference to the use of excessive force by showing
that they knew that unnecessary and grossly excessive force was being employed against inmates
on a frequent basis and that these practices posed a substantial risk of harm to inmat.es. According
to the court, officials consciously disregarded the risk of harm, choosing inst.ead to tolerat.e and even
encourage abuses of force by deliberat.ely ignoring them when they occurred, tacitly accepting a
code of silence, and failing to implement adequat.e systems to control and regulat.e the use of force.
The court found that officials had an affirmative management strat.egy to permit the use of
excessive force for the purpose of punishment and det.errence. The court found that double-celling
and inmat.e assaults did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation in the absence of
evidence that the overall total number of cell fights over a three-year period was significantly more
than would be expected for a facility of the prison's size and security designation. (Pelican Bay
Stat.e Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Masonoff y. DuBois, 899 F.Supp. 782 (D.Mass. 1995). Prison inmat.es filed a class action suit
against prison officials alleging that conditions of confinement violat.ed their rights under the
Eighth Amendment. The district court grant.ed summary judgment, in part, for the inmat.es.
The court found that the use of chemical toilets violated the Eighth Amendment rights of the
inmat.es where the use and emptying of the toilets resulted in extremely unsanitary conditions,
the toilets caused an unbearable stench, and prison inmat.es suffered numerous health problems
caused by the use of toilets including nausea, burns, and rashes. The court also found that there
were genuine issues of mat.erial fact as to whether prison officials acted with deliberat.e indifference
regarding chemical toilets, precluding summary judgment. The court denied summary judgment
for the prison officials with regard to fire safety issues raised by the inmat.es. lnmat.es alleged fire
hazards caused by the lack of a functioning sprinkler system and the lack of automatic locks on cell
doors, which are required by a stat.e building code. Prison officials responded that the facility had
implemented a rigorous fire safety program which mitigated any dangers imposed by these
deficiencies. The court noted that while it may look to stat.e codes in its effort to det.ermine society's
standard of decency, such standards do not necessarily reflect constitutional minima. The court
found that the inmat.es' assertion that their exposure to asbestos fibers causes cancer stated a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim, precluding summary judgment. (Southeast Correctional
Cent.er, Massachusetts)

HYGIENE
PLUMBING
SANITATION

1996

u.s. Appeals Court
NOISE
LIGHTS

Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996). A county jail resident filed a prose§ 1983
action against jail officials, alleging constitutional deprivations. The district court dismissed
the suit and the inmat.e appealed. 'Ibe appeals court affirmed the lower court decisions
regarding some conditions of confinement and issues, including floor-sleeping, theft of his property,
lockdowns, denial of access to courts, and denial of opportunity to participat.e in rehabilitative
programs to earn good-time credits. But the appeals court reversed the lower court by finding that
several allegations were sufficient to stat.e claims. The inmat.e alleged that he was restricted to his
cell or unit for ext.ended periods of time and had insufficient space to exercise in his unit. His
claims that his pleas for psychological treatment were ignored and that he was deprived of
necessary medication were also sufficient to overcome a motion to

15.26

dismiss. The court found that although the inmate had no right to leave his cell to go to a general
reading library, his allegation of denial of access to reading materials and inadequate lighting for
reading in the jail stated a § 1983 claim. The inmate's claim of excessive noise in the jail also
stated a § 1983 claim. He alleged that noise occurred every night--often all night--and interrupted
or prevented his sleep. He also stated a claim by alleging that he was denied protection from cold
temperatures in the jail by the jail staffs failure to provide him with blankets. (Cook County Jail,
Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
Bryanty. Madigan. 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). A paraplegic inmate sued prison employees
ADA-AMERICANS WITH under the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for allegedly
DISABILITIES ACT
refusing his request for guardrails for his bed, and for denying him pain medication. The
district court dismissed the case and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
finding that the inmate failed to state a claim under ADA. The appeals court discussed the
question of whether the ADA is applicable to correctional facilities, noting that the question has
divided the circuit courts. The court stated that it was very far from clear that prisoners should
be considered "qualified individual[s]" within the meaning of the Act According to the court,
incarceration, which requires the provision of a place to sleep, is not a "program" or "activity" of a
public entity within the meaning of the Act, nor is sleeping in one's cell. Even if there were some
applicability of the Act to inmates. the court found that ADA would not be violated by a prison's
simply failing to attend to the medical needs of its disabled prisoners, or by medical malpractice.
The court found that the inmate did not allege discrimination based on his disability, but rather
incompetence in the treatment of his condition. 011. Dept of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
FURNISHINGS

Davidson v. Scully, 914 F.Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). A prisoner moved for a preliminary
injunction in his suit against prison officials. The district court refused to grant an injunction
regarding the prisoner's claim that furnishings and supplies were inadequate .to allow him to
prepare his case. The court noted that although having to sit on a bed and write on a shelf'
attached to the wall, with an undersized pen, using only an overhead light fixture as lighting,
might cause strain and make writing less comfortable, these complaints did not amount to an
unconstitutional denial of reasonable access. The court found that the state's decisions regarding
furnishings and supplies available to inmates in the special housing unit were reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests, supporting the need to limit furniture and light fixtures to items
that are immobile. (Auburn Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CEIL SIZE

Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1996). A prison inmate filed civil
rights claims and state law claims against county officials alleging violation of his constitutional
rights when he was a pretrial detainee. The district court granted summary judgment for some
defendants, and the appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part The court found that
confinement of the pretrial detainee in a space of just over 30 square feet and the use of a floor
mattress for 13 nights did not constitute "punishment" in violation of the detainee's due process
rights. The court noted that the totality of circumstances supported the existence of a legitimate
governmental interest, based on the short duration of confinement, the necessity to keep the
detainee under observation for both his medical condition and safety concerns, and the amount of
time he spent out of his cell. (Cape Girardeau County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court

Keenan v. Hall. 83 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1996). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against
prison officials and employees. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
finding that summary judgment was precluded for several allegations. The appeals court found
that a disputed issue of material fact as to noise in the prison--whether there was constant yelling,
screaming and banging--precluded summary judgment The court also found that allegations that
the prison had inadequate ventilation and air flow might state a claim for cruel and unusual
punishment if the conditions undermine the health of inmates and the sanitation of the prison.
Confinement in a 54 square foot cell did not violate the inmate's right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Although the average temperature of the inmate's cell tended to be either
well above or well below room temperature, the inmate's constitutional rights were not violated.
The court ruled that the practice of requiring inmates to live in constant illumination results in
unconstitional physical and psychological harm. (Oregon State Prison)

LIGHTS
VENTILATION
CELL SIZE

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CONSENT DECREE
COURT ORDER

McClendon y. Cit,y of Albuquerque, 79 F.3d 1014 (10th Cir. 1996). After a class action suit was
filed against a detention facility, the district court granted a preliminary injunction to reduce
the population. The district court judge had made an unannounced visit to the facility, which
was followed by a one-day evidentiary hearing. The preliminary injunction was converted into
a permanent injunction based on a partial settlement agreement between the parties. The district
court ordered the facility to reduce its inmate population according to a schedule of progressively
decreasing population caps, and imposed detailed conditions concerning the day-to-day operation
of the facility. To comply with the population caps, the order required the defendants to implement
a "Matrix Release System" (MRS) which assigned a numerical score to each inmate, providing the
basis for the release of selected prisoners when the population cap was exceeded. After using the
MRS twice, the defendants decided to avoid exceeding the population caps by housing inmates in
other facilities. The plaintiffs objected to the arrangements that were proposed (which included
using tents, the basement of the courthouse, and re-opening a facility which had been closed) and

15.27

filed suit. The judge imposed a condition which required the defendants to make any proposed site
available to plaintiffs' counsel for inspection; in the event of a dispute between the parties, the
judge noted that he would be "happy to tour any other facilities that may be used as an interim
measure." Local government officials and employees filed an application for an emergency stay
of the order and a writ of prohibition seeking relief from the injunction. The district court had
required prior court approval and inspection by inmates' counsel of any confinement facilities that
were to be used other than the local detention center. The appeals court assigned the petition for
writ to a panel for review, and granted a stay of the district court order, fmding that the local
officials had demonstrated the likelihood of success on appeal. The officials secured a stay of the
order and eventually the court vacated some elements of the decision when the City opened a new
facility (100 F.3d 869) (Bernalillo Co. Det. Center, N. M.)
U.S. District Court
ADA-AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
CELLS

Roe v. County Com'n of Monongalia County, 926 F.Supp. 74 (N.D.W.Va. 1996). A mental
health patient brought an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against a
county and county officials for alleged statutory and constitutional violations which occurred
when the patient was picked up on a mental health warrant. The district court denied the
defendants' motions to dismiss, finding that the action was timely and that the patient stated a
claim under ADA. The patient claimed he was held for a time in a padded cell, was handcuffed
and shackled, was not given proper treatment or a hearing, and was not allowed to use a bathroom,
change clothes or eat without handcuffs. The court found that the inmate was unable to
communicate with his family, was unable to attend to his personal hygiene, and was isolated and
segregated in a manner that the ADA was designed to prevent. (Monongalia County Sheriffs
Department)
1997

U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENI' DECREE

Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 1997). Prison officials who had entered
into a consent decree governing conditions at New York City jails moved for the
immediate termination of those decrees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Pretrial
detainees opposed the motion. The district court vacated the decrees and the detainees appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that the PLRA's consent decree
termination provision did not violate the separation of powers principle, equal protection or due
process. The court found, however, that the provision refers to constitutional termination of federal
remedies arising out of consent decrees, but does not mandate the termination of the decrees
themselves. The court also found that the PLRA provision made only the nonfederal aspects of a
consent decree unenforceable by federal courts; nonfederal provisions remained binding but could
only be enforced by state courts. (New York City Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997). A former state
prisoner sued the Indiana Department of Corrections alleging violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the
suit on the ground that the Act is inapplicable to prison inmates and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to
state prisoners. The court stated that although incarceration itself is hardly a "program" or
"activity" to which a disabled person might wish access, there is no doubt that an educational
program is a program and when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a "program" within the
meaning of the ADA. The court also held that the use of a state prison library and dining hall are
"activities" under ADA, conferring rights on qualified disabled individuals. The State had conceded
that ADA applied to a prison's relations with its employees and visitors, as well as to public
schools. According to the court, ADA was cast in terms of eliminating a form of discrimination that
Congress considered unfair, not in terms of subsidizing an interest group. The court decision did
not discuss the Rehabilitation Act separately because it found it to be "materially identical to and
the model for the ADA." (Indiana Department of Corrections)
·

U.S. Appeals Court
VENTILATION

Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 64-0 (7th Cir. 1997). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials alleging that conditions of his confmement in protective custody
violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded
in part. The appeals court held that poor ventilation in the inmate's cell during the summer did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. as the cell had a window which opened and a small electric fan,
and a small "chuckhole" in the door which provided some cross-ventilation. The prisoner's claims
that the rank air in the cell exposed him to diseases and caused respiratory problems was not
backed by medical or scientific sources. The appeals court found that summary judgment was
precluded by issues of fact as to whether clothes and bedding provided to the prisoner adequately
protected him from cold temperatures in his cell in the winter. The court noted that to determine
whether low temperatures in the cell violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, the court
should examine such factors as the severity of the cold, its duration, whether the prisoner has an
alternative means to protect himself from cold, the adequacy of such alternatives, and whether the
prisoner must endure other uncomfortable conditions as well as cold. (Stateville Correctional
Center, Illinois)

15.28

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY
HYGIENE
LIGHTS
NOISE
PLUMBING
SAFETY
SANITATION
EARTHQUAKES
CELLSIZE
CROWDING
STAFFING
DOUBLE CELLING

Jones v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F .Supp. 896 (N .D.Cal. 1997). Pretrial
detainees brought a class action against the City and County of San Francisco and
various city officials challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement
at a jail. The district court granted various summaiy judgment motions tiled by the
plaintiffs and the defendants, enjoining future overcrowding based on past
unconstitutional overcrowding. The court found due process violations based on the
defendants' inadequate response to fire safety risks at the jail, excessive risks of harm
from earthquakes, physical defects in the jail's water, plumbing and sewage systems,
excessive noise levels, and poor lighting. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to
show deliberate indifference or another basis for liability on the claims of current
overcrowding, inadequate food preparation and storage, provision of medical services,
personal visitation, hours and accessibility of legal visitation, legal materials and
assistance, and outdoor recreation. The court noted that pretrial detainees enjoy the
greater protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, rather
than the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court found that some conditions of pretrial confinement may violate the
Constitution in combination when they would not do so alone, but only when they have a
mutually enforcing effect that produces deprivation of a single, identifiable human need
such as food, warmth, or exercise.
Conditions violated the pretrial detainees' due process rights where the jail operated at
about 124% of its capacity on average during a nine-month period, resulting in doublecelling of inmates in 41-square-foot cells designed for single occupancy, and causing
excessive time in cells and insufficient day room space when inmates were allowed to leave
their cells.
The court found that officials were entitled to summaiy judgment precluding any
finding of deliberate indifference on crowding and space allocation claims because of their
efforts to move inmates from the jail to relieve overcrowding.
The court found that the detainees were not provided with reasonable safety from fire
because the defendants failed to install door assemblies or additional sprinklers and had not
responded reasonably to fire safety risks at the jail.
The detainees were exposed to excessive risks of harm from earthquakes in violation of
their due process rights, where the jail lay a quarter mile from the San Andreas fault and
faced a 50% chance of experiencing a high magnitude earthquake over the next 50 years.
The jail appeared structurally unable to withstand substantial seismic activity and had a
malfunctioning bar locking system and inadequate staffmg that further augmented risk by
potentially leaving inmates trapped in their cells during and after an earthquake. The court
rejected the government's contention that more than 30 public buildings in the area had the
same seismic rating as the jail. The court noted that the public's alleged tolerance of risk
associated with entering a poorly-constructed library or museum for an hour did not equate
to tolerance for spending 100 days continuously trapped in such a facility.
The court found deliberate indifference to the risk of earthquakes despite the
defendants' contention that it would cost more than $33 million to upgrade the jail and
efforts to gain voter approval for funding for a new facility had failed. The court noted that
the city could have attempted other funding methods and did have some funds allocated for
seismic repairs but diverted that money to other projects.
The court found due process violations resulting from physical defects in the jail's water,
plumbing and sewage system which created safety hazards. The jail's antiquated water
supply system violated public health requirements and safe drinking water codes.
Deteriorated sanitary fixtures such as unsealed floors, hot water pipes with deteriorated
asbestos insulation, violated the detainees' rights as did sewage leaks from plumbing
equipment. These conditions violated detainees' rights even though there was no evidence of
any disease resulting from the deficiencies.
Despite some efforts to reduce noise in the jail, the detainees established a constitutional
violation in noise levels which ranged between 73 and 96 decibels, exceeding acceptable
levels, and caused increased risk of psychological harm and safety concerns due to officers'
inability to hear calls for help. The extent to which noise continued to exceed maximum
standards suggested that previous noise reduction efforts were merely cosmetic and that far
more could be done.
The court found due process violations from poor lighting where correctional standards
mandated lighting of at least 20 foot--<:andles in living areas, and some health standards
required 30 foot-candles, but readings in the jail ranged from 0.28 to 5 foot-candles.
The court concluded that development and implementation of a narrowly tailored
remedial plan was an appropriate remedy, and that the plan was to address each condition
that was found unconstitutional including fire safety, seismic safety, water, plumbing,
sewage, noise, lighting and overcrowding. (San Francisco Jail No. 3, California)

U.S. District Court
VENTILATION

Thomas v. Irvin, 981 F.Supp. 794 (W.D.N.Y.1997). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action
against prison officials alleging that their placement of him in drug watch isolation
status for seven days violated the Eighth Amendment and his due process rights. The
district court found that the state did not violate the inmate's due process rights, noting that
the room in which he was confined was larger than an average cell at the prison and was
equipped with all of the essential items necessary for proper rest and hygiene. The inmate

15.29

was allowed to exercise and smoke cigarettes, and he received regular meals and daily
medical attention. The officials had obtained credible information from a confidential
informant that the inmate was in possession of narcotics after a visit. The prisoner had
alleged that the isolation room had inadequate ventilation because two air vents in the room
were covered as a security measure to prevent inmates from concealing contraband in the
vents. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

1998
U.S. District Court
VENTILATION
DOUBLE CELLING
CELL SIZE

Bolton v. Goord, 992 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Inmates brought a§ 1983 suit claiming
that New York's practice of housing two inmates in a prison cell previously used to house
one inmate violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court held that
double celling under the conditions set forth at trial did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment and that New York had not conferred on inmates a protected liberty interest in
single-cell housing. The court held that the application of the Eighth Amendment is guided
by contemporary standards of decency, but while the opinions of experts and the standards
established by concerned organizations may be helpful on some questions, they do not
establish constitutional minima. According to the court. public attitudes toward certain
punishment, or what society is willing to tolerate in its prisons, is the more appropriate
gauge of contemporary standards. The court noted that when double-celling was researched
prior to its implementation, officials considered whether an inmate was violent or victim.prone before placing him in a double cell, evidence did not establish a cause and effect
relationship between double-celling and an increase in violence, and guidelines for doublecelling took into account medical conditions. According to the court, double-celling was in
effect in most other state prison systems and in the federal system at the time it was
implemented in New York. Inmates had the same access to extensive programs and services
after double-celling was implemented, and there was no evidence of "overcrowding" in the
sense that the facility had to compromise its services in order to handle the additional
number of inmates. The court also noted that disputes between cellmates were handled
quickly and never rose to more than minor incidents of physical violence, the small cell size
was not shown to have resulted in the deprivation of any basic human need, and there was
no indication that natural ventilation was so inadequate as to cause injury. According to the
court, the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee inmates a certain type of ventilation or a
certain rate of air exchange. (Woodbume Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
PLUMBING

Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff in his individual capacity. and a county, alleging he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement while he was confined in the
jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that summary judgment for the
sheriff was precluded by the nature, seriousness and duration of the alleged deprivations.
The detainee alleged that he was placed in a cell that measured eleven by fifteen feet with
five or six other men for 24-hours a day, that his bed linens were never cleaned nor
exchanged, that he was permitted only two showers a week in an unsanitary shower stall,
that the sink in his cell frequently clogged and prevented his basic hygiene, that his cell had
poor ventilation, and that he was allowed out of his cell for recreation only two times during
his confinement. The parties disagreed on the length of the detainee's confinement. which
the court found to be between two-and-one-half months and six months. (Otero County Jail,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE

Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger. 18 F .8upp.2d 445 (D.N .J. 1998).
Inmates filed a motion to hold county corrections defendants in civil contempt for
noncompliance with a consent decree addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
The district court held that monetary sanctions for civil contempt were not appropriate in
light of the county's efforts to attain full compliance by investing over $200 million in new
facilities and improving existing ones. The court concluded that contempt sanctions would
be counterproductive and would impede the county's efforts to build a new jail. The court
held that it could not consider whether a classification plan satisfied the consent decree until
an independent analysis was conducted. The court noted that the Special Master reported
that staffing was inadequate, and as a result inmates and staff are exposed to danger and
other problems. The court adopted the Master's recommendation that an independent,
professional staffing analysis be conducted to address staff training, coverage and
operations. The Master also reported that there was an insufficient supply of personal
hygiene items, and the court ordered the defendants to comply with the consent order's
terms by issuing adequate amounts of personal hygiene items, including toilet paper, soap,
shampoo, toothpaste, toothbrush, comb, mirror, individual razors and shaving cream or
powder. (Essex County Jail and Essex County Jail Annex, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN

Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 14 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.N.M. 1998). A female
inmate who had been raped by a prison guard brought a § 1983 action alleging that
officials deliberately disregarded a substantial risk of harm to her and denied her necessary
psychological care. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials.
15.30

The court held that the officials' awareness of two prior incidents of sexual misconduct by other
security and correctional officers was not sufficient to establish that the officials must have drawn
the inference that a substantial risk of harm existed. The court found that the alleged
"voyeuristic" location and viewability of shower areas, the absence of food tray slots in a
segregation unit, and the staffing and monitoring of guards in the segregation unit, did not create
a substantial risk of harm. The court held that the inmate was not deprived of necessary medical
care following the incident. She received psychiatric care after she was sexually assault, her care
was assessed by an independent psychiatric medical evaluator who concluded that her treatment
had been "reasonable and appropriate," and she saw a psychiatrist 18 times and a psychologist at
least 100 times during a six month period. <New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility, operated
by the Corrections Corporation of America)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL AREAS

Morales Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F.Supp.2d 151 (D.Puerto Rico 1998). In
an ongoing action against a corrections system seeking improvement of medical and
mental health care provided to inmates, an expert witness prepared a report documenting the
state of compliance with prior orders that had been entered. The district court held that the
correctional system continued to violate inmates' Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by failing to provide adequate medical care. The court found that the officials' actions or
lack thereof contributed to the deaths of inmates and to the infliction of pain and suffering. The
court ruled that there were systematic deficiencies in staffing, facilities, procedures and
administration, and that officials acted in a manner that was deliberately indifferent to the basic
human and health needs of inmates. The court found many violations of inmates' constitutional
rights. The court noted that budgetary limitations or inadequate resources can never be a valid
justification for constitutional violations. The court concluded that the system had failed to
provide adequate facilities and equipment necessary for the provision of adequate health care of
inmates pursuant to acceptable professional standards. But the court noted that despite the
findings of the expert, the National Commission on Correctional Health Care had accredited the
medical care programs in four prisons and awarded provisional accreditation to four more in 1992.
But an expert found noncompliance with at least one essential standard at every accredited
facility, and the Department of Health provided the court monitor's staff with credible evidence
that employees had falsified documents in support of accreditation. (Administration of Correction,
Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAPPED

Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 1998). Paraplegic inmates brought a § 1983
suit challenging their placement in solitary confinement. The district court ruled in
favor of the inmates and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmates'
Eighth Amendment rights were violated and that damage awards of $2,000 for each inmate for
their 32-hour period of solitary confinement were not excessive . The court found that corrections
officials violated the inmates' rights because the inmates did not receive adequate food or medical
care while in solitary confmement. The inmates' wheelchairs did not fit through the solitary
confinement cell doors, so they were lifted onto their beds and their wheelchairs were folded and
then reopened inside their cells. Because their wheelchairs could not pass their cell bunks to
reach the barred door where food trays were set, the inmates missed four consecutive meals. The
inmates were unable to use a toilet during their 32-hours in solitary confmement because the
facilities were not accessible and no assistance was provided. <Arkansas Department of
Corrections, Diagnostic Unit)

U.S. District Court
ASBESTOS

Smith v. Montefiore Med. Center-Health Services, 22 F.Supp.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
A pretrial detainee sued a city and city corrections officials to recover from alleged injuries he
suffered as the result of his alleged exposure to asbestos. The district court held that a three-day
delay in treating the detainee after his alleged exposure did not amount to deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs, noting that a mere delay in rendering medical treatment does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court also found that prison officials' failure to
warn the detainee of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in connection with asbestos abatement
work in the prison did not support a claim of deliberate indifference. Warning signs were
reportedly posted three days after the alleged incident, which the court found to be at most
negligent conduct. (George Motchan Detention Center, New York)
1999

U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
COURT ORDER

Berwanger v. Cottey. 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999). A county jail moved under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to terminate the maximum population features of a court
injunction. The district court entered an order terminating all prisoner release orders but the
appeals court remanded the case. The appeals court held that the district court erred by letting
more than a year pass without action on the motion to terminate prospective relief, and then
terminating the decree without making any findings. <Marion County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
HYGIENE
SANITATION
PLUMBING

Harris v. Brewington-Carr, 49 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.Del. 1999). A pretrial detainee challenged
his conditions of confinement and a district court judge refused to dismiss the case, finding
that the detainee had sufficiently alleged violation of his due process rights. The pretrial
detainee alleged that he was required to sleep on the floor for one week while being held in a
booking and receiving area, that he had to sleep on the floor for three weeks before receiving
15.31

a bed, that he was housed in a one man cell with two other men, that the open toilet in his cell
was unsanitary and deprived him of his right to privacy, that there was a lack of showers and
excessive noise, that he was housed with sentenced and unsentenced inmates, and that as a nonsmoker he had to breathe cigarette smoke from other inmates. (Multi-Purpose Criminal Justice
Facility, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
DAYROOM
RECREATION AREAS
WINDOWS

Richard v. Reed, 49 F.Supp.2d 485 (E.D.Va. 1999). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 complaint
alleging that county jail officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by depriving him of
direct sunlight for more than 100 days. The district court dismissed the case, finding that
the prisoner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because deprivation of sunlight for 100
days was not a sufficiently serious deprivation of a human need. The court held that the case was
frivolous. The prisoner was confined in a housing unit comprised of a dayroom which had no
windows and ten cells, each of which had a window. Prisoners were not allowed in their cells
between 8:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. and prisoners who wanted to take recreation could use an indoor
recreation area. The prisoner alleged that his health was placed in danger because he was
exposed to illness caused by a lack of exposure to direct sunlight. The court suggested that there
might be extreme circumstances under which deprivation of sunlight or light for an extended
period of time might amount to a serious deprivation, but found this was not such a case. The
court cited Charles Dicken's A Tale of Two Cities in which a character was imprisoned in the
Bastille for almost eighteen years in a small cell "where the light of day has never shone." But
after reviewing nine cases that had considered a similar question with varied results, the court
concluded that "the threshold for constitutional significance occurs well short of the Dickens
example." The court found that the conditions cited by the prisoner did not violate contemporary
notions of decency, stating that "This conclusion finds support given that people who serve on
nuclear submarines or who live within the Arctic Circle or in Antarctica go without direct
exposure to sunlight for similarly long periods of time." The court also noted that the window in
the prisoner's cell would provide natural light in the summertime when he was allowed back into
the cell at 5:30 p.m. (Fairfax County Adult Detention Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED

Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Kan. 1999). A former county jail inmate, a double amputee
without legs from a point below his knees, brought a civil rights action against jail officials asserting
claims under the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied summary judgment for the
defendants, finding that it was precluded on all claims. The court held that refusal to provide the
inmate with a wheelchair while confined in the county jail did not violate the Eighth Amendment
since jail exits, entrances and hallways were too narrow to accommodate wheelchairs and there
were legitimate safety concerns about placing a wheelchair among the jail's general population.
The court also found that deficiencies such as plumbing problems, overcrowding, inadequate
exercise areas, and other defects during the inmate's confinement in the county jail did not rise to
the level of cruel and unusual punishment; there were opportunities to exercise in dayrooms,
plumbing problems and other allegedly unsanitary conditions did not pose a serious threat to the
health, safety or well-being of the inmate, and overcrowding did not result in denial of the
minimal measures of life's necessities. But the court denied summary judgment for jail officials on
the issue of whether they were deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of the inmate while he
was confined at the jail. The court noted that the ability of the inmate to move himself about in
the jail, to use the toilet, to use the shower, to obtain his meals, and to obtain suitable recreation
and exercise, were a basic need that jail officials were obligated to help provide under the Eighth
Amendment. The court also noted that the fact that the inmate was able to use most of the jail
services did not preclude his Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or Rehabilitation Act claims
against jail officials. (Cowley County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

White v. Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d 848 (N.D.Ill. 1999). An inmate at a state prison brought an
action against prison officials and a construction company to recover damages for injuries he
incurred in a fire. The district court dismissed the construction company from the suit finding that
the company was not a "state actor" for the purposes of§ 1983. The court found that the inmate stated
a claim against prison officials by alleging that they failed to assist him for an unreasonable time
during a prison fire. According to the court, the allegation that state correctional officials knew the
inmate faced severe and substantial risk from fire because of inoperative fire safety and prevention
equipment, and failed to ensure that the system was operational, stated an Eighth Amendment claim.
In addition to their disregard of non-operational fire safety and prevention systems, officials also
allegedly failed to free the inmate from his burning cell. (Joliet Correctional Center, Illinois)

2000
U.S. Appeals Court
FURNISHINGS
SAFETY

Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2000). An inmate sought permission to proceed in forma
pauperis in his§ 1983 action that alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights because his
sleeping bunk was installed upside down causing him to slide off and land on the concrete floor,
and that anchor bolts that fastened the bunk to the wall improperly protruded into the sleeping
area posing a potential for injury. The district court denied the inmate's motion finding the action
to be frivolous, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
the inmate's claims could conceivably implicate an Eighth Amendment concern. (Hardeman
County Correctional Facility, Tennessee)
15.32

U.S. District Court
PROTECTIVE
CUSTODY

Graham v. Perez. 121 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Protective custody inmates at a state prison
brought a § 1983 action challenging their conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed
the case, finding that the inmates failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing
suit. The court also found that certain complained-of conditions of confinement were insufficiently
serious to constitute Eighth Amendment violations as a matter of law. The complaints included:
only two and one-half hours out of cell time daily, deprivation of job opportunities and prison
wages, limited location and content of meals, inadequate lighting. lack of electrical outlets in cells.
limited recreational opportunities. limited access to newspapers, limited personal telephone calls,
and limited personal grooming opportunities. (Fishkill Correctional Facility. New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dept.• 228 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2000). Survivors of an arrestee
who had committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's department and against the
sheriff and deputies. The district court denied individual defendants' motions to dismiss on the
ground of qualified immunity and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded the case. The appeals court held that the sheriff and senior deputy, who knew
of a prior suicide under similar circumstances, could have been found to have acted with
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's known suicidal tendencies, but that a newly-hired deputy
who only followed orders which were not facially outrageous, was entitled to qualified immunity.
The arrestee had been placed in a cell that had a significant blind spot and tie off points. and was
provided with a blanket and towel even though a prior detainee had hanged himself in the same
cell under similar circumstances. The female arrestee had been brought to the local jail by state
troopers who informed jail employees that she had tried to kill herself when she was
apprehended. She was placed in a "detox" cell which is used to house inmates who are intoxicated,
who need to be isolated for security reasons. or who are designated for placement on a suicide
watch. The arrestee was placed on a suicide watch. but the cell could be completely observed only
if an officer viewed it from an adjacent hallway. The following evening the arrestee was discovered
hanging from a light fixture in the cell, having not been observed by jail staff for as many as 45
minutes prior to being discovered. (West Feliciana Parish Prison. Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP

Kruger v. Jenne, 164 F.Supp.2d 1330 (S.D.Fla. 2000). A blind county jail inmate brought a§ 1983
and Americans with Disability Act (ADA) suit against a sheriff and a private medical care
company that contracted to provide medical care to inmates. alleging deprivation of necessary
accommodations and failure to treat his medical needs. The district court held that the inmate
stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the company and an ADA claim against the
sheriff in his ofiicial capacity. and allowed the inmate to maintain simultaneous ADA and § 1983
claims against the sheriff. The private medical company allegedly failed to accommodate the
inmate's blindness with a cane or otherwise, despite advance notice of the need for one. and
allegedly deliberately delayed or withheld needed treatment for injuries sustained in several falls.
based on cost-savings policies. leading to unnecessary suffering. The sheriff allegedly failed to
have the inmate's cell fitted with hand rails or provide him with a cane, leading directly to the
inmate's injuries when he suffered several falls. The inmate alleged that the sheriff carried out a
policy of denying or delaying needed medical care for cost-savings reasons. (North Broward
Detention Center, Florida. and EMSA Correctional Care)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
SANITATION

Oladipupo v. Austin. 104 F.Supp.2d 626 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a§ 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confmement. The district court held that the failure of jail officials to segregate pretrial detainees
who were HIV positive did not violate the due process rights of non-infected detainees. The court
denied summary judgment for the ofiicials on the issue of whether the jail's dormitory violated
state fire and sanitation codes. The detainee alleged that the dormitory was overcrowded and had
only eight sinks, commodes and showers for 72 pretrial detainees that were housed in the
dormitory. (Avoyelles Parish Jail. Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
VENTILATION
CROWDING

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 654 (W.D.La. 2000). A detainee of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) who was awaiting removal from the United States brought a § 1983
action against parish jail officials challenging the constitutionality of his conditions of
confinement. The district court held that the allegation that the detainee was deprived of a
mattress and bed presented a cognizable constitutional claim. According to the court. the
detainee's allegation that he was forced to sleep on a cold, wet floor for seven hours presented a
due process claim. Jail officers had removed mattresses from a cell in which the detainee and
others were housed after they had placed barriers in front of the ventilation system in an attempt
to control the temperature in the cell. The court held that an issue offact existed as to whether
jail officials were personally involved in creating and perpetuating the conditions. (Avoyelles
Parish Jail. Louisiana)
2001

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITATION AREAS

Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). A city corrections department moved for
immediate termination of consent decrees requiring judicial supervision over restrictive housing,
inmate correspondence, and law libraries at city jails, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (pLRA). The district court vacated the decrees and pretrial detainees appealed. The appeals
15.33

court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand the district court granted the
motion in part and denied it in part and the city appealed. The appeals affirmed. The appeals
court held that the detainees were not required to show actual injury when they challenged
regulations which allegedly adversely affected their Sixth Amendment right to counsel by
impeding attorney visitation. The appeals court concluded that there was a continuing need for
prospective relief with respect to the detainees' right to counsel, and the relief granted by the
district court satisfied the requirements of PLRA. The court found that detainees were
experiencing unjustified delays during attorney visitation. The district court required procedures
to be established to ensure that attorney visits commenced within a specified time period
following arrival at the jail, and the city was instructed to ensure the availability of an adequate
number of visiting rooms that provide the requisite degree of privacy. (New York City Department
of Correction)
U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Brown v. McElroy, 160 F.Supp.2d 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). A prisoner brought an action against the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and Public Health Service (PHS) alleging
inadequate medical treatment and other complaints. The district court found that PHS officials
were absolutely immune from liability on the claim of inadequate health care. The court found no
constitutional violation from the alleged conditions of a cold room, no clean bed linens, toiletries,
or clean clothing. (Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, Batavia, New York)

U.S. District Court
BEDS
NOISE
TEMPERATURE
FURNISHINGS
SANITATION

Caldwell v. District of Columbia, 201 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001). An inmate filed a§ 1983 action
against the District of Columbia and several employees of its corrections department, alleging
unconstitutional conditions of confinement and denial of medical care. A jury entered a verdict in
favor of the inmate, on all claims, and awarded $174,178. The appeals court granted judgment for
the defendants as a matter of law, in part, denied judgment for the defendants in part, and did not
reduce the damage award. The court found that statements by the inmate's attorney during his
closing argument, suggesting specific dollar amounts to be considered by the jury, did not warrant
a new trial. The appeals court held that findings that conditions were unconstitutional were
supported by evidence, as were findings that officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
serious medical needs. The appeals court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a "physical
injury" for the purposes of PLRA, with allegations that excessive heat in his cell made him dizzy,
dehydrated, and disoriented, gave him a severe rash, and that smoke from rolled toilet paper
"wicks" and frequent use of mace gave him bronchial irritation and a runny nose. The inmate also
alleged that the small bunk aggravated his arthritis. According to the court, the inmate did not
have to allege that excessive noise in the cell block caused him hearing loss, where his contention
was that the noise levels contributed a deprivation of sleep. The appeals court held that the
inmate's exposure to feces in his cell, foul water, filth, excessive heat, smoke, and mace, and the
lack of outdoor exercise, resulted in a substantial risk of serious harm. (Maximum Security
Facility, Lorton Correctional Complex, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
TOILETS
BEDS

Carlyle v. Aubrey, 189 F.Supp.2d 660 (W.D.Ky. 2001). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against a county jail alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the prisoner was not subjected to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, even though water service in his cell was broken, he
was forced to sleep on the floor, and he was fed only a bologna sandwich. The prisoner had
admitted that he was offered drinking water on at least two occasions and that officers brought in
water to flush the toilet. The court noted that although forcing a prisoner to sleep on the floor for
extended periods may amount to an Eighth Amendment violation, the temporary inconvenience of
one night spent on the floor does not. (Jefferson County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
CELL SIZE
CELL CAPA CITY
CROWDING

Chilcote v. Mitchell, 166 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Or. 2001). A former prisoner and detainees at a
federal detention center sued officials alleging they were subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, finding no
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations from the size of the cell. The court noted that all
three occupants of the cell could not be off of their bunks at the same time because the cell was so
small, and the occupants were confined in the cell for 20 to 21 hours daily. The court found that
the crowding was necessitated by the volume of incoming detainees and the lockdown was needed
because of the danger posed by detainees had not yet been evaluated. The cells had been designed
to house two inmates and ranged in size from 80.7 to 96 square feet. In a triple-bunk cell, 40 to 45
square feet of floor space is covered by the bunks, sink and toilet. The remaining floor space, 35 to
40 square feet "effectively does not permit all three occupants to be off their bunks at the same
time." There are no lockers, chairs or tables in the cells. (Fed'l Detention Ctr., Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
NEPA- National Envi·
ronmental Protection
Act
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT

Citizens Advy. Comm. on Priv. Pris. v. U.S. D.O.J., 197 F.Supp.2d 226 (W.D.Pa. 2001). A citizens'
committee sued the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that
the defendants failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when they
awarded a contract to build and operate a new prison to a private company. The district court held
that the committee had standing to bring the action and that the Bureau was required to prepare
a final environmental assessment. According to the court, the Bureau "basically admitting that it
had violated NEPA" ordered a halt to work on the facility and re·examined the environmental
impact. The court held that the Bureau violated the provisions of NEPA when it initially awarded
the contract. But the court found that the Bureau had cured its initial NEPA violations and was
15.34

not required to file an Environmental Impact Statement, and allowed the project to proceed.
(Cornell Corrections, Inc., Federal Bureau of Prisons, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Covillion v. Alsop, 145 F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2001). An arrestee brought a§ 1983 action alleging
excessive use of force while he was confined. The district court found that the arrestee failed to
show excessive use of force based on the allegedly freezing temperature of his holding cell. The
arrestee had alleged that he had been placed in the cell "where they turned the freezer on .. " and
implied that the jail administrator was responsible for cooling the cell. The court noted that the
thermostat that controls the cell temperature also controls the temperature of the jail control
room, booking room, and visitors' room. (Somerset County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
ASBESTOS

Crawford v. Artuz, 143 F.Supp.2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Prison inmates sued officials alleging that
the officials did not make a sufficient response to problems ca used by the presence of friable
asbestos. The court entered judgment for the officials, finding that the inmates failed to show
present or future prospects of injury from exposure to asbestos. (Green Haven Corr'l Fae., N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLUMBING
SANITATION

Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. 2001). A prisoner brought a§ 1983 action alleging
that his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed
the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and
remanded. The appeals court held that the prisoner's allegations regarding unsanitary conditions
in his cell and exposure to below-freezing temperatures during winter due to unrepaired broken
windows, were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The prisoner alleged that mice
were constantly entering his cell and that the area directly in front of his cell was filled with
human feces, urine and sewage water for several days. (Auburn Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASBESTOS
SANITATION

Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2001). An inmate brought a§ 1983 action against
prison officials alleging constitutional violations, including unhealthful conditions and exposure
to asbestos. The district court entered summary judgment for the officials and the appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate was precluded from recovering for emotional or
mental damages because he failed to allege a physical injury. The inmate alleged that he was
subject to cold showers, cold food, unsanitary dishes, insect problems, lack of adequate clothing,
and the presence of an open "cesspool" near his housing unit. (East Carroll Detention Center,
Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Navedo v. Maloney, 172 F.Supp.2d 276 (D.Mass. 2001). A state inmate brought§ 1983 and
Americans with Disabilities (ADA) actions against a state, a private medical care provider, and
medical employees, alleging that their refusal to allow him access to a wheelchair and to disabledaccessible facilities violated his civil rights and caused severe and irreparable damage to his leg.
The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants, in part, finding that fact issues
remained as to the extent of the inmate's injuries, and denied qualified immunity to the state
corrections commissioner. The commissioner had rejected the medical staffs recommendation
that the inmate be transferred to another facility with appropriate accommodations and allegedly
failed to maintain prisons in compliance with federal standards of accessibility. (Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Norfolk and Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Shirley)

2002
U.S. District Court
CROWDING
GENERAL
CONDITIONS

Bobbitt v. Detroit Edison Co., 216 F.Supp.2d 669 (E.D.Mich. 2002). An arrestee filed a§ 1983
action in state court alleging that city police officers violated her constitutional rights in
connection with her arrest for disorderly conduct. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the arrestee failed to establish liability with her
allegations that a city jail was not clean, did not provide sufficient seating, and did not provide
ready access to a telephone. According to the court, the arrestee's assertions that the city
maintained inadequate policies for training and hiring its police officers, and that an arresting
officer had been involved in one other incident of alleged misconduct, were insufficient to subject
the city to liability under§ 1983 for failing to provide adequate training. The arrestee alleged she
was forced to stand for approximately five hours in a police holding cell, that the cell contained
only a 4·inch concrete slab on which to sit, and that the slab was too low. (Eighth Precinct,
Detroit Police Department, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
SEPARATION

Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee who was severely
beaten by a fellow detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials, alleging
deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
detainee also alleged an Eighth Amendment violation resulting from failure to segregate violent
and nonviolent detainees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the appeals court affirmed. The detainee had told one jail official that he was
threatened by a fellow detainee who had a history of assaults, but the officials failed to separate
them. The court noted that the plaintiff told one official he had a black belt in martial arts and
was a decorated war hero and never requested protective custody. The court found that the

XIX

15.35

county's policy of not screening or segregating potentially violent inmates from non-violent ones
did not constitute deliberate indifference to the health and safety of detainees, because inmates
were housed in single cells and were able to lock their cells from the inside at any time.
(Hampshire County Jail/House of Corrections, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS

Carney v. Craven, 40 Fed.Appx. 48 (6th Cir. 2002). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action
under§ 1983. The district court dismissed the action and the appeals court affirmed, as modified.
The appeals court held that the prisoner failed to show that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his request to fix a faulty light which was producing a strobe-like effect, and which
allegedly caused him headaches and eye pain. The court noted that the prisoner's request to have
the bulb repaired was not recklessly disregarded, but rather, a new light bulb was not
immediately available, and the prisoner was ultimately moved to a new cell eleven days after
reporting the problem. (Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
VENTILATION

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898 (9 th Cir. 2002). Inmates sued prison officials under§ 1983
alleging violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. The district court denied summary
judgment in favor of the defendants and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that correctional officers did not use excessive
force when they used two bursts of pepper spray to quell fighting in a cell. But the appeals court
found that summary judgment was precluded by fact questions on the issue of officials' potential
deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of inmates in nearby cells who were affected
by pepper spray that drifted into their cells. The court noted that excessive force directed at one
prisoner can also establish a cause of action for harm that befalls other prisoners. (Pelican Bay
State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Derby Industries, Inc. v. Chestnut Ridge Foam, 202 F.Supp.2d 818 (N.D.Ind. 2002). A
manufacturer of a mattress intended for use in prisons sued a competitor for false advertising.
The district court denied the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction, finding that a video
tape was neither false nor misleading, and that the plaintiff manufacturer was not being
irreparably harmed. The court found that the video advertisement, which depicted a flammability
test for its and a competitor's products, was not literally false, noting that the test was a general
procedure which could be performed in several ways. The plaintiff identified only one customer
who was confused, and their confusion was not substantial enough for the manufacturer to lose
their business. (Derby Industries, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Flores v. O'Donnell, 36 Fed.Appx. 204 (7 th Cir. 2002). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials alleging cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officials and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals held that while an
issue of fact existed as to whether the duration and severity of cold in the inmate's cell was
serious enough to implicate the Eighth Amendment, officials were not deliberately indifferent to
the inmate's complaints about the cold. The court noted that in order to assess whether cold cell
temperatures violated the Eighth Amendment, the court must consider factors that include the
severity of the cold, its duration, whether the prisoner had alternatives means to protect himself
from the cold, and the adequacy of such alternatives. According to the court, officials responded to
the inmate's complaints by offering him clothing, three hours after he first complained of the cold,
on the condition that he wear a mask to prevent him from spitting on officers. The inmate
refused, and later received medical attention several times. (Waupun Correctional Facility,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
CELL SIZE

Liles v. Camden County Dept. of Corrections, 225 F.Supp.2d 450 (D.N.J. 2002). Former inmates
brought an action against county officials alleging that conditions of confinement violated their
Eighth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that evidence did not support the claim
that shower conditions caused tlie inmates to break out in rashes. Although the inmates
presented an expert report of a "forensic sanitarian," the court noted that the report concluded
only that the poor condition of the shower and lack of sanitation "may result" in rashes. The court
held that a 22-day lock-down that caused inconvenience and discomfort to the inmates did not
violate the Eighth Amendment, although the inmates were allowed only 20 minutes daily outside
their cells to shower, use the bathroom, exercise and make phone calls. The court noted that the
lock-down went into effect because an inmate had tried to escape out of a prison roof and the roof
had to be prepared. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether fighting that broke out as the result of prisoners urinating on each other constituted a
threat to the health and safety of the inmates. The inmates alleged that violence among inmates
broke out when urine splashed on inmates who slept on cell floors next to toilets, due to crowding.
(Camden County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Moore v. Gardner, 199 F.Supp.2d 17 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). An inmate brought a pro se action against
prison officials under § 1983 and § 1985, alleging mail tampering and unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. The district granted summary judgment, in part, to the defendants, finding that

XIX

15.36

the alleged mail tampering did not result in an actual injury to the inmate. The court denied
summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether the inmate was subjected to
unconstitutionally cold conditions. The inmate alleged he was forced to live in a cold, drafty cell
for three weeks during the winter, without his bed sheets and with only one blanket. (Southport
Corr'] Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
CROWDING
CELL CAPACITY
FURNISHINGS
CELL SIZE

Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9 th Cir. 2002). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action against a
county sheriff and two jail employees, alleging confinement in unconstitutional conditions. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the detainee did not suffer more than a de minimis physical injury from his jail confinement and
therefore could not make the required showing for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). But the appeals court held that the detainee was entitled to seek nominal and
punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment. The detainee had admitted during a
deposition that the back and leg pain he allegedly suffered from sitting and sleeping on benches
and the floor of a temporary cell was not serious. The detainee had been temporarily confined on
three separate occasions. In one instance he was confined in a temporary holding cell equipped
with benches, toilets and sinks. Inmates eat three meals per day in the cell, and are not provided
with cots, blankets or pillows. At one time the detainee was housed for 51 hours with
approximately 50 other men in a cell measuring 404 square feet. He was transferred to another
cell where he spent another 74 hours confined with an average of 18 prisoners in a cell that
measured 174 square feet. The detainee described conditions in the cells as "a human carpet."
(Clark Co. Det. Ctr., Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
LOCATION
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Regional Economic Community v. City ofMiddletown, 294 F.3d 35 (2 nd Cir. 2002). A community
action program brought a suit under the Fair Housing Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act, after it was denied a special-use permit to establish two halfway
houses for recovering alcoholics. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the recovering
alcoholics who would have been residents of the proposed halfway houses were disabled for the
purposes of ADA, FHA and the Rehabilitation Act. The appeals court found that summary
judgment was precluded by a prima facie case of retaliation and by genuine issues of material fact
as to the reasons for denial of the permit. (City of Middletown, New York)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Smith v. US., 207 F.Supp.2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). A federal prisoner filed an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that the Bureau of Prisons breached its duty to provide
him with suitable quarters. The district court entered judgment for the government, finding no
violation. The inmate alleged that the Bureau failed to adequately heat his cell and that it was so
cold that he could see his breath, that his knees swelled and his arthritis worsened, and that he
suffered severe stress, anxiety and panic attacks. The court found credible evidence that the cell
temperature was within the normal range, and that prison officials immediately responded to the
prisoner's complaints by raising the thermostat, checking the heating system, insulating the
window, providing extra blankets and a portable heater, and transferring the prisoner to another
cell. (Witness Security Unit, Federal Correctional Institution, Otisville, New York)
2003

U.S. Appeals Court
DOUBLE-CELLING
SPECIAL CELL

Alexander v. Tippah County, Miss., 351 F.3d 626 (5th Cir. 2003). Two state prisoners brought a §
1983 action alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the
case and the appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prisoners could not recover
for mental or emotional damages as a result of their twenty-four hour placement in an unsanitary
isolation cell, where the only claimed injury was nausea suffered by one prisoner that was not
severe enough to warrant medical attention. The isolation cell, referred to as "the hole," was a
sparse eight-by-eight concrete room without running water or a toilet. The only sanitary was
facility was a grate-covered hole in the floor that could be flushed from the outside, and the only
bed was a concrete protrusion in the wall wide enough for one person. The prisoners were not
provided with a mattress, sheets, or blankets, but they conceded that the cell was clean and dry
when they were placed in it. They were initially stripped of their clothes but were eventually
given boxer shorts to wear. (Tippah County Detention Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN
SECURITY

Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). An inmate filed a prose action alleging
that county officials violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate's alleged
conditions, consisting of unclean shower stalls with rust bubbles, cockroaches that crawled into
his orifices while he slept, wild birds that were flying free through the facility, and an unsafe
condition that resulted from the on-duty officer's inability to see directly into his cell at all times,
did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The inmate also alleged that a correctional
officer was sleeping while he was supposed to be supervising recreation in a gym. The court noted
that the inmate did not assert how he was actually harmed by the conditions. (Albany County

XIX

15.37

Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SIZE
DOUBLE CELLING

Hurst v. Snyder, 63 Fed.Appx. 240 (7th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. A state prison inmate brought
an action against prison officials, alleging that he was deprived of adequate living space. The
district court dismissed the case as frivolous and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals could held that a former state statute that required prison facilities to
provide at least 50 square feet of cell space per person did not give the inmate a protected liberty
interest in having 50 square feet of cell space. The court found that the amendment of the statute,
to delete the express reference to a "per person" space requirement, did not violate the ex post
facto clause. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY

Simpson v. Penobscot County Sheriff's Dept., 285 F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2003). A former county jail
inmate brought a§ 1983 action alleging violation of his right to privacy, his right to medical
treatment, and his right to seek redress during his placement in administrative segregation. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Due
Process Clause did not afford a remedy under § 1983 for the alleged invasion of privacy of a
county jail inmate who was placed in a cell that did not have a privacy partition next to the toilet.
The toilet's placement in the cell allowed female inmates, at separate intervals, to have a direct
view of him while he was performing bodily functions. The court noted that jail officials did not
know about the problem, and that once the inmate made them aware of it, they investigated and
mitigated the problem by placing a removable piece of magnetic paper over the lower door
window. The court found that the officials did not know about the problem until the inmate
submitted a grievance in September 2002, although the inmate would have previously had access
to the jail supervisors on their daily tours of the facility three times each day, providing him with
51 opportunities to raise the issue before he filed his grievance. (Penobscot County Jail, Maine)
2004

U.S. District Court
DOUBLE CELLING

Baker v. Haun, 333 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Utah 2004). Injunctive relief was granted prohibiting the
practice of double-celling in certain areas of a prison, in a state prison inmates' class action
challenging their conditions of confinement. The prison moved to terminate the injunction under
the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held that the
continuation of the injunction was not warranted where there was no evidence of any present
unwillingness on the part of prison officials to comply with the injunction. The court found that
prison officials who resumed double-celling in one area without court permission did not engage
in contemptuous conduct because the officials had renovated the area in accordance with court
requirements. (Wasatch Unit, Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
SANITATION
VENTILATION

Brown v. Mitchell, 327 F.Supp.2d 615 (E.D.Va. 2004). The administratrix of the estate of a jail
inmate who contracted and died from bacterial meningitis while in jail brought a civil rights
action. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city
had a policy or custom of jail mismanagement, and whether any policy or custom caused the
inmate's death. The court also found that there were fact issues as to whether the sheriff violated
the Eighth Amendment regarding jail overcrowding. The court ordered further proceedings to
determine if the city council was aware of the long history of overcrowding, poor ventilation and
structural defects in the jail. The court found that the sheriff did not violate the Eighth
Amendment by failing to maintain sanitation in the jail, because sanitation deficiencies were
caused by overcrowding, not by her failure to perform. The sheriff was also not found liable for
failure to train her staff, where she had an illness-recognition and response program in place
which consisted of initial and follow-up training, combined with surprise inspections. The court
noted that the guards' failure to respond to the obvious illness of the inmate could be attributed to
their failure to apply their training, for which the sheriff was not responsible. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the jail physician
showed deliberate indifference when he ordered the inmate returned to overcrowded and illventilated quarters, essentially without treatment. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (11 th Cir. 2004). Death row inmates brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging that high temperatures in their prison cells during the
summer months amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district court denied relief
following a bench trial and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
inmates failed to satisfy the objective component of their Eighth Amendment claim. The court
found that the heat was not constitutionally excessive because the building mass generally
remained between 80 degrees at night, and 85 to 86 degrees during the day. During the relevant
period, the unit experienced temperatures over 90 degrees only nine percent of the time, recorded
temperatures over 95 degrees only seven times, and never recorded temperatures over 100
degrees. The court noted that the building, although not air conditioned, had an effective
ventilation system, and numerous conditions such as access to cold water, alleviated rather than
exacerbated the heat. (Union Correctional Institution, Florida)

XIX

15.38

U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS

Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5 th Cir. 2004). A death row prisoner brought a suit on behalf of
himself and other prisoners confined to death row, alleging that certain conditions of confinement
on death row violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court found that a number of conditions violated the Eighth Amendment
and issued an injunction designed to alleviate the conditions. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court found that lighting in each death
row cell was less than twenty foot-candles, in violation of the constitutional rights of the class
members. Expert testimony was presented that lighting in the cells was grossly inadequate for
the purposes of sanitation, personal hygiene and reading, and that these conditions contributed to
further mental health deterioration. (Mississippi Department of Corrections, Unit 32-C, State
Penitentiary in Parchman)

U.S. Appeals Court
FIRE SAFETY

Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513 (6 th Cir. 2004). State inmates filed a class action under§ 1983
alleging that their conditions of confinement violated their constitutional rights. Their claims
were settled by a consent decree. The district court denied prison officials' motion to terminate
the consent decree and issued an injunction ordering the departmentalization of facilities as a fire
safety remedy. The officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the consent decree encompassed the cell blocks in question
but that the district court judge abused his discretion when he found that current conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment, because the court incorporated its principal findings from two
years earlier, despite the fact that a number of issues had since been resolved. The appeals court
also noted that the district court did not state the standard it was applying to find that conditions
relating to fire safety and fire prevention were inadequate, and failed to identify the point at
which certain fire safety deficiencies ceased being mere deficiencies and instead became
constitutional violations. (State Prison of Southern Michigan, Central Complex)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2004). Prisoners of a "supermax" prison brought a suit
challenging their conditions of confinement. After the plaintiff class was certified and a
preliminary injunction was entered, a consent decree was approved by the court. The prisoners
subsequently moved to enforce the decree. The district court entered an order directing the
installation of air conditioning and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the district court's order was not a grant of "prospective relief" that was subject to the
requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SIZE

Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). A former pretrial detainee brought an action
against federal officials asserting constitutional claims relating to the conditions of his
confinement. The district court dismissed several defendants for lack of jurisdiction and
dismissed the case against the remaining defendants for failure to state a claim. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed the
detainee's first amended complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a claim that
he suffered unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that the defendants were not entitled
to qualified immunity. The detainee alleged that he was confined under extremely harsh
conditions, that he was placed in solitary confinement and locked in an extremely small closet·
sized space, with minimal contact with other human beings for a prolonged time that exceeded
500 days. The detainee alleged that the harsh conditions were imposed solely for the sake of
punishment. The court noted that ample federal caselaw existed at the time of the challenged
conduct to give fair warning to officials that it was unconstitutional to hold a detainee in solitary
confinement 500 days, for punishment, with virtually no procedural protection in the form of
periodic reviews. (United States Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
HANDICAPPED
CELL SIZE

Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004). A paraplegic state prisoner brought a§ 1983 action

XIX

alleging Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants on most of the claims, and following a jury
trial entered judgment for a disciplinary hearing officer on the remaining claims. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court
held that fact issues, as to whether the prisoner was afforded basic levels of humane care and
hygiene, precluded summary judgment on the prisoner's§ 1983 claims for monetary damages and
injunctive relief under the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner was
"disabled" within the meaning of ADA and had standing to seek injunctive relief against a prison
warden. The prisoner was due to remain in isolation for over eight years as the result of more
than 180 disciplinary reports. Able-bodied inmates in disciplinary isolation are housed in less
stringent units than the building in which the prisoner was housed. Because of the small cell size
in his unit, prison policy calls for beds to removed daily so that wheelchair-bound inmates have
some minimal area within with to move around in their cells. The prisoner alleged that there was
no room in his cell, making him immobile and restrained for long periods of time, and that prison
staff failed to remove the bed from his cell daily. The prisoner also alleged that the showers in the
housing unit are not wheelchair-accessible. (Georgia State Prison)

15.39

U.S. District Court
ASBESTOS

Pack v. Artuz, 348 F.Supp.2d 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A state prisoner brought a prose§ 1983 action
alleging failure to protect him from exposure to potentially dangerous levels of asbestos. The
district court held that there was no evidence that the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were
violated, absent evidence that the level of exposure posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage
to his immediate or future health. According to the court, there was no evidence of either the
intensity or duration of the alleged exposure in most of the cell block, and even in areas where
exposure was assumed, there was no evidence as to the concentration of airborne asbestos fibers
or that the inmate had an asbestos-related disease. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New
York)

2005
U.S. Appeals Court
VENTILATION

Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7 th Cir. 2005). Arrestees who were detained in a county jail
following their arrest on murder charges brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff and
jail staff following their acquittal and release from jail. The district court denied summary
judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that he violated a
detainee's right to receive adequate attention for a serious medical condition, when he allegedly
deprived one detainee of toothpaste for over three weeks and another detainee for over 113 days.
One detainee suffered dental pain throughout his incarceration and had to have several teeth
extracted because of tooth decay. The court denied qualified immunity for jail staff who allegedly
deprived a detainee of his asthma inhaler on multiple occasions. The court also denied qualified
immunity on the claim that they failed to provide humane health conditions as the result of the
allegedly unhealthy condition of the jail's ventilation system. The detainees alleged that the flow
of black fiberglass from the ventilation system caused nosebleeds and respiratory problems, and
allegedly exacerbated the serious asthma condition of one detainee. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SANITATION

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a§ 1983 action
alleging violation of his Eighth Amendment rights related to an attack in prison, and inhumane
conditions in a disciplinary segregation unit. The district court dismissed the action and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate's
allegations stated a claim that prison officials failed to protect him from attacks by other inmates.
The inmate had been beaten and stabbed in a prison chapel by inmates who belonged to another
Muslim group. The court held that the inmate's allegations stated a claim that conditions were
sufficiently serious to form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. The inmate alleged that
there was a lack of drinkable water in the prison yard, where temperatures exceeded one hundred
degrees. The inmate also alleged that conditions in disciplinary segregation created serious
health hazards, including toilets that did not work, sinks that were rusted, and stagnant pools of
water that were infested with insects. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING

Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3 rd Cir. 2005). Pretrial detainees filed a suit under§ 1983,
challenging the conditions of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainees
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the district must employ
the "due process" analysis to determine whether the conditions of confinement amounted to
"punishment" that was improperly imposed prior to the adjudication of guilt, not the Eighth
Amendment standards regarding cruel and unusual punishment. The detainees challenged the
practice of triple-celling three detainees to a cell that had been designed to be occupied by a single
person, which required one of the occupants to sleep on the floor in proximity to a toilet. (MultiPurpose Criminal Justice Facility, Gander Hill, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

King v. Frank, 371 F.Supp.2d 977 (W.D.Wis. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a§ 1983 action
against corrections officials, alleging undue restrictions on telephone usage and access to written
publications, improper cell illumination, and failure to provide adequate mental health care. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the inmate
was not deprived of a basic human need by the presence of a constantly illuminated nine·watt
fluorescent light in his cell, even though he alleged that the light caused him sleeplessness and
other problems. The court noted that a registered nurse and a psychologist both examined the
inmate and concluded that he suffered no ill effects. (Waupun Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Moody v. Kearney, 380 F.Supp.2d 393 (D.Del. 2005). A state inmate filed a§ 1983 action alleging
that prison officials locked him in an unventilated room, causing him to suffer a severely
debilitating heat stroke. The district court dismissed the case and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the inmate stated a claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and that fact issues remained as to whether a
private contractor that provided medical services for the prison had a policy of not protecting
vulnerable inmates from high temperatures. The inmate alleged that he was receiving

XIX

15.40

anticholinergic medication and was therefore particularly vulnerable to heat stroke, and that
prison officials knew about this vulnerability but acted with deliberate indifference by keeping
him in a room with no windows, no ventilation, or access to running water when the temperature
inside the facility was 120 degrees. (State Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
LIGHTS
WINDOWS

Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F.Supp.2d 986 (W.D.Wis. 2005). A state prison inmate sued officials
seeking damages for their alleged indifference to his illness and challenging his conditions of
confinement. The district court entered judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the
officials did not show deliberate indifference to the inmate's mental illness condition, because he
was examined and prescribed various antipsychotic medications. The inmate alleged that the only
deficiency in his treatment was that officials failed to provide art supplies when they were
requested. The court found that there were fact issues as to whether the inmate was subjected to
conditions that were severe enough to violate the Eighth Amendment, but that the officials had
qualified immunity from the inmate's damages suit. The court held that placing the mentally ill
inmate in a continuously-illuminated maximum security cell without windows was not clearly
established to be an Eighth Amendment violation at the time they placed the inmate in the most
extreme isolation section of the maximum security prison. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
SANITATION

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a§ 1983 action
against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction,
deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district court denied
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held conditions of confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient,
where the detainee was placed in around·the·clock segregation with the exception of a five·
minute shower break every third day, all hygiene items were withheld from him, he could only
access water-·including water to flush his toilet··at the discretion of individual officers, and was
subjected daily to multiple strip searches that required him to place his unwashed hands into his
mouth. (Hillsborough County Jail, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Wills v. Terhune, 404 F.Supp.2d 1226 (E.D.Cal. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a§ 1983
action alleging that constant illumination in the prison's security housing unit constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the
motion. The court held that the constant illumination did not constitute an unsafe condition of
confinement and that the defendants established a valid security purpose for the lighting. The
inmate alleged that the low wattage bulb prevented his sleep, but conceded that it was not bright
enough to read or write by. (California State Prison, Corcoran)
2006

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
EQUIPMENT

Duquin v. Dean, 423 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate filed an action alleging that
prison officials violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Rehabilitation Act, and a consent decree by failing to provide qualified sign language
interpreters, effective visual fire alarms, use of closed-captioned television sets, and access to text
telephones (ITY). Officials moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in
their favor. The court held that the officials at the high-security facility complied with the
provision of a consent decree requiring them to provide visual fire alarms for hearing-impaired
inmates, even if the facility was not always equipped with visual alarms, where corrections
officers were responsible for unlocking each cell door and ensuring that inmates evacuate in
emergency situations. The court held that the deputy supervisor for programs at the facility was
not subject to civil contempt for her failure to fully comply with the provision of consent decree
requiring the facility to provide access to text telephones (TTY) for hearing-impaired inmates in a
manner equivalent to hearing inmates' access to telephone service, even though certain areas
within the facility provided only limited access to ITY, and other areas lacked TTY altogether.
The court noted that the deputy warden made diligent efforts to comply with the decree, prison
staff responded to the inmate's complaints with temporary accommodations and permanent
improvements, and repairs to broken equipment were made promptly. The court found that the
denial of the inmate's request to purchase a thirteen-inch color television for his cell did not
subject the deputy supervisor for programs to civil contempt for failing to fully comply with the
provision of a consent decree requiring the facility to provide closed-captioned television for
hearing-impaired inmates, despite the inmate's contention that a closed-caption decoder would
not work on commissary televisions. The court noted that the facility policy barred color
televisions in cells and that suppliers confirmed that there was no technological barrier to
installing decoders in televisions that were available from the commissary. (Wende Corr'l
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
EQUIPMENT

Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf
brought an action against a superintendent of programs at a prison, alleging failure to provide
interpreters, visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned

XIX

15.41

device in contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree awarding
declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired prisoners by state
prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a consent order. The court found
that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent order, noting that sign language
interpreters were provided at educational and vocational programs and at medical and counseling
appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as required by consent decree, the prison was
equipped with visual fire alarms that met the requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts
were being made to comply with the consent decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PADDED CELLS

Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). A former county jail detainee brought a§ 1983
action against county jail officials, alleging violation of his due process rights in connection with
the use of restraints and confinement, requesting damages and injunctive relief. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief,
reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims for damages, and remanded for further
proceedings. The court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot by
detainee's release from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or
confined in a padded unit for the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate
goals. The detainee alleged he was placed in four-point restraints, chained to a wall in a "rubber
room," forced to shower in waist chains and shackles, and denied hearings before being punished.
The detainee was 17 years old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County Jail,
Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
CELL CAPACITY
DOUBLE CELLING

Jones v. Goard, 435 F.Supp.2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Inmates brought an action against New York
prison officials, challenging the double-celling policy at maximum-security prisons. Double-celling
is a practice in which two prisoners are housed in a cell originally designed for one person. The
complaint was filed in 1995, and was effectively stayed for some time pending litigation of a
companion case challenging the same practice in medium security prisons. After a full trial on
the merits, the district court in the medium security case denied the plaintiffs any relief. The
district court dismissed all of the inmates' class claims, but reserved decisions on individual
plaintiffs' claims for damages under the Eighth Amendment and the First Amendment. The court
held that the practice of double-celling, and the undesirable conditions allegedly created by
double-celling of inmates, including facts that inmates were forced to sleep near a toilet, were
exposed to cellmates' odors, and kept excess personal property in their cells, did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. The court found that Muslim inmates' claim that double-celling interfered
with their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion was not moot after they were no
longer being double-celled, where many of the inmates were double-celled on numerous occasions
for short periods of time, and the policy of double-celling inmates continued. The defendant's
voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice. The court noted that the Eighth Amendment does not
guarantee prisoners freedom from any and all sorts of unsavory environs, and that to the extent
that conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society.
According to the court, the practice of double-celling inmates did not result in a substantial
risk of serious harm to inmates due to violence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where
incident reports indicated that six years after the implementation of the double-celling policy,
inmates generally faced a lower risk of assault than they did before the policy was implemented,
and there was no evidence that any under-reporting of assaults affected the reporting of incidents
in double cells more than the reporting of incidents generally.
The court also found that injury and disease allegedly caused by double-celling did not create
an unreasonable risk of serious damage to inmates' health, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, noting that although nine inmates had been injured getting into or out of the top
bunk in their cells, and six inmates caught colds from their cellmates, there was no evidence that
the design or placement of the bunks was unsafe, or that any inmate actually contracted, or was
even exposed to, a serious disease from his cellmate in a double cell.
The court held that alleged mistakes made by New York prison officials in screening
dangerous inmates before placing them in double cells in maximum security prisons did not show
that New York's double-celling policy subjected inmates to a substantial risk of serious harm, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the rate of inmate assaults had declined in the six
years after the double-celling policy was implemented. (New York Department of Correctional
Services)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED

Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.Mass. 2006). A state prisoner whose leg had
been amputated brought an action against numerous defendants, including a county correctional
center and sheriff, alleging that failure to provide him with handicapped-accessible shower

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facilities during the renovation of his housing unit violated his federal and state civil rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the officials provided
alternative accessible facilities, precluding claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that officials provided the prisoner with a chair for use in the standard
shower, assigned him to a housing unit with handicapped-accessible showers, promptly transferred him
back to his original unit at his request, and ultimately made arrangements for him to shower in the medical
unit. The court held that the prisoner could not establish an Eighth Amendment claim, where officials
allowed the prisoner to shower in medical unit and made other such accommodations imposing only minor
impediments and delays. The court found that the transfer of the prisoner to a maximum security housing
unit in order to place him near a handicapped accessible shower was not in retaliation for the prisoner's
exercise of constitutional rights, as would violate § 1983. (Hampden Co. Corr’l Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS
NOISE

Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against
officials at a “supermax” prison, alleging that his conditions of confinement had aggravated his mental
illness. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the officials did not unconstitutionally subject the prisoner to cruel and
unusual punishment, absent evidence that they knew that the conditions were making his mental illness
worse. According to the court, prison authorities must be given considerable latitude in the design of
measures for controlling homicidal maniacs without exacerbating their manias beyond what is necessary
for security. The prisoner alleged that the heat in the cells in the Summer interacted with the his
antipsychotic drugs and caused him extreme discomfort, and that the constant illumination of the cells also
disturbs psychotics. The prisoner alleged that the low level of noise, without audiotapes, a radio, or any
source of sound, prevented him from stilling the voices in his head. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006). A former pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action
against a county sheriff and officials of the sheriff's office, alleging overcrowding and inadequate shelter at
the jail in violation of Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, and detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded. The court held that the detainee's evidence that county officials had failed to address
serious and obvious problems with conditions, namely a continuously cold and wet cell area, for a period
of months, especially given additional evidence including officials' alleged wearing of winter coats inside
jail, raised a fact issue as to whether officials had been deliberately indifferent to a serious deprivation,
precluding summary judgment for the officials. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)
2007

U.S. District Court
FURNISHINGS
ODOR
BEDS
TEMPERATURE

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that dismissal of the detainee’s § 1983
claims of cruel and unusual punishment at the District of Columbia jail based on lack of reading material, lack of
recreational equipment, failure of the commissary to stock items such as lotions, skin oils, hair oils, and peanut
butter, the detainee's exposure to the stench created by regular sewage backups, as well as the jail's use of bunk
beds without ladders was required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because the detainee did not
allege that he suffered any physical injury. Instead, the detainee alleged mental and emotional injuries.
According to the court, the alleged conditions from overcrowding at a District of Columbia jail-- showers
infested with bacteria, standing water, various diseases and hundreds of unsanitary and defective mattresses,
some of which contained roaches and other insects, did not constitute the deprivation of basic human needs, as
required for jail overcrowding to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that the detainee's
allegations that due to lack of heating and ventilation at the jail he suffered from temperatures ranging from 30 to
40 degrees during the winter, that he was not provided with sufficient blankets for cold jail cells, and that such
actions were taken with deliberate indifference to his needs and pursuant to policy of Department of Corrections
(DOC) were sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The court noted that warmth is a basic human need, the deprivation of
which can amount to a violation of Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.
(Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of
America)

U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male former inmates of a county jail brought a class
action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that the defendants had a policy and/or practice of subjecting male
inmates to strip-searches prior to their release, and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the expert’s testimony was admissible. According to the court, the
expert testimony of a registered architect who specialized in the design of prisons and jails, concerning whether
there was adequate space in the jail for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees was
relevant and reliable. The court noted that while the expert did not review all of the written discovery in the case,
the expert reached his opinions after a tour of the jail and after reviewing other expert reports, jail floor plans, a
sheriff's status report and charts summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

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U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN
SUICIDE

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections officers,
and negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were not
deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers' liability
under the due process clause for the detainee's suicide. The court held that under the Pennsylvania negligence
law, architects who designed the jail had no duty to prevent the suicide of the detainee who strangled himself by
tying his shoelace to a ventilation grate above a toilet and applying pressure to his neck. According to the court,
there was no direct causal connection between any alleged negligence by the architects and the detainee's
suicide. According to the court, while Pennsylvania courts had not addressed this specific issue, other
jurisdictions have held that an architect cannot be held liable for a prison suicide: (1) in an Oregon case “We
refuse to extend suicide liability to architects, contractors, engineers, and a vast array of other parties involved
with the design and construction of buildings…Architects and contractors should not be exposed to endless
suicide liability when they have relinquished their authority and control over the facility to the owner;” (2) in an
Illinois case “The magnitude of the burden placed on architects to eliminate all fixtures, such as grilles, that
might be of aid in the commission of a suicide and, at the same time, to design an attractive and feasible cell at a
reasonable cost would seem to be great;” and in an Alabama case “We hold ... that an architect designing a
prison or jail owes no duty to design the prison or jail to be suicide-proof.” (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates,
Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Graham v. Poole, 476 F.Supp.2d 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials. The officials moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
prisoner's allegations that he slipped and fell as he was leaving the shower due to the failure of prison employees
to provide non-slip mats on the floor in and near the shower amounted to nothing more than negligence, and thus
was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the employees. The court found that the prisoner
failed to allege that a prison superintendent was personally involved in any alleged Eighth Amendment violation,
as required to state a § 1983 claim against the superintendent. The prisoner alleged that following his accident,
the superintendent instituted a policy providing an additional towel to each cell to be utilized for a bath mat, but
did not allege that the superintendent was aware of any hazardous condition prior to prisoner's accident. (Five
Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Hadix v. Caruso, 492 F.Supp.2d 743 (W.D.Mich. 2007). Prisoners brought a suit to correct unconstitutional
prison conditions necessary for prisoner health and safety, and requested injunctive relief as to a heat-related
injury. The district court entered an injunction. The court held that prison officials may not, consistent with
Eighth Amendment values, cause the expected deaths of prisoners subject to heat-illness by exposing them to
high heat and humidity conditions. According to the court, the requirements for safe Eighth Amendment custody
are violated by housing high-risk inmates in facilities which are routinely at heat index levels above 90 during
summer months, when it is known that such heat conditions will reliably cause heat injury and death. The court
ruled that the prisoners were entitled to an injunction requiring that all prisoners classified at high-risk for heatrelated injury be housed in areas in which the heat index was reliably maintained below a heat index of 90. The
court noted that the injunction was necessary to prevent irreparable harm, including bodily injury and death, and
that the scope of the injunction was narrowly tailored and was the least intrusive means of correction of the
Eighth Amendment violation. (Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, Charles E. Egeler Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
CELL SIZE
DOUBLE CELLING

Jurado Sanchez v. Pereira, 525 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Puerto Rico 2007). A prisoner's next of kin brought a civil
rights action under § 1983 against prison officials, seeking to recover damages for the prisoner's death while he
was incarcerated, and alleging constitutional rights violations, as well as state law claims of negligence. The
officials moved for summary judgment on the cause of action under § 1983. The district court denied the motion,
finding that summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact on the failure
to protect claim and as to whether the officials had qualified immunity. According to the court, genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether there were enough guards at the prison when the prisoner was killed by
another inmate, and whether officials were mandated to perform weekly or monthly searches of cells, which
could have prevented the accumulation of weapons used in the incident in which the prisoner was killed.
Bayamon 308, an intake center, was considered minimum security with some limitations. The inmate capacity at
Bayamon 308 is 144. Although the capacity was not exceeded, some cells, despite being originally built for one
inmate, housed two inmates. According to the court, Bayamon 308 does not comply with the 55 square footage
minimum requirements for each cell in a continuing federal consent order. Therefore, the individual cell gates
are left continuously open, like an open dormitory. At the time of the incident officials did not take gang
affiliation into consideration when segregating prisoners. The prisoner did not identify himself as a gang
member, nor inform officials that he feared for his life. The facility was under court order to follow a staffing
plan that stated the minimum amount of staff, the optimum amount, the fixed positions and the movable
positions, pursuant to a lawsuit. Fixed positions, such as control units, cannot be changed under any
circumstances, but the movable positions may be modified depending on necessity due to the type of inmate at
the facility. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not comply with the staffing plan, while the defendants
insisted that they did comply. (Bayamon 308 Facility, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
SUICIDE

Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Va. 2007). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate filed a § 1983 action against a sheriff and county jail employees arising out of the detainee's jail suicide.
The detainee had a history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, anxiety, paranoia, and delusions and had been
hospitalized for these conditions several times in the three years prior to his suicide. His treatment records show
that he was hospitalized because family members reported suicidal ideation and bizarre, violent, and sexually
inappropriate behavior. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.

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The court held that the sheriff's deputies' failure to provide the pretrial detainee with prompt medical care after
they discovered him hanging in his cell did not amount to deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious bodily
injuries, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee was still
alive when they took him down approximately 13 minutes after discovering him, there was no showing of an
affirmative causal link between their inaction and the detainee's death from hypoxic brain injury. The court held
that a reasonable sheriff would not have understood from existing law that the absence of an operating video
surveillance system in the county jail would violate a suicidal pretrial detainee's constitutional rights, and thus
the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983, even though the jail policy and
procedure manual required immediate repair of any defective security equipment, and the sheriff was aware that
the equipment had not been operating for some time. (Buchanan County, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Maddox v. Berge, 473 F.Supp.2d 888 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against prison officials and employees, alleging that his administrative confinement for participating in a
riot violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that allegations that the prisoner was
confined to his cell 23 hours a day and that he was denied “outside recreation” while he was in administrative
confinement demonstrated injuries from an objectively serious deprivation, for the purposes of his conditions or
confinement claim. The court held that the allegation that the prisoner was subjected to 24-hour illumination
stated a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, although the prisoner did not allege that he suffered
any adverse effects as a result of the lighting. The district court held that placement of the prisoner in
administrative confinement, which subjected him to highly restricted non-face-to-face visits, lack of
communication with other prisoners, nearly complete idleness in a cell that was constantly illuminated, lack of
recreation, extremely limited out of cell time, and lack of access to any meaningful programming, was not
clearly established as conduct that violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights, and therefore the warden and
secretary of the corrections department had qualified immunity from the prisoner’s damages suit under § 1983.
(Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
COURT ORDER
CAPACITY

Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners
being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at one of two correctional facilities that were allegedly understaffed
and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and county commissioners alleging
that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The district court held that there was
clear and convincing evidence that crowding was the primary cause of the violation of a federal right, and that no
other relief besides a prisoner release order would remedy that violation. The release order provided for
incarceration of all violent felons and for reopening of all jail facilities under the control of the county to
maximum occupancy, while at the same time protecting the constitutional rights of inmates in the county jail
facilities. (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a claim under § 1983 against corrections
officers alleging that he was subjected to severe cold in retaliation for filing grievances. The district court
granted the officers' motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether subjecting the inmate to four straight nights of 20-degree temperatures was sufficiently severe to deter
the inmate from filing future grievances. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
inmate's actions of writing grievances against corrections officers caused the officers to retaliate by turning on
“purge” fans, subjecting the inmate to cold temperatures. (Clements Unit, Amarillo, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
SANITATION

Cockcroft v. Kirkland, 548 F.Supp.2d 767 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations related to toilet and cleaning supply problems.
The district court dismissed the action in part. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity from claims that they refused to give the inmate adequate supplies and tools to sanitize his toilet in
response to a widespread backflushing toilet problem caused by a design defect, in which sewage would rise up
in the toilet of a cell when the toilet in an adjoining cell was flushed. According to the court, the officials'
conduct, as alleged, violated the prisoner's clearly established rights under the Eighth Amendment to a minimum
level of cleanliness and sanitation. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
BEDS

Connolly v. County of Suffolk, 533 F.Supp.2d 236 (D.Mass. 2008). An inmate who fractured his arm after falling
from a bunk bed in his cell sued a county, alleging negligence under state law and Eighth Amendment violations
under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the county. The court held that the failure of
prison officials to equip the inmate's bunk bed with a ladder was not cruel and unusual punishment and that
failure to provide ladders for prison bunk beds did not constitute deliberate indifference to the inmate's rights.
(Suffolk County House of Corrections, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois
Department of Human Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed,
as well as two former DHS Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions
of his confinement violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a
bench trial, the district court held that requiring the detainee to sleep in a room illuminated by a night light did
not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
NOISE
TEMPERATURE

Osterback v. McDonough, 549 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Fla. 2008). Inmates sued corrections officials, alleging that
conditions of close management (CM) status amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. Following the grant of
the inmates' motion to certify the class, and issuance of an order entering the officials' revised offer of judgment
(ROJ), the officials moved to terminate the ROJ pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
district court granted the motion. The court found that housing provided to inmates on close management (CM)
status did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even though the inmates' expert concluded that CM cells were not
appropriate due to extreme heat in summer and cold temperatures in winter, inasmuch as the inmates were not
subjected to extreme deprivations. The court found that restrictions on the ability of inmates on close
management status to speak to each other, including a ban on shouting, did not violate the Eighth Amendment,
in that inmates had adequate opportunities to communicate with each other, allowing inmates to speak loudly
would jeopardize security, and there were no ready alternatives to prohibiting yelling or other disruptive
behavior. (Everglades Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
SHOWERS
TOILETS
DAYROOM

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a
§ 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses and
beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse lawyers
were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. The
court found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial
detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The county did not offer any legitimate
rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms, sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas and
common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity impaired detainees, and the county offered no explanation or
justification for the significant differences between the vocational and recreational activities available to nondisabled and disabled detainees. Termination of injunctive orders requiring that inmates be provided with seating
while detained in holding cells, or elsewhere, awaiting transport to or from court and requiring that inmates be
given at least fifteen minutes within which to complete each meal did not constitute an abuse of discretion since
the treatment of detainees in the county's holding cells and the time allowed for meals did not violate the
detainees' constitutional rights. The court held that restrictions placed on use of the day room, limiting
administrative segregation detainees' use of the room to one or two inmates at a time, were reasonably related to
institutional security concerns. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SANITATION
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a § 1983 action alleging
that his conditions of confinement violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of some defendants and denied a motion for summary judgment based on
qualified immunity for the clinical director of a detention facility. The clinical director appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court did not commit plain error in assuming
implicitly that the clinical director was entitled to assert qualified immunity as a state actor. The court found that
the offender’s alleged conditions of confinement did not amount to inhumane treatment in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The conditions purportedly included unpleasant odors, lack of air conditioning, peeling
paint and the presence of cockroaches which, according to the court, did not amount to inhumane treatment. The
court noted that although the alleged conditions were unpleasant, they were not so objectively serious that they
could establish a constitutional violation. (Joliet Treatment & Detention Facil., Illinois Dept. of Human Services)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PLUMBING
SAFETY

Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F.Supp.2d 834 (S.D.Tex. 2008). A legally blind state inmate brought an action alleging
that prison officials failed to remedy unsafe conditions in handicapped showers, in violation of his constitutional
rights, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), and the Texas Tort
Claims Act (TTCA). The inmate also alleged that prison medical officials were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials. The court held that prison
officials did not discriminate against the legally blind inmate as the result of their alleged failure to remedy
unsafe conditions in the prison's handicapped showers, and thus the officials were not liable under Title II of
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for injuries the inmate sustained in a slip and fall accident. The court
found that prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, as a result of their failure to remedy unsafe slippery conditions in the prison's
handicapped showers, absent a showing that the officials were aware of and deliberately ignored an excessive
risk. (Estelle Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
FIRE SAFETY

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights. The district
court dismissed in part. The court found that allegations by the detainee that state officials failed to provide
adequate fire sprinklers or access to fire extinguishers stated a claim for violation of the detainee's due process
rights. The court held that the detainee’s allegations that he was subjected to segregation, and that the conditions
of segregation included a small cell with no windows and no opportunity to interact with other human beings,
did not state a claim for violation of the due process clause. The court noted that prisons may impose restrictions
on pretrial detainees so long as those restrictions are related to a non-punitive governmental purpose. (Vermont
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS
SECURITY

Walker v. Woodford, 593 F.Supp.2d 1140 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a
prison and its personnel alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to turn
off the lights in their cells. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner had to present evidence showing that the prison's 24-hour illumination

XXII

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policy was the cause of his insomnia or related problems before the prison could be required to explain why
legitimate penological interests justified it. According to the court, the prisoner's testimony did not establish that
the illumination caused the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or that prison personnel were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in not modifying the illumination policy. The court found that prison
officials were not plainly incompetent in requiring low-level lighting in prison cells 24 hours per day for security
purposes. (Calipatria State Prison, California)
U.S. District Court
CELLS
EQUIPMENT
SANITATION

Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
correction officers and a superintendent, alleging that the defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment and denied him equal protection of the law, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
prisoner's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated by a soiled mattress, the
plexiglass shield over the front of his cell, another inmate's overflowed toilet, the use of a single slot to pass
objects through a cell door, the denial of his preferred cleaning materials when other suitable materials were
made available to him, or a single two-week period during which the plaintiff's cell was not cleaned. The court
noted that the prisoner's complaints related principally to his personal preferences as to the cleanliness of his cell.
Prison officials did not display deliberate indifference to the prisoner's complaints, but instead responded quickly
and appropriately, in that the prisoner received a new mattress within two days of his request, and he was moved
to a new cell without a plexiglass cover within five days of his complaint. (Southport Corr’l Facility, New York)
2009

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CAPACITY

Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Cal. 2009). State prisoners brought class actions against a
governor and other officials, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement as to the provision of medical
and mental health care. After granting a correctional officer association's motion to intervene as a plaintiff, the
motion to convene a three-judge panel was granted, to consider plaintiffs' request for order to reduce prison
population. The court held that clear and convincing evidence established that overcrowding was the primary
cause of the provision of inadequate medical and mental health care; (2) deficiencies in the provision of medical
and mental health care could not be resolved in the absence of a prisoner release order; (3) reduction in the
California state prison population to a system-wide cap was warranted; (4) the court's order was the least
intrusive means necessary to correct the violations, as required by PLRA; and (5) reduction in the California
state prison population to a system-wide cap of 137.5% was warranted. (California Department of Rehabilitation
and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Dace v. Smith-Vasquez, 658 F.Supp.2d 865 (S.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison employees, alleging that his exposure to excessively cold conditions during his incarceration resulted in a
deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and that employees unconstitutionally retaliated against him by
exposing him to such conditions. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to administratively exhaust his § 1983 claims against prison
employees in accordance with Illinois Department of Corrections grievance procedures, as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, even if the employees failed to directly respond to
some or all of the prisoner's grievances, the fact remained that the prisoner failed to take up those unresolved
grievances with a Grievance Officer as required by the grievance procedures. The court held that the prisoner
failed to establish that alleged excessively cold temperature in his cell for a period of approximately three weeks
was sufficiently serious to deprive him of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities, as would support
his Eighth Amendment prison conditions claim. Although the prisoner and other inmates in his cell block had to
bundle up to try to stay warm, and the prisoner contracted a case of common cold, there was no concrete,
objectively verifiable evidence that demonstrated the degree of cold in the cell during the relevant time period.
The court found that prison employees were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's complaints regarding
cold temperature in his cell during a three-week period, as would support the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
prison conditions claim. The court noted that the prisoner testified that he had winter clothing and a blanket and
that he used them, employees made efforts to address the prisoner's complaints regarding the situation by
submitting work orders for a heating system, and there was no evidence that the employees had authority to do
anything else. The court found that the prisoner failed to establish that his prior lawsuit against prison officials
and/or his filing of grievances was the “motivating factor” for the alleged actions of prison employees, including
exposing the prisoner to extreme cold, not allowing him to go to the commissary, handcuffing him, damaging his
property, and not responding to his grievances, as would support his § 1983 retaliation claim against the
employees. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY
CROWDING
DAYROOM
HYGIENE
LIGHTS
NOISE
SAFETY
TEMPERATURE

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class
action against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights.
The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation
of the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The amended judgment provided
relief regarding the following: population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and windows,
artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access to reading materials, access to religious services, mail, telephone
privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety, hygiene, toilet facilities, access to law library, medical care,
dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation, inmate
classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers, training and screening of staff members,
facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures, inmate grievance policy and procedures,
reports and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution. The detainees moved for attorney's fees and
nontaxable costs. The district court held that the class of detainees was the prevailing party entitled to attorney's
fees. The court noted that defending and enforcing the judgment for more than five years and obtaining

15.47

prospective relief required substantial time and labor, the issues presented were not novel but many were
difficult and complex, conducting discovery, marshaling evidence, and presenting that evidence during a 13-day
evidentiary hearing required considerable skill, commitment of attorneys' time and advancement of costs limited
attorneys' ability to take on new cases, and the attorneys would not receive any compensation for their work
representing the detainees except as awarded by the court. (Maricopa County Sheriff and Maricopa County
Board of Supervisors, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
FURNISHINGS
SANITATION
VENTILATION

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a
detention center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by
another prisoner. The court held that a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner's health or safety did not result
from the prisoner's detention, where, among other things, a professional exterminator routinely sprayed the
facility for rodents and bugs, exposed wires from ceiling light fixtures that had been pulled down by inmates
were not hazardous or were not located in cells where the prisoner had been confined, the ventilation system was
operational and only temporarily malfunctioned when inmates put paper and other materials in vents, fresh water
was located in coolers in pods and was brought to the prisoner's cell several times per day, and the prisoner had
been provided with a concrete sleeping slab and extra blankets. (Crittenden County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAPPED
HYGIENE

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial
detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county and county
sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. The court
held that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff raised that defense for the
first time in his motion for summary judgment. The court held that the pretrial detainees adequately alleged
discrimination based on the prison's failure to provide wheelchair-accessible bathroom facilities. According to
the court, the detainees met the PLRA physical injury requirement. In addition to alleging mental and emotional
harm, the detainees complained of bed sores, infections, and injuries resulting from falling to the ground from
their wheelchairs and toilets, which were undeniably physical injuries. The court held that county prison
facilities to which the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees claimed to have been denied access-showers, toilets, and sinks--were “services” and “programs” within the meaning of Title II of ADA, which
forbade discrimination against persons with disabilities in the area of public services, programs, and activities.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees were intentionally discriminated against, and as to whether
modifications to county prison facilities requested by the detainees were reasonable. (Cook County Department
of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL AREAS
MEDICAL EXAM

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2009). In a class action brought on behalf of state prisoners,
alleging that state officials were providing inadequate health care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the receiver appointed to oversee the provision of health care at state
prisons moved for an order of contempt based on the state's failure to fund the receiver's capital projects. The
district court ordered the state to fund the projects and to show cause why it should not be held in contempt. The
state appealed, and alternatively filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The appeals court dismissed the appeal
and denied the writ of mandamus. According to the court, the state failed to prove that it would be damaged or
prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal, weighing against granting the state's petition for a writ of
mandamus to prevent the district court from holding it in contempt based on its failure to fund the receiver's
capital projects. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
LIGHTS
SECURITY

Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). Relatives of a deceased pretrial
detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, requesting damages for constitutional violations
culminating in the detainee's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the lack of adequate
inmate supervision and malfunctioning cell locks and cell lights. The court also found an issue of material fact as
to whether the Administrator of the Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections (AOC) failed to act with regard to
security risks, including malfunctioning door locks, in the annex within which the pretrial detainee was found
hanged. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the prison annex superintendent's failure to
remedy supervision problems in housing units where he knew inmates were able to and did move freely in and
out of their cells due to malfunctioning door locks. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to a correctional officer's failure to patrol the living area of the annex within
which the pretrial detainee was found hanged while he knew inmates were able to freely move around. The court
denied qualified immunity to the defendants because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged inaction,
and a reasonable prison official working in the system would have known that a lack of supervision, combined
with the knowledge that cell locks did not function, would create an obvious and undeniable security risk.
(Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Annex 246)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUIPMENT
HANDICAPPED
HYGIENE
VISITATION AREAS

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for
mobility filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court noted that although the height of a counter was not lowered in
response to the grievance, the prison had attempted to remedy the situation by changing the way in which hot
food was served from the counter. According to the court, the inability of disabled prisoners who depended on
wheelchairs for mobility to access restrooms throughout a state prison rose to the level of an objective violation

15.48

of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoners soiled themselves up to several times per week. The court noted
that the sheer frequency with which those incidents occurred, not to mention the physical injuries that at least
some prisoners had suffered in attempting to use an inaccessible restroom, indicated that the prisoners had been
denied a minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or there was an unreasonable risk of serious damage to
their future health. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prison and its employees were deliberately indifferent to the prisoners' restroom needs.
The court found that the height of a food service counter and the absence of accessible water fountains
throughout the state prison were not conditions that deprived disabled prisoners, who depended on wheelchairs
for mobility, of minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and they did not pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to their future health, as required for a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. The court noted that although one prisoner suffered a burn on his hand caused by hot
food or liquid falling from a food service counter, falling or spilled food did not create an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to the prisoner's health. The court held that the existence of potholes and broken concrete in state
prison yards did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment as to disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, even if those prisoners had
fallen and suffered injuries as a result. According to the court, the inaccessibility of telephones throughout a state
prison, inaccessibility of a family reunion site, inaccessibility of a law library, and malfunctioning of a school
elevator, that did not cause any physical harm or pain to disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for
mobility, were not the kind of deprivations that denied a basic human need, and thus did not constitute a
violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (New York State Department
of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
ASBESTOS

Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought an action against prison employees, the U.S.
Attorney General, and the director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos
while assigned to work at a prison. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the Inmate
Accident Compensation Act was the exclusive remedy against the government for a prisoner with alleged workrelated injuries, and thus dismissal of the prisoner's claims under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) was warranted. The court held that the federal workers' compensation scheme for participants in a prison work program
lacked the requisite procedural safeguards of the inmate's constitutional rights to foreclose a Bivens action by the
inmate. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that prison employees had known that asbestos was
present in a closet in which the inmate was working when he was exposed to asbestos were sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment Bivens claim against those employees. (United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of disabled state prison inmates and parolees moved for an order requiring state prison officials to track and accommodate the needs of disabled parolees
housed in county jails, and to provide access to a workable grievance procedure pursuant to the officials' obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and prior court orders. The district
court granted the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The appeals court held that: (1) contractual arrangements between the state and a county for incarceration of state
prison inmates and parolees in county jails were subject to ADA; (2) the district court's order was not invalid for
violating federalism principles; (3) the state failed to show that the order was not the narrowest, least intrusive
relief possible, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); but (4) there was insufficient evidence
to justify the system-wide injunctive relief in the district court's order. The court noted the state's recent proposal
to alter its sentencing practices to place in county jails approximately 14,000 persons who would otherwise be
incarcerated in state prisons. The court also noted that the state's contracts with counties were not simply for
incarceration, but to provide inmates and parolees in county jails with various positive opportunities, from educational and treatment programs, to opportunities to contest their incarceration, to the fundamentals of life, such
as sustenance, and elementary mobility and communication, and the restrictions imposed by incarceration meant
that the state was required to provide these opportunities to individuals incarcerated in county jails pursuant to
state contracts to the same extent that they were provided to all state inmates. The district court’s order did not
require the state to shift parolees to state facilities if county jails exhibited patterns of ADA non-compliance;
rather, the order required that, if the state became aware of a class member housed in a county jail who was not
being accommodated, the state either ensure that the jail accommodated the class member, or move the class
member to a state or county facility which could accommodate his needs. In finding that statewide injunctive
relief was not needed, the court held that evidence of ADA violations was composed largely of single incidents
that could be isolated, and the district court's order identified no past determinations that showed class members
in county jails were not being accommodated. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Blackmon v. Kukua, 758 F.Supp.2d 398 (S.D.Tex. 2010). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against
prison officials, alleging his exposure to excessive heat violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether conditions during
the state prisoner's incarceration in a prison unit, which included frequent temperatures into the 100's and insufficient ventilation, and which allegedly had a negative effect on the prisoner's personal health, constituted a
denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. The court held that a prison maintenance supervisor
did not act with deliberate indifference to the state prisoner's health or safety in responding to the prisoner's
grievance about excessive heat, as required to support an Eighth Amendment claim, where he investigated the
prisoner's complaint and gave an appropriate response. According to the court, the state prisoner's right not to be
subjected to excessive heat was clearly established at the time he was continually exposed to temperatures into
the 90s and 100s, in determining whether prison officials who failed to respond to his complaints about the heat

15.49

were entitled to qualified immunity in his civil rights action. (Garza East Unit, Beeville, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice)
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUIPMENT
FIRE SAFETY

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the
defendants violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with deliberate
indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a jail fire, even if a
jailer supplied cigarettes to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in effect at all relevant times. The
court noted that the jailer who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine months before the
fire occurred, and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as recently as five days before the fire. According to
the court, the county jail's inoperable sprinklers and lack of extra fire safety equipment such as oxygen tanks did
not amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell
during a fire, where jail officials took action to deal with fire hazards by prohibiting smoking and searching for
contraband, and fire extinguishers and smoke detectors were present at the time of the fire. The court held that
any failure of the sheriff to engage his officers in more exhaustive emergency training did not amount to
deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a fire, even
if the officers' lack of training presented a substantial safety risk. The court noted that the officers' actions in
removing inmates from their cells after they discovered the fire demonstrated that they did not disregard the risk.
(Oregon County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL AREAS
SANITATION

Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county for personal injuries stemming from a staph infection that he contracted while incarcerated in the county's
jail. At the conclusion of a jury trial in the district court the detainee prevailed. The county appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the county's actions in
allowing the infection were more than de minimis; (2) sufficient evidence existed to support the finding that the
county had an unconstitutional custom or policy in allowing the infection to be present; and (3) sufficient
evidence supported the finding that the detainee contracted the infection while in jail. The court noted that
physicians testified that there was a “bizarrely high incidence” of the infection and that they were not aware of a
jail with a higher percentage of the infection than the county's jail. According to the court, there was evidence
that jail officials had long known of the extensive infection problem yet continued to house inmates in the face
of the inadequately controlled staph contamination, and that the county was not willing to take the necessary
steps to spend the money to take appropriate actions. The court noted that there was evidence that the jail had
refused to install necessary hand washing and disinfecting stations and had failed to use alcohol-based sanitizers,
which were the recommended means of hand disinfection. (Dallas County, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded
attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the
sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and
requiring the sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of
Agriculture's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held that air temperatures above 85
degrees greatly increased the risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals taking psychotropic medications, and
thus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited housing such detainees in areas where the temperature exceeded 85
degrees. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
DOUBLE CELLING
GENERAL
CONDITIONS
PLUMBING
SANITATION
VENTILATION

Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A federal prisoner initiated a Bivens-type action against
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees, making several complaints about various conditions of his former place
of confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The
court held that, absent any evidence that the alleged conditions of the prisoner's cell caused harm to the prisoner,
and that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) defendants were deliberately indifferent to that harm, cell conditions did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that his cell was in poor condition, with poor welding
and rust erosion present at the base of the walls, had inadequate plumbing, was infested with “cockroaches,
spiders, worms, mice and other unknown insects,” and lacked ventilation. The court found that the prisoner's
allegation, that as a special management unit inmate, he was not given the same commissary privileges as a
general population inmate, did not rise to the level of a sufficiently serious constitutional deprivation to give rise
to an Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that double celling of the prisoner did not violate the Eighth
Amendment where the prisoner did not allege that he was singled out for double-celling or that his health or life
was endangered by the condition. The court noted that double celling inmates is not per se unconstitutional, and
that considerations that are relevant in determining if double celling violates the Eighth Amendment include the
length of confinement, the amount of time prisoners spend in their cells each day, sanitation, lighting, bedding,
ventilation, noise, education and rehabilitation programs, opportunities for activities outside the cells, and the
repair and functioning of basic physical facilities such as plumbing, ventilation, and showers. (Special
Management Unit, United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY

Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F.Supp.2d 941 (M.D.Pa. 2010). An inmate, whose head and back had allegedly been
injured when a portion of drywall ceiling in a prison shower collapsed onto him, filed a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials alleging deliberate indifference to his safety, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. All

15.50

parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part, and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prison's unit manager or correctional officers had subjective knowledge of the dangerous condition of the ceiling
in the inmates' shower facilities. (State Correctional Institution at Smithfield, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought a
§ 1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to
hiring and supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainees failed to
establish deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court noted that none of the
deputy's prior misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic assault, demonstrated a
propensity to commit rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a causal link between the
center's alleged policy of not terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and the deputy's conduct. The
court noted that "...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere fact that a male guard
supervises a female inmate does not lead to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great risk of being sexually
assaulted by the guard." According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the county detention center
was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring surveillance equipment,
and thus they could not recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there was no evidence that the
center had a policy or custom of ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that only one person monitored
the 89 cameras that were used throughout the Detention Center and that they were mainly monitored only for
ingress and egress of secured doors. They asserted that the county should have had cameras in the video
arraignment room for the inmates' protection. The court noted that state jail regulations do not require constant
monitoring of video surveillance cameras or dictate where the cameras are to be placed inside a detention
facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Silverstein v. Federal Bureau Of Prisons, 704 F.Supp.2d 1077 (D.Colo. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Bureau of Prisons and correctional officers, challenging conditions of his confinement.
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. The court held that the allegation that the
inmate was indefinitely placed in solitary confinement, isolated from other inmates and correctional facility staff,
and subjected to continuous lighting and camera surveillance, was sufficient to allege a liberty interest in conditions of his confinement. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was subjected to solitary confinement for more than two decades was sufficient to state claim under the Eighth Amendment against the Bureau.
But, according to the court, the inmate did not have a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to administrative segregation facility. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum facility, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
KITCHEN
SANITATION

Smith-Bey v. CCA/CTF, 703 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). A District of Columbia inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison, the private corporation that ran the prison, and a food services company, alleging the prison's
kitchen was so poorly maintained and infested with vermin that being forced to eat food prepared there
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the two instances in
which the inmate discovered cockroaches in his food, "while certainly unpleasant," did establish an Eighth
Amendment violation. (Correctional Treatment Facility, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison officials,
complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a
disturbing strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then brought a separate action
against prison officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's prohibition of his subscription to
commercially available pictures of nude women. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted, the inmate appealed, and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The
inmate then moved for a partial refund of filing fees that had been collected from his prison trust account,
challenging the prison's practice of withholding 40 percent of his account to satisfy the filing fee requirement for
his two appeals. The appeals court found that PLRA required that no more than 20 percent of an inmate's
monthly income be deducted to pay filing fees, irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals the inmate
had pending at any one time. The court held that granting the inmate a partial refund of fees was not warranted
since the amounts withheld from the inmate's account were actually owed and were properly, if excessively,
collected. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS
SAFETY

Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2010). A former inmate brought Eighth Amendment claims against
a prison maintenance supervisor and three correction officers alleging that they willfully and maliciously
exposed him to ultraviolet radiation resulting in physical injury. The district court denied the defendants' motion
for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that correction officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claims alleging
that officers used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
in removing the shield used to protect cell occupants from exposure to ultraviolet radiation from a germicidal
ultraviolet radiation lamp used for the treatment of tuberculosis. The court found that officers acted in retaliation
for a comment made by another inmate during a “shake down” of the cell, and that officers ignored demands to
replace the shield or deactivate the light, since reasonable officers were on sufficient notice that they may not
purposefully expose inmates to potentially harmful radiation in the complete absence of a penological purpose.
The court found that the inmate's allegation that the prison's maintenance supervisor received notice that
correction officers had removed the protective shield but failed to take timely action to replace the shield alleged
was nothing more than simple negligence, and thus was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation.
(East Arkansas Regional Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

15.51

2011
U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CELL SIZE

Bailey v. Hughes, 815 F.Supp.2d 1246 (M.D.Ala. 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against a county
sheriff's department, a sheriff, corrections officers, and others, alleging unconstitutional deprivations of his rights
while in custody in a county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss and for an award of attorney fees. The district
court granted the motions. The district court held that: (1) neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Fourth
Amendment's excessive force prohibition applied to the sentenced offender; (2) the sheriff and supervisory
officials were entitled to qualified immunity; (3) allegations did not state an Eighth Amendment claim based on
jail overcrowding; (4) the officers' alleged conduct in tasering the prisoner did not violate the Eighth
Amendment; (5) allegations did not state a § 1983 claim for an unconstitutional strip search; (6) placement of the
prisoner alone in closet-sized cell for eight hours after the alleged incident did not amount to unconstitutional
confinement; and (7) the officers' alleged conduct in searching the prisoner's cell did not amount to retaliation for
prisoner's prior lawsuit. The court noted that the prisoner admitted that he repeatedly refused the officers' verbal
commands and fled his cell, he was repeatedly warned that he would be shocked if he did not comply with the
officers' commands, and he was shocked by a taser only once before he fled his cell and then two to three times
after he did so. (Houston County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
DOUBLE CELLING
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING

Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2011). State inmates filed a § 1983 action asserting multiple
causes of action pertaining to their convictions and conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the
case, finding that class certification was not warranted, where the inmates made no attempt to define the class,
many claims were specific to named plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se. The court found that
overcrowded conditions at the county jail, which required two inmates to share a cell designed for one and
required inmates to eat meals in their cells, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the
pretrial detainee's due process rights and an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights, absent a showing that conditions
of confinement deprived them of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, or subjected them to a health
risk. The inmates claimed that one inmate was required to sleep on a mattress on the floor cell, which allegedly
adds clutter to the floor and increases the risk of injury. The inmates alleged that the jail has more inmates than
the day rooms can accommodate at meal time, and inmates are therefore required to eat meals in their cells.
(Cuyahoga County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
MAINTENANCE

Byron v. Dart, 825 F.Supp.2d 958 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was stabbed in the head by an
unknown inmate who opened the detainee's cell door from outside without a key brought a § 1983 action against
the county sheriff, jail administrators, and a corrections officer, alleging that the defendants failed to protect him
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations in his complaint stated a
“sufficiently serious injury” as required for a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against the prison
administrators. The court also found that the detainee's allegations in his complaint were sufficient to state a
“deliberate indifference” element of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against prison
administrators. The detainee alleged that the problem of malfunctioning cell doors was “pervasive,” “welldocumented,” and “expressly noted by prison officials in the past,” that work orders to repair cell doors were
never executed, and that he complained about his door, but it was never repaired. According to the court, the
detainee became aware, from his own observations and in speaking with other detainees, that numerous cells
were “in a state of disrepair and/or had malfunctioned,” and that specifically, the doors of the cells could be
“popped” open by detainees from the outside without a key. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUIPMENT
FURNISHING
SAFETY

Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2011). A female jailer brought a § 1983 action against a county, sheriff,
county commissioners, and several other defendants, alleging violations of her substantive due process rights.
The district court denied the sheriff's and commissioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified
immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the defendants'
failure to act was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the jailer. According to the court, the sheriff's and
county commissioners' awareness of potentially dangerous conditions in the jail, including that the jail was
understaffed and that the drunk tank had an interior-mounted door handle, and failure to take action regarding
those conditions, which resulted in the jailer being attacked and taken hostage by two inmates, was not deliberate
indifference as to the safety of the jailer, as would violate the jailer's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process rights on a state created danger theory. The court found that the defendants’ failure to act was at most
gross negligence, rather than deliberate indifference, and the jailer was aware of the conditions as she had been
injured previously due to the handle and staffing issue, such that she could take these issues into account in
interacting with inmates. (Miller County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
FACILITY DESIGN

Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F.Supp.2d 915 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the
district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the court held that: (1) a sub-class was properly defined as mobilityimpaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees; (2) the detainees were subject to physical barriers to
accessibility of jail facilities, in violation of ADA; (3) certain categories of programs, services, and activities
were not similarly available to the detainees, in violation of ADA; (4) the county failed to establish that
accommodations requested by the detainees would require fundamental alteration or produce an undue burden,
or that current conditions were reasonably related to the facilities' legitimate interests; and (5) the least intrusive
means to compel the county to remedy physical barriers and disparate provision of programs, services, and
activities to detainees was to allow the county to draft a proposed plan. The court held that the widespread
injunctive relief ordered by the district court, which addressed the county's failure to accommodate detainees

15.52

with respect to toilets and showers, as well as programs, activities, and services, was narrowly drawn, extended
no further than necessary to correct violations of the detainees' federal rights, and was the least intrusive means
necessary to correct violation of those federal rights, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
(Orange County Jail System, California, including the Central Jail Complex, the Intake Release Center, the
Men's Central Jail, the Women's Central Jail and the James A. Facility Musick and the Theo Lacy Facility)
U.S. District Court
FURNISHINGS
SANITATION

Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila, 763 F.Supp.2d 294 (D.Puerto Rico 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983
action against a prison warden and a director of corrections for alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court held that the prison warden was liable for an
Eighth Amendment violation but the inmate was not entitled to a judgment against the director of corrections.
The court found that the inmate was entitled to $1,000 per day for pain and suffering and to a punitive damages
award of $10,000 from the warden. According to the court, the warden was liable to the inmate for violating the
inmate’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because the inhumane
conditions to which the inmate was subjected in his cell included the lack of an adequate place to sit, no working
toilet, shower runoff water channeled through the cell, and foul odors. The court held that these conditions were
the result of design and not of accident or happenstance, and were known to the prison officials in charge and in
control, including the warden. (Correctional Institution Annex 296, Guayama, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
SANITATION

Solomon v. Nassau County, 759 F.Supp.2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, jail, sheriff, and undersheriff, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was bitten by a rodent
in his jail cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that because the sheriff and undersheriff were not “personally involved” in any
alleged failure to maintain a safe prison environment, they were not subject to § 1983 liability for the injury to
the pretrial detainee who was bitten by a rodent in his jail cell. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pretrial detainee was exposed to a substantial risk
of contracting rabies or another dangerous disease from a rodent bite, and whether the county was aware of the
substantial risk of serious harm. According to the court, although protection of inmates from harmful chemicals
and the need to prevent inmates from using poisons, glue traps, or door sweeps as weapons were legitimate
penological interests that supported the reasonableness of the jail's pest control plan, a genuine issue of fact
existed as to whether the county was adequately complying with the plan, and whether the lack of compliance
could have resulted in the alleged substantial risk of harm. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
CROWDING
MEDICAL EXAM
SANITATION
USE OF FORCE

U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D.Ill. 2011). The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) brought
an action against a county, alleging conditions in a county jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment.
Following entry of a consent decree, the county moved for entry of a prisoner release order. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that while overcrowding was a primary cause of the unconstitutional
conditions at the jail and a prisoner release order was the least intrusive form of relief for overcrowding in the
jail, the proposed prisoner release order was not narrowly drawn or sufficiently specific, and thus the grant of the
order was not warranted. The court noted that conditions of overcrowding caused guards to resort to excessive
force, incidents involving guards' use of excessive force were more frequent on days the jail was overcrowded,
overcrowding caused grossly unsanitary and unhealthy conditions, and chronic overcrowding of the jail's
medical facilities resulted in inadequate medical and mental-health care. According to the court, the proposed
order did not explain or justify the number of inmates who would be affected by the order or the number of
inmates that would be released annually, did not specify which class or classes of prisoners would be eligible for
release or what grounds were to be used in deciding whether an inmate should be released on their own
recognizance or released on electronic monitoring, or provide assurance that adequate funding would be
available for electronic monitoring equipment or that prisoners released to electronic monitoring would be
effectively monitored. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
2012

U.S. District Court
KITCHEN
SAFETY

Allen v. Ford, 880 F.Supp.2d 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety equipment while he was working in a cafeteria
and in failing to provide treatment when he burned himself, as well as asserting deliberate indifference in instruction and supervision. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) the negligence claims were precluded by sovereign immunity; (2) one officer did not know of
and disregard the severity of the prisoner's injuries; and (3) the officer advising the prisoner to sign up for sick
call for the following morning, rather than providing emergency sick call at that time, was not deliberately indifferent. The court noted that the prisoner reported the incident to the officer, who asked if he was badly burned,
the prisoner responded that he did not know, the prisoner's skin did not blister until after he returned to his cell at
the end of his shift, and the prisoner visited the medical department the next morning and was transferred to a
county medical center. (New York State Department of Corrections, Wende Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
COURT ORDER

Armstrong v. Brown, 857 F.Supp.2d 919 (N.D.Cal. 2012). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class
action against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure.
Following remand to allow the development of additional evidence, the prisoners and parolees filed a renewed
motion. The district court granted the motion and entered an enforce order. The court held that: (1) officials'
efforts to comply with ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and prior orders were inadequate and ineffective on a
system-wide level; (2) system-wide injunctive relief was appropriate; (3) district court would not abstain from
exercising its jurisdiction over matters pertaining to county jails; (4) a stay of the prior order was not warranted;

15.53

and (5) the district court would exercise its retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. The court held that
state officials were obliged to ensure ADA-compliant conditions for prisoners and parolees that they housed
under their own authority in county jails. (California Youth and Adult Corrections Authority, Board of Prison
Terms, California Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
DINING
HANDICAPPED
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012). A former inmate sued the Illinois Department
of Corrections, its Director, and several employees claiming violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim, and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the inmate’s allegations that his use of the toilets and showers at the
prison was made more difficult by the absence of grab bars did not state an Eighth Amendment claim, where the
inmate was able to shower four times a month. He also missed meals on occasion because he could not walk fast
enough to the cafeteria. The court found that the prisoner pleaded a plausible claim for failure to make
reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act where he alleged that the Department of Corrections
refused to accommodate his disability, and consequently kept him from accessing meals and showers on the
same basis as other inmates. (Vandalia Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS AREAS
SANITATION

Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont. 2012). Native American state prisoners brought an
action against a state, the state department of corrections (DOC), a private prison facility, and wardens, alleging
violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Defendants filed motion to
dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the allegations were sufficient to plead the searches were a substantial
burden on their religious exercise; (2) the allegations were sufficient plead the confiscations and prohibitions
were a substantial burden on their religious exercise; (3) the allegations about relieving a prisoner from the pipe
carrier position were sufficient to plead it was a substantial burden on his religious exercise; (4) transferred
prisoners did not have standing for claims for injunctive and declaratory relief; (5) the private facility was a state
actor; and (6) the private facility was an instrumentality of the state. The Native American prisoners' alleged that
the prison subjected them to en masse strip searches before and after sweat lodge ceremonies, that the searches
sometimes occurred in a hallway where other inmates could see them and at least one occurred in a gym with
video cameras monitored by a female guard, and that some inmates declined to participate in the ceremony due
to the degrading nature of the searches. According to the court, the prisoners' allegations that sacred items were
confiscated or prohibited by the prison for their sweat lodge ceremonies, including smudge tobacco and antlers,
and that the items were essential for the ceremony to be meaningful and proper were sufficient to plead
confiscations and prohibitions were a substantial burden on their religious exercise, as required for their claims
under RLUIPA. The prisoner also alleged that they were subject to pat down searches before and after entering
the ceremonial sweat lodge grounds, that they were provided insufficient water and toilet facilities, that the size
of the sweat lodge and the frequency of the ceremonies was inadequate, and that they were not provided a Native
American spiritual advisor. (Montana Department of Corrections; Corrections Corporation of America;
Crossroads Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDS
FURNISHINGS
SUICIDE

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated
at a state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action
against state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old
youth had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district
court granted summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that, even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a
youth detention facility that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be
imminently suicidal, amounted to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not
then so clearly established as to defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. The
court found that a psychologist at the state youth detention facility, who had authorized the minor's transfer after
learning of minor's unsuccessful participation in the facility's drug abuse program, was not deliberately
indifferent to the minor's serious medical needs, in violation of due process. According to the court, even if he
knew that the minor, who had mental health issues, presented a suicide risk and that the transferee facility was
using metal bunk beds like that which the minor thereafter used to hang himself. The court found that the
psychologist's involvement with the minor was minimal, the decision to make the transfer was made after the
psychologist met with the facility's entire treatment staff, and the psychologist did not know which room at the
transferee facility the minor would be given or that the facility's other suicide prevention measures would prove
to be inadequate. (Illinois Youth Center, IYC Kewanee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EQUIPMENT
LIGHTS
SAFETY

Solivan v. Dart, 897 F.Supp.2d 694 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county,
corrections officers, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to undue punishment. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's §
1983 complaint stated a claim against a correctional officer for deliberate indifference to a serious need in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the complaint alleged facts that indicated that the officer left
inmates visually and audibly unsupervised for hours, knowing that a substantial risk of harm was present. The
complaint further alleged that there were no light bulbs in the detainee's cell, no intercoms or emergency call
buttons in cells, and no overhead cameras on his tier of the jail. According to the court, the complaint stated that
the harm the detainee suffered at the hands of other inmates was significant, including severe injuries to his right
eye and bleeding from his ear, and the complaint alleged that the detainee was the only person of Hispanic origin
housed in the maximum security tier, while a significant majority of other inmates were African American, and
that these circumstances put the detainee in an identifiable group of prisoners who were singled out for attack.
(Division One, Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

15.54

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
SECURITY

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia
jail who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court entered
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district court
granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure of District of
Columbia jail personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and monitoring
of inmate movements was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow inmate was for the jury, in
the detainee's negligence action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate who was being held at the D.C.
Jail on charges of first-degree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had received a pass to go to the jail's law
library, unaccompanied. Apparently he did not arrive at the library but no one from the library called the
inmate’s housing unit to report that he had not arrived. An expert retained by the detainee asserted that failure to
monitor inmate movements violated national standards for the operation of jails. En route to the jail mental
health unit, the detainee saw the inmate enter a mop closet. The inmate, along with another inmate, approached
the detainee and stabbed him nine times with a knife. During court proceedings there was testimony that the
inmates had hidden contraband in the mop closets. The closets are supposed to be locked at all times, other than
when the jail is being cleaned each afternoon. But there was evidence from which the jury could infer that all
inmates except those who did not have jobs cleaning in the jail had access to them. According to the detainee’s
expert witness, keeping mop closets locked at times when the general inmate population is permitted to be in the
vicinity of the closets is in accordance with national standards of care for the operation of detention facilities.
According to the district court, “In sum, the circumstantial evidence of Mr. Foreman's [inmate who attacked the
detainee] freedom of movement is enough to have allowed a jury to conclude that the District's negligence was a
proximate cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
BEDS
EQUAL
PROTECTION

Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F.Supp.2d 1039 (N.D.Cal. 2012). A detainee at a county jail who had
limited mobility and deformed hands as a result of systemic lupus and rheumatoid arthritis brought an action
against the contractor that provided medical care assessment services for detainees, and its employees, alleging
violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA),
and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the private contractor was not liable as a public entity
or instrumentality under the ADA; (2) the contractor qualified as a “business establishment,” under the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (3) the complaint properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal
accommodations, as required to state a claim under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (4) the allegations
were insufficient to assert intentional discrimination, as required to state a claim against the contractor for
violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (5) the CDPA applied to county jails and the accommodations
and services provided therein; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against contractor under the CDPA. The jail
inmate who had limited mobility and deformed hands alleged that she was unable to use the toilet in the jail as
needed, causing her injuries, and that she was deprived of access to jail's facilities, beds, showers, walkways, and
benches. According to the court, this properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal accommodations, as
required to state a claim against the private contractor that contracted with county to provide medical care
assessment services for the county jail. (County of Alameda, California)
2013

U.S. District Court
BEDS
SAFETY

Alvarado-David v. U.S., 972 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.Puerto Rico 2013). A prisoner brought an action against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging he fell out of his bunk and hit a toilet bowl,
breaking his frontal teeth and upper lip because the United States' failed to provide prisoners with ladders to
climb to their bunks. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the
FTCA's discretionary function exception. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the decision
by Bureau of Prisons (BOP) personnel not to provide ladders or other equipment for the prisoners to climb to
their bunks fit within the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. The court noted that no rules or
regulations governed the use of ladders or bunk beds in correctional facilities, and the decision not to provide
ladders in correctional facilities for safety reasons, as ladders could be broken off and used as weapons or escape
devices, was grounded in considerations of public policy. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto
Rico)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS
MAINTENANCE
SANITATION
VENTILATION

Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims
against various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who allegedly were responsible for
the conditions of the inmate's confinement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the
motion, finding that the inmate adequately pled that Illinois prison officials were deliberately indifferent, as
required to state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the inmate alleged that he
repeatedly advised the official about the prison's detrimental living conditions and that the official did not make
an effort to remedy the conditions, that he informed another official about the intolerable living conditions and
that this official did not make an effort to remedy the conditions, and that he discussed the intolerable living
conditions with other officials, each of whom also failed to make any efforts to remedy the living conditions.
The inmate claimed that he was subjected to unsanitary conditions, a lack of ventilation, and continuous lighting
that interfered with his sleep. He also alleged that his housing area had dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell
and a strong odor of ammonia from his uncleaned toilet, that there was pest infestation accompanied by filth and
feces, and that there was a complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even garbage bags. He also cited filthy
soiled bedding, missing or dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged cell furniture and fixtures, and
badly peeling toxic paint. The inmate suffered from endocarditis, an infection of the lining of the heart, which he
claimed was due to the conditions of his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost constant, fungal
infections” stemmed. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)

15.55

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL
PROTECTION

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance
procedure. The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the
California Penal Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the
discrimination suffered by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to
assist in preventing further Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials
to track and accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a
workable grievance procedure were consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act and did not infringe on California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
COURT ORDER
HANDICAPPED

Armstrong v. Brown, 939 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2013). Prisoners brought a class action against the
Governor of California, the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and a number of related directors
and executive officers, seeking to enforce prior orders requiring the defendants to provide sign language
interpreters (SLI), and to hold the defendants in contempt for violations. The district court granted the motion to
enforce the prior orders. The court held that setting a policy which failed to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired
inmates during rounds by psychiatric technicians warranted enforcement of the order against the defendants, and
the defendants' failure to provide SLIs for hearing-impaired inmates at classes attended by deaf inmates also
warranted an enforcement order. But the court decided that civil contempt sanctions were not appropriate
because officials were making substantial efforts to reach compliance with the orders by voluntarily increasing
both contract and civil services positions for qualified SLIs. (Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, California
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY

Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). Patients at a state Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO) brought a § 1983 complaint against CCUSO administrators, challenging placement of video cameras
in CCUSO restrooms, and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop their use. The district court denied the
motion as to cameras in “dormitory style restrooms” but granted an injunction ordering that cameras in
“traditional style bathrooms” be pointed at a ceiling or covered with lens cap. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that CCUSO conducted a “search” by capturing images of patients while occupying singleuser bathrooms, and that CCUSO did not conduct a reasonable search by capturing patients' images, thereby
constituting a Fourth Amendment violation. The appeals court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that the patients had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a single-person bathroom when there was no immediate indication it was being used for purposes
other than those ordinarily associated with bathroom facilities, and that involuntarily civilly committed persons
retain the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches that is analogous to the right retained
by pretrial detainees. According to the court, the facility did not conduct a reasonable search of its involuntarily
committed patients by capturing images of patients while they occupied single-user bathrooms in a secure
facility, thereby constituting a violation of Fourth Amendment, where the cameras did not provide administrators
with immediate alerts concerning patient safety or prevent assaults or dangerous acts, and less intrusive methods
were available for administrators to use to prevent illicit activities by patients. (Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for
Sex Offenders)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUIPMENT
SECURITY

Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc., 721 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action
against the manufacturer of allegedly faulty locks on cell doors that permitted another inmate to enter the
detainee's cell and assault and rape him. The manufacturer moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion and then denied reconsideration. The manufacturer moved for permission to file an appeal
before the case had been adjudicated. The motion was granted in part. The appeals court affirmed, allowing the
case to continue. (RR Brink, Harrison County Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
GENERAL
CONDITIONS
VENTILATION

Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F.Supp.2d 639 (M.D.La. 2013). State death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
state department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations
of violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act.
The district court granted declaratory and injunctive relief in part and denied in part. The court held that the
temperature and humidity of cells presented a substantial risk of harm to death row inmates, as required for their
claims against the prison and officials, alleging the conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment.
The court noted that: (1) the inmates were regularly subjected to temperatures above 90.5 degrees and heat
indices above 100 degrees; (2) the heat index inside death row tiers was often higher than that outside the
facility; (3) inmates were subjected to consecutive days with heat indices above 100 degrees; (4) inmates were at
risk of heat-related illnesses including heat stroke and worsening of their underlying conditions, which included
diabetes, hypertension, and uncontrolled blood pressure; and (5) two inmates were over age 55, increasing the
risk for them.
The court found that prison officials had knowledge that the heat and humidity in death row tiers placed
inmates at a substantial risk of harm, as required to find the officials were deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. The inmates had submitted multiple
administrative complaints regarding the heat, and officials responded that they knew it was “extremely hot.”
According to the court, prison officials disregarded the substantial risk of serious harm to death row inmates
regarding heat and humidity in cells, as required to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs for the purpose of the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims, where the officials did not take
any actions to reduce the heat conditions despite knowledge of the conditions.

15.56

The court found that there was no evidence that death row inmates were limited in any major life activities
due to their medical conditions, including hypertension, obesity, and depression, as required for their claims
against the prison and officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. (Louisiana State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
ANTIQUATED
FACILITY
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING
HYGIENE
PLUMBING
VENTILATION
WINDOWS

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail and that the sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee's
allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause for subjecting him to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The prisoner alleged that: (1) on one occasion he was confined with
eight inmates in a portion of the county jail intended for three; (2) he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken
windows and cracked toilets; (3) on another occasion he and other inmates had to sleep on the floor even though
shower water leaked there; (4) cells had broken windows, exposed wiring, extensive rust, sinks without running
water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs, and a broken heating and cooling system; (5) inmates were
denied any recreation; and (6) the jail furnished inmates with no supplies to clean for themselves.
The appeals court found that county jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's
serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause even if he was dissatisfied with the treatment he
received from a jail nurse. The court noted that the detainee was taken to see a nurse as soon as he informed the
officer on duty about his leg wound, he was taken to a hospital promptly after writing a letter to the sheriff
asking to see a doctor, and the detainee received medical attention, medication, testing, and ongoing observation
at the hospital. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
CAPACITY

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment
challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the
general prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court
to enter a population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted
and the cases were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of
its design capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied
the motion. The three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding
was reduced and no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not
provide the basis for a motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable
to continue applying the order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to
providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had
achieved a durable remedy to prison crowding. (California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
MEDICAL AREAS

Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California state prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against various prison and state officials, alleging failure to provide mental care in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. After a three-judge court found that overcrowding was the primary cause of
ongoing constitutional violations, and was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, officials moved to
terminate all prospective relief and vacate the judgment. The district court denied the motion, holding that: (1)
there remained an ongoing violation of the Eighth Amendment in inadequate assessment, treatment, or
intervention regarding prisoner suicides; (2) prisoners placed in administrative segregation units continued to
face a substantial risk of harm; (3) prisoners continued to face delays in access to care; (4) prisons continued to
have shortages in treatment space and access to beds; and (5) officials were deliberately indifferent in
implementing policies to remedy the Eighth Amendment violations. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
CAPACITY
CROWDING

Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against a Governor, alleging that due to prison overcrowding, they received inadequate
mental health care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
Separately, California prisoners with serious medical conditions brought a class action asserting constitutional
claims similar to those in the other action. In the case concerning mental health care, the district court found
Eighth Amendment violations and appointed a special master to oversee the development and implementation of
a remedial plan. In the case concerning medical care, the State stipulated to a remedial injunction, and, after the
State failed to comply with that injunction, the district court appointed a receiver to oversee remedial efforts. A
three judge district court panel consolidated the two cases and the panel entered a remedial order requiring the
State to reduce its prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity within two years. The Governor
appealed. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the population reduction order. The district court
subsequently denied the defendants' motion to vacate or modify the population reduction order, and directed the
defendants to comply with the population reduction order. The defendants' moved to stay the order directing
compliance pending appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The district court denied the motion, finding
that: (1) the State was not likely to succeed on the merits of the prisoners' lawsuit challenging prison conditions;
(2) the State would not be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) issuance of a stay would substantially injure the
prisoners; and (4) the public interest favored denying the stay. (California)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED
MEDICAL AREAS
RELIGIOUS AREAS

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs and who
were civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit, seeking injunctive relief against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate their disabilities in
violation of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss and for summary judgment,
and the detainees moved for discovery and to deny the government's motions. The district court granted the mo-

15.57

tions in part and denied in part. The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit under the ABA, the detainees were not “prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) and thus did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found
that the detainees, by alleging that, unlike detainees without disabilities, they could not access the prison's religious library or an outdoor pagan worship area, stated claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in their action seeking injunctive relief against
the Bureau of Prisons for failing to accommodate their disabilities. The court held that the detainees failed to
state a claim for a violation of the constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the
detainees had a limited constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged that the prison
medical facility had no private, wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm from the use or
disclosure of their medical information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
BEDS
CELL CAPACITY
CROWDING
HYGIENE
SAFETY
SANITATION

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided
food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts
related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1)
the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with
legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's
legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal
mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious
medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too
costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the
detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence,
contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement
whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled”
inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former
detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his
official capacity. The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day
period while the kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would
support the inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent
evidence that the food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the
detainee's diet consisted of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The
court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food item when
another ran out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from days before,
serving juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and serving meals on
cracked trays that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial deprivation of
food sufficient to amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due
process rights. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE
SANITATION

Florio v. Canty, 954 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a warden and a corrections officer, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's exposure to human waste on
two occasions, for a total of less than a few hours, did not give rise to a serious risk of substantial harm. The
prisoner alleged that prison officials waited 10 to 30 minutes after two separate incidents of a toilet overflowing
to release the prisoner from his cell and having the prisoner clean the cell with inadequate cleaning gear and
without training, allegedly resulting in the prisoner developing a foot fungus. The court held that this was not
deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his health and safety, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The
court noted that officials acted to alleviate the unsanitary conditions, the overflow also occurred in
approximately 20 other cells, and the prisoner was not prevented from bathing or washing his clothes after the
incidents. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERCOM
AUDIO
COMMUNICATION

Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013). The wife of a pretrial detainee who suffered from
dementia and who was severely beaten by his cellmate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials in their
individual capacities for alleged violation of the Due Process Clause by deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk of harm to the detainee. The wife also asserted a supervisory liability claim against the sheriff in his official
capacity and a state law claim for loss of support and consortium. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants. The wife appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that there was no evidence
that jail officials were subjectively aware of a risk of serious harm to which the pretrial detainee was exposed
from his severe beating by a cellmate, and that the officials deliberately disregarded that risk, as required to
support the detainee's § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Due Process Clause. According
to the court, the officers' failure to conduct cell checks and head counts and their deactivation of emergency call
buttons constituted negligence but did not justify constitutional liability under § 1983. According to the court,
jail officials' policy violations by failing to enter every cell in conducting head counts and in deactivating
emergency call buttons did not constitute a custom so settled and permanent as to have the force of law. (Clayton
County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
MAINTENANCE

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). A civilly-committed resident at a special treatment unit
(STU) operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) brought action an against NJDOC
officials, alleging violations of his substantive due process rights under § 1983. The district court held that the
resident's claims against the officials in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court
held that the resident's allegations adequately pled the officials’ personal involvement in his complaint that: (1)

15.58

there were visibly leaking steam pipes in a special treatment unit (STU) for which trash cans were used to collect
water; (2) NJDOC officials personally toured STU; (3) STU received numerous written complaints from
residents about inadequate hot water; and (4) an STU assistant administrator told the resident that defective
piping valves were too expensive to repair. The court found that the officials were subject to liability under §
1983 in their individual capacities. The court held that NJDOC officials were not entitled to qualified immunity
from the civilly committed resident's § 1983 conditions of civil commitment claim under the Due Process
Clause, arising from inadequate hot water at a special treatment unit (STU) in which he was housed. (Special
Treatment Unit, Avenel, Middlesex County, New Jersey)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL AREA

Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex. 2013) The parents of a detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county, the county jail medical staff,
and officials, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constitutional violations. The
action was removed to federal court. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded
by fact issues with regard to: (1) the nurses who were defendants; (2) the claim that the county failed to monitor
the detainee’s health; and (3) failure to train officers on how to observe and assess the jail detainees' medical
needs and respond to those needs. The court noted that the way the jail infirmary was structured, including the
lack of direct access between the detainees and the nursing staff, and the absence of procedures for
communication between the nurses and the correctional officers concerning emergent medical symptoms, were a
county custom. According to the court, whether that custom was adopted or continued, even though it was
obvious that its likely consequence would be a deprivation of medical care for the detainees, precluded summary
judgment in favor of the county in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim brought against the county. (Dallas
County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SANITATION

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim against the
District of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's fiveday stay in a “Safe Cell,” which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First Amendment right
of free speech or right of access to courts. The court found that the detainee's alleged exposure to “dried urine on
the toilet seat and floor” and garbage during his five-day stay, along with the denial of a shower, did not rise to
the level of a Fifth Amendment due process violation. According to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe
Cell was not motivated by a desire to punish the detainee, but rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's
ailments after his “legs and back gave out” twice. The court noted that denial of the detainee’s request to have
the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that the detainee would not be in the cell that long. (D.C. Jail,
District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HYGIENE
SAFETY
HANDICAPPED

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal
detainee who was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's
department and county officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations that the
county officials developed, supervised, and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that grievances
were received in the proper manner and were properly responded to, and were aware of his serious medical
needs and his grievances, yet turned a blind eye to the situation, were sufficient to state a claim against the
officials in their individual capacities in his civil rights action alleging he was denied medical care and kept in
unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple
disabilities that he sustained in an auto accident, including weakness and numbness in his left side and he
partially dragged his left leg. He also had incontinence with urine and bowel movements and required the use of
adult diapers. He was unable to stand still without assistance, which made showering and using the toilet
difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his obvious disabilities and medical issues, he was assigned to a
regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a top bunk. He had to hop on one leg to go up or down the stairs
and needed assistance from other inmates to get into and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given adult
diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then, he was not given an adequate supply of diapers and would
sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in clothes with urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not
given enough biohazard bags, and the soiled diapers and bags piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no
one to assist the detainee, he fell while attempting to get out of his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone
came to help him. As a result, his left leg worsened and his right leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was
forced to crawl down stairs on his buttocks, and scoot along the floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and
unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large
facility, were sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual capacity.
According to the court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to any
correctional officer working in the area in which the inmate was housed.
The court held that the detainee's allegations that correctional staff at the county jail acted pursuant to an
official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues or complaints about
problems with walking if they were ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene items such
as adult diapers to inmates, among other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy or custom was a
“moving force” in the alleged violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity claims under Monell.
The court held that the detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on the basis of his disabilities
while he was housed at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory intent, as required to state an ADA
claim against the county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

15.59

U.S. District Court
ANTIQUATED
FACILITY
ASBESTOS
MAINTENANCE

Pratt v. City of New York, 929 F.Supp.2d 314(S.D.N.Y. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a city,
its Commissioner of Corrections, and other prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of Eighth Amendment based on th e prison's failure to address and mitigate asbestos exposure in prison
dormitories. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court
held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim that the prison's failure to address and mitigate friable asbestos
exposure constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that the prison
dormitory was contaminated with asbestos and that prison maintenance deliberately avoided testing potentially
contaminated pipes and older floor tiles for asbestos exposure. According to the court, exposure to friable
asbestos poses a sufficiently serious risk to a prisoner's health as to constitute a serious deprivation, as an
element of a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that
most of the facility pipes and the ceiling heating system were deteriorating due to roof leaks, and that leaking
water captured small asbestos particles (“friable asbestos”) from the deteriorated pipes and heating system and
brought the friable asbestos into the dormitory. According to the prisoner, the friable asbestos is also blown
throughout the dormitory by the ceiling heating system. The prisoner was a licensed asbestos remover. (Anna M.
Koss Center, Rikers Island, New York City, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SIZE
CROWDING
HYGIENE
MEDICAL AREAS
RECREATION
AREAS

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). An Illinois prisoner serving a life sentence brought a § 1983
action against prison officials, alleging that the prisoner and other inmates classified as low-aggression offenders
in the prisoner's cellhouse were subject to lockdowns for more than 50 percent of the days in a 33-month period.
The district court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage for prisoner civil actions and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner had
exhausted his administrative remedies. The court found that frequent unit-wide prison lockdowns for substantial
periods of time deprived him of exercise and caused him various health issues, such as irritable bowel syndrome,
severe stress, headaches, and tinnitus, stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court,
the prisoner sufficiently alleged prison officials' deliberate indifference to physical and psychological injuries, as
required to state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, based on excessive prison lockdowns. The court
noted that the prisoner alleged that he had filed multiple grievances about prison conditions, including a
grievance specifically challenging small cells, and that the prison was the subject of numerous past lawsuits,
including one specifically ordering a remedial plan for overcrowding, small cells, and lack of adequate medical
care and hygiene. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
NOISE
CELL CAPACITY
HYGIENE
SAFETY
SANITATION
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a §
1983 action against a warden and various other prison officials and employees, alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were
sufficient to plead that he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was subjected
to unreasonable health and safety risks, as required to state a § 1983 claims against prison officials for violations
of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that: (1) for approximately 28 months he was confined in a cell
with five other men with inadequate space and ventilation; (2) the heat was stifling in the summer and it was
freezing in the winter; (3) urine and feces splattered the floor; (4) there were insufficient cleaning supplies; (5)
the mattress was too narrow for him to lie on flat; and (6) noisy and crowded conditions made sleep difficult and
created a constant risk of violence. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead
that prison officials knew of and disregarded excessive risks to his health and safety, as required to find that the
officials were deliberately indifferent. The prisoner alleged that officials knew of overcrowding in his cell, that
he spoke with some officials about the conditions, that officials were aware noise was loud and constant, that
they were aware of temperature issues, that the prisoner informed officials that his bed was too narrow, that one
official failed to issue cleaning supplies, and that conditions did not change despite his complaints. (Federal
Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
SHOWER
TOILET
HANDICAPPED

Blossom v. Dart, 64 F.Supp.3d 1158 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A disabled detainee in a county jail brought an action
against a county and a county sheriff, asserting a § 1983 claim for deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment
rights and alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The
sheriff filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that the disabled detainee, who suffered injuries due to the lack of accommodation for his disability, sufficiently
alleged that the sheriff had personal knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged deprivation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights, so as to state a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity. The detainee
alleged that the sheriff acquired personal knowledge of the fact that disabled prisoners assigned to a certain jail
division had sustained injuries because shower and toilet facilities were not equipped with appropriate grab bars,
toilet seats, and shower seats, and the detainee alleged that despite revising the jail’s housing assignment policy
for detainees who used wheelchairs, the sheriff refused to revise the policy for other disabled detainees. The
court also found that the detainee sufficiently alleged that there was an official policy allowing disabled
detainees to be housed in non-accessible housing units that continued to exist despite the knowledge that the
policy had caused serious injuries to disabled detainees. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FACILITY DESIGN
EQUIPMENT

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 3 F.Supp.3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In a county jail detainees' action against a county, the
detainees moved for spoliation sanctions based on the county's alleged failure to preserve capital project plans
that allegedly showed surveillance camera locations, and videos from a surveillance camera in the housing area
where one detainee was allegedly beaten. “Spoliation” is the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or
the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees failed to show that the capital project plans existed,

15.60

and failed to show that a surveillance camera in the housing area existed. The court noted that ambiguous
statements made by a jail official that he was not sure if such plans existed but that they might indicate camera
locations, and a speculative expert opinion stating that it was customary for a system installer to provide an “as
built” floor plan detailing camera placement, were insufficient to show that such plans in fact existed for the jail.
(Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
CELL SIZE
FURNISHINGS
PRIVACY

Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee commenced an action alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights by holding him in disciplinary segregated confinement throughout the
period of pretrial detention and into the subsequent criminal sentence as punishment for conduct that had
occurred while he was imprisoned during a prior criminal sentence. The district court held that the detainee's
punitive disciplinary confinement violated due process, and largely denied the officials' claims of qualified
immunity. The court awarded the detainee partial money damages and equitable relief after a three-day bench
trial, and awarded attorneys' fees and costs on the detainee's motion. The officials appealed. The appeals court
reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court noted that conditions in the disciplinary unit are
considerably more onerous than conditions of confinement for the general population--an inmate is kept for
twenty-three hours a day in a cell measuring seven by twelve feet, each cell has a solid steel door with a small
inset window, a narrow window to the outdoors, a cement bed, desk, and stool, and a toilet visible through the
inset window. An inmate typically leaves his cell for only one hour a day to exercise (five days a week) and to
shower (three days a week). He is subject to strip searches whenever he enters or leaves his cell. When an inmate
is out of his cell for any reason, he is manacled and placed in leg chains. Inmates are socially isolated. Each
inmate receives his meals through a slot in the steel door and is given only twenty minutes to eat. The prison
library is off-limits, although an inmate may receive law books from a “book cart,” which requires a formal
request and typically results in a wait of eight days. Communication with other inmates, guards, and the outside
world is severely restricted. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
EQUIPMENT
MAINTENANCE
SECURITY

Freeland v. Ballard, 6 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.W.Va. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging the officials were deliberately indifferent to serious security breaches and failed to protect him from
another inmate who escaped a segregation cell and attacked him with a piece of metal. The officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegation that there was at least one prior incident when an inmate repeatedly beat on his door until it became
unsecured and permitted the inmate to escape from the cell and assault another prisoner, did not give rise to a
plausible claim that prison officials had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner and
disregarded that risk in violation of the Eighth Amendment. But the court found that the prisoner's allegations,
that an inmate escaped a segregation cell and attacked prisoner with a piece of metal but prison officials did
nothing to intervene to stop the attack when they had the opportunity to do so, and that the officials were aware
of prior incidents of inmates beating their doors open and attacking other inmates, were sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim. (Mount Olive Correctional Complex, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIGHTS

Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison
officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days violated the Eighth Amendment's bar
against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by factual issues as to: (1) the brightness of the continuous lighting in the prisoner's special
management unit cell; (2) the effect on the prisoner of the continuous lighting; and (3) whether prison officials
were deliberately indifferent. The inmate was housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU), an administrative
segregation unit with single-cells that are continuously illuminated for twenty-four hours a day. Each cell in the
SMU has three, four-foot-long fluorescent lighting tubes in a mounted light fixture. A cell occupant can use a
switch inside the cell to turn off two of the tubes, but the center tube is always on. The tube is covered by a blue
light-diffusing sleeve. Institution policy requires welfare checks in the SMU to be conducted every thirty
minutes, which is more frequent than checks for the general prison population. Officials asserted that continuous
illumination allows officers to “assess the baseline behavior of offenders to ensure they are not at risk of harming
themselves or making an attempt to harm staff, cause property damage or incite problem behavior from other
offenders.” The officials stated that turning the cell lights on and off every thirty minutes would be disruptive to
the cell occupants. The prisoner alleged that the light was so bright he could not sleep, even with “four layers of
towel wrapped around his eyes.” He alleged that the lighting gave him “recurring migraine headaches” and that
he could not distinguish between night and day in the cell. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 994 F.Supp.2d 840 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The mother of a former inmate who died of
hyperthermia while incarcerated brought an action against the prison's health care provider, asserting claims
under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging the provider's failure to
make accommodations for the inmate's disabilities resulted in the inmate's death. The provider moved to dismiss.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that the mother alleged sufficient facts to state that the
inmate was discriminated against by the prison's health care provider, in support of her claims under the ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act, by alleging that the provider knew of the risks and dangers associated with certain
medical conditions and medications, that the provider knew the inmate suffered from those conditions and used
those medications, and that despite that knowledge, the provider failed to make reasonable accommodations,
resulting in the inmate suffering more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoners, namely, his death. The
court noted that the mother alleged that the provider knew both that the inmate suffered from hypertension,
diabetes, schizophrenia, and/or depression, and was prescribed medications to treat his disabilities, and that
extreme temperatures could be deadly, but still failed to protect the inmate from the extreme temperatures that
ultimately resulted in the inmate's death. The court found that the mother alleged sufficient facts concerning the
accommodations that should have been provided by the prison's health care provider without a request, but were

15.61

denied or refused, as well as which facilities, programs, or services should have been modified by the provider,
to state claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The mother complained that the provider's intake
process was flawed in that it could take up to 10 days for prisoners to receive an intake physical, and that the
delay created a loophole that left inmates with heat sensitive conditions and disabilities especially vulnerable to
death because they did not receive accommodations for their heat sensitive disabilities, and that the provider's
failure to employ 24–hour medical staff at the prison resulted in a fatal delay and denial of vital medical care to
the inmate. (University of Texas Medical Branch, Texas Department of Criminal Justice Garza West Unit)
U.S. District Court
PLUMBING
MAINTENANCE

Morris v. Corrections Corporation of America, 75 F.Supp.3d 457 (D.D.C.. 2014) A former District of Columbia
inmate brought a state-court negligence action against a private prison operator, seeking damages for a scrotal
burn injury he allegedly sustained when the water temperature in a prison shower spiked unexpectedly. The
operator moved the action to federal court, and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that there was no evidence that the operator had notice of allegedly dangerously high
water temperatures in the prison showers, and the operator’s alleged breach of its duty to properly maintain the
shower facilities was not the proximate cause of the scrotal burn. (Correctional Treatment Facility, operated by
Corrections Corporation of America, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAPPED
MEDICAL AREAS

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 22 F.Supp.3d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A female former prisoner,
who was a double amputee, brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and
various MDOC-associated officers and healthcare professionals, asserting violations of § 1983, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state law. The prisoner alleged failure to provide adequate health care and
accommodations for disabled individuals. The district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a
corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand the district court held that: (1) a fact
question as to whether the warden was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed precluded summary judgment, and (2) it was clearly established that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constituted the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that she acquired MRSA following the amputation of
her left leg. As a result of her condition, her housing assignment at the facility was changed from the infirmary to
the segregation unit. The prisoner alleged that there was an absence of handicap facilities within this unit, that
she was unable to safely transfer from her wheelchair to the bed or toilet, and that she was allowed only one
shower during the two weeks while housed in segregation. (Huron Valley Women's Corr. Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE

Woodson v. City of Richmond, Va., 2 F.Supp.3d 804 (E.D.Va. 2014). A detainee in a city jail filed a § 1983
action against the city, the sheriff, and deputies, claiming constitutional and state law violations arising from the
detainee's heat stroke allegedly caused by deliberate indifference to his need for medical care. The detainee was
housed on the top floor of the jail during a time when outside temperatures exceeded 100 degrees, and when
interior temperatures were even higher. The inmate suffered a heat stroke and was found unresponsive in his
cell, and he had a body temperature of 106.1 degrees. The sheriff cross-claimed against the city for
indemnification or contribution. The city moved to dismiss the cross-claim. The court dismissed the cross-claim,
finding that the sheriff lacked the right to contribution and the right to indemnification for § 1983 claims or state
law claims. (Richmond City Jail, Virginia)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE

Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015). Death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a state
department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations that
heat in the prison violated the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act (RA). Following a bench trial, the district court sustained the Eighth Amendment claims,
rejected the disability claims, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the state to install air conditioning
throughout death row. The department and officials appealed and the inmates cross-appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence of, or relying on heat index measurements of death-row facilities; (2) the
district court did not clearly err in finding that heat in death-row cells posed a substantial risk of serious harm
to inmates and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed to death-row inmates by the
heat in prison cells; (3) housing of death-row inmates in very hot prison cells without sufficient access to heatrelief measures violated the Eighth Amendment; (4) inmates were not disabled under ADA or RA; and (5)
permanent injunctive relief requiring the state to install air conditioning throughout death-row housing violated
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where acceptable remedies short of facility-wide air conditioning
were available. (Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
VENTILATION
SANITATION

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force against
him and that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial detention. The
defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the former pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive
force when he responded to a fight between the detainee and fellow inmates, and jumped on the detainee’s back,
striking him in face and knocking out a tooth, and that the officer was not merely using force to maintain or
restore discipline but that the entire incident was “premeditated,” stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against
officer under the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the former detainee’s allegations that county
correctional officers used excessive force when they pushed him face-first into a glass window, pushed him to
the floor, kicked, stomped on and punched him, and used handcuffs to inflict pain, that as a result of the

15.62

altercation, the inmate urinated and defecated on himself and experienced dizziness and a concussion, and that
the force used on him was in response to his reaching for legal papers and attempting to steady himself, stated a
§ 1983 excessive force claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause. The court found that the former
detainee’s allegations that, after he was released from a special housing unit (SHU), county correctional officers
placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was exposed to human excrement and bodily fluids over the
course of multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme conditions in the SHU by way of 24-hour lighting
by the officers, stated a § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against the officers under the Due Process
Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility and Monroe County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
CROWDING
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PLUMBING
SANITATION

Bell v. Lindsay, 116 F.Supp.3d 511 (D. Md. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action alleging that
officers used excessive force when arresting him, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that prison
employees subjected him to overcrowded conditions of confinement and manifested deliberate indifference to
his medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state
claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee: (1) failed
to state a conditions of confinement claim based on overcrowding; and (2) failed to state a claim under Title II of
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), absent allegations that the detainee was disabled, that he was denied
any benefit of prison’s services, programs, or activities, and that any such exclusion or denial was by reason of
his disability. According to the court, the detainee’s allegations that he was placed into a holding room at the
prison with 25 to 30 inmates without a toilet or sink and forced to sleep on the floor failed to state a § 1983
Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim, absent allegations that the detainee was in the holding
room for any substantial period of time, or that employees were personally involved in the violation of detainee’s
constitutional rights. (George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CROWDING
TEMPERATURE

Cano v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.3d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Pretrial detainees temporarily housed in a
booking facility brought an action against a city and city officials under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference
to detainee health in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) temporarily subjecting
detainees to overcrowded jail cells was not deliberate indifference; (2) failure to provide sleeping equipment,
such as beds, cots, pillows, blankets, or bedding was not deliberate indifference; (3) availability of only one
toilet for 24 hours in each overcrowded holding cell was not deliberate indifference; (4) alleged failure to
provide food and water was not deliberate indifference; (5) police officers were not subjectively aware of a risk
to the detainees; (6) police officers did not act with punitive intent; (7) placement of pretrial detainees in jail
cells with alleged rodent and insect infestations was not deliberate indifference; (8) placement of pretrial
detainees in jail cells with alleged violent offenders that had limited police supervision, allegedly leading to
fights, thefts, and bullying, was not deliberate indifference to detainee health; and (9) alleged exposure of
pretrial detainees to extreme hot or cold temperature conditions in unventilated jail cells was not deliberate
indifference to detainee health that would violate the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainees were not kept in the cells
for more than 24 hours, and were not harmed by the alleged overcrowding. (Brooklyn Central Booking, City of
New York Police Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FACILITY DESIGN
SPECIAL CELL

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a county, its
sheriff’s department, and two officers under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be protected
from harm by other inmates, arising out of an attack against the arrestee by another arrestee with whom he was
jailed. A jury returned a verdict for the arrestee, and the district court denied the defendants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
The court held that: (1) the right of inmates to be protected from attacks by other inmates was established with
sufficient clarity to guide a reasonable officer; (2) substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that
the officer was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the arrestee; (3) sufficient evidence
supported the jury’s determination that the officer’s deliberate indifference was the actual and proximate cause
of harm to the arrestee; (4) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s determination that the supervising officer
was aware of, but disregarded, the risk to the arrestee posed by the other inmate; (5) the design of a jail by a
municipality is the result of a series of deliberate choices that render the design a formal municipal policy for the
purposes of municipal liability under § 1983; (6) arrestee failed to establish that the county had actual knowledge
of a risk of harm from the design of the jail, as required to establish liability under § 1983; and (7) the award of
future damages to the arrestee was supported by the record. The jury returned a verdict for the arrestee on all
counts and awarded him $2,605,632 in damages. The parties later stipulated to $840,000 in attorney fees,
$18,000 in punitive damages.
The arrestee had been placed in a “sobering cell” after his arrest for public drunkenness and was seriously
injured by another drunken inmate in the sobering cell. When the other inmate was admitted, staff determined
that he posed a threat to officers, requiring supervision by two officers at all times. The other arrestee was placed
in the same cell as the plaintiff, even though the jail policy was to place combative inmates in a separate cell, and
separate cells were available but left unused on the night of the incident.
The jail was purportedly in violation of a state regulation requiring monitoring equipment in sobering cells, as
required to establish that the county was deliberately indifferent to the Fourth Amendment right of pretrial
detainees to be protected from harm by other inmates and was liable under § 1983 for injuries sustained by the
arrestee. According to the court ”One would assume that for any given construction project, including jails, the
municipality’s governing body—or a committee that it appoints to act in its stead—reviews bids, considers
designs, and ultimately approves a plan for the facility and allocates funds for its construction. These choices are
sufficient, in our opinion, to meet the definition of a formal municipal policy…” (Los Angeles Sheriff’s West
Hollywood Station, California)

15.63

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE
SANITATION

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based
on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets
and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one
case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did
not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily
determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to
sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene
products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were
denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction
preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for
failure to pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures
of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal
Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their
Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due
Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due
Process violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently,
with respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not
afforded counsel at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their
incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
LIGHTS

Grenning v. Stout, 144 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D. Wash. 2015). A state prisoner commenced s § 1983 action against
prison officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days in segregation management unit
(SMU) violated the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted
summary judgment to the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
district denied summary judgment, in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the state prisoner suffered harm resulting from his exposure to
continuous light for 13 days; (2) whether state prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in exposing the
prisoner to continuous light for 13 days; (3) whether the prisoner had suffered an immediate injury from being
exposed to continuous light in the prison's segregation management unit; (4) whether legal damages would be
inadequate to compensate the prisoner for his alleged suffering or to restore his health, as to the costs of
changing the lighting; and (5) whether penological purposes would be undermined if the lighting was changed.
The court noted that the prisoner had offered evidence of the harm he already had suffered due to the lighting
conditions, including testimony of a board certified sleep medicine expert. (Airway Heights Corrections Center,
Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
TEMPERATURE
VENTILATION

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2015). The mother of an inmate who died of complications from
heatstroke while incarcerated brought an action against prison officials and employees, the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice (TDCJ), the University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), and an official of UTMB, alleging
that they were responsible for her son’s death. Prison officials moved to dismiss on the basis of qualified
immunity. The district court deferred ruling and the officials appealed. The appeals court dismissed the action,
finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal. The court held that the inmate’s factual allegations, if
true, would be sufficient to establish prison officials’ liability for an Eighth Amendment violation and to
overcome a qualified immunity defense, and that further clarification of the facts was necessary for the district
court to rule on the prison officials’ qualified immunity defense. The mother of the inmate alleged that officials
subjected the inmate to dangerous heat conditions in conscious disregard of the serious risk that the heat posed
for prisoners who, like the inmate, suffered from certain medical conditions, took certain medications, and had
recently been transferred from air-conditioned jails to non-climate-controlled facilities. The mother alleged that
the officials had promulgated and had power to change policies that allegedly caused the inmate’s death, and the
Eighth Amendment right not to be subjected to extremely dangerous temperatures without adequate ameliorative
measures had been clearly established at the time of inmate’s death. (Garza West Unit, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEPARATION
CELLS

Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the acting director
of a state department of corrections, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process in his placement in solitary confinement for
20 year following his participation in a riot. The inmate was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths
(“NOGE”), also known as the “Five Percenters.” Prison policy required the inmate to renounce his affiliation
with NOGE as a condition of being released from segregation. The inmate asserted that NOGE was a religion
and that he was being asked to renounce his religion in order to be released from solitary confinement, in
violation of RLUIPA. The district court granted the director’s motion for summary judgment and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
prison policy did not force the inmate to choose between continued adherence to his religion or release from
solitary confinement. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the prison’s review process for inmates in solitary confinement was adequate. The court noted
that the inmate was subject to near-daily cavity and strip searches, he was confined to a small cell for all sleeping
and waking hours, aside from 10 hours of activity outside the cell per month, he was denied educational,
vocational, and therapy programs, the inmate was socially isolated, and confinement was indefinite. (South
Carolina Department of Corrections)

15.64

U.S. Appeals Court
PADDED CELL

Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015). Parents of a deceased prisoner, who died from injuries suffered
while in jail, brought a § 1983 action against a prison sergeant, lieutenant, and case manager, alleging that the
employees were indifferent to the prisoner’s medical needs. The prisoner had been arrested for possession of
marijuana and was given a 120 “shock sentence” in confinement. He became suicidal and was transferred to a
padded cell at the request of mental health personnel. He was to have been personally observed every 15 minutes
by staff and procedure required the prisoner to give a verbal response each time. After a shift chance, the
oncoming officer decided to monitor the prisoner via closed circuit television rather than making the required inperson rounds. During the shift, the prisoner injured himself in the cell and eventually died from his injuries. The
district court denied the employees’ motion for summary judgment, based on assertions of qualified immunity.
The employees appealed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether a prison sergeant, who was in charge of the unit where prisoner was kept, and a
lieutenant, were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm to the prisoner who died from injuries allegedly
sustained in a padded cell. (Missouri Western Reception, Diagnostic and Correction Center)

U.S. District Court
DOUBLE CELLING/
BUNKING

Perry v. Dickhaut, 125 F.Supp.3d 285 (D. Mass. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials and a prison nurse, asserting Eighth Amendment claims for excessive force in attempting to doublebunk the prisoner. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that prison
officials did not act with deliberate indifference to the risk of serious harm from prisoner violence, as would
violate the Eighth Amendment, by repeatedly double-bunking the prisoner in a cell with another prisoner.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the officials knew or should have known that the prisoner and
his cellmates were enemies, and making an exception to the double-bunk system for one inmate simply because
he was purposefully disruptive would pose substantial risks for the overall management of prison. (SouzaBaranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CELLS
SPECIAL CELL
SEPARATION

Turner v. Palmer, 84 F.Supp.3d 880 (S.D.Iowa 2015). A 16-year-old who had been adjudicated delinquent and
who had prior psychiatric hospitalizations, brought an action against the operators of a state-run juvenile home
under § 1983 for violations of her due process rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based
on the alleged systematic and excessive use of cement-walled isolation cells. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court denied the motion, finding that the juvenile stated a claim for due process violations and
alleged a continuing violation. The facility had several small cement isolation cells, labeled Quiet Rooms, Safety
Rooms, Comfort Rooms, and the Special Unit. The prisoner alleged that she spent numerous consecutive weeks
locked in isolation cells, spending 289 out of the 528 days she was at the facility in isolation. She claimed she
was only given one thin mat to sleep on, was only permitted to exit the cell to use the restroom; and during many
of these stays, she was not allowed any homework, classroom instruction, reading material, or outside
communication. (Iowa Juvenile Home, Toledo, Iowa)

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XIX

XIX

XIX

claims of misidentification were never investigated. The court noted that his date of birth, physical appearance and Social
Security number differed from that of the wanted suspect, and the officials had ready access to both parties' fingerprints, such
that it would have been easy to confirm that he was not the man named in a warrant. (Stateville Corr’l Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A deaf motorist brought an action against a county,
alleging that his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and subsequent detention violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The motorist alleged that throughout the arrest process, the county
failed to establish effective communication because it did not provide him with any auxiliary aids as required by the ADA
and RA. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
motorist's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and his subsequent stationhouse detention was not covered by the
ADA or the Rehabilitation Act (RA). According to the court, the motorist's arrest was due to his erratic and suspicious
driving, not his disability, and following his arrest the police merely communicated the breath test consent form to the
motorist, who foreclosed further questioning by requesting an attorney through his driver's rights card. The court held that the
detention of the motorist following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) did not violate the Rehabilitation Act
(RA), where the motorist was not detained because of his disability, but instead was detained because Florida law required a
DUI arrestee to be detained for at least eight hours. The court found that a county police officer did not intentionally
discriminate, act in bad faith, or act with deliberate indifference during the initial stop and arrest of the motorist, as required
to support the award of compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). As the officer became aware of the
motorist's disability, the officer allowed the motorist to get out of his car so they could speak face to face, and attempted to
communicate through sign language. The officer believed in good faith that effective communication was established because
the motorist responded to him, and the motorist read the implied consent form. The court found that the detention of the deaf
motorist in solitary confinement following his arrest did not rise to the level of intentional discrimination or deliberate
indifference to the motorist's disability, as required to support the award of compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). Corrections facility officers believed that their communication with the motorist was effective and they detained
the motorist in solitary confinement as a good faith protective measure, not as a discriminatory act. (Miami-Dade County,
Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials and parole board
members, alleging that she was illegally incarcerated in violation of § 1983, and asserting state law claims for false
imprisonment and invasion of privacy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the parole board members, parole agent,
warden and correctional officers were entitled to absolute immunity. The court noted that parole board members had the
authority under state law to make such decisions based on the prisoner’s signed parole agreement, and the warden’s and
correctional officers’ incarceration of the prisoner was based on a facially valid court order. (S.Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
IDENTIFICATION

Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city and county sheriff’s
department, alleging that police and sheriff’s deputies violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to
entertain his claim that he was being held in custody due to mistaken identity. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of city, and entered judgment upon a jury verdict against the sheriff’s department. The arrestee and sheriff’s
department appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the sheriff’s department was
not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in the arrestee’s § 1983 action, where units of government were not entitled to
immunity in § 1983 actions, and the judge who arraigned the arrestee did not forbid the sheriff’s department from conducting
further inquires into the arrestee’s identity. The court found that the sheriff’s department policy of ignoring an arrestee’s
claims of mistaken identity after an arrestee has appeared in court and a judge had ordered him held in custody did not violate
the arrestee’s right to due process, as required for the department to be liable under § 1983 to the arrestee. The detainee was
held by the department for 13 days after his arraignment on a warrant that had been issued for someone else. The court noted
that the judge did not abdicate responsibility to determine the arrestee’s identity or delegate that responsibility to the
department, and there was no doubt that the arrestee was the person that the judge ordered held at arraignment. (Cook
County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVESTIGATIVE
DETENTION

Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought an action against a city and city police officers,
alleging the duration and conditions of his detention violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserting a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court entered judgment as matter of law in favor of the
defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that the arrestee’s conditions
of confinement civil rights claim for the five-day period between his arrest and his preliminary probable cause hearing was
required to be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, using the “objectively unreasonable” standard, rather than under the
Eighth Amendment's “deliberate indifference” standard. The court held that the question was for the jury. The arrestee
presented evidence that he was shackled to the wall of an interrogation room for four days, that he was deprived of food,
drink, and sleep, and that he was forced to yell for a long period of time before being let out to use the bathroom, and that the
defendant officers denied such treatment. The court found that the police officers violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment
right to a prompt judicial probable cause determination by holding him for a period of five days after his arrest without a
probable cause hearing, for the purpose of arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim, absent any justification for the delay.
The arrestee had been arrested for a murder he did not commit. Following his arrest, the defendants-- all police detectives-kept him shackled to the wall of a windowless, nine-by-seven-foot interrogation room for four days and nights while they
investigated the case. The arrestee had nowhere to sleep but a four-foot-by-ten-inch metal bench or the dirty brick floor. The
interrogation room had no toilet or sink; he had to “scream” for the detectives to let him out to use a bathroom. He was given
only one bologna sandwich and one serving of juice as food and drink during the entire four days and nights that he was kept
in the interrogation room. The detectives questioned him from time to time and made him stand in two lineups. After twoand-a-half days in these conditions, the arrestee started to become disoriented and began hearing voices telling him to
confess. He ultimately gave a statement containing a false confession that did not match the details of the crime. On the fifth
day of his detention, the arrestee was moved to a city lockup, charged, and finally taken to court. The following day, the

XXII

16.19

police investigation led detectives to another individual who confessed to the murder. The arrestee was released the next day.
(Chicago Police Department's Area 5, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

North River Ins. Co. v. Broward County Sheriff's Office, 428 F.Supp.2d 1284 (S.D.Fla. 2006). An insurer sued a county
sheriff's office and a number of its officers, seeking a determination of its coverage obligations regarding lawsuits involving
former inmates who had been incarcerated over 20 years earlier, but who were recently exonerated. The insurer moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that “bodily injury” and “personal injury” covered by the policy did not cover
allegations of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment that occurred 20 years earlier. One of the complaints was filed
by the estate of an inmate who died in prison in 2000 and was posthumously exonerated later that year. The second complaint
was filed by a person who was arrested in 1979 and convicted in 1980 and spent 22 years in prison before he was exonerated
and released from prison in June 2001. (Broward County Sheriff’s Office, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
IDENTIFICATION

Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought § 1983 action against an arresting officer and
city, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the
arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer acted reasonably, and thus, did not violate
the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, when he made an arrest on an outstanding traffic
warrant. According to the court, although the arrestee had a different middle initial and different birth date than the person
listed on the warrant, the arrestee had the same first and last name, and when the officer questioned the arrestee about the
warrant, he replied, apparently confusing it with a traffic violation that he had actually committed, that he thought it had been
taken care of already. The court found that there was no indication that officer knew that the arrestee was not the person for
whom the warrant had been issued. The court noted that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when
they reasonably mistake a second party for the first party, the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest. The court also noted
that when a person is lawfully arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, police officers and jailers have no constitutional duty to
investigate whether the arrestee is actually the person named in the warrant. (City of Chicago, Ill.)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVESTIGATIVE
DETENTION

Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Two separate actions were brought against a county and individual
officers arising out of a police shooting and the subsequent detention of witnesses to the shooting. The district court granted
the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the 90-minute detention
of witnesses to a police shooting was not reasonable for investigative purposes under the Fourth Amendment, but that the
constitutional rights of the witnesses to a police shooting to not be detained for 90 minutes following the shooting was not
clearly established at the time. According to the court, the witnesses to the shooting failed to establish the county’s policy or
custom to train its officers concerning the constitutional limitations on detention of witnesses in connection with the police
shooting investigations. (Utah County Sheriff’s Office, Utah)
2007

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Allen v. City of New York, 480 F.Supp.2d 689 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A prison inmate sued a city and corrections officers, claiming
violation of the Eighth Amendment, false arrest, and malicious prosecution arising from a beating administered by the
officers while being escorted to his cell. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues regarding whether officers accompanying inmate
could and should have intervened to keep one officer from banging the inmate's head against a wall, whether the officer who
allegedly banged the inmate's head against a wall used excessive force, whether an officer who filed a criminal assault
complaint against the inmate committed malicious prosecution, and whether that officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
(Rikers Island, New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Gary v. Floyd, 582 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against an arresting officer and a
police department, alleging he was arrested pursuant to improperly obtained warrants. The arrestee sought compensatory and
punitive damages for allegedly being held for approximately one month after the charges against him were dropped. The
district court held that the arresting officer had probable cause to make the arrest and that the department could not be held
liable under the theory of respondeat superior. But the court found that the arrestee was entitled to amend his complaint to
include as defendants a sergeant and directors of the detention center. According to the court, an amendment to the arrestee's
complaint, alleging that he was not released from confinement within a reasonable time after charges of forgery were
dismissed, would not be futile, even though the sergeant's affidavit indicated that the arrestee was released within 48 hours
after the detention center received notification that he was to be released. The arrestee alleged that the detention center was
immediately notified when the charges were dismissed, but that he was not released for nearly one month. (Greenville City
Police Department, Greenville County Detention Center, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Limone v. U.S., 497 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.Mass. 2007). Two former prisoners whose convictions arising out of a murder were
overturned, and representatives of two co-defendants who died in prison, sued the United States and individual federal and
state law enforcement officers under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Bivens, § 1983, and state law, alleging their
complicity in framing the prisoners. Following a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The court
held that:(1) FBI agents engaged in malicious prosecution; (2) agents engaged in a coercive conspiracy; (3) agents
intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the prisoners; (4) agents were negligent in their treatment of prisoners; (5) FBI
was liable for negligent supervision of the agents activities; (6) damages for wrongful imprisonment would be set at the rate
of $1 million per year, adjusted for unrelated concurrent sentences; (7) loss of consortium damages would be awarded to
wives and children of prisoners; and (8) damages would be awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Peterson v. Tomaselli, 469 F.Supp.2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against an
assistant district attorney (ADA), a city, the commissioner of a city corrections department, and unnamed defendants,
alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he was held in a state prison longer than legally prescribed. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the ADA did not violate the

XXII

16.20

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights and that the ADA did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights. The court held that
the prisoner’s claim that he was being kept in a state prison for eight months beyond his properly-calculated conditional
release date, if proven, did not violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights, where the prosecutor had no knowledge that
the unwarranted punishment would be inflicted, the prosecutor reasonably believed that the prisoner would receive credit for
his federal sentence when serving the state sentence, and there was no causal connection between the prosecutor’s alleged
actions and the prisoner’s extended incarceration. (Federal Corr’l Institution, Ray Brook, New Jersey)
2008
U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
IDENTIFICATION

Castro v. City of Hanford, 546 F.Supp.2d 822 (E.D.Cal. 2008). An arrestee brought an action against a county, city, and
various law enforcement officers, alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and asserting various state law claims,
including false arrest, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment for the county. The court held
that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the county jail officer's alleged unconstitutional conduct in failing to perform
live scan fingerprinting on the arrestee while he was in custody, absent a showing that the county had a policy or practice not
to perform such fingerprinting. The court found that county jailers had a reasonable belief that the detainee was the person
named in an arrest warrant, and did not have reason to know that the detainee was not the subject of the warrant, and thus, the
detainee could not prevail in false imprisonment and negligence claims. The court noted that the jailers relied upon the
information provided to them by the arresting officers, and there was no court order or other independent evidence that would
have called the lawfulness of the detention into question. (Hanford Police Department, Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
INVESTIGATIVE
DETENTION
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). Detainees, who were
anti-abortion activists who had displayed photographs of aborted fetuses on the streets outside a middle school's campus,
brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, individual deputies in their individual and official capacities,
and a middle school official in his individual and official capacity, alleging free speech and Fourth Amendment violations
arising from their detention and the search of their vehicle. The district court dismissed or granted summary judgment for the
defendants on all claims. The detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part.
The court held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the officers' 75-minute detention of the anti-abortion activists,
which followed a valid Terry stop to investigate possible vehicular violations after the activists drove a “security vehicle” and
truck featuring graphic photographs of aborted fetuses on public streets around the middle school. According to the court, the
detention should have lasted only long enough to allow the officers to examine the security vehicle and determine whether
there were outstanding warrants involving the vehicle or its occupants. (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department,
California)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Farag v. U.S., 587 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Airline passengers detained after a flight landed brought a Bivens action
against Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, a city police detective, and counterterrorism agents, alleging that their
seizure, detention, and interrogation after the flight landed violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and false arrest and false
imprisonment claims against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the agents did not have
probable cause to detain the airline passengers and that, as an issue of first impression, the agents could not rely on Arab
ethnicity alone as probable cause to arrest airline passengers. The court held that the detention of the airline passengers at the
terminal after their plane landed was a de facto arrest, rather than a Terry stop, for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth
Amendment claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that upon entering the terminal the
passengers were met by police dogs and at least ten uniformed police officers in SWAT gear carrying shotguns. They were
taken to separate locations about thirty-five to forty-feet apart, each accompanied by two police officers, ordered to raise their
hands, and frisked. They were held in separate cells at a police station. The passengers were removed from the airline
concourse and taken to a jail cell between five and fifteen minutes away by car. The court found that the four hour detention
of passengers in a city jail was not a justified Terry stop for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment claims and
common-law false imprisonment and false arrest claims. (Port Authority Police Station, Kennedy Airport, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
PROBABLE CAUSE

Holguin v. Lopez, 584 F.Supp.2d 921 (W.D.Tex. 2008). An arrestee brought § 1983 and state law claims against an officer.
The officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part and dismissed in part. The court
held that the arrestee stated a cause of action in his complaint for false arrest and false imprisonment under Texas law, in that
he sufficiently alleged that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to arrest him for driving while intoxicated (DWI)
and the charge of phone harassment. (Socorro Police Jail, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
DUE PROCESS

Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against state officials
alleging that the officials violated his constitutional rights and state law when they took him into custody without a warrant or
a probable cause hearing, and transferred him to a correctional facility in order for him to serve his previously imposed
sentence. The district court dismissed the prisoner's claims with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court noted that under Oklahoma law, a convicted defendant who is at liberty without having served his sentence may be
arrested as on escape and ordered into custody on the unexecuted judgment. According to the court, state officials did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they seized the state prisoner without a warrant, after having been released from federal
custody erroneously, so that he could serve the remainder of his unfinished state sentence. The court noted that the officials
had reason to believe that the prisoner had not completed serving his state sentences and there were no special circumstances
that would have made his otherwise permissible arrest unreasonable. The court also found that the prisoner had no due
process right to a hearing when he was taken back into custody. (Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 2008). Detainees held as material witnesses whose testimony was vital to murder
prosecutions brought an action against a district attorney's office and prosecutors who had secured bench warrants for their
arrests. The detainees alleged that the prosecutors failed to notify relevant authorities that the underlying action for which the
first detainee was held had been continued for nearly four months and that the underlying action for which the second
detainee was held had been dismissed. One detainee had been held for 54 days and the other was held for 58 days. The

XXII

16.21

district court dismissed the first detainee's claims under § 1983 and state law, and denied the motion to dismiss the second
detainee's § 1983 claims. The parties appealed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor's act of failing to notify the judge
that issued the bench warrant for the first detainee's arrest that the prosecution had been continued was not an advocative act,
warranting absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court also found that the prosecutor's act of failing to notify relevant
authorities that the second detainee remained incarcerated despite dismissal of the prosecution was not an advocative act for
which the prosecutor would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court noted that a prosecutor disobeyed a
judge's explicit instructions that he be advised of any delay, as well as a rule requiring the prosecutor to keep the court
informed of the status of detained material witnesses. The court concluded that policy considerations underlying absolute
prosecutorial immunity counseled against granting absolute immunity to the prosecutors in these cases, where there was no
common law tradition of extending absolute immunity to a prosecutor for failing to notify the court of the status of a detained
witness. The court concluded that denying absolute immunity in these cases would not likely interfere with prosecutors'
independent decisionmaking by exposing them to vexatious litigation. The court also noted that by virtue of their status as
third-party witnesses, the detainees were not entitled to the protections available to criminal defendants, including the
appellate process. (Office of District Attorney of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dept., 541 F.Supp.2d 504 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against
a city, its police department, and individual officers, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated when he was not
arraigned within the time prescribed under state law. The court held that the municipal police department was not subject to
suit pursuant to § 1983 and that the arrestee was not falsely imprisoned during the 29-day period between his arrest and
arraignment. According to the court, the Connecticut arraignment statute did not give rise to a due process liberty interest.
The court noted that the arrestee was lawfully in the custody of the Department of Corrections pursuant to a remand to
custody order for a separate parole violation during the 29 days prior to his arraignment. (New Haven Police Department,
New Haven Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
PROBABLE CAUSE

Portentoso v. Kern, 532 F.Supp.2d 920 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against a state parole authority
and officers, stemming from an alleged illegal search of his residential property and his arrest. The defendants moved for
dismissal and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
state parole officers had probable cause to search the parolee's barn, for the purposes of the parolee's Fourth Amendment
claim alleging warrantless and illegal search, since the parolee's ex-wife had reported to officers that her daughter told her
there were weapons in the barn. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact,
regarding whether the parolee consented to the state parole officers' search of his house after searching the barn for weapons.
The court found that the state parole officers had probable cause to arrest the parolee after finding ammunition in his house,
since possession of ammunition contravened the parolee's conditions of supervision. (Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F.Supp.2d 785 (D.Md. 2008). A detainee brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) claiming negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for his illegal detention for over nine months.
The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the role and duties of
BOP personnel who were allegedly responsible for the continued confinement of the detainee during his false imprisonment.
The BOP asserted that the employees were “investigative or law enforcement officers” for the purposes of the government's
waiver of sovereign immunity. The detainee had been sentenced to 121 months of incarceration in a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas. The district court granted the request of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to reduce his
sentence to time served and ordered his release. The detainee was not released for approximately ten months after the court’s
order. (District of Columbia, and U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F.Supp.2d 1217 (N.D.Cal. 2008). After a jury rendered a verdict in favor of a parolee and his
girlfriend based on a finding that officers planted a semi-automatic rifle in his residence in order to frame him, the officers
filed post-trial motions seeking to overturn the jury's verdict on both liability and damages. The district court held that
substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor of the parolee but that the $5 million dollar emotional distress award
to the parolee was grossly excessive. According to the court, the emotional distress award to the parolee for malicious
prosecution that resulted in 4 1/2 months imprisonment, the indignity of having to defend himself against trumped-up
criminal charges and parole revocation proceedings, the uncertainty and apprehension about his fate and future caused by the
false arrest, and loss of his house and relationship with his girlfriend was grossly excessive. The court granted a new trial on
damages unless the parolee accepted a reduction from $5 million to $3 million. The court found that the parolee was not
precluded from recovering damages that accrued after the indictment on his malicious prosecution claim against the police
officers. The court noted that the parolee's testimony was corroborated by another witness, the lack of any fingerprints on the
gun, expert's testimony about standard police procedures, the testimony of a parole agent that an inspection of the parolee's
home was scheduled for that same day, the lack of any other guns or ammunition found in the search of the house, and
inconsistencies in the officers' testimony. The court also found that the award of $750,000 to the parolee's girlfriend for
emotional distress suffered when officers' conducted a suspicionless search of the parolee’s residence while she was present
was grossly excessive, and was subject to reduction to $300,000. (City of Oakland, California)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Stanley v. Muzio, 578 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against two state judicial marshals,
the Connecticut State Police and individual troopers and officers of the Connecticut State Police, alleging false imprisonment
and use of excessive force. Following dismissal of claims against the State Police, troopers and officers, the marshals moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the marshals did not enjoy
state statutory immunity from federal claims and from the state law false imprisonment claim. The court found that the
arrestee stated a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. According to the court, the marshals were not entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity or qualified immunity. The court noted that the arrestee’s claim for false imprisonment under Connecticut law,
alleging that two state judicial marshals kicked him in the head and back after he was forcibly restrained, were sufficient to
allege reckless, wanton, or malicious conduct that was outside the scope of the defendants' employment as state judicial
marshals. The court found that the arrestee's allegation that two state judicial marshals told him that he had to remain in the

XXII

16.22

courtroom for five minutes following a hearing on a restraining order obtained by his wife and forcibly stopped him when he
tried to leave after three minutes stated a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment. (Connecticut State Judicial Marshals,
Connecticut State Police)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a city and its police
officers alleging illegal arrest, excessive force, inadequate medical attention, and failure to train. The district court granted in
part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties filed cross-appeals. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the police officers ignored the arrestee's complaints that his
handcuffs were too tight, and whether the arrestee suffered permanent nerve injury because of the handcuffing. (Las Cruces
Police Department, New Mexico)
2009

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Blandford v. District of Columbia Jail, 593 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.D.C. 2009). An arrestee brought a civil rights action against a
District of Columbia jail, alleging that he was detained for seven days without a lawful basis. The district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arrestee failed to demonstrate that he was detained beyond
his purported release date, as required to state a § 1983 claim against the jail for unlawful detention. The court noted that the
arrestee appended to his complaint a document that showed he was freed two days after his purported release date and
voluntarily appeared in court on that date, and jail records showed that the arrestee was released on the same day that bond
was posted on his behalf, and was not in jail at any time after the purported release date. (Dist. of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
PROBABLE CAUSE

Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2009). A former detainee, who had been seized
by deputies for a psychological evaluation, brought a § 1983 action against deputy sheriffs and others alleging violations of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court awarded summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the deputies had probable cause to seize and detain the
detainee for a psychological evaluation, after a dispatcher received a 911 call from a hospital to report that the detainee, who
had called the hospital to report an adverse reaction to his prescription medication, had threatened suicide. The deputies knew
that the detainee had made prior suicide threats, that police had responded to those threats, and that firearms had been found
in the home. The court held that exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless seizure of the detainee for
psychological evaluation in his home. (Burke County, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
PROBABLE CAUSE
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a parole agent and others,
alleging false arrest and unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims but the one against the parole agent for unlawful detention. The district
court denied the agent’s motion for reconsideration and the agent appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the arrestee's 13-day confinement in jail without a probable cause hearing violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found
that the parole agent was the person responsible for ensuring that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause hearing after
his warrantless arrest for allegedly violating probation. The court held that the parole agent was not entitled to qualified
immunity because he logged the arrestee into jail incorrectly as a parole violator, which ensured that the arrestee would not
receive a prompt probable cause hearing. (Mich. Department of Corrections and Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Limone v. U.S., 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009). Former prisoners whose murder convictions were overturned, and representatives
of codefendants who died in prison, brought an action against the United States Government, asserting claims under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) arising from the Government's involvement in framing the prisoners. Following a bench
trial, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the Government appealed. The appeals court held that evidence
supported the district court's conclusion that the FBI's conduct in cultivating witness's testimony inculpating wrongly accused
defendants in a state murder prosecution, while possessing information undercutting the testimony's veracity, was extreme
and outrageous, as required to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law and the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). According to the court, the FBI agents knowingly participated in events leading to
wrongful indictment, prosecution, conviction and continued incarceration of the defendants, they aided a witness in framing
the plaintiffs and they bolstered the credibility of the witness's testimony. The appeals court held that the FBI's conduct did
not fall within the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception, and thus the Government was not
immune from the defendants' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Massachusetts law and FTCA.
According to the court, the FBI's conduct violated due process. The appeals court ruled that non-economic damages awards
of $1 million per year of wrongful incarceration in the plaintiffs' action were not excessive and the damages awards were not
grossly disproportionate to the injuries sustained and did not shock the conscience. (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Suffolk
County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
IDENTIFICATION
PROBABLE CAUSE

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F.Supp.2d 1025 (D.Ariz. 2009). Detainees of Hispanic descent brought an action against a
county sheriff for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that deputies from the sheriff's office profiled, targeted, and
ultimately stopped and detained persons based on their race in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court ruled against the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that: (1) allegations were sufficient to state
Fourth Amendment claims; (2) allegations were sufficient to state equal protection claims; (3) the county was subject to
municipal liability; and (4) the court would not dismiss the county sheriff's office as a non-jural entity. The plaintiff was
detained for four hours in a police holding cell without being apprised of any charges against him, and was then handed over
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials. The court held that an allegation that deputies placed the Hispanic
passenger of a speeding vehicle in full custodial arrest for violating United States immigration laws, even after the passenger
provided them with sufficient immigration documents, including a United States Visa containing a fingerprint and picture, a
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) permit, and a Mexican Federal Voter Registration Card with a picture and
fingerprint, was sufficient to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for being placed into full custodial arrest
without probable cause. The court noted that an allegation that the deputies' request for an Hispanic driver's Social Security

16.23

card was not “standard procedure” for all routine traffic stops conducted by the county. According to the court, allegations
that the county sheriff made a public statement that physical appearance alone was sufficient to question an individual about
their immigration status, that the county's crime suppression sweeps had been allegedly targeted at areas having a high
concentration of Hispanics, and that the county had used volunteers with known animosity towards Hispanics and immigrants
to assist in crime sweeps, were sufficient to allege a discriminatory purpose, as required to state a § 1983 equal protection
claim. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Cave Creek Holding Cell, Arizona)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009). Reversed 678 F3d 748. A detainee, a United States citizen who was
designated an “enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought an action against a senior
government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of right of information, denial of right to
association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and denial of due
process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the detainee, who was a United States citizen, had no other means of redress for alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his
detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior government official, alleging the official's actions violated
constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military Commissions Act was only applicable to alien, or non-citizen,
unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee Treatment Act did not “affect the rights under the United States Constitution
of any person in the custody of the United States.” The court found that national security was not a special factor counseling
hesitation and precluding judicial review in the Bivens action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official were
public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the law. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
alleged that the official's acts caused a constitutional deprivation, as required for the detainee's constitutional claims against
the official. The detainee alleged that the senior government official intended or was deliberately indifferent to the fact that
the detainee would be subjected to illegal policies that the official set in motion, and to a substantial risk that the detainee
would suffer harm as a result, that the official personally recommended the detainee's unlawful military detention and then
wrote opinions to justify the use of unlawful interrogation methods against persons suspected of being enemy combatants.
According to the court, it was foreseeable that illegal interrogation policies would be applied to the detainee, who was under
the effective control of a military authority and was one of only two suspected enemy combatants held in South Carolina. The
court found that the detainee's allegations that he was detained incommunicado for nearly two years with no access to counsel
and thereafter with very restricted and closely-monitored access, and that he was hindered from bringing his claims as a result
of the conditions of his detention, were sufficient to state a claim for violation of his right to access to courts against a senior
government official. The court held that federal officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to
detainees under the United States Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified immunity
from claims brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from claims brought by
the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On appeal, 678 F3d 748, the appeals court reversed the
district court decision, finding that the official was entitled to qualified immunity because there had not been a violation of
well established law. (Military Brig, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
PROBABLE CAUSE

Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2009). An arrestee who was stopped by a city police officer for a traffic
violation and arrested after the officer mistakenly identified him as an individual who had nine unpaid parking tickets and a
warrant out for his arrest, brought a § 1983 action against the city and a prosecutor seeking relief on behalf of a class of
similarly situated individuals who had been arrested by the city for parking violations. The arrestee alleged that the city had
an unconstitutional policy of arresting people for not paying their parking tickets. The district court granted the defendants’
motions for summary judgment. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the fact that an
otherwise reasonable arrest was not for an “arrestable” offense would not make it unconstitutional, that an arrest for a
“nonjailable” offense would not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity from
damages for her action in filing motion for an arrest warrant. (City of Peoria, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 664 F.Supp.2d 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against a prison
superintendent, corrections sergeant, corrections officers, and others. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted. The district court denied the motion, finding that the prisoner's allegations
were sufficient to allege a corrections sergeant's personal involvement in a civil rights violation, as well as the
superintendent's and corrections officers. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison corrections sergeant
supervised corrections officers, that the sergeant “allowed” officers to harass the prisoner by filing multiple false misbehavior
reports, that the sergeant “abdicated his duty” to prevent such harassment, and that the sergeant “participated in” the
harassment, were sufficient to allege the sergeant's personal involvement in a civil rights violation. According to the court,
the prisoner's allegations that he wrote to the prison superintendent challenging his false imprisonment in a special housing
unit (SHU) because he had done nothing wrong, and that the superintendent responded but did not remedy the situation, were
sufficient to allege the superintendent's personal involvement in constitutional violations, as required to state a claim against
the superintendent under § 1983. The court also found that allegations that prison corrections officers issued false
misbehavior reports against the prisoner, and that he was not allowed to question witnesses at a hearing and was ejected from
the hearing, were sufficient to state claims under § 1983 against the officers for filing false misbehavior reports and violations
of due process. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought an action against officers of a county sheriff's department in
their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on his
over-detention and the officers' alleged efforts to procure an involuntary waiver of his civil rights claim. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the officers were not liable under § 1983 in their official capacities on the over-detention claim, absent evidence that they had
a policy, practice, or custom of over-detaining inmates. According to the court, the detainee had no freestanding
constitutional right to be free of a coercive waiver, and even if the detainee had a right to be free from a coercive waiver, the

16.24

officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the involuntary waiver claim. The detainee had been arrested on a warrant
from another county for domestic abuse and was transported to the arresting county jail. The arresting county had the
responsibility to notify the other county, under state law, but failed to do so. Over two months later the arresting county
realized that the detainee had been over-detained and released him. On the day of his release, a deputy in street clothing asked
the detainee, who did not speak English, to sign papers that were an offer to settle his claim for over-detention for $500. The
detainee asserted that he did not know what was in the papers. (Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city and others
alleging false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment
and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the limitations period for a Fourth Amendment
claim of false imprisonment begins to run when the false imprisonment ends, when the plaintiff is either released or detained
pursuant to a legal process. The arrestee was released on personal recognizance after charges were brought against him. The
court noted that the commencement of a criminal case by the institution of a legal process marks the dividing line between
claims of false imprisonment and claims of malicious prosecution. The court found that pretrial release conditions imposed
on the arrestee did not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, as required to support a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim
against the city, where the conditions required the arrestee to notify the court of any change in address, to refrain from
committing crimes, and to forebear from consuming either controlled substances or excessive quantities of alcohol. (City of
Nashua, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
PROBABLE CAUSE

Waker v. Brown, 754 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010). An arrestee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against various
defendants, including the District of Columbia mayor and police chief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss and the
arrestee filed a motion to compel the identities of police and Department of Corrections (DOC) officers. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiff's motion. The court held that police
officers did not violate the arrestee's due process rights in arresting him and detaining him for several days, where the arrest
was based upon a fugitive warrant from another county that was not invalidated or based upon mistaken identity, and the
arrestee appeared before a court and was released on his own recognizance. The arrestee had been held for six days in jail
prior to his release. (District of Columbia Jail)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). A probationer, who had been convicted of false imprisonment under New
Mexico law, brought § 1983 claims against a probation officer and the New Mexico Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he
was wrongly directed to register as a sex offender and was wrongly placed in a sex offender probation unit, in violation of his
rights to substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court
held that the complaint was insufficient to overcome the Secretary's qualified immunity defense, but the probation officer's
alleged actions, if proven, denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the
court, the probation officer's alleged actions of placing the probationer in a sex offender probation unit and directing him to
register as a sex offender, after the probationer had been convicted of false imprisonment under New Mexico law, if proven,
denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court noted that false imprisonment was
not a sex offense in New Mexico unless the victim was a minor. (New Mexico Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action against former homicide
detectives, a police commissioner, and a city for damages arising from his wrongful conviction and unlawful imprisonment
for the murder of a twelve-year-old girl. Following a verdict against the detective in a second trial, the detective filed motions
for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to reduce the jury award. The district court denied the motions. The court
held that the detective was not entitled to qualified immunity for failing to turn over impeachment evidence to a prosecutor.
The court held that an award of approximately $1 million per year of the plaintiff's wrongful fourteen-year incarceration was
not excessive in the suit against the detective who withheld impeachment evidence, and therefore a reduction in the award
was not warranted. The court noted that the jury determined the value of non-economic damages. (City of Boston,
Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 428 (D.Mass. 2011). A plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against a state prosecutor,
alleging withholding of evidence resulted in his wrongful conviction and incarceration for 14 years. After a jury verdict in his
favor, the plaintiff moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court held that counsel was entitled to $1,613,847 in
reasonable attorneys' fees and $51,632 in costs. The court noted that the proposed rates for the plaintiff's attorneys were
reasonable based on their experience, the requested number of hours was adjusted downward to reflect unsuccessful claims,
and there was nothing to indicate that the time records submitted were not contemporaneous. (City of Boston, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a public
defender, clerk of court, and deputy clerk of court, alleging that she was unlawfully imprisoned for 87 days after criminal
charges against her were dismissed, in violation of her rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and false
imprisonment under Virginia law. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to state § 1983 and false imprisonment claims
against public defender and that the public defender was entitled to governmental immunity against a legal malpractice claim.
The court found that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the clerk and that the clerk was
not entitled to quasi–judicial immunity against the § 1983 claim and was not entitled to sovereign immunity against the
negligence claim. The court also found that the detainee alleged necessary conduct by the clerk and deputy clerk to state a
claim for punitive damages. According to the court, the allegations that the clerk of court received at least two letters
notifying her that the pretrial detainee should be released, and that she still failed to take action to effectuate that release after
criminal charges against the detainee were dismissed, were sufficient to allege the clerk's personal involvement in the
detainee's continued detention. The court noted that the clerk's alleged inaction in procuring the detainee's release after

16.25

criminal charges were dismissed was not a choice within the clerk's discretion and was not taken pursuant to the state court's
direction. The court also held that the clerk of court failed in her execution of a ministerial duty, precluding her entitlement to
sovereign immunity against the pretrial detainee's negligence claim, where the clerk received orders for detainee to be
released, which the clerk's office was then required to notify the jail of the detainee's change in status so as to effectuate her
release. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail, and Circuit Court of the City of Hampton, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
PROBABLE CAUSE

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821 F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). A journalist arrested while
covering a demonstration at a university sued the university's board of regents, its police department and various officers on
the department, asserting § 1983 claims for violation of the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Excessive Bail
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a claim for violation of the Privacy Protection Act. The defendants filed a partial
motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the journalist stated a §
1983 claim for violation of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment on the theory that the defendants added
unsupported charges for the sole purpose of increasing his bail. The court found that the theory was viable under the
Excessive Bail Clause, despite the indirect means the defendants allegedly used to obtain the higher bail, and the intervening
actions of the judicial officer who actually set bail. The court found that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim against the
police chief in his individual capacity where the journalist asserted that the chief failed to train or supervise those individuals
who directly deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights and that, by his policy decisions, he set in motion the acts that
deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights. The court held that the journalist’s claims that he was wrongfully arrested
by university police and that his property was subject to searches and seizures without proper cause and without the proper
warrants, stated a claim under the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) against the university police chief for failure to screen, train,
and supervise. The court noted that the journalist's claim related specifically to the statutory provisions of the PPA, that he
alleged sufficient facts to support his claim of a causal connection between the police chief's conduct and the statutory
violation, and liability was not limited to those personally involved in the statutory violation. (University of California,
Berkeley)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Reed v. Baca, 800 F.Supp.2d 1102 (C.D.Cal. 2011). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff, county, and the
sheriff's department, alleging wrongful arrest and detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the county and the sheriff's department did not infringe on the pretrial detainee's
Fourteenth Amendment rights by detaining him pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence,
despite the detainee's argument that the county and the department knew or should have known that he was entitled to release
prior to dismissal of the case against him. According to the court, even assuming a violation, the detainee failed to present
evidence to show that his continued detention, beyond the point at which the county and the department allegedly knew or
should have known he was entitled to release, was pursuant to a policy or custom evincing deliberate indifference to his
constitutional rights, as would support liability. The court found that the county sheriff was not liable in his individual
capacity under § 1983 for the pretrial detainee's over-detention, absent evidence that the sheriff had any direct contact with
the detainee or actual knowledge of claimed constitutional violations, or condoned, ratified, or encouraged the alleged
constitutional violations in any way. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3rd Cir. 2011). A detainee who was being held as a material witness in a homicide
prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who secured her arrest warrant, alleging the prosecutor failed
to have her released from custody knowing that her testimony was not required for several months. The district court entered
an order granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On
remand, the district court entered an order denying the prosecutor's motion for summary judgment, and the prosecutor
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficient to establish prima
facie violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the detainee's Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable seizures was clearly established and the prosecutor was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity.
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A former prisoner, who served nearly 24 years in prison for rape and
murder before his conviction was vacated and charges were dismissed, brought a § 1983 action against a city, county, police
officers, police supervisors, and prosecutors, as well as a former mayor, alleging deprivation of a fair trial, wrongful
conviction, a Monell claim, conspiracy under § 1985 and § 1986, and various state law claims. The defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the former prisoner’s
allegations that police officers engaged in suppressing, destroying, and preventing discovery of exculpatory evidence,
including instruments of torture used to coerce the prisoner's confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the police officers for
a Brady violation, despite the officers' contention that the prisoner was aware of everything that he claimed was withheld at
the time of the trial. The court found that the former prisoner’s complaint, alleging that municipal officials acted in collusion
with a former mayor and a state's attorney and high-ranking police officials to deflect public scrutiny of the actions of police
officers that suppressed and prevented discovery of exculpatory evidence, which prolonged prisoner's incarceration, stated a §
1983 claim against municipal officials for deprivation of fair trial and wrongful conviction.
According to the court, a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983 complaint by the former
prisoner, alleging that the prosecutor personally participated in the prisoner's interrogation and that of a codefendant, and then
suppressed the truth concerning those events. The court found that the allegation put the prosecutor's conduct outside the
scope of his prosecutorial function. The court held that the complaint by the former prisoner, alleging that the former
prosecutor encouraged, condoned, and permitted the use of torture against the prisoner in order to secure a confession, stated
a § 1983 claim against the prosecutor for coercive interrogation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
court noted that the allegations supported the inference that the prosecutor participated in an investigatory rather than a
prosecutorial role. According to the court, the “Plaintiff's 46–page complaint sets forth an account of the murder of Betty
Howard and Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution for that murder, including the torture he alleges he endured at the hands of Area
2 police officers. The complaint also details the history of torture at Area 2 and the alleged involvement of the various
Defendants in that torture and in subsequent efforts to cover it up.” (Cook County, Illinois)

16.26

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Tookes v. U.S., 811 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.D.C. 2011). An arrestee brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
against the United States, alleging assault and battery, false imprisonment, and negligent training and supervision. The United
States filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The
court held that the training and supervision of Deputy United States Marshals was a discretionary function, and therefore, the
discretionary function exception to FTCA precluded subject matter jurisdiction of the arrestee's negligent training and
supervision claims, following an alleged attack by marshals. The court noted that there were no statutes, regulations, or
policies that specifically prescribed how to train or oversee marshals, and decisions involved social, economic, and political
policy in that decisions had to balance budgetary constraints, public perception, economic conditions, individual
backgrounds, office diversity, experience, public safety, and employee privacy rights, as well as other considerations.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the arrestee should have known she could be diagnosed as suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder following an alleged false imprisonment by United States marshals, and therefore, the arrestee
was not limited from seeking greater damages for her emotional injuries than the amount claimed in her administrative form,
in her FTCA claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the United States marshals falsely imprisoned the arrestee by bringing her back into a courthouse. (United States Marshals
Services, District of Columbia)
2012

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST

Amobi v. District of Columbia Government, 882 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2012). A corrections officer brought an action against
other officers, a prison director, and the District of Columbia, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the officer could not assert false
arrest and malicious prosecution claims against other corrections officers for reporting his restraint of a transgender inmate,
which resulted in criminal charges against the officer, even though the assault charges were eventually dropped against the
officer upon the inmate's admission that he had provoked the officer. The court noted that the reporting officers described
what they observed and provided probable cause for the arrest and prosecution. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVESTIGATIVE
DETENTION
PROBABLE CAUSE
FALSE ARREST

Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012). Thirty-two arrestees filed a § 1983 action against a city and police
officers in their individual capacities for allegedly violating the First and Fourth Amendments by detentions and arrests, on
the first day of the Republican National Convention. The charges were ultimately dismissed. The district court granted the
city and the officers summary judgment and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that police
officers' brief detention of seven members of a group at a park during the Republican National Convention comported with
Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements for investigative detention, since the group members were detained only
while the officers sought to determine which members were involved in a prior confrontation with officers at an intersection.
The court found that the officers had arguable probable cause for the mass arrest of 160 people in the park, based on an
objectively reasonable mistaken belief that all 160 people were part of a unit of 100 protestors that officers had probable
cause to believe had committed third-degree riot and unlawful assembly in violation of Minnesota law. According to the
court, the officers' deployment of non-lethal munitions, as authorized by the lead sergeant commanding mobile field force
operations during the confrontation with a crowd at the Republican National Convention, was not excessive force, under the
Fourth Amendment, since officers reasonably believed that the noncompliant crowd intended to penetrate a police line
blocking access to the downtown. (City of St. Paul, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION
PROBABLE CAUSE

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of the Cherokee
Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail employees, and a nurse, alleging
false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and seeking
declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and desecration was unconstitutional. The musician had
been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the musician's allegations that his use of an American flag during his performance
at a casino was a constitutionally protected activity, that the county sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional
nature of the activity, and that the sheriff adopted an unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the musician's arrest
and imprisonment, stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a supervisor for violations of the
musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The court found that the musician's allegations that the county sheriff was, at all times relevant to the musician's claims
related to his arrest and imprisonment, a commissioned law enforcement officer and the duly-elected sheriff and chief policy
maker for county sheriff's office, that the deputy sheriff was a commissioned law enforcement officer acting as a marshal for
Cherokee Nation and a deputy sheriff for the county's sheriff's office, and that the deputy sheriff was acting as the sheriff's
employee during events giving rise to the musician's claims, were sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff was responsible
for the deputy's training and supervision, as required for the musician's § 1983 inadequate training claim against county
sheriff in his official capacity. According to the court, the musician's allegations that the county had policy or custom that
was the moving force behind the alleged violation of the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that
the policy/custom encouraged the confinement of the musician in response to his use of an American flag during a concert for
allegedly expressive purposes, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. The court held that the
musician's allegations that the seizure and search of his person were unconstitutional because the underlying conduct for
which he was seized was legal and did not provide lawful grounds upon which to base his arrest and the subsequent searches
of his person, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. (Cherokee Casino, Rogers County Jail,
Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
FALSE ARREST

Harris v. Hammon, 914 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Minn. 2012). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county and various
officials with the state department of corrections (DOC), alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as
well as state law claims for false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED). The defendants moved for summary judgment and for judgment on the pleadings. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that there was no evidence of a continuing, widespread
pattern of misconduct on account of county employees in not releasing prisoners pursuant to court orders, as required for the

16.27

prisoner's § 1983 failure-to-train claims against the county for alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The prisoner had been held for more than five days after a judge ordered his release pending his appeal. According to the
court, the former prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that department of corrections (DOC) employees were
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, as required to state a § 1983 claim
for violations of his due process rights based on his continued detention after a court ordered his release. The prisoner alleged
that he had a court order for his release but he was returned to prison, that a judge faxed and mailed the release order to the
prison after being contacted by the prisoner's attorney the next day, that the judge's clerk also telephoned employees to inform
them that the prisoner was to be released, that one employee did not respond to calls from the prisoner's attorney, that another
employee told the attorney he would have to hand deliver a certified copy of order by the end of her shift in three minutes so
that the prisoner could be released before the weekend, and that employees told the attorney several days later that they might
not be able to release the prisoner because the order could be invalid. The court also held that the prisoner's allegations were
sufficient to plead that his continued detention, after his release was ordered by a judge, violated a clearly established right, as
required to overcome qualified immunity for department of corrections (DOC) employees. (Lino Lakes Correctional Facility,
Ramsey County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action, alleging that a
sheriff, who was sued in his official capacity, violated his rights by detaining him without charges for nine days, The district
court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the sheriff did not violate the substantive due process rights of the arrestee, where the sheriff brought the arrestee before
court for an initial hearing within 72 hours of his arrest, followed the court's order in holding the arrestee without bond, and
released the arrestee promptly, within 72 hours of the initial hearing, excluding intervening weekend days, when the
prosecutor did not file charges within the time permitted by the court. (Delaware County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST

Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012). Two pretrial detainees, who were arrested for murder, but who were
subsequently released after their charges were dropped, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and investigating
officers, alleging violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered an order
denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in
part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a detainee's confession
was coerced, and whether officers fabricated evidence. The court held that the sheriff could not be liable under § 1983 for his
alleged failure to train investigating officers not to fabricate evidence, since any reasonable officer would know that
fabricating evidence was unacceptable. (Cass County Sheriff's Office, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION
DUE PROCESS

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various village police officers
and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the right to counsel, cruel and unusual
punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several state law claims. The defendants
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the detainee's allegation that she was offered medication for her unnamed mental ailment while incarcerated, but that she
declined to accept the medication “for fear of overmedication or a harmful interaction,” failed to establish that she was
subjected to inhumane conditions or that the police were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to
support her claim that she was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due
Process Clause. According to the court, the arrestee's failure to allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by the village,
combined with her failure to show that the unconstitutional consequences of the village's alleged failure to train its police
officers were patently obvious, precluded her claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012). Insurers that, pursuant to commercial general liability
policies, provided law enforcement liability coverage to a city and its employees acting within the scope of their employment,
brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking declarations that they had no duty to defend or indemnify the city or its employees in a third-party action in which a civil rights plaintiff alleged that the city and its police officers played a role in his
wrongful conviction. The district court granted summary judgment for the insurers and the defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that coverage did not exist for a claim alleging false arrest and imprisonment. (Waukegan, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
FALSE ARREST

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services, 907 F.Supp.2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A plaintiff brought a § 1983 action
against a state's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its commissioner and several employees, and the state's
Division of Parole and its chairperson and several employees, alleging wrongful detention for violations of an allegedly
illegally-imposed term of post-release supervision (PRS), false arrest and imprisonment, negligence, and a New York state
claim for gross negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
individual defendants, who were employees of New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) or Division of
Parole, were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions during the time between the administrative imposition of a term
of post-release supervision (PRS) and a court decision, which found that such imposition of PRS violated due process
guarantees. (New York State Division of Parole, Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012). A parolee brought a § 1983 action against the District
of Columbia, seeking money damages for unlawful revocation of his parole by the Parole Board. The district court granted
summary judgment in the parolee's favor as to the issue of liability. After a trial on damages, the jury returned a verdict of
$2.3 million for the parolee. The District of Columbia moved for a new trial. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the damages award was not excessive, that the parolee was properly allowed to testify as to what he experienced for
the ten years that he was wrongly incarcerated, and that evidence concerning an alleged prior traffic offense was properly
excluded. The court found that the jury's damage award to the parolee whose parole was unlawfully revoked, resulting in his
serving an additional ten years in prison, of $230,000 per year—or about forty-four cents per minute—for each year that he
was stripped of the privileges of individual choice and physical freedom and subjected to the indignity of incarceration, was
not excessive. (District of Columbia Parole Board)

16.28

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION
PROBABLE CAUSE

U.S. v. Maricopa County, Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073 (D.Ariz. 2012). The United States filed an action against a county, the
county sheriff's office, and the sheriff in his official capacity, relating to treatment of Latinos, including jail detainees, and
asserting claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, violations of equal
protection and due process, and discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Title VI and the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the
county's motion, and granted the sheriff and sheriff's office motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the sheriff's
office was an entity that was not capable of being sued in its own name. The court held that the allegations stated a claim
under Title VI for disparate impact discrimination, stated a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and that
the allegations satisfied the requirements for pleading the municipal liability of the county. According to the court, allegations
by the United States, that officers from the county sheriff's office routinely and unlawfully targeted Latinos through
pretextual traffic stops, crime suppression sweeps, and worksite raids, and that as a result Latinos were far more likely to be
deprived of their constitutional rights than non-Latinos, stated a claim for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI by
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. The court also found that allegations that a former Arizona
county attorney acted in concert with the county sheriff's office and the sheriff to file a baseless lawsuit accusing people who
had publicly criticized the defendants, and to file baseless state bar complaints against attorneys who spoke out against
defendants, and that the defendants used unjustified arrests to intimidate and retaliate against critics of their immigration
policies, stated a claim under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act for retaliation for exercising First
Amendment rights. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Ward v. Brown, 891 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a state prison, the
state's department of corrections, and prison officials, alleging violation of various constitutional rights, negligence, false
imprisonment, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Following the grant of the defendants' motions to
dismiss the federal claims, and denial of the defendants' motion to dismiss the state claims, the defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by: (1) a material fact issue as to whether a prison official was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's right to
be free from state custody; (2) material factual disputes as to whether the prison official properly retained the prisoner's
release date; (3) a material dispute of fact as to whether the department of corrections was put on notice of the prison
official's alleged miscalculation of the prisoner's release date; and (4) material disputes of fact as to whether the department
of corrections falsely imprisoned prisoner. The inmate challenged the defendants' alleged refusal to correct his release date
from a state prison, causing him to be over-incarcerated in a federal prison, in violation of his constitutional rights.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
PROBABLE CAUSE
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee who died on the
night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police officers, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical care. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for
the representative and against four defendants on the unlawful detention claim, and for the defendants on claims relating to
denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur
on the issue of damages. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the
issue of whether the defendants held the detainee for more than 48 hours before being taken before a judge or being released,
or for less than 48 hours for an improper purpose, was for the the jury; (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest the
detainee for a crime with an intent element; (3) the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention
was for the jury; (4) the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5) the award of
$1 million in compensatory damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive damages was not warranted
where there was little to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference to the detainee's rights.. The
court noted that, although the detainee suffered significant physical pain during the time he was detained, as well as intense
humiliation and severe mental and emotional distress, he was in custody for, at most, 53 hours, and only the final five hours
of his detention were unlawful. The detainee had driven a semi-trailer truck through a bus stop and into a Chicago Transit
Authority “L” Station, killing two women and injuring 20 people. After brief treatment in a hospital, the police transported
him to a police station, where he was interviewed and then placed in a holding cell. He ultimately only received a traffic
citation, though police kept investigating the collision until the time of his death. Officers were making arrangements to take
the detainee to a hospital for evaluation after finding that he had difficulty walking once removed from his cell. He died in the
hospital 6 weeks later. (City of Chicago Police Department, Illinois)
2013

U.S. District Court
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A former inmate, a sex offender, brought an action against Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC) employees, alleging under § 1983 that the employees violated his rights under Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment by allowing him to be held beyond the term of his incarceration, and asserting a claim for false
imprisonment under state law. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court allowed the motion. The
court held that the employees complied with the terms of a state court judge's handwritten sentencing order and the
employees were not deliberately indifferent in allegedly allowing the inmate to be held beyond his release date. (Lake County
Jail, Robinson Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). A former member of a county board of supervisors brought an
action against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, a former county attorney, and deputy county attorneys, asserting
claims under § 1983 and state law for wrongful institution of civil proceedings, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment
and arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful search. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions. The court held
that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by fact issues: (1) with respect to the malicious prosecution claims;
(2) as to whether misrepresentations and omissions of evidence in a search warrant affidavit were material; (3) as to unlawful
search claims against the sheriff and deputy county attorneys; (4) with respect to the false arrest claim; and (5) with respect to
the claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. The court noted that a reasonable magistrate would not have issued a

16.29

search warrant based on the accurate and complete representation of known evidence. The court held that the retaliatory
animus of the county sheriff and prosecutors would chill a person of ordinary firmness from criticizing the sheriff and
prosecutors and from vigorously litigating against them. According to the court, fact issues as to whether the county sheriff
and prosecutors acted outrageously and either intended the arrestee harm, or were recklessly indifferent to whether their
actions would infringe on his rights and cause him severe distress, precluded summary judgment for the defendants with
regard to the claim for punitive damages in the action for unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First
Amendment violations. (Maricopa County Sheriff and County Attorneys, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). A motorist brought a § 1983 action alleging First Amendment
retaliation against a city and police officers who booked and jailed the motorist following a traffic stop. The district court
granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the motorist appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the motorist’s criticism of the police for what the motorist perceived to be an unlawful and racially motivated traffic
stop was squarely within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment, and any action to punish or deter such speech was
categorically prohibited by the federal constitution. The court found that the motorist's booking and jailing by the police
officers, allegedly in retaliation for the motorist's criticism of what he perceived to be an unlawful and racially motivated
traffic stop, would chill a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activity, as required to support a § 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim against the city and the police officers. The court held that the police officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity from the motorist's § 1983 claim that they booked and arrested him in violation of the First
Amendment, where it was clearly established that it was unlawful to book and jail motorist in retaliation for First
Amendment activity, even if probable cause existed, and a reasonable police officer would have known that it was unlawful
to use his authority to retaliate against an individual because of his speech. During the traffic stop one officer said to the
motorist: (1) “Stop running the mouth and listen”; (2) “If you talk over me, you are going to go to jail, sir. Do not talk over
me”; (3) “If you cooperate, I may let you go with a ticket today. If you run your mouth, I will book you in jail for it. Yes, I
will, and I will tow your car”; and (4) “If you cooperate and shut your mouth, I'll give you a ticket and you can go.” (City of
Yakima Police Department, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION
PROBABLE CAUSE
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a Bivens action against FBI agents,
alleging that the agents' unlawful conduct caused him to be held in custody for three months without probable cause. The
district court denied the agents' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The agents appealed. The appeals court
affirmed and remanded. The court held that: (1) allegations by the detainee that FBI agents witnessed a black male, short,
stocky, and in his late fifties, transfer $321,956 in drug proceeds to an undercover informant; (2) after a year passed without
the FBI being able to locate or identify that suspect, they were under pressure to make an arrest; (3) agents worked with the
informant to arrange a tainted photo array, during which informant identified the detainee, who was a tall, thin, 40-year-old,
black male, and who had strikingly dissimilar appearance to the suspect; (4) that one agent either knowingly or with reckless
disregard for the truth made sworn statements in a warrant affidavit identifying the detainee as the suspect who delivered the
tainted cash; (5) that based on the affidavit, a magistrate issued an arrest warrant; and (6) that the detainee was bound over
and held in federal custody for three months, stated a Bivens claim against agents for violation of detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights. (Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual who died from
acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against a city and its mayor, as well as the
police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging claims under § 1983 for various constitutional
violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the
claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor him and
provide proper care; (3) the administrator failed to establish municipal liability based on failure to train; (4) the administrator
failed to establish supervisory liability against the supervising officer; (5) police were immune from negligence liability
under statutory exception to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6) the officers were not liable for false imprisonment. The
court noted that at the time of the relevant events, a reasonable officer would not have known that determining that a suitable
treatment facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his ability to constitutionally detain an
intoxicated individual who was not charged with any crime, as required for the right to be clearly established, and therefore
the individual officers who detained the individual were entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983. (Peabody Police
Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
DUE PROCESS
PROBABLE CAUSE

Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Ariz. 2013). Latino persons brought a class action against a sheriff and sheriff's
office, seeking injunctive relief based on allegations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments violations in the policy of using
race as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion and in investigating or detaining Latino occupants of motor vehicles
suspected of being in the country without authorization, without any basis for state charges. The district court entered
judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that: (1) the policy of the sheriff's office directing deputies to detain vehicle
occupants because of the belief that occupants were not legally present in the United States violated the Fourth Amendment;
(2) the policy permitting deputies to use race or Hispanic appearance as a factor in determining whether there was reasonable
suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment; (3) the policy permitting deputies to use race as a factor in forming reasonable
suspicion that persons violated state laws relating to immigration status was not narrowly tailored; (4) the sheriff's office
intentionally discriminated against Latino persons; (5) deputies investigating the identities of, and arresting, vehicle
passengers on immigration violations without reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop lengthened the stop in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; and (6) deputies could not use reasonable suspicion of unauthorized presence in the United States,
without more, as probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a state law had been violated. (Maricopa County Sheriff,
Arizona)

16.30

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
IMPRISONMENT
PROBABLE CAUSE

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district attorney and
prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983, statutory violations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well as state law claims, all related to her alleged
unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as
required to establish local government liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the
prison officials to implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of constitutional
violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have acted with conscious
indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process claim against the district attorney and
the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official
policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable
cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in
a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district
attorney under § 1983 by the detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers
such as bills of information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing what he was
signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process. The court found
a substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct
knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the district attorney still failed to correct the mistakes
that caused the detention, and to cover up his failures in connection with the case, the district attorney made a conscious
decision to bring belated charges against the detainee. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim
against the prison officials under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because
she was mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis.
(East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Taylor v. City of Mason, 970 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Ohio 2013). A deaf arrestee brought an action against a police department
and a city, alleging that denial of a qualified interpreter during questioning prior to arrest at the jail violated the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he was falsely imprisoned. The defendants moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the deaf arrestee's allegations, that police
officers denied him the benefits of effectively communicating with them prior to arrest by failing to provide an appropriate
auxiliary aid, were sufficient to state a claim under ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The arrestee alleged that he initiated a
phone call to police because he had been assaulted, and that, although officers requested an American Sign Language (ASL)
interpreter, they did not wait for the interpreter to arrive before they began questioning him, but instead used his alleged
attacker as an interpreter, and she reported that the arrestee sexually assaulted her. The court found that the allegations were
also sufficient to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the arrestee alleged that he expressed dissatisfaction with
the interpreter provided at the jail, who was not certified in ASL, that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights as
explained by the interpreter, and that the lack of a qualified interpreter was directed at him particularly. (City of Mason Police
Department and Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PROBABLE CAUSE

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who worked at a
city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that their being
required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and that they were retaliated against, in
violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what
triggered the strip searches of contractors who worked at city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for
revocation of the contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it
was clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search
action against the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights when they accepted
employment, and thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and individualized suspicion that employees
were hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual body cavity search.” The court also found that summary
judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to what triggered the strip searches. (Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors, Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROBABLE CAUSE
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, several
deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and that his right to a
prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. The detainee had been held
for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals court held that the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination,
where the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court
held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his
Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The
arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it
in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention facility,
despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause
determination. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that
led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the requisite mental
state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest
people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens with charges never being filed; (2)
the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations occurring under his supervision and due to his
failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being

16.31

filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal
detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014
U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
DUE PROCESS

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought § 1983 claims and state-law claims
against a county and its jail director, relating to the arrestee's detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled
before the arrest. After removal to federal court, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part, and remanded to the state court. The court held that the arrestee's § 1983 claims
against a county and its jail director, relating to detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had been cancelled before the
arrest, were properly characterized as Fourth Amendment claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, rather than for
malicious prosecution. The court found that county jail employees did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unlawful seizure, when they booked him into the jail following a city police officer's arrest of the plaintiff
pursuant to a bench warrant that was facially valid, but that had been cancelled before the arrest. According to the court,
county jail employees, upon learning from the arrestee's attorney about the pre-arrest cancellation of the facially valid bench
warrant pursuant to which city police officers had conducted the arrest, did not act with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely
imprison the arrestee by requiring a release order from a judge, and thus, the arrestee's continued detention for two days, until
the release order was issued, did not constitute false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted
that jail employees acted reasonably, since a judge could better determine why a bench warrant remained available to city
police at the time of arrest, and whether any other basis for detaining the arrestee existed. (Metropolitan Detention Center,
Bernalillo County, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Hebshi v. U.S., 32 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). After she was forcibly removed from an airliner, detained, and subjected
to a strip-search, a passenger brought a civil rights action against federal agents and airport law enforcement officers, alleging
discrimination based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, and violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The airline law enforcement officers moved for partial judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion. The
court held that the passenger stated claims for unreasonable seizure and unreasonable search, and that the officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the passenger's allegations that she was forced off an airplane by armed
officers, handcuffed, briefly questioned on the tarmac, transported to a jail, locked in a guarded cell under video surveillance,
detained for four hours, and strip-searched, before being extensively questioned about her involvement in other passengers'
alleged suspicious activity, were sufficient to allege that the seizure was a de facto arrest made without probable cause in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the passenger's allegations that she was arrested, detained for
four hours, strip-searched by airport law enforcement officers, based on her alleged involvement in suspicious activities by
two other passengers, that the officers made no effort to verify her identity or corroborate any connection between her and the
other passengers, and that the strip-search was not conducted promptly, were sufficient to state a claim for unreasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment. (Frontier Airlines, Federal Law Enforcement Agents, Wayne County Airport Authority
Law Enforcement Agents, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Liska v. Dart, 60 F.Supp.3d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county and a county sheriff,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants deprived him of liberty without procedural due process, and asserting claims under
state law for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendants moved to dismiss the case for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of
first impression, the detainee had a liberty interest protected by procedural due process in remaining on home confinement;
(2) the defendants violated the detainee’s procedural due process rights; (3) the detainee sufficiently stated the sheriff’s
personal involvement in the alleged procedural due process violation; and (4) the sheriff was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court noted that the pretrial detainee had a liberty interest protected by procedural due process in remaining on
home confinement, and thus the county and county sheriff were required to afford the detainee procedural due process prior
to transferring the detainee to jail due to his alleged violation of the terms of home confinement. The detainee alleged that the
sheriff was responsible for implementing the cell-box system used in the detainee’s home during his home confinement, that
the sheriff was aware of issues with the type and brand of system assigned to the detainee and many other home detainees,
that the sheriff knew or should have known of the malfunctions of the system in the detainee’s home, and that the sheriff
allowed the detainee’s incarceration in the county jail for violation of the terms of his home confinement despite knowledge
of numerous false alarms registered by the system. (Cook County Sheriff’s Department, Cook County Jail)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a city, city police officers, a
county, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that he was unreasonably arrested and incarcerated for a 12-day period.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that: (1) a front desk officer was entitled to qualified immunity from unlawful arrest claim; (2) the deputies who transported
the arrestee from a police station across the street to a detention facility, and assisted in the arrestee's booking, were entitled
to qualified immunity from a substantive due process claim; (3) there was no evidence that the city's alleged policy of relying
on the state court to schedule a hearing after promptly being advised of a warrant arrest was substantially certain to result in a
constitutional violation; but (4) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city had actual or
constructive notice that its failure to train as to how to process conflicting information during the process of “packing” an
arrest warrant for distribution was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and as to whether the city
substantially chose to disregard the risk of harm. (City and County of Denver, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
IDENTIFICATION
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 771 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 2014). A juvenile, by and through his guardian, filed a §
1983 action against a township, its police chief, a police officer, the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, and the
center's intake officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and loss of filial consortium. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, and on remand the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the superintendent and the intake officer,
and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the intake officer at the juvenile detention center

16.32

had no duty to make an independent assessment of probable cause for the juvenile detainee's arrest and detention, and thus
did not violate the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights by signing a complaint prepared by the arresting officer that charged
the detainee as a delinquent child. (Clermont County Juvenile Detention Center, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
ARREST AND
DETENTION

Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A detainee, a Honduran citizen who had been arrested for driving
under the influence and fleeing officers after they effectuated a traffic stop of his vehicle, and subsequently had been held on
an immigration detainer from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and then on a federal material witness warrant,
brought a pro se action against a village, police chief, police officers, sheriff, jail deputies, and an Assistant United States
Attorney. The detainee alleged violation of his due process, equal protection, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment
rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district
court held that: (1) the detainee stated a claim against the village defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due
process rights in connection with his detention after he had posted bond; (2) the detainee stated a claim for violation of his
consular rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (3) the detainee stated a claim against the
county defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in connection with his 29-hour detention;
and (4) absolute prosecutorial immunity did not shield the AUSA from the plaintiff's claims that the AUSA violated his
Fourth Amendment and due process rights, along with the federal material witness statute and the federal rules of criminal
procedure. The court noted that following the detainee’s post-arrest transfer to the county's custody, he was detained for
approximately 29 hours pursuant to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer request, and that the county
lacked probable cause that the detainee had violated a federal criminal law, but instead detained him while the federal
government investigated to determine whether or not he had, in violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment and procedural
and substantive due process rights. (Village of Round Lake Beach, Lake County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST

Ysasi v. Brown, 3 F.Supp.3d 1088 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against county sheriff officers and a
detention center, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and other claims under the Constitution. The officers and the detention
center moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
arrestee presented no evidence that the four-day incarceration prior to his arraignment prejudiced his defense, either in his
criminal trial or in the current civil case, by concealing evidence against the arresting county sheriff officers. The court noted
that the arrestee was arraigned within the time required by New Mexico rule. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2015

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
UNLAWFUL DETENTION

Mayorov v. United States, 84 F.Supp.3d 678 (N.D.Ill. 2015). A former state prisoner sued the United States, pursuant to the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence and false imprisonment based on Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) issuing an immigration detainer against him, despite his United States citizenship, causing him to
spending 325 days in prison that he otherwise would not have served due to the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC)
rules prohibiting a detainee from participating in a boot camp as an alternative to a custodial prison sentence. The parties
moved for summary judgment. The district court held that fact issues as to whether the government breached a duty to
reasonably investigate the prisoner’s citizenship status prior to issuing an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detainer. (Illinois Impact Incarceration Program)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

McGowan v. U.S., 94 F.Supp.3d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A federal prisoner, who was serving the remainder of his sentence at a
halfway house, brought an action against a U. S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee who managed the halfway house,
alleging violations of his right to free speech, and asserting claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and negligence under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and dismissed
the action. The court held that the prisoner could not bring a Bivens claim alleging his free speech right was violated when he
was transferred from the halfway house to a prison for violating a BOP regulation against publishing under a byline, where
the prisoner could have challenged his transfer through a habeas petition after exhausting BOP’s administrative remediation
process. The court noted that the prisoner’s reassignment to prison was rescinded when his lawyers notified the BOP that the
byline regulation had been repealed. The court held that the prisoner’s confinement was uncategorically privileged, and thus,
under state law, he could not assert a claim for false imprisonment against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) based on his brief transfer from the halfway house. (Community First Services, Inc., and Metropolitan
Detention Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
DUE PROCESS

Ngemi v. County of Nassau, 87 F.Supp.3d 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A father brought a § 1983 action against a county, alleging
he was denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in being arrested and incarcerated for failing to meet
his child support obligations. The county moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the father received ample process prior to his arrest. The court noted that father was present at the hearing where
his failure to comply with the order of support was addressed, an order of disposition was mailed to his home after the
hearing and warned him that failure to comply would result in imprisonment, the order afforded the father the opportunity to
object, the order of commitment was also mailed to the father and advised him of his ability to appeal, the father never
contested the orders, and the father never claimed over the course of four years that he could not pay his child support arrears.
(Nassau County Family Court, Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Purvis. v. City of Atlanta, 142 F.Supp.3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city, county,
and the county sheriff, asserting claims for unlawful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The arrestee alleged that, following his lawful arrest for drinking in public, he was unlawfully held by the city
and county for an additional five to six days on an invalid warrant. The city, county, and sheriff moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the allegation was insufficient to establish a
pattern or practice on the part of the county or city arising out of an official policy or custom; (2) the sheriff, in his official
capacity, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) the allegations were sufficient to support an inference that the
sheriff directed subordinates to act unlawfully; (4) the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim for
violation of the arrestee's due process right to timely release; and (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the
claim alleging violation of the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. (Atlanta City Det. Center, Fulton County Jail, Georgia)

16.33

16.34

XIX

XIX

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Mann ex rel. Terrazas v. Lopez, 404 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D.Tex. 2005). Representatives of the
estates of two detainees who had committed suicide while confined brought an action against a
sheriff and jail officers, alleging failure to supervise and failure to train. The district court found
that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for failing to prevent the detainees’ suicides,
where there was no evidence that the sheriff was personally aware of any suicidal thoughts the
detainees might have had and did not personally direct any actions involving the detainees
during their incarceration. The court ordered further proceedings to determine if the sheriff’s
failure to modify his policies regarding potentially suicidal detainees was an intentional choice,
or merely unintentionally negligent oversight. One inmate was known to have mental health
problems and was housed in a mental health unit that provided a 1 to 18 officer to inmate ratio,
compared to the 1 to 48 ratio required by state standards. The inmate hanged himself using a
torn-up bed sheet. The other inmate was being held in a new detox cell and was founding
hanging four minute after she had been visually observed by an officer. She also used a bed
sheet to hang herself. (Bexar County Adult Detention Center, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745 (10th Cir. 2005). A state inmate sued a prison’s licensed practical
nurses (LPN), registered nurse (RN), and nurse practitioner (NP) under § 1983 alleging Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district court entered summary judgment for the
LPNs and RN, and partial summary judgment for the NP. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the inmate’s alleged
severe chest pain and subsequent heart attack, if proven, were sufficiently serious to satisfy the
objective element of the test for deliberate indifference. The court found that fact issues existed
as to whether the evening LPN was deliberately indifferent when she allegedly told the inmate
that there was nothing she could do about her chest pains and that the prisoner would have to
wait until the morning. (Pueblo Minimum Center, Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Pool v. Sebastian County, Ark., 418 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2005). A county inmate sued jail officials
under § 1983 alleging that her miscarriage resulted from the officials’ deliberate indifference to
her serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied
summary judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and dismissed in part. The court found that the facts alleged by the inmate, if proven, indicated
that she had a need for medical attention that would have been obvious to a layperson, and
therefore had a serious medical need. The inmate alleged that she had informed jail officials that
she was pregnant, bleeding and passing blood clots, and that she was in extreme pain from
cramping to the point that it affected her ability to perform routine daily functions. (Sebastian
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL

Praylor v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir. 2005). A transsexual state

U.S. District Court
ABORTION

Roe v. Crawford, 396 F.Supp.2d 1041 (W.D.Mo. 2005). A female inmate sued prison officials,

prison inmate brought a suit, asserting that denial of his request for hormone therapy
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The district court denied relief and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that declining to provide hormone
treatment did not amount to deliberate indifference to the inmate’s serious medical needs, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the prison had a policy for treating
transsexuals, but that the inmate did not qualify for hormone therapy because of the length of
his term and the prison’s inability to perform a sex change operation, the lack of a medical
necessity for the hormone, and disruption to the all-male prison. (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, University of Texas and Texas Tech University)
requesting a preliminary injunction requiring them to transport her to a local health care
provider for the purpose of providing medical services to terminate her pregnancy. The district
court held that the inmate was entitled to injunctive relief and ordered accordingly. The court
found that denying the inmate the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy constituted
irreparable injury and that substantial delay in the decision to abort increased the risks
associated with the procedure. According to the court, the prison policy not to transport female
prisoners out of the institution for abortions that were not medically necessary was claimed to be
reasonably related to the penological interests of security and cost, but the court found those
interests were not legitimate penological interests. (Women’s Diagnostic and Correctional
Center, Missouri)
2006

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

XX

Beasley v. City of Sugar Land, 410 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.Tex. 2006). An arrestee sued a city under
§ 1983, claiming she was subjected to a strip search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
city moved for summary judgment and the district court entered summary judgment for the city.
The court held that the municipality's policy of authorizing strip searches only when an official
had reasonable suspicion that an arrestee was a threat to facility security, did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. The arrestee was cited for driving her mother's car with no driver's license,
no current motor vehicle inspection or registration, no insurance, and no license plate light, a
17.33

few days after her eighteenth birthday. She was summoned to appear in court but mistakenly
appeared five days late. She was arrested at her house on a warrant for failure to appear and
she was allowed to put on shoes and socks, but was taken to jail in the clothes she was wearing-pajama pants and a cotton shirt with no bra. On the way to the city jail the arresting officer
radioed for a female officer to meet him at the jail to perform a search. At the jail a female police
officer told the arrestee to stand with her hands against a wall. She instructed the arrestee to
lift her shirt and the officer lifted Beasley's breasts to feel beneath them. The officer then
instructed the arrestee to drop her pants while continuing to hold up her shirt. The officer pulled
the arrestee’s panties taut and did a quick two-finger swipe across Beasley's vagina. The male
arresting officer allegedly witnessed this search. The arrestee initially alleged that she was
subjected to a “strip search and body cavity search,” but the court found that her description of
the events did not indicate that a body cavity search occurred. (City of Sugar Land, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Colo. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Forton v. County of Ogemaw, 435 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of a deceased jail

XX

against a city, city officers, a county, and county officers alleging excessive force. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that an officer who handcuffed the arrestee in the
customary manner by cuffing her hands behind her back did not use excessive force, even if the
officer knew that the arrestee had a hand deformity. The court noted that the officer's decision to
not deviate from the standard practice of placing handcuffs behind the back was a judgment call.
The arrestee had told the officer to be gentle because she was frail and had recently undergone
elbow surgery. The officer double-locked the handcuffs behind her back so that they would not
tighten. He then marched her outside, deposited her in his cruiser, and belted her in for
transport to the jail. Upon arriving at the lockup, the arrestee was transferred to the custody of
a jail officer, who unlocked the handcuffs, patted her down, and placed her in a holding cell.
After other required aspects of the booking process had been completed, another jail officer
fingerprinted the arrestee, who claimed that the officer who fingerprinted her repeatedly pushed
her fingers down hard, in spite of being told that she had a hand deformity. She also claimed
that the fingerprinting caused injuries to her wrist and her surgically repaired middle finger.
(Knox County Jail, Maine)
alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment against a prison nurse and
corrections officers, arising out of the stillbirth of her fetus. The court denied the defendants’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's delayed labor, resulting in the
stillbirth of an otherwise viable fetus, constituted a physical injury to the mother sufficient to
satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) physical injury requirement, and that PLRA
did not bar her constitutional claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
inmate had told an officer that she was in labor and needed medical assistance but the officer
sent her back to her housing unit. Later she told another officer that she was in labor and
needed help but the officer declined to provide her with medical assistance and told her to return
to her unit. Upon her third request for medical assistance, another officer sent her to the
facility's medical unit where the nurse examined the inmate and found no evidence that her
water had broken. During the examination the nurse did not use a fetal heart monitor to
evaluate the status of the fetus, apparently because she did not know how to use the monitor.
The inmate was sent back to her housing unit without treatment, even though she told the
nurse that she had difficulties with prior deliveries. The next day, another officer noticed
Clifton's distress and sent her to the medical unit. She was sent from the prison to a hospital,
where it was determined that her fetus was dead. (Women's Corr’l Facility, Canon City, Colo.)
inmate brought suit against a county and various employees, claiming deprivation of the
inmate's Eighth Amendment right to medical care. The female inmate had been serving a
sentence in the jail and died from a cancerous tumor that encircled her esophagus. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate had
an objectively serious medical condition, as required for an Eighth Amendment claim. The court
found that the jail nurse supervising medical care of the inmate did not display deliberate
indifference to the inmate's medical condition, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the
nurse twice had the inmate sent to a clinic for a physician's evaluation, provided the inmate
with an inhaler and instructed the inmate in its use, had the inmate moved to an observation
cell, and left orders that the inmate be transported to a medical facility if her condition
worsened. The court found that a jail officer who was observing the inmate was not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's medical condition, where the officer had no knowledge of the inmate's
condition, administered the inhalator dose, checked on the inmate frequently, and declined the
inmate's request that she be taken to hospital, supported by another inmate, only because of the
non-hospitalization order left by nurse. According to the court, the alleged failure of the jail
administrator, who was not on duty on the day in question, to relay a friend's concern regarding
the physical condition of inmate, left as telephone message, did not establish that the
administrator was deliberately indifferent to the medical situation of inmate. The court also

17.34

found that correctional officers did not show deliberate indifference to the inmate, although the inmate was
screaming while in an observation cell, wanting to return to her own cell, and not eating, because the officers
observed her frequently and took her back to her cell at her request, where she instantly fell to the floor
unconscious. (Ogemaw County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Gilanian v. City of Boston, 431 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Mass. 2006). A detainee brought a civil rights action against a
municipality, county, sheriff, and corrections officers alleging that strip searches violated her Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The district court denied the detainee’s motion, finding
that fact issues as to whether the strip search of the detainee was justified and whether the search was conducted
in a reasonable manner, precluded summary judgment. The case challenged two strip-searches of the detainee
conducted while she was held in pretrial detention, and asserted claims against the City of Boston, Suffolk
County, Suffolk County Sheriff Richard Rouse, and two unidentified Suffolk County corrections officers. The
court suggested that the trial should focus primarily on the question of whether there was a less restrictive
alternative. The court posed questions, including: could the policy change, from strip-searching to segregation,
have been implemented at the time of the detainee’s second strip-search; what changes, if any, in staffing, space
allocation, and budget were necessary for the jail to switch to segregation after the Roberts decision; what less
restrictive alternatives, other than segregation, might have been available to the Jail in March 2000; if the switch
to segregation was possible in 2001, how far back in time is it proper to assume that the same switch could have
been made? (Nashua Street Jail, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE
USE OF FORCE

Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2006). A female inmate brought claims against correctional officers,
supervisors, and a county alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by the alleged use of excessive
force. The district court entered summary judgment on the claims and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) genuine issues of fact precluded
summary judgment on the claim that officers used excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause; (2) the supervisor’s actions in allegedly using a racial epithet against another inmate and in
allegedly removing feminine hygiene products from the cell was not cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) the
purported violation of county policies that were not alleged to be unconstitutional provided no basis for civil
rights liability for the county. According to the court, genuine issues of material fact as to whether correctional
officers used excessive force in tackling and using pepper spray on the inmate when they entered her cell to
subdue a cellmate precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim; questions included whether
their acts were defensive in nature or motivated by frustration or anger, whether the force applied was necessary
to maintain order and was commensurate with the situation, whether the inmate failed to comply with the officers’
orders and was actively resisting them, whether a verbal warning was issued before the application of pepper
spray, and whether the inmate suffered actual injuries. The court found that the correctional officers’ alleged
violation of county policies regarding the use of force and the use of pepper spray could not give rise to civil
rights liability on the part of the county, absent any allegation the policies themselves were unconstitutional. The
inmate had testified that her head was slammed down on the floor, her hair was pulled, and that an officer sprayed
mace on her face and eyes. She claimed that she sustained injuries from the incident, including bruising and
lacerations on her arms, a broken thumb, and two black eyes. The inmate admitted that after the incident an
officer gave her a cold towel and she was taken to the shower. (Jasper County Detention Center)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Keel v. Dovey, 459 F.Supp.2d 946 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated her civil rights by placing her in administrative segregation pending the investigation of a
disciplinary charge against her, and by conducting a disciplinary hearing that violated her procedural due process
rights. Officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the
inmate did not have a due process liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation prior to a
disciplinary hearing; (2) the use of confidential information in a disciplinary hearing did not violate the inmate’s
right to procedural due process; and (3) the inmate was not denied due process as the result of the officials’ refusal
to permit her to listen to and read intercepted inmate phone calls. The court noted that the administrative
segregation the inmate endured pending disciplinary investigation was not an atypical and significant hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. According to the court, even if her cell was unsanitary, birds and
mice were present in inmate cells, and she lost her prison job and her ability to participate in religious ceremonies,
the inmate did not suffer forfeiture of time credits, she had non-contact visits of one hour in length, and there was
no evidence regarding conditions of cells outside of administrative segregation. The court held that the use of
confidential information did not violate the inmate’s procedural due process rights, where officials stated that
disclosure of the source’s identity would endanger the source or the institution’s security, more than one source
independently provided the same information, the source incriminated herself in criminal activity when providing
the information, and part of the information provided by the source had already proven to be true. (California
Institution for Women, Chino)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F.Supp.2d 1189 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A female county jail detainee who had been
raped by three inmates, sued a county and employees, alleging violation of her federal and state rights. The district
court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity on the claim that they retaliated against the detainee for her efforts to report the rape. The
court found that the detainee stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against the officer who placed
the detainee in a cell with male inmates, but against no other jail personnel. The court also found valid claims of
conspiracy, and conspiracy to block the opportunity to report the rape, under § 1983 on the part of officer who
placed the detainee in the cell with the male inmates. After the incident, officers allegedly cut off the detainee’s
access to phones and visitors and threatened that there would be negative consequences if she persevered with her
charges. (Lee County Jail, Alabama)

XXI

17.35

U.S. District Court
ABORTION

Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006). An inmate brought a class action against corrections
officials, challenging a policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant inmates off-site to provide abortion care for
non-therapeutic abortions. The district court held that the policy violated inmates' Due Process rights and the
policy violated the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that inmates who chose to terminate a pregnancy and had
to be transported outside of the prison for that purpose posed no greater security risk than any other inmate
requiring outside medical attention. The court held that a Missouri law prohibiting the use of State funds to assist
with an abortion did not encompass transport to the location where the procedure was to take place, there was no
alternative way for an inmate to obtain a non-therapeutic abortion, and abortion out counts had no measurable
impact on the ongoing prison need to schedule and reschedule medical appointments. (Women's Eastern
Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006). A female arrestee who had undergone a strip search
with body cavity inspection upon booking on a misdemeanor charge of being under the influence of a controlled
substance, brought § 1983 Fourth Amendment action against a county sheriff and against the deputy who had
performed the search. The district court granted summary judgment for the arrestee, and defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a suspicionless strip search conducted
solely on basis of the county's blanket policy for controlled-substance arrestees offended the Fourth Amendment,
where the intrusiveness of the search was extreme, the county did not show any link between the policy and
legitimate security concerns for persons spontaneously arrested and detained temporarily on under-the-influence
charges, and the arrestee was detained only until bail was posted and never entered the jail's general population.
The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because the appellate court in the county's
federal circuit had never previously addressed the constitutionality of a body cavity search policy premised on the
nature of drug offenses, and had held that the nature of offense alone may sometimes provide reasonable
suspicion. (Ventura County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). The mother of a female detainee who died while in jail
brought a § 1983 action, claiming that police officers violated the detainee’s rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the officers. The mother
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the mother lacked standing. The detainee, the daughter of
the plaintiff, had been brought to a jail and was being interrogated when she began talking unintelligibly and
experiencing seizures. An officer said that she was “faking a seizure” to avoid jail time. She lost consciousness
but officers did not request an ambulance for nearly an hour. She had ingested cocaine at the time of her arrest and
died from cocaine intoxication. (Howard County Jail and City of Nashville, Arkansas)
2007

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837 (S.D.Miss. 2007). A daughter, as next friend of a jail
detainee who suffered second-degree burns on her ankles, thighs, and buttocks while awaiting mental health
commitment, brought a civil rights suit against a sheriff and a county. The sheriff moved for summary judgment
on claims brought against him in his individual capacity. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the sheriff did not violate the detainee's right to be protected from harm, absent evidence showing that restraints
were likely used to subdue her. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
medical needs in failing to administer her anti-psychotic medications, where the detainee's refusal to take her
medications prior to being taken into custody, coupled with her violent and psychotic behavior as the result of the
refusal, was the basis for her commitment. The court found that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent in
failing to discover second-degree burns of an unknown origin on the detainee's ankles, thighs, and buttocks
because jailers regularly observed the detainee through a viewing window in her cell door, but did not actually
enter the cell to visually inspect the detainee for signs of injury. (Amite County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Davis v. U.S., 474 F.Supp.2d 829 (N.D.Tex. 2007). An inmate who was raped by a prison officer in a federal
medical center brought a Federal Tort Claims Act action against the United States, alleging negligence on the part
of other prison officers. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court found
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison officers were
working within the scope of their employment when they led the inmate to another officer who raped her, whether
the officers violated a duty to protect the inmate from harm, and whether their violations proximately caused the
inmate’s injury. (Federal Medical Center-Carswell, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Hill v. Richards, 525 F.Supp.2d 1076 (W.D.Wis. 2007. The estate of a county jail inmate who
committed suicide sued the social worker who interviewed the inmate shortly before her suicide, claiming
deliberate indifference to the inmate's suicidal mental condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The social
worker moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to
whether the worker was aware of a suicide risk, as the result of a statement by the inmate that she had poked
herself with a thumbtack, and as to the adequacy of the worker’s response to the inmate's statement. The court
noted that expert testimony was not required to establish that the social worker violated the Eighth Amendment by
being deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of the jail inmate; under those circumstances a jury of
laypersons could conclude that there was a duty to protect the inmate. The social worker knew, from her
experiences with the inmate, that the inmate had a history of depression, that she had been prescribed multiple
medications for depression and that she previously had expressed a desire to die. The social worker also knew that
the inmate had not been taking her medication for several weeks and that she was being housed in segregation at
the jail, where neither other prisoners nor staff could easily monitor her. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

XXI

17.36

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
TRANSFER
MEDICAL CARE

Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 2007). A state prison inmate sued officials, claiming her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment were violated when she was transferred from a medium to a maximum security facility. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the officials on the federal
claims and dismissed the state law claim. The court held that the inmate had a liberty interest in not being sent to a
maximum security prison, as required in order to bring a claim that transfer to maximum security facility without
prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, was a violation of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court noted
that the maximum security prison's strict control over every aspect of an inmate's life, and almost virtual isolation
from any human contact, imposed conditions of confinement far worse than her previous situation in the general
population of a medium security prison. But the court found that the officials had qualified immunity from the
inmate's due process claim because, at the time of the transfer, it was not clearly established that an inmate could
have a liberty interest in not being transferred to a maximum security prison.
The court held that the officials’ alleged difference in access to health care providers, between the medium
security prison and the maximum security prison to which the inmate was transferred, was insufficient to support
a determination that prison officials showed deliberate indifference to her medical needs by transferring her. The
court noted that the inmate’s delivery of drugs required for AIDS treatment was delayed and intermittently
interrupted, but the patient's file did not reflect the seriousness of her condition, and when one maximum security
prison employee was found derelict in making deliveries of medications, the employee was fired. (Maryland
Correctional Adjustment Center [“Supermax”])

U.S. Appeals Court
PREGNANCY
MEDICAL CARE

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee in a county jail, who had been
pregnant during her detention and whose child had been stillborn, brought a § 1983 action against county and jail
officials, a physician, and the jail's medical services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious
medical needs. The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on failure to satisfy the
administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the jail's administrative
appeal procedure for inmates was not “available” within the meaning of PLRA, where the detainee had no way of
knowing about it. According to the court, the detainee adequately exhausted her available remedies under PLRA
by filing a document titled “request form.” The court noted that the handbook given to inmates did not mention a
grievance form, but only spoke of a “written request,” and the inmate checked the “complaint” box on the request
form rather than the “request” box and cogently described her grievance. The court found that the detainee's
amniotic fluid leak constituted a serious medical need and the facility commander exceeded gross negligence in
answering the detainee's complaint about lack of treatment, supporting a deliberate indifference claim. The
commander apparently held a general disbelief of inmates' medical complaints, and responded only with a
statement that the detainee could visit an outside physician if she could pay for it. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Heckenlaible v. Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority, 491 F.Supp.2d 544 (E.D.Va. 2007). An inmate
brought an action against a correctional officer and regional jail authority, seeking to recover monetary relief for
injuries suffered as a result of an allegedly nonconsensual sexual encounter between her and the officer. The jail
authority moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
correctional officer, whose duties required him to observe inmates in the shower, was acting within the scope of
his employment when he allegedly sexually assaulted the inmate after he observed her showering and during a
“cell search” thereafter. The court held that the inmate’s deposition testimony that she was the victim of a sexual
assault by the correctional officer was sufficient to preclude summary judgment in favor of the jail authority on
her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The court found that absent evidence indicating that the
correctional officer was known by anyone to have a propensity to commit sexual assault at the time he was hired,
or evidence indicating that some testing would have revealed that the officer would pose a danger to inmates, the
jail authority was not liable under Virginia law on the inmate's negligent hiring claim. The court also found that
since the jail authority never received any complaints from inmates about the officer, and swiftly investigated the
matter and took appropriate action upon learning that a sexual encounter had occurred, it was not liable for
negligent retention. (Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2007). A female pretrial detainee sued a deputy sheriff under § 1983,
alleging that the deputy was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk that she would be sexually assaulted by a
correctional officer. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for summary judgment seeking qualified
immunity. The deputy appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether a county jail official was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm from a male
correctional officer’s alleged action of going to a female inmate’s cell three times after lockdown, and as to
whether the official exhibited deliberate indifference to that risk, precluded summary judgment as to whether the
official was liable under § 1983 for due process violations. The court found that, for purposes of qualified
immunity, the law was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s assault (December 2002) that it would
violate a county jail inmate’s due process rights for a jail official to exhibit deliberate indifference to a substantial
risk that a correctional officer would sexually assault the inmate, and that a supervisor who was deliberately
indifferent to a substantial risk of such assault could be held liable under § 1983. (Pennington County Jail, S.D.)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Laube v. Allen, 506 F.Supp.2d 969 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A class action lawsuit was brought on behalf of women
incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections, who claimed that various state officials were deliberately
indifferent to the denial of female prisoners' basic human needs, to the denial of their serious medical needs, and
to their substantial risk of serious physical violence. The district court approved two four-year settlement
agreements and the prisoners moved for attorneys' fees and expenses. The district court held that: (1) the prisoners
were the “prevailing parties” for purposes of imposing attorneys' fees and expenses; (2) the number of hours billed

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through the date of oral arguments on the motion for a preliminary injunction and the date on which the billing
statement read “end of preliminary injunction time” would be cut in half across-the-board; (3) the time spent
challenging the prison officials’ second remedial plan was non-compensable; (4) fees relating to discovery
disputes between the prisoners and the non-state defendants were not compensable from the state defendants; (5)
attorney fees that were directly and reasonably incurred in obtaining the court-ordered relief contained within
medical-settlement agreement were compensable; (6) interest on attorney's fees and expenses runs from the date
of the judgment establishing plaintiffs' entitlement to the award; and (7) the prisoners were entitled to
compensable litigation expenses directly and reasonably related to their enforcement expenses. (Alabama
Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Meyer v. Nava, 518 F.Supp.2d 1279 (D.Kan. 2007). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a former
employee at a county jail, a board of county commissioners, and a county sheriff, seeking damages for injuries
suffered after being raped by a former jail employee while incarcerated at the county jail. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that a former jail employee who
raped the prisoner was not a final policymaker and therefore the county could not be held liable under § 1983. The
court noted that even though the employee had some discretion to place the prisoner in a particular area of the jail,
he had no authority to make or change county policy, and all authority to establish policy otherwise remained with
the sheriff. The court held that evidence was insufficient to show that the county sheriff possessed knowledge of
an excessive risk to female inmates and that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent toward such a known risk, as
would have subjected the sheriff to § 1983 liability for an Eighth Amendment violation of the former prisoner's
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. According to the court, the employee's consensual actions
with another female inmate, the actions of another male jailer with a female inmate, and the employee’s telephone
calls to an inmate after her release did not constitute evidence demonstrative of the sheriff's knowledge of any
violation of department policy or a substantial risk of serious harm to female inmates. The court held that the
county board lacked any authority to supervise or discipline the county sheriff or his subordinates, as required to
subject it to § 1983 liability. The court found that the former county jail employee's actions in sexually assaulting
the former prisoner were not within the scope of his employment, and thus the county and sheriff were not subject
to liability for the actions under the Kansas Tort Claims Act (KTCA). According to the court, the employee was
acting for his personal benefit and not in furtherance of any business of the county, there was no express or
implied authority to perform the acts in which he engaged, and the acts were not foreseeable in the furtherance of
his duties. (Lyon County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Mombourquette ex rel. Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F.Supp.2d 624 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A pretrial detainee in
a county jail who was left seriously brain damaged after she attempted suicide by hanging in her cell, brought a
civil rights suit against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and jail nurses, alleging that they violated her
constitutional rights by failing to protect her from harming herself. The defendants filed motions for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court held that evidence that the pretrial detainee reported to
county jail personnel that a jail lieutenant was taking another female inmate out of her cell at night to engage in
sexual activity was admissible, because such evidence showed that the lieutenant had a strong motive to withhold
protection from the detainee, and thus was relevant to show he intentionally disregarded a risk to the detainee’s
safety. The court also found that evidence that county sheriff refused to investigate allegations that the county jail
lieutenant was engaging in sexual misconduct with another inmate was relevant and admissible, where the
sheriff’s dismissive attitude of the complaint exhibited deliberate indifference, both toward the detainee’s health
and safety in particular and generally toward the health and safety of all inmates. The court denied summary
judgment because it found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a nurse and correctional officers at the
county jail were deliberately indifferent to pretrial detainee’s health and safety. The court also found a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether there was an affirmative link between the county sheriff’s failure to properly
train and supervise county jail personnel and the failure to prevent the detainee’s suicide. (Monroe County Jail,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Nillson-Borrill v. Burnheimer, 505 F.Supp.2d 180 (D.Me. 2007). A female former inmate who was allegedly
raped by a male inmate while she was incarcerated brought a civil rights action against a prison superintendent.
The superintendent moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district
court held that the Maine Civil Rights Act permits a deliberate indifference claim against a corrections
superintendent, based solely upon violence that a prisoner suffered at the hands of a fellow inmate, and claims
against officers in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Maine Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
RESTRAINTS

Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). A county jail detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic
bipolar depression, sued a jail official under § 1983, alleging due process violations arising from his physical
restraint. The district court denied the official's motion for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity.
The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the official's alleged conduct of
cuffing the detainee to a floor-grate toilet in an uncomfortable manner for approximately three hours, if proven,
did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights. According to the court, the official’s alleged actions
did not shock the conscience and thus did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights, inasmuch as
official took such action after the detainee, who had been diagnosed with manic bipolar depression, had
threatened to pull out her own peripherally inserted central catheter (PICC) so that she would bleed to death, and
after the detainee had shown that having her hands handcuffed behind her back was alone not an adequate form of
restraint. (Independence County Jail, Arkansas)

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17.38

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMMING

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 523 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.N.D. 2007).
Former and present female inmates of the North Dakota Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed suit
alleging that the department violated their equal protection rights and Title IX of the Federal Educational
Amendments Act by discrimination on the basis of sex. The female inmates alleged that the state provided
female inmates, in comparison with their male counterparts, with unequal and inferior housing, facilities,
classification systems, orientation programs, educational programs, vocational programs, work opportunities,
and substance abuse treatment opportunities. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The
court held that the female inmates' placement at a women's correction and rehabilitation center, a contract
facility to house female inmates, was not based on a discriminatory statutory scheme. The court found that the
prison industry programs offered at the center were not “education programs or activities” as defined by Title
IX. According to the court, the vocational training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to
those offered to male inmates at state facilities. The court noted that the availability and access to the restaurant
management, heating and air conditioning, auto technician, welding, carpentry, and food service programs is
based on the location of inmates, not on their gender. (Southwest Multi-County Corr. Center, North Dakota)
2008

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and free
speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with antipsychotic
medication while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in
part. The court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision to sedate the detainee
and therefore the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The deputy had called
paramedics and admittedly lobbied the medics to sedate the detainee, he allegedly falsely reported to the
paramedics that the detainee had been banging her head and throwing herself against her steel cell door, and he
participated in physically restraining the detainee during the injection, at the request of the paramedics. The
court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deputy
falsely reported to the paramedics. The court found that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity from
liability. The court found that the training of county jail personnel by the county sheriff and other officials with
respect to forcible sedation of pretrial detainees in the county jail, was not deliberately indifferent to the due
process rights of the detainees, and therefore the sheriff and county officials were not liable under § 1983 for
failure to properly train. The training required personnel to call the paramedics and let the paramedics, with the
advice of a physician, make the decision as to whether or not to sedate. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action,
alleging that an emergency room physician violated her constitutional rights by forcibly injecting her with
antipsychotic medication while she was in custody. The physician filed a motion for summary judgment, which
was granted by the district court. The court held that the physician “acted under color of state law” within the
meaning of § 1983 when he ordered the inmate to be involuntarily sedated, and that the physician exercised
reasonable medical judgment in deciding to forcibly sedate the inmate. The court noted that although the
private physician did not contract directly with the state to treat the inmate, the physician however undertook a
public function because the provision of medical services to inmates was traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state. The inmate appeared highly intoxicated and out of control, was pounding and throwing her body
against her cell door, was violently pulling against her restraints and thrashing about, and was unable to gain
control in the presence of the paramedics or to allow her vital signs to be taken. (Pitkin County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Anglin v. City of Aspen, 562 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo. 2008). A jail inmate brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a city, former and current police officers, and a police chief, alleging that the defendants violated
her rights to due process and free speech, as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly
injecting her with antipsychotic medication while she was in custody at a county jail. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that officers did not deprive the inmate of due process by
restraining her while paramedics forcibly sedated her and that the officers' act of restraining the inmate while
she was sedated did not amount to excessive use of force. The court found that the police chief was not liable
for failure to train and/or supervise officers, where the training reflected the sound conclusion that medical
professionals, rather than law enforcement personnel, were the individuals most qualified to determine whether
sedation was appropriate. According to the court, absent a policy of sedating detainees, the city was not
municipally liable under § 1983. The court held that the officers’ act of restraining the inmate while paramedics
forcibly administered antipsychotic medication to her was not substantially motivated as a response to her
exercise of allegedly constitutionally protected conduct, as would support the inmate's First Amendment free
speech retaliation claim against the officers, where the physician, not the officers, had legal authorization to
decide whether an emergency existed that justified the inmate's forced sedation, and the officers did not
participate in making the decision to forcibly sedate the inmate. (City of Aspen, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer and
others alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip searched. The
district court denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The appeals court
affirmed the district court decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in conducting the strip search
during booking, following the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for harassment, where the arrestee never
intermingled with the general jail population but rather was confined in a cell by herself for several hours while
awaiting bail. The court noted that three pat down searches had been performed on the arrestee prior to
booking, the arrestee was wearing shorts and a sleeveless blouse at the time of booking, the jailer saw that the

XXII

17.39

arrestee did not have any tattoos or moles indicating that she was the culprit, and the crime of harassment was
not a crime of violence. The court found that the arrestee had a right not to be strip searched during booking
when she was not going to intermingle with the general prison population. She had already been through a patdown search, and there was no reasonable suspicion that she had a weapon. According to the court, the jailer
who conducted the strip search was not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of this incident it was
clearly established that a strip search could be justified if there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee
possessed weapons and the detainee intermingled with the general jail population.
The 46-year-old mother of nine had been riding in a family van with some of her children when she was
stopped by an officer because there was an extra child in the back seat. The officer arrested her with the belief
that she was the person for whom a warrant had been issued. After being booked at the jail it became apparent
that she was not the person named in the warrant because she did not have the tattoos and moles that were
described in the file. Knowing that the plaintiff was not the person named in the warrant, a jail officer
nonetheless continued to process and strip search her. As she was standing naked, she began to lactate. She
tried to cover herself but was told by the officer to put her arms down. She was mocked continually by the
officer and a male officer during this incident. (Jefferson County Detention Facility, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Brazier v. Oxford County, 575 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county and corrections officers, alleging that strip searches performed upon her during two post-arrest
confinements at a county jail, both relating to her driving privileges, were unconstitutional. The district court
held that the strip searches violated the county's written policy, and thus the county was subject to liability
under § 1983. The court noted that the county's written policy prohibited strip searches of inmates charged with
misdemeanor crimes unless there was reasonable suspicion to believe that an inmate was hoarding evidence to
a crime, weapons, drugs, or contraband. (Oxford County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
CHILDREN

Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2008). A detainee sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking to
end her detention in jail for violating a state court civil contempt order that directed her to return her child to
the father's custody in the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. The district court denied her motion for reconsideration and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the detainee’s incarceration was not in violation of laws or treaties of the
United States, as required for a grant of habeas petition. The court noted that a Spanish court awarded custody
of the child to the detainee, who had removed the child from her habitual place of residence in New Jersey
without the American father's permission, in direct contravention of both the letter and spirit of the Hague
Convention. The court noted that this also violated the principles of international comity by applying Spanish
law, rather than New Jersey law, and therefore warranted refusal to afford comity to the decisions of Spanish
courts. (Bergen County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of
conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the jail. The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the county did not have an
unconstitutional strip search policy or custom at the county jail, and that the sheriff did not acquiesce to a
policy or practice of unconstitutional strip searches. The court found that there was no evidence of an
unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of
every person taken into custody at the county jail, as required for the arrestee to establish a § 1983 claim
against the county. The court noted that it’s prior determination in an unrelated case, that the county maintained
an unconstitutional policy of strip searching all misdemeanor detainees, concerned a period several years prior
to the time that the arrestee was detained. The court found that the strip search of the female arrestee upon her
admission to jail after self-surrendering on an outstanding felony arrest warrant was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. The search, in which the arrestee was required to run her fingers through her hair, extend
her arms out straight, open her mouth for visual inspection, spread her toes, lift each of her breasts, expose her
vagina, squat on her haunches with her back to the officer and, while squatting, cough violently several times,
at which time she expelled menstrual fluid, caused the arrestee humiliation and embarrassment. The court
found that the search was based on a drug charge in her inmate file, the fact that she made a planned admission
to jail which provided the opportunity to conceal contraband, and that she was going to be housed overnight at
the jail, which had a problem with contraband. The search was performed by a female officer in the changing
area of the shower stall adjacent to the booking area, which was mostly shielded from view by a plastic curtain.
(Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Costa v. County of Burlington, 584 F.Supp.2d 681 (D.N.J. 2008). An administrator, individually and as the
representative of a deceased pretrial detainee‘s estate, brought civil rights and state law claims against a county
and the warden of a county jail, alleging that the inmate contracted Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) during her incarceration and ultimately died as result of MRSA-related pneumonia. The administrator
appealed the pretrial rulings of a United States Magistrate. The district court denied the appeal in part and
dismissed in part. The court held that broadening the scope of discovery of documents concerning other
inmates' medical treatment beyond grievances related to Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
would have been too intrusive and minimally probative. (Burlington County Corrections and Work Release
Center, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
jail officials and the county claiming, among other things, that the county's policy or custom regarding the
provision of medical care at the jail on weekends reflected deliberate indifference to her medical needs and
caused injuries resulting from a fall from the top bunk in her cell when she had a seizure. After a jury found

XXII

17.40

against the county, the district court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The county
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to find a
direct causal link between county's policy of permitting jail officials to “contact” medical staff simply by
leaving a medical form in the nurse's inbox, even though a nurse might not see the notice for 48 hours, and the
alleged denial of the inmate's right to adequate medical care, allegedly leading to the inmate suffering a seizure
and falling from a top bunk. According to the court, the deposition testimony of a doctor provided a basis for
finding that the inmate would not have suffered a seizure had she been given medication within a few hours of
her arrival at the jail. The inmate, a self-described recovering alcoholic who also suffers from epilepsy, was
arrested on a probation violation and taken to the jail. That afternoon, she had a seizure, fell from the top bunk
of a bed in her cell, and sustained significant injuries to her right hip and right clavicle. Her case proceeded to
trial and the jury found that none of the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs,
but determined that the county's policy regarding weekend medical care exhibited deliberate indifference to,
and was the proximate cause of, her injuries. The jury awarded her $214,000 in damages. (Grand Traverse
County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PRIVACY
SUICIDE

Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against medical
providers working at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment due process
rights arising from a strip search conducted by a male officer. She also challenged her mental health
confinement. The district court granted summary judgment for the medical providers. The court held that the
prison doctor's decision to remove the inmate from her cell after she became agitated and demanded two
psychotropic drugs and to place her in mental health segregation was not deliberate indifference. The court
found that removal of the female inmate from her cell into administrative segregation and removal of her
clothing, after she became agitated and demanded psychotropic drugs, did not violate her privacy or Eighth
Amendment due process rights, even though officers who performed such tasks were all male. According to the
court, the inmate was on suicide watch, which required removal of clothing to avoid self-injury, removal was
done pursuant to established procedure and was videotaped, and a staffing shortage rendered it impractical to
include a female officer on the removal team. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought § 1983 and 1985 claims against a police
department and others alleging her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was subjected to a strip
search. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no reasonable
suspicion that the arrestee was hiding drugs on her person as required to justify the strip search and the officers
were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of
material fact regarding whether the jail's surveillance system telecast the strip search. (Southampton Police
Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Conn. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that she was denied necessary medical care in violation of her Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court held that the claim was cognizable as a habeas petition. According to the court, the
claim asserted by the prisoner who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer, that she was denied necessary
medical care in federal prison in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, and seeking restoration of certain medical treatment, specifically hormone medication, was
cognizable as a habeas petition challenging her conditions of confinement pursuant. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 584 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). Female former arrestees
filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court
of District of Columbia, under § 1983, claiming violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The arrestees
alleged that the marshal strip searched all females awaiting presentment to a superior court judge, without
reasonable and particularized suspicion that any female was carrying contraband on her person and without
strip searching any male arrestees. The District of Columbia moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that the former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia was a federal official who was not amenable to suit, under § 1983, as an employee,
servant, agent, or actor under the control of the District of Columbia, precluding the female former arrestees'
class action. The court noted that the marshal was empowered to act under the color of the federal Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, and a District of Columbia law provided that the marshal acted under the supervision of the United
States Attorney General. According to the court, the District of Columbia lacked authority to control the
conduct of the former United States Marshal, precluding the female former arrestees' class action under § 1983.
The arrestees were held for presentment for an offense that did not involve drugs or violence, but they were
subjected to a blanket policy of a strip, visual body cavity search and/or squat search without any
individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing drugs, weapons or
other contraband. (District of Columbia, Superior Court Cellblock)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 512 F.3d 478 (8th Cir. 2008). The trustee for the heirs of an inmate
brought an action against a state Department of Corrections, corrections officers and prison nurse alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need in violation of Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the trustee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the inmate did not have a medical need so obvious that a layperson would easily
recognize the need for a doctor's immediate attention, as required to establish an objectively serious medical
need without a physician's diagnosis. The court found that corrections officers and a prison nurse did not
violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by deliberate indifference to

XXII

17.41

the inmate's serious medical need. The court noted that although the inmate appeared to be unable to stand or
walk under her own power, did not respond to officers' directions, rolled on the ground grunting and groaning
and had dried blood and cuts on her lips, prison personnel had no background knowledge that made it obvious
that those symptoms required medical attention and the inmate never expressed a need for medical attention.
(Blue Earth County Jail and Minnesota Correctional Facility- Shakopee)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEARCHES

Jones v. Murphy, 567 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.Md. 2008). A male arrestee brought a class action, alleging that a
booking facility's policy of frisking female arrestees while searching male arrestees down to their underwear
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment for the arrestee, finding that the booking facility's gender-differentiated search policy was not
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in preventing arrestees from bringing weapons into the
booking facility, and thus violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted
that the additional staff needed to more thoroughly search female arrestees was not overly burdensome, and
searching all arrestees to their last layer of clothing was a readily available constitutional alternative.
(Baltimore City Central Booking, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich. 2008). The personal representative of an arrestee's
estate brought an action against a county and two employees of the jail where the arrestee died of heart failure.
The arrestee had been brought to the jail on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Two
days after her admission she was found unresponsive in her cell and could not be revived. It was subsequently
determined that she died of heart failure (ischemic cardiomyopathy). The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that neither a jail interviewer, whose only
contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, nor a jail nurse,
who first came into contact with the arrestee when she was summoned to assist in CPR and other efforts to
revive the arrestee after she was found unresponsive in her jail cell, were deliberately indifferent to the
arrestee's serious medical needs. According to the court, neither employee perceived a substantial risk to the
arrestee's health and well-being and yet disregarded that risk, and any purported negligence in the interviewer's
assessment of the arrestee's medical needs did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The court held
that the conduct of the interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a classification interview lasting
between five and fifteen minutes, did not amount to “gross negligence” within the meaning of Michigan's
governmental immunity statute, and therefore she was not liable for failing to secure immediate medical
treatment for a condition that shortly would result in the arrestee's death. (Oakland County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a police
roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil rights action
against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to which she was
transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
allegations in the motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary
of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the warden at a central
booking facility, for intrusive searches to which she was subjected. The court found that the allegations in the
offender's complaint-- that she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a visual body cavity search as
the result of a policy implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and
Correctional Services (DPSCS) and by a warden at the central booking facility-- adequately pleaded the
minimum facts necessary to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary and the warden under §
1983. The policy allegedly authorized strip searches and visual body cavity searches of all persons admitted to
the facility, regardless of the charges filed against them or circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore
Central Booking and Intake Facility, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff's deputy,
alleging use of excessive force during transport to jail. The district court denied the deputy’s motion for
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the deputy's
repeated use of a taser on the unruly arrestee qualified as wanton and sadistic and was not objectively
reasonable, precluding qualified immunity. The court noted that the excessive force claim asserted by the
arrestee, who had not been formally charged but was being transported to a jail at the time of the events giving
rise to the claim, was analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, not under the Fourth
Amendment. According to the court, the deputy first tased the arrestee after she forcefully stated “fuck you” to
the deputy, the deputy did not follow the sheriff's department's taser policy requiring initial use of open-hand
measures, the arrestee likely was not endangering herself as the deputy had claimed, since she was handcuffed
and in a hobbling device while locked in the back-seat cage of the squad car, and the deputy used the taser
under the arrestee's breast and on her inner thigh. (Eastern Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Ortiz v. Lasker, 590 F.Supp.2d 423 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A female inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that a
male corrections officer physically and sexually assaulted her. The inmate moved for a default judgment and
the district court granted the motion in part. The court held that the inmate was entitled to a default judgment on
her claims of unconstitutional denial of liberty, use of excessive force, assault and battery, and sexual assault
against the male corrections officer following the officer's failure to respond to the allegations asserted in the
complaint. The inmate alleged that the officer twice cornered her in a locked, isolated classroom, and subjected
her to verbal and physical abuse, including but not limited to forcible rape. The court held that the inmate failed
to allege intent or disregard of a substantial probability to cause severe emotional distress, as required to state a
claim against the male corrections officer for intentional infliction of emotional distress under New York law.
(Albion Correctional Facility, New York)

XXII

17.42

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.N.C. 2008). The administratrix of a detainee's estate brought
a § 1983 action in state court against county defendants, alleging that they used excessive force when they used
tasers on her. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The county and sheriff's department moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. According to the court, under North Carolina law, the sheriff,
not the county encompassing his jurisdiction, has final policymaking authority over hiring, supervising, and
discharging personnel in the sheriff's office. The court found that the sheriff's deputies' alleged use of excessive
force in attempting to control the detainee by use of tasers, and the sheriff's department's alleged failure to train
and supervise its employees as to the use of tasers, could not be attributed to the county, so as to subject it to §
1983 liability for the detainee's death. The court held that the county sheriff's department lacked the legal
capacity, under North Carolina law, to be sued under § 1983 liability for the detainee's death. (Bladen County
Sheriff’s Department, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail
doctor, and paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under §
1983 and asserting state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court found that the detainee had a sufficiently serious medical condition, as required to prevail
in a § 1983 deliberate indifference claim against jail officers and others, under the Due Process Clause. The
court noted that at one point the detainee was found unconscious in her cell without a pulse, and for
approximately two weeks after that incident, the detainee complained to officers and a doctor about chest pains,
numbness, dizziness, vomiting, nausea, constipation, and a possible kidney infection.
The court held that the alleged conduct of the correctional officers in observing and being aware of the
detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy, and
chest pains, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, which required the officers to transport the detainee to
a hospital emergency room for evaluation upon complaints of chest pain, amounted to deliberate indifference to
the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee’s due process rights.
The court found that the paramedic's conduct in allegedly disregarding a jail protocol which required the
paramedic to transport detainees to a hospital emergency room when they complained of chest pains, by failing
to transport the detainee upon responding to an incident in which the detainee allegedly lost consciousness, had
no pulse, and complained of chest pain and nausea after she regained consciousness, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of her due process rights. The court found
that county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly train jail officers as to the
proper protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the detainee, absent a showing that any individual official
encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the officers' alleged deliberate indifference.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a county jail doctor in being aware of the detainee's serious
medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy, and chest pains, but
failing to conduct more than a cursory examination, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, amounted to
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee's due process
rights. Because the detainee had a clearly established right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to receive medical treatment to address serious medical needs, the court found that jail officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity for their alleged conduct in failing to provide the diabetic detainee with
medical treatment. (Roane County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Popoalii v. Correctional Medical Services, 512 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against multiple staff members of the state department of corrections (DOC) alleging deliberate
indifference to her serious medical conditions. The district court struck the prisoner's expert affidavit and
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that DOC staff members were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical condition
of cryptococcal meningitis, which resulted in her eventual blindness, as required to prevail in a § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim. According to the court, the prisoner had none of the normal signs or risk factors of
cryptococcal meningitis. The court noted that although the staff probably should have been more vigilant in
obtaining the prisoner's medical records, which would have disclosed her condition, there was no showing that
they knew of the prisoner's condition. (Women's Eastern Reception Diagnostic and Corr. Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABORTION

Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a class action against corrections officials
challenging the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant
inmates off-site for elective, non-therapeutic abortions. The district court determined that the MDC policy was
unconstitutional and entered judgment for the inmate. Corrections officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the MDC policy could not withstand scrutiny under Turner. The court noted that
even if the MDC policy rationally advanced the prison's legitimate security interests, the policy acted as a
complete bar to elective abortions. The prison policy allowed transportation “outcounts” to outside facilities
only for medically necessary therapeutic abortions due to a threat to the mother's life or health. According to
the court, obtaining an abortion prior to incarceration was not a valid alternative means of exercising the right.
According to the court, the MDC policy did not reduce the overall number of outcounts and so did not reduce
any strain on financial or staff resources, and ready alternatives to the MDC policy existed including reverting
to the previous policy of allowing outcounts for elective abortions. (Missouri Department of Corrections,
Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2008). A female inmate who was sexually assaulted by a detention
officer brought an action against an officer and a sheriff under § 1983 and state law. The district court granted
summary judgment to the sheriff and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part

XXII

17.43

and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether
the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to inmates that continued to exist at
the jail, notwithstanding the measures he had implemented to remedy the circumstances in the jail that had
directly led to sexual assaults of inmates by detention officers. Prior to this case, two independent incidents of
sexual assault occurred in the jail, both perpetrated by male detention officers against female inmates. The
appeals court had previously found evidence that these assaults were the product of unconstitutional jail
conditions maintained through the deliberate indifference of the sheriff. The court noted many ways in which
his administration of the jail fell below an acceptable standard. Three years after these assaults the plaintiff in
this case was sexually assaulted by a detention officer who was later arrested for and convicted of the assaults.
(Huerfano County Jail, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 567 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee who was subjected to a strip and visual
body cavity search brought a § 1983 action against a county for alleged violations of her Fourth Amendment
rights. She brought the action after opting out of a class action against the county in which her claim had
initially moved forward and in which she was named as class representative. The county asserted counterclaims
for breach of contract and equitable estoppel and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that the settlement agreement in a prior class action did not contain an implied term that the arrestee,
as named class representative, would not opt out of the agreement. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 573 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county
alleging a strip and visual body cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff, in part. The court held that jail personnel did not have individualized
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee was concealing contraband or weapons, as required to perform a strip and
visual body cavity search of the arrestee who had been arrested for felony witness tampering. The court noted
that the arrestee was not arrested for a violent felony, spending a night in jail did not implicate sufficiently
serious security concerns to warrant a search, the county failed to show the underlying facts of the crime
provided individualized reasonable suspicion, and the county failed to establish that the arrestee's conduct
required the search. According to the court, a felony categorization alone does not obviate the requirement of
individualized reasonable suspicion for a strip and visual body cavity search of an arrestee. (Knox County Jail,
Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

U.S. v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2008). Two male correctional officers at a federal correctional
institution were charged with a variety of misconduct arising from their inappropriate sexual contact with
female inmates and their distribution of contraband to inmates. Both defendants were found guilty of
conspiracy to accept an illegal gratuity. One was also found guilty of witness tampering and the other of
bribery. The district court sentenced the defendants to twelve months of incarceration, followed by a three-year
term of supervised release, and ordered them to pay a fine. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that there was sufficient evidence that the officers' conduct constituted an “official act”
to support their conviction for conspiracy to accept an illegal gratuity. According to the appeals court, the
district court did not commit a plain error by instructing the jury that sex was a “thing of value” under the
bribery statute. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to uphold the officer's witness tampering
conviction. The court noted that the government offered evidence of five instances which satisfied the official
act requirement, where officers switched unit assignments, one officer permitted an inmate to telephone another
officer to request contraband, one officer telephoned another officer on an inmate's behalf, one officer
permitted an inmate to leave her unit to meet with another officer, and one officer gave another officer the key
to staff offices to meet with an inmate in the middle of the night. The district court had instructed the jury that
“contraband” was defined as “anything whatsoever not approved by the warden”, despite the defendant's claim
that a broad federal regulatory definition of “contraband” should have been used. (Federal Correctional Institute
in Tallahassee, Florida)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
RESTRAINTS

Zabala-Calderon v. U.S., 616 F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). A female detainee filed suit, under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), seeking injunctive relief and damages from the United States for injuries she
allegedly suffered from falling to the ground when exiting the bus managed by the United States Marshal
Service (USMS) during her transport from a detention center to a federal courthouse while she was fully
restrained with handcuffs, a belly chain, and shackles. The district court denied the government’s motion for
summary judgment, finding that fact issues precluded summary judgment as to whether the detainee's injuries
were caused by the government's negligence. The court found genuine issues of material fact remained as to
whether the government failed to follow a standard of care and skill in transporting the female detainee by
placing shackles on her that were allegedly too short for her to step down from a bus managed by the United
States Marshal Service (USMS) and by allegedly failing to assist her as she stepped down from bus, resulting in
the detainee's falling to the ground and sustaining injuries. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Puerto Rico)
2009

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

XXII

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in
failing to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or
indication that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female
inmates, posed a risk to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an

17.44

investigation and terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an
“indifferent and objectively unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of
the inmate's rights. The court held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and
Georgia constitution, absent evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county
did not have a policy or custom of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under §
1983 to the inmate who was sexually assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train
deputies and jailers in proper procedures for escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory
liability on the § 1983 claim of the inmate, where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at
the jail or any problems with jailers improperly escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who
committed the assault had been trained previously on how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to
have intimate contact with inmates. During the time period in question, the county did not have a policy
prohibiting a male jailer from escorting a female inmate within the Jail. The court held that the county and
sheriff had sovereign immunity from the state law claims of the inmate, absent evidence that such immunity
had been waived by an act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Brace v. Massachusetts, 673 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2009). The administrator of a female detainee’s estate
sued the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and a number of individuals having some role in providing medical
services to inmates at a county correctional facility, including a clinician, asserting claims for negligence and
medical malpractice, and alleging that the detainee was deprived of her constitutional rights by deliberate
indifference to her medical needs. A clinician moved to dismiss certain counts. The district court allowed the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that dismissal of a medical malpractice claim after a medical
tribunal found that there was insufficient evidence to raise a legitimate question of liability did not preclude the
deceased detainee's estate from stating a § 1983 claim against a prison clinician for deliberate indifference to
the inmate's medical needs. The court held that the deceased detainee's estate stated a § 1983 wrongful death
claim against the jail clinician for deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical needs, in violation of her
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The estate alleged that the clinician observed the detainee while she
was in obvious medical distress and took the minimal step of making a phone call to a medical unit about the
detainee's condition. (Hampden County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621(M.D.Pa. 2009). A former inmate filed a § 1983
action against a county, county prison board, and various county officials to recover for injuries she sustained
while working in a jail kitchen. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in part. The
court held that the sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983 for alleged failure to obtain
adequate medical treatment for the inmate after she suffered burns while working in a jail kitchen, where the
sheriff did not participate in or have knowledge of any violations of the inmate's rights, did not direct jail
employees to commit the violations, and did not acquiesce in the employees' violations. The court found that
the inmate's allegation that a county prison board failed to adopt, and the jail's warden and deputy wardens
failed to implement, policies regarding treatment of severe burns and general medical treatment was sufficient
to state a claim against the board and officials under § 1983 for violation of her Eighth Amendment right to
adequate medical care, where the inmate claimed that there was a total absence of policy concerning medical
treatment for severe burns or general medical care when prison facilities were inadequate. According to the
court, the county's alleged negligence in the training of kitchen staff at the county jail was not sufficiently
shocking to support the inmate's § 1983 due process claim pursuant to a state-created danger theory based on
the inmate's allegation that she suffered severe burns while transferring a hot container from a stove to a top
shelf of upright warmers, even if the county officials knew or should have known that the inmate was
physically unable to place the container on the top shelf in a safe fashion. (Clinton County Prison Board,
Clinton County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
FAULURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Chao v. Ballista, 630 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Mass. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
officials at the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging that the officials failed to properly
investigate and protect her from sexual abuse by a prison guard. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint
on a number of grounds. The district court held that the former prisoner was not subject to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. The court found that the former prisoner's allegations in her
amended complaint that, over the course of a year, she and the prison guard engaged in 50 to 100 sexual
encounters in a prison facility without detection, that the guard had a sexual relationship with at least one other
female inmate, that sexual encounters continued even after the guard was reassigned to different duties, and
that a prison nurse placed the prisoner on oral contraceptive pills during the relevant time period, sufficiently
stated a § 1983 claim against prison officials. The district court held that DOC officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity, given the extent of the abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the available
sources of information. (South Middlesex Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009). The representative of the estate of a
woman who committed suicide while being held in a District of Columbia jail brought an action against the
District and the jail's medical services contractor in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging
negligence in the provision of mental health care in ensuring that the woman was not a danger to herself. The
representative also alleged that the District and contractor failed to adequately provide a medical response upon
discovering the woman in the immediate moments after her suicide. The contractor removed the case to federal
district court and moved to dismiss. The district court held that the representative was required to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) on claims against the contractor before

XXIII

17.45

bringing an action under FTCA and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the FTCA claims and
claims against the District. (District of Columbia Jail)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE

Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The estate and minor sisters of an 18year-old female prisoner who committed suicide while on suicide watch at a correctional institution brought an
action against correctional officers and staff, alleging violations of the prisoner's civil rights and seeking $5
million for the estate plus $5 million for the sisters. After accepting the defendants' offer of a judgment for
$635,000, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting $328,740 in attorney fees. The district court awarded
$100,000 to the plaintiffs, with $1,500 to be taxed as fees for the guardian ad litem. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, holding that the fact that the case was settled for $635,000 did not
warrant a reduction in the requested attorney fees. The court noted that $635,000 was not a nominal award, and
the Farrar analysis for determining attorney fees, which considered the extent of relief compared to the relief
sought, was not relevant in cases in which the recovery was not merely nominal. The court found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $1,500 in fees to the guardian ad litem. (Taycheedah
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE

Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F.Supp.2d 858 (E.D.Wis. 2009). Female inmates filed a class action alleging that medical,
dental, and mental health care provided to prisoners at a state facility violated the Eighth Amendment, Equal
Protection Clause, Title II of Americans with Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act. The officials moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there were systemic and
gross deficiencies in staffing, facilities, and procedures at the state correctional facility that resulted in
provision of inadequate medical care for female inmates. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded on the inmates' claim that the state violated Title II of ADA by failing to provide access to programs
to inmates with mobility, visual, and hearing disabilities. The court found a genuine issue of material fact as to
the effectiveness of accommodations offered to disabled inmates at a state correctional facility. The court found
that the female inmates' allegation that the state provided inpatient mental health services for male inmates, but
not for female inmates, was sufficient to state claim against the state under the Equal Protection Clause, despite
the state's contention that the disparity was natural outgrowth of the historically small number of female
inmates in the state. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth
Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by issues of fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the
prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her
religion was substantially burdened by the prison's policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph
that showed her without a hijab to cover her head; and, (3) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was
substantially burdened by the prison's failure to provide an imam during Ramadan. The court held that the
prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy did not violate the prisoner’s limited right, under
the Fourth Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the court, although the prisoner made a sufficient
showing of a subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would not be considered reasonable by society,
since the prison had a legitimate penological interest in security and in providing equal employment
opportunities to both male and female staff, and no available further accommodation was reasonable under the
circumstances. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2009). A female inmate brought a civil rights action against a prison
official, alleging the official deprived her of 16 meals over a 23-day period in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court entered summary judgment
for the official, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the
official's conduct in allegedly depriving the inmate of 16 meals over a 23-day period for the inmate’s failure to
remove a paper from the rear window of her cell was a sufficiently serious deprivation of a life necessity, as
required to establish violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The court noted that the official's argument-- that the alleged deprivation was due to the inmate's personal
choice not to comply with a prison policy-- failed to demonstrate how the inmate's failure to remove a paper
from a window jeopardized her safety or security during in-cell feeding. The court found that the official was
not entitled to qualified immunity because the inmate's right to adequate meals was clearly established, and the
case law alerting prison officials to their obligations to provide inmates with adequate meals should have put
the official on notice of her Eighth Amendment rights. (High Desert State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Hall v. Terrell, 648 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2009). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer, alleging that he raped her while she was in custody. Following entry of default judgment
against the officer, a bench trial to determine damages, and the entry of a judgment awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, the detainee moved for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The district court granted the
motion for attorney fees in part. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to the
detainee's request for attorney fees where the detainee was, at every stage of the lawsuit, a prisoner confined to
a correctional facility, she was the prevailing party in her suit, and the suit was an action in which attorney fees
were authorized under § 1988. The court held that the reasonable hourly rate for the lodestar amount, in
determining the award of attorney fees under PLRA, was the hourly rate for Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
appointments in Tenth Circuit and District of Colorado. According to the court, under PLRA, the appropriate
hourly rate for the award of paralegal fees was 64% of the average rate that she had requested for non-senior

XXIII

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attorneys, and for an assistant was 50% of such rate. The court held that under PLRA, 10 percent was the
appropriate percentage of the judgment obtained by the detainee against the corrections officer, where the
factor of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith favored the detainee, the factor of ability to satisfy the
award of attorney fees suggested that the detainee should bear some portion of attorney fees, and the factor of
the possibility that the award might deter other persons favored the detainee. The district court had awarded
$1,354,070 in damages, comprised of $354,070.41 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages. (Denver Women's Correctional Facility, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
CHILDREN
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Havard v. Puntuer, 600 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D.Mich.,2009). The guardian of a minor child, who was born in a
county jail while her mother was incarcerated there, brought a § 1983 action against jail employees for injuries
sustained during and immediately after the birthing process. The district court denied the employees’ motion to
dismiss. The court held that the minor child was a “person” within the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of
her § 1983 claims against jail employees, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of alleged unconstitutional
conduct during and immediately after the birthing process. The child was allegedly injured by the employees'
failure to provide medical attention to the mother in violation of the child's due process rights, such that the
child was not in a hospital at the time of her birth, the physicians and the facilities of the hospital were not
available to resuscitate her when she was born, and she was not resuscitated until she arrived at the hospital
following transport from the jail, at which time she had no respiration or heartbeat.
The court found that deputies and a nurse at the county jail were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
§ 1983 action brought on behalf of the minor child, where the constitutional duty to care for helpless infants
who have newly come into the world, including the duty to care for them by anticipation, during the birthing
process, was clearly established at the time of the birth. The court noted that the defendants allegedly left the
mother in her cell for two hours even though they were aware that she was in active labor, crying out for help,
and that, once called, paramedics did not arrive until the child was being delivered and did not have the
equipment to resuscitate the child when she was delivered. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jennings v. Hart, 602 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2009). The administrator of an inmate's estate brought an
action against a sheriff and several other current or former officers in a county sheriff's department, alleging
claims under § 1983 and a state wrongful death act for one officer’s alleged wrongful denial of medical care to
an inmate in the county jail. The district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. The district court held that the officers lacked the discretion to keep the inmate at the jail
and deny her the opportunity to be seen by a neurologist or other medical professional for ten days following
referral by a nurse practitioner. The officers allegedly ignored the inmate's repeated requests for help and
worsening physical condition, including severe headaches, dizziness, pressure in her head, loss of appetite, and
fluid drainage in her ears. By the time the officers contacted outside medical professionals, the inmate was
suffering from brain abscesses and a stroke which lead to her death. (Culpeper County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). An individual who was raped by a trainee corrections officer
while she was a pretrial detainee, brought a § 1983 action against the trainee corrections officer and other
public officials and entities. After a jury found the trainee corrections officer liable and awarded damages, the
district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. The trainee corrections officer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the plaintiff's psychologist's report as a supplemental report, and the district court's jury
instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court applied one percent of the detainee’s
$1.1 million judgment ($11,000) to attorneys' fees. With the detainee’s legal expenses totaling $186,208.88, the
defendant was responsible for $175,208.88 in attorneys' fees, in addition to the $1.1 million judgment. The
appeals court did not affirm the award of only one percent and remanded the case for further proceedings.
(Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009). The administrators of an estate, the husband, and
guardians of the children of an arrestee who died following her arrest by sheriff's deputies and her admission to
a county jail, brought an action under § 1983 and state law against the deputies and the manufacturer and
distributor of the stun gun used by deputies during the arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the use of
the stun gun constituted reasonable force where the arrestee's behavior was violent, aggressive and prolonged,
demonstrating that she was clearly a danger to herself and others, and the deputy warned the arrestee to stop her
behavior and discharged his stun gun only after she refused to comply with the his orders. According to the
court, the plaintiffs failed to establish that the arrestee's death was caused by the use of a stun gun. The court
noted that the plaintiffs' own medical expert testified that, while it would have been naive of him to say that the
use of the stun gun did not contribute in some degree to the arrestee's death, he was unable to declare to a
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the arrestee would have survived but for its use.
The court held that the sheriff's deputies were not deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical
condition of “excited delirium” when they opted to take her to jail instead of to a hospital. Although one deputy
had knowledge of the arrestee's past methamphetamine use, and the arrestee's mother and another person told a
different deputy that the arrestee was sick and needed to go to the hospital, the deputies had no prior knowledge
of the medical condition called “excited delirium” or its accompanying risk of death. The court noted that the
arrestee's physical resistance and verbal communication suggested to the deputies that, although agitated, the
arrestee was not in immediate medical danger, which was an opinion shared by emergency medical personnel
called to the scene by the deputies. (Whitfield County Sheriff's Office, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), and a corrections officer, alleging that
while giving birth to her child she was forced to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to
her hospital bed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for

XXIII

17.47

summary judgment. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the corrections officer’s conduct in forcing the inmate to go through the final stages of labor with
both legs shackled to her hospital bed constituted “deliberate indifference” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The appeals court held that the inmate, in the final stages of labor, had a “clearly established”
right not to be shackled absent clear and convincing evidence that she was a security or flight risk, and thus a
government official would not be protected from § 1983 liability for violating that right based on qualified
immunity. (Arkansas Department of Correction, McPherson Unit)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Parlin v. Cumberland County, 659 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2009). A female former county jail inmate brought
an action against jail officers, a county, and a sheriff, under § 1983 and Maine law, alleging deliberate
indifference to her serious medical needs, negligence, and excessive force. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officers were not deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need; (2) an officer who fell on the inmate did not use excessive force; (3) the
county was not liable for deprivation of medical care; and (4) the county was not liable for failure to train. The
court held that the officers were not entitled to absolute immunity from excessive force claims where a genuine
issue of material fact existed as to whether the officers used excessive force in transferring the jail inmate
between cells. According to the court, there was no evidence that jail officers were subjectively aware of the
jail inmate's serious medical condition, where the inmate made no mention of her shoulder injury to the officers
other than crying out “my shoulder” after she had fallen. (Cumberland County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SUICIDE

Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dept., 599 F.Supp.2d 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). An arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city, police department and officers, alleging Fourth Amendment violations following her
arrest for allegedly making harassing telephone calls. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that probable cause existed to commence the criminal action and perform the arrest,
and that the suspicionless seizure of the arrestee's brassiere while incarcerated qualified as a “special need” for
Fourth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the police department had a policy of seizing brassieres
purely as a safety measure to preclude their use as a suicide tool, and the policy was implemented in a manner
reasonably designed to reduce intrusion on the arrestee's privacy by allowing her to remove the brassiere
without disrobing. (Schenectady Police Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
TRANSFER

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). North Dakota prison inmates, representing a certified class of female inmates, brought a sex discrimination suit under §
1983 and Title IX, alleging that a state prison system provided them with unequal programs and facilities as
compared to male inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that North Dakota's gender-explicit statutes, allowing the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to place female inmates in county jails and allowing
the Department to place female inmates in “grade one correctional facilities” for more than one year, was substantially related to the important governmental objective of providing adequate segregated housing for female
inmates, and thus the statutes were facially valid under heightened equal protection review. According to the
court, even if the decision to house them at the women’s center was based on economic concerns, where the
female prison population as a whole was much smaller than the male population, sufficient space to house the
female prisoners was becoming an issue as the entire prison population increased. Female inmates were in need
of a separate facility to better meet their needs, and statutes expressly required the Department to contract with
county facilities that had adequate space and the ability to provide appropriate level of services and programs
for female inmates. The court held that the female inmates, by expressing an assertion before the district court
that they were not challenging the programming decisions made by Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation upon transfer to county jails for housing, abandoned an “as-applied” challenge to the gender-explicit statutes facilitating such transfers. The court held that North Dakota's “prison industries” program offered at a
women's correction and rehabilitation center, under contract between several counties and the state, was not an
“educational program” subject to Title IX protections, even though the program provided on-the-job training.
The court noted that the program was primarily an inmate work or employment program, providing female
inmates with paying jobs and enabling them to make purchases, pay restitution, or support their families, and
the contract between the counties and state distinctly separated inmate employment and educational programs.
According to the court, vocational training offered at the center was not discriminatorily inferior to those offered to male inmates at state facilities, as required for a claim under Title IX. Although locational differences
existed, like male inmates, female inmates had access to a welding class and classes in basic parenting, social
skills, speech, and healthy lifestyles. (Southwest Multi-County Correctional Center, North Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
police chief and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search
and did not violate due process, and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to a strip search
under Missouri strip search law. The court found that the action of photographing the tattoo did not violate the
Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the arrestee was required to unzip her pants for the photograph and
that the photograph was taken by male officer. The court concluded that the photograph served legitimate law
enforcement purposes, the chief told the arrestee that photograph was needed for identification purposes, and
the photograph was taken in private. The court noted that the arrestee gave a false date of birth and social
security number. She was arrested for making a false declaration and for being a minor in possession of
alcohol. (City of Bella Villa, Missouri)

XXIII

17.48

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009). After granting a detainee's motion for summary
judgment on liability under § 1983 for a strip search she underwent at a county jail, the county moved to
exclude the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits allegedly caused by her mental distress growing out of
the strip search. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
detainee's tardy pretrial disclosure of economic loss information did not prejudice the county's ability to
investigate so as to warrant the exclusion of evidence of the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits. The
court found that damages for economic loss based upon a lost future contract were not recoverable in the civil
rights suit seeking damages allegedly caused by the detainee's mental distress, since the jury would have to
speculate in order to determine whether the detainee suffered an economic loss on a future contract and, if so,
how much. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
PRIVACY

Zargary v. The City of New York, 607 F.Supp.2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A prisoner, who wore a headscarf as an
Orthodox Jew, brought an action against a city, alleging that the city's practice or custom of removing head
coverings from prisoners before taking photographs during admittance to a correctional facility violated her
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court entered judgment in favor of the city.
The court held that the city correctional facility's practice or custom of removing head coverings from prisoners
before taking photographs during their admittance to a facility was rationally related to the legitimate
penological interest of being able to identify prisoners accurately to maintain security, and that the practice did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court noted that the prisoner could
dramatically change her appearance by removing the headscarf, making it more difficult to identify her, which
would pose a security risk. According to the court, the prisoner had other means to express her religious beliefs
in prison, the corrections officers attempted to accommodate the prisoner by minimizing the presence of male
officers in the room when the photograph was taken, and the alternative of not removing the headscarf could
not be said to pose only a de minimis security risk. (Rose M. Singer Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY
RESTRAINTS

Brawley v. Washington, 712 F.Supp.2d 1208 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A female former inmate brought a § 1983
action against the Washington State Department of Corrections and various officials, seeking relief from
violations of her constitutional rights that she alleged occurred during the birth of her first child. The
Department filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part.
The court held that the female inmate, who was shackled to a hospital bed while giving birth, showed, from an
objective standpoint, that she had a serious medical need and was exposed to an unnecessary risk of harm for
the purposes of her § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
material issues of fact as to whether officers were deliberately indifferent to the risks of harm to the inmate and
her serious medical needs when they shackled her to a hospital bed. According to the court, the inmate showed
that shackling inmates while they were in labor was clearly established as a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, thereby barring the Department of Corrections'
qualified immunity defense. (Washington State Corrections Center for Women)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970(D.Hawai‘I 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against correctional facility officials and medical staff, alleging the defendants were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs resulting in the delivery of a stillborn child. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional facility's medical
staff subjectively knew the pretrial detainee's complaints of vaginal bleeding presented a serious medical need.
The court held that the staff’s failure to ensure the detainee received an ultrasound and consultation was no
more than gross negligence, and the medical staff did not deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with the pretrial
detainee's medical treatment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the correctional facility officials' actions and inactions in training the facility's
medical staff resulted in the alleged deprivation of the pretrial detainee's right to medical treatment and whether
the officials consciously disregarded serious health risks by failing to apply the women's lock-down policies.
Following a verbal exchange with a guard, two officers physically forced the detainee to the ground from a
standing position. While she was lying on the ground on her stomach, the officers restrained her by holding
their body weights against her back and legs and placing her in handcuffs. The detainee was approximately
seven months pregnant at the time. (Oahu Community Correctional Center, Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Chase v. District of Columbia, 723 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.D.C. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
for monetary damages against the District of Columbia and the operator of the District's Correctional Treatment
Facility (CTF), alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments, as well as invasion of privacy,
while under arrest, during interrogation, and while in jail and CTF. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motions. The court held that the District did not have a custom or policy that caused
the detainee to be videotaped while naked and changing her clothes in an interrogation room, thereby
precluding the detainee's municipal liability claim alleging that the videotaping was an unreasonable search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the detainee had not been adjudicated of any crime
and was not subject to punishment, thereby precluding her Eighth Amendment claim. (District of Columbia,
Corrections Corporation of America, Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F.Supp.2d 1127 (D.Colo. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action,
proceeding in forma pauperis, against prison officials, alleging that she was raped by a lieutenant while
incarcerated, and asserting various due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment violations. The
officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the issue of whether the state prisoner's placement in administrative segregation for a period of one year
violated her due process rights could not be determined at the motion to dismiss stage of the prisoner's § 1983

XXIII

17.49

action against prison officials, because of a factual dispute as to whether the duration of confinement was
atypical and significant. According to the court, the contours of constitutional law were sufficiently clear that
the state prison officials were on notice that assignment of a prisoner to administrative segregation under
conditions that imposed a significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life
could give rise to a liberty interest protected by due process, and, thus, the officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 action, with respect to her due process claim.( Denver Women's
Correctional Facility, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
MEDICAL CARE

Fields v. Smith, 712 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Wis. 2010). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates,
who were diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials,
alleging, among other things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a
statutory provision preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment
surgery to inmates with GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The
inmates sought a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The
court held that: (1) GID or transsexualism was a “serious medical need” for the purposes of the Eighth
Amendment; (2) as matter of first impression, enforcement of the statute against the inmates violated the Eighth
Amendment; (3) as matter of first impression, the statute was facially unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment; (4) the possibility that certain inmates seeking treatment for gender issues might have had
conditions not requiring hormone therapy did not repel a facial challenge to the statute; and (5) as matter of first
impression, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause both as applied to the inmates and on its face. The
district court granted the motion, issuing a “…permanent injunction that restrains the defendants from
enforcing or attempting to enforce the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 302.386(5m), by direct, indirect or other
means, against any prisoner to whom the statute would otherwise apply and specifically against the plaintiffs.”
(Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
in part, and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was
substantially burdened, as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for nonemergency pat searches of female inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's
belief was not accurate. The court found that the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of
the precepts of Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden.
The court found that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and security of the female prison through the
use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's
right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments regarding how and why the crossgender pat searches promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the
facility, not to its safety and security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding staffing and
employment issues at the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as
required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The court
noted that even if the prison's interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and
employment issues were compelling, cross-gender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of
addressing these interests, as required to justify the substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of
religion under RFRA, absent evidence that the prison considered and rejected less restrictive practices to crossgender pat searches. (Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). The administrator of a female detainee‘s estate brought a §
1983 action against correctional facility officials and nurses, alleging they violated her due process rights by
failing to provide adequate medical care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and
the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a physician unqualified to offer expert
testimony that the detainee's death from non-specific heart failure would have been prevented had she been
given her congestive heart failure medication, where the physician lacked specific knowledge in cardiology and
pharmacology, and he provided no basis for his testimony except that the detainee's medication treated heart
disease. But the appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding the physician
unqualified to offer expert testimony that the detainee's vomiting combined with her diuretic medication may
have contributed to her tachycardia and subsequent death from non-specific heart failure.
The court held that a correctional facility nurse who examined the detainee during intake was not
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs posed by her heart condition, as required to establish
violation of the detainee's due process right to adequate medical care in the § 1983 action. The court noted that,
even though the nurse failed to follow the facility's protocol requiring her to contact a doctor when an inmate
complained of chest pains, the nurse placed the detainee on a list to have her vital signs checked each morning,
and the nurse arranged for the detainee to get her congestive heart failure medication. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the nurse who examined the
detainee following her complaints of nausea was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs posed by
her heart condition and vomiting. In its decision, the court noted that “On the other hand, Nurse Pam Hibbert
was presented with ample evidence that Taylor needed medical treatment.” (Peoria County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010.) A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
various prison officials and corrections officers, alleging retaliation, harassment, due process violations,
defamation of character, and mental anguish. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's conduct of pressing charges against a

XXIII

17.50

corrections officer who the prisoner claimed raped and impregnated her and complaining about other officers'
alleged harassment amounted to a “constitutionally protected activity,” as required for the prisoner to state a §
1983 retaliation claim. The court found that corrections officers' alleged conduct of withholding the prisoner's
incoming and outgoing mail in retaliation for the prisoner's pressing rape charges against an officer at another
prison amounted to an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim
against the officers. But the court found that a prison official's alleged conduct of reassigning the prisoner to a
different unit in the same prison did not rise to the level of an “adverse action,” as required to establish a prima
facie pro se § 1983 retaliation claim. The court found that the prisoner had no liberty interest in her place of
confinement, transfer, or classification, and thus, prison officials' alleged refusal to have the prisoner
transferred to an out-of-state institution did not violate her due process rights. The court found that the
prisoner's assertions that she made supervisory prison officials aware of the harassment and retaliation she
allegedly suffered at the hands of correctional officers as a result of her pressing rape charges against a
correctional officer at another facility, and that none of the supervisory officials offered assistance or took any
corrective action, were sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability, in her § 1983 retaliation action. (State
Correctional Institution at Cambridge Springs, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Jessup v. Miami-Dade County, 697 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2010). A pre-trial detainee who had been placed
on suicide precaution status at a county detention center for women, filed a state action against a corrections
officer and the county, asserting negligence and claims under § 1983 for the officer's deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, and against the county for failure to train or discipline staff. The defendants removed
the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the detainee's actions of drinking from a toilet, smearing menstrual blood on a window, and stepping
on and off a ledge in her cell, did not indicate a “strong likelihood” that she was about to inflict self-harm, as
required for jail officials to be liable for deliberately disregarding the detainee's serious medical needs in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when they failed to place her in four-point restraints. The detainee
subsequently injured her head. The court noted that the detainee's activities were bizarre but not violent,
aggressive or out of control as would require restraints. According to the court, a jail official did not act in a
fashion “beyond gross negligence,” as required to hold her liable for deliberate disregard of the pre-trial
detainee's serious medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, when the official failed to act to
stop the detainee from self-inflicting head and nose injuries by banging her head against a cell wall during her
confinement after being placed on a suicide watch. The officials immediately ordered the detainee to stop head
banging activity and tried to open her cell. (Miami-Dade Women's Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of her constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court found that an ADC employee's use of force against the inmate was justified by the
inmate's disruptive behavior during the search of her cell and thus did not give rise to the ADC employee's
liability on an excessive force claim. The inmate alleged that the ADC employee grabbed her by the arm,
dragged her from her cell, and threw her into the shower. The court note that there was no medical evidence
that the ADC employee's use of handcuffs caused any permanent injury to the inmate as required to support a
claim that the employee used excessive force against the inmate. (Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
MEDICAL CARE

Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F.Supp.2d 874 (E.D.Wis. 2010). A prisoner, a biological male suffering from Gender
Identity Disorder (GID), brought an action against prison officials alleging violation of Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by denying him certain medical services related to his disorder. The district court granted summary judgment for the prison officials in part and denied in part. The court
held that the prisoner's Gender Identity Disorder (GID) was a “serious medical need,” as required to establish
the prisoner's § 1983 claim alleging that denial of his request for the opportunity to live as a female, as part of
his treatment for GID, violated his Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, although the prisoner had
received some hormonal therapy to provide relief from GID symptoms, denial of the opportunity to live as a
female allegedly caused the prisoner to be depressed, resulting in self-mutilation of his genitals and suicide
attempts. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether triadic therapy for Gender Identity Disorder (GID), which consisted of hormone therapy, real-life experience living as the preferred gender, and sex reassignment surgery, was the appropriate treatment for the
prisoner. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether prison officials' denial of a request by the male prisoner to live as a female by, for example,
wearing makeup and female undergarments and removing facial hair, constituted deliberate indifference to the
prisoner's serious medical needs, and whether security concerns justified such denial. (Wisconsin Department
of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority, 703 F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Va. 2010). A female inmate
brought an action against a regional jail authority and correctional officers who held the ranks of colonel, lieutenant, captain, sergeant, and corporal, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, and asserting state-law claims for assault and battery, gross negligence, and negligent retention. The
district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's allegations in her complaint: (1) of over ten instances of sexual assaults by a correctional officer, under circumstances where his superiors were in a position to have knowledge of what was happening at various times; (2) that each named superior witnessed or participated in several of those actions; (3) that all superiors had direct knowledge of the
officer's personal remarks to the inmate; (4) and that the officer's obsession with the inmate was a matter of
commentary among all correctional staff, were sufficient to state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim for
supervisory liability against the superiors. The inmate also alleged that each superior witnessed several inci-

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17.51

dents where the officer followed the inmate into a storage room and assaulted her. The inmate also alleged that
a corporal, who was in charge of inmate workers, witnessed the correctional officer, in violation of jail regulations, approach her several times while working in the kitchen, and that the corporal told the inmate not to be
rude to the officer or she would be fired from her job after the inmate asked the corporal to prevent the officer
from moving behind the counter. (Rappahannock Jail Authority, Rappahannock Regional Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed in part 678 F.3d 500.. The guardian of the
estate of a pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city
and city police officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent
release from custody without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee, who exhibited
drastic and unnatural behavior throughout her 28-hour detention, had a serious mental health condition. The
court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arresting city police officer, and other police
employees, who witnessed the arrestee singing rap lyrics, taking her clothes off and dancing provocatively for
different men, acting erratically, discussing the price of oil, and screaming bizarre and vulgar statements,
among other things, had notice that the arrestee had a serious mental health condition that required medical
attention. The court noted that a city police officer, who spoke on the telephone with the detainee's mother, and
was informed by her mother that the detainee was likely bipolar and might be having an episode, had notice
that the detainee had a serious mental health condition that required medical attention, precluding summary
judgment. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a city police officer, who had
actual knowledge of the pretrial detainee's mental health condition based on observations of her behavior while
in custody, placed the detainee in a position of heightened risk when she released the detainee from the police
station and pointed her toward an area known for violent crime, without providing the detainee with food,
money, or medication, and as to whether the officer's conduct “shocked the conscience.” The court identified a
fact issue as to whether the detainee would not have been raped and seriously injured absent a city police officers' failure to provide the detainee with psychiatric care.
The court held that city police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim
brought by the mother of the detainee, for unreasonably failing to provide the detainee with mental health care
under the Fourth Amendment, as it was clearly established that pretrial detainees were entitled to mental health
treatment for serious mental health conditions. On appeal (678 F.3d 500), the appeals court held that the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court also denied qualified immunity for the city
police officer who released the detainee, where the law was clearly established that the officer could not release
the detainee from custody in a manner that increased her risk of harm. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010). A female detainee filed a § 1983 suit against a sheriff and a
deputy, individually and in their official capacities, alleging failure to train the deputy, who had sexually
assaulted the detainee. After bench trial the district court granted in part and denied in part the sheriff’s motion
for summary judgment. The sheriff and the detainee cross-appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the sheriff in his official capacity was not liable for the
deputy's inadequate training, and that the sheriff in his individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity
from the failure to train claim. The court noted that although the deputy received minimal training at best for
his law enforcement position, the inadequacy of his training was not so likely to result in violation of the
constitutional rights of the detainee, so that the county could reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need for training, especially when the county had no notice at all that a sexual assault was
likely. According to the court, there was no patently obvious need to train the deputy not to sexually assault
women, and the sexual assault was a consequence too remote to conclude that failure to train the deputy caused
him to sexually assault the detainee. (Hot Spring County Sheriff's Department and Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2010). A female pretrial detainee brought a § 1983
action against a deputy sheriff, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs. The district court denied the deputy's motion for summary judgment and the deputy appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the deputy sheriff was not
qualifiedly immune from the pretrial detainee's § 1983 excessive force claim, since the deputy's alleged actions,
including slamming the detainee's head to the floor seven to eight times while she was restrained, if proven,
were obviously beyond what the Constitution would allow under the circumstances.
The court held the deputy sheriff's alleged actions or inactions following her altercation with the pretrial
detainee, if proven, did not constitute deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs, where: the
detainee alleged that the deputy dispatched her to her cell directly after the altercation; the nurse saw her within
approximately two minutes of her arrival in the cell; the nurse informed the deputy that the detainee had a
possible nose injury but that her nose was not broken; the nurse and an officer then attended to the detainee
within approximately five minutes of the detainee's cellmate's first signals for help; and, the detainee then
received continuous medical care until she was taken to hospital. The court noted that no preexisting law
clearly established that an approximately two-to-five-minute delay of medical care, either while the detainee
moved from a waiting room to her cell following an altercation or while her cellmate waited for the guard to
respond to her signaling, was a constitutional violation.
The appeals court accepted the depiction of events from recordings from closed-circuit video cameras
placed throughout jail, rather than crediting the detainee's account of the altercation, where the video obviously
contradicted the detainee's version of the facts. But the court noted that video failed to convey spoken words or
tone and sometimes failed to provide unobstructed views of the events, and the court credited the detainee's
version where no obviously contradictory video evidence was available. (Hillsborough County Jail, Florida)

XXIII

17.52

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A female inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections
officials regarding injuries suffered by the inmate at the hands of a corrections officer alleged to have sexually
assaulted the inmate. The superintendent and deputy superintendent for security moved to dismiss claims that
they were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's personal safety. The district court denied the motion. The
court held that the inmate's allegations against the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security,
claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to her rights and were responsible for creating or maintaining
policies or practices that failed to prevent her from being repeatedly raped and assaulted by a corrections
officer, stated a claim for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The court noted that the complaint
alleged that the officials were responsible for determining where inmates were to be housed and the assignment
of guards, and in conjunction with another official, investigation and response to complaints of staff
misconduct. The court found that the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security were not entitled to
qualified immunity, given the extent of the alleged sexual abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the
number of questionable, if not unintelligible, decisions made with respect to the inmate during the course of an
investigation. (Taconic Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). Two female detainees brought
a § 1983 action against a county detention center and officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to
hiring and supervision of a deputy who sexually assaulted them while they awaited arraignment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
detainees failed to establish deliberate indifference with respect to the center's hiring of the deputy. The court
noted that none of the deputy's prior misdemeanor offenses, including his driving infractions and domestic
assault, demonstrated a propensity to commit rape. The court found that the detainees failed to demonstrate a
causal link between the center's alleged policy of not terminating employees with excessive absenteeism and
the deputy's conduct. The court noted that "...Absent evidence of prior complaints of sexual assault, the mere
fact that a male guard supervises a female inmate does not lead to the conclusion that the inmate is at a great
risk of being sexually assaulted by the guard." According to the court, the detainees failed to establish that the
county detention center was deliberately indifferent to their constitutional rights by not effectively monitoring
surveillance equipment, and thus they could not recover in their § 1983 action against the center, where there
was no evidence that the center had a policy or custom of ineffective surveillance. The detainees argued that
only one person monitored the 89 cameras that were used throughout the Detention Center and that they were
mainly monitored only for ingress and egress of secured doors. They asserted that the county should have had
cameras in the video arraignment room for the inmates' protection. The court noted that state jail regulations do
not require constant monitoring of video surveillance cameras or dictate where the cameras are to be placed
inside a detention facility. (Kenton County Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action against
a county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law, arising out of
the detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's motion for
summary judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court
reversed. The court held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in county custody,
upon arriving at the jail to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the
detainee was unable to be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the detainee's death, so as to
entitle the agent to governmental immunity from gross negligence liability under Michigan law. The court
noted that the detainee was in the custody of county jail officials in the hours leading up to her death, the parole
agent worked for the state Department of Corrections, not the county, the detainee had been experiencing
delirium tremens (DT) symptoms for close to 48 hours prior to arrival at the jail, a physician had been notified
of the detainee's condition and told jail officials to monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a
matter of minutes only, and county jail officials failed to check the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left
the jail. (Lenawee County Sheriff’s Department, and Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PREGNANCY

Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010). A detainee who suffered a miscarriage at a
county jail brought a civil rights action against the county, county sheriff, two deputies, and the nurse who had
examined her. The district court denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity
grounds, and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and rendered. The court held that the injury suffered by
the pregnant detainee who used crack cocaine daily and had a miscarriage at the county jail was not caused by
any deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs by the deputies, in violation of due process. According
to the court, the deputies knew that the detainee had spoken with a nurse at the jail who determined that the
detainee's condition was not an emergency, and there was no evidence that the detainee's situation was so
obviously dire that the deputies must have known that the nurse had grossly misjudged her condition.
(Birmingham Jail, Jefferson County, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver, 742 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D.Colo. 2010). Deaf detainees, and the estate of one
detainee who committed suicide, brought a civil rights action challenging their arrests and detentions by the
members of city and county's police and sheriff departments. The district court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that failure to provide a deaf detainee with a
sign language interpreter during the intake process did not constitute disability discrimination. The court found
that jail deputies were not deliberately indifferent to a deaf detainee's needs. But the court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deaf detainee had access to the
jail's services after he was booked and placed in his housing assignment to the same extent as inmates who
could communicate verbally, and whether the detainee could access the jail's services without assistance.
The court held that jail deputies were not deliberately indifferent to needs of a deaf detainee who committed
suicide, and because there was no underlying Eighth Amendment violation, supervisor defendants were not

XXIII

17.53

liable in either their official or individual capacities for the detainee's suicide, and the municipality was not
liable for failure to adequately train and supervise the deputies. The court noted that no evidence indicated that
the detainee had been suicidal prior to his incarceration or at the time of his medical screening, but rather,
evidence established that the detainee could communicate through writing and otherwise sufficiently to at least
alert medical staff that he needed assistance. The court noted that medical staff made regular and frequent visits
to the jail. But the court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the sheriff's department breached a duty to the detainee to take reasonable care to prevent
the detainee from committing suicide, and whether any such breach proximately caused the detainee's suicide.
The court held that jail officials' late night release of the deaf detainee and the potential harm from being
unable to communicate or get herself home did not demonstrate the level of outrageousness required to establish a substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory. According to the court, the detainee
failed to show that officers would have been aware of the risk that, instead of waiting in the facility for public
transportation to begin, the detainee would leave and accept a ride from a stranger. The detainee was released at
2:00 a.m. and she was given bus tokens by a deputy sheriff. Her husband had called the facility to say that he
was on his way to pick her up, but the message was not relayed to the detainee. There was a waiting area in the
lobby of the facility but she did not notice it and attempted to get herself home on her own. (City and County of
Denver Police and Sheriff Departments, Pre-arraignment Detention Facility, Denver County Jail, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2010). A female prisoner initiated a pro se § 1983 suit,
alleging that two officers failed to protect her from a sexual assault by a male prisoner, and that others failed to
properly train and supervise the officers responsible for her safety. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the officers were deliberately
indifferent to the safety of the female prisoner who was placed in the back of a dark van for transport with two
male inmates and allegedly raped by one of them. (Stone County Jail, Missouri)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2011). Current and former female inmates filed a class action § 1983
suit against several line officers employed at seven state prisons and various supervisors and other corrections
officials, claiming that they were sexually abused and harassed by the line officers and that the supervisory
defendants contributed to this abuse and harassment through the maintenance of inadequate policies and
practices. The district court dismissed, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part, and
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the female inmates who made internal complaints,
investigated by an Inspector General (IG), that sought redress only for the alleged actions of a particular
corrections officer and did not seek a change in policies or procedures, failed to exhaust their internal remedies,
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to proceed in federal court on § 1983 claims of sexual
abuse and harassment. But the court found that the female inmates' claim of a failure to protect was sufficient
exhaustion with regard to a § 1983 class action litigation seeking systemic relief from alleged sexual abuse and
harassment. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Banker v. County of Livingston, 782 F.Supp.2d 39 (W.D.N.Y. 2011.) A female patient brought an action
against a county and the company that provided court-ordered alcohol treatment and counseling services,
alleging she was sexually abused by a counselor while undergoing treatment and counseling. The defendants
moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motions. The court held that the plaintiff's allegation that she
was required to make unescorted visits to a male area of the jail in order to receive alcohol abuse medication
that was mandated as a condition of probation, did not state a claim of a constitutional magnitude as would give
rise to the county's municipal liability under § 1983. According to the court, the county's alleged requirement
that the plaintiff walk unescorted through portions of the male population jail to receive her medication was not
so outrageous as could give rise to the county's liability for negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED)
under New York law, where nothing indicated that the plaintiff's physical safety was threatened. (Livingston
County Council on Alcohol and Substance Abuse, Livingston County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identify
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSSEXUAL

Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011). A Massachusetts civil detainee, who was anatomically male but
suffered from gender identity disorder (GID), brought an action against Massachusetts officials alleging
“deliberate indifference” to her medical needs, and seeking an injunction requiring that hormone therapy and
female garb and accessories be provided to her. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, and the
state officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the record supported the district
court's conclusion that Massachusetts officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the civil
detainee or exercised an unreasonable professional judgment by denying her female hormone therapy. The
court noted that it had been fifteen years since the detainee first asked for treatment, and for ten years, health
professionals had been recommending hormone therapy as a necessary part of the treatment. According to the
court, when, during the delay, the detainee sought to castrate herself with a razor blade, state officials could be
said to have known that the detainee was at a “substantial risk of serious harm.” (Massachusetts Treatment
Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county,
sheriff, and deputy sheriff alleging that the deputy sexually assaulted her. After entry of a jury verdict in the
detainee's favor, the district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The
parties filed cross-appeals. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that there was
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual
misconduct, and the jury's determination that the county was subject to municipal liability was not

XXIII

17.54

irreconcilably inconsistent with its finding that the sheriff was not negligent. According to the court, trial
evidence revealed that the detainee was housed in a female housing unit at the facility, that the deputy, acting
alone, escorted some female detainees to the recreation center but ordered the plaintiff to remain behind. When
the deputy returned, he grabbed the plaintiff, put his hands over her nose and mouth, forced her into the
deputies' bathroom, and raped her. The plaintiff reported the assault the next morning, prompting an
investigation that led to the deputy’s arrest for first-degree rape. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Chao v. Ballista, 772 F.Supp.2d 337 (D.Mass. 2011). A former inmate brought an action under § 1983 and the
Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) against a prison guard and officials, alleging that the guard violated
her constitutional rights by sexually exploiting her while she was incarcerated, and that the officials failed to
protect her from the guard's repeated sexual battery. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether repeated sexual encounters between the male prison guard and the
female inmate were consensual, as to whether the psychological and physical harm suffered by the inmate was
objectively, sufficiently serious, and as to whether the guard was recklessly indifferent to the inmate's health,
safety, and her right to be free from sexual harassment and abuse. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials were actually aware of the conditions
giving rise to the risk of serious harm to the female inmate, namely, the male guard's sexual misconduct, and as
to whether the officials disregarded that risk. (South Middlesex Corr’l Center, Framingham, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Chao v. Ballista, 806 F.Supp.2d 358 (D.Mass. 2011). A female former inmate brought an action under § 1983
and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) against a prison guard and superintendent, alleging that the
guard violated her constitutional rights by sexually exploiting her while she was incarcerated, and that the superintendent failed to protect her from the guard's repeated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the district
court entered judgment in the inmate's favor. The defendants subsequently moved for judgment as matter of
law or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. The court held that the question of whether the
prison guard's misconduct in sexually exploiting the inmate while she was incarcerated rose to the level of “sufficiently serious harm” necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, was for the jury. The court also
found that the issue of whether the prison guard and superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the rights,
health, or safety of the inmate was for the jury. The court found that the jury verdict finding that the prison
superintendent was not liable for punitive damages because the superintendent's conduct was not “willful,
wonton, or malicious,” was not inconsistent with the verdict finding that the superintendent was “sufficiently
culpable” as to have been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
The court noted that malicious conduct is not required to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory
liability for deliberate indifference. According to the court, issues of whether the prison guard knew, or should
have known, that emotional distress would result from his sexually exploiting the inmate while she was
incarcerated, and as to whether the guard's conduct, including demanding fellatio in 23 separate places with the
inmate, was extreme and outrageous, were for the jury. The court found that the superintendent was not entitled
to qualified immunity from the former inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the superintendent failed to protect
her from the prison guard's repeated sexual exploitation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the law
was clearly established that prison officials had a duty to protect their inmates by training and supervising
guards, creating and sustaining a safe prison environment, and investigating allegations of sexual misconduct or
abuse when they arose. (South Middlesex Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill., 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 2011). The estate of a deceased female arrestee brought a
§ 1983 action against a city and police officers, alleging failure to provide medical care in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and the Illinois wrongful death law. After a jury verdict in favor of the estate, the city and
officers filed motions for judgment as a matter of law and/or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. The city and officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The
appeals court held that evidence presented at trial in the estate's § 1983 action was sufficient to establish causation of the arrestee's death, where evidence from one of the arrestee's cellmates, two deputy sheriffs and a civilian aide at the lockup, permitted a jury to find that she experienced severe abdominal pain throughout her
confinement. A professor and head of coronary care at university hospitals testified that the pain led the arrestee to produce more epinephrine, which combined with a pre-existing heart condition caused her death, and
uterine tumors found during a post-mortem examination led to his conclusion that the arrestee had suffered
serious abdominal pain. The court held that the probative value of evidence of the deceased arrestee's police
record, time in prison, and drug addiction outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice, where the evidence bore
directly on the appropriate amount of damages and that a new trial on the issue of damages was warranted.
(Chicago Police Department lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identify
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSSEXUAL

Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011). Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) inmates, who were
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought a § 1983 action against DOC officials, alleging,
among other things, that the officials violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by enforcing a statutory
provision preventing DOC medical personnel from providing hormone therapy or sexual reassignment surgery
to inmates with GID, and from evaluating inmates with GID for possible hormone therapy. The inmates sought
a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the statute against them and other inmates. The district court
granted judgment on behalf of the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) enforcement of the statute constituted deliberate indifference to the inmates' serious
medical needs; (2) the statute facially violated the Eighth Amendment; (3) deference to prison administrators in
implementing the ban was not warranted; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in enjoining the
entirety of the Wisconsin Inmate Sex Change Prevention Act. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

17.55

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Female arrestees, who were
arrested for non-drug and non-violent offenses, brought an action against the District of Columbia and a former
United States Marshal for the Superior Court, among others, alleging that the defendants' blanket policy of
subjecting them to “drop, squat, and cough” strip searches before presentment to a judicial official violated
their rights to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and their rights to equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The marshal moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth
Amendment claim and that there was no evidence that the Marshal implemented a policy that directed the blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees, as would support a Fifth Amendment claim, nor that the Marshal knew of a blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees. The court noted that the law at the time of
the searches did not clearly establish that strip searching female arrestees prior to presentment to a judicial
official violated the Fourth Amendment. (U. S.Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). A former detainee sued a county for allegedly violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by requiring her to remove her
headscarf, in public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice, while she was held on two occasions in a
county courthouse holding facility pending disposition of her probation violation. The district court granted the
county's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the holding facility was an “institution” under RLUIPA. According to the court, the
county courthouse holding facility was a “pretrial detention facility,” and thus was an “institution” under
RLUIPA, where the facility's main purpose was to temporarily hold individuals who were awaiting court proceedings, including individuals awaiting trial. The court noted that although the facility housed inmates for
relatively short periods, it held up to 600 inmates a day, and was described by the county as a secure detention
facility for the confinement of persons making a court appearance. According to the court, the short-term detainee was not required to satisfy PLRA's exhaustion requirements before suing for the county's alleged violation of RLUIPA in failing to accommodate her religious beliefs. (Orange Co. Santa Ana Courthouse, Calif.)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011). A female arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action
against a city and a number of its police officers, alleging claims arising out of the arrestee's denial of medical
care and death during detention. The district court barred the proposed testimony of the estate's medical expert,
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for police officers to take no action to seek medical
care for the arrestee, and as to whether the arrestee would not have died or experienced pain and suffering prior
to her death had the police officers taken her to a hospital. The court held that remand was required for the
district court to determine whether the medical expert's testimony that, assuming the arrestee died of a heroin
overdose, she would have suffered less if she had been taken to the hospital, would help a jury understand
whether the police officers' failure to take the arrestee to the hospital exacerbated her injury. According to the
court, the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established at the time of
arrestee's death that the Fourth Amendment protected a person's rights until she had had a probable cause
hearing, and that providing no medical care in the face of a serious health risk was deliberate indifference.
(Chicago Police Department 23rd District Lockup, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual contact
with the guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff moved to
compel discovery and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held that the
detainee was not required to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her § 1983
action, in order to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). The court noted that the county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they
transferred, and the county did not offer any assistance to the detainee after learning of the alleged assaults.
The court found that neither the county nor the county sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to train
or supervise county jail guards to not sexually assault jail detainees, and thus, the female detainee could not
demonstrate that the county or sheriff was liable under § 1983. According to the court, the guards did not need
specific training to know that they should refrain from sexually assaulting detainees, and there was no showing
that the general training program for guards was deficient or that there was a pattern of prior abuses at county
jail. The court held that the summary judgment affidavit of the pretrial detainee's expert, containing the opinion
that county officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights and safety of jail detainees in training or
supervising jail staff, and that sexual improprieties on the part of staff were easily accomplished and rarely
punished, was insufficient to avoid summary judgment, where the affidavit was conclusory, and without factual
predicate. The court found that the detainee was entitled to the sanction of an adverse jury instruction against
the county for the destruction of recordings of interviews conducted by police during the investigation of the
county jail guard's contact with the detainee. (Adams County Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 788 F.Supp.2d 839 (N.D.Iowa 2011). A detainee sued a county, claiming
that her civil rights were violated by a strip search conducted by jail employees. Following a jury verdict
awarding substantial damages, the county moved for a new trial or for a reduction of the jury’s award. The
court granted the motion. The court held that a new trial was warranted because it was impossible to determine
why the jury, in its first verdict, awarded $5,000 for past emotional distress, and then a few minutes later
awarded her $250,000 for past emotional distress in a second verdict. The court noted that, after the jury
learned it could not award $250,000 I n nominal damages, it drastically increased its initial award of $5,000 for
past emotional distress to $250,000 in the second verdict, and while the jury may have intended the $250,000

17.56

award as punitive damages, such damages were not pled, and the jury had been instructed that such damages
could not be awarded. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Shultz v. Allegheny County, 835 F.Supp.2d 14 (W.D.Pa. 2011). The administratrix of the estate of an inmate
who died after developing bacterial pneumonia while pregnant brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail
health services, and various officials and employees of county jail, alleging they ignored her serious medical
problems. The county and official filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that allegations that the inmate had complained of symptoms involving her breathing and lungs to jail
personnel but was told to “stick it out,” that she feared impending death and communicated that to officials and
her mother, that her condition progressed to the point where she had difficulty breathing and had discharge
from her lungs, that she was taken to the infirmary with additional symptoms including nausea and vomiting,
which had been present for several days, that she was treated for influenza without taking cultures or other
testing, that there was no outbreak of the flu within the jail, that her condition did not improve, that she
continued to complain of difficulty breathing and lung discharge, that she was taken to a medical facility
intensive care unit, and that tests were performed there but her condition had already progressed to the point
where it was fatal were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. The court found
that allegations that her condition could have been easily controlled and cured with testing were sufficient to
plead a cost-cutting/saving custom or policy existed and was the moving force in the inmate's death, as required
for the § 1983 action. (Allegheny Correctional Health Services Inc., Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 802 F.Supp.2d 870 (E.D.Ky. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county fiscal court, a judge, detention center, and jailers, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, resulting in her being forced to endure labor unassisted by
medical personnel and to give birth to her child in a holdover cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pregnant inmate had a “serious medical
need” during the overnight hours in which she, at the end of her pregnancy term, experienced readily recognizable symptoms of labor, and as to whether the county jailer who communicated with the inmate on the night
in question, and who was purportedly a certified nursing assistant (CNA), perceived the facts necessary to draw
the inference that a serious medical condition existed and then disregarded that condition. According to the
court, the fact that the inmate gave birth to a healthy baby in a holdover cell following a normal and, by all
appearances, unremarkable course of labor and delivery, went to the amount of damages to be awarded in the
inmate's § 1983 action against the county defendants, but did not change the fact that the type of injury the
inmate allegedly suffered was cognizable under the 8th Amendment. (Jessamine County Det. Center, Kentucky)
2012

U.S. District Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE

Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F.Supp.2d 486 (D.Mass. 2012). An inmate, who was a male-to-female transsexual
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), brought an action against prison medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments for failing to provide adequate medical treatment for her GID.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that allegations by the inmate that
she was a male-to-female transsexual diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder (GID), that laser hair removal
or electrolysis was part of her treatment prescribed by doctors under contract with the prison, and that she was
denied this medical care were sufficient to plead that her serious medical need was not adequately treated in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court also held that allegations that she was denied this care on at least
three separate occasions, despite a long history of administrative appeals and requests for doctors' orders to be
followed, were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference by prison officials in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, allegations that the associate medical director at the prison had direct responsibility for administrating medical care ordered by physicians, and that the director failed to permit the inmate to
receive her prescribed treatment, were sufficient to plead personal involvement by the director in deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, as required for the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the
Eighth Amendment. The court also found that the assistant deputy commissioner for clinical services at the
prison was aware of the inmate's prescribed course of treatment, that the inmate was denied treatments, and that
the commissioner responded to filed grievances by claiming the grievances were resolved and then telling the
inmate to address her concerns with primary care providers, were sufficient to plead the commissioner's personal involvement in deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs. (Massachusetts Dept. of Correction)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Ard v. Rushing, 911 F.Supp.2d 425 (S.D.Miss. 2012). A female inmate brought an action against a sheriff and a
deputy asserting claims under § 1983 and § 1985 for violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
and also alleging a state law claim for negligence, relating to an incident in which she was sexually assaulted
by the deputy while she was incarcerated. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the
female jail inmate as would have violated the Eighth Amendment, where the sheriff had established safeguards
to ensure the safety of female prisoners, including a female-only, camera-monitored area in which female inmates were housed, a policy that male jailers could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, and a
policy that a female jailer was to cover each shift. The court noted that past allegations that the deputy had
engaged in unwanted sexual contact with female inmates had been investigated and found not to be substantiated. The court found that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff had knowledge of the deputy's disregard of
the sheriff's policy to ensure the safety of female prisoners, which included a requirement that male jailers
could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, or to show that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to the need for more or different training, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment failure to
train/supervise claim. (Lincoln County Jail, Mississippi)

17.57

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
MEDICAL CARE

Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Female detainees filed § 1983 actions
against a city and city officials alleging that the policy, practice, and custom of the city department of correction (DOC) of subjecting female detainees to a forced gynecological examination upon admission to DOC
custody violated their constitutional rights. The detainees alleged that they were not informed of what the exam
entailed and were subjected to, or threatened with, punishment if they questioned or refused the exam. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the statute of limitations
for the detainees' claims was tolled until the gynecological exam class claims were dismissed from the class
action challenging the DOC's alleged practice of conducting strip searches, where the potential gynecological
exam class was pleaded in both the original complaint and the first amended intervenor complaint, and the
settlement agreement did not provide unequivocal notice that the gynecological exam class claims were not
being pursued. (New York City Department of Correction, Rose M. Singer Center, Rikers Island)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL CARE
PROGRAMMING
TRANSFER
WORK RELEASE

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against
them on the basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. After a non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2)
the claims were not moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that
the challenged practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or reasonable accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of
categorically segregating all HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state;
and (6) food-service policies that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded
HIV-positive inmates from programs for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA
and the Rehabilitation Act. The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to
challenge ADOC policies that HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population
prisoners and that women were allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other workrelease facility for women. The court held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to
afford HIV-positive inmates individualized determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral load, history of high-risk behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual
aspects of inmates, was a reasonable accommodation to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's
special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, for integration into the general prison population. According to the court, requiring ADOC
to dismantle its policy of segregating HIV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would
neither impose undue financial and administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of
ADOC's operations. The court suggested that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources
by maintaining its segregation policy, in that a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to
house only a few women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Kendrick v. Pope, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012). A female state inmate brought a civil rights action against a
corrections officer who allegedly confiscated religious items during a cell shakedown. The district court dismissed the inmate's claims and she appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that genuine
issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officer confiscated the inmate's Catholic Bible,
rosary beads, and other religious materials during a cell shakedown, and subsequently failed to return those
items. (McPherson Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SEARCHES

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various village
police officers and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the right to counsel, cruel and unusual punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several
state law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's allegation that she was offered medication
for her unnamed mental ailment while incarcerated, but that she declined to accept the medication “for fear of
overmedication or a harmful interaction,” failed to establish that she was subjected to inhumane conditions or
that the police were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to support her claim that she
was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause. According to the court, the arrestee's failure to allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by the village,
combined with her failure to show that the unconstitutional consequences of the village's alleged failure to train
its police officers were patently obvious, precluded her claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police
Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate
brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, a nurse, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to
the inmate's right to adequate medical care while in pretrial confinement, which resulted in her death. The
defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the
motions in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the correctional officers' failure to call emergency rescue when the pregnant jail inmate complained of
stomach cramps constituted more than grossly negligent disregard of a substantial risk of a serious harm,
precluding summary judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical
need claim. According to the court, correctional officers were on notice that their alleged actions or inactions
violated the jail inmate's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and, thus,

17.58

the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in § 1983 action. The court also held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers acted with ill
will or malice toward the jail inmate, or exhibited reckless indifference. (Bradford County Jail, Florida)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered
from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights
violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to
mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed
from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the
defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have
understood that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual
issue that could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution
on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly
established due process right for the police to not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe
place and releasing her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled
to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was
not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing
the arrestee's individual-recognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release,
and who received a telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition
and did nothing in response and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity
to the civil rights claims that the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the
detention aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's
cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was
not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange for medical treatment
of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station, Second District Station,
Chicago Police Department)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Shelton v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 677 F.3d 837 (8th Cir. 2012). The administratrix of the estate of a
mental health patient brought an action against various public officials and health professionals, alleging shortcomings in the way the medical professionals responded after the patient hanged herself while a patient at the
facility. The district court dismissed the action. The administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the state actors' discovery of an unconscious voluntary mental health patient hanged in her room
did not trigger duties related to involuntary commitment nor did it give rise to a constitutional-level duty of
care. According to the court, after the state actors discovered the patient, she was no different than any
unconscious patient in an emergency room, operating room, or ambulance controlled by the state actors, and, in
such circumstances, the state actors owed patients state-law duties of care based upon standards for simple or
professional negligence. The court found that the physician's decision to remove the mental health patient from
a suicide watch was a medical-treatment decision, and therefore a claim based on that decision could not be
brought pursuant to either the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act, absent any
allegation that the removal from suicide watch was influenced by anything other than the physician's judgment.
(Arkansas State Hospital)

U.S. District Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSSEXUAL

Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner, a male-to-female transsexual, brought
an action against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging violations
of her Eighth Amendment rights. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the prisoner's gender
identity disorder (GID) was a serious medical need and the treatment received by the prisoner was not
adequate. The court found that the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical
need and the DOC's pattern of obstruction and delay was likely to continue, as required for the prisoner to
obtain injunctive relief on her Eighth Amendment claim, where the DOC's policy for treating GID imposed a
blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery without exception. The court noted that the
transsexual prisoner's gender identity disorder was a “serious medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, the prisoner's GID was diagnosed by a physician as needing treatment, and she had a history of
suicide attempts and self castration while in custody. The court found that the treatment received by the
transsexual prisoner was not adequate, although the DOC provided the prisoner with psychotherapy and
hormone treatment, it failed to perform an individual medical evaluation aimed solely at determining
appropriate treatment for her GID as a result of its blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment
surgery. (MCI–Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A female state inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action
against a prison's correction officers, officials, and medical staff, asserting 25 claims contesting the conditions
of her confinement and the conduct of the staff. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s complaint stated due process claims based on
insufficient notice of a disciplinary hearing and on the inmate's allegedly improper removal from a disciplinary
hearing. According to the court, the pro se state inmate's allegations that she was denied access to a computer
failed to state a claim against prison officials for due process violations absent allegations that such denial
constituted an atypical and significant hardship to her. Although the inmate claimed that it was impossible for
her to perform legal work because courts no longer accepted hand-written documents, the court did not prohibit
hand-written documents and had accepted them on prior motions in the inmate's case. The court held that the

17.59

inmate stated a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 against a male prison correction officer by
alleging that the officer had written a false inmate misbehavior report (IMR) against her three days after she
had filed a grievance against him for performing a degrading sexual act in front of her, and that because of the
false report she had been forced to spend three months in the prison's special housing unit (SHU). (Bedford
Hills Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
HYGIENE
MEDICAL CARE

Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F.Supp.2d 1039 (N.D.Cal. 2012). A detainee at a county jail who had
limited mobility and deformed hands as a result of systemic lupus and rheumatoid arthritis brought an action
against the contractor that provided medical care assessment services for detainees, and its employees, alleging
violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Disabled Persons Act
(CDPA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the private contractor was not liable as a
public entity or instrumentality under the ADA; (2) the contractor qualified as a “business establishment,”
under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (3) the complaint properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal
accommodations, as required to state a claim under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (4) the allegations
were insufficient to assert intentional discrimination, as required to state a claim against the contractor for
violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (5) the CDPA applied to county jails and the
accommodations and services provided therein; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against contractor under
the CDPA. The jail inmate who had limited mobility and deformed hands alleged that she was unable to use the
toilet in the jail as needed, causing her injuries, and that she was deprived of access to jail's facilities, beds,
showers, walkways, and benches. According to the court, this properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal
accommodations, as required to state a claim against the private contractor that contracted with county to
provide medical care assessment services for the county jail. (County of Alameda, California)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female
federal detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and
employees of the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail,
alleging violation of the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of all county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal
immigration authorities pending her removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial
detainee. The court noted that a pretrial detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as
much protection during her detention as convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-namely protection from harm caused by a defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health.
The court asserted that persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process
clause, to more considerate treatment during detention than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who interviewed the
detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations, acute anxiety,
and feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or any other jail
staff or to recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health treatment,
amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's due process
rights. The court held that a nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately indifferent
to the detainee's risk of suicide, as would violate the detainee's due process rights, where the nurse manager
treated the detainee for panic attacks and anxiety, and recommended that she be given a cellmate and
transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of which were done, and there was no showing that the
nurse manager knew that the detainee was suicidal.
According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to jail
staff on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention
policy, did not render the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail,
absent a showing that such failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Chennault v. Mitchell, 923 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2013). The guardian for an incapacitated former pretrial
detainee filed § 1983 action against a former sheriff and former officers of the sheriff's department for alleged
violation of the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, by deliberate indifference to her
medical needs that resulted in her permanent brain damage from an attempted suicide. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that sheriff's department officers were not
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee, as required to support the detainee's § 1983
claim for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, where the officers had no knowledge or
even any reason to suspect that the detainee presented a risk of suicide, rather than merely a risk of violent
behavior towards officers. According to the court, the sheriff's department officers' pepper spraying of the
detainee due to her violent behavior toward the officers, and then failing to decontaminate her, did not establish
that the officers knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to the detainee, where the officers did not
know or have reason to believe that the detainee was suicidal at the time that she was sprayed, the detainee did
not allege that the use of spray was unnecessary or excessive in amount, and the detainee did not exhibit any
adverse reactions to the spray or to the lack of decontamination. The court found that the sheriff's department
officers' failure to support the detainee's body and/or neck when they cut her shirt on which she hung herself on
cell bars in an attempted suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in
violation of her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court noted that, even though the detainee's
injuries were increased from sliding down cell bars and forcibly striking her head on the cell door, the officers

17.60

faced an emergency and needed to act quickly and decisively to save the detainee's life. According to the court,
their actions “…were not only reasonable in this situation, but laudable.” The court held that the detainee's §
1983 claim that the sheriff failed to train jail personnel, to ensure they could adequately respond to the medical
needs of combative and/or intoxicated detainees, was foreclosed by the lack of a Fourteenth Amendment
violation by jail personnel and a lack of a causal link between the sheriff's policies and the detainee's attempted
suicide, where jail personnel were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs in violation of the
detainee's due process rights, and there was no pattern of unconstitutional violations resulting in suicides or
attempted suicides. (Richmond City Jail Annex, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
PRIVACY
SEARCHES

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things,
that jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in
retaliation for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district
court held that the expert's reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant
excluding his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa
law which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing
so as to permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a
physical probe by any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's
private parts or physically probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose
clothing was forcibly removed in the presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the
arrestee refused to answer questions during the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not
subjected to a “strip search” requiring reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the
court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment where the officers'
reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was substantially justified, and the scope of the
intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from
the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers neither knew, nor reasonably should
have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy rights.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
amount of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became
disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the
arrestee onto the cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that
male county jail officers did not use excessive force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in
restraining the female arrestee in a holding cell after the female officers had allegedly thrown the arrestee onto
a cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to forcibly remove the arrestee's
clothing and to change her into jail attire. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
PREGNANCY

Cooper v. Rogers, 968 F.Supp.2d 1121 (M.D.Ala. 2013). A female state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against
jail officials in Alabama court, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. After the action was removed to federal court, officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held: (1) officials were acting within scope of their discretionary
authority when they denied the pregnant prisoner medical care, as required to invoke qualified immunity; (2)
the prisoner’s prolonged vaginal bleeding accompanied by pain was a serious medical need; (3) officials acted
with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs; but (4) evidence was insufficient to
establish that deliberate indifference to prisoner's serious medical needs caused her miscarriage. The court
noted that officials were aware that the prisoner was pregnant and that she was experiencing vaginal bleeding
and pain, the prisoner testified that she made almost daily verbal requests for medical attention, officials
ignored her requests or responded by threatening to send her to a women's prison, and told her to keep the baby
inside of her. (Bullock County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder

De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013). A pre-operative transsexual inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that state prison officials' continued denial of consideration for sex reassignment surgery as treatment
for her gender identity disorder (GID) constituted deliberate indifference to her serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation was sufficient to state a plausible
Eighth Amendment claim against the officials, even though the officials had provided the inmate with hormone
treatment and mental health consultations, and had allowed her to live and dress as a woman, where the standard protocol for treatment of GID indicated that sex reassignment surgery might be necessary for individuals
who continued to present with severe GID after one year of hormone therapy and dressing as woman. The court
noted that the officials failed to evaluate the inmate concerning her suitability for surgery, despite her repeated
complaints as to the persistence of her symptoms and the inefficacy of her existing treatment. (Powhatan Correctional Center, and Buckingham Correctional Center, Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013). A female pretrial detainee brought an action under § 1983
against a corrections officer and various other officers at a jail after she had been sexually assaulted. The
district court denied the supervisory defendants' motion to dismiss and they appealed. The appeals court
reversed, finding that the detainee had to allege that the supervisory officers actually knew of a serious risk that
the offending officer posed, and that her complaint was insufficient to state a plausible claim that each
supervisory officer should have known of a substantial risk that the offending officer would sexually assault
her. (Shelby County Jail, Florida)

17.61

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2013). A sentenced female county jail prisoner
brought a § 1983 action against the county and others, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment in connection with two guards' conduct of having sexual intercourse with
her. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the county jail prisoner consented to engaging in sexual
intercourse with the two officers, and thus, the officers’ conduct could not support the prisoner's § 1983 Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim. The court noted that the prisoner admitted to talking to one officer about
her sexual fantasies and that she asked to have sex with him. She also admitted to allowing another officer to
look at her naked, she did nothing to indicate her lack of consent when the two officers entered her cell, when
they removed her clothing, or when they touched her. According to the court, there was no showing that the
prisoner's mental health issues negated her ability to consent or that the officers had any knowledge of the
prisoner's mental health issues. The officers had confessed and were fired immediately. (Logan County Jail,
Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that a
city police officer at the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic detainee could not be
held liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of detainee, who died
from diabetic ketoacidosis after she was taken to a county jail. The court also found that city police officers
who transported the detainee to the county jail, rather than a hospital, were not deliberately indifferent to the
serious medical needs of the detainee, where the officers were entitled to defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the scene. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious
risk to the health of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at
the jail involved medical care provided to an inmate, much less that medical care involved an inmate with diabetes, or that the sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical contractor had any adverse effect on
the detainee, as would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his individual capacity, for his alleged
deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The court found that the county's actions in
shutting off water to the mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's cell when the inmate was stuffing clothing into
the cell's toilet did not violate the detainee's 14th Amendment rights. According to the court, the estate's claim
against the county that the detainee, who died of diabetic ketoacidosis after allegedly refusing diabetic
treatment and food while incarcerated, was not properly treated for her mental illness and diabetes was not
actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act or the Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign Co. Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH
EQUAL PROTECTION
ACCESS TO COURT

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were
forced to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior
Court filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior
Court, alleging that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the Fifth
Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district court
granted summary judgment to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court found that the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock was at all times
a federal official acting under the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia could not be held
liable under § 1983 for the marshal's conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme gave the District of
Columbia no power to exercise authority over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal, and lacked the
discretion to stop sending pre-presentment arrestees to the marshal. According to the court, any Fourth
Amendment right that the former United States Marshal may have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on
minor charges to blanket strip searches was not clearly established at the time of any violation, and therefore
the marshal was entitled to qualified immunity on the detainees' claims alleging violations of their Fourth
Amendment rights. The court also found no evidence that the marshal purposefully directed that women should
be treated differently than men with respect to the strip-search policy at the Superior Court cellblock, in
violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (District of Columbia, United States Marshal
for the Superior Court)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Keele v. Glynn County, Ga.. 938 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee's estate brought an action
against a county, county sheriff, and officials at the county detention facility in their official and individual
capacities, alleging that, while detained, the detainee's access to necessary medical care was delayed or
deficient and that the delay or deficiency led to the detainee's death. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's
bruised or fractured ribs and rash were objectively serious medical needs, as required for the estate's deliberate
indifference claim against officials at the county detention facility under Fourteenth Amendment. According to
the court, a lay person would be alerted to the necessity of medical attention after the detainee lost control of
her bowels, began to hallucinate, vomited repeatedly, became pale and developed blisters inside her mouth, and
thus the detainee had an objectively serious medical need when the symptoms manifested, as required for the
estate's deliberate indifference claim against the officials.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
the nurse at the county detention facility was subjectively aware that the pretrial detainee faced a substantial
risk of serious harm, whether the nurse was more than grossly negligent in disregarding that risk of harm, and
whether the nurse's actions caused the detainee's injuries, including death. The court noted that a reasonable
nurse in the county detention facility nurse's position would have known that delaying provision of medical
care to a pretrial detainee with the detainee's symptoms, which included hallucinating, withdrawing from pain
medication, pale, vomiting, hives, complaining of feeling bad, and not eating, drinking, or getting up to do any

17.62

activity, violated her constitutional rights, and thus the nurse failed to establish an entitlement to qualified
immunity from deliberate indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, it was
clearly established that knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care
constituted deliberate indifference, and the law was clearly established that nearly half a day was too long to
fail to properly respond to a medical need. (Glynn County Detention Center, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
PREGNANCY
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). A female former prison inmate who was impregnated as a
result of her vocational-training instructor's unlawful sexual acts brought a § 1983 action against a former
warden and other Kansas Department of Corrections employees. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part, but denied qualified immunity for the former warden, who appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former prison inmate adequately alleged that the former warden
violated a clearly established constitutional right, precluding qualified immunity for the warden in the § 1983
action alleging that the warden was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse by the vocational-training
instructor. According to the court, the inmate alleged that the warden had knowledge of the abuse but failed to
properly investigate or terminate staff when abuse allegations were substantiated, and that the prison's structural
policy problems contributed to abuse by failing to address known problems with the vocational program or to
use cameras to monitor inmates and staff. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). A female former state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a private operator of a state prison, the warden, and corrections officers, alleging violation of her civil
rights arising under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state claims. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate’s complaint stated claims against the operator and the warden for violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment, and for First Amendment retaliation. The inmate alleged that the operator and the
warden engaged in practices of placing inmates who reported sexual abuse in segregation or otherwise
retaliating against them, violating its written policies by failing to report allegations of prison rape to outside
law enforcement, failing to conduct adequate internal investigations regarding rape allegations, and offering
financial incentives to prison employees for non-reporting of rape allegations. The inmate alleged that the
operator and the warden placed her in segregation for eight months because she reported a corrections officer's
rape and another officer's assault, that the operator and warden were aware of her complaints, and that her
placement in segregation was in close temporal proximity to the complaints. (New Mexico Women's
Correctional Facility, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DISCIPLINE
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
SPECIAL NEEDS

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983,
statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well
as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and
prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government
liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to
implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of
constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have
acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process
claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention
for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional
requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and
(4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process. The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district attorney under §
1983 by the detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers
such as bills of information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even
knowing what he was signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process. The court found a substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the
detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and
illegally held, the district attorney still failed to correct the mistakes that caused the detention, and to cover up
his failures in connection with the case, the district attorney made a conscious decision to bring belated charges
against the detainee. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison
officials under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she
was mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on
that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SEARCHES
TRANSSEXUAL

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender
woman, who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action
against the United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and
police officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection
with her arrests, and asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The
police chief, officer, and USMS defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
unlawful search claim, where a reasonable officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female
detainee by male USMS employees that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and
verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency,
was unreasonable. The court also found that the USMS marshals and the police officer were not entitled to

17.63

qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment conditions of confinement claim brought by the pretrial
detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee with male detainees and otherwise treating
her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that treating the female
detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and, therefore, would
know that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department, Sixth District Police Station and MPD's Central Cellblock, and United States Marshals Service)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE
SEARCHES

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). A female former prisoner brought
an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), a warden, and other DOC-associated
officers, doctors, and nurses, asserting violations of § 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and state law. The prisoner alleged that she underwent three separate amputations as a result of
inadequate health care by the defendants and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate
penological purpose. The district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on
their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims against them, and they appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court did not properly
evaluate the warden's qualified immunity defense to the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate
indifference to her serious medical needs, when it denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to
“defendants.,” The court held that remand was warranted for the court to conduct a particularized analysis of
whether the warden was deliberately indifferent to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement while in
quarantine. The court noted that the district court did not mention any facts in the record that specifically
pertained to the warden, nor did the court make any findings regarding the warden's knowledge or mental state.
According to the court, the prisoner established, for qualified immunity purposes, that the corrections officer
violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a strip search of her in her cell in view of other inmates
and prison personnel. The court noted that the officer received a reprimand for violating Department of
Corrections (DOC) rules by conducting the strip search in view of those not assisting in the search, the officer
allegedly refused to tell the prisoner her reasons for initiating the search, and smirked during the search, which
suggested personal animus and implicated the prisoner's dignitary interest. The court found that the female
prisoner's right not to be subjected to a suspicionless strip search in full view of others absent a legitimate
penological justification was clearly established, for purposes of the female corrections officer's qualified
immunity defense. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Valade v. City of New York, 949 F.Supp.2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought § 1983 and state law
actions against police officers and a city. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment
excessive force claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a police officer used
excessive force against the arrestee by handcuffing her too tightly and shoving her into a police car. The court
also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee was sexually assaulted while she was in
police custody following her arrest. (New York City Police Department, Central Booking)

U.S. Appeals Court
PREGNANCY
RESTRAINTS

Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). An Immigration detainee filed
a § 1983 action against a metropolitan government alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs
after she was shackled during the final stages of labor and post-partum recovery. The district court entered
judgment in the detainee's favor. A jury awarded the detainee $200,000 in damages. The defendants appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment should not have been
granted by the district court, where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the pregnant
immigration detainee presented a flight risk, whether the officers who accompanied her to the hospital when
she went into labor were aware of the hospital's no restraint order, and whether the detainee was at risk of
physical or psychological harm as a result of being shackled. The appeals court also found genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the hospital prescribed a breast pump to allow the detainee to express her breast
milk postpartum, and whether a layperson would recognize the need to provide the detainee with a breast
pump. (Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Davison County Sheriff's Office,
Tennessee)
2014

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F.Supp.3d 113 (D.Mass. 2014). A former female inmate and current female inmates
brought a class action against a sheriff and an assistant superintendent pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the
policy of permitting male officers to videotape female inmates being strip-searched violated the Fourth
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary
judgment. The district court granted the inmates’ motion and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held
that strip searches of female inmates being transferred to a segregation unit while male officers conducted
videotaping in the vicinity were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the
officers actually viewed the inmates, where the inmate being searched was fully aware that a male officer was
videotaping her, the officer was within the inmate's view just a few feet away, the inmate was required to strip
and manipulate her body in the officer's presence, including lifting her breasts and spreading her legs, and the
videotaping by male officers was not limited to urgent situations. The court found that the policy did not have a
reasonable relationship with a legitimate penological interest, and therefore, the policy was unconstitutional in
violation of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the inmates, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed
the inmates. The court noted that the policy of using males to tape searches applied to all strip searches upon
transfer, not just emergencies, the prison did not have staffing problems, permitting males to tape the searches
did not enhance employment opportunities, and the policy did not provide for alternatives. According to the
court, clearly established law prohibited male officers from viewing female inmates during a strip search, and

17.64

therefore, the sheriff and assistant superintendent were not entitled to qualified immunity in female inmates' §
1983 class action. (Western Regional Women's Correctional Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
WORK RELEASE

Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). Five female inmates brought a § 1983 action against
state officials and employees, alleging they were subjected to sexual abuse while working outside a community
corrections center in which they were housed, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmates were
participating in the Prisoner Public Works Program (“PPWP”) that allowed offenders to work off-site at
different state offices. They were working during the day doing grounds maintenance at the Oklahoma
Governor's Mansion, where they were supervised by a groundskeeper and his immediate supervisor. When
inmates work at places such as the Governor's Mansion, the DOC does not have a guard stay with the women at
the work site. Instead, they are supervised by state workers employed at the work site, who function like
guards. These individuals go through an eight hour training program. The inmate claimed that they were
sexually harassed and sexually assaulted by the groundskeeper and by a cook employed at the Governor's
Mansion.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether
prison guards were deliberately indifferent. The court held that: (1) the prison district supervisor did not have
knowledge of a substantial risk of harm to the inmates because the supervisor did not know that the inmates
were working only with males while off-site; (2) the supervisor was not deliberately indifferent; (3) the prison
supervising case manager was not deliberately indifferent; and (4) there was no evidence that the employee had
supervisory authority over the inmate. The court noted that the inmate did not return to the work assignment
where she was allegedly abused by state employees or have contact with the alleged abusers, as required for
the continuing violation doctrine to apply to her § 1983 action that alleged violations of the 8th Amendment.
According to the court, despite the supervisor being aware of misconduct by a groundskeeper under his
supervision, the supervisor was aware that the groundskeeper violated certain policies, but did not have
knowledge of the sexual assaults, and he investigated the groundskeeper's conduct and counseled the
groundskeeper. The court also found that the prison supervising case manager, who oversaw the off-site public
works program, was not deliberately indifferent to the excessive risk of sexual assaults of female inmates
working at the governor's mansion as part of the program, where the inmates did not complain to the manager
and the manager was never informed of misconduct. (Hillside Community Corrections Center, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2014). A female pretrial detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, and medical services contractor, alleging the defendants failed to provide adequate medical
treatment for the detainee's diabetes in violation of her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois law. After several of the estate's claims were
dismissed, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants on the estate's remaining claims. The
estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
district court abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the wrongful death claim brought by the
detainee's estate for failure to include an affidavit and written report confirming the claim's merit, where the
court made no specific finding that failure to include an affidavit and report was in bad faith or an attempt to
delay litigation, and its conclusion that the estate could not timely file an amended complaint because the
statute of limitations had lapsed failed to take into account the possibility that an amendment would relate back
to the estate's initial, timely complaint. The court found that the county sheriff's lack of a written policy or
procedure for diabetic detainees whose blood sugar was not being measured and who refused to eat did not
amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs in violation of her due process
rights. According to the court, the deaths of seven correctional facility inmates and a single incident of an
inmate complaining about his diabetes treatment were insufficient to put the sheriff on notice that his lack of a
policy could cause the death of a detainee as a result of diabetic ketoacidosis, as none of the deaths were caused
by complications from diabetes. (Champaign County Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE

Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought an action against the Massachusetts
Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the DOC's refusal to provide male-to-female sex reassignment
surgery (SRS) to treat the inmate's gender identity disorder (GID) constituted inadequate medical care and
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court granted an injunction requiring the DOC to provide SRS, and the DOC appealed. The appeals
court reversed. The court held that the DOC's decision not to provide SRS to treat the inmate's GID was not
sufficiently harmful to the inmate so as to violate the Eighth Amendment, and the DOC was not deliberately
indifferent in refusing to provide SRS. The court noted that the DOC continued to provide all ameliorative
measures to the inmate, in addition to antidepressants and psychotherapy. The DOC solicited the opinion of
multiple medical professionals, and the DOC's concerns about safety and security, including the provision of
safe housing options for the inmate after SRS, were reasonable, according to the court. (Massachusetts
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PREGNANCY
MEDICAL CARE

Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa. 2014). An inmate who was seven and one-half months
into a “high risk” pregnancy brought an action under § 1983 against a county for deliberate indifference to her
health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and survival and
wrongful death claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the loss of the child following a
placental abruption. The county moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
prisoner: (1) stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to monitor the unborn child after the prisoner
complained of vaginal bleeding; (2) stated a claim against the county based on custom and practice; (3)
sufficiently alleged a causal link between the policies and the loss of the child; (4) stated a claim against county

17.65

officials for individual liability; and (5) stated wrongful death and survivor claims for the death of the child.
The inmate alleged that individual policy makers, including the chief operating officer of the county jail’s
health services, and the jail’s nursing supervisor, were responsible for the policies that led to failure to provide
adequate medical treatment. The prisoner also alleged that she was made to wait over 24 hours before being
sent to a hospital after her vaginal bleeding started, that she was transported by a police cruiser rather than
ambulance, that it was well known that bleeding late in pregnancy often indicated serious medical issues, that
the child was alive during birth, and that the delay in medical treatment contributed to the injuries during birth
and the death of the child shortly after birth. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Poore v. Glanz, 46 F.Supp.3d 1191 (N.D.Okla. 2014). A juvenile female held as an inmate in the medical unit
of a county jail brought an action against the county and the county sheriff in his individual capacity under §
1983 alleging deliberate indifference to her health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment, based on an alleged failure to prevent a detention officer's repeated sexual assaults.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the county sheriff was
aware of the risk of sexual assault by detention officers as to female inmates housed in the medical unit of the
county jail, and whether he failed to take steps to alleviate that risk. The court also found a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the county jail had a policy and practice of housing juvenile female inmates in a
wing of the medical unit which was not under direct supervision and was frequently single-staffed, such that it
placed those inmates at a substantial risk of sexual assault by jail staff. (Tulsa County Jail, also called the David
L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.Supp.3d 569 (W.D.Va. 2014). Female inmates brought a § 1983 action alleging that a
correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care and that Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Corrections (VDOC) officials were deliberately indifferent to that failure, in violation of the inmates’ Eighth
Amendment rights. The inmates moved for class certification. The district court held that class certification was
warranted under the subsection of the class action rule pertaining to cases where predominantly injunctive or
declaratory relief was appropriate. The court found that the proposed class of approximately 1,200 female
inmates housed at the state correctional facility who were subject to its medical care system was sufficiently
large, on its face, to satisfy the size requirement for class certification, and that the “commonality” requirement
for class certification was met. The court noted that one of the questions of fact was whether the VDOC
medical contract system permitted improper cost considerations to interfere with the treatment of serious
medical conditions. (Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women, Commonwealth of Virginia Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Scott v. Clarke, 64 F.Supp.3d 813 (W.D.Va. 2014). Prisoners brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging failure to provide adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted the prisoners’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the state department of
corrections has a non-delegable duty to provide prisoners with medical care that meets constitutional minimum
standards; (2) the prisoners had serious medical needs; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the prisoners’ serious medical needs. The court
noted that the prisoners serious medical needs included: (1) one prisoner who had sarcoidosis, which was a
potentially life-threatening chronic inflammatory disease that could affect the body’s vital organs; (2) another
prisoner had Hepatitis C; (3) another prisoner had severely deformed ingrown toenail that made it difficult to
walk when inflamed and infected, and she was profoundly hearing impaired; and (4) a final prisoner suffered
from various medical problems, including degenerative disc disease affecting her neck and spine, bi-lateral
carpal tunnel syndrome in her wrists, a bladder condition causing constant incontinence, and chronic kidney
disease. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
the decision by prison officials to favor lower contract costs over the likely quality of resulting care was
deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ serious medical needs. (Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women,
Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
SPECIAL NEEDS

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 22 F.Supp.3d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A female former prisoner,
who was a double amputee, brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and
various MDOC-associated officers and healthcare professionals, asserting violations of § 1983, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state law. The prisoner alleged failure to provide adequate health care and
accommodations for disabled individuals. The district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a
corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand the district court held that: (1) a fact
question as to whether the warden was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm existed precluded summary judgment, and (2) it was clearly established that
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constituted the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain proscribed by Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that she acquired MRSA following the
amputation of her left leg. As a result of her condition, her housing assignment at the facility was changed from
the infirmary to the segregation unit. The prisoner alleged that there was an absence of handicap facilities
within this unit, that she was unable to safely transfer from her wheelchair to the bed or toilet, and that she was
allowed only one shower during the two weeks while housed in segregation. (Huron Valley Women's
Correctional Facility, Michigan)

17.66

2015
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
PRIVACY

Blanco v. County of Kings, 142 F.Supp.3d 986 (E.D. Cal. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a
county, city, and county and city law enforcement officers alleging violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983, stemming from an alleged cross gender strip search at a county
jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the female arrestee sufficiently alleged that a male law enforcement officer's entering a room
while she was still undressed following a strip search at the county jail, in order to interrogate her further, and
in absence of a compelling interest or emergency, violated her right to privacy, as required to state claim under
§ 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that the
officer’s conduct in entering the room was outrageous, willful, and intended to cause her mental anguish that
directly and proximately caused the arrestee severe and protracted emotional distress likely to result in a
“permanent disability,” as required to state a claim under the California law for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED). (City of Lemoore Police Department, Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SUICIDE

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under §
1983 against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers
violated the detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental
health history and safety, to her safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a
looped shoelace from her cell. The court noted that the detainee was not identified as a suicide risk, the officers
did not have access to the detainee’s medical records, the officers were not trained to make suicide assessments,
and the detainee’s risk of suicide was not so obvious that someone other than a professional could have
recognized the risk. The court noted that even if an expert’s report prepared for the plaintiff had been filed on
time, the report would have been excluded due to the expert’s lack of qualifications. According to the court, the
expert only pointed to national statistics as support for his opinion that the detainee possessed predisposing
characteristics that made her an obvious risk for suicide, and the expert’s opinions that the officers were
improperly trained and a reasonable mental health clinician would have deemed the detainee to pose a suicide
risk were irrelevant. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER
HYGIENE
SEARCHES
PRIVACY
MEDICAL CARE

Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a §
1983 action in state court against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC), the former New Jersey
Attorney General, the New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, a correctional sergeant, and various other
correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the defendants violated her constitutional rights when they
transferred her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing,
sanitary napkins, and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Attorney General, Commissioner of Corrections, and correctional sergeant, and
dismissed the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part
and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) NJDOC’s policies regarding custodial placements and the Due
Process Clause did not give the prisoner a liberty interest in being housed in a particular institution, as required
to support a due process claim based on the prisoner’s transfers among custodial facilities; (2) allegations that
correctional officers deprived the prisoner of potable water were sufficiently serious so as to reach level of an
Eighth Amendment violation; (3) allegations that correctional officers forced her to walk down a staircase and
hallway naked in plain view of male prison personnel and inmates to reach a shower were sufficiently serious
so as to reach the level of Eighth Amendment violation; (4) allegations that she was denied her sanitary napkins
and medication for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps were sufficiently serious so as to reach the level
of an Eighth Amendment violation; and (5) the prisoner plausibly alleged that a correctional officer maliciously
searched her body cavities, as required to state a claim against the officer for using excessive force in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner alleged facts demonstrating that a cavity search was not routine,
that the cavity search was conducted in a manner that violated New Jersey regulations, and alleged that the
cavity search was so painful that during the search prisoner cracked a molar while clenching her teeth. The
court noted that a state has broad authority to confine an inmate in any of its institutions, and thus, courts
recognize that a state’s authority to place inmates anywhere within the prison system is among a wide spectrum
of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the
federal courts. (Garrett House Residential Community Release Facility, Edna Mahan Correctional Facility,
New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015). A special needs inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
county sheriff and detention officers, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate indifference to the
risk of assault. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and dismissed in part. The district
court held that undisputed record facts blatantly contradicted the district court’s factual determination, in
denying summary judgment based on qualified immunity. According to the court, the detention officer who left
his post in the jail’s medical unit to deliver a gurney during a medical emergency was entitled to qualified
immunity from the special needs inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim arising from her sexual assault by a fellow
inmate while in the unit’s tub room. The court noted that the officer had no subjective knowledge of the risk of
assault to the inmate, and left believing the inmate was in a locked room under the supervision of another
officer. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma)

17.67

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F.Supp.3d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, asserting claims for violation of her Free Exercise Clause rights under the First Amendment, the
Religious Land and Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, alleging that she was prohibited from attending religious services. The officials moved to dismiss the
action. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegation that prison officials prevented her from attending religious services was sufficient to support a claim
for violation of the Equal Protection Clause. According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that a prison
official prevented her from attending two religious services “because of her hair” and because of “her
sexuality,” while other prisoners in the facility were not prevented from attending those services, was sufficient
to allege that she was treated differently from others similarly situated, as required to support a claim that
prison officials discriminated against her in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted that there
was no legitimate penological interest that would be served by denying the prisoner the right to attend religious
services based on her hair and/or sexuality. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Nagy v. Corrections Corporation of America, 79 F.Supp.3d 114 (D.D.C. 2015). A female detainee brought an
action in the District of Columbia Superior Court against the operator of a correctional facility, alleging
negligence, negligent supervision, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The operator moved the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the motion, finding that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to: (1) whether the operator caused the detainee’s injuries stemming from a second alleged assault by
failing to follow up on the first alleged assault by guards at the correctional facility; (2) whether the detainee
was injured by outrageous behavior of the guards; (3) whether the guards negligently handled the detainee, and
(4) whether this negligence physically injured the detainee. The detainee alleged that she was abused almost
immediately upon arrival at the facility, when two correctional officers grabbed her by the arms, took her to a
locked cell, and threw her against the commode. She alleged that she landed sideways on her back, and that the
officers kicked her on her right side, broke her ribs, and bruised her body. She reported the incident to
corrections officials. Six days later, she was once again allegedly assaulted “by staff and officers.” She showed
her injuries to a doctor who observed bruises on her buttocks and hips “of varying stages, none that appeared
newer than 2–3 days old with some yellowing and fading.” (Correctional Treatment Facility, Corrections Corp.
of America, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL

Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate filed a § 1983 action
against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender
dysphoria, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court issued a preliminary injunction ordering
the officials to provide the inmate with sex reassignment surgery, and the officials appealed. The injunction
was stayed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate’s release from prison rendered
the action moot, and remand was warranted for determination of whether her release while her appeal was
pending was the result of the officials’ actions. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a §
1983 action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s
gender dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the officials were
deliberately indifferent to her medical needs and deprived her of her right to equal protection under the law
when they denied her sex reassignment surgery. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated
a claim for prospective injunctive relief; (2) the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim based on denial of the request for sex reassignment surgery; (3) the inmate stated an equal protection
claim; but (4) the inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial of
a request for a legal name change. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a §
1983 action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s
gender dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved to strike expert testimony and for a
preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide her with sex reassignment surgery (SRS). The
defendants moved for judicial notice. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The
district court found that the expert report of a psychiatrist retained by the officials and medical staff would not
be stricken for failure to comply with the requirements for disclosure of expert qualifications, and that the
expert was qualified to testify regarding prison culture and the treatment that incarcerated persons with gender
dysphoria should receive. The court noted that notwithstanding years of treatment in the form of hormone
therapy and counseling, the inmate continued to experience severe psychological pain, and that the treating and
examining psychologists agreed the inmate met the eligibility criteria for SRS under the standards of care for
treating transsexual patients. The court held that: (1) the inmate was likely to succeed on the merits of the
Eighth Amendment claim; (2) the inmate was suffering irreparable harm that would likely continue absent a
preliminary injunction; (3) the balance of equities weighed in favor of granting an injunction; (4) it was in the
public interest to grant an injunction; and (5) an injunction would meet the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103 (D.N.M. 2015). A female prison inmate brought an action under § 1983
for numerous violations of her constitutional rights, including under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments against employees of the contractor that operated the correctional facility, and against the
contractor under the theory of vicarious liability, for alleged physical and sexual assault by employees while
she was incarcerated. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the

17.68

motion. The court held that the “aided-in-agency” theory of vicarious liability applied to the female prison
inmate’s claims under § 1983 against the contractor after the contractor’s employee repeatedly sexually
assaulted the inmate. According to the court, the employee’s relationship with the inmate by virtue of his
employment conferred “extraordinary power” upon him, the employee’s authority to do as he wished appeared
to be delegated to him, and the inmate was unlikely to be able to successfully complain about the employee’s
actions. The court noted that the issue of whether the employer was vicariously liable for the employee’s
repeated rape and sexual assault of the inmate was for a jury to decide in the inmate’s claim under § 1983 for
violations of numerous constitutional rights, including the right to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (New Mexico Women’s Correctional Facility, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county,
county sheriff, and jail officers alleging that she was subjected to an unreasonable search, that her right to
freedom of speech was violated, and that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the unreasonable search claim, and after a jury verdict, in the
officers’ favor on the remaining claims, and denied the detainee’s motion for a new trial. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the officers did not violate the detainee’s Fourth Amendment
rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. According to the court, it was objectively
reasonable for county jail officers to believe that the pretrial detainee presented a risk of harm to herself if she
was permitted to retain strings on her clothing, and thus the officers did not violate her Fourth Amendment
rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. The court noted that the detainee refused to
respond to medical screening questions, refused to comply with a female officer’s instruction to change into an
orange jumpsuit while male officers were outside the holding cell, and acted aggressively toward the male
officers when they entered. The officers restrained the detainee face down on her stomach and covered her with
a paper suit while the female officer removed her clothing. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSSEXUAL
GID- Gender Identity
Disorder
MEDICAL CARE

Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2015). A transgender inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by their deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs. The district court dismissed the action without leave to amend. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate’s complaint, alleging that she suffered from severe gender
dysphoria for which male-to-female sexual reassignment surgery (SRS) was the medically necessary treatment,
but that prison officials refused to provide the surgery, stated a cause of action under Eighth Amendment.
(Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a
county and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation
of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, following his wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail
employee was entitled to qualified immunity; (2) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to
whether the jail employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3) the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention
training policy, where employees were required to attend training to learn about suicide risk detection and
prevention methods, and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face suicide checks
with detainees; (4) the county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5) a fact issue existed as to
whether the county had an unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary judgment. The court
noted that it was not clearly established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon
other duties to ensure that suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly established that the
employee was prohibited from providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,” since the
employee was not aware of any other suicides in that cell.
According to the court, the jail cell entry policy prohibiting jail employees from entering a cell alone did not
amount to training employees to be deliberately indifferent to the needs of detainees, and was not causally
related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county was not liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to
detainee health. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
HYGIENE
MEDICAL CARE
SEARCHES

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
sheriff, and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to
unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly
invasive searches. The detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the
detention facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail
conditions imposed on the detainee, including permitting the detainee, who was incarcerated for 32 days, to
shower only three times, only permitting the detainee outside of her cell for recreation on one occasion, failing
to clean her cell, failing to provide the detainee with clean clothing, and depriving the detainee of food,
amounted to punishment.
The court also found fact issues as to whether the county sheriff’s deputies’ manner of conducting a visual
body cavity search of the female pretrial detainee on three occasions exhibited exaggerated and excessive force,
and was vindictive or harassing, precluding summary judgment on the detainee’s § 1983 Fourth Amendment
unlawful search claim against the deputies.
The court found that there was no evidence that county jail employees’ alleged failure to adequately treat
the detainee’s blood condition caused her measurable harm, where there was no indication that the alleged
denial of treatment caused the detainee any physical pain, or that any mental anguish the detainee suffered was

17.69

related to denial of her medication.
The court denied summary judgment to the defendants on the detainee’s claim that she was denied dental
treatment. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
PREGNANCY
MEDICAL CARE
TRANSFER

White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2015). A pregnant county prisoner brought a civil rights action under
§ 1983 against a county sheriff’s office, alleging violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging deliberate
indifference to her need for proper prenatal care and prompt transport to a hospital for delivery of her baby
while she was in their temporary custody. The county moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that no administrative remedies
were available, and thus the prisoner did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies under the requirements of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that the delay in her transport to the hospital contributed
to her baby’s birth defects. According to the court, the prisoner had no opportunity to grieve the delay in
transport until after the harm was done, the prisoner was uninformed about any deadline for filing a grievance,
the prisoner would not have known that she would be transferred to another jail four days after returning from
the hospital, and the prisoner could not have filed a grievance after she was transferred. (Kankakee County Jail,
Illinois)

17.70

U.S. District Court
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Page v. Kirby, 314 F.Supp.2d 619 (N.D.W.Va. 2004). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.Ind. 2004). Death row inmates at a state prison

challenging his conditions of confinement. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that
private corporations that provided food and medical services at a state prison were not subject to
liability under § 1983, absent an allegation that the inmate's constitutional rights were denied
because of a corporation's policy or custom. (Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

brought a § 1983 action in state court, alleging that a 79-day lockdown of the death row area
violated their constitutional rights. The lockdown had been implemented after a death row
inmate was killed during recreation, apparently by other death row inmates. The court held that
ceasing, for security reasons, allowing religious volunteers into the death row unit for group
religious services and for spiritual discussions during the lockdown did not violate the inmates'
First Amendment right to practice their religion. (Indiana State Prison)
2005

U.S. District Court
SERVING

Atkins v. County of Orange, 372 F.Supp.2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Jail inmates brought a § 1983
action against a county and corrections officers, alleging indifference to their mental health needs
and mistreatment. The defendants moved to preclude expert witness testimony and for partial
summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part and denied it in part.
The court found that the alleged act of serving food to a jail inmate on a napkin or paper towel on
one occasion did not amount to a constitutional deprivation. (Orange County Correctional Facility
and County Commissioner of Mental Health, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Baird v. Alameida, 407 F.Supp.2d 1134 (C.D.Cal. 2005). A insulin-dependent diabetic inmate
brought a civil rights action against state prison officials claiming they acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs by requiring the prison to serve a “Heart Healthy” diet
to all inmates and failing to make provisions for therapeutic outpatient diets. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The court held that the inmate was provided
with a diet that was medically appropriate for diabetics and that the diet had not been shown to
be the cause of the inmate’s diabetic complications. (Wasco State Prison, California Men’s Colony,
and Avenal State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80 (D.Mass. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil
rights action against employees of a state corrections department alleging violation of his right to
practice his Muslim religion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the defendant failed to establish
that the prisoner’s religious beliefs were not sincerely held, noting that although the prisoner had
a long history of pro se litigation, he might have been both litigious and religiously observant.
According to the court, the fact that the prisoner first sought a pork-free diet and four months
later sought a vegetarian diet could have suggested an evolution of his beliefs, and not
“backsliding” or nonobservance of religious tenets. According to the court, summary judgment
was barred by genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the denial of the prisoner’s
request for a vegetarian diet was reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns. The court
also denied qualified immunity for the officials who provided a pork-free diet but allegedly
refused his request for the vegetarian diet. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar
Junction)

against corrections officials, alleging that they refused to let him out of his cell for meals and
showers because he refused to comply with a rule that required prisoners to stow certain items
while outside of their cells. The rule requires inmates to store certain of their belongings in a
storage box in their cells, to enhance fire safety, facilitate cell searches, and otherwise promote
safety and security. The inmate missed meals because he refused to comply with the rule. The
district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that enforcing the stowage rule by forbidding exit from the cell was not
cruel and unusual punishment, since the inmate had the option of simply complying with the
rule. According to the court, the rule was a valid means of promoting the safety and security of
the prison. (Illinois)

2006
U.S. District Court
SANITATION
SERVING

XX

Carr v. Whittenburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 925 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action

against prison officials, alleging retaliation for filing a prison grievance regarding food handling
by the security staff and the inmate cell house workers. The court held that genuine issues of
material fact as to the intent and motive of the prison officials precluded summary judgment. The
grievance alleged that the Unit Superintendent allowed his security staff and the inmate cell
house workers to act as food handlers in the absence of required medical staff approval and
appropriate sanitation apparel, in violation of Illinois Department of Corrections policies.

18.21

(Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
FOOD QUALITY

Dickens v. Taylor, 464 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2006). A prisoner filed a civil rights action against

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against

various corrections defendants, alleging unlawful conditions of confinement and excessive force.
The district court dismissed the claims. The court held that: (1) placement of the prisoner in
isolation for not more than two months at a time did not implicate a liberty interest; (2) neither
Delaware law nor Department of Corrections regulations created a due process liberty interest in
a prisoner’s classification within an institution, and the prisoner had no property or liberty
interest in the prison classification program or his housing assignment; (3) the prisoner failed to
state an equal protection claim based on the allegation that a majority of the inmates in the
special housing unit were black; (4) the denial of the disciplined prisoner’s television privilege did
not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim since television privileges did not constitute
necessities; and (5) the failure to serve brand name cereals and cold fresh water during meal time
were not an Eighth Amendment violation. (Delaware Correctional Center)
prison officials, alleging that a behavioral modification program imposed on him violated his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding
that fact issues precluded summary judgment. According to the court, there were fact issues as to
whether the prisoner, who was subjected to a behavioral modification program, was denied the
minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and whether prison officials acted with disregard of
a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner. The appeals court opinion opened with the
following statement. “Stripped naked in a small prison cell with nothing except a toilet; forced to

sleep on a concrete floor or slab; denied any human contact; fed nothing but ‘nutri-loaf’; and given
just a modicum of toilet paper-four squares-only a few times. Although this might sound like a
stay at a Soviet gulag in the 1930s, it is, according to the claims in this case, Wisconsin in 2002.
Whether these conditions are, as a matter of law, only “uncomfortable, but not unconstitutional”
as the State contends, is the issue we consider in this case.” The facility is an all-segregation

facility, designed to house recalcitrant inmates. At the time at issue in this case, the facility used
a five-level system of inmate classification, with Level One being the most restrictive. All inmates
were placed in Level One upon their arrival at the prison. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility at
Boscobel)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Madison v. Riter, 411 F.Supp.2d 645 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner brought an action against

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). A detainee brought an action pursuant to
Bivens and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that federal prison officials

XX

prison officials and others under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), challenging the denial of his requests for kosher meals. The district court found that
the applicable RLUIPA section increasing the level of protection of prisoners' religious rights
violated the Establishment Clause and the prisoner appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. On remand, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss which was dismissed by the
court. The district court held that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Clause
authority and that Congress' use of its Spending Clause authority was in pursuit of “the general
Welfare.” The court held that the RLUIPA conditions were related to federal interests and that
conditioning the award of federal corrections funds on a state's compliance with RLUIPA was not
coercive. According to the court, the federal corrections funding conditions imposed upon states
through RLUIPA did not violate the Tenth Amendment and the state waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity to the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA. The court also held
that the “common fare diet” available to prison inmates upon approval from the appropriate
prison authorities would satisfy the inmate’s religious dietary needs and allow him to celebrate
Passover. (Bland Correction Center, Virginia)

subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to accommodate his religious needs. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The district court
held that: the warden of the federal penitentiary at which the detainee was held was not liable for
alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion; the detainee failed to show
that officials served him pork in violation of his right to free exercise of religion; qualified
immunity shielded the officials from liability to the extent that their alleged failure to inform the
detainee that he was being served pork substitutes violated his right to free exercise of religion;
prison officials did not violate the detainee's free exercise rights by not informing him of the time
so that he could pray at appropriate times of day; officials' refusal to hold three of the detainee's
meals during Ramadan did not violate his free exercise rights; allegations that prison officials
mocked the detainee's religion at most asserted a de minimis violation of the detainee's free
exercise rights; and, the detainee did not establish a violation of his rights under RFRA.
According to the court, allegations that the Muslim detainee asked his case manager at the
federal penitentiary for a clock so that the he would know when to say his prayers, and that the
case manager said “You think this is going to work?” after the detainee was praying, sufficiently
alleged the case manager's personal participation in alleged violations of the detainee's right to

18.22

free exercise of religion. (United States Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)
U.S. District Court
RELIGION DIET

Porter v. Caruso, 431 F.Supp.2d 768 (W.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed an action alleging that prison
officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by refusing to refer to him by his new legal name, and
by denying his request to be placed on a kosher meal plan. The officials moved to dismiss and the district court
held that dismissal of the inmate's exhausted claims was not warranted. The inmate asserted that he was an
adherent of an ancient Egyptian religion known as Kemetic Spiritual Science, and that as part of his religious
faith he legally changed his name. The inmate alleged that corrections officials repeatedly failed to comply with
their own policy directives and forced him to refer to himself by his former name. The inmate also asserted that
the dietary requirements of his religion are comparable to those observed in the Jewish faith and he requested to
be placed on the kosher meal plan, but the officials denied his request. (Michigan Department of Corrections)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007). A Jewish inmate incarcerated in a Texas prison brought a
cause of action under § 1983, challenging prison policies that affected his ability to participate in Sabbath and
Jewish holiday services and to eat a kosher diet. He alleged that these policies violated his free exercise and
equal protection rights, as well as rights accorded to him under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that: (1) prison policies on the
availability of religious services to the less than 1% of the prison population practicing the Jewish faith, which
resulted in the inmate’s being denied weekly Sabbath and other holy day services when a rabbi or approved
volunteer was not present, did not violate the inmate’s free exercise rights; (2) prison officials’ failure to provide
kosher meals did not violate the inmate’s free exercise rights; (3) it was not a violation of the inmate’s equal
protection rights for prison officials to consider the demand and needs of groups requesting access to the prison
chapel; (4) refusal to allow the Jewish inmates to congregate for religious services when a rabbi or outside
volunteer was not available did not place a “substantial burden” on the inmate’s free exercise of religion; and (5)
“compelling governmental interests” supported the decision by prison officials not to provide the kosher meals.
According to the court, the inmate retained the ability to participate in alternative means of exercising his
religious beliefs, including the ability to worship in his cell using religious materials and the ability to access the
chapel and the lockers containing religious materials on certain days and times. The inmate had the option of
receiving vegetarian or pork-free meals and prison officials had a legitimate governmental interest in running a
simplified food service rather than a full-scale restaurant. The court found that it was not a violation of the
Jewish inmate’s equal protection rights for prison officials to consider demand and need of groups requesting
access to the prison chapel, along with space and staffing limitations, in deciding where religious groups would
be allowed to conduct their services, and the mere fact that other religious groups may have enjoyed greater
access to the chapel than the Jewish inmates, who constituted less than 1% of the prison population, was not
constitutionally impermissible. The court noted that there were “compelling governmental interests” within the
meaning of RLUIPA, that supported the decision of the prison officials not to provide kosher meals to its Jewish
inmates and to require them to chose vegetarian or pork-free meals instead; the administrative and budgetary
interests at stake could not be achieved by any different or lesser means. (Huntsville Unit, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Foster v. Elyea, 496 F.Supp.2d 951 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator, on behalf of a deceased inmate,
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their failure to provide the inmate with prescribed
medication, treatment, diet, or exercise opportunities hastened his death or caused him great emotional distress.
The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the allegations of the special administrator stated an Eighth Amendment claim that employees were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs. The administrator alleged that the employees
knew that the inmate faced a risk of death if he did not receive his prescribed medication, treatment, diet, and
exercise for his type two diabetes, high blood pressure, and congestive heart failure, but that department of
corrections employees personally involved in delivering medical services to the inmate failed to provide those
things to him. (Statesville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SANITATION

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging
deprivations of his speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
dismissed some of the claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining claims. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that his health was
placed at risk by an allegedly malfunctioning dishwasher that left particles of food on his plate at dinner failed to
state an Eighth Amendment claim. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison employee had
failed to provide a purported atlas that he had ordered, on security grounds, were insufficient to state a First
Amendment violation where the prisoner did not provide a description, title or other identifying information for
the book. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that the prison refused to allow him to speak to the public
at large by placing advertisements in newspapers was insufficient to state a claim for violation of his First
Amendment free speech rights where the prisoner did not provide the content of the advertisements. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Guzzi v. Thompson, 470 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2007). A state prisoner brought a suit challenging the denial of
his request for a kosher diet. The court held that the prisoner failed to show the likelihood of success on the
merits of his claim that keeping kosher was a protected religious exercise under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for an Orthodox Catholic, precluding preliminary injunctive relief.
According to the court, the prisoner was not likely to succeed in demonstrating that a kosher diet, separate from

XXII

18.23

the practice of Judaism, was a protected religious activity under RLUIPA. On appeal (2008 WL 2059321) the
appeals court reversed and remanded. (MCI-Shirley, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
TEMPERATURE
NUTRITION

Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka, 485 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee sued various prison officials
and medical care providers under § 1983, claiming violations of a variety of his constitutional rights. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainee did not suffer a violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was allegedly served cold food and two nutritionally deficient
breakfasts. According to the court, merely serving food cold did not present a serious risk of harm or an
immediate danger to the health of the detainee, and while he had significant pre-existing health problems, there
was no indication that those conditions were caused or exacerbated by the diet provided. (Alvin S. Glenn
Detention Center, South Carolina)
2008

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Bey v. Douglas County Correctional Facility, 540 F.Supp.2d 1194 (D.Kan. 2008). A prisoner brought an action
against prison officials for violation of his constitutional rights. Following denial of his prior motion the prisoner
filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion, finding that the prisoner
was entitled to a preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to provide him with Kosher food in accordance
with his sincerely held Jewish faith. The court found that irreparable harm was shown because the prisoner's
claim was for violation of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. According to the court, the harm
to prison officials if the injunction was issued was de minimus, and there was no hardship to the public in view
of the fact that the prison was under an agreement with a food supplier that carried Kosher foods. (Douglas
County Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Campbell v. Cornell Corrections of Rhode Island, Inc., 564 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.R.I. 2008). A former inmate
brought a § 1983 action against a privately-owned correction facility and corrections employees, alleging
violations of his rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. The district court denied summary judgment in
part. The court held that failure to serve the inmate a vegetarian diet consistent with his religious beliefs did not
constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, absent an allegation that the prison failed to provide the inmate with
food that was adequate in quantity, nutritional value or in any other respect. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison's refusal to provide the
inmate a vegetarian diet consistent with his religious beliefs was reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. (Wyatt Detention Facility, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Dean v. Corrections Corp. of America, 540 F.Supp.2d 691 (N.D.Miss. 2008). An Hawai’i inmate housed in a
private correctional facility in Mississippi brought a pro se suit claiming violation of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate alleged that he was deprived of a diet that conformed with
his religion and a magistrate had recommended that an injunction be entered ordering the facility to provide a
religious diet to the inmate. The district court held that the Hawai’I Department of Public Safety was responsible
for a program or activity that placed a burden on the inmate's exercise of his religion, and the court thus had
jurisdiction to hear the inmate's RLUIPA claims because the state received federal financial assistance. The court
noted that the Hawai’i Department of Public Safety entered into a contract with a private corrections corporation
to take custody of various Hawai'i inmates, such that the corporation was an instrumentality of the Department.
The court held that the inmate alleged and proved no more than a de minimis injury from violations of his right
to free exercise of religion, and thus, was only entitled to nominal damages in his action. (Tallahatchie County
Correctional Facility, Corrections Corp. of America, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal
protection rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered
judgment for the inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with
respect to the grooming policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding nominal damages, as limited by PLRA, of $1,500 for the
prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals, which amounted to $1.44 for each
constitutional violation. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
award punitive damages for the prison officials' constitutional violation of failing to provide Kosher meals. The
district court accurately stated the legal standard for the award of punitive damages, but found that prison
officials did not act with malice, and that punitive damages were not warranted to deter future unlawful conduct,
because the officials already had instituted a policy for providing Kosher meals. (East Arkansas Regional Unit of
the Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Holloway v. Bizzaro, 571 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Fla. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se civil rights complaint
pursuant to § 1983 on the claim that prison officials denied his requests for pork-free meals. The district court
dismissed the case finding that the prisoner failed to allege any physical injury as a result of the alleged free
exercise violation, as required to seek compensatory damages against the prison officials. (Miami-Dade County,
Florida)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Mass. 2008). Inmates in a state prison, who adhered to the religious
teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, filed a civil rights action against the commissioner of
the state department of correction, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendments and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and Massachusetts laws. Following a non-jury trial, the
commissioner moved for judgment on partial findings. The court held that refusal to provide a daily Halal menu

XXII

18.24

to Muslim inmates substantially burdened the Muslim inmates' exercise of their religious beliefs and that the
refusal did not further a compelling state interest. The court found that the use of a towel provided by the
department of corrections for daily prayer did not substantially burden the Muslim inmates' ability to perform
daily prayer. According to the court, a ban on the Muslim inmates' participation in obligatory weekly group
prayer services while in a separate confined housing unit substantially burdened the inmates' practice of a core
tenet of their faith. The court held that a ban on participation by the Muslim inmates confined in a separate
housing unit in obligatory weekly group prayer services by closed-circuit television was not the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling State interest. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Cedar Junction)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner, who was a member of the Ordo Templi Orientis
(OTO) group, which was associated with the Thelema religion, sued prison officials, alleging that they violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by denying him a non-meat diet. The
district court entered summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the request for a non-meat diet was a request rooted in sincerely held beliefs,
even though OTO had no general dietary restrictions. According to the court, to the extent that officials denied
the prisoner's requests because OTO had no general dietary restrictions, such denials violated RLUIPA. The
court found that the requirement, that an OTO clergy member submit written verification of the prisoner's
membership in OTO and its tenets, imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, where OTO
lacked clergy members as traditionally understood, and had no universal requirements that could be verified by
its leaders, at least when it came to dietary restrictions. The court held that the orderly administration of the
prison dietary system did not constitute a compelling governmental interest and that such a requirement was not
the least restrictive means of achieving the officials' ends. According to the court, the prisoner's right to a nonmeat diet was clearly established, as required for the prisoner to overcome the officials' qualified immunity
defense. The court noted that the prison already served two diets that would have satisfied the prisoner's request,
and they failed to show what effort would have been involved in providing him a meatless diet or how it would
have hampered prison administration. (Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
RELIGIOUS DIET

Kole v. Lappin, 551 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2008). A Jewish inmate filed a complaint against federal prison
officials alleging that a reduction in the number of kosher-for-Passover food items available to inmates for
purchase for the Passover holiday violated her First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the prison's limitation on the number of
supplemental kosher-for-Passover foods available for purchase by Jewish inmates did not substantially burden
the plaintiff's religious practice in violation of the First Amendment, where the prison provided her with two
Seder dinners during Passover, and otherwise provided her with three kosher-for-Passover meals and a box of
Matzoh each day during the eight days of the holiday. The court found that the differences between food
available for inmate purchase on a special holiday list available between Thanksgiving and Christmas and the
more limited list of kosher-for-Passover food available for purchase did not violate the plaintiff's right to equal
protection. The court noted that the prison's stated penological interests in limiting a small group of inmates'
access to special goods to avoid hoarding and illegal trade, and in the efficient financial operation of the prison
commissary, were logically advanced by offering a smaller number of “best sellers” for sale on Passover.
(Federal Correction Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F.Supp.2d 677 (W.D.Mich. 2008). A civil rights action was brought against state prison
officials, raising claims arising from the death of a prisoner, who died from dehydration after a four-day period
during which he received no medical care and little water and food. A jury found that certain defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, the defendants were grossly negligent, and one
defendant was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The jury awarded $250,000 in actual
damages, and $2,500,000 in punitive damages. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, and to
stay enforcement of the judgment. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial. The district court denied the
motions, finding that evidence supported the finding that an official knew of the obvious risks to the prisoner.
The court held that punitive damages of $1,250,000 per prison official defendant was not constitutionally
excessive for the dehydration death of a physically vulnerable prisoner, who was trapped without physical
necessities or medical care for five days during a heat wave and who was awarded $250,000 in actual damages.
The court noted that evidence established that prison officials kept the prisoner's water turned off, knew that the
prisoner was not drinking, and knew the prison was on a heat alert. (Bellamy Creek Corr. Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 (8th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sued the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) and prison officials alleging that they violated his right to practice his Muslim religion in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner alleged that
prison officials failed to provide him with appropriate meals. The district court entered summary judgment for
the BOP and the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prisoner's ability to practice his
religion was not substantially burdened in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA or RLUIPA. The court
found that the officials did not violate the prisoner's equal protection rights. According to the court, limitations in
dietary accommodations did not substantially burden the Muslim prisoner's ability to practice his religion, where
the prisoner had an option of purchasing halal vegetarian entrees on days that allegedly inadequate kosher meat
entrees were served. The court noted that the prisoner received money from work and family members and had
not pursued alternatives such as requesting to be first in line at the food bar to avoid cross-contamination.
(Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas)

XXII

18.25

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). A Muslim inmate brought a pro se civil rights action against
state prison officials alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
the Free Exercise Clause and the Equal Protection Clause after he was denied a requested religious dietary
accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that factual issues precluded summary judgment on the
inmate's free exercise, RLUIPA and Equal Protection claims. The fact issues included the impact of
accommodating the inmate's request for kosher meat diet and the availability of ready alternatives, the extent of
the burden imposed on the inmate's religious activities by the prison's refusal to serve him the requested kosher
meat diet, the extent of the burden that would be created by accommodating the inmate's request, and the
existence of less restrictive alternatives. The court also found that material issues of fact existed as to whether
the costs of providing a kosher meat diet to Muslim inmates in the prison justified different treatment of the
Muslim inmate whose request for a kosher diet was denied, and that of Jewish inmates who received kosher or
orthodox kosher meals. The court held that the prison's refusal to provide the inmate with a kosher meat diet
implicated the Free Exercise Clause, given the inmate's sincere belief that he was personally required to consume
kosher meat to maintain his spirituality. (Arizona Department of Corrections, Florence)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Smith v. Bruce, 568 F.Supp.2d 1277 (D.Kan. 2008). A Muslim prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
food supplier, alleging that the supplier violated his First Amendment freedom of religion rights by serving
gelatin with an animal byproduct in a religious vegetarian diet. The district court denied the supplier’s motion for
summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was denied by genuine issues of material fact as to
the sincerity of the prisoner's religious beliefs and whether the supplier personally participated in the alleged
First Amendment violation through policy or custom. The court noted that the Muslim prisoner was not required
to show deliberate indifference on the part of the prison food supplier in order to establish a violation of his First
Amendment freedom of religion rights via the supplier's alleged custom or policy of providing nonvegetarian
gelatin to prisoners with religious diets, but rather that the alleged violation was an affirmative act rather than a
failure to act. (Aramark Correctional Services, Hutchinson Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought two actions against jail
personnel alleging a number of constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court noted that the detainee “…is a white supremacist. He is also a prolific pro se litigator who
makes a habit of suing jail and prison officials when he is charged with a crime. Those facts are central to
understanding these related civil cases.” The court held that the detainee's alleged belief in the Church of the
Creator and “White Man's Bible” was not protected and the jail had valid reasons for denying the detainee's
alleged religious dietary requests. (Douglas County Correctional Center, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL
RELIGIOUS DIET

Thomas v. Northern, 574 F.Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.Mo. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against
correctional officers alleging that they violated his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary
judgment for the officers and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers did not violate the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to provide him with a replacement meal after he refused the meal
initially offered to him. The inmate had refused the meal because it contained pork. The court noted that there
was no evidence that the inmate ever told officials that he had a religious preference. (Southeast Correctional
Center, Missouri)
2009

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
NOURISHMENT

Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Aliens who were alleged enemy combatants engaging in
voluntary hunger strikes while detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved to enjoin
measures taken as part of a forced-feeding program. The district court denied the motion. The court found that
the detainees failed to show a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order
enjoining the government from using a restraint-chair in order to facilitate force-feeding them. The court noted
that pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the complaints of detained alleged enemy combatants. According to the court, the government officials who
imposed various restraints on the detained alleged enemy combatants, including the use of a restraint chair, in
order to facilitate force-feeding them in response to their hunger strikes, were not thereby deliberately indifferent
to their Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that evidence that the detained alleged enemy combatants
had assaulted medical staff and guards during attempts to force-feed them after the detainees engaged in hunger
strikes, demonstrated that the government might suffer a substantial injury if the detainees' request for a
preliminary injunction against the use of a restraint-chair to facilitate such feedings were granted. (U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a warden seeking
monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The prisoner asserted violations of the Eighth
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) based on the failure to
provide him with kosher food which resulted in his not eating for eight days. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the warden. The prisoner appealed. The court held that the warden was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on the prisoner's claim seeking monetary damages for the alleged violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for not providing him with kosher meals.
According to the court, even though the state accepted federal funds for its prisons, RLUIPA did not contain a
clear indication that receipt of federal prison funds was unambiguously conditioned on a state's consent to be
sued for monetary damages. The court held that there was no evidence that the warden knew of and disregarded
an excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, as required to support the prisoner's claim against the warden
for deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on failure to provide
him with kosher food. (Hiawatha Correctional Facility, Michigan)

XXII

18.26

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET
COSTS

Dawson v. Burnett, 631 F.Supp.2d 878 (W.D.Mich. 2009). A state prisoner, who was a practicing Buddhist,
brought an action against prison officials arising out of the alleged denial of the prisoner's request to eat a strict
vegetarian (vegan) diet. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the prisoner's desire to eat a vegan diet was based upon or required by his Buddhist religious
belief. According to the court, the prison officials' argument that a strict vegan menu was more costly than the
vegetarian menu already available to the prisoner was irrelevant to demonstrating a legitimate penological
interest, since prison officials already provided a vegan menu to those prisoners whose religious beliefs
compelled such a diet. The court held that the State of Michigan, by accepting federal prison funds, did not
waive Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from a monetary suit brought by the prisoner under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), arising out of his alleged denial of a strict
vegan diet as a practicing Buddhist. The court found that the prisoner could not recover monetary damages
against individual prison officials in their personal capacity under RLUIPA, since neither were recipients of
federal prison funds and RLUIPA did not provide for the recovery. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION

Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2009). A female inmate brought a civil rights action against a prison
official, alleging the official deprived her of 16 meals over a 23-day period in violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court entered summary judgment
for the official, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the
official's conduct in allegedly depriving the inmate of 16 meals over a 23-day period for the inmate’s failure to
remove a paper from the rear window of her cell was a sufficiently serious deprivation of a life necessity, as
required to establish violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The
court noted that the official's argument-- that the alleged deprivation was due to the inmate's personal choice not
to comply with a prison policy-- failed to demonstrate how the inmate's failure to remove a paper from a window
jeopardized her safety or security during in-cell feeding. The court found that the official was not entitled to
qualified immunity because the inmate's right to adequate meals was clearly established, and the case law
alerting prison officials to their obligations to provide inmates with adequate meals should have put the official
on notice of her Eighth Amendment rights. (High Desert State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against various prison
officials alleging his right to free exercise of religion and equal treatment were violated. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The court held that isolated acts of negligence, in which prison officials failed to approve the state
prisoner's requests for religious accommodations in a timely fashion, did not amount to a violation of the
prisoner's right to free exercise of religion. The court noted that on one occasion the prisoner requested fried
food on a religious holiday and the request was approved one month after the holiday, and on another occasion
the prisoner requested two sack lunch meal accommodations for days of religious fasting and the requests were
approved two days after the days of fasting had already passed. The court found that prison officials' improper
cleaning of serving utensils reserved for kosher food, by washing those utensils with non-kosher utensils, did not
amount to a violation of the state prisoner's right to free exercise of religion. According to the court, the act
amounted to a single violation of a kosher diet, not a prison policy, and the allegation showed only that the
prison imperfectly implemented kosher requirements or were negligent in implementing a kosher diet, not that
prison officials deliberately contaminated the kosher utensils. (Norton Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Gay v. Chandra, 652 F.Supp.2d 959 (S.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner, who suffered from antisocial and
narcissistic personality disorders, brought a § 1983 action against a psychiatrist who treated him in prison,
alleging that conditions of confinement to which the psychiatrist subjected him violated the Eighth Amendment.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the psychiatrist in part, and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the cell where the
prisoner was restrained naked was excessively cold, and as to whether the psychiatrist knew that the prisoner
would in fact be restrained naked in excessively low temperatures. Similarly, the court found fact issues as to
whether the psychiatrist's decision not to allow the prisoner to wear any clothing while he was restrained denied
the prisoner a “civilized measure” of life's necessities, and as to whether the psychiatrist was deliberately
indifferent to the fact that the prisoner was restrained without clothes. According to the court, summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the psychiatrist's denial of food to the
prisoner while the prisoner was restrained for 32 hours constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. (Tamms
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Goodvine v. Swiekatowski, 594 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state inmate brought an action against a
state, its department of corrections, and various prison officials, alleging that interference with the practice of his
Muslim faith violated § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and state law.
A screening of the complaint for frivolous claims was required under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the inmate's allegations stated a claim against prison officials under
RLUIPA. The court found that a rule that limited religious materials he could own to one soft cover text and that
he was unable to practice his faith without his tariqah materials and additional religious texts did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause. The court held that the denial of the inmate's request to purchase a Qur'an while in
segregation, and the denial of the inmate's request for a halal diet did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
According to the court, refusal to provide sandwiches to the inmate to break fast did not violate RLUIPA, and
prison officials' failure to “establish the Qiblah” for the inmate did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or
RLUIPA. The court found that the inmate's allegations, that a prison chaplain discriminated against him by
providing Christian inmates with free copies of the Bible and denied him an available free copy of the Qur'an,
stated a claim against the chaplain under the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause, The court held

XXII

18.27

that the inmate's allegations that prison officials modified meal schedules for Christians wishing to fast for
religious purposes but not for Muslims, stated a claim against prison officials under the Establishment Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2nd Cir. 2009). Prisoners brought a pro se action against prison officials alleging
violation of their rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of officials. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison's restrictions on the prisoners' practice
of the Tulukeesh religion, which limited the practice to the privacy of the prisoner's cell and keeping a holy book
with the prison chaplain from whom the prisoners' could seek permission to read it, served prison officials'
compelling security and administrative interests, for the purposes of the prisoners' action alleging violation of
their rights under RLUIPA. The court found that prison officials' refusal to comply with some of the prisoners'
dietary demands, which were allegedly required by the prisoners' Tulukeesh religion, was the least restrictive
means of satisfying the officials' compelling administrative burden, where the dietary requests were highly
detailed and required specific foods (and portions thereof) on individual days of the week, and that such foods be
prepared by Tulukeesh adherents. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether prison officials could provide a less restrictive substitute for the religious
alternative menu. Officials' refused to comply with their request for a vegan diet that did not include soybeans, as
required by their Tulukeesh religion. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SPECIAL DIET

Marquez v. Quarterman, 652 F.Supp.2d 785 (E.D.Tex. 2009). A prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action complaining about the prison system's refusal to provide him with dentures.
The district held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment “deliberate
indifference to medical needs” claim under § 1983, where the prisoner complained about an inability to chew
food, stomach cramps, gas, and spastic colon, which resulted in a loss of weight of 13 pounds since his arrival at
the prison system. The court allowed the prisoner to proceed with his deliberate indifference claims against a
food services officer, who purportedly denied him a soft food diet, despite the prescription for it. (Polunsky Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and medical personnel at a county correctional center, alleging a violation of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied
in part. According to the court, jail staff was not, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, deliberately indifferent
to a known or obvious risk that the inmate would develop diabetes from an allegedly high starch diet, and staff
was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's medical needs when he developed diabetes while incarcerated.
Prior to his incarceration, the inmate's physicians had advised him to observe a low-salt, low-fat diet. The inmate
did not recall his physicians advising him that starches and sugars could increase his blood sugar. Upon
discovery of the inmate's elevated blood sugar levels, he was placed on a diabetic diet, received daily blood
glucose tests, and was prescribed diabetic medications. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of
his request for dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his
diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing
and granted the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and
censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the prisoner failed to meet the burden of proving that the prison's asserted penological
reason for denying dietary supplements was not legitimate. The prison had asserted that the supplements either
posed security threats or were not part of the prison's procurement program. The court held that there was no
evidence that the officials knew of and ignored any risk to the prisoner posed by his diet, as required to support
his claim that the officials violated the Eighth Amendment because the food given to the prisoner lacked
adequate nutrition. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009). A Roman Catholic prisoner sued a prison chaplain in his official
and individual capacities for alleged violations of his rights under the free exercise and establishment clauses of
the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Illinois
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court entered partial summary judgment in favor of
the chaplain, and, after a bench trial on the remaining issues, found against the prisoner on all counts. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the Roman Catholic prisoner's practice of his religion, which
compelled him to abstain from all meat on all Fridays and during Lent and to avoid the meat of four-legged
animals, was substantially burdened under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA by the requirement that
he document that his preferred diet was compelled by his religion. The court found that denial of the prisoner's
request that he not be given the meat of four-legged animals did not constitute a substantial burden on his
religious exercise for the purposes of the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and IRFRA since a regular diet would still
be nutritionally adequate if all meat of four-legged animals were skipped, and thus the prisoner was not put to a
choice between his religious beliefs and adequate nutrition. But the denial of a non-meat diet on Fridays and
during Lent substantially burdened the prisoner's practice of his religion. According to the court, since the
prisoner currently received a non-meat diet and there was no evidence that the prison intended to revoke the
prisoner's religious diet, the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief was moot. The court noted that RLUIPA, which
was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause, could not subject state officials to suit in their individual
capacities. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

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18.28

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Owens-Ali v. Pennell, 672 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.Del. 2009). A pro se state prisoner, a Moorish American National
adherent, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) against prison officials, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that the officials violated
his constitutional rights when they denied his request for a religious diet, and that the officials retaliated against
him for his attempts to exercise his religious beliefs. The prisoner requested counsel. The court held that the
prisoner's claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA for monetary damages against prison officials in their official
capacities were essentially claims against the state, and thus those claims were barred by the state’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The court held that prison supervisory officials could not be held liable under § 1983 for
alleged violations of the prisoner's constitutional rights in connection with his request for a religious diet absent a
showing that those officials were aware of his allegations and remained “deliberately indifferent” to his plight.
(James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F.Supp.2d 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging due process violations
in connection with a disciplinary hearing and violations of his constitutional rights relative to his temporary
removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The employees moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a state prison correction officers' captain, correction officer,
and/or prison counselor were personally involved in the temporary removal of the Jewish prisoner from a kosher
cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the Jewish prisoner's missing of more than 30 days of kosher meals during his
temporary removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program constituted more than a de minimus
injury to the prisoner. The court also held that DOCS employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from
the Jewish prisoner's § 1983 claim that his temporary removal from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD)
program violated his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, where it was clearly established
that a prisoner was entitled to a diet consistent with his religious beliefs, and that such beliefs were protected
under the Free Exercise Clause. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action against state prison
officials in their official and individual capacities, seeking injunctive relief and damages under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 based on the officials' refusal to make any
accommodation for his kosher dietary restrictions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. The appeals court
held that RLUIPA did not authorize a claim for money damages against an official sued in her individual
capacity when invoked as a spending clause statute. The court held that the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief
under RLUIPA based on the state prison officials' refusal to make accommodations for his kosher dietary
restrictions was rendered moot by his transfer to a federal prison. The court noted that even if the prisoner's
claim was capable of repetition because there was a possibility that he could return to state prison if his appeal of
a federal conviction was successful, the claim would not likely persist in evading judicial review, as the prisoner
would have sufficient opportunity to re-initiate an action seeking injunctive relief if he returned to state prison.
(Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla. 2009). A pro se inmate at a county jail, who professed to
follow the Muslim faith, brought a § 1983 action against a former county sheriff, the jail's director of program
services, and the jail's former and current directors of food services, alleging that the defendants' acts or
omissions abridged his First Amendment religious rights. The inmate sought preliminary injunctive relief. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the revocation of the
inmate's Kosher diet due to his non-compliance with that diet did not constitute a violation of his First
Amendment rights, and the inmate was not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief. (Monroe County Detention
Center, Florida)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET
COSTS

Yaacov v. Collins, 649 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2009). A Jewish inmate brought a § 1983 suit alleging that his
First Amendment rights to free exercise were violated when he was denied a Kosher meal plan for three years.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the decision to restrict
Kosher meals to prisoners registered as Orthodox Jews had a reasonable relationship to the legitimate
penological interest of cost control for budgetary reasons. The officials asserted that to properly prepare Kosher
meals would require expensive kitchens and that purchasing pre-packaged Kosher meals would cost $7.00 per
meal as compared to $0.80 per main-line meal. The court noted that the policy did not exclude all available
means for free exercise, but afforded the alternative of eating cereal, peanut butter, and fresh fruits and
vegetables. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Mansfield Correctional Institution)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner who followed the Islamic faith
brought an action against prison employees and prison canteen workers under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983. The prisoner asserted claims challenging his conditions of
incarceration. The district court dismissed several of the prisoner's claims for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and granted summary judgment in favor of workers and employees on the remaining claims. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the Islamic prisoner's claims against prison employees in their official capacities for violations of RLUIPA based
on their denial of his dietary requests were not moot, even though the prisoner had been transferred away from

XXIII

18.29

the prisons where some of the employees worked. The court noted that the reasons given for denying the
prisoner's requests involved Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) policies, the director of ODOC had
final policymaking authority for ODOC and remained a party to the litigation, the prisoner was still incarcerated
in ODOC's custody and was subject to its policies, and a judgment in his favor could have required ODOC to
modify those policies. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the denial of the prisoner's requests for a lawful Islamic diet substantially burdened his religious
exercise. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the denial of the prisoner's request
for meat for a religious feast that complied with Islamic dietary laws substantially burdened his religious
exercise. According to the court, forcing the Islamic prisoner to accept pudding and gelatin on his food tray on
one occasion, which allegedly rendered all food on the tray contaminated and inedible for him, did not amount to
a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. The court held that the state
department of corrections' policy of spending money on nonreligious items but not on religious ones did not
violate the Islamic prisoner's right to equal protection. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary, Great Plains Correctional
Facility, Oklahoma Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
NUTRITION
QUALITY
RELIGIOUS DIET

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth
Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were
sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that he was deprived of personal hygienic items and sanitary
conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoner alleged he was regularly deprived of toilet
paper and soap, that he was only allowed to shower twice a week, that he was made to strip in dirty showers full
of filth and insects, that the unit in which he resided was littered with food and urine and contained open sewers,
and that he suffered illness as a result. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that the food he was
provided lacked nutritional value and was of lesser quality than food provided to other inmates, that officers
made trays of food from dirty food carts located next to inmate showers and that birds picked at the inmate's
food while the carts were outside were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d 1171 (N.D.Okla. 2010). An inmate brought claims against state prison officials
under § 1983 for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, RLUIPA, the inmate’s due process rights, or equal protection, by
denying him access to particular issues of a religious publication based on guidelines prohibiting publications
that advocate terrorism, criminal behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred. According to the court, prison
officials' failure to provide the inmate with a Halal diet did not violate his rights under First Amendment or
RLUIPA, where the inmate failed to establish that such failure imposed a substantial burden on his religious
exercise, since the inmate stated that his religious needs could be satisfied by the provision of a Kosher diet.
(Dick Conner Correctional Center, Jess Dunn Correctional Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials,
asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion
for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's
pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's kosher meal
program and the alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot by the
prisoner’s transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the particular
prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole. The court found that the
prison chaplain was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where, consistent with his job function, he
received the prisoner's request for kosher meals, checked the prisoner's eligibility, and was informed that the
prisoner was a Muslim and therefore not eligible for kosher meals. Once the mistake was discovered, the
chaplain and other prison officials worked as quickly as possible to ensure that the prisoner began receiving
kosher meals. The appeals court held that the prisoner's pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under
RLUIPA, challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher
meal program, were not rendered moot by his transfer to another prison, noting that the prisoner's non-kosher
status traveled with him to the transferee prison. The court held that the prisoner’s amended claims against
prison officials, challenging his removal from a kosher meal program and his failure to be reinstated into the
kosher meal program following his transfer to a different prison, were not futile, for the purpose of the prisoner's
motion to amend. The court noted that the prisoner consistently stated his religious preference as Jewish
throughout his incarceration, and he submitted numerous grievances concerning alleged violations of kosher
practice by prison kitchen staff. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Maximum Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F.Supp.2d 1185 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action under §
1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against former and current food
program managers for a Department of Corrections (DOC) and a registered dietician employed by a prison,
alleging that the defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA in
their creation of kosher and mainline diets. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the kosher diet menus did not deprive the prisoner of

XXIII

18.30

sufficient calories and nutrients to sustain him and maintain his health; (2) a Passover menu did not deprive the
prisoner of sufficient calories and nutrients to sustain him and maintain his health; (3) provision of kosher food
to the prisoner did not substantially interfere with his ability to freely exercise his religion, as would violate the
First Amendment and RLUIPA; and (4) the use of a fortified fruit drink in lieu of milk did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. (Washington State Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
NUTRITION
FOOD QUALITY

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded
attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the
sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and
requiring the sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of
Agriculture's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors,
Arizona)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against four
employees at a prison for claims arising from his access to a prison law library and the adequacy of the prison's
food service. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim against an assistant
librarian alleging denial of access to courts through a denied “call-out” request. The court found that the assistant
librarian did not engage in retaliatory conduct against the inmate and did not deny the inmate equal protection.
According to the court, the failure of the prison's assistant food service director to provide hot meals during a
religious holiday observed by the inmate did not violate the inmate's right to equal protection, absent evidence
that the director supplied prisoners of other faiths with hot meals during non-daylight hours. The court held that
the assistant food service director did not coerce the inmate, an Orthodox Muslim, into participating in Jewish
religious practices, and did not take any actions establishing a state religion, so as to violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial by the prison's assistant food service
director of adequate advance notice of meal substitutions, hot meals during non-daylight hours during a religious
holiday, and adequate nutritional calories to the Muslim inmate was rationally related to legitimate governmental
and penological interests of prison security and fiscal budgetary discipline, and thus the denials did not violate
the inmate's First Amendment free exercise rights. The court noted that the inmate retained alternative means for
practicing his Muslim faith, and granting requests for specialized diets would be expensive and would divert
resources from other penological goals. (Muskegon Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
NUTRITION
SEGREGATION
SPECIAL DIET

Greene v. Esgrow, 686 F.Supp.2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials improperly executed a restricted-diet disciplinary sentence. The district court granted the
officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that imposition of a forty-two meal restricted-diet disciplinary
sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, absent a
showing that the food that inmate was given was nutritionally inadequate, or that his health was adversely
affected or jeopardized by his being placed on the restricted diet. (New York State Department of Correctional
Services, Southport Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPECIAL DIET

Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, brought a §
1983 action against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) employees, alleging that employees
violated his constitutional rights in denying him a vegan diet. The district court granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and denied the prisoner's motion for
preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that, under the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) grievance procedures,
the Administrative Reviewing Authority (ARA) exceeded its authority when it rejected the prisoner's grievance
appeal regarding his claim to a vegan diet as part of his religious practices because it contained multiple issues,
thereby preventing the prisoner from completing the grievance process. According to the court, the prisoner's
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to the vegan diet claim, in accordance with PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement, would be excused, and the prisoner could pursue that claim in his § 1983 action against
ODOC employees. (Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Mack Alford Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
KITCHEN SANITATION
PRIVATE PROVIDER

Smith-Bey v. CCA/CTF, 703 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010). A District of Columbia inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a prison, the private corporation that ran the prison, and a food services company, alleging the prison's
kitchen was so poorly maintained and infested with vermin that being forced to eat food prepared there
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the two instances in
which the inmate discovered cockroaches in his food, "while certainly unpleasant," did establish an Eighth
Amendment violation. (Correctional Treatment Facility, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
SANITATION

Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F.Supp.2d 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a county and officials, alleging civil rights violations. The defendants moved for dismissal. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee adequately alleged that he was
denied his right to a speedy trial and that he was presumptively prejudiced by the delay, as required to state a §
1983 claim for a Sixth Amendment violation. The detainee alleged he was held for two years in prison prior to

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18.31

receiving trial for the charge of violating a protective order, and that he was subsequently found not guilty.
The court held that the detainee adequately alleged that his conditions of confinement constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The detainee alleged that he received
tainted food that contained bodily waste, soap, metal pins, and staples, and that, when he went on a hunger strike
to protest his legal situation, deputy sheriffs were taking bets on when he would start eating again. (Nassau
County Sheriff's Department, New York)
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F.Supp.2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Jewish prison inmates at a state correctional facility
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their First Amendment rights were violated by the
defendants' failure to properly accommodate their religious needs. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether “special circumstances” existed so as to excuse the two inmates'
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prior to
bringing a § 1983 action against prison officials. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether a correctional officer treated Jewish prison inmates differently on
account of their religion. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether cold alternative
meals available in a state correctional institution violated the Jewish inmates' constitutional right to a kosher diet,
pursuant to the inmates' rights to religious liberty under First Amendment. According to the court, summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison officials prevented Jewish
inmates from having materials necessary to their worship, on the inmates' claim that the officials failed to make
reasonable accommodation to their religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment, by not providing a
rabbi or religious materials in the correctional facility. (Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Willis v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 753 F.Supp.2d 768 (S.D.Ind. 2010). A Jewish inmate
brought a class action against a Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging denial of kosher meals in violation
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his First Amendment free exercise of
religion rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The motions were granted in part and denied in
part. The district court held that: (1) the denial of a kosher diet substantially burdened the inmate's religious
exercise; (2) the increased costs of providing kosher meals to inmates was not a compelling interest; (3) the DOC
did not establish that providing vegan meals to Jewish inmates was the least restrictive means of furthering a
compelling government interest; (4) enforcement of a prison policy violated the First Amendment as applied to
the Jewish inmate; and (5) the chaplain knowingly applied the policy in violation of the Jewish inmate's First
Amendment rights. According to the court, requiring inmates with religious diet cards to eat 75% of their meals
using the card or have the card suspended violated the First Amendment as applied to the Jewish inmate who
could only eat kosher meals pursuant to his beliefs. The court noted that the inmate used his card for all available
meals, which was only two-thirds of mealtimes as the prison did not provide kosher breakfasts, and the inmate
had no alternative to the kosher diet once the prison suspended his card. (New Castle Corr’l Facility, Indiana)
2011

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Barnes v. Fedele, 760 F.Supp.2d 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
officials or employees of New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging that the defendants
violated his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the state prisoner failed to allege that he was treated
differently on account of his religion, as would support his equal protection claim, where nothing in the
prisoner's complaint suggested that any similarly situated inmates of a different faith were treated more
favorably than him, or that he was singled out for discriminatory treatment on account of his religion. The
prisoner had alleged that Rastafarian, but not Jewish, inmates were permitted to wear crowns. The court also
found that the prisoner failed to assert any factual allegations to support his claim under § 1983 that a prison
employee denied him a Kosher diet. According to the court, a prison rabbi did not violate the prisoner's
constitutional rights, and thus was not liable under § 1983, by allegedly failing to respond to one of the
prisoner’s letters, and by responding to the prisoner's complaints regarding religion rules in a way in which the
prisoner was unhappy. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Roberts v. Klein, 770 F.Supp.2d 1102 (D.Nev. 2011). A Black state prisoner filed a civil rights action against
prison administrators and employees alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,
his statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Equal
Protection Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim that prison officials and employees violated his religious
rights under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause on allegations that they
implemented and enforced a policy that denied him kosher meals because his Jewish faith had not been verified
by an outside entity, and the prison did not show that there was valid rational connection between the prison
regulation and a legitimate government interest. (Southern Desert Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought an action against correctional facility
officials, alleging violations of § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
based on their denial of his request for a vegan diet, which he claimed was required by his religious practices.
The district court entered an order granting in part and denying in part the officials' motion for summary
judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate could not recover monetary damages
against officials under RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate's action against the officials was treated as
an action against the state, and monetary damages were not available against a state under RLUIPA.
(Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Illinois)

XXIII

18.32

2012
U.S. District Court
SPECIAL DIET

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The wife of an inmate who died of cancerrelated causes while in the custody of a county department of correction (DOC) brought an action against the
county, DOC officials, and entities that contracted with the county to provide medical care and treatment to
DOC inmates and employees of those entitles. The wife alleged under § 1983 that the inmate received
inadequate medical care, and asserted related state-law claims for wrongful death and medical malpractice. The
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and/or for summary judgment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the physicians who were
under contract with the county to provide medical services to inmates at the county jail on a part-time basis acted
under the color of state law, within the meaning of § 1983, when they treated the inmate, and thus the physicians
were subject to liability under § 1983. The court held that the allegations that the health care coordinator for the
DOC denied or delayed responding to the wife's request for the inmate's medical records, which she hoped to use
to have the inmate's parole restored and to seek a second medical opinion, and that the coordinator expressly
denied the wife's request to provide the inmate with a liquid dietary supplement which wife would supply at her
own cost, sufficiently pled the coordinator's personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of necessary
medical care to the inmate, so as to subject the coordinator to liability under § 1983. (Westchester County
Department of Correction, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, asserting that the prison's 16-day denial of kosher meals, mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison violated his constitutional rights and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a
preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, and denied
prisoner's motion to amend and second motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the prison's “zero
tolerance” policy for possession of even one non-kosher food item violated the Free Exercise Clause and
RLUIPA. But the court determined that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there had not
been any determination that the regulation was in any way deficient at the time of the officials' actions. The court
held that the prison's use of questionnaire about the inmate's knowledge of his designated religion was proper.
According to the court, the officials' failure to reinstate the inmate to his kosher diet regimen violated the
inmate's rights but punitive damages were not warranted. The court awarded $1 in nominal damages where the
inmate did not look like he missed many meals as a result of the officials' actions, and there was no evidence of
physical injury. The court noted that even though the prison had economic interest in restricting kosher diet to
prisoners who had a sincere belief that the diet was necessary to practice their religion, where the inmate had no
other means of eating, there was no evidence that providing a modicum of flexibility would have a ripple effect
on prison staff or inmates or would escalate the cost of providing kosher meals. (Michigan Department of
Corrections, Alger Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
HEALTH STANDARDS
SEGREGATION

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama
Department of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated
against them on the basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. After a non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to
sue; (2) the claims were not moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to
believe that the challenged practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were
“otherwise qualified,” or reasonable accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket
policy of categorically segregating all HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on
the state; and (6) food-service policies that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and
prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally
excluded HIV-positive inmates from programs for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore
violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Jones v. Hobbs, 864 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Ark. 2012). A prisoner brought an action against various state
department of correction (DOC) officials, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether officials impeded the prisoner's efforts to
secure a diet which comported with the dictates of his religion; (2) whether fiscal and security concerns were
rationally connected to the denial of a religious diet; (3) whether the prisoner had a sufficient alternative means
to practice his religion; (4) whether there was an alternative way to accommodate the prisoner's request for a
vegan meal at de minimis cost to valid penological interests; and (5) whether the prisoner's right to a diet suiting
his religious beliefs was clearly established. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought
an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances
and requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for
the defendant and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state
Jewish prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide
him with kosher meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process

18.33

before filing suit. The court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were
sincere, as required to support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA,
where the prisoner stated that he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the
prisoner offered evidence that he requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department,
and while at another prison, he ate kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the
prisoner was harassed for his adherence to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the
department transferred the prisoner for a time so he could receive kosher food. The court held that the prisoner
was denied a generally available benefit because of his religious beliefs, and thus, the state's department of
criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA, where every
prisoner in the department's custody received a nutritionally sufficient diet, every observant Jewish prisoner at
the designated prison received a kosher diet free of charge, and the Jewish prisoner at issue was forced to pay for
his kosher meals. The court found that there was no evidence of a compelling government interest in forcing the
Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded
by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the state's department of criminal justice employed the least
restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining security by forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of
his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
NUTRITION
SPECIAL DIET

Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and jail
personnel, alleging that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment
as a result of his exclusive diet of nutriloaf, a bad-tasting food given to prisoners as a form of punishment. The
parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officials were aware that the
inmate was being sickened by his exclusive diet of nutriloaf, yet did nothing about it. According to the court,
deliberate withholding of nutritious food from a prison inmate, or substitution of a tainted or otherwise sickening
food, with the effect of causing substantial weight loss, vomiting, stomach pains, and maybe an anal fissure, or
other severe hardship, violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
(Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2012).
The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial detainee from various encounters with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition that required a restricted diet; (2)
the undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on a misdemeanor offense; (3) the detainee's doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on house arrest as opposed to detention because
of his medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted to a hospital for emergency surgery during a previous confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he be released for medical attention; (6) the detainee lost
over 40 pounds during two weeks of detention; (7) the detainee requested to see a doctor but was told to “quit
complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were sufficient to plead
that the undersheriff knew of and failed to respond to the detainee's serious medical condition, as would be deliberate indifference required to state a § 1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth Amendment due process
after the detainee died. The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the pretrial detainee an affirmative duty to keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their safekeeping, were sufficient to plead a duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) under California law against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen County Adult Detention Facility, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights when they denied his
requests to erect, and eat his meals in, a temporary structure during a Jewish festival. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the officials, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that prison officials did not violate the prisoner's clearly established First Amendment free exercise rights when
they denied his requests to erect and eat his meals in a temporary structure or “succah” during a Jewish festival,
entitling them to qualified immunity. According to the court, it was not apparent that the contours of a prisoner's
right to reasonable dietary and meal accommodations extended to the use of a succah. (South Dakota State
Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
SPECIAL DIET

Starr v. Moore, 849 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.N.H. 2012). A state prisoner brought an action against a prison employee
and others, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, in connection
with employee's alleged conduct of telling other inmates that they were no longer receiving special meals on
holidays as a result of a prior lawsuit filed by prisoner. The prisoner moved to exclude evidence of his prior
lawsuits and grievances. The district court held that evidence of the prisoner's subsequent grievances and
lawsuits against prison employees was relevant and that alleged prior statements by the employee, blaming the
prisoner for a prison policy of no longer providing special meals to prisoners on holidays, were admissible as
prior bad acts. (Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Taylor v. Dormire, 690 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials refused to feed the prisoner for several days while he was restrained in connection with
his removal from his cell, based on his declaration of his cellmate as an enemy. The district court entered
judgment on the jury's verdict for the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court’s error was not harmless as to its failure to give the prisoner's

18.34

requested instruction on nominal damages. The court noted that the jury had been instructed that damages
constituted a required element of a verdict in favor of the prisoner and that if any element was not proven then
the verdict had to be in favor of prison officials. According to the court, the jury must have considered the
damages issue, since it wrote a symbol for “zero” in the space on the verdict form for damages. (Jefferson City
Correctional Center, Missouri)
2013
U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
RELIGIOUS DIET

Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against state prison
officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the officials' decision to revoke his vegan diet.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the officials’ motion, granted the prisoner’s
motion, and entered an injunction. The court held that the fact that the prisoner's vegan diet had been restored did
not render moot his declaratory judgment action against state prison officials, in which he alleged that they
violated his religious rights by revoking his vegan diet for purchasing chicken-flavored ramen noodles, because
no vegetarian noodles were available to him, and his vegan diet was subject to revocation anytime he ordered
ramen noodles, regardless of whether he consumed the seasoning packet containing chicken. The court found
that the prisoner demonstrated a substantial burden to his religious practice, satisfying his initial burden under
The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the prisoner held a religious belief
that required him to adhere to a vegan diet, he purchased chicken-flavored ramen noodles from the state prison
commissary, the commissary did not carry a vegetarian noodle option, the prisoner did not eat the meat flavoring
packet but instead discarded it, and the prisoner's vegan diet was revoked solely due to his noodle purchase.
According to the court, prison officials' revocation of the prisoner's vegan diet was not the least restrictive means
to further a compelling governmental interest, and thus the officials did not meet their burden under RLUIPA to
justify such action,. The court noted that although the state prison policy dictated that personal preference diet
cards could be confiscated if a prisoner abused or misused the privilege by voluntarily consuming self-prohibited
foods, and such policy was legitimately geared toward weeding out insincere requests, the prisoner's purchase of
noodles with a meat seasoning packet did not mean that his beliefs were insincere. The district court decision
opened by stating: “It is not every day that someone makes a federal case out of ramen noodles. But
unfortunately that's what Joshus Borkholder had to do.” (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Conway v. Purves, 963 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mich. 2013). State prisoners brought an action against a state
department of corrections (DOC) and its officials challenging the nutritional adequacy of the meals provided to
the prisoners during the Islamic month of Ramadan, and asserting claims for violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and constitutional violations. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary
injunction or a temporary restraining order (TRO) to require the department of corrections and its officials to
provide nutritionally balanced meals containing between 2600 and 2900 calories on any given day during
Ramadan. The district court denied the motion, finding that the prisoners failed to show certain and immediate
irreparable harm, as required for a preliminary injunction. The court noted that Ramadan had recently concluded,
that any harm that the prisoners could suffer approximately one year in the future was speculative, and the action
would likely be resolved prior to the next Ramadan observance. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FOOD
SANITATION

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided
food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts
related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1)
the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with
legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's
legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal
mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious
medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment because it was too
costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county detention facility, which allegedly led to the
detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led to inmate-on-inmate violence,
contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing conditions of confinement
whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility officials “triple-celled”
inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of the former
detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his
official capacity.
The court held that the food service provider's serving the detainee cold meals for a 45-day period while the
kitchen in the county detention facility was being renovated, was not “punishment,” as would support the
inmate's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the provider, absent evidence
that the food served to the detainee was spoiled or contaminated, that a significant portion of the detainee's diet
consisted of such food, or that the food service caused more than a temporary discomfort. The court also held
that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the detainee one food item when another ran out,
failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate leftovers from days before, serving juice in a
dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration date, and serving meals on cracked trays that
caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to a substantial deprivation of food sufficient to
amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic
County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

18.35

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
UTENSILS

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail
and various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were
neither long enough nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the
only changes to the inmate's meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than
plastic; (2) eating utensils were quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was
given a mattress and a blanket; (4) the inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5)
rather than being prohibited human contact, deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate
to ensure his safety. The court found that jail officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic
reaction to suicide garments in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an
officer about his allergic reaction to a suicide gown, the officer called a nurse who immediately examined the
inmate and gave him cream and medication, and the officers appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical
decision that the inmate did not need different garments because there was no sign of rash or bumps on the
inmate. (Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET
EQUAL PROTECTION

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
correctional officers, alleging they used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by spraying him
with an excessive quantity of pepper spray, and that they violated his rights to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment rights when they denied him a vegetarian breakfast as required by his religion. The
officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate posed a threat to correctional officers, and
as to whether the officers' discharge of pepper spray on the inmate was required to gain his compliance. The
court found that correctional officers who refused to provide the inmate with a vegetarian meal required by his
religion did not treat the inmate any differently than others who were similarly situated, and thus the officers did
not violate the inmate's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The court noted that although other
prisoners were provided with vegetarian meals for religious reasons, they were not similarly situated to the
inmate because the officers did not know the inmate had also been approved for a vegetarian meal. (Salinas
Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET
FOOD QUALITY

Garnica v. Washington Dept. of Corrections, 965 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2013). A state prisoner brought
an action in state court against the Washington Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC personnel, alleging
violations of First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The action was removed to federal court, and the defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that even if the ailments that the Muslim prisoner
experienced during a Ramadan fast were related to meals provided to him by prison personnel during the fast,
those ailments were not sufficiently serious to constitute a serious medical need, as required to establish prison
personnel's deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court
found that prison personnel did not act with deliberate indifference to the Muslim prisoner's health and safety
with respect to the meals provided to the prisoner during his Ramadan fast, and thus, there was no violation of
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that prison personnel acted with the intent to provide
the prisoner and other Ramadan participants with proper nutrition and calories during Ramadan, and when they
learned the caloric value of the prison's Ramadan meals had been miscalculated, they corrected the caloric values
and added supplements to the meals to ensure that the goal of 2700 average calories was met. When the prisoner
complained of diarrhea, constipation, and headaches during Ramadan, he was seen by a DOC medical
professional and was treated for his complaints.
The court held that the prisoner's right to practice his Muslim religion was not substantially burdened, within
the meaning of RLUIPA, by the nature or quantity of food provided to him by prison personnel during the
Ramadan fast. According to the court, although the prisoner was not satisfied with the quality or quantity of the
food provided, he and other Ramadan participants were given a daily meal and supplements. The court found
that meals contained an average of 2700 calories and he and other vegetarian participants received additional
snacks to compensate for meat items they could not consume. The court noted that even though one meal that
was provided contained only approximately 1900 calories due to a mistake in packaging the Ramadan meals, the
mistake was corrected the next day and thereafter the prisoner was given calorically and nutritionally adequate
meals throughout the Ramadan fast. (Clallam Bay Corrections Center, Washington Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). The estate of a diabetic pretrial detainee brought an action
against a city, police officers, a county, the county sheriff, and a jail medical provider, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that a city
police officer at the scene of the arrest who had no involvement with the diabetic detainee could not be held
liable under § 1983 for being deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of detainee, who died from
diabetic ketoacidosis after she was taken to a county jail. The court also found that city police officers who
transported the detainee to the county jail, rather than a hospital, were not deliberately indifferent to the serious
medical needs of the detainee, where the officers were entitled to defer to the judgment of the paramedics on the
scene. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county sheriff knew of a serious risk to the health
of the diabetic pretrial detainee and consciously disregarded that risk, that any prior deaths at the jail involved
medical care provided to an inmate, much less that medical care involved an inmate with diabetes, or that the
sheriff's decisions about certification of the jail's medical contractor had any adverse effect on the detainee, as
would subject the sheriff to liability under § 1983, in his individual capacity, for his alleged deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The court found that the county's actions in shutting off

18.36

water to the mentally ill, diabetic pretrial detainee's cell when the inmate was stuffing clothing into the cell's
toilet did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights.
According to the court, the estate's claim against the county that the detainee, who died of diabetic
ketoacidosis after allegedly refusing diabetic treatment and food while incarcerated, was not properly treated for
her mental illness and diabetes was not actionable under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the
Rehabilitation Act. (Champaign County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
DENIAL OF FOOD
RELIGIOUS DIET

Johns v. Lemmon, 980 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Ind. 2013). An inmate, who was an Observant Jew, brought an
action against a prison superintendent and a commissioner of the department of corrections (DOC), alleging that
denial of food on Friday to consume on the Sabbath violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
plaintiff’s motion and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held that the prison's failure to provide food on
Friday to the inmate was a substantial burden on his religious exercise, and that the practice did not serve a
compelling governmental interest of food safety. The inmate sought to have food provided on Friday to consume
on the Sabbath, and the prison’s refusal required him to buy his Sabbath food from the commissary. The court
noted that the inmate's preferred practice was permitted for a period of about five months and during that time
the inmate stored meals in a cooler for a day, which other prisoners were permitted to do. (Miami Correctional
Facility, Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Lewis v. Zon, 920 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Jewish inmate brought an action against a state's
department of corrections and approximately 50 of its officials and employees pursuant to § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging denial of religious accommodations in
violation of the First Amendment and RLUIPA. The inmate moved for summary judgment and the defendants
cross moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and
granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) there was no evidence that the
prison's practice of inspecting the inmate's meals substantially burdened the prisoner's free exercise of his faith;
(2) the prison's policy of inspecting the prisoners' meals for dangerous items was objectively reasonable; (3) the
prison's offering of religious meal plans to inmates who demonstrated entitlement thereto preserved the inmates'
free exercise freedoms; (4) the prison's failure to provide the inmate with food during Jewish holy day fast days
was not cruel and unusual punishment; (5) there was no evidence that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's medical needs during his hunger strike; (6) a material fact dispute regarding whether
the inmate was denied medical treatment when he began experiencing pain after the culmination of his hunger
strike precluded summary judgment on the claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need; and (7)
the inmate's having to forego fresh bedding for a few hours after soiling his bedding was not a serious medical
situation requiring treatment.(New York State Department of Correctional Services, Upstate Correctional
Facility, Downstate Correctional Facility, Wende Correctional Facility, and Auburn Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison
officials, asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the
searches, denial of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities,
inadequacy of his diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine
mailed to him. The district granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food
and clothing and granted the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation,
and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to
the strip searches, and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of
the officials as to the strip search claims, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) even if there was a valid penological reason for the strip searches
conducted on a prisoner, the manner in which the searches were conducted was itself required to pass
constitutional muster, and (2) a jury instruction requiring the prisoner to negate the possibility that strip searches
would have occurred even if there had been no retaliatory motive was plain error. (Stateville Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
NUTRITION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Munson v. Gaetz, 957 F.Supp.2d 951 (S.D.Ill. 2013). A Buddhist inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging failure to provide him with an adequate diet, deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, and violations of his right to free exercise of religion. The officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officials were not aware that
feeding the inmate a soy-rich diet posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and therefore, the
officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that there was no evidence that a vegetarian diet containing soy was nutritionally
inadequate, as required for the Buddhist inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of his First Amendment free
exercise rights. The court held that the Buddhist inmate had administratively exhausted his claims that a highsoy diet fed to him violated the Eighth Amendment and his First Amendment free exercise rights, where he had
submitted grievances about the diet to the grievance office, he wrote to a warden and an assistant warden
regarding his grievances, and the prison officials did not respond to the grievances. (Menard Correctional Center,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Parkell v. Morgan, 917 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a medical provider and various officials, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that the detainee’s
allegations that he did not have adequate law library access were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violation
of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, where the detainee alleged he was provided access to a law
library, just not type he desired. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he adhered to a mystic branch

18.37

of Wicca and that the prison offered limited selection of diets to satisfy his religious needs were sufficient to
state a § 1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment religious rights. (Howard R. Young Correctional
Institution, Delaware)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Rich v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought an action
against the Florida Department of Corrections and corrections officials for money damages and injunctive relief,
alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), based on their failure
to provide him with a strictly kosher diet. The district court entered summary judgment for the Department and
the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that Florida's plan
to provide kosher meals to prisoners did not render the prisoner's claim moot because the new plan was not an
unambiguous termination of its policy which had deprived the prisoner of kosher meals. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether denial of kosher meals was in furtherance of a
compelling government interest, and as to whether denial of kosher meals was the least restrictive means to
further the cost and security interests that were asserted. (Union Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD
RELIGIOUS DIET

Washington v. Afify, 968 F.Supp.2d 532 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an
action against the department of correctional services (DOCS) employees, alleging violations of the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) ordering the inmate to clean up human waste did not
violate the Eighth Amendment; (2) housing the inmate with a cellmate who allegedly exposed the inmate to
pornographic images and prevented him from reciting his daily prayers with necessary humility and tranquility
did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free exercise right; (3) the inmate's allegations that he was denied
two religious breakfast meals and one evening meal during a Muslim holy month unless he signed up to work in
the mess hall were insufficient to state a claim; (4) the Muslim inmate's allegations that he was singled out in
being ordered to clean up feces, being transferred to a different cell, and transferred to new prison job were
insufficient to state a claim for violations of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. (Southport Correctional
Facility, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET
FREE EXERCISE

Banks v. Annucci, 48 F.Supp.3d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
correctional officers harassed him, tampered with his food and contaminated his Kosher meals, interfered with
his mail, mishandled his grievances, and interfered with his access to courts, and that prison medical employees
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs to
him. The district court held that the inmate's allegation that correctional officers tampered with or contaminated
his meals was sufficient to state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to nutritionally adequate
food prepared and served under conditions that did not present an immediate danger to his health and well-being.
The court found that the Jewish inmate's allegation that prison employees tampered with his sealed Kosher meals
on several occasions by unsealing items and/or contaminating them was sufficient to state a claim against an
employee for violation of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Dean v. Corrections Corporation of America, 108 F.Supp.3d 702 (D. Ariz. 2014). A state prisoner, who was an
adherent of the Essene faith, brought a § 1983 action against a private prison management company, warden, and
the State of Hawai’i Department of Public Safety, alleging that, following his assignment to a prison in Arizona,
he was denied a raw-food, vegetarian diet that had been requested, consistent with his religious beliefs, in
violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for a change of venue to the District of Arizona. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) material fact issues existed
as to the sincerity of the prisoner’s beliefs and whether those beliefs were substantially burdened; (2) the
potential perception of preferential treatment was not a compelling interest to justify a burden on the prisoner’s
religious practice under RLUIPA; (3) an inconsistency with simplified food service and additional costs
presented a compelling interest to justify the burden on the prisoner’s religious practice under RLUIPA; (4)
rejecting the prisoner’s requested diet was the least restrictive means to further a compelling government
interest; and (5) refusing the prisoner’s requested diet did not violate his First Amendment rights. (Saguaro
Correctional Center, operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers and a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while
incarcerated at a county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motions, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected
liberty interest was implicated. The inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting
classification officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel
had deemed a continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate remained on suicide watch for eight days after a
psychiatrist and a social worker recommended his removal from the suicide watch. The court also found a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of confinement while he was placed on
suicide watch imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life, such that it implicated a protected liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took away the inmate’s
clothing and required him to wear a suicide-safe garment-- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tear-resistant
material and Velcro. He was not allowed to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock.
He was housed in a stripped cell in the Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare
mattress and a blanket made out of the same coarse material as the smock. Corrections officers situated
immediately in front of the Plexiglass cell window constantly supervised the inmate. According to the county,

18.38

suicide watch inmates have access to the yard, a plastic spoon, a rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors,
and medical and mental health services, but the inmate claimed that he had no showers, telephone calls,
prescription medications, food, or access to the law library while in the BMHU. (Suffolk County Correctional
Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
city and city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related
to conditions of their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to
state a municipal liability claim; (2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a
sufficiently serious deprivation so as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth
Amendment claim based on the deprivation of laundry services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were
deliberately indifferent to their conditions of confinement; (5) the inmates’ administrative classification did not
implicate their liberty interests protected by due process; and (6) cell searches did not rise to the level of an
Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the cells flooded with sewage for up to eight-and-a-half
hours, during which they periodically lacked outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably unpleasant, but it was
not a significantly serious deprivation so as to violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. According to the
court, there was no constitutional right to outdoor recreation, and the inmates were not denied food entirely, but
rather, were not allowed to eat during periods of lock-down. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET

Noble v. Three Forks Regional Jail Authority, 995 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.Ky. 2014). A diabetic former inmate
brought an action against a regional county jail and a number of its employees, individually and in their official
capacities, alleging both constitutional claims under § 1983 and state claims stemming from his incarceration.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there
was no evidence that the county jail maintained an official policy or custom to deprive inmates of medical care
to save money, thus precluding the former inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
against jail arising from his alleged receipt of daily diabetes medication that was contrary to his doctor's advice,
and food that exacerbated his diabetic condition. The court found that the diabetic inmate was not at an excessive
risk of serious harm, nor did county jail employees fail to take adequate precautions to protect the inmate from
harm, and thus the employees were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical condition, in
violation of Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate received substantial medical attention while
incarcerated, and he was allowed special accommodations based on his diabetic condition, including taking his
medication and blood sugar test kit to his cell. He was granted a specialized menu from the cafeteria, and his
daily medication administration schedule was modified after consultation with a physician. (Three Forks
Regional Jail Authority, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
FOOD HANDLERS
PORTION
SERVICE

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail
officials, alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used
excessive force in uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The prisoner claimed indifferent supervision of jail
officers, when members of the Crips gang served him and other non-gang members “tiny food portions while
serving gang members large food portions.” The prisoner complained to officials and this resulted in the Crips
gang members being admonished and chided. The day after this chiding, the prisoner alleged that he and two
other non-Crips-affiliated inmates “were victims of gang assault where [plaintiff] & [another inmate] got cut &
stabbed.” According to the inmate, while the attack was occurring, a corrections officer allowed the Crips to act
with impunity and waited 20 to 30 minutes to press an alarm, and another officer failed to open a door that
would lead the prisoner to safety, and failed to use mace to break up the alleged gang assault. (New York City
Department of Correction, Riker’s Island)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Thompson v. Smeal, 54 F.Supp.3d 339 (M.D.Pa. 2014). A state prisoner brought a case against prison officials,
alleging that denial of his request that Christian inmates be granted communal feasts on Christmas and Easter
violated his religious and equal protection rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the officials again moved for summary
judgment, and the inmate moved for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motions. The court
held that summary judgment on the prisoner’s First Amendment claim was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the prison’s policy of refusing to provide Christmas and Easter communal meals
for Christians only, with a group prayer over the food, was legitimately and neutrally applied; (2) whether the
prison’s penological interests were served by allowing some religious meals and not others; and (3) whether
there were alternative means of exercising the prisoner’s right to free religious expression. According to the
court, summary judgment on the RLUIPA claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
denying communal meals to Christian inmates at the state prison was the least restrictive means to achieve the
prison’s alleged compelling interests of security, space limitations, and food safety concerns. (State Correctional
Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014). A Muslim state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 alleging that prison officials interfered with his
Ramadan observance. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that state prison officials' decision to
abandon the policy of requiring inmates to provide some physical indicia of the Islamic faith, such as a Quran,
Kufi, prayer rug, or written religious material obtained from the prison Chaplain's office, in order to receive

18.39

accommodations for a Ramadan observance did not moot the inmate's challenge to the policy as violative of his
rights under the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA, where the officials retained the authority and the capacity to
reinstate the policy. The court found that the policy violated the inmate's rights under the Free Exercise Clause,
where the inmate provided a reasonable explanation for the fact that he lacked physical manifestations of his
faith, officials ignored numerous signs that he was a practicing Muslim, and there was no evidence that the
requested accommodation would have been unduly burdensome. The inmate provided a state court judgment
against the Commonwealth as proof that the VDOC had lost his possessions, and also produced documents
showing that he was receiving common fare meals in accordance with his faith, and he informed officers that he
had observed Ramadan in 2008 and 2009. Despite this, an official responded, “that don't mean anything.” The
court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the inmate's action under
RLUIPA and § 1983. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGIOUS DIET

Winder v. Maynard, 2 F.Supp.3d 709 (D.Md. 2014). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a prison official, asserting that the official hindered his religious practice. The official filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court
held that denial of the inmate's request for pork products for a Wiccan ceremonial meal did not substantially
impede the inmate’s ability to practice his religious beliefs in violation of the Free Exercise Clause or the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the inmate's request for a
religious ceremonial meal had been approved and he was directed that while the requested pork products could
not be provided through the dietary department or prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchen
facilities, pork products could nevertheless be purchased through the commissary and consumed at the
ceremonial meal. According to the court, the prison's accommodation of other religious prisoners through the
adoption of a religious diet while allegedly refusing to provide pork products for Wiccan practitioners did not
violate the equal protection rights of the inmate because: (1) the kosher Jewish diet demanded certain food
preparation and food choices not required for Wiccan inmates; (2) neither Jewish nor Muslim inmates received
ritually slaughtered meat; (3) no pork was prepared in Department of Corrections (DOC) kitchens in order to
respect the religious dietary requirements of Jewish and Muslim inmates; (4) the prison was unable to provide
pork through dietary services due to legitimate penological goals regarding budget and security; (5) the prisoner
was free to purchase pork products through the commissary; and (6) prison meal plans were created in order to
see that the needs of all religious groups are accommodated. (Jessup Correctional Institution, Maryland)
2015

U.S. District Court
NUTRITION

Brown v. Moore, 93 F.Supp.3d 1032 (W.D. Ark. 2015). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and jail officials, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate’s being
housed with a prisoner who had a staph infection constituted deliberate indifference. The court found that the
inmate’s assertion that his diet was not approved on a yearly basis by a dietician in compliance with Arkansas
Jail Standards did not equate to a constitutional violation under the Eighth Amendment. (Boone County
Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET
FOOD QUALITY

Byrd v. Stirling, 144 F.Supp.3d 803 (D.S.C. 2015). A state inmate filed a civil action against prison officials,
alleging that the prison served him meals incompatible with his diabetes and that much of the food was expired,
rotten, or full of preservatives. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies before bringing the civil action in district court, and thus dismissal was warranted
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, the inmate did not complete all three
levels of internal review at the prison before he filed suit. (Manning Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
FOOD HANDLERS
RELIGION

Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015). A Muslim former inmate brought civil rights claims against
prison officials under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), seeking
monetary and injunctive relief. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the officials and the
former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded in part. The court held that
the inmate’s claims for injunctive relief, arising from an alleged requirement that he handle pork while working
in a kitchen, were moot because he had been released from custody. The court found that unsworn statements of
an inmate cook who told the Muslim inmate that the food service coordinator had directed the inmate cook to
mix pork in with meat used in a tamale pie were hearsay, and thus could not properly be considered in
opposition to the prison officials’ motion for summary judgment as to the Muslim inmate’s claim that his free
exercise rights were violated when he was served and ate the pie without notice that it contained pork. But the
court held that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the Muslim inmate’s § 1983 claim
that he was ordered in 2007 to cook pork loins as part of his job duties in a kitchen, in violation of his religious
beliefs. The court noted that the penitentiary implemented a policy prior to the incident in question, providing
that an inmate could opt out of handling pork on religious grounds, the inmate alleged that he told the officers in
charge that he had the right to not handle pork, and the fact that some officers claimed they were not personally
aware of the policy change was not sufficient to show that the inmate’s right to avoid handling pork was not
clearly established. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL DIET
COMMISSARY
NUTRITION

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a sheriff, prison
officials and a commissary, alleging that he was a diabetic and that, while incarcerated, he was not provided with
a medically appropriate diet, was not permitted to purchase food items from the prison commissary, and was the
subject of false misbehavior reports when he complained about his dietary issues. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to

18.40

allege that the prison commissary, operated by a private company, was acting under the color of state law, as
required to state constitutional claims against the commissary. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that
the commissary had a policy of denying commissary access to diabetic prisoners or had the authority to override
the prison's policy with respect to inmates with dietary restrictions, and instead, alleged that the prison
maintained a policy of limiting commissary access for prisoners with dietary restrictions. The court found that
the inmate did not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against a sergeant who allegedly would not process
the inmate's grievance related to his inability to purchase snacks from the prison commissary, where the sergeant
was acting in compliance with a state regulation, which required him, as the Grievance Coordinator, to return
grievances regarding issues outside the authority of the chief administrative officer to control, such as medical
decisions made by health care professionals.
The court held that the inmate adequately alleged that the food provided to him by the prison was not
nutritionally adequate with respect to his status as a diabetic and that the diet he was provided presented an
immediate danger to his health and well-being, and thus, the inmate met the objective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim for medical indifference. (Erie County Holding Center, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner, a Navajo Tribe member, brought an action under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections, seeking an order requiring the state prison system to accommodate some of his religious practices.
The district court granted the prison’s summary judgment motion. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the prisoner’s inability to eat game meat for a religious feast substantially burdened
his religious exercise, and as to whether the prisoner’s inability to wear a multicolored headband while praying
in his cell and during group religious ceremonies substantially burdened his religious exercise, and whether
prison had a compelling justification for prohibiting multicolored headbands. (Wisconsin Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
sheriff, and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to
unsanitary living conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly
invasive searches. The detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the
detention facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to what policies governed classification of pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail conditions imposed on
the detainee, including permitting the detainee, who was incarcerated for 32 days, to shower only three times,
only permitting the detainee outside of her cell for recreation on one occasion, failing to clean her cell, failing to
provide the detainee with clean clothing, and depriving the detainee of food, amounted to punishment. (Century
Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
NUTRITION

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought action under § 1983 against a county
alleging deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to the provision of adequate medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to pay adequate wages
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for his job in the jail’s laundry room. The district court dismissed the
case and the detainee appealed. The appeals court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the food he
received was “well below nutritional value,” as required to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference
to his health in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF FOOD

Smith v. Eovaldi, 112 F.Supp.3d 779 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a §
1983 action against several prison officers, alleging use of excessive force and exposure to inhumane conditions
in his cell. The prisoner alleged that after he had a “negative outburst” and was “maced” by a lieutenant and
removed from his cell by a corrections officer, he was taken to an infirmary bullpen, where he was forced to lie
on the floor. While he was on the floor, the prisoner alleged that officers kicked and punched him for ten
minutes, causing him to defecate upon himself. He alleged that after the incident, he was stripped of his prison
clothes and “inadequately seen” by “medical” personnel. At the screening stage of the case, the district court
dismissed the complaint in part against some defendants, but declined to dismiss with regard to the others. The
court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims against several prison officers for use of excessive
force by alleging that the officers engaged in prolonged attacks against him and that one officer subsequently
attacked him again. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF FOOD
FOOD QUALITY
NUTRITION

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against a
prison superintendent, a corrections sergeant, and corrections officers, alleging unsanitary conditions, theft of
legal documents, harassment, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary
judgment to the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court’s decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that remand was required for the district court to
address issue in first instance of whether the prisoner had a right under the First, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
Amendments to refuse to provide false information to a corrections officer. The court held that the prisoner
adequately pleaded an Eighth Amendment claim against prison officials by alleging that his restricted diet was
unusually unhealthy, where his diet consisted of bread that was usually stale and cabbage that usually was rotten.
(Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

18.41

2016
U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). A Wisconsin state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison staff, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to exercise his religion freely, specifically by
preventing him from fasting properly during a Muslim holy month. The district court granted the staff’s motion
for summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held
that: (1) denial of meal bags substantially burdened the prisoner’s free exercise rights; (2) fact issues existed as
to whether staff members were personally involved; (3) fact issues existed as to whether staff members acted
intentionally; and (4) qualified immunity did not shield the staff members, where the prisoner had a clearly
established right to a diet consistent with his religious beliefs. The court noted that the denial of meal bags to the
Muslim prisoner substantially burdened his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion, where, without
meal bags, the prisoner was forced to choose between foregoing adequate nutrition or violating a central tenant
of his religion, i.e., fasting properly during holy month. According to the court, the prisoner was thereby denied a
proper meal for a 55–hour period, which left him weak and tired, unsure if he would ever be put back on the
appropriate list to receive meal bags, and pressured to use the cafeteria during daylight hours, contrary to his
religious beliefs. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

18.42

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XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

XIX

the hands of other inmates who were not homosexual, and they could be subjected to assaults by
homophobic fellow inmates. The court found that the rule was not void for vagueness under the
First Amendment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2006
U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Americans United For Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Bacon v. Taylor, 414 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS LITERATURE
BOOKS

Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate sued state prison officials under § 1983
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging a ban on
books the inmate deemed necessary for the practice of his Odinist religion. The district court
entered summary judgment for the officials and the inmate appealed. The appeals court held that,
even if the state substantially burdened the inmate's religious exercise by banning books he
deemed necessary to practice his Odinist religion, the ban on such books was the least restrictive
means to promote a compelling state interest in safety, and thus did not violate the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court noted that the books promoted violence
to exalt the status of whites and demean other races, and that redaction of offensive material was
not a realistic option. According to the court, a state prison procedure that prohibited activities and
literature that advocate racial or ethnic supremacy or purity was not overbroad, in violation of free
speech guarantees or RLUIPA, where the overbreadth of the regulation was not substantial in
relation to its proper applications. Officials had refused to allow the inmate to possess the books

XX

F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D.Iowa 2006). A separation of church and state advocacy group, and affected
state prison inmates, sued the State of Iowa, claiming that funding of a contract under which an
organization providing pre-release rehabilitation services to inmates through a program based on
Evangelical Christianity violated the Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs moved for declarative
and injunctive relief. The district court held that: (1) the service provider was operating under color
of state law, for purposes of a suit under § 1983; (2) the program was pervasively sectarian; (3) the
program did not involve payments made at the direction of inmates, which would not violate
Establishment Clause; (4) the program fostered excessive entanglement of government with
religion; (5) the contract violated the Establishment Clause. The service provider was enjoined
from further contract performance, would not be paid amounts due under its contract, and would
be forced to return all payments received. The court noted that the plaintiffs had standing to sue
the State of Iowa and corrections officials and the prison ministries organization, even though they
were not Iowa taxpayers, because the inmate plaintiffs had made contributions to the telephone
fund, designed to finance telephone use by inmates, from which withdrawals had been allegedly
made to pay for the prison ministry in question. The court noted that if secular activities of a
pervasively sectarian organization may be separated from sectarian activities, the secular
activities may be funded by the government without violating the Establishment Clause. The
court found that all instruction, regardless of subject, with exception of computer science, was
presented as an aspect of Evangelical Christianity, and participants were required to participate in
single and group devotional activities. According to the court, state prison inmates were not given
true freedom of choice, there was no secular alternative to participation in the program, which
offered superior living quarters and some relaxation of prison rules. The program provider was
required to return the $1,529,182 paid by the state. (Iowa Department of Corrections and
InnerChange Freedom Initiative, Newton Correctional Facility)

three correctional officers, alleging denial of his First Amendment right of access to courts,
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights, and cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment
for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that
a correctional officer, on one occasion, smoked a cigarette on the tier by another inmate's cell and
blew smoke into that inmate's cell, and that on several occasions the correctional officer smoked in
the isolated control pod, did not sufficiently allege that the prisoner was exposed to unreasonably
high levels of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) to the degree necessary to state claim a under §
1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the prisoner's allegation that a
correctional officer opened and read the draft of his lawsuit against her and then refused to return
it to him did not sufficiently allege an actual injury as required to state a claim under § 1983 for
violation of First Amendment constitutional right of access to the courts. The prisoner alleged only
that as a result of not receiving his original draft back he had forgotten the exact dates he saw the
officer smoking in the prison, but the prisoner did not allege that his inability to remember specific
dates had unduly prejudiced his case against the officer. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison authorities could have
reasonably interpreted the prisoner's draft of a § 1983 lawsuit against a correctional officer as a
threat to the security and safety of the prison, or that a reasonable person would have known that
the document was the draft of a legal complaint against the officer, justifying his placement in
administrative segregation rather than constituting retaliation for the prisoner having exercised
his First Amendment free speech rights by drafting the lawsuit against the officer. (Howard R.
Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

19.67

Creed of Iron, Temple of Wotan, and The NPKA Book of Blotar, which he said were necessary to

practice his religion. The inmate identified his religion as Odinism (or Odinic Rite), which like
Asatru and Wotanism entails the worship of Norse gods. The inmate maintained that the books
were religious texts. The officials conceded that Odinism is a religion. (Wisconsin Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
NEWSPAPERS

Calia v. Werholtz, 426 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D.Kan. 2006). A former state prison inmate, proceeding pro

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Crenshaw v. Herbert, 445 F.Supp.2d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

George v. Smith, 467 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prisoner sued prison officials under §

se, brought a § 1983 action against corrections officials, alleging that their enforcement against
him of rules restricting certain inmates' ability to subscribe to newspaper, magazine, and
newsletter publications violated his First Amendment rights. The court granted summary
judgment for the officials. The court held that the inmate’s\l claims for injunctive relief were moot
and that the officials were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity insofar as the inmate's
action sought monetary damages and was brought against the officials in their official capacities.
The court found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because enforcement of the
rules did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. (Lansing Correctional Facility,
Kansas)
alleging that corrections employees violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him
from certain jobs, allegedly in retaliation for filing a grievance against a corrections officer with
whom he had an altercation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected activity
and the adverse actions. The court noted that the inmate was initially removed from his nurse's
aide position because of his own fears for his safety there, and his removal from a laundry job was
allegedly for poor performance. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

1983, alleging deprivation of his free speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion in part and stayed in part. The court held that: (1) the officials’ ban on the prisoner’s receipt
of a newsletter on the ground that the newsletter solicited gifts did not violate the prisoner’s free
speech rights; (2) a prohibition against the prisoner possessing an atlas did not violate his free
speech rights; (3) the officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in concluding that a
magazine advocated behavior consistent with a gang and thus was prohibited by regulation; and
(4) the prisoner was not exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke. The
court found that the prison officials’ ban on the prisoner’s receipt of a newsletter that advocated for
healthcare improvements in the prison and encouraged readers to “(s)end donations” and to urge
their families to “join in the fight,” did not violate the prisoner’s free speech rights, in that it was a
reasonable application of the prison policy prohibiting delivery of correspondence soliciting gifts.
Similarly, the court held that the prohibition against the prisoner possessing an atlas had a
reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological interest, and thus did not violate his free speech
rights, in that the possession of an atlas might allow the prisoner to plot escape routes. The court
held that prison officials did not violate the prisoner’s speech rights in concluding that a magazine
advocated behavior consistent with a gang, and thus was prohibited by a prison regulation, in as
much as it was neither arbitrary nor irrational for the prison officials to conclude that a picture in
the magazine portrayed gang-related hand signs. (Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Giarratano v. Johnson, 456 F.Supp.2d 747 (W.D.Va. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Gray v. Johnson, 436 F.Supp.2d 795 (W.D.Va. 2006). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against

XX

against the director of a state corrections department, challenging the constitutionality of a
statutory exclusion of prisoners from making requests for public records under the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA). The district court dismissed the action. The court held that
the statutory exclusion of prisoners from making requests for public records under the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) was rationally related to a legitimate state interest, and thus,
it did not violate the inmate's right to equal protection. The court noted that the Virginia General
Assembly, in passing the exclusion, could have believed that inmates were intrinsically prone to
abusing VFOIA request provisions and that such frivolous requests would unduly burden state
resources, or that inmates had less need to access public records because their confinement greatly
limited the amount of contact they had with state government. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)
prison officials claiming that he was compelled to participate in a residential substance abuse
program that allegedly contained religious elements, in violation of the Establishment Clause of
First Amendment. The Therapeutic Community Program (TCP) was operated for inmates with a
history of substance abuse who have twelve to eighteen months left to serve. Those who qualify for
the TCP either have to participate or forfeit the right to accrue good conduct time. Members of the
TCP live together in a dorm and they are required to actively participate, and to encourage other
members to do the same. If an inmate fails to participate satisfactorily, he loses his good conduct
time, and prison officials may transfer him to a dorm with other inmates who either refuse to
participate or who have refused to cooperate once in the program. The TCP offers therapeutic

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group meetings, educational seminars, group talent shows, and Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and
Narcotics Anonymous meetings (NA). The program consists of five “phases,” each of which
requires the completion of a variety of tasks, ranging from demonstrating certain behavioral
modifications to completing a written test. The goal of each participant is to “phase out” of the
program by completing the requisite activities for each phase. To that end, participants have at
their disposal a library of self-help materials.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that prison
officials had an objectively reasonable belief that the prisoner's participation in the residential
substance abuse program did not violate his rights, and therefore were entitled to qualified
immunity in prisoner's § 1983 action claiming that he was compelled to participate in the program
in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Prison officials had previously
taken actions in order to bring the program into compliance with Establishment Clause, including
making Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) participation optional,
removing any religious references from inspirational readings, separating religious library
materials from secular ones, making the use of any religious library materials completely optional,
and enacting a rule prohibiting participants from proselytizing but allowing them to discuss the
role of religion in their personal recovery. According to the court, these steps created an objectively
reasonable belief that the program complied with Establishment Clause.
The court held that the program did not have a non-secular legislative purpose in violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, where the program's dominant purpose was
rehabilitation of inmates with a history of substance abuse, and prison officials demonstrated that
rehabilitation was the true goal of program, not a sham secular purpose. According to the court,
the program did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause, where a reasonable observer would not construe religious activities which
took place in program, including a single historical discussion of the Essene community, the
performance of a single gospel song at a talent show, the availability of non-mandatory Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, and the availability of spiritual
materials in the community library, as advancement of religion by the state, since all activities
involved free expression of other participants in program. The court found that the program did not
impermissibly entangle religion and government in violation of the Establishment Clause, where
staff members were required to intervene to prevent proselytizing when individuals expressed
their faith during the program. (Therapeutic Community Program, Botetourt Corr’l Ctr., Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006). Black and Latino inmates and parolees brought an
action against the New York Governor, Chairperson of the Board of Elections, and Commissioner
of Corrections to challenge, as a violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), a statute
disenfranchising incarcerated and paroled felons. The district court dismissed the claim. The
inmates and parolees appealed and en banc review was granted. The appeals court affirmed and
remanded, finding that the VRA prohibition against voting qualifications or prerequisites that
resulted in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color did not apply to
vote denial and dilution claims. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
PUBLICATIONS

Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. California Department of Corrections, 456 F.Supp.2d 1188
(E.D.Cal. 2006). A prison ministry program and state prisoners brought an action against the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR), alleging that a correctional
facility's policy prohibiting the sending of free softbound Christian literature, compact discs, and
tapes to prisoners who have requested those materials violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and their First Amendment rights. The court held that the
policy violated prisoners' free exercise and free speech rights under First Amendment. According to
the court, the asserted penological goals of preventing the receipt of contraband, reducing fire
hazards, increasing the efficiency of random cell inspections or enhancing prison security did not
justify the policy, and the distinction between approved vendors and unapproved vendors was
arbitrary and not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court also found that
the policy violated prisoners' rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) where the approved vendor policy placed a “substantial burden” on the exercise of
the prisoners' religious beliefs because prisoners were unable to engage in conduct that is
motivated by their sincere religious beliefs without access to the materials provided by the
unapproved vendor at no cost, and the unique study and worship materials provided by the
unapproved vendor were unavailable through any of the approved vendors. (California State
Substance Abuse Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
MOVIES

Jewell v. Gonzales, 420 F.Supp.2d 406 (W.D.Pa. 2006). A class of inmates brought an action

XX

against the U.S. Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and a warden,
challenging the constitutionality of a program statement and institutional supplement prohibiting
the showing of unedited R-rated movies to inmates. The parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The district
court held that the class of inmates had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the program
statement and institutional supplement. According to the court, the prohibition lacked a rational
connection to the legitimate governmental interest of advancing punishment and deterrence, as

19.69

required for the prohibition to pass muster under the First Amendment. The court also found that
the prohibition lacked a rational connection to the legitimate governmental interest of providing a
safe and non-hostile work environment to prison employees, where the government failed to
establish that individuals who had chosen corrections work would have been strongly offended by
the showing of R-rated films. But the court held that the prohibition did have a rational connection
to the legitimate governmental interest of ensuring efficient allocation of prison resources, as
required for the prohibition to pass muster under the First Amendment, because the rule
amendment authorizing the prohibition was aimed at ensuring that taxpayers' money was spent
on reasonable measures to maintain and secure prisoners rather than on unnecessary luxuries.
The court also found that the prohibition had a rational connection to a legitimate governmental
interest of promoting the rehabilitation of federal inmates, where the government reasonably
viewed R-rated films as a medium which often contained types of negative messages, references or
stimuli that reinforced criminogenic risk factors. The court noted that the prohibition preserved an
alternative means for prisoners to exercise their First Amendment rights because inmates retained
access to films rated G, PG, and PG-13 as well as cable television programming and R-rated films
edited for standard television, and that such an accommodation would not have had an
impermissible ripple effect upon prison resources. (Federal Correctional Institution, McKean,
Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). State prisoners brought an action against prison

U.S. District Court
CRITICISM
CONVERSATION

King v. Ditter, 432 F.Supp.2d 813 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action,

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

XX

officials, claiming that a policy of opening and inspecting their legal mail outside of their presence
violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted judgment for the prisoners and
the officials appealed. Another district court on similar claims granted judgment for the officials
and the prisoners in that case also appealed. The cases were consolidated on appeal. The court
entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that the policy of opening legal mail outside the
presence of the addressee prisoner impinged upon the prisoner's right to freedom of speech under
the First Amendment, and that the legal mail policy was not reasonably related to the prison's
legitimate penological interest in protecting the health and safety of prisoners and staff. The court
held that reasonable prison administrators would not have realized that they were violating the
prisoners' First Amendment free speech rights by opening prisoners' legal mail outside of the
prisoners' presence, entitling them to qualified immunity. The court noted that although the
administrators maintained the policy after three relatively uneventful years had passed after the
September 11 terrorist attacks and subsequent anthrax concerns, the policy was reasonable when
it was established. (New Jersey Department of Corrections)
a prison job supervisor, alleging that the supervisor lowered his pay and ultimately fired him for
criticizing the supervisor's managerial practices. The supervisor moved for dismissal and the
district court dismissed in part, and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the inmate
stated a First Amendment retaliation claim, when the complaint alleged that the inmate engaged
in the protected activities of writing letter to warden and complaining to others about supervisor's
racism and changes in work schedule, and that the inmate experienced adverse actions in
response. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

challenging the confiscation of his outgoing letter, which contained a swastika and a reference to
the Ku Klux Klan. The prisoner alleged violations of his First Amendment free speech rights, and
his due process rights. The district court dismissed the due process claim, and granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants on remaining claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison regulation, prohibiting prisoners from possessing
symbolism that could be associated with any inmate group not approved by the warden, was not
impermissibly vague, for the purpose of determining whether the regulation was facially violative
of the prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. According to the court, although the
regulation gave some discretion and flexibility to prison officials, the prison setting required it to
ensure order and safety. The appeals court deferred to state prison officials' assessment of whether
a swastika and a reference to the Ku Klux Klan in the prisoner's outgoing letter were gang-related
symbols, for the purpose of the prisoner's claim that seizure of the letter by prison officials violated
his First Amendment right to free speech, where knowledge of gang symbolism was acquired
primarily through interaction with and observation of prisoners, and the symbolism was constantly
changing. According to the court, the confiscation of the prisoner's outgoing letter furthered the
substantial governmental interest in prisoner rehabilitation, and thus, it did not violate the
prisoner's First Amendment free speech rights. The court noted that the letter was an attempt to
express the prisoner's affiliation with racially intolerant groups, which thwarted the state's goals of
encouraging the prisoner to live crime-free when released from custody, and fostering the
prisoner's ability to resolve conflicts without violence. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

Muntaqim v. Coombe, 449 F.3d 371 (2nd Cir. 2006). A felon filed an action alleging that New

York's felon disenfranchisement statute violated the Voting Rights Act. The district court granted
the prison officials' motion for summary judgment, and the felon appealed. The appeals court held

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that felon was not a resident of New York and thus did not have standing to challenge New York's
felon disenfranchisement statute as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. The court noted that even
though the felon had been incarcerated in New York prisons for the past 30 years, the inmate was
a California resident before he was incarcerated in New York, he was never resident of New York,
and he disavowed any intention to become a resident of New York in future. (Shawangunk
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER PUBLICATIONS

Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
several correctional officers and medical personnel at a prison. The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that a state
regulation governing prison publications did not give the prisoner a liberty interest, protected by
the due process clause, in participating in the publication and distribution of an inmate
publication, where the regulation granted unfettered discretion to prison officials to restrict
prisoner publications. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought an action against prison

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. The court also held that the officials did not violate the inmate’s First
Amendment free speech rights by refusing the word puzzles sent by the inmate’s family through
regular mail and by disallowing catalogs for magazines or books, where there was no allegation
that the inmate had been denied actual magazines or books, and word puzzles were not permitted
under prison regulations. According to the court, the prison officials' denials of several privileges
while the inmate was voluntarily housed in a security housing unit, including extra visits, reading
material, exercise, television, cleaning tools, boiling water, ice, razors, and additional writing
utensils, were not a sufficiently serious deprivation to support the inmate's claim that the denials
constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Delaware Correctional
Center)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Perez v. Frank, 433 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A Sunni Muslim inmate sued a state prison,
claiming violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and the First Amendment. The inmate petitioned for permission to proceed in forma
pauperis. The district court held that: (1) the prison did not violate RLUIPA by refusing to leave a
dayroom open all hours, to allow for ritual washing (Wudu) at any time; (2) the inmate could
proceed with his claim that he was barred from participating in named religious ceremonies and
from joining in a group prayer, in violation of RLUIPA; (3) the inmate could proceed with his claim
that he was denied prayer oil, in violation of RLUIPA; (4) the inmate could proceed with his claim
that his exercise of religion rights under First Amendment were violated; (5) the denial of desired
quantities of prayer oil and the opportunity for inmate-led services was not an Establishment
Clause violation; (6) the inmate could proceed with his claim that the disparity of treatment for
feast days, for various religions, was an Establishment Clause violation; and (7) the inmate could
proceed with his claim that denial of access to Muslim lectures was a freedom of speech violation.
(New Lisbon Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
NAME

Porter v. Caruso, 431 F.Supp.2d 768 (W.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed an action alleging that
prison officials violated his First Amendment free exercise rights by refusing to refer to him by his
new legal name, and by denying his request to be placed on a kosher meal plan. The officials moved
to dismiss and the district court held that dismissal of the inmate's exhausted claims was not
warranted. The inmate asserted that he was an adherent of an ancient Egyptian religion known as
Kemetic Spiritual Science, and that as part of his religious faith he legally changed his name. The
inmate alleged that corrections officials repeatedly failed to comply with their own policy directives
and forced him to refer to himself by his former name. (Mich. Dept. of Corrections)

XX

personnel, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court entered
judgment upon jury verdict in favor of the inmate. Inmate appealed the court’s refusal to award
attorney fees and declaratory relief, and a prison warden and social worker cross-appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's oral complaints to prison
personnel about prison conditions, including the use of shackles in group therapy and denial of
yard time to prisoners in a pre-transfer unit, related to matters of public concern and were
designed to effect a change in prison policy, and thus, they were protected by the First
Amendment. The court held that the inmate, who was awarded only nominal damages under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in his action against prison personnel, was not entitled to an
attorney fee award greater than 150% of the nominal damages based on his claim for declaratory
judgment, that his punishment by personnel was illegal. The court noted that the only relief the
inmate secured was nominal damages, and since the inmate had already been transferred to
another facility, a declaratory judgment would have been largely duplicative of the jury's verdict
concluding that personnel had retaliated against inmate. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

19.71

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 2006). A prison legal journal, Prison Legal
News (PLN), brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), challenging the
agency's refusal to grant a waiver of search and duplication fees associated with a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) document request. The district court granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff, finding that the BOP was the proper defendant in the action, and the BOP improperly
denied the fee waiver request. According to the court, PLN demonstrated that the disclosure of
records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would contribute to the understanding
of government operations or activities, as required to qualify for a fee waiver, since the information
at issue had not reached the threshold level of dissemination, and where the request sought
information regarding specific events that occurred within BOP facilities that would provide
insight to the public about how its federal prisons were being managed and operated, and how its
tax dollars were being expended. PLN had submitted a FOIA request to the BOP seeking “a copy of
all documents showing all money paid by the [BOP] for lawsuits and claims against it” between
January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. Specifically, the plaintiff sought “a copy of the verdict,
settlement or claim in each case showing the dollar amount paid, the identity of the
plaintiff/claimant and the legal identifying information for each lawsuit or claim or attorney fee
award” and “a copy of the complaint ... or the claim ... in each incident which describes the facts
underlying each lawsuit and claim.” Under FOIA, fees will be waived if “disclosure of the
information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the
commercial interest of the requester.” To support its request for a fee waiver, PLN provided the
following information in its letter to the BOP: “PLN is a § 501[c](3) non-profit organization. We
are a serious legal and political journal that reports on news and litigation involving detention
facilities. We have published monthly since 1990 and currently have around 3,400 subscribers in
all 50 states. We [e]stimate our actual readership to [be] in the range of 18,000 people. We believe
that the requested documents will shed light on the operations of the BOP and help provide the
public with a better understanding of how the nation's prison system is run and managed since
damage verdicts and settlements are an important means of measuring respect for constitutional
rights within penal facilities. Moreover, the payout of government money is a strong indicator to
tax payers of how government facilities are operated. The information requested is plainly related
to the operations and activities of the BOP.” (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
HAIR

Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner challenged a prison's

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
SEX OFFENDERS

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). A civilly-committed sex offender brought an
action against the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, other
Department officials, and sex offender program employees, alleging violations of federal and state
law for being placed in isolation, receiving inadequate medical attention, and being retaliated
against. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the offender
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that placement of the civilly-committed sex
offender in isolation because of rule infractions did not infringe on his procedural due process
rights, given that his commitment was indefinite, that he received notice and had the right to be
heard, that the decision to use isolation was a discretionary decision by state officials, and that the
State had a vital interest in maintaining a secure environment. The court found that the
offender's transfer was not in retaliation for his alleged advocacy for another patient, so as to
violate the offender's speech rights, where the sex offender program officials indicated that they
transferred the offender to lessen his contact with the patient, whom the offender was suspected of
exploiting, and where the offender failed to present any evidence that the transfer took place for
any other reason. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Minnesota Department of Human Services)

U.S. District Court
NAME

Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se action against

XX

grooming policy as violative of his constitutional rights and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The Rastafarian prisoner sought to wear his hair and
beard uncut but he was punished under the prison’s policy. The state moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion, holding that the policy was constitutional, that
RLUIPA was constitutional, that prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the
policy did not violate RLUIPA. According to the court, the inmate grooming policy was rationally
related to legitimate penological interests and thus did not violate the Rastafarian prisoner's rights
under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment, or the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The court found that the policy furthered
compelling penological interests in security, staff safety, inmate identification, and inmate health,
and that a proposed religious exception to the policy was unworkable. (Virginia Department of
Corrections)

prison officials under § 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
alleging denial of his rights to worship, to petition for redress of grievances, and to have access to
courts. The prisoner requested a preliminary injunction and the district court denied the request.
The court held that the prisoner stated cause of action against prison officials under § 1983 seeking
monetary damages for First Amendment and RLUIPA violations by alleging that all inmates in his
housing unit were denied communal worship. The court noted that the statute prohibiting

19.72

prisoners from bringing federal civil actions for mental or emotional injury absent a showing of
physical injury does not restrict damages in a First Amendment constitutional claim. The court
found that the prisoner stated cause of action for First Amendment violations in § 1983 complaint
against a prison chaplain and administrative assistant, in connection with alleged denial of
communal worship, in that it was reasonable to infer from the prisoner's factual allegations that
such officials might have implemented or enforced, or could have lifted, the restrictions at issue
while the prisoner was in certain housing units. According to the court, the alleged failure of state
prison officials to quickly correct records that listed the prisoner's religion, with the result that the
prisoner was prevented from engaging in communal worship for 39 days, if proven, did not violate
the prisoner's First Amendment rights where any such actions were the result of negligence, not an
intent to deny the prisoner access to worship. The court found that allegations of the prisoner's
complaint against prison officials, stating that he was not allowed to use his religious name to send
or receive mail, stated a cause of action under the First Amendment and RLUIPA for monetary
damages and injunctive relief. The court ruled that prison officials' alleged actions of denying the
prisoner access to a law library, denying him the ability to make copies, and confiscating his legal
materials, if proven, did not violate his constitutional right of access to courts, in that he could
write to the court and thus could file a complaint, he could send an original document and state
that he was unable to obtain copies, and he did not maintain that unreturned legal papers were
not replaceable. The court noted that there is no abstract, freestanding right to a law library, and
a prisoners' constitutional right of access to courts goes no further than access. The court found
that the confiscation of a prisoner's legal paperwork is merely a property loss, not a denial of the
constitutional right of access to courts, if the papers are replaceable. (Miami Correctional Facility,
Indiana)
U.S. District Court
NAME
RELIGION

Shidler v. Moore, 446 F.Supp.2d 942 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A Sunni Muslim inmate brought a civil

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
CRITICISM

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a prison official transferred him in retaliation for his exercising his First Amendment
rights. After a jury verdict in the inmate's favor, the official filed a motion for a new trial, and the
inmate moved for costs and attorney fees. The district court held that the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) that prohibited inmates from recovering mental or
emotional damages in the absence of a the physical injury, did not bar the inmate's claim for
emotional damages and that evidence supported the award of punitive damages. The court applied
only $1 of the inmate's damages award to his attorney fee award. The court noted that a jury may
be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the defendant's conduct is shown
to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless disregard or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others. According to the court, the jury's award of
punitive damages against the prison official was supported by evidence that the official transferred
the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights in
complaining to the official's superiors about the official's misconduct, even though the official was
aware that the transfer would prevent the inmate from seeing his attorney, from paying his
attorney, and from seeing his emotionally-disabled daughter. (Michigan Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
FREE SPEECH

Smith v. Miller, 423 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action

XX

rights action against prison officials who allegedly prevented him from practicing his religion. The
district court held that the inmate's allegations regarding the prison's prayer oil policy stated
claims for declaratory relief, monetary and punitive damages for a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and for declaratory relief as well as nominal and punitive damages for a
violation of Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate alleged
that a prison official created and enforced a policy prohibiting the use of prayer oil, that when the
policy was changed, only one type of oil was available and that he was allergic to it, and that the
official refused to permit him to purchase an alternative to which he was not allergic. The court
found that the inmate's allegation that he was denied communal worship even though Christians
were permitted communal worship, that he was denied the ability to participate in Ramadan
activities, and that he was classified as a Christian for the purpose of preventing him from
practicing his religion, also stated a claim. But the court found that the prison policy that
prevented the inmate from using his religious name on his mail did not violate his First
Amendment right to free exercise of religion, absent an allegation that the inmate had legally
changed his name in state court, or that members of other religious groups were able to change
their names more easily. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

challenging prison officials' decision to confiscate his anarchist materials. The officials moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that fact issues remained as to whether mere
possession of anarchist literature presented a clear and present danger to prison security. The
court opened its opinion by stating: “The issue of anarchism has raised its ugly face again, this
time in a prison context…The question here focuses on whether or not prison officials at the
Indiana State Prison are authorized to confiscate anarchist materials from inmates incarcerated
there…While the question presented here is a very close one, and it may be one on which the
prison authorities will later prevail….there needs to be a more extensive factual record.” The court

19.73

noted that if a trial were to be held, the court would attempt to appoint counsel for the plaintiff and
make every effort to keep the case as narrowly confined as possible. According to the court,
“Although it is a close case, there is enough here, if only barely enough, to keep the courthouse
doors open for this claim which necessarily involves overruling and denying the defendants'
motion.” (Indiana State Prison)
U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION

Stewart v. Alameida, 418 F.Supp.2d 1154 (N.D.Cal. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Swope v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 439 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). A federal inmate brought a pro se
action under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking copies of recorded telephone
conversations between him and third parties in the possession of Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The
district court held that the third parties involved with the calls did not waive their privacy
interests, that the recordings were exempt from disclosure, and that the exempt and non-exempt
portions of the recordings were non-segregable. According to the court, the BOP recordings of
inmate telephone conversations are the functional equivalent of “law enforcement records” for the
purposes of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption from disclosure of law enforcement
records that would involve an invasion of a third party's privacy. (Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
MAIL
LEGAL MAIL

Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that a prison policy that required prisoners to purchase all hobby
materials, legal materials, books, and magazines from their prison accounts, and prohibiting gifts
to prisoners of such materials from unauthorized sources, violated his due process rights, his right
of access to the courts, and his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner appealed. According to the court, the confiscation of
documents mailed to the prisoner which were purchased by a person who was a visitor of another
inmate, did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights, where the ban was content neutral,
it was rationally related to the penological interest of preventing bartering, extortion, possession of
contraband, and other criminal activity by prisoners, the prisoner was still able to purchase the
same materials himself using funds from his prison account, and he had access to the same
materials in the prison law library. The court noted that permitting such third-party gifts and then
trying to control the resultant security problems through reactive efforts of prison officers would
impose an undue burden on prison staff and resources. The court held that the inmate’s proposed
accommodation, allowing third party gifts if third parties provided relevant information, such as
the source, amount, and manner of payment, would entail data collection, processing, and
substantial staff resources. The suit was prompted by prison officials' interception of three parcels
mailed to plaintiff. The first contained books from a “Mystery Guild” book club; the other two
contained legal documents from the Colorado State Archives and the Library of Congress which
had been purchased for the plaintiff by a third party who was listed as another inmate's visitor
and, thus, fell within a Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) prohibition on gifts from
unauthorized sources. The court also held that denial of the prisoner's access to courts claim that
challenged the prison policy restricting receipt of his legal mail, was warranted, absent a showing
that the prisoner's failure to receive his legal mail actually frustrated, impeded, or hindered his
efforts to pursue a legal claim. (Fremont Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept,, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). A registered sex offender brought

XX

action against California corrections officials alleging violation of his First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational and due process rights, claiming that his validation as a gang associate
kept him in a secure housing unit. Officials moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that state regulations providing for gang validation based on
association bore a rational relation to a penological interest in institutional security and that the
full accommodation of inmate's associational rights would seriously hinder security and
compromise safety. According to the court, an interview after he was gang-validated afforded the
inmate an adequate procedural remedy consistent with due process. The court found that any of
three photographs of the inmate posing with inmates, some of whom were validated gang
associates and one of whom was a validated gang member, supported the inmate's gang validation
consistent with due process. (San Quentin Adjustment Center, California)

a civil rights suit challenging the provisions of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act that
required sex offenders to register, and the provision of the statute that prohibited certain
registered sex offenders from living within two thousand feet of a school or a daycare center. The
district court denied the offenders’ motion for class certification and dismissed the suit for failure
to state a claim. The offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held: (1) the
residency restriction did not violate substantive due process; (2) the residency restriction did not
violate equal protection by treating the high-risk offenders who did not own property differently
from the property-owning high risk offenders or from low-risk offenders; (3) the restrictions did not
violate a constitutional right to travel; (4) the restriction did not constitute an unconstitutional ex
post facto law as applied to the offenders who sustained convictions prior to the enactment of the
statute; and (5) the offenders were not deprived of any liberty interest in avoiding a risk
assessment without procedural due process. The court held that the statute rationally advanced a

19.74

legitimate government purpose of protecting children from the most dangerous sex offenders by reducing their
proximity to the locations frequented by children, that the statute was intended to be regulatory and non-punitive, and
was not punitive in effect. (Arkansas General Assembly, Sex and Child Offender Registration Act)
2007
U.S. District Court
LANGUAGE

Allah v. Poole, 506 F.Supp.2d 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate sued correctional officers under § 1983, alleging
various violations of his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a commissary supervisor's directive to the inmate and other
prisoners working at the commissary, that they speak to each other only in English, did not violate any constitutional
right the inmate may have had to converse with fellow prisoners in Spanish. According to the court, the stated rationale
for the directive, to ensure the supervisor's own safety, was indisputably legitimate and the restriction on the inmate's
use of Spanish applied only while he was working in the commissary. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
PUBLICATIONS

Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A former prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, challenging alleged denials of publications and mail, as well as alleged retaliatory acts by officials.
The district court granted summary judgment as to certain claims and the officials moved for reconsideration as to a
portion of that order and for summary judgment, and the inmate moved for summary judgment. The district court held
that reconsideration of summary judgment was warranted by genuine issues of fact that existed as to whether prison
officials violated the inmate's First Amendment rights by retaliating against him after he brought numerous grievances
and a civil rights action. The court found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity as to books containing
sexually explicit materials, instructions on fighting techniques and military procedures and materials, criminal
investigatory techniques, and instructions on building electronic devices, but issues of fact existed as to whether prison
officials denied a book about revolution and four legal books based on their content. (Georgia Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
REGULATIONS

Daker v. Wetherington, 469 F.Supp.2d 1231 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A Muslim inmate brought a suit under § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that his religious beliefs were not
accommodated adequately while he was incarcerated at several prison facilities. The defendants moved for summary
judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The Georgia Department of Corrections’ shaving
policy provides that goatees, beards, and similar facial adornments are prohibited unless medically indicated. The court
held that the Department’s shaving policy was not rendered constitutionally infirm by speculating that the Department
could, without undermining security, allow a very small percentage of its prisoners to grow facial hair. The inmate had
suggested that the prison accommodate his beliefs by transferring him out of the state prison system. The Muslim
inmate had challenged a requirement at one of the prisons that he recite the Prison’s Code of Ethics, but the court found
that he did not have standing to pursue that claim. The court noted that the inmate was no longer required to recite the
purportedly offensive Code, and that among the four prisons in which the inmate had been incarcerated, only one prison
warden required him to recite the Code of Ethics. The court held that the Muslim inmate was unlawfully denied a
weekly Ta’lim class, which was an Islamic educational class. Although the prison policy previously denying Muslim
prisoners access to Ta’lim had been revised, the Department provided no assurance that the inmate would not be
subjected to a similar policy should he be transferred to another prison facility in the future. The court allowed this
claim to go forward in view of the frequency of transfer of the inmate between the Department facilities in the previous
seven years, and the likelihood that he would be transferred to another facility in the future where there was little
assurance that he would not be denied Ta’lim. (Ray James State Prison, Arrendale State Prison, Hancock State Prison
and Spalding County Correctional Institution, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
NEWSPAPERS

George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983, alleging
deprivations of his speech rights and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court dismissed
some of the claims and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the remaining claims. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that his health was placed at risk by an
allegedly malfunctioning dishwasher that left particles of food on his plate at dinner failed to state an Eighth
Amendment claim. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison employee had failed to provide a
purported atlas that he had ordered, on security grounds, were insufficient to state a First Amendment violation where
the prisoner did not provide a description, title or other identifying information for the book. The court held that the
prisoner's allegation that the prison refused to allow him to speak to the public at large by placing advertisements in
newspapers was insufficient to state a claim for violation of his First Amendment free speech rights where the prisoner
did not provide the content of the advertisements. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Greybuffalo v. Kingston, 581 F.Supp.2d 1034 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory
and injunctive relief, challenging, on First Amendment grounds, prison officials' actions in confiscating two documents
as “gang literature” and disciplining him for possessing the documents. One document was a publication of the
“American Indian Movement” (AIM). The other was a code of conduct for a prisoner group that was created to enable
“self-protection of Native Americans.” The court held that interpreting the prison regulation to prohibit inmates from
possessing literature of any group that had not been sanctioned by prison officials was an exaggerated response to
legitimate security interests that violated the First Amendment. The court found that the history of the civil rights
organization referenced in the seized document did not permit the reasonable conclusion that the inmate's possession of
the document implicated a legitimate interest in preventing gang activity or prison security. The court ordered the
expungement from prison records of the finding that the inmate's possession of the document violated prison rules. The
court held that officials could reasonably conclude that the inmate's possession of a code of conduct for a prisoner
group that was created to enable “self-protection” of Native American prisoners could lead to future security problems
and that the officials did not violate the inmate's free speech rights when it prohibited and disciplined the inmate for

XXI

19.75

possessing the code of conduct. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Gullick v. Ott, 517 F.Supp.2d 1063 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A plaintiff filed a § 1983 action alleging that a deputy sheriff
detained him and issued a citation because of his support for a candidate opposed by the deputy in a sheriff's race, in
violation of the First Amendment. The deputy moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The
court held that the plaintiff did not have to demonstrate an absence of probable cause in order to establish a First
Amendment retaliation claim. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the
deputy sheriff had probable cause to detain the plaintiff and issue him a citation, and whether the deputy's actions were
motivated by the plaintiff's support for the candidate. The court found that the plaintiff suffered sufficient injury to
support a retaliation claim and that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity because it was clearly established
at the time of the incident that law enforcement officers could not retaliate against citizens for exercising their First
Amendment rights. The court opened its decision by stating “The facts of this case sound like they came straight from a
bad movie on cable TV…” (Columbia County, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PHOTOGRAPHS

Jackson v. Frank, 509 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, challenging
a prison's policy of preventing prisoners from possessing individual, commercially published photographs. The prisoner
had asked to display a picture of the actress Jennifer Aniston in his cell. The district court entered summary judgment
for the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the policy did not violate the
prisoner’s First Amendment right to receive information, where the policy rationally advanced the prison's interest in
saving staff resources, the prisoner had an alternative means of exercising his right through subscribing to magazines,
and the prisoner put forward no evidence of a cost savings of capping the volume of mail that inmates might receive
compared to the benefits of banning individual, commercial photographs. (Green Bay Correctional Institute,
Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
“PUBLISHER ONLY”
RULE

Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2007). County jail prisoners and a legal publication for prisoners
filed § 1983 suits against county jails, county officials, and a state Department of Corrections (DOC), challenging the
constitutionality of mail regulations in the jails and state prisons. The district court dismissed the actions and the
plaintiffs appealed. The two actions were consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that: (1) a jail regulation banning prisoners' receipt of technical and sexually explicit
publications did not violate the First Amendment; (2) the jail regulation barring prisoners from ordering books from the
outside did not violate the First Amendment; and (3) the prison's refusal to accept legal publications did not amount to a
violation of prisoners' First Amendment or due process rights where the refusal to accept the magazines was not based
on any prison policy, but was due to a prison mailroom personnel's negligence. The court remanded the case to the
district court to conduct a four-part Turner analysis of the validity of the county jail's ban on prisoners' receipt of all
catalogs. The court held that the regulation banning ordering books from outside was reasonably related to the jail's
legitimate penological goal of security, as it prevented contraband from being smuggled into the jail, and that prisoners
had access to thousands of paperbacks through the jail library, prisoners could request permission to order books
directly from a publisher, prisoners could also obtain paperback books donated to them through a program at local
bookstore, prisoners had access to other reading materials such as newspapers and certain magazines. The court noted
that allowing prisoners to have unrestricted access to books from all outside sources would significantly impact jail
resources. (Utah State Prison, Salt Lake County Jail and San Juan County Jail, Utah)

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS
CORRESPONDENCE
MAIL
NEWSPAPERS
REGULATIONS

Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that a prison
regulation prohibiting inmates from acting as reporters or publishing under bylines violated the First Amendment. After
a bench trial was held, the district court entered judgment for the inmate. The court found that the inmate had
constitutional standing to raise the First Amendment challenge against the regulation, where the inmate had been
punished twice for publishing under a byline. The court held that the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation
violated the First Amendment, despite the BOP's concerns of creating “big wheel” inmates who presented a security
risk, a chilling effect on the performance or speech of prison staff, or permitting inmates to conduct business. The court
noted that a myriad of similar publishing opportunities were available to inmates, there was no particular security risk
associated with an inmate publishing under a byline in the news media that was not present with other inmate
publications, the BOP had adequate authority to screen and exclude dangerous content coming into the prison, and there
was no evidence linking inmates' outgoing news media correspondence to inmates conducting business. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Maximum Unit [“ADX”], Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An inmate at a supermaximum security prison filed a §
1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The inmate filed a motion seeking leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate’s claim that he was transferred to a maximum security facility in retaliation for his decision to name a warden as
a defendant in a civil rights action was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in
his § 1983 action, where fact issues remained as to whether the lawsuit motivated the warden’s decision to transfer the
inmate. The court found that the inmate’s claim that prison officials violated his First Amendment free speech and free
exercise rights, and violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) as a result of their
decision to prohibit the inmate from possessing any written materials was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was
entitled to proceed in forma pauperis. But the court held that the officials’ refusal to authorize a study group for inmates
who described themselves as atheists, freethinkers, humanists and “other,” and those who identified themselves to
prison officials as having no religious preference, did not violate the atheist inmate’s First Amendment free exercise
rights, absent a showing that reading books about atheism or meeting in study group with inmates of various
philosophical bents constituted observation of central religious beliefs or the practices of atheism. (Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility)

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U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
MEDIA ACCESS

Montoya v. Board of County Com'rs, 506 F.Supp.2d 434 (D.Colo. 2007). A jail inmate brought civil rights and civil
rights conspiracy claims against sheriffs, a deputy sheriff, and officials of two counties alleging violation of his
constitutional rights when he was tasered by a correctional officer and later transferred and placed in segregation in
alleged retaliation for complaining to the press about the tasering incident. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that a civil rights claim was not stated against
counties and sheriffs in their official capacities for the inmate's transfer and placement in segregated confinement in
alleged retaliation for his complaints to press, given the inmate's complete failure to allege any specific facts suggesting
that segregation was the result of a custom or policy, rather than being simply a single act of deprivation disconnected
from any wider scheme. According to the court, the county sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity on individual
capacity claims involving conspiracy to transfer and place jail inmate in protective, segregated confinement in
retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights, absent any indication that the sheriffs, who never
communicated with each other about the transfer, were personally involved in the decision, exercised discretionary
control over the decision, or failed to supervise jail administrators who actually made the transfer. (Chaffee and Park
Counties, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Moses v. Dennehy, 523 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Mass. 2007). Prison inmates sued a department of corrections, claiming that a
regulation banning possession of sexually explicit materials violated their First Amendment rights. The department
moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the department. The court held that there was a
rational relationship between the regulation banning inmates' possession of sexually explicit materials and a legitimate
interest in prison security. According to the court, the regulation satisfied the First Amendment requirement that
alternative means of expression be provided because inmates were afforded an opportunity to receive materials on a
wide range of subjects, other than those involving sexuality or nudity, and there was even an exception allowing for
nude images having medical, educational, or anthropological content. According to the court, the possibility of harm to
other inmates supported the validity of the regulation. The court concluded that the administration of the regulation did
not violate the First Amendment, where publications known always to feature sexually explicit materials were banned
outright, and others were banned following prison staff inspection of individual issues. (Massachusetts Department of
Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER
PUBLICATIONS

Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against several correctional
officers and medical personnel at a prison. The district court dismissed the claims and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court found that a California prison regulation, which provided that inmates could
participate in the publication and distribution of an inmate publication only with the institution head’s specific approval,
did not give the state prisoner a liberty interest protected by the due process clause, in participating in such a
publication. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
OBSCENITY

Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F.Supp.2d 421 (M.D.Pa. 2007). An inmate at a federal minimum security correctional facility
brought an action claiming that a federal statute banning the use of federal funds to distribute certain sexually explicit
material to prisoners violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court dismissed the action. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions that an evidentiary hearing be held. Upon
remand, the district court entered judgment in favor of the prison. The court held that the statute and accompanying
regulations were reasonably related to the legitimate penological goals of rehabilitating sex offenders, rehabilitating
other inmates, and preserving institutional security. The court noted that the statute, interpreted to prohibit prison
inmates from receiving publicly available soft-core pornographic materials, satisfied the First Amendment requirement
that it be reasonably related to the penological goal of rehabilitating sex offenders, even though sex offenders
represented only 2.8% of the prison population. According to the court, the need to rehabilitate sex offenders was much
more important than the rights of other inmates to view the material in question. (Allenwood Low Security Correctional
Institution, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
PRISONERS

Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33 (1st.Cir. 2007). A state prison inmate sued a state corrections
department, alleging that the department's policy that prohibited inmates from preaching to fellow inmates violated the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted summary judgment for the
department, and inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by fact questions as to whether the department's total ban on preaching by inmates promoted the
department's compelling interest in prison security, as applied to the inmate who was an ordained minister and who had
preached to fellow inmates without incident for several years. The court found that no substantial evidence was offered
in support of the theory that any inmate preacher would be seen as an inmate leader, and that inmate leaders threatened
security. The court also held that the department could not satisfy RLUIPA’s “ least restrictive means” requirement by
making blanket statements that all alternatives to a total ban had been considered and rejected, and that any amount of
inmate preaching was dangerous to institutional security. The court required the department to explain why alternative
policies would be infeasible, or why they would be less effective in maintaining security. (Adult Correctional
Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES
RETALIATION

Wilson v. Greetan, 571 F.Supp.2d 948 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a correctional
officer who issued a conduct report and an officer who presided over the prisoner's disciplinary hearing, alleging that
the issuing officer retaliated against him for exercising his right to free speech and to petition the government for
redress of grievances. The prisoner alleged that the presiding officer was complicit in retaliation when he found the
prisoner guilty at a hearing. The district court held that there was no evidence that the presiding officer found the
prisoner guilty at the hearing out of a desire to further any retaliation that may have been initiated by the issuing officer.
The court noted that the presiding officer was not required to consider any evidence at the hearing. The court held that
the prisoner's speech--telling the issuing officer that he was corrupt—was a matter of public concern, but the prisoner's
sole motivation in telling the issuing officer that he was corrupt was not to further a purely private interest, as would
undermine a free speech claim. (Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

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2008
U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
INSPECTION OF
MAIL

Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that the officials repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of his presence in
violation of his rights to access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the officials’ motion for
summary judgment and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals
court held that the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts requires that incoming legal mail may be
opened only in the inmate's presence and only to inspect for contraband. According to the court, the inmate’s right to
have properly marked incoming attorney mail opened only in his presence was clearly established. The court found
that the lack of showing of actual injury precluded recovery on the right-of-access claim. The court held that the inmate
had a free speech right to communicate with his attorneys separate from his right of access to the courts and that the
pattern and practice of opening the prisoner's attorney mail outside his presence impinges on his freedom of speech.
The court noted that actual injury is not required for the prisoner to state a free speech claim arising from the opening of
attorney mail and that the First Amendment prohibition against opening the inmate's attorney mail outside his presence
was clearly established. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights and state law by placing him in an administrative segregation unit (ASU) for
eighteen months pending resolution of a disciplinary charge against him. The district court granted the officials’ motion
for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate’s placement in ASU, and the six-month interval between reviews
of the inmate’s retention, did not violate due process. The court held that placement of the inmate in ASU for eighteen
months was not in retaliation for the inmate's refusal to cooperate in a prison narcotics investigation, and therefore did
not violate the inmate's due process rights, where prison officials kept the inmate in ASU in order to maintain the
integrity of an investigation involving the inmate's mother, an unknown number of prison guards, and at least one other
inmate. The court held that the inmate's loss of telephone privileges did not constitute a due process violation, given the
availability of alternative means of communication by mail or in person. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH

Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). Detainees, who
were anti-abortion activists who had displayed photographs of aborted fetuses on the streets outside a middle school's
campus, brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff's department, individual deputies in their individual and
official capacities, and a middle school official in his individual and official capacity, alleging free speech and Fourth
Amendment violations arising from their detention and the search of their vehicle. The district court dismissed or
granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims. The detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded in part. The court held that the Fourth Amendment was violated by the officers' 75minute detention of the anti-abortion activists, which followed a valid Terry stop to investigate possible vehicular
violations after the activists drove a “security vehicle” and truck featuring graphic photographs of aborted fetuses on
public streets around the middle school. According to the court, the detention should have lasted only long enough to
allow the officers to examine the security vehicle and determine whether there were outstanding warrants involving the
vehicle or its occupants. (Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the director of a
state Department of Corrections challenging the constitutionality of the statutory exclusion of prisoners from making
requests for public records under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA). The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the allegations were insufficient to state a
claim for facial violation of the equal protection clause and were insufficient to state a claim for an “as-applied”
violation of the equal protection clause. According to the court, denial of the prisoner's request for records did not
violate his right to access the courts. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CRITICISM
FREE SPEECH

Jackson v. Onondaga County, 549 F.Supp.2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A jail inmate filed a pro se civil rights action
against a county and two county jail deputies, alleging that his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were
violated as the result of filing a false disciplinary report. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the inmate did not engage in protected speech, as required for a First Amendment
retaliation claim, when he called a female deputy ugly and used profane language. (Onondaga County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Johnson v. Raemisch, 557 F.Supp.2d 964 (W.D.Wis. 2008). An inmate sued prison officials under § 1983, contending
that their censorship of a newsletter violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court held that the
challenged censorship was not logically connected to a legitimate penological interest and therefore violated the
inmate's First Amendment rights. The court found that many of the proffered reasons for the censorship suggested that
it was the critical nature of the newsletter that prompted the decision, rather than any true interest in security or
rehabilitation. According to the court, to the extent that there was a true concern for security or rehabilitation,
censorship of the newsletter, which did not advocate violence or any other unlawful activity, was an exaggerated
response to those concerns. The court held that the appropriate injunctive relief for a violation of the inmate's First
Amendment rights in the officials' blocking the inmate's subscription to a newsletter addressing prisoner rights issues
was to provide the inmate with a copy of the newsletter. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS

Jordan v. Sosa, 577 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Colo. 2008). A federal prisoner brought an action against a prison and officials,
alleging that a prison regulation prohibiting the prisoner from receiving sexually explicit material in the mail was
unconstitutional. The district court held that the regulation did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights nor did
it violate the inmate's or publishers' due process rights. But the court found that the portion of the regulation that
allowed the prison to fail to retain the rejected publication violated due process. (United States PenitentiaryAdministrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
OBSCENITY

Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner sued two prison officers and two prison nurses,
alleging violations of his free speech and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court entered summary judgment for
the officers and nurses. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's act of
calling a hearing officer a “foul and corrupted bitch” was not protected conduct. The court found that the prison officers
did not use excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment in restraining the prisoner after he insulted a hearing
officer, where the prisoner did not dispute that he was angered, bit an officer’s hand, and verbally threatened the
officers. The prisoner stated that the officers merely attempted to shove him down stairs and “almost” broke his glasses,
and the prisoner by his own account suffered at most “minor lacerations and cuts.” According to the court, the
prisoner's injuries from the altercation with the officers, consisting of minor cuts and lacerations, did not create an
objectively serious medical need, and any denial of medical treatment thus did not violate his Eighth Amendment
rights. (Alger Max.Corr’l Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH

Pettus v. McGinnis, 533 F.Supp.2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against New York
State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging they participated in a disciplinary proceeding
against him which was initiated in retaliation for his having testified against a corrections officer at a disciplinary
hearing involving another inmate. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 claim, since at the
time of the disciplinary proceedings against the prisoner, it was not clearly established that an inmate's act of providing
testimony on behalf of another inmate at the other inmate's disciplinary hearing was protected by the First Amendment.
The court found that a corrections officer's filing of an alleged false misbehavior report against the inmate did not result
in an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, as required for the alleged
filing to have violated the inmate's due process rights. The inmate was sentenced to 30 days in keeplock as a result of
the charges against him, and the finding of guilt on the charge did not lack evidentiary support. (New York State
Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095 (N.D.Cal. 2008). In an action arising from a publisher's
allegations that a state corrections department illegally censored its publications, the parties' settlement agreement
provided that the publisher was the prevailing party for the purposes of a reasonable attorney fee award and costs. The
publisher, Prison Legal News, had alleged that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
illegally censored its publications. The publisher moved for a fee award for work performed by its counsel after the
settlement agreement was executed, and for the establishment of a semi-annual fees process. The defendants opposed
the motion. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the allegedly
minimal nature of work performed after the agreement was executed did not preclude the publisher from being the
prevailing party entitled to the fee award; (2) the publisher could recover fees for time spent by its counsel on such
activities as drafting press releases and responding to media inquiries; (3) clerical tasks could not be billed at the
paralegal or attorney rate; (4) a reduction in the fee award was not warranted on grounds that the publisher had multiple
attorneys in attendance at two telephone conferences; (5) a fee reduction was not warranted on grounds that the
requested fees included hours spent on duplicative and excessive tasks; and (6) the establishment of a semi-annual fees
process was not warranted. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
TELEPHONE

Sliney v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 577 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). An inmate brought an action against the federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), based on his requests for a tape
recording of portions of certain telephone calls. After a tape purportedly containing the inmate's side of recorded
conversations was provided, the BOP moved for summary judgment, and the inmate requested that he be provided with
the original recordings. The district court denied summary judgment for the BOP. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a material issue of fact as to whether the tape of the redacted telephone conversations that
was provided by the BOP left out or redacted entire portions of the inmate's conversation. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
FREE SPEECH

Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action against a warden,
assistant warden, and hearing review officer for allegedly retaliating against him for exercising his free speech rights in
complaining of certain practices at the prison. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's letter to the assistant warden,
complaining that prisoners like himself, with “compromised immune systems,” were required to go outside in “thirtysomething degree temperatures, wearing substandard clothing,” and that he was given a “diet composed of 95% starch”
when prison officials knew that he was diabetic, constituted a protected exercise of his free speech rights. But the court
held that a reasonable jury could not find that prison officials would not have disciplined the inmate but for his having
filed such grievances. The court found that objective administrators standing in the prison officials' shoes would assume
that the gist of what the inmate said in his letter and the language that he employed, which “reeked of disrespect for the
administrators' authority, would be noised about the prison's population and, if ignored, could seriously impede their
ability to maintain order and thus achieve the institution's penological objectives.” (Easterling Correctional Facility,
Alabama)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

St. Louis v. Morris, 573 F.Supp.2d 846 (D.Del. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against various
prison staff and officials, alleging that he was removed from his prison kitchen job in retaliation for exercising his First
Amendment rights to report institutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The court held that the prisoner's unsubstantiated deposition testimony concerning informal, verbal complaints he made
to prison officials reporting alleged institutional violations was insufficient to defeat summary judgment. The court
noted that a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to employment while an inmate. (James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center, Delaware)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Taylor v. Walker, 537 F.Supp.2d 966 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the Illinois
Department of Corrections Director, a correctional center warden, and corrections officer. The district court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, including the issue of whether the corrections
officer was the prisoner's work supervisor. The prisoner alleged that the officer retaliated against him for exercising his
First Amendment rights by firing him from his prison job. (Hill Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
OBSCENITY

Washpon v. Parr, 561 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against court
officers alleging false arrest, illegal search, malicious prosecution, denial of equal protection, excessive force, and
violation of free speech. The district court granted summary judgment for the officers in part and denied in part. The
court held that any restrictions on the arrestee's speech inside the courthouse were reasonable under the First
Amendment in light of her admitted failure to pass through security or to comply with officers' orders to leave the
building, absent evidence that government regulation of speech inside the courthouse amounted to viewpoint
discrimination. At one point during the incident the arrestee allegedly “proceeded to speak in a loud manner, using
profanity.” (Bronx County Criminal Court, New York)
2009

U.S. District Court
HUNGER STRIKE

Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Aliens who were alleged enemy combatants engaging in
voluntary hunger strikes while detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved to enjoin measures
taken as part of a forced-feeding program. The district court denied the motion. The court found that the detainees
failed to show a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order enjoining the government
from using a restraint-chair in order to facilitate force-feeding them. The court noted that pursuant to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the complaints of detained alleged
enemy combatants. According to the court, the government officials who imposed various restraints on the detained
alleged enemy combatants, including the use of a restraint chair, in order to facilitate force-feeding them in response to
their hunger strikes, were not thereby deliberately indifferent to their Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that
evidence that the detained alleged enemy combatants had assaulted medical staff and guards during attempts to forcefeed them after the detainees engaged in hunger strikes, demonstrated that the government might suffer a substantial
injury if the detainees' request for a preliminary injunction against the use of a restraint-chair to facilitate such feedings
were granted. (U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
RETALIATION

Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging that
they retaliated against him for providing an affidavit in a deceased inmate's mother's wrongful death action, in violation
of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation,
but failed to state a claim for denial of access to the courts. According to the court, the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim
for First Amendment retaliation by alleging that he engaged in protected speech by filing an affidavit in the wrongful
death action, that he suffered retaliation through: delays in his incoming and outgoing mail; harassment by an officer
kicking his cell door, turning his cell light off an on, and opening his cell trap and slamming it shut in order to startle
him; unjustified disciplinary charges; and improper dismissal of his grievances. The prisoner alleged that he would not
have been harassed if he had not participated in the wrongful death action. The court found that the prisoner's
participation in filing the affidavit was not sufficiently connected to the deceased inmate's rights to allow the prisoner to
assert a denial of access retaliation claim based on his assistance to the deceased inmate. (Wisc. Secure Program Facil.)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
MARRIAGE

Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ill. 2009). Federal prisoners brought an action against prison officials, alleging
that the officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of their marriage and to grant them a spousal exemption to the rule
that inmates could not correspond with each other violated their equal protection and due process rights. The officials
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. According to the court, the prison officials'
failure to acknowledge the validity of the marriage of two prisoners and to grant them a spousal exemption to the rule
that inmates could not correspond with each other did not violate the prisoners' equal protection rights where there was
no showing that officials singled out the prisoners based on their Islamic religion or any other improper consideration.
The court found that the prison had a legitimate security interest in generally preventing unrelated prisoners from
corresponding, the face of the prisoners' marriage certificate did not strictly comport with the statutory requirements,
the marriage certificate was not registered, as required by state law, and there was some evidence that the marriage was
not valid due to one prisoner's failure to terminate a prior marriage. (Federal Corr’l Institution, Greenville, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMUNICATIONS
WITH PRISONERS
MEDIA ACCESS

Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner who was formerly on death row and was housed
in a special confinement unit, filed a pro se lawsuit against various officials of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging
that they violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy that prevented prisoners in a
special confinement unit from giving face-to-face interviews with the media. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the BOP
policy that prevented prisoners in special confinement units at maximum security prisons from giving face-to-face or
video interviews with the media did not violate the equal protection clause. According to the court, although the BOP
did not prevent such media interviews with other prisoners in a less secure confinement, the policy was rationally
related to the BOP's need for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special confinement units in maximum
security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners, leading to an increased risk of violence
among the more violent prisoners. The court found that the BOP did not violate the prisoner’s free speech rights where
the policy was rationally related to the prison's need for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special
confinement units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners,
glamorize violence, and promote celebrity, leading to an increased risk of violence. The court noted that the BOP did
allow correspondence from prisoners in special confinement units to media representatives, prisoners were free to file
lawsuits, and correspondence sent to courts and attorneys by prisoners could not be censored. (“Special Confinement
Unit,” U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
MAIL
TELEPHONE
VISITS

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention
center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner. The court held
that the prisoner stated a free exercise of religion claim under the First Amendment by alleging that detention center
personnel prevented him from practicing the central tenet of his faith of regularly reading his Bible for 19 days while he
was in protective custody. According to the court, the prisoner's First Amendment freedom of association and speech
rights had not been violated by denial of his visitation, phone, and mailing privileges for two days as the direct result of
the prisoner committing a disciplinary infraction while he was in protective custody. (Crittenden County Detention
Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2009). State prison officials filed a motion to reconsider an order enjoining
them from enforcing a rule preventing prisoners from possessing books, pamphlets, forms or other material regarding
actions that could be taken under Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The district court denied the motion, and the
prison officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The appeals court held that the letter which the
prisoner attempted to mail to the Michigan Secretary of State's office, requesting information about copyrighting and
trademark registration in Michigan, was not “legal mail,” and thus its confiscation pursuant to the prison regulation was
not subject to heightened review under the First Amendment. But the court found that the prisoner was likely to
succeed on the merits of his First Amendment claim and the balancing of the relevant factors favored issuance of a
preliminary injunction. The court noted that the harms that prisoners would face from the enforcement of the rule
outweighed those which the prison defendants would face if the court upheld the injunction, and public interest in
preventing prisoners' abusive filings would not be harmed by the preliminary injunction. (Saginaw Correctional
Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FORMER
PRISONERS
NEWSPAPERS
RETALIATION

Kantamanto v. King, 651 F.Supp.2d 313 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A former prisoner brought an action against a prison
commissioner, deputy warden, and correctional officer, alleging that he was terminated from his prison law library job
in retaliation for his publication of an article critical of prison conditions, in violation of his speech and due process
rights. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that the
alleged termination by the correctional officer of the prisoner from his law library job, if proven, was an adverse action,
but the prisoner did not have a protected liberty or property interest in his job arising directly from the Due Process
Clause. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to: (1) whether any termination of the prisoner from his law library job by a correctional officer was in retaliation for
the prisoner's exercise of his free speech rights, through publishing an article about prison conditions in a newspaper;
and (2) whether the alleged reason for terminating the prisoner from his law library job, i.e., that his “close custody”
status did not permit him to work in the law library, was a pretext for terminating him for exercising his speech rights.
The court also held that a prison policy outlining the job termination and reassignment process did not create a liberty
interest in such a job. (Curran-Fromhold Correctional Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting claims
based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of his request for
dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his diet, failure to issue
certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the officials judgment as a
matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's censorship of a magazine mailed to the
prisoner, by removing an article that described a prison riot and pictures of people believed to have been making gang
signs, was reasonable, even if the prisoner had access to other writings and to television shows about prison riots.
(Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEWSPAPERS

Michtavi v. New York Daily News, 587 F.3d 551 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a pro se action against newspaper
publishers, asserting state-law claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a newspaper report
claiming that the prisoner incarcerated on narcotics charges planned to cooperate with prosecutors was not defamatory
under New York law. According to the court, right-thinking persons would not think ill of the prisoner for legitimately
cooperating with law enforcement. (New York Daily News)

U.S. District Court
CONVERSATION
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
TELEPHONE

Milton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 596 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). A prisoner filed a pro se complaint, under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking recordings of telephone conversations that he made from the prison to
others. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Justice. The court held that the
recordings were exempt from disclosure as personnel and medical files and similar files due to the invasion of privacy
of third parties to conversations. The court also found that the recordings were exempt from disclosure as records
compiled for law enforcement purposes, disclosure of which would invade the privacy of third parties to conversations.
The court noted that the prisoner failed to tender signed waivers from the third parties to the conversations, and failed to
offer a public interest rationale for overcoming the third parties' privacy interests. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Wash. D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH
PRISONER WORK
STOPPAGE

Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 F.3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner, appearing pro se, brought an action against three prison
officials alleging they violated his constitutional rights to free speech and due process of law in the course of an
investigation and disciplinary hearing related to a pamphlet allegedly written by the prisoner, which encouraged
inmates to engage in work stoppages. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for summary judgment. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that entreaties to work stoppages, like petitions protesting
prison conditions, are not entitled to First Amendment protection where other less disruptive means of airing grievances

XXIII

19.81

are available. According to the court, work stoppages are deliberate disruptions of the regular order of the prison
environment and are a species of organized union activity, which are plainly inconsistent with the legitimate objectives
of a prison organization. (Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMMUNICATION
MAIL
VISITORS

Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an in forma pauperis § 1983 action
against a corrections official, alleging that a prohibition against any communication between the inmate and his sons
constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The district court dismissed
the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the enforcement of a “negative
mail list” that included the inmate's sons did not unduly infringe upon the inmate's First Amendment rights, and the
officials' removal of the inmate's sons from the approved visitors list was reasonable. The court found that the
restriction was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in protecting crime victims and their families from
unwanted communications, given the inmate's wife's request that the sons be placed on the list and the fact that the
inmate had been imprisoned after violating a probation condition of no contact with the sons. The court noted that an
alternate means of communication remained open via the inmate's mother. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
MAIL

Sikorski v. Whorton, 631 F.Supp.2d 1327 (D.Nev. 2009). A state prisoner and his mother and sister brought a § 1983
action against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights by censoring, refusing to deliver, and returning various pieces of mail addressed to the prisoner and failing to
provide them with notice and the opportunity to appeal their decisions. The prisoner also alleged that officials retaliated
against him for his use of the prison grievance system. The court held that the prison's policy of not allowing inmates
names and addresses of private citizens without express, informed consent of the citizens did not violate the First
Amendment rights of the prisoner who was issued an “unauthorized mail notification” relating to a citizens' petition for
recommendations regarding parole and sentencing procedures, which was forwarded to the prisoner by a third-party.
According to the court, there was a valid, rational connection between the policy and a legitimate governmental interest
of protecting citizens, there were alternative means of exercising rights that remained open to the prisoner,
accommodation of the asserted rights would have had a significant impact on guards and other inmates, and on the
allocation of prison resources generally, and that there were no alternatives to the policy. The court found that the
prison's practice of returning mail to the sender unopened when such mail contained tape or stickers did not violate the
First Amendment where the policy was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in preventing illegal
chemical drugs from coming into the prison. The court held that the prison's policy of not giving notice and the
opportunity to appeal to inmates regarding mail that was returned to the sender because of noticeable violations on the
outside of the envelope did not violate the First Amendment or due process. The court noted that providing the
accommodation of giving notice and opportunity to appeal for every piece of mail with a noticeable violation would
have placed a significant burden on prison resources. (Nevada State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009). Incarcerated felons brought an action challenging the validity of an
amendment to the Massachusetts constitution disqualifying currently incarcerated inmates from voting in all
Massachusetts elections. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for the entry of judgment on the
pleadings on the inmates' Voting Rights Act (VRA) claim but granted the Commonwealth's motion for summary
judgment on the inmates' Ex Post Facto Clause claim. Both the Commonwealth and inmates appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the vote denial claim challenging the
amendment that would disenfranchise incarcerated felons was not cognizable under the Voting Rights Act (VRA).
According to the court, the Act was not meant to proscribe the authority of states to disenfranchise imprisoned felons.
The court found that the amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause where the amendment did not impose any
affirmative disability or restraint, physical or otherwise, and felon disenfranchisement had historically not been
regarded as punitive in the United States. The court noted that there was a rational non-punitive purpose for the
disenfranchisement. (Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONVERSATION
EAVESDROPPING
PRIVACY
VISITS

Sparks v. Seltzer, 607 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). A psychiatric patient, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action against a director and a treatment team leader at a psychiatric center in a
New York state psychiatric hospital. The patient was housed in an inpatient, long-term locked ward which normally
houses a mixture of voluntary patients, patients who have been involuntarily committed under the civil law, and
patients committed as a result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or a finding of
incompetence to stand trial. The patient alleged violations of his First Amendment rights and his “zone of privacy”
concerning a supervised visitation policy. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court
held that the psychiatric patients' speech during supervised visits at a state psychiatric hospital was not wholly
unprotected by the First Amendment, although the speech was casual and among family members or friends. According
to the court, the reluctance of psychiatric patients in the state psychiatric hospital to discuss various matters within the
earshot of a supervising guard during supervised visitation did not give rise to a cognizable injury to their free speech
rights. The court noted that no patient had lost privileges, had the term of involuntary hospitalization extended, or had
otherwise been punished or threatened with being punished for anything he or a visitor had said in a supervised visit.
Patients were not required to speak loudly enough to be heard, guards did not generally report the contents of
conversations to hospital authorities, and no sound recordings of the visits were made. The court held that the state
psychiatric hospital's supervised visitation policy imposed upon patients did not invade their “zone of privacy” in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, since patients had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital visiting room
which could be entered by anyone during a visit and which was used by more than one patient at a time for visits. The
court found that the supervised visitation policy did not, on its face or applied to patients, infringe upon their privacy
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, New York)

XXIII

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2010
U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE

Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d 1171 (N.D.Okla. 2010). An inmate brought claims against state prison officials under
§ 1983 for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion, RLUIPA, the inmate’s due process rights, or equal protection, by denying him access to
particular issues of a religious publication based on guidelines prohibiting publications that advocate terrorism, criminal
behavior, racial, religious, or national hatred. According to the court, the guidelines were reasonably related to the
legitimate penological goal of maintaining order and security, individual review of incoming publications was a rational
means of achieving that goal and did not deprive the inmate of all means of exercising his religion, and allowing such
materials would have a significant negative impact on other inmates and guards. The court also found no violation from
the officials’ denial of access to a book containing instructions for scaling walls, traveling under or over barbed wire,
and combat techniques, since preventing the book was the least restrictive means of ensuring that the inmate did not
receive information that would facilitate violence or escape. But the court held that the officials failed to meet their
burden to show that prohibiting a book about the warrior ethos and the history of stoicism in the military was the least
restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest, as required for summary judgment on the inmate's RLUIPA claim.
(Dick Conner Correctional Center, Jess Dunn Correctional Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
BOOKS

Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action claiming
that prison officials violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when they applied a Virginia Department of
Corrections (VDOC) regulation to exclude the books Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the prison library and
prevented him from ordering those books from a private, approved vendor. The parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The district granted the inmate’s motion, finding that the regulation violated the First Amendment, and that
injunctive relief was warranted. The court held that the regulation was not reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests, and thus, was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The court noted that legitimate government
interests in security, discipline, good order and offender rehabilitation were not rationally related to the regulation,
which forbid all “explicit ... descriptions of sexual acts” including “sexual acts in violation of state or federal law,” and
encompassed much of the world's finest literature, but did not extend to “soft core” pornography. According to the
court, while the inmate had no right to a general purpose reading library under the First Amendment, where the Virginia
Department of Corrections (VDOC) decided to provide a general literary library to offenders, VDOC officials were
constrained by the First Amendment in how they regulated the library. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy
following a determination that the First Amendment was violated by a prison regulation, which excluded the books
Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from a prison library, was injunctive relief against the enforcement and
application of the regulation. (Augusta Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER
PUBLICATIONS
REGULATIONS

Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233 (2nd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought suit against correctional officials under § 1983,
alleging that he was deprived of rights protected by the First Amendment when he was disciplined by prison officials
for possessing and distributing a booklet of which he was the principal author. The district court granted in part and
denied in part the parties' summary judgment motions. The parties appealed and cross-appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the prison disciplinary rule prohibiting
contraband was unconstitutionally vague as applied to the state prisoner. The prisoner was disciplined for possessing
and distributing a brochure that violated an inmate group's internal bylaws by not having been approved by the group's
staff advisor. The court noted that the bylaws did not indicate that violation of the group's bylaws constituted a violation
of the prison contraband rule, thus exposing the prisoner to far greater penalties than the group could have imposed, and
prison rules conferred almost complete enforcement discretion on prison officials. According to the court, the prisoner's
right to not be punished under prison rules for violation of an inmate group's internal bylaws was clearly established,
weighing against the prison officials' claim of qualified immunity in the § 1983 action. The court noted that the essence
of constitutional prohibitions on vagueness was that the rules must give notice of conduct that they, rather than another
set of rules, prohibit and must constrain discretion of officials who apply them. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether state prison officials actually intended to punish the
prisoner under the prison's contraband rule or for violating an internal bylaw of an inmate group. (Woodbourne
Correctional Facility, Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Convicted felons filed a suit challenging the State of
Washington's felon disenfranchisement law, alleging that it violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by denying the right
to vote on account of race. The district court granted Washington summary judgment, and the felons appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court again granted Washington
summary judgment. The felons appealed again. The appeals court found that a VRA challenge to the felon
disenfranchisement law requires intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system, and Washington's
disenfranchisement law did not violate the VRA. (State of Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official intentionally confiscated and destroyed letters sent to
him by persons outside the prison “under the guise” of sticker and perfume violations, for the purpose of harassing him,
were sufficient to plead violations of his First Amendment speech rights. The court also found that the prisoner's
allegations that a prison official returned to him outgoing letters that had “appropriate postage affixed without reason”
for failure to mail them, were sufficient to plead a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment speech rights. The court
found an alleged First Amendment speech rights violation with the prisoner's allegations that he was given a letter from
his sister and that it was confiscated from him due to his incommunicado status, but that it was never returned to him.
(Wyoming State Penitentiary)

19.83

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). Several convicted felons brought action against Tennessee's
governor and secretary of state, state coordinator of elections, and several county elections administrators, alleging that,
by conditioning restoration of felons' voting rights on payment of court-ordered victim restitution and child support
obligations, Tennessee's voter re-enfranchisement statute violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and the felons appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that Tennessee had rational basis for the challenged provisions of the state's reenfranchisement statute, the challenged provisions of the state's re-enfranchisement statute did not violate the TwentyFourth Amendment or Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the challenged provisions were not punitive in nature, and
thus did not violate the state's Ex Post Facto Clause. The court noted that the felons, having lost their voting rights upon
being convicted of felonies, lacked any fundamental interest in their right to vote, and wealth-based classifications did
not constitute discrimination against any suspect class. According to the court, Tennessee's interests in encouraging
payment of child support and compliance with court orders, and in requiring felons to complete their entire sentences,
including paying victim restitution, supplied a rational basis sufficient for the challenged provisions to pass equal
protection muster. (Shelby County, Madison County, and Davidson County, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
RETALIATION

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious practices and retaliated
against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the prisoner pled sufficient facts to state a claim against prison officials on a theory
of supervisor liability under § 1983 by alleging that he wrote to the officials about violations of his rights, that the officials were “made completely aware of the inappropriate actions of their subordinates,” and that they “actively chose to
be deliberately indifferent to these actions.” The court found that the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief based on the
California Department of Corrections' (DOC) alleged systemic discrimination against those practicing the Pagan religion were not moot, even though he had been transferred from the prison where many of the alleged violations of his
rights occurred, where he was still incarcerated in a prison run by the DOC. The court held that the prisoner's claims for
damages under RLUIPA against state prison officials in their official capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, since RLUIPA did not provide a clear statement requiring states to waive immunity from liability
for money damages. According to the court, the issue of whether prison officials violated the prisoner's rights under the
Free Exercise Clause by failing to reasonably accommodate his Druid religious faith could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss phase because of factual disputes as to what interest justified the officials' alleged failure, the existing
and potential alternatives for Druid religious exercise, and the impact of requested accommodations on prison officials
and other inmates. The court found that the prisoner stated claim for retaliation by prison officials for conduct protected
by the Free Exercise Clause by alleging that he was strip-searched as harassment for writing letters to prison and government officials in which he complained about the lack of accommodations for his religion. The prisoner also alleged
that officials conspired to place him in administrative segregation and ultimately to transfer him to requite his complaints about their previous adverse actions against him, and that the actions taken against him were motivated solely by
the officials' desire to inhibit his religious worship. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison officials for violation of his right to equal protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were denied opportunities to
practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions and that the officials engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Pagan practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER
ASSOCIATIONS
FREE SPEECH
PRISONER
PUBLICATIONS

Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010). An inmate, whose books, magazines and manuscript about the fantasy
role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons were confiscated by prison officials under a prison's policy banning fantasy
games, filed a § 1983 action alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court granted
the defendants summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that despite the
inmate's contention that a fantasy role-playing game had never incited prison violence or motivated devotees to form
stereotypical street or prison gangs in the past, prison officials were rational in their belief that, if left unchecked,
fantasy role-playing games could lead to gang behavior among inmates and undermine prison security in the future.
The court also found that, despite the inmate's contention that fantasy role-playing games had a positive rehabilitative
effect on prisoners, prison officials were rational in their belief that fantasy role-playing games could impede inmates'
rehabilitation, lead to escapist tendencies or result in more dire consequences, and thus the prison ban on fantasy roleplaying games did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free speech rights. The court noted that officials were
concerned about potential inmate obsession with escape, both figurative and literal and based the ban on the possibility
that games could foster inmates' obsession with escaping from both real life and the correctional environment, placing
legitimate penological goals of prison security and inmate rehabilitation in peril. According to the court, the prison
policy prohibiting possession of fantasy role-playing game manuals, strategy guides, character novellas, and other
related materials was rationally related to the goal of preventing susceptible inmates from embarking upon a dangerous
escapist path, and thus confiscation of the inmate's role-playing books, magazines and manuscript did not violate his
First Amendment free speech rights. The court found that prison officials' ban on fantasy role-playing games and
publications met the requirement that inmates have alternative means of exercising a restricted right, under the Turner
test for reviewing the reasonableness of prison regulations impacting constitutional rights, since the inmate whose
fantasy role-playing game materials were confiscated could express himself by writing another work of fiction, could
possess other reading materials, or could engage with other inmates in allowable games. (Waupun Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) by traveling in interstate commerce without updating his sex offender registration, moved to
dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA's registration requirement exceeded Congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion. The appeals court affirmed, finding that SORNA did not
exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. (Mississippi and Wisconsin)

19.84

U.S. District Court
HUNGER STRIKE

Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F.Supp.2d 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county and officials, alleging civil rights violations. The defendants moved for dismissal. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee adequately alleged that he was denied his right to a
speedy trial and that he was presumptively prejudiced by the delay, as required to state a § 1983 claim for a 8th
Amendment violation. The detainee alleged he was held for two years in prison prior to receiving trial for the charge of
violating a protective order, and that he was subsequently found not guilty. (Nassau County Sheriff's Dept., New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CRITICISM
RETALIATION

Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was a prison law clerk brought a § 1983 action
against a prison law librarian, alleging retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his free speech rights. Following a jury
verdict for the inmate, the district court denied the librarian's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial.
The librarian appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that the inmate law
clerk's speech that criticized prison library policies requiring that clerks not help other inmates prepare their legal
documents and not store the clerks' personal legal materials in the library was not protected by the First Amendment.
The court found that the speech had a negative impact on the prison librarian's legitimate interests in discipline and
providing efficient library services, particularly since it amounted to advocacy on behalf of other inmates, and the
inmate had an alternative means to express his complaints. The court also found that the inmate law clerk's oral
complaint to the prison librarian about the placement of his personal materials in the library was not protected by his
First Amendment right to free speech, where the complaint was made in a confrontational, disorderly manner. (Miami
Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2011

U.S. District Court
MEDIA ACCESS
VISITING

Battle v. A & E Television Networks, LLC, 837 F.Supp.2d 767 (M.D.Tenn. 2011). A wife who had unwittingly been
filmed by a television crew at a maximum security prison while visiting her husband who was an inmate there filed suit
against a television producer and a television network alleging defamation/false light and intentional infliction of
emotional distress (IIED) when the program was aired on the national television network. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that, under Tennessee law, the
television program which aired on a national network depicting the wife visiting her inmate husband in a maximum
security prison, and which contained a voice-over explaining how drugs and contraband were passed to prisoners from
outsiders, was capable of a defamatory meaning, and thus the wife stated a claim for defamation/false light against the
television producer and the network. According to the court, the stream of audio and visual components interacting with
each other suggested that the wife was a drug smuggler, and even though the program indicated that a search of the
wife revealed no drugs, the overall impression was that the wife just happened not to get caught on that particular day.
But the court found that the actions of television producer and network were not so outrageous as to be beyond all
bounds of decency or utterly intolerable in a civilized community, as required to support claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, since the program could also be understood to suggest that the plaintiff had not brought drugs into
the facility. The program, “The Squad: Prison Police,” was aired by A & E Television Networks, LLC. (Riverbend
Maximum Security Institution, Nashville, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSOCIATION
FREE SPEECH

Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762 (10th Cir. 2011). An inmate brought an action against a television
network, alleging defamation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the network and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the television network's statement in a broadcast that
the inmate was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang was not materially false, and therefore, was not
actionable for defamation under Colorado law, where the inmate engaged in recreation yard conversations with gang
members, engaged in a drug smuggling conspiracy with the gang in which he would receive drug filled balloons from a
visitor and distribute them to the gang, and the inmate sent a handwritten apology to the gang leader apologizing after
the conspiracy failed and referred to leader repeatedly as “bro.” (Supermax, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CRITICISM
NEWSPAPERS

Carpenter v. King, 792 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 2011). A prisoner brought a defamation action against a newspaper
reporter, editor, senior editor, and owner. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner's complaint, including allegations that the reporter's newspaper article named
him as carrying out death threats to murder a victim that District of Columbia court papers found the plaintiff had made,
and that there were no such court papers, failed to state claim for defamation against the reporter under District of
Columbia law, absent an allegation that the reporter was negligent or malicious in relying upon the sources with the
knowledge when he made a reference to court papers. The court found that the newspaper reporter's writings about the
conviction for which the prisoner was serving his sentence did not give rise to a cognizable claim for defamation under
District of Columbia law, since news of reporting on official court proceedings was privileged. (Federal Correctional
Complex, Coleman, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
HAIR

DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2011). A Texas state prisoner brought an action against the Texas Department
of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and several prison officials in their individual and official capacities, alleging that several
TDCJ policies impermissibly interfered with his ability to practice his religion in violation of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The prisoner also asserted several claims under § 1983, alleging that those
same policies violated his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the district court did not clearly err by concluding that TDCJ's grooming policy, requiring all
inmates except those with medical exceptions to be clean shaven, did not violate RLUIPA. The court found that the
TDCJ policy against allowing inmates to stand for long periods of time in prison dayrooms was not a substantial burden
on the exercise of religious beliefs of the prisoner whose religious practice required him to pray five times a day at set
times for anywhere from four to 20 minutes, during which time he had to stand, kneel, and bow, and therefore TDCJ's
dayroom policy did not violate RLUIPA. The court noted that the prisoner's ability to stand, kneel, and bow was not
restricted in the recreation yard or in his cell, and he had hourly access to those locations from the dayroom. The court

19.85

held that the district court's finding, concluding that the TDCJ policy of tape-recording all inmate-led Muslim religious
services to ensure that religious services take place and to aid in investigating potential disciplinary violations, did not
impose a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious practice under RLUIPA. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice)
U.S. District Court
MAIL

Hamilton v. Hall, 790 F.Supp.2d 1368 (N.D.Fla. 2011). A female county jail inmate brought a class action under §
1983 against a county sheriff, challenging a jail policy requiring all outgoing mail, except legal and other privileged
correspondence, to be in postcard form. The sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the inmate stated a claim against the county sheriff under § 1983 for violation of her First Amendment right to
freedom of speech, by alleging that the jail's policy of requiring all outgoing mail, other than legal and otherwise
privileged correspondence, to be in postcard form inhibited her ability to communicate with those outside the jail.
(Santa Rosa County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
JAIL HOUSE
LAWYER
RETALIATION

Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the secretary of a state
department of corrections, alleging that he was transferred to an out-of-state prison in retaliation for his advocacy on
behalf of himself and other convicts. The district court entered summary judgment in the secretary's favor, and denied
the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
decision by the secretary to transfer the inmate to an out-of-state maximum security prison was not in retaliation for the
inmate's advocacy on behalf of himself and other convicts, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free
speech rights, even though the inmate had not received any misconduct reports in the fourteen years before transfer, and
posed no danger to staff or other prisoners. According to the court, the initial decision to transfer the inmate was made
three years before the secretary assumed his current position, the inmate had accumulated a large number of legitimate
separations while incarcerated in the state prison system, and the transfer did not violate any standard prison policies or
procedures. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS

Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). A publisher and his criminal justice publication brought two suits
claiming that their First Amendment rights were being violated by the mail policies at two county jails in California that
refused to distribute unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. The district court granted summary judgment to
the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the jails were justified in refusing to distribute
unsolicited copies of the publication to inmates. According to the court, the facts to be considered included the degree
to which allowing distribution of the publication would produce additional clutter in cells or otherwise adversely affect
jail security, the extent to which the jails would be forced to expend additional resources to deliver the publication, and
whether the publisher could effectively reach inmates by delivery only upon request. (Sacramento County, Butte
County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
OBSCENITY
PUBLICATIONS

Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011). A federal inmate brought an action against Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) officials challenging the constitutionality of a statutory and regulatory ban on the use of federal funds to
distribute to federal prisoners commercially published materials that were sexually explicit or which featured nudity.
The district court entered judgment in the government's favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court dismissed the
action, finding that the action was rendered constitutionally moot by the inmate's transfer to another facility and the
action was rendered prudentially moot by the transfer. (Administrative Maximum Security Facility, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
FREE SPEECH

Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 retaliation action against a
correctional captain, alleging that the captain violated his First Amendment rights when she disciplined him for filing
an inmate grievance and for speaking to her in a manner she found disrespectful. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the captain. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court
held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to: (1) the causal relationship between the inmate's
grievance and the discipline that the correctional captain imposed against the inmate; and, (2) the causal relationship
between the inmate's statements and discipline. The court found that the inmate's statement to the correctional captain
about contacting his attorney in response to the correctional captain's failure to respond to the inmate's grievances was
not inconsistent with his prisoner status or with legitimate penological objectives, and thus it was entitled to free speech
protection. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CRITICISM
PUBLICATIONS
RETALIATION

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich. 2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in Michigan
brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees alleging that his
placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was prohibited from communicating
with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion was being hampered in violation of his
First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail policy was unconstitutional. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court held that the prisoner's statements in a published
magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected speech, and that a fact issue precluded summary judgment
on the retaliation claims against the other facility's warden, resident unit manager, and assistant resident unit supervisor
stemming from the prisoner's participation in that article. The Esquire Magazine article discussed security flaws at the
correctional facility, detailing the prisoners' escape plan and revealing which prison staff he manipulated and how he
obtained and built necessary tools to dig a tunnel. The court noted that the prisoner's statements were not directed to
fellow inmates, and rather he spoke on issues relating to prison security and was critical of the conduct of Michigan
Department of Corrections personnel, which resulted in his near-successful prison break.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether the
defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative segregation work
assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a pretext to retaliate for
his protected speech in the published magazine article. The court found that the alleged violation of the prisoner's right
to free exercise of his religion from the rejection of a claimed religious publication, Codex Magica, was justified by the

19.86

prison's legitimate penological interest in limiting prisoners' access to books that included instructions on how to write
in code. According to the court, because the prison had a valid penological interest in restricting access to the
publication, which contained instructions on how to write in code, the prisoner mail regulation used to censor that book
could not be unconstitutional as applied on the ground that it prevented the prisoner's access to that publication. (Ionia
Maximum Correctional Facility, Kinross Correctional Facility, Standish Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
MAIL
FREE SPEECH

Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). An individual who operated two pen
pal services that solicited pen pals for prisoners, as well as another pen pal service, brought a civil rights action
challenging the constitutionality of a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) rule prohibiting inmates from
soliciting pen pals. The district court granted the FDOC's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the plaintiffs, whose interests as publishers in accessing
prisoners had been harmed, had standing to bring their claims, but that the FDOC rule at issue was rationally related to
a legitimate penological interest. The court found that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in accessing inmates and they
were afforded constitutionally required due process. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Procunier v. Martinez set forth a three-part test to decide whether there are proper procedural safeguards for inmate
correspondence of a personal nature: (1) the inmate must receive notice of the rejection of a letter written by or
addressed to him, (2) the author of the letter must be given reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and (3)
complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.
(Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP
VOTING

Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 653 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2011).
Public-interest organizations filed a civil rights action alleging that a port authority's rejection of advertisements on
buses informing ex-prisoners that they had the right to vote, and encouraging them to exercise the right, was the result
of viewpoint discrimination. The district court granted judgment to the plaintiffs after a bench trial. The defendant
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court permissibly found that the port
authority did not reject the advertisement on the grounds that it was “political”, that the authority's rejection of the
advertisement was the result of viewpoint discrimination, and evidence that the port authority had accepted several
noncommercial advertisements, but rejected the advertisement at issue, strongly suggested viewpoint discrimination.
(ACLU, Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Education Fund, Port Authority of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CRITICISM
FREE SPEECH

Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418 (7th Cir, 2011). A state prisoner brought an action against prison employees, alleging that
the employees violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous conditions, and
violated the First Amendment by penlizing him for questioning the propriety of the work assignment and preparing to
sue. The district court dismissed the complaint. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for violating his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment by forcing him to work at hard labor in dangerous conditions. The prisoner alleged
that he was assigned to uproot tree stumps in cold weather, without being given any protective gear, that he developed
blisters from handling heavy tools in the cold without gloves, and that he was subjected to the risk of getting hit by the
blades of the tools because they slipped from their handles as prisoners hacked away without proper training. The court
found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison employees for violating his First Amendment right to free speech,
by alleging that the employees penalized him for questioning the propriety of his work assignment and preparing to sue.
(Branchville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
FREE SPEECH

Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2011). The publisher of a newsletter about the Wisconsin state
prison system and a pro se state prisoner who wrote an article for that newsletter brought separate actions challenging a
regulation imposed by the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC) on distribution of incoming prisoner mail. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the DOC officials. The plaintiffs appealed and the actions were
consolidated for appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officials' decision to bar distribution of the
newsletter to prisoners did not violate the First Amendment and the officials' refusal to deliver copies of the article that
the state prisoner had written to the newsletter did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted
that one newsletter article described the Wisconsin parole commission as totalitarian and abusers of prisoners, and
another urged its readers to employ any and all tactics to bring about change in prison life, so that it was reasonable for
the officials to perceive the newsletter articles as posing a potential threat to rehabilitation and security. (Wisconsin
Department of Corrections, Green Bay Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
NEWSPAPERS
CRITICISM

Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 810 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.D.C. 2011). A prisoner brought an action against a
publisher, alleging libel in the summary of his criminal case. All parties moved for summary judgment and the district
court denied the motions. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the publisher's statements about the prisoner in criminal case summaries were defamatory. The court held that
the publisher's summary, and clarification of its summary for the prisoner's mandamus petition following his
convictions for second degree murder for involvement in the deaths of United States marshals, were not an accurate and
complete report on, or a fair abridgement of, the mandamus petition. The publisher's accounts claimed the prisoner
showed no contrition and had religious and philosophical beliefs that justified the murders. The court found that the fair
report privilege under District of Columbia law did shield the publisher. The court noted that the statements published
were attributable to the prosecutor in the underlying criminal proceeding, rather than the findings in the mandamus
petition. (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., D.C. District Court)

U.S. Appeals Court
ASSOCIATION
INTERNET
MAIL

Woods v. Commissioner of the Ind. Dept. of Corrections, 652 F.3d 745 (7TH Cir. 2011). State inmates brought a class
action against the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging violations of the First Amendment related to a
regulation prohibiting advertising for pen-pals and receiving materials from websites and publications that allowed
advertisements for pen-pals. The district court granted the IDOC's motion for summary judgment and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the regulation related fairly directly to the IDOC's stated goal

19.87

of preventing fraud by limiting inmates' access to potential victims, thus weighing in favor of a finding that the
regulation was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in the inmates' class action. The court noted that
ample alternative means of communication existed regardless of the regulation, where inmates were free to obtain pen–
pals through various groups that visited the prison or to cultivate contacts through other inmates, their attorneys, and by
their own initiative. (Indiana Department of Corrections)
2012
U.S. Appeals Court
EXECUTIONS
MEDIA ACCESS
PRIVACY

Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2012). A coalition of media corporations filed a § 1983 action alleging
that a state's denial of the right to witness all stages of executions violated the First Amendment. The district court
denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and they appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely
to prevail, gaining access to all steps in the execution process, beginning with the condemned prisoner's entry into the
execution chamber, through insertion of intravenous lines into his body, reading of the death warrant, and
pronouncement of death. The state's asserted interests in protecting the dignity of condemned prisoners and the
sensibilities of their family and fellow inmates, and in protecting the identity of medical team members who
participated in the execution. The court noted that the state already offended the dignity of condemned inmates and the
sensibilities of their families and fellow inmates by allowing strangers to watch as they were put to death, that medical
team members could wear surgical garb to mask their identities, and there was no evidence that the state was unable to
recruit and retain medical team members to participate in executions. (State of Idaho)

U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
FREE SPEECH
MAIL
TELEPHONE

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) officials
and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and practices relating
to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the MSOP
policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable; (2) the policy of placing full restraints
on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not liable for using excessive force in handcuffing
patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients' rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP
telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6) there was no evidence that officials were deliberately
indifferent to the patients' health or safety. The court also found that the (MSOP) telephone-use policy did not violate
the First Amendment free speech rights of patients who were civilly committed to MSOP. According to the court, the
policy of monitoring patients' non-legal telephone calls and prohibiting incoming calls was reasonably related to
MSOP's security interests in detecting and preventing crimes and maintaining a safe environment. The court upheld the
30-minute limit on the length of calls, finding it was reasonably related to the legitimate governmental interest of
providing phone access to all patients, and that patients had viable alternatives by which they may exercise their First
Amendment rights, including having visitors or sending or receiving mail, and patients had abused telephone privileges
prior to implementation of the policy by engaging in criminal activity or other counter-therapeutic behavior by phone.
(Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
LANGUAGE
REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES

Brown v. Hannah, 850 F.Supp.2d 471 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officials filed a motion to dismiss and the district
court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a liberty interest in remaining free
from disciplinary confinement; (2) placement in confinement was not an atypical and significant hardship; (3) the
inmate did not have a constitutionally protected right in the prison setting to use inappropriate, disrespectful, and
derogatory language to a prison official; (4) rejection of his grievance was not an attempt to frustrate his ability to
pursue a lawsuit; and (5) allegations were insufficient to state a conspiracy claim. (State Correctional Institution,
Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012). Individuals convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against Nature
by Solicitation (CANS) statute brought a § 1983 action against Louisiana's Governor, Attorney General, and other state
and municipal officials, challenging the statute's requirement that they register as sex offenders under Louisiana's sex
offender registry law. The individuals moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the individuals were treated differently than those convicted of engaging in the same conduct under the
solicitation provision of Louisiana's prostitution statute, which did not require registration as sex offender, and thus the
provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of CANS to register as sex offenders deprived
the individuals of equal protection of laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Crime Against Nature by
Solicitation Statute, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
INTERNET
REGULATIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Jindal, 853 F.Supp.2d 596 (M.D.La. 2012). Registered sex offenders brought an action seeking a declaration that
the Louisiana statute precluding registered sex offenders from using or accessing social networking websites, chat
rooms, and peer-to-peer networks was unconstitutional, and seeking injunctive relief. The district court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the statute was facially overbroad and the statute was void for
vagueness. The court found that a department of corrections regulation did not cure deficiencies in the statute where the
regulation only applied to sex offenders who were under supervision by state probation officers, which was a limited
segment of the class of persons otherwise subject to the statute. The court concluded: “Although the Act is intended to
promote the legitimate and compelling state interest of protecting minors from internet predators, the near total ban on
internet access imposed by the Act unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have become important to
everyday life in today's world. The sweeping restrictions on the use of the internet for purposes completely unrelated to
the activities sought to be banned by the Act impose severe and unwarranted restraints on constitutionally protected
speech. More focused restrictions that are narrowly tailored to address the specific conduct sought to be proscribed
should be pursued.” (Louisiana)

19.88

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of the
Cherokee Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail employees, and a
nurse, alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights, and seeking declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and desecration was
unconstitutional. The musician had been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the musician's allegations that his
use of an American flag during his performance at a casino was a constitutionally protected activity, that the county
sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional nature of the activity, and that the sheriff adopted an
unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the musician's arrest and imprisonment, stated a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a supervisor for violations of the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The court found that the musician's allegations that the county sheriff was, at all times relevant to
the musician's claims related to his arrest and imprisonment, a commissioned law enforcement officer and the dulyelected sheriff and chief policy maker for county sheriff's office, that the deputy sheriff was a commissioned law
enforcement officer acting as a marshal for Cherokee Nation and a deputy sheriff for the county's sheriff's office, and
that the deputy sheriff was acting as the sheriff's employee during events giving rise to the musician's claims, were
sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff was responsible for the deputy's training and supervision, as required for the
musician's § 1983 inadequate training claim against county sheriff in his official capacity.
According to the court, the musician's allegations that the county had policy or custom that was the moving force
behind the alleged violation of the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the
policy/custom encouraged the confinement of the musician in response to his use of an American flag during a concert
for allegedly expressive purposes, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. The court
held that the musician's allegations that the seizure and search of his person were unconstitutional because the
underlying conduct for which he was seized was legal and did not provide lawful grounds upon which to base his arrest
and the subsequent searches of his person, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity.
(Cherokee Casino, Rogers County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMUNICATIONS
WITH PRISONERS
MAIL

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Convicted sex offenders who, after completing their sentences,
remained in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, brought
a § 1983 action, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at a treatment facility. The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that security restrictions on face-to-face interactions between the civil detainees held in different
units within the state's treatment facility for sexually violent persons (SVP) did not constitute treatment decisions
which, as a matter of due process, had to be made by health professionals, merely because the security restrictions
affected treatment options. The court found that requiring the civil detainees to use United States Mail, rather than the
facility's internal mail system, to send letters to detainees in the facility's other units did not violate the detainees' First
Amendment associational rights, even if the facility's internal mail system was a superior means of sending letters. The
court noted that commitment under the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act is civil and may be for
purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not for punishment. As a general matter, persons who have been
involuntarily civilly committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. (Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS

Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
violated his constitutional rights by barring him from personally possessing books he had shipped to a prison. The
district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
decision to prohibit the inmate from personally possessing books containing drug-related information did not violate the
First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment or due process. According to the court, the state prison officials had a
legitimate and neutral governmental objective of restricting prisoner access to drug-related information, despite the
inmate's contention that he wanted the books to educate himself about his prescribed medications, where the prison
officials made an individualized determination, and the books were available in prison library. (Il. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXECUTIONS
MEDIA ACCESS
NEWSPAPERS

Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F.Supp.2d 362 (M.D.Pa. 2012). A newspaper brought an action against the secretary of a state department of corrections (DOC), alleging the First Amendment guaranteed the right to observe a prisoner's execution without obstructions. The newspaper moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the historical practice in Pennsylvania indicated that the public and press traditionally enjoyed a right of access to executions and that permitting the press to view an entire execution without visual or auditory
obstruction contributed to the proper functioning of the execution process. The court found that the state's significant
interest in protecting the identities of employees taking part in lethal injections did not outweigh the newspaper's right
of access to observe executions, and that the newspaper demonstrated that granting a preliminary injunction would not
result in harm to the state. The court noted that “… allowing the press to report on the entire method of execution may
promote a more informed discussion of the death penalty… and it may promote the public perception of fairness and
transparency concerning the death penalty, which can only be achieved by permitting full public view of the execution…. Allowing the press to view the entire execution also provides significant community therapeutic value, as well
as exposes the execution process to public scrutiny.” (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
CENSORSHIP
REGULATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2012). A non-profit publisher of a magazine about prisoners'
rights filed a § 1983 suit claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) book censorship policy and procedures, as applied to the publisher that was prohibited from distributing five books to prisoners. The district court granted the TDCJ summary judgment. The publisher
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of two books graphically depicting prison rape was rationally related to a legitimate penological goal of
protecting prisoners from a threat to safety and security by use of descriptions as templates to commit similar rapes, and

19.89

thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of the two books to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's
First Amendment right to free speech. According to the court, the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited the
publisher's distribution of a book containing racial slurs and advocating overthrow of prisons by riot and revolt was
rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison's safety and security from race riots, and
thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First
Amendment right to free speech. The court also noted that the prison had a legitimate penological goal of protecting
prisoners from the threat of violence due to the existence of race-based prison gangs and the prevalence of racial discord. The court found that the TDCJ book censorship policy that formerly prohibited the publisher's distribution of a
book recounting sexual molestation of a young child was rationally related to the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison from impairment of the rehabilitation of sex offenders and from disruptive outbursts by prisoners who
were similarly victimized, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's distribution of the book to prisoners did not
contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free speech. The court noted that the TDCJ policy left prisoners
and the publisher with ample alternatives for exercising their free speech rights by permitting prisoners to read the publisher's newsletter and the majority of books that the publisher distributed. (Prison Legal News, Texas Department of
Criminal Justice)
U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act

Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 910 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.D.C. 2012). A litigant who had been arrested and detained
for civil contempt based on abusive litigation practices brought a pro se Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and
Privacy Act claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the litigant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in her action to obtain
documents from the United States Marshals Service (USMS) related to her arrest and detention for civil contempt. The
litigant and her husband originally sued dozens of individuals and entities for damages arising out of a property dispute
with her neighbors in Idaho. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
VOTING

Swann v. Secretary, Georgia, 668 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2012). A former inmate at a county jail brought a civil rights
action against a state and county officials, alleging that the officials failed to mail him a presidential absentee ballot at
the jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The former inmate appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the former inmate lacked standing to
bring an action against county officials for their failure to mail him an absentee ballot for the presidential election at the
county jail, where the inmate's non-receipt of a ballot was not fairly traceable to any action of the officials, but only to
inmate's own conduct, since the inmate failed to provide the address of the jail on his absentee ballot application.
(DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
LANGUAGE
RELIGION

Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Va. 2012). An inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a jail, alleging that a prohibition against speaking in Arabic during
prayer violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the jail policy
requiring prayers or services be spoken in English when inmates from different housing units and classification levels
congregated, but allowing prayers to be offered in Arabic within individual housing units, was reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests of security and did not substantially burden inmates' right to free exercise of their First
Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail was concerned about inmates plotting riots or escapes while
congregating with other units, jail officers did not speak Arabic, and inmates could gather within their housing units and
pray in Arabic. (Northern Neck Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOOKS
FREE SPEECH
LITERATURE

Toston v. Thurmer, 689 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate brought a pro se civil rights complaint under §
1983 against prison officials, alleging that his rights of free speech and due process were violated when a disciplinary
proceeding found him guilty of possession of gang literature and sentenced him to 90 days confinement in segregation.
The inmate's due process claim was dismissed, and the district court granted summary judgment for officials on the free
speech claim. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The appeals court held that
the limitation of the state prison inmate's right of free speech, as a result of a disciplinary proceeding that found him
guilty of possession of gang literature, was adequately justified by prison officials' legitimate concern that the inmate
copied from a prison library book a ten-point program by the founder of a hate group's predecessor in order to show it
to others that the inmate hoped to enlist in a prison gang, with the program to serve as the gang's charter. The court
noted that a prison librarian's decision that on the whole a book is not gang literature does not preclude disciplinary
proceedings against an inmate who copies incendiary passages from it. The inmate had purchased, with prison
permission, “To Die for the People: The Writings of Huey P. Newton” the founder of the Black Panthers, and he had
checked out two books from the prison library about the Black Panthers. The court vacated the district court decision
regarding the alleged due process violation. The inmate alleged that his due process rights were violated because he had
no notice that copying passages from prison library books or a book he had been allowed to purchase could subject him
to a sentence of 90 days' confinement in segregation for possessing gang literature. The appeal court ordered the district
court to determine whether a 90–day sentence to segregation was, or was not, a deprivation of liberty. (Waupun
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2013

U.S. District Court
COMMUNICATIONS
WITH PRISONERS
CORRESPONDENCE
RETALIATION

Aref v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013). Current and former prisoners brought an action against the Bureau
of Prisons (BOP), BOP officials, and the Attorney General, claiming that their First and Fifth Amendment rights were
violated when they were placed in Communications Management Units (CMUs), in which their ability to communicate
with the outside world was seriously restricted. Following dismissal of all but the procedural due process and First
Amendment retaliation claims, the defendants moved to dismiss the First Amendment claims. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the prisoner's release from BOP custody rendered moot
his official-capacity claims for equitable relief; (2) a second prisoner sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation
claim; but (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred the prisoners' individual-capacity claims against a BOP
official for mental or emotional injury. (Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois)

19.90

U.S. District Court
CRITICISM
RETALIATION

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was beaten by
drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private company which was in the
business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district court held that the inmate established a §
1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim. According to the
court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally protected speech because he complained about conditions of his
confinement in the transport vehicle; (2) the driver of transport vehicle engaged in adverse or retaliatory conduct by
pulling the inmate out of the van and onto the ground and beating and kicking the inmate; and (3) there was a causal
connection between the driver's retaliatory action and inmate's protected speech, in that the incident would not have
occurred but for the inmate's complaints regarding conditions of his confinement. The court noted that the inmate's
injuries included headaches and facial scars, and his injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more than de
minimis injuries. The court ruled that the inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages because the inmate
had scarring on his face and suffered from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and
he suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result of actions of drivers of transport van, who kicked and beat him.
The court held that the inmate was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 based on the violation of his
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers were no longer
employed by their private employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did it punish the drivers for
their actions, and imposition of punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking similar actions in the future.
(United States Prisoner Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION
FORMER
PRISONERS
FAMILY
REGULATIONS

Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A correctional officer brought an action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's (DOCCS), alleging
DOCCS's work rule prohibiting personal association of DOCCS employees with current and former inmates and their
associates was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the officer’s motion. The court held that the work rule was facially overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment, where DOCCS had enforced the rule against the officer and denied her the right to associate with her
former husband and the father of her grandchild. The court found that the rule was not narrowly tailored to further the
State's compelling interest in maintaining safe and orderly administration of its prisons, as applied to constitutionally
protected close familial relationships, and thus, did not withstand strict scrutiny on the First Amendment overbreadth
claim. The court noted that the rule provided no temporal or geographical limitation with respect to the former inmate's
incarceration, nor did its prohibition account for variations in the seriousness of that person's offense or his or her
prison disciplinary history. The court found that the rule was substantially overbroad, in violation of the First
Amendment, as applied to close familial relationships, where the rule would prevent a DOCCS employee from visiting,
or even corresponding with an incarcerated spouse if the couple had no children or if their children did not maintain a
relationship with the incarcerated parent, and the rule prohibited employees from ever reestablishing contact with a
spouse, child, sibling, or parent when that person was released and became a “former inmate.” (New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Davidson v. Bureau of Prisons, 931 F.Supp.2d 770 (E.D.Ky. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) suit against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking the results of an audit of his prison
that had been conducted by the American Correctional Association. Following dismissal of his suit, the prisoner moved
for reconsideration and for an award of costs. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to judicial relief given
that the BOP had compiled the responsive documents and was awaiting only payment of the $33 copying charge. The
court found that the prisoner had substantially prevailed and was thus eligible to recover his litigation costs, and that the
prisoner was only entitled to recover his $350 filing fee. There had been a two-year delay in the BOP's response.
(Federal Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
HUNGER STRIKE

Dhiab v. Obama, 952 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013). An alien who was engaged in a voluntary hunger strike while
detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved for a preliminary injunction against force-feeding
him and the administration of medications related to the force-feeding without his consent. The district court denied the
motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion. (U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMUNICATIONS
WITH PRISONERS
FREE SPEECH
MEDIA ACCESS
PRIVACY

Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc., 730 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013). A former prison gang member brought claims of
appropriation of likeness, public disclosure of private fact, false promise, and negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, against the producers of a documentary television series on gangs, alleging that the producers failed
to conceal the member's identity in the broadcast as promised. The district court denied the producers' motion to strike
the complaint under the California anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation) statute. The producers
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the producers' actions
were in furtherance free speech rights, the producers' actions were connected with issues of public interest, the identity
of the former gang member was not a topic of legitimate public concern, the broadcast of the documentary series met
the public affairs exception to appropriation of likeness liability, and the producers had no legal duty not to reveal
private facts about the former gang member during the broadcast. (Gangland Productions, Inc. and A & E Television
Networks, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). A motorist brought a § 1983 action alleging First Amendment
retaliation against a city and police officers who booked and jailed the motorist following a traffic stop. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the motorist appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the motorist’s criticism of the police for what the motorist perceived to be an unlawful
and racially motivated traffic stop was squarely within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment, and any action
to punish or deter such speech was categorically prohibited by the federal constitution. The court found that the
motorist's booking and jailing by the police officers, allegedly in retaliation for the motorist's criticism of what he
perceived to be an unlawful and racially motivated traffic stop, would chill a person of ordinary firmness from future
First Amendment activity, as required to support a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the city and the

19.91

police officers. The court held that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the motorist's § 1983
claim that they booked and arrested him in violation of the First Amendment, where it was learly established that it was
unlawful to book and jail motorist in retaliation for First Amendment activity, even if probable cause existed, and a
reasonable police officer would have known that it was unlawful to use his authority to retaliate against an individual
because of his speech. During the traffic stop one officer said to the motorist: (1) “Stop running the mouth and listen”;
(2) “If you talk over me, you are going to go to jail, sir. Do not talk over me”; (3) “If you cooperate, I may let you go
with a ticket today. If you run your mouth, I will book you in jail for it. Yes, I will, and I will tow your car”; and (4) “If
you cooperate and shut your mouth, I'll give you a ticket and you can go.” (City of Yakima Police Department,
Washington)
U.S. District Court
PHOTOGRAPHS
PUBLICATIONS
REGULATIONS

Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). State inmates brought an action against prison officials, alleging
that the officials' refusal to let them receive mail that included photographs depicting nudity and sexual activity violated
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and that grievance procedures for challenging the refusals violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that a state prison regulation preventing inmates from obtaining nude or sexually explicit
photographs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the inmates' First
Amendment rights. The court noted that: (1) the regulation was expressly aimed at protecting prison security; (2) the
regulation permitted withholding reading materials only if it furthered interests in security, good order, or discipline,
and there existed a valid and rational connection between the regulation and prison security; (3) the prison left open
alternative means of exercising the restricted right by permitting inmates to receive a wide range of publications; (4) the
restrictions fell within the broad limits of deference to prison officials regarding what was detrimental to security; and
(5) the inmates did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated inmates' rights at a de minimus cost to valid
penological interests. The court found that there was no evidence regarding how the state prison's grievance and appeal
procedures operated, as required to support the inmates’ claim that they were provided with insufficient opportunities to
challenge prison's rejections of sexually explicit photographs and publications sent to them, in violation of due process.
(Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR
RELIGION

Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). Native American inmates brought an action against the Alabama
Department of Corrections, challenging its short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the Department and the inmates appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the Department’s short-hair policy for male inmates furthered compelling
governmental interests in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, as required to survive a challenge under RLUIPA by
inmates who wished to wear their hair long in accordance with dictates of their Native American religion. The court
noted that long hair was used to conceal weapons and contraband, it concealed inmates' fungus outbreaks, sores, cysts,
and tumors, and it impeded the ability of prison staff to identify inmates. According to the court, allowing an exception
for Native American inmates would not eliminate the Department's concerns, as inmates could manipulate searches of
their own hair to conceal weapons, and it would do nothing to assuage the Department's concerns about hair-pulling
during fights. The court held that the Department’s short-hair policy, which applied to all male inmates without
exception, did not discriminate on the basis of race or religion in violation of the Native American inmates' equal
protection rights. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
BOOKS
CORRESPONDENCE
PRETRIAL
DETAINEES
RELIGIOUS
LITERATURE

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an action against
the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement violated his right to
practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal reference books, and that the
defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved for a preliminary and a permanent
injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified complaint. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motion in part. The court held that the
pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied him books needed to practice his Orthodox Jewish religious
faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), absent
evidence that the county jail received federal funds in connection with its policies limiting the number and type of
books allowed in cells. The court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the number of religious books that the
pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him access to others that were not in his cell,
was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the detainee's rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell limitation was reasonable in a facility that housed
2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and the expressive content of books was not considered,
books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books
was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the copying of parts or all of a text, and the detainee was not denied
access to nine religious books he claimed were required in practicing his faith, but rather, argued only that access was
required to be more convenient.
The court found that the jail's policy of prohibiting hard cover books in cells, including limiting religious texts to
those that did not have hard covers, was based on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate rights of the
pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise Clause. The court noted that evidence at hearing on the
detainee's motion for injunctive relief showed that hardcover books posed safety and security risks because hard covers
could be used to conceal contraband and because of their potential use as weapons, the policy was applied in a neutral
way, and the expressive content of books was not considered.
The court found that the jail's policy of limiting package mail to four pounds was based on legitimate penological
interests, and thus, did not violate rights as applied to the pretrial detainee, an Orthodox Jew, under the Free Exercise
Clause when the jail rejected one of detainee's packages that contained more than four pounds of books. The court
noted that the jail received a large volume of mail and other items each day, all of which had to be searched for
contraband and threats their contents could pose to the safety and security of inmates and jail officials, the policy was
applied in a neutral way, and the expressive content of books was not considered. The court held that the jail's policy
that limited the number and type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial detainee's Due Process rights,

19.92

where there was no evidence that the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the jail's policies prohibiting hard
cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials by increasing the time he was allowed in the
library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to keep in his cell. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
NAME

Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought an action alleging that a Wisconsin prison
policy that required inmates to use their committed names in conjunction with a second name unless a state court
approved a change-of-name application, in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the defendants
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the policy did not violate either the
speech clause or the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the policy did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, absent an allegation that any inmate, of any race or religion, was allowed to change his name
on his own say-so after being convicted. The court found that the policy did not create a substantial burden on the
inmate's religious exercise, as would violate RLUIPA. The court noted that the dual name requirement served the
compelling governmental interest of maintaining prison security, and the requirement was the least restrictive means of
satisfying that interest. The court commented on the name of the statute: “…which often goes by the unpronounceable
initialism RLUIPA but which we call ‘the Act’ so that the opinion can be understood by normal people.” (Wisconsin
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
TELEPHONE

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim against the
District of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the detainee's five-day stay in a
“Safe Cell,” which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First Amendment right of free speech or
right of access to courts. The court found that the detainee's alleged exposure to “dried urine on the toilet seat and floor”
and garbage during his five-day stay, along with the denial of a shower, did not rise to the level of a Fifth Amendment
due process violation. According to the court, placement of detainee in a Safe Cell was not motivated by a desire to
punish the detainee, but rather by a nurse's desire to attend to the detainee's ailments after his “legs and back gave out”
twice. The court noted that denial of the detainee’s request to have the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that
the detainee would not be in the cell that long. (D.C. Jail, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRISONER
PUBLICATIONS
REGULATIONS

Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). A civil detainee, who was involuntarily committed as a sexually violent
predator, brought a civil rights action against a facility director, claiming that the facility's policy barring residents from
copying the detainee's newsletter violated his expressive freedoms under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court granted final summary judgment in favor of the facility director, and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held that the constitutionality of the facility's policy of banning outright all
possession and distribution of the detainee's newsletter should have been considered along with the facility's prior
policy limiting the means of the newsletter's propagation in the ruling on the facility director's motion for summary
judgment. The appeals court found that Turner 's rational relation standard was the appropriate standard against which
to measure the detainee's First Amendment claims, however, the government could not justify limitation on the
detainee's expressive freedoms based on retribution or general deterrence. (Florida Civil Commitment Center)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
MAIL

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and
distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom
employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to deliver its
materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the
motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy limiting incoming inmate
correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment, where there was an apparent commonsense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and limiting the number of pages a particular piece of
correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues of communication remained open for publishers who
wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the court held that the jail’s failure to give the non-profit
organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's refusal to deliver its materials to inmates violated the
organization's procedural due process rights.
The court ruled that the blanket ban on newspapers and magazines violated clearly established law, and therefore
neither the county jail mailroom employees nor their supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
First Amendment claim arising from employees' failure to deliver the organization's materials to inmates. According to
the court, the law was clear that blanket bans on newspapers and magazines in prisons violated the First Amendment,
and it was objectively unreasonable for the employees to throw away mail, or refuse to deliver it, based upon a
perceived blanket ban on newspapers and magazines. Because the county jail mailroom uniformly enforced the
unconstitutional county policy and allowed books from only four publishers, the county was subject to liability for First
Amendment violations in § 1983 action. The court held that there was no evidence that mailroom employees, their
supervisors, or command staff at the county jail were motivated by evil motive or intent when they violated the nonprofit publisher's First Amendment and due process rights by discarding publisher's materials without providing the
publisher opportunity to contest or appeal the non-deliverability decision, or that those individuals' unconstitutional
actions involved reckless or callous indifference to the publisher's federally protected rights, as would support an award
of punitive damages against the individuals in the publisher's § 1983 action. (Pinal County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
MAIL

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action alleging
that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and letters mailed to
inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it or the inmates with the
notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A bench trial was held, resulting
in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting inmates from receiving mail that was not
on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving

19.93

magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of withholding of incoming mail by jail authorities; (4)
entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the postcard-only policy was warranted; and (5) a
permanent injunction prohibiting officials from enforcing the prohibition against magazines was not warranted.
(Columbia County Jail, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
MAIL
PRIVACY
REGULATIONS
TELEPHONE
VISITS

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against
Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the Privacy Act and
the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact visits and limiting noncontact visits
and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more than other inmates, had a rational connection
to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's action alleging the rules violated his First
Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court, the prison had an interest in monitoring the
inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could pose a threat to others or to the orderly operation
of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not preclude the inmate from using alternative means to
communicate with his family, where the inmate could send letters, the telephone was available to him, and he could
send messages through others allowed to visit.
The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive
microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after contact visits, did not establish ready alternatives
to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone usage and noncontact visits due to being labeled as
a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of inmates subject to strip searches increased the cost
of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all security concerns that arose from contact visits, such as
covert notes or hand signals. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's
general population for over six years, that he was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational
opportunities available to other inmates, that contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week
during business hours when his children were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per
month, were sufficient to plead harsh and atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural due
process claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without warning, that he
was only provided an administrative detention order that stated he was being moved due to his classification, that he
was eventually told he was classified as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification imposed greater restrictions upon
his confinement, and that he was never provided with a hearing, notice of criteria for release from conditions, or notice
of a projected date for release from conditions were sufficient to plead denial of due process, as required for his claim
alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment procedural due process. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and USP
Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and CMU at
USP Marion)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

White v. Department of Justice. 952 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking records pertaining to him. Following
denial of DOJ's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, DOJ renewed its motion for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) DOJ conducted a search reasonably calculated to locate the
responsive records; (2) Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) had no obligation to search for the
records; and (3) EOUSA properly withheld the records as attorney work-product. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Mail Referral
Unit, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS

Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action in state court
against a warden, alleging that suspension of his visitation privileges for two years violated the First, Fifth, Eight, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Following removal to federal court, the district court granted the warden's motion for
summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The appeals court
held that: (1) the inmate did not have clearly established right to visitation; (2) the inmate’s claim for injunctive relief
was rendered moot when the inmate received restoration of his visitation privileges; (3) there was no evidence that the
inmate would be deprived of his visitation privileges in the absence of any culpable conduct on his part; and (4) the
inmate's request for “any other relief that seems just and proper” was insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief.
(Evans Correctional Institution, South Carolina)
2014

U.S. District Court
MAIL

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 23 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A civil
rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail's postcard-only
mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary restraining order (TRO),
the organization moved for preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion. The organization had sought a
preliminary injunction enjoining the jail policy of refusing to promptly deliver properly marked legal mail sent by an
organization attorney and individually addressed to an inmate. The court held that there was a likelihood of success on
the merits of its claim that the policy violated the First Amendment protection accorded inmates' legal mail. The court
noted that the organization sent letters in envelopes that were individually addressed to individual inmates, were labeled
“legal mail,” clearly delineated that the mail came from an organization attorney, the letters asked if the inmate was
interested in meeting with an organization attorney to obtain legal advice regarding the jail policy of limiting all
incoming and outgoing mail to one side of a four by six–inch postcard, but the letters were not delivered. The jail
opened the letters and read them, and the jail failed to notify the inmates or the organization that the letters were not
delivered. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MARRIAGE

Amos v. Higgins, 996 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Mo. 2014). Fiancees of prisoners brought an action against a county
recorder of deeds, in her official capacity, asserting that a state law's requirement that a marriage license applicant must
sign the application in the presence of a recorder was unconstitutional, as applied in instances when one or both

19.94

applicants could not appear in person, or when an applicant was incarcerated. The fiancees moved for a preliminary
injunction prohibiting the recorder from requiring prisoners to execute or sign their marriage license applications in her
presence. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the Missouri statute requiring both applicants to
execute and sign a marriage license in presence of the issuing recorder was unconstitutional as applied, and an issuance
of a permanent injunction was warranted. The court noted that the “in presence” statutory requirement significantly
interfered with the fiancees' exercise of their fundamental right to marry, and it was not closely tailored to solely
effectuate a sufficiently important state interest, given that the identity of incarcerated marriage license applicants could
be verified through other means without requiring them to sign a marriage license application in the recorder's physical
presence. (Moniteau County Recorder of Deeds, Tipton Correctional Center, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Cash v. Wetzel, 8 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2014). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging,
among other things, violations of his civil rights in connection with destruction of his legal materials. The officials
moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for leave to file a supplemental complaint alleging retaliation, and for entry
of default. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the claims against
officials in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh Amendment The court held that the allegation that two
prison officials separated the prisoner from his legal materials, causing him to be unable to adequately litigate his direct
appeal, stated a claim for denial of his right of access to courts. But the court found that because the prisoner did not
lose a legal claim as the result of the officials' alleged withholding of the prisoner's legal material during a meeting with
his attorney, the officials could not be held liable for denying the prisoner's access to courts.
According to the court, the alleged adverse actions against prisoner, including denial of his requests to make
personal and legal phone calls, and statements by prison officials that “this trouble you're going through could easily go
away if you would just drop the lawsuit,” that were taken by state actors, as required for the prisoner's § 1983
retaliation claim against prison officials, and were sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
rights and thus constituted adverse actions.
The court found that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for failure to intervene against two prison officials by
alleging that the officials were present as another prison official destroyed prisoner's legal materials, and that two
officials were aware of a conspiracy to deprive the prisoner of his right of access to courts, and that they did not
investigate and stop the conspiracy. According to the court, a claim was also stated by allegations that two officials
decided to withhold mitigation evidence from the prisoner in retaliation for bringing a lawsuit, in presence of the other
official, and that each official failed to intervene in the other's withholding.
The court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 for supervisory liability against a prison official by
alleging that the official acquiesced in his subordinates' removal of the prisoner's legal documents. (State Correctional
Institution- Graterford, SCI-Albion, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES
RETALIATION
INTERNET

Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials and employees retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of letters and
manuscript he authored, as well as his filing of grievances and a lawsuit. The district court granted the inmate’s motion
for a protective order. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the inmate's incoming mail from his creative writing instructor and his outgoing mail
to his mother were restricted by prison officials due to the legitimate penological interest of prohibiting inmates from
receiving or sending sexually explicit mail, and thus the restriction of the mail did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment rights. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether prison mailroom staff members selectively applied the foreign language mail policy as a pretext to prevent the
inmate, who filed grievances, from receiving mail from his overseas parents written in Norwegian, as to whether the
staff members made an effort to seek translations, and as to whether the policy as applied amounted to a de facto ban on
all of the inmate's incoming non-English mail.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer who screened the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his family and a correctional sergeant with whom the
screening officer shared the e-mail colluded to penalize the inmate for opinions expressed in the e-mail, and as to
whether the actions of the screening officer and the sergeant chilled the inmate's exercise of protected rights. The court
held that the correctional sergeant was not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the
sergeant retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, when he disciplined the inmate based on
disparaging remarks contained in the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his mother, where a reasonable official would have
understood that punishing the inmate for the unflattering content of personal correspondence directed to another was
unlawful. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
CENSORSHIP
MAIL
NEWSPAPERS
PUBLICATIONS
SEX OFFENDERS
TELEPHONE

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including failure to
provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to religious freedom.
The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’ motions. The court found that the
patients’ allegations that, based on policies and procedures created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no
more than six or seven hours per week in treatment, that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that
treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated
a § 1983 substantive due process claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment.
According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against state officials with
allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be monitored during religious
services and during private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear religious apparel or to possess certain
religious property, and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and
that such policies and practices were not related to legitimate institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found
that the patients’ allegations that state officials limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and
magazines, and removed or censored articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim

19.95

that officials unreasonably restricted their right to free speech. The court found that the patients stated a § 1983
unreasonable search and seizure claim under the Fourth Amendment with allegations that, taken together with the
patients' other allegations surrounding the punitive nature of their confinement, state officials violated their Fourth
Amendment rights through their search policies, procedures, and practices, and that they were subjected to cell
searches, window checks, strip searches, and random pat downs,. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. District Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS
CORRESPONDENCE

Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d 1289 (M.D.Ga. 2014). The publisher of a periodical that addressed
prisoners' rights brought a civil rights action against a county sheriff and a county jail commander, alleging that mail
policies at the jail restricting the distribution of the periodical violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. A bench
trial was held. The district court entered judgment in favor of the publisher in part and in favor of the defendants in part.
The court held that: (1) the jail's postcard-only policy did not violate the publisher's First Amendment right of free
speech; (2) the jail policy totally banning individual inmates' receipt of publications through the mail violated the First
Amendment; and, (3) the postcard-only policy violated due process. According to the court, the jail's postcard-only
policy, which restricted a jail inmate's receipt of mail to postcards only, was reasonably related to the jail's legitimate
penological interests in security and efficiency, and thus, did not violate the periodical publisher's First Amendment
right to communicate with inmates. The court noted that by limiting the space in which correspondents could
communicate with inmates, the policy impeded the ability to conceal illegal schemes in lengthy correspondence,
reduced the likelihood of inmates' receipt of contraband, saved jail employees' four to six hours per day screening
inmate mail, and the publisher could still communicate via postcards or by phone, and no easy, low-cost alternative
existed. But the court found that the postcard-only policy did not provide appropriate notice and appeal procedures for
non-postcard mail, and thus, violated the publisher's procedural due process rights, where no jail policy required the
sender to be notified each time the jail decided not to deliver to an inmate a book, a magazine, or a multi-page letter.
(Walton County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
ASSOCIATION
FAMILY
SEX OFFENDER

Reinhardt v. Kopcow, 66 F.Supp.3d 1348 (D.Colo. 2014). Inmates, parolees, and probationers, as well their family
members, brought a § 1983 action against various employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and
members of the state’s Sex Offender Management Board, alleging that the state’s treatment of persons convicted of sex
crimes violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought monetary
damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion
in part and a denied in part. The court held that the potential penalty resulting from a Colorado policy that requires
inmates in the state’s sex offender treatment program to admit to prior acts, was so severe as to constitute compulsion to
testify, and would violate their privilege against self-incrimination. The court noted that inmates who chose to
participate in the program would be compelled to make incriminating statements that could be used against them during
any retrial.
The court found that individuals classified as sex offenders, both imprisoned and on probation, sufficiently alleged
that Colorado policies restricting their contact with family members, and particularly with their children, were not
rationally related to any legitimate penological interest, as required to support their claims that these policies violated
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to familial association and due process. The court noted that some
of these individuals were not convicted of sex offenses involving children, and some of them were not convicted of any
sex offense at all. The court held that CDOC employees were entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where the
rights of individuals classified as sex offenders that were purportedly violated by Colorado policies restricting their
contact with family members were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. (Colorado Department of
Corrections, Sex Offender Management Board)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL
PUBLICATIONS
SEX OFFENDERS

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process rights by
failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal protection rights
by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted summary judgment for the
prison employees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state prison's rule
providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) was neutral,
as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers and religious materials, since
the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison did not have any ulterior motive in promulgating the
rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related to the prison's legitimate interest in sex-offender
rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, since the rule placed restrictions on reading
material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing distractions. The court noted that the magazines that the prisoner
requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in the professional judgments by prison officials tasked with overseeing
program. According to the court, confiscation of the magazines of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to the rule, did
not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the prisoner could, and did, use the prison's grievance system to claim
that he had been wrongly denied those magazines, and prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and
giving written justification that explained why he was not entitled to relief. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Goree Unit)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS DIET

Sutton v. City of Philadelphia, 21 F.Supp.3d 474 (E.D.Pa. 2014). A Muslim inmate in a city prison system brought an
action against the city, the company that provided food to the prison, and the company's regional manager, alleging
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that: (1) claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief were moot because the inmate had been
moved from the city’s prison system; (2) the company could be sued under § 1983; (3) failure to provide appropriate
meals to the inmate was not the result of the company's policies or customs; (4) a genuine issue of material fact existed
as to whether the company was jointly responsible for maintaining a discriminatory religious alternative meal system;
(5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the regional manager acquiesced to a policy that on its face

19.96

discriminated against Muslim inmates; (6) the company did not violate RLUIPA; and (7) a city custom or policy did not
cause the Muslim inmate to fail to receive meals required by his religion. The court noted that an instruction to the
Muslim inmate by a single unidentified employee of the company that provided food to prisoners, to remove non-Halal
meat from his breakfast tray and to eat the remainder, did not establish a custom or policy of the company that caused
the inmate to be provided food that did not meet his religious requirements. (Philadelphia Prison System, Curran–
Fromhold Correctional Facility, Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center, Pennsylvania, and Aramark Corporation)
2015
U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015). A civil rights
organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail’s mail policy, pursuant
to which all incoming and outgoing mail except “bona-fide legal mail” had to be on standard four-by-six-inch
postcards, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary restraining order (TRO),
the organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion and the county appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the organization had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that
the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process protections. The court noted that the organization alleged
that the jail blocked delivery of letters sent by the organization’s attorney without providing the organization or the
intended inmate recipients notice and opportunity to contest the decision. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MAIL

Barrett v. Premo, 101 F.Supp.3d 980 (D. Or. 2015). An inmate brought a claim under § 1983 against several
corrections officials for violation of his First Amendment rights arising out of rejection of a piece of mail he sent to
another inmate because it had artwork on the front of the envelope. The district court ordered declaratory and injunctive
relief. The court found that: (1) the Department of Corrections did not have a consistently enforced policy or practice
prohibiting artwork on the front of incoming envelopes, and thus the rejection of the inmate’s envelope violated his
First Amendment rights; (2) monetary damages were inadequate to address the inmate’s loss of First Amendment
freedoms; (3) the constitutional hardship to prison inmates was far greater than the insignificant potential impact on the
prison’s time and resources from having to look more closely at envelopes to read a recipient’s address if artwork was
present; (4) a permanent injunction enjoining the Department from enforcing the policy would permit inmates and
nonparty members of the public to more easily and effectively communicate, and thus the public interest weighed in
favor of an injunction; (5) a permanent injunction did not extend any further than necessary to correct the First
Amendment violations and was the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violations; and (6) supervisory prison
officials were sufficiently involved in alleged violation of the inmate’s First Amendment rights to be liable under §
1983. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
NEWSPAPERS

Brown v. Moore, 93 F.Supp.3d 1032 (W.D. Ark. 2015). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a
§ 1983 action against a sheriff and jail officials, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated. The defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate’s being housed with a prisoner who
had a staph infection constituted deliberate indifference. The court held that the inmate, who alleged that a television,
tuned to a cable news channel, “blared” from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m., did not establish an Eighth Amendment excessive
noise claim where the only harm he mentioned was that he found the news to be repetitive and depressing, and this
harm was related to the content of the news and the length of time the television was tuned to the same channel, and it
did not suggest that the noise level was so extreme that it adversely affected his health. The court held that summary
judgment on the inmate’s First Amendment claim was precluded by material issues of fact as to how many newspapers
were distributed at the jail, how they were distributed, whether they were available on a daily basis, and who distributed
the newspapers. (Boone County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS

Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d 1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). The publisher of a magazine intended
for newly arrested county jail detainees awaiting trial brought an action against a county alleging violation of the right
to free speech protected under the First Amendment after the county barred general distribution of unsolicited paper
products to detainees. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the county jail’s policy of limiting written
publications was rationally related to legitimate a penological interest in preventing inmates from using paper to
conduct illicit activity; (2) electronic touch-screen kiosks that displayed the publisher’s magazine in the jail were
sufficient alternative means; (3) the impact of accommodating the asserted right weighed in favor of the county policy;
and (4) the policy was not an exaggerated response. The court found that a corrections officer’s testimony regarding the
nefarious uses of paper in county jails, including that he could not recall a time when the publisher’s law-oriented
magazine had been used by detainees for such purposes was not, without more, sufficient to refute the county’s
explanation that its policy limiting detainee’s access to paper was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest.
The court ruled that the publisher’s proposal to provide two copies of the publisher’s law-oriented magazine in the
county jail law library, standing alone, was not a sufficient alternative means for the publisher to communicate the
existence of the magazine to county jail detainees, where most inmates would likely have left the jail before they would
receive it from the library. (Butte County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
JAIL HOUSE
LAWYER
RETALIATION
FREE SPEECH

Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims under § 1983 for retaliation for the prisoner’s actions in filing and voicing inmate grievances on behalf of other
prisoners as a member of prison’s inmate liaison committee. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a
claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded in part. The court held that the
prisoner’s actions in filing and voicing inmate grievances on behalf of other prisoners, as a member of the prison’s
inmate liaison committee, was protected conduct under his First Amendment right of petition. (New York Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision, Special Housing Unit, Fishkill Correctional Facility)

19.97

U.S. Appeals Court
HUNGER STRIKE

Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). A wife brought an action under § 1983 against corrections
officials, claiming that revocation of her visitation privileges with her incarcerated husband who was on a hunger strike
violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment, based on qualified immunity, in favor of
the officials, for their decision to terminate the wife’s visitation privileges during the time of hunger strike. The court
denied summary judgment to the officials for the period following the end of the hunger strike, ruling that the question
of whether the officials continued to enjoy qualified immunity after the hunger strike ended was one for a jury. The
officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the officials were entitled to qualified
immunity. According to the court, the officials’ decision had been motivated by lawful considerations even though it
had consequences in the future, where the husband had a considerable amount of influence over other prisoners and
considered himself, and was viewed by others, to be the leader of the hunger strike. The court noted that evidence
suggested that the wife had urged her husband to prolong that strike after the strike had ended, and the officials were
legitimately concerned that the strike might spread, about the disruption caused by the strike, and about the security and
safety of staff and inmates. (Georgia Dept. of Corr., Diagnostic and Classification Prison Special Management Unit)

U.S. District Court
FORMER PRISONERS
FAMILY
FREE SPEECH

Jamal v. Kane, 96 F.Supp.3d 447 (M.D. Pa. 2015). Incarcerated individuals who engaged in written and oral human
rights advocacy, prisoner advocacy groups, and entities that relied on prisoners’ speech, brought actions alleging that
Pennsylvania’s Revictimization Act violated the First Amendment. The Act authorized civil actions seeking injunctive
and other relief whenever an offender engaged in any “conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on
the victim.” After several actions were consolidated, the state attorney general and a district attorney moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring an action against the district attorney, but that the plaintiffs had standing to bring a suit against the attorney
general, even though the Act had not been enforced against anyone since its enactment,. According to the court, the Act
was plainly applicable to the plaintiffs, the attorney general failed to foreswear enforcement of the Act, and the Act
authorized any victim of a personal injury crime or any family member of a homicide victim to file suit. (Penn. Crime
Victims Act)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING
PRIVACY

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and
two jail guards, alleging the jail’s use of a transparent jumpsuit during his transfer to a state prison, which exposed the
prisoner’s genitals, violated the prisoner’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court dismissed
the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that: (1) the prisoner was required to direct his grievance to the jail, not the state prison, in order to satisfy the
Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement; (2) the jail’s grievance procedure was not “available,”
within the meaning of PLRA; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the
jail’s requirement that the prisoner wear a transparent jumpsuit did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Illinois
Department of Corrections, Livingston County Jail)

U.S. District Court
NEWSPAPERS

Koger v. Dart, 114 F.Supp.3d 572 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A county jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and
the county sheriff, alleging that the county jail’s absolute ban on newspapers was unconstitutional under the First
Amendment. The inmate moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
absolute ban on newspapers for inmates was rationally connected to jail security, where newspapers were flammable,
they could cause sanitation problems because inmates could use them to clog toilets and they were issued with greater
frequency than other publications, thus increasing the volume of material to be disposed, newspapers could be
fashioned into weapons using paper mâché, and they could cause violence by informing inmates about the nature of
other inmates’ charges or outside gang activity. But the court held that the county jail’s absolute ban on newspapers for
inmates was not reasonably related to the jail’s legitimate interest in security, and thus the ban violated the inmate’s
First Amendment free speech rights. According to the court, an absolute ban was the most extreme response available,
as it completely extinguished the inmate’s ability to exercise his right to read newspapers, and the ban was an
exaggerated response to security concerns, as there were obvious, easy alternatives that would accommodate the
inmate’s right with de minimis impact on the jail, such as permitting newspapers only in the jail library to reduce waste
generated, and not purchasing local papers to limit the risk of violence from inmates learning of local gang activity.
(Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
ASSEMBLY

Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F.Supp.3d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
asserting claims for violation of her Free Exercise Clause rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Land and
Institutionalized Person Act (RLUIPA), and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, alleging that she
was prohibited from attending religious services. The officials moved to dismiss the action. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that prison officials prevented her
from attending religious services was sufficient to support a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegation that a prison official prevented her from attending two religious
services “because of her hair” and because of “her sexuality,” while other prisoners in the facility were not prevented
from attending those services, was sufficient to allege that she was treated differently from others similarly situated, as
required to support a claim that prison officials discriminated against her in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The court noted that there was no legitimate penological interest that would be served by denying the prisoner the right
to attend religious services based on her hair and/or sexuality. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
REGULATIONS
NEWSPAPERS
CORRESPONDENCE

McGowan v. U.S., 94 F.Supp.3d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A federal prisoner, who was serving the remainder of his
sentence at a halfway house, brought an action against a U. S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee who managed the
halfway house, alleging violations of his right to free speech, and asserting claims for false arrest, false imprisonment,
and negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion and dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner could not bring a Bivens claim alleging his free
speech right was violated when he was transferred from the halfway house to a prison for violating a BOP regulation

19.98

against publishing under a byline, where the prisoner could have challenged his transfer through a habeas petition after
exhausting BOP’s administrative remediation process. The court noted that the prisoner’s reassignment to prison was
rescinded when his lawyers notified the BOP that the byline regulation had been repealed. (Community First Services,
Inc., and Metropolitan Detention Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
BOOKS

Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
seeking injunctive relief, along with nominal and punitive damages, after the officials barred his receipt of used books
pursuant to prison directives. The officials and the prisoner both filed motions for summary judgment. The district court
granted the officials’ motion and denied the prisoner’s motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies under Maryland law prior to filing the § 1983 action in federal court, in violation of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
The court found that a prison directive banning inmate possession of incoming used books not sent directly by a
publisher was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, as required by due process. The court noted that the
prisoner was allowed to receive new books sent directly from a publisher, the ban was expressly aimed at advancing jail
security and protecting the safety of jail personnel and other inmates, the ban was logically connected to those goals, to
allow inmates to possess used books from stores or e-commerce companies could have had significant impact on the
safety and security of prison personnel and other inmates. The court noted that the prisoner did not point to an
alternative that fully accommodated his rights while at same time imposed de minimis cost to valid penological
interests. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
CENSORSHIP
PUBLICATIONS

Murchison v. Rogers, 779 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015). A former state prisoner filed a § 1983 action, alleging that prison
officials violated his First Amendment rights by censoring his weekly news magazine (Newsweek). The district court
dismissed claims against certain officials, and granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining officials. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that censorship of the prisoner’s weekly news magazine was
rationally connected to the officials’ legitimate penological interest in prohibiting materials that promoted violence,
disorder, or violation of the law. The court noted that the prisoner had alternative means of exercising his First
Amendment right. (South Central Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
NAME

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s gender dysphoria in
violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the officials were deliberately indifferent to her medical
needs and deprived her of her right to equal protection under the law when they denied her sex reassignment surgery.
The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied the
motion in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim for prospective injunctive relief; (2) the inmate stated
an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim based on denial of the request for sex reassignment surgery; (3) the
inmate stated an equal protection claim; but (4) the inmate failed to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim based on denial of a request for a legal name change. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PUBLICATIONS
OBSCENITY
MAIL

Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action challenging a prison policy
banning all sexually explicit material as violative of the First Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the policy did not
violate the prisoner’s First Amendment right of free expression. The court held that the policy was reasonably related to
the prison’s legitimate penological interests in preventing prison violence and black-market trading among prisoners.
(Stateville Prison, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PUBLICATIONS
REGULATIONS

Prison Legal News v. Jones, 126 F.Supp.3d 1233 (N.D. Fla. 2015). The publisher of a monthly legal magazine brought
a § 1983 action against the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), alleging violations of its First
Amendment and procedural due process rights arising out of impoundment and rejection of magazine publications.
Following a bench trial, the district court held that the regulation prohibiting prisoner access to publications with a
specific type of advertisements did not violate the First Amendment. The court noted that advertisements for three-way
calling and call-forwarding services in the magazine presented a security threat, warranting the FDOC's decision to
impound and reject the magazine under a Florida administrative rule.
The court held that FDOC's repeated failure to provide an impoundment notice to the publisher violated the
publisher`s substantive due process rights. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act
TELEPHONE

Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113 F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A requester brought a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) for information related to prison telephone practices and policies, including those at ICE’s
federal immigration detention centers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted
the requestor’s motion. The court held that the performance incentive rate of the phone services contractor for federal
immigration detention centers was not exempt from disclosure. According to the court, the phone services contractor
was not likely to suffer substantial competitive harm if the performance incentive rate from its successful bid for federal
immigration detention centers was disclosed, and thus that rate, which reflected the percentage of revenue set aside in
escrow and only paid to the contractor upon the government’s determination that the contractor performed successfully,
was not exempt from disclosure. The court found that the defendants violated FOIA by failing to make a timely
determination on the requester’s requests for information. The court found the delays “egregious” where the requester
did not receive ICE’s first production of documents, or any other determination, until 361 days after mailing its first
FOIA request letter, seven months after mailing its second request letter, and almost four months after filing this
lawsuit, and production of the remainder of the requested documents was not completed for several additional months.
The court awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs to the requester, finding that it was the prevailing party. (U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

19.99

U.S. District Court
MAIL
ASSOCIATION
MARRIAGE

Quiroz v. Short, 85 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for participating in
another inmate’s civil rights suit. One official moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to:
(1) whether the official acted with a retaliatory motive when he sent to the prisoner’s fiance a letter intended for another
woman; (2) whether the prison official acted with a retaliatory motive when he issued a rules violation report (RVR)
against the prisoner; and (3) whether officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by issuing the RVR
against him. The court found that: (1) the official did not have a retaliatory motive in investigating an administrative
grievance; (2) the prisoner’s assertion that one of the official’s duties was to monitor incoming and outgoing mail was
insufficient to show that the official destroyed two specific pieces of the prisoner’s mail; (3) the official was entitled to
qualified immunity on the prisoner’s right to intimate association claim; and (4) the official’s act of sending a letter to
the prisoner’s fiancé that was intended for another woman did not prevent the prisoner from continuing to associate
with his fiancé and did not prevent the prisoner from marrying his fiancé. (Pelican Bay State Prison, Secure Housing
Unit, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
MARRIAGE
VISITING

Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). A female former prison worker brought an action against prison
officials, alleging that the officials denied her request to marry an inmate in violation of her fundamental rights. The
district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment and the worker appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded, finding that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prison’s decision to deny the worker’s request to marry an inmate was reasonably related to its legitimate penological
interests. The worker had been an employee of Aramark Correctional Services, Inc. that operated and managed food
services in the prison. She became involved with an inmate worker who was under her supervision. She quit her job
after being discovered in a romantic relationship with the inmate. She was denied visiting privileges after she left her
job. The former worker alleged that prohibiting her marriage to the inmate was an exaggerated response to the prison’s
security objectives and that the prohibition was unnecessary for the maintenance of a safe and orderly institution. She
emphasized that she only sought “a single visit to the institution, of a short duration, for the limited purpose of marrying
her fiancé.” (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
TELEPHONE
VISITS
REGULATIONS

U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A defendant who was indicted for murder of an internationally
protected person and attempted murder of an internationally protected person, filed a motion to vacate or modify
special administrative measures governing conditions of his pretrial detention. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the measures were rationally connected to the legitimate government objective of preventing the detainee
from coordinating violent attacks. The detainee had been placed in a special housing unit and limitations on
communications between him and people inside or outside the prison were limited. The court noted that the detainee
had admitted allegiance to terrorist organizations, had previously broken out of prison two times, one escape was
allegedly coordinated between the defendant and a terrorist organization, and three prison guards had been killed during
one escape. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

19.100

that it would defer to the regulation promulgated by the federal Bureau of Prisons that
interpreted the phrase “term of imprisonment” to mean actual time served rather than the
sentence imposed. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Harris v. Meulemans, 389 F.Supp.2d 438 (D.Conn. 2005). An inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a warden and corrections officials to challenge, as a violation of procedural due process, a
hearing the resulted in his classification as a “Security Risk Group Member.” The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The court held that an inmate has no due process
liberty interest in a particular security classification, accrual of good time credits, or placement in
a less-restrictive half-way house or work-release setting. (Cheshire Correctional Institution,
Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Moreland v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180 (5th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner

petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on the theory that her good time credits had been
improperly calculated. The district court granted the petition and the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the phrase “term
of imprisonment” as used in the statute that permits a federal prisoner to earn up to 54 days of
good time credit at the end of each year of imprisonment, unambiguously referred to the actual
time served in prison, not to the sentenced imposed. The court found that the BOP had properly
awarded credit only for each year served. (Federal Prison Camp, Bryan, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the calculation of his good time credit by the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP). The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that it would defer to the BOP’s interpretation of the good time credit
statute, which interpreted the ambiguous phrase “term of imprisonment” to mean actual time
served. (Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of
his good time credit by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The district court denied the petition
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that Congress implicitly delegated
authority to interpret the ambiguous phrase “term of imprisonment” to the BOP and that the
prisoner was not entitled to good time credit based on his entire 10-year sentence, but rather to
54 days for each full year actually served. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Guaynabo, Puerto
Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Petty v. Stine, 424 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the manner in which the Bureau of Prisoners calculated his good time credit.
The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the Bureau reasonably interpreted the statute by awarding good time based on the
actual time served by the prisoner, not based on the sentence imposed. (Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the manner in which the Bureau of Prisoners calculated his good time credit.
The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the Bureau reasonably interpreted the statute by awarding good time based on the
actual time served by the prisoner, not based on the sentence imposed. (Federal Bureau of
Prisons, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
REVOCATION

Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005). A state inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas

XX

asserting that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was calculating his good time credit in a manner that
was contrary to the federal prisoner release statute. The district court denied relief and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
appeals court held that the petition was not ripe for judicial review and that in any event, the
BOP’s interpretation of the statute was entitled to Chevron deference. The court held that the
phrase “term of imprisonment” in the statute that permitted a federal prisoner to earn up to 54
days of good time credit at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment was
ambiguous, in that it could mean either the sentence imposed or the actual time served in prison.
The court accorded deference to the BOP interpretation, which awarded credit for each year
served in prison. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Texas)

corpus, challenging on due process grounds a misconduct conviction that caused him to be
demoted to a non-credit-earning prisoner. The district court denied the petition and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, ordering the issuance of a writ on remand.
The court held that the misconduct conviction reduced the inmate’s credit-earning class in a
manner that inevitably affected the direction of his sentence and therefore deprived the inmate of
a liberty interest. According to the court, officials violated the inmate’s due process rights by

20.21

convicting him without any evidence. (Great Plains Correctional Facility, Oklahoma)
U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, contending that he was entitled to more good time credit (GTC) than
awarded by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The district court denied the petition and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in
the statute was ambiguous and that the court would defer to the BOP’s statutory interpretation.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Petersburg, Virginia)
2006

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Gaskins v. Johnson, 443 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D.Va. 2006). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of good conduct credits. The district
court dismissed the petition. The court held that the appropriate remedy for the inmate's
challenge to the denial of good conduct credits was an action pursuant to § 1983, not a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. The court found that the inmate did not have a protected liberty interest
in either maintaining a current classification or obtaining a new classification, as required to
prevail on a § 1983 claim. (Powhatan Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME CREDITS

Gray v. Johnson, 436 F.Supp.2d 795 (W.D.Va. 2006). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION
DUE PROCESS

Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prison inmate sought federal habeas
relief after a prison disciplinary board had imposed discipline, consisting of revocation of 30 days'
good-time credit, for a lockdown infraction. The district court denied the petition and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court should have
held an evidentiary hearing, given the inmate's sworn testimony and extrinsic evidence that
contradicted the disciplinary board's version of events. The inmate had asserted that he had

XX

prison officials claiming that he was compelled to participate in a residential substance abuse
program that allegedly contained religious elements, in violation of the Establishment Clause of
First Amendment. The Therapeutic Community Program (TCP) was operated for inmates with a
history of substance abuse who have twelve to eighteen months left to serve. Those who qualify
for the TCP either have to participate or forfeit the right to accrue good conduct time. Members of
the TCP live together in a dorm and they are required to actively participate, and to encourage
other members to do the same. If an inmate fails to participate satisfactorily, he loses his good
conduct time, and prison officials may transfer him to a dorm with other inmates who either
refuse to participate or who have refused to cooperate once in the program. The TCP offers
therapeutic group meetings, educational seminars, group talent shows, and Alcoholics
Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous meetings (NA). The program consists of five
“phases,” each of which requires the completion of a variety of tasks, ranging from demonstrating
certain behavioral modifications to completing a written test. The goal of each participant is to
“phase out” of the program by completing the requisite activities for each phase. To that end,
participants have at their disposal a library of self-help materials.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that prison
officials had an objectively reasonable belief that the prisoner's participation in the residential
substance abuse program did not violate his rights, and therefore were entitled to qualified
immunity in prisoner's § 1983 action claiming that he was compelled to participate in the
program in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Prison officials had
previously taken actions in order to bring the program into compliance with Establishment
Clause, including making Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA)
participation optional, removing any religious references from inspirational readings, separating
religious library materials from secular ones, making the use of any religious library materials
completely optional, and enacting a rule prohibiting participants from proselytizing but allowing
them to discuss the role of religion in their personal recovery. According to the court, these steps
created an objectively reasonable belief that the program complied with Establishment Clause.
The court held that the program did not have a non-secular legislative purpose in violation of
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, where the program's dominant purpose was
rehabilitation of inmates with a history of substance abuse, and prison officials demonstrated
that rehabilitation was the true goal of program, not a sham secular purpose.
According to the court, the program did not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause, where a reasonable observer would not construe
religious activities which took place in program, including a single historical discussion of the
Essene community, the performance of a single gospel song at a talent show, the availability of
non-mandatory Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and Narcotics Anonymous (NA) meetings, and the
availability of spiritual materials in the community library, as advancement of religion by the
state, since all activities involved free expression of other participants in program.
The court found that the program did not impermissibly entangle religion and government in
violation of the Establishment Clause, where staff members were required to intervene to prevent
proselytizing when individuals expressed their faith during the program. (Therapeutic
Community Program, Botetourt Correctional Center, Virginia)

20.22

unsuccessfully sought a continuance before the prison disciplinary board in order to obtain additional evidence,
including a surveillance videotape, that would contradict the accuser's version of events. The court noted that a prison
disciplinary board is entitled to resolve conflicts in the stories presented to it, in deciding to impose revocation of
good-time credits as discipline, as long as some evidence supports the decision; however, the board is not entitled to
prevent an inmate from offering material evidence. (Indiana Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS

Louis v. Department of Correctional Services of Nebraska, 437 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2006). Inmates and former inmates
brought an action against a state corrections department and various department officials alleging that the method of
collecting and testing urine samples for drug use violated their constitutional right to procedural due process. The
district court entered judgment in favor of defendants and the inmates appealed. The appeals court found that due
process in connection with testing of the inmates' urine for drugs did not require that the inmates sign and seal the
specimens after collection, absent evidence that the collection protocols requiring that the collector label and seal the
specimens resulted in erroneous deprivations of inmates' good-time credits. According to the court, even if collection
procedures did not eliminate all possibility of mislabeled samples, they conformed to the practices used in privatesector workplace drug testing, and were adequate to ensure reasonably reliable results. The court concluded that the
refusal of the corrections department to fund confirmatory drug testing of a prisoner's urine sample after initial testing
yielded a positive result, when the prisoner denied using illicit drugs, did not violate a prisoner's due process rights.
The court noted that the initial testing was 95 percent accurate and that a prisoner had the opportunity to obtain
confirmatory testing at an independent laboratory at his own expense. The appeals court upheld the refusal of the
corrections department to allow inmates to call lab technicians as witnesses at disciplinary hearings to testify about
procedures used for drug testing of inmates' urine samples, finding that this practice did not violate a prisoner's due
process rights. The court noted that inmates could present urinalysis laboratory reports prepared by the lab
technicians, and the exclusion of technicians’ testimony was justified by the department’s need to manage the
environment of the prison and maximize the productivity of lab technicians. (Nebraska State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Scruggs v. Jordon, 435 F.Supp.2d 869 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state prisoner sought federal habeas relief after he lost 120
days of good time credit as a sanction at a prison disciplinary proceeding. The district court denied the petition. The
court held that prison officials did not violate due process in the prison disciplinary proceeding when they amended
the original violation, and that due process did not require disqualification of the chairman of the state prison
disciplinary board because the chairman was not directly involved in the investigation of the charges against the
prisoner. According to the court, the board's refusal to allow the prisoner to present his walking cane as evidence did
not violate due process, where the prisoner had not made a request to present physical evidence at the disciplinary
hearing, and was allowed to present his version of the incident. The court also noted that due process did not require
live testimony of corrections officers at a prison disciplinary hearing, absent a showing by the prisoner that their
testimony would have been any different if given live, or that he was prejudiced by the absence of live testimony.
(Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2007

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Bonet v. Khahaifa, 512 F.Supp.2d 141 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging denial of due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing that resulted in confinement in a
special housing unit (SHU) and loss of good-time credits. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the inmate’s 180-day confinement in the special housing unit (SHU) did not
violate the inmate's procedural due process rights because it did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate, as required to establish interference with a due process liberty interest. (Attica Correctional Facility and
Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
EQUAL
PROTECTION

Jackson v. Russo, 495 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass. 2007). A prisoner brought a suit against prison officials claiming that
compensation and good time credits awarded to him for participation in a barber program violated his due process and
equal protection rights. The prisoner moved for summary judgment, and the defendants moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part as moot. The court held that the
prisoner had no constitutionally created right to conduct business while incarcerated or to receive payment by the
prison for services he provided to other inmates as part of a barber vocational program. The court held that the
corrections commissioner's refusal to award additional good time credits to the inmate who enrolled in the barber
school, beyond awards granted in 2.5 day increments for participation in various programs, did not create an atypical
prison hardship, so as to give rise to an interest protected by due process. The court noted that the prisoner was not
unfairly denied the opportunity to participate in other prison activities that might have earned him more credits.
According to the court, the prisoner had no constitutional, statutory, or regulatory right to good time credits. (Souza
Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Moreno v. Buss, 523 F.Supp.2d 878 (N.D.Ind. 2007). After exhausting administrative remedies, a state prisoner
submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pertaining to demotion in his credit time earning classification at a
prison disciplinary hearing. The court held that the prisoner had a procedural due process right, consistent with
security considerations, to present a sweatshirt as exculpatory evidence for the Disciplinary Hearing Board’s (DHB)
consideration and that the DHB's review of investigative files containing photographs of the sweatshirt was not
sufficient to satisfy the prisoner's due process rights because review of photographs would not have allowed the DHB
to determine the nature of the stains on the sweatshirt, which was the point at issue. The inmate alleged that the
sweatshirt was stained with paint, not blood. The court found that the DHB's error in failing to allow the prisoner to
present the sweatshirt as exculpatory evidence was harmful, and that there was no evidence to support the DHB's
finding that the prisoner was guilty of battery. The court noted that it was not necessary for the sweatshirt to be
physically present at the hearing, so long as the DHB examined it before making a decision. (Indiana State Prison)

XXII

20.23

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO

Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2007). An inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and the district court
denied the petition. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate suffered an
injury in fact, as required for the inmate to have standing to bring a habeas petition challenging the decision of the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to terminate his boot camp program, even though placement in boot camp was a
discretionary decision made on an individual basis. The court noted that the decision denied the inmate the ability to
be considered for a program that would have allowed her to serve only six months in prison. The court found that the
decision of the BOP to terminate the boot camp program was committed to agency discretion by law, and thus was
not susceptible to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The inmate had only the
recommendation by the judge that her eligibility for the discretionary program be evaluated and she had not earned
any early release privileges when informed of the termination. (Federal Correctional Institution Dublin, California)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION

Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments by punishing him for writing letters using
vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that the
prison censored his outgoing mail and punished him for its contents stated a § 1983 claim that his First Amendment
rights were violated. The prisoner had attempted to mail a series of letters to his grandmother and mother. The letters
used vulgar and offensive racist language to describe prison officials. After reviewing the letters, prison officials cited
the prisoner for violation of various prison disciplinary rules, resulting in a loss of good time, revocation of certain
privileges, and other punitive measures. The appeals court found that the district court's dismissal relied on an
incorrect legal standard. (Oregon State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
REMOVAL

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging a prison
disciplinary proceeding in which he was assessed a 150-day forfeiture of good-time credit. The district court
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the
prisoner provided the state court with sufficient facts to exhaust his state court remedies. The court noted that
exhaustion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires that a habeas petitioner fairly
present his federal claims to the highest state court available and the petitioner describes in the state proceedings both
the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts have a fair
opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. The court noted
that exhaustion of state remedies under AEDPA does not require that a habeas petitioner present to the state courts
every piece of evidence supporting his federal claims. According to the court the state prisoner's state habeas petition
provided the state court with sufficient facts to address his claim that his due process right to call witnesses in a
disciplinary proceeding was violated. The petition explicitly stated that the prisoner was denied his due process rights
to a witness and made clear based on statute citations that the prisoner was charged with committing a battery upon
someone who was not an inmate. The prisoner cited a statute governing denial and revocation of good-time credits,
referred to a case holding that due process demands that an inmate be allowed to call witnesses in his defense in a
disciplinary proceeding involving possible loss of good-time credits, and cited a regulation controlling disciplinary
proceedings. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
REVOCATION

Gauthier v. Dexter, 573 F.Supp.2d 1282 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus
challenging discipline imposed for trafficking in narcotics on prison grounds. The district court denied the petition,
finding that the prisoner was given sufficient notice of the charges alleged against him, the officer at the prisoner's
disciplinary hearing was impartial, and the prisoner's conviction was sufficiently supported by the informant's
confidential statements. The court noted that prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution,
and the full panoply of constitutional rights due to a defendant in such proceedings does not apply. The prison
disciplinary committee determined that the prisoner distributed heroin from his cell window to other prisoners who
sold it in the prison yard, supporting a drug trafficking violation and subsequent revocation of work credits. The court
found that even though the determination was primarily based on statements from confidential informants, the
informants had previously given reliable information, the information supporting the prisoner's violation was
independently corroborated, and the informants incriminated themselves through their statements. (California Men's
Colony East)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL
PROTECTION

Kogut v. Ashe, 592 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). A county jail inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging he was prevented from participating in various jail work programs as a result of discrimination based on his
disability. The district court granted petition. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was prevented from
participating in a good-time work program that would have affected the duration of his confinement as a result of
discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was sufficient to form the basis of habeas
relief. The court noted that while an inmate may have no right under the Constitution to credit for good-time, he may
not under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) be barred, based on discrimination arising from his
disability, from work programs that may have the effect of reducing his sentence. He alleged that he suffers from
disabilities which affect his ability to perform certain types of work assigned in the jail. The inmate alleged that he
was “denied any and/or all access” to work assigned through the “County Correctional Facilities Work Programs” and
provided 16 inmate work request forms in support of this claim. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
REVOCATION

Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections officer,
alleging use of excessive force after the inmate failed to comply with the officer's orders. A jury trial resulted in a
verdict in the officer's favor, and the district court denied the inmate's motion for a new trial. The inmate appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate was not precluded from testifying that the
officer started the physical altercation by punching him, and that his subsequent actions were done in self-defense,

XXII

20.24

even if such testimony was contrary to the result of a prison disciplinary proceeding in which the inmate was found
guilty of battery on the officer and assessed 150 days of behavioral credit forfeiture. (Cal. Medical Facility, Vacaville)
U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging the
Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) calculation of good time credits in determining the length of time left to serve on his 20year sentence. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the BOP's program statement, calculating good time credits based on the time served rather than the sentence
imposed, reasonably interpreted the good time credit statute, despite the invalidity of a regulation with an identical
methodology. According to the court, the inmate's good time credits were required to be calculated based on time
served rather than on the sentence imposed. (Federal Correctional Institute, Sheridan, Oregon)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
GOOD TIME CREDIT
LIBERTY INTEREST

Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2009). A former inmate of the Washington Department of Corrections
(DOC), who had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment plus a term of community custody based on his status as a
sex offender, brought a § 1983 action against the secretary of the DOC. The former inmate alleged that denial of his
application for early release into community custody constituted a violation of his due process rights. The district
court granted summary judgment for the DOC secretary, and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that state statutes did not create a liberty interest in early release into community custody for sex offenders who earned a good-time early release date. Rather, according to the court, the statutes only made such offenders eligible for discretionary transfer at an earlier date, if appropriate. (Washington State Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EX POST FACTO
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730 (8th Cir 2009). A former state prisoner filed § 1983 action against the Secretary of the
South Dakota Department of Corrections (DOC) and two wardens, seeking money damages for unconstitutionally
prolonged incarceration based on violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause by the DOC's retroactive withholding of the
prisoner's mandatory good-time credits pursuant to a statute enacted after his sex offense was committed. The district
court granted the secretary and one warden qualified immunity, but denied the other warden qualified immunity. The
warden appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The court held that although the prison warden
accepted service of the state prisoner's habeas petition challenging the Department’s withholding of good-time credits,
the warden was entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 claims for money damages for
unconstitutionally prolonged incarceration. According to the court, at the time the warden accepted service he had no
duty to review the prisoner's status to determine that he was entitled to be released, and the warden lacked unilateral
authority to restore good-time credits and release the prisoner. (South Dakota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Kogut v. Ashe, 602 F.Supp.2d 251 (D.Mass. 2009). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been discriminatorily excluded from work programs in which he could have earned good-time credits,
in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the
prisoner's alleged disabilities were not the reason for his exclusion from the work programs, as would violate the
ADA. The prisoner was excluded from the work programs because he had been the subject of over 30 incident reports
for harassment of staff, fights with other inmates, and other disciplinary infractions, and several of those incidents
required the prisoner's segregation from general prison population. The court noted that disciplinary issues and concerns over prison security may be legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for limiting access to a jail program.
(Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
REVOCATION

Lorando v. Waldren, 629 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.D.C. 2009). A parolee filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging the
loss of good time credits due to a parole violation. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the parolee's rights were not violated when he was not afforded a probable cause hearing before the United States Parole
Commission (USPC) within five days after he was taken into custody pursuant to a parole violation warrant. According to the court, the parolee suffered no prejudice from the delay, and to the extent that he sought release from custody
due to the delay, his request was mooted by his re-parole. The court found that even if the United States Parole Commission (USPC) had incorrectly determined that the parolee had five, not four, prior convictions in revoking parole,
the parolee was not prejudiced by determination, since the salient factor score would have been identical because four
or more prior convictions were accorded the same weight. ((Dist. of Columbia Central Det. Facility, U.S. Parole
Commission)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
REVOCATION

Morgan v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2009). A petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging a disciplinary
proceeding that resulted in loss of good time credit due to his use of indecent or vulgar language in a note he mailed to
opposing counsel in an unrelated habeas proceeding. The district court granted summary judgment for the government
and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the state prison had a legitimate
penological interest in rehabilitation that justified its revocation of 15 days of the prisoner's good time credit as punishment for violating a disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of indecent or vulgar language when the prisoner mailed
to a state's attorney in habeas proceeding a note written on toilet paper stating, “Please use this to wipe your ass, that
argument was a bunch of shit.” According to the court, the punishment was not an impermissible infringement of the
prisoner's First Amendment right to free speech. The court noted that the prisoner's note demonstrated a completely
unjustified disrespect for authority, expressed in the most unacceptably vulgar form, which would be offensive in
mainstream society, and the prison's disciplinary action served to correct behavior that would seriously prejudice the
prisoner when he returns to the civil world. The court found that requirements of due process were satisfied at the
prisoner's hearing where the prisoner: received notice of the disciplinary hearing and his attendant rights; he was provided assistance of a counsel substitute; the prisoner called the charging officer as a witness and that officer testified
via speaker phone; the hearing officer's denial of the prisoner's request that the prison's mail room supervisor and
Assistant Attorney General be called as witnesses was warranted since the prisoner's note was not intercepted; and
that the charging officer's report and testimony, the prisoner's admission that the note was in his handwriting, and

XXIII

20.25

prison mail logs all supported the finding against him. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Stevenson Unit)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
REMOVAL

Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F.Supp.2d 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees
of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging due process violations in connection
with a disciplinary hearing and violations of his constitutional rights relative to his temporary removal from a kosher
cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether a state prison correction officers' captain, correction officer, and/or prison counselor were personally involved in the temporary removal of the Jewish prisoner from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The
court found that the prisoner, who was found guilty by a prison disciplinary hearing officer of violating New York
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) rules, had a protected liberty interest in his earned good time credit
toward release, and thus an officer was required to provide the prisoner with procedural due process before imposing
on the prisoner a penalty that included loss of six months of good time credit. The court held that a hearing officer's
failure to call unidentified inmates to testify at the prisoner's disciplinary hearing did not violate the prisoner's procedural due process rights, where the prisoner did not make any request during a hearing for such witnesses to testify,
and the prisoner failed to explain the relevancy of unidentified inmates' testimony. (Southport Corr’l Facility, N.Y.)
2010

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Hill v. Cowin, 717 F.Supp.2d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 2241 habeas petition alleging he was being
unlawfully held in prison beyond his release date because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly calculated his
Good Conduct Time (GCT). The district court granted the petition, finding that the BOP improperly calculated the
prisoner's GCT, resulting in his being held beyond his release date. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Izzo v. Wiley, 620 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging a
decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denying his eligibility for the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot Program. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the provision of the Second Chance Act (SCA) making an offender eligible for the Elderly Offender Home Detention
Pilot Program if he is at least 65 years old and has served 75% of the term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced
refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court, without any consideration of good time credit. (Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Colorado)
2011

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EX POST FACTO

Baggett v. Keller, 796 F.Supp.2d 718 (E.D.N.C. 2011.) State prisoners, who were each convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, petitioned for federal habeas relief on the ground that their accrued good time,
gain time, and merit time credits entitled them to unconditional release. The district court dismissed the petitions. The
court held that the decision to withhold application of credits from the calculation of the date for unconditional release
did not violate the prisoners' due process rights. The court noted that the credits were solely for the purpose of allowing prisoners serving life sentences to move to less restrictive custody grades, not for allowing unconditional release.
The court held that the decision did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, where the DOC never promulgated a regulation under state law shortening or modifying prisoner's sentences and never applied sentence reduction credits toward calculating the date of their unconditional release. (North Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Bonadonna v. Grondolsky, 762 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.Mass. 2011). A federal inmate filed a habeas petition challenging
the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) determination that he was ineligible to participate in the Elderly Offender Home
Detention Pilot Program. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that good time credit could not be
considered in determining whether the inmate was eligible for home detention by satisfying the requirement that he
serve 75% of his “term of imprisonment.” The court also held that due process did not require that the inmate receive
a hearing prior to denial of his request. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011.) A federal prisoner, who was employed by the Department of
Justice's Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) program while in Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, brought a
Bivens action against various federal officials, alleging that the defendants denied him promotions and back pay for
his UNICOR job, and denied him good time credit for vocational training received through UNICOR and educational
training he took at his own expense through a correspondence course. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that sovereign immunity barred the prisoner's claims against the officials in
their official capacities and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the officials in their individual
capacities. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner had filed an administrative remedy request at the institutional level,
where the prisoner had failed to file an administrative remedy request at the regional and central office levels, and the
regional and central office levels had the authority to provide relief or to take action in response to the complaint.
(United States Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia, Federal Prison Industries)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Reyes-Morales v. Wells, 766 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Ga. 2011). An alien federal prisoner petitioned for habeas relief,
challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) decision to reduce good conduct time (GCT) applied to his sentence
after he withdrew from a literacy program required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court
denied the petition. The court held that the prisoner was not subject to a final order of removal, deportation, or exclusion, as required to receive the 54-day per year Good Conduct Time award, despite nonparticipation in a literacy program. According to the court, the BOP's regulations and program statements concerning loss of GCT time due to
nonparticipation in a literacy program were a reasonable interpretation of PLRA. The court found that the reduction of
GCT did not violate the prisoner's procedural due process rights. (McRae Correctional Facility, Georgia)

XXIII

20.26

2012
U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate petitioned for habeas relief arguing that the
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) illegally referred him to the Special Management Unit (SMU) of a penitentiary in
which he was currently placed, as punishment for filing numerous lawsuits against the BOP. The district court
dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's petition for
habeas relief did not concern the execution of his sentence, and thus the district court did not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over it, since the inmate did not allege that the BOP's conduct was somehow inconsistent with the
command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment; even if the inmate's placement in SMU made him eligible
to lose good time credits, he might not end up losing any. (United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
RESTORATION

Mitts v. Zickefoose, 869 F.Supp.2d 568 (D.N.J. 2012). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging his loss of good conduct time (GCT) credit following a finding that he was guilty of committing the
disciplinary infraction of fighting. The prisoner's claims were screened and his claims relating to his transfer and loss
of privileges were dismissed. The district court held that the prisoner was denied a meaningful opportunity to call
witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, warranting federal habeas relief directing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to
provide him with a curative hearing, where the prisoner, having been placed in solitary confinement, without
assistance of a staff representative, was unable to either detect the identities of inmate witnesses or to determine
whether another inmate involved in the altercation confessed to him being merely the victim of that inmate's violence.
(FCI Fort Dix and United States Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2012). A former prisoner brought an action against the
District of Columbia, alleging he was over-detained and asserting claims for negligent training and supervision. The
district moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the prisoner was to be released.
The district court began its opinion as follows: “Our saga begins with the tale of plaintiff's numerous arrests. Plaintiff
was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for violating the Bail Reform Act, one felony
charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance and one misdemeanor charge for carrying an
open can of alcohol without a permit.” During the prisoner’s time in jail he was sentenced for all of the remaining
charges. The prisoner claimed he was over-detained by approximately two months, and that this was the direct result
of the D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision of its employees with regard to calculating jail credits. (District of
Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Smith v. Reyes, 904 F.Supp.2d 1070 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison employees, alleging excessive force, failure to protect, failure to supervise, and filing a false
misbehavior report in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss.
The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims against prison employees in their official capacities, alleging
violations of the Eighth Amendment, were precluded by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court found
that the prisoner’s allegations that a prison employee assaulted him and that other employees failed to report the
alleged misconduct implied the invalidity of an administrative report resulting in the loss of good-time credits, was
precluded because the prisoner's conviction had not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question.
(Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2012). Inmates of state and city prison systems brought an action
against corrections defendants, alleging violations of their due process rights when they were imprisoned for periods
of time longer than their judicially imposed sentences. The district court dismissed the claims against some
defendants, and granted summary judgment as to the remaining defendants. The prisoners appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity on the inmates' claim that their
procedural due process rights were violated when officials failed to promptly afford them Parole Jail Time credits for
the time served in local custody on sentences ordered to run concurrently with undischarged parole revocation
sentences. (N.Y. State and New York City prison systems)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EX POST FACTO
LIBERTY INTEREST

Waddell v. Department of Correction, 680 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 2012). A district court dismissed a prisoner’s habeas
petition as time-barred, and, in the alternative, denied the petition on its merits, and the petitioner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the state corrections department's practice of applying earned good
time credits for certain identified purposes, but not for the purpose of reducing a prisoner's life sentence did not give
rise to a due process protected liberty interest in a life sentence reduced by good time credits. The court also held that
the corrections department's failure to utilize the prisoner's good time credits to reduce his life sentence under the
eighty-year rule did not give rise to an ex post facto claim. (North Carolina Department of Correction)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2013). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging
findings made by Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) that he had possessed weapons in violation of a prison
regulation and sanctioned him with forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit and the imposition of 60 days in
disciplinary segregation. The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the DHO did not violate the federal prisoner's due process rights when it found
that the prisoner had committed the prohibited act of “Possession of a Weapon,” on the basis that two homemade
shanks had been found in a cell that he shared with another prisoner. The court noted that, although those weapons
may have belonged to his cellmate, all prisoners had an affirmative responsibility to keep their “area” free from
contraband and the collective responsibility theory applied. According to the court, a prisoner serving a term of

20.27

imprisonment of more than one year had a liberty interest in good time credit that was protected by Fourteenth
Amendment, since he had statutory right to receive credit toward his sentence for good conduct. But the court noted
that on a claim of loss of good time credits through a disciplinary action, though the “some evidence” standard is a
standard of appellate review and not a “burden of proof,” a reviewing court need only find that a decision by a
Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) had “some basis in fact” in order to affirm the decision as comporting with the
Due Process Clause. (Federal Correctional Institution, Fairton, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
REVOCATION

Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging a
prison disciplinary action resulting in the loss of his “good-time” credit that would extend his period of incarceration
by 30 days. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prisoner
was not required to seek a certificate of appealability (COA) before appealing the denial of his petition for habeas
relief. The court allowed the appeal to go forward. (Plainfield Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2014

U.S. District Court
REVOCATION

Brooks v. Prack, 77 F.Supp.3d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging due process violations in connection with the rehearing of a misbehavior report. The officials moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that summary judgment would be premature and that the penalty imposed on the inmate implicated a
property interest protected by due process. The court also found that the inmate stated procedural due process claims
that he was denied adequate assistance and that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence. A penalty of 20
months in a special housing unit (SHU), loss of privileges, and loss of 20 months of recommended good time had
been imposed on the inmate who was found guilty in a disciplinary rehearing of assault on staff, refusal of a direct
order, and insolent language. The inmate alleged that he met with and was interviewed by his inmate assistant, that he
gave the assistant a list of materials he wanted in preparation for his disciplinary rehearing, but the assistant did not
give him certain requested materials, including a list of inmates in a certain block, a list of porters, photographs, and
command logs. The inmate also alleged that the assistant did not give him answers to questions he proposed to ask
potential witnesses and failed to provide him with witness refusal forms. According to the court, the inmate’s
allegations that the hearing officer recommenced a disciplinary hearing outside of the inmate’s presence and stated on
the record that he provided the inmate with certain materials, which the inmate claimed he never received, stated a §
1983 procedural due process claim related to the inmate’s exclusion from a portion of the rehearing. (Southport
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION

Grandberry v. Smith, 754 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the revocation of 30 days of his good-time credits upon his conviction of an administrative offense of
possession of an electronic device. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that the revocation of the prisoner's good-time credits was
not supported by some evidence, where there was no evidence that the prisoner used a computer to download forms
and documents that he was not told to by a prison employee. (Putnamville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION
DUE PROCESS

Austin v. Pazera, 779 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that a
disciplinary proceeding had denied him due process of law, primarily by convicting him on the basis of insufficient
evidence. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that
evidence did not support the disciplinary determination that the inmate was guilty of attempted trafficking in tobacco.
According to the court, the prison disciplinary hearing officer’s finding that the inmate was guilty was not supported
by even “some evidence,” and, thus, the subsequent revocation of his good time credit and other imposed disciplinary
sanctions violated due process. The inmate’s punishment consisted of losing 60 days of good-time credit which
increased his period of imprisonment by 60 days, being demoted from “credit class 1” to “credit class 2.” Inmates in
the first class earn one day of good time credit for each day of imprisonment, while inmates in the second class earn
one day of credit for every two days of imprisonment. The inmate was also given 20 hours of extra work duty, and
denied access to the prison commissary for 25 days. (Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against prison officials,
alleging that he was denied due process in connection with a prison disciplinary hearing. The district court granted the
officials’ motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
inmate’s due process rights were not violated in connection with the disciplinary hearing. According to the court, any
procedural error arising from the disciplinary hearing officer’s modification of the charge against the inmate, without
providing the inmate advance written notice of the modification, was corrected through the administrative appeal
process, and the inmate ultimately did not lose any good time credits, and thus the inmate’s due process rights were
not violated in connection with the disciplinary hearing. (Victorville Med. II, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME
EX POST FACTO

Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging a
state statutory amendment modifying the credit-earning status of prison-gang members and associates in segregated
housing, so that such prisoners could no longer earn any good-time credits that would reduce their sentences. The
district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions
to the district court. The court held that the amendment disadvantaged the offenders it affected by increasing the
punishment for their crimes, an element for an ex post facto violation. The court noted that even if a prisoner could
easily opt out of his prison gang, a prisoner who continued doing what he was doing before the statute was amended
would have his prison time effectively lengthened. (Special Housing Unit, Corcoran State Prison, California)

20.28

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2015). A Christian inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commonwealth of Virginia and various employees and contractors of the Virginia Department of Corrections
(VDOC), alleging that the defendants violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by prohibiting him from consuming wine during communion,
requiring him to work on Sabbath days, and assigning him non-Christian cellmates. Following dismissal of some
claims, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues regarding the wine
ban. The court also found that the inmate stated an RLUIPA claim based on cell assignment, a First Amendment
claim based on cell assignment, and an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The court noted that the
inmate alleged that he was required to share a cell with a particular inmate who subjected him to “anti-Christian”
rhetoric, and that he was “burdened, mocked, and harassed” on account of his religious views by being housed in a
cell with that inmate.
The inmate alleged that his religion required him to abstain from working during the “Old Jewish” and “New
Christic” Sabbaths, that his cleaning job would not accommodate his Sabbath observations, that his requests for job
transfers were denied, that prison officials had not approved him for any job for which he applied in over three years.
The inmate alleged that he would face sanctions and lose the opportunity to accrue good conduct allowances and
earned sentence credits if he failed to work for 30 to 40 hours per week. (Sussex I Prison, Waverly, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F.Supp.3d 215 (D. Mass. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the Commissioner
of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and prison officials, alleging that prison personnel violated his due
process, equal protection, and 8th Amendment rights by not providing rehabilitative educational programs that
awarded good time credits. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the
complaint. The court held that prison officials' refusal to allow the inmate, who was housed in a disciplinary unit, an
opportunity to participate in educational and rehabilitative programs in order to earn good time credits to reduce his
sentence, did not violate the inmate's due process rights. According to the court, the inmate did not demonstrate that
the officials' exercise of discretion to not provide good time credit opportunities to inmates in a disciplinary unit
constituted an imposition of an atypical and significant hardship not normally within range of confinement expected
for an inmate serving an indeterminate term. The court noted that the exercise of discretion by the Department of
Corrections in imposing different classifications upon inmates, with respect to restricting the ability of an inmate
housed in a prison disciplinary unit to earn good time credits to reduce his sentence, did not lack a rational basis, was
not otherwise based on suspect classification, and thus did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights. The court
found that the DOC had a legitimate public purpose in allocating limited resources available for earned good time
credit programs to inmates who were motivated to make best use of them by improving their chances for successful
return to society and as an inducement to control and reduce those inmates' tendencies towards violence. (MCI—
Cedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Mills v. Holmes, 95 F.Supp.3d 924 (E.D. Va. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison employees, alleging violations of this Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in reducing his
good conduct allowance class level. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court converted the inmate’s action into a habeas corpus proceeding and ruled that the inmate did not
have a protected liberty interest under Virginia law in his good conduct allowance earning level. The court noted that
a state law stated that inmates “may be entitled to good conduct allowance,” and while state regulations provided
objective criteria for decision-making, the results were not guaranteed since the decisions could be rejected in another
hearing in which officials had discretion, and any action was subject to approval by another official. (Deep Meadow
Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
REVOCATION

Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking relief on
due process grounds for disciplinary sanctions he received for possession of a cellular telephone, which included
revocation of his good time credits. The district court denied the prisoner’s petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner was given sufficient notice of the charges against him, as required by
due process. (Federal Correctional Complex at Coleman Medium Prison, Florida)

20.29

20.30

exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), by
failing to appeal his grievance to the highest level. (Everglades Correctional Institution, Florida)
U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Neese v. Arpaio, 397 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D.Ariz. 2005). An inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that

U.S. District Court
RIGHT OF ACCESS

Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F.Supp.2d 946 (S.D.Cal. 2005). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment
rights to file prison grievances. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the
fact that the prisoner undertook exhaustive efforts to remedy a myriad of alleged violations of his
First Amendment rights did not demonstrate that his rights were not violated at all. The court
noted that adoption of such a theory would subject prisoners to a “Catch 22” by establishing a rule
that, by virtue of an inmate having fulfilled the requirements necessary to pursue a cause of
action in federal court, he would be precluded from prosecuting the very claim he was forced to
exhaust. According to the court, the prisoner presented the “very archetype of a cognizable First
Amendment retaliation claim” in alleging that prison officials: (1) arbitrarily confiscated,
withheld and eventually destroyed his property, threatened to transfer him to another facility,
and ultimately assaulted him; (2) because he; (3) exercised his First Amendment rights to file
prison grievances and otherwise seek access to the legal process, and that; (4) beyond imposing
those tangible harms, the officers’ actions chilled the prisoner’s First Amendment rights; and (5)
were not undertaken in narrowly tailored furtherance of legitimate penological purposes. The
court noted that the prisoner’s conflict with the officers “has its genesis in the most unlikely of
places: the servicing of his Canon typewriter.” (California Correctional Institution, Tehachapi,
California)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil rights
action alleging that a corrections officer sexually assaulted him during a routine pat-frisk search
and retaliated against him for filing a subsequent grievance. The district court denied summary
judgment for the officer. The court held that officer’s alleged sexual assault constituted cruel and
unusual punishment and that the officer as not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held
that the officer’s alleged retaliatory planting of evidence and retaliatory filing of a misbehavior
report was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have any constitutional right to be free from cell searches of any kind, including
retaliatory cell searches. The court found that the prisoner suffered punishment as the result of
the officer’s alleged retaliatory issuance of a misbehavior report, when he was placed in less
desirable housing. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80 (D.Mass. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil
rights action against employees of a state corrections department alleging violation of his right to
practice his Muslim religion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the defendant failed to establish
that the prisoner’s religious beliefs were not sincerely held, noting that although the prisoner had
a long history of pro se litigation, he might have been both litigious and religiously observant.
According to the court, the fact that the prisoner first sought a pork-free diet and four months
later sought a vegetarian diet could have suggested an evolution of his beliefs, and not
“backsliding” or nonobservance of religious tenets. The court held that the prisoner’s failure to file
a grievance regarding the alleged confiscation of his religious medallion meant that his § 1983
claim concerning that incident was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). But the
court found that the prisoner’s letters to a Muslim prison chaplain and prison officials were

XX

county jail officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by serving him inadequate meals and
spoiled food, and by subjecting him to overcrowding and unsanitary living conditions. The district
court dismissed the complaint, finding that the action was barred by his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies. According to the court, the county jail inmate had administrative
remedies available to him regarding his complaints, which he did not fully exhaust, despite the
inmate’s claim that a jail official refused to give him grievance forms. The court noted that the
inmate had filed many grievances and his cellmates had filed grievances, and the inmate had not
grieved any issue to the highest administrative level available to him. (Maricopa County Durango
Jail, Arizona)

rights suit alleging that prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by denying him
access to internet-generated materials and by denying his appeals regarding the alleged
constitutional violations. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the
prisoner’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were mooted by the issuance of a federal
court’s state-wide injunction against enforcement of the policy. The court granted qualified
immunity from liability to the officials because the constitutional right to Internet-generated
material was not clearly established at the time. The court held that the prisoner had no legal
entitlement to a grievance procedure on which to state a constitutional claim based on
administrative appeal. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

21.21

“grievances,” and therefore his § 1983 claim for denial of his request for a vegetarian diet was not
barred by PLRA because the letters contained all of the information required by the relevant
regulations. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Cedar Junction)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2005). A state prisoner brought an action against a
prison block officer, alleging that the officer transferred him to another prison in retaliation for
exercising his First Amendment rights when he complained to the officer’s supervisors that the
officer had failed to authorize disbursements of money from his prison account to pay his lawyer
to review his appellate brief and file. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary
judgment and the officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner
engaged in protected conduct when he informed the officer’s supervisor about the refusal to
release funds, for the purposes of his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court found that the
officer took an adverse action against the prisoner even though the officer’s action simply made
the prisoner eligible for a routine transfer, and the violation involved a clearly established right of
which a reasonable officer would have been aware. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action
challenging their transfers to a higher-security prison. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoners’ suit challenging transfers to a
high security prison was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the transfer review process was not
available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation, and the prisoners’ grievances were sufficient to
alert the prison that the transfer decisions were being challenged. The court held that the alleged
change in a prison policy that required transferring gang members to a high security facility did
not constitute an ex post facto violation. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Young v. Hightower, 395 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.Mich. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a pro se

civil rights action against prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his safety
when they refused to buckle his seatbelt when he was transported in chains in a prison van and
when the vehicle was then involved in a collision that resulted in injuries to the inmate. The
district court held that the inmate had satisfied the exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) even though he did not return a document requested in response to
his completed step III grievance form. The court found that prison policy did not require specific
documents to be filed with the step III form and the request for documents suggested that the
request was procedural rather than substantive. According to the court, when an inmate takes
the prison grievance procedure to its last step, the PLRA exhaustion requirement has been
satisfied if the state forgoes an opportunity to decide matters internally. (Chippewa Correctional
Facility, Michigan)
2006

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2006). A state prison inmate brought pro se § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXAUSTION

Campos v. Correction Officer Smith, 418 F.Supp.2d 277 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A state inmate filed a §
1983 action alleging that correctional officers violated his constitutional rights by failing to
protect him from an assault by a fellow inmate and used excessive force against him. The district
court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that dismissal was an
appropriate sanction for the inmate's submission of a falsified document, and that the inmate
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The inmate had submitted a document to support
his claim that he had exhausted his administrative appeals and the court found it was falsified.
The inmate contended that his failure to file a timely appeal of the denial of his grievance was
due to prison officials' interception of his outgoing mail. The court found that the inmate's
contention was supported only by an obviously sham, backdated letter, and was otherwise purely
conclusory. According to the court, “The conclusion is inescapable, then, that plaintiff has
knowingly submitted a falsified exhibit in an attempt to rebut defendants' contention that he
never appealed the '03 grievance.” (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

XX

against a prison’s warden and correction officers, alleging they failed to protect him from violence
by the other inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the
action, citing the inmate’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate appealed and the appeals court reversed. The appeals court held
that the inmate had satisfied the adequate-control component of PLRA’s exhaustion requirement
with respect to his claim against the warden, given the details contained in two grievances he
filed against the warden. The inmate had filed a pair of grievances that, together, alleged that the
warden had the inmate moved to a different unit for no justifiable reason, that both the inmate
and his case manager had informed the warden that the inmate could be in danger if housed with
the other prisoners in that unit, and that the inmate was subsequently attacked by two fellow
prisoners in his cell while sleeping. (Trumbull Correctional Institution, Ohio)

21.22

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Carr v. Whittenburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 925 (S.D.Ill. 2006). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Crenshaw v. Herbert, 445 F.Supp.2d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Davies v. Valdes, 462 F.Supp.2d 1084 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se action

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
correction officers, alleging he was beaten in retaliation for punching an assistant warden. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the
prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies, even
though his grievance was lost and was not received by a board. The court noted that the
exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) even if the prisoner is requesting relief that the relevant administrative review board has
no power to grant, such as monetary damages, or if the prisoner believes that exhaustion is futile.
But the court found that prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion
requirement and that an administrative remedy becomes unavailable if prison employees do not
respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a
prisoner from exhausting. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Flanyak v. Hopta, 410 F.Supp.2d 394 (M.D.Penn. 2006). A state prison inmate filed a § 1983

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Laird v. Mattox, 430 F.Supp.2d 636 (E.D.Tex. 2006) An inmate filed a § 1983 suit complaining of

XX

against prison officials, alleging retaliation for filing a prison grievance regarding food handling
by the security staff and the inmate cell house workers. The court held that genuine issues of
material fact as to the intent and motive of the prison officials precluded summary judgment. The
grievance alleged that the Unit Superintendent allowed his security staff and the inmate cell
house workers to act as food handlers in the absence of required medical staff approval and
appropriate sanitation apparel, in violation of Illinois Department of Corrections policies.
(Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

alleging that corrections employees violated his First Amendment rights when they removed him
from certain jobs, allegedly in retaliation for filing a grievance against a corrections officer with
whom he had an altercation. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected activity
and the adverse actions. The court noted that the inmate was initially removed from his nurse's
aide position because of his own fears for his safety there, and his removal from a laundry job was
allegedly for poor performance. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

against various corrections officials, alleging that they violated his due process rights in
connection with disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that the issuance of a report that the prisoner possessed a
weapon, and approval of the report during the administrative review, did not violate the
prisoner’s due process rights because they were supported by some evidence. The reporting prison
official stated that he found a nail with black electrical tape wrapped around its handle end under
the prisoner’s locker, and that he found a pencil wrapped in electrical tape in the same manner.
According to the court, the refusal to allow testimony at the disciplinary proceedings did not
violate the prisoner’s due process rights. Under the Due Process Clause, prison officials have the
discretion, within reasonable limits, to refuse to call witnesses in a prison disciplinary hearing if
their testimony would be unnecessary or irrelevant, or would impose hazards in the prison. The
court found that the prisoner did not have a liberty interest in avoiding confinement in an
administrative segregation unit (ASU) or special housing unit (SHU). The court concluded that
the disciplinary proceedings against the prisoner were not in retaliation for his filing of a
grievance, or for a grievance filed on behalf of other inmates in his role as an advisory committee
representative, so as to violate his free speech rights. The prisoner asserted that officials planted
a weapon on him. The prison officials were unaware of the prisoner’s prior complaints until the
prisoner filed suit. The court also held that requiring the prisoner to submit to a drug/urine test
did not violate his right to privacy, where he was found in possession of a weapon, his bed was
next to the bed of an inmate found with marijuana, and the prison had a legitimate interest in
attempting to curb drug use. (California Rehabilitation Center)

Eighth Amendment action against the supervisor of the unit overseeing prison jobs and against
the prison's health care administrator, alleging that he had been subjected to unsafe conditions
while working as a welder. The inmate also alleged that the administrator had been deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs arising from those conditions. The defendants moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's
failure to exhaust the prison's three-step grievance procedure precluded his § 1983 action,
regardless of the reasons given, including futility. The court noted that there is no futility
exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative exhaustion requirement.
(State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, Pennsylvania)

alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his confinement. The district court dismissed
the case in toto, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required

21.23

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that completion of the
exhaustion of administrative remedies process is a mandatory prerequisite for an inmate's filing
of a § 1983 suit with respect to prison conditions, and that even complete exhaustion following the
filing of the lawsuit is not sufficient. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division, Gib Lewis Unit)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison

officials, alleging that they retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to use
the prison grievance system. Following denial of the defendants' first motion for summary
judgment, the appeals court remanded for consideration of whether an inmate's retaliation claim
must allege more than a de minimis adverse act. On remand, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) when addressing an issue of
apparent first impression for the court, prisoners bringing § 1983 retaliation claims against
prison officials must allege more than an inconsequential or de minimis retaliatory act to
establish a constitutional violation; (2) the officials' alleged actions in moving the inmate to a less
desirable job within the prison did not rise to the level of an actionable retaliation; (3) the
inmate's claim that he was transferred to an inferior and more dangerous prison satisfied the de
minimis threshold; and (4) the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the inmate's job
transfer claim. The court noted that although the inmate's official job classification was switched
from the commissary to the kitchen for about six weeks, he was actually made to work in the
kitchen for only a week at most, and he spent just one day in the “pot room,” which was evidently
an unpleasant work station, after which he was moved to the butcher shop, about which he raised
no complaints. (Telford Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action
against a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and physician's assistant for a county
correctional facility, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the detainee administratively exhausted his claim that the superintendent and
assistant superintendent were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, even though
he did not file a formal grievance, given that “rules” on grievance procedures in the inmate
handbook did not require that the grievance take a particular form. The court noted that the
detainee submitted a request form asking for referral to a specialist, as specified in the medical
procedures section of handbook, and that inquiries made by an investigator for the detainee's
criminal defense attorney into the facility's refusal to refer the detainee to an outside medical
care provider for his shoulder pain gave the superintendent and assistant superintendent the
requisite opportunity to address the detainee's complaints, which they took advantage of by
explaining the decision made. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), on his claim
that a physician's assistant at the county correctional facility was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs by failing to refer him to specialist outside the facility for his shoulder
injury. According to the court, the complaints made on the detainee's behalf by an investigator for
the detainee's criminal defense attorney did not allege any misfeasance on the part of the
physician's assistant or even mention him, and therefore did not give the facility's officials
sufficient notice of the detainee's concerns about treatment received from the physician's
assistant to allow those concerns to be dealt with administratively. (Merrimack County House of
Corrections, New Hampshire)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 claim

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that

XX

asserting violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with the
confiscation of magazines by prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the exhaustion requirement of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to prisoners who were held in private prisons, and
the prisoner's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the confiscation of his
magazines was subject to the PLRA exhaustion requirement. (Idaho Correctional Center,
operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Inc.)

prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The inmate
asserted that, after he wrote a letter and filed a suit complaining about abuse by the staff of the
prison where he was confined, the targets of his accusations retaliated by issuing bogus conduct
reports and arranging for him to be disciplined. The prisoner spent 300 days in segregation and
lost 25 days of recreation privileges. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held: (1) the inmate was not
required to establish or demonstrate in his complaint that the original speech was truthful where
the complaint set out the inmate's grievance clearly enough to put officials on notice; (2) the
inmate did not vouch for the correctness of the prison disciplinary board’s findings against him
because the board’s report was included with his filing; and (3) the disciplinary board’s finding

21.24

did not collaterally prevent the inmate from filing the § 1983 action. (Wisconsin)
2007
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker, 486 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 2007). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, challenging certain prison policies, and alleging that officials retaliated against them for filing an earlier
lawsuit. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the appeals court held that the district court could
not dismiss the prisoner's claims without determining which of the prisoner's claims had been properly exhausted
and which of the claims, if any, were meritorious. The court noted that if an inmate fails to exhaust one or more
discrete claims raised in a § 1983 complaint, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires only that the
unexhausted claim or claims be dismissed, but does not require that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
(Potosi Correctional Facility, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh
living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that dismissal of the detainee’s § 1983 claims of cruel
and unusual punishment at the District of Columbia jail based on lack of reading material, lack of recreational
equipment, failure of the commissary to stock items such as lotions, skin oils, hair oils, and peanut butter, the
detainee's exposure to the stench created by regular sewage backups, as well as the jail's use of bunk beds without
ladders was required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) because the detainee did not allege that he
suffered any physical injury. Instead, the detainee alleged mental and emotional injuries. The court held that the
provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing
a civil action against prison officials regarding prison conditions applied to the detainee who brought a § 1983
action before he was released from jail, even though the detainee had been released from jail by the time that the
defendants brought their motion to dismiss. The court found that merely alleging that the lack of appropriate
security at the District of Columbia jail created a risk of personal injury to detainees, without any allegation that the
detainee reasonably feared an attack on his personal safety, failed to set forth sufficient facts to state a claim under
§ 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the detainee at the correctional treatment facility
operated by the District's private contractor was not excused from the requirement, under Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), of exhausting his administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 action against the contractor's
employee relating to denial of the detainee's requests for dental care, even if the detainee believed it would be futile
to pursue the facility's grievance procedures. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility
operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Bumpus v. Canfield, 495 F.Supp.2d 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that state
prison officials and employees violated his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with his medical care and
treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held
that the prison physician's delay of several days in dispensing the inmate's hypertension medication did not
demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, where there was no evidence that the
inmate experienced any complications during the time that he was waiting for his prescription to be refilled. The
court found that the prison's nurse administrator was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical
needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, even if she did not respond to the inmate's letters complaining about
his perceived lack of medical attention, where the administrator was not personally involved in the inmate's
medical treatment, and the inmate did not believe that the administrator was deliberately trying to hurt him. The
court held that the prison officials' alleged refusal to process the inmate's grievance, or failure to see to it that
grievances are properly processed, does not give rise to claim under § 1983. (Elmira Corr’l Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F.Supp.2d 1302 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a state department of corrections, a contract medical care provider, and a prison physician
challenging the constitutionality of medical treatment provided to him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the commissioner was not subject to liability
under § 1983 for the prison medical staff's alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs,
where the commissioner did not personally participate in, or have any direct involvement with, the inmate's medical
treatment, that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the course of treatment provided to the inmate, and
such treatment did not result from a policy instituted by the commissioner. The court found that the inmate's failure
to properly exhaust the prison's grievance procedure barred his § 1983 action. According to the court, even though
the inmate filed grievance forms addressing his medical treatment, the treatment that was the subject of the forms
was wholly unrelated to the medical treatment about which he complained in his § 1983 action. (Bullock County
Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2007). A federal prisoner filed a Bivens action against federal prison
officials, alleging that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement when officials ignored a
mandatory evacuation order for a hurricane and abandoned him and other prisoners without adequate food, water,
and ventilation. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The court held that the dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was not proper, as the lack of exhaustion was an affirmative defense, the complaint
was silent as to exhaustion, and the defendants had not yet filed a responsive pleading. (Federal Correctional
Complex, Beaumont, Texas)

XXII

21.25

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clarke v. Thornton, 515 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate appearing pro se brought a § 1983 action
against a superintendent of a correctional facility and officers, alleging violations of her constitutional and statutory
rights while she was incarcerated. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies prior to bringing her action in federal court. The court noted that although the inmate
satisfied the first two tiers of the administrative review process under New York law by filing a formal grievance
and appealing to the relevant prison superintendent, the inmate did not complete the final step by appealing to the
Central Office Review Committee (CORC). The court found that this resulted in failure to exhaust all
administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Taconic Corr’l Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A former prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, challenging alleged denials of publications and mail, as well as alleged retaliatory acts by
officials. The district court granted summary judgment as to certain claims and the officials moved for
reconsideration as to a portion of that order and for summary judgment, and the inmate moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that reconsideration of summary judgment was warranted by genuine issues of
fact that existed as to whether prison officials violated the inmate's First Amendment rights by retaliating against
him after he brought numerous grievances and a civil rights action. The court found that the officials were entitled
to qualified immunity as to books containing sexually explicit materials, instructions on fighting techniques and
military procedures and materials, criminal investigatory techniques, and instructions on building electronic
devices, but issues of fact existed as to whether prison officials denied a book about revolution and four legal books
based on their content. (Georgia Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Davis v. Williams, 495 F.Supp.2d 453 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison's medical
services provider and staff, prison officials, and a fellow inmate. The court held that the inmate failed to state a §
1983 claim against the prison's medical services provider. The court noted that the provider was not mentioned at
any time in the complaint or in any of the amendments, and there were no allegations against the provider to
suggest that it, in any way, allegedly violated the inmate’s constitutional rights. The court held that the inmate was
not required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a § 1983 action against the state prison's medical
staff, since, in response to a grievance filed by the inmate against the staff regarding “physical harm/conduct of
officers,” where the inmate received a memorandum from the inmate grievance chairperson informing him that the
issue was “not grievable” because inmates could not request or demand disciplinary action on staff. The court noted
that if prison authorities thwart an inmate's efforts to pursue a grievance, administrative remedies may be presumed
exhausted for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as no further remedies are available.
(Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES

Fields v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil
rights action under § 1983 against the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) and nine OSP employees, alleging
claims for violations of various constitutional rights and other federal-law and state-law claims. The district court
dismissed all the federal-law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and then exercised its discretion
to dismiss the state-law claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
before bringing suit and that the district court was within its discretion in denying the prisoner's motions to amend
his complaint. The court noted that although the prisoner filed grievances with the Oklahoma Department of
Correction (ODOC) he failed to comply with the required grievance procedures. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). A pretrial detainee in a county jail, who had been pregnant
during her detention and whose child had been stillborn, brought a § 1983 action against county and jail officials, a
physician, and the jail's medical services provider, alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs.
The district court granted summary judgment for all defendants based on failure to satisfy the administrative
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the jail's administrative appeal procedure
for inmates was not “available” within the meaning of PLRA, where the detainee had no way of knowing about it.
According to the court, the detainee adequately exhausted her available remedies under PLRA by filing a document
titled “request form.” The court noted that the handbook given to inmates did not mention a grievance form, but
only spoke of a “written request,” and the inmate checked the “complaint” box on the request form rather than the
“request” box and cogently described her grievance. The court found that the detainee's amniotic fluid leak
constituted a serious medical need and the facility commander exceeded gross negligence in answering the
detainee's complaint about lack of treatment, supporting a deliberate indifference claim. The commander apparently
held a general disbelief of inmates' medical complaints, and responded only with a statement that the detainee could
visit an outside physician if she could pay for it. (Lee County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Henderson v. Ayers, 476 F.Supp.2d 1168 (C.D.Cal. 2007). An inmate brought a pro se and in forma pauperis suit
under § 1983 against an acting warden, in his individual and official capacities, claiming that the warden had
denied the inmate his right to attend Friday Islamic prayer services and seeking injunctive relief. The warden
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate satisfied the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though he did not specifically name the warden in
his grievance. The court noted that exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is not necessarily
inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances, but rather, compliance with
prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. The court held that the inmate
stated a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and
stated a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that he had been denied excused
time-off work to attend Friday Islamic prayer services, as his religion required, and that he had been subjected to
progressive discipline, including loss of privileges, for attempting to attend these prayer services. (California State
Prison, Los Angeles County)

XXII

21.26

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. Tedford, 616 F.Supp.2d 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his constitutional rights by verbally and physically assaulting him, and then denying him adequate
medical care for the injuries he sustained in that assault. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate filed a medical care grievance that was not responded to,
recorded, or assigned a grievance number. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the sergeant who supervised the state corrections officers who allegedly
assaulted the inmate also had supervisory authority over the nurse who treated the inmate. The inmate alleged that
the sergeant was grossly negligent in supervising the nurse when she engaged in the examination of the inmate.
(Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Supreme Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. (2007). State prison inmates brought separate § 1983 actions against corrections officials.
The district courts dismissed the actions for failure to satisfy procedural rules, implementing the administrative
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The appeals courts affirmed the respective
dismissals. Certiorari was granted, and the actions were consolidated. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
remanded. The court held that an inmate's failure to exhaust under PLRA is an affirmative defense-- an inmate is
not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. According the court, the inmates' § 1983
actions were not automatically rendered noncompliant with PLRA exhaustion requirement by the fact that not all
defendants named in the complaints had been named in previous administrative grievances. The court found that an
inmate's compliance with the PLRA exhaustion requirement as to some, but not all, claims does not warrant
dismissal of an entire action. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging
discrimination and retaliation in his prison employment. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) telling admittedly noisy
inmates to “shut up” on one occasion did not violate the equal protection clause, even if equally noisy inmates of
another race were not equally chastised; (2) the prisoner failed to present affirmative evidence that the garment
factory supervisor’s work assignments were motivated by race discrimination; (3) the supervisor’s work
assignments would not have chilled an inmate of ordinary firmness from filing grievances, as was required for a §
1983 retaliation claim; and (4) the prisoner’s protected activity of filing a grievance was not causally connected to
the alleged retaliation of an increased work load. (Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
MONETARY
DAMAGES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 2007). A federal prisoner brought a pro se suit against prison officials,
alleging Bivens claims for indifference to his serious medical needs and tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). The district court dismissed the Bivens claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and dismissed the tort claims without prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held that the unavailability of monetary damages in the
prison grievance system did not excuse noncompliance with PLRA, and that the prisoner did not procedurally
exhaust his remedies by bringing administrative tort claims and making informal complaints. But the court found
that the alleged threats directed at the prisoner may have rendered administrative procedures unavailable,
preventing the officials from raising non-exhaustion as defense. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Federal Bureau of
Prisons, New York City)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Malik v. District of Columbia, 512 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C. 2007). An inmate sued the District of Columbia, a
correctional services company retained by the District, and a transportation company claiming violations of the
Eighth Amendment during a 40-hour bus ride transferring the inmate between two facilities. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to the claims
against the District and the correctional services company. On appeal (574 F.3d 781), the appeals court held that
the prisoner did not have administrative remedies for the inmate to exhaust. The court ruled that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether he exhausted any administrative remedies available to him under the
transportation company's informal grievance policy, precluding summary judgment. (District of Columbia,
Corrections Corporation of America, TransCor, CCA's Northeast Ohio Correctional Center, Youngstown, Ohio,
and CCA Central Arizona Detention Center)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Maraglia v. Maloney, 499 F.Supp.2d 93 (D.Mass. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against several
Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) prison security officers. The state moved to dismiss the claims for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the motion
was converted into one for summary judgment. At a prior hearing, the court determined that the question of
whether the prisoner exhausted remedies involved disputed issues of fact. The district court held that the issue of
fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted remedies presented a question for the jury, not the court, to resolve. The
court noted that evidence of the prisoner's failure to file another grievance, challenging the fact that he had not
received responses to other allegedly filed grievances went to the issue of the prisoner's credibility regarding
exhaustion. (Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Monk v. Williams, 516 F.Supp.2d 343 (D.Del.2007). An inmate brought an action against a warden and a prison
administrator, alleging retaliation based upon his practice of religion. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the inmate's removal from a drug treatment program would not have
deterred a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his right to practice religion. The inmate told responding
officers that he had just finished praying and to let another inmate finish prayer, and thus his own religious conduct
was not disturbed. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner must complete an administrative
review process in accordance with applicable procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing
suit in federal court. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before filing action

XXII

21.27

because the inmate failed to appeal the prison administrator’s denial of his grievance. (Howard R. Young
Correctional Institution, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Murray v. Prison Health Services, 513 F.Supp.2d 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison health services, among others, alleging that a superintendent, nurse administrator and two nurses at
the prison were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and denied him daily medication for his HIV infection.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
prisoner's alleged actions, sending letters to the nurse administrator and superintendent, were not sufficient to
satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Green Haven Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

O'Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se suit claiming
prison officials denied him accommodation and treatment for mental illness, under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed the suit pursuant to the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's suit
did not arise under § 1983 and that exhaustion is required under PLRA. The court found that the prisoner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. According to the court, the prisoner's filing of grievances requesting a lower bunk
due to poor balance resulting from a brain injury were not equivalent to claims of denial of mental health treatment,
and the prisoner’s complaint to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) did not exhaust the prison's internal
grievance process. The court found that the DOJ's investigation of the prisoner’s claims did not satisfy the
exhaustion requirement as the investigation did not terminate the prisoner's rights to pursue ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims internally. (Lovelock Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Roman v. Donelli, 616 F.Supp.2d 299 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner, who suffered from Hepatitis C, brought a
§ 1983 action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services' (DOCS) chief medical officer,
among others, alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. The officer moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held
that the officer was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs and that the prisoner was not
similarly situated to another prisoner who was allegedly treated for the same condition. According to the court, the
officer's allegedly differentiated treatment of prisoners was not motivated by discriminatory animus, as would
support an equal protection claim. The chief medical officer refused to implement a course of treatment that was
not approved by Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for 22 months after the prisoner was treated ineffectively
with a different drug combination. The court noted that the officer made decisions regarding the prisoner's
treatment based on information before him at the time, and when the officer became aware of the circumstances
that would warrant an exception to the prison policy prohibiting treatment with drugs that were not FDA approved,
the officer approved treatment. The court found that the prisoner did not suffer any adverse action as a result of his
filing of grievances, as would support a First Amendment retaliation claim. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Singh v. Goord, 520 F.Supp.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate who professed a belief in the Sikh faith brought an
action against various officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, the New York State Constitution, and various other constitutional provisions. The DOCS moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate
failed to exhaust administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), with respect
to his free exercise clause claim regarding his right to wear a Kacchera, which was a religious undergarment. The
court found that summary judgment for the defendants was precluded by an issue of fact as to whether the inmate
received the decision of the Superintendent, but failed to appeal it. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Smith v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 517 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner who had requested
information from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) several times under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) brought
an action against the BOP, challenging the BOP's aggregation of the prisoner's FOIA requests and denial of his fee
waiver request. The BOP brought a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the prisoner was required to exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
review of BOP's aggregation of his FOIA requests, and that he was not entitled to a fee waiver. The court held that
the prisoner was not entitled to a fee waiver for information he requested from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), where the prisoner did not specify the public interest that would allegedly
be satisfied by disclosure of the requested information, identify the government activity or operation on which the
prisoner intended to shed any light, or explain how disclosure would contribute to the public's understanding of
such activity or operation, as required by Department of Justice (DOJ) procedures for disclosure of records under
FOIA. (BOP FCI Gilmer, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Sweet v. Wende Correctional Facility, 514 F.Supp.2d 411 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate filed a civil rights suit
against a prison, disciplinary hearing officer and others. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate did not exhaust his administrative
remedies on his due process claim concerning an alleged refusal to call witnesses. The court found that any right
the inmate had to have witnesses testify at a hearing was not violated when the witnesses refused to give testimony.
According to the court, the lack of a transcript of a prison disciplinary hearing did not violate due process. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

XXII

21.28

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Warren v. Goord, 476 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate whose face was slashed by an unidentified
assailant brought a pro se suit under § 1983 against corrections officials, claiming that their failure to install metal
detectors at the entrance to a prison yard constituted an Eighth Amendment violation. The inmate sought damages
and injunctive relief. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the inmate stated an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983 for failure to protect, where
his allegations regarding the attack sufficiently pled that he was put at a substantial risk of serious harm, and the
prison officials' alleged tolerance for weapons in the prison yard and resulting inmate attacks may have risen to the
level of disregarding a substantial and pervasive risk of violence. The court found that the inmate failed to state a §
1983 claim against a prison official who was alleged only to have denied the inmate's grievance, where the inmate
did not explain how the denial of a grievance violated his constitutional or federal rights. The court found that the
inability of the inmate to identify the superintendent of security at a correctional facility was not fatal to his “John
Doe” claim against the superintendent. The court declined to dismiss the claim until the inmate had had sufficient
discovery to name the defendant. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Wesolowski v. Sullivan, 524 F.Supp.2d 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought a § 1983 action against DOCS employees alleging his
constitutional rights were violated while he was confined at a correctional facility when employees confiscated
fundraising materials. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the inmate failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement by
never appealing the denial of a grievance filed with the Inmate Grievance Resolution Committee (IGRC) to Central
Office Review Committee (CORC). (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637 (3rd Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison's unit
manager, alleging he violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from an attack by another prisoner.
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner's procedural default should have been excused. The court held
that, although the prisoner procedurally defaulted his claim when he did not name the unit manager in his initial
grievance that asked to be moved from his cell because he feared he would be hurt by his cellmate, the default
should have been excused in his § 1983 action, because the unit manager responded to the grievance and
acknowledged conversations the prisoner had with staff regarding his transfer request, but rejected the grievance as
lacking merit. (Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2007). Black inmates brought a suit against prison officials asserting
an equal protection claim that they were consistently treated differently from similarly situated white inmates in job
assignments, disciplinary actions and security classifications. One inmate also asserted a retaliation claim against a
deputy warden. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied summary judgment for
the plaintiffs. The court held that an inmate failed to establish an equal protection claim against a prison
commissioner and warden, absent evidence of the involvement of the commissioner or warden in the alleged
incidents of racial discrimination. The court found that an inmate did not establish an equal protection claim based
on the allegation that he was not permitted to return to a particular prison building following an investigation while
a similarly situated white inmate was permitted to return. According to the court, the exhaustion provision of the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred an inmate's claim that his transfer to another facility constituted
retaliation for filing grievances and civil rights lawsuits. The inmate had written a letter to the warden's office
contesting his transfer, but filed no grievances raising a retaliation claim or even his housing transfer generally.
(Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)
2008

U.S. District Court
REMEDIES

Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner incarcerated in a privately operated
correctional facility brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison employees for allegedly acting with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court interpreted the
complaint as asserting a claim under Bivens and dismissed it for failure to state a claim because the prisoner had
adequate state remedies available. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that even
assuming that the private prison was a government actor for the purposes of Bivens liability, alternative remedies
existed by which the prisoner could recover from its employees. (McRae Correctional Facility, Corrections
Corporation of America, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a claim under § 1983 against corrections
officers alleging that he was subjected to severe cold in retaliation for filing grievances. The district court granted
the officers' motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether subjecting the
inmate to four straight nights of 20-degree temperatures was sufficiently severe to deter the inmate from filing
future grievances. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate's actions of writing
grievances against corrections officers caused the officers to retaliate by turning on “purge” fans, subjecting the
inmate to cold temperatures. (Clements Unit, Amarillo, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008). State inmates brought § 1983 suits against prison officials, claiming
that they had been beaten. The district court dismissed the complaints without prejudice. The inmates appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the district judge properly acted as a fact finder in resolving, on
motions to dismiss, a factual dispute as to whether an inmate had exhausted administrative remedies as required by
PLRA. The court found that in dismissing a state inmate's § 1983 suit for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the inmate's allegation that he was denied access to

XXII

21.29

grievance forms at a prison was not credible, especially given the unrebutted evidence that he successfully filed a
grievance there, although it was one for property loss. According to the court, a state inmate's untimely appeal of a
warden's denial of his grievance did not satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement for him to pursue a § 1983 claim.
The court found that, despite an inmate's contention that he failed to report an incident of prison abuse because he
feared additional violent reprisals by prison officials, the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as
required by PLRA for him to pursue a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the inmate was later transferred to
another prison where the threat of violence was removed and he could have filed an out-of-time grievance and then
shown good cause for its untimeliness. (Rogers State Prison, Georgia)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cohen v. Corrections Corp. of America, 588 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a pro se § 1983
action, claiming that a private prison and corrections personnel failed to accommodate the practice of his religion of
Judaism by not providing kosher food. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The prisoner petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded based on intervening law. On remand, the prisoner filed a
supplemental brief. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that PLRA did not require exhaustion prior
to filing complaint. The court noted that a new decision by the U.S. Supreme Court held that under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner is not required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint.
The Court further held that “exhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not
named in the grievance.” The Supreme Court found that the appeals court imposition of the prerequisite to properly
exhaust a claim prior to filing a complaint was “unwarranted.” (Corrections Corporation of America, Northeast
Ohio Correctional Center.)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging a prison
disciplinary proceeding in which he was assessed a 150-day forfeiture of good-time credit. The district court
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the
prisoner provided the state court with sufficient facts to exhaust his state court remedies. The court noted that
exhaustion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires that a habeas petitioner
fairly present his federal claims to the highest state court available and the petitioner describes in the state
proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the state courts
have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim. The
court noted that exhaustion of state remedies under AEDPA does not require that a habeas petitioner present to the
state courts every piece of evidence supporting his federal claims. According to the court the state prisoner's state
habeas petition provided the state court with sufficient facts to address his claim that his due process right to call
witnesses in a disciplinary proceeding was violated. The petition explicitly stated that the prisoner was denied his
due process rights to a witness and made clear based on statute citations that the prisoner was charged with
committing a battery upon someone who was not an inmate. The prisoner cited a statute governing denial and
revocation of good-time credits, referred to a case holding that due process demands that an inmate be allowed to
call witnesses in his defense in a disciplinary proceeding involving possible loss of good-time credits, and cited a
regulation controlling disciplinary proceedings. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ellis v. Vadlamudi, 568 F.Supp.2d 778 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against prison
medical personnel alleging due process and Eighth Amendment violations as the result of failure to treat his
chronic pain from several diagnosed medical conditions. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). A magistrate filed a report and
recommendation that the motion be denied and the defendants filed objections. The district court held that the
continuing violations doctrine should be applied to repeated failure to treat chronic pain, such that instances
predating and postdating a prison grievance were exhausted, even if discrete grievances were not filed for each
denial of treatment within the time limits of the state prison's grievance system. (Mound Correctional Facility,
Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Fields v. Roswarski, 572 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against city
police officers, alleging they used excessive force when arresting him, and against custody officers at a county jail,
alleging they used excessive force by unnecessarily spraying the inmate with pepper spray for an unreasonable
period of time. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that the inmate failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. According to the court, the inmate failed to comply with the requirement,
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), of exhausting his administrative remedies before bringing a §
1983 action, because after denial of his belated grievance, he failed to appeal from the denial of the grievance, and
the jail's grievance policy would have allowed such an appeal. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Gillet v. Anderson, 577 F.Supp.2d 828 (W.D.La. 2008). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violation of his right to free exercise of his religion. The district court granted summary judgment
for the officials, finding that the prisoner failed to meet the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement. The court noted that the prisoner did not file a request for a review of the initial denial of his
administrative request for the religious materials until the day after he filed his complaint, and the final
administrative determination denying the prisoner's request was not rendered until more than 30 days after the
prisoner filed his suit. (David Wade Correctional Center, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought §§ 1981 and 1983
actions against prison officials, alleging violations of his right to due process, right to equal protection, and Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The court held that the prisoner had no due process liberty interest in freedom from use of
four-point restraints or in having a prison nurse arrive before corrections officers placed the prisoner in the

XXII

21.30

restraints. According to the court, such restraints were expected adverse consequences of confinement, the prisoner
had been accused of hitting a corrections officer, and officers entered the prisoner's cell to conduct an investigation.
The court found that prison officials' alleged failure to follow procedure at disciplinary proceedings and provide the
prisoner with a medical report, question witnesses, and make another witness available for questioning did not
violate the prisoner's due process liberty interest. According to the court, failing to follow proper procedures is
insufficient to establish an infringement of a liberty interest, where the process is not an end in itself, but rather its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest. The court found that the prisoner's Eighth Amendment §
1983 claims for excessive force and equal protection race discrimination could not be dismissed under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) at the screening stage for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to
the court, if a prisoner's complaint contains claims that are administratively exhausted and claims that are not
exhausted, the district court should proceed with the exhausted claims while dismissing the claims that are not
exhausted and should not dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 2008). A prisoner who was formerly incarcerated in Pennsylvania and
transferred to Massachusetts brought an action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, alleging that he was transferred out-of-state in retaliation for prior lawsuits. The previous lawsuits
were against a Pennsylvania prison librarian, who allegedly denied his requests for legal materials, and against
numerous Massachusetts prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections. The court held that the conduct by the Secretary of the Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, in authorizing, directing, and arranging the Pennsylvania prisoner's transfer from a
Pennsylvania prison to a Massachusetts prison, pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact, was sufficient to
constitute the “transaction of business” in Massachusetts, as would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
the district court. The court found that the prison librarian's conduct in responding to requests for legal materials by
the prisoner incarcerated in Massachusetts was insufficient to constitute the “transaction of business” in
Massachusetts, within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. The court noted that the prisoner “…has
been the quintessential ‘jailhouse lawyer,’ pursuing post-conviction relief and filing numerous grievances and
lawsuits on behalf of himself and other prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement.” The prisoner
estimated that he had represented “thousands” of his fellow inmates in proceedings. He alleged that the
Pennsylvania DOC grew tired of his lawsuits and agitation and, in order to prevent him from filing more lawsuits
and in retaliation for the actions he had already taken, began a strategy of transferring him to out-of-state prisons.
(Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jensen v. Knowles, 621 F.Supp.2d 921 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
prison officials, claiming deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly denying the prisoner a
medically necessary diabetic diet and forcing him to reside in a cell with a prisoner who smoked, and deprivation of
his First Amendment rights by the alleged confiscation of the prisoner's Bible and Christian doctrine books. The
district dismissed the action on the grounds that the prisoner was not entitled to in forma pauperis (IFP) status,
under the three strikes rule. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the defendants moved to
dismiss, and the prisoner moved for to correctional officer. The district court granted the defendants’ motions in
part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiff’s motion. The court held that the prisoner's claim that he was
deprived of his First Amendment rights due to the confiscation of his Bibles and Christian doctrine books by prison
officials was precluded on exhaustion grounds, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the
prisoner exhausted his claim, where the prisoner filed suit two days before the prison grievance process itself was
exhausted. The court found that the prisoner's claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, due to
exposure to second-hand smoke by his forced housing with a prisoner who smoked and due to prison officials'
failure to issue a medical order prohibiting his housing with a smoker, satisfied the exhaustion requirements by
completing the grievance process, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule Creek State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a state court § 1983 action
against the director of a state's department of corrections, alleging improper debiting of his trust account to pay for
legal copies and postage, improper classification, improper conditions of confinement, and denial of rehabilitative
opportunities. The director removed the action to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment for
the director and remanded. The court held that the inmate's written requests to prison staff, and correspondence
addressing issues of prison conditions, did not satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative
exhaustion requirement, so as to permit the inmate's § 1983 action involving the same prison conditions to go
forward. According to the court, the inmate's filing of grievances, after commencing the § 1983 action, could not
satisfy the PLRA administrative exhaustion requirement with respect to claims made in the § 1983 suit. (South
Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees
of a county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 and violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the purposes of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) as to some of his § 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims against
employees of the county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue appeals at all, or did not pursue appeals to the
final step. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Lindell v. Schneiter, 531 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W..D.Wis. 2008). A prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
prison employees, claiming violations of his Eighth and First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the

XXII

21.31

employees did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the medical condition of the inmate, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, by limiting him to 2.5 hours of exposure to sunlight per week. The court found that the inmate failed
to show a health risk associated with his being forced to use unwashed outerwear when exercising. The court ruled
that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a corrections officer directly told the inmate that
he was being denied access to a desired program because he filed complaints, whether another officer failed to
intervene when the inmate was told he was being retaliated against, and as to the existence of direct evidence of
retaliation. The court noted that there was evidence that two prison security officers directly stated that the inmate
was being placed in restricted housing and denied participation in a desired program because he brought
administrative complaints. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
U.S. District Court
MONETARY
DAMAGES
RETALIATION

May v. Rich, 531 F.Supp.2d 998 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought suit against a prison employee, alleging
civil rights claims for denial of access to the courts and retaliation for filing grievances and litigation. Following a
jury trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the prisoner, awarding $2,388. The prison employee moved
for judgment as matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted the motion, entering a
judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. The court held that the prisoner did not suffer an actual injury, as
required for a denial of access claim. The court found that the employee did not retaliate against the prisoner by
filing a disciplinary report based on his possession of prison contraband. The court noted that the employee had an
absolute duty to file a disciplinary report against the prisoner for possession of carbon paper, which was contraband
in the prison system, such that reporting the prisoner could not be deemed retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of
First Amendment rights in filing civil rights suits. (Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2008). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging
deliberate indifference to his medical needs and retaliation. The district court dismissed and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. On remand, the district court dismissed and the
prisoner appealed again. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded. The court held that the
prisoner was not required to name particular defendants in prison grievances in order to satisfy the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirements. According to the court, nothing in prison grievance procedures
required the prisoner to identify specific individuals in his grievances. (Southern Correctional Institute, North
Carolina Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION

Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d (9th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action a against a prison warden,
alleging First Amendment and due process violations resulting from the prison's decision that the prisoner could not
participate in special programs. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. On remand, the appeals court affirmed, holding that the prisoner's administrative appeal was not timely
filed. According to the court, the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his § 1983
action, where the 15-day period for administrative appeals began to run on the date of the prison's decision that the
prisoner could not participate in “special programs,” rather than on the date he actually felt the effects of the
prison's decision, and the prisoner filed an administrative appeal after the 15-day period had expired. (San Quentin
State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging that he was denied procedural due process when transferred to a state facility and when he was
forced to take psychotropic medications. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials and denied
motions for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner failed to
exhaust challenges to the transfers and forced medication. The court also found that the prisoner forfeited the
argument that exhaustion should be excused because of an inadequate law library because that issue had not been
raised in the district court. The court noted that a prisoner's exhaustion of administrative remedies before filing a §
1983 claim is required even if the prisoner believes his efforts in securing relief will be futile or if the
administrative authority has no power to grant the requested relief. (Wisconsin Resource Center and the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit for damages, governed by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, claiming officers broke his arm when using excessive force to remove him from his cell.
The court denied the officers' motion to reconsider a grant of the prisoner's jury demand on factual issues related to
an affirmative defense. The officers filed an interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the prisoner was not entitled by the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial, rather than a bench trial, on
factual issues relating to his affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner alleged
that he could not prepare a grievance as he was left-handed and his left arm was broken, and that he was transferred
to another prison before prison officials conducted a promised investigation, which would form the basis of his
grievance. (Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se action against a prison official,
alleging that she transferred him to another facility because he filed grievances and lawsuits against prison staff.
The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issues as to whether: the official was personally involved in the transfer; the asserted reasons for
the transfer were pretextual; and the prisoner exhausted remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
(Miami Correctional Facility, Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

XXII

21.32

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of
Sunni Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for injunctive relief
qualified for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not rendered moot by his
transfer to another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability to freely transfer the
prisoner between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a reasonable expectation that the
prisoner would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's policies were applicable to all of its
prison facilities. The court held that two prisoners exhausted available remedies, as required by PLRA, through the
state Inmate Grievance Program (IGP), even though the prisoners failed to mention any allegedly unlawful conduct
by individual defendants in their grievances. According to the court, where the prison officials decided three
consolidated grievances rather than deciding one grievance and forwarding a response of that grievance to the two
prisoners, the subject matter of the consolidated grievance was the same as the subject matter of litigation. (New
York State Department of Corr. Services, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Short v. Greene, 577 F.Supp.2d 790 (S.D.W.Va. 2008). A jail inmate brought an action against a state, complaining
of jail conditions. The district court denied the state’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the state failed to
demonstrate that the inmate had not exhausted administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). (Southwestern Regional Jail, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION

Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action against a warden,
assistant warden, and hearing review officer for allegedly retaliating against him for exercising his free speech
rights in complaining of certain practices at the prison. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's letter to
the assistant warden, complaining that prisoners like himself, with “compromised immune systems,” were required
to go outside in “thirty-something degree temperatures, wearing substandard clothing,” and that he was given a
“diet composed of 95% starch” when prison officials knew that he was diabetic, constituted a protected exercise of
his free speech rights. But the court held that a reasonable jury could not find that prison officials would not have
disciplined the inmate but for his having filed such grievances. The court found that objective administrators
standing in the prison officials' shoes would assume that the gist of what the inmate said in his letter and the
language that he employed, which “reeked of disrespect for the administrators' authority, would be noised about the
prison's population and, if ignored, could seriously impede their ability to maintain order and thus achieve the
institution's penological objectives.” (Easterling Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against various
officials and employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that he was subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment and deliberately indifferent medical care. The district court dismissed the action and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the prisoner was not required to
file an additional grievance or seek leave to file an emergency or out-of-time grievance. The court found that a
prison official's serious threats of substantial retaliation against the prisoner for lodging a grievance could make the
administrative remedy “unavailable” for the purpose of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement, and the administrative remedy of filing an appeal would be unavailable. (Men's State Prison,
Hardwick, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging denial of various social and educational programs and services at
a prison because he was deaf, and naming as a defendant the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (NJDOC), the Executive Director of the New Jersey Parole Board, the prison's chief administrator, the
prison's assistant administrator, the prison's parole administrator, a corrections officer, two social workers at prison,
and the prison's psychiatrist. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prisoner's deafness inhibited his capacity to express his grievances comprehensibly in writing in accordance with
prison grievance program's requirements. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the prison
social worker's ability to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and expressively, using
any necessary specialized vocabulary. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a prison appeals coordinator,
warden and chief deputy warden alleging his First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances was violated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison appeals coordinator's warning to
the prisoner that he should be “careful” about what he writes and requests in his administrative grievances
intimated that some form of punishment or adverse action would follow a failure to comply. (California Medical
Facility)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Brown v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296 (D.Mass. 2009). Inmates brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging retaliatory transfer, deliberate indifference and due process violations. The district court granted
the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmates failed to demonstrate that they would
not have been transferred to a new prison but for the prison officials' retaliatory motive, for filing grievances about
being required to install security screens on other prisoners' windows. The court noted that the inmates had refused

XXII

21.33

to perform work assignments in the prison's maintenance shop in violation of prison regulations. According to the
court, prison officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmates' safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment
by refusing to reassign them to new jobs despite their fear of retribution by other prisoners. The prisoners had
installed security screens on other prisoners' windows as part of their job duties. The court noted that there was no
evidence that the inmates were subjected to ominous threats or violence by other prisoners. (Bay State Correctional
Center, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state inmate
filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including interference
with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights,
failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual punishment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to provide Hindu worship services on
Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the decision to reduce Hindu worship services at
the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum,
incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a
qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in the study of his religion did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause. The court held that prison officials did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights when they housed
an easily-provoked prisoner in the cell next to his cell, despite the inmate's contention that officials placed him
there in retaliation for his civil action against them. The inmate admitted that he never had any problems with the
prisoner prior to their altercation, and the inmate acknowledged that he provoked the altercation. The court held
that an officer's filing of a disciplinary charge against the inmate, after the inmate filed a grievance with the warden
alleging that the officer had failed to break up an altercation involving the inmate, was not retaliatory in violation of
the inmate's First Amendment rights, where prison officials investigated the altercation, the inmate admitted that he
provoked the altercation, and the inmate was found guilty of a disciplinary violation. (North Dakota State
Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES

Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner who allegedly suffered permanent vision impairment
due to a prison's failure to treat his eye condition while he was incarcerated brought a civil rights action against
prison officials for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The district court dismissed the prisoner's
complaint, and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's
allegations regarding a prison official's role as head of the prison's medical unit in treatment of the prisoner's eye
condition were sufficient to support his § 1983 claim against the official for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. Although the prisoner's complaint did not say that he ever spoke with the official or explain how she
came to know of his eye condition, it may have been possible to show through discovery that the physicians and
nurses to whom the prisoner spoke reported to the official on his condition, and that the official rather than the
other members of the health unit made the decision to leave the condition untreated. The court found that a prison
complaint examiner was not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need when she rejected as
untimely the prisoner's grievance regarding the alleged failure of the prison's medical staff to treat his eye
condition. The court noted that the examiner was fulfilling her duty to dismiss untimely grievances, and was not
required to go beyond the duties of her job and try to help the prisoner. (Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
superintendent, corrections officers, prison nurses and a physician alleging violations of his federal constitutional
rights. A nurse, the superintendent, and the physician moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's grievance relating to his alleged beating by corrections
officers, for which the prisoner sought an investigation into the beating and to be seen by a doctor, presented no
ongoing situation that the prison's superintendent could remedy, such that the superintendent was not personally
involved in the alleged violation of the prisoner's constitutional right. According to the court, although the request
to see a doctor referred to an ongoing situation, by the time superintendent received it the prisoner had been seen by
a doctor, and by the time superintendent answered the prisoner's appeal the prisoner had been transferred to another
prison. The court found that the prisoner's allegations: (1) that a prison doctor retaliated against him for a previous
grievance he had filed against the doctor by denying medical evaluation, treatment, and adequate pain medication;
(2) that all levels of the inmate grievance process determined that the doctor had, by his own admission, prescribed
the prisoner a medication to which he was allergic; (3) that the doctor failed to detect a condition which was later
determined to require surgery on the prisoner's elbow; (4) and that the doctor told the prisoner his elbow looked
fine and that his allergy to the medication was the prisoner's “problem,”' were sufficient to state a prima facie case
of retaliation under the First Amendment. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Clark v. Williams, 619 F.Supp.2d 95 (D.Del. 2009). An inmate sued state corrections officials, claiming that they
violated his Eighth Amendment rights when he was incarcerated in a cell with an inmate infected with human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and Hepatitis B, and by failing to provide him with medical treatment when he
contracted Hepatitis B. The district court held that the inmate had no administrative remedy, and thus, the
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not have to be met. The court ruled that
the issue of whether prison officials were aware that the inmate was living under conditions that exposed him to a
communicable disease that posed an unreasonable risk of serious harm to his future health was a triable fact issue.
According to the court, the medical services administrator and a physician were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's medical needs. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

XXII

21.34

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Dace v. Smith-Vasquez, 658 F.Supp.2d 865 (S.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
employees, alleging that his exposure to excessively cold conditions during his incarceration resulted in a
deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and that employees unconstitutionally retaliated against him by
exposing him to such conditions. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to administratively exhaust his § 1983 claims against prison
employees in accordance with Illinois Department of Corrections grievance procedures, as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, even if the employees failed to directly respond to some or
all of the prisoner's grievances, the fact remained that the prisoner failed to take up those unresolved grievances
with a Grievance Officer as required by the grievance procedures. The court found that the prisoner failed to
establish that his prior lawsuit against prison officials and/or his filing of grievances was the “motivating factor” for
the alleged actions of prison employees, including exposing the prisoner to extreme cold, not allowing him to go to
the commissary, handcuffing him, damaging his property, and not responding to his grievances, as would support
his § 1983 retaliation claim against the employees. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129(2nd Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a state
department of correctional services (DOCS) hearing officer, seeking damages for the alleged abridgment of his
procedural due process rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing resulting in the prisoner's administrative
segregation for 55 days. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the hearing officer and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the prisoner adequately exhausted
his administrative remedies by filing an administrative appeal following his administrative disciplinary hearing.
The court noted that state prison regulations did not allow the prisoner to separately grieve the hearing officer's
alleged conduct in presiding over the hearing, and the prisoner was not required to grieve separately the conditions
of his administrative confinement to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to the actual
conditions of the prisoner's segregated confinement for 55 days, imposed following a disciplinary hearing. (Elmira
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Davis v. D.C. Dept. of Corrections, 623 F.Supp.2d 77 (D.D.C. ,2009). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a §
1983 action against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, the director of the Department, an
administrator, warden and health care director, and other department employees, alleging that he was sexually
harassed, denied medical and dental treatment, physically assaulted and retaliated against during his confinement.
The district court granted some motions for summary judgment and denied others. The district court held that the
inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing claims against the warden, and that the director of
the health care corporation could not be held liable for the actions of jail and correctional treatment facility
employees. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding
whether the inmate exhausted administrative remedies prior to filing a § 1983 claim against the D. C. Department
of Corrections by telling staff members about the sexual misconduct. (District of Columbia Jail, District of
Columbia Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2009). A district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
state defendants on the prisoner's civil rights claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that state grievance procedures did not require an inmate to specifically name the
responsible parties, and therefore the inmate did not fail to exhaust his administrative remedies under PLRA by
omitting the names of the responsible parties from his prison grievance. The court found that the passage of only
six months between the dismissal of the prisoner's lawsuit and an allegedly retaliatory beating by officers, one of
whom was a defendant in the prior lawsuit, was sufficient to support an inference of a causal connection, and
therefore a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the causal connection element of the prisoner’s First
Amendment retaliation claim. (New York State Department of Corr. Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO ACCESS

Gray v. Hernandez, 651 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, seeking
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, against an acting warden, captain, and two employees in a prison
library. The prisoner alleged he was placed in administrative segregation pending the investigation of rule violation
charges filed by the two employees, accusing him of attempting to extort money from them by offering to settle his
potential suit against them. The district court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a chilling of his First
Amendment right to file grievances and pursue civil rights litigation by alleging that his placement in
administrative segregation caused him mental and financial harms. The court held that the prisoner's allegations
that his placement in administrative segregation forced him to endure 24-hour lock-down, lack of medical
treatment, only one shower every three days, and lack of exercise did not constitute an allegation of a dramatic
departure from the standard conditions of confinement, as would invoke procedural due process protections. The
court noted that an inmate does not have a liberty interest, for purposes of procedural due process, in being housed
at a particular institution or in avoiding isolation or separation from the general prison population, unless the
proposed transfer will subject the inmate to exceptionally more onerous living conditions, such as those
experienced by inmates at a “Supermax” facility. (Mule Creek State Prison, High Desert State Prison, Donovan
State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RIGHT TO ACCESS

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and
others, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and unsafe living conditions based on their failure to assign him a
lower bunk for medical reasons. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court granted the motion and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. Although the court found that a prison grievance need only alert the prison to the
nature of the wrong for which redress is sought and the inmate's failure to grieve deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs did not invalidate his exhaustion attempt, the inmate did not properly exhaust administrative

XXII

21.35

remedies under PLRA. The court held that the inmate's grievance regarding his need for a lower bunk assignment
did not provide sufficient notice of the staff's alleged disregard of his lower bunk assignments to allow officials to
take appropriate responsive measures, as required to properly exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before he brought a § 1983 action. The officials responding to the inmate's
grievance reasonably concluded that a nurse's order for a lower bunk assignment solved the inmate's problem.
(Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
MONETARY
DAMAGES
RETALIATION

Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action for retaliatory
discipline against a corrections officer who had filed a disciplinary report against the inmate after the inmate had
filed a grievance report against an officer for directing “profane or abusive language” toward him. After a bench
trial, the district court awarded the inmate $1.00 in compensatory damages and $2,500.00 in punitive damages. The
officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not err in concluding
that the inmate established a prima facie case of retaliatory discipline and in determining that the officer's
retaliation against the inmate was reprehensible. According the appeals court, evidence supported the district court's
findings that the officer was knowingly untruthful in claiming that the inmate lied in the grievance, the officer's
retaliatory conduct was willful, reckless, and malicious, and the officer knew that Arkansas Department of
Corrections (ADC) regulations prohibited him from filing the disciplinary report. The court held that the district
court did not err in concluding that the high, 2,500:1 ratio of punitive to economic damages awarded to the inmate
in his § 1983 action did not offend due process, where the officer’s action was sufficiently egregious to sustain the
punitive damages. (Arkansas Dept. Corrections, Tucker Max. Security Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that he was
beaten by corrections officers and denied medical treatment by a nurse. The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of the prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court was
required to first explain the procedural requirements for responding to a summary judgment motion and its
potential consequences, and to provide the prisoner with an opportunity to take discovery and submit evidence in
response to the motion. According to the appeals court, the district court could not convert the defendants' motion
for judgment on the pleadings in the prisoner's pro se civil rights action into a motion for summary judgment, then
grant the motion, extinguishing the claim, without first giving the prisoner notice of the conversion and an
opportunity to take relevant discovery and to submit any evidence relevant to the issues raised by the motion.
(Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate sued the operators of a
correctional facility under § 1983, asserting that overcrowded and unsanitary conditions had caused him to become
infected with the methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The district court granted the
operators’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The
court noted that the inmate had access to an inmate handbook, was familiar with parts of it, and did not dispute that
he had other means of informing himself of the requirements of the official grievance process. (Central Treatment
Facility, District of Columbia, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2009). A Muslim federal prisoner proceeding pro se filed suit against his
supervisor at a prison factory, claiming that his termination from a prison job assignment was due to the
supervisor's personal animus towards Muslims in violation of the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.
The district court dismissed the claims and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part. The court held
that the federal prisoner had no protected property interest in his job assignment at a prison factory, precluding the
prisoner's due process claim against a former supervisor for terminating his job assignment. The court noted that
property interests protected by the Due Process Clause are not created by the Constitution, but rather are created
and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law, rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits. The court also noted that employees “at will” have no property interest protected by the Due Process
Clause in their continued employment. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the prisoner failed to comply with the Bureau of
Prisons' (BOP) procedural rules creating a four-step administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints, by
not raising his First Amendment claim until the third step of grievance process. According to the court, the prisoner
lacked good cause for failing to exhaust administrative remedies. (Federal Correctional Institution, Otisville, New
York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), alleging violations of his constitutional rights stemming from a
knife attack by his fellow inmates. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the California
state prisoner was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies beyond the second level of the prison appeals
system in order to bring a § 1983 action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where, after filing his first
level appeal, the prisoner had been informed that the appeals process was unavailable to him. (Calipatria State
Prison Facility “B”, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, asserting
claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleged retaliation for his complaints about the searches, denial of his
request for dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, alleged inadequacy of his diet,
failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted

XXII

21.36

the officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that whether
strip searches were conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and cause psychological pain, and
whether guards subjected the prisoner to a non-routine search in retaliation for his complaints about strip searches,
were questions for the jury. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial
detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county and county
sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment. The court held
that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff raised that defense for the first time in his
motion for summary judgment. The court held that paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees who were
formerly housed at the county prison were not “prisoners confined in jail” for the purposes of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), and thus their civil rights claims were not subject to, or barred by, PLRA. The court held that
county prison facilities to which the paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees claimed to have been
denied access--showers, toilets, and sinks--were “services” and “programs” within the meaning of Title II of ADA,
which forbade discrimination against persons with disabilities in the area of public services, programs, and activities. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
paraplegic and partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees were intentionally discriminated against, and as to whether
modifications to county prison facilities requested by the detainees were reasonable. (Cook County Department of
Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Savage v. Judge, 644 F.Supp.2d 550 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Prison inmates brought a civil rights action against prison
officials for allegedly violating their civil rights in connection with reassignment of the inmates to different cells
and assaults allegedly committed upon them. Inmates not only asserted unlawful retaliation claims, but claimed that
officials exercised excessive force in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights and unlawfully conspired to violate their rights. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
prison officials, in separating the cellmates from each other and in transferring one to another facility, were retaliating against the cellmates for their pursuit of grievances, or were taking necessary action to prevent the cellmates
from engaging in homosexual activity in a cell. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to how an
inmate sustained an injury to his face while he was being transferred to another cell. (Graterford L-Unit- RHU,
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for
mobility filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that a state prisoner who depended on a wheelchair for mobility was not
required by the administrative remedy exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to
appeal a grievance regarding the height of a food service counter before bringing suit, where the grievance that he
filed conceivably was resolved in his favor. The court noted that although the height of a counter was not lowered
in response to the grievance, the prison had attempted to remedy the situation by changing the way in which hot
food was served from the counter. The court found that a prisoner who had his grievance denied because he no
longer was in custody of the prison, and who never appealed to the final stage of the administrative program, did
not exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before bringing a
lawsuit regarding that grievance. (New York State Dept. of Corr. Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Shaw v. Jahnke, 607 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against a corrections officer alleging excessive force. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies. According to the court, the prisoner made
sufficient efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
and that it was the corrections department's misinformation rather than any negligence or manipulation on the prisoner's part that prevented him from completing the grievance process. (Columbia Corr’l Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Sikorski v. Whorton, 631 F.Supp.2d 1327 (D.Nev. 2009). A state prisoner and his mother and sister brought a §
1983 action against prison officials and correctional officers, alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by censoring, refusing to deliver, and returning various pieces of mail addressed to the prisoner
and failing to provide them with notice and the opportunity to appeal their decisions. The prisoner also alleged that
officials retaliated against him for his use of the prison grievance system. The court held that the prison's policy of
not allowing inmates names and addresses of private citizens without express, informed consent of the citizens did
not violate the First Amendment rights of the prisoner who was issued an “unauthorized mail notification” relating
to a citizens' petition for recommendations regarding parole and sentencing procedures, which was forwarded to the
prisoner by a third-party. According to the court, there was a valid, rational connection between the policy and a
legitimate governmental interest of protecting citizens, there were alternative means of exercising rights that remained open to the prisoner, accommodation of the asserted rights would have had a significant impact on guards
and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and that there were no alternatives to the
policy. The court found that the prison's practice of returning mail to the sender unopened when such mail contained tape or stickers did not violate the First Amendment where the policy was rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest in preventing illegal chemical drugs from coming into the prison. The court held that the
prison's policy of not giving notice and the opportunity to appeal to inmates regarding mail that was returned to the

XXIII

21.37

sender because of noticeable violations on the outside of the envelope did not violate the First Amendment or due
process. The court noted that providing the accommodation of giving notice and opportunity to appeal for every
piece of mail with a noticeable violation would have placed a significant burden on prison resources. The court
found that the prisoner failed to establish that a correctional officer retaliated against him, in violation of § 1983,
for exercising the prison grievance system by issuing notices of charges against the prisoner, returning unopened
letters addressed to the prisoner, and issuing an unauthorized mail notification. The court held that the officer acted
for legitimate correctional reasons, and the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment rights was not chilled. (Nevada State Prison)
U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Skinner v. Holman, 672 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Del. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison employees, alleging he was retaliated against for having filed a prison grievance. The defendants moved to dismiss the
claims as frivolous and the district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was
denied transfer to a minimum security prison, was prevented from working, and was kept in disciplinary confinement for several months as a result of a grievance he had filed were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation for the
exercise of his First Amendment rights by prison employees. (James T. Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Wilbert v. Quarterman, 647 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Tex. 2009). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action alleging that two correctional officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they allowed him to be transported without seatbelts, resulting in injuries following the vehicle's sudden stop. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Although the court held that the
prisoner stated a claim of deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the prisoner did not timely
file a grievance and therefore the prisoner did not satisfy the exhaustion of the administrative remedies requirement
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that he had requested a seatbelt and was denied, that he
was not properly seated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) transport van, that the van was traveling at an unsafe speed, and that he was injured when the van suddenly stopped. (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, McConnell Unit)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Current and former inmates at a county jail brought a
§ 1983 action against the county, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging that they were abused by officials during their incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether corrections officers and prison officials knew or
should have known that an officer would apply excessive force to the inmate by shocking him when he was restrained and whether they could have prevented the officer's excessive use of force; (2) whether the inmates exhausted administrative remedies by filing grievances regarding use of a restraint chair, lack of mattresses, inability
to shower, cell conditions, and issues with mail; (3) whether the use of mechanical restraints against the inmates
constituted wanton infliction of pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (4) whether an inmate complied with
officials when extracted from a cell, rendering the use of oleoresin capsicum spray excessive and unjustified; (5)
whether cell conditions posed a substantial risk of harm to inmates and whether corrections officers and prison
officials were deliberately indifferent to that risk; and (6) whether the warden of the county jail was aware of and
condoned the use of excessive force against inmates at jail. The court held that a former inmate of a county correctional facility was not required to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
prior to filing Eighth Amendment claims against prison officials and corrections officers under § 1983, where the
inmate was not incarcerated at the time complaint was filed. (Mifflin County Correctional Facility, Lewistown,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Zulu v. Botta, 613 F.Supp.2d 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 suit against the director
of a city library, who was not a state corrections department employee. The director moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the director was not involved in any of the alleged
violations of the inmate's rights. The court found that while there were some issues over the inmate's excessive
book requests, there was no evidence that the director had anything to do with that matter, and that there was no
evidence that the director conspired with corrections employees to file a false misbehavior report against the inmate
in retaliation for his filing of a grievance. (Geneva Free Library, Geneva, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of disabled state prison inmates and parolees
moved for an order requiring state prison officials to track and accommodate the needs of disabled parolees housed
in county jails, and to provide access to a workable grievance procedure pursuant to the officials' obligations under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and prior court orders. The district court granted
the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The appeals court held
that: (1) contractual arrangements between the state and a county for incarceration of state prison inmates and parolees in county jails were subject to ADA; (2) the district court's order was not invalid for violating federalism
principles; (3) the state failed to show that the order was not the narrowest, least intrusive relief possible, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); but (4) there was insufficient evidence to justify the systemwide injunctive relief in the district court's order. The court noted the state's recent proposal to alter its sentencing
practices to place in county jails approximately 14,000 persons who would otherwise be incarcerated in state prisons. The court also noted that the state's contracts with counties were not simply for incarceration, but to provide
inmates and parolees in county jails with various positive opportunities, from educational and treatment programs,
to opportunities to contest their incarceration, to the fundamentals of life, such as sustenance, and elementary mobility and communication, and the restrictions imposed by incarceration meant that the state was required to provide these opportunities to individuals incarcerated in county jails pursuant to state contracts to the same extent that

XXIII

21.38

they were provided to all state inmates. The district court’s order did not require the state to shift parolees to state
facilities if county jails exhibited patterns of ADA non-compliance; rather, the order required that, if the state became aware of a class member housed in a county jail who was not being accommodated, the state either ensure
that the jail accommodated the class member, or move the class member to a state or county facility which could
accommodate his needs. In finding that statewide injunctive relief was not needed, the court held that evidence of
ADA violations was composed largely of single incidents that could be isolated, and the district court's order identified no past determinations that showed class members in county jails were not being accommodated. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Caldwell v. Luzerne County Corrections Facility Management Employees, 732 F.Supp.2d 458 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A
county prison inmate brought civil rights claims against prison officials. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate stated claims of excessive
force against prison officials with respect to various incidents in which he was allegedly tased, causing him to hit
his forehead on a cell wall, forced to remain on a hard mattress at an uncomfortable angle, causing severe neck
pain, strip searched, placed in 5-point restraints, causing swollen and bleeding wrists, pulled forcefully while handcuffed, causing his hands to swell and bleed, punched and slapped in the back while handcuffed, maced, and
slammed onto the floor, kicked and punched. The court held that the inmate’s allegations that in four incidents
occurring over a span of four months he was placed on a mattress at an awkward angle for over 12 hours and
subjected to severe pain, not permitted to use the bathroom, eat, drink, or shower while placed in 5-point restraints
for many hours, and was refused a blanket while restrained in a cell with broken windows and an air vent blowing
directly on him, were sufficient to state a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment. The court
held that the inmate's allegations that he was subjected by prison officials to excessive force and unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, and that the officials' conduct reflected retaliation for his filing of lawsuits against them,
stated a claim for retaliation under § 1983. (Luzerne County Corrections Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 728 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.W.V. 2010).
A pretrial detainee who was strip searched and deloused brought a class action against a regional jail authority,
challenging its strip search and delousing policies. The jail authority moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the detainee stated a claim in regard to the strip search policy and in regard to the delousing policy. The court found that a jail authority official sued in his individual capacity was not entitled to qualified immunity. The detainee alleged that the jail had a blanket policy of conducting visual cavity strip searches of
all pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes, regardless of whether the detainees were
intermingled with the general population of the jail, and that there was no reasonable suspicion that he harbored
weapons or contraband. The court ruled that whether the jail's delousing policy, which allegedly applied to all
pretrial detainees, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment could not be decided on a motion to dismiss. The
court noted that the detainee who brought the action against a regional jail authority for alleged civil rights
violations was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
where he was no longer an inmate at the time he filed suit. (West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility
Authority, Western Regional Jail)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F.Supp.2d 1263 (N.D.Fla. 2010). A Black Muslim state prisoner brought a civil rights
action against a prison warden and correctional officers, alleging, among other things, that the defendants used
excessive force against him in violation of the Eighth Amendment and retaliated against him, in violation of First
Amendment, for submitting grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied
the motion. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
correctional officers' repeated verbal threats, including death threats, combined with physical assaults, against the
Black Muslim prisoner caused the prisoner extreme psychological harm, and as to whether the officers maliciously
and sadistically used force against the prisoner because he was black or because he practiced the Muslim faith. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison
warden had the ability to remove the Black Muslim prisoner from the supervision of the correctional officer who
was allegedly verbally and physically abusing him, but refused to do so, and denied the prisoner's request for protective custody. (Taylor Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee, who was transferred first to a temporary jail and
then to a state corrections facility after Hurricane Katrina damaged a parish correctional center, brought a § 1983
action. The detainee alleged that he was beaten and mistreated while at the temporary jail, resulting in hearing loss
and other injuries. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded for further discovery. The court held that the record was
not sufficiently developed to determine whether administrative remedies were “available” for detainee to exhaust at
the state facility, requiring remand. (Jefferson Parish, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) three strikes provision brought a civil rights action against a prison, warden, and various prison employees, alleging the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by using excessive force to
restrain him and by recklessly disregarding his need for medical attention. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to pre-pay the filing fee, and a motions panel authorized the prisoner's appeal. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that that while the prisoner's allegation of excessive force satisfied the three strikes provision's imminent danger requirement, the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The
court noted that the prisoner had an administrative remedy under an Illinois regulation providing an emergency
grievance procedure for state prisoners claiming to be in urgent need of medical attention. (Menard Correctional
Center, Illinois)

XXIII

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U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION

Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against four employees at a prison for claims arising from his access to a prison law library and the adequacy of the prison's food
service. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim against an assistant librarian alleging denial of access to courts through a denied “call-out” request. The court found that the assistant librarian did not
engage in retaliatory conduct against the inmate and did not deny the inmate equal protection. The court held that
the assistant food service director did not coerce the inmate, an Orthodox Muslim, into participating in Jewish religious practices, and did not take any actions establishing a state religion, so as to violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment. The court held that the alleged denial by the prison's assistant food service director of
adequate advance notice of meal substitutions, hot meals during non-daylight hours during a religious holiday, and
adequate nutritional calories to the Muslim inmate was rationally related to legitimate governmental and
penological interests of prison security and fiscal budgetary discipline, and thus the denials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free exercise rights. The court noted that the inmate retained alternative means for practicing his Muslim faith, and granting requests for specialized diets would be expensive and would divert resources
from other penological goals. (Muskegon Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RIGHT OF ACCESS
EXHAUSTION

Hartry v. County of Suffolk, 755 F.Supp.2d 422 (E.D.N.Y.2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a county, alleging failure to protect him from harm and deliberate indifference to his health and safety.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's transfer
from one county prison to another county prison deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to pursue his administrative remedies following an attack by another inmate, and therefore, his failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to bringing his § 1983 action against the sergeant and the county was excused. The court noted that the inmate
handbook permitted an inmate five days to file a grievance, and the inmate was transferred within two days of the
attack. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
inmate faced a real and significant threat of harm from other inmates, and whether the prison sergeant was aware of
a substantial risk of harm to the inmate from other inmates. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether moving an inmate only in response to a direct threat, within or outside of the jail, was a reasonable protective measure. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
DUE PROCESS

Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a suit alleging that prison officials' use of pepper spray to extract him from his cell during a building-wide search of all prisoners' cells constituted excessive
force and that his right to due process was denied in connection with a disciplinary charge stemming from his refusal to comply with the search. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate exhausted administrative process,
as required by PLRA, for the claim that he was denied due process in connection with a disciplinary charge when
prison officials purported to grant relief that resolved his grievance to his satisfaction, a hearing and access to a
videotape. The court noted that the inmate was not required to appeal that decision. (Salinas Valley State Prison,
California)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Jackson v. Raemisch, 726 F.Supp.2d 991 (W.D.Wis. 2010). A Muslim inmate brought an action against correctional officials, alleging civil rights violations due to a prohibition against workplace prayer. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
claim brought under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) stemming from the defendants' alleged refusal to allow the inmate to pray in a kitchen facility, was moot, since only injunctive or declaratory relief was available under the statute, and the inmate no longer worked in the kitchen and was unlikely to
return to work there. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether a correctional official issued a conduct report to the Muslim inmate because of a grievance he filed
concerning the prohibition against workplace prayer. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether a correctional official directed her staff to take retaliatory
action against the Muslim inmate because of a grievance he filed concerning the prohibition against workplace
prayer. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jones v. Mathai, 758 F.Supp.2d 443 (E.D.Mich. 2010). A prisoner brought an action against several prison officials, including a prison doctor, alleging retaliation and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The
district court denied the doctor’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court held that the doctor was
not entitled to dismissal of the prisoner's claims alleging retaliation for failure to exhaust, where the doctor had
filed two motions for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, and a motion for reconsideration that all determined
the prisoner had exhausted his claim under the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. (Deerfield Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F.Supp.2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against the New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and prison employees, alleging violations of
his rights involving the defendants' purported failure to adequately treat his claimed hearing problems and related
ear pain. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the prisoner failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prior to bringing
a § 1983 action, where any grievances possibly covering his claims were never fully exhausted or became exhausted only months after the suit was filed. (Sullivan Correction Facility, New York)

XXIII

21.40

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES
DUE PROCESS

Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a Seventh Day Adventist, brought a §
1983 action against the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) employees, alleging that employees violated
his constitutional rights in denying him a vegan diet. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and denied the prisoner's motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held
that, under the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC) grievance procedures, the Administrative Reviewing
Authority (ARA) exceeded its authority when it rejected the prisoner's grievance appeal regarding his claim to a
vegan diet as part of his religious practices because it contained multiple issues, thereby preventing the prisoner
from completing the grievance process. According to the court, the prisoner's failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies with regard to the vegan diet claim, in accordance with PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, would be excused, and the prisoner could pursue that claim in his § 1983 action against ODOC employees. (Oklahoma Department of Corrections, Mack Alford Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES

Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2010). A former state prisoner brought an action against
the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), its secretary, prison officers, the private company that
managed a prison kitchen, and two of the company's employees, alleging various constitutional claims and negligence under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). The prisoner had sustained injuries from work he was
required to perform in a kitchen, and he made allegations about the injuries and his subsequent treatment. The state
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that no New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC) policy or regulation made any provision for the state prisoner's liberty interest in a
labor assignment or otherwise provided the prisoner with protection from corrections officers ordering him to perform work in a prison kitchen or protection from orders in contravention of a medical order. The court ruled that
the prisoner's § 1983 procedural due process claim arising from injuries he allegedly sustained while performing
kitchen work was precluded. According to the court, corrections officers' alleged misclassification and denial of a
grievance process did not rise to the degree of outrageousness, or the magnitude of potential or actual harm, that
was truly conscience-shocking, precluding the state prisoner's § 1983 substantive due process claims. The court
noted that the state prisoner made no allegation that he contracted any disease while working in the prison kitchen,
but only that he suffered a shoulder injury as the result of a heavy-lifting component of his work, thus precluding
his § 1983 unconstitutional conditions claim against the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC) and its
secretary. The court held that the prisoner did not personally suffer any injury as a result of a corrections officer's
classification of prisoners for work duty, purportedly assigning inmates with known transmissible diseases to
kitchen work, precluding the prisoner's claim for an alleged violation of federal public health policy. (Aramark
Corporation, Central New Mexico Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
DUE PROCESS

Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee resident of the Missouri Sexual Offender
Treatment Center brought a § 1983 action against 13 treatment center officials, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of six of the 13 defendants. The remaining
seven defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as follows: (1) as to whether the officials recklessly disregarded an objectively serious risk of harm to the pretrial detainee resident by placing him with a roommate who had a history of
sexually assaulting vulnerable young males; (2) as to whether the pretrial detainee had a serious medical need and
whether a treatment center official deliberately disregarded the need by failing to provide the psychological treatment she prescribed; (3) as to whether officials retaliated against the detainee resident for filing an abuse and neglect charge and several grievances complaining about treatment center officials' failure to provide him necessary
psychological treatment; and (4) as to whether officials' transfer of the detainee resident to an unfinished ward that
only housed one resident who was confined to shackles twenty-four hours a day was punitive and violated due
process by imposing a punishment that had no legitimate institutional objective. (Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2010). A prisoner who was denied an orthopedic
consultation for his continual and severe back pain brought a civil rights action to recover for prison officials' alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
the prisoner did not have to file new grievances addressing every subsequent act by prison official that contributed
to the continuation of a problem already raised in an earlier grievance in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court noted that the prisoner had demonstrated “meticulous respect” for the corrections department’s
administrative grievance procedures.(Apalachee Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Michigan Department of Corrections, the health-management company that provided medical services for a prison,
and several prison and company officials. The inmate alleged that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights by denying him adequate medical care for a separated shoulder he suffered during a prison basketball game.
The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissal for the inmate's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the inmate
properly exhausted administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) with respect to his § 1983 claim that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights, even though the inmate failed
to identify the “names of all those involved” in the grievance as required by the prison's internal grievance policies.
The court noted that the inmate invoked one complete round of the prison's three-step grievance procedure and the
prison addressed the merits of the inmate's claim at each step of the process rather than defaulting the inmate's
claim as procedurally barred. (Mound Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections, and Corrections
Medical Services, Inc.)

21.41

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION

Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F.Supp.2d 666 (D.Del. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against 47 defendants,
including various prison officials, alleging various claims arising from acts occurring while he was a pretrial detainee and sentenced inmate. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that allegations that a sergeant and a corporal sergeant “set up” the pretrial detainee
in connection with a hearing on a razor incident, and that the detainee was told during a disciplinary hearing that
the sergeant and corporal sergeant were going to make the detainee's life miserable, were sufficient for the detainee
to state a due process claim. The court also held that a retaliation claim was stated by allegations that the state prisoner received false charges, write-ups and accusations from prison officials, was placed in “the hole” or in isolation
on numerous occasions, received numerous threats, was denied food and had foreign objects placed in his food.
The inmate alleged that these actions were all in retaliation for exercising his right to file grievances, his statements
about suing people, and making those on the outside aware of the prison conditions. The court held that these allegations, when construed liberally, set forth a chronology of events from which retaliation could be inferred.
According to the court, allegations that the pretrial detainee was denied dinner on several occasions, the toilet in
his cell flooded and he was left in his cell for over seven hours, all of the detainee's uneaten food was shaken on the
cell floor while prison staff was collecting food trays, the detainee was placed in a cell with blood everywhere and
nothing to be protected from exposure, he was intentionally awoken from sleep, was denied recreation, and was not
given supplies to clean urine thrown under his cell door, were sufficient for the detainee to state a claim that his
conditions of confinement were in violation of the due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment. (James T.
Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Rouser v. White, 707 F.Supp.2d 1055 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner, who was a practicing Wiccan, brought an
action under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the officials retaliated against his filing of grievances and litigation arising
out of the officials' alleged failure to accommodate the practice of his religion. The prisoner moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking an order enjoining officials from taking his religious articles and requiring them to satisfy
certain requirements with respect to his religious services. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the prisoner's § 1983 claims were likely to succeed on their merits. According to the court, the prisoner demonstrated a causal connection between the officials' actions and his treatment at a prison and that it was likely that the
officials were violating his rights. The court noted that the alleged conduct that infringed upon the prisoner's
religious practice extended through decades, rendering it nearly impossible for the officials to show that their
conduct, which, according to the officials, they had voluntarily ceased, could not be expected to start up again.
The prisoner asked the court to enjoin prison officials from taking his religious items, allow him to keep and
maintain religious texts, allow him to obtain group Wiccan items prior to Wiccan group services, allow him access
to an outdoor, nature-based religious area for Wiccan group services, and grant him access to a fire pit. The court
found that the requested relief conformed with RLUIPA because the relief was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the harm requiring preliminary relief, and was the least intrusive means necessary to
correct that harm. (California State Prison—Sacramento, Mule Creek State Prison and Pleasant Valley State Prison)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious practices and retaliated
against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner pled sufficient facts to state a claim against prison officials on a
theory of supervisor liability under § 1983 by alleging that he wrote to the officials about violations of his rights,
that the officials were “made completely aware of the inappropriate actions of their subordinates,” and that they
“actively chose to be deliberately indifferent to these actions.” The court found that the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief based on the California Department of Corrections' (DOC) alleged systemic discrimination against
those practicing the Pagan religion were not moot, even though he had been transferred from the prison where
many of the alleged violations of his rights occurred, where he was still incarcerated in a prison run by the DOC.
The court found that the prisoner stated claim for retaliation by prison officials for conduct protected by the Free
Exercise Clause by alleging that he was strip-searched as harassment for writing letters to prison and government
officials in which he complained about the lack of accommodations for his religion. The prisoner also alleged that
officials conspired to place him in administrative segregation and ultimately to transfer him to requite his complaints about their previous adverse actions against him, and that the actions taken against him were motivated
solely by the officials' desire to inhibit his religious worship. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim
against prison officials for violation of his right to equal protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were denied opportunities to practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions and that the officials engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Pagan practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department
of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RIGHT OF ACCESS
EXHAUSTION

Russo v. Honen, 755 F.Supp.2d 313 (D.Mass. 2010). A federal prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and various medical officials, alleging withholding of necessary medical treatment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the federal prisoner
was denied access to the inmate grievance forms required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Plymouth County Correctional Facility, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Shariff v. Poole, 689 F.Supp.2d 470 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner who was a paraplegic brought a § 1983
action against current and former New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that the employees conspired and retaliated against him. The employees moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner failed to show that the
employees acted with racial or related class-based discriminatory animus, as would support his claim that the employees conspired to interfere with his civil rights by denying him rights and privileges. The court held that the

21.42

alleged actions of the employees, including subjecting the prisoner who was paraplegic and who, as vice-chairman
of the prisoners' liaison committee, had filed grievances against employees, to an excessive number of cell
searches, filing false misbehavior reports, confiscating legal documents, verbally threatening the prisoner, and
excessively pat frisking and searching the prisoner, amounted to adverse actions for the purposes of the prisoner's §
1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the employees, although such actions did not necessarily amount to
violations of the prisoner's constitutionally protected rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a state correctional officer acted with retaliatory motive in
confiscating an unfinished grievance of the prisoner who was vice-chairman of prisoners' liaison committee. (Five
Points Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION
DUE PROCESS

Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials, claiming
deprivation of his constitutional rights by a prison guard who was allegedly reading the prisoner's legal mail in the
prisoner's presence in his cell in violation of a prison regulation, and by issuing a prison misconduct charge against
the prisoner after an exchange of angry words. The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that although the prisoner
had a liberty interest in receiving his mail, under the First Amendment, the prisoner was not deprived of his procedural due process rights based on the prison guard allegedly violating a prison regulation by reading the prisoner's
mail in the prisoner's presence in his cell. The court noted that the prisoner received a post-deprivation hearing, as
part of the prison grievance procedure, which determined that the guard had not read mail in violation of regulation.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the guard issued a misconduct charge against him over their
dispute that the guard allegedly read the prisoner's legal mail did not rise to the level of a valid § 1983 claim, where
the prisoner failed to allege that the charge interfered in any way with his rights to counsel, access to courts, equal
protection, or procedural due process. The court noted that the complaint stated no facts or theories from which the
court could devise a plausible constitutional claim, and did not even divulge what the disposition of the charge was.
According to the court, no constitutional provision flatly prohibits, as unlawful censorship, a prison from opening
and reading a prisoner's mail, unless it can be shown that the conduct interferes with the prisoner's right to counsel
or access to the courts, or violates his rights of equal protection or procedural due process. “We find no per se constitutional rule that such conduct automatically violates a broad, general rule prohibiting censorship, as our dissenting colleague seems to imagine. (Alger Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION
INVESTIGATION

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that the
employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal property,
denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees moved for
summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel.
The court held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the prisoner to
wake him up, while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe to be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment.
The court found that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly threw urine
and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the brief and unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held liable for failing to intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly investigate the alleged
incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such failure to investigate did
not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process right to a thorough
investigation of his grievances. According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly
interfered with the prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the
prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury,
that his access to courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired.
The court held that there was no evidence that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an
alleged incident in which a correctional officer spit chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth
Amendment claim based on denial of medical care.
The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted that the prisoner filed an
exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which were deemed frivolous.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state
correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a different facility.
The court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983
excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where a
reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that their conduct violated the
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's use of force against an
inmate for reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional rights. The inmate
allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body, which the court found did not
constitute a serious medical condition.
The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell in a
special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his
conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy applied to all
inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological interest in
protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New
York Correctional Facility)

21.43

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F.Supp.2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Jewish prison inmates at a state correctional facility
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their First Amendment rights were violated by the defendants' failure to properly accommodate their religious needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the motion. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether “special circumstances” existed so as to excuse the two inmates' failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), prior to bringing a § 1983 action against
prison officials. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a correctional officer treated Jewish prison inmates differently on account of their religion. The court also
found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether cold alternative meals available in a state correctional institution violated the Jewish inmates' constitutional right to a kosher diet, pursuant to the inmates' rights to religious
liberty under First Amendment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether prison officials prevented Jewish inmates from having materials necessary to their worship, on the inmates' claim that the officials failed to make reasonable accommodation to their religious beliefs in
violation of the First Amendment, by not providing a rabbi or religious materials in the correctional facility.
(Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES
RETALIATION

Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was a prison law clerk brought a § 1983 action
against a prison law librarian, alleging retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his free speech rights. Following a
jury verdict for the inmate, the district court denied the librarian's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a
new trial. The librarian appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that
the inmate law clerk's speech that criticized prison library policies requiring that clerks not help other inmates prepare their legal documents and not store the clerks' personal legal materials in the library was not protected by the
First Amendment. The court found that the speech had a negative impact on the prison librarian's legitimate interests in discipline and providing efficient library services, particularly since it amounted to advocacy on behalf of
other inmates, and the inmate had an alternative means to express his complaints. The court also found that the
inmate law clerk's oral complaint to the prison librarian about the placement of his personal materials in the library
was not protected by his First Amendment right to free speech, where the complaint was made in a confrontational,
disorderly manner. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2011). Current and former female inmates filed a class action § 1983 suit
against several line officers employed at seven state prisons and various supervisors and other corrections officials,
claiming that they were sexually abused and harassed by the line officers and that the supervisory defendants contributed to this abuse and harassment through the maintenance of inadequate policies and practices. The district
court dismissed, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part, and vacated and remanded in part.
The court held that the female inmates who made internal complaints, investigated by an Inspector General (IG),
that sought redress only for the alleged actions of a particular corrections officer and did not seek a change in policies or procedures, failed to exhaust their internal remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) to proceed in federal court on § 1983 claims of sexual abuse and harassment. But the court found that the
female inmates' claim of a failure to protect was sufficient exhaustion with regard to a § 1983 class action litigation
seeking systemic relief from alleged sexual abuse and harassment. (N. Y. Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Annoreno v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, 823 F.Supp.2d 860 (C.D.Ill. 2011). A federal pretrial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and others, alleging that the officers assaulted him while
in their custody. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the detainee failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
prior to filing suit. According to the court, the detainee's submission of a “sick call slip,” rather than an “inmate
grievance form,” regarding an alleged assault committed upon him by corrections officers, was inadequate to
exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA, and thus the district court lacked jurisdiction over the detainee's §
1983 action. The court noted that sick call slips were submitted directly to medical department and not forwarded
to administrative staff who received inmate grievance forms, the inmate handbook required that complaints be
submitted in writing on an inmate grievance form, and the detainee knew that grievance forms were used in the
facility and had filed multiple grievance forms prior to the incident in question. (Jerome Combs Detention Center,
Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MONETARY
DAMAGES
RETALIATION

Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers and a state, alleging violation of his constitutional rights as the result of an assault from officers in
retaliation for filing grievances about disciplinary actions taken against him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the state was entitled
to sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's § 1983 excessive force suit against correctional officers
in their individual capacities did not implicate a rule against double recovery, under New York law, despite the
officers' contention that the prisoner had already won an excessive force suit in state court against the officers in
their official capacities and now wanted "a second bite at the apple." The court noted that there was no court in
which the prisoner could have brought both an excessive force claim under state law against the state and the officers in their official capacities and a § 1983 claim against the officers in individual capacities for which punitive
damages were available. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether the prisoner's filing of a grievance was the motivating factor for the alleged assault by the correctional officers. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

21.44

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Davis v. Correctional Medical Services, 760 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that prison medical officials failed to provide mental health treatment, failed to follow policies and procedures to prevent officers and other inmates from harassing him, and failed to provide adequate medical treatment
for his broken nose. The district court granted the officials’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The
court held that the failure of the prison's mental health administrator to speak to the inmate or to investigate his
complaint regarding his treatment and his living conditions did not violate any recognizable constitutional right, as
required to sustain the inmate's § 1983 claim against the administrator. The court held that the inmate adequately
exhausted his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) regarding medical treatment
for his fractured nose, as required to file suit under § 1983 in federal court regarding his treatment, even though he
did not appeal the grievance resolution decisions, where the grievances were resolved in the inmate’s favor.
According to the court, prison medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's fractured nose,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the officials took an x-ray two months after the incident, the inmate
did not complain about his nasal condition for seven months, once he did, the condition was consistently monitored
and evaluated on several occasions, and the inmate was approved for surgery, but he refused to undergo the procedure. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION
RETALIATION

Hale v. Rao, 768 F.Supp.2d 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought an action against prison officials alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and alleging that the conditions of his confinement violated the
Eighth Amendment. Prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court excused the state inmate's failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing
the claim in federal court because prison staff had thrown out a grievance filled out by another inmate on the inmate's behalf, refused to provide the inmate with the materials needed to file another grievance, and threatened to
physically assault him if he attempted to utilize the grievance procedure. The court noted that the inmate was illiterate and had a poor understanding of the grievance procedure. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Holmes v. Fischer, 764 F.Supp.2d 523 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to non-random urinalysis drug testing, confining him in
a special housing unit (SHU), and denying medical care. The defendants moved for a more definite statement, to
strike the complaint, and to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The inmate alleged that, while incarcerated in a special housing unit (SHU): (1) he was routinely cuffed from behind, aggravating left shoulder and leg
conditions resulting from previous injuries, (2) he was subjected to continuous illumination in his cell, rendering it
impossible to sleep; (3) officials interfered with the inmate grievance he attempted to file regarding constant SHU
cell illumination; (4) he was denied dental floss; (5) he was denied, during winter months, proper boots, gloves, hat,
and thermos; (6) he was exposed to feces thrown by mentally-ill inmates confined to SHU; (7) he was denied
proper medical treatment and tests; and (8) he was subjected to urinalysis testing which so traumatized him as to
cause physical harm. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to state claims under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to necessary medical care. According to the
court, the inmate's allegations that he was subjected to urinalysis based on reports from confidential informants
whose credibility and reliability had not been confirmed, despite the complete absence of any history of drug use,
and that two random urinalysis tests to which he was subjected were done to retaliate against him for filing inmate
grievances regarding non-random urinalysis testing, were sufficient to state an unreasonable search claim under the
Fourth Amendment, The court found that the inmate’s allegation that, as a result of repeated non-random urinalysis
drug testing to which he was subjected, he suffered physical harm, including insomnia, nausea, headaches, burning
eyes, aggravation of an old gunshot wound, inability to exercise, and appetite loss, was sufficient to state a cruel
and unusual punishment claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Elmira Correctional Facility, and Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 826 F.Supp.2d 1319 (N.D.Fla. 2011). A hard-of-hearing inmate at a state
prison, who had allegedly been denied the benefit of television and radio services provided to other inmates, filed
suit against the state department of corrections seeking accommodation in the form of volume-boosting listening
devices, and alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court denied
the motion. The court held that even though the inmate was transferred to a different prison after filing grievances
and prior to filing suit, he sufficiently exhausted his administrative remedies under PLRA, since officials had been
alerted to his problem and had the opportunity to resolve it before being sued. The court noted that even though the
prison to which the inmate had been transferred would require him to have different adaptive technology than the
type which he had originally sought, his claim arose from the same continuing failure of the prison to provide him
with access to television and radio audio. (Polk Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for bringing such a suit.
The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss the
inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for lack of standing, and granted
summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that inmates sought redress for wrongs allegedly perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates' grievances gave notice that the inmates alleged the prison
policies failed to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, they did not provide notice
that the source of the perceived problem was the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. But the court found that an
inmate’s grievance alleging he requested that the prison's administration contact and allow visitation by clergy of
his own Wiccan faith, which was denied because his chaplain was not a regular paid chaplain, was sufficient to put

21.45

CDCR on notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring policy was the root cause of the inmate's complaint and thus preserved his ability to challenge that policy under PLRA. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Milligan v. Archuleta, 659 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials took away his prison employment in retaliation for his grievance regarding his designation as a potential
escape risk, and in violation of his equal protection rights. The district court dismissed the complaint on its own
motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district
court erred in dismissing the equal protection claim, even though the complaint was deficient because it did not
plead facts sufficient to show that the inmate's classification as an escape risk lacked a rational basis or a reasonable
relation to a legitimate penological interest. According to the court, amendment of the complaint would not
necessarily be futile, and the claim was not based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. The court noted that the
fact that the state inmate did not have a constitutional right to employment did not foreclose his retaliation claim
against the prison official arising from loss of his prison job after he filed a grievance. (Colorado Territorial
Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011). A federal prisoner, who was employed by the Department of
Justice's Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) program while in Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody, brought
a Bivens action against various federal officials, alleging that the defendants denied him promotions and back pay
for his UNICOR job, and denied him good time credit for vocational training received through UNICOR and educational training he took at his own expense through a correspondence course. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that sovereign immunity barred the prisoner's claims against
the officials in their official capacities and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the officials in
their individual capacities. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner had filed an administrative remedy request at the
institutional level, where the prisoner had failed to file an administrative remedy request at the regional and central
office levels, and the regional and central office levels had the authority to provide relief or to take action in response to the complaint. (United States Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia, Federal Prison Industries)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 retaliation action against a correctional captain, alleging that the captain violated his First Amendment rights when she disciplined him for filing
an inmate grievance and for speaking to her in a manner she found disrespectful. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the captain. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to: (1) the causal relationship between the
inmate's grievance and the discipline that the correctional captain imposed against the inmate; and, (2) the causal
relationship between the inmate's statements and discipline. The court found that the inmate's statement to the correctional captain about contacting his attorney in response to the correctional captain's failure to respond to the
inmate's grievances was not inconsistent with his prisoner status or with legitimate penological objectives, and thus
it was entitled to free speech protection. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 suit alleging that prison officials violated his due process rights during his prison disciplinary proceedings and retaliated against him for filing
grievances. The district court granted the officials motion for summary judgment and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner received procedural due process in hearings in which he
was found guilty of disciplinary violations, where the prisoner received a detailed written notice of the charges
against him, and of his rights during the investigations and hearings, he had the opportunity to present evidence and
witnesses, he received written statements of the findings against him and the evidence relied upon by the disciplinary panels, and he had rights to request staff assistance and to appeal the panels' decisions to the warden. The
court found no evidence that prison officials were subjectively motivated to discipline the state prisoner because of
his earlier grievances, in violation of the First Amendment. Rather, according to the court, officials would have
taken the same disciplinary actions in the absence of the prisoner's protected activity, and even if some impermissible reason had entered into an official's decision-making process, the causal connection was severed, since the
prisoner would have been disciplined anyway, as hearing panels concluded he committed charged conduct.
(Holmes Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a county,
county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual contact with the
guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff moved to compel discovery
and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held that the detainee was not required
to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her § 1983 action, in order to satisfy the
administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that the
county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they transferred, and the county did not offer
any assistance to the detainee after learning of the alleged assaults. The court found that the detainee was entitled
to the sanction of an adverse jury instruction against the county for the destruction of recordings of interviews
conducted by police during the investigation of the county jail guard's contact with the detainee. (Adams County
Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F.Supp.2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A federal prisoner brought a pro se Bivens action
against two prison correction officers and a prison counselor, alleging violations of his due process rights, cruel and
unusual punishment, and retaliation for filing prison grievances. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner could not prove that a prison counselor failed
to process his visitor requests and filed a false incident report against him in retaliation for filing a grievance
against a corrections officer, as required to establish a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, even if the

21.46

alleged retaliation occurred close in time to the filing of the grievance. The court noted that the prisoner presented
no evidence that the counselor's conduct was motivated by in an intent to retaliate, that she even knew about the
grievance, or that the one month time for processing a visitor request was unusually long, and at least one visitor
request was denied for the non-retaliatory reason that the visitor had a criminal record. (Metropolitan Correctional
Center, New York City)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES

Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011). Two juvenile delinquents brought a § 1983 action against
mental health providers and the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), alleging that the actions of the
defendants while the delinquents were in custody violated the Fourteenth Amendment and New Jersey law. One of
the plaintiffs was 15 years old when he was adjudicated as delinquent and remained in custody for a total of 225
days. For approximately 178 of those days, the delinquent was held in isolation under a special observation status
requiring close or constant watch, purportedly for his own safety. Although the delinquents were placed in isolation
for different reasons, the conditions they experienced were similar. Each was confined to a seven-foot-by-sevenfoot room and allowed out only for hygiene purposes. The rooms contained only a concrete bed slab, a toilet, a
sink, and a mattress pad. One delinquent was allegedly held in extreme cold, and the other was allegedly isolated
for four days in extreme heat. Both were denied any educational materials or programming, and were prevented
from interacting with their peers. One delinquent’s mattress pad was often removed, a light remained on for 24
hours a day, and he was often required to wear a bulky, sleeveless smock. Both delinquents were allegedly denied
mental health treatment during their periods in isolation. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that a juvenile delinquent housed in New
Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities was educated about filing a form with a social worker as the
procedure for filing an administrative grievance, as required for the procedure to be available to the delinquent to
exhaust his § 1983 claims against JJC and mental health providers. The court also found that there was no evidence
the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) provided written notice to the juvenile delinquent housed at JJC
facilities of the opportunity to appeal their disciplinary sanctions, which would have triggered the requirement that
he appeal each sanction within 48 hours of notice, as required to exhaust administrative remedies. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the New Jersey Juvenile
Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health providers were deliberately indifferent towards conditions of confinement, in protecting and in providing medical care for the juvenile delinquent housed in JJC facilities; (2) whether
placing the juvenile delinquent housed in temporary close custody and special observation status implicated a liberty interest; (3) whether a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities
had procedural due process protections available to him upon a change of status; (4) whether the juvenile delinquent had a liberty interest implicated in his transfer to a more restrictive placement; (5) whether the juvenile delinquent had sufficient procedural due process protections available to him upon transfer to a more restrictive placement; and (6) whether the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health providers acted with
malice or reckless indifference. (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission, Juvenile Medium Security Facility, New
Jersey Training School, Juvenile Reception and Assessment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 lawsuit against two prison
officials, alleging that he was beaten in retaliation for submitting a complaint through the prison grievance system.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that intimidation or threats by prison officials could render an
administrative remedy unavailable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion provision.
(Arkansas Valley Correction Facility, Colorado)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in connection with the officers' alleged failure
to comply with the prisoner’s medical orders, which required the prisoner to be housed in a ground floor cell. The
district court dismissed the action and denied the prisoner's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to consider arguments that directed the court to crucial facts showing he might have exhausted his
administrative remedies, and in addition to being pro se, the prisoner was illiterate, disabled, and had limited
English skills. The court found that the prisoner satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing his § 1983 action against the correctional officers, where the prisoner
filed grievances addressing the officers' alleged failure to comply with medical orders several months before filing
the complaint. The court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against correctional
officers for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs .The prisoner alleged that he suffered from
numerous medical conditions and was hearing and mobility impaired, that his medical orders stated that the
prisoner was mobility impaired and had housing restrictions requiring a lower bunk, no stairs, and no triple bunk,
and that the correctional officers knew of those medical orders, but failed to comply with them. (Mule Creek State
Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2012). A detainee in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff,
alleging failure to protect him against other inmates, deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, failure to
adequately train and supervise deputies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross negligence. The
district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) the sheriff, in asserting the detainee's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, met his
burden of showing that a grievance procedure existed and was not followed; (2) jail officials did not affirmatively
interfere with the detainee's ability to exhaust administrative remedies, as would provide a basis for excusing
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); and

21.47

(3) the detainee failed to show that jail's grievance procedure was effectively unavailable to him, due to his lack of
awareness of the grievance procedure. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's, Main Jail, California)
U.S. District Court
PROCEDURES

Armstrong v. Brown, 857 F.Supp.2d 919 (N.D.Cal. 2012). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class
action against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance procedure.
Following remand to allow the development of additional evidence, the prisoners and parolees filed a renewed
motion. The district court granted the motion and entered an enforce order. The court held that: (1) officials' efforts
to comply with ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and prior orders were inadequate and ineffective on a system-wide
level; (2) system-wide injunctive relief was appropriate; (3) district court would not abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction over matters pertaining to county jails; (4) a stay of the prior order was not warranted; and (5) the
district court would exercise its retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. The court held that state officials
were obliged to ensure ADA-compliant conditions for prisoners and parolees that they housed under their own
authority in county jails. (California Youth and Adult Corrections Authority, Board of Prison Terms, California
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
RETALIATION

Brown v. Hannah, 850 F.Supp.2d 471 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officials filed a motion to dismiss and the
district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a liberty interest in
remaining free from disciplinary confinement; (2) placement in confinement was not an atypical and significant
hardship; (3) the inmate did not have a constitutionally protected right in the prison setting to use inappropriate,
disrespectful, and derogatory language to a prison official; (4) rejection of his grievance was not an attempt to
frustrate his ability to pursue a lawsuit; and (5) allegations were insufficient to state a conspiracy claim. (State
Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RETALIATION

Covarrubias v. Wallace, 907 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Tex. 2012). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison guards and officials complaining of alleged violations of his constitutional rights, in connection with
an alleged assault by guards and a subsequent disciplinary hearing. The district court held that: (1) picket officers
could not be held liable under a supervisory liability theory for failing to intervene when the prisoner was subjected
to pepper spray, where even if they had authority to intervene, they did not have a realistic opportunity to intervene;
(2) the punishments imposed on the prisoner for assaulting a guard did not violate any due process liberty interest;
(3) denial of the prisoner's grievance did not violate any due process liberty interest; and (4) the prisoner failed to
state an Eighth Amendment claim for disregarding an excessive risk to his health or safety. But the court found that
the prisoner's allegations, that corrections officers used excessive force against him in retaliation for requesting a
supervisor and for attempts to informally resolve a complaint, stated § 1983 claims against the officers. The
prisoner alleged that as he was being restrained, one officer fired a two- to three-second burst of pepper spray into
his right eye, and the officers subsequently tackled him, using their elbows, knees, arms, and hands on his back,
legs, arms, and face as they piled on him and pressed his face into the concrete. (Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice,
Correctional Institutions Division, Beto Unit)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’i 2012). Inmates brought a state court action against the
governor of Hawai'i, the Director of the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the private manager of a
correctional facility in Arizona at which they were housed, seeking declaratory relief that the defendants violated
their rights to free exercise of their religion by depriving them of their prayer objects. The action was removed to
federal court. The inmates moved for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from exercising the
policies that infringed on their right to exercise their religion. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that one inmate failed to exhaust his prison administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA), prior to bringing the action. After submitting an informal resolution form, the inmate did not obtain
the final recommendation from the warden or the administrative duty officer on his damaged property claim before
initiating the grievance process under a prison policy, and the inmate did not appeal denial of his formal grievance.
The court found that the correctional facility's policy, prohibiting the inmate from possessing his prayer object, a
kukui nut, and requiring him to donate it to charity, destroy it, or send it out of the institution, substantially
burdened his religious exercise under RLUIPA. (Hawaii Department of Public Safety, Corrections Corporation of
America, Saguaro Correctional Center, Arizona, and Red Rock Correctional Center, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). A state inmate, who was a member of the Christian Identity Faith
and proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against department of corrections (DOC) employees, alleging
violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the inmate did not file grievances for most claims, even though such procedures were
available to him, and he did not appeal those grievances that he did file, and therefore failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. According to the court,
prison officials withholding of certain religious pamphlets from the mail of the inmate, was validly and rationally
connected to a legitimate interest in ensuring order and safety, for the purposes of the inmate's § 1983 claim
alleging that the withholding violated his First Amendment free exercise and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights. The court noted that the pamphlets contained racially inflammatory material and that the prison
population was racially mixed. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging excessive force, deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, and retaliation for filing a grievance. After appointing counsel
for the inmate and allowing him to proceed in forma pauperis, the district court granted an attorney's motion to
withdraw and dismissed the case. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

21.48

remanded. The court held that the statutory period for the inmate to file a § 1983 action alleging that an unidentified corrections officer who fired two rounds from shotgun into the inmate population violated an Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive force was tolled while the inmate completed the administrative grievance process. The court held that the issue of when the inmate completed the prison's grievance process with regard to his
claim involved fact issues that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court found that the inmate's allegations that he suffered a shotgun wound that caused excessive bruising and bleeding, that prison officials waited
four days before treating his wound, and that he experienced prolonged, unnecessary pain as result of a readily
treatable condition, were sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that the inmate's allegations that he used the prison's grievance system to address his injury and lack of treatment he received following his injury, that he was transferred to a
correctional center where he had known enemies when he refused to drop his grievance, and that there was no other
explanation for his transfer, were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment right
to use a prison grievance system. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Stateville Correctional Center)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a
§ 1983 action against employees of a department of corrections (DOC), alleging harassment, excessive force,
denial of medical care, denial of due process, and assault and battery. After denying the employees' motion for
summary judgment, the district court denied the employees' motion for reconsideration. The employees appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court did not have the discretion to waive the
pre-filing requirement of exhausting administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
court noted that the prisoner exhausted administrative remedies after his lawsuit was underway, but PLRA required
exhaustion to occur prior to filing. (Louisiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.N.J. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department
of corrections, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right against
cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that there was no evidence that prison officials were personally involved
in a corrections officers' alleged assault on the state prisoner, as required to establish supervisory liability against
the officials under § 1983, despite defense counsel's bare assertions of deliberate indifference and notice of
assaultive history. The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether the force used by corrections officers to subdue the prisoner was excessive and in violation of Eighth
Amendment, and whether a corrections officer participated in the alleged assault on the prisoner. The court held
that the corrections officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where the prisoner's complaint alleged a
violation of the constitutional right to be free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and such right was
clearly established at the time of the officers' alleged misconduct. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies
regarding the excessive force claim against corrections officials in accordance with the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (N.J. Department of Corrections, Bayside State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. District of Columbia, 869 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C. 2012). A District of Columbia prisoner brought a §
1983 action against the District and a correctional facility, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, as
well as various common-law torts, including negligence and assault and battery. The District filed a motion to
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
prisoner's alleged inability to read and mental retardation did not prevent him from accessing the grievance process,
and prison staff's failure to inform the prisoner of the grievance process did not excuse his failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (District of Columbia Central
Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir. 2012). A federal prisoner brought an action against a warden, prison
rabbi, and prison chaplain alleging violation of his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies.
According to the court, the prisoner's grievance challenging the prison's limitations on congregational prayer at the
prison, which was limited to only one time a day, five days a week, in a chapel, was sufficient to exhaust his
administrative remedies, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (RFRA), with respect to the continuing limitation
on congregational prayer at the prison following a warden's replacement. According to the court, the grievance
provided prison administration an opportunity to resolve the same problem that would continue intermittently until
the lawsuit was filed, and issues raised in the lawsuit regarding the alleged inadequacy of spaces and times allotted
for congregational prayer were identical to issues exhausted in the grievance. (Federal Correctional Institution,
Otisville, New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION

Johnston v. Maha, 845 F.Supp.2d 535 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county sheriff, employees of a county jail, and others, alleging, among other things, violations of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court
held that: (1) a fact issue as to whether a correctional officer assaulted the detainee precluded summary judgment
on the detainee's Eighth Amendment claim; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issue as to whether the
detainee was twice placed in isolation as a form of punishment without being given advance notice or opportunity
to be heard; and (3) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the detainee exhausted
administrative remedies as to the claim that a correctional officer placed him in an isolation cell without prior
notice. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

21.49

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner sued several corrections employees under § 1983
for violating his First Amendment rights when they transferred him to an increased security level facility in
retaliation for his participation in a state-court class action against corrections officials regarding inmate property,
as well as for his assistance to other inmates in filing grievances. The district court entered judgment in favor of the
defendants, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that a causal connection existed between the adverse action in increasing the prisoner's security level and
the prisoner's purportedly disruptive First Amendment protected conduct, and that certain officials failed to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have taken the same action absent the protected conduct. The
court found that a deputy warden could be held liable on the prisoner's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim,
where her memo complaining about the prisoner's behavior was the actual and proximate cause of the increase in
the prisoner's security level, and where she helped execute the order increasing the prisoner's security level with the
knowledge that it was intended to retaliate for the prisoner's protected conduct. According to the court, the transfer
coordinator was not liable on the prisoner's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim based on his editing of the
prisoner's security screen to replace the initial notation with the notation that the prisoner was manipulative, where
there was no showing that he knew or should have known that his superior's order to do so was meant to retaliate
for the prisoner's protected conduct a month earlier. The court held that an assistant deputy warden was not liable
on the prisoner's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim based on his signing a backdated security screen
approving the prisoner's transfer to the increased security facility, where he neither knew or should have known that
he was implementing punishment for the prisoner's exercise of his protected rights. (Michigan Department of
Corrections, Brooks Correctional Facility, Chippewa Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Morrison v. Parmele, 892 F.Supp.2d 485 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated, when officers
assaulted him in retaliation for his complaints that he was being sexually assaulted by another inmate, and filed a
false misbehavior report against him. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion, holding that the prisoner failed to show that special circumstances excused his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Groveland Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought an
action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances and
requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and
the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendant and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner
exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher
meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit. The
court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required to
support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner stated
that he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence that he
requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison, he ate
kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed for his adherence
to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department transferred the prisoner for a
time so he could receive kosher food. (Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional
Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging, among other things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and denial of access to
courts. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order and stay, and the
prisoner moved for a temporary restraining order, for a continuance to permit discovery, and to strike portions of
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner was not responsible for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the prisoner’s allegations
were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim; (3) the prisoner’s allegations were
sufficient to state a due process claim that he was placed in solitary confinement in violation of the Bureau of
Prison's regulations and without having a legitimate investigation or a pending disciplinary charge; and (4) the
allegations were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. According to the
court, prison officials' refusal to provide grievance forms and interference with the prisoner’s efforts to exhaust
administrative remedies did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment right of access to courts. (Federal
Correctional Center in Butner, N.C., and Rivers Correctional Institution, operated by GEO Group, Inc)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Rahim v. Holden, 882 F.Supp.2d 638 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought an action against prison officials, alleging violations of his due process rights related to his parole. The
officials moved for dismissal. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a grievance procedure was
unavailable to the state prisoner with regard to claims against prison officials as to alleged Fourteenth Amendment
due process violations related to his parole, and therefore, the prisoner was excused from the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner was denied parole, which he
believed was for arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible reasons, but instructions for filing a grievance
specifically stated that parole decisions were non-grievable. The court noted that another form indicated he could
appeal a parole decision to the Board of Parole by writing a letter to the Board, and he wrote letters to Board.
(James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

21.50

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Starr v. Moore, 849 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.N.H. 2012). A state prisoner brought an action against a prison employee
and others, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, in connection with
employee's alleged conduct of telling other inmates that they were no longer receiving special meals on holidays as
a result of a prior lawsuit filed by prisoner. The prisoner moved to exclude evidence of his prior lawsuits and
grievances. The district court held that evidence of the prisoner's subsequent grievances and lawsuits against prison
employees was relevant and that alleged prior statements by the employee, blaming the prisoner for a prison policy
of no longer providing special meals to prisoners on holidays, were admissible as prior bad acts. (Northern New
Hampshire Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
RETALIATION

Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
had confiscated his legal papers and computer disks on multiple occasions, damaged or destroyed legal and
religious papers and property, taken actions to deprive him of access to courts, violated his First Amendment rights,
retaliated against him by filing false misconduct charges and transferring him to other prisons, and conspired
against him to violate his rights. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the state inmate exhausted his administrative remedies, and whether
prison officials prevented the inmate from filing grievances and exhausting his administrative remedies. (Michigan
Department of Corrections, Gus Harrison Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A female state inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against
a prison's correction officers, officials, and medical staff, asserting 25 claims contesting the conditions of her
confinement and the conduct of the staff. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s complaint stated due process claims based on insufficient
notice of a disciplinary hearing and on the inmate's allegedly improper removal from a disciplinary hearing. The
court held that the inmate stated a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 against a male prison correction
officer by alleging that the officer had written a false inmate misbehavior report (IMR) against her three days after
she had filed a grievance against him for performing a degrading sexual act in front of her, and that because of the
false report she had been forced to spend three months in the prison's special housing unit (SHU). (Bedford Hills
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights and Nevada laws. The district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice pursuant to the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the humiliation that the
state inmate suffered during an alleged incident did not rise to the level of severe psychological pain as required to
state an Eighth Amendment claim. The inmate alleged that a correctional officer entered the inmate's cell while the
inmate was on the toilet and, while the inmate was still on the toilet, rubbed his thigh against inmate's thigh and
smiled in sexual manner, then left the cell laughing, The court found that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First
Amendment retaliation claim against a correctional officer and an associate warden by alleging that he engaged in
protected conduct by filing grievances against the officer and alleging: (1) that the officer and the associate warden
took adverse actions against him, including filing of a false disciplinary charge against him, placing him in
administrative segregation, and telling lies that resulted in denial of his parole, and (2) that such adverse actions
were taken shortly after, and in retaliation for, the filing of grievances, and that the adverse actions, which involved
more than minimal harms, had no legitimate penological reason.
The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against a correctional
officer by asserting that he had filed grievances against the officer, who allegedly refused to give him his breakfast,
that the officer mentioned grievances during same interaction in which the officer refused to give the inmate his
breakfast, that the officer's conduct was retaliatory, and that the inmate also asked during the same interaction to
file an additional grievance about the denial of breakfast. (Nevada State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Way v. Johnson, 893 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2012). A District of Columbia inmate brought an action against
wardens, an investigator, federal agencies, and other officials, alleging failure to investigate, and that his removal
from a drug treatment program was discrimination based on his homosexuality and HIV-positive status. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative
remedies in either of the two prisons in which he was housed as to removal from the drug treatment program or a
change of housing, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the inmate did not file any
grievance in the first prison, and only filed an informal grievance form at the second prison. The court noted that
the inmate did not appeal upon the response from the warden at the second prison. (United States Parole
Commission, Secure Residential Treatment Program, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the
District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). A male state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging sexual
abuse by a female prison guard in violation of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner established non-consent; (2) sexual abuse of the prisoner
by a prison guard constituted malicious and sadistic use of force; (3) the sexual assault on the prisoner by the prison
guard was deeply offensive to human dignity and was completely void of penological justification; (4) supervisory
prison officials were not on notice that the prison guard presented a substantial risk to the prisoner through sexual
abuse; and (5) prison officials did not retaliate against the prisoner for filing a grievance. According to the court,
the prisoner established non-consent for purposes of surviving summary judgment, where the prisoner and guard
were in a consensual relationship that involved hugging and kissing, then they were involved in a disagreement and

21.51

the prisoner told the guard to “back off” and that they had to “stop” seeing each other for a while, and then the
initial sexual encounter that gave rise to the action occurred. (Idaho Correctional Institution of Orofino)
2013
U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES
RIGHT OF ACCESS

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance
procedure. The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the
California Penal Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the
discrimination suffered by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to assist
in preventing further Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials to track
and accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a workable
grievance procedure were consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act
and did not infringe on California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Brown v. Massachusetts, 950 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.Mass. 2013). An inmate brought an action under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference to his health, against corrections facility officers and a superintendent. The officers and
superintendent moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate's complaints
about another inmate who had violent tendencies being placed in his cell, and corrections officers' refusal to move
him, were able to be grieved within the meaning of the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that
required the exhaustion of administrative remedies for grievable complaints. According to the court, summary
judgment was also precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the corrections officers were aware
they exposed the inmate to a serious risk of harm by placing another inmate who had violent tendencies in his cell,
and by refusing to separate the two after the first inmate explained to the officers that he feared for his safety.
Summary judgment was also precluded due to fact issues as to whether the inmate’s complaint to the corrections
officers that he did not feel safe with another inmate who had been placed in his cell, would trigger the inmate's
clearly established right to be free from violence at the hands of other prisoners.(Essex County Corrections Facility,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging prison
employees retaliated against him for exercising his federal constitutional right to file administrative grievances
about his medical care. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the defendant had three strikes under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) in forma pauperis provision, and that dismissal of a complaint as repetitive and an abuse of
process constituted a strike under the PLRA's in forma pauperis provision. (Lawton Correctional Facility,
Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720 (E.D.N.C. 2013). Detainees who used wheelchairs and who
were civilly committed at a federal corrections facility as sexually dangerous persons filed suit, seeking injunctive
relief against the United States Bureau of Prisons for its alleged failure to accommodate their disabilities in
violation of the Architectural Barriers Act (ABA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and
the detainees moved for discovery and to deny the government's motions. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court found that although the detainees failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior
to filing suit under the ABA, the detainees were not “prisoners” as defined by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) and thus did not have to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found that the
detainees, by alleging that, unlike detainees without disabilities, they could not access the prison's religious library
or an outdoor pagan worship area, stated claims under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in their action seeking injunctive relief against the Bureau of Prisons
for failing to accommodate their disabilities.The court held that the detainees failed to state a claim for a violation
of the constitutional right to privacy. According to the court, even assuming that the detainees had a limited
constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment, the inmates alleged that the prison medical facility had no
private, wheelchair-accessible examination room, but did not allege harm from the use or disclosure of their
medical information. (Butner Federal Correctional Complex, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se § 1983 action against an
officer and a sheriff, alleging that the officer used excessive force by releasing his canine while responding to a
fight between the detainee and another inmate, and that he did not receive immediate medical attention after the
incident. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court
held that: (1) the detainee failed to allege that the sheriff was personally involved in the dog bite incident, as
required for § 1983 liability; (2) the officer did not use excessive force; (3) prison officials were not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs where there was no evidence that the officials refused to treat the
detainee, ignored his complaints, or intentionally treated him incorrectly; (4) the detainee failed to state a § 1983
failure to train or supervise claim; (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the failure to train claim,
where the detainee made no specific allegations about how the sheriff was unreasonable in his training and
supervising methods; and (6) the detainee could not maintain a claim for mental or emotional suffering. The court
noted that the detainee refused to stop fighting when the officer ordered him to stop, thus causing an obvious threat

21.52

to security. In response, the officer applied the amount of force necessary to restore order on the tier, and as soon as
the detainee went to the ground and stopped fighting, the officer ordered the dog to release its grip. The detainee
suffered a minor injury when he was bitten by the dog. According to the court, the detainee made no specific
allegations regarding how the training and supervision program at the detention facility was inadequate or
defective, he contended that his numerous complaints and grievances went unanswered but provided no evidence of
inadequate training or supervision, and he made no allegation of an official policy that caused the allegedly
inadequate training and supervision. (Harrison County Adult Detention Center, Mississippi)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action against a
county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a correctional officer who
was driving a jail transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the inmate to hurtle forward and hit his
head on a metal divider. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court had the ability, in the interests of judicial
economy and finality, to address the merits of the suit once it determined that the inmate had not exhausted his
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Kankakee County, Jerome Combs Det. Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PROCEDURES

Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). State inmates brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' refusal to let them receive mail that included photographs depicting nudity and sexual
activity violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, and that grievance procedures for challenging the
refusals violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’
motion for summary judgment. The court held that a state prison regulation preventing inmates from obtaining
nude or sexually explicit photographs was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not
violate the inmates' First Amendment rights. The court noted that: (1) the regulation was expressly aimed at protecting prison security; (2) the regulation permitted withholding reading materials only if it furthered interests in
security, good order, or discipline, and there existed a valid and rational connection between the regulation and
prison security; (3) the prison left open alternative means of exercising the restricted right by permitting inmates to
receive a wide range of publications; (4) the restrictions fell within the broad limits of deference to prison officials
regarding what was detrimental to security; and (5) the inmates did not point to an alternative that fully accommodated inmates' rights at a de minimus cost to valid penological interests. The court found that there was no evidence
regarding how the state prison's grievance and appeal procedures operated, as required to support the inmates’
claim that they were provided with insufficient opportunities to challenge prison's rejections of sexually explicit
photographs and publications sent to them, in violation of due process. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 923 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison official under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and Bivens,
alleging he was denied access to the postal service in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's admitted failure to submit a claim to
the Bureau of Prisons prior to filing his lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging BOP's mail
regulations violated his First Amendment rights, deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that neither his counselor nor his unit manager provided him the
appropriate form for submitting a formal inmate grievance, and that without access to the first step of the process,
he could not have been expected to complete the process, were sufficient to allege that circumstances rendered
administrative remedies effectively unavailable, such as would excuse the prisoner from exhausting his
administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court found that neither the
requirement of a mailing label generated by the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) mail system, nor the return of mail
lacking such a label, violated the prisoner's First Amendment rights, and the prisoner provided no factual
allegations to support his conclusory claims that the system denied him access to the press, the establishment or
exercise of religion, and peaceable assembly. (Federal Correctional Institution in Texarkana, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
asserting claims based on strip searches at prisons and alleging retaliation for his complaints about the searches,
denial of his request for a dietary supplements which he considered to be religious necessities, inadequacy of his
diet, failure to issue certain winter clothing items, and censorship of pages in a magazine mailed to him. The district
granted summary judgment in favor of the officials on the claims about prison food and clothing and granted the
officials judgment as a matter of law on the claims about strip searches, retaliation, and censorship. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated the judgment with respect to the strip searches, and remanded.
On remand, the district court entered judgment, upon a jury verdict, in favor of the officials as to the strip search
claims, and the prisoner again appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1)
even if there was a valid penological reason for the strip searches conducted on a prisoner, the manner in which the
searches were conducted was itself required to pass constitutional muster, and (2) a jury instruction requiring the
prisoner to negate the possibility that strip searches would have occurred even if there had been no retaliatory
motive was plain error. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Munson v. Gaetz, 957 F.Supp.2d 951 (S.D.Ill. 2013). A Buddhist inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging failure to provide him with an adequate diet, deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs,
and violations of his right to free exercise of religion. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officials were not aware that feeding the
inmate a soy-rich diet posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and therefore, the officials were
entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The
court found that there was no evidence that a vegetarian diet containing soy was nutritionally inadequate, as
required for the Buddhist inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of his First Amendment free exercise rights.
The court held that the Buddhist inmate had administratively exhausted his claims that a high-soy diet fed to him

21.53

violated the Eighth Amendment and his First Amendment free exercise rights, where he had submitted grievances
about the diet to the grievance office, he wrote to a warden and an assistant warden regarding his grievances, and
the prison officials did not respond to the grievances. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). A female former state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
a private operator of a state prison, the warden, and corrections officers, alleging violation of her civil rights arising
under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state claims. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s complaint stated
claims against the operator and the warden for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment, and for First
Amendment retaliation. The inmate alleged that the operator and the warden engaged in practices of placing
inmates who reported sexual abuse in segregation or otherwise retaliating against them, violating its written
policies by failing to report allegations of prison rape to outside law enforcement, failing to conduct adequate
internal investigations regarding rape allegations, and offering financial incentives to prison employees for nonreporting of rape allegations. The inmate alleged that the operator and the warden placed her in segregation for
eight months because she reported a corrections officer's rape and another officer's assault, that the operator and
warden were aware of her complaints, and that her placement in segregation was in close temporal proximity to the
complaints. (New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
MONETARY
DAMAGES
PROCEDURES

Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2013). A Michigan prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officers, seeking financial damages for an officer's alleged use of excessive force. The district court granted the
officers' motions for summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
prisoner had an adequate opportunity to litigate, at a major misconduct hearing, the factual dispute as to whether he
grabbed a prison officer by the right hand and pulled the officer's hand into the cell as the door was closing. The
court noted that not only did the prisoner have, and exercise, a plethora of statutory protections, but any objections
he had to the major misconduct hearing itself could have been appealed within the department and then, if
necessary, to state court. (Ionia Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted the officers' motion for
summary judgment with respect to official capacity claims, but denied summary judgment with respect to
individual capacity claims. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court improperly applied the Fourth Amendment excessive force
legal standard to the prisoner's § 1983 claim for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, warranting
remand to the district court to inquire whether the force was applied to the prisoner in a good-faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm. The appeals court held that summary
judgment in prisoner's First Amendment retaliation action was precluded by a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether a correctional officer's threats of death would chill a prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the
prison grievance process. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional
officer issued death threats to the prisoner because the prisoner had filed and pursued an excessive force grievance.
According to the court, summary judgment in the First Amendment retaliation action was precluded by a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the correctional officer's placement of the prisoner in a cell without his
personal property, proper facilities, bedding, or clothing, and the officer's threat that things would get worse, issued
after hearing the prisoner complain that he was being retaliated against, were adverse actions sufficient to chill a
prisoner of ordinary firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process. (Potosi Correctional Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
RETALIATION

Schultz v. Pugh, 728 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison officials,
claiming he had been retaliated against for speaking up about an assault that he alleged had been made upon him by
two prison guards. The district court dismissed, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not filing a grievance that conformed to prison
rules barred his action. The prisoner claimed that he was afraid to file a grievance because the retaliation included a
prohibition against speaking about the alleged assault. (Chippewa Valley Corr’l. Treatment Facility, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Simmons v. Adamy, 987 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate brought a § 1983 action against
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) officials and a corrections officer, alleging, among other things, that
the defendants subjected him to unlawful retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and inmate
cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that the
alleged actions of prison officials in restricting the law library access of the Muslim inmate after he filed
grievances, scheduling his library “call-outs” to conflict with religious celebrations and classes, and filing a false
misbehavior report, were not adverse actions that could support the inmate's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation
claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that: (1) the inmate was treated differently from other inmates
who had not pursued grievances; (2) he was afforded less than reasonable, or less than typical, access to the law
library; (3) his free exercise rights were affected in more than a de minimis fashion; or (4) he was unfairly
disciplined as a result of the report. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2013). A paraplegic prisoner who was confined to a wheelchair
brought a civil rights action against a county correctional facility, approximately thirty individual medical
personnel and prison officers, and nine John Does. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court
held that because prison procedures did not contemplate an appeal from a non-decision, when the prisoner failed to
receive even a response to grievances addressing certain incidents, much less a decision as to those grievances, the
appeals process was “unavailable” to him for the exhaustion purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
(Camden County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

21.54

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
RIGHT TO ACCESS

Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against county
detention center employees, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by issues of material fast as to: (1) the inmate's First Amendment
retaliation claim against a supervisor; (2) First Amendment retaliation claims arising from the inmate's transfer to
another housing module; and (3) claims arising from the alleged obstruction of the inmate's access to a grievance
process. The court found a dispute of material fact as to whether a program supervisor was motivated by the lawsuit
the inmate had previously filed against her, when she removed the inmate from a trustee program almost
immediately after he reminded her about his having filed the suit, resulting in his loss of access to income, work
opportunities, and housing advantages as well as other privileges.
A fact issue was found as to whether the 53-year old inmate would have been transferred from a housing module
for older inmates to a module that housed younger and more violent offenders, but for his use of the grievance
process. The inmate had been approved for the detention center's Inmate Worker Program (IWP), also known as the
“trustee program.” Inmates in the trustee program received job assignments within the detention center and were
paid for each shift, with an opportunity to earn more for additional work. They also received a number of privileges
and incentives. They were housed in a trustee module and were eligible for late nights, weekend contact visitation
rewards, and access to popcorn, soda, and a movie player. One of inmate's work assignments was in the kitchen,
where inmates received extra food and may have one meal per work day in the break room area. (Jackson County
Detention Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). An Illinois prisoner serving a life sentence brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that the prisoner and other inmates classified as low-aggression offenders in the
prisoner's cellhouse were subject to lockdowns for more than 50 percent of the days in a 33-month period. The
district court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage for prisoner civil actions and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner had exhausted his
administrative remedies. The court found that frequent unit-wide prison lockdowns for substantial periods of time
deprived him of exercise and caused him various health issues, such as irritable bowel syndrome, severe stress,
headaches, and tinnitus, stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the prisoner
sufficiently alleged prison officials' deliberate indifference to physical and psychological injuries, as required to
state a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation, based on excessive prison lockdowns. The court noted that the
prisoner alleged that he had filed multiple grievances about prison conditions, including a grievance specifically
challenging small cells, and that the prison was the subject of numerous past lawsuits, including one specifically
ordering a remedial plan for overcrowding, small cells, and lack of adequate medical care and hygiene. (Menard
Correctional Center, Illinois)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). A detainee in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff,
alleging failure to protect him against other inmates, deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, failure to
adequately train and supervise deputies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and gross negligence. The
district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed and
then the court granted a rehearing en banc. The appeals court then reversed and remanded. The court held that
administrative remedies at the jail were not available within meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
and therefore the detainee satisfied his exhaustion requirement. (Los Angeles Co. Men's Central Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
RIGHT OF ACCESS
DUE PROCESS
POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES

Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F.Supp.3d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Jail inmates, who were addicted to heroin
before being taken into custody, brought a pro se § 1983 action against a county, the provider of on-site medical
services at a jail, and county officials, alleging refusal to accept a grievance deprived them of First Amendment
right to petition the government for redress, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and deliberate indifference to risk of inadequate medical care at the jail. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the inmates had no First Amendment right to have grievances processed or investigated in any particular
manner; (2) the mere receipt of the inmates' grievance by an assistant warden and the county executive was
insufficient to establish their personal involvement; (3) the inmate's allegations established a deputy commissioner's
personal involvement; (4) the allegations supported the inmates' § 1983 claim that the provider was deliberately
indifferent; and (5) the allegations satisfied Monell's policy or custom requirement to support a § 1983 claim
against county. (Correct Care Solutions Medical Services P.C., and Westchester County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
PROCEDURES
RIGHT OF ACCESS

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who died in a
county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care providers who
serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that: (1) the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable juror to find that the correctional officers and a jail
superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s medical needs; (2) summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the officers knew that the detainee was suffering seizures while in
jail and failed to take appropriate action; (3) a reasonable juror could have found that neither a physician nor a
nurse made a reasoned medical judgment not to prescribe a particular anti-seizure drug for the detainee; and, (4) in
the Seventh Circuit, private health care workers providing medical services to inmates are not entitled to assert
qualified immunity. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the decision of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider not to implement a
standardized grievance mechanism led to a widespread practice at the jail of ignoring or delaying response to
grievances and medical requests made by detainees, and as to whether this failure was the moving force behind the
pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death. (Grundy County Jail, Illinois)

21.55

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and violations of
his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the deliberate
indifference claim and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising
out of alleged constitutional violations that occurred while in prison were mooted by his release from prison. The
court found that there was no evidence that prison mental health care providers were deliberately indifferent to the
prisoner's medical needs, as required to support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, where the
prisoner was seen by mental health care employees regularly for his complaints, and evidence showed that the
prisoner's suicide threats were manipulative in nature. According to the appeals court, in deciding whether the
former prisoner's § 1983 claims were administratively exhausted pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), the district court should have used the date of the First Amended Complaint, which added the claims,
rather than the date of the original complaint. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Cox v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 18 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). A mentally disabled state prisoner
brought an action against a state department of correction (DOC) and various officials, alleging violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
found that the prisoner's grievance alleging he was improperly classified, resulting in a sexual assault, provided the
DOC with sufficient notice to investigate, and therefore, the prisoner's claims under the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) were administratively exhausted. (Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, Old Colony Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F.Supp.3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee in a county department of corrections
jail brought an action against three correctional officers, alleging that they beat him in two separate incidents, and
asserting an excessive-force claim under § 1983. The officers filed a motion for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before filing his § 1983 action, where the detainee neither appealed the notice that his
grievance was being forwarded to the jail's Office of Professional Review (OPR), nor did he await the results of
OPR's investigation. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials and employees retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of letters
and manuscript he authored, as well as his filing of grievances and a lawsuit. The district court granted the inmate’s
motion for a protective order. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate's incoming mail from his creative writing instructor and his
outgoing mail to his mother were restricted by prison officials due to the legitimate penological interest of
prohibiting inmates from receiving or sending sexually explicit mail, and thus the restriction of the mail did not
violate the inmate's First Amendment rights. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether prison mailroom staff members selectively applied the foreign language mail
policy as a pretext to prevent the inmate, who filed grievances, from receiving mail from his overseas parents
written in Norwegian, as to whether the staff members made an effort to seek translations, and as to whether the
policy as applied amounted to a de facto ban on all of the inmate's incoming non-English mail.
The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer who screened the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his family and a correctional sergeant with whom
the screening officer shared the e-mail colluded to penalize the inmate for opinions expressed in the e-mail, and as
to whether the actions of the screening officer and the sergeant chilled the inmate's exercise of protected rights. The
court held that there was no causal connection between the inmate's seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) in
separate litigation and the officials' placing him in solitary confinement over one year later. (Airway Heights
Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a
mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action against the
Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) officer, a
housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims for First Amendment
retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and Title VII. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to
establish retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and the warden. The court found
that the prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not engaged in “protected conduct,” as
required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing unit supervisor, where the prisoner
was not authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was in violation of department policy. (Lois M.
DeBerry Special Needs Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Palmer v. Flore, 3 F.Supp.3d 632 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging
that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants asserted an affirmative defense that the
prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The
district dismissed the defendants’ defense with prejudice, finding that the prisoner's timely submission of a Step-I
grievance pursuant to the Michigan Department of Corrections' (MDOC) three-step grievance process was
sufficient to comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, even though the prisoner received no response from
prison officials. The court noted that the prisoner completed the required form an slid it through the crack in his cell
door, which was apparently a common practice that prisoners in administrative segregation used for submitting
grievances. (St. Louis Correctional Facility, Michigan)

21.56

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Richard v. Fischer, 38 F.Supp.3d 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A multiracial Muslim inmate brought a civil rights action
alleging that prison officials and employees discriminated against him on the basis of race and religion and
retaliated against him for filing grievances. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that New York State Department of Correctional
Services (DOCS) employees were acting within scope of their employment, specifically, the duty of assigning
work positions to inmates, when they denied the multiracial Muslim inmate employment outside of his cellblock.
According to the court, a prison employee's filing of allegedly false disciplinary reports against the inmate was
causally related to the inmate's filing of grievances challenging the prison's employment policy one to three months
prior, thus supporting the inmate's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the employee. (Five Points
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Stevens v. Gooch, 48 F.Supp.3d 992 (E.D.Ky. 2014). An inmate brought an action against a jailer and a county,
asserting section 1983 and state law claims related to the adequacy of the jail's medical treatment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court found that the inmate sufficiently
exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to bringing the § 1983
action, where the inmate filed five grievances related to his ankle injury but never received a response from jail
officials. (Lincoln County Jail, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Swisher v. Porter County Sheriff's Dept., 769 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and jail personnel, alleging that he was denied medical care while in jail. The district court
dismissed the case, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that jail
officials “invited” the inmate's noncompliance with grievance procedures, and thus he sufficiently exhausted
administrative remedies by asking senior jail officers, up to and including the warden, about how to file a
grievance. According to the court, the inmate was told not to file a grievance because the officers understood his
problem and would resolve it without the need for invocation of a formal grievance procedure. But those informal
resolution procedures were not successful, and the officials did not tell the inmate how to invoke a formal
grievance process. (Porter County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail
officials, alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used
excessive force in uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for the
prisoner, to conclude that no administrative mechanism existed through which to obtain remedies for the alleged
attack, and thus the prisoner was not required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to exhaust
administrative remedies before bringing his claim. The court noted that the jail's grievance policy stated that
“allegation of assault…by either staff or inmates” was non-grievable, the policy stated that an inmate complaint “is
grievable unless it constitutes assault, harassment or criminal misconduct,” the prisoner alleged that officials
committed criminal misconduct in acting with deliberate indifference toward him, and although the prisoner did not
complain of the assault by officials, the prisoner would not have been required to name a defendant in filing a
grievance. According to the court, even if city jail officials would have accepted the prisoner's failure-to-protect
grievance, the prisoner's mistake in failing to exhaust administrative procedures was subjectively reasonable. (New
York City Department of Correction, Riker’s Island)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Williams v. Klien, 20 F.Supp.3d 1171 (D.Colo .2014). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against various
prison officials, alleging a due process violation and First Amendment retaliation, as related to his complaints about
sleep deprivation and penalties that followed his complaints. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate stated a Bivens claim against a prison
official, alleging First Amendment retaliation and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and the prison official
was not entitled to qualified immunity on the inmate's First Amendment retaliation claim seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The inmate alleged that the prison official expressed his disdain for the inmate and his various
grievances, and then arranged for continued adverse actions to be taken against the inmate, as required for the
inmate to state a Bivens claim for declaratory or injunctive relief. The inmate alleged that during a one year period,
he was awakened each night while he was sleeping, as officers were conducting count they would beat on his cell
door, and that these actions were taken to deprive him of adequate sleep. According to the court, the inmate's
allegations indicated that he sought to exercise his First Amendment rights by filing grievances, that the official
was aware of the inmate's attempt to file grievances, that, based on that awareness, the official took action to
impose adverse consequence on the inmate, and that the consequence would deter a person of ordinary firmness
from engaging in a constitutionally-protected activity. (Federal Correctional Institution, Florence, Colorado)
2015

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Angulo v. Nassau County, 89 F.Supp.3d 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se action against a county
and its correctional facility personnel, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional rights through the
destruction of various legal documents and his legal mail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the inmate’s letter of complaint did not comply with the
correctional facility’s grievance procedure, and thus the inmate failed to properly exhaust his administrative
remedies; (2) administrative remedies were “available” to the inmate, and thus the inmate was not excused from
filing a grievance; (3) the inmate’s allegations that personnel acted willfully and maliciously were insufficient to
support the claim that personnel interfered with his ability to access the courts; and (4) personnel did not conspire
to destroy the inmate’s legal mail. (Nassau County Correctional Center, and Downstate Correctional Facility, New
York)

21.57

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a
county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force against him and
that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial detention. The defendants
moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the former pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive force when he
responded to a fight between the detainee and fellow inmates, and jumped on the detainee’s back, striking him in
face and knocking out a tooth, and that the officer was not merely using force to maintain or restore discipline but
that the entire incident was “premeditated,” stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against officer under the Due
Process Clause. According to the court, the former detainee’s allegations that county correctional officers used
excessive force when they pushed him face-first into a glass window, pushed him to the floor, kicked, stomped on
and punched him, and used handcuffs to inflict pain, that as a result of the altercation, the inmate urinated and
defecated on himself and experienced dizziness and a concussion, and that the force used on him was in response to
his reaching for legal papers and attempting to steady himself, stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against the
officers under the Due Process Clause.
The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that a county correctional officer who responded to a
fight between the detainee and other inmates “collaborated” with fellow officers to delay an emergency call,
allowing the detainee to be attacked by inmates, stated a conspiracy claim in violation of his constitutional rights
under § 1983.
The court held that the former detainee’s allegations that, before being placed in a special housing unit (SHU),
he was subjected to a strip search by a county correctional officer, that during the course of the strip search the
detainee felt that he was degraded and humiliated, and he subsequently filed grievance against the officer, that later
the same day the officer approached the detainee’s cell and made sexual comments and gestures, and that other
officers filed a false misbehavior report against him in retaliation for the detainee’s grievance, stated a § 1983 First
Amendment retaliation claim against the officers.
The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that, after he was released from a special housing unit
(SHU), county correctional officers placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was exposed to human
excrement and bodily fluids over the course of multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme conditions in
the SHU by way of 24-hour lighting by the officers, stated a § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against the
officers under the Due Process Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility and Monroe County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers,
alleging use of excessive force. One officer moved for summary judgment on the ground that inmate failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that an internal investigation afforded correction officials time and
opportunity to address the complaints internally, as required for an exception to the PLRA exhaustion of remedies
requirement to apply, and the inmate’s belief that he had exhausted administrative remedies was a reasonable
interpretation of the inmate grievance procedures. (Maryland Reception Diagnostic and Classification Center)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Burroughs v. Petrone, 138 F.Supp.3d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), alleging
Eighth Amendment violations and asserting a claim for retaliation under First Amendment. The inmate sought
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate sufficiently pled a
First Amendment retaliation claim based on confiscated property. The inmate alleged that correction officers
confiscated two bags of his property in retaliation for his grievances. (Downstate Correctional Facility, Coxsackie
Correctional Facility, N.Y.)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Byrd v. Stirling, 144 F.Supp.3d 803 (D.S.C. 2015). A state inmate filed a civil action against prison officials,
alleging that the prison served him meals incompatible with his diabetes and that much of the food was expired,
rotten, or full of preservatives. The district court dismissed the action, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies before bringing the civil action in district court, and thus dismissal was warranted under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, the inmate did not complete all three levels of
internal review at the prison before he filed suit. (Manning Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions
and asserting claims for cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment retaliation.
The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to state a claim
pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the grievance sent by the state prisoner directly to the Secretary of the Florida Department of
Corrections (FDOC) met the conditions for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps at the institutional
level under Florida law, and thus the prisoner satisfied the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion
requirement with respect to his § 1983 claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and
First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the prisoner clearly stated at the beginning of the grievance form
that he was filing a grievance of reprisal, indicating he feared for his life and that he was “gassed in confinement
for grievances [he] wrote,” and clearly stated the reason for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps,
namely, his fear that he would be killed if he filed additional grievances at the institutional level, and alleged
participation by high-ranking prison officials. The court found that the prisoner stated claims against prison
officials for First Amendment retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment by alleging that prison guards and
officials sprayed him with tear gas without provocation, denied him prompt medical care, filed false disciplinary
reports, and threatened further retaliation, all in retaliation for filing grievances. (Liberty Correctional Institution,
Florida)

21.58

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
asserting claims under § 1983 for retaliation for the prisoner’s actions in filing and voicing inmate grievances on
behalf of other prisoners as a member of prison’s inmate liaison committee. The district court dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated, and remanded in
part. The court held that the prisoner’s actions in filing and voicing inmate grievances on behalf of other prisoners,
as a member of the prison’s inmate liaison committee, was protected conduct under his First Amendment right of
petition. (N.Y. Dept. of Corrections & Community Supervision, Special Housing Unit, Fishkill Corr. Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Goguen v. Allen, 780 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, claiming that the defendants inflicted punishment on him without due process of law and retaliated against
him for filing grievances, in violation of his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The
district court denied summary judgment to the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal. The court held that the district court’s determination that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the motivations of the corrections
officers in assigning a pretrial detainee to administrative segregation precluded granting the officers’ motion for a
sovereign immunity-based summary judgment was not subject to appellate review, where the officers on appeal did
not raise any purely legal issues that called into question the denial of their summary judgment motion based on
qualified immunity, but rather raised challenges to the plaintiff’s evidence and recitation of facts. (Somerset County
Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
RIGHT OF ACCESS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION
PROCEDURES

Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2015). A county jail detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county sheriff’s department, and sheriff’s deputies, alleging that he was severely beaten by the deputies
while in a holding cell at a courthouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
based on the detainee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded, finding that the affidavit of a county jail grievance coordinator, along with a handbook
detailing a grievance procedure, did not establish that the detainee had an available administrative remedy, and
neither the handbook nor the affidavit demonstrated that the county or sheriff’s department, or any official, handled
grievances arising from occurrences in the courthouse holding cells or whether remedies for such grievances were
actually available. According to the court, the deputies forfeited any arguments that statutory remedies were
available to the county jail detainee where the deputies failed to identify in the district court or on appeal any
statutes or regulations showing that administrative remedies were available for events that took place in the
courthouse holding facility. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Hudson v. MacEachern, 94 F.Supp.3d 59 (D. Mass. 2015). Two state prisoners brought a pro se action against
multiple officials of the state department of corrections (DOC), asserting that they were targeted for retaliation for
their filing of prison grievances, as well as for assisting other prisoners in filing grievances. The officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that alleged conduct by
certain DOC officials in placing the prisoner in the special management unit, a segregated housing unit, and filing a
disciplinary report against him, after becoming aware of, and because of, the prisoner’s protected conduct of filing
grievances against officials and assisting other inmates in filing grievances, was sufficient to support the prisoner’s
pro se First Amendment retaliation claim against the officials. According to the court, the prisoner’s allegations that
a prison disciplinary officer improperly rubberstamped the disciplinary report against the prisoner without adequate
investigation, without more, did not state a claim for violation of a Massachusetts prison regulation requiring the
disciplinary officer to review prison disciplinary reports or make further investigation the officer deemed necessary.
(Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Shirley)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that he was placed in segregation as punishment for insisting on keeping his appointment with an attorney
and that he was denied due process when he sought redress from the prison’s grievance system. The district court,
pursuant to the screening process of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), dismissed the suit on the pleadings.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state prisoner did not provide any
information as to the content or purpose of his meeting with the attorney, precluding any finding as to whether the
meeting involved protected speech, as required to support the prisoner’s § 1983 claim that he was punished not for
his insubordinate speech to a prison guard, but rather for meeting with, and presumably talking to, an attorney.
(Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and
two jail guards, alleging the jail’s use of a transparent jumpsuit during his transfer to a state prison, which exposed
the prisoner’s genitals, violated the prisoner’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The district court
dismissed the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner was required to direct his grievance to the jail, not the state prison,
in order to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement; (2) the jail’s grievance
procedure was not “available,” within the meaning of PLRA; (3) allegations were sufficient to state a claim under
the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the jail’s requirement that the prisoner wear a transparent jumpsuit did not violate
the Fourth Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Livingston County Jail)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.3d 613 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections
officer and a prison health care provider, alleging excessive force in the officer’s use of pepper spray and deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. The officer and the provider moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate exhausted his available
administrative remedies as to his claim that the corrections officer used excessive force in spraying him with

21.59

pepper spray, as required to file suit against the officer, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court
noted that the inmate filed a request for an administrative remedy on the issue of alleged use of excessive force,
appealed the decision rendered concerning his claim of excessive force, and subsequently filed a grievance with the
inmate grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust
his available administrative remedies, as required prior to bringing suit with respect to prison conditions under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as to his claim that after he was sprayed with pepper spray, he was forced to
sleep on a mattress that was contaminated with pepper spray, without sheets, for weeks. The court noted that the
inmate failed to file a request for an administrative remedy on the issue of the contaminated mattress, and raised the
issue for first time in his appeal to the inmate grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. (North
Branch Correctional Institution, Maryland)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against a part-time prison
psychiatrist, alleging that he suffered sexual abuse by another prisoner as a result of the psychiatrist’s deliberate
indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered summary
judgment in the psychiatrist’s favor. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
district court’s ruling that the former prisoner did not submit a substitute prison grievance letter was not clearly
erroneous, and the former prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his § 1983 claim.
(Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

McBride v. Lopez, 791 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2015). After a prison’s appeals coordinator dismissed a prisoner’s
administrative grievance as untimely, the prisoner brought an action against prison guards under § 1983 claiming
violation of the Eighth Amendment by use of excessive force against him, under the provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The district court granted the guards’ motion to dismiss and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court noted that a two-part test for determining whether a threat
to a prisoner rendered the prison grievance system unavailable had been developed by the 11th Circuit, requiring the
prisoner to provide a basis for the court to find that he actually believed prison officials would retaliate against him
if he filed a grievance, and if he makes such a showing, he must then demonstrate that his belief was objectively
reasonable. The court found that the prisoner subjectively believed that the guards’ statements were a threat, where
the prisoner had recently been beaten by the guards that made the statement, and the prisoner could have believed
the guards bore him considerable hostility and therefore the statement could have been interpreted as threatening.
But the court found that the statement could not have reasonably been objectively viewed as a threat of retaliation if
the prisoner filed a grievance against the guards, where there was no allegation or evidence that the guards believed
the prisoner was contemplating filing a grievance, and the prisoner had not asked for the materials necessary to file
a grievance or had given any indication he intended to file a grievance. (Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2015). After a prison’s appeals coordinator dismissed a prisoner’s
administrative grievance as untimely, the prisoner brought an action against prison guards under § 1983 claiming
violation of the Eighth Amendment by use of excessive force against him. The district court granted the guards’
motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the threat of
retaliation for reporting an incident can render the prison grievance process effectively unavailable and thereby
excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a court action; (2) the prisoner
subjectively perceived prison guards’ statement to be a threat not to use the prison grievance system; and (3) prison
guards’ statement could not have reasonable been objectively viewed as a threat of retaliation if the prisoner filed a
grievance against the guards. The guards had stated that he was “lucky,” in that the injuries he sustained during an
altercation between the prisoner and guards “could have been much worse” than they were, to be a threat not to use
the prison grievance system. The court noted that the prisoner had recently been beaten by the guards that made the
statement, and the prisoner could have believed the guards bore him considerable hostility and therefore the
statement could have been interpreted as threatening. (Pleasant Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
seeking injunctive relief, along with nominal and punitive damages, after the officials barred his receipt of used
books pursuant to prison directives. The officials and the prisoner both filed motions for summary judgment. The
district court granted the officials’ motion and denied the prisoner’s motion. The court held that the prisoner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies under Maryland law prior to filing the § 1983 action in federal court, in
violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a sheriff, prison
officials and a commissary, alleging that he was a diabetic and that, while incarcerated, he was not provided with a
medically appropriate diet, was not permitted to purchase food items from the prison commissary, and was the
subject of false misbehavior reports when he complained about his dietary issues. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to
allege that the prison commissary, operated by a private company, was acting under the color of state law, as
required to state constitutional claims against the commissary. The court noted that the inmate did not allege that
the commissary had a policy of denying commissary access to diabetic prisoners or had the authority to override
the prison's policy with respect to inmates with dietary restrictions, and instead, alleged that the prison maintained a
policy of limiting commissary access for prisoners with dietary restrictions.
The court found that the inmate did not state a First Amendment retaliation claim against a sergeant who
allegedly would not process the inmate's grievance related to his inability to purchase snacks from the prison
commissary, where the sergeant was acting in compliance with a state regulation, which required him, as the
Grievance Coordinator, to return grievances regarding issues outside the authority of the chief administrative
officer to control, such as medical decisions made by health care professionals. (Erie County Holding Center, New
York)

21.60

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Pearson v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3rd Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances and a civil lawsuit. The district court
dismissed the case and denied the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation that a unit manager told him he was being
terminated from his prison job because of grievances that he had filed nearly one year earlier was sufficient to state
a plausible retaliation claim in the inmate's § 1983 action against prison officials. (Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in particular, that the officials were
deliberately indifferent to his severe hand injury, delaying his receipt of medically necessary surgery for ten
months. After twice denying the inmate’s request for pro bono counsel, the district court dismissed the action with
prejudice, for failure to state a claim. The inmate appealed and appellate counsel was appointed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim against a prison physician for such
serious delays in the provision of adequate treatment that the Eighth Amendment may have been violated; (2) the
inmate stated a claim against a prison nurse for deliberate indifference; (3) the inmate sufficiently identified an
unconstitutional policy or practice to state a claim under § 1983 against the private corporation that served as the
prison’s health care provider; (4) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference against the prison’s health
care administrator; (5) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference against prison grievance officials; (6)
the inmate stated a valid First Amendment retaliation claim; and (7) the district court’s denial of the inmate’s
request for pro bono counsel was not unreasonable. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F.Supp.3d 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for participating
in another inmate’s civil rights suit. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the official had a retaliatory motive for issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR)
against the prisoner; (2) whether officials had a retaliatory motive when they searched the prisoner’s cell; and (3)
whether prison officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by searching his cell, confiscating his
paperwork, and issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR) against him. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Quiroz v. Short, 85 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for participating
in another inmate’s civil rights suit. One official moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to: (1) whether the official acted with a retaliatory motive when he sent to the prisoner’s fiance a
letter intended for another woman; (2) whether the prison official acted with a retaliatory motive when he issued a
rules violation report (RVR) against the prisoner; and (3) whether officials had an agreement to retaliate against the
prisoner by issuing the RVR against him. The court found that: (1) the official did not have a retaliatory motive in
investigating an administrative grievance; (2) the prisoner’s assertion that one of the official’s duties was to
monitor incoming and outgoing mail was insufficient to show that the official destroyed two specific pieces of the
prisoner’s mail; (3) the official was entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner’s right to intimate association
claim; and (4) the official’s act of sending a letter to the prisoner’s fiancé that was intended for another woman did
not prevent the prisoner from continuing to associate with his fiancé and did not prevent the prisoner from marrying
his fiancé. (Pelican Bay State Prison, Secure Housing Unit, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RIGHT OF ACCESS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that county
correctional officers unlawfully used excessive force in the course of handcuffing him after he disobeyed an order.
The district court entered summary judgment in the officers’ favor and inmate the appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) from
bringing the action. The court noted that the inmate did not have an available administrative remedy, where the
inmate did not have access to an inmate handbook that set forth the proper grievance procedure, the officer
informed the inmate that he could not file a grievance, the handbook only permitted inmates to dispute alleged
violations, and the inmate was not contesting his discipline, but rather was challenging the officers’ conduct that
occurred after his offenses. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Vincent v. Sitnewski, 117 F.Supp.3d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). A New York inmate brought a § 1983 action against
prison officers, alleging claims for First Amendment retaliation and failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment.
The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the alleged
sexual groping by a prison officer would have deterred a person of “ordinary firmness” from exercising his
constitutional rights, and as to whether the officer who allegedly groped the inmate was motivated by retaliatory
purpose.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a prison
officers’ alleged intrusion on the inmate’s shower, removal of a shower curtain and the inmate’s clothes, and
conduct of leaving the inmate standing naked in the shower room for approximately one hour, would have deterred
a person of “ordinary firmness” from exercising his constitutional rights, and as to whether the officer who
allegedly groped the inmate was motivated by a retaliatory purpose.
According to the court, summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
prison officer’s conduct of entering the inmate’s cell and warning the inmate that if he filed any more grievances,
or if the officer caught him doing “any of that Muslim stuff around here,” the officer was going to “jump” him,

21.61

would have deterred a person of “ordinary firmness” from exercising his constitutional rights. The court found that
the inmate’s allegations that prison officers handcuffed him to a bedpost for 18 hours, purportedly as payback for
filing grievances, even if improbable, were neither fanciful, fantastic, nor delusional, precluding summary
judgment on the ground of factual frivolousness on the inmate’s § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation
arising from such conduct. The court noted that the inmate did not contradict himself and his allegations were quite
serious, as they showed officers using their power to threaten and dehumanize an inmate they were supposed to
protect. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that he had been beaten by prison staff and denied medical care after the beating. The district court
dismissed the action based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed. The court held that the district court failed to accept as true the prisoner’s view of the facts regarding
exhaustion of administrative remedies and failed to make specific findings to resolve disputed issue of fact
regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Telfair State Prison, Ware State Prison, Georgia Diagnostic
and Classification Prison, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2015). A pregnant county prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against a county sheriff’s office, alleging violation of her Eighth Amendment rights, alleging deliberate
indifference to her need for proper prenatal care and prompt transport to a hospital for delivery of her baby while
she was in their temporary custody. The county moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that no administrative remedies were
available, and thus the prisoner did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies under the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act. The prisoner alleged that the delay in her transport to the hospital contributed to her baby’s
birth defects. According to the court, the prisoner had no opportunity to grieve the delay in transport until after the
harm was done, the prisoner was uninformed about any deadline for filing a grievance, the prisoner would not have
known that she would be transferred to another jail four days after returning from the hospital, and the prisoner
could not have filed a grievance after she was transferred. (Kankakee County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

White v. Clement, 116 F.Supp.3d 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state prisoner sued the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and a superintendent, two physicians, a registered nurse, a
nurse administrator, and a chief medical officer (CMO), who were employed by DOCCS, claiming violation of the
Eighth Amendment by denying adequate medical care. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether a registered nurse ignored the prisoner’s excruciating pain and
vomiting up blood from adverse reactions to his prescription medications, in retaliation for the prisoner’s filing of
prison grievances. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether the registered nurse refused to treat or to document the prisoner’s excruciating pain and
vomiting up blood from his adverse reaction to his prescription medications. (New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision, Southport Correctional Facility

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action alleging prison officials violated
his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the Mississippi Department of Corrections’
implementation of a “backlogging” policy did not abrogate the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA’s)
exhaustion requirement, and the prison’s failure to respond at the first step of a three step grievance process did not
excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Central Mississippi Correctional Facility)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2016). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and the
county that employed him, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference for shackling him to his hospital
bed and failing to provide assistance to move between his geriatric (jerry) chair and bed, with the result that his bed
sores did not improve. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the
prisoner’s alleged failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that a prison employees’ failure to inform the prisoner of the grievance
procedure available to him at the time when he was hospitalized and complaining of being shackled to his hospital
bed, meant that the grievance procedure was unavailable and that the prisoner did not have to exhaust his
administrative remedies. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2016). A civil detainee filed a § 1983 action alleging that a facility’s
officials retaliated against him for filing grievances. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the detainee
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the detained sex offender’s allegations that
officials at the detention facility disregarded his grievances regarding his dental care, and told him that he was
“ignorant” and “stupid” and “moron,” and that his life would go better if he stopped complaining, were sufficient to
state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against the officials. (Rushville Treatment and Detention
Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison physicians,
alleging that they had violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to his medical needs by
denying him pain medication. The district court granted the physicians’ motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that as a matter of first impression, a prisoner exhausts
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), despite not complying with the

21.62

procedural rule, if prison officials decide the merits of a grievance at each step of the administrative process.
According to the court, the prisoner’s grievance was sufficient to exhaust his available remedies under the state
prison grievance system. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2016). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials
retaliated against him by transferring and reclassifying him, that the transfer and classification review process
violated his due process rights, and that officials were deliberately indifferent to his post–traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals
court reversed. The court held that the prison’s medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s
post–traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in violation of Eighth Amendment, despite the inmate’s contention that
treatment that occurred after his treating psychiatrist left the prison rose to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment. The court noted that officials attempted to provide the inmate with another psychiatrist at the facility,
ultimately found him another psychiatrist at a different facility, continued medication as they saw fit within their
independent medical judgment, and gave him his requested private cell.
The court found that the officials’ decision to transfer the inmate to another facility and to place him in
administrative segregation was not in retaliation for his complaints about his medical care, in violation of the First
Amendment, where the reason for the transfer was to provide the inmate with necessary psychiatric care after his
treating psychiatrist’s contract with the state ended and the inmate refused to meet with the facility’s other
psychiatrist. The court noted that the inmate was placed in administrative segregation because he refused to share a
cell within any other prisoners, and there were no other private cells. (Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services, Nebraska State Penitentiary, Tecumseh State Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION

Szubielski v. Pierce, 152 F.Supp.3d 227 (D. Del. 2016). A state prisoner, acting pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP),
brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, relating to his continuing classification for solitary confinement. At
the screening stage of the case, the district court held that the prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim
against a prison warden and an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement. The prisoner
complained of 24-hour cell confinement, limited recreation, extreme social isolation, environmental deprivation,
limited telephone calls, and limited visits. The prisoner suffered from schizophrenia, severe manic depression, and
an anxiety disorder. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that the prison warden retaliated against him
after a civil rights advocacy organization filed a lawsuit challenging solitary confinement of prisoners, by keeping
the prisoner in solitary confinement despite a classification committee's reclassification of the prisoner for mediumsecurity housing, stated a First Amendment retaliation claim. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that
his continued solitary confinement, which had already lasted nine years, involved extreme social isolation,
inadequate medical care, limited recreation, and environmental deprivation, stated a claim the under the Eighth
Amendment regarding conditions of confinement. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

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21.64

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XIX

affirmed. The court held that it would defer to the BOP’s interpretation of the good time credit
statute, which interpreted the ambiguous phrase “term of imprisonment” to mean actual time
served. (Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)
U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE DATE

Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2005). Federal prisoners brought petitions for habeas
relief, challenging the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to exclude prisoners, whose
crime of conviction involved firearms, from eligibility for early release following completion of
drug treatment. The district court granted the petitions and the government appealed. The court
of appeals reversed in part, finding that the BOP could only apply the restriction prospectively.
After several more proceedings the case was again before the appeals court. The court held that
the BOP violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) when it adopted an interim rule and
that the prisoners suffered injuries in fact by the BOP’s adoption of the interim rule. The court
found that the BOP adopted the rule that excluded the prisoners from eligibility without first
publishing a notice of the proposed rule-making, without providing a period for comment on the
rule before adoption, and that the BOP did not publish the adopted rule before its effective date.
The court found that the BOP’s violation of APA was not harmless and that the rule was invalid.
The court noted that the BOP had adopted the interim rule because federal circuit courts of
appeal had not agreed on the constitutionality of the previous rule. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner challenged the calculation of
his good time credit by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The district court denied the petition
and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that Congress implicitly delegated
authority to interpret the ambiguous phrase “term of imprisonment” to the BOP and that the
prisoner was not entitled to good time credit based on his entire 10-year sentence, but rather to
54 days for each full year actually served. (Metropolitan Det. Center, Guaynabo, Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Petty v. Stine, 424 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas

U.S. District Court
TRANSFER

Pimentel v. Gonzales, 367 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). A prisoner brought a pro-se petition for

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition

corpus challenging the manner in which the Bureau of Prisoners calculated his good time credit.
The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the Bureau reasonably interpreted the statute by awarding good time based on the
actual time served by the prisoner, not based on the sentence imposed. (Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Kentucky)

a writ of habeas corpus challenging a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy that limited his
transfer to a Community Corrections Center, to the lesser of six months or the last ten percent of
a prisoner’s sentence. The district court granted the petition, finding that the BOP’s policy was
not an appropriate exercise of its discretion under the enabling statute that provided specific
factors relevant to such placements. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

asserting that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was calculating his good time credit in a manner that
was contrary to the federal prisoner release statute. The district court denied relief and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
appeals court held that the petition was not ripe for judicial review and that in any event, the
BOP’s interpretation of the statute was entitled to Chevron deference. The court held that the
phrase “term of imprisonment” in the statute that permitted a federal prisoner to earn up to 54
days of good time credit at the end of each year of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment was
ambiguous, in that it could mean either the sentence imposed or the actual time served in prison.
The court accorded deference to the BOP interpretation, which awarded credit for each year
served in prison. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT

Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the manner in which the Bureau of Prisoners calculated his good time credit.
The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the Bureau reasonably interpreted the statute by awarding good time based on the
actual time served by the prisoner, not based on the sentence imposed. (Federal Bureau of
Prisons, New York)

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Thomas v. Barker, 371 F.Supp.2d 636 (M.D.Pa. 2005). A jail inmate brought a pro se civil rights
suit seeking to challenge the propriety of charges of escape and other crimes. The district court
dismissed the case, finding that the inmate could not seek release from custody in a § 1983 action.
The court noted that to the extent that the jail inmate was challenging the fact or duration of his
confinement by attacking a sheriff’s filing of charges against him, the claims had to be brought in
a habeas corpus petition, rather than a civil rights action. The court also held that any claim for
monetary damages based on a civil rights claim for allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment
based on vindictive prosecution would not accrue in the inmate’s favor under the Heck rule until
such time as the charges were dismissed or convictions were reversed on direct appeal, expunged

XX

22.57

by a state tribunal, or called into question by the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus. The
court found that the claims were legally frivolous and subject to dismissal under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (State Correctional Institution-Retreat, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Thomas v. Pennsylvania, 375 F.Supp.2d 406 (M.D.Pa. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil rights suit
seeking damages and challenging revocation of his parole that resulted in his having to serve
back time. The district court dismissed the case, finding that it was legally frivolous for the
purposes of dismissal under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA.) The court
held that the prisoner was required to bring a habeas corpus petition to the extent that he
challenged the fact or duration of his confinement. (State Correctional Institution-Retreat,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

U.S. v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). A purported crime boss who was being held
as a pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention in a
restrictive special housing unit. The district court granted the petition, finding that indefinite
solitary confinement of the detainee was not reasonably related to the government’s legitimate
objective of preventing the detainee from allegedly planning or approving violent criminal conduct
while behind bars. The court held that to justify such “harsh” detention, more substantial proof
was required that the detainee committed or directed the crime of murder in aid of racketeering
while in detention, or had conspired with another inmate to murder a federal prosecutor.
According to the court, the security restrictions placed obstacles on the detainee’s
communications with his attorneys, which was especially important because the detainee was
charged with a crime for which he could receive the death penalty. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

U.S. District Court
TRANSFER
SENTENCE

U.S. v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Mont. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a habeas petition
challenging the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy that precluded his placement in a community
corrections center, as recommended by the sentencing court. The district court granted the
petition, finding that the prisoner was not required to first exhaust his administrative remedies
before the court could consider the petition, because by the time the inmate exhausted every
available administrative remedy he would nearly be done serving his entire sentence. The court
held that the statutes governing placement of inmates in prerelease custody did not authorize the
BOP policy, under which inmates were designated to a community corrections center only for the
lesser of six months or ten percent of their sentence. The court ordered the BOP to consider the
appropriateness of transferring the inmate to a community confinement center. (Federal
Correctional Center, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
GOOD TIME

Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005). A state inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir. 2005). A federal prisoner petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, contending that he was entitled to more good time credit (GTC) than
awarded by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The district court denied the petition and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the phrase “term of imprisonment” in
the statute was ambiguous and that the court would defer to the BOP’s statutory interpretation.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Petersburg, Virginia)

corpus, challenging on due process grounds a misconduct conviction that caused him to be
demoted to a non-credit-earning prisoner. The district court denied the petition and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, ordering the issuance of a writ on remand.
The court held that the misconduct conviction reduced the inmate’s credit-earning class in a
manner that inevitably affected the direction of his sentence and therefore deprived the inmate of
a liberty interest. According to the court, officials violated the inmate’s due process rights by
convicting him without any evidence. (Great Plains Correctional Facility, Oklahoma)

2006
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
ALIEN

Adem v. Bush, 425 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). In a habeas case, the petitioner, who was detained

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2006). A prisoner incarcerated for civil contempt for

XX

at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a motion to hold federal
respondents in contempt of a protective order governing access to counsel for Guantanamo
detainees and a motion to expedite his access to counsel. The district court held that the
protective order did not require evidence of authority to represent a detainee as a prerequisite to
counsel meeting with a detainee, but rather, the protective order provided that counsel who
purportedly represented a particular detainee provide evidence of their authority to represent
that detainee within 10 days of counsel's second visit with the detainee. (United States at the
Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

refusing to comply with an order, sought habeas corpus relief. The district court denied the
prisoner’s motion for bail and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, remanded, and
ordered the case to be reassigned. The court held that the Non-Detention Act did not eliminate

22.58

the lower courts' inherent power to order coercive civil confinement, and implicitly authorized
coercive confinement in the face of civil contempt. The court found that civil confinement only
becomes punitive, for the purposes of a due process analysis, when it loses the ability to secure
compliance. The court held that a seven-year length of imprisonment for refusing to produce
corporate records and property, so as to comply with an order issued in a civil securities fraud
action, did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights, where the property in question had a
“life-altering” value of $15 million, such that his refusal to comply indicated that he was willing to
suffer jail time in hopes of ending up in possession of the property. The court opened it’s opinion
with the following statement: “It has been said that a civil contemnor who is incarcerated to

compel compliance with a court order holds the key to his prison cell: Where defiance leads to the
contemnor's incarceration, compliance is his salvation.” (Metropolitan Correctional Center,

Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)
U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Ash v. Reilly, 433 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.D.C. 2006). A District of Columbia prisoner petitioned for a

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
PROGRAMS

Barq v. Daniels, 428 F.Supp.2d 1147 (D.Or. 2006). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Folk v. Atty. Gen. of Commonwealth of Pa., 425 F.Supp.2d 663 (W.D.Pa. 2006). A state inmate
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a state parole board's denial of parole. The
district court held that requiring the inmate to admit to the sexual crimes for which he was
convicted, as a condition for completing a rehabilitation program, did not violate his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, nor the inmate’s substantive due process rights or
the inmate's First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak. The court found that the
requirement did not constitute sufficient compulsion to implicate the inmate's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, even though the inmate's chance at parole was diminished if he
did not successfully complete the program, where the inmate's failure to accept responsibility for
his sexual behavior did not automatically preclude him from parole. (State Corr’l Institution,
Houtzdale, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME

Gaskins v. Johnson, 443 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D.Va. 2006). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the denial of good conduct credits. The district
court dismissed the petition. The court held that the appropriate remedy for the inmate's
challenge to the denial of good conduct credits was an action pursuant to § 1983, not a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. The court found that the inmate did not have a protected liberty interest
in either maintaining a current classification or obtaining a new classification, as required to
prevail on a § 1983 claim. (Powhatan Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 2006). A pro se prisoner filed a habeas petition,
challenging his sentence for a disciplinary conviction in a prison administrative hearing. The
district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the due process error in denying the prisoner's request to call a corrections officer to testify
at a hearing was harmless where the officer's testimony would have supported another officer's
report of the riot incident, so that the testimony would not have aided prisoner's defense. The
court found that no liberty interest was implicated when prison officials punished the prisoner for
possession of less dangerous contraband by imposing seven days of segregation and 30 days of
restriction time following a disciplinary hearing, and thus, the prisoner's due process rights were
not violated, absent a showing that the prisoner lost any good-time credits, or that the
segregation or restriction time imposed caused an atypical or significant hardship. (Hutchinson
Correctional Facility, Kansas)

XX

writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention on the ground that his rights were violated at his
parole revocation hearing. The district court granted relief and subsequently denied
reconsideration. On appeal, the decision was vacated and remanded. On remand, the district
court granted the prisoner’s petition, finding that: (1) unsworn verbal allegations of four or five
unidentified individuals who purportedly identified the parolee as the attacker in an assault were
not reliable hearsay statements; (2) refusal to allow the parolee to exercise his confrontation
rights violated due process; and (3) the parolee did not waive his right to confrontation. The court
noted that when hearsay is used to support a decision to revoke parole, there must be some
independent basis for believing the hearsay to be true. (United States Parole Commission)

habeas corpus, alleging that his removal from his originally assigned class under the Bureau of
Prisons' (BOP) drug and alcohol treatment program (DAP), and subsequent placement into
another class that graduated on a later date violated his constitutional rights. The district court
held that it was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion for BOP to rely exclusively on
the number of sessions that it forced the petitioner to miss in deciding to remove the prisoner
from his original DAP class. The prisoner had been placed in a special housing unit (SHU)
through no fault of his own, and he missed classes as a result. The court noted that had the
prisoner been permitted to rejoin his class, as of graduation he would have completed more
sessions than seventy-five percent of the other DAP participants. (FCI Sheridan, Oregon)

22.59

U.S. District Court
CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED

J.P.C. (JUV) v. U.S., 430 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.S.D. 2006). A juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking credit, which the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had refused to award him, for
days spent in custody at age 19 prior to revocation of his probation. The district court held that
the juvenile was entitled to credit for time spent in custody awaiting a dispositional hearing that
resulted in revocation of his release and commencement of official detention. The court noted that
no deference was due to the revised Bureau of Prisons policy of no longer granting credit to
juveniles for pretrial or pre-hearing custody, where the change in policy was based on one district
court decision from another jurisdiction, the policy was made without notice to the Judicial
Conference, and was not founded on statutes, comments, or independent setting of policy. The
plaintiff was a juvenile when he was placed on probation until age 21. He violated his conditions
of probation and was taken into custody at age 19 by order of the court. He was held in a county
jail (with adult offenders) until his dispositional hearing. (South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
GOOD TIME

Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prison inmate sought federal habeas
relief after a prison disciplinary board had imposed discipline, consisting of revocation of 30 days'
good-time credit, for a lockdown infraction. The district court denied the petition and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court should have
held an evidentiary hearing, given the inmate's sworn testimony and extrinsic evidence that
contradicted the disciplinary board's version of events. The inmate had asserted that he had
unsuccessfully sought a continuance before the prison disciplinary board in order to obtain
additional evidence, including a surveillance videotape, that would contradict the accuser's
version of events. The court noted that a prison disciplinary board is entitled to resolve conflicts
in the stories presented to it, in deciding to impose revocation of good-time credits as discipline, as
long as some evidence supports the decision; however, the board is not entitled to prevent an
inmate from offering material evidence. (Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS

Navarro v. Adams, 419 F.Supp.2d 1196 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner filed a pro se petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his state court conviction and his sentence for first degree
murder. The district court held that a deputy sheriff's search of his cell and seizure of attorneyclient privileged documents did not warrant federal habeas relief because it did not substantially
prejudice the prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the prisoner’s
cell was searched to locate evidence regarding gang activity and threats to witnesses, not to
interfere with his relationship with his defense counsel, and the information seized was turned
over to the trial court for an in-camera review without being viewed by any member of the
prosecution team. (California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or. 2006). Aliens from Cuba and Vietnam, who had

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
SEGREGATION

Nicholson v. Carroll, 458 F.Supp.2d 249 (D.Del. 2006). A state prisoner filed a petition for writ of

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Rose v. Mayberg, 454 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2006). A sex offender who had been civilly committed to a

XX

final orders of removal and had been released from custody on general orders of supervision, but
who had violated their orders by committing crimes, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the validity of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP). The district court denied the petition, holding that: (1) ISAP
regulations requiring participating aliens to remain in their residences between eight and 12
hours per day was not “detention” outside the statutory authority of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); (2) ISAP requirements did not violate the aliens' liberty interests under the
Fifth Amendment; (3) placement of the aliens in ISAP did not violate their procedural due process
rights; and (4) ISAP was not subject to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements.
(Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program, Oregon)

habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the
imposition of discipline in the form of administrative segregation. The district court denied the
inmate’s petition, finding that the claim that he was denied an impartial disciplinary hearing, as
guaranteed by the due process clause, was not cognizable on habeas review, where the
disciplinary sanctions imposed against the prisoner did not involve any loss of good time credit,
but only confinement to administrative segregation for 15 days. (Delaware Correctional
Institution)

state hospital as a sexually violent predator (SVP), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
after exhausting claims relevant to his petition in state court. The district court denied the
petition and the offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The federal appeals court held
that the decision by a state appellate court-- that due process did not require a jury in a civil
commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) to determine if a sex
offender was completely unable to control his behavior-- was not an objectively unreasonable
application of the decisions of United States Supreme Court, and therefore the sex offender was
not entitled to federal habeas relief. According to the court, only some showing of abnormality
was required, that made it difficult, if not impossible, for a dangerous person to control his
dangerous behavior. (California Department of Mental Health)

22.60

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Scruggs v. Jordon, 435 F.Supp.2d 869 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A state prisoner sought federal habeas relief after he lost
120 days of good time credit as a sanction at a prison disciplinary proceeding. The district court denied the
petition. The court held that prison officials did not violate due process in the prison disciplinary proceeding
when they amended the original violation, and that due process did not require disqualification of the chairman
of the state prison disciplinary board because the chairman was not directly involved in the investigation of the
charges against the prisoner. According to the court, the board's refusal to allow the prisoner to present his
walking cane as evidence did not violate due process, where the prisoner had not made a request to present
physical evidence at the disciplinary hearing, and was allowed to present his version of the incident. The court
also noted that due process did not require live testimony of corrections officers at a prison disciplinary hearing,
absent a showing by the prisoner that their testimony would have been any different if given live, or that he was
prejudiced by the absence of live testimony. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2007

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS

Adams v. Bradshaw, 484 F.Supp.2d 753 (N.D.Ohio 2007). After his convictions for aggravated murder and other
offenses were affirmed, an offender sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that, even if a due
process violation occurred, the improper use of a stun belt placed on the defendant his during trial was a
harmless error because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The court noted that due process prohibits the
use of shackles on a defendant during a criminal trial, unless there exists an essential state interest, such as the
interest in courtroom security. (Trumbell County, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner convicted in state court of first-degree murder and
sentenced to life in prison filed a second petition for habeas relief, which the district court dismissed. The
prisoner appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that his lack
of access to a state prison law library or legal assistance presented a sufficient impediment to toll the statutory
period for filing a habeas petition. (Iowa)

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Hansley v. Ryan, 482 F.Supp.2d 383 (D.Del. 2007). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
asserting that she had been held for more than 90 days at a higher level of incarceration than warranted for
someone who was sentenced and waiting for bed space at a work-release location, and that she had not had a
mental health evaluation while incarcerated. The district court dismissed. The court held that the prisoner's two
claims would not alter her sentence or undo her conviction, and thus such claims did not state any issue
cognizable on a federal habeas review. (Women's Work Release Treatment Center in New Castle, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808 (10th Cir. 2007). A prisoner petitioned for habeas corpus relief,
arguing that prison officials violated his due process rights during disciplinary proceedings. The district court
dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in
part. The court held that the refusal of prison officials to allow the prisoner's witnesses to testify at his
disciplinary hearing did not prejudice the prisoner, and thus did not violate his due process rights, where each
witness submitted written statements, the witnesses provided a description of the fight underlying the
disciplinary charge, and although the prisoner argued that one officer's statement was ambiguous, he did not
demonstrate how further testimony would have aided his defense. But the court found that prison officials'
refusal to produce and consider a videotape, which the prisoner contended would exonerate him as to the
disciplinary charges, violated the prisoner's due process rights, where the officials offered no reason that
producing the videotape would be hazardous to institutional safety. (U.S. Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Jordan v. Pugh, 484 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal prisoner brought an action against prison
officials challenging the constitutionality of a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation prohibiting prisoners
from acting as a reporter or publishing under a byline. The prisoner petitioned for permission to attend his trial in
person and moved for reconsideration of a court order granting the defendants' motion to preclude the testimony
of two witnesses who were also prisoners. The district court held that circumstances did not warrant granting the
petition in light of the security risks associated with transferring the prisoner to lower security facility to
facilitate participation in the trial. The court found that the proffered testimony of the other prisoners was not
relevant. (United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2007). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking relief from a disciplinary determination. The district court denied the petition. The court held
that the inmate could not challenge the loss of telephone and commissary privileges in disciplinary proceedings
by way of a habeas petition, where the loss had only a speculative or incidental effect on the length of his
sentence. The court ruled that the inmate's loss of his prison job was a condition of confinement that could not be
challenged in a habeas corpus proceeding. According to the court, a prison disciplinary board's determination
that the inmate attempted to introduce non-hazardous contraband and made unauthorized use of the mail in
violation of prison regulations was supported by some evidence, such that any right to due process that the
prisoner had in the disciplinary proceeding that resulted only in his loss of privileges was satisfied. The court
noted that the prison intercepted a letter written by the prisoner proposing a scheme to obtain tapes from outside
by means of a fraudulent solicitation to a prison employee in a way that would conceal the inmate's involvement.
(Federal Correctional Institution at Milan, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FRIVOLOUS PETITIONS

Miles v. Angelone, 483 F.Supp.2d 491 (E.D.Va. 2007). After his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied,
a petitioner filed numerous unsuccessful motions for reconsideration. The district court reclassified the
petitioner's twelfth such motion as a new and successive habeas petition and entered A separate order advising
the petitioner that he should not file any additional motions for reconsideration or seek any additional review

XXII

22.61

absent a remand or allowance of a successive petition by the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the
petitioner's appeal and, in a separate order, affirmed the order advising the petitioner not to file additional
motions. The petitioner then filed his seventeenth motion seeking reconsideration, which the court of appeals
denied. The court held that the petitioner's history of filing frivolous and harassing pleadings supported a limited
pre-filing injunction against the petitioner, noting that the successive and frivolous motions for reconsideration
of dismissal of his original petition were a substantial burden on judicial resources. (Virginia)
U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
GOOD TIME

Moreno v. Buss, 523 F.Supp.2d 878 (N.D.Ind. 2007). After exhausting administrative remedies, a state prisoner
submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pertaining to demotion in his credit time earning classification at
a prison disciplinary hearing. The court held that the prisoner had a procedural due process right, consistent with
security considerations, to present a sweatshirt as exculpatory evidence for the Disciplinary Hearing Board’s
(DHB) consideration and that the DHB's review of investigative files containing photographs of the sweatshirt
was not sufficient to satisfy the prisoner's due process rights because review of photographs would not have
allowed the DHB to determine the nature of the stains on the sweatshirt, which was the point at issue. The
inmate alleged that the sweatshirt was stained with paint, not blood. The court found that the DHB's error in
failing to allow the prisoner to present the sweatshirt as exculpatory evidence was harmful. According to the
court, there was no evidence to support the DHB's finding that the prisoner was guilty of battery. The court noted
that it was not necessary for the sweatshirt to be physically present at the hearing, so long as the DHB examined
it before making a decision. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2007). An inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and the district
court denied the petition. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate
suffered an injury in fact, as required for the inmate to have standing to bring a habeas petition challenging the
decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to terminate his boot camp program, even though placement in boot
camp was a discretionary decision made on an individual basis. The court noted that the decision denied the
inmate the ability to be considered for a program that would have allowed her to serve only six months in prison.
The court found that the decision of the BOP to terminate the boot camp program was committed to agency
discretion by law, and thus was not susceptible to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). The inmate had only the recommendation by the judge that her eligibility for the discretionary program
be evaluated and she had not earned any early release privileges when informed of the termination. (Federal
Correctional Institution Dublin, California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE

West v. Whitehead, 484 F.Supp.2d 1011 (D.S.D. 2007). A federal prisoner filed petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging calculation by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of his release date. The district court
denied the petition. The court held that the prisoner received credit against his Utah sentences for imprisonment
which occurred prior to the date his federal sentence commenced, and, thus, any additional credit for time served
on the Utah sentences would be a prohibited award of double credit for prior custody. (Federal Prison Camp,
Yankton, South Dakota)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Barnes v. Black, 544 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to order a
prison warden to have him transported to the district court where his personal injury suit was pending. The
district court denied the petition and denied the prisoner's request for a lawyer. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court dismissed the action. The court held that the district court's order denying the state prisoner's
request for a lawyer to represent him in his personal injury lawsuit and in his habeas petition were non-final and
therefore the appeals court did not have jurisdiction. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
SEGREGATION

Basciano v. Lindsay, 530 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus seeking an order lifting special administrative measures governing his confinement and releasing him
from a special housing unit back into the general prison population. The district court denied the petition. The
court held that the restrictive conditions of pretrial confinement which removed the detainee from the general
prison population, did not amount to punishment without due process. The court noted that there was substantial
evidence of the detainee's dangerousness, a rational connection between the conditions and a legitimate purpose
of protecting potential victims, and the existence of an alternative means for the detainee to exercise his right to
communicate with others and with counsel. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
JURISDICTION
TRANSFER

Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008). An alien, who was an Algerian national, petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus to challenge his detention at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and moved for interim relief barring his
transfer to Algeria based on the likelihood of torture by the Algerian government and a terrorist organization.
The district court denied the motion and the alien filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously requested bar of his
transfer. A motions panel temporarily enjoined his transfer to preserve appellate jurisdiction. The appeals court
remanded the case to decide whether a preliminary injunction was necessary and appropriate. The court also
found that federal courts can preserve jurisdiction pending Supreme Court review of the same jurisdictional issue
in a different case. According to the court, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not displace the federal
courts' remedial powers. (Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Brown v. McNeil, 591 F.Supp.2d 1245 (M.D.Fla. 2008). An inmate of the Florida penal system whose
conditional release supervision had been revoked, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court
granted summary judgment. The court held that the state court's decision to uphold revocation for failure to make
supervision payments was unreasonable, and the state court's decision to uphold revocation based on violation of
curfew provisions was unreasonable given that the inmate violated curfew only one time, and had been given

XXII

22.62

permission to violate curfew several times. According to the court, the state court's decision to uphold the parole
commission's revocation of the inmate's conditional release supervision for failure to make $30.00 per month
cost of supervision payments and being $312.41 in arrears, was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented, and an unreasonable application of clearly established federal due
process principles. The court noted that the state court’s finding that the failure to pay costs was willful,
substantial, and material, was incorrect by clear and convincing evidence, where testimony and evidence of
record revealed that inmate did not have the ability to remain current with his supervision payments given his
other financial obligations at the time. (Florida Parole Commission)
U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Carlin v. Wong, 552 F.Supp.2d 1023 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a federal habeas petition
challenging a parole board's denial of parole. The district court granted the petition, finding that denial of parole
violated the prisoner's due process liberty interest in parole arising under California law. The court found that the
parole board's denial of parole was not supported by any evidence that the prisoner's release, after having served
27 years in prison for second degree murder, would threaten public safety, and, thus, violated the prisoner's due
process liberty interest in parole under California law. The court noted that the prisoner, who was 61 years old,
had served beyond his minimum sentence of 17 years, had stopped using drugs, participated in self-help
programs and taken academic courses, had never had a major disciplinary violation in prison and his prison
record had been free of any infractions for twenty years. The district attorney supported granting parole. (San
Quentin State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
JURISDICTION
HAGUE CONVENTION

Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2008). A detainee sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking to end
her detention in jail for violating a state court civil contempt order that directed her to return her child to the
father's custody in the United States pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction. The district court denied her motion for reconsideration and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the detainee’s incarceration was not in violation of laws or treaties of the United
States, as required for a grant of habeas petition. The court noted that a Spanish court awarded custody of the
child to the detainee, who had removed the child from her habitual place of residence in New Jersey without the
American father's permission, in direct contravention of both the letter and spirit of the Hague Convention. The
court noted that this also violated the principles of international comity by applying Spanish law, rather than
New Jersey law, and therefore warranted refusal to afford comity to the decisions of Spanish courts. (Bergen
County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
AEDPA- Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty
Act

Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging a prison
disciplinary proceeding in which he was assessed a 150-day forfeiture of good-time credit. The district court
dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that
the prisoner provided the state court with sufficient facts to exhaust his state court remedies. The court noted
that exhaustion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) requires that a habeas
petitioner fairly present his federal claims to the highest state court available and the petitioner describes in the
state proceedings both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based so that the
state courts have a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his
constitutional claim. The court noted that exhaustion of state remedies under AEDPA does not require that a
habeas petitioner present to the state courts every piece of evidence supporting his federal claims. According to
the court the state prisoner's state habeas petition provided the state court with sufficient facts to address his
claim that his due process right to call witnesses in a disciplinary proceeding was violated. The petition
explicitly stated that the prisoner was denied his due process rights to a witness and made clear based on statute
citations that the prisoner was charged with committing a battery upon someone who was not an inmate. The
prisoner cited a statute governing denial and revocation of good-time credits, referred to a case holding that due
process demands that an inmate be allowed to call witnesses in his defense in a disciplinary proceeding
involving possible loss of good-time credits, and cited a regulation controlling disciplinary proceedings.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE

Furnari v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 531 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus claiming that the United States Parole Commission had improperly denied parole to him. The
district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that
the commission had timely performed its duties to set a “release date” early enough to permit the prisoner to
appeal from that release date to the National Appeals Board before the Parole Commission expired. The court
held that grant of parole was not warranted on the basis of a 100 year sentence, as a mitigating circumstance.
(United States Parole Commission)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED
PAROLE

Garner v. Caulfield, 584 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2008). A parolee filed a habeas petition to challenge his
detention following revocation of his parole. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
parolee was not entitled to credit toward service of his sentence for his stay at a residential program akin to
placement in a halfway house, which was a condition of parole. The court found that the Parole Commission
issued a valid parole violator warrant before the date on which the petitioner would have reached his full-term
expiration date, and therefore it was authorized to revoke the petitioner's parole. (United States Parole
Commission, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
DUE PROCESS

Garson v. Perlman, 541 F.Supp.2d 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prison inmate, who had sought bail pending the
direct appeal of his bribery conviction, sought federal habeas relief after a state court denied his motion. The
inmate alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause and a substantive due process
violation. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the Excessive Bail Clause does not
encompass bail pending appeal. The court found that the inmate did not have a protected liberty interest in bail
pending appeal, precluding his due process claim. (Mid-State Correctional Facility, New York)

XXII

22.63

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Gauthier v. Dexter, 573 F.Supp.2d 1282 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a petition for habeas corpus
challenging discipline imposed for trafficking in narcotics on prison grounds. The district court denied the
petition, finding that the prisoner was given sufficient notice of the charges alleged against him, the officer at the
prisoner's disciplinary hearing was impartial, and the prisoner's conviction was sufficiently supported by the
informant's confidential statements. The court noted that prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of constitutional rights due to a defendant in such proceedings does
not apply. The prison disciplinary committee determined that the prisoner distributed heroin from his cell
window to other prisoners who sold it in the prison yard, supporting a drug trafficking violation and subsequent
revocation of work credits. The court found that even though the determination was primarily based on
statements from confidential informants, the informants had previously given reliable information, the
information supporting the prisoner's violation was independently corroborated, and the informants incriminated
themselves through their statements. (California Men's Colony East)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, challenging the Parole Commission's decision to impose successive terms of special parole after
the prisoner's original special term of parole was revoked. The district court granted the petition, finding that the
Parole Commission could not reimpose a successive term of special parole. The court noted that special parole is
different from regular parole in three aspects: (1) it follows the term of imprisonment, while regular parole
entails release before the end of the prison term; (2) it is imposed, and its length is selected by the sentencing
judge, rather than by the Parole Commission; and (3) if the conditions of special parole are violated, the parolee
is returned to prison to serve the entire parole term, and he does not receive credit for the time spent in noncustodial supervision. (Federal Correctional Institution in Milan, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED
SENTENCE

Huff v. Sanders, 632 F.Supp.2d 903 (E.D.Ark. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a habeas corpus petition,
challenging the government's designation of the date of commencement of his sentence, and seeking additional
presentence detention credit. The district court granted the petition in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the inmate satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement even though he failed to comply with the
Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) demands as to the form of the documents; (2) the federal sentence commenced on the
date that the inmate was sentenced for federal charges and remanded to the custody of United States Marshal; (3)
the inmate was entitled to credit against his federal sentence for all of his presentence incarceration; but (4) the
inmate was not entitled to presentence detention credit for time spent in a residential drug treatment center.
(Federal Detention Center, Houston, Texas, and Federal Correctional Institution, Oakdale, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Conn. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a § 2241 petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, alleging that she was denied necessary medical care in violation of her Eighth Amendment rights.
The district court held that the claim was cognizable as a habeas petition. According to the court, the claim
asserted by the prisoner who had been diagnosed with cervical cancer, that she was denied necessary medical
care in federal prison in violation of her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment,
and seeking restoration of certain medical treatment, specifically hormone medication, was cognizable as a
habeas petition challenging her conditions of confinement pursuant. (Federal Correctional Inst., Danbury, Conn.)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT
JURISDICTION

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F.Supp.2d 312 (D.D.C. 2008). In actions challenging the United
States' detention of alleged enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, one detainee brought an
emergency motion to compel access to his medical records and to order officials to provide him with a blanket
and mattress in his cell. The district court denied the motion, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim. The court noted that no court, justice, or judge has jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by, or on behalf of, an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. The
court also noted that no court, justice, or judge has jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the
United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such a determination. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS

Jones v. McDaniel, 552 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D.Nev. 2008). A state prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus seeking
relief from sanctions imposed at two prison disciplinary hearings. The prisoner was sanctioned with 180 days of
administrative segregation, loss of telephone privileges for 30 days, loss of canteen privileges, and referral for
loss of 59 days of statutory good time. The district court granted the petition. The court held that there was no
evidence to support the prisoner's convictions for violating prison disciplinary rules, as required to comply with
the due process requirement that a factual basis be incorporated into a hearing officer's written statement. The
court noted that the “written statement” requirement as to disciplinary proceedings against state inmates “is not a
ritual that magically renders a disciplinary decision constitutional,” but rather, a disciplinary board must explain
the evidence relied upon, such that it is at very least possible to discern the factual basis of the conviction.
According to the court, a hearing officer's denial of the prisoner's request to call the charging officer as a witness
in the disciplinary hearing violated the prisoner's due process rights, so as to entitle the prisoner to habeas relief.
(Ely State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
JUVENILE

Khadr v. Bush, 587 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainee moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment, and the government filed a cross-motion to dismiss or to hold the petition
in abeyance pending completion of military commission proceedings. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court held that the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not bar a challenge to

XXII

22.64

detention based on the detainee's capture as a juvenile, but the detainee's challenge to detention based on his
capture as a juvenile was barred by the habeas statute. The court found that a provision of the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) barring courts from having jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the United States as an enemy combatant did not apply to the habeas claim brought by a
detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba., where the detainee's claim was entirely
independent from the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission. But the court held that the
detainee’s petition challenged the conditions of his confinement, rather than the legality of his detention, and,
thus, was barred by a provision of habeas statute barring the courts from having jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States as an
enemy combatant. The court noted that the detainee's request for relief was not tantamount to a request for
outright release and was more accurately characterized as a request seeking a different program or location or
environment. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
GOOD-TIME

Kogut v. Ashe, 592 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). A county jail inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging he was prevented from participating in various jail work programs as a result of discrimination based on
his disability. The district court granted petition. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was prevented
from participating in a good-time work program that would have affected the duration of his confinement as a
result of discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was sufficient to form the
basis of habeas relief. The court noted that while an inmate may have no right under the Constitution to credit for
good-time, he may not under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) be barred, based on
discrimination arising from his disability, from work programs that may have the effect of reducing his sentence.
He alleged that he suffers from disabilities which affect his ability to perform certain types of work assigned in
the jail. The inmate alleged that he was “denied any and/or all access” to work assigned through the “County
Correctional Facilities Work Programs” and provided 16 inmate work request forms in support of this claim.
(Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROGRAMS
TRANSFER

Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008). Federal inmates brought separate § 2241 petitions for writs of
habeas corpus alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) unlawfully declared them ineligible for placement at a
halfway house. Following consolidation, the district court denied the petitions. The inmates appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that the petitions brought by the two inmates
were rendered moot by their placement in halfway houses. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
program statement establishing a policy concerning when the BOP would place the inmate in a Residential ReEntry Center (RRC) did not conflict with a statute authorizing the BOP to designate the place of a prisoner's
confinement by categorically excluding a class of inmates from the opportunity to be transferred to a RRC more
that 11 to 13 months before release. According to the court, the plain language of the program statement allowed
a decision regarding RRC referral earlier than 11 to 13 months before release, at the time when most inmates
would have been serious candidates for such a transfer, and the program statement said only that the decision
usually was made no later than that time. (Federal Prison Camp, Yankton, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Opalec v. Curry, 556 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Cal. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se action for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging a parole board's decision that he was not suitable for parole. The district court granted the
petition, finding that denial of parole violated due process. According to the court, the board identified only one
main reason for its decision that the inmate was not suitable for parole-- the commitment offense. The inmate
had no disciplinary record in his 12 years in prison or in the 2 years he was in a county jail before he went to
prison, had favorable psychological reports, had a stable social history, was remorseful, and had made realistic
plans for his release and developed marketable skills. (Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFER

Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a habeas corpus petition to
compel the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to immediately consider transferring him to a residential reentry center
(RRC). The district court granted the petition, and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that as a matter of first impression, the statute governing BOP's prisoner placement did not authorize regulations
restricting placement in RRCs. According to the court, the statute governing the designation of the place of imprisonment did not authorize restricting prisoners' placement in residential reentry centers to lesser of the last
10% or the last six months of their sentences. The court found that the regulations violated the statute's clear
instruction that all placement and transfer determinations take into consideration each of the five enumerated
factors. (California)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE DATE

Strother v. Nardolillo, 583 F.Supp.2d 645 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A petitioner moved for a writ of habeas corpus to
challenge the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole's decision to detain him after the completion of his
maximum sentence in a state prison for a parole violation related to a prior conviction in Delaware. The district
court dismissed the petition as second or successive to a previous habeas petition and the petitioner appealed.
The appeals court reversed. On remand, the district court held that the petitioner was required to show collateral
consequences or continuing injury to maintain the petition. The court noted that the petitioner was released from
custody during the pendency of the proceedings, and thus collateral consequences could not be presumed.
(George W. Hill Correctional Facility, and Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008). A federal inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging
the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) calculation of good time credits in determining the length of time left to serve on
his 20-year sentence. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the BOP's program statement, calculating good time credits based on the time served rather
than the sentence imposed, reasonably interpreted the good time credit statute, despite the invalidity of a
regulation with an identical methodology. According to the court, the inmate's good time credits were required to
be calculated based on time served rather than on the sentence imposed. (Federal Correctional Institute,
Sheridan, Oregon)

22.65

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Welch v. Mukasey, 589 F.Supp.2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus alleging that he was being illegally detained as a material witness in a federal investigation of an alleged
conspiracy. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the petitioner failed to state a claim upon which
habeas relief could be granted. According to the court, the petitioner failed to allege any facts that would support
a finding that he was in custody pursuant to any material witness warrant, that federal custody was imminent or
that he was subject to a removal order. (Orleans Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INTERSTATE
COMPACT
JURISDICTION

Williams v. Warden-Central Detention Facility, 538 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008). A pretrial detainee filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking to invoke his right to a speedy trial, or to be released from custody
and to have all charges against him dropped. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
detainee was not entitled to federal habeas relief, despite the detainee's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
and violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, Fifth Amendment presentment and due process clauses,
Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, and Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. According to the court,
the record bore no suggestion that he had presented any of his claims to a state court, any delays were the result
of the detainee's conduct, and the claims could all be properly resolved by a state court. (District of Columbia
Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
RELEASE DATE

Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department
of corrections alleging wrongful imprisonment. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding the claim was cognizable. The court noted that the prisoner
was not eligible for habeas relief since his sentence had expired and he would be left without any access to
federal court if his § 1983 claim was barred. The prisoner had filed grievances with the prison administration
when his release date was moved back by nearly three months but no formal administrative proceedings were
initiated to resolve the complaint. (Virginia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Wilson-El v. Finnan, 544 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging his
disciplinary conviction. The district court dismissed the petition and an appeal was taken. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the disciplinary finding that the prisoner was guilty of being a habitual conduct rule
violator did not raise a constitutional violation addressable under habeas corpus. The court noted that the
prisoner's prior disciplinary finding of guilt on a conduct report charging him with insolence played a role in the
prison's designation of him as a habitual offender, and thus may indirectly have led to his loss of good-time
credits. (Indiana)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
MEDICAL CARE

Zuhair v. Bush, 592 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008). An alien, who had petitioned for habeas relief from his
detention in the Guantanamo Bay military facility, brought an emergency motion to compel immediate medical
relief. The district court held that the court would appoint its own medical/mental health expert to examine the
detainee and provide the court with a report and any recommendations. The court noted that evidence suggested
that the health of the petitioner was continuing to deteriorate. (U. S. Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)
2009

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F.Supp.2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009). A detainee being held at the United States Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was being unlawfully
detained by federal officials. The district court granted the petition, finding that the detainee was not lawfully
detainable as an enemy combatant pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and was
entitled to habeas corpus relief. The court held that the prior relationship between the detainee and al Qaeda or
the Taliban can be sufficiently vitiated by the passage of time, intervening events, or both, such that the detainee
can no longer be considered to have been “part of” either organization at the time he was taken into custody by
United States forces when determining whether the detainee may be held as an enemy combatant. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Al Mutairi v. U.S., 644 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009). A detainee at Guantanamo Bay military base filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the lawfulness of his detention, and both the detainee and the government
brought evidentiary motions. The district court granted the petition. The court held that the government was not
entitled to have its evidence admitted with a presumption of accuracy and authenticity. The court found that
evidence pertaining to the detainee's path and timing of travels was probative of what the detainee may have
been doing during his travels and that evidence pertaining to the loss of the detainee's passport was probative.
The court held that the detention of the detainee at Guantanamo Bay military base was unlawful. According to
the court, although the government established that some of the detainee's conduct was consistent with persons
who may have become part of al Wafa or al Qaida, there was nothing in the record beyond speculation that the
detainee did, in fact, train or otherwise become part of one or more of those organizations. (Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED
SENTENCE

Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner convicted for drug offenses petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to credit for the 14-month period that he was at liberty
after federal authorities inadvertently released him prior to the expiration of his sentence, and that the prisoner's
sentence for escape, imposed approximately 10 years after he was sentenced on federal drug charges, was
subject to the statutory presumption that the sentence should run consecutively. The court noted that the
erroneous release happened only because the prisoner had escaped from his halfway house, causing the need to
process him again when he was apprehended, and there was no showing that the government acted arbitrarily or
intentionally to prolong the prisoner's sentence. According to the court, giving the prisoner credit for the time he
was free would amount to rewarding him for his escape. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Massachusetts)

22.66

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS OF
CONFINEMENT

Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First and Fourth
Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted the government's
motion for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by issues of fact as to: (1) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially burdened by the prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy; (2) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was
substantially burdened by the prison's policy of requiring her to carry an identification photograph that showed
her without a hijab to cover her head; and, (3) whether the prisoner’s exercise of her religion was substantially
burdened by the prison's failure to provide an imam during Ramadan. The court held that the prison's non-emergency cross-gender pat-down search policy did not violate the prisoner’s limited right, under the Fourth
Amendment, to bodily privacy. According to the court, although the prisoner made a sufficient showing of a
subjective expectation of privacy, the expectation would not be considered reasonable by society, since the
prison had a legitimate penological interest in security and in providing equal employment opportunities to both
male and female staff, and no available further accommodation was reasonable under the circumstances. (Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
JURISDICTION
TRANSFER

Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Nine detainees at the United States naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainees requested interim relief requiring the
government to provide 30 days' notice to the court and counsel before transferring them from the naval base,
asserting fears that they would be transferred to a country where they might be tortured or further detained. The
district court entered requested orders and the government appealed. The appeals court vacated. The court held
that the district court could exercise jurisdiction over claims related to the detainees' potential transfer. According to the court, a provision of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) eliminating jurisdiction over non-habeas
actions against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of a detainees’ transfer did not apply to preclude jurisdiction over the detainees' claims for notice of transfer. But the court found that a writ of habeas corpus was not available to bar the detainee's transfer based upon the likelihood of a detainee being tortured in recipient country. The district court could not issue a writ of habeas corpus to bar the transfer of a detainee based
upon the expectation that the recipient country would detain or prosecute the detainee. (United States Naval
Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT
PROGRAMS

Kogut v. Ashe, 602 F.Supp.2d 251 (D.Mass. 2009). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that he had been discriminatorily excluded from work programs in which he could have earned goodtime credits, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court dismissed the petition,
finding that the prisoner's alleged disabilities were not the reason for his exclusion from the work programs, as
would violate the ADA. The prisoner was excluded from the work programs because he had been the subject of
over 30 incident reports for harassment of staff, fights with other inmates, and other disciplinary infractions, and
several of those incidents required the prisoner's segregation from general prison population. The court noted
that disciplinary issues and concerns over prison security may be legitimate non-discriminatory grounds for
limiting access to a jail program. (Worcester County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT
PAROLE

Lorando v. Waldren, 629 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.D.C. 2009). A parolee filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging
the loss of good time credits due to a parole violation. The district court denied the petition. The court held that
the parolee's rights were not violated when he was not afforded a probable cause hearing before the United States
Parole Commission (USPC) within five days after he was taken into custody pursuant to a parole violation warrant. According to the court, the parolee suffered no prejudice from the delay, and to the extent that he sought
release from custody due to the delay, his request was mooted by his re-parole. The court found that even if the
United States Parole Commission (USPC) had incorrectly determined that the parolee had five, not four, prior
convictions in revoking parole, the parolee was not prejudiced by determination, since the salient factor score
would have been identical because four or more prior convictions were accorded the same weight. ((District of
Columbia Central Detention Facility, U.S. Parole Commission)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
GOOD TIME

Morgan v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2009). A petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in loss of good time credit due to his use of indecent or vulgar language in a note
he mailed to opposing counsel in an unrelated habeas proceeding. The district court granted summary judgment
for the government and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the state
prison had a legitimate penological interest in rehabilitation that justified its revocation of 15 days of the prisoner's good time credit as punishment for violating a disciplinary rule prohibiting the use of indecent or vulgar
language when the prisoner mailed to a state's attorney in habeas proceeding a note written on toilet paper stating, “Please use this to wipe your ass, that argument was a bunch of shit.” According to the court, the punishment was not an impermissible infringement of the prisoner's First Amendment right to free speech. The court
noted that the prisoner's note demonstrated a completely unjustified disrespect for authority, expressed in the
most unacceptably vulgar form, which would be offensive in mainstream society, and the prison's disciplinary
action served to correct behavior that would seriously prejudice the prisoner when he returns to the civil world.
The court found that requirements of due process were satisfied at the prisoner's hearing where the prisoner:
received notice of the disciplinary hearing and his attendant rights; he was provided assistance of a counsel substitute; the prisoner called the charging officer as a witness and that officer testified via speaker phone; the hearing officer's denial of the prisoner's request that the prison's mail room supervisor and Assistant Attorney General be called as witnesses was warranted since the prisoner's note was not intercepted; and that the charging
officer's report and testimony, the prisoner's admission that the note was in his handwriting, and prison mail logs
all supported the finding against him. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,
Stevenson Unit)

22.67

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE

Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a habeas petition challenging
the constitutionality of Utah's indeterminate sentencing scheme. The district court dismissed the petition and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that Utah's indeterminate sentencing
scheme did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights and Utah parole statutes did not create a liberty interest
entitling the prisoner to federal due process protections. (Utah Board of Pardons)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE

Terrell v. U.S., 564 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner serving a life sentence for murder filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus asking the court to order in-person parole determination hearings. The district court
granted the petition, and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the United
States Parole Commission's use of videoconferencing to conduct parole determination proceedings violated the
Parole Commission Reorganization Act's requirement that a prisoner shall be allowed to “appear and testify” on
his own behalf at the parole determination hearing. According to the court, the meaning of the term “appear” at
the time the Parole Commission Reorganization Act was enacted was unambiguous and required an in-person
hearing, given that other methods, such as videoconferencing, did not exist at the time of the enactment. The
court noted that relief for a prisoner under the federal habeas statute and under § 1983 are not necessarily mutually exclusive remedies in the parole context, and that the claim brought by the prisoner pursuant to habeas statute was cognizable under habeas statute as a challenge to the execution of his sentence. (Branch Prison, Marquette, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS

Twitty v. Ashcroft, 712 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner, who brought an action alleging that a
state department of correction employee used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment, moved for
a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that Bureau of Prisons (BOP) transport him from Colorado to Connecticut to
attend his civil trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that expense and security concerns
outweighed the prisoner's interest in physically appearing at the trial, precluding an issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus. The court noted: (1) that it would cost the Bureau of Prisons about $70,000 to transport the prisoner from
Colorado to Connecticut for the trial; (2) that he would be temporarily housed in a less secure facility than the
one in Colorado; and (3) that transporting the prisoner between the facility and the courthouse, a trip of eighty
miles in each direction, and supervising him during trial would require the assistance of multiple United States
Marshals and presented a risk of escape, a risk of harm to law enforcement officers and danger to public. According to the court, the Colorado facility offered to permit the prisoner to appear at trial via videoconference,
which was a reasonable alternative in the circumstances. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum,
Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Rojas-Yepes, 630 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C. 2009). A prisoner who was being held in a medium-security
facility after his extradition from Colombia and who was pending trial, moved to modify his jail conditions after
the Department of Corrections (DOC) received a copy of the indictment and he was therefore reclassified as a
“maximum custody” prisoner and placed in a special management unit (SMU) pending his transfer to a maximum-security facility. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner’s claim for modification of his jail conditions would be construed as a habeas petition. The court found that the prisoner lacked a
property or liberty interest in his classification and placement. The court noted that classification was not a fixed
entitlement, but rather was revisited every 90 days based on changed conditions and new facts. According to the
court, the DOC did not violate the prisoner's equal protection rights by reclassifying him, where the prisoner was
reclassified based, not on national origin, but rather on the nature of the charges against him and how much
power and influence he was alleged to have within the charged drug-trafficking conspiracy. The court found that
the DOC's classification procedures were rationally related to a legitimate interest in maintaining order and
safety in detention facilities. (Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia Jail)
2010

U.S. District Court
RELIGION

Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that she was being denied freedom of religious expression, in violation of the First Amendment and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, in
part, and denied in part. The court held that the Muslim inmate's right to free exercise of religion was substantially burdened, as required to support her claim under RFRA, by a prison policy allowing for non-emergency
pat searches of female inmates by male guards, despite prison officials' claim that the inmate's belief was not
accurate. The court found that the choice offered the inmate, of violating her understanding of the precepts of
Islam, or refusing a search and risking punishment, constituted a substantial burden.
The court found that the prison's interest in maintaining safety and security of the female prison through the
use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's
right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, where the prison's arguments regarding how and why the crossgender pat searches promoted safety and security at the prison were actually related to the staffing of the facility,
not to its safety and security. According to the court, the prison's interest in avoiding staffing and employment
issues at the female prison through the use of cross-gender pat searches was not compelling, as required to justify a substantial burden on the inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA. The court noted that even
if the prison's interests in maintaining safety and security and avoiding staffing and employment issues were
compelling, cross-gender pat searches were not the least restrictive means of addressing these interests, as required to justify the substantial burden on an inmate's right of free exercise of religion under RFRA, absent evidence that the prison considered and rejected less restrictive practices to cross-gender pat searches. (Federal
Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut)

22.68

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
DUE PROCESS
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D.Cal. 2010). Aliens, who were diagnosed with severe
mental illnesses, filed a class action, alleging that their continued detention without counsel during pending removal proceedings violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due
Process Clause. The aliens moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion in part. The
court held that the aliens were not required to exhaust administrative remedies, since the very core of the aliens'
claim was that without the appointment of counsel, they would be unable to meaningfully participate in the administrative process before the BIA, and the BIA did not recognize a right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings under any circumstances; therefore, resort to the BIA would be futile. The court held that the mentally
ill aliens who were detained pending removal proceedings, without counsel and for prolonged periods without
custody hearings, were entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the immediate appointment of
qualified counsel to represent them during their immigration proceedings and custody hearings. (Department of
Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Northwest Detention Center, Tacoma, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF
PROGRAMS
SENTENCE
DUE PROCESS

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had
been released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a
preliminary injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after their
releases. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico appealed.
Another class of prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus and
the district court granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The court held that re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder under a new regulation
eliminating the ESP program for prisoners convicted of murder, did not violate the ex post facto clause, where
the prisoners had committed their crimes of conviction at times predating the creation of the ESP, so that Puerto
Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners from participating in the ESP had no effect on the punishment assigned by
law. The court also held the re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of murder did not violate substantive due
process. The court found that although the impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners was substantial, Puerto
Rico had a justifiable interest in faithfully applying the new statute which barred prisoners convicted of murder
from the ESP program. According to the court, there was no showing that Puerto Rico acted with deliberate
indifference or that re-imprisonment was conscience-shocking.
But the court found that the prisoners convicted of murder, who had been released for several years pursuant
to the ESP, had a protected due process liberty interest in their continued participation in the ESP program, despite the fact that their releases were premised on lower court determination, which was later overturned, that the
statute eliminating such prisoners from the program violated the ex post facto clause. The prisoners were serving
out the remainder of their sentences in their homes, where they lived either with close relatives, significant others, or spouses and children, and although they were subject to monitoring with an electronic tracking anklet, and
routine drug and alcohol testing, they were authorized to work at a job or attend school. The court also found
that the re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of procedural due process, where the prisoners were not
given any pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP status was revoked, and the prisoners had to wait two
weeks after their arrest before receiving any opportunity to contest it. The court concluded that the prisoners
whose procedural due process rights were violated by their re-incarceration or their imminent future re-incarceration after determination that they had been unlawfully admitted into the ESP were not entitled to either habeas
relief, for those already re-imprisoned, or preliminary injunctive relief for those yet to be re-imprisoned, where
the subsequent Puerto Rico statute provided a valid, independent, constitutional basis for the prisoners' re-incarceration. (Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PAROLE

Hart v. Curry, 716 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging a state court decision upholding a governor's reversal of the state parole board's grant of parole. The
district court granted the petition. The court held that California law created a due process liberty interest in
having the governor's reversal be supported by some evidence as to how aggravated circumstances of commitment the offense indicated a risk of current dangerousness. The court found that the determination that the governor's reversal based solely on circumstances surrounding commitment of the offense was supported by some
evidence was unreasonable. (Correctional Training Facility, Soledad, California, and California Board of Parole)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME CREDIT
RELEASE DATE

Hill v. Cowin, 717 F.Supp.2d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 2241 habeas petition alleging he was
being unlawfully held in prison beyond his release date because the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) improperly calculated his Good Conduct Time (GCT). The district court granted the petition, finding that the BOP improperly
calculated the prisoner's GCT, resulting in his being held beyond his release date. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Hopkins v. Grondolsky, 759 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.Mass. 2010). A prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case, finding that the loss of 90 days of commissary privileges as a disciplinary action was not a loss of any protected
liberty interest, and allegations were insufficient to plead prison regulations unreasonably burdened the prisoner’s constitutional rights. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Sex Offender Management Program, FMC Devens,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
PROGRAMS

Izzo v. Wiley, 620 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2010). A federal inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging a decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) denying his eligibility for the Elderly Offender Home Detention
Pilot Program. The district court denied the petition and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the provision of the Second Chance Act (SCA) making an offender eligible for the Elderly Offender Home Detention Pilot Program if he is at least 65 years old and has served 75% of the term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced refers to the term imposed by the sentencing court, without any consideration of
good time credit. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Colorado)

22.69

U.S. Appeals Court
PROGRAMS

Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeascorpus
challenging a decision of the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to deny him eligibility for admission to a
Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that BOP’s promulgation of a rule requiring the federal prisoner
to present documented proof of substance use within 12 months of imprisonment to be eligible for admission to
RDAP was a valid interpretive rule, and that implementation of the 12-month rule was neither arbitrary nor capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted that a reasonable basis existed for the BOP
decision to adhere to 12-month rule in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, (DSM-IV), and a reasonable basis existed for the Bureau to apply that rule to require documented use of
drugs within 12 months prior to incarceration. (United States Bureau of Prisons, Federal Correctional Institution
at Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Santibanez v. Havlin, 750 F.Supp.2d 1121 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging a state prison disciplinary conviction resulting from a rules violation report. The district court granted
the petition. The district court held that a state appellate court's determination that sufficient evidence existed to
convict the petitioner challenging state prison disciplinary conviction of possession of escape paraphernalia was
contrary to clearly established federal law; rather than applying the “some evidence” standard, as required to
comport with due process, the trial court had unreasonably based its denial of habeas relief on general observations regarding courts' customary deference to the judgment of prison officials. (California State Prison–Solano)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Sieu Phong Ngo v. Curry, 745 F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se sought a
writ of habeas corpus, challenging a decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings finding him unsuitable
for parole. The district court granted the motion, finding that the prisoner was entitled to habeas relief because
the state court unreasonably applied California's “some evidence” requirement when finding him unsuitable for
parole. The court noted that the record demonstrated that, since being incarcerated, the prisoner had not been
involved with gang-related activities or engaged in any violence, the prisoner's commitment offense for murder
did not amount to “some evidence,” he repeatedly apologized for his role in the victim's death, he accepted responsibility for the murder, and psychological reports indicated that the prisoner was remorseful, showed significant insight into his commitment offense, and recognized the negative aspects of gang involvement. (California
Board of Parole Hearings)
2011

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
GOOD TIME

Bonadonna v. Grondolsky, 762 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.Mass. 2011). A federal inmate filed a habeas petition challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) determination that he was ineligible to participate in the Elderly
Offender Home Detention Pilot Program. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that good time
credit could not be considered in determining whether the inmate was eligible for home detention by satisfying
the requirement that he serve 75% of his “term of imprisonment.” The court also held that due process did not
require that the inmate receive a hearing prior to denial of his request. (Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE

Cobbs v. Superintendent, 821 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Ind. 2011). After he was found guilty in a prison
disciplinary hearing of possessing an unauthorized electronic device, a prisoner petitioned for federal habeas
relief. The district court granted the petition. The court held that the prison disciplinary hearing body's (DHB)
failure to review a potentially exculpatory segment of videotape evidence to determine if other inmates planted
the cell phone, warranted the grant of a petition for federal habeas relief. (New Castle Correctional Facility,
Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
ALIEN
RELEASE DATE

Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). A Senegalese detainee, who was subject to a voluntary departure order or an alternate removal order, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a preliminary
injunction for immediate release from prolonged immigration detention. The district court denied the petitioner's
motion, and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an alien subject facing prolonged detention is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is entitled to be
released from detention unless the government establishes that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the
community. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, San Pedro Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROGRAMS

Reyes-Morales v. Wells, 766 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Ga. 2011). An alien federal prisoner petitioned for habeas
relief, challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) decision to reduce good conduct time (GCT) applied to
his sentence after he withdrew from a literacy program required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
The district court denied the petition. The court held that the prisoner was not subject to a final order of removal,
deportation, or exclusion, as required to receive the 54-day per year Good Conduct Time award, despite nonparticipation in a literacy program. According to the court, the BOP's regulations and program statements concerning loss of GCT time due to nonparticipation in a literacy program were a reasonable interpretation of PLRA.
The court found that the reduction of GCT did not violate the prisoner's procedural due process rights. (McRae
Correctional Facility, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS

Santiago-Lebron v. Florida Parole Com'm, 767 F.Supp.2d 1340 (S.D.Fla. 2011). A federal inmate petitioned for
habeas relief, seeking immediate release based on the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) cancellation of the Spanish
Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (RDAP). The district court dismissed the action. The court held that: (1)
BOP did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause in canceling the Spanish RDAP; (2) the prisoner was not “similarly situated” to English-speaking inmates who took the English RDAP; (3) termination of the Spanish RDAP
was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose; (4) BOP was not required to comply with APA's “no-

22.70

tice and comment” requirement before canceling the Spanish RDAP; and (5) cancellation of the Spanish RDAP
was a permissible construction of the statute requiring BOP to provide substance abuse treatment to eligible
inmates. The court noted that the prisoner had not started the program, much less successfully completed it or
been provided with a determination of eligibility for early release, prior to the date the amended policy became
effective. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a settled expectation of participating in the Spanish
Residential Drug and Alcohol Program (RDAP) and potentially receiving a sentence reduction, and thus no ex
post facto violation occurred when the Spanish RDAP was cancelled, where the prisoner had not yet begun
RDAP when it was cancelled. (Federal Correctional Institution, Miami, Florida)
U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS
RELEASE DATE

Tkochenko v. Sabol, 792 F.Supp.2d 733 (M.D.Pa. 2011). An immigration detainee filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus seeking review of her continuing custody by immigration officials. The district court granted the
petition. The court held that although the immigration detainee, a native and citizen of Ukraine who was convicted of possessing small quantities of drugs, was subject to immigration laws' mandatory detention provisions
applicable to aliens convicted of drug offenses, the two-year duration of her detention by immigration officials
pending entry of a final removal order offended due process considerations. The court held that the detainee was
entitled to federal habeas relief in the form of bail consideration. The court noted that the detainee's detention
was almost five times the typical 5-month length of detention acknowledged as presumptively reasonable by the
Supreme Court, and the lengthy period of detention was largely attributable to litigation decisions made by the
government, and the period of detention had no fixed, finite, or identifiable duration. (York County Prison,
Pennsylvania)
2012

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CIVIL COMMITMENT
INTERROGATION
SEGREGATION

Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315 (D.C.Cir. 2012). Survivors of detainees who died at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base sued the United States and a host of government officials under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The survivors asserted that the
detainees had been subjected to physical and psychological torture and abuse, inadequate medical treatment and
withholding of necessary medication, and religious abuse. The district court granted the government's motion to
be substituted as the defendant on the ATCA claims and its motion to dismiss both the ATCA and the FTCA
claims. The appeals court later denied the survivors' motion for reconsideration. The survivors appealed. The
appeals court affirmed on other grounds. The appeals court held that habeas corpus statute amendments barred
federal court jurisdiction over the action. (Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
SENTENCE

Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The
district court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a state
court's determination that the juvenile petitioner's 89–year sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment was
reasonable, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and thus did
not warrant federal habeas relief, despite the juvenile's contention that his consecutive, fixed-term sentences
amounted to the practical equivalent of life without parole. (Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that they deprived him of access to the courts by preventing him from using library resources to prepare
a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey. The court noted that such a
claim for damages would require the prisoner to show that the deprivation of access hindered his efforts to
successfully withdraw his guilty plea, which would necessarily implicate the validity of the prisoner's conviction
that he incurred on account of that guilty plea. The court noted that even if the prisoner was no longer in custody
at the time of his § 1983 suit, he could have pursued federal habeas relief while in custody, but failed to do so.
Under Illinois practice, the prisoner had thirty days to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but for the first
twenty-nine days of this period, he was held at prison facilities that lacked library resources of any kind.
(Sheridan Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
SEGREGATION

Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate petitioned for habeas relief arguing that the
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) illegally referred him to the Special Management Unit (SMU) of a penitentiary
in which he was currently placed, as punishment for filing numerous lawsuits against the BOP. The district court
dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's petition
for habeas relief did not concern the execution of his sentence, and thus the district court did not have subjectmatter jurisdiction over it, since the inmate did not allege that the BOP's conduct was somehow inconsistent with
the command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment; even if the inmate's placement in SMU made him
eligible to lose good time credits, he might not end up losing any. (United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF
ACCESS TO COURTS

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, 892 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2012). In habeas
proceedings challenging aliens' detentions at the U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, four detainees
moved individually to dismiss their habeas petitions without prejudice, conditioned on their continued access to
counsel under the protective order previously created to assure such rights. Counsel for two other detainees, who
were denied access to their counsel following the denial of their habeas petitions, moved for an order affirming
that the protective order continued to apply to them. The district court consolidated the motions and held that the
protective order continued to govern access to counsel issues for all detainees who had a right to petition for
habeas relief. (U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

22.71

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Leslie v. Holder, 865 F.Supp.2d 627 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An alien, a native, and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus contending that his continued detention by United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) for four years without a bond hearing was unconstitutional. The district court denied the
petition. The alien appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the purpose of a bond hearing. The
district court released the alien on bond with conditions. The court held that the alien was entitled to the grant of
bail, pending a final removal order. The court noted that although the alien had prior drug convictions and a
history of drug abuse, all of the convictions were over a decade old, the alien suffered from multiple health
problems, including degenerative spine disease, high blood pressure, and gastro-intestinal ailments, he credibly
asserted that the passage of time and his age of 59 years tempered his conduct, the alien earned his high school
equivalency certificate in prison, he participated in drug treatment and counseling, one immigration judge had
found that the alien had learned his lesson and was not a danger to community, the alien had an extensive and
supportive family in the United States, two family members agreed to serve as custodians for the alien upon his
release, and the habeas claim that he was subjected to unreasonably prolonged detention had substantial merit.
The court imposed bail conditions that the alien not violate any laws while on release, that the alien advise the
District Court and immigration officials before making a change of residence or phone number, that the alien
appear as required for removal proceedings, that the alien be supervised by immigration authorities, and that the
alien be released to the custody of a third-party custodian, the alien's sister-in-law, who was required to certify
that she would ensure the alien's compliance with all bail conditions. (United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELEASE DATE

Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743 (8th Cir, 2012). A former state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against two
Department of Corrections (DOC) officials for his allegedly unconstitutional imprisonment 375 days beyond the
date on which he became eligible for supervised release, purportedly violating his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted the officials summary judgment. The former prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that a state court of appeals' decision, remanding to
the trial court the petitioner's habeas claim seeking immediate release from state prison, was not “favorable
termination,” thus barring his § 1983 claim, since the remand decision did not reverse, expunge, invalidate, or
impugn his incarceration by grant of writ of habeas corpus, but rather directed the Department of Corrections
(DOC) to consider restructuring his release plan and to seek to develop a plan that could lead to his release from
prison by satisfying all conditions of supervised release. (Minnesota Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Mitts v. Zickefoose, 869 F.Supp.2d 568 (D.N.J. 2012). A federal prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, challenging his loss of good conduct time (GCT) credit following a finding that he was guilty of
committing the disciplinary infraction of fighting. The prisoner's claims were screened and his claims relating to
his transfer and loss of privileges were dismissed. The district court held that the prisoner was denied a
meaningful opportunity to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing, warranting federal habeas relief directing
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to provide him with a curative hearing, where the prisoner, having been placed in
solitary confinement, without assistance of a staff representative, was unable to either detect the identities of
inmate witnesses or to determine whether another inmate involved in the altercation confessed to him being
merely the victim of that inmate's violence. (FCI Fort Dix and U.S. Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that denials by
prison officials of his request for a conjugal visit with his wife violated the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment by interfering with his practice of a tenet of
his Islamic faith requiring him to marry, consummate his marriage, and father children. The district court denied
a prison official's motion to dismiss the prisoner's claims as untimely, and the official appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that notwithstanding a prior denial pursuant to the same regulation, denial of the
prisoner's second request for a conjugal visit was a separate, discrete act, triggering running of the statute of
limitations on the prisoner's Section 1983 claim against prison officials for violation of his First Amendment and
RLUIPA rights. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PAROLE
PROGRAMS
SEX OFFENDER

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
after a state court denied habeas relief, alleging that state's decision to deny him parole, unless he admitted his
guilt and participated in sex offender treatment program, violated his Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the parole
condition did not violate the prisoner's right against self incrimination. The court noted that the state had a
legitimate interest in rehabilitating prisoners, the prisoner did not have any right or entitlement to parole under
state law, his sentence was not lengthened, and the actual conditions of his imprisonment had not been altered.
(Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SENTENCE

Sweat v. Grondolsky, 898 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). An inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against a warden, alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had failed to give him credit for time he
served in state custody. The warden moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the BOP was bound by a federal court's express designation that the inmate's federal sentence
should run consecutively to the state sentence, and the inmate's claim that the sentencing judge incorrectly
construed the facts of his case, and therefore misapplied the provisions of a sentencing guideline, had to be
brought in a motion to vacate the sentence before the sentencing court. (Federal Medical Center, Devens,
Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Bout, 860 F.Supp.2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A federal prisoner convicted of multiple conspiracies to kill
United States nationals, kill officers and employees of the United States, acquire, transfer, and use anti-aircraft
missiles, and provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, who had been held in
solitary confinement, moved to be transferred to the general prison population. The motion was construed as a
habeas petition. The district court held that continued solitary confinement violated the prisoner's Eighth

22.72

Amendment rights. According to the court, the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to indefinitely
hold the federal prisoner in solitary confinement was not rationally related to any legitimate penological
objectives and thus violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that although the BOP
argued that the prisoner's release from solitary confinement would pose a high security risk, there was no
evidence that the prisoner had a direct affiliation with any member of a terrorist organization, or that he
personally engaged in violent acts. The court concluded that the prisoner did not present an unusually high risk
of escape or harm to others, any involvement that the prisoner had with the former Liberian dictator, Charles
Taylor, occurred several years ago and was not the basis of his criminal conviction, and the prisoner's release into
the general population would have minimal impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources. (Special
Housing Unit, Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Jones, 869 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). After a defendant, convicted of racketeering and racketeering
conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute marijuana, use of a firearm in furtherance of the distribution conspiracy, and
four instances of small-scale marijuana distribution, but found not guilty of charges relating to a murder, was
sentenced, he filed a motion challenging the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to classify his
security level as “high” and designate him for incarceration at a high-security facility. The district court held that
the remedy for the inmate's alleged misclassification lay primarily with the BOP. The court noted that the
classification and designation of inmates is a matter within BOP’s sole discretion. According to the court,
although a district court has habeas jurisdiction to address the execution of a sentence, it does not have
jurisdiction over a habeas petition challenging the petitioner's classification by the Bureau of Prisons. (United
States Penitentiary, Big Sandy, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD-TIME CREDIT
SENTENCE

Waddell v. Department of Correction, 680 F.3d 384 (4th Cir. 2012). A district court dismissed a prisoner’s
habeas petition as time-barred, and, in the alternative, denied the petition on its merits, and the petitioner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the state corrections department's practice of
applying earned good time credits for certain identified purposes, but not for the purpose of reducing a prisoner's
life sentence did not give rise to a due process protected liberty interest in a life sentence reduced by good time
credits. The court also held that the corrections department's failure to utilize the prisoner's good time credits to
reduce his life sentence under the eighty-year rule did not give rise to an ex post facto claim. (North Carolina
Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF
RELEASE DATE

Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and § 1985 against a county, sheriff, jail, and court official, alleging that the defendants unlawfully
subjected him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a state habeas
corpus petition that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee could not maintain a § 1983 action
challenging the terms of his confinement; (2) the clerk had quasi-judicial immunity from the pretrial detainee's §
1983 claim; (3) the jail was not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; (4) the county could not be liable to the
pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff; and (5) the county could not be liable to the pretrial
detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the county clerk. The court noted that under North Carolina law, the
county had no control over the sheriff's employees and/or control over the jail, and therefore county could not be
liable to the detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff or those of his detention officers for events that
occurred at a jail operated by the sheriff. (Buncombe County Detention Facility, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012). An ex-convict petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to
challenge his state rape conviction after he had fully served his sentence, alleging that the sex offender
registration requirements of Virginia and Texas law imposed sufficiently substantial restraints on his liberty so
as to amount to custody. The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
granted a certificate of appealability (COA). The petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
sex offender registration requirements did not place a sex offender in custody for the purposes of federal habeas
jurisdiction, since they did not constitute physical restraints. According to the court, the requirements did not disincentivize moving by making it more onerous for offender to live in other places because registration and
notification requirements were the same from state to state, and the particularized collateral consequences
stemming from the way that states and individuals have reacted to persons who have been convicted of sex
offenses were same as the collateral consequences generally faced by other persons convicted of felony.
(Virginia)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
HABEAS CORPUS
RELIEF

Biggs v. Secretary of California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 717 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2013). After
California's Governor reversed the parole board's decision finding the petitioner suitable for parole, the petitioner
sought habeas relief, alleging that retroactive application of an interim change to the California Constitution
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The district court denied relief and the petitioner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the federal habeas court did not unreasonably apply
clearly established federal law in determining, without an as-applied analysis of the significance of the risk of
increased punishment, that retroactive application of the interim change to the California Constitution giving the
Governor final say over grants of parole, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Parole Hearing Board)

22.73

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
GOOD-TIME CREDIT

Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2013). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging findings made by Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) that he had possessed weapons in violation of
a prison regulation and sanctioned him with forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit and the imposition of 60
days in disciplinary segregation. The district court dismissed the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the DHO did not violate the federal prisoner's due process rights
when it found that the prisoner had committed the prohibited act of “Possession of a Weapon,” on the basis that
two homemade shanks had been found in a cell that he shared with another prisoner. The court noted that,
although those weapons may have belonged to his cellmate, all prisoners had an affirmative responsibility to
keep their “area” free from contraband and the collective responsibility theory applied. According to the court, a
prisoner serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year had a liberty interest in good time credit that was
protected by Fourteenth Amendment, since he had statutory right to receive credit toward his sentence for good
conduct. But the court noted that on a claim of loss of good time credits through a disciplinary action, though the
“some evidence” standard is a standard of appellate review and not a “burden of proof,” a reviewing court need
only find that a decision by a Disciplinary Hearing Officer (DHO) had “some basis in fact” in order to affirm the
decision as comporting with the Due Process Clause. (Federal Correctional Institution, Fairton, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was
subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking
an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The
district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the statute authorizing
mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was entitled to a
bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County Jail and House of
Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth
County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME

Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief,
challenging a prison disciplinary action resulting in the loss of his “good-time” credit that would extend his
period of incarceration by 30 days. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court held that the prisoner was not required to seek a certificate of appealability (COA) before appealing the
denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court allowed the appeal to go forward. (Plainfield Correctional
Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
SENTENCE

In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2013). Prisoners who were convicted as juveniles applied for leave to file
second or successive habeas petitions based on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on
collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. The appeals court granted the
applications. The court held that prisoners made a prima facie showing that the new constitutional rule regarding
imposition of life sentences on juvenile offenders was retroactive. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS

Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F.Supp.2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An alien, a native of Jamaica, filed a habeas petition
challenging his detention in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pending
final determination of his removal proceedings. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
alien, who was deportable by reason of having committed a statutorily enumerated drug offense, was subject to
the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) mandatory detention provision even though he was not taken into
custody by an ICE until nearly four years after he was released from criminal custody. The court found that the
fifteen-month detention of the alien during removal proceedings, without an individualized bond hearing, was
not unreasonably long in violation of due process, and that the public-safety concern of risk of flight justified
continued detention of the alien. (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
ALIEN
BAIL

Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F.Supp.2d 759 (M.D.Pa. 2013). A detainee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging ICE's determination that he
was subject to mandatory detention and seeking bond hearing. The court held that the detainee was entitled to
bond hearing. According to the court, clear unambiguous language demonstrated that Congress intended to give
the Attorney General the authority of mandatory detention only if the government took an alien immediately
when the alien was released from custody resulting from enumerated offense. (Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2013). After his Texas conviction for possession of a cellular
telephone while an inmate of a correctional facility was affirmed, a prisoner sought federal habeas relief. The
district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that the prison mailbox rule applied to the petitioner's filing of his state postconviction application, and thus the application was deemed to have been filed on the date he turned the
application over to prison authorities to be filed, and not on the date the application was stamped received by the
clerk of the court. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging
prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued
detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an
immigration judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the
statute authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by
reason of having committed certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to

22.74

authorize mandatory detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens
subject to prolonged detention were entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result
from the government's reading of the immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens
subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The
court ruled that the class was comprised of all non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are
or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration detention statutes
pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have not been detained
pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether
their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)
U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
ACCESS TO COURTS

Rosciszewski v. Adducci, 983 F.Supp.2d 910 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A lawful permanent resident (LPR) petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his continued detention in a county jail without a bond hearing, upon the
recent reopening of his deportation case after it lay dormant for 15 years. The district court granted the petition.
The district court held that the District Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the district in
which the alien was being detained was the proper respondent, not the warden of the jail in which the alien was
being held. The court found that the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that required
mandatory detention of a criminal alien during the pendency of removal proceedings did not apply to the alien, a
citizen of Canada and a lawful permanent resident (LPR), who had been taken into immigration custody 15 years
after his deportation case had lay dormant, and, thus, the alien was entitled to an individualized bond hearing
before an immigration judge. (Calhoun County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Straker v. Jones, 986 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An alien, who had been detained by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) under a statute that called for mandatory detention by DHS of any alien who had been
convicted of certain crimes “when the alien is released,” petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ordering the
administrator of a correctional facility to provide the alien with a bond hearing. The district court granted the
petition. The court noted that the detained alien was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, by making
an argument before an Immigration Judge that he had not been “released,” within the meaning of the statute,
before making such argument before the district court on a petition for habeas corpus, since making such an
argument before an Immigration Judge would have been futile, as the Immigration Judge would have been
bound to follow a contrary precedent from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Orange County
Correctional Facility, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
PAROLE
CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED

Bennett v. United States Parole Commission, 41 F.Supp.3d 47 (D.D.C. 2014). A District of Columbia (D.C.)
prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he was denied due process during a parole
revocation proceeding, and that his custody was illegal because the case supporting his parole violation was
dismissed on a finding of no probable cause, and because his sentence had expired. The district court denied the
motion, finding that credit for the time prisoner served while on parole was rescinded upon each parole
revocation. (United States Parole Commission, and D.C. Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME
DISCIPLINE

Grandberry v. Smith, 754 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the revocation of 30 days of his good-time credits upon his conviction of an administrative offense
of possession of an electronic device. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that the revocation of the prisoner's goodtime credits was not supported by some evidence, where there was no evidence that the prisoner used a computer
to download forms and documents that he was not told to by a prison employee. (Putnamville Correctional
Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER

Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging his placement in a security housing unit (SHU). After the writ was issued, the district court ordered
the state to release the inmate from segregated housing conditions, and the state appealed. The appeals court
vacated, reversed, and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion by finding
that the state had violated its order issuing a writ of habeas corpus requiring the state to release the inmate from
the facility's security housing unit (SHU). According to the court, the state subsequently placed the inmate in the
facility's administrative segregation unit (ASU) and then in another facility's SHU. The court noted that the
inmate had been released into federal custody before the order was issued, his placement in ASU after he was
released from federal custody pending evaluation of his gang status was standard procedure, and the inmate was
validated as an active gang member and placed in other SHU. According to the court, the district court
improperly impeded state prison management. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE

Neal v. LaRiva, 765 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014). A federal prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging prison
officials sanctioned him without due process for violating a prison rule forbidding the forging of any document,
article of identification, money, security, or official paper. The district court denied the petitioner's motion to
stay and to compel arbitration, and denied the petition on the merits. The petitioner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that the Bureau of Prisons was not required to arbitrate the prisoner's habeas claim, and the
petitioner's repeated flouting of his duty to be honest with the court warranted a fine and referral to the United
States Attorney for possible prosecution for perjury. The appeals court opened its decision by asserting that the
detainee “…seems unable to resist dishonesty.” (Federal Correctional Institution, Terre Haute, Indiana)

22.75

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
ACCESS TO COURTS
DUE PROCESS

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for
habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action
against, among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of
individuals who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six
months and were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own behalf,
for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings
absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that an individual
assessment is required before a detainee may be shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the
individual assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an
assessment by an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in the detainee's case. The court denied the
motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent
injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety
concerns about his immigration proceedings, including the logistical issues of escorting the detainee through
multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE
to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Massachusetts)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCIPLINE
GOOD TIME

Austin v. Pazera, 779 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, alleging that
a disciplinary proceeding had denied him due process of law, primarily by convicting him on the basis of
insufficient evidence. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed, finding that evidence did not support the disciplinary determination that the inmate was guilty of
attempted trafficking in tobacco. According to the court, the prison disciplinary hearing officer’s finding that the
inmate was guilty was not supported by even “some evidence,” and, thus, the subsequent revocation of his good
time credit and other imposed disciplinary sanctions violated due process. The inmate’s punishment consisted of
losing 60 days of good-time credit which increased his period of imprisonment by 60 days, being demoted from
“credit class 1” to “credit class 2.” Inmates in the first class earn one day of good time credit for each day of
imprisonment, while inmates in the second class earn one day of credit for every two days of imprisonment. The
inmate was also given 20 hours of extra work duty, and denied access to the prison commissary for 25 days.
(Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
SENTENCE

Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2015). After affirmance of a state prisoner’s murder conviction
pursuant to a guilty plea, and his death sentence following a penalty-phase jury trial, the prisoner petitioned for
federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held the prisoner was not prejudiced by being shackled for the first day of jury selection for the penalty
phase. According to the court, even assuming that visible shackling of the defendant violated due process, the
defendant was not prejudiced because the nature of the defendant’s crime was a gruesome and violent murder,
the defendant had agreed, as part of the defense strategy, to show his acceptance of responsibility, and to appear
before the jury in jail clothing for the entire penalty phase, the first impression created by the defendant’s
shackling was partly the point of the defense strategy, and for almost three full weeks the defendant did not
appear in shackles before the jury that issued the death sentence. (Whatcom County, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME
SENTENCE

Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner petitioned for federal habeas relief, challenging
a state statutory amendment modifying the credit-earning status of prison-gang members and associates in
segregated housing, so that such prisoners could no longer earn any good-time credits that would reduce their
sentences. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded with instructions to the district court. The court held that the amendment disadvantaged the offenders
it affected by increasing the punishment for their crimes, an element for an ex post facto violation. The court
noted that even if a prisoner could easily opt out of his prison gang, a prisoner who continued doing what he was
doing before the statute was amended would have his prison time effectively lengthened. (Special Housing Unit,
Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Knighten v. United States Parole Commission, 105 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2015). A parolee sentenced under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) brought an action, construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
challenging the United States Parole Commission’s refusal to terminate his supervision. The district court denied
the motion, finding that the Parole Commission did not have the authority to grant an early termination of the
parolee’s supervision, and that a rational basis in the record supported denial of the parolee’s request for early
termination of parole supervision. (U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
GOOD TIME

Mills v. Holmes, 95 F.Supp.3d 924 (E.D. Va. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various prison employees, alleging violations of this Fourteenth Amendment due process rights in
reducing his good conduct allowance class level. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court converted the inmate’s action into a habeas corpus proceeding and ruled that
the inmate did not have a protected liberty interest under Virginia law in his good conduct allowance earning
level. The court noted that a state law stated that inmates “may be entitled to good conduct allowance,” and
while state regulations provided objective criteria for decision-making, the results were not guaranteed since the
decisions could be rejected in another hearing in which officials had discretion, and any action was subject to
approval by another official. (Deep Meadow Correctional Center, Virginia)

22.76

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). A petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, on behalf of
himself and a class of aliens detained during immigration proceedings for more than six months without a bond
hearing, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief providing individualized bond hearings with the burden on the
government, certification of the class, and appointment of class counsel. The district court denied the petition.
The petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court then granted
summary judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction, and the parties appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the aliens were entitled to automatic individualized
bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention. The court ruled that the government had to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien was a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify
denial of a bond at the hearing. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL
DUE PROCESS

Rodriguez v. Shanahan, 84 F.Supp.3d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). An alien who was subjected to mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, seven years after his criminal detention for narcotics possession, petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, seeking an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention by the
Department of Homeland Security. The district court granted the petition, finding that the alien was entitled to a
bond hearing pending removal proceedings and that his continued detention violated his Fifth Amendment due
process rights. (Department of Homeland Security, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME
DISCIPLINE

Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015). A prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition, seeking relief
on due process grounds for disciplinary sanctions he received for possession of a cellular telephone, which
included revocation of his good time credits. The district court denied the prisoner’s petition and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner was given sufficient notice of the charges against
him, as required by due process. (Federal Correctional Complex at Coleman Medium Prison, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
JUVENILE
SENTENCE

Thompson v. Roy, 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015). A juvenile who was convicted of first degree premeditated
murder and first degree murder while committing a robbery, was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of
mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which the district court denied. The juvenile appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that
while imposition of a sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a juvenile
homicide offender violated the Eighth Amendment, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review.
(Minnesota)

22.77

22.78

XIX

XIX

cleaning items, did not violate the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SINKS
TOILETS
WATER

Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging violation of
his Eighth Amendment rights related to an attack in prison, and inhumane conditions in a disciplinary segregation unit.
The district court dismissed the action and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court
held that the inmate’s allegations stated a claim that conditions were sufficiently serious to form the basis for an Eighth
Amendment violation. The inmate alleged that there was a lack of drinkable water in the prison yard, where
temperatures exceeded one hundred degrees. The inmate also alleged that conditions in disciplinary segregation created
serious health hazards, including toilets that did not work, sinks that were rusted, and stagnant pools of water that were
infested with insects. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Owens v. Sebelius, 357 F.Supp.2d 1281 (D.Kan. 2005). A state prison inmate who had been returned to custody after
violating his parole sued officials, challenging a deduction from his prison trust account for fees incurred for
supervision while he was on parole. The prisoner alleged that the deductions caused him “undue hardships” and
“denied the opportunity to maintain his sanitary hygienic needs” because he was unable to purchase hygiene items. The
district court dismissed the case. The court found that the deduction did not constitute the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment, was not an impermissible ex post facto law, and did not violate the inmate’s equal protection or
due process rights. According to the court, the $25 per month fee was a reasonable reimbursement for the costs of
supervision, such as electronic monitoring equipment, drug screening, and surveillance services. The court noted that
the inmate did not allege that he was denied free basic hygiene supplies. (Winfield Correctional Facility, Kansas).

U.S. Appeals Court
TOILETS
WATER

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county jail and
jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction, deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings,
and subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the
district court denied judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held conditions of confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient, where the detainee was
placed in around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a five-minute shower break every third day, all hygiene
items were withheld from him, he could only access water--including water to flush his toilet--at the discretion of
individual officers, and was subjected daily to multiple strip searches that required him to place his unwashed hands
into his mouth. (Hillsborough County Jail, New Hampshire)
2006

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS
TOILETS

J.P. v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793 (S.D.Ohio 2006). A former juvenile corrections facility inmate sued the facility and
individuals, claiming the lack of access to courts to pursue a claim of injury from being assaulted by an officer, and
claims of substandard accommodations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the inmate had standing to bring a claim that the facility interfered with his access to courts by not
making adequate efforts to provide attorneys, and that the inmate stated a claim that the facility interfered with his right
of access to court, by not providing an attorney to pursue a legitimate claim that officers unconstitutionally restricted
his bathroom privileges. According to the court, the inmate did not state a claim that conditions of confinement violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment when he alleged that showers were cold, worms were coming in through a
drain, and his personal hygiene materials had been lost during a move from one cell to another. The court found that
these problems were insufficiently serious. The court held that the inmate stated claim that conditions of confinement
violated his rights under Eighth Amendment, when he alleged that officers frequently denied inmates the opportunity to
use a rest room, as a disciplinary measure, forcing them to urinate into objects including latex gloves. (Ohio
Department of Youth Services, Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2006). A female inmate brought claims against correctional officers,
supervisors, and a county alleging that her constitutional rights were violated by the alleged use of excessive force. The
district court entered summary judgment on the claims and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) genuine issues of fact precluded summary judgment on the
claim that officers used excessive force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; (2) the supervisor’s
actions in allegedly using a racial epithet against another inmate and in allegedly removing feminine hygiene products
from the cell was not cruel and unusual punishment; and (3) the purported violation of county policies that were not
alleged to be unconstitutional provided no basis for civil rights liability for the county. (Jasper County Detention
Center)
2007

U.S. District Court
BEDDING

XXI

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia Department
of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private contractor, brought a §
1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent supervision under District of
Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh living conditions in jail, and
extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and
denied in part. According to the court, the alleged conditions from overcrowding at a District of Columbia jail-showers infested with bacteria, standing water, various diseases and hundreds of unsanitary and defective mattresses,
some of which contained roaches and other insects, did not constitute the deprivation of basic human needs, as required
for jail overcrowding to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that the detainee's allegations that
due to lack of heating and ventilation at the jail he suffered from temperatures ranging from 30 to 40 degrees during the
winter, that he was not provided with sufficient blankets for cold jail cells, and that such actions were taken with
deliberate indifference to his needs and pursuant to policy of Department of Corrections (DOC) were sufficient to state

23.19

a claim under § 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment through deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The
court noted that warmth is a basic human need, the deprivation of which can amount to a violation of Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional
Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)
U.S. District Court
SINKS
WATER

Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). A pre-trial detainee brought a pro se, in forma pauperis action
against prison officials, alleging improper conditions of confinement, negligent medical treatment, invasion of privacy,
and excessive force. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the alleged conditions of the detainee's
confinement, including being required to sleep on the floor of an overcrowded holding tank, being deprived of a
mattress, and being provided with water only in a dirty sink, if proven, did not violate his Eighth Amendment or due
process rights, given that he experienced such conditions for only ten days, and that use of sink did not cause him to
suffer disease or other serious harm. (River Parish Correction Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS
ISOLATION
CLOTHING

Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and jail administrator, alleging that he was subjected to punitive, degrading and inhumane treatment when, without
explanation, he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet in an isolation cell, and, on another occasion, shackled to his
cot. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that although
the detainee's complaint against the sheriff and jail administrator did not allege that he was subjected to mistreatment
pursuant to any specific official policy, the detainee's allegations that the sheriff promulgated all policies and
procedures in the county jail, that the detainee was placed in an isolation cell and shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet,
which was nothing more than a hole in the ground covered by a grate, and that the sheriff ordered the detainee removed
from this cell for an interview and then reshackled to the toilet grate, were sufficiently specific to state a § 1983 claim
against the sheriff under the theory of supervisory liability. The detainee alleged that without explanation, he was
moved into a ‘lockdown’ cell for one day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot and his right leg
was shackled to the other end of the cot's frame. Again without explanation, he was allegedly then moved to an
isolation cell, where he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is actually nothing more than a hole in the
ground. He alleged that he was held in this configuration for almost 12 days and was not released to allow urination or
defecation, which caused him to soil himself, and that he was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry
clothing, personal hygiene items, or bedding. (Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging his rights were
violated by the denial of access to free hygiene items. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court held that the prison’s failure to timely respond to the prisoner’s Step Three grievance regarding
access to hygiene products established that the prisoner exhausted his available administrative remedies, as required by
PLRA. A Step 3 grievance requires the prison to respond within 45 days. 196 days after he filed his Step 3 grievance he
still had not received a response and then filed suit. The court held that the prisoner’s elaboration on the way the
prison’s policies caused him to suffer dental problems satisfied his obligation to state an injury to support his Eighth
Amendment claim but did not equate to a delay in dental treatment claim. The prisoner contended that he was unable to
pay for hygiene items out of his prison income after the prison debits his prison account to pay for restitution, medical
care, legal photocopies, and legal postage. (Colorado Department of Corrections)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983, challenging conditions of
their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and the detainees appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand the district court
granted the defendants’ renewed motions for summary judgment and the detainees again appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that triple-celling of the pretrial detainees was rationally related to prison officials' legitimate
governmental interest in trying to manage overcrowding conditions at the prison, for the purposes of the detainees'
claim that triple-celling violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process right. The court found that requiring the
detainees to sleep on a mattress on the floor of their cells for a period of three to seven months did not violate the
detainees' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The court noted that although many pretrial detainees did spend a
substantial amount of time on floor mattresses, they also had access to 3,900 square foot dayrooms, there was no
evidence that the use of the floor mattresses resulted in disease or the splashing of human waste upon the detainees, and
over $2.8 million dollars had been spent on capital improvements during the past five years to maintain or elevate the
living conditions for prisoners. The court noted that even if the detainees' due process constitutional rights were
violated by requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear so that a reasonable
official would understand that what he was doing violated a constitutional right, entitling the prison officials to
qualified immunity in the detainees' suit under § 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement. (Multi-Purpose
Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, CA, 538 F.Supp.2d 1254 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A civilly committed sexually violent
predator (SVP) brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and county claiming numerous violations of his
constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in
part. The court held that the SVP stated a civil rights due process claim against the county and a civil rights due process
claim against the sheriff and county regarding conditions of his confinement at the jail. The SVP alleged that policies
regarding conditions of confinement and denial of medical care injured him, and that the sheriff did not properly train
his subordinate employees to prevent those injuries. The SVP alleged that the defendants did not provide prescribed
medications and that a holding cell was cold and did not have a mattress, hygiene supplies, or bed roll. (West Valley
Detention Center, San Bernardino County, California)

XXI

23.20

U.S. District Court
SHOWERS
SINKS

Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court held that a temporary shower policy of escorting prisoners from their cells to the shower room and back
wearing only boxer shorts and shower shoes, which was adopted by the prison due to security concerns, created at most
an inconvenience, but not a significant interference with the Islamic religious clothing requirement. The clothing
requirement directs Muslim men to exercise modesty by covering their “awrah,” which is a portion of the body from
the navel to the knee, from others' gaze. The court found that the policy did not violate RLUIPA, since Muslims did not
have to shower every day to practice their religion and the prisoner could have cleansed himself in his cell sink. The
court also found that the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest in maintaining prison safety
and security. The court held that the rights of the Muslim prisoner under RLUIPA to practice his religion of Islam had
not been subjected to a substantial burden by the policy that limited the prisoner to the possession of no more than 12
ounces of scented oil in his cell, and limited him to buying no more than 8 ounces of scented oil per purchase order.
According to the court, the rule had been drafted after consultation with a Muslim imam and permitted prisoners to be
in the possession of religious prayer oil that served their religious purposes for many weeks, if not many months.
(Ironwood State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a §
1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and statutory
rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court rejected the detainees'
claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held
that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading materials, mattresses and beds, law books, population caps, sleep,
blankets, dayroom access (not less than two hours each day), telephone access and communication with jailhouse
lawyers were not necessary to correct current ongoing violations of the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. The
court affirmed termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court erred in its finding that two
orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS
TOILETS

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a §
1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and statutory
rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court rejected the detainees'
claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held
that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses and beds, law books, population caps,
sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to current the current
and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. The court found that the county failed to reasonably
accommodate mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The county did not offer any legitimate rationale for maintaining inaccessible bathrooms,
sinks, showers, and other fixtures in the housing areas and common spaces assigned to mobility and dexterity impaired
detainees, and the county offered no explanation or justification for the significant differences between the vocational
and recreational activities available to non-disabled and disabled detainees. (Orange County Jail System, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING

Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008). A state inmate filed a civil rights suit against a prison official and a
correctional officer alleging violation of his due process rights in placing him in administrative segregation for 59 days,
and violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment due to unsanitary conditions in
segregation. The district court granted the official's motion for partial summary judgment. The court later denied the
inmate's motion to amend to add a warden as a defendant and entered summary judgment for the prison official and
correctional officer. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court
found that the inmate's sleeping on a moldy and wet mattress involved a sufficiently serious prison condition to deny a
civilized measure of life's necessities, as required for an Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that summary
judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer knew about the condition of the inmate's wet and moldy mattress. (New Lisbon
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
TOILETS

Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d 431 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
correction officers and a superintendent, alleging that the defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment
and denied him equal protection of the law, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district
court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the prisoner's rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments were not violated by a soiled mattress, the plexiglass shield over the front of his cell,
another inmate's overflowed toilet, the use of a single slot to pass objects through a cell door, the denial of his preferred
cleaning materials when other suitable materials were made available to him, or a single two-week period during which
the plaintiff's cell was not cleaned. The court noted that the prisoner's complaints related principally to his personal
preferences as to the cleanliness of his cell. Prison officials did not display deliberate indifference to the prisoner's
complaints, but instead responded quickly and appropriately, in that the prisoner received a new mattress within two
days of his request, and he was moved to a new cell without a plexiglass cover within five days of his complaint.
(Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
TOILET PAPER

Zavala v. Barnik, 545 F.Supp.2d 1051 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed a civil rights complaint in state court
alleging that a prison official threw a roll of toilet paper at him, spit on him, and yelled profanities at him. After
removal to federal court the official moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
profanities allegedly directed by the prison official to the inmate did not evidence racial or discriminatory animus,
where the official only referred to “you people.” The court held that the inmate's alleged deprivation of toilet paper by
the official did not rise to the level of an unquestioned and serious deprivation of a basic human need necessary to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation, where the incident involved a de minimis, apparently brief, one-time

XXIII

23.21

deprivation. The court found that the official did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights by hitting the
inmate on the leg with a toilet paper roll on one occasion, absent a showing of any physical injury. (Ironwood State
Prison, California)
2009
U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
HYGIENE ITEMS

Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.Supp.2d 977 (E.D.Wis. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility
officials, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The court held that the correctional facility's enforcement of a
behavior action plan that regularly denied the inmate a sleeping mattress, occasionally required him to wear only a
segregation smock or paper gown, and subjected him to frequent restraint did not deny the inmate the minimal civilized
measure of life's necessities and was targeted at his misconduct, and thus the plan did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate's cell was heated to 73 degrees, he was generally provided some
form of dress, he was granted access to hygiene items, and he was only denied a mattress and other possessions after he
used them to perpetrate self-abusive behavior, covered his cell with excrement and blood, and injured facility staff.
(Green Bay Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS
TOILET PAPER

Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a pro se action against
department of corrections employees, alleging violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well
as the New York Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied in
part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether a
corrections officer was present during, and participated in, the alleged assault of the prisoner. The court held that the
denial of access to toilet paper and soap during the prisoner's confinement in a special housing unit did not constitute an
unconstitutional condition of confinement, as required for the prisoner's inadequate prison conditions claim against
corrections officers under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the deprivation of toilet paper and soap was not
continuous, there was no evidence that the prisoner was deprived of any other toiletry items, and there was no evidence
that the prisoner requested toilet paper during medical visits. (Gouverneur Correctional Facility, Clinton Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ISOLATION
SHOWERS

Gray v. Hernandez, 651 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, seeking damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief, against an acting warden, captain, and two employees in a prison library. The
prisoner alleged he was placed in administrative segregation pending the investigation of rule violation charges filed by
the two employees, accusing him of attempting to extort money from them by offering to settle his potential suit
against them. The district court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a chilling of his First Amendment right to file
grievances and pursue civil rights litigation by alleging that his placement in administrative segregation caused him
mental and financial harms. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that his placement in administrative
segregation forced him to endure 24-hour lock-down, lack of medical treatment, only one shower every three days, and
lack of exercise did not constitute an allegation of a dramatic departure from the standard conditions of confinement, as
would invoke procedural due process protections. The court noted that an inmate does not have a liberty interest, for
purposes of procedural due process, in being housed at a particular institution or in avoiding isolation or separation
from the general prison population, unless the proposed transfer will subject the inmate to exceptionally more onerous
living conditions, such as those experienced by inmates at a “Supermax” facility. (Mule Creek State Prison, High
Desert State Prison, Donovan State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
HAIR
SHOWERS

Greene v. Furman, 610 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of disciplinary proceedings instituted after he
allegedly spit at another inmate. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that an allegation that a
corrections officer issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate failed to state a claim for a due process
violation. The court noted that the issuance of false misbehavior reports against an inmate by corrections officers is
insufficient on its own to establish a denial of due process. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was denied
exercise, showers and haircuts after he became involved in an altercation with another inmate failed to state a claim for
an Eighth Amendment violation based on his conditions of confinement, where the deprivations alleged were not
atypical, did not result in any physical injury, and did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Southport
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
RODENTS/PESTS
WATER

Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a detention
center and its personnel alleging several violations. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether detention center personnel failed to protect the prisoner from an attack by another prisoner. The court held
that a substantial risk of harm to the prisoner's health or safety did not result from the prisoner's detention, where,
among other things, a professional exterminator routinely sprayed the facility for rodents and bugs, exposed wires from
ceiling light fixtures that had been pulled down by inmates were not hazardous or were not located in cells where the
prisoner had been confined, the ventilation system was operational and only temporarily malfunctioned when inmates
put paper and other materials in vents, fresh water was located in coolers in pods and was brought to the prisoner's cell
several times per day, and the prisoner had been provided with a concrete sleeping slab and extra blankets. (Crittenden
County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
SHOWERS

Malles v. Lehigh County, 639 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A prisoner, who allegedly contracted Methicillin
Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) while incarcerated at a county prison, brought an action under § 1983
against the county prison and the prison medical provider, alleging that the defendants unconstitutionally failed to
provide him timely, adequate medical care and to protect him from getting infected, and that the provider was negligent
under state law. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
alleged failure of the county prison and the company which contracted with the county to provide medical services to

XXIII

23.22

inmates at the prison to quarantine inmates infected with MRSA, to properly clean and maintain shower facilities, to
warn inmates about MRSA and educate them about prevention, and generally to take more precautions against the
spread of MRSA did not deprive the prisoner who allegedly contracted MRSA at the prison of life's necessities
according to contemporary standard of decency, as would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under Eighth
Amendment. According to the court, the county prison and company which contracted with the county to provide
medical services to inmates were not deliberately indifferent to the risk that the prisoner would contract MRSA in
prison, as would violate the Eighth Amendment, where the prison and company engaged in some efforts to stop the
spread of MRSA, even if they did not do everything they could or planned to do. (Lehigh County, Penn., and
PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)
U.S. District Court
SHOWERS

Schaub v. County of Olmsted, 656 F.Supp.2d 990 (D.Minn. 2009). An inmate at a county detention center brought an
action against a county, detention center, center director, probation officer, and several unnamed defendants, alleging
that he was injured as result of failure to accommodate his medical condition of paraplegia. The district court denied
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether members of county detention center staff were deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's serious medical needs arising from paraplegia; (2) whether failure to oversee nursing staff at the detention
center was the “moving force” behind the delay in treating the inmate's wounds and pressure sores on his return to the
county detention center; (3) whether the county detention center's unwritten policy barring medical care to work-release
inmates was the “moving force” behind the inmate's injuries during his first two months in the center; and (4) whether
the county detention center's modifications in permitting the inmate to attend to his hygiene at home, or rely on nursing
staff to bathe him, were reasonable, and whether the inmate was excluded from appropriate medical care because of his
disability. (Olmsted County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
TOILETS

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility
filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
According to the court, the inability of disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility to access restrooms throughout a state prison rose to the level of an objective violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoners soiled themselves up to several times per week. The court noted that the sheer frequency with which those incidents occurred, not to mention the physical injuries that at least some prisoners had suffered in attempting to use an
inaccessible restroom, indicated that the prisoners had been denied a minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or
there was an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their future health. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison and its employees were deliberately indifferent to
the prisoners' restroom needs. (New York State Depy. of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR

Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009). A South Carolina prisoner brought an action alleging that a prison
grooming policy violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The South Carolina
Department of Corrections moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prison's policy
requiring maximum security inmates to wear closely cropped hair, and which allowed for implementation of that policy
through physical force, imposed a substantial burden on the inmate's religious practice within the meaning of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the policy compelled an inmate to modify his
behavior in violation of his genuinely held religious beliefs. According to the court, an affidavit offered by the
Department of Corrections in support of summary judgment did not demonstrate that the prison policy of forcibly
shaving the heads of maximum security unit prisoners who wore long hair as a matter of religious belief furthered a
compelling governmental interest in space utilization, hygiene, or security by the least restrictive means under
RLUIPA. The court noted that the affidavit dealt solely with the grooming policy applied to special management unit
prisoners, and the Department failed to explain how the rationale offered for not accommodating special management
unit prisoners applied to maximum security unit prisoners. (South Carolina Department of Corrections, Maximum
Security Unit at Kirkland Correctional Institution)
2010

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS
TOILET PAPER

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were
factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by depriving
him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in segregation/isolation, leading to a mental
health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health professionals eight times over a five year period instead
of every 90 days as required by administrative regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue
art and music for his mental health but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions
resulted in the need to take anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression,
extreme depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and
systematic dehumanization. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to state a colorable § 1983
claim that he was deprived of personal hygienic items and sanitary conditions in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where the prisoner alleged he was regularly deprived of toilet paper and soap, that he was only allowed to shower twice
a week, that he was made to strip in dirty showers full of filth and insects, that the unit in which he resided was littered
with food and urine and contained open sewers, and that he suffered illness as a result.
(High Desert State Prison, Nevada)

23.23

U.S. District Court
SHAVING

Braithwaite v. Hinkle, 752 F.Supp.2d 692 (E.D.Va. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a prison officer, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and his Eighth
Amendment right to reasonable medical care. Following dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, the officer filed a
motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison policy requiring
prisoners to shave unless exempted for medical reasons did not violate the Sunni Muslim prisoner's First Amendment
right to free exercise of religion, where the policy promoted the prison's strong interests in safety, sanitation and
identification of inmates. The court noted that the inmate had other methods to practice his religion, and the policy did
not allow forcible shaving of inmates. (Greensville Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
TOOTHPASTE

Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's deprivation of
dental care was not temporary, as required for his Eighth Amendment claim, where the inmate was denied toothpaste
for 337 days. According to the court, the prisoner's deprivation of toothpaste by the prison caused him physical injury,
as required for his Eighth Amendment claim, where the inmate was diagnosed with periodontal disease of the gums and
one tooth was extracted. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that he was denied toothpaste for 337 days, that
he filed various grievances about the deprivation, and that he was diagnosed with periodontal disease of the gums and
one tooth was extracted as a result of the deprivation, were sufficient to plead that prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his hygiene needs, as required for his Eighth Amendment claims. (Newberry Correctional Facility,
Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official intentionally confiscated and destroyed letters sent to
him by persons outside the prison “under the guise” of sticker and perfume violations, for the purpose of harassing him,
were sufficient to plead violations of his First Amendment speech rights. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations that a prison official returned to him outgoing letters that had “appropriate postage affixed without reason” for
failure to mail them, were sufficient to plead a violation of the prisoner's First Amendment speech rights. The court
found an alleged First Amendment speech rights violation with the prisoner's allegations that he was given a letter from
his sister and that it was confiscated from him due to his incommunicado status, but that it was never returned to him.
The court held that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials confiscated canteen items, deprived him of hygiene
items for 25 hours and incarcerated him for four weeks in an isolation cell with limited outdoor recreation and lack of
access to hygiene items, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Wyoming
State Penitentiary)
2011

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS

Solomon v. Nassau County, 759 F.Supp.2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, jail, sheriff, and undersheriff, alleging that his civil rights were violated when he was bitten by a rodent in his
jail cell. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that because the sheriff and undersheriff were not “personally involved” in any alleged failure to
maintain a safe prison environment, they were not subject to § 1983 liability for the injury to the pretrial detainee who
was bitten by a rodent in his jail cell. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the pretrial detainee was exposed to a substantial risk of contracting rabies or another
dangerous disease from a rodent bite, and whether the county was aware of the substantial risk of serious harm.
According to the court, although protection of inmates from harmful chemicals and the need to prevent inmates from
using poisons, glue traps, or door sweeps as weapons were legitimate penological interests that supported the
reasonableness of the jail's pest control plan, a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the county was adequately
complying with the plan, and whether the lack of compliance could have resulted in the alleged substantial risk of
harm. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
2012

U.S. District Court
BEDDING

Bell v. Luna, 856 F.Supp.2d 388 (D.Conn. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials and a
prison doctor, alleging that the defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and showed
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
state prison doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health in failing to take sufficient measures to treat
the inmate’s joint and back pain, or in failing to prescribe the inmate with an analgesic cream, as would violate the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that forcing the inmate to go nearly seven months with a torn,
partially unstuffed, unhygienic mattress was a condition of confinement sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that a unit manager “willfully, wantonly, and maliciously
disregarded” the inmate's repeated requests for an adequate and hygienic mattress stated a claim under § 1983 against
the manager for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the unit
manager was not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim where the law of the Second Circuit
would have put the manager on notice at the time of the alleged violation that failing to provide the inmate with an
hygienic, working mattress for over half a year ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment. (MacDougall–Walker Correctional
Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983 action against
various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to not be continually restrained without clothing or

23.24

cover in a cell for five days following his ingestion of a handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and the key
used for opening cell doors, where restraint had been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those keys; (2) the
continuous restraint of the prisoner without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights; (3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims were barred; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was
competent to advance his case and was not entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS
TOILETS

Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012). A former inmate sued the Illinois Department of
Corrections, its Director, and several employees claiming violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim, and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that the inmate’s allegations that his use of the toilets and showers at the prison was made more difficult by
the absence of grab bars did not state an Eighth Amendment claim, where the inmate was able to shower four times a
month. He also missed meals on occasion because he could not walk fast enough to the cafeteria. The court found that
the prisoner pleaded a plausible claim for failure to make reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act
where he alleged that the Department of Corrections refused to accommodate his disability, and consequently kept him
from accessing meals and showers on the same basis as other inmates. (Vandalia Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's death
while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other things that
jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting deliberate
indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary judgment against the
estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the judge in the first suit had
dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court dismissed that case on the basis of
collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his
conditions of confinement were sufficiently serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court
noted that whether the detainee himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given
detainee's mental condition, it did not foreclose the claim. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a
substantial risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support the
pretrial detainee's claim of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The court noted that while jail personnel
were aware that the detainee had a hygiene problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of assault because of that
problem, particularly within the more secure confines of the administrative segregation unit. The court found that
neither jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might
engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die within a matter of hours and did
not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his death under § 1983. According to the
court, while a factfinder might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness with respect to the safety
of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by failing to conduct hourly checks of the unit, there was
no evidence that the guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the possibility that the detainee might injure
himself to the point of death before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
SHOWERS
TOILETS

Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F.Supp.2d 1039 (N.D.Cal. 2012). A detainee at a county jail who had limited
mobility and deformed hands as a result of systemic lupus and rheumatoid arthritis brought an action against the
contractor that provided medical care assessment services for detainees, and its employees, alleging violations of Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the California Disabled Persons Act (CDPA), and the California
Unruh Civil Rights Act. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that: (1) the private contractor was not liable as a public entity or instrumentality under the ADA;
(2) the contractor qualified as a “business establishment,” under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (3) the
complaint properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal accommodations, as required to state a claim under the
California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (4) the allegations were insufficient to assert intentional discrimination, as required
to state a claim against the contractor for violation of the California Unruh Civil Rights Act; (5) the CDPA applied to
county jails and the accommodations and services provided therein; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against
contractor under the CDPA. The jail inmate who had limited mobility and deformed hands alleged that she was unable
to use the toilet in the jail as needed, causing her injuries, and that she was deprived of access to jail's facilities, beds,
showers, walkways, and benches. According to the court, this properly asserted a deprivation of full and equal
accommodations, as required to state a claim against the private contractor that contracted with county to provide
medical care assessment services for the county jail. (County of Alameda, California)
2013

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
RODENTS/PESTS

Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims against
various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who allegedly were responsible for the conditions
of the inmate's confinement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion, finding that the
inmate adequately pled that Illinois prison officials were deliberately indifferent, as required to state a § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim. According to the court, the inmate alleged that he repeatedly advised the official about the prison's
detrimental living conditions and that the official did not make an effort to remedy the conditions, that he informed
another official about the intolerable living conditions and that this official did not make an effort to remedy the
conditions, and that he discussed the intolerable living conditions with other officials, each of whom also failed to
make any efforts to remedy the living conditions. The inmate claimed that he was subjected to unsanitary conditions, a
lack of ventilation, and continuous lighting that interfered with his sleep. He also alleged that his housing area had
dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell and a strong odor of ammonia from his uncleaned toilet, that there was pest

23.25

infestation accompanied by filth and feces, and that there was a complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even
garbage bags. He also cited filthy soiled bedding, missing or dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged cell
furniture and fixtures, and badly peeling toxic paint. The inmate suffered from endocarditis, an infection of the lining of
the heart, which he claimed was due to the conditions of his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost
constant, fungal infections” stemmed. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
HOUSEKEEPING
SHOWERS
TOILETS

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that, as a pretrial detainee,
he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail and that the sheriff was deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to
state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause for subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement.
The prisoner alleged that: (1) on one occasion he was confined with eight inmates in a portion of the county jail
intended for three; (2) he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken windows and cracked toilets; (3) on another
occasion he and other inmates had to sleep on the floor even though shower water leaked there; (4) cells had broken
windows, exposed wiring, extensive rust, sinks without running water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs, and a
broken heating and cooling system; (5) inmates were denied any recreation; and (6) the jail furnished inmates with no
supplies to clean for themselves. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BEDDING
TOILETS

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility brought a
pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided food and sanitation
services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional torts related to his pretrial
detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in
part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim
against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference with legal mail claim against a correctional officer
that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First
Amendment retaliation claim based on interference with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to
whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the
provider denied such treatment because it was too costly. The detainee asserted that overcrowding at the county
detention facility, which allegedly led to the detainee being forced to sleep and eat his meals next to open toilet, and led
to inmate-on-inmate violence, contributed to his assault by another inmate. According to the court, the long-standing
conditions of confinement whereby the county detention facility was overcrowded for at least 24 years and facility
officials “triple-celled” inmates, allegedly leading to unsanitary conditions, amounted to a “custom” for the purposes of
the former detainee's § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his
official capacity. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING

Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county jail and
various jail officers, asserting claims for denial of due process and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
condition. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's five days on suicide watch were neither long enough
nor harsh enough to deprive him of a due-process-protected liberty interest, where: (1) the only changes to the inmate's
meals were that trays upon which food was served were disposable foam rather than plastic; (2) eating utensils were
quickly removed after each meal; (3) the inmate was not denied bedding but was given a mattress and a blanket; (4) the
inmate was denied writing materials for only the first 48 hours; and (5) rather than being prohibited human contact,
deputies were assigned to closely and personally monitor the inmate to ensure his safety. The court found that jail
officers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's allergic reaction to suicide garments in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that after the inmate told an officer about his allergic reaction to a suicide gown, the
officer called a nurse who immediately examined the inmate and gave him cream and medication, and the officers
appropriately deferred to the nurse's medical decision that the inmate did not need different garments because there was
no sign of rash or bumps on the inmate. (Racine County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
HOUSEKEEPING
TOILETS

Florio v. Canty, 954 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action against a
warden and a corrections officer, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner's exposure to human waste on two occasions, for a
total of less than a few hours, did not give rise to a serious risk of substantial harm. The prisoner alleged that prison
officials waited 10 to 30 minutes after two separate incidents of a toilet overflowing to release the prisoner from his cell
and having the prisoner clean the cell with inadequate cleaning gear and without training, allegedly resulting in the
prisoner developing a foot fungus. The court held that this was not deliberate indifference to a substantial risk to his
health and safety, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that officials acted to alleviate the
unsanitary conditions, the overflow also occurred in approximately 20 other cells, and the prisoner was not prevented
from bathing or washing his clothes after the incidents. (Anna M. Kross Center, Rikers Island, New York City
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
HOT WATER

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). A civilly-committed resident at a special treatment unit (STU)
operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) brought action an against NJDOC officials, alleging
violations of his substantive due process rights under § 1983. The district court held that the resident's claims against
the officials in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court held that the resident's allegations
adequately pled the officials’ personal involvement in his complaint that: (1) there were visibly leaking steam pipes in a
special treatment unit (STU) for which trash cans were used to collect water; (2) NJDOC officials personally toured
STU; (3) STU received numerous written complaints from residents about inadequate hot water; and (4) an STU
assistant administrator told the resident that defective piping valves were too expensive to repair. The court found that
the officials were subject to liability under § 1983 in their individual capacities. The court held that NJDOC officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from the civilly committed resident's § 1983 conditions of civil commitment

23.26

claim under the Due Process Clause, arising from inadequate hot water at a special treatment unit (STU) in which he
was housed. (Special Treatment Unit, Avenel, Middlesex County, New Jersey)
U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner who had spent six months in segregation as
punishment for a disciplinary misconduct charge which was later expunged, filed a § 1983 action, alleging that the
segregation violated his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's placement in disciplinary
segregation in a cell with a solid metal door and a confrontational cell mate for 182 days, with only weekly access to
the shower and the recreation yard, did not amount to atypical and significant hardships, as required to establish a
deprivation of the prisoner's due process liberty interests, where the prisoner was not deprived of all human contact or
sensory stimuli. The court found that the state prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their conduct in
placing the prisoner in disciplinary segregation, as the disciplinary segregation did not violate any clearly established
right. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
HAIR

Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). Native American inmates brought an action against the Alabama
Department of Corrections, challenging its short-hair policy under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment for the Department and the inmates appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that the Department’s short-hair policy for male inmates furthered compelling
governmental interests in security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, as required to survive a challenge under RLUIPA by
inmates who wished to wear their hair long in accordance with dictates of their Native American religion. The court
noted that long hair was used to conceal weapons and contraband, it concealed inmates' fungus outbreaks, sores, cysts,
and tumors, and it impeded the ability of prison staff to identify inmates. According to the court, allowing an exception
for Native American inmates would not eliminate the Department's concerns, as inmates could manipulate searches of
their own hair to conceal weapons, and it would do nothing to assuage the Department's concerns about hair-pulling
during fights. The court held that the Department’s short-hair policy, which applied to all male inmates without
exception, did not discriminate on the basis of race or religion in violation of the Native American inmates' equal
protection rights. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal detainee who
was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's department and county
officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations that the county officials developed, supervised,
and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that grievances were received in the proper manner and were
properly responded to, and were aware of his serious medical needs and his grievances, yet turned a blind eye to the
situation, were sufficient to state a claim against the officials in their individual capacities in his civil rights action
alleging he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county
jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple disabilities that he sustained in an auto accident, including weakness and
numbness in his left side and he partially dragged his left leg. He also had incontinence with urine and bowel
movements and required the use of adult diapers. He was unable to stand still without assistance, which made
showering and using the toilet difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his obvious disabilities and medical issues, he
was assigned to a regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a top bunk. He had to hop on one leg to go up or
down the stairs and needed assistance from other inmates to get into and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given
adult diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then, he was not given an adequate supply of diapers and would
sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in clothes with urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not given
enough biohazard bags, and the soiled diapers and bags piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no one to assist
the detainee, he fell while attempting to get out of his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone came to help him.
As a result, his left leg worsened and his right leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was forced to crawl down
stairs on his buttocks, and scoot along the floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and unhealthy
conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large facility, were
sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual capacity. According to the
court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to any correctional officer working in the
area in which the inmate was housed. The court held that the detainee's allegations that correctional staff at the county
jail acted pursuant to an official policy or custom not to perform a medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues
or complaints about problems with walking if they were ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary
hygiene items such as adult diapers to inmates, among other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy or
custom was a “moving force” in the alleged violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity claims under
Monell. The court held that the detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on the basis of his
disabilities while he was housed at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory intent, as required to state an
ADA claim against the county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS
TOILET PAPER

Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and
county detention center personnel. The district court granted the defendants qualified immunity in part, but denied it as
to the detainee's claim that the defendants' refusal to give him adequate toilet paper violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that detention
center personnel did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights by providing him with only one roll of
toilet paper per week, even the detainee used his weekly allotment before the week's end each week. When this
happened, the detainee had to shower to clean himself following a bowel movement. The court noted that although the
detainee exhausted his toilet paper supply each week before receiving an additional roll the following week, he was not
always without toilet paper, and when he did run out of toilet paper, he was able to clean himself by taking a shower.
(Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

23.27

U.S. Appeals Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). An Illinois prisoner serving a life sentence brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging that the prisoner and other inmates classified as low-aggression offenders in the
prisoner's cellhouse were subject to lockdowns for more than 50 percent of the days in a 33-month period. The district
court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage for prisoner civil actions and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative
remedies. The court found that frequent unit-wide prison lockdowns for substantial periods of time deprived him of
exercise and caused him various health issues, such as irritable bowel syndrome, severe stress, headaches, and tinnitus,
stated a claim for an Eighth Amendment violation. According to the court, the prisoner sufficiently alleged prison
officials' deliberate indifference to physical and psychological injuries, as required to state a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation, based on excessive prison lockdowns. The court noted that the prisoner alleged that he had filed
multiple grievances about prison conditions, including a grievance specifically challenging small cells, and that the
prison was the subject of numerous past lawsuits, including one specifically ordering a remedial plan for overcrowding,
small cells, and lack of adequate medical care and hygiene. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BEDDING
HOUSEKEEPING

Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action against a warden and various other prison officials and employees, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that he was
deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was subjected to unreasonable health and safety
risks, as required to state a § 1983 claims against prison officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner
alleged that: (1) for approximately 28 months he was confined in a cell with five other men with inadequate space and
ventilation; (2) the heat was stifling in the summer and it was freezing in the winter; (3) urine and feces splattered the
floor; (4) there were insufficient cleaning supplies; (5) the mattress was too narrow for him to lie on flat; and (6) noisy
and crowded conditions made sleep difficult and created a constant risk of violence. The court also found that the
prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead that prison officials knew of and disregarded excessive risks to his health
and safety, as required to find that the officials were deliberately indifferent. The prisoner alleged that officials knew of
overcrowding in his cell, that he spoke with some officials about the conditions, that officials were aware noise was
loud and constant, that they were aware of temperature issues, that the prisoner informed officials that his bed was too
narrow, that one official failed to issue cleaning supplies, and that conditions did not change despite his complaints.
(Federal Correctional Institution, Ray Brook, New York)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS

Williams v. Erickson, 962 F.Supp.2d 1038 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action alleging that a prison
nurse's refusal to open the seal on a new colostomy bag so that he could change the bag violated the Eighth
Amendment and Illinois law. The defendants moved to dismiss, and the district court denied the motion in part. The
court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to: (1) state a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs; (2) state a claim for deliberate indifference to conditions of confinement; and (3) state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Illinois law. The court noted that the inmate was required to sit
in fecal waste for four hours while medical personnel who had the means of remedying the problem deliberately
ignored him. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of Corrections)
2014

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS
TOILETS
WATER

Cano v. City of New York, 44 F.Supp.3d 324 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Pretrial detainees brought an action against a city and
police officers, alleging that inhumane conditions at a detention facility violated due process. The city and the officers
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees alleged objectively serious conditions
that deprived them of basic human needs, that the officers and the city were deliberately indifferent to conditions at the
facility, and that there was punitive intent. The detainees alleged that, over a 24-hour period, they were subjected to
overcrowded cells, insects, rodents, extreme temperatures, unsanitary conditions, sleep deprivation, lack of adequate
food and water, lack of access to bathroom facilities, and lack of protection from the conduct of other inmates.
(Brooklyn Central Booking, New York)

U.S. District Court
WATER
HYGIENE ITEMS
TOILETS

Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against employees of a
county correctional facility, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need, violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his confinement, and excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The employees moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
detainee had initially been refused admission to the jail because he displayed signs of a drug overdose and he was
admitted to a local hospital. After hospital personnel determined he was stable he was admitted to the jail. At one point
in his confinement, the detainee acted out and banged his cell door with a plastic stool. This resulted in the retrieval of
the stool by jail officers and, while he was held down by one officer, he was kicked in the face by another officer.
When he yelled for help, an officer responded by choking the detainee and then spraying him with pepper spray, and he
was not permitted to shower to remove the pepper spray for thirty minutes. The court found that the detainee’s
allegations against the employees in their individual capacities regarding the intentional denial of medical treatment,
excessive use of force, and violation of his rights under Fourteenth Amendment with regard to conditions of his
confinement were sufficient to set forth a plausible claim for punitive damages. The detainee alleged that he was denied
basic human needs such as drinking water, access to a toilet and toilet paper, and toiletries such as soap and a
toothbrush. (Washington County Correctional. Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
PESTS/RODENTS

Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC), a prison warden, and other prison officials, alleging
that his conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights, that he was deprived of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was subjected to race discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. The district court dismissed the case, in part. The court held that the prisoner stated claims against the warden

23.28

and prison administrators for violation of his equal protection rights and his conditions of confinement. The prisoner
alleged that the prison had a policy or custom of segregating blacks and non-blacks, and that prison officials refused to
place him in a non-black cell to get away from pests in his cell. The court held that the administrators allowed ants to
infest his cell for weeks and that as a result, he received ant bites that caused him to scratch until his skin was broken
due to severe itching, in violation of his conditions of confinement rights under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment.
(Little Sandy Correctional Complex, Green River Correctional Complex, Kentucky)
2015
U.S. Appeals Court
SHOWERS

Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner, who was a paraplegic, brought an action against a
prison medical director, assistant warden, and prison doctors, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical
condition. The district court denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court reversed, finding that: (1) prison doctors were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious
medical needs by failing to provide him with adequate pain management; (2) officials were not deliberately indifferent
by subjecting the prisoner to unsanitary showers; and (3) doctors did not fail to provide adequate training and
supervision regarding proper wound care, even if the prisoner’s wound care by nurses and other subordinates was
occasionally sporadic, where the doctors were active in managing it, and they regularly changed the prescribed
frequency of the bandage changes based on the changing condition of the prisoner’s wounds, and also prescribed
antibiotic therapy regimens to assist with healing. The court noted that it was undisputed that the showers were cleaned
twice per day with bleach, that the prisoner was given a disinfectant spray bottle for his personal use, and that the
prisoner was permitted to enter the showers before the other prisoners so that he could clean himself without
interference, and there was no showing that the prisoner was ever prohibited from using the showers. (R.E. Barrow
Treatment Center, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
RODENTS/PESTS
BEDDING

Cano v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.3d 65 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). Pretrial detainees temporarily housed in a booking
facility brought an action against a city and city officials under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee
health in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) temporarily subjecting detainees to
overcrowded jail cells was not deliberate indifference; (2) failure to provide sleeping equipment, such as beds, cots,
pillows, blankets, or bedding was not deliberate indifference; (3) availability of only one toilet for 24 hours in each
overcrowded holding cell was not deliberate indifference; (4) alleged failure to provide food and water was not
deliberate indifference; (5) police officers were not subjectively aware of a risk to the detainees; (6) police officers did
not act with punitive intent; (7) placement of pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged rodent and insect infestations
was not deliberate indifference; (8) placement of pretrial detainees in jail cells with alleged violent offenders that had
limited police supervision, allegedly leading to fights, thefts, and bullying, was not deliberate indifference to detainee
health; and (9) alleged exposure of pretrial detainees to extreme hot or cold temperature conditions in unventilated jail
cells was not deliberate indifference to detainee health that would violate the right to provision of adequate medical
treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the detainees were not
kept in the cells for more than 24 hours, and were not harmed by the alleged overcrowding. (Brooklyn Central
Booking, City of New York Police Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE ITEMS
CLOTHING
SHOWERS
WATER

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit against a
city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations
that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets and other minor
offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one case, nearly two months,
in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did not warrant incarceration in the
first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily determined payment was made, violated
their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood,
mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene products, were denied access to a shower, laundry,
and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate
food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional
rights, and sought a permanent injunction preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that
residents were jailed for failure to pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of
alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and
Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their
Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due Process
violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due Process
violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with respect to
fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded counsel at initial
hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration for failing to pay
court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
SHOWERS

Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county, sheriff,
and deputies, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants denied her medical care, subjected her to unsanitary living
conditions, deprived her of food, clean clothes, and access to exercise, and conducted overly invasive searches. The
detainee had been classified as mentally ill and housed in a mental health unit at the detention facility. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to what policies governed classification of
pretrial detainees who were mentally ill. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether jail conditions imposed on the detainee, including permitting the detainee, who was
incarcerated for 32 days, to shower only three times, only permitting the detainee outside of her cell for recreation on

23.29

one occasion, failing to clean her cell, failing to provide the detainee with clean clothing, and depriving the detainee of
food, amounted to punishment. (Century Regional Detention Facility, Los Angeles County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
RODENTS/PESTS

Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought action under § 1983 against a county alleging
deliberate indifference to his health in violation of the right to the provision of adequate medical treatment under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as failure to pay adequate wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for his job in the jail’s laundry room. The district court dismissed the case and the detainee
appealed. The court held that the detainee failed to allege harm stemming from the presence of spider nests,
cockroaches, and mice, and thus failed to state a claim under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to his health in violation
of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The court noted that the detainee did not allege that pests were present in his cell, or that pests had ever come into
contact with his person or his property, or that he’d been bitten or stung or otherwise suffered physical or psychological
harm, or that his property had been damaged. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SHOWERS
HYGIENE ITEMS
CLOTHING

Smith v. Eovaldi, 112 F.Supp.3d 779 (S.D. Ill. 2015). A state inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action against several prison officers, alleging use of excessive force and exposure to inhumane conditions in his cell.
The prisoner alleged that after he had a “negative outburst” and was “maced” by a lieutenant and removed from his cell
by a corrections officer, he was taken to an infirmary bullpen, where he was forced to lie on the floor. While he was on
the floor, the prisoner alleged that officers kicked and punched him for ten minutes, causing him to defecate upon
himself. He alleged that after the incident, he was stripped of his prison clothes and “inadequately seen” by “medical”
personnel. At the screening stage of the case, the district court dismissed the complaint in part against some defendants,
but declined to dismiss with regard to the others. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged § 1983 claims
against several prison officers for use of excessive force by alleging that the officers engaged in prolonged attacks
against him and that one officer subsequently attacked him again.
The court allowed the prisoner’s claims against several prison officers regarding conditions of his confinement to
proceed. The prisoner alleged that two officers did not feed him for several days after the alleged attack against him,
that two other officers did not allow the inmate to shower or otherwise clean off fecal matter for several months, and
that two other officers denied him hygiene products and warm clothing during winter months. (Menard Correctional
Center, Illinois)

23.30

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XIX

XIX

XIX

outgoing mail, in violation of various regulations, was de minimis, and did not rise to level of a
constitutional violation; (5) the sheriff had qualified immunity where the prisoner failed to show
that the sheriff actually participated in acts that allegedly deprived prisoner of his constitutional
rights, formulated a policy of tolerating such violations, or was deliberately indifferent; but (6) a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a prison director, captain, and deputy
superintendent were personally involved in acts that allegedly deprived the prisoner of his
constitutional rights, precluding summary judgment for those officials on basis of qualified
immunity. (Plymouth County Correctional Facility, Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY

Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593 (8th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials

U.S. Appeals Court
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and county sheriff’s department, alleging that police and sheriff’s deputies violated his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to entertain his claim that he was being held in
custody due to mistaken identity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of city,
and entered judgment upon a jury verdict against the sheriff’s department. The arrestee and
sheriff’s department appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
held that the sheriff’s department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in the arrestee’s §
1983 action, where units of government were not entitled to immunity in § 1983 actions, and the
judge who arraigned the arrestee did not forbid the sheriff’s department from conducting further
inquires into the arrestee’s identity. The court found that the sheriff’s department policy of
ignoring an arrestee’s claims of mistaken identity after an arrestee has appeared in court and a
judge had ordered him held in custody did not violate the arrestee’s right to due process, as
required for the department to be liable under § 1983 to the arrestee. The detainee was held by the
department for 13 days after his arraignment on a warrant that had been issued for someone else.
The court noted that the judge did not abdicate responsibility to determine the arrestee’s identity
or delegate that responsibility to the department, and there was no doubt that the arrestee was the
person that the judge ordered held at arraignment. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F.Supp.2d 1016 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a §
1983 action against prison officials, challenging their refusal to permit him to organize an atheist
study group. Following remand from the court of appeals, the officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that it was not clearly established in 2002 that atheism was a
“religion,” and the officials were qualifiedly immune from suit. The court noted that the Free
Exercise clause and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) limit the
government's ability to burden a prisoners' exercise of sincerely-held religious beliefs, even when
governmental burdens are imposed neutrally upon believer and non-believer alike. The court noted
that the courts had recognized that secular humanism and other non-theistic belief systems were
protected by the Free Exercise Clause, but the inmate did not tell officials he was an adherent of
any such belief system, and did not indicate that his proposed group was connected to “religious”
principles. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Madison v. Riter, 411 F.Supp.2d 645 (W.D.Va. 2006). A state prisoner brought an action against

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought an action against the

XX

and parole board members, alleging that she was illegally incarcerated in violation of § 1983, and
asserting state law claims for false imprisonment and invasion of privacy. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the parole board members, parole agent,
warden and correctional officers were entitled to absolute immunity. The court noted that parole
board members had the authority under state law to make such decisions based on the prisoner’s
signed parole agreement, and the warden’s and correctional officers’ incarceration of the prisoner
was based on a facially valid court order. (South Dakota State Penitentiary)

prison officials and others under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), challenging the denial of his requests for kosher meals. The district court found that
the applicable RLUIPA section increasing the level of protection of prisoners' religious rights
violated the Establishment Clause and the prisoner appealed. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded. On remand, the defendants brought a motion to dismiss which was dismissed by the
court. The district court held that RLUIPA was a valid exercise of Congress' Spending Clause
authority and that Congress' use of its Spending Clause authority was in pursuit of “the general
Welfare.” The court held that the RLUIPA conditions were related to federal interests and that
conditioning the award of federal corrections funds on a state's compliance with RLUIPA was not
coercive. According to the court, the federal corrections funding conditions imposed upon states
through RLUIPA did not violate the 10th Amendment and the state waived its 11th Amendment
immunity to the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA. (Bland Correction Center, Virginia)
Commonwealth of Virginia, prison officials, and others under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), challenging the denial of his request for kosher meals.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss all claims and the state appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that RLUIPA is a

24.51

valid exercise of Congress’ spending power, such that Virginia could not avoid the RLUIPA
protections of inmates’ religious liberty. According to the court, the restrictions under RLUIPA
against the States’ imposition of substantial burdens on the religious liberty of the inmates did not
impose an unconstitutional condition in violation of Spending Clauses, as RLUIPA did not induce
the States to engage in unconstitutional activities. The court found that RLUIPA was not
unconstitutionally coercive, in violation of Spending Clause restrictions, because it conditioned all
federal funding for Virginia state prisons on the compliance with its ban on substantial state
restrictions on religious liberty of inmates. The court also held that the state’s waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity did not extend to suits for monetary damages. (Greenville Correctional
Center and Bland Correction Center, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Meyer v. Teslik, 411 F.Supp.2d 983 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a chaplain,
claiming that the omission of his name from a list of those allowed to attend Native American
religious ceremonies violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The chaplain moved for summary judgment. The
district court held that the inmate's exercise of his Native American religion was “substantially
burdened,” for the purpose of determining whether RLUIPA was violated when, over a threemonth period, the prison chaplain did not include him on the list of inmates allowed to attend
religious services when there was no compelling reason for omission. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether the chaplain
deliberately left the inmate’s name off the list, resulting in a denial of his First Amendment right
to exercise his core beliefs by participating in pipe and drum ceremonies. The court held that the
chaplain was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for violating First Amendment and
RLUIPA rights of the inmate where the right of the inmate to participate in core activities of
religion, including services, was clearly established. (Fox Lake Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). A detainee brought an action pursuant to
Bivens and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), alleging that federal prison officials

subjected him to an unconstitutional search and failed to accommodate his religious needs. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the court granted the motion. The district court held
that: the warden of the federal penitentiary at which the detainee was held was not liable for
alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion; the detainee failed to show that
officials served him pork in violation of his right to free exercise of religion; qualified immunity
shielded the officials from liability to the extent that their alleged failure to inform the detainee
that he was being served pork substitutes violated his right to free exercise of religion; prison
officials did not violate the detainee's free exercise rights by not informing him of the time so that
he could pray at appropriate times of day; officials' refusal to hold three of the detainee's meals
during Ramadan did not violate his free exercise rights; allegations that prison officials mocked
the detainee's religion at most asserted a de minimis violation of the detainee's free exercise rights;
and, the detainee did not establish a violation of his rights under RFRA. According to the court,
allegations that the Muslim detainee asked his case manager at the federal penitentiary for a clock
so that the he would know when to say his prayers, and that the case manager said “You think this
is going to work?” after the detainee was praying, sufficiently alleged the case manager's personal
participation in alleged violations of the detainee's right to free exercise of religion. (United States
Penitentiary, Pollock, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Plemmons v. Roberts, 439 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2006). A county jail inmate who had been arrested for
failing to pay child support brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The court of appeals held
that genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county jail inmate suffered from a serious
heart condition, whether jail officials were notified of the inmate's history of heart problems,
whether officials failed to recognize that the inmate was suffering from the symptoms of a heart
attack that would be obvious to a lay person, whether the officials acted promptly to obtain
necessary medical help, and whether the officials were properly trained to deal with such a
medical emergency, precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. According to the
court, the corrections officers’ alleged delay in providing medical care to the inmate who was
having a heart attack constituted conduct that violated clearly established law, and therefore the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. The inmate alleged that two officers inexcusably delayed in
summoning an ambulance even though he had told them that he had a history of heart trouble.
The court noted that the medical intake form completed by one of the officers did not contain any
mention of heart problems. (Pulaski County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Price v. Caruso, 451 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Mich. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a pro se suit

XX

against the director of the state corrections department, claiming that failure to provide
transportation to another facility in order to permit his minimum attendance requirement for
Jewish services to be satisfied, was a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found material issues of fact, as to whether there were sufficient

24.52

Jewish inmates in the prison to conduct services, precluded summary judgment. The court found
that the inmate's claim for damages, arising from the refusal of authorities to transport him to
another facility, was not rendered moot when he was transferred to another facility where need for
transportation no longer existed. According to the court, the inmate could pursue his damages
claim against the director in her official capacity, claiming that his rights under the RLUIPA were
violated because it was not clear whether, in accepting federal funding, the state had waived
sovereign immunity, and with it the director's official capacity immunity. (Southern Michigan
Correctional Facility)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). Former detainees at a military facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers, alleging they
were tortured. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part,
and deferred in part. The court held that military personnel supervising the interrogation of
detainees at the facility had qualified immunity from a claim that they promoted or condoned
torture in violation of Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights of detainees, because the question as to
whether the detainees had rights under the constitution had not been resolved by high courts and
therefore personnel could not have known that their conduct was wrongful. The court noted that
District of Columbia law applied to the question of whether military personnel at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, were acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly tortured
detainees. The prisoners alleged various forms of torture, including hooding, forced nakedness,
housing in cages, deprivation of food, forced body cavity searches, subjection to extremes of heat
and cold, harassment in the practice of their religion, forced shaving of religious beards, placing
the Koran in the toilet, placement in stress positions, beatings with rifle butts, and the use of
unmuzzled dogs for intimidation. The court found “most disturbing” their claim that executive
members of the U. S. government were directly responsible for the “depraved conduct the plaintiffs
suffered over the course of their detention.” (U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2006). The wife and administrator of the estate of a detainee
who committed suicide in jail brought a § 1983 action against a county and sheriff's deputies
alleging deliberate indifference to a substantial risk that the detainee would commit suicide. The
district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court
held that jailers who placed the detainee in a cell under video surveillance were entitled to
qualified immunity, but the jailer who observed the detainee in the cell by video surveillance was
not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the jailers who placed the detainee in a
cell under video surveillance were entitled to qualified immunity even though they did not remove
the detainee's clothing and shoelaces, because the detainee did not have the right to have his
jailers take precautions against his suicide beyond placing him in a cell under video surveillance.
The court found that the jailer who observed the detainee in his cell by video surveillance was not
entitled to qualified immunity because the jailer observed the detainee remove his shoelaces, tie
them to a bar, place a noose around his neck, and test the weight of his rope. The jail policy and
procedures manual in effect at the time addressed the proper treatment of potentially suicidal
inmates and required custodial officers to remove all potential tools such as sheets, blankets, and
shoelaces, to conduct inmate checks at random intervals at least twice per hour, and to make
reports of any unusual occurrences. The jail used surveillance cameras to monitor inmate activity.
The court reviewed the videotape taken from the surveillance camera that recorded the detainee’s
activity and it showed the detainee removing the laces from his shoes, tying them together, and
climbing from his bed to the bars of his cell. (Warren County Jail, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Com'rs, 447 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2006). An arrestee who was
involuntarily committed to a mental hospital brought an action against a city board of police
commissioners and police officers, alleging false arrest, unlawful detention and confinement,
malicious abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court
dismissed the case but the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the board was not
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court found that binding precedent
directed that the board is not an arm of the state and thus was not entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. (St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Turner v. Huibregtse, 421 F.Supp.2d 1149 (W.D.Wis. 2006). An inmate sued a deputy warden and
two correctional officers under § 1983, claiming that they violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment when one officer sexually assaulted the inmate during a pat search and the other
officers failed to prevent the assault. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court held that
the inmate stated a claim against one officer who allegedly grabbed the inmate's buttocks and
fondled his penis during a search, and against a second officer who allegedly held the inmate and
laughed while the first officer grabbed the inmate's buttocks and fondled his penis. The court held
that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where, at the time of the search, it was
clearly established that an otherwise legal search that was conducted in a harassing manner
intended to humiliate and inflict psychological pain was unconstitutional. According to the court, if
the inmate showed that he was sexually assaulted during the search, but failed to show that he
suffered any physical injury, he would not be entitled to compensatory damages but he could be

XX

24.53

entitled to other forms of recovery, such as nominal and punitive damages. (Wisconsin Secure
Program Facility, Boscobel, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The sister of a pretrial detainee
brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and others to recover damages related to the incustody death of her brother. The district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary judgment
and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals dismissed in part, reversed and remanded in part.
The court held that the county sheriff had no knowledge of the pretrial detainee's serious medical
needs, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the sheriff had no
personal interaction with the pretrial detainee during his incarceration, and there was no
indication that the sheriff knew the pretrial detainee had been vomiting for several hours, was not
provided with his anti-depressant medication for two to three days preceding his death, or had
heart problems that put him at risk for a heart attack. According to the court, the sheriff's practice
of delegating to others such duties as reading mail and responding to communications regarding
jail inmates did not amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical
needs, as required to be held individually liable for the detainee's death in a § 1983 action. The 46year-old detainee had completed a medical intake form indicating he had a history of mental
illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he
did not have a history of heart problems or high or low blood pressure. Although he had no
medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his mother later brought his medications,
including an anti-depressant. The jail ran out of his anti-depressant medication for two days and
the detainee began to act odd. He was moved to an isolation cell to be monitored. He was later
found dead in the cell. An autopsy led to the determination that the detainee died of natural
causes--arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease--causing a heart attack that resulted in his death.
Detectable amounts of his anti-depressant medication were found in the detainee’s system during
the autopsy. (Greene County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006). Two separate actions were brought against
a county and individual officers arising out of a police shooting and the subsequent detention of
witnesses to the shooting. The district court granted the officers’ motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. The appeals court held that the 90-minute detention of witnesses to
a police shooting was not reasonable for investigative purposes under the Fourth Amendment, but
that the constitutional rights of the witnesses to a police shooting to not be detained for 90 minutes
following the shooting was not clearly established at the time. According to the court, the
witnesses to the shooting failed to establish the county’s policy or custom to train its officers
concerning the constitutional limitations on detention of witnesses in connection with the police
shooting investigations. (Utah County Sheriff’s Office, Utah)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY

Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against parole board members, a psychologist who contracted with the state to provide
mental health services, and others, alleging that his arrest for a parole violation and the
subsequent decisions of the parole board violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted summary judgment for some parole board members and the arresting officer
on immunity grounds, and granted the psychologist’s motion for summary judgment. The former
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and held that: (1) the claim against parole board
members and the arresting officer was not cognizable under § 1983; and (2) the psychologist
enjoyed absolute immunity. According to the court, regardless of the fact that federal habeas relief
was no longer available, the parole revocation decision had not been rendered invalid, and success
on the former prisoner’s claims would necessarily invalidate a revocation decision. The court held
that the private psychologist who contracted with the state to perform the evaluation and
presented his findings to the adjudicative parole board, which then relied on his report and
expertise in reaching its ultimate decision to deny the inmate parole, acted as an arm of the court
and enjoyed absolute immunity from the inmate’s § 1983 action alleging the wrongful denial of
parole. (New Jersey State Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY

Ziemba v. Armstrong, 433 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Conn. 2006). A prison inmate sued a correctional
officer under § 1983, seeking actual damages of $100,000 and punitive damages of $150,000, for
injuries incurred when excessive force was used to place the inmate in a four-point restraint. A
jury returned a verdict against one officer, who moved for judgment as matter of law and a new
trial. The district court denied the motions, finding that the officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity and that the jury could find that the officer had the requisite state of mind when he
attacked the inmate. The court found that compensatory damages did not shock the conscience and
that punitive damages of $150,000 were warranted. The jury found that the officer hit the inmate
in the face, knelt on him and otherwise inflicted pain in the course of securing the inmate in a fourpoint restraint, where he remained for 22 hours. The court noted that the officer engaged in
reprehensible conduct by hitting the inmate after the inmate was secured, and that punitive
damages were only 50% higher than compensatory damages. (Connecticut Department of
Corrections)

XX

24.54

2007
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court found that the detainee's allegations that a
DOC captain placed him in solitary confinement in retaliation for his oral complaint to the captain that his newlyassigned cellmate was HIV positive, stated a claim under § 1983 for retaliation for exercising First Amendment
free speech rights. The court found that whether the detainee had a protected right under the First Amendment, to
complain to the captain was not clearly established at the time, and thus, the captain had qualified immunity from
the detainee's§ 1983 claim. The court found that the detainee's allegations that the Director of the Department of
Corrections (DOC), despite his actual and constructive knowledge that DOC employees were engaged in conduct
that posed a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury through over-detention, failed to train,
monitor, and discipline DOC employees with regard to timely release of inmates from DOC custody, and that the
Director's deliberate failure to do so caused detainee's over-detention, were sufficient when construed liberally to
state a claim under § 1983 for violation of due process and violation of protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court noted that the detainee had a clearly established constitutional protection against overdetention and thus, the Director was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and
Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Curry v. South Carolina, 518 F.Supp.2d 661 (D.S.C. 2007). A former prisoner who obtained post-conviction
relief treating him as juvenile, with the result that his sentence was shortened, brought a § 1983 suit against the
state, various state departments, a county public defenders office, and others. A U.S. magistrate judge
recommended that the court dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The former prisoner filed objections and
moved to amend his complaint. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held
that the Department of Corrections and the Department of Juvenile Justice were entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The court found that the public defender and the private attorney did not act under the color of state
law. The court held that the public defenders office was not a state actor and that the County Solicitor's Office was
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also found that Eleventh Amendment immunity extended to
the state's Family Court. But the court ruled that the proposed amendment of the complaint was not futile to the
extent that it sought to add a municipal police department as a defendant. The court noted that the amended
complaint alleged that the police department had improperly treated the criminal defendant as an adult with the
result that he was sentenced as an adult without the benefit of a juvenile waiver hearing. (Charleston County,
South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Farid v. Ellen, 514 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate brought a suit against correctional officials
under § 1983, alleging that he was deprived of rights protected by the First Amendment when he was disciplined
by prison officials for possessing and distributing a booklet of which he was the principal author. The parties filed
motions for summary judgment which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court found that
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from money damages because the right of the inmate not to be
punished for possession or distribution of written expression of ideas, pursuant to prison rules that did not give
notice of the basis on which such written expression would be determined to be improper, was not clearly
established. On appeal (593 F.3d 233) the appeals court found that fact issues as to basis for the prisoner's
punishment precluded summary judgment on the qualified immunity issue, and officials reasonably should have
known that the prisoner's rights were clearly established and that their actions violated those rights. (Woodborne
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Guarneri v. West, 518 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that
various government and prison personnel had violated his constitutional rights. The defendants brought motions to
dismiss and the district court granted them in part. The court held that the prisoner stated a civil rights claim
against prison superintendents but that the claims against the officials in their official capacities were barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. The court noted that the state prison, as a state agency, enjoyed Eleventh Amendment
immunity.(New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058 (S.D.Cal. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
medical officials involuntarily administered anti-psychotic medications without following proper procedures and
in deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the involuntary administration of anti-psychotic medications
to the inmate did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, as required to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation, where the officials administered the drugs in an attempt to treat the
inmate's mental health crisis. But the court held that the post-deprivation remedies available to the California
inmate after the officials forcibly administered anti-psychotic drugs were insufficient to protect the inmate's due
process liberty interest in being free from involuntary medication. According to the court, although state law
established procedural safeguards before inmates could be involuntarily medicated, the prison officials allegedly
disregarded their duty to comply with those established pre-deprivation procedures. The court found that the
inmate's right to be free from arbitrary administration of anti-psychotic medication was clearly established by
existing case law in 2002, the time of this incident, and therefore state prison officials were not entitled to
qualified immunity from liability. (California State Prison-Sacramento)

XXII

24.55

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee who had
died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections officers. The defendants moved
for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted the motion. The 71 year old
pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including schizophrenia and dementia, which reportedly
manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia, bizarre thoughts and behavior, physical violence, and
verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The court held that county corrections officers' putting the inmate
into a cell different from the one to which he had been assigned, allegedly leading to the beating death of a pretrial
detainee who shared the same cell, did not violate the detainee's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The
court noted that even though the action violated a jail policy, the policy was created primarily to keep track of
inmates' placement, not to maintain inmate safety, and there was no evidence of widespread inmate-on-inmate
violence due to the misplacement of inmates. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the sheriff's
alleged poor training and supervision of corrections officers led to the officers' allegedly inadequate reaction to
the incident between the jail inmates, which ended with the beating death of one inmate. The court also found that
the sheriff's failure to comply with a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee to a mental health facility did not
show supervisory liability because the purpose of the transfer order was likely to get the detainee treatment for
mental illness, not to protect him. The court held that the county corrections officers were acting within the scope
of their duties when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same cell with a pretrial detainee, and thus the
officers were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s survivors' § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake violated jail policies or procedures did not mean
that the officers were not exercising discretionary authority. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

Maness v. District Court of Logan County-Northern Div., 495 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2007). After a state court clerk
refused his repeated requests to present his application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), the federal district
court dismissed a prisoner's § 1983 action arising from his state court conviction. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the judge and prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity, and the district court clerk's ministerial decision
to not present the prisoner's IFP application to the Arkansas state court did not violate the prisoner's right of
access to the court. The appeals court noted that the clerk who allegedly refused to present the criminal prisoner's
IFP application to a circuit judge was not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity in the prisoner's
subsequent civil rights action. (Logan County District Court, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Strope v. Collins, 492 F.Supp.2d 1289 (D.Kan. 2007). Inmates brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, stemming from censorship of magazines containing alleged nudity. The parties moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that summary
judgment on the inmates’ claims alleging First Amendment violations was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact, regarding whether prison officials' withholding of publications containing alleged nudity was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The court found that an inmate who sued prison officials
was afforded adequate procedural due process in the denial of access to magazines containing alleged nudity,
where the inmate was given written notice of withholding of the magazine by way of an “Appeal of Censored
Material,” was told verbally about the refusal to process a Special Purpose Order (SPO) for a supplemental issue,
and had the opportunity to grieve the censorship and appeal decisions to prison officials who were not involved in
original process.
According to the court, the prison officials were not entitled to sovereign immunity to the extent that the
inmates were seeking prospective injunctive relief from the officials in their official capacities, where the inmates
adequately indicated that they were challenging the nudity regulation itself and the manner in which it could be
applied prospectively. The court held that officials were not entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that they
were being sued in their individual capacities, where the claim that the censorship was not related to legitimate
penological interests implicated clearly-established First Amendment rights. The court held that genuine issues of
material fact, regarding the extent to which the prison warden personally participated in the alleged deprivation of
the inmates' First Amendment right to receive information by censoring magazines containing alleged nudity,
precluded summary judgment on claims alleging the warden's vicarious liability under a federal civil rights
statute. (Lansing Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Thomas v. Baca, 514 F.Supp.2d 1201 (C.D. California 2007). Pre-trial detainees and post-conviction prisoners
who alleged they were required to sleep on the floor of county jail facilities brought a civil rights class action suit
against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities. The prisoners moved for summary adjudication of certain
issues and the sheriff moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative, for summary adjudication. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that undisputed evidence established the
custom of forcing inmates to sleep on the floor and that this custom violated the Eighth Amendment, even if the
majority of inmates had bunks and floor-sleeping inmates were provided with mattresses. The plaintiffs had
presented undisputed evidence that over 24,000 instances of floor sleeping occurred in the jail system in a four
month period. The court found that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the jail's
custom of forcing some inmates to sleep on the floor, where it was not clearly established during the 2002 to 2005
period covered by the suit, that providing inmate with a mattress would not avoid a violation or that floor sleeping
violated the Eighth Amendment rights of convicted inmates as well as due process rights of pretrial detainees.
(Los Angeles Sheriff Department, California)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F.Supp.2d 654 (M.D.La. 2007). Two state prisoners brought Eighth Amendment claims
for cruel and unusual punishment, and claims under state law, against state officials and prison officials, including
the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, a prison warden, and members of the
lockdown review board, relating to the prisoners' extended lockdown of approximately 28 to 35 years in the
prison's closed cell restriction (CCR) unit. The prisoners asserted deprivation of sleep, exercise, social contact,

XXII

24.56

and environmental stimulation. Both prisoners had been charged with and convicted of murdering a correctional
officer during a riot. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants in part and denied in part.
The court held that the Secretary of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections was not liable, as a
supervisory official, to state prisoners under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment protection
against cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that the Secretary was aware that the prisoners' extended
lockdown allegedly was without a current legitimate penological justification.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prisoners' extended lockdown, for from approximately 28 to 35 years, in prison's closed cell restriction (CCR) unit
deprived them of at least one of the basic human needs asserted by prisoners, i.e., sleep, exercise, social contact,
or environmental stimulation. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was lack of
legitimate penological justification for the extended lockdown of the prisoners, which was relevant to whether
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to state prisoners' basic human needs. According to the court, prison
officials had fair warning that continued confinement of the prisoners in extended lockdown for over 28 years
could be constitutionally infirm, and thus, they were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoners' § 1983
claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Louisiana State Penitentiary at
Angola, Louisiana)
2008
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Alvarado v. Battaglia, 539 F.Supp.2d 1022 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
warden and corrections officers arising from an alleged incident in which an officer discharged a firearm in the
direction of the prisoner and other inmates from a guard tower that overlooked the inmates' recreation yard. The
district court held that the prisoner stated an excessive force claim against the officer who allegedly discharged the
firearm but failed to state a claim against the warden. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that the
corrections officer discharged a firearm in the direction of the prisoner and other inmates in response to the
inmates' banter were sufficient to state an excessive force claim, so as to overcome the officer's qualified
immunity defense. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that prison officials knew that the corrections
officer who allegedly discharged the firearm was mentally unstable, yet allowed her to continue working, were
insufficient to establish that the warden acted with deliberate indifference, as required for the warden to be held
liable under § 1983 for the officer's actions. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2008). A prisoner sued a prison investigator and deputy sheriff under §
1983 alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during an investigation of a prison stabbing, for which the
prisoner was convicted and sentenced to death, but later exonerated during a habeas proceeding. Following the
death of the investigator, his estate was substituted as a party. The district court denied the prisoner's motion to
alter or amend judgment and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the investigator and deputy were
qualifiedly immune from the prisoner’s claim of unreasonable seizure, assuming that the prisoner's placement in a
detention cell by the investigator and deputy pursuant to the investigation of a prison stabbing was an arrest that
was supported by arguable probable cause. The court noted that inculpatory evidence against the prisoner
included evidence of a motive to kill the victim and exculpatory evidence included the officer's identification of a
third inmate as the inmate whom the victim was chasing, such that more than a minimal investigation was
required. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205 (D.Colo. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil rights
action, alleging that a county sheriff, county jailers, and others violated her rights to due process and free speech,
as well as her right to be free from unreasonable seizure, by forcibly injecting her with antipsychotic medication
while in custody at a county jail. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part. The
court held that a county sheriff's deputy personally participated in the decision to sedate the detainee and therefore
the deputy could be liable in his individual capacity under § 1983. The deputy had called paramedics and
admittedly lobbied the medics to sedate the detainee, he allegedly falsely reported to the paramedics that the
detainee had been banging her head and throwing herself against her steel cell door, and he participated in
physically restraining the detainee during the injection, at the request of the paramedics. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the deputy falsely reported to
the paramedics. The court found that the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (Pitkin
County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer and
others alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip searched. The
district court denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The appeals court affirmed
the district court decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in conducting the strip search during
booking, following the arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for harassment, where the arrestee never intermingled
with the general jail population but rather was confined in a cell by herself for several hours while awaiting bail.
The court noted that three pat down searches had been performed on the arrestee prior to booking, the arrestee
was wearing shorts and a sleeveless blouse at the time of booking, the jailer saw that the arrestee did not have any
tattoos or moles indicating that she was the culprit, and the crime of harassment was not a crime of violence. The
court found that the arrestee had a right not to be strip searched during booking when she was not going to
intermingle with the general prison population. She had already been through a pat-down search, and there was no
reasonable suspicion that she had a weapon. According to the court, the jailer who conducted the strip search was
not entitled to qualified immunity because at the time of this incident it was clearly established that a strip search
could be justified if there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons and the detainee
intermingled with the general jail population. The 46-year-old mother of nine had been riding in a family van with
some of her children when she was stopped by an officer because there was an extra child in the back seat. The

XXII

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officer arrested her with the belief that she was the person for whom a warrant had been issued. After being
booked at the jail it became apparent that she was not the person named in the warrant because she did not have
the tattoos and moles that were described in the file. Knowing that the plaintiff was not the person named in the
warrant, a jail officer nonetheless continued to process and strip search her. As she was standing naked, she began
to lactate. She tried to cover herself but was told by the officer to put her arms down. She was mocked continually
by the officer and a male officer during this incident. (Jefferson County Detention Facility, Colorado)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2008). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against correction
officers alleging deliberate indifference by failing to provide safe transportation. The district court denied the
officers' claims of qualified immunity and denied their motions for summary judgment. The officers appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that evidence that a correction
officer transporting inmates as part of a convoy refused to fasten the inmate's seatbelt knowing that he could not
do so himself because of his shackles, and drove recklessly while ignoring requests to slow down, was sufficient
for a reasonable jury to conclude that the officer manifested deliberate indifference for the inmate's safety in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court found that another correction officer who was driving a vehicle as
part of the convoy who drove too fast and followed the lead vehicle too closely did not act with deliberate
indifference for the safety of inmate passenger in the lead vehicle, even though the officer's driving proximately
caused a multiple vehicle rear-end accident which resulted in the inmate's injuries, absent evidence that the officer
was asked to slow down and refused, or that the officer knew that the inmate had been denied a seatbelt. (Missouri
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined in
a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their
individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his
individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants in
their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all officers
and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was protected
by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert testimony
indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the county was not
liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that he
failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where verbal policies existed
concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's efforts in training and
supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be liable under § 1983 for the
suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court noted that the deputies did receive training, and that there was no
evidence of a pattern of similar violations or evidence that it should have been apparent that a constitutional
violation was the highly predictable consequence of an alleged failure to train. The court found that while the
deputies' conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make
any attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate indifference,
nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for the county to
be liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). Two county inmates who were ordered released after
being found not guilty of the charges against them brought an action individually and on behalf of a class against
a county sheriff and county, challenging the constitutionality of a policy under which male inmates, in the custody
of the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDC), were subjected to strip searches upon returning to CCDC
after being ordered released. The district court held that male inmates in the custody of CCDC who were
potentially discharged were similarly situated to female potential discharges, as supported the male inmates' claim
that the county's policy of strip searching all male discharges and not all female discharges violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The court noted that the two groups of inmates were housed within the same facility, there
were varying security classifications within each group that corresponded to each other, statistics concerning
inmate violence clearly indicated that it took place among female as well as male inmates, and the county's
primary justification for distinguishing between male and female discharges, namely, its alleged inability to hold
them in a receiving, classification, and diagnosis center (RCDC) while their records were reviewed, was a
logistical rather than a security concern. The court found that the county sheriff was not acting as an arm of the
state insofar as requiring strip searching of discharged male inmates, and thus was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court noted that an Illinois Administrative Code (IAC) provision stating that “detainees permitted
to leave the confines of the jail temporarily, for any reason, shall be thoroughly searched prior to leaving and
before re-entering the jail” did not mandate strip searches, just that inmates be “thoroughly searched.” (Cook
County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008). The widow and children of a detainee who died from
complications of cocaine ingestion while incarcerated in a county jail, brought an action in state court against a
city and two police officers. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all
claims. The district court granted the motion in part and remanded. The court found that the officers violated the
detainee's Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care when they did not obtain medical aid for the detainee after
he vomited in the patrol car and rock cocaine was found in the vomit. According to the court, a rational jury could
conclude that the officers knew that the detainee had swallowed rock cocaine and had a serious medical condition,
and that the officers did not render care themselves, did not call for paramedics, did not take the detainee to the
hospital, and did not report the discovery of the rock cocaine in the vomit to the jail nurse. The court found that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity where the detainee, who did not exhibit signs of being high as his
detention progressed and who was previously communicative of his symptoms, gave an inaccurate reason to
explain his condition and never requested medical treatment. (City of Fresno and Fresno County Jail, California)

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U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2008). The personal representative of the estate of an inmate who died
after suffering a severe asthma attack at a jail brought a § 1983 action against jail nurses and officers, alleging
deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The inmate died while serving a 35-day sentence for
failing to pay child support. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
defendants appealed. The court held that the appeals court had jurisdiction over the officers' appeal and that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity, and that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the nurse’s
appeals. The court held that the jail nurses, as employees of a for-profit private medical provider, rather than the
county, could not assert a qualified immunity defense to the § 1983 action. Although the nurses were acting under
the color of state law, because of the contractual relationship between the county and the provider, there was no
firmly rooted common law practice of extending immunity to private actors, and policy rationales undergirding
qualified immunity did not support extending immunity to the nurses. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole, 551 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2008). A former state
employee brought an action against his employer and others, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act (RA),
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The district court
dismissed all but the employee’s RA claims, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that
receipt of federal funds by a subunit of a Pennsylvania judicial district waived Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Rehabilitation Act (RA) for claims against the employer. The court noted that an Eleventh Amendment
immunity waiver under the Rehabilitation Act applies to all of the operations of a state department regardless of
whether the particular activities are federally assisted. (Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole Department,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees filed suit under § 1983, challenging conditions
of their confinement on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and the detainees appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand
the district court granted the defendants’ renewed motions for summary judgment and the detainees again
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that triple-celling of the pretrial detainees was rationally
related to prison officials' legitimate governmental interest in trying to manage overcrowding conditions at the
prison, for the purposes of the detainees' claim that triple-celling violated their Fourteenth Amendment due
process right. The court noted that even if the detainees' due process constitutional rights were violated by
requiring them to sleep on mattresses on the floor, the law was not sufficiently clear so that a reasonable official
would understand that what he was doing violated a constitutional right, entitling the prison officials to qualified
immunity in the detainees' suit under § 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement. (Multi-Purpose
Criminal Justice Facility, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). The estate and family of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 survival
and wrongful death action against correctional officers, alleging violations of the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights. The district court granted, in part, the officers' motion for summary judgment. The officers appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that an officer violated the deceased inmate's
Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force, arising from the inmate's death after his extraction from
his cell involving the use of pepper spray, and thus the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity on § 1983
claims. The court found there was no question that some dispersal of pepper spray was warranted in carrying out
the extraction. But the officer’s final burst of pepper spray was deployed after the inmate had laid down on the
floor, and the officer and members of the extraction team never changed the inmate's clothing or removed the spit
mask covering his nose and mouth and never secured medical treatment for the inmate. Although the inmate
proffered his hands through the door pursuant to the officer's order, albeit in front of rather than behind him, the
officer deployed several additional bursts of pepper spray even after the inmate attempted to comply with the
order, and the inmate never reacted violently. (Western Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Johnson v. Collins, 564 F.Supp.2d 759 (N.D.Ohio 2008). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against a
prison warden and others, seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of a prison policy that banned the
wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks. The district court denied the warden’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. The court held that the possibility that the prisoner could show that the warden, by adhering to a prison
policy that prohibited the wearing of shoulder-length dreadlocks for security reasons, was continuing to violate
the prisoner’s federal rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by
substantially burdening the exercise of his Rastafarian religion, precluding the Eleventh Amendment from barring
the suit seeking injunctive relief against the warden in his official capacity. The court found that the warden was
not entitled to qualified immunity as a government official performing discretionary functions on the claim that he
substantially burdened the prisoner's rights under RLUIPA to practice his Rastafarian religion. The court held that
the prisoner's suit for injunctive relief against ongoing enforcement of the prison policy banning the wearing of
shoulder-length dreadlocks was not mooted by his transfer to another prison within the same state system, nor did
a change in the prison grooming code to allow for religious-based exemptions. (Madison Correctional Institution,
Toledo Correctional Institution, Mansfield Correctional Institution, Lebanon Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
doctors and a mayor, alleging that the defendants denied him adequate medical care while he was incarcerated in
violation of his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the action in part and denied the defendants’
motion for dismissal in part. The court held that the prisoner’s amended complaint sufficiently alleged a serious
deprivation, as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim, and the complaint sufficiently alleged that doctors
acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs. The court found that the doctors alleged
to have been involved only in the first few weeks of the prisoner's medical treatment could not be charged with
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court found that a qualified immunity defense did not

XXII

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shield the doctors from liability. The prisoner alleged he was denied magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan for
months and that, as a consequence, his shoulder injury was not properly diagnosed and his surgery was
unreasonably delayed, and that inadequate medical treatment caused a condition of urgency, degeneration, and
extreme pain, and the delayed surgery that was necessary to his recovery. The court noted that an unconvicted
detainee's rights are at least as great as those of a convicted prisoner, and district courts apply the same “deliberate
indifference” test developed under the Eighth Amendment to Fourteenth Amendment claims. (Manhattan House
of Detention and Riker's Island Corrections Building, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, who practiced the
Odinist/Asatru faith, brought claims pursuant to § 1983 against a state criminal justice department and prison
officials, alleging First Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and appeal was taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
court held that the claims brought by the prisoner pursuant to the § 1983 action alleging First Amendment
violations and pursuant to RLUIPA seeking declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction against prison
officials in their official capacity were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's
claims for compensatory damages against prison officials in their official capacity on claims brought pursuant to §
1983 alleging First Amendment violations and RLUIPA violations were barred by the provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibiting actions for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury. According to the court, a state criminal justice department's regulation
of not allowing an Odinist group to assemble for religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer was
reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest, for the purposes of determining whether the regulation
encroached on the prisoner's First Amendment right to free exercise. The court noted that officials asserted
justifications for the volunteer requirement that involved prison security concerns, as well as staff and space
limitations. The court held that summary judgment for the state was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to the neutrality of the prison's enforcement of the policy of not allowing religious groups to assemble for
religious services in the absence of an outside volunteer. The court also found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether rune literature was banned from the prison library, as to
whether the prison's policy of not allowing the Odinist group to assemble for religious services in the absence of
an outside volunteer imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, and as to whether the
prison's policy of preventing the possession of runestones substantially burdened the prisoner's religious exercise.
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Hughes Unit)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Miller v. Johnson, 541 F.Supp.2d 799 (E.D.Va. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action against a state
department of corrections and warden, seeking damages under the Rehabilitation Act. The inmate suffered from
Guillain-Barre syndrome, a paralyzing neurological disorder that caused nerve damage in his feet and ankles. As a
consequence of his disease, the inmate was unable to bend his left foot at the ankle and was able to walk only with
great difficulty. He was able to climb stairs only while holding handrails in order to steady himself. According to
the court, the inmate was a qualified person with a disability within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. The
district court held that by accepting federal funding, the department waived sovereign immunity as a bar to the
prisoner's action. (Greensville Correctional Center, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Norwood v. Woodford, 583 F.Supp.2d 1200 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed an action alleging that prison
officials deprived him of outdoor exercise, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and retaliated against him for
asserting his right to be free from harm, in violation of the First Amendment. The officials moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the allegation that
the inmate was deprived of outdoor exercise for 39 days was sufficient to satisfy the objective component of his
Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the issue of whether state prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference when they denied the inmate any outdoor exercise for a 39-day period during an alleged emergency
lockdown situation involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss. The court noted that
it was clearly established at the time of the deprivation that state prison officials' denial of outdoor exercise for
inmates for an extended period of time could constitute an Eighth Amendment violation, and thus the officials
were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 2008). Detainees held as material witnesses whose testimony was vital to
murder prosecutions brought an action against a district attorney's office and prosecutors who had secured bench
warrants for their arrests. The detainees alleged that the prosecutors failed to notify relevant authorities that the
underlying action for which the first detainee was held had been continued for nearly four months and that the
underlying action for which the second detainee was held had been dismissed. One detainee had been held for 54
days and the other was held for 58 days. The district court dismissed the first detainee's claims under § 1983 and
state law, and denied the motion to dismiss the second detainee's § 1983 claims. The parties appealed. The appeals
court held that the prosecutor's act of failing to notify the judge that issued the bench warrant for the first
detainee's arrest that the prosecution had been continued was not an advocative act, warranting absolute
prosecutorial immunity. The court also found that the prosecutor's act of failing to notify relevant authorities that
the second detainee remained incarcerated despite dismissal of the prosecution was not an advocative act for
which the prosecutor would be entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. The court noted that a prosecutor
disobeyed a judge's explicit instructions that he be advised of any delay, as well as a rule requiring the prosecutor
to keep the court informed of the status of detained material witnesses. The court concluded that policy
considerations underlying absolute prosecutorial immunity counseled against granting absolute immunity to the
prosecutors in these cases, where there was no common law tradition of extending absolute immunity to a
prosecutor for failing to notify the court of the status of a detained witness. The court concluded that denying
absolute immunity in these cases would not likely interfere with prosecutors' independent decision-making by

XXII

24.60

exposing them to vexatious litigation. The court also noted that by virtue of their status as third-party witnesses,
the detainees were not entitled to the protections available to criminal defendants, including the appellate process.
(Office of District Attorney of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Pentlarge v. Murphy, 541 F.Supp.2d, 421 (D.Mass. 2008). Detainees who had been civilly committed as sexually
dangerous persons (SDPs) under Massachusetts law brought a civil rights suit against officials seeking damages
and equitable relief against the enforcement of a policy requiring them to waive confidentiality as a condition to
receiving sexual offender treatment. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in part and denied
in part. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the policy that
forced the detainees to choose between treatment and a waiver of the right against self-incrimination. The court
found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages as they were not on notice
of the potential unconstitutionality of the waiver policy. (Nemansket Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Pettus v. McGinnis, 533 F.Supp.2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against New
York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging they participated in a disciplinary
proceeding against him which was initiated in retaliation for his having testified against a corrections officer at a
disciplinary hearing involving another inmate. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's
§ 1983 claim, since at the time of the disciplinary proceedings against the prisoner, it was not clearly established
that an inmate's act of providing testimony on behalf of another inmate at the other inmate's disciplinary hearing
was protected by the First Amendment. The court found that a corrections officer's filing of an alleged false
misbehavior report against the inmate did not result in an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life, as required for the alleged filing to have violated the inmate's due process rights.
The inmate was sentenced to 30 days in keeplock as a result of the charges against him, and the finding of guilt on
the charge did not lack evidentiary support. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Petzak v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Corrections, 579 F.Supp.2d 1330 (D.Nev. 2008). A 74-year-old correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against his supervisor, alleging that statutory stress electrocardiogram
(EKG) testing for officers over the age of 40 violated equal protection. The district court granted summary
judgment for the supervisor in part and denied in part. The court held that the differential treatment of correctional
officers violated equal protection, but the supervisor was entitled to qualified immunity from damages. According
to the court, the differential treatment of correctional officers over and under the age of 40, under Nevada's
statutory electrocardiogram (EKG) testing requirements, was not rationally related to a legitimate government
interest, violating equal protection. The court noted that while the state had an interest in requiring insured
employees to submit to physicals and to be physically fit for duty, there was no evidence why officers had to
undergo a stress EKG test only after reaching 40 years of age. (Nevada Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial detainee
who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail doctor, and
paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under § 1983 and asserting
state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and
the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court found that
county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly train jail officers as to the proper
protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the detainee, absent a showing that any individual official
encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the officers' alleged deliberate indifference. The court found
that the alleged conduct of a county jail doctor in being aware of the detainee's serious medical condition, which
included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy, and chest pains, but failing to conduct more than a
cursory examination, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, amounted to deliberate indifference to the
detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. Because the detainee had a
clearly established right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to receive medical treatment
to address serious medical needs, the court found that jail officials were not entitled to qualified immunity for
their alleged conduct in failing to provide the diabetic detainee with medical treatment. (Roane County Jail,
Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of
Sunni Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for injunctive relief
qualified for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not rendered moot by his
transfer to another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability to freely transfer the
prisoner between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a reasonable expectation that the
prisoner would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's policies were applicable to all of
its prison facilities. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether a prison policy denying Shi'ite prisoners Friday prayer services independent of Sunni participation
was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest, precluding summary judgment in
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court held that the state did not waive
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment as to money damages by accepting federal funds pursuant RLUIPA.
The court found that Shi'ite prisoners' right to a reasonable opportunity to worship by way of separate Jumah
services for Shi'ites and Sunnis was clearly established, for the purposes of determining whether prison officials
were qualifiedly immune from the prisoners' free exercise claim. (New York State Department of Correctional
Services, Mid-Orange Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility)

XXII

24.61

U.S. Appeals Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2008). The administrator of the estate of contemnor filed a § 1983
suit individually and in her official capacity against deputy sheriffs in their individual capacities for violating the
Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The administrator alleged that the deputies used excessive force, leading to her
son's death, while restraining him for resisting arrest in a state courtroom after a judge held him in contempt. The
district court granted in part, and denied in part, the deputies' motion for summary judgment on the ground of
official immunity and the deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
found that the deputies were protected by official immunity for seizing the mother. According to the court, the
deputy sheriffs did not subject the mother to excessive force by seizing her in the courtroom. Other deputies
restrained her son for resisting arrest allegedly sat on his back. The court noted that the deputies moved the
mother by wheelchair to another courtroom in a modest use of force. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FTCA-Federal Tort Claims
Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F.Supp.2d 785 (D.Md. 2008). A detainee brought an action against the federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) claiming negligence pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for his illegal detention for
over nine months. The district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to the role and duties of BOP personnel who were allegedly responsible for the continued
confinement of the detainee during his false imprisonment. The BOP asserted that the employees were
“investigative or law enforcement officers” for the purposes of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The detainee had been sentenced to 121 months of incarceration in a federal prison in Leavenworth, Kansas. The
district court granted the request of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia to reduce his sentence
to time served and ordered his release. The detainee was not released for approximately ten months after the
court’s order. (District of Columbia, and U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, KS)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.S.D. 2008). A state inmate brought an action under § 1983 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging corrections officials refused to make
various accommodations for his practice of the Jewish religion. The district court held that the State of South
Dakota, by accepting Federal prison funding, waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in claims for monetary
damages under RLUIPA. The court found that the officials' denial of the inmate's request for a permanent space
for Jewish inmates' religious services did not impose a substantial burden on his exercise of the inmate’s religion.
The court noted that the inmate admitted that Jewish inmates had sufficient space for their services and that lack
of a permanently designated room for their services did not prevent him from practicing his religion. (South
Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 535 F.Supp.2d 1033 (C.D.Cal. 2008). The estate of a deceased county jail inmate
brought a § 1983 action against a county and officials, claiming violation of the inmate's Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, arising out of denial of the inmate's request for an asthma inhalator. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of state
officials did not apply to the county sheriff. The court found that the estate stated a claim that the county was
liable when the inmate died allegedly because he was denied an asthma inhalator. The court held that the
allegation that the county “promulgated, created, maintained, ratified, condoned, and enforced a series of policies,
procedures, customs and practices which authorized the arbitrary punishment and infliction of pain, torture, and
physical abuse of certain inmates and detainees” was sufficient to state a claim. The court found that the estate
stated a claim that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to his medical
condition, through allegations that they ignored the inmate's plea to be furnished with his asthma inhalator. (Los
Angeles County Men's Central Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Smith v. Stanton, 545 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a state, a
probation officer, a probation supervisor, and a county, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated in
connection with the inclusion in a state pre-sentence report (PSR) of certain confidential psychiatric records. The
court held that claims against the state were barred by the state's sovereign immunity. According to the court, the
inclusion of the records in the PSR did not violate New York statutes governing PSRs and did not violate the
inmate's constitutional right to privacy. (Chemung County, New York)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

Stanley v. Muzio, 578 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against two state
judicial marshals, the Connecticut State Police and individual troopers and officers of the Connecticut State
Police, alleging false imprisonment and use of excessive force. Following dismissal of claims against the State
Police, troopers and officers, the marshals moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the marshals did not enjoy state statutory immunity from federal claims and
from the state law false imprisonment claim. The court found that the arrestee stated a § 1983 claim for false
imprisonment. According to the court, the marshals were not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity or qualified
immunity. The court noted that the arrestee’s claim for false imprisonment under Connecticut law, alleging that
two state judicial marshals kicked him in the head and back after he was forcibly restrained, were sufficient to
allege reckless, wanton, or malicious conduct that was outside the scope of the defendants' employment as state
judicial marshals. The court found that the arrestee's allegation that two state judicial marshals told him that he
had to remain in the courtroom for five minutes following a hearing on a restraining order obtained by his wife
and forcibly stopped him when he tried to leave after three minutes stated a § 1983 claim for false imprisonment.
(Connecticut State Judicial Marshals, Connecticut State Police)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a city and
its police officers alleging illegal arrest, excessive force, inadequate medical attention, and failure to train. The
district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The parties filed
cross-appeals. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals

XXII

24.62

court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the police
officers ignored the arrestee's complaints that his handcuffs were too tight, and whether the arrestee suffered
permanent nerve injury because of the handcuffing. The court noted that for purposes of determining the police
officers' qualified immunity from liability under § 1983 for use of excessive force, the arrestee's right to be free
from unduly tight handcuffing, and the contours of that right, were clearly established in 2003. The court also
found that it was clearly established that all law enforcement officials had an affirmative duty to intervene to
protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence,
and thus one of the officers was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where the officer was in close
proximity to the initial handcuffing, and was present thereafter. The arrestee had been taken into custody and
transported to the police station, where two blood alcohol tests were administered. Both tests showed no alcohol.
He was held for another 90 minutes, during which time he made several requests for someone to loosen his
handcuffs because his wrists were hurting. All requests were ignored. Eventually, the officers charged the arrestee
with Driving While Under the Influence to the Slightest Degree, and they released him on his own recognizance.
The charge was later dropped. Following his release, the arrestee went to an emergency room. A toxicology
screening report showed no drugs or alcohol. A doctor who treated the arrestee observed “multiple superficial
abrasions and ecchymosis” on both wrists. He diagnosed the arrestee with neurapraxia in both wrists, and a soft
tissue sprain of the right wrist. The pain and discomfort in the arrestee’s wrists did not subside, and it interfered
with his ability to practice as an orthodontist and to play golf. He was diagnosed with a permanent radial nerve
injury in his wrists that was caused by the handcuffing. (Las Cruces Police Department, New Mexico)
U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Williams v. Beltran, 569 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against a prison,
alleging violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by forcing him to shave
his beard, which he had worn for religious reasons. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
RLUIPA unambiguously conditions receipt of federal prison funds on the waiver of Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity, and the remedial clause in RLUIPA providing for “appropriate relief” was not sufficiently
broad to waive state sovereign immunity from money damages. The court noted that there are three main
exceptions to the broad grant of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment: first, Congress may
authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; second, a state may waive
its sovereign immunity by consenting to suit; and third, suit may be brought to enjoin a state official rather than
against the state itself. The court concluded that California had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity
from money damages under RLUIPA and absent the availability of monetary relief, the plaintiff lacked any
remedy for his alleged RLUIPA claim. (California State Prison Lancaster)
2009

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Austin v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 685 (D.Del. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action alleging a § 1983 claim for
inadequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and a state law medical negligence claim against a
medical service corporation under contract with the state to provide healthcare services at a prison. The district
court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the corporation that provided prison healthcare was not a
state actor entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the state prisoner's § 1983 claim. The court noted that
despite having been named in hundreds of § 1983 actions, the corporation had never been held to be an arm of the
state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. The court noted that the corporation was an autonomous actor and was
not immune from state taxation, and any judgment against the corporation would not be paid from the state
treasury. According to the court, although the corporation could not be held liable for allegedly medically
negligent acts of an employee under the theories of respondeat superior or vicarious liability, the corporation
could be directly liable for acts of the employee if the employee's acts were deemed the result of the corporation's
policy or custom that was so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights that the corporation could
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
The court noted that a “policy” of the corporation is made when a decision-maker possessing final authority to
establish a policy with respect to an allegedly violative action issues an official proclamation, policy or edict.
According to the court, the “custom” of the corporation can be proven by showing that a given course of conduct,
although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as to virtually constitute
law. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Wilmington, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Bailey v. Pataki, 636 F.Supp.2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Convicted sex offenders brought an action against state
officials, alleging that their involuntary psychiatric commitment deprived them of constitutional due process
protections. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for a stay pending
resolution of certain pending state court proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
allegations of the convicted sex offenders were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against state
officials for deprivation of the offenders' liberty interests in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment. The offenders alleged that: (1) they were involuntarily transferred to state-run mental institutions based
on the certification of doctors designated by the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New York
Department of Correctional Services, instead of independent, court-appointed doctors; (2) that some were never
served with a notice of petition for their involuntary commitment; (3) that notice was not provided to any of the
offenders' friends and family; (4) and that they were not provided an opportunity to request a pre-commitment
hearing and an opportunity to be heard. The court found that the procedural due process rights of the convicted
sex offenders, to certain pre-transfer procedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a
psychiatric evaluation by court-appointed doctors, was clearly established at the time of their involuntary
commitment and transfer from prison to a mental hospital, so as to preclude any claim of qualified immunity on
the part of New York officials. The court noted that the offenders were certified for involuntary commitment after
being examined for short periods of time lasting no more than 20 minutes, and once certified, all six offenders

XXII

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were transported in handcuffs and shackles where they were broadly evaluated for treatment. (New York State
Office of Mental Health, New York Department of Correctional Services)
U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment and
the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing
to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or indication
that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates, posed a risk
to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an investigation and
terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent and objectively
unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's rights.
The court held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate who was
sexually assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and Georgia constitution,
absent evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county did not have a policy or
custom of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under § 1983 to the inmate who was
sexually assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and jailers in proper
procedures for escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory liability on the § 1983 claim of
the inmate, where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any problems with jailers
improperly escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who committed the assault had been trained
previously on how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate contact with inmates.
During the time period in question, the county did not have a policy prohibiting a male jailer from escorting a
female inmate within the Jail. The court held that the county and sheriff had sovereign immunity from the state
law claims of the inmate, absent evidence that such immunity had been waived by an act of the General
Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims under
California law. The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who collided with the wall of a
safety cell and broke his neck, failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted the detainee from his holding
cell and used a stun gun and pepper spray on him following an incident in which the detainee rubbed water from
his toilet on his body, was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need for medical attention, as required to state
due process claim under § 1983. According to the court, the detainee failed to allege that the officer knew he was
suicidal and was not receiving medical care, or that the officer attempted to interfere with the detainee's receipt of
such medical attention. The court found that the detainee's allegations that the officer used a stun gun, a stun-type
shield and pepper spray in an attempted cell extraction while the detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding behind
his toilet were sufficient to state an excessive force claim under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for
the officer, even though the detainee had not responded to the officers' commands to come out of his cell. The
court noted that the law clearly established that police officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee who did not
pose a threat and who merely failed to comply with commands. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
pleaded that the city had a policy of using stun guns in such situations, as required to state a § 1983 Fourth
Amendment excessive force claim against the city. The detainee alleged that nine months prior to his assault, a
separate incident occurred that was similar. (City of Willows Police Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against a warden seeking
monetary damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The prisoner asserted violations of the Eighth
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) based on the failure to
provide him with kosher food which resulted in his not eating for eight days. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the warden. The prisoner appealed. The court held that the warden was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity on the prisoner's claim seeking monetary damages for the alleged violation of the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) for not providing him with kosher meals.
According to the court, even though the state accepted federal funds for its prisons, RLUIPA did not contain a
clear indication that receipt of federal prison funds was unambiguously conditioned on a state's consent to be sued
for monetary damages. The court held that there was no evidence that the warden knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety, as required to support the prisoner's claim against the warden for
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on failure to provide him
with kosher food. (Hiawatha Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730 (8th Cir 2009). A former state prisoner filed § 1983 action against the Secretary of
the South Dakota Department of Corrections (DOC) and two wardens, seeking money damages for
unconstitutionally prolonged incarceration based on violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause by the DOC's
retroactive withholding of the prisoner's mandatory good-time credits pursuant to a statute enacted after his sex
offense was committed. The district court granted the secretary and one warden qualified immunity, but denied
the other warden qualified immunity. The warden appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and remanded. The
court held that although the prison warden accepted service of the state prisoner's habeas petition challenging the
Department’s withholding of good-time credits, the warden was entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's
§ 1983 claims for money damages for unconstitutionally prolonged incarceration. According to the court, at the
time the warden accepted service he had no duty to review the prisoner's status to determine that he was entitled to
be released, and the warden lacked unilateral authority to restore good-time credits and release the prisoner.
(South Dakota Department of Corrections)

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U.S. District Court
LEGISLATIVE
IMMUNITY

Dewees v. Haste, 620 F.Supp.2d 625 (M.D.Pa. 2009). A former deputy warden brought an action against a county, a county prison warden, a county commissioner, and members of the county's prison salary board, alleging that
his position was eliminated in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the speech activities of the
deputy warden, who provided information to the county district attorney regarding the prison's food services contract and reported misappropriation of inmate funds to a county commissioner, were conducted pursuant to his
employment with the prison, precluding his First Amendment retaliation claims. The court noted that the employee handbook required the deputy warden to report any corrupt or unethical behavior or violations of rules or law.
According to the court, the county prison board's proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for eliminating the
deputy warden's position--that the county was seeking to cut employment-related expenses and the position had
been deemed expendable--was insufficient to show that the budget cuts were not for cause. The court held that the
county commissioner was entitled to legislative immunity on the former deputy warden's First Amendment retaliation claim where the commissioner's actions of recommending and voting for elimination of the deputy warden’s
position, as part of an effort to reduce the county's budget, was squarely within the sphere of his legislative work.
(Dauphin County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a parole agent and
others, alleging false arrest and unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims but the one against the parole agent for unlawful detention. The district court denied the agent’s motion for reconsideration and the agent appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the arrestee's 13-day confinement in jail without a probable cause hearing
violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the parole agent was the person responsible for ensuring
that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause hearing after his warrantless arrest for allegedly violating probation. The court held that the parole agent was not entitled to qualified immunity because he logged the arrestee
into jail incorrectly as a parole violator, which ensured that the arrestee would not receive a prompt probable
cause hearing. (Michigan Department of Corrections and Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against a sheriff's deputy under § 1983. The district court entered summary judgment for the
deputy and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that once the district court decided
that the detainee had shown excessive force, it could not then find that the deputy was qualifiedly immune because his use of excessive force was not in violation of clearly established law. But the court found that the deputy's kick to the detainee's face, which resulted in fractures, did not constitute excessive force. The court noted that
the deputy saw the detainee struggling with six other officers who were unable to restrain him, the detainee had
not yet been secured when the deputy kicked him, the deputy intended to kick the detainee in the arm rather than
the face, the detainee had grabbed the arm of another officer, and the officers made an immediate offer of medical
care. (Georgia)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Fleming v. Sharma, 605 F.Supp.2d 399 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). The wife of a deceased prisoner, individually and as
administratrix of the prisoner's estate, brought an action under § 1983 against a prison physician and a medical
director, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and seeking loss of consortium as a result of the prisoner's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison physician and medical director were deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the prisoner, who suffered from congestive heart
failure, and who died while under the defendants' care. The defendants allegedly failed to provide the prisoner
with medication to stabilize his heart condition, despite the recommendations of four different physicians that the
prisoner be treated with the medication. According to the court, the prison physician and the medical director were
not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the wife where the very nature of the action
called into question the reasonableness of the defendants' decision not to administer medication. (Mohawk Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an action against a probation officer, the state parole board, and state correctional facility employees, asserting that his constitutional
rights were violated by allegedly false information in his presentence report for a burglary conviction and in the
prison file which resulted in the inmate's classification in the state penal system at a higher level than was appropriate and in a sex offender designation. The district court held that: (1) the board was entitled to absolute immunity; (2) employees were not liable in their official capacities on claims for compensatory relief but the employees
sued in their individual capacities were liable; (3) the inmate stated a violation of a protected liberty interest in
parole release under the state constitution; (4) the inmate stated a claim under the state constitution for violation of
a protected liberty interest in not being required to undergo sex offender treatment; and (5) the inmate adequately
alleged a physical injury required to recover for mental or emotional injury. (Kanawha County Adult Probation
Department, West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole, Huttonsville Corr’l Center, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
OFFICIAL CAPACITY
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C. 2009). Pretrial detainees, allegedly assaulted by fellow
inmates, brought a suit against the former Director of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections and a
former jail warden in both their official and individual capacities, and against the District of Columbia. The detainees sought damages under § 1983 for alleged Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the detainees' § 1983 official capacity claims against the former Director and former jail warden were redundant to the claims against the District of Columbia, warranting dismissal.
The court noted that claims brought against government employees in their official capacity are treated as claims

24.65

against the employing government and serve no independent purpose when the government is also sued. The
detainees alleged that before the scalding attacks that injured them, one of the very assailants had committed a
similar scalding attack using water heated in an unguarded microwave, and that the locations where their assaults
occurred were inadequately staffed with corrections officers and resulted in the assaults taking place without any
officers in the vicinity. The court held that these allegations were sufficient to plead conditions of detention that
posed a substantial risk of serious harm, as required to state a failure-to-protect claim against the Director of the
District of Columbia Department of Corrections and the jail warden. The court found that the detainees' allegation
that the Director and jail warden were deliberately indifferent to negligent supervision of correctional officers and
lack of staff training, was sufficient to state a § 1983 failure to train claim violative of their due process rights.
The detainees alleged that the warden and Director were at the top of the “chain of command” at the jail, that they
had been aware of violence issues for many years, and that they had been instructed to take action against violence on numerous occasions. The district court denied qualified immunity for the Director and jail warden, noting that the detainees' due process rights against deliberate indifference were clearly established at the time of
violent scalding attacks by fellow inmates. (District of Columbia Jail)
U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner brought an action against a state prosecutor, the general counsel of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC) and the warden of a Georgia prison,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights by having him transferred from federal to state custody at the end of
his federal sentence. The district court granted the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the
ground they were entitled to absolute immunity. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for his role in the
plaintiff's transfer. But the court held that the general counsel of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC)
and the warden of a Georgia prison were not entitled to absolute immunity from liability under § 1983 and state
law for causing the issuance of a second state warrant against the prisoner prior to his release from federal prison,
and issuing a notice of surrender to the prisoner and threatening further prosecution following his release. The
court noted that the general counsel's role as legal advisor to the DOC and the warden's role as chief jailer of the
prison where the prisoner was incarcerated were not roles intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process. (Jackson State Prison, Georgia Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Havard v. Puntuer, 600 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D.Mich. 2009). The guardian of a minor child, who was born in a county jail while her mother was incarcerated there, brought a § 1983 action against jail employees for injuries sustained during and immediately after the birthing process. The district court denied the employees’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the minor child was a “person” within the Fourteenth Amendment at the time of her §
1983 claims against jail employees, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of alleged unconstitutional conduct
during and immediately after the birthing process. The child was allegedly injured by the employees' failure to
provide medical attention to the mother in violation of the child's due process rights, such that the child was not in
a hospital at the time of her birth, the physicians and the facilities of the hospital were not available to resuscitate
her when she was born, and she was not resuscitated until she arrived at the hospital following transport from the
jail, at which time she had no respiration or heartbeat. The court found that deputies and a nurse at the county jail
were not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 action brought on behalf of the minor child, where the
constitutional duty to care for helpless infants who have newly come into the world, including the duty to care for
them by anticipation, during the birthing process, was clearly established at the time of the birth. The court noted
that the defendants allegedly left the mother in her cell for two hours even though they were aware that she was in
active labor, crying out for help, and that, once called, paramedics did not arrive until the child was being delivered and did not have the equipment to resuscitate the child when she was delivered. (Wayne County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Hughes v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 594 F.Supp.2d 1226 (D.Colo. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), the Colorado Parole Board, and the operator of a
residential community corrections facility, alleging failure to adequately respond to the prisoner's mental health
needs in violation of his constitutional rights and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court
dismissed the complaint in part and denied dismissal in part. The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims
against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) and the Colorado Parole Board were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, where Colorado had not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, Congress had not abrogated
state sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims, and both the CDOC and Board were state agencies. The court held
that the prisoner's allegations of physical injury merely stemmed directly from his alleged mental illness and constituted only common manifestations of depression and anxiety, and thus were insufficient under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to state a claim for money damages against the CDOC and the Board for alleged ADA
violations. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to plead a claim against the CDOC
for discriminatorily denying the prisoner access to medical care in violation of Title II of the ADA. The prisoner
alleged that the CDOC maintained a policy of assuring that inmates and parolees received required mental health
treatment, that the CDOC intentionally failed to provide him mental health treatment while he was at the correctional facility, and that the CDOC denied his access to such treatment while on parole. The court noted that Title
II of the ADA does not categorically bar a state parole board from making an individualized assessment of the
future dangerousness of an inmate by taking into account the inmate's disability. (Sterling Correctional Facility,
Independence House, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Jennings v. Hart, 602 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2009). The administrator of an inmate's estate brought an action
against a sheriff and several other current or former officers in a county sheriff's department, alleging claims under § 1983 and a state wrongful death act for one officer’s alleged wrongful denial of medical care to an inmate in
the county jail. The district court denied the officers’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity.
The district court held that the officers lacked the discretion to keep the inmate at the jail and deny her the oppor-

24.66

tunity to be seen by a neurologist or other medical professional for ten days following referral by a nurse practitioner. The officers allegedly ignored the inmate's repeated requests for help and worsening physical condition,
including severe headaches, dizziness, pressure in her head, loss of appetite, and fluid drainage in her ears. By the
time the officers contacted outside medical professionals, the inmate was suffering from brain abscesses and a
stroke which lead to her death. (Culpeper County Jail, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Jones v. Carroll, 628 F.Supp.2d 551 (D.Del. 2009). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison employees, alleging that they failed to protect him from an attack by another inmate. The prison employees moved
for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The inmate moved for reconsideration. On reconsideration, the district court found that summary judgment was precluded for certain issues. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an inmate's medical condition
after having been stabbed by another inmate excused his failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court also found that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
inmate told prison officials about the violent threats he received from another inmate, precluded summary judgment on the inmate's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim brought under § 1983. The court held that prison
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities in the § 1983 action alleging that
officials failed to protect the inmate from serious harm from another inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that case law put officials on notice that failure to protect an inmate from violence at the
hands of another inmate violated an inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center,
Delaware Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009). The personal representatives of a pre-trial detainee who died
of alcohol withdrawal in a jail brought an action under § 1983 and state law against a county commission, sheriff,
chief corrections officer, and jailer. The district court denied the corrections jailer's motion to dismiss and denied
reconsideration. The jailer appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the jailer was not entitled to absolute
immunity under Alabama law. (Baldwin County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner in custody at a county jail filed a pro se § 1983
action, alleging jail guards' conduct in shooting him with a taser gun amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that a jail
guard who stood by while another guard shot a taser gun at the inmate in response to a superior officer's order,
after the inmate refused an order to get out of bed, could not be liable in the inmate's § 1983 excessive force
claim, where the bystander guard had no realistic opportunity to stop the other guard from discharging the taser
gun. The court held that the guard was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability for his use of a taser gun
against the prisoner, where, at the time of the conduct, the prisoner was allegedly prone on his bed, weakened, and
docile. According to the court, the guard allegedly used the taser without warning the prisoner first, and the prisoner allegedly did not have enough time to respond to the guard's order to get out of bed, so that no reasonable
guard would think he was justified in using the taser gun under the circumstances as alleged. (Jerome Combs
Detention Center, Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Plaintiffs brought a class action against a county,
sheriff, and former sheriff, seeking injunctive relief and damages for alleged violations of his federal and state
constitutional rights resulting from strip and/or visual body cavity searches of detainees and inmates of the county
jail. The district granted summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that the policy of the county
sheriff's office of subjecting to strip search all pretrial detainees who are ordered released as a result of court appearances, upon their return from the courthouse and prior to their being returned to the county jail's general population for administrative reasons pending release, violated the detainees' Fourth Amendment rights. The court
found that there was no evidence that pretrial detainees at the county jail were subjected to strip searches in small
groups as a means of punishment, as required to establish that the strip searches violated the detainees' due process rights. According to the court, pre-arraignment arrestees were not similarly situated to post-arraignment detainees, such that the practice of providing privacy for pre-arraignment strip and/or visual body cavity searches,
but not for such searches of post-arraignment detainees, did not violate equal protection, notwithstanding the contention that the interest in maintaining the privacy of one's body cavities was the same for both arrestees and detainees. The court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time the county
sheriff's office maintained the policy allowing for group strip and visual body cavity searches of post-arraignment
detainees of the county jail, it was not clearly established that such searches violated the detainees' Fourth
Amendment rights. (Kern County Sheriff's Department, Central Receiving Facility, Ridgecrest, Mojave, and
Lerdo facilities, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, deputies, and board of county commissioners alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs after the detainee died while in police custody. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on qualified immunity grounds. The plaintiff
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arresting officers and custodial officers had no reason to suspect that the detainee, who was intoxicated, posed a risk of heart attack and death, as required to support
a claim that the officers violated the Fourteenth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to the detainee's
serious medical needs. (Cleveland County Detention Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009). The guardian of an incapacitated detainee brought a § 1983
action on behalf of the detainee against a supervising detention facility officer, a practical nurse, and other detention facility officers, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs. The district court denied

24.67

qualified immunity to the defendants and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the supervising officer could not have reasonably relied on the practical nurse's opinion that the detainee did not require
hospitalization and, thus, was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officer was aware of the
cocktail of potent drugs the detainee had consumed and that circumstances strongly suggested he did not consume
the drugs in prescribed dosages, the officer was aware the detainee exhibited symptoms of extreme intoxication,
and the officer knew or reasonably should have known that the practical nurse based his assessment on the faulty
assumption that the detainee was under the influence of alcohol, not drugs. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the deputies' and sergeant's subjective knowledge of the
detainee's medical need, and the care that the nurse provided to the detainee. The court also found that a sergeant
who was trained in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and who made no attempt to resuscitate the detainee was
not entitled to qualified immunity, since the sergeant was aware of the detainee's medical need and was capable of
providing assistance, but failed to do so. (Garland County Adult Detention Center, Arkansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the director of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), and a corrections officer, alleging that
while giving birth to her child she was forced to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to her
hospital bed in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the corrections officer’s conduct in forcing the inmate to go through the final stages of labor with both legs shackled to
her hospital bed constituted “deliberate indifference” in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The appeals court
held that the inmate, in the final stages of labor, had a “clearly established” right not to be shackled absent clear
and convincing evidence that she was a security or flight risk, and thus a government official would not be protected from § 1983 liability for violating that right based on qualified immunity. (Arkansas Department of Correction, McPherson Unit)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Owens-Ali v. Pennell, 672 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.Del. 2009). A pro se state prisoner, a Moorish American National
adherent, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) against prison officials, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that the officials violated his
constitutional rights when they denied his request for a religious diet, and that the officials retaliated against him
for his attempts to exercise his religious beliefs. The prisoner requested counsel. The court held that the prisoner's
claims under § 1983 and RLUIPA for monetary damages against prison officials in their official capacities were
essentially claims against the state, and thus those claims were barred by the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court held that prison supervisory officials could not be held liable under § 1983 for alleged violations of
the prisoner's constitutional rights in connection with his request for a religious diet absent a showing that those
officials were aware of his allegations and remained “deliberately indifferent” to his plight. The court found that
the prisoner's action was not so factually or legally complex that requesting an attorney to represent the prisoner
was warranted. The court noted that the prisoner's filings in this case demonstrated his ability to articulate his
claims and represent himself. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison librarian, claiming that her failure to allow him access to a comb-binding machine violated his First Amendment right of access
to the courts. The district court granted summary judgment to the inmate, and after a bench trial, awarded the
inmate $1,500 in compensatory damages. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed, and the librarian's petition for
a rehearing en banc was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted the librarian's petition for a writ of
certiorari, vacated the panel opinion, and remanded. On remand, the appeals court reversed and remanded, finding
that the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, it was objectively legally reasonable
for the prison librarian to conclude that her denial of access to the comb-binding machine would not hinder the
inmate's capability to file his petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, and thus
the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 suit in light of the Supreme Court's flexible rules for pro se filings, which did not require and perhaps did not even permit comb-binding. (Snake River
Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 558 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2009). A discharged prison guard sued the
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) and its commissioner under § 1983, claiming that a regulation
prohibiting her from associating with present or former inmates violated her First Amendment associational rights
and her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court dismissed the case and the prison guard
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the First Amendment associational and Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights of the prison guard were not violated when she was discharged for violating a
DOC regulation prohibiting non-approved association with a former inmate. The court found that the DOC's legitimate interest in preserving prison security was reasonably advanced by prohibiting a guard-former prisoner relationship, and that the DOC's interest outweighed the degree of intrusion into the guard's private life imposed by
the regulation. The court held that the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) was entitled to sovereign
immunity, and that the Commissioner of the DOC had qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 claim because it was not clearly established that enforcement of the regulation would be an unlawful act. (Massachusetts
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees and multiple prison facilities, alleging violations of their
constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds and for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that state prison regulations which permitted the confiscation of certain types of mail and prohibited

24.68

“copyrighting” of names served a legitimate and neutral government purpose, and thus did not violate the prisoners' constitutional rights. The court held that the prisoners' § 1983 claims against hearing officers relating to prison
misconduct proceedings were barred by absolute judicial immunity. The court held that a prisoner's allegation in
his complaint that an MDOC employee did not refer him for psychiatric treatment after he attempted to commit
suicide sufficiently stated a § 1983 claim for an Eighth Amendment violation based on denial of medical treatment. (Michigan Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F.Supp.2d 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging due process violations in connection with a disciplinary hearing and violations of his constitutional rights relative to his temporary removal
from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a state prison correction officers' captain, correction officer, and/or prison counselor were personally involved in the temporary removal of the Jewish prisoner from a kosher cold alternative diet (CAD) program. The court held that DOCS employees were not entitled to qualified immunity from
the prisoner's § 1983 procedural due process claim that he was denied the opportunity to call witnesses and to hear
and respond to evidence presented against him at a disciplinary hearing. The court noted that at the time of the
hearing, it was clearly established that the prisoner was entitled to advance written notice of disciplinary charges,
an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense, and a written statement by a fact finder of evidence relied on and reasons for
the disciplinary action. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 claims against correctional officials, a prison warden, a prison's correctional officer, and a physician, and medical battery and medical
malpractice claims against the physician, relating to strip searches, x-rays, rectal examinations, and exploratory
surgery to detect and recover suspected contraband. The district court dismissed the suit and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the digital
rectal examinations were not unreasonable where the procedures were the direct culmination of a series of searches that began when a metal detector used to scan the prisoner's person gave a positive reading, the prisoner had
two normal bowel movements before the searches were conducted, a physician examined him upon arrival at the
hospital and found him to be asymptomatic, and several lab tests were found to be “within normal limits.” The
court found that the exploratory surgery of the abdomen of the prisoner was unreasonable where the surgery required total anesthesia, surgical invasion of the abdominal cavity, and two days of recovery in the hospital. The
court noted that the surgery was conducted despite several indications of the absence of contraband, including the
results of two monitored bowel movements and two rectal examinations. The court found that correctional officers' conduct, in forcing the prisoner to undergo an invasive abdominal surgery, was a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, such that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability.
(Bayamón 501 Unit of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections, and Río Piedras Medical Center)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla. 2009). A pro se inmate at a county jail, who professed to follow the Muslim faith, brought a § 1983 action against a former county sheriff, the jail's director of program services, and the jail's former and current directors of food services, alleging that the defendants' acts or omissions
abridged his First Amendment religious rights. The inmate sought preliminary injunctive relief. The district court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that: (1) the fact that organized Muslim
religious services were not provided at the jail did not amount to deprivation of the inmate's rights under the Free
Exercise Clause; (2) the sheriff and the program services director were entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's claim that a policy restricting religious headwear violated the First Amendment; (3) the fact that Jewish
inmates may have been permitted to wear religious headwear did not render the no-headwear policy unconstitutional; (4) a policy preventing inmates' use of non-breakaway prayer beads did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment rights; (5) a policy banning the possession of prayer rugs by inmates did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment rights; (6) the revocation of the inmate's Kosher diet due to his non-compliance with that diet did not
constitute a violation of his First Amendment rights; and (7) the inmate was not entitled to preliminary injunctive
relief. The court noted that the jail depends entirely on volunteer religious leaders and there were no volunteer
leaders from the Muslim faith. (Monroe County Detention Center, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009). A prison inmate brought a civil rights action
challenging prison officials' refusal to allow him to participate in religious services while he was on cell restriction, and refusal to make a chapel available for religious services due to security concerns allegedly presented
by holding such services in the chapel. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court dismissed as moot in part, reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded.
The court held that the state-wide cessation, in all correctional facilities in Texas, of the policy of preventing general-population prisoners on cell restriction from attending religious services had the effect of mooting the civil
rights claim. The court found that the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) did not
create an individual-capacity cause of action in favor of the prison inmate against prison officials who had denied
him access to a prison chapel. According to the court, RLUIPA did not provide clear notice that, by accepting
federal funds, the state was waiving its sovereign immunity from liability for such monetary damages. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact on the inmate's claims for injunctive relief challenging the denial of access to a chapel. The inmate alleged that his exercise of religion was substantially burdened because he could not use the prison chapel where he could kneel in front of an alter in view of
a cross, and due to his being able to attend religious services only at other locations in the prison that were not
specifically designed for Christian worship. (Robertson Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

24.69

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2009). An arrestee who was stopped by a city police officer for a
traffic violation and arrested after the officer mistakenly identified him as an individual who had nine unpaid
parking tickets and a warrant out for his arrest, brought a § 1983 action against the city and a prosecutor seeking
relief on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals who had been arrested by the city for parking violations. The arrestee alleged that the city had an unconstitutional policy of arresting people for not paying their
parking tickets. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The arrestee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the fact that an otherwise reasonable arrest was not for an
“arrestable” offense would not make it unconstitutional, that an arrest for a “nonjailable” offense would not violate the Fourth Amendment, and the prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity from damages for her action in
filing motion for an arrest warrant. (City of Peoria, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). Two inmates each brought an action against state prison officials, asserting various claims of interference with their free exercise of religion under the First Amendment and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the officials' motions for summary judgment in part, and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held: (1) the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from
imposition of substantial burdens on their religious exercise not justified by compelling state interests was a valid
exercise of Congress's Spending Clause authority; (2) the section of RLUIPA conditioning a state's acceptance of
federal funds on its consent to suit for appropriate relief did not unambiguously encompass monetary damages so
as to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for monetary claims by acceptance of the federal money; (3)
the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from substantial burdens on religious exercise was not a statute prohibiting discrimination within the meaning of the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 (CRREA); (4) the
inmate made a threshold showing of a substantial burden on his religious exercise by alleging that officials denied
his request to possess and use a succah and that the succah was a mandatory part of the Sukkot Festival and essential to the practice of his Jewish faith; but (5) the officials did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his request for additional weekly group religious and language study time; and (6) the officials
did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his request to have and use a tape player in
his cell for religious language studies. The court noted that RLUIPA promoted the general welfare by furthering
society's goal of rehabilitating inmates and respecting individual religious worship. (S. Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wesolowski v. Washburn, 615 F.Supp.2d 126 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections employees, alleging that the employees violated his rights by interfering with his ability to send outgoing mail. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court
held that the employees did not violate the prisoner's right of access to the courts protected under the First
Amendment when they correctly determined that certain mail did not qualify as “legal mail” under applicable
corrections department regulations, and rejected certain letters and other items that the prisoner sought to mail
because of his noncompliance with the regulations. The court noted that, at most, the prisoner was inconvenienced
and had some delays in his outgoing mail. The court held that the employees did not violate the prisoner's right to
the free flow of mail as protected under the First Amendment when they correctly determined that certain mail did
not qualify as “legal mail” and rejected certain letters and other items. According to the court, all the employees
did was to require the prisoner's compliance with regulations concerning outgoing mail. The court found that even
if the employees had incorrectly determined that some of the prisoner's outgoing mail was not legal mail, and thus
did not qualify for free postage, employees were entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 action
because the employees did not violate any of the prisoner's clearly established rights of which a reasonable person
in the employees' position would have known. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
REASONABLE BELIEF

Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force case against four
corrections officers, arising out of a beating which occurred while the detainee was being held in a booking room
pending completion of the booking process, but after he had been surrendered to jailers by his arresting officer.
The district court granted summary judgment to two of the officers based on qualified immunity. The detainee,
and the officers whose motions for summary judgment were denied, appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the district court's error, in not applying the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test to the officer whose actions the court found violated the higher Fourteenth
Amendment due process “shocks-the-conscience” standard, was harmless. (Montgomery County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2010). A juvenile who had been adjudicated as delinquent brought an action against a residential maximum security center and several staff members for a
spinal cord injury that occurred during a “pick-up” football game at the center. The district court granted summary
judgment for the center and its staff. The juvenile appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the district court did not err in granting Eleventh Amendment immunity to the youth development center,
which was a detention facility for juveniles run by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), where
the DPW was an administrative agency without existence apart from the Commonwealth. The court found that
there was not a sufficient likelihood that serious harm would result from juveniles playing tackle football without
protective equipment, as required for the juvenile to establish that the center and its officials violated his Eighth
Amendment rights. (New Castle Youth Development Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Brawley v. Washington, 712 F.Supp.2d 1208 (W.D.Wash. 2010). A female former inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the Washington State Department of Corrections and various officials, seeking relief from violations of
her constitutional rights that she alleged occurred during the birth of her first child. The Department filed a motion

24.70

for summary judgment, which the district court granted in part and denied in part. The court held that the female
inmate, who was shackled to a hospital bed while giving birth, showed, from an objective standpoint, that she had
a serious medical need and was exposed to an unnecessary risk of harm for the purposes of her § 1983 Eighth
Amendment claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by material issues of fact as to whether
officers were deliberately indifferent to the risks of harm to the inmate and her serious medical needs when they
shackled her to a hospital bed. According to the court, the inmate showed that shackling inmates while they were
in labor was clearly established as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, thereby barring the Department of Corrections' qualified immunity defense. (Washington State Corrections Center for Women)
U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 938 (D.Ariz. 2010). A state prisoner brought a pro se action against a
state, department of corrections, its current and former directors, and a company to which his services were contracted while in prison, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act,
and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA). The court held that the state, the department of corrections, and its
current and former directors had Eleventh Amendment immunity as to the prisoner's ADA disability discrimination claims relating to the tomato picking he performed for a private business through a prison program. The court
found that the prisoner stated a claim under Title II of the ADA. Americans with Disabilities Act with allegations
that: (1) the prison program under which prisoners picked tomatoes for a private business offered six times the
wages paid for other prison jobs, as well as bonuses, and job skills not otherwise available; (2) that because of his
disability, he was denied access to the program and the ability to obtain the benefits; and (3) that prison and state
officials intentionally discriminated against him by denying and ignoring his requests for accommodations.
The court found that the private company that contracted with the state prison for prisoners to perform tomato
picking on behalf of the company was not a “public entity” and, thus, it was not subject to Title II of the ADA.
According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that state, prison, and state officials received direct federal financial assistance and therefore his claim stated a Rehabilitation Act claim against the state and these officials.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the private company that contracted with the state prison for
prisoners to perform tomato picking on behalf of the company received an indirect financial benefit and competitive advantage from paying lower wages, was too vague and conclusory, as well as implausible, to satisfy the
short and plain statement requirement for stating a claim that company violated the Rehabilitation Act. (Arizona
Department of Corrections, Arizona Correctional Industries, Eurofresh)

U.S. District Court
LEGISLATIVE
IMMUNITY
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A juvenile and his parents brought an action against juvenile court judges, a private attorney, juvenile probation staff, the owner of construction company, property owners, and others. They alleged that, in connection with a scheme to divert juvenile offenders to newly constructed
privately-owned juvenile detention facilities in return for kickbacks, the defendants violated the juvenile's constitutional rights. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants engaged in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy, and alleged false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that the judge was not entitled to immunity for his alleged non-judicial conduct and was not entitled to legislative immunity for budgetary actions he took in his role as president judge. The court held that the
juvenile lacked standing to assert a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against
the defendants because the juvenile asserted that he suffered great emotional distress and loss of earning capacity
based on the education that he missed while in custodial detention, which did not demonstrate any concrete monetary loss. (Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials,
asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion
for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoner's pro
se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's kosher meal program and the alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot by the prisoner’s
transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the particular prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole. The court found that the prison chaplain
was entitled to qualified immunity from liability, where, consistent with his job function, he received the prisoner's request for kosher meals, checked the prisoner's eligibility, and was informed that the prisoner was a Muslim
and therefore not eligible for kosher meals. Once the mistake was discovered, the chaplain and other prison officials worked as quickly as possible to ensure that the prisoner began receiving kosher meals. (Alger Maximum
Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F.Supp.2d 1127 (D.Colo. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, proceeding in
forma pauperis, against prison officials, alleging that she was raped by a lieutenant while incarcerated, and asserting various due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment violations. The officials moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether the state prisoner's placement in administrative segregation for a period of one year violated her due process rights could not
be determined at the motion to dismiss stage of the prisoner's § 1983 action against prison officials, because of a
factual dispute as to whether the duration of confinement was atypical and significant. According to the court, the
contours of constitutional law were sufficiently clear that the state prison officials were on notice that assignment
of a prisoner to administrative segregation under conditions that imposed a significant and atypical hardship in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life could give rise to a liberty interest protected by due process, and,
thus, the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 action, with respect to her due
process claim.( Denver Women's Correctional Facility, Colorado)

24.71

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
denied the officials' motion to dismiss. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that the right of the prisoner to receive visits from his children was not clearly established and the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the restriction was temporary and the prisoner had
violated prison rules by participating in a sexually-oriented telephone call involving a minor. (Corcoran State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Durrenberger v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 757 F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.Tex. 2010). A hearing impaired prison
visitor brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), alleging failure to accommodate his disability during visits in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act.
The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and granted summary judgment, in part, for the
visitor. The court held that acceptance by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) of federal financial
assistance waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from the prison visitor's action alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, where the Act expressly stated that acceptance of federal funds
waived immunity. The court held that summary judgment as to compensatory damages was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to the amount of damages suffered by the visitor by the prison's failure to accommodate his disability. The court found that a permanent injunction enjoining future violations of the Rehabilitation
Act by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) was warranted in the hearing impaired prison visitor's
action alleging failure to accommodate, where TDCJ had not accommodated the visitor in the past, continued to
not provide accommodations and gave no indication that it intended to provide any in the future. (Hughes Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hardy v. 3 Unknown Agents, 690 F.Supp.2d 1074 (C.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison physicians, alleging that the physicians failed to provide adequate medical care, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, and that one physician retaliated against him for filing grievances, in violation of the First
Amendment. The physicians moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in part
and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner had an ear infection, constituting a serious medical need, while under the prison physician's
care, and, if so, whether the physician was deliberately indifferent to that need. The court found that a state prison
physician was not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 claim alleging that the physician provided inadequate medical care for his ear infection, where a reasonable physician would have understood that
failure to examine and treat the prisoner's ear in response to his complaints about ear pain and difficulty hearing
would violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the state prison physician's prescribing of medication for the prisoner's psoriasis without actually examining the prisoner's back did not amount to deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious medical needs, as would violate the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
whether or not the physician's prescribing of medication without a back examination was sound medical practice,
it was hardly a failing of constitutional magnitude. The court held that the prison physician was not deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in refusing to approve a
“lay-in” or reduction of duties based on the prisoner's back problems. The court found that the reasons given for
the physician's decision, including lack of documentation as to whether the prisoner underwent back surgery and
his observations of the prisoner, were reasonable. (California State Prison-Los Angeles County)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010). Following a pretrial detainee's death from
alcohol withdrawal while in a county jail, the detainee's estate brought an action against the county, sheriff, police
officers, and others under § 1983 and state law, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed and reversed in part. The court held that allegations supported a claim that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, but that the sheriff and others did not have actual knowledge of the
detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail. The court found that allegations supported a claim that the
sheriff and jail administrators were deliberately indifferent. According to the court, for the purposes of a jailer's
claim of qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that he was deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's
serious medical needs under the due process clause, it was clearly established at the time of the detainee’s confinement that a jail official who was aware of, but ignored, dangers of acute alcohol withdrawal and waited for an
emergency before obtaining medical care was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights. The
court found that the complaint's specific allegations that the sheriff and jail administrators who were responsible
for management and administration of the jail had customs or policies of improperly screening inmates for alcohol
withdrawal and improperly handling inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs, together with its factual detail concerning a prior similar incident, satisfied the pleading standards for stating a § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause based on supervisor liability. (Lawrence
County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Jaundoo v. Clarke, 690 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.Mass. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against various Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) and UMass Correctional Health Service (UMCH) officials and employees, alleging that the defendants unlawfully deprived him of necessary medical care by confiscating his crutches
while he was incarcerated in a maximum security prison. The prisoner moved for leave to file an amended complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that UMCH had sovereign
immunity from the prisoner's proposed negligence and medical malpractice claims and that a UMCH employee
had immunity from liability for her alleged negligence and medical malpractice, under the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act (MTCA). The court held that the prisoner stated a deliberate indifference claim under § 1983 against a
Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) employee, a correctional officer, by alleging that the officer
intentionally created and submitted an incident report in which he falsely claimed that he had seen prisoner run-

24.72

ning, for the purpose of depriving the prisoner of his crutches. The court found that supervisory and failure to train
claims were precluded, where officials and employees did not directly participate in the decision to deprive the
prisoner of his crutches. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, UMass Correctional Health Service, MCICedar Junction)
U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Johnson v. Deloach, 692 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ala. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison supervisory officials and correctional officers, challenging the constitutionality of actions taken against him
during his incarceration. The prisoner alleged that an officer, without justification, repeatedly slapped him about
his face and head causing the back of his head to strike the wall, and the prisoner “became dazed and disoriented....” The officer allegedly stopped slapping the prisoner and then grabbed the prisoner around his throat and
began choking him while shoving his back and head against the wall. The officer then allegedly stopped choking
the prisoner, lifted the prisoner off the floor and slammed him to the floor causing his back, head and left leg to hit
a pole protruding from the wall. According to the prisoner, two other officers watched these actions and failed to
intervene. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court
held that state prison officials were absolutely immune from the prisoner's § 1983 claims brought against them in
their official capacities, since Alabama had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Congress had not
abrogated Alabama's immunity. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding the need for the use of force against the state prisoner by a correctional officer and the amount
of force used by the officer, as to whether the officer acted “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm, and as to
whether two other officers witnessed the use of excessive force and failed to intervene. The court noted that a
correctional officer who is present at a scene and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer's use of excessive force can be held personally liable under § 1983 for his nonfeasance.(Draper Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Johnson v. Roberts, 721 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.Kan. 2010). A former county jail inmate brought an action against a
deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners, alleging use of excessive force when the deputy used a stun
gun on the inmate. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that
the use of a stun gun to subdue the county jail inmate was reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate had placed a towel in front of a security camera in violation of
a jail rule, and when deputies responded to the inmate's cell to confiscate the towel and the inmate's property box,
the inmate refused to hand over the box and either dropped or threw the box to the floor and refused an order to
pick it up, placing the deputy in the position of bending down to retrieve the box from directly in front of the noncompliant inmate. The court found that the use of a stun gun was not a clearly established violation of the Eighth
Amendment at the time of the incident and thus the deputy, sheriff, and county board of commissioners were
entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the deputy used the stun gun to ensure the inmate's compliance with orders and not to punish the inmate. (Miami County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an action
against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various civil rights violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his release
from the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and the survivors moved for
leave to amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a decision to arrest the individual for
being under the influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol use and knowledge that the individual was
being medicated for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a “kickout” charge so that he would be released from
jail six hours later. The court found that the arresting officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a special
relationship with the arrestee, similar to the special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to create a
duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's accidental
drowning following his release from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the arrestee needed medical attention and that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such attention.
The court held that the county, city, and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a California Tort
Claims Act section related to liability of public entities and employees for the release of prisoners, for the wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic decision to release the arrestee from the county jail, but not as to the
defendants' ministerial acts after the initial decision to release the arrestee. The court noted that the arrestee had a
lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and had trouble walking, and had a seizure while he was in a holding cell.
The arrestee’s body was found floating in the San Joaquin River, approximately two miles west of the county jail,
shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). A parolee, who had never been convicted of a sex offense,
brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and officials, alleging that defendants
denied him due process when they imposed and enforced sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision following his term of incarceration. The district court found that the procedural protections given to the parolee were constitutionally insufficient and ordered that the parolee be provided with an appropriate hearing.
Cross-appeals were taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court
held that: (1) the procedure provided by TDCJ to parolees who had never been convicted of a sex offense and
faced possible sex offender registration and therapy violated due process; (2) a parolee subject to imposition and
enforcement of sex-offender conditions as part of mandatory supervision was owed a hearing that meets due process requirements; (3) the state was not required to provide counsel to a parolee facing registration as a sex offender and sex therapy as part of mandatory supervision; and (4) TDCJ officials were not entitled to immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment from the parolee's claim for injunctive relief. (Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Parole Division)

24.73

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against corrections
officials, alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment as the
result of officials' deliberate indifference. The district court denied one official's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court
held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the official's motion for summary judgment, and
that the official was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the state prison records specialist was
entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim, alleging that the records specialist was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's unlawful incarceration beyond the expiration of his maximum
term of imprisonment. The court noted that the records specialist responded quickly to the prisoner's requests for
information about his commitment records, she communicated the prisoner's concerns to her supervisor, the sentencing judge, and the state Department of Corrections (DOC) central office, and there was no showing that she
ever ignored the prisoner's claims or failed to follow established DOC policy. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Albion)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010) affirmed in part 678 F.3d 500. The guardian of the estate
of a pretrial detainee, who allegedly suffered from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a city and city
police officers, alleging civil rights violations in connection with the detainee's arrest and subsequent release from
custody without being provided access to mental health treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that city police officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim brought by the mother of the detainee, for unreasonably
failing to provide the detainee with mental health care under the Fourth Amendment, as it was clearly established
that pretrial detainees were entitled to mental health treatment for serious mental health conditions. On appeal
(678 F.3d 500), the appeals court held that the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The district
court also denied qualified immunity for the city police officer who released the detainee, where the law was
clearly established that the officer could not release the detainee from custody in a manner that increased her risk
of harm. (Chicago Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A female inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections
officials regarding injuries suffered by the inmate at the hands of a corrections officer alleged to have sexually
assaulted the inmate. The superintendent and deputy superintendent for security moved to dismiss claims that they
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's personal safety. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that the inmate's allegations against the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security, claiming that they
were deliberately indifferent to her rights and were responsible for creating or maintaining policies or practices
that failed to prevent her from being repeatedly raped and assaulted by a corrections officer, stated a claim for 8th
and 14th Amendment violations. The court noted that the complaint alleged that the officials were responsible for
determining where inmates were to be housed and the assignment of guards, and in conjunction with another
official, investigation and response to complaints of staff misconduct. The court found that the superintendent and
deputy superintendent for security were not entitled to qualified immunity, given the extent of the alleged sexual
abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the number of questionable, if not unintelligible, decisions made
with respect to the inmate during the course of an investigation. (Taconic Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials for
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious practices and
retaliated against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's claims for damages under RLUIPA against state
prison officials in their official capacity were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, since RLUIPA
did not provide a clear statement requiring states to waive immunity from liability for money damages. According
to the court, the issue of whether prison officials violated the prisoner's rights under the Free Exercise Clause by
failing to reasonably accommodate his Druid religious faith could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss phase
because of factual disputes as to what interest justified the officials' alleged failure, the existing and potential
alternatives for Druid religious exercise, and the impact of requested accommodations on prison officials and
other inmates. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY

Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010). A female detainee's estate brought an action against a
county, sheriff, on-call physician, police officers, and parole agent, under § 1983 and state law, arising out of the
detainee's death while in the county's custody. The district court denied the parole agent's motion for summary
judgment on a gross negligence claim. The agent filed interlocutory appeal. The appeals court reversed. The court
held that the parole agent's failure to intercede on behalf of the detainee in county custody, upon arriving at the jail
to serve the detainee a notice of parole violation charges and determining that the detainee was unable to be transported or served, was not the “proximate cause” of the detainee's death, so as to entitle the agent to governmental
immunity from gross negligence liability under Michigan law. The court noted that the detainee was in the custody of county jail officials in the hours leading up to her death, the parole agent worked for the state Department of
Corrections, not the county, the detainee had been experiencing delirium tremens (DT) symptoms for close to 48
hours prior to arrival at the jail, a physician had been notified of the detainee's condition and told jail officials to
monitor the detainee, the agent was present at the jail for a matter of minutes only, and county jail officials failed
to check the detainee until 40 minutes after the agent left the jail. (Lenawee County Sheriff’s Department, and
Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things, that
the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his personal
property, denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The employees

24.74

moved for summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to appoint counsel. The court held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on the prisoner to
wake him up, while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently severe to be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court found that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly threw
urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the brief and
unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held liable for failing to
intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly investigate the alleged
incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such failure to investigate did
not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process right to a thorough investigation of his grievances. According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the
prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury,
that his access to courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired. The court held
that there was no evidence that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an alleged incident in
which a correctional officer spit chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an Eighth Amendment claim
based on denial of medical care. The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was
protected by the First Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not
violate the prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted
that the prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which
were deemed frivolous. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether state correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a
different facility. The court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
prisoner's § 1983 excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a different facility, where a reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known that their
conduct violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison official's use
of force against an inmate for reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's constitutional
rights. The inmate allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his body, which the
court found did not constitute a serious medical condition. The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell in a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not
amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between his conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24
hours per day, since the illumination policy applied to all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate penological interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New
York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010). A detainee who suffered a miscarriage at a county
jail brought a civil rights action against the county, county sheriff, two deputies, and the nurse who had examined
her. The district court denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, and
they appealed. The appeals court reversed and rendered. The court held that the injury suffered by the pregnant
detainee who used crack cocaine daily and had a miscarriage at the county jail was not caused by any deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs by the deputies, in violation of due process. According to the court, the
deputies knew that the detainee had spoken with a nurse at the jail who determined that the detainee's condition
was not an emergency, and there was no evidence that the detainee's situation was so obviously dire that the deputies must have known that the nurse had grossly misjudged her condition. (Birmingham Jail, Jefferson Co., AL.)

U.S. District Court
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wereb v. Maui County, 727 F.Supp.2d 898 (D.Hawai‘i 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee, a diabetic who died in
custody, brought an action against a county and county police department employees, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's medical needs, and asserting a claim for wrongful
death under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The detainee died in a 2-cell police lockup. The court held that county police officers and public safety aids who did not interact with or observe the pretrial detainee not moving in his cell were not subjectively aware of the serious medical need of the detainee, and thus those officers and aids were not deliberately indifferent to that need, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that summary judgment as to
the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee and/or a county public safety aid
who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video had subjective
knowledge of the serious medical need of detainee, precluding summary judgment.
The court found that neither county police officers who interacted with the pretrial detainee, nor a county public safety aid who did not see the detainee move around in his cell while she monitored him over video, were
entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by
the detainee's parents, where at the time of the detainee's death, it was clearly established that officers could not
intentionally deny or delay access to medical care. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the §
1983 municipal liability claim by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county adequately trained its
employees to monitor the medical needs of the pretrial detainees, and, if so, as to whether the county's inadequate
training of its employees was deliberately different, and as to whether inadequate training “actually caused” the
death of the pretrial detainee. (Lahaina Police Station, Maui County, Hawaii)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2010). A former inmate brought Eighth Amendment claims against a
prison maintenance supervisor and three correction officers alleging that they willfully and maliciously exposed
him to ultraviolet radiation resulting in physical injury. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court
held that correction officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claims alleging that officers

24.75

used excessive force and acted with deliberate indifference, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in removing
the shield used to protect cell occupants from exposure to ultraviolet radiation from a germicidal ultraviolet radiation lamp used for the treatment of tuberculosis. The court found that officers acted in retaliation for a comment
made by another inmate during a “shake down” of the cell, and that officers ignored demands to replace the shield
or deactivate the light, since reasonable officers were on sufficient notice that they may not purposefully expose
inmates to potentially harmful radiation in the complete absence of a penological purpose. The court found that
the inmate's allegation that the prison's maintenance supervisor received notice that correction officers had removed the protective shield but failed to take timely action to replace the shield alleged was nothing more than
simple negligence, and thus was insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment violation. (East Arkansas Regional
Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)
2011
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, Ala., 766 F.Supp.2d 1214 (N.D.Ala. 2011). A pretrial detainee sued a city,
city police officers, jailers, a mayor, and city council members, asserting § 1983 claims alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and his health and safety. The court found that qualified immunity applied to
bar the § 1983 liability of jailers for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the pretrial detainee,
because the detainee failed to argue against the qualified immunity defense. According to the court, once a defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing both that the defendant committed the constitutional violation and that the law governing the circumstances was already clearly established at the time of the violation, and the detainee failed to adequately respond to the qualified immunity defense.
The court noted that the jailers did not contact medical professionals at the detainee's request for four days at
most, and that the detainee, who complained that he was in pain, at that point had been without prescription pain
medication to which he was addicted for at least three days. The court also noted that the detainee had already
faked a suicide attempt to garner jailers' attention and had also been both combative and difficult. (City of Muscle
Shoals Municipal Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011). Current or
former deputy sheriffs who had been charged with felonies, suspended, reinstated after suspension, and then discharged, brought § 1983 claims based on Fourteenth Amendment due process violations against the county, its
board of supervisors, civil service commissioners, and sheriff. The deputies were joined by their union. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and the former deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1)
due process required that the deputies receive post-suspension hearings in addition to the limited procedures they
received before their suspensions; (2) all four deputies adequately stated Monell claims against the county; (3)
civil service commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity from the claims of the deputies who did not receive post-suspension hearings, although those claims could go forward against the sheriff and county supervisors; and (4) all individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claims of the two
deputies who received post-suspension hearings, as their right to a more substantial hearing was not clearly established at the time of the violations. (Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380 (D.C.Cir. 2011). Arrestees, who were arrested while protesting International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies in the District of Columbia, brought a Bivens action against a former
United States Marshal, alleging that they had been subjected to unconstitutional strip searches upon being processed into holding cells at a courthouse. The arrestees moved for summary judgment as to liability, and the Marshal moved for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. The district court denied those motions. On
appeal, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that there was no clearly established constitutional prohibition of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion. According to the court,
strip searching of all male arrestee demonstrators or protestors engaged in civil disobedience, in a locality that had
a persistent problem with contraband being smuggled into a cellblock, prior to their commingled placement in
holding cells, without individualized, reasonable suspicion had not been prohibited by the Fourth Amendment at
the time of the incident, and therefore the supervising United States Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity.
(United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers and a state, alleging violation of his constitutional rights as the result of an assault from officers in
retaliation for filing grievances about disciplinary actions taken against him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the state was entitled to sovereign immunity. The court found that the prisoner's § 1983 excessive force suit against correctional
officers in their individual capacities did not implicate a rule against double recovery, under New York law, despite the officers' contention that the prisoner had already won an excessive force suit in state court against the
officers in their official capacities and now wanted "a second bite at the apple." The court noted that there was no
court in which the prisoner could have brought both an excessive force claim under state law against the state and
the officers in their official capacities and a § 1983 claim against the officers in individual capacities for which
punitive damages were available. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the prisoner's filing of a grievance was the motivating factor for the alleged assault by
the correctional officers. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011). Prison employees brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that a search using a portable ion scanning machine violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that it was not clearly established that the use of an ion scanning machine to detect drugs and other
chemicals could not create reasonable suspicion to justify a strip search, and therefore, prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 action by prison employees alleging that a strip search following a

24.76

positive scan violated the Fourth Amendment. The court found that it was not clearly established that the Fourth
Amendment was violated by strip searches of prison employees conducted in a restroom with a same-sex prison
officer following a positive test from an ion scanning machine that could detect drugs and other chemicals, and
therefore, officers and officials were entitled to qualified immunity in the employee's § 1983 action. (Maryland
Correctional Training Center)
U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Chess v. U.S., 836 F.Supp.2d 742 (N.D.Ill. 2011). An inmate who suffered personal injuries in an assault by a
fellow inmate brought an action against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging it failed to properly screen the fellow inmate upon intake and also failed to monitor him. The inmate had suffered second-degree burns when the other inmate threw a cup of scalding water onto his face and then physically
assaulted him by hitting him with the cup and punching him. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the government failed to comply with certain directives aimed at monitoring federal prisoners
suffering from mental illness, for the purposes of its attempt to avoid liability to the federal inmate who suffered
personal injuries in an assault by a fellow inmate under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA) waiver of sovereign immunity. The court found that the inmate’s claims relating to a corrections officer's alleged failure to monitor inmates during lockup were not barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) discretionary function exception.
According to the court, while there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
officials complied with requirements to review the inmate's central file upon intake and to review the assaulting
inmate's mental health on a monthly basis, the assaulted inmate failed to raise the issue for trial as to whether the
Bureau’s failure to review the assailing inmate's central file proximately caused his injury. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether, after his second placement,
BOP officials knew or reasonably should have known that the inmate should have been segregated from the administrative population. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a correctional officer's
alleged failure to monitor the unit at the time of the attack constituted negligence and proximately caused the
attacked inmate's injuries. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Correctional Center Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Cryer v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 763 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Mass. 2011). A Native American inmate
brought a civil rights action against the Massachusetts Department of Correction and officials, challenging denial
of access to ceremonial tobacco to be used for religious purposes. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact, regarding whether the correctional anti-smoking policy which
banned tobacco in all forms including ceremonial tobacco, created a substantial burden on the Native American
inmate's religious practice, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).
The court found that the conduct of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to
ceremonial tobacco did not violate a clearly established federal right of which a reasonable officer would have
known, entitling the officials to qualified immunity on the inmate's § 1983 claim under the Free Exercise Clause
of First the Amendment. The court noted that the policy of state correctional officials in denying the Native American inmate's access to ceremonial tobacco did not contravene a Massachusetts statute governing smoking in public workplaces, since the provision stated that smoking “may be permitted” in specifically enumerated places and
circumstances, including religious ceremonies where smoking was part of a ritual. (Souza–Baranowski Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action against former
homicide detectives, a police commissioner, and a city for damages arising from his wrongful conviction and
unlawful imprisonment for the murder of a twelve-year-old girl. Following a verdict against the detective in a
second trial, the detective filed motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, and to reduce the jury
award. The district court denied the motions. The court held that the detective was not entitled to qualified immunity for failing to turn over impeachment evidence to a prosecutor. The court held that an award of approximately $1 million per year of the plaintiff's wrongful fourteen-year incarceration was not excessive in the suit
against the detective who withheld impeachment evidence, and therefore a reduction in the award was not warranted. The court noted that the jury determined the value of non-economic damages. (City of Boston, Mass.)

U.S. District Court
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). A former pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a public defender, clerk of court, and deputy clerk of court, alleging that she was unlawfully imprisoned for 87
days after criminal charges against her were dismissed, in violation of her rights under Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments, and false imprisonment under Virginia law. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state
claim. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to
state § 1983 and false imprisonment claims against public defender and that the public defender was entitled to
governmental immunity against a legal malpractice claim. The court found that the detainee's allegations were
sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the clerk and that the clerk was not entitled to quasi–judicial immunity
against the § 1983 claim and was not entitled to sovereign immunity against the negligence claim. The court also
found that the detainee alleged necessary conduct by the clerk and deputy clerk to state a claim for punitive damages. According to the court, the allegations that the clerk of court received at least two letters notifying her that
the pretrial detainee should be released, and that she still failed to take action to effectuate that release after criminal charges against the detainee were dismissed, were sufficient to allege the clerk's personal involvement in the
detainee's continued detention. The court noted that the clerk's alleged inaction in procuring the detainee's release
after criminal charges were dismissed was not a choice within the clerk's discretion and was not taken pursuant to
the state court's direction. The court also held that the clerk of court failed in her execution of a ministerial duty,
precluding her entitlement to sovereign immunity against the pretrial detainee's negligence claim, where the clerk
received orders for detainee to be released, which the clerk's office was then required to notify the jail of the detainee's change in status so as to effectuate her release. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail, and Circuit Court of the
City of Hampton, Virginia)

24.77

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
BIVENS CLAIMS

Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action against
an Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) and the United States, asserting various claims under Bivens and
the Wiretap Act in relation to his jailhouse phone calls. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted. The court held that the AUSAs were entitled to absolute immunity from
claims relating to their use of the tapes. The but court found that an AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity
for ordering the recordings, where the alleged order to make warrantless recordings of the inmate's jailhouse
phone calls was investigative, rather than prosecutorial, and therefore, the AUSA was not entitled to absolute
immunity from the inmate's Wiretap Act or Bivens Fourth Amendment claims. The court found that the inmate
did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jailhouse phone calls, and therefore, the warrantless recording of his calls did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail telephones played a
recorded warning that calls might be recorded and monitored, and the inmate's use of a jailhouse phone after hearing the warning constituted implied consent to the recording of his calls. (Eastern District of New York, Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Female arrestees, who were arrested for non-drug and non-violent offenses, brought an action against the District of Columbia and a former
United States Marshal for the Superior Court, among others, alleging that the defendants' blanket policy of subjecting them to “drop, squat, and cough” strip searches before presentment to a judicial official violated their
rights to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and their rights to equal protection
under the Fifth Amendment. The marshal moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment
claim and that there was no evidence that the Marshal implemented a policy that directed the blanket practice of
strip searching female arrestees, as would support a Fifth Amendment claim, nor that the Marshal knew of a blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees. The court noted that the law at the time of the searches did not
clearly establish that strip searching female arrestees prior to presentment to a judicial official violated the Fourth
Amendment. (United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought a pro se suit against a state, state
agencies, a city, city agencies, and state and city officials, and corrections officers, claiming that he was dyslexic
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his disability in the public school system and in education programs offered in juvenile detention facilities and adult correctional facilities, as well as in prison disciplinary
proceedings. The court dismissed some claims and denied dismissal for other claims. The court held that the inmate's Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims accrued for limitations purposes no later than
the year in which he reached the age of 21, where under New York law, a child was no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the IDEA after the age of 21 and did not have a right to demand a public education beyond that age. The court held that New York's continued acceptance of federal funds after 2001 waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the inmate's Rehabilitation Act claims arising after that date, where the state's continued acceptance of federal funds was a knowing relinquishment of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
court ruled that the inmate's allegations suggested a discriminatory animus against him because of his alleged
disability, dyslexia, and thus, Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply to shield the state, state agencies and
state employees from the inmate's ADA claims. (New York City Department of Correction- Rikers Island, State
of New York Department of Correctional Services Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011). The mother of a deceased inmate brought an action,
as administratrix of the inmate's estate, against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, a county sheriff's department, a county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. She also brought common law claims of wrongful death, negligence, and assault and
battery. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the Commonwealth, in enacting legislation effectuating the assumption of
county sheriff's department by the Commonwealth, did not waive sovereign immunity as to § 1983 claims filed
against the Commonwealth, the department, and corrections officers in their official capacities after the transfer
took effect. The court found that the correction officers who were no longer participating in the transfer of the
inmate at the time inmate first resisted and the officers who took the first responsive measure by “double locking”
the inmate's handcuffs were not subject to liability in their individual capacities as to the § 1983 substantive due
process claim brought by inmate's mother arising from the inmate's death following the transfer.
According to the court, corrections officers who applied physical force to the resisting inmate during the transfer of the inmate, or were present when the inmate was unresponsive and requiring medical attention, were subject
to liability, in their individual capacities, as to the § 1983 substantive due process claim brought by the inmate's
mother. The court held that the county sheriff and corrections officers who participated in the transfer of the inmate, who died following the transfer, were immune from negligence and wrongful death claims brought by the
inmate's mother under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) provision which categorically protected public
employees acting within the scope of their employment from liability for “personal injury or death” caused by
their individual negligence. But the court found that the mother properly alleged that county corrections officers'
contact with the inmate amounted to excessive force, and that a supervisor instructed the use of excessive force, as
required to state a claim for assault and battery, under Massachusetts law, against the officers. (South Bay House
of Correction, Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
QUASI-JUDICIAL
IMMUNITY

McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D.Pa. 2011). A state prisoner filed § 1983 action against his probation officer, and others, alleging violation of his constitutional rights after he was sent to prison for 83 days without a hearing for violation of his electronic monitoring program. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the state prisoner had a due process
liberty interest in serving his sentence in home confinement; (2) his claim was not barred by Heck v. Humphrey;
(3) the prisoner had standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief; (4) the claim against the director of the state

24.78

probation and parole department was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (5) the probation officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; (6) the probation officer was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity; and (7) the
director of the state probation and parole department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. The court noted
that the prisoner pled guilty after a judge advised him repeatedly that if he accepted the government's plea offer,
he would not serve any time in prison, but would carry out his sentence in electronically-monitored home confinement. (Delaware County Office of Adult Probation and Parole Services, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY

Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011). A federal prisoner, who was employed by the Department
of Justice's Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) program while in Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) custody,
brought a Bivens action against various federal officials, alleging that the defendants denied him promotions and
back pay for his UNICOR job, and denied him good time credit for vocational training received through UNICOR
and educational training he took at his own expense through a correspondence course. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that sovereign immunity barred the prisoner's claims
against the officials in their official capacities and that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over the officials in their individual capacities. The court found that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner had filed an administrative remedy
request at the institutional level, where the prisoner had failed to file an administrative remedy request at the regional and central office levels, and the regional and central office levels had the authority to provide relief or to
take action in response to the complaint. (U. S. Penitentiary Hazelton, West Virginia, Federal Prison Industries)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
who were responsible for a post-riot lockdown of a prison, alleging that the lockdown resulted in denial of his
Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary judgment and subsequently denied the officials' motion for reconsideration. The officials appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the state prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the post-riot lockdown of prison resulted in denial of his
Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise because it was not clearly established at the time of the lockdown,
nor was it established yet, precisely how or when a prison facility housing problem inmates must return to its
normal operations, including outdoor exercise, during and after a state of emergency called in response to a major
riot. (Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

O'Neil v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 804 F.Supp.2d 532 (N.D.Tex. 2011). The next friend to a deceased
prisoner's minor daughter who died of an asthma attack while confined brought a § 1983 action against the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), a prison doctor, the company that provided health care services at the
prison, and others, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions
in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether a picket officer, in failing to respond to the emergency call button of the prisoner who was suffering from an asthma attack and in refusing to respond to the cellmate's verbal calls to help the prisoner during an
asthma attack, knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to the prisoner and failed to act with deliberate indifference to that harm. The court found that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that
summary judgment on claims alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA). Rehabilitation Act of 1973, was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), in failing to put the prisoner who suffered from asthma on job
restriction from temperature or humidity extremes, failing to allow the prisoner access to his medication on the
day he died as the result of an asthma attack, and failing to provide the prisoner with periodic physician follow-up
appointments, failed to accommodate the prisoner's disability. The court held that summary judgment on alleged
violations of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the company that provided health care services at the prison, in failing to respond to emergency calls for help for the prisoner who suffered from asthma and failing to provide the prisoner
with prompt medical attention on the day he died as the result of an asthma attack, failed to accommodate the
prisoner's disability. (Jordan Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011). A female arrestee's estate brought a civil rights action
against a city and a number of its police officers, alleging claims arising out of the arrestee's denial of medical
care and death during detention. The district court barred the proposed testimony of the estate's medical expert,
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The estate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether it was objectively unreasonable for police officers to take no action to seek medical care for the
arrestee, and as to whether the arrestee would not have died or experienced pain and suffering prior to her death
had the police officers taken her to a hospital. The court held that remand was required for the district court to
determine whether the medical expert's testimony that, assuming the arrestee died of a heroin overdose, she would
have suffered less if she had been taken to the hospital, would help a jury understand whether the police officers'
failure to take the arrestee to the hospital exacerbated her injury. According to the court, the police officers were
not entitled to qualified immunity where it was clearly established at the time of arrestee's death that the Fourth
Amendment protected a person's rights until she had had a probable cause hearing, and that providing no medical
care in the face of a serious health risk was deliberate indifference. (Chicago Police Department 23rd District
Lockup, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011). A prisoner who was detained for 15 months beyond his release date
as the result of a mistake by employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) brought suit under
§ 1983 to recover for alleged violation of his due process rights. The district court denied a motion for judgment
as a matter of law filed by the Commissioner of the MDOC on a qualified immunity theory, and the Commissioner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the prisoner did not satisfy the burden of showing that failure

24.79

on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to promulgate a policy to prevent such mistakes by his subordinates was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The court found that the prisoner failed to
satisfy burden of showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to train employees to prevent
such mistakes was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law, and the Commissioner was qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 on a failure-to-train theory, given evidence that the employees of the
MDOC's records department had all attended training sessions with a lawyer to ensure that they better understood
court orders. According to the court, the fact that an employee erred in one instance did not show that the Commissioner's alleged actions in failing to train were objectively unreasonable. (Mississippi Department of Corrections, Intensive Supervision Program)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Rivas v. Martin, 781 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind. 2011). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and jail officials, alleging they violated her right to due process by detaining her beyond their authority to do so.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim
for violation of her right to due process by alleging that the sheriff and jail officials held her, after she had posted
bond, without a probable cause determination for five days beyond the 48 hour limit in her immigration detainer.
The court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the defendants allegedly
violated the detainee's clearly established constitutional rights. (LaGrange County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Roberts v. Klein, 770 F.Supp.2d 1102 (D.Nev. 2011). A Black state prisoner filed a civil rights action against
prison administrators and employees alleging violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,
his statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the Equal
Protection Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim that prison officials and employees violated his religious rights
under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and the Equal Protection Clause on allegations that they implemented and
enforced a policy that denied him kosher meals because his Jewish faith had not been verified by an outside entity, and the prison did not show that there was valid rational connection between the prison regulation and a legitimate government interest. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim that a prison employee retaliated
against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, on allegations that he sincerely
believed that he must attend religious services and his work assignment was terminated soon after he attended
Jewish services, after which the employee stated that “You're no damn Jew,” “You're right I'm firing you,” and
“Around here I'm your God.” According to the court, the prisoner also stated a claim that a prison employee retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and deprived him of Equal
Protection under Fourteenth Amendment, on allegations that he was written up on disciplinary charges for attending Jewish services, as a protected activity, while white inmates of the Jewish faith were not written up on disciplinary charges for attending services, and that he was placed on disciplinary charges two days later because he
attended the services. The court held that the prison employees were not entitled to qualified immunity. (Southern
Desert Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3rd Cir. 2011). A detainee who was being held as a material witness in a homicide prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who secured her arrest warrant, alleging the
prosecutor failed to have her released from custody knowing that her testimony was not required for several e
district court entered an order denying the prosecutor's motion for summary judgment, and the prosecutor appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficient to establish
prima facie violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the detainee's Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was clearly established and the prosecutor was not entitled to prosecutorial immunity. (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A former prisoner, who served nearly 24 years in prison for
rape and murder before his conviction was vacated and charges were dismissed, brought a § 1983 action against a
city, county, police officers, police supervisors, and prosecutors, as well as a former mayor, alleging deprivation
of a fair trial, wrongful conviction, a Monell claim, conspiracy under § 1985 and § 1986, and various state law
claims. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied
in part. The court held that the former prisoner’s allegations that police officers engaged in suppressing, destroying, and preventing discovery of exculpatory evidence, including instruments of torture used to coerce the prisoner's confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the police officers for a Brady violation, despite the officers' contention that the prisoner was aware of everything that he claimed was withheld at the time of the trial. The court
found that the former prisoner’s complaint, alleging that municipal officials acted in collusion with a former
mayor and a state's attorney and high-ranking police officials to deflect public scrutiny of the actions of police
officers that suppressed and prevented discovery of exculpatory evidence, which prolonged prisoner's incarceration, stated a § 1983 claim against municipal officials for deprivation of fair trial and wrongful conviction. According to the court, a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983 complaint by the former
prisoner, alleging that the prosecutor personally participated in the prisoner's interrogation and that of a codefendant, and then suppressed the truth concerning those events. The court found that the allegation put the prosecutor's
conduct outside the scope of his prosecutorial function. The court held that the complaint by the former prisoner,
alleging that the former prosecutor encouraged, condoned, and permitted the use of torture against the prisoner in
order to secure a confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the prosecutor for coercive interrogation, in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court noted that the allegations supported the inference that the prosecutor participated in an investigatory rather than a prosecutorial role. According to the court, the “Plaintiff's 46–
page complaint sets forth an account of the murder of Betty Howard and Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution for that
murder, including the torture he alleges he endured at the hands of Area 2 police officers. The complaint also
details the history of torture at Area 2 and the alleged involvement of the various Defendants in that torture and in
subsequent efforts to cover it up.” (Cook County, Illinois)

24.80

2012
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Bell v. Luna, 856 F.Supp.2d 388 (D.Conn. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
and a prison doctor, alleging that the defendants subjected him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement and
showed deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the state prison doctor was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's health in failing to take
sufficient measures to treat the inmate’s joint and back pain, or in failing to prescribe the inmate with an analgesic
cream, as would violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that forcing the inmate to go
nearly seven months with a torn, partially unstuffed, unhygienic mattress was a condition of confinement sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that a unit
manager “willfully, wantonly, and maliciously disregarded” the inmate's repeated requests for an adequate and
hygienic mattress stated a claim under § 1983 against the manager for cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the unit manager was not entitled to qualified immunity from
the inmate's § 1983 claim where the law of the Second Circuit would have put the manager on notice at the time
of the alleged violation that failing to provide the inmate with an hygienic, working mattress for over half a year
ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment. (MacDougall–Walker Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Parolees, on behalf of themselves and a presumed class,
brought a § 1983 action against officials at a state's department of corrections and department of parole, alleging
that the officials subjected them to unlawful custody by continuing to impose terms of post-release supervision
(PRS) that had been declared unlawful, and arresting and re-incarcerating them for technical violations of those
terms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that the officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage, and that the parolees stated a § 1983 claim against
each individual official. The officials' contended that the appeals court decision that found the practice to be unlawful created confusion about the appropriate remedy for parolees who had been given the terms unlawfully. The
court held that the appeals court decision clearly established that the administrative imposition of mandatory PRS
was unconstitutional, that the court clearly explained that the remedy for such a legal infirmity was that the term
of PRS should be vacated and the state should be given the opportunity to seek appropriate resentencing, and the
officials had an obligation to treat the appeals court decision as binding on all terms of administratively imposed
PRS. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Department of Parole)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials, asserting that the prison's 16-day denial of kosher meals, mistakes in administering the kosher-meal program, and lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison violated his constitutional rights and Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a preliminary
injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, and denied prisoner's motion to
amend and second motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
vacated in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the prison's “zero tolerance” policy for possession of even one non-kosher food item violated the Free Exercise Clause and RLUIPA. But the court determined that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there had not been any determination that the
regulation was in any way deficient at the time of the officials' actions. The court held that the prison's use of
questionnaire about the inmate's knowledge of his designated religion was proper. According to the court, the
officials' failure to reinstate the inmate to his kosher diet regimen violated the inmate's rights but punitive damages
were not warranted. The court awarded $1 in nominal damages where the inmate did not look like he missed
many meals as a result of the officials' actions, and there was no evidence of physical injury. The court noted that
even though the prison had economic interest in restricting kosher diet to prisoners who had a sincere belief that
the diet was necessary to practice their religion, where the inmate had no other means of eating, there was no
evidence that providing a modicum of flexibility would have a ripple effect on prison staff or inmates or would
escalate the cost of providing kosher meals. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner who was a Muslim brought a pro se §
1983 action against a prison warden and other prison employees for claims arising out of the prison's ban on prayer oil. The court held that allegations that a prison warden issued an addendum to a Department Operations Manual (DOM) that implemented a policy that only orders for certain religious items would be counted under the quarterly package program was sufficient to state First Amendment retaliation claim against warden. The court noted
that: (1) the policy made it more burdensome to obtain items required for the inmate to practice his religion or
practice it as easily as inmates of different faiths; (2) that there existed a causal link between the policy and his
faith; (3) that his required religious oil was banned approximately five months after the inmate appealed the policy; (4) that the policy would chill a person of ordinary firmness from practicing his religion, and (5) that a legitimate penological interest was not furthered by the policy. The court found that the inmate’s allegation that a
prison warden enacted a policy which considered special orders for religious packages to be counted as quarterly
packages for inmates, because of its adverse effects on plaintiffs of a particular religion, stated an equal protection
claim. According to the court, the articles listed in the policy were those ordered by only prisoners of that religion.
The court held that the warden and officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's claim alleging a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where a reasonable person
in the position of the prison warden and related officials would believe that his or her conduct in enacting a policy
banning the purchase and receipt of prayer oil by inmates for 14 months violated inmates' First Amendment right
to freely exercise his or her religion and of the inmate’s Equal Protection rights. (Calipatria State Prison, Calif.)

24.81

U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Ariz. 2012). In consolidated cases, members of a county board of
supervisors, county staff, and judges of county courts, brought actions against members of county sheriff's office
and county attorney's office, alleging various torts and constitutional violations. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that members of the county sheriff's office and county attorney's office were not entitled to absolute immunity in their filing of a federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit against members of county board of supervisors, county staff, and judges of county's courts, where the RICO suit was far removed from the judicial phase of the criminal process, and there was no basis for governmental enforcement under RICO itself. According fo the court, the
county sheriff's and county attorney's voluntary dismissal of their RICO suit constituted termination in favor of
the members of the county board of supervisors, county staff, and judges of county's courts, as required to support
Arizona law claims against the sheriff and attorney for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. According to the
court, numerous constitutional violations allegedly undertaken by the county attorney, the county sheriff, and their
subordinates, were sufficiently egregious and voluminous to raise a fair inference of failure to train in relation to
the § 1983 claims asserted by the plaintiffs. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office and County Attorney's Office,
Phoenix, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which resulted in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a requirement
that he have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion.
The district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted with the state and its
employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's § 1983 claim; (2) the
claim against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official capacity for recovery of a
cash payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was not personally liable for the
cash payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged negligent
supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training procedures for parole officers; (5)
the parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations stated a due process claim against
corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that Colorado department of corrections
officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing him on parole, as required by Colorado law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no contact with his children, stated a due
process claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment & Training Institute, under contract to the Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2012). The minor siblings of an inmate who
committed suicide brought a § 1983 action against correctional facility staff members, alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition involving a long history of suicide attempts, self-harm, and mental
illness. The district court granted qualified immunity to the management-level defendants and others, but denied
qualified immunity to an intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards. The defendants who were denied
qualified immunity appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that the intake nurse and a psychology associate were subjectively aware that the inmate was a
suicide risk, as required to state a claim alleging deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition.
The court found that the inmate's siblings adequately alleged that prison guards were subjectively aware that the
inmate was a suicide risk. According to the court, the siblings adequately alleged that the intake nurse and psychology associate failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal tendencies, and
that prison guards failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm from the inmate's suicidal tendencies. The
court held that the intake nurse, psychology associate, and prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity.
The court noted that the guards allegedly knew or should have known of the inmate's mental illness and suicide
attempts because he was adjudicated mentally ill, he had court-ordered medications he refused to take the night he
died, and he had a well-documented history of suicidal behavior. The inmate was housed in a unit where inmates
in need of greater supervision were placed. The guards allegedly failed to call for medical attention despite finding the inmate with no pulse and not breathing on the floor of his cell with a white cloth wrapped around his neck,
and waited to assemble an entry team and then applied restraints to the inmate before removing the ligature from
around his neck. (Columbia Correctional Institute, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). A prisoner at a state correctional institution filed a pro se
§ 1983 action against the prison and officials alleging his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when officials knowingly placed him in danger by assigning him to a housing unit
where he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the complaint stated a claim against the deputy
superintendent and an assistant for violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging that officials were aware of
the feud between two rival prison gangs, that the prisoner was a known member of one of the gangs, that despite
this knowledge officials had assigned the prisoner to a section of the prison where a rival gang was housed, and as
a result he was violently attacked and sustained permanent injuries. The court found that the official who had
instituted the gang housing policy could not be held personally liable, since he did not implement the policy, nor
was he deliberately indifferent in supervising or training those who did. According to the court, state prison officials who had placed the prisoner known to be a gang member in danger by assigning him to a housing unit where
he was violently attacked by members of a rival gang, were not entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's §
1983 suit. The court noted that clearly established law provided that the Eighth Amendment was violated if officials disregarded a known, substantial risk to an inmate's health or safety, and the officials had disregarded this
risk, as well as violated a prison policy, by placing rival gang members in same housing unit. (Souza Baranowski
Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

24.82

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Glover v. Gartman, 899 F.Supp.2d 1115 (D.N.M. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while in custody brought an action against a warden of a county detention center
and corrections officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated his substantive due process rights
when they provided him with razor blades and failed to respond in a timely manner to his emergency calls for
help. The officers moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that a county corrections officer's act of providing the pretrial detainee with two razor blades and then leaving the detainee alone for over an hour so that detainee could shave before trial, during which time the detainee
committed suicide, did not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution or the New Mexico Constitution, where the officer did not know that the detainee posed any suicide risk. The
court also held that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer violated
the pretrial detainee's substantive due process rights, where there was no due process violation, as the officer did
not know that the detainee posed any suicide risk, and a detainee's substantive due process right not to be left
alone with razor blades was not clearly established at the time of the incident. The court also found that a corrections officer was entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim that the officer violated the substantive due
process rights of the detainee by failing to respond to the detainee's calls for help. According to the court, the
officer's conduct did not rise to the level of a due process violation, and the substantive due process right of the
detainee to have an officer respond to a call was not clearly established absent evidence that the officer heard the
call or knew of a suicide risk. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
RLUIPA- Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act

Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). A former state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a correctional officer, alleging the forcible shearing of his dreadlocks violated the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The former
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that while the prisoner's
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) claim against the correctional officer in his official capacity was barred by the state's sovereign immunity, the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The
court noted that the Act does not create a cause of action against state employees in their personal capacity. The
court held that the taking of a Nazirite vow, which barred the cutting of hair, by the state prisoner who was a
member of the orthodox African Hebrew Israelites of Jerusalem was religiously motivated, for purposes of the
prisoner's claim that prison officials failed to accommodate his religious beliefs and thus violated the free exercise
clause of the First Amendment. The court found that the officer was not entitled to quality immunity because there
was no suggestion that the officer who ordered shearing of prisoner's dreadlocks due to a reasonable belief that the
prisoner was insincere in his religious beliefs, or was a security threat. (Big Muddy Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2012). A detainee, who suffered a month-long incarceration following
sentencing for operating while intoxicated, even though a state court had not ordered his incarceration, brought a §
1983 action against prison intake officers and a counselor. The district court denied the officers' and counselor's
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and they appealed. The appeals court vacated
and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to engage in a full qualified immunity analysis
as to each of the detainee's § 1983.claims, setting aside the district court's order denying summary judgment to the
prison intake officers and counselor on qualified immunity grounds. The court noted that, although the district
court did an admirable job of explaining the facts of the case and construing those facts in the light most favorable
to the detainee, the court nevertheless repeatedly stated in its analysis that there were material issues of fact in
dispute, and its decision lacked consideration of the individual defendants' actions with respect to each of the
constitutional claims. (Iowa Medical Classification Center, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus brought a
class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and the Department's Chief Medical
Officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as
well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving the injunctive and equitable claims. Defendants
moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims. The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees
and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court vacated the district court's decision granting
summary judgment to the Chief Medical Officer on the Eighth Amendment claim, due to the extreme brevity of
the district court's opinion. The appeals court also vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment
on the ADA claim on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment precluded damages. (New York Department of
Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state psychiatric
hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against various state officials
under § 1983, challenging conditions of their confinement. The district court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss, and the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the appeals court
held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the civilly committed persons
failed to plead plausible claims against the state hospital's administrators and supervisory officials in their individual capacities, and thus the administrators and officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for money damages under § 1983, where there was no allegation of a specific policy or custom that caused constitutional
deprivations, and no specific allegations regarding each defendant's purported knowledge of deprivations. (Atascadero State Hospital, California)

24.83

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.N.J. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a department of corrections, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment right
against cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that there was no evidence that prison officials were personally involved in a corrections officers' alleged assault on the state prisoner, as required to establish supervisory
liability against the officials under § 1983, despite defense counsel's bare assertions of deliberate indifference and
notice of assaultive history. The court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether the force used by corrections officers to subdue the prisoner was excessive and in violation of
Eighth Amendment, and whether a corrections officer participated in the alleged assault on the prisoner. The court
held that the corrections officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where the prisoner's complaint alleged a
violation of the constitutional right to be free from unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, and such right was
clearly established at the time of the officers' alleged misconduct. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies
regarding the excessive force claim against corrections officials in accordance with the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (N.J. Department of Corrections, Bayside State Prison)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who observed the Nation of Gods and
Earths (NGE) faith brought an action against correctional officials, alleging that the officials violated his right to
practice his religion, denied his right of access to courts, and retaliated against him. The prisoner sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The officials moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether correctional officials' restrictions on NGE activities were adequately justified by legitimate security concerns, as required under
the First Amendment and RLUIPA, could not be resolved on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, since it was
not possible, based solely on the pleadings, to determine whether the actions of the officials had unjustifiably
burdened the prisoner's religious exercise. The court held that individual correctional officials were qualifiedly
immune from the prisoner's claim for damages based on the officials' preventing the prisoner from participating in
such activities, where the rights of the prisoner, who observed the NGE faith, to hold study group classes, wear
certain articles of clothing or emblems, and observe NGE holy days, were not clearly established First Amendment rights, given that department of corrections protocols did not specifically protect such religious activities.
The court found that the prisoner's allegations, that he was denied access to courts due to a correctional official's
confiscation or destruction of documents, failed to state a claim for denial of access to courts, where the allegations were conclusory, and the prisoner failed to show what prejudice he suffered as a result of the official's alleged actions. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). A deceased inmate's mother sued a prison psychiatrist under §
1983, claiming that he was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical need of the inmate, who hung himself
from his bed. The district court denied the psychiatrist's motion for summary judgment and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the psychiatrist could not invoke qualified immunity. According to the court, a
physician employed by an independent non-profit organization, but working part-time for a county as a prison
psychiatrist, could not invoke qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit arising out of his activities at the prison. The
court found that there was no common-law tradition of immunity for a private doctor working for a public institution at the time that Congress enacted § 1983. (Butler County Prison, Community Behavioral Health, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated
at a state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action
against state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old youth
had a history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district court
granted summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court
held that, even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a youth detention facility that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be imminently
suicidal, amounted to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not then so clearly established as to defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. (Illinois Youth
Center, IYC Kewanee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate
brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers, a nurse, and a sheriff, alleging deliberate indifference to the
inmate's right to adequate medical care while in pretrial confinement, which resulted in her death. The defendants
filed motions for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and granted the motions in part.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers' failure to call emergency rescue when the pregnant jail inmate complained of stomach cramps
constituted more than grossly negligent disregard of a substantial risk of a serious harm, precluding summary
judgment for the officers on the deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical need claim. According to
the court, correctional officers were on notice that their alleged actions or inactions violated the jail inmate's clearly established Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate medical care, and, thus, the officers were not entitled to
qualified immunity in § 1983 action. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the correctional officers acted with ill will or malice toward the jail inmate, or
exhibited reckless indifference. (Bradford County Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered
from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights
violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to
mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed

24.84

from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the
defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied
in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established
right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood
that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that
could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right
for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing
her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity;
(7) the watch officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified
immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individualrecognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in response
and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that
the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the detention aide who was responsible
for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual
blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to
the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station, Second District Station, Chicago Police Department)
U.S. District Court
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging, among other things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and denial of access to
courts. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order and stay, and the
prisoner moved for a temporary restraining order, for a continuance to permit discovery, and to strike portions of
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner was not responsible for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the prisoner’s allegations
were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim; (3) the prisoner’s allegations were
sufficient to state a due process claim that he was placed in solitary confinement in violation of the Bureau of
Prison's regulations and without having a legitimate investigation or a pending disciplinary charge; and (4) the
allegations were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The court dismissed
claims that were based on the theory of respondeat superior. According to the court, prison officials' refusal to
provide grievance forms and interference with the prisoner’s efforts to exhaust administrative remedies did not
violate the prisoner's First Amendment right of access to courts. (Federal Correctional Center-Butner, N.C., and
Rivers Correctional Institution, operated by the GEO Group, Inc)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Peoples v. Fischer, 898 F.Supp.2d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who was housed in segregation for over
two years brought an action against prison officials, alleging the defendants violated his right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment. After the district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint in part, the defendants moved
for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prison
officials were arguably put on sufficient notice that a sentence of three years of special housing unit (SHU) confinement for a non-violent infraction of prison rules could well be found to be grossly disproportionate and, therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, such that the conduct of the prison officials in sentencing the prisoner
to such a sentence could be found to have violated the prisoner's clearly established right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. The court denied qualified immunity for the prison officials, noting that numerous courts had
found that long stretches of segregation could constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and courts had repeatedly
determined that the conditions of segregated confinement were unconstitutional if they did not meet certain minimum standards. The court noted that the prisoner was housed in segregation for over two years even though there
was never any finding that he posed a threat to the safety of others or the security of the prison. (Upstate Correctional Facility, Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Roberts v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Retired state employees brought an action against the
state of New York, state departments, and state officials, alleging that the defendants unilaterally increased the
percentage of contributions that retired employees were required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement
and violated the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, impaired the retired
employees' contractual rights under terms of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and violated state law.
The retirees sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgments and monetary damages. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) claims
against the state of New York and state departments were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the allegations
stated a claim against state officials for violation of the Contracts Clause; and (3) the allegations stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against state officials. (Council 37, American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees, New York)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services, 907 F.Supp.2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A plaintiff brought a § 1983
action against a state's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its commissioner and several employees,
and the state's Division of Parole and its chairperson and several employees, alleging wrongful detention for violations of an allegedly illegally-imposed term of post-release supervision (PRS), false arrest and imprisonment,
negligence, and a New York state claim for gross negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the individual defendants, who were employees of New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) or Division of Parole, were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions

24.85

during the time between the administrative imposition of a term of post-release supervision (PRS) and a court
decision, which found that such imposition of PRS violated due process guarantees. (New York State Division of
Parole, Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York)
U.S. District Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Shah v. Danberg, 855 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who pled guilty but mentally ill to a charge of
first degree murder filed a § 1983 action against a state judge and prison officials alleging that his placement in a
correctional center, rather than in a psychiatric center, violated his constitutional rights. The court held that the
state judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability in inmate's § 1983 action despite the inmate's
contention that the judge's incorrect application of a state statute resulted in violation of his constitutional rights,
where there were no allegations that the judge acted outside the scope of her judicial capacity, or in the absence of
jurisdiction. The could ruled that the state inmate failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his
claim and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering his transfer, despite the inmate's contention
that he was mentally unstable and had repeatedly caused himself physical injury during his suicide attempts,
where medical records the inmate submitted were ten years old, and a state supreme court recognized that prison
officials had discretion to house inmates at facilities they chose. The court ordered the appointment of counsel,
noting that the inmate was unable to afford legal representation, he had a history of mental health problems, and
the matter presented complex legal issues. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2012). An inmate, who was a Sunni Muslim of the Habashi sect, brought
an action against officials at two prisons, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered judgment in favor of
the defendants after a bench trial. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that:
(1) RLUIPA did not permit the inmate's action against prison officials; (2) the error in placing the burden upon the
inmate was not harmful; (3) it was not an abuse of discretion to permit prison officials to raise a qualified immunity defense at trial; and (4) the officials were entitled to qualified immunity. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, SCI–Pittsburgh and SCI–Greene)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Smith v. Reyes, 904 F.Supp.2d 1070 (S.D.Cal. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison employees, alleging excessive force, failure to protect, failure to supervise, and filing a false misbehavior report in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claims against prison employees in their official capacities, alleging
violations of the Eighth Amendment, were precluded by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The court
found that the prisoner’s allegations that a prison employee assaulted him and that other employees failed to report the alleged misconduct implied the invalidity of an administrative report resulting in the loss of good-time
credits, was precluded because the prisoner's conviction had not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or
called into question. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against prison officials and medical personnel, alleging, among other things,
deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that: (1) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether denial of a recommended treatment violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment
rights; (2) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the decision to treat
the inmate pharmacologically, rather than surgically, was a mere difference of opinion over the course of treatment that did not establish deliberate indifference; (3) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the warden
and the assistant warden on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (4) factual
issues precluded summary judgment for the head of the prison's utilization review panel on the claim for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; (5) the Eleventh Amendment applied to bar the claim
against the state and the state corrections department for monetary damages based on the alleged custom or policy
of refusing to provide certain types of medical care to inmates; and (6) factual issues precluded summary judgment for the defendants on the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim for injunctive relief. (Ely State Prison, Nevada
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in custody
at a county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate, against a county
sheriff and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
amendments. The county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father cross-moved for partial summary judgment and for sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the father failed to establish that the county defendants had a duty to preserve any video of the
detainee in his cells, as would support sanctions against the defendants in the father's civil rights action. The court
noted that the defendants did not anticipate litigation resulting from the detainee's death, the father did not file suit
until almost two years after the detainee's death, and there was no indication that the father requested that the
defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the defendants any form of notice that litigation was imminent or
even contemplated until the lawsuit was actually filed.
The court found that county correctional officers' use of force in placing the detainee in a restraint chair was
not excessive, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where less than one hour before the detainee was placed
in the chair he had tied tourniquet around his arm, somehow removed metal button from his prison jumpsuit, cut
his wrist or arm, and sprayed blood across his cell. The court noted that the officers were familiar with the inmate's history of self-mutilation, and the extent of injury inflicted by the officers' use of the chair was minimal,
and the officers made some effort to temper the severity of their use of force. After the detainee was placed back
in the restraint chair, he was given water, and a jail nurse, at one officer's request, took the inmate's blood pres-

24.86

sure, pulse, and breathing rate, and determined that the detainee appeared in normal health and needed no further
medical care. The court also held that the officers' continued restraint of the detainee in the restraint chair was not
excessive, as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment where the officers were aware of detainee's history of selfmutilation, the detainee posed a serious risk of harm to himself, and the particular circumstances confronting the
officers justified the continued use of restraints until the officers were reasonably assured that the situation had
abated. According to the court, even if the history of the detainee as a “cutter” constituted a serious medical need,
there was no evidence that the county correctional officers were deliberately indifferent to that need, in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the only risk of harm the officers were subjectively aware of was the detainee's potential to injure himself. Despite the detainee's refusal to speak with medical staff upon arrival at jail, he
was immediately classified as a suicide risk due to his self-destructive history and was placed on a suicide watch,
and for two days, the detainee remained on suicide watch in jail custody, whereby he was observed at least every
15 minutes, without incident.
The court concluded that there was no causal connection between the county correctional officers' alleged
indifference to the detainee's medical needs and detainee's death while in custody at the county jail, as would
support a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim brought by the detainee's father. The court noted
that the father's medical expert opined that the detainee's death was not causally related to his restraint in the chair,
and although the expert listed dehydration as a contributing cause of the detainee's sudden cardiac dysrhythmia
that led to the detainee's death, the expert did not testify that the detainee would have survived had he not been
dehydrated.
The court held that the father failed to show, by way of medical evidence, that an alleged six-minute delay of a
correctional officer in performing resuscitation efforts once the detainee was found unresponsive, was the cause of
the detainee's death, as would support the father's Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against the
county defendants. The court ruled that “All parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in
hindsight, perhaps more could have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to
view the Defendants' actions. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated
Stanfill's constitutional rights. The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” (Houston County
Detention Center, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). The representative of the estate of a detainee who
died on the night he was to be released from custody brought an action against a city and city police officers,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants unlawfully detained the detainee and denied him medical care. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the representative and against four defendants on the unlawful detention
claim, and for the defendants on claims relating to denial of medical care. The defendants moved for judgment as
a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial or remittitur on the issue of damages. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the issue of whether the defendants held the
detainee for more than 48 hours before being taken before a judge or being released, or for less than 48 hours for
an improper purpose, was for the the jury; (2) the officers had probable cause to arrest the detainee for a crime
with an intent element; (3) the issue of whether individual officers participated in the unlawful detention was for
the jury; (4) the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful detention claim; (5) the award
of $1 million in compensatory damages was excessive; and (6) the award of $150,500 in punitive damages was
not warranted where there was little to indicate that the defendants acted with evil intent or callous indifference.
(Chicago Police Dept., Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a city,
police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action for
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the
floor of a sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear
to fall, exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown about
the passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate into an
empty soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself around the
floor of the van, and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself out of the
van and into his wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability, for purposes of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether
the arrestee was denied the benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of his arrest
when he was moved from a police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary judgment to the
extent the arrestee's claims involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two other dates; (4)
fact issues existed as to whether the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's
known medical need for suppositories every other day, in violation of due process, but they were not deliberately
indifferent to his need for catheters and prescription pain medication; and (5) the county defendants were not
entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that while the county defendants disputed the arrestee's version of
the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving any training regarding how to transport disabled inmates. (Utica
Police Department, Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
2013

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). An inmate brought § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims
against various employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) who allegedly were responsible for
the conditions of the inmate's confinement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion,
finding that the inmate adequately pled that Illinois prison officials were deliberately indifferent, as required to
state a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, the inmate alleged that he repeatedly advised the

24.87

official about the prison's detrimental living conditions and that the official did not make an effort to remedy the
conditions, that he informed another official about the intolerable living conditions and that this official did not
make an effort to remedy the conditions, and that he discussed the intolerable living conditions with other officials, each of whom also failed to make any efforts to remedy the living conditions. The inmate claimed that he
was subjected to unsanitary conditions, a lack of ventilation, and continuous lighting that interfered with his sleep.
He also alleged that his housing area had dried bodily fluids on the wall of his cell and a strong odor of ammonia
from his uncleaned toilet, that there was pest infestation accompanied by filth and feces, and that there was a
complete lack of basic cleaning supplies or even garbage bags. He also cited filthy soiled bedding, missing or
dilapidated, and sometimes dangerously damaged cell furniture and fixtures, and badly peeling toxic paint. The
inmate suffered from endocarditis, an infection of the lining of the heart, which he claimed was due to the conditions of his confinement, and from which his “numerous, almost constant, fungal infections” stemmed. The court
held that the inmate's official-capacity suit against Illinois prison officials seeking prospective relief was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, as it fell within the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court noted that the inmate named individual state officials as defendants in this action, and he alleged that those state officials failed to provide him with the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, and the inmate sought a permanent injunction enjoining the officials from
continuing to engage in the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois Department of
Corrections)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.Me. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials failed to protect him from a padlock assault by a fellow prisoner, and retaliated against him for filing
complaints about prison conditions. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the decision by state prison officials to provide inmates with
padlocks to secure their personal belongings did not demonstrate deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, despite the history of padlocks being used
as weapons by some prisoners. The court noted that a state statute required officials to provide inmates with a
reasonably secure area for their personal belongings, and there were generally only one or two padlock assaults
per year. The court found that verbal abuse, threats, and two strip-searches of the inmate by a prison guard were
not de minimis, and thus were sufficiently adverse to support the inmate's First Amendment retaliation claim
against the guard. Because inmates; rights against retaliatory action by prison officials for filing complaints about
their treatment were clearly established, the court ruled that the prison guards were not entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the inmate's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation action. (Maine State Prison)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Canales v. Gatzunis, 979 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.Mass. 2013). A former county jail inmate brought an action in state
court against a county sheriff's department, the sheriff, the jail superintendent, a state public safety commissioner,
and others, alleging the defendants subjected him to reckless, negligent, and cruel medical treatment. Some defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court found that because the county sheriff's department and other county defendants voluntary removed
to inmate's action to federal court, the defendants did not enjoy Eleventh Amendment immunity against any Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (MTCA) claims they would be subject to in state court as a result of waiver. The court
held that the former jail inmate's allegations that the county defendants had a “disorganized medical program” at
the jail and failed to maintain a “quality assurance program,” and that the jail failed “to maintain adequate and
accurate medical records,” insufficiently pled that the jail superintendent was personally involved in misinforming
the inmate that he had HIV and mistakenly administering another prisoner's HIV medication to the inmate, as
would subject the superintendent to supervisory liability for his subordinates' alleged Eighth Amendment violations under § 1983. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that the “defendants” told the inmate that he
had HIV and administered HIV medication to him, even though he did not have HIV, did not sufficiently state
that the county jail superintendent was personally involved with the inmate's medical treatment or otherwise took
any action with respect to the inmate, as would support the inmate's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against the superintendent, in his individual capacity, under Massachusetts law. (Suffolk County House of
Correction, Mass.)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2013). A former state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against a state and prison officials, alleging, among other things, that the defendants unconstitutionally restrained
his liberty during an illegal term of probation. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss, and
the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former inmate's allegations were
sufficient to establish standing to assert a § 1983 claim, but as a matter of apparent first impression, the prison
officials charged with executing a facially valid court order, enjoy absolute immunity from § 1983 liability for the
conduct prescribed by those orders. (Montana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). A motorist brought a § 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation against a city and police officers who booked and jailed the motorist following a traffic stop. The
district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the motorist appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the motorist’s criticism of the police for what the motorist perceived to be an
unlawful and racially motivated traffic stop was squarely within the protective umbrella of the First Amendment,
and any action to punish or deter such speech was categorically prohibited by the federal constitution. The court
found that the motorist's booking and jailing by the police officers, allegedly in retaliation for the motorist's criticism of what he perceived to be an unlawful and racially motivated traffic stop, would chill a person of ordinary
firmness from future First Amendment activity, as required to support a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim
against the city and the police officers. The court held that the police officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the motorist's § 1983 claim that they booked and arrested him in violation of the First Amendment,
where it was clearly established that it was unlawful to book and jail motorist in retaliation for First Amendment

24.88

activity, even if probable cause existed, and a reasonable police officer would have known that it was unlawful to
use his authority to retaliate against an individual because of his speech. (City of Yakima Police Department,
Washington)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee who had been beaten by three fellow inmates
brought an action against a correctional officer, a lieutenant, and jail officials, alleging deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The officer and the lieutenant appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that summary judgment for the correctional
officer was precluded by a fact question as to whether the correctional officer was aware of a substantial risk of
harm to the detainee and was deliberately indifferent to his safety. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). A civilly-committed resident at a special treatment unit
(STU) operated by the New Jersey Department of Corrections (NJDOC) brought action an against NJDOC officials, alleging violations of his substantive due process rights under § 1983. The district court held that the resident's claims against the officials in their official capacities were barred by sovereign immunity. The court held
that the resident's allegations adequately pled the officials’ personal involvement in his complaint that: (1) there
were visibly leaking steam pipes in a special treatment unit (STU) for which trash cans were used to collect water;
(2) NJDOC officials personally toured STU; (3) STU received numerous written complaints from residents about
inadequate hot water; and (4) an STU assistant administrator told the resident that defective piping valves were
too expensive to repair. The court found that the officials were subject to liability under § 1983 in their individual
capacities. The court held that NJDOC officials were not entitled to qualified immunity from the civilly committed resident's § 1983 conditions of civil commitment claim under the Due Process Clause, arising from inadequate
hot water at a special treatment unit (STU) in which he was housed. (Special Treatment Unit, Avenel, Middlesex
County, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F.Supp.2d 1313 (M.D.Ala. 2013). An inmate filed a Bivens suit against a prison officer
and others for use of excessive force during a pat-down search, alleging violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and other claims. All claims except the excessive use of force
claim were dismissed. The officer filed a renewed motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity, or in
the alternative for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer. The
court held that evidence did not create a fact issue as to whether the prison official maliciously or sadistically
inflicted pain on the inmate while conducting a pat-down search, as required for the inmate to survive summary
judgment on the defense of qualified immunity. According to the court, when the officer entered the inmate's
cubicle, he observed the inmate rise from his bunk, turn, and place his hand down front of his pants, which typically signaled that an inmate was trying to conceal an object. The inmate was facing away from the officer when
the officer began the pat-down and thus, the inmate could not observe any expression or movement suggesting
that the officer had any malicious motive in touching the inmate's shoulders. Even after the inmate fell to his
knees from post-surgery shoulder pain, the officer's statement “[o]h, you still can't raise your arm” did not indicate
malice for the sole purpose of inflicting pain, but rather supported an inference that the officer still did not believe
the inmate's assertion about shoulder surgery and that he could not raise his arm. (Federal Prison Camp, Montgomery, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT

Hannon v. Beard, 979 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2013). Twenty-seven state inmates filed a § 1983 action against
the Massachusetts Department Of Correction (MDOC), UMass Correctional Health (UMCH), the governor, and
prison officials, alleging violations of their right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by exposing them to
harmful environmental conditions, First Amendment rights by retaliating against them for filing grievances and
law suits, fundamental right of access to courts, and due process and equal protection rights. The officials moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion, finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred claims against
MDOC and UMCH, and that the inmates failed to state plausible Eighth Amendment claims and First Amendment retaliation claims. According to the court, the inmates' allegations that they were exposed to unsafe levels of
toxins at a facility were not enough to show that the alleged deprivation was objectively serious, and thus were
insufficient to state a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. The court noted that the inmates did not allege specific
facts that would support a finding that environmental toxins were actually present, that the inmates were actually
exposed to those substances, and that exposure caused injury. (UMass Correctional Health, and Massachusetts
Department of Correction, Souza Baranowski Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT
OFFICIAL CAPACITY

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
(HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims. The
inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement
agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's
attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the
district court held that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth Amendment claim against an officer in his
official capacity; (2) the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment claim based on initial denial of treatment due to
his short prison term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim based on
denial of treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete a substance abuse program;(4) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap set forth in the
agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community Supervision)

24.89

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were forced
to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior Court filed a
class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, alleging
that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district court granted summary judgment
to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that
the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock was at all times a federal official acting under
the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia could not be held liable under § 1983 for the marshal's
conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme gave the District of Columbia no power to exercise authority
over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal, and lacked the discretion to stop sending pre-presentment arrestees
to the marshal. According to the court, any Fourth Amendment right that the former United States Marshal may
have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on minor charges to blanket strip searches was not clearly established at the time of any violation, and therefore the marshal was entitled to qualified immunity on the detainees'
claims alleging violations of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no evidence that the marshal
purposefully directed that women should be treated differently than men with respect to the strip-search policy at
the Superior Court cellblock, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (District of Columbia, United States Marshal for the Superior Court)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Keele v. Glynn County, Ga.. 938 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee's estate brought an action
against a county, county sheriff, and officials at the county detention facility in their official and individual capacities, alleging that, while detained, the detainee's access to necessary medical care was delayed or deficient and
that the delay or deficiency led to the detainee's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's bruised or fractured ribs and
rash were objectively serious medical needs, as required for the estate's deliberate indifference claim against officials at the county detention facility under Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, a lay person would be
alerted to the necessity of medical attention after the detainee lost control of her bowels, began to hallucinate,
vomited repeatedly, became pale and developed blisters inside her mouth, and thus the detainee had an objectively
serious medical need when the symptoms manifested, as required for the estate's deliberate indifference claim
against the officials.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact regarding whether
the nurse at the county detention facility was subjectively aware that the pretrial detainee faced a substantial risk
of serious harm, whether the nurse was more than grossly negligent in disregarding that risk of harm, and whether
the nurse's actions caused the detainee's injuries, including death. The court noted that a reasonable nurse in the
county detention facility nurse's position would have known that delaying provision of medical care to a pretrial
detainee with the detainee's symptoms, which included hallucinating, withdrawing from pain medication, pale,
vomiting, hives, complaining of feeling bad, and not eating, drinking, or getting up to do any activity, violated her
constitutional rights, and thus the nurse failed to establish an entitlement to qualified immunity from deliberate
indifference claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, it was clearly established that
knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to provide that care constituted deliberate indifference, and the law was clearly established that nearly half a day was too long to fail to properly respond to a medical need. (Glynn County Detention Center, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). A female former prison inmate who was impregnated as a result
of her vocational-training instructos unlawful sexual acts brought a § 1983 action against a former warden and
other Kansas Department of Corrections employees. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part, but denied qualified immunity for the former warden, who appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former prison inmate adequately alleged that the former warden violated a clearly
established constitutional right, precluding qualified immunity for the warden in the § 1983 action alleging that
the warden was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse by the vocational-training instructor. According to the
court, the inmate alleged that the warden had knowledge of the abuse but failed to properly investigate or terminate staff when abuse allegations were substantiated, and that the prison's structural policy problems contributed
to abuse by failing to address known problems with the vocational program or to use cameras to monitor inmates
and staff. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual who
died from acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against a city and its
mayor, as well as the police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging claims under § 1983
for various constitutional violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment under state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by
failing to call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor him and provide proper care; (3) the administrator
failed to establish municipal liability based on failure to train; (4) the administrator failed to establish supervisory
liability against the supervising officer; (5) police were immune from negligence liability under statutory exception to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6) the officers were not liable for false imprisonment. The court noted that at the time of the relevant events, a reasonable officer would not have known that determining that a suitable treatment facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his ability to constitutionally
detain an intoxicated individual who was not charged with any crime, as required for the right to be clearly established, and therefore the individual officers who detained the individual were entitled to qualified immunity under
§ 1983. (Peabody Police Department, Massachusetts)

24.90

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). A Muslim state inmate brought an action against a prison
captain in his individual capacity, alleging that the captain ordered an unconstitutional strip search and prevented
him from attending religious services in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person's Act
(RLUIPA), and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied the inmate's motion for
default judgment and granted the captain's motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate was not entitled to monetary damages against a correctional
officer under the provisions of RLUIPA; (2) the strip search did not violate the inmate's Fourth Amendment
rights; (3) a reasonable officer would not know that a lengthy strip search in the presence of female officers violated clearly established law, and thus the captain was entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) the captain did not
act in an objectively unreasonable manner by refusing to permit the inmate to attend a religious service after the
search, where the inmate had created a disturbance during the search. According to the court, the inmate’s potentially provocative questions in a public hallway constituted a disturbance, where during the strip search, the inmate asked the captain why he was singling out Muslims and subjecting them to harassment in a hallway with
several other Muslim inmates who were waiting to attend a religious service. (H.H. Coffield Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims
Act
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

McKinney v. U.S., 950 F.Supp.2d 923 (N.D.Tex. 2013). A 79-year-old federal prisoner, who allegedly had been
injured while being transported to a medical center, filed suit against the United States pursuant to the Federal
Torts Claim Act (FTCA). The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that the prisoner's
tort claim was not barred under the discretionary function exception to FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.
The court noted that a prisoner has the right to bring a cause of action under FTCA for a breach of the duty prescribed by federal statute requiring the Bureau of Prisons to provide for the safekeeping, care, and subsistence of
all federal prisoners. The prisoner alleged that he was injured when officials failed to assist him on stairs when he
was exiting an airplane, while he was fully restrained in handcuffs, shackles, and a belly chain. According to the
court, there were no legitimate policy considerations at play in the officials' choice not to assist a fully restrained,
elderly, ill, and outnumbered prisoner on the stairs of an airplane. The prisoner alleged that, due to his fall, he
suffered intense pain, has reoccurring medical issues, must now use a walker to get around, continues to need
medication for pain, and requires counseling to address the mental and emotional stress he has suffered. (FCI–
Fort Worth, Texas, and Federal Medical Center, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Munson v. Gaetz, 957 F.Supp.2d 951 (S.D.Ill. 2013). A Buddhist inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging failure to provide him with an adequate diet, deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, and violations of his right to free exercise of religion. The officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the officials were not aware that
feeding the inmate a soy-rich diet posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and therefore, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The court found that there was no evidence that a vegetarian diet containing soy was nutritionally
inadequate, as required for the Buddhist inmate's § 1983 claim alleging violations of his First Amendment free
exercise rights. The court held that the Buddhist inmate had administratively exhausted his claims that a high-soy
diet fed to him violated the Eighth Amendment and his First Amendment free exercise rights, where he had submitted grievances about the diet to the grievance office, he wrote to a warden and an assistant warden regarding
his grievances, and the prison officials did not respond to the grievances. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of
serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983 that
the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against, in
violation of his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions in forcing the inmate to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a joint cover-up if the two inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which ultimately resulted
in the fellow inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological purpose, and was far afield
of the species of force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that the alleged actions reflected
indifference to inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim. The court ruled that the correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity
from the inmate's § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims because inmates had a clearly established
right to remain incarcerated in reasonably safe conditions, and it was objectively unreasonable to threaten inmates
until they agreed to fight each other in front of prison officials. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, Protective
Custody Unit, New York State Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013). Former state inmates brought an action against a director of a
Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that their detention beyond their release dates violated their rights.
The district court granted qualified immunity to the director. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The appeals court held that the director’s taking of 43 to 60 days beyond the state inmates' release dates to recalculate the inmates' release dates after a judicial decision required credit for time served for supervision or services,
was not clearly unlawful, as would be deliberate indifference, and therefore, the director was entitled to qualified
immunity in the inmates' § 1983 action alleging that over-detention violated Fourteenth Amendment substantive
due process. The court noted that the judicial decision did not order the immediate release of the inmates, the
director was not notified of the over-detentions, the inmates did not request recalculation of their release dates,
and the director had to recalculate thousands of release dates. (Iowa Department of Corrections)

24.91

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender woman,
who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action against the
United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and police officers, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection with her arrests, and asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The police chief, officer, and USMS defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The district court held that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful search
claim, where a reasonable officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female detainee by male
USMS employees that included intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment,
all in front of male detainees and male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable. The
court also found that the USMS marshals and the police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from a §
1983 Fifth Amendment conditions of confinement claim brought by the pretrial detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee with male detainees and otherwise treating her as if she were male. According
to the court, a reasonable officer would know that treating the female detainee as the detainee was treated exposed
her to a substantial risk of serious harm, and, therefore, would know that those actions violated the detainee's due
process rights. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Sixth District Police Station and MPD's
Central Cellblock, and United States Marshals Service)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Sours v. Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority, 946 F.Supp.2d 678 (E.D.Ky. 2013). The administrator of a detainee's
estate filed a § 1983 action against jail officials alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical
needs, negligence, and violation of state regulations. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the nurse, a deputy jailer, and the center's administrator were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs; (2) the nurse's determination that the detainee did not need insulin “right away” was a discretionary decision for which she was entitled to qualified official immunity; (3) the nurse was not entitled to qualified official immunity for her alleged
failure to leave adequate instructions to deputy jailers for the care of the detainee; and (4) the jailers were entitled
to qualified official immunity, The court noted that, under Kentucky law, the detention center nurse's duty to ensure that the diabetic pretrial detainee could be cared for in her absence was mandatory and ministerial, and thus
the nurse was not entitled to qualified official immunity in the wrongful death action brought by the administrator,
for her alleged failure to leave adequate instructions for deputy jailers for the care of the detainee. According to
the court, the nurse was aware that the jailers were unlikely to be able to identify the symptoms of diabetic ketoacidosis and that there was no information in the detention center about diabetes. On appeal, the court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the nurse was not entitled to qualified immunity. (Big Sandy
Regional Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 719 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought
a suit against corrections officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging, among
other things, that the defendants' denial of his request for a medical leave to obtain additional treatment for his
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law and
his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner had traveled
to Nicaragua in the 1980s to join the Contra rebel forces and saw combat while fighting with them in that country's civil war. He also was working on the scaffolding of a building across the street from the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001, and was credited with risking his life to rescue several of his coworkers. He witnessed
victims of the attack jump from the towers. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the corrections officials were entitled to qualified immunity on prisoner's equal protection
claim, and on the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim. According to the court, even if the prisoner was in need of
absolutely necessary medical care, neither official had reason to conclude that such care was not available to him
in the prison, and thus there was a rational basis for distinguishing between leaves of absence for the treatment of
mental illness as opposed to other sorts of illness for which leave was available. The court noted that there no
evidence that either official thought that denying the prisoner's request for a leave of absence would cause him
harm, much less harm so serious that it would be objectively unreasonable for them to believe that the policy of
restricting leaves of absence for mental health treatment was consistent with prisoner's right to be free of cruel and
unusual punishment. (New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff
and county detention center personnel. The district court granted the defendants qualified immunity in part, but
denied it as to the detainee's claim that the defendants' refusal to give him adequate toilet paper violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held
that detention center personnel did not violate the detainee's Fourteenth Amendment rights by providing him with
only one roll of toilet paper per week, even the detainee used his weekly allotment before the week's end each
week. When this happened, the detainee had to shower to clean himself following a bowel movement. The court
noted that although the detainee exhausted his toilet paper supply each week before receiving an additional roll
the following week, he was not always without toilet paper, and when he did run out of toilet paper, he was able to
clean himself by taking a shower. (Faulkner County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2013). A female former prisoner brought an
action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (DOC), a warden, and other DOC-associated officers,
doctors, and nurses, asserting violations of § 1983, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and state
law. The prisoner alleged that she underwent three separate amputations as a result of inadequate health care by
the defendants and was subjected to a strip search that served no legitimate penological purpose. The district court
denied summary judgment to the warden and a corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the §

24.92

1983 claims against them, and they appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that the district court did not properly evaluate the warden's qualified immunity defense to
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs, when it denied
summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds to “defendants.,” The court held that remand was warranted
for the court to conduct a particularized analysis of whether the warden was deliberately indifferent to the conditions of the prisoner's confinement while in quarantine. The court noted that the district court did not mention any
facts in the record that specifically pertained to the warden, nor did the court make any findings regarding the
warden's knowledge or mental state. According to the court, the prisoner established, for qualified immunity purposes, that the corrections officer violated her Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a strip search of her in her
cell in view of other inmates and prison personnel. The court noted that the officer received a reprimand for violating Department of Corrections (DOC) rules by conducting the strip search in view of those not assisting in the
search, the officer allegedly refused to tell the prisoner her reasons for initiating the search, and smirked during
the search, which suggested personal animus and implicated the prisoner's dignitary interest. The court found that
the female prisoner's right not to be subjected to a suspicionless strip search in full view of others absent a legitimate penological justification was clearly established, for purposes of the female corrections officer's qualified
immunity defense. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). An inmate who had recently been released from the custody of a county jail filed a pro se suit against a sheriff and jail administrator, claiming his First Amendment rights
were violated by his inability to access a law library and to engage in religious worship while confined in involuntary protective custody (IPC). The inmate also alleged that he was discriminated against and placed in IPC because he was a sex offender, in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, and that his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the
plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) there was
no evidence of injury, as required to support a claim for violation of the First Amendment's right of access to the
courts; (2) there was no evidence that the inmate had firmly held religious beliefs, as required to support a claim
for violation of his First Amendment's right to free exercise of religion; (3) confinement of the inmate in administrative segregation for 132 days was not cruel or unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
(4) the inmate's initial five-day segregation, for purposes of a determining a housing classification, was insufficient to establish a liberty interest. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact: (1) as to whether the county jail had a rational basis for housing inmates with sex offender criminal
histories in administrative segregation, rather than with the general prison population; (2) whether there was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and (3) on the officials' claim for qualified immunity. (Montgomery
County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). The estate of a detainee, who died in police custody from multiple drug intoxication, brought a § 1983 action against the arresting and detaining officers, alleging that the officers
had shown deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the officers’
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the arresting officer's discovery of an
empty bottle of a recently refilled anti-anxiety medication, and the detainee's statement that he had taken “a little”
of the medication, did not amount to subjective knowledge that the detainee required medical attention, and thus
the officer was entitled to qualified immunity in the § 1983 action arising from the subsequent death of the detainee in police custody. The court noted that the detainee presented no external injuries, and the detainee was conscious during the initial encounter, answering officers’ questions and following instructions. The court found that
summary judgment for the police officer in charge of the jail was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether the police officer had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of the detainee and whether
the officer deliberately disregarded that need. According to the court, a reasonable officer in charge of a jail would
have known that a constitutional violation occurs by deliberately disregarding a detainee's serious medical needs,
and thus the right was clearly established, and in turn the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the §
1983 claim arising from detainee's death while in police custody. (Saline County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2013). An employee at a correctional center brought a § 1983 action
against various officials alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment arising from the issuance of a
written reprimand and suspension following his comments to a state attorney regarding the criminal prosecution
of a co-worker. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The employee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employee failed to show that a reasonable official
would have known that to restrict or punish his speech regarding a co-worker's punishment was unconstitutional
at the time of his discipline, as required for the employee to defeat a supervisors' claims of qualified immunity
from the employee's § 1983 claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment speech rights. According to
the court, the Illinois Department of Corrections' interests in suppressing the speech of a supervisor at a correctional facility regarding a co-worker's discipline outweighed the supervisor's interests in making the speech, and,
thus, the supervisor's First Amendment speech rights were not violated when he was disciplined for such speech.
The court noted that supervisors were tasked with enforcing rules and regulations, and when the supervisor criticized a disciplinary decision it undermined respect for the chain-of-command, and there was value in maintaining
order and respect in the paramilitary context of a correctional center. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who
worked at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under
§ 1983 that their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and
that they were retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was

24.93

precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of contractors who worked at
city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it was clearly established, for qualified
immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful search action against the sheriff and
sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights when they accepted employment, and
thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and individualized suspicion that employees were
hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual body cavity search.” The court also found that
summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches. (Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors,
Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in
part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals court
held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the arrestee's
right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged
that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a
prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged
that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in
any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released from the county's detention
facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable
cause determination. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff
acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that:
(1) the sheriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and
detention of citizens with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3)
routine warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F.Supp.3d 113 (D.Mass. 2014). A former female inmate and current female inmates brought a
class action against a sheriff and an assistant superintendent pursuant to § 1983, alleging that the policy of permitting male officers to videotape female inmates being strip-searched violated the Fourth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The district court
granted the inmates’ motion and denied the defendants’ motion. The court held that strip searches of female inmates being transferred to a segregation unit while male officers conducted videotaping in the vicinity were unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the inmates,
where the inmate being searched was fully aware that a male officer was videotaping her, the officer was within
the inmate's view just a few feet away, the inmate was required to strip and manipulate her body in the officer's
presence, including lifting her breasts and spreading her legs, and the videotaping by male officers was not limited
to urgent situations. The court found that the policy did not have a reasonable relationship with a legitimate
penological interest, and therefore, the policy was unconstitutional in violation of the Fourth Amendment as applied to the inmates, regardless of whether the officers actually viewed the inmates. The court noted that the policy of using males to tape searches applied to all strip searches upon transfer, not just emergencies, the prison did
not have staffing problems, permitting males to tape the searches did not enhance employment opportunities, and
the policy did not provide for alternatives. According to the court, clearly established law prohibited male officers
from viewing female inmates during a strip search, and therefore, the sheriff and assistant superintendent were not
entitled to qualified immunity in female inmates' § 1983 class action. (Western Regional Women's Correctional
Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). African American corrections officers brought an action under §
1981 and § 1983 against prison administrators and supervisors, alleging race based harassment and retaliation, and
disparate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the officers had
a subjective belief that the discrimination and harassment they experienced was severe and pervasive; (2) the
officers established a broad pattern of harassment, and thus specific individual acts had to be viewed as illustrative; (3) the acts, comments, and inaction by a supervisor were purposeful and objectively actionable; (4) the officers suffered materially adverse consequences after they filed an official complaint, as required for a retaliation
claim; (5) supervisors who permitted and participated in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work
assignments, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officers experienced anxiety, dread,
and panic attacks, they felt like they were being treated more like inmates than fellow officers, they initially enjoyed going to work but subsequently found their job to be depressing and anxiety-producing due to discrimination and harassment, they felt personally at risk because they no longer trusted that their fellow officers would
come to their aid in a dangerous situation, and one officer's hair started to fall out from the stress he suffered. The
officers had alleged that they experienced racist remarks on a near daily basis, that supervisors had been present
and laughing without objection to statements made by others, and each officer became aware of offensive remarks

24.94

even if each individual did not hear it first-hand. Supervisors allegedly acted to intensify the pattern of harassment
of African American corrections officers after they filed an official complaint of a racially hostile environment,
subsequently assigning them inferior or less desirable jobs, “papering” their files with reports on trivial or invented misconduct, and singling them out for additional work details and consistently forcing them to take unpopular
details. The court held that these were materially adverse employment actions sufficient to support the officer's
prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981.
The court found that a reasonable prison supervisor would have understood that permitting and participating in
racially derisive remarks, and then assigning inferior work assignments for reporting such conduct, would have
violated the rights of the African American corrections officers, and thus the supervisors who did permit and participate in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work assignments, were not entitled to qualified
immunity to the officers' hostile work environment and retaliation claims under § 1981 and § 1983. (Nebraska
State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014). The estate of deceased pretrial detainee who died while
in custody after officers restrained him in his response to his alleged insubordination, brought a § 1983 action in
state court against the deputies and a sergeant, alleging excessive force, deprivation of life without due process,
and failure to provide immediate medical care. Following removal to federal court, the district court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee's right to be free from excessive force, including use of a
neck restraint, stun gun, and pressure on his back while he was on his stomach and not resisting, was clearly established, for purposes of determining whether the deputies and sergeant were entitled to qualified immunity.
According to the court, a reasonable officer would know that failing to check a pretrial detainee's vital signs or
provide immediate medical attention after he was rendered unconscious by the use of force, which allegedly included at least a two-minute neck hold, 140 pounds of pressure on his back, and the use of stun gun for eight seconds, was deliberate indifference. (Downtown Detention Center, Denver, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner who was wrongfully convicted of murder and
sentenced to death brought an action against, county prosecutors, among others, alleging a § 1983 claim of violation of his due process rights and related state tort claims. The former prisoner had been incarcerated for 17 years
before the conviction was overturned. The district court partially granted and partially denied a defense motion to
dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the former prisoner
moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated its prior order to
the extent that it dismissed the former prisoner's federal claim against prosecutor arising from the prosecutor's preprosecution fabrication of evidence, and retained jurisdiction over the state claims. The prosecutors appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the prosecutor did
not have absolute or qualified immunity from § 1983 claims arising out of his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; (2) the prosecutor did not have absolute immunity under Illinois law for
his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; and (3) remand was required to allow
reconsideration of the determination that the prosecutor did not have immunity from state law claims arising out
of use of fabricated evidence at retrial. The court noted that absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors is only for
acts they commit within the scope of their employment as prosecutors; when they do non-prosecutorial work they
lose their absolute immunity and have only qualified immunity. (Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Fouch v. District of Columbia, 10 F.Supp.3d 45 (D.D.C. 2014). A detainee, who allegedly suffered severe injuries
from collision between two police vehicles, one of which he was riding in, handcuffed behind the back and without a seat belt or harness, while being transported between police stations for processing of a misdemeanor threat
charge, brought an action against the District of Columbia and the two officers who had been driving the vehicles.
After the court dismissed claims against the officer who had been driving the other vehicle, the District and the
remaining officer filed a motion for partial dismissal. The district court granted the motion for partial dismissal in
part and denied in part without prejudice. The court held that the District of Columbia could not be held liable for
damages under § 1983. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Central Booking Division)

U.S. District Court
BIVENS CLAIM

Haley v. Tryon, 12 F.Supp.3d 573 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). A former detainee brought an action against federal detention facility officials and four nonfederal officers, alleging failure to protect him and denial of proper medical
treatment, in violation of his rights pursuant to the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the detainee's complaint failed to allege that a
field office director and an assistant field officer director were personally involved in any constitutional violation,
as required to state a Bivens claim. (Buffalo Federal Detention Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
INSURANCE

LCS Corrections Services, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.3d 712 (S.D.Tex. 2014). An insured prison operator brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that an insurer had a duty under a commercial umbrella liability policy to defend it in an underlying civil rights action. The underlying case was brought by the representative
of a deceased inmate who allegedly died because of the operator’s policy of not giving inmates their scheduled
medications. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that the underlying claim for refusing to provide prescribed medications fell within the scope of the policy's
professional liability exclusion, despite the operator's contention that the claim addressed administrative rather
than professional conduct because it was a global administrative decision to deprive inmates of that particular
medical care, where the exclusion extended to “failure to provide professional services.” (Lexington Insurance
Company, LCS Corrections Services, Inc., Texas)

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U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Liska v. Dart, 60 F.Supp.3d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county and a
county sheriff, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants deprived him of liberty without procedural due process,
and asserting claims under state law for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of first impression, the detainee had a liberty interest protected
by procedural due process in remaining on home confinement; (2) the defendants violated the detainee’s procedural due process rights; (3) the detainee sufficiently stated the sheriff’s personal involvement in the alleged procedural due process violation; and (4) the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the
pretrial detainee had a liberty interest protected by procedural due process in remaining on home confinement, and
thus the county and county sheriff were required to afford the detainee procedural due process prior to transferring
the detainee to jail due to his alleged violation of the terms of home confinement. The detainee alleged that the
sheriff was responsible for implementing the cell-box system used in the detainee’s home during his home confinement, that the sheriff was aware of issues with the type and brand of system assigned to the detainee and many
other home detainees, that the sheriff knew or should have known of the malfunctions of the system in the detainee’s home, and that the sheriff allowed the detainee’s incarceration in the county jail for violation of the terms of
his home confinement despite knowledge of numerous false alarms registered by the system. (Cook County Sheriff’s Department, Cook County Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health
care services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for
administration and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference
where the inmate did not allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical care
or basic necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it was
not unreasonable for the prison to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical care.
The court noted that the prison posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and what
it covered, and a regulation was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). Parents, on behalf of their minor children, brought a § 1983 action
against the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, correctional officers, and other administrators, claiming
that the suspicionless strip search of the juveniles, as part of the intake process of the detention center, violated the
juveniles' Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the parents. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the right of juvenile detainees held on minor offenses to be free from suspicionless strip searches was not clearly established at
time the two juveniles arrested for underage drinking were strip searched, and thus, correctional officers who
conducted searches were protected by qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 action arising from the
searches. The court noted that prior court decisions had recognized that a strip search of a person arrested for a
minor offense was unreasonable, given that subsequent court decisions had found that state's enhanced responsibility for juveniles supported strip searches, and a recent Supreme Court decision had concluded that the Fourth
Amendment did not prohibit strip search of all adult criminal detainees. The court found that under Kentucky law,
the correctional officers' strip searches of the two juveniles, as part of the intake process of a juvenile detention
center, were ministerial acts, and thus, the officers were not eligible for qualified official immunity from liability
on the juveniles' claims of negligence, invasion of privacy, assault, false imprisonment, grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress, and arbitrary action in violation of state constitution, even if officers were both acting
in good faith and within scope of their employment. (Breathitt Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014). A state parolee filed a civil rights action against the Governor of
the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and parole personnel to challenge the imposition and enforcement of a residency restriction and a requirement that he submit to electronic monitoring using a Global Positioning System (GPS) device as conditions of his parole. The district court dismissed the action. The parolee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) neither absolute nor qualified immunity
barred the parolee's civil rights claims against the State of California, Secretary of Corrections, and parole personnel that were limited to injunctive relief; (2) absolute immunity barred the state parolee's civil rights claims for
damages against his parole officers for imposing allegedly unconstitutional parole conditions; (3) absolute immunity did not extend to the state parolee's civil rights claim that parole officers enforced conditions of his parole
in an unconstitutionally arbitrary or discriminatory manner; and (4) the parolee could challenge a condition of
parole under § 1983 if his or her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier release from parole nor
imply, either directly or indirectly, the invalidity of criminal judgments underlying that parole term. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Turner v. Hamblin, 995 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought an action against various
prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause by failing to provide
services to Muslim prisoners when an outside volunteer was not available to lead the service. The prison officials
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity on the prisoner's claim, where the law was not clearly established that the Free
Exercise Clause required prison officials to hold religious services for prisoners if no qualified non-prisoners were
available to lead the service. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

24.96

U.S. District Court
PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY

Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A detainee, a Honduran citizen who had been arrested
for driving under the influence and fleeing officers after they effectuated a traffic stop of his vehicle, and subsequently had been held on an immigration detainer from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and then on
a federal material witness warrant, brought a pro se action against a village, police chief, police officers, sheriff,
jail deputies, and an Assistant United States Attorney. The detainee alleged violation of his due process, equal
protection, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the detainee stated a
claim against the village defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in connection
with his detention after he had posted bond; (2) the detainee stated a claim for violation of his consular rights
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (3) the detainee stated a claim against the
county defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in connection with his 29-hour
detention; and (4) absolute prosecutorial immunity did not shield the AUSA from the plaintiff's claims that the
AUSA violated his Fourth Amendment and due process rights, along with the federal material witness statute and
the federal rules of criminal procedure. The court noted that following the detainee’s post-arrest transfer to the
county's custody, he was detained for approximately 29 hours pursuant to an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer request, and that the county lacked probable cause that the detainee had violated a federal
criminal law, but instead detained him while the federal government investigated to determine whether or not he
had, in violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment and procedural and substantive due process rights. (Village
of Round Lake Beach, Lake County Jail, Illinois)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate
brought a state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983
violations of the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial
detainee in a jail booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement floor
without any way to break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly
chain and leg irons, led to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the
detainee’s prior restraint behavior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would
have provoked the officer to use such force. The court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions
were unconstitutional, and therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s attempts to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and
subdued.
The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial
detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his
chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave the
medical cell after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to mention the
use of a chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law and
sought to avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to
train and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom,
and to ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence
that the sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements to federal
officials about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide medical
attention to the detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate of the pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally
and deliberately made false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified
the conduct of his officers and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions. The court concluded that the officers’ use of excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death
could be imputed to the sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators
were a position that was inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Collazo-Perez v. Puerto Rico, 100 F.Supp.3d 88 (D.P.R. 2015). A Puerto Rico prisoner brought a pro se § 1983
action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the head of a prison’s security, and others, alleging his prison
transfer violated his civil rights. The prisoner sought $75,000 to compensate him for damages suffered. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner’s allusions to
negligence on the part of prison’s head of security in immediately transferring the prisoner to another institution,
after confidential information about which the prisoner was the author was disseminated to the penal population,
were insufficient to state a due process claim that the security head and others endangered the prisoner. According
to the court, the prison’s head of security had sovereign immunity from the prisoner’s § 1983 suit, where the head
of security was at all times acting within the scope of his employment, and in his official capacity. (Bayamon
Penal Complex, Puerto Rico)

24.97

U.S. Appeals Court
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015). An acquitted defendant brought an action against a sheriff in his
official capacity under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, arising out of the sheriff’s
requiring him to submit to a cheek swab for a DNA sample before he could be released from jail, after he was
acquitted of felony charges by a jury. The district court denied the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment based
on sovereign immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeal court affirmed, finding that the sheriff was generally
considered a county official and thus not afforded immunity as a state actor, and the sheriff was not required by
state law to the collect defendant’s DNA prior to releasing him from jail following his acquittal, and thus the sheriff was acting as a county official and not entitled to immunity. (Franklin County, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RELEASE
SENTENCE

Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015). A prisoner, a non-homicide juvenile offender, brought a
§ 1983 action against a parole commission and others, alleging denial of his constitutional right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment and due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as a result of being
denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion and granted the prisoner’s motion in part. The court held that the prisoner
was denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,
as required by the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the parole commissioners and case analysts did not
distinguish parole reviews for juvenile offenders from adult offenders, thus failing to consider the children's diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change. The court noted that caseloads were enormous, with
each parole case analyst having responsibility for approximately 4,338 offenders, and the opportunity to appear
for a parole hearing seemed to exist mainly for those who were on notice, with no notice to the offender being
required. (North Carolina Post–Release Supervision and Parole Commission, and North Carolina Department of
Public Safety)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F.Supp.3d 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2015). The personal representative of a jail inmate's estate filed
suit against the county sheriff, the captain in charge of jail guards, guards, and the physician contracted to provide
health care services for the jail population, asserting claims for wrongful death, deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs, and a state law claim against the physician for medical malpractice. The jail defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of immunity, and the physician filed a motion to dismiss for failure
to state claims. The district court denied the motions. The court held that: (1) the amended Alabama statute that
extended qualified immunity of a sheriff and sheriff's deputies to corrections officers working in sheriffs' jails was
a constitutionally permissible exercise by Alabama Legislature of its broad police power; (2) immunity under
Alabama's Jailer Liability Protection Act required findings that jail personnel were acting within the scope of their
official duties and that they were acting in compliance with law; (3) the personal representative adequately alleged
the inmate's serious medical need; (4) the personal representative adequately alleged that the physician had subjective knowledge of, but failed to treat the inmate for an abscessed tooth; (5) the personal representative adequately alleged that the physician's failure to examine or provide any treatment to the inmate for an abscessed
tooth was the cause of the inmate's death; and (6) the allegations stated a claim against the physician for medical
malpractice under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. The personal representative alleged that the inmate submitted medical request forms through jail personnel for treatment of an abscessed tooth, that the physician ignored
the requests, that a toothache caused noticeably severe swelling that required immediate medical attention, that
inmate's pain and swelling was such that any reasonable person would know that he required immediate medical
attention, and that, at some time before the inmate's release from jail several days later, the physician and/or
agents of the entity that provided physician services to the jail observed the inmate through the window of a
locked door but did not examine him in any way or refer him for any care. The inmate died at a hospital within
hours after being released from the jail. (Winston County Jail, (Correctional Managed Care Consultants, LLC, and
Winston County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103 (D.N.M. 2015). A female prison inmate brought an action under § 1983 for
numerous violations of her constitutional rights, including under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
against employees of the contractor that operated the correctional facility, and against the contractor under the
theory of vicarious liability, for alleged physical and sexual assault by employees while she was incarcerated. The
defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
“aided-in-agency” theory of vicarious liability applied to the female prison inmate’s claims under § 1983 against
the contractor after the contractor’s employee repeatedly sexually assaulted the inmate. According to the court, the
employee’s relationship with the inmate by virtue of his employment conferred “extraordinary power” upon him,
the employee’s authority to do as he wished appeared to be delegated to him, and the inmate was unlikely to be
able to successfully complain about the employee’s actions. The court noted that the issue of whether the employer was vicariously liable for the employee’s repeated rape and sexual assault of the inmate was for a jury to
decide in the inmate’s claim under § 1983 for violations of numerous constitutional rights, including the right to
bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that while state-employee prison guards are
entitled to qualified immunity against federal suits under § 1983, private prison guards receive no such benefit.
(New Mexico Women’s Correctional Facility, operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Purvis v. City of Atlanta, 142 F.Supp.3d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2015). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city,
county, and the county sheriff, asserting claims for unlawful arrest and detention in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The arrestee alleged that, following his lawful arrest for drinking in public, he was unlawfully held by the city and county for an additional five to six days on an invalid warrant. The city, county, and
sheriff moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the
allegation was insufficient to establish a pattern or practice on the part of the county or city arising out of an official policy or custom; (2) the sheriff, in his official capacity, was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3)
the allegations were sufficient to support an inference that the sheriff directed subordinates to act unlawfully; (4)
the sheriff was not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim for violation of the arrestee's due process right to

24.98

timely release; and (5) the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim alleging violation of the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. (Atlanta City Detention Center, Fulton County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
SCREENING
MEDICAL SCREENING

Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee's guardian filed a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, the jail's private healthcare providers, and a booking nurse to recover for injuries that the detainee suffered from a severe assault by fellow prisoners. The defendants filed for dismissal. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who had been assaulted by other county
jail inmates, stated a plausible municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the corporation that assisted in developing the sheriff's policies with respect to medical and mental health care of inmates, where the detainee alleged that the corporation shared responsibility with the sheriff to adequately train and supervise its employees,
and that the corporation's policies, practices, and customs posed substantial risks to inmates' health and safety, but
failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate those risks. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Tulsa County
Sheriff, Oklahoma, Correctional Healthcare Management, Inc. and, Correctional Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY

Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir. 2015). The mother of deceased inmate brought a § 1983
action against a county and a medical provider, which contracted with county to provide medical services to county inmates, alleging that the medical provider’s failure to train and supervise its nurses violated the inmate’s constitutional right to adequate medical care and that the medical provider was negligent under state law. The twentyfive year old inmate had entered the jail to serve a short sentence for a misdemeanor offense. He died three days
later from complications of an untreated methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureas (MRSA) infection. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the medical provider. The mother appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact
as to whether the medical provider’s training program was inadequate, whether the inadequacy resulted from its
deliberate indifference to inmate’s right to adequate medical care, and whether the inadequacy caused, or was
closely related to, the inmate’s death. The court noted that the nurses were required to make professional judgments outside their area of medical expertise, and unless training was provided, the nurses lacked knowledge
about the constitutional consequences of their actions or inactions in providing medical care to inmates. The court
found that the medical provider did not derive its existence and status from the county, and thus was not entitled
to share the county’s governmental immunity on a Kentucky negligence claim. The court noted that nearly all of
the inmate’s medical conditions-- high blood pressure, rheumatoid arthritis, gout, osteoporosis, and staph infection-- had been diagnosed by a private physician as mandating treatment, and deputy jailers could tell that the
inmate needed prompt medical treatment even though they did not have the same medical training as the nurses
who were employed at the county jail. (Hopkins County Detention Center, Southern Health Partners, Inc., Kentucky)

U.S. Supreme Court
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). The widow of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a state department of correction (DOC), the warden of a state correctional institution, and others,
alleging that they violated the Eighth Amendment in failing to prevent the inmate's suicide. The district court
denied the commissioner's and warden's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The commissioner and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding that any
right of an incarcerated person to proper implementation of adequate suicide prevention goals was not clearly
established at the time of the inmate’s death, and, thus, the commissioner and warden were qualifiedly immune
from the widow's claim. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

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not entitled to qualified immunity, where the inmate claimed that his constantly reasserted claims
of misidentification were never investigated. The court noted that his date of birth, physical
appearance and Social Security number differed from that of the wanted suspect, and the officials
had ready access to both parties' fingerprints, such that it would have been easy to confirm that he
was not the man named in a warrant. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A deaf motorist brought an
action against a county, alleging that his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and
subsequent detention violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). The motorist alleged that throughout the arrest process, the county failed to establish
effective communication because it did not provide him with any auxiliary aids as required by the
ADA and RA. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the motorist's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and his subsequent
stationhouse detention was not covered by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act (RA). According to
the court, the motorist's arrest was due to his erratic and suspicious driving, not his disability, and
following his arrest the police merely communicated the breath test consent form to the motorist,
who foreclosed further questioning by requesting an attorney through his driver's rights card. The
court held that the detention of the motorist following his arrest for driving under the influence
(DUI) did not violate the Rehabilitation Act (RA), where the motorist was not detained because of
his disability, but instead was detained because Florida law required a DUI arrestee to be detained
for at least eight hours. The court found that the detention of the deaf motorist in solitary
confinement following his arrest did not rise to the level of intentional discrimination or deliberate
indifference to the motorist's disability, as required to support the award of compensatory damages
under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). Corrections facility officers believed that their communication
with the motorist was effective and they detained the motorist in solitary confinement as a good
faith protective measure, not as a discriminatory act. (Miami-Dade County, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
PROCEDURES
SCREENING

Carroll v. City of Quincy, 441 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Mass. 2006). A pretrial detainee who was injured
when he fell in a cell after being left with his hands handcuffed behind his back, sued a city and
city police officers, alleging negligence and violations of his federal and state civil rights. The
detainee fell as he attempted to exit the cell when he was still handcuffed. It was later determined
at the hospital that the detainee had a blood alcohol content of 0.37. The detainee allegedly
sustained serious injuries, including a subdural hematoma, traumatic brain injury, depressive
illness and seizure disorder. The district court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as
to whether city police officers had subjective knowledge the detainee's highly intoxicated state, and
whether they acted with deliberate indifference when they left him with his hands handcuffed
behind his back. The court found that the officers' conduct in leaving the highly intoxicated
pretrial detainee in a cell was not undertaken pursuant to any city policy or custom, as required
for the imposition of municipal liability, where the city had rather detailed written policies
restricting the use of handcuffs. The court noted that an officer testified that if an arrestee was too
intoxicated to be booked, it was the usual practice to put the arrestee in a cell until he/she sobered
up and, during that period, the handcuffs would be removed unless the detainee was acting
violently. According to the court, the officers' conduct in leaving the detainee alone with his hands
handcuffed behind his back was not caused by deliberately indifferent policies of the city, where
the city's policies clearly delineated the proper procedures for the use of restraints on intoxicated
detainees and the handling of such detainees. (City of Quincy Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Me. 2006). In a class action, persons strip-searched by
jail officials agreed to a consent decree. The district court approved the agreement, issuing an
injunction ensuring compliance with the Fourth Amendment law governing strip searches of
certain arrestees. The court enjoined the county from strip searching any persons charged with a
crime that does not involve weapons, violence or controlled or scheduled substances during the jail

XX

against a city, city officers, a county, and county officers alleging excessive force. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that an officer who handcuffed the arrestee in the customary
manner by cuffing her hands behind her back did not use excessive force, even if the officer knew
that the arrestee had a hand deformity. The court noted that the officer's decision to not deviate
from the standard practice of placing handcuffs behind the back was a judgment call. The arrestee
had told the officer to be gentle because she was frail and had recently undergone elbow surgery.
The officer double-locked the handcuffs behind her back so that they would not tighten. He then
marched her outside, deposited her in his cruiser, and belted her in for transport to the jail. Upon
arriving at the lockup, the arrestee was transferred to the custody of a jail officer, who unlocked
the handcuffs, patted her down, and placed her in a holding cell. After other required aspects of the
booking process had been completed, another jail officer fingerprinted the arrestee, who claimed
that the officer who fingerprinted her repeatedly pushed her fingers down hard, in spite of being
told that she had a hand deformity. She also claimed that the fingerprinting caused injuries to her
wrist and her surgically repaired middle finger. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

25.31

admission process, while they are being held awaiting bail or a first court appearance, or after
being arrested on a default or other warrant, unless the officer or person conducting the strip
search has reasonable suspicion to believe the person does possess a weapon, controlled or
scheduled substances, or other contraband. The court ordered the sheriff and his successors to
keep a written log that records every instance in which a newly-admitted individual is subject to a
strip search procedure, with the following information: (1) the date and time of the search
procedure; (2) the name of each officer participating in the search procedure; (3) a brief statement
of facts found to constitute “reasonable suspicion” for a strip search, to include the crime with
which the individual was charged; and (4) the name of the officer who made the determination that
“reasonable suspicion” warranted a strip search and who approved the search. The agreement also
provided for monetary compensation of persons who had been improperly strip-searched. (Knox
County Jail, Maine)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). The personal representative of the estate of a

U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION

Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and county sheriff’s department, alleging that police and sheriff’s deputies violated his Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to entertain his claim that he was being held in
custody due to mistaken identity. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of city,
and entered judgment upon a jury verdict against the sheriff’s department. The arrestee and
sheriff’s department appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court
held that the sheriff’s department was not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity in the arrestee’s §
1983 action, where units of government were not entitled to immunity in § 1983 actions, and the
judge who arraigned the arrestee did not forbid the sheriff’s department from conducting further
inquires into the arrestee’s identity. The court found that the sheriff’s department policy of
ignoring an arrestee’s claims of mistaken identity after an arrestee has appeared in court and a
judge had ordered him held in custody did not violate the arrestee’s right to due process, as
required for the department to be liable under § 1983 to the arrestee. The detainee was held by the
department for 13 days after his arraignment on a warrant that had been issued for someone else.
The court noted that the judge did not abdicate responsibility to determine the arrestee’s identity
or delegate that responsibility to the department, and there was no doubt that the arrestee was the
person that the judge ordered held at arraignment. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006.) Arrestees brought suit,

XX

pretrial detainee who died following self-mutilation while incarcerated in a jail, brought a civil
rights action against the county sheriff, the arresting police officer, and jailers in their individual
and official capacities alleging violation of the pretrial detainee’s right to medical treatment and to
due process. The district court granted judgment for the defendants and the estate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not have an objectively
serious medical need on intake from the perspective of the arresting police officer, as a layperson;
(2) the arresting police officer did not subjectively know that the detainee required medical
attention; (3) a reasonable police officer would not have known on intake that the pretrial detainee
had an objectively serious medical need; (4) the detainee did not have an objectively serious
medical need on intake from the perspective of the jailer, as a layperson; (5) the jailer did not
subjectively know that the detainee required medical attention; (6) a reasonable jailer would not
have known on intake that the pretrial detainee had an objectively serious medical need; (7) the
county did not have an official practice of booking inmates who were hallucinating without
providing medical care; and (8) the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the
Arkansas State Jail Standards from evidence in the trial, as the jail standards did not represent
minimum constitutional standards. (Crawford County Detention Center, Arkansas)

individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, against a county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, county undersheriff, former county undersheriff, a jail administrator
and a lieutenant, challenging the constitutionality of the search policy of the county jail. The
district court held that the policy, pursuant to which arrestees being admitted to a county jail were
effectively subjected to strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment and that the arrestees were
entitled to permanent injunctive relief. The court found that the arrestees were the “prevailing
parties” entitled to an award of attorney fees. According to the court, the Fourth Amendment
precludes officials from performing strip searches and/or body cavity searches of arrestees charged
with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a reasonable suspicion that
the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the crime charged, the particular
characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the arrest. The court held that the
indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is unconstitutional. The policy required
arrestees to remove their clothing in front of a corrections officer (CO) and take a shower,
regardless of the nature of their crime and without any determination that there was a reasonable
suspicion that they possessed contraband. The court found that the policy violated the Fourth
Amendment, despite the claim that the written policy did not involve either a command for the
arrestee to undress completely or a command for the CO to inspect the naked arrestee. The court
noted that the procedure that was followed in fact by the COs required all admittees to remove
their clothes, submit to a visual examination by the CO, and shower. The court held that the

25.32

arrestees were entitled to a permanent injunction prohibiting county jail officials from conducting
a strip search, as set forth in the jail's “change out” procedure. (Montgomery Co. Jail, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
MEDICATION

Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S. D., 452 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2006). A widow, as personal

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Plemmons v. Roberts, 439 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2006). A county jail inmate who had been arrested for
failing to pay child support brought a § 1983 action against a county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court
denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment and they appealed. The court of appeals held
that genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county jail inmate suffered from a serious
heart condition, whether jail officials were notified of the inmate's history of heart problems,
whether officials failed to recognize that the inmate was suffering from the symptoms of a heart
attack that would be obvious to a lay person, whether the officials acted promptly to obtain
necessary medical help, and whether the officials were properly trained to deal with such a
medical emergency, precluded summary judgment in favor of the defendants. According to the
court, the corrections officers’ alleged delay in providing medical care to the inmate who was
having a heart attack constituted conduct that violated clearly established law, and therefore the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity in the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim. The inmate alleged that two officers inexcusably delayed in
summoning an ambulance even though he had told them that he had a history of heart trouble.
The court noted that the medical intake form completed by one of the officers did not contain any
mention of heart problems. (Pulaski County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Posey v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 430 F.Supp.2d 616 (N.D.Tex. 2006). The family of
deceased county jail detainee sued a county and the company that provided telephone services to a
jail, after the detainee hanged himself using the cord from a defective telephone in his cell. The
county moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the federal claims against all
defendants. The court held that jail employees did not violate the due process rights of the
detainee by displaying deliberate indifference to his condition while he was being booked and
placed in a cell, when they left him alone in the cell, with a broken telephone that had an exposed
cord. The court noted that where there was no showing that the employees knew the detainee was
a suicide risk, and any shortcomings in following the county's suicide screening procedures were at
most gross negligence, which was below the deliberate indifference standard needed to impose §
1983 liability. The court held that there was no policy or custom by which county could be held
liable under a § 1983 action for the suicide death of the detainee. According to the court, the two
previous incidents of detainee suicide, over almost two decades, one of which may have involved
telephone cords, did not establish that the existing suicide policy was defective for failure to
instruct staff on this contingency, and that failure of staff to follow some suicide prevention policies
did not rise to level of deliberate indifference required for county liability. (Dallas Co. Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Pryor v. Dearborn Police Dept., 452 F.Supp.2d 714 (E.D.Mich. 2006). The estate of an arrestee
brought a § 1983 action against police officers and a police department, alleging failure to provide
the arrestee with adequate medical care. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's condition-- a crack

XX

representative of a pretrial detainee who died of an acute asthma attack while detained in a
county jail, brought a civil rights action against the county and jailers alleging deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s serious medical needs. The detainee had arrived at the jail at 7:10
p.m. with an envelope marked with the detainee’s name, inmate number, and the following
notation in bold red letters: “URGENT Colo. Inter-Correctional Medical Summary Transfer Report
DELIVER TO MEDICAL DEPARTMENT AT ONCE.” In an intake interview, the detainee told
the jailer that he suffered from a severe asthma condition. The detainee said he was taking a
“bunch” of medications, though he brought with him to the jail only an Albuterol inhaler. After a
jury trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants as a matter of law. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the head jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the
detainee’s medical needs in failing to take the detainee to a physician shortly after the detainee’s
arrival, absent any evidence that the jailer actually knew of and recklessly disregarded the risk of
serious harm to the detainee posed by the lack of access to his prescribed medications over the
weekend. According to the court, the head jailer’s failure to take the detainee and his medical
records to the physician was at most negligence. The court held that the jail administrator and the
chief deputy were not deliberately indifferent, notwithstanding the chief deputy’s instructions to
another jailer to attempt to get the inmate’s prescriptions filled without taking the detainee to an
emergency room. Although the jail administrator failed to ensure that the detainee visited a
physician to secure a refill of his prescriptions, the day before the detainee died the administrator
had been advised by a physicians assistant that an emergency room visit was not necessary unless
the detainee made frequent use of the inhaler. The administrator was following that advice. The
court noted that a jailer repeatedly asked others to obtain the detainee’s medications and, on his
day off, took medical notes transferred with the detainee to the physicians assistant and then
visited the detainee in the jail to tell him of the physicians assistant’s advice. (Lawrence County
Jail, South Dakota)

25.33

cocaine overdose-- constituted a serious medical need, and whether the police officers acted with
deliberate indifference to the arrestee's serious medical need. The detainee was arrested, and
while he was in custody in a police vehicle he consumed an unknown quantity of cocaine. He again
ingested cocaine when he was detained at the police station and subsequently collapsed on the
floor of his cell and began convulsing. Paramedics were eventually called, and they transported the
arrestee to a hospital, where he died three days later. (Dearborn Police Station, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1179 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A daughter, individually and

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Me. 2006). A class action suit was brought against a
county, its sheriff, and unidentified jail correctional personnel under § 1983, claiming that the
Fourth Amendment rights of detainees alleged to have committed non-violent, non-weapons, and
non-drug felonies, and detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors, were violated when
they were subjected to strip searches without reasonable suspicion that they were harboring
contraband on or within their bodies. Summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part
to the plaintiffs, and the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court held that:
(1) evidence, including booking logs at the county jail, demonstrated that corrections officers
routinely strip searched misdemeanor detainees without reasonable suspicion; (2) a jail
administrator's letter was highly probative of what municipal policymakers knew about ongoing
strip search practices at the jail; (3) intake and release log evidence provided proof that, for at least
some corrections officers, strip searching was customary; and (4) the actions taken by the county in
response to the unconstitutional practice of strip searching misdemeanor detainees amounted to
acquiescence in it. According to the court, a county jail inspection report provided information
about the circumstances surrounding search practices at the jail, as well as the knowledge of the
county policymakers before the commencement of the class period, and, thus, was relevant in the
class action suit. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
SEARCHES

Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A detainee held for civil contempt

as administrator of the estate of her deceased father, brought state and federal law claims against
a sheriff and county commission arising from her father's death while he was an inmate in a
county jail. The county commission and sheriff filed separate motions for summary judgment,
which the district court granted. The court held that the county sheriff did not have the requisite
knowledge to be found deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate who
failed to disclose his medical condition or to request treatment. According to the court, the sheriff
did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the jail inmate who died of cardiovascular disease
on his second day of incarceration, absent a showing that the inmate disclosed his condition upon
admission, that the sheriff otherwise knew that the inmate had a serious condition that required
immediate medical treatment, or that the sheriff failed to provide the inmate with treatment with
knowledge that failure to do so posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The inmate apparently
was not taking his medications and did not request medical treatment. The court found that
facially constitutional policies governing booking, supervision, staffing, and training of jail
personnel did not, as applied, result in deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the
inmate, where the policies provided for health screening of inmates upon their admission and
medical treatment when requested by inmates, and there was no evidence that the policies were
ignored nor any history of widespread problems to place the sheriff on notice of the need to correct
the policies, as required to hold the sheriff individually liable. (Coosa County Jail, Alabama)

brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging civil rights violations due to invasive
search procedures. Following a jury verdict for the defendants, the detainee moved for a new trial.
The district court held that a jury's verdict as to an unreasonable body cavity search was against
the manifest weight of evidence. The court noted that, notwithstanding the detainee's purported
intermingling with others who were incarcerated, he was not charged with any crime, and there
was no evidence that deputies noticed anything suspicious about detainee which would have
otherwise justified a search. The detainee was subjected to an invasive urethral swabbing
procedure without his consent. The detainee had been held in civil contempt and ordered held in
custody after he refused to sign certain documents related to his pending divorce proceedings.
Upon arrival at the jail, the detainee was processed along with approximately 250 other new
inmates. After spending some time in a holding pen, the detainee and others were photographed
and given identification cards. An employee from Cermak Health Services, the agency responsible
for administering medical treatment to detainees at the jail, then asked Thompson a number of
medical screening questions. During the interview, the detainee responded to the questions on a
standard form concerning his medical history and signed the following “consent for treatment”
portion of the form: I consent to a medical and mental health history and physical including

screening for tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases as part of the intake process of the
Cook County Jail. I also consent to ongoing medical treatment by Cermak Health Services staff for
problems identified during this process. I understand I may be asked to sign forms allowing other
medical treatments. I understand that every effort will be made by CHS staff to keep my medical
problems confidential. I understand the policy of CHS regarding access to health care at Cook
County Jail. The defendants presented evidence at trial that during the interview, an employee
informed the detainee of his right to refuse the medical screening, but the detainee denied that

XX

25.34

anyone informed him of his right to refuse to consent. Following the medical screening interview, his personal
property was inventoried and then he and other inmates then underwent a urethral swabbing procedure. He claimed
that he felt pain both during and after the procedure. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION

Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought § 1983 action against an arresting officer
and city, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a police officer acted
reasonably, and thus, did not violate the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, when he
made an arrest on an outstanding traffic warrant. According to the court, although the arrestee had a different middle
initial and different birth date than the person listed on the warrant, the arrestee had the same first and last name, and
when the officer questioned the arrestee about the warrant, he replied, apparently confusing it with a traffic violation
that he had actually committed, that he thought it had been taken care of already. The court found that there was no
indication that officer knew that the arrestee was not the person for whom the warrant had been issued. The court
noted that when the police have probable cause to arrest one party, and when they reasonably mistake a second party
for the first party, the arrest of the second party is a valid arrest. The court also noted that when a person is lawfully
arrested pursuant to a valid warrant, police officers and jailers have no constitutional duty to investigate whether the
arrestee is actually the person named in the warrant. (City of Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
TELEPHONE

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf mother sued a county
and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which
prohibits discrimination in public services, by asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their
plea hearing, despite her contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a spectator. The court
noted that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving as an interpreter, that she could have
refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow responsible for her service as an interpreter, its request was
based on her skill in lip-reading and sign language, not on her disability. According to the court, assuming that
overnight incarceration was covered by the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public services, and
assuming that placing a phone call was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the meaning of an ADA regulation
prohibiting public entities from providing a disabled person aid, benefit, or service that was not as effective as that
provided to others, the county did not violate ADA in using relay operators and notes to allow the deaf detainees to
communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted
that information was transmitted and received, which was the same benefit non-disabled person would have
received. While in custody, the two brothers communicated with officers through written notes. The jail was not
equipped with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Instead, the officers acted as relay operators, using paper and
pencil, as they spoke with an operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which lasted 45 minutes. (Hardin
County Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICATION
MEDICAL SCREENING

Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2006). The sister of a pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action against a sheriff and others to recover damages related to the in-custody death of her brother. The
district court denied the sheriff's motion for summary judgment and the sheriff appealed. The court of appeals
dismissed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the county sheriff had no knowledge of the
pretrial detainee's serious medical needs, and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the sheriff
had no personal interaction with the pretrial detainee during his incarceration, and there was no indication that the
sheriff knew the pretrial detainee had been vomiting for several hours, was not provided with his anti-depressant
medication for two to three days preceding his death, or had heart problems that put him at risk for a heart attack.
According to the court, the sheriff's practice of delegating to others such duties as reading mail and responding to
communications regarding jail inmates did not amount to deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious
medical needs, as required to be held individually liable for the detainee's death in a § 1983 action. The 46-year-old
detainee had completed a medical intake form indicating he had a history of mental illness, headaches,
epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart
problems or high or low blood pressure. Although he had no medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his
mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. The jail ran out of his anti-depressant medication
for two days and the detainee began to act odd. He was moved to an isolation cell to be monitored. He was later
found dead in the cell. An autopsy led to the determination that the detainee died of natural
causes--arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease--causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. Detectable amounts
of his anti-depressant medication were found in the detainee’s system during the autopsy. (Greene Co. Jail, Ark.)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). The mother of a detainee who died while in jail brought a §
1983 action, claiming that police officers violated the detainee’s rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the officers. The mother appealed.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the mother lacked standing. The detainee, the daughter of the plaintiff,
had been brought to a jail and was being interrogated when she began talking unintelligibly and experiencing
seizures. An officer said that she was “faking a seizure” to avoid jail time. She lost consciousness but officers did
not request an ambulance for nearly an hour. She had ingested cocaine at the time of her arrest and died from cocaine
intoxication. (Howard County Jail and City of Nashville, Arkansas)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
SCREENING

XXII

Ashford v. U.S., 511 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007). An inmate sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was negligent in placing him in a prison population with
a gang member who had attacked him in the past. The district court entered summary judgment for the BOP and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the discretionary-function exception

25.35

to FTCA did not apply if the inmate raised a concern at a prison intake interview that he would be endangered if he
were placed in the prison population with the gang member. The court noted that a prison policy required that the
inmate be put into solitary confinement pending an investigation if he raised such a concern, leaving prison officials
with no discretion. According to the court, genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the inmate raised a
concern at the prison intake interview, precluding summary judgment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
MEDICAL SCREENING

Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809 (S.D.Miss. 2007). The son of a pre-trial detainee who had
committed suicide while in custody, filed suit against the city and jail officers asserting claims pursuant to the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments for failure to train, failure to adopt a policy for safe custodial care of suicidal detainees,
and failure to adopt a policy of furnishing medical care to suicidal detainees. The detainee was detained on suspicion
of drunk driving and was resistant during the booking process. During the booking proRLUIPA-Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Actcess the detainee answered a series of questions. When he was asked, “Have you
ever attempted suicide or are you thinking about it now?” he responded, “No.” He was taken to a cell that was
designated for intoxicated or combative prisoners, given a sheet and a blanket, and was locked in the cell at 3:30 a.m.
While conducting a jail check at approximately 5:30 a.m., an officer discovered the detainee kneeling in a corner of
the cell with the sheet around his neck. He was unable to be revived. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether jail officers had actual knowledge of a substantial risk of
suicide by the detainee, and that fact issues precluded summary judgment in the claim against the city and officers in
their official capacities. On appeal (261 Fed.Appx. 659), the appeals court reversed and remanded. (City of Moss
Point, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doe v. Balaam, 524 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Nev. 2007). A transsexual arrestee, who was strip searched at a county jail,
brought an action against the county and county sheriff seeking damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction
prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip searches. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that deputies at the county jail had a reasonable suspicion,
based on specific articulated facts coming directly from the transsexual arrestee concealing a sock in his crotch area,
that the arrestee was carrying or concealing contraband, so as to justify a strip search of the arrestee prior to being
housed in the general jail population. The court noted that the arrestee had turned himself in for a misdemeanor
destruction of property charge, and even though he had told deputies that he was a transsexual and that he had a
rolled-up sock concealed in his crotch area, the deputies had no way of knowing whether the arrestee was truthful
about what he was, in fact, concealing. According to the court, even if there had been a violation of the arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, the transsexual arrestee failed to allege that
the county sheriff knew of and failed to act or prevent any alleged violation, or that any individual employees acted
pursuant to an official county policy or custom, as required to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against the sheriff and
county for alleged constitutional violations. (Washoe County, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007). Arrestees who were subjected to strip searches when they
self-surrendered at a county jail and were then released on their own recognizance, pursuant to the sheriff
department's contraband control policy, brought an action against the county and county sheriff. The arrestees sought
damages, attorney fees, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from conducting certain strip
searches, prohibiting the defendants from engaging in similar unconstitutional conduct in the future, and requiring
and ordering the defendants to institute proper training and policy changes. The inmates moved for partial summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the county's policy of strip searching all
arrestees who self-surrendered to the county jail, absent reasonable suspicion that any arrestee was smuggling
contraband, was unreasonable, and thus amounted to deliberate indifference to the arrestees' Fourth Amendment
rights, especially given that all of the arrestees were booked and then released on their own recognizance without
ever being housed with the general jail population. (Washoe County Detention Facility, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a pretrial detainee who
committed suicide brought an action alleging civil rights violations against a county and its corrections officers, and
negligence claims against the architect of a county prison. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that correctional and intake officers were not deliberately indifferent
to the pretrial detainee's vulnerability to suicide, as was required for the officers' liability under the due process
clause for the detainee's suicide. The court noted that the suicide was a “complete surprise” to the police chief who
spent one and a half hours with the detainee, the detainee told an officer “he had much to look forward to, and [did]
not believe in suicide,” the detainee was placed in a cell next to an inmate who was on suicide watch and could be
regularly observed, and the officer intervened when he noticed the detainee was still kneeling during a second
observation of the detainee. The court found that county employees, through the jail's suicide policy, were not
deliberately indifferent as to whether the pretrial detainee successfully committed suicide, as required to support a
due process claim. According to the court, the policy was annually reviewed by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections and was never found deficient, the detainee's screening form did not trigger a suicide watch, and the
employees acted without deliberate indifference in allowing the detainee to retain his shoelaces while in his jail cell.
The court held that under the Pennsylvania negligence law, architects who designed the jail had no duty to
prevent the suicide of the detainee who strangled himself by tying his shoelace to a ventilation grate above a toilet
and applying pressure to his neck. According to the court, there was no direct causal connection between any alleged
negligence by the architects and the detainee's suicide. According to the court, while Pennsylvania courts had not
addressed this specific issue, other jurisdictions have held that an architect cannot be held liable for a prison suicide:
(1) in an Oregon case “We refuse to extend suicide liability to architects, contractors, engineers, and a vast array of
other parties involved with the design and construction of buildings…Architects and contractors should not be
exposed to endless suicide liability when they have relinquished their authority and control over the facility to the
owner;” (2) in an Illinois case “The magnitude of the burden placed on architects to eliminate all fixtures, such as

XXII

25.36

grilles, that might be of aid in the commission of a suicide and, at the same time, to design an attractive and feasible
cell at a reasonable cost would seem to be great;” and in an Alabama case “We hold ... that an architect designing a
prison or jail owes no duty to design the prison or jail to be suicide-proof.” (Crabtree, Rohrbaugh & Associates,
Carbon County Prison, Pennsylvania)
U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
MEDICATION
CLOTHING

Forgan v. Howard County, Tex., 494 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 2007). The family of a county jail inmate who committed
suicide brought an action against the county, county sheriff's department, and various jail officers, alleging deliberate
indifference under § 1983 and claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA). The inmate was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and possession of marijuana. During the booking process, the inmate indicated that he was
medicated for a number of mental ailments, including depression, but that he was not thinking about killing himself
at the time. Based on this and other information, a jail officer classified the inmate as a “risk” for suicide, meaning
that he would be checked every fifteen minutes. The inmate was issued a pair of trousers and a shirt to wear, and he
was placed in a holding cell. After approximately one hour, the inmate was found hanging from his jail-issued
trousers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and the family appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that providing a county jail inmate with non-defective trousers, which the
inmate later used to commit suicide, did not equate to “use of property” by the county, within the meaning of the
TTCA, and that the county was not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the county was not liable in the §
1983 deliberate indifference claim absent a showing that the county lacked an adequate suicide prevention policy for
jail inmates, or that the county failed to adequately train its jail officials in suicide prevention. The court noted that
proof of a single incident generally will not support a finding of inadequate training as a matter of custom or policy,
for the purpose of establishing § 1983 municipal liability. (Howard County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Hall v. County of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F.Supp.2d 821 (D.Nev. 2007). A pretrial detainee's survivors sued a city,
county, and various city and county officers and officials, asserting various claims under § 1983 in connection with
the death of the detainee from an overdose after swallowing his methamphetamine during a roadside stop of a
vehicle in which he was riding. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in
part. The district court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
deputy sheriff and a jailer knew that the detainee had swallowed the methamphetamine during a roadside stop and
whether they ignored the detainee's panting and gasping, his claims that he could not see or breathe, and his crying
and screaming that he needed to go to the hospital. The court found that law enforcement officers and other jail
officers, who were unaware that the detainee had swallowed his methamphetamine during a roadside stop, were not
deliberately indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs, so as to violate his Eighth Amendment rights, even
though he was complaining, uncooperative and acted like an intoxicated person. The court noted that from their
perspective, the detainee was behaving like many other “besotted” pretrial detainees who were “plucked from the
highway in the wee hours of the night and who suffered nothing more than a drug-induced stupor while cooling their
heels in a cell awaiting their turn to see the local magistrate.” (Nemaha County, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center, 511 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2007). A plaintiff, on behalf of the estate of her
son who committed suicide while incarcerated at juvenile detention facility, brought a wrongful-death action against
the facility, its superintendent, a non-profit provider that performed suicide evaluations at the facility and a social
worker employed by the provider. The plaintiff asserted claims under § 1983 and state law. The facility and nonprofit moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that under the state
compulsion test, the private provider that performed suicide evaluations at the juvenile detention facility was not a
“state actor” for § 1983 purposes. The court noted that the facility did not exert any control over suicide evaluations
and the provider performed evaluations on an as-needed basis using its own standards and procedures. According to
the court, the facility had discretion to implement the provider's recommendations resulting from the evaluations.
But the court held that the private provider was a state actor for § 1983 purposes because it was performing a “public
function.” (Central Ohio Youth Center)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on a county policy, the county was
not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a physician did not act with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held that the county sheriff was not liable in his
individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate absent a showing that he participated in any of the
alleged activities in any individual capacity. According to the court, the county was not liable to the estate under §
1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since
the county policy did not directly cause county personnel to fail to seek physician approval to reinitiate the inmate's
prescription medication. The court noted that although the jail had a written policy of abruptly discontinuing any
narcotic medications when inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless of whether the inmate had a
valid prescription for the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic medications to be reinstated with
the permission of a doctor. The court found that the county did not act with deliberate indifference in its training and
supervision of county jail personnel in dealing with inmates' medical needs, absent a showing of a pattern or a
recurring situation of tortuous conduct by inadequately trained employees. The court held that the county jail
physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, where the physician did
not refuse to treat the inmate nor ignore his complaints, prescribed medication when he was first called about the
inmate's disorientation and hallucinations, and saw the inmate and diagnosed him with undifferentiated
schizophrenia. According to the court, although the physician failed to see signs of withdrawals from
benzodiazepine, there was no indication that he intentionally treated the inmate for schizophrenia while knowing
that, in fact, he was suffering dangerous withdrawals from a prescription drug to which he was addicted.
(Montgomery County Jail, Texas)

25.37

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007). An arrestee sued a city and others under § 1983, asserting
claims for false arrest and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court entered summary judgment
for the defendants and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the arrestee's asthma
was not objectively serious during the time he was being processed, and therefore an officer was not deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs. According to the court, the arrestee's statements to the officer that he had asthma,
needed his medication, and could not breathe, made in the context of a request that the arrestee take a breathalyzer
test, were insufficient by themselves to show that he was suffering from a serious attack. (City of Chicago Police
Department, Illinois)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION
SEARCHES

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a jailer and others
alleging her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when she was strip searched. The district court
denied the jailer's request for qualified immunity and the jailer appealed. The appeals court affirmed the district court
decision. The court held that the jailer was not justified in conducting the strip search during booking, following the
arrest pursuant to an arrest warrant for harassment, where the arrestee never intermingled with the general jail
population but rather was confined in a cell by herself for several hours while awaiting bail. The court noted that
three pat down searches had been performed on the arrestee prior to booking, the arrestee was wearing shorts and a
sleeveless blouse at the time of booking, the jailer saw that the arrestee did not have any tattoos or moles indicating
that she was the culprit, and the crime of harassment was not a crime of violence. The court found that the arrestee
had a right not to be strip searched during booking when she was not going to intermingle with the general prison
population. She had already been through a pat-down search, and there was no reasonable suspicion that she had a
weapon. According to the court, the jailer who conducted the strip search was not entitled to qualified immunity
because at the time of this incident it was clearly established that a strip search could be justified if there was a
reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons and the detainee intermingled with the general jail
population. The 46-year-old mother of nine had been riding in a family van with some of her children when she was
stopped by an officer because there was an extra child in the back seat. The officer arrested her with the belief that
she was the person for whom a warrant had been issued. After being booked at the jail it became apparent that she
was not the person named in the warrant because she did not have the tattoos and moles that were described in the
file. Knowing that the plaintiff was not the person named in the warrant, a jail officer nonetheless continued to
process and strip search her. As she was standing naked, she began to lactate. She tried to cover herself but was told
by the officer to put her arms down. She was mocked continually by the officer and a male officer during this
incident. (Jefferson County Detention Facility, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2008). The father of a detainee who died while in custody in a county
jail brought a § 1983 claim against county sheriff's deputies and jailers, alleging deliberate indifference to the
detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held
that the arresting officers were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died after
ingesting a lethal combination of drugs while in custody in the county jail. Although the officers had been warned by
the detainee's stepfather that the detainee was strung out on drugs, and one officer observed that the detainee had
glassy eyes and appeared to be under the influence of something, the officers saw only that the detainee possessed a
bottle of prescription pills. The court noted that neither the detainee nor any family member requested that the
detainee be given medical treatment, and the symptoms exhibited by the detainee were not necessarily indicative that
medical attention was required. The court found that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of the detainee. The jailer was in charge of dressing out the detainee before he was placed in his cell, and
although the jailer found a bottle of prescription pills and observed that the detainee was wasted, the detainee
advised that he had just woken up, and no one told the jailer that the detainee needed medical help or needed to be
looked after. The court also held that a jailer was not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the
detainee even though the jailer was aware that the detainee was in possession of a bottle of pills when he was
arrested, that his speech was slurred, that he needed assistance when he was moved from one cell to another and that
his eyes were rolling back in his head at that time, and that the detainee was making a snoring sound at the time of
one bed check. According to the court, the jailer was never aware that the detainee could have ingested a lethal
amount of drugs, no one ever recommended to the jailer that the detainee be placed in a holding cell or otherwise be
observed, and the jailer observed the detainee laughing and talking with his cellmates at one point. (Bacon County
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
IDENTIFICATION

Castro v. City of Hanford, 546 F.Supp.2d 822 (E.D.Cal. 2008). An arrestee brought an action against a county, city,
and various law enforcement officers, alleging violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and asserting various state
law claims, including false arrest, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment for the
county. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the county jail officer's alleged
unconstitutional conduct in failing to perform live scan fingerprinting on the arrestee while he was in custody, absent
a showing that the county had a policy or practice not to perform such fingerprinting. The court found that county
jailers had a reasonable belief that the detainee was the person named in an arrest warrant, and did not have reason to
know that the detainee was not the subject of the warrant, and thus, the detainee could not prevail in false
imprisonment and negligence claims. The court noted that the jailers relied upon the information provided to them
by the arresting officers, and there was no court order or other independent evidence that would have called the
lawfulness of the detention into question. (Hanford Police Department, Kings County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging an unconstitutional policy and/or custom and practice of
conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at the jail. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the county did not have an unconstitutional

25.38

strip search policy or custom at the county jail, and that the sheriff did not acquiesce to a policy or practice of
unconstitutional strip searches. The court found that there was no evidence of an unconstitutional policy and/or
custom and practice of conducting a strip search and visual body cavity search of every person taken into custody at
the county jail, as required for the arrestee to establish a § 1983 claim against the county. The court noted that it’s
prior determination in an unrelated case, that the county maintained an unconstitutional policy of strip searching all
misdemeanor detainees, concerned a period several years prior to the time that the arrestee was detained. The court
found that the strip search of the female arrestee upon her admission to jail after self-surrendering on an outstanding
felony arrest warrant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The search, in which the arrestee was required to
run her fingers through her hair, extend her arms out straight, open her mouth for visual inspection, spread her toes,
lift each of her breasts, expose her vagina, squat on her haunches with her back to the officer and, while squatting,
cough violently several times, at which time she expelled menstrual fluid, caused the arrestee humiliation and
embarrassment. The court found that the search was based on a drug charge in her inmate file, the fact that she made
a planned admission to jail which provided the opportunity to conceal contraband, and that she was going to be
housed overnight at the jail, which had a problem with contraband. The search was performed by a female officer in
the changing area of the shower stall adjacent to the booking area, which was mostly shielded from view by a plastic
curtain. (Knox County Jail, Maine)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008). The widow and children of a detainee who died from
complications of cocaine ingestion while incarcerated in a county jail, brought an action in state court against a city
and two police officers. After removal to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The district court granted the motion in part and remanded. The court found that the officers violated the detainee's
Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care when they did not obtain medical aid for the detainee after he vomited
in the patrol car and rock cocaine was found in the vomit. According to the court, a rational jury could conclude that
the officers knew that the detainee had swallowed rock cocaine and had a serious medical condition, and that the
officers did not render care themselves, did not call for paramedics, did not take the detainee to the hospital, and did
not report the discovery of the rock cocaine in the vomit to the jail nurse. The court found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity where the detainee, who did not exhibit signs of being high as his detention
progressed and who was previously communicative of his symptoms, gave an inaccurate reason to explain his
condition and never requested medical treatment. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the city failed
to adequately train the officers. According to the court, the undisputed evidence showed that Fresno police officers
receive police academy training, field training programs, on the job training, advanced officer courses, and various
classes and seminars. The court noted that Fresno police officers are particularly trained: (1) to conduct evaluations
to determine if a person is under the influence of a controlled substance, including rock cocaine (for those officers
involved in narcotics investigations); (2) to request aid for persons in need of medical care; (3) to recognize an
arrestee's need for medical care and provide such care; (4) to be aware of efforts that suspects may make to hide
controlled substances, including putting such substances in their mouths; (5) to render medical aid, contact
emergency medical services or transport the suspect to the hospital if they have a reasonable belief that a suspect has
swallowed a controlled substance, such as rock cocaine; (6) to know that ingestion of cocaine can cause death; (7) to
know that arrested persons may have evidence in their mouth; (8) to know that persons arrested on drug charges may
attempt to conceal the illegal drugs on their person; and (9) to be suspicious of those arrested and what the arrestees
say. (City of Fresno and Fresno County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Jones v. Murphy, 567 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.Md. 2008). A male arrestee brought a class action, alleging that a booking
facility's policy of frisking female arrestees while searching male arrestees down to their underwear violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the arrestee,
finding that the booking facility's gender-differentiated search policy was not reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest in preventing arrestees from bringing weapons into the booking facility, and thus violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the additional staff needed to more
thoroughly search female arrestees was not overly burdensome, and searching all arrestees to their last layer of
clothing was a readily available constitutional alternative. (Baltimore City Central Booking, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL SCREENING

Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich. 2008). The personal representative of an arrestee's estate
brought an action against a county and two employees of the jail where the arrestee died of heart failure. The arrestee
had been brought to the jail on a bench warrant for failing to appear at a court proceeding. Two days after her
admission she was found unresponsive in her cell and could not be revived. It was subsequently determined that she
died of heart failure (ischemic cardiomyopathy). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that neither a jail interviewer, whose only contact with the arrestee was a
classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, nor a jail nurse, who first came into contact with
the arrestee when she was summoned to assist in CPR and other efforts to revive the arrestee after she was found
unresponsive in her jail cell, were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's serious medical needs. According to the
court, neither employee perceived a substantial risk to the arrestee's health and well-being and yet disregarded that
risk, and any purported negligence in the interviewer's assessment of the arrestee's medical needs did not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference. The court held that the conduct of the interviewer, whose only contact with the
arrestee was a classification interview lasting between five and fifteen minutes, did not amount to “gross negligence”
within the meaning of Michigan's governmental immunity statute, and therefore she was not liable for failing to
secure immediate medical treatment for a condition that shortly would result in the arrestee's death. (Oakland County
Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Joy v. Healthcare C.M.S., 534 F.Supp.2d 482 (D.Del. 2008). An inmate filed an action under § 1983, raising
constitutional claims against a Governor, mayor, and corrections officials. The district court held that the prisoner
stated an Eighth Amendment claim against the warden based on his exposure to tuberculosis, where he alleged that
the warden was aware that inmates were not thoroughly screened for disease before going into the general
population and that correctional medical services did not have a policy in place to examine inmates before placing
them into the general population. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

25.39

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). A motorist who was arrested for driving around a police
roadblock and subsequently failing to stop when signaled by a pursuing squad car brought a civil rights action
against an arresting officer, police commissioner and warden at central booking facility to which she was
transported. She alleged she was subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that allegations in the
motorist's complaint were sufficient to state a supervisory liability claim against the Secretary of the Maryland
Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and the warden at a central booking facility, for
intrusive searches to which she was subjected. The court found that the allegations in the offender's complaint-- that
she was improperly subjected to a strip search and to a visual body cavity search as the result of a policy
implemented by the Secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) and
by a warden at the central booking facility-- adequately pleaded the minimum facts necessary to state a supervisory
liability claim against the Secretary and the warden under § 1983. The policy allegedly authorized strip searches and
visual body cavity searches of all persons admitted to the facility, regardless of the charges filed against them or
circumstances surrounding their arrest. (Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Facility, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a county jail initiated a class action
complaining about being subjected to “blanket strip searches” upon entering and/or returning to the jail, as well as
their continued detention past their scheduled release dates. The county and city defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court granted the county defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, and denied the city defendants'
motion. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded. On rehearing en banc, the
appeals court held that the practice of conducting full body visual strip searches on all jail detainees being booked
into the general population for the first time did not violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether there was
any reasonable suspicion to believe that the inmates were concealing contraband, and regardless of whether the
inmates were arrested for minor offenses or misdemeanors. The plaintiffs were 11 former detainees at the Fulton
County Jail in Georgia, all of whom were strip searched upon entering or re-entering the general population. The
court divided the plaintiffs into three groups, which overlapped to some extent. The court addressed the detainees in
the “the Arrestee Strip Search Class” which consists of the eight plaintiffs who were strip searched as part of the
point-of-entry booking process before they were placed into the general jail population for the first time. (Fulton Co.
Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga. 2008). A mother brought an action against a city police
officer and a county paramedic, arising out of her son's death while detained in a county jail after his arrest. The
district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the arresting officer was not
deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the detainee who died of an apparent drug overdose after
being arrested on drug charges and placed into custody at a county jail, absent evidence that the arresting officer
actually saw the detainee swallow any drugs that allegedly led to his death. The court held that the county paramedic
who responded to the jail was not deliberately indifferent despite any alleged negligence in the paramedic's original
diagnosis. The court noted that the paramedic promptly responded to both calls from county jail concerning the
detainee, and, each time, examined the detainee to determine whether further medical treatment was needed.
According to the court, the paramedic's alleged bad judgment and negligence in caring for the pretrial detainee who
died of an apparent drug overdose, was insufficient to show a lack of good faith for the purposes of statutory
immunity from negligence or malpractice liability under Georgia law. (City of Blackshear, Pierce Co. Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 573 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county
alleging a strip and visual body cavity search violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary
judgment for the plaintiff, in part. The court held that jail personnel did not have individualized reasonable suspicion
that the arrestee was concealing contraband or weapons, as required to perform a strip and visual body cavity search
of the arrestee who had been arrested for felony witness tampering. The court noted that the arrestee was not arrested
for a violent felony, spending a night in jail did not implicate sufficiently serious security concerns to warrant a
search, the county failed to show the underlying facts of the crime provided individualized reasonable suspicion, and
the county failed to establish that the arrestee's conduct required the search. According to the court, a felony
categorization alone does not obviate the requirement of individualized reasonable suspicion for a strip and visual
body cavity search of an arrestee. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
ORIENTATION

U.S. v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). A defendant was convicted in district court of multiple
crimes related to drug trafficking conspiracy and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
defendant's consent to the recording of his prison phone calls could be implied from his decision to use the prison
telephone and therefore the voice exemplars used from prison recordings were admissible in trial. The court noted
that a prison employee testified that prominent signs next to the telephones proclaimed “all calls may be
recorded/monitored,” in both English and Spanish. The defendant underwent orientation at the prison and received a
handbook in his choice of English or Spanish which stated that all calls may be monitored. When the defendant
made phone calls, a recorded message prompted him to select English or Spanish and then informed him in the
language of his choice that all calls were subject to being monitored and recorded. (Correctional Corp. of America
(CCA), Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008). The father of a pretrial detainee who purportedly hanged
himself while incarcerated at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a county, the county sheriff, and unknown
jail officials. The district court granted summary judgment in part in favor of jail officials and the sheriff in their
individual capacities. The father appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court denied the father's motion
for leave to amend the complaint to identify the unknown jail officials, and granted summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on remaining claims. The father again appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
amended complaint to substitute named county jail officials for unknown jail officials did not relate back to the

25.40

original complaint, for the purpose of avoiding a statute of limitations bar. The court found that the county sheriff
was not liable under § 1983 for the death of the pretrial detainee, where the sheriff was not present at the jail until
after the detainee was found dead, and there was no showing that the sheriff played any part in the detainee's death,
or that the sheriff was deliberately indifferent in failing to attempt to resuscitate the detainee or obtain additional
medical care for the detainee. The court held that the county was not liable under § 1983 for the detainee's purported
suicide, where the county had adequate policies and procedures for detainees who posed an obvious risk of suicide,
the detainee did not indicate that he was suicidal on an intake form or otherwise exhibit obvious suicidal tendencies,
and the county was not deliberately indifferent in failing to train or supervise county jail officials. The court noted
that in the specific context of jail suicide prevention, municipalities must provide custodial officials with minimal
training to detect the obvious medical needs of pretrial detainees with known, demonstrable, and serious medical
disorders, but a failure to train custodial officials in screening procedures to detect latent suicidal tendencies does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The court found that in the absence of manifest signs of suicidal
tendencies, a city may not be held liable for a pretrial detainee's jailhouse suicide in a § 1983 suit based on a failure
to train. (Stephens County Jail, Texas)
2009
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D.Pa. 2009). Arrestees detained in state custodial facilities
managed by a private corporation brought a class action against the corporation, alleging the facilities' blanket policy
of mandatory strip searches without individualized suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The corporation
moved for judgment on the pleadings for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the district
court denied the motion. The court held that the arrestees stated a § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment violation.
The court noted that strip searches in a custodial facility differ qualitatively from other intake procedures which
entail some incidental nudity but do not involve visual inspection of the naked body. The court said that the exposure
of the naked body to scrutiny by government officers is what makes strip searches more invasive than other
admission procedures at a custodial facility. According to the court, the searches involved visual inspection of the
arrestees’ naked bodies, the searches of named arrestees were not based on reasonable suspicion, and the purported
class consisted of arrestees who were either charged with minor offenses or non-violent offenses that did not involve
drugs. (George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
TELEPHONE

Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 597 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Minn. 2009). Two hearing-impaired arrestees, and their respective
girlfriend and husband, brought an action against a county, sheriff's department, and city, alleging that they were
arrested by city police officers without being provided an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter and detained at
an adult detention center (ADC) without access to an ASL interpreter or auxiliary aids that would have permitted
them to communicate with others outside of the ADC. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and for negligence.
The district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the girlfriend and husband had standing to sue the
county, sheriff's department, and city under state and federal anti-discrimination laws, where they alleged that they
experienced fear, anxiety, humiliation, and embarrassment because of the defendants' failure to permit the arrestees
to contact them. The court found that the girlfriend and husband stated a claim for discrimination under the ADA by
alleging that the arrestees requested auxiliary aids to communicate with people outside of the ADC, and that the
county's failure to provide such aids precluded their communication with the arrestees. (Ramsey County Adult
Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev. 2009). A German citizen, who was detained by Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) officials at a Nevada airport, and later transferred to a local jail, after his name had
been erroneously placed on a watch list, brought an action against the United States, DHS officials, a police
department, a city, and a police chief, alleging various constitutional violations. The district court granted the DHS
and United States motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that DHS officials could not bypass
constitutional requirements for strip searches and body-cavity searches of non-admitted aliens at a border by sending
the German citizen to a detention facility where they allegedly knew strip searches occurred in the absence of
reasonable suspicion under circumstances in which the DHS officials could not perform the strip search themselves.
According to the court, regardless of any reasonable suspicion that detention center officials had for a strip search,
federal officials at the border needed reasonable suspicion for a strip search. The court found that the Fourth
Amendment right of a non-admitted alien to be free from a non-invasive, non-abusive strip search absent suspicion
to conduct such a search was clearly established in 2006, when the German citizen was detained at an airport, and
thus, a DHS officer was not entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the German citizen who was detained
after arriving at a United States airport and was asked to spy for the United States government in order to obtain an
entry visa was not subjected to “involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, where the German
citizen never actually spied for the United States. (North Las Vegas Detention Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES
SEARCHES
SHOWERS

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 595 F.Supp.2d 492 (D.N.J. 2009) Reversed and
remanded 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010); aff’d 132 S.Ct. 1510).. A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action
under § 1983 against counties, county jails, and jail wardens, among others, alleging that the defendants violated the
non-indictable arrestees' constitutional rights by their policy of strip searching them without reasonable suspicion.
The arrestee sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied an injunction. The court held that county jail
officers' “visual observation” of indictable and non-indictable offenders during intake procedures, which included
complete disrobing, followed by examination of nude inmates for bruises, marks, wounds, or other distinguishing
features, followed by supervised shower with a delousing agent, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
According to the district court, the blanket strip search policy, in the absence of a reasonable suspicion for drugs,
weapons, or other contraband, violated the arrestees' Fourth Amendment rights. According to the court, the jails'
justification for the policy-- general security concerns and health concerns-- did not trump Fourth Amendment

25.41

protections. The court noted that the mere fact that there was ambiguity or inconsistency in a state regulation
pertaining to strip searches did not change the fact that the law on the issue was clearly established in a jurisdiction
pursuant to case law for nearly twenty-two years, for purposes of qualified immunity. On appeal the district court
ruling was reversed and remanded. The appeals court found that the jails' policy of conducting strip searches of all
arrestees upon their admission into the general prison population was reasonable and that the jails were not required
to provide evidence of attempted smuggling or discovered contraband as justification for the policy. According to
the appeals court, the decision to conduct strip searches, rather than use a body scanning chair, was reasonable; the
U.S. Supreme Court agreed. (Burleigh County Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New Jersey).
U.S. District Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The administrator
of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action against the county and
prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless indifference and Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also alleged wrongful death under state law. The
county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist
counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist moved separately for summary judgment. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the evaluating
psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee was a suicide risk and failed to take necessary and available precautions to
prevent the detainee's suicide as would show deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs; (2) whether the
evaluating psychiatrist was an employee of the county prison entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Political
Subdivision Tort Claim Act (PSTCA) or was an independent contractor excluded from such immunity; (3) whether
the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to appropriately document the pretrial detainee's medical records led to the
detainee's removal from a suicide watch; (4) whether the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide watch level
was customary, precluding summary judgment as to whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to record this
information; (5) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide watch level to
county prison officials resulted in the pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating psychiatrist
communicated the appropriate suicide watch level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials and whether the
psychiatrist was required to record the watch level in the detainee's medical records. (Northumberland County
Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
DELAY
PROCEDURES

Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). A former detainee filed a class action against a
sheriff, claiming that new detainees remanded to the sheriff's custody after a probable cause hearing were
unconstitutionally required to undergo intake procedures at the county jail before release on bond. The district court
certified the class and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the former
detainee's class action lacked a predominance of common issues, precluding certification of the class, where the
detainee had not challenged any particular intake procedure. The court noted that the reasonableness of the delay
between posting bond and release and the reasonableness of the time and manner of assigning identification numbers
prior to release required individual determinations based on the length of delay for each detainee and the conditions
and exigencies of the jail existing on that particular day. According to the court, resolution of an equal protection
claim could be satisfied in an individual suit. The court noted that the detainee was not interested in a large damage
award, and his constitutional claims required individualized liability and damages determinations that could be better
litigated in an individual suit. (Sheriff of Cook County, Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Miller v. Yamhill County, 620 F.Supp.2d 1241 (D.Or. 2009). Three inmates of a county correction facility brought a
class action against a county and sheriff alleging their policy of strip searching inmates at the facility without
reasonable suspicion that they were carrying contraband or weapons was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the sheriff
supervising the deputies who conducted allegedly unconstitutional searches was not liable under § 1983, where the
sheriff was not personally involved in any of the searches at issue, and there was no causal connection between any
conduct of the sheriff and the alleged violations.
The court held that the strip search of an inmate at the facility, who was arrested for threatening someone with a
knife and a cane, was reasonable upon the inmate's entry into the general jail population following his completion of
a drug treatment program, in light of the underlying menacing charge. The court noted that the inmate was returning
to the jail at the time of his choosing and therefore had knowledge that he would be entering the jail, and the inmate
was returning from a drug treatment facility because of his possession and use of contraband.
According to the court, the strip search of another inmate at the facility, who had been arrested on charges of
driving while suspended and the felony of attempt to elude, was reasonable, in light of one of the charges being a
felony, and the fact that the inmate had eluded arrest earlier in the day, and therefore knew that the police were
looking for him and that he would likely be entering the jail population. The court found that the strip search of a
third inmate at the facility, who had been arrested on driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) charges, was
reasonable, noting that after her arrest, the inmate managed to remove and conceal her handcuffs in her underwear,
and after an extended search of the patrol car and booking area, and repeated denials that she had the handcuffs, the
inmate removed the handcuffs from her pants, and deputy concluded that a strip search was necessary on the basis
that inmate might be concealing other contraband. (Yamhill County Corrections Facility, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION

Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2009). The son of an inmate murdered in a county jail, and the son's trustee, brought a § 1983 action against a county, seeking damages for the murder of the son's father based on the county's booking policy. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the son appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's booking policy, classifying an incoming inmate as high or
low risk after an intake interview, and then housing those incoming inmates designated as high risk in a separate area
of the jail, was not itself unconstitutional, so as to establish the county's municipal liability under § 1983 for the
murder of an inmate killed by another inmate. The inmate who murdered the plaintiff’s father had been transferred
from a maximum security state prison and had previously attacked a fellow inmate. The policy vested discretion in

25.42

the booking officer to determine whether additional information about an inmate's criminal or incarceration history
was necessary and whether the inmate posed a risk to others and needed to be placed in a separate unit. According to
the court, there was no evidence that the county had notice of an alleged inadequacy in its booking policy, or that the
policy's alleged inadequacy in failing to require officers to seek information about an incoming individual's history
for violence prior to classification was so patently obvious that the county should have known that a constitutional
violation was inevitable, as required to impose § 1983 liability on county, based on deliberate indifference.
The father was arrested for having no proof of auto insurance and was placed in a cell in the Alpha Intake Unit
(AIU) after it was determined that he would be unable to go before a county judge that day. When the inmate who
murdered the father arrived at the jail, he was booked by a county corrections officer under the booking policy at the
time that required the officer to ask an arriving inmate several questions, to observe the inmate's demeanor, to review
any additional information provided about the inmate, and then to classify the inmate as either high or low risk. Under the policy, if there was no information provided about the inmate's previous history, the policy did not require
the officer to seek such information. Incoming inmates classified as low risk, including those transferred from other
correctional facilities, were placed in the AIU for a 72 hour observation period, after which their classification was
reviewed. If classified as high risk, inmates were placed in a separate housing unit. The booking officer was unaware
that the prison inmate had been in segregation 23 hours a day at a high security prison, that he had a history of mental illness, and that the assault related to his court appearance had been an unprovoked, violent attack on a fellow
inmate. The officer classified him as low risk, based on the information she had and the inmate’s calm, polite demeanor during the booking process. (Sherburne County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A mother, for herself and as the personal
representative of an arrestee who hanged himself in a holding cell at a police precinct shortly after he was arrested by
the United States Secret Service, brought an action against the District of Columbia and several police and Secret
Service officers. The District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings, or in the alternative, for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the District of Columbia did not violate the
Fifth Amendment right of the arrestee to be free from deliberate indifference to his substantial risk of committing
suicide; (2) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for a police officers' failure to attempt to revive the
arrestee; and (3) the District of Columbia could not be held liable for officers' inadequate training and supervision.
The court noted that although a Secret Service officer suspected the arrestee was under the influence of cocaine after
he had observed his jittery behavior and discovered a half-used bag of cocaine on the arrestee during a search at the
precinct, there was no evidence that cocaine-users were a greater suicide risk or that jittery behavior was a warning
sign of impending suicide. According to the court, there was no evidence that police officers who accepted custody
of the arrestee had subjective knowledge of his suicidal tendencies or actually drew the inference that the arrestee
was a suicide risk, and there was no evidence that a Secret Service officer communicated either his suspicion of the
arrestee's cocaine use or his observation of jittery behavior to either police officer. (District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, Third District Precinct)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
SEARCHES
SUICIDE

Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dept., 599 F.Supp.2d 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, police department and officers, alleging Fourth Amendment violations following her arrest for
allegedly making harassing telephone calls. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The
court held that probable cause existed to commence the criminal action and perform the arrest, and that the
suspicionless seizure of the arrestee's brassiere while incarcerated qualified as a “special need” for Fourth Amendment purposes. The court noted that the police department had a policy of seizing brassieres purely as a safety measure to preclude their use as a suicide tool, and the policy was implemented in a manner reasonably designed to reduce intrusion on the arrestee's privacy by allowing her to remove the brassiere without disrobing. (Schenectady
Police Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police
chief and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search and did not violate
due process, and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to a strip search under Missouri strip
search law. The court found that the action of photographing the tattoo did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the arrestee was required to unzip her pants for the photograph and that the photograph was taken
by male officer. The court concluded that the photograph served legitimate law enforcement purposes, the chief told
the arrestee that photograph was needed for identification purposes, and the photograph was taken in private. The
court noted that the arrestee gave a false date of birth and social security number. She was arrested for making a false
declaration and for being a minor in possession of alcohol. (City of Bella Villa, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2009). The estate of a deceased detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
police officer and a city, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious illness or injury while in the officer's care. The district court denied summary judgment and the officer and city brought an appeal. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the pretrial detainee's condition and need for medical attention was
not so obvious to the police officer as to establish the existence of a serious medical need, for the purposes of a claim
of deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The officer allegedly failed to inform emergency medical technicians (EMT) on the scene and at the jail that the detainee, who later died from respiratory and cardiac failure resulting from cocaine use, had admitted that he smoked crack cocaine. According to the court, the EMTs and jail
nurse, who presumably had a greater facility than the average layperson to recognize an individual's medical need,
observed the detainee's behavior and administered tests based on those observations, and both the EMTs and the jail
officers concluded that the detainee did not need to be transported to the hospital. After admission to the jail, the
detainee continued to hallucinate and officers placed him in a restraint chair “for his own safety,” tasing him to “relax his muscles.” The detainee remained restrained for approximately three and a half hours, during which time he
was calm but continued to hallucinate. Shortly after the officers released him from the chair, the detainee began to

25.43

shake and spit up blood and then became unconscious. He was taken to a hospital where he was diagnosed with
respiratory and cardiac failure and multi-organ failure resulting from cocaine use. He lapsed into a coma and died
eleven months later. (City of Cleveland, Bradley County Justice Center, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2009). Survivors of a pretrial detainee, who died while in custody from
acute cocaine intoxication when the bag of cocaine that he swallowed before his arrest burst in his intestines, brought
a § 1983 action, alleging that police officers and prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need
for medical care. The district court granted the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that police detectives were not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of the detainee. The court noted that the detectives' knowledge that the detainee had pupils that were
maximally dilated and that he needed medical clearance did not show that the detectives were aware of an unjustifiably high risk to the detainee's health, or that the risk to the detainee's health was so obvious that they should have
inferred such a risk. According to the court, jailers were not deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the detainee. According to the court, the fact that the jailers were told the detainee needed medical clearance and that he
had dilated pupils did not show that the jailers knew or should have known of a substantial risk to the detainee's
health. (Harlingen City Jail, Cameron County Carrizales-Rucker Detention Center, Texas)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009). After granting a detainee's motion for summary judgment
on liability under § 1983 for a strip search she underwent at a county jail, the county moved to exclude the detainee's
evidence of lost income or profits allegedly caused by her mental distress growing out of the strip search. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee's tardy pretrial disclosure of
economic loss information did not prejudice the county's ability to investigate so as to warrant the exclusion of evidence of the detainee's evidence of lost income or profits. The court found that damages for economic loss based
upon a lost future contract were not recoverable in the civil rights suit seeking damages allegedly caused by the detainee's mental distress, since the jury would have to speculate in order to determine whether the detainee suffered an
economic loss on a future contract and, if so, how much. (Knox County Jail, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
PROCEDURES

Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009). A detainee’s sister brought a § 1983 action against several officers
and county employees alleging they were deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s serious medical needs which resulted in his death. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether jail officials deliberately disregarded the medical needs and condition of the detainee. The
detainee was charged with first-degree sexual assault. During the jail's intake procedure, he completed a medical
intake form, indicating that he had a history of mental illness, headaches, epilepsy/seizures, ulcers, and kidney/bladder problems, but indicating that he did not have a history of heart problems or high or low blood pressure.
Although the detainee had no medications with him upon his arrival at the jail, his mother later brought his medications, including an anti-depressant. He received his medication for several days until the prescription ran out. He
missed several doses before a new prescription arrived. During the time he was without medication, his cellmate told
jail employees that the detainee had been ingesting shampoo and engaging in other odd behavior. The detainee was
moved to an isolation cell to be monitored on an hourly basis. He was observed vomiting and asked to see a nurse
but he was not provided access. He was later found dead in his cell. An autopsy determined that he died of natural
causes: arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease, causing a heart attack that resulted in his death. (Greene Co.Jail, Ark.)

U.S. District Court
IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES

Zargary v. The City of New York, 607 F.Supp.2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A prisoner, who wore a headscarf as an Orthodox Jew, brought an action against a city, alleging that the city's practice or custom of removing head coverings
from prisoners before taking photographs during admittance to a correctional facility violated her rights under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court entered judgment in favor of the city. The court held that
the city correctional facility's practice or custom of removing head coverings from prisoners before taking photographs during their admittance to a facility was rationally related to the legitimate penological interest of being able
to identify prisoners accurately to maintain security, and that the practice did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment. The court noted that the prisoner could dramatically change her appearance by removing the
headscarf, making it more difficult to identify her, which would pose a security risk. According to the court, the
prisoner had other means to express her religious beliefs in prison, the corrections officers attempted to accommodate the prisoner by minimizing the presence of male officers in the room when the photograph was taken, and the
alternative of not removing the headscarf could not be said to pose only a de minimis security risk. (Rose M. Singer
Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force case against four corrections officers, arising out of a beating which occurred while the detainee was being held in a booking room
pending completion of the booking process, but after he had been surrendered to jailers by his arresting officer. The
district court granted summary judgment to two of the officers based on qualified immunity. The detainee, and the
officers whose motions for summary judgment were denied, appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the district court's error, in not applying the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness test to the officer whose actions the court found violated the higher Fourteenth Amendment due process “shocks-the-conscience” standard, was harmless. (Montgomery County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
STRIP SEARCHES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 728 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.W.Va. 2010).
A pretrial detainee who was strip searched and deloused brought a class action against a regional jail authority, challenging its strip search and delousing policies. The jail authority moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the detainee stated a claim in regard to the strip search policy and in regard to the delousing policy. The court found that a jail authority official sued in his individual capacity was not entitled to quali-

25.44

fied immunity. The detainee alleged that the jail had a blanket policy of conducting visual cavity strip searches of all
pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes, regardless of whether the detainees were intermingled with the general population of the jail, and that there was no reasonable suspicion that he harbored weapons
or contraband. The court ruled that whether the jail's delousing policy, which allegedly applied to all pretrial detainees, was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment could not be decided on a motion to dismiss. The court noted that
the detainee who brought the action against a regional jail authority for alleged civil rights violations was not
required to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where he was no
longer an inmate at the time he filed suit. (W.V.Regional Jail and Corr’l Facility Authority, Western Regional Jail)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed 132 S.Ct.
1510 (2012). A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action pursuant to § 1983 against two jails, alleging a strip
search violated the Fourth Amendment. After granting the motion for class certification, the district court granted the
arrestee's motion for summary judgment, denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the jails' motions
for qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The jails appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that as a matter of first impression in the circuit, the jails' policy of conducting strip searches of all
arrestees upon their admission into the general prison population was reasonable. The court found that jails were not
required to provide evidence of attempted smuggling or discovered contraband as justification for the strip search
policy. According to the court, the decision to conduct strip searches, rather than use a body scanning chair, was
reasonable. The court noted that the chair would not detect non-metallic contraband like drugs, and there was no
evidence regarding the efficacy of the chair in detecting metallic objects. The appeals court decision was affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court in 2012 (132 S.Ct. 1510). (Burlington County Jail, Essex County Correctional
Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). The administrator of a female detainee‘s estate brought a § 1983
action against correctional facility officials and nurses, alleging they violated her due process rights by failing to
provide adequate medical care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a physician unqualified to offer expert testimony that the detainee's death from non-specific heart failure would have been prevented had she been given her congestive heart failure
medication, where the physician lacked specific knowledge in cardiology and pharmacology, and he provided no
basis for his testimony except that the detainee's medication treated heart disease. The court held that a correctional
facility nurse who examined the detainee during intake was not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
posed by her heart condition, as required to establish violation of the detainee's due process right to adequate medical
care in the § 1983 action. The court noted that, even though the nurse failed to follow the facility's protocol requiring
her to contact a doctor when an inmate complained of chest pains, the nurse placed the detainee on a list to have her
vital signs checked each morning, and the nurse arranged for the detainee to get her congestive heart failure medication. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
nurse who examined the detainee following her complaints of nausea was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs posed by her heart condition and vomiting. In its decision, the court noted that “On the other hand,
Nurse Pam Hibbert was presented with ample evidence that Taylor needed medical treatment.” (Peoria Co. Jail, Ill.)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROCEDURES
USE OF FORCE

Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2010).A pretrial detainee brought an action against a county jail officer,
alleging use of excessive force under § 1983 and state-law battery. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the officer. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that a videotape of the incident between the detainee and a county jail officer was properly considered by the district court, in determining the
officer's motion for summary judgment, where the detainee's version of events was blatantly contradicted by the
videotape. The court found that the county jail officer's use of a leg-sweep maneuver to bring the pretrial detainee to
the floor, which resulted in the detainee's leg being fractured, did not constitute wanton infliction of pain, and thus,
the detainee could not prevail in her § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against the officer. The
court noted that it was undisputed that the detainee was acting in a manner, that she attempted to jerk away from the
officer, and struggled with the officer when he attempted to lead her away. It was undisputed that the leg-sweep
maneuver was in compliance with the jail's policies on the use of force. The leg fracture resulted from the accident of
another officer collapsing on the detainee as they both fell to floor. (Davidson Co. Crim.Justice Center, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2010). Following a pretrial detainee's death from alcohol
withdrawal while in a county jail, the detainee's estate brought an action against the county, sheriff, police officers,
and others under § 1983 and state law, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The
district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed and
reversed in part. The court held that allegations supported a claim that jailers were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's serious medical needs, but that the sheriff and others did not have actual knowledge of the detainee's erratic and strange behavior while in jail. The court found that allegations supported a claim that the sheriff and jail
administrators were deliberately indifferent. The court held that allegations that jailers were told by other inmates
and other jail staff that the pretrial detainee was displaying erratic and strange behavior, and that jailers took no steps
to secure immediate medical attention for the detainee, supported a § 1983 claim that jailers were deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's serious medical needs under the due process clause. The court found that the complaint's
specific allegations that the sheriff and jail administrators who were responsible for management and administration
of the jail had customs or policies of improperly screening inmates for alcohol withdrawal and improperly handling
inmates addicted to alcohol or drugs, together with its factual detail concerning a prior similar incident, satisfied the
pleading standards for stating § 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's serious medical needs
under the due process clause based on supervisor liability. (Lawrence County Jail, Alabama)

25.45

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action
against a county, among others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly
admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants conceded liability, and following a non-jury trial on the issue of
general damages, the district court held that each arrestee was entitled to the same dollar amount per new admit strip
search by way of the general damages award, that it would exclude any information concerning the effect that the
searches had upon arrestees in awarding general damages, and an award of $500 in general damages to each arrestee
was appropriate. (Nassau County, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an action
against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various civil rights violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his release from
the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and the survivors moved for leave to
amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a decision to arrest the individual for being under the
influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol use and knowledge that the individual was being medicated
for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a “kickout” charge so that he would be released from jail six hours later.
The court found that the arresting officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a special relationship with the
arrestee, similar to the special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to create a duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning following his
release from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the arrestee needed medical attention and
that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such attention. The court held that the county, city,
and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a California Tort Claims Act section related to liability of
public entities and employees for the release of prisoners, for the wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic
decision to release the arrestee from the county jail, but not as to the defendants' ministerial acts after the initial
decision to release the arrestee. The court noted that the arrestee had a lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and
had trouble walking, and had a seizure while he was in a holding cell. The arrestee’s body was found floating in the
San Joaquin River, approximately two miles west of the county jail, shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin
County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

McIllwain v. Weaver, 686 F.Supp.2d 894 (E.D.Ark. 2010). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a city,
county, and law enforcement officers challenging his strip search. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
and the arrestee moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in
part. The court held that special circumstances justified the presence of a male sheriff's deputy during the strip search
of the female arrestee who was being booked into jail, and thus, the male deputy's presence during the strip search
did not violate the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the male deputy came to the cell in
which the arrestee was being searched only after the arrestee began physically resisting the efforts of a female officer
to perform the strip search, and the female officer called for help. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what the county policy or custom was with respect to strip searches of
arrestees, and as to the adequacy of the county's training procedures for strip searches. (Sharp County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
SUICIDE

Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo. 2010). The mother of a detainee who committed suicide
in a cell in county detention center brought an action against the county and corrections officials, asserting claims for
wrongful death under § 1983 and under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute. The county and the commanding officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted in the motion, in part. The court held
that the mother failed to allege that the detention center's commanding officer personally participated. The court
found that the mother's allegations that her son was demonstrating that he was under the influence of narcotics at the
time of his detention, that her son had expressed suicidal tendencies, and that jail employees heard or were told of
choking sounds coming from her son's cell but took no action, were sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment
deliberate indifference claim under § 1983. The court held that the mother's allegation that the county unconstitutionally failed to train and supervise its employees with respect to custody of persons with symptoms of narcotics
withdrawal and suicidal tendencies was sufficient to state a failure to train claim against the county, under § 1983,
arising out of the death of her son who committed suicide while housed as a pretrial detainee. The detainee had used
a bed sheet to hang himself and the mother alleged that the county failed to check him every 20 minutes, as required
by jail policy. (St. Charles County Detention Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICAL SCREENING
SUICIDE

Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver, 742 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D.Colo. 2010). Deaf detainees, and the estate of one
detainee who committed suicide, brought a civil rights action challenging their arrests and detentions by the members of city and county's police and sheriff departments. The district court granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court held that failure to provide a deaf detainee with a sign language
interpreter during the intake process did not constitute disability discrimination. The court found that jail deputies
were not deliberately indifferent to a deaf detainee's needs. But the court held that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deaf detainee had access to the jail's services after he was booked
and placed in his housing assignment to the same extent as inmates who could communicate verbally, and whether
the detainee could access the jail's services without assistance. The court held that jail deputies were not deliberately
indifferent to needs of a deaf detainee who committed suicide, and because there was no underlying Eighth
Amendment violation, supervisor defendants were not liable in either their official or individual capacities for the
detainee's suicide, and the municipality was not liable for failure to adequately train and supervise the deputies. The
court noted that no evidence indicated that the detainee had been suicidal prior to his incarceration or at the time of
his medical screening, but rather, evidence established that the detainee could communicate through writing and
otherwise sufficiently to at least alert medical staff that he needed assistance. The court noted that medical staff
made regular and frequent visits to the jail. But the court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact existed as to whether the sheriff's department breached a duty to the detainee to take

25.46

reasonable care to prevent the detainee from committing suicide, and whether any such breach proximately caused
the detainee's suicide. The court held that jail officials' late night release of the deaf detainee and the potential harm
from being unable to communicate or get herself home did not demonstrate the level of outrageousness required to
establish a substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory. According to the court, the detainee
failed to show that officers would have been aware of the risk that, instead of waiting in the facility for public
transportation to begin, the detainee would leave and accept a ride from a stranger. The detainee was released at 2:00
a.m. and she was given bus tokens by a deputy sheriff. Her husband had called the facility to say that he was on his
way to pick her up, but the message was not relayed to the detainee. There was a waiting area in the lobby of the
facility but she did not notice it and attempted to get herself home on her own. (City and County of Denver Police
and Sheriff Departments, Pre-arraignment Detention Facility, Denver County Jail, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation
Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody at a county jail, did not
need a mental health professional when he was booked at the jail after being arrested on charges of illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive of whether the detainee presented a serious need when he was booked at the jail approximately two weeks later after being arrested on charges
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court held that information received by booking officers after
pretrial detainee's suicide, including information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that the
detainee was living in a tent, that the detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had
commented to other inmates that if he was going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing
what was in the officers' minds at time they were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk that the
detainee would commit suicide. According to the court, the corrections officers lacked actual knowledge of a
significant likelihood that the detainee would imminently seek to take his own life, or even of facts that would
promote the inference of a subjective awareness of such a substantial risk, and thus the officers did not act with
deliberate indifference to that risk in violation of due process, despite any alleged negligence in assessing and
observing the detainee prior to his suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the county sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners
during the overnight shift was constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their
cells. During the overnight period from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven
cell checks on Cellblock 2. While standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four cells
and observe detainees in those cells, but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells in the
cellblock. During her checks, Officer Keefer personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in Cellblock 2
because she could see them from the guard walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was unable to
see into his cell from the guard walkway. At 6:45 AM, when another officer let the detainees in Cellblock 2 out of
their cells for breakfast, he discovered Wells hanging in his cell. (Bureau County Jail, Illinois)
2011

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). Arrestees brought a class action against a county
challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees.
After the county admitted liability, the plaintiffs' class action involving more than 17,000 members was certified for
the issue of general damages and the district court awarded general damages of $500 per strip search. The county
moved to decertify the class for purposes of determining the issue of arrestees' special damages. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the resolution of special damages could not proceed on a class-wide basis,
since questions of law or fact common to the class no longer predominated over questions affecting individuals.
(Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380 (D.C.Cir. 2011). Arrestees, who were arrested while protesting International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies in the District of Columbia, brought a Bivens action against a former
United States Marshal, alleging that they had been subjected to unconstitutional strip searches upon being processed
into holding cells at a courthouse. The arrestees moved for summary judgment as to liability, and the Marshal moved
for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. The district court denied those motions. On appeal, the
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that there was no clearly established constitutional prohibition
of strip searching arrestees without individualized, reasonable suspicion. According to the court, strip searching of
all male arrestee demonstrators or protestors engaged in civil disobedience, in a locality that had a persistent problem
with contraband being smuggled into a cellblock, prior to their commingled placement in holding cells, without
individualized, reasonable suspicion had not been prohibited by the Fourth Amendment at the time of the incident,
and therefore the supervising United States Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity. (United States Marshal for
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
DELAY

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011). Inmates at local jails brought a putative class
action, under § 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated their Fourth, Fifth
and Eighth Amendments rights. Following certification of the over-detention class, the parties moved and cross–
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that
the District of Columbia's over-detention of jail inmates did not constitute a “seizure,” precluding § 1983 claims
alleging Fourth Amendment violations related to over-detentions stemming from the time it took to process inmates'
court–ordered releases. The court noted that the inmates were already in custody at the time they were ordered released or their sentences expired, such that their freedom of movement had already been terminated, and there was
no evidence that the plaintiffs' over-detentions involved fresh “seizures” warranting a Fourth Amendment analysis.

25.47

The court found that the District of Columbia's enforcement of a local ordinance with a “10 p.m. cut-off” rule, under
which jail inmates were kept overnight if their court–ordered releases were not processed prior to 10 p.m., violated
the inmates' substantive due process rights for purposes of a § 1983 action. According to the court, the enforcement
of the rule resulted in over-detention of individuals who were entitled to release, such over-detentions were not the
result of necessary administrative tasks or other reasonable delays, and the District could have promoted a claimed
interest in inmate welfare while simultaneously respecting the entitlement of persons with court orders for release to
prompt release. The court held that the District of Columbia violated the inmates' substantive due process rights, for
the purposes of a § 1983 action, by over-detaining inmates and failing to release them by the end of the day on which
they were entitled to release. According to the court, although processing of releases generally should have taken
between two and two–and–a–half hours to complete, the average over-detention time for inmates was approximately
36 hours, even though the District was on notice, via another litigation involving over-detention, that prevailing
release practices were deeply inadequate and that a fundamental change was required. The court found that a
significant reduction in the number of over-detentions after the District of Columbia implemented measures to
improve the manner in which inmate releases were processed demonstrated that the District was not deliberately
indifferent to inmates' substantive due process rights, precluding the inmates' § 1983 action against the District.
(District of Columbia Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING

Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2011). A jail inmate brought a § 1983 claim against deputies, alleging that
he suffered sexual abuse by another inmate as the result of their deliberate indifference to his safety needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court denied the deputies' motion for summary judgment and the deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deputies' alleged failure to protect the inmate from
sexual assault by another inmate was objectively serious. The court held that the deputy who processed the inmate
through booking when he entered the jail and completed a referral form that scheduled the inmate for a mental health
assessment did not subjectively ignore any risk to the inmate's safety, and thus was not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate's safety needs, noting that the deputy had no further contact with the inmate. The court also found that a deputy who ordinarily worked road patrol, and worked in the jail only on the day that the inmate reported that he had
been sexually assaulted by another inmate, did not subjectively ignore any risk to the inmate's safety, and thus was
not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the deputy did
not have sufficient contact with the inmate to permit the deputy to perceive his asserted status as a vulnerable inmate,
or to observe his alleged altercations with the other inmate. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether one deputy, who was familiar with the inmate who reported the alleged
sexual assault as well as the inmate who allegedly assaulted him, knew of the risk to inmate's safety because of his
status as a vulnerable inmate and the other inmate's status as a predatory inmate, and as to whether the deputy knew
of the risk to the inmate's safety based on noise generated by the alleged assaults. (Macomb County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING

Chess v. U.S., 836 F.Supp.2d 742 (N.D.Ill. 2011). An inmate who suffered personal injuries in an assault by a fellow
inmate brought an action against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging it
failed to properly screen the fellow inmate upon intake and also failed to monitor him. The inmate had suffered
second-degree burns when the other inmate threw a cup of scalding water onto his face and then physically assaulted
him by hitting him with the cup and punching him. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the government failed to comply with certain directives aimed at monitoring federal prisoners suffering from mental
illness, for the purposes of its attempt to avoid liability to the federal inmate who suffered personal injuries in an
assault by a fellow inmate under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waiver
of sovereign immunity. The court found that the inmate’s claims relating to a corrections officer's alleged failure to
monitor inmates during lockup were not barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) discretionary function
exception. According to the court, while there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) officials complied with requirements to review the inmate's central file upon intake and to review the
assaulting inmate's mental health on a monthly basis, the assaulted inmate failed to raise the issue for trial as to
whether the Bureau’s failure to review the assailing inmate's central file proximately caused his injury.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether, after
his second placement, BOP officials knew or reasonably should have known that the inmate should have been
segregated from the administrative population. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether a
correctional officer's alleged failure to monitor the unit at the time of the attack constituted negligence and
proximately caused the attacked inmate's injuries. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Correctional Center
Chicago, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
SUICIDE
RESTRAINTS

Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). The estate of a detainee who committed suicide
after being released from custody brought a § 1983 action against police officers, their supervisors, and a town,
alleging that the officers and supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the arrestee's medical needs and that the
town failed to train the officers to prevent detainee suicides. The district court denied the individual defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings and they appealed. The appeals court reversed. The appeals court held that the
estate failed to state a claim for deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to health under the
Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the estate failed to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate a causal
relationship between the police officers' failure to furnish medical care to the detainee during a seven-hour period of
custody and the detainee's act of committing suicide by walking in front of a train 14 hours after his release from
custody. The court noted that the detainee had been thinking about suicide at the time he was arrested, the detainee
was thinking about suicide at the time he was released from custody, and when the police released the detainee from
custody they placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been had they not acted at all. The
court found that in the absence of a risk of harm created or intensified by a state action, there is no due process
liability for harm suffered by a prior detainee after release from custody in circumstances that do not effectively

25.48

extend any state impediment to exercising self-help or to receiving whatever aid by others may normally be
available. The twenty-one-year-old detainee had been involved in a one-car accident, he was arrested about eleven
o'clock in the morning and brought to the police station. On the way there he said he intended to throw himself in
front of a train, and he continued to utter suicide threats at the station house accompanied by self-destructive
behavior, to the point of licking an electrical outlet. As a consequence, the police did not lock him in a cell, but
placed him in leg restraints and followed an evaluation protocol that showed a high suicide risk. He was not
examined by a doctor, but was released on his own recognizance about six o'clock that evening. (Town of Pembroke,
Massachusetts)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Craig v. Floyd County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011). A pretrial detainee who was admitted to a county jail
after being cleared for admittance by a medical center to which he was transported following his arrest, brought a
civil rights action against the county based on its nine-day delay in eventually providing him with surgical treatment
for multiple fractures to his head. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the pretrial detainee failed to show that a nine-day
delay by medical personnel at the county jail in providing him with appropriate surgical treatment for multiple fractures to his skull was the result of any unconstitutional custom or policy of allegedly not referring detainees to physicians, of relying on hospital clearance forms instead of performing their own diagnostic tests on detainees transported to jail from a hospital, or of using the least costly means to treat detainees. The court noted that the detainee's
only proof of any such policy or custom was that nine medical providers had evaluated him sixteen times at the
county jail, before he was finally transported to a medical center when a tomography scan of his head revealed these
fractures. According to the court, while nine different medical providers were involved in the detainee's treatment
before a tomography was eventually ordered, this was insufficient to show that the county had a policy or custom of
constitutional violations against detainees that was either persistent or so widespread as to have the force of law, as
required to subject the county to liability under § 1983. (Floyd County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE

Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2011). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a detention center captain alleging use of excessive force, and against a lieutenant and sergeant for failing to prevent the use of excessive
force. The district court dismissed the action and the arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the detention center captain's decision to use force, and the amount of force used in subduing the arrestee during
the booking process were objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and he thus did not violate the arrestee's
Fourth Amendment rights. The court noted that the arrestee refused to comply with directions, loudly abused correctional officers, and aggressively leapt toward the captain. (Ouachita County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
PROCEDURES
SEARCH- PROPERTY

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821 F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). A journalist arrested
while covering a demonstration at a university sued the university's board of regents, its police department and
various officers on the department, asserting § 1983 claims for violation of the First Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a claim for violation of the Privacy
Protection Act. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim for violation of the Excessive Bail Clause of
the Eighth Amendment on the theory that the defendants added unsupported charges for the sole purpose of
increasing his bail. The court found that the theory was viable under the Excessive Bail Clause, despite the indirect
means the defendants allegedly used to obtain the higher bail, and the intervening actions of the judicial officer who
actually set bail.The court found that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim against the police chief in his individual
capacity where the journalist asserted that the chief failed to train or supervise those individuals who directly
deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights and that, by his policy decisions, he set in motion the acts that
deprived the journalist of his constitutional rights. The court held that the journalist’s claims that he was wrongfully
arrested by university police and that his property was subject to searches and seizures without proper cause and
without the proper warrants, stated a claim under the Privacy Protection Act (PPA) against the university police
chief for failure to screen, train, and supervise. The court noted that the journalist's claim related specifically to the
statutory provisions of the PPA, that he alleged sufficient facts to support his claim of a causal connection between
the police chief's conduct and the statutory violation, and liability was not limited to those personally involved in the
statutory violation. (University of California, Berkeley)

U.S. District Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed suicide
at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county deputy sheriff,
jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the defendants violated the
inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The defendants removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the inmate, who had been diagnosed with
schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide or
intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy was not liable under § 1983 where the deputy
did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody.
The court also found that jail officials were not deliberately indifferent towards the schizophrenic inmate who was
awaiting transfer to a state prison, as would violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights, because there was no
indication that the officials subjectively knew that the inmate was at a substantial risk of committing suicide and
intentionally disregarded that risk. According to the court, simply because the jail inmate, who was diagnosed with
schizophrenia, had previously been on a suicide watch at the jail did not put jail officials on notice that he was suicidal during his subsequent incarceration two years later. The court held that jail officials' mere failure to comply
with a state standard and a jail policy requiring a four-time per hour check on any prisoner who had ever been on a
suicide watch did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the inmate. The court found that the mother of the
inmate failed to show a direct causal link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth
Amendment violation, as required to sustain the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials
based on their alleged failure to train jail employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

25.49

2012
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Female detainees filed § 1983 actions against a
city and city officials alleging that the policy, practice, and custom of the city department of correction (DOC) of
subjecting female detainees to a forced gynecological examination upon admission to DOC custody violated their
constitutional rights. The detainees alleged that they were not informed of what the exam entailed and were
subjected to, or threatened with, punishment if they questioned or refused the exam. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the statute of limitations for the detainees' claims
was tolled until the gynecological exam class claims were dismissed from the class action challenging the DOC's
alleged practice of conducting strip searches, where the potential gynecological exam class was pleaded in both the
original complaint and the first amended intervenor complaint, and the settlement agreement did not provide
unequivocal notice that the gynecological exam class claims were not being pursued. (New York City Dept. of
Correction, Rose M. Singer Center, Rikers Island)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate, brought
deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's medical
services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison. The employees
and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court
held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and survival actions in her
individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in prison, where the wrongful
death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative, such as a mother in her action as
administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as a trustee ad litem. The court found
that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a policy, practice, or custom that resulted in her
son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of
her son while he was in prison. Upon admission to the facility, the detainee had been evaluated and scored a 12 on a
scale, which was to have triggered classification as suicidal (a score of 8 or more). The Classification Committee
subsequently did not classify the detainee as suicidal as they were required to do under the jail classification policy,
and no member of the Committee communicated to medical contractor staff or correctional officers responsible for
monitoring the detainee that he was suicidal and going through drug withdrawal. At the time, the jail was equipped
with an operational and working video surveillance system and there was a video camera in the detainee’s cell.
(Fayette County Prison, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SCREENING
LENGTH

Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2012). A detainee, who suffered a month-long incarceration following
sentencing for operating while intoxicated, even though a state court had not ordered his incarceration, brought a §
1983 action against prison intake officers and a counselor. The district court denied the officers' and counselor's
motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and they appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court failed to engage in a full qualified immunity analysis as to
each of the detainee's § 1983.claims, setting aside the district court's order denying summary judgment to the prison
intake officers and counselor on qualified immunity grounds. The court noted that, although the district court did an
admirable job of explaining the facts of the case and construing those facts in the light most favorable to the
detainee, the court nevertheless repeatedly stated in its analysis that there were material issues of fact in dispute, and
its decision lacked consideration of the individual defendants' actions with respect to each of the constitutional
claims. (Iowa Medical Classification Center, Oakdale, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
MEDICATION
SEARCHES

Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against various village police
officers and a village alleging unreasonable search and seizure of her vehicle, denial of the right to counsel, cruel and
unusual punishment, conspiracy under § 1985, failure to train, unlawful detention, and several state law claims. The
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the detainee's allegation that she was offered medication for her unnamed mental ailment
while incarcerated, but that she declined to accept the medication “for fear of overmedication or a harmful
interaction,” failed to establish that she was subjected to inhumane conditions or that the police were deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need, as required to support her claim that she was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the arrestee's
failure to allege any other incidents of wrongdoing by the village, combined with her failure to show that the
unconstitutional consequences of the village's alleged failure to train its police officers were patently obvious,
precluded her claim against the village. (Village of Park Forest Police Department, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a jail superintendent,
the jail nursing supervisor, five nurses he encountered while incarcerated, and a county, asserting that they had been
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need for treatment due to tuberculosis. The district court granted
summary judgment on immunity grounds to the administrators and the county, but denied summary judgment to the
nurses. The nurses appealed. The appeals court held that two nurses were entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's action, but summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact for three of the nurses on
the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. The court held that although one nurse might have been negligent in failing
to perceive of, or further investigate, the inmate's signs of illness in connection with tuberculosis, she did not
deliberately disregard the inmate's need for medical treatment, and thus, she was entitled to qualified immunity from
the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claims. The court noted that the nurse only met the inmate during his intake
exam, she noted his elevated pulse, his weight loss and coughing, he did not complain of medical issues directly to
her or on the screening form, and he played basketball within several days of his intake exam. The court found that a
second nurse did not deliberately disregard the inmate's need for medical treatment arising from tuberculosis, and
thus, she was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the nurse's interaction with the inmate lasted
two minutes and was confined to reading the result of his Mantoux test, and although the result was not read
correctly, the error did not show indifference to the inmate's medical needs. The court held that summary judgment

25.50

was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether three nurses who knew from other inmates and
correctional staff, of the inmate's medical needs due to tuberculosis, were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the inmate’s condition worsened during
his 56 day sentence for fifth degree assault, and he was transferred to a hospital emergency room two days before he
was scheduled for release. (Ramsey County Correctional Facility, Minnesota)
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered from
bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights violations in
connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to mental health
treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed from a window,
causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the defendants. The
defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and
remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established right for police to
provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood that the arrestee had a
serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that could not be decided on
interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on interlocutory appeal of denial of
qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established constitutional right for her release to be
delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly established due process right for the police to
not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe place and releasing her in a hazardous one while
unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not
entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the
court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the arrestee's individual-recognizance bond and collecting
possessions that were to be returned on her release, and who received a telephone call from the mother of the
arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did nothing in response and who did not even note the call in
a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police had created a danger, without
justification. The court found that the detention aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the
arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way, such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred
another person out of the arrestee's cell because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other
personnel at the stationhouse, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not
arrange for medical treatment of serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station,
Second District Station, Chicago Police Department.)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.Iowa 2012). Misdemeanor arrestees brought a civil
rights action against a county and law enforcement officials, alleging that their Fourth Amendment rights were
violated when they were searched pursuant to a “blanket” policy authorizing strip searches of all arrestees facing
serious misdemeanor or more serious charges. Following the grant of summary judgment, in part, in favor of the
arrestees, the county moved for reconsideration. The court granted the motion, in part. The court held that the recent
Supreme Court decision in Florence, which held that reasonable suspicion was generally not required to strip search
pretrial detainees, subject to possible exceptions, was an intervening change in the law, justifying reconsideration.
According to the court, the county's strip search policy was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of
whether arrestees would be put into the general population. But the court found that summary judgment was
precluded on the arrestee's claim that the manner of a strip search was unreasonable. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
MEDICATION

Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). A wheelchair-using, paraplegic arrestee sued a city,
police officer, a county, a former sheriff, and county corrections officers, bringing federal causes of action for
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection and due process. The arrestee alleged that he was lifted out of his wheelchair and placed on the floor of a
sheriff's van, forcing him to maneuver himself onto a bench seat which caused his pants and underwear to fall,
exposing his genitals, that he was not secured to the bench with a seatbelt, causing him to be thrown about the
passenger compartment and suffer leg spasms during his ride to the jail, that he was forced to urinate into an empty
soda bottle and handle his sterile catheter with his hands that were dirty from moving himself around the floor of the
van, and that the county corrections officers stood by as he struggled to maneuver himself out of the van and into his
wheelchair while other inmates watched. The city and county defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that: (1) the city did not fail to accommodate the arrestee's disability, for purposes of the ADA and
Rehabilitation Act claims; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the arrestee was denied
the benefit of safe and appropriate transportation by the county on the day of his arrest when he was moved from a
police station to a county jail; (3) the county was entitled to summary judgment to the extent the arrestee's claims
involved his transportation from the jail to court proceedings on two other dates; (4) fact issues existed as to whether
the county defendants were deliberately indifferent to the paraplegic inmate's known medical need for suppositories
every other day, in violation of due process, but they were not deliberately indifferent to his need for catheters and
prescription pain medication; and (5) the county defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted
that while the county defendants disputed the arrestee's version of the facts, corrections officers all denied receiving
any training regarding how to transport disabled inmates. (Utica Police Department, Oneida County Correctional
Facility, New York)

25.51

2013
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL SCREENING
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female federal
detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and employees of
the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail, alleging violation of
the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all
county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal immigration authorities pending her
removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial detainee. The court noted that a pretrial
detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as much protection during her detention as
convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-- namely protection from harm caused by a
defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health. The court asserted that persons who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process clause, to more considerate treatment during detention
than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.
The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who interviewed the
detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations, acute anxiety, and
feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or any other jail staff or to
recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health treatment, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's due process rights. The court held that a
nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately indifferent to the detainee's risk of suicide, as
would violate the detainee's due process rights, where the nurse manager treated the detainee for panic attacks and
anxiety, and recommended that she be given a cellmate and transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of
which were done, and there was no showing that the nurse manager knew that the detainee was suicidal.
According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail director's failure to provide annual training to jail staff
on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and their failure to implement a suicide prevention policy, did
not render the county liable under § 1983 for the detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail, absent a showing
that such failures caused the detainee's suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against a county board
of commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his arrest.
The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the force used against the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a
corrections officer and the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent deputy sheriffs from using excessive force,
absent a showing that the nurse and officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from
occurring; (3) the nurse was not liable for deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical needs, where the arrestee's
latent cranial injury was not so obvious that a lay person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's
attention; (4) the county board of commissioners was not liable under § 1983 for any alleged conduct of deputy
sheriffs in violating the arrestee's federal constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom
was the moving force behind the alleged violations; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a
deputy sheriffs' use of force against the arrestee was reckless under Ohio law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether a deputy sheriff assaulted the arrestee in response to an off-color jibe; and (7) genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the county board of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew that litigation was
probable and whether their destruction of videotape evidence of deputies' use of force against the arrestee was
willful. The court also found that the jail nurse did not act with malice and in a wanton and willful manner in
allowing the arrestee to sit in a county jail cell for 12 hours with serious injuries, where the nurse attended to the
arrestee, assessed what she perceived to be minor injuries, provided him with ibuprofen for his pain, and advised him
he could contact someone for further medical assistance if necessary. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
CLOTHING
SEARCHES
TELEPHONE
USE OF FORCE

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983 action
against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other things, that jail
officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner, and did so in retaliation
for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and cell phone. The defendants moved
for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's
reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did not warrant excluding his opinions in their
entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible.
The court found that the incident in which male and female county jail officers forcibly removed the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and changed her into jail attire was not a “strip search” within the meaning of the Iowa law
which defined a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person's clothing so as to
permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe by
any body cavity,” where there was no indication that the officers inspected the arrestee's private parts or physically
probed any of her body cavities. The court also found that the arrestee whose clothing was forcibly removed in the
presence of male and female county jail officers in a holding cell after the arrestee refused to answer questions
during the booking process and to remove her clothing herself, was not subjected to a “strip search” requiring
reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s
privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional
safety-- was substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the
officers neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy
rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
amount of force used by female county jail officers during the booking process to forcibly remove the female
arrestee's under-wire bra and change her into jail attire after the arrestee refused to answer questions, became

25.52

disruptive, and refused to remove her clothing herself, was reasonable. The officers allegedly threw the arrestee onto
the cell bunk, causing her to bang her head against the bunk or cell wall. The court found that male county jail
officers did not use excessive force, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, in restraining the female arrestee
in a holding cell after the female officers had allegedly thrown the arrestee onto a cell bunk, causing her to bang her
head against bunk or cell wall, in an effort to forcibly remove the arrestee's clothing and to change her into jail attire.
(Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)
U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE

Davis v. Pickell, 939 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff,
undersheriff, and deputies, alleging various claims, including excessive force. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The detainee had been booked into a
holding cell at the jail and then he was removed from the multi-prisoner cell and taken to a single-inmate “safety
cell.” He alleges that during the transfer, deputy sheriffs subjected him to excessive force in the course of removing
his jacket and shoes. The district court found that “[T]he videotape provides substance to those allegations.” The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the deputies' use of
force against the detainee shocked the conscience, whether the deputies maliciously used force, and whether the use
of force on the detainee was outrageous conduct. (Genesee County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEARCHES

Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.N.J. 2013). Arrestees filed a proposed class action under § 1983
alleging that their constitutional rights were violated when they were strip searched at a county jail. The district court
granted the arrestees' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and the county appealed. The district court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the arrestees' proposed amendment to their complaint, in
which they alleged that they were arrested for minor offenses, that they either were held, or could have been held,
outside of the general jail population, and that they were subjected to strip searches pursuant to the county's blanket
policy before their detentions had been reviewed by a judicial officer, stated plausible claims for violation of their
rights under Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Burlington County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PSYCHOLOGICAL
SCREENING
SUICIDE

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044 (D.Minn. 2013). Trustees for the next-of-kin of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought an action against the county, alleging
under § 1983 that the county provided inadequate medical care to the detainee, in violation of his due process rights.
The trustees also asserted related claims for negligence and wrongful death under state law. The county moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county had actual knowledge of the
pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to that risk, and as to whether
the detainee's death was the result of an unconstitutional custom. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county's training of its jail employees on proper
implementation of its suicide prevention policy was adequate, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent
in failing to revise its training, and as to whether any inadequate training on the part of the county caused the pretrial
detainee's suicide. (Mille Lacs County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 958 F.Supp.2d 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought a class action
against county officials and others, challenging a county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly
admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants moved for reconsideration and to vacate a prior order granting
summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on the liability issue. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the defendants' concession of liability did not, in and of itself,
divest the court of discretion to reconsider its prior order granting summary judgment in favor of the arrestees on the
issue of liability; (2) the Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders decision was an intervening change in the
controlling federal law, justifying the district court's reconsideration of a prior order granting summary judgment in
favor of the arrestees on their federal claim; and (3) the Florence decision did not justify reconsideration of a prior
grant of summary judgment on the New York state constitutional claim. (Nassau County Corr’l. Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
PROCEDURES

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual who
died from acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against a city and its
mayor, as well as the police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging claims under § 1983 for
various constitutional violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment under state law. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the officers
were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to
call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the
individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor him and provide proper care; (3) the administrator failed to
establish municipal liability based on failure to train; (4) the administrator failed to establish supervisory liability
against the supervising officer; (5) police were immune from negligence liability under statutory exception to
Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6) the officers were not liable for false imprisonment. The court noted that at
the time of the relevant events, a reasonable officer would not have known that determining that a suitable treatment
facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his ability to constitutionally detain an
intoxicated individual who was not charged with any crime, as required for the right to be clearly established, and
therefore the individual officers who detained the individual were entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
(Peabody Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
IDENTIFICATION
SEARCHES

Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C. 2013). A former pretrial detainee, a transgender woman,
who underwent sex reassignment surgery and had her sex legally changed to female, brought an action against the
United States Marshals Service (USMS), USMS marshals, District of Columbia, a police chief, and police officers,
alleging under § 1983 that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights in connection with her arrests, and
asserting claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and tort law. The police chief, officer, and USMS

25.53

defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court held
that the USMS marshals were not entitled to qualified immunity from the unlawful search claim, where a reasonable
officer would have known that a cross-gender search of a female detainee by male USMS employees that included
intimate physical contact, exposure of private body parts, and verbal harassment, all in front of male detainees and
male USMS employees, in the absence of an emergency, was unreasonable. The court also found that the USMS
marshals and the police officer were not entitled to qualified immunity from a § 1983 Fifth Amendment conditions
of confinement claim brought by the pretrial detainee, arising from the defendants' actions in holding the detainee
with male detainees and otherwise treating her as if she were male. According to the court, a reasonable officer
would know that treating the female detainee as the detainee was treated exposed her to a substantial risk of serious
harm, and, therefore, would know that those actions violated the detainee's due process rights. (District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police Dept., 6th District Police Station and MPD's Central Cellblock, and U.S.Marshals Service)
U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION

Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee filed suit under § 1983
against a sheriff's department to recover for injuries sustained when he was severely beaten by another inmate
housed in a maximum-security cellblock. The district court entered summary judgment for the sheriff's department,
and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detainee failed to establish that the
security classification policy used by the sheriff's department to assign inmates to cellblocks within the jail was
deliberately indifferent to inmate safety in violation of his due-process rights. The court noted that: (1) the detainee
presented no evidence that the classification policy created a serious risk of physical harm to inmates, much less that
the sheriff's department knew of it and did nothing; (2) the attack by the detainee's cellmate was not enough to
establish that the policy itself systematically exposed inmates like the detainee to a serious risk of harm; and (3) it
was unclear that a policy strictly segregating those accused of nonviolent crimes from those accused of violent
crimes would do a better job of ensuring inmate safety than the multiple-factor classification system used by the
sheriff's department. The detainee claimed that the Department's approach to classifying inmates for cellblock
placement ignored serious risks to inmate safety because the security classification policy fails to separate “violent”
from “nonviolent” inmates and thus fails to protect peaceful inmates from attacks by inmates with assaultive
tendencies. The appeals court described the classification practices: “A classification officer interviews each new
detainee and reviews a range of information, including the inmate's age, gender, gang affiliation, medical concerns,
current charge, criminal history, behavioral and disciplinary history within the jail, and any holds due to parole
violations. Pursuant to standards recommended by the American Correctional Association, the classification policy
assigns point values within these categories, with higher point values corresponding to lower security risks.”
(Sangamon County Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PROCEDURES
TRANSLATOR

Taylor v. City of Mason, 970 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Ohio 2013). A deaf arrestee brought an action against a police
department and a city, alleging that denial of a qualified interpreter during questioning prior to arrest at the jail
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he was falsely imprisoned.
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
the deaf arrestee's allegations, that police officers denied him the benefits of effectively communicating with them
prior to arrest by failing to provide an appropriate auxiliary aid, were sufficient to state a claim under ADA and
Rehabilitation Act. The arrestee alleged that he initiated a phone call to police because he had been assaulted, and
that, although officers requested an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, they did not wait for the interpreter
to arrive before they began questioning him, but instead used his alleged attacker as an interpreter, and she reported
that the arrestee sexually assaulted her. The court found that the allegations were also sufficient to state a claim
under the Rehabilitation Act, where the arrestee alleged that he expressed dissatisfaction with the interpreter
provided at the jail, who was not certified in ASL, that he did not fully understand his Miranda rights as explained by
the interpreter, and that the lack of a qualified interpreter was directed at him particularly. (City of Mason Police
Department and Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). The estate of a detainee, who died in police custody from multiple
drug intoxication, brought a § 1983 action against the arresting and detaining officers, alleging that the officers had
shown deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical needs. The district court denied the officers’ motion
for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the arresting officer's discovery of an empty bottle of a
recently refilled anti-anxiety medication, and the detainee's statement that he had taken “a little” of the medication,
did not amount to subjective knowledge that the detainee required medical attention, and thus the officer was entitled
to qualified immunity in the § 1983 action arising from the subsequent death of the detainee in police custody. The
court noted that the detainee presented no external injuries, and the detainee was conscious during the initial
encounter, answering officers’ questions and following instructions. The court found that summary judgment for the
police officer in charge of the jail was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer
had subjective knowledge of the serious medical need of the detainee and whether the officer deliberately
disregarded that need. According to the court, a reasonable officer in charge of a jail would have known that a
constitutional violation occurs by deliberately disregarding a detainee's serious medical needs, and thus the right was
clearly established, and in turn the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 claim arising from
detainee's death while in police custody. (Saline County Detention Center, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Valade v. City of New York, 949 F.Supp.2d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Arrestees brought § 1983 and state law actions
against police officers and a city. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment excessive force
claim was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a police officer used excessive force against the
arrestee by handcuffing her too tightly and shoving her into a police car. The court also found a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the arrestee was sexually assaulted while she was in police custody following her arrest.
(New York City Police Department, Central Booking)

25.54

2014
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 39 F.Supp.3d 635 (E.D.Pa. 2014). The parents of a juvenile, who was arrested and charged
with summary offenses and committed to a youth detention facility after he threatened several girls in his
neighborhood, brought an action on his behalf against state troopers, a county, and county officials, asserting claims
under § 1983 and state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) county officials did not have the right to conduct blanket strip
searches of juveniles upon admission to detention facility; (2) detention facility officials who strip searched the
juvenile were not entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable search claims; (3) county officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from the unreasonable search claims; and (4) the county was not entitled to summary
judgment on the unreasonable search claims. The court found that summary judgment of the Fourth Amendment
claims were precluded by fact issues as to whether the county and the facility's director had a policy, practice, or
custom of conducting blanket strip searches and acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of the juveniles being
detained at the facility. (Lancaster County Youth Detention Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
CHEMICAL AGENTS
SEARCHES

Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority, 771 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014). Two
arrestees brought a § 1983 action for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against a regional jail authority
and three of its former or current executive directors, challenging the constitutionality of visual strip searches and
delousing of the arrestees. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. An arrestee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the post-arraignment visual strip search of one arrestee did not
violate the Fourth Amendment; (2) the pre-arraignment visual strip search of the other arrestee did not violate a
clearly established right where the arrestee was strip-searched in a private room, and he was to be held until the next
morning in a holding cell where he might interact with up to 15 other arrestees; (3) delousing of the arrestees did not
violate a clearly established right; and (4) declaratory and injunctive relief would be premature. The court noted that
the delousing was done in a private room with only one officer, who was of the same sex as the arrestees, and it did
not entail the officer himself touching either arrestee. (West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility
Authority)

U.S. District Court
SCREENING
PROCEDURES

Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought § 1983 claims and state-law
claims against a county and its jail director, relating to the arrestee's detention pursuant to a bench warrant that had
been cancelled before the arrest. After removal to federal court, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part, and remanded to the state court. The court
held that the arrestee's § 1983 claims against a county and its jail director, relating to detention pursuant to a bench
warrant that had been cancelled before the arrest, were properly characterized as Fourth Amendment claims for false
arrest and false imprisonment, rather than for malicious prosecution. The court found that county jail employees did
not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure, when they booked him into the
jail following a city police officer's arrest of the plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that was facially valid, but that
had been cancelled before the arrest. According to the court, county jail employees, upon learning from the arrestee's
attorney about the pre-arrest cancellation of the facially valid bench warrant pursuant to which city police officers
had conducted the arrest, did not act with deliberate or reckless intent to falsely imprison the arrestee by requiring a
release order from a judge, and thus, the arrestee's continued detention for two days, until the release order was
issued, did not constitute false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that jail
employees acted reasonably, since a judge could better determine why a bench warrant remained available to city
police at the time of arrest, and whether any other basis for detaining the arrestee existed. (Metropolitan Detention
Center, Bernalillo County, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
MEDICATION

Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee sued a county and jail officials for
alleged deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, after he became legally blind allegedly due to his high
blood pressure while incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment based on qualified
immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals
court held that the lack of medical screening at intake, failure to prescribe medication, and a delay in administering
medication were not deliberate indifference. The court held that the officials' failure to conduct medical screening of
the detainee at intake did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials
began logging the detainee's daily blood pressure in response to his complaints of heart problems. The court found
that the officials' failure to prescribe medication for the detainee after several high blood pressure readings did not
constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The court noted that although the officials at most
should have known they were committing malpractice by not prescribing medication, medical malpractice was not
deliberate indifference. According to the court, the officials' delay in administering blood pressure medication to the
detainee by failing to write a second prescription sooner, after the medication did not arrive following first
prescription, did not constitute deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, where the officials at most were
negligent, and deliberate indifference required even more than gross negligence. (Faulkner County Jail, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
MEDICATION

Hinojosa v. Livingston, 994 F.Supp.2d 840 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The mother of a former inmate who died of
hyperthermia while incarcerated brought an action against the prison's health care provider, asserting claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging the provider's failure to make
accommodations for the inmate's disabilities resulted in the inmate's death. The provider moved to dismiss. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the mother alleged sufficient facts to state that the inmate was
discriminated against by the prison's health care provider, in support of her claims under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act, by alleging that the provider knew of the risks and dangers associated with certain medical
conditions and medications, that the provider knew the inmate suffered from those conditions and used those
medications, and that despite that knowledge, the provider failed to make reasonable accommodations, resulting in
the inmate suffering more pain and punishment than non-disabled prisoners, namely, his death. The court noted that

25.55

the mother alleged that the provider knew both that the inmate suffered from hypertension, diabetes, schizophrenia,
and/or depression, and was prescribed medications to treat his disabilities, and that extreme temperatures could be
deadly, but still failed to protect the inmate from the extreme temperatures that ultimately resulted in the inmate's
death.
The court found that the mother alleged sufficient facts concerning the accommodations that should have been
provided by the prison's health care provider without a request, but were denied or refused, as well as which
facilities, programs, or services should have been modified by the provider, to state claims under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. The mother complained that the provider's intake process was flawed in that it could take up to
10 days for prisoners to receive an intake physical, and that the delay created a loophole that left inmates with heat
sensitive conditions and disabilities especially vulnerable to death because they did not receive accommodations for
their heat sensitive disabilities, and that the provider's failure to employ 24–hour medical staff at the prison resulted
in a fatal delay and denial of vital medical care to the inmate. (University of Texas Medical Branch, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice Garza West Unit)
U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class action
against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for newly
admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded general damages of $500 per
strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently, the arrestees moved for attorney fees in
the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030. The court held that it would apply the current,
unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in determining counsel fees using the lodestar method as a
cross-check against the percentage method. The court found that the lodestar rates were $300 for all associates, with
two exceptions for requested rates below $300, and $450 for all partners. The court awarded $3,836,000 in counsel
fees, which was equivalent to 33 1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf of the class, and $182,030.25 in costs
and expenses. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Keller v. U.S., 771 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2014). A federal inmate brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), alleging that federal prison employees negligently failed to protect him from being attacked by another
inmate. The government moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison intake psychologist failed to comply with mandatory
regulations by not examining all of the inmate's medical records before releasing the inmate into the general prison
population, and whether prison guards violated post orders by failing to attentively monitor their assigned areas of
the prison yard. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL SCREENING
USE OF FORCE

M.H. v. County of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049 (N.D.Cal. 2014). A pretrial detainee’s estate brought a civil rights
action against a county, its sheriff, sheriff’s deputies, and a correctional healthcare provider, alleging violations of §
1983 as well as common law claims for negligence, assault, and battery after the detainee died from alcohol
withdrawal. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that summary judgment was
precluded by fact issues: (1) with regard to the nurse who performed the detainee’s medical intake assessment to
determine, if she was subjectively aware of his risk of alcohol withdrawal but did nothing prior to his death; (2) as to
whether the county adequately implemented its training policies concerning recognition of inmates with alcohol and
other drug problems; (3) with regard to the healthcare provider for failure to supervise the nurse who performed the
detainee’s medical intake assessment and for failure to follow its own policies; and (4) as to whether a deputy was
justified in using a stun gun against the detainee while moving him to an isolation cell and in delivering closed-fist
strikes to the detainee’s back after a struggle ensued. The court also found a fact issue with regard to whether a social
worker was subjectively reckless when she chose to see other inmates despite knowing that the pretrial detainee was
at risk for severe alcohol withdrawal. The detainee had been arrested for jaywalking. (Alameda County, Glenn Dyer
Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
PROCEDURES

Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a city, city police
officers, a county, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that he was unreasonably arrested and incarcerated
for a 12-day period. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) a front desk officer was entitled to qualified immunity from unlawful arrest
claim; (2) the deputies who transported the arrestee from a police station across the street to a detention facility, and
assisted in the arrestee's booking, were entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive due process claim; (3) there
was no evidence that the city's alleged policy of relying on the state court to schedule a hearing after promptly being
advised of a warrant arrest was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation; but (4) summary judgment
was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city had actual or constructive notice that its failure to train as to how
to process conflicting information during the process of “packing” an arrest warrant for distribution was substantially
certain to result in a constitutional violation, and as to whether the city substantially chose to disregard the risk of
harm. (City and County of Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SCREENING

Rogge v. City of Richmond, Tex., 995 F.Supp.2d 657 (S.D.Tex. 2014). The parents of an arrestee who committed
suicide while in police custody brought a § 1983 and state law action in state court against the city and two police
officers. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the arresting police officer was unaware of the arrestee’s risk of self harm.
The arrestee committed suicide in a police station holding cell, and thus, by not checking on the arrestee for several
hours, the officer did not act with deliberate indifference to the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm,
so as to violate his due process rights. The court noted that the arrestee was calm and that he cooperated with the
officer during their interaction, and although he said he was terminated from his job, admitted drinking, and said he
was on medication for anxiety, he did not express an interest in hurting himself or appear distraught. The message
that the officer received from the arrestee's father did not raise suspicion of a risk of suicide, and the officer believed

25.56

that all dangerous personal items had been taken from the arrestee and that the dispatch officer would monitor him
via a video feed.
The court found that the police dispatch officer who was monitoring the video feed from the police station
holding cell was unaware of the arrestee’s risk of self harm, and thus, the officer did not act with deliberate
indifference to the arrestee's obvious need for protection from self harm, so as to violate his due process rights. The
arrestee slept on bench in the cell for most of the two and a half hours he was in the cell before hanging himself, and
the officer did not observe on the video monitor any behavior on the arrestee's part that suggested he was a suicide
risk. The officer observed that the arrestee did not have items of personal property considered to be suicide
implements, and although the arrestee's father came to the station and told the officer that he and his wife were
worried, he did not indicate the arrestee might be suicidal. (Richmond City Jail, Texas)
U.S. Appeals Court
IDENTIFICATION

S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 771 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 2014). A juvenile, by and through his guardian,
filed a § 1983 action against a township, its police chief, a police officer, the superintendent of a juvenile detention
center, and the center's intake officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and loss of
filial consortium. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, and on remand the district court entered summary judgment in
favor of the superintendent and the intake officer, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the intake officer at the juvenile detention center had no duty to make an independent assessment of
probable cause for the juvenile detainee's arrest and detention, and thus did not violate the detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights by signing a complaint prepared by the arresting officer that charged the detainee as a delinquent
child. (Clermont County Juvenile Detention Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). Parents, on behalf of their minor children, brought a § 1983 action against
the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, correctional officers, and other administrators, claiming that the
suspicionless strip search of the juveniles, as part of the intake process of the detention center, violated the juveniles'
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the parents. The defendants appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the right of juvenile detainees
held on minor offenses to be free from suspicionless strip searches was not clearly established at time the two
juveniles arrested for underage drinking were strip searched, and thus, correctional officers who conducted searches
were protected by qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 action arising from the searches. The court noted
that prior court decisions had recognized that a strip search of a person arrested for a minor offense was
unreasonable, given that subsequent court decisions had found that state's enhanced responsibility for juveniles
supported strip searches, and a recent Supreme Court decision had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not
prohibit strip search of all adult criminal detainees. The court found that under Kentucky law, the correctional
officers' strip searches of the two juveniles, as part of the intake process of a juvenile detention center, were
ministerial acts, and thus, the officers were not eligible for qualified official immunity from liability on the juveniles'
claims of negligence, invasion of privacy, assault, false imprisonment, grossly negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and arbitrary action in violation of state constitution, even if officers were both acting in good faith and
within scope of their employment. (Breathitt Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). Arrestees brought a civil rights action under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments against a mayor, municipal council, police department, and current and former wardens of a central
booking and intake center for alleged mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to the center for booking and
processing. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified
immunity. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the law on strip searches of
arrestees in jail in a dedicated search room with compelling security justifications was not clearly established at the
time that the searches were conducted. (Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center, Maryland)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
DETOXIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION
RULES

Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2015). An arrestee brought an action against a county, its
sheriff’s department, and two officers under § 1983 for violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be protected
from harm by other inmates, arising out of an attack against the arrestee by another arrestee with whom he was
jailed. A jury returned a verdict for the arrestee, and the district court denied the defendants’ motion for judgment as
a matter of law. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held
that: (1) the right of inmates to be protected from attacks by other inmates was established with sufficient clarity to
guide a reasonable officer; (2) substantial evidence supported the jury’s determination that the officer was
deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the arrestee; (3) sufficient evidence supported the
jury’s determination that the officer’s deliberate indifference was the actual and proximate cause of harm to the
arrestee; (4) sufficient evidence supported the jury’s determination that the supervising officer was aware of, but
disregarded, the risk to the arrestee posed by the other inmate; (5) the design of a jail by a municipality is the result
of a series of deliberate choices that render the design a formal municipal policy for the purposes of municipal
liability under § 1983; (6) arrestee failed to establish that the county had actual knowledge of a risk of harm from the
design of the jail, as required to establish liability under § 1983; and (7) the award of future damages to the arrestee
was supported by the record. The jury returned a verdict for the arrestee on all counts and awarded him $2,605,632
in damages. The parties later stipulated to $840,000 in attorney fees, $18,000 in punitive damages.
The arrestee had been placed in a “sobering cell” after his arrest for public drunkenness and was seriously injured
by another drunken inmate in the sobering cell. When the other inmate was admitted, staff determined that he posed
a threat to officers, requiring supervision by two officers at all times. The other arrestee was placed in the same cell
as the plaintiff, even though the jail policy was to place combative inmates in a separate cell, and separate cells were
available but left unused on the night of the incident. The court noted that the arrestee submitted billing records from
his cognitive assistant and his treating psychologist and a chart detailing the charges for medical expenses he already

25.57

had incurred, and proffered several medical experts who testified to his need for ongoing medical care.
The jail was purportedly in violation of a state regulation requiring monitoring equipment in sobering cells, as
required to establish that the county was deliberately indifferent to the Fourth Amendment right of pretrial detainees
to be protected from harm by other inmates and was liable under § 1983 for injuries sustained by the arrestee.
According to the court ”One would assume that for any given construction project, including jails, the municipality’s
governing body—or a committee that it appoints to act in its stead—reviews bids, considers designs, and ultimately
approves a plan for the facility and allocates funds for its construction. These choices are sufficient, in our opinion,
to meet the definition of a formal municipal policy…” (Los Angeles Sheriff’s West Hollywood Station, California)
U.S. District Court
SUICIDE
SCREENING

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under § 1983
against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers violated the
detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental health history and safety, to her
safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a looped shoelace from her cell. The
court noted that the detainee was not identified as a suicide risk, the officers did not have access to the detainee’s
medical records, the officers were not trained to make suicide assessments, and the detainee’s risk of suicide was not
so obvious that someone other than a professional could have recognized the risk. (Suffolk County House of
Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
USE OF FORCE

Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015). The administrator of a pretrial detainee’s estate brought a
state court action against a county, county sheriff, police officer and police sergeant, alleging § 1983 violations of
the detainee’s constitutional rights and various state law claims. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to
dismiss and denied individual defendants’ requests for qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that a police officer’s act of shoving a fully restrained pretrial detainee in a jail
booking area, causing the detainee to strike his head on the wall as he fell to the cement floor without any way to
break his fall, constituted “gratuitous force” in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free
from excessive force. The court noted that the detainee’s state of being handcuffed, in a belly chain and leg irons, led
to a reasonable inference that the officer’s actions were a result of his frustration with the detainee’s prior restraint
behavior, since the detainee was not in any condition to cause a disruption that would have provoked the officer to
use such force. The court held that the police officer was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and
therefore he was not entitled to qualified immunity from liability under § 1983. According to the court, the officer’s
attempts to cover up the assault by filing false reports and lying to federal investigators following the death of the
detainee led to a reasonable conclusion that the officer understood that his actions violated the detainees’ clearly
established right not to be gratuitously assaulted while fully restrained and subdued.
The court held that a police sergeant’s continued use of a chokehold on the unresisting, fully-shackled pre-trial
detainee, after hearing the detainee choke and gurgle, and when a fellow officer was urging him release his
chokehold, was objectively unreasonable, in violation of the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
excessive force. The court noted that the sergeant’s subsequent acts of telling other officers to leave the medical cell
after the detainee was rendered unconscious, failing to seek medical help, and refusing to mention the use of a
chokehold in incident reports, led to the inference the that sergeant was aware he violated the law and sought to
avoid liability. According to the court, the police sergeant was on notice that his actions were unconstitutional, and
therefore, he was not entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983.
The court found that the county sheriff could be held personally liable under § 1983, based on his failure to train
and supervise employees in the use of excessive force, the use of a chokehold and injuries derived therefrom, and to
ensure that the medical needs of persons in the sheriff’s custody were met. According to the court, evidence that the
sheriff helped his employees cover up their unconstitutional actions by making false statements to federal officials
about his knowledge of his employees’ assault, chokehold, and deliberate failure to provide medical attention to the
detainee demonstrated that the sheriff at least implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the
unconstitutional conduct of the offending employees. The court noted that under Ohio law, allegations by the estate
of the pretrial detainee that the county sheriff had full knowledge of the assault but intentionally and deliberately
made false statements to federal officials were sufficient to state a claim that the sheriff ratified the conduct of his
officers and, thus, was potentially personally liable for his officers’ actions. The court concluded that the officers’
use of excessive force, failure to provide medical care, assault and battery, and wrongful death could be imputed to
the sheriff in his official capacity since the sheriff’s false statements to federal investigators were a position that was
inconsistent to non-affirmance of the officers’ actions. (Lucas County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SCREENING
SEARCHES

Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against a county, county
sheriff, and jail officers alleging that she was subjected to an unreasonable search, that her right to freedom of speech
was violated, and that the officers used excessive force. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment on the unreasonable search claim, and after a jury verdict, in the officers’ favor on the remaining
claims, and denied the detainee’s motion for a new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the officers did not violate the detainee’s Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in
a holding cell. According to the court, it was objectively reasonable for county jail officers to believe that the pretrial
detainee presented a risk of harm to herself if she was permitted to retain strings on her clothing, and thus the
officers did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights when they forcibly removed her clothing in a holding cell. The
court noted that the detainee refused to respond to medical screening questions, refused to comply with a female
officer’s instruction to change into an orange jumpsuit while male officers were outside the holding cell, and acted
aggressively toward the male officers when they entered. The officers restrained the detainee face down on her
stomach and covered her with a paper suit while the female officer removed her clothing. (Woodbury County Jail,
Iowa)

25.58

2016
U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL SCREENING

Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2016). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a law enforcement
officer, alleging that the officer’s decision to transport him to the jail rather than a hospital denied him emergency
medical care for lacerations to his hand. The district court entered summary judgment in the officer’s favor and the
arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable delay in medical care for an arrestee was not clearly established at the time of the incident; (2) it was
clearly established, under the Due Process Clause, that pretrial detainees or arrestees had the right to be free from
deliberately indifferent denial of emergency medical care; and (3) evidence did not support the finding that the
arrestee had an objectively serious medical need for treatment. (Jefferson County Sheriff’s Department, Missouri)

25.59

25.60

XIX

XIX

granted summary judgment in favor of the officials and the former detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment on the claims for injunctive relief, reversed the grant of summary judgment on the claims
for damages, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the detainee's claim for injunctive relief was
rendered moot by detainee's release from jail. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the detainee was restrained in shackles and chains or confined in a padded unit for
the purpose punishment, or for valid reasons related to legitimate goals. The detainee alleged he was placed in fourpoint restraints, chained to a wall in a “rubber room,” forced to shower in waist chains and shackles, and denied
hearings before being punished. The detainee was 17 years old when he was admitted to the jail. (St. Louis County
Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT
CONDITIONS

J.P. v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793 (S.D.Ohio 2006). A former juvenile corrections facility inmate sued the facility and
individuals, claiming the lack of access to courts to pursue a claim of injury from being assaulted by an officer, and
claims of substandard accommodations. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The
court held that the inmate had standing to bring a claim that the facility interfered with his access to courts by not
making adequate efforts to provide attorneys, and that the inmate stated a claim that the facility interfered with his
right of access to court, by not providing an attorney to pursue a legitimate claim that officers unconstitutionally
restricted his bathroom privileges. The court found that the facility did not display deliberate indifference to the
condition of inmate who was beaten by an officer, noting that while he was not taken to an infirmary, a nurse
monitored his condition. According to the court, the inmate did not state a claim that conditions of confinement
violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when he alleged that showers were cold, worms were coming in
through a drain, and his personal hygiene materials had been lost during a move from one cell to another. The court
found that these problems were insufficiently serious. The court held that the inmate stated claim that conditions of
confinement violated his rights under Eighth Amendment, when he alleged that officers frequently denied inmates the
opportunity to use a rest room, as a disciplinary measure, forcing them to urinate into objects including latex gloves.
(Ohio Department of Youth Services, Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
CREDIT

J.P.C. (JUV) v. U.S., 430 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.S.D. 2006). A juvenile petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking
credit, which the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had refused to award him, for days spent in custody at age 19 prior
to revocation of his probation. The district court held that the juvenile was entitled to credit for time spent in custody
awaiting a dispositional hearing that resulted in revocation of his release and commencement of official detention. The
court noted that no deference was due to the revised Bureau of Prisons policy of no longer granting credit to juveniles
for pretrial or pre-hearing custody, where the change in policy was based on one district court decision from another
jurisdiction, the policy was made without notice to the Judicial Conference, and was not founded on statutes,
comments, or independent setting of policy. The plaintiff was a juvenile when he was placed on probation until age
21. He violated his conditions of probation and was taken into custody at age 19 by order of the court. He was held
in a county jail (with adult offenders) until his dispositional hearing. (South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
ISOLATION
CONDITIONS

R.G. v. Koller, 415 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Hawai’i 2006). Three juveniles who either identified themselves as, or were
perceived to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender and who had been confined at a state juvenile correctional
facility brought claims against the facility alleging due process, equal protection, Establishment Clause, and access to
counsel violations. The district court granted the juveniles’ motion for a preliminary injunction in part, and denied in
part. The court held that the juveniles had standing to seek a preliminary injunction preventing the facility officials
from engaging in unconstitutional conduct and requiring them to implement policies and procedures to ensure their
safety at the facility. Although none of the juveniles were incarcerated at the time the complaint was filed, the court
found that enjoining certain unconstitutional conduct and requiring officials to implement policies and procedures to
remedy those conditions would remedy the juveniles' injury, and, the juveniles showed a likelihood of repetition of
the injury given that each of the juveniles had been incarcerated at the facility two to three times over a relatively
short period of time, each had been released only to return to the facility a short time later, and the juveniles'
experiences indicated that, at the time the complaint was filed, each juvenile was likely to return to the facility. The
court found that the facility's adoption of a youth rights policy providing that youth should not be discriminated
against on the basis of sexual orientation did not render moot the juveniles' claims for injunctive relief from sexual
orientation harassment, absent evidence, aside from the policies themselves, that the facility had altered its treatment
of its lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards. According to the court, the facility's use of isolation to “protect” its
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards was not within the range of acceptable professional practices and
constituted punishment in violation of their due process rights. The court found that such practices were, at best, an
excessive and therefore unconstitutional, response to the legitimate safety needs of the institution. The court held that
officials at the facility acted with deliberate indifference in violation of due process in allowing pervasive verbal,
physical, and sexual abuse to persist against lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender juveniles. The juveniles complained
of a relentless campaign of harassment based on their sexual orientation that included threats of violence, physical and
sexual assault, imposed social isolation, and near constant use of homophobic slurs. (Hawai‘i Youth Corr’l Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006). Former detainees at a county juvenile detention center
brought a § 1983 class action against a county and individual county officials, challenging the center's policy of stripsearching all juveniles admitted to the facility regardless of the seriousness of the charged offense or the existence of
suspicion. The district court entered partial summary judgment for the former detainees, finding that the searches
violated the minors' constitutional rights, and that the officials were not qualifiedly immune from the minors' claims.
The county and officials appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that requiring a juvenile to strip to her undergarments upon admission to the facility was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. A juvenile female had been brought to the center for a curfew violation. A female staff
person took her to a private restroom, directed her to remove her shorts, t-shirt, and sandals, but allowed her to remain
attired in her undergarments. The staff person touched her to look under her arms, between her toes, and through her

26.21
XXII

hair and scalp. The court held that the search was reasonable under Fourth Amendment in light of the state's
responsibility to act in loco parentis with respect to juveniles in lawful state custody, and that the special needs for
such a search outweighed the invasion of personal privacy. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified
immunity where there was no appellate decision from the Supreme Court or any federal circuit ruling on such an
issue, and, although many courts had concluded that the strip search of adult offenders without individualized
suspicion was unreasonable, those cases did not consider interests involved when state had responsibility to act in loco
parentis. (Minnehaha County Juvenile Detention Center, South Dakota)
2007
U.S. District Court
SENTENCE
TRIAL AS ADULT

Curry v. South Carolina, 518 F.Supp.2d 661 (D.S.C. 2007). A former prisoner who obtained post-conviction relief
treating him as juvenile, with the result that his sentence was shortened, brought a § 1983 suit against the state,
various state departments, a county public defenders office, and others. A U.S. magistrate judge recommended that the
court dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The former prisoner filed objections and moved to amend his
complaint. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the Department of
Corrections and the Department of Juvenile Justice were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court found
that the public defender and the private attorney did not act under the color of state law. The court held that the public
defenders office was not a state actor and that the County Solicitor's Office was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. The court also found that Eleventh Amendment immunity extended to the state's Family Court. But the
court ruled that the proposed amendment of the complaint was not futile to the extent that it sought to add a municipal
police department as a defendant. The court noted that the amended complaint alleged that the police department had
improperly treated the criminal defendant as an adult with the result that he was sentenced as an adult without the
benefit of a juvenile waiver hearing. (Charleston County, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE
RELEASE

L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F.Supp.2d 1072 (E.D.Cal. 2007). Juvenile parolees brought a class action against a
parole board, claiming that regulations denied their due process rights to have two hearings prior to a parole
revocation, or alternatively one prompt comprehensive hearing. The parolees moved for summary judgment on the
due process claim, and the claim for injunctive relief. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the requirement that a hearing take place within 60 days following the parolee being taken into
custody violated the parolees' due process rights. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues
as to whether an injunction should be issued mandating that the parole board issue a regulation requiring a hearing
within 10 days of assumption of custody over a juvenile parolee. (California Juvenile Parole System)

U.S. District Court
SUICIDE

Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center, 511 F.Supp.2d 862 (S.D. Ohio 2007). A plaintiff, on behalf of the estate of her
son who committed suicide while incarcerated at juvenile detention facility, brought a wrongful-death action against
the facility, its superintendent, a non-profit provider that performed suicide evaluations at the facility and a social
worker employed by the provider. The plaintiff asserted claims under § 1983 and state law. The facility and non-profit
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that under the state compulsion
test, the private provider that performed suicide evaluations at the juvenile detention facility was not a “state actor” for
§ 1983 purposes. The court noted that the facility did not exert any control over suicide evaluations and the provider
performed evaluations on an as-needed basis using its own standards and procedures. According to the court, the
facility had discretion to implement the provider's recommendations resulting from the evaluations. But the court held
that the private provider was a state actor for § 1983 purposes because it was performing a “public function.” (Central
Ohio Youth Center)
2008

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROGRAMS

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584 F.Supp.2d 1314 (M.D.Ala. 2008). A disabilities advocacy
program brought a suit against the director of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS) seeking access to
residents, facilities, staff and records under federal law. The parties filed a joint motion seeking court approval of a
settlement. The court held that the limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) on prospective relief
concerning conditions had no application because the suit was not concerned with conditions of confinement or
effects of actions by officials on confined juveniles. The court also found that the advocacy group was not subject to
the limitations on prisoner suits under PLRA. The court held that the settlement of the suit was fair, adequate,
reasonable and not illegal or against public policy, and thus warranted the requested court approval. According to the
court, the agreement contained a detailed plan for facilitating access, a process for dispute resolution between the
parties, and a provision for the court's retaining jurisdiction for one year for the limited purpose of enforcing
compliance. (Alabama Department of Youth Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVACY
SUPERVISION

Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2008). Female corrections officers brought a Title VII action
against a county, challenging a staffing policy that reduced the number of shifts available to them at a juvenile
detention center, and alleging other incidents of discrimination as well as retaliation. Following a bench trial, the
district court entered judgment for the county. The officers appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that a sex-based classification, requiring that each unit in the juvenile detention
center be staffed by at least one officer of the same sex as the detainees in the unit, was not reasonably necessary for
the rehabilitation, security, or privacy functions of the facility, with respect to the third shift when only one officer
was present on each unit. According to the court, the classification was therefore not a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ), so as to be exempt from Title VII. The court noted that no staff-on-inmate sexual assaults had
occurred, the county had not investigated alternatives to same-sex staffing, juvenile privacy concerns were not limited
to the third shift, and the effectiveness of role-modeling programs did not require the presence of a same-sex staff
member at all times. (Milwaukee County Juvenile Detention Center, Wisconsin)

26.22
XXII

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Khadr v. Bush, 587 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainee moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment, and the government filed a cross-motion to dismiss or to hold the petition in
abeyance pending completion of military commission proceedings. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The court held that the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not bar a challenge to detention based on
the detainee's capture as a juvenile, but the detainee's challenge to detention based on his capture as a juvenile was
barred by the habeas statute. The court found that a provision of the Military Commissions Act (MCA) barring courts
from having jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States as an
enemy combatant did not apply to the habeas claim brought by a detainee at the United States Naval Base in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba., where the detainee's claim was entirely independent from the prosecution, trial, or judgment
of a military commission. But the court held that the detainee’s petition challenged the conditions of his confinement,
rather than the legality of his detention, and, thus, was barred by a provision of habeas statute barring the courts from
having jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien
detained by the United States as an enemy combatant. The court noted that the detainee's request for relief was not
tantamount to a request for outright release and was more accurately characterized as a request seeking a different
program or location or environment. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)
2009

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Gregg v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 661 F.Supp.2d 842 (S.D.Ohio 2009). The resident of a juvenile correctional
facility brought a § 1983 action against facility officials, seeking damages for injuries he allegedly received at the
hands of corrections officers. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a fact question as to whether
correctional officers used excessive force in subduing the resident when he stepped out of the line to receive his
medication. The court also found a fact question as to whether correctional officers who observed the alleged beating
of the resident by other officers violated the resident's constitutional rights by failing to intervene in the beating. (Ohio
River Valley Juvenile Correctional Facility, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 645 F.Supp.2d 888 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Juvenile parolees brought a class action against various
state officials and agencies seeking to change parole revocation procedures. Following a settlement which included
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs. The court granted the motion in part. The court held
that a five percent reduction of the lodestar amount (number of hours the prevailing party reasonably spent on the
litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) was appropriate, resulting in an attorney fee award of $4,421,173.
The court held that the parolees could recover attorney fees related to their unsuccessful motions to amend the
complaint, and for time billed for communications among parolees' counsel. According to the court, the hours billed
by the parolees' attorneys for motion practice and drafting of complaint were reasonable, but that time billed by the
parolees' attorneys related to press about the case was not reasonable. (California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
PRIVACY
SEARCH

Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir. 2009). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a police chief
and city, alleging the chief's photographing of her tattoo violated her rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the chief's photographing of the arrestee's tattoo was not an unreasonable search and did not violate due process,
and the photographing of the arrestee's tattoo did not amount to a strip search under Missouri strip search law. The
court found that the action of photographing the tattoo did not violate the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that the
arrestee was required to unzip her pants for the photograph and that the photograph was taken by male officer. The
court concluded that the photograph served legitimate law enforcement purposes, the chief told the arrestee that
photograph was needed for identification purposes, and the photograph was taken in private. The court noted that the
arrestee gave a false date of birth and social security number. She was arrested for making a false declaration and for
being a minor in possession of alcohol. (City of Bella Villa, Missouri)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
PROGRAMS
MEDICAL CARE

Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2010). A juvenile who had been adjudicated as
delinquent brought an action against a residential maximum security center and several staff members for a spinal
cord injury that occurred during a “pick-up” football game at the center. The district court granted summary judgment
for the center and its staff. The juvenile appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district
court did not err in granting Eleventh Amendment immunity to the youth development center, which was a detention
facility for juveniles run by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), where the DPW was an
administrative agency without existence apart from the Commonwealth. The court found that there was not a
sufficient likelihood that serious harm would result from juveniles playing tackle football without protective
equipment, as required for the juvenile to establish that the center and its officials violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. (New Castle Youth Development Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
SENTENCE

Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (M.D.Pa. 2010). A juvenile and his parents brought an action against juvenile
court judges, a private attorney, juvenile probation staff, the owner of construction company, property owners, and
others. They alleged that, in connection with a scheme to divert juvenile offenders to newly constructed privatelyowned juvenile detention facilities in return for kickbacks, the defendants violated the juvenile's constitutional rights.
The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants engaged in a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) conspiracy, and alleged false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the
judge was not entitled to immunity for his alleged non-judicial conduct and was not entitled to legislative immunity
for budgetary actions he took in his role as president judge. The court held that the juvenile lacked standing to assert a
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against the defendants because the juvenile

XXIII

26.23

asserted that he suffered great emotional distress and loss of earning capacity based on the education that he missed
while in custodial detention, which did not demonstrate any concrete monetary loss. (Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F.Supp.2d 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A former juvenile inmate at the Office of Child and Family
Services (OCFS) brought a § 1983 action against OCFS employees, alleging use of excessive force and failure to
intervene. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) the events leading up to the use of a
physical restraint technique (PRT) on the juvenile inmate by OCFS employees; (2) the need for a second employee to
assist the first employee with the PRT; and (3) the cause of the arm fracture the inmate sustained during the incident.
(Highland Office of Child and Family Services, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEARCH

Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Ore. 2010). A class action was brought on behalf of juvenile
detainees against a county and officials, challenging strip-search procedures at a juvenile detention facility. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the scope of an admission strip-search policy applied
to juvenile detainees was excessive in relation to the government's legitimate interests, in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment. According to the court, notwithstanding the county's general obligation to care for and protect juveniles,
the searches were highly intrusive, the county made no effort to mitigate the scope and intensity of the searches, and
less intrusive alternatives existed. The court found that county officials failed to establish a reasonable relationship
between their legitimate interests and post-contact visit strip-searches performed on juvenile detainees, as required
under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the searches occurred irrespective of whether there was an
individualized suspicion that a juvenile had acquired contraband, and most contact visits occurred between juveniles
and counsel or therapists. (Yamhill County Juvenile Detention Center, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE

Molina v. New York, 697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A juvenile detainee brought an action against a state, its
Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) that operated a youth correctional facility, state and facility officials,
and detention aides, asserting § 1983 claims and claims of negligence and assault and battery. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
juvenile detainee's allegations that detention aides at the youth correctional facility broke his arm while restraining
him were sufficient to support a plausible Eighth Amendment claim that the aides used excessive force. The court
held that the detainee's allegations that he had to wait approximately 15 hours before being diagnosed and scheduled
for surgery despite the obviousness of his injuries and his own pleading for assistance, were sufficient to state an
Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. (Louis Gossett Jr. Residential
Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE

Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2010). Parents of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide
while in custody brought a state-court action against various jail personnel, their supervisors, and their county
employer, asserting claims under state tort law, § 1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the parents appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that there was no evidence that a prison nurse knew the pretrial
detainee who subsequently committed suicide was in substantial danger of killing himself, as required to demonstrate
the prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to such risk in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. According to the
court, although the nurse was aware that the detainee had previously attempted to take his own life, suffered from
depression, and was at some risk of making another attempt, at the time detainee killed himself, over a month had
elapsed since his suicide attempt, during which time the detainee received counseling, took antidepressants, and by all
accounts, was doing better. The court found that prison nurses were not deliberately indifferent, under the Fourteenth
Amendment, to the detainee who committed suicide, because they failed to ensure that the detainee had daily
evaluations pursuant to the suicide prevention policy, absent evidence that they knew detainee was in a suicidal crisis.
According to the court, the prison nurses' failure to retrieve the used gauze the pretrial detainee used to hang himself
did not constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, absent evidence that the prison
nurses were aware the pretrial detainee had accumulated the gauze. The court found that the teenage pretrial detainee
waved the prison nurse away on the morning of the day he committed suicide, when the nurse tried to speak with him,
because he was absorbed in watching television, did not show that the prison nurse was subjectively aware of the
detainee's risk of suicide, so as to support a deliberate indifference claim against the prison nurse under the Fourteenth
Amendment. (Navajo County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
SUICIDE

Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill. 2010). The estate of a 17-year-old pretrial detainee who
committed suicide while in custody at a county jail brought an action against the county, county sheriff, and
corrections officers, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the fact that the pretrial detainee, who committed suicide while in custody at a
county jail, did not need a mental health professional when he was booked at the jail after being arrested on charges of
illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor and possession of drug paraphernalia, was not dispositive of whether the
detainee presented a serious need when he was booked at the jail approximately two weeks later after being arrested
on charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The court held that information received by booking officers
after pretrial detainee's suicide, including information that the detainee had been kicked out of his father's house, that
the detainee was living in a tent, that the detainee and his girlfriend had a suicide pact, and that the detainee had
commented to other inmates that if he was going to prison he would “shoot himself,” was irrelevant to establishing
what was in the officers' minds at time they were alleged to have been deliberately indifferent to the risk that the
detainee would commit suicide. According to the court, the corrections officers lacked actual knowledge of a
significant likelihood that the detainee would imminently seek to take his own life, or even of facts that would
promote the inference of a subjective awareness of such a substantial risk, and thus the officers did not act with
deliberate indifference to that risk in violation of due process, despite any alleged negligence in assessing and
observing the detainee prior to his suicide.

XXIII

26.24

The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county
sheriff's policy that correctional officers not personally observe prisoners during the overnight shift was
constitutionally inadequate. From 10 PM to 6:30 AM, detainees are locked in their cells. During the overnight period
from 11 PM on June 8, 2007, to 5 AM on June 9, 2007, Officer Keefer did eleven cell checks on Cellblock 2. While
standing in the guard walkway, officers are able to look into two of the four cells and observe detainees in those cells,
but officers are unable to see the detainees in the other two cells in the cellblock. During her checks, Officer Keefer
personally observed the detainees in two of the cells in Cellblock 2 because she could see them from the guard
walkway, but did not observe Wells in his cell because she was unable to see into his cell from the guard walkway. At
6:45 AM, when another officer let the detainees in Cellblock 2 out of their cells for breakfast, he discovered Wells
hanging in his cell. (Bureau County Jail, Illinois)
2011
U.S. District Court
IDEA- Individuals with
Disabilities Education
Act
PROGRAMS

Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought a pro se suit against a state, state
agencies, a city, city agencies, and state and city officials, and corrections officers, claiming that he was dyslexic and
that the defendants failed to accommodate his disability in the public school system and in education programs
offered in juvenile detention facilities and adult correctional facilities, as well as in prison disciplinary proceedings.
The court dismissed some claims and denied dismissal for other claims. The court held that the inmate's Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims accrued for limitations purposes no later than the year in which he
reached the age of 21, where under New York law, a child was no longer entitled to the protections and benefits of the
IDEA after the age of 21 and did not have a right to demand a public education beyond that age.
The court found that the inmate adequately alleged the personal involvement of the Commissioner of the New
York Department of Correction in an alleged ongoing violation of the inmate's constitutional rights, stating a § 1983
claim against the Commissioner. The inmate alleged that: (1) he repeatedly gave the Commissioner complete details
of the failures of a correctional facility to accommodate the his disability; (2) the Commissioner had “full knowledge”
of the refusal to accommodate from both grievances and disciplinary appeals; (3) the Commissioner had upheld every
decision denying accommodation; and (4) the Commissioner failed to take action to remedy the ongoing violation.
The court held that the inmate stated ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for compensatory damages against state
and correctional officials in their official capacities when he alleged that at least some of the accommodations he
sought at a correctional facility would allow him to overcome obstacles to his meaningful participation in existing
programs and existing educational services, without fundamentally altering the programs. The court noted that New
York's continued acceptance of federal funds after 2001 waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the inmate's
Rehabilitation Act claims arising after that date, where the state's continued acceptance of federal funds was a
knowing relinquishment of its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court ruled that the inmate's allegations suggested
a discriminatory animus against him because of his alleged disability, dyslexia, and thus, Eleventh Amendment
immunity did not apply to shield the state, state agencies and state employees from the inmate's ADA claims. (New
York City Dept.of Correction- Rikers Island, State of New York Department of Correctional Services Elmira
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
USE OF FORCE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2011.) A pre-trial detainee at an adolescent jail brought an
action against a city, city officials, and corrections officers, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law arising from
an incident in which an officer allegedly punched him in the face. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee failed to state excessive force claims
against supervisory officials and a § 1983 claim against the city. The court found that correctional officers and
supervisors did not have immunity under New York law from state law claims and the city did not have immunity
under New York law from state law claims brought on the respondeat superior basis. The court held that the
determination of whether the pretrial detainee's claim against the city for its negligent hiring, training, and retention of
officers and supervisors allegedly involved in the detainee's beating could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss
phase because of factual issues as to whether the actions of these officers and supervisors were undertaken in the
scope of their employment. (Robert N. Davoren Center, Rikers Island, New York City)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
ISOLATION
PROGRAMS

Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011.) Two juvenile delinquents brought a § 1983 action against
mental health providers and the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), alleging that the actions of the
defendants while the delinquents were in custody violated the Fourteenth Amendment and New Jersey law. One of the
plaintiffs was 15 years old when he was adjudicated as delinquent and remained in custody for a total of 225 days. For
approximately 178 of those days, the delinquent was held in isolation under a special observation status requiring
close or constant watch, purportedly for his own safety. Although the delinquents were placed in isolation for
different reasons, the conditions they experienced were similar. Each was confined to a seven-foot-by-seven-foot
room and allowed out only for hygiene purposes. The rooms contained only a concrete bed slab, a toilet, a sink, and a
mattress pad. One delinquent was allegedly held in extreme cold, and the other was allegedly isolated for four days in
extreme heat. Both were denied any educational materials or programming, and were prevented from interacting with
their peers. One delinquent’s mattress pad was often removed, a light remained on for 24 hours a day, and he was
often required to wear a bulky, sleeveless smock. Both delinquents were allegedly denied mental health treatment
during their periods in isolation.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
there was no evidence that a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities
was educated about filing a form with a social worker as the procedure for filing an administrative grievance, as
required for the procedure to be available to the delinquent to exhaust his § 1983 claims against JJC and mental health
providers. The court also found that there was no evidence the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC)
provided written notice to the juvenile delinquent housed at JJC facilities of the opportunity to appeal their
disciplinary sanctions, which would have triggered the requirement that he appeal each sanction within 48 hours of
notice, as required to exhaust administrative remedies.

26.25

The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the New
Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health providers were deliberately indifferent towards
conditions of confinement, in protecting and in providing medical care for the juvenile delinquent housed in JJC
facilities; (2) whether placing the juvenile delinquent housed in temporary close custody and special observation
status implicated a liberty interest; (3) whether a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey Juvenile Justice
Commission (JJC) facilities had procedural due process protections available to him upon a change of status; (4)
whether the juvenile delinquent had a liberty interest implicated in his transfer to a more restrictive placement; (5)
whether the juvenile delinquent had sufficient procedural due process protections available to him upon transfer to a
more restrictive placement; and (6) whether the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health
providers acted with malice or reckless indifference. (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission, Juvenile Medium
Security Facility, New Jersey Training School, Juvenile Reception and Assessment Center)
2012
U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE

Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district
court denied the petition, and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that a state court's
determination that the juvenile petitioner's 89–year sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment was reasonable,
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and thus did not warrant federal
habeas relief, despite the juvenile's contention that his consecutive, fixed-term sentences amounted to the practical
equivalent of life without parole. (Ohio)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
STATE LIABILITY

Hampton v. Sabie, 891 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Ill. 2012). A former inmate at a juvenile correctional facility brought a §
1983 action against a correctional officer and the facility superintendent, alleging that the officer sexually assaulted
him and that the superintendent was deliberately indifferent to the inmate's constitutional rights by failing to protect
him from the assault. The superintendent moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the inmate's § 1983 claim was governed by the state's general two-year limitations period for personal injury claims,
rather than the state's six-year statute applicable to sexual assaults against a child. (Illinois Youth Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SUICIDE
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL CARE

Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). The mother of a minor who hanged himself while incarcerated at a
state youth detention facility, on her own behalf and as the minor's representative, brought a § 1983 action against
state officials, alleging deliberate indifference to the minor's serious mental illness. The 16-year-old youth had a
history of mental illness and was known to have attempted suicide at least three times. The district court granted
summary judgment for the officials. The mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that,
even assuming that state supervisory officials' decision to use metal bunk beds in rooms of a youth detention facility
that were occupied by residents who were mentally disturbed but did not appear to be imminently suicidal, amounted
to deliberate indifference to the residents' serious medical needs, the law was not then so clearly established as to
defeat the officials' defense of qualified immunity to the due process claim. (Illinois Youth Center, IYC Kewanee,
Illinois)

U.S. Supreme Court
SENTENCE

Miller v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). Following transfer from a state juvenile court to a state circuit court, a
defendant was convicted of capital murder, for an offense he committed when he was 14 years old. The defendant
appealed his conviction and the resulting sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The state appeals
court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court combined this case with another similar case. The court reversed and
remanded, finding that that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of
their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. (Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
SENTENCE

U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). Three juvenile defendants, each of whom was a member of an
Indian tribe and who pleaded true to a charge of aggravated sexual abuse with children in the district court, appealed
their conditions of probation or supervision requiring registration under the Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA). The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the SORNA registration requirement as
applied to certain juvenile delinquents in cases of aggravated sexual abuse superseded the conflicting confidentiality
provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA), and that the SORNA registration requirement did not
violate the juveniles' constitutional rights. (Fort Peck Tribes, Montana)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
USE OF FORCE
MEDICAL CARE
SUICIDE ATTEMPT
DUE PROCESS

Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). A former juvenile pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against various members of a juvenile detention center's staff, alleging they violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights
guaranteed to him as a pretrial detainee. The district court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The court
held that the eleven-year-old pretrial detainee's right to be free from punishment altogether was clearly established at
the time the staff allegedly used a chair bearing wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints to punish detainee, for the
purposes of the juvenile detention center's staff's qualified immunity defense. According to the court, the senior
correctional officer approved a decision by one of his subordinates, a fully grown man, to sit on the chest of the
eleven-year-old without any penological purpose. The court found that the detainee’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights were violated when employees allegedly failed to provide the eleven-year-old detainee with any
meaningful mental health care despite his obvious need for it. The court noted that prison officials who assumed a
“gate keeping” authority over the prisoner’s access to medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to the
detainee's medical needs when they denied or delayed access to medical care. But the court also held that the
detainee's alleged right to be placed in a particular facility of his choice while awaiting trial was not clearly
established at the time the director failed to transfer detainee to a nearby shelter. The court stated: “Weeks before
eleven-year-old, 4'11," 96–pound Brandon Blackmon arrived at the juvenile detention center in Sedgwick, Kansas,

26.26

officials there made a new purchase: the Pro–Straint Restraining Chair, Violent Prisoner Chair Model RC–1200LX.
The chair bore wrist, waist, chest, and ankle restraints. In the months that followed, the staff made liberal use of their
new acquisition on the center's youngest and smallest charge. Sometimes in a legitimate effort to thwart his attempts
at suicide and self-harm. But sometimes, it seems, only to punish him. And that's the nub of this lawsuit.” (Juvenile
Residential Facility, Sedgwick County, Kansas)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT

E.A.F.F. v. U.S., 955 F.Supp.2d 707 (W.D.Tex. 2013). Unaccompanied alien minors brought an action against Office
of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) officials, alleging they were physically and sexually abused while they were in
detention awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status. The officials moved for partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the motions. The court noted that a person detained for deportation is equivalent to a pretrial
detainee, and a pretrial detainee's constitutional claims are considered under the Due Process Clause. The court held
that the officials could not be held liable for due process violations that occurred when the unaccompanied alien
minors were physically and sexually abused as a result of alleged overcrowding at a detention facility, where they
were being held while awaiting final adjudication of their immigration status, and where there was no evidence that
the officials were responsible for decisions regarding the facility's capacity.
According to the court, isolated incidents of physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention facility
were insufficient to put the officials on notice of a substantial risk of future abuse, as required to hold the officials
liable for deliberate indifference in failing to protect the minors' safety in violation of their due process rights. The
court noted that other incidents of alleged abuse were investigated by the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services and did not result in any abuse findings. The court found that officials' failure to systematically interview
minors concerning their abuse allegations did not amount to deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of their
due process rights, where officials spoke to some of the minors during their monitoring visits, and clinicians were onsite and available to speak with the minors on a regular basis. The court held that the officials could not be held liable
in their supervisory capacities on a theory of failure to train or supervise, for due process violations arising from
alleged physical and sexual abuse by staff members at the detention facility, where staff members received training in
behavior management and de-escalation techniques, officials responded to reports of abuse by recommending or
providing further training, officials adopted safety policies designed to prevent abuse, and officials recommended that
staff members work in pairs and they were unaware that staff members were working individually. (Nixon facility
Operated by Away From Home, Inc., Texas)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C. 2013). A juvenile detainee's mother filed a § 1983 action
against the District of Columbia for violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, after the detainee was attacked and killed by other detainees. After the district court ruled in the District's
favor, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the District moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that officials at the juvenile detention facility were not deliberately
indifferent to a known safety risk, and thus their failure to protect the detainee from an attack by another detainee did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, there was no evidence of a history of assaults on youth at
the facility, such that any facility employee knew or should have known that a fight between the detainee and another
youth was going to take place, or that the youth who fought with the detainee had a history of assaultive behavior
while at the facility. The court also found no evidence that a municipal custom, policy, or practice caused any such
violation. The court also held that the mother’s failure to designate an expert witness barred her claim. (Oak Hill
Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
ISOLATION
MEDICAL CARE

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while housed at
a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare provider which
contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees of the provider,
individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1)
the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services to an inmate was non-delegable; (2)
intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county defendants of liability for alleged negligence;
(3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the county was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's
rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but (6) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to an Eighth
Amendment medical claim against the employees.
According to the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health services
to the 17-year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was non-delegable, and thus
the county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged medical malpractice of the
healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health services at the jail. The
court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the county or sheriff to delegate their
duties and obligations they owned to the inmate.
The court found that the intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly diagnose
and treat the inmate's medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an injection of a
psychotropic medication, were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county sheriff of liability for their
failure to protect the inmate. The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's policy or custom of
placing inmates in protective custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of the inmate, who died while on protective custody status. According to the court, there was no evidence that
the county had actual notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of the county jail officials' use of
isolation, or an administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing unit at the county jail, or that any
omissions in the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in which the inmate, died from a purported
cardiac event.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate's prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and failed

26.27

to timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate was suffering
from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so, whether they were
deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare Management, Inc.,
Arizona)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
SENTENCE

In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013). A prisoner serving a life sentence without parole, based on conduct
committed while he was a juvenile, filed an application for leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence. The appeals court denied the motion. The appeals court held that although a decision of
the Supreme Court established a new rule of constitutional law, in that it determined for the first time in Miller that
the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for
juvenile offenders, the rule was not made retroactive to cases on collateral review, as would warrant granting leave to
the prisoner to file a second or successive motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. (Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE

In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2013). Prisoners who were convicted as juveniles applied for leave to file
second or successive habeas petitions based on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. The appeals court granted the applications. The court
held that prisoners made a prima facie showing that the new constitutional rule regarding imposition of life sentences
on juvenile offenders was retroactive. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE
IMPRISONMENT
UNLAWFUL
DETENTION

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 953 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.D.C. 2013). A jury ruled in favor of an apartment resident in
her and an arrestee's action against a police officer for false arrest and imprisonment and Fourth Amendment
violations stemming from a search of the residence she shared with the arrestee. The officer moved for judgment as a
matter of law (JMOL). The court held that the officer violated the resident's Fourth Amendment rights by detaining
and handcuffing her for two hours while executing a weapons search of the apartment. According to the court, the
evidence was sufficient to support the conclusion that the police officer lacked sufficient safety or efficacy concerns to
justify under the Fourth Amendment detaining and handcuffing the resident's hands behind her back for two hours.
The court noted that the officer did not assert that the arrestee was a gang member or express any concern that an
armed cohort of the arrestee might be present, the arrestee was in jail at the time of the search, and the resident was at
home alone and in underwear when the police arrived. (District of Columbia)
2014

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 39 F.Supp.3d 635 (E.D.Pa. 2014). The parents of a juvenile, who was arrested and charged
with summary offenses and committed to a youth detention facility after he threatened several girls in his
neighborhood, brought an action on his behalf against state troopers, a county, and county officials, asserting claims
under § 1983 and state law. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) county officials did not have the right to conduct blanket strip searches
of juveniles upon admission to detention facility; (2) detention facility officials who strip searched the juvenile were
not entitled to summary judgment on the unreasonable search claims; (3) county officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity from the unreasonable search claims; and (4) the county was not entitled to summary judgment on the
unreasonable search claims. The court found that summary judgment of the Fourth Amendment claims were
precluded by fact issues as to whether the county and the facility's director had a policy, practice, or custom of
conducting blanket strip searches and acted with deliberate indifference to the rights of the juveniles being detained at
the facility. (Lancaster County Youth Detention Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Poore v. Glanz, 46 F.Supp.3d 1191 (N.D.Okla. 2014). A juvenile female held as an inmate in the medical unit of a
county jail brought an action against the county and the county sheriff in his individual capacity under § 1983 alleging
deliberate indifference to her health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, based on an alleged failure to prevent a detention officer's repeated sexual assaults. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine disputes of material fact as to whether the county sheriff was aware of the risk of sexual assault
by detention officers as to female inmates housed in the medical unit of the county jail, and whether he failed to take
steps to alleviate that risk. The court also found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the county jail had a
policy and practice of housing juvenile female inmates in a wing of the medical unit which was not under direct
supervision and was frequently single-staffed, such that it placed those inmates at a substantial risk of sexual assault
by jail staff. (Tulsa County Jail, also called the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST

S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 771 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 2014). A juvenile, by and through his guardian,
filed a § 1983 action against a township, its police chief, a police officer, the superintendent of a juvenile detention
center, and the center's intake officer, alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and loss of
filial consortium. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, and on remand the district court entered summary judgment in favor of the
superintendent and the intake officer, and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
intake officer at the juvenile detention center had no duty to make an independent assessment of probable cause for
the juvenile detainee's arrest and detention, and thus did not violate the detainee's Fourth Amendment rights by
signing a complaint prepared by the arresting officer that charged the detainee as a delinquent child. (Clermont
County Juvenile Detention Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCHES

T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). Parents, on behalf of their minor children, brought a § 1983 action against
the superintendent of a juvenile detention center, correctional officers, and other administrators, claiming that the
suspicionless strip search of the juveniles, as part of the intake process of the detention center, violated the juveniles'
Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the parents. The defendants appealed.

26.28

The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the right of juvenile detainees
held on minor offenses to be free from suspicionless strip searches was not clearly established at time the two
juveniles arrested for underage drinking were strip searched, and thus, correctional officers who conducted searches
were protected by qualified immunity from liability in the § 1983 action arising from the searches. The court noted
that prior court decisions had recognized that a strip search of a person arrested for a minor offense was unreasonable,
given that subsequent court decisions had found that state's enhanced responsibility for juveniles supported strip
searches, and a recent Supreme Court decision had concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit strip search
of all adult criminal detainees. The court found that under Kentucky law, the correctional officers' strip searches of the
two juveniles, as part of the intake process of a juvenile detention center, were ministerial acts, and thus, the officers
were not eligible for qualified official immunity from liability on the juveniles' claims of negligence, invasion of
privacy, assault, false imprisonment, grossly negligent infliction of emotional distress, and arbitrary action in violation
of state constitution, even if officers were both acting in good faith and within scope of their employment. (Breathitt
Regional Juvenile Detention Center, Kentucky)
2015
U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center brought a
class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated their constitutional
rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the detention center as part of a
settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225 direct-care employees and require them
to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees intervened to oppose the administrator’s plan, arguing
that the proposal violated Illinois employment law by overriding the collective bargaining and arbitration statutes. The
district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The union appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The appeals court held that the district court’s approval of the administrator’s plan was not a simple
enforcement of the order appointing the administrator, and thus the district court was required pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that the relief requested by the administrator was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of a federal right, and was the least intrusive means. (Cook
County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
USE OF FORCE
CONDITIONS
SUICIDE

Hughes v. Judd, 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015). Several juveniles, as representatives of other juveniles
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action asserting that the sheriff of a Florida county and the health care provider
retained by the sheriff violated the juveniles’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment during the juveniles’ detention
at the county jail. The district court held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that either the sheriff or the health care
provider was deliberately indifferent to any substantial risk of serious harm during the juveniles’ detention, or that
their policies or customs effected any other constitutional violation. According to the court, at most, the juveniles
showed only that two persons, each of whom was qualified to testify as an expert, disfavored some of the sheriff’s
past or present managerial policies and practices and advocated the adoption of others they felt were superior for one
reason or another.
The court found that the juvenile detainees’ challenges to particular conditions of confinement at the jail were
mooted by changes, which included elimination of a “holding cage,” elimination of the holding area for even
temporary suicide watches, installation of cameras in each sleeping cell with monitors posted above each dorm,
updating of the physical facility, relocation of the classrooms, a 48-hour review for juveniles in isolation, and
installation of a radio frequency identification (RFID) system. The court found that the use of pepper spray against the
juvenile detainees at the county jail did not violate the Eighth Amendment, where pepper spray was effective for
quickly stopping a fight without inflicting injury, nearly every use of pepper spray at that jail was to stop a fight, and
there was no evidence that the pepper spray had lasting, negative effect. (Polk County Central County Jail, Florida,
and Corizon Health, Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEARCH

J. B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015). Parents of a juvenile, who was arrested and charged
with summary offenses and committed to a youth detention facility after he threatened several girls in his
neighborhood, brought an action on his behalf against state troopers, a county, and county officials, asserting claims
under § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search, false imprisonment, and violations of due process. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, in part, and denied summary judgment on the
unreasonable search claim. The officials appealed, challenging the denial of summary judgment as to the unreasonable
search claim. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that held that the strip searches conducted by
the juvenile detention center as a standard part of the intake process for juvenile detainees before their admission to
general population were reasonable. The searches required detainees to remove all clothing for close visual inspection,
but did not involve any touching by an inspecting officer. According to the court, although the searches were intrusive
and juvenile detainees had an enhanced right to privacy, the detainees’ privacy interests were outweighed by the
center’s penological interests in addressing the risk of introducing contagious infections and diseases into the general
population, detecting contraband, and identifying potential gang members. The court found that the searches promoted
the center’s responsibility to screen juvenile detainees for signs of abuse in their home and self-mutilation. (Lancaster
County Juvenile Probation, Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE

Thompson v. Roy, 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015). A juvenile who was convicted of first degree premeditated murder
and first degree murder while committing a robbery, was sentenced to two consecutive sentences of mandatory life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which the
district court denied. The juvenile appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that while imposition of a
sentence of mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a juvenile homicide offender violated the
Eighth Amendment, it did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. (Minnesota)

26.29

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SEPARATION
PROGRAMS

Turner v. Palmer, 84 F.Supp.3d 880 (S.D.Iowa 2015). A 16-year-old who had been adjudicated delinquent and who
had prior psychiatric hospitalizations, brought an action against the operators of a state-run juvenile home under §
1983 for violations of her due process rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, based on the
alleged systematic and excessive use of cement-walled isolation cells. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion, finding that the juvenile stated a claim for due process violations and alleged a continuing
violation. The facility had several small cement isolation cells, labeled Quiet Rooms, Safety Rooms, Comfort Rooms,
and the Special Unit. The prisoner alleged that she spent numerous consecutive weeks locked in isolation cells,
spending 289 out of the 528 days she was at the facility in isolation. She claimed she was only given one thin mat to
sleep on, was only permitted to exit the cell to use the restroom; and during many of these stays, she was not allowed
any homework, classroom instruction, reading material, or outside communication. (Iowa Juvenile Home, Toledo,
Iowa)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
SENTENCE

U.S. v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2016). After a juvenile’s life sentence for homicide was affirmed under the
then-mandatory federal Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the sentence, seeking
resentencing in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama. The district court resentenced the
defendant to 600 months in prison, varying downward from advisory Guidelines’ range of life in prison. The
defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that his sentence did not fall within the categorical ban in
Miller on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders. The court found that the 600–month
sentence was not substantively unreasonable, and that the sentencing disparity compared to another juvenile was
based on legitimate distinctions. (Minnesota)

26.30