DETENTION AND
CORRECTIONS
CASELAW CATALOG

26th Edition
2015-2016

Volume One: Sections 1-7
Rod C. Miller
Donald J. Walter
Research and Review:
Joseph Heltzel
Chris Dickey
Richard Drennon
Kyle McCarty

CRS, Inc.

A Non-Profit Organization
925 Johnson Drive
Gettysburg, PA 17325
(717) 338-9100
Fax (717) 718-6178
www.correction.org
rod@correction.org
Copyright 2017

Table of Contents
DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS CASELAW CATALOG
VOLUME 1
How to Use the Catalog
Index and Topic Finder
Table of Cases
1. Access to Courts
2. Administration

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Administrative Segregation
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Fees
Bail
Civil Rights

VOLUME 2
8. Classification and Separation
9. Conditions of Confinement
10. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
11. Discipline

12. Exercise and Recreation
13. Ex-Offenders
14. Failure to Protect

VOLUME 3
15. Facilities
16. False Imprisonment/Arrest
17. Female Prisoners
18. Food
19. Free Speech, Expression, Assoc.
20. Good Time

21. Grievance Procedures, Prisoner
22. Habeas Corpus
23. Hygiene-Prisoner Personal
24. Immunity
25. Intake and Admissions
26. Juveniles

VOLUME 4
27. Liability
28. Mail
29. Medical Care

30. Mental Problems (Prisoner)
31. Personnel

VOLUME 5
32. Pretrial Detention
33. Privacy
34. Programs-Prisoner
35. Property-Prisoner Personal

36. Release
37. Religion
38. Rules & Regulations-Prisoner

VOLUME 6
39. Safety and Security
40. Sanitation
41. Searches
42. Services-Prisoner
43. Sentence
44. Standards

45. Supervision
46. Training
47. Transfers
48. Use of Force
49. Visiting
50. Work- Prisoner

CRS, Inc.
925 Johnson Drive, Gettysburg, PA 17325 (717) 338-9100
www.correction.org Fax (717) 718-6178 rod@correction.org
All Rights Reserved

Index and Topic Finder
I. Index
Major section headings are shown in bold print and are underlined. Numbers after entry identify
the section(s) in which the word or phrase can be found.
-Prisoner...14
-Prisoner on Staff...14
Assembly...19
Assessment of Costs...Section 4, 32
Assignment...3, 31, 45, 50
Assignment, staff...3, 45
Assistance...11
Assistance, Legal...1, 9
Association... 19, 31
Association, Expression and Free Speech...Sec.19
ATCA- Alien Tort Claim Act...27
Attendance, court...1
Attorney...31, 49
Attorney-Client Area...15
Attorney-Client Communications...33
Attorney Fees...Section 5
Attorney Fees...1, 4, 5
Attorney Mail...28
Attorney Scheduling...49
Attorney Search...41, 49
Attorney Visits...32
Audio Communication…15, 39, 45
Automobile...33, 41

Abortion...17, 29
Absolute Immunity...24
Access to Attorneys...1, 38, 39, 47
Access to Counsel...1
Access to Courts...Section 1, 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 22,
26, 32, 38, 47
Access to Religion...38
Accounts, Prisoner...2
Accreditation...44
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)...7,
8, 14, 22, 29, 33, 37, 38, 49
ADA-Amer. with Disabilities Act...7, 9, 11, 15, 25,
29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 49, 50
ADEA-Age Discrimination in Employment Act…
31
Adequacy of Care...29
Administration...Section 2
Administrative Segregation... Section 3, 34
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)… 2, 4
Admission Procedures...37
Admission, Intake &...Section 25
AEDPA, Antiterror. & Effect. Death Penalty Act..1,
22
Age Discrimination...31
AIDS - Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome...7,
8, 14, 22, 29, 33, 37, 38, 49
Alcohol/Drugs...29, 34
Alien...6, 7, 9, 22, 27, 32, 36
Alien Tort Claim Act (ATCA) ...27
Alternative to Confinement...36
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)… 7, 9, 11,
15, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 49, 50
Antiquated Facility...15
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)...1, 22
APA -Administrative Procedures Act … 2, 4
Appeal...11
Appearance...37
Appointed Attorney...1
Arrest and Detention...16
Art...34
Articles...37
Artificial Insemination...22, 38
Asbestos...9, 15
Assault--Officer on prisoner...14

Back Pay...31
"Bad" Time... 11
Bail...Section 6, 22, 32, 36
Bail Fund...6
Bail Reform Act (BRA)...6, 32
Banishment...43
Beards...37, 38
Bedding...9, 10, 23, 25, 40
Beds...9, 15
Benefits… 31, 50
BFOQ- Bona Fide Occupational Qualification...31
Binding….. 1
Bivens Claims...24, 27
Blood Tests...33, 37, 41
Body Cavity Search...41
Body Searches...41
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)...31
Bond...6
Books...19, 38, 39
BRA- Bail Reform Act… 6, 32
Breast Feeding...17
Brutality...7, 14, 48

XXVI

i

Compassionate Release...36
Compensation...50
Compensatory Damages...27
Computers… 1
Conditions...2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 17, 26, 32
Conditions of Confinement... Section 9, 9, 10, 22
Conditions of Segregation...11
Conditional Release...36
Confidential Information...33, 37
Confinement...30
Confinement, Conditions of... Section 9, 9, 10, 22
Confiscation...28, 35
Conjugal Visit...49
Consecutive Sentences...43
Consent Decree...5, 15, 27, 50
Consent Decree- Modification...27
Consent Decree- Termination...27
Conspiracy...7
Contact Visits...32, 39, 49
Contagious Diseases...3, 29
Contempt...27
Contraband...39, 41
Contract... 31
Contract Services...2, 27, 29
Contractors... 31
Conversation...19
Copayment... 4
Corporal Punishment...11
Correspondence...7, 8, 11, 19,
28, 37, 38
-Court...28
-Friends, Relatives...28
-Withholding...28
Cost of Confinement...4, 13
Costs...29, 37
Costs, Assessment of...Section 4, 32
Counsel...11
Counseling...34, 37
Court,
-Access to...Section 1, 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 22, 26, 32,
38, 47
-Appearance...6
-Costs...1, 4, 14
-Monitor...27
-Order...15
-Transfer...47
Covenant- Not-To-Sue...27
Crafts… 34
Credit...36, 43
Credit For Time Served...22
Credit, Reduction...43
Criminal Charges...11
CRIPA-Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act...7, 9, 32
Crisis Intervention...34

Budget... 2
Bulk Mail...28
Bunk, Lower...7, 8
Capacity...9, 15
Capital Punishment...10, 43
Care, Adequacy of...29
Cassette Tapes...19
Cell Assignment...8
Cell Capacity...9, 15, 32, 39
Cell Extraction...48
Cell Checks...45
Cell Searches...32, 41
Cell Size...15
Cells...9, 10, 15, 29, 32, 40
Censorship...19, 28
Chain Gang...50
Challenges...9
Change of Conditions...9
Chapel...15
Chaplain...37
Chemicals, Exposure...39, 50
Chemical Agents...48
Children...17, 29, 49
Civil Commitment...7, 8, 9, 16, 22, 32, 36
Civil Liability...27
Civil Rights...Section 7
Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act (CRIPA)...7, 9, 32
Civil Rights Remedies Equal. Act (CRREA)…1
Civil Suit...1
Claims...13
Class Action...27
Classification & Separation... Section 8, .7, 9, 17,
25, 26, 32, 37, 39
Classification Criteria...8
Cleaning Supplies...39
Clemency...43
Clippings… 19
Clothing...9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 23, 25, 31, 32, 37,
38, 39, 40
Clothing- Court Appearances...1, 32
Color of Law...7
Commissary...2, 4, 10, 18, 32, 42
Commission...2, 42
Commitment...30
Commitment, Involuntary...36, 43
Common Areas...40
Communication...17, 30
-Client/Attorney...33
-Systems...45
-Video...1
-with Parents...26
-with Prisoners...19
Community Service...43
XXVI

ii

DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid... 33, 41
Dogs...41, 48
Dormitories...9, 15
Double-Celling/Bunking...8, 9, 10, 15
Double-Jeopardy...11, 43
Drug...34
Drug/Alcohol Testing...41
Drug Testing...10, 11, 31, 32, 33, 38, 41
Due Process...1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 16, 20, 21, 22, 30, 31,
32, 34, 36, 38, 47, 50

Criteria...8
Criticism...19
Cross-Dressing...19
Cross Gender… 41
Cross Gender Supervision...45
Crowding...9, 10, 15, 32, 33, 35, 39, 40
CRREA- Civil Rights Remedies Equal. Act…1
Cruel & Unusual Punishment... Section 10, 9, 47
Custody Level...8, 38
Damage to Property...41
Damages...4, 27
Damages, Monetary...21
Dayroom...15
Deadly Force...48
Death... 7
Death Penalty...9, 10, 22, 30, 37
Deductions from Pay/Wages...50
Defenses...4, 9, 10, 27
Delay...6, 28, 36, 43
Delay in Treatment/Care...29, 30
Deliberate Indifference...27, 29, 30, 45
Delivery...28
Demotion...31
Denial...29, 47
-of Bail...6
-of Food...18
-of Visits...49
Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid (DNA)... 33, 41
Dental Care...29
Destruction, Property...35
Detainee, Pretrial...4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 22, 29,
34,38, 39, 41, 47, 49, 50
Detention...30
-in Police Car...16
-Investigative...16
-Preventive...26, 32
Determination...5
Diagnosis…29
Diet...3, 37
Diet, Medical...18
Dining...9, 15, 18
Disability (see also Handicap)...1, 31
Disciplinary Procedures...8, 11
Discipline...Section 11, .7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 17, 18, 22,
31, 32, 47, 50
Discretion...39
Discrimination...2, 7, 11, 17, 31, 32, 36, 50
Diseases, Contagious...3, 29
Disposition of Funds...4, 35
Disposition of Property... 35, 36
Distance...47
Disturbance...38, 39, 48
Diversion...9, 26, 32
XXVI

Early Release...36
Eavesdropping...19
Educational...34
Educational Areas...15
EEOC- Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission...50
Electronic Monitoring...14, 36
Electronic Surveillance...45
Eleventh Amendment...24
eMail…28
Emergency Care...29
Emergency Drill… 39
Emotional Distress, 9
Employee...41, 50
Employee Discipline...2
Employee Qualifications...2
Employee Union...2, 31
Employment Discrimination...17
Enforcement... 38
Enhancement...5
Environmental Impact...15
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)...50
Equal Opportunity...31, 50
Equal Pay Act...31
Equal Protection...1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 26,
29, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 43, 47, 50
Equipment...15, 29
Escape...39
Establishment Clause... 37
Evacuation…39
Evaluation...1, 30
Evidence...2, 3, 11, 41
Ex Post Facto...20, 36, 43
Examination Facilities...29
Examinations...29
Excessive Bail...6
Excessive Fines Clause... 4
Excessive Force...48
Execution...7, 10, 19
Exercise...3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 32, 39
Exercise and Recreation...Section 12
Exhaustion...1, 7, 21, 22
iii

FOIA- Freedom of Information Act...2, 5, 19
Food...Section 18, .9, 10, 11, 32
-Handlers...18
-Quality...18
-Service...40
-Temperature...18
Forced Exposure...37
Forced Labor...50
Forcible Injection...33
Foreign Countries...47
Former Employee... 49
Former Prisoners...19, 49
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983...1, 5, 7, 24, 27, 29
4 U.S.C.A. Section 1988...5
Forwarding… 28
Free Exercise… 37
Free Expression...38
Free Speech...3, 7, 19, 31, 50
Free Speech, Expression and
Association...Section 19
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)...2, 5, 19
Freedom of Religion...37
Frequency...49
Frisk Search...41
Frivolous Petitions…22
Frivolous Suits....1
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims Act...24, 27
Funds, Inmate... 2
Furloughs...36, 43
Furnishings...15

Ex-Offenders...Section 13, 1
Experimentation...29
Expert Witness...1
Expiration...43
Expiration of Sentence...36
Exposure to Chemical Agents...39, 50
Expungement...7, 11, 33
Eye Care...29
Facial Hair...38, 39
Facilities...Section 15, 9, 12, 29, 47
Facility Design...15
Facility Plans...32
Failure--to Act…27
-to Appear... 6
-to Direct...27, 48
-to Intervene…14, 27
-to Protect...Section 14, 7, 8, 10,
14, 17, 26, 27, 31, 32, 36, 47, 48
-to Provide Care...9, 10, 29, 30
-to Supervise...27, 45
-to Train...7, 27, 46
Fair Housing Act (FHA)...7, 27
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)...27, 31, 50
False Arrest...7, 16, 26, 32
False Claims Act... 27
False Imprisonment/Arrest...Section 16, 7, 16, 32
Family...19, 49
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)...31
Family Relationships...33
Fast...37
FCA- False Claims Act...27
Federal Courts...22
Federal Probation Act...43
Federal Standards…44
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)...24, 27
Fees, Attorney...Section 5
Fees...4
Female--Detainees...6
-Officers...45
-Prisoners...Section 17, 29, 49
-Staff...45
Females...12, 32
FHA- Fair Housing Act...27
Filing Fees...1
Fines...4, 11, 27, 43
Fire...14, 39,
Fire Hose...48
Fire Safety...9, 10, 15, 39
Floor, Sleeping...9
FLSA- Fair Labor Standards Act...31, 50
FMLA- Family Medical Leave Act...31
XXVI

Gangs...8, 39
Gender Identity Disorder (GID)... 17, 29
General Conditions...15
GID- Gender Identity Disorder…17, 29
Good Faith Defense...7, 24, 27
Good Faith Immunity...27
Good-Time...Sec. 20, 3, 11, 20, 22, 32, 36, 43, 50
Good Time Credit...20, 22
Governmental Immunity...24, 27
Governmental Liability...27
Graduated Release... 36
Grievance...7, 11, 32
Grievance Procedures, Prisoner... Section 21
Grooming...38
Groups...11
Guidelines...43
Habeas Corpus...Section 22, 7, 47
Habeas Corpus Relief...22
Hair...19, 23, 32, 37, 38, 39
Haircut...42
Haircutting… 40
Hair Length...37, 38, 39, 40
iv

Informants...3, 11
Informants Procedures...11
Informed Consent...29
Initial Appearance...1, 32
Injunctive Relief... 27
Injury...10, 50
Inmate Funds... 2, 4, 35
Inmate-Run Business...38
Insanity...43
Insanity Defense...11
Inspection...2, 18
Inspection of Mail...19, 28
Insurance...24
Intake and Admissions...Sec 25
Intake Screening...29, 30, 32
Intercom…15
Interest...35
Interference... 28, 29
Interference with Treatment...29
International Standards....44
Internet... 19, 33
Interpreter...8, 11, 29, 31, 33
Interrogation...1, 22
Interstate Compact...7, 22, 47
Intervene, Failure to…14, 27
Intimidation...14
Investigation...1, 31
Investigative Detention...16
Involuntary--Commitment...7, 36, 43
-Medication...29, 30, 32
-Nourishment...18, 29
-Servitude... 7, 50
-Treatment… 29
Isolation...3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 23, 26, 28, 29
Items Permitted...38, 39

Handicap...3, 7, 8, 29, 32
Handicapped...15, 34
Handicapped Inmates...8, 9
Harassment...2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 31
Hats...19, 37, 38, 39
Health...33
Health Standards...18
Hearing... 3, 11
Hearing Impaired...9, 11, 29
Heating...9
Heck Rule… 27
Hiring/Qualifications...31
HIV - See AIDS
Hobbies…34
Holidays…31
Home Detention...6, 32, 36
Homosexuals...3, 7, 8
Hospital...29
Hospitalization...30
Hostile Work Environment...31
Hot Water...9, 23, 40
House Arrest...43
Housekeeping...40
Hunger Strike...19
Hygiene...3, 7, 9, 15, 17, 23
Hygiene- Prisoner Personal... Section 23
Hygiene Items...23, 25
IDEA-Individuals with Disabilities Education Act...
26, 34
Identification... 16, 25, 49
Idle Pay...50
Idleness...9, 42, 50
Immunity...Section 24, (see also Liability) 7, 11
-Absolute...24
-Government…24, 27
-Judicial....24
-Legislative...24
-Municipal...24
-Qualified…7, 24, 27, 41
-Quasi-Judicial…24, 27
-Sovereign…24, 27
Impartitlity…11
Inadequate Care…29
Inadequate Supervision...45
Incentives... 34
Indigency...4, 43
Indigent Inmates...1, 28, 42
Indigent Prisoners...19, 23, 42
Individual Capacity...24, 27
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA)... 26, 34
Indoor Exercise…12
In Forma Pauperis...1
XXVI

Jail House Lawyers...1, 5, 19
Jewelry...35, 38, 39
Jewelry/Ornaments...37
Judicial Immunity...24
Jurisdiction...22
Juveniles...Section 26, 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 22,
29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 41
Keys...39
Kitchen...9, 15, 18, 40
Kitchen Sanitation...18
Labor...9, 10
Language...11, 19, 28, 38
Laundry...9, 23, 40
Law Books...1
Law Libraries...1, 3, 7, 32, 47
v

-Exam...15
-Issues...33
-Restrictions...50
-Screening...25, 46
-Treatment...3
Medication...25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 36
Medication, Involuntary...29, 30, 32
Mental Commitments...26
Mental Health...29, 32, 46, 47
Mental Illness... 7
Mental Institutions...47
Mental Problems (Prisoners)... Section 30
Mentally Ill...8
Methadone...29
Methadone Treatment...32
Military Facility... 7
Military Service….31
Minimum Sentence... 43
Miranda Warning...7
Misdiagnosis...29
Monetary Damages...21
Money...35
Movies...12, 19
Municipal Immunity...24
Municipal Liability...27
Music...19

Laxatives...41
"Least Restrictive Means"...32
Legal--Assistance...1, 9
-Costs...43
-Mail...28
-Material...1, 35
-Research…1
-Services...31
Legislative Immunity...24
Length...3, 25, 32
Length of Segregation...8, 11
Lethal Injection...10
Liability...Section 27, (see also Immunity)... 7, 11,
27
Liability- Release of Prisoner...36
Liberty Interest...3, 8, 11, 20, 31, 34, 36, 38, 43, 47,
49, 50
Library...42
Libraries, Law...1, 3, 7, 32, 47
Lien… 1
Lighting...9, 10
Lights...9, 10, 15
Limitation...5, 28, 35
Limiting Correspondents...28
Limiting Language...28
Literature...19
Live Testimony…11
Living Areas...41
Lobbying...19
Location... 15
Lock Down... 39
"Lock-In"...39
Locks...39
Loss of Property...35
Lower Bunk...7, 8

Name...19, 37
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)...15
Natural Light...9
Negligence...7, 27, 29, 46
Negligent Hiring…27
Negligent Retention...27
Negligent Supervision...27
Negotiation...31
NEPA- National Environmental Protection Act...15
Newspapers...19
Noise...9, 10, 15
Nominal Damages...27
Notary...1
Notice...11, 28, 38
Notification...47
Nourishment, Involuntary...18, 29
Nudity...33
Nutrition...18

Mail...Section 28, 3, 19, 32, 33, 37, 38, 39, 47
Mail, Outgoing...28, 38
Maintenance... 15
Makeup...38
Malicious Prosecution…16
Malpractice...29
Mandatory Retirement...31
Marriage...19, 22, 31
Mattress... 8, 9
Media...28, 33, 49
Media Access...19, 38, 39
Medical Areas...15
Medical Care...Section 29, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 26,
32, 33, 36, 37, 46, 47
Medical--Costs...4
-Diet...18
XXVI

Obscenity...19
Observation By Staff...33
Odors...9
Offenders, Ex-...Section 13, 1
Officer on Prisoner Assault...14
Official Capacity...24, 27
Opening of Mail...19, 28
Opportunity...37
vi

Placement in Segregation...3, 11
Planning...2
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act... 1, 4, 5, 7, 13,
14, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36
Plumbing...9, 10, 15, 35, 40
Policies and Procedures...2, 8, 11, 21, 25, 27, 29
Political Affiliation… 31
Polygraph...11, 31
Population...9
Portions...18
Post Cards… 28
Postage...1, 28
Post-Judgment Services...5
Precedent... 24
Pregnancy...17
Pre-Release...36
Presentence Report...43
Pre-Sentence Detention...20. 32
Pretrial Confinement...43
Pretrial Detainees...4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 22, 29, 34,
38, 39, 41, 47, 49, 50
Pretrial Detention...Section 32, 29, 30
Pretrial Release… 6, 36, 41
Prevailing Party...4, 5
Preventive Detention...26, 32
Prison Industries...50
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)... 1, 4, 5, 7,
13, 14, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 32, 36
Prisoner--Accounts...2, 4
-Assault (guards)...14
-Assault (inmates)...11, 14
-Associations...19
-Checks...45
-On Staff Assault…14
-Publications...19
-Suicide...14
-Suicide Attempt...14
-Unions...19
-Work Stoppage...19
Prisoners... 19
Privacy...Section 33, 7, 10, 13, 15, 17, 19, 29, 30,
31, 32, 37, 41, 49
Privacy Act...33
Private Facility...47
Private Operator...27
Private Physician...29
Private Provider... 18, 27, 29, 30
Private Sector... 50
Privileged Communications...1
Privileged Correspondence/Mail... 1, 28
Privileges...3, 8, 9
Pro Se Litigants/Litigation...1, 5
Probable Cause...16, 32

Opportunity to Practice...37
Opportunity To Worship...37
Opposite Sex...41
Original Sentence...43
Other State...1, 47
Out of Cell Time...9
Outdoor Exercise...12
Outdoor Recreation...12
Outgoing Mail...28, 38
Overcrowding...7, 9
Overtime... 2, 31
Packages...28, 32, 38
Padded Cells...15, 30
PAMII- Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act… 30
Paralegals...5
Pardon...13, 36, 43
Parity- Male/Female...34
Parity with Sentenced...32
Parole... 4, 7, 14, 22, 33, 36, 37, 43
-Costs…4
-Conditions...36
-Denial…36
-Due Process...36
-Granting...36
-Guidelines...36
-Hearing...36
-Interpretor...36
-Liability...36
-Policies...36
-Revocation...36
-Searches...36
-Sentencing to...36, 43
-Violations...36
-Violators...6
Parolees…41
Partial Success...5
Participation...34
"Pat Down" Searches...41
Payment...50
Payment of Expenses...47
Pay Parity...31
Pepper Spray... 48
Personal Liability...27
Personnel...Section 31, 29
Pests/Rodents...23, 40
Petition... 21
Photocopying...1
Photographs… 19
Physical Requirements...31
Place of Imprisonment...43
Place to Worship...37
Placement…3
XXVI

vii

Probation...22, 31, 43, 45
-Conditions...43
-Revocation...6, 36, 43
-Search...43
-Violation...43
Probationers...41
Procedures/Policies...2, 8, 11, 21, 25, 27
Professional Standards...44
Programming...17
Programs...3, 7, 9, 22, 26, 32
Programs-Prisoner...Section 34
Prohibited Property...35
Prohibition...28
Prohibition- Corres. with Jurors...28
Prohibition- Publications...28
Promotion...31
Property...2, 7, 38
Property Interest...31, 50
Property- Prisoner Personal...Section 35
Prosecution...11, 31
Prostheses...29
Protection...32, 39
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals
Act (PAMII)… 30
Protection From Harm...14, 31
Protective Custody...3, 8, 10, 15, 32
Psychiatric...34
Psychiatric Care...3, 30
Psychological...34
-Counseling...34
-Screening...25, 31
-Services...32, 33
Psychotropic Drugs...29, 30
Publications...19, 32, 37, 38, 39
Publishers Only Rule...19, 28, 38
Punishment...11, 32
Punishment, Cruel & Unusual... Section 10, 9, 47
Punitive Damages...7, 27
Punitive Segregation...8, 9, 11
Purpose...47
Qualifications...31
Qualified Immunity...7, 24, 27, 41
Quality...18
Quarantine...29
Quasi-Judicial Immunity...24, 27
RA- Rehabilitation Act…7, 29, 32
Racial Discrimination...7, 8, 9, 31, 34, 49
Radio...12
Razors… 23
Reading of Mail...28
Reading Material...11
Research, Legal… 1
XXVI

viii

Reasonable Belief...24
Reasonable Care...29
Receipts...35
Reclassification...8, 11
Recognized Religions...37
Recommendation… 43
Records...1, 2, 11, 18, 29, 30, 33, 47
Records-Access...29
Recoupment...1, 4
Reckless Indifference…27
Recreation...3, 12, 32
Recreation Areas...15
Redress Of Grievances...19
Reduction...43
Reduction of Crowding...20
Reduction of Sentence...43
Refusal to Admit...25
Refusal- Mail... 28
Refusal to Work...11, 50
Regulation...37
Regulation- Name...37
Regulations...3, 7, 8, 11, 19, 28, 37
Rehabilitation...34
Rehabilitation Act (RA)… 7, 29
Rejecting Mail...28
Release...Section 36, 13, 14, 26, 29, 32, 34
-Condition...32
-Date...22, 36
-on Bond...36
-on Recognizance...36
-Site...36
-Work Release…50
Release Notification...22
Religion...Section 37, 3, 7, 8, 11, 19, 22, 26, 28, 29,
31, 32, 34, 38, 39, 50
Religious--Areas...15
-Articles...37, 38, 39
-Diet...18
-Groups...39
-Literature...19, 28
-Services...3, 11, 39
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)...37
Religious Land Use & Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUPPA) ... 37
Remedies...4, 7, 9, 10, 26, 27
Removal...20
-from Job...50
-from Program...34
Reprisal...47
Requirements, Program...34
Respondeat Superior...7, 24, 27
Restitution...4, 11, 43
Restoration...20

-Searches... 50
Segregation...8, 9, 11, 12, 18, 22, 30, 32, 34, 39, 49,
50
Segregation, Administrative... Section 3, 34
Segregation- Mail...11
Seizure...28
Seizure- Outgoing Mail...28
Self-Incrimination...1, 7
Sentence...Section 43, 22, 26, 30, 36
Sentence Conditions...36
Sentence Reduction...21, 32
Sentencing to Parole...36, 43
Separation...3, 8, 9, 10, 15, 26, 32, 39
Services...37
Services- Prisoner...Section 42
Serving...18
Servitude, Involuntary...7, 50
Settlement… 27
Sewerage...40
Sex Discrimination...7, 31
Sex Offenders...7, 8, 13, 19, 22, 30, 32, 33, 34, 36,
39, 43
Sexual Abuse...7
Sexual Assault... 14, 17, 32
Sexual Harassment...7, 17, 31
"Shakedowns"...41
Shaving...23
Shoes…23
Showers...9, 23, 25, 35, 40
Sick Call...29
Sincerity, Religion...37
Sinks...23, 40
Slavery...7, 50
Smoke...9, 10, 29
Smoke-free Environment...10, 29
Smoking...7, 8, 10, 38
Soap/Shampoo...37
Social Security...4, 35
Solitary Confinement...8, 11
Sovereign Immunity...24, 27
Special--Cell...15
-Diets...18, 29
-Housing...29, 30
-Master...27
-Needs...8, 17
-Visits... 49
Speedy Trial...1, 32
Spouses...10, 49

Restraining Chair...48
Restraints...1, 3, 10, 11, 12, 17, 25, 29, 30, 32, 39,
47, 48
Restrictions...3, 37, 38, 49
Retaliation...1, 3, 11, 19, 21, 31, 36, 47
Retaliation for Legal Action...1
Retardation...3, 30
Retention...31
Retirement...31, 35
Review...3, 43
Review of Segregation...11
Revocation...6, 20, 43
Revocation, Parole...36
RFRA-Religious Freedom Restoration Act...37
Right--of Access...21
-of Privacy...33
-to Counsel...1, 47
-to Marry...38
-to Refuse...29
-to Treatment...26, 30, 34, 42
-to Work...50
Rights Retained...7, 9, 32
Riot...14, 39
RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Institutionalized
Persons Act...37
Rodents/Pests...23, 40
Rules...11, 25, 38, 49
Rules and Regulations- Prisoner... Section 38
Rules- Items Permitted...38
Safety...9, 10, 15, 32, 39, 50
Safety and Security...Section 39
Safety Regulations...39
Same-Sex Search...41
Sanctions...27
Sanitation...Section 40, 9, 10, 15, 18, 32, 41
Satanism...37, 39
Schedule...31
Scheduling...49
Screening...1, 25, 46
Search by Female...37
Search- Property...25, 41
Search of Prosthetic...41
Search Warrant...41
Searches...Section 41, 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 14, 17, 25, 26,
31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 39, 47, 49
-Attorney...1
-Cell...39
Section 1983...1, 5, 7, 24, 27, 29
Section 1988...5
Security...7, 10, 15
-Practices...28, 39
-Restrictions...39
XXVI

ix

Title VII...31
Tobacco… 37
Toilet Paper...23
Toilets...9, 10, 23, 35, 40
Toothpaste… 23
Tort Claims...7
Tort Law...27
Tort Liability...27
Torture... 7, 10
Totality of Conditions...9, 10
Towels...25
Training....Section 46, 4, 29, 30, 31, 34,
Transfer between Prisoners...35
Transfers...Section 47, 1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 11, 17, 22, 26,
29, 30, 31, 32, 39, 47, 50
Translation...1
Translators...11, 25, 29
Transplant… 29
Transport...32
Transport Costs...2
Transportation...4, 14, 29, 39, 47
Transsexual...8, 17, 29, 38, 47
Treatment...8, 29
Treatment Programs...34
Trial….1
Trial as Adult...26
Trusties...10
Trusty...8
Trusty System...9
Typewriters...1

Staff...17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 33
-Assignment...3, 45
-Contracts...2
-Discipline...2
-Drug Test...2
-of Opposite Sex...33
Staffing...9, 10, 14, 32, 39
Staffing Levels...2, 31, 45
Stamps...35
Standards...Section 44
-Federal....44
-International...44
-United Nations....44
State--Interest...32
-Liability...26, 27
-Regulations...44
-Requirements...9
-Standards...44
-Statutes...10, 44, 47
Statute of Limitations...1, 22
Statutes (preventing lawsuits)...27
Stinger Grenade…48
Storage...35
Strikes...31
Strip Searches...41
Stun Belt...1, 48
Stun Gun...1, 48
Suicide...8, 14, 15, 17, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32
Suicide Attempt...14, 26, 29, 32
Supermax... 38, 39
Supervised Release...36, 43
Supervised Release- Conditions...43
Supervision...Section 45, 14, 30, 31, 32, 50
Supervisory Liability...27
Surveillance...3, 39, 45
Surveillance, Video...39, 45
Suspension...31, 50
Sweat Lodge… 37
Taser… 48
Teleconference... 1
Telephone...1, 2, 3, 4, 19, 25, 32, 39, 42
Telephone Calls...33, 39
Telephone Costs… 2, 7
Television...12
Temperature...9, 10, 15, 18
Temporary Release (furloughs)... 32, 36
Termination...31, 50
Termination of Order...27
Termination of Visits...49
Threatening...48
Threats...9, 10, 14
Time Limits...49
Timely Release...36
XXVI

Unemployment...2
Union...2, 31
United Nations, Standards...44
Unlawful Detention... 16, 32
Unsentenced Prisoners...50
Urine Test...41
Use of Force...Section 48, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 25,
26, 30, 32, 39, 41, 48
Utensils...18
Variety...18
VAWA- Violence Against Women Act… 17, 27
Vehicles...41
Ventilation...9, 10, 15
Verbal Harassment...7
Veterans... 35
Vicarious Liability...27
Victim… 6, 7, 36
Video… 49
Video Communication...1
Video Surveillance...39, 45
View by Inmate... 33
View By Staff...33
x

Violation...38
Violation Of Court Order...27
Violence...10
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)... 17, 27
Visitation...9, 19
Visitation Areas...15
Visiting...Section 49, 19
Visitor Searches...19, 41, 49
Visitors...19, 33
Visits...1, 3, 7, 11, 17, 19, 32, 37, 38, 39, 41
Vocational...34
Volunteers... 2, 37, 38, 49
Voting...6, 7, 19, 32
Waiver...28, 30
Waiver by Prisoner...20
Waiver of Rights...7
Water...40
Weapon… 39
Wheelchair... 29, 39
Windows...9, 15, 32, 39
Withholding Correspondence...28
Witness...11
Witness Fees...1
Women...9
Work...3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 32, 37, 38, 39
-Assignment...29, 50
-Conditions...2, 31, 50
-Prisoner...Section 50
-Release...17, 36, 50
-Rules... 31
-Stoppage...50
-Work/Study...34
Worker’s Compensation…31
Writing Material...1
Wrongful Death...14, 32
X-Ray...29, 41

XXVI

xi

II. TOPIC FINDER:
INDEX OF 50 MAJOR SECTIONS
SUBTOPICS ADDRESSED BY EACH
The following pages present the specific subtopics which are used within each of the 50 major
sections of the Catalog. Subtopics are identified on the left margin of each case summary.
Legal Research
Lien
Notary
Other State
Photocopying
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Postage
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Privileged Communication
Privileged Correspondence/Mail
Pro Se Litigation
Records
Recoupment
Restraints
Retaliation
Retaliation for Legal Action
Right to Counsel
Screening
Searches
Searches- Attorney
Self-Incrimination
Speedy Trial
Statute of Limitations
Stun Belt
Stun Gun
Teleconference
Telephone
Transfer
Transportation
Translation
Trial
Typewriter
Video Communication
Visits
Witness Fees
Writing Material

1. ACCESS TO COURTS
Subtopics:
Access to Attorney
Access to Counsel
Access to Court
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act
AEDPA- Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)
Appointed Attorney
Assistance, Legal
Attendance, Court
Attorney Fee
Binding
Civil Rights Remedies Equal. Act (CRREA)
Civil Suit
Class Action
Clothing-Court Appearances
Computers
Court Costs
CRREA- Civil Rights Remedies Equal.Act
Disability
Due Process
Equal Protection
Evaluation
Evidence
Exhaustion
Ex-Offender
Expert Witness
Filing Fees
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
Frivolous Suits
In Forma Pauperis
Indigent Inmates
Initial Appearance
Interrogation
Investigation
Jail House Lawyers
Juveniles
Law Books
Law Library
Legal Assistance
Legal Mail
Legal Material

XXVI

2. ADMINISTRATION
Subtopics:
APA- Administrative Procedures Act
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
Budget
Commissary
Commission
Conditions
xii

Placement
Placement in Segregation
Pretrial Detainee
Privileges
Programs
Protective Custody
Psychiatric Care
Recreation
Regulations
Religion
Religious Services
Restraints
Restrictions
Retaliation
Retardation
Review
Searches
Separation
Staff Assignment
Surveillance
Telephone
Transfer
Visits
Work

Contract Services
Discrimination
Employee Discipline
Employee Qualifications
Employee Union
FOIA- Freedom of Information Act
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Harassment
Inmate Funds
Inspection
Overtime
Planning
Policies/Procedures
Prisoner Accounts
Property
Records
Staff Contracts
Staff Discipline
Staff Drug Test
Staffing Levels
Telephone
Telephone Costs
Training
Transport Costs
Unemployment
Union
Volunteers
Working Conditions

4. ASSESSMENT OF COSTS
Subtopics:
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
APA- Administrative Procedures Act
Attorney Fees
Commissary
Copayment
Cost of Confinement
Court Costs
Damages
Defense
Disposition of Funds
Due Process
Excessive Fines Clause
Fees
Fines
Indigency
Inmate Funds
Medical Costs
Parole
Parole Costs
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Prevailing Party
Pretrial Detainee
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Prisoner Accounts
Recoupment
Remedies
Restitution

3. ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
Subtopics:
Access to Courts
Assignment
Conditions
Contagious Diseases
Diet
Due Process
Equal Protection
Evidence
Exercise
Free Speech
Good Time
Handicap
Hearing
Homosexuals
Hygiene
Informant
Isolation
Juvenile
Law Library
Length
Liberty Interest
Mail
Medical Treatment

XXVI

xiii

AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Aliens
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Brutality
Civil Commitment
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA)
Classification
Color of Law
Conditions
Conspiracy
Correspondence
CRIPA- Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act
Death
Discipline
Discrimination
Due Process
Equal Protection
Execution
Exhaustion
Expungement
Failure to Protect
Failure to Train
Fair Housing Act- FHA
False Arrest
False Imprisonment
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
FHA- Fair Housing Act
Free Speech and Association
Good Faith Defense
Grievance
Habeas Corpus
Handicap
Harassment
Homosexuals
Hygiene
Immunity
Interstate Compact
Involuntary Commitment
Involuntary Servitude
Juvenile
Law Library
Liability
Lower Bunk
Medical Care
Mental Illness
Military Facility
Miranda Warning
Negligence
Overcrowding
Parole
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Pretrial Detainees

Social Security
Telephone
Transportation
5. ATTORNEY FEES
Subtopics:
Attorney Fees
Consent Decree
Determination
Enhancement
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1988
Freedom of Information Act
Jail House Lawyer
Limitation
Paralegals
Partial Success
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
Post-Judgment Services
Prevailing Party
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Pro Se Litigants
6. BAIL
Subtopics:
Alien
Bail
Bail Fund
Bail Reform Act (BRA)
Bond
BRA- Bail Reform Act
Conditions
Court Appearance
Delay
Denial of Bail
Excessive Bail
Failure to Appear
Female Detainees
Home Detention
Parole Violators
Pretrial Release
Probation Revocation
Revocation
Searches
Victim
Voting
7. CIVIL RIGHTS
Subtopics:
Access to Court
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act

XXVI

xiv

Equal Protection
Failure to Protect
Gangs
Handicapped Inmate
Harassment
Homosexuals
Interpreter
Isolation
Juveniles
Length of Segregation
Liberty Interest
Lower Bunk
Mattress
Medical Care
Mentally Ill
Policy/Procedure
Pretrial Detainees
Privileges
Protective Custody
Punitive Segregation
Racial Discrimination
Reclassification
Regulations
Religion
Segregation
Separation
Sex Offenders
Smoking
Solitary Confinement
Special Needs
Suicide
Transfer
Transsexual
Treatment
Trusty
Work

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Privacy
Programs
Property
Punitive Damages
Qualified Immunity
RA- Rehabilitation Act
Racial Discrimination
Regulations
Rehabilitation Act (RA)
Religion
Remedies
Respondeat Superior
Rights Retained
Safety
Search
Security
Self Incrimination
Sex Discrimination
Sex Offender
Sexual Abuse
Sexual Harassment
Slavery
Smoking
Telephone Costs
Tort Claims
Torture
Transfers
Use of Force
Verbal Harassment
Victims
Visits
Voting
Waiver of Rights
Work
8. CLASSIFICATION AND
SEPARATION
Subtopics:
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Cell Assignment
Civil Commitment
Classification
Classification Criteria
Correspondence
Criteria
Custody Level
Disciplinary Procedures
Discipline
Double Celling
Due Process

XXVI

9. CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
Subtopics:
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act
Aliens
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Asbestos
Bedding
Beds
Capacity
Cell Capacity
Cells
Challenges
Change of Conditions
Civil Commitment
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA)
Classification
xv

Safety
Sanitation
Segregation
Separation
Showers
Smoke
Staffing
State Requirements
Temperature
Threats
Toilets
Totality of Conditions
Transfers
Trusty System
Use of Force
Ventilation
Visitation
Windows
Women
Work

Clothing
Conditions
Conditions of Confinement
CRIPA- Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act
Crowding
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Death Penalty
Defenses
Dining
Discipline
Diversion
Dormitories
Double Bunking
Double Celling
Emotional Distress
Equal Protection
Exercise
Facilities
Failure to Provide Care
Fire Safety
Floor-Sleeping
Food
Handicapped Inmates
Harassment
Hearing Impaired
Heating
Hot Water
Hygiene
Idleness
Isolation
Juveniles
Kitchen
Labor
Laundry
Legal Assistance
Lighting
Lights
Mattress
Medical Care
Natural Light
Noise
Odors
Out of Cell Time
Overcrowding
Plumbing
Population
Pretrial Detainees
Privileges
Programs
Punitive Segregation
Racial Discrimination
Remedies
Restraints
Rights Retained

XXVI

10. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT
Subtopics:
Bedding
Capital Punishment
Cells
Clothing
Commissary
Conditions
Crowding
Death Penalty
Defenses
Discipline
Double Celling
Drug Testing
Execution
Exercise
Failure to Protect
Failure to Provide Care
Fire Safety
Food
Harassment
Injury
Isolation
Juveniles
Labor
Lethal Injection
Lighting
Lights
Medical Care
Noise
Plumbing
Pretrial Detainees
xvi

Groups
Hearing
Hearing Impaired
Immunity
Impartiality
Informants
Informants Procedures
Insanity Defense
Interpreter
Investigation
Isolation
Juveniles
Language
Length of Segregation
Liability
Liberty Interest
Live Testimony
Notice
Placement in Segregation
Polygraph
Pretrial Detainees
Prisoner on Prisoner Assault
Procedures
Prosecution
Punishment
Punitive Segregation
Reading Material
Reclassification
Records
Refusal to Work
Regulations
Religion
Religious Services
Restitution
Restraints
Retaliation
Review of Segregation
Rules
Segregation
Segregation-Mail
Solitary Confinement
Transfer
Translators
Visits
Witness
Work

Privacy
Protective Custody
Remedies
Restraints
Safety
Sanitation
Searches
Security
Separation
Smoke
Smoke-Free Environment
Smoking
Spouses
Staffing
State Statutes
Temperature
Threats
Toilets
Torture
Totality of Conditions
Trusties
Use of Force
Ventilation
Violence
Work
11. DISCIPLINE
Subtopics:
Access to Courts
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Appeal
Assistance
“Bad” Time
Clothing
Conditions of Segregation
Corporal Punishment
Correspondence
Counsel
Criminal Charges
Disciplinary Procedures
Discipline
Discrimination
Double Jeopardy
Drug Testing
Due Process
Equal Protection
Evidence
Exercise
Expungement
Fine
Food
Good-Time
Grievance

XXVI

12. EXERCISE AND RECREATION
Subtopics:
Clothing
Exercise
Facilities
Females
Indoor Exercise
xvii

Threats
Transportation
Use of Force
Wrongful Death

Movies
Outdoor Exercise
Outdoor Recreation
Radio
Recreation
Restraints
Segregation
Television

15. FACILITIES
Subtopics:
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Antiquated Facility
Asbestos
Attorney-Client Area
Audio Communication
Beds
Capacity
Cell Capacity
Cell Size
Cells
Chapel
Consent Decree
Court Order
Crowding
Dayroom
Dining
Dormitories
Double Celling
Educational Areas
Environmental Impact
Equal Protection
Equipment
Facility Design
Fire Safety
Furnishings
General Conditions
Handicapped
Hygiene
Intercom
Kitchen
Lights
Location
Maintenance
Medical Areas
Medical Exam
National Environmental Protection Act
(NEPA)
NEPA- National Environ.Protection Act
Noise
Padded Cells
Plumbing
Privacy
Protective Custody
Recreation Areas
Religious Areas
Safety

13. EX-OFFENDERS
Subtopics:
Access to Court
Claims
Cost of Confinement
Pardon
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Privacy
Release
Sex Offenders
Voting
14. FAILURE TO PROTECT
Subtopics:
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Brutality
Court Costs
Electronic Monitoring
Failure to Intervene
Failure to Protect
Fire
Intimidation
Juveniles
Medical Care
Officer on Prisoner Assault
Parole
PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Prisoner on Prisoner Assault
Prisoner on Staff Assault
Prisoner Suicide
Prisoner Suicide Attempt
Protection From Harm
Release
Riot
Searches
Sexual Assault
Staffing
Suicide
Suicide Attempt
Supervision

XXVI

xviii

Suicide
Transfer
Transsexual
VAWA- Violence Against Women Act
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)
Visits
Work Release

Sanitation
Security
Separation
Special Cell
Suicide
Temperature
Use of Force
Ventilation
Visitation Areas
Windows

18. FOOD
Subtopics:
Commissary
Denial of Food
Dining
Discipline
Equal Protection
Food
Food Handlers
Food Quality
Food Temperature
Health Standards
Inspection
Involuntary Nourishment
Kitchen
Kitchen Sanitation
Medical Diet
Nutrition
Portions
Private Provider
Quality
Records
Religious Diet
Sanitation
Segregation
Serving
Special Diet
Staff
Temperature
Utensils
Variety

16. FALSE IMPRISONMENT/ARREST
Subtopics:
Arrest and Detention
Civil Commitment
Detention in Police Car
Due Process
False Arrest
False Imprisonment
Identification
Investigative Detention
Malicious Prosecution
Probable Cause
Unlawful Detention
17. FEMALE PRISONERS
Subtopics:
Abortion
Access to Court
Breast-feeding
Children
Classification
Clothing
Communication
Conditions
Discipline
Discrimination
Employment Discrimination
Equal Protection
Exercise
Failure to Protect
Gender Identity Disorder (GID)
GID- Gender Identity Disorder
Hygiene
Medical Care
Pregnancy
Privacy
Programming
Restraints
Searches
Sexual Assault
Sexual Harassment
Special Needs
Staff

XXVI

19. FREE SPEECH, EXPRESSION AND
ASSOCIATION
Subtopics:
Assembly
Association
Books
Cassette Tapes
Censorship
Clippings
Clothing
Communications with Prisoners
Conversation
Correspondence
Criticism
xix

Cross-Dressing
Eavesdropping
Executions
Family
FOIA- Freedom of Information Act
Former Prisoners
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Free Speech
Hair
Hats
Hunger Strike
Indigent Prisoners
Inspection of Mail
Internet
Jail House Lawyer
Language
Literature
Lobbying
Mail
Marriage
Media Access
Movies
Music
Name
Newspapers
Obscenity
Opening of Mail
Photographs
Pretrial Detainees
Prisoner Associations
Prisoner Publications
Prisoner Unions
Prisoner Work Stoppage
Privacy
Publications
"Publisher-Only" Rule
Redress of Grievances
Regulations
Religion
Religious Literature
Retaliation
Sex Offenders
Staff
Telephone
Visitation
Visiting
Visitor Searches
Visitors
Visits
Voting

Equal Protection
Ex Post Facto
Good Time
Good-Time Credit
Liberty Interest
Pre-Sentence Detention
Reduction of Crowding
Removal
Restoration
Revocation
Waiver by Prisoner
21. GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES,
PRISONER
Subtopics:
Due Process
Exhaustion
Investigation
Monetary Damages
Petition
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Procedures
Retaliation
Right of Access
22. HABEAS CORPUS
Subtopics:
Access to Courts
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
AEDPA-Antiterrorism & Effective Death
Penalty Act
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Alien
Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA)
Artificial Insemination
Bail
Civil Commitment
Conditions of Confinement
Credit For Time Served
Death Penalty
Discipline
Due Process
Exhaustion
Federal Courts
Frivolous Petitions
Good Time
Good- Time Credit
Habeas Corpus
Habeas Corpus Relief
Interrogation

20. GOOD-TIME
Subtopics:
Due Process

XXVI

xx

Judicial Immunity
Legislative Immunity
Municipal Immunity
Official Capacity
Precedent
Prosecutorial Immunity
Qualified Immunity
Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Reasonable Belief
Respondeat Superior
Sovereign Immunity

Interstate Compact
Jurisdiction
Juvenile
Marriage
Parole
PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act
Pretrial Detainee
Probation
Programs
Release Notification
Release Date
Religion
Segregation
Sentence
Sentence Reduction
Sex Offender
Statute of Limitations
Transfer

25. INTAKE AND ADMISSIONS
Subtopics:
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Bedding
Classification
Clothing
Delay
Hygiene Items
Identification
Length
Medical Screening
Medication
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Procedures
Psychological Screening
Refusal to Admit
Restraints
Rules
Screening
Searches
Search- Property
Showers
Suicide
Telephone
Towels
Translator
Use of Force

23. HYGIENE- PRISONER PERSONAL
Subtopics:
Bedding
Clothing
Hair
Hot Water
Housekeeping
Hygiene
Hygiene Items
Indigent Prisoners
Isolation
Laundry
Razor
Rodents/Pests
Shaving
Shoes
Showers
Sinks
Toilet Paper
Toilets
Toothpaste
Water

26. JUVENILES
Subtopics:
Access to Court
Classification
Communication with Parents
Conditions
Credit
Diversion
Due Process
Equal Protection
Failure to Protect
False Arrest
IDEA-Indiv. w/Disabilities Education Act

24. IMMUNITY
Subtopics:
Absolute Immunity
Bivens Claims
Eleventh Amendment
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims Act
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
Good Faith Defense
Governmental Immunity
Individual Capacity
Insurance

XXVI

xxi

Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
Fines
FLSA- Fair Labor Standards Act
FTCA- Federal Tort Claims Act
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
Good Faith Defense
Good Faith Immunity
Governmental Immunity
Governmental Liability
Heck Rule
Individual Capacity
Injunctive Relief
Insurance
Liability
Municipal Liability
Negligence
Negligent Hiring
Negligent Retention
Negligent Supervision
Nominal Damages
Official Capacity
Personal Liability
PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act
Policies/Procedures
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Private Operator
Private Provider
Punitive Damages
Qualified Immunity
Quasi-Judicial Immunity
Reckless Indifference
Religious Land Use and Inst. Persons Act
(RLUIPA
Remedies
RLUIPA- Religious Land Use and Inst.
Persons Act
Respondeat Superior
Sanctions
Settlement
Sovereign Immunity
Special Master
State Liability
Statutes (preventing lawsuits)
Supervisory Liability
Termination of Order
Tort Law
Tort Liability
VAWA- Violence Against Women Act
Vicarious Liability
Violation of Court Order
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)

Isolation
Medical Care
Medication
Mental Commitment
Parole
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Preventive Detention
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Privacy
Programs
Release
Religion
Remedies
Right to Treatment
Search
Sentence
Separation
State Liability
Suicide
Suicide Attempt
Supervision
Transfer
Trial as Adult
Use of Force
27. LIABILITY
Subtopics:
Alien
Alien Tort Claims Act (ACTA)
ATCA- Alien Tort Claims Act
Bivens Claim
Civil Liability
Class Action
Compensatory Damages
Consent Decree
Consent Decree- Modification
Consent Decree- Termination
Contempt
Contract Services
Court Monitor
Covenant- Not-To-Sue
Damages
Defenses
Deliberate Indifference
Failure to Act
Failure to Direct
Failure to Intervene
Failure to Protect
Failure to Supervise
Failure to Train
Fair Housing Act (FHA)
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
False Claims Act (FCA)
FCA- False Claims Act

XXVI

xxii

AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Alcohol/Drugs
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Cells
Children
Contagious Diseases
Contract Services
Costs
Delay in Treatment
Delay of Care
Deliberate Indifference
Denial
Dental Care
Diagnosis
Emergency Care
Equal Protection
Equipment
Examination Facilities
Examinations
Experimentation
Eye Care
Facilities
Failure to Provide Care
Female Prisoners
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983
GID- Gender Identity Disorder
Handicap
Hearing Impaired
Hospital
Inadequate Care
Informed Consent
Intake Screening
Interference
Interference with Treatment
Interpreter
Involuntary Medication
Involuntary Nourishment
Involuntary Treatment
Isolation
Juvenile
Malpractice
Medication
Mental Health
Methadone
Misdiagnosis
Negligence
Personnel
Policies
Pretrial Detainee
Pretrial Detention
Privacy
Private Physician
Private Provider

28. MAIL
Subtopics:
Attorney Mail
Bulk Mail
Censorship
Confiscation
Correspondence
Corres.- Court
Corres.- Friends, Relatives
Delay
Delivery
e-Mail
Forwarding
Indigent Inmates
Inspection of Mail
Interference
Isolation
Language
Legal Mail
Limitation
Limiting Correspondents
Limiting Language
Media
Notice
Opening Mail
Outgoing Mail
Packages
Post Cards
Postage
Privileged Correspondence
Privileged Mail
Prohibition
Prohibition- Corres. with Jurors
Prohibition- Publications
"Publisher-Only" Rule
Reading of Mail
Refusal
Regulations
Rejecting Mail
Religion
Religious Literature
Security Practices
Seizure
Seizure- Outgoing Mail
Waiver
Withholding Correspondence
29. MEDICAL CARE
Subtopics:
Abortion
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Adequacy of Care

XXVI

xxiii

Pretrial Detention
Privacy
Private Provider
Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill
Individuals Act (PAMII)
Psychiatric Care
Psychotropic Drugs
Records
Restraints
Retardation
Right to Treatment
Segregation
Sentence
Sex Offenders
Special Housing
Staff
Suicide
Supervision
Training
Transfer
Use of Force
Waiver

Prostheses
Psychotropic Drugs
Quarantine
RA- Rehabilitation Act
"Reasonable Care"
Records
Records-Access
Rehabilitation Act (RA)
Release
Religion
Restraints
Right to Refuse
Sick Call
Smoke
Smoke-free Environment
Special Diets
Special Housing
Staff
Suicide
Suicide Attempt
Training
Transfer
Translator
Transplant
Transportation
Transsexual
Treatment
Wheelchair
Work Assignment
X-Ray

31. PERSONNEL
Subtopics:
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act
ADEA- Age Discrimination in Employment
Act
Age Discrimination
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Assignment
Association
Attorney
Back Pay
Benefits
BFOQ- Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Clothing
Contract
Contractors
Demotion
Disability
Discipline
Discrimination
Drug Testing
Due Process
Equal Opportunity
Equal Pay Act
Equal Protection
Failure to Protect
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
FLSA- Fair Labor Standards Act

30. MENTAL HEALTH
Subtopics:
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Commitment
Communication
Confinement
Death Penalty
Delay In Care
Deliberate Indifference
Detention
Due Process
Equal Protection
Evaluation
Failure to Provide Care
Hospitalization
Intake Screening
Involuntary Medication
Juvenile
Medication
Padded Cells
PAMII- Protection and Advocacy for Mentally
Ill Individuals Act

XXVI

xxiv

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Assessment of Costs
Attorney Visits
Bail
Bail Reform Act (BRA)
BRA- Bail Reform Act
Cell Capacity
Cell Searches
Cells
Civil Commitment
Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act (CRIPA)
Classification
Clothing
Clothing-Court Appearances
Commissary
Conditions
Contact Visits
CRIPA- Civil Rights of Inst. Persons Act
Crowding
Discipline
Discrimination
Diversion
Drug Test
Due Process
Equal Protection
Exercise
Facility Plans
Failure to Protect
False Arrest
False Imprisonment
Females
Food
Good Time
Grievance
Hair
Handicap
Home Detention
Initial Appearance
Intake Screening
Involuntary Medication
Juveniles
Law Libraries
"Least Restrictive Means"
Length
Mail
Medical Care
Medication
Mental Health
Methadone Treatment
Packages
Parity with Sentenced
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Pre-Sentence Detention
Preventive Detention

FMLA- Family Medical Leave Act
Free Speech
Harassment
Hiring/Qualifications
Holidays
Hostile Work Environment
Interpreter
Investigation
Legal Services
Liberty Interest
Mandatory Retirement
Marriage
Military Service
Negotiation
Overtime
Pay Parity
Physical Requirements
Political Affiliation
Polygraph
Privacy
Probation
Promotion
Property Interest
Prosecution
Protection From Harm
Psychological Screening
Qualifications
Racial Discrimination
Religion
Retaliation
Retention
Retirement
Schedule
Searches
Sex Discrimination
Sexual Harassment
Staffing Levels
Strikes
Supervision
Suspension
Termination
Title VII
Training
Transfers
Union
Worker’s Compensation
Working Conditions
Work Rules
32. PRETRIAL DETENTION
Subtopics:
Access to Court
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Alien

XXVI

xxv

Drug Testing
Expungement
Family Relationships
Forcible Injection
Health
Internet
Interpreters
Mail
Media
Medical Care
Medical Issues
Nudity
Observation by Staff
Parole
Privacy Act
Psychological Services
Records
Removal from Program
Right of Privacy
Searches
Sex Offenders
Staff
Staff of Opposite Sex
Telephone Calls
View by Inmates
View by Staff
Visitors

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Privacy
Probable Cause
Programs
Protection
Protective Custody
Psychological Services
Publications
Punishment
RA- Rehabilitation Act
Recreation
Rehabilitation Act (RA)
Release
Release- Condition
Religion
Restraints
Rights Retained
Safety
Sanitation
Searches
Segregation
Sentence Reduction
Separation
Sex Offenders
Sexual Assault
Speedy Trial
Staffing
State Interest
Suicide
Suicide Attempt
Supervision
Telephone
Temporary Release
Transfer
Transport
Unlawful Detention
Use of Force
Visits
Voting
Windows
Work
Wrongful Death

34. PROGRAMS-PRISONER
Subtopics:
Administrative Segregation
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Alcohol/Drugs
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Art
Counseling
Crafts
Crisis Intervention
Drug
Due Process
Educational
Equal Protection
Handicapped
Hobbies
I.D.E.A.- Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act
Incentives
Individuals with Disabilities Educ. Act (IDEA)
Juveniles
Liberty Interest
Parity- Male/Female
Participation
Pretrial Detainees
Psychiatric

33. PRIVACY
Subtopics:
Acquired Immune Def. Syndrome (AIDS)
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Attorney-Client Communications
Automobile
Blood Test
Confidential Information
Crowding
DNA

XXVI

xxvi

Credit
Delay
Discrimination
Disposition of Property
Due Process
Early Release
Electronic Monitoring
Equal Protection
Ex Post Facto
Expiration of Sentence
Failure to Protect
Furloughs
Good-Time
Graduated Release
Home Detention
Involuntary Commitment
Juvenile
Liability-Release of Prisoner
Liberty Interest
Medical Care
Medication
Notification
Pardon
Parole
Parole-Conditions
Parole-Denial
Parole-Due Process
Parole-Granting
Parole-Guidelines
Parole- Hearing
Parole- Interpreter
Parole-Liability
Parole-Policies
Parole-Revocation
Parole-Searches
Parole Violations
PLRA- Prison Litigation Reform Act
Pre-Release
Pretrial Release
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
Probation/Revocation
Release Date
Release on Bond
Release on Recognizance
Release Site
Retaliation
Sentence
Sentence Conditions
Sentencing to Parole
Sex Offenders
Supervised Release
Temporary Release
Timely Release
Veterans

Psychological
Psychological Counseling
Racial Discrimination
Rehabilitation
Release
Religion
Removal from Program
Requirements
Right to Treatment
Segregation
Sex Offender
Training
Treatment Programs
Vocational
Work/Study
35. PROPERTY- PRISONER PERSONAL
Subtopics:
Confiscation
Crowding
Destruction of Property
Disposition of Funds
Disposition of Property
Inmate Funds
Interest
Jewelry
Legal Material
Limitations
Loss of Property
Money
Plumbing
Pre-Release
Prohibited Property
Receipts
Retirement
Searches
Showers
Social Security
Stamps
Storage
Toilets
Transfer between Prisoners
Veterans
36. RELEASE
Subtopics:
ADA- Americans with Disabilities Act
Alien
Alternatives to Confinement
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Bail
Civil Commitment
Compassionate Release
Conditional Release

XXVI

xxvii

Satanism
Searches
Search by Female
Services
Sincerity
Soap
Sweat Lodge
Tobacco
Visits
Volunteers
Work
38. RULES AND REGULATIONSPRISONER
Subtopics:
Access to Attorney
Access to Court
Access to Religion
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Artificial Insemination
Beards
Books
Clothing
Correspondence
Custody Level
Disturbance
Drug Testing
Due Process
Enforcement
Facial Hair
Free Expression
Grooming
Hair
Hair Length
Hats
Inmate-Run Business
Items Permitted
Jewelry
Language
Liberty Interest
Mail
Makeup
Media Access
Notice
Outgoing Mail
Packages
Pretrial Detainees
Property
Publications
"Publisher-Only" Rule
Religion
Religious Articles

Victim
Work Release
37. RELIGION
Subtopics:
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Admission Procedures
Appearance
Articles
Beards
Blood Tests
Books
Chaplain
Classification
Clothing
Correspondence
Costs
Counseling
Death Penalty
Diet
Equal Protection
Establishment Clause
Fast
Forced Exposure
Free Exercise
Freedom of Religion
Hair
Hair Length
Hats
Jewelry/Ornaments
Mail
Medical Care
Name
Opportunity
Opportunity to Practice
Opportunity to Worship
Parole
Place to Worship
Privacy
Publications
Recognized Religions
Regulations
Regulation- Name
Religious Articles
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
Religious Land Use & Inst. ersons Act
(RLUIPA)
Restrictions
RFRA-Religious Freedom Restoration Act
RLUIPA- Religious Land Use & Inst. Persons
Act

XXVI

xxviii

Restraints
Riot
Safety
Safety Regulations
Satanism
Searches
Searches- Cell
Security Practices
Security Restrictions
Segregation
Separation
Sex Offender
Staffing
Supermax
Telephone
Telephone Calls
Transfer
Transportation
Use of Force
Video Surveillance
Visits
Weapon
Wheelchair
Windows
Work

Restrictions
Right to Marry
Rules
Rules- Items Permitted
Smoking
Supermax
Transsexual
Violation
Visits
Volunteers
Work
39. SAFETY AND SECURITY
Subtopics:
Access to Attorney
Audio Communication
Books
Cell Capacity
Classification
Cleaning Supplies
Clothing
Confidential Information
Contact Visits
Contraband
Crowding
Discretion
Disturbance
Emergency Drill
Escape
Evacuation
Exercise
Exposure to Chemicals
Facial Hair
Fire
Fire Safety
Gangs
Hair
Hair Length
Hats
Items Permitted
Jewelry
Keys
"Lock-In"
Locks
Lock Down
Mail
Media Access
Pretrial Detainees
Protection
Publications
Religion
Religious Articles
Religious Groups
Religious Services

XXVI

40. SANITATION
Subtopics:
Bedding
Cells
Clothing
Common Areas
Crowding
Food Service
Haircutting
Hair Length
Hot Water
Housekeeping
Kitchen
Laundry
Plumbing
Rodents/Pests
Sanitation
Sewerage
Showers
Sinks
Toilets
Water
41. SEARCHES
Subtopics:
Attorney Search
Automobile
Blood Tests
xxix

Body Cavity Search
Body Searches
Cell Searches
Contraband
Cross Gender
Damage to Property
DNA- Deoxy Ribonucleic Acid
Dogs
Drug/Alcohol Testing
Drug Test
Employee
Evidence
Frisk Search
Juvenile
Laxatives
Living Areas
Opposite Sex
Parolees
Pat Down Search
Pretrial Detainees
Pretrial Release
Privacy
Probationers
Property
Qualified Immunity
Retaliation
Same-Sex Search
Sanitation
Search of Property
Search of Prosthetic
Search Warrant
"Shakedowns"
Strip Searches
Urine Test
Use of Force
Vehicle
Visits
Visitor Searches
X-Ray

Capital Punishment
Clemency
Community Service
Consecutive Sentences
Conditions
Credit
Delay
Double Jeopardy
Equal Protection
Expiration
Ex Post Facto
Federal Probation Act
Fines
Furlough
Good-Time
Guidelines
House Arrest
Indigency
Insanity
Involuntary Commitment
Legal Costs
Liberty Interest
Minimum Sentence
Original Sentence
Pardon
Parole
Place of Imprisonment
Presentence Report
Pretrial Confinement
Probation
Probation- Conditions
Probation- Revocation
Probation- Search
Probation- Violation
Recommendation
Reduction of Sentence
Reduction
Restitution
Review
Revocation
Sentence
Sentence to Parole
Sex Offenders
Supervised Release
Super. Release-- Conditions

42. SERVICES- PRISONER
Subtopics:
Commissary
Commission
Haircut
Idleness
Indigent Inmates
Library
Right to Treatment
Telephone

44. STANDARDS
Subtopics:
Accreditation
Federal Standards
International Standards
Professional Standards
Standards
State Regulations

43. SENTENCE
Subtopics:
Banishment

XXVI

xxx

Mental Health
Mental Institution
Notification
Other State
Payment of Expenses
Pretrial Detainees
Private Facility
Purpose
Records
Reprisal
Restraints
Retaliation
Right to Counsel
Searches
State Statute
Transfer
Transportation
Transsexual

State Standards
State Statutes
United Nations Standards
45. SUPERVISION
Subtopics:
Assignment
Audio Communication
Cell Checks
Communication Systems
Cross Gender Supervision
Deliberate Indifference
Electronic Surveillance
Failure to Supervise
Female Officers
Female Staff
Inadequate Supervision
Prisoner Checks
Probation
Staff Assignment
Staffing Levels
Surveillance
Video Surveillance

48. USE OF FORCE
Subtopics:
Brutality
Cell Extraction
Chemical Agents
Deadly Force
Disturbance
Dogs
Excessive Force
Failure to Direct
Failure to Protect
Fire Hose
Pepper Spray
Restraining Chair
Restraints
Stinger Grenade
Stun Belt
Stun Gun
Taser
Threatening
Use of Force

46. TRAINING
Subtopics:
Failure to Train
Medical Care
Mental Health
Medical Screening
Negligence
Screening
Training
47. TRANSFERS
Subtopics:
Access to Attorney
Access to Court
Court Transfer
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Denial
Discipline
Distance
Due Process
Equal Protection
Facility
Failure to Protect
Foreign Countries
Habeas Corpus
Interstate Compact
Law Library
Liberty Interest
Mail
Medical Care

XXVI

49. VISITING
Subtopics:
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS)
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
AIDS- Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Attorney
Attorney Scheduling
Attorney Search
Children
Conjugal Visit
xxxi

Involuntary Servitude
Liberty Interest
Medical Restrictions
Payment
Pretrial Detainees
Prison Industries
Private Sector
Property Interest
Refusal to Work
Religion
Removal From Job
Right to Work
Safety
Security Searches
Segregation
Slavery
Supervision
Termination
Transfer
Unsentenced Prisoners
Work Assignments
Work Conditions
Work Release
Work Stoppage

Contact Visits
Denial of Visits
Family
Female Prisoners
Former Employees
Former Prisoners
Frequency
Identification
Liberty Interest
Media
Pretrial Detainees
Privacy
Racial Discrimination
Restrictions
Rules
Scheduling
Searches
Segregation
Special Visits
Spouses
Termination of Visits
Time Limits
Video
Visiting
Visitor Searches
Volunteers
50. WORK- PRISONER
Subtopics:
ADA-Americans with Disabilities Act
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
Assignment
Benefits
Chain Gang
Compensation
Consent Decree
Deductions From Pay
Deduction From Wages
Discipline
Discrimination
Due Process
EEOC- Equal Employment Opp. Comm'n
Employee
Equal Opportunity
Equal Protection
Exposure to Chemicals
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
FLSA- Fair Labor Standards Act
Forced Labor
Free Speech
Good-Time
Idle Pay
Idleness
Injury

XXVI

xxxii

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

TABLE OF CASES
A.A. v. New Jersey, 176 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.N.J. 2001). 13,
27, 33
A.L.A. v. West Valley City, 26 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 1994).
33
A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372
F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 2004). 26
A.N.R. Ex Rel. Reed v. Caldwell, 111 F.Supp.2d 1294
(M.D.Ala. 2000). 21, 32
Aaron v. Finkbinder, 793 F.Supp. 734 (E.D.Mich. 1992),
affirmed, 4 F.3d 993. 25, 29
Abarca v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 75 F.Supp.2d 566
(E.D.Tex. 1999). 9, 10, 31
Abbott v. McCotter, 13 F.3d 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). 35
Abbott v. Meese, 824 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 28, 38
Abdool-Rashaad v. Seiter, 690 F.Supp. 598 (S.D. Ohio
1987). 37, 38
Abdul Jabbar-Al Samad v. Horn, 913 F.Supp. 373 (E.D.Pa.
1995). 39, 37
Abdul-Akbar v. Department of Corrections, 910 F.Supp.
986 (D.Del. 1995). 1
Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307 (3rd Cir. 2001). 1
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 1993). 1, 27
Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 775 F.Supp. 735 (D. Del. 1991). 1
Abdul-Hakeem v. Koehler, 910 F.2d 66 (2nd Cir. 1990). 22,
47
Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301 (10th Cir. 2010).
18, 37
Abdullah v. Gunter, 949 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1995. 1, 35
Abdullah v. Smith, 465 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. 1983). 12, 37
Abdullah v. Washington, 437 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.D.C.
2006). 9, 10, 27, 29
Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C.
2008.) 2, 10, 29, 38
Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker, 450 F.3d 350 (8th Cir.
2006). 1, 21
Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996). 1
Abdur-Raheem v. Selsky, 806 F.Supp.2d 628 (W.D.N.Y.
2011). 3
Abdur-Rahman v Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d
489 (6th Cir. 1995). 37
Abdur-Raqiyb v. Erie County Medical Center, 536
F.Supp.2d 299 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 29, 37
Abdush-Shahid v. Coughlin, 933 F. Supp. 168 (N.D.N.Y.
1996). 18, 29, 33
Abed v. Armstrong, 209 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2000). 8, 20, 22
Abernathy v. Perry, 869 F.2d 1146 (8th Cir. 1989). 3, 8
Abney v. Alameida, 334 F.Supp.2d 1221 (S.D.Cal. 2004).
1, 2, 4, 35
Abney v. Jopp, 655 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 7, 10,
14
Abodeen v. Bufardi, 75 Fed.Appx. 822 (2nd Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 1
Abordo v. State of Hawaii, 938 F.Supp. 656 (D.Hawai'i
1996). 7, 37, 38
Abrams v. Hunter, 910 F.Supp. 620 (M.D.Fla. 1995). 14, 45
Abrazinski v. Dubois, 876 F.Supp. 313 (D.Mass. 1995). 11
Abrazinski v. DuBois, 940 F.Supp. 361 (D.Mass. 1996). 11
Abshire v. Walls, 830 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1987). 5, 32, 41
Abuhouran v. U.S., 595 F.Supp.2d 588 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 9,
10, 27, 29
Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128 (3rd Cir. 1998). 1, 19, 38,
49

TC-1
XXVI

Acevedo v. Forcinito, 820 F.Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1993). 1
Ackerman v. Giles, 105 S.Ct. 2114 (1985). 17, 41
ACLU of Maryland of Wicomico County, MD., 999 F.2d
780 (4th Cir. 1993). 49
Acoolla v. Angelone, 186 F.Supp.2d 670 (W.D.Va. 2002). 1
Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st Cir.
2006). 1, 27, 29, 32
Adair v. U.S., 497 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 2, 31
Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2003). 14
Adams v. Banks, 663 F.Supp.2d 485 (S.D.Miss. 2009). 9,
10, 29
Adams v. Bouchard, 591 F.Supp.2d 1191 (W.D.Okla.
2008). 1, 31, 48
Adams v. Bradshaw, 484 F.Supp.2d 753 (N.D.Ohio 2007).
1, 22, 48
Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973). 1
Adams v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 485
F.Supp.2d 940 (N.D.Ill. 2007). 29, 32
Adams v. Drew, 906 F.Supp. 1050 (E.D.Va. 1995). 14, 29,
33
Adams v. Ellis, 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952). 22
Adams v. Franklin, 111 F.Supp.2d 1255 (M.D.Ala. 2000).
24, 29, 32
Adams v. Hansen, 906 F.2d 192 (5th Cir. 1990). 48
Adams v. James, 784 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1986). 1, 50
Adams v. James, 797 F.Supp. 940 (M.D.Fla. 1992). 50, 47
Adams v. Kincheloe, 743 F.Supp. 1393 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
11, 18
Adams v. Mathis, 458 F.Supp. 302 (N.D. Ala. 1978). 12
Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537 (11th Cir. 1995). 14, 29
Addison v. Pash, 961 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1992). 11, 38
Adem v. Bush, 425 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). 1, 7, 22
Adewale v. Whalen, 21 F.Supp.2d 1006 (D.Minn. 1998).
16, 24, 25, 32, 41, 46, 48
Adeyola v. Gibon, 537 F.Supp.2d 479 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
38, 41, 49
Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004). 37, 38, 50
Adkins v. Martin, 699 F.Supp. 1510 (W.D. Okl. 1988). 11,
22, 41
Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009). 11, 14
Adler v. Menifee, 293 F.Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 8
Admire v. Strain, 566 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.La. 2008). 31
Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana
Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 583
(E.D.La. 2010). 27, 30
Advocacy Center for Elderly and Disabled v. Louisiana
Dept. of Health and Hospitals, 731 F.Supp.2d 603
(E.D.La. 2010). 9, 27, 30
Advocacy Center v. Stalder, 128 F.Supp.2d 358 (M.D.La.
1999). 1, 2, 30
Africa v. Horn, 998 F.Supp. 557 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 3, 29, 37
Africa v. Vaughan, 998 F.Supp. 552 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 19, 38,
49
Ageel v. Seiter, 781 F.Supp. 517 (S.D. Ohio 1991),
affirmed, 966 F.2d 1451. 37, 38
Agster v. Maricopa County, 406 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2005).
32, 48
Agster v. Maricopa County, 486 F.Supp.2d 1005 (D.Ariz.
2007). 5
Aguilera v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit
Board, 582 F.Supp. 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1983), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 237. 2
Aguilera v. Cook County Police and Corrections Merit
Board, 760 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S.Ct. 237. 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999). 31
Ahmad v. Ehrmann, 339 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Colo. 2004).
37, 38
Ahrens v. Thomas, 434 F.Supp. 873 (W.D. Mo. 1977). 8,
12, 14, 17, 18, 23, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 37, 38,
40, 44, 45, 47, 50
Aiello v. Kingston, 947 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1991). 38
Aiello v. Litscher, 104 F.Supp.2d 1068 (W.D.Wis. 2000).
19, 28, 38
Ainsworth v. Stanley, 317 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). 7, 33, 34
Ajala v. West, 106 F.Supp.3d 976 (W.D. Wisc. 2015). 7,
37, 38, 39
Akande v. Grounds, 555 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2009). 31
Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1301. 9, 10, 15
Akbar v. Borgen, 803 F.Supp. 1479 (E.D.Wis. 1992). 38
Akbar v. Fairman, 788 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1986). 4, 5, 11
Akbar v. Gross, 816 F.Supp. 501 (E.D.Wis. 1993). 11
Akella v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 67 F.Supp.2d 716
(E.D.Mich. 1999). 33
Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 1030 (6th Cir. 2003) 31
Akers v. Watts, 740 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2010). 28, 33, 39
Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012). 1, 8, 21, 29
Akines v. Shelby County Government, 512 F.Supp.2d 1138
(W.D. Tenn. 2007). 2, 31
Akridge v. Wilkinson, 351 F.Supp.2d 750 (S.D.Ohio 2004).
7, 31
Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F.Supp.2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009). 7,
22
Al Mutairi v. U.S., 644 F.Supp.2d 78 (D.D.C. 2009). 22
Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C.Cir. 2003). 7, 9, 22
Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584
F.Supp.2d 1314 (M.D.Ala. 2008). 2, 26, 34
Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). 7,
18, 19, 48
Alaka v. Elwood, 225 F.Supp.2d 547 (E.D.Pa. 2002). 6, 22
Al-Alamin v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1991). 37
Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). 1, 19,
28
Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). 1, 27, 28
Alamo v. Clay, 137 F.3d 1366 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 36
Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2008). 21, 27
Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2006). 1, 14,
Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2006). 29
Albert v. DePinto, 638 F.Supp. 1307 (D.Conn. 1986). 27,
48
Alberti v. Heard, 600 F.Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 9, 14,
45
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347 (5th Cir. 1995). 4, 15,
27
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 606 F.Supp. 478 (S.D. Tex. 1985).
45
Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220 (5th Cir. 1986). 14,
39, 45, 46
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris Co., 406 F.Supp. 649 (S.D. Tex.
1975). 7, 8, 15, 18, 23, 25, 29, 31, 32, 34, 39, 45, 46
Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Tex., 937 F.2d 984 (5th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1994. 9
Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir, 2012). 1, 21
Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014). 14, 21, 32
Albright v. U.S., 10 F.3d 790 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 31
Albro v. Onondaga County, N.Y., 677 F.Supp. 697 (N.D.
N.Y. 1988). 9, 10, 15, 39
Aldape v. Lambert, 34 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1994). 29, 41
Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2010). 24, 25, 48

TC-2
XXVI

Alevras v. Snyder, 49 F.Supp.2d 1112 (E.D.Ark. 1999). 22,
35, 43, 50
Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F.Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995). 26,
34, 44
Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, Ala., 766 F.Supp.2d
1214 (N.D.Ala. 2011). 1, 24, 29, 32
Alexander v. Gilmore, 202 F.Supp.2d 478 (E.D.Va. 2002).
11, 13, 27, 38
Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 1998). 1
Alexander v. Johnson, 217 F.Supp.2d 780 S.D.Tex. 2001).
22, 36
Alexander v. Perrill, 836 F.Supp. 701 (D. Ariz. 1993). 20,
36, 43
Alexander v. Perrill, 916 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1990). 27, 36
Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F.Supp.2d 298 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
34, 37, 50
Alexander v. State of Conn., 876 F.2d 277 (2nd Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2831. 1, 22
Alexander v. Tippah County, Miss., 351 F.3d 626 (5th Cir.
2003) 3, 9, 15
Alexander v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 514 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir.
2008). 36
Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F.Supp.2d 486 (D.Mass. 2012).
17, 27, 29
Alfrey v. U.S., 276 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2002). 14, 24, 27
Ali v. District of Columbia, 278 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
37, 47
Ali v. U.S., 743 F.Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1990). 1, 47
Alicea v. Howell, 387 F.Supp.2d 227 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 11,
41
Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F.Supp.2d 1124 (S.D.Cal. 1999). 22
Aliwoli v. Gilmore, 127 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997). 1, 22
Aliym v. Miles, 679 F.Supp. 1 (W.D. N.Y. 1988). 37, 38
Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060 (2nd Cir.
1989). 27, 48
Al-Jundi v. Mancusi, 926 F.2d 235 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 182. 27, 48
Alkire v. Irving, 305 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2002). 1, 32
Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 208 F.Supp.2d 520 (E.D.Pa. 2002). 12,
18, 37, 39
Allah v. Brown, 351 F.Supp.2d 278 (D.N.J. 2004). 1, 24, 28
Allah v. Goord, 405 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 7, 14,
29, 39
Allah v. Menei, 844 F.Supp. 1056 (E.D.Pa. 1994). 37
Allah v. Milling, 982 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2013). 3, 8,
32
Allah v. Poole, 506 F.Supp.2d 174 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 19,
38, 50
Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3rd Cir. 2000). 1, 3
Allaway v. McGinnis, 473 F.Supp.2d 378 (W.D.N.Y.
2007). 48
Allegheny County Prison Emp. v. County of Allegh., 315
F.Supp.2d 728 (W.D.Pa. 2004). 31, 39, 41
Allen v. Board of Com'rs of County of Wyandotte, 773
F.Supp. 1442 (D. Kan. 1991). 14, 17, 32, 41
Allen v. City & County of Honolulu, 39 F.3d 936 (9th Cir.
1994). 1, 12
Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 816 F.Supp. 1501
(D.Hawaii 1993). 1, 9, 11, 12, 14
Allen v. City of New York, 480 F.Supp.2d 689 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). 14, 16, 48
Allen v. Clements, 930 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.Colo. 2013). 1,
7, 34, 43
Allen v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77 (2nd. Cir. 1995). 19, 28
Allen v. Cuomo, 100 F.3d 253 (2nd Cir. 1996). 4, 11, 35, 50

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Allen v. Ford, 880 F.Supp.2d 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). 15, 27,
29, 50
Allen v. Higgins, 902 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1990). 5, 24, 28
Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). 31
Allen v. Iranon, 99 F.Supp.2d 1216 (D.Hawai'i 1999). 31
Allen v. Leis, 213 F.Supp.2d 819 (S.D.Ohio 2002). 4, 32
Allen v. Lowder, 875 F.2d 82 (4th Cir. 1989). 27, 36
Allen v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 405 (6th
Cir. 1999). 31
Allen v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corr., 128
F.Supp.2d 483 (S.D.Ohio 2001). 31
Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1994). 1, 12, 24
Allen v. Schiff, 908 F.Supp.2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 2, 31
Allen v. Thomas, 388 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2004). 19, 35
Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563 2 (9th Cir. 1987). 37, 39
Allen v. Wood, 970 F.Supp. 824 (E.D.Wash. 1997). 19, 21,
28, 35
Allen v. Woodford, 543 F.Supp.2d 1138 (E.D.Cal. 2008).
17, 24, 29
Alley v. Angelone, 962 F.Supp. 827 (E.D.Va. 1997). 14, 27,
50
Allison v. GEO Group, Inc., 611 F.Supp.2d 433 (E.D.Pa.
2009). 25, 32, 41
Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2003). 7, 34
Allman v. Koehler, 554 N.Y.S.2d 842 (A.D. 1990). 31
Allred v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 109 F.Supp.2d 390 (E.D.Pa.
2000). 22, 36
Almon v. Reno, 192 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999). 22
Almond v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 425
F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 31
Alnutt v. Cleary, 913 F.Supp. 160 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 11, 47
Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012). 28,
38, 39
Al-Ra'Id v. Ingle, 69 F.3d 28 (5th Cir. 1995). 35, 37
Alsina-Ortiz v. Laboy, 400 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2005). 14, 29
Alsobrook v. Alvarado, 986 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla.
2013). 8, 14, 29
Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2011). 1, 29,
39, 48
Alston v. Howard, 925 F.Supp. 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 29
Alston v. Read, 663 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2011). 36, 43
Altizer v. Deeds, 191 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 1999). 19, 28
Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1009. 8, 50
Altman v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 251 F.3d 1199
(8th Cir. 2001). 31
Al-Turki v. Robinson, 762 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2014). 29
Alvarado v. Battaglia, 539 F.Supp.2d 1022 (N.D.Ill. 2008).
24, 48
Alvarado v. Litscher, 267 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2001). 9, 10, 29
Alvarado v. Westchester County, 22 F.Supp.3d 208
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 21, 29, 44
Alvarado-David v. U.S., 972 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.Puerto Rico
2013). 9, 15, 27, 39
Alvarez Kerkado v. Otero de Ramos, 693 F.Supp. 1366 (D.
Puerto Rico 1988). 14, 24
Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir. 2008). 37
Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2012). 13, 27, 37
Alves v. Murphy, 530 F.Supp.2d 381 (D.Mass. 2008). 2, 7,
8, 9
Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315 (D.C.Cir. 2012). 7,
22, 27
Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2011). 2, 7, 14,
17, 21
Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 19, 38

TC-3
XXVI

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 693 F.Supp.2d
1130 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 2, 31, 33, 45
Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017
(9th Cir. 2014). 31, 33, 45
Ambrose v. Young, 474 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 2007). 10, 38,
50
Amen-Ra v. Department of Defense, 961 F.Supp. 256
(D.Kan. 1997). 1, 7, 36
American Civil Liberties of Missouri Foundation v.
Lombardi, 23 F.Supp.3d 1055 (W.D.Mo. 2014). 7
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v.
Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015). 1,
19, 28, 32
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v.
Livingston County, 23 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich.
2014). 1, 19, 27, 28
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670
F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). 7, 43
American Fed. of Gov. Emp., Local 2441 v. FLRA, 864
F.2d 178 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 31
American Fed. of Gov. Employees v. Barr, 794 F.Supp.
1466 (N.D.Cal. 1992). 2, 31
American Federation of Gov. Emp. Council 33 v. Meese,
688 F.Supp. 547 (N.D. Cal. 1988). 31, 41
American Federation of Gov. Emp. Council 33 v.
Thornburgh, 720 F.Supp. 154 (N.D. Calif. 1989). 31
American Humanist Ass’n v. U.S., 63 F.Supp.3d 1274
(D.Or. 2014). 37
American Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59
(8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 565. 1
Americans United For Separation of Church and State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries, 432 F.Supp.2d 862
(S.D.Iowa 2006). 19, 27, 34, 37
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th
Cir. 2007). 1, 4, 37
Ames v. Randle, 933 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 9, 15,
23, 24, 27, 40
Ammirato v. Hanberry, 797 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1986). 36,
43
Ammons v. Lemke, 426 F.Supp.2d 866 (W.D.Wis. 2006).
29
Amobi v. District of Columbia Government, 882 F.Supp.2d
78 (D.D.C. 2012). 16, 31
Amos v. Higgins, 996 F.Supp.2d 810 (W.D.Mo. 2014). 19,
44
Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2008). 3, 24
Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Systems, Inc., 195 F.3d
584 (10th Cir. 1999). 16, 32
Anaya v. New Mexico State Personnel Bd., 762 F.2d 909
(N.M.App. 1988). 31
Andersen v. McCotter, 100 F.3d 723 (10th Cir. 1996). 19,
31
Andersen v. McCotter, 205 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2000). 31
Anderson ex rel. Cain v. Perkins, 532 F.Supp.2d 837
(S.D.Miss. 2007). 17, 29, 30, 32
Anderson v. Angelone, 123 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 1997). 37
Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F.Supp.2d 1133 (D.Colo. 2012).
3, 10, 12, 29, 30
Anderson v. Colorado, Dept. of Corrections, 848 F.Supp.2d
1291 (D.Colo. 2012). 3, 12, 29, 30
Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310 (9th Cir. 1995).
3, 9, 15, 30, 32
Anderson v. D.C. Public Defender Service, 881 F.Supp. 663
(D.D.C. 1995). 1

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Anderson v. Davis, 279 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 2002). 43
Anderson v. Fiedler, 798 F.Supp. 544 (E.D.Wis. 1992). 35
Anderson v. Gutschenritter, 836 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1988).
14, 27, 32
Anderson v. McCotter, 3 F.Supp.2d 1223 (D.Utah 1998). 31
Anderson v. Nassau County Dept. of Corrections, 558
F.Supp.2d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 2, 31
Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 848. 23, 32, 41
Anderson v. Recore, 317 F.3d 194 (2nd Cir. 2003). 36, 50
Anderson v. Redman, 429 F.Supp. 1105 (D. Del. 1977). 8,
15, 29, 40
Anderson v. Romero, 72 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 1995). 8, 12, 27,
33, 42
Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2000). 14, 32
Anderson v. Sullivan, 702 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 3,
11, 27, 48
Anderson v. Sundquist, 1 F.Supp.2d 828 (W.D.Tenn. 1998).
1, 4, 33
Anderson v. Vasquez, 827 F.Supp. 617 (N.D. Cal. 1992)
modified 28 f.3d 104. 38, 49
Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51
(D.D.C. 2006). 1, 29, 39, 47, 48
Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217 (D.N.J.
2000). 2, 27, 29
Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). 1, 29
Andrews v. Glenn, 768 F.Supp. 668 (C.D. Ill. 1991). 10, 29
Andrews v. Siegel, 929 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1991). 14
Andujar v. City of Boston, 760 F.Supp. 238 (D. Mass.
1991). 16, 46
Anela v. City of Wildwood, 595 F.Supp. 511 (D. N.J.
1984). 16, 27
Anela v. City of Wildwood, 790 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949. 6, 9, 17, 27, 32
Anglin v. City of Aspen, 562 F.Supp.2d 1304 (D.Colo.
2008). 17, 29, 46, 48
Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1205
(D.Colo. 2008). 17, 24, 29, 32, 46
Anglin v. City of Aspen, Colo., 552 F.Supp.2d 1229
(D.Colo. 2008). 17, 29, 32
Angulo v. Nassau County, 89 F.Supp.3d 541 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). 1, 21, 28
Annoreno v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, 823 F.Supp.2d
860 (C.D.Ill. 2011). 1, 14, 21, 32
Anthony v. Burkhart, 28 F.Supp.2d 1239 (M.D.Fla. 1998).
7, 21, 24, 50
Anthony v. County of Sacramento Sheriff's Dept., 845
F.Supp. 1396 (E.D. Cal. 1994). 1, 2, 7, 31
Antoine v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045
(E.D.Cal. 2008). 1, 27, 32, 48
Anton v. Sheriff of DuPage County, Ill., 47 F.Supp.2d 993
(N.D.Ill. 1999). 9, 10, 14, 29, 32
Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1996). 9, 12,
15, 18, 19, 28, 29, 30, 42
Antonelli v. Sheahan, 863 F.Supp. 756 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 37
Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). 1,
9, 10, 12, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 41
Arce v. Banks, 913 F.Supp. 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 10, 29
Arce v. O'Connell, 427 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 7,
9, 29
Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329 (2nd Cir. 1998). 3
Arce v. Walker, 58 F.Supp.2d 39 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). 1, 47
Arce v. Walker, 907 F.Supp. 658 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 12
Archer v. Reno, 877 F.Supp. 372 (E.D. Ky. 1995). 17, 34

TC-4
XXVI

Archuleta v. Wagner, 523 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2008). 17,
24, 25, 32, 41
Ard v. Rushing, 911 F.Supp.2d 425 (S.D.Miss. 2012). 2, 14,
17, 45, 46
Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). 3, 7, 8,
39, 42, 47, 49
Aref v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013). 1, 9, 19,
27, 39
Arey v. Robinson, 819 F.Supp. 478 (D.Md. 1992). 11, 33,
38
Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008).
2, 31
Arias v. United States Parole Commission, 648 F.2d 196
(3rd Cir. 1981). 36
Arizona ex rel. Horne v. Geo Group, Inc., 816 F.3d 1189
(9th Cir. 2016). 31
Arline v. City of Jacksonville, 359 F.Supp.2d 1300
(M.D.Fla. 2005). 16, 32, 36
Arlt v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 229 F.Supp.2d
938 (D.Mo. 2002). 7, 34, 50
Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D.Ill. 2013). 16,
36, 43
Arment v. Henry, 658 F.2d 663 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1983). 11
Armstrong v. Bertrand, 336 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2003). 22, 26
Armstrong v. Brown, 103 F.Supp.3d 1070 (N.D. Ca. 2015).
3, 7, 27
Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). 2, 7, 15,
21, 29, 36
Armstrong v. Brown, 857 F.Supp.2d 919 (N.D.Cal. 2012).
9, 15, 21, 27
Armstrong v. Brown, 939 F.Supp.2d 1012 (N.D.Cal. 2013).
9, 15, 29, 34
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001). 7, 36
Armstrong v. Davis, 318 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2003). 5
Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2006). 7, 22,
27
Armstrong v. Lane, 771 F.Supp. 943 (C.D. Ill. 1991). 34, 47
Armstrong v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 196
F.Supp.2d 673 (M.D.Tenn. 2002). 27, 44
Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2010). 2, 7, 9, 15, 21, 27
Armstrong v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 976 F.Supp. 17
(D.D.C. 1997). 2, 13, 33
Arney v. Simmons, 26 F.Supp.2d 1288 (D.Kan. 1998). 1,
19, 39
Arney v. Simmons, 923 F.Supp. 173 (D.Kan. 1996). 2, 35,
42
Arney v. Thornburgh, 817 F.Supp. 83 (D.Kan. 1993). 7, 8
Arnold on Behalf of H.B. v. Lewis, 803 F.Supp. 246
(D.Ariz. 1992). 17, 29, 30
Arnold v. Cody, 951 F.2d 280 (10th Cir. 1991). 22, 36
Arnold v. Jones, 891 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1989). 14, 24, 48
Arnold v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 843 F.Supp.
110 (D.S.C. 1994). 10, 39, 50
Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). 7, 9, 15, 33,
39, 45
Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.Supp.3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). 7, 27
Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). 2, 34,
36
Arroyo Lopez v. Nuttall, 25 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). 14, 27, 37
Arroyo v. Schaefer, 548 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1977). 7, 48
Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2001). 1, 2, 4, 35
Arsberry v. Seilaff, 586 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1978). 3, 11
Arteaga v. State, 532 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Ct.App. 1988). 24

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Arthur v. Allen, 574 F.Supp.2d 1252 (S.D.Ala. 2008). 10
Artuz v. Bennett, 121 S.Ct. 361 (2000). 22
Artway v. Scheidemantel, 671 F.Supp. 330 (D. N.J. 1987).
11, 35
Ash v. Reilly, 354 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004). 22, 36
Ash v. Reilly, 433 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.D.C. 2006). 22, 36
Ashann-Ra v. Com. Of Virginia, 112 F.Supp.2d 559
(W.D.Va. 2000). 9, 10, 21, 33, 45
Ashelman v. Wawrzaszek, 111 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1997).
18, 37
Ashford v. Barry, 737 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990). 35, 38
Ashford v. District of Columbia, 306 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.
2004). 8, 14, 47
Ashford v. U.S., 511 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2007). 8, 14, 25, 27
Ashker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 224 F.Supp.2d
1253 (N.D.Cal. 2002). 19, 28, 39
Ashker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 350 F.3d 917
(9th Cir. 2003) 19, 28, 38, 39
Ashmus v. Calderon, 31 F.Supp.2d 1175 (N.D.Cal. 1998).
22
Askew v. Fairman, 880 F.Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 9
Askew v. Sheriff of Cook County, Ill., 568 F.3d 632 (7th
Cir. 2009). 27, 32, 48
Aspinall v. Thomas, 118 F.Supp.3d 664 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
31
Asquith v. Department of Corrections, 186 F.3d 407 (3rd
Cir. 1999). 34, 36
Asquith v. Volunteers of America, 1 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.N.J.
1998). 11, 35, 36
Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2012). 7,
29, 33
Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of
Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011). 2, 24, 31
Astrada v. Howard, 979 F.Supp. 90 (D.Conn. 1997). 7, 16,
32
Aswegan v. Bruhl, 965 F.2d 676 (8th Cir. 1992). 29,
Aswegan v. Henry, 49 F.3d 461 (8th Cir. 1995). 10, 29
Aswegan v. Henry, 981 F.2d 313 (8th Cir. 1992). 1, 19
Atchison v. Collins, 288 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.2002). 1, 4, 35
Atkins v. City of Chicago, 441 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D.Ill.
2006). 7, 13, 16, 25
Atkins v. County of Orange, 372 F.Supp.2d 377 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). 17, 18, 23, 29, 30, 48
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2003). 9, 10, 29,
38
Attorney General v. Sheriff of Suffolk County, 477 N.E.2d
361 (Mass. Sup. Jud.Ct. 1985). 9, 15, 32
Attorney General v. Sheriff of Worcester County, 413
N.E.2d 722 (Mass. 1980). 8, 23, 40
Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.Pa. 2008). 1, 35,
38
Atwood v. Vilsack, 338 F.Supp.2d 985 (S.D.Iowa 2004). 6,
7, 32, 43
Augustin v. Jablonsky, 819 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y.
2011). 25, 27, 32, 41
Aupperlee v. Coughlin, 97 F.Supp.2d 336 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
36, 50
Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1997). 22, 43
Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991). 16, 32
Austin v. Hopper, 15 F.Supp.2d 1210 (M.D.Ala. 1998). 10,
11, 19, 49, 50
Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 2003). 9, 26, 29
Austin v. Lehman, 893 F.Supp. 448 (E.D.Pa. 1995). 3, 42
Austin v. Pazera, 779 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2015). 11, 20, 22

TC-5
XXVI

Austin v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 876 F.Supp.
1437 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 5, 7, 27
Austin v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 685 (D.Del. 2009). 24, 27,
29
Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F.Supp.2d 719 (N.D.Ohio 2002).
3, 7, 8, 10, 38
Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (6th Cir. 2004). 3, 8, 9,
27, 39
Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 660 (N.D.Ohio 2006).
8, 39, 47
Austin v. Wilkinson, 502 F.Supp.2d 675 (N.D.Ohio 2006).
8, 39, 47
Avalos v. Baca, 517 F.Supp.2d 1156 (C.D.Cal. 2007). 2, 7,
36
Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). 7, 16, 27, 32,
36
Averhart v. Shuler, 652 F.Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ind. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1045, 484 U.S. 1073, affirmed,
834 F.2d 173. 1, 28
Avratin v. Bermudez, 420 F.Supp.2d 1121 (S.D.Cal. 2006).
10, 14, 48
Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). 2, 14,
21, 27, 29, 32, 46
Awalt v. Marketti, 75 F.Supp.3d 777 (N.D.Ill. 2014). 14, 32
Ayers v. Rone, 852 F.Supp. 18 (E.D. Mo. 1994). 49
Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 1998). 11, 27
Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.Supp.2d 70 (D.Me. 2013). 14, 24,
35, 44
Aziz v. Moore, 8 F.3d 13 (8th Cir. 1993). 37
Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F.Supp. 460 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). 7, 10, 37, 39, 41, 48
Babcock v. Butler County, 806 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2015). 31
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996). 8, 47
Bachman v. Jeffes, 488 F.Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 36
Bacon v. Taylor, 414 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2006). 1, 9, 19
Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1991). 22, 34
Bader v. Wren, 532 F.Supp.2d 308, (D.N.H. 2008). 34, 37
Bader v. Wrenn, 675 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2012). 37, 47
Baez v. Rapping, 680 F.Supp. 112 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 8, 24,
29
Bafford v. Nelson, 241 F.Supp.2d 1192 (D.Kan. 2002). 48
Baggett v. Ashe, 41 F.Supp.3d 113 (D.Mass. 2014). 17, 24,
33, 41
Baggett v. Keller, 796 F.Supp.2d 718 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 8,
20, 36
Bagguley v. Barr, 893 F.Supp. 967 (D.Kan. 1995). 1, 28
Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1997). 14, 24, 50
Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 597 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Minn.
2009). 7, 25, 32
Bahrampour v. Lampert, 356 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004). 19,
24, 28, 38, 39
Bailey v. Feltmann, 810 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2016). 25, 29, 32
Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1516. 29, 34
Bailey v. Hughes, 815 F.Supp.2d 1246 (M.D.Ala. 2011). 9,
10, 15, 41, 48
Bailey v. Pataki, 636 F.Supp.2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 7, 24,
30, 47
Bailey v. Pataki, 722 F.Supp.2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 7, 36
Bailey v. Shillinger, 828 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1987). 8, 9, 10,
12, 39
Bailey v. Wood, 708 F.Supp. 249 (D.Minn. 1989), reversed,
909 F.2d 1197. 5
Bailey v. Wood, 909 F.2d 1197 (8th Cir. 1990). 10, 14, 27
Bailor v. Taylor, 170 F.Supp.2d 466 (D.Del. 2001). 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Baird v. Alameida, 407 F.Supp.2d 1134 (C.D.Cal. 2005).
18, 29
Baker County Medical Services, Inc. v. U.S. Atty. Gen.,
763 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). 4, 29
Baker v. Blanchette, 186 F.Supp.2d 100 (D.Conn. 2001). 29
Baker v. Cuomo, 842 F.Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 19
Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F.Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972). 8,
10, 12, 26, 39
Baker v. Haun, 333 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Utah 2004). 15, 27
Baker v. Holden, 787 F.Supp. 1008 (D. Utah 1992). 9
Baker v. Kernan, 795 F.Supp.2d 992 (E.D.Cal. 2011). 8, 10,
39
Baker v. Krieger, 287 F.Supp.2d 207 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 1,
21
Baker v. Lehman, 932 F.Supp. 666 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 14, 39,
50
Baker v. Lyles, 904 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1990). 11, 39
Baker v. McCollan, 99 S.Ct. 2689 (1979). 7, 16
Baker v. McNeil Island Corrections Center, 859 F.2d 124 2
(9th Cir. 1988). 50
Baker v. North Carolina Dept. of Corr., 354 S.E.2d 733
(N.C. App. 1987). 27, 50
Baker v. Piggott, 833 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2918. 1, 35, 38
Baker v. RR Brink Locking Systems, Inc., 721 F.3d 716 (5th
Cir. 2013). 14, 15, 32, 39
Baker v. St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, No. 832536 (8th Cir. 1984). 14
Baker v. State Dept. of Rehabilitation, 502 N.E.2d 261
(Ohio App. 1986). 14, 27
Baker v. U.S., 670 F.3d 448 (3rd Cir. 2012). 9, 27
Baker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 118 F.Supp.3d 985
(N.D. Ill. 2015). 29
Baker v. Wilkinson, 635 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.La. 2009). 9,
27, 29
Baker v. Willett, 42 F.Supp.2d 192 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 24,
27, 32, 48
Baker v. Zlochowon, 741 F.Supp. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 1
Balas v. Taylor, 567 F.Supp.2d 654 (D.Del. 2008). 2, 31
Baldwin v. Stalder, 137 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1998). 48
Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015). 1, 7, 9, 10,
15, 27
Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F.Supp.2d 639 (M.D.La. 2013). 9, 15,
29
Ball v. Sledd, 814 F.Supp. 48 (D.Kan. 1993). 3
Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Correction, 119 F.Supp.3d 1271
(D. Idaho 2015). 27
Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012). 4, 5
Ballance v. Virginia, 130 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2000).
19, 35, 38, 39, 41
Ballance v. Young, 130 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Va. 2000). 1,
28, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41
Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 3, 11,
32, 34, 35, 37, 41
Ballard v. Woodard, 641 F.Supp. 432 (W.D.N.C. 1986). 29,
37, 48
Baltoski v. Pretorius, 291 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ind. 2003)
21, 37
Bame v. Dillard, 637 F.3d 380 (D.C.Cir. 2011). 24, 25, 32,
41
Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2009). 1, 3, 11
Bane v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 267 F.Supp.2d 514
(W.D.Va. 2003). 24, 27, 39, 48
Banker v. County of Livingston, 782 F.Supp.2d 39
(W.D.N.Y. 2011). 9, 17, 33, 36

TC-6
XXVI

Banks v. Annucci, 48 F.Supp.3d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 1,
18, 35, 37
Banks v. Beard, 399 F.3d 134 (3rd Cir. 2005). 3, 19, 35, 38,
39
Banks v. Fauver, 801 F.Supp. 1422 (D.N.J. 1992). 3, 8
Banks v. Havener, 234 F.Supp. 27 (E.D. Vir. 1964). 37, 38,
39
Banks v. Klapish, 717 F.Supp. 520 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 11,
24
Banks v. Person, 49 F.Supp.2d 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 36, 48
Banks v. Sheahan, 914 F.Supp. 231 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 1
Banks v. United States, 614 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1980). 43
Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). 1, 2, 9,
15, 21, 23, 24, 27, 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 40, 46, 47
Bannan v. Angelone, 962 F.Supp. 71 (W.D.Va. 1996). 1, 35
Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 1 (10th Cir. 1954). 38
Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1995). 11, 29,
50
Bao Ge v. Li Peng, 201 F.Supp.2d 14 (D.D.C. 2000). 7, 50
Baptist v. Lane, 708 F.Supp. 920 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 1, 8, 47
Baptist v. O'Leary, 742 F.Supp. 975 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 50
Barajas v. Waters, 815 F.Supp. 222 (E.D.Mich. 1993),
affirmed, 21 F.3d 427. 9
Baraldini v. Thornburgh, 884 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 8,
17, 47
Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 2007). 18, 37
Barbaro v. U.S. ex rel. Federal Bureau of Prisons FCI
Otisville, 521 F.Supp.2d 276, (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 27, 29
Barber v. City of Salem, Ohio, 953 F.2d 232 (6th Cir.
1992). 14, 32,46,
Barber v. Grow, 929 F.Supp. 820 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 14, 50
Barber v. U.S. Attorney General, 458 F.Supp.2d 1378
(S.D.Ga. 2006). 1, 28
Barber v. Wall, 66 Fed.Appx. 215 (1st Cir. 2003).
[unpublished] 4, 11, 35
Barbour v. Haley, 410 F.Supp.2d 1120 (M.D.Ala. 2006). 1
Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2006). 1
Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476 (3rd Cir. 1990). 22, 43
Bardzik v. County of Orange, 635 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011).
2, 31
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923 (11th Cir. 1989). 8, 47
Barham v. Ramsey, 338 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C. 2004). 32,
36
Barker v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 513 F.3d 831 (8th
Cir. 2008). 31
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (6th Cir. 1972). 32
Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307 (3rd
Cir. 2014). 14, 29
Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169 (2nd Cir. 2001). 36
Barnes v. Alves, 10 F.Supp.3d 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). 1
Barnes v. Black, 544 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2008). 1, 22
Barnes v. Broward County Sheriff's Office, 190 F.3d 1274
(11th Cir. 1999). 5, 31
Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y.
2015). 7, 9, 15, 21, 32, 40, 48
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C.
2011). 6, 25, 32, 36
Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C.
2013). 1, 36
Barnes v. Fedele, 760 F.Supp.2d 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 18,
37, 38
Barnes v. Gov. of the Virgin Islands, 415 F.Supp. 1218 (D.
V.I. 1976). 8, 12, 18, 25, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 50
Barnes v. Parker, 972 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1992). 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Barnes v. Ross, 926 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 7, 29,
30
Barnes v. Wilson, 110 F.Supp.3d 624 (D. Md. 2015). 28, 48
Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1994). 1, 8, 49
Barnett v. Rogers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 18, 37
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 2 (10th Cir. 1998). 7, 9,
17, 23, 27, 39, 40, 45, 46
Baron v. Hickey, 242 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.Mass. 2003). 31
Baron v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 402 F.3d 225 (1st
Cir. 2005). 31
Barone v. Hatcher, 984 F.Supp. 1304 (D.Nev. 1997). 11
Barouch v. United States Department of Justice, 87
F.Supp.3d 10 (D.C.D.C, 2015). 31, 39
Barq v. Daniels, 428 F.Supp.2d 1147 (D.Or. 2006). 22, 34
Barrett v. Belleque, 544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008). 11, 20,
28, 38
Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.N.H. 2003) 29
Barrett v. Premo, 101 F.Supp.3d 980 (D. Or. 2015). 19, 27,
28
Barrett v. U.S., 845 F.Supp. 774 (D.Kan. 1994). 14, 27, 39
Barrie v. Grand County, Utah, 119 F.3d 862 (10th Cir.
1997). 14, 32
Barrington v. New York, 806 F.Supp.2d 730 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). 14, 21, 24, 27, 48
Barron v. Keohane, 216 F.3d 692 (8th Cir. 2000). 22, 29
Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152 (3rd
Cir. 1997). 22,43
Barry v. Luzerne County, 447 F.Supp.2d 438 (M.D.Pa.
2006). 31
Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F.Supp. 1235 (S.D.Cal. 1997). 29
Barstow v. Kennebec County Jail, 115 F.Supp.2d 3 (D.Me.
2000). 39, 41
Barstow v. Shea, 196 F.Supp.2d 141 (D.Conn. 2002). 16,
31
Bartholomew v. Reed, 477 F.Supp. 223 (D. Ore. 1979). 3, 8
Bartholomew v. Watson, 665 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1982). 11
Bartlett v. Pearson, 406 F.Supp.2d 626 (E.D.Va. 2005). 8,
9, 10, 29, 38
Basciano v. Lindsay, 530 F.Supp.2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
8, 22, 32, 39
Baskerville v. Blot, 224 F.Supp.2d 723 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 1,
21, 29
Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98 (2nd Cir. 1992). 18, 37
Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999). 11, 12
Bass v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir. 2002). 31
Bates v. Wright, 738 F.Supp. 386 (D. Ore. 1990). 11
Batista v. Kelly, 854 F.Supp. 186 (W.D.N.Y. 1994),
affirmed, 50 F.3d 2. 11
Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011). 7, 17, 29
Battle v. A & E Television Networks, LLC, 837 F.Supp.2d
767 (M.D.Tenn. 2011). 19, 33, 49
Battle v. Anderson, 614 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980). 1
Battle v. Barton, 970 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1992), cert denied,
113 S.Ct. 1300. 11
Battle v. Central State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126 (11th Cir.
1990). 1, 29
Batton v. State Government of North Carolina, Executive
Branch, 501 F.Supp. 1173 (E.D. N.C. 1980). 36
Batts v. Richards, 4 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.Conn. 1998). 3, 8, 47
Bauer v. Henman, 731 F.Supp. 903 (S.D. Ill. 1990). 1, 22
Baugh v. Woodard, 808 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1987). 30, 47
Baum v. Webb, 863 F.Supp. 918 (E.D. Ark. 1994). 31
Baumann v. Walsh, 36 F.Supp.2d 508 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 14,
29, 39, 50
Bausch v. Cox, 32. F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Wis. 1998). 1

TC-7
XXVI

Bausch v. Sumiec, 139 F.Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.Wis. 2001).
34, 36, 37
Baxter v. Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1085. 20, 22
Baxter v. Palmigiano, Enomoto v. Clutchette, 425 U.S. 308
(1976). 7, 11, 20
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 7, 30
Baylis v. Taylor, 475 F.Supp.2d 484 (D.Del. 2007). 1, 29,
30
Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 124 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 1997). 39, 49
Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 423 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 2005). 19, 38,
39, 49
Beadle v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Dept., 29 F.3d 589
(11th Cir. 1994). 31
Beagle v. Schwarzenegger, 107 F.Supp.3d 1056 (E.D. Cal.
2014). 29
Bean v. Cunningham, 650 F.Supp. 709 (D.N.H. 1986). 1,
29, 35, 47, 48
Bear v. Kautzky, 305 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2002). 1, 19
Beard v. Livesay, 798 F.2d 874 (6th Cir. 1986). 8, 47
Beardslee v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005). 10
Beardsley v. Moore, 765 F.Supp. 560 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 8,
18
Beasley v. City of Sugar Land, 410 F.Supp.2d 524
(S.D.Tex. 2006). 17, 32, 41
Beasley v. Duncil, 792 F.Supp. 485 (S.D.W.Va. 1992),
affirmed, 9 F.3d 1107. 50
Beasley v. Konteh, 433 F.Supp.2d 874 (N.D.Ohio 2006).
37, 38
Beasley v. Wharton, 682 F.Supp. 1234 (M.D. Ga. 1988).
19, 38, 49
Beatty v. Davidson, 713 F.Supp.2d 167 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
27, 29, 32, 46
Beauchamp v. Sullivan, 21 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994). 1, 38
Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). 2, 7,
12, 19, 39, 41, 42, 47, 48
Beck v. Kansas University Psychiatry Foundation, 671
F.Supp. 1552 (D. Kan. 1987). 24, 27, 36
Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330 (8th Cir. 2001). 29
Beck v. Symington, 972 F.Supp. 532 (D.Ariz. 1997). 1, 4
Beckett v. Dept. of Corrections of Delaware, 981 F.Supp.
319 (D.Del. 1997). 31
Beckford v. Department of Corrections, 605 F.3d 951 (11th
Cir. 2010). 2, 31
Beckford v. Irvin, 49 F.Supp.2d 170 (W.D.N.Y. 1999). 7, 8,
9, 10, 12, 23, 27, 29
Beckwith v. Hart, 263 F.Supp.2d 1018 (D.Md. 2003). 27,
48
Bedell v. Schiedler, 770 F.2d 909 (Or. 1989). 15, 22
Bednar v. County of Schuylkill, 29 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.Pa.
1998). 27, 29, 31
Bee v. Greaves, 669 F.Supp. 372 (D. Utah 1987). 5
Bee v. Greaves, 910 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1990). 27, 29, 30
Bee v. Utah State Prison, 823 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1987). 1
Beebe v. Heil, 333 F.Supp.2d 1011 (D.Colo. 2004). 7, 34,
36
Beebe v. Phelps, 650 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1981). 17, 36
Beeks v. Hundley, 34 F.3d 658 (8th Cir. 1994). 35, 43
Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002). 4, 18,
37
Beerheide v. Suthers, 82 F.Supp.2d 1190 (D.Colo. 2000). 4,
18, 37
Beeson v. Johnson, 668 F.Supp. 498 (E.D. N.C. 1987). 9,
29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Bektic-Marrero v. Goldberg, 850 F.Supp.2d 418 (S.D.N.Y.
2012). 14, 18, 27, 29
Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 7, 22
Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.
2013). 2, 8, 14, 17, 25, 29, 30, 32, 46
Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir.
1994). 14, 24, 46
Belcher v. Oliver, 898 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1990). 14, 24, 25,
32
Belgard v. State of Hawaii, 883 F.Supp. 510 (D. Hawaii
1995). 37, 38
Belk v. Purkett, 15 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1994). 36
Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2002). 1, 13, 21, 35
Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997 (6th Cir. 2005). 1, 13, 27
Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2006). 1, 14, 21
Bell v. Lindsay, 116 F.Supp.3d 511 (D. Md. 2015). 9, 15,
32
Bell v. Luna, 856 F.Supp.2d 388 (D.Conn. 2012). 9, 10, 23,
24, 29
Bell v. Manson, 427 F.Supp. 450 (D. Conn. 1976). 32, 39,
41
Bell v. Stalder, 111 F.Supp.2d 796 (W.D.La. 2000). 37, 38
Bell v. Stigers, 937 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1991). 30, 32
Bell v. True, 356 F.Supp.2d 613 (W.D.Va. 2005). 22
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 7, 9, 11, 15, 28, 32,
38, 39, 41, 49
Bellamy v. Wells, 548 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.Va. 2008). 7,
32, 33
Bell-Bey v. Williams, 87 F.3d 832 (6th Cir. 1996). 1, 19, 28
Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). 7, 13, 33, 36,
45
Bellis v. Davis, 186 F.3d 1092 (8th Cir. 1999). 22, 34, 43
Bellum v. Vose, 848 F.Supp. 1065 (D.Mass. 1994). 11, 20
Beltran v. O’Mara, 405 F.Supp.2d 140 (D.N.H. 2005). 1,
23, 32, 48
Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 771 F.Supp. 426 (D.D.C.
1991). 29, 33
Benavides v. County of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 79. 29, 31, 44, 46
Bender v. Regier, 385 F.3d 1133 (8th Cir. 2004). 29
Benedict v. Southwestern Pennsylvania Human Services,
Inc., 98 F.Supp.3d 809 (W.D. Va. 2015). 14, 34
Benefield v. McDowall, 241 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2001).
14, 24, 27
Benford v. Wright, 782 F.Supp. 1263 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 37
Benglen v. Zavaras, 7 F.Supp.2d 1171 (D.Colo. 1998). 14,
48
Benitez v. Gonda, 778 F.Supp. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
affirmed, 963 F.2d 1522. 12, 30, 47
Benitez v. Wolff, 907 F.2d 1293 (2nd Cir. 1990). 11
Benitez v. Wolff, 985 F.2d 662 (2nd Cir. 1993). 11
Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert
denied, 498 US 951. 19, 37, 38
Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 39 F.Supp.3d 635 (E.D.Pa. 2014).
25, 26, 41
Benjamin v. Fraser, 264 F.3d 175 (2nd Cir. 2001). 1, 15, 27,
32, 33, 39, 49
Benjamin v. Jacobsen, 172 F.3d 144 (2nd Cir. 1999). 27, 32
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 1997). 15, 27
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 923 F.Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 3,
27
Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F.Supp.2d 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 28,
32
Benjamin v. Koehler, 710 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 9

TC-8
XXVI

Benjamin v. Malcolm, 659 F.Supp. 1006 (S.D. N.Y. 1987).
9, 10, 15
Benner v. McAdory, 165 F.Supp.2d 773 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 14
Bennett v. Duckworth, 909 F.Supp. 1169 (N.D.Ind. 1995).
1, 22
Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1003. 48
Bennett v. United States Parole Commission, 41 F.Supp.3d
47 (D.D.C. 2014). 22
Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2004). 37
Benning v. Georgia, 845 F.Supp.2d 1372 (M.D.Ga. 2012).
27, 37, 38
Benning v. Georgia, 864 F.Supp.2d 1358 (M.D.Ga. 2012).
37, 38, 39
Benny v. O'Brien, 736 F.Supp. 242 (D.Kan. 1990). 1, 11
Benson v. County of Orange, 788 F.Supp. 1123 (C.D. Cal.
1992). 1, 49
Benson v. Godinez, 919 F.Supp. 285 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 9, 15
Benter v. Peck, 825 F.Supp. 1411 (S.D.Iowa 1993). 4, 29
Bentley v. Dennison, 852 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
24, 36, 43
Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013).
2, 9, 14, 19, 27, 29, 32, 47
Bentsen v. Ralston, 658 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1981). 17, 36
Benyi v. Broome County, N.Y., 887 F.Supp. 395 (N.D.N.Y.
1995). 8, 14
Benzel v. Grammer, 869 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 244. 3, 19
Beo v. District of Columbia, 44 F.3d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
47
Berch v. Stahl, 373 F.Supp. 412 (W.D. N.C. 1974). 1, 2, 3,
7, 8, 11, 17, 19, 28, 30, 33, 49
Berdine v. Sullivan, 161 F.Supp.2d 972 (E.D.Wis. 2001).
47, 49
Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895). 22
Bergen v. Spaulding, 881 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1989). 20, 36,
43
Bergeron v. Cabral, 535 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). 2,
31
Berke v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 942 F.Supp.2d 71
(D.D.C. 2013). 4, 5, 42
Berl v. Westchester County, 849 F.2d 712 (2nd Cir. 1988).
31
Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991). 22, 36
Bernadou v. Purnell, 836 F.Supp. 319 (D.Md. 1993). 1, 35
Bernard v. County of Santa Clara, 699 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir.
1983). 16, 32
Bernini v. City of St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012). 16,
48
Berrios-Berrios v. Thornburg, 716 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Ky.
1989). 17, 39, 49
Berry v. Baca, 379 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2004). 32, 36
Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 1999). 18, 49
Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 1994). 11, 29, 50
Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990).
14, 27, 39
Berry v. City of Phillipsburg, Kan., 796 F.Supp. 1400
(D.Kan. 1992). 27, 48
Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1982). 7, 27
Berry v. Oswalt, 143 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). 7, 12, 14,
17
Berry v. Peterman, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). 29
Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989). 9, 27
Berry v. Sherman, 365 F.3d 631 (8th Cir. 2004). 14
Berry v. State, 400 So.2d 80 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981). 36

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Berryhill v. Schriro, 137 F.3d 1073 (8th Cir. 1998). 7, 14
Berryman v. Epp, 884 F.Supp. 242 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 1, 2,
4
Berwanger v. Cottey, 178 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 1999). 15, 27
Best v. District of Columbia, 743 F.Supp. 44 (D. D.C.
1990). 7, 33
Best v. Essex County, N.J. Hall of Records, 986 F.2d 54
(3rd Cir. 1993). 9, 14,
Best v. Kelly, 879 F.Supp. 305 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 37
Best v. New York City Dept. of Correction, 14 F.Supp.3d
341 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 11, 14, 32, 47
Bettis v. Delo, 14 F.3d 22 (8th Cir. 1994). 3, 37
Betts v. McCaughtry, 827 F.Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1993),
affirmed, 19 F.3d 21. 7, 35, 38
Betts v. New Castle Youth Development Center, 621 F.3d
249 (3rd Cir. 2010). 12, 24, 26
Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500 (4th Cir. 1997). 3, 9, 23,
40.
Beville v. Ednie, 74 F.3d 210 (10th Cir. 1996). 1, 28
Bey v. Douglas County Correctional Facility, 540
F.Supp.2d 1194 (D.Kan. 2008). 18, 37
Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d 986 (2nd Cir. 1986). 37
Beyah v. Putman, 885 F.Supp. 371 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 1, 11
Beyerbach v. Sears, 49 F.3d 1324 (8th Cir. 1995). 29
Biancone v. Kramer, 513 F.Supp. 908 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
48
Bibbs v. Armontrout, 943 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1212. 50
Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267 (5th Cir. 2008). 9, 10, 15, 21
Bibeau v. Pacific Northwest Research Foundation, 188 F.3d
1105 (9th Cir. 1999). 13, 29
Biberdorf v. Oregon, 243 F.Supp.2d 1145 (D.Or. 2002). 16,
36
Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3rd Cir. 1995). 1, 19, 28
Bieros v. Nicola, 857 F.Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 1
Bigbee v. Nalley, 482 F.Supp.2d 1092 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 12
Bigbee v. U.S., 359 F.Supp.2d 806 (W.D.Wis. 2005). 35
Biggs v. Secretary of California Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 717 F.3d 678 (9th Cir. 2013). 22, 36
Bihms v. Klevenhagen, 928 F.Supp. 717 (S.D.Tex. 1996).
4, 29, 35
Bijeol v. Nelson, 579 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1978). 32, 40, 50
Billops v. Sandoval, 401 F.Supp.2d 766 (S.D.Tex. 2005).
27, 29, 45
Bills v. Dahm, 32 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 1994). 38, 49
Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980). 3, 8
Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280
(S.D.Fla. 2006). 7, 16, 25, 32
Bird v. Figel, 725 F.Supp. 406 (N.D. Ind. 1989). 7, 8, 9, 29
Birdine v. Gray, 375 F.Supp.2d 874 (D.Neb. 2005). 32, 33,
39, 48
Birrell v. Brown, 867 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1989). 9, 24
Birth v. Crabtree, 996 F.Supp. 1014 (D.Or. 1998). 22, 34,
43
Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2011). 8, 14, 25
Bishop v. Lewis, 155 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1998). 1, 21
Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 7
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3rd Cir. 2012). 3, 14, 27, 32
Bizzarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 2005). 31
Black v. Callahan, 876 F.Supp. 131 (N.D. Tex. 1995). 1
Black v. Delbello, 575 F.Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). 32, 47
Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395 (7th Cir. 1994). 11, 21
Black v. Selksy, 15 F.Supp.2d 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 11
Blackburn v. Snow, 771 F.2d 556 (1985). 24, 41, 49

TC-9
XXVI

Blackmon v. Crawford, 305 F.Supp.2d 1174 (D.Nev. 2004).
1
Blackmon v. Essary, 850 F.Supp. 814 (E.D. Mo. 1994). 19,
37
Blackmon v. Kukua, 758 F.Supp.2d 398 (S.D.Tex. 2010). 9,
10, 15
Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2013). 14, 26,
29, 30, 32, 47, 48
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890 (6th Cir.
2004). 29, 32
Blackstock v. Corrections Corp. of America, 660 F.Supp.2d
764 (W.D.La. 2009). 29
Blackston v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 499
F.Supp.2d 601 (D.Del. 2007). 29
Blades v. Schuetzle, 302 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2002). 7, 14
Blades v. Twomey, 553 N.Y.S.2d 215 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1990).
35
Blagman v. White, 112 F.Supp.2d 534 (E.D.Va. 2000). 21,
37, 42
Blair v. Graham Correctional Center, 782 F.Supp. 411
(C.D. Ill. 1992), affirmed 4 F.3d 996. 31, 37
Blair v. Loomis, 1 F.Supp.2d 769 (N.D.Ohio 1998). 19, 38,
39, 49
Blair-Bey v. Nix, 963 F.2d 162 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 620. 37
Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 22
Blair-Bey v. Quick, 159 F.3d 591 (D.C.Cir. 1998). 22, 36,
43
Blair-El v. Tinsman, 666 F.Supp. 1218 (S.D. Ill. 1987). 39,
48
Blaise v. Fenn, 48 F.3d 337 (8th Cir. 1995). 1, 28
Blake v. Berman, 625 F.Supp. 1523 (D. Mass. 1986). 1, 47
Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1989). 1
Blake v. Pryse, 444 F.2d 218 2 (8th Cir. 1971). 7, 23, 38, 39
Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015). 1, 21
Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.N.C. 2012). 1,
28, 32, 44
Blanco v. County of Kings, 142 F.Supp.3d 986 (E.D. Cal.
2015). 17, 32, 33
Blanco v. U.S., 433 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Puerto Rico 2006).
50
Blandford v. District of Columbia Jail, 593 F.Supp.2d 255
(D.D.C. 2009). 16, 32, 36
Blanken v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation & Correction, 944
F.Supp. 1359 (S.D.Ohio 1996). 31
Blankenship v. Gunter, 707 F.Supp. 1137 (D. Neb. 1988).
35
Blankenship v. Gunter, 898 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1990). 35, 37
Blankenship v. Virginia, 432 F.Supp.2d 607 (E.D.Va.
2006). 2, 14, 26, 44
Blanks v. Smith, 790 F.Supp. 192 (E.D. Wis. 1992). 39
Blaylock v. Painter, 901 F.Supp. 233 (W.D.Tex. 1995). 1
Bledsoe v. Biery, 814 F.Supp. 58 (D. Kan. 1993), affirmed,
992 F.2d 1222. 28
Blissett v. Casey, 147 F.3d 218 (2nd Cir. 1998). 5
Blissett v. Casey, 969 F.Supp. 118 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 5
Blizzard v. Watson, 892 F.Supp. 587 (D.Del. 1995). 3, 12
Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233 (3rd Cir. 1980). 36
Block v. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1984). 32, 41, 49
Bloom v. Toliver, 133 F.Supp.3d 1314 (N.D. Okla. 2015).
8, 11, 14, 32
Blossom v. Dart, 64 F.Supp.3d 1158 (N.D.Ill. 2014). 8, 15,
27, 32
Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423 (M.D.Fla. 1996). 16,
27

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Blumhagen v. Sabes, 834 F.Supp. 1347 (D.Wyo. 1993). 10,
29
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589
(1996). 27
Board of County Com'rs. of Bryan County, Okls. v. Brown,
117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997). 27, 31, 46, 48
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S.Ct. 2415 (1987). 36
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). 31
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001). 7, 24, 31
Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2005). 9, 15, 23,
29, 32
Bobbitt v. Detroit Edison Co., 216 F.Supp.2d 669
(E.D.Mich. 2002). 15, 17, 32, 46
Boblett v. Angelone, 942 F.Supp. 251 (W.D.Va. 1996). 4,
29
Boblett v. Angelone, 957 F.Supp. 808 (W.D.Va. 1997). 8,
10, 29
Boddie v. New York State Div. of Parole, 288 F.Supp.2d
431 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 1, 22, 36
Boddie v. New York State Division of Parole, 277
F.Supp.2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 1, 22, 36
Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857 (2nd Cir. 1997). 7, 11,
48
Bogan v. Stroud, 958 F.2d 180 (7th Cir. 1992). 27, 48
Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2000). 5
Bolden v. Alston, 810 F.2d 353 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 229. 3, 8, 11
Bolden v. Stroger, 306 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2004). 27,
30, 32
Boles v. Neet, 333 F.Supp.2d 1005 (D.Colo. 2004). 29, 37
Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). 37
Bolin v. Black, 875 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 542. 27, 48
Bollig v. Fiedler, 863 F.Supp. 841 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 34
Bolton v. Goord, 992 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 9, 10,
15, 44
Bolton v. U.S., 347 F.Supp.2d 1218 (N.D.Fla. 2004). 7, 17,
27
Bonacci v. Kindt, 868 F.2d 1442 (5th Cir. 1989). 1, 38
Bonadonna v. Grondolsky, 762 F.Supp.2d 311 (D.Mass.
2011). 20, 22, 34
Boncher ex rel. Boncher v. Brown County, 272 F.3d 484
(7th Cir. 2001). 1, 14, 32, 44
Bond v. Aguinaldo, 228 F.Supp.2d 918 (N.D.Ill. 2002). 1
Bond v. Aguinaldo, 256 F.Supp.2d 810 (N.D.Ill. 2003). 29
Bonebrake v. Norris, 417 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2005). 22, 43
Bonet v. Khahaifa, 512 F.Supp.2d 141 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 3,
11, 20
Bonner v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 714 F.Supp. 420
(D. Ariz. 1989). 8, 11, 34
Bonner v. Outlaw, 552 F.3d 673 (8th Cir. 2009). 28, 38
Bonner v. Parke, 918 F.Supp. 1264 (N.D.Ind. 1996). 11, 22
Bono v. Benov, 197 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 1999). 36
Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F.Supp. 934 (E.D. Ill. 1978). 3, 8, 9, 11,
38, 39
Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980). 2, 8, 9
Bonsol v. Perryman, 240 F.Supp.2d 823 (N.D.Ill. 2003). 22
Bony v. Brandenburg, 735 F.Supp. 913 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
10, 24, 48
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 668 F.3d
896 (7th Cir. 2012). 2, 12, 35
Bookless v. Bruce, 814 F.Supp. 52 (D. Kan. 1993). 1
Boomer v. Deperio, 405 F.Supp.2d 259 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
1, 21, 29

TC-10
XXVI

Boomer v. Irvin, 919 F.Supp. 122 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 37
Boomer v. Irvin, 963 F.Supp. 227 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 37
Booth v. Barton County, KS, 157 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D.Kan.
2001). 5, 7, 13, 17
Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000). 1, 21
Booth v. Churner,121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001). 1, 21, 27
Booth v. King, 346 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Pa. 2004). 1, 7, 10,
14
Booth v. Pence, 354 F.Supp.2d 553 (E.D.Pa. 2005). 29
Booth v. U.S., 996 F.2d 1171 (11th Cir. 1993). 20
Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2006). 14, 30
Boren v. Deland, 958 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1992). 41, 49
Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150 (6th Cir. 1991). 29
Borges v. Piatkowski, 337 F.Supp.2d 424 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
1, 21, 29
Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2004). 1, 4
Boring v. Kozakiewiez, 833 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1298. 1, 29
Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind.
2013). 2, 18, 37, 42
Borzych v. Frank, 340 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Wis. 2004). 37
Borzych v. Frank, 439 F.3d 388 (7th Cir. 2006). 19, 37, 38,
39
Bosse v. Baltimore County, 692 F.Supp.2d 574 (D.Md.
2010). 31
Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1989). 11, 22
Boswell v. Mayer, 169 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 1999). 1, 28
Botero Gomez v. U.S., 725 F.Supp. 526 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
22, 29, 36
Boudin v. Thomas, 543 F.Supp. 686 (S.D. N.Y. 1982). 3, 8,
17, 22, 32, 49
Boulware v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 186
(D.D.C. 2007). 2, 7, 34
Bounds v. O'Dell, 873 F.Supp. 221 (E.D. Mo. 1995). 50
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). 1, 7
Bourdon v. Loughren, 386 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2004). 1, 32
Bourgeois v. Hongisto, 488 F.Supp. 304 (S.D. N.Y. 1980).
29
Bout v. Bolden, 22 F.Supp.2d 646 (E.D.Mich. 1998). 8, 10,
29
Boutchee v. Grossheim, 11 F.3d 101 (8th Cir. 1993). 11
Boutwell v. Keating, 399 F.3d 1203 (10th Cir. 2005). 22, 34,
36
Boutwell v. Nagle, 861 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 2452. 22, 43
Bowdry v. Ochalla, 605 F.Supp.2d 1009 (N.D.Ill. 2009).
13, 36, 43
Bowen v. Hood, 202 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2000). 13, 34, 36
Bowen v. State Com'n of Correction, 461 N.Y.S.2d 668
(App. 1983). 15
Bowens v. City of Atmore, 171 F.Supp.2d 1244 (S.D.Ala.
2001). 14
Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.Supp.2d 977 (E.D.Wis. 2009). 3,
9, 23, 39, 48
Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F.Supp. 201 (N.D. Calif. 1981).
17, 33
Bowman v. Campbell, 850 F.Supp. 144 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).
29
Bowman v. City of Middletown, 91 F.Supp.2d 644
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 21, 32, 39, 42
Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 188 F.Supp.2d
870 (M.D.Tenn. 2000). 4, 7, 27, 29
Bowman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 350 F.3d 537
(6th Cir. 2003) 5, 27, 29
Bowrin v. U.S. I.N.S., 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999). 22

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977). 29, 30
Bowser v. Vose, 968 F.2d 105 (lst Cir. 1992). 36
Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2006). 7, 14
Boyce v. Fairman, 24 F.Supp.2d 880 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 14,
27, 29
Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2002). 14
Boyd v. Anderson, 265 F.Supp.2d 952 (N.D.Ind. 2003). 1,
3, 23, 39, 40, 49, 50
Boyd v. Arnone, 48 F.Supp.3d 210 (D.Conn. 2014). 37
Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of America, 380 F.3d 989 (6th
Cir. 2004). 1, 27
Boyd v. Coughlin, 914 F.Supp. 828 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 37,
34
Boyd v. Driver, 579 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 2009). 1, 14, 27
Boyd v. Harper, 702 F.Supp. 578 (E.D. Va. 1988). 14, 25,
32
Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 1995). 27, 29
Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). 7,
14, 17, 24, 27, 31, 45, 46
Boyd v. Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, 160 F.Supp.2d
213 (D.R.I. 2001). 29
Boyd v. Selmer, 842 F.Supp. 52 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). 48
Boyer v. City of Mansfield, 3 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D.Ohio
1998). 29, 32, 48
Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F.Supp.2d 1216 (M.D.Ala. 2002).
2, 25, 29, 30, 32, 46, 48
Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2005). 14, 29,
32, 39, 48
Brace v. Massachusetts, 673 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2009).
14, 17, 29, 32
Bracewell v. Lobmiller, 938 F.Supp. 1571 (M.D.Ala. 1996).
3, 9
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S.
484 (1973). 22
Bradley v. Fairfax, 634 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1980). 36
Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1995). 11, 19, 21
Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2011). 1,
9, 15, 32, 33
Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022 (5th Cir. 1998). 7, 23, 29
Bradshaw v. Lappin, 738 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.Colo. 2010).
2, 4, 35
Brady-Lunny v. Massey, 185 F.Supp.2d 928 (C.D.Ill.
2002). 19, 33
Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Dept., 788 F.Supp. 366
(N.D. Ill. 1992). 14, 17, 32
Bragado v. City of Zion/Police Dept., 839 F.Supp. 551
(N.D.Ill. 1993). 14, 25, 39, 45
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S.Ct. 2196 (1998). 7, 29
Braham v. Clancy, 425 F.3d 177 (2nd Cir. 2005). 1, 14, 21
Braithwaite v. Hinkle, 752 F.Supp.2d 692 (E.D.Va. 2010).
23, 37, 38
Brancaccio v. Reno, 964 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997). 47
Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2008). 7, 8
Brandon v. Allen, 516 F.Supp. 1355 (1981). 7, 14, 27, 31,
46, 48
Brannum v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 518 F.3d 542
(8th Cir. 2008). 31
Branton v. City of Moss Point, 503 F.Supp.2d 809
(S.D.Miss. 2007). 14, 25, 29, 32, 45, 46
Brashear v. Simms, 138 F.Supp.2d 693 (D.Md. 2001). 1, 9,
10, 38
Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.
2003). 2, 32, 36
Brassfield v. County of Cook, 701 F.Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1988). 27, 29, 45

TC-11
XXVI

Brathwaite v. Correctional Medical Services, 630 F.Supp.2d
413 (D.Del. 2009). 29
Braun v. Maynard, 652 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 2011). 24, 31, 41
Brauner v. Coody, 793 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2015). 23, 29, 40,
46
Brawley v. Washington, 712 F.Supp.2d 1208 (W.D.Wash.
2010). 10, 13, 17, 24, 29, 48
Brazier v. Oxford County, 575 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Me.
2008). 2, 17, 32, 41
Breads v. Moehrle, 781 F.Supp. 953 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 29,
30
Breakiron v. Neal, 166 F.Supp.2d 1110 (N.D.Tex. 2001). 4,
29, 35
Breazil v. Bartlett, 998 F.Supp. 236 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 11,
18
Bredbenner v. Malloy, 925 F.Supp.2d 649 (D.Del. 2013).
29
Breest v. Moran, 571 F.Supp. 343 (D. R.I. 1983). 22, 47
Breiner v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections, 610 F.3d 1202 (9th
Cir. 2010). 2, 31
Brennan v. Hendrigan, 888 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1989). 31
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 128 (N.D. Ca. 1972).
1, 2, 32, 34
Bressette v. New York State Div. of Parole, 2 F.Supp.2d
383 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 22, 36
Bressman v. Farrier, 825 F.Supp. 231 (N.D.Iowa 1993). 11,
28
Brewer v. Blackwell, 836 F.Supp. 631 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
dismissed 43 F.3d 1476. 29
Brewer v. City of Daphne, 111 F.Supp.2d 1299 (S.D.Ala.
1999). 14, 29, 30, 46
Brewer v. Parkman, 918 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1990). 31
Brewer v. Perrin, 349 N.W.2d 198 (Mich. App. 1984). 14,
25, 27, 45
Brewer v. Seiter, 838 F.Supp. 340 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 11, 24
Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816 (5th Cir. 1993), cert,
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1081. 1, 28
Brewster v. Nassau County, 349 F.Supp.2d 540 (E.D.N.Y.
2004). 1, 27, 32
Brewster v. Pike, 608 F.Supp. 1163 (W.D. Vir. 1985). 31
Brewton v. Hollister, 948 F.Supp. 244 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 3
Brian B. ex rel. Lois B. v. Com. Dept. of Educ., 230 F.3d
582 (3rd Cir. 2000). 26, 34
Brian B. v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Educ., 51 F.Supp.2d 611
(E.D.Pa. 1999). 26, 34
Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d
621(M.D.Pa. 2009). 2, 13, 17, 27, 29, 50
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). 1, 19
Bridges v. Rhodes, 41 Fed.Appx. 902 (8th Cir. 2002). 29
Bridgewater v. Taylor, 832 F.Supp.2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
14, 39, 45, 48
Briggs v. Waters, 484 F.Supp.2d 466 (E.D.Va. 2007). 31
Brinson v. McKeeman, 992 F.Supp. 897 (W.D.Tex. 1997).
1
Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3rd Cir. 2008). 1
Briscoe-King v. Terhune, 43 Fed.Appx. 45 (9th Cir. 2002)
[unpublished]. 31
Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2006). 14, 27
Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 1997). 37, 39
Brock v. Warren County, Tenn., 713 F.Supp. 238 (E.D.
Tenn. 1989). 9, 14, 29, 46
Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158 (2nd Cir. 2002). 29
Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2009). 21
Brodheim v. Rowland, 783 F.Supp. 1245 (N.D. Cal. 1991),
modified, 993 F.2d 716. 20, 22, 36, 43

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Brody v. McMahon, 684 F.Supp. 354 (N.D. N.Y. 1988). 9,
27
Broner v. Flynn, 311 F.Supp.2d 227 (D.Mass. 2004). 14, 24
Brookins v. Kolb, 990 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1993). 1, 47
Brookins v. Williams, 402 F.Supp.2d 508 (D.Del. 2005). 9,
29, 32
Brooks v. Andolina, 826 F.2d 1266 (3rd Cir. 1987). 8, 11,
19, 50
Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367 (4th Cir. 2012). 31
Brooks v. Austin, 720 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D.Pa. 2010). 32, 48
Brooks v. Berg, 289 F.Supp.2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 29, 30
Brooks v. Buscher, 62 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 1995). 1, 3
Brooks v. Difasi, 112 F.3d 46 (2nd Cir. 1997). 11
Brooks v. George County, Miss., 84 F.3d 157 (5th Cir.
1996). 27, 50
Brooks v. Kleiman, 743 F.Supp. 350 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 11,
12, 18
Brooks v. Prack, 77 F.Supp.3d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). 11,
20
Brooks v. Roy, 776 F.3d 957 (8th Cir. 2015). 34, 37
Brooks v. Roy, 881 F.Supp.2d 1034 (D.Minn. 2012). 27,
34, 37
Brooks v. State of Okl., 862 F.Supp. 342 (W.D. Okl. 1994).
43
Brooks v. State, 529 So.2d 313 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1988). 39
Brooks v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 959 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013). 2, 8, 33
Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 2 (5th Cir. 1994). 39,
48
Broulette v. Starns, 161 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D.Ariz. 2001). 19,
28, 38, 46
Broussard v. Johnson, 253 F.3d 874 (5th Cir. 2001). 11, 22
Broussard v. Johnson, 918 F.Supp. 1040 (E.D.Tex. 1996).
11, 20, 22
Brown Ex Rel. Indigenous Inmates v. Schuetzle, 368
F.Supp.2d 1009 (D.N.D. 2005). 19, 37
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 22
Brown v. Angelone, 938 F.Supp. 340 (W.D.Va. 1996). 11
Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2000). 15
Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2000). 15, 32
Brown v. Beard, 492 F.Supp.2d 474 (E.D.Pa. 2007). 1, 29
Brown v. Beck, 481 F.Supp. 723 (S.D. Ga. 1980). 29
Brown v. Benton, 452 F.Supp. 28 (W.D. Okl. 1978). 31
Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2004). 11, 20, 22
Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1993). 29
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2005). 7, 14
Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2010). 14, 29, 32,
46
Brown v. Carpenter, 889 F.Supp. 1028 (W.D.Tenn. 1995).
11, 19, 21
Brown v. City of Chicago, 573 F.Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ill.
1983). 27, 48
Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 603 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C.
2009). 2, 31
Brown v. Corsini, 657 F.Supp.2d 296 (D.Mass. 2009). 14,
21, 47, 50
Brown v. Coughlin, 758 F.Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 10,
29
Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3rd Cir. 2002). 1, 14, 21, 38
Brown v. Crowley, 312 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2002). 2, 11, 21,
35
Brown v. Cunningham, 730 F.Supp. 612 (D. Del. 1990). 3,
8, 47
Brown v. District of Columbia, 514 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir.
2008). 27, 29

TC-12
XXVI

Brown v. District of Columbia, 66 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.D.C.
1999). 3, 11, 13
Brown v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 602 F.Supp.2d 173
(D.D.C. 2009). 2, 33
Brown v. Fortner, 518 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2008). 14, 24, 39,
47
Brown v. Frey, 889 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1156. 3, 11, 24
Brown v. Hannah, 850 F.Supp.2d 471 (M.D.Pa. 2012). 7, 8,
11, 19, 21
Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2001). 14, 29, 32
Brown v. Hilton, 492 F.Supp. 771 (D. N.J. 1980). 11, 19,
28, 39, 41
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004). 29
Brown v. Livingston, 17 F.Supp.3d 616 (S.D.Tex. 2014).
27, 37, 38
Brown v. Massachusetts, 950 F.Supp.2d 274 (D.Mass.
2013). 8, 14, 21
Brown v. McBride, 929 F.Supp. 1132 (N.D.Ind. 1996). 34
Brown v. McElroy, 160 F.Supp.2d 699 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 9,
15, 23, 24, 40
Brown v. McFadden, 416 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2005). 20,
22
Brown v. McNeil, 591 F.Supp.2d 1245 (M.D.Fla. 2008).
22, 36
Brown v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 353 F.3d 1038 (8th
Cir. 2004). 14, 29, 39, 47
Brown v. Mitchell, 327 F.Supp.2d 615 (E.D.Va. 2004). 9,
15, 27, 29, 40, 46
Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). 7, 16,
34, 36, 43
Brown v. Moore, 93 F.Supp.3d 1032 (W.D. Ark. 2015). 8,
18, 19, 29, 44
Brown v. Neagle, 486 F.Supp. 364 (S.D. W.V. 1979). 3, 8,
20, 39
Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services,
583 F.Supp.2d 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 2, 31
Brown v. North Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 612 F.3d
720 (4th Cir. 2010). 14, 27, 45
Brown v. Oregon Dept. of Corrections, 751 F.3d 983 (9th
Cir. 2014). 8, 9, 11
Brown v. Pepe, 42 F.Supp.3d 310 (D.Mass. 2014). 33, 38
Brown v. Quigley, 853 F.Supp. 325 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 1, 28
Brown v. Scott, 329 F.Supp.2d 905 (E.D.Mich. 2004). 14
Brown v. Sheridan, 894 F.Supp. 66 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 29,
45
Brown v. Smith, 813 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987). 7, 10, 27,
48
Brown v. State of Tennessee, 693 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1982).
31
Brown v. Sumner, 701 F.Supp. 762 (D. Nev. 1988). 7, 34,
50
Brown v. Thompson, 868 F.Supp. 326 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 10,
24, 27, 29
Brown v. Wallace, 957 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1992). 17, 29
Brown v. Williams, 36 Fed.Appx. 361 (10th Cir. 2002). 1,
28, 33
Brown v. Williams, 399 F.Supp.2d 558 (D.Del. 2005). 9,
23, 32, 40
Brown v. Youth Services Intern. of South Dakota, 89
F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.S.D. 2000). 2, 14, 26, 27
Browne v. San Francisco Sheriff's Dept., 616 F.Supp.2d
975 (N.D.Cal. 2009). 29, 32, 48
Brown-El v. Delo, 969 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1992). 3
Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68 (8th Cir. 1994). 18, 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Brown-El v. Virginia Parole Bd., 948 F.Supp. 558 (E.D.Va.
1996). 20, 36
Brownell v. Figel, 950 F.2d 1285 (7th Cir. 1991). 29, 48
Browning v. Pennerton, 633 F.Supp.2d 415 (E.D.Ky. 2009).
14, 29
Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1995). 27, 34,
36
Brownlee v. Conine, 957 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1992). 1, 22,
29, 32
Brownlow v. Chavez, 871 F.Supp. 1061 (S.D. Ind. 1994).
10, 29
Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283 (9th Cir. 2003) 1, 21, 47
Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). 2, 14,
24, 29, 32, 45, 46
Bruner v. Rasmussen, 792 F.Supp. 731 (D.Utah 1992). 11
Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw, 846 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan.
2012). 2, 14, 27, 29
Bruns v. Halford, 913 F.Supp. 1295 (N.D.Iowa 1996). 3, 11
Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F.Supp. 609 (S.D. Ill. 1987), cert.
den., 491 U.S. 907, aff’d, 854 F.2d 162. 1, 8, 11, 12,
41, 48
Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 3193. 10, 39, 41, 47, 48, 49
Bryan v. Administrative of F.C.I. Otisville, 897 F.Supp. 134
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 37
Bryan v. Endell, 141 F.3d 1290 (8th Cir. 1998). 29
Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 865. 16, 27
Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233 (3rd Cir. 1975). 1, 28
Bryant v. City of New York, 404 F.3d 128 (2nd Cir. 2005).
32, 36
Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal. 2008). 3,
11, 19, 42
Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995). 37
Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). 15, 29
Bryant v. Maffucci, 729 F.Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1990),
affirmed, 923 F.2d 979. 17, 29, 33
Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 152. 17, 29
Bryant v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 559. 1, 35
Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008). 1, 21
Bryant v. Winston, 750 F.Supp. 733 (E.D. Va. 1990). 28
Buchanan v. Maine, 417 F.Supp.2d 24 (D.Me. 2006). 46, 48
Buchignani v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, 632 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. App. 1982). 2, 42
Buckley v. Barbour County, Ala., 624 F.Supp.2d 1335
(M.D.Ala. 2008). 14, 27, 46, 50
Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993). 11, 21, 35
Buckley v. Gomez, 36 F.Supp.2d 1216 (S.D.Cal. 1997). 7,
21, 28, 29
Buckley v. Rogerson, 133 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 1998). 3, 29,
39, 48
Buckley v. State Correctional Institution-Pine Grove, 98
F.Supp.3d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 7, 34
Buckner v. Hollins, 983 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1993). 14
Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). 7, 9, 12, 15,
23, 29, 32
Buffington v. O'Leary, 748 F.Supp. 633 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 9,
12, 34, 40
Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.Supp. 1162 (E.D. Vir. 1980). 3, 8,
9, 11,17,34,39
Bullion v. Buonaiuto, 524 F.Supp. 159 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 36
Bullock v. Barham, 23 F.Supp.2d 883 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 8, 14

TC-13
XXVI

Bullock v. Dart, 599 F.Supp.2d 947 (N.D.Ill. 2009). 33, 36,
39, 41
Bullock v. Gomez, 929, F.Supp. 1299 (C.D.Cal. 1996). 7,
49
Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). 1,
7, 15, 36, 41
Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ill. 2007). 33,
36, 41
Bullock v. Sheahan, 568 F.Supp.2d 965 (N.D.Ill. 2008). 24,
33, 36, 39, 41, 44
Bumgarner v. Lockhart, 920 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2898. 1, 3
Bumpus v. Canfield, 495 F.Supp.2d 316 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
21, 29
Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2012). 22, 26
Bundrick v. Hammond, 817 F.Supp. 470 (D.Del. 1993). 29
Bunyon v. Burke County, 306 F.Supp.2d 1240 (S.D.Ga.
2004). 1, 6, 32, 36
Burciaga v. County of Lenawee, 123 F.Supp.2d 1076
(E.D.Mich. 2000). 8, 14, 32
Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). 1, 22, 27
Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134 (3rd Cir.
2007). 7, 14
Burgardt v. Davies, 804 F.Supp. 180 (D. Kan. 1992). 11, 29
Burger v. Bloomberg, 418 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005). 7, 29
Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). 1, 14, 25,
29, 32, 48
Burgess v. Lowery, 201 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2000). 41, 49
Burgin v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 923 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1991). 48
Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1990). 18
Burgos v. Alves, 418 F.Supp.2d 263 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 29
Burgos v. Kuhlmann, 523 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Sup. 1987). 11, 38
Burgos v. Philadelphia Prison System, 760 F.Supp.2d 502
(E.D.Pa. 2011). 29, 32
Burgos v. Thompson, 879 F.Supp. 37 (N.D. W.Va. 1995).
43
Burke v. Comm. of Virginia, 938 F.Supp. 320 (E.D.Va.
1996). 31
Burke v. North Dakota Corrections and Rehabilit., 294 F.3d
1043 (8th Cir. 2002). 1, 29
Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and
Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). 2,
11, 14, 21, 29, 30, 37, 38, 50
Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319 (11th
Cir. 2006). 31
Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Florida, 390 F.Supp.2d
1208 (M.D.Fla. 2005). 19, 31
Burkett v. Wicker, 435 F.Supp.2d 875 (N.D.Ind. 2006). 27,
29, 32
Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 2009). 21, 29
Burks v. Walsh, 461 F.Supp. 454 (W.D. Mo. 1978). 9, 10,
15, 33, 40, 44
Burks-Bey v. Stevenson, 328 F.Supp.2d 928 (N.D.Ind.
2004). 37
Burleson v. Glass, 268 F.Supp.2d 699 (W.D.Tex. 2003). 29,
50
Burleson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 393 F.3d 577
(5th Cir. 2004). 29, 50
Burnell v. Coughlin, 975 F.Supp. 473 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 11,
20, 22
Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 2, 36, 44
Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2008). 14, 25,
29, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Burnham v. Oswald, 333 F.Supp. 1128 (W.D. N.Y. 1971).
19, 39
Burns v. City of Galveston, Tex., 905 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.
1990). 25, 30, 32, 46
Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136 (8th Cir. 2014). 48
Burns v. PA Dept. of Correction, 544 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir.
2008). 2, 4, 11, 35
Burns v. Town of Leesville, 383 So.2d 109 (Ct. App. La.
1980). 14, 25, 27, 29
Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 1999). 11
Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir. 2000). 22, 43
Burrell v. Datta, 17 F.Supp.2d 810 (C.D.Ill. 1998). 29
Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). 8,
14, 15, 32
Burris v. Kirkpatrick, 649 F.Supp. 740 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 27,
48
Burroughs v. Petrone, 138 F.Supp.3d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2015).
21, 35
Burt v. Carlson, 752 F.Supp. 346 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 24, 28
Burton v. Armontrout, 975 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2960. 10, 40, 50
Burton v. Cameron County, Tex., 884 F.Supp. 234 (S.D.
Tex. 1995). 1, 9, 23, 27, 29, 32
Burton v. City of Philadelphia, 121 F.Supp.2d 810 (E.D.Pa.
2000). 13, 29
Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2015). 9, 29, 32
Burton v. Foltz, 599 F.Supp. 114 (E.D. Mich. 1984). 28
Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1986). 27, 48
Burton v. Lynch, 664 F.Supp.2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 21,
29
Burton v. Nault, 902 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 198. 1, 28, 33
Burton v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 751 F.Supp. 194 (D. Kan.
1990). 36
Bush v. Butler, 521 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2007). 7, 27
Bush v. Ware, 589 F.Supp. 1454 (E.D. Wisc. 1984). 27, 48
Bussey v. Phillips, 419 F.Supp.2d 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 38,
50
Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc.. 919
F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.Fla. 2013). 2, 29, 36
Bustos v. A & E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762 (10th
Cir. 2011). 19, 39
Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2002). 14, 32
Butler v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005). 1
Butler v. Coitsville Tp. Police Dept., 93 F.Supp.2d 862
(N.D.Ohio 2000). 25, 29, 32
Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2006). 29, 32
Butler v. Snyder, 106 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.Del. 2000). 36, 37
Butler-Bay v. Frey, 811 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1987). 19, 37,
38, 39
Button v. Kibby-Brown, 970 F.Supp. 649 (C.D.Ill. 1997).
31
Byar v. Lee, 336 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Ark. 2004). 13, 32,
37, 38
Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C.
2006). 5, 27, 32, 36
Byrd v. Abate, 945 F.Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 14, 45
Byrd v. Hasty, 142 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir. 1998). 22, 39, 43
Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dept., 629 F.3d 1135
(9th Cir. 2011). 32, 33, 41
Byrd v. Moseley, 942 F.Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1996). 1, 27, 34
Byrd v. Stirling, 144 F.Supp.3d 803 (D.S.C. 2015). 18, 21
Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1983). 7, 18, 29
Byron v. Dart, 825 F.Supp.2d 958 (N.D.Ill. 2011). 14, 15,
32, 39

TC-14
XXVI

C.H. v. Sullivan, 718 F.Supp. 726 (D. Minn. 1989),
affirmed, 920 F.2d 483. 9, 10, 11, 39
C.H. v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1990). 9, 10
Cabral v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 587 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2009).
2, 27, 31
Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454 2 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091. 5, 27, 29, 30,
32
Cabrales v. County of Los Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir.
1991). 5
Caddell v. Allenbrand, 804 F.Supp. 200 (D.Kan. 1992). 1
Cadwell v. NYC Dept. of Corr., 750 F.Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). 31
Cady v. Walsh, 753 F.3d 348 (1st Cir. 2014). 14, 29, 32
Caffey v. Johnson, 883 F.Supp. 128 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 27,
36, 37
Cagle v. Hutto, 177 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 1999). 27
Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2003). 14, 32,
39, 45
Cain v. Rock, 67 F.Supp.2d 544 (D.Md. 1999). 7, 17, 45
Caiozzo v. Koreman, 581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009). 29, 32
Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998). 22
Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of CA., 127 F.3d
782 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied 118 S.Ct. 1395. 22
Calderon-Ortiz v. Laboy-Alvarado, 300 F.3d 60 (1st Cir.
2002). 14, 32, 45
Caldwell v. District of Columbia, 201 F.Supp.2d 27
(D.D.C. 2001). 7, 9, 10, 12, 15, 27, 29, 40
Caldwell v. District of Columbia, 901 F.Supp. 7 (D.D.C.
1995). 14, 29, 46
Caldwell v. Hammonds, 53 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 1,
9, 21, 27, 29
Caldwell v. Luzerne County Corrections Facility
Management Employees, 732 F.Supp.2d 458
(M.D.Pa. 2010). 9, 21, 48
Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1992). 48
Caldwell v. Quinlan, 729 F.Supp. 4 (D. D.C. 1990),
affirmed, 923 F.2d 200. 9, 10
Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090 (11th.
Cir. 2014). 8, 14
Caley v. Hudson, 759 F.Supp. 378 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 1, 22
Calhoun v. Detella, 319 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2003). 7, 10, 33,
41
Calhoun v. Hargrove, 312 F.3d 730 (5th Cir. 2002). 7, 29,
50
Calhoun v. New York State Div. of Parole Officers, 999
F.2d 647 (2nd Cir. 1993). 43
Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2005). 2, 13, 29
Calhoun v. Thomas, 360 F.Supp.2d 1264 (M.D.Ala. 2005).
9, 23, 32, 48
Calhoun v. Volusia County, 499 F.Supp.2d 1299 (M.D.Fla.
2007).29
Calia v. Werholtz, 426 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D.Kan. 2006). 19,
24, 38
California First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299
F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 2, 19, 38, 39
Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2006). 29
Callaway v. Smith County, 991 F.Supp. 801 (E.D.Tex.
1998). 27, 29
Calloway v. City of New Orleans, 524 So.2d 182 (La. App.
4 Cir. 1988). 14, 27, 29
Calvi v. Knox County, 470 F.3d 422 (1st Cir. 2006). 17, 25,
32, 48
Calvin v. Kansas Parole Bd., 993 F.Supp. 1366 (D.Kan.
1998). 24, 36

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Calvin v. Sheriff of Will County, 405 F.Supp.2d 933
(N.D.Ill. 2005). 25, 32, 41
Camarillo v. McCarthy, 998 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1993). 8, 29
Camberos v. Branstad, 73 F.3d 174 (8th Cir. 1995). 29
Cameron v. Allen, 525 F.Supp.2d 1302 (M.D.Ala. 2007). 1,
21, 29
Cameron v. Hendricks, 942 F.Supp. 499 (D.Kan. 1996). 41
Cameron v. Metcuz, 705 F.Supp. 454 (N.D. Ind. 1989). 14,
24
Cameron v. Myers, 569 F.Supp.2d 762 (N.D.Ind. 2008). 27,
29
Cameron v. Sarraf, 128 F.Supp.2d 906 (E.D.Va. 2000). 29
Cameron v. Tomes, 783 F.Supp. 1511 (D. Mass. 1992),
modified 990 F.2d 14. 9, 29, 30, 39
Camp v. Oliver, 798 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1986). 1, 2
Campbell v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 155 F.3d 950
(8th Cir. 1998). 31
Campbell v. Bergeron, 486 F.Supp. 1246 (M.D. La. 1980).
8, 14, 32, 39
Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980). 9, 12,
15, 18, 27, 37
Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2007). 1, 4
Campbell v. Cornell Corrections of Rhode Island, Inc., 564
F.Supp.2d 99 (D.R.I. 2008). 13, 18, 37
Campbell v. Credit Bureau Systems, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d
732 (E.D.Ky. 2009). 4, 29
Campbell v. Crist, 491 F.Supp. 586 (D. Mont. 1980). 43
Campbell v. Emory Clinic, 166 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 1999).
14
Campbell v. Grammer, 889 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1989). 10,
39, 48
Campbell v. Henman, 931 F.2d 1212 (7th Cir. 1991). 11, 22
Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2009). 6, 36
Campbell v. McGruder, 416 F.Supp. 100 (D. D.C. 1975).
12, 23, 29, 30, 40, 48
Campbell v. McGruder, 554 F.Supp. 562 (D.C. D.C. 1982).
15, 32, 45
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 29,
30
Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2007). 33, 41
Campbell v. Purkett, 957 F.2d 535 (8th Cir. 1992). 37, 38
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1999). 29, 30,
48
Campbell v. Williamson, 783 F.Supp. 1161 (C.D. Ill. 1992).
11, 22, 36
Campbell-El v. District of Columbia, 874 F.Supp. 403
(D.D.C. 1994). 37, 39
Campbell-El v. District of Columbia, 881 F.Supp. 42
(D.D.C. 1995). 10, 42, 50
Camper v. Benov, 966 F.Supp. 951 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 22, 36
Campise v. Hamilton, 382 F.Supp. 172 (S.D. Tex. 1974),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102. 9, 27, 44
Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979). 19, 33
Campo v. Keane, 913 F.Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 11, 24
Campos v. Correction Officer Smith, 418 F.Supp.2d 277
(W.D.N.Y. 2006). 1, 21
Campos v. Coughlin, 854 F.Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 37
Camps v. City of Warner Robins, 822 F.Supp. 724
(M.D.Ga. 1993). 2, 14, 27, 32
Canadian Coalition Against Death Penalty v. Ryan, 269
F.Supp.2d 1199 (D.Ariz. 2003). 19, 28
Canales v. Gabry, 844 F.Supp. 1167 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 36,
43
Canales v. Gatzunis, 979 F.Supp.2d 164 (D.Mass. 2013). 9,
13, 14, 24, 27, 29

TC-15
XXVI

Candelaria v. Coughlin, 787 F.Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1992),
affirmed, 979 F.2d 845. 29, 47
Candelaria v. Griffin, 641 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1981). 36
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183 (7th Cir. 1994). 33, 45
Canedy v. Boardman, 801 F.Supp. 254 (W.D.Wis. 1992),
reversed, 16 F.3d 183. 31, 33, 41
Canedy v. Boardman, 91 F.3d 30 (7th Cir. 1996). 24, 3, 37,
41
Canell v. Armenikis, 840 F.Supp. 783 (D.Or. 1993). 33, 45
Canell v. Beyers, 840 F.Supp. 1378 (D.Or. 1993). 27, 33,
41
Canell v. Bradshaw, 840 F.Supp. 1382 (D. Or. 1993). 1, 15
Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1998). 32, 37,
46
Canell v. Multnomah County, 141 F.Supp.2d 1046 (D.Or.
2001). 4, 8, 9, 14, 25, 29, 50
Cannon v. Washington, 418 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2005). 1, 21,
28, 35
Cano v. City of New York, 119 F.Supp.3d 65 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). 8, 9, 15, 23, 32, 40
Cano v. City of New York, 44 F.Supp.3d 324 (E.D.N.Y.
2014). 9, 23, 32, 40
Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). 1, 13, 21, 29,
30
Cansler v. State, 34 CrL 2372 (Kansas Sup. Ct. 1984). 27,
43
Canterino v. Wilson, 644 F.Supp. 738 (W.D. Ky. 1986),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 539. 1, 9, 17, 34
Canterino v. Wilson, 869 F.2d 948 (6th Cir. 1989). 7, 9, 17,
34, 50
Cantley v. West Virginia Reg. Jail and Corr. Facility
Authority, 771 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2014). 25, 32, 39, 41
Cantley v. West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional
Facility Authority, 728 F.Supp.2d 803 (S.D.W.Va.
2010). 21, 25, 32, 41
Cantu v. Jones, 293 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 2002). 14, 27
Cantu v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 653 F.Supp.2d 726
(E.D.Mich. 2009). 2, 31
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 37
Capitol City Lodge v. Ingham County, 399 N.W.2d 463
(Mich. App. 1986). 2, 31
Capps v. Atiyeh, 495 F.Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1980). 9, 15
Capps v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1990). 22
Caputo v. Fauver, 800 F.Supp. 168 (D.N.J. 1992), affirmed,
995 F.2d 216. 1
Caraballo-Sandoval v. Honsted, 35 F.3d 521 (11th Cir.
1994). 3, 8, 49
Carafas v. Lavallee, 88 S.Ct. 1556 (1968). 22
Carapellucci v. Town of Winchester, 707 F.Supp. 611 (D.
Mass. 1989). 25, 29, 32, 44, 45
Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2007). 1, 21
Card v. Dugger, 709 F.Supp. 1098 (M.D. Fla. 1988),
affirmed, 871 F.2d 1023. 37, 49
Cardenas v. Lewis, 66 Fed.Appx. 86 (9th Cir. 2003).
[unpublished] 8, 11, 14, 32
Cardenas v. Wigen, 921 F.Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 11,
22
Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794 (6th Cir. 2009). 18, 24,
29, 37
Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3rd Cir. 2012). 3, 20, 22
Carl v. Angelone, 883 F.Supp. 1433 (D.Nev. 1995). 2, 41
Carl v. Muskegon County, 763 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2014). 30,
32
Carlin v. Manu, 72 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Or. 1999). 17, 41

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Carlin v. Wong, 552 F.Supp.2d 1023 (N.D.Cal. 2008). 22,
36
Carlsen v. U.S, 521 F.3d 1371 (Fed Cir. 2008). 2, 31
Carlson v. Conklin, 813 F.2d 769 (6th Cir. 1987). 27, 36, 45
Carlson v. Green, 100 S.Ct. 1468 (1980). 10, 14, 27, 29
Carlyle v. Aubrey, 189 F.Supp.2d 660 (W.D.Ky. 2001). 9,
15,18, 29, 32, 40
Carman v. Burgess, 763 F.Supp. 419 (W.D. Mo. 1991). 1,
48
Carmel v. Thomas, 510 F.Supp. 784 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 36
Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 881 F.Supp.2d 833
(N.D.Ohio 2012).7, 14, 36
Carmichael v. Richards, 307 F.Supp.2d 1014 (S.D.Ind.
2004). 8, 14, 25, 32, 39
Carmon v. Duveal, 554 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.Conn. 2008). 1, 3
Carney v. Craven, 40 Fed.Appx. 48 (6th Cir. 2002). 10, 15
Carothers v. County of Cook, 808 F.3d 1140 (7th Cir. 2015).
31
Carothers v. Follette, 314 F.Supp. 1014 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
1, 3, 11, 28, 38
Carpenter v. King, 792 F.Supp.2d 29 (D.D.C. 2011). 19
Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931. 19, 28
Carpenter v. Wilkinson, 946 F.Supp. 522 (N.D.Ohio 1996).
19, 37
Carper v. Deland, 54 F.3d 613 2 (10th Cir. 1995). 1
Carper v. DeLand, 851 F.Supp. 1506 (D.Utah 1994). 1
Carr v. Whittenburg, 462 F.Supp.2d 925 (S.D.Ill. 2006). 18,
21, 40
Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir. 2008). 17,
22, 32
Carrasquillo v. City of New York, 324 F.Supp.2d 428
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 14
Carrigan v. Davis, 70 F.Supp.2d 448 (D.Del. 1999). 7, 14,
17
Carrigan v. State of Del., 957 F.Supp. 1376 (D.Del. 1997).
8, 14, 17, 27, 46
Carrion v. Wilkinson, 309 F.Supp.2d 1007 (N.D.Ohio
2004). 18, 29
Carroll v. Detella, 255 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001). 9, 10, 40
Carroll v. City of Quincy, 441 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Mass.
2006). 2, 14, 25, 32
Carroll v. Yates, 362 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 2004). 1, 21
Carruthers v. Jenne, 209 F.Supp.2d 1294 (S.D.Fla. 2002). 5,
27
Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 22
Carter v. Carriero, 905 F.Supp. 99 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 11
Carter v. Fagin, 348 F.Supp.2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 29
Carter v. Fagin, 363 F.Supp.2d 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 29
Carter v. Fair, 786 F.2d 433 (1st Cir. 1986). 1
Carter v. Fairman, 675 F.Supp. 449 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 11
Carter v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 579 F.Supp.2d 798
(W.D.Tex. 2008). 39, 49
Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2003) 14
Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 134
F.Supp.3d 794 (D. Del. 2015). 1, 2, 12, 42, 45
Carter v. Kane, 938 F.Supp. 282 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 11, 27
Carter v. McCaleb, 29 F.Supp.2d 423 (W.D.Mich. 1998).
43, 50
Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152 (3rd Cir. 2002). 1, 41
Carter v. Newland, 441 F.Supp.2d 208 (D.Mass. 2006). 29
Carter v. O'Sullivan, 924 F.Supp. 903 (C.D.Ill. 1996). 1, 19
Carter v. Thompson, 808 F.Supp. 1548 (M.D.Fla. 1992). 11
Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997).
1, 5, 8, 9, 25, 27, 29, 30, 32

TC-16
XXVI

Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005). 7, 22, 36
Carty v. Turnbull, 144 F.Supp.2d 395 (D.Virgin Islands
2001). 27, 32
Caruso v. City of New York, 973 F.Supp.2d 430 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). 31
Carver v. Knox County, Tenn., 753 F.Supp. 1370 (E.D.
Tenn. 1989). 9, 12, 23
Carver v. Lehman, 558 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2009). 13, 20, 36
Carwile v. Ray, 481 F.Supp. 33 (E.D. Wash. 1979). 1, 27,
28
Casaburro v. Giuliani, 986 F.Supp. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
32, 39, 48
Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2002). 14
Case v. Andrews, 603 P.2d 623 (1979). 1, 33
Casey v. Lewis, 773 F.Supp. 1365 (D. Ariz. 1991),
reversed, 4 F.3d 1516. 1, 8, 49, 50
Casey v. Lewis, 834 F.Supp. 1477 (D. Ariz. 1993). 10, 17,
30
Casey v. Lewis, 834 F.Supp. 1553 (D. Ariz. 1992). 1, 33
Casey v. Lewis, 834 F.Supp. 1569 (D. Ariz. 1993). 7, 9
Casey v. Lewis, 837 F.Supp. 1009 (D. Ariz. 1993). 3, 8
Cash v. County of Erie, 654 F.3d 324 (2nd Cir. 2011). 14,
17, 27, 32
Cash v. Wetzel, 8 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 19, 27,
35
Cason v. District of Columbia, 580 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C.
2008). 29, 50
Cassels v. Stalder, 342 F.Supp.2d 555 (M.D.La. 2004). 19,
38
Cassidy v. Indiana Dept. of Correction, 59 F.Supp.2d 787
(S.D.Ind. 1999). 7, 27, 50
Cassidy v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 199 F.3d 374 (7th
Cir. 2000). 7, 27, 34
Casteel v. Pieschek, 3 F.3d 1050 (7th Cir. 1993). 1
Casteel v. Pieschek, 944 F.Supp. 748 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 1,
32
Castellini v. Lappin, 365 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.Mass. 2005). 4,
43
Castillo v. Bobelu, 1 F.Supp.3d 1190 (W.D.Okla. 2014). 14,
17, 34, 36, 45, 50
Castillo v. Bowles, 687 F.Supp. 277 (N.D. Tex. 1988). 9
Castillo v. Cameron County, Tex., 238 F.3d 339 (5th Cir.
2001). 27, 32
Castillo v. Cook County Mail Room Dept., 990 F.2d 304
(7th Cir. 1993). 1, 28
Castillo v. Gardner, 854 F.Supp. 725 (E.D. Wash. 1994). 41
Castle v. Clymer, 15 F.Supp.2d 640 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 19, 27,
47, 50
Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013). 7, 50
Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 938 (D.Ariz.
2010). 24, 34, 50
Castor v. U.S., 883 F.Supp. 344 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 1
Castro v. City of Hanford, 546 F.Supp.2d 822 (E.D.Cal.
2008). 16, 25, 32
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654 (9th Cir.
2015). 8, 14, 15, 25, 27, 32
Castro v. Melchor, 760 F.Supp.2d 970 (D.Hawai‘i 2010).
17, 29, 32, 39, 46, 48
Castro v. Terhune, 712 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2013). 8, 39
Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780 (W.D.Mich. 2012).
1, 9, 34, 36, 37
Catapano v. Smith, 495 N.Y.S.2d 856 (A.D. 4 1985). 11
Catletti Ex Rel. Estate of Catletti v. Rampe, 334 F.3d 225
(2nd Cir. 2003). 2, 31
Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1987). 3, 11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Caudell v. Rose, 378 F.Supp.2d 725 (W.D.Va. 2005). 1
Caudle-El v. Peters, 727 F.Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 7,
23
Cavalieri v. Shepard, 321 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003). 14, 25,
32, 39, 45
Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). 1,
14, 17, 25, 32, 39, 45
Cawthon v. City of Greenville, 745 F.Supp. 377 (N.D.
Miss. 1990). 14, 31, 48
Ceballos de Leon v. Reno, 58 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.N.J. 1999).
22
Cello-Whitney v. Hoover, 769 F.Supp. 1155 (W.D. Wash.
1991). 1
Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Angeles County
Sheriff Dept., 533 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2008). 16, 19, 32
Cephas v. Truitt, 940 F.Supp. 674 (D.Del. 1996). 3, 11, 14,
32
Cepulonis v. Fair, 563 F.Supp. 659 (D. Mass. 1983). 1
Cerka v. Salt Lake County, 988 F.Supp. 1420 (D.Utah
1997). 31
Cerniglia v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1034
(E.D.Cal. 2008). 3, 7, 9
Chacon v. U.S., 48 F.3d 508 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 50
Chairs v. Burgess, 25 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ala. 1998). 5,
27
Chambers v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 205 F.3d 1237
(10th Cir. 2000). 8, 20, 34
Chambers v. NH Prison, 562 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.N.H. 2007).
2, 29, 45
Chance v. Compton, 873 F.Supp. 82 (W.D. Tenn. 1994). 3,
11
Chance v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 730 F.3d 404
(5th Cir. 2013). 37, 38
Chandler v. Baird, 926 F.2d 1057 (11th Cir. 1991). 3
Chandler v. Coughlin, 733 F.Supp. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 1,
28
Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2004). 1, 9,
10, 15
Chao v. Ballista, 630 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Mass. 2009). 13,
14, 17, 27
Chao v. Ballista, 772 F.Supp.2d 337 (D.Mass. 2011). 14, 17
Chao v. Ballista, 806 F.Supp.2d 358 (D.Mass. 2011). 7, 14,
17, 27
Chapman v. Guessford, 924 F.Supp. 30 (D.Del. 1996). 8, 32
Chapman v. Nichols, 989 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1993). 27, 41,
32
Chapman v. Pickett, 491 F.Supp. 967 (C.D. Ill. 1980). 3, 8,
11, 37, 38
Chapman v. Pickett, 801 F.2d 912 (7th Cir. 1986). 11, 27,
37
Chappell v. Helder, 696 F.Supp.2d 1021 (W.D.Ark. 2010).
37, 38, 39
Chappell v. Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013). 9,
10,39, 41, 49
Chapple v. Keane, 903 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 21
Charles v. Coughlin, 985 F.Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 11
Charles v. United States, 278 F.2d 386 (9th Cir. 1960). 41
Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 937 (W.D.Wis. 2002).
24, 37, 38
Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Wis. 2002).
37
Charles v. Verhagen, 348 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2003) 37
Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 (2nd Cir. 2000). 30, 32
Charron v. Medium Sec. Inst., 730 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Mo.
1989). 7, 8, 11, 24, 32, 49, 50

TC-17
XXVI

Charry v. State of Cal., 13 F.3d 1386 (9th Cir. 1994). 26, 43
Chase v. District of Columbia, 723 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.D.C.
2010). 17, 32, 33
Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82 (2nd Cir. 1999). 5, 19, 37,
39
Chauvin v. Erickson, 998 F.2d 617 (8th Cir. 1993). 20, 50
Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 806 F.3d
210 (3d Cir. 2015). 17, 29, 33, 40, 41, 47, 48
Chavers v. Abrahamson, 803 F.Supp. 1512 (E.D.Wis.
1992). 1, 35
Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2000). 2, 29, 32,44
Chavez v. County of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936 (D.N.M.
2014). 16, 25, 32, 36
Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981). 9, 10, 11
Chavis v. Smith, 834 F.Supp. 153 (D.Md. 1993). 43
Chavis v. Struebel, 317 F.Supp.2d 232 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
13, 21
Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev.
2009). 7, 25, 27, 32, 41
Chennault v. Mitchell, 923 F.Supp.2d 765 (E.D.Va. 2013).
14, 17, 29, 32, 48
Cherry v. Crow, 845 F.Supp. 1520 (M.D. Fla. 1994). 14, 29
Chess v. U.S., 836 F.Supp.2d 742 (N.D.Ill. 2011). 8, 14, 24,
25, 27, 30
Chesson v. Jaquez, 986 F.2d 363 (10th Cir. 1993). 11
Chester v. Beard, 657 F.Supp.2d 534 (M.D.Pa. 2009). 10,
27, 46
Chestnut v. Magnusson, 942 F.2d 820 (1st Cir. 1991). 20,
32, 36
Chilcote v. Mitchell, 166 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Or. 2001). 9,
15, 32
Childers v. Maloney, 247 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.Mass. 2003). 11,
47, 50
Childress v. Delo, 820 F.Supp. 458 (E.D.Mo. 1993). 12, 29,
35, 37
Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 34, 36
Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983). 37, 38,
39
Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013). 1, 21
Childs v. Pellegrin, 822 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1987). 1, 3, 48
Chilton v. Atwood, 769 F.Supp. 267 (M.D. Tenn. 1991). 1,
28
Chimurenga v. City of New York, 45 F.Supp.2d 337
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). 16, 49
Chinchello v. Fenton, 763 F.Supp. 793 (M.D. Pa. 1991). 28
Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1986). 27, 28,
46
Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1990). 1, 49
Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2001). 7, 8,
25, 29, 32
Chitwood v. Dowd, 889 F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2219. 22, 47
Choate v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1370 (8th Cir. 1993). 27, 50
Choate v. Lockhart, 779 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Ark. 1991),
reversed, 7 F.3d 1370. 50
Choate v. Merrill, 685 F.Supp.2d 146 (D.Me. 2010). 14, 29
Choquette v. City of New York, 839 F.Supp.2d 692
(S.D.N.Y. 2012). 17, 25, 27, 29, 32
Chortek v. City of Milwaukee, 356 F.3d 740 (7th Cir.
2004). 25, 32
Chow v. Reno, 193 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 1999). 22
Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999). 1, 19, 28,
35, 37
Christian By and Through Jett v. Stanczak, 769 F.Supp. 317
(E.D. Mo. 1991). 14, 25, 30, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Christian v. Wagner, 611 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Iowa 2009).
29, 32
Christian v. Wagner, 623 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2010). 29, 32,
39, 50
Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998). 4, 35,
50
Christianson v. Clarke, 932 F.Supp. 1178 (D.Neb. 1996). 3,
8
Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d
1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). 14, 29, 32, 45, 46, 48
Christina A. Ex Rel. Jennifer A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d
990 (8th Cir. 2003). 5, 26
Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2nd Cir. 1972). 1, 3, 8,
19, 27, 28, 39, 41
Christopher v. Buss, 384 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2004). 10, 14
Christy v. Robinson, 216 F.Supp.2d 398 (D.N.J. 2002). 29
Church v. Hegstrom, 416 F.2d 449 (2nd Cir. 1969). 29
Church v. Maryland, 180 F.Supp.2d 708 (D.Md. 2002). 31
Ciaprazi v. County of Nassau, 195 F.Supp.2d 398
(E.D.N.Y. 2002). 5, 27
Ciempa v. Jones, 745 F.Supp.2d 1171 (N.D.Okla. 2010).
18, 19, 37, 39
Cirilla v. Kankakee County Jail, 438 F.Supp.2d 937
(C.D.Ill. 2006). 14, 29, 32
Citizens Advy. Comm. on Priv. Pris. v. U.S. D.O.J., 197
F.Supp.2d 226 (W.D.Pa. 2001). 2, 15
Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center, 891 F.Supp. 312
(W.D.La. 1995). 2, 24, 27
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). 37
City of Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 103
S.Ct. 2979 (1983). 4, 29
City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S.Ct. 2686 (1986). 5
City of Shepherdsville, Kentucky v. Rymer, 105 S.Ct. 3518
(6th Cir. 1985). 7, 27, 46, 48
Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Local 1000, AFSCME v.
N.L.R.B., 569 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2009). 2, 31
Clanton v. Glover, 280 F.Supp.2d 1360 (M.D.Fla. 2003).
34, 37
Clapper v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 946 F.Supp.
672 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 36
Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979). 14, 27, 45
Clark v. Alston, 442 F.Supp.2d 395 (E.D.Mich. 2006). 31
Clark v. California, 739 F.Supp.2d 1168 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 7,
27, 34
Clark v. Conahan, 737 F.Supp.2d 239 (M.D.Pa. 2010). 9,
24, 26
Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876 (11th Cir. 1988). 10, 14, 24,
48
Clark v. Groose, 36 F.3d 770 (8th Cir. 1994). 3
Clark v. Long, 255 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2001). 37, 50
Clark v. McMillin, 932 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.Miss. 1996). 14,
32, 45
Clark v. Neal, 890 F.Supp. 345 (D.Del. 1995). 11, 36
Clark v. Prichard, 812 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1987). 43
Clark v. State of GA. Pardons and Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d
636 (11th Cir. 1990). 36
Clark v. Williams, 619 F.Supp.2d 95 (D.Del. 2009). 21, 29
Clarke v. Blais, 473 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Me. 2007), 29, 32,
48
Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 19, 20,
22, 38
Clarke v. Thornton, 515 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 21
Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280 (6th Cir. 2006). 8,
14, 24, 29, 30

TC-18
XXVI

Clarkson v. Coughlin, 783 F.Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 7,
9, 17, 34
Clarkson v. Coughlin, 898 F.Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
7, 8, 9, 11, 15, 17, 29, 33, 34, 36
Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904
(N.D.Iowa 2013). 1, 17, 25, 32, 33, 39, 41, 48
Clayton v. Tansy, 26 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1993). 1
Clayton v. Thurman, 775 F.2d 1096 (1985). 5
Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S.Ct. 496 (1986). 11, 24
Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2009). 14, 27
Clement v. California Dept. of Corrections, 220 F.Supp.2d
1098 (N.D.Cal. 2002). 19, 28
Clement v. California Dept. of Corrections, 364 F.3d 1148
(9th Cir. 2004). 7, 19, 27, 28, 38
Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 15, 29, 48
Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2007). 11
Clemmons v. Bohannon, 918 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990). 9,
10, 29
Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). 9,
10
Cleveland v. Goin, 703 F.2d 204 (Ore. Sup. Ct., 1985). 9,
32, 47
Cleveland-Perdue v. Brutsche, 881 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 368. 27, 29
Clifton v. Craig, 924 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 116 LE2d 69. 37
Clifton v. Eubank, 418 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Colo. 2006). 17,
27, 29
Cline v. Fox, 319 F.Supp.2d 685 (N.D.W.Va. 2004). 19, 38,
42
Cloaninger ex rel. Estate of Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555
F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 2009). 16, 30
Clone v. Presley, 640 F.2d 271 (10th Cir. 1981). 36
Closs v. Weber, 238 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2001). 20, 36
Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232 (9th
Cir. 2010). 8, 14, 29, 30, 32, 45
Clynch v. Chapman, 285 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Conn. 2003) 6,
32
Coades v. Jeffes, 822 F.Supp. 1189 (E.D.Pa. 1993). 29
Coakley v. Murphy, 884 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1989). 34, 47,
50
Coakley v. Oregon State Corr. Inst., 730 P.2d 622 (1986).
11, 38
Coalition for Gov. Procurement v. Federal Prison, 365 F.3d
435 (6th Cir. 2004). 50
Cobb v. Atych, 643 F.2d 946 (3rd Cir. 1981). 1, 6, 32, 47
Cobb v. Marshall, 481 F.Supp.2d 1248 (M.D.Ala. 2007).
27, 31
Cobb v. Pozzi, 352 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 2003) 31
Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2004). 31
Cobbs v. Superintendent, 821 F.Supp.2d 1071 (N.D.Ind.
2011). 11, 22
Cobige v. City of Chicago, Ill., 651 F.3d 780 (7th Cir.
2011). 14, 17, 27, 29, 32
Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1996)1, 47
Cochran v. Pinchak, 401 F.3d 184 (3rd Cir. 2005). 9, 24
Cochrane v. Quattrocchi, 949 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 2965. 41
Cockcroft v. Kirkland, 548 F.Supp.2d 767 (N.D.Cal. 2008).
1, 9, 15, 40
Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2007). 48
Cockrell-El v. District of Columbia, 937 F.Supp. 18
(D.D.C. 1996). 11, 37, 48
Codd v. Brown, 949 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1991). 50
Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767 (8th Cir. 2002). 5

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Cody v. Hillard, 830 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1078. 9, 15, 44
Cody v. Jones, 895 F.Supp. 431 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 8, 9
Cofer v. Schriro, 176 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1999). 19, 37
Coffey v. Cox, 218 F.Supp.2d 997 (C.D.Ill. 2002). 31
Coffey v. U.S., 870 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D.N.M. 2012). 14, 27,
29, 47
Coffey v. U.S., 906 F.Supp.2d 1114 (D.N.M. 2012). 14, 27,
29, 47
Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944). 7, 9
Coffman v. Trickey, 884 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied 110 S.Ct. 1523. 11, 24
Cofield v. Ala. Public Service Com'n., 936 F.2d 512 (11th
Cir. 1991). 1
Cohen v. Corrections Corp. of America, 588 F.3d 299 (6th
Cir. 2008). 1, 21
Cokeley v. Endell, 27 F.3d 331 (8th Cir. 1994). 1, 50
Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663 (3rd Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1338. 14, 27, 32, 45
Colburn v. Upper Darby Tp., 946 F.2d 1017 (3rd Cir.
1991). 14, 29, 32
Cole v. Snow, 586 F.Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1984). 27, 41
Cole v. Taber, 587 F.Supp.2d 856 (W.D.Tenn. 2008). 31
Coleman Ex Rel. Coleman v. Parkman, 349 F.3d 534 (8th
Cir. 2003) 14, 32
Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2014). 3,
12, 27, 30, 48
Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013).
7, 9, 15, 27, 29, 30, 39, 40
Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Cal. 2013). 7,
15, 30
Coleman v. Brown, 960 F.Supp.2d 1057 (E.D.Cal. 2013). 9,
10, 15, 27, 29, 30, 39
Coleman v. District of Columbia Commissioners, 234
F.Supp. 408 (E.D. Vir. 1964). 37, 38
Coleman v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 2004). 36
Coleman v. Lappin, 535 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C. 2008). 2
Coleman v. Lappin, 607 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2009). 2
Coleman v. Reno, 91 F.Supp.2d 130 (D.D.C. 2000). 47
Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 922 F.Supp.2d 882 (E.D.Cal.
2009). 9, 15, 29, 30
Coleman v. Turner, 838 F.2d 1004 (8th Cir. 1988). 5, 17,
28, 49
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D.Cal. 1995). 2,
3, 10, 27, 29, 30, 46, 47, 48
Coleman-Bey v. U.S., 512 F.Supp.2d 44 (D.D.C. 2007). 29
Coley v. Grant County, 36 Fed.Appx. 242 (9th Cir. 2002).
31
Coley v. Harris, 30 F.Supp.3d 428 (D.Md. 2014). 41, 48
Coley v. Lucas County, Ohio, 799 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2015).
14, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32, 39, 46, 48
Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315 (1st
Cir. 1995). 11, 22, 32
Collazo-Leon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 855 F.Supp. 530
(D. Puerto Rico 1994). 11, 32
Collazo-Perez v. Puerto Rico, 100 F.Supp.3d 88 (D.P.R.
2015). 24, 47
Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982 (7th Cir.
1998). 14, 29, 30, 32, 36
Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2004). 32
Collins v. Bopson, 816 F.Supp. 335 (E.D.Pa. 1993). 48
Collins v. County of Kern, 390 F.Supp.2d 964 (E.D.Cal.
2005). 14, 32, 39
Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979). 48

TC-19
XXVI

Collins v. Ferguson, 804 F.Supp.2d 134 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
3, 11
Collins v. Goord, 581 F.Supp.2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 1
Collins v. Graham, 377 F.Supp.2d 241 (D.Me. 2005). 7, 27
Collins v. Hannigan, 14 F.Supp.2d 1239 (D.Kan. 1998). 8,
29, 47, 50
Collins v. Hendrickson, 371 F.Supp.2d 1326 (M.D.Fla.
2005). 22, 36
Collins v. Kahelski, 828 F.Supp. 614 (E.D. Wis. 1993). 48
Collins v. Kearney, 495 F.Supp.2d 466 (D.Del. 2007). 1,
29, 48
Collins v. Knox County, 569 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.Me. 2008).
17, 25, 33, 39, 41
Collins v. Montgomery Cty Bd. Of Prison Inspectors, 176
F.3d 679 (3rd Cir. 1999). 5
Collins v. Palczewski, 841 F.Supp. 333 (D. Nev. 1993). 50
Collins v. Romer, 962, F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1992). 4, 5
Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F.Supp. 257 (D. Md. 1972). 1,
11, 19, 28, 29, 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 48, 49
Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 F.Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973). 3,
7, 8, 26, 27, 48
Collins v. Scott, 961 F.Supp. 1009 (E.D.Tex. 1997). 37, 41,
48
Collins v. Seeman, 462 F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2006). 14
Collins v. Thompson, 8 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 2133. 15
Collins v. Ward, 652 F.Supp. 500 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 9, 10,
39, 48
Collins v. Williams, 575 F.Supp.2d 610 (D.Del. 2008). 29
Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.Conn. 2001).
14, 17, 41
Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2nd Cir. 1995). 1, 11
Colon v. Schneider, 899 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1990). 39, 41,
48
Colon v. Sullivan, 681 F.Supp. 222 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 36,
38
Colton v. Ashcroft, 299 F.Supp.2d 681 (E.D.Ky. 2004). 8,
22, 27
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). 2, 18, 24,
37, 38, 47
Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). 2,
18, 24, 27, 37
Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2014). 29, 50
Combs v. Corrections Corp. of America, 977 F.Supp. 799
(W.D.La. 1997). 7, 37, 38
Combs v. Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2002). 39, 48
Comm. Dept. of Corrections v. Powell, 347 S.E.2d 532
(Va.App. 1986). 31
Commonwealth v. Dugger, 486 A.2d 382 (Pa. Sup. Ct.,
1985). 41
Commonwealth v. Lapia, 457 A.2d 877 (Penn. App. 1983).
41, 49
Commonwealth v. McBride, 433 A.2d 509 (Super. Ct. Pa.
1981). 43
Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2001). 14, 29,
30
Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347 (3rd Cir. 2002). 1, 21
Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F.Supp. 1119 (D. N.H. 1971). 1,
3, 8, 19, 28, 32
Conklin v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 514 F.Supp.2d 1
(D.D.C. 2007). 2, 33
Conley v Very, 450 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2006). 14
Conley v. Birch, 796 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 2015). 14, 29
Conley v. Brewer, 652 F.Supp. 106 (W.D. Wis. 1986). 20,
22

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Conner v. Donnelly, 42 F.3d 220 (4th Cir. 1994). 2, 27, 29
Conner v. Sakaj, 994 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir. 1993). 11, 37, 38
Connolly v. County of Suffolk, 533 F.Supp.2d 236
(D.Mass. 2008). 10, 15
Connor v. Clinton County Prison, 963 F.Supp. 442
(M.D.Pa. 1997). 19, 31, 33
Conseillant v. Alves, 599 F.Supp.2d 367 (W.D.N.Y. 2009).
10, 29
Conway v. Purves, 963 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mich. 2013).
18, 27, 37
Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2005). 1, 33, 37, 41
Cook Ex Rel. Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe County, 402
F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 2005). 14, 27, 29, 30, 32
Cook v. Boyd, 881 F.Supp. 171 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 1, 19
Cook v. Brockway, 424 F.Supp. 1046 (N.D. Tex. 1977). 27
Cook v. City of New York, 578 F.Supp. 179 (S.D. N.Y.
1984). 41
Cook v. Housewright, 611 F.Supp. 828 (D. Nev. 1985). 27,
29
Cook v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 736 F.Supp.2d 1190
(S.D.Ill. 2010). 2, 31
Cook v. Lehman, 863 F.Supp. 207 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 11
Cook v. Pueppke, 421 F.Supp.2d 1201 (E.D.Mo. 2006). 29
Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2000). 34, 43
Cooke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 926 F.Supp.2d 720
(E.D.N.C. 2013). 15, 21, 29, 32, 33, 37
Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 1, 29
Cookish v. Powell, 945 F.2d 441 (1st Cir. 1991). 33, 41
Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544 (10th
Cir. 1988). 31
Cooper v. Delo, 997 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1993). 1
Cooper v. Ellsworth Correctional Work Facility, 817
F.Supp. 84 (D.Kan. 1993), affirmed, 2 F.3d 1160. 47,
48
Cooper v. Garcia, 55 F.Supp.2d 1090 (S.D.Cal. 1999). 8, 49
Cooper v. Morin, 424 N.Y.2d 168 (1979), cert. denied, 100
S.Ct. 2965. 32, 49
Cooper v. Noble, 33 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1994), modified, 41
F.3d 212. 15, 27
Cooper v. Office of Sheriff of Will County, 333 F.Supp.2d
728 (N.D.Ill. 2004). 14, 27, 29, 32
Cooper v. Rimmer, 379 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2004). 10
Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F.Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991). 18, 37
Cooper v. Rogers, 968 F.Supp.2d 1121 (M.D.Ala. 2013).
14, 17, 29
Cooper v. Schriro, 189 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999). 21, 29
Cooper v. Sedgwick County, Kansas, 206 F.Supp.2d 1126
(D.Kan. 2002). 31
Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 929 F.2d 1078
(5th Cir. 1991). 1, 18, 38
Cooper v. Smith, 855 F.Supp. 1276 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 31
Cooper v. Sumner, 672 F.Supp. 1361 (D. Nev. 1987).1, 3,
47, 50
Cooper v. Tard, 855 F.2d 125 (3rd Cir. 1988). 37, 39
Copeland v. County of Macon, Ill., 403 F.3d 929 (7th Cir.
2005). 7, 14, 27, 32
Copeland v. Matthews, 768 F.Supp. 779 (D.Kan. 1991). 20,
36
Coppage v. Mann, 906 F.Supp. 1025 (E.D.Va 1995). 27, 29,
45
Corbin v. Gillen, 839 F.Supp.2d 376 (D.Mass. 2011). 2, 31
Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2nd Cir. 1972). 1
Cordell v. Howard, 879 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Mass. 2012). 29
Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573 (6th Cir. 2014). 48
Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F.Supp. 9 (S.D. N.Y. 1984). 8, 29

TC-20
XXVI

Cornelia v. Laib, 117 F.Supp.2d 754 (N.D.Ill. 2000). 29, 32
Cornelius v. Town of Highland Lake, Ala., 880 F.2d 348
(11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1784. 36, 50
Cornell v. Nix, 921 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1820. 22
Cornell v. Woods, 69 F.3d 1383 (8th Cir. 1995). 5, 11, 47
Coronel v. Paul, 316 F.Supp.2d 868 (D.Ariz. 2004). 37, 38
Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61
(2001). 24, 27
Corrections U.S.A. v. McNany, 892 F.Supp.2d 626
(M.D.Pa. 2012). 2, 31
Corrente v. State of R.I., Dept. of Corrections, 759 F.Supp.
73 (D. R.I. 1991). 7, 27, 31
Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 2,
19, 31, 49
Cort v. Crabtree, 113 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 1997). 22, 36, 43
Cortes v. City of New York, 700 F.Supp.2d 474 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). 31
Cortes v. Johnson, 114 F.Supp.2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
29, 33
Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556 (1st
Cir. 1988), cert. den., 109 S.Ct. 68. 14, 27, 29, 30, 39,
45
Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015). 5, 14, 27, 39
Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir.
2011). 14, 25, 27, 29, 32, 36, 46
Cosco v. Uphoff, 195 F.3d 1221 (10th Cir. 1999). 1, 35, 38
Cossette v. Poulin, 573 F.Supp.2d 456 (D.N.H. 2008). 50
Costa v. County of Burlington, 566 F.Supp.2d 360 (D.N.J.
2008). 14, 29
Costa v. County of Burlington, 584 F.Supp.2d 681 (D.N.J.
2008). 17, 29
Cotta v. County of Kings, 79 F.Supp.3d 1148 (E.D.Cal.
2015). 8, 14, 39, 45
Cotton v. Lockhart, 476 F.Supp. 956 (E.D. Ark. 1979). 19,
28
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2003). 14, 32,
45, 46
Cottrell v. Kaysville City, Utah, 801 F.Supp. 572 (D.Utah
1992), reversed, 994 F.2d 730. 17, 41
Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2012). 37, 38
Couch v. Jabe, 737 F.Supp.2d 561 (W.D.Va. 2010). 19, 27,
38, 39, 42
Counce v. Goings, 816 F.Supp. 674 (D.Kan. 1993). 14
Counts v. Newhart, 951 F.Supp. 579 (E.D.Va. 1996). 1, 47
Covarrubias v. Wallace, 907 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Tex.
2012). 11, 14, 21, 27, 48
Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146 (D.Ariz. 2009). 1,
28, 38
Covillion v. Alsop, 145 F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2001). 9, 15,
32
Covington v. District of Columbia, 839 F.Supp. 894
(D.D.C. 1993). 5
Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1992). 41
Covino v. Vermont Dept. of Corrections, 933 F.2d 128 (2nd
Cir. 1991). 1, 3, 47
Cowans v. Warren, 150 F.3d 910 (8th Cir. 1998). 21
Cowans v. Wyrick, 862 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1988). 10, 39
Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). 1,
11, 33, 35, 38, 39, 41, 42, 50
Cox v. DeSoto County, Miss., 564 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009).
2, 31
Cox v. District of Columbia, 834 F.Supp. 439 (D.D.C.
1992). 29
Cox v. Embly, 784 F.Supp. 685 (E.D. Mo. 1992). 28, 38

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Cox v. Hartshorn, 503 F.Supp.2d 1078 (C.D.Ill. 2007). 29,
32
Cox v. LNU, 924 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan. 2013). 1, 7
Cox v. Malone, 199 F.Supp.2d 135 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 1, 13
Cox v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 18 F.Supp.3d 38
(D.Mass. 2014). 1, 8, 14, 21, 29, 30
Cozine v. Crabtree, 15 F.Supp.2d 997 (D.Or. 1998). 16, 36
Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2015). 24, 33, 41
Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113
(C.D.Cal. 2008). 1, 4, 5, 27, 32, 41
Craig v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490 (10th Cir. 1998). 9, 12, 15, 32
Craig v. Floyd County, Ga., 643 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2011).
25, 29, 32
Craig v. Hocker, 405 F.Supp. 656 (D. Nev. 1975). 1, 8, 9,
10, 11, 30
Crane v. Logli, 992 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 245. 8, 47
Craven County Hosp. Corp. v. Lenoir County, 331 S.E.2d
690 (N.C. App. 1985). 4, 27
Craven v. Richmond City, (Superior Court of CA. #207934,
1983). 18, 27, 29
Craw v. Gray, 159 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2001). 32, 45,
46, 48
Crawford v. Artuz, 143 F.Supp.2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 9,
15
Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009). 1, 3, 27, 37
Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252 (2nd Cir. 2015). 7, 10,
14, 49
Crawford v. Doe, 484 F.Supp.2d 446 (E.D.Va.2007). 1, 13
Crawford v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481
(7th Cir. 1997). 7, 15, 29
Crawford-El v. Britton, 93 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 19,
28
Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F.Supp.3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 1,
21, 32, 48
Creed v. Virginia, 596 F.Supp.2d 930 (E.D.Va. 2009). 29,
48
Crenshaw v. Herbert, 445 F.Supp.2d 301 (W.D.N.Y. 2006).
19, 21, 50
Crime, Justice & America, Inc. v. Honea, 110 F.Supp.3d
1027 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 19, 32, 38, 39, 42
Crocker v. County of Macomb, 285 F.Supp.2d 971
(E.D.Mich. 2003) 14, 32
Crocker v. Durkin, 159 F.Supp.2d 1258 (D.Kan. 2001). 37
Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 1999). 19, 28, 39
Cromwell v. Coughlin, 773 F.Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
49
Cronn v. Buffington, 150 F.3d 538 (5th Cir. 1998). 16, 24,
36
Crooks v. Nix, 872 F.2d 800 (8th Cir. 1989). 2, 27, 29
Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F.Supp. 666 (D. Me. 1991). 8, 17,
38
Cross v. Powers, 328 F.Supp. 899 (W.D. Wisc. 1971). 1
Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598 (8th Cir. 2005). 2, 14,
32, 45
Crow v. Washington Co. Bd. of Prison Inspectors, 504
F.Supp. 412 (W.D. Penn. 1980). 14, 29
Crowder v. Kelly, 928 F.Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 1996). 9, 10, 29
Crowder v. True, 74 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 1996). 7, 29
Crowder v. True, 845 F.Supp. 1250 (N.D.Ill. 1994). 3
Crowell v. Walsh, 151 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 20, 22
Crozier v. Shillinger, 710 F.Supp. 760 (D. Wyo. 1989). 8,
10, 49
Cruise v. Marino, 404 F.Supp.2d 656 (M.D.Pa. 2005). 14,
17, 29, 32, 45

TC-21
XXVI

Crump v. Kansas, 143 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D.Kan. 2001). 36
Crutcher-Sanchez v. County of Dakota, 687 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 2012). 2, 31
Cruz v. Beto, 329 F.Supp. 443 (S.D. Tex. 1970), affirmed,
445 F.2d 1801. 1
Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). 7, 11, 28, 37
Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59 (1971). 1, 19, 38
Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1980). 1, 42
Cruz v. Sielaff, 767 F.Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 36
Cryer v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 763 F.Supp.2d
237 (D.Mass. 2011). 24, 37, 38, 44
Cryer v. Spencer, 934 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Mass. 2013). 37,
38
Csizmadia v. Fauver, 746 F.Supp. 483 (D. N.J. 1990). 31,
33
Cucciniello v. Keller, 137 F.3d 721 (2nd Cir. 1998). 6, 22,
32, 36
Cuebas v. Davila, 618 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.Puerto Rico 2009).
8, 14, 30, 32
Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade County, Fla., 285 F.3d
962 (11th Cir. 2002). 17, 25, 32, 41
Culbert v. Young, 834 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 1296 (1988). 11
Culton v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 515 F.3d 828 (8th
Cir. 2008). 31
Culver By and Through Bell v. Fowler, 862 F.Supp. 369
(M.D. Ga. 1994). 27, 48
Culver v. Town of Torrington, Wyo., 930 F.2d 1456 (10th
Cir. 1991). 48
Cummings v. Caspari, 797 F.Supp. 747 (E.D.Mo. 1992) and
821 F.Supp. 1291 (E.D.Mo. 1993). 11, 29, 48
Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F.Supp.2d 1263 (N.D.Fla.
2010). 9, 14, 21, 45, 48
Cummings v. McCarter, 826 F.Supp. 299 (E.D.Mo. 1993).
3, 29
Cummings v. Roberts, 628 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1980). 3, 8,
29
Cunningham v. David Special Commitment Center, 158
F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 1998). 17, 34
Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1982). 10, 18
Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 2000). 17, 29
Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1987). 1, 29, 32
Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2001). 14, 19, 38,
39
Curran v. Cousins, 482 F.Supp.2d 36 (D.Mass. 2007). 31
Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007). 31
Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2013). 14, 29, 32
Currie v. Cundiff, 870 F.Supp.2d 581 (S.D.Ill. 2012). 14,
27, 29, 32
Curry v. Crist, 226 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2000). 8, 14, 50
Curry v. Hall, 839 F.Supp. 1437 (D. Or. 1993). 21, 38
Curry v. Kerik, 163 F.Supp.2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 32, 40
Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001). 1, 14, 21
Curry v. South Carolina, 518 F.Supp.2d 661 (D.S.C. 2007).
24, 26
Curtis v. Curtis, 37 Fed.Appx. 141 (6th Cir. 2002). 23
Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 995. 14
Curtis v. TransCor America, LLC, 877 F.Supp.2d 578
(N.D.Ill. 2012). 14, 27, 47
Cusamano v. Alexander, 691 F.Supp.2d 312 (N.D.N.Y.
2009). 7, 36
Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
1, 9, 11, 13, 14, 23, 35, 48
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005). 7, 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Cuyahoga County Hospital v. City of Cleveland, 472
N.E.2d 757 (Ohio App. 1984). 4, 29
Cygan v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 388 F.3d 1092
(7th Cir. 2004). 19, 31
Czajka v. Caspari, 995 F.2d 870 (8th Cir. 1993). 29
Czajka v. Moore, 708 F.Supp. 253 (E.D. Mo. 1989). 11, 49
D.B., et al. v. Graham Tewksbury, et al., 545 F.Supp. 896
(1982). 9, 26, 32
D.M. v. Terhune, 67 F.Supp.2d 401 (D.N.J. 1999). 5, 30
Dabney v. Anderson, 92 F.Supp.2d 801 (N.D.Ind. 2000). 1,
11
Dace v. Mickelson, 797 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1986). 36
Dace v. Smith-Vasquez, 658 F.Supp.2d 865 (S.D.Ill. 2009).
1, 9, 15, 21
Dahl v. Weber, 580 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 2009). 20, 24, 36
Daily v. Byrnes, 605 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1979). 27, 29, 48
Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga. 2007). 1,
19, 21, 38
Daker v. Wetherington, 469 F.Supp.2d 1231 (N.D.Ga.
2007). 19, 37, 38
Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2008). 3, 14, 27
Dallas v. Haley, 228 F.Supp.2d 1317 (M.D.Ala 2002). 22
Dancy v. Simms, 116 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.Md. 2000). 29, 30
Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1473. 7, 14, 25, 27, 30, 32, 45, 46
Daniel v. Fulwood, 893 F.Supp.2d 42 (D.D.C. 2012). 36
Daniel v. Rolfs, 29 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Wash. 1998). 49
Daniels v. Aikens, 755 F.Supp. 239 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 47
Daniels v. Anderson, 237 N.W.2d 397 (Neb. Sup. Ct.
1975). 45
Daniels v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 380
F.Supp.2d 379 (D.Del. 2005). 29
Daniels v. Crosby, 444 F.Supp.2d 1220 (N.D.Fla. 2006).
34, 35, 47, 50
Daniels v. Delaware, 120 F.Supp.2d 411 (D.Del. 2000). 14,
17, 27, 44, 46
Daniels v. McKinney, 193 Cal. Rptr. 842 (App. 1983). 5,
12, 17, 27
Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986). 7, 14, 27
Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730 (6th Cir. 2005). 26, 32,
43
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). 29, 32, 48
Danley v. Allyn, 485 F.Supp.2d 1260 (N.D.Ala. 2007). 27,
29, 32, 48
Danser v. Stansberry, 772 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2014). 8, 14,
39, 45
Dantone v. Bhaddi, 570 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.Mass. 2008). 14,
29, 47
Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Me. 2006). 25,
32, 41
Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2008). 2, 31
Darring v. Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1986). 1
Darul-Islam v. Dubois, 997 F.Supp. 176 (D.Mass. 1998).
37, 39
Darwin v. Carlson, 714 F.Supp. 34 (Civ. Div. Dist. Col.
1989). 35, 38
Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433 (D.C.Cir.
2000). 14, 17, 27, 32, 46
Daugherty v. Campbell, 33 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 1994). 41, 49
Daugherty v. Campbell, 935 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 939. 24, 41
Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 872. 41, 49
Davenport v. DeRobertis, 653 F.Supp. 649 (N.D. Ill. 1987),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908. 3, 10, 12, 23, 24

TC-22
XXVI

Davenport v. DeRoberts, 844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 260. 9, 10, 12, 23, 40
David B. v. McDonald, 156 F.3d 780 (7th Cir. 1998). 26
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1988). 7, 8, 11,
39
Davidson v. Bureau of Prisons, 931 F.Supp.2d 770
(E.D.Ky. 2013). 2, 4, 19, 44
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). 7, 14, 27
Davidson v. City of Cranston, R.I., 42 F.Supp.3d 325
(D.R.I. 2014). 7
Davidson v. Conway, 318 F.Supp.2d 60 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
9, 23
Davidson v. Coughlin, 920 F.Supp. 305 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
9, 10, 29
Davidson v. Coughlin, III, 968 F.Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). 3, 10, 12
Davidson v. Desai, 817 F.Supp.2d 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 9,
29, 33
Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27 (2nd Cir. 1994). 1, 10, 29, 48
Davidson v. Goord, 259 F.Supp.2d 238 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 1
Davidson v. Mann, 129 F.3d 700 (2nd Cir. 1997). 3, 19, 28
Davidson v. Murray, 371 F.Supp.2d 361 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
1, 3, 23
Davidson v. Riley, 45 F.3d 625 (2nd Cir. 1995). 1, 39
Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50 (2nd Cir. 1982). 1, 28
Davidson v. Scully, 914 F.Supp. 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 1,
9, 12, 15, 18, 37
Davie v. Wingard, 958 F.Supp. 1244 (S.D.Ohio 1997). 37,
38
Davies v. Valdes, 462 F.Supp.2d 1084 (C.D.Cal. 2006). 3,
11, 21, 33
Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2008). 2, 5, 31
Davila v. Gladden, 777 F.3d 1198 (11th Cir. 2015). 37, 38
Davis El v. O'Leary, 668 F.Supp. 1189 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 7,
22, 24, 36
Davis ex rel. Davis v. Borough of Norristown, 400
F.Supp.2d 790 (E.D.Pa. 2005). 2, 16, 26, 46, 48
Davis v. Abercrombie, 903 F.Supp.2d 975 (D.Hawai’I
2012). 21, 27, 35, 37, 38
Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129 (2nd Cir. 2009). 3, 11, 21
Davis v. Beeler, 966 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Ky. 1997). 22, 36
Davis v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1036. 7, 35
Davis v. Brady, 143 F.3d 1021 (6th Cir. 1998). 14, 32, 36
Davis v. Carlson, 837 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1988). 10, 47, 49,
50
Davis v. Carroll, 390 F.Supp.2d (D.Del. 2005). 14, 27, 29,
45, 48
Davis v. Carter, 452 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 2006). 29, 32
Davis v. Castleberry, 364 F.Supp.2d 319 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
21, 41
Davis v. City of Camden, 657 F.Supp. 396 (D. N.J. 1987).
17, 27, 32, 41
Davis v. City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1989).
27, 45, 46, 48
Davis v. City of New York, 142 F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y.
2001). 13, 25, 37
Davis v. Correctional Medical Services, 760 F.Supp.2d 469
(D.Del. 2011). 1, 21, 29, 30
Davis v. County of Nassau, 355 F.Supp.2d 668 (E.D.N.Y.
2005). 29
Davis v. Crabtree, 923 F.Supp. 166 (D.Or. 1996). 43
Davis v. D.C. Dept. of Corrections, 623 F.Supp.2d 77
(D.D.C. 2009). 21

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Davis v. Dallas County, Tex., 541 F.Supp.2d 844 (N.D.Tex.
2008). 2, 36
Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C.Cir.
1998). 1, 27, 33
Davis v. Dorsey, 167 F.3d 411 (8th Cir. 1999). 29, 32
Davis v. First Correctional Medical, 530 F.Supp.2d 657
(D.Del. 2008). 29
Davis v. First Correctional Medical, 589 F.Supp.2d 464
(D.Del. 2008). 29
Davis v. Fulton County, Ark., 90 F.3d 1346 (8th Cir. 1996).
8, 14, 27, 36
Davis v. Gunter, 771 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Neb. 2011). 27
Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2004). 13, 16, 24, 36
Davis v. Hall, 992 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1993). 29, 32
Davis v. Hill, 173 F.Supp.2d 1136 (D.Kan. 2001). 32, 48
Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F.Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 29,
30
Davis v. Jones, 936 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1991). 29, 32
Davis v. Kelly, 981 F.Supp. 178 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 1, 47
Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F.Supp. 1134 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). 3, 8,
9, 10, 27, 32
Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208 (11th cir. 1991). 5, 48
Davis v. Milwaukee County, 225 F.Supp.2d 967 (E.D.Wis.
2002). 1, 11, 21, 32
Davis v. Moss, 841 F.Supp. 1193 (M.D. Ga. 1994). 4, 10,
27, 48
Davis v. Muscarella, 615 F.Supp.2d 296 (D.Del. 2009). 14
Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2002). 9, 10, 29,
38
Davis v. NYS Dept. of Corrections Attica Correctional
Facility, 110 F.Supp.3d 458 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). 31
Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir.
2010). 2, 14, 15, 27, 32, 38, 39, 46
Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1979). 5
Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). 1, 7, 9,
15, 39, 41, 48, 49
Davis v. Pickell, 939 F.Supp.2d 771 (E.D.Mich. 2013). 8,
25, 32, 48
Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196 (S.D.Cal. 2012). 24,
37, 38, 39
Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679 F.3d 433 (6th Cir.
2012). 29, 41, 50
Davis v. Reilly, 324 F.Supp.2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 14,
29, 32
Davis v. Sancegraw, 850 F.Supp. 809 (E.D. Mo. 1993). 48
Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003 (5th Cir. 1998). 9, 10
Davis v. Scott, 94 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 1996). 14
Davis v. Silva, 511 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). 11, 20, 21, 22
Davis v. Township of Paulsboro, 421 F.Supp.2d 835
(D.N.J. 2006). 29, 32, 48
Davis v. U.S., 474 F.Supp.2d 829 (N.D.Tex. 2007). 14, 17,
27
Davis v. Vermont, Dept. of Corrections, 868 F.Supp.2d 313
(D.Vt. 2012). 2, 31
Davis v. Village of Calumet Park, 737 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D.
Ill. 1990), reversed, 936 F.2d 971. 27, 29, 32
Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2015). 32, 39, 48
Davis v. Williams, 495 F.Supp.2d 453 (D.Del. 2007). 21
Davis v. Williams, 572 F.Supp.2d 498 (D.Del. 2008). 14,
29
Davis v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 445 F.3d 971 (7th
Cir. 2006). 2, 31
Davis v. Woehrer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1078 (E.D.Wis. 1999). 1,
21, 50

TC-23
XXVI

Davis v. Zahradnick, 600 F.2d 458 (4th Cir. 1979). 14, 27,
29, 45
Dawes v. Carpenter, 899 F.Supp. 892 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 19,
28
Dawes v. Coughlin, 964 F.Supp. 652 (N.D.N.Y. 1997). 12,
29, 39, 48
Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489 (2nd Cir. 2001). 1, 11, 21
Dawson v. Burnett, 631 F.Supp.2d 878 (W.D.Mich. 2009).
18, 37
Dawson v. County of Westchester, 351 F.Supp.2d 176
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 31
Dawson v. Newman, 419 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2005). 24, 36,
43
Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995). 43
Dawson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 929, 104 S.Ct. 1714. 11
Day v. Johnson, 119 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1997). 31
Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 2003). 1
de Jesus Benavides v. Santos, 883 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1989).
14, 31, 39
De La Paz v. Peters, 959 F.Supp. 909 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 7, 8,
29
De Luna v. Hidalgo County, Tex., 853 F.Supp.2d
623(S.D.Tex. 2012). 2, 4, 27, 36
Dean v. City of Fresno, 546 F.Supp.2d 798 (E.D.Cal. 2008).
14, 24, 25, 29, 32, 46
Dean v. Corrections Corp. of America, 540 F.Supp.2d 691
(N.D.Miss. 2008). 18, 37
Dean v. Corrections Corporation of America, 108
F.Supp.3d 702 (D. Ariz. 2014). 18, 37, 47
Dean v. Olibas, 129 F.3d 1001 (8th Cir. 1997). 6, 16
Dean v. Thomas, 933 F.Supp. 600 (S.D.Miss 1996). 4, 11,
27
Dean v. Walker, 743 F.Supp.2d 605 (S.D.Miss. 2010). 7,
14, 27, 39
Dean v. Walker, 764 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D.Miss. 2011). 7,
27, 39
Dearth v. State, 390 So.2d 108 (Ct. App. Fla. 1980). 43
Deary v. Three Un-Named Police Officers, 746 F.2d 185
(3rd Cir. 1984). 16, 24
DeBlasio v. Gilmore, 313 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2003). 1, 4, 13
Deblasio v. Johnson, 128 F.Supp.2d 315 (E.D.Va. 2000). 7,
10, 11, 19, 23, 37, 38, 40
DeBow v. City of East St. Louis, 510 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. App.
1987), cert. denied, 116 Il2d 552. 8, 14, 25, 32, 44
DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 2, 4, 7,
29, 42
Decker v. Dunbar, 633 F.Supp.2d 317 (E.D.Tex. 2008).
Affirmed 358 Fed.Appx. 509. 1, 9, 10, 29
Dees v. Murphy, 794 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1986). 22
DeFlumer v. Dalsheim, 505 N.Y.S.2d 919 (A.D. 2 Dept.
1986). 29, 38
DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 18 F.Supp.2d 848
(N.D.Ill. 1998). 24
DeGenova v. Sheriff of DuPage County, 209 F.3d 973 (7th
Cir. 2000). 24, 29, 32
DeGidio v. Pung, 704 F.Supp. 922 and 723 F.Supp. 135 (D.
Minn. 1989), affirmed, 920 F.2d 525. 5, 27, 29
DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1990). 5, 29
Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
7, 24, 29, 35
DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3rd Cir. 2004). 18, 37
DeHart v. Lehman, 9 F.Supp.2d 539 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 18, 37
Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F.Supp.2d 748 (E.D.Mich. 2001). 1,
27, 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Del Carmen Molina v. I.N.S., 170 F.3d 1247 (9th Cir.
1999). 22, 36
Del Guzzi v. U.S., 980 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1992). 43
Del Raine v. Bureau of Prisons, 989 F.Supp. 1373 (D.Kan.
1997). 50
Del Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 1994). 9, 35,
41
Delancy v. Crabtree, 131 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1997). 7, 36
Delaney v. Detella, 123 F.Supp.2d 429 (N.D.Ill. 2000). 9,
12, 27
Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 185
(D.D.C. 2009). 1, 7, 27, 49
Delaney V. Selsky, 899 F.Supp. 923 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 11
Delaware County Prison v. Com. Unemp. Comp. Bd., 455
A.2d 790 (Penn. App. 1983). 2, 31, 45
Deleon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93 (2nd Cir. 2004). 1, 28
Delgado v. New York City Dept. of Correction, 842
F.Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 11
Delgado v. Sheriff of Milwaukee Co. Jail, 487 F.Supp. 649
(E.D. Wisc. 1980). 1, 32
Delgado-Brunet v. Clark, 93 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 1996). 14
Delker v. Maass, 843 F.Supp. 1390 (D. Or. 1994). 24, 29
Dellairo v. Garland, 222 F.Supp.2d 86 (D.Me. 2002). 29
De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003). 17, 29
De'lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520 (4th Cir. 2013). 17, 29, 30
Delph v. Trent, 86 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2000). 14
Delverne v. Klevenhagen, 888 F.Supp. 64 (S.D.Tex. 1995).
4, 29, 35
Demaio v. Mann, 877 F.Supp. 89 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 10, 11,
15
DeMallory v. Cullen, 855 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1988). 1
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 S.Ct. 599 (1991). 1
Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 19, 32, 33
DeMier v. Gondles, 676 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1982). 5, 41
DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145 (5th Cir. 2011). 19, 37
Dennis v. Nevada, 282 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Nev. 2003) 31
Dennis v. Thurman, 959 F.Supp. 1253 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 9,
10, 48
Dennison v. Osp, 715 P.2d 88 (Ore. 1986). 38, 39
Dennison v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 268
F.Supp.2d 387 (M.D.Pa. 2003). 2, 31, 33
Denny v. Schultz, 708 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2013). 11, 20, 22,
39
Denson v. Marshall, 44 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Mass. 1999). 18,
37, 42
Denson v. Marshall, 59 F.Supp.2d 156 (D.Mass. 1999). 37
Denz v. Clearfield County, 712 F.Supp. 65 (W.D. Pa.
1989). 9, 10
Department of Corrections v. Colbert, 391 S.E.2d 759 (Ga.
1990). 31
Department of Corrections v. Dixon, 436 So.2d 320 (Fla.
App. 1983). 31
Dept. of Corr. v. Corr. Officer, 514 A.2d 405 (1986). 2, 31
Dept. of Corrections v. Helton, 477 So.2d 14 (Fla. App. 1
Dist. 1985). 2, 31, 39
Dept. of Corrections v. Local No. 246, 554 A.2d 319 (D.C.
App. 1989). 31
Dept. of Corrections v. Piccirillo, 474 So.2d 1199 (Fla.
App. 1 Dist. 1985). 38
Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv. v. Whaley, 531 So.2d 723
(Fla.App. 4 Dist. 1988). 8, 14, 26, 27
Derby Industries, Inc. v. Chestnut Ridge Foam, 202
F.Supp.2d 818 (N.D.Ind. 2002). 15, 39
DeSouto v. Cooke, 751 F.Supp. 794 (E.D. Wis. 1990). 35

TC-24
XXVI

Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001). 9, 27, 40,
48
Desroche v. Strain, 507 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.La. 2007). 9,
23, 29, 32, 33, 40
DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1991). 29
DeToledo v. County of Suffolk, 379 F.Supp.2d 138
(D.Mass. 2005). 16, 24, 49
DeTomaso v. McGinnis, 970 F.2d 211 (7th Cir. 1992). 36,
50
Dettmer v. Landon, 617 F.Supp. 592 (D.C. Va. 1985), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 3234. 37, 38, 39
Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 737 F.Supp. 261
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), affirmed, 930 F.2d 909. 8, 24
Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). 1, 2, 35,
38, 39
DeVonish v. Scully, 496 N.Y.S.2d 485 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1985).
31
DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000). 7, 11, 22, 50
Dewees v. Haste, 620 F.Supp.2d 625 (M.D.Pa. 2009). 2, 24,
31
Dewitt v. Wall, 41 Fed.Appx. 481 (1st Cir. 2002). 19, 49
Dhiab v. Obama, 952 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013). 9, 19,
29
Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F.Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
3, 19
Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1990). 19, 28
Dias v. Vose, 865 F.Supp. 53 (D.Mass. 1994), affirmed, 50
F.3d 1. 29
Diaz v. Collins, 872 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.Tex. 1994). 37, 39
Diaz v. Davidson, 799 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2015). 9, 10, 12
Diaz v. Kinkela, 253 F.3d 241 (6th Cir. 2001). 11, 22, 36,
43
Diaz v. Ward, 506 F.Supp. 226 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 36
Diaz-Romero v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 115 (1st Cir. 2008). 31
Dible v. Scholl, 506 F.3d 1106 (8th Cir. 2007). 11, 13
Dickens v. District of Columbia, 502 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.D.C.
2007). 14, 30, 36
Dickens v. Taylor, 464 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2006). 3, 8,
12, 18
Diercks v. Durham, 959 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1992). 11, 27
DiFebo v. Keve, 395 F.Supp. 1350 (D. Del. 1975). 7, 27, 29
DiGiovanni v. City of Philadelphia, 531 F.Supp. 141 (E.D.
Penn. 1982). 7, 24, 27
Dillard v. Pitchess, 399 F.Supp. 1225 (C.D. Calif. 1975). 5,
9, 18, 32
Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365 (9th Cir. 1995). 1, 27, 47
Dillon v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 552 F.Supp. 30
(W.D. Vir. 1982). 8, 14, 26, 27, 44
Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010). 1, 21, 32
DiLoreto v. Borough of Oaklyn, 744 F.Supp. 610 (D.N.J.
1990). 17, 32, 33, 41
Dilworth v. Goldberg, 3 F.Supp.3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 1,
15, 39
Dilworth v. Goldberg, 914 F.Supp.2d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
9, 29, 32
Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). 1, 11,
21, 29, 48
Dimas v. County of Quay, New Mexico, 730 F.Supp. 373
(D.N.M. 1990). 14, 36
Dinger v. City v. New Albany, 662 F.Supp. 929 (S.D. Ind.
1987). 7, 8, 10, 29
Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). 6, 7, 22,
36
Dipace v. Goord, 308 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 14,
29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

DiRose v. McClennan, 26 F.Supp.2d 550 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
28, 38
Disability Advocates, Inc. v. McMahon, 279 F.Supp.2d 158
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). 16, 30, 32
Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Dept. of
Correction, 960 F.Supp.2d 271 (D.Mass. 2012). 3, 8,
14, 27, 30
Dismas Charities v. U.S. Dept., Just., Bur., Pris., 287
F.Supp.2d 741 (W.D.Ky. 2003) 2
District of Columbia v. Anderson, 597 A.2d 1295 (D.C.
App. 1991). 29
Divers v. Department of Corrections, 921 F.2d 191 (8th Cir.
1990). 1, 3
Dixon v. Fox, 893 F.2d 1556 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 262. 11, 18
Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1997). 3, 9, 10, 15
Dixon v. Goord, 224 F.Supp.2d 739 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 11
Dixon v. Kirby, 210 F.Supp.2d 792 (S.D.W.Va. 2002). 28,
38
Dixon v. Page, 291 F.3d 485 (7th Cir. 2002). 13
Dizak v. State, 508 N.Y.S.2d 290 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1986). 14,
45, 46
Doan v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). 6, 36
Doan v. Watson, 168 F.Supp.2d 932 (S.D.Ind. 2001). 13,
25, 32, 41
Dobbey v. Mitchell-Lawshea, 806 F.3d 938 (7th Cir. 2015).
29
Dobbin v. Artuz, 143 F.Supp.2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 8, 29
Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2005). 6, 32
Dobson v. Magnusson, 923 F.2d 229 (1st Cir. 1991). 8, 14
Doby v. Hickerson, 120 F.3d 111 (8th Cir. 1997). 27, 29, 30
Dockerty-Bostron v. Waukesha County, 744 F.Supp. 877
(E.D. Wis. 1990). 29
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010). 2, 6,
36
Dodge v. County of Orange, 282 F.Supp.2d 41 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). 32, 41
Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F.Supp.2d 1127 (D.Colo. 2010).
3, 8, 14, 17, 24
Dodson v. Reno, 958 F.Supp. 49 (D.Puerto Rico 1997). 1,
32, 47
Doe By and Through Doe v. Washington County, 150 F.3d
920 (8th Cir. 1998). 1, 5, 14, 26, 32
Doe No. 1 v. Balaam, 494 F.Supp.2d 1173 (D.Nev. 2007).
25, 32, 36, 41
Doe v. Balaam, 524 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Nev. 2007). 25, 32,
41
Doe v. Beard, 63 F.Supp.3d 1159 (C.D.Cal. 2014). 29, 33
Doe v. Caldwell, 913 F.Supp.2d 262 (E.D.La.2012). 7, 36,
44
Doe v. City of Cleveland, 788 F.Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio
1991). 32, 33
Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015).
7, 26, 27, 31, 32, 44
Doe v. Coughlin, 509 N.Y.S.2d 209 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1986),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 196. 29, 49
Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F.Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 8, 33
Doe v. Gangland Productions, Inc., 730 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.
2013). 19, 33
Doe v. Heil, 781 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Colo. 2011). 1, 7, 34
Doe v. Jindal, 851 F.Supp.2d 995 (E.D.La. 2012). 19, 34,
36, 44
Doe v. Jindal, 853 F.Supp.2d 596 (M.D.La. 2012). 19, 44
Doe v. Lally, 467 F.Supp. 1339 2 (D. Md. 1979). 7, 8, 9, 14
Doe v. McFaul, 599 F.Supp. 1421 (E.D. Ohio 1984). 26

TC-25
XXVI

Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). 7, 33, 41
Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012). 7, 36,
44
Doe v. New York, 97 F.Supp.3d 5 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 13, 27,
29
Doe v. Pataki, 427 F.Supp.2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006.) 7, 13
Doe v. Public Health Trust of Dade Co., 696 F.2d 901 (11th
Cir. 1983). 26, 30
Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2012). 7,
36, 44
Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F.Supp.2d 1178 (E.D.Cal.
2007). 7, 13, 36
Doe v. Simon, 221 F.3d 137 (2nd Cir. 2000). 36
Doe v. Sparks, 733 F.Supp. 227 (W.D. Pa. 1990). 17, 19, 49
Doe v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 956 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 187. 14
Doe v. Swinson, 20 Crim. L. Rptr. 2272 (E.D. Vir. 1976). 8,
27
Doe v. United Social and Mental Health Services, 670
F.Supp. 1121 (D. Conn. 1987). 24, 27, 36
Doe v. Ward, 124 F.Supp.2d 900 (W.D.Pa. 2000). 7, 33, 47
Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1994). 29, 33
Dohner v. McCarthy, 635 F.Supp. 408 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 9,
10, 15
Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2015). 19, 21
Dolberry v. Levine, 567 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
1, 14, 28, 40
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006). 1, 21
Dollar v. Gutierrez, 111 F.Supp.3d 1114 (D. Nev. 2015). 29
Dominguez v. Correctional Medical Services, 555 F.3d 543
(6th Cir. 2009). 29
Dominguez v. Figel, 626 F.Supp. 368 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 1,
12, 37
Dominguez-Estrella v. U.S. I.N.S., 71 F.Supp.2d 578
(W.D.La. 1999). 22
Dominique v. Weld, 880 F.Supp. 928 (D.Mass. 1995). 34,
36, 50
Domino v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752
(5th Cir. 2001). 14, 29, 30
Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776 (7th Cir.
2008). 13, 36, 50
Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Ariz. 2012). 2,
24, 27
Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). 1,
7, 16, 41
Donhauser v. Goord, 314 F.Supp.2d 139 (N.D.N.Y. 2004).
7, 27, 34
Donnell C. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F.Supp. 1016
(N.D.Ill. 1993). 32, 34
Dorman v. District of Columbia, 888 F.2d 159 (D.C. Cir.
1989). 14, 25, 27, 32, 46
Dormire v. Wilkinson, 249 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2001). 19, 35,
38
Dorr v. County of Butte, 795 F.2d 875 (9th Cir. 1986). 2, 31
Dorsey v. Givens, 209 F.Supp.2d 850 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 14,
17
Dorsey v. St. Joseph Co. Jail Officials, 910 F.Supp. 1343
(N.D.Ind, 1996). 14, 29, 32, 48
Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ill. 2009). 7, 19,
28, 38
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 7, 31
Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1991). 4, 5
Dotson v. Maschner, 764 F.Supp. 163 (D. Kan. 1991). 11
Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994). 5

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Doty v. Doyle, 182 F.Supp.2d 750 (E.D.Wis. 2002). 2, 4,
35, 47
Doty v. Lewis, 995 F.Supp. 1081 (D.Ariz. 1998). 37
Doucette v. Morrison County, Minn., 763 F.3d 978 (8th Cir.
2014). 31
Doughty v. Bd. of County Com'rs for County of Weld, 731
F.Supp. 423 (D. Colo. 1989). 10
Douglas v. DeBruyn, 936 F.Supp. 572 (S.D.Ind. 1996). 1, 8,
34, 42, 50
Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.La. 2008). 1,
7, 12, 29, 42
Douglas v. Murphy, 6 F.Supp.2d 430 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 16, 36
Douglas v. Stanwick, 93 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
29, 32
Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2008). 1, 45
Dowdy v. Johnson, 510 F.Supp. 836 (E.D. Vir. 1981). 11
Dowling v. Hannigan, 995 F.Supp. 1188 (D.Kan. 1998). 14
Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1996). 22, 43
Downey v. Denton County, Tex., 119 F.3d 381 (5th Cir.
1997). 7, 14, 17, 27
Downey v. Sheahan, 136 F.Supp.3d 472 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).
36
Dowty v. Tarrell, 368 F.Supp.2d 1024 (D.S.D. 2005). 29
Doyle v. Coombe, 976 F.Supp. 183 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 9, 50
Doyle v. Elsea, 658 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1981). 36
Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 393 F.Supp.2d 756 (D.Minn.
2005). 14, 27, 29, 30, 32, 45
Drake ex rel. Cotton v. Koss, 445 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir.
2006). 8, 14, 30, 32, 45
Drake v. Velasco, 207 F.Supp.2d 809 (N.D.Ill. 2002). 9, 18,
32, 45
Draper v. Walsh, 790 F.Supp. 1553 (W.D.Okl. 1991). 32,
41
Drayton v. Robinson, 719 F.2d 1214 (3rd Cir. 1983). 3, 8,
32
Driver v. Groose, 273 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 2001). 7, 19, 38
Drogosch v. Metcalf, 557 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2009). 16, 24,
32, 36
Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2011).
16, 24, 27
Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 428 (D.Mass. 2011).
5, 16
Drummer v. Luttrell, 75 F.Supp.2d 796 (W.D.Tenn. 1999).
1, 4, 17, 39, 41, 43, 48
Dry v. CFR Court of Indian Offenses, 168 F.3d 1207 (10th
Cir. 1999). 22
Dry v. U.S., 235 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). 16, 32
Duamutef v. Fial, 922 F.Supp. 807 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 14,
48
Duamutef v. Hollins, 297 F.3d 108 (2nd Cir. 2002). 19, 28
Duamutef v. O'Keefe, 98 F.3d 22 (2nd Cir. 1996). 1, 19, 21,
38
Duane v. Lane, 959 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1992). 10
Duberry v. District of Columbia, 106 F.Supp.3d 245
(D.D.C. 2015). 31
DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C.
2008). 2, 31
Ducally v. Rhode Island Dept. of Corrections, 160
F.Supp.2d 220 (D.R.I. 2001). 10, 29, 48
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2008). 29
Duckworth v. St. Louis Metropolitan Police Dept., 491 F.3d
401 (8th Cir. 2008). 31
Dudley v. Shaver, 770 S.W.2d 712 (Mo.App. 1989). 47
Duenas v. Nagle, 765 F.Supp. 1393 (W.D. Wis. 1991). 10,
11

TC-26
XXVI

Duffield v. Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2008). 29
Duffy v. County of Bucks, 7 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Pa. 1998).
16, 32, 41, 43
Duffy v. Riveland, 88 F.3d 1525 (9th Cir. 1996). 7, 11
Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1996). 7, 11
Dufrin v. Spreen, 712 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1983). 41
Dugas v. Jefferson County, 931 F.Supp. 1315 (E.D.Tex.
1996). 17, 27, 32, 41
Duhon v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 517 So.2d 1016 (La.
App. 3 Cir. 1987). 27, 50
Dukes v. Georgia, 428 F.Supp.2d 1298 (N.D.Ga. 2006). 29,
32, 47
Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997). 17, 29
Dunavant v. Moore, 907 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1990). 19,
37,38,39
Dunbar v. County of Saratoga, 358 F.Supp.2d 115
(N.D.N.Y. 2005). 24, 27, 31
Duncan v. County of Dakota, Neb., 687 F.3d 955 (8th Cir.
2012). 2, 31
Duncan v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Family Serv., 166
F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1999). 31
Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago County, 165 F.3d
587 (7th Cir. 1999). 29. 32
Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2010). 11, 24, 38,
49
Dunn v. Killingsworth, 984 F.Supp.2d 811 (M.D.Tenn.
2013). 3, 8, 14, 39
Dunn v. White, 880 F.2d 1188 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 871. 11, 33, 41
Dunne v. Keohane, 14 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 2182. 22, 36
Duplantis v. Carmona, 85 Fed.Appx. 397 (5th Cir. 2004)
[unpublished]. 35
Dupont v. Saunders, 800 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986). 1, 11, 50
Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2002). 1
Duquin v. Dean, 423 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 7, 9,
15, 29, 39
Duran v. Anaya, 642 F.Supp. 510 (D.N.M. 1986). 2, 29, 30,
31, 39, 45
Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976). 32
Duran v. Elrod, 760 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1985). 9, 15
Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J.,2013). 1, 2, 9,
14, 15, 18, 23, 27, 28, 29, 32, 39, 40
Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64 (3rd Cir. 1993). 29
Durrenberger v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 757
F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.Tex. 2010). 7, 24, 27, 49
Dusenbery v United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002). 7, 35
Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2010).
2, 15, 29, 40
Duvall v. Keating, 162 F.3d 1058 (10th Cir. 1998). 43
Dye v. Lomen, 40 Fed.Appx. 993 (7th Cir. 2002). 23, 33,
41, 48
Dzana v. Foti, 829 F.2d 558 (5th Cir. 1987). 11
E.A.F.F. v. U.S., 955 F.Supp.2d 707 (W.D.Tex. 2013). 9,
14, 26, 27, 32, 39
E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010).
2, 31, 37
E.E.O.C. v. Ithaca Industries, Inc., 829 F.2d 519 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 306. 31
Eads v. Hanks, 280 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2002). 11, 22
Earl v. Norris, 884 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1989). 11
Earl v. Racine County Jail, 718 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2013). 9,
18, 23, 29, 30, 35, 39, 45
Earrey v. Chickasaw County, Miss., 965 F.Supp. 870
(N.D.Miss. 1997). 14, 32, 45

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Eason v. Frye, 972 F.Supp.2d 935 (S.D.Miss. 2013). 21, 27,
29, 32, 46, 48
Eason v. Nicholas, 847 F.Supp. 109 (C.D. Ill. 1994). 1, 4,
23
Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322 (5th Cir. 1996). 1, 18, 37, 39
Eastman v. Walker, 895 F.Supp. 31 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 3
Eastwood v. Dept. of Corrections of State of Okl., 846 F.2d
627 (10th Cir. 1988). 27, 31
Eberle v. City of Newton, 289 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan.
2003) 32, 48
Ebrahime v. Dart, 899 F.Supp.2d 777 (N.D.Ill. 2012). 14,
32
Echevarria v. Dept. of Correct. Services of N.Y., 48
F.Supp.2d 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 14
Eckford-El v. Toombs, 760 F.Supp. 1267 (W.D. Mich.
1991). 28
Edgington v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 52 F.3d 777
(8th Cir. 1995). 1
Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). 7,
24, 34, 36, 45, 46
Edmondson v. Fremgen, 17 F.Supp.3d 833 (E.D.Wis.
2014). 1, 2, 4, 35
Edmonson v. Coughlin, 21 F.Supp.2d 242 (W.D.N.Y.
1998). 3
Edmonson v. State, 504 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Ct. Cl. 1986). 11, 16
Edney v. Karrigan, 69 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 14,
39
Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728 (8th Cir. 2014). 14, 32, 48
Edwards v. Dept. of Corrections, 615 F.Supp. 804 (D. Ala.
1985). 2, 17, 31
Edwards v. District of Columbia, 616 F.Supp.2d 112
(D.D.C. 2009). 14, 17, 27, 29, 30
Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1989). 8, 14,
24, 26
Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2000). 11, 19,
32
Edwards v. Oberndorf, 309 F.Supp.2d 780 (E.D.Va. 2003).
25, 32
Edwards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 523 F.Supp.2d 462
(E.D.Pa. 2007). 7, 36, 43, 44
Edwards v. U.S., 41 F.3d 154 (3rd Cir. 1994). 43
Edwards v. Washington, 661 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2009).
2, 31
Egan v. Hawk, 983 F.Supp. 858 (D.Minn. 1997). 22, 43
Egerton v. Cockrell, 334 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2003). 1, 22
Eggleton v. Gluch, 717 F.Supp. 1230 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
affirmed, 916 F.2d 712. 3, 24
Eichelman v. Lancaster County, 510 F.Supp.2d 377
(E.D.Pa. 2007). 14, 32
El Tabech v. Gunter, 922 F.Supp. 244 (D.Neb. 1996). 8, 9,
10, 14
Elam v. Henderson, 472 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 868. 18, 37
El-Amin v. Tirey, 817 F.Supp. 694 (W.D.Tenn. 1993),
affirmed, 35 F.3d 565. 11
Eldridge v. Morrison, 970 F.Supp. 928 (M.D.Ala. 1996). 7,
31
Elie v. Henderson, 340 F.Supp. 958 (E.D. La. 1972). 1, 39,
49
Elkin v.Fauver, 969 F.2d 48 (3rd Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 473. 11, 27
Elliott v. Byers, 975 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1992). 14, 50
Elliott v. Cheshire County, N.H., 750 F.Supp. 1146 (D.
N.H. 1990). 14, 29, 32

TC-27
XXVI

Elliott v. Cheshire County, N.H., 940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991).
14, 32, 46
Elliott v. Lynn, 38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994). 33, 41
Ellis ex rel. Lanthorn v. Jamerson, 174 F.Supp.2d 747
(E.D.Tenn. 2001). 14, 32
Ellis v. Butler, 890 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1989). 29
Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee LLC, 650 F.3d 640 (7th Cir.
2011). 31
Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). 2, 24, 31
Ellis v. Meade, 887 F.Supp. 324 (D.Me. 1995). 7, 32, 33, 41
Ellis v. Vadlamudi, 568 F.Supp.2d 778 (E.D.Mich. 2008).
21, 29
Ellis v. Washington County and Johnson City, Tenn., 198
F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 1999). 14, 32, 46
Ellis v. Washington County, Tenn., 80 F.Supp.2d 791
(E.D.Tenn. 1998). 14, 25, 32
Ellison v. Scheipe, 570 F.Supp. 1361 (E.D. Penn. 1983). 29
Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2015). 1, 22
El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2010). 5, 44
Elwell v. Dobucki, 224 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2000). 24, 31
Ely-El v Godinez, 8 F.Supp.2d 776 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 29
Emerson-West v. Redman, 574 F.Supp.2d 433 (D.Del.
2008). 11, 27
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2008). 10
Endl v. New Jersey, 5 F.Supp.3d 689 (D.N.J. 2014). 10, 14,
27, 29
Engebretson v. Mahoney, 724 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2013). 13,
24, 36
Engel v. Wendl, 921 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1990). 11, 24
Engelleiter v. Brevard County Sheriff’s Dept., 290
F.Supp.2d 1300 (M.D.Fla. 2003) 29, 32
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). 22
English v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.D.C.
2011). 2, 4, 35
Ennis v. Teague, 882 F.Supp. 1023 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 2
Enriquez v. Kearney, 694 F.Supp.2d 1282 (S.D.Fla. 2010).
32, 39, 48
Entertainment Network, Inc. v. Lappin, 134 F.Supp.2d 1002
(S.D.Ind. 2001). 19, 38, 39
Ephraim v. Angelone, 313 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Va. 2003).
18, 19, 37
Epps v. Levine, 484 F.Supp. 474 (D. Md. 1980). 32, 42, 47
Erickson v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 469 F.3d 600
(7th Cir. 2006). 14, 31
Ervin v. Busby, 992 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 220. 29, 47
Erwin v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir.
1989). 27, 46
Escalera v. Lunn, 354 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2004). 16, 31
Esmont v. City of New York, 371 F.Supp.2d 202 (E.D.N.Y.
2005). 8, 17, 25, 32
Espinal v. Goord, 180 F.Supp.2d 532 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 11
Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2009). 1, 21
Espinoza v. Peterson, 283 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2002). 11, 20,
22
Espinoza v. Sabol, 558 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2009). 22, 43
Espinoza v. Wilson, 814 F.2d 1093 (6th Cir. 1987). 7, 19
Esposito v. Leddy, 618 F.Supp. 1362 (D.C. Ill. 1985). 28,
38
Essex County Jail Annex Inmates v. Treffinger, 18
F.Supp.2d 445 (D.N.J. 1998). 2, 8, 15, 23, 27, 39, 45,
46
Essex County Jail Inmates v. Amato, 726 F.Supp. 539 (D.
N.J. 1989). 6, 9, 12, 15

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Estate of Adbollahi v. County of Sacramento, 405
F.Supp.2d 1194 (E.D.Cal. 2005). 2, 14, 25, 29, 30,
32, 45, 46
Estate of Allen v. City of Rockford, 349 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir.
2003) 14, 32, 41
Estate of Amaro v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 808 (9th Cir.
2011). 14, 32
Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405 (10th Cir. 2014).
14, 24, 29, 32, 48
Estate of Bradich v. City of Chicago, 413 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2005). 14, 29, 32, 45
Estate of Brooks Ex Rel. Brooks v. U.S., 197 F.3d 1245
(9th Cir. 1999). 16, 32
Estate of Brown v. Barian, 43 F.Supp.2d 1008 (E.D.Wis.
1999). 14, 36
Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305 (6th Cir.
2005). 29, 32
Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal., 618 F.Supp.
722 (U.S.D.C. N.D. Cal. 1985). 14, 25, 27
Estate of Cartwright v. City of Concord, Cal., 856 F.2d
1437 (9th Cir. 1988). 2, 8, 14, 32, 46
Estate of Chance v. First Correctional Medical Inc., 579
F.Supp.2d 583 (D.Del. 2008). 29
Estate of Cills v. Kaftan, 105 F.Supp.2d 391 (D.N.J. 2000).
2, 14, 29, 30
Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254 (7th Cir.
1996). 14, 29, 30, 32
Estate of Crouch v. Madison County, 682 F.Supp.2d 862
(S.D.Ind. 2010). 14, 27, 29, 46
Estate of Davis by Ostenfeld, v. Delo, 115 F.3d 1388 (8th
Cir. 1997). 14, 27, 48
Estate of Davis v. Johnson, 745 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1984).
14, 27
Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th
Cir. 2009). 4, 5, 14, 17, 27
Estate of Ford v. Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir.
2002). 8, 14
Estate of Frank v. City of Beaver Dam, 921 F.Supp. 590
(E.D.Wis 1996). 14, 32
Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia,
655 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2009). 2, 8, 14, 39, 45, 46
Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia,
833 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011). 2, 14, 32, 45
Estate of Hampton v. Androscoggin County, 245 F.Supp.2d
150 (D.Me. 2002). 25, 29, 45
Estate of Harvey ex rel. Dent v. Roanoke City Sheriff's
Office, 585 F.Supp.2d 844 (W.D.Va. 2008). 14, 29,
32, 47, 48
Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 988 F.Supp.2d 726
(N.D.Tex. 2013). 2, 14, 27, 29
Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 652 F.Supp.2d
730 (N.D.Tex. 2009). 14, 27, 29, 32
Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, Tex., 795 F.3d 456 (5th
Cir. 2015). 29, 32
Estate of Hill v. Richards, 525 F.Supp.2d 1076 (W.D.Wis.
2007. 1, 14, 17, 29, 30
Estate of Hocker By Hocker v. Walsh, 22 F.3d 995 (10th
Cir. 1994). 14, 25, 29
Estate of Johnson v. Weber, 785 F.3d 267 (8th Cir. 2015). 8,
14, 50
Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984
(7th Cir. 2012). 14, 24, 29, 30, 45
Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2005).
14, 27, 32, 48

TC-28
XXVI

Estate of Novack Ex Rel. Turbin v. County of Wood, 226
F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2000). 14, 32
Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958
F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). 2, 14, 27, 29, 32,
45, 47
Estate of Puza v. Carbon County, 586 F.Supp.2d 271
(M.D.Pa. 2007). 14, 15, 25, 29, 32
Estate of Reynolds v. Greene County, 163 F.Supp.2d 890
(S.D.Ohio 2001). 1, 5
Estate of Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services,
596 F.Supp.2d 1208 (N.D.Ind. 2009). 29, 30, 32
Estate of Schroeder v. Gillespie County, 23 F.Supp.3d 775
(W.D.Tex. 2014). 14, 32
Estate of Sisk v. Manzanares, 262 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Kan.
2002). 14, 29
Estate of Stevens ex rel. Collins v. Board of Com’rs. of
County of San Juan, 53 F.Supp.3d 1368 (D.N.M.
2014). 14, 32
Estate of Trentadue v. U.S., 560 F.Supp.2d 1124
(W.D.Okla. 2008). 9, 14, 27
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1066. 7, 10, 29
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). 1, 43
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976), reh'g. denied, 426
U.S. 954. 1, 6, 32
Estep v. Dent, 914 F.Supp. 1462 (W.D.Ky. 1996). 8, 12, 27,
37, 38
Estevez-Yalcin v. Children’s Village, 331 F.Supp.2d 170
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 2, 26, 31, 38
Estrada v. Reed, 508 F.Supp.2d 699 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 1, 29
Evans v. Bonner, 196 F.Supp.2d 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 29
Evans v. Deuth, 8 F.Supp.2d 1135 (N.D.Ind. 1998). 11, 22
Evans v. Dillahunty, 662 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1981). 36
Evans v. Hennessy, 934 F.Supp. 127 (D.Del. 1996). 8, 19,
27, 48
Evans v. Holm, 114 F.Supp.2d 706 (W.D.Tenn. 2000). 22,
47
Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S.Ct. (1986), reh'g. denied, 106 S.Ct.
2909. 5
Evans v. Jenne, 660 F.Supp. 426 (S.D. Miss. 1986). 19, 28
Evans v. Manos, 336 F.Supp.2d 255 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). 29
Evans v. Saar, 412 F.Supp.2d 519 (D.Md 2006). 10
Evans v. Vare, 402 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Nev. 2005). 1, 19,
28, 38
Everson v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.3d 737
(6th Cir. 2004). 31, 45
Everson v. Nelson, 941 F.Supp. 1048 (D.Kan. 1996). 3
Evicci v. Baker, 190 F.Supp.2d 233 (D.Mass. 2002). 1, 14,
29, 48
Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 2112. 20, 36
Ewell v. Murray, 813 F.Supp. 1180 (W.D.Va. 1993). 36, 41
Ewell v. Murray, 813 F.Supp. 1213 (M.D. Ga. 1988). 20,
25, 35, 38
Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.Supp.3d 269 (D. N.J.
2015). 14, 27, 32, 46, 48
Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941). 1, 22
Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 22
Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193 (1830). 22
Ezell v. Darr, 951 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ga. 2013). 2, 31,
44
Facey v. Dickhaut, 892 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012). 8,
10, 14, 24, 39, 45, 46
Facey v. Dickhaut, 91 F.Supp.3d 12 (D.Mass. 2014). 8, 14,
39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Faheem-el v. Klincar, 38 CrL 3178 (N.D. Ill. 1985). 6, 36
Fair v. Givan, 509 F.Supp. 1086 (N.D. Ind. 1981). 1
Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009). 2, 31
Fairley v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2002). 5, 7, 16, 25
Fairman v. Konteh, 361 F.Supp.2d 704 (N.D.Ohio 2005).
31
Falcon v. Knowles, 807 F.Supp. 1531 (S.D.Fla. 1992). 47,
Fallis v. United States, 476 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1973). 37, 39,
49
Fallon v. Lockhart, 919 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1990). 28
Falzerano v. Collier, 535 F.Supp. 800 (D.C. N.J. 1982). 1
Fambro v. Fulton County, Ga., 713 F.Supp. 1426 (N.D. Ga.
1989). 9, 23, 29, 40
Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F.Supp.2d 535
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 2, 9, 32
Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo.
2015). 1, 6, 7, 9, 15, 23, 27, 29, 32, 36, 40
Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184 (3rd Cir. 2015). 11, 36
Farabee v. Rider, 995 F.Supp. 1398 (M.D.Fla. 1998). 14,
16, 32, 46, 48
Farag v. U.S., 587 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 7, 16,
32
Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233 (2nd Cir. 2010). 19, 38, 39
Farid v. Goord, 200 F.Supp.2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 11,
19, 21, 41
Farley v. Andrews, 430 F.Supp.2d 786 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 31
Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (1994). 8, 14, 27
Farmer v. Crews, 804 F.Supp. 1516 (M.D.Fla. 1992). 36
Farmer v. Haas, 990 F2d 319 (7th Cir. 1993). 1
Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F.Supp.2d 120 (D.D.C. 1999).
17, 29, 30
Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 2007). 7,
8, 17, 29, 47
Farmer v. Loving, 392 F.Supp. 27 (W.D. Vir. 1975). 13, 19,
28, 49
Farmer v. Moritsugu, 742 F.Supp. 525 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 8,
50
Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2002). 17, 33, 41
Farnam v. Walker, 593 F.Supp.2d 1000 (C.D.Ill. 2009). 29
Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). 7, 13,
19, 44
Farrell v. Burke, 449 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 2006). 36
Farrell v. Peters, 951 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1992). 19, 28
Farrish v. Mississippi State Parole Board, 836 F.2d 969 (5th
Cir. 1988). 27, 36
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003). 29
Farver v. Schwartz, 255 F.3d 473 (8th Cir. 2001). 11, 21, 47
Faulcon v. City of Philadelphia, 18 F.Supp.2d 537 (E.D.Pa.
1998). 8, 14, 32, 44, 45, 46
Faulder v. Johnson, 99 F.Supp.2d 774 (S.D.Tex. 1999). 10,
43
Faulkner v. McLochlin, 732 F.Supp. 945 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
5
Faulkner v. McLocklin, 727 F.Supp. 486 (N.D. Ind. 1989).
28, 32
Fawaad v. Herring, 874 F.Supp. 350 (N.D. Ala. 1995). 19,
28, 37
Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084 (11th Cir. 1996). 19, 37
Feagin v. Broglin, 693 F.Supp. 741 (N.D. Ind. 1988). 11
Fear v. Diboll Correctional Center, 582 F.Supp.2d 841
(E.D.Tex. 2008). 29
Federal Bureau of Prisons v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 2, 31
Federal CURE v. Lappin, 602 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.D.C.
2009). 2, 49

TC-29
XXVI

Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1978). 28
Feeney v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 464 F.3d 158
(1st Cir. 2006). 13, 29
Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). 1, 18, 27, 37,
38, 39
Feigley v. Fulcomer, 720 F.Supp. 475 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 10,
14, 27, 29, 46
Felce v. Fiedler, 974 F2d 1484 (7th Cir. 1992). 30, 36
Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000). 1, 22
Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F.Supp. 14 (D. P.R. 1979). 9, 15,
25, 29, 30
Feliciano v. Colon, 672 F.Supp. 627 (D. P.R. 1987). 9, 15
Felix v. McCarthy, 939 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1165. 27, 48
Felix v. Rolan, 833 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1987). 1, 37, 39
Felix-Torres v. Graham, 521 F.Supp.2d 157, (N.D.N.Y.
2007). 8, 29
Felker v. Turpin, 116 S.Ct. 2333 (1996). 22, 43
Felton v. Lincoln, 429 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.Mass. 2006). 1,
11, 24, 28, 35
Fenelon v. Riddle, 34 Fed.Appx. 265 (9th Cir. 2002). 37, 50
Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2009). 24, 32,
48
Fenner v. Moran, 772 F.Supp. 59 (D. R.I. 1991). 10, 29
Fenner v. Suthers, 194 F.Supp.2d 1146 (D.Colo. 2002). 29
Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). 2,
8, 14, 25, 29, 32, 39, 44, 45
Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 88 F.3d 647 (8th Cir.
1996). 9, 15
Ferguson v. Cape Girardeau County, 883 F.Supp. 431 (E.D.
Mo. 1995). 29
Ferguson v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 38 Fed.Appx.
561 (10th Cir. 2002). 1,
Fermin-Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Med., 191
F.Supp.2d 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 47
Fernandez v. Rapone, 926 F.Supp. 255 (D.Mass. 1996). 41,
49
Ferola v. Moran, 622 F.Supp. 814 (D.C. R.I. 1985). 27, 30,
48
Ferranti v. Moran, 618 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1980). 1, 47, 49
Ferreira v. Dubois, 963 F.Supp. 1244 (D.Mass. 1996). 11
Ferreira v. Duval, 887 F.Supp. 374 (D.Mass. 1995). 1, 3, 11
Ferrington v. Louisiana Dept. of Corrections, 315 F.3d 529
(5th Cir. 2002). 1, 21
Ferris v. County of Kennebec, 44 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.Me.
1999). 17, 29, 32
Fickes v. Jefferson County, 900 F.Supp. 84 (E.D.Tex.
1995). 14, 32, 48
Fielder v. Bosshard, 590 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979). 10, 14,
27, 29
Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2011). 2, 15, 31, 39
Fields v. Department of Public Safety, 911 F.Supp.2d 373
(M.D.La. 2012). 31
Fields v. Gander, 734 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984). 29
Fields v. Henry County, Tenn., 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir.
2012). 6, 32, 36, 44
Fields v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109 (10th
Cir. 2007). 1, 21
Fields v. Roswarski, 572 F.Supp.2d 1015 (N.D.Ind. 2008).
21, 48
Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011). 17, 29, 44
Fields v. Smith, 712 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Wis. 2010). 8, 17,
29, 44
Fields v. State Dept. of Corrections, 498 So.2d 174 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 1986). 31, 39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014). 1, 7, 13,
24
Fierro v. Gomez, 865 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 10,
43
Fiesel v. Cherry, 294 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2002). 31
Figg v. Russell, 433 F.3d 593 (8th Cir. 2006). 16, 24
Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 1, 7,
9, 15, 29, 39
Fillmore v. Eichkorn, 891 F.Supp. 1482 (D.Kan. 1995). 16,
30, 32, 37, 48
Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2004). 48
Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2007). 1, 22
Finn v. Warren County, Kentucky, 768 F.3d 441 (6th Cir.
2014). 14, 29, 45, 46
Finnegan v. Maire, 405 F.3d 694 (8th Cir. 2005). 29
Finney v. Arkansas Board of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th
Cir. 1974). 28, 38
Finney v. Mabry, 458 F.Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark. 1978). 3, 29,
31
Finnie v. Lee County, Miss., 907 F.Supp.2d 750 (N.D.Miss.
2012). 2, 31
Fiorenzo v. Nolan, 755 F.Supp. 801 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
affirmed, 965 F.2d 348. 31
Fiorillo v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795
F.2d 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 2, 19, 31
Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 7, 17,
47
Fisher v. King, 232 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2000). 19
Fisher v. Koehler, 718 F.Supp. 1111 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 10,
15, 45
Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2005). 14, 32, 45
Fisher v. Miami-Dade County, 114 F.Supp.3d 1247 (S.D.
Fla. 2015). 7, 14, 29, 32
Fitts v. Witkowski, 920 F.Supp. 679 (D.S.C. 1996). 39, 48
Fitzgerald v. Corrections Corp. of America, 403 F.3d 1134
(10th Cir. 2005). 29
Fitzgerald v. Procunier, 393 F.Supp. 335 (N.D. Calif. 1975).
2, 11
Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072 (6th Cir. 1972). 29
Fitzpatrick v. State, 439 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa 1989). 36
Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001). 37, 38
Flanagan v. Warden, U.S. Penitentiary, 784 F.Supp. 178
(M.D. Pa. 1992), affirmed, 6 F.3d 779. 11, 22
Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2010). 23, 29
Flanyak v. Hopta, 410 F.Supp.2d 394 (M.D.Penn. 2006). 1,
21, 29, 44, 50
Flechsig v. U.S., 786 F.Supp. 646 (E.D. Ky. 1991),
affirmed, 986 F.2d 1421 and 991 F.2d 300. 14, 27
Fleming v. LeFevere, 423 F.Supp.2d 1064 (C.D.Cal. 2006).
29
Fleming v. Oregon Bd. of Parolee, 998 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.
1993). 36
Fleming v. Sharma, 605 F.Supp.2d 399 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
14, 24, 29
Fleming v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 952
F.Supp. 283 (D.S.C. 1996). 7, 31
Fletcher v. Butts, 994 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1993). 29
Fletcher v. Little, 5 F.Supp.3d 655 (D.Del. 2013). 7, 8, 14
Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th
Cir. 2010). 1, 4, 14, 21, 48
Fletcher v. State, 405 So.2d 748 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981). 43
Flint ex rel. Flint v. KY Dept. of Corrections, 270 F.3d 340
(6th Cir. 2001). 14, 50
Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1987). 1, 50
Flood v. Lane, 638 F.Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 24, 26, 36

TC-30
XXVI

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 595 F.Supp.2d 492 (D.N.J. 2009)
Reversed and remanded 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010);
aff’d S.Ct. 1510. 25, 32
Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of
Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed
132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). 2, 25, 27, 32, 41
Florer v. Bales-Johnson, 752 F.Supp.2d 1185 (W.D.Wash.
2010). 18, 37
Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d
916 (9th Cir. 2011). 2, 27, 37
Flores v. O’Donnell, 36 Fed.Appx. 204 (7th Cir. 2002). 9,
10, 15
Flores v. San Diego County, 206 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000).
31
Florio v. Canty, 954 F.Supp.2d 227 (S.D.N.Y.2013). 9, 15,
23, 39, 40
Flournoy v. Fairman, 897 F.Supp. 350 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 32,
49
Flournoy v. Ghosh, 881 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D.Ill. 2012). 29
Flowers v. Bennett, 135 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ala. 2000).
29
Flowers v. Dalsheim, 826 F.Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 1
Flowers v. Fauver, 683 F.Supp. 981 (D. N.J. 1988). 50
Flowers v. Phelps, 956 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1992), modified,
964 F.2d 400. 14, 48
Flowers v. Smith, 496 N.Y.S.2d 149 (A.D. 4 Dept 1985). 2,
4, 28
Floyd v. Ortiz, 300 F.3d 1223 (10th Cir. 2002). 2, 27, 35, 42
Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013).
1, 14, 21, 39
Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 945 F.Supp.2d 972 (C.D.Ill.
2013). 14, 29, 39, 47
Flynn v. Doyle, 630 F.Supp.2d 987 (E.D.Wis. 2009). 29, 30
Flynn v. Doyle, 672 F.Supp.2d 858 (E.D.Wis. 2009). 17,
29, 30, 45
Flynn v. Sandahl, 58 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 1995). 31, 33
Foelker v. Outagamie County, 394 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 2005).
29
Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). 3, 9, 10,
12
Folk v. Atty. Gen. of Commonwealth of Pa., 425 F.Supp.2d
663 (W.D.Pa. 2006). 7, 22, 34, 36
Fontroy v. Beard, 485 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.Pa. 2007). 1, 28
Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2009). 1, 28
Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). 32, 41
Foote v. Spiegel, 995 F.Supp. 1347 (D.Utah 1998). 17, 25,
32, 41
Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1997). 1, 29
Forchion v. Intensive Supervised Parole, 240 F.Supp.2d 302
(D.N.J. 2003). 19, 36
Ford v. Beister, 657 F.Supp. 607 (M.D. Pa. 1986). 19, 49
Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014). 5, 9, 11, 12, 15,
32
Ford v. Bender, 903 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.Mass. 2012). 4, 5
Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2013). 16,
19, 24
Ford v. Clarke, 746 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.Mass. 2010). 8, 32
Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir.
2008). 1, 2, 17, 27, 29
Ford v. County of Oakland, 35 Fed.Appx. 393 (6th Cir.
2002). 13, 14, 17
Ford v. Dowd, 931 F.2d 1286 (8th Cir. 1991). 2, 31
Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2nd Cir. 2003) 27, 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41 F.Supp.2d 392
(E.D.N.Y. 1999). 7, 32, 50
Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986). 30, 43
Forde v. Baird, 720 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.Conn. 2010). 17, 22,
37, 39, 41, 45
Forde v. Zickefoose, 612 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn. 2009).
17, 22, 33, 37, 39, 41
Ford-Sholebo v. U.S., 980 F.Supp.2d 917 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 1,
14, 27, 29, 32
Forgan v. Howard County, Tex., 494 F.3d 518 (5th Cir.
2007).14, 25, 32, 45
Forrest v. Prine, 620 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2010). 32, 41, 48
Forter v. Geer, 868 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Or. 2012). 21, 28,
37, 38, 39
Fortner v. Thomas 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir, 1993). 33
Forton v. County of Ogemaw, 435 F.Supp.2d 640
(E.D.Mich. 2006). 14, 17, 29
Forts v. Malcolm, 426 F.Supp. 464 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). 8, 17,
32, 38, 49
Fortune Society v. McGinnis, 319 F.Supp. 901 (S.D. N.Y.
1970). 19, 28
Foster v. Basham, 932 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1991). 1, 24, 28
Foster v. Elyea, 496 F.Supp.2d 951 (N.D.Ill. 2007). 18, 29
Foster v. Fulton County, 223 F.Supp.2d 1301 (N.D.Ga.
2002). 1, 6, 32, 36
Foster v. Fulton County, Georgia, 223 F.Supp.2d 1292
(N.D.Ga. 2002). 9, 29, 32, 45, 46
Foster v. Ghosh, 4 F.Supp.3d 974 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 4, 27, 29
Foster v. Hughes, 979 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1992). 35
Foster v. Lawson, 291 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2002). 1, 41
Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2009). 10, 11, 17,
18
Foster v. United States Parole Comm'n., 515 F.Supp. 541
(S.D. Ohio 1981). 36
Foster v. Wyrick, 823 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1987). 7, 50
Fouch v. District of Columbia, 10 F.Supp.3d 45 (D.D.C.
2014). 14, 24, 32, 47
Foulk v. Charrier, 262 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2001). 1, 5, 27, 29,
48
Foulks v. Cole County, Mo. 991 F.2d 454 (8th Cir 1993).
29
Fournier v. Reardon, 160 F.3d 754 (1st Cir. 1998). 31. 46
Fourte v. Faulkner County, Ark., 746 F.3d 384 (8th Cir.
2014). 25, 29, 32
Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2008). 37, 39
Fowler v. Cross, 635 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981). 36
Fowler v. Vincent, 452 F.Supp. 449 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). 7,
27, 48
Fowlkes v. Thomas, 667 F.3d 270 (2nd Cir. 2012). 4, 35
Fox v. Lappin, 409 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.Mass. 2006). 8, 34, 36,
44
Fox v. United States Parole Comm'n., 517 F.Supp. 855 (D.
Kan. 1981). 36
Fraise v. Terhune, 283 F.3d 506 (3rd Cir. 2002). 3, 8, 37, 39
Frake v. City of Chicago, 210 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2000). 14,
25, 32, 44
Fraley v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924 (9th Cir.
1993). 43
Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County,
636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). 2, 14, 25, 29, 30,
32, 46
Francis v. Carroll, 773 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.Del. 2011). 13, 29
Francis v. Fox, 838 F.2d 1147 (11th Cir. 1988). 36, 50
Francis v. Pike County, Ohio, 708 F.Supp. 170 (S.D. Ohio
1988). 14, 27, 32, 45, 48

TC-31
XXVI

Francisco v. Correctional Medical System, 548 F.Supp.2d
128 (D.Del. 2008). 29
Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D.Cal.
2010). 1, 7, 22
Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D.Cal.
2011). 1, 7, 27, 32
Frank v. County of Ontario, 884 F.Supp.2d 11 (W.D.N.Y.
2012). 29, 32
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). 22
Frank v. Schultz, 808 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2015). 11, 20
Frank v. United States, 515 F.Supp. 703 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
43
Franklin v. Banks, 979 F.2d 1375 (8th Cir. 1992). 50
Franklin v. Barry, 909 F.Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1995). 7, 8
Franklin v. City of Slidell, 936 F.Supp.2d 691 (E.D.La.
2013). 31
Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2013). 14, 17,
32
Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625 (D.C.Cir.
1998). 8, 11, 29, 33, 36
Franklin v. District of Columbia, 960 F.Supp. 394 (D.D.C.
1997). 2, 7, 11, 29, 33, 34
Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2002). 49
Franklin v. Lockhart, 890 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1989). 10, 37,
50
Franklin v. Lynaugh, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (1988), reh'g. denied,
109 S.Ct. 25. 43
Franklin v. Pocono Ranch Lands Property Owners Ass'n,
484 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Del. 2007). 1
Franks v. Oklahoma State Industries, 7 F.3d 971 (10th Cir.
1993). 50
Frary v. County of Marin, 81 F.Supp.3d 811 (N.D.Cal.
2015). 29, 32, 45
Fraternal Order of Police Barkley Lod. v. Fletcher, 618
F.Supp.2d 712, (W.D.Ky. 2008). 27, 31, 44
Fraternal Order of Police v. Williams, 263 F.Supp.2d 45
(D.D.C. 2003). 2, 31
Fraternal Order of Police v. Williams, 375 F.3d 1141
(D.C.Cir. 2004). 31
Fraternal Order of Police/Dept. v. Washington, 394
F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2005). 2, 31, 39, 41
Fratus v. Deland, 49 F.3d 673 (10th Cir. 1995). 1
Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313 (2nd Cir. 1996). 3, 11, 50
Frazier v. Diguglielmo, 640 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Pa. 2008).
1, 28, 35
Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1990). 47
Frazier v. Forgione, 881 F.Supp. 879 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 1,
27
Frazier v. Harrison, 537 F.Supp. 17 (E.D. Tenn. 1981). 22
Frazier v. Hesson, 40 F.Supp.2d 957 (W.D.Tenn. 1999). 8,
20, 22, 36
Frazier v. King, 873 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 502. 24, 29, 31
Frazier v. Ward, 528 F.Supp. 80 (N.D. N.Y. 1981). 41, 49
Fredericks v. Huggins, 711 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1983). 29, 32
Free v. State, 392 So.2d 857 (Ct. Crim. App. Ala. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990, reh'g. denied, 452 U.S.
973. 43
Free v. U.S., 879 F.2d 1535 (7th Cir. 1989). 1, 27, 35, 41
Freedman v. City of Allentown, Pa., 853 F.2d 1111 (3rd
Cir. 1988). 14, 27, 46
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 179
F.Supp.2d 950 (W.D.Wis. 2002). 34, 37
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. McCallum, 324
F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 34, 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Olson, 566
F.Supp.2d 980 (D.N.D. 2008). 34, 37
Freeland v. Ballard, 6 F.Supp.3d 683 (S.D.W.Va. 2014). 14,
15, 39
Freeman v. Abdullah, 925 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1991). 1, 37
Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 1997). 7, 37
Freeman v. Berge, 283 F.Supp.2d 1009 (W.D.Wis. 2003) 3,
9, 10, 11, 12
Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). 3, 9 , 38,
39
Freeman v. Fairman, 916 F.Supp. 786 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 27,
29
Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 3553, 463 U.S. 1214. 27, 48
Freeman v. Fuller, 623 F.Supp. 1224 (D.C. Fla. 1985). 8
Freeman v. Godinez, 996 F.Supp. 822 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 14,
21
Freeman v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 369 F.3d 854
(5th Cir. 2004). 19, 37
Freeman v. Watkins, 479 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2007). 1
Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3D 528 (9th Cir. 2006). 31
Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335 (8th Cir. 1997). 7, 47
French v. Adams County Detention Center, 379 F.3d 1158
(10th Cir. 2004). 36
French v. Heyne, 547 F.2d 994 (7th Cir. 1977). 8, 34, 38
Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 2000). 36
Friedland v. Fauver, 6 F.Supp.2d 292 (D.N.J. 1998). 4, 36
Friedman v. State of Arizona, 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 996. 37, 39
Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1991). 37
Friends v. Moore, 776 F.Supp. 1382 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 10,
29, 39, 48
Frink v. Arnold, 842 F.Supp. 1184 (S.D. Iowa 1994),
affirmed, 43 F.3d 673. 19, 35
Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627 (10th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Froehlich v. State of Wis., Dept. of Corrections, 196 F.3d
800 (7th Cir. 1999). 47
Frohmader v. Wayne, 958 F.2d 1024 (10th Cir. 1992). 29,
48
Fromer v. Scully, 649 F.Supp. 512 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). 19,
23, 37, 38
Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2nd Cir. 1989). 37, 38, 39
Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F.Supp.2d 651 (W.D.Pa.
2009). 7, 27, 44
Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998). 7, 8, 12, 18,
29, 30, 32
Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348 (9th Cir. 1999). 19, 28,
35, 38
Fruit v. Norris, 905 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1990). 11, 20, 27,
36, 50
Frye v. Henderson, 474 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1973). 19, 28
Frye v. Pettis County Sheriff Dept., 41 Fed.Appx. 906 (8th
Cir. 2002). 9, 32, 40
Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335 (3rd Cir. 2000). 32, 39, 48
Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Service Board, 791 F.2d 736 (9th
Cir. 1986). 2, 31, 33
Fuller v. Dillon, 236 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2001). 29, 30
Fuller v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 851
F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 1988). 7, 24, 36
Fuller v. Lane, 686 F.Supp. 686 (C.D. Ill. 1988). 36, 50
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). 1, 4, 43
Fuller v. Rich, 925 F.Supp. 459 (N.D.Tex 1995). 8, 50
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F.Supp. 370 (D. D.C. 1962). 10,
11

TC-32
XXVI

Furgan v. Ga. St. Bd. of Offender Rehabilitation, 554
F.Supp. 873 (N.D. Ga. 1982). 37, 38
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), reh'g. denied, 409
U.S. 902. 43
Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2013). 18, 37,
48
Furnari v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 531 F.3d 241 (3rd Cir. 2008).
22, 36
Furnari v. Warden, Allenwood Federal Corr. Inst., 218 F.3d
250 (3rd Cir. 2000). 22, 36
Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1035. 5
Gabai v. Jacoby, 800 F.Supp. 1149 (A.D.N.Y. 1992). 29, 48
Gabby v. Meyer, 390 F.Supp.2d 801 (E.D.Wis. 2005). 1,
21, 29
Gabel v. Estelle, 677 F.Supp. 514 (S.D. Tex. 1987). 9, 18,
39, 50
Gabel v. Lynaugh, , 835 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1988). 1
Gabriel v. Corrections Corp. of America, 211 F.Supp.2d
132 (D.D.C. 2002). 27, 29
Gabriel v. County of Herkimer. 889 F.Supp.2d 374
(N.D.N.Y. 2012). 2, 14, 27, 29, 32
Gabriel v. Hamlin, 514 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2008). 29, 50
Gagne v. City of Galveston, 671 F.Supp. 1130 (S.D. Tex.
1987). 14, 32
Gagon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 1, 36, 43
Gailor v. Armstrong, 187 F.Supp.2d 729 (W.D.Ky. 2001).
14, 32, 46, 48
Gaines v. Choctaw County Com'n., 242 F.Supp.2d 1153
(S.D.Ala. 2003). 27, 29, 32, 45
Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299 (7th Cir. 1986). 1, 19, 28
Gaither v. Anderson, 236 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2000). 11, 22
Galeas v. Inpold, 845 F.Supp.2d 685 (W.D.N.C. 2012). 1,
28
Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F.Supp.2d 1045
(C.D.Cal. 2004). 6, 32
Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir.
2007). 5, 6, 32
Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009). 18, 37
Gallardo v.Dicarlo, 203 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal. 2002).
14, 17, 48
Gallipeau v. Berard, 734 F.Supp. 48 (D. R.I. 1990),
modified, 971 F.2d 744. 1
Galloway v. State of Louisiana, 817 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.
1987). 14, 39
Galloway v. Suffolk County Correctional Facility, 232
F.Supp.2d 4 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 30, 34
Galvan v. Bexar County, Texas, 785 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir.
1986). 2, 31
Galvan v. Carothers, 855 F.Supp. 285 (D.Alaska 1994). 8,
17, 24
Gambino v. Gerlinski, 96 F.Supp.2d 456 (M.D.Pa. 2000).
36, 44
Gamble v. Calbone, 375 F.3d 1021 (10th Cir. 2004). 11, 22
Ganey v. Edwards, 759 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1985). 5, 27
Gangloff v. Poccia, 888 F.Supp. 1549 (M.D.Fla. 1995). 11,
14
Gannaway v. Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511
(E.D. Pa. 2015). 1, 4, 7, 29
Garcia Rodriguez v. Andreu Garcia, 403 F.Supp.2d 174
(D.Puerto Rico 2005). 16, 32
Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.Puerto
Rico 2008). 2, 31
Garcia v. Burns, 787 F.Supp. 948 (D. Nev. 1992). 3, 8

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Garcia v. City of Boston, 115 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.Mass. 2000).
14, 29, 30, 32, 48
Garcia v. Condarco, 114 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.N.M. 2000). 7,
17, 27
Garcia v. District of Columbia, 56 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.
1998). 7, 11, 21
Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). 7, 8,
12, 47
Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1153. 36
Garcia v. Reeves County, Tex., 32 F.3d 200 (5th Cir. 1994).
31
Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1985).
14, 25, 29, 32
Garcia-Feliciano v. U.S., 101 F.Supp.3d 142 (D.P.R. 2015).
14, 27
Gardner v. Beale, 780 F.Supp. 1073 (E.D.Va. 1991),
affirmed, 998 F.2d 1008. 10, 18
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969). 22
Gardner v. Cato, 841 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1988). 8, 14, 27,
29, 39
Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427 (8th Cir. 1997). 1, 28
Gardner v. Wilson, 959 F.Supp. 1224 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 4,
29, 35, 43
Garmong v. Montgomery County, 668 F.Supp. 1000 (S.D.
Tex. 1987). 5, 14
Garner v. Caulfield, 584 F.Supp.2d 167 (D.D.C. 2008). 22,
36, 43
Garner v. Jones, 120 S.Ct. 1362 (2000). 36
Garner v. Kennedy, 713 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2013). 37, 38, 39
Garnica v. Washington Dept. of Corrections, 965
F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D. Wash. 2013). 18, 29, 37
Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir. 1987). 31
Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789 (6th
Cir. 2005). 25, 29, 32
Garrett v. Angelone, 940 F.Supp. 933 (W.D.Va. 1996). 7, 8,
27, 36
Garrett v. Department of Corrections, 589 F.Supp.2d 1289
(M.D.Fla. 2007). 3
Garrett v. Gilmore, 926 F.Supp. 554 (W.D.Va. 1996). 1, 35
Garrett v. Okaloosa County, 734 F.2d 621 (11th Cir. 1984).
31
Garrett v. United States, 501 F.Supp. 337 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
8, 13, 14, 27
Garrison v. Department of Justice, 72 F.3d 1566 (Fed.Cir.
1995). 31, 41
Garrity v. Fiedler, 850 F.Supp. 777 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 11,
36
Garson v. Perlman, 541 F.Supp.2d 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 6,
22
Gartrell v. Ashcroft, 191 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002). 19,
37, 38
Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2001). 29
Garvin v. Terhune, 157 F.Supp.2d 416 (D.N.J. 2001). 34,
37
Garvin v. U.S., 882 F.Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 43
Gary v. Floyd, 582 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.S.C. 2007). 16, 32, 36
Garza v. Carlson, 877 F.2d 14 (8th Cir. 1989). 3, 18, 29, 37,
39
Gaskins v. Dickhaut, 881 F.Supp.2d 223 (D.Mass. 2012). 1,
28
Gaskins v. Johnson, 443 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D.Va. 2006). 8,
20, 22
Gaspers v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 648 F.3d 400 (6th
Cir. 2011). 31

TC-33
XXVI

Gassler v. Rayl, 862 F.2d 706 (8th Cir. 1988). 1, 47
Gassler v. Wood, 14 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 1994). 19, 28, 33
Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156 (2nd Cir. 2001). 9, 15, 40
Gaston v. Coughlin, 81 F.Supp.2d 381 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
11, 27, 44, 50
Gaston v. Coughlin, 861 F.Supp. 199 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 3,
7, 11, 47
Gaston v. Taylor, 918 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1990). 11, 38
Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1991). 38
Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). 14, 45
Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2004). 9, 10, 15, 23,
30, 40, 44
Gatlin Ex Rel. Gatlin v. Green, 227 F.Supp.2d 1064
(D.Minn. 2002). 14, 19, 28, 32, 46
Gatlin ex rel. Gatlin v. Green, 362 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir.
2004). 14, 46
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203
(1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2266. 14, 29,
48
Gauthier v. Dexter, 573 F.Supp.2d 1282 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
11, 20, 22
Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 2 (8th Cir. 1997). 27
Gavin v. McGinnis, 788 F.Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 7,
49
Gavin v. McGinnis, 866 F.Supp. 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 24,
49
Gay v. Chandra, 652 F.Supp.2d 959 (S.D.Ill. 2009). 9, 10,
18, 30
Gay v. Chandra, 682 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012). 1, 6, 7
Gay v. Turner, 994 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1993). 17, 47
Gayle v. Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677 (2nd Cir. 2002). 3, 11, 21
Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). 1, 6, 7,
32
Gayle v. Lucas, 133 F.Supp.2d 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
11,13,21
Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). 1, 14, 17,
25, 29, 32
Geddes v. Cox, 880 F.Supp. 767 (D.Kan. 1995). 7, 29
Geder v. Godinez, 875 F.Supp. 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 3, 9,
10, 11, 40
Geder v. Lane, 745 F.Supp. 538 (C.D. Ill. 1990). 41
Geder v. Roth, 765 F.Supp. 1357 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 1
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010). 12, 19, 23,
28, 38, 42
Gentry v. Duckworth 65 F.3d 555 (7th Cir. 1995). 1
George v. City of Wichita, 348 F.Supp.2d 1232 (D.Kan.
2004). 32, 41
George v. King, 837 F.2d 705 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
106 S.Ct. 1975. 1, 10, 18,
George v. SC Data Center, Inc., 884 F.Supp. 329 (W.D.
Wis. 1995). 50
George v. Smith, 467 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 9,
19, 28, 29, 38
George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007). 18, 19, 40
George v. Sonoma County Sheriff's Dept., 732 F.Supp.2d
922 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 27, 29
George v. Sullivan, 896 F.Supp. 895 (W.D.Wis. 1995). 19,
37
Gerakaris v. Champagne, 913 F.Supp. 646 (D.Mass. 1996).
1, 6, 25, 29, 32
Gerber v. Hickman, 103 F.Supp.2d 1214 (E.D.Cal. 2000).
19, 49
Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002). 7, 19, 38,
49

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Gerber v. Sweeney, 292 F.Supp.2d 700 (E.D.Pa. 2003) 12,
23, 42
Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F.Supp.2d 827 (S.D.Ohio 2002).
24, 37
Germano v. Winnebago County, Ill., 403 F.3d 926 (7th Cir.
2005). 31
Getch v. Rosenbach, 700 F.Supp. 1365 (D. N.J. 1988). 47
Geter v. Wille, 846 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 870. 14
Gethers v. Harrison, 27 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D.N.C. 2014). 2,
31, 33, 45
Gettleman v. Werner, 377 F.Supp. 445 (W.D. Penn. 1974).
31, 41
Getz v. Board of County Com'rs. 194 F.Supp.2d 1154
(D.Kan. 2002). 31
Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2009). 1, 27
Gevas v. McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 2015). 14
Gholson v. Murry, 953 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.Va. 1997). 3, 12,
37, 40, 50
Giakoumelos v. Coughlin, 88 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 1996). 11
Giampetruzzi v. Malcolm, 406 F.Supp. 836 (S.D. N.Y.
1975). 1, 3, 12, 19, 32, 37, 38, 41, 45, 49
Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 (2nd Cir. 2004). 1
Giano v. Selsky, 238 F.3d 223 (2nd Cir. 2001). 3, 47
Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050 (2nd Cir. 1995). 19, 38
Giano v. Sullivan, 709 F.Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 11,
22
Giarratano v. Johnson, 456 F.Supp.2d 747 (W.D.Va. 2006).
2, 19, 44
Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2008). 1, 19,
44
Giarratano v. Murray, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir. 1988). 1, 43
Giba v. Cook, 232 F.Supp.2d 1171 (D.Or. 2002). 1, 38, 35,
41
Gibbs v. Franklin, 18 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1994). 14
Gibbs v. Franklin, 49 F.3d 1206 (7th Cir. 1995). 14
Gibbs v. Hopkins, 10 F.3d 373 (6th Cir. 1993). 1, 11
Gibbs v. King, 779 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1986). 11, 38
Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107 (2nd Cir. 1994). 27, 48
Gibson v. Babcock, 601 F.Supp. 1156 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 27,
29, 32, 48
Gibson v. Brooks, 335 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Conn. 2004). 14
Gibson v. City Municipality of New York, 692 F.3d 198
(2nd Cir. 2012). 1, 7
Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir.
2002). 25, 29, 32
Gibson v. Foltz, 963 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1992). 9, 14
Gibson v. Matthews, 715 F.Supp. 181 (E.D. Ky. 1989),
affirmed, 926 F.2d 532. 17, 24, 29
Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1991). 17, 29
Gibson v. McEvers, 631 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1980). 11, 29
Gibson v. Milwaukee County, 95 F.Supp.3d 1061 (E.D.
Wis. 2015). 31
Gibson v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657 (6th Cir. 2008). 9, 10,
14, 27, 29, 30
Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1986). 22
Giddings v. Joseph Coleman Center, 473 F.Supp.2d 617
(E.D.Pa. 2007). 29, 30, 36
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 22
Gil v. Reed, 535 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2008). 29
Gilanian v. City of Boston, 431 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Mass.
2006). 17, 32, 41
Gilbert v. Collins, 905 F.2d 61 2 (5th Cir. 1990). 48
Gilbert v. Frazier, 931 F.2d 1581 (7th Cir. 1991). 11
Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237 (7th Cir. 1995). 33, 41, 43

TC-34
XXVI

Gilbert v. Selsky, 867 F.Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 11, 27,
46
Gilbertson v. Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, 993 F.2d
74 (5th Cir. 1993). 36
Gilchrist v. Kane County Correctional Center, 48 F.Supp.2d
809 (N.D.Ill. 1999). 29
Giles v. Ackerman, 559 F.Supp. 226 (D. Ida. 1983), reh'g.
denied, 746 F.2d 614, cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2114.
17, 41
Giles v. Henry, 841 F.Supp. 270 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 7, 11
Giles v. Kearney, 516 F.Supp.2d 362 (D.Del.2007). 29, 48
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318 (3rd Cir. 2009). 29, 48
Giles v. Tate, 907 F.Supp. 1135 (S.D.Ohio 1995). 1
Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192 (2nd Cir. 1987). 1, 10, 27, 29,
50
Gill v. Neaves, 657 F.Supp. 1394 (W.D. Tex. 1987). 1, 27
Gill v. Smith, 283 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 9, 10
Gilland v. Owens, 718 F.Supp. 665 (W.D. Tenn. 1989). 1,
9, 12, 29, 35
Gillespie v. Brewer, 602 F.Supp. 218 (N.D. W.Va. 1985). 5
Gillespie v. Crawford, 833 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1987). 9, 10
Gillet v. Anderson, 577 F.Supp.2d 828 (W.D.La. 2008). 21
Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1989). 4, 27,
35, 47
Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2006). 9, 10, 11,
18
Gillman v. Okaloosa County Florida, 58 F.Supp.3d 1305
(N.D. Fla. 2014). 31
Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101(9th Cir. 2011).
27, 36, 44
Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009).
7, 8, 24, 27, 34, 43
Gilmore v. County of Douglas, State of Neb., 406 F.3d 935
(8th Cir. 2005). 2, 7, 19, 42
Gilmore v. Goord, 415 F.Supp.2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). 3,
47
Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013). 29, 32
Gilmore v. Jeffes, 675 F.Supp. 219 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 11
Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F.Supp. 105 (N.D. Calif. 1970). 1
Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987
(9th Cir. 2000). 27
Gilmore-Bey v. Coughlin, 929 F.Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). 37
Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 273 F.3d 932
(11th Cir. 2001). 43
Gilson v. Cox, 711 F.Supp. 354 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 7, 14,
23
Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
31
Gindraw v. Dendler, 967 F.Supp. 833 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 29
Ginest v. Board of County Com’rs. of Carbon County, 333
F.Supp.2d 1190 (D.Wyo. 2004). 2, 27, 29, 32, 46
Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon County, 423
F.Supp.2d 1237 (W.D.Wyo. 2006). 5, 27
Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs. of Carbon County, 306
F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.Wyo. 2004). 2, 27
Gipson v. Cochran, 90 F.Supp.3d 1285 (S.D.Ala. 2015). 31
Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 14 F.Supp.2d 1245
(D.N.M. 1998). 14, 17, 27
Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 14 F.Supp.2d 1252
(D.N.M. 1998). 15, 17, 30
Giron v. Corrections Corp. of America, 191 F.3d 1281
(10th Cir. 1999). 14, 17
Giroux v. Sherman, 807 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D.Pa. 1992). 27,
48

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Giroux v. Somerset County, 178 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 1999). 8,
14, 32, 45
Gittens v. Lefevre, 891 F.2d 38 (2nd Cir. 1989). 3, 8, 24
Gittens v. Sullivan, 848 F.2d 389 (2nd Cir. 1988). 1
Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1970). 37
Givens v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 381 F.3d 1064
(11th Cir. 2004). 2, 13, 35, 50
Givens v. Jones, 900 F.2d 1229 (8th Cir. 1990). 9, 10, 29
Gladson v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 551 F.3d 825 (8th
Cir. 2009). 37
Gladson v. Rice, 862 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1988). 8, 9
Glascoe v. U.S., 358 F.3d 967 (D.C.Cir. 2004). 20, 22
Glaspy v. Malicoat, 134 F.Supp.2d 890 (W.D.Mich. 2001).
27, 38, 39, 49
Glass v. Rodriguez, 417 F.Supp.2d 943 (N.D.Ill. 2006). 29,
32
Glasshofer v. Thornburgh, 514 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D. Penn.
1981). 37, 38
Glauner v. Miller, 184 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999). 8, 34, 36
Glaze v. Byrd, 721 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2013). 14, 24, 27, 32
Gleave v. Graham, 4 F.Supp.2d 163 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 4,
36
Gleave v. Graham, 954 F.Supp. 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 4
Glenn v. Berndt, 289 F.Supp.2d 1120 (N.D.Cal. 2003) 14,
39
Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1988). 8, 14, 29,
39
Glick v. Lockhart, 769 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 523. 1
Glick v. Walker, 834 F.2d 709 (8th Cir. 1987). 11
Glidden v. Atkinson, 750 F.Supp. 25 (D. Me. 1990). 34
Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 408
F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). 1, 30, 32, 33
Glover v. Gartman, 899 F.Supp.2d 1115 (D.N.M. 2012). 8,
14, 24, 29, 32
Glover v. Johnson, 198 F.3d 557 (6th Cir. 1999). 17, 27
Glover v. Johnson, 35 F.Supp.2d 1010 (E.D.Mich. 1999). 7,
17, 27, 34
Glover v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 1996). 1, 17
Glover v. Johnson, 850 F.Supp. 592 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 1,
17
Glover v. Johnson, 879 F.Supp. 752 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 17,
27, 34
Glover v. Johnson, 931 F.Supp. 1360 (E.D.Mich. 1996). 1,
3, 4, 17, 34, 27, 50
Glover v. Johnson, 934 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1991). 17, 34
Glumb v. Honsted, 891 F.2d 872 (11th Cir. 1990). 22, 36
Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.Supp. 1309 (D. Ariz. 1988),
affirmed, 951 F.2d 1504. 1
Glynn v. Auger, 678 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1982). 9, 10, 15
Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339 (5th Cir. 2006). 29, 50
Godbolt v. Commissioner, Dept. Corr. Servs., 524 F.Supp.
21 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 36
Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2007). 17,
21, 20, 32
Goetz v. Ricketts, 632 F.Supp. 926 (D. Colo. 1986). 5
Goff v. Bechtold, 632 F.Supp. 697 (S.D. W.Va. 1986). 29
Goff v. Burton, 7 F.3d 734 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S.Ct. 2684. 1, 11, 47
Goff v. Burton, 91 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1996). 1, 11, 27, 47
Goff v. Dailey, 991 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1993). 38
Goff v. Graves, 362 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2004). 18, 37
Goff v. Nix, 113 F.3d 887 (8th Cir. 1997). 1, 28
Goffman v. Gross, 59 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995). 8, 29
Goguen v. Allen, 780 F.3d 437 (1st Cir. 2015). 8, 21, 32

TC-35
XXVI

Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1988). 14
Golberg v. Hennepin County, 417 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2005).
25, 32, 36
Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F.Supp.2d 302 (D.N.J. 1999). 22, 43
Golden v. McCaughtry, 937 F.Supp. 818 (E.D.Wis. 1995).
19. 35
Goldhaber v. Higgins, 576 F.Supp.2d 694 (W.D.Pa. 2007).
36, 50
Goldsby v. Carnes, 365 F.Supp. 395 (W.D. Mo. 1973). 2, 3,
8, 11, 12, 18, 23, 25, 35, 38, 40, 42
Goldsby v. Carnes, 429 F.Supp. 370 (W.D. Mo. 1977). 8,
11, 18, 23, 26, 29, 31, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46
Goldsmith v. White, 357 F.Supp.2d 1336 (N.D.Fla. 2005). 1
Golub v. Coughlin, 885 F.Supp. 42 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 8
Gometz v. Henman, 807 F.2d 113 (7th Cir. 1986). 1
Gomez v. Grossheim, 901 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1990). 8, 29,
47
Gomez v. Kaplan, 964 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 11
Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 2012). 21, 29, 47,
48
Gomez v. Vernon, 962 F.Supp. 1296 (D.Idaho 1997). 1
Gomm v. DeLand, 729 F.Supp. 767 (D. Utah 1990),
affirmed, 931 F.2d 62. 10, 29
Gonyer v. McDonald, 874 F.Supp. 464 (D. Mass. 1995). 9
Gonzales Rodriguez v. Alvarado, 134 F.Supp.2d 451
(D.Puerto Rico 2001). 14
Gonzales v. Brevard, 531 F.Supp.2d 1019 (W.D.Wis.
2008). 29
Gonzales v. Martinez, 403 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2005). 14,
17, 32
Gonzales-Perez v. Harper, 241 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 11,
20
Gonzalez v. Angelilli, 40 F.Supp.2d 615 (E.D.Pa. 1999). 2,
14, 27, 36, 46
Gonzalez v. Cecil County, Maryland, 221 F.Supp.2d 611
(D.Md. 2002). 14, 27, 29, 32
Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 141 F.Supp.2d 304
(N.D.N.Y. 2001). 17, 32, 41
Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 2011). 29
Gonzalez v. Litscher, 230 F.Supp.2d 950 (W.D.Wis. 2002).
37
Gonzalez v. Monty, 89 F.Supp.2d 1347 (S.D.Fla. 2000). 29
Gonzalez v. Narcato, 363 F.Supp.2d 486 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
3, 21, 37, 41
Gonzalez v. New York State Dept. of Correct. Ser., 122
F.Supp.2d 335 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 31
Gonzalez v. O'Connell, 355 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 2004). 22
Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012). 1, 21
Gonzalez v. U.S., 681 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2012). 7, 27, 29
Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010).
1, 22, 34, 36, 43, 44
Gonzalez-Jimenez De Ruiz v. U.S., 231 F.Supp.2d 1187
(M.D.Fla. 2002). 7, 27, 29, 47, 49
Gonzalez-Mercado v. Municipality of Guaynabo, 206
F.Supp.2d 257 (D.Puerto Rico 2002). 29, 32
Goode v. Correctional Medical Services, 168 F.Supp.2d
289 (D.Del. 2001). 14, 17, 29
Goodell v. Anthony, 157 F.Supp.2d 796 (E.D.Mich. 2001).
1
Gooden v. Crain, 405 F.Supp.2d 714 (E.D.Tex. 2005). 37,
38
Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012).
7, 16, 19, 27, 33, 46
Goodman v. Kimbrough, 718 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2013).
14, 15, 27, 30, 32, 39, 45

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Goodman v. Wagner, 553 F.Supp. 255 (E.D. Penn. 1982).
29
Goodnow v. Palm, 264 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Vt. 2003). 29
Goodson v. City of Atlanta, 763 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1985).
9, 27, 32, 40
Goodson v. United States, 472 F.Supp. 1211 (E.D. Mich.
1979). 19, 28
Goodson v. Willard Drug Treatment Campus, 615
F.Supp.2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 7, 8, 29
Goodvine v. Ankarlo, 9 F.Supp.3d 899 (W.D.Wis. 2014).
14, 30, 45
Goodvine v. Swiekatowski, 594 F.Supp.2d 1049 (W.D.Wis.
2009). 18, 37, 38
Goodwin v. State of Okl., 923 F.2d 156 (10th Cir. 1991). 22
Goodwin v. Turner, 702 F.Supp. 1452 (W.D. Mo. 1988).
22, 38
Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990). 38
Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973). 6, 19
Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858 (8th Cir.
2006). 29
Gordon v. Alexander, 592 F.Supp.2d 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
36
Gordon v. Caruso, 720 F.Supp.2d 896 (W.D.Mich. 2010).
37, 38, 39
Gordon v. City of New York, 517 N.E.2d 1331 (N.Y.
1987). 14, 25, 30, 32
Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). 1,
6, 7, 22, 32, 36
Gordon v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 841 F.Supp. 176 (E.D. Va.
1994). 22, 36,
Gordon v. Woodbourne Correctional Facility, 481
F.Supp.2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 49
Gorman v. Moody, 710 F.Supp. 1256 (N.D. Ind. 1989). 9,
29
Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 98 F.Supp.3d 498 (N.D.N.Y.
2015). 2, 31
Gorski v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 290 F.3d
466 (1st Cir. 2002). 31
Goss v. Sullivan, 839 F.Supp. 1532 (D. Wyo. 1993). 8, 14
Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) 9,
15, 40, 45
Grace v. Wainwright, 761 F.Supp. 1520 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
3, 12, 29
Graham ex rel. Estate v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d
377 (6th Cir. 2004). 14, 32
Graham v. Bowen, 648 F.Supp. 298 (S.D. Tex. 1986). 4
Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1991). 22, 34
Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75 (2nd Cir. 1996). 11, 21,
50
Graham v. Hodge, 69 F.Supp.3d 618 (S.D.Miss. 2014). 14,
29, 32, 46
Graham v. Lanfong, 25 F.3d 203 (3rd Cir. 1994). 20, 43
Graham v. Perez, 121 F.Supp.2d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 3,
10, 15
Graham v. Poole, 476 F.Supp.2d 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 15,
39
Graham v. Sheriff of Logan County, 741 F.3d 1118 (10th
Cir. 2013). 14, 17
Graham v. Van Dycke, 564 F.Supp.2d 1305 (D.Kan. 2008).
17, 29, 30, 33, 41
Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe v. U.S., 150 F.3d 170 (2nd
Cir. 1998). 18, 19
Grandberry v. Keever, 735 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2013). 11, 20,
22

TC-36
XXVI

Grandberry v. Smith, 754 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 2014). 11, 20,
22
Grandison v. Cuyler, 774 F.2d 598 (1985). 11
Graning v. Sherburne County, 172 F.3d 611 (8th Cir. 1999).
31
Grantham v. Dept. of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219 (Miss.
1988). 27, 36
Granville v. United States, 613 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1980). 36
Grass v. Sargent, 903 F.2d 1206 (8th Cir. 1990). 38, 49
Gravely v. Madden, 142 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 1998). 48
Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). 5, 27,
29, 30, 32
Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2010). 5, 7, 9, 15,
18, 27, 29, 32
Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). 2, 5,
9, 12, 15, 27, 32, 40
Graves v. North Dakota State Penitentiary, 325 F.Supp.2d
1009 (D.N.D. 2004). 7
Gray v. Cannon, 974 F.Supp.2d 1150 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 19,
21, 28, 38, 39
Gray v. City of Detroit, 399 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2005). 14, 29,
32, 45, 46
Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1972). 3, 8, 19
Gray v. Farley, 13 F.3d 142 (4th Cir. 1993). 29
Gray v. Hernandez, 651 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D.Cal. 2009). 3,
9, 12, 21, 23, 40
Gray v. Johnson, 436 F.Supp.2d 795 (W.D.Va. 2006). 19,
20, 34, 37
Gray v. Tunica County, Mississippi, 279 F.Supp.2d 789
(N.D.Miss. 2003). 14, 32, 45
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999). 14, 25, 32,
44, 46, 48
Grayson v. Rison, 945 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1991). 8, 47
Grayson v. Ross, 454 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2006). 14, 25, 29,
32, 44
Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450 (7th Cir. 2012). 24, 37,
38, 39
Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829 (11th Cir. 1990). 14, 24, 30
Greaves v. State of N.Y., 958 F.Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
11, 36
Greco v. County of Nassau, 146 F.Supp.2d 232 (E.D.N.Y.
2001). 31
Greear v. Loving, 391 F.Supp. 1269 (W.D. Vir. 1975). 48
Green v. Baca, 306 F.Supp.2d 903 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 14, 32,
36
Green v. Baron, 879 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1989). 30, 32
Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189 (2nd Cir. 1995). 11, 24
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004). 41
Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1978), affirmed,
100 S.Ct. 1468. 29
Green v. Ferrell, 500 F.Supp. 870 (S.D. Miss. 1980). 9, 11,
29
Green v. Floyd County, Ky., 803 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D.Ky.
2011). 7, 9, 10, 14
Green v. Khrisnaswamy, 328 F.Supp.2d 417 (W.D.N.Y.
2004). 29
Green v. McCall, 636 F.Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1986). 36
Green v. McGinnis, 515 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
29
Green v. Polunsky, 229 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2000). 37, 38
Green v. Thoryk, 30 F.Supp.2d 862 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 7, 14
Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). 1,
18, 21, 37, 39
Green v. White, 525 F.Supp. 81 (E.D. Mo. 1981), cert.
denied, 103 S.Ct. 2464. 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2006). 1
Greene v. Bowles, 361 F.3d 290 (6th Cir. 2004). 14, 17
Greene v. Esgrow, 686 F.Supp.2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 3,
10, 11, 18
Greene v. Furman, 610 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 3,
10, 11, 12, 23, 30, 32
Greene v. Mazzuca, 485 F.Supp.2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 7,
10
Greene v. Meese, 875 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1989). 22
Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008).
13, 37, 38, 39
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
36
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2005). 1, 29
Greer v. Shoop, 141 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 1998). 24, 36
Greffey v. State of Ala. Dept. of Corrections, 996 F.Supp.
1368 (N.D.Ala. 1998). 14, 29, 30
Gregg v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 661 F.Supp.2d 842
(S.D.Ohio 2009). 14, 26, 48
Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 2000). 14, 29
Gregory v. Auger, 768 F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 601. 11, 28
Gregory v. State of New York Parole Comm'n., 496 F.Supp.
748 (M.D. Pa. 1980). 36
Gregory v. Weigler, 873 F.Supp. 1189 (C.D. Ill. 1995). 5
Grenemyer v. Gunter, 770 F.Supp. 1432 (D. Colo. 1991),
affirmed, 968 F.2d 20. 22, 36
Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006). 36
Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash.
2014). 1, 19, 21, 28, 33
Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). 3,
9, 10, 15, 45
Grenning v. Stout, 144 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D. Wash. 2015).
3, 9, 10, 15
Greybuffalo v. Kingston, 581 F.Supp.2d 1034 (W.D.Wis.
2007). 11, 19, 35, 39
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2008). 14,
29, 32
Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). 1, 8, 9, 21,
29
Griffin v. Coughlin, 743 F.Supp. 1006 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 1,
3, 10, 34, 37, 42
Griffin v. DeTella, 21 F.Supp.2d 843 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 1, 35
Griffin v. Gomez, 741 F.3d 10 (9th Cir. 2014). 8, 22, 39, 47
Griffin v. Hardrick, 604 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 2010). 25, 32, 48
Griffin v. Lombardi, 946 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1991). 19, 28
Griffin v. Smith, 493 F.Supp. 129 (W.D. N.Y. 1980). 8, 11,
12, 18, 23, 34, 40, 42, 45, 48, 49
Griffin v. Spratt, 768 F.Supp. 153 (E.D. Pa. 1991), reversed,
969 F.2d 16. 11
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703 (3rd Cir. 1997). 3
Griffin-El v. Delo, 34 F.3d 602 (8th Cir. 1994). 8
Griffin-El v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 835 F.Supp.
1114 (E.D.Mo. 1993), affirmed, 43 F.3d 1476. 2, 19,
33, 42
Grillo v. Coughlin, 31 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 1994). 11
Grim v. Moore, 745 F.Supp. 1280 (S.D. Ohio 1988). 32, 35
Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C.
2013). 1, 2, 14, 26, 27, 45
Grimm v. Jackson, 845 F.Supp. 383 (W.D.Va. 1994). 7, 36
Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 1996). 14, 46
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008). 1, 21, 29,
48
Griswold v. Morgan, 378 F.Supp.2d 328 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
29

TC-37
XXVI

Groceman v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir.
2004). 41
Grochulski v. Kuhlmann, 575 N.Y.S.2d 722 (A.D. 1991).
11
Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F.Supp.2d 273 (D.N.J. 2013). 8, 9,
15, 23, 24, 32
Gross v. Buescher, 791 F.Supp. 796 (E.D.Mo. 1992). 29
Gross v. Henderson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 823 (App. Div. 1981).
11
Gross v. Tazewell County Jail, 533 F.Supp. 413 (W.D. Vir.
1982). 9, 15
Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801 (10th Cir. 2006). 11, 22
Grove v. Kadlic, 968 F.Supp. 510 (D.Nev. 1997). 4, 13
Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F.Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). 8,
9, 10, 12, 15, 44
Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). 1, 9,
23, 33, 39, 40, 48
Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 740 F.Supp.2d 1018 (E.D.Wis.
2010). 9, 39
Grummett v. Rushen, 587 F.Supp. 913 (N.D. Ca. 1984). 33,
45
Grune v. Rodriguez, 176 F.3d 27 (2rd Cir. 1999). 36
Guajardo v. Estelle, 568 F.Supp. 1354 (S.D. Tex. 1983). 11,
28
Guajardo v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 363 F.3d 392
(5th Cir. 2004). 27
Guarneri v. West, 518 F.Supp.2d 514 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 24
Guarneri v. West, 782 F.Supp.2d 51 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 1
Guerra v. Drake, 371 F.3d 404 (8th Cir. 2004). 27, 32, 39,
48
Gulett v. Haines, 229 F.Supp.2d 806 (S.D.Ohio 2002). 14,
19, 32
Gulley v. Ghosh, 864 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill. 2012). 29
Gullick v. Ott, 517 F.Supp.2d 1063 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 19,
31
Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F.Supp. 952
(N.D. Iowa, 1979). 31
Gutierrez v. Joy, 502 F.Supp.2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 34,
36
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364 (7th Cir. 1997). 29
Gutierrez-Perez v. Fasano, 37 F.Supp.2d 1166 (S.D.Cal.
1999). 22
Guy v. State, 396 N.W.2d 197 (Iowa App. 1986). 11, 19, 38
Guy v. United States, 492 F.Supp. 571 (N.D. Calif. 1980).
14, 27
Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2007). 8, 14, 32
Guzzi v. Thompson, 470 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2007). 18,
37
Gwathney v. Warren, 930 F.Supp.2d 1313 (M.D.Ala.
2013). 24, 41, 48
Gwin v. Snow, 870 F.2d 616 (11th Cir. 1989). 22, 36
Gwynn v. Transcor America, Inc., 26 F.Supp.2d 1256
(D.Colo. 1998). 7, 14, 17, 27, 47
H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard, 786 F.2d 1080 (11th Cir. 1986).
8, 11, 26, 27, 29, 32, 48
Haas v. Burlington County, 955 F.Supp.2d 334 (D.N.J.
2013). 25, 27, 32, 41
Hadi v. Horn, 830 F.2d 779 (7th Cir. 1987). 37, 39
Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F.Supp.2d 574 (W.D.Mich. 2006). 3,
29, 30, 48
Hadix v. Caruso, 492 F.Supp.2d 743 (W.D.Mich. 2007). 9,
15, 27
Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 2000). 5
Hadix v. Johnson, 367 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2004). 15, 27, 39
Hadix v. Johnson, 712 F.Supp. 550 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 1

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Hadley v. Peters, 841 F.Supp. 850 (C.D. Ill. 1994). 3, 10,
11, 50
Haff. v. Cooke, 923 F.Supp. 1104 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 19, 37
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 2009). 1, 27, 29
Hagan v. Tirado, 896 F.Supp. 990 (C.D.Cal. 1995). 3
Hahn v. City of Kenner, 984 F.Supp. 424 (E.D.La. 1997).
25, 32
Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2014). 14, 17, 29, 32
Hahn v. Walsh, 915 F.Supp.2d 925 (C.D.Ill. 2013). 17, 18,
29, 30, 32, 45
Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2014). 37
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), reh'g. denied, 405
U.S. 948. 7, 11, 14
Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. Sale, 817 F.Supp. 336
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). 29
Hake v. Manchester Township, 486 A.2d 836 (N.J. 1985).
14, 29, 46
Hakim v. Hicks, 223 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). 19, 37
Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 2000). 31
Hale v. Rao, 768 F.Supp.2d 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 1, 9, 21,
29
Hale v. Scott, 252 F.Supp.2d 728 (C.D.Ill. 2003). 1, 21
Hale v. Scott, 371 F.3d 917 (7th Cir. 2004). 19, 21
Hale v. State of Ariz., 993 F.2d 1387 (9th Cir. 1993). 50
Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579 (11th Cir. 1995).
8, 14, 27, 46
Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 1996). 14, 27, 29, 39,
44
Haley v. Tryon, 12 F.Supp.3d 573 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). 14,
24, 32
Halikipoulos v. Dillion, 139 F.Supp.2d 312 (E.D.N.Y.
2001). 6
Halkett v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 763
F.Supp.2d 205 (D.Me. 2011). 2, 31
Hall v. Artuz, 954 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 29
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991). 35, 37
Hall v. Bennett, 379 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2004). 14, 39, 50
Hall v. California Dept. of Corrections, 835 F.Supp. 522
(N.D. Cal. 1993). 31
Hall v. Conklin, 966 F.Supp. 546 (W.D.Mich. 1996). 1, 28
Hall v. County of Nemaha, Neb., 509 F.Supp.2d 821
(D.Nev. 2007). 25, 29, 32
Hall v. Eichenlaub, 559 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Mich. 2008).
22, 36, 44
Hall v. Griego, 896 F.Supp. 1043 (D.Colo. 1995). 8, 37, 47
Hall v. Johnson, 224 F.Supp.2d 1058 (E.D.Va. 2002). 28,
39
Hall v. Ryan, 957 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1992). 14, 29, 30, 32
Hall v. Singletary, 999 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1993). 19, 28
Hall v. Terrell, 648 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2009). 5, 14,
17, 27
Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 1999). 29, 32
Hallal v. Hopkins, 947 F.Supp. 978 (S.D.Miss. 1995). 1, 35,
49
Hallett v. Morgan, 287 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2002). 17, 27, 30
Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2002). 17, 27, 29,
30
Hallett v. New York State Dept. of Correct. Serv., 109
F.Supp.2d 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 7, 8, 13, 29, 36
Hallmark v. Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 21,
22
Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir.
1993). l, 32
Halpin v. Simmons, 33 Fed.Appx. 961 (10th Cir. 2002). 29,
47

TC-38
XXVI

Halvorsen v. Baird, 146 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 1998). 19, 27, 32
Hameed v. Coughlin, 37 F.Supp.2d 133 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 3
Hameed v. Mann, 849 F.Supp. 169 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). 11
Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F.Supp. 195 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
14, 27, 39, 45
Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1992). 29
Hamilton v. Hall, 790 F.Supp.2d 1368 (N.D.Fla. 2011). 19,
28
Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). 2,
27, 29, 46, 48
Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F.Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972). 2,
9, 17, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 38, 40, 41, 42, 50
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F.Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971). 10,
14, 32, 45
Hamilton v. Love, 358 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. Ark. 1973). 12,
17, 23, 27, 45
Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99 (5th Cir. 1996). 9, 32
Hamilton v. Peters, 919 F.Supp. 1168 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 36
Hamilton v. Roth, 624 F.2d 1204 (3rd Cir. 1980). 29
Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970). 9,
18, 23, 25, 29, 30, 40
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996). 37, 38
Hamilton v. Schriro, 863 F.Supp. 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1994).
37
Hamilton v. Scott, 762 F.Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1991),
affirmed, 976 F.2d 341. 11, 20
Ha'min v. Lewis, 440 F.Supp.2d 715 (M.D.Tenn. 2006). 32,
37
Hamlin v. Kennebec County Sheriff's Dept., 728 F.Supp.
804 (D. Me. 1990). 14, 25, 32
Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1996). 11, 20,
43
Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096. 9, 32
Hamm v. Groose, 15 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1994). 1
Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). 3, 7, 19,
38, 39
Hammond v. Gordon County, 316 F.Supp.2d 1262
(N.D.Ga. 2002). 14, 17, 32
Hammond v. Rector, 123 F.Supp.3d 1076 (S.D. Ill. 2015).
29
Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County, Miss., 543
F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2008). 6, 27
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077
(3rd Cir. 1976). 10, 32
Hampton v. Sabie, 891 F.Supp.2d 1014 (N.D.Ill. 2012). 13,
14, 26, 44
Hampton v. Schauer, 361 F.Supp. 641 (D. Colo. 1973). 1,
38
Hancock v. Thalacker, 933 F.Supp. 1449 (N.D.Iowa 1996).
11, 21, 27
Handberry v. Thompson, 436 F.3d 52 (2nd Cir. 2006). 26,
27, 34
Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335 (2nd Cir. 2006). 26,
27, 34
Handberry v. Thompson, 92 F.Supp.2d 244 (S.D.N.Y.
2000). 24, 36
Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939 (8th Cir. 2012). 24, 25, 32, 36
Hanks v. Prachar, 457 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2006). 11, 15, 26,
32, 39, 48
Hannah v. U.S., 523 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 2008). 1, 29
Hannon v. Allen, 241 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.Mass. 2003). 1, 47
Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 2008). 1, 21, 47
Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2011). 2, 19, 47

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Hannon v. Beard, 979 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Mass. 2013). 9, 24,
39
Hansard v. Barrett, 980 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir. 1992). 50
Hanselman v. Fiedler, 822 F.Supp. 1342 (E.D.Wis. 1993).
38
Hansen v. California Dept. of Corrections, 868 F.Supp. 271
(N.D. Cal. 1994). 31, 33
Hansen v. California Dept. of Corrections, 920 F.Supp.
1480 (N.D.Cal. 1996). 31, 33
Hansen v. Rimel, 104 F.3d 189 (8th Cir. 1997). 7, 29
Hansley v. Ryan, 482 F.Supp.2d 383 (D.Del. 2007). 22
Hanson v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 991 F.Supp.
1059 (C.D.Ill. 1998). 7, 19, 25, 32, 33
Hanson v. U.S., 712 F.Supp.2d 321 (D.N.J. 2010). 27, 39,
41, 48
Hanuman v. Groves, 41 Fed.Appx. 7 (8th Cir. 2002). 32
Hanvey v. Blakenship, 474 F.Supp. 1349 (W.D. Vir. 1979).
11, 35
Harbeck v. Smith, 814 F.Supp.2d 608 (E.D.Va. 2011). 16,
24, 27, 32, 36
Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2005). 8, 19,
28, 39
Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009). 7, 10
Hardaway v. Kerr, 573 F.Supp. 419 (W.D. Wisc. 1983). 38,
49
Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013). 3, 8,
9, 11, 12, 23
Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2008). 3, 11
Hardiman v. Hartley, 842 F.Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ind. 1993).
1, 11, 35
Hardin v. Hayes, 957 F.2d 845 (11th Cir. 1992). 14, 17
Hardin v. Straub, 109 S.Ct. 1998 (1989). 1, 7
Hardin v. Straub, 954 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1992). 3, 27
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). 31,
33
Harding v. Jones, 768 F.Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 8, 14
Hardy v. 3 Unknown Agents, 690 F.Supp.2d 1074
(C.D.Cal. 2010). 24, 29
Hardy v. City of New York, 732 F.Supp.2d 112 (E.D.N.Y.
2010). 29
Hardy v. District of Columbia, 601 F.Supp.2d 182 (D.D.C.
2009). 14, 24, 32, 45, 46
Hardy v. Town of Hayneville, 50 F.Supp.2d 1176
(M.D.Ala. 1999). 16, 32, 46, 48
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 814 F.Supp. 1312
(N.D.Miss. 1993). 17, 32
Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 949 F. Supp. 456 (N.D.
Miss. 1996). 14, 32
Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 36 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 1994).
14, 29, 32
Hare v. City of Corinth, MS, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996).
14, 29, 32
Hare v. City of Corinth, MS., 22 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994).
14, 17, 25, 29, 32, 45
Harford v. County of Broome, 102 F.Supp.2d 85 (N.D.N.Y.
2000). 31
Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404 (9th Cir. 2002). 19, 38
Harksen v. Garratt, 29 F.Supp.2d 265 (E.D.Va. 1998). 21,
35
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S.Ct. 2680 (1991). 43
Harms v. Godinez, 829 F.Supp. 259 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 11
Harnett v. Barr, 538 F.Supp.2d 511 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). 27,
37
Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2005). 48

TC-39
XXVI

Harper v. Kemp, 677 F.Supp. 1213 (M.D. Ga. 1988). 25,
35, 38
Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir.
2010). 14, 24, 25, 27, 29, 32
Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.
2009). 6, 13, 25, 27, 36
Harper v. State, 397 N.W.2d 740 (Iowa 1986). 11
Harper v. State, 759 P.2d 358 (Wash. 1988). 29
Harper v. Wallingford, 877 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1989). 19,
28, 38, 39
Harper v. Young, 64 F.3d 563 (10th Cir. 1995). 22, 36
Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1980). 1
Harrell v. Sheahan, 937 F.Supp. 754 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 14, 16,
36, 46
Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). 2,
3, 14, 26, 27, 29, 30
Harrelson v. Elmore County, Ala., 859 F.Supp. 1465 (M.D.
Ala. 1994). 7, 24, 27
Harriman v. Hancock County, 627 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2010).
9, 14, 29
Harrington v. City of Nashua, 610 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2010).
16, 32, 36
Harrington v. Garyson, 764 F.Supp. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1991).
24
Harrington v. Scribner, 785 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 2015). 8, 9,
39
Harris by and Through Harris v. Maynard, 843 F.2d 414
(10th Cir. 1988). 8, 14, 27
Harris County v. Jenkins, 678 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. App.
1984). 25, 27, 29
Harris v. Angelina County, Tex., 31 F.3d 331 (5th Cir.
1994). 9, 15
Harris v. Bolin, 950 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991). 19, 28
Harris v. Brewington-Carr, 49 F.Supp.2d 378 (D.Del.
1999). 9, 15, 23, 32, 33, 40
Harris v. Campbell, 804 F.Supp. 153 (D.Kan. 1992). 29
Harris v. Chanclor, 537 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976). 10, 14,
27, 48
Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996). 27, 37,
38, 48
Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). 7,
29, 32, 48
Harris v. City of New York, 44 F.Supp.2d 510 (S.D.N.Y.
1999). 36, 43
Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18 (2nd Cir. 2010). 1
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311 and 1333 (3rd
Cir. 1995). 15
Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 47 F.3d 1311 and 1333 and
1342 (3rd Cir. 1995). 2, 27, 44
Harris v. Curtin, 656 F.Supp.2d 732 (W.D.Mich. 2009). 48
Harris v. Davis, 874 F.2d 461 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 735. 10, 11
Harris v. Day, 649 F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1981). 36
Harris v. Doe, 78 F.Supp.3d 894 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 1, 35
Harris v. Dugger, 757 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 37, 38
Harris v. Evans, 920 F.2d 864 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 641. 19, 36
Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232 (7th Cir. 1988), affirmed,
993 F.2d 1549. 9, 10, 12, 23, 40
Harris v. Ford, 32 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Alaska 1999). 1
Harris v. Hammon, 914 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Minn. 2012). 9,
16, 36, 45, 46
Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1999). 29
Harris v. Johnson, 323 F.Supp.2d 797 (S.D.Tex. 2004). 10
Harris v. Keane, 962 F.Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 11, 41

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Harris v. Lord, 957 F.Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 1, 10, 30,
37
Harris v. MacDonald, 532 F.Supp. 36 (N.D. Ill. 1982). 11,
20
Harris v. Martin, 792 F.2d 52 (3rd Cir. 1986). 22, 36
Harris v. Meulemans, 389 F.Supp.2d 438 (D.Conn. 2005).
8, 20
Harris v. Morales, 69 F.Supp.2d 1319 (D.Colo. 1999). 29,
32, 48
Harris v. Murray, 758 F.Supp. 1114 (E.D. Va. 1991). 3, 9,
29
Harris v. Murray, 761 F.Supp. 409 (E.D. Va. 1990). 9, 15,
18, 29
Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995). 7, 11
Harris v. Powers, 520 F.Supp. 111 (W.D. Wis. 1981). 43
Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F.Supp. 1564 (M.D. Ala. 1990),
modified, 941 F.2d 1495. 8, 29, 33, 41
Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991). 1, 8, 29,
33
Harris v. U.S., 677 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C. 1988). 27
Harris v. Warrick County Sheriff's Dept., 666 F.3d 444 (7th
Cir. 2012). 2, 31
Harrison Memorial Hospital v. Kitsap County, 700 P.2d
732 (Wash. Sup.Ct. 1985). 4, 29
Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2008). 24, 29
Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 2000). 29
Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014). 14, 34,
39, 45
Harrison v. Dahm, 911 F.2d 37 (8th Cir. 1990). 11, 24
Harrison v. Dretke, 865 F.Supp. 385 (W.D. Tex. 1994). 11,
39
Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 464 F.Supp.2d 552
(E.D.Va. 2006). 2, 7, 42
Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 611 F.Supp.2d 54
(D.D.C. 2009). 2, 7, 42
Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 681 F.Supp.2d 76
(D.D.C. 2010). 4, 7, 42
Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2013). 1, 27,
43
Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka, 485 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.S.C.
2007). 1, 18, 32
Harrison v. Raney, 837 F.Supp. 875 (W.D. Tenn. 1993). 8,
47
Harrison v. Watts, 609 F.Supp.2d 561 (E.D.Va. 2009). 37
Hart v. Bertsch, 529 F.Supp.2d 1032 (D.N.D. 2008). 9, 10,
29
Hart v. Celaya, 548 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Cal. 2008). 3, 29,
41, 48
Hart v. Curry, 716 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.Cal. 2010). 22, 36
Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). 24, 43, 47
Hart v. Sheahan, 396 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2005). 17, 32, 39,
45
Harter v. Vernon, 980 F.Supp. 162 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 31
Hartline v. Gallo, 546 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2008). 17, 33, 41
Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). 2, 27,
37
Hartmann v. Carroll, 719 F.Supp.2d 366 (D.Del. 2010). 29,
47
Hartmann v. Carroll, 882 F.Supp.2d 742 (D.Del. 2012). 1,
29
Hartry v. County of Suffolk, 755 F.Supp.2d 422
(E.D.N.Y.2010). 1, 14, 21, 39
Hartsfield v. Colburn, 371 F.3d 454 (8th Cir. 2004). 29, 32
Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2007). 29, 32

TC-40
XXVI

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008). 1, 11
Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305 (6th Cir. 1999). 39, 48
Harvey v. Clay County Sheriff's Department, 473 F.Supp.
741 (W.D. Mo. 1979). 14
Harvey v. County of Ward, 352 F.Supp.2d 1003 (D.N.D.
2005). 14, 25, 32, 44, 46
Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010). 21, 41, 48
Harvey v. Schoen, 245 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 2001). 1, 27
Hasenmeier-McCarthy v. Rose, 986 F.Supp. 464
(S.D.Ohio1998). 29, 37, 48
Haslar v. Megerman, 104 F.3d 178 (8th Cir. 1997). 29, 32,
39
Hastings v. Marciulionis, 434 F.Supp.2d 585 (W.D.Wis.
2006). 37, 38
Haston v. Tatham, 842 F.Supp. 483 (D. Utah 1994). 27, 50
Hatch v. Sharp, 919 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 1693. 38, 39
Hatfield v. Scott, 306 F.3d 223 (5th Cir. 2002). 2, 35
Hatori v. Haga, 751 F.Supp. 1401 (D. Hawaii 1989). 3
Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002). 35
Hattermann v. U.S., 743 F.Supp. 578 (C.D. Ill. 1990). 36,
43
Hattie v. Hallock, 8 F.Supp.2d 685 (N.D.Ohio 1998). 21
Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2011). 1, 28
Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 702. 19, 32
Havard v. Puntuer, 600 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D.Mich. 2009).
17, 24, 29
Haverda v. Hays County, 723 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2013). 31
Hawkins v. Brooks, 694 F.Supp.2d 434 (W.D.Pa. 2010.) 8,
14, 17, 27, 28, 45, 47
Hawkins v. Comparet-Cassani, 251 F.3d 1230 (9th Cir.
2001). 1, 27, 32, 39, 48
Hawkins v. County of Lincoln, 785 F.Supp.2d 781 (D.Neb.
2011). 2, 14, 29, 32, 45
Hawkins v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 497 F.Supp.2d 362
(N.D.N.Y. 2007). 31
Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732 (4th Cir. 1999). 36
Hawks v. Timms, 35 F.Supp.2d 464 (D.Md. 1999). 1
Hawley v. Evans, 716 F.Supp. 601 (N.D. Ga. 1989). 29
Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987). 3, 39, 41
Haybarger v. Lawrence County Adult Probation and Parole,
551 F.3d 193 (3rd Cir. 2008). 24, 31
Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015). 7,
26, 36
Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006). 7, 19
Hayes v. Dovey, 914 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal. 2012). 12,
39
Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 285 F.Supp.2d 1132
(E.D.Ark. 2003) 1, 27, 32
Hayes v. Faulkner County, Ark., 388 F.3d 669 (8th Cir.
2004). 1, 32
Hayes v. Florida, 105 S.Ct. 1643 (1985). 16
Hayes v. Garcia, 461 F.Supp.2d 1198 (S.D.Cal. 2006). 12,
39
Hayes v. Long, 72 F.3d 70 (8th Cir. 1995). 7, 11, 27, 37
Hayes v. Marriott, 70 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 1995). 33, 41
Hayes v. McBride, 965 F.Supp. 1186 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 11,
20, 22
Hayes v. North State Law Enforcement Officers Ass'n., 10
F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 1993). 2, 31
Hayes v. Snyder, 546 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 2008). 13, 29
Hayes v. Vessey, 777 F.2d 1149 (6th Cir. 1985). 2, 14, 27,
31
Haynes v. Lambor, 785 F.Supp. 754 (N.D. Ill. 1992). 11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Haynes v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 760 F.Supp. 124
(E.D. Mich. 1991), affirmed, 945 F.2d 1404. 14, 39
Haynes v. Stephenson, 588 F.3d 1152 (8th Cir. 2009). 21, 27
Hayward v. United States Parole Commission, 659 F.2d
857 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1991. 36,
43
Hazen Ex Rel. LeGear v. Reagen, 208 F.3d 697 (8th Cir.
2000). 27
Hazen v. Pasley, 768 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985). 2, 9, 18, 35,
48
Hazen v. Reagen, 16 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1994). 19, 47
Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). 2, 27, 34,
36, 37
Health and Hosp. Corp. v. Marion County, 470 N.E.2d
1348 (Ind. App. 2 Dist. 1984). 4
Heard v. Tilden, 809 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2016). 27, 29
Hearn v. Morris, 526 F.Supp. 267 (E.D. Calif. 1981). 19, 28
Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). 9, 10,
14, 15, 23, 37, 40, 45
Heath v. DeCourcy, 704 F.Supp. 799 (S.D. Ohio 1988). 9,
27
Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 2010). 1, 3, 12
Hebshi v. U.S., 32 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich. 2014). 16, 32,
41
Hechavarria v. Quick, 670 F.Supp. 456 (D. R.I. 1987). 8, 11
Heckenlaible v. Virginia Peninsula Regional Jail Authority,
491 F.Supp.2d 544 (E.D.Va. 2007). 14, 17, 27, 31
Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 386
F.3d 1148 (D.C.Cir. 2004). 7, 26, 32
Hedgepeth v. Washington Metro. Area Transit, 284
F.Supp.2d 145 (D.D.C. 2003) 16, 26, 32
Hedin v. OSP, 760 P.2d 901 (Or.App. 1988). 3
Hedrick v. Roberts, 183 F.Supp.2d 814 (E.D.Va. 2001). 14,
32
Heflin v. Stewart County, Tenn., 958 F.2d 709 (6th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 598. 14, 24, 29
Heft v. Carlson, 489 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973). 1
Heggen v. Lee, 284 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2002). 31
Heidelberg v. Illinois Prisoner Review Bd., 163 F.3d 1025
(7th Cir. 1998). 22, 36
Heideman v. Wirsing, 840 F.Supp. 1285 (W.D. Wis. 1992).
19, 31
Heimerle v. Atty. Gen. U.S.A., 558 F.Supp. 1292 (S.D.
N.Y. 1983). 28
Heimermann v. McCaughtry, 855 F.Supp. 1027 (E.D. Wis.
1994). 11
Heine v. Receiving Area Personnel, 711 F.Supp. 178 (D.
Del. 1989). 14, 27, 45
Heisler v. Kralik, 981 F.Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 14, 32
Heitman v. Gabriel, 524 F.Supp. 622 (W.D. Mo. 1981). 9,
12, 15, 23, 40, 44
Helling v. McKinney, 113 S.Ct. 2475 (1993). 9, 10, 29
Helton v. U.S., 191 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.D.C. 2002). 17, 25,
27, 32, 41
Hemmings v. Gorczyk, 134 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 1998). 29
Hemphill v. Kincheleo, 987 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1993). 27, 41
Hemphill v. New York, 198 F.Supp.2d 546 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). 1, 21
Henderson v. Ayers, 476 F.Supp.2d 1168 (C.D.Cal. 2007).
1, 21, 37, 50
Henderson v. Belfueil, 354 F.Supp.2d 889 (W.D.Wis.
2005). 33, 41
Henderson v. Berge, 362 F.Supp.2d 1030 (W.D.Wis. 2005).
12, 19, 37

TC-41
XXVI

Henderson v. DeRobertis, 940 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1578. 9, 27
Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2014). 1, 29
Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2015). 14, 17
Henderson v. Harris, 672 F.Supp. 1054 (W.D. Ill. 1987). 2,
24, 29
Henderson v. Lane, 979 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1992). 9, 12, 27
Henderson v. New York, 423 F.Supp.2d 129 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). 31
Henderson v. Ricketts, 499 F.Supp. 1066 (D. Colo. 1980).
1, 28
Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 1999) cert.
den. 120 S.Ct. 1269. 9, 10, 29, 32
Henderson v. Simms, 223 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 2000). 36
Henderson v. Simms, 54 F.Supp.2d 499 (D.Md. 1999). 13,
36
Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2004). 37, 38
Henderson v. Thomas, 891 F.Supp.2d 1296 (M.D.Ala.
2012). 3, 27, 29, 34
Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267
(M.D.Ala.2012). 2, 7, 8, 17, 18, 29, 34, 38, 50
Henderson v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 13 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 314. 11, 22
Hendking v. Smith, 781 F.2d 850 (11th Cir. 1986). 8, 35,
36, 38
Hendon v. Ramsey, 528 F.Supp.2d 1058 (S.D.Cal. 2007).
24, 29, 30, 44
Hendrick v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 141 F.Supp.3d
393 (D. Md. 2015). 8, 29
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390 (2nd Cir. 1997). 1, 47
Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109 (2nd Cir. 1991). 14
Hendrickson v. Branstad, 740 F.Supp. 636 (N.D. Iowa
1990), modified, 934 F.2d 158. 5, 26
Hendrickson v. Branstad, 934 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991). 5
Hendrickson v. Cooper, 589 F.3d 887 (7th Cir. 2009). 27, 48
Hendrix v. Evans, 715 F.Supp. 897 (N.D. Ind. 1989),
affirmed 972 F.2d 351. 12, 19, 34, 35
Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435 (N.D. Ind. 1981),
cert. denied, 104 SCt. 3587. 9, 10, 12, 15
Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255 (10th
Cir. 2009). 2, 31
Henry v. Coughlin, 940 F.Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 49
Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2008).
2, 26, 31, 33
Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1989). 24, 39, 48
Henry v. Ryan, 775 F.Supp. 247 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 29, 41
Henry v. Van Cleve, 469 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1972). 7, 49
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). 22, 36
Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1988). 11
Henson v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 213 F.3d 897 (5th Cir.
2000). 11, 20, 22
Henthorn v. Swinson, 955 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 974. 28
Heredia v. Doe, 473 F.Supp.2d 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 27,
29, 39
Hereford v. Jefferson County, 586 So.2d 209 (Ala. 1991).
14, 36
Herlein v. Higgins, 172 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1999). 19, 38
Herman v. Clearfield County, PA, 836 F.Supp. 1178 (W.D.
Pa. 1993), affirmed, 30 F.3d 1486. 14, 25, 27, 46
Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa.
2007). 7, 29, 32, 34
Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660 (5th Cir. 2001). 15, 18,
23, 40

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F.Supp.2d 148 (D.R.I.
1999). 22, 36
Hernandez v. Carbone, 567 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.Conn. 2008).
6, 32
Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F.Supp.2d 987 (C.D.Cal. 2013). 7,
8, 27
Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303 (2nd Cir. 2009). 1, 21
Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906
(7th Cir. 2011). 2, 31
Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 117. 49
Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929
(N.D. Cal. 2015). 7, 27, 29, 30, 44
Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963
(N.D.Cal. 2014). 2, 9, 27, 29, 32, 44, 45, 46
Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2016). 21, 29, 32
Hernandez v. Denton, 929 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1990). 1
Hernandez v. Estelle, 788 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir. 1986). 24, 28,
38
Hernandez v. Goord, 312 F.Supp.2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
1, 7, 27
Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1987). 2, 8,
34
Hernandez v. Montanez, 36 F.Supp.3d 202 (D.Mass. 2014).
41, 49
Hernandez v. Selsky, 572 F.Supp.2d 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
11
Hernandez v. Sheahan, 455 F.3d 772 (7th Cir. 2006). 16,
24, 25, 32
Hernandez v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 1 F.Supp.2d 1262 (D.Kan.
1998). 22, 36
Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2008). 3,
10, 29
Hernandez v. Whiting, 881 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1989). 1
Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013). 7,
16, 32
Herndon v. Whitworth, 924 F.Supp. 1171 (N.D.Ga. 1995).
29
Herrera v. County of Santa Fe, 213 F.Supp.2d 1288
(D.N.M. 2002). 27, 48
Herrera v. Scully, 815 F.Supp. 713 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 1, 28
Herrin v. Treon, 459 F.Supp.2d 525 (N.D.Tex. 2006). 3, 14,
45
Herring v. Keenan, 218 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2000). 29, 33
Herring v. Singletary, 879 F.Supp. 1180 (N.D. Fla. 1995).
36, 43
Hershberger v. Scaletta, 861 F.Supp. 1470 (N.D. Iowa
1993). 1, 12, 28, 38
Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir.
2008). 2, 31, 44
Hester v. McBride, 966 F.Supp. 765 (N.D.Ind. 1997). 11,
20, 22
Hetzel v. Swartz, 31 F.Supp.2d 444 (M.D.Pa. 1998). 29, 30,
33
Hewes v. Magnusson, 350 F.Supp.2d 222 (D.Me. 2004). 1,
3, 14
Hewitt v. Helms, 103 S.Ct. 864 (1983). 3
Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642 (6th Cir.
2012). 2, 32
Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 1993). 10, 48
Hickombottom v. McGuire, 765 F.Supp. 950 (N.D. Ill.
1991). 22, 32
Hicks v. Brysch, 989 F.Supp. 797 (W.D.Tex. 1997). 1
Hicks v. Erie County, New York, 65 Fed.Appx. 746 (2nd
Cir. 2003). [unpublished] 1

TC-42
XXVI

Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22 (5th Cir. 1995). 37
Hicks v. Moore, 422 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2005). 32, 39, 41
Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2011). 25, 32, 48
Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Center, 756 F.Supp. 1244 (E.D.
Mo. 1991), affirmed, 113 S.Ct 954. 31
Hickson v. Coughlin, 454 N.Y.S.2d 368 (App. Div. 1982).
19, 49
Hickson v. Kellison, 296 S.E.2d 855 (W.Vir. 1982). 9, 40,
44
Hidalgo v. F.B.I., 541 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.D.C. 2008). 2
Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980). 43
Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 1996). 14, 32, 48
Higgenbottom v. McManus, 840 F.Supp. 454 (W.D. Ky.
1994). 1
Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683 (3rd Cir. 2002). 4, 35, 43
Higgins v. Burroughs, 834 F.2d 76 (3rd Cir. 1987). 37, 38,
39
Higgins v. Correctional Medical Services of Ill., 8
F.Supp.2d 821 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 29, 32, 47
Higgins v. Jefferson County, Ky., 344 F.Supp.2d 1004
(W.D.Ky. 2004). 31
Higgs v. Bland, 888 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1989). 11
Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2002). 3, 11, 32
Hightower v. Nassau County Sheriff’s Dept., 343 F.Supp.2d
191 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 5
Hikel v. King, 659 F.Supp. 337 (E.D. N.Y. 1987). 1, 35, 41
Hili v. Sciarrotta, 140 F.3d 210 (2nd Cir. 1998). 24, 43
Hill v. Blackwell, 774 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1985). 37, 38
Hill v. Blum, 916 F.Supp. 470 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 21. 37. 41
Hill v. Com., Bureau of Corrections, 555 A.2d 1362 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1989). 27
Hill v. Cowin, 717 F.Supp.2d 268 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 20, 22,
36
Hill v. Davidson, 844 F.Supp. 237 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 1, 8, 50
Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 1,
24, 33, 42
Hill v. Franklin County, Ky., 757 F.Supp. 29 (E.D. Ky.
1991), affirmed, 948 F.2d 1289. 14, 36
Hill v. Goord, 63 F.Supp.2d 254 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 36, 43
Hill v. Hoisington, 28 F.Supp.3d 725 (E.D.Mich. 2014). 32,
36, 48
Hill v. Koon, 732 F.Supp. 1076 (D. Nev. 1990), modified,
977 F.2d 589. 41
Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2992. 4, 27, 29
Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2002). 17, 32, 33,
45, 48
Hill v. Shelander, 992 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1993). 48
Hill v. State, 721 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App. 1986). 43
Hill v. Terrell, 846 F.Supp.2d 488 (W.D.N.C. 2012). 1, 28
Hill v. Thalacker, 399 F.Supp.2d 925 (W.D.Wis. 2005). 7,
50
Hill v. U.S., 922 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Mass. 2013). 14, 27
Hill v. Washington State Dept. of Corrections, 628
F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D.Wash. 2009). 7, 38, 49
Hilliard v. Scully, 667 F.Supp. 96 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 1
Hills v. Kentucky, 457 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2006). 30, 32
Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2012). 5, 24, 27
Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). 4, 5,
24, 27, 29, 34
Hinderlitter v. Hungerford, 814 F.Supp. 66 (D. Kan. 1993).
28
Hinebaugh v. Wiley, 137 F.Supp.2d 69 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
20, 22
Hines v. Anderson, 547 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2008). 27, 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Hines v. Crabtree, 935 F.Supp. 1104 (D.Or. 1996). 22, 43
Hines v. Sheahan, 845 F.Supp. 1265 (N.D.Ill. 1994). 9, 32
Hines v. South Carolina Dept. Of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353
(4th Cir. 1998). 19, 37, 38
Hinkfuss v. Shawano County, 772 F.Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wis.
1991). 14, 29, 32, 46
Hinojosa v. Davey, 803 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 2015). 20, 22, 39,
43
Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2015). 9, 10,
14, 15, 29
Hinojosa v. Livingston, 994 F.Supp.2d 840 (S.D.Tex.
2014). 9, 14, 15, 25, 29
Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999). 27, 29
Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp.2d 61
(D.D.C. 2009). 1, 21
Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 624 F.Supp.2d 45
(D.D.C. 2009). 27, 29
Hinton v. Moritz, 11 F.Supp.2d 272 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 16,
36
Hirsch v. Burke, 40 F.3d 900 (7th Cir. 1994). 16, 27, 46
Hirschberg v. Commodity Futures Trading, 414 F.3d 679
(7th Cir. 2005). 13, 43
Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 916 F.2d 572
(10th Cir. 1990). 2, 31
Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1982). 27, 31
Hluchan v. Fauver, 482 F.Supp. 1155 (D. N.J. 1980). 8, 38,
44
Hoang v. Comfort, 282 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2002). 22
Hobbs v. Evans, 924 F.2d 774 (8th Cir. 1991). 9, 14
Hobbs v. Pennell, 754 F.Supp. 1040 (D. Del. 1991). 37
Hobbs v. Powell, 138 F.Supp.3d 1328 (N.D. Ala. 2015). 14,
24, 29
Hodge v. Murphy, 808 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.R.I. 2011). 29, 32
Hodge v. Prince, 730 F.Supp. 747 (N.D. Tex. 1990). 1
Hodge v. Ruperto, 739 F.Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 9, 18,
32
Hodges v. Com. of Virginia, 871 F.Supp. 873 (W.D. Va.
1994). 19, 28
Hodges v. Jones, 873 F.Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 1, 11,
50
Hodges v. Klein, 412 F.Supp. 896 (D. N.J. 1976). 41
Hodges v. Stanley, 712 F.2d 34 (2nd Cir. 1983). 41
Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113 (4th Cir. 1996). 24, 29, 30
Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2nd Cir. 2013). 7, 10
Hogan v. Russ, 890 F.Supp. 146 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 4, 29
Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336 (8th Cir. 2011). 8, 14, 29, 32
Holguin v. Lopez, 584 F.Supp.2d 921 (W.D.Tex. 2008). 16
Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555 (11th Cir. 1997). 31
Holland v. City of Atmore, 168 F.Supp.2d 1303 (S.D.Ala.
2001). 14, 25, 32
Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215 (2nd Cir. 2014). 11, 37, 41
Holland v. Morgan, 6 F.Supp.2d 827 (E.D.Wis. 1998). 48
Holland v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692 (D.Del. 2009). 8, 47,
50
Hollenbaugh v. Maurer, 397 F.Supp.2d 894 (N.D.Ohio
2005). 14, 29, 32
Holley v. Deal, 948 F.Supp. 711 (M.D.Tenn. 1996). 29
Hollimon v. DeTella, 6 F.Supp.2d 968 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 41
Holloman v. Nelson, 817 F.Supp. 88 (D.Kan. 1993). 29
Holloway v. Alexander, 957 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1992). 7
Holloway v. Bizzaro, 571 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Fla. 2008).
18, 37
Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th
Cir. 2012). 1, 6, 16, 32, 36
Holloway v. Hornsby, 23 F.3d 944 (5th Cir. 1994). 1, 21

TC-43
XXVI

Holloway v. Lockhart, 813 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1987). 10, 39,
48
Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1989). 28, 37
Holloway v. Wittry, 842 F.Supp. 1193 (S.D.Iowa 1994).
10, 27
Holly v. Rapone, 476 F.Supp. 226 (E.D. Penn. 1979). 25,
29, 44
Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). 3, 32
Holm v. Haines, 734 F.Supp. 366 (W.D. Wis. 1990). 1, 11,
41
Holman v. Central Arkansas Broadcasting Co., 610 F.2d
542 (5th Cir. 1979). 33
Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 1997). 1, 22
Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854 (3rd Cir. 1983). 1, 27
Holmes v. Cooper, 872 F.Supp. 298 (W.D. Va. 1995). 20
Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2005). 16, 24,
36
Holmes v. Fischer, 764 F.Supp.2d 523 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). 3,
9, 10, 21, 29
Holmes v. Sheahan, 930 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 423. 29, 46
Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044
(D.Minn. 2013). 2, 14, 25, 29, 32, 46
Holt Bonding Co., Inc. v. Nichols, 988 F.Supp. 1232
(W.D.Ark. 1997). 6, 27
Holt v. Caspari, 923 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1991). 1, 11
Holt v. Caspari, 961 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 190. 11
Holt v. Pitts, 702 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1983). 1
Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 7, 8, 9,
10, 15, 34, 50
Holton v. Conrad, 24 F.Supp.3d 624(E.D.Ky. 2014). 2, 32,
48
Holton v. Fields, 638 F.Supp. 1319 (S.D. W.Va. 1986). 17,
36, 50
Hood v. Itawamba County Miss., 819 F.Supp. 556
(N.D.Miss. 1993). 2, 14, 32, 46
Hook v. State of Ariz., 907 F.Supp. 1326 (D.Ariz. 1995). 27
Hoover v. Keating, 59 Fed.Appx. 288 (10th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 8
Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). 7, 10, 11, 27, 48
Hopkins v. Campbell, 870 F.Supp. 316 (D.Kan. 1994). 12
Hopkins v. Collins, 548 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1977). 19, 28
Hopkins v. Grondolsky, 759 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.Mass. 2010).
11, 22, 42
Hopkins v. Pusey, 475 F.Supp.2d 479 (D.Del. 2007). 7
Hopkins v. Stice, 916 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1990). 24, 31
Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1982). 9, 10
Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779 (9th Cir. 1985). 9, 10,
15, 18, 23, 39, 40
Horn by Parks v. Madison County Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d
653 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 199. 14,
25, 26, 39
Horne v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342 (S.C. 1985). 14, 24, 25,
26
Horne v. Coughlin, 795 F.Supp. 72 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). 11, 30
Horne v. Coughlin, 949 F. Supp. 112 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 11
Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 1995). 1, 14
Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2011). 1
Hoskins v. McBride, 202 F.Supp.2d 839 (N.D.Ind. 2002).
11, 20, 22
Hoskins v. Oakland County Sheriff's Dept., 227 F.3d 719
(6th Cir. 2000). 31
Hosna v. Groose, 80 F.3d 298 (8th Cir. 1996). 3, 12, 34, 39
Hossie v. U.S., 682 F.Supp. 23 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 14, 39, 45

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 19, 39
Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968). 1, 38
House v. Nelson, 210 F.Supp.2d 993 (N.D.Ill. 2002). 36
Houseknecht v. Doe, 653 F.Supp.2d 547 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 3,
8, 37, 38
Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008). 31
Housley v. Dodson, 41 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 1994). 1, 10, 12,
27
Housley v. Killinger, 747 F.Supp. 1405 (D. Or. 1990),
affirmed, 972 F.2d 1339. 1
Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 3, 7,
8, 9, 18, 30, 42
Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1989). 9, 10, 27,
40
Howard v. Barnett, 21 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 1994). 10, 48
Howard v. Cronk, 526 F.Supp. 1227 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 1,
39, 49
Howard v. Headly, 72 F.Supp.2d 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 10,
29, 50
Howard v. Keohane, 898 F.Supp. 459 (E.D.Ky. 1995). 19
Howard v. Leonardo, 845 F.Supp. 943 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). 1,
3, 21, 35
Howard v. Pierce, 981 F.Supp. 190 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 11
Howard v. Snyder, 389 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.Del. 2005). 1, 35,
38, 39
Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808 (10th Cir.
2007). 11, 22
Howard v. U.S., 864 F.Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994). 37
Howard v. Waide, 534 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2008). 8, 14, 39
Howard v. Wilkerson, 768 F.Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
11
Howe v. Civiletti, 625 F.2d 454 (2nd Cir. 1980). affirmed,
101 S.Ct. 2468. 47
Howell v. Evans, 922 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1991). 24, 29
Hrbek v. Farrier, 787 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1986). 2, 4, 50
Hrbek v. Nix, 12 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 313. 1, 11
Hrdlicka v. Reniff, 631 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2011). 19, 28,
38, 39
Hron v. Jenkins, 15 F.Supp.2d 1082 (D.Kan. 1998). 8, 29
Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2001). 26
Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001). 1
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3rd Cir. 2005). 15, 32
Hubbard v. Taylor, 452 F.Supp.2d 533 (D.Del. 2006). 9, 29,
32
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2008). 9, 23, 24,
32, 40
Hubbs v. Alamao, 360 F.Supp.2d 1073 (C.D.Cal. 2005). 29,
30, 33
Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, CA, 538 F.Supp.2d
1254 (C.D.Cal. 2008). 7, 9, 23, 29
Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd
Cir. 2015). 1, 7, 21, 32, 44
Huddleston v. Shirley, 787 F.Supp. 109 (N.D. Miss. 1992).
43, 50
Hudgins v. DeBruyn, 922 F.Supp. 144 (S.D.Ind. 1996). 2,
4, 29, 42
Hudson v. Dennehy, 538 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Mass. 2008).
18, 37, 38
Hudson v. Dennehy, 568 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 2008). 5
Hudson v. Hedgepeth, 92. F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 1996). 11, 22
Hudson v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2001). 11, 22
Hudson v. MacEachern, 94 F.Supp.3d 59 (D. Mass. 2015).
11, 21

TC-44
XXVI

Hudson v. Maloney, 326 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Mass. 2004).
18, 37, 38
Hudson v. McHugh, 148 F.3d 859 (7th Cir. 1998). 29, 47
Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). 10, 48
Hudson v. McMillian, 962 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1992). 48
Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 2000). 31
Hudson v. Thornburgh, 770 F.Supp. 1030 (W.D. Pa. 1991),
affirmed, 980 F.2d 723. 7, 11, 19
Huff v. Sanders, 632 F.Supp.2d 903 (E.D.Ark. 2008). 22,
43
Huffman v. Fiola, 850 F.Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 1, 14,
23, 33, 39, 45, 48
Huffman v. McBride, 853 F.Supp. 1095 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
11
Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988 (D.S.D. 2011). 2,
27, 28, 39
Hughes v. Bedsole, 48 F.3d 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). 31
Hughes v. Bedsole, 913 F.Supp. 420 (E.D.N.C. 1994). 7,
31, 19
Hughes v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 594 F.Supp.2d
1226 (D.Colo. 2009). 24, 30, 36
Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 2015). 7, 14
Hughes v. Joliet Correctional Center, 931 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.
1991). 1, 29
Hughes v. Judd, 108 F.Supp.3d 1167 (M.D. Fla. 2015). 9,
26, 29, 45, 48
Hughes v. Lee County Dist. Court, Iowa, 9 F.3d 1366 (8th
Cir. 1993). 11
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980). 3, 5, 11
Hughes v. Savell, 902 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1990). 14
Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2016). 21, 32
Hughes v. Slade, 347 F.Supp.2d 821 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 22,
43
Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1990). 48
Hummel v. McCotter, 28 F.Supp.2d 1322 (D.Utah 1998).
31
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 22
Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46 (7th Cir. 1990). 11, 18, 37
Hundley v. McBride, 908 F.Supp. 601 (N.D.Ind. 1995). 11,
21, 22
Hunt ex rel. Chiovari v. Dart, 612 F.Supp.2d 969 (N.D.Ill.
2009). 1, 14
Hunt ex rel. Chiovari v. Dart, 754 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D.Ill.
2010). 1, 14, 32
Hunt v. Dental Dept., 865 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1989). 27, 29
Hunt v. Polk County, 551 F.Supp. 339 (S.D. Iowa 1982). 6,
32, 41
Hunt v. Reynolds, 974 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 709. 9, 10, 29
Hunt v. Sapien, 480 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D.Kan. 2007). 3
Hunt v. State of Missouri, Dept. of Corrections, 297 F.3d
735 (8th Cir. 2002). 2, 5, 31
Hunt v. Uphoff, 199 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 1999). 29
Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). 2, 29, 30, 32,
33
Hunter v. Auger, 672 F.2d 668 (1982). 41, 49
Hunter v. Ayers, 336 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2003). 7, 20, 22,
36
Hunter v. County of Albany, 834 F.Supp.2d 86 (N.D.N.Y.
2011). 2, 31
Hunter v. County of Sacramento, 652 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir.
2011). 13, 14, 48
Hunter v. Quinlan, 815 F.Supp. 273 (N.D.Ill. 1993). 28
Hunter v. Samples, 15 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 1994). 22, 47

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Hurd v. Garcia, 454 F.Supp.2d 1032 (S.D.Cal. 2006). 10,
12, 39
Hurley v. Ward, 584 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1978). 41
Hurst v. Lee County, Miss., 764 F.3d (5th Cir. 2014). 31
Hurst v. Snyder, 63 Fed.Appx. 240 (7th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 9, 10, 15, 44
Hurt v. Birkett, 566 F.Supp.2d 620 (E.D.Mich. 2008). 7, 29,
48
Hurtado v. Reno, 34 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D.Colo. 1999). 7
Husayn v. Gates, 588 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008). 7, 29
Husbands v. McClellan, 957 F.Supp. 403 (W.D.N.Y. 1997).
11, 20
Husbands v. McClellan, 990 F.Supp. 214 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
3, 11, 20
Huskey v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 632 F.Supp.
1282 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 19, 33
Hutchings v. Corum, 501 F.Supp. 1276 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
1, 9, 10, 12, 15, 19, 23, 27, 32, 40
Hutchings v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 201 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir.
2000). 36, 43
Hutchins v. McDaniels, 512 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2007). 27,
41
Hutchinson v. Belt, 957 F.Supp. 97 (W.D.La. 1996). 4, 29
Hutto v. Davis, 972 F.Supp. 1372 (W.D.Okl. 1997). 25, 29,
45, 46
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), reh'g. denied, 439
U.S. 1122. 5, 9, 11
Hvorcik v. Sheahan, 847 F.Supp. 1414 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 16,
27
Hyde v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 948 F.Supp. 625
(S.D.Tex. 1996). 37
Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007). 7, 9, 29,
41, 48
Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012). 7, 9, 24
Hyson v. Neubert, 820 F.Supp. 184 (D.N.J. 1993). 11
Iglesia v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d 1017 (Ind. App. 1982). 14, 27,
36
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008). 14, 24, 29, 46,
48
Ilina v. Zickefoose, 591 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Conn. 2008). 17,
22, 29
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983), reh'g. denied, 104
S.Ct. 33. 41
Illinois v. Lafayette, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983). 25, 41
Imhoff v. Temas, 67 F.Supp.3d 700 (W.D.Pa. 2014). 9, 23,
27, 29, 32, 40, 48
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Ridge, 169 F.3d 178 2 (3rd
Cir. 1999). 1, 27
In Matter of Miner v. N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional
Services, 524 N.Y.S.2d 390 (N.Y. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 364, reh'g. denied, 109 S.Ct. 825. 19, 38,
49
In re Alea, 286 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 2002). 1, 4, 35
In Re Bayside Prison Litigation, 190 F.Supp.2d 755 (D.N.J.
2002). 1, 7, 21, 38, 39
In re Cook, 928 F.2d 262 (8th Cir. 1991). 1
In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964 (2nd Cir. 1989). 1
In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024
(D.Hawai’i 2006). 6
In re Gaines, 932 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1991). 21
In re Grimes, 256 Cal.Rptr. 690 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1989). 1,
19
In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to
Counsel, 892 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2012). 1, 22

TC-45
XXVI

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F.Supp.2d
312 (D.D.C. 2008). 7, 22
In re Head, 228 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. 1986). 5, 22
In re Jonathan M., 172 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Ct. App. 1981). 43
In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013). 26, 43
In re Nassa County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485
(E.D.N.Y. 2014). 1, 4, 25, 27, 32, 41
In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219 (2d
Cir. 2006). 27, 32, 41
In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F.Supp.2d 304
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 2, 25, 27, 41
In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 958 F.Supp.2d 339
(E.D.N.Y. 2013). 25, 32, 41
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 906 F.Supp.2d
759 (S.D.Ohio 2012). 2, 7, 10
In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 994 F.Supp.2d
906 (S.D.Ohio 2014). 7, 10
In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3rd Cir. 2013). 22, 26, 43
In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247 (D.C.Cir. 1997). 1, 4, 36
In re T.W., 652 F.Supp. 1440 (E.D. Wis. 1987). 26
In re Terrence G., 37 CrL 2413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1985). 26,
41
In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1988). 1
In Re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1998). 1, 39
Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2007). 3, 28
Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). 3, 8, 9,
11, 12, 15, 34, 37, 38
Ind. Dept. of Correction v. Ind. Civ. Rights, 486 N.E.2d 612
(Ind. App. 1 Dist. 1985). 2, 31
Indian Inmates of NE Penitentiary v. Grammer, 649 F.Supp.
1374 (D. Neb. 1986). 37, 38
Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Com'n v.
Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 642
F.Supp.2d 872 (S.D.Ind. 2009) 7, 9, 30
Indreland v. Yellowstone County Bd. of Comr's, 693
F.Supp.2d 1230 (D.Mont. 2010). 8, 37, 38, 39
Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898 (11th Cir. 1995). 1, 10, 37, 49
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 848 F.Supp.
52 (W.D. Pa. 1994). 4, 15, 27
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 487 F.Supp.
638 (W.D. Penn. 1980). 25, 29
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 565 F.Supp.
1278 (W.D. Penn. 1983). 1, 9, 12
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 612 F.Supp.
874 (D.C. Penn. 1985). 9
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 699 F.Supp.
1137 (W.D. Pa. 1988). 9, 27
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 874 F.2d 147
(3rd Cir. 1989). 9, 27
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 901 F.2d 1191
(3rd Cir. 1990). 5, 9
Inmates of D.C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F.3d 1357 (D.C.Cir.
1998). 5
Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 650 F.Supp. 619 (D. D.C.
1986). 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 29, 39, 42, 45
Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 717 F.Supp. 854 (D.D.C.
1989). 3, 8, 15, 29, 44
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F.Supp.
676 (D. Mass. 1973). 23, 28, 32, 37, 49
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F.Supp. 561
(D. Mass. 1990), affirmed, 915 F.2d 1557. 9, 27
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 928 F.2d 33 (1st
Cir. 1991). 17, 47
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st
Cir. 1997). 27, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 12 F.3d 286 (1st
Cir. 1993). 15, 27
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rufo, 844 F.Supp. 31 (D.
Mass. 1994). 15, 27
Inmates v. Ohio State Adult Parole Authority, 929 F.2d 233
(6th Cir. 1991). 36
Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2007). 36, 37
Intersimone v. Carlson, 512 F.Supp. 526 (M.D. Penn.
1980). 1, 28
Ippolito v. Buss, 293 F.Supp.2d 881 (N.D.Ind. 2003). 1, 4
Iron Eyes v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1990). 19, 37
Irving v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2008). 9, 10, 14
Isaac v. United States, 490 F.Supp. 613 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
29
Isaraphanich v. Coughlin, 716 F.Supp. 119 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). 36, 49
Isby v. Clark, 100 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 1996). 3, 10
Ishaaq v. Compton, 900 F.Supp. 935 (W.D.Tenn. 1995). 1,
14, 21, 47
Islam v. Jackson, 782 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D. Va. 1992). 18
Israel v. Abate, 949 F.Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 2, 19,
31
Iuteri v. Nardoza, 662 F.2d 159 (2nd Cir. 1981). 36
Ivey v. Harney, 47 F.3d 181 (7th Cir. 1995). 1
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1987). 27, 41
Ivy v. Moore, 31 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 760. 11
Iwanski v. Ray, 44 Fed.Appx. 370 (10th Cir. 2002). 14
Izzo v. Wiley, 620 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2010). 20, 22, 34
J. B. ex rel. Benjamin v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir.
2015). 26, 41
J.P. v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793 (S.D.Ohio 2006). 1, 9, 23,
26
J.P.C. (JUV) v. U.S., 430 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.S.D. 2006). 22,
Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2012). 10, 14, 47
Jaben v. Moore, 788 F.Supp. 500 (D.Kan. 1992). 1, 37
Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420 (10th Cir. 2004). 19,
35, 38
Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997). 22, 43
Jackson v. Ashcroft, 347 F.Supp.2d 924 (D.Or. 2004). 20,
22
Jackson v. Austin, 241 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Kan. 2003). 27,
48
Jackson v. Berge, 864 F.Supp. 873 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 9, 10
Jackson v. Bostick, 760 F.Supp. 524 (D. Md. 1991). 3
Jackson v. Brookhart, 640 F.Supp. 241 (S.D. Iowa 1986).
11, 19, 28
Jackson v. Buckman, 756 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2014). 29, 32,
48
Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989). 50
Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2003). 3, 11
Jackson v. Carpenter, 921 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1991). 1
Jackson v. Correctional Corporation of America, 564
F.Supp.2d 22 (D.D.C. 2008). 27, 29
Jackson v. Culbertson, 984, F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1993). 48
Jackson v. DeTella, 998 F.Supp. 901 (N.D. Ill. 1998). 9, 23,
48
Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C.
2000). 19, 37, 38, 39
Jackson v. Doria, 851 F.Supp. 288 (N.D.Ill. 1994). 16
Jackson v. Duckworth, 955 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1992). 9, 10,
40
Jackson v. Elrod, 671 F.Supp. 1508 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 19, 27,
38, 39
Jackson v. Elrod, 881 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1989). 19, 24, 28

TC-46
XXVI

Jackson v. Everett, 140 F.3d 1149 (8th Cir. 1998). 14
Jackson v. Fauver, 334 F.Supp.2d 697 (D.N.J. 2004). 27, 29
Jackson v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 538 F.Supp.2d 194
(D.D.C. 2008). 2, 33
Jackson v. First Correctional Medical Services, 380
F.Supp.2d 387 (D.Del. 2005). 2, 29
Jackson v. Frank, 509 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 2007). 19, 38
Jackson v. Gandy, 877 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.N.J. 2012). 10,
14, 21, 24, 27, 48
Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F.Supp. 1005 (E.D. Tenn. 1986). 9,
10, 12, 15, 23, 40, 49
Jackson v. Gerl, 622 F.Supp.2d 738 (W.D.Wis. 2009). 10,
41, 46, 48
Jackson v. Goord, 664 F.Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 9,
10, 40, 50
Jackson v. Hendrick, 446 A.2d 226 (Penn. 1982). 14, 45
Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). 7,
19, 39, 49
Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760 (7th Cir.
2002). 29, 32
Jackson v. Illinois Prisoner Review Bd., 631 F.Supp. 150
(N.D. Ill. 1986). 36
Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 2005). 7, 22, 36
Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F.Supp.2d 278 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
26, 29, 39, 48
Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). 1, 36
Jackson v. Johnson, 962 F.Supp. 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 14
Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008). 1, 27, 29
Jackson v. Lane, 688 F.Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 1, 10,
29
Jackson v. Lockhart, 7 F.3d 1391 (8th Cir. 1993). 36, 50
Jackson v. Long, 102 F.3d 722 (4th Cir. 1996). 31
Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d 316 (2nd Cir. 1999). 37
Jackson v. McCall, 509 F.Supp. 504 (D. D.C. 1981). 36
Jackson v. McIntosh, 81 F.3d 112 (9th Cir. 1996). 29
Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578 (1st Cir. 1983). 3, 10,
19
Jackson v. Mowery, 743 F.Supp. 600 (N.D. (Ind. 1990). 13,
19, 28
Jackson v. New York Dept. of Correctional Services, 994
F.Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 3, 16, 47
Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2014). 27, 34, 37
Jackson v. Norris, 748 F.Supp. 570 (M.D. Tenn. 1990),
affirmed, 928 F.2d 1132. 1, 28
Jackson v. O'Leary, 689 F.Supp. 846 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 10,
50
Jackson v. Onondaga County, 549 F.Supp.2d 204
(N.D.N.Y. 2008). 11, 19
Jackson v. Pate, 382 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1967). 18, 37
Jackson v. Pollion, 733 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013). 29
Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986). 1, 28
Jackson v. Raemisch, 726 F.Supp.2d 991 (W.D.Wis. 2010).
21, 37, 50
Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1979). 36
Jackson v. Russo, 495 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.Mass. 2007). 20,
34, 44, 50
Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 331 F.3d 790
(11th Cir. 2003). 5
Jackson v. Stevens, 694 F.Supp.2d 1334 (M.D.Ga. 2010.) 8,
14, 27
Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 17,
20, 22, 43
Jackson v. U.S., 24 F.Supp.2d 823 (W.D.Tenn. 1998). 13,
14, 26, 29, 39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Jackson v. West, 787 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2015). 14, 29, 30,
32
Jackson v. Wharton, 687 F.Supp. 595 (M.D. Ga. 1988). 1,
29
Jackson v. Whitman, 642 F.Supp. 816 (W.D. La. 1986). 9
Jackson v. Wiley, 352 F.Supp.2d 666 (E.D.Va. 2004). 1
Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091 (2nd Cir. 1997).
19, 37
Jackson-El v. Winsor, 986 F.Supp. 440 (E.D.Mich. 1997). 1
Jacobs v. Ramirez, 400 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2005). 36
Jacobs v. West Feliciana Sheriff's Dept., 228 F.3d 388 (5th
Cir. 2000). 14, 14, 25, 32
Jacobs v. Wilkinson, 529 F.Supp.2d 804 (N.D.Ohio 2008).
1, 37, 50
Jacobson v. Coughlin, 523 F.Supp. 1247 (N.D. N.Y. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 77. 11
Jacques v. Hilton, 569 F.Supp. 730 (D. N.J. 1983). 37
Jaffee v. Redmond, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (1996). 30, 33
Jago v. Shields, 507 F.Supp. 67 (W.D. Va. 1981). 36
Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981). 36
Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d
602 (D.N.J. 2008). 5, 7, 9, 37
Jama v. U.S.I.N.S., 343 F.Supp.2d 338 (D.N.J. 2004). 27,
37
Jamal v. Kane, 105 F.Supp.3d 448 (M.D. Pa 2015). 7, 44
Jamal v. Kane, 96 F.Supp.3d 447 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 7, 19
James v. Aidala, 389 F.Supp.2d 451 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 2,
11
James v. Alfred, 832 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1987). 48
James v. Coughlin, 13 F.Supp.2d 403 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 7,
11, 19, 23, 29, 41, 48
James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 63. 8
James v. Quinlan, 866 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 197. 50
James v. Reno, 39 F.Supp.2d 37 (D.D.C. 1999). 8, 47
James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972). 4
James v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 159 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 1998).
36, 43, 47
James-Bey v. Freeman, 638 F.Supp. 758 (D. D.C. 1986). 47
Janes v. Hernandez, 215 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 2000). 5, 8, 13,
32
Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1999). 31
Jarecke v. Hensley, 552 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2008). 29,
30, 47
Jarno v. Lewis, 256 F.Supp.2d 499 (E.D.Va. 2003). 7, 14,
22
Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir.
2012). 7, 9, 15, 23
Jarriett v. Wilson, 414 F.3d 634 (6th Cir. 2005). 1, 3, 9, 19,
29
Jasper v. Thalacker, 999 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1993). 48
Jaundoo v. Clarke, 690 F.Supp.2d 20 (D.Mass. 2010). 24,
29
Jaundoo v. Clarke, 783 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Mass. 2011). 29
Jawad v. Gates, 113 F.Supp.3d 251 (D.D.C. 2015). 7, 27
Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). 32, 37, 41
Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson, 540 F.Supp.2d 501 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). 27, 41, 48
Jeanty v. County of Orange, 379 F.Supp.2d 533 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). 32, 46, 48
Jefferies v. Wyandotte County Bd. of County Com'rs, 979
F.Supp. 1372 (D.Kan. 1997). 31
Jeffers v. Gomez, 240 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 39, 48

TC-47
XXVI

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2001). 14, 39, 48
Jefferson v. Douglas, 493 F.Supp. 13 (W.D. Okla. 1979).
10, 18, 42
Jeffes v. Barnes, 208 F.3d 49 (2nd Cir. 2000). 31
Jeffries v. Block, 940 F.Supp. 1509 (C.D.Cal. 1996). 29
Jeffries v. Reed, 631 F.Supp. 1212 (E.D. Wash. 1986). 1, 3,
8, 19, 28, 39, 41
Jehovah v. Clarke, 798 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2015). 8, 20, 37,
50
Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1994). 17, 34, 50
Jelinek v. Greer, 90 F.3d 242 (7th Cir. 1996). 8, 14
Jenkins v. Angelone, 948 F.Supp. 543 (E.D.Va. 1996). 18,
37
Jenkins v. Cain, 977 F.Supp. 1255 (W.D.La. 1997). 1, 22
Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628 (8th
Cir. 2009). 2, 29, 32
Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). 16, 43,
44
Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329
(N.D.Ga. 2007). 2, 8, 14, 24, 27, 32, 46
Jenkins v. Fauver, 530 A.2d 790 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1986). 8,
47
Jenkins v. Haubert, 179 F.3d 19 (2nd Cir. 1999). 11, 13
Jenkins v. Lane, 977 F.2d 266 (7th Cir. 1992). 1, 3
Jenkins v. Raub, 310 F.Supp.2d 502 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). 1,
21
Jenkins v. State of La., Thru Dept. of Corrections, 874 F.2d
992 (5th CIr. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 871. 31
Jenkins v. Wilson, 432 F.Supp.2d 808 (W.D.Wis. 2006).
14, 32, 48
Jennings v. County of Washtenaw, 475 F.Supp.2d 692
(E.D.Mich. 2007). 31
Jennings v. Hart, 602 F.Supp.2d 754 (W.D.Va. 2009). 14,
17, 24, 29
Jennings v. Parole Bd. of Virginia, 61 F.Supp.2d 471
(E.D.Va. 1999). 22, 36
Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1996). 5, 8, 14, 25,
27
Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397 (N.D.Ind.
1997). 1, 27
Jensen v. Gunter, 807 F.Supp. 1463 (D.Neb. 1992). 8, 9, 24
Jensen v. Klecker, 599 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1979). 35, 38
Jensen v. Knowles, 621 F.Supp.2d 921 (E.D.Cal. 2008). 1,
21
Jensen v. Webb, 520 N.Y.S.2d 971 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1987). 15
Jermosen v. Coughlin, 745 F.Supp. 128 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 1
Jermosen v. Coughlin, 877 F.Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 1,
7, 28
Jermosen v. Coughlin, 878 F.Supp. 444 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
11, 24
Jermosen v. Smith, 945 F.2d 547 (2nd Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1565. 11, 24
Jersawitz v. Hanberry, 783 F.2d 1532 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 272. 19, 38
Jessup v. Miami-Dade County, 697 F.Supp.2d 1312
(S.D.Fla. 2010). 14, 17, 29, 32
Jessup v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 889 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1989).
22, 36
Jesus Christ Prison Ministry v. California Department of
Corrections, 456 F.Supp.2d 1188 (E.D.Cal. 2006). 19,
28, 37, 38
Jeter v. Montgomery County, 480 F.Supp.2d 1293
(M.D.Ala. 2007). 31
Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2006). 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Jewell v. Gonzales, 420 F.Supp.2d 406 (W.D.Pa. 2006). 12,
19
Jihaad v. O'Brien, 645 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1981). 11, 27
Jihad v. Wright, 929 F.Supp. 325 (N.D.Ind. 1996). 3, 29
Jimenez v. Franklin, 680 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012). 4
Jimenez v. New Jersey, 245 F.Supp.2d 584 (D.N.J. 2003).
16, 32, 41
Jo v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C.
2008). 2, 31
Joan W. v. City of Chicago, 771 F.2d 1020 (1985). 41
John Does 1-100 v. Ninneman, 612 F.Supp. 1069 (D.C.
Minn. 1985). 24, 41
John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, 932 F.Supp.2d 803 (E.D.Mich.
2013). 7, 36, 43, 44
John L. v. Adams, 969 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1992). 1, 26
Johnpoll v. Thornburgh, 898 F.2d 849 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 63. 35, 50
Johns v. Lemmon, 980 F.Supp.2d 1055 (N.D.Ind. 2013).
18, 37, 42
Johnson v. American Towers, LLC, 781 F.3d 693 (4th Cir.
2015). 39
Johnson v. Anderson, 370 F.Supp. 1373 (D. Del. 1974). 11
Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1993). l
Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). 1
Johnson v. Baker, 108 F.3d 10 (2nd Cir. 1997). 34, 36, 49
Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 2006). 17, 23,
48
Johnson v. Board of Police Com’rs, 351 F.Supp.2d 929
(E.D.Mo. 2004). 7, 16, 32, 50
Johnson v. Board of Police Com’rs, 370 F.Supp.2d 892
(E.D.Mo. 2005). 7, 32, 50
Johnson v. Boreani, 946 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1991). 3, 39
Johnson v. Bowers, 884 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1989). 29
Johnson v. Boyd, 676 F.Supp.2d 800 (E.D. Ark. 2009). 11,
14, 15, 19, 23, 28, 37, 40, 42, 49
Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F.Supp.2d 1044 (M.D.Tenn.
2008). 7, 13, 43, 44
Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). 7, 13,
19, 44
Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2002). 5, 14,
27, 48
Johnson v. Bruce, 771 F.Supp. 327 (D. Kan. 1991),
affirmed, 961 F.2d 220. 18, 37
Johnson v. Clafton, 136 F.Supp.3d 838 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
29, 32
Johnson v. Collins, 564 F.Supp.2d 759 (N.D.Ohio 2008).
24, 37, 38, 39
Johnson v. Commissioner of Corr. Services, 699 F.Supp.
1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 9
Johnson v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 392 F.Supp.2d
326 (D.Conn. 2005). 2, 31
Johnson v. Conner, 754 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2014). 14, 29,
30, 39
Johnson v. Crabtree, 996 F.Supp. 999 (D.Or. 1997). 22, 34,
43
Johnson v. Daniels, 769 F.Supp. 230 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 7,
19, 28, 35
Johnson v. Deloach, 692 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ala. 2010).
14, 24, 48
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 461 F.Supp.2d 48 (D.D.C.
2006). 32, 41
Johnson v. District of Columbia, 869 F.Supp.2d 34 (D.D.C.
2012). 21
Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 2006). 29

TC-48
XXVI

Johnson v. Douglas County Medical Dept., 725 F.3d 825
(8th Cir. 2013). 29
Johnson v. DuBois, 20 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.Mass. 1998). 9,
50
Johnson v. Evinger, 517 F.3d 921 (7th Cir. 2008). 11
Johnson v. Fauver, 786 F.Supp. 442 (D. N.J. 1992). 36
Johnson v. Finnan, 467 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2006). 11, 20, 22
Johnson v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 826 F.Supp.2d
1319 (N.D.Fla.2011). 12, 21, 29, 42
Johnson v. Freeburn, 29 F.Supp.2d 764 (E.D.Mich. 1998).
21
Johnson v. Galli, 596 F.Supp. 135 (D. Nev. 1984). 19
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1033. 3, 10, 14, 27, 29, 32, 48
Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532 (2nd Cir. 2006). 3, 28, 35,
38
Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d
1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 1, 17, 24, 32, 41
Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780
F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). 1, 17, 24, 32, 41
Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 584
F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). 1, 17, 41
Johnson v. Hamilton, 452 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006). 14, 29,
48
Johnson v. Hardin County, Ky., 908 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir.
1990). 5, 27, 29
Johnson v. Hay, 931 F.2d 456 2 (8th Cir. 1991). 29
Johnson v. Herman, 132 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.Ind. 2001).
27, 32, 36
Johnson v. Hill, 910 F.Supp. 218 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 8, 14, 29
Johnson v. Hill, 965 F.Supp. 1487 (E.D.Va. 1997). 1, 13
Johnson v. Hornung, 358 F.Supp.2d 910 (S.D.Cal. 2005). 1,
28
Johnson v. Howard, 20 F.Supp.2d 1128 (W.D.Mich. 1998).
1
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). 7, 14
Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2005). 29, 32
Johnson v. Kelsh, 664 F.Supp. 162 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 24, 36
Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir. 2012). 21, 37, 38
Johnson v. Kingston, 292 F.Supp.2d 1146 (W.D.Wis. 2003)
1, 47
Johnson v. Lark, 365 F.Supp. 289 (E.D. Mo. 1973). 7, 10,
11, 12, 18, 23, 25, 29, 40, 44
Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2000). 9, 10
Johnson v. Lockhart, 941 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1991). 29
Johnson v. Lynaugh, 766 S.W.2d 393 (Tex.App.--Tyler
1989). 1, 37
Johnson v. Martin, 223 F.Supp.2d 820 (W.D.Mich. 2002).
37
Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 105 S.Ct.
2717 (1985). 31
Johnson v. Medford, 208 F.Supp.2d 590 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
29, 34
Johnson v. Miller, 925 F.Supp. 334 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 1
Johnson v. Milliner, 65 F.Supp.3d 1295 (S.D.Ala. 2014).
32, 48
Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1991). 9, 37
Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1991). 9, 37, 38
Johnson v. Nelson, 877 F.Supp. 569 (D.Kan. 1995). 22, 29
Johnson v. O'Brien, 445 F.Supp. 122 (E.D. Mo. 1977). 12,
29, 49
Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F.Supp.2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 6,
22
Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). 1, 2,
4, 21, 35

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Johnson v. Pearson, 316 F.Supp.2d 307 (E.D.Va. 2004). 8,
10, 29
Johnson v. Pelkner, 891 F.2d 136 (7th Cir. 1989). 9, 23, 40
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995). 32, 33, 45
Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164 (4th Cir. 1998). 29
Johnson v. Raemisch, 557 F.Supp.2d 964 (W.D.Wis. 2008).
19, 28, 39
Johnson v. Roberts, 721 F.Supp.2d 1017 (D.Kan. 2010). 13,
24, 35, 39, 48
Johnson v. Robinson, 987 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1993). 15, 27
Johnson v. Rowley, 569 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2009). 21, 50
Johnson v. Scott, 702 P.2d 56 (Okl. 1985). 1, 35
Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2006). 29
Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F.Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979). 26,
34
Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650 (9th Cir. 2000). 7, 8,
19
Johnson v. State of California, 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.
2003). 7, 8, 25
Johnson v. Stephan, 816 F.Supp. 677 (D.Kan. 1993),
affirmed, 6 F.3d 691. 19, 29
Johnson v. Stovall, 233 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2000). 11, 21
Johnson v. Tedford, 616 F.Supp.2d 321 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
14, 21, 29
Johnson v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 910 F.Supp.
1208 (W.D.Tex. 1995). 1, 36, 47
Johnson v. U.S., 590 F.Supp.2d 101 (D.D.C. 2008). 13, 36
Johnson v. U.S., 816 F.Supp. 1519 (N.D.Ala. 1993). 8, 10,
29
Johnson v. Unknown Dellatifa, 357 F.3d 539 (6th Cir.
2004). 1, 7, 10, 24
Johnson v. Vondera, 790 F.Supp. 898 (E.D. Mo. 1992). 29
Johnson v. Ward, 76 Fed.Appx 858 (10th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 20, 50
Johnson v. Williams, 768 F.Supp. 1161 (E.D. Va. 1991).
12, 18, 23, 29
Johnson v. Wright, 423 F.Supp.2d 1242 (M.D.Ala. 2005).
14, 32, 48
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 1
Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1988). 37
Johnston v. Ciccone, 260 F.Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1966). 8,
30, 32
Johnston v. Lucas, 786 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1986). 8, 14, 27
Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008) . 1,
21, 29, 32, 48
Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2010). 1, 8, 9, 32,
48
Johnston v. Maha, 845 F.Supp.2d 535 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). 3,
9, 10, 11, 14, 21, 32
Johnstone v. U.S., 980 F.Supp. 148 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 24, 29,
50
Joihner v. McEvers, 898 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1990). 47
Jolivet v. Deland, 966 F.2d 573 (10th Cir. 1992). 27, 28
Jolly v. Badgett, 144 F.3d 573 (8th Cir. 1998). 29
Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468 (2nd Cir. 1996). 29, 37
Jolly v. Klein, 923 F.Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 29, 32
Jones v. Banks, 878 F.Supp. 107 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 14
Jones v. Bishop, 981 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 7, 9
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2004). 7, 32
Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). 1, 19, 28, 38,
39
Jones v. Carroll, 628 F.Supp.2d 551 (D.Del. 2009). 1, 13,
14, 24
Jones v. Caruso, 569 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2009). 19, 28, 38

TC-49
XXVI

Jones v. City and County of San Francisco, 976 F.Supp. 896
(N.D.Cal. 1997). 1, 9, 12, 15, 18, 23, 27, 33, 32, 39,
40, 44, 45
Jones v. City of Jackson, 203 F.3d 875 (5th Cir. 2000). 16,
24
Jones v. Coonce, 7 F.3d 1359 (8th Cir. 1993). 3, 24
Jones v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d
824 (W.D.Mich. 2012). 2, 9, 27, 29
Jones v. Culinary Manager II, 30 F.Supp.2d 491 (E.D.Pa.
1998). 7, 10
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 22
Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 102 S.Ct. 27. 1, 7, 8, 12, 15, 28, 32, 39, 40
Jones v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981) cert
denied 102 S.Ct 27. 7, 9, 10, 11, 15, 27, 32
Jones v. Edguardo A. Consuegra’s Estate, 338 F.Supp.2d
1282 (M.D.Fla. 2004). 29
Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (1st Cir. 1985). 25, 41
Jones v. Ehlert, 704 F.Supp. 885 (E.D. Wis. 1989),
affirmed, 899 F.2d 17. 29
Jones v. Franzen, 697 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1983). 1
Jones v. Garcia, 430 F.Supp.2d 1095 (S.D.Cal. 2006). 12
Jones v. Goord, 435 F.Supp.2d 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 9, 10,
14, 15, 35, 37
Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 1999). 1, 21
Jones v. Hamelman, 869 F.2d 1023 (7th Cir. 1989). 14
Jones v. Hannigan, 959 F.Supp. 1400 (D.Kan. 1997). 29, 50
Jones v. Hobbs, 864 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Ark. 2012). 2, 18,
37, 39
Jones v. Hodge, 662 F.Supp. 254 (E.D. N.C. 1987). 8
Jones v. Huff, 789 F.Supp. 526 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). 14, 48
Jones v. Hutto, 763 F.2d 979 (8th Cir. 1985). 7, 31
Jones v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 825 (5th Cir. 2000). 43
Jones v. Kelly, 918 F.Supp. 74 (W.D.N.Y. 1995). 14, 47
Jones v. Kelly, 937 F.Supp. 200 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 3, 19
Jones v. Lexington County Detention Center, 586
F.Supp.2d 444 (D.S.C. 2008). 1, 32, 44
Jones v. Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422 (8th Cir. 1994). 5
Jones v. Lopez, 262 F.Supp.2d 701 (W.D.Tex. 2001). 16,
24, 36
Jones v. Marshall, 459 F.Supp.2d 1002 (E.D.Cal. 2006). 14,
29
Jones v. Mathai, 758 F.Supp.2d 443 (E.D.Mich. 2010). 1,
21
Jones v. McAndrew, 996 F.Supp. 1439 (N.D.Fla. 1998). 7,
10, 43
Jones v. McDaniel, 552 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D.Nev. 2008). 11,
22
Jones v. McDaniel, 717 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 4, 5, 11
Jones v. Michigan, 698 F.Supp.2d 905 (E.D.Mich. 2010). 8,
29, 50
Jones v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 512 F.3d 478 (8th
Cir. 2008). 14, 17, 29
Jones v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 615 F.Supp. 456
(D.C. Miss. 1985). 2, 5, 7, 31
Jones v. Moran, 900 F.Supp. 1267 (N.D.Cal 1995). 3, 8
Jones v. Morris, 769 F.Supp. 274 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 50
Jones v. Murphy, 567 F.Supp.2d 787 (D.Md. 2008). 17, 25,
39, 41
Jones v. Murray, 763 F.Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991),
modified, 962 F.2d 302. 33, 36, 41
Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2010). 7,
14, 29, 32
Jones v. Norris, 310 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 2002). 29, 50

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S.
119 (1977). 19
Jones v. Oakland County, 585 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich.
2008). 8, 17, 25, 29
Jones v. Pramstaller, 678 F.Supp.2d 609 (W.D. Mich.
2009). 2, 10, 29
Jones v. Pramstaller, 874 F.Supp.2d 713 (W.D.Mich. 2012).
1, 14, 29
Jones v. Price, 696 F.Supp.2d 618 (N.D.W.Va. 2010). 33,
41
Jones v. Puckett, 160 F.Supp.2d 1016 (W.D.Wis. 2001). 8,
24, 34, 36
Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001). 36
Jones v. Russell, 950 F.Supp. 855 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 1, 3, 8
Jones v. Salt Lake County, 503 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2007).
19, 28, 38, 39
Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491 (8th Cir. 2000). 48
Jones v. St. Tammany Parish Jail, 4 F.Supp.2d 606 (E.D.La.
1998). 29, 32
Jones v. Stine, 843 F.Supp. 1186 (W.D. Mich. 1994). 3, 9,
10, 12, 24
Jones v. Taylor, 534 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2008). 27, 46,
48
Jones v. Thompson, 818 F.Supp. 1263 (S.D.Ind. 1993). 27,
32, 48
Jones v. U.S., 91 F.3d 623 (3rd Cir. 1996). 29
Jones v. Warden of Stateville Correctional Center, 918
F.Supp. 1142 (N.D.Ill, 1995).1, 38
Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections
Medical Dept., 557 F.Supp.2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
7, 29
Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2015). 18, 37, 50
Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F.Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971). 3,
8, 11, 18, 19, 23, 25, 27, 29, 34, 39, 40, 42
Jones v. Wittenberg, 440 F.Supp. 60 (N.D. Ohio 1977). 31,
46
Jones/Seymour v. LeFebvre, 781 F.Supp. 355 (E.D.Pa.
1991), affirmed, 961 F.2d 1567. 33
Jones-Bey v. Conley, 144 F.Supp.2d 1035 (N.D.Ind. 2000).
29, 48
Jones-Bey v. Wright, 944 F.Supp. 723 (N.D.Ind. 1996). 29,
37, 48
Jones-El v. Berge, 374 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2004). 9, 10, 15,
27
Jordan Ex Rel. Johnson v. Taylor, 310 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir.
2002). 39, 49
Jordan v. Cobb County, Georgia, 227 F.Supp.2d 1322
(N.D.Ga. 2001). 32, 48
Jordan v. Department of Corrections, 418 N.W.2d 914
(Mich. App. 1987). 2, 28
Jordan v. Fischer, 773 F.Supp.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 7,
14, 48
Jordan v. Gardner, 953 F.2d 1137 (9th Cir. 1992), affirmed,
986 F.2d 1521. 10, 37, 41
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993). 10, 17,
31, 41
Jordan v. Jones, 625 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1980). 3, 11
Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F.3d 820 (10th Cir. 2005). 19, 32
Jordan v. Pugh, 484 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Colo. 2007). 1, 22
Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Colo. 2007). 7, 19,
28, 38
Jordan v. Sosa, 577 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.Colo. 2008). 19, 28,
38
Jordan v. Sosa, 654 F.3d 1012 (10th Cir. 2011). 19, 38, 44
Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980). 49

TC-50
XXVI

Joseph Ex Rel. Estate of Harbin v. City of Detroit, 289
F.Supp.2d 863 (E.D.Mich. 2003) 14, 29, 32
Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). 1,
24, 35, 37, 39
Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2nd Cir. 2009). 18, 37, 39
Joy v. Healthcare C.M.S., 534 F.Supp.2d 482 (D.Del.
2008). 25, 29
Judd v. Furgeson, 239 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.N.J. 2002). 1
Judd v. Packard, 669 F.Supp. 741 (D. Md. 1987). 8, 9, 29
Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F.Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982). 27
Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2013). 1, 14, 32,
39, 45
Jurado Sanchez v. Pereira, 525 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Puerto
Rico 2007). 2, 9, 14, 15, 39, 45
Jurich v. Mahoning County, 31 Fair Emp. Prac. 1275 (N.D.
Ohio 1983). 31
Justice v. Coughlin, 941 F.Supp. 1312 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). 11
Justice v. Danberg, 571 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.Del. 2008). 2, 31
Justice v. Dennis, 793 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1986). 27, 32, 48
Justice v. Machtinger, 733 F.Supp.2d 495 (D.Del. 2010). 2,
31
Justus ex rel. Estate of Justus v. County of Buchanan, 498
F.Supp.2d 883 (W.D.Va. 2007). 14
Justus v. County of Buchanan, 517 F.Supp.2d 810
(W.D.Va. 2007). 14, 15, 29, 30, 32, 45
K.F.P. v. Dane County, 110 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1997). 8, 14
K.M. v. Alabama Dept. of Youth Services, 360 F.Supp.2d
1253 (M.D.Ala. 2005). 7, 14, 17, 26
Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). 7,
33, 37, 41
Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1988). 18, 37
Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544 (8th Cir. 2007). 14, 17, 32
Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). 4, 5, 14, 17,
27, 32
Kaiser v. County of Sacramento, 780 F.Supp. 1309
(E.D.Cal. 1991). 1, 32
Kalasho v. Kapture, 868 F.Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
24, 28
Kalka v. Megathlin, 10 F.Supp.2d 1117 (D.Ariz. 1998). 1,
28
Kalka v. Vasquez, 867 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 2677. 20, 22, 50
Kalwasinski v. Morse, 201 F.3d 103 (2nd Cir. 1999). 3, 11
Kanayurak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893 (Alaska
Sup.Ct. 1984). 14, 17, 27
Kane v. Winn, 319 F.Supp.2d 162 (D.Mass. 2004). 22, 29
Kansas v. Crane, 122 S.Ct. 867 (2002). 7
Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1977). 30
Kantamanto v. King, 651 F.Supp.2d 313 (E.D.Pa. 2009).
13, 19, 50
Kapfhammer v. Boyd, 5 F.Supp.2d 689 (E.D.Wis. 1998). 48
Karacsonyi v. Radloff, 885 F.Supp. 368 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
15, 36, 43, 50
Karolis v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 935 F.Supp.
523 (D.N.J. 1996). 11, 29, 37
Karriem v. Barry, 32 Crim. L. Rptr. 2429 (D. D.C. 1983).
37, 39
Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.Supp.3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015). 7,
8, 36
Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). 1, 2,
7, 19, 28, 32, 34, 37, 41, 42
Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F.Supp.2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 1,
21, 29
Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1996). 22, 36, 43, 47

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Kathriner v. City of Overland, Missouri, 602 F.Supp. 124
(E.D. Mo. 1984). 17, 24, 32, 41
Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418 (3rd Cir. 2006).
29, 31, 44
Kaufman v. Carter, 952 F.Supp. 520 (W.D.Mich. 1996). 29,
32
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005). 1,
19, 28, 37
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 422 F.Supp.2d 1016 (W.D.Wis.
2006). 24, 37
Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). 37, 38, 39
Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis.
2007). 1, 12, 19, 29, 37, 47
Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis.
2007). 1, 12, 28, 37, 38, 47
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007). 37, 38
Kayser v. Caspari, 16 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1994). 29
Kearney v. Coughlin, 488 N.Y.S.2d 300 (A.D. 3 Dept.
1985). 31
Keel v. Dovey, 459 F.Supp.2d 946 (C.D.Cal. 2006). 3, 9,
11, 17, 40
Keele v. Glynn County, Ga.. 938 F.Supp.2d 1270 (S.D.Ga.
2013). 17, 24, 29, 32
Keeler v. Pea, 782 F.Supp. 42 (D. S.C. 1992). 3
Keeling v. Schaefer, 181 F.Supp.2d 1206 (D.Kan. 2001). 2,
7, 11, 27, 35, 50
Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1996). 1, 8, 10, 11,
12, 15, 18, 23, 42, 49
Keeney v. Heath, 57 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 1995). 19, 31
Keenum v. Amboyer, 558 F.Supp. 1321 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
39, 49
Keeton v. State of Okl., 32 F.3d 451 (10th Cir. 1994). 36
Keith v. DeKalb County, Georgia, 749 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir.
2014). 8, 14, 30, 32
Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). 2, 13, 14,
17, 24, 31, 45
Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). 7, 11, 24, 26, 34
Kell v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 26 F.3d 1016 (10th Cir. 1994).
22, 36
Kellas v. Lane, 923 F.2d 492 (7th Cir. 1990). 3
Kelleher v. New York State Trooper Fearon, 90 F.Supp.2d
354 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 27, 32, 41
Keller v. U.S., 771 F.3d 1021 (7th Cir. 2014). 14, 25, 27, 45
Kelley v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1975). 8
Kelley v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2005). 9, 10, 29
Kelley v. McGinnis, 899 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1990). 29
Kelley v. Vaughn, 760 F.Supp. 161 (W.D. Mo. 1991). 50
Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 1995). 36
Kelly v. Ambroski, 97 F.Supp.3d 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2015). 7,
29
Kelly v. Foti, 77 F.3d 819 (5th Cir. 1996). 17, 32, 35, 41
Kelly v. Foti, 870 F.Supp. 126 (E.D.La. 1994). 24, 41
Kelly v. United States, 630 F.Supp. 428 (W.D. Tenn. 1985).
2, 35
Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). 1, 2,
4, 5, 27
Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Idaho 2013). 2,
27, 39, 45
Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Idaho 2013). 2,
27, 45
Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Idaho 2013). 2,
27
Kelsey v. State of Minnesota, 622 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1980).
1

TC-51
XXVI

Kemner v. Hemphill, 199 F.Supp.2d 1264 (N.D.Fla. 2002).
14
Kemp v. Balboa, 23 F.3d 211 (8th Cir. 1994). 4
Kemp v. Moore, 946 F.2d 588 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 1958. 37, 38
Kemp v. Waldron, 479 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1984). 14,
27, 31, 45
Kemppainen v. Aransas County Detention Center, 626
F.Supp.2d 672 (S.D.Tex. 2009). 29
Kendrick v. Bland, 931 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1991). 15
Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). 1,
17, 28, 35, 37, 39, 41, 48
Kendrick v. Pope, 671 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2012). 17, 35, 37,
41
Kennan v. Bennett, 613 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980). 11, 20
Kennedy v. Hardimann, 684 F.Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
27, 31, 41
Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 667 F.Supp. 697
(D.C. Cal. 1987), affirmed, 901 F.2d 702. 32, 41
Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 887 F.2d 920 (9th
Cir. 1989). 41
Kennedy v. Meacham, 382 F.Supp. 996 (D. Wy. 1974). 37
Kennelly v. Lemoi, 529 F.Supp. 140 (D.C. R.I. 1981). 5
Kenner v. Martin, 648 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981). 36
Kenney v. Hawaii, 109 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D.Hawai'i 2000).
13, 29
Kenney v. Paderes, 217 F.Supp.2d 1095 (D.Hawai’i 2002).
13, 29
Kensu v. Haigh, 87 F.3d 172 (6th Cir. 1996). 1, 28
Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1987). 10, 19, 33,
37
Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S.Ct.
1904 (1989). 49
Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (1985). 5, 7, 27
Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 1996). 8, 34, 36, 37
Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1998). 1, 34
Kersch v. Board of County Com'rs of Natrona County, 851
F.Supp. 1541 (D.Wyo. 1994). 5
Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 11, 21
Kesler v. King, 29 F.Supp.2d 356 (S.D.Tex. 1998). 27, 31,
48
Keup v. Hopkins, 596 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2010). 5, 28
Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 1999). 11, 39
Keyhea v. Rushen, 223 Cal. Rptr. 747 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1986). 29, 30
Khadr v. Bush, 587 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). 7, 22, 26
Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011).
1, 17, 32, 37
Kidd v. Gowen, 829 F.Supp. 16 (D.N.H. 1993). 25, 32, 41
Kiddy-Brown v. Blagojevich, 408 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 2005).
31
Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001). 37, 38
Kikumura v. Turner, 28 F.3d 592 (7th Cir. 1994). 19, 28
Killen v. McBride, 907 F.Supp. 302 (N.D.Ind. 1994). 3, 9
Killingsworth v. Ondahl, 978 F.Supp. 1425 (D.Kan. 1997).
8, 14, 24
Kim v. Hurston, 182 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 1999). 36
Kim v. Veglas, 607 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Mass. 2009). 1, 47
Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F.3d 523 (9th Cir. 2002). 6, 22
Kiman v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 451 F.3d
274 (1st Cir. 2006). 29
Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 251 F.Supp.2d 47 (D.D.C. 2003). 19,
38
Kimberlin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 318 F.3d 228 (D.C.Cir.
2003). 19, 35, 39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Kimberlin v. White, 7 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1993). 36
Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 523 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir. 1975). 3, 11,
23
Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1976). 27
Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997). 1, 4, 22
Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1982). 19, 24, 38
Kind v. Frank, 329 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2003). 37
Kindred v. Duckworth, 9 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 1993). 1, 28
King v. Caruso, 542 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 39,
49
King v. Chapman, 4 F.Supp.3d 1017 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 29
King v. County of Gloucester, 483 F.Supp.2d 396 (D.N.J.
2007). 5, 14
King v. Ditter, 432 F.Supp.2d 813 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 19, 50
King v. Fairman, 997 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1993). 14, 47
King v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634 (7th Cir.
2005). 1, 19, 34, 35, 38
King v. Frank, 371 F.Supp.2d 977 (W.D.Wis. 2005). 3, 8, 9,
10, 15, 29, 30
King v. Greenblatt, 53 F.Supp.2d 117 (D.Mass. 1999). 27,
34
King v. Higgins, 702 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 404. 11, 27
King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2012). 29, 32
King v. Kramer, 763 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2014). 14, 29, 30, 32
King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 19, 21,
33, 47
King v. McMickens, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679 (A.D. 1 Dept.
1986). 2, 31, 41
King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010). 2, 27, 31
King v. Morrison, 231 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2000). 34, 36
King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). 4, 5, 27, 32
King v. White, 839 F.Supp. 718 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 1
King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2012). 8, 11, 21
King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015). 2, 5, 8, 27,
47
Kingsley v. Bureau of Prisons, 937 F.2d 26 (2nd Cir. 1991).
10, 11
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466 (2015). 32, 48
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 801 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015). 32,
48
Kinney v. Anglin, 889 F.Supp.2d 1101 (C.D.Ill. 2012). 31
Kinney v. Indiana Youth Center, 950 F.2d 462 (7th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 313. 48
Kinney v. Kalfus, 25 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1994). 29
Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2008). 2, 29, 47
Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999). 8, 36,
43
Kirwan v. Larned Mental Health, 816 F.Supp. 672 (D.Kan.
1993). 19
Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.
1971). 27
Kitchen v. Dallas County, Tex., 759 F.3d 468 (5th Cir.
2014). 14, 29, 32, 46, 48
Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.3d 613 (D. Md. 2015). 1, 21,
29, 48
Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2002). 8, 24, 36,
50
Kitt v. Ferguson, 750 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Neb. 1990),
affirmed, 950 F.2d 725. 10, 24
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 22, 47
Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2008). 14,
32, 39
Kleeman v. United States Parole Com'n., 125 F.3d 725 (9th
Cir. 1997). 43, 47

TC-52
XXVI

Klein v. Pyle, 767 F.Supp. 215 (D. Colo. 1991). 8, 47
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 107 F.3d 609 (8th
Cir. 1997). 1, 17, 34
Klinger v. Department of Corrections, 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir.
1994). 17, 34
Klinger v. Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 824
F.Supp. 1374 (D.Neb. 1993) reversed 31 F.3d 727. 1,
17, 34
Klinger v. Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 902
F.Supp. 1036 (D.Neb. 1995). 27
Klos v. Haskell, 48 F.3d 81 (2nd Cir. 1995). 34
Klos v. Haskell, 835 F.Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1993),
affirmed, 48 F.3d 81. 34, 47
Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). 1
Kneen v. Zavaras, 885 F.Supp.2d 1055 (D.Colo. 2012). 27,
29
Kness v. Sondalle, 725 F.Supp. 1006 (E.D. Wis. 1989),
affirmed, 917 F.2d 1306. 1
Knight v. Armontrout, 878 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1989). 11
Knight v. Gill, 999 F.2d 1020 (6th Cir. 1993). 14, 46
Knight v. Keane, 247 F.Supp.2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 50
Knight v. Lombardi, 952 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1991). 28
Knight v. Thompson, 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). 19,
23, 37, 38, 39
Knight v. Thompson, 796 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2015). 37, 38
Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2015). 37, 38
Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2000). 31
Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147
F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 3, 7, 39, 41, 49
Knight v. Wiseman, 590 F.3d 458 (7th Cir. 2009). 29, 50
Knighten v. United States Parole Commission, 105
F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C 2015). 22, 36
Knop v. Johnson, 667 F.Supp. 467 (W.D. Mich. 1987). 1,
10, 28
Knop v. Johnson, 712 F.Supp. 571 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 5
Knowles v. New York City Dept. of Corrections, 904
F.Supp. 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 14
Knows His Gun v. Montana, 866 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Mont.
2012). 15, 27, 33, 35, 37, 38, 41, 47
Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2011). 1
Knox v. Lanham, 895 F.Supp. 750 (D.Md. 1995). 8, 36, 43
Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405 (7th Cir. 1993). 39
Kocienski v. City of Bayonne, 757 F.Supp. 457 (D. N.J.
1991). 14, 17, 25, 29, 32, 46
Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86 (2nd Cir. 1996). 29, 35
Koenig v. Vanelli, 971 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1992). 38
Koerschner v. Warden, 508 F.Supp.2d 849 (D.Nev. 2007).
1, 3
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2008). 18, 37
Koger v. Dart, 114 F.Supp.3d 572 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 19, 42
Koger v. Snyder, 252 F.Supp.2d 723 (C.D.Ill. 2003). 1, 21,
41, 47
Kogut v. Ashe, 592 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). 20, 22,
50
Kogut v. Ashe, 602 F.Supp.2d 251 (D.Mass. 2009). 20, 22,
34, 50
Kohl v. Smythe, 25 F.Supp.2d 1124 (D.Hawai'i 1998). 31
Kole v. Lappin, 551 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2008). 18, 37,
42
Kolman v. Sheahan, 31 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1994). 19, 31
Konah v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.D.C.
2011). 2, 31
Konah v. District of Columbia, 915 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.
2013). 2, 31, 46

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Konah v. District of Columbia, 971 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C.
2013). 2, 14, 31
Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F.Supp. 585 (W.D. Mo. 1968),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963. 37, 39
Konigsberg v. Lefevre, 267 F.Supp.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y.
2003). 1, 35, 47
Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F.Supp.2d 874 (E.D.Wis. 2010). 10,
17, 29
Koos v. Holm, 204 F.Supp.2d 1099 (W.D.Tenn. 2002). 22,
47
Kopec v. Coughlin, 767 F.Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 29
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F.Supp.2d 156 (D.Mass. 2002).
27, 29, 38
Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 17, 29
Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Mass. 2012). 27,
29
Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2001).
32, 39, 48
Kotz v. Lappin, 515 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.D.C. 2007). 2, 36
Kounelis v. Sherrer, 396 F.Supp.2d 525 (D.N.J. 2005). 50
Kounelis v. Sherrer, 529 F.Supp.2d 503 (D.N.J. 2008). 11,
48
Koutnik v. Brown, 351 F.Supp.2d 871 (W.D.Wis. 2004).
19, 28
Koutnik v. Brown, 456 F.3d 777 (7th Cir. 2006). 19, 28, 38,
39
Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2003). 1
Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). 1,
9, 19, 28, 32, 37, 38, 39
Kramer v. Gwinnett County, Georgia, 306 F.Supp.2d 1219
(N.D.Ga. 2004). 29, 32
Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 1995). 41
Kress v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 694 F.3d 890 (7th Cir.
2012). 27, 29
Kriegal v. State Of Rhode Island, Dept. Of Corrs., 266
F.Supp.2d 288 (D.R.I. 2003). 31
Krisch v. Smith, 853 F.Supp. 301 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 1
Kritenbrink v. Crawford, 313 F.Supp.2d 1043 (D.Nev.
2004). 8, 13
Kroll v. St. Charles County, Mo., 766 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.
Mo. 1991). 15, 27
Kropp v. McCaughtry, 915 F.Supp. 85 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 9,
12
Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2009). 29, 32, 48
Krug v. Lutz, 329 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2003). 19, 28
Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F.Supp. 583 (D.Minn. 1995). 33,
41
Kruger v. Jenne, 164 F.Supp.2d 1330 (S.D.Fla. 2000). 7,
15, 29
Kruger v. Nebraska, 90 F.Supp.3d 874 (D. Neb. 2015). 14,
27
Kucharczyk v. Westchester County, 95 F.Supp.3d 529
(S.D.N.Y. 2015). 27, 29
Kuffel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 882 F.Supp. 1116 (D.D.C.
1995). 33
Kuhne v. Florida Dept. of Corrections, 745 F.3d 1091 (11th
Cir. 2014). 13, 29
Kujawski v. Board of Com’rs of Bartholomew Cty, 104
F.Supp.2d 1027 (S.D.Ind. 2000). 31
Kula v. Malani, 539 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Hawai‘I 2008). 7,
34
Kulikowski v. Board of County Com'rs. of County, 231
F.Supp.2d 1053 (D.Colo. 2002). 31
Kulow v. Nix, 28 F.3d 855 (8th Cir. 1994). 3, 11
Kunkel v. Stockwell, 887 F.Supp. 215 (E.D.Mo. 1995). 14

TC-53
XXVI

Kuperman v. Wrenn, 645 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2011). 37, 38, 39
Kurtz v. Denniston, 872 F.Supp. 631 (N.D. Iowa 1994). 18,
37
Kvech v. New Mexico Dept. of Public Safety, 987
F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.N.M. 2013). 7
L.C. v. State, 625 P.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. Alaska 1981). 43
L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 519 F.Supp.2d 1072 (E.D.Cal.
2007). 26, 36
L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 645 F.Supp.2d 888 (E.D.Cal.
2009). 5, 26
L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 2442. 14, 31
La Bounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121 (2nd Cir. 1991). 34, 50
Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F.Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977). 8,
29, 50
LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 1998). 9, 40
Labounty v. Johnson, 253 F.Supp.2d 496 (W.D.N.Y. 2003).
1
LaBoy v. Coughlin, 822 F.2d 3 (2nd Cir. 1987). 2, 11, 27
LaChance v. Reno, 13 F.3d 586 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 2711. 22, 36
Lackey v. Texas, 115 S.Ct. 1421 (1995). 10
Lacy v. Berge, 921 F.Supp. 600 (E.D. Wis. 1996). 11, 14,
27
Ladd v. Davies, 817 F.Supp. 81 (D.Kan. 1993). 1, 35
Ladd v. Hannigan, 962 F.Supp. 1390 (D.Kan. 1997). 1
Lafaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1987). 7, 10, 29, 50
LaFevers v. Saffle, 936 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1991). 18, 37
LaFrance v. Rampone, 678 F.Supp. 72 (D.Vt. 1988). 24, 36
Laganiere v. County of Olmsted, 772 F.3d 1114 (8th Cir.
2014). 14, 29, 45
Lagar v. Tegels, 94 F.Supp.3d 998 (W.D. Wis. 2015). 37
Lahey v. Kelly, 524 N.Y.S.2d 30 (Ct. App. 1987). 29, 38,
41
Laird v. Mattox, 430 F.Supp.2d 636 (E.D.Tex. 2006) 1, 21
Laird v. McBride, 858 F.Supp. 822 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 22, 41
Lakin v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2014). 14, 39
LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F.Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1987). 10,
14, 27
Lamb v. Hutto, 467 F.Supp. 562 (E.D. Vir. 1979). 48
Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F.Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986). 29,
38, 47
Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 1999).
14, 32, 48
Lambert v. Sullivan, 35 F.Supp.2d 1131 (E.D.Wis. 1999).
22, 47, 50
Lambros v. Hawk, 993 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Kan. 1998). 1, 47
Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419 (11th Cir.
1997). 14, 24, 29, 32
Landfair v. Sheahan, 878 F.Supp. 1106 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 9,
27
Landman v. Royster, 333 F.Supp. 621 (E.D. Vir. 1971). 48
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). 1
Lane v. Doan, 287 F.Supp.2d 210 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 1, 21
Lane v. Griffin, 834 F.2d 403 (4th Cir. 1987), affirmed, 887
F.2d 1080. 27, 37
Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2012). 7, 8, 9, 19,
28, 34
Langford v. Day, 134 F.3d 1381 (9th Cir. 1998). 10
Langley v. Coughlin, 709 F.Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 9,
17, 27, 29, 30
Langston v. Peters, 100 F.3d 1235 (7th Cir. 1996). 2, 14
Lanier v. Fair, 876 F.2d 243 (1st Cir. 1989). 24, 36, 47
Lanni v. Engler, 994 F.Supp. 849 (E.D.Mich. 1998). 33

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

LaPlante v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 89
F.Supp.3d 235 (D.Mass. 2015). 37, 38
LaPlante v. Pepe, 307 F.Supp.2d 219 (D.Mass. 2004). 1, 5
Lappe v. Loeffelholz, 815 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1987). 24, 30
LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878. 37, 39
Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1981). 10, 15, 25,
29, 32, 39, 44
Larkin v. Galloway, 266 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2001). 1
Larry v. Goetz, 575 F.Supp.2d 965 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 37
Larson v. Kempker, 405 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2005). 9, 10, 29
Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2005). 9, 10, 29
LaRue v. Fairman, 780 F.Supp. 1190 (N.D.Ill. 1991). 1
Lashley v. Stotts, 816 F.Supp. 676 (D.Kan. 1993). 1, 47
Lashley v. Wakefield, 367 F.Supp.2d 461 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). 1, 21, 41
Lasley v. Godinez, 833 F.Supp. 714 (N.D.Ill. 1993). 39, 41
Latimore v. Johnson, 7 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1993). 14, 24
Latimore v. Widseth, 986 F.2d 292 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 1124. 14, 33,
Lato v. Attorney General of the U.S., 773 F.Supp. 973
(W.D. Tex. 1991). 34, 47
Laube v. Allen, 506 F.Supp.2d 969 (M.D.Ala. 2007). 5, 17
Laube v. Campbell, 333 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 2004).
27
Laube v. Haley, 242 F.Supp.2d 1150 (M.D.Ala. 2003). 17,
27
Laughter v. Kay, 986 F.Supp. 1362 (D.Utah 1997). 41, 49
Laurence v. Wall, 551 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2008). 1
Lavender v. Lampert, 242 F.Supp.2d 821 (D.Or. 2002). 29
Laventure v. Aramark Correct. Services, 76 Fed.Appx 870
(10th Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. 50
Lawhorn v. Duckworth, 736 F.Supp. 1501 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
29
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990). 1, 14
Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2002). 14,
48
Lawrence v. Davis, 401 F.Supp. 1203 (W.D. Vir. 1975). 19,
28
Lawrence v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 308 F.Supp.2d
709 (E.D.Va. 2004). 29
Lawrenz v. James, 852 F.Supp. 986 (M.D. Fla. 1994),
affirmed, 46 F.3d 70. 19, 31
Laws v. Barron, 348 F.Supp.2d 795 (E.D.Ky. 2004). 22, 34
Laws v. Cleaver, 140 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.Conn. 2001). 48
Lawson v. Dugger, 844 F.Supp. 1538 (S.D. Fla. 1994). 19,
28, 37
Lawson v. Liburdi, 114 F.Supp.2d 31 (D.R.I. 2000). 27
Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996). 19, 37
Lawson v. Wainwright, 641 F.Supp. 312 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
19, 37
Laxton v. Watters, 348 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D.Wis. 2004). 7
Lay v. Anderson, 837 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1988). 1
Lay v. Porker, 371 F.Supp.2d 1159 (C.D.Cal. 2004). 33, 41
Layman Ex Rel. Layman v. Alexander, 343 F.Supp.2d 483
(W.D.N.C. 2004). 29, 32, 46
Layton v. Beyer, 953 F.2d 839 (3rd Cir. 1992). 3
Layton v. Quinn, 328 N.W.2d 95 (Ct. App. Mich. 1982).
14, 24, 31
Laza v. Reish, 84 F.3d 578 (2nd Cir. 1996). 32, 47
Lazano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1983). 30, 48
Lazoda v. Maggy, 900 F.Supp. 596 (N.D.N.Y. 1955). 1, 11
LCS Corrections Services, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 19
F.Supp.3d 712 (S.D.Tex. 2014). 2, 14, 24, 27, 29

TC-54
XXVI

Leach v. Dufrain, 103 F.Supp.2d 542 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 10,
18, 38
Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2173. 27, 29
Leacock v. DuBois, 937 F.Supp. 81 (D.Mass. 1996). 3, 11
Leacock v. DuBois, 974 F.Supp. 60 (D.Mass. 1997). 3, 11
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532 (3rd Cir. 2002). 34, 43
Leary v. Livingston County, 528 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2008).
14, 32
Leavitt v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 645 F.3d 484
(1st Cir. 2011). 29
LeBlanc v. Foti, 487 F.Supp. 272 (E.D. La. 1980). 46, 48
Lebron v. Armstrong, 289 F.Supp.2d 56 (D.Conn. 2003) 1,
28, 42
Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997). 1, 4, 29,
44
Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245 (6th Cir.
2011). 2
Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001).
25, 46
Lee v. Corrections Corp. of America, 525 F.Supp.2d 1238
(D.Hawai‘i 2007). 1, 2, 14
Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F.Supp.2d 615 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 11, 27
Lee v. Coughlin, 530 N.Y.S.2d 884 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1988).
11, 50
Lee v. Coughlin, 902 F.Supp. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 11
Lee v. Crouse, 284 F.Supp. 541 (D. Kan. 1967). 37, 39
Lee v. Dugger, 902 F.2d 822 2 (11th Cir. 1990). 20, 24, 43
Lee v. Frederick, 519 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 10,
29
Lee v. Johnson, 793 F.Supp.2d 798 (W.D.Va. 2011). 37
Lee v. Perez, 175 F.Supp.2d 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 25, 32,
41
Lee v. Sikes, 870 F.Supp. 1096 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 10, 50
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). 7, 8
Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2015). 1, 13, 14, 21,
30
Lee v. Young, 533 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2008). 9, 13, 29
Lee. v. Withrow, 76 F.Supp.2d 789 (E.D.Mich. 1999). 22,
36
Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1980). 1, 5
Leeks v. Cunningham, 997 F.2d 1330 (11th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 609. 27, 30
LeFrere v. Quezada, 588 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2009). 24
Leggett v. Badger, 759 F.2d 1556 (11th Cir. 1985). 4, 14,
27
Lehn v. Holmes, 364 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2004). 1, 8, 29
Leitzsey v. Coombe, 998 F.Supp. 282 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 19,
33, 35, 38, 41
Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602 (7th Cir. 2005). 3, 11
LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993). 9, 11
LeMaire v. Maass, 745 F.Supp. 623 (D. Or. 1990). 9, 10, 12
Lemieux v. Kerby, 931 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1991). 20, 36,
43
Lemire v. California Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 10, 14,
29, 30, 45
Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991). 28
Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1993). 1
Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1989). 11
Leon v. Harris, 489 F.Supp. 221 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 37
Leon v. Johnson, 96 F.Supp.2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2000). 29,
33
Leonard v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (1st Cir. 1979). 3, 14
Leonard v. Nix, 55 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 1995). 11, 19, 22, 28

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Leonard v. Norris, 797 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1986). 10, 11, 12
Leshore v. County of Worcester, 945 F.2d 471 (1st Cir.
1991). 14, 30, 32
Leslie v. Doyle, 125 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir. 1997). 10, 11
Leslie v. Doyle, 868 F.Supp. 1039 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 3, 12,
29
Leslie v. Holder, 865 F.Supp.2d 627 (M.D.Pa. 2012). 6, 22,
36
Letcher v. Turner, 968 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1992). 33, 41
Letterman v. Does, 789 F.3d 856 (8th Cir. 2015). 14, 15,
29, 30, 45
Leverette v. Bell, 247 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2001). 31, 41
Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008). 7, 29, 41
Levitan v. Ashcroft, 281 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 37, 38
Lewis Ex Rel. Lewis v. Gagne, 281 F.Supp.2d 429
(N.D.N.Y. 2003) 1, 26
Lewis v. Angelone, 926 F.Supp. 69 (W.D.Va. 1996). 29
Lewis v. Attorney General of U.S., 878 F.2d 714 (3rd Cir.
1989). 20, 22, 25, 43
Lewis v. Board of Sedgwick County Com'rs., 14, 27, 32,
46, 48
Lewis v. Casey, 516 U.S. 804 (1996). 1
Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dept., 554 F.Supp.2d 297
(N.D.N.Y. 2008). 5
Lewis v. City of West Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288
(11th Cir. 2009). 14, 32, 46, 48
Lewis v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 28 F.Supp.2d
1073 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 21, 27, 50
Lewis v. Cooper, 771 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985). 14, 29
Lewis v. Delaware County, 109 F.Supp.2d 406 (E.D.Pa.
2000). 31
Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 2009). 24, 48
Lewis v. Driskell, 850 F.Supp. 678 (M.D.Tenn. 1994). 22
Lewis v. Houston County Jail, 876 F.Supp. 861 (E.D. Tex.
1995). 16, 24
Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007). 7, 21, 50
Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766 (5th Cir. 2001). 29, 50
Lewis v. Mollette, 752 F.Supp.2d 233 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 14,
26, 48
Lewis v. Naku, 650 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D.Cal. 2009). 29
Lewis v. O'Grady, 853 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1988). 16
Lewis v. O'Leary, 631 F.Supp. 60 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 14, 27
Lewis v. Ollison, 571 F.Supp.2d 1162 (C.D.Cal. 2008). 23,
37, 38, 39
Lewis v. Parish of Terrobonne, 894 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1990). 8, 14, 27
Lewis v. Sheahan, 35 F.Supp.2d 633 (N.D.Ill. 1999). 2, 29
Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2013). 2, 37, 38,
39
Lewis v. Sullivan, 134 F.Supp.2d 954 (W.D.Wis. 2001). 1,
29
Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2002). 1
Lewis v. U.S., 702 F.Supp. 231 (E.D. Mo. 1988). 27
Lewis v. Washington, 265 F.Supp.2d 939 (N.D.Ill. 2003). 3,
34, 37, 39
Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F.Supp.3d 678 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 7,
11
Lewis v. Zon, 920 F.Supp.2d 379 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). 10, 18,
29, 37
Liebe v. Norton, 157 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1998). 2, 14, 25, 32,
45, 46
Liebson v. New Mexico Corrections Dept., 73 F.3d 274
(10th Cir. 1996). 14, 31
Lightfoot v. Walker, 486 F.Supp. 504 2 (S.D. Ill. 1980). 15,
18, 29, 40

TC-55
XXVI

Lightfoot v. Walker, 619 F.Supp. 1481 (D.C. Ill. 1985). 5,
23
Ligon v. Doherty, 208 F.Supp.2d 684 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 1,
21
Lile v. McKune, 24 F.Supp.2d 1152 (D.Kan. 1998). 7, 33,
34
Lile v. McKune, 299 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2002). 7, 34
Lile v. Simmons, 143 F.Supp.2d 1267 (D.Kan. 2001). 8
Lile v. Tippecanoe County Jail, 844 F.Supp. 1301 (N.D.
Ind. 1992). 14, 29, 32, 39, 45
Liles v. Camden County Dept. of Corrections, 225
F.Supp.2d 450 (D.N.J. 2002). 9, 14, 15, 23, 40
Lillard v. State, 274 S.E.2d 96 (Ct. App. Ga. 1980). 43
Limone v. U.S., 497 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.Mass. 2007). 13, 16,
27
Limone v. U.S., 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009). 16, 27
Lin Li Qu v. Central Falls Detention Facility Corp., 717
F.Supp.2d 233 (D.R.I. 2010). 27, 29, 47
Lindell v. Casperson, 360 F.Supp.2d 932 (W.D.Wis. 2005).
19, 21, 37, 38
Lindell v. Frank, 377 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2004). 19, 27, 28,
38
Lindell v. Houser, 442 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2006). 1, 7, 8
Lindell v. Litscher, 212 F.Supp.2d 936 (W.D.Wis. 2002). 1
Lindell v. Schneiter, 531 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W.D.Wis.
2008). 3, 9, 12, 21, 29
Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997). 22
Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851
(9th Cir. 1985). 1
Lindsay v. Dunleavy, 177 F.Supp.2d 398 (E.D.Pa. 2001).
29
Lineberry v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 923 F.Supp.2d 284
(D.D.C. 2013). 21, 27, 28
Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 1999). 7, 14, 27
Lingenfelter v. Bd. Of County Com’rs of Reno Cty., 359
F.Supp.2d 1163 (D.Kan. 2005). 16, 32
Link v. Luebbers, 830 F.Supp.2d 729 (E.D.Mo. 2011). 5, 7,
10, 27, 43
Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F.Supp.3d 215 (D. Mass. 2015). 3,
8, 20, 34, 43
Lipinski v. Skinner, 781 F.Supp. 131 (N.D.N.Y. 1991). 27,
33
Lipscombe v. Ridley, 780 F.Supp. 16 (D.D.C. 1991). 3, 47
Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). 1, 3
Liska v. Dart, 60 F.Supp.3d 889 (N.D. Ill. 2014). 16, 24, 32,
36
Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2010). 18, 21, 37
Little v. Lycoming County, 912 F.Supp. 809 (M.D.Pa.
1996). 7, 10, 29
Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y.
2014). 3, 8, 9, 12, 18, 27, 39, 40, 41
Little v. Norris, 787 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir. 1986). 1, 3, 11, 28,
37, 38
Little v. Shelby County, Tenn., 384 F.Supp.2d 1169
(W.D.Tenn. 2005). 8, 9, 10, 14, 27, 32, 42
Little v. Terhune, 200 F.Supp.2d 445 (D.N.J. 2002). 3, 7, 34
Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981). 11, 30
Littlejohn v. Moody, 381 F.Supp.2d 507 (E.D.Va. 2005). 9,
14, 24, 39, 50
Litz v. City of Allentown, 896 F.Supp. 1401 (E.D.Pa 1995).
14, 32
Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012). 1, 16, 32,
46
Lloyd v. City of New York, 43 F.Supp.3d 254 (S.D.N.Y.
2014). 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Lloyd v. Corrections Corp. of Amer., 855 F.Supp. 221
(W.D. Tenn. 1994). 1
Lloyd v. Lee, 570 F.Supp.2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 24, 29
Lloyd v. Suttle, 859 F.Supp. 1408 (D.Kan. 1994). 3
Locher v. Plageman, 765 F.Supp. 1260 (W.D. Va. 1991).
11, 22
Locicero v. O’Connell, 419 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). 2, 14, 27
Lock v. Jenkins, 464 F.Supp. 541 (N.D. Ind. 1978). 23
Lock v. Jenkins, 634 F.Supp. 615 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 5
Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). 15, 32, 48
Lockett v. Suardini, 526 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2008). 19, 29, 48
Loeber v. County Of Albany, 216 F.Supp.2d 20 (N.D.N.Y.
2002). 3, 32, 41
Logan v. Clarke, 119 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1997). 29
Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 942. 41
Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521 (1973). 14, 27, 45
Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2003) 29,
32, 48
Lomax v. McCaughtry, 731 F.Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1990),
affirmed, 949 F.2d 398. 3, 11
Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683 (8th Cir. 2002). 21, 37, 50
Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F.Supp.2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 1,
33, 49
Loney v. Scurr, 474 F.Supp. 1186 (S.D. Iowa 1979). 37
Long v. Beyer, 676 F.Supp. 75 (D. N.J. 1988). 1
Long v. Collins, 917 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1990). 35
Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
2006). 2, 14, 29, 46
Long v. Gaines, 173 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2001). 36
Long v. Katzenbach, 258 F.Supp. 89 (M.D. Penn. 1966). 37
Long v. Morris, 485 F.Supp.2d 1247 (D.Kan. 2007). 48
Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996). 29, 30
Long v. Nix, 877 F.Supp. 1358 (S.D. Iowa 1995). 8, 29
Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111 (6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 187. 41, 49
Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3rd Cir. 1968). 19, 37, 38, 39
Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1991). 1, 5
Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007). 7, 37, 38,
39
Longstreet v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 276 F.3d 379
(7th Cir. 2002). 31
Longstreth v. Maynard, 961 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 260. 37, 38
Longval v. Commissioner of Correction, 484 N.E.2d 112
(App. Ct. Mass. 1985). 2, 43, 50
Lopez Morales v. Otero de Ramos, 725 F.Supp. 106 (D.
Puerto Rico 1989), affirmed, 915 F.2d 1557. 14, 29
Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F.Supp.3d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 17,
19, 37
Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). 1,
9, 16, 32
Lopez v. Davis, 121 S.Ct. 714 (2001). 22, 24, 36
Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756 (10th Cir. 1999). 14, 29,
32, 45, 46
Lopez v. Reynolds, 998 F.Supp. 252 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 48
Lopez v. Smiley, 375 F.Supp.2d 19 (D.Conn. 2005). 1, 14,
21, 48
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000). 12, 29
Lopez v. Ward, 719 F.Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), affirmed,
898 F.2d 137. 29
Lopez v. Youngblood, 609 F.Supp.2d 1125 (E.D.Cal.
2009). 24, 32, 33, 41

TC-56
XXVI

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014).
6, 7, 32
Lopez-Valenzuela v. County of Maricopa, 719 F.3d 1054
(9th Cir. 2013). 6, 7, 16, 32, 44
Lorando v. Waldren, 629 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.D.C. 2009). 20,
22, 36
Loret v. Selsky, 595 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 11,
39
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Garcia, 741 F.3d 922
(9TH Cir. 2014). 34
Losee v. Maschner, 113 F.Supp.2d 1343 (S.D.Iowa 1998).
1, 4, 35
Losee v. Nix, 842 F.Supp. 1178 (S.D.Iowa 1994). 3, 20, 35
Lott v. Arroyo, 785 F.Supp. 508 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 34
Lott v. Selsky, 747 F.Supp. 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), affirmed,
932 F.2d 957. 11
Louis v. Department of Correctional Services of Nebraska,
437 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2006). 11, 20, 41
Loukas v. Hofbauer, 784 F.Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 3,
24
Love v. Ficano, 19 F.Supp.2d 754 (E.D.Mich. 1998). 6, 22,
32
Love v. McCown, 38 Fed.Appx. 355 (8th Cir. 2002). 18, 37
Love v. McKune, 33 Fed.Appx. 369 (10th Cir. 2002). 7, 8,
12, 34, 38, 42, 50
Love v. Reed, 216 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2000). 18, 37
Love v. Summit County, 776 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 814. 1, 32
Love v. Tippy, 133 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2006). 37
Lovett v. Seniff, 277 F.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Ind. 2003). 1
Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2006). 7, 50
Lowe v. City of St. Louis, 843 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1988).
14, 27
Lowrance v. Achtyl, 20 F.3d 529 (2nd Cir. 1994). 3, 11, 21
Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F.Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
3, 10, 19, 27, 29, 47
Lozeau v. Lake County, Mont., 98 F.Supp.2d 1157
(D.Mont. 2000). 5
Lucas v. Parish of Jefferson, 999 F.Supp. 839 (E.D.La.
1998). 16, 36, 42
Lucas v. Wasser, 425 F.Supp. 955 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). 7, 44
Luce v. Magnusson, 675 F.Supp. 681 (D. Me. 1987). 1
Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 1994). 1, 11, 41
Lucero v. Gunter, 52 F.3d 874 (10th Cir. 1995). 41
Lucero v. Hensley, 920 F.Supp. 1067 (C.D.Cal. 1996). 7, 37
Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass.
2013). 7, 14, 16, 24, 25, 27, 32
Luciano v. Galindo, 944 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1991). 48
Lucien v. Godinez, 814 F.Supp. 754 (N.D.Ill. 1993). 29
Lucien v. Peters, 840 F.Supp. 591 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 1
Luck v. D.C. Parole Bd., 996 F.2d 372 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 20,
36
Luck v. Rovenstine, 168 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 1999). 16, 27,
32
Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). 2,
5, 14, 29, 30, 32, 46
Luckes v. County of Hennepin, 415 F.3d 936 (8th Cir.
2005). 2, 16, 25, 32
Luckette v. Lewis, 883 F.Supp. 471 (D. Ariz. 1995). 37
Ludlam v. Coffee County, 993 F.Supp. 1421 (M.D.Ala.
1998). 17, 24, 32
Luedtke v. Bertrand, 32 F.Supp.2d 1074 (E.D.Wis. 1999).
1, 4

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Luedtke v. Gudmanson, 971 F.Supp. 1263 (E.D.Wis. 1997).
1, 34
Lugo v. Senkowski, 114 F.Supp.2d 111 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
29, 36
Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1995). 3
Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243
(E.D.Cal. 2010). 7, 14, 24, 25, 29, 32, 36
Lum v. Penarosa, 2 F.Supp.2d 1291 (D.Hawai'i 1998). 7,
22, 36
Lumbert v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257 (7th
Cir. 1987). 1
Lumley v. City of Dade City, Fla., 327 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.
2003). 27, 29, 32
Lumpkin v. Burns, 702 F.Supp. 242 (D. Nev. 1988). 33, 37
Luna v. Pico, 356 F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 2004). 11, 24
Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574 (7th Cir. 1994). 10, 48
Lunsford v. RBC Dain Rauscher, Inc., 590 F.Supp.2d 1153
(D.Minn. 2008). 1
Luong v. Hatt, 979 F.Supp. 481 (N.D.Tex. 1997). 14, 47
Lustgarden v. Gunter, 779 F.Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1991),
affirmed, 966 F.2d 552. 20, 22, 36
Lusz v. Scott, 126 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1997). 11
Luttrell v. Nickel, 129 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 1997). 14
Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F.Supp.2d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2007).
22
Lutz v. Smith, 180 F.Supp.2d 941 (N.D.Ohio 2001). 4, 25,
29, 32
Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d 1222 (D.N.M.
2010). 2, 8, 13, 21, 50
Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452 (11th Cir. 1984). 30
Lynch v. Hubbard, 47 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 1999). 36
Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2004). 1, 5, 19, 32
Lynn v. Lappin, 593 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.D.C. 2009). 2, 33
Lynn v. Maryland, 295 F.Supp.2d 594 (D.Md. 2003). 5, 27
Lynn v. O’Leary, 264 F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2003). 32, 41,
48, 49
Lynott v. Story, 929 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1991). 22, 36
Lynsky v. City of Boston, 761 F.Supp. 858 (D. Mass.
1990). 29
Lyons v. Cunningham, 583 F.Supp. 1147 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
14, 27
Lyons v. Holden-Selby, 729 F.Supp.2d 914 (E.D.Mich.
2010). 14
Lyons v. Papantoniou, 558 F.Supp. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). 9,
10, 47
Lyons v. Powell, 729 F.Supp. 1404 (D.N.H. 1990). 9, 27,
32
Lyons v. Powell, 838 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1988). 9, 15, 32
Lyons v. Trinity Services Group, Inc., 401 F.Supp.2d 1290
(S.D.Fla. 2005). 1, 21, 50
M.C.I. Concord Advisory Bd. v. Hall, 447 F.Supp. 398 (D.
Mass. 1978). 3, 8, 9, 10, 15, 29, 44
M.H. v. County of Alameda, 62 F.Supp.3d 1049 (N.D.Cal.
2014). 14, 25, 29, 32
M.H. v. County of Alameda, 90 F.Supp.3d 889 (E.D. Cal.
2013). 14, 27, 29, 48
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000). 22
Maberry v. McKune, 24 F.Supp.2d 1222 (D.Kan. 1998). 19,
35, 37, 38
Mabine v. Vaughn, 25 F.Supp.2d 587 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 8, 14
Mabry v. County of Kalamazoo, 626 F.Supp. 912 (W.D.
Mich. 1986). 16, 24
MacDonald v. Angelone, 69 F.Supp.2d 787 (E.D.Va. 1999).
33, 38
Mace v. Amestoy, 765 F.Supp. 847 (D. Vt. 1991). 34, 43

TC-57
XXVI

Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621 (5th Cir. 2003). 29,
32
MacFarlane v. Walter, 179 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 1999). 7, 8,
20, 22, 32, 43, 50
Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 2007). 1, 21
MacKay v. Farnsworth, 48 F.3d 491 (10th Cir. 1995). 10,
14
Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460 (6th Cir. 1997). 3, 8
Mackey v. United States, 79 F.Supp.3d 57 (D.D.C. 2015).
4, 35
Macklin v. Huffman, 976 F.Supp. 1090 (W.D.Mich. 1997).
31
MacLaird v. Werger, 723 F.Supp. 617 (D. Wyo. 1989). 5
Maclean v. Secor, 876 F.Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 11, 14,
24
MacLeod v. Kern, 424 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.Mass. 2006). 29
Madden v. City of Meriden, 602 F.Supp. 1160 (D. Conn.
1985). 27, 48
Madden v. Kemna, 739 F.Supp. 1358 (W.D. Mo. 1990). 8
Maddox v. Berge, 473 F.Supp.2d 888 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 3,
9, 10, 12, 15, 28
Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408 (9th Cir.
1986). 27, 48
Maddox v. Elzie, 238 F.3d 437 (D.C.Cir. 2001). 22, 36
Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011). 2, 37
Madera v. Goord, 103 F.Supp.2d 536 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). 11
Madewell v. Garmon, 484 F.Supp. 823 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
7, 27
Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203 (8th Cir. 1990). 10, 50
Madison County Jail Inmates v. Thompson, 773 F.2d 834
(7th Cir. 1985). 9, 27
Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1997). 11, 20, 36
Madison v. Riter, 355 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2003). 18, 37
Madison v. Riter, 411 F.Supp.2d 645 (W.D.Va. 2006). 18,
24, 37
Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118 (4th Cir. 2006). 24, 37
Madley v. U.S. Parole Com’n., 278 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir.
2002). 36
Madrid v. Gomez, 190 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 1999). 5
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D.Cal. 1995). 3, 8,
9, 14, 15, 29, 30, 39, 42, 46, 48
Madyun v. Franzen, 704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 493. 41
Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1987). 1
Maggard v. Florida Parole Comm'n., 616 F.2d 890 (5th Cir.
1980), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 960, reh'g. denied., 450
U.S. 960. 36
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997). 10, 29
Magill v. Lee County, 990 F.Supp. 1382 (M.D.Ala. 1998).
25, 32, 41
Magluta v. Samples, 375 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2004). 9, 11,
15, 32
Maguire v. Coughlin, 901 F.Supp. 101 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 1,
9, 10, 47, 48
Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980). 5, 7
Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 1996). 2, 35, 43
Mahers v. Harper, 12 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1993). 11, 24
Mahers v. Hedgepeth, 32 F.3d 1273 (8th Cir. 1994). 27, 41
Mahfouz v. Lockhart, 826 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1987). 34, 36,
50
Mahler v. Slattery, 489 F.Supp. 798 (E.D. Vir. 1980). 21,
28
Mahotep v. DeLuca, 3 F.Supp.2d 385 (W.D.N.Y 1998). 14,
21, 48
Maillett v. Phinney, 755 F.Supp. 463 (D. Me. 1991). 1

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Main Road v. Atych, 385 F.Supp. 105 (E.D. Penn. 1974).
32, 50
Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S.Ct. 2502 (1980). 5, 7
Majors v. Ridley-Turner, 277 F.Supp.2d 916 (N.D.Ind.
2003). 29
Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2015). 14, 27
Makin v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 183 F.3d 1205
(10th Cir. 1999). 27, 37
Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 2000). 11, 20, 22
Maldonado Santiago v. Velazquez Garcia, 821 F.2d 822
(1st Cir. 1987). 47
Maldonado v. Terhune, 28 F.Supp.2d 284 (D.N.J. 1998). 29
Malek v. Camp, 822 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1987). 11
Malek v. Haun, 26 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1994). 24, 36
Malerba v. Selsky, 872 F.Supp. 1136 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 11,
24
Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1994). 19, 28, 37
Malik v. Brown, 71 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 1995). 1, 19, 37
Malik v. District of Columbia, 512 F.Supp.2d 28 (D.D.C.
2007). 21, 47
Malik v. Mack, 15 F.Supp.2d 1047 (D.Kan. 1998). 3, 25, 48
Malles v. Lehigh County, 639 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D.Pa.
2009). 2, 9, 23, 29
Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986). 7, 16, 24, 46
Malloy v. Gray, 79 F.Supp.3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015). 36, 43
Malone v. Dept. of Corr., La. Training Inst., 468 So.2d 839
(La. App. 1 Cir. 1985). 2, 31
Malsh v. Austin, 901 F.Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 9, 29
Malsh v. Garcia, 971 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 1, 19,
28
Manarite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953 (1st Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 113. 14, 32, 46
Mandala v. Coughlin, 920 F.Supp. 342 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 29
Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783 (11th Cir. 1989). 27, 29
Maness v. District Court of Logan County-Northern Div.,
495 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2007). 1, 24
Mangiafico v. Blumenthal, 358 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.Conn.
2005). 31
Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999). 31
Manier v. Cook, 394 F.Supp.2d 1282 (E.D.Wash. 2005).
32, 48
Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 859 F.Supp. 302
(M.D. Tenn. 1994). 2, 27, 29
Manley v. Bronson, 657 F.Supp. 832 (D. Conn. 1987). 3,
10, 12
Manley v. Fordice, 945 F.Supp. 132 (S.D.Miss. 1996). 12,
19, 37
Mann ex rel. Terrazas v. Lopez, 404 F.Supp.2d 932
(W.D.Tex. 2005). 14, 17, 32, 45, 46
Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2013). 7, 10, 43
Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055 (10th Cir. 1995). 1, 5, 43,
49
Mann v. Reynolds, 828 F.Supp. 894 (W.D. Okl. 1993)
reversed 46 F.3d 1055. 1, 49
Mann v. Taser Intern., Inc., 588 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2009).
14, 17, 29, 32, 48
Manning v. Sweitzer, 891 F.Supp.2d 961 (N.D.Ill. 2012).
16, 17, 25, 29, 32, 46
Manso v. Federal Detention Center, 182 F.3d 814 (11th Cir.
1999). 22, 36
Maraglia v. Maloney, 499 F.Supp.2d 93 (D.Mass. 2007). 1,
21
Maraj v. Massachusetts, 836 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.Mass. 2011).
14, 24, 27, 39, 47, 48

TC-58
XXVI

Maraj v. Massachusetts, 953 F.Supp.2d 325 (D.Mass.
2013). 14, 29, 39, 48
Marange v. Fontenot, 879 F.Supp. 679 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 1
Marcelus v. Corrections Corp. of America/Correctional
Treatment Facility, 540 F.Supp.2d 231(D.D.C. 2008).
31
Marchant v. City of Little Rock, Ark., 557 F.Supp. 475
(E.D. Ark. 1983). 24, 27, 29
Marchese v. Lucas, 758 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1369. 27, 46, 48
Marcotte v. Monroe Corrections Complex, 394 F.Supp.2d
1289 (W.D.Wash. 2005). 29
Marcum v. McWhorter, 308 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2002). 31
Marcussen v. Brandstat, 836 F.Supp. 624 (N.D. Iowa 1993).
8, 14, 29, 38
Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2009). 14, 21
Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693 (7th Cir.
2009). 9, 11
Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084 (W.D.Wis. 2006).
1, 37, 47
Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1993). 37
Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992). 20, 22
Marlowe v. Fabian, 676 F.3d 743 (8th Cir, 2012). 13, 22, 36
Marquard v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 429 F.3d
1278 (11th Cir. 2005). 1, 22
Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2003). 14, 48
Marquez v. Quarterman, 652 F.Supp.2d 785 (E.D.Tex.
2009). 10, 18, 29
Marria v. Broaddus, 200 F.Supp.2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 1,
19, 37
Marricone v. U.S., 703 F.Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 25, 29
Marriott By and Through Marriott v. Smith, 931 F.2d 517
(8th Cir. 1991). 24, 41, 49
Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1
(N.D.N.Y. 2006.) 5, 25, 32, 41
Marsh v. Arn, 937 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1991). 14, 24
Marsh v. Barry, 705 F.Supp. 12 (D. D.C. 1988). 14
Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707 (5th Cir. 1995). 27
Marshall v. Fairman, 951 F.Supp. 128 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 11
Marshall v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 190
(D.D.C. 2007). 34
Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006). 1
Marshall v. Kozakiewicz, 601 F.Supp. 1549 (1985). 8
Marshall v. Reno, 915 F.Supp. 426 (D.D.C. 1996). 8, 36, 47
Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). 4, 7,
34, 35, 50
Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76 (7th Cir. 1987). 28
Martin v. Davies, 694 F.Supp. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 1
Martin v. Debruyn, 880 F.Supp. 610 (N.D. Ind. 1995). 4, 29
Martin v. Donaghue, 407 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D.Ind. 2006).
29
Martin v. Ezeagu, 816 F.Supp. 20 (D.D.C. 1993). 1, 27
Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Martin v. Hadix, 119 S.Ct. 1998 (1999). 1, 5
Martin v. Haggerty, 548 A.2d 371 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1988). 7, 19
Martin v. Harrison County Jail, 975 F.2d 192 (5th Cir.
1992). 14, 48
Martin v. Jones, 969 F.Supp. 1058 (M.D.Tenn. 1997). 1, 22
Martin v. Lord, 378 F.Supp.2d 184 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 1
Martin v. New York Dept. of Correctional Services, 224
F.Supp.3d 434 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 31
Martin v. Rison, 741 F.Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1990). 19, 38
Martin v. Shoults, 888 F.Supp. 1086 (D.Kan. 1995). 48
Martin v. Somerset County, 387 F.Supp.2d 65 (D.Me.
2005). 14, 29, 30, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Martin v. Swift, 781 F.Supp. 1250 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 17,
41
Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 714. 37, 38
Martinez Diaz v. Olsen, 110 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.N.J. 2000).
8
Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082 (10th Cir. 2009). 14, 24,
29, 32
Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir.
1998). 16, 27, 32
Martinez v. Espinas, 938 F.Supp. 650 (D.Hawai'i 1996). 1
Martinez v. Garden, 430 F.3d 1302 (10th Cir. 2005). 29
Martinez v. Griffin, 840 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1988). 1, 18
Martinez v. Hedrick, 36 Fed.Appx. 209 (7th Cir. 2002). 11,
22, 38
Martinez v. Johnson, 33 Fed.Appx. 395 (10th Cir. 2002). 47
Martinez v. Mathis, 970 F.Supp. 1047 (S.D.Ga. 1997). 14,
24, 32
Martinez v. Rosado, 614 F.2d 829 (2nd Cir. 1980). 48
Martinez v. State of California, 100 S.Ct. 553 (1980), reh'g.
denied, 100 S.Ct. 1285. 7, 36
Martinez v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 300 F.3d 567
(5th Cir. 2002). 31
Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1992),
cert.denied, 113 S.Ct. 1856. 50
Martinez v. U.S., 19 F.3d 97 (2nd Cir. 1994). 43
Martini v. Russell, 582 F.Supp. 136 (C.D. Ca. 1984). 27
Martino v. Miller, 318 F.Supp.2d 63 (W.D.N.Y. 2004). 29
Martinson v. Leason, 22 F.Supp.3d 952 (D.Minn. 2014). 10,
29
Martucci v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991). 1, 3, 28,
32, 39
Martyr v. Bachik, 755 F.Supp. 325 (D. Or. 1991). 28
Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 2007). 32,
48
Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2001). 1, 29
Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir.
1984). 6, 17, 32, 41
Mascetta v. Miranda, 957 F.Supp. 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
31
Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Or.
2010). 2, 26, 32, 39, 49
Mason v. Clark, 920 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1990). 35
Mason v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 559 F.3d 880
(8th Cir. 2009). 29, 34, 42
Mason v. Sargent, 898 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1990). 11
Mason v. Schriro, 45 F.Supp.2d 709 (W.D.Mo. 1999). 7, 8
Mason v. Village of Babylon, New York, 124 F.Supp.2d
807 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 17, 25, 32, 41
Masonoff v. Dubois, 336 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Mass. 2004). 9,
10, 23, 40
Masonoff v. DuBois, 899 F.Supp. 782 (D.Mass. 1995). 9,
10, 15, 23, 39, 40, 44
Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727 (7th Cir. 1999). 31
Massey v. Helman, 35 F.Supp.2d 1110 (C.D.Ill. 1999). 31
Massey v. U.S., 312 F.3d 272 (7th Cir. 2002). 29
Massey v. Wilson, 484 F.Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1980). 41
Mastroianni v. Reilly, 602 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
18, 29, 30
Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745 (10th Cir. 2005). 17, 29
Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002). 2, 4,
35, 43
Mathie v. Fries, 935 F.Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 7, 14,
27, 32, 48
Mathieu v. Chun, 828 F.Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 29

TC-59
XXVI

Mathis v. Bess, 763 F.Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 1
Mathis v. Fairman, 120 F.3d 88 (7th Cir. 1997). 14, 30, 32,
46
Mathis v. State, 531 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. 1988). 31
Mathison v. Moats, 812 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2016). 29
Matiyn v. Commissioner Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.Supp.
42 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 37
Matiyn v. Henderson, 841 F.2d 31 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2876. 24, 37, 47
Matos Ex Rel. Matos v. O’Sullivan, 335 F.3d 553 (7th Cir.
2003). 14, 29
Matrisciano v. Walker, 417 F.Supp.2d 1014 (C.D.Ill. 2006).
31
Matter of Plunkett, 788 P.2d 1090 (Wash. App. 1990). 11
Matter of Stowman, 491 A.2d 1275 (N.J. App. 1985). 31
Matthews v. Armitage, 36 F.Supp.2d 121 (N.D.N.Y. 1999).
14
Matthews v. Morales, 23 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1994). 19, 37
Matthews v. Peters, 818 F.Supp. 224 (N.D.Ill. 1993). 9, 23,
40
Matulin v. Village of Lodi, 862 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1988). 31
Matz v. Kelsch, 638 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1981). 36
Matzker v. Herr, 748 F.2d 1142 (7th Cir. 1984). 14, 29, 32
Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143 (7th Cir. 1994). 1, 5
Maul v. Constan, 928 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1991). 4, 29, 30
Maurello v. U.S., 111 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.N.J. 2000). 16, 24,
27
Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1999). 19, 32, 35,
38
Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014). 1, 32, 45, 48
Maxton v. Johnson, 488 F.Supp. 1030 (D. S.C. 1980). 3
Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361 (1981). 11, 23
Maxwell v. South Bend Work Release Center, 787
F.Supp.2d 819 (N.D.Ind. 2011). 7, 36, 50
May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 1997). 37, 38
May v. Baldwin, 895 F.Supp. 1398 (D.Or. 1995). 3, 7, 11,
12, 23, 37, 38, 39, 42
May v. Rich, 531 F.Supp.2d 998 (C.D.Ill. 2008). 1, 7, 11,
21, 27
May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2000). 1, 29, 32, 39
Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F.Supp. 833 (E.D. Penn. 1979). 1,
47
Mayberry v. Spicer, 808 F.Supp. 563 (E.D.Mich. 1992). 50
Mayberry v. Walters, 862 F.2d 1040 (3rd Cir. 1988),
affirmed, 884 F.2d 1382 and 884 F.2d 1384. 5, 14
Maydak v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 254 F.Supp.2d 23 (D.D.C.
2003). 2, 19, 33
Maydak v. U.S., 363 F.3d 512 (D.C.Cir. 2004). 2, 7, 19,
33, 35, 49
Mayers v. Anderson, 93 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D.Ind. 2000).
11, 20, 22
Mayfield v. Collins, 918 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1990). 1
Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599
(5th Cir. 2008). 1, 24, 37, 38, 39
Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. 1853 (1988). 43
Maynard v. Kear, 474 F.Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1979). 10,
29
Mayner v. Callahan, 873 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1989). 36
Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1989). 49
Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001). 8, 14, 32,
39
Mayorov v. United States, 84 F.Supp.3d 678 (N.D.Ill.
2015). 6, 7, 13, 16
Mays v. Mahoney, 23 F.3d 660 (2nd Cir. 1994). 11
Mays v. Rhodes, 255 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2001). 29, 50

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2009). 9, 18, 19,
21, 28, 38, 41
Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2013). 9, 18, 21,
28, 37, 39, 41
Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1992). 29
Mayweathers v. Terhune, 328 F.Supp.2d 1086 (E.D.Cal.
2004). 37, 38, 50
McAleese v. Owens, 770 F.Supp. 255 (M.D. Pa. 1991). 29
McAlister v. Robinson, 488 F.Supp. 545 (D. Conn. 1978).
3, 11
McAllister v. Zydel, 929 F.Supp. 102 (W.D.N.Y. 1996). 3
McAlphin v. Toney, 281 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 2002). 1, 29
McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1992). 27, 30
McBride v. Cahoone, 820 F.Supp.2d 623 (E.D.Pa. 2011).
24, 27, 36, 43
McBride v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 677 F.Supp. 537
(N.D. Ill. 1987). 9, 34
McBride v. Lopez, 791 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2015). 14, 21, 48
McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2015). 1, 14, 21,
48
McCabe v. Mais, 602 F.Supp.2d 1025 (N.D.Iowa 2008). 27,
41
McCabe v. Prison Health Services, 117 F.Supp.2d 443
(E.D.Pa. 1997). 2,
McCain v. Scott, 9 F.Supp.2d 1365 (N.D.Ga. 1998). 21, 47
McCall v. Board of Com’rs of County of Shawnee, KS, 291
F.Supp.2d 1216 (D.Kan. 2003) 31
McCall v. Crosthwait, 590 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Ala.
2008). 32, 48
McCall v. Pataki, 232 F.3d 321 (2nd Cir. 2000). 1, 7, 36
McCann v. Phillips, 864 F.Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 11,
27
McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008). 2, 31
McCarthy v. Armstrong, 2 F.Supp.2d 231 (D.Conn. 1998).
3, 8
McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S.Ct. 1081 (1992). 4, 21, 29
McCarty v. Woodson, 465 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1972). 1
McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740 (8th Cir. 2012). 25, 29
McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611(7th Cir. 2011).
7, 14, 36
McClaflin v. Pearce, 739 F.Supp. 537 (D. Or. 1990). 1, 37
McClaflin v. Pearce, 743 F.Supp. 1381 (D. Or. 1990). 37
McClain v. Northwest Comm. Corr. Ctr., 268 F.Supp.2d
941 (N.D.Ohio 2003). 2, 31
McClanahan v. City of Moberly, 35 F.Supp.2d 744
(E.D.Mo. 1998). 32, 48
McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F.Supp.2d 205 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
3, 27
McClary v. Kelly, 4 F.Supp.2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 3
McClendon v. City of Albuquerque, 79 F.3d 1014 (10th
Cir. 1996). 9, 15
McCloud v. Delaney, 677 F.Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 29
McClung v. Camp County, Tex., 627 F.Supp. 528 (E.D.
Tex. 1986). 9, 12, 23, 29, 39, 40
McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). 1, 2, 21,
34, 37, 49
McCollum v. California, 610 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D.Cal.
2009). 2, 31, 37
McConnell v. Selsky, 877 F.Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 11
McConney v. City of Houston, 863 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir.
1989). 6, 32, 36
McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1990). 8, 9
McCord v. Maggio, 927 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1991). 9, 15, 40
McCorkle v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1989). 37, 39

TC-60
XXVI

McCorkle v. Walker, 871 F.Supp. 555 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 10,
23, 29
McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059 (5th Cir. 1997). 29
McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788 F.Supp.
890 (E.D. Va. 1992). 44
McCoy v. Goord, 255 F.Supp.2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 13,
30
McCoy v. Nevada Department of Prisons, 776 F.Supp. 521
(D. Nev. 1991). 17
McCoy v. Webster, 47 F.3d 404 (11th Cir. 1995). 14, 24
McCray v. Burrell, 622 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 997, 449 U.S. 1003, 101 S.Ct. 537.
3, 30
McCray v. Dietz, 517 F.Supp. 787 (D. N.J. 1980). 36
McCray v. First State Medical System, 379 F.Supp.2d 635
(D.Del. 2005). 1, 29, 47
McCray v. State of Maryland, 456 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1972).
41
McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 859. 7, 8, 34
McCray v. Williams, 357 F.Supp.2d 774 (D.Del. 2005). 29
McCreary v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 2013). 24,
33, 37, 41
McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2011). 1, 3
McCuiston v. Wanicka, 483 So.2d 489 (Fla. App. 2 Dist.
1986). 1
McCullough v. Cady, 640 F.Supp. 1012 (E.D. Mich. 1986).
24, 48
McCullough v. Scully, 784 F.Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 1,
29
McCullough v. Wittner, 552 A.2d 881 (Md. 1989). 21
McCullum v. Tepe, 693 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2012). 24, 27,
29, 30
McCurry v. Moore, 242 F.Supp.2d 1167 (N.D.Fla. 2002).
13, 36, 46
McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir.
2010). 5, 27
McDaniel v. Rhodes, 512 F.Supp. 117 (S.D. Ohio 1981).
29, 36, 50
McDay v. City of Atlanta, 740 F.Supp. 852 (N.D. Ga.
1990), affirmed, 927 F.2d 614. 14, 32
McDiffett v. Stotts, 902 F.Supp. 1419 (D.Kan. 1995). 3, 11,
41, 49
McDonald v. Armontrout, 908 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1990). 9,
27
McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 U.S.
802 (1969). 19, 32
McDonald v. Doe, 650 F.Supp. 858 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). 24
McDonald v. Dunning, 760 F.Supp. 1156 (E.D. Va. 1991).
16
McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1979). 1
McDonald v. State of Illinois, 557 F.2d 596 2 (7th. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966. 1
McDonald v. State of KS, Dept. of Corrections, 880
F.Supp. 1416 (D.Kan. 1995). 2, 31
McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1998). 1
McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987). 31, 41
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2004). 2, 13,
29, 32, 39
McDowell v. Jones, 990 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1993). 7, 9
McDuffie v. Hopper, 982 F.Supp. 817 (M.D.Ala. 1997). 14,
27, 29, 30
McDuffie v. Rikers Island Medical Department, 668
F.Supp. 328 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 8, 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

McEachern v. Civiletti, 502 F.Supp. 532 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
29
McEachin v. Beard, 319 F.Supp.2d 510 (E.D.Pa. 2004). 35
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2nd Cir. 2004). 1,
11, 37
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999). 29
McElroy v. Lopac, 403 F.3d 855 (7th Cir. 2005). 19, 50
McElveen v. Prince William County, 725 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 88. 9, 15, 27
McElyea v. Babbit, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). 18, 37
McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012). 37, 38,
39
McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 2012). 7, 32, 50
McGavock v. City of Water Valley, Miss., 452 F.3d 423
(5th Cir. 2006). 31
McGhee v. Belisle, 501 F.Supp. 189 (E.D. La. 1980). 11,
20, 36
McGhee v. Clark, 166 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1999). 4, 35, 43
McGhee v. Foltz, 852 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1988). 14, 45
McGill v. Duckworth, 726 F.Supp. 1144 (N.D. Ind. 1989),
modified, 944 F.2d 344. 14
McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1265. 14
McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 233. 1, 4
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). 20, 36
McGlothlin v. Murray, 54 F.Supp.2d 629 (W.D.Va. 1999).
1, 5
McGoldrick V. Farrington, 462 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Me.
2006). 3, 9, 10
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). 1,
2, 4, 35
McGoue v. Janecka, 211 F.Supp.2d 627 (E.D.Pa. 2002). 20,
34, 50
McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2010). 29
McGowan v. U.S., 94 F.Supp.3d 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 16,
19, 27, 36
McGregor v. City of Olathe, KS, 158 F.Supp.2d 1225
(D.Kan. 2001). 32
McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158
(5th Cir. 1995). 36, 43
McGruder v. Phelps, 608 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1979). 8
McGuinness v. Dubois, 75 F.3d 794 (1st Cir. 1996). 3, 11
McGuinness v. Dubois, 891 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass. 1995). 3,
11, 34, 46
McGuire v. Strange, 83 F.Supp.3d 1231 (M.D.Ala. 2015).
7, 13, 29
McHenry v. Chadwick, 896 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1990). 14, 27
McIllwain v. Weaver, 686 F.Supp.2d 894 (E.D.Ark. 2010).
25, 33, 41
McIlwain v. Prince William Hosp., 774 F.Supp. 986 (E.D.
Va. 1991). 29
McKeever v. Israel, 476 F.Supp. 1370 (E.D. Wisc. 1979).
35
McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432 (2nd Cir. 2004). 29
McKenzie v. Crotty, 738 F.Supp. 1287 (D. S.D. 1990). 27
McKenzie v. O’Gara, 289 F.Supp.2d 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
49
McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320 (7th Cir. 1984). 27, 41
McKinney v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1992),
affirmed, 113 S.Ct. 2475. 9, 10, 29
McKinney v. Compton, 888 F.Supp. 75 (W.D.Tenn. 1995).
29, 48
McKinney v. Debord, 507 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1974). 19, 28

TC-61
XXVI

McKinney v. Hanks, 911 F.Supp. 359 (N.D.Ind. 1995). 11,
22
McKinney v. Maynard, 952 F.2d 350 (10th Cir. 1991). 37,
38
McKinney v. U.S., 950 F.Supp.2d 923 (N.D.Tex. 2013). 14,
24, 27, 29, 47
McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002). 7, 34
McLaurin v. Cole, 115 F.3d 408 (6th Cir. 1997). 11, 21
McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 1995). 48
McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 368 F.Supp.2d
289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 6, 32
McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982 (8th Cir. 1994). 48
McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999). 22, 34,
43
McMaster v. Pung, 984 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1993), affirmed,
984 F.2d 950. 1, 11, 28
McMaster v. State of Minn., 30 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 1994). 50
McMaster v. State of Minn., 819 F.Supp. 1429 (D.Minn.
1993), affirmed, 30 F.3d 976. 50
McMath v. Alexander, 486 F.Supp. 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
1
McMillan v. Healey, 739 F.Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 11,
24
McMorrow v. Little, 109 F.3d 432 (8th Cir. 1997). 7, 36
McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008). 1, 10
McNally v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 28 F.Supp.2d
671(D.Me. 1998). 7, 25, 29, 32
McNeal v. Owens, 769 F.Supp. 270 (W.D. Tenn. 1991). 48
McNeal v. U.S., 979 F.Supp. 431 (N.D.W.Va. 1997). 29
McNeil v. Ellerd, 823 F.Supp. 627 (E.D.Wis. 1993),
affirmed, 991 F.2d 795. 9, 40
McNeil v. Lane, 16 F.3d 123 (7th Cir. 1994). 9, 15
McNeil v. Redman, 21 F.Supp.2d 884 (C.D.Ill. 1998). 7, 29
McNeill v. Allen, 106 F.Supp.3d 711 (W.D. N.C. 2015). 27,
29, 32
McPherson v. Coombe, 29 F.Supp.2d 141 (W.D.N.Y.
1998). 8, 9, 10, 29
McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999). 11,
22
McPherson v. McBride, 943 F.Supp. 971 (N.D.Ind. 1996).
11, 22
McQueen v. Williams, 587 So.2d 918 (Miss. 1991). 14, 23,
24, 39
McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002). 22, 36
McQuillion v. McKenzie, 35 Fed.Appx. 547 (9th Cir. 2002).
19
McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009). 24, 29,
32
McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986). 41, 48
McRoy v. Cook County Dept. of Corrections, 366
F.Supp.2d 662 (N.D.Ill. 2005). 8, 37, 39, 41
McRoy v. Sheahan, 383 F.Supp.2d 1010 (N.D.Ill. 2005).
29, 32
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), reh'g. denied, 429
U.S. 873. 7, 8, 47
Mead v. Palmer, 794 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2015). 7, 29
Meade v. Plummer, 344 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D.Mich. 2004).
27
Meadors v. Ulster County, 984 F.Supp.2d 83 (N.D.N.Y.
2013). 2, 31
Meadows v. Gibson, 855 F.Supp. 223 (W.D. Tenn. 1994).
10, 21
Meadows v. Hopkins, 713 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1983). 28
Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776 (W.D.Pa. 2013). 7, 8,
10, 29, 38

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Medical Development Intern. v. California Dept. of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, 585 F.3d 1211 (9th
Cir. 2009). 2, 27, 29
Medina v. Clark, 791 F.Supp. 194 (W.D.Tenn. 1992),
affirmed, 978 F.2d 1259. 22, 43
Meek v. Orton, 773 F.Supp. 172 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 4, 29
Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1996). 11, 20, 22
Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014).
1, 8, 21, 30, 33, 34, 41
Meis v. Grammer, 411 N.W.2d 355 (Neb. 1987). 35, 50
Meis v. Gunter, 906 F.2d 364 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S.Ct. 682. 11, 34
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Ariz. 2013). 7,
16
Mellette v. Lowe, 881 F.Supp. 499 (D.Kan. 1995). 22, 36
Meloy v. Bachmeier, 302 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2002). 13, 29
Melvin v. Nickolopoulos, 864 F.2d 301 (3rd Cir. 1988). 22,
36
Melvin v. U.S., 963 F.Supp. 1052 (D.Kan. 1997). 27, 35
Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 106 S.Ct.
2537 (1986). 27
Mendez v. Superior Court (Perry), 253 Cal. Rptr. 731
(Cal.App. 5 Dist. 1988). 2, 31
Mendez-Suarez v. Veles, 698 F.Supp. 905 (N.D. Ga. 1988).
5, 19
Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1992), cert,
denied, 113 S.Ct. 102. 11, 49
Menocal v. GEO Group, Inc., 113 F.Supp.3d 1125 (D.
Colo. 2015). 27, 32, 50
Mercer v. Griffin, 30 CrL 2253 (1981). 9, 27
Merideth v. Grogan, 812 F.Supp. 1223 (N.D.Ga. 1992),
affirmed, 985 F.2d 579. 14, 29
Merit v. Lynn, 848 F.Supp. 1266 (W.D. La. 1994). 36, 50
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 311. 10, 17, 29
Merneigh v. Lane, 409 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. App. 1980). 1
Merritt v. Broglin, 891 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1989). 36
Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 434. 1
Merritt v. Reed, 120 F.3d 124 (8th Cir. 1997). 31
Merritt-Bey v. Salts, 747 F.Supp. 536 (E.D. Mo. 1990),
affirmed, 938 F.2d 187. 3, 7, 33, 41
Merriweather v. Sherwood, 235 F.Supp.2d 339 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). 1, 27, 30, 37
Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2009). 1, 2,
13, 27, 28
Merrriweather v. Marion County Sheriff, 368 F.Supp.2d
875 (S.D.Ind. 2005). 14, 26, 32
Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2009). 1, 4, 7
Messere v. Fair, 752 F.Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1990). 1
Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F.Supp. 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 18,
25, 29, 32, 37
Metcalf v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 530 F.Supp.2d 131
(D.D.C. 2008). 1
Metheney v. Anderson, 953 F.Supp. 854 (N.D.Ohio 1996).
29, 37
Metheny v. Hammonds, 216 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2000). 36,
43
Metro. Dade County v. P.L. Dodge Foundations, 509 So.2d
1170 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 1987). 4, 29
Meuir v. Greene County Jail Employees, 487 F.3D 1115
(8th Cir. 2007). 29, 32
Meyer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 940 F.Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1996). 8, 19, 33

TC-62
XXVI

Meyer v. Nava, 518 F.Supp.2d 1279 (D.Kan. 2007). 2, 14,
17
Meyer v. Reno, 911 F.Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1996). 8
Meyer v. Teslik, 411 F.Supp.2d 983 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 24,
37, 38
Meza v. Livingston, 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). 24, 34, 36
Michael v. Ghee, 411 F.Supp.2d 813 (N.D.Ohio 2006). 36,
43, 44
Michael v. Ghee, 498 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007). 36, 43
Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725 (4th Cir.
2006). 1, 7, 13
Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 458 N.E.2d 702
(Mass. 1983). 9, 23, 40
Michtavi v. New York Daily News, 587 F.3d 551 (2nd Cir.
2009). 19
Mickens v. Winston, 462 F.Supp. 910 (E.D. Vir. 1978). 8
Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 355 F.3d 294 (3rd Cir. 2004).
36, 43
Mikeska v. Collins, 900 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1990). 1, 3, 11,
50
Milburn v. McNiff, 36 CrL 2441 (NY Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1985). 19
Miles v. Angelone, 483 F.Supp.2d 491 (E.D.Va. 2007). 1,
22
Miles v. Bell, 621 F.Supp. 51 (D.C. Conn. 1985). 9, 12, 15,
18, 23, 29, 32, 33, 39, 40, 44
Miles v. Konvalenka, 791 F.Supp. 212 (N.D.Ill. 1992). 3,
18, 40
Milledge v. McCall, 43 Fed.Appx. 196 (10th Cir. 2002)
[unpublished]. 27, 33
Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir.
2000). 7
Miller v. Beard, 699 F.Supp.2d 697 (E.D.Pa. 2010). 29, 30
Miller v. Benson, 51 F.3d 166 (8th Cir. 1995). 50
Miller v. Calhoun County, 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005). 29,
32, 46
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), reh'g. denied, 414
U.S. 881. 19
Miller v. Campanella, 794 F.3d 878 (7th Cir. 2015). 29
Miller v. Campbell, 108 F.Supp.2d 960 (W.D.Tenn. 2000).
1, 4, 50
Miller v. Campbell, 804 F.Supp. 159 (D.Kan. 1992). 9, 39
Miller v. Carson, 392 F.Supp. 515 (M.D. Fla. 1975). 26
Miller v. Carson, 401 F.Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975). 4, 5, 9,
10, 27, 32, 34
Miller v. Carson, 550 F.Supp. 543 (M.D. Fla. 1982). 4, 15,
27
Miller v. Carson, 628 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1980). 5
Miller v. Corrections Corp. of America, 375 F.Supp.2d 889
(D.Alaska 2005). 29
Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011). 7, 11
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2008). 1
Miller v. Duckworth, 963 F.2d 1002 (7th Cir. 1992). 11, 22
Miller v. Fairman, 872 F.Supp. 498 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 9, 14,
48
Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562 (10th Cir. 1991). 48
Miller v. Harbaugh, 698 F.3d 956 (7th Cir. 2012). 15, 24,
26, 29, 30, 47
Miller v. Johnson, 541 F.Supp.2d 799 (E.D.Va. 2008). 24,
29
Miller v. Kennebec County, 219 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000). 16,
17, 32, 41
Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2004). 7, 9, 15, 29,
39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Miller v. Leathers, 885 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1018. 48
Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1018. 48
Miller v. McBride, 259 F.Supp.2d 738 (N.D.Ind. 2001). 3, 8
Miller v. McBride, 64 Fed.Appx. 558 (7th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 14, 45
Miller v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 986 F.Supp. 1078
(W.D.Mich. 1997). 23, 29
Miller v. Neathery, 52 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1995). 14
Miller v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 296 F.3d 18
(1st Cir. 2002). 31
Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d
616 (3rd Cir. 1998). 22
Miller v. PrimeCare Medical AS, 89 F.Supp.2d 779
(N.D.W.Va. 2000). 29
Miller v. Selsky, 111 F.3d 7 (2nd Cir. 1997). 11, 20
Miller v. Shelby County, 93 F.Supp.2d 892 (W.D.Tenn.
2000). 3, 8, 12, 14, 27, 39
Miller v. Thornburgh, 755 F.Supp. 980 (D. Kan. 1991). 22,
47
Miller v. U.S., 964 F.Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1997). 43
Miller v. Washington County, 650 F.Supp.2d 1113 (D.Or.
2009). 27, 39, 41, 47
Miller v. Whitehead, 527 F.3d 752 (8th Cir. 2008). 22, 34
Miller v. Yamhill County, 620 F.Supp.2d 1241 (D.Or.
2009). 25, 32, 41
Milligan v. Archuleta, 659 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2011). 8, 21,
39, 50
Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2004).
17, 32, 33, 41
Mills v. Holmes, 95 F.Supp.3d 924 (E.D. Va. 2015). 20, 22
Mills v. Maryland, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988). 43
Mills v. Meadows, 1 F.Supp.2d 548 (D.Md. 1998). 31
Mills v. Oliver, 367 F.Supp. 77 (D. Vir. 1973). 29
Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1990). 10, 29
Milton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 596 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C.
2009). 2, 19
Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Clarke, 513 F.Supp.2d
1014 (E.D.Wisc. 2007). 2, 31
Mims v. Shapp, 399 F.Supp. 818 (W.D. Penn. 1975). 1
Mingo v. Patterson, 455 F.Supp. 1358 (D. Colo. 1978). 1,
47
Minigan v. Irvin, 977 F.Supp. 607 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 28
Miniken v. Walter, 978 F.Supp. 1356 (E.D.Wash. 1997).
19, 28
Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). 1,
19, 21, 38, 39
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reh'g. denied, 385
U.S. 890. 1
Miranda v. Munoz, 770 F.2d 255 (1st Cir. 1985). 29
Miranda v. Utah, 629 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D.Utah 2009). 5
Mirmehdi v. U.S., 689 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2012). 7, 27
Missouri v. Jenkins By Agyei, 109 S.Ct. 2463 (1989). 5
Mistretta v. Prokesch, 5 F.Supp.2d 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
16, 32
Mistretta v. Volusia County Dept. of Corrections, 61
F.Supp.2d 1255 (M.D.Fla. 1999). 31
Mitchell v. Angelone, 82 F.Supp.2d 485 (E.D.Va. 1999). 7,
37, 38
Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d
1309 (11th Cir. 2002). 1, 27
Mitchell v. Dixon, 862 F.Supp. 95 (E.D.N.C. 1994). 1, 49
Mitchell v. Dodrill, 696 F.Supp.2d 454 (M.D.Pa. 2010). 9,
15, 40, 42

TC-63
XXVI

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1995). 1, 11, 27,
41
Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). 1, 7
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523 (3rd Cir. 2003). 1, 11, 21
Mitchell v. Keane, 974 F.Supp. 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 27,
45, 48
Mitchell v. Kirk, 20 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 1994). 24, 35
Mitchell v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 190
F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2002). 7, 13, 20, 34, 50
Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d 1433 (10th Cir. 1996). 9, 14,
48
Mitchell v. Newryder, 245 F.Supp.2d 200 (D.Me. 2003).
23, 32, 40
Mitchell v. Rappahannock Regional Jail Authority, 703
F.Supp.2d 549 (E.D.Va. 2010). 14, 17, 27, 45
Mitchell v. Shomig, 969 F.Supp. 487 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 1, 10
Mitchell v. Thompson, 18 F.3d 425 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 191. 24, 31
Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). 27
Mitchell v. Untreiner, 421 F.Supp. 886 (N.D. Fla. 1976). 1,
8, 15, 18, 23, 25, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35, 37, 40
Mitts v. Zickefoose, 869 F.Supp.2d 568 (D.N.J. 2012). 11,
20, 22
Mladek v. Day, 293 F.Supp.2d 1297 (M.D.Ga. 2003). 14,
29, 32, 48
Mobile Co. Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 551 F.Supp. 92 (S.D.
Ala. 1982), affirmed, 703 F.2d 580. 4, 9, 15
Moeller v. Bradford County, 444 F.Supp.2d 316 (M.D.Pa.
2006). 13, 34, 37
Moenius v. Stevens, 688 F.Supp. 1054 (D. Maryland,
1988). 8, 25, 32
Moffat v. Broyles, 288 F.3d 978 (7th Cir. 2002). 11, 20
Mohamed v. Tattum, 380 F.Supp.2d 1214 (D.Kan. 2005).
14, 24
Molano v. Bezio, 42 F.Supp.3d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). 11
Molesky v. Walter, 931 F.Supp. 1506 (E.D. Wash. 1996). 1,
30, 33
Molina v. New York, 697 F.Supp.2d 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
26, 29, 32, 48
Molinelli v. Tucker, 901 F.2d 13 (2nd Cir. 1990). 24, 31
Mombourquette v. Amundson, 469 F.Supp.2d 624
(W.D.Wis. 2007), 14, 17, 29, 32
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Ser. of the City of New York, 98
S.Ct. 2018 (1978). 7, 27
Monie v. State Personnel Bd., 424 N.W.2d 874 (Neb.
1988). 31
Monk v. Williams, 516 F.Supp.2d 343 (D.Del. 2007). 34,
37
Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 595
F.Supp. 1417 (D. N.J. 1984). 8, 9, 15, 29
Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 643
F.Supp. 1217 (U.S.D.C. N.J. 1986), cert. denied, 108
S.Ct. 1731. 4, 29
Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 717
F.Supp. 268 (D. N.J. 1989). 15
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2008). 1, 35
Monroe v. Bombard, 422 F.Supp 211 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). 37
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 7, 27
Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). 2,
18, 21, 29, 42
Montalvo v. Snyder, 207 F.Supp.2d 581 (E.D.Ky. 2002).
Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections,
773 F.3d 472 (3rd Cir. 2014). 1, 4, 35

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2010). 2, 24,
36
Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548 (9th Cir.
1998). 4, 22, 35, 43, 50
Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976). 1, 7, 47
Montcalm Pub. Corp. v Beck, 80 F.3d 105 (4th Cir. 1996).
19, 28
Montcalm Pub. Corp. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 199
F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1999). 5
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757 (2nd Cir. 1999). 24, 36
Montez Estate of Hearlson v. U.S., 359 F.3d 392 (6th Cir.
2004). 14, 24, 27
Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862 (10th Cir. 2000). 22, 47
Montez v. Romer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Colo. 1999). 7, 27
Montgomery v. Anderson, 262 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2001). 11,
20, 22
Montgomery v. Brookshire, 880 F.Supp. 483 (W.D. Tex.
1995). 31
Montgomery v. Kelly, 526 N.Y.S.2d 274 (A.D. 1988). 38
Montgomery v. Kelly, 661 F.Supp. 1051 (W.D. N.Y. 1987).
19, 37, 38
Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492 (3rd Cir. 2002). 1, 29
Montoya v. Board of County Com'rs, 506 F.Supp.2d 434
(D.Colo. 2007). 3, 19, 47, 48
Montoya v. Newman, 115 F.Supp.3d 1263 (D. Colo. 2015).
29, 32, 40
Moody v. Baker, 857 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 40. 1, 50
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 (1976). 36
Moody v. Kearney, 380 F.Supp.2d 393 (D.Del. 2005). 9,
10, 15, 29
Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1989). 1, 11
Moody v. Proctor, 986 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1993). 29, 39
Moody v. Rodriguez, 164 F.3d 893 (5th Cir. 1999). 7, 43
Moomey v. City of Holland, 490 F.Supp. 188 (W.D. Mich.
1980). 14, 27
Moonblatt v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp.2d 15
(D.D.C. 2008). 7, 13, 27
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 87 (1935). 22
Moore ex rel. Estate of Grady v. Tuelja, 546 F.3d 423 (7th
Cir. 2008). 14, 29, 32, 48
Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717 (4th Cir. 2008). 21
Moore v. Branson, 755 F.Supp. 268 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
affirmed, 950 F.2d 728. 28
Moore v. Carwell, 168 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 1999). 1, 37, 41
Moore v. Chavez, 36 Fed.Appx. 169 (6th Cir. 2002). 23, 42,
50
Moore v. Ciccone, 459 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1972). 28, 30
Moore v. Clarke, 821 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1987). 7, 19
Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), reh'g.
denied, 412 U.S. 963. 7, 24
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 22
Moore v. Dowd, 731 F.Supp. 921 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 3
Moore v. Gardner, 199 F.Supp.2d 17 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 1,
9, 10, 15, 38
Moore v. Hofbauer, 144 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.Mich. 2001).
20, 22, 36
Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697 (6th Cir. 1993). 39, 48
Moore v. Hosier, 43 F.Supp.2d 978 (N.D.Ind. 1998). 2, 14,
32, 46, 48
Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 1997). 29
Moore v. Janing, 427 F.Supp. 567 (D. Neb. 1976). 1, 8, 15,
18, 27, 32, 34
Moore v. Lehman, 940 F.Supp. 704 (M.D.Pa. 1996). 1, 17,
49

TC-64
XXVI

Moore v. Mabus, 976 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1992). 3, 8
Moore v. Morales, 445 F.Supp.2d 1000 (N.D.Ill. 2006). 14,
32, 48
Moore v. Morgan, 922 F.2d 1553 (11th Cir. 1991). 9, 27
Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1998). 32, 48
Moore v. Peters, 92 F.Supp.3d 109 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). 11,
36
Moore v. Plaster, 313 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 2002). 1
Moore v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 24 F.Supp.2d 1164
(D.Kan. 1998). 29
Moore v. Schuetzle, 354 F.Supp.2d 1065 (D.N.D. 2005). 1,
28
Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F.Supp.2d 969 (D.N.D. 2007). 1,
3, 12
Moore v. Selsky, 900 F.Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 11
Moore v. Smith, 18 F.Supp.2d 1360 (N.D.Ga. 1998). 14,
21, 22
Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3rd Cir. 1993). 36, 43
Moore v. Thomas, 653 F.Supp.2d 984 (N.D.Cal. 2009). 29,
48
Moore v. Vega, 371 F.3d 110 (2nd Cir. 2004). 36, 41
Moore v. Winebrenner, 927 F.2d 1312 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 116 LE2d 69. 14
Moorehead v. Keller, 845 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.N.C. 2012).
2, 28, 37, 38
Mooreman v. Sargent, 991 F.2d 472 (8th Cir. 1993). 14
Mooring v. San Francisco Sheriff’s Dept., 289 F.Supp.2d
1110 (N.D.Cal. 2003) 8, 14, 32
Moorman v. Thalacker, 83 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 1996). 11, 24,
47
Moots v. Lombardi, 453 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2006). 8, 11,
29, 30
Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F.Supp. 627
(D. P.R. 1987). 9, 10, 15, 27
Morales Feliciano v. Hernandez Colon, 704 F.Supp. 16 (D.
Puerto Rico 1988). 1
Morales Feliciano v. Romero Bercelo, 672 F.Supp. 591 (D.
P.R. 1986). 9, 32, 34, 39, 42, 50
Morales Feliciano v. Rossello Gonzalez, 13 F.Supp.2d 151
(D.Puerto Rico 1998). 2, 8, 15, 18, 25, 27, 29, 30, 44
Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 378 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). 2,
27, 29, 30
Morales v. GEO Group, Inc., 824 F.Supp.2d 836 (S.D.Ind.
2010). 2, 31
Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006). 10
Morales v. Mackalm, 278 F.3d 126 (2nd Cir. 2002). 7, 21,
29
Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D.Cal. 2006). 7, 8
Morales v. U.S., 72 F.Supp.3d 826 (W.D.Tenn. 2014). 12,
14, 27, 45
Morales-Feliciano v. Parole Bd. of Com. of P.R., 887 F.2d
1 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 1511. 15, 27
Morales-Fernandez v. I.N.S., 418 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir.
2005). 22
Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010). 2, 22,
34
Moran v. Farrier, 924 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1991). 11
Moran v. United States, 18 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 1994). 1
More v. Farrier, 984 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 74. 7, 9, 12
Moreland v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 431 F.3d 180 (5th
Cir. 2005). 20, 22
Moreland v. Miami-Dade County, 255 F.Supp.2d 1304
(S.D.Fla. 2002). 2, 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Moreland v. U.S., 932 F.2d 690 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 675. 22, 43
Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344 (2nd Cir. 1987). 1, 35
Moreno v. Buss, 523 F.Supp.2d 878 (N.D.Ind. 2007). 11,
20, 22
Moreno v. State of California, 25 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Cal.
1998). 36
Morgan v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 967 F.Supp. 1184
(D.Ariz. 1997). 1, 21
Morgan v. Arizona Dept. of Corrections, 976 F.Supp. 892
(D.Ariz. 1997). 14, 21
Morgan v. Dept. of Offender Rehab., 305 S.E.2d 130 (Ga.
App. 1983). 31
Morgan v. District of Columbia, 647 F.Supp. 694 (D. D.C.
1986). 11, 49
Morgan v. MacDonald, 41 F.3d 1291 (9th Cir. 1994). 50
Morgan v. Maricopa County, 259 F.Supp.2d 985 (D.Ariz.
2003). 1, 13
Morgan v. NV Bd. of State Prison Commissioners, 615
F.Supp. 882 (D.C. Nev. 1985). 5
Morgan v. Quarterman, 570 F.3d 663 (5th Cir. 2009). 11,
20, 22
Morgan v. Ward, 699 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). 11,
41
Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa.
2014). 2, 10, 14, 17, 27, 29, 47
Morin v. Department of Corrections, 727 F.Supp. 699 (D.
Me. 1990). 29, 50
Morissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 1995). 9, 10,
11, 27
Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 27
(D.D.C. 2013). 2, 31
Morris v. City of Alvin, Tex., 950 F. Supp. 804 (S.D.Tex.
1997). 14, 29, 32
Morris v. Corrections Corporation of America, 75
F.Supp.3d 457 (D.D.C. 2014). 9, 10, 13, 14, 15
Morris v. Crawford County, 299 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2002).
2, 14, 27, 31, 32
Morris v. Crawford County, Ark., 173 F.Supp.2d 870
(W.D.Ark. 2001). 32, 48
Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex.
2013). 2, 14, 15, 29, 32, 46
Morris v. Eversley, 282 F.Supp.2d 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 13,
14, 17
Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). 2, 4, 24,
29, 35, 44
Morris v. McCotter, 773 F.Supp. 969 (E.D. Tex. 1991). 36
Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682 (5th Cir. 2006). 21, 47, 50
Morris v. Travisono, 499 F.Supp. 149 (D. R.I. 1980). 8, 9
Morrison v. Cortright, 397 F.Supp.2d 424 (W.D.N.Y.
2005). 7, 41
Morrison v. Davis, 195 F.Supp.2d 1019 (S.D.Ohio 2001). 5
Morrison v. Davis, 88 F.Supp.2d 799 (S.D.Ohio 2000). 5,
27
Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 2001). 7, 37,
38
Morrison v. Hartman, 898 F.Supp.2d 577 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).
7, 14, 48
Morrison v. Martin, 755 F.Supp. 683 (E.D.N.C. 1990). 9,
30
Morrison v. Parmele, 892 F.Supp.2d 485 (W.D.N.Y. 2012).
14, 21
Morrow v. Harwell, 640 F.Supp. 225 (W.D. Tex. 1986). 1
Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1985). 1, 19

TC-65
XXVI

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821
F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). 6, 16, 25, 27, 46
Morstad v. Dept. of Corrections & Rehab., 147 F.3d 741
(8th Cir. 1998). 14, 34
Morton v. Bolyard, 810 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2011). 20,
21, 24, 34, 50
Mosby v. Cavey, 686 F.Supp.2d 868 (W.D.Wis. 2010). 29,
32
Mosby v. Mabry, 697 F.2d 213 (8th Cir. 1982). 14, 27, 28,
37
Moser v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 406 F.3d 895 (7th
Cir. 2005). 31
Moses v. Dennehy, 523 F.Supp.2d 57 (D.Mass. 2007). 19,
38, 39
Moses v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 951
F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y.2013). 2, 14, 29, 30, 48
Mosher v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 2009). 2, 14, 32,
45, 49
Mosholder v. Barnhardt, 679 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2012). 31
Mosier v. Maynard, 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 260. 37
Mosier v. Robinson, 722 F.Supp. 555 (W.D. Ark. 1989). 14,
27, 32
Moss v. Apker, 376 F.Supp.2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 2, 22,
43
Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d 686 (4th Cir. 1989). 20, 22
Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2011). 11, 19, 21
Moulton v. DeSue, 966 F.Supp.2d 1298 (M.D.Fla. 2012).
14, 17, 24, 27, 29, 32
Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d
781 (5th Cir. 2012). 2, 4, 18, 21, 35, 37, 39, 44
Mowrey v. Romero, 749 F.Supp. 1097 (M.D. Fla. 1990),
reversed, 963 F.2d 384. 29
Moyers v. Buescher, 806 F.Supp. 218 (E.D.Mo. 1992). 29
Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2009). 2, 8, 14,
25, 32
Moyo v. Gomez, 32 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 732, modified, 40 F.3d 982. 7
Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 732. 31
Mroz v. City of Tonawanda, 999 F.Supp. 436 (W.D.N.Y.
1998). 14, 26, 32, 36
Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). 4, 7,
36, 44
Muhammad v. City of New York Dept. of Corrections, 904
F.Supp. 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 37
Muhammad v. Hilbert, 906 F.Supp. 267 (E.D.Pa 1995). 1,
21
Muhammad v. Klotz, 36 F.Supp.2d 240 (E.D.Pa. 1999). 37
Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1992). 37
Muhammad v. McCarrell, 536 F.3d 934 (8th Cir. 2008). 48
Muhammad v. McMickens, 708 F.Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y.
1989). 27, 37
Muhammad v. Moore, 760 F.Supp. 869 (D. Kan. 1991). 35,
50
Muhammad v. Pitcher, 35 F.3d 1081 (6th Cir. 1994). 28
Muhammad v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 789 F.Supp. 449
(D.D.C. 1992). 8, 29, 33
Muhammad v. Warithu-Deen Umar, 98 F.Supp.2d 337
(W.D.N.Y. 2000). 37
Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F.Supp. 1311 (D. Del.
1979). 18, 37
Muhammand v. Carlson, 845 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 1346. 8, 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Muhammand v. Wainwright, 839 F.2d 1422 (11th Cir.
1987). 11, 24, 37
Muhammed v. U.S., 6 F.Supp.2d 582 (N.D.Tex. 1998). 27,
29
Muhmmaud v. Murphy, 632 F.Supp.2d 171 (D.Conn.
2009). 11
Mujahid v. Crabtree, 999 F.Supp. 1398 (D.Or. 1998). 4, 22,
35
Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2005). 20, 22
Mujahid v. Meyer, 59 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 1995). 3, 11
Mujahid v. Sumner, 807 F.Supp. 1505 (D.Hawaii 1992),
affirmed, 996 F.2d 1226. 19, 28
Mulberry v. Neal, 96 F.Supp.2d 1149 (D.Colo. 2000). 22,
36
Mullen v. Unit Manager Weber, 730 F.Supp. 640 (M.D. Pa.
1990). 14, 47
Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298 (2nd Cir. 1999). 31
Mullins v. City of New York, 523 F.Supp.2d 339 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). 2, 31
Mullins v. Smith, 14 F.Supp.2d 1009 (E.D.Mich. 1998). 11
Mullins v. Stratton, 878 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D. Ky. 1995). 14,
46
Mumin v. Phelps, 857 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1988). 37, 39
Munera v. Metro West Detention Center, 351 F.Supp.2d
1353 (S.D.Fla. 2004). 7, 32, 48
Munir v. Kearney, 377 F.Supp.2d 468 (D.Del. 2005). 19,
34, 37, 50
Munir v. Scott, 792 F.Supp. 1472 (E.D.Mich. 1992),
reversed, 12 F.3d 213. 27, 37
Munoz v. Kolender, 208 F.Supp.2d 1125 (S.D.Cal. 2002).
8, 9, 32, 34
Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630 (7th Cir. 2012). 19, 35, 38,
42
Munson v. Gaetz, 957 F.Supp.2d 951 (S.D.Ill. 2013). 18,
21, 24, 37
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2nd Cir. 2004). 7, 19
Muntaqim v. Coombe, 449 F.3d 371 (2nd Cir. 2006). 7, 19
Munyiri v. Haduch, 585 F.Supp.2d 670 (D.Md. 2008). 17,
25, 27, 32, 41
Munz v. Nix, 908 F.2d 267 (8th Cir. 1990). 1
Murchison v. Rogers, 779 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2015). 13, 19,
28
Murcia v. County of Orange, 185 F.Supp.2d 290 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). 25, 32, 41
Murcia v. County of Orange, 226 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y.
2002). 32, 41
Murdock v. Washington, 193 F.3d 510 (7th Cir. 1999) cert
den. 120 S.Ct. 2015. 7, 34
Murphy v. Bray, 51 F.Supp.2d 877 (S.D.Ohio 1999). 29
Murphy v. Carroll, 202 F.Supp.2d 421 (D.Md. 2002). 7, 37,
38, 50
Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541 (5th Cir. 1994). 1, 11
Murphy v. Dowd, 757 F.Supp. 1019 (E.D. Mo. 1990), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 603, affirmed, 938 F.2d 187. 1
Murphy v. Dowd, 975 F.2d 435 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 1310. 10, 27
Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007).
2, 9, 23, 27, 32
Murphy v. Gilman, 551 F.Supp.2d 677 (W.D.Mich. 2008).
9, 18, 27, 29
Murphy v. Kellar, 950 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1992). 1
Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich.2011).
3, 19, 28, 37, 39, 50
Murphy v. Missouri Department of Corrections, 814 F.2d
1252 (8th Cir. 1987). 19, 28, 37, 39

TC-66
XXVI

Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 372 F.3d 979 (8th
Cir. 2004). 19, 37
Murphy v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 506 F.3d 1111
(8th Cir. 2007). 37
Murphy v. OSCI, 790 P.2d 1179 (Or.App. 1990). 38
Murphy v. Town of Natick, 516 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass.
2007). 2, 31
Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 1995). 11, 29
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246 (3rd Cir. 2011). 8, 9
Murray v. Dosal, 150 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 1998). 1, 4, 35
Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d
1280 (D.Kan. 2006). 1, 9, 12, 32, 40, 49
Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S.Ct. 2765 (1989). 1
Murray v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 911 F.2d 1167
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 760. 50
Murray v. Prison Health Services, 513 F.Supp.2d 9
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 1, 21
Murrell v. Bennett, 615 F.2d 306 (5th Cir. 1980). 18, 29
Musgrove v. Broglin, 651 F.Supp. 769 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 14,
48
Muslim v. Frame, 854 F.Supp. 1215 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 18, 37
Muslim v. Frame, 891 F.Supp. 226 (E.D.Pa. 1995). 32, 37,
38
Musser v. County of Centre, 515 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Cmwlth,
1986). 31, 48
Mustafa v. State of Nebraska Dept. of Correctional, 196
F.Supp.2d 945 (D.Neb. 2002). 31
Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2013). 2,
19, 37
Myers v. County of Lake, Ind., 30 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 666. 14, 26, 27
Myers v. Hundley, 101 F.3d 542 (8th Cir. 1996). 1, 3, 23,
50
Myers v. Klevenhagen, 97 F.3d 91 (5th Cir. 1996). 4, 29, 35
Myers v. Maryland Div. of Correction, 782 F.Supp. 1095
(D. Md. 1992). 8, 25
Myers v. Milbert, 281 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.W.Va. 2003) 18,
19, 48
Myers v. Potter, 422 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2005). 26, 32
Myles v. U.S., 416 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2005). 14, 27
Myrie v. Calvo/Calvoba, 591 F.Supp.2d 620 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). 29, 32
Myrie v. Commissioner, N.J. Dept. of Corrections, 267 F.3d
251 (3rd Cir. 2001). 42, 43
Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). 1, 8, 19,
38, 42
Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2007). 8, 19
N.E.W. v. Kennard, 952 F.Supp. 714 (D.Utah 1997). 5, 32,
49
N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2nd Cir. 2004). 26, 32,
41
N.Y. State Com'n. of Correction v. Ruffo, 530 N.Y.S.2d
469 (Sup. 1988). 12, 15, 44
Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F.Supp.3d 609 (E.D.La. 2014). 14, 27,
30, 32, 45
Nagy v. Corrections Corporation of America, 79 F.Supp.3d
114 (D.D.C. 2015). 14, 17, 48
Nails v. Laplante, 596 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Conn. 2009). 27,
29
Nakao v. Rushen, 580 F.Supp. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 41
Nakao v. Rushen, 635 F.Supp. 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 28,
33
Nally v. Ghosh, 799 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2015). 29
Nam Dang v. Sheriff of Seminole County, Fla., 38
F.Supp.3d 1333 (M.D.Fla. 2014). 29, 32, 46

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63 (3rd Cir. 1996). 1, 3, 10
Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 1998). 1, 35
Napier v. Madison County, KY., 238 F.3d 739 (6th Cir.
2001). 29, 32
Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528 (11th Cir. 2002). 9, 27
Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2015). 1
Nash v. McGinnis, 315 F.Supp.2d 318 (W.D.N.Y. 2004).
28, 33
Nash v. Wennar, 645 F.Supp. 238 (U.S.D.C. Vt. 1986). 29
Nasir v. Morgan, 350 F.3d 366 (3rd Cir. 2003) 19, 28, 38
Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d
575 (3rd Cir. 2003). 29, 32
Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742
(8th Cir. 2014). 37, 38
Native American Council of Tribes v. Weber, 897
F.Supp.2d 828 (D.S.D. 2012). 37, 38, 39
Naumoff v. Old, 167 F.Supp.2d 1250 (D.Kan. 2001). 14,
27, 32
Navarro v. Adams, 419 F.Supp.2d 1196 (C.D.Cal. 2006). 1,
22, 39, 41
Navedo v. Maloney, 172 F.Supp.2d 276 (D.Mass. 2001). 7,
15, 29
Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). 1, 48
Navin v. Iowa Dept. of Corrections, 843 F.Supp. 500 (N.D.
Iowa 1994). 19, 49
Neal v. Camper, 647 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. App. 1983). 49
Neal v. City of Harvey, Ill., 1 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill.
1998). 16, 32
Neal v. Clark, 938 F.Supp. 484 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 3, 9, 10
Neal v. District of Columbia, 131 F.3d 172 (D.C.Cir. 1997).
3, 50
Neal v. Hargrave, 770 F.Supp. 553 (D. Nev. 1991). 20, 36
Neal v. LaRiva, 765 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014). 22, 27
Neal v. Lewis, 325 F.Supp.2d 1231 (D.Kan. 2004). 35, 37,
38
Neal v. Lewis, 414 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2005). 19, 37, 38,
39
Neal v. Miller, 778 F.Supp. 378 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 10, 48
Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1997). 8, 34, 36
Neal V. Shimoda, 905 F.Supp. 813 (D.Hawai'i 1995). 8, 34,
36, 43
Neb. Dept. of Correctional Serv. v. Carroll, 383 N.W.2d
740 (Neb. 1986). 5, 31
Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 1998). 22
Neely v. Eshelman, 507 F.Supp. 78 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 36
Nees v. Bishop, 524 F.Supp. 1310 (D.C. Colo. 1981). 1, 27
Neese v. Arpaio, 397 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D.Ariz. 2005). 1, 21
Neff v. Bryant, 772 F.Supp.2d 1318 (D.Nev. 2011). 1, 28,
36
Nei v. Dooley, 372 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2004). 14
Neisler v. Tuckwell, 807 F.3d 225 (7th Cir. 2015). 50
Nelson v. Balazic, 802 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1986). 24, 36
Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 1998). 32,
41
Nelson v. Collins, 455 F.Supp. 727 (D. Md. 1978). 3, 30
Nelson v. Correctional Medical Services, 583 F.3d 522 (8th
Cir. 2009). 17, 24, 29, 48
Nelson v. Coughlin, 538 N.Y.S.2d 360 (A.D. 1989). 11
Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C.
2013). 1, 8, 9, 15, 19, 29, 32, 40, 42
Nelson v. District of Columbia, 953 F.Supp.2d 128 (D.D.C.,
2013). 26, 41
Nelson v. Giurbino, 395 F.Supp.2d 946 (S.D.Cal. 2005). 1,
21
Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2001). 4, 35, 42

TC-67
XXVI

Nelson v. Herdzik, 559 F.Supp. 27 (1983). 12, 27
Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976. 26, 30
Nelson v. Michalko, 35 F.Supp.2d 289 (W.D.N.Y. 1999).
11
Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009). 18, 27, 37
Nelson v. Overberg, 999 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1993). 14, 27
Nelson v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 1452
(M.D.Fla. 1997). 27, 29, 32
Nelson v. Shuffman, 603 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 2010). 9, 21, 30,
32
Nelson v. Warden of C.F.C.F., 461 F.Supp.2d 316 (E.D.Pa.
2006). 1
Nerren v. Livingston Police Dept., 86 F.3d 469 (5th Cir.
1996). 29, 32
Nesvold v. Roland, 37 F.Supp.3d 1022 (W.D.Wis. 2014).
31
Nettles v. Griffith, 883 F.Supp. 136 (E.D. Tex. 1995). 3, 4,
8, 10, 14, 27, 39
Neumeyer v. Beard, 421 F.3d 210 (3rd Cir. 2005). 39, 41, 49
Nevada Dept of Corrections v. Cohen, 581 F.Supp.2d 1085
(D.Nev. 2008). 1, 35, 38
Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th
Cir. 2011). 1, 35, 38
Neville v. True, 900 F.Supp. 972 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 29, 32
New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benev.
Ass'n, Inc. v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 111
(N.D.N.Y. 2012). 2, 31
New York v. Eno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894). 22
Newbrough v. Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, 822
F.Supp.2d 558 (E.D.Va. 2011). 14, 29, 32, 46
Newby v. District of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C.
1999). 7, 17, 45, 46
Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968
F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). 7, 9, 15, 23, 27, 29, 32
Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F.Supp. 772 (E.D.Pa. 1993). 9, 24,
25, 32, 41
Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 1997). 1, 4
Newman v. Holmes, 122 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1997). 14, 27
Newman v. State of Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915. 29, 42
Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F.Supp.2d 1189
(M.D.Ala. 2006). 7, 14, 17, 32
Newsome v. Webster, 843 F.Supp. 1460 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
32, 48
Newson v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371 (6th Cir. 1989). 1, 50
Newton v. Black, 133 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 1998). 14, 24, 27
Ngemi v. County of Nassau, 87 F.Supp.3d 413 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). 4, 16, 43
Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2005). 1
Ngo v. Woodford, 539 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2008). 21
Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or. 2006). 2, 6,
22, 36
Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F.Supp.2d 1099 (S.D.Cal. 2000). 22
Nicastro v. Clinton, 882 F.Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1995). 50
Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2nd Cir. 2005). 33, 41
Nicholas v. Miller, 109 F.supp.2d 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 19
Nicholas v. Miller, 189 F.3d 191 (2nd Cir. 1999). 1, 19
Nicholas v. Riley, 874 F.Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1995). 34
Nicholas v. Tucker, 89 F.Supp.2d 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 1.
11. 38. 50
Nicholas v. Wallenstein, 266 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001). 31
Nichols v. Hopper, 173 F.3d 820 (11th Cir. 1999). 27
Nicholson v. Carroll, 458 F.Supp.2d 249 (D.Del. 2006). 3,
11, 22

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Nicholson v. Choctaw Co., Ala., 498 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.
Ala. 1980). 18, 25, 29, 38, 40, 46, 49
Nicholson v. Kent County Sheriff's Dept., 839 F.Supp. 508
(W.D. Mich. 1993). 7, 48
Nicholson v. Moran, 835 F.Supp. 692 (D.R.I. 1993). 11
Nicholson v. Moran, 961 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1992). 8, 11
Nickens v. Melton, 38 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 1994). 1, 35
Nicolas v. Rhode Island, 160 F.Supp.2d 229 (D.R.I. 2001).
24, 36
Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F.Supp. 1208 (E.D.Mich. 1996). 7, 19,
47
Niemic v. Maloney, 448 F.Supp.2d 270 (D.Mass. 2006). 29,
33
Niemic v. UMass Correctional Health, 89 F.Supp.3d 193
(D.Mass. 2015). 29
Niemyjski v. City of Albuquerque, 379 F.Supp.2d 1221
(D.N.M. 2005). 32, 46, 48
Nillson-Borrill v. Burnheimer, 505 F.Supp.2d 180 (D.Me.
2007). 14, 17
Nilsen v. York County, 382 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.Me. 2005).
25, 27, 32, 33, 41
Nilsson v. Coughlin, 670 F.Supp. 1186 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 9,
10, 15, 40
Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tenn., 814 F.2d 277 (6th
Cir. 1987). 27
Nitcher v. Cline, 899 F.2d 1543 (8th Cir. 1990). 29, 41
Nix v. Evatt, 850 F.Supp. 455 (D.S.C. 1994). 11, 24
Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). 3, 12, 24,
39
Noble v. Three Forks Regional Jail Authority, 995
F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.Ky. 2014). 13, 18, 29
Noble v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 194 F.3d 152 (D.C.Cir. 1999).
22, 36
Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 22
Nolley v. County of Erie, 776 F.Supp. 715 (W.D.N.Y.
1991). 1, 8, 17, 29, 33, 37
Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014). 1, 28
Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). 2, 3, 9, 12
Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2006). 29
Norman v. Schuetzle, 585 F.3d 1097 (8th Cir. 2009). 8, 14
Norman v. Taylor, 9 F.3d 1078 (4th Cir. 1993). 10, 48
Norris v. Corrections Corp. of America, 521 F.Supp.2d 586
(W.D.Ky. 2007). 27
Norris v. Detrick, 918 F.Supp. 977 (N.D.W.Va. 1996). 48
Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634 (8th Cir. 2007). 17, 29, 30,
32, 48
Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183 (3rd Cir. 1978). 29
Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, Inc., 641 F.3d 695 (6th
Cir. 2011). 2, 4, 11, 35
Norsworthy v. Beard, 802 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2015). 17, 29
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104 (N.D.Cal. 2015).
17, 19, 27, 29
Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015).
1, 17, 27, 29
North Emerson-West v. Redman, 630 F.Supp.2d 373
(D.Del. 2009). 27
North River Ins. Co. v. Broward County Sheriff's Office,
428 F.Supp.2d 1284 (S.D.Fla. 2006). 16, 27
Northern v. Hanks, 326 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2003). 20, 22
Northern v. Nelson, 315 F.Supp. 687 (N.D. Calif. 1970). 37
Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th
Cir. 2012). 7, 16, 27
Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 4
Norton v. The City of Marietta, OK, 432 F.3d 1145 (10th
Cir. 2005). 48

TC-68
XXVI

Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2010). 12, 39
Norwood v. Woodford, 583 F.Supp.2d 1200 (S.D.Cal.
2008). 12, 24, 39
Norwood v. Woodford, 661 F.Supp.2d 1148 (S.D.Cal.
2009). 10, 12, 39
Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1971). 1
Nowaczyk v. State of New Hampshire, 882 F.Supp. 18
(D.N.H. 1995). 6, 22
Nowosad v. English, 903 F.Supp. 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). 25,
32, 41, 48
Nunes v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 766 F.3d 136
(1st Cir. 2014). 29, 33
Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2010). 39, 41, 50
Nunez v. Horn, 72 F.Supp.2d 24 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 29
Nusbaum v. Terrangi, 210 F.Supp.2d 784 (E.D.Va. 2002).
20, 34, 37
Nwaokocha v. Sadowski, 369 F.Supp.2d 362 (E.D.N.Y.
2005). 1, 35
O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 119 S.Ct. 1728 (1999). 22
Oare v. Coughlin, 520 N.Y.S.2d 658 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1987).
31
Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2008). 21, 30,
47
O'Brien v. Borough of Woodbury Heights, 679 F.Supp. 429
(D. N.J. 1988). 27, 32, 41
O'Brien v. Indiana Dept. of Correction ex rel. Turner, 495
F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2007). 3, 8, 14
O'Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003)
37
O'Bryan v. Saginaw, 446 F.Supp. 436 (E.D. Mich. 1978). 1,
12, 25, 28, 49
O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2011). 11, 21
Ocasio v. Konesky, 821 F.Supp.2d 571 (W.D.N.Y. 2011).
29, 34
Ochoa v. U.S., 819 F.2d 366 (2nd Cir. 1987). 36, 43
Ochs v. Thalacker, 90 F.3d 293 (8th Cir. 1996). 3, 8, 29, 37
O'Connell v. County of Northampton, 79 F.Supp.2d 529
(E.D.Pa. 999). 31
O'Conner v. Keller, 510 F.Supp. 1359 (D. Md. 1981). 3, 10,
23, 27, 48
Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 2008). 16, 24
O'Dell v. Netherland, 112 F.3d 773 (4th Cir. 1997). 1, 49
Odenwalt v. Gillis, 327 F.Supp.2d 502 (M.D.Pa. 2004). 19,
49
Odom v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 349 F.3d 765
(4th Cir. 2003) 14
Odom v. Tripp, 575 F.Supp. 1491 (E.D. Mo. 1983). 28, 32
O'Donnell v. Thomas, 826 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1987). 29, 48
Oest v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 240 F.3d 605 (7th Cir.
2001). 31
Offet v. Solem, 936 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1991). 20, 36, 43
O'Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056
(9th Cir. 2007). 21, 29, 30
O'Hagan v. Soto, 725 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1984). 1, 24
Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 118 S.Ct. 1244
(1998). 43
O'Keefe v. Murphy, 860 F.Supp. 748 (E.D. Wash. 1994).
19, 21, 28
O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322 (9th Cir. 1996). 1, 21
O'Kelley v. Snow, 53 F.3d 319 (11th Cir. 1995). 36
Oken v. Nuth, 30 F.Supp.2d 877 (D.Md. 1998). 22
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 16. 7, 27
Olabisiomotosho v. City of Hudson, 185 F.3d 521 (5th Cir.
1999). 29, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 626 (W.D.La. 2000). 8,
9. 15, 18, 19, 29, 32, 44
Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 643 (W.D.La. 2000). 8,
9, 32, 39, 40
Oladipupo v. Austin, 104 F.Supp.2d 654 (W.D.La. 2000). 9,
15, 32
Olaniyi v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C.
2012). 29, 30, 32, 46
Oldham v. Chandler-Halford, 877 F.Supp. 1340 (N.D. Iowa
1995). 9, 29
Olds v. Hogg, 774 F.Supp. 1202 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 24, 36
O'Leary v. Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 79 F.3d 82 (8th
Cir. 1996). 9, 10, 11, 23
Olgin v. Darnell, 664 F.2d 107 (1981). 32, 39
Olibas v. Gomez, 481 F.Supp.2d 721 (W.D.Tex. 2006). 6, 7
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983). 8, 47
Oliva v. Heller, 839 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir. 1988). 24
Olivas v. Corrections Corp. of America, 408 F.Supp.2d 251
(N.D.Tex. 2006). 2, 27, 29
Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1990). 48
Oliver v. Deen, 77 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1996). 8, 9, 10, 29
Oliver v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175 (3rd Cir. 1997). 1, 28
Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2002). 7, 9, 15, 32
Oliver v. Powell, 250 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Va. 2002). 9, 10,
28, 39
Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2002). 7, 17, 33, 41,
45
O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1990). 1, 29
Olsen v. Klecker, 642 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1981). 39, 41
Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010). 1, 27
Olson v. Loy, 951 F.Supp. 225 (S.D.Ga. 1996). 19, 38
Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708 (7th Cir. 2014). 14, 29
Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1993). 29
Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1987). 1
Oluwa v. Gomez, 133 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1998). 18, 37
Olynick v. Taylor County, 643 F.Supp. 1100 (W.D. Wis.
1986). 16, 17, 24, 47, 50
Omar v. Casterline, 288 F.Supp.2d 775 (W.D.La. 2003) 8,
32, 37, 41
Omar v. Casterline, 414 F.Supp.2d 582 (W.D.La. 2006). 18,
24, 32, 37
O'Neil v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 804 F.Supp.2d
532 (N.D.Tex. 2011). 14, 24, 29, 50
Onishea v. Hopper, 171 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 1999). 7, 8,
34, 37, 38, 50
Opalec v. Curry, 556 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Cal. 2008). 22,
36
O'Quinn v. Manuel, 767 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1985). 14, 27,
45
Orange v. Fielding, 517 F.Supp.2d 776 (D.S.C. 2007). 14,
27, 32
Orebaugh v. Caspari, 910 F.2d 526 (8th Cir. 1990). 35
Oregon Advocacy Center v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir.
2003). 1, 30, 47
Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 2008). 17, 32, 48
Ornelas v. Giurbino, 358 F.Supp.2d 955 (S.D.Cal. 2005). 7
Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 1998). 34, 36, 43
Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). 3, 9, 29, 30
Orr v. Trumbull County, 77 F.Supp.2d 853 (N.D.Ohio
1999). 31
Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1987). 10, 11, 50
Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F.Supp.2d 1025 (D.Ariz.
2009). 7, 16, 27, 32
Ortiz Gonzalez v. Otero De Ramos, 737 F.Supp. 9 (D.
Puerto Rico 1990). 11, 47

TC-69
XXVI

Ortiz v. City of Chicago, 656 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2011). 14,
17, 24, 29, 32
Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). 1, 32, 37, 38
Ortiz v. Fort Dodge Correctional Facility, 368 F.3d 1024
(8th Cir. 2004). 19, 28, 38
Ortiz v. Lasker, 590 F.Supp.2d 423 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 14,
17
Ortiz v. Turner, 651 F.Supp. 309 (S.D. Ill. 1987). 27, 44
Ortiz v. Voinovich, 211 F.Supp.2d 917 (S.D.Ohio 2002). 3,
14, 17
Orwat v. Maloney, 360 F.Supp.2d 146 (D.Mass. 2005). 14,
48
Osborn v. Mason, 359 F.Supp. 1107 (D. Conn. 1973). 11
Oses v. Fair, 739 F.Supp. 707 (D. Mass. 1990). 10
Oses v. U.S., 833 F.Supp. 49 (D. Mass. 1993). 43
Osorio v. Rios, 429 F.Supp. 570 (D. P.R. 1976). 26
Ospina v. Department of Corrections, State of Del., 749
F.Supp. 572 (D. Del. 1990). 24, 48
Osterback v. McDonough, 549 F.Supp.2d 1337 (M.D.Fla.
2008). 10, 14, 15, 27, 30, 44
Ostrander v. Horn, 145 F.Supp.2d 614 (M.D.Pa. 2001). 39
Oswald v. Graves, 819 F.Supp. 680 (E.D.Mich. 1993). 1
Oswalt v. Godinez, 894 F.Supp. 1181 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 11
Overbay v. Lilliman, 572 F.Supp. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
27, 46, 48
Overturf v. Massie, 385 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2004). 22, 47
Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980),
reh'g. denied, 100 S.Ct. 2979. 7, 24, 31
Owen v. Heyne, 473 F.Supp. 345 (N.D. Ind. 1978). 3
Owen v. Wille, 117 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 1997). 19, 28, 38
Owens v. City of Atlanta, 780 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1986).
14, 25, 27, 48
Owens v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.Supp.2d 373 (E.D.Pa.
1998). 14, 32, 46
Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2nd Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 980. 7, 27, 46
Owens v. Libhart, 729 F.Supp. 1510 (M.D. Pa. 1990),
affirmed, 925 F.2d 419. 11
Owens v. Sebelius, 357 F.Supp.2d 1281 (D.Kan. 2005). 4,
23, 36
Owens-Ali v. Pennell, 672 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.Del. 2009). 1,
18, 24, 37
Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596 (6th Cir.
2005). 29, 32, 48
Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 F.Supp. 1368 (W.D. Penn.
1978). 11, 48
Owens-El v. Robinson, 457 F.Supp. 984 (W.D. Penn.
1978). 19, 30, 49
Owens-El v. Robinson, 498 F.Supp. 877 (W.D. Penn.
1980). 5
Oxendine v. Kaplan, 241 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2001). 29
Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975). 49
Oyedeji v. Ashcroft, 332 F.Supp.2d 747 (M.D.Pa. 2004). 22
PA Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 622 F.3d 215 (3rd Cir. 2010). 36,
43, 44
Pabon v. LeFevre, 508 N.Y.S.2d 95 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1986). 41
Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir. 2006). 29
Pabon v. Wright, 459 F.3d 241 (2nd Cir. 2006). 29, 33
Pace v. Oliver, 634 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1981). 2, 11
Pacheco v. Comisse, 897 F.Supp. 671 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 1,
37
Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
20
Pack v. Artuz, 348 F.Supp.2d 63 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 9, 15

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Packett v. Clarke, 910 F.Supp. 469 (D.Neb. 1996). 19, 28,
38, 39
Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005). 33, 41
Padgett v. Ferrero, 294 F.Supp.2d 1338 (N.D.Ga. 2003). 33,
41
Padgett v. Stein, 406 F.Supp. 287 (M.D. Penn. 1975). 1, 4,
18, 23, 29, 32, 34, 40, 44
Padilla v. Miller, 143 F.Supp.2d 479 (M.D.Pa. 2001). 16
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009). 1, 7,
16, 27, 32, 37, 48
Pagan v. Dubois, 884 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass. 1995). 7, 19
Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1988). 19, 31
Page v. Kirby, 314 F.Supp.2d 619 (N.D.W.Va. 2004). 18,
27, 29
Page v. Mancuso, 999 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2013). 27,
32, 36, 41
Page v. Norvell, 186 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Or. 2000). 29, 30
Page v. Sharpe, 487 F.2d 567 (1st Cir. 1973). 7, 29
Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000). 1, 30
Pagels v. Morrison, 335 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2003). 14
Pahk v. Hawaii, 109 F.Supp.2d 1262 (D.Hawai'i 2000). 27,
36
Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). 7, 14, 17, 24,
25, 27, 29, 30, 32, 36
Paine v. Johnson, 689 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D.Ill. 2010). 14,
17, 24, 30, 32, 34, 36
Pak v. Reno, 8 F.Supp.2d 1001 (N.D.Ohio 1998). 22
Pak v. U.S., 278 F.Supp.2d 263 (D.Conn. 2003). 34
Palmer v. Board of Com'rs for Payne County Oklahoma,
765 F.Supp.2d 1289 (W.D.Okla. 2011). 29, 32, 46
Palmer v. Flore, 3 F.Supp.3d 632 (E.D.Mich. 2014). 1, 3, 21
Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 1999). 9, 10, 23,
29, 40, 50
Palmer v. Marion County, 327 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2003). 14,
32
Palmer v. Richards, 364 F.3d 60 (2nd Cir. 2004). 3, 11, 24
Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009). 1, 10
Palmermo v. Correctional Medical Services Inc., 133
F.Supp.2d 1348 (S.D.Fla. 2001). 29
Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 710 F.Supp. 875 (D. R.I. 1989). 9,
27
Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 737 F.Supp. 1257 (D. R.I. 1990). 6,
9, 20
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 839. 5
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 639 F.Supp. 244 (D. R.I. 1986). 9
Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1983). 5
Palmigiano v. Sundlun, 482 F.Supp.2d 207 (D.R.I. 2007).
27
Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776 (D. R.I. 1970). 1,
19, 44
Panayoty v. Annucci, 898 F.Supp.2d 469 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
37, 38, 39
Pannell v. McBride, 306 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2002). 11, 22
Paoli v. Lally, 636 F.Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 184, affirmed, 812 F.2d 1489. 8, 47
Papa v. U.S., 281 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2002). 27
Para-Profess. Law Clinic, SCI-Graterford v. Beard, 334
F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2003). 1, 27
Pardo v. Hosier, 946 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1991). 3, 8, 11
Pardue Ex Rel. Christian v. Ashe, 36 Fed.Appx. 199 (6th
Cir. 2002). 14, 25. 32
Parette v. Lockhart, 927 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1991). 22
Pargo v. Elliot, 894 F.Supp. 1243 (S.D.Iowa 1995). 17, 19,
34, 50

TC-70
XXVI

Pargo v. Elliott, 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995). 17, 34
Parisie v. Morris, 873 F.Supp. 1560 (N.D. Ga. 1995). 27, 36
Parkell v. Danberg, 871 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2012). 3, 9,
29
Parkell v. Morgan, 917 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del. 2013). 1, 18,
32, 37
Parker v. Asher, 701 F.Supp. 192 (D. Nev. 1988). 10, 48
Parker v. Bladen County, 583 F.Supp.2d 736 (E.D.N.C.
2008). 14, 17, 46, 48
Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2009). 5
Parker v. Kelly, 529 N.Y.S.2d 662 (A.D. 1988). 38
Parker v. McKeithen, 488 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 838. 14
Parker v. Shade, 872 F.Supp. 573 (E.D. Wis. 1994). 3
Parker v. Vose, 875 F.Supp. 954 (D.R.I. 1994). 11
Parker v. Williams, 855 F.2d 763 (11th Cir. 1988). 14, 24,
31
Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989). 27
Parkerson v. State, 274 S.E.2d 799 (Ct. App. Ga. 1980). 43
Parkinson v. Goord, 116 F.Supp.2d 390 (W.D.N.Y. 2000).
7, 29
Parkus v. Delo, 135 F.3d 1232 (8th Cir. 1998). 48
Parlin v. Cumberland County, 659 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me.
2009). 13, 17, 29, 46, 48
Parnell v. Waldrep, 511 F.Supp. 764 (W.D. N.C. 1981). 12,
19, 28
Parnell v. Waldrep, 538 F.Supp. 1203 (W.D. N.C. 1982). 1,
12, 27
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 7, 19, 27, 35
Parrish Ex Rel Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294 (4th Cir.
2004). 14, 32
Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2010). 14, 17, 27, 32,
46
Parrish v. Mallinger, 133 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1998). 2, 4, 35
Parrott v. U.S., 536 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2008). 14, 27, 35
Parsons v. Pitzer, 149 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1998). 22, 34, 43
Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2014). 9, 27, 29, 30
Partee v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 863 F.Supp. 778
(N.D. Ill. 1994). 1
Partelow v. Massachusetts, 442 F.Supp.2d 41 (D.Mass.
2006). 9, 15, 29
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers of Houston, 791
F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986). 29, 30
Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 751 F.2d 1448
(5th Cir. 1985). 14, 25, 27, 29
Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th
Cir. 2010). 1, 21
Patchette v. Nix, 952 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1991). 9, 49
Pate v. Peel, 256 F.Supp.2d 1326 (N.D.Fla. 2003). 21, 29,
50
Patel v. Fleming, 415 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2005). 1, 9, 10
Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). 1, 7,
11, 21, 24, 27
Patel v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 807 (8th Cir.
2008). 18, 37
Patrick v. Lewis, 397 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Minn. 2005). 14,
25, 29, 32
Patrick v. Raemisch, 550 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2008).
34, 36
Patrick v. Redman, 818 F.Supp. 86 (D. Del. 1993). 36, 7
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Florida, 102 S.Ct.
2557 (1982). 7
Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006). 2, 5,
27, 31
Patterson v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 564 (2nd Cir. 1990). 11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Patterson v. Hopkins, 350 F.Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
15, 26
Patterson v. Knowles, 162 F.3d 574 (10th Cir. 1998). 20,
22, 36
Patterson v. Pearson, 19 F.3d 439 (8th Cir. 1994). 29
Patterson v. Webster, 760 F.Supp. 150 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 34,
36
Patton v. Fenton, 491 F.Supp. 156 (M.D. Pa. 1979). 36
Patton v. Jefferson Correctional Center, 136 F.3d 458 (5th
Cir. 1998). 1
Paul P. v. Farmer, 80 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.N.J. 2000). 7, 13,
33
Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396 (3rd Cir. 1999). 33, 36
Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md.
2010). 7, 29, 34, 42
Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). 1, 14,
17, 21, 32, 45, 46
Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2005). 2, 22, 34,
36
Pavey v. Conley, 528 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2008). 21, 48
Paydon v. Hawk, 960 F.Supp. 867 (D.N.J. 1997). 22, 43
Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir.
1998). 14, 32
Payne v. Axelrod, 871 F.Supp. 1551 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 11,
24
Payne v. Collins, 986 F.Supp. 1036 (E.D.Tex. 1997). 14
Payne v. Friel, 919 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Utah 2013). 3, 47
Payne v. Monroe County, 779 F.Supp. 1330 (S.D. Fla.
1991). 14
Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 2015). 19, 28
Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2002). 4,
6, 32, 36
Payton v. Horn, 49 F.Supp.2d 791 (E.D.Pa. 1999). 4, 35
Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981). 36
Paz v. Warden, Federal Correctional Institution, 787 F.2d
469 2 (10th Cir. 1986). 22, 36
Paz v. Weir, 137 F.Supp.2d 782 (S.D.Tex. 2001). 14, 17
Peacock v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 199
F.Supp.2d 306 (D.Md. 2002). 16, 32
Pearl v. Cason, 219 F.Supp.2d 820 (E.D.Mich. 2002). 1, 22
Pearson v. Ramos, 237 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001). 11, 12
Pearson v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3rd
Cir. 2015). 1, 21, 50
Pearson v. Simms, 345 F.Supp.2d 515 (D.Md. 2003). 1, 28
Pearson v. Vaughn, 102 F.Supp.2d 282 (E.D.Pa. 2000). 14
Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006). 5, 19, 27
Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2002). 14, 39
Peckham v. Wisconsin Dept. Of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694
(7th Cir. 1998). 39, 41
Peddle v. Sawyer, 64 F.Supp.2d 12 (D.Conn. 1999). 7, 9,
14, 17
Pedraza v. Meyer, 919 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1990). 29, 32
Pedro v. Oregon Parole Board, 825 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 726. 36
Peebles v. Frey, 617 F.Supp. 1072 (D.C. Mo. 1985). 48
Peek v. Ciccone, 288 F.Supp. 329 (W.D. Mo. 1968). 28
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 19, 39, 49
Pella v. Adams, 638 F.Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1986). 41
Pella v. Adams, 723 F.Supp. 1394 (D. Nev. 1989). 11
Pelland v. Rhode Island, 317 F.Supp.2d 86 (D.R.I. 2004).
43
Pelletier v. Magnuson, 201 F.Supp.2d 148 (D.Me. 2002).
14, 29, 30
Pelletier v. Magnusson, 195 F.Supp.2d 214 (D.Me. 2002).
14, 30

TC-71
XXVI

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). 7, 27
Pena v. Greffet, 108 F.Supp.3d 1030 (D.N.M. 2015). 27, 48
Pena v. Greffet, 110 F.Supp.3d 1103 (D.N.M. 2015). 14,
17, 24, 27
Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). 2, 3,
7, 13, 14, 17, 21
Pendergrass v. Hannigan, 788 F.Supp. 488 (D. Kan. 1992).
10, 50
Pendergrass v. Hodge, 53 F.Supp.2d 838 (E.D.Va. 1999).
39
Peniman v. Cartwright, 550 F.Supp. 1302 (S.D. Iowa 1982).
5
Penland v. Long, 922 F.Supp. 1085 (W.D.N.C. 1996). 2, 31
Penn v. Escorsio, 764 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2014). 14, 32
Pennington v. Taylor, 343 F.Supp.2d 508 (E.D.Va. 2004). 8
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation v. Scott, 118 S.Ct. 2014
(1998). 36, 41
Pennsylvania Bur. of Correction v. U.S. Marshals, 106 S.Ct.
355 (1985). 1, 2, 4, 22
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct.
1952 (1998). 7, 8, 29
Pennsylvania Prison Soc. v. Cortes, 508 F.3d 156 (3rd Cir.
2007). 43, 44
Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Rendell, 419 F.Supp.2d 651
(M.D.Pa. 2006). 7, 36, 43
Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399 (10th Cir. 1996). 1, 21, 23,
50
Pentlarge v. Murphy, 541 F.Supp.2d 421 (D.Mass. 2008). 7,
24, 34
People Ex Rel Vega v. Smith, 485 N.E.2d 997 (N.Y. 1985).
11, 38
People ex rel. Martin v. Smith, 457 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct.
1982). 11, 22
People Ex Rel. Reed v. Scully, 531 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup.
1988). 11, 22
People v. Cheeks, 493 N.Y.S.2d 518 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1985).
38
People v. Greenwald, 445 N.Y.S.2d 865 (App. Div. 1982).
35, 41
People v. McCaslin, 223 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Cal. App. 1 Dist.
1986). 28
People v. Nagel, 38 CrL 2101 (Ill. App. Ct., 4th Dist. 1985).
32, 41
People v. Roth, 397 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. App. 1986). 41, 43
People v. West, 37 CrL 2359 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 1985).
41
People v. Whitfield, 488 N.E.2d 1087 (Ill. App. 5 Dist.
1986). 31, 41
Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers, 422 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir.
2005). 1, 3, 8, 19, 32, 33, 39
Peoples v. Fischer, 898 F.Supp.2d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 3,
9, 10, 24
Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). 1, 2, 3,
10, 19, 39, 41, 42
Peralta v. Dillard, 704 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). 2, 29
Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). 2, 29
Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F.Supp. 1504 (D.C. N.Y. 1985).
11, 41
Percy v. Jabe, 823 F.Supp. 445 (E.D.Mich. 1993). 11, 49
Perez Olivo v. Gonzalez, 384 F.Supp.2d 536 (D.Puerto
Rico 2005). 29, 39, 48
Perez v. Cate, 632 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2011). 5
Perez v. Coughlin, 536 N.Y.S.2d 207 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1988).
11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Perez v. County of Westchester, 83 F.Supp.2d 435
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 13, 29, 30
Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 10, 21,
29
Perez v. Frank, 433 F.Supp.2d 955 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 19, 37
Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 2007). 31
Perez v. Metropolitan Correctional Center Warden, 5
F.Supp.2d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 1, 35
Perez v. Oakland County, 380 F.Supp.2d 830 (E.D.Mich.
2005). 14, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 45
Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2006). 8,
14, 30
Perez v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d
143 (2nd Cir. 2009). 5
Perez-Garcia v. Village of Mundelein, 396 F.Supp.2d 907
(N.D.Ill. 2005). 2, 7, 16, 25, 32, 36
Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2005). 20, 22
Perkins v. Brown, 285 F.Supp.2d 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 14,
29, 32, 41, 48
Perkins v. Grimes, 161 F.3d 1127 (8th Cir. 1998). 14, 32
Perkins v. Kansas Dept. of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803 (10th
Cir. 1999). 12, 29
Perkins v. Lawson, 312 F.3d 872 (7th Cir. 2002). 14, 27, 29
Perko v. Bowers, 945 F.2d 1038 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1482. 1
Perkowski v. City of Detroit, 794 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Mich.
1992). 14
Perro v. State, 517 So.2d 258 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987). 27, 50
Perry v. Davies, 757 F.Supp. 1223 (D. Kan. 1991). 25, 37,
38
Perry v. Dickhaut, 125 F.Supp.3d 285 (D. Mass. 2015). 8,
14, 15, 48
Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2000). 31
Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 2015). 29
Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d
1359 (11th Cir. 2011). 7, 19, 28, 38, 39
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). 2, 31
Persechini v. Callaway, 651 F.3d 802 (8th Cir. 2011). 11,
34, 43
Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). 7, 19, 35
Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dept., 541 F.Supp.2d
504 (D.Conn. 2008). 1, 16, 32
Peters v. City of Biloxi, Mississippi, 57 F.Supp.2d 366
(S.D.Miss. 1999). 32, 48
Peters v. Risdal, 786 F.3d 1095 (8th Cir. 2015). 17, 25, 32,
33, 48
Petersen v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 301 F.3d 1182 (10th
Cir. 2002). 31
Peterson v. Davis, 551 F.Supp. 137 (D. Md. 1982). 24, 48
Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905 (6th Cir. 2013). 11, 21
Peterson v. Scully, 707 F.Supp. 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 29
Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998). 1
Peterson v. Tomaselli, 469 F.Supp.2d 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
16, 36
Petition of Anderson, 772 F.2d 510 (Wash. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 565. 11, 17, 38
Petition of Johnston, 745 F.2d 864 (Wash. 1987). 41, 43
Petrazzoulo v. U.S. Marshals Service, 999 F.Supp. 401
(W.D.N.Y. 1998). 27, 29, 32
Petrichko v. Kurtz, 117 F.Supp.2d 467 (E.D.Pa. 2000). 29
Petrichko v. Kurtz, 52 F.Supp.2d 503 (E.D.Pa. 1999). 29,
45, 46
Petrick v. Maynard, 11 F.3d 991 (10th Cir. 1993). 1
Petrig v. Folz, 581 F.Supp.2d 1013 (S.D.Ind. 2008). 14, 29

TC-72
XXVI

Petrolino v. County of Spokane, 678 F.Supp.2d 1082
(E.D.Wash. 2009). 32, 48
Petrone v. Pike County Probation Dept., 240 F.Supp.2d 317
(M.D.Pa. 2002). 14, 36
Petties v. Carter, 795 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 29
Pettit v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Ariz. 2014). 1, 48
Pettus v. McGinnis, 533 F.Supp.2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
11, 19, 24
Pettus v. Wright, 514 F.Supp.2d 436 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 29
Petty v. Stine, 424 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2005). 20, 22
Petzak v. Nevada ex rel. Department of Corrections, 579
F.Supp.2d 1330 (D.Nev. 2008). 24, 31, 44
Peyton v. Rowe, 88 S.Ct. 1549 (1968). 22, 43
Pfeil v. Lampert, 11 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Wyo. 2014). 37, 38
Phelps v. Dunn, 770 F.Supp. 346 (E.D. Ky. 1991). 7, 37, 39
Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180 (2nd Cir. 2002). 18
Phelps v. Tucker, 370 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ind. 2005). 11
Phiffer v. Columbia River Correctional Inst., 384 F.3d 791
(9th Cir. 2004). 9, 24, 27
Philadelphia Inquirer v. Wetzel, 906 F.Supp.2d 362
(M.D.Pa. 2012). 10, 19, 33, 39
Phillips Ex Rel. Phillips v. Monroe County, Miss., 311 F.3d
369 (5th Cir. 2002). 29
Phillips v. Booker, 76 F.Supp.2d 1183 (D.Kan. 1999). 4, 22,
35, 43, 50
Phillips v. Brennan, 969 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 990. 36
Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124 (2nd Cir. 2005). 7
Phillips v. Hust, 338 F.Supp.2d 1148 (D.Or. 2004). 1
Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007). 1, 27
Phillips v. Hust, 507 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). 1, 27
Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009). 1, 24, 27
Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006).
1, 8, 29
Phillips v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 731 F.Supp. 792
(W.D. Mich. 1990), affirmed, 932 F.2d 969. 17, 29,
30
Phillips v. Monroe County, Mississippi, 143 F.Supp.2d 663
(N.D.Miss. 2001). 29
Phillips v. Norris, 320 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 2003). 3, 11, 12,
49
Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir.
2008). 2, 17, 24, 29, 32, 46
Phillips v. True, 992 F.Supp. 1255 (D.Kan. 1998). 22, 36
Phillips v. U.S., 836 F.Supp. 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 1, 7, 43
Phipps v. Parker, 879 F.Supp. 734 (W.D.Ky. 1995). 3, 19,
37, 38
Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899
(N.D.Ill. 2009). 1, 9, 13, 15, 21, 29, 32, 34, 36
Picariello v. Fenton, 491 F.Supp. 1026 (M.D. Penn. 1980).
4, 27, 48
Piccolo v. Lansing, 939 F.Supp. 319 (D.N.J. 1996). 22, 43
Pichardo v. Kinker, 73 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996). 3, 39
Picon v. Morris, 933 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1991). 15, 27
Piedra v. True, 169 F.Supp.2d 1239 (D.Kan. 2001). 14, 48
Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008).
1, 3, 7, 9, 12, 23, 27, 32
Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008).
3, 9, 12, 15, 23, 27, 32, 34, 37
Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F.Supp.2d 915 (C.D.Cal.
2011). 9, 15, 32, 34
Pierce v. County of Orange, 905 F.Supp.2d 1017 (C.D.Cal.
2012). 4, 5, 9, 32
Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C.
2015). 3, 27, 29, 34

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Pierce v. King, 918 F.Supp. 932 (E.D.N.C. 1996). 50
Pierce v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and Corr., 284
F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Ohio 2003) 2, 31
Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems, 25 F.Supp.3d
1198 (E.D.Mo. 2014). 7, 27, 30, 32
Pierce v. Smith, 347 F.Supp.2d 1143 (M.D.Ala. 2004). 37
Piercy v. Maketa, 480 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2007). 31, 45
Pierson v. Hartley, 391 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2004). 8, 14
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 7, 16, 24
Pietrafeso v. Lawrence County, S. D., 452 F.3d 978 (8th
Cir. 2006). 14, 25, 29, 32
Piggie v. Hanks, 98 F.Supp.2d 1003 (N.D.Ind. 2000). 11, 22
Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2002). 11, 22
Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ind. 2008). 1, 21,
47
Pilgrim v. Luther, 571 F.3d 201 (2nd Cir. 2009). 19, 50
Pilon v. Bordenkircher, 100 S.Ct. 7 (1979). 22
Pimentel v. Gonzales, 367 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
22, 36
Pina v. Lantz, 495 F.Supp.2d 290 (D.Conn. 2007). 31
Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139 (2nd Cir. 1995).
16, 24
Pindle v. Poteat, 360 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 2003). 22, 36
Ping v. McBride, 888 F.Supp. 917 (N.D.Ind. 1993). 11, 22
Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73 (4th Cir. 1995). 1
Pinkston v. Bensinger, 359 F.Supp. 95 (N.D. Ill. 1973). 3,
37
Pinkston v. Madry, 440 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2006). 14, 29, 39
Pino v. Dalsheim, 558 F.Supp. 673 (S.D. N.Y. 1983). 1, 47
Pino v. Dalsheim, 605 F.Supp. 1305 (1984). 11, 27, 50
Pinson v. U.S. Department of Justice, 104 F.Supp.3d 30
(D.D.C. 2015). 1, 2
Pippins v. Adams County Jail, 851 F.Supp. 1228 (C.D.Ill.
1994). 1, 11, 12, 32, 37
Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1999). 22, 47, 50
Piscottano v. Murphy, 317 F.Supp.2d 97 (D.Conn. 2004).
31
Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247 (2nd Cir. 2007). 2, 31
Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. County of Madison, Ill., 746
F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2014). 14, 29, 30, 32
Pittman v. Department of Justice, 486 F.3d 1276 (Fed Cir.
2007). 31
Pittman v. Kurtz, 165 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2001). 32,
48
Pitts v. Kee, 511 F.Supp. 497 (D. Del. 1981). 3, 4, 27
Pitts v. Meese, 684 F.Supp. 303 (D. D.C. 1987). 7, 17, 47
Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 17
Pittsburgh League of Young Voters Educ. Fund v. Port
Authority of Allegheny County, 653 F.3d 290 (3rd
Cir. 2011). 13, 19
Pizarro Calderon v. Chavez, 327 F.Supp.2d 131 (D.Puerto
Rico 2004). 11, 20, 22
Pizzuto v. County of Nassau, 239 F.Supp.2d 301 (E.D.N.Y.
2003). 14, 48
Pizzuto v. County of Nassau, 240 F.Supp.2d 203 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). 14, 48
Plair v. City of New York, 789 F.Supp.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). 14, 26, 27, 32, 48
Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1988). 50
Plasko v. City of Pottsville, 852 F.Supp. 1258 (E.D. Pa.
1994). 14, 32
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2009). 2,
15, 27, 29
Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010). 27

TC-73
XXVI

Platcher v. Health Professionals, Ltd., 549 F.Supp.2d 1040
(C.D.Ill. 2008). 14, 27
Platt v. Brockenborough, 476 F.Supp.2d 467 (E.D.Pa.
2007). 1, 3, 12
Plemmons v. Roberts, 439 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2006). 24, 25,
29, 46
Pletka v. Nix, 957 F.2d 1480 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 163. 3, 27
Plumb v. Prinslow, 847 F.Supp. 1509 (D.Or. 1994). 24, 36
Plumeau v. Yamhill Cty. Sch. Dist., 907 F.Supp. 1423
(D.Or. 1995). 14, 27
Plyler v. Evatt, 846 F.2d 208 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 241. 9, 15, 27
Plyler v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273 (4th Cir. 1990). 5
Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728 (4th Cir. 1997). 22, 36
Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). 1,
2, 5, 7, 16, 17, 27, 30, 32, 36, 46
Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 532 F.Supp.2d
275 (D.Mass. 2008). 31
Poirier v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 558 F.3d 92
(1st Cir. 2009). 24, 31
Polanco v. Dworzack, 25 F.Supp.2d 148 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
29
Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2007). 1, 40
Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 1997). 1, 10, 22
Policano v. Koehler, 715 F.Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 14,
39
Polk v. Montgomery County, MD, 689 F.Supp. 556 (D. Md.
1988). 5, 17, 41
Pollard v. Montgomery County, 66 F.Supp.2d 1218
(M.D.Ala. 1999). 31
Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 239, reh'g. denied, 109 S.Ct. 545.
19, 37, 38, 39, 40
Ponchik v. Bogan, 929 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1991). 47
Ponzini v. Monroe County, 897 F.Supp.2d 282 (M.D.Pa.
2012). 14, 29, 30, 32, 45
Pool v. Mo. Dept. of Corr. and Human Resources, 883 F.2d
640 (8th Cir. 1989). 48
Pool v. Sebastian County, Ark., 418 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
2005). 17, 29
Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012). 4, 29, 35, 44
Poole v. Kelly, 954 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 20, 22, 36,
43
Poole v. Stephens, 688 F.Supp. 149 (D. N.J. 1988). 31, 41
Poole v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 578 (D.Del. 2006). 9, 29,
32, 40
Poore v. Glanz, 46 F.Supp.3d 1191 (N.D.Okla. 2014). 14,
17, 26, 45
Pope v. Hightower, 101 F.3d 1382 (11th Cir. 1996). 1, 19,
39
Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90 (7th Cir. 1996). 14, 27, 47
Popham v. City of Talladega, 742 F.Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ala.
1989). 14, 24
Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir.
1990). 14, 45, 46
Popoalii v. Correctional Medical Services, 512 F.3d 488
(8th Cir. 2008).14, 17, 29
Porm v. White, 762 F.2d 635 (1985). 14
Porras v. Montefiore Medical Center, 742 F.Supp. 120
(S.DN.Y. 1990). 31
Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010). 7, 32, 48
Portee v. Tollison, 753 F.Supp. 184 (D. S.C. 1990),
affirmed, 929 F.2d 694. 8, 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Portentoso v. Kern, 532 F.Supp.2d 920 (N.D.Ohio 2008).
16, 36, 41
Porter v, Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002). 1, 21
Porter v. Caruso, 431 F.Supp.2d 768 (W.D.Mich. 2006). 18,
19, 37
Porter v. Coughlin, 964 F.Supp. 97 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 3, 11
Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011). 2, 24, 36, 46
Porter v. Selsky, 287 F.Supp.2d 180 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) 3, 9,
40
Porterfield v. Durst, 589 F.Supp.2d 523 (D.Del. 2008). 29
Porth v. Farrier, 934 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1991). 9, 23, 40
Portis v. City of Chicago, 510 F.Supp.2d 461 (N.D.Ill.
2007). 2, 36
Portis v. City of Chicago, Ill., 613 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2010).
32, 36
Portis v. Evans, 297 S.E.2d 248 (Sup. Ct. Ga. 1982). 1, 47
Portley-El v. Brill, 288 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir. 2002). 20
Posey v. Dewalt, 86 F.Supp.2d 565 (E.D.Va. 1999). 8, 22
Posey v. Southwestern Bell Telephone L.P., 430 F.Supp.2d
616 (N.D.Tex. 2006). 14, 25, 32
Poston v. Fox, 577 F.Supp. 915 (D. N.J. 1984). 5, 27
Potter v. Ledesma, 541 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Puerto Rico
2008). 27, 29
Potts v. City of Philadelphia, 224 F.Supp.2d 919 (E.D.Pa.
2002). 16, 32
Potts v. Holt, 13 F.Supp.3d 445 (M.D.Pa. 2014). 18, 37, 39
Potts v. Moreci, 12 F.Supp.3d 1065 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 3, 8, 9,
27, 32
Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568 (9th Cir. 2012). 22, 37, 49
Pourmoghani-Esfahani v. Gee, 625 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.
2010). 14, 17, 29, 32, 39, 45
Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga. 2005). 25,
32, 36, 41
Powell v. Barrett, 541 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). 13, 25,
32, 36
Powell v. Cusimano, 326 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.Conn. 2004). 3,
13, 41
Powell v. Department of Corrections, State of Okl., 647
F.Supp. 968 (N.D. Okl. 1986). 1, 3, 8, 29, 37
Powell v. Estelle, 959 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 668. 37, 39
Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir. 1990). 24, 29
Powell v. Morris, 37 F.Supp.2d 1011 (S.D.Ohio 1999). 31
Powell v. Riveland, 991 F.Supp. 1249 (W.D.Wash. 1997).
7, 19, 28
Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2012). 1, 29
Powell v. Ward, 643 F.2d 924 (2nd Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
102 S.Ct. 131. 11
Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338 (3rd Cir. 2014). 36
Powells v. Minnehaha County Sheriff Dept., 198 F.3d 711
(8th Cir. 1999). 1, 7, 28
Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Com'n, 501
F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007). 1, 43
Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 576 F.Supp.2d 67
(D.D.C. 2008). 14, 32, 48
Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 594 F.Supp.2d 54
(D.D.C. 2009). 14, 29, 32
Powers-Bunce v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 173
(D.D.C. 2009). 14, 25, 29, 32, 46
Powloski v. Wullich, 479 N.Y.S.2d 89 (App. 1984). 12
Pratt v. City of New York, 929 F.Supp.2d 314(S.D.N.Y.
2013). 9, 10, 15
Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1995). 8, 19, 47
Pratt v. Rowland, 770 F.Supp. 1399 (N.D. Cal. 1991). 3, 11
Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2006). 1

TC-74
XXVI

Praylor v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 423 F.3d 524
(5th Cir. 2005). 29
Praylor v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 430 F.3d 1208
(5th Cir. 2005). 17, 29, 38
Preast v. Cox, 628 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1980). 1, 19
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 7, 11, 20, 22, 43
Presley v. City of Blackshear, 650 F.Supp.2d 1307 (S.D.Ga.
2008). 14, 25, 27, 29, 32, 44
Pressley v. Brown, 754 F.Supp. 112 (W.D. Mich. 1990). 3,
12
Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1987). 39, 48
Preston v. Thompson, 589 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1978). 23
Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307 (E.D.Va. 1999). 9, 14, 32
Prevard v. Fauver, 47 F.Supp.2d 539 (D.N.J. 1999). 7, 20,
34, 36, 43, 50
Price v. Barry, 53 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 36
Price v. Caruso, 451 F.Supp.2d 889 (E.D.Mich. 2006). 24,
27, 37
Price v. Correctional Medical Services, 493 F.Supp.2d 740
(D.Del. 2007). 1, 29, 47
Price v. District of Columbia, 545 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C.
2008). 14
Price v. Dixon, 961 F. Supp. 894 (E.D.N.C. 1997). 39, 48
Price v. Kelly, 847 F.Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1994). 3, 11
Price v. Sasser, 65 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1995). 14
Price v. Wall, 428 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2006). 1, 34, 47
Price v. Wall, 464 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.R.I. 2006). 1, 8, 47
Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). 27, 29
Priest v. Gudmanson, 902 F.Supp. 844 (E.D.Wis. 1995). 1
Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245 (4th Cir. 2015). 9, 10, 12, 49
Primus v. Lee, 517 F.Supp.2d 755 (D.S.C. 2007). 27, 29, 39
Prison Law Office v. Koenig, 233 Cal. Rptr. 590 (Cal. App.
1 Dist. 1986). 36
Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz.
2013). 2, 19, 27, 28, 38, 39
Prison Legal News v. Chapman, 44 F.Supp.3d 1289
(M.D.Ga. 2014). 19, 28, 38
Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d
1068 (D.Or. 2013). 2, 19, 27, 28, 32, 38, 39
Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2001).
19, 28
Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys,
628 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2011). 2, 33
Prison Legal News v. Jones, 126 F.Supp.3d 1233 (N.D. Fla.
2015). 19, 28
Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C.
2006). 2, 19
Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2005).
19, 28
Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir.
2012). 2, 19, 28, 38, 39
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095
(N.D.Cal. 2008). 4, 5, 19, 28
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446 (9th
Cir. 2010). 4, 5, 28
Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113
F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 2, 4, 5, 19, 42
Prison Legal News, Inc. v. Simmons, 401 F.Supp.2d 1181
(D.Kan. 2005). 24, 38
Probst v. Central Ohio Youth Center, 511 F.Supp.2d 862
(S.D. Ohio 2007). 14, 25, 26, 27, 30
Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F.Supp.2d 743 (E.D.Mich. 2009).
14, 24, 28, 30, 35, 38, 41
Proctor v. Horn, 95 F.Supp.3d 1242 (D. Nev. 2015). 29
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). 1, 28

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). 7, 27, 28
Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986). 1
Proffitt v. Ridgway, 279 F.3d 503 (7th Cir. 2002). 14, 32
Proffitt v. U.S., 758 F.Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1990). 11
Profitt v. District of Columbia, 790 F.Supp. 304 (D. D.C.
1991). 31, 41
Prophete v. Gilless, 869 F.Supp. 537 (W.D. Tenn. 1994). 1,
10, 18
Propst v. Leapley, 886 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir. 1989). 7, 11
Prosser v. Nagaldinne, 927 F.Supp.2d 708 (E.D.Mo. 2013).
29
Prosser v. Ross, 70 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 1995). 14
Proudfoot v. Williams, 803 F.Supp. 1048 (E.D.Pa. 1992). 1,
41
Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 364. 1
Prows v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 704 F.Supp. 272 (D. D.C.
1988). 35, 50
Prude v. Clarke, 675 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2012). 10, 18, 29
Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403 (5th
Cir. 2007). 5, 6, 44
Pruitt v. Joiner, 395 N.E.2d 276 (3rd Dist. 1979). 9, 22, 32
Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F.Supp. 863 (E.D. N.C.
1983). 18, 37
Pryor v. Dearborn Police Dept., 452 F.Supp.2d 714
(E.D.Mich. 2006). 14, 25, 29, 32
Pryor-el v. Kelly, 892 F.Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1995). 1, 10, 21,
29, 34, 35
Puccini v. U.S., 978 F.Supp. 760 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 13, 16, 24,
36
Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 2, 21,
24, 37, 39, 47
Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1977). 32
Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F.Supp.2d 759 (M.D.Pa. 2013).
6, 22
Pulaski County Civil Service Com'n. v. Davis, 730 S.W.2d
220 (Ark. 1987). 31
Pulliam v. Tallapoosa County Jail, 185 F.3d 1182 (11th Cir.
1999). 31
Purcell ex rel. Estate of Morgan v. Toombs County, 400
F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2005). 2, 8,
Purkey v. CCA Detention Center, 339 F.Supp.2d 1145
(D.Kan. 2004). 1, 19, 21, 27, 32
Purvis v. Ponte, 929 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1991). 8, 14
Purvis. v. City of Atlanta, 142 F.Supp.3d 1337 (N.D. Ga.
2015). 16, 24, 32, 36
Putman v. Gerloff, 701 F.2d 63 (8th Cir. 1983). 48
Pyka v. Village of Orlando Park, 906 F.Supp. 1196 (N.D.Ill
1995). 6, 14, 32, 46, 48
Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403 (7th Cir. 2014). 9, 29
Pyles v. Kamka, 491 F.Supp. 204 (D. Md. 1980). 9, 11
Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 2, 14,
17, 24, 45
Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 1999). 16, 25, 29, 32
Quam v. Minnehaha County Jail, 821 F.2d 522 (8th Cir.
1987). 11
Quarles v. Palakovich, 736 F.Supp.2d 941 (M.D.Pa. 2010).
9, 15
Quarrels v. Breton, 645 F.Supp. 211 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 10,
29
Quartararo v. Catterson, 73 F.Supp.2d 270 (E.D.N.Y.
1999). 36, 50
Quartararo v. Catterson, 917 F.Supp. 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
11, 24, 36

TC-75
XXVI

Quartararo v. Hoy, 113 F.Supp.2d 405(E.D.N.Y. 2000). 24,
27, 36, 50
Quasim v. Scully, 708 F.Supp. 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 49
Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2013).
29, 30
Quinlan v. Fairman, 663 F.Supp. 24 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 11
Quinn v. Cunningham, 879 F.Supp. 25 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 21,
50
Quinn v. Nix, 983 F.2d 115 (8th Cir. 1993). 19, 27, 38
Quinones v. Durkis, 638 F.Supp. 856 (S.D. Fla. 1986). 27
Quinones-Ruiz v. Pereira-Castillo, 607 F.Supp.2d 296
(D.Puerto Rico 2009). 10, 41
Quint v. Cox, 348 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Kan. 2004). 25, 29,
32
Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F.Supp.3d 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2015). 1, 11,
21, 35, 41
Quiroz v. Short, 85 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D.Cal. 2015). 1, 11,
19, 21, 28
Qureshi v. U.S., 600 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2010). 1, 27
R.G. v. Koller, 415 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Hawai’i 2006). 7, 8,
26, 27
Ra Chaka v. Franzen, 727 F.Supp. 454 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 37,
39
Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 2000). 22, 47
Raffone v. Robinson, 607 F.2d 1058 (2nd Cir. 1979). 3, 24
Ragan v. Lynch, 113 F.3d 875 (8th Cir. 1997). 11, 20
Ragins v. Gilmore, 48 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D.Va. 1999). 36
Ragland v. Angelone, 420 F.Supp.2d 507 (W.D.Va. 2006).
19, 37, 38
Rahim v. Holden, 882 F.Supp.2d 638 (D.Del. 2012). 1, 21,
36
Rahman v. Schriro, 22 F.Supp.3d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 14,
29, 32, 41, 48, 50
Rahman v. Stephenson, 626 F.Supp. 886 (W.D. Tenn.
1986). 29, 37, 38
Rahman X v. Morgan, 300 F.3d 970 (8th Cir. 2002). 3, 9
Raines v. Lack, 714 F.Supp. 889 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). 3, 11,
27, 47
Raines v. State of Fla., 983 F.Supp. 1362 (N.D.Fla. 1997).
7, 20, 50
Rainey v. Conerly, 973 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1992). 48
Raley v. Fraser, 747 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1984). 5, 27, 48
Ralk v. Lincoln County, GA., 81 F.Supp.2d 1372 (S.D.Ga.
2000). 29, 32
Ralston v. McGovern, 167 F.3d 1160 (7th Cir. 1999). 10,
27, 29
Ramer v. Kerby, 936 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991). 11, 22
Ramey v. Hawk, 730 F.Supp. 1366 (E.D.N.C. 1989). 11, 41
Ramirez v. Department of Corrections, Colo., 222 F.3d
1238 (10th Cir. 2000). 31
Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Service, 715 F.2d 694 (1st Cir.
1983). 24, 31
Ramirez v. Pugh, 486 F.Supp.2d 421 (M.D.Pa. 2007). 19,
38
Ramirez v. U.S., 998 F.Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1998). 16, 27
Ramos Bonilla v. Vivoni Del Valle, 336 F.Supp.2d 159
(D.Puerto Rico 2004). 16, 32
Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F.Supp. 122 (D. Colo. 1979), cert.
denied, 101 S.Ct. 1759. 29
Ramos v. Lamm, 632 F.Supp. 376 (D. Colo. 1986). 5
Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1041. 5, 10, 18, 28, 40, 44
Ramos v. O'Connell, 28 F.Supp.2d 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Ramos-Martinez v. Negron-Fernandez, 393 F.Supp.2d 118
(D.Puerto Rico 2005). 31
Ramsey v. Busch, 19 F.Supp.2d 73 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 14,
Ramsey v. Coughlin, 1 F.Supp.2d 198 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
18, 29, 37
Ramsey v. Goord, 661 F.Supp.2d 370 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 11,
18, 20, 24, 37
Ramsey v. Schauble, 141 F.Supp.2d 584 (W.D.N.C. 2001).
13, 14, 27, 29, 32
Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). 1, 21,
29, 32
Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991). 36, 43
Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 2000). 13
Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
7, 8, 9, 14, 24, 29, 30, 39, 48, 50
Randle v. Parker, 48 F.3d 301 (8th Cir. 1995). 14
Randolph v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Services, 453 F.3d 724
(6th Cir. 2006). 31
Randolph v. Rodgers, 170 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 1999). 7, 11,
34
Randolph v. Simmons, 757 F.Supp.2d 233 (W.D.N.Y.
2010). 11
Randolph v. State, 74 F.Supp.2d 537 (D.Md. 1999). 14, 29,
36
Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F.Supp.2d 605 (E.D.Pa. 2013). 1,
9, 11, 12, 29, 35
Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 217 F.3d 77 (2nd Cir. 2000).
14, 27
Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234 (Fla. App. 5 Dist. 1985).
17, 41
Ransom v. Davies, 816 F.Supp. 681 (D.Kan. 1993). 11
Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1999). 11, 18, 24,
32, 37
Rapier v. Kankakee County, Ill., 203 F.Supp.2d 978
(C.D.Ill. 2002). 14, 32, 45
Rasheed-Bey v. Duckworth, 969 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1992).
11
Rashid v. Khulmann, 991 F.Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 22
Raske v. Martinez, 876 F.2d 1496 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 543. 20, 22, 36
Rasul v. District of Columbia, 680 F.Supp. 436 (D. D.C.
1988). 31
Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 7, 9, 10, 27,
37
Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). 7, 10,
24, 48
Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 433 F.Supp.2d 58 (D.D.C. 2006). 32, 37
Ratcliff v. Moore, 614 F.Supp.2d 880 (S.D.Ohio 2009). 1,
12
Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 788 F.Supp.2d 839
(N.D.Iowa 2011). 17, 27, 41
Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976
(N.D.Iowa 2012). 2, 25, 32, 41
Rawls v. Sundquist, 929 F.Supp. 284 (M.D.Tenn. 1996). 7,
12, 35, 38
Ray v. Kertes, 285 F.3d 287 (3rd Cir. 2002). 1, 13, 21
Ray v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864 (7th Cir.
2013). 10, 29
Rayes v. Eggars, 838 F.Supp. 1372 (D.Neb. 1993). 29, 37
Rayfield v. S.C. Dept. of Corrections, 374 S.E.2d 910 (S.C.
App. 1988). 2, 14, 36
Reckard v. County of Westchester, 351 F.Supp.2d 157
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 31
Redd v. Dougherty, 578 F.Supp.2d 1042 (N.D.Ill. 2008). 31
Redd v. Gilless, 857 F.Supp. 601 (W.D.Tenn. 1994). 14

TC-76
XXVI

Redding v. Florida, Dept. of Juvenile Justice, 401
F.Supp.2d 1255 (N.D.Fla. 2005). 2, 31
Redding v. Marsh, 750 F.Supp. 473 (E.D. Okl. 1990). 29
Redman v. County of San Diego, 896 F.2d 362 (9th Cir.
1990). 8, 14, 32
Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 972. 14, 32
Redmond v. Baxley, 475 F.Supp. 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
14, 45
Redmond v. Gill, 352 F.3d 801 (3rd Cir. 2003) 1
Reece v. Gragg, 650 F.Supp. 1297 (10th Cir. 1986). 8, 9,
10, 15, 32
Reed v. Baca, 800 F.Supp.2d 1102 (C.D.Cal. 2011). 16, 27,
32
Reed v. Cedar County, 474 F.Supp.2d 1045 (N.D.Iowa
2007). 31
Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1990). 14, 29
Reed v. Faulkner, 653 F.Supp. 965 (N.D. Ind. 1987). 23, 37,
38, 39
Reed v. Iranon, 940 F.Supp. 1523 (D.Hawai'i 1996). 24, 36
Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 1999). 10, 18, 29
Reed v. McKune, 298 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2002). 7, 34
Reed v. OSP, 773 P.2d 5 (Or. App. 1989). 11
Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484 (7th Cir. 1991). 31
Reed v. Woodruff County Ark., 7 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 1993).
14, 29
Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2010). 21,
29
Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2011). 2, 35
Reeves v. Collins, 27 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 1994). 29, 50
Reeves v. King, 774 F.3d 430 (8th Cir. 2014). 11, 14
Reeves v. Pettcox, 19 F.3d 1060 (5th Cir. 1994). 11, 38
Regional Economic Community v. City of Middletown, 294
F.3d 35 (2nd Cir. 2002). 2, 15
Reid v. Artus, 984 F.Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 3, 23, 29
Reid v. Cumberland County, 34 F.Supp.3d 396 (D.N.J.
2013). 1, 2, 48
Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). 1, 6, 22,
27, 32, 39
Reid v. Griffin, 808 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 2015). 29, 30
Reid v. Johnson, 333 F.Supp.2d 543 (E.D.Va. 2004). 10
Reilly v. Grayson, 157 F.Supp.2d 762 (E.D.Mich. 2001). 8,
9, 10, 27, 29, 38
Reilly v. Grayson, 310 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2002). 9, 10, 27,
29, 38
Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617 (6th Cir. 2012). 27, 29
Reimann v. Frank, 397 F.Supp.2d 1059 (W.D.Wis. 2005).
1, 8, 12, 29
Reimann v. Murphy, 897 F.Supp. 398 (E.D.Wis. 1995). 19,
37
Reimers v. State of Or., 863 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1988). 37
Reinhardt v. Kopcow, 66 F.Supp.3d 1348 (D.Colo. 2014).
7, 19, 34, 43
Reinhart v. City of Schenectady Police Dept., 599
F.Supp.2d 323 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). 17, 25, 32, 41
Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, Mo., 724 F.Supp. 662
(E.D.Mo. 1989), affirmed, 924 F.2d 794. 14, 24, 25,
29
Rellergert v. Cape Girardeau County, Mo., 924 F.2d 794
(8th Cir. 1991). 24, 29
Rembert v. Holland, 735 F.Supp. 733 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
14
Remmers v. Brewer, 361 F.Supp. 537 (N.D. Iowa 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012. 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Renaud v. Wyoming Dept. of Family Services, 203 F.3d
723 (10th Cir. 2000). 31
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315 (3rd Cir. 2010). 34,
43
Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182 (4th Cir. 2009). 18, 27,
37
Reneer v. Sewell, 975 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1992). 1, 28
Renkel v. U.S., 456 F.3d 640 (6th Cir. 2006). 29
Reno v. Koray, 115 S.Ct. 2021 (1995). 22, 43
Rentschler v. Campbell, 739 F.Supp. 561 (D.Kan. 1990). 1,
28
Rentz v. Spokane County, 438 F.Supp.2d 1252 (E.D.Wash.
2006). 14, 32, 44
Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 2003) 37
Resnick v. Adams, 37 F.Supp.2d 1154 (C.D.Cal. 1999). 20,
22, 32, 43
Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 2000). 3, 32
Reutcke v. Dahm, 707 F.Supp. 1121 (D.Neb. 1988). 1, 3, 27
Revilla v. Glanz, 7 F.Supp.3d 1207 (N.D.Okla. 2014). 14,
27, 29, 30, 32
Revilla v. Glanz, 8 F.Supp.3d 1336 (N.D.Okla. 2014). 27,
29, 32
Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016). 1, 21
Reyes-Morales v. Wells, 766 F.Supp.2d 1349 (S.D.Ga.
2011). 20, 22, 34
Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2nd Cir. 2012). 7, 34, 50
Reynolds v. Barrett, 741 F.Supp.2d 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2010).
7, 50
Reynolds v. Bucks, 833 F.Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 38
Reynolds v. City of Anchorage, 225 F.Supp.2d 754
(W.D.Ky. 2002). 26, 41
Reynolds v. Dormire, 636 F.3d 976 (8th Cir. 2011). 14, 29,
39
Reynolds v. Powell, 370 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2004). 9, 39
Reynolds v. Sheriff, City of Richmond, 574 F.Supp. 90
(E.D. Vir., 1983). 14, 27, 32
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166 (3rd Cir. 1997). 4, 29,
32, 35
Reynolds v. Wagner, 936 F.Supp. 1216 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 1,
2, 4, 29, 35
Reynolds v. Wolff, 916 F.Supp. 1018 (D.Nev 1996). 11, 20
Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2012). 3, 9, 47
Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F.Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). 11,
12, 14, 32, 45
Rhem v. Malcolm, 396 F.Supp. 1195 (S.D. N.Y. 1975). 8,
11, 12, 39
Rhem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2nd Cir. 1975). 49
Rhode Island Broth. Of Officers v. Rhode Island, 264
F.Supp.2d 87 (D.R.I. 2003). 31
Rhode Island Broth., Correct. Offic. v. Rhode Isl., 357 F.3d
42 (1st Cir. 2004). 31
Rhode Island Defense Attorneys' Assoc. v. Dodd, 463 A.2d
1370 (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1983). 1, 41, 49
Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999). 1, 22
Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S.Ct. 2392 (1981). 9, 10, 14, 15,
40, 46
Rhodes v. Knight, 861 F.Supp. 980 (D.Kan. 1994),
affirmed, 45 F.3d 440. 1, 3, 50
Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005). 1, 21, 35,
47
Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S.Ct. 202 (1988). 5
Rial v. McGinnis, 756 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 1, 22
Ribble v. Lucky, 817 F.Supp. 653 (E.D.Mich. 1993). 14
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2004). 14

TC-77
XXVI

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d
650 (7th Cir. 2012). 3, 9, 14, 23, 27, 29, 30, 32, 45, 48
Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2004). 19, 38
Rice v. McBride, 967 F.Supp. 1097 (N.D.Ind. 1997). 11, 22
Rich v. Bruce, 129 F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 1997). 14, 39
Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir.
1992). 14, 24, 32
Rich v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 716 F.3d
525 (11th Cir. 2013). 2, 18, 37
Richard v. Fischer, 38 F.Supp.3d 340 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). 11,
21, 34, 37, 50
Richard v. Reed, 49 F.Supp.2d 485 (E.D.Va. 1999). 9, 10,
12, 15
Richards v. Dretke, 394 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2004). 11, 20
Richards v. Jones, 31 F.Supp.3d 630 (D.Del. 2014). 29
Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2012). 1, 29
Richards v. Southeast Alabama Youth Ser. Diversion, 105
F.Supp.2d 1268 (M.D.Ala. 2000). 14, 26, 32, 39
Richards v. State of Connecticut Dept. of Corrs., 349
F.Supp.2d 278 (D.Conn. 2004). 31
Richards v. Thaler, 710 F.3d 573 (5th Cir. 2013). 22
Richards v. White, 957 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1992). 37
Richardson v. Coughlin, 763 F.Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). 11, 19
Richardson v. McDonnell, 841 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1988). 1,
28
Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S.Ct. 2100 (1997). 27
Richardson v. Nassau County, 277 F.Supp.2d 196
(E.D.N.Y. 2003). 29, 32
Richardson v. New York State Dept. of Corr. Ser., 180 F.3d
426 (2nd Cir. 1999). 31
Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392 (7th Cir. 1988). 14, 27
Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010). 7, 8,
12, 39
Richardson v. Van Dusen, 833 F.Supp. 146 (N.D.N.Y.
1993). 11, 48
Richerson v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Government,
958 F.Supp. 299 (E.D.Ky. 1996). 32, 41
Richman v. Sheahan, 512 F.3d 876 (7th Cir. 2008). 14, 24,
48
Richmond v. Cagle, 920 F.Supp. 955 (E.D.Wis. 1996). 34
Richmond v. Ricketts, 640 F.Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1986). 22
Richmond v. Stigile, 22 F.Supp.2d 476 (D.Md. 1998). 1, 4,
23, 35
Rickenbacker v. U.S., 365 F.Supp.2d 347 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
32, 42, 43
Ricker v. Leapley, 25 F.3d 1406 (8th Cir. 1994). 3, 11
Rickman v. Avaniti, 854 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1988). 41
Riddick v. Sutton, 794 F.Supp. 169 (E.D.N.C. 1992). 33
Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1996). 8, 29,
30, 34, 36
Rider v. Louw, 957 F.Supp 983 (E.D.Mich. 1997). 14
Ridley v. Leavitt, 631 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1980). 48
Rienholtz v. Campbell, 64 F.Supp.2d 721 (W.D.Tenn.
1999). 1, 21, 38, 47, 50
Rigano v. County of Sullivan, 486 F.Supp.2d 244 (S.D.N.Y.
2007). 8, 14, 45
Rigg v. City of Lakewood, 896 F.Supp.2d 978 (D.Colo.
2012). 14, 27
Riggins v. Walter, 279 F.3d 422 (7th Cir. 2001). 3, 11
Riker v. Lemmon, 798 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2015). 19, 31, 49
Riley v. Blagojevich, 425 F.3d 357 (7th Cir. 2005). 31
Riley v. Church, 874 F.Supp. 765 (E.D. Mich. 1994). 11, 21
Riley v. County of Cook, 682 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill.
2010). 2, 14, 27

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997). 32, 48
Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143 (3rd Cir. 1985). 14, 39
Riley v. Kolitwenzew, 967 F.Supp.2d 1251 (C.D.Ill. 2013).
1
Riley v. Kurtz, 361 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2004). 5, 27
Riley v. Kurtz, 893 F.Supp. 709 (E. D.Mich. 1995). 1, 28,
11
Riley v. Olk-Long, 282 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2002). 14, 17, 27,
45
Riley v. Snyder, 72 F.Supp.2d 456 (D.Del. 1999). 9
Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 1995). 3, 8
Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973). 37,
38
Ringenberg v. Cox, 524 F.Supp. 112 (E.D. Va. 1981). 36
Ringgold v. Lamby, 565 F.Supp.2d 549 (D.Del. 2008). 29,
33, 50
Ringuette v. City of Fall River, 146 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998).
16, 32
Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1987). 11, 19, 27, 38
Ripp v. Nickel, 838 F.Supp.2d 861 (W.D.Wis. 2012). 1, 11
Risdal v. Iowa, 243 F.Supp.2d 970 (S.D.Iowa 2003). 1, 4,
22
Risdal v. Martin, 810 F.Supp. 1049 (S.D. Iowa 1993). 23,
48
Rise v. State, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995). 33, 41, 43
Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1991). 16, 46
Rivas v. Martin, 781 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind. 2011). 6, 24,
32, 36
Rivera Borrero v. Rivera Correa, 93 F.Supp.2d 122
(D.Puerto Rico 2000). 8, 39
Rivera v. Alvarado, 240 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Puerto Rico
2003). 29
Rivera v. Dyett, 762 F.Supp. 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 5
Rivera v. Smith, 462 N.Y.S.2d 352 (App. 1983). 37, 41
Rivera-Feliciano v. Acevedo-Vila, 438 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.
2006). 36
Rivera-Quinones v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 397 F.Supp.2d 334
(D.Puerto Rico 2005). 1, 14, 45
Rivers v. State, 537 N.Y.S.2d 968 (Ct.Cl. 1989). 27, 29
Rizvi v. Crabtree, 42 F.Supp.2d 1024 (D.Or. 1999). 3, 19,
22, 47
Roach v. Kligman, 412 F.Supp. 521 (E.D. Penn. 1976). 29
Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). 5
Robbins v. Clarke, 946 F.2d 1331 (8th Cir. 1991). 8, 29, 33
Roberson v. Bradshaw, 198 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 1999). 29
Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 48
Robert v. Carter, 819 F.Supp.2d 832 (S.D.Inc. 2011). 2, 31
Roberts v. Champion, 255 F.Supp.2d 1272 (N.D.Okla.
2003). 1, 37, 38
Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1985). 14,
27, 32
Roberts v. Cohn, 63 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D.Ind. 1999). 1, 35
Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F.Supp.2d 784
(N.D.Ohio 2007). 2, 9, 27, 32
Roberts v. Klein, 770 F.Supp.2d 1102 (D.Nev. 2011). 11,
18, 24, 37, 50
Roberts v. Mahoning County, 495 F.Supp.2d 719
(N.D.Ohio 2007). 9, 15, 27, 32, 36
Roberts v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 149 (N.D.N.Y.2012).
2, 24, 31
Roberts v. Rhode Island, 175 F.Supp.2d 176 (D.R.I. 2000).
25, 41
Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept., 500 F.3d
1185 (10th Cir. 2007). 1, 29, 42

TC-78
XXVI

Robeson v. Squadrito, 57 F.Supp.2d 642 (N.D.Ind. 1999).
9, 12, 18, 23, 29, 32
Robey v. Chester County, 946 F.Supp. 333 (E.D.Pa. 1996).
14, 30, 32
Robinson v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 997 F.Supp.
1303 (C.D.Cal. 1998). 36
Robinson v. Catlett, 725 F.Supp.2d 1203 (S.D.Cal. 2010).
8, 29
Robinson v. Cavanaugh, 20 F.3d 892 (8th Cir. 1994). 14,
39, 50
Robinson v. City of Chicago, 638 F.Supp. 186 (N.D. Ill.
1986), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 756. 16
Robinson v. Danberg, 729 F.Supp.2d 666 (D.Del. 2010). 9,
21, 32
Robinson v. Estate of Williams, 721 F.Supp. 806 (S.D.
Miss. 1989). 14, 27, 39
Robinson v. Fahey, 366 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Va. 2005). 36
Robinson v. Fauver, 932 F.Supp. 639 (D.N.J. 1996). 1, 4,
35
Robinson v. Hager, 292 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002). 29
Robinson v. IL State Corr. Ctr. (Statesville), 890 F.Supp.
715 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 3, 9, 18, 40, 42, 49
Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). 1,
16, 25, 32, 46
Robinson v. Moses, 644 F.Supp. 975 (N.D. Ind. 1986). 29,
32
Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1999). 7, 40
Robinson v. Phelps, 946 F.Supp.2d 354 (D.Del. 2013). 8, 9,
14, 29, 47, 48
Robinson v. Prunty, 249 F.3d 862 (9th Cir. 2001). 3, 12, 14
Robinson v. Ridge, 996 F.Supp. 447 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 1, 35,
37, 39, 41
Robinson v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 244 F.Supp.2d 57
(N.D.N.Y. 2003). 14, 45
Robinson v. Young, 674 F.Supp. 1356 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
11, 38
Robles v. U.S., 146 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Rocheleau v. Cumberland County Sheriff's Department, 733
F.Supp. 140 (D. Me. 1990). 27
Rochon v. L.A. State Penitentiary Inmate Account, 880
F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 742.
35
Rochon v. Maggio, 517 So.2d 213 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1987).
1, 28, 35, 39, 41
Rock v. McCoy, 763 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1985). 25, 29, 32,
48
Rockford Memorial Hosp. v. Schueler, 521 N.E.2d 251 (Ill.
App. 2 Dist. 1988). 4
Rodgers v. Thomas, 879 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1989). 11
Rodi v. Ventetuolo, 941 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1991). 3, 24
Rodney v. Romano, 814 F.Supp. 311 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 30
Rodriguez v. Ames, 224 F.Supp.2d 555 (W.D.N.Y. 2002).
1, 19, 33
Rodriguez v. Ames, 287 F.Supp.2d 213 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)
29, 33
Rodriguez v. Blaedow, 497 F.Supp. 558 (E.D. Wisc. 1980).
19, 39
Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005). 11, 18,
35, 38
Rodriguez v. Connecticut, 169 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.Conn.
2001). 14
Rodriguez v. Coughlin, 795 F.Supp. 609 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
1, 41
Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 1012
(C.D. Cal. 2014). 1, 5, 27, 48

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 990
(C.D. Cal. 2014). 13, 27, 48
Rodriguez v. Jiminez, 409 F.Supp. 582 (D. P.R. 1976). 1, 9,
10, 23, 26, 27, 38
Rodriguez v. Kincheloe, 763 F.Supp. 463 (E.D. Wash.
1991), affirmed 967 F.2d 590. 21, 29, 33, 45
Rodriguez v. McClenning, 399 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y.
2005). 7, 11, 21, 33, 41
Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 1 F.Supp.2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
11, 48
Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470 (2nd Cir. 1995). 3, 39,
49
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Service, 577 F.3d 816
(7th Cir. 2009). 29
Rodriguez v. Reno, 164 F.3d 575 (11th Cir. 1999). 22
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 6, 7,
22, 27, 32, 36, 44
Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). 1, 6,
22, 27, 32
Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections, 508 F.3d
611 (11th Cir. 2007). 10, 14, 39
Rodriguez v. Shanahan, 84 F.Supp.3d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
6, 22
Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). 22, 36
Rodriguez v. U.S., 847 F.Supp. 231 (D. Puerto Rico 1993).
16, 32
Rodriguez v. Westchester County Jail Correctional, 372
F.3d 485 (2nd Cir. 2004). 1
Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399
(D.Puerto Rico 2009). 2, 14, 15, 32, 39, 45
Rodriguez-Marin v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 72 (1st Cir.
2006). 2, 27, 31
Rodriguez-Sanchez v. Acevedo-Vila, 763 F.Supp.2d 294
(D.Puerto Rico 2011). 9, 10, 15, 27
Rodriquez v. James, 823 F.2d 8 (2nd Cir. 1987). 28, 35
Roe v. County Com'n of Monongalia County, 926 F.Supp.
74 (N.D.W.Va. 1996) 7, 15, 25, 30
Roe v. Crawford, 396 F.Supp.2d 1041 (W.D.Mo. 2005). 17,
27, 29
Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006). 17,
29, 39
Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008). 2, 17, 29
Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72 (2nd Cir. 1999). 41, 43
Rogers v. Boatright, 709 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2013). 14, 29,
39, 47
Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C.
2012). 6, 13, 20, 36, 45, 46
Rogers v. Fair, 902 F.2d 140 (1st Cir. 1990). 24, 36
Rogers v. Haley, 421 F.Supp.2d 1361 (M.D.Ala. 2006). 2,
31
Rogers v. Haley, 436 F.Supp.2d 1256 (M.D.Ala. 2006). 31
Rogers v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections Spec. Unit, 160
F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 13, 22, 30
Rogers v. Isom, 709 F.Supp. 115 (E.D. Va. 1989). 1
Rogers v. Morris, 34 Fed.Appx. 481 (7th Cir. 2002). 19, 28,
38, 39
Rogers v. Oestreich, 736 F.Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1990). 2,
11
Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982). 37, 39
Rogge v. City of Richmond, Tex., 995 F.Supp.2d 657
(S.D.Tex. 2014). 14, 25, 32, 45
Rogowski v. Reno, 94 F.Supp.2d 177 (D.Conn. 1999). 22
Roland v. Murphy, 289 F.Supp.2d 321 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 1,
17, 33, 41
Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). 1, 21, 27

TC-79
XXVI

Roll v. Carnahan, 225 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2000). 43
Rollins v. Magnusson, 542 F.Supp.2d 114 (D.Me. 2008). 1,
35
Romaine v. Rawson, 140 F.Supp.2d 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2001).
14, 27
Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2012). 1, 22,
34, 36
Roman v. Donelli, 616 F.Supp.2d 299 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 21,
29
Roman v. Koehler, 775 F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 27
Romey v. Vanyur, 9 F.Supp.2d 565 (E.D.N.C. 1998). 22, 36
Romo v. Champion, 46 F.3d 1013 (10th Cir. 1995). 41, 49
Ronchetti v. Rickards, 790 F.Supp. 117 (N.D. W.Va. 1992).
36, 43
Rondon Pinto v. Jimenez Nettleship, 660 F.Supp. 255 (D.
P.R. 1987). 14, 27
Roop v. Squadrito, 70 F.Supp.2d 868 (N.D.Ind. 1999). 7, 8,
9, 12, 23, 32, 38, 40
Rosado v. Alameida, 349 F.Supp.2d 1340 (S.D.Cal. 2004).
29
Rosado v. Alameida, 497 F.Supp.2d 1179 (S.D.Cal. 2007).
29
Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003). 7,
22
Rosario v. Brawn, 670 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2012). 14, 29, 30,
32, 47
Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2015). 17, 29
Rosborough v. Management & Training Corp., 350 F.3d
459 (5th Cir. 2003) 27
Rosciszewski v. Adducci, 983 F.Supp.2d 910 (E.D.Mich.
2013). 6, 22
Roscom v. City of Chicago, 550 F.Supp. 153 (N.D. Ill.
1982). 17, 27, 41
Roscom v. City of Chicago, 570 F.Supp. 1259 (N.D. Ill.
1983). 41
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). 22
Rose v. Mayberg, 454 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2006). 7, 22
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 22
Rose v. Morris, 619 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1980). 36
Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich.
2005). 3, 32
Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F.Supp.2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
21, 49
Rosen v. Chang, 811 F.Supp. 754 (D.R.I. 1993). 29
Ross v. Blackledge, 477 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973). 37
Ross v. Clayton County, GA., 173 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir.
1999). 31
Ross v. Coughlin, 669 F.Supp. 1235 (S.D. N.Y. 1987). 18,
37, 38, 39
Ross v. Douglas County, Nebraska, 234 F.3d 391 (8th Cir.
2000). 31
Ross v. Keelings, 2 F.Supp.2d 810 (E.D.Va. 1998). 34, 37
Ross v. Kelly, 784 F.Supp. 35 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), affirmed,
970 F.2d 896. 29
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 1
Ross v. Qwens, 720 F.Supp. 490 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 49
Ross v. Thompson, 927 F.Supp. 956 (N.D.W.Va. 1996). 4,
36
Ross v. United States, 641 F.Supp. 368 (D. D.C. 1986). 14,
47
Rother v. NYS Dept. of Corrections and Community
Supervision, 970 F.Supp.2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). 2,
27, 31
Rothgeb v. United States, 789 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1986). 36,
43

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 523 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.N.D. 2007). 17,
34
Roubideaux v. North Dakota Dept. of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 570 F.3d 966 (8th Cir. 2009). 17, 34,
44, 47, 50
Roucchio v. Coughlin, 29 F.Supp.2d 72 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
13, 36, 50
Roucchio v. Coughlin, 923 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
34, 36
Rouse v. Benson, 193 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 1999). 7, 21, 37,
47
Rouse v. Plantier, 997 F.Supp. 575 (D.N.J. 1998). 7, 29
Rouser v. White, 630 F.Supp.2d 1165 (E.D.Cal. 2009). 27,
37
Rouser v. White, 707 F.Supp.2d 1055 (E.D.Cal. 2010). 21,
37, 38
Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159 (3rd Cir. 1997). 22, 36,
43
Rouster v. County of Saginaw, 749 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2014).
14, 29, 32
Rowe v. Davis, 373 F.Supp.2d 822 (N.D.Ind. 2005). 3, 37,
38
Rowe v. DeBruyn, 17 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 508. 11
Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 29
Rowe v. I.N.S., 45 F.Supp.2d 144 (D.Mass. 1999). 6
Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2007). 2, 27
Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 1999). 19, 28
Rowland v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971). 35, 38
Rowland v. U.S. Dist. Court for N.D. of Cal., 849 F.2d 380
(9th Cir. 1988). 9, 15
Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F.Supp. 257 (D. Neb. 1971). 49
Rowlery v. Genesee County, 54 F.Supp.3d 763 (E.D.Mich.
2014). 14, 27, 32, 46, 48
Rowold v. McBride, 973 F.Supp. 829 (N.D.Ind. 1997). 11,
22, 37, 50
Roy v. Johnson, 97 F.Supp.2d 1102 (S.D.Ala. 2000). 14
Royal v. Durison, 319 F.Supp.2d 534 (E.D.Pa. 2004). 36,
43
Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2004). 27
Royal v. Tombone, 141 F.3d 596 (5th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116 (3rd Cir. 1998). 22, 36
Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170
(D.D.C. 2013). 3, 8, 19, 33, 38, 39, 45, 49
Ruark v. Drury, 21 F.3d 213 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 66. 29
Ruark v. Solano, 928 F.2d 947 (10th Cir. 1991). 1
Rubins v. Roetker, 737 F.Supp. 1140 (D. Colo. 1990),
affirmed, 936 F.2d 583. 1, 48
Ruble v. King, 911 F.Supp. 1544 (N.D.Ga. 1995). 29, 48
Rublee v. Fleming, 160 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998). 34, 36
Rucci v. Thoubboron, 68 F.Supp.2d 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
31
Rucker v. City of Kettering, 84 F.Supp.2d 917 (S.D.Ohio
2000). 31, 44
Rucker v. Johnson, 724 F.Supp. 568 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 11, 24
Rudd v. Jones, 879 F.Supp. 621 (S.D. Miss. 1995). 1
Rudd v. Sargent, 866 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1989). 11
Ruehman v. Village of Palos Park, 842 F.Supp. 1043
(N.D.Ill. 1993), affirmed, 34 F.3d 525. 16, 24
Ruffin v. County of Los Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 951. 31
Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services, 907
F.Supp.2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 7, 16, 24, 36

TC-80
XXVI

Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S.Ct. 748
(1992). 15
Ruiz v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 118 (5th Cir. 1980). 5
Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F.Supp. 112 (S.D. Tex. 1986). 9, 15,
17, 27
Ruiz v. U.S., 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001). 27
Ruiz-Rosa v. Rullán, 485 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2007). 29, 32
Rules Regarding Inmate-Therapist Conf. 540 A.2d 212
(N.J. Super. A.D. 1988). 30, 33
Ruley v. Nevada Bd. of Prison Com'rs., 628 F.Supp. 108
(D. Nev. 1986). 2, 4, 11, 24, 35
Rumsey v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 327 F.Supp.2d
767 (E.D.Mich. 2004). 1
Rumsey v. N.Y. State Dept. of Corr. Services, 19 F.3d 83
(2nd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 202. 2, 5, 31
Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). 3, 19,
21, 24, 27, 37, 47
Rush v. McKune, 888 F.Supp. 123 (D.Kan. 1995). 3
Russ v. Young, 895 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1990). 8
Russell v. Coughlin, 774 F.Supp. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1991),
reversed, 15 F.3d 219. 11, 24
Russell v. Coughlin, 782 F.Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 11
Russell v. Coughlin, 910 F.2d 75 (2nd Cir. 1990). 3, 24
Russell v. Eaves, 722 F.Supp. 558 (E.D. Mo. 1989). 36
Russell v. Enser, 496 F.Supp. 320 (D. S.C. 1979). 29
Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005).
2, 6, 16, 32, 36
Russell v. Knox County, 826 F.Supp. 20 (D.Me. 1993). 14,
32, 45
Russell v. Richards, 384 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2004). 23, 29
Russell v. Scully, 15 F.3d 219 (2nd Cir. 1993). 3, 11
Russell v. Selsky, 35 F.3d 55 (2nd Cir. 1994). 11
Russo v. Honen, 755 F.Supp.2d 313 (D.Mass. 2010). 1, 21
Russo v. Johnson, 129 F.Supp.2d 1012 (S.D.Tex. 2001).
22, 43
Rust v. Clarke, 883 F.Supp. 1293 (D. Neb. 1995). 37
Ruston v. Department of Justice, 521 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C.
2007). 2
Rutherford v. Pitchess, 104 S.Ct. 3227 (1983). 5
Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F.Supp. 104 (C.D. Calif. 1978).
18
Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1983). 15,
32, 39, 49
Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167 F.3d 514 (9th Cir.
1999). 29, 32, 48
Ryan Robles v. Otero de Ramos, 729 F.Supp. 920 (D.Puerto
Rico 1989). 24, 39, 46, 48
Ryan v. Burlington County, 674 F.Supp. 464 (D. N.J.
1987), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1745. 8, 14, 32
Ryan v. Burlington County, N.J., 708 F.Supp. 623 (D. N.J.
1989). 8, 14, 24, 39
Ryan v. Sargent, 969 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 1000. 3
Ryder v. Freeman, 918 F.Supp. 157 (W.D.N.C. 1996). 31,
46
Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F.Supp. 1493 (E.D.Wash.
1993). 37, 41,
S.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Pierce Tp. Bd. of Trustees, 771 F.3d 956
(6th Cir. 2014). 16, 25, 26, 32
Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995). 27, 35
Saenz v. Marshall, 791 F.Supp. 812 (C.D.Cal. 1992),
affirmed 990 F.2d 1260. 1
Safe Haven Sober Houses, LLC v. City of Boston, 517
F.Supp.2d 557 (D.Mass.2007). 2, 7

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Sahagian v. Dickey, 646 F.Supp. 1502 (W.D. Wis. 1986). 2,
35, 50
Said v. Lacky, 731 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. App. 1987). 31
Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2008). 8, 9, 15, 34, 40
Salaam v. Lockhart, 905 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1990),cert
denied, 111 S.Ct. 677. 37
Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 674 F.Supp. 1048 (S.D. N.Y.
1987). 47, 50
Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 993 F.2d 306 (2nd Cir. 1993). 37
Salahuddin v. Coughlin, 999 F.Supp. 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
3, 37
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263 (2nd Cir. 2006). 37
Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 429 F.Supp.2d
1056 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 31
Salas v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 493 F.3d 913 (7th
Cir. 2007). 31
Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991).
29, 32
Sales v. Marshall, 873 F.2d 115 (6th Cir. 1989). 14
Sales v. Murray, 862 F.Supp. 1511 (W.D. Va. 1994). 11
Salinas v. Breier, 695 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 119. 27, 41
Sallee v. Joyner, 40 F.Supp.2d 766 (E.D.Va. 1999). 21
Samford v. Dretke, 562 F.3d 674 (5th Cir. 2009). 19, 28, 38,
49
Sammons v. Allenbrank, 817 F.Supp. 94 (D.Kan. 1993). 1
Samonte v. Frank, 517 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawaii 2007). 1,
4, 35
Sample v. Borg, 675 F.Supp. 574 (E.D. Cal. 1987), vacated,
870 F.2d 563. 37, 38
Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086 (D.C.Cir.
2006). 2
Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099 (3rd Cir. 1988). 36, 43
Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). 1, 37,
38, 39
Sample v. Morrison, 406 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2005). 20, 22,
36
Sampson v. City of Xenia, 108 F.Supp.2d 821 (S.D.Ohio
1999). 16
Samuals v. Department of Corrections, N.Y.C., 548 F.Supp.
253 (E.D. N.Y. 1982). 32, 36
Samuel v. Carroll, 505 F.Supp.2d 256 (D.Del. 2007). 29
Samuel v. City of Chicago, 41 F.Supp.2d 801 (N.D.Ill.
1999). 29, 32
Samuel v. First Correctional Medical, 463 F.Supp.2d 488
(D.Del. 2006). 29
Samuels v. Lefevre, 885 F.Supp. 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 11
Sanchez Rodriguez v. Departamento de Correccion y
Rehabilitacion, 537 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.Puerto Rico
2008). 10, 12, 39, 41
Sanchez v. California, 90 F.Supp.3d 1036 (E.D.Cal. 2015).
31
Sanchez v. Coughlin, 518 N.Y.S.2d 456 (A.D. 3 Dept.
1987). 11, 20, 36
Sanchez v. Hoke, 498 N.Y.S.2d 535 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1986).
11
Sanchez v. Pereira-Castillo, 590 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2009). 24,
29, 33, 39, 41
Sanchez v. Roth, 891 F.Supp. 452 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 11
Sanchez v. Taggart, 144 F.3d 1154 (8th Cir. 1998). 50
Sanchez-Alaniz v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 85 F.Supp.3d
208 (D.C.D.C. 2015). 2
Sanchez-Ramos v. Sniezek, 370 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ohio
2005). 1

TC-81
XXVI

Sanchez-Velasco v. Secretary of Dept. of Corr., 287 F.3d
1015 (11th Cir. 2002). 22
Sand v. Steele, 218 F.Supp.2d 788 (E.D.Va. 2002). 11
Sandage v. Board of Com'rs of Vanderburgh County, 548
F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2008). 14, 27, 36, 50
Sandefur v. Lewis, 937 F.Supp. 890 (D.Ariz. 1996). 3, 8
Sanders v. Borgert, 711 F.Supp. 889 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2182. 3, 11
Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015).
2, 14, 25, 29, 30, 32
Sanders v. Hayden, 544 F.3d 812 (7th Cir 2008). 50
Sanders v. Heitzkey, 757 F.Supp. 981 (E.D. Wis. 1991),
affirmed, 962 F.2d 10. 41, 48
Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 1999). 14, 32,
45
Sanders v. Howze, 50 F.Supp.2d 1364 (M.D.Ga. 1998). 14,
32, 46
Sanders v. Kingston, 53 Fed.Appx. 781 (7th Cir. 2002).
[unpublished] 9. 29
Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). 7, 12,
29, 35, 37, 38
Sanders v. Woodruff, 908 F.2d 310 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 525. 3
Sanderson v. Buchanon, 568 F.Supp.2d 217 (D.Conn.
2008). 29
Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995). 3, 11, 38
Sandlin v. Pearsall, 427 F.Supp. 494 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). 17,
27, 29
Sandoval v. U.S., 980 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1993). 2, 14, 27
Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1989). 1
Sanford v. Brookshire, 879 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
9, 15, 27
Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S.Ct. 2352. 9, 26, 34
Santana v. Coughlin, 457, N.Y.S.2d 944 (App. Div. 1982).
11
Santana v. Keane, 949 F.2d 584 (2nd Cir. 1991). 3
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2013). 14, 21, 27,
48
Santiago v. C.O. Campisi Shield #4592., 91 F.Supp.2d 665
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 14, 32, 48
Santiago v. Semenza, 965 F.Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 32,
48
Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010). 1, 14, 48
Santiago v. Yarde, 487 F.Supp. 52 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). 10, 48
Santiago-Lebron v. Florida Parole Com'm, 767 F.Supp.2d
1340 (S.D.Fla. 2011). 22, 34, 36
Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015).
11, 20, 22, 39
Santibanez v. Havlin, 750 F.Supp.2d 1121 (E.D.Cal. 2010).
11, 22
Santori v. Fong, 484 F.Supp. 1029 (E.D. Penn. 1980). 30,
32, 34
Santos v. Bush, 874 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.N.J. 2012). 27, 29,
30
Santos v. Hauck, 242 F.Supp.2d 257 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 1,
21
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2001). 14,
45
Sapanajin v. Gunter, 857 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1988). 37
Sarro v. Cornell Corrections, Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I.
2003). 27
Sarro v. Essex County Correctional Facility, 84 F.Supp.2d
175 (D.Mass. 2000). 9, 10
Sash v. Zenk, 344 F.Supp.2d 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 20, 22

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Sash v. Zenk, 428 F.3d 132 (2nd Cir. 2005). 20, 22
Sasnett v. Deptartment of Corrections, 891 F.Supp. 1305
(W.D.Wis. 1995). 1, 37, 38
Sasnett v. Litscher, 197 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1999). 19, 37, 38
Sasnett v. Sullivan, 908 F.Supp. 1429 (W.D.Wis. 1995). 19,
37, 38
Sasser v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 373 F.Supp.2d
1276 (M.D.Ala. 2005). 24, 31
Sassman v. Brown, 73 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D.Cal. 2014). 7,
27, 34
Sassman v. Brown, 99 F.Supp.3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). 7,
36, 47
Saulsberry v. Arpaio, 41 Fed.Appx. 953 (9th Cir. 2002). 32,
33, 41
Saunders v. Chatham County, 728 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir.
1982). 14, 27
Saunders v. Horn, 959 F.Supp. 689 (E.D.Pa. 1996). 7, 29
Saunders v. Hunter, 980 F.Supp. 1236 (M.D.Fla. 1997). 31
Saunders v. U.S., 502 F.Supp.2d 493 (E.D.Va. 2007). 14,
32
Saunders-El v. Tsoulos, 1 F.Supp.2d 845 (N.D.Ill. 1998). 37
Sauve v. Lamberti, 597 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2008). 2,
29, 30
Savage v. Judge, 644 F.Supp.2d 550 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 9, 21,
39, 47
Savko v. Rollins, 749 F.Supp. 1403 (D. Md. 1990),
affirmed, 924 F.2d 1053. 1, 35
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). 19
Sayed v. Profitt, 743 F.Supp.2d 1217 (D.Colo. 2010). 37
Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2016). 3, 8, 21,
30, 47
Scaife v. Wilson, 861 F.Supp. 1027 (D.Kan. 1994). 11, 21,
41
Scales v. Mississippi State Parole Bd., 831 F.2d 565 (5th
Cir. 1987). 7, 22, 36, 43
Scalise v. Meese, 891 F.2d 640 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1815. 47
Scarpino v. Grosshiem, 852 F.Supp. 798 (S.D. Iowa 1994).
34, 37
Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F.Supp.2d 986 (W.D.Wis. 2005). 8,
9, 10, 15, 30
Scarver v. Litscher, 434 F.3d 972 (7th Cir. 2006). 9, 10, 15,
30, 39
Schacht v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 175 F.3d 497
(7th Cir. 1999). 31
Schad v. Brewer, 732 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2013). 43
Schaefer v. Tannian, 793 F.Supp. 146 (E.D.Mich. 1992). 31
Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43 (8th Cir. 1995). 36
Schall, Comm. of N.Y. Dept. of Juv. Justice v. Martin et al.,
104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984). 26, 32
Schaub v. County of Olmsted, 656 F.Supp.2d 990 (D.Minn.
2009). 2, 23, 29, 36, 50
Schaub v. VonWald, 638 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2011). 27, 29
Schenck v. Edwards, 921 F.Supp. 679 (E.D.Wash. 1996). 1,
41
Schepers v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction,
691 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2012). 2, 7
Scher v. Engelke, 943 F.2d 921 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1516. 24, 41
Scher v. Purkett, 758 F.Supp. 1316 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 3, 23
Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). 24, 48
Schlemm v. Wall, 784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015). 18, 37, 39
Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F.Supp. 612 (M.D. Penn. 1980).
18, 37

TC-82
XXVI

Schlicher v. (NFN) Peters, I and I, 103 F.3d 940 (10th Cir.
1996). 33, 41
Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777 (10th Cir. 1997). 1
Schmanke v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 847 F.Supp. 134 (D.
Minn. 1994). 22, 43
Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.
1992). 14
Schmelzer v. Norfleet, 903 F.Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 3,
11
Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir.
2009). 17, 25, 26, 32, 33, 41
Schmidt v. Odell, 64 F.Supp.2d 1014 (D.Kan. 1999). 7, 9,
12, 15,27, 29, 34, 39
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 22
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313 (3rd Cir. 2011). 16, 24,
32, 36
Schneyder v. Smith, 709 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2010). 6,
32, 36
Schnitzler v. Reisch, 518 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D.S.D. 2007).
27, 34, 37
Schoelch v. Mitchell, 625 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 2010). 14, 32
Schreiber v. Ault, 280 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2002). 37
Schreter v. Bednosky, 963 F.Supp. 216 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
29, 32
Schrier v. Halford, 60 F.3d 1309 (8th Cir. 1995). 1, 47
Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995). 1, 8,
47
Schuemann v. CO St. Board of Adult Parole, 624 F.2d 172
(10th Cir. 1980). 22, 36
Schultz v. Pugh, 728 F.3d 619 (7th Cir. 2013). 14, 21
Schwartz v. County of Montgomery, 843 F.Supp. 962 (E.D.
Pa. 1994), affirmed, 37 F.3d 1488. 8, 14, 39
Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail
(Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal.
2012). 6, 14, 18, 27, 29, 32, 46
Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000). 7, 14,
17
Scicluna v. Wells, 219 F.Supp.2d 846 (E.D.Mich. 2002). 29
Scoby v. Neal, 734 F.Supp. 837 (C.D. Ill. 1990). 31, 41
Scoby v. Neal, 981 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1992). 31, 41
Scott v. Angelone, 771 F.Supp. 1064 (D. Nev. 1991),
affirmed, 980 F.2d 738. 4, 29, 35
Scott v. Antonini, 764 F.Supp.2d 904 (E.D.Mich. 2011). 29
Scott v. Baldwin, 225 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2000). 22, 36
Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034 (8th Cir. 2013). 13, 24, 36
Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004). 21
Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.Supp.3d 569 (W.D.Va. 2014). 4, 17,
27, 29
Scott v. Clarke, 64 F.Supp.3d 813 (W.D.Va. 2014). 17, 29
Scott v. Coughlin, 727 F.Supp. 806 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 8, 27
Scott v. Coughlin, 944 F.Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 11
Scott v. DiGuglielmo, 615 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2009).
27, 30
Scott v. District of Columbia, 139 F.3d 940 (D.C. Cir.
1998). 9, 10, 29
Scott v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 317 F.Supp.2d 529
(D.N.J. 2004). 8, 22
Scott v. Garcia, 370 F.Supp.2d 1056 (S.D.Cal. 2005). 8, 29,
47
Scott v. Kelly, 107 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2000). 1, 22
Scott v. Kelly, 533 N.Y.S.2d 157 (A.D. 1988). 11
Scott v. Kelly, 962 F.2d 145 (2nd Cir. 1992). 11, 36
Scott v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 961 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1992). 37, 38, 39
Scott v. Moore, 114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). 14, 27, 32, 45

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Scott v. Moore, 85 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1996). 14, 17, 45
Scott v. Ozmint, 467 F.Supp.2d 564 (D.S.C. 2006). 1, 37
Scott v. Reno, 902 F.Supp. 1190 (C.D.Cal. 1995). 27. 29,
47, 50
Scotti v. Russell, 175 F.Supp.2d 1099 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 9, 10
Scotto v, Almenas, 143 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 1998). 27, 36
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). 7, 27, 48
Scruggs v. Jordon, 435 F.Supp.2d 869 (N.D.Ind. 2006). 11,
20, 22
Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588 (10th Cir. 2000). 16,
32, 36
Scurry v. Fernandez, 841 F.Supp. 12 (D.D.C. 1993). 29
Seacrest v. Gallegos, 30 Fed.Appx. 755 (10th Cir. 2002). 22,
36
Seale v. Mason, 326 F.Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971). 35, 37,
38, 39
Sealey v. Coughlin, 857 F.Supp. 214 (N.D.N.Y. 1994). 3
Sealey v. Coughlin, 997 F.Supp. 316 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 3
Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578 (2nd Cir. 1999). 3
Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2000). 29
Seals v. Shah, 145 F.Supp.2d 1378 (N.D.Ga. 2001). 29
Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2002). 7, 20,
34, 35
Searcy v. Simmons, 68 F.Supp.2d 1197 (D.Kan. 1999). 1,
34, 37
Searcy v. Simmons, 97 F.Supp.2d 1055 (D.Kan. 2000). 7,
33, 34, 35
Searcy v. Singletary, 894 F.Supp. 1565 (M.D.Fla. 1995). 3
Searer v. Wells, 837 F.Supp. 1198 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 27
Searles v. Dechant, 393 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2004). 37, 50
Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th Cir. 2001). 18,
27, 37
Seaver v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 998
F.Supp. 1215 (D.Kan. 1998). 22
Seaver v. Manduco, 178 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.Mass. 2002). 10,
41
Security and Law Enforcement Employees v. Carey, 737
F.2d 187 (2nd Cir. 1984). 31, 41
Seehausen v. Van Buren, 243 F.Supp.2d 1165 (D.Or. 2002).
11, 22, 38
Seelig v. Koehler, 554 N.Y.S.2d 201 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990).
31, 33
Segreti v. Giller, 259 F.Supp.2d 733 (N.D.Ill. 2003). 13, 21,
50
Segura v. Colombe, 895 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D.N.M. 2012). 2,
27
Selah v. Goord, 255 F.Supp.2d 42 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). 29, 37
Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013). 3, 8, 11
Selep v. City of Chicago, 842 F.Supp. 1068 (N.D. Ill.
1993). 16
Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2006). 29, 32
Seling v. Young, 121 S.Ct. 727 (2001). 13, 22, 30, 36, 43
Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1101. 36
Sellers v. Bureau of Prisons, 959 F.2d 307 (D.C.Cir. 1992).
2, 33
Sellers v. U.S. 881 F.2d 1061 (11th Cir. 1989). 1
Sellers v. U.S., 902 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1990). 27, 35
Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F.Supp.2d 66 (D.D.C. 2008). 36, 43
Seltzer-Bey v. Delo, 66 F.3d 961 (8th Cir. 1995). 7, 41
Senalan v. Curran, 78 F.Supp.3d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 7, 14,
32, 48
Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89 F.Supp.2d 1356 (N.D.Ga. 2000).
22
Senisais v. Fitzgerald, 940 F.Supp. 196 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 29

TC-83
XXVI

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). 1,
7, 11, 19, 29, 47
Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013). 7, 10
Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 342. 17, 33
Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146
(10th Cir. 2006), 27, 39, 45, 48
Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). 7, 30, 33,
39, 41
Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2010). 44, 50
Serrano v. Alvarado, 169 F.Supp.2d 14 (D.Puerto Rico
2001). 1
Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2003). 3, 7, 11,
24
Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2007). 2, 20, 22
Sesler v. Pitzer, 110 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 1997). 22, 36, 43
Sesler v. Pitzer, 926 F.Supp. 130 (D.Minn 1996). 22, 43
Settles v. U.S. Parole Com’n., 429 F.3d 1098 (D.C.Cir.
2005). 36
Severino v. Negron, 996 F.2d 1439 (2nd Cir. 1993). 27, 36,
50
Sewell v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461 (6th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 75. 31
Sexton v. Kenton County Detention Center, 702 F.Supp.2d
784 (E.D.Ky. 2010). 14, 15, 17, 27, 31, 44, 45
Shabazz v. Askins, 14 F.3d 533 (10th Cir. 1994). 1, 36
Shabazz v. Barnauskas, 790 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 655. 19, 37, 38
Shabazz v. Cole, 69 F.Supp.2d 177 (D.Mass. 1999). 7,42,50
Shabazz v. Coughlin, 852 F.2d 697 (2nd Cir. 1988). 27, 37
Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 1997). 19, 28,
37, 39
Shaddy v. Gunter, 690 F.Supp. 860 (D. Neb. 1988). 49
Shadrick v. Hopkins County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724 (6th Cir.
2015). 14, 24, 27, 29, 46
Shaffer v. Meyers, 338 F.Supp.2d 562 (M.D.Pa. 2004). 36
Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998). 37, 41, 43
Shah v. Danberg, 855 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Del. 2012). 1, 8,
24, 43, 44
Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F.Supp.2d 99
(D.Mass. 2001). 1, 37, 38
Shaheed-Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 393 F.Supp.2d 80
(D.Mass. 2005). 1, 18, 19, 21, 24, 37, 47
Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705
(S.D.Miss. 2015). 4, 5, 14, 27, 32, 45, 46
Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56 (2nd Cir. 2001). 32, 41
Shain v. Ellison, 356 F.3d 211 (2nd Cir. 2004). 27, 32, 41
Shain v. Ellison, 53 F.Supp.2d 564 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 32, 41
Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 1995). 23, 29
Shakur v. Bell, 447 F.Supp. 958 (S.D. N.Y. 1978). 47
Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2008). 18, 37
Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106 (2nd Cir. 2004). 33, 37
Shango v. Jurich, 608 F.Supp. 931 (N.D.Ill. 1985),
affirmed, 965 F.2d 289. 11
Shango v. Jurich, 965 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1992). 1
Shannon v. Lester, 519 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1975). 29
Shanton v. Detrick, 826 F.Supp. 979 (N.D. W.Va. 1993),
affirmed, 17 F.3d 1434. 29, 48
Shape v. Barnes County, N.D., 396 F.Supp.2d 1067
(D.N.D. 2005). 31, 44
Shapley v. Nevada Board of State Prison Commissioners,
766 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1985). 4, 29
Sharafeldin v. Maryland, Dept. of Public Safety, 131
F.Supp.2d 730 (D.Md. 2001). 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 1,
7, 9, 10, 15, 21, 23, 42, 49
Shariff v. Poole, 689 F.Supp.2d 470 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 7,
21, 35
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2012). 24, 37
Sharp v. Leonard, 611 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1979). 36
Sharp v. Siegler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969). 3, 11, 37
Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2000). 27, 34
Shaw v. Allen, 771 F.Supp. 760 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). 15, 27
Shaw v. Coosa County Com’n., 330 F.Supp.2d 1285
(M.D.Ala. 2004). 2, 27, 29, 45
Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1179
(M.D.Ala. 2006). 2, 14, 25, 29
Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1199
(M.D.Ala. 2006). 14, 27
Shaw v. District of Columbia, 944 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.D.C.
2013). 8, 17, 24, 25, 32, 33, 38, 41
Shaw v. Jahnke, 607 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W.D.Wis. 2009). 1,
21
Shaw v. Murphy, 121 S.Ct. 1475 (2001). 1, 7, 19
Shaw v. Neb. Dept. of Correctional Services, 666 F.Supp.
1330 (D. Neb. 1987). 7, 31
Shaw v. TDCJ-CID, 540 F.Supp.2d 834 (S.D.Tex. 2008). 9,
15, 29
Shea v. Heggie, 624 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1980). 36
Shearin v. Correction Officer Pennington, 867 F.Supp. 1250
(E.D.Va. 1994). 10, 14, 48
Sheehan v. Beyer, 51 F.3d 1170 (3rd Cir. 1995). 3
Sheehan v. U.S., 822 F.Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1993). 14, 27
Sheerin v. State, 434 N.W.2d 633 (Iowa 1989). 14, 36
Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164 (6th Cir. 1996). 19, 28
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295 (6th Cir. 1999). 11, 21, 50
Shehee v. Saginaw County, 86 F.Supp.3d 704 (E.D.Mich.
2015). 14, 29
Shelby County Jail Inmates v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085 (7th
Cir. 1986). 8, 9, 12, 15
Sheldon v. C/O Pezley, 49 F.3d 1312 (8th Cir. 1995). 10,
29, 48
Sheley v. Dugger, 824 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987). 3, 10
Shell v. Brun, 585 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 1, 7
Shell v. Brzezniak, 365 F.Supp.2d 362 (W.D.N.Y. 2005). 1,
11, 29
Shelly v. Johnson, 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). 11, 24
Shelton v. Angelone, 183 F.Supp.2d 830 (W.D.Va. 2002).
48
Shelton v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 677 F.3d
837 (8th Cir. 2012). 17, 29, 30, 45
Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F.Supp. 1048 (W.D.Wis.
1996). 7, 41
Shelvin v. Lykos, 741 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App. 1987). 29
Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex.
2015). 2, 14, 17, 30, 32, 39, 45, 46
Shepard v. Peryam, 657 F.Supp.2d 1331 (S.D.Fla. 2009).
18, 24, 37, 38
Shepard v. Wapello County, Iowa, 250 F.Supp.2d 1112
(S.D.Iowa, 2003). 2, 31
Shepheard v. City of New York, 577 F.Supp.2d 669
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 2, 31
Shepherd v. Dallas County, 591 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2009). 9,
29, 32
Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603 (2nd Cir. 2011). 4, 5
Shepherd v. Powers, 55 F.Supp.3d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
45, 46, 48
Shepherd v. Wenderlich, 746 F.Supp.2d 430 (N.D.N.Y.
2010). 1, 5

TC-84
XXVI

Sheppard v. Early, 168 F.3d 689 (4th Cir. 1999). 43
Sheppard v. Phoenix, 210 F.Supp.2d 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
14, 27, 48
Sheppard v. U.S., 537 F.Supp.2d 785 (D.Md. 2008). 16, 24,
36, 43
Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809 (8th
Cir. 2008). 1, 32, 33
Sheriff’s Silver Star Ass’n v. County of Oswego, 56
F.Supp.2d 263 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 31, 44, 45
Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014).
4, 7, 8, 9, 23, 29, 40
Sherrer v. Stephens, 50 F.3d 496 (8th Cir. 1994). 10, 29
Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). 1,
2, 19, 35, 37
Shidler v. Moore, 446 F.Supp.2d 942 (N.D.Ind. 2006). 19,
37, 38
Shields v. Dart, 664 F.3d 178 (7th Cir. 2011). 14, 32, 39
Shiflet v. Cornell, 933 F.Supp. 1549 (M.D.Fla. 1996). 1, 7,
29
Shifrin v. Fields, 39 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1994). 10, 36
Shilling v. Crawford, 536 F.Supp.2d 1227 (D.Nev. 2008). 8,
37, 47
Shimer v. Washington, 100 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996). 19, 31
Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). 4, 35
Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). 1, 3, 15,
28, 32, 39
Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3rd Cir. 2000). 3
Shockley v. McCarty, 677 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.Del. 2009). 1,
14
Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176 (2nd Cir. 2009).
29
Shook v. Board of County Commissioners of County of El
Paso, 543 F.3d 597 (10th Cir. 2008). 27, 30
Shookoff v. Adams, 750 F.Supp. 288 (M.D. Tenn. 1990),
modified, 969 F.2d 228. 1, 26
Short v. Greene, 577 F.Supp.2d 790 (S.D.W.Va. 2008). 21
Short v. Smoot, 436 F.3d 422 (4th Cir. 2006). 14, 24, 32, 45
Shorter v. Baca, 101 F.Supp.3d 876 (C.D. Cal. 2015). 8, 9,
17, 18, 23, 29, 30, 32, 40, 41, 48
Shouse v. Ljunggren, 792 F.2d 902 (9th Cir. 1986). 36
Shreve v. Franklin County, Ohio, 743 F.3d 126 (6th Cir.
2014). 14, 32, 39, 48
Shropshire v. Duckworth, 654 F.Supp. 369 (N.D. Ind.
1987). 3, 27, 47
Shrum v. City of Coweta, Okla., 449 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir.
2006). 31
Shuford v. Conway, 86 F.Supp.3d 1344 (N.D.Ga. 2015).
14, 32, 39, 48
Shuler v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.D.C.
2010). 7, 49
Shuler v. Edwards, 485 F.Supp.2d 294 (W.D.N.Y. 2007).
29
Shultz v. Allegheny County, 835 F.Supp.2d 14 (W.D.Pa.
2011). 2, 14, 17, 29
Shumpert v. Johnson, 621 F.Supp.2d 387 (N.D.Miss. 2009).
31
Shumway v. OR St. Penitentiary, 657 P.2d 686 (Ore. 1983).
11
Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481 (5th Cir. 1999). 14, 29
Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751
(E.D.Ky. 2006). 2, 4, 13, 32, 35, 44
Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th
Cir. 2007). 2, 4, 32, 35
Siddiqi v. Lane, 748 F.Supp. 637 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 8, 39

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Siddiqi v. Lane, 763 F.Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1991), affirmed,
972 F.2d 352. 7, 8
Siddiqi v. Leak, 880 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1989). 37
Sidebottom v. Schiriro, 927 F.Supp. 1221 (E.D.Mo. 1996).
19, 49
Sienkiewicz v. Santa Cruz County, 240 Cal.Rptr. 451
(Cal.App. 6 Dist. 1987). 31
Sieu Phong Ngo v. Curry, 745 F.Supp.2d 1031 (N.D.Cal.
2010). 22, 36
Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Ass'n, 469 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir.
2006). 1
Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 910 F.Supp.2d 149
(D.D.C. 2012). 7, 19
Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2005). 21, 47
Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006).
5, 7, 19, 27, 47
Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 48
Sikorski v. Whorton, 631 F.Supp.2d 1327 (D.Nev. 2009).
19, 21, 28
Silas v. City of New York, 536 F.Supp.2d 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). 1
Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 2015). 1, 4
Silva v. Casey, 992 F.2d 20 (2nd Cir. 1993). 11
Silva v. Clarke, 603 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Mass. 2009). 29
Silva v. State, 745 P.2d 380 (N.M. 1987). 14, 27
Silvera v. Connecticut Dept. of Corrections, 726 F.Supp.2d
183 (D.Conn. 2010). 8, 14, 30, 32, 45
Silverstein v. Federal Bureau Of Prisons, 704 F.Supp.2d
1077 (D.Colo. 2010). 3, 9, 15, 45, 47
Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2005). 1, 28, 47
Simmons v. Adamy, 987 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
1, 21, 37
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 728 F.Supp. 352 (E.D. Pa.
1990), affirmed, 947 F.2d 1042. 14, 25, 29, 46
Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042 (3rd Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1671. 14, 25, 29, 32, 46
Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805 (8th Cir. 1998). 3, 7, 15,
27
Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 122 F.Supp.3d 255
(M.D.N.C. 2015). 27, 29, 44
Simmons v. Corizon Health, Inc., 136 F.Supp.3d 719
(M.D.N.C. 2015). 27, 29
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009). 7, 19, 44
Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.
2010). 14, 26, 29, 30, 32
Simmons v. Poppell, 837 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1988). 1, 35
Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court, 318 F.3d
1156 (9th Cir. 2003). 1, 32
Simmons v. The G.E.O. Group, Inc., 528 F.Supp.2d 583
(E.D.N.C. 2007). 2, 31
Simmons v. Wolff, 594 F.Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C. 2009). 47
Simpson v. Gallant, 223 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Me. 2002). 3,
11, 19, 28, 32
Simpson v. Gallant, 231 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Me. 2002). 1, 3,
11, 32
Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990). 14, 27, 29,
48
Simpson v. Horn, 25 F.Supp.2d 563 (E.D.Pa. 1998). 8, 9,
10, 18, 40
Simpson v. Horn, 80 F.Supp.2d 477 (E.D.Pa. 2000). 7, 8
Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006). 1, 11, 21
Simpson v. Office of Chief Judge of Circuit Court of Will
County, 559 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2009). 31
Simpson v. Penobscot County Sheriff’s Dept., 285
F.Supp.2d 75 (D.Me. 2003) 15, 21, 33

TC-85
XXVI

Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008). 11, 14,
20, 48
Sims v. Brierton, 500 F.Supp. 813 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 1, 39,
41
Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 1994). 10, 35, 39
Sims v. Montgomery County Com'n., 766 F.Supp. 1052
(M.D. Ala. 1990). 7, 31
Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F.Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
10, 12
Singer v. Ferro, 711 F.3d 334 (2nd Cir. 2013). 31
Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010). 19, 38, 39
Singh v. Goord, 520 F.Supp.2d 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 21,
37, 38, 39
Singletary v. District of Columbia, 876 F.Supp.2d 106
(D.D.C. 2012). 16, 27, 36
Singleton v. City of New York, 496 F.Supp.2d 390
(S.D.N.Y. 2007). 31
Singleton v. Hoester, 505 F.Supp. 54 (E.D. Mo. 1980). 43
Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (8th Cir. 2003). 7, 22,
29, 30
Singson v. Norris, 553 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 2009). 37, 38, 39
Sinnett v. Simmons, 45 F.Supp.2d 1210 (D.Kan. 1999). 14,
37, 47
Sira v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57 (2nd Cir. 2004). 3, 11
Siripongs v. Davis, 282 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2002). 5
Sisneros v. Booker, 981 F.Supp. 1374 (D.Colo. 1997). 22,
43
Sisneros v. Nix, 884 F.Supp. 1313 (S.D.Iowa 1995). 19, 27,
28, 47
Sisneros v. Nix, 95 F.3d 749 (8th Cir. 1996). 27, 47
Sisney v. Reisch, 533 F.Supp.2d 952 (D.S.D. 2008). 24, 37,
39
Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2012). 18, 37
Sistrunk v. Khan, 931 F.Supp.2d 849 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 29, 32
Sital v. Burgio, 592 F.Supp.2d 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 3, 11,
33
Sivak v. Ada County, 769 P.2d 1131 (Idaho App. 1989). 9,
18
Six v. United States Parole Commission, 502 F.Supp. 446
(E.D. Mich. 1980). 36
Sizemore v. Lee, 20 F.Supp.2d 956 (W.D.Va. 1998). 1, 22
Sizemore v. Williford, 829 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1987). 19, 38
Sizer v. County of Hennepin, 393 F.Supp.2d 796 (D.Minn.
2005). 6, 32, 36
Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1991). 1, 28,
37, 38
Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2005). 3, 7,
48
Skinner v. Holman, 672 F.Supp.2d 657 (D.Del. 2009). 11,
21, 47, 50
Skinner v. Lampert, 457 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Wyo. 2006).
14, 27
Skinner v. Uphoff, 410 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Wyo. 2006). 1,
2, 14, 27
Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2002). 14, 48
Skundor v. McBride, 280 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.W.Va. 2003).
3, 12, 33, 39, 41
Skurstenis v. Jones, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000). 17, 25,
29, 32, 41
Slade v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th
Cir. 2005). 4, 32, 35
Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1035, 105 S.Ct. 1413. 27, 48
Slater v. Susquehanna County, 613 F.Supp.2d 653 (M.D.Pa.
2009). 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Sledge v. Cummings, 995 F.Supp. 1276 (D.Kan. 1998). 37,
38
Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2009). 29
Sledge v. U.S., 883 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012). 2, 14, 27,
39, 49
Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934
F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). 3, 27, 29, 30, 32
Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934
F.Supp.2d 1282 (D.N.M. 2013). 1, 27, 32
Slezak v. Evatt, 21 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 235. 8
Sliney v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 577 F.Supp.2d 113
(D.D.C. 2008). 2, 19
Sloane v. Borawski, 64 F.Supp.3d 473 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
11, 48
Sluss v. United States Department of Justice, 78 F.Supp.3d
61 (D.D.C. 2015). 2, 47
Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2013). 1,
21
Small v. Lehman, 98 F.3d 762 (3rd Cir. 1996). 37
Small v. Sutton, 653 F.Supp. 900 (10th Cir. 1987). 24, 36
Small v. Weekly, 749 F.Supp. 1052 (D. Colo. 1990). 14, 24
Smallwood v. Renfro, 708 F.Supp. 182 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 24,
29, 48
Smart v. Goord, 21 F.Supp.2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 22, 47
Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2013). 29
Smentek v. Dart, 683 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 2012). 27, 32
Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). 37, 39
Smith v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 103 F.3d 637 (8th
Cir. 1996). 14, 45
Smith v. Arkansas Dept. of Correction, 995 F.2d 869 (8th
Cir. 1993). 31
Smith v. Armstrong, 968 F.Supp. 40 (D.Conn. 1996). 1
Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). 2, 14,
25, 29, 30, 44, 45, 46
Smith v. Barber, 316 F.Supp.2d 992 (D.Kan. 2004). 9, 12,
26, 32
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961). 1, 22
Smith v. Bingham, 914 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1116. 34
Smith v. Blue, 67 F.Supp.2d 686 (S.D.Tex. 1999). 14, 26,
29, 45, 46
Smith v. Board of County Com'rs. of County of Lyon, 216
F.Supp.2d 1209 (D.Kan. 2002). 23, 27, 40, 44, 45, 46,
50
Smith v. Brevard County, 461 F.Supp.2d 1243 (M.D.Fla.
2006), 14, 27, 32, 45
Smith v. Bruce, 568 F.Supp.2d 1277 (D.Kan. 2008). 18, 37
Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032 (6th Cir. 2001). 21, 47
Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178 (2nd Cir. 2003). 29
Smith v. Carrasco, 334 F.Supp.2d 1094 (N.D.Ind. 2004).
19, 35
Smith v. Chrans, 629 F.Supp. 606 (C.D. Ill. 1986). 33, 41
Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F.Supp.2d 1217 (N.D.Cal.
2008). 4, 16, 27
Smith v. Clarke, 458 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2006). 29
Smith v. Cochran, 216 F.Supp.2d 1286 (N.D.Okla. 2001).
7, 13, 17, 50
Smith v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 23 F.3d 339 (10th
Cir. 1994). 35
Smith v. Conway County, Ark., 759 F.3d 853 (8th Cir.
2014). 14, 27, 32, 48
Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1996). 9, 23, 32,
40

TC-86
XXVI

Smith v. Copeland, 892 F.Supp. 1218 (E.D.Mo. 1995). 3, 9,
12, 18, 19, 24, 27, 29, 32, 48
Smith v. Coughlin, 727 F.Supp. 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 24,
33, 36
Smith v. Coughlin, 938 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1991). 11
Smith v. County of Lenawee, 600 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 2010).
14, 17, 24, 27, 29, 32, 45
Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 535 F.Supp.2d 1033
(C.D.Cal. 2008). 2, 14, 24, 29
Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir. 2006). 14, 39
Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304 (7th Cir. 2015). 12, 18, 23, 32,
40, 50
Smith v. Delamaid, 842 F.Supp. 453 (D.Kan. 1994). 48
Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 710. 19, 28
Smith v. Dept. of Corrections, 792 P.2d 109 (Or. App.
1990). 18
Smith v. District of Columbia, 674 F.Supp.2d 209 (D.D.C.
2009). 13, 14, 29
Smith v. Dodrill, 718 F.Supp. 1293 (N.D. W.Va. 1989). 2,
31
Smith v. Eovaldi, 112 F.Supp.3d 779 (S.D. Ill. 2015). 10,
18, 23, 29, 48
Smith v. Erickson, 884 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1989). 1, 28
Smith v. Erickson, 961 F.2d 1387 (8th Cir. 1992). 1, 28
Smith v. Fairman, 528 F.Supp. 186 (C.D. Ill. 1981). 9, 15
Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (C.D. Ill. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 1879. 10, 19, 33, 41
Smith v. Farley, 858 F.Supp. 806 (N.D. Ind. 1993). 11, 22
Smith v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 517 F.Supp.2d 451
(D.D.C. 2007). 2, 4, 21
Smith v. Fischer, 803 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2015). 11
Smith v. Franklin County, 227 F.Supp.2d 667 (E.D.Ky.
2002). 1, 13, 29
Smith v. Gosh, 653 F.Supp. 846 (W.D. Wis. 1987). 5, 16,
48
Smith v. Haley, 401 F.Supp.2d 1240 (M.D.Ala. 2005). 13,
24, 37, 38
Smith v. Harvey County Jail, 889 F.Supp. 426 (D.Kan.
1995). 1, 12, 18, 29, 32
Smith v. Holzapfel, 739 F.Supp. 1089 (E.D. Tex. 1990). 48
Smith v. Iron County, 692 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1982). 39, 48
Smith v. Jenkins, 919 F.2d 90 (8th Cir. 1990). 29, 30
Smith v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 262 (5th Cir. 2006). 10
Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 2012).
14, 29, 32, 45
Smith v. Lejeune, 203 F.Supp.2d 1260 (D.Wyo. 2002). 14,
29, 32, 46
Smith v. Linn County, 342 N.W.2d 861 (Iowa 1984). 4, 29
Smith v. Maloney, 735 F.Supp. 39 (D. Mass. 1990). 41, 49
Smith v. Marcantonio, 910 F.2d 500 (8th Cir. 1990). 14, 24
Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1990). 11, 28
Smith v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 936 F.2d 1390
(1st Cir. 1991). 11, 47
Smith v. Matthews, 793 F.Supp. 998 (D.Kan. 1992). 41, 49
Smith v. McDonald, 869 F.Supp. 918 (D.Kan. 1994). 49
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641 (3rd Cir. 2002). 14
Smith v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 765 F.Supp.2d 973
(E.D.Mich. 2011). 31
Smith v. Michigan, 256 F.Supp.2d 704 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
14, 29
Smith v. Miller, 423 F.Supp.2d 859 (N.D.Ind. 2006). 19,
38, 39
Smith v. Montefiore Med. Center-Health Services, 22
F.Supp.2d 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 9, 15, 32

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Smith v. Montgomery County, Md., 643 F.Supp. 435 (D.
Md. 1986). 25, 32, 41
Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2008). 11, 19, 21,
38
Smith v. Muccino, 223 F.Supp.2d 396 (D.Conn. 2002). 8, 9,
10, 14
Smith v. Noonan, 992 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1993). 3, 8, 11
Smith v. Norris, 877 F.Supp. 1296 (E.D. Ark. 1995). 14, 27,
45
Smith v. O'Connor, 901 F.Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 1,
35, 41
Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246 (4th Cir. 2009). 23, 37, 38,
48
Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2011). 10, 19, 39, 50
Smith v. Reilly, 604 F.Supp.2d 124 (D.D.C. 2009). 36, 43
Smith v. Reyes, 904 F.Supp.2d 1070 (S.D.Cal. 2012). 20,
24
Smith v. Reynaud, 89 F.Supp.2d 784 (W.D.La. 2000). 29
Smith v. Rowe, 761 F.2d 360 (1985). 50
Smith v. Sampson, 349 F.Supp. 268 (D. N.H. 1972). 23, 32,
38
Smith v. Sangamon County Sheriff's Dept., 715 F.3d 188
(7th Cir. 2013). 8, 9, 14, 25, 32, 39, 44
Smith v. Scott, 223 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2000). 20
Smith v. Securus Technologies, Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 976 (D.
Minn. 2015). 2, 42
Smith v. Shawnee Library System, 60 F.3d 317 (7th Cir.
1995). 1, 3
Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1991). 3, 11
Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2009). 29
Smith v. Stanton, 545 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 24,
33
Smith v. Sullivan, 1 F.Supp.2d 206 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 26
Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1977). 7, 9, 27, 29
Smith v. Sumner, 994 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1993). 11, 12
Smith v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 814 F.Supp. 246 (D.Conn.
1993). 36
Smith v. U.S., 207 F.Supp.2d 209 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 3, 9
Smith v. U.S., 518 F.Supp.2d 139 (D.D.C. 2007). 27, 36
Smith v. U.S., 561 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 2009). 15, 27, 50
Smith v. U.S., 850 F.Supp. 984 (M.D.Fla. 1994). 2, 24
Smith v. U.S., 896 F.Supp. 1183 (N.D.Fla. 1995). 7, 17
Smith v. Ullman, 874 F.Supp. 979 (D.Neb. 1994). 14
Smith v. Wade, 103 S.Ct. 1625 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1983). 7, 14,
27
Smith-Bey v. CCA/CTF, 703 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010).
15, 18, 40
Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d
123 (D.D.C. 2009). 2, 31
Smook v. Minnehaha County, 340 F.Supp.2d 1037 (D.S.D.
2004). 17, 26, 33, 41
Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006).
26, 32, 33, 41
Smook v. Minnehaha County, S.D., 353 F.Supp.2d 1059
(D.S.D. 2005). 26, 32, 41
Smylis v. City of New York, 25 F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1998). 31
Smylis v. City of New York, 983 F.Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1997). 31
Sneed v. Donahue, 993 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1993). 36
Snell v. DeMello, 44 F.Supp.2d 386 (D.Mass. 1999). 14,
29, 32
Snell v. Suffolk County, 611 F.Supp. 521 (D.C. N.Y. 1985).
7, 31

TC-87
XXVI

Snell v. Suffolk County, 782 F.2d 1094 (2nd Cir. 1986). 2,
7
Snelling v. Riveland, 983 F.Supp. 930 (E.D.Wash. 1997).
19, 28
Snider v. Dylag, 188 F.3d 51 (2nd Cir. 1999). 10, 14
Snipes v. Detella, 95 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 1996). 29, 40
Snodgrass v. Robinson, 512 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2008). 36,
43, 44
Snow ex rel. Snow v. City of Citronelle, AL., 420 F.3d
1262 (11th Cir. 2005). 2, 14, 29, 30, 32
Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012). 24, 27, 29,
45
Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.Supp. 1451 (D. N.J. 1989). 14
Snyder v. Blagojevich, 332 F.Supp.2d 1132 (N.D.Ill. 2004).
31
Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279 (7th Cir. 2004). 1
Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1994). 4, 5, 7, 8,
24
Sok v. I.N.S., 67 F.Supp.2d 1166 (E.D.Cal. 1999). 22
Solberg v. County of Yellowstone, 659 P.2d 290 (Mont.
1983). 14, 27, 29
Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946 (9th Cir.
2008). 1, 14
Solivan v. Dart, 897 F.Supp.2d 694 (N.D.Ill. 2012). 8, 10,
14, 15, 32, 45
Solomon v. Dixon, 724 F.Supp. 1193 (E.D.N.C. 1989),
affirmed, 904 F.2d 701. 50
Solomon v. Nassau County, 759 F.Supp.2d 251 (E.D.N.Y.
2011). 15, 23, 32, 40
Solomon v. Zant, 888 F.2d 1579 (11th Cir. 1989). 1, 38, 39
Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 1997). 33, 41
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). 2,
17, 27, 29, 30
Sonntag v. Papparozzi, 256 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.N.J. 2003).
36
Sorenson v. Murphy, 874 F.Supp. 461 (D. Mass, 1995). 11,
49
Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2002). 19, 28, 39
Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2015). 2, 35,
38, 42
Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316 (5th
Cir. 2009). 8, 24, 37, 39
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971). 4, 27
Soto v. Belcher, 339 F.Supp.2d 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 1, 21
Soto v. Cady, 566 F.Supp. 773 (E.D. Wisc. 1983). 48
Soto v. City of Sacramento, 567 F.Supp. 662 (E.D. Cal.
1983). 14
Soto v. Johansen, 137 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 1998). 14
Soto v. Lord, 693 F.Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 11, 27
Soto-Ramirez v. Ashcroft, 228 F.Supp.2d 566 (M.D.Pa.
2002). 22
Souffront v. Alvarado, 115 F.Supp.2d 237 (D.Puerto Rico
2000). 27, 29
Sours v. Big Sandy Regional Jail Authority, 946 F.Supp.2d
678 (E.D.Ky. 2013). 14, 24, 29, 32
Sours v. Purkett, 978 F.2d 1086 (8th Cir. 1992). 37
Southerland v. Thigpen, 784 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1986). 17,
29
Southern Christian Leadership v. Supreme Court, 61
F.Supp.2d 499 (E.D.La. 1999). 1
Souza v. Travisono, 498 F.2d 1120 (1st Cir. 1974). 38, 49
Sowards v. Loudon County, 203 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2000).
31
Sowell v. Vose, 941 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1991). 1
Spann v. Roper, 453 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2006). 29, 30

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Sparks v. Gaines, 144 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2001). 22, 36
Sparks v. Seltzer, 607 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 7,
19, 33, 49
Spaulding v. Collins, 867 F.Supp. 499 (S.D.Tex. 1993). 11,
22, 39
Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services,
719 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). 7, 10, 24, 30, 36
Spear v. Sowders, 33 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 1994). 24, 41, 49
Spear v. Sowders, 71 F.3d 626 (6th Cir. 1995). 33, 41, 49
Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2009). 14, 25, 29, 32,
48
Speed v. Stotts, 941 F.Supp. 1051 (D.Kan. 1996). 3, 11
Spellman v. Hopper, 142 F.Supp.2d 1323 (M.D.Ala. 2000).
3, 19, 38
Spellman v. Hopper, 95 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 1999).
3, 19, 38
Spellmon-Bey v. Lynaugh, 778 F.Supp. 338 (E.D. Tex.
1991), dismissed, 12 F.3d 1097. 11, 20
Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986). 11, 41
Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006). 9, 15,
32
Spencer v. Jackson County, Mo., 738 F.3d 907 (8th Cir.
2013). 8, 21, 34, 50
Spencer v. Kemna, 118 S.Ct. 978 (1998). 22, 36
Spencer v. Knapheide Truck Equipment Co., 183 F.3d 902
(8th Cir. 1999). 14, 32
Spencer v. Moore, 638 F.Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 21
Spencer v. Sheahan, 158 F.Supp.2d 837 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 29,
32
Sperle v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 297 F.3d 483 (6th
Cir. 2002). 14, 31
Spicer v. Collins, 9 F.Supp.2d 673 (E.D.Tex. 1998). 11, 14,
18, 35, 48
Spicer v. Com. of Va., Dept. of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705
(4th Cir. 1995). 31
Spicer v. District of Columbia, 916 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013). 14, 45
Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004). 31
Spiegla v. Hull, 481 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2007). 31
Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1999). 37, 38, 39
Spotted Bear v. McCall, 648 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1980). 36
Spotts v. U.S., 562 F.Supp.2d 46 (D.D.C. 2008). 9, 40
Spotts v. U.S., 613 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2010). 27, 39
Spotville v. Cain, 149 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1998). 22
Spratt v. County of Kent, 621 F.Supp. 594 (D.C. Mich.
1985), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1574. 34, 37
Spratt v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Corrections, 482 F.3d 33
(1st.Cir. 2007). 19, 37, 38
Sprau v. Coughlin, 997 F.Supp. 390 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 14,
21
Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1989). 11, 21
Spruce v. Sargent, 149 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 1998). 14
Spruytte v. Govorchin, 961 F.Supp. 1094 (W.D.Mich.
1997). 1, 35
Spruytte v. Hoffner, 181 F.Supp.2d 736 (W.D.Mich. 2001).
19, 27, 47, 50
Spruytte v. Hoffner, 197 F.Supp.2d 931 (W.D.Mich. 2001).
5
Spurlock v. Simmons, 88 F.Supp.2d 1189 (D.Kan. 2000). 7,
19
St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1980). 19, 37,
38, 39
St. Louis v. Morris, 573 F.Supp.2d 846 (D.Del. 2008). 19,
50

TC-88
XXVI

Stack v. Karnes, 750 F.Supp.2d 892 (S.D.Ohio 2010). 2, 29,
46
Stafford v. Harrison, 766 F.Supp. 1014 (D. Kan. 1991). 34,
37
Stafford v. State, 835 F.Supp. 1136 (W.D.Mo. 1993). 2, 31
Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
37, 38
Standish v. Bommel, 82 F.3d 190 (8th Cir. 1996). 9, 39
Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). 1,
14, 24, 29, 32, 45, 48
Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). 1, 4,
8, 11, 18, 32, 37
Stanley v. Hejirika, 134 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 1998). 27, 48
Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340 (7th Cir. 2000). 34
Stanley v. Muzio, 578 F.Supp.2d 443 (D.Conn. 2008). 16,
24, 32, 48
Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2010). 1, 21, 28,
38
Stanwood v. Green, 559 F.Supp. 196 (1983). 4, 5
Staples v. U.S., 948 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.013). 8, 9, 29
Staples v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 904 F.Supp. 487
(E.D.Va. 1995). 7, 29
Staples v. Young, 438 N.W.2d 567 (Wis. 1989). 11, 21
Star v. Gramley, 815 F.Supp. 276 (C.D.Ill. 1993). 7, 19, 38
Starchild v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 973 F.2d 610 (8th
Cir. 1992). 22, 43
Stark v. County of Westchester, 862 F.Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y.
1994). 14
Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). 7, 14, 27, 32
Starr v. Moore, 849 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.N.H. 2012). 2, 11,
18, 21
State Bank of St. Charles v. Camic, 712 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 491. 14, 27
State Correctional Inst. v. Nelson, 503 A.2d 116 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1986). 2, 31, 46
State Dept. of Corrections v. Romero, 524 So.2d 1032 (Fla.
App. 1988). 27, 50
State Dept. of Justice, Inmate Injury Fund v. Spear, 767
P.2d 928 (Or.App. 1989). 50
State Ex. Rel. M.L.N. v. Greiner, 360 S.E.2d 554 (W.Va.
1987). 8, 26
State v. Balser, 460 So.2d 74 (La. App., 1984). 19, 41
State v. Berger, 618 S.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. Mo. 1981). 47
State v. Braxton, 37 CrL 2372 (Conn. Sup. Ct. 1985). 16
State v. Dawson, 282 S.E.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. App. W.Va.
1981). 36, 43
State v. Ferre, 734 P.2d 888 (Ore. App. 1987). 43
State v. Grey, 602 S.W.2d 259 (Crim. App. Tenn. 1980).
32, 47
State v. Hartzog, 635 P.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1981). 41
State v. Human Rights Com'n., 534 N.E.2d 161 (Ill.App. 4
Dist. 1989). 2, 31
State v. Killebrew, 327 N.W.2d 155 (Ct. App. Wisc. 1982).
11
State v. Maier, 423 A.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Me. 1980). 43
State v. Moot, 398 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. App. 1986). 36, 43
State v. Patrick, 381 So.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. La. 1980). 36
State v. Ryan, 429 A.2d 332 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 880. 43
State v. Simon, 297 N.W.2d 206 (Iowa 1980). 1
State v. Staab, 430 So.2d 55 (La. 1983). 1
State v. Thornton, 38 CrL 2173 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1985). 16,
39
State v. Washington, 37 CrL 2226 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985).
26, 32, 36

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

State v. Williams, 36 CrL 2103 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 1984). 16
Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). 7, 19,
27, 28, 34
Steading v. Thompson, 941 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1206. 10, 29
Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1996). 29, 30
Steele v. Withrow, 157 F.Supp.2d 734 (E.D.Mich. 2001).
22, 26
Stefanoff v. Hays County, Tex., 154 F.3d 523 (5th Cir.
1998). 19, 20, 24
Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466 (9th Cir. 1996). 19,
37
Steffenhagen v. Armontrout, 749 F.Supp. 997 (W.D. Mo.
1990). 14
Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). 35, 38
Steidl v. Gramley, 151 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 1998). 14, 45
Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). 7, 36, 43
Stenzel v. Ellis, 916 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1990). 10, 48
Stephany v. Wagner, 835 F.2d 497 (3rd Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2851. 3
Stephens v. Correctional Services Corp., 428 F.Supp.2d 580
(E.D.Tex. 2006). 14, 27, 32, 46
Stephens v. Muncy, 751 F.Supp. 1214 (E.D. Va. 1990),
affirmed, 929 F.2d 694. 36, 43
Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190 (3rd Cir.
2000). 14, 33
Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1981). 41
Sterling v. Wood, 68 F.3d 1124 (8th Cir. 1995). 1, 47
Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.Supp.2d 153
(D.D.C. 2007). 2, 4
Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 537 F.Supp.2d 178
(D.D.C. 2008). 4, 43
Stevens v. County of Duchess, 445 F.Supp. 89 (S.D. N.Y.
1977). 14, 27
Stevens v. Gooch, 48 F.Supp.3d 992 (E.D.Ky. 2014). 1, 21,
29
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2007). 3, 8, 32
Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1989). 28
Stevenson v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 1214 (10th Cir. 1991).
22, 47
Stewart ex rel. Estate of Stewart v. Waldo County, 350
F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Me. 2004). 14, 29, 32
Stewart v. Alameida, 418 F.Supp.2d 1154 (N.D.Cal. 2006).
8, 19, 39
Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2012). 37
Stewart v. Beaufort County, 481 F.Supp.2d 483 (D.S.C.
2007). 32, 48
Stewart v. Block, 938 F.Supp. 582 (C.D.Cal. 1996). 1, 11,
18, 21
Stewart v. Davies, 954 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1992). 34, 36
Stewart v. Gates, 450 F.Supp. 583 (C.D. Calif. 1978). 3, 12
Stewart v. LaGrand, 119 S.Ct. 1018 (1999). 10, 43
Stewart v. Lyles, 66 Fed.Appx. 18 (7th Cir. 2003).
[unpublished] 33, 41
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 118 S.Ct. 1618 (1998). 1, 22
Stewart v. McGinnis, 800 F.Supp. 604 (N.D.Ill, affirmed, f
F.3d 1031. 1992). 9, 35
Stewart v. McManus, 924 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1991). 11, 39,
48
Stewart v. McMickens, 677 F.Supp. 226 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
1
Stewart v. Robinson, 115 F.Supp.2d 188 (D.N.H. 2000). 14,
25, 32
Stewart v. Taft, 235 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2002). 29
Stickley v. Byrd, 703 F.3d 421 (8th Cir. 2013). 23, 24, 32

TC-89
XXVI

Stigall v. Madden, 26 F.3d 867 (8th Cir. 1994). 16, 47
Stiltner v. Crouse, 327 F.Supp.2d 667 (W.D.Va. 2004). 14,
25, 32, 45
Stiver v. Meko, 130 F.3d 574 (3rd Cir. 1997). 34, 43
Stojcevski v. County of Macomb, 143 F.Supp.3d 675 (E.D.
Mich. 2015). 13, 14, 27, 29, 44
Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1983). 8, 14,
27
Stokes v. Fair, 795 F.2d 235 (1st Cir. 1986). 8
Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F.Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1975). 29
Stokes v. Miller, 216 F.Supp.2d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 1, 22
Stone v. Caswell, 963 F.Supp.2d 32 (D.Mass. 2013). 14, 48
Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850
(9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1050. 15, 27,
36
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), reh'g. denied, 429
U.S. 874. 22
Stone v. Schmidt, 398 F.Supp. 768 (W.D. Wisc. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 865. 28
Stone-Bey v. Swihart, 898 F.Supp. 1287 (N.D.Ind. 1995).
11
Stone-El v. Fairman, 785 F.Supp. 711 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 24,
28
Stone-El v. Sheahan, 914 F.Supp. 202 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 9,
10, 12, 27, 32, 39
Stoner v. Arkansas Dep. of Correction, 983 F.Supp.2d 1074
(E.D.Ark. 2013). 2, 31
Stones v. McDonald, 7 F.Supp.3d 422 (D.Del. 2014). 29
Story v. Foote, 782 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 2015). 31, 33, 41
Story v. Morgan, 786 F.Supp. 523 (W.D. Pa. 1992). 1, 47
Stotts v. Salas, 938 F.Supp. 663 (D.Hawai'i 1996). 1
Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 22 F.Supp.3d
715 (E.D.Mich. 2014). 3, 13, 15, 17, 29
Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 705 F.3d 560
(6th Cir. 2013). 17, 24, 29, 33, 41
Stough v. Gallahger, 967 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1992). 31
Stout v. City of Porterville, 196 Calif. Rptr. 301 (Calif. Ct.
App. 1983). 14, 27
Stow v. Grimaldi, 993 F.2d 1002 (lst Cir. 1993). 28
Strachan v. Ashe, 548 F.Supp. 1193 (D. Mass. 1982). 10,
11, 23, 24, 40
Straker v. Jones, 986 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 6, 22
Straley v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 582 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir.
2009). 22, 36, 44
Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1986).
19, 25
Strandell v. Jackson County, Ill., 634 F.Supp. 824 (S.D. Ill.
1986). 8, 14, 44
Straub v. Monge, 815 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 336. 1
Street v. Fair, 918 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1990). 14
Street v. Vose, 936 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 948. 1
Streeter v. Goord, 519 F.Supp.2d 289 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). 27,
29
Streeter v. Hopper, 618 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1980). 3, 9, 14,
19, 22, 27, 47
Streeter v. Sheriff of Cook County, 576 F.Supp.2d 913
(N.D.Ill. 2008). 32, 33, 39, 41
Streit v. County of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552 (9th Cir.
2001). 16, 24, 27, 32, 36
Strickland v. Delo, 758 F.Supp. 1319 (E.D. Mo. 1991). 3,
11
Strickland v. Dyer, 628 F.Supp. 180 (E.D. Ark. 1986). 8, 11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Strickland v. Godinez, 104 F.Supp.3d 940 (S.D. Ill. 2015).
37, 38
Strickler v. McCord, 306 F.Supp.2d 818 (N.D.Ind. 2004).
14, 32
Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375 (4th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 393. 1, 9, 10, 33
Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980). 11
Stringer v. Williams, 161 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 1998). 22, 36
Stringfellow v. Perry, 869 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir. 1989). 3
Strong v. Woodford, 428 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2006).
1, 28
Strope v. Collins, 492 F.Supp.2d 1289 (D.Kan. 2007). 24,
27, 28, 38
Strother v. Nardolillo, 583 F.Supp.2d 645 (E.D.Pa. 2008).
22, 36
Stroud v. Roth, 741 F.Supp. 559 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 3, 29, 37
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951). 22
Strouss v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 250 F.3d 336 (6th
Cir. 2001). 31
Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). 2, 7, 11,
30, 34, 45
Stuck v. Aikens, 760 F.Supp. 740 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 8, 47
Studway v. Feltman, 764 F.Supp. 133 (W.D. Wis. 1991). 11
Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009 (3rd Cir. 1987). 19, 49
Sturts v. City of Philadelphia, 529 F.Supp. 434 (E.D. Penn.
1982). 7, 14
Stutes v. Tipto, 540 F.Supp.2d 516 (D.Vt. 2008). 9, 27, 47
Stutler v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 263 F.3d 698 (7th
Cir. 2001). 31
Sudler v. City of New York, 689 F.3d 159 (2nd Cir. 2012).
20, 36, 43
Sullivan v. Bornemann, 384 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2004). 25,
29, 32
Sullivan v. Flannigan, 8 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1993). 29, 30
Sullivan v. Ford, 828 F.Supp. 480 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 11
Sult v. Prison Health Services Polk County Jail, 806
F.Supp. 251 (M.D.Fla. 1992). 29
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 7 F.3d 1543 (11th Cir. 1993). 36
Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277 2 (11th Cir. 1990). 36
Sulton v. Wright, 265 F.Supp.2d 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 2,
27, 29, 47
Summers v. Salt Lake County, 713 F.Supp. 1415 (D. Utah
1989). 1, 28, 33
Summers v. Sheahan, 883 F.Supp. 1163 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 9,
10, 27, 29, 40
Sundby v. Fiedler, 827 F.Supp. 580 (W.D. Wis. 1993). 34
Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). 1, 21, 35,
47
Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). 3, 7, 9, 11,
15, 23, 32, 40, 41
Sutherland v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 580 F.3d 748
(8TH Cir. 2009). 2, 31
Sutton v. City of Philadelphia, 21 F.Supp.3d 474 (E.D.Pa.
2014). 18, 37
Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3rd Cir. 2003). 3, 37, 38
Sutton v. Stewart, 22 F.Supp.2d 1097 (D.Ariz. 1998). 28,
37, 38, 39
Swader v. Com. of Va., 743 F.Supp. 434 (E.D. Va. 1990).
14, 36
Swain v. Spinney, 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 17, 25, 41, 46
Swain v. Spinney, 932 F.Supp. 25 (D.Mass. 1996). 32, 41
Swan by Carello v. Daniels, 923 F.Supp. 626 (D.Del. 1995).
27, 29, 32, 45
Swan v. U.S., 159 F.Supp.2d 1174 (N.D.Cal. 2001). 14, 30,
33

TC-90
XXVI

Swan v. U.S., 698 F.Supp.2d 227 (D.Mass. 2010). 29
Swann v. Secretary, Georgia, 668 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
2012). 7, 13, 19, 28
Swart v. Scott County, Minn., 650 F.Supp. 888 (D. Minn.
1987). 5, 41
Sweat v. Grondolsky, 898 F.Supp.2d 347 (D.Mass. 2012).
22, 43
Sweatt v. Bailey, 876 F.Supp. 1571 (M.D. Ala. 1995). 14,
19, 24, 48
Sweeney v. Parke, 113 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 1997). 11, 20, 22
Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595
(E.D.Va. 2012). 2, 19, 37, 38, 39
Sweet v. Wende Correctional Facility, 514 F.Supp.2d 411
(W.D.N.Y. 2007). 11, 21
Swift v. Lewis, 901 F.2d 730 (9th Cir. 1990). 37, 38, 39
Swift v. Tweddell, 582 F.Supp.2d 437 (W.D.N.Y. 2008).
29, 30, 33, 39
Swiggett v. Batcho, 826 F.Supp.2d 722 (E.D.Pa. 2011). 36
Swisher v. Porter County Sheriff's Dept., 769 F.3d 553 (7th
Cir. 2014). 1, 21
Swoboda v. Dubach, 788 F.Supp. 519 (D. Kan. 1992),
modified, 992 F.2d 286. 9
Swofford v. Mandrell, 969 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1992). 1, 14,
32
Swope v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 439 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C.
2006). 2, 19, 33
Sykes v. Kreiger, 451 F.Supp. 421 (N.D. Ohio 1975). 1, 3,
19, 28, 29, 30
Sykes v. McPhillips, 412 F.Supp.2d 197 (N.D.N.Y. 2006).
27, 29, 33
Sylvester v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713 (7th Cir. 1998). 11, 22
Sypert v. U.S., 559 F.Supp. 546 (D. D.C. 1983). 29
Szubielski v. Pierce, 152 F.Supp.3d 227 (D. Del. 2016). 3,
8, 9, 10, 12, 21, 30
T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2014). 24, 25, 26
Tabbaa v. Chertoff, 509 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2007). 32, 41
Tablada v. Thomas, 533 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 2008). 20, 22, 43
Tafari v. Hues, 539 F.Supp.2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 1
Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 1,
3, 10, 14, 21, 24, 28, 29, 39, 47, 48
Tafoya v. McCall, 76 Fed.Appx. 266 (10th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 1
Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2008). 14, 17
Taha v. Bucks County, 9 F.Supp.3d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2014). 2,
7, 32, 33
Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F.Supp. 723 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 9, 12, 15,
23, 30, 34, 35, 39, 42, 49
Tajeddini v. Gluch, 942 F.Supp. 772 (D.Conn. 1996). 1, 29
Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2005). 9, 10, 29
Talbert v. Kelly, 799 F.2d 62 (3rd Cir. 1986). 6, 32
Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1998). 3, 10, 18
Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884 (6th Cir. 1999). 1, 4
Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1987). 43
Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2009). 14, 25, 29,
32
Tanner v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.Supp.2d 117
(D.D.C. 2006). 34, 47, 50
Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027 (E.D.Mich. 2005). 7,
13, 29
Tapia-Ortiz v. Winter, 185 F.3d 8 (2nd Cir. 1999). 1
Tardiff v. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2005).
24, 25, 27, 32, 41, 44
Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Me.2006).
25, 32, 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Tardiff v. Knox County, 567 F.Supp.2d 201 (D.Me. 2008).
17, 27, 32, 41
Tardiff v. Knox County, 573 F.Supp.2d 301 (D.Me. 2008).
17, 25, 32, 41
Tardiff v. Knox County, 598 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.Me. 2009).
17, 25, 27, 32, 41
Tarpley v. Allen County, Indiana, 312 F.3d 895 (7th Cir.
2002). 1, 35, 37, 38, 42
Tarpley v. Dugger, 841 F.2d 359 (11th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 101. 1
Tart v. Young, 168 F.Supp.2d 590 (W.D.Va. 2001). 37, 47
Tasker v. Moore, 738 F.Supp. 1005 (S.D. W.Va. 1990). 24,
27, 36
Tate v. Frey, 673 F.Supp. 880 (W.D. Ky. 1987). 4, 9
Tate v. Gusman, 459 F.Supp.2d 519 (E.D.La. 2006). 32, 39
Tate v. Kassulke, 409 F.Supp. 651 (W.D. Ky. 1976). 1, 3,
10, 11, 23, 29, 30, 40
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971). 22, 43
Tate v. Troutman, 683 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2010). 9,
27, 29
Tatsch-Corbin v. Feathers, 561 F.Supp.2d 538 (W.D.Pa.
2008). 14, 27, 29, 30
Tatum v. Simpson, 399 F.Supp.2d 1159 (D.Colo. 2005). 29,
32
Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79 (N.D.N.Y.2013). 1, 3,
8, 10, 13, 24, 37
Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2000). 14, 29, 32
Taylor v. Anderson, 868 F.Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 18,
29
Taylor v. Armontrout, 894 F.2d 961 (8th Cir. 1989). 49
Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015). 14, 24, 30
Taylor v. Barnett, 105 F.Supp.2d 483 (E.D.Va. 2000). 29
Taylor v. Bowers, 966 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 394. 29
Taylor v. City of Mason, 970 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Ohio
2013). 7, 16, 25, 32
Taylor v. Coughlin, 29 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 1994). 1, 35, 38
Taylor v. Cox, 912 F.Supp. 140 (E.D.Pa. 1995). 1, 35, 37
Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2002). 1
Taylor v. Dormire, 690 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2012). 9, 18, 27
Taylor v. Foltz, 803 F.Supp. 1261 (E.D.Mich. 1992),
affirmed, 14 F.3d 602. 8, 27
Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266 (4th Cir. 1994). 9, 39, 45
Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 127. 14, 27
Taylor v. Hale, 909 F.Supp.2d 1320 (N.D.Ala. 2012). 14,
32, 48
Taylor v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority, 550
F.Supp.2d 614 (E.D.Va. 2008). 2, 31
Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 192. 19, 35
Taylor v. Koon, 682 F.Supp. 475 (D. Nev. 1988). 11
Taylor v. Leidig, 484 F.Supp. 1330 (D. Colo. 1980). 28, 41
Taylor v. N.C. Dept. of Corrections, 363 S.E.2d 868 (N.C.
App. 1988). 14
Taylor v. Perini, 413 F.Supp. 189 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 38
Taylor v. Perini, 477 F.Supp. 1289 (N.D. Ohio 1979). 19,
38
Taylor v. Plousis, 101 F.Supp.2d 255 (D.N.J. 2000). 29, 32
Taylor v. Rodriguez, 238 F.3d 188 (2nd Cir. 2001). 11
Taylor v. Sawyer, 284 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2002). 22
Taylor v. Sebelius, 350 F.Supp.2d 888 (D.Kan. 2004). 2, 4,
36
Taylor v. State of Rhode Island, 101 F.3d 780 (1st Cir.
1996). 4, 43

TC-91
XXVI

Taylor v. Sterrett, 344 F.Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), reh'g.
den., 420 U.S. 983. 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 18, 30, 34, 37,
44
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g.
denied, 420 U.S. 983. 1, 28, 37
Taylor v. Sullivan, 980 F.Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 24,
36
Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). 1, 14,
18, 21, 27, 45, 48
Taylor v. Thornton, 107 F.Supp.2d 1061 (W.D.Mo. 2000).
19, 36, 37
Taylor v. United States, 103 F.Supp.3d 87 (D.D.C. 2015).
32, 48
Taylor v. Walker, 537 F.Supp.2d 966 (C.D.Ill. 2008). 19, 50
Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1991). 11
Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2010). 1, 7
Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 882
(E.D.Wis. 2006). 14, 29, 32, 45
Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009). 3, 29, 48
Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo.
2010). 2, 14, 25, 32, 45, 46
Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F.Supp.2d 1115 (S.D.Cal. 2007).
10, 41
Teamsters Local Union No. 117 v. Washington Dept. of
Corrections, 789 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). 31
Teas v. Ferguson, 608 F.Supp.2d 1070 (W.D.Ark. 2009).
13, 48
Teen Ranch v. Udow, 389 F.Supp.2d 827 (W.D.Mich.
2005). 19, 26, 34, 37
Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072 (10th Cir. 2007). 31
Tellier v. Fields, 280 F.3d 69 (2nd Cir. 2000). 27
Temple v. Albert, 719 F.Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 27
Temple v. Dahm, 905 F.Supp. 670 (D.Neb. 1995). 12
Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367 (10th Cir. 1994). 3
Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2011). 2, 4, 42,
44
Terbush v. Massachusetts ex rel. Hampden County Sheriff's
Office, 987 F.Supp.2d 109 (D.Mass. 2013). 29, 33, 38
Termunde v Cook, 684 F.Supp. 255 (D. Utah 1988). 3, 37
Terrell v. Bassett, 353 F.Supp.2d 658 (E.D.Va. 2005). 11
Terrell v. Godinez, 966 F.Supp. 679 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 3, 11
Terrell v. U.S., 564 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2009). 22, 36
Terrovona v. Brown, 783 F.Supp. 1281 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
41
Terry Ex Rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F.Supp.2d 934 (E.D.Ark.
2002). 1, 30, 32
Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373 (11th Cir. 1989). 31
Terry v. Rucker, 649 F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1981). 36
Tesch v. County of Green Lake, 157 F.3d 465 (7th Cir.
1998). 7, 32
Tesoro v. Zavaras, 46 F.Supp.2d 1118 (D.Colo. 1999). 7,
29, 48
Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir. 1975). 37, 38
Thacker v. Dixon, 784 F.Supp. 286 (E.D.N.C. 1991). 19, 37
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 110 F.3d 1233 (6th Cir. 1997). 1,
10, 18
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999). 1, 7, 9
The Chicago Reader v. Sheahan, 141 F.Supp.2d 1142
(N.D.Ill. 2001). 19
The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F.Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974).
19
Theck v. Warden, I.N.S., 22 F.Supp.2d 1117 (C.D.Cal.
1998). 19, 22
Theriault v. Carlson, 339 F.Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 871, reh'g. denied, 434 U.S. 943. 37

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Theriault v. Magnusson, 698 F.Supp. 369 (D. Me. 1988).
19, 28
Theriault v. Quinlan, 609 F.Supp. 733 (2nd Cir. 1985). 36
Theriault v. Silber, 391 F.Supp. 578 (W.D. Tex. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 871. 37
Theus v. Angelone, 895 F.Supp. 265 (D.Nev. 1995). 37, 39,
48
Thiel v. Nelson, 422 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D.Wis. 2006). 7,
10, 29
Thiel v. Wisconsin, 399 F.Supp.2d 929 (W.D.Wisc. 2005).
7, 32, 41, 47
Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2002). 7, 39, 47
Thomas ex rel. Smith v. Cook County Sheriff, 401
F.Supp.2d 867 (N.D.Ill. 2005). 14, 25, 27, 29, 32
Thomas v. Adams, 55 F.Supp.3d 552 (D.N.J. 2014). 7, 34,
47
Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491 (2nd Cir. 2006). 29, 32
Thomas v. Baca, 514 F.Supp.2d 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 9,
24, 32
Thomas v. Barker, 371 F.Supp.2d 636 (M.D.Pa. 2005). 1,
22, 27
Thomas v. Benton County, Ark., 702 F.Supp. 737 (W.D.
Ark. 1988). 14, 39, 45
Thomas v. Booker, 762 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975. 14, 27
Thomas v. Booker, 784 F.2d 299 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 106 S.Ct. 1975. 27, 45
Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3rd Cir. 1973). 7, 49
Thomas v. Brown, 824 F.Supp. 160 (N.D.Ind. 1993). 9, 10,
23, 40
Thomas v. Bruce, 428 F.Supp.2d 1161(D.Kan. 2006). 29
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). 2, 5, 10,
27, 30, 48
Thomas v. Calero, 824 F.Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 3,
11
Thomas v. City of Clanton, 285 F.Supp.2d 1275 (M.D.Ala.
2003) 7, 24, 32, 41, 46
Thomas v. City of Peoria, 580 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 2009). 16,
24
Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th
Cir. 2010). 2, 14, 27, 29
Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217 (3rd Cir.
2014). 14, 27, 46
Thomas v. Deitz, 518 F.Supp. 794 (D. N.J. 1981). 36
Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1994). 19, 36
Thomas v. Ferguson, 361 F.Supp.2d 435 (D.N.J. 2004). 9,
48
Thomas v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 881
F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1989). 22, 36
Thomas v. Gunter, 103 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 1997). 37
Thomas v. Gunter, 32 F.3d 1258 (8th Cir. 1994). 37
Thomas v. Irvin, 981 F.Supp. 794 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 9, 15,
41
Thomas v. Jabe, 760 F.Supp. 120 (E.D. Mich. 1991). 3, 9,
18, 40
Thomas v. McBride, 3 F.Supp.2d 989 (N.D.Ind. 1998). 20,
22, 41
Thomas v. McBride, 306 F.Supp.2d 855 (N.D.Ind. 2004).
11, 22
Thomas v. Nassau County Correctional Center, 288
F.Supp.2d 333 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) 29
Thomas v. Newkirk, 905 F.Supp. 580 (N.D.Ind. 1995). 11
Thomas v. Northern, 574 F.Supp.2d 1029 (E.D.Mo. 2008).
18, 37, 48

TC-92
XXVI

Thomas v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corr., 615 F.Supp.2d 411
(W.D.Pa. 2009). 8, 14, 29
Thomas v. Pennsylvania, 375 F.Supp.2d 406 (M.D.Pa.
2005). 1, 22, 36
Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). 3, 9, 12,
39
Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997). 11, 12, 42
Thomas v. Ramos, 918 F.Supp. 228 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 12
Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). 1, 11, 21,
38, 48
Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259 (2nd Cir. 1991). 35
Thomas v. Sheahan, 499 F.Supp.2d 1062 (N.D.Ill. 2007).
14, 29, 32, 45, 46
Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). 1,
29, 32, 46
Thomas v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Com'rs, 447 F.3d 1082
(8th Cir. 2006). 24
Thomas v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 220 F.3d 389
(5th Cir. 2000). 31
Thomas v. U.S. Secretary of Defense, 730 F.Supp. 362
(D.Kan. 1990). 7, 19, 28
Thomas v. U.S., 779 F.Supp.2d 154 (D.C.C. 2011). 29
Thomas v. Walton, 461 F.Supp.2d 786 (S.D.Ill. 2006). 14,
29, 30, 48
Thomas v. Zelez, 731 F.Supp. 1462 (D. Kan. 1990). 8
Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1987). 29
Thompson v. Armontrout, 647 F.Supp. 1093 (W.D. Mo.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 2202, affirmed, 808
F.2d 28. 36
Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir. 2002). 22, 29
Thompson v. City of Arlington, Tex., 838 F.Supp. 1137
(N.D. Tex. 1993). 31, 33
Thompson v. City of Galveston, 979 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.Tex.
1997). 16, 26, 32
Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.
1989). 9, 41
Thompson v. Clarke, 848 F.Supp. 1452 (D.Neb. 1994). 19,
24, 37
Thompson v. Cockrell, 263 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2001). 36
Thompson v. Com. of Ky., Dept. of Corrections, 109 S.Ct.
1904 (1989). 38, 49
Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D.Ill.
2006). 25, 29, 32, 41
Thompson v. Davis, 282 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2002). 7, 36
Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2002). 7, 34, 36
Thompson v. District of Columbia Dept. of Corrections,
511 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2007). 36, 43
Thompson v. Duke, 882 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 2167. 36
Thompson v. Eason, 258 F.Supp.2d 508 (N.D.Tex. 2003).
14
Thompson v. Enomoto, 915 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 117 LE2d 131. 27
Thompson v. Federal Prisons Industries, Inc., 546
F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.Tex. 2008). 50
Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2002). 2, 18,
42
Thompson v. Hawk, 978 F.Supp. 1421 (D.Kan. 1997). 11,
11
Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 2016). 18, 37
Thompson v. Joslin, 536 F.Supp.2d 799 (S.D.Tex. 2008).
50
Thompson v. King, 730 F.3d 742 (8th Cir. 2013). 14, 24, 25,
27, 29, 32
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2687 (1988). 26, 43

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 908. 16
Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500 (3rd Cir. 1989). 11, 41
Thompson v. Roy, 793 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2015). 22, 26
Thompson v. Smeal, 54 F.Supp.3d 339 (M.D.Pa. 2014). 18,
37, 38, 39
Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997). 33, 41
Thompson v. Spears, 336 F.Supp.2d 1224 (S.D.Fla. 2004).
14, 32, 39, 44, 45
Thompson v. Upshur County, TX, 245 F.3d 447 (5th Cir.
2001). 14, 27, 29, 32
Thompson v. Wyandotte County Detention, 869 F.Supp.
893 (D.Kan. 1994). 7, 17, 33
Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Minn. 2005). 1,
29, 32, 41, 48
Thomson v. Jones, 619 F.Supp. 745 (7th Cir. 1985). 27, 48
Thomson v. Washington, 362 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004). 1
Thongvanh v. Thalaker, 17 F.3d 256 (8th Cir. 1994). 19, 28
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (1989). 28, 38, 39
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.
1986). 2, 24, 31, 33
Thorne v. Jones, 585 F.Supp. 910 (D. La. 1984), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016. 41, 49
Thorne v. Jones, 765 F.2d 1270 (1st Cir. 1985), affirmed,
983 F.2d 1332, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016. 19, 27,
41
Thornhill v. Breazeale, 88 F.Supp.2d 647 (S.D.Miss. 2000).
2, 14, 30, 32
Thornley v. Edwards, 671 F.Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 1,
28
Thornton v. Brown, 47 F.3d 194 (7th Cir. 1995). 14
Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2014). 24, 36, 43
Thornton v. City of Montgomery, 78 F.Supp.2d 1218
(M.D.Ala. 1999). 14, 32, 46
Thornton v. Jackson, 998 F.Supp.2d 1365 (N.D.Ga. 2014).
8, 9, 14, 39
Thornton v. Phillips County, Arkansas, 240 F.3d 728 (8th
Cir. 2001). 14, 39, 48
Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2005). 1, 9, 12
Thornton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 93 F.Supp.2d 1057
(D.Minn. 2000). 25, 29, 32
Thorpe v. Little, 804 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Del. 2011). 1, 32,
48
Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 418 F.Supp.2d 875 (E.D.Tex.
2006). 3, 37, 38
Thye v. U.S., 109 F.3d 127 2 (2nd Cir. 1997). 47
Tibbs v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2006). 16,
25, 32, 48
Tidwell v. Hicks, 791 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2015). 14, 48
Tikalsky v. City of Chicago, 687 F.2d 175 (Chicago Ill.
1981). 27, 41
Tilbe v. Entitas Foundation, Inc., 499 F.Supp. 817 (D. Nev.
1980). 36
Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3rd Cir. 1990). 9, 15
Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D.Ill. 2011). 1, 7,
16, 24
Tillman v. Lebanon County Correctional Facility, 221 F.3d
410 (3rd Cir. 2000). 4, 35
Tilmon v. Prator, 292 F.Supp.2d 898 (W.D.La. 2003) 11, 32
Tilmon v. Prator, 368 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004). 11, 32
Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 2807. 33, 41, 45
Tindal v. Goord, 530 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 29
Tinius v. Carroll County Sheriff Dept., 321 F.Supp.2d 1064
(N.D.Iowa 2004). 16, 29, 32

TC-93
XXVI

Tinsley v. Pittari, 952 F.Supp. 384 (N.D.Tex. 1996). 37
Tipler v. Douglas County, Neb., 482 F.3d 1023 (8th Cir.
2007). 31, 45
Tisdale v. Dobbs, 807 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1986). 37
Tittle v. Jefferson County Com'n., 10 F.3d 1535 (11th Cir.
1994). 14, 25
Tkochenko v. Sabol, 792 F.Supp.2d 733 (M.D.Pa. 2011). 6,
22, 36
Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2001). 29, 46
Tobias v. Campbell, 202 F.Supp.2d 934 (E.D.Mo. 2001). 14
Todaro v. Bowman, 872 F.2d 43 (3rd Cir. 1989). 11, 19
Todaro v. Ward, 431 F.Supp. 1129 (S.D. N.Y. 1977). 10, 29
Todd v. Graves, 217 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Iowa 2002). 1, 27
Todd v. Montoya, 877 F.Supp.2d 1048 (D.N.M. 2012). 14,
27, 32
Todd v. Navarro, 698 F.Supp. 871 (S.D. Fla. 1988). 31
Toeller v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 461 F.3d 871
(7th Cir. 2006). 31
Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2004). 29
Tokar v. Armontrout, 97 F.3d 1078 (8th Cir. 1996). 7, 8, 9,
10, 29, 33
Tolden v. Coughlin, 457 N.Y.S.2d 942 (App. Div. N.Y.
1982). 11
Tommassello v. Stine, 642 F.Supp.2d 910 (D.Minn. 2009).
29
Tookes v. U.S., 811 F.Supp.2d 322 (D.C.Cir. 2011). 16, 27,
45, 46
Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 286 F.3d 576 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). 21, 33, 47
Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 474 F.Supp.2d 14
(D.D.C. 2007). 2
Tooley v. Boyd, 936 F.Supp. 685 (E.D.Mo. 1996). 3, 50
Toombs v. Bell, 798 F.2d 297 (8th Cir. 1986). 29
Toombs v. Bell, 915 F.2d 345 (8th Cir. 1990). 27, 29
Toombs v. Hicks, 773 F.2d 995 (1985). 10, 50
Torcasio v. Murray, 862 F.Supp. 1482 (E.D. Va. 1994). 7,
9, 10, 15
Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231 (1st Cir. 1991). 14, 30
Torrence v. Musilek, 899 F.Supp. 380 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 14
Torres Garcia v. Puerto Rico, 402 F.Supp.2d 373 (D.Puerto
Rico 2005). 14, 47, 50
Torres Rios v. Pereira Castillo, 545 F.Supp.2d 204
(D.Puerto Rico 2007). 1, 14
Torres v. Alvarado, 143 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Puerto Rico
2001). 1
Torres v. Amato, 22 F.Supp.3d 166 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 14,
32, 39
Torres v. Corrections Corp. of America, 372 F.Supp.2d
1258 (N.D.Okla. 2005). 1, 27
Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141 (3rd Cir. 2002). 3, 11, 13
Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). 1, 2, 4, 9,
15, 28, 35
Torres v. Stewart, 263 F.Supp.2d 463 (D.Conn. 2003). 8,
20, 32
Torres v. Trombly, 421 F.Supp.2d 527 (D.Conn. 2006). 29
Torres v. Walker, 356 F.3d 238 (2nd Cir. 2004). 5
Torres v. Wis. Dept. of Health & Social Services, 838 F.2d
944 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1133, 109
S.Ct. 1537. 31, 33
Torres v. Wisc. Dept. of Health & Social Services, 859 F.2d
1523 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1133. 31
Torres-Viera v. Laboy-Alvarado, 311 F.3d 105 (1st Cir.
2002). 39, 48
Torricellas v. Poole, 954 F.Supp. 1405 (C.D.Cal. 1997). 11,
37, 49

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Toston v. Thurmer, 689 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2012). 11, 19, 39,
42
Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236 (3rd Cir. 1999). 1,
32, 50
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1069. 3, 49, 50
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 213. 3
Toussaint v. Rowland, 711 F.Supp. 536 (N.D. Cal. 1989),
modified, 926 F.2d 800. 3
Townsend v. Cooper, 759 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2014). 8, 9, 29,
30
Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008). 3, 9, 10,
23
Townsend v. Jefferson County, 601 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir.
2010). 17, 24, 29
Townsend v. Moya, 291 F.3d 859 (5th Cir. 2002). 14, 27
Trapnell v. Ralston, 819 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987). 1, 47
Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1980). 19, 24
Trask v. County of Strafford, 772 F.Supp. 42 (D. N.H.
1991). 14, 32
Travis v. Lockhart, 607 F.Supp. 1083 (D.C. Ark. 1985). 19
Travis v. Lockhart, 925 F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1991). 22, 43
Travis v. Norris, 805 F.2d 806 (8th Cir. 1986). 19, 38
Treadwell v. Murray, 878 F.Supp. 49 (E.D.Va. 1995). 8, 25,
29, 45
Treats v. Morgan, 308 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2002). 39, 48
Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191 (10th Cir. 1996). 1, 4, 28
Trentadue v. Integrity Committee, 501 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.
2007). 2, 14
Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471 (2nd
Cir. 2006). 14, 27, 45
Trigillo v. Snyder, 547 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2008). 31
Tripati v. U.S.I.N.S., 784 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1028. 24
Triplett v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 1450 (D.C.Cir.
1997). 14, 27, 48
Tritico v. U.S. Parole Com'n., 760 F.Supp. 154 (W.D. Mo.
1991). 36, 43
Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999). 21, 27, 32
Troster v. Pennsylvania State Dept. of Corrections, 65 F.3d
1086 (3rd. Cir 1995). 19, 31
Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2002). 1, 9, 27,
32
Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011). 1, 3,
8, 9, 21, 26, 29
True v. Nebraska, 612 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2010). 31, 41
Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health
Services, 73 F.Supp.3d 1311 (W.D.Wash. 2014). 29,
30, 32, 47
Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health,
101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). 7, 27, 30,
32
Tuckel v. Grover, 660 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2011). 14, 21
Tucker v, Branker, 142 F.3d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 1
Tucker v. Angelone, 954 F.Supp. 134 (E.D.Va. 1997). 47
Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330 (9th Cir. 1991). 22, 36
Tucker v. Evans, 276 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 2002). 14, 46
Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn.
2006). 7, 25, 29, 32, 42
Tucker v. Randall, 840 F.Supp. 1237 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 9,
19, 29, 32
Tucker v. Randall, 948 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1991). 1, 32
Tucker v. Rose, 955 F.Supp. 810 (N.D.Ohio 1997). 18, 40
Tucker v. Suinlan, 748 F.Supp. 32 (U.S.D.C. 1990). 29

TC-94
XXVI

Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008). 1, 7, 32,
42
Tucker v. Thompson, 421 F.Supp. 297 (M.D. Ga. 1976). 14,
27
Tulloch v. Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114 (2nd Cir. 1995). 11, 24
Tully v. Department of Justice, 481 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir.
2007). 31
Turiano v. Schnarrs, 904 F.Supp. 400 (MD.Pa. 1995). 1, 32
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F.Supp.2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
3, 9
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2013). 9, 12, 15,
21, 23, 39
Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 24, 43
Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). 1, 21
Turner v. Caspari, 38 F.3d 388 (8th Cir. 1994). 11
Turner v. Correctional Medical Services, 494 F.Supp.2d
281 (D.Del. 2007). 13, 29
Turner v. Hamblin, 995 F.Supp.2d 859 (W.D.Wis. 2014).
24, 37
Turner v. Hickman, 342 F.Supp.2d 887 (E.D.Cal. 2004). 34,
37
Turner v. Huibregtse, 421 F.Supp.2d 1149 (W.D.Wis.
2006). 7, 14, 24
Turner v. Johnson, 46 F.Supp.2d 655 (S.D.Tex. 1999). 11,
16, 22, 50
Turner v. Kight, 192 F.Supp.2d 391 (D.Md. 2002). 17, 25,
29, 32, 41, 48
Turner v. Kight, 217 F.Supp.2d 680 (D.Md. 2002). 32, 41
Turner v. Maschner, 777 F.Supp. 875 (D. Kan. 1991),
affirmed, 962 F.2d 17. 11
Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2002). 9
Turner v. Miller, 679 F.Supp. 441 (M.D. Pa. 1987). 11, 14
Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). 7, 9, 29, 39,
40, 47
Turner v. Mull, 997 F.Supp.2d 985 (E.D.Mo. 2014). 29, 39
Turner v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs., 624 F.Supp.
318 (D. Nev. 1985). 2, 4, 35, 50
Turner v. Palmer, 84 F.Supp.3d 880 (S.D.Iowa 2015). 9, 15,
26, 34
Turner v. Rataczak, 28 F.Supp.3d 818 (W.D.Wis. 2014). 48
Turner v. Safley, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). 19, 28
Turner v. State, 395 So.2d 1242 (Ct. App. Fla. 1981). 43
Turner v. Wilkinson, 92 F.Supp.2d 697 (S.D.Ohio 1999). 5,
19, 36
Turney v. Scroggy, 831 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1987). 11, 24
Turney v. Waterbury, 375 F.3d 756 (8th Cir. 2004). 14, 25,
32, 45, 46
Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.
1998). 8, 14, 27, 32
Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir.
1984), reh'g. denied, 106 S.Ct. 16. 7, 27, 46, 48
Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 861 F.2d 295
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 9, 27
Twitty v. Ashcroft, 712 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.Conn. 2009). 1, 22
Tyler v. Barton, 901 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1990). 24, 33, 41
Tyler v. Black, 811 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 1760. 3, 8, 9, 15, 39
Tyler v. Harris, 226 F.Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964). 8, 32,
50
Tyler v. McCaughtry, 293 F.Supp.2d 920 (E.D.Wis. 2003).
11, 20, 22, 42
Tyler v. U.S., 737 F.Supp. 531 (E.D. Mo. 1990). 9
Tyler v. United States, 602 F.Supp. 476 (E.D. Mo. 1984). 9,
32
Tyler v. White, 811 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1987). 48

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Tyson v. Tilghman, 764 F.Supp. 251 (D. Conn. 1991). 22,
47
U.S. Dept. of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal
Correctional Complex Coleman, Fla. v. Federal Labor
Relations Authority 737 F.3d 779 (D.C.Cir. 2013). 2,
31, 39
U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Julian, 108 S.Ct. 1606 (1988). 36,
43
U.S. ex rel. Adams v. O'Leary, 659 F.Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill.
1987). 49
U.S. ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226 (7th Cir. 1983).
1
U.S. Ex Rel. Moore v. Conner, 284 F.Supp.2d 1092
(N.D.Ill. 2003) 22, 36, 43
U.S. ex rel. Stevenson v. Mancusi, 325 F.Supp. 1028 (W.D.
N.Y. 1971). 1
U.S. v. A.F.F., 144 F.Supp.2d 797 (E.D.Mich. 2001). 26
U.S. v. A.J., 190 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 1999). 26, 36
U.S. v. Addison, 984 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1997). 6
U.S. v. Agnello, 101 F.Supp.2d 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 6, 36
U.S. v. Al-Arian, 280 F.Supp.2d 1345 (M.D.Fla. 2003). 6
U.S. v. Alatishe, 37 CrL 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 6, 32
U.S. v. Al-Azzawy, 768 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1985). 6, 32
U.S. v. Ali, 396 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D.Va. 2005). 1, 7, 19, 32,
39
U.S. v. Allen, 190 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1999). 39, 50
U.S. v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 1573. 19, 33
U.S. v. Ammar, 919 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1990). 22, 36
U.S. v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278 (2nd Cir. 1994). 36, 43
U.S. v. Anderson, 583 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2009). 36, 43
U.S. v. Anthony Y,, 990 F.Supp. 1310 (D.N.M. 1998). 26
U.S. v. Anthony Y., 172 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 1999). 26
U.S. v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151 T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 (6th
Cir. 2014). 7, 36
U.S. v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 1995). 1
U.S. v. Baker, 836 F.Supp. 1237 (E.D.N.C. 1993). 1
U.S. v. Ballard, 704 F.Supp. 620 (E.D.N.C. 1987). 29, 30
U.S. v. Ballek, 170 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 1999). 7, 43, 50
U.S. v. Barfield, 396 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2005). 43
U.S. v. Barker, 19 F.Supp.2d 1380 (S.D.Ga. 1998). 27
U.S. v. Barnard, 770 F.Supp.2d 366 (D.Me. 2011). 36
U.S. v. Barnes, 506 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2008). 32, 41
U.S. v. Barnett, 986 F.Supp. 385 (W.D.La. 1997). 6
U.S. v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). 1, 3,
22, 32
U.S. v. Battle, 59 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 1999). 6, 32
U.S. v. Batts, 758 F.3d 915 (8th Cir. 2014). 39, 43
U.S. v. Beckwith, 987 F.Supp. 1345 (D.Utah 1997). 1, 32
U.S. v. Bell, 820 F.2d 980, (9th Cir. 1987). 6, 43
U.S. v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2009). 36, 43
U.S. v. Bermudez-Plaza, 221 F.3d 231 (1st Cir. 2000). 36,
43
U.S. v. Betts, 511 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2007). 36, 43
U.S. v. Beulke, 892 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.S.D. 2012). 4, 35,
43
U.S. v. Bout, 860 F.Supp.2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 3, 8, 22,
39
U.S. v. Bracy, 510 F.3d 792 (8th Cir. 2007). 30, 32
U.S. v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998). 30, 32
U.S. v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348 (D.C. Cir.
2002). 43
U.S. v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2011). 7, 36, 44
U.S. v. Broncheau, 759 F.Supp.2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 2010). 30,
36

TC-95
XXVI

U.S. v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2003). 41
U.S. v. Brown, 878 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1989). 28
U.S. v. Browning, 761 F.Supp. 681 (C.D. Cal. 1991). 20,
22, 36, 43
U.S. v. Bryant, 670 F.Supp. 840 (D. Minn. 1987). 29, 30
U.S. v. Burhoe, 692 F.Supp.2d 137 (D.Me. 2010). 29, 30
U.S. v. Caldwell, 750 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1007, 105 S.Ct. 1873. 41
U.S. v. Campbell, 28 F.Supp.2d 805 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 6
U.S. v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371 (10th Cir. 1997). 36, 41
U.S. v. Caraballo, 47 F.Supp.2d 190 (D.Puerto Rico 1999).
6
U.S. v. Carneglia, 238 F.Supp.2d 502 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 29,
36
U.S. v. Carnes, 987 F.Supp. 551 (E.D.Mich. 1997). 36, 41
U.S. v. Caro, 461 F.Supp.2d 478 (W.D.Va. 2006). 2
U.S. v. Carrozza, 2 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.Mass. 1998). 28, 33
U.S. v. Carta, 503 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2007). 7, 36, 44
U.S. v. Carter, 996 F.Supp. 260 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 6
U.S. v. Catalan-Roman, 329 F.Supp.2d 240 (D.Puerto Rico
2004). 3, 8, 22, 32
U.S. v. Chairse, 18 F.Supp.2d 1021 (D.Minn. 1998). 30, 36
U.S. v. Chappel, 208 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2000). 11
U.S. v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 1317. 29, 30
U.S. v. Ciccone, 312 F.3d 535 (2nd Cir. 2002). 6
U.S. v. Clark, 651 F.Supp. 76 (M.D. Pa. 1986), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 2082. 19, 33
U.S. v. Clark, 865 F.2d 1433 (4th Cir. 1989). 6
U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). 7
U.S. v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2008). 14, 29
U.S. v. Conley, 531 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008). 33
U.S. v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2nd Cir. 1985). 6, 32
U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D.Ill.
2011). 9, 15, 27, 36
U.S. v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041 (10th Cir. 2004). 1, 32
U.S. v. Cossey, 637 F.Supp.2d 881 (D.Mont. 2009). 6, 36
U.S. v. Cote, 544 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2008). 14, 32
U.S. v. Crowder, 738 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2013). 36, 43
U.S. v. Cuello, 357 F.3d 162 (2nd Cir. 2004). 26, 43
U.S. v. D.H., 12 F.Supp.2d 472 (D.Virgin Islands 1998). 26
U.S. v. D.R., 225 F.Supp.2d 694 (E.D.Va. 2002). 26
U.S. v. Daggao, 28 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 1994). 43
U.S. v. Daniels, 281 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2002). 14, 48
U.S. v. DeBeir, 16 F.Supp.2d 592 (D.Md. 1998). 6, 32
U.S. v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1987). 29, 43
U.S. v. District of Columbia, 897 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir.
1990). 25
U.S. v. Dresbach, 806 F.Supp.2d 1039 (E.D.Mich. 2011).
36, 43
U.S. v. Duff, 831 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1987). 43
U.S. v. Durham, 219 F.Supp.2d 1234 (N.D.Fla. 2002). 1, 48
U.S. v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). 1,39,48
U.S. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2nd Cir. 2000). 32
U.S. v. Enriquez, 35 F.Supp.2d 176 (D.Puerto Rico 1999).
6, 32
U.S. v. Epps, 987 F.Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1997). 6
U.S. v. Erie County, N.Y., 763 F.3d 235 (2nd Cir. 2014). 27
U.S. v. Evanoff, 10 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1993). 36, 43
U.S. v. Evans, 1 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 1993). 20
U.S. v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2005). 30, 32
U.S. v. Faulkner, 323 F.Supp.2d 1111 (D.Kan. 2004). 32,
33
U.S. v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101 (2nd Cir. 1998). 19, 28, 43
U.S. v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2011). 1, 32, 43

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

U.S. v. Figueroa, 828 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1987). 43
U.S. v. Flanagan, 868 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1989). 43
U.S. v. Flores, 214 F.Supp.2d 1193 (D.Utah 2002). 1, 3, 19,
22, 28, 32, 39, 49
U.S. v. Floyd, 11 F.Supp.2d 39 (D.D.C. 1998). 6, 32
U.S. v. Flynn, 49 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 1995). 36, 43
U.S. v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2011). 35, 39, 44
U.S. v. Fricosu, 844 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Color. 2012). 33,
41
U.S. v. Frierson, 208 F.3d 282 (1st Cir.2000). 30
U.S. v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2008). 1, 35
U.S. v. Gangi, 57 Fed.Appx. 809 (10th Cir. 2003)
[unpublished]. 32, 33, 49
U.S. v. Garcia, 135 F.3d 951 (5th Cir. 1998). 1, 4
U.S. v. Garcia, 470 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2006). 47
U.S. v. Garcia-Mejia, 394 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2004). 43
U.S. v. Gelfuso, 838 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1988). 32
U.S. v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2004). 43
U.S. v. Ghailani, 751 F.Supp.2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 39,
41
U.S. v. Goad, 788 F.3d 873 (8th Cir. 2015). 36, 39
U.S. v. Goba, 220 F.Supp.2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). 6
U.S. v. Goba, 240 F.Supp.2d 242 (W.D.N.Y. 2003). 6
U.S. v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). 36
U.S. v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2006). 14, 29, 32,
48
U.S. v. Gonzales, 995 F.Supp. 1299 (D.N.M. 1998). 6
U.S. v. Gonzalez, 675 F.Supp. 208 (D. N.J. 1987). 6, 32
U.S. v. Gonzalez, 945 F.2d 525 (2nd Cir. 1991). 8, 43
U.S. v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 1999). 28, 33
U.S. v. Gotti, 219 F.Supp.2d 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 6
U.S. v. Gotti, 755 F.Supp. 1159 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 3, 32
U.S. v. Gould, 563 F.Supp.2d 1224 (D.N.M. 2008). 14, 48
U.S. v. Graham, 683 F.Supp.2d 129 (D.Mass. 2010). 7, 30
U.S. v. Green, 157 F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1998). 26
U.S. v. Green, 532 F.3d 538 (6th Cir. 2008). 29, 30, 32
U.S. v. Green, 842 F.Supp. 68 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). 19, 33
U.S. v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 143. 31, 33
U.S. v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S.Ct. 720. 31
U.S. v. Grimes, 54 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 1995). 43
U.S. v. Groce, 838 F.Supp. 411 (E.D. Wis. 1993). 1
U.S. v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002). 43
U.S. v. Guerrette, 289 F.Supp.2d 10 (D.Me. 2005). 43
U.S. v. Hager, 288 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 2002). 43
U.S. v. Hammer, 121 F.Supp.2d 794 (M.D.Pa. 2000). 37
U.S. v. Hammer, 226 F.3d 229 (3rd Cir. 2000). 43
U.S. v. Hammond, 204 F.Supp.2d 1157 (E.D.Wis. 2002). 6,
32
U.S. v. Hancox, 49 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 1995). 36, 43
U.S. v. Hardy, 724 F.3d 280 (2nd Cir. 2013). 29, 30, 32
U.S. v. Harmon, 999 F.Supp. 467 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 8, 22
U.S. v. Harris, 876 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 417, 110 S.Ct. 569. 43
U.S. v. Heatley, 41 F.Supp.2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 28, 32,
33
U.S. v. Hebert, 201 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). 38, 41
U.S. v. Hernandez, 281 F.3d 746 (8th Cir. 2002). 1, 16, 32
U.S. v. Herrera, 29 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D.Tex. 1998). 6, 32
U.S. v. Hillstrom, 837 F.Supp. 1324 (M.D. Pa. 1993). 43
U.S. v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254 (8th Cir. 1997). 41
U.S. v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2008). 36
U.S. v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 143. 33, 39

TC-96
XXVI

U.S. v. Humphress, 878 F.Supp. 168 2 (D.Or. 1994). 22, 43
U.S. v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1991). 36
U.S. v. Janis, 820 F.Supp. 512 (S.D.Cal. 1992), affirmed, 46
F.3d 1147. 1
U.S. v. Jaramillo-Ayala, 526 F.Supp.2d 1094 (S.D.Cal.
2007). 29
U.S. v. Jefferson, 175 F.Supp.2d 1123 (N.D.Ind. 2001). 36,
37
U.S. v. Jefferson, 816 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 2016). 26
U.S. v. Johnson, 225 F.Supp.2d 982 (N.D.Iowa 2002). 1,
32, 47
U.S. v. Johnson, 352 F.Supp.2d 596 (D.Md. 2005). 1, 32
U.S. v. Jones, 152 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 1998). 36, 41
U.S. v. Jones, 869 F.Supp.2d 373 (D.Vt. 2012). 8, 22, 38
U.S. v. Jones, 980 F.Supp. 359 (D.Kan. 1997). 6, 32
U.S. v. Juvenile (I.H.), 1 F.Supp.2d 509 (D.Virgin Islands
1998). 26
U.S. v. Juvenile JG, 139 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 1998). 26
U.S. v. Juvenile K.J.C., 976 F.Supp. 1219 (N.D.Iowa 1997).
26
U.S. v. Juvenile Lwo, 160 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1998). 26
U.S. v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012). 26, 36,
43
U.S. v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778 (9th Cir. 2003) 26
U.S. v. Kazenbach, 824 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1987). 11, 29
U.S. v. Keeven, 115 F.Supp.2d 1132 (E.D.Mo. 2000). 29,
30, 32
U.S. v. Kortgaard, 26 F.Supp.2d 1239 (D.Hawai'i 1997). 22
U.S. v. Kriesel, 508 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2007). 33, 36, 41, 43
U.S. v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363 (10th Cir. 1997). 22
U.S. v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786 (9th Cir. 1991). 43
U.S. v. LaVallee, 439 F.3d 670 (10th Cir. 2006). 14, 31
U.S. v. Lee, 79 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.N.M. 1999). 6
U.S. v. Lemons, 302 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2002). 27, 50
U.S. v. Leon, D.M., 132 F.3d 583 (10th Cir. 1997). 26
U.S. v. Ligambi, 886 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa. 2012). 28, 32,
33, 38, 39
U.S. v. LoFranco, 620 F.Supp. 1324 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). 6, 32
U.S. v. Lopez, 327 F.Supp.2d 138 (D.Puerto Rico 2004). 8,
32
U.S. v. Loughner, 672 F.3d 731 (9th Cir. 2012). 29, 30, 32
U.S. v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2001). 36, 43
U.S. v. Mackie, 876 F.Supp. 1489 (E.D. La. 1994). 6, 36
U.S. v. Mahmood, 19 F.Supp.2d 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 43
U.S. v. Malloy, 11 F.Supp.2d 583 (D.N.J. 1998). 6, 32, 36
U.S. v. Marcello, 370 F.Supp.2d 745 (N.D.Ill. 2005). 6, 32,
36
U.S. v. Maricopa County, Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073
(D.Ariz. 2012). 1, 8, 9, 16, 38
U.S. v. Marion, 708 F.Supp.2d 1131 (D.Or. 2010). 3, 7, 11
U.S. v. Martin, 356 F.Supp.2d 621 (W.D.Va. 2005). 1
U.S. v. Massachusetts, 781 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Mass. 2011). 2,
31
U.S. v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2006). 36, 41
U.S. v. Maull, 768 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1985). 6, 32
U.S. v. McCormick, 54 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1995). 36
U.S. v. McGee, 981 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1992). 43
U.S. v. McGregor, 866 F.Supp. 215 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 36, 43
U.S. v. McKinley, 228 F.Supp.2d 1158 (D.Or. 2002). 6, 32
U.S. v. McQueen, 727 F.3d 1144 (11th Cir. 2013). 14, 48
U.S. v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2nd Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 562. 6, 32
U.S. v. Mike, 632 F.3d 686 (10th Cir. 2011). 36, 43
U.S. v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2009). 1, 38, 39
U.S. v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007). 14, 29, 32, 48

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

U.S. v. Miller, 526 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Okl. 1981). 41
U.S. v. Miller, 547 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). 36, 50
U.S. v. Mills, 186 F.Supp.2d 965 (E.D.Wis. 2002). 43
U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 3,
19, 32, 39, 49
U.S. v. Montgomery, 675 F.Supp. 164 (S.D. N.Y. 1987),
cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 846. 19, 33, 39
U.S. v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033 (11th Cir. 2008). 17, 31
U.S. v. Morales, 45 F.3d 693 (2nd Cir. 1995). 36
U.S. v. Morales-Morales, 985 F.Supp. 229 (D.Puerto Rico
1997). 36
U.S. v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 1999). 30, 32
U.S. v. Morin, 437 F.3d 777 (8th Cir. 2006). 32, 33, 39
U.S. v. Moruzin, 583 F.Supp.2d 535 (D.N.J. 2008). 29, 30,
32
U.S. v. Mostafa, 14 F.Supp.3d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 1
U.S. v. Muhammad, 165 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 1999). 30
U.S. v. Mujahid, 799 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2015). 2, 14, 47
U.S. v. Nedd, 415 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Me. 2006). 32
U.S. v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143 (3rd Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 111. 11, 20
U.S. v. Noriega, 764 F.Supp. 1480 (S.D. Fla. 1991). 33
U.S. v. Noriega, 917 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 976. 19, 33
U.S. v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2008). 1
U.S. v. Oakley, 731 F.Supp. 1363 (S.D. Ind. 1990). 39, 41
U.S. v. Oakley, 944 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S.Ct. 1508. 41
U.S. v. One Juvenile Male, 51 F.Supp.2d 1094 (D.Or.
1999). 26
U.S. v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Mont. 2005). 1, 22,
36, 43
U.S. v. Paskow, 11 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993). 36, 43
U.S. v. Patrick V., 359 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2004). 26, 43
U.S. v. Payne, 181 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1999). 36, 41
U.S. v. Peoples, 71 F.Supp.2d 967 (W.D.Mo. 1999). 19, 33,
39, 49
U.S. v. Perez, 565 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2009). 36, 43
U.S. v. Perez, 940 F.Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 33
U.S. v. Peterson, 544 F.Supp.2d 1363 (M.D.Ga. 2008). 4,
50
U.S. v. Phillips, 977 F.Supp. 1418 (D.Colo. 1997). 36, 41
U.S. v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995). 36
U.S. v. Ramirez, 297 F.3d 185 (2nd Cir. 2002). 26
U.S. v. Ramirez-Gutierrez, 503 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2007). 9,
32
U.S. v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 9, 32
U.S. v. Reese, 71 F.3d 582 (6th Cir. 1995). 36, 43
U.S. v. Replogle, 176 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Neb. 2001). 33, 41,
43
U.S. v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446 (2nd Cir. 2002). 33, 41, 43, 45
U.S. v. Richards, 105 F.Supp.2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 29
U.S. v. Rios-Flores, 318 F.Supp.2d 452 (W.D.Tex. 2003).
22
U.S. v. Rivera, 104 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.Mass. 2000). 6
U.S. v. Rivera-Guerrero, 426 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2005). 29,
30
U.S. v. Rivera-Morales, 365 F.Supp.2d 1139 (S.D.Cal.
2005). 30, 32
U.S. v. Robinson, 27 F.Supp.2d 1116 (S.D.Ind. 1998). 6
U.S. v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 1006, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1102.
1
U.S. v. Rojas-Yepes, 630 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C. 2009). 8,
22

TC-97
XXVI

U.S. v. Rollack, 90 F.Supp.2d 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 7, 19,
28, 32, 33, 41
U.S. v. Rose, 802 F.3d 114 (1st Cir. 2015). 31
U.S. v. Roy, 349 F.Supp.2d 60 (D.Mass. 2003). 32, 33
U.S. v. Rudisill, 43 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999). 6, 32
U.S. v. Rush, 853 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.D.C. 2012). 4
U.S. v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 1997). 26
U.S. v. Sack, 379 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir. 2004). 39
U.S. v. Salerno, 107 S.Ct. 2095 (1987). 6, 32
U.S. v. Salyer, 853 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Cal. 2012). 1, 32,
33
U.S. v. Sanchez, 30 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). 36, 43
U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015). 1, 2,
39, 45
U.S. v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). 7, 13, 19, 33,
36
U.S. v. Sanders, 663 F.2d 1 (1981). 41
U.S. v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995). 1
U.S. v. Scales, 231 F.Supp.2d 437 E.D.Va. 2002). 7, 13
U.S. v. Scales, 344 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Me. 2004). 6
U.S. v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1989). 41, 43
U.S. v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005). 6, 7, 36, 41
U.S. v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 778 F.3d
1223 (11th Cir. 2015). 1, 27, 37
U.S. v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758 (3rd Cir. 2000). 43
U.S. v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886 (10th Cir. 2005). 14, 48
U.S. v. Shelton, 431 F.Supp.2d 675 (E.D.Tex. 2006). 11,
14, 43
U.S. v. Shields, 522 F.Supp.2d 317 (D.Mass. 2007). 7
U.S. v. Silva, 133 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.Mass. 2001). 6
U.S. v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1999). 26
U.S. v. Smith, 826 F.Supp. 1282 (D. Kan. 1993). 47
U.S. v. Sotelo, 94 F.3d 1037 (7th Cir. 1996). 19, 28, 43
U.S. v. Sparger, 79 F.Supp.2d 714 (W.D.Tex. 1999). 6
U.S. v. Spriggs, 827 F.Supp. 372 (E.D. Va. 1993), affirmed,
30 F.3d 132. 41, 49
U.S. v. State of Mich., 868 F.Supp. 890 (W.D. Mich. 1994).
7
U.S. v. State of Michigan, 680 F.Supp. 270 (W.D. Mich.
1988). 11, 18
U.S. v. Stegman, 295 F.Supp.2d 542 (D.Md. 2003). 33, 41,
43
U.S. v. Stotts, 925 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1991). 1, 19, 28
U.S. v. Taylor, 183 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 1999). 1
U.S. v. Taylor, 47 F.3d 508 (2nd Cir. 1995). 36, 43
U.S. v. Taylor, 679 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2012). 34, 36, 43
U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga.
2006). 2, 9, 14, 29, 30, 32
U.S. v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1988). 43
U.S. v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514 (3rd Cir.
2014). 7
U.S. v. Thomas, 992 F.Supp. 782 (D.Virgin Islands 1998).
6
U.S. v. Thornberg, 676 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012). 1, 30, 43
U.S. v. Torres-Palma, 290 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2002). 1
U.S. v. Trujillo, 404 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2005). 36, 41
U.S. v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002). 36, 41
U.S. v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012). 1, 32, 39, 43
U.S. v. Van Poyck, 77, F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996). 25, 32, 33
U.S. v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). 1, 25,
33
U.S. v. Villanueva, 32 F.Supp.2d 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 36
U.S. v. Wallen, 177 F.Supp.2d 455 (D.Md. 2001). 29, 32
U.S. v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 1999). 7, 31, 32, 48
U.S. v. Walters, 89 F.Supp.2d 1217 (D.Kan. 2000). 6

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

U.S. v. Walton, 935 F.Supp. 1161 (D.Kan. 1996). 28, 32, 33
U.S. v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2002). 4, 43
U.S. v. Warner, 830 F.2d 651 (7th Cir. 1987). 43
U.S. v. Warren, 566 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2009). 36, 41
U.S. v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
110 S.Ct. 3243. 29, 30
U.S. v. Webb, 30 F.3d 687 (6th Cir. 1994). 43
U.S. v. West, 557 F.2d 151 (8th Cir. 1977). 1
U.S. v. Weston, 134 F.Supp.2d 115 (D.D.C. 2001. 29, 30,
32
U.S. v. Weston, 206 F.3d 9 (D.C.Cir. 2000). 30, 32
U.S. v. Wetmore, 700 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 2012). 7
U.S. v. Williams, 356 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2004). 43
U.S. v. Wilson, 686 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2012). 14, 31
U.S. v. Wolvin, 339 F.Supp.2d 1062 (W.D.Wis. 2004). 36
U.S. v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2012). 7
U.S. v. Woods, 127 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1997). 36
U.S. v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688 (2nd Cir. 1996). 14, 28, 33
U.S. v. Wray, 980 F.Supp. 534 (D.D.C. 1997). 6, 32
U.S. v. Young, 533 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Nev. 2007). 4, 43,
50
Udey v. Kastner, 805 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1986). 18, 37
Uduko v. Cozzens, 975 F.Supp.2d 750 (E.D.Mich. 2013). 3,
27, 37
Ueland v. U.S., 291 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 2002). 27
Ulibarri v. City & County of Denver, 742 F.Supp.2d 1192
(D.Colo. 2010). 14, 17, 25, 29, 36
Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984
(1983), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1600. 9, 12, 15, 32
United States ex rel. Goings v. Aaron, 350 F.Supp. 1 (D.
Minn. 1972). 19, 38
United States ex rel. Goldberg v. Warden, 622 F.2d 60 (3rd
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871. 36
United States ex rel. McCalvin v. Irving, 504 F.Supp. 368
(C.D. Ill. 1980). 36
United States ex rel. Petri v. Warden, 507 F.Supp. 5 (M.D.
Pa. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 871. 36
United States ex rel. Pullia v. Luther, 635 F.2d 612 (7th
Cir. 1980). 36
United States ex rel. Smith v. Robinson, 495 F.Supp. 696
(E.D. Penn. 1980). 2, 3, 11
United States ex rel. Steigler v. Board of Parole, 501
F.Supp. 1077 (D. Del. 1980). 36
United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F.Supp. 114 (S.D.
N.Y. 1977). 42, 47
United States v. A.W.J., 639 F.Supp. 1558 (D. Minn. 1986).
26
United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979). 36, 43
United States v. Basso, 632 F.2d 1007 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965. 43
United States v. Becerra-Cobo, 790 F.2d 427 (5th Cir.
1986). 6
United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1986). 43
United States v. Binh Tang Vo, 78 F.Supp.3d 171 (D.D.C.
2015). 1
United States v. Brown, 656 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1156. 43
United States v. Caldera, 631 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1980). 43
United States v. Cummings, 633 F.Supp. 38 (E.D. N.Y.
1986). 1, 43
United States v. Deitz, 629 F.Supp. 655 (N.D. N.Y. 1986).
6, 16, 32
United States v. Domingues, 783 F.2d 702 (7th Cir. 1986).
6

TC-98
XXVI

United States v. Fahnbulleh, 796 F.2d 239 (8th Cir. 1986).
43
United States v. Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980). 43
United States v. Fontana, 510 F.Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 1468. 43
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). 22, 43
United States v. Frisone, 795 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir. 1986). 32
United States v. Gentile, 610 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1979). 36
United States v. Grant, 807 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1987). 36, 43
United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3rd Cir. 1986). 6, 32
United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1986). 4, 43
United States v. Knights, 121 S.Ct. 1955 (2001). 41, 43
United States v. Lowe, 654 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1981). 43
United States v. Lynch, 647 F.Supp. 1293 (D. S.C. 1986).
43
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976). 1, 22
United States v. Margala, 662 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1981). 43
United States v. Martinez, 650 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). 43
United States v. McDonald, 611 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1980).
43
United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F.Supp. 907 (D. Md.
1981). 43
United States v. McLeod, 608 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1979). 43
United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963). 24
United States v. Raunazzi, 434 F.Supp. 619 (S.D. N.Y.
1977). 43
United States v. Rea, 524 F.Supp. 427 (E.D. N.Y. 1981). 43
United States v. Rivera, 614 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1980). 36
United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1130 (D.Colo. 2015).
1, 49
United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1154 (D.Colo. 2015).
1, 39
United States v. Roberts, 638 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 909. 43
United States v. Ruggiero, 796 F.2d 35 (2nd Cir. 1986). 6
United States v. Sharpe, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). 16
United States v. Smith, 618 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 868. 43
United States v. Smith, 774 F.2d 1005 (1985). 41
United States v. Spilotro, 786 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1986). 6,
32
United States v. Stine, 521 F.Supp. 808 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 3493. 43
United States v. Torrez-Flores, 624 F.2d 776 (7th Cir.
1980). 43
United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 988. 43
United States v. Vasta, 649 F.Supp. 974 (S.D. N.Y. 1986).
19, 33
United States v. Wheeler, 795 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986). 6
United States v. Williams, 787 F.2d 1182 (7th Cir. 1986).
41, 43
United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1980). 43
United States v. York, 578 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1005. 41
University Emergency Serv. v. City of Detroit, 367 N.W.2d
344 (Mich. App. 1984). 4, 29
Unterberg v. Correctional Medical Systems, Inc., 799
F.Supp. 490 (E.D.Pa. 1992). 17, 29
Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1988). 24, 39,
48
Upthegrove v. Kuka, 408 F.Supp.2d 708 (W.D.Wisc. 2006).
1, 29
Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1262. 31

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F.Supp.2d 842 (E.D.Mich. 2003) 22
Ussery v. Mansfield, 786 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015). 48
Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah Sup.Ct.
1985). 4
Uzzell v. Scully, 893 F.Supp. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 3, 11
Vaden v. Lantz, 459 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.Conn. 2006). 31
Vaden v. U.S. Department of Justice, 79 F.Supp.3d 207
(D.D.C. 2015). 1, 33
Valade v. City of New York, 949 F.Supp.2d 519 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). 14, 17, 25, 32, 48
Valadez v. City of Des Moines, 324 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa
Sup.Ct. 1982). 16, 27, 29
Valdes v. Crosby, 390 F.Supp.2d 1084 (M.D.Fla. 2005). 2,
10, 14, 24, 27, 29
Valdes v. Crosby, 450 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2006). 14, 48
Valdez v. Farmon, 766 F.Supp. 1529 (E.D. Cal. 1991). 17,
41, 48
Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 19,
32
Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp.2d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2002). 7,
36
Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F.Supp.2d 852 (E.D.Cal.
2008). 36
Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2010).
27, 36
Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 2998. 27, 32, 48
Valentin v. Murphy, 95 F.Supp.2d 99 (D.Conn. 2000). 3, 39
Valentine v. Beyer, 850 F.2d 951 (3rd Cir. 1988). 1
Valentine v. Honsinger, 894 F.Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
11
Valiant-Bey v. Morris, 829 F.2d 1441 (8th Cir. 1987). 28,
37
Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259 (10th Cir. 2009). 27,
30, 39, 48
Vallina v. Meese, 704 F.Supp. 769 (E.D. Mich. 1989). 3
Valona v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 165 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 1998).
22, 36
Van Curen v. Jago, 641 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1981) reversed
102 S.Ct. 31. 36
Van den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 2011).
19, 28, 39
Van Poyck v. Dugger, 779 F.Supp. 571 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
49
Van Poyck v. Singletary, 106 F.3d 1558 (11th Cir. 1997).
28, 42
Van Straten v. Schwartz, 38 F.Supp.2d 1038 (E.D.Wisc.
1999). 22, 36
Van v. Miami-Dade County, 509 F.Supp.2d 1295 (S.D.Fla.
2007). 31
Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). 1, 24,
37, 38
Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2003). 2, 4, 11, 21,
35, 50
Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1996). 17, 29
Vance v. Rice, 524 F.Supp. 1297 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 24
Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 1994). 1
Vanderburg v. Harrison County, Miss. ex rel. Bd. of
Supervisors, 716 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.Miss. 2010).
14, 32, 48
Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580 (6th
Cir. 2013). 1, 29
Vann v. Vandenbrook, 596 F.Supp.2d 1238 (W.D.Wis.
2009). 1, 14, 29, 30, 34

TC-99
XXVI

Vantassel v. Brooks, 355 F.Supp.2d 788 (W.D.Pa. 2005).
31
Vargas v. Pataki, 899 F.Supp. 96 (N.D.N.Y. 1995). 36, 43
Varnado v. Collins, 920 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1991). 29
Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F.Supp.2d 40
(E.D.N.Y. 2010). 1, 9, 18, 19, 32
Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75 (2nd Cir. 1997). 41, 49
Varrone v. Bilotti, 867 F.Supp. 1145 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). 41,
49
Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1988). 43
Vasquez v. Coughlin, 726 F.Supp. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 11,
24
Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F.Supp.2d 1120 (W.D.Wis.
2007). 1, 28, 41, 48
Vaughan v. Lacey, 49 F.3d 1344 (8th Cir. 1995). 29, 30
Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904 (8th Cir. 2009). 14, 25, 29,
30, 32
Vaughn v. Greene County, Arkansas, 438 F.3d 845 (8th Cir.
2006). 14, 24, 25, 29, 32
Vaughn v. Kerley, 897 F.Supp. 1413 (M.D.Fla. 1995). 29
Vaughn v. Ricketts, 663 F.Supp. 401 (D. Ariz. 1987). 27,
41
Vaughn v. Ricketts, 950 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1991). 24, 41
Vaughn v. Willis, 853 F.2d 1372 (7th Cir. 1988). 14, 27
Vazquez v. Carver, 729 F.Supp. 1063 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 9
Vazquez v. Gray, 523 F.Supp. 1359 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 9,
15, 44
Vega v. Parsley, 700 F.Supp. 879 (W.D. Tex. 1988). 14, 24,
26, 45, 46
Velarde v. Ricketts, 480 F.Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1979). 35,
38
Velasco v. Head, 166 F.Supp.2d 1100 (W.D.Va. 2000). 48
Velasquez v. Woods, 329 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2003). 2, 41
Velez v. Johnson, 395 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2005). 14, 32, 45
Velez-Ramirez v. Puerto Rico, 98 F.Supp.3d 388 (D.P.R.
2015). 2, 31
Veloz v. New York, 339 F.Supp.2d 505 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
29
Veloz v. New York, 35 F.Supp.2d 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 29
Venable v. Thornburgh, 766 F.Supp. 1012 (D. Kan. 1991).
22, 47
Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied 118 S.Ct. 1679. 22, 43
Veney v. Wyche, 293 F.3d 726 (4th Cir. 2002). 3, 7, 8, 9
Verdecia v. Adams, 327 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2003). 14
Verner v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 150 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir.
1998). 43, 47
Verser v. Barfield, 741 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013). 1, 48
Verser v. Elyea, 113 F.Supp.2d 1211 (N.D.Ill. 2000). 21,
27, 29
Verser v. Ghosh, 925 F.Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 2013). 29
Vest v. Lubbock County, 444 F.Supp. 824 (N.D. Tex.
1977). 12, 15, 18, 28, 29, 32, 49
Vester v. Murray, 683 F.Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1988). 1, 5, 29
Vester v. Rogers, 795 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 916. 19, 38
Via v. Taylor, 224 F.Supp.2d 753 (D.Del. 2002). 13, 31
Victoria W. v. Larpenter, 369 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2004). 17,
29
Vienneau v. Shanks, 425 F.Supp. 676 (W.D. Wisc. 1977).
28, 32
Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989). 11
Viero v. Bufano, 901 F.Supp. 1387 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 14, 26,
27
Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1989). 1

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Villante v. Dept. of Corrections of City of New York, 786
F.2d 516 (2nd Cir. 1986). 3, 11, 14
Villanueva v. George, 659 F.2d 851 (1981). 8, 9, 11, 32
Villarreal v. Woodham, 113 F.3d 202 (11th Cir. 1997). 32,
50
Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2014).
6, 7, 16, 24
Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709
F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 1, 17, 29
Vincent v. Sitnewski, 117 F.Supp.3d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
14, 21, 48
Vine v. County of Ingham, 884 F.Supp. 1153 (W.D.Mich.
1995). 14, 25, 29, 46
Vines v. Howard, 676 F.Supp. 608 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 11
Vineyard v. County of Murray,Ga., 990 F.2d 1207 (llth Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 636. 2, 32, 48
Vinnedge v. Gibbs, 550 F.2d 926 (4th Cir. 1977). 10, 29
Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011). 18, 27,
37
Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007). 3, 9, 40
Vinson v. Barkley, 646 F.Supp. 39 (W.D. N.Y. 1986). 24,
36
Vinson v. Clarke County, Ala., 10 F.Supp.2d 1282
(S.D.Ala. 1998). 14, 32, 46
Vinson v. Texas Bd. of Corrections, 901 F.2d 474 (5th Cir.
1990). 1
Virgili v. Gilbert, 272 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2001). 31
Vitek v. Jones, 100 S.Ct. 1254 (1980). 1, 30, 47
Vodica v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980). 19
Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 1,
9, 11, 17, 21
Volk v. Gozalez, 262 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2001). 5
Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2013). 2, 24, 31
Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). 2,
16, 24, 27, 31, 33, 41
Vollette v. Watson, 978 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2013). 2,
27, 31, 41
Volpe v. U.S., 543 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.Mass. 2008). 13
Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 810 F.Supp.2d
138 (D.D.C. 2011). 19
Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d
204 (D.D.C. 2013). 7, 27, 33
Vondrak v. City of Las Cruces, 535 F.3d 1198 (10th Cir.
2008). 16, 24, 29, 32, 48
Vore v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 281 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Ariz.
2003) 41
Vosburg v. Solem, 845 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 313. 10, 14, 27
Vuncannon v. U.S., 650 F.Supp.2d 577 (N.D.Miss. 2009).
4, 29, 36, 50
Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). 2, 4, 29,
44, 50
W.C. v. DeBruyn, 883 F.Supp. 354 (S.D. Ind. 1995). 5
Waddell v. Brandon, 528 F.Supp. 1097 (W.D. Okl. 1981).
5, 14, 41
Waddell v. Department of Correction, 680 F.3d 384 (4th Cir.
2012). 20, 22, 43
Wade v. Castillo, 658 F.Supp.2d 906 (W.D.Wis. 2009). 29,
30
Wade v. Farley, 869 F.Supp. 1365 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 11, 22
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). 22
Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2012). 1, 13,
32
Wagner v. Bay City, Tex., 227 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2000). 29,
32, 48

TC-100
XXVI

Wagner v. County of Maricopa, 706 F.3d 942 (9th Cir.
2013). 25, 29, 30, 48
Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866 (6th Cir. 1979). 36
Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1997). 3, 22
Wagner v. Henman, 902 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1990). 11
Wagner v. Thomas, 608 F.Supp. 1095 (D.C. Tex. 1985). 19,
41
Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586 (7th Cir. 2015). 29, 39
Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169 (1985). 1
Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759
(S.D.Tex 2007). 2, 25, 27, 29, 32, 46
Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). 29,
30, 36
Waker v. Brown, 754 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010). 1, 16,
32, 36
Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1989). 29, 30
Waletzki v. Keohane, 13 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 1994). 20, 22,
50
Walker v. Artus, 998 F.Supp.2d 18 N.D.N.Y. 2014). 37, 39
Walker v. Bain, 65 F.Supp.2d 591 (E.D.Mich. 1999). 5
Walker v. Bates, 23 F.3d 652 (2nd Cir. 1994). 7, 11
Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2015). 8, 37
Walker v. Benjamin, 293 F.3d 1030 (7th Cir. 2002). 29
Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969). 37, 39
Walker v. Bowersox, 526 F.3d 1186 (8th Cir. 2008). 11, 48
Walker v. Butler, 967 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1992). 29
Walker v. City of Elba, Ala., 874 F.Supp. 361 (M.D. Ala.
1994). 50
Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006).
16, 32, 46
Walker v. Epps, 550 F.3d 407 (5th Cir. 2008). 10
Walker v. Epps, 587 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Miss. 2008). 9, 10
Walker v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2004). 7, 50
Walker v. Gomez, 609 F.Supp.2d 1149 (S.D.Cal. 2009). 27,
33, 47
Walker v. Kubicz, 996 F.Supp. 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 29
Walker v. Mahoney, 915 F.Supp. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). 3,
11
Walker v. Mintzes, 771 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1985). 12, 23
Walker v. Nelson, 863 F.Supp. 1059 (D.Neb. 1994). 36
Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449 (6th Cir. 1990). 14, 46
Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 966. 13, 49
Walker v. Peters, 233 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 2000). 29
Walker v. Peters, 863 F.Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 29
Walker v. Peters, 989 F.Supp. 971 (N.D.Ill. 1997). 29
Walker v. Reed, 104 F.3d 156 (8th Cir. 1997). 1, 27
Walker v. Rowe, 791 F.2d 507 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S.Ct. 597. 2, 27, 31, 39, 46
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2013). 9, 10, 15,
23, 27, 39, 40
Walker v. Shansky, 28 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 1994), affirmed,
51 F.3d 276. 10, 24, 30
Walker v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 2008). 32, 46, 48
Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415 (9th Cir. 1994). 11
Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990). 41
Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2002). 1, 21,
22, 36
Walker v. Wainwright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968), reh'g. denied,
390 U.S. 1036. 22
Walker v. Woodford, 454 F.Supp.2d 1007 (S.D.Cal. 2006).
9, 10
Walker v. Woodford, 593 F.Supp.2d 1140 (S.D.Cal. 2008).
2, 9, 10, 15, 39
Wall v. Dion, 257 F.Supp.2d 316 (D.Me. 2003). 27, 29

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014). 18, 35, 37
Wallace v. Adkins, 115 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1997). 14, 31
Wallace v. Burbury, 305 F.Supp.2d 801 (N.D.Ohio 2003). 1
Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 1563. 50
Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681
(8th Cir. 1998). 31
Wallin v. Norman, 317 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2003). 13, 29
Walling v Slusher, 976 F.Supp. 1402 (D.Kan. 1997). 3, 11
Walls v. Tadman, 762 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 2014). 9, 14
Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
108 S.Ct. 2832. 8, 14
Walters v. County of Charleston, 63 Fed.Appx. 116 (4th
Cir. 2003) [unpublished]. 32, 48
Walters v. Edgar, 900 F.Supp. 197 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 1, 3
Walters v. Grossheim, 990 F.2d 381 (8th Cir. 1993). 4, 27,
39
Walters v. Thompson, 615 F.Supp. 330 (U.S.D.C. Ill.
1985). 1, 3
Walton v. Fairman, 836 F.Supp. 511 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 9, 40
Walton v. Norris, 59 F.3d 67 2 (8th Cir. 1995). 29, 30
Walton v. U.S., 551 F.3d 1367 (Fed.Cir. 2009). 50
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130 (2nd Cir. 2003). 6, 22
Wanninger v. Davenport, 697 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1983). 1
Warburton v. Goord, 14 F.Supp.2d 289 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
1, 7, 14, 33
Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F.Supp.2d 306 (W.D.N.Y.
1998). 1, 33, 34, 37
Ward v. Brown, 891 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D.Cal. 2012). 13,
16, 36
Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020. 17, 25, 41
Ward v. Dowd, 707 F.Supp. 417 (E.D. Mo. 1989). 29
Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271 (6th. Cir. 1995). 14, 47
Ward v. Johnson, 437 F.Supp. 1053 (E.D. Vir. 1977). 1, 9,
29, 47
Ward v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 1098 (1981). 11
Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F.Supp.2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). 1,
18, 21, 37
Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2010). 4, 35, 44, 50
Ward v. Stewart, 511 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Ariz. 2007). 4, 35,
50
Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 1297. 37
Ward v. Washtenaw County Sheriff's Dept., 881 F.2d 325
(6th Cir. 1989). 19
Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954 (10th Cir. 2006). 1, 19, 39
Ware v. Fairman, 884 F.Supp. 1201 (N.D.Ill. 1995). 9, 29,
40
Ware v. Morrison, 276 F.3d 385 (8th Cir. 2002). 11, 49
Wares v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 1141 (10th Cir. 2004). 37
Wares v. Simmons, 524 F.Supp.2d 1313 (D.Kan. 2007). 37,
38, 39
Wares v. VanBebber, 231 F.Supp.2d 1120 (D.Kan. 2002).
24, 27, 37, 38
Wares v. Vanbebber, 319 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Kan. 2004).
37
Waring v. Meachum, 175 F.Supp.2d 230 (D.Conn. 2001). 9,
18, 23, 39
Warner v. County of Washoe, 620 F.Supp. 59 (D.C. Nev.
1985). 2, 14, 27
Warren v. Baskerville, 233 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2000). 20, 22,
36
Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36 (D.C.Cir.
2004). 27, 29

TC-101
XXVI

Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 111. 4, 5, 29
Warren v. Goord, 476 F.Supp.2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 14,
21
Warren v. Goord, 579 F.Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 14,
39
Warren v. Irvin, 985 F.Supp. 350 (W.D.N.Y. 1997). 3, 10,
18, 20
Warren v. Keane, 196 F.3d 330 (2nd Cir. 1999). 9, 10, 29
Warren v. Keane, 937 F.Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 9, 10,
27, 29
Warren v. Miles, 230 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 2000). 34, 43
Warren v. Shelby County, Tenn., 191 F.Supp.2d 980
(W.D.Tenn. 2001). 13, 29
Warren v. State of Mo., 754 F.Supp. 150 (W.D. Mo. 1990),
affirmed, 995 F.2d 130. 10, 24, 50
Warren v. State of Mo., 995 F.2d 130 (8th Cir. 1993). 29,
50
Warren v. Stempson, 800 F.Supp. 991 (D.D.C. 1992),
affirmed, 995 F.2d 306. 9, 11, 40
Warren v. United States Parole Commission, 659 F.2d 183
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 950. 36
Warren v. Westchester County Jail, 106 F.Supp.2d 559
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 4, 10, 48
Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). 19,
27, 37, 38, 39
Washington v. Afify, 968 F.Supp.2d 532 (W.D.N.Y. 2013).
11, 18, 37, 40, 50
Washington v. California City Correction Center, 871
F.Supp.2d 1010 (E.D.Cal. 2012). 2, 31
Washington v. Chrans, 769 F.Supp. 1045 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
11
Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 F.Supp.2d 269
(D.D.C. 2008). 2, 31
Washington v. District of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478 (D.C.
Cir. 1986). 2, 14, 31
Washington v. Garcia, 977 F.Supp. 1067 (S.D.Cal. 1997).
7, 37
Washington v. Hively, 695 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2012). 14, 27,
32, 41
Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272 (3rd Cir. 2007). 37, 38,
39
Washington v. Lake County, Ill, 969 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.
1992). 31
Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 762 F.Supp. 199 (N.D. Ill.
1991), affirmed 969 F.2d 250. 2, 31
Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff's Dept., 306 F.3d
515 (7th Cir. 2002). 8, 14, 32
Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093 (6th Cir. 1994). 19
Washington v. Silber, 805 F.Supp. 379 (W.D.Va. 1992),
affirmed, 993 F.2d 1541. 30
Washington v. State, 405 So.2d 62 (Ct. Crim. App. Ala.
1981). 11, 22
Washington v. Tinsley, 809 F.Supp. 504 (S.D.Tex. 1992).
32, 38
Washlefske v. Winston, 234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000). 2, 35
Washpon v. Parr, 561 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 19,
39
Wasserman v. Rodacker, 557 F.3d 635 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 32,
36, 48
Waterman v. Commandant, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, 337
F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Kan. 2004). 19, 28
Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208 (3rd Cir. 1999). 19, 34
Waterman v. Farmer, 84 F.Supp.2d 579 (D.N.J. 2000). 5

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Watford v. Bruce, 126 F.Supp.2d 425 (E.D.Va. 2001). 32,
48
Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). 1, 9, 21,
33
Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682 (6th Cir.
2001). 14, 32, 46
Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010). 1, 19, 21,
35
Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537 (lst Cir. 1993). 29, 35
Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990). 50
Watson v. McGee, 527 F.Supp. 234 (S.D. Oh. 1981). 14
Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F.Supp. 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 14,
48
Watson v. Norris, 729 F.Supp. 581 (M.D. Tenn. 1989). 1, 3,
24
Watson v. Riggle, 315 F.Supp,2d 963 (N.D.Ind. 2004). 39,
48
Watson v. Smith, 682 F.Supp. 225 (S.D. N.Y. 1988). 11, 36
Watson v. U.S., 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007). 27, 29
Watts v. McKinney, 394 F.3d 710 (9th Cir. 2005). 14, 48
Watts v. Ramos, 948 F.Supp. 739 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 3, 12
Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2006).
17, 32, 41
Way v. Johnson, 893 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2012). 8, 21, 34
Wayland v. City of Springdale, Ark., 933 F.2d 668 (8th Cir.
1991). 32
Weaver v. Clarke, 120 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 1997). 5, 9, 10, 29
Weaver v. Clarke, 45 F.3d 1253 (8th Cir. 1995). 9, 29
Weaver v. Tipton County, Tenn., 41 F.Supp.2d 779
(W.D.Tenn. 1999). 24, 29, 32, 45, 46
Weaver v. Toombs, 756 F.Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 1
Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1991). 1, 4, 35
Webb v. Ada County, 285 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002). 5
Webb v. Ada County, Idaho, 195 F.3d 524 (9th Cir. 1999).
5
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000). 4, 22
Webb v. Budz, 480 F.Supp.2d 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 7, 32
Webb v. Goldstein, 117 F.Supp.2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
29, 33
Webb v. Jessamine County Fiscal Court, 802 F.Supp.2d 870
(E.D.Ky. 2011). 17, 27, 29
Webb v. Keohane, 804 F.2d 413 (7th Cir. 1986). 47
Webb v. Lawrence County, 144 F.3d 1131 (8th Cir. 1998).
14, 24, 32
Webb v. Lawrence County, 950 F.Supp. 960 (D.S.D. 1996).
8, 14, 24, 27
Webber v. Crabtree, 158 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1998). 10, 38
Webber v. Hammack, 973 F.Supp. 116 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
29
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
483 U.S. 1020. 24, 25, 27, 41
Weber v. Village of Hanover Park, 768 F.Supp. 630 (N.D.
Ill. 1991). 16
Webster v. Chevalier, 834 F.Supp. 628 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
35
Webster v. City of New York, 333 F.Supp.2d 184
(S.D.N.Y. 2004). 32, 48
Webster v. Fischer, 694 F.Supp.2d 163 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 3,
11, 28, 29
Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2001). 31
Weeks v. Chaboudy, 984 F.2d 185 (6th Cir. 1993). 27, 29
Weeks v. Hodges, 871 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Ind. 2012). 4,
29
Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept,, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir.
2006). 7, 13, 19, 43

TC-102
XXVI

Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 2 (7th Cir. 1998). 31
Weicherding v. Riegel, 981 F.Supp. 1143 (C.D.Ill. 1997).
19, 31
Weiler v. Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047 (8th Cir. 1998). 1, 28
Weinberger v. State of Wis., 906 F.Supp. 485 (W.D.Wis.
1995). 14, 45
Weir v. Nix, 114 F.3d 817 (8th Cir. 1997). 35, 37
Weir v. Nix, 890 F.Supp. 769 (S.D.Iowa 1995). 3, 19, 35,
37
Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027 (7th Cir. 2000). 8, 14, 25,
32
Welch v. Bartlett, 196 F.3d 389 (2nd Cir. 1999). 3
Welch v. Mukasey, 589 F.Supp.2d 178 (N.D.N.Y. 2008).
22
Welch v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Tex., 734 F.Supp. 765
(N.D. Tex. 1990). 8
Welch v. Spangler, 939 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1991). 27, 41
Welch v. Thompson, 20 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1994). 36, 50
Weller v. Grant County Sheriff, 75 F.Supp.2d 927
(N.D.Ind. 1999). 36, 38, 50
Wellmaker v. Dahill, 836 F.Supp. 1375 (N.D. Ohio 1993).
24, 37, 38
Wells v. Bureau County, 723 F.Supp.2d 1061 (C.D.Ill.
2010). 14, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32, 45
Wells v. City of Chicago, 896 F.Supp.2d 725 (N.D.Ill.
2012). 16, 24, 27, 29, 32, 36
Wells v. City of Chicago, 925 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Ill.
2013). 5, 27
Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1985). 30, 48
Wells v. Jefferson County Sheriff Dept., 159 F.Supp.2d
1002 (S.D.Ohio 2001). 9, 13, 14, 32
Wells v. McGinnis, 344 F.Supp. 594 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). 1
Wells v. Wade, 36 F.Supp.2d 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 11
Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S.Ct. 1121. 27, 36
Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1988). 50
Wenzler v. Warden of G.R.C.C., 949 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.Va.
1996). 1, 35
Wereb v. Maui County, 727 F.Supp.2d 898 (D.Hawai‘i
2010). 14, 24, 29, 45, 46
Wereb v. Maui County, 830 F.Supp.2d 1026 (D.Hawai‘I
2011). 14, 29, 32, 46
Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995). 37
Wesolowski v. Bockelman, 506 F.Supp.2d 118 (N.D.N.Y.
2007). 31
Wesolowski v. Harvey, 784 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y.
2011). 10, 29
Wesolowski v. Kamas, 590 F.Supp.2d 431 (W.D.N.Y.
2008). 9, 15, 23, 40
Wesolowski v. Sullivan, 524 F.Supp.2d 251 (W.D.N.Y.
2007). 1, 21, 35, 38
Wesolowski v. Washburn, 615 F.Supp.2d 126 (W.D.N.Y.
2009). 1, 24, 28
Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1990). 29, 48
West v. Atkins, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988). 2, 27, 29
West v. Frank, 492 F.Supp.2d 1040 (W.D.Wis. 2007). 2,
28, 38
West v. Lamb, 497 F.Supp. 989 (D. Nev. 1980). 9, 15
West v. Macht, 235 F.Supp.2d 966 (E.D.Wis. 2002). 8, 30
West v. Macht, 986 F.Supp. 1141 (W.D.Wis. 1997). 1
West v. McCaughtry, 971 F.Supp. 1272 (E.D.Wis. 1997). 3,
29
West v. Murphy, 771 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2014). 25, 32, 41
West v. Schwebke, 333 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2003). 8, 34, 36

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

West v. Virginia Dept. of Corrections, 847 F.Supp. 402
(W.D. Va. 1994). 7, 17, 34
West v. Whitehead, 484 F.Supp.2d 1011 (D.S.D. 2007). 22,
36
West v. Wright, 747 F.Supp. 329 (E.D. Va. 1990). 9, 10
Westbrook, III v. Wilson, 896 F.Supp. 504 (D.Md. 1995). 3,
29
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). 7, 8, 27, 39,
47
Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). 1, 7, 8,
19, 21, 39, 47
Westmoreland v. Brown, 883 F.Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1995).
14, 27
Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420 (3rd Cir. 2001). 31
Wetmore v. Gardner, 735 F.Supp. 974 (E.D. Wash. 1990).
24, 41
Wever v. Lincoln County, Nebraska, 388 F.3d 601 (8th Cir.
2004). 14, 27, 32, 45, 46
Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205 (11th
Cir. 2015). 1, 9, 21, 48
Wheeler v. Sims, 951 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S.Ct. 320. 11
Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680 (7th
Cir. 2012). 27, 29
White v. Bukowski, 800 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2015). 17, 21,
29, 47
White v. Clement, 116 F.Supp.3d 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).
21, 29
White v. Cooper, 55 F.Supp.2d 848 (N.D.Ill. 1999). 14, 15,
39
White v. Crane, 45 Fed.Appx. 552 (8th Cir. 2002). 14, 32
White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096 (D.N.D. 2006).
6, 9, 14, 29, 32
White v. Department of Correctional Services, 814
F.Supp.2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 2, 31
White v. Department of Justice. 952 F.Supp.2d 213
(D.D.C., 2013). 2, 19
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988). 29
White v. Fauver, 19 F.Supp.2d 305 (D.N.J. 1998). 7, 14, 17,
21
White v. Fauver, 530 A.2d 37 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1987). 8
White v. Gregory, 1 F.3d 267 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S.Ct. 931. 1, 18
White v. Gregory, 87 F.3d 429 (10th Cir. 1996). 1
White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277 (8th Cir. 1994). 10, 48
White v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005). 10
White v. Kane, 860 F.Supp. 1075 (E.D.Pa. 1994), affirmed,
52 F.3d 319. 11
White v. Kautsky, 386 F.Supp.2d 1042 (N.D.Iowa, 2005).
1, 27
White v. Kautzky, 269 F.Supp.2d 1054 (N.D.Iowa 2003). 1
White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2007). 1
White v. Lemacks, 183 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 1999). 14, 31
White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1990). 29
White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 221 F.3d
254 (1st Cir. 2000). 31
White v. Nix, 7 F.3d 120 (8th Cir. 1993). 9, 11
White v. Nix, 805 F.Supp. 721 (S.D.Iowa 1992), affirmed,
7 F.3d 120. 9, 10, 11
White v. Ottinger, 442 F.Supp.2d 236 (E.D.Pa. 2006). 11,
14
White v. Paulsen, 997 F.Supp. 1380 (E.D.Wash. 1998). 29
White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501 (9th Cir. 1990). 39, 48
White v. State of Colorado, 82 F.3d 364 (10th Cir. 1996). 7,
29, 50

TC-103
XXVI

White v. Washington County, Tenn., 85 F.Supp.3d 955
(E.D.Tenn. 2015). 14, 29, 30, 32
White v. White, 886 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1989). 1, 28
Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995). 11
Whiting v. Marathon County Sheriff’s Dept., 382 F.3d 700
(7th Cir. 2004). 14, 17
Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 2007). 1, 23,
29, 35
Whitley v. Albers, 106 S.Ct. (1986). 39, 48
Whitley v. Lewis, 844 F.Supp. 276 (E.D. Va. 1994),
affirmed, 48 F.3d 1218. 29
Whitley v. Miller, 57 F.Supp.3d 152 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 11
Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d 380 (7th Cir. 1998). 11, 20
Whitman v. Nesic, 368 F.3d 931 (7th Cir. 2004). 41
Whitmire v. Arizona, 298 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2002). 7, 38,
49
Whitnack v. Douglas County, 16 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 1994).
9, 40
Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1989). 37
Whitson v. Stone County Jail, 602 F.3d 920 (8th Cir. 2010).
14, 17, 47
Whitt v. Stephens County, 529 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2008). 14,
25, 32, 47
Whittington v. Lynaugh, 842 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 108. 1, 8
Whittington v. Vaughn, 289 F.Supp.2d 621 (E.D.Pa. 2003)
11, 30
Wickliffe v. Clark, 783 F.Supp. 389 (N.D. Ind. 1991). 20,
22, 36, 43
Wicks v. Shields, 181 F.Supp.2d 423 (E.D.Pa. 2002). 1, 19,
50
Wiggins v. Nelson, 510 F.Supp. 666 (D. Conn. 1981). 36
Wiggins v. Wise, 951 F.Supp. 614 (S.D.W.Va. 1996). 22,
36
Wiideman v. Angelone, 848 F.Supp. 136 (D.Nev. 1994). 1
Wilbert v. Quarterman, 647 F.Supp.2d 760 (S.D.Tex.
2009). 14, 21, 47
Wilborn v. Walsh, 584 F.Supp.2d 384 (D.Mass. 2008). 7,
36
Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122
(W.D.Wash. 2013). 1, 7, 42
Wildberger v. Bracknell, 869 F.2d 1467 (11th Cir. 1989).
11, 19, 21
Wildermuth v. Furlong, 147 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 1998). 22,
34, 36
Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C.
2012). 7, 22, 32, 36, 43
Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). 29
Wilkens v. Moore, 40 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 1994). 10, 14, 48
Wilkerson v. Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845 (5th Cir. 2014). 8, 11,
12
Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1983). 8, 10,
12
Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F.Supp.2d 654 (M.D.La. 2007).
3, 9, 10, 24
Wilkes v. Borough of Clayton, 696 F.Supp. 144 (D.N.J.
1988). 17, 32, 33
Wilkins v. Davis, 780 F.Supp. 646 (E.D. Mo. 1991),
affirmed, 963 F.2d 377. 14
Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C.
2012). 1, 2, 14, 15, 32, 39, 44
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). 1, 5, 14, 27,
48
Wilkins v. Roper, 843 F.Supp. 1327 (E.D. Mo. 1994). 11

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768 (6th Cir.
2008). 1, 35
Wilkins-Jones v. County of Alameda, 859 F.Supp.2d 1039
(N.D.Cal. 2012). 9, 15, 17, 23, 29
Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 109 S.Ct. 2304
(1989). 7, 27
Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 664 F.Supp.2d 218 (W.D.N.Y.
2009). 7, 11, 16
Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015). 1, 9, 18,
40
William v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). 45
Williams v. Anderson, 959 F.2d 1411 (7th Cir. 1992). 24,
29, 30
Williams v. Armontrout, 852 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 564. 3, 8
Williams v. Bass, 63 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 1995). 11, 36
Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637 (3rd Cir. 2007). 1, 21
Williams v. Beltran, 569 F.Supp.2d 1057 (C.D.Cal. 2008).
24, 27, 37
Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996). 39, 48
Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335. 10, 24, 27
Williams v. Bitner, 359 F.Supp.2d 370 (M.D.Pa. 2005). 37,
50
Williams v. Bitner, 455 F.3d 186 (3rd Cir. 2006). 37, 50
Williams v. Blackburn, 761 F.Supp. 24 (M.D. La. 1991),
affirmed, 14 F.3d 52. 14
Williams v. Board of Regents of University of New
Mexico, 20 F.Supp.3d 1177 (D.N.M. 2014). 30, 32
Williams v. Boles, 841 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1988). 48
Williams v. Borough of West Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458
(3rd Cir. 1989). 14, 25, 32
Williams v. Bradshaw, 459 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2006). 17,
25, 29, 32
Williams v. Brimeyer, 116 F.3d 351 (8th Cir. 1997). 27, 28,
37
Williams v. Briscoe, 641 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1056. 36
Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 3002. 29, 48
Williams v. Cain, 117 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 1997). 1, 22
Williams v. Calderon, 48 F.Supp.2d 979 (C.D.Cal. 1998). 1,
22, 33
Williams v. Carter, 10 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1993). 1
Williams v. Cash, 836 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1988). 27, 48
Williams v. Cearlock, 993 F.Supp. 1192 (C.D.Ill. 1998). 29
Williams v. Champagne, 13 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.La. 2014).
37, 38, 48
Williams v. City of Las Vegas, 34 Fed.Appx. 297 (9th Cir.
2002). 25, 32, 39, 48
Williams v. City of New York, 728 F.Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y.
1990). 5, 11
Williams v. Community Solutions, Inc., 932 F.Supp.2d 323
(D.Conn. 2013). 7, 10, 14, 33
Williams v. Consovoy, 333 F.Supp.2d 297 (D.N.J. 2004).
20, 24, 36
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2006). 24,
30, 36
Williams v. Correctional Medical Services, 629 F.Supp.2d
360 (D.Del. 2009). 29
Williams v. Coughlin, 875 F.Supp. 1004 (W.D.N.Y. 1995).
10, 11, 18
Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442 (8th Cir. 1995). 9, 23
Williams v. Department of Corrections, 208 F.3d 681 (8th
Cir. 2000). 39, 48

TC-104
XXVI

Williams v. District of Columbia, 439 F.Supp.2d 34
(D.D.C. 2006). 9, 10, 13, 29
Williams v. District of Columbia, 530 F.Supp.2d 119
(D.D.C. 2008). 9, 13, 29
Williams v. Elyea, 163 F.Supp.2d 992 (N.D.Ill. 2001). 29
Williams v. Erickson, 962 F.Supp.2d 1038 (N.D.Ill. 2013).
9, 23, 29
Williams v. First Correctional Medical, 377 F.Supp.2d 473
(D.Del. 2005). 29
Williams v. Fitch, 550 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). 39,
41
Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372 (11th Cir. 1996). 11
Williams v. Gomez, 795 F.Supp. 978 (N.D.Cal. 1992). 1
Williams v. Goord, 111 F.Supp.2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 3,
7, 10, 11, 12, 39
Williams v. Goord, 142 F.Supp.2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 3,
12, 24, 39
Williams v. Greifinger, 918 F.Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
11, 12, 24
Williams v. Hampton, 797 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2015). 14, 39
Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2008). 7,
21, 29, 34
Williams v. Heard, 533 F.Supp. 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1982). 24,
27, 36
Williams v. Herron, 687 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2012). 2, 31
Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2011). 3, 8, 11,
27
Williams v. Hopkins, 130 F.3d 333 (8th Cir. 1997). 10, 43
Williams v. Hopkins, 983 F.Supp. 891 (D.Neb. 1997). 10.
43
Williams v. ICC Committee, 812 F.Supp. 1029 (N.D.Cal.
1992). 1, 9, 23, 28, 29
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970). 43
Williams v. Jackson, 600 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 2010). 11, 13,
14, 15, 24, 29
Williams v. Johnson, 171 F.3d 300 (5th Cir. 1999). 22, 36
Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 2003)
16, 27, 32, 41
Williams v. Keane, 940 F.Supp. 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 29
Williams v. Kelly, 624 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1019. 14, 27, 39, 48
Williams v. Kelone, 560 So.2d 915 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1990).
10, 23, 40
Williams v. Kelso, 201 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 2000). 14, 25,
29, 30, 32, 45
Williams v. King, 56 F.Supp.3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 7, 37
Williams v. Klien, 20 F.Supp.3d 1171 (D.Colo .2014). 9,
11, 21
Williams v. Kling, 849 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
11, 21
Williams v. Kyler, 680 F.Supp. 172 (M.D. Pa. 1986). 33, 41
Williams v. Lee, 33 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 1994). 36
Williams v. Liefer, 491 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2007). 29
Williams v. Luna, 909 F.2d 121 2 (5th Cir. 1990). 1, 48
Williams v. Manternach, 192 F.Supp.2d 980 (N.D.Iowa
2002). 1, 7, 11, 50
Williams v. McGinnis, 755 F.Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
34, 47
Williams v. McKeithen, 939 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1991). 15
Williams v. McKeithen, 963 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1992). 2, 15
Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991). 50
Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 1999). 14, 29, 30
Williams v. Meyer, 346 F.3d 607 (6th Cir. 2003). 7, 8, 22
Williams v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole, 661 F.2d
697 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993. 36

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Williams v. Norris, Arkansas Dept. Of Corrections, 148
F.3d 983 (8th Cir. 1998). 29, 50
Williams v. O'Leary, 805 F.Supp. 634 (N.D.Ill. 1992). 29
Williams v. One Female Corrections Officer Sgt. Kolaczyk,
940 F.Supp. 31 (D.Mass. 1996). 7, 29
Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2013). 7, 19, 49
Williams v. Ozmint, 726 F.Supp.2d 589 (D.S.C. 2010). 9,
11, 39
Williams v. Price, 25 F.Supp.2d 605 (W.D.Pa. 1997). 1, 10,
12, 33, 41
Williams v. Price, 25 F.Supp.2d 623 (W.D.Pa. 1997). 1, 33
Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246 (7th Cir. 1995). 3, 8, 29
Williams v. Rhoden, 629 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1980). 36
Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2007). 25,
29, 32
Williams v. Smith, 717 F.Supp. 523 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 11,
21
Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006). 1
Williams v. Sweeney, 882 F.Supp. 1520 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 3
Williams v. Thomas, 692 F.2d 1032 (1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 3115. 1, 5
Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (1982), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 762. 24, 27, 29
Williams v. U.S., 747 F.Supp. 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 27, 29
Williams v. Vidor, 17 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1994). 10, 48
Williams v. Wade, 354 F.Supp.2d 894 (W.D.Wis. 2005).
19, 37
Williams v. Wahner, 731 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2013). 1, 14
Williams v. Ward, 845 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 109 S.Ct. 818. 32
Williams v. Warden-Central Detention Facility, 538
F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2008). 22, 32
Williams v. White, 897 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1990). 1, 15, 27
Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1988). 9, 14
Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003). 19, 22,
36
Williams-El v. McLemore, 213 F.Supp.2d 783 (E.D.Mich.
2002). 29, 39, 47
Williamson v Brewington-Carr, 173 F.Supp.2d 235 (D.Del.
2001). 29
Williamson v. Black, 537 F.Supp.2d 792 (M.D.N.C. 2008).
28
Williamson v. Correct Care Solutions LLC, 890 F.Supp.2d
487 (D.Del. 2012). 29
Williamson v. Correctional Medical Services, 494
F.Supp.2d 285 (D.Del. 2007). 29
Willis v. Artuz, 301 F.3d 65 (2nd Cir. 2002). 33, 41
Willis v. Clemente, 882 F.Supp. 133 (S.D.Ind. 1994). 29
Willis v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 753
F.Supp.2d 768 (S.D.Ind. 2010). 2, 18, 37
Willis v. Lane, 738 F.Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1989). 1, 28
Willis v. Mullins, 517 F.Supp.2d 1206 (E.D.Cal. 2007.) 41
Willis v. Youngblood, 384 F.Supp.2d 883 (D.Md. 2005). 48
Willoughby v. Luster, 717 F.Supp. 1439 (D. Nev. 1989). 11
Wills v. Terhune, 404 F.Supp.2d 1226 (E.D.Cal. 2005). 9,
10, 15
Willson v. Buss, 370 F.Supp.2d 782 (N.D.Ind. 2005). 19,
28, 38
Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th Cir. 1991). 31
Wilson v. Beame, 380 F.Supp. 1232 (E.D. N.Y. 1974). 1, 3,
12, 32, 34, 37
Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 1998). 1,
12, 24, 32
Wilson v. Brown, 889 F.2d 1195 (1st Cir. 1989). 27, 47
Wilson v. Chang, 955 F.Supp. 18 (D.R.I. 1997). 29

TC-105
XXVI

Wilson v. City of Chanute, 43 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D.Kan.
1999). 14, 27, 29, 32
Wilson v. City of Fountain Valley, 372 F.Supp.2d 1178
(C.D.Cal. 2004). 36, 41
Wilson v. City of Kalamazoo, 127 F.Supp.2d 855
(W.D.Mich. 2000). 7, 25, 32, 33
Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2008). 33, 41, 44
Wilson v. Cook County Bd. of Commissioners, 878 F.Supp.
1163 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 9, 18, 23, 29, 32
Wilson v. Cooper, 922 F.Supp. 1286 (N.D.Ill. 1996). 9, 39,
47, 48
Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2015). 1, 21
Wilson v. Flaherty, 689 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2012). 13, 22, 36
Wilson v. Franceschi, 735 F.Supp. 395 (M.D. Fla. 1990). 8,
29
Wilson v. Greetan, 571 F.Supp.2d 948 (W.D.Wis. 2007).
11, 19
Wilson v. Groaning, 25 F.3d 581 (7th Cir. 1994). 48
Wilson v. Harper, 949 F. Supp. 714 (S.D.Iowa 1996). 11
Wilson v. Hauck, 141 F.Supp.3d 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). 1,
13, 14, 48
Wilson v. Holman, 793 F.Supp. 920 (E.D.Mo. 1992). 28
Wilson v. Horn, 971 F.Supp. 943 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 21
Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2008). 22, 36
Wilson v. Johnson, 999 F.Supp. 394 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). 29,
50
Wilson v. Jones, 251 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2001). 8, 17, 32,
41
Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005). 11, 20, 22,
43
Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F.Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968). 7, 8,
31, 39
Wilson v. Lawrence County, Mo., 154 F.3d 757 (8th Cir.
1998). 13, 16
Wilson v. Lockhart, 949 F.2d 1051 (8th Cir. 1991). 22
Wilson v. Loftus, 489 F.Supp. 996 (D. Del. 1980). 36
Wilson v. Maricopa County, 463 F.Supp.2d 987 (D.Ariz.
2006). 14, 32, 45, 46
Wilson v. Maricopa County, 484 F.Supp.2d 1015 (D.Ariz.
2006). 14, 39, 45
Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). 1, 2, 16,
24, 27, 31, 32, 44, 45, 46
Wilson v. Philadelphia Detention Center, 986 F.Supp. 282
(E.D.Pa. 1997). 3, 11, 27
Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2002). 1, 2
Wilson v. Schomig, 863 F.Supp. 789 (N.D. Ill. 1994). 9, 10,
24, 50
Wilson v. Seiter, 111 S.Ct. 2321 (1991). 9, 10
Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1990). 10
Wilson v. Shannon, 982 F.Supp. 337 (E.D.Pa. 1997). 7, 12,
41, 48
Wilson v. Shelby County, Ala., 95 F.Supp.2d 1258
(N.D.Ala. 2000). 17, 32, 41
Wilson v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 567 (D.Del. 2006). 1, 7, 8,
50
Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2007). 7, 21,
50
Wilson v. Taylor, 597 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.Del. 2009). 14, 27,
30, 36, 46
Wilson v. Vannatta, 291 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Ind. 2003) 3,
9, 12, 18, 29
Wilson v. Watters, 348 F.Supp.2d 1031 (W.D.Wis. 2004).
7, 32
Wilson v. Wilkinson, 608 F.Supp.2d 891 (S.D.Ohio 2007).
33, 41, 44

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Wilson v. Wright, 998 F.Supp. 650 (E.D.Va. 1998). 14
Wilson v. Zellner, 200 F. Supp.2d 1356 (M.D.Fla. 2002).
16, 36
Wilson-El v. Finnan, 544 F.3d 762 (7th Cir. 2008). 11, 22
Wilson-Simmons v. Lake County Sheriff's Dept., 982
F.Supp. 496 (N.D.Ohio 1997). 31
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971). 9, 11, 22
Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, (8th Cir. 2009). 2, 31
Winburn v. Bologna, 979 F.Supp. 531 (W.D.Mich. 1997).
19, 28, 37, 39
Winder v. Leak, 790 F.Supp. 1403 (N.D.Ill. 1992). 11, 48
Winder v. Maynard, 2 F.Supp.3d 709 (D.Md. 2014). 18, 37,
42
Winfield v. Steele, 755 F.3d 629 (8th Cir. 2014). 43
Winkelman v. Magne, 173 F.Supp.2d 821 (C.D.Ill. 2001).
2, 31
Winnie v. Clarke, 893 F.Supp. 875 (D.Neb. 1995). 3, 50
Winston v. Campbell, 868 F.Supp. 1242 (D.Kan. 1994). 9
Winters ex rel. Estate of Winters v. Arkansas Department of
Health and Human Services, 437 F.Supp.2d 851
(E.D.Ark. 2006). 14, 29, 30, 32
Winters v. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services,
491 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2007). 29, 30, 32
Wirsching v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2004). 7,
12, 20, 34, 49
Wise v. Carlson, 902 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1990). 48
Wisenbaker v. Farwell, 341 F.Supp.2d 1160 (D.Nev. 2004).
1
Wishon v. Gammon, 978 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1992). 3, 9, 12,
18, 34, 40
Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264 (9th Cir. 1995). 28, 38
Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 849. 8, 14, 27
Withers v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 710 F.3d 688 (7th
Cir. 2013). 8, 14, 29
Withrow v. Bartlett, 15 F.Supp.2d 292 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).
37, 39
Witte v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 434 F.3d 1031
(7th Cir. 2006). 31
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996). 31
Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744 (7th Cir. 2004). 1, 21
Wojtczak v. Cuyler, 480 F.Supp. 1288 (E.D. Penn. 1979). 1,
3, 14, 50
Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305 (3rd Cir. 2002). 12, 19
Wolfe v. Horn, 130 F.Supp.2d 648 (E.D.Pa. 2001). 17, 29,
38
Wolfe v. State, 759 P.2d 950 (Idaho App. 1988). 8
Wolfel v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1983). 11, 27
Wolfel v. Ferguson, 689 F.Supp. 756 (S.D. Ohio 1987). 29
Wolfel v. Morris, 972 F.2d 712 (6th Cir. 1992). 11, 19, 21,
38
Wolfel v. Sanborn, 666 F.2d 1005 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1115. 24, 27
Wolff v. Hood, 242 F.Supp.2d 811 (D.Or. 2002). 35
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 1, 7, 11, 20, 28
Wolfish v. Levi, 406 F.Supp. 1243 (S.D. N.Y. 1976). 32,
39, 49
Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3rd Cir.
2005). 1, 14, 29, 32, 42
Women Prisoners of Corrections v. Dist. of Columbia, 968
F.Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1997) 7, 9, 17, 29, 39
Women Prisoners of D.C. Correct. v. D.C., 93 F.3d 910
(D.C. Cir. 1996). 7, 9, 17
Women Prisoners v. District of Columbia, 877 F.Supp. 634
(D.D.C. 1994). 7, 17, 27, 29, 34, 37, 39, 50

TC-106
XXVI

Wong v. Coughlin, 526 N.Y.S.2d 640 (A.D. 3 Dept. 1988).
11
Wong v. Warden, FCI Raybrook, 171 F.3d 148 (2nd Cir.
1999). 22, 47
Wong v. Warden, FCI Raybrook, 999 F.Supp. 287
(N.D.N.Y. 1998). 7, 22
Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2012). 14, 21,
45
Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922 (1st Cir. 1996). 41, 49
Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff's Dept., 354 F.3d 57 (1st
Cir. 2003). 32, 41, 49
Wood v. Hancock County, 245 F.Supp.2d 231 (D.Me.
2002) 25, 38, 39
Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1990). 1, 29
Wood v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 391 F.Supp.2d 852
(D.Idaho 2005). 29
Wood v. Sunn, 865 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1988). 5, 27, 29
Wood v. Woracheck, 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980). 16, 25,
27, 29
Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014). 1, 37
Woodall v. Foti, 648 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1981). 29, 30
Woodard v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, 107 F.3d 1178
(6th Cir. 1997). 43
Woodbridge v. Dahlberg, 954 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir. 1992). 39
Woodley v. Department of Corrections, 74 F.Supp.2d 623
(E.D.Va. 1999). 4, 20, 22, 36
Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). 4, 5
Woods v. City of Utica, 902 F.Supp.2d 273 (N.D.N.Y.
2012). 9, 24, 25, 29, 32, 33, 39, 46, 47
Woods v. Commissioner of the Ind. Dept. of Corrections,
652 F.3d 745 (7TH Cir. 2011). 19, 28
Woods v. Evatt, 876 F.Supp. 756 (D.S.C. 1995). 37
Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215 (6th Cir. 1997). 14, 27
Woods v. O'Leary, 890 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1989). 28, 37, 38
Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161 (5th Cir. 1995). 1, 11, 21
Woods v. Thieret, 903 F.2d 1080 (7th Cir. 1990). 11
Woods v. White, 689 F.Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988). 29, 33
Woodson v. Attorney General, 990 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir.
1993), reversed, 990 F.2d 1344. 36, 43
Woodson v. City of Richmond, Va., 2 F.Supp.3d 804
(E.D.Va. 2014). 9, 15, 29, 32
Woodson v. City of Richmond, Virginia, 88 F.Supp.3d 551
(E.D.Va. 2015). 9, 14, 29, 45
Woodson v. Lack, 865 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1989). 3, 22
Woodson v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 770 F.Supp. 25 (D. D.C.
1991). 20, 36
Woodward v. Correctional Medical Services, 368 F.3d 917
(7th Cir. 2004). 27, 29, 30, 32, 46
Wool v. Hogan, 505 F.Supp. 928 (D. Vt. 1981). 41, 49
Word v. Croce, 169 F.Supp.2d 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 29
Word v. Croce, 230 F.Supp.2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 3, 29,
38
Workman v. Levy, 136 F.Supp.2d 899 (M.D.Tenn. 2001).
37
Workman v. Summers, 136 F.Supp.2d 896 (M.D.Tenn.
2001). 43
Wormley v. U.S., 601 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2009). 27, 36
Wottlin v. Fleming, 136 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 1998). 22, 43
Wrenn v. Freeman, 894 F.Supp. 244 (E.D.N.C. 1995). 1
Wright v. Baker, 849 F.Supp. 569 (N.D. Ohio 1994). 29,
43
Wright v. Caspari, 779 F.Supp. 1025 (E.D. Mo. 1992). 11,
47
Wright v. County of Franklin, Ohio, 881 F.Supp.2d 887
(S.D.Ohio 2012). 29, 32, 46

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Wright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521 (6th Cir. 1982). 5
Wright v. Enomoto, 462 F.Supp. 397 (N.D. Calif. 1976). 3,
8
Wright v. Genovese, 694 F.Supp.2d 137 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
29, 50
Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255 (2nd Cir. 2009). 14, 48
Wright v. Jones, 907 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1990). 14, 27
Wright v. Lacy, 664 F.Supp. 1270 (D. Minn. 1987). 36
Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2000). 4, 35
Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496 (2nd Cir. 1994). 3, 27
Wright v. Whiddon, 747 F.Supp. 694 (M.D. Ga. 1990)
reversed 951 F.2d 297. 32, 39, 48
Wrinkles v. Davis, 311 F.Supp.2d 735 (N.D.Ind. 2004). 3,
12, 18, 37, 39, 49
Wuori v. Concannon, 551 F.Supp. 185 (D. Me. 1982). 5
Wyatt By and Through Rawlins v. Horsely, 793 F.Supp.
1053 (M.D.Ala. 1991). 27, 30
Wyatt By And Through Rawlins v. Rogers, 985 F.Supp.
1356 (M.D.Ala. 1997). 27, 44
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 34,
42
Wycoff v. Hedgepeth, 34 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 1994). 35, 41
Wycoff v. Nichols, 94 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir. 1996). 3, 11
Wynn v. Mundo, 367 F.Supp.2d 832 (M.D.N.C. 2005). 29
Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2001). 29
Yaacov v. Collins, 649 F.Supp.2d 679 (N.D.Ohio 2009).
18, 37
Yahweh v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 158 F.Supp.2d 1332
(S.D.Fla. 2001). 22, 36, 37
Yahweh v. U.S. Parole Com'n, 428 F.Supp.2d 1293
(S.D.Fla. 2006). 36
Yarbaugh v. Roach, 736 F.Supp. 318 (D.D.C. 1990). 29
Yarber v. Indiana State Prison, 713 F.Supp. 271 (N.D. Ind.
1988). 31
Yates v. Stalder, 217 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2000). 7
Yeager v. Corrections Corp. of America, 944 F.Supp.2d
913 (E.D.Cal. 2013). 2, 31
Yellow Horse v. Pennington County, 225 F.3d 923 (8th Cir.
2000). 14, 32
Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48 (10th Cir. 2014). 37, 39
Yeskey v. Com. of Pa. Dept. of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168
(3rd Cir. 1997). 7, 34
Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 76 F.Supp.2d 572 (M.D.Pa. 1999).
7, 36
Yi v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 412 F.3d 526 (4th Cir.
2005). 20, 22
Yoder v. Oestreich, 820 F.Supp. 405 (W.D.Wis. 1993). 19
Yoder v. Ryan, 318 F.Supp.2d 601 (N.D.Ill. 2004). 14
Young v. Adams, 693 F.Supp.2d 635 (W.D.Tex. 2010). 10,
29
Young v. Berks County Prison, 940 F.Supp. 121 (E.D.Pa.
1996). 10, 22
Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 172 (D.Conn. 2014). 14,
29, 30
Young v. Choinski, 15 F.Supp.3d 194 (D.Conn. 2014). 14,
29, 30
Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 336 N.W.2d 24 (Mich. App.
1983). 14, 24, 27
Young v. City of Atlanta, 631 F.Supp. 1498 (N.D. Ga.
1986). 17, 29, 48
Young v. City of Augusta, Ga. through DeVaney, 59 F.3d
1160 (11th Cir, 1995). 29, 30, 46
Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567 (4th Cir.
2001).14, 32, 46, 48

TC-107
XXVI

Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 834 (N.D.Ill.
2009). 32, 41
Young v. County of Cook, 616 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill.
2009). 32, 41
Young v. Cutter Biological, 694 F.Supp. 651 (D. Ariz.
1988). 50
Young v. District of Columbia, 107 F.Supp.3d 69 (D.D.C.
2015). 29, 32, 46
Young v. Ericksen, 758 F.Supp.2d 777 (E.D.Wis. 2010).
12, 37, 39
Young v. Freer, 829 F.Supp. 32 (N.D.N.Y. 1993). 11
Young v. Hayes, 218 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000). 22, 43
Young v. Hightower, 395 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.Mich. 2005).
1, 21, 39
Young v. Hoffman, 970 F.2d 1154 (2nd Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 114 S.Ct. 115. 11
Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396 (3rd Cir. 1991). 11
Young v. Keohane, 809 F.Supp. 1185 (M.D.Pa. 1992). 9, 32
Young v. Kihl, 720 F.Supp. 22 (W.D.N.Y. 1989). 11
Young v. Lane, 733 F.Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1990),
reversed, 922 F.2d 370. 37
Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991). 37, 38, 39
Young v. Larkin, 871 F.Supp. 772 (M.D. Pa. 1994),
affirmed, 47 F.3d 1163. 1, 8, 32, 33, 49
Young v. Molloy, 760 F.Supp. 43 (W.D.N.Y. 1991). 11
Young v. Selk, 508 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2007). 14
Young v. Wall, 359 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005). 4, 35, 50
Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011). 2, 35
Youngbear v. Thalacker, 174 F.Supp.2d 902 (N.D.Iowa
2001). 37
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971). 1, 38
Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001). 3, 39
Ysasi v. Brown, 3 F.Supp.3d 1088 (D.N.M. 2014). 1, 16, 32
Zabala-Calderon v. U.S., 616 F.Supp.2d 195 (D.Puerto Rico
2008). 14, 17, 27
Zaire v. Dalsheim, 698 F.Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1988),
affirmed, 904 F.2d 33. 24, 33
Zakiya v. Reno, 52 F.Supp.2d 629 (E.D.Va. 1999). 22, 36,
43
Zamakshari v. Dvoskin, 899 F.Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
11
Zargary v. The City of New York, 607 F.Supp.2d 609
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 2, 17, 25, 37
Zarnes v. Rhodes, 64 F.3d 285 (7th Cir. 1995). 14, 17, 27,
32
Zatko v. California, 112 S.Ct. 355 (1991). 1
Zavala v. Barnik, 545 F.Supp.2d 1051 (C.D.Cal. 2008). 7,
23
Zavaro v. Coughlin, 970 F.2d 1148 (2nd Cir. 1992). 11, 27
Zboralski v. Monahan, 446 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Ill. 2006).
33, 41, 49
Zboralski v. Monahan, 616 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Ill. 2008).
33, 41
Zembiec v. County of Monroe, 766 F.Supp.2d 484
(W.D.N.Y. 2011). 31
Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill., 220 F.3d 805 (7th Cir.
2000). 29, 32
Ziccarelli v. Leake, 767 F.Supp. 1450 (N.D. Ill. 1991). 31
Ziemba v. Armstrong, 343 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.Conn. 2004
Ziemba v. Armstrong, 430 F.3d 623 (2nd Cir. 2005). 14, 27,
29, 46, 48
Ziemba v. Armstrong, 433 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Conn. 2006).
14, 24, 27, 48
Ziemba v. Rell, 409 F.3d 553 (2nd Cir. 2005). 14

Table of Cases

Sections in Which Each Case Appears Follow the Citation

Ziemba v. Thomas, 390 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Conn. 2005). 1,
35
Zimmerlee v. Keeney, 831 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S.Ct. 2851. 11
Zimmerman v. Hoard, 5 F.Supp.2d 633 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 1,
32, 41, 44
Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226 (M.D.Pa.
2009). 1, 9, 13, 14, 21, 45, 48
Zimmerman v. Tippecanoe Sheriff's Dept., 25 F.Supp.2d
915 (N.D.Ind. 1998). 1, 19, 28, 29, 32, 33, 42
Zimmerman v. Tribble, 226 F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2000). 1, 20,
28, 34
Zinn v. McKune, 143 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1998). 27, 31
Zitto v. Crabtree, 185 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 1999). 36
Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1989). 31
Zorzi v. County of Putnam, 30 F.3d 885 (7th Cir. 1994). 19,
31
Zuhair v. Bush, 592 F.Supp.2d 16 (D.D.C. 2008). 22, 29
Zulu v. Botta, 613 F.Supp.2d 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 21, 42
Zunker v. Bertrand, 798 F.Supp. 1365 (E.D.Wis. 1992). 41,
49
Zupan v. Brown, 5 F.Supp.2d 792 (N.D.Cal. 1998). 36
Zwalesky v. Manistee County, 749 F.Supp. 815 (W.D.
Mich. 1990). 14, 25, 32

TC-108
XXVI

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County, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

U.S. v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D.Mont. 2005). A federal prisoner filed a habeas petition
challenging the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy that precluded his placement in a community
corrections center, as recommended by the sentencing court. The district court granted the
petition, finding that the prisoner was not required to first exhaust his administrative
remedies before the court could consider the petition, because by the time the inmate
exhausted every available administrative remedy he would nearly be done serving his entire
sentence. The court held that the statutes governing placement of inmates in prerelease
custody did not authorize the BOP policy, under which inmates were designated to a
community corrections center only for the lesser of six months or ten percent of their sentence.
The court ordered the BOP to consider the appropriateness of transferring the inmate to a
community confinement center. (Federal Correctional Center, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). State prisoners brought a ' 1983 action
challenging their transfers to a higher-security prison. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoners= suit challenging transfers
to a high security prison was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the transfer review
process was not available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation, and the prisoners=
grievances were sufficient to alert the prison that the transfer decisions were being
challenged. The court held that the alleged change in a prison policy that required transferring
gang members to a high security facility did not constitute an ex post facto violation. The court
ruled that the prisoners stated a claim for denial of due process, where the conditions at the
high security prison were arguably different enough to give the prisoners a liberty interest in
not being transferred there, and there was a dispute as to whether the state provided
sufficient pre- and post-transfer opportunities for the prisoners to challenge the propriety of
the transfers. The court held that the transfers did not violate the gang members= First
Amendment associational rights, noting that prisoners had no right to associate with gangs.
(Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

White v. Kautsky, 386 F.Supp.2d 1042 (N.D.Iowa, 2005). A state prison inmate sued a state
corrections director and a warden, claiming that a policy that did not allow attorneys to do
legal research for inmates in appropriate cases violated his right to have access to the courts.
The district court held that the inmate was injured by the policy for the purposes of a
constitutional claim, where he did not pursue his non-frivolous claim that noncompliance with
extradition procedures invalidated his conviction. The court concluded that the corrections
department did not provide the inmate with a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations, where there was no legal library and the attorney who was provided to
consult with the inmate was only allowed to confer and consult about the lack of merit of any
proposed litigation, without being allowed to conduct any legal research. The court noted that
the inmate=s question that required research carried a great deal of significance for the
inmate. The court awarded only nominal damages in the amount of $1 and held that the
inmate was not entitled to the compensatory damages he had requested, equal to the
estimated amount of legal fees that would have been incurred with his lawsuit. The court
declined to award punitive damages where there was no showing that the department acted
maliciously when it provided attorneys to inmates for the limited purpose of advising and
conferring, but did not allow the attorneys to conduct any legal research. (Anamosa State
Penitentiary, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Woloszyn v. County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314 (3rd Cir. 2005). The administratrix of a pretrial

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

XX

detainee who committed suicide in jail brought a ' 1983 action and wrongful death claims
against and county and corrections officers. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the defendants and the administratrix appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that the administratrix failed to establish that the corrections officers were aware of the
detainee=s vulnerability to suicide. The court noted that even though a captain said he would
put the detainee on five-minute checks, he also said that he would follow a nurse=s advice. The
nurse found the detainee to be polite, cooperative and alert, and cleared the detainee for onehour checks for signs of alcohol withdrawal. The detainee told a booking officer he was not
suicidal and appeared to be in good spirits. The court found that the administratrix=s expert
failed to identify what specific type of training would have alerted officers to the fact that the
detainee was suicidal. (Lawrence County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

Young v. Hightower, 395 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.Mich. 2005). A state prison inmate brought a pro
se civil rights action against prison officials, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his
safety when they refused to buckle his seatbelt when he was transported in chains in a prison
van and when the vehicle was then involved in a collision that resulted in injuries to the
inmate. The district court held that the inmate had satisfied the exhaustion requirement of
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) even though he did not return a document requested

1.135

in response to his completed step III grievance form. The court found that prison policy did not
require that documents to be filed with the step III form and the request for documents
suggested that the request was procedural rather than substantive. According to the court,
when an inmate takes the prison grievance procedure to its last step, the PLRA exhaustion
requirement has been satisfied if the state forgoes an opportunity to decide matters internally.
(Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Ziemba v. Thomas, 390 F.Supp.2d 136 (D.Conn. 2005). An inmate brought a ' 1983 action

against state officials, alleging use of force and related civil rights violations. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court
held that the alleged failure of prison officials to return his legal materials did not hinder his
access to courts, as required to maintain a claim under ' 1983, where there was no reliable
evidence that any actual injury stemmed from the alleged violation. (Corrigan Correctional
Institution, Connecticut)
2006

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Acosta v. U.S. Marshals Service, 445 F.3d 509 (1st Cir. 2006). A detainee brought an action

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Adem v. Bush, 425 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2006). In a habeas case, the petitioner, who was
detained at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a motion to hold
federal respondents in contempt of a protective order governing access to counsel for
Guantanamo detainees and a motion to expedite his access to counsel. The district court held
that the protective order did not require evidence of authority to represent a detainee as a
prerequisite to counsel meeting with a detainee, but rather, the protective order provided that
counsel who purportedly represented a particular detainee provide evidence of their authority
to represent that detainee within 10 days of counsel's second visit with the detainee. (United
States at the Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Alberson v. Norris, 458 F.3d 762 (8th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner's mother, on the prisoner's

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

XX

against the United States Marshals Service, various county jails where he was detained,
doctors in a federal prison, a private medical center, a private doctor, and others, alleging
claims under ' 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and alleging negligence under
state law. The district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that filing of an administrative claim with the United States
Marshals Service was insufficient to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), for the purpose of ' 1983 claims against county jails and
a federal prison doctor. The court noted that administrative claims against the county jails had
to be directed to those facilities, and claims alleging wrongdoing by a doctor at a federal prison
had to be filed with the federal Bureau of Prisons. The court ruled that FTCA claims against
county facilities were barred by the independent contractor exemption of the FTCA. According
to the court, allegations did not state deliberate indifference claims against a private medical
center or a private doctor with allegations that someone at a private medical center
overmedicated him, and that a private doctor failed to properly diagnose the severity of his
foot injury. The detainee had been arrested on federal drug and firearm charges and he was
held without bail. During his pretrial detention, the United States Marshals Service lodged
him in several county jail facilities with which it contracts, and he also spent time in two
federal facilities. (Hillsborough County Department of Corrections, NH; Cumberland County
Jail, Maine; Merrimack County House of Corrections, NH; FMC Rochester, MN; Strafford
County House of Corrections, NH; FCI Raybrook, NY)

behalf and as the special administrator of his estate, brought a ' 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging deliberate indifference with respect to the medical treatment of the prisoner,
who died from complications arising from Goodpasture Syndrome. The district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that Goodpasture Syndrome was a sophisticated medical condition, and thus, the
estate, which was alleging inadequate medical treatment, was required to present expert
testimony proving causation. The court noted that after the prisoner complained of earaches
and other afflictions, he received extensive medical treatment, including treatment from a
physician on six separate dates in a period of about two months, followed shortly thereafter by
admission to the infirmary ward. (Wrightsville Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

Anderson-Bey v. District of Columbia, 466 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2006). Prisoners transported
between out-of-state correctional facilities brought a civil rights action against the District of
Columbia and corrections officers, alleging common law torts and violation of their
constitutional rights under First and Eighth Amendments. The prisoners had been
transported in two groups, with trips lasting between 10 and 15 hours. The defendants
brought motions to dismiss or for summary judgment which the court denied with regard to
the District of Columbia. The court held that: (1) a fact issue existed as to whether the
restraints used on prisoners during the prolonged transport caused greater pain than was
necessary to ensure they were securely restrained; (2) a fact issue existed as to whether the

1.136

officers acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoners’ health or safety in the transport of
the prisoners; (3) a causal nexus existed between the protected speech of the prisoners in
bringing the civil lawsuit against the corrections officers and subsequent alleged retaliation by
the officers during the transport of prisoners; (4) a fact issue existed as to whether the officers
attempted to chill the prisoners’ participation in the pending civil lawsuit against the officers;
and (5) a fact issue existed as to whether conditions imposed on the prisoners during the
transport were justified by valid penological needs. The court found that the denial of food
during a bus ride that lasted between 10 and 15 hours was insufficiently serious to state a
stand-alone cruel and unusual punishment civil rights claim under the Eighth Amendment.
The court also found that the denial of bathroom breaks during the 10 to 15 hour bus trip, did
not, without more, constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
The court stated that the extremely uncomfortable and painful shackles applied for the
numerous hours during transports, exacerbated by taunting, threats, and denial of food,
water, medicine, and toilets, was outrageous conduct under District of Columbia law,
precluding summary judgment on the prisoners’ intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against the corrections officers. (District of Columbia)
U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION
LEGAL MATERIAL

Bacon v. Taylor, 414 F.Supp.2d 475 (D.Del. 2006). A state prisoner brought a ' 1983 action
against three correctional officers, alleging denial of his First Amendment right of access to
courts, retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights, and cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part, and denied it in part. The court held that the
prisoner's allegations that a correctional officer, on one occasion, smoked a cigarette on the tier
by another inmate's cell and blew smoke into that inmate's cell, and that on several occasions
the correctional officer smoked in the isolated control pod, did not sufficiently allege that the
prisoner was exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) to the
degree necessary to state claim a under ' 1983 for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
court found that the prisoner's allegation that a correctional officer opened and read the draft
of his lawsuit against her and then refused to return it to him did not sufficiently allege an
actual injury as required to state a claim under ' 1983 for violation of First Amendment
constitutional right of access to the courts. The prisoner alleged only that as a result of not
receiving his original draft back he had forgotten the exact dates he saw the officer smoking in
the prison, but the prisoner did not allege that his inability to remember specific dates had
unduly prejudiced his case against the officer. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison authorities could have
reasonably interpreted the prisoner's draft of a ' 1983 lawsuit against a correctional officer as
a threat to the security and safety of the prison, or that a reasonable person would have
known that the document was the draft of a legal complaint against the officer, justifying his
placement in administrative segregation rather than constituting retaliation for the prisoner
having exercised his First Amendment free speech rights by drafting the lawsuit against the
officer. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE
FRIVOLOUS SUITS

Barber v. U.S. Attorney General, 458 F.Supp.2d 1378 (S.D.Ga. 2006). An inmate filed a pro se

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED
ATTORNEY

Barbour v. Haley, 410 F.Supp.2d 1120 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A class of death row inmates brought a
' 1983 action alleging that the state's denial of legal assistance prior to their filing of
postconviction challenges deprived them of their right of access to courts. The district court
held that Alabama's failure to provide counsel to indigent death row inmates for investigation
and preparation of postconviction challenges to their convictions did not violate their federal
constitutional right of meaningful access to courts. According to the court, indigent death row
inmates had no Sixth Amendment right to appointment of counsel prior to their filing of
postconviction petitions. The court held that death row inmates could not challenge Alabama's
postconviction relief procedures as being so onerous that they constituted denial of their right
of access to courts, without identifying some existing claim that had been lost, or whose
presentation had been hindered, as the result of the challenged procedures. (Alabama
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222 (11th Cir. 2006). Death row inmates brought a § 1983 class

XX

action against the United States Attorney General. The district court held that the inmate's
repeated filing of frivolous pro se actions in district courts warranted imposition of a sanction
permitting the warden to open and inspect each outgoing envelope from the inmate addressed
to a court, to withhold postage from any document that was not a notice of appeal (NOA) from
the sanction order, and to block all of the inmate's mail to court if he used his own resources to
pay postage. The court opened its opinion by stating Ainmate-plaintiff Edward Barber's
recreational-litigation days have come to an end.@ (Georgia)

action, alleging that Alabama's failure to provide them with legal assistance prior to their
filing post-conviction challenges deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment right of access
to the courts. The district court entered judgment for the state, and plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that death-sentenced inmates have no federal
constitutional right to counsel for the preparation and presentation of claims for post-

1.137

conviction relief, as part of Fourteenth Amendment right of access to courts, and that the
inmates were not entitled to relief on their claim for a lesser form of legal assistance than
provision of counsel. The court noted that death-sentenced inmates have no Sixth or Eighth
Amendment right to post-conviction counsel. (William E. Donaldson Correctional Facility and
Holman State Prison, Alabama)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Bell v. Konteh, 450 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2006). A state prison inmate brought pro se § 1983
action against a prison’s warden and correction officers, alleging they failed to protect him
from violence by the other inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court
dismissed the action, citing the inmate’s failure to comply with the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The inmate appealed and the appeals court reversed. The
appeals court held that the inmate had satisfied the adequate-control component of PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement with respect to his claim against the warden, given the details
contained in two grievances he filed against the warden. The inmate had filed a pair of
grievances that, together, alleged that the warden had the inmate moved to a different unit for
no justifiable reason, that both the inmate and his case manager had informed the warden
that the inmate could be in danger if housed with the other prisoners in that unit, and that the
inmate was subsequently attacked by two fellow prisoners in his cell while sleeping. (Trumbull
Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXAUSTION

Campos v. Correction Officer Smith, 418 F.Supp.2d 277 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A state inmate filed

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a ' 1983 action against
correction officers, alleging he was beaten in retaliation for punching an assistant warden. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the
prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner exhausted his administrative
remedies, even though his grievance was lost and was not received by a board. The court noted
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) even if the prisoner is requesting relief that the relevant administrative
review board has no power to grant, such as monetary damages, or if the prisoner believes that
exhaustion is futile. But the court found that prison officials may not take unfair advantage of
the exhaustion requirement and that an administrative remedy becomes unavailable if prison
employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct
to prevent a prisoner from exhausting. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE

Felton v. Lincoln, 429 F.Supp.2d 226 (D.Mass. 2006). Federal prisoner brought civil rights

XX

a ' 1983 action alleging that correctional officers violated his constitutional rights by failing to
protect him from an assault by a fellow inmate and used excessive force against him. The
district court granted the officers= motion for summary judgment. The court held that
dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the inmate's submission of a falsified document, and
that the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The inmate had submitted a
document to support his claim that he had exhausted his administrative appeals and the court
found it was falsified. The inmate contended that his failure to file a timely appeal of the
denial of his grievance was due to prison officials' interception of his outgoing mail. The court
found that the inmate's contention was supported only by an obviously sham, backdated letter,
and was otherwise purely conclusory. According to the court, AThe conclusion is inescapable,
then, that plaintiff has knowingly submitted a falsified exhibit in an attempt to rebut
defendants' contention that he never appealed the '03 grievance.@ (Attica Correctional Facility,
New York)

action under ' 1983 against jail officials, in their individual and official capacities, asserting
claims for violations of his constitutional rights. The prisoner alleged that jail personnel
wrongfully reviewed and confiscated material which was part of the discovery in his
underlying criminal case and which had been sent to him by counsel, that he was wrongfully
disciplined for possessing such material, and that there was wrongful interference with other
incoming and outgoing mail, in violation of various regulations. The district court held that: (1)
the temporary confiscation of the prisoner=s legal materials did not violate his rights to due
process and to meaningful access to courts, where the prisoner's counsel engaged in extensive
discussions with prison personnel to make sure that the material was available for the
prisoner's review in preparation for his trial, and the prisoner's defense was in no way
impaired as a result of having the material temporarily confiscated; (2) the alleged wrongful
disciplinary isolation imposed against the prisoner for possessing the legal material did not
violate prisoner's right to due process; (3) officials' alleged failure to allow prisoner to be
represented at disciplinary hearing did not amount to a violation of the prisoner's
constitutional rights; (4) any wrongful interference with the prisoner's incoming and outgoing
mail, in violation of various regulations, was de minimis, and did not rise to level of a
constitutional violation; (5) the sheriff had qualified immunity where the prisoner failed to
show that the sheriff actually participated in acts that allegedly deprived prisoner of his
constitutional rights, formulated a policy of tolerating such violations, or was deliberately
indifferent; but (6) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a prison director,

1.138

captain, and deputy superintendent were personally involved in acts that allegedly deprived
the prisoner of his constitutional rights, precluding summary judgment for those officials on
basis of qualified immunity. (Plymouth County Correctional Facility, Massachusetts)
U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Flanyak v. Hopta, 410 F.Supp.2d 394 (M.D.Penn. 2006). A state prison inmate filed a ' 1983
Eighth Amendment action against the supervisor of the unit overseeing prison jobs and
against the prison's health care administrator, alleging that he had been subjected to unsafe
conditions while working as a welder. The inmate also alleged that the administrator had been
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs arising from those conditions. The defendants
moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that
the inmate's failure to exhaust the prison's three-step grievance procedure precluded his '
1983 action, regardless of the reasons given, including futility. The court noted that there is no
futility exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative exhaustion
requirement. (State Correctional Institution at Mahanoy, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriff=s Department, 408 F.Supp.2d 609 (C.D.Ill. 2006). A

brought an action against a superintendent of programs at a prison, alleging failure to provide
interpreters, visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned
device in contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree
awarding declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired
prisoners by state prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the
district court granted the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a
consent order. The court found that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent
order, noting that sign language interpreters were provided at educational and vocational
programs and at medical and counseling appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as
required by consent decree, the prison was equipped with visual fire alarms that met the
requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts were being made to comply with the consent
decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

detainee brought a civil rights action against county defendants and a police officer, alleging
various violations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and detention. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed in part and declined to dismiss in
part. The court held that the detainee sufficiently stated claims under the Eighth Amendment
and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against a jail and a correctional officer
with respect to both his first and second detentions. The court found that the detainee, who
was awaiting a probation revocation hearing, sufficiently stated a claim under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments by alleging that the county jail maintained policies and customs that
tolerated cruel and unusual punishment of convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees, and
that the correctional officer strapped him to a wheelchair for several hours, forcing him to
urinate on himself and to sit in his urine for several hours, while he was in a manic state. The
inmate alleged that the jail and correctional officer knew of his mental condition because it
was documented and that the officer's and jail's acts were intentional with malice and reckless
I disregard for his federally protected rights. The court held that the detainee sufficiently
stated denial of access to courts claims against a county jail and correctional officers by
alleging that the jail maintained a policy and practice of arbitrarily denying inmates=
confidential consultations with their attorneys and that the officers directly participated in the
arbitrary and capricious denial of his access to counsel. The court found that the detainee
stated an equal protection claim against a county jail and officer by alleging that the jail
maintained a policy and practice that discriminated against him because of his mental illness,
and that an officer discriminated against him in terms of the type of confinement on the basis
of his mental illness. (Sangamon County Jail, Village of Grandview Police, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405 (4th Cir. 2006). The district court dismissed on its merits a
prisoner’s civil rights suit that alleged various state prison officials were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs. The prisoner appealed and moved to proceed without
prepayment of fees. The appeals court held that routine dismissal under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies does not count as a
“strike” for the purpose of the Three-Strike Rule limiting in forma pauperis filings. The court
cited the PLRA provision prohibiting a prisoner who has filed three previous suits that were
dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, from proceeding in forma
pauperis in subsequent suits. (Virginia)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY

J.P. v. Taft, 439 F.Supp.2d 793 (S.D.Ohio 2006). A former juvenile corrections facility inmate

XX

sued the facility and individuals, claiming the lack of access to courts to pursue a claim of
injury from being assaulted by an officer, and claims of substandard accommodations. The
district court denied the defendants= motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
inmate had standing to bring a claim that the facility interfered with his access to courts by
not making adequate efforts to provide attorneys, and that the inmate stated a claim that the

1.139

facility interfered with his right of access to court, by not providing an attorney to pursue a
legitimate claim that officers unconstitutionally restricted his bathroom privileges. (Ohio
Department of Youth Services, Marion Juvenile Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE

Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 2006). State prisoners brought an action against prison
officials, claiming that a policy of opening and inspecting their legal mail outside of their
presence violated their First Amendment rights. The district court granted judgment for the
prisoners and the officials appealed. Another district court on similar claims granted judgment
for the officials and the prisoners in that case also appealed. The cases were consolidated on
appeal. The court entered judgment for the prisoner, finding that the policy of opening legal
mail outside the presence of the addressee prisoner impinged upon the prisoner's right to
freedom of speech under the First Amendment, and that the legal mail policy was not
reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interest in protecting the health and
safety of prisoners and staff. The court held that reasonable prison administrators would not
have realized that they were violating the prisoners' First Amendment free speech rights by
opening prisoners' legal mail outside of the prisoners' presence, entitling them to qualified
immunity. The court noted that although the administrators maintained the policy after three
relatively uneventful years had passed after the September 11 terrorist attacks and
subsequent anthrax concerns, the policy was reasonable when it was established. (New Jersey
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Laird v. Mattox, 430 F.Supp.2d 636 (E.D.Tex. 2006) An inmate filed a ' 1983 suit complaining
of alleged violations of his constitutional rights during his confinement. The district court
dismissed the case in toto, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies
as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that completion
of the exhaustion of administrative remedies process is a mandatory prerequisite for an
inmate's filing of a ' 1983 suit with respect to prison conditions, and that even complete
exhaustion following the filing of the lawsuit is not sufficient. (Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Gib Lewis Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED
ATTORNEY

Lindell v. Houser, 442 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2006). A white-supremacist inmate brought an

U.S. District Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE

Lonegan v. Hasty, 436 F.Supp.2d 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Defense attorneys brought a Bivens

U.S. Appeals Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
INTERROGATION

Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711 (7th Cir. 2006). An arrestee brought an action against a
city and city police officers, alleging the duration and conditions of his detention violated his
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserting a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court entered judgment as matter of law in favor of the
defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found
that the police officers violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment right to a prompt judicial
probable cause determination by holding him for a period of five days after his arrest without

XX

action alleging that prison official violated the Eighth Amendment by housing him with a
black inmate. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the official and the
inmate appealed. The court of appeals held that the official did not violate the inmate=s Eighth
Amendment rights by placing him in a cell with a black inmate, even though the official knew
of the black inmate's involvement with a gang and the white inmate's expression of fear. The
court found that the official did not have reason to believe that the white inmate was at a
serious risk since eighteen months had passed without incident after the cellmates' initial
fight and nothing indicated specific threats had been made by the black inmate or other
members of the gang. The court noted that the inmate had no constitutional right to be
housed with members of his own race, culture, or temperament. The court held that the
inmate was not entitled to a court-appointed lawyer to help him prosecute his case against
prison officials, noting that the inmate was experienced in litigation, and that any difficulty
prosecuting his case was largely caused by the inmate=s choice to pursue other cases at the
same time. (Waupun Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
action against officials of a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility, claiming that the
statutory and constitutional rights of themselves and their inmate clients were violated
through the practice of videotaping meetings. The district court denied the defendants= motion
to dismiss in part, and granted it in part. The court held that: (1) a claim was stated under the
Fourth Amendment; (2) there was no qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment claim;
(3) a claim of personal involvement by a warden was stated; and (4) the availability of Fourth
Amendment relief precluded a claim under Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, attorneys
employed by the Legal Aid Society of New York, claimed that, by secretly recording their
conversations with certain detainees at the federal Bureau of Prisons' Metropolitan Detention
Center (AMDC@), located in Brooklyn, New York, the defendants violated Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended (the AWiretap Act@ or ATitle
III@), and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. BOP personnel told the
attorneys that video cameras were not on during their meeting with their clients, but a
subsequent BOP investigation concluded that visual and sound recordings existed for many of
the attorney/client meetings. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, N.Y.)

1.140

a probable cause hearing, for the purpose of arrestee's § 1983 Fourth Amendment claim,
absent any justification for the delay. The arrestee had been arrested for a murder he did not
commit. Following his arrest, the defendants-- all police detectives-- kept him shackled to the
wall of a windowless, nine-by-seven-foot interrogation room for four days and nights while
they investigated the case. The arrestee had nowhere to sleep but a four-foot-by-ten-inch metal
bench or the dirty brick floor. The interrogation room had no toilet or sink; he had to “scream”
for the detectives to let him out to use a bathroom. He was given only one bologna sandwich
and one serving of juice as food and drink during the entire four days and nights that he was
kept in the interrogation room. The detectives questioned him from time to time and made
him stand in two lineups. After two-and-a-half days in these conditions, the arrestee started to
become disoriented and began hearing voices telling him to confess. He ultimately gave a
statement containing a false confession that did not match the details of the crime. On the
fifth day of his detention, the arrestee was moved to a city lockup, charged, and finally taken
to court. The following day, the police investigation led detectives to another individual who
confessed to the murder. The arrestee was released the next day. (Chicago Police
Department's Area 5, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
TRANSFER

Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084 (W.D.Wis. 2006). A state prison inmate sued a prison
and individuals, alleging that “magic seals” were removed from the interior of his prison cell in
violation of his religious rights, and that officials conspired to transfer him to another facility.
The district court entered judgment for the defendants. The court held that prison officials did
not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) when they
prohibited the inmate from affixing “magic seals,” presumably part of the inmate's practice of
religion involving magic, to the walls of his cell. The court found that the absence of any
evidence that officials made any kind of concerted effort to send the inmate to a state prison
that lacked adequate legal research facilities precluded his claim that his transfer was the
result of a conspiracy to deny his right to pursue legal remedies, rather than the stated
purposes of sending him closer to home to ease his return to the outside world. (Oakhill
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY

Marshall v. Knight, 445 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 2006). A pro se state prisoner brought a ' 1983
action against a prison superintendent and other unnamed prison employees, alleging that
they unconstitutionally deprived him of access to the courts by impeding his access to the
prison law library. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner=s allegations stated a ' 1983
claim for unconstitutional denial of the prisoner's right of access to the courts. The prisoner
alleged that a prison superintendent and other unnamed prison employees enforced policies
that diminished his access to the prison law library to the point of being non-existent, and that
his lack of library access adversely affected his attempt to challenge the length of his
incarceration. The appeals court found that these allegations were sufficient, when liberally
construed, to state a ' 1983 claim for unconstitutional denial of the prisoner's right of access to
the courts. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
LAW LIBRARY

Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725 (4th Cir. 2006). A former state prison inmate

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
LAW LIBRARY
ACCESS TO COUNSEL

Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Dept., 453 F.Supp.2d 1280 (D.Kan. 2006). A former
pretrial detainee at a county jail brought a ' 1983 action against a county sheriff's department,
sheriff, undersheriff, and county attorney, alleging various constitutional violations. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
inmate's alleged weight loss while he was a pretrial detainee at the county jail did not satisfy
the section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requiring a showing of physical injury
in addition to mental or emotional injury in order to obtain compensatory damages. The court
held that the detainee was not deprived of access to the courts and competent counsel, even if
he was not permitted direct, physical access to a law library, was not separately assigned a
paralegal to assist him, and was unable to call counsel on a few instances, where the detainee
was given frequent and heavy access to law library materials, the county had limited resources
for providing physical access to a law library, the detainee was an able and experienced prison
litigator, the detainee decided not to file civil actions while at the jail, the detainee spoke with
counsel on many occasions, and the detainee was satisfied with counsel's representation.
(Edwards County Jail, Kansas)

XX

who was being detained under a state=s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) brought civil
actions. The district court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former inmate was not a
Aprisoner@ for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and therefore his
complaint was not subject to the PLRA=s screening requirements. The court noted that the
former inmate was under Acivil detention@ not Acriminal detention.@ The court held that the
former inmate=s complaint failed to state a claim for damages for denial of access to a law
library, where the complaint did not explain how he was injured by any limitations on his
access to the law library. (Charleston County Detention Center, South Carolina)

1.141

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY

Myron v. Terhune, 457 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a ' 1983 action
against several correctional officers and medical personnel at a prison. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. According to the
court, a regulation governing library services in prisons did not give the prisoner a liberty
interest, protected by the due process clause, in library access hours. The court noted that
while the regulation may have created a liberty interest in requiring prison officials to have a
law library, the warden was vested with discretion to regulate access to library facilities.
(Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Navarro v. Adams, 419 F.Supp.2d 1196 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner filed a pro se petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his state court conviction and his sentence for first
degree murder. The district court held that a deputy sheriff's search of his cell and seizure of
attorney-client privileged documents did not warrant federal habeas relief because it did not
substantially prejudice the prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that
the prisoner=s cell was searched to locate evidence regarding gang activity and threats to
witnesses, not to interfere with his relationship with his defense counsel, and the information
seized was turned over to the trial court for an in-camera review without being viewed by any
member of the prosecution team. (California)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Nelson v. Warden of C.F.C.F., 461 F.Supp.2d 316 (E.D.Pa. 2006). A state prisoner brought a §

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
SEARCHES
RETALIATION

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a ' 1983 action
alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials=
motion for summary judgment. The court held that the officials did not deny the inmate's
request to call an attorney, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to
access courts, where the officials made several attempts to contact the inmate's attorney but
were told that she was too busy or did not want to speak to the inmate, the attorney had filed
a motion to withdraw as the inmate's counsel, and the public defender's office informed the
officials that the inmate was not a client. According to the court, the officials gave the inmate
adequate law library time and legal assistance, and thus did not violate the inmate's First
Amendment right to access courts, even though the inmate did not have access to the prison's
legal resources 24 hours per day. The court noted that during a two-and-a-half month period,
the inmate requested and received law library services 23 times, and had access to the law
library 77 times. The court found that the officials' decision to Ashake down@ the inmate's cell
was not in retaliation for his having filed a civil rights action, and thus did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, where shakedowns were routine, and the
inmate was thought to have prohibited materials in his cell. The court found that the inmate
had no constitutionally protected right to purchase food or other items as cheaply as possible
through the prison commissary, and therefore prison officials did not violate the inmate=s
Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly overcharging for commissary products. (Delaware
Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED
ATTORNEY

Phillips v. Jasper County Jail, 437 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2006). An inmate at a county jail brought

XX

1983 action against warden, corrections officers, and others, challenging his medical
quarantine. The corrections officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion, finding that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, so that his
suit was barred under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Although the prisoner
received an inmate handbook explaining the rules and procedures for filing an administrative
grievance, he failed to file a grievance challenging the medical quarantine. (Curran-Fromhold
Correctional Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

a ' 1983 action against various jail employees and the jail's doctor, alleging violation of his
constitutional rights. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment and the inmate appealed. The court of appeals held that the inmate was not entitled
to appointed counsel where discovery had just begun at the time the inmate requested counsel
and there was no conflicting testimony, there was no indication that the inmate was unable to
investigate or present his case, the inmate correctly identified the applicable legal standard
governing his claims and successfully amended his complaint to include essential information,
his claims involved information readily available to him, the inmate was able to avoid
procedural default, the complaint was sufficient to survive the first motion for summary
judgment, and the inmate had been able to file more than thirty documents with the court.
The court held that the jail's doctor who prescribed anti-seizure medicine to the inmate was
not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, even though the medication
prescribed was different from the medication the inmate had taken in the past. According to
the court, the doctor did not know that the medication prescribed would present a danger to
the inmate or that he was prescribing less medication than was required. The court found that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether jail
employees assigned the inmate to a top bunk, despite the fact that he suffered from a seizure
disorder. (Jasper County Jail, Missouri)

1.142

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW BOOKS
LEGAL MATERIAL
WRITING MATERIAL

Pratt v. Tarr, 464 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a pro se § 1983

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Price v. Wall, 428 F.Supp.2d 52 (D.R.I. 2006). An inmate brought a ' 1983 suit against
corrections officials, alleging that he was intentionally transferred to the facility where he was
confined in an effort to frustrate his rehabilitation, in retaliation for his filing of a motion to
compel compliance with a state court order, in violation of the First Amendment. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court held that the inmate stated a First
Amendment retaliation claim where he alleged that corrections officials intentionally
transferred him to the facility in retaliation for his court action. According to the court, the
question was not whether the defendants had a right to transfer the inmate, but whether such
action was accomplished for an unlawful purpose. The inmate had been required, as a
condition of his sentence, to complete certain rehabilitative programs, including psychological
and psychiatric treatment while incarcerated. After not receiving any of the court-mandated
treatment, the inmate filed a motion in the state courts seeking to compel the Department of
Corrections to comply with the state court order. After several skirmishes, the Department of
Corrections agreed to provide the inmate with the court-mandated treatment. The parties
further agreed that if the inmate successfully completed the first round of treatment, the
Department of Corrections would upgrade his classification status, permitting him to
participate in further rehabilitative treatment as mandated by the state court. The inmate
successfully completed his first round of treatment and appeared before a classification board
for review of his classification status. Based on his successful completion of the initial round of
treatment and pursuant to the agreement between the inmate and the Department, the board
recommended that the inmate=s classification be upgraded. But the defendants refused to
permit an upgrade and instead launched no less than three separate, unrelated investigations
into various matters, delaying the inmate=s classification status upgrade and prohibiting him
from participating in further rehabilitation. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION
TRANSFER

Price v. Wall, 464 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.R.I. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil rights

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Rand v. Simonds, 422 F.Supp.2d 318 (D.N.H. 2006). A pretrial detainee brought a pro se action
against a superintendent, assistant superintendent, and physician's assistant for a county
correctional facility, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the detainee administratively exhausted his claim that the
superintendent and assistant superintendent were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs, even though he did not file a formal grievance, given that Arules@ on grievance
procedures in the inmate handbook did not require that the grievance take a particular form.
The court noted that the detainee submitted a request form asking for referral to a specialist,
as specified in the medical procedures section of handbook, and that inquiries made by an
investigator for the detainee's criminal defense attorney into the facility's refusal to refer the
detainee to an outside medical care provider for his shoulder pain gave the superintendent and
assistant superintendent the requisite opportunity to address the detainee's complaints, which
they took advantage of by explaining the decision made. The court held that the detainee
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), on his claim that a physician's assistant at the county correctional facility was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by failing to refer him to specialist outside
the facility for his shoulder injury. According to the court, the complaints made on the
detainee's behalf by an investigator for the detainee's criminal defense attorney did not allege
any misfeasance on the part of the physician's assistant or even mention him, and therefore
did not give the facility's officials sufficient notice of the detainee's concerns about treatment

XX

action against prison officials, alleging that the officials had violated his right of access to the
courts by denying him adequate materials. The district court granted the officials' motion for
judgment on the pleadings, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that
the inmate stated a claim by alleging that the officials' denial of adequate materials had
caused him to lose court cases, and by submitting information about those cases. In his
complaint, the inmate alleged that officials “den[ied] him adequate scribe materials, a desk, a
chair and personal legal property to defend pending litigation in state and federal courts,
which caused plaintiff's cases to now be lost and/or dismissed” and that the officials “violate[d]
access to the courts' standards by refusing to release law books, briefs, transcripts, case law
materials, [and] carbon paper.” (Wisconsin)

action under § 1983 against various prison officials, alleging the officials retaliated against
him in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that: (1) the prisoner’s transfer to an out-of-state
correctional system was not adverse; (2) the prisoner’s classification while confined in the outof-state correctional facility to a restrictive or harsh classification was not adverse, for the
purposes of his First Amendment retaliation claim; (3) the prisoner’s transfer was not in
retaliation for his legal activities; and (4) the officials were not liable for retaliation based on
the prisoner’s classification while confined in the out-of-state correctional facility. The court
noted that the prisoner’s classification was not significantly more severe than his classification
while confined at the in-state correctional facility. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)

1.143

received from the physician's assistant to allow those concerns to be dealt with
administratively. (Merrimack County House of Corrections, New Hampshire)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se ' 1983 claim
asserting violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in connection with the
confiscation of magazines by prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the exhaustion requirement of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to prisoners who were held in private prisons,
and the prisoner's claim that his constitutional rights were violated by the confiscation of his
magazines was subject to the PLRA exhaustion requirement. (Idaho Correctional Center,
operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Sample v. Lappin, 424 F.Supp.2d 187 (D.D.C. 2006). An inmate brought suit for declaratory
and injunctive relief, claiming that a denial of his request for wine violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), and that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Director failed to train, supervise, and
promulgate policies requiring his subordinates to comply with RFRA and RLUIPA. The
defense moved to dismiss, and the parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether an outright ban on an
inmate's consumption of wine was the least restrictive means of furthering the government's
compelling interest in controlling intoxicants. The inmate described himself as Aan observant
Jew@ who Apracticed Judaism before his incarceration and continues his practice of Judaism
while confined,@ and who Asincerely believes that he must drink at least 3.5 ounces of red wine
(a reviit) while saying Kiddush, a prayer sanctifying the Sabbath, during Friday night and
Saturday shabbos services.@ The court found that the inmate exhausted his administrative
remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), with respect to his request
for wine, regardless of whether he asked that a rabbi, a chaplain, or a Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
staff member administer the wine to him. According to the court, the inmate's obligation to
exhaust his administrative remedies did not require that he posit every conceivable
alternative means by which to achieve his goal, which was the unburdened exercise of his
sincere religious belief. (Federal Correctional Institution, Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Scott v. Ozmint, 467 F.Supp.2d 564 (D.S.C. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). A civilly-committed sex offender

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
PHOTOCOPYING
LEGAL MATERIAL

Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se action
against prison officials under ' 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), alleging denial of his rights to worship, to petition for redress of grievances, and to
have access to courts. The prisoner requested a preliminary injunction and the district court
denied the request. The court held that the prisoner stated cause of action against prison
officials under ' 1983 seeking monetary damages for First Amendment and RLUIPA violations
by alleging that all inmates in his housing unit were denied communal worship. The court
noted that the statute prohibiting prisoners from bringing federal civil actions for mental or
emotional injury absent a showing of physical injury does not restrict damages in a First
Amendment constitutional claim. The court found that the prisoner stated cause of action for
First Amendment violations in ' 1983 complaint against a prison chaplain and administrative
assistant, in connection with alleged denial of communal worship, in that it was reasonable to
infer from the prisoner's factual allegations that such officials might have implemented or

XX

seeking an injunction requiring a state corrections director and prison chaplains to recognize
the Neterian faith as a religion. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the prisoner did not satisfy the requirement
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) that he show physical injury as required for a civil
rights suit for mental or emotional injury; and (2) the decision was reasonably related to
legitimate penological concerns. (McCormick Correctional Institution, South Carolina)

brought an action against the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services,
other Department officials, and sex offender program employees, alleging violations of federal
and state law for being placed in isolation, receiving inadequate medical attention, and being
retaliated against. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and the offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that placement of the
civilly-committed sex offender in isolation because of rule infractions did not infringe on his
procedural due process rights, given that his commitment was indefinite, that he received
notice and had the right to be heard, that the decision to use isolation was a discretionary
decision by state officials, and that the State had a vital interest in maintaining a secure
environment. The court found that the offender's transfer was not in retaliation for his alleged
advocacy for another patient, so as to violate the offender's speech rights, where the sex
offender program officials indicated that they transferred the offender to lessen his contact
with the patient, whom the offender was suspected of exploiting, and where the offender failed
to present any evidence that the transfer took place for any other reason. (Minnesota Sex
Offender Program, Minnesota Department of Human Services)

1.144

enforced, or could have lifted, the restrictions at issue while the prisoner was in certain
housing units. The court ruled that prison officials' alleged actions of denying the prisoner
access to a law library, denying him the ability to make copies, and confiscating his legal
materials, if proven, did not violate his constitutional right of access to courts, in that he could
write to the court and thus could file a complaint, he could send an original document and
state that he was unable to obtain copies, and he did not maintain that unreturned legal
papers were not replaceable. The court noted that there is no abstract, freestanding right to a
law library, and a prisoners' constitutional right of access to courts goes no further than
access. The court found that the confiscation of a prisoner's legal paperwork is merely a
property loss, not a denial of the constitutional right of access to courts, if the papers are
replaceable. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
PRE SE LITIGATION

Sieverding v. Colorado Bar Ass'n, 469 F.3d 1340 (10th Cir. 2006). A pro se plaintiff petitioned
for a writ of mandamus challenging the filing restrictions imposed by the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado, that prohibited filing of a pro se action in any court
without the district court’s approval. The appeals court held that the filing restrictions were
overbroad as to appellate courts, state courts, and district courts in other circuits and should
have been limited to a ban on suits on any subject matter against the persons, entities,
counsel, and insurance companies of the parties involved in prior litigation by the plaintiff.
The court noted that the right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional, and
there is no constitutional right of access to the courts to prosecute an action that is frivolous or
malicious. The court also found that a federal district court in the District of Colorado may
impose filing restrictions that include other federal district courts within the Tenth Circuit,
but it is not appropriate to extend those restrictions to include federal district courts outside
the Tenth Circuit, nor is it reasonable for a court in the Tenth Circuit to speak on behalf of
courts in other circuits as those courts are capable of taking appropriate action on their own.
(United States District Court for the District of Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303 (7th Cir. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The
inmate asserted that, after he wrote a letter and filed a suit complaining about abuse by the
staff of the prison where he was confined, the targets of his accusations retaliated by issuing
bogus conduct reports and arranging for him to be disciplined. The prisoner spent 300 days in
segregation and lost 25 days of recreation privileges. The district court dismissed the
complaint and the inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held:
(1) the inmate was not required to establish or demonstrate in his complaint that the original
speech was truthful where the complaint set out the inmate's grievance clearly enough to put
officials on notice; (2) the inmate did not vouch for the correctness of the prison disciplinary
board’s findings against him because the board’s report was included with his filing; and (3)
the disciplinary board’s finding did not collaterally prevent the inmate from filing the § 1983
action. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Skinner v. Uphoff, 410 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Wyo. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a ' 1983
class action against prison officials, alleging failure to safeguard inmates against assaults by
other inmates, and seeking individual compensatory as well as class injunctive relief. The
district court granted injunctive relief and declaratory relief, finding that the defendants failed
to adequately train and supervise employees, failed to properly review policy violations, and
failed to properly discipline employees, all of which led to risks to inmate safety. In an effort to
alleviate the problems at the prison, a remedial plan was adopted and approved by the court.
The parties filed various motions to modify the remedial plan and the state moved for
termination of the final decree. The district court granted the motions in part, and denied in
part. The court held that state inmates and prison officials were entitled, under the remedial
plan, to the opportunity to ask an outside investigator about reports of his investigation of
suspected premeditated inmate-on-inmate assaults. The investigator was an independent
contractor, and his reports bore directly upon whether officials were complying with plan. The
court held that the inmates had the right under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to
pursue discovery as to existence of the alleged ongoing and continuing constitutional violations
before the court could terminate the remedial plan entered in the inmates' action challenging
officials' responses to inmate-on-inmate violence. The court concluded that the inmates
demonstrated good cause for a 60-day postponement of an automatic stay of the remedial plan
after the officials filed a motion for termination, where the inmates made allegations of
ongoing inmate-on-inmate violence and delays in the officials' remedial actions, and a joint
expert raised various concerns. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE

Strong v. Woodford, 428 F.Supp.2d 1082 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A prisoner filed a ' 1983 action,
alleging prison officials mishandled or destroyed his outgoing legal mail. The defendants filed
a motion to dismiss. The district court held that the prisoner failed to state a First
Amendment violation with respect to access to the courts and that the prisoner's allegations
that prison officials negligently destroyed or mishandled his legal mail did not support an
actionable claim under ' 1983. The court held that the prisoner's allegations of supervisor

XX

1.145

liability did not state a claim under ' 1983 and that the officials were immune from liability
for money damages or other retroactive relief. According to the court, a delay in filing a legal
document without any attendant adverse consequences does not constitute actual harm, as
required for an inmate to assert claims based on a denial of his First Amendment rights in
legal correspondence. (California)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Upthegrove v. Kuka, 408 F.Supp.2d 708 (W.D.Wisc. 2006). An inmate brought a ' 1983 action
arising from an alleged failure to provide him with pain medication. The defendant officers
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the inmate
failed to file an inmate complaint so as to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to one
correctional officer. The court found that a correctional sergeant who, prior to dispensing the
inmate's pain medication, was called away to a prison emergency, did not act with deliberate
indifference to the inmate's serious medical need because another officer replaced the sergeant
and continued to dispense medications. The court noted that the inmate inexplicably did not
remain in line to receive his medication and therefore any pain he suffered as the result of
missing his medication was the result of his own choice, not of any Eighth Amendment
violation. (Jackson Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW BOOKS
LEGAL MATERIAL
LEGAL MAIL

Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983
action against prison officials, alleging that a prison policy that required prisoners to purchase
all hobby materials, legal materials, books, and magazines from their prison accounts, and
prohibiting gifts to prisoners of such materials from unauthorized sources, violated his due
process rights, his right of access to the courts, and his First Amendment rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The prisoner appealed. According to
the court, the confiscation of documents mailed to the prisoner which were purchased by a
person who was a visitor of another inmate, did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment
rights, where the ban was content neutral, it was rationally related to the penological interest
of preventing bartering, extortion, possession of contraband, and other criminal activity by
prisoners, the prisoner was still able to purchase the same materials himself using funds from
his prison account, and he had access to the same materials in the prison law library. The
court noted that permitting such third-party gifts and then trying to control the resultant
security problems through reactive efforts of prison officers would impose an undue burden on
prison staff and resources. The court held that the inmate’s proposed accommodation, allowing
third party gifts if third parties provided relevant information, such as the source, amount,
and manner of payment, would entail data collection, processing, and substantial staff
resources. The suit was prompted by prison officials' interception of three parcels mailed to
plaintiff. The first contained books from a “Mystery Guild” book club; the other two contained
legal documents from the Colorado State Archives and the Library of Congress which had been
purchased for the plaintiff by a third party who was listed as another inmate's visitor and,
thus, fell within a Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) prohibition on gifts from
unauthorized sources. The court also held that denial of the prisoner's access to courts claim
that challenged the prison policy restricting receipt of his legal mail, was warranted, absent a
showing that the prisoner's failure to receive his legal mail actually frustrated, impeded, or
hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim. (Fremont Correctional Facility, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLOTHING-COURT
APPEARANCES

Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006). Following affirmance on the appeal of the
defendant's state conviction for first degree murder and armed burglary in the first degree,
and imposition of the death penalty, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The district court denied the petition and the defendant appealed. The court of appeals held
that a witness's identification of the defendant, who appeared at a deposition in prison attire
and manacles, did not violate due process. The court noted that the defendant compelled the
witness to attend a deposition where it was obvious that he was the only suspect, and he chose
to conduct the deposition himself rather than have advisory counsel do so. According to the
court, while the manacles and prison garb were involuntary, they were reasonable in light of
security concerns and added only marginally to the suggestiveness created by the defendant's
voluntary presence and self-identification as the defendant. (Arizona Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Wilson v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 567 (D.Del. 2006). Thirty-one Black inmates filed a § 1983
action alleging that state prison officials routinely denied their right to procedural due process
during disciplinary hearings and security classification determinations. The officials moved to
dismiss the complaint and the inmates asked for summary judgment. The motions were
granted in part and denied in part. The court held that Delaware has created no
constitutionally protected liberty interest in an inmate’s security classification, even when the
change in classification is for disciplinary reasons. The court held that an inmate’s allegation
that he was transferred to a housing unit with far fewer privileges after filing a civil rights
action against the prison officials, in violation of his First Amendment right of access to courts,
sufficiently alleged a retaliation claim against the officials, and that a genuine issue of
material fact as to the reason for the inmate’s transfer to a more restrictive facility precluded

XX

1.146

summary judgment. (Delaware Department of Correction)
2007
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Abdul-Muhammad v. Kempker, 486 F.3d 444 (8th Cir. 2007). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, challenging certain prison policies, and alleging that officials retaliated against them for filing an
earlier lawsuit. The district court dismissed the complaint and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On remand, the appeals court held that the district court
could not dismiss the prisoner's claims without determining which of the prisoner's claims had been properly
exhausted and which of the claims, if any, were meritorious. The court noted that if an inmate fails to exhaust one
or more discrete claims raised in a § 1983 complaint, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires only that
the unexhausted claim or claims be dismissed, but does not require that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety.
(Potosi Correctional Facility, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
STUN BELT
RESTRAINTS

Adams v. Bradshaw, 484 F.Supp.2d 753 (N.D.Ohio 2007). After his convictions for aggravated murder and other
offenses were affirmed, an offender sought a writ of habeas corpus. The district court held that, even if a due
process violation occurred, the improper use of a stun belt placed on the defendant his during trial was a harmless
error because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The court noted that due process prohibits the use of
shackles on a defendant during a criminal trial, unless there exists an essential state interest, such as the interest in
courtroom security. (Trumbell County, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECOUPMENT

Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406 (8th
Cir. 2007). A separation of church and state advocacy group, state prison inmates, and others, sued the State of
Iowa and a Christian provider of rehabilitation services, claiming that funding of a contract with the Christian
organization providing pre-release rehabilitation services to inmates violated the Establishment Clause. The
district court granted declaratory and equitable relief in favor of advocacy group and the inmates. The provider
and state corrections officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court
held that the state funding constituted an endorsement of religion, but that the district court abused its discretion in
awarding recoupment of state funds that had been paid to the provider. The court noted that even though the
provider had the ability to repay the funds, the district court gave no weight to the fact that specific statutes
authorized the funding, made no finding of bad faith by the state legislature and governor, and did not consider the
testimony of state prison officials that the program was beneficial and that the state received much more value
than it paid for. (Iowa Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se action against prison officials,
alleging that the threat he faced from contagious diseases violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoner sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) but the district court
denied the motion. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that
the prisoner's qualification for an imminent danger exception to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) threestrikes rule was determined at the time of filing of the complaint and that under the imminent danger exception the
prisoner could file an entire complaint IFP. The prisoner alleged that he was at risk of contracting HIV and that he
had already contracted hepatitis C, because of his exposure to other prisoners who had those contagious diseases
due to prison officials' policy of not screening prisoners for such diseases. (California State Prison, Solano)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MAIL
TRANSFER
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, harsh
living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the defendants’
motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that the provision of Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before bringing a civil action against prison officials
regarding prison conditions applied to the detainee who brought a § 1983 action before he was released from jail,
even though the detainee had been released from jail by the time that the defendants brought their motion to
dismiss. The court held that the detainee did not state a claim under § 1983 that inadequacies in the jail's law
library violated his First Amendment right of access to the courts, even if he alleged that such inadequacies caused
the filing of his appeals to be untimely, in the absence of an allegation that such untimeliness had an actual
adverse impact on the appeals. The court held that the detainee's allegations that his legal mail was opened by
officials at the jail outside of his presence on numerous occasions during a four-month period, and that such
actions were intentional and pursuant to a policy or systemic practice, stated a claim under § 1983 for violation of
First Amendment free speech rights. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility
operated by the Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Baylis v. Taylor, 475 F.Supp.2d 484 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against various defendants,
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The defendants moved for dismissal. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s administrative remedies with
respect to his claim that prison personnel were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs were presumed
to have been exhausted, for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s requirement that administrative
remedies be exhausted before a § 1983 action could be brought, since no further remedies were available to the
inmate. (Delaware Correctional Center)

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U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Brown v. Beard, 492 F.Supp.2d 474 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging that medical
personal were intentionally not providing adequate medical care to combat his risk factors for heart disease. Prison
officials moved to vacate an order allowing the prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury, as
required to proceed IFP under the Prison Litigation Reform Act after having three or more prior IFP actions
dismissed as frivolous. The court noted that the prisoner did not dispute that he was receiving medical attention
for high blood pressure, low blood sugar, and high cholesterol, but merely disputed the findings and quality of
treatment he was receiving. (SCI Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male former inmates of a county jail brought a class
action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that the defendants had a policy and/or practice of subjecting male
inmates to strip-searches prior to their release, and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the expert’s testimony was admissible. According to the court, the
expert testimony of a registered architect who specialized in the design of prisons and jails, concerning whether
there was adequate space in the jail for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees was relevant
and reliable. The court noted that while the expert did not review all of the written discovery in the case, the
expert reached his opinions after a tour of the jail and after reviewing other expert reports, jail floor plans, a
sheriff's status report and charts summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cameron v. Allen, 525 F.Supp.2d 1302 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the
commissioner of a state department of corrections, a contract medical care provider, and a prison physician
challenging the constitutionality of medical treatment provided to him. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the commissioner was not subject to liability
under § 1983 for the prison medical staff's alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs,
where the commissioner did not personally participate in, or have any direct involvement with, the inmate's
medical treatment, that medical personnel made all decisions relative to the course of treatment provided to the
inmate, and such treatment did not result from a policy instituted by the commissioner.
The court found that the inmate's failure to properly exhaust the prison's grievance procedure barred his § 1983
action. According to the court, even though the inmate filed grievance forms addressing his medical treatment, the
treatment that was the subject of the forms was wholly unrelated to the medical treatment about which he
complained in his § 1983 action. (Bullock County Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
LAW BOOKS
COMPUTERS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in an
action against prison officials, alleging deprivation of access to legal materials. The district court dismissed the
case and the prisoner appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the prisoner was barred from
proceeding in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), until all the fees for all of the
prisoner's past and pending litigation have been paid in full. The prisoner alleged that the jail violates the
Constitution because it provides computer-assisted legal research rather than a library of physical law books. The
court noted that the prisoner had legal counsel in all criminal cases pending against him and that access to legal
materials is required only for unrepresented litigants. (Milwaukee County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2007). A federal prisoner filed a Bivens action against federal prison
officials, alleging that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement when officials ignored a
mandatory evacuation order for a hurricane and abandoned him and other prisoners without adequate food, water,
and ventilation. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The court held that the dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was not proper, as the lack of exhaustion was an affirmative defense, the complaint
was silent as to exhaustion, and the defendants had not yet filed a responsive pleading. (Federal Correctional
Complex, Beaumont, Texas)

U.S. District Court
EX-OFFENDER
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Crawford v. Doe, 484 F.Supp.2d 446 (E.D.Va.2007). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against corrections
officials. The inmate moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied the motion, finding that the
inmate was subject to the “three strike” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though he
had been released. The former prisoner claimed that he asked a correctional officer to copy a document that he
intended to file in the United States Supreme Court. The officer allegedly asked an inmate, who worked for a Unit
Manager, to copy the document and it was shredded. The former prisoner sought $15,000,000. (West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Daker v. Ferrero, 506 F.Supp.2d 1295 (N.D.Ga. 2007). A former prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, challenging alleged denials of publications and mail, as well as alleged retaliatory acts by
officials. The district court granted summary judgment as to certain claims and the officials moved for
reconsideration as to a portion of that order and for summary judgment, and the inmate moved for summary
judgment. The district court held that reconsideration of summary judgment was warranted by genuine issues of
fact that existed as to whether prison officials violated the inmate's First Amendment rights by retaliating against
him after he brought numerous grievances and a civil rights action. The court found that the officials were entitled
to qualified immunity as to books containing sexually explicit materials, instructions on fighting techniques and
military procedures and materials, criminal investigatory techniques, and instructions on building electronic
devices, but issues of fact existed as to whether prison officials denied a book about revolution and four legal
books based on their content. (Georgia Department of Corrections)

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U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Estate of Hill v. Richards, 525 F.Supp.2d 1076 (W.D.Wis. 2007. The estate of a county jail inmate who committed
suicide sued the social worker who interviewed the inmate shortly before her suicide, claiming deliberate
indifference to the inmate's suicidal mental condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The social worker
moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether
the worker was aware of a suicide risk, as the result of a statement by the inmate that she had poked herself with a
thumbtack, and as to the adequacy of the worker’s response to the inmate's statement. The court noted that expert
testimony was not required to establish that the social worker violated the Eighth Amendment by being
deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of the jail inmate; under those circumstances a jury of laypersons
could conclude that there was a duty to protect the inmate. The social worker knew, from her experiences with the
inmate, that the inmate had a history of depression, that she had been prescribed multiple medications for
depression and that she previously had expressed a desire to die. The social worker also knew that the inmate had
not been taking her medication for several weeks and that she was being housed in segregation at the jail, where
neither other prisoners nor staff could easily monitor her. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Estrada v. Reed, 508 F.Supp.2d 699 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An allegedly indigent federal prisoner brought a proposed
Bivens action against a warden, prison doctor, two prison health services administrators, and a captain on the
prison's medical staff, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court granted the
prisoner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, in part, finding that the prisoner alleged potentially serious
medical needs and allowed an inference of deliberate indifference on the part of several of the defendants. The
prisoner alleged that prison medical staff failed to monitor his blood pressure consistently after doctors
recommended such monitoring, and that a serious stroke left him with limited ability to use much of his left side
and with difficulty speaking, so that he required consistent therapy to regain his motor skills. (Federal Correctional
Institution, Oxford, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Fields v. Oklahoma State Penitentiary, 511 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil
rights action under § 1983 against the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) and nine OSP employees, alleging
claims for violations of various constitutional rights and other federal-law and state-law claims. The district court
dismissed all the federal-law claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and then exercised its discretion
to dismiss the state-law claims. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
before bringing suit and that the district court was within its discretion in denying the prisoner's motions to amend
his complaint. The court noted that although the prisoner filed grievances with the Oklahoma Department of
Correction (ODOC) he failed to comply with the required grievance procedures. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424 (8th Cir. 2007). A prisoner convicted in state court of first-degree murder and
sentenced to life in prison filed a second petition for habeas relief, which the district court dismissed. The prisoner
appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to establish that his lack of access
to a state prison law library or legal assistance presented a sufficient impediment to toll the statutory period for
filing a habeas petition. (Iowa)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Fontroy v. Beard, 485 F.Supp.2d 592 (E.D.Pa. 2007). Inmates sued state prison officials, claiming that a policy of
opening legal and court mail outside their presence violated the First Amendment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the inmates, in part. The court held that the policy of opening inmate legal and court mail
outside of their presence, inspecting for contraband, and resealing the mail without reading it, violated the First
Amendment right of inmates to have mail opened in their presence. The court noted that the policy did not further
the prison's objective of blocking contraband entering prison through the mails, over an alternate procedure of
opening mail in inmate's presence. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Franklin v. Pocono Ranch Lands Property Owners Ass'n, 484 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Del. 2007). A prisoner brought
an in forma pauperis civil action against a property owners' association and other defendants. The district court
dismissed the action, finding that the amended complaint failed to provide sufficient notification of the nature and
factual basis of the claimed wrong and therefore should be dismissed under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). (Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Freeman v. Watkins, 479 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil rights complaint
attacking various prison conditions as well as the process afforded him in disciplinary proceedings. The district
court dismissed the suit for failure to totally exhaust administrative remedies, and the prisoner appealed. The court
of appeals vacated and remanded. The court held that under an intervening precedent, the prisoner was not
required to plead exhaustion of administrative remedies. According to the court, failure to exhaust was an
affirmative defense, and the prisoner did not have a duty under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to plead
or to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies on his civil rights claims, and thus the district court could
not require an affirmative showing of exhaustion upon its preliminary screening of the case. (Fremont
Correctional Facility and Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MATERIAL
PHOTOCOPYING
INDIGENT INMATES

Harrison v. Moketa/Motycka, 485 F.Supp.2d 652 (D.S.C. 2007). A pretrial detainee sued various prison officials
and medical care providers under § 1983, claiming violations of a variety of his constitutional rights. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the detainee did not suffer a violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment rights when he was allegedly served cold food and two nutritionally deficient
breakfasts. According to the court, merely serving food cold did not present a serious risk of harm or an
immediate danger to the health of the detainee, and while he had significant pre-existing health problems, there
was no indication that those conditions were caused or exacerbated by the diet provided. The court held that the
detainee's right of access to the courts was not violated by any restriction on his access to a law library, despite his

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claim that his “wrongful” conviction was proof of his actual injury. He did not identify a specific defense or legal
claim that he was unable to pursue due to his alleged lack of access to legal materials, and any finding that he had
been injured by a “wrongful” conviction would have impermissibly implied the invalidity of his conviction. The
court noted that lack of free photocopying of law library materials did not deny the indigent detainee access to the
courts. (Alvin S. Glenn Detention Center, South Carolina)
U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Henderson v. Ayers, 476 F.Supp.2d 1168 (C.D.Cal. 2007). An inmate brought a pro se and in forma pauperis suit
under § 1983 against an acting warden, in his individual and official capacities, claiming that the warden had
denied the inmate his right to attend Friday Islamic prayer services and seeking injunctive relief. The warden
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate satisfied the exhaustion
requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though he did not specifically name the warden in
his grievance. The court noted that exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) is not necessarily
inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances, but rather, compliance with
prison grievance procedures is all that is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. The court held that the inmate
stated a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and
stated a claim for violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that he had been denied excused
time-off work to attend Friday Islamic prayer services, as his religion required, and that he had been subjected to
progressive discipline, including loss of privileges, for attempting to attend these prayer services. (California State
Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
IN PORMA PAUPERIS

Jackson v. Johnson, 475 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007). An individual who had been released from prison on
mandatory supervision and who resided in a privately operated halfway house, apparently as a condition of his
mandatory supervision, brought an action under § 1983 and § 1985, asserting that his access to the courts had
been diminished in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed his suit, denied
his motion for reconsideration, and, following his appeal, denied his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP) on appeal. The court of appeals held that the individual was a “prisoner” within the meaning of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) three strikes provision and, thus, could not proceed IFP on appeal. The appeals
court denied the motion to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the appeal. The court noted that, to the extent
that the halfway house resident argued that the state could not detain him in the halfway house because his
residence there was voluntary and not a condition of his release, the proper vehicle for his challenge was a habeas
petition rather than a § 1983 action. According to the court, PLRA’s three-strikes provision does not bar prisoners
from proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) in a habeas action, even if the prisoner has accumulated three strikes.
According to the court, although the supervisee had been released from confinement in prison, his release was not
to the general public, but was to a facility where he was locked up 16 to 24 hours a day and from which he could
leave only for very limited purposes. The court noted that even if the supervisee’s time at the halfway house was
for primarily non-punitive purposes, that is, to reintegrate him into society, his confinement resulted from his
criminal violation, as he remained under the supervision of the Pardons and Paroles Division. (Pardons and
Paroles Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Fort Worth, Texas)

U.S. Supreme Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. (2007). State prison inmates brought separate § 1983 actions against corrections officials.
The district courts dismissed the actions for failure to satisfy procedural rules, implementing the administrative
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The appeals courts affirmed the respective
dismissals. Certiorari was granted, and the actions were consolidated. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and
remanded. The court held that an inmate's failure to exhaust under PLRA is an affirmative defense-- an inmate is
not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. According the court, the inmates' §
1983 actions were not automatically rendered noncompliant with PLRA exhaustion requirement by the fact that
not all defendants named in the complaints had been named in previous administrative grievances. The court
found that an inmate's compliance with the PLRA exhaustion requirement as to some, but not all, claims does not
warrant dismissal of an entire action. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TRIAL

Jordan v. Pugh, 484 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal prisoner brought an action against prison officials
challenging the constitutionality of a federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation prohibiting prisoners from acting
as a reporter or publishing under a byline. The prisoner petitioned for permission to attend his trial in person and
moved for reconsideration of a court order granting the defendants' motion to preclude the testimony of two
witnesses who were also prisoners. The district court held that circumstances did not warrant granting the petition
in light of the security risks associated with transferring the prisoner to lower security facility to facilitate
participation in the trial. The court found that the proffered testimony of the other prisoners was not relevant.
(United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
LAW LIBRARY
RETALIATION

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 474 F.Supp.2d 1014 (W.D.Wis. 2007). An inmate at a supermaximum security prison filed
a § 1983 action alleging that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The inmate filed a motion seeking
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that the inmate’s claim that he was transferred to a maximum security facility in retaliation for his decision to
name a warden as a defendant in a civil rights action was not frivolous, and thus the inmate was entitled to
proceed in forma pauperis in his § 1983 action, where fact issues remained as to whether the lawsuit motivated the
warden’s decision to transfer the inmate. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Kaufman v. Schneiter, 524 F.Supp.2d 1101 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A former state inmate sued prison officials for
declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that he was subjected to retaliatory transfer and that his rights
under the First and Eighth Amendments and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA)
were violated. The court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the warden was
not involved in the inmate's transfer to a maximum security institution, precluding the warden's liability on the

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claim alleging that he transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's filing of an earlier lawsuit against him.
The court found that there was no evidence that any of the prison officials sued by the inmate were personally
involved in denying delivery to the inmate of the letter underlying his free speech claim, and therefore the officials
could not be held liable under § 1983. The court held that the former state inmate did not show that while he was
incarcerated at a maximum security facility, he ever chose to use out-of-cell time to visit the law library, as
opposed to out-of-door exercise, and thus to show an injury-in-fact required for the former inmate to have
standing to challenge the prison official's policy of requiring inmates to choose between out-of-cell exercise time
and law library time under the Eighth Amendment. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
U.S. District Court
APPOINTED
ATTORNEY
LEGAL MATERIAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Koerschner v. Warden, 508 F.Supp.2d 849 (D.Nev. 2007). A state prisoner brought a motion for appointment of
counsel for a federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted the motion. The court held that appointment of
counsel was warranted in light of the serious, and potentially constitutionally suspect, limitations placed by the
state prison on the due process right of access to courts by segregation-unit inmates. The court noted that access to
court for inmates in segregation consisted of a new “paging system,” under which inmates can request a maximum
of five specified legal materials at a time, and the assistance of essentially untrained inmate legal assistants.
(Lovelock Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
OTHER STATE

Lee v. Corrections Corp. of America, 525 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawai‘i 2007). A Hawai'i prisoner, who was
incarcerated in a Mississippi prison pursuant to a contract between Hawai'i and the private corporation that
operated the prison, brought a § 1983 action against the corporation, the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety, and
prison officials, arising from an incident in which the prisoner was allegedly beaten by other inmates. The
defendants moved to transfer venue. The district court granted the motion, changing the venue to Mississippi.
According to the court, the proper venue was Mississippi because the alleged beating, as well as the allegedly
negligent monitoring, supervision, training, and hiring by the corporation and prison officials, all occurred in
Mississippi. The court noted that convenience factors also supported the transfer of the action to Mississippi
because all of the parties except for the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety were on the mainland, the majority of
witnesses resided in Mississippi or on the mainland, and there was a local interest in having the controversy
decided in Mississippi. The plaintiff alleged that he had been attacked by inmates confined with him in the Special
Housing Incentive Program (“SHIP”) unit when the cell doors in the segregation unit were inadvertently
unlocked, which allowed the inmates to exit their cells. (Tallahatchie County Correctional Facility, Tutwiler,
Mississippi. Operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37 (2nd Cir. 2007). A federal prisoner brought a pro se suit against prison officials,
alleging Bivens claims for indifference to his serious medical needs and tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA). The district court dismissed the Bivens claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and dismissed the tort claims without prejudice. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court held that the unavailability of monetary damages
in the prison grievance system did not excuse noncompliance with PLRA, and that the prisoner did not
procedurally exhaust his remedies by bringing administrative tort claims and making informal complaints. But the
court found that the alleged threats directed at the prisoner may have rendered administrative procedures
unavailable, preventing the officials from raising non-exhaustion as defense. (Metropolitan Detention Center,
Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York City)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Maness v. District Court of Logan County-Northern Div., 495 F.3d 943 (8th Cir. 2007). After a state court clerk
refused his repeated requests to present his application to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), the federal district
court dismissed a prisoner's § 1983 action arising from his state court conviction. The appeals court affirmed,
finding that the judge and prosecutor enjoyed absolute immunity, and the district court clerk's ministerial decision
to not present the prisoner's IFP application to the Arkansas state court did not violate the prisoner's right of access
to the court. The appeals court noted that the clerk who allegedly refused to present the criminal prisoner's IFP
application to a circuit judge was not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity in the prisoner's subsequent
civil rights action. (Logan County District Court, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Maraglia v. Maloney, 499 F.Supp.2d 93 (D.Mass. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit against several
Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) prison security officers. The state moved to dismiss the claims for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the
motion was converted into one for summary judgment. At a prior hearing, the court determined that the question
of whether the prisoner exhausted remedies involved disputed issues of fact. The district court held that the issue
of fact as to whether the prisoner exhausted remedies presented a question for the jury, not the court, to resolve.
The court noted that evidence of the prisoner's failure to file another grievance, challenging the fact that he had
not received responses to other allegedly filed grievances went to the issue of the prisoner's credibility regarding
exhaustion. (Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS

Miles v. Angelone, 483 F.Supp.2d 491 (E.D.Va. 2007). After his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied, a
petitioner filed numerous unsuccessful motions for reconsideration. The district court reclassified the petitioner's
twelfth such motion as a new and successive habeas petition and entered A separate order advising the petitioner
that he should not file any additional motions for reconsideration or seek any additional review absent a remand or
allowance of a successive petition by the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the petitioner's appeal
and, in a separate order, affirmed the order advising the petitioner not to file additional motions. The petitioner
then filed his seventeenth motion seeking reconsideration, which the court of appeals denied. The court held that
the petitioner's history of filing frivolous and harassing pleadings supported a limited pre-filing injunction against
the petitioner, noting that the successive and frivolous motions for reconsideration of dismissal of his original
habeas petition were a substantial burden on judicial resources. (Virginia)

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LEGAL MAIL

Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F.Supp.2d 969 (D.N.D. 2007). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
officials, claiming cruel and unusual punishment and violation of his right of access to courts. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Eighth Amendment rights of the
inmate, who had been placed in administrative segregation, were not violated when he was limited to five hours of
outside exercise per week. The court found that the inmate's right of access to courts, and right to counsel, were
not violated when prison officials inadvertently opened letters to the inmate from a state court judge and the
Department of Justice, on two occasions. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Murray v. Prison Health Services, 513 F.Supp.2d 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison health services, among others, alleging that a superintendent, nurse administrator and two nurses at
the prison were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs and denied him daily medication for his HIV
infection. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint and the district court granted the motion. The court held
that the prisoner's alleged actions, sending letters to the nurse administrator and superintendent, were not sufficient
to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Green Haven Correctional
Facility, N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
BINDING
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
librarian in her personal and official capacities, alleging violation of his right to free speech and right of access to
court under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the prisoner, and
subsequently awarded compensatory damages of $1,500. The librarian appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the librarian’s refusal to allow the prisoner to comb-bind
his petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court violated the state prisoner’s First
Amendment right of access to the courts, where the prisoner raised a nonfrivolous claim in his certiorari petition, a
state court applied an incorrect legal standard in determining the prisoner’s ineffective assistance to counsel claim
in his postconviction petition, and the denial of the use of comb-binding machine frustrated his attempt to press
his claim in the Supreme Court. The court noted that even if Supreme Court rules did not require comb-binding, it
was the binding method the prison routinely made available to the prisoner and others, it was foreseeable that the
librarian’s refusal would obstruct the prisoner’s ability to file a petition in a timely manner, and the prisoner had
no independent tort cause of action against the librarian for violation of his rights. The court found that the
librarian was not entitled to qualified immunity for her conduct in refusing to allow the prisoner to use a combbinding machine, where her conduct violated the prisoner’s clearly established right to prepare, serve, and file
court documents in a timely manner, and not to be subjected to arbitrary enforcement of prison rules. The
prisoner’s petition missed the Supreme Court filing deadline and was denied as untimely. The appeals court held
that the librarian’s refusal was blatantly contrary to past practice and state prison regulations, and under existing
precedent, the librarian should have known that refusal of the prisoner’s request could result in missing the filing
deadline. According to the court, the damages award could be based on costs that the prisoner expended in
prosecuting his postconviction relief petition over the course of many years and any mental or emotional injury
the prisoner suffered, but the district court was required to make specific findings concerning the amount of the
costs expended as well as specific findings concerning mental or emotional injury. The court concluded that where
the district court’s findings are insufficient to indicate the factual basis for its ultimate conclusion concerning
damages in a § 1983 claim, its finding as to the amount of damages is clearly erroneous. (Snake River
Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
BINDING

Phillips v. Hust, 507 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a prison
librarian in her personal and official capacities, alleging violations of his right to free speech and right to access
courts under the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of prisoner, and
subsequently awarded compensatory damages of $1,500. The librarian appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the librarian's refusal to allow the prisoner to comb-bind
his petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court violated the prisoner's First Amendment
right of access to the courts, the librarian was not entitled to qualified immunity, and the district court was
required to make specific findings to support the damages award. The appeals court denied the librarian’s petition
for rehearing. In a dissent, Circuit Judge Kozinski expressed his “utter astonishment that we're leaving an opinion
on the books that not only denies the prison librarian qualified immunity but actually holds her liable. Her
transgression? Failing to help a prisoner bind a brief in a way that's not even permitted, and certainly not required,
by the Supreme Court's rules….How the prison librarian violated any of his rights, let alone his clearly established
rights, is a mystery that repeated readings of the majority opinion do not dispel.” (Snake River Correctional
Institution, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Platt v. Brockenborough, 476 F.Supp.2d 467 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that he was repeatedly placed in punitive segregation, was not permitted to exercise regularly,
and was denied an opportunity to appeal disciplinary decisions. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prison's failure to respond to the
prisoner's numerous grievances regarding his conditions of confinement did not infringe on the prisoner's due
process right of access to the courts, since the prisoner could file suit in federal court. The court found that the
prisoner failed to state a due process claim based on denial of access to a prison law library, where the prisoner
failed to explain even in minimal detail what injury he suffered as a result of the alleged denial of access. The
court noted that access to the prison law library is not a freestanding right, and a prisoner challenging the denial of
access must allege some actual injury to have standing to assert a claim on this basis. (Philadelphia Industrial
Correctional Center)

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U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152 (2nd Cir. 2007). A prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against several
correctional employees claiming violations of his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights for his
alleged exposure to mold in a gym shower and for unjust discipline. The district court denied the prisoner's
motion to proceed in forma pauperis and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed,
and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The appeals court held that the prisoner was not in imminent
danger of a serious physical injury as required for in forma pauperis status under the exception to the threestrikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court found that the imminent danger exception
does not violate equal protection and that the in forma pauperis statute is not overbroad. (Auburn Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
INDIGENT INMATES
DUE PROCESS

Powers v. Hamilton County Public Defender Com'n, 501 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 2007). A former prisoner filed a
putative § 1983 class action, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated by the county public
defender's policy or custom of failing to seek indigency hearings on behalf of criminal defendants facing jail
time for unpaid fines. The district court granted the motion for class certification, and granted summary
judgment in favor of the arrestee on the issue of liability. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the alleged automatic incarceration of the
arrestee for his failure to pay fine, without conducting an indigency hearing to determine his ability to pay the
fine, violated due process; (2) the public defender's failure to request an indigency hearing was the moving
force behind prisoner's failure to receive an indigency hearing; (3) the public defender acted under the color of
state law; and (4) fact issues precluded summary judgment. (Hamilton County Public Defender Office and
Hamilton County Public Defender Commission, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Price v. Correctional Medical Services, 493 F.Supp.2d 740 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983
action against a prison's medical services provider and prison officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs. The provider moved to dismiss, and the inmate moved for appointment of counsel. The
district court denied the motions. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim under § 1983 against the
prison's medical services provider for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that the refusal of prompt medical care to his recently surgically
repaired wrists, upon his transfer from another facility, by employees of the prison's medical services provider,
was, or could have been, partially responsible for the permanent damage to his wrists that was independently
verified by an outside doctor. The court noted that the seriousness of the prisoner’s medical need was so
obvious, from the condition he arrived in, his description of the events to nurses, and from the obvious pain he
was under for a period of weeks, that any lay person would have recognized the need for a doctor. The court
declined to appoint counsel for inmate, noting that the prisoner had been capably representing himself, and
there were no special circumstances requiring the appointment of counsel. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
VIDEO COMMUNICA
-TION
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act

Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept., 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007). A deaf pretrial detainee
brought suit under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against deputies and a sheriff,
claiming wrongful arrest and failure to accommodate his disability. The district court dismissed all claims
against the defendants on their motion for summary judgment and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that a fact issue as to whether the totally deaf detainee with a
surgically implanted cochlear implant was substantially limited in his ability to hear, precluded summary
judgment as to whether he was a qualified individual under ADA. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the jail knew, or should have been aware of, the deaf
inmate's limitations. The court found that the detainee was qualified to receive benefits and services of the
county jail, within the meaning of ADA, with respect to phone services and televised closed-circuit viewing of
his probable cause hearing, as such services were available to all inmates. (Las Animas County Jail, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
FILING FEES
INDIGENT INMATES
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Samonte v. Frank, 517 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawai’i 2007). A prisoner, who had filed several civil rights
actions, moved to have funds withdrawn from his prison trust account sequentially, rather than
simultaneously, to satisfy court orders granting him in forma pauperis (IFP) status and directing collection
and payment of filing fees. The district court denied the motion. The court held that indigent prisoners are
required to pay filing fees on a per case basis, rather than per prisoner basis, and that per case payments did
not burden the prisoner's constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. The court noted that the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) filing fee provision requiring indigent prisoners to make monthly
payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income should be applied by simultaneously collecting fees
for all of a prisoner's outstanding cases, as long as a minimum of $10 remains in the prisoner's account.
(Hawai’i)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Thomas v. Sheahan, 514 F.Supp.2d 1083 (N.D.Ill. 2007). A special administrator filed a § 1983 suit against
a county, sheriff, county board, correctional officers, supervisors and correctional medical technician on
behalf of a pretrial detainee who died at a county jail from meningitis and pneumonia, alleging violations of
constitutional rights and state law claims for wrongful death, survival action, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court held that the administrator's failure to produce documentary evidence of lost
wages or child support payments did not preclude her from introducing evidence at trial. The court found that
the physician was not qualified to testify as to the manifestations of meningitis absent evidence that the
physician was an expert on meningitis or infectious diseases. According to the court, a jail operations expert's
proposed testimony that the county did not meet minimum standards of the conduct for training of
correctional staff was inadmissible. The court also found that evidence of jail conditions was relevant and thus
admissible, where the administrator of the detainee's estate argued that county officials should have known
that the detainee was sick because he was throwing up in his cell and in a day room. (Cook County, Illinois)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Torres Rios v. Pereira Castillo, 545 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Puerto Rico 2007). The mother of a prisoner who died
from injuries he received from another inmate while under custody at a Puerto Rico facility filed a civil rights
action against prison officials. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The district court denied the motion, finding that neither the mother nor the estate of the prisoner were subject
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. (Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Vasquez v. Raemisch, 480 F.Supp.2d 1120 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed under the in
forma pauperis statute in a proposed civil rights action for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief brought
against prison officials and corrections officers. The court held that the prisoner failed by state a First
Amendment claim by alleging that his legal mail was opened by prison officials three times outside his
presence, and that his legal mail was given to another prisoner with the same last name on one occasion,
where the prisoner did not suggest that any of the four instances he described prevented him from litigating a
case, and none of the mail at issue involved correspondence from his criminal defense lawyer. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Wesolowski v. Sullivan, 524 F.Supp.2d 251 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). An inmate in the custody of the New York
State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) brought a § 1983 action against DOCS employees alleging
his constitutional rights were violated while he was confined at a correctional facility when employees
confiscated fundraising materials. The employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion
requirement by never appealing the denial of a grievance filed with the Inmate Grievance Resolution
Committee (IGRC) to Central Office Review Committee (CORC). The court found that the confiscation of
materials describing how someone could conduct a political fundraising event to benefit Families Against
Mandatory Minimums (FAMM) did not violate the inmate's rights under the First Amendment, considering
the possibilities for abuse that would have arisen if inmates were freely allowed to engage in fundraising from
fellow inmates. According to the court, the restriction and regulation of such activities by prisoners was
unquestionably a legitimate penological interest, and it was uncontroverted that the inmate did not follow
established procedures for obtaining authorization to engage in such activities. The court noted that even
assuming the employees' actions in confiscating the materials violated the inmate's First Amendment rights,
the employees were entitled to qualified immunity, as no authority had clearly established the inmate's First
Amendment right to possess the materials in question at the time of events giving rise to lawsuit. (New York
State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
LEGAL RESEARCH

White v. Kautzky, 494 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2007). A pro se state prisoner sued the Director of the Iowa
Department of Corrections and warden of the prison where he was incarcerated under § 1983, claiming that
the policy of not allowing contract attorneys to do legal research for inmates in appropriate cases violated his
right to have access to the courts. The district court entered judgment for the prisoner and awarded nominal
damages. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and vacated, finding that the prisoner was not
actually injured by the policy, as required to establish a violation of his right to access to the courts. (Anamosa
State Penitentiary, Iowa)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION

Whitington v. Ortiz, 472 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging his
rights were violated by the denial of access to free hygiene items. The district court dismissed the action and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that the prison’s failure to timely respond to the prisoner’s Step
Three grievance regarding access to hygiene products established that the prisoner exhausted his available
administrative remedies, as required by PLRA. A Step 3 grievance requires the prison to respond within 45
days. 196 days after he filed his Step 3 grievance he still had not received a response and then filed suit. The
court held that the prisoner’s elaboration on the way the prison’s policies caused him to suffer dental
problems satisfied his obligation to state an injury to support his Eighth Amendment claim but did not equate
to a delay in dental treatment claim. The prisoner contended that he was unable to pay for hygiene items out
of his prison income after the prison debits his prison account to pay for restitution, medical care, legal
photocopies, and legal postage. (Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637 (3rd Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison's
unit manager, alleging he violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from an attack by another
prisoner. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner's procedural default should have been excused.
The court held that, although the prisoner procedurally defaulted his claim when he did not name the unit
manager in his initial grievance that asked to be moved from his cell because he feared he would be hurt by
his cellmate, the default should have been excused in his § 1983 action, because the unit manager responded
to the grievance and acknowledged conversations the prisoner had with staff regarding his transfer request,
but rejected the grievance as lacking merit. (Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon)
2008

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

XXII

Adams v. Bouchard, 591 F.Supp.2d 1191 (W.D.Okla. 2008). A jail inmate brought a § 1983 action against
sheriff's deputies and a sheriff, alleging the deputies assaulted him, used excessive force, and that the sheriff
failed to properly supervise the deputies. The defendants moved for summary judgment and qualified
immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate properly exhausted
administrative remedies prior to bringing the federal action. The court found that the inmate's efforts towards
exhausting his § 1983 excessive force claim against sheriff's deputies were insufficient to satisfy the
exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to his claim that the sheriff failed
to supervise the deputies. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material

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fact as to whether the force used by the sheriff's deputies against the inmate was necessary. According to the
court, the sheriff's deputies were not entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim because it was clearly established at the time of the alleged excessive force that prison
officials could not maliciously and sadistically inflict injury for the very purpose of causing harm. (Oklahoma
County Detention Center, Oklahoma)
U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL

Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
state corrections officials, alleging that the officials repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of
his presence in violation of his rights to access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the
officials’ motion for summary judgment and the officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner’s constitutional right of access to the courts requires
that incoming legal mail may be opened only in the inmate's presence and only to inspect for contraband.
According to the court, the inmate’s right to have properly marked incoming attorney mail opened only in his
presence was clearly established. The court found that the lack of showing of actual injury precluded
recovery on the right-of-access claim. The court held that the inmate had a free speech right to communicate
with his attorneys separate from his right of access to the courts and that the pattern and practice of opening
the prisoner's attorney mail outside his presence impinges on his freedom of speech. The court noted that
actual injury is not required for the prisoner to state a free speech claim arising from the opening of attorney
mail and that the First Amendment prohibition against opening the inmate's attorney mail outside his presence
was clearly established. (Georgia State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Antoine v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a civil
rights action against corrections officers based upon the officers' use of a “grating” restraint practice. After a
jury verdict in favor of the detainees, the officers moved for a new trial. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that it was proper to permit an expert witness to express his
opinions regarding the propriety of the “grating” practice in the context of whether the officers' decision to
employ that practice rather than the “prostraint” restraining chair was appropriate. The court found that the
compensatory damages instruction given in the detainee's civil rights action was in error since it permitted the
jury to believe that it could award an unlimited amount of non-compensatory damages to compensate the
plaintiff for the abstract “value” of his constitutional rights. According to the court, the use of the term
“constitutional injuries”--combined with the instruction allowing the jury to award nominal damages, and the
omission of the $1.00 limit--invited the jury to award an unlimited amount of damages based on the
importance of the plaintiff's constitutional rights in lieu of awarding compensatory damages. The jury
awarded the detainee $20,000 in compensatory damages as well as $25,000 in punitive damages against each
of four defendants, and $50,000 against one defendant. (Sacramento County, California)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
PHOTOCOPYING
POSTAGE

Atwell v. Lavan, 557 F.Supp.2d 532 (M.D.Pa. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
prison employees, probation and parole board members and medical personnel, alleging he was denied access
to courts in violation of the First Amendment. The district court held that the inmate’s allegation that he was
denied access to court because he was not provided with free photocopies and postage failed to state a claim
under the First Amendment. The court noted that the copying service at the prison was not tantamount to an
adequate law library, the inmate did not show he was actually injured in any of his cases with respect to not
having adequate copies, and the inmate could have filed handwritten copies of his documents. The court
found that the allegation that the inmate was denied access to the courts because he was denied access to
stored legal material failed to state a claim under the First Amendment. The court noted that the inmate was
allowed access to his stored materials in exchange for a like number of items from his cell, and prison staff did
not care which of the inmate's items were in his cell as long as he kept within the allowed limit of items. (State
Correctional Institution at Dallas, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Barnes v. Black, 544 F.3d 807 (7th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to order
a prison warden to have him transported to the district court where his personal injury suit was pending. The
district court denied the petition and denied the prisoner's request for a lawyer. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court dismissed the action. The court held that the district court's order denying the state prisoner's
request for a lawyer to represent him in his personal injury lawsuit and in his habeas petition were non-final
and therefore the appeals court did not have jurisdiction. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTENDANCE-COURT

Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3rd Cir. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 Eighth Amendment
action against corrections officers and a prison nurse, alleging the use of excessive force and failure to provide
needed medical treatment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants as to some claims,
and subsequently dismissed the remaining claims for failure to prosecute, following the inmate's failure to
appear at a final pretrial conference. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded, finding
that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that the inmate had refused to attend
the pretrial conference, its finding of prejudice from the inmate's failure to appear, and the finding of
willfulness or bad faith. The appeals court ruled that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the
action without affording the inmate the opportunity to be heard. The appeals court criticized the district court
for assuming the truth of prison officials' assertion that the prisoner had refused to attend the pretrial
conference, without hearing from the prisoner or seeking his explanation. (State Correctional Institution at
Camp Hill, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008). State inmates brought § 1983 suits against prison officials,
claiming that they had been beaten. The district court dismissed the complaints without prejudice. The
inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the district judge properly acted as a fact
finder in resolving, on motions to dismiss, a factual dispute as to whether an inmate had exhausted

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administrative remedies as required by PLRA. The court found that in dismissing a state inmate's § 1983 suit
for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the district court did not clearly err in finding that the inmate's
allegation that he was denied access to grievance forms at a prison was not credible, especially given the
unrebutted evidence that he successfully filed a grievance there, although it was one for property loss.
According to the court, a state inmate's untimely appeal of a warden's denial of his grievance did not satisfy
the PLRA exhaustion requirement for him to pursue a § 1983 claim. The court found that, despite an inmate's
contention that he failed to report an incident of prison abuse because he feared additional violent reprisals by
prison officials, the inmate failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by PLRA for him to
pursue a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the inmate was later transferred to another prison where the
threat of violence was removed and he could have filed an out-of-time grievance and then shown good cause
for its untimeliness. (Rogers State Prison, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
NOTARY

Carmon v. Duveal, 554 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.Conn. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
several prison officials, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. The court held that absent any
showing that he was actually injured by a prison counselor's refusal to notarize certain court documents, the
inmate was not deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts. According to the court, although the
counselor's refusal to notarize the papers was due to the inmate's failure to submit necessary documentation,
the inmate did not thereafter submit such documentation, he did not allege that the request for documentation
was improper, and he did not show how the lack of notarization hindered his efforts to pursue his legal
claims. The court found that the prolonged period of segregation might implicate a protected liberty interest.
(Cheshire Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cockcroft v. Kirkland, 548 F.Supp.2d 767 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging Eighth Amendment violations related to toilet and cleaning supply problems.
The district court dismissed the action in part. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified
immunity from claims that they refused to give the inmate adequate supplies and tools to sanitize his toilet in
response to a widespread backflushing toilet problem caused by a design defect, in which sewage would rise
up in the toilet of a cell when the toilet in an adjoining cell was flushed. According to the court, the officials'
conduct, as alleged, violated the prisoner's clearly established rights under the Eighth Amendment to a
minimum level of cleanliness and sanitation. The court found that the official was not entitled to qualified
immunity from the state prisoner's § 1983 claim that the official was deliberately indifferent to his safety. The
court held that the prisoner's § 1983 claim that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to his safety, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provision
that a prisoner may not bring an action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
prior showing of physical injury, even though the prisoner never suffered any physical injury as a result of the
official's alleged acts. The prisoner alleged that the official disclosed to three other inmates that they had been
placed on his enemy list at his request, and that this caused him to be considered an informant, which in turn
caused him to place nine more inmates on his enemy list. (Pelican Bay State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Cohen v. Corrections Corp. of America, 588 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a pro se § 1983
action, claiming that a private prison and corrections personnel failed to accommodate the practice of his
religion of Judaism by not providing kosher food. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The prisoner petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the decision, and remanded based on intervening law. On
remand, the prisoner filed a supplemental brief. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that PLRA
did not require exhaustion prior to filing complaint. The court noted that a new decision by the U.S. Supreme
Court held that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner is not required to specifically plead or
demonstrate exhaustion in his complaint. The Court further held that “exhaustion is not per se inadequate
simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievance.” The Supreme Court found that the
appeals court imposition of the prerequisite to properly exhaust a claim prior to filing a complaint was
“unwarranted.” (Corrections Corporation of America, Northeast Ohio Correctional Center.)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
PHOTOCOPYING
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Collins v. Goord, 581 F.Supp.2d 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against a
commissioner of a state corrections department and a correctional facility's superintendent, law library
administrator, and law library supervisors, asserting claims for denial of access to the courts, deprivation of
property without due process, and retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by factual issues on the inmate's claim alleging denial of his right
of access to the courts. The court found that there was no evidence that the administrator or a second
supervisor received or denied the inmate's requests for photocopying, as required to establish a claim against
them for denial of the inmate's right of access to the courts. The court found that factual issues existed as to
whether denial of the inmate's request for an advance for the purchase of photocopying frustrated his pursuit
of a non-frivolous legal claim in his state-court litigation. According to the court, material issues of fact existed
as to whether the law library supervisor acted deliberately and maliciously in denying the inmate's requests for
an advance for the purchase of photocopying to make copies of an order to show cause that he was to serve in
connection with state-court litigation, after the inmate established that the copies were required by the court
and that the documents could not be replicated in longhand. The court also found fact issues as to whether a
supervisor acted as a decision-maker with respect to the inmate's request for an advance. (Fishkill Correctional
Facility, New York)
Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a
class action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment. After the court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered
into private mediation and reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a class fund

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEE

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award of $25,648,204. The inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held
that class counsel were entitled to an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund plus
costs. The court noted that counsel obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary results in a complex and
risky case involving 150,000 class members, 20,000 claims, and five certified classes, each of which
presented unsettled legal issues. According to the court, tens or hundreds of thousands of future inmates
benefited from policy changes brought about by the suit, and the attorneys were highly experienced and
highly regarded civil rights lawyers with extensive class action experience. (San Bernardino County Jail,
California)
U.S. District Court
RESTRAINTS
SEARCHES
TRANSPORTATION

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois
Department of Human Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was
housed, as well as two former DHS Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the
conditions of his confinement violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due
process. After a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the practice of searching the detainee prior to his
visits with guests and attorneys violated his substantive due process rights; (2) the practice of using a “blackbox” restraint system on all of the detainee's trips to and from court over a 15-month period violated his
substantive due process rights; (3) requiring the detainee to sleep in a room illuminated by a night light did
not violate the detainee's substantive due process rights; (4) a former director was not protected by qualified
immunity from liability for the constitutional violations; and (5) the detainee would be awarded compensatory
damages in the amount of $30 for each hour he wore the black box in violation of his rights. The court found
that a 21-day lockdown following an attempt at organized resistance by a large number of detainees at the
facility, shortly after the breakout of several incidents of violence, was not outside the bounds of professional
judgment for the purposes of a substantive due process claim asserted by the detainee. The court noted that
strip searches of a detainee prior to his court appearances and upon his return to the institution did not violate
substantive due process, where detainees were far more likely to engage in successful escapes if they could
carry concealed items during their travel to court, and searches upon their return were closely connected with
the goal of keeping contraband out of the facility. The court held that the practice of conducting strip searches
of the detainee prior to his visits with guests and attorneys was not within the bounds of professional
judgment, and thus, violated the detainee's substantive due process rights, where the only motivation for such
searches appeared to be a concern that a detainee would bring a weapon into the meeting, and most weapons
should have been detectable through a pat-down search. (Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Decker v. Dunbar, 633 F.Supp.2d 317 (E.D.Tex. 2008). Affirmed 358 Fed.Appx. 509. An inmate filed a pro
se § 1983 action against prison officials, asserting Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, among other
constitutional claims. The officials moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The court held that the inmate failed to demonstrate that his alleged lack of access to the prison's law library
resulted in dismissal of his multiple previously filed criminal appeals and civil cases, and thus the inmate
failed to establish an actual injury, as required to prevail on the claim that he was denied access to court.
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dolberry v. Levine, 567 F.Supp.2d 413 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials asserting his constitutional rights were violated in a number of ways. Both parties moved for
summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The
court held that denial of showers and cleaning supplies for several weeks did not give rise to a violation under
the Eighth Amendment. The court found that a skin rash suffered by the prisoner, allegedly due to the lack of
showers, was a de minimis injury insufficient to satisfy the “physical injury” requirement for a prisoner
bringing a civil action for a mental or emotional injury under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).
(Wyoming Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans With
Disabilities Act
TELEPHONE

Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.La. 2008). A deaf prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
violation of his equal protection rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth
Amendment as the result of his limited access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) device for phone calls, lack of
access to closed captioning for television, and verbal abuse from officers. The district court dismissed the
action. The court held that the prisoner’s civil rights claims arising from denial of full access to a telephone
typewriter (TTY) and denial of closed captioning on a television in a parish prison accrued each time he was
denied access to a TTY or captioning or was threatened or assaulted for requesting access. The court found
that the differential treatment permitting other inmates unlimited telephone access, while permitting the deaf
inmate only limited access, did not violate the deaf inmate's equal protection rights where the deaf inmate,
who required the use of telephone typewriter (TTY) device for the deaf in a separate office, failed to show that
limited access burdened a fundamental right. The court found that the deaf prisoner was not similarly situated
to hearing inmates who could use inmate telephones, as required to support an equal protection claim based
on failure to afford him the same access that hearing inmates received to the phone system. The court
concluded that the limited access provided to the deaf prisoner was rationally related to legitimate security
interests of the prison, where a deputy was required to escort the prisoner outside his housing area each time
the prisoner used the phone, precluding the claim that he was denied equal protection based on the greater
phone privileges afforded to hearing inmates who had access to phones in the housing tier. The court held that
failure to provide a telephone typewriter (TTY) device on the deaf prisoner's housing tier, while providing
unlimited access to phones to other prisoners, did not discriminate against the disabled inmate in violation of
Title II of the ADA. According to the court, allowing the prisoner twice daily use of a TTY device on a prison
facility phone outside the housing tier was meaningful access, and lack of a TTY in the housing tier affected
disabled persons in general, precluding a finding of specific discrimination against the inmate in particular.
The court held that alleged verbal abuse from correctional officers when the deaf prisoner complained about

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the lack of a telephone typewriter (TTY) was too trivial to rise to the level of a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The district court dismissed the
complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the district court had the authority under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to
dismiss without prejudice the prisoner's § 1983 complaint against prison officials requesting damages for
emotional injury, where the complaint disclosed that the prisoner was requesting damages for emotional injury
without a prior showing of a physical injury. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that his family had
informed a prison supervisor of ongoing misconduct by the supervisor's subordinates, and that the supervisor
failed to stop the misconduct, supported the prisoner's § 1983 claim of retaliation against the supervisor.
According to the court, the allegations allowed a reasonable inference that the supervisor knew that the
subordinates would continue to engage in the unconstitutional misconduct but failed to stop them from doing
so. (Bay Correctional Facility, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate sued prison officials, alleging that they violated
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), as well as his free exercise and equal
protection rights, by enforcing a grooming policy and denying him Kosher meals. The district court entered
judgment for the inmate with respect to the Kosher meals, but entered judgment for the prison officials with
respect to the grooming policy. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court noted that the
district court's finding that the corrections department director's expert testimony that male inmates presented
greater security risks than female inmates was credible, and was not clearly erroneous. (East Arkansas
Regional Unit of the Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against jail officials and the county claiming, among other things, that the county's policy or custom regarding
the provision of medical care at the jail on weekends reflected deliberate indifference to her medical needs and
caused injuries resulting from a fall from the top bunk in her cell when she had a seizure. After a jury found
against the county, the district court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The county
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to find a
direct causal link between county's policy of permitting jail officials to “contact” medical staff simply by
leaving a medical form in the nurse's inbox, even though a nurse might not see the notice for 48 hours, and the
alleged denial of the inmate's right to adequate medical care, allegedly leading to the inmate suffering a seizure
and falling from a top bunk. According to the court, the deposition testimony of a doctor provided a basis for
finding that the inmate would not have suffered a seizure had she been given medication within a few hours of
her arrival at the jail. The inmate, a self-described recovering alcoholic who also suffers from epilepsy, was
arrested on a probation violation and taken to the jail. That afternoon, she had a seizure, fell from the top
bunk of a bed in her cell, and sustained significant injuries to her right hip and right clavicle. Her case
proceeded to trial and the jury found that none of the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious
medical needs, but determined that the county's policy regarding weekend medical care exhibited deliberate
indifference to, and was the proximate cause of, her injuries. The jury awarded her $214,000 in damages.
(Grand Traverse County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
LEGAL MATERIAL

Frazier v. Diguglielmo, 640 F.Supp.2d 593 (E.D.Pa. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against several
prison officers and supervisors, alleging that the defendants violated his rights by interfering with his mail and
seizing legal materials from his cell. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner's bare allegation, that
prison officials' seizure of a writ of coram nobis “obstructed” his right to “petition the government for redress
of grievances,” was insufficient to allege the infringement of an exercise of a First Amendment right of access
to the courts to secure judicial relief, as required to state a claim for violation of the right of access. The court
noted that the prisoner did not describe the contents of the writ or the judgment he sought to challenge, nor
did the prisoner allege or even allude to any prejudice in any legal action caused by the writ's confiscation.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that prison officials seized legal documents relating to his
criminal and habeas cases was insufficient to state a claim for violation of First Amendment right of access to
the courts, absent an allegation that the alleged seizure caused him prejudice in a legal challenge to his
conviction or to his conditions of confinement. (State Correctional Institution at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the
director of a state Department of Corrections challenging the constitutionality of the statutory exclusion of
prisoners from making requests for public records under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA).
The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
allegations were insufficient to state a claim for facial violation of the equal protection clause and were
insufficient to state a claim for an “as-applied” violation of the equal protection clause. According to the court,
denial of the prisoner's request for records did not violate his right to access the courts. (Red Onion State
Prison, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought §§ 1981 and
1983 actions against prison officials, alleging violations of his right to due process, right to equal protection,
and Eighth Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the prisoner had no due process liberty interest
in freedom from use of four-point restraints or in having a prison nurse arrive before corrections officers
placed the prisoner in the restraints. The court found that the prisoner's Eighth Amendment § 1983 claims for

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excessive force and equal protection race discrimination could not be dismissed under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) at the screening stage for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. According to the
court, if a prisoner's complaint contains claims that are administratively exhausted and claims that are not
exhausted, the district court should proceed with the exhausted claims while dismissing the claims that are not
exhausted and should not dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (Kentucky State Penitentiary)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Hannah v. U.S., 523 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner filed a pro se complaint under the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States and others involved in the medical treatment that he
received while suffering from Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureas (MRSA), a sinus infection. After
the prisoner's untimely motion for appointment of an expert witness was denied, the United States moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the lawsuit. The prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
appoint an expert witness, and that under Texas law, the prisoner was required to present expert testimony to
establish the applicable standard of care with respect to the treatment of MRSA and to show how the care he
received breached that standard. According to the court, his failure to designate or hire an expert to testify on
his behalf entitled the United States to judgment as a matter of law. (Federal Medical Center, Fort Worth,
Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
JAIL HOUSE LAWYERS
LEGAL MATERIAL
RETALIATION
TRANSFER

Hannon v. Beard, 524 F.3d 275 (1st Cir. 2008). A prisoner who was formerly incarcerated in Pennsylvania
and transferred to Massachusetts brought an action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, alleging that he was transferred out-of-state in retaliation for prior lawsuits. The previous
lawsuits were against a Pennsylvania prison librarian, who allegedly denied his requests for legal materials,
and against numerous Massachusetts prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings
regarding the Secretary of the Department of Corrections. The court held that the conduct by the Secretary of
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, in authorizing, directing, and arranging the Pennsylvania
prisoner's transfer from a Pennsylvania prison to a Massachusetts prison, pursuant to an Interstate Corrections
Compact, was sufficient to constitute the “transaction of business” in Massachusetts, as would support the
exercise of personal jurisdiction by the district court. The court found that the prison librarian's conduct in
responding to requests for legal materials by the prisoner incarcerated in Massachusetts was insufficient to
constitute the “transaction of business” in Massachusetts, within the meaning of the Massachusetts long-arm
statute. The court noted that the prisoner “…has been the quintessential ‘jailhouse lawyer,’ pursuing postconviction relief and filing numerous grievances and lawsuits on behalf of himself and other prisoners
challenging their conditions of confinement.” The prisoner estimated that he had represented “thousands” of
his fellow inmates in proceedings. He alleged that the Pennsylvania DOC grew tired of his lawsuits and
agitation and, in order to prevent him from filing more lawsuits and in retaliation for the actions he had
already taken, began a strategy of transferring him to out-of-state prisons. (Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, Massachusetts Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
RETALIATION

Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging denial of access to courts and retaliatory discipline. The district court dismissed his access to
courts claim and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the retaliation claim. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that some evidence supported the disciplinary actions
taken against the prisoner and thus he failed to establish a § 1983 retaliatory discipline claim. The court noted
that a corrections officer filed reports of disciplinary violations against the prisoner for disruptive conduct,
verbal abuse, and making threats. An independent hearing officer found the prisoner guilty of the violations.
The court found that the prisoner failed to establish an actual injury necessary for an access to courts claim.
The prisoner alleged that officials intentionally denied him access to law books in the prison library and
adequate legal assistance from a prison attorney. The court noted that the prisoner only roughly and generally
alleged that he was prevented from filing. The prisoner alleged that he did not know what arguments to make
not that he was actually prevented from filing a complaint or that a filed complaint was dismissed for lack of
legal adequacy. The court found the prisoner’s claim that any complaint he would have filed would have been
insufficient was speculative. (Iowa State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2008). A prisoner brought an action against federal prison
employees and the federal government, alleging negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and
constitutional claims pursuant to Bivens. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that a Physician's
Assistant (PA) in the prison did not act with deliberate indifference toward the prisoner in response to an
alleged back injury suffered by the prisoner after being escorted out of his cell for a strip search. According to
the court, the PA saw the prisoner shortly after his alleged injuries and ordered an x-ray, personally observed
the prisoner's condition and took into consideration prior x-rays of his spine, and afforded some of the pain
treatment that the prisoner demanded. The court found that the district court's decision not to recruit counsel
for the prisoner was reasonable, and thus not an abuse of discretion. The court noted that the case was not
overly difficult, the prisoner's submissions were coherent and organized as were his requests for documents
and interrogatories, the prisoner was able to testify about his own injuries and he successfully secured medical
records that were not overly complex, and the prisoner was able to take direct testimony from several
witnesses and conducted cross-examination. (United States Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jacobs v. Wilkinson, 529 F.Supp.2d 804 (N.D.Ohio 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 suit, claiming
constitutional violations arising from prison officials' forcing him to shave his beard in contravention of his
religious beliefs. The inmate also alleged denial of proper medical work restrictions. The district court
dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform

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Act (PLRA). The inmate moved to reopen, and to consolidate his complaint and the court's prior screening
order. The court held that a Supreme Court decision holding that courts should not dismiss prisoner
complaints under the PLRA in their entirety when the prisoner presents both exhausted and unexhausted
claims did not apply retroactively to the inmate's case. (Mansfield Correctional Institution, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jensen v. Knowles, 621 F.Supp.2d 921 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials, claiming deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly denying the
prisoner a medically necessary diabetic diet and forcing him to reside in a cell with a prisoner who smoked,
and deprivation of his First Amendment rights by the alleged confiscation of the prisoner's Bible and Christian
doctrine books. The district dismissed the action on the grounds that the prisoner was not entitled to in forma
pauperis (IFP) status, under the three strikes rule. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the
defendants moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved to re-serve a correctional officer. The district court
granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and granted the plaintiff’s motion. The court held
that the prisoner's claim that he was deprived of his First Amendment rights due to the confiscation of his
Bibles and Christian doctrine books by prison officials was precluded on exhaustion grounds, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though the prisoner exhausted his claim, where the prisoner filed
suit two days before the prison grievance process itself was exhausted. The court found that the prisoner's
claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated, due to exposure to second-hand smoke by his forced
housing with a prisoner who smoked and due to prison officials' failure to issue a medical order prohibiting
his housing with a smoker, satisfied the exhaustion requirements by completing the grievance process, as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of District of Columbia, 584 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2008). Female former arrestees
filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court
of District of Columbia, under § 1983, claiming violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The arrestees
alleged that the marshal strip searched all females awaiting presentment to a superior court judge, without
reasonable and particularized suspicion that any female was carrying contraband on her person and without
strip searching any male arrestees. The District of Columbia moved for summary judgment and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that the former United States Marshal for the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia was a federal official who was not amenable to suit, under § 1983, as an employee,
servant, agent, or actor under the control of the District of Columbia, precluding the female former arrestees'
class action. The court noted that the marshal was empowered to act under the color of the federal Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, and a District of Columbia law provided that the marshal acted under the supervision of the
United States Attorney General. According to the court, the District of Columbia lacked authority to control
the conduct of the former United States Marshal, precluding the female former arrestees' class action under §
1983. The arrestees were held for presentment for an offense that did not involve drugs or violence, but they
were subjected to a blanket policy of a strip, visual body cavity search and/or squat search without any
individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that they were concealing drugs, weapons or
other contraband. (District of Columbia, Superior Court Cellblock)

U.S. District Court
PHOTOCOPIES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
POSTAGE

Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a state court § 1983
action against the director of a state's department of corrections, alleging improper debiting of his trust
account to pay for legal copies and postage, improper classification, improper conditions of confinement, and
denial of rehabilitative opportunities. The director removed the action to federal court. The district court
granted summary judgment for the director and remanded. The court held that the inmate's written requests to
prison staff, and correspondence addressing issues of prison conditions, did not satisfy the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative exhaustion requirement, so as to permit the inmate's § 1983 action
involving the same prison conditions to go forward. According to the court, the inmate's filing of grievances,
after commencing the § 1983 action, could not satisfy the PLRA administrative exhaustion requirement with
respect to claims made in the § 1983 suit. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

Johnston v. Maha, 584 F.Supp.2d 612 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought an action against
employees of a county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under § 1983 and violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the purposes
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) as to some of his § 1983 and Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) claims against employees of the county jail, where the inmate either did not pursue appeals at all, or
did not pursue appeals to the final step. The court held that evidence was insufficient to show that medical
staff at the county jail acted with deliberate indifferent to the inmate's medical needs as to requested dental
care, as required to support his § 1983 claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that
although the inmate had to wait two months to see a dentist, the dentist filled the inmate's cavities and took xrays related to that treatment. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MATERIAL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Jones v. Lexington County Detention Center, 586 F.Supp.2d 444 (D.S.C. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought
a pro se civil rights action against a county detention center and sheriff, alleging his inability to have access to
legal research materials violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held
that the detainee did not have a constitutional right of access to a law library while being temporarily held in a
county detention facility awaiting trial on criminal charges, where the detainee did not allege that he had been
incarcerated for too long and was not pursuing any speedy trial claims. The court noted that a state is only
required to provide criminal defendants legal counsel, not legal research materials. According to the court, the
detainee's lack of access to a law library while being temporarily held in a county detention facility was not an
“actual injury,” as required to confer standing for the detainee to allege a deprivation of a constitutional right
of access to the courts. (Lexington County Detention Center, South Carolina)

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U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Laurence v. Wall, 551 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2008). A pro se inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
employees. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to effect timely service of process. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the inmate showed good cause
for failure to timely serve the defendants, where the trial court failed to direct the United States Marshal to
serve process for the inmate. (Adult Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)

U.S. District Court
TELECONFERENCE

Lunsford v. RBC Dain Rauscher, Inc., 590 F.Supp.2d 1153 (D.Minn. 2008). Prisoners brought a pro se suit
against a securities clearing house, brokerage firm, and brokerage firm employees, alleging a civil rights
conspiracy, due process, contract, and securities law violations in closing of their brokerage accounts.
Following arbitration of some prisoners' common law and securities law claims, the prisoners moved to vacate
the award. The defendants moved to confirm the award and to dismiss the remaining claims. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that requiring the prisoners to testify
telephonically did not merit vacation of the award. The court noted that prisoners were not a protected class
and had no fundamental right to maintain securities brokerage accounts with private entities, as required to
support claims for a Fifth Amendment due process violation, civil rights conspiracy, and neglect to prevent
civil rights conspiracy. (RBC Dain Correspondent Services, Nations Financial Group, Inc., Federal Corr’l
Institute, Edgeville, South Carolina)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

May v. Rich, 531 F.Supp.2d 998 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought suit against a prison employee,
alleging civil rights claims for denial of access to the courts and retaliation for filing grievances and litigation.
Following a jury trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the prisoner, awarding $2,388. The prison
employee moved for judgment as matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted
the motion, entering a judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. The court held that the prisoner did not
suffer an actual injury, as required for a denial of access claim. The court found that the employee did not
retaliate against the prisoner by filing a disciplinary report based on his possession of prison contraband. The
court noted that the employee had an absolute duty to file a disciplinary report against the prisoner for
possession of carbon paper, which was contraband in the prison system, such that reporting the prisoner
could not be deemed retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of First Amendment rights in filing civil rights suits.
(Pontiac Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Mayfield v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 529 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner, who practiced the
Odinist/Asatru faith, brought claims pursuant to § 1983 against a state criminal justice department and prison
officials, alleging First Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, and appeal was taken. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the claims brought by the prisoner pursuant to the § 1983 action alleging First
Amendment violations and pursuant to RLUIPA seeking declaratory relief as well as a permanent injunction
against prison officials in their official capacity were not barred by sovereign immunity. The court found that
the prisoner's claims for compensatory damages against prison officials in their official capacity on claims
brought pursuant to § 1983 alleging First Amendment violations and RLUIPA violations were barred by the
provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prohibiting actions for mental or emotional injury
suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
Hughes Unit)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

McNair v. Allen, 515 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2008). A death row inmate moved for a stay of his execution, on
the theory that the method of execution to which he was subject, death by lethal injection, violated his right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted the motion to allow the inmate to
litigate his § 1983 claims and the defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated. The court held that the
two-year statute of limitations on the § 1983 claim brought by the inmate began to run when the inmate
became subject to the new execution protocol, not at the time of the inmate's execution or on the date that a
federal habeas review was completed. (Holman Correctional Facility, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2008). A paraplegic state inmate, a frequent litigant as a plaintiff
in the federal courts in Georgia, brought a pro se § 1983 action against the Commissioner of the Department
of Correction and various Department officials, asserting violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court
dismissed the complaint without prejudice as frivolous and enjoined the inmate from submitting further filings
with the court, except in limited circumstances, without first paying the unpaid filing fees that he had accrued.
The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that
the injunction against the inmate, which, with three narrow exceptions, prohibited him from filing any new
papers with the court under the “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) until he
paid all accrued filing fees, was overbroad and exceeded the bounds of judicial discretion. The three
exceptions allowed the inmate to file new papers in response to criminal cases brought against him, to request
reconsideration, and to plead that he had been denied access to state court. The court noted that the inmate
had filed several suits alleging similar core facts, but held that a narrower injunction could have targeted the
filings arising from transactions already raised and litigated in earlier cases. The court found that the alleged
similarity between the allegations in the plaintiff's current complaint and those presented in his earlier lawsuits
did not provide grounds for dismissal of the complaint. (Georgia Department of Correction, Augusta State
Medical Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
LEGAL MATERIAL

Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2008). Prisoners brought a § 1983 action against various prison
employees alleging their constitutional rights were violated when legal materials were confiscated. The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and their motion for summary judgment. The prisoners
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoners failed to state a claim for denial of

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right of access to courts. The court held that the prisoners, claiming that prison officials confiscated all of their
legal materials including legal briefs and reference books, failed to state a claim for denial of right of access to
courts, absent specific facts demonstrating that underlying claims were non-frivolous or that underlying
claims could no longer be pursued as a result of the officials' actions. (State Correctional Institute at
Graterford, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
TYPEWRITER

Nevada Dept of Corrections v. Cohen, 581 F.Supp.2d 1085 (D.Nev. 2008).The Nevada Department of
Corrections (DOC) brought an action against inmates, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on the
personal possession of typewriters by inmates was constitutional. The DOC moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the ban: (1) was reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests; (2) did not infringe upon inmates' right of access to courts; (3) reasonably advanced
legitimate correctional goals; and (4) was not an unconstitutional “taking” where the prison regulated property
that prisoners could legitimately possess while incarcerated and offered options to dispose of the property, and
prisoners were not deprived of all economically beneficial use of typewriters. The court noted that prison
officials had determined that possession of typewriters aided the ability of inmates to breach safety and
security due to the potential use of typewriter parts as weapons. According to the court, since inmates were
not required to file typewritten documents with courts, there was no evidence of actual injury or that the ban
would foreclose any meaningful opportunities for inmates to pursue arguable claims. (Nevada Department of
Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Petaway v. City of New Haven Police Dept., 541 F.Supp.2d 504 (D.Conn. 2008). An arrestee brought a §
1983 action against a city, its police department, and individual officers, alleging that his constitutional rights
were violated when he was not arraigned within the time prescribed under state law. The court held that the
municipal police department was not subject to suit pursuant to § 1983 and that the arrestee was not falsely
imprisoned during the 29-day period between his arrest and arraignment. According to the court, the
Connecticut arraignment statute did not give rise to a due process liberty interest. The court noted that the
arrestee was lawfully in the custody of the Department of Corrections pursuant to a remand to custody order
for a separate parole violation during the 29 days prior to his arraignment. (New Haven Police Department,
New Haven Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
SLEEP
LAW BOOKS
JAILHOUSE LAWYERS

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions,
the district court rejected the detainees' claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading materials,
mattresses and beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, dayroom access (not less than two hours
each day), telephone access and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to correct current
ongoing violations of the pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. Inmates had alleged that they were denied the
opportunity for eight hours of uninterrupted sleep on the night before and the night after each court
appearance. The court affirmed termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court
erred in its finding that two orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Piggie v. Riggle, 548 F.Supp.2d 652 (N.D.Ind. 2008). A prisoner brought a pro se action against a prison
official, alleging that she transferred him to another facility because he filed grievances and lawsuits against
prison staff. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether: the official was personally involved in the transfer; the
asserted reasons for the transfer were pretextual; and the prisoner exhausted remedies under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Miami Correctional Facility, Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Rollins v. Magnusson, 542 F.Supp.2d 114 (D.Me. 2008). An inmate sued multiple defendants, alleging they
were responsible for the confiscation of his legal briefs and research notes stored on prison-owned hard drives
and back-up diskettes, in violation of his right of access to the courts. The district court held that the alleged
confiscation did not impede his ability to litigate his appeal to such an extent that it impacted the outcome of
the appeal, as required for an “actual injury” supporting his claim that he was denied his right of access to the
courts. The court noted that his complaint was that he was having difficulty complying with deadlines because
of impaired vision/medical conditions, and while he may not have had as much access to his legal materials as
he wanted in the form he wanted, he was able to see his appeal through and obtain a ruling on the merits.
(Maine State Prison)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Shell v. Brun, 585 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging various
constitutional violations. Following the dismissal of certain claims, the defendants moved for summary
judgment on access to courts and failure-to-protect claims. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that there was no evidence that a prison superintendent knew of the inmate's alleged problems with the
law library that allegedly caused him difficulties in prosecuting a proceeding challenging a disciplinary report.
According to the court, there was no evidence that any limitations on prison law library hours and book
withdrawals were unreasonable, made it more difficult for the inmate to prosecute a state administrative
proceeding challenging a misbehavior report, or that the outcome of the inmate's administrative proceeding
would have been different but for those policies. The court noted that prison officials may place reasonable
restrictions on inmates' use of facility law libraries, as long as those restrictions do not interfere with inmates'
access to the courts. (Attica Corr’l Facility, New York)

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U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
TELEPHONE

Sherbrooke v. City of Pelican Rapids, 513 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2008). An arrestee sued a city and its police
officers alleging that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when officers recorded one side of his
conversation with his attorney. The district court entered summary judgment for the arrestee and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the recording of the conversation
with the attorney did not constitute a search. The court found that the police officers' recording of one side of
the suspect's conversation with his attorney, pursuant to a standard operating procedure of recording detainees
who were awaiting a blood alcohol content breath test, did not constitute a search inasmuch as the suspect
could not reasonably expect that the conversation was private. The court noted that officers were present
when the call was made in an open room at the police station and the suspect acknowledged that the recording
was “fine” with him. (City of Pelican Rapids, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
LEGAL MAIL
LEGAL MATERIAL

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights. The detainee
alleged that his mail was opened and returned to him, thereby impeding his ability to communicate with his
attorney, that his placement in close custody limited his ability to access legal materials, and that his
placement in segregation barred him from contacting his attorney and potential witnesses. The district court
dismissed in part. The court held that the inmate did not state a First Amendment claim for deprivation of
access to courts, absent an allegation of actual injury in connection with his challenge to his conviction or
sentence. (Vermont Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Silas v. City of New York, 536 F.Supp.2d 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate sued a city and a city correctional
officer for violations of § 1983 in connection with a claim for the use of excessive force. The defendants
moved to enforce the terms of an oral settlement agreement, settling the matter for $1,500, that was made
during a court proceeding at which the plaintiff participated by telephone. The court held that the oral
agreement, made on the telephone by the inmate, was not made “in open court,” as required under New York
law to be enforceable. According to the court, the proceeding was entirely informal, and there was neither a
transcription nor any other form of contemporaneous documentation of the terms of the agreement. (Marcy
Correctional Facility, New York City Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRO SE LITIGATION
VIDEO COMMUNICATION

Solis v. County of Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought civil rights claims
against a prison guard and others alleging that the guard was deliberately indifferent to his rights in failing to
prevent an attack by other inmates. The district court entered summary judgment on some claims for the
defendants and judgment for the prison guard following a bench trial on the remaining claims. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the pro se prisoner was not given fair
notice of the requirements of responding to, or consequences of losing on, a summary judgment motion and
thus the entry of summary judgment against him was a reversible error. According to the court, the prisoner
did not, by participating in the district court's bench trial by videotape depositions, which was conducted
without the parties' presence, consent to the erroneous withdrawal of his prior jury demand. The court found
that the erroneous denial of the prisoner's right to a jury trial was not harmless, where a reasonable jury could
have found the prisoner's version of events more credible than the guard's and determined that the guard acted
with deliberate indifference in failing to protect the prisoner from an attack by other inmates. (Los Angeles
County, California)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
CIVIL SUITS
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought two actions against jail
personnel alleging a number of constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court noted that the detainee “…is a white supremacist. He is also a prolific pro se litigator
who makes a habit of suing jail and prison officials when he is charged with a crime. Those facts are central to
understanding these related civil cases.” The court held that the detainee's alleged belief in the Church of the
Creator and “White Man's Bible” was not protected and the jail had valid reasons for denying the detainee's
alleged religious dietary requests. The court found that the detainee was not denied his right of access to the
courts, notwithstanding his placement in segregation, where the detainee had been offered, and either
accepted or declined, counsel in both underlying criminal prosecutions. The court noted that the detainee was
provided with legal assistance and law library access, and the detainee was not substantially impeded
regarding his legal matters whether he was in segregation or otherwise. According to the court, the detainee
had no right to assistance from jail officials regarding his general civil litigation activities. The court held that
a charge of $65 to the detainee's account by county jail officials, as discipline for ripping pages from or
otherwise defacing several law books, did not violate due process, as the disciplinary procedures the detainee
underwent provided him with all the process he was due and because he had additional remedies in state court
if such procedures were insufficient. (Douglas County Correctional Center, Nebraska)
Tafari v. Hues, 539 F.Supp.2d 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging mistreatment. The district court revoked the inmate's in forma pauperis (IFP)
status pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and subsequently dismissed for failure to pay a
filing fee. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded and the defendants moved for
revocation of the inmate's IFP status. The district court denied the revocation motion, finding that partial
dismissal of the inmate's complaint in a prior action was not a strike under the three-strikes rule. (Eastern
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
FILING FEES
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans With
Disabilities Act

XXII

Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008). Deaf and mute arrestees and their deaf mother sued a city
and county, alleging that denial of an interpreter or other reasonable accommodations during criminal
proceedings violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the county's
motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
county's use of the deaf mother's services as an interpreter during her deaf sons' dispositional hearing on
criminal charges did not violate Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services. The

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court noted that the mother voluntarily served as the interpreter and that her service was requested in light of
her sign language skills, not for any discriminatory purpose. The court found that the deaf and mute arrestees
were not denied a “service, program, or activity” when the city failed to provide an interpreter during a
domestic disturbance call which resulted in their arrest, and the city thus was not liable under ADA's Title II.
According to the court, the arrests were made not because the arrestees were disabled, but because the
arrestees assaulted police officers, individual citizens, or attempted to interfere with a lawful arrest. The court
concluded that the arresting officers were able to effectively communicate with the arrestees. The court held
that the county did not violate Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services, by using
relay operators to allow the deaf arrestees to communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with
a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Jailers assisted the arrestees in making their requested phone call by
utilizing relay operators, the phone call lasted nearly forty-five minutes, and the Department of Justice (DOJ)
provisions did not mandate the presence of a TTY telephone. (City of Savannah Police Department , Hardin
County Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Turner v. Burnside, 541 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against various
officials and employees of the Georgia Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that he was subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment and deliberately indifferent medical care. The district court dismissed the
action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the prisoner
was not required to file an additional grievance or seek leave to file an emergency or out-of-time grievance.
The court found that a prison official's serious threats of substantial retaliation against the prisoner for lodging
a grievance could make the administrative remedy “unavailable” for the purpose of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion requirement, and the administrative remedy of filing an appeal would be
unavailable. (Men's State Prison, Hardwick, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

U.S. v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2008). After a federal prisoner’s conviction for second-degree
murder and kidnapping resulting in death were affirmed, he moved for post conviction relief. The district
court dismissed the motion and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court
held that confiscation of the prisoner's legal materials constituted extraordinary circumstances, where the
prisoner exercised requisite due diligence by requesting the materials after they were seized. According to the
court, confiscation of the prisoner's legal materials upon his entry into disciplinary segregation, just six weeks
before the expiration of the limitations period on his post conviction relief claim, and the holding of such
materials until two weeks after the limitations period expired, constituted extraordinary circumstances for the
purposes of equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period on the prisoner's post conviction relief petition.
(New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Novak, 531 F.3d 99 (1st Cir. 2008). In an attorney's prosecution for endeavoring to obstruct justice and
two counts of money laundering, he moved to suppress intercepted telephone calls with a prospective client,
made while that client was in pretrial detention. The district court granted the motion, and the government
appealed. The appeals court reversed. The court held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated by the jail's
monitoring of the detainee's telephone calls to his attorney. According to the court, a telephone call can be
monitored and recorded without violating the Fourth Amendment so long as one participant in the call
consents to the monitoring. By placing the calls after being informed that they would be monitored and
recorded, the detainee consented to such monitoring. The court decision begins by stating that “…the
government in this case brings an extraordinary appeal: It asks us to reverse a district court ruling barring
from evidence recordings of phone calls made between an attorney and his client. These calls were recorded in
clear violation of state and federal regulations.” The court noted that the attorney had not raised a Sixth
Amendment challenge, and for Fourth Amendment purposes, his client consented to the monitoring of his
calls. The court held that “On these narrow facts, we reverse the determination of the district court that the
calls must be excluded.” (Barnstable County Jail, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Verdin-Garcia, 516 F.3d 884 (10th Cir. 2008). A defendant was convicted in district court of multiple
crimes related to drug trafficking conspiracy and he appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the defendant's consent to the recording of his prison phone calls could be implied from his decision to use the
prison telephone and therefore the voice exemplars used from prison recordings were admissible in trial. The
court noted that a prison employee testified that prominent signs next to the telephones proclaimed “all calls
may be recorded/monitored,” in both English and Spanish. The defendant underwent orientation at the prison
and received a handbook in his choice of English or Spanish which stated that all calls may be monitored.
When the defendant made phone calls, a recorded message prompted him to select English or Spanish and
then informed him in the language of his choice that all calls were subject to being monitored and recorded.
(Correctional Corp. of America (CCA), Leavenworth, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
VIDEO COMMUNICATION

Wilkins v. Timmerman-Cooper, 512 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2008). An offender convicted in state court of rape
filed a habeas petition challenging his parole revocation. The district court dismissed the petition and the
offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state court's determination that the use
of videoconferencing technology for witness testimony at the parole revocation hearing did not violate the
offender’s right to confront witnesses and did not violate due process. The court found that the determination- that the use of videoconferencing was sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the parolee to observe
and confront witnesses-- was not an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court noted that relevant
Supreme Court decisions recognized that parolees had fewer rights in parole revocation hearings than in
criminal trials and provided that conventional substitutes for live testimony were permitted at revocation
hearings. The court noted that videoconferencing provided the parolee with the ability to observe and respond
to the testimony of an accuser. The court commented that a videotape of the parole revocation hearing
demonstrated that the parolee and counsel observed, heard and questioned in real time the witnesses who

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testified via videoconferencing. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Southern Ohio
Correctional Facility)
2009
U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY
RETALIATION

Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials. The district court awarded summary judgment for the officials, and the prisoner appealed pro se. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the discipline imposed on the inmate for his alleged
misrepresentations about a prison official in an officer kite form, in stating that the officer insisted that the
inmate write his legal documents by hand, was not retaliatory. The court noted that the officer's directly
contradictory incident report provided “some evidence” to support the disciplinary action. According to the
court, the discipline imposed on the inmate for his alleged failure to follow an officer's direct order to go to
another officer's office was not retaliatory, where the undisputed evidence showed that the inmate failed to
follow the direct order. The court held that the inmate was not deprived of substantive due process, where he
was not deprived of access to the courts and was not subjected to retaliatory discipline, and the disciplinary
sanctions of 10 and 15 days' segregation imposed on him that prevented him from using the law library did
not impede his ability to pursue a non-frivolous claim or offend a protected liberty interest. (Minnesota
Correctional Facility in Lino Lakes, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Boyd v. Driver, 579 F.3d 513 ((5th Cir. 2009). Following his acquittal on charges of assaulting prison
employees, a federal inmate filed a pro se Bivens action against numerous prison employees, alleging a
“malicious prosecution conspiracy.” The inmate alleged that prison employees committed perjury and
tampered with evidence in his prosecution for assaulting employees. The district court dismissed the action
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The appeals
court held that the inmate was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his claim in
his Bivens action, where the claim was not “about prison life” within the meaning of the exhaustion provision
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, the allegation by the inmate, that prison
employees committed perjury and tampered with evidence in conspiring to maliciously prosecute him for
assault, did not, without more, state any constitutional claim, as required to support a Bivens action. But the
court held that allegations that prison employees gave perjured testimony at the inmate's criminal trial and
destroyed and tampered with video evidence of the alleged assaults stated a claim for a due process violation,
sufficient to support his Bivens action. (Federal Correctional Institution Three Rivers, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
alleging that they retaliated against him for providing an affidavit in a deceased inmate's mother's wrongful
death action, in violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the complaint and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court found that the prisoner
stated a claim for First Amendment retaliation, but failed to state a claim for denial of access to the courts.
According to the court, the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim for First Amendment retaliation by alleging that he
engaged in protected speech by filing an affidavit in the wrongful death action, that he suffered retaliation
through: delays in his incoming and outgoing mail; harassment by an officer kicking his cell door, turning his
cell light off an on, and opening his cell trap and slamming it shut in order to startle him; unjustified
disciplinary charges; and improper dismissal of his grievances. The prisoner alleged that he would not have
been harassed if he had not participated in the wrongful death action. The court found that the prisoner's
participation in filing the affidavit was not sufficiently connected to the deceased inmate's rights to allow the
prisoner to assert a denial of access retaliation claim based on his assistance to the deceased inmate.
(Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Covell v. Arpaio, 662 F.Supp.2d 1146 (D.Ariz. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff, alleging that the sheriff violated his First Amendment rights by instituting a policy that banned
incoming letters and restricted incoming mail to metered postcards. The prisoner alleged that the mail policy
prevented him from receiving legal mail from witnesses in his criminal case. The sheriff moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the jail’s non-privileged mail policy
which banned incoming letters and restricted incoming mail to metered postcards was reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest in reducing contraband smuggling. The court noted that alternative means,
including postcards, telephones, and jail visits, existed. According to the court, allowing stamped mails would
increase the likelihood of smuggling contraband into the jail, which would in turn lead to conflicts and
violence, and there was no evidence that the prisoner's suggested alternative, by having staff inspect each
piece of mail and remove the stamps, would accommodate the right at a de minimis cost to the jail. The court
held that even if correspondence from a witness on the prisoner's witness list was improperly excluded by the
county jail, in violation of the prisoner's right of access to the courts, the prisoner failed to allege any violation
of the policy that was at the direction of the county sheriff, as required to render him liable under § 1983.
(Maricopa County Lower Buckeye Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
JAIL HOUSE LAWYERS
LEGAL ASSISTANCE
LEGAL MATERIAL
SEARCHES

Cox v. Ashcroft, 603 F.Supp.2d 1261 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against the United
States Attorney General, several federal prosecutors, and the owner and employees of a privately-owned
federal facility in which the prisoner was incarcerated, alleging constitutional violations arising from his
arrest, prosecution, and incarceration. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner
did not have any Fourth Amendment rights to privacy in his cell, and thus did not suffer any constitutional
injury as a result of the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmate's legal materials. According to
the court, the prison facility's imposition of a 30-day suspension of the prisoner's telephone privileges related
to a disciplinary action arising from the search of his cell and the confiscation of another inmates' legal papers,

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did not constitute an unreasonable limitation on the prisoner's First Amendment rights. The court noted that
prisoners have a First Amendment right to telephone access, subject to reasonable limitations. The court found
that regulations at a privately-owned federal prison facility prohibiting the prisoner from having the legal
papers of another inmates in his cell did not chill the prisoner's exercise of his First Amendment right to
provide legal assistance to fellow inmates, thus precluding liability on the part of the prison and its employees
in the prisoner's § 1983 action alleging First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the regulations
reflected a legitimate penological objective in regulating when and where such assistance was provided. (Taft
Correctional Institution, Wackenhut Corrections Corporation, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009). Muslim inmates confined in a special management unit
(SMU) sued the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that he violated their right to freely exercise
their religion by preventing them from participating in Jum'ah Friday group prayer. The district court entered
an injunction requiring closed-circuit broadcasting of Jum'ah in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were
housed or might be housed in the future, and subsequently denied the commissioner's motion for
reconsideration. The commissioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the injunction requiring corrections officials to provide
closed circuit television broadcasts of services in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or
might be housed in the future, as opposed to the SMU in which they were currently housed, without making
findings as to whether other SMUs were suitable for closed circuit broadcasts. The court found that the
injunction did not violate the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the prospective relief was narrowly
drawn and providing closed-circuit broadcasting was the least intrusive means to alleviate the burden on the
inmates’ rights. The court noted that the commissioner put nothing in the record to differentiate other SMUs
on the issues of a compelling governmental interest or least restrictive means. (Massachusetts Department of
Correction, MCI-Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
RETALIATION

Cusamano v. Sobek, 604 F.Supp.2d 416 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A former state prisoner brought a pro se action
against department of corrections employees, alleging violation of his First, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights as well as the New York Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part, and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine
issue of material fact regarding whether a corrections officer was present during, and participated in, the
alleged assault of the prisoner. The court noted that an officer's failure to intervene during another officer's use
of excessive force can itself constitute excessive force. The court also held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether excessive force was used against the prisoner.
The court found that a corrections officer's failure to include the prisoner's legal documents in the prisoner's
personal items when the prisoner was transferred to a special housing unit was unintentional and did not
cause the prisoner to be prejudiced during legal proceedings, as required for the prisoner's First Amendment
denial of access to courts claim against the officer. (Gouverneur Correctional Facility, Clinton Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Dace v. Smith-Vasquez, 658 F.Supp.2d 865 (S.D.Ill. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison employees, alleging that his exposure to excessively cold conditions during his incarceration resulted in
a deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and that employees unconstitutionally retaliated against him by
exposing him to such conditions. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the prisoner failed to administratively exhaust his § 1983 claims against prison
employees in accordance with Illinois Department of Corrections grievance procedures, as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, even if the employees failed to directly respond
to some or all of the prisoner's grievances, the fact remained that the prisoner failed to take up those
unresolved grievances with a Grievance Officer as required by the grievance procedures. The court found that
the prisoner failed to establish that his prior lawsuit against prison officials and/or his filing of grievances was
the “motivat-ing factor” for the alleged actions of prison employees, including exposing the prisoner to
extreme cold, not allowing him to go to the commissary, handcuffing him, damaging his property, and not
responding to his grie-vances, as would support his § 1983 retaliation claim against the employees. (Menard
Correctional Center, Ill.)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY

Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 185 (D.D.C. 2009). A former inmate and his wife brought a
§ 1983 action, on behalf of themselves and their child, against the District of Columbia and several D.C.
officials and employees, alleging various constitutional violations related to the inmate's incarceration for
criminal contempt due to his admitted failure to pay child support. They also alleged the wife encountered
difficulties when she and her child attempted to visit the husband at the D.C. jail. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that an attorney, who
was an African-American woman, stated a § 1983 claim against the District of Columbia and D.C. jail official
for violations of her Fifth Amendment due process rights by alleging that an official refused to allow her to
visit her clients at the jail based on her gender and race. (Lorton and Rivers Correctional Centers, and District
of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION

Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119 (2nd Cir. 2009). A district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
the state defendants on the prisoner's civil rights claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, and
reversed and remanded in part. The court held that state grievance procedures did not require an inmate to
specifically name the responsible parties, and therefore the inmate did not fail to exhaust his administrative
remedies under PLRA by omitting the names of the responsible parties from his prison grievance. The court
found that the passage of only six months between the dismissal of the prisoner's lawsuit and an allegedly

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retaliatory beating by officers, one of whom was a defendant in the prior lawsuit, was sufficient to support an
inference of a causal connection, and therefore a genuine issue of material fact existed as to the causal
connection element of the prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)
U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVILEGED
CORRESPONDENCE

Fontroy v. Beard, 559 F.3d 173 (3rd Cir. 2009). Inmates sued state prison officials, claiming that a policy of
opening legal and court mail outside their presence violated the First Amendment. The district court declared
the policy unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment. The prison officials appealed. The appeals
court reversed, finding that the policy did not violate the First Amendment right of inmates to have mail
opened in their presence. According to the court, the policy of requiring a control number on legal and court
mail sent to inmates, opening mail without control numbers outside of inmates' presence, and inspecting for
contraband before delivering mail to inmates, did not violate the First Amendment right of inmates to have
mail opened in their presence. The court noted that the new legal mail policy was implemented to avoid abuse
of the legal mail privilege, that the new policy was less burdensome on prison employees than the prior policy,
that the inmates' proposed alternative could not be achieved at de minimis cost, and while inmates could not
control whether courts or attorneys actually obtained control numbers, that alternatives were provided by new
policy. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELECONFERENCE

Gevas v. Ghosh, 566 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging prison staff
members and administrators were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. After a telephonic
conference among all of the parties was held, an agreement was supposedly reached, but there was no court
reporter or recording of the conference. The district court granted the defendants' motion to enforce the
settlement agreement and ordered the prisoner to sign the release and settlement agreement within 30 days or
have his case dismissed. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. According to the court, the
magistrate judge's failure to record the settlement agreement did not invalidate the settlement, and the
magistrate judge did not coerce the prisoner into settling. The court noted that both parties assumed the risk
that the judge would recall the discussion differently than they did, when neither asked that any part of the
discussion be placed on the record. According to the court, having made no such request to have the
discussion placed on the record, the prisoner had to live with the consequences. (Stateville Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2009). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff and others, alleging cruel and unusual punishment and unsafe living conditions based on their failure
to assign him a lower bunk for medical reasons. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court granted the motion
and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. Although the court found that a prison grievance need
only alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought and the inmate's failure to grieve
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs did not invalidate his exhaustion attempt, the inmate did
not properly exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA. The court held that the inmate's grievance
regarding his need for a lower bunk assignment did not provide sufficient notice of the staff's alleged
disregard of his lower bunk assignments to allow officials to take appropriate responsive measures, as
required to properly exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) before
he brought a § 1983 action. The officials responding to the inmate's grievance reasonably concluded that a
nurse's order for a lower bunk assignment solved the inmate's problem. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
FILING FEES
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146 (3rd Cir. 2009). Fourteen state prisoners jointly filed a single § 1983
complaint, on behalf of themselves and a purported class, claiming violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by prison officials' purported deliberate indifference to the exposure of prisoners to an
outbreak of a serious and contagious skin condition, allegedly scabies. The prisoners sought class
certification, requested to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
and sought appointment of counsel. The district court denied joinder (combining actions), dismissed with
leave to amend for all except one prisoner, and denied class certification. The prisoners appealed. The appeals
court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) IFP prisoners were not
barred from joinder by PLRA; (2) each joined prisoner was required to pay the full individual filing fee; and
(3) the typicality and commonality requirements were satisfied for class certification. The court noted that
prisoners proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP) remained within the definition of “persons” under the
permissive joinder rule, and thus, the prisoners were not categorically barred from joinder in their civil rights
action, despite concerns that joinder would undermine PLRA by permitting split fees or avoiding the threestrike rule that limited IFP status. (Adult Diagnostic and Treatment Center, New Jersey)

U.S. Supreme Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CIVIL SUIT

Haywood v. Drown, 129 S.Ct. 2108 (2009). A state prisoner brought civil rights actions in the New York
Supreme Court against several correction employees for allegedly violating his civil rights in connection with
prisoner disciplinary proceedings. The action was dismissed as barred by a state “jurisdictional” statute
requiring that such causes of action for damages arising out of the conduct of state corrections officers within
the scope of their employment be filed against the state in the New York Court of Claims. The prisoner
appealed. The New York Supreme Court Appellate Division affirmed, and the prisoner appealed. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. The court held that, having made the decision to create courts of general jurisdiction
which regularly sat to entertain analogous civil rights actions against state officials other than corrections
officers, New York was not at liberty to shut the doors of these courts to civil rights actions to recover
damages from its corrections officers for acts within the scope of their employment, and to instead require that
such damages claims be pursued against the state in another court of only limited jurisdiction. (New York)

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U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303 (2nd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a civil rights action alleging that he
was beaten by corrections officers and denied medical treatment by a nurse. The district court entered
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis of the prisoner's failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the
district court was required to first explain the procedural requirements for responding to a summary judgment
motion and its potential consequences, and to provide the prisoner with an opportunity to take discovery and
submit evidence in response to the motion. According to the appeals court, the district court could not convert
the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings in the prisoner's pro se civil rights action into a motion
for summary judgment, then grant the motion, extinguishing the claim, without first giving the prisoner notice
of the conversion and an opportunity to take relevant discovery and to submit any evidence relevant to the
issues raised by the motion. (Clinton Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Hinton v. Corrections Corp. of America, 623 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate sued the operators of a
correctional facility under § 1983, asserting that overcrowded and unsanitary conditions had caused him to
become infected with the methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The district court
granted the operators’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the inmate failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The court noted that the inmate had access to an inmate handbook, was familiar with
parts of it, and did not dispute that he had other means of informing himself of the requirements of the official
grievance process. (Central Treatment Facility, District of Columbia, operated by Corrections Corporation of
America)

U.S. District Court
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Hunt ex rel. Chiovari v. Dart, 612 F.Supp.2d 969 (N.D.Ill. 2009). A mother brought a § 1983 action against
a county sheriff, unknown county corrections officers, unknown village police officers, and a village, for
deprivation of her son's constitutional rights, arising out of his death while being transported to a county jail.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the unknown officers. The court held that the
county sheriff's objection to a production request for personnel files of three officers did not lull the mother
into delaying the suit, so as to prevent the officials from asserting the Illinois statute of limitations defense
against the mother's claims under § 1983. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jones v. Carroll, 628 F.Supp.2d 551 (D.Del. 2009). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
employees, alleging that they failed to protect him from an attack by another inmate. The prison employees
moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The inmate moved for reconsideration. On
reconsideration, the district court found that summary judgment was precluded for certain issues. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether an inmate's
medical condition after having been stabbed by another inmate excused his failure to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court also found that a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the inmate told prison officials about the violent threats he received from
another inmate, precluded summary judgment on the inmate's Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim
brought under § 1983. The court held that prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity in their
individual capacities in the § 1983 action alleging that officials failed to protect the inmate from serious harm
from another inmate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that case law put officials on
notice that failure to protect an inmate from violence at the hands of another inmate violated an inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware Correctional Center, Smyrna,
Delaware)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL
TRANSFER

Kim v. Veglas, 607 F.Supp.2d 286 (D.Mass. 2009). A prisoner, who was initially convicted and incarcerated
in Maine, brought an action against various prison officials in Massachusetts and Maine alleging that his
transfer to a Massachusetts corrections facility violated a variety of his constitutional and statutory rights. The
district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that a Maine prison law librarian was subject to
Massachusetts' long-arm statute, for the purposes of a claim of denial of access to the courts brought by the
prisoner. The court noted that, in a letter to the prisoner in response to his request for legal materials, the
librarian stated that he was the individual to contact for Maine legal materials, and that he required the
prisoner to provide “exact citations” for requested legal materials. The prisoner contended that this
requirement essentially prohibited him from acquiring Maine legal materials, and thus caused his
constitutional injury. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations were sufficient to satisfy the relatedness
requirement for exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the librarian, consistent with due process.
According to the court, the librarian's alleged conduct was both the “but-for” and proximate cause of the
prisoner's inability to access the courts, and the foreseeable result of the letter the librarian sent into
Massachusetts was that it would prevent the prisoner from having meaningful access to legal materials. The
court held that the exercise by the Massachusetts court of personal jurisdiction over the Maine prison law
librarian would be reasonable, as required to comply with due process. The court found that Massachusetts
had an interest in adjudicating the dispute because: (1) the Commonwealth would be less willing to accept
inmates pursuant to the New England Interstate Corrections Compact if the prisoners it accepted must bring
suit in Maine; (2) the prisoner had a great interest in accessing the federal courts in Massachusetts, given that
he had adequate access to Massachusetts legal materials; (3) litigating in Massachusetts would promote
judicial economy because the prisoner had already been appointed pro bono counsel and the case was pending
in Massachusetts for several years; and (4) the suit would promote a substantive social policy of ensuring that
interstate transfers of prisoners were not used as a means of cutting off inmates' ability to access the courts to
seek redress for injuries suffered at the hands of donor states. (Maine State Prison, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution-Cedar Junction)

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U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVILEGED
CORRESPONDENCE

Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner filed a Bivens complaint
claiming deprivation of his First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by prison mailroom employees'
routinely opening and reading prisoner's mail outside of his presence, although the mail was marked as “legal
mail” or “special mail” pursuant to Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulations. The district court denied the
employees summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The employees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment as to whether two envelopes from the prisoner's attorney were opened outside the
presence of the prisoner; (2) an envelope from federal community defenders was properly labeled legal mail;
(3) nine envelopes containing the word “attorney/client” were properly labeled legal mail; (4) prison
employees' opening of the prisoner's legal mail outside his presence violated his clearly established First and
Sixth Amendment rights; (5) prison mailroom supervisors were not protected by qualified immunity; but (6)
prison mailroom employees were protected by qualified immunity. According to the court, the former
prisoner's allegations that prison mailroom employees opened his legal mail outside his presence despite his
repeated complaints to mailroom supervisors, were sufficient to find that mailroom supervisors acted
unreasonably in response to the prisoner's complaints, precluding the supervisors' protection by qualified
immunity. The prisoner alleged that the supervisors' conduct encouraged an atmosphere of disregard for
proper mail-handling procedures, where one supervisor stated that the prison did not have to follow case law
but only the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) policy, and that other supervisors knew of the prisoner's complaints
but did nothing to correct the admitted errors. (Mich. Fed. Det. Ctr., Fed Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2009). A person who had been involuntarily committed to a
state hospital brought an action against hospital officials, asserting a variety of claims relating to the
conditions of his confinement and treatment, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court
dismissed the action and the committee appealed. He was granted permission to proceed in format pauperis
(IFP) on appeal and ordered to make partial payments of the appellate filing fee through monthly payments
from his institutional account. The appeals court held that, as a matter of first impression, the fee payment
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applicable to prisoners did not apply to those who
were civilly committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). (Sexual Predator
Treatment Program, Larned State Hospital, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that he needed medical treatment for Hepatitis B and C and that an
omitted notation regarding his need for protective custody resulted in his improper transfer to a high-security
facility known for murders and assaults on anyone known as a snitch. The district court denied the prisoner's
motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Prisoner moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The appeals court
denied the motion. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not bar the prisoner
from proceeding IFP, but the prisoner qualified as an abusive filer under Butler v. Department of Justice,
which held that a court could deny IFP status to a prisoner who, though not technically barred by the PLRA,
had nonetheless abused the privilege. The court noted that the prisoner had 63 prior cases, only two of which
were “strikes” under the PLRA. (USP Florence, Colorado, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MATERIAL
PHOTOCOPYING

Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against the
chief of corrections at a detention center, alleging his rights under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause were violated. The district court dismissed the complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983 claim that his First
Amendment free exercise rights were violated by alleging that he was denied a religious rosary and a prayer
booklet solely because a jail official did not find those items vital to worship. The court also found the
alleged denial stated a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The
court found that the detainee failed to allege that any deprivations in obtaining legal materials caused him an
actual injury, as required to state a claim that his right of access to courts was denied. The court noted that a
prisoner's complaint must spell out, in minimal detail, the connection between the alleged denial of access to
legal materials and an inability to pursue a legitimate challenge to a conviction, sentence, or prison
conditions to state a claim that his right to access the courts was denied. The detainee had asked jail officials
to copy, at no charge, approximately fifty legal documents that pertained either to his pro se civil suit against
his jailers or to his criminal prosecution. The detainee was represented by counsel in the criminal case, but
was proceeding pro se in the civil matter. Jail officials told the detainee that he would be charged $1.00 per
page, but also noted that copies regarding his criminal case would be provided at no charge. The detainee
sought access to a law library and tried to subscribe to various legal periodicals, but his requests were denied.
(Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
PRO SE LITIGATION

Owens-Ali v. Pennell, 672 F.Supp.2d 647 (D.Del. 2009). A pro se state prisoner, a Moorish American
National adherent, brought an action pursuant to § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) against prison officials, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that the
officials violated his constitutional rights when they denied his request for a religious diet, and that the
officials retaliated against him for his attempts to exercise his religious beliefs. The prisoner requested
counsel. The court found that the prisoner's action was not so factually or legally complex that requesting an
attorney to represent the prisoner was warranted. The court noted that the prisoner's filings in this case
demonstrated his ability to articulate his claims and represent himself. (James T. Vaughn Correctional
Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

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U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
INTERROGATION

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal. 2009). Reversed 648 F3d 748. A detainee, a United States
citizen who was designated an “enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought
an action against a senior government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion,
denial of right of information, denial of right to association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of
right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and denial of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who was a
United States citizen, had no other means of redress for alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his
detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior government official, alleging the official's actions
violated constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military Commissions Act was only applicable to
alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee Treatment Act did not “affect the rights
under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody of the United States.” The court found that
national security was not a special factor counseling hesitation and precluding judicial review in the Bivens
action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official were public record, and litigation may be
necessary to ensure compliance with the law. The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged that the
official's acts caused a constitutional deprivation, as required for the detainee's constitutional claims against
the official. The detainee alleged that the senior government official intended or was deliberately indifferent
to the fact that the detainee would be subjected to illegal policies that the official set in motion, and to a
substantial risk that the detainee would suffer harm as a result, that the official personally recommended the
detainee's unlawful military detention and then wrote opinions to justify the use of unlawful interrogation
methods against persons suspected of being enemy combatants. According to the court, it was foreseeable
that illegal interrogation policies would be applied to the detainee, who was under the effective control of a
military authority and was one of only two suspected enemy combatants held in South Carolina.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was detained incommunicado for nearly two years
with no access to counsel and thereafter with very restricted and closely-monitored access, and that he was
hindered from bringing his claims as a result of the conditions of his detention, were sufficient to state a
claim for violation of his right to access to courts against a senior government official. The court held that
federal officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees under the United
States Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to qualified immunity from claims
brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly immune from claims brought
by the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). On appeal, 678 F3d 748, the appeals
court reversed the district court decision, finding that the official was entitled to qualified immunity because
there had not been a violation of well established law. (Military Brig, South Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
TELECONFERENCE

Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment. Following a bench trial, the district entered judgment for the officials, and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion
by declining to appoint counsel for the inmate under the in forma pauperis statute. The prisoner claimed that
the district court improperly conditioned his use of telephonic testimony on his waiver of a jury trial, but the
appeals court found that a bench trial that featured telephonic testimony was the prisoner's strategic choice.
(California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BINDING

Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison librarian,
claiming that her failure to allow him access to a comb-binding machine violated his First Amendment right
of access to the courts. The district court granted summary judgment to the inmate, and after a bench trial,
awarded the inmate $1,500 in compensatory damages. A panel of the court of appeals affirmed, and the
librarian's petition for a rehearing en banc was denied. The United States Supreme Court granted the
librarian's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the panel opinion, and remanded. On remand, the appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the
court, it was objectively legally reasonable for the prison librarian to conclude that her denial of access to the
comb-binding machine would not hinder the inmate's capability to file his petition for a writ of certiorari to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and thus the librarian was entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's § 1983 suit in light of the Supreme Court's flexible rules for pro se filings, which did not require and
perhaps did not even permit comb-binding. (Snake River Correctional Institution, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Phipps v. Sheriff of Cook County, 681 F.Supp.2d 899 (N.D.Ill. 2009). Paraplegic and partially-paralyzed
pretrial detainees currently and formerly housed at a county prison brought a class action against the county
and county sheriff, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions for summary
judgment. The court held that the sheriff waived the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the sheriff
raised that defense for the first time in his motion for summary judgment. The court held that paraplegic and
partially-paralyzed pretrial detainees who were formerly housed at the county prison were not “prisoners
confined in jail” for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and thus their civil rights
claims were not subject to, or barred by, PLRA. The court held that the pretrial detainees adequately alleged
discrimination based on the prison's failure to provide wheelchair-accessible bathroom facilities. According
to the court, the detainees met the PLRA physical injury requirement. In addition to alleging mental and
emotional harm, the detainees complained of bed sores, infections, and injuries resulting from falling to the
ground from their wheelchairs and toilets, which were undeniably physical injuries. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

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U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIALS

Ratcliff v. Moore, 614 F.Supp.2d 880 (S.D.Ohio 2009). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against
several prison officials and employees alleging a failure to accommodate their religious practices along with
other constitutional violations under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court denied summary judgment for the defendants,
finding that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether a prisoner was denied access to the court as
a result of the prison's policy of restricting access to excess legal materials once every 30 days. The court
found that any deprivation of the prisoner's exercise rights was not attributable to any “deliberate
indifference” on the part of prison officials or employees, as required to support the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment denial of exercise claim. The court noted that the prisoner voluntarily engaged in religious
hunger strikes, was put on medical idle status because of the hunger strikes, refused medical treatment and
continued his hunger strikes, all of which resulted in the extension of his medical idle status which affected
his access to exercise. (Ross Correctional Institution, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, Marion
Correctional Institution, and Trumbull Correctional Institution, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs
for mobility filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that a prisoner who had his grievance denied
because he no longer was in custody of the prison, and who never appealed to the final stage of the
administrative program, did not exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) before bringing a lawsuit regarding that grievance. According to the court, the
inaccessibility of telephones throughout a state prison, inaccessibility of a family reunion site, inaccessibility
of a law library, and malfunctioning of a school elevator, that did not cause any physical harm or pain to
disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, were not the kind of deprivations that denied a
basic human need, and thus did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. (N.Y. State Dept. of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Shaw v. Jahnke, 607 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against
a corrections officer alleging excessive force. The district court denied the officer’s motion for summary
judgment. The court held that the prisoner had exhausted his administrative remedies. According to the
court, the prisoner made sufficient efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and that it was the corrections department's misinformation rather than any
negligence or manipulation on the prisoner's part that prevented him from completing the grievance process.
(Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Shockley v. McCarty, 677 F.Supp.2d 741 (D.Del. 2009). A former inmate filed a pro se, in forma pauperis §
1983 action against prison officials alleging his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when an officer
labeled him a “snitch.” The district court denied the officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that a prison
official's failure to include an affirmative defense of frivolousness in an answer to the former inmate's in
forma pauperis § 1983 complaint waived the defense. The court noted that while the inmate’s case might not
succeed on the merits, the complaint was not indisputably meritless, fantastic, delusional or trivial, and
contained sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief. According to the court, the label of “snitch” in a
prison posed serious risks to the inmate and could have incited others to harm him by identifying him as
such. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
VIDEO COMMUNITATION
TRANSPORTATION

Twitty v. Ashcroft, 712 F.Supp.2d 30 (D.Conn. 2009). A federal prisoner, who brought an action alleging that
a state department of correction employee used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
moved for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that Bureau of Prisons (BOP) transport him from Colorado to
Connecticut to attend his civil trial. The district court denied the motion. The court held that expense and
security concerns outweighed the prisoner's interest in physically appearing at the trial, precluding an
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The court noted: (1) that it would cost the Bureau of Prisons about
$70,000 to transport the prisoner from Colorado to Connecticut for the trial; (2) that he would be temporarily
housed in a less secure facility than the one in Colorado; and (3) that transporting the prisoner between the
facility and the courthouse, a trip of eighty miles in each direction, and supervising him during trial would
require the assistance of multiple United States Marshals and presented a risk of escape, a risk of harm to law
enforcement officers and danger to public. According to the court, the Colorado facility offered to permit the
prisoner to appear at trial via videoconference, which was a reasonable alternative in the circumstances.
(United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
RESTRICTIONS

U.S. v. Mikhel, 552 F.3d 961 (9th Cir. 2009). An alien inmate convicted of capital offenses moved to allow
attorney-client access without special administrative measures (SAM) restrictions that allegedly violated the
Due Process Clause and Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The appeals
court held that modification of the SAM was warranted to permit the attorney to use a translator in a meeting
with the inmate, and modification of the SAM was warranted to allow the attorney's investigators to
disseminate the inmate's communications. The court also found that modification of the SAM was warranted
to allow the attorney's investigator to meet with the inmate. The court found that the SAM was an
exaggerated response to the prison's legitimate security interests and unacceptably burdened the inmate's due
process and Sixth Amendment rights. (Central District, California)

XXIV

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U.S. Appeals Court
CRREA- Civil Rights
Remedies Equalization
Act of 1986

Van Wyhe v. Reisch, 581 F.3d 639 (8th Cir. 2009). Two inmates each brought an action against state prison
officials, asserting various claims of interference with their free exercise of religion under the First
Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court
denied the officials' motions for summary judgment in part, and the officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held: (1) the section of
RLUIPA protecting inmates from imposition of substantial burdens on their religious exercise not justified
by compelling state interests was a valid exercise of Congress's Spending Clause authority; (2) the section of
RLUIPA conditioning a state's acceptance of federal funds on its consent to suit for appropriate relief did not
unambiguously encompass monetary damages so as to effect a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit for
monetary claims by acceptance of the federal money; (3) the section of RLUIPA protecting inmates from
substantial burdens on religious exercise was not a statute prohibiting discrimination within the meaning of
the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 (CRREA); (4) the inmate made a threshold showing of a
substantial burden on his religious exercise by alleging that officials denied his request to possess and use a
succah and that the succah was a mandatory part of the Sukkot Festival and essential to the practice of his
Jewish faith; but (5) the officials did not substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his
request for additional weekly group religious and language study time; and (6) the officials did not
substantially burden the inmate's religious exercise by denying his request to have and use a tape player in
his cell for religious language studies. The court noted that RLUIPA promoted the general welfare by
furthering society's goal of rehabilitating inmates and respecting individual religious worship. (South Dakota
State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PRO SE LITIGATION

Vann v. Vandenbrook, 596 F.Supp.2d 1238 (W.D.Wis. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
crisis intervention worker, registered nurse, and several corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The prisoner moved to proceed in forma
pauperis and for the appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to proceed in part and
denied in part, and denied the motion for appointment of counsel. The court held that the prisoner's proffered
reasons for appointment of counsel—that the case was legally and factually complex, that the claim required
the testimony of medical experts, and that he lacked legal training to present the case, especially in front of a
jury, were universal among pro se litigants and thus constituted insufficient grounds for the appointment of
counsel. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
INDIGENT INMATES
LEGAL MAIL

Wesolowski v. Washburn, 615 F.Supp.2d 126 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against corrections employees, alleging that the employees violated his rights by interfering with his ability
to send outgoing mail. The employees moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the employees did not violate the prisoner's right of access to the courts protected
under the First Amendment when they correctly determined that certain mail did not qualify as “legal mail”
under applicable corrections department regulations, and rejected certain letters and other items that the
prisoner sought to mail because of his noncompliance with the regulations. The court noted that, at most, the
prisoner was inconvenienced and had some delays in his outgoing mail. The court held that the employees
did not violate the prisoner's right to the free flow of mail as protected under the First Amendment when they
correctly determined that certain mail did not qualify as “legal mail” and rejected certain letters and other
items. According to the court, all the employees did was to require the prisoner's compliance with regulations
concerning outgoing mail. The court found that even if the employees had incorrectly determined that some
of the prisoner's outgoing mail was not legal mail, and thus did not qualify for free postage, employees were
entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoner's § 1983 action because the employees did not violate any of
the prisoner's clearly established rights of which a reasonable person in the employees' position would have
known. (Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Zimmerman v. Schaeffer, 654 F.Supp.2d 226 (M.D.Pa. 2009). Current and former inmates at a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against the county, corrections officers, and prison officials, alleging that they were
abused by officials during their incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact. The court held that a former inmate of
a county correctional facility was not required to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing Eighth Amendment claims against prison officials and corrections officers
under § 1983, where the inmate was not incarcerated at the time complaint was filed. (Mifflin County
Correctional Facility, Lewistown, Pennsylvania)
2010

U.S. District Court
ASSISTANCE
LEGAL MATERIALS

XXIV

Antonetti v. Skolnik, 748 F.Supp.2d 1201 (D.Nev. 2010). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against various prison officials, alleging various constitutional claims, including violations of the First,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court dismissed in part. The court held that the
prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a colorable § 1983 claim that prison officials violated
the Eighth Amendment by depriving him of needed medical care. The prisoner alleged that he was housed in
segregation/isolation, leading to a mental health breakdown, and: (1) that he was seen by mental health
professionals eight times over a five year period instead of every 90 days as required by administrative
regulations; (2) that mental health professionals recommended he pursue art and music for his mental health
but that prison officials denied him the materials; (3) and that the officials' actions resulted in the need to take
anti-psychotic and anti-depression medications due to suffering from bouts of aggression, extreme
depression, voices, paranoia, hallucinations, emotional breakdowns and distress, unreasonable fear, and
systematic dehumanization. The court found that the prisoner's allegations were factually sufficient to state a

1.172

colorable § 1983 claim for a violation of his First Amendment right of access to courts, where the prisoner
alleged that he was housed in segregation for several years and was repeatedly denied materials such as
books, paper, pens and envelopes, as well as assistance from a law clerk. According to the court, the
prisoner's allegations that officials deprived him of incoming mail without notice and without a postdeprivation remedy were factually sufficient to state a § 1983 claim under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. (High Desert State Prison, Nevada)
U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Dillon v. Rogers, 596 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee, who was transferred first to a temporary
jail and then to a state corrections facility after Hurricane Katrina damaged a parish correctional center,
brought a § 1983 action. The detainee alleged that he was beaten and mistreated while at the temporary jail,
resulting in hearing loss and other injuries. The district court dismissed the action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded for further
discovery. The court held that the record was not sufficiently developed to determine whether administrative
remedies were “available” for detainee to exhaust at the state facility, requiring remand. (Jefferson Parish,
Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner subject to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) three strikes provision brought a civil rights action against a prison, warden,
and various prison employees, alleging the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by using
excessive force to restrain him and by recklessly disregarding his need for medical attention. The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to pre-pay the filing fee, and a motions panel authorized the
prisoner's appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that that while the prisoner's allegation of
excessive force satisfied the three strikes provision's imminent danger requirement, the prisoner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The court noted that the prisoner had an administrative
remedy under an Illinois regulation providing an emergency grievance procedure for state prisoners claiming
to be in urgent need of medical attention. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D.Cal. 2010). Aliens, who were diagnosed with severe
mental illnesses, filed a class action, alleging that their continued detention without counsel during pending
removal proceedings violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the
Due Process Clause. The aliens moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion in
part. The court held that the aliens were not required to exhaust administrative remedies, since the very core
of the aliens' claim was that without the appointment of counsel, they would be unable to meaningfully
participate in the administrative process before the BIA, and the BIA did not recognize a right to appointed
counsel in removal proceedings under any circumstances; therefore, resort to the BIA would be futile. The
court held that the mentally ill aliens who were detained pending removal proceedings, without counsel and
for prolonged periods without custody hearings, were entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction
requiring the immediate appointment of qualified counsel to represent them during their immigration
proceedings and custody hearings. (Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Northwest Detention Center, Tacoma, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXPERT WITNESS
DUE PROCESS

Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610 (7th Cir. 2010). The administrator of a female detainee‘s estate brought a §
1983 action against correctional facility officials and nurses, alleging they violated her due process rights by
failing to provide adequate medical care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants,
and the administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding a physician unqualified to offer
expert testimony that the detainee's death from non-specific heart failure would have been prevented had she
been given her congestive heart failure medication, where the physician lacked specific knowledge in
cardiology and pharmacology, and he provided no basis for his testimony except that the detainee's
medication treated heart disease. But the appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion in
finding the physician unqualified to offer expert testimony that the detainee's vomiting combined with her
diuretic medication may have contributed to her tachycardia and subsequent death from non-specific heart
failure. (Peoria County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
DUE PROCESS

Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864 (1st Cir. 2010). A class of prisoners convicted of murder, who had
been released pursuant to an electronic supervision program (ESP), filed a complaint under § 1983, seeking a
preliminary injunction against their re-incarceration pursuant to a regulation which became effective after
their releases. The district court granted a preliminary injunction and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
appealed. Another class of prisoners who had been re-incarcerated filed a separate petition for a writ of
habeas corpus and the district court granted the petition. The district court consolidated the two cases, and
denied the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss. The commonwealth appealed. The appeals court reversed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the re-incarceration of the prisoners convicted of
murder under a new regulation eliminating the ESP program for prisoners convicted of murder, did not
violate the ex post facto clause, where the prisoners had committed their crimes of conviction at times
predating the creation of the ESP, so that Puerto Rico's decision to disqualify prisoners from participating in
the ESP had no effect on the punishment assigned by law. The court also held the re-incarceration of the
prisoners convicted of murder did not violate substantive due process. The court found that although the
impact of re-incarceration on the prisoners was substantial, Puerto Rico had a justifiable interest in faithfully
applying the new statute which barred prisoners convicted of murder from the ESP program. According to
the court, there was no showing that Puerto Rico acted with deliberate indifference or that re-imprisonment
was conscience-shocking. The court found that the re-incarceration of the prisoners deprived them of

XXIV

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procedural due process, where the prisoners were not given any pre-hearing notice as to the reason their ESP
status was revoked, and the prisoners had to wait two weeks after their arrest before receiving any
opportunity to contest it. (Puerto Rico Department of Justice, Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
LAW LIBRARY
RETALIATION

Green v. Tudor, 685 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.Mich. 2010). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against four
employees at a prison for claims arising from his access to a prison law library and the adequacy of the
prison's food service. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the inmate failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his claim against an
assistant librarian alleging denial of access to courts through a denied “call-out” request. The court found that
the assistant librarian did not engage in retaliatory conduct against the inmate and did not deny the inmate
equal protection. The court held that the assistant food service director did not coerce the inmate, an
Orthodox Muslim, into participating in Jewish religious practices, and did not take any actions establishing a
state religion, so as to violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The court held that the
alleged denial by the prison's assistant food service director of adequate advance notice of meal substitutions,
hot meals during non-daylight hours during a religious holiday, and adequate nutritional calories to the
Muslim inmate was rationally related to legitimate governmental and penological interests of prison security
and fiscal budgetary discipline, and thus the denials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free
exercise rights. The court noted that the inmate retained alternative means for practicing his Muslim faith,
and granting requests for specialized diets would be expensive and would divert resources from other
penological goals. (Muskegon Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Harris v. City of New York, 607 F.3d 18 (2nd Cir. 2010). A prisoner brought an action under § 1983, alleging
that he was assaulted by corrections officers. The district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint on the
grounds that he had accumulated four strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), was not
entitled to in forma pauperis status, and had not paid any filing fees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court held that PLRA's three strikes limitation on in forma pauperis proceedings was applicable to the
prisoner, even though he was released from prison subsequent to filing the complaint. The court found that
PLRA's three strikes rule was not an affirmative defense that needed to be raised in the pleadings, and that
the district court could rely on docket sheets to determine whether the three strikes rule applied. According to
the court, the proper practice upon dismissal of the prisoner's suit was to permit him to apply for in forma
pauperis status as a non-incarcerated plaintiff if he so qualified. (City of New York Department of
Corrections, Riker's Island)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION
TRANSFER

Hartry v. County of Suffolk, 755 F.Supp.2d 422 (E.D.N.Y.2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
a sergeant and a county, alleging failure to protect him from harm and deliberate indifference to his health
and safety. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
inmate's transfer from one county prison to another county prison deprived him of a meaningful opportunity
to pursue his administrative remedies following an attack by another inmate, and therefore, his failure to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing his § 1983 action against the sergeant and the county was
excused. The court noted that the inmate handbook permitted an inmate five days to file a grievance, and the
inmate was transferred within two days of the attack. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the inmate faced a real and significant threat of harm from
other inmates, and whether the prison sergeant was aware of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate from
other inmates. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether moving an inmate only in
response to a direct threat, within or outside of the jail, was a reasonable protective measure. (Suffolk County
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging denial of his right to court access and violations of the Eighth Amendment.
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations that prison officials denied him access
to a prison law library while the facility was on lockdown, and that he was prevented from filing a brief in
support of his state court appeal of his conviction, were sufficient to plead an actual injury as required to
state a claim for violation of his First Amendment right to court access, and his Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process. The court held that allegations by the state prisoner that prison officials forced him to choose
between spending eight hours per week for eight months on either exercising outdoors or using the law
library to research his § 1983 complaint and state-law habeas petition were sufficient to plead claim of an
Eighth Amendment violation. (California State Prison-Sacramento C-Facility)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Hunt ex rel. Chiovari v. Dart, 754 F.Supp.2d 962 (N.D.Ill. 2010). A pretrial detainee's estate brought a civil
rights action against a sheriff, whose actions allegedly led to the death of detainee while he was in custody at
a county jail. The district court granted the sheriff’s motion for summary judgment. According to the court,
the mere fact that the pretrial detainee died while he was in the custody of the sheriff at the county jail was
not sufficient to give rise to an excessive force claim under the due process clause, without identifying any
responsible officer, or providing any admissible evidence regarding what happened to the detainee or what
the detainee or any officers in the vicinity were doing at the time of the detainee's collapse. The court found
that the opinions of medical experts, that the detainee’s death resulted from trauma to the head from an
assault, “was hopelessly speculative” and therefore inadmissible. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

XXIV

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U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39 (2nd Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against employees of a
county jail, alleging violations of his constitutional rights and of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
in connection with detention and medical care while in jail. The district court granted the defendants
summary judgment. The inmate petitioned for the appointment of counsel in his appeal. The appeals court
granted the petition. The court held that the appointment of counsel was appropriate in connection with the
inmate's appeal from dismissal of his claim that his placement in solitary confinement, and subsequent
excessive force he suffered, violated his constitutional rights, since there was likely merit in the inmate's
claims. The court found that it appeared from the inmate's complaint that he might have been a pretrial
detainee at the time he was placed in solitary confinement, and thus the claim that the inmate was subjected
to excessive force as a detainee would arise under the Fifth, not the Eighth Amendment, because as a
detainee he could not be punished at all. The court noted that there was no evidence that the inmate violated
any rule or was provided with a pre-deprivation hearing. According to the court, the legal issues were fairly
complex, especially with respect to whether the inmate's pretrial detention was substantial enough to give
rise to a constitutional violation of a procedural due process right. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jones v. Mathai, 758 F.Supp.2d 443 (E.D.Mich. 2010). A prisoner brought an action against several prison
officials, including a prison doctor, alleging retaliation and deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs. The district court denied the doctor’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The court held that
the doctor was not entitled to dismissal of the prisoner's claims alleging retaliation for failure to exhaust,
where the doctor had filed two motions for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, and a motion for
reconsideration that all determined the prisoner had exhausted his claim under the requirements of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. (Deerfield Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Kasiem v. Switz, 756 F.Supp.2d 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against the New York Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and prison employees, alleging
violations of his rights involving the defendants' purported failure to adequately treat his claimed hearing
problems and related ear pain. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court
held that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), prior to bringing a § 1983 action, where any grievances possibly covering his claims
were never fully exhausted or became exhausted only months after the suit was filed. (Sullivan Correction
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Kendrick v. Faust, 682 F.Supp.2d 932 (E.D. Ark. 2010). A female state prison inmate brought a § 1983
action against employees of the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC), alleging various violations of
her constitutional rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that she sustained an actual injury or
that an Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) official denied her the opportunity to review her mail
prior to its being confiscated, as required to support a claim that the official violated the inmate's
constitutional right of access to the courts and her First Amendment right to send and receive mail. (Arkansas
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL
LAW LIBRARY

Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010). An inmate at a county jail which served as a temporary
detention center filed a class action in state court against a sheriff, alleging that procedures at the jail violated
Indiana law and the inmates' First Amendment rights. The inmate challenged jail staff's alleged practices of
opening inmates' legal mail, denying inmates access to the law library, and failing to respond to inmates'
grievances. The case was removed to federal court. The inmate moved for class certification but he was
transferred out of jail before the court's ruling. The district court granted the sheriff's motion for judgment on
the pleadings and dismissed action as moot. The inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that the inherently transitory exception to the mootness doctrine prevented dismissal of the case. The
court noted that even though the inmate was transferred out of the jail prior to certification of his class action,
there would likely be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation complained of in the inmate’s
complaint. (Tippecanoe County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Parzyck v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 627 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2010). A prisoner who was denied an
orthopedic consultation for his continual and severe back pain brought a civil rights action to recover for
prison officials' alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the
complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner did not have to file new grievances addressing every
subsequent act by prison official that contributed to the continuation of a problem already raised in an earlier
grievance in order to exhaust his administrative remedies. The court noted that the prisoner had demonstrated
“meticulous respect” for the corrections department’s administrative grievance procedures.(Apalachee
Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
FILING FEES
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Qureshi v. U.S., 600 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2010). A detainee filed a complaint against the United States seeking
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act based on his allegedly unlawful detention by the Department of
Homeland Security. The district court issued an order requiring him to obtain the court's permission before
filing suit in any federal court in the state of Texas, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that the pre-filing injunction was invalid where the district court entered
the injunction without affording the detainee prior notice or the opportunity to oppose the injunction or be
heard on its merits. (Texas)

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U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Russo v. Honen, 755 F.Supp.2d 313 (D.Mass. 2010). A federal prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and various medical officials, alleging withholding of necessary medical treatment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the federal prisoner was denied access to the inmate grievance forms required to exhaust his administrative
remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Plymouth County Correctional Facility,
Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against certain
officers and employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging that they violated his
constitutional rights by failing to protect him from other inmates, failing to provide him with medical care,
and retaliating against him for speaking out against the IDOC. Following a jury trial, the district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded in part. According to the appeals court, the district court abused its discretion in
denying the pro se state prisoner's request for counsel under the federal in forma pauperis statute during the
discovery phase of his § 1983 action. The appeals court found that the district court failed to consider the
relatively difficult allegations the prisoner had to prove, the difficulty posed by the prisoner's confinement in
another facility during trial preparation, the prisoner's inability to identify parties and witnesses, and a
decidedly uncooperative prison administration who had the assurances of the magistrate judge that it would
not have to worry about a lawyer being around during the discovery period. The appeals court ruled that the
prisoner was prejudiced by district court's denial of his request for counsel, requiring reversal. (Menard
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
ATTORNEY FEE

Shepherd v. Wenderlich, 746 F.Supp.2d 430 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials and related defendants for alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The district court entered judgment upon a jury verdict for the prisoner against two of the defendants,
awarding $1 in actual damages. The prisoner moved for post-trial relief. The district court held that the
prisoner was the “prevailing party” in the action and that he had satisfied statutory requirements, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), for the award of attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” The court
held that a cap on the award of attorney fees of 150% under PLRA was applicable to the prisoner's action.
The prisoner originally sought attorneys' fees totaling $99,485.25, which were later reduced to $46,575. The
district court awarded attorneys' fees against the two defendants in the amount of $1.40 and awarded costs
against the two defendants in the total amount of $2,124. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LEGAL MAIL
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
DUE PROCESS

Stanley v. Vining, 602 F.3d 767 (6th Cir. 2010). A prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison officials,
claiming deprivation of his constitutional rights by a prison guard who was allegedly reading the prisoner's
legal mail in the prisoner's presence in his cell in violation of a prison regulation, and by issuing a prison
misconduct charge against the prisoner after an exchange of angry words. The district court granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that although the prisoner had a liberty interest in receiving his mail, under the First
Amendment, the prisoner was not deprived of his procedural due process rights based on the prison guard
allegedly violating a prison regulation by reading the prisoner's mail in the prisoner's presence in his cell.
The court noted that the prisoner received a post-deprivation hearing, as part of the prison grievance
procedure, which determined that the guard had not read mail in violation of regulation.
The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the guard issued a misconduct charge against him over
their dispute that the guard allegedly read the prisoner's legal mail did not rise to the level of a valid § 1983
claim, where the prisoner failed to allege that the charge interfered in any way with his rights to counsel,
access to courts, equal protection, or procedural due process. The court noted that the complaint stated no
facts or theories from which the court could devise a plausible constitutional claim, and did not even divulge
what the disposition of the charge was. According to the court, no constitutional provision flatly prohibits, as
unlawful censorship, a prison from opening and reading a prisoner's mail, unless it can be shown that the
conduct interferes with the prisoner's right to counsel or access to the courts, or violates his rights of equal
protection or procedural due process. “We find no per se constitutional rule that such conduct automatically
violates a broad, general rule prohibiting censorship, as our dissenting colleague seems to imagine. (Alger
Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL
TRANSFER

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other
things, that the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying
his personal property, denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement.
The employees moved for summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint
and to appoint counsel. According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly
interfered with the prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation
of the prisoner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any
actual injury, that his access to courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was
impaired. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)

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U.S. Appeals Court
FILING FEES
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against officers and
employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections, claiming violation of his civil rights by allegedly
contaminating his food, tampering with his mail, depriving him of sleep, and assaulting him. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the prisoner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), upon
concluding that he was not in imminent danger as required for the three-strikes provision of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and subsequently dismissed action after the prisoner failed to pay the filing
fee. The prisoner appealed and requested leave to proceed IFP. The appeals court denied the request. The
court held that a prior evidentiary hearing was required to consider contested imminent danger allegations,
ordering the prisoner to pay the filing fee if he wanted the case to go forward. (Illinois Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
FILING FEES

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison officials,
complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a
disturbing strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then brought a
separate action against prison officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's prohibition of
his subscription to commercially available pictures of nude women. The district court dismissed the action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the inmate appealed, and the appeals court
dismissed the appeal. The inmate then moved for a partial refund of filing fees that had been collected from
his prison trust account, challenging the prison's practice of withholding 40 percent of his account to satisfy
the filing fee requirement for his two appeals. The appeals court found that PLRA required that no more than
20 percent of an inmate's monthly income be deducted to pay filing fees, irrespective of the total number of
cases or appeals the inmate had pending at any one time. The court held that granting the inmate a partial
refund of fees was not warranted since the amounts withheld from the inmate's account were actually owed
and were properly, if excessively, collected. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

Varricchio v. County of Nassau, 702 F.Supp.2d 40 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county and officials, alleging civil rights violations. The defendants moved for dismissal. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee adequately
alleged that he was denied his right to a speedy trial and that he was presumptively prejudiced by the delay,
as required to state a § 1983 claim for a Sixth Amendment violation. The detainee alleged he was held for
two years in prison prior to receiving trial for the charge of violating a protective order, and that he was
subsequently found not guilty. The court held that the detainee adequately alleged that his conditions of
confinement constituted cruel and unusual punishment, as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The
detainee alleged that he received tainted food that contained bodily waste, soap, metal pins, and staples, and
that, when he went on a hunger strike to protest his legal situation, deputy sheriffs were taking bets on when
he would start eating again. (Nassau County Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
DUE PROCESS

Waker v. Brown, 754 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2010). An arrestee, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against various defendants, including the District of Columbia mayor and police chief. The defendants filed
motions to dismiss and the arrestee filed a motion to compel the identities of police and Department of
Corrections (DOC) officers. The district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and
denied the plaintiff's motion. The court held that police officers did not violate the arrestee's due process
rights in arresting him and detaining him for several days, where the arrest was based upon a fugitive warrant
from another county that was not invalidated or based upon mistaken identity, and the arrestee appeared
before a court and was released on his own recognizance. The arrestee had been held for six days in jail prior
to his release. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ward v. Rabideau, 732 F.Supp.2d 162 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Jewish prison inmates at a state correctional
facility brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging their First Amendment rights were violated
by the defendants' failure to properly accommodate their religious needs. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court found that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether “special circumstances” existed so as to excuse the
two inmates' failure to exhaust administrative remedies, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), prior to bringing a § 1983 action against prison officials. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether a correctional officer treated Jewish prison
inmates differently on account of their religion. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether cold alternative meals available in a state correctional institution violated the Jewish inmates'
constitutional right to a kosher diet, pursuant to the inmates' rights to religious liberty under First
Amendment. According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as
to whether prison officials prevented Jewish inmates from having materials necessary to their worship, on the
inmates' claim that the officials failed to make reasonable accommodation to their religious beliefs in
violation of the First Amendment, by not providing a rabbi or religious materials in the correctional facility.
(Groveland Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY
JAIL HOUSE LAWYERS

Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791 (7th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was a prison law clerk brought a § 1983
action against a prison law librarian, alleging retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his free speech rights.
Following a jury verdict for the inmate, the district court denied the librarian's motions for judgment as a
matter of law or for a new trial. The librarian appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded with
instructions. The court held that the inmate law clerk's speech that criticized prison library policies requiring
that clerks not help other inmates prepare their legal documents and not store the clerks' personal legal
materials in the library was not protected by the First Amendment. The court found that the speech had a

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negative impact on the prison librarian's legitimate interests in discipline and providing efficient library
services, particularly since it amounted to advocacy on behalf of other inmates, and the inmate had an
alternative means to express his complaints. The court also found that the inmate law clerk's oral complaint
to the prison librarian about the placement of his personal materials in the library was not protected by his
First Amendment right to free speech, where the complaint was made in a confrontational, disorderly
manner. (Miami Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2011
U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE/MAIL

Al-Amin v. Smith, 637 F.3d 1192 (11th Cir. 2011). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that the officials had repeatedly opened his privileged attorney mail outside of
his presence, in violation of his rights of access to the courts and free speech. The district court denied the
officials' motion for summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part, and denied
rehearing en banc. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. On remand, the district court granted
the officials' motion, precluding the inmate from offering evidence of either compensatory or punitive
damages. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the prisoner could not seek punitive
damages relief absent a physical injury, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. (Georgia
State Prison)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals, Ala., 766 F.Supp.2d 1214 (N.D.Ala. 2011). A pretrial detainee sued a
city, city police officers, jailers, a mayor, and city council members, asserting § 1983 claims alleging
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and his health and safety. The court found that qualified
immunity applied to bar the § 1983 liability of jailers for deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs
of the pretrial detainee, because the detainee failed to argue against the qualified immunity defense.
According to the court, once a defendant raises a defense of qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing both that the defendant committed the constitutional violation and that the law
governing the circumstances was already clearly established at the time of the violation, and the detainee
failed to adequately respond to the qualified immunity defense. The court noted that the jailers did not
contact medical professionals at the detainee's request for four days at most, and that the detainee, who
complained that he was in pain, at that point had been without prescription pain medication to which he was
addicted for at least three days. The court also noted that the detainee had already faked a suicide attempt to
garner jailers' attention and had also been both combative and difficult. (City of Muscle Shoals Municipal
Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS
EVIDENCE

Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action alleging
excessive force and deliberate indifference against numerous state and private defendants. The district court
granted summary judgment against the prisoner. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the prisoner's request for a videotape of a fight was of the
nature that it would have changed legal and factual deficiencies of his civil rights action alleging excessive
force, and thus the prisoner was entitled to production of it, since the videotape would have shown how
much force had been used in subduing the prisoner. But the court held that the prisoner who was alleging
excessive force and deliberate indifference was not entitled to the production of his medical records before
considering the state's motion for summary judgment, where the state and private defendants produced
enough evidence to demonstrate that medical personnel were not deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs. (Ionia Maximum Security Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Annoreno v. Sheriff of Kankakee County, 823 F.Supp.2d 860 (C.D.Ill. 2011). A federal pretrial detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, correctional officers, and others, alleging that the officers
assaulted him while in their custody. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion. The court held that the detainee failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing suit. According to the court, the detainee's submission of
a “sick call slip,” rather than an “inmate grievance form,” regarding an alleged assault committed upon him
by corrections officers, was inadequate to exhaust administrative remedies under PLRA, and thus the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the detainee's § 1983 action. The court noted that sick call slips were submitted
directly to medical department and not forwarded to administrative staff who received inmate grievance
forms, the inmate handbook required that complaints be submitted in writing on an inmate grievance form,
and the detainee knew that grievance forms were used in the facility and had filed multiple grievance forms
prior to the incident in question. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee County, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
TELEPHONE

Bradley v. Mason, 833 F.Supp.2d 763 (N.D.Ohio 2011). State inmates filed a § 1983 action asserting
multiple causes of action pertaining to their convictions and conditions of confinement. The district court
dismissed the case, finding that class certification was not warranted, where the inmates made no attempt to
define the class, many claims were specific to named plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs were proceeding pro se.
The court held that a pretrial detainee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone calls made from
within jail to individuals other than his attorney, and thus jail officials did not violate the detainee's Fourth
Amendment rights by monitoring his calls to his former spouse.
The court held that the county inmates lacked standing to raise a claim that the county jail's lack of a law
library violated their due process rights, where the inmates did not claim that they attempted to exercise the
right of self-representation and did not otherwise have access to legal materials. According to the court, the
county jail's removal of its law library was rationally related to its interest in reducing expenses, and thus did
not violate the inmates' equal protection rights. The court noted “…because Plaintiff's claim for law library is

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not explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not a fundamental right. Therefore, the
prison's policy need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.” (Cuyahoga County Jail,
Ohio)
U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Davis v. Correctional Medical Services, 760 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983
action alleging that prison medical officials failed to provide mental health treatment, failed to follow
policies and procedures to prevent officers and other inmates from harassing him, and failed to provide
adequate medical treatment for his broken nose. The district court granted the officials’ motions to dismiss
and for summary judgment. The court held that the failure of the prison's mental health administrator to
speak to the inmate or to investigate his complaint regarding his treatment and his living conditions did not
violate any recognizable constitutional right, as required to sustain the inmate's § 1983 claim against the
administrator. The court held that the inmate adequately exhausted his administrative remedies under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) regarding medical treatment for his fractured nose, as required to file
suit under § 1983 in federal court regarding his treatment, even though he did not appeal the grievance
resolution decisions, where the grievances were resolved in the inmate’s favor. (James T. Vaughn
Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
SELF INCRIMINATION

Doe v. Heil, 781 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Colo. 2011). A state prisoner convicted of a sex offense filed a § 1983
action, alleging that Department of Corrections (DOC) regulations requiring him to provide a full sexual
history and to pass a polygraph examination in order to participate in a sex offender treatment program
violated his constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion.
The court held that the regulations did not violate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. According to the court, the DOC had a legitimate penological interest in having convicted sex
offenders complete a treatment program before being released on parole. The court found that the prisoner
lacked a due process liberty interest in participating in a sex offender treatment program. (Colorado
Department of Corrections Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
DUE PROCESS

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Immigrant detainees brought a putative
class action on behalf of mentally disabled detainees being held in custody without counsel during removal
proceedings, asserting claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Rehabilitation Act, and Due
Process Clause. A detainee who was a native and citizen of Belarus, and who had been deemed mentally
incompetent to represent himself in removal proceedings, moved for a preliminary injunction. The district
court granted the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee was entitled to a custody hearing at
which the government had to justify his continued detention on the basis that he was a flight risk or would be
a danger to the community; (2) a qualified representative for a mentally incompetent immigrant detainee may
be an attorney, law student or law graduate directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an accredited
representative; (3) the detainee’s father could not serve as a qualified representative for detainee at a custody
hearing; (4) appointment of a qualified representative to represent the detainee at a custody hearing was a
reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act; (5) the likelihood of irreparable harm and the
balance of hardships favored the detainee; and (6) a mandatory injunction was warranted. (Sacramento
County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
WRITING MATERIAL

Guarneri v. West, 782 F.Supp.2d 51 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A former prisoner brought a pro se action against
numerous correctional facilities' employees for constitutional claims arising during his incarceration. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the fact
that the prisoner was not permitted to go to a law library as frequently as he wanted, or was not issued a
sufficient supply of writing paper, did not constitute denial of access to courts. The court noted that there was
no evidence of harm in his ability to contest his underlying criminal conviction or to fully litigate other
grievances and proceedings. According to the court, the prisoner failed to explain how his more than 50
documented visits to prison law libraries were insufficient to permit him to fully litigate his convictions and
grievances, identify any papers he was unable to file due to the lack of paper, or specify an actual injury that
resulted from the correctional facility's failure to provide him with unlimited access to the libraries. (Elmira
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Hale v. Rao, 768 F.Supp.2d 367 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought an action against prison officials
alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and alleging that the conditions of his
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Prison officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court excused the state inmate's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to bringing the claim in federal court because prison staff had thrown out a
grievance filled out by another inmate on the inmate's behalf, refused to provide the inmate with the
materials needed to file another grievance, and threatened to physically assault him if he attempted to utilize
the grievance procedure. The court noted that the inmate was illiterate and had a poor understanding of the
grievance procedure. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MAIL
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Haury v. Lemmon, 656 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2011). A prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison personnel, alleging they interfered with delivery of his legal mail and failed to provide a
sufficient law library. The district court denied the prisoner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that dismissal of the
prisoner's prior lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction did not warrant imposing a strike for filing frivolous actions in
determining whether the prisoner could proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) in his current § 1983 action. (Indiana)

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U.S. District Court
INVESTIGATION
TELEPHONE

Hill v. Donoghue, 815 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against an Assistant United States Attorneys (AUSA) and the United States, asserting various claims under
Bivens and the Wiretap Act in relation to his jailhouse phone calls. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court granted. The court held that the AUSAs were entitled to absolute immunity from claims relating to their use of the tapes. The but court found that an AUSA was not
entitled to absolute immunity for ordering the recordings, where the alleged order to make warrantless recordings of the inmate's jailhouse phone calls was investigative, rather than prosecutorial, and therefore, the
AUSA was not entitled to absolute immunity from the inmate's Wiretap Act or Bivens Fourth Amendment
claims. The court found that the inmate did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his jailhouse
phone calls, and therefore, the warrantless recording of his calls did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights. The court noted that the jail telephones played a recorded warning that calls might be recorded and
monitored, and the inmate's use of a jailhouse phone after hearing the warning constituted implied consent to
the recording of his calls. (Eastern District of New York, Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
PRO SE LITIGATION

Hoskins v. Dart, 633 F.3d 541 (7th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a county
sheriff and corrections officers. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (IFP), who
had been actively litigating three other cases, was not entitled to omit his litigation history in subsequent case
on the basis that another prisoner had told him that he could ignore that portion of the complaint form. According to the court, the prisoner was subject to sanctions for fraudulent litigation conduct because the omission could be considered both material and intentional, since the prisoner had signed the form, his signature
certified the truth of the entire complaint, and the complaint had contained highlighted instructions ordering
him to list those lawsuits. The court held that dismissal with prejudice of all of the prisoner's cases was an
appropriate sanction. (Cook County Sheriff, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 780 F.Supp.2d 62 (D.D.C. 2011). Female arrestees, who were
arrested for non-drug and non-violent offenses, brought an action against the District of Columbia and a
former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, among others, alleging that the defendants' blanket
policy of subjecting them to “drop, squat, and cough” strip searches before presentment to a judicial official
violated their rights to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment, and their rights to
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment. The marshal moved for summary judgment. The court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the Marshal was entitled to qualified immunity
from the Fourth Amendment claim and that there was no evidence that the Marshal implemented a policy
that directed the blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees, as would support a Fifth Amendment
claim, nor that the Marshal knew of a blanket practice of strip searching female arrestees. The court noted
that the law at the time of the searches did not clearly establish that strip searching female arrestees prior to
presentment to a judicial official violated the Fourth Amendment. (United States Marshal for the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia)

U .S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Khatib v. County of Orange, 639 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011). A former detainee sued a county for allegedly
violating the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) by requiring her to remove her
headscarf, in public, against her Muslim religious beliefs and practice, while she was held on two occasions
in a county courthouse holding facility pending disposition of her probation violation. The district court
granted the county's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded, finding that the holding facility was an “institution” under RLUIPA. According to the court, the county courthouse holding facility was a “pretrial detention facility,” and thus was an
“institution” under RLUIPA, where the facility's main purpose was to temporarily hold individuals who were
awaiting court proceedings, including individuals awaiting trial. The court noted that although the facility
housed inmates for relatively short periods, it held up to 600 inmates a day, and was described by the county
as a secure detention facility for the confinement of persons making a court appearance. According to the
court, the short-term detainee was not required to satisfy PLRA's exhaustion requirements before suing for
the county's alleged violation of RLUIPA in failing to accommodate her religious beliefs. (Orange County
Santa Ana Courthouse, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 2011). A state inmate who had unsuccessfully sought in state court
to have his name changed for religious reasons brought a pro se action under § 1983 against eight state-court
judges, seeking mandamus and injunctive relief, and contending that the defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights to equal protection and due process, his First Amendment rights to freedom of religion
and to petition the government for redress of injustice, the Seventh, Ninth, and Thirteenth Amendments, and
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous and malicious under a prisoner complaint screening statute. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that federal courts lacked the authority to issue a writ of mandamus ordering
state-court judges to take action in their capacities as such, that the inmate could not obtain injunctive relief
against the state-court judges under § 1983, and that the inmate's claims were “frivolous” within meaning of
prisoner complaint screening statute. (Oklahoma State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a
volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for
bringing such a suit. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion to dismiss the inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for
lack of standing, and granted summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed.

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The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that
inmates sought redress for wrongs allegedly perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required
to exhaust under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates'
grievances gave notice that the inmates alleged the prison policies failed to provide for certain general
Wiccan religious needs and free exercise, they did not provide notice that the source of the perceived
problem was the absence of a paid Wiccan chaplaincy. (Calif. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL RESEARCH

McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2011). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against prison
officers, alleging denial of access to the courts. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate was not denied access to the courts in
his previous § 1983 action by being placed in special housing, which had a new research system he did not
know how to use and he was not instructed in its use. The court noted that the inmate filed a notice of appeal,
a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion to reconsider the denial of that motion, and a motion to
suspend appeal. (Federal Correctional Institution Greenville, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Neff v. Bryant, 772 F.Supp.2d 1318 (D.Nev. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a warden,
caseworker and correctional officers, alleging violations of the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
After dismissal of the prisoner's claims, the prisoner filed an amended complaint. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations that legal materials mailed to him were intercepted and withheld, and that as a result he
lost a motion related to a civil claim, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for denial of access to the
courts in violation of the First Amendment, absent allegations as to the nature of the motion, or that the result
of the failed motion was the loss of a non-frivolous direct criminal appeal, habeas corpus petition, or § 1983
claim. (Ely State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
TYPEWRITER

Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014 (9th Cir. 2011). The Nevada Department of
Corrections brought an action against an inmate, seeking declaratory judgment that its ban on personal
possession of typewriters by inmates was constitutional. Following intervention by additional inmates, the
district court granted the Department’s motion for summary judgment. Several inmates appealed, and the
appeals were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the typewriter ban
did not constitute First Amendment retaliation; (2) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates' First
Amendment right of access to the Nevada Supreme Court; (3) the ban did not infringe upon the inmates’
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
affording the inmate the opportunity to conduct discovery prior to its ruling on the Department’s motion for
summary judgment. The court noted that the Department’s ban on personal possession of typewriters by
inmates reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal of institutional safety, and that the ban was
enacted after the murder of an inmate with a weapon fashioned from the roller pin of a typewriter. (Nevada
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
TRANSFER

Pauls v. Green, 816 F.Supp.2d 961 (D.Idaho 2011). A female pretrial detainee brought an action against a
county, county officials, and a jail guard, alleging that she was coerced into having inappropriate sexual
contact with the guard. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment, and the plaintiff moved
to compel discovery and for sanctions. The district court granted the motions, in part. The court held that the
detainee was not required to file grievances after being transferred to a state prison before filing her § 1983
action, in order to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). The court noted that the county jail grievance procedures were not available to detainees after they
transferred, and the county did not offer any assistance to the detainee after learning of the alleged assaults.
(Adams County Jail, Idaho)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Thorpe v. Little, 804 F.Supp.2d 174 (D.Del. 2011). A pretrial detainee, proceeding in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against a prison, prison officials, and prison medical personnel, alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Civil Rights Act, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA), and supplemental state law claims. The detainee moved to show cause and for transfer to a
different institution. The district court denied the motions and dismissed the claims in part. The court held
that the prison did not violate the pretrial detainee's First Amendment right of access to courts by only
allowing the detainee to receive legal services from the prison law library through written requests, where the
detainee was provided access to courts if he merely submitted a written request, and the detainee was
represented by a public defender. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
INTERROGATION

XXIV

Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A former prisoner, who served nearly 24 years
in prison for rape and murder before his conviction was vacated and charges were dismissed,
brought a § 1983 action against a city, county, police officers, police supervisors, and prosecutors, as
well as a former mayor, alleging deprivation of a fair trial, wrongful conviction, a Monell claim,
conspiracy under § 1985 and § 1986, and various state law claims. The defendants filed separate
motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held
that the former prisoner’s allegations that police officers engaged in suppressing, destroying, and
preventing discovery of exculpatory evidence, including instruments of torture used to coerce the
prisoner's confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the police officers for a Brady violation, despite
the officers' contention that the prisoner was aware of everything that he claimed was withheld at the
time of the trial. The court found that the former prisoner’s complaint, alleging that municipal
officials acted in collusion with a former mayor and a state's attorney and high-ranking police
officials to deflect public scrutiny of the actions of police officers that suppressed and prevented

1.181

discovery of exculpatory evidence, which prolonged prisoner's incarceration, stated a § 1983 claim
against municipal officials for deprivation of fair trial and wrongful conviction.
According to the court, a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983
complaint by the former prisoner, alleging that the prosecutor personally participated in the
prisoner's interrogation and that of a codefendant, and then suppressed the truth concerning those
events. The court found that the allegation put the prosecutor's conduct outside the scope of his
prosecutorial function. The court held that the complaint by the former prisoner, alleging that the
former prosecutor encouraged, condoned, and permitted the use of torture against the prisoner in
order to secure a confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the prosecutor for coercive interrogation,
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court noted that the allegations supported
the inference that the prosecutor participated in an investigatory rather than a prosecutorial role.
According to the court, the “Plaintiff's 46–page complaint sets forth an account of the murder of
Betty Howard and Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution for that murder, including the torture he alleges
he endured at the hands of Area 2 police officers. The complaint also details the history of torture at
Area 2 and the alleged involvement of the various Defendants in that torture and in subsequent
efforts to cover it up.” (Cook County, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011). Two juvenile delinquents brought a § 1983 action
against mental health providers and the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), alleging that the
actions of the defendants while the delinquents were in custody violated the Fourteenth Amendment and
New Jersey law. One of the plaintiffs was 15 years old when he was adjudicated as delinquent and remained
in custody for a total of 225 days. For approximately 178 of those days, the delinquent was held in isolation
under a special observation status requiring close or constant watch, purportedly for his own safety.
Although the delinquents were placed in isolation for different reasons, the conditions they experienced were
similar. Each was confined to a seven-foot-by-seven-foot room and allowed out only for hygiene purposes.
The rooms contained only a concrete bed slab, a toilet, a sink, and a mattress pad. One delinquent was
allegedly held in extreme cold, and the other was allegedly isolated for four days in extreme heat. Both were
denied any educational materials or programming, and were prevented from interacting with their peers. One
delinquent’s mattress pad was often removed, a light remained on for 24 hours a day, and he was often
required to wear a bulky, sleeveless smock. Both delinquents were allegedly denied mental health treatment
during their periods in isolation. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that a juvenile delinquent housed in New
Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities was educated about filing a form with a social worker as
the procedure for filing an administrative grievance, as required for the procedure to be available to the
delinquent to exhaust his § 1983 claims against JJC and mental health providers. The court also found that
there was no evidence the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) provided written notice to the
juvenile delinquent housed at JJC facilities of the opportunity to appeal their disciplinary sanctions, which
would have triggered the requirement that he appeal each sanction within 48 hours of notice, as required to
exhaust administrative remedies. (New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission, Juvenile Medium Security
Facility, New Jersey Training School, Juvenile Reception and Assessment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
SPEEDY TRIAL

U.S. v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 2011). After denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment based on
violation of his Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, a defendant pled guilty in district court to conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The defendant appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that a thirty-five month delay between an indictment charging conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine and the defendant's guilty plea was sufficient to trigger an
analysis of the defendant's claim that his Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights were violated. The court found
that the thirty-five month delay was caused solely by the government's gross negligence, for the purposes of
determining whether such a delay violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. The
defendant was serving a term of imprisonment of 110 months following his guilty plea. (U.S. Marshals
Service, Bartow County, Cobb County, Georgia)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against correctional
officers, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in connection with the officers' alleged
failure to comply with the prisoner’s medical orders, which required the prisoner to be housed in a ground
floor cell. The district court dismissed the action and denied the prisoner's motion to alter or amend the
judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The court held that the district
court abused its discretion by failing to consider arguments that directed the court to crucial facts showing he
might have exhausted his administrative remedies, and in addition to being pro se, the prisoner was illiterate,
disabled, and had limited English skills. The court found that the prisoner satisfied the administrative
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to filing his § 1983 action against
the correctional officers, where the prisoner filed grievances addressing the officers' alleged failure to
comply with medical orders several months before filing the complaint. (Mule Creek State Prison,
California)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Albino v. Baca, 697 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2012). A detainee in a county jail brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff, alleging failure to protect him against other inmates, deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, failure to adequately train and supervise deputies, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
gross negligence. The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff. The detainee appealed. The

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appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the sheriff, in asserting the detainee's failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, met his burden of showing that a grievance procedure existed and was not
followed; (2) jail officials did not affirmatively interfere with the detainee's ability to exhaust administrative
remedies, as would provide a basis for excusing failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the
provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); and (3) the detainee failed to show that jail's
grievance procedure was effectively unavailable to him, due to his lack of awareness of the grievance
procedure. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department's, Main Jail, California)
U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging they lost his legal mail. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that when prison staff ignored the detainee's subpoenas it did not violate
his right of access to the courts. The court noted that the detainee was represented by counsel, the subpoenas
were invalid as the detainee was a criminal defendant who had no right under North Carolina common law to
pretrial discovery, North Carolina statutes did not authorize the use of subpoenas “duces tecum” as a
criminal discovery tool, and North Carolina law did not allow criminal defendants to depose witnesses.
(Lincoln County Detention Center, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY

Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that they deprived him of access to the courts by preventing him from using library
resources to prepare a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court dismissed the action and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey. The
court noted that such a claim for damages would require the prisoner to show that the deprivation of access
hindered his efforts to successfully withdraw his guilty plea, which would necessarily implicate the validity
of the prisoner's conviction that he incurred on account of that guilty plea. The court noted that even if the
prisoner was no longer in custody at the time of his § 1983 suit, he could have pursued federal habeas relief
while in custody, but failed to do so. Under Illinois practice, the prisoner had thirty days to file a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, but for the first twenty-nine days of this period, he was held at prison facilities that
lacked library resources of any kind. (Sheridan Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LEGAL MATERIAL

Catanzaro v. Harry, 848 F.Supp.2d 780 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a §
1983 action against a state department of corrections, department officials, a warden, parole board members,
and numerous prison and department employees, alleging violation of his due process rights, violation of the
Fourth Amendment, denial of adequate medical care, his right to free exercise of religion, equal protection,
access to courts, and retaliation. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner had no protected interest in early
release on parole; (2) the requirement that the prisoner complete a sex-offender treatment program as condition for parole did not violate the Due Process Clause as the condition for parole did not exceed the sentence
imposed on the prisoner; (3) the prisoner's conditions at sex-offender treatment facility did not implicate the
prisoner's right to procedural due process, notwithstanding the fact that the prisoner did not have access to
recreational facilities or a law library, the prisoner could not work, the prisoner had to arrange for his own
health care, and the prisoner did not have the opportunity to attend religious services; (4) the transfer of the
prisoner to facility for sex-offender treatment program did not violate his right to substantive due process;
and (5) the prisoner stated a claim for violation of Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, the prisoner's complaint, alleging that a parole agent prevented him from bringing his own legal papers with him during his transfer from a sex-offender treatment facility to a prison, and that as a result, the prisoner was unable
to notify the court of his address change and a lost opportunity to object to dismissal of two retaliation
claims, failed to state a claim for violation of prisoner's right of access to the courts. (Cooper Street Correctional Facility, Residential Sex Offender Program (RSOP) at the Kalamazoo, and Probation Enhancement
Program in Muskegon, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Galeas v. Inpold, 845 F.Supp.2d 685 (W.D.N.C. 2012). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against a mailroom officer, alleging mishandling of his legal mail. The district court granted the officer’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate's allegations that his mother sent him two packages
by certified mail containing his legal papers, that the mailroom officer signed the receipt, and that the inmate
never received the packages were insufficient to plead intentional interference by the officer, as required to
state a § 1983 claim for denial of access to the courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court
also held that the allegations were insufficient to plead an actual injury, as required to state a § 1983 claim
against the mailroom officer for denial of access to the courts, absent allegations as to the contents of those
papers or of the legal to issue to which they were vital. (Lanesboro Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
POSTAGE
INDIGENT INMATES

Gaskins v. Dickhaut, 881 F.Supp.2d 223 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
prison's superintendent and treasurer, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional right of access to
courts under the Fourteenth Amendment. The prisoner challenged a Massachusetts Department of
Corrections' (DOC) regulation that determined that an inmate was not indigent, and thus ineligible for free
postage, if he had more than $10 in his prison account during 60-day period. The defendants moved to
dismiss and the district court allowed the motion. The court held that the inmate failed to allege that the
policy prevented him from pursuing a legal claim or caused him to suffer an actual injury, as required to state
a § 1983 claim against prison officials for denial of access to courts under Fourteenth Amendment, where his
complaint lacked such allegations. (Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Souza Baranowski
Correctional Center)

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U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS
RETALIATION

Gay v. Chandra, 682 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012). A prisoner sued three mental health professionals at the prison
alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required
the cost bond without evaluating the merit or lack of merit of the prisoner's claims, and then dismissed the
case with prejudice when prisoner did not post the bond he could not afford, and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to
consider the prisoner's current ability to afford a bond before requiring one as a condition of prosecuting a
civil rights lawsuit. The court noted that a court's authority to award costs to a prevailing party implies a
power to require the posting of a bond reasonably calculated to cover those costs, even though no statute or
rule expressly authorizes such an order. The court may require a bond where there is reason to believe that
the prevailing party will find it difficult to collect its costs when the litigation ends. The appeals court
described the plaintiff as a “deeply disturbed Illinois inmate with a long history of self-mutilation.” (Tamms
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
FRIVOLOUS CASES

Gibson v. City Municipality of New York, 692 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2012). A detainee in the custody of a state's
mental health commissioner filed a civil rights action against city officials. The district court dismissed the
complaint, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee
was a “prisoner” within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, a
detainee in the custody of the state's mental health commissioner pursuant to a temporary order of
observation was a “prisoner” within the meaning of PLRA, and thus could not proceed in forma pauperis in a
civil rights action against city officials because of his previous frivolous filings, where the criminal
proceedings against the detainee were merely suspended during his confinement and observation, and would
only terminate if he was still being held at the time a temporary order expired or the criminal charges at issue
were otherwise dropped. (Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
FILING FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brought a § 1983 action against employees of a department of corrections (DOC), alleging harassment,
excessive force, denial of medical care, denial of due process, and assault and battery. After denying the
employees' motion for summary judgment, the district court denied the employees' motion for
reconsideration. The employees appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district
court did not have the discretion to waive the pre-filing requirement of exhausting administrative remedies
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court noted that the prisoner exhausted administrative
remedies after his lawsuit was underway, but PLRA required exhaustion to occur prior to filing. (Louisiana
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, filed a § 1983
action against various prison officials, guards, and medical staff, alleging violations of the Eighth
Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the prisoner did not have a clearly established right to
not be continually restrained without clothing or cover in a cell for five days following his ingestion of a
handcuff key, the master key for belt restraints, and the key used for opening cell doors, where restraint had
been imposed to keep the prisoner from re-ingesting those keys; (2) the continuous restraint of the prisoner
without clothing or cover in a cell for five days did not violate his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights; (3) the prisoner's Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims
were barred; and (4) the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the prisoner was competent to
advance his case and was not entitled to appointed counsel. (Waupun Correction Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Hartmann v. Carroll, 882 F.Supp.2d 742 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action,
proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, against a warden, deputy warden, and an employee of the medical
healthcare contractor for the Delaware Department of Correction (DOC). The prisoner alleged deliberate
indifference to his medical needs. The prisoner requested counsel, and the employee moved to dismiss. The
district court denied the request for counsel and denied the motion to dismiss. The court held that evidence
did not support the conclusion that the prisoner was incompetent, where the prisoner had actively
participated in the litigation, and he had been able to represent himself in court. (Sussex Correctional
Institution, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

Hill v. Terrell, 846 F.Supp.2d 488 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against a department of correction (DOC) and prison officials, alleging denial of access to the courts. The
district court granted the defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the prison's
censorship of the prisoner's outgoing mail did not violate his First Amendment rights, where two individuals
contacted the prison with notice that they did not wish to be contacted by the prisoner, the prison policy
permitted withdrawal of the prisoner's privilege to write to a particular person upon request by that person,
and the prisoner was informed that letters would be censored to those people. According to the court, the
prisoner's allegations that prison staff censored his legal mail, preventing him from communicating adequately or confidentially with his attorneys, were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for denial of access to
the courts in violation of the First Amendment, absent allegations of any specific instances where his legal
mail was censored or of an actual injury from the censorship. (Marion Correctional Inst., North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
SPEEDY TRIAL

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that a sheriff, who was sued in his official capacity, violated his rights by detaining him without
charges for nine days, The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the arrestee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff did not violate the substantive due process

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rights of the arrestee, where the sheriff brought the arrestee before court for an initial hearing within 72 hours
of his arrest, followed the court's order in holding the arrestee without bond, and released the arrestee
promptly, within 72 hours of the initial hearing, excluding intervening weekend days, when the prosecutor
did not file charges within the time permitted by the court. (Delaware County Jail, Wisconsin)
U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
ACCESS TO COURTS

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Continued Access to Counsel, 892 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C. 2012). In habeas
proceedings challenging aliens' detentions at the U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, four
detainees moved individually to dismiss their habeas petitions without prejudice, conditioned on their
continued access to counsel under the protective order previously created to assure such rights. Counsel for
two other detainees, who were denied access to their counsel following the denial of their habeas petitions,
moved for an order affirming that the protective order continued to apply to them. The district court
consolidated the motions and held that the protective order continued to govern access to counsel issues for
all detainees who had a right to petition for habeas relief. (U.S. Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Jones v. Pramstaller, 874 F.Supp.2d 713 (W.D.Mich. 2012). The estate of a prisoner who died of viral
meningoencephalitis brought an action under § 1983 against a doctor who provided the prisoner with
medical care under contract with the contractor that provided health care to state prisoners. The doctor
moved for disqualification of the estate's expert witness. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the estate failed to show that the expert witness' testimony was based on common sense rather than
expertise and experience, and the estate failed to show that the expert witness's opinion was based on reliable
principles and methods. The proposed expert witness, a physician, believed that the doctor's unreasonable
delay in having the prisoner hospitalized was probably a cause of the prisoner's death. (Ernest Brooks
Facility, Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Joseph v. Fischer, 900 F.Supp.2d 320 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who observed the Nation of Gods
and Earths (NGE) faith brought an action against correctional officials, alleging that the officials violated his
right to practice his religion, denied his right of access to courts, and retaliated against him. The prisoner
sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The officials moved for judgment on the
pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of
whether correctional officials' restrictions on NGE activities were adequately justified by legitimate security
concerns, as required under the First Amendment and RLUIPA, could not be resolved on a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, since it was not possible, based solely on the pleadings, to determine whether the
actions of the officials had unjustifiably burdened the prisoner's religious exercise. The court found that the
prisoner's allegations, that he was denied access to courts due to a correctional official's confiscation or
destruction of documents, failed to state a claim for denial of access to courts, where the allegations were
conclusory, and the prisoner failed to show what prejudice he suffered as a result of the official's alleged
actions. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVIDENCE

Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340 (8th Cir. 2012). Two pretrial detainees, who were arrested for murder, but
who were subsequently released after their charges were dropped, brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff and investigating officers, alleging violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The district court entered an order denying the defendants' motions for summary judgment, and they
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied in part, and remanded. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a detainee's confession was coerced, and whether
officers fabricated evidence. The court held that the sheriff could not be liable under § 1983 for his alleged
failure to train investigating officers not to fabricate evidence, since any reasonable officer would know that
fabricating evidence was unacceptable. (Cass County Sheriff's Office, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION
EXHAUSTION
DUE PROCESS

Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against
prison officials, alleging, among other things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment, violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and denial of
access to courts. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order and
stay, and the prisoner moved for a temporary restraining order, for a continuance to permit discovery, and to
strike portions of the defendants' motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner was not
responsible for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA); and (2) the prisoner’s allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim. (Federal Correctional Center in Butner, North Carolina, and Rivers Corr’l Institution,
operated by the GEO Group, Inc)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Powell v. Symons, 680 F.3d 301 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action asserting Eighth
Amendment claim that a physician was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court
granted summary judgment for the defendant and the prisoner appealed. Another prisoner filed a similar
claim and the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and that prisoner appealed. The
appeals were consolidated. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the district court abused
its discretion as to one prisoner in not entering an order appointing an appropriate representative under the
guardian ad litem rule, and that a letter from a physician as to the other prisoner sufficed to put the district
court on notice that the prisoner possibly was incompetent. The court noted that the letter from the physician
stated that the prisoner “is under my care for Major Depression and Attention Deficit Disorder. I do not feel
he is competent at this time to represent himself in court. I would recommend that he be given a public
defender, if at all possible.” (SCI–Rockview, Pennsylvania)

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U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Rahim v. Holden, 882 F.Supp.2d 638 (D.Del. 2012). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought an action against prison officials, alleging violations of his due process rights related to his
parole. The officials moved for dismissal. The district court denied the motion. The court held that a grievance procedure was unavailable to the state prisoner with regard to claims against prison officials as to alleged Fourteenth Amendment due process violations related to his parole, and therefore, the prisoner was
excused from the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. The
prisoner was denied parole, which he believed was for arbitrary and constitutionally impermissible reasons,
but instructions for filing a grievance specifically stated that parole decisions were non-grievable. The court
noted that another form indicated he could appeal a parole decision to the Board of Parole by writing a letter
to the Board, and he wrote letters to Board. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS
42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983

Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
doctor, alleging that a delay in treatment violated the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the
doctor's motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that
the allegations were sufficient to plead incapacitation. According to the court, the prisoner's allegations that
he had several surgeries that disabled him, that he was in constant pain and unable to walk when out of a
hospital, and that he filed suit as soon as he could muster concentration and energy to do so, were sufficient
to plead incapacitation, as required to toll the limitations period under Indiana law for the prisoner's § 1983
claim against the prison doctor for violations of the Eighth Amendment. (Pendleton Corr’l. Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
POSTAGE
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION
WRITING MATERIAL

Ripp v. Nickel, 838 F.Supp.2d 861 (W.D.Wis. 2012). A prisoner brought an action against a prison warden
and other prison administrators claiming he was disciplined for threatening to file a lawsuit. The prisoner
moved to compel the warden to provide writing materials and postage. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the prisoner's right to have meaningful access to courts was violated when the warden refused to
provide postage to the prisoner, who had no money in his inmate trust fund account to purchase his own
postage, so that he could mail his summary judgment material to the court to pursue his claim that he was
disciplined for threatening to file a lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner would suffer an actual injury
without the warden's assistance since he would be unable to file his summary judgment materials or otherwise continue litigating his case, and the prisoner's claim was not frivolous. (Columbia Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
SELF INCRIMINATION

Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204 (3rd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
after a state court denied habeas relief, alleging that state's decision to deny him parole, unless he admitted
his guilt and participated in sex offender treatment program, violated his Fifth Amendment right against self
incrimination. The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the parole
condition did not violate the prisoner's right against self incrimination. The court noted that the state had a
legitimate interest in rehabilitating prisoners, the prisoner did not have any right or entitlement to parole
under state law, his sentence was not lengthened, and the actual conditions of his imprisonment had not been
altered. (Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
TRANSFER

Shah v. Danberg, 855 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who pled guilty but mentally ill to a
charge of first degree murder filed a § 1983 action against a state judge and prison officials alleging that his
placement in a correctional center, rather than in a psychiatric center, violated his constitutional rights. The
court held that the state judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from liability in inmate's § 1983
action despite the inmate's contention that the judge's incorrect application of a state statute resulted in violation of his constitutional rights, where there were no allegations that the judge acted outside the scope of her
judicial capacity, or in the absence of jurisdiction. The could ruled that the state inmate failed to establish the
likelihood of success on the merits of his claim and thus was not entitled to a preliminary injunction ordering
his transfer, despite the inmate's contention that he was mentally unstable and had repeatedly caused himself
physical injury during his suicide attempts, where medical records the inmate submitted were ten years old,
and a state supreme court recognized that prison officials had discretion to house inmates at facilities they
chose. The court ordered the appointment of counsel, noting that the inmate was unable to afford legal representation, he had a history of mental health problems, and the matter presented complex legal issues. (James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
EXPERT WITNESS

Stanfill v. Talton, 851 F.Supp.2d 1346 (M.D.Ga. 2012). The father of a pretrial detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action individually, and as administrator of the detainee's estate,
against a county sheriff and others, alleging that the defendants violated the detainee's rights under the Eighth
and Fourteenth amendments. The county defendants moved for summary judgment, and the father crossmoved for partial summary judgment and for sanctions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the father failed to establish that the county defendants had a duty to
preserve any video of the detainee in his cells, as would support sanctions against the defendants in the father's civil rights action. The court noted that the defendants did not anticipate litigation resulting from the
detainee's death, the father did not file suit until almost two years after the detainee's death, and there was no
indication that the father requested that the defendants impose a litigation hold or provided the defendants
any form of notice that litigation was imminent or even contemplated until the lawsuit was actually filed.
The court ruled that “All parties can agree that Stanfill's death was unfortunate, and that in hindsight, perhaps
more could have been done. Hindsight, however, is not an appropriate lens through which to view the
Defendants' actions. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving that the Defendants violated
Stanfill's constitutional rights. The Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.” (Houston
County Detention Center, Georgia)

XXIV

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U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
LEGAL MATERIAL
RETALIATION
TRANSFER

Surles v. Andison, 678 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 2012). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials had confiscated his legal papers and computer disks on multiple occasions, damaged or destroyed
legal and religious papers and property, taken actions to deprive him of access to courts, violated his First
Amendment rights, retaliated against him by filing false misconduct charges and transferring him to other
prisons, and conspired against him to violate his rights. The district court entered summary judgment in the
officials' favor, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the state inmate exhausted
his administrative remedies, and whether prison officials prevented the inmate from filing grievances and
exhausting his administrative remedies. (Michigan Dept. of Corrections, Gus Harrison Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LEGAL ASSISTANCE

U.S. v. Maricopa County, Ariz., 915 F.Supp.2d 1073 (D.Ariz. 2012). The United States filed an action
against a county, the county sheriff's office, and the sheriff in his official capacity, relating to treatment of
Latinos, including jail detainees, and asserting claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment, retaliation in
violation of the First Amendment, violations of equal protection and due process, and discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin in violation of Title VI and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court denied the county's motion, and
granted the sheriff and sheriff's office motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the sheriff's
office was an entity that was not capable of being sued in its own name. The court found that allegations that
the county sheriff's office and the sheriff conducted jail operations in English and provided inadequate language assistance to the large jail population of Latino inmates who were limited English proficient (LEP)
individuals, thereby denying the Latino LEP inmates meaningful access to jail programs such as sanitary
needs, food, clothing, legal information, and religious services, stated a claim for disparate impact discrimination under Title VI by programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. (Maricopa County
Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
TELEPHONE

U.S. v. Salyer, 853 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A defendant in a criminal prosecution moved to suppress recordings of telephone calls he made while in pretrial detention, and the government moved for an
order permitting it to listen to and use the recordings. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that most of the recorded conversations were not covered by attorney-client
privilege, and conversations in which legal advice was the predominate purpose were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The court noted that attorney-client communication was not the predominate purpose of
telephone conversations between defendant and attorney who was a friend and who did not represent him in
the criminal case. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVALUATION
EVIDENCE

U.S. v. Thornberg, 676 F.3d 703 (8th Cir. 2012). Following his apprehension more than six years after escaping from federal prison camp, a defendant pled not guilty, by reason of insanity, to the charge of escape
from custody. The district court granted the defendant's first motion for a psychiatric evaluation, denied his
second motion for a psychiatric evaluation, and sentenced him to 30 months in prison upon his conviction by
a jury for escape. The defendant appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court found that although
a forensic psychologist from the federal Bureau of Prisons did not review the indigent defendant's full medical history, a psychiatric evaluation determining that the defendant did not suffer from a severe mental defect
was not deficient, precluding his claim of deprivation of due process by a single evaluation performed by a
psychologist rather than psychiatrist, and by denial of his request for a second evaluation to assess his competency to stand trial. The court noted that the psychologist reviewed defendant's medical records dating
from the time of his escape and concluded that his feelings of persecution from his family that allegedly coerced him to escape from prison were not evidence that he had delusions, as those feelings disappeared immediately after he escaped, and that his attempts to evade detection after escape could be seen as evidence of
his understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct. (Federal Prison Camp, Duluth, Minnesota)

U.S. Appeals Court
LAW LIBRARY
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

U.S. v. Tyerman, 701 F.3d 552 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant was convicted in district court of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and he appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. After a trial, the defendant was convicted in the district court of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, and possession of a stolen firearm. His motion for acquittal or new trial was denied and the defendant appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the government's passive conduct in receiving information regarding the location of the defendant's gun, from the defendant's counsel, did not violate the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel. The court found that the defendant's conduct in creating handcuff keys
and practicing the use of them constituted a substantial step, as an element of attempt, with respect to escaping from pretrial incarceration, for purposes of using attempted escape as the basis for a sentence enhancement for obstruction of justice. At sentencing, a U.S. Marshal testified that prison guards discovered two
homemade handcuff keys in the defendant’s cell. According to the Marshal, during the investigation, other
inmates revealed the defendant’s plans to escape from jail and his use of the law library (which lacked surveillance) to practice removing handcuffs. (U. S. District Court, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
COMPUTERS
LEGAL MATERIAL
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F.Supp.2d 489 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A female state inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action
against a prison's correction officers, officials, and medical staff, asserting 25 claims contesting the conditions of her confinement and the conduct of the staff. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s complaint stated due process
claims based on insufficient notice of a disciplinary hearing and on the inmate's allegedly improper removal
from a disciplinary hearing. According to the court, the pro se state inmate's allegations that she was denied
access to a computer failed to state a claim against prison officials for due process violations absent allegations that such denial constituted an atypical and significant hardship to her. Although the inmate claimed

1.187

that it was impossible for her to perform legal work because courts no longer accepted hand-written documents, the court did not prohibit hand-written documents and had accepted them on prior motions in the
inmate's case. (Bedford Hills Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY
TELEPHONE
SPEEDY TRIAL

Waganfeald v. Gusman, 674 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 2012). Pre-trial detainees who had been arrested for public
intoxication and were incarcerated in New Orleans when Hurricane Katrina struck the city brought a § 1983
action against a sheriff, chief deputy, and others, alleging claims for violations of their Fourth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment rights, as well as claims for false imprisonment under Louisiana law. A jury trial was
held. After denying the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, the district court entered judgment on the jury verdict for the plaintiffs on some of the claims, and denied the defendants' post-verdict
motions for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed, vacated, and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that under Louisiana
law, the sheriff's actions fell within the emergency exception to the 48-hour rule, and so the plaintiffs' detention was not “unlawful,” as required to establish their claim of false imprisonment, despite the sheriff's failure to release them when they were not granted a probable cause determination within 48 hours after their
arrest. The court found that, even if the plaintiffs had a Sixth Amendment right to counsel during the period
in question, the chief deputy did not act in an objectively unreasonable manner in light of clearly established
law when, after the prison's land-line telephones became inoperable, he refused to let the plaintiffs use their
cell phones to call an attorney. (Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, Louisiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
RETALIATION

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights and Nevada laws. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to the in forma pauperis (IFP) statute, and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held that the
humiliation that the state inmate suffered during an alleged incident did not rise to the level of severe psychological pain as required to state an Eighth Amendment claim. The inmate alleged that a correctional officer
entered the inmate's cell while the inmate was on the toilet and, while the inmate was still on the toilet,
rubbed his thigh against inmate's thigh and smiled in sexual manner, then left the cell laughing, The court
found that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against a correctional officer
and an associate warden by alleging that he engaged in protected conduct by filing grievances against the
officer and alleging: (1) that the officer and the associate warden took adverse actions against him, including
filing of a false disciplinary charge against him, placing him in administrative segregation, and telling lies
that resulted in denial of his parole, and (2) that such adverse actions were taken shortly after, and in retaliation for, the filing of grievances, and that the adverse actions, which involved more than minimal harms, had
no legitimate penological reason. The court held that the inmate sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim against a correctional officer by asserting that he had filed grievances against the officer, who
allegedly refused to give him his breakfast, that the officer mentioned grievances during same interaction in
which the officer refused to give the inmate his breakfast, that the officer's conduct was retaliatory, and that
the inmate also asked during the same interaction to file an additional grievance about the denial of breakfast. (Nevada State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia jail who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court entered
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district
court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure of District of Columbia jail personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and
monitoring of inmate movements was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow inmate was
for the jury, in the detainee's negligence action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate who was
being held at the D.C. Jail on charges of first-degree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had received a
pass to go to the jail's law library, unaccompanied. Apparently he did not arrive at the library but no one
from the library called the inmate’s housing unit to report that he had not arrived. An expert retained by the
detainee asserted that failure to monitor inmate movements violated national standards for the operation of
jails. En route to the jail mental health unit, the detainee saw the inmate enter a mop closet. The inmate,
along with another inmate, approached the detainee and stabbed him nine times with a knife. During court
proceedings there was testimony that the inmates had hidden contraband in the mop closets. The closets are
supposed to be locked at all times, other than when the jail is being cleaned each afternoon. But there was
evidence from which the jury could infer that all inmates except those who did not have jobs cleaning in the
jail had access to them. According to the detainee’s expert witness, keeping mop closets locked at times
when the general inmate population is permitted to be in the vicinity of the closets is in accordance with
national standards of care for the operation of detention facilities. According to the district court, “In sum,
the circumstantial evidence of Mr. Foreman's [inmate who attacked the detainee] freedom of movement is
enough to have allowed a jury to conclude that the District's negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”. (District of Columbia Central Detention Facility)
2013

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
DUE PROCESS

Allen v. Clements, 930 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.Colo. 2013). Inmates in the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) who had been sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment under the Colorado Sex Offender
Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) brought a class action against CDOC officials, alleging under § 1983 that
the officials were arbitrarily denying them sex offender treatment and interfering with their access to counsel
and courts. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion.

1.188

The court held that: (1) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) terminating one inmate's
treatment because of polygraphs did not violate due process; (3) denial of re-enrollment requests did not
implicate the inmates' liberty interests; (4) termination procedures comported with procedural due process;
and (5) the inmates failed to state a substantive due process claim. (Colorado Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Aref v. Holder, 953 F.Supp.2d 133 (D.D.C. 2013). Current and former prisoners brought an action against
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), BOP officials, and the Attorney General, claiming that their First and Fifth
Amendment rights were violated when they were placed in Communications Management Units (CMUs), in
which their ability to communicate with the outside world was seriously restricted. Following dismissal of all
but the procedural due process and First Amendment retaliation claims, the defendants moved to dismiss the
First Amendment claims. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) the prisoner's release from BOP custody rendered moot his official-capacity claims for equitable relief;
(2) a second prisoner sufficiently alleged a First Amendment retaliation claim; but (3) the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) barred the prisoners' individual-capacity claims against a BOP official for mental or
emotional injury. (Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute, Indiana, and Marion, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
EXPERT WITNESS

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 924 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2013). Inmates at local jails brought a class action, under § 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated their Fourth,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. Following certification of the classes, the parties filed pretrial motions
to exclude or limit certain evidence from being introduced at the liability trial. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) records of inmate over-detentions constituted
admissible hearsay evidence; (2) evidence of a settlement in a related class action was admissible under the
“other purposes” exception of the rule governing admission of settlement evidence; (3) an expert's testimony
regarding the total number of over-detentions occurring during particular periods was admissible; and (4)
evidence regarding strip searches performed on inmates was not admissible. The District of Columbia attacked the methodology of the expert, but the court noted that the expert had years of experience reviewing
inmate jackets and other data to determine whether an inmate was over-detained, had personally reviewed
hundreds of inmate jackets, and had educated himself on the system of collecting inmate data. (District of
Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVIDENCE

Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought an action under § 1983 against a county board of commissioners, sheriff, deputies, and jail nurse, alleging violations of his constitutional rights
during his arrest. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion.
The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The appeals court held that: (1) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the force used against
the arrestee was reasonable; (2) a corrections officer and the jail nurse were not liable for failure to prevent
deputy sheriffs from using excessive force, absent a showing that the nurse and officer had both the opportunity and the means to prevent the harm from occurring; (3) the nurse was not liable for deliberate indifference to the arrestee's medical needs, where the arrestee's latent cranial injury was not so obvious that a lay
person would easily have recognized the necessity for a doctor's attention; (4) the county board of commissioners was not liable under § 1983 for any alleged conduct of deputy sheriffs in violating the arrestee's federal constitutional rights, absent a showing that any county policy or custom was the moving force behind
the alleged violations; (5) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a deputy sheriffs' use of force
against the arrestee was reckless under Ohio law; (6) a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a
deputy sheriff assaulted the arrestee in response to an off-color jibe; and (7) genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether the county board of commissioners, sheriff, and deputies knew that litigation was probable and whether their destruction of videotape evidence of deputies' use of force against the arrestee was
willful. (Greene County Jail, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging prison
employees retaliated against him for exercising his federal constitutional right to file administrative grievances about his medical care. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. The prisoner
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the defendant had three strikes under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) in forma pauperis provision, and that dismissal of a complaint as
repetitive and an abuse of process constituted a strike under the PLRA's in forma pauperis provision. (Lawton Correctional Facility, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Clay v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 982 F.Supp.2d 904 (N.D.Iowa 2013). A female arrestee brought a § 1983
action against a city, an arresting officer, county, county sheriff, and jail officers, alleging, among other
things, that jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in unconstitutional manner,
and did so in retaliation for her vociferous complaints about her detention and the search of her purse and
cell phone. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the arrestee moved to exclude expert testimony. The district court held that the expert's reference to an incorrect standard for the excessive force claim did
not warrant excluding his opinions in their entirety, although portions of the expert's report were inadmissible. According to the court, the officers did not violate the arrestee’s privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment where the officers' reason for removing the arrestee's bra-- institutional safety-- was substantially justified, and the scope of the intrusion was relatively small. The court also found that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity from the female arrestee's § 1983 unlawful search claim, where the officers
neither knew, nor reasonably should have known, that their actions would violate the arrestee's privacy
rights. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

1.189

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED
ATTORNEY
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
LEGAL MATERIAL
LAW LIBRARY

Cox v. LNU, 924 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan. 2013). A state inmate brought a pro se civil rights action in state
court. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The inmate moved to secure case law cited in the
defendants' court filings and for the appointment of counsel. The district court denied the motions. The court
held that: (1) the defendants were not required to furnish copies of unpublished cases that were available
through electronic providers; (2) the court would not exercise its discretion to require the defendants to provide copies of published decisions; (3) the inmate's declaration that he was “broke” and had “no money or
assets for anything” did not qualify as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis; and (4) even if the inmate
qualified for in forma pauperis status, discretionary authority to request appointment of counsel would not be
exercised. (Johnson County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVIDENCE
LEGAL MATERIAL
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two prison
officials, claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his
legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion
for summary judgment, and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from
a prison official to a law librarian supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the
authenticity of the e-mail, and no evidence that the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose
or transmit the purported e-mail. The court held that the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal
materials from his cell, to eliminate a fire hazard and to make it easier for officials to conduct searches and
inventories of the prisoner's property during prison searches, was not retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a
prior lawsuit. According to the court, the prisoner's speculation regarding the officials' motive could not
overcome the officials' sworn statements on the motion for summary judgment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL SUIT
EVIDENCE

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). A former member of a county board of supervisors
brought an action against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, a former county attorney, and deputy
county attorneys, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law for wrongful institution of civil proceedings,
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment and arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful search. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion,
and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions. The court held that summary judgment for the
defendants was precluded by fact issues: (1) with respect to the malicious prosecution claims; (2) as to
whether misrepresentations and omissions of evidence in a search warrant affidavit were material; (3) as to
unlawful search claims against the sheriff and deputy county attorneys; (4) with respect to the false arrest
claim; and (5) with respect to the claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. The court noted that a
reasonable magistrate would not have issued a search warrant based on the accurate and complete representation of known evidence. The court held that the retaliatory animus of the county sheriff and prosecutors
would chill a person of ordinary firmness from criticizing the sheriff and prosecutors and from vigorously
litigating against them. According to the court, fact issues as to whether the county sheriff and prosecutors
acted outrageously and either intended the arrestee harm, or were recklessly indifferent to whether their actions would infringe on his rights and cause him severe distress, precluded summary judgment for the defendants with regard to the claim for punitive damages in the action for unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment violations. (Maricopa County Sheriff and County Attorneys, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LEGAL MAIL
RETALIATION

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J..2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided
food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional
torts related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on: (1) the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an
interference with legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately
withheld the detainee's legal mail during a two-week period; and (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim
based on interference with legal mail. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Fluker v. County of Kankakee, 741 F.3d 787 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate and his wife filed a § 1983 action
against a county and the county sheriff's office to recover for injuries the inmate suffered when a correctional
officer who was driving a jail transport vehicle was required to brake suddenly, causing the inmate to hurtle
forward and hit his head on a metal divider. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court had the
ability, in the interests of judicial economy and finality, to address the merits of the suit once it determined
that the inmate had not exhausted his remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Kankakee
County, Jerome Combs Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Ford-Sholebo v. U.S., 980 F.Supp.2d 917 (N.D.Ill. 2013). The wife of a deceased pretrial detainee who suffered from a seizure disorder, individually and as administrator of the detainee's estate, brought a wrongful
death action against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The district court
held that: (1) evidence supported a finding that the detainee had a seizure disorder; (2) correctional facility
employees breached the standard of care for treating the detainee's seizure disorder; (3) the employees' failures and breaches of the standard of care proximately caused the detainee's death; and (4) an award of damages to the wife in the amount of $40,000 for the loss of consortium was appropriate. The court noted that the
testimony of the administrator's expert physician and a pathologist who was subpoenaed to testify at trial,

1.190

that the detainee suffered from a seizure disorder, was overwhelmingly credible, while testimony of the government's two experts, that the detainee did not have seizure disorder, was incredible and unreliable. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Chicago, and Kankakee County Detention Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
DUE PROCESS

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was
subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals,
seeking an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the statute
authorizing mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was
entitled to a bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County
Jail and House of Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County,
Sheriff of Plymouth County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C. 2013). A juvenile detainee's mother filed a §
1983 action against the District of Columbia for violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligent hiring,
training, and supervision, after the detainee was attacked and killed by other detainees. After the district
court ruled in the District's favor, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the District moved
for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that officials at the juvenile
detention facility were not deliberately indifferent to a known safety risk, and thus their failure to protect the
detainee from an attack by another detainee did not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court,
there was no evidence of a history of assaults on youth at the facility, such that any facility employee knew
or should have known that a fight between the detainee and another youth was going to take place, or that the
youth who fought with the detainee had a history of assaultive behavior while at the facility. The court also
found no evidence that a municipal custom, policy, or practice caused any such violation. The court also held
that the mother’s failure to designate an expert witness barred her claim. (Oak Hill Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner filed an action against a state and state officers seeking damages and injunctive relief stemming from his unlawful confinement in a prison system. The
district court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court found that the statute of limitations applicable to the prisoner's § 1983 complaint had not been
triggered until the state court of appeals issued its holding that the prisoner had been improperly sentenced to
consecutive terms for his convictions and remanded the case for entry of a corrected judgment. The court
noted that although the prisoner apparently had learned that he was being held unlawfully while still in prison, he did not have knowledge of his injury until the state court of appeals established that he had suffered
such an injury. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Michigan Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES
EQUAL PROTECTION

Johnson v. Government of Dist. of Columbia, 734 F.3d 1194 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Female arrestees who were
forced to endure strip searches while awaiting presentment at hearings at the District of Columbia Superior
Court filed a class action against the District of Columbia and a former United States Marshal for the Superior Court, alleging that such searches violated the Fourth Amendment. They also alleged a violation of the
Fifth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee, where men were not similarly strip searched. The district
court granted summary judgment to the District and the Marshal. The arrestees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court found that the former marshal who administered the Superior Court cellblock
was at all times a federal official acting under the color of federal law, and, thus, the District of Columbia
could not be held liable under § 1983 for the marshal's conduct. The court noted that the statutory scheme
gave the District of Columbia no power to exercise authority over, or to delegate authority to, the marshal,
and lacked the discretion to stop sending pre-presentment arrestees to the marshal. According to the court,
any Fourth Amendment right that the former United States Marshal may have violated by subjecting detainees arrested on minor charges to blanket strip searches was not clearly established at the time of any violation, and therefore the marshal was entitled to qualified immunity on the detainees' claims alleging violations
of their Fourth Amendment rights. The court also found no evidence that the marshal purposefully directed
that women should be treated differently than men with respect to the strip-search policy at the Superior
Court cellblock, in violation of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. (District of Columbia,
United States Marshal for the Superior Court)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812 (7th Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a suit under § 1983 against a
guard who allegedly failed to protect him from an attack by other inmates. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the guard, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the guard acted with a conscious disregard of a significant risk of violence to the detainee, when she noted
that two cells in the corridor where she was posted were not securely locked, but only noted that this was a
“security risk” in her log. The guard then let several of the inmates who were supposed to remain locked up
out of their cells, let them congregate in a darkened corridor, and then left her post, so that no guard was
present to observe more than 20 maximum-security prisoners milling about. The court found that the detainee was entitled to appointed counsel in his § 1983 suit against a prison guard. According to the court, although the case was not analytically complex, its sound resolution depended on evidence to which detainee in
his distant lockup had no access, and the detainee needed to, but could not, depose the guard in order to explore the reason for her having left her post and other issues. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

1.191

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RETALIATION
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
FRIVOLOUS SUITS

Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against a warden and
other state officials, claiming retaliation for the website of the prisoner's mother that allegedly exposed prison
corruption and fought for prisoners' rights. The district court granted the officials summary judgment. The
prisoner appealed, and the officials moved to dismiss on the ground that the prisoner was disqualified from
proceeding in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The appeals court held that, in
a matter of first impression, repeated knowing violations of the notice pleading rule are strikes under PLRA,
and the prisoner was disqualified from proceeding in forma pauperis. The court noted that the prisoner's two
prior appeals that were dismissed as frivolous for lack of good faith counted as strikes, and his three prior
complaints that violated the notice pleading rule's short and plain statement requirement counted as strikes
for failure to state a claim, as he was given leave to amend but failed to correct the violations after repeated
warnings by the district court. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MATERIALS
TYPEWRITER

Kramer v. Conway, 962 F.Supp.2d 1333 (N.D.Ga. 2013). A pretrial detainee at a county jail brought an
action against the jail, the jail administrator, and a county sheriff, alleging that conditions of his confinement
violated his right to practice his Orthodox Jewish faith, that the defendants violated his right to possess legal
reference books, and that the defendants failed to accommodate his physical disabilities. The detainee moved
for a preliminary and a permanent injunction and moved for leave to file a second amendment to his verified
complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motions in part and
granted the motion in part. The court held that the pretrial detainee’s allegation that the county jail denied
him books needed to practice his Orthodox Jewish religious faith failed to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), absent evidence that the county jail received
federal funds in connection with its policies limiting the number and type of books allowed in cells. The
court held that the county jail's policy of limiting the number of religious books that the pretrial detainee, an
Orthodox Jew, could keep in his cell, but providing him access to others that were not in his cell, was based
on legitimate penological interests, and thus, did not violate the detainee's rights under the Free Exercise
Clause. According to the court, a uniformly applied books-in-cell limitation was reasonable in a facility that
housed 2,200 inmates, the limitation was applied in a neutral way and the expressive content of books was
not considered, books in sufficient quantities could be used as weapons and presented fire and obstacle hazards, access to other books was made by exchanging out titles and by allowing the copying of parts or all of a
text, and the detainee was not denied access to nine religious books he claimed were required in practicing
his faith, but rather, argued only that access was required to be more convenient. The court held that the jail's
policy that limited the number and type of books allowed in a cell did not violate the pretrial detainee's Due
Process rights, where there was no evidence that the policy was intended to punish the detainee, the jail's
policies prohibiting hard cover books and limiting the number of books allowed in a cell were reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests, and the jail gave the detainee substantial access to legal materials
by increasing the time he was allowed in the library and liberally allowing him to copy legal materials to
keep in his cell. The court held that the jail, the jail administrator, and the county sheriff's denial of a typewriter in the pretrial detainee's cell to accommodate his alleged handwriting disability did not violate the
detainee's rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted that the detainee was able to write by hand, although he stated he experienced pain when doing so. According to the
court, if the detainee chose to avoid writing by hand he had substantial access to a typewriter in the jail's law
library, there was no permanent harm from the handwriting he performed, there was no evidence the detainee
was not able to adequately communicate with lawyers and jail officials without a typewriter in his cell, and
the accommodation of an in-cell typewriter would impose an undue burden on jail personnel because metal
and moving parts of typewriter could be used as weapons. (Gwinnett County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
EVALUATION
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison guards
claiming that the guards used excessive force to subdue him after he punched a prison guard. The district
court granted summary judgment for the guards. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the prisoner's request for
the appointment of counsel under the federal in forma pauperis statute in the prisoner's § 1983 action, where
the court focused on the prisoner's competency to try his case instead of whether the prisoner appeared competent to litigate his own claims. The appeals court found that the trial court failed to address the prisoner's
personal abilities and allegations that he had limited education, mental illness, language difficulties, and
lacked access to other resources, and the court applied the appellate review standard of whether the recruitment of counsel would affect the outcome of the case. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
TELEPHONE
WRITING MATERIAL

Nelson v. District of Columbia, 928 F.Supp.2d 210 (D.D.C. 2013). A detainee brought a § 1983 claim
against the District of Columbia arising from his stay in jail. The defendant moved to dismiss and the district
court granted the motion. The court held that denial of one telephone call and access to stationery during the
detainee's five-day stay in a “Safe Cell,” which was located in the jail's infirmary, did not implicate his First
Amendment right of free speech or right of access to courts. The court noted that denial of the detainee’s
request to have the cell cleaned was for the non-punitive reason that the detainee would not be in the cell that
long. (D.C. Jail, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
LAW LIBRARY
PRO SE LITIGATION

Parkell v. Morgan, 917 F.Supp.2d 328 (D.Del. 2013). A pretrial detainee, proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a medical provider and various officials, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that the detainee’s allegations that he did not have adequate law library access were insufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violation
of the First Amendment right of access to the courts, where the detainee alleged he was provided access to a
law library, just not type he desired. The court held that the detainee's allegations that he adhered to a mystic

1.192

branch of Wicca and that the prison offered limited selection of diets to satisfy his religious needs were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for violation of his First Amendment religious rights. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, Delaware)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a
district attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to §
1983, statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA),
as well as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part.
The court held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local
government liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison
officials to implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately
train their employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said
to have acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due
process claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment;
(3) bail; and (4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of
her liberty without due process.
The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district attorney under § 1983 by the
detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers such as bills
of information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing what he
was signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due
process. The court found a substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after obtaining clear direct knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the
district attorney still failed to correct the mistakes that caused the detention, and to cover up his failures in
connection with the case, the district attorney made a conscious decision to bring belated charges against the
detainee. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison officials under §
1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she was mentally
disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis.
(East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
LEGAL MAIL
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS

Randolph v. Wetzel, 987 F.Supp.2d 605 (E.D.Pa. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against public
officials employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and prison medical providers, alleging, among
other things, that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and provided inadequate medical treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and the inmate cross-moved for
partial summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motions in part and denied in part, and
denied the inmate’s motion. The district court held that state prison officials were not deliberately indifferent
to the inmate's allegedly serious medical condition, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in requiring the
inmate to use a wheelchair to access outdoors for “yard time” or to see visitors, rather than transporting the
inmate on a gurney. The court noted that the officials relied on the medical providers' judgment that the inmate was able to sit up and get into a wheelchair.According to the court, the inmate's absence at his misconduct hearings, allegedly due to his injuries, and his subsequent sentence of 540 days of disciplinary custody,
did not violate his procedural due process rights, where the inmate received both advanced written notice of
the claimed violation and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon in reaching
their decision. The court found that the inmate's alleged restricted access to his personal effects and legal
mail when he was moved between cells, and his alleged denial of access to a law library, did not result in an
actual injury to inmate, thus precluding his § 1983 access to courts claim. The court noted that the inmate
proceeded with all of his legal claims in addition to his complaint of denial of access to courts. (SCI
Graterford, SCI Greene, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
RECORDS

Reid v. Cumberland County, 34 F.Supp.3d 396 (D.N.J. 2013). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a
county, its department of corrections, warden, and correctional officers alleging that officers used excessive
force against him. The inmate moved to compel discovery. The district court granted the motion. The court
held that: (1) information regarding past instances of excessive force by correctional officers was relevant to
the inmate's supervisory liability claims; (2) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files were relevant;
(3) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files were not protected by the official information privilege;
(4) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files were not protected by the deliberative process privilege;
(5) internal affairs files concerning the incident in question were subject to discovery; (6) the county failed to
adequately demonstrate that the inmate's request for prior instances of excessive force and accompanying
documentation was sufficiently burdensome to preclude discovery; and (7) complaints about officers' excessive force, statistics of excessive force, the county's use of force reports, and related internal affairs files were
not protected by the official information privilege or the deliberative process privilege. (Cumberland County
Department of Corrections, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Riley v. Kolitwenzew, 967 F.Supp.2d 1251 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee filed a civil rights action alleging that county jail officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. On remand, the detainee moved for reconsideration of an order denying recruitment of pro bono
counsel to handle his case. The district court denied the motion. According to the court, even if appointment

1.193

of counsel might make the detainee more effective in presenting his case, the detainee had demonstrated his
ability to competently file motions and participate in litigation, the detainee was knowledgeable, reasonable,
and capable of understanding the nature of his allegations, and the detainee's complaint and motions were
well written and demonstrated a clear understanding of the issues involved. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY
EQUAL PROTECTION

Simmons v. Adamy, 987 F.Supp.2d 302 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). A Muslim inmate brought a § 1983 action against
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) officials and a corrections officer, alleging, among other
things, that the defendants subjected him to unlawful retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment, and inmate cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion.
The court held that the alleged actions of prison officials in restricting the law library access of the Muslim
inmate after he filed grievances, scheduling his library “call-outs” to conflict with religious celebrations and
classes, and filing a false misbehavior report, were not adverse actions that could support the inmate's § 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that there was no evidence that: (1) the inmate was treated differently from other inmates who had not pursued grievances; (2) he was afforded less than reasonable,
or less than typical, access to the law library; (3) his free exercise rights were affected in more than a de
minimis fashion; or (4) he was unfairly disciplined as a result of the report. The court found that the inmate
was not denied reasonable access to a prison law library, thus precluding his denial of access to courts claim
under § 1983, where during the year-and-a-half that the inmate was incarcerated at the prison, he was scheduled for more than 100 law library “call-outs” and was granted “special access” to the library on eight different occasions. The court noted that the inmate received more frequent access to the law library during his
incarceration than any other inmate, visiting the law library as many as 63 times in seven months. According
to the court, the prison's scheduling of the Muslim inmate's law library call-outs to conflict with Muslim
classes, services, and observances, did not place a substantial burden on the inmate's ability to practice his
religion, and thus did not amount to denial of the inmate's religious freedom under the First Amendment or
the Religious Land Use Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the overlap occurred less than 20%
of the time. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
WITNESS

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought
an action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging
violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. After a verdict in favor of the detainee, the defendants
moved for a new trial based on nondisclosure of the existence of attorney-client relationship between the
detainee's counsel and a witness, who was a lead plaintiff in other proceedings. The district court denied the
motion, finding that failure to volunteer information about their representation of the witness was not fraud,
misrepresentation, or misconduct, and did not substantially interfere with the defense. The detainee alleged
that, because of his mental illness, officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for
virtually the entire 22 months of his incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate
medical care, and without periodic review of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration,
in 1violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive
d1amages against the Detention Center Director, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against the facility
me1dical director. The jury fixed the amount of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, which included
$5010,000 for each month that detainee was incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since
the detainee’s release from custody. (Doña Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES

Small v. Camden County, 728 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2013). A paraplegic prisoner who was confined to a wheelchair brought a civil rights action against a county correctional facility, approximately thirty individual medical personnel and prison officers, and nine John Does. The district court dismissed the action for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The
appeals court held that because prison procedures did not contemplate an appeal from a non-decision, when
the prisoner failed to receive even a response to grievances addressing certain incidents, much less a decision
as to those grievances, the appeals process was “unavailable” to him for the exhaustion purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Camden County Correctional Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LAW LIBRARY

Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79 (N.D.N.Y.2013). An inmate who had recently been released from the
custody of a county jail filed a pro se suit against a sheriff and jail administrator, claiming his First Amendment rights were violated by his inability to access a law library and to engage in religious worship while
confined in involuntary protective custody (IPC). The inmate also alleged that he was discriminated against
and placed in IPC because he was a sex offender, in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, and that
his conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Both sides moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that there was no evidence of injury, as required to support a claim for violation of the First
Amendment's right of access to the courts; According to the court, there was no evidence that the inmate
suffered any type of actual injury as a result of receiving only one trip to the facility's law library during his
132-day confinement in involuntary protective custody (IPC). (Montgomery County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 727 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a pro se action
alleging that the contract prison medical professionals were deliberately indifferent to his health care needs,
and applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court denied the IFP application under the “three
strikes” rule, and found that the prisoner failed to satisfy pleading requirements for an imminent danger exception. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the prisoner sufficiently alleged an imminent danger of serious physical injury, to satisfy the pleading requirements of the

1.194

imminent danger exception. The prisoner alleged that the defendants continued to deny approved specialty
care referral visits for his chronic illnesses of diabetes and Hepatitis C, that he faced a risk of coma or death
resulting from the denial of physician-prescribed special shoes, a transport vehicle, a special diet and medication, and he had already undergone a partial amputation of his feet. (Prison Health Services, Earnest C.
Brooks Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
ATTENDANCE, COURT

Verser v. Barfield, 741 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison
security officers who allegedly held him down and punched him in the stomach during a cell change, alleging that the officers violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive use of force. Following a
jury trial in the district court, a verdict was returned in favor of the officers. The inmate appealed denial of
his motion for a new trial. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the total
exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom at the time the verdict was read prevented the inmate from exercising his right to poll the jury. According to the court, the error arising from the district court's total exclusion of the inmate from the courtroom was not harmless, and thus a new trial was warranted. The court noted
that a jury poll definitely or even likely would have revealed that the verdict in favor of the officers was not
unanimous. (Western Illinois Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
TRIAL

Villegas v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). An Immigration detainee
filed a § 1983 action against a metropolitan government alleging deliberate indifference to her serious medical needs after she was shackled during the final stages of labor and post-partum recovery. The district court
entered judgment in the detainee's favor. A jury awarded the detainee $200,000 in damages. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment should
not have been granted by the district court, where there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
pregnant immigration detainee presented a flight risk, whether the officers who accompanied her to the hospital when she went into labor were aware of the hospital's no restraint order, and whether the detainee was
at risk of physical or psychological harm as a result of being shackled. The appeals court also found genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the hospital prescribed a breast pump to allow the detainee to express
her breast milk postpartum, and whether a layperson would recognize the need to provide the detainee with a
breast pump. The court declined to reassign the case on remand to another district court judge. The court
found that reassignment was not warranted, even though the district judge had entered summary judgment in
the detainee's favor on her Eighth Amendment claims, and had made critical comments about the government's legal positions and its counsel, where the judge's comments reflected that he was attempting to enforce parameters that he established for trial. The court noted that the judge had made a number of rulings
favorable to the government. (Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Davison County
Sheriff's Office, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COUNSEL
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
INDIGENT INMATES
INITIAL APPEARANCE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013). Indigent criminal defendants
brought a class action in state court against two cities, alleging the public defense system provided by the
cities violated their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs,
finding that the defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the deprivation
was caused by deliberate choices of the city officials who were in charge of the public defense system. The
court noted that the cities were appointing counsel in a timely manner, but the public defenders were assigned so many cases that the defendants often went to trial or accepted plea bargains without meeting with
counsel. The court required the cities to re-evaluate their public defender contracts and to hire a public defense supervisor to ensure indigent criminal defendants received their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
(City of Mount Vernon and City of Burlington, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging an officer
maliciously and sadistically assaulted him with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
prisoner alleged that the officer “lifted and then slammed him to the concrete floor where, once pinned,
punched, kicked, kneed, and choked” him until the officer was removed by another member of the corrections staff. After a jury returned a verdict for the prisoner, the district court granted the prisoner's motion for
attorneys' fees, but only in the amount of $1. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), capping attorneys' fee award at 150% of
the value of the prisoner’s monetary judgment, satisfied a rational basis review. The court held that the
PLRA provision did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component by treating the prisoner
and non-prisoner litigants differently, where the provision rationally forestalled collateral fee litigation while
ensuring that the incentive provided by an attorneys' fee award still attached to the most injurious civil rights
violations. (Lanesboro Correctional Institute, North Carolina Department of Public Safety)

U.S. Appeals Court
FRIVOLOUS SUITS
PRO SE LITIGATION
TELECONFERENCE

Williams v. Wahner, 731 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2013). A pro se state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against state
corrections officials, alleging that they willfully failed to prevent other inmates from assaulting him. The
district court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
appeals court held that the district court erred in conducting a telephonic merit-review hearing, which included an oral examination of the pro se prisoner, as part of the initial screening for the frivolousness of the
prisoner's § 1983 complaint against prison officials for allegedly failing to prevent other inmates from assaulting him. The court found that the district court conducted the hearing to resolve contested factual issues,
rather than to clarify the complaint's allegations, and then dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure
to state a claim. (Moultrie County, Illinois)

1.195

U.S. Appeals Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county
sheriff, several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully
detained, and that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded in part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges
being filed. The appeals court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim
that they violated the arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth
Amendment right to a prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court
held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the
deprivation of his Fourth Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his §
1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor
charge until after he was released from the county's detention facility, despite having a clear duty under New
Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause determination. According to the
court, under New Mexico law, the warden of the county's detention facility and the county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that operated and were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure
to adequately train their subordinates.
The court noted that statutes charged both the warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise
subordinates in diligently filing a criminal complaint or information and ensuring that arrestees received a
prompt probable cause hearing. The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that caused the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the
warden acted with the requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the warden,
regardless of whether the arrestee ever had direct contact with the warden. The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing of written criminal complaints, resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with deliberate indifference to routine constitutional
violations at the facility. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that led to the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and
that the sheriff acted with the 1requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the
sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the s1heriff allowed deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus
resulting in the arrest and de1tention of citizens with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing con1stitutional violations occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to
adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges
being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such policy was the significant moving force behind the
arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia Co. Sheriff's Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2014

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MAIL

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 23 F.Supp.3d 834 (E.D.Mich.
2014). A civil rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that
the jail's postcard-only mail policy violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a
temporary restraining order (TRO), the organization moved for preliminary injunction. The district court
granted the motion. The organization had sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the jail policy of refusing
to promptly deliver properly marked legal mail sent by an organization attorney and individually addressed
to an inmate. The court held that there was a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the policy
violated the First Amendment protection accorded inmates' legal mail. The court noted that the organization
sent letters in envelopes that were individually addressed to individual inmates, were labeled “legal mail,”
clearly delineated that the mail came from an organization attorney, the letters asked if the inmate was interested in meeting with an organization attorney to obtain legal advice regarding the jail policy of limiting all
incoming and outgoing mail to one side of a four by six–inch postcard, but the letters were not delivered. The
jail opened the letters and read them, and the jail failed to notify the inmates or the organization that the
letters were not delivered. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Banks v. Annucci, 48 F.Supp.3d 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
correctional officers harassed him, tampered with his food and contaminated his Kosher meals, interfered
with his mail, mishandled his grievances, and interfered with his access to courts, and that prison medical
employees were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs to him. The court held that prison officials' alleged unauthorized intentional taking or destruction of the inmate's property did not violate the inmate's due process rights, where the state afforded an adequate post-deprivation remedy. The court noted that the officials did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right of access to courts when they allegedly confiscated a rough draft of his civil rights complaint,
where the inmate did not allege that he suffered an actual injury as a result, or that officials acted deliberately
or maliciously. (Upstate Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS
EVIDENCE

Barnes v. Alves, 10 F.Supp.3d 391 (W.D.N.Y. 2014). Prison officials moved for reconsideration of a decision by the district court requiring the officials to produce the entire Inspector General report relating to one
of the incidents at issue in a state inmate's § 1983 action. The district court denied the motion, finding that
good cause existed to require prison officials to pay for the copy of the report they were required to produce
to the inmate. (Upstate Correctional Facility in Malone, New York)

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U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
APPOINTED ATTORNEY
EXHAUSTION

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging deliberate indifference to his mental health needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
and violations of his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs and to have access to the courts, in violation
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the officials on the
deliberate indifference claim and dismissed the remaining counts for failure to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate's claims for injunctive and
declaratory relief arising out of alleged constitutional violations that occurred while in prison were mooted
by his release from prison. The court found that there was no evidence that prison mental health care providers were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs, as required to support an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, where the prisoner was seen by mental health care employees regularly
for his complaints, and evidence showed that the prisoner's suicide threats were manipulative in nature. The
court held that denial of the former prisoner's request for appointment of counsel was not abuse of discretion
by the district court, where the prisoner was unlikely to succeed on the merits, and had been able to articulate
his legal claims in light of the complexity of the issues involved. According to the appeals court, in deciding
whether the former prisoner's § 1983 claims were administratively exhausted pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the district court should have used the date of the First Amended Complaint, which
added the claims, rather than the date of the original complaint. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Cox v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 18 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). A mentally disabled state prisoner brought an action against a state department of correction (DOC) and various officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court found that the prisoner's grievance alleging he was improperly classified, resulting
in a sexual assault, provided the DOC with sufficient notice to investigate, and therefore, the prisoner's
claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) were administratively exhausted. The prisoner
alleged that the DOC did not keep him safe and that he was mentally challenged. According to the court, the
prisoner's allegations that he was sexually assaulted by other inmates, that he suffered other abuses, that
prison officials knew of the risk of harm to the prisoner, that his history of mental illness was welldocumented, and that officials were responsible for policies, procedures, and training that led to his injury
were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the officials for violations of the Eighth Amendment, and a
claim under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, absent allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion by
officials. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, Old Colony Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Crayton v. Graffeo, 10 F.Supp.3d 888 (N.D. Ill. 2014). A pretrial detainee in a county department of corrections jail brought an action against three correctional officers, alleging that they beat him in two separate
incidents, and asserting an excessive-force claim under § 1983. The officers filed a motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his § 1983 action, where the detainee neither appealed the notice that his grievance was being forwarded to the jail's Office of Professional Review (OPR),
nor did he await the results of OPR's investigation. (Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
INVESTIGATION

Dilworth v. Goldberg, 3 F.Supp.3d 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). In a county jail detainees' action against a county,
the detainees moved for spoliation sanctions based on the county's alleged failure to preserve capital project
plans that allegedly showed surveillance camera locations, and videos from a surveillance camera in the
housing area where one detainee was allegedly beaten. “Spoliation” is the destruction or significant alteration
of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation. The district court denied the motion, finding that the detainees failed to show that the capital project plans existed, and failed to show that a surveillance camera in the housing area existed. The court
noted that ambiguous statements made by a jail official that he was not sure if such plans existed but that
they might indicate camera locations, and a speculative expert opinion stating that it was customary for a
system installer to provide an “as built” floor plan detailing camera placement, were insufficient to show that
such plans in fact existed for the jail. (Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York)

U.S. District Court
COURT COSTS
FILING FEES

Edmondson v. Fremgen, 17 F.Supp.3d 833 (E.D.Wis. 2014). An indigent prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against the clerk of the state courts of appeals, alleging that the clerk violated various of his civil rights when
she froze his inmate trust accounts until filing fees had been paid in two of his state appeals. The clerk
moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion
to dismiss and denied the motion to appoint counsel. The court held that freezing the prisoner's trust accounts
did not violate his right to access the courts, did not violate the prisoner's right to procedural due process, and
was not an illegal seizure. . According to the court, the indigent prisoner's right to access the courts were not
violated, although not having the ability to spend money in his accounts prevented him from copying legal
materials, where allowing the prisoner's appeals to proceed in the first place, by having deductions for filing
fees made from his inmate trust accounts, did not injure his ability to access the courts. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
EVIDENCE

Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner who was wrongfully convicted of murder and sentenced to death brought an action against, county prosecutors, among others, alleging a § 1983
claim of violation of his due process rights and related state tort claims. The former prisoner had been incarcerated for 17 years before the conviction was overturned. The district court partially granted and partially
denied a defense motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On
remand, the former prisoner moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated its prior order to the extent that it dismissed the former prisoner's federal claim against pros-

1.197

ecutor arising from the prosecutor's pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence, and retained jurisdiction over
the state claims. The prosecutors appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the prosecutor did not have absolute or qualified immunity from § 1983
claims arising out of his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; (2) the
prosecutor did not have absolute immunity under Illinois law for his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence
that was later introduced at trial; and (3) remand was required to allow reconsideration of the determination
that the prosecutor did not have immunity from state law claims arising out of use of fabricated evidence at
retrial. The court noted that absolute immunity afforded to prosecutors is only for acts they commit within
the scope of their employment as prosecutors; when they do non-prosecutorial work they lose their absolute
immunity and have only qualified immunity. (Illinois)
U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
DUE PROCESS

Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). Aliens brought a class-action lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other federal and state government agencies, alleging that
the defendants' acts of subjecting individuals to mandatory immigration detention violated the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause. The government moved to dismiss. The district court
declined to dismiss the alien’s claims for injunctive relief, finding that the aliens had standing to challenge
the adequacy of the Joseph hearing and associated mandatory detention procedures, and that allegations that
the Joseph hearings failed to afford aliens adequate protection were sufficient to state claims for due process
violations. (Dept. of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, District of New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Grenning v. Klemme, 34 F.Supp.3d 1144 (E.D.Wash. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials and employees retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for the content of letters and manuscript he authored, as well as his filing of grievances and a lawsuit. The district court
granted the inmate’s motion for a protective order. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded
by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison mailroom staff members selectively applied the foreign language mail policy as a pretext to prevent the inmate, who filed grievances, from receiving mail from
his overseas parents written in Norwegian, as to whether the staff members made an effort to seek translations, and as to whether the policy as applied amounted to a de facto ban on all of the inmate's incoming nonEnglish mail. The court held that the correctional sergeant was not entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate's § 1983 claim that the sergeant retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, when he
disciplined the inmate based on disparaging remarks contained in the inmate's outgoing e-mail to his mother,
where a reasonable official would have understood that punishing the inmate for the unflattering content of
personal correspondence directed to another was unlawful. The court held that there was no causal connection between the inmate's seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) in separate litigation, and the officials' placing him in solitary confinement over one year later. (Airway Heights Corr. Center, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Henderson v. Ghosh, 755 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2014). An inmate brought an action against prisoner health care
providers and other corrections employees, alleging that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs by failing to inform him of his declining kidney health until he had “stage 5 kidney
failure.” The district court denied the inmate's motions for recruitment of counsel during the pleading and
discovery phases of the litigation, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The inmate appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion
in denying the inmate's two requests for appointment of counsel, where the inmate had a low IQ, was functionally illiterate, and was inexperienced with civil litigation, and the inmate's claim was factually and legally
complex, requiring complex medical evidence and retention of expert witnesses. The court held that the
inmate was prejudiced by the failure of the district court to appoint counsel, where the inmate was unable to
obtain any medical evidence in opposition to summary judgment, the inmate was unable to timely file requests for discovery, and the inmate was unable to identify “John or Jane Doe” defendants who were dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
CLASS ACTION
PREVAILING PARTY

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class action against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded general damages of $500 per strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently, the
arrestees moved for attorney fees in the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030. The
court held that it would apply the current, unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in determining counsel fees using the lodestar method as a cross-check against the percentage method. The court
found that the lodestar rates were $300 for all associates, with two exceptions for requested rates below
$300, and $450 for all partners. The court awarded $3,836,000 in counsel fees, which was equivalent to 33
1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf of the class, and $182,030.25 in costs and expenses. (Nassau
County Correctional Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
INVESTIGATION

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota
Sex Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the
right to religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’ motions. The court held that the patients’ allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially amounted to lifelong confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and run like, a medium to high security prison, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process

1.198

claim pertaining to the punitive nature of the patients' confinement. The court ordered that its court-appointed
experts would be granted complete and unrestricted access to the documents the experts requested, including
publicly available reports and documents related to the patients' lawsuit, as well as MSOP evaluation reports
and administrative directives and rules. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEE

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden and
the contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center violated
their constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found the operator to
be in contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt proceeding, by the contractor that operated the state correctional facility, which provided an extension of the settlement agreement, required a specific
independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of the settlement agreement term, and offered to pay
reasonable attorney fees, did not give the inmates the same relief that they achieved in the contempt proceeding, and thus the inmates' rejection of the offer did not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and costs
they incurred in the contempt proceeding. The court noted that the inmates were already entitled to reasonable
attorney fees in the event of a breach, and the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt proceeding with
regard to the extension and the addition of an independent monitor. After considering the totality of the record
and the arguments by counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in fees and costs. (Idaho
Correctional Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
CLOTHING-COURT
APPEARANCE

Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926 (7th Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee filed a § 1983 action against personnel at a
county jail, alleging that they had used excessive force against him. The detainee alleged that the defendants
used excessive force in response to him covering the lens of the video camera in his jail cell. In the first incident, the detained alleged that his arms were twisted, he was pinned against the wall, and he was choked. In the
second incident, the detainee alleged that a taser was used to gain his compliance in transferring him to a separate cell. Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the defendants and denied the detainee's
motions for new trial. The detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the court’s
errors in failing to conceal the detainee's shackles from jury, and in requiring the detainee to wear prison clothing while the defendants were allowed to wear uniforms were not harmless. According to the court there was
no indication that concealment of the restraints would have been infeasible, and visible shackling of the detainee had a prejudicial effect on the jury. The court noted that there would have been no reason for the jury to
know that the plaintiff was a prisoner, and being told that the plaintiff was a prisoner and the defendants were
guards made a different impression than seeing the plaintiff in a prison uniform and the defendants in guard
uniforms. (Langlade County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
JAILHOUSE LAWYER

Meeks v. Schofield, 10 F.Supp.3d 774 (M.D.Tenn. 2014). A state prisoner, who allegedly suffered from paruresis, a mental anxiety disorder that made it difficult to urinate without complete privacy, brought an action
against the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Correction, its Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) officer, a housing unit supervisor, a grievance board chairman, and a warden, asserting § 1983 claims
for First Amendment retaliation and violation of his right to privacy, and alleging violations of the ADA and
Title VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that the prisoner failed to establish retaliation claims against the ADA officer, the housing unit supervisor, and
the warden. The court found that the prisoner, who was assisting other inmates with their legal work, was not
engaged in “protected conduct,” as required to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against the housing unit supervisor, where the prisoner was not authorized to help other inmates with legal work, and thus was
in violation of department policy. The court held that the transfer of the prisoner to a medical housing unit did
not result in denial of access to prison programs and services available to the general population, so as to support an ADA claim of discrimination on the basis of a perceived disability. The court noted that the transfer
was intended to accommodate the prisoner's complaints about bathroom doors being removed in the general
housing unit, and the prisoner was allowed to continue his prison job, have access to the law library, and participate in the same activities he was allowed to participate in while he was housed with the general population.
(Lois M. DeBerry Special Needs Facility, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 773 F.3d 472 (3rd Cir. 2014). Inmates brought a §
1983 action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the DOC's implementation of a policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from their inmate accounts to cover courtordered restitution, fines, and costs violated their procedural due process rights. The district court granted the
officials' motion for summary judgment. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the DOC’s refusal to provide exceptions to its across-the-board 20% rate of
deduction, pursuant to a DOC policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from inmate accounts to cover
court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs, did not violate due process, in light of the fact that the DOC would
not make deductions when an inmate's account fell below a certain minimum. The court found that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding the extent of the notice the inmate received with respect to his sentence and the DOC policy that permitted automatic deduction of funds from his
inmate account to cover court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MAIL

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2014). A state death-row inmate brought a § 1983 action for declaratory and injunctive relief against Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) officials and a prison guard
who allegedly read the inmate's legal mail. A district court dismissed for failure to state a claim. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate stated claims for a violation of his

1.199

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. According to the court, the inmate, by alleging that the prison guard read,
rather than merely inspected or scanned for contraband the inmate's outgoing legal mail related to the appeal of
his murder conviction and death sentence, and that prison officials had asserted their entitlement to read a
prisoner's legal mail while in the prisoner's presence, stated a claim for violation of his Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. (Arizona State Prison)
U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PROCEDURES
EXHAUSTION

Palmer v. Flore, 3 F.Supp.3d 632 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants asserted an affirmative
defense that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA). The district dismissed the defendants’ defense with prejudice, finding that the prisoner's
timely submission of a Step-I grievance pursuant to the Michigan Department of Corrections' (MDOC) threestep grievance process was sufficient to comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, even though the prisoner received no response from prison officials. The court noted that the prisoner completed the required form
an slid it through the crack in his cell door, which was apparently a common practice that prisoners in administrative segregation used for submitting grievances. (St. Louis Correctional Facility, Mich.)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE

Pettit v. Smith, 45 F.Supp.3d 1099 (D.Ariz. 2014). A state prisoner filed a motion for spoliation sanctions
against the Arizona Department of Corrections, relating to the loss or destruction of a video recording of a use
of force incident, the personnel report for the incident, investigative reports and attachments, and a postincident photograph of the prisoner's hand. The prisoner asserted an excessive claim arising from an incident
when the prisoner was escorted from a shower to a prison cell. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the department had a common-law duty to preserve evidence and reasonably
should have anticipated the prisoner's lawsuit. The court found that appropriate spoliation sanctions included
an “adverse-inference” instruction. (Arizona State Prison Complex—Eyman, Arizona Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
RESTRAINTS
DUE PROCESS

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for
habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action
against, among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of
individuals who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six
months and were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own
behalf, for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that an individual assessment is required before a detainee may be shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the individual
assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an assessment by
an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in the detainee's case. The court denied the motion for an
injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent injunction. The
court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety concerns about
his immigration proceedings, including the logistical issues of escorting the detainee through multiple floors
and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE to shackle the
detainee, given the detainee's extensive criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Mass.)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Robinson v. Keita, 20 F.Supp.3d 1140 (D.Colo. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a city, city police
officers, a county, and sheriff's deputies, alleging under § 1983 that he was unreasonably arrested and incarcerated for a 12-day period. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) a front desk officer was entitled to qualified immunity from
unlawful arrest claim; (2) the deputies who transported the arrestee from a police station across the street to a
detention facility, and assisted in the arrestee's booking, were entitled to qualified immunity from a substantive
due process claim; (3) there was no evidence that the city's alleged policy of relying on the state court to schedule a hearing after promptly being advised of a warrant arrest was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation; but (4) summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the city had actual or
constructive notice that its failure to train as to how to process conflicting information during the process of
“packing” an arrest warrant for distribution was substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and
as to whether the city substantially chose to disregard the risk of harm. (City and County of Denver, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014). State detainees brought an action
against numerous defendants, including a county, a sheriff’s department, and individual jail guards and supervisors, alleging excessive force under § 1983. Following a jury verdict in their favor, the detainees moved for
attorney fees. The district court granted the motion, holding that: (1) the detainees were entitled to recover fully
compensatory attorney fees, notwithstanding the fact that some individual defendants were dismissed or prevailed at trial and that the detainees did not succeed on all motions, where the detainees succeeded on all of
their claims; (2) the detainees were entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 2.0; and, (3) the district court would
apply only a 1% contribution of the detainees’ $950,000 damages award to their attorney fee award, where the
defendants’ conduct involved malicious violence leaving some detainees permanently injured. The court
awarded over $5.3 million for attorney fees. (Men’s Central Jail, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Stevens v. Gooch, 48 F.Supp.3d 992 (E.D.Ky. 2014). An inmate brought an action against a jailer and a county, asserting section 1983 and state law claims related to the adequacy of the jail's medical treatment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court found that the inmate
sufficiently exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prior to bringing the § 1983 action, where the inmate filed five grievances related to his ankle injury but never received a
response from jail officials. (Lincoln County Jail, Kentucky)

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U.S. Appeals Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Swisher v. Porter County Sheriff's Dept., 769 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a sheriff and jail personnel, alleging that he was denied medical care while in jail. The district court
dismissed the case, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that jail
officials “invited” the inmate's noncompliance with grievance procedures, and thus he sufficiently exhausted
administrative remedies by asking senior jail officers, up to and including the warden, about how to file a
grievance. According to the court, the inmate was told not to file a grievance because the officers understood
his problem and would resolve it without the need for invocation of a formal grievance procedure. But those
informal resolution procedures were not successful, and the officials did not tell the inmate how to invoke a
formal grievance process. (Porter County Jail, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Taylor v. Swift, 21 F.Supp.3d 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against city jail
officials, alleging that officials failed to protect him from an assault from other inmates, and that officials used
excessive force in uncuffing the prisoner after escorting him from showers to his cell. The officials moved to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the motion was converted to a motion for
summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that it was objectively reasonable for
the prisoner, to conclude that no administrative mechanism existed through which to obtain remedies for the
alleged attack, and thus the prisoner was not required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing his claim. The court noted that the jail's grievance policy stated
that “allegation of assault…by either staff or inmates” was non-grievable, the policy stated that an inmate complaint “is grievable unless it constitutes assault, harassment or criminal misconduct,” the prisoner alleged that
officials committed criminal misconduct in acting with deliberate indifference toward him, and although the
prisoner did not complain of the assault by officials, the prisoner would not have been required to name a defendant in filing a grievance. According to the court, even if city jail officials would have accepted the prisoner's failure-to-protect grievance, the prisoner's mistake in failing to exhaust administrative procedures was
subjectively reasonable. (New York City Dept. of Correction, Riker’s Island)

U.S. District Court
WITNESS
VIDEO
COMMUNICATION

U.S. v. Mostafa, 14 F.Supp.3d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A defendant was charged with various terrorist-related
offenses. The government moved for an order to allow a witness to testify by live closed-circuit television
(CCTV) or by deposition. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the testimony of the witness was probative and material to the charges against the defendant, the witness was unavailable to testify in
person, the government made good-faith and reasonable efforts to obtain the presence of the witness, and
granting the government's motion to allow the witness to testify by live CCTV furthered the interests of justice.
The court ordered the cameras to be positioned such that the jury can see witness’s face at all times and such
that the witness can see the faces of the jurors, defendant, and the questioner as he testifies, as he would in a
courtroom. (Southern District, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate filed an action under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and § 1983 alleging that prison officials had imposed an unwarranted
burden on his exercise of religion. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials' favor, and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state inmate failed to establish that prison
officials retaliated against him, in violation of the First Amendment, for his earlier suit, in which he prevailed
on appeal in a § 1983 due process claim, when they restricted his access to a prison chapel during the investigation of his relationship with another guard. (Idaho Correctional Institute–Orofino, Idaho State Correctional
Institution)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE

Ysasi v. Brown, 3 F.Supp.3d 1088 (D.N.M. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against county sheriff
officers and a detention center, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and other claims under the Constitution.
The officers and the detention center moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee presented no evidence that the four-day incarceration
prior to his arraignment prejudiced his defense, either in his criminal trial or in the current civil case, by concealing evidence against the arresting county sheriff officers. The court noted that the arrestee was arraigned
within the time required by New Mexico rule. (Lea County Detention Center, New Mexico)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
PRIVILEGED CORRESPONDENCE/MAIL

American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan v. Livingston County, 796 F.3d 636 (6th Cir. 2015). A civil
rights organization brought a § 1983 action against a county and county officials alleging that the jail’s mail
policy, pursuant to which all incoming and outgoing mail except “bona-fide legal mail” had to be on standard
four-by-six-inch postcards, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Following the grant of a temporary
restraining order (TRO), the organization moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the
motion and the county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the organization had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
protections. The court noted that the organization alleged that the jail blocked delivery of letters sent by the
organization’s attorney without providing the organization or the intended inmate recipients notice and opportunity to contest the decision. (Livingston County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
LEGAL MAIL

Angulo v. Nassau County, 89 F.Supp.3d 541 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se action against a
county and its correctional facility personnel, alleging the defendants violated his constitutional rights through
the destruction of various legal documents and his legal mail. The defendants moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the inmate’s letter of complaint did not comply
with the correctional facility’s grievance procedure, and thus the inmate failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies; (2) administrative remedies were “available” to the inmate, and thus the inmate was not ex-

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cused from filing a grievance; (3) the inmate’s allegations that personnel acted willfully and maliciously were
insufficient to support the claim that personnel interfered with his ability to access the courts; and (4) personnel
did not conspire to destroy the inmate’s legal mail. (Nassau County Correctional Center, and Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015). Death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a state
department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations
that heat in the prison violated the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act (RA). Following a bench trial, the district court sustained the Eighth Amendment claims,
rejected the disability claims, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the state to install air conditioning
throughout death row. The department and officials appealed and the inmates cross-appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse
its discretion by admitting evidence of, or relying on heat index measurements of death-row facilities; (2) the
district court did not clearly err in finding that heat in death-row cells posed a substantial risk of serious harm
to inmates and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed to death-row inmates by the
heat in prison cells; (3) housing of death-row inmates in very hot prison cells without sufficient access to
heat-relief measures violated the Eighth Amendment; (4) inmates were not disabled under ADA or RA; and
(5) permanent injunctive relief requiring the state to install air conditioning throughout death-row housing
violated the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where acceptable remedies short of facility-wide air conditioning were available. (Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Blake v. Ross, 787 F.3d 693 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional officers,
alleging use of excessive force. One officer moved for summary judgment on the ground that inmate failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. The district court granted the motion and the inmate appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an internal investigation afforded correction officials
time and opportunity to address the complaints internally, as required for an exception to the PLRA exhaustion
of remedies requirement to apply, and the inmate’s belief that he had exhausted administrative remedies was a
reasonable interpretation of the inmate grievance procedures. (Maryland Reception Diagnostic and Classification Center)

U.S. District Court
FILING FEES

Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 134 F.Supp.3d 794 (D. Del. 2015). A state prisoner filed a
pro se complaint under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against a prison. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner's claims that the prison's business office miscalculated and deducted incorrect sums of money from his prison account when making partial filing fee payments, that there was poor
television reception, and that he was not allowed to purchase canteen items from the commissary, were not
actionable under § 1983, where all of the claims were administrative matters that should be handled by the
prison.
The court found that the prisoner's claims that he was being electronically monitored through a “microwave
hearing effect eavesdropping device” and electronic control devices were fantastical and/or delusional and
therefore were insufficient to withstand screening for frivolity in filings by an in forma pauperis prisoner, in
the prisoner's § 1983 action. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS

Cavanagh v. Taranto, 95 F.Supp.3d 220 (D. Mass. 2015). A pretrial detainee’s son brought an action under §
1983 against correctional officers who were on duty the day of the detainee’s suicide, alleging the officers
violated the detainee’s due process rights. The officers moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the officers were not deliberately indifferent to the detainee’s mental health
history and safety, to her safety through inadequate cell checks, or to her safety by failing to remove a looped
shoelace from her cell. The court noted that even if an expert’s report prepared for the plaintiff had been filed
on time, the report would have been excluded due to the expert’s lack of qualifications. According to the court,
the expert only pointed to national statistics as support for his opinion that the detainee possessed predisposing
characteristics that made her an obvious risk for suicide, and the expert’s opinions that the officers were improperly trained and a reasonable mental health clinician would have deemed the detainee to pose a suicide risk
were irrelevant. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging
that administrators and individuals affiliated with a correctional center violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the prisoner stated a claim for relief under the
Eighth Amendment with allegations that the prison administrator knew that conditions of his mandatory release
included a ban on computer-related material, but nevertheless instituted, condoned, or willfully turned a blind
eye to the practice that placed computer-related material among his possessions. The court also found that the
district court had to determine, upon the prisoner’s motion for appointment of counsel, whether the prisoner,
from the confines of his present institutional situation, could adequately investigate and articulate, in accordance with established practices of § 1983 liability, familiarity of each defendant with the practices of the educational program that placed computer-related material among his possessions, even though the conditions of
his mandatory release included a ban on computer-related material. (Big Muddy River Corr. Center, Illinois)

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U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
RETALIATION

Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions and asserting claims for cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment
retaliation. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to
state a claim pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the grievance sent by the state prisoner directly to the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC) met the conditions for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps
at the institutional level under Florida law, and thus the prisoner satisfied the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
(PLRA) exhaustion requirement with respect to his § 1983 claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment, due
process violations, and First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the prisoner clearly stated at the beginning of the grievance form that he was filing a grievance of reprisal, indicating he feared for his life and that
he was “gassed in confinement for grievances [he] wrote,” and clearly stated the reason for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps, namely, his fear that he would be killed if he filed additional grievances at
the institutional level, and alleged participation by high-ranking prison officials. The court found that the prisoner stated claims against prison officials for First Amendment retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment
by alleging that prison guards and officials sprayed him with tear gas without provocation, denied him prompt
medical care, filed false disciplinary reports, and threatened further retaliation, all in retaliation for filing grievances. (Liberty Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
RETALIATION

Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging he was subjected to harsh treatment in retaliation for filing grievances about prison conditions and asserting claims for cruel and unusual punishment, due process violations, and First Amendment
retaliation. The district court dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and failure to
state a claim pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded. The court held that the grievance sent by the state prisoner directly to the Secretary of the Florida
Department of Corrections (FDOC) met the conditions for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps
at the institutional level under Florida law, and thus the prisoner satisfied the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
(PLRA) exhaustion requirement with respect to his § 1983 claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment, due
process violations, and First Amendment retaliation. The court noted that the prisoner clearly stated at the beginning of the grievance form that he was filing a grievance of reprisal, indicating he feared for his life and that
he was “gassed in confinement for grievances [he] wrote,” and clearly stated the reason for bypassing the informal and formal grievance steps, namely, his fear that he would be killed if he filed additional grievances at
the institutional level, and alleged participation by high-ranking prison officials. The court found that the prisoner stated claims against prison officials for First Amendment retaliation and cruel and unusual punishment
by alleging that prison guards and officials sprayed him with tear gas without provocation, denied him prompt
medical care, filed false disciplinary reports, and threatened further retaliation, all in retaliation for filing grievances. (Liberty Correctional Institution, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS
CLOTHING- COURT
APPEARANCE

Elmore v. Sinclair, 799 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 2015). After affirmance of a state prisoner’s murder conviction
pursuant to a guilty plea, and his death sentence following a penalty-phase jury trial, the prisoner petitioned for
federal habeas relief. The district court denied relief and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held the prisoner was not prejudiced by being shackled for the first day of jury selection for the penalty
phase. According to the court, even assuming that visible shackling of the defendant violated due process, the
defendant was not prejudiced because the nature of the defendant’s crime was a gruesome and violent murder,
the defendant had agreed, as part of the defense strategy, to show his acceptance of responsibility, and to appear before the jury in jail clothing for the entire penalty phase, the first impression created by the defendant’s
shackling was partly the point of the defense strategy, and for almost three full weeks the defendant did not
appear in shackles before the jury that issued the death sentence. (Whatcom County, Washington)

U.S. District Court
INITIAL APPEARANCE
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
DUE PROCESS

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based
on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets
and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one
case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did
not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily
determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to
sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene
products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were
denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction
preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for failure to pay fines without inquiry into
their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures of punishment were sufficient to state
a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly
stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their Due Process rights; (3) allegations of preappearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due Process violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently, with respect to fines, than civil
judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not afforded counsel at initial hearings
on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their incarceration for failing to pay courtordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

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U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Gannaway v. Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2015). A state inmate brought § 1983
action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees, private companies and healthcare
professionals contracted to provide medical services to DOC institutions, alleging that he received inadequate
medical treatment throughout his incarceration, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that he was retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions. The court held that the inmate failed to show that he suffered any actual injury from
the prison officials' alleged denial of access to a law library or paralegal assistance, as would support his §
1983 First Amendment access to courts claim. According to the court, the dockets from the inmate's civil rights
cases showed that courts granted him extensions to file documents whenever requested, and a case initiated by
the inmate was dismissed after he responded to the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. (Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (SCI) at
Rockview, and Prime Care Medical).

U.S. District Court
IN FORMA PAUPERIS
INDIGENT INMATES

Harris v. Doe, 78 F.Supp.3d 894 (N.D. Ill. 2015). In two related actions, an inmate, proceeding pro se, alleged
§ 1983 claims against prison officers for deprivations of his civil rights. The inmate sought to proceed in forma
pauperis in these suits. The district court dismissed the suits, holding that the inmate’s allegation of poverty in
his applications to proceed in forma pauperis was untrue. The court noted that the inmate represented that he
had not received more than $200 in funds over the preceding 12 months from any of numerous categories
listed in the application, including a catch-all category of “any other source.” According to the court, his prisoner trust fund account reflected a $3,000 deposit, the inmate quickly withdrew most of that $3,000 by writing
checks to a “friend” or “friends” who in turn later re-deposited those funds into his account over the next several months, and the inmate promptly expended these re-deposits on commissary items well before he filed his
suits. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2015). A county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county sheriff’s department, and sheriff’s deputies, alleging that he was severely beaten by the
deputies while in a holding cell at a courthouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants based on the detainee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the affidavit of a county jail grievance coordinator, along
with a handbook detailing a grievance procedure, did not establish that the detainee had an available administrative remedy, and neither the handbook nor the affidavit demonstrated that the county or sheriff’s department,
or any official, handled grievances arising from occurrences in the courthouse holding cells or whether remedies for such grievances were actually available. According to the court, the deputies forfeited any arguments
that statutory remedies were available to the county jail detainee where the deputies failed to identify in the
district court or on appeal any statutes or regulations showing that administrative remedies were available for
events that took place in the courthouse holding facility. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY

Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, alleging that he was placed in segregation as punishment for insisting on keeping his appointment with
an attorney and that he was denied due process when he sought redress from the prison’s grievance system.
The district court, pursuant to the screening process of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), dismissed
the suit on the pleadings. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the state
prisoner did not provide any information as to the content or purpose of his meeting with the attorney, precluding any finding as to whether the meeting involved protected speech, as required to support the prisoner’s §
1983 claim that he was punished not for his insubordinate speech to a prison guard, but rather for meeting
with, and presumably talking to, an attorney. (Indiana Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889 (7th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff and two jail guards, alleging the jail’s use of a transparent jumpsuit during his transfer to a state prison,
which exposed the prisoner’s genitals, violated the prisoner’s rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.
The district court dismissed the prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim and granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment claim. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) the prisoner was required to direct his grievance
to the jail, not the state prison, in order to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement; (2) the jail’s grievance procedure was not “available,” within the meaning of PLRA; (3) allegations
were sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment; and (4) the jail’s requirement that the prisoner
wear a transparent jumpsuit did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Livingston County Jail)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Kitchen v. Ickes, 116 F.Supp.3d 613 (D. Md. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a corrections
officer and a prison health care provider, alleging excessive force in the officer’s use of pepper spray and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The officer and the provider moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate exhausted
his available administrative remedies as to his claim that the corrections officer used excessive force in spraying him with pepper spray, as required to file suit against the officer, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). The court noted that the inmate filed a request for an administrative remedy on the issue of alleged
use of excessive force, appealed the decision rendered concerning his claim of excessive force, and subsequently filed a grievance with the inmate grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. The
court held that the inmate failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies, as required prior to bringing
suit with respect to prison conditions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as to his claim that after
he was sprayed with pepper spray, he was forced to sleep on a mattress that was contaminated with pepper
spray, without sheets, for weeks. The court noted that the inmate failed to file a request for an administrative

1.204

remedy on the issue of the contaminated mattress, and raised the issue for first time in his appeal to the inmate
grievance office regarding the officer’s use of pepper spray. (North Branch Correctional Institution, Maryland)
U.S. APPEALS COURT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2015). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against a part-time prison psychiatrist, alleging that he suffered sexual abuse by another prisoner as a result of the psychiatrist’s deliberate indifference to his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court entered
summary judgment in the psychiatrist’s favor. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court’s ruling that the former prisoner did not submit a substitute prison grievance letter
was not clearly erroneous, and the former prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing
his § 1983 claim. (Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

McBride v. Lopez, 807 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2015). After a prison’s appeals coordinator dismissed a prisoner’s
administrative grievance as untimely, the prisoner brought an action against prison guards under § 1983 claiming violation of the Eighth Amendment by use of excessive force against him. The district court granted the
guards’ motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the
threat of retaliation for reporting an incident can render the prison grievance process effectively unavailable
and thereby excuse a prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies before filing a court action; (2) the
prisoner subjectively perceived prison guards’ statement to be a threat not to use the prison grievance system;
and (3) prison guards’ statement could not have reasonable been objectively viewed as a threat of retaliation if
the prisoner filed a grievance against the guards. The guards had stated that he was “lucky,” in that the injuries
he sustained during an altercation between the prisoner and guards “could have been much worse” than they
were, to be a threat not to use the prison grievance system. The court noted that the prisoner had recently been
beaten by the guards that made the statement, and the prisoner could have believed the guards bore him considerable hostility and therefore the statement could have been interpreted as threatening. (Pleasant Valley State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Minton v. Childers, 113 F.Supp.3d 796 (D. Md. 2015). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, seeking injunctive relief, along with nominal and punitive damages, after the officials barred his
receipt of used books pursuant to prison directives. The officials and the prisoner both filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the officials’ motion and denied the prisoner’s motion. The court
held that the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under Maryland law prior to filing the § 1983
action in federal court, in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Naranjo v. Thompson, 809 F.3d 793 (5th Cir. 2015). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against the management
company of a prison in which he was incarcerated. The district court denied the inmate’s motion for appointment of counsel, and entered summary judgment in the company’s favor. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider
using its inherent power to compel counsel to accept uncompensated appointment after it determined that the
inmate’s § 1983 action against the management company presented exceptional circumstances, even though
such appointment was not authorized by statute. (Reeves County Detention Center, Pecos, Texas, operated by
GEO Group, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
EXPERT WITNESS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1164 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A transsexual female prison inmate brought a §
1983 action against prison officials and medical staff for denying necessary medical treatment for the inmate’s
gender dysphoria in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved to strike expert testimony and for a
preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide her with sex reassignment surgery (SRS). The defendants moved for judicial notice. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court found that the expert report of a psychiatrist retained by the officials and medical staff would not be
stricken for failure to comply with the requirements for disclosure of expert qualifications, and that the expert
was qualified to testify regarding prison culture and the treatment that incarcerated persons with gender dysphoria should receive. The court noted that notwithstanding years of treatment in the form of hormone therapy
and counseling, the inmate continued to experience severe psychological pain, and that the treating and examining psychologists agreed the inmate met the eligibility criteria for SRS under the standards of care for treating
transsexual patients. The court held that: (1) the inmate was likely to succeed on the merits of the Eighth
Amendment claim; (2) the inmate was suffering irreparable harm that would likely continue absent a preliminary injunction; (3) the balance of equities weighed in favor of granting an injunction; (4) it was in the public
interest to grant an injunction; and (5) an injunction would meet the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Pearson v. Secretary Dept. of Corrections, 775 F.3d 598 (3rd Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that prison officials retaliated against him for filing grievances and a civil lawsuit. The district court
dismissed the case and denied the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate's allegation that a unit manager told him he was being
terminated from his prison job because of grievances that he had filed nearly one year earlier was sufficient to
state a plausible retaliation claim in the inmate's § 1983 action against prison officials. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
PRO SE LITIGATION
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against prison officials alleging cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, in particular, that the officials were deliberately indifferent to his severe hand injury, delaying his receipt of medically necessary surgery
for ten months. After twice denying the inmate’s request for pro bono counsel, the district court dismissed the

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action with prejudice, for failure to state a claim. The inmate appealed and appellate counsel was appointed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that: (1) the inmate stated a claim against a prison
physician for such serious delays in the provision of adequate treatment that the Eighth Amendment may have
been violated; (2) the inmate stated a claim against a prison nurse for deliberate indifference; (3) the inmate
sufficiently identified an unconstitutional policy or practice to state a claim under § 1983 against the private
corporation that served as the prison’s health care provider; (4) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference against the prison’s health care administrator; (5) the inmate stated a claim for deliberate indifference
against prison grievance officials; (6) the inmate stated a valid First Amendment retaliation claim; and (7) the
district court’s denial of the inmate’s request for pro bono counsel was not unreasonable. (Lawrence Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
APPOINTED ATTORNEY

Pinson v. U.S. Department of Justice, 104 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2015). A federal prison inmate brought an
action against the Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging DOJ withheld records from him in violation of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. The inmate moved for sanctions, a protective order,
appointment of counsel, an order to show cause, production of documents, and a preliminary injunction. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate would be appointed
counsel for the limited purpose of reviewing correspondence withheld by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and
determining DOJ’s compliance with FOIA. The court found that sanctions for the DOJ’s failure to timely
comply with a court order were not warranted. The court noted that the BOP’s mail policy prevented the inmate from reviewing the DOJ’s FOIA responses, preventing him from properly litigating his FOIA claims.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, ADX Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION
JAILHOUSE LAWYER

Quiroz v. Horel, 85 F.Supp.3d 1115 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for
participating in another inmate’s civil rights suit. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the official had a retaliatory motive for issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR) against the prisoner; (2) whether officials had a retaliatory motive when they searched the prisoner’s cell; and (3) whether prison officials had an agreement to retaliate against the prisoner by searching his
cell, confiscating his paperwork, and issuing a Rules Violation Report (RVR) against him. (Pelican Bay State
Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION
JAILHOUSE LAWYER

Quiroz v. Short, 85 F.Supp.3d 1092 (N.D.Cal. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, alleging that the officials retaliated against him for filing a prior federal civil rights complaint and for
participating in another inmate’s civil rights suit. One official moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the official acted with a retaliatory motive when he sent to the prisoner’s fiance a letter intended for another woman; (2) whether the prison official acted with a retaliatory motive
when he issued a rules violation report (RVR) against the prisoner; and (3) whether officials had an agreement
to retaliate against the prisoner by issuing the RVR against him. The court found that: (1) the official did not
have a retaliatory motive in investigating an administrative grievance; (2) the prisoner’s assertion that one of
the official’s duties was to monitor incoming and outgoing mail was insufficient to show that the official destroyed two specific pieces of the prisoner’s mail; (3) the official was entitled to qualified immunity on the
prisoner’s right to intimate association claim; and (4) the official’s act of sending a letter to the prisoner’s fiancé that was intended for another woman did not prevent the prisoner from continuing to associate with his
fiancé and did not prevent the prisoner from marrying his fiancé. (Pelican Bay State Prison, Secure Housing
Unit, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASS ACTION

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). A petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, on behalf of
himself and a class of aliens detained during immigration proceedings for more than six months without a bond
hearing, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief providing individualized bond hearings with the burden on
the government, certification of the class, and appointment of class counsel. The district court denied the petition. The petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court then granted summary judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction, and the parties appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the aliens were entitled to automatic individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention. The court ruled that the government
had to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien was a flight risk or a danger to the community to
justify denial of a bond at the hearing. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
RETALIATION FOR
LEGAL ACTION

Rowe v. Gibson, 798 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought § 1983 claims against prison administrators
and employees of a prison medical services company, claiming that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to his serious medical needs by preventing him from having access to heartburn medication before he ate
meals, and by denying him access to prescribed, rather than over-the-counter, heartburn medication for 33
days, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court found
that summary judgment was precluded by issues of fact as to whether restricting the time the prisoner took
heartburn medication, several hours after a meal, departed from professional practice, and whether prison medical staff told the prisoner that they were withholding the prisoner’s heartburn medication to convince the prisoner not to file lawsuits. (Corizon, Inc., and Pendleton Correctional Facility, Indiana)

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U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 2015). An indigent state prisoner who had been allowed to file in forma pauperis commenced an action alleging that the director of a county domestic relations section deprived
him of his federal income tax refund, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed
the prisoner’s complaint, and ordered collection of an initial partial filing fee, followed by monthly installments. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
monthly income of an indigent state prisoner who owed two separate court fees was subject to a single monthly
20% deduction. (State Corr. Institution, Rockview, Penn., and Perry County Domestic Relations Section)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that county correctional officers unlawfully used excessive force in the course of handcuffing him after he disobeyed an order.
The district court entered summary judgment in the officers’ favor and inmate the appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the inmate was not barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
from bringing the action. The court noted that the inmate did not have an available administrative remedy,
where the inmate did not have access to an inmate handbook that set forth the proper grievance procedure, the
officer informed the inmate that he could not file a grievance, the handbook only permitted inmates to dispute
alleged violations, and the inmate was not contesting his discipline, but rather was challenging the officers’
conduct that occurred after his offenses. (Dane County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RESTRAINTS

U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants filed challenges to a federal district court
policy, adopted upon the recommendation of the United States Marshals, to place defendants in full shackle
restraints for all non-jury proceedings, with the exception of guilty pleas and sentencing hearings, unless a
judge specifically requests the restraints be removed in a particular case. The district court denied the challenges. The defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court found that the defendants’ challenges to the shackling policy were not rendered moot by the fact that they were no longer detained. The court held that there was no adequate justification of the necessity for the district court’s generalized shackling policy. According to the court, although the Marshals recommended the policy after some security incidents, coupled with understaffing, created strains in the ability of the Marshals to provide adequate
security for a newly opened, state-of-the-art courthouse, the government did not point to the causes or magnitude of the asserted increased security risk, nor did it try to demonstrate that other less restrictive measures,
such as increased staffing, would not suffice. (Southern District of California, United States Marshals, San
Diego Federal Courthouse)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

U.S. v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 778 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2015). The federal government
brought an action against the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that the DOC’s failure to
provide a kosher diet to all of its prisoners with sincere religious grounds for keeping kosher violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted the DOC’s motion for
a preliminary injunction and the federal government appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court
decision and dismissed the appeal. The court held that the preliminary injunction did not comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and thus, expired after 90 days. The court noted that injunctive relief was
not narrowly drawn, extended further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, and was not
the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation, in violation of PLRA. (Fla. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INVESTIGATION
DUE PROCESS

United States v. Binh Tang Vo, 78 F.Supp.3d 171 (D.D.C 2015). A defendant being prosecuted for an alleged
conspiracy to commit visa fraud moved to quash subpoenas that were issued by the prosecutors. The defendant
was housed in a District of Columbia correctional facility and the prosecutors had sought copies of visitation
logs, call logs, and recorded telephone calls of two co-defendants who had previously entered guilty pleas. The
district court granted the defendant’s motion to prevent the release of these documents. The court held that the
government’s subpoenas exceeded the bounds of a rule governing issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases, and
the subpoenas amounted to a mere “fishing expedition,” and thus retroactive approval was unwarranted. (Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
WITNESS

United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1130 (D.Colo. 2015). A federal prisoner moved for an order directing
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to allow him to have a face-to-face meeting with another inmate, his co-defendant
in a federal prosecution. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prisoner’s Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right to present witnesses in his own defense were trial
rights that did not entitle him to such a “tête-à-tête” witness interview. The court found that the opportunity
afforded by the BOP for defense counsel to interview the co-defendant was sufficient, even in the absence of a
face-to-face meeting between the defendant and the co-defendant, to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional
rights. The court noted that the decision by the BOP to keep the inmates separate was supported by a legitimate
penological interest in the security of the facility and the safety of its staff and inmates. (Administrative Maximum Facility Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
COMPUTERS
ACCESS TO ATTORNEY

United States v. Rivera, 83 F.Supp.3d 1154 (D.Colo. 2015). A prisoner moved for a standing order directing
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to permit counsel and a defense investigator to bring laptop computers into the
facility during the remaining pendency of his criminal action. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the BOP reasonably refused to allow defense counsel and defense investigators to bring their laptop
computers into the maximum security facility, and instead permitted them to download materials from their
own computers onto the BOP’s “clean” computer that did not store downloaded information. The court noted
that the increased staff and equipment necessary to thoroughly inspect every laptop for weapons and other
contraband to ensure the security of staff and inmates would be a burden. The court noted that counsel could
print a hard copy of any materials that could not readily be downloaded onto a clean computer. (Administrative Maximum Facility Florence, and FCI Englewood, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Colorado)

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U.S. District Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Vaden v. U.S. Department of Justice, 79 F.Supp.3d 207 (D.D.C. 2015), A federal prisoner filed suit under the
Privacy Act against the Department of Justice, seeking injunctive relief for the correction of alleged inaccuracies with respect to the determination of his custody classification and security level. The prisoner sought damages. The Department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the prisoner
filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court dismissed the action. The court held that the prisoner’s
failure to exhaust administrative remedies did not warrant dismissal under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), but the prisoner’s custody classification and determination of security level were part
of an inmate central records system that was expressly exempt from agency obligations under the Privacy Act.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, United States Penitentiary—II, Coleman, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Whatley v. Warden, Ware State Prison, 802 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought a § 1983
action, alleging that he had been beaten by prison staff and denied medical care after the beating. The district
court dismissed the action based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The
appeals court reversed. The court held that the district court failed to accept as true the prisoner’s view of the
facts regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies and failed to make specific findings to resolve disputed
issue of fact regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Telfair State Prison, Ware State Prison,
Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, Georgia)

U.S. Appeals Court
LEGAL MATERIAL

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 against a
prison superintendent, a corrections sergeant, and corrections officers, alleging unsanitary conditions, theft of
legal documents, harassment, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court’s decision
and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court held that remand was required for the district court to
address issue in first instance of whether the prisoner had a right under the First, Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth
Amendments to refuse to provide false information to a corrections officer. The court held that the prisoner’s
claim of theft of legal documents should be considered as one for impeding access to the courts. (Wende Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2015). A state prisoner brought an action alleging prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the Mississippi Department of
Corrections’ implementation of a “backlogging” policy did not abrogate the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s
(PLRA’s) exhaustion requirement, and the prison’s failure to respond at the first step of a three step grievance
process did not excuse the prisoner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (Central Mississippi Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE

Wilson v. Hauck, 141 F.Supp.3d 226 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A former inmate brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers alleging they violated his rights by use of excessive force and/or by failing to protect him
from that excessive force. The inmate moved for sanctions for alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that: (1) officers at one point possessed and had the ability to preserve original photographs of the inmate's injuries and the original videotape of his cell extraction; (2) officers were at
least negligent with respect to the destruction or loss of both the original photographs and the videotape; and
(3) differences between the originals and the copies were sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the originals would support inmate's claims. (Attica Correctional Facility, N.Y.)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
EXHAUSTION

2016
Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison physicians, alleging that they had violated the Eighth Amendment through deliberate indifference to his medical
needs by denying him pain medication. The district court granted the physicians’ motion to dismiss. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that as a matter of first impression, a
prisoner exhausts administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), despite not complying with the procedural rule, if prison officials decide the merits of a grievance at each step of the administrative process. According to the court, the prisoner’s grievance was sufficient to exhaust his available remedies under the state prison grievance system. (Mule Creek State Prison, California)

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XIX

XIX

XIX

problems relating to abusive officers. (Florida State Prison)
2006
U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Blankenship v. Virginia, 432 F.Supp.2d 607 (E.D.Va. 2006). The mother of a ward of a juvenile

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Carroll v. City of Quincy, 441 F.Supp.2d 215 (D.Mass. 2006). A pretrial detainee who was
injured when he fell in a cell after being left with his hands handcuffed behind his back, sued a
city and city police officers, alleging negligence and violations of his federal and state civil rights.
The detainee fell as he attempted to exit the cell when he was still handcuffed. It was later
determined at the hospital that the detainee had a blood alcohol content of 0.37. The detainee
allegedly sustained serious injuries, including a subdural hematoma, traumatic brain injury,
depressive illness and seizure disorder. The court found that the officers' conduct in leaving the
highly intoxicated pretrial detainee in a cell was not undertaken pursuant to any city policy or
custom, as required for the imposition of municipal liability, where the city had rather detailed
written policies restricting the use of handcuffs. According to the court, the officers' conduct in
leaving the detainee alone with his hands handcuffed behind his back was not caused by
deliberately indifferent policies of the city, where the city's policies clearly delineated the proper
procedures for the use of restraints on intoxicated detainees and the handling of such detainees.
(City of Quincy Police Station, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION

Davis v. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections, 445 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006). A state corrections

U.S. District Court
RECORDS
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Giarratano v. Johnson, 456 F.Supp.2d 747 (W.D.Va. 2006). An inmate brought a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE COSTS
APA-Administrative
Procedures Act

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 464 F.Supp.2d 552 (E.D.Va. 2006). A federal inmate
brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison officials under Bivens

XX

correction center who was permanently disabled after being beaten by two fellow inmates,
brought a § 1983 civil rights action against the center's former superintendent, former assistant
superintendent, and former counselor for failing to protect the ward. The defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment. The district court held that: (1) the superintendent and assistant
superintendent could not be held liable under § 1983 based on constructive knowledge of the
threat against ward; (2) the fact that the juvenile correction center had been decertified by the
Virginia Board of Juvenile Justice, standing alone, did not necessarily confer on the
superintendents the knowledge as to the ongoing and substantial risk of harm to residents, as
was required to hold them liable under § 1983; (3) evidence indicating a deficiency in the center's
record management capabilities did not suggest a willful disregard for the safety of the wards;
and (4) a counselor responded reasonably to ensure the ward's safety when the ward was moved
to the more secure isolation pod. (Beaumont Juvenile Correction Center, Virginia)

employee brought an action against the agency and supervisors under Title VII and § 1983,
alleging that he was demoted because of his race. The district court entered judgment upon jury
verdict in favor of the employee, and defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding
that evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of the employee. The court
noted that although there was no direct evidence that the agency and supervisors were
motivated by racial bias when they demoted the employee after he was found to have harassed a
co-worker, an agency memo drafted and approved by the supervisors indicated that the
employee's violation was a category B violation. Two white employees received far less severe
penalties for category B violations, and testimony that the supervisors thought the employee's
violation was more serious than category B came from the supervisors rather than from
disinterested witnesses and was not supported by documentary evidence. (Jackson Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

against the director of a state corrections department, challenging the constitutionality of a
statutory exclusion of prisoners from making requests for public records under the Virginia
Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA). The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the statutory exclusion of prisoners from making requests for public records under the
Virginia Freedom of Information Act (VFOIA) was rationally related to a legitimate state
interest, and thus, it did not violate the inmate's right to equal protection. The court noted that
the Virginia General Assembly, in passing the exclusion, could have believed that inmates were
intrinsically prone to abusing VFOIA request provisions and that such frivolous requests would
unduly burden state resources, or that inmates had less need to access public records because
their confinement greatly limited the amount of contact they had with state government. (Red
Onion State Prison, Virginia)

and various federal statutes, challenging an increase in the long-distance telephone rate. The
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that: (1) the
telephone rate increase did not implicate the inmate’s First Amendment rights; (2) the inmate’s
procedural due process rights were not violated: (3) the inmate failed to state an equal protection
violation; (4) BOP’s increase in the telephone rates was not subject to judicial review; (5) the
inmate failed to state a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA); and (6) the inmate’s
Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) claim would be transferred to another court. According to

2.37

the court, prisoners have no per se First Amendment right to use a telephone and are not
entitled to a specific rate for their telephone calls. The court found that the three-cent increase
in the long-distance telephone rate charged to the federal inmate, from twenty cents per minute
to twenty-three cents per minute, did not implicate the inmate’s First Amendment rights.
Although prisoners have a due process property interest in the funds held in their prison
accounts, the court noted that the post-deprivation proceeding of the normal grievance process
was available. The court also ruled that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) precluded a
judicial review of the BOP increase in telephone rates. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)
U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE

Locicero v. O’Connell, 419 F.Supp.2d 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). An inmate brought a pro se § 1983

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). The widow of an inmate who had
been confined in a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county and
others, alleging failure to adequately train jail medical staff, leading to the denial of adequate
medical care which resulted in the inmate's death. Following removal to federal court, the
district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the widow appealed. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed
regarding whether the county's policy of relying on medical professionals, without offering
training on how to implement procedures for documenting, monitoring, and assessing inmates in
the medical unit of the jail, amounted to deliberate indifference to the inmates’ serious medical
needs. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the county's failure to implement specific policies regarding the
treatment of inmates in the medical unit of the jail amounted to a failure to train the jail's
medical staff on how to treat inmates, and whether the policies were the moving force behind the
inmate's death. The 71-year-old inmate was serving a 120-day jail sentence, and he suffered
from congestive heart failure and other ailments. Over a period of eighteen days his medical
condition deteriorated, and although nurses saw him several times during that period, there is
no record of a doctor's examination until the morning of the 18th day, hours before he died of
cardiac arrest. (Los Angeles County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or. 2006). Aliens from Cuba and Vietnam, who had

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Olivas v. Corrections Corp. of America, 408 F.Supp.2d 251 (N.D.Tex. 2006). An inmate brought a

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006). An African-American former employee of a
county sheriff's department brought an action against another corrections officer, alleging the
existence of a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After a jury trial, the district court awarded the former employee nominal
damages on the hostile work environment claim, $100,000 on the emotional distress claim, and

XX

action against a correction facility's superintendent and a correction officer, alleging
deprivations of his Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. The
district court held that the inmate's allegations were sufficient to plead that the superintendent
was personally involved in an alleged deprivation of the inmate's constitutional rights. The court
found that the inmate stated a claim against a prison superintendent for deliberate indifference
under § 1983 by alleging that the risk a corrections officer posed to inmates was obvious prior to
the deprivation the inmate allegedly suffered, and by alleging that a corrections officer
reportedly was officially reprimanded for misconduct towards inmates and that the severity of
his misconduct rose to a level requiring his temporary removal from duty or from a particular
program. The inmate alleged that the officer threatened him and hit him on more than one
occasion. (Downstate Correctional Facility, New York)

final orders of removal and had been released from custody on general orders of supervision, but
who had violated their orders by committing crimes, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the validity of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP). The district court denied the petition, holding that: (1) ISAP
regulations requiring participating aliens to remain in their residences between eight and 12
hours per day was not “detention” outside the statutory authority of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); (2) ISAP requirements did not violate the aliens' liberty interests under the
Fifth Amendment; (3) placement of the aliens in ISAP did not violate their procedural due
process rights; and (4) ISAP was not subject to Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
requirements. (Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Intensive Supervision Appearance
Program, Oregon)

§ 1983 action against a private company that managed a prison, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights and a claim of negligence under state law. The corporation moved for
summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that: the company
was not liable for alleged deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; even if
the corporation failed to properly prioritize the inmate's dental injury, the failure did not
amount to deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs; and the inmate did not
suffer a “physical injury” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Corrections
Corporation of America, Mineral Wells Pre-Parole Transfer Facility, Texas)

2.38

$20,000 in punitive damages. The court denied the corrections officer's motion for a new trial
and awarded the former employee attorney fees. The parties appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when, pursuant to New York law, it declined to reduce
compensatory damages of $100,000 awarded to the plaintiff on his claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, arising from an assault in which the officer and others sprayed the
plaintiff with mace, covered him with shaving cream, and taunted him with racial slurs. The
court noted that the plaintiff had testified as to his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of selfconfidence, as well as to his sleeplessness, headaches, stomach pains, and burning in his eyes
from the use of mace. The appeals court found that the punitive damages award of $20,000 did
not exceed the maximum permissible amount considering that this was a thoroughly
reprehensible incident, particularly in light of its racial motivation, and that the punitive
damages award represented a relatively small fraction of $100,000 compensatory damages
awarded on the emotional distress claim. The court noted that the officer against whom the
award was made should have appreciated the gravity of the racially motivated assault on a
fellow officer and should have understood that such conduct could have adverse economic
consequences. But the appeals court concluded that the $20,000 damage award was excessive in
light of the personal finances of the defendant corrections officer, who earned an annual salary
of approximately $37,632, was married and had two children. The court found that an award of
no more than $10,000 would provide sufficient punishment and deter future conduct. The court
remanded the case for a new trial on punitive damages, unless the plaintiff agreed to remit the
portion of the punitive damages award that exceeded $10,000. The plaintiff alleged that he had
been subjected to a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and that his employment
had been terminated because of his race. He alleged that he heard fellow employees use racial
slurs and make disparaging remarks about African-Americans on approximately 12 occasions
during his first three months of employment. (Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials’ motion for
summary judgment. The court found that the inmate had no constitutionally protected right to
purchase food or other items as cheaply as possible through the prison commissary, and
therefore prison officials did not violate the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights by allegedly
overcharging for commissary products. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F.Supp.2d 17 (D.D.C. 2006). A prison legal journal, Prison
Legal News (PLN), brought an action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), challenging
the agency's refusal to grant a waiver of search and duplication fees associated with a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) document request. The district court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiff, finding that the BOP was the proper defendant in the action, and the BOP
improperly denied the fee waiver request. According to the court, PLN demonstrated that the
disclosure of records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) would contribute to the
understanding of government operations or activities, as required to qualify for a fee waiver,
since the information at issue had not reached the threshold level of dissemination, and where
the request sought information regarding specific events that occurred within BOP facilities that
would provide insight to the public about how its federal prisons were being managed and
operated, and how its tax dollars were being expended. PLN had submitted a FOIA request to
the BOP seeking “a copy of all documents showing all money paid by the [BOP] for lawsuits and
claims against it” between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2003. Specifically, the plaintiff sought
“a copy of the verdict, settlement or claim in each case showing the dollar amount paid, the
identity of the plaintiff/claimant and the legal identifying information for each lawsuit or claim
or attorney fee award” and “a copy of the complaint ... or the claim ... in each incident which
describes the facts underlying each lawsuit and claim.” Under FOIA, fees will be waived if
“disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute
significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not
primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.” To support its request for a fee waiver,
PLN provided the following information in its letter to the BOP: “PLN is a § 501[c](3) non-profit
organization. We are a serious legal and political journal that reports on news and litigation
involving detention facilities. We have published monthly since 1990 and currently have
around 3,400 subscribers in all 50 states. We [e]stimate our actual readership to [be] in the
range of 18,000 people. We believe that the requested documents will shed light on the
operations of the BOP and help provide the public with a better understanding of how the
nation's prison system is run and managed since damage verdicts and settlements are an
important means of measuring respect for constitutional rights within penal facilities.
Moreover, the payout of government money is a strong indicator to tax payers of how
government facilities are operated. The information requested is plainly related to the
operations and activities of the BOP.” (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

XX

2.39

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION

Rodriguez-Marin v Rivera-Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2006). Employees of Puerto Rico's

corrections administration filed suit under § 1983 against the administration alleging political
discrimination, claiming that they were demoted in violation of their First Amendment and due
process rights. The district court entered a verdict for the employees, awarding compensatory
and punitive damages, and the defendants appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that
evidence was sufficient to support the jury finding that the employees were demoted based on
their political affiliation. The court noted that the employees were long-standing, competent
employees and that both were demoted without being given any notice or opportunity to defend
their demotions, and that important documents were missing from their personnel files.
According to the court, punitive damages of $120,000 to $195,000 assessed against the chief
legal advisor of the new political administration were not excessive because the demotions
jeopardized the employees' livelihood. As a result of their demotions, one employee's salary was
reduced by 60 percent and the other's was reduced by 43 percent. Both employees suffered harm
to their professional careers, were unable to meet their financial obligations because of their
reduced salaries, and suffered emotional distress for which they sought medical attention. The
court noted that “discrimination based on political-party affiliation is rampant in government
employment in Puerto Rico.” (Administration of Corrections, Puerto Rico)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE QUALIFICATIONS
DISCRIMINATION

Rogers v. Haley, 421 F.Supp.2d 1361 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A Caucasian state corrections sergeant
sued his superiors, claiming that he was denied promotions due to his race in violation of his
equal protection rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court
granted the motion in part and denied it in part. The court held that the equal protection rights
of the sergeant were not violated when a Black officer was selected over him for promotion to
lieutenant, despite the claim that the recruitment policies of the department encouraged blacks
to apply for the position, decreasing the prospects of whites to receive the appointment. The
court noted that the Black applicant interviewed very well, showed an outstanding grasp of the
elements of the position, and had local experience. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded as to the Equal Protection Clause claim alleging purposeful discrimination. The court
found that a warden's affidavit, admitting that he would have recommended the White male
correctional officer for promotion to lieutenant but for his belief that a “no-bypass rule” required
him to promote any black or female employee from the promotional register, precluded summary
judgment for the defendant. At the time of the events giving rise to this litigation, the
department and all other state agencies were subject to a 1970 injunction which provided that:
“Defendants shall not appoint or offer a position to a lower-ranking white applicant on a
certificate in preference to a higher-ranking available Negro applicant, unless the defendants
have first contacted and interviewed the higher-ranking Negro applicant and have determined
that the Negro applicant cannot perform the functions of the position, is otherwise unfit for it, or
is unavailable. In every instance where a determination is made that the Negro applicant is
unfit or unavailable, documentary evidence shall be maintained by the defendants that will
sustain that finding.” This provision is called the “no-bypass rule.” (Ala. Dept. of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Sample v. Bureau of Prisons, 466 F.3d 1086 (D.C.Cir. 2006). A federal inmate requested records
in an electronic format pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The district court
granted summary judgment for the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which had provided the
documents in paper format. The inmate appealed and the appeals court reversed and remanded
with instructions. The court held that pursuant to FOIA, BOP was obligated to provide records
to the federal inmate in the electronic format the inmate requested. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Shaw v. Coosa County Com'n., 434 F.Supp.2d 1179 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A daughter, individually

XX

and as administrator of the estate of her deceased father, brought state and federal law claims
against a sheriff and county commission arising from her father's death while he was an inmate
in a county jail. The county commission and sheriff filed separate motions for summary
judgment, which the district court granted. The court held that the county sheriff did not have
the requisite knowledge to be found deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the
inmate who failed to disclose his medical condition or to request treatment. According to the
court, the sheriff did not violate the Eighth Amendment rights of the jail inmate who died of
cardiovascular disease on his second day of incarceration, absent a showing that the inmate
disclosed his condition upon admission, that the sheriff otherwise knew that the inmate had a
serious condition that required immediate medical treatment, or that the sheriff failed to
provide the inmate with treatment with knowledge that failure to do so posed a substantial risk
of serious harm. The inmate apparently was not taking his medications and did not request
medical treatment. The court found that facially constitutional policies governing booking,
supervision, staffing, and training of jail personnel did not, as applied, result in deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of the inmate, where the policies provided for health
screening of inmates upon their admission and medical treatment when requested by inmates,
and there was no evidence that the policies were ignored nor any history of widespread problems
to place the sheriff on notice of the need to correct the policies, as required to hold the sheriff
individually liable. (Coosa County Jail, Alabama)

2.40

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Shidler v. Moore, 409 F.Supp.2d 1060 (N.D.Ind. 2006). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison
officials under § 1983 and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging denial of
his rights to worship, to petition for redress of grievances, and to have access to courts. The prisoner requested
a preliminary injunction and the district court denied the request. According to the court, the alleged failure of
state prison officials to quickly correct records that listed the prisoner's religion, with the result that the prisoner
was prevented from engaging in communal worship for 39 days, if proven, did not violate the prisoner's First
Amendment rights where any such actions were the result of negligence, not an intent to deny the prisoner
access to worship. The court found that allegations of the prisoner's complaint against prison officials, stating
that he was not allowed to use his religious name to send or receive mail, stated a cause of action under the
First Amendment and RLUIPA for monetary damages and injunctive relief. (Miami Correctional Facility,
Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former inmates, and
relatives and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging that the methods used by the
counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration violated the Due Process
Clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the
Kentucky statute authorizing county jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement policies did not
require that prisoners be sentenced before fees could be imposed, and that due process did not require a predeprivation hearing before prison fees were assessed. According to the court, the First Amendment rights of
non-prisoners who contributed funds to prisoners' accounts were not violated. The court noted that the statute
authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to deduct them from prisoners' canteen accounts, as soon as
prisoners' were booked into the jail. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Skinner v. Uphoff, 410 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Wyo. 2006). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 class action
against prison officials, alleging failure to safeguard inmates against assaults by other inmates, and seeking
individual compensatory as well as class injunctive relief. The district court granted injunctive relief and
declaratory relief, finding that the defendants failed to adequately train and supervise employees, failed to
properly review policy violations, and failed to properly discipline employees, all of which led to risks to
inmate safety. In an effort to alleviate the problems at the prison, a remedial plan was adopted and approved by
the court. The parties filed various motions to modify the remedial plan and the state moved for termination of
the final decree. The district court granted the motions in part, and denied in part. The court held that state
inmates and prison officials were entitled, under the remedial plan, to the opportunity to ask an outside
investigator about reports of his investigation of suspected premeditated inmate-on-inmate assaults. The
investigator was an independent contractor, and his reports bore directly upon whether officials were
complying with plan. The court held that the inmates had the right under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) to pursue discovery as to existence of the alleged ongoing and continuing constitutional violations
before the court could terminate the remedial plan entered in the inmates' action challenging officials' responses
to inmate-on-inmate violence. The court concluded that the inmates demonstrated good cause for a 60-day
postponement of an automatic stay of the remedial plan after the officials filed a motion for termination, where
the inmates made allegations of ongoing inmate-on-inmate violence and delays in the officials' remedial
actions, and a joint expert raised various concerns. (Wyoming State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Swope v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 439 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006). A federal inmate brought a pro se action under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking copies of recorded telephone conversations between him and
third parties in the possession of Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The district court held that the third parties involved
with the calls did not waive their privacy interests, that the recordings were exempt from disclosure, and that
the exempt and non-exempt portions of the recordings were non-segregable. According to the court, the BOP
recordings of inmate telephone conversations are the functional equivalent of “law enforcement records” for
the purposes of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption from disclosure of law enforcement records
that would involve an invasion of a third party's privacy. (Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield,
Missouri)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

U.S. v. Caro, 461 F.Supp.2d 478 (W.D.Va. 2006). An inmate was charged with first degree murder of his
cellmate. The district court granted the inmate’s discovery motion seeking certain Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
records based upon Brady, and denied his motions seeking some records on other grounds. The inmate and the
government filed objections. The district court held that: (1) the government was not required to disclose the
requested records under Brady, and (2) government was not required to disclose the requested records under the
rule requiring production, upon request, of data and material to prepare for defense. The inmate had asked for
BOP records concerning all inmates who had ever been confined in a supermax control unit, all incidents of
inmate violence in the same control unit, and all inmate homicides that had occurred in BOP prisons
nationwide in last 20 years. The court held that the material with not necessary with respect to the future
dangerousness of the capital defendant charged with murdering his cellmate, and the government was not
required to disclose them under Brady, inasmuch as there was no indication that such records would support the
opinion of an expert who stated that he could make an individualized assessment of the likelihood that the
inmate would commit violent acts in future. (U.S. Penitentiary, Lee, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET

U.S. v. Terrell County, Ga., 457 F.Supp.2d 1359 (M.D.Ga. 2006). The federal government brought a Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) action against a county, county sheriff, and various other
county officials, seeking a determination that county jail conditions were grossly deficient in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. The court
held that the sheriff and other officials were deliberately indifferent to the jail's gross deficiencies in the areas

XXI

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of medical and mental health care for inmates, protection of inmates from harm, environmental health and
safety of inmates, and fire safety, in violation of the due process clause. The court noted that the lack of funds
is not a defense to, nor legal justification for, unconstitutional conditions of a jail, for the purpose of analyzing
a deliberate indifference claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even if a defendant
argues that it is planning or working towards construction of a new jail to remedy the unconstitutional
conditions at the current facility, the failure to implement interim measures to alleviate those conditions
demonstrates deliberate indifference, according to the court. (Terrell County, Georgia)
2007
U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING CONDITIONS

Adair v. U.S., 497 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Current and former federal prison employees brought an action
against the government for back pay, hazard pay, environmental hazard pay, and contributions to thrift savings
accounts due to their exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke at their workplace. The U.S. Court of Federal
Claims granted the government's motion to dismiss. The employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed on an
alternative ground. The appeals court held that the employees' exposure to second-hand cigarette smoke was
not an unusual physical hardship or unusual hazard, given that the exposure was an expected condition of
employment usually involved in carrying out the duties of their positions, especially when those duties
involved the caretaking or monitoring of inmates and second-hand smoke, as part of the ambient air, was
commonly encountered indoors and outdoors where people worked or played. The court found that the
employees' exposure to second-hand smoke was not an unusually severe working condition or an unusually
severe hazard within the plain meaning of the statute mandating additional compensation for federal employees
whose duties involved such severe conditions. The court held that at the time the statute was enacted, secondhand smoke was not considered unusually severe. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Akines v. Shelby County Government, 512 F.Supp.2d 1138 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). Female correctional officers
brought Title VII, § 1983 and a Tennessee Whistleblower Act suit alleging hostile work environment arising
from a county's indifference to sexual harassment of the officers by county jail inmates. The district court
granted summary judgment to the county on the claims of certain officers. The county renewed its motion with
respect to the remaining officers and the court granted it. The court held that the county's taking of appropriate
disciplinary steps in response to reports of inmate harassment precluded a finding that it had fostered a hostile
work environment in violation of Title VII. According to the court, the county was not deliberately indifferent
to the rights of the female officers or a moving force behind the harassment, as required for a violation of §
1983. The court noted that the presence of one incident in which the institution apparently did not respond to a
female correctional officer's filing of a disciplinary complaint against one inmate for alleged sexual harassment
was insufficient to establish a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, where the institution
responded by disciplining inmates in connection with other reported incidents. (Shelby County Correctional
Center, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
RELEASE

Avalos v. Baca, 517 F.Supp.2d 1156 (C.D.Cal. 2007). A county jail detainee brought an action against a county
sheriff and under-sheriff, alleging claims arising out of his over-detention and involuntary waiver of an overdetention claim. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the defendants did not maintain an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of over-detention
and that the sheriff and under-sheriff were not individually liable for the detainee’s over-detention under §
1983. According to the court, evidence demonstrated that only 0.4 percent of persons released by the
department during the relevant time period were over-detained, the department had taken steps to reduce the
number of over-detentions in recent years, and the total number of over-detentions by the department had
dramatically decreased over time. The court noted that the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to
be free of a coercive waiver of rights and that the detainee failed to establish that the county sheriff and others
conspired to violate his constitutional rights. A member of the department’s risk management team had
approached the detainee and offered him $500 if he would release all claims. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, California)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Banks v. York, 515 F.Supp.2d 89 (D.D.C. 2007). A detainee in a jail operated by the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections (DOC), and in a correctional treatment facility operated by the District's private
contractor, brought a § 1983 action against District employees and contractor's employees alleging negligent
supervision under District of Columbia law, over-detention, deliberate indifference to serious medical needs,
harsh living conditions in jail, and extradition to Virginia without a hearing. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The appeals court found that the detainee's allegation
that policies or practices of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to training,
supervision and discipline of employees responsible for the detainees' release from DOC custody resulted in his
untimely release from jail, in violation of his constitutional rights, stated a claim for municipal liability under §
1983. (Central Detention Facility. D.C. and Correctional Treatment Facility operated by the Corrections
Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Boulware v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner brought a pro se
action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and various BOP officials in their official and individual capacities,
seeking to compel them to provide the prisoner with some of the marketable vocational opportunities provided
to similarly situated offenders housed in other federal facilities. The defendants moved to dismiss and the court
granted the motion. The court held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) claim. The court found that the prisoner failed to state a claim against individual BOP
officials. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a liberty interest to participate in vocational
programs of his choice as required to sustain a due process claim and the prisoner could not sustain an equal

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protection claim. The court held that the BOP's failure to provide additional programs did not violate the
prisoner's right to participate in programs. According to the court, the unavailability of a program at a particular
prison is not an atypical deprivation of rights in violation of the due process clause, but rather merely leaves the
prisoner with the normal attributes of confinement. (United States Bureau of Prisons' Rivers Correctional
Institution (“RCI”) in Winton, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Chambers v. NH Prison, 562 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.N.H. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
that prison officials had denied him necessary dental care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The
district court granted the prisoner’s motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the prisoner
demonstrated the likelihood of success on merits where his allegations were sufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against some defendants. The prisoner alleged that officials were deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs in refusing to provide care for a cavity for approximately one year due to a staffing
shortage. According to the court, the prisoner’s allegations that prison supervisors and a prison dentist knew of
the prisoner's pain as the result of an unfilled cavity, but nevertheless failed to take steps to ensure that care was
provided to him within a reasonable time period, provided the minimal facts necessary to state a claim for
supervisory liability under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Conklin v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 514 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal inmate brought a pro se action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Privacy Act alleging that the copy of his presentence
investigation report (PSI) in the BOP's files contained incorrect statements about him, resulting in his
classification as a “high custody” inmate. The district court granted the BOP’s motion to dismiss. The court
held that fact issues as to the date on which the prisoner knew or had reason to know of allegedly incorrect
statements in the copy of his PSI in BOP files precluded dismissal as untimely. The court held that amendment
of the copy of the inmate's PSI in BOP files was not an available remedy and damages were not an available
remedy. (Beckley Federal Correctional Institution in Beaver, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Jenkins v. DeKalb County, Ga., 528 F.Supp.2d 1329 (N.D.Ga. 2007). Survivors of a county jail detainee who
had died as the result of an apparent beating by a fellow inmate brought a § 1983, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment action against a county sheriff in his individual capacity, and against corrections officers. The
defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The district court granted the
motion. The 71 year old pretrial detainee suffered from multiple mental illnesses including schizophrenia and
dementia, which reportedly manifested themselves in theform of delusions, paranoia, bizarre thoughts and
behavior, physical violence, and verbal outbursts that included racial epithets. The court held that county
corrections officers' putting the inmate into a cell different from the one to which he had been assigned,
allegedly leading to the beating death of a pretrial detainee who shared the same cell, did not violate the
detainee's right against cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that even though the action violated a
jail policy, the policy was created primarily to keep track of inmates' placement, not to maintain inmate safety,
and there was no evidence of widespread inmate-on-inmate violence due to the misplacement of inmates. The
court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that the sheriff's alleged poor training and supervision of
corrections officers led to the officers' allegedly inadequate reaction to the incident between the jail inmates,
which ended with the beating death of one inmate. The court also found that the sheriff's failure to comply with
a court order to transfer the pretrial detainee to a mental health facility did not show supervisory liability
because the purpose of the transfer order was likely to get the detainee treatment for mental illness, not to
protect him. The court held that the county corrections officers were acting within the scope of their duties
when they mistakenly placed a fellow inmate in the same cell with a pretrial detainee, and thus the officers
were eligible for qualified immunity in the detainee’s survivors' § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
action. The court noted that the fact that the mistake violated jail policies or procedures did not mean that the
officers were not exercising discretionary authority. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFFING LEVELS

Jurado Sanchez v. Pereira, 525 F.Supp.2d 248 (D.Puerto Rico 2007). A prisoner's next of kin brought a civil
rights action under § 1983 against prison officials, seeking to recover damages for the prisoner's death while he
was incarcerated, and alleging constitutional rights violations, as well as state law claims of negligence. The
officials moved for summary judgment on the cause of action under § 1983. The district court denied the
motion, finding that summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of material fact on
the failure to protect claim and as to whether the officials had qualified immunity. According to the court,
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether there were enough guards at the prison when the prisoner
was killed by another inmate, and whether officials were mandated to perform weekly or monthly searches of
cells, which could have prevented the accumulation of weapons used in the incident in which the prisoner was
killed. Bayamon 308, an intake center, was considered minimum security with some limitations. The inmate
capacity at Bayamon 308 is 144. Although the capacity was not exceeded, some cells, despite being originally
built for one inmate, housed two inmates. According to the court, Bayamon 308 does not comply with the 55
square footage minimum requirements for each cell in a continuing federal consent order. Therefore, the
individual cell gates are left continuously open, like an open dormitory. At the time of the incident officials did
not take gang affiliation into consideration when segregating prisoners. The prisoner did not identify himself as
a gang member, nor inform officials that he feared for his life. The facility was under court order to follow a
staffing plan that stated the minimum amount of staff, the optimum amount, the fixed positions and the
movable positions, pursuant to a lawsuit. Fixed positions, such as control units, cannot be changed under any
circumstances, but the movable positions may be modified depending on necessity due to the type of inmate at
the facility. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants did not comply with the staffing plan, while the
defendants insisted that they did comply. (Bayamon 308 Facility, Puerto Rico)

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U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Kotz v. Lappin, 515 F.Supp.2d 143 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner moved for injunctive relief ordering the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and BOP director to reverse its refusal for the second time to allow the prisoner to
participate in a Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) and receive a sentence reduction. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that the RDAP statute did not grant the prisoner a liberty interest in the
possibility of early release. The court found that the BOP program statement restricting early release for
participation in RDAP to one time was an interpretive rule not subject to the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). (Federal Correctional Institute, Cumberland, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Lee v. Corrections Corp. of America, 525 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawai‘i 2007). A Hawai'i prisoner, who was
incarcerated in a Mississippi prison pursuant to a contract between Hawai'i and the private corporation that
operated the prison, brought a § 1983 action against the corporation, the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety,
and prison officials, arising from an incident in which the prisoner was allegedly beaten by other inmates. The
defendants moved to transfer venue. The district court granted the motion, changing the venue to Mississippi.
According to the court, the proper venue was Mississippi because the alleged beating, as well as the allegedly
negligent monitoring, supervision, training, and hiring by the corporation and prison officials, all occurred in
Mississippi. The court noted that convenience factors also supported the transfer of the action to Mississippi
because all of the parties except for the Hawai'i Department of Public Safety were on the mainland, the
majority of witnesses resided in Mississippi or on the mainland, and there was a local interest in having the
controversy decided in Mississippi. The plaintiff alleged that he had been attacked by inmates confined with
him in the Special Housing Incentive Program (“SHIP”) unit when the cell doors in the segregation unit were
inadvertently unlocked, which allowed the inmates to exit their cells. (Tallahatchie County Correctional
Facility, Tutwiler, Mississippi. Operated by Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Meyer v. Nava, 518 F.Supp.2d 1279 (D.Kan. 2007). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
former employee at a county jail, a board of county commissioners, and a county sheriff, seeking damages for
injuries suffered after being raped by a former jail employee while incarcerated at the county jail. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that a former
jail employee who raped the prisoner was not a final policymaker and therefore the county could not be held
liable under § 1983. The court noted that even though the employee had some discretion to place the prisoner in
a particular area of the jail, he had no authority to make or change county policy, and all authority to establish
policy otherwise remained with the sheriff. The court held that evidence was insufficient to show that the
county sheriff possessed knowledge of an excessive risk to female inmates and that the sheriff was deliberately
indifferent toward such a known risk, as would have subjected the sheriff to § 1983 liability for an Eighth
Amendment violation of the former prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. According to
the court, the employee's consensual actions with another female inmate, the actions of another male jailer with
a femal inmate, and the employee’s telephone calls to an inmate after her release did not constitute evidence
demonstrative of the sheriff's knowledge of any violation of department policy or a substantial risk of serious
harm to female inmates. The court held that the county board lacked any authority to supervise or discipline the
county sheriff or his subordinates, as required to subject it to § 1983 liability. (Lyon County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE QUALIFICATIONS

Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n v. Clarke, 513 F.Supp.2d 1014 (E.D.Wisc. 2007). A union and county
sheriff's deputies brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff, sheriff's captain and county alleging that the
defendants violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the Constitution. The plaintiffs were
seeking an injunction barring the defendants from permitting any further presentations given by a religious
group. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that inviting the religious organization to speak within the sheriff's department was an
unconstitutional endorsement of religion. Before the leadership conference the sheriff had spoken of promotion
criteria and distributed written material recommending that deputies surround themselves with people of faith.
The court found that a sheriff's captain could be held liable under § 1983 for the department's Establishment
Clause violation in endorsing the message of a religious organization composed of law enforcement officers
because the captain took an affirmative role in setting up the organization's presentations and failed to take any
action to alleviate the appearance of government endorsement of religion. However, the court held that
evidence was insufficient to establish that the county sheriff had made Christianity a prerequisite for promotion
in violation of Free Exercise Clause. The sheriff had distributed religious material prior to the leadership
conference when he was speaking about promotion criteria. (Milwaukee County Sheriff's Department,
Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
OVERTIME

Mullins v. City of New York, 523 F.Supp.2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Police sergeants brought an action against a
city and its police department to recover overtime compensation to which they were allegedly entitled under the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), but for which they had not been paid. The sergeants moved for partial
summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that the sergeants were exempt from FLSA as
executives for the period governed by the “short test.” According to the court, the primary duty of the police
sergeants was management and therefore they were exempt from FLSA overtime pay requirements as
executives for the period governed by the “short test.” The court noted that although the sergeants spent most of
their shifts working alongside their subordinates and performing many of the same law enforcement tasks, they
were responsible for ensuring that their subordinates performed their assignments, and they were personally
subject to discipline for failure to do so. The court denied summary judgment in part because of genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the police sergeants had the authority to hire or fire other employees, or whether
their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of
status of other employees were given particular weight. (New York City Police Department)

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U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Murphy v. Franklin, 510 F.Supp.2d 558 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and jail administrator, alleging that he was subjected to punitive, degrading and inhumane treatment
when, without explanation, he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet in an isolation cell, and, on another
occasion, shackled to his cot. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and denied in
part. The court held that although the detainee's complaint against the sheriff and jail administrator did not
allege that he was subjected to mistreatment pursuant to any specific official policy, the detainee's allegations
that the sheriff promulgated all policies and procedures in the county jail, that the detainee was placed in an
isolation cell and shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which was nothing more than a hole in the ground
covered by a grate, and that the sheriff ordered the detainee removed from this cell for an interview and then
reshackled to the toilet grate, were sufficiently specific to state a § 1983 claim against the sheriff under the
theory of supervisory liability. The detainee alleged that without explanation, he was moved into a ‘lockdown’
cell for one day, in which his right hand was cuffed to the frame of his cot and his right leg was shackled to the
other end of the cot's frame. Again without explanation, he was allegedly then moved to an isolation cell, where
he was shackled hands-to-feet to the toilet, which is actually nothing more than a hole in the ground. He alleged
that he was held in this configuration for almost 12 days and was not released to allow urination or defecation,
which caused him to soil himself, and that he was also not given any personal necessities such as clean, dry
clothing, personal hygiene items, or bedding. (Elmore County Jail, Alabama)

U.S. District Court
OVERTIME

Murphy v. Town of Natick, 516 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2007). Police officers filed a complaint against a
Massachusetts town, its police department, and the chief of police, on behalf of themselves and 54 other current
and former patrol and superior officers employed by the town. The officers alleged willful violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), specifically, that the town failed to pay all the overtime they were due for hours
worked in excess of 40 per week. The district court held that the town was required to include all wage
augments in the calculation of the regular rate with the exception of an in-service training differential, and that
the officers were to be paid FLSA overtime for performing town details. The court found that sergeants and
lieutenants fell within the executive exemption to the FLSA overtime requirement, but that detectives did not.
(Natick Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE

Piscottano v. Murphy, 511 F.3d 247 (2nd Cir. 2007). Correctional employees brought a § 1983 action against
state officials alleging that discipline imposed on them for associating with a motorcycle club violated their
First Amendment and due process rights to freedom of expressive association and freedom of intimate
association. The employees asserted a “void-for-vagueness” challenge to the regulation under which they were
disciplined. The district court entered summary judgment for the state officials and the employees appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the conduct of three employees constituted expressive activity
on a matter of public concern but the discipline of the three employees did not violate their freedom of
expressive association. The court found that the regulation prohibiting correctional officers from engaging in
behavior that could reflect negatively on the corrections department was not void for vagueness as applied to
the three employees. The court noted that the motorcycle club was not an organization that spoke out on
matters of public concern. According to the court, the state correctional employees' approval or endorsement of
the club necessarily would constitute expressive conduct on a matter of public concern where the employee
testified that what the club was “all about” riding motorcycles, having parties and having fun. According to the
court, in a public employee's action alleging retaliation for exercising speech rights, evidence that harms or
disruptions have in fact occurred are not necessary for the employer to justify an adverse employment action.
The court found that the employer need only make a reasonable determination that the employee's speech
creates the potential for such harms. (Connecticut Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET
CONDITIONS

Roberts v. County of Mahoning, Ohio, 495 F.Supp.2d 784 (N.D.Ohio 2007). Pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners being held in the custody of an Ohio sheriff at two correctional facilities that were allegedly
understaffed and overcrowded brought a § 1983 class action against the county, sheriff, and county
commissioners, alleging that conditions of confinement at those facilities were unconstitutional. The district
court appointed a special master for the remedial phase of the litigation. A three-judge panel of the district court
approved the proposed stipulated order. The district court held that the appointment of a special master had
accomplished the court's original objective and the appointment would be terminated. The court noted that the
special master's reports and other actions had fulfilled the requirement that he “assist the parties, specifically
the Defendants, in attempting to find a solution to the problems which created the unconstitutional conditions in
the Jail,” and his fourth report had established a mechanism for the litigation's actual resolution. The first two
reports addressed a narrowly avoided crisis that would have resulted from massive layoffs of security staff as a
result of a budget shortfall in the county. The third report, filed after passage of a successful ballot issue
increasing revenues available for the funding of the MCJC, described the parties' continued cooperation in
attempting to resolve the problems facing the jail, in particular, the need for accelerated collection of the
proceeds from the successful bond issue. The court concluded “These reports, to which no party filed any
objection, were instrumental in establishing an informational foundation for discussions of possible remedies to
the phenomenon of chronic and serious crowding in the jail.” (Mahoning County Justice Center, Ohio)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
INMATE FUNDS

Rowe v. Jones, 483 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2007). Following settlement of county prisoners’ § 1983 class action
lawsuit against county officials, an inmate welfare fund was created. The district court dismissed the officials’
motion to terminate a permanent plan for a charitable trust providing for donations from the fund. The officials
appealed and the appeals court reversed and remanded with instructions. The court held that an order
establishing a charitable trust funded by an inmate welfare fund, and a later order continuing the charitable trust
were “consent decrees,” rather than “private settlement agreements,” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA). The court noted that PLRA’s termination provisions, limiting prospective relief, are applicable to
consent decrees but not to private settlement agreements. The court noted that county officials did not sign

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either the order or otherwise indicate their consent to the charitable trust, the orders bore the district judge’s
signature and the district court’s official stamp, and the district court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement
of the charitable trust in both orders. (Glynn County Detention Center, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Ruston v. Department of Justice, 521 F.Supp.2d 18 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prison inmate sued the U. S.
Department of Justice, seeking disclosure of records from a psychiatric examination. The department moved
for summary judgment and the district court entered judgment for the department. The court held that an
intelligence test protocol and a psychiatric test extended score report were exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act as confidential commercial information. (Metropolitan Detention Center, Los
Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DISCRIMINATION

Safe Haven Sober Houses, LLC v. City of Boston, 517 F.Supp.2d 557 (D.Mass.2007). The operator of homes
for recovering alcoholics and drug users, its executive director, and manager sued a city and its inspectional
services department, alleging the department's regulatory and criminal enforcement actions against the operator
and its officials violated nondiscrimination provisions of Massachusetts General Laws, the Fair Housing Act
(FHA), the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs filed a motion
for a preliminary injunction to stay pending state court criminal proceedings. The district court denied the
motion, noting that the plaintiffs failed to establish that other exceptional circumstances creating a threat of
irreparable injury were both great and immediate, and that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) prevented the district
court from enjoining pending criminal proceedings. (Massachusetts Housing Court Department, Boston
Division and Safe Haven Sober Houses, LLC)

U.S. Appeals Court
APA-Administrative
Procedures Act

Serrato v. Clark, 486 F.3d 560 (9th Cir. 2007). An inmate petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus and the district
court denied the petition. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate
suffered an injury in fact, as required for the inmate to have standing to bring a habeas petition challenging the
decision of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to terminate his boot camp program, even though placement in boot
camp was a discretionary decision made on an individual basis. The court noted that the decision denied the
inmate the ability to be considered for a program that would have allowed her to serve only six months in
prison. The court found that the decision of the BOP to terminate the boot camp program was committed to
agency discretion by law, and thus was not susceptible to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). The inmate had only the recommendation by the judge that her eligibility for the discretionary
program be evaluated and she had not earned any early release privileges when informed of the termination.
(Federal Correctional Institution Dublin, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates, former inmates, and relatives
and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against two counties, challenging methods used by the counties
to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration. The district court entered
summary judgment for the counties and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing to inmates prior to
withholding a portion of money from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board. The
court found that the relatives lacked a property interest in the money they sent to inmates and that the counties
did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding money. According to the court, the
county inmates had a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause in money withheld from their
canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and board, but the county was not required under the Due
Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing to inmates prior to withholding money from their canteen
accounts where the amounts withheld were small, the risk of erroneous deprivation was minor in that
withholding involved elementary accounting and was non-discretionary, the potential benefits of a hearing
were small, and the government's interests of sharing costs and furthering offender accountability were
substantial. The court also found that the county did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in
withholding a portion of money that relatives had sent to the inmates for their canteen accounts,
notwithstanding that if the money had not been withheld the inmates might have spent it making telephone
calls. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE

Simmons v. The G.E.O. Group, Inc., 528 F.Supp.2d 583 (E.D.N.C. 2007). An African-American employee at a
private correctional detention facility sued his employer, claiming race discrimination under Title VII. The
employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
employee, who was disciplined in connection with his guilty plea to driving while intoxicated (DWI) and
failure to inform the facility of the charges until later confronted, was not similarly situated to a Caucasian
coworker who had been charged with a misdemeanor offense of failing to obey a traffic officer. According to
the court, the employee's complaint concerning the employer's smoking policy was not a protected activity
under Title VII and could not form the basis for a retaliation claim. (G.E.O. Group, Inc., Rivers Correctional
Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Smith v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 517 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner who had requested
information from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) several times under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
brought an action against the BOP, challenging the BOP's aggregation of the prisoner's FOIA requests and
denial of his fee waiver request. The BOP brought a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions. The court held that the prisoner was required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to seeking judicial review of BOP's aggregation of his FOIA requests, and that he was not entitled to a fee
waiver. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to a fee waiver for information he requested from the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), where the prisoner did not specify the
public interest that would allegedly be satisfied by disclosure of the requested information, identify the

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government activity or operation on which the prisoner intended to shed any light, or explain how disclosure
would contribute to the public's understanding of such activity or operation, as required by Department of
Justice (DOJ) procedures for disclosure of records under FOIA. (BOP FCI Gilmer, West Virginia)
U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) challenging its statutory authority to promulgate a regulation
through which it had established restitution payment schedules. The BOP requested that the court transfer the
suit to the federal district wherein the inmate was incarcerated. The district court denied the transfer, holding
that the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice did not weigh in favor of the transfer of venue.
According to the court, the federal inmate's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) action against the federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would not be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, so as to justify a
transfer of venue from the District of Columbia to the district within which the inmate was incarcerated. The
court noted that the success of the inmate's claim would not have affected the fact or length of the inmate's
confinement, but would only invalidate the BOP's restitution schedule. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Jesup,
Georgia)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Toolasprashad v. Bureau of Prisons, 474 F.Supp.2d 14 (D.D.C. 2007). A requester brought an action under
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), challenging the
BOP’s failure to produce more than 500 documents he allegedly gave a psychology intern at a federal
correctional institution. The BOP moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The district court held that the BOP’s search was reasonably calculated to locate all records
responsive to the request, although the search failed to produce the more than 500 documents the
requester allegedly gave a psychology intern, where BOP employees adequately described the searches
and averred that all files likely to contain responsive records had been searched. (Federal Correctional
Institution in Petersburg, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS
FOIA- Freedom of Information Act

Trentadue v. Integrity Committee, 501 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). A citizen, the brother of a federal prisoner
who was discovered hanged in his cell, filed an administrative complaint with the Integrity Committee
(IC), a subdivision of the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE). The plaintiff alleged
misconduct by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) of the United States Department of Justice
(DOJ) in reviewing the investigation into the prisoner's death, and later filed a request for various
documents pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff subsequently filed a
complaint in federal district court, seeking a set of documents submitted by the IG to the IC. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the IC, finding that the IG's submission was properly
withheld under FOIA exemption 7(A) because its disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere
with enforcement proceedings. The plaintiff appealed and also pursued a separate FOIA case in federal
court. After it was determined that the DOJ's Public Integrity Section was no longer conducting an
investigation, the appeals court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded. On
remand, the district court found that the documents could be withheld under exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C).
The citizen appealed. The appeals court reversed in part and remanded, holding: (1) those portions of the
IG's cover letter stating historical facts about the OIG's investigation and listing the individuals involved
in preparing the OIG's response to the IC were not protected by exemption 5; (2) that portion of the IG's
response providing general background information on the prisoner's death and the subsequent
investigations and lawsuits was unprotected by exemption 5; (3) with the exception of a few
recommendations, the IG's substantive, factual responses to plaintiff's discrete allegations were not
protected by exemption 5; (4) those portions of the IG's response which answered the plaintiff’s
allegations with respect to specific individuals who already had been publicly identified were not
protected by exemption 6; (5) even if the records at issue were compiled by the IC for reasons of law
enforcement, the relevant public interest outweighed any privacy concerns with respect to the bulk of the
information, so that it was not protected by exemption 7(C), the exemption for law enforcement records.
(Federal Transfer Center in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Wakat v. Montgomery County, 471 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Tex 2007). The estate of inmate who died in a
county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, jail physician, and other county personnel. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court held that the county was not liable based on
a county policy, the county was not liable for failure to train or supervise county jail personnel, and a
physician did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs. The court held
that the county sheriff was not liable in his individual capacity under § 1983 to the estate of the inmate
absent a showing that he participated in any of the alleged activities in any individual capacity. According
to the court, the county was not liable to the estate under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the inmate's
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since the county policy did not directly
cause county personnel to fail to seek physician approval to reinitiate the inmate's prescription
medication. The court noted that although the jail had a written policy of abruptly discontinuing any
narcotic medications when inmates were initially processed for booking, regardless of whether the inmate
had a valid prescription for the narcotic, the jail also had a policy allowing the narcotic medications to be
reinstated with the permission of a doctor. (Montgomery County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

West v. Frank, 492 F.Supp.2d 1040 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A prisoner sued prison officials under § 1983,
alleging that they violated his speech and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy prohibiting
prisoners from receiving publications in the mail. The prisoner wanted to stay abreast of the nation's
current events while he was incarcerated and had subscribed to USA Today using his own funds.

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Authorities at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility where the prisoner was incarcerated refused to
deliver the newspaper. The officials moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion. The
court held that the officials who had no involvement in the adoption or implementation of the policy
could not be liable under § 1983 for any violation of the prisoner's speech rights that occurred when the
policy was applied to him. The court held that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the
prison violated the prisoner's free speech rights by enforcing its policy against him, instituted as part of a
behavior modification program, precluding summary judgment. But the court found that the action was
moot, where the state had abandoned the policy, and the prisoner had been transferred from the only
prison in the state that imposed such a policy. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)
2008
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Abdullah v. Washington, 530 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.D.C. 2008.) An inmate filed a § 1983 action seeking damages
for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights stemming from his alleged exposure to second-hand tobacco
smoke while confined at a District of Columbia detention facility. The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that the plaintiff’s expert's testimony failed to demonstrate a causal
relationship between environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) and the increased risk of harm to the inmate. The
court noted that the expert was a biophysicist, not a medical doctor, never went to the jail, and never examined
the inmate or his medical records. The court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the health
risks caused by environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), even if the officials inadequately enforced no-smoking
rules, where a non-smoking policy was in existence during the inmate's incarceration, and the jail was
undergoing extensive renovation to improve air quality, including the ventilation system. (District of Columbia
Department of Corrections, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program v. Wood, 584 F.Supp.2d 1314 (M.D.Ala. 2008). A disabilities
advocacy program brought a suit against the director of the Alabama Department of Youth Services (DYS)
seeking access to residents, facilities, staff and records under federal law. The parties filed a joint motion
seeking court approval of a settlement. The court held that the limitations under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA) on prospective relief concerning conditions had no application because the suit was not concerned
with conditions of confinement or effects of actions by officials on confined juveniles. The court also found
that the advocacy group was not subject to the limitations on prisoner suits under PLRA. The court held that the
settlement of the suit was fair, adequate, reasonable and not illegal or against public policy, and thus warranted
the requested court approval. According to the court, the agreement contained a detailed plan for facilitating
access, a process for dispute resolution between the parties, and a provision for the court's retaining jurisdiction
for one year for the limited purpose of enforcing compliance. (Alabama Department of Youth Services)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Alves v. Murphy, 530 F.Supp.2d 381 (D.Mass. 2008). A person who had been civilly committed as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) brought a civil rights action alleging that treatment center officials placed him at a risk
of harm by not adhering to certain mandatory procedures prior to implementing a double-bunking policy. The
plaintiff also alleged that the officials violated equal protection principles by granting privileges to certain
residents at the center, but not to others. A magistrate judge dismissed the action. The judge held that failure of
the state treatment center to follow its own procedures regarding double-bunking, standing alone, was not a
sufficient basis for a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the First Circuit analyzes the constitutional claims of
pretrial detainees, who, like civil committees, may not be punished, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But, according to the court, the court draws on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
applies the “deliberate indifference” standard when analyzing a pretrial detainee's failure-to-protect claims.
(Massachusetts Treatment Center)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
WORKING CONDITIONS

Anderson v. Nassau County Dept. of Corrections, 558 F.Supp.2d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A female county
correctional employee, a sergeant, brought a Title VII action against a county department, lieutenant,
undersheriff, and sheriff, alleging she was passed over for promotion to the rank of lieutenant in violation of §
1983, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The district court held that summary
judgment for the defendants on the hostile work environment claims was precluded by a triable issue of fact as
to whether the employee's treatment was severe and pervasive. The court also found triable issues of fact as to
how many promotions were made after the employee became eligible for the rank of lieutenant, the reasons for
failure to promote her, and the defendants' intent in selecting the persons who were promoted. (Nassau County
Sheriff's Department, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
HARASSMENT

Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724 (7th Cir. 2008). A former city employee who had worked as a jailer
brought a Title VII action against the city and former coworkers alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, and
brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the city's failure to provide a pre-termination hearing denied her of due
process. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the employee appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the city's admission that the employee's surreptitious recording of a
meeting was a significant factor in her dismissal did not amount to direct evidence of retaliation. The court
found that a seven week interval between the employee's sexual harassment complaint and her subsequent
arrest and termination, without more, did not amount to direct evidence of retaliation. According to the court,
the employee did not show that she was performing her duties satisfactorily. The court’s opinion began with the
assertion that the employee’s “turbulent tenure as a jailor…lasted just ten months…” (Alton Police Department,
Illinois)

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2.48

U.S. Appeals Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). Prisoners filed numerous petitions for a writ of habeas
corpus, asserting that a regulation implemented by the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by categorically excluding prisoners convicted of offenses involving
possession, carrying, or use of firearms from early release for the successful completion of a residential
substance abuse program. The district court denied the petitions and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the regulation was invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), since the BOP failed to articulate a rationale for the regulation so as to provide a means for reviewing
the reasonableness of the agency's categorical exclusion of a class of nonviolent offenders from eligibility for
early release. The court noted that the BOP's general desire for uniformity in the application of the regulation
did not explain why the exclusion rule was promulgated, as the uniformity could have been accomplished in
any number of ways. (Sheridan Correctional Institution, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE UNION
OVERTIME
STAFFING LEVELS

Balas v. Taylor, 567 F.Supp.2d 654 (D.Del. 2008). The executrix of the estate of a state department of
corrections (DOC) employee, who committed suicide, brought a § 1983 action against the DOC and the
employee's supervisors, alleging that the employee's suicide was proximately caused by the defendants'
retaliation in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that resignation from a special
emergency unit by the employee was “symbolic speech” protected by the First Amendment, supporting the
First Amendment retaliation claim brought by the executrix of the employee's estate. The court noted that, at
the time of the resignation, the DOC and a labor union were in the middle of contract negotiations, and the
extent to which the prisons were understaffed and the imposition of mandatory and voluntary overtime were
major issues in the dispute. According to the court, the resignation of the employee along with other members
of the emergency unit was meant to communicate their lack of support for overtime to prison management, and
the employee's resignation from the unit was not pursuant to his suit and yet elected amounted to a refusal to
perform his duties. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the employee’s resignation was a substantial or motivating factor in the alleged retaliatory actions
taken against the employee, which included poor performance reviews, and whether the same alleged adverse
actions would have taken place in the absence of the protected conduct.
The court found that the employee’s supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged
conduct of giving the employee a mediocre performance evaluation with falsified criticism and taking other
retaliatory action against the employee, because of the employee's protected activities of supporting his labor
union, refusing to cross a picket line, and resigning from a special prison emergency unit. According to the
court, the alleged conduct was retaliatory, and a reasonable official in the supervisor's position could not have
believed that his actions were constitutionally permissible, as clearly established law prohibited retaliation for
union membership and activity, and exercise of First Amendment rights. (Correction Emergency Response
Team, Sussex Correctional Institute, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
UNION

Bergeron v. Cabral, 535 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass. 2008). Corrections officers filed a § 1983 action alleging that
a sheriff's revocation of their commissions as deputy sheriffs shortly after her election constituted retaliation
and political discrimination in violation of their First Amendment rights. The sheriff moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the revocation
was of sufficient consequence to constitute an “adverse employment action.” The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the sheriff's decision to revoke the officers' commissions
as deputy sheriffs was motivated by their dissemination of letters and a press release during a political
campaign, which would indicate that the sheriff engaged in political discrimination. The court noted that the
commission was discretionary, unremunerated and was not a requirement for service as a corrections officer.
The commission had no bearing on the officers' work hours, vacation days, or job assignments, but its
revocation resulted in the diminution of the officers' status, and deprived them of the opportunity to supplement
their income by working private details. The court found that the sheriff's interest in maintaining order and
discipline among her officers outweighed any legitimate interest of the corrections officers in promoting their
union's bargaining position by publishing allegations of the sheriff's malfeasance during an election campaign,
and therefore the sheriff's alleged retaliation against union officers did not violate the First Amendment.
(Suffolk County Sheriff, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Brazier v. Oxford County, 575 F.Supp.2d 265 (D.Me. 2008). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a
county and corrections officers, alleging that strip searches performed upon her during two post-arrest
confinements at a county jail, both relating to her driving privileges, were unconstitutional. The district court
held that the strip searches violated the county's written policy, and thus the county was subject to liability
under § 1983. The court noted that the county's written policy prohibited strip searches of inmates charged with
misdemeanor crimes unless there was reasonable suspicion to believe that an inmate was hoarding evidence to
a crime, weapons, drugs, or contraband. (Oxford County Jail, Maine)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT

Brown v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 583 F.Supp.2d 404 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). A correctional
officer brought an action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and several
other institutional and individual defendants, alleging race discrimination and harassment in violation of Title
VII, § 1981, § 1983, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the officer satisfied the
personal involvement requirement for stating a § 1981 hostile work environment claim against his co-workers;
(2) the alleged harassment by his co-workers was not done under color of law for the purposes of a § 1983
claim; (3) the officer's complaints to supervisors about alleged discrimination and harassment based on his race
did not constitute speech protected under § 1983 and did not relate to matters of public concern; (4) the officer's
state law claims against individual state officials and employees were barred by the election-of-remedies
provision in NYSHRL; (5) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the actions and statements of

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his co-workers created a hostile work environment under Title VII; (6) genuine issues of material fact existed
as to whether the DOCS took appropriate steps to put an end to the alleged harassment; and (7) genuine issues
of material fact existed as to whether his co-workers and supervisors acted with retaliatory animus. (Elmira
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322 (5th Cir. 2008). The daughter of a detainee who hung himself while confined
in a “drunk tank” of a county jail brought a § 1983 action against the county, and a sheriff and deputies in their
individual and official capacities. The district court awarded summary judgment to each defendant sued in his
individual capacity on the basis of qualified immunity, but denied summary judgment to individual defendants
in their official capacities and to the county. After a trial, the district court directed a verdict in favor of all
officers and the county. The daughter appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the sheriff was
protected by qualified immunity and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding expert
testimony indicating that the detainee was alive when paramedics arrived at the jail. The court found that the
county was not liable under § 1983. According to the court, the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity from
the claim that he failed to adopt any written policy pertaining to inmate supervision or medical care, where
verbal policies existed concerning inmate supervision and medical care. The court found that the sheriff's
efforts in training and supervising deputies were not deliberately indifferent, as required for the sheriff to be
liable under § 1983 for the suicide of a drunk driving detainee. The court found that while the deputies'
conclusion that the detainee who had hung himself was already dead, and their resulting failure to make any
attempt to save his life, were arguably negligent, this conduct alone did not amount to deliberate indifference,
nor was any county custom or policy the moving force behind the deputies' conduct, as required for the county
to be liable under § 1983 for denial of reasonable medical care. (Marion County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Burns v. PA Dept. of Correction, 544 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 due process claim
against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's disciplinary proceedings.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded. The court held that as a matter of first impression, the department of corrections'
assessment of the inmate's institutional account, even absent an attempt to deduct funds from it, constituted a
deprivation of a protected property interest for the purposes of procedural due process. The court found that the
Department of Corrections' voluntary promise to refrain from the future seizure of funds from the inmate's
account, in a letter submitted more than three years after it originally assessed that account for medical and
other fees, did not render the inmate's appeal of his procedural due process claim moot. The court noted that the
alleged violation was complete at the moment the inmate was deprived of a property interest without being
afforded the requisite process, and, if proven, would entitle the inmate to at least an award of nominal damages.
The inmate had been disciplined for assaulting another inmate and he lost his prison job, good time credits, and
was assessed for medical costs for the inmate who was injured. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
OVERTIME
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Carlsen v. U.S, 521 F.3d 1371 (Fed Cir. 2008). Federal employees of the Bureau of Prisons brought an action
against United States under the Federal Employees Pay Act (FEPA) alleging that they were entitled to be paid
for overtime that they had worked. The United States Court of Federal Claims granted judgment for the United
States and the employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the occasional or irregular
overtime work allegedly performed by the Bureau of Prisons employees who worked in a secure environment
was not subject to compensation under FEPA unless the overtime was directed or approved in writing by a
person authorized to approve such overtime. The court noted that the employees worked in a setting in which
they were required to follow all orders, written or oral. The court found that documents such as agency
manuals, standards of conduct and training documents which emphasized that employees were required to
follow orders of their superiors, when considered together with verbal directives that had the effect of requiring
employees to work outside their scheduled shifts, did not constitute express written directives or orders to the
employees to work overtime. According to the court, documents such as emails of employees' performance
standards and emails from a warden's secretary and announcements of times and places of meetings that the
employees were expected to attend did not constitute sufficient written orders to the employees to work
overtime. The court ruled that the time that employees spent waiting in a key line did not constitute overtime
work. However, the court found that “post orders” that defined employees' duties for each shift by inherently
requiring the presence of two employees, one of whom was off-duty, in order to exchange information and
equipment at change of shifts, did constitute written orders to work overtime, but the tasks for which an
employee was entitled to overtime credit, which amounted to less than ten minutes per day, were de minimis.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Coleman v. Lappin, 535 F.Supp.2d 96 (D.D.C. 2008). A federal inmate brought an action under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) challenging the Federal Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) refusal to confirm or deny the
existence of records relating to a former BOP employee who filed a disciplinary report against him. BOP
officials moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that disciplinary
records pertaining to the employee did not, as a matter of law, fall within the FOIA exception for law
enforcement records, even though the employer was subject to the BOP's standards of employee conduct, and
the inmate’s allegations might warrant an official investigation pursuant to those standards. (Federal Bureau of
Prisoner, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 2008). A county corrections officer, who was placed on leave
without pay after he returned to work following a stroke, brought an action against the county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, and others, alleging violation of his due process rights, and violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officer on

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2.50

the due process claims, granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ADA claims, and dismissed
the state law claims. The officer appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officer, who had
suffered a stroke, failed to establish an ADA discrimination claim because he could no longer perform the
essential functions of the position of corrections officer. The court noted that the officer's physician advised that
he could no longer have contact with inmates, could have no physical contact, no physical activity other than
sitting in a chair with brief episodes of standing and walking, no lifting, kneeling, stooping, or running, and
must have a work environment with adequate heat and air conditioning. The sheriff’s office had stated that
correctional officers are primarily responsible for maintaining vigil, standing watch over inmates, counting
inmates, breaking up fights among inmates, inspecting for contraband, escorting inmates outside their cells,
searching inmates and visitors, and searching for escaped inmates. Although there are some positions requiring
less inmate contact than others, the sheriff’s office asserted that all officers, regardless of the position to which
they were assigned, must be able to respond to emergencies such as riots or escapes, and must be able to rotate
through various positions as needed. This requirement, often occurring due to unforeseeable events, meant that
the Sheriff's Office was unable to guarantee that any assignment would shield an officer from all inmate
contact. (Cook County Sheriff's Office of Corrections, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
EMPLOYEE UNION

Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2008). County corrections officers brought a § 1983 First
Amendment retaliation action against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities, alleging that disciplinary
actions taken by the sheriff had been motivated by the officers' union activities. The officers also asserted statelaw civil rights and tort claims. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the sheriff on the §
1983 claims against him in his official capacity, and against the sheriff on some state-law claims. The sheriff
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers' private speech to coworkers concerning a
planned picket, whose stated purpose was to allow union members to publicly express criticism of management
and to alert the public to the behavior of the sheriff was on a matter of public concern. According to the court,
there was no evidence of actual or potential disruption from the officers' brief statements to coworkers
concerning a planned picket by the union, and conversely there was ample evidence that the officers had been
suspended because of their pro-union activity rather than for reasons of disruption of public safety. The court
held that the attorney fee award to the officers’ attorneys of approximately $172,000 was not excessive, even
though the back-wages damages award was only approximately $18,000. According to the court, the award
under a civil rights attorney fee statute did not necessarily have to be proportionate to the amount of damages.
The court also held that the officers' lack of success on one of their claims did not preclude the fee award
because the officers were successful on the claim that had propelled the litigation. (Bristol County Sheriff's
Office, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
RECORDS

Davis v. Dallas County, Tex., 541 F.Supp.2d 844 (N.D.Tex. 2008). Inmates filed a state court action alleging
that a new computer system designed and installed by a county and contractors prevented county officials from
receiving relevant inmate information, causing them to be retained beyond their correct release dates. The case
was removed to federal court. The district court denied the contractor’s motion to dismiss. The court held that
the contractor had a duty of care to the inmates to ensure that they were not incarcerated beyond their proper
term, and fact issues remained as to whether the county's negligent reliance on a new computer system was the
concurrent, rather than the superseding, cause of the inmates' detention. (Dallas County, Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
WORKING CONDITIONS

DuBerry v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2008). A former employee brought an action
against the D.C. Department of Corrections, alleging that the department discriminated against him on the basis
of his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title VII, § 1983, § 1981, and the
D.C. Human Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the parties in part and denied in part.
The court held that the employee sufficiently exhausted his ADA claims and that there was sufficient evidence
to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the department discriminated and retaliated against the employee.
The court also found that evidence was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the department's
proffered reasons for termination and refusal to rehire were pretextual. The court held that the department did
not violate Title VII, § 1983 or § 1981. The former employee had been diagnosed with diabetes and his
condition required him to eat meals at designated times and prevented him from skipping meals. He was
transferred to the third shift and he requested an accommodation because he believed working that shift would
be incompatible with the diabetes treatment regimen prescribed by his physician. The Department denied his
accommodation request and transferred him to the third shift. He was eventually transferred to the first shift
after using 208 hours of sick leave during his first three months on the third shift. When he was later denied a
promotion, he filed an EEOC complaint. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against
jail officials and the county claiming, among other things, that the county's policy or custom regarding the
provision of medical care at the jail on weekends reflected deliberate indifference to her medical needs and
caused injuries resulting from a fall from the top bunk in her cell when she had a seizure. After a jury found
against the county, the district court denied the county's motions for judgment as a matter of law. The county
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence existed for reasonable minds to find a
direct causal link between county's policy of permitting jail officials to “contact” medical staff simply by
leaving a medical form in the nurse's inbox, even though a nurse might not see the notice for 48 hours, and the
alleged denial of the inmate's right to adequate medical care, allegedly leading to the inmate suffering a seizure
and falling from a top bunk. According to the court, the deposition testimony of a doctor provided a basis for
finding that the inmate would not have suffered a seizure had she been given medication within a few hours of
her arrival at the jail. The inmate, a self-described recovering alcoholic who also suffers from epilepsy, was
arrested on a probation violation and taken to the jail. That afternoon, she had a seizure, fell from the top bunk
of a bed in her cell, and sustained significant injuries to her right hip and right clavicle. Her case proceeded to

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trial and the jury found that none of the jail officials were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs,
but determined that the county's policy regarding weekend medical care exhibited deliberate indifference to,
and was the proximate cause of, her injuries. The jury awarded her $214,000 in damages. (Grand Traverse
County Jail, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
WORKING CONDITIONS

Garcia Rodriguez v. Laboy, 598 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.Puerto Rico 2008). Employees of a correctional facility
brought a § 1983 action alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations against canine unit officers of
the Puerto Rico Correction Department, individually and in their official capacities. The employees challenged
the officers' alleged public strip searches involving narcotics dogs and body cavity searches. The court granted
two officers’ motion to dismiss. The employees challenged searches that required them to make a line where
narcotics dogs would sniff them. If the dogs alerted to the presence of narcotics, the employees would be
subject to a strip search. However, the employees had to sign release forms before the strip search, and were
forced to do so without time to read the forms and under the threat of losing their jobs. Then, the employees
were required to undress and subject themselves to a body cavity search. The searches took place in areas to
which the public, other employees, and inmates had access to, where they were able to witness the process. The
court noted that when conducting these types of searches, officers of the Canine Unit violated several of the
internal regulations of the Unit. The regulations required the officers to take every person searched before a
supervisor, write a memorandum about each search, and ensure that the area of inspection was not
contaminated prior to that particular search. Also, the search had to be limited to a physical search. The court
noted that the officers of the Canine Unit searched over thirty employees, but never found any controlled
substances. (Correction Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Correctional Complexes of
Guayama 500 and Las Cucharas)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATION
OVERTIME
STAFFING LEVELS

Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2008). Female corrections officers brought a Title VII
action against a county, challenging a staffing policy that reduced the number of shifts available to them at a
juvenile detention center, and alleging other incidents of discrimination as well as retaliation. Following a
bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the county. The officers appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. The court held that a sex-based classification, requiring that
each unit in the juvenile detention center be staffed by at least one officer of the same sex as the detainees in
the unit, was not reasonably necessary for the rehabilitation, security, or privacy functions of the facility, with
respect to the third shift when only one officer was present on each unit. According to the court, the
classification was therefore not a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ), so as to be exempt from Title
VII. The court noted that no staff-on-inmate sexual assaults had occurred, the county had not investigated
alternatives to same-sex staffing, juvenile privacy concerns were not limited to the third shift, and the
effectiveness of role-modeling programs did not require the presence of a same-sex staff member at all times.
The court found that the reduction in overtime hours available to female officers resulting from the policy was
an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII, in that overtime pay had been a significant and
expected component of the female officers' compensation, and the policy had the greatest effect on the third
shift, which provided the majority of overtime work and a pay premium. The court held that the incidents
alleged by the female officers, such as being told not to wear sweaters or to eat in front of the juveniles,
unspecified “intimidation” and door slamming by the head of a shift, missing or marked up time-cards,
occasional early morning phone calls, and not being assigned to work together on same the shift or in easier
pods, if proven, did not rise to the level of an adverse action under the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII.
(Milwaukee County Juvenile Detention Center, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS
DISCRIMINATION

Hervey v. County of Koochiching, 527 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2008). A female jail administrator brought an action
under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), alleging that her employer and her supervisors
discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and retaliated against her for participation in a protected
activity. The plaintiff also alleged that her employer was liable for violations of the Minnesota Government
Data Practices Act (MGDPA). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the
plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded with directions to modify the final judgment so as
to dismiss the MGDPA claim without prejudice, so that it may be considered, if at all, by the courts of
Minnesota. The court held that the female jail administrator failed to demonstrate that her supervisors took
away many of her major responsibilities and twice suspended her without pay because of her gender, in
violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court noted that although the
supervisors allegedly changed the management structure of the sheriff's office without approval of county
board, nothing about this change in management structure supported the inference that subsequent action taken
by a new management team were based on gender. The court found that the administrator failed to establish
that similarly situated male employees were not punished as severely for their misconduct as she was, and that
this differential treatment constituted a submissible case of discrimination based on sex under Title VII or the
Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court noted that the administrator's alleged misconduct in recently
lying to a supervisor about leaving a voicemail on his telephone when she was going to be absent from work
was not similar to the acts of misconduct that she cited in support of her sex discrimination claim, one of which
involved a supervisor allegedly lying on his application to become a licensed police officer some 25 years
earlier, and the others of which involved alleged off-duty misconduct or misconduct that was not shown to have
been reported to supervisors. The court held that the administrator failed to show that her alleged harassment by
her supervisors was based on sex, as required to establish her claim of hostile work environment under Title
VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). According to the court, although the administrator claimed
that supervisors created a hostile work environment by, among other things, constantly criticizing her, requiring
her to report to the under-sheriff, and yelling at her on several occasions, she did not produce any evidence that
she was the target of harassment because of her sex and that the offensive behavior was not merely nonactionable, vulgar behavior. The court held that the record did not support a reasonable inference that the

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administrator's supervisors retaliated against her, in violation of Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act
(MHRA), for filing a claim with the state human rights department. The court noted that the administrator's
conduct in filing a claim was protected, but the administrator was accused of insubordination before she
notified her employer of her protected activity. (Koochiching County Jail, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Hidalgo v. F.B.I., 541 F.Supp.2d 250 (D.D.C. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), seeking information regarding a
paid government informant, including the amount of payments made to the informant and the FBI's
interventions on the informant's behalf in criminal cases. The district court held that the payment information
was not protected from disclosure under FOIA's “internal personnel rules” or “circumvention of the law”
exemptions and that the FBI's file on the confidential informant was not protected under FOIA's “personnel and
medical files” or law enforcement/personal privacy exemptions. But the court held that the information
provided to the FBI by the informant regarding the subjects of an investigation was protected under FOIA's
“expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings” exemption. The court noted that the inmate “…has
pursued the documents at issue for a decade, at one point with the pro bono assistance of a former Solicitor
General of the United States.” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Jo v. District of Columbia, 582 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.D.C. 2008). A lieutenant with the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections commenced a § 1983 action against the District, three District employees, and
others, alleging that he was denied a promotion to the rank of captain because of his South Korean descent. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the District
demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision not to promote the lieutenant and that the
decision was not pretextual. The court also found that the lieutenant failed to demonstrate the existence of any
policy. The court noted that the use of the lieutenant's picture on a recruitment poster that contained the phrase
“Professional Dedicated to Duty” did not give rise to an inference of discrimination, on account of the
lieutenant's South Korean descent. According to the court, there was no evidence that the persons selected for
depiction in the poster were the most qualified lieutenants in the Department, and other individuals depicted in
the poster were not even supervisory employees. (D.C. Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a state court § 1983 action
against the director of a state's department of corrections, alleging improper debiting of his trust account to pay
for legal copies and postage, improper classification, improper conditions of confinement, and denial of
rehabilitative opportunities. The director removed the action to federal court. The district court granted
summary judgment for the director and remanded. The court held that the state corrections department's policy
of debiting prison inmates' trust accounts to cover the cost of all legal correspondence did not infringe upon
theinmate's right of access to courts under the Due Process Clause, where the inmate was not denied the use of
a writing instrument, paper or postage for legal mail. The court noted that the department had provided notice
of its policy to debit accounts for the costs of such correspondence, the department had a compelling interest in
maintaining an orderly assessment process, the inmate could contest any allegedly erroneous assessment via the
prison grievance process, and the state offered an adequate post-deprivation remedy. (South Carolina
Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE UNION

Justice v. Danberg, 571 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.Del. 2008). An employee of the Delaware Department of
Corrections (DOC) brought an action pursuant to § 1983 against the DOC and its commissioner and director of
human resources, alleging a denial of promotion in retaliation for his involvement in union activities, in
violation of the First Amendment. The district court held that the employee was acting as a citizen when
participating in union activities, the employee's participation in union negotiations was of considerable concern
to the community, and the employee's interest in participating in union negotiations outweighed the DOC's
interest in the efficiency of its public service operations. The court held that summary judgment was precluded
by fact issues as to whether the employee's participation in union activities was the substantial motivating
factor in the DOC's failure to promote him and as to whether the employee's union activity was a motivating
factor in the loss of his application for promotion. (Delaware Department of Correction, Morris Community
Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials at
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), and
against a private transportation company and its employees. The inmate alleged violation of his constitutional
right to adequate medical treatment during his transfer between institutions, resulting in the failure of
chemotherapy for his advanced liver disease from hepatitis C. The district court dismissed the claims against
the NMDOC, and dismissed the claimsagainst the remaining parties after settlement. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that NMDOC officials lacked sufficient contacts with Illinois for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court noted that New Mexico officials had only arranged and planned the
inmate's transfer by a handful of phone calls, but did not purposefully avail themselves of the privileges of
conducting activities in Illinois, and had not deliberately engaged in significant activities or created continuing
obligations in Illinois. The inmate’s transfer took place in October 2004. The court noted that although the
inmate’s bus trip to New Mexico could have been completed in less than 24 hours, the route that the private
transport company (TransCor) chose lasted six days. Moreover, while the Illinois and New Mexico prison
officials were all well aware of the inmate’s prescribed treatment and of how strictly it had to be followed, they
failed to establish procedures that would ensure proper medical care for the inmate during the trip. According
to the court, “During his transfer, everything that could go wrong with [the inmate’s] treatment, did.” (Illinois
Department of Corrections, New Mexico Department of Corrections, TransCor America, LLC)

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U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE

McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2008). An employee, a correctional officer, brought suit against
an employer alleging she was subject to race discrimination and retaliation under § 1981 and § 1983, with
respect to matters of employment discipline, compensation, a lowering of service rating, failure to promote, and
failure to reassign or transfer. The employee also alleged that she was subject to a hostile work environment.
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment on all claims. The officer appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employee was not similarly situated to white employees
who were allegedly treated more favorably, as required for a race discrimination claim under Title VII. Neither
of the employee's comparators committed similar or more serious offenses as those committed by the
employee, including violating a uniform directive, or abusing the indicia or privileges of their office. The court
found that the employer's policy that employees who were suspended could not recover for their unpaid leave
by working overtime upon their return to work was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason under Title VII for
restricting the employee from working overtime. According to the court, the employer's reasons for giving the
employee an unsatisfactory service rating were not a pretext for unlawful retaliation under Title VII. The
employer cited the employee's chronic tardiness, her manner of requesting leave by calling in, and her
suspension. The court also held that the alleged instances of racially derogatory language, extending over a
period of more than two years, were too sporadic and isolated to establish that the employer's conduct was so
objectively severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile work environment under Title VII. (Mobile County
Jail, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2008). A representative of the estate of a pretrial
detainee who died in a county jail of untreated diabetes brought an action against correctional officers, a jail
doctor, and paramedics, alleging deliberate indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition under §
1983 and asserting state law medical malpractice claims. The district court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the alleged conduct of the correctional officers in observing and being aware of
the detainee's serious medical condition, which included signs of nausea, vomiting blood, swelling, lethargy,
and chest pains, and in allegedly disregarding jail protocols, which required the officers to transport the
detainee to a hospital emergency room for evaluation upon complaints of chest pain, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of the detainee’s due process rights. The
court found that the paramedic's conduct in allegedly disregarding a jail protocol which required the paramedic
to transport detainees to a hospital emergency room when they complained of chest pains, by failing to
transport the detainee upon responding to an incident in which the detainee allegedly lost consciousness, had no
pulse, and complained of chest pain and nausea after she regained consciousness, amounted to deliberate
indifference to the detainee's serious medical condition, in violation of her due process rights. The court found
that county officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly train jail officers as to the
proper protocols for obtaining medical treatment for the detainee, absent a showing that any individual official
encouraged, authorized, or knowingly acquiesced to the officers' alleged deliberate indifference. (Roane County
Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Pugh v. Goord, 571 F.Supp.2d 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). State prisoners sued prison officials, alleging violations of
their constitutional and statutory rights to free exercise of Shi'a Islam and to be free from the establishment of
Sunni Islam. Following remand from the appeals court, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that one prisoner's claim for
injunctive relief qualified for a “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception, and therefore was not
rendered moot by his transfer to another facility. The court noted that the corrections department had the ability
to freely transfer the prisoner between facilities prior to the full litigation of his claims, and there was a
reasonable expectation that the prisoner would be subject to the same action again, given that the department's
policies were applicable to all of its prison facilities. (New York State Department of Correctional Services,
Mid-Orange Correctional Facility and Fishkill Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Roe v. Crawford, 514 F.3d 789 (8th Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a class action against corrections officials
challenging the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDC) policy prohibiting transportation of pregnant
inmates off-site for elective, non-therapeutic abortions. The district court determined that the MDC policy was
unconstitutional and entered judgment for the inmate. Corrections officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the MDC policy could not withstand scrutiny under Turner. The court noted that
even if the MDC policy rationally advanced the prison's legitimate security interests, the policy acted as a
complete bar to elective abortions. The prison policy allowed transportation “outcounts” to outside facilities
only for medically necessary therapeutic abortions due to a threat to the mother's life or health. According to
the court, obtaining an abortion prior to incarceration was not a valid alternative means of exercising the right.
According to the court, the MDC policy did not reduce the overall number of outcounts and so did not reduce
any strain on financial or staff resources, and ready alternatives to the MDC policy existed including reverting
to the previous policy of allowing outcounts for elective abortions. (Missouri Department of Corrections,
Women's Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Sauve v. Lamberti, 597 F.Supp.2d 1312 (S.D.Fla. 2008). A former prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a
sheriff and correctional health services corporation, alleging that the defendants denied the prisoner access to
medications while he was incarcerated. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to the
extent that a doctor employed by the corporation with which the county contracted for correctional health care
services was aware of the prisoner's history of drug problems, mental health issues, and prior noncompliance
with treatment at the time of his decision not to place the prisoner on medication. The court also found genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the decision not to place the prisoner on medication for the first 49 days of

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his incarceration was based on the medical judgment of the doctor. The court held that summary judgment was
also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the corporation had a practice or policy that
resulted in the prisoner being denied medication for 49 days during his incarceration. The court ruled that the
sheriff failed to establish an entitlement to summary judgment, even though the former prisoner presented
evidence only as to the private corporation with which the county contracted for correctional health care
services because the county remained liable for constitutional deprivations caused by policies or customs of the
corporation. (Broward County Jail, Florida, and Armor Correctional Health Services)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Shepheard v. City of New York, 577 F.Supp.2d 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A New York City Department of
Correction (DOC) employee, a correction officer, brought a pro se action against the DOC and the City of New
York, alleging they discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The district court granted summary judgment for the DOC and the city. The court held that the
employee failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as she did not meet the burden of proving she
could perform the essential functions of her position as Captain with or without reasonable accommodation.
The court found that the employee failed to state a claim for discriminatory termination. The court noted that
the tasks of a Captain's position required an individual to be “focused, attentive, alert, and vigilant,” all of
which were attributes that were either impaired or lacking as the result of her depression and/or medication she
was taking in order to treat that condition. The court also noted that her attendance record evinced her inability
to report to work, and her inability to perform the essential functions required of a Captain also implicated
safety concerns. (New York City Department of Corrections, New York)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Sliney v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 577 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). An inmate brought an action against
the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), based on his requests
for a tape recording of portions of certain telephone calls. After a tape purportedly containing the inmate's side
of recorded conversations was provided, the BOP moved for summary judgment, and the inmate requested that
he be provided with the original recordings. The district court denied summary judgment for the BOP. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a material issue of fact as to whether the tape of the
redacted telephone conversations that was provided by the BOP left out or redacted entire portions of the
inmate's conversation. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Smith v. County of Los Angeles, 535 F.Supp.2d 1033 (C.D.Cal. 2008). The estate of a deceased county jail
inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and officials, claiming violation of the inmate's Fourth, Fifth,
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, arising out of denial of the inmate's request for an asthma inhalator.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the allegation that the county
“promulgated, created, maintained, ratified, condoned, and enforced a series of policies, procedures, customs
and practices which authorized the arbitrary punishment and infliction of pain, torture, and physical abuse of
certain inmates and detainees” was sufficient to state a claim. The court found that the estate stated a claim that
officials violated the Eighth Amendment by showing deliberate indifference to his medical condition, through
allegations that they ignored the inmate's plea to be furnished with his asthma inhalator. (Los Angeles County
Men's Central Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Taylor v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority, 550 F.Supp.2d 614 (E.D.Va. 2008). An applicant who was
rejected for a position as a corrections officer sued an employer, claiming it discriminated against her on the
basis of her disability when it did not hire her, and seeking monetary and injunctive relief pursuant to the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the one-handed applicant was disabled, whether she could perform each
essential function of the position, whether the proposed accommodations were unreasonable, whether she
would pose a direct threat to herself or her fellow employees, and whether her disability was a motivating
factor in the decision not to hire. (Hampton Roads Regional Jail Authority, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Walker v. Woodford, 593 F.Supp.2d 1140 (S.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against a
prison and its personnel alleging that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by refusing to turn
off the lights in their cells. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that the prisoner had to present evidence showing that the prison's 24-hour illumination
policy was the cause of his insomnia or related problems before the prison could be required to explain why
legitimate penological interests justified it. According to the court, the prisoner's testimony did not establish
that the illumination caused the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or that prison personnel were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in not modifying the illumination policy. The court found
that prison officials were not plainly incompetent in requiring low-level lighting in prison cells 24 hours per
day for security purposes. (Calipatria State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
STAFF DISCIPLINE

Washington v. District of Columbia, 538 F.Supp.2d 269 (D.D.C. 2008). Former employees brought a civil
rights action against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (DOC) and its director alleging
violation of their due process rights, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district
court granted the DOC’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the employees had to exhaust their grievance
arbitration according to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), or through review by the
Office of Employee Appeals (OEA) according to the terms of the Comprehensive Merit Protection Act
(CMPA), before bringing suit. The court found that the allegedly defamatory statements made by the director
of the DOC regarding the culpability of former employees for a jail escape sufficiently related to a “personnel”
issue to require administrative exhaustion under the employee grievance provisions of the CMPA. Two
employees had been terminated in response to the escape of two prisoners. The court opened its opinion by

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stating “This case concerns a prison break, mass personnel terminations, mass personnel reinstatements and the
various efforts undertaken by the defendant (the District of Columbia) and the plaintiffs (D.C. Jail security
officers) to enlist this court in a tug-of-war over the right of the D.C. Department of Corrections (“DOC”) to
subject its employees to a second round of disciplinary review and firings after an administrative appeals board
found the preliminary round deficient.” Two days after two inmates escaped, the DOC Director issued written
notification to twelve D.C. Jail employees, including the plaintiffs, placing them on paid administrative leave
pending further investigation of the escape. At a press briefing the Director announced the summary firings of
the plaintiffs for dereliction of duty. (District of Columbia Jail)
2009
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Brickell v. Clinton County Prison Bd., 658 F.Supp.2d 621(M.D.Pa. 2009). A former inmate filed a § 1983
action against a county, county prison board, and various county officials to recover for injuries she sustained
while working in a jail kitchen. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in part. The
court held that the sheriff was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983 for alleged failure to obtain
adequate medical treatment for the inmate after she suffered burns while working in a jail kitchen, where the
sheriff did not participate in or have knowledge of any violations of the inmate's rights, did not direct jail
employees to commit the violations, and did not acquiesce in the employees' violations. The court found that
the inmate's allegation that a county prison board failed to adopt, and the jail's warden and deputy wardens
failed to implement, policies regarding treatment of severe burns and general medical treatment was sufficient
to state a claim against the board and officials under § 1983 for violation of her Eighth Amendment right to
adequate medical care, where the inmate claimed that there was a total absence of policy concerning medical
treatment for severe burns or general medical care when prison facilities were inadequate. (Clinton County
Prison Board, Clinton County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
HARASSMENT
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Brown v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 603 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2009). A former female correctional officer sued the
District of Columbia, a private corrections contractor, and the director of the Department of Corrections (DOC)
in his official capacity, asserting claims under Title VII and § 1983 alleging that her supervisor sexually
harassed and raped her. The district court dismissed the case in part and denied dismissal in part. The court
found that the Title VII claim and the § 1983 claim against the director were redundant of the claims against the
District. The court held that the former female correctional officer's allegations were sufficient for a municipal
liability claim under § 1983 against the District of Columbia, including allegations that the District adopted a
custom of permitting sexual harassment to occur in correctional facilities by failing to take corrective action in
response to her numerous sexual harassment complaints against the supervisor. The officer also alleged that the
District allowed the supervisor to continue his incessant and relentless harassment and that ultimately the
District's inaction led to her sexual assault by her harasser. The officer alleged that the District knew the sexual
assault occurred at the correctional facility because sexual harassment was a standard operating procedure at
the facility. The officer asserted that she suffered harm due to the District's willful blindness and failure to
implement and effectuate appropriate policies to remedy and/or prevent sexual harassment and rape. The court
held that the issue of whether the District of Columbia and the private prison contractor were the correctional
officer's joint employers, as required for the officer's Title VII claim against District, could not be resolved by a
motion to dismiss. According to the court, there was a factual dispute as to whether the District possessed
sufficient control over the contractor's employees to be considered a joint employer of officer. (District of
Columbia, Corrections Corporation of America Correctional Treatment Facility)

U.S. District Court
APA-Administrative
Procedures Act
RECORDS

Brown v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 602 F.Supp.2d 173 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner filed an action
under the Privacy Act alleging that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) deliberately and willfully did not
maintain accurate records and reports about gangs and gang members which caused him to be housed with
inmates from whom he should have been kept separate, jeopardizing his safety and resulting in serious physical
injury from attacks. The BOP filed a motion to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. The court
found that the Inmate Central Records System maintained by the BOP was exempt from the amendment
requirements and civil remedies provisions of the Privacy Act; therefore, the federal prisoner could not sue the
BOP for damages under the Privacy Act for information not maintained or incorrectly maintained in the BOP's
Inmate Central Records System. According to the court, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) was not
available to the federal prisoner to address alleged inadequate and inaccurate record keeping by BOP, since
BOP was not required to maintain accurate records. The court also noted that suit under APA was not available
to the prisoner even under a liberal construction of his complaint as a challenge to the decision of the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) of where to house him, since the prisoner's place of imprisonment, and his transfers to other
federal facilities, were specifically exempted from challenge under APA. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, District of
Columbia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Burke v. North Dakota Dept. of Correction and Rehabilitation, 620 F.Supp.2d 1035 (D.N.D. 2009). A state
inmate filed a § 1983 action against prison officials alleging statutory and constitutional violations, including
interference with his free exercise of religion, lack of adequate medical care, retaliation for exercising his
constitutional rights, failure to protect, refusal to accommodate his disability, and cruel and unusual
punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that: (1) failure to
provide Hindu worship services on Thursdays did not violate the inmate's equal protection rights; (2) the
decision to reduce Hindu worship services at the facility did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (3) restriction
of the Hindu inmate's use of camphor, kumkum, incense, and a butter lamp during worship services did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause; and (4) failure to find a qualified Hindu representative to assist the inmate in
the study of his religion did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. According to the court, the officials'
requirement that the inmate work did not violate the Eighth Amendment, even though the inmate suffered from

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mental illness and hepatitis C, and the Social Security Administration had determined that he was disabled. The
inmate had not requested accommodations in his working conditions on account of his disabilities, and there
was no evidence that the inmate was being forced to work beyond his physical strength or that the jobs were
endangering his life or health. The court noted that the prison policies and procedures manual established that
all inmates were expected to work, regardless of their disability status. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Cabral v. County of Glenn, 624 F.Supp.2d 1184 (E.D.Cal. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a city and a police officer alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and claims
under California law. The city and officer filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, a psychotic and suicidal individual who collided with
the wall of a safety cell and broke his neck, failed to plead that a police officer, who extracted the detainee from
his holding cell and used a stun gun and pepper spray on him following an incident in which the detainee
rubbed water from his toilet on his body, was deliberately indifferent to the detainee's need for medical
attention, as required to state due process claim under § 1983. According to the court, the detainee failed to
allege that the officer knew he was suicidal and was not receiving medical care, or that the officer attempted to
interfere with the detainee's receipt of such medical attention. The court found that the detainee's allegations
that the officer used a stun gun, a stun-type shield and pepper spray in an attempted cell extraction while the
detainee was naked, unarmed and hiding behind his toilet were sufficient to state an excessive force claim
under § 1983. The court denied qualified immunity for the officer, even though the detainee had not responded
to the officers' commands to come out of his cell. The court noted that the law clearly established that police
officers could not use a stun gun on a detainee who did not pose a threat and who merely failed to comply.
(City of Willows Police Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Cabral v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 587 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2009). A nurse practitioner working as a contractor in a
county house of correction brought an action against a county sheriff claiming that she was barred from
entering the house of correction, in violation of her free speech rights, for informing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) of alleged prisoner abuse. The county sheriff brought an Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) proceeding against the United States Department of Justice, seeking discovery of relevant documents.
The district court denied the requested discovery and the sheriff appealed. A jury found in favor of the
contractor in the underlying free speech case and the district court denied the defendants' motions for a new
trial. The appeals from the two judgments were consolidated. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that
the sheriff's request for information concerning a meeting between the nurse and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) would directly and adversely impact the FBI investigations into prisoner abuse in the house
of correction and violate the Privacy Act, so as to warrant denial of such requests. The court found that the
award of $250,000 in punitive damages to the nurse was not excessive, where the sheriff's conduct was
reprehensible and the award could have been greater. (Suffolk County House of Correction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Cantu v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 653 F.Supp.2d 726 (E.D.Mich. 2009). An employee, a Michigan
Department of Corrections (MDOC) officer who was of Caucasian and Hispanic descent, brought an action
against MDOC, a correctional facility, a facility warden, and several other corrections officers, alleging
violations of Title VII, Michigan law and § 1983, as well as claims of conspiracy and gross negligence. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the alleged hostile work environment and disparate treatment of the
MDOC employee of Caucasian and Hispanic descent were attributable to his race and national origin; (2)
whether the Department promptly investigated complaints of the employee regarding his alleged harassment by
African-American co-workers, and as to whether an appropriate action was taken in response to any
investigation conducted; and (3) whether the employee experienced an adverse action when he was unable to
receive anticipated overtime as the result of administrative leave, which was allegedly precipitated by the
employer's actions. The court held that the prison warden was not entitled to qualified immunity from the §
1983 equal protection claim brought against the employee, where the employee's factual allegations in support
of his equal protection claims against the warden regarding his treatment subsequent to his assault by an
African-American co-worker, the employee's stress leave, and the warden's possible failure to respond to the
employee's complaints of continued harassment stated violations of well-established rights at the time of those
events. (Ryan Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. Appeals Court
UNION

Civil Service Employees Ass'n, Local 1000, AFSCME v. N.L.R.B., 569 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2009). A union
representing correctional officers at a county correctional facility petitioned for review of a National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) decision that upheld an employer's termination of non-union employees for having
picketed a health clinic. The appeals court granted the petition and vacated the NLRB decision. The appeals
court held that the peaceful picketing of the health clinic by county correctional facility employees, in their
individual capacity, for the purpose of collective bargaining but without the requisite notice from a union under
the NLRA, did not deprive the employees of their status as employees protected by the NLRA or constitute
unprotected conduct, as would have exposed the employees to discharge. The employees sought to organize
and represent the employees of a health clinic that was operated by Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS).
The union had requested that CMS recognize it as the collective-bargaining representative of all clinic
employees except physicians, supervisors and one clerical worker, but CMS rejected the request. (Albany
County Correctional Facility, New York)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
FOIA-Freedom Of
Information Act
RECORDS

Coleman v. Lappin, 607 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2009). An inmate filed a suit requesting information, under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regarding the investigations of a
former prison employee who was terminated, as well as a disciplinary report that she filed against the inmate.
The district court granted summary judgment for the BOP in part and denied in part. The court held that
facsimile and extension numbers of BOP personnel, staff members' names, titles, Social Security numbers,
dates of birth, pay grades, union affiliations, and dates of duty were exempt from disclosure. The court found
that one page of information intended for BOP staff use only and records compiled for law enforcement
purposes were not exempt from disclosure absent a description of the harms resulting from disclosure. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Big Sandy USP, Kentuchy)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
UNEMPLOYMENT

Cox v. DeSoto County, Miss., 564 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009). A county employee brought an action against her
county employer, alleging that as result of her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA), and in retaliation for her refusal to campaign actively for reelection of the county sheriff, in violation
of the First Amendment, she was reassigned to the jail and later terminated. The district court granted summary
judgment as to the termination claims, and entered judgment, upon jury verdict, in favor of the employer on the
First Amendment claim, and in favor of employee on the age discrimination claim in connection with her
reassignment. The employee appealed the grant of summary judgment. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the decision of the Mississippi Employment Security
Commission (MESC), that the employee was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits because she
was discharged for work-related misconduct, did not collaterally prohibit the employee from claiming that she
was terminated in retaliation for bringing an ADEA wrongful transfer claim, given the detailed administrative
remedy provided by ADEA for such claims. (DeSoto County Sheriff, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET
STAFFING LEVELS

Dewees v. Haste, 620 F.Supp.2d 625 (M.D.Pa. 2009). A former deputy warden brought an action against a
county, a county prison warden, a county commissioner, and members of the county's prison salary board,
alleging that his position was eliminated in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the
speech activities of the deputy warden, who provided information to the county district attorney regarding the
prison's food services contract and reported misappropriation of inmate funds to a county commissioner, were
conducted pursuant to his employment with the prison, precluding his First Amendment retaliation claims. The
court noted that the employee handbook required the deputy warden to report any corrupt or unethical behavior
or violations of rules or law. According to the court, the county prison board's proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for eliminating the deputy warden's position--that the county was seeking to cut employmentrelated expenses and the position had been deemed expendable--was insufficient to show that the budget cuts
were not for cause. The court held that the county commissioner was entitled to legislative immunity on the
former deputy warden's First Amendment retaliation claim where the commissioner's actions of recommending
and voting for elimination of the deputy warden’s position, as part of an effort to reduce the county's budget,
was squarely within the sphere of his legislative work. (Dauphin County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
STAFF CONTRACTS

Edwards v. Washington, 661 F.Supp.2d 13 (D.D.C. 2009). A trainee at the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections brought a pro se action against the Department's director, alleging due process and equal protection
claims arising from personal injuries she sustained during an employment qualification training exercise. The
district court dismissed the action. The court held that the trainee waived her right to bring any claims in
negligence against the Department by voluntarily signing a liability release form. The court noted that the
prospective liability release form was unambiguous and clear in releasing the Department from liability.
(District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DCDC”).

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 655 F.Supp.2d 69 (D.D.C. 2009). The personal
representative of the estate of a prisoner, who was killed while incarcerated, brought a § 1983 action against the
District of Columbia and several individual officials and jail employees, alleging negligence, deliberate and
reckless indifference to allegedly dangerous conditions at a jail, and wrongful death. The district court granted
summary judgment in part and denied in part. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the District of Columbia's inmate and detainee classification
policies, procedures, and practices were inadequate; (2) whether the District of Columbia's jail staffing policies,
procedures, and practices were inadequate; (3) whether the security policies, procedures, and practices were
inadequate; (4) whether the District of Columbia adequately trained Department of Corrections officials; and
(5) whether officials provided adequate supervision of inmates. (District of Columbia Central Detention
Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2009). Former guards at a county jail brought a § 1983 action against
various jail officials and others, alleging conspiracy to cover up inmate abuse and violation of their First
Amendment rights. Following a grant of summary judgment in favor of certain defendants, the district court
entered summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. The guards appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the guards' reports about alleged inmate
abuse at the jail perpetrated by other guards was not protected speech under the First Amendment, and thus,
could not be the basis of a First Amendment retaliation claim. The court noted that a county jail policy required
guards to report misconduct by their colleagues, and even if an unwritten policy prohibited such reports of
misconduct, it did not offend the First Amendment. The court found that the coworkers who allegedly bullied
and made threats against the guards in order to deter the guards from testifying in favor of an inmate violated
the guards' free speech rights under the First Amendment, and the guards could recover under § 1983 for such a
violation. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)

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U.S. District Court
APA-Administrative
Procedures Act
CONDITIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Families for Freedom v. Napolitano, 628 F.Supp.2d 535 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Immigrant advocacy organizations
and former immigration detainees brought an action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) seeking an
order to compel the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to act on their petition seeking promulgation of
regulations to govern conditions in immigration detention facilities operated by Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). DHS moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that DHS's nearly
two-and-one-half year delay in deciding the petition was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court noted that
the DHS Office of Inspector General had issued a report detailing significant problems in ICE detention
facilities, problems with detainee medical care had been chronicled by the news media, and the petitioners
alleged that detainees in DHS custody were dying as result of substandard conditions. (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom Of
Information Act

Federal CURE v. Lappin, 602 F.Supp.2d 197 (D.D.C. 2009). A nonprofit organization that advocated for the
federal inmate population and their families and provided information to the public about the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) challenged the BOP's denial of a fee waiver for information requested under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), regarding the ion spectrometer method of scanning prison visitors. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the organization. The court held that the requested information was
likely to contribute to increased public understanding of government activities, would reach a reasonably broad
group of interested persons, and would contribute significantly to public understanding of government
activities. The court noted that the organization would analyze and synthesize technical information to relay to
prisoners and their families via a website, online newsletter, and Internet chat room that would disseminate
information to a sufficiently broad audience. According to the court, the requested information was not yet in
the public domain, so that any dissemination by the organization would enhance public understanding of the
technology in centralized and easily accessible forums. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
RECORDS

Francis ex rel. Estate of Francis v. Northumberland County, 636 F.Supp.2d 368 (M.D.Pa. 2009). The
administrator of the estate of a detainee who committed suicide while in a county prison brought an action
against the county and prison officials, asserting claims for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment reckless
indifference and Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment under § 1983. The administrator also
alleged wrongful death under state law. The county defendants brought third-party claims against a psychiatrist
who evaluated the detainee, and the psychiatrist counter-claimed. The county defendants and psychiatrist
moved separately for summary judgment. The court held that the County, which paid $360,000 in exchange for
a release of claims brought by the estate of the detainee, would be entitled to indemnity on third-party claims
against the psychiatrist who evaluated the detainee if a jury determined that the psychiatrist was at fault in the
detainee's suicide. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to: (1) whether the evaluating psychiatrist knew the pretrial detainee was a suicide risk and failed to take
necessary and available precautions to prevent the detainee's suicide as would show deliberate indifference to
the detainee's medical needs; (2) whether the evaluating psychiatrist was an employee of the county prison
entitled to immunity under the Pennsylvania Political Subdivision Tort Claim Act (PSTCA) or was an
independent contractor excluded from such immunity; (3) whether the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to
appropriately document the pretrial detainee's medical records led to the detainee's removal from a suicide
watch; (4) whether the recordation of the pretrial detainee's suicide watch level was customary, precluding
summary judgment as to whether the evaluating psychiatrist had a duty to record this information; (5) whether
the evaluating psychiatrist's failure to communicate the appropriate suicide watch level to county prison
officials resulted in the pretrial detainee's suicide; and (6) whether the evaluating psychiatrist communicated the
appropriate suicide watch level for the pretrial detainee to county prison officials and whether the psychiatrist
was required to record the watch level in the detainee's medical records.
The court found that the county prison had an effective suicide policy in place and thus the psychiatrist
who evaluated the pretrial detainee had no viable Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care and failure
to train counterclaims under § 1983 against the county. According to the court, while at least one individual at
the prison may have failed to carry out protocols for the diagnosis and care of suicidal detainees, the policy
would have been effective if properly followed as was customary at the prison. The court held that the county
prison warden adequately trained subordinates with regard to protocols for the care and supervision of suicidal
inmates and adequately supervised execution of these protocols, and thus the psychiatrist who evaluated the
pretrial detainee had no viable counterclaim under § 1983 against the warden for failure to adequately train or
supervise under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Northumberland County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
RECORDS

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class
action against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees' civil
rights. The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by
stipulation of the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered
a second amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The amended judgment
provided relief regarding the following: population/housing limitations, dayroom access, natural light and
windows, artificial lighting, temperature, noise, access to reading materials, access to religious services, mail,
telephone privileges, clothes and towels, sanitation, safety, hygiene, toilet facilities, access to law library,
medical care, dental care, psychiatric care, intake areas, mechanical restraints, segregation, outdoor recreation,
inmate classification, visitation, food, visual observation by detention officers, training and screening of staff
members, facilities for the handicapped, disciplinary policy and procedures, inmate grievance policy and
procedures, reports and record keeping, security override, and dispute resolution. The detainees moved for
attorney's fees and nontaxable costs. The district court held that: (1) the class of detainees was the prevailing
party entitled to attorney's fees; (2) the initial lodestar figure of $1,239,491.63 for attorney's fees was
reasonable; (3) Kerr factors provided no basis for downward adjustment of the initial lodestar; (4) the attorney's
fees award would not be reduced for limited success; (5) the amount requested as reimbursement for attorney's

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fees was fully compensable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (6) PLRA did not require
appointment of class counsel for the award of attorney's fees and non-taxable costs; and (7) the class was
entitled to interest on the award of attorney' fees from the date of the court's order ruling in favor of the
detainees on the motion to terminate. (Maricopa County Sheriff and Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,
Arizona)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261 (D.Conn. 2009). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 action against the
State of Connecticut, a warden, and correctional officers, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for head
trauma, abrasions to his ear and shoulder, and post-traumatic stress due to an officers' alleged use of
unconstitutionally excessive force during a prison altercation. The inmate also alleged inadequate supervision,
negligence, and willful misconduct. The court held that the inmate's factual allegations against correctional
officers, in their individual capacities, were sufficient for a claim of excessive force in violation of the inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights. The officers allegedly pinned the inmate to the ground near his cell, following an
inspection for contraband, and purportedly sprayed the inmate in the face with a chemical agent despite his
complaints that he had asthma. The court found that the inmate's allegations against the warden in his
individual capacity were sufficient for a claim of supervisory liability, under § 1983, based on the warden's
specific conduct before and after the altercation between the inmate and correctional officers. The inmate
alleged that the warden was responsible for policies that led to his injuries and for procedures followed by
medical staff following the incident, and the warden failed to properly train officers, to adequately supervise
medical staff, to review video evidence of the incident, and to order outside medical treatment of the inmate's
injuries even though a correctional officer received prompt medical care at an outside hospital for his head
injury sustained in the altercation. (Corrigan-Radgowski Correctional Center, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
COMMISSION
TELEPHONE COSTS

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 611 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the Bureau's conduct in adopting telephone rates and commissary
prices violated his constitutional due process and equal protection rights. The district court granted the
Bureau’s motion to dismiss in part. The court noted that the prisoner had previously litigated claims against the
Bureau of Prisons arising from an increase in telephone rates, and barred the prisoner from bringing additional
claims based on that same cause of action, regardless of whether the prisoner's claim invoked different
provision of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the prisoner did not have a constitutionally
protected property or liberty interest in commissary pricing, as required to state a claim for the violation of due
process based on allegedly unfair prices. The court noted that an inmate has no federal constitutional right to
purchase items from a prison commissary. According to the court, the Bureau of Prisons used the same markup guidelines in all of its institutions to set commissary prices, and thus there was no evidence that commissary
prices violated the federal prisoner's equal protection rights. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
TRAINING

Hennagir v. Utah Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2009). An employee who was part of the
medical staff for a state department of corrections (DOC), brought an action against her DOC employer,
alleging disability discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), in
connection with the DOC's refusal to allow the employee to continue in her position without completing the
required physical safety training. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The
employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that completion of the required physical safety
training was an “essential job function” for the employee, and that allowing the employee to continue with her
identical job duties, by eliminating the essential job function of completion of the required physical safety
training, was not a “reasonable accommodation.” The court held that completion of the required physical
safety training was an “essential job function” for the employee within the meaning of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The court noted that the DOC required all personnel who had contact with inmates to
complete the training, the employee had regular contact with inmates as part of her job, and although the
employee claimed that she never had to use the safety training techniques during her eight years of employment
at the prison, the potential consequences of an inmate attack against any staff were incredibly severe. (Utah
Department of Corrections, Central Utah Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hunter v. Amin, 583 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2009). The sister of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide in a
county jail brought an action on her own behalf, and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased
brother, against a jail psychiatrist, county sheriff, and the county, asserting claims under § 1983, as well as
claims of medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the
sister appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that
the county jail's policy that prevented the pretrial detainee from speaking to the jail psychiatrist without a jail
officer being present did not violate the detainee's constitutional rights, so as to serve as the basis for holding
the county liable for the detainee's death under § 1983. According to the court, the pretrial detainee had a
constitutional right to adequate mental health treatment, but there was no evidence suggesting that the detainee
could not have received adequate mental health treatment in the presence of a corrections officer. The appeals
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the jail
psychiatrist committed medical malpractice by discontinuing the medication of the detainee who later
committed suicide. (St. Clair County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Jenkins v. County of Hennepin, Minn., 557 F.3d 628 (8th Cir. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against
a county, the supervisor of a jail's nursing staff, and others alleging he received constitutionally inadequate
medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the supervisor of the jail's nursing staff
did not act with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical condition when she determined that the
inmate should be sent for an x-ray in a day or two. The inmate was unable to open his jaw completely, blow his

XXII

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nose, or chew. According to the court, the decision reflected a medical judgment that the inmate's injury,
though possibly serious, was not urgent and nothing indicated that a one-day delay was detrimental to the
inmate's recovery. The court held that the inmate failed to establish that any of the jail's official policies
reflected deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, as required to support his § 1983 claim.
(Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Jones v. Pramstaller, 678 F.Supp.2d 609 (W.D. Mich. 2009). The personal representative for a prisoner's estate
brought a § 1983 action against prison employees and others, alleging that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to the prisoner's known serious medical need in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free
of cruel and unusual punishment. The representative also brought state law claims for gross negligence and
recklessness. Several employees moved for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the personal
representative stated a claim against a prison physician by alleging that the physician should have realized the
likely gravity and urgency of the prisoner's condition when he read a report that the prisoner had lost control of
his muscles, could not walk, and had his eyes rolling back in his head involuntarily, but failed to order an
immediate examination of the prisoner. The court ordered further discovery to determine whether the director
and coordinator failed to put in place policies and procedures requiring that prisoner complaints, symptoms, or
diagnoses of a certain type or severity be communicated to officials within a certain time period after the
information became available. (Ernest Brooks Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Lynn v. Lappin, 593 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner brought a pro se action against the
Bureau of Prisons director and a prison warden, alleging that the defendants used false and inaccurate records
to willfully and intentionally make adverse decisions concerning the prisoner. The district court dismissed the
action. The court held that the Privacy Act provided the prisoner's exclusive remedy, and that the prisoner could
not maintain a claim under the Act, where the Department of Justice (DOJ) had properly exempted the Bureau
of Prisons' inmate central record system entirely from the Act's access and amendment requirements.
(Administrative Maximum Facility, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Malles v. Lehigh County, 639 F.Supp.2d 566 (E.D.Pa. 2009). A prisoner, who allegedly contracted Methicillin
Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) while incarcerated at a county prison, brought an action under §
1983 against the county prison and the prison medical provider, alleging that the defendants unconstitutionally
failed to provide him timely, adequate medical care and to protect him from getting infected, and that the
provider was negligent under state law. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. The court held that neither prison nurses' perfunctory examinations of the prisoner nor their failure to
recognize the prisoner's MRSA for five days constituted deliberate indifference to the prisoner's serious
medical needs. The court found that the failure of the county prison and/or the company which contracted with
the county to provide medical services to inmates at the prison to fully execute their own plans to more
aggressively prevent the spread of MRSA did not provide the basis for the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
failure-to-protect claim in his § 1983 action. The court noted that the county and/or the company certainly
could provide inmates with conditions that exceeded the relatively low bar of the Eighth Amendment, but they
were not required to do that simply because they made plans to do so. The court held that the alleged failure of
the county prison and the company which contracted with the county to provide medical services to inmates at
the prison to quarantine inmates infected with MRSA, to properly clean and maintain shower facilities, to warn
inmates about MRSA and educate them about prevention, and generally to take more precautions against the
spread of MRSA did not deprive the prisoner who allegedly contracted MRSA at the prison of life's necessities
according to contemporary standard of decency, as would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the county prison and company which contracted with the county
to provide medical services to inmates were not deliberately indifferent to the risk that the prisoner would
contract MRSA in prison, as would violate the Eighth Amendment, where the prison and company engaged in
some efforts to stop the spread of MRSA, even if they did not do everything they could or planned to do.
(Lehigh County, Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATION
VOLUNTEERS

McCollum v. California, 610 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D.Cal. 2009). A volunteer Wiccan chaplain for inmates
incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) filed suit alleging
disparate treatment from volunteers of other faiths and retaliation for his complaints about the CDCR's
treatment of Wiccans. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that equal protection was not denied to the volunteer Wiccan chaplain who alleged he was not being permitted
to see inmates at times and in locations when and where other chaplains were permitted, and that being denied
access to chapel time for religious instruction and benefits extended to other administrative volunteer chaplains
including access to telephone and computer, and being subjected to more rigorous security scrutiny. According
to the court, there was no evidence that other voluntary clergy did not encounter the same difficulties or as to
inmates that were denied access to his services. The court found that the CDCR did not retaliate against the
volunteer Wiccan chaplain for protected speech complaining against the mistreatment of Wiccans by
“denigrating” him while addressing a group of Protestant chaplains or by refusing to hire him as community
partnership manager at a women's facility and a state prison. The court noted that the claimed denigration, even
if true, did not result in the loss of a valuable government benefit, and that the decision not to hire him was
based on the superior qualifications of those ultimately hired rather than on his religion. (California Corrections
Institution)

XXIII

2.61

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Medical Development Intern. v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 585 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir.
2009). A medical services provider for two California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons brought an action in state court against CDCR and the receiver appointed by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California to oversee the delivery of medical care to prisoners incarcerated by
the CDCR. The provider sought damages for the receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract
with CDCR. After the case was removed to the district court, the court granted the receiver's motion to dismiss.
The provider appealed, but the appeal was stayed to allow the provider to seek leave from the Northern District
to sue the receiver. Subsequently, the Northern District denied the provider's request, and then denied the
provider's motion for clarification. The provider appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The appeals court held
that the receiver was not immune in his official capacity from the claim of a medical services provider seeking
damages for the receiver's refusal to pay for services it provided under contract with CDCR. The court noted
that the receiver held “all powers vested by law in the Secretary of the CDCR as they relate[d] to the
administration, control, management, operation, and financing of the California prison medical health care
system,” which necessarily included the power to control CDCR with regard to paying the provider. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2009). A former federal prisoner filed a Bivens complaint
claiming deprivation of his First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment rights by prison mailroom employees' routinely
opening and reading prisoner's mail outside of his presence, although the mail was marked as “legal mail” or
“special mail” pursuant to Bureau of Prison's (BOP) regulations. The district court denied the employees
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The employees appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) a fact issue precluded summary
judgment as to whether two envelopes from the prisoner's attorney were opened outside the presence of the
prisoner; (2) an envelope from federal community defenders was properly labeled legal mail; (3) nine
envelopes containing the word “attorney/client” were properly labeled legal mail; (4) prison employees'
opening of the prisoner's legal mail outside his presence violated his clearly established First and Sixth
Amendment rights; (5) prison mailroom supervisors were not protected by qualified immunity; but (6) prison
mailroom employees were protected by qualified immunity. According to the court, the former prisoner's
allegations that prison mailroom employees opened his legal mail outside his presence despite his repeated
complaints to mailroom supervisors were sufficient to find that mailroom supervisors acted unreasonably in
response to the prisoner's complaints, precluding the supervisors' protection by qualified immunity from the
prisoner's claims. The prisoner alleged that the supervisors' conduct encouraged an atmosphere of disregard for
proper mail-handling procedures, where one supervisor stated that the prison did not have to follow case law
but only the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) policy, and that other supervisors knew of the prisoner's complaints but
did nothing to correct the admitted errors. (Michigan Federal Detention Center. Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
FOIA-Freedom Of
Information Act
RECORDS
TELEPHONE

Milton v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 596 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009). A prisoner filed a pro se complaint, under the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking recordings of telephone conversations that he made from the
prison to others. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Justice. The court
held that the recordings were exempt from disclosure as personnel and medical files and similar files due to the
invasion of privacy of third parties to conversations. The court also found that the recordings were exempt from
disclosure as records compiled for law enforcement purposes, disclosure of which would invade the privacy of
third parties to conversations. The court noted that the prisoner failed to tender signed waivers from the third
parties to the conversations, and failed to offer a public interest rationale for overcoming the third parties'
privacy interests. (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Mosher v. Nelson, 589 F.3d 488 (1st Cir. 2009). The administrator of the estate of a pretrial detainee who was
killed at a state mental health hospital by another patient brought an action against the superintendent of the
hospital, the commissioner of the state department of corrections (DOC), and other state officials, alleging civil
rights violations and state-law claims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the superintendent of the state
mental health hospital and the commissioner of the state department of corrections were entitled to qualified
immunity from § 1983 liability on the deliberate indifference claim. According to the court, although the
patient was able to strangle the detainee while the detainee was visiting the patient in his room, the hospital had
a long-standing policy that allowed patients to visit in each others' rooms during the short period during the end
of the morning patient count and lunch. The court noted that there was no history of violence or individualized
threats made by any patient, and reasonable officials could have believed that allowing the visiting policy to
continue and maintaining the current staffing levels at the hospital would not cause a substantial risk of harm.
(Bridgewater State Hospital, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Moyle v. Anderson, 571 F.3d 814 (8th Cir. 2009). The son of an inmate murdered in a county jail, and the son's
trustee, brought a § 1983 action against a county, seeking damages for the murder of the son's father based on
the county's booking policy. The district court granted the county's motion for summary judgment and the son
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's booking policy, classifying an incoming
inmate as high or low risk after an intake interview, and then housing those incoming inmates designated as
high risk in a separate area of the jail, was not itself unconstitutional, so as to establish the county's municipal
liability under § 1983 for the murder of an inmate killed by another inmate. The inmate who murdered the
plaintiff’s father had been transferred from a maximum security state prison and had previously attacked a
fellow inmate. The policy vested discretion in the booking officer to determine whether additional information
about an inmate's criminal or incarceration history was necessary and whether the inmate posed a risk to others
and needed to be placed in a separate unit. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county had

XXIII

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notice of an alleged inadequacy in its booking policy, or that the policy's alleged inadequacy in failing to
require officers to seek information about an incoming individual's history for violence prior to classification
was so patently obvious that the county should have known that a constitutional violation was inevitable, as
required to impose § 1983 liability on county, based on deliberate indifference. (Sherburne County Jail,
Minnesota)
U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET

Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 560 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2009). In a class action brought on behalf of state prisoners,
alleging that state officials were providing inadequate health care in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the receiver appointed to oversee the provision of health care at state
prisons moved for an order of contempt based on the state's failure to fund the receiver's capital projects. The
district court ordered the state to fund the projects and to show cause why it should not be held in contempt.
The state appealed, and alternatively filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. The appeals court dismissed the
appeal and denied the writ of mandamus. According to the court, the state failed to prove that it would be
damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal, weighing against granting the state's petition for a
writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from holding it in contempt based on its failure to fund the
receiver's capital projects. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Rodriguez-Borton v. Pereira-Castillo, 593 F.Supp.2d 399 (D.Puerto Rico 2009). Relatives of a deceased
pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, requesting damages for constitutional
violations culminating in the detainee's death. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to the lack of
adequate inmate supervision and malfunctioning cell locks and cell lights. The court also found an issue of
material fact as to whether the Administrator of the Puerto Rico Administration of Corrections (AOC) failed to
act with regard to security risks, including malfunctioning door locks, in the annex within which the pretrial
detainee was found hanged. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to the prison annex
superintendent's failure to remedy supervision problems in housing units where he knew inmates were able to
and did move freely in and out of their cells due to malfunctioning door locks. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to a correctional officer's failure to patrol the
living area of the annex within which the pretrial detainee was found hanged while he knew inmates were able
to freely move around. The court denied qualified immunity to the defendants because it was clearly
established at the time of the alleged inaction, and a reasonable prison official working in the system would
have known that a lack of supervision, combined with the knowledge that cell locks did not function, would
create an obvious and undeniable security risk. (Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, and Annex 246)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Schaub v. County of Olmsted, 656 F.Supp.2d 990 (D.Minn. 2009). An inmate at a county detention center
brought an action against a county, detention center, center director, probation officer, and several unnamed
defendants, alleging that he was injured as result of failure to accommodate his medical condition of
paraplegia. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether members of county
detention center staff were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs arising from
paraplegia; (2) whether failure to oversee nursing staff at the detention center was the “moving force” behind
the delay in treating the inmate's wounds and pressure sores on his return to the county detention center; (3)
whether the county detention center's unwritten policy barring medical care to work-release inmates was the
“moving force” behind the inmate's injuries during his first two months in the center; and (4) whether the
county detention center's modifications in permitting the inmate to attend to his hygiene at home, or rely on
nursing staff to bathe him, were reasonable, and whether the inmate was excluded from appropriate medical
care because of his disability. (Olmsted County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
HARASSMENT

Smith-Thompson v. District of Columbia, 657 F.Supp.2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009). A female correctional officer
stationed at a District of Columbia jail brought an action in District of Columbia court alleging that officials
permitted her to be sexually harassed by a fellow officer and retaliated against her in violation of Title VII. The
officer alleged that the District was liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court held that the
officer sufficiently pleaded a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, even though she failed to specify in
her complaint the precise dates of her involvement in the protected activity of lodging a complaint with the
Office of the Special Inspector, her assistance in the Special Inspector's investigation, and her contact with the
Office of Human Rights (DCOHR). According to the court, the officer's allegations suggested that the District
of Columbia Department of Corrections placed her on unpaid leave shortly after she engaged in the protected
activity. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT

Sutherland v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, 580 F.3d 748 (8TH Cir. 2009). A state corrections employee sued
her employer for sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII. The district court granted the
Department summary judgment and the employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held
that the employee's harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive for a hostile work environment claim,
and the employee was not subjected to materially adverse retaliatory actions. The court noted that the employee
alleged only one incident of a co-worker's offensive touching, but other harassment did not involve the coworker or physical contact. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE

Wimbley v. Cashion, 588 F.3d 959, (8th Cir. 2009). An African-American female correctional officer brought a
§ 1983 claim against a warden, alleging race and sex discrimination. The district court denied the warden's
motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The warden appealed and the appeals
court affirmed. The court held that a White male correctional officer who was not terminated for discharging

XXIII

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pepper spray at an inmate was similarly situated to the African-American female correctional officer who was
terminated after she discharged pepper spray, supporting the female officer's prima facie § 1983 race and sex
discrimination claims against the warden. The court noted that both officers were involved in similar pepperspray conduct, but were disciplined differently. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the warden's proffered reason for terminating the female
corrections officer, that she did so in violation of department of corrections policy to intimidate inmates, was a
pretext for race and sex discrimination. (Arkansas Department of Correction, Delta Regional Unit)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Zargary v. The City of New York, 607 F.Supp.2d 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). A prisoner, who wore a headscarf as an
Orthodox Jew, brought an action against a city, alleging that the city's practice or custom of removing head
coverings from prisoners before taking photographs during admittance to a correctional facility violated her
rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court entered judgment in favor of the city.
The court held that the city correctional facility's practice or custom of removing head coverings from prisoners
before taking photographs during their admittance to a facility was rationally related to the legitimate
penological interest of being able to identify prisoners accurately to maintain security, and that the practice did
not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The court noted that the prisoner could
dramatically change her appearance by removing the headscarf, making it more difficult to identify her, which
would pose a security risk. According to the court, the prisoner had other means to express her religious beliefs
in prison, the corrections officers attempted to accommodate the prisoner by minimizing the presence of male
officers in the room when the photograph was taken, and the alternative of not removing the headscarf could
not be said to pose only a de minimis security risk. (Rose M. Singer Correctional Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 693 F.Supp.2d 1130 (N.D.Cal. 2010). Sheriff's deputies brought
an action against a city and county, alleging various claims including retaliation, and that a gender based
staffing policy violated Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA). Cross-motions
for summary judgment were filed. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part, and
denied in part. The court held that the sheriff's department policy that only female deputies would be assigned
to female-only housing units was implemented to protect the interests that amount to the essence of the Sheriff's
business, including safety and privacy, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a
defense to the deputies' claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment
and Housing Act (FEHA). The court noted that the policy was implemented to prevent sexual misconduct and
inappropriate relationships between male deputies and female inmates, to alleviate male deputies' fears of false
accusations of misconduct resulting in a reluctance to supervise female inmates closely, which created
opportunities for smuggling and use of contraband, and to prevent female inmates from being required to dress
and undress in front of male deputies.
The court found that the sheriff was entitled to deference in his policy judgment to implement the
department policy that only female deputies would be assigned to female-only housing units and in determining
whether the policy was reasonably necessary to achieve issues of safety and privacy and to ensure normal
operation of the jails, as required to establish a bona fide occupational qualification as a defense to the deputies'
claims of employment discrimination under Title VII and California's Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA). The court noted that, despite not conducting formal studies or seeking consultation, the policy was
based upon the sheriff's experience and observations over thirty years as sheriff and conversations with senior
officials and jail commanders over several months. The court noted that suggested non-discriminatory
alternatives to the sheriff's department policy, including cameras and additional training, were not feasible
alternatives that furthered the objectives of safety, security and privacy. Installation of cameras in the units was
cost-prohibitive and did not address privacy concerns or the fact that misconduct took place outside of the
units, additional training would not eliminate sexual abuse since deputies already knew it was forbidden, and
there was no effective testing or screening method to identify deputies who might engage in sexual misconduct.
The court found that the fact that the deputy made statements to the National Academy of Arbitrators,
alleging that the sheriff was influenced by financial contributions and nepotism and that the sheriff's general
counsel had engaged in sex tourism was a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason to terminate the deputy under Title
VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. (San Francisco Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of disabled state prison inmates and
parolees moved for an order requiring state prison officials to track and accommodate the needs of disabled
parolees housed in county jails, and to provide access to a workable grievance procedure pursuant to the
officials' obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and prior court
orders. The district court granted the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
vacated in part. The appeals court held that: (1) contractual arrangements between the state and a county for
incarceration of state prison inmates and parolees in county jails were subject to ADA; (2) the district court's
order was not invalid for violating federalism principles; (3) the state failed to show that the order was not the
narrowest, least intrusive relief possible, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); but (4) there
was insufficient evidence to justify the system-wide injunctive relief in the district court's order. The court
noted the state's recent proposal to alter its sentencing practices to place in county jails approximately 14,000
persons who would otherwise be incarcerated in state prisons. The court also noted that the state's contracts
with counties were not simply for incarceration, but to provide inmates and parolees in county jails with
various positive opportunities, from educational and treatment programs, to opportunities to contest their
incarceration, to the fundamentals of life, such as sustenance, and elementary mobility and communication, and
the restrictions imposed by incarceration meant that the state was required to provide these opportunities to
individuals incarcerated in county jails pursuant to state contracts to the same extent that they were provided to

XXIII

2.64

all state inmates. The district court’s order did not require the state to shift parolees to state facilities if county
jails exhibited patterns of ADA non-compliance; rather, the order required that, if the state became aware of a
class member housed in a county jail who was not being accommodated, the state either ensure that the jail
accommodated the class member, or move the class member to a state or county facility which could
accommodate his needs. In finding that statewide injunctive relief was not needed, the court held that evidence
of ADA violations was composed largely of single incidents that could be isolated, and the district court's order
identified no past determinations that showed class members in county jails were not being accommodated.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING CONDITIONS

Beckford v. Department of Corrections, 605 F.3d 951 (11th Cir. 2010). Female employees at a state correctional
institution filed a state court action under Title VII alleging that the state Department of corrections failed to
remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by male inmates. After removal to federal court, the
district court entered judgment in the employees' favor, and the department appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the department of corrections was not entitled to a blanket exemption from
liability under Title VII arising from its failure to remedy a sexually hostile work environment created by male
inmates whenever female employees were present, even if its employees did not participate in or encourage the
harassment. According to the court, the exhibitionist masturbation and gender-specific verbal harassment by
male inmates in the state correctional institution in the presence of female employees was sex-based and highly
offensive conduct that could be used to establish a Title VII claim against the department of corrections for
failing to remedy a sexually hostile work environment. (Florida Department of Corrections, Martin
Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Bradshaw v. Lappin, 738 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.Colo. 2010). Inmates of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
brought actions against various prison defendants, alleging that the Director of the BOP violated the inmates'
rights, under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), by requiring them to develop a financial plan
addressing payment of their restitution obligations. The inmates moved to consolidate, and defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court consolidated the cases. The court held that allegations that prison
officials improperly collected the sum of $25 per quarter from each trust account of the two inmates, which in
turn was credited against a debt that it was undisputed the inmates actually owed, did not constitute a condition
of confinement amounting to a “sufficiently serious” deprivation of minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities, thereby precluding the inmates' Eighth Amendment claims. The court held that the officials were
entitled to qualified immunity from the inmates' Bivens claims that they were improperly placed on Inmate
Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) “refusal” status, as it was not clear how, or even if, the inmates'
constitutional rights would be implicated by being improperly placed on IFRP “refusal” status, and if
placement did violate some constitutional right, that right was not so “clearly established” that officials could
be expected to know their conduct violated the Constitution. The court noted that participation in IFRP was
voluntary and both inmates voluntarily entered into written agreements to participate in the program, thereby
expressly authorizing the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to begin deducting funds from their accounts each quarter.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Breiner v. Nevada Dept. of Corrections, 610 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2010). Male correctional officers brought suit,
challenging an employment policy of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) of hiring only female
correctional lieutenants at a women's prison. The district court granted summary judgment for the Department
and the officers appeals. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that a male correctional
officer who had previously applied for correctional lieutenant positions, but allegedly was deterred from
applying for lieutenant positions at women's prisons by his knowledge that his application would be futile
because of the prison's policy of hiring only women for that position, had standing to pursue a Title VII claim.
According to the court, denial of single opportunity to a man for promotion to correctional lieutenant at the
women's prison was not “de minimis,” and could violate Title VII, despite the existence of promotional
opportunities for men across the system as a whole. The court found that gender was not a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) that would justify the facially discriminatory policy of hiring only female
correctional lieutenants at the women's prison, where there was no factual basis for concluding that all male
correctional lieutenants would tolerate sexual abuse by their subordinates, that all men in a correctional
lieutenant role would themselves sexually abuse inmates, or that women, by virtue of their gender, could better
understand the behavior of female inmates. (Nevada Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282 (6th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought pro se action against prison officials,
asserting that the prison's 16–day denial of kosher meals, multiple mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and the lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison, violated his constitutional rights and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's
motion for a preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the
prisoner's pro se claims for injunctive and declaratory relief under RLUIPA, challenging a particular prison's
kosher meal program and the alleged denial of Jewish services and literature at the prison, were rendered moot
by the prisoner’s transfer to another prison. The court noted that the claims were directed specifically at the
particular prison's policies and procedures, not at the state prison system's programs as a whole. The court held
that the prisoner’s amended claims against prison officials, challenging his removal from a kosher meal
program and his failure to be reinstated into the kosher meal program following his transfer to a different
prison, were not futile, for the purpose of the prisoner's motion to amend. The court noted that the prisoner
consistently stated his religious preference as Jewish throughout his incarceration, and he submitted numerous
grievances concerning alleged violations of kosher practice by prison kitchen staff. (Michigan Department of
Corrections, Alger Maximum Correctional Facility)

XXIII

2.65

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION

Cook v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 736 F.Supp.2d 1190 (S.D.Ill. 2010). A former employee brought an
action against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleging age discrimination in violation of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). The employer filed a
motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The district court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the employee was discriminated
against because of her age; (2) whether the employee was performing legitimate business expectations; (3)
whether the employee suffered an adverse employment action; (4) whether coworkers were similarly situated;
(5) whether the employee was not promoted due to her age; and (5) whether the employee was constructively
discharged. (Illinois Department of Corrections, Centralia Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Davis v. Oregon County, Missouri, 607 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and various state law authority against a county, county sheriff's department, and a sheriff, alleging the
defendants violated his rights in failing to ensure his safety after a fire broke out at the county jail. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The detainee appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the county jail's smoking policy did not demonstrate that the sheriff acted with
deliberate indifference in violation of the due process rights of the detainee caught in his cell during a jail fire,
even if a jailer supplied cigarettes to inmates, since the jail had an anti-smoking policy in effect at all relevant
times. The court noted that the jailer who allegedly supplied the cigarettes to the inmates had retired nine
months before the fire occurred, and jail officials made sweeps for contraband as recently as five days before
the fire. (Oregon County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a former county
sheriff, in his individual capacity, for alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by
depriving the arrestee of his protected liberty interest in posting bail. The district court denied summary
judgment for the sheriff as to qualified immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's
due process rights were violated by deprivation of his protected liberty interest in posting preset bail during his
detention in the county jail. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county
sheriff caused the deprivation of the arrestee's due process rights by the sheriff's personal involvement in
maintaining policies at the county jail that prohibited the arrestee from posting preset bail during his detention.
(Logan County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET
CONDITIONS

Duvall v. Dallas County, Tex., 631 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2010). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
a county for personal injuries stemming from a staph infection that he contracted while incarcerated in the
county's jail. At the conclusion of a jury trial in the district court the detainee prevailed. The county appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) sufficient evidence supported the finding that the county's
actions in allowing the infection were more than de minimis; (2) sufficient evidence existed to support the
finding that the county had an unconstitutional custom or policy in allowing the infection to be present; and (3)
sufficient evidence supported the finding that the detainee contracted the infection while in jail. The court noted
that physicians testified that there was a “bizarrely high incidence” of the infection and that they were not
aware of a jail with a higher percentage of the infection than the county's jail. According to the court, there was
evidence that jail officials had long known of the extensive infection problem yet continued to house inmates in
the face of the inadequately controlled staph contamination, and that the county was not willing to take the
necessary steps to spend the money to take appropriate actions. The court noted that there was evidence that the
jail had refused to install necessary hand washing and disinfecting stations and had failed to use alcohol-based
sanitizers, which were the recommended means of hand disinfection. (Dallas County, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

E.E.O.C. v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) brought an action on behalf of a group of female Muslim employees against their employer, a private
company that was contracted to run a prison, alleging that the employer violated Title VII's prohibitions on
religious discrimination when it failed to accommodate the employees by providing them an exemption to the
prison's dress policy which precluded them from wearing Muslim head coverings-- called khimars--at work.
The district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment and denied the EEOC's cross-motion
for summary judgment. The EEOC appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the employer's
refusal to allow employees to wear khimars at work did not violate Title VII. According to the court, the
employer, a private company, was not required under Title VII to provide to female Muslim employees an
exemption to the prison's dress policy, as such a religious accommodation would have caused a safety or
security risk and resulted in undue hardship to the employer. The court noted that khimars, like hats, could have
been used to smuggle contraband into and around the prison, khimars could have been used to conceal the
identity of the wearer, creating problems of misidentification, khimars could have been used against prison
employees in an attack, and accommodating the employees would have necessarily required additional time
and resources of prison officials. (GEO Group, Inc., George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Delaware County,
Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3rd Cir. 2010). Affirmed 132
S.Ct. 1510 (2012). A non-indictable arrestee brought a class action pursuant to § 1983 against two jails,
alleging a strip search violated the Fourth Amendment. After granting the motion for class certification, the
district court granted the arrestee's motion for summary judgment, denied his motion for a preliminary
injunction and denied the jails' motions for qualified and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The jails appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that as a matter of first impression in the
circuit, the jails' policy of conducting strip searches of all arrestees upon their admission into the general prison
population was reasonable. The court found that jails were not required to provide evidence of attempted

XXIII

2.66

smuggling or discovered contraband as justification for the strip search policy. According to the court, the
decision to conduct strip searches, rather than use a body scanning chair, was reasonable. The court noted that
the chair would not detect non-metallic contraband like drugs, and there was no evidence regarding the efficacy
of the chair in detecting metallic objects. The appeals court decision was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court in 2012 (132 S.Ct. 1510). (Burlington County Jail, Essex County Correctional Facility, New
Jersey)
U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act
COMMISSARY
FOIA-Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS
TELEPHONE COSTS

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 681 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices
violated his due process and equal protection rights, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He
also alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act. After BOP's motion to
dismiss and for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, the prisoner moved for
reconsideration, and the BOP moved for summary judgment on remaining FOIA claims. The district court
granted the BOP’s motion. The court found no prejudicial error from the court's dismissal of his claims in
connection with BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices, as would warrant reconsideration.
The court held that an investigation memorandum prepared by a warden concerning a tort claim brought by the
prisoner against the BOP was exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
exemption for inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency. The court found that BOP conducted a reasonable and
adequate search for records concerning the prisoner's disability checks, and for records concerning the cost of
and profits from inmates' copy cards, as required under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 742 F.Supp.2d 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). Arrestees brought a class action
against a county, among others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search policy for
newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. The defendants conceded liability, and following a non-jury trial on
the issue of general damages, the district court held that each arrestee was entitled to the same dollar amount
per new admit strip search by way of the general damages award, that it would exclude any information
concerning the effect that the searches had upon arrestees in awarding general damages, and an award of $500
in general damages to each arrestee was appropriate. (Nassau County, New York)

U.S. District Court
UNION

Justice v. Machtinger, 733 F.Supp.2d 495 (D.Del. 2010). A correctional officer brought a § 1983 action
against a human resources director alleging his First Amendment freedom of speech rights were violated by
denial of a promotion in retaliation for union activities. The director moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that the human resources director was entitled to qualified immunity.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the human resources director was personally involved in the
misplacement of the officer's application, or had a motive other than his position to retaliate against the officer.
The officer alleged that the DOC's human resources director violated his First Amendment free speech rights
by intentionally misplacing his application for promotion in retaliation for the officer's union activities. In a
prior court decision, the court found that the officer's participation in union negotiations was of considerable
concern to the community and that his interest in participating in union negotiations outweighed the DOC's
interest in the efficiency of its public service operations. (Delaware Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT

King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2010). A female former deputy sued her employer sheriff in his
official capacity, under Title VII, for sexual harassment and in his individual capacity, under state law, for
battery. The sheriff left office and the incoming sheriff was substituted in the action. A jury returned verdicts
for the deputy on both claims, and the district court entered judgment for the deputy, awarded compensatory
and punitive damages, and granted the sheriff's post-trial motion to reduce the compensatory damages award.
Both sheriffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that substitution was appropriate for the
claim under Title VII. The court held that, under Virginia law, the punitive damages award of $100,000
imposed for the sheriff's battery of the female deputy by unwanted touching was not excessive. The court also
found that the compensatory damages award of $50,000, which the district court had reduced from $175,000,
was not excessive. (City of Roanoke, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d 1222 (D.N.M. 2010). A former state prisoner brought an action
against the New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC), its secretary, prison officers, the private company that managed a prison kitchen, and two of the company's employees, alleging various constitutional
claims and negligence under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). The prisoner had sustained injuries
from work he was required to perform in a kitchen, and he made allegations about the injuries and his subsequent treatment. The state defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held
that no New Mexico Department of Corrections (NMDOC) policy or regulation made any provision for the
state prisoner's liberty interest in a labor assignment or otherwise provided the prisoner with protection from
corrections officers ordering him to perform work in a prison kitchen or protection from orders in contravention
of a medical order. The court ruled that the prisoner's § 1983 procedural due process claim arising from injuries
he allegedly sustained while performing kitchen work was precluded. According to the court, corrections officers' alleged misclassification and denial of a grievance process did not rise to the degree of outrageousness, or
the magnitude of potential or actual harm, that was truly conscience-shocking, precluding the state prisoner's §
1983 substantive due process claims. The court held that the prisoner did not personally suffer any injury as a
result of a corrections officer's classification of prisoners for work duty, purportedly assigning inmates with
known transmissible diseases to kitchen work, precluding the prisoner's claim for an alleged violation of federal
public health policy. (Aramark Corporation, Central New Mexico Correctional Facility)

2.67

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Mashburn v. Yamhill County, 698 F.Supp.2d 1233 (D.Or. 2010). A class action was brought on behalf of
juvenile detainees against a county and officials, challenging strip-search procedures at a juvenile detention
facility. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the scope of an admission stripsearch policy applied to juvenile detainees was excessive in relation to the government's legitimate interests, in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment. According to the court, notwithstanding the county's general
obligation to care for and protect juveniles, the searches were highly intrusive, the county made no effort to
mitigate the scope and intensity of the searches, and less intrusive alternatives existed. The court found that
county officials failed to establish a reasonable relationship between their legitimate interests and post-contact
visit strip-searches performed on juvenile detainees, as required under the Fourth Amendment. The court noted
that the searches occurred irrespective of whether there was an individualized suspicion that a juvenile had
acquired contraband, and most contact visits occurred between juveniles and counsel or therapists. (Yamhill
County Juvenile Detention Center, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243 (3rd Cir. 2010). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against corrections
officials, alleging that he was incarcerated beyond the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment as the
result of officials' deliberate indifference. The district court denied one official's motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity. The official appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals
court held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court's denial of the official's motion for summary
judgment, and that the official was entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the state prison
records specialist was entitled to qualified immunity in the prisoner's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim,
alleging that the records specialist was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's unlawful incarceration beyond
the expiration of his maximum term of imprisonment. The court noted that the records specialist responded
quickly to the prisoner's requests for information about his commitment records, she communicated the
prisoner's concerns to her supervisor, the sentencing judge, and the state Department of Corrections (DOC)
central office, and there was no showing that she ever ignored the prisoner's claims or failed to follow
established DOC policy. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, State Correctional Institution at Albion)

U.S. Appeals Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Mora-Meraz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2010). A federal prisoner petitioned for a writ of habeascorpus
challenging a decision of the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to deny him eligibility for admission to a
Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP). The district court denied the petition and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that BOP’s promulgation of a rule requiring the federal prisoner
to present documented proof of substance use within 12 months of imprisonment to be eligible for admission to
RDAP was a valid interpretive rule, and that implementation of the 12-month rule was neither arbitrary nor
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court noted that a reasonable basis existed for the BOP
decision to adhere to 12-month rule in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition, (DSM-IV), and a reasonable basis existed for the Bureau to apply that rule to require documented use
of drugs within 12 months prior to incarceration. (United States Bureau of Prisons, Federal Correctional
Institution at Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT

Morales v. GEO Group, Inc., 824 F.Supp.2d 836 (S.D.Ind. 2010). A former employee brought a Title VII
action against a private correctional facility manager, her former employer, alleging sexual harassment,
retaliation, and constructive discharge. The employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether the sexually charged comments made by the female employee's supervisors and
co-workers over a nine-month period were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
environment. The court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as
to whether the female employee engaged in a protected activity by complaining about sexual harassment and
whether she suffered an adverse employment action by being required to attend a meeting with her alleged
harassers, and whether a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign under the circumstances
presented to the female employee. She had been assigned to a new unit after complaining about sexual
harassment but was never given any training or a password to log on to her computer. (Geo Group, Inc., and
Indiana Department of Corrections, New Castle Correctional Facility)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFF DISCIPLINE

Qasem v. Toro, 737 F.Supp.2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). A female inmate brought a § 1983 suit against corrections
officials regarding injuries suffered by the inmate at the hands of a corrections officer alleged to have sexually
assaulted the inmate. The superintendent and deputy superintendent for security moved to dismiss claims that
they were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's personal safety. The district court denied the motion. The
court held that the inmate's allegations against the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security,
claiming that they were deliberately indifferent to her rights and were responsible for creating or maintaining
policies or practices that failed to prevent her from being repeatedly raped and assaulted by a corrections
officer, stated a claim for Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The court noted that the complaint
alleged that the officials were responsible for determining where inmates were to be housed and the assignment
of guards, and in conjunction with another official, investigation and response to complaints of staff
misconduct. The court found that the superintendent and deputy superintendent for security were not entitled to
qualified immunity, given the extent of the alleged sexual abuse, the numerous warning signs alleged, and the
number of questionable, if not unintelligible, decisions made with respect to the inmate during the course of an
investigation. (Taconic Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Riley v. County of Cook, 682 F.Supp.2d 856 (N.D.Ill. 2010). The special administrator of the estate of a
prisoner who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought a civil rights action under § 1981
and § 1983 against county defendants. Approximately three weeks after he was admitted to the jail the prisoner
was found in his cell hanging by his neck from a bed sheet. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court

2.68

granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the county could not have been directly liable,
under Illinois law, for failure to establish and implement the policies and procedures raised in the civil rights
complaint, where it was within the purview of the sheriff's office, not the county, to implement policies and
procedures within the county jail. The court noted that Illinois sheriffs were independently elected officials not
subject to the control of the county. The county also could not have been vicariously liable for the acts of the
sheriff and his employees under a respondeat superior theory under Illinois law, as the sheriff was an
independently-elected official, answering directly to the electorate, and not having a master/servant relationship
with the county board. (Cook County Sheriff, Cook County Department of Corrections, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Stack v. Karnes, 750 F.Supp.2d 892 (S.D.Ohio 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against a county and
the county Board of Commissioners, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that the county was not entitled to immunity afforded under Ohio law to counties. The court found that the
inmate's allegations that the county historically had a policy, custom, and practice of failing to implement
adequate training programs for jail personnel, and that he was denied medical treatment for his diabetes, were
sufficient to state a Monell claim against the county for violation of the Eighth Amendment . According to the
court, the county Board of Commissioners had no duty to keep a safe jail, and therefore, could not be liable in
the inmate's § 1983 action alleging he was denied adequate medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment,
where the sheriff was the entity in charge of the jail, rather than the Board. (Franklin County Corrections
Center, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Teague v. St. Charles County, 708 F.Supp.2d 935 (E.D.Mo. 2010). The mother of a detainee who committed
suicide in a cell in county detention center brought an action against the county and corrections officials,
asserting claims for wrongful death under § 1983 and under the Missouri Wrongful Death Statute. The county
and the commanding officer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted in the
motion, in part. The court held that the mother failed to allege that the detention center's commanding officer
personally participated. The court found that the mother's allegations that her son was demonstrating that he
was under the influence of narcotics at the time of his detention, that her son had expressed suicidal tendencies,
and that jail employees heard or were told of choking sounds coming from her son's cell but took no action,
were sufficient to state a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim under § 1983.
The court held that the mother's allegation that the county unconstitutionally failed to train and supervise
its employees with respect to custody of persons with symptoms of narcotics withdrawal and suicidal
tendencies was sufficient to state a failure to train claim against the county, under § 1983, arising out of the
death of her son who committed suicide while housed as a pretrial detainee. The detainee had used a bed sheet
to hang himself and the mother alleged that the county failed to check him every 20 minutes, as required by jail
policy. (St. Charles County Detention Center, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Inmates incarcerated at the Florida State Prison (FSP)
brought a § 1983 action against various officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections
(DOC), alleging that the use of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The claims against individual
correctional officers responsible for administering the agents were settled. After a five-day bench trial on the
remaining claims against the DOC Secretary and the FSP warden for declaratory judgment and injunctive
relief, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court ended final judgment and a
final permanent injunction in the inmates' favor. The Secretary and warden appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court found that the DOC’s policy and practice of spraying inmates with chemical agents, as
applied to an inmate who was fully secured in his seven-by-nine-foot steel cell, was not presenting a threat of
immediate harm to himself or others, and was unable to understand and comply with officers' orders due to his
mental illness, were extreme deprivations violating the broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity and decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the district court did
not clearly err in finding that the record demonstrated that DOC officials acted with deliberate indifference to
the severe risk of harm an inmate faced when officers repeatedly sprayed him with chemical agents for
behaviors caused by his mental illness. (Florida State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFFING LEVELS

Thomas v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010). A mother brought a § 1983 and state
wrongful death action against a county, sheriff, and various officers and medical technicians at a county jail
after her son died from pneumococcal meningitis while being held as a pretrial detainee. The mother asserted a
claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs as well as a common-law claim for wrongful death. Following
a jury verdict for the mother, the district court, ordered the reduction of the total damage award from
$4,450,000 to $4,150,000. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and
remanded in part. The court held that the issue of whether county corrections officers were subjectively aware
of the pretrial detainee's serious medical condition that culminated in death from pneumococcal meningitis, as
required to support the detainee’s survivor's § 1983 deliberate indifference action against a county and officers,
was for the jury, given the cellmates' and other witnesses' accounts of the detainee's vomiting and exhibiting
other signs of serious illness within plain view of officers without any response from them, and given testimony
as to the inmates' various complaints to officers regarding his condition. According to the court, issues of
whether the county had a custom or practice of failing to timely review jail inmates' medical requests, and a
causal link between such failure and the death of the pretrial detainee from pneumococcal meningitis were for
the jury. The court noted that the supervisor and individual medical technicians for the contractor that handled
medical services for inmates testified to the practice of not retrieving inmate medical requests on a daily basis,
and the detainee's fellow inmates testified to having filed numerous medical requests on the detainee's behalf.
The court found that a causal link was not shown between the county sheriff's department's alleged policy of

2.69

understaffing the county jail and the pretrial detainee's death from pneumococcal meningitis. Although
individual deputies employed as corrections officers were shown to have known of and ignored the detainee's
medical needs, there was no evidence that such inaction was due to understaffing rather than other causes.
(Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison officials,
complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell, resulting in a
disturbing strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then brought a separate
action against prison officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's prohibition of his
subscription to commercially available pictures of nude women. The district court dismissed the action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the inmate appealed, and the appeals court dismissed
the appeal. The inmate then moved for a partial refund of filing fees that had been collected from his prison
trust account, challenging the prison's practice of withholding 40 percent of his account to satisfy the filing fee
requirement for his two appeals. The appeals court found that PLRA required that no more than 20 percent of
an inmate's monthly income be deducted to pay filing fees, irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals
the inmate had pending at any one time. The court held that granting the inmate a partial refund of fees was not
warranted since the amounts withheld from the inmate's account were actually owed and were properly, if
excessively, collected. (Red Onion State Prison, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Willis v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 753 F.Supp.2d 768 (S.D.Ind. 2010). A Jewish inmate
brought a class action against a Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging denial of kosher meals in violation
of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and his First Amendment free exercise
of religion rights. Cross motions for summary judgment were filed. The motions were granted in part and
denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the denial of a kosher diet substantially burdened the inmate's
religious exercise; (2) the increased costs of providing kosher meals to inmates was not a compelling interest;
(3) the DOC did not establish that providing vegan meals to Jewish inmates was the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling government interest; (4) enforcement of a prison policy violated the First Amendment
as applied to the Jewish inmate; and (5) the chaplain knowingly applied the policy in violation of the Jewish
inmate's First Amendment rights. According to the court, requiring inmates with religious diet cards to eat 75%
of their meals using the card or have the card suspended violated the First Amendment as applied to the Jewish
inmate who could only eat kosher meals pursuant to his beliefs. The court noted that the inmate used his card
for all available meals, which was only two-thirds of mealtimes as the prison did not provide kosher breakfasts,
and the inmate had no alternative to the kosher diet once the prison suspended his card. (New Castle
Correctional Facility, Indiana)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2011). Current and former female inmates filed a class action § 1983
suit against several line officers employed at seven state prisons and various supervisors and other corrections
officials, claiming that they were sexually abused and harassed by the line officers and that the supervisory
defendants contributed to this abuse and harassment through the maintenance of inadequate policies and
practices. The district court dismissed, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part, and
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the female inmates who made internal complaints,
investigated by an Inspector General (IG), that sought redress only for the alleged actions of a particular
corrections officer and did not seek a change in policies or procedures, failed to exhaust their internal remedies,
as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to proceed in federal court on § 1983 claims of sexual
abuse and harassment. But the court found that the female inmates' claim of a failure to protect was sufficient
exhaustion with regard to a § 1983 class action litigation seeking systemic relief from alleged sexual abuse and
harassment. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
UNION

Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011). Current or
former deputy sheriffs who had been charged with felonies, suspended, reinstated after suspension, and th e n
discharged, brought § 1983 claims based on Fourteenth Amendment due process violations against the county,
its board of supervisors, civil service commissioners, and sheriff. The deputies were joined by their union. The
defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and the former
deputies appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held
that: (1) due process required that the deputies receive post-suspension hearings in addition to the limited
procedures they received before their suspensions; (2) all four deputies adequately stated Monell claims against
the county; (3) civil service commissioners were entitled to qualified immunity from the claims of the deputies
who did not receive post-suspension hearings, although those claims could go forward against the sheriff and
county supervisors; and (4) all individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
claims of the two deputies who received post-suspension hearings, as their right to a more substantial hearing
was not clearly established at the time of the violations. (Los Angeles County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE
DISCIPLINE

Bardzik v. County of Orange, 635 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). A sheriff's lieutenant brought a § 1983 action
against a county, sheriff, and others alleging that the defendants retaliated against him for his support of the
sheriff's opponent in an election challenge, in violation of his First Amendment rights. The defendants moved
for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity
for his allegedly retaliatory demotion of the lieutenant from a policymaking position, but the sheriff was not
entitled to qualified immunity for his alleged retaliation against the lieutenant while the lieutenant was not in a

2.70

policymaking position. The court noted that when the lieutenant was the Reserve Division Commander, the
lieutenant had broad responsibility, influence on programs, frequent contact with elected officials, technical
competence, and power to control others, and that the lieutenant impeded the sheriff's agenda. In his
subsequent role with the court operations unit, the lieutenant was not a policymaker. The lieutenant alleged
that the sheriff retaliated against him by transferring him from the prestigious position of Reserve Division
Commander to an undesirable post at Court Operations, and that the sheriff continued punishing him even
after he was transferred by denying him a pay raise and taking the unprecedented step of directing that the
lieutenant’s rating on his annual evaluation be reduced from “exceeds expectations” to “meets expectations.”
The lieutenant was also denied the opportunity to interview for Chief of Police positions in 2006 and 2007,
even though all lieutenants were allowed to interview even if they were considered unqualified. The court
noted that two internal investigations were initiated against the lieutenant, which were ultimately dismissed as
unfounded. (Orange County Sheriff's Department, California)
U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE

Corbin v. Gillen, 839 F.Supp.2d 376 (D.Mass. 2011). A correctional officer employed by a county sheriff's
department brought a § 1983 action against the department's superintendent and assistant superintendent,
alleging that the defendants violated his right to free speech by disciplining him for disparaging remarks he
made to a county selectman. The officer's statements to the county selectman were made during a jail tour,
during which the officer derided the current sheriff and criticized the sheriff's department. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court allowed the motion. The court held that the officer's
statements were made in performance of his official duties, the officer's speech did not penetrate the realm of
public concern, and the temporal proximity between the officer's displaying of a bumper sticker on his car and
his suspension without pay was insufficient to establish a First Amendment political affiliation claim.
(Plymouth County Sheriff's Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

English v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.D.C. 2011). An involuntarily committed psychiatric
patient brought an action against the District of Columbia, the mayor and various other officials, alleging
constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, and various violations of District of Columbia law. The defendants
filed a motion to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the process received by
the patient at a public institution in regards to removal of money from his patient account was sufficient to
satisfy Fifth Amendment procedural due process. The court noted that the patient received a pre-deprivation
notice reasonably calculated to make him aware that he owed money and that this money would be taken from
his account, the patient followed the procedures listed on the notice to challenge the invoice and availed
himself of the appeals process, he received a response, and he requested and received an external review.
(Saint Elizabeths, District of Columbia Department of Mental Health)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS

Estate of Gaither ex rel. Gaither v. District of Columbia, 833 F.Supp.2d 110 (D.D.C. 2011). The personal
representative of a detainee's estate brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia, department of
corrections officials, and corrections officers, seeking damages in connection with the detainee's fatal stabbing
while he was incarcerated pending sentencing for felony distribution of cocaine. The corrections officers
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that the officers were entitled to
qualified immunity. According to the court, at the time of the detainee's death it was not clearly established
that corrections officers were acting with deliberate indifference by exposing inmates, including the detainee,
to a substantial threat of inmate-on-inmate attack by understaffing a unit, and thus corrections officers were
entitled to qualified immunity. (District of Columbia, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE UNION
STAFFING LEVELS

Federal Bureau of Prisons v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 654 F.3d 91 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) brought a Petition for Review from a final order of the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA), holding that the BOP had a duty to bargain over its implementation of a “mission critical”
standard for staffing at federal correctional institutions. The district court granted the petition, vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that the BOP was not required to bargain with the union before deciding
that certain positions designated as non-critical were to be performed by relief officers and only as needed.
The court noted that the collective bargaining agreement gave the agency the exclusive, non-negotiable right
to assign work, but provided that the agency could bargain with a representative of its employees over
procedures it would use when it exercised that authority. (American Federation of Government Employees,
Council of Prison Locals No. 33, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING CONDITIONS
STAFFING LEVELS

Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 2011). A female jailer brought a § 1983 action against a county,
sheriff, county commissioners, and several other defendants, alleging violations of her substantive due process
rights. The district court denied the sheriff's and commissioners' motion for summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
defendants' failure to act was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the jailer. According to the court,
the sheriff's and county commissioners' awareness of potentially dangerous conditions in the jail, including
that the jail was understaffed and that the drunk tank had an interior-mounted door handle, and failure to take
action regarding those conditions, which resulted in the jailer being attacked and taken hostage by two
inmates, was not deliberate indifference as to the safety of the jailer, as would violate the jailer's Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process rights on a state created danger theory. The court found that the
defendants’ failure to act was at most gross negligence, rather than deliberate indifference, and the jailer was
aware of the conditions as she had been injured previously due to the handle and staffing issue, such that she
could take these issues into account in interacting with inmates. (Miller County Jail, Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought an
action under § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against a Jewish
organization that contracted with the prison to provide Jewish religious services to prisoners, a rabbi who was

2.71

president of the organization, and an outreach program of the organization. The prisoner alleged that the
defendants refused to provide basic religious reading materials, other basic materials, and spiritual leadership.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the organization and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner, whose requests for a Torah, Jewish calendar, and
rabbi visit were denied by the private Jewish organization could not establish that such denial was the result of
a governmental policy, as required to hold the organization liable for any deprivation of the prisoner's free
exercise rights under § 1983 or his rights under the RLUIPA. According to the court, there was no evidence
that the organization was enforcing a department of corrections (DOC) or governmental policy, or that the
organization's internal policy was adopted by the DOC. The court also held that the prisoner could not
establish that the organization helped DOC staff determine whether other prisoners should be classified by the
DOC as Jewish, as required to hold the organization liable. The court noted that the private Jewish
organization and its rabbi were not “state actors” under the public function analysis, as would allow the
defendants to be held liable on the prisoner's claims. (Washington State Penitentiary)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
RECORDS

Halkett v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 763 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.Me. 2011). An employee, a prison
counselor, brought an action in state court against an employer alleging violations of the Maine Whistleblower
Protection Act (MWPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA). Following removal to federal court, the
employer moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the prison
counselor had a reasonable belief that his employer, the prison's medical provider, had improperly handled
inmate treatment notes in violation of Maine law, and there was sufficient proximity between his complaints
to the provider about misfiled and missing mental health care notes and his termination, so as to establish a
prima facie case of violation of the Maine Whistleblower Protection Act (MWPA). The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the prison medical
provider's proffered reason for terminating the prison counselor--that he had violated policies regarding
telephone contact by prisoners with those on the outside--was a pretext for what the counselor asserted was
the actual reason for his termination, the counselor's many complaints to the provider about its lax and, in his
view, unlawful procedures concerning inmate treatment records.(Correctional Medical Services, Inc.,
Downeast Correctional Facility, Maine)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against the secretary of a
state department of corrections, alleging that he was transferred to an out-of-state prison in retaliation for his
advocacy on behalf of himself and other convicts. The district court entered summary judgment in the
secretary's favor, and denied the inmate's motion for reconsideration. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the decision by the secretary to transfer the inmate to an out-of-state maximum
security prison was not in retaliation for the inmate's advocacy on behalf of himself and other convicts, and
thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment free speech rights, even though the inmate had not received
any misconduct reports in the fourteen years before transfer, and posed no danger to staff or other prisoners.
According to the court, the initial decision to transfer the inmate was made three years before the secretary
assumed his current position, the inmate had accumulated a large number of legitimate separations while
incarcerated in the state prison system, and the transfer did not violate any standard prison policies or
procedures. (Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hawkins v. County of Lincoln, 785 F.Supp.2d 781 (D.Neb. 2011.) The personal representative of a hospital
patient brought a § 1983 action against the hospital, a county, a city, and related defendants for claims arising
when the patient was brought to the hospital at the time of his arrest, was released by the hospital to a county
jail, and subsequently hanged himself at the jail. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials were objectively aware that the prisoner posed a
risk of harm to himself that included a risk of suicide. According to the court, although the prisoner had
serious medical needs in connection with his risk of suicide, no prison correctional officers, jailers, and/or law
enforcement officers were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs, even though it might have been
negligent for individual defendants to take the prisoner off a suicide watch without having him evaluated by a
physician or other professional. According to the court, the defendants' conduct was not more blameworthy
than mere negligence. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the county acted with deliberate indifference by failing to have a specific policy for
determining when an inmate could be removed from a suicide watch and placed in a situation that could
increase the likelihood of a successful suicide attempt. (Lincoln County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
UNION

Hernandez v. Cook County Sheriff's Office, 634 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011). County corrections officers who
were investigated in connection with a jailbreak brought an action against the county sheriff's office and its
officials, alleging, among other things, that the defendants retaliated against them in violation of their rights to
free political association and free speech under the First Amendment. The district court denied the defendants'
motion for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
court held that: (1) the defendants did not waive their qualified immunity argument as to the officers' First
Amendment retaliation claims; (2) the officers' workplace safety complaints were not protected by the First
Amendment; but (3) the appeals court would not decide the issue of whether the defendants were entitled to
qualified immunity from First Amendment political retaliation claims because the district court had decided
the matter was waived and had never reached a conclusion on that issue. The event that precipitated this case
was a jailbreak at the Abnormal Behavior Observation (ABO) unit of the Cook County jail. An inmate had
overpowered a jail officer after temporarily blinding him by throwing a cleaning solution in his face. The
inmate then released seven other inmates from their cells. The inmates shut off the lights and set a
diversionary fire, and the first inmate put on the officer’s uniform. In the confusion, the disguised inmate

2.72

convinced other jail officers to open certain internal doors, after which the inmates beat several officers. Using
keys obtained from the subdued officers, six inmates managed to escape from the facility. They were soon
recaptured and Sheriff's Office authorities immediately suspected that the inmates had help from within the
Sheriff’s Office. The plaintiffs in this case included six former officers of the Special Operations Response
Team (SORT), and four other officers. The inmate who began the escape process identified three officers as
having advance knowledge of the jailbreak and additional officers were then implicated. The inmate asserted
that one of the officers had approached him multiple times with a proposition to stage a jailbreak to draw
adverse attention to the leading Cook County Sheriff candidate, in advance of a pending election. The officers
claimed that in the days following the jailbreak, investigators detained them under guard for up to 24 hours
and denied them food, water and sleep. Several claimed that they were discouraged from contacting a union
steward or an attorney. All of the plaintiffs were brought up on administrative charges. (Cook County Sheriff's
Office, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Hughbanks v. Dooley, 788 F.Supp.2d 988 (D.S.D. 2011.) A prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging that the
state Department of Corrections' correspondence policy prohibiting the delivery of bulk-rate mail was
unconstitutional. The prisoner moved for preliminary injunctive relief and asked the court to invalidate
portions of the policy. The district court denied the motion. The court found that the prisoner's mere allegation
that his First Amendment rights were violated by the prison's denial of bulk-rate mail established the threat of
irreparable harm, in determining whether to grant the prisoner a preliminary injunction seeking to invalidate
the prison's bulk-rate mail policy, but the balance of hardships favored the prison in determining whether to
grant the prisoner's request. The court noted that the bulk-rate mail policy was a state policy, and suspension
of the policy for all inmates in the state would compromise the safety and security of every institution in the
state. The court found that the policy was rationally-related to the prison's penological purpose of maintaining
security and order, that prisoners could review catalogs in a prison property office and could pre-pay postage
on any catalog to have it mailed first or second class, that the challenged policy was statewide and any
accommodation would have a significant effect on state inmates and prison staff, and the policy was not an
exaggerated response to security and other concerns. (Mike Durfee State Prison, South Dakota)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT

Hunter v. County of Albany, 834 F.Supp.2d 86 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). A former county corrections officer who was
a Native American brought an action against the county, asserting claims of unlawful discrimination and
harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and New York State Human Rights Law.
The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the officer
did not suffer an adverse employment action, as required to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination
claim, as a result of a lone instance of being ordered to perform an irregular task by his supervisor. The court
held that a supervisor's reference to the Native American county corrections officer and his co-workers as
“cunts,” and an inmate escape video portraying the officer and co-workers as “Keystone Cops,” did not give
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent as required to establish a prima facie Title VII discrimination claim,
where the incidents at issue did not single the officer out on the basis of race or nationality, but portrayed the
officer and co-workers in same light. The court concluded that the alleged misconduct suffered by the officer
was not sufficiently continuous and concerted or severe and pervasive as to alter the officer's employment
conditions and to create an abusive working environment, as required to support a Title VII hostile work
environment claim. (Albany County, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
HARASSMENT

Konah v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 61 (D.D.C. 2011). A Liberian female formerly employed by a
private health care corporation that contracted with the District of Columbia to provide medical treatment to
inmates in a particular penitentiary, whose employment was terminated after she reported alleged harassment
and assault and battery by inmates, sued the District and a correctional officer, claiming they violated the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Title VII, the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and common
laws. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the employee adequately pled a claim that a correctional officer's failure
to promptly open a “sally port” to allow her to escape inmates in their undergarments who allegedly surrounded
her, jeered at her, used sexually explicit language, and grabbed her on the buttocks was an “unreasonable
seizure of her person” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court found that the employee adequately
pled a claim of discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of equal protection against the correctional
officer, noting that her allegations that the officer and the District of Columbia “failed to remedy sexually
offensive conduct by inmates,” which included “gender specific abusive language” and “sexual assaults.” The
court also held that the employee adequately pled a due process claim against the correctional officer who
deliberately refused to open the “sally port” because the officer prevented her exit and deprived her of her
liberty. The court found that the correctional officer was not entitled to dismissal, on the basis of qualified
immunity, of § 1983 claims brought by the employee where it was clearly established that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the detention of individuals without any cause, that the correctional officer's
discrimination on the basis of sex violated the Fifth Amendment, and that the government could not deprive an
individual of her liberty by detaining her without due process. (Unity Health Care, Inc., and the District of
Columbia, Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Lee v. City of Columbus, Ohio, 636 F.3d 245 (6th Cir. 2011). City employees brought a class action against a
city, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act, as well as constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employees and entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting the city from enforcing its sick leave procedures. The city appealed. The appeals court reversed and
remanded, finding that the city directive comported with the Rehabilitation Act, and the directive did not raise
an informational privacy concern. The city directive required all employees who used sick leave for personal
illness of more than three days or a family illness of more than two days, as well as those employees who were

2.73

on a sick leave verification list, to provide a note to their immediate supervisor from a doctor stating the nature
of their illness. The court found that the directive comported with the Rehabilitation Act and did not violate
proscriptions pertaining to disability related inquiries, where the directive was a universal sick leave policy for
all employees, disabled or not. (City of Columbus, Ohio)
U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET

Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011). An inmate filed a pro se § 1983 complaint against a prison
chaplain and prison wardens, claiming that they violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and asserting related state law claims.
The district court dismissed some claims, and subsequently granted summary judgment against the inmate on
the remaining claims. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that prison officials singled out African Hebrew Israelite (AHI)
services for cancellation, purportedly due to budget cuts, disproportionately allocated the prison's religious
budget and resources to other religions, and failed to pursue alternatives to allow the inmates to pursue their
faith. According to the court, this sufficiently stated a facially plausible claim under § 1983 for denial of a
reasonable opportunity to exercise his religion without adequate penological justification. (Lawrence
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

McCollum v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2011). Inmates and a
volunteer prison chaplain brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) and others, challenging CDCR's paid chaplaincy program, and alleging retaliation for
bringing such a suit. The defendants moved to dismiss and for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion to dismiss the inmates' claims in part, dismissed the chaplain's Establishment Clause claim for lack
of standing, and granted summary judgment on the chaplain's remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmates' grievances failed to alert CDCR that inmates
sought redress for wrongs allegedly perpetuated by CDCR's chaplaincy-hiring program, as required to exhaust
under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, while the inmates' grievances gave
notice that the inmates alleged the prison policies failed to provide for certain general Wiccan religious needs
and free exercise, they did not provide notice that the source of the perceived problem was the absence of a
paid Wiccan chaplaincy. But the court found that an inmate’s grievance alleging he requested that the prison's
administration contact and allow visitation by clergy of his own Wiccan faith, which was denied because his
chaplain was not a regular paid chaplain, was sufficient to put CDCR on notice that the paid-chaplaincy hiring
policy was the root cause of the inmate's complaint and thus preserved his ability to challenge that policy under
PLRA. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, Inc., 641 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 due
process claim against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's
disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a hearing officer's
reliance entirely on the statements of a corrections officer, in determining whether videotape evidence was
relevant in a prison disciplinary proceeding, deprived the inmate of his right to due process. According to the
court, the inmate's right to present evidence was completely undermined by the hearing officer's failure to
independently determine whether the evidence was relevant. But the court held that the hearing officer's denial
of the inmate's request to call an alleged victim of the assault by the inmate as a witness in the disciplinary
hearing did not deprive the inmate of his right to due process. The court noted that the hearing officer had asked
the witness to testify, but the witness had refused, and the interest in protecting the witness and managing the
difficult relationships within the prison setting far outweighed the inmate's right to call the alleged victim as a
witness. (State Correctional Institute at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2011). A prisoner who was detained for 15 months beyond his release
date as the result of a mistake by employees of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC) brought
suit under § 1983 to recover for alleged violation of his due process rights. The district court denied a motion
for judgment as a matter of law filed by the Commissioner of the MDOC on a qualified immunity theory, and
the Commissioner appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that the prisoner did not satisfy the burden of
showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC to promulgate a policy to prevent such
mistakes by his subordinates was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The court found
that the prisoner failed to satisfy burden of showing that failure on the part of the Commissioner of the MDOC
to train employees to prevent such mistakes was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law,
and the Commissioner was qualifiedly immune from liability under § 1983 on a failure-to-train theory, given
evidence that the employees of the MDOC's records department had all attended training sessions with a lawyer
to ensure that they better understood court orders. According to the court, the fact that an employee erred in one
instance did not show that the Commissioner's alleged actions in failing to train were objectively unreasonable.
(Mississippi Department of Corrections, Intensive Supervision Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2011). The publisher of a
legal journal brought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys (EOUSA), seeking disclosure of a videotape depicting the aftermath of a brutal prison murder
and autopsy photographs of the victim. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
EOUSA and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed the appeal in part. The
court held that: (1) the FOIA personal privacy exemption for law enforcement records barred disclosure of the
portion of the prison videotape depicting the victim's body after the murder and the autopsy photographs; (2)
the FOIA personal privacy exemption for law enforcement records barred disclosure of a portion of the audio
recording from the prison videotape; and (3) the public domain doctrine did not override the exemption.
(United States Penitentiary, Florence, Colorado)

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U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2011). A group of state inmates brought an action against the
Secretary of the Kansas Department of Corrections, challenging two policies which required money obtained
by inmates to be saved for use upon release from prison. The Secretary filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
alternative, to grant summary judgment. The district court granted the motion to dismiss and the inmates
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. According to the court, compulsory savings accounts for release-eligible
prisoners did not violate substantive due process because they were rationally related to a legitimate
penological purpose of ensuring that inmates had funds upon release to ease their transition into free society.
(Kansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
TRAINING

Robert v. Carter, 819 F.Supp.2d 832 (S.D.Ind. 2011). A former civil deputy process server brought an action
against a sheriff, county, its council, and its board of commissioners, alleging that the defendants failed to grant
him a medical exemption from stun gun training or to provide him with a reasonable accommodation, in
violation of Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The deputy also alleged that the defendants terminated
him in violation of his procedural and substantive due process rights. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that stun gun training was essential to the
deputy’s position and that an exemption from training was unwarranted. According to the court, the defendants
had no obligation to consider the deputy's non–back–related ailments in determining a reasonable
accommodation, and the deputy had no property interest in continued employment. (Hamilton County Sheriff's
Department, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Shultz v. Allegheny County, 835 F.Supp.2d 14 (W.D.Pa. 2011). The administratrix of the estate of an inmate
who died after developing bacterial pneumonia while pregnant brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail
health services, and various officials and employees of county jail, alleging they ignored her serious medical
problems. The county and official filed a motion to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that allegations that the inmate had complained of symptoms involving her breathing and lungs to jail
personnel but was told to “stick it out,” that she feared impending death and communicated that to officials and
her mother, that her condition progressed to the point where she had difficulty breathing and had discharge
from her lungs, that she was taken to the infirmary with additional symptoms including nausea and vomiting,
which had been present for several days, that she was treated for influenza without taking cultures or other
testing, that there was no outbreak of the flu within the jail, that her condition did not improve, that she
continued to complain of difficulty breathing and lung discharge, that she was taken to a medical facility
intensive care unit, and that tests were performed there but her condition had already progressed to the point
where it was fatal were sufficient to plead deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. The court found
that allegations that her condition could have been easily controlled and cured with testing were sufficient to
plead a cost-cutting/saving custom or policy existed and was the moving force in the inmate's death, as required
for the § 1983 action. (Allegheny Correctional Health Services Inc., Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Smith v. Atkins, 777 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.N.C. 2011). The mother of a schizophrenic inmate who committed
suicide at a jail and the mother of the inmate's children brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county
deputy sheriff, jail officials, a medical contractor, and a nurse employed by the contractor, alleging that the
defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights in failing to provide adequate medical care. The
defendants removed the action to federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the deputy sheriff who happened to be at the jail delivering a prisoner when the
inmate, who had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, committed suicide, did not know that the inmate was at a
substantial risk of committing suicide or intentionally disregarded such risk. The court found that the deputy
was not liable under § 1983 where the deputy did not know the inmate or anything about him, or have any
responsibilities associated with the inmate's custody. The court found that the mother of the inmate failed to
show a direct causal link between a specific deficiency in training and an alleged Eighth Amendment violation,
as required to sustain the mother's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against jail officials based on their alleged
failure to train jail employees. (Bertie–Martin Regional Jail, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2011). Seven inmates incarcerated at a state prison sued current
and former officials in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the former Governor, for marking up the
price of commissary goods beyond a statutory cap. The district court dismissed the cases for failure to state a
claim and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded with instructions. According to the
appeals court, even if a statutory cap on the mark-up of the price of prison commissary goods created a
protected property interest, the prisoners did not state a procedural due process claim based on the Department
of Corrections' alleged cap violation where they did not allege that post-deprivation remedies were inadequate
to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

U.S. v. Massachusetts, 781 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.Mass. 2011.) The United States of America brought an action
against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, seeking an order enjoining the Commonwealth from
administering a physical abilities test in the selection of correctional officers due to its alleged disparate impact
on women in violation of Title VII. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the Commonwealth's use of the test unintentionally
imposed a disparate impact on women, and an issue of material fact existed as to whether the test was job
related and consistent with a business necessity. The court noted that in two out of three years in which the test
was conducted, the disparity between male and female pass rates well exceeded two-to-three standard
deviations, the range considered statistically significant in the context of disparate impact. (Massachusetts
Department of Corrections)

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U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE DISCIPLINE
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

White v. Department of Correctional Services, 814 F.Supp.2d 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). A female correction officer
brought an action against New York State, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS),
and supervisory officers, alleging violations of Title VII and § 1983. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable alternatives existed to the
prison's gender-based hiring policy under which the officer in charge (OIC) position was posted for male
corrections officers only, in light of the fact that the urine testing and strip frisks of male prisoners comprised
only a small part of the OIC's job duties and that female officers had worked the OIC position in the past. The
court also found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
notice of discipline against the female corrections officer, which threatened severe consequences such as
dismissal from service and loss of accrued annual leave, as well as a counseling memoranda and negative
comment in the officer's performance evaluation, were sufficient to dissuade a reasonable worker from making
or supporting a charge of sex discrimination.
According to the court, summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the proffered reason for a notice of discipline and counseling memoranda against the female corrections officer,
that she had violated Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) policies by leaving her post and entering an
area in which she was not allowed, were a pretext for retaliation for the officer's having filed sex discrimination
complaints with a state agency and her union.
The court found that genuine issues of material fact as to whether a supervisory officer and the prison's
superintendent were personally involved in the male-only designation of the officer in charge (OIC) position
precluded summary judgment on the female corrections officer's § 1983 claim alleging her right to equal
protection was violated when these officials discriminated against her because of her gender by denying her the
OIC position, on the grounds that the female officer had not established the officials' supervisory liability.
(Lincoln Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Young v. Wall, 642 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against the director of
the Rhode Island Department of Corrections (RIDOC), alleging that the director's decision to cease paying
interest on funds held in inmates' trust accounts constituted an unconstitutional taking and that the RIDOC's
failure to afford the prisoner notice and opportunity to be heard before abandoning the practice of accruing
interest violated his right to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the
director and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner did not have a
constitutionally protected property right, under Rhode Island law, in the interest not yet paid on his inmate trust
accounts, and the prisoner did not have a due process right to notice and the opportunity to be heard before the
prison abandoned the practice of accruing interest. (Rhode Island Department of Corrections)
2012

U.S. District Court
STAFF DRUG TEST

Allen v. Schiff, 908 F.Supp.2d 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A former county corrections officer brought a civil rights
action against a county sheriff and a county for constitutional violations allegedly arising out of the
administration of a mandatory, random drug test. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the drug testing program, which required the
county corrections officer--who had not refused or failed a prior drug test-- to provide a urine sample while
being directly observed from the front. According to the court, the sheriff had final policymaking authority on
the manner in which testing was administered to department employees, such that the county could be liable
under § 1983 to the extent that this testing violated the Fourth Amendment. The sheriff had spearheaded the
change in the mandatory, random drug testing policy for corrections officers employed by the county sheriff's
department, and he directed the entity performing the tests to directly observe the collection of urine samples
from corrections officers. (Sullivan County Sheriff's Department and Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Ard v. Rushing, 911 F.Supp.2d 425 (S.D.Miss. 2012). A female inmate brought an action against a sheriff and a
deputy asserting claims under § 1983 and § 1985 for violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments,
and also alleging a state law claim for negligence, relating to an incident in which she was sexually assaulted
by the deputy while she was incarcerated. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that the sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of harm to the
female jail inmate as would have violated the Eighth Amendment, where the sheriff had established safeguards
to ensure the safety of female prisoners, including a female-only, camera-monitored area in which female
inmates were housed, a policy that male jailers could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, and
a policy that a female jailer was to cover each shift. The court noted that past allegations that the deputy had
engaged in unwanted sexual contact with female inmates had been investigated and found not to be
substantiated. The court found that the inmate failed to show that the sheriff had knowledge of the deputy's
disregard of the sheriff's policy to ensure the safety of female prisoners, which included a requirement that male
jailers could not enter the female-only area without a female jailer, or to show that the sheriff was deliberately
indifferent to the need for more or different training, as required to establish an Eighth Amendment failure to
train/supervise claim. (Lincoln County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
officials and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and
practices relating to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that: (1) the MSOP policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not

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unreasonable; (2) the policy of placing full restraints on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3)
officials were not liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions
from the patients' rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did not violate the First
Amendment; and (6) there was no evidence that officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or
safety. According to the court, the MSOP identified reasons for its policy requiring 13–inch clear-chassis
televisions or 17– to 19–inch flat-screen televisions--that the shelves in patients' rooms could safely hold those
televisions, and that a clear-chassis or flat-screen television would reduce contraband concealment. According
to the court, those justifications implicated both patient safety and MSOP's interest in maintaining security and
order at the institution and making certain no contraband reached patients. The court also found that the
(MSOP) telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment free speech rights of patients who were
civilly committed to MSOP. According to the court, the policy of monitoring patients' non-legal telephone calls
and prohibiting incoming calls was reasonably related to MSOP's security interests in detecting and preventing
crimes and maintaining a safe environment. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)
U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET
CONTRACT SERVICESS

Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison, 668 F.3d 896 (7th Cir. 2012). A state prisoner filed a civil
rights action alleging that prison officials misappropriated proceeds from a prison recreation fund in violation
of his due process rights. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prisoner suing under § 1983 sufficiently stated that he had suffered an injury
in-fact, as required for Article III standing, by prison officials' alleged misappropriation of proceeds from a
prison recreation fund in violation of his due process rights. According to the court, the prisoner had a high
probability of receiving benefits under a properly administered recreation fund, although the prisoner actually
did not have a property interest in that fund, and that the prisoner had a colorable claim to a property interest in
that fund and the merits of the case. But the court held that the prisoner did not have any legitimate expectation
to any benefit derived from prison's recreation fund, and thus he did not have any protected property interest in
the fund, since the governing statute required only that funds be spent for the direct benefit of prisoners if
prison officials decided to utilize money from the fund and the fund established from one prison could be
transferred to another prison without consulting any prisoner. (Indiana State Prison)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Bruner-McMahon v. Hinshaw, 846 F.Supp.2d 1177 (D.Kan. 2012). The administrator of the estate and the
children of a deceased inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison medical contractor, its employees,
county officials, and prison employees, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy knew that the
inmate faced a risk of a serious medical condition and chose to ignore it. The court also found that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a deputy who found the inmate lying
on the floor in his cell but did not contact the clinic was deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious medical
need. The court found that a deputy who helped escort the inmate back to his cell was not deliberately
indifferent to the inmate's serious medical need, as would violate the Eighth Amendment after the inmate died a
couple days later, even though the deputy saw the inmate acting strangely and moving slowly, where the deputy
believed the inmate had a mental health condition and did not need emergency care from a medical provider,
and the deputy believed the deputy in charge at that time would address the matter, and the deputy had no other
contact with the inmate. According to the court, a county custom, practice, or policy did not cause alleged
constitutional violations by jail deputies in not getting medical care for inmate, as required for supervisory
liability for the sheriff in his official capacity. The court noted that policy required that inmates receive
necessary medical care without delay, deputies were expected to use common sense when responding to an
inmate request or a known need, if an inmate appeared ill or a deputy otherwise recognized the need for
medical attention the deputy was supposed to advise the inmate to place his name on sick call, contact a
supervisor, or call the medical facility, and, in the event of a medical emergency, the deputy could call an
emergency radio code alerting a medical facility to respond immediately. (Sedgwick County Adult Detention
Facility, Kansas)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012). State prisoners filed an action against members of the Virginia
Parole Board in their official capacities, contending that the Board had adopted policies and procedures with
respect to parole-eligible inmates imprisoned for violent offenses that violated the Due Process and Ex Post
Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed the action and denied a motion to amend. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that Virginia had created a limited due process liberty
interest in being considered for parole at a specified time, and in being furnished with a written explanation for
denial of parole, through passage of its parole statute. But the court held that the prisoners’ complaint supported
an inference, at most, that the parole board was exercising its discretion, but that in doing so the board was
taking a stricter view towards violent offenders than it had in past, which did not implicate the Ex Post Facto
Clause. According to the court, the mere fact that the parole board had implemented procedural changes during
the same multi-year period that the rate of release decreased did not produce a plausible inference of a causal
connection to an alleged Ex Post Facto Clause violation due to a significant risk of extended punishment.
(Virginia Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Colvin v. Caruso, 852 F.Supp.2d 862 (W.D.Mich. 2012). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against prison
officials, asserting that the prison's 16-day denial of kosher meals, mistakes in administering the kosher-meal
program, and lack of Jewish services and literature at the prison violated his constitutional rights and Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court denied the prisoner's motion for a
preliminary injunction, and subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the officials, and denied
prisoner's motion to amend and second motion for preliminary injunction. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court held that the prison's “zero
tolerance” policy for possession of even one non-kosher food item violated the Free Exercise Clause and

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RLUIPA. But the court determined that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity where there had not
been any determination that the regulation was in any way deficient at the time of the officials' actions. The
court held that the prison's use of questionnaire about the inmate's knowledge of his designated religion was
proper. According to the court, the officials' failure to reinstate the inmate to his kosher diet regimen violated
the inmate's rights but punitive damages were not warranted. The court awarded $1 in nominal damages where
the inmate did not look like he missed many meals as a result of the officials' actions, and there was no
evidence of physical injury. The court noted that even though the prison had economic interest in restricting
kosher diet to prisoners who had a sincere belief that the diet was necessary to practice their religion, where the
inmate had no other means of eating, there was no evidence that providing a modicum of flexibility would have
a ripple effect on prison staff or inmates or would escalate the cost of providing kosher meals. (Michigan
Department of Corrections, Alger Correctional Facility)
U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE UNION

Corrections U.S.A. v. McNany, 892 F.Supp.2d 626 (M.D.Pa. 2012). A national association of correctional
officers brought a diversity action against a state association of correctional officers and the association's
officers, alleging interference with an existing contract, interference with a business relationship, and
interference with prospective relations. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) there was no evidence that the actions of the state
association's executives interfered with the relationship between the national association and its members; (2)
the state association president's letter to members regarding the decision to withdraw its organizational
membership in the national association did not breach a privilege; (3) there was no evidence that the state
association acted with the specific purpose of harming the national association or that the alleged interference
and harm were ever carried out intentionally; and (4) no prospective contractual relations existed between the
national association and individual correctional officers in Pennsylvania. The court noted that under
Pennsylvania law, the president of the state association ofcorrectional officers was acting in his official
capacity by sending a letter to the association's members notifying them of the executive board's decision to
withdraw its organizational membership in a national association of correctional officers, and thus, the
president was not a third party to the contract between the state association and the national association for
purposes of the action by the national association for interference with a contract. According to the court, the
president's letter constituted the type of work the state association's president was intended to perform, fell
substantially and clearly within the authorized time and space limit of the president's employment, and helped
actuate, at least in part, the executive board's new policy. (Pennsylvania State Corrections Officers Association,
Corrections U.S.A.)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Crutcher-Sanchez v. County of Dakota, 687 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2012). A female former county correctional
officer filed suit, pursuant to §§ 1983 and 1985, against her employer, a sheriff, a supervisor, and a co-worker
who was later promoted to supervisor, claiming that the sheriff and supervisor created or fostered a sexually
hostile work environment, and that the supervisor and co-worker conspired to deprive the employee of equal
protection. The district court denied the defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and the
defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that:
(1) the supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity from the hostile work environment sexual harassment
claim; (2) the employee was not the victim of a civil rights conspiracy; and (3) the sheriff did not subject the
employee to a sexually hostile work environment. According to the court, the supervisor's harassing conduct
started shortly after the employee began working at the jail and included the supervisor looking the employee
“up and down” during work, driving to a parking lot of her second job while repeatedly calling her on the
telephone, subjecting her to constant sexual attention, and asking her to not tell anyone about their sexual
relationship. The court found that the supervisor's unwelcome sexual harassment directed toward the female
officer was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create a hostile work
environment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, where the supervisor took advantage of employee
when she was intoxicated and vulnerable, the employee felt harassed by the supervisor's leering, the employee
was subject to sexual attention by the supervisor during nearly her entire employment with the county, and the
employee was fired for ending her sexual relationship with the supervisor. The court held that the supervisor
was not entitled to qualified immunity from the female correctional officer's § 1983 claim since it was clearly
established at the time of the harassment that the supervisor's attempt to have sex with a subordinate violated
the subordinate's civil rights. According to the court, the sheriff's offer of a box of chocolates to the female
correctional officer, and asking her out several times, was not sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct to create
a sexually hostile work environment, as required to support the officer's § 1983 claim for sexual harassment in
violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection, since the sheriff's inappropriate acts were not so
intimidating, offensive, or hostile as to poison the work environment. (Dakota County Jail, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Davis v. Vermont, Dept. of Corrections, 868 F.Supp.2d 313 (D.Vt. 2012). A former employee of the Vermont
Department of Corrections (DOC), who worked as a prison guard, brought an action against his former
employer, alleging, among other things, that he was retaliated against in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and that he was sexually harassed on the basis of his sex in violation of Title VII and
the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA). The employer moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) as a matter of
first impression, the employer was immune from the employee's ADA retaliation claim; (2) the employee stated
a Title VII hostile work environment claim based on harassing conduct that suggested the employee failed to
conform to gender stereotypes; (3) the employee sufficiently stated that he was disabled under the
Rehabilitation Act; (4) the employer failed to show that any perceived impairment of the employee was both
transitory and minor, as a defense to the Rehabilitation Act claim; (5) the alleged incidents were sufficiently
severe to alter the conditions of the employee's employment, as supported by the hostile work environment
claims; (6) the alleged harassment by co-workers and inmates could be imputed to the employee's supervisors

2.78

for purposes of holding the employer vicariously liable; and (7) there was a causal connection between the
employee's protected activity and the adverse employment actions, as supported a prima facie case of
retaliation. The court found that although images sent to the male DOC employee in e-mails by his supervisors
and co-workers referring to genitalia may have been tinged with offensive sexual connotations, the images did
not constitute discrimination because of sex, as would support the employee's Title VII sexual harassment
claim, where no inference could be drawn that the conduct was due to general hostility to the presence of males
in the workplace or that it was due to the disparate treatment of members of the opposite sex.
According to the court, allegations in the employee's second amended complaint that a supervisor sent him
an e-mail stating “way to milk it, buddy,” referring to the time the employee took off due to a work-related
testicular injury, and that a male inmate stated, “good luck making kids with that package,” sufficiently stated a
Title VII hostile work environment claim based on harassing conduct that suggested the employee failed to
conform to gender stereotypes. The court held that the alleged incidents in which supervisors of the employee,
a prison guard who sustained a work-related testicular injury, sent the employee two e-mails on consecutive
days containing explicit references to his genital pain, the e-mails were circulated to other staff, and were hung
in a mail room where employees, both male and female, could see them, the employee received a threatening
note in his mailbox after he returned from hernia surgery that stated “how's your nuts/kill yourself/your done,”
and the employee was copied on an e-mail containing a cartoon drawing of someone with gun to his head with
the caption “Kill Yourself,” were sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of the employee's employment, as
supported his hostile work environment claims based on disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act
and the Vermont Fair Employment Practices Act (VFEPA). (Vermont Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

De Luna v. Hidalgo County, Tex., 853 F.Supp.2d 623(S.D.Tex. 2012). Two students, on behalf of themselves
and a purported class, brought a § 1983 action against state magistrates and a county, alleging violation of
federal due process and equal protection rights based on their placement in jail for unpaid fines or costs related
to violations of the Texas Education Code. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the students also moved for class certification. The district court held that: (1) the students lacked standing to seek
equitable and declaratory relief from magistrates' practice of incarcerating individuals without an indigency
determination; (2) the county's policy of jailing individuals charged with fine-only misdemeanor offenses who
had failed to directly inform the arraigning magistrate of their indigency violated due process; and (3) the students did not waive their right to an affirmative indigency determination by waiving their right to counsel at
arraignment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded on the § 1983 claim by a genuine issue of
material fact existed as to whether one of the students placed in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations of Texas Education Code knew that she could tell a state magistrate that she could not pay the fines on her
outstanding charges and obtain either a payment plan or community service. (Hidalgo County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F.Supp.2d 1020 (D.Ariz. 2012). In consolidated cases, members of a county board of
supervisors, county staff, and judges of county courts, brought actions against members of county sheriff's
office and county attorney's office, alleging various torts and constitutional violations. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that members of the
county sheriff's office and county attorney's office were not entitled to absolute immunity in their filing of a
federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) lawsuit against members of county board
of supervisors, county staff, and judges of county's courts, where the RICO suit was far removed from the
judicial phase of the criminal process, and there was no basis for governmental enforcement under RICO itself.
According fo the court, the county sheriff's and county attorney's voluntary dismissal of their RICO suit
constituted termination in favor of the members of the county board of supervisors, county staff, and judges of
county's courts, as required to support Arizona law claims against the sheriff and attorney for wrongful
institution of civil proceedings.
The court held that an abuse of process claim was stated against the sheriff and attorney when a judge in the
county's criminal court alleged that county sheriff and county attorney hired a process server to serve the judge
with the federal RICO suit, when the sheriff and the attorney knew or should have known that the server
previously had been prosecuted for threatening to kill the judge. The court held that neither the county sheriff
nor the deputy county attorney were entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage of the § 1983
action, where the plaintiffs' claims overlapped to some extent, there was asymmetry of the information between
plaintiffs and the defendants regarding which defendants actually took, ordered, supervised, or approved certain
actions, and the defendants would not be prejudiced by allowing these claims to proceed because they would
already be subject to discovery in the plaintiffs' suit. According to the court, numerous constitutional violations
allegedly undertaken by the county attorney, the county sheriff, and their subordinates, were sufficiently
egregious and voluminous to raise a fair inference of failure to train in relation to the § 1983 claims asserted by
the plaintiffs. (Maricopa County Sheriff's Office and County Attorney's Office, Phoenix, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORKING CONDITIONS

Duncan v. County of Dakota, Neb., 687 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2012). A female former county employee brought a
§ 1983 action against a county, a supervisor, and others, alleging hostile-work-environment, sexual harassment,
and constructive discharge in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court denied the supervisor's motion for summary judgment, and he appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the supervisor's alleged conduct was not so objectively severe, extreme, or
intimidating as to alter the term, condition, or privilege of the employee's employment. The supervisor
allegedly engaged in sexual favoritism and traded preferential treatment for sexual favors. According to the
court, the supervisor's alleged conduct had not been physically threatening or humiliating to the officer, the
supervisor had not denied the officer any benefits or opportunities, and any promotion for which the officer had
been available had not gone to any employee who had had a sexual relationship with the supervisor. (Dakota
County Jail, Nebraska)

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U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Ferencz v. Medlock, 905 F.Supp.2d 656 (W.D.Pa. 2012). A mother, as administrator for her son’s estate,
brought deliberate indifference claims under a wrongful death statute against prison employees, and the prison's
medical services provider, following the death of her son when he was a pretrial detainee in a county prison.
The employees and provider moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The district court held that under Pennsylvania law, the mother lacked standing to bring wrongful death and
survival actions in her individual capacity against several prison employees for her son's death while he was in
prison, where the wrongful death and survival statutes only permitted recovery by a personal representative,
such as a mother in her action as administratrix of her son's estate, or as a person entitled to recover damages as
a trustee ad litem. The court found that the mother's claims that a prison's medical services provider had a
policy, practice, or custom that resulted in her son's death were sufficient to overcome the provider's motion to
dismiss the mother's § 1983 action for the death of her son while he was in prison. (Fayette County Prison,
Pennsylvania, and PrimeCare Medical, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Finnie v. Lee County, Miss., 907 F.Supp.2d 750 (N.D.Miss. 2012). A female Pentecostal juvenile detention
officer brought an action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that her termination violated her First
Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of religion and that it was religious and gender
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the county's pants-only uniform policy
did not violate the Free Exercise Clause; (2) the officer was not replaced by someone outside her protected
class as a female; (3) the uniform policy was not sex discrimination or sex stereotyping; (4) requiring the
county to offer the officer an exemption to the uniform policy would subject the county to undue hardship; and,
(5) the officer did not show that the county's proffered reason for her termination was a pretext for
discrimination. According to the court, requiring the county employer to offer the Pentecostal female juvenile
detention officer an exemption to its “no skirts” policy as a religious accommodation would subject the county
to undue hardship, and thus, policy was not religious discrimination under Title VII. The court noted that there
were legitimate safety concerns presented from female officers wearing skirts, including impairment of an
officer's ability to perform defense-tactic maneuvers because of the likelihood that an assailant could pin the
material of the skirt to the floor with his knees, preventing the officer from moving her body to perform
maneuvers, and the female officer, who lacked a GED certificate at the time she worked for the county, was not
qualified for vacant positions which would allow her to wear skirt. But the court found that summary judgment
was precluded by an issue of material fact as to whether the county's proffered reason for terminating the
officer was a pretext for retaliation, where less than one month passed between the filing of a charge and the
officer's termination. (Lee County Juvenile Detention Center, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Gabriel v. County of Herkimer. 889 F.Supp.2d 374 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). The administrator of a pretrial detainee's
estate brought a § 1983 action against a county, jail officials, and jail medical personnel, alleging deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, due process violations, and a state claim for wrongful death. The county
brought a third-party complaint against a hospital demanding indemnity. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the hospital moved to dismiss the third-party complaint. The district court held that severance of
the third party complaint involving the hospital was warranted, where a separate trial regarding indemnity,
following a verdict on liability, would be both economical and convenient. The court found that summary
judgment was precluded by material fact issues as to: (1) whether a nurse practitioner was aware of the
detainee’s history of depression, anxiety, tachycardia, angina, mitral valve prolapsed, degenerative back
disease, and sciatic nerve, but consciously disregarded the risk of harm to him; (2) whether the detainee had a
serious medical condition; and (3) whether a policy or custom of the county led to the denial of medical
treatment for the detainee. According to the court, there was no evidence that a corrections officer disregarded
an excessive risk to the safety of the pretrial detainee, noting that when the officer witnessed the detainee fall,
he assisted him and promptly contacted the medical unit. According to the court, a lieutenant was not a
policymaker, as required to support a § 1983 claim by the estate, where the lieutenant was responsible for jail
security and had no involvement in the jail's medical policies and procedures. (Herkimer Co. Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION

Harris v. Warrick County Sheriff's Dept., 666 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2012). An African American former deputy
sheriff sued a sheriff's department under a federal civil right statutes, alleging that he was terminated from his
probationary employment due to his race. The district court granted summary judgment for the department and
the former deputy appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) coworkers' use of
racially tinged nicknames and workplace exposure to excerpts from a movie apparently perceived as treating
racism as acceptable did not establish that the former deputy was terminated due to his race, and (2) the
department's different treatment of white deputy sheriffs who had performance problems during their
probationary employment did not establish that former deputy was terminated due to his race. (Warrick County
Sheriff, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama
Department of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated
against them on the basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. After a non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing
to sue; (2) the claims were not moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to
believe that the challenged practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were
“otherwise qualified,” or reasonable accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket
policy of categorically segregating all HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act; (5) housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on
the state; and (6) food-service policies that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and

2.80

prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally
excluded HIV-positive inmates from programs for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore
violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of
segregating HIV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue
financial and administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations.
The court suggested that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its
segregation policy, in that a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few
women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Heyerman v. County of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee, who was imprisoned for
more than 17 years after a state appellate court reversed his criminal conviction and remanded the matter to the
trial court, brought a § 1983 action against a county and the county's prosecuting attorney. The district court
granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that there was no evidence that the county's prosecuting attorney was directly responsible for any
conduct that led to any violation of the speedy-trial rights of the pretrial detainee, as required to hold the
prosecuting attorney individually liable under § 1983. The court also found that the detainee failed to
demonstrate a defective policy or practice to hold the county or the county's prosecuting attorney in her official
capacity liable for the alleged violation of his speedy-trial rights under § 1983. (Calhoun County, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 906 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Ohio 2012). Following consolidation of
several § 1983 actions brought by state death row inmates to challenge the constitutionality of various facets of
a state's execution protocol, one inmate moved for a stay of execution, a temporary restraining order (TRO),
and a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion, finding that the inmate was not likely to
succeed on the merits of his equal protection claim. The inmate alleged that the state's execution policy,
including its allegedly discretionary approach to written execution protocol and informal policies, violated his
right to equal protection by codifying the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals without sufficient
justification, entitling him to a stay of execution. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Jones v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 845 F.Supp.2d 824 (W.D.Mich. 2012). The personal
representative of the estate of an inmate, who died of viral meningoencephalitis while under the control of the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), brought an action against prison officials and personnel, as well
as the company which contracted to provide medical services to the inmate and the company's employees,
alleging that the defendants violated the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care. The
representative also asserted state law claims for gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The court held that the company that provided medical services to inmates under a contract with the
Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) could not be held liable under § 1983 on a supervisory liability
theory in the action brought by the personal representative, but the company was subject to suit under § 1983.
The court found that the personal representative failed to establish that policies or customs of the company
which provided medical services to inmates under contract with the MDOC were involved in the inmate's
treatment, as required to sustain a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the company based on the inmate's
alleged inadequate medical treatment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the doctor employed by company was aware of the serious medical needs of the
inmate, as to whether the doctor's treatment of the inmate displayed deliberate indifference, and as to whether
the doctor's inaction or delay proximately caused the inmate's death. (Ernest Brooks Facility, Michigan, and
Correctional Medical Services)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET

Jones v. Hobbs, 864 F.Supp.2d 808 (E.D.Ark. 2012). A prisoner brought an action against various state department of correction (DOC) officials, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether officials impeded the prisoner's
efforts to secure a diet which comported with the dictates of his religion; (2) whether fiscal and security concerns were rationally connected to the denial of a religious diet; (3) whether the prisoner had a sufficient
alternative means to practice his religion; (4) whether there was an alternative way to accommodate the prisoner's request for a vegan meal at de minimis cost to valid penological interests; and (5) whether the prisoner's
right to a diet suiting his religious beliefs was clearly established. (Arkansas Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her
deceased son, who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county
and jail officials for allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs.
Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding actual and
punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law
and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the
awards. The appeals court held that while the detainee had a constitutional right to protection from a known
risk of suicide, the jail nurse and the jail director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not
liable. According to the court, the county jail nurse's affirmative but unsuccessful measures to prevent the
pretrial detainee's suicide did not constitute deliberate indifference to his risk of suicide, where the nurse
assessed the detainee twice after learning from his mother that he had recently attempted suicide, the nurse
arranged for the detainee to have two appointments with the jail's psychiatrist, including an appointment on the
morning of the detainee's suicide, the nurse contacted the detainee's own psychiatrist to gather information
about the detainee's condition, she reviewed the detainee's medical records, and she responded in writing to

2.81

each of the detainee's requests for medical care. The court held that the county jail director's actions and
omissions in managing jail's suicide intervention practices did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to
the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, even though the director delegated to the jail nurse significant
responsibility for suicide intervention before formally training her on suicide policies and procedures, and the
jail's actual suicide intervention practices did not comport with the jail's written policy. The court noted that the
jail had a practice under the director's management of identifying detainees at risk of committing suicide,
placing them on a suicide watch, and providing on-site medical attention, and the detainee remained on suicide
watch and received medical attention including on the day of his suicide. The court held that the county lacked
a custom, policy, or practice that violated the pretrial detainee's due process rights and caused his suicide,
precluding recovery in the § 1983 action. The court found that, even though the county had flaws in its suicide
intervention practices, the county did not have a continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of constitutional
misconduct regarding prevention of suicide in the county jail. (Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)
U.S. District Court
VOLUNTEERS

Moorehead v. Keller, 845 F.Supp.2d 689 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A state inmate, a Messianic Jew, brought a pro se §
1983 action against North Carolina Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the officials
prevented him from writing to his “spiritual advisor” and discontinued Messianic Jewish services at the prison,
in violation of his constitutional rights. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the state prison regulation prohibiting prison volunteers from
corresponding with inmates was reasonably related to the prison's legitimate penological interest in preventing
volunteers from becoming unduly familiar with inmates, and thus the actions of North Carolina Department of
Corrections (DOC) officials in preventing the Messianic Jewish inmate from corresponding with his “spiritual
advisor,” who was a volunteer at the prison, pursuant to regulation did not violate the inmate's constitutional
rights. (Mountain View Correctional Institution, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner brought
an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his grievances
and requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) and the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered summary judgment for
the defendant and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state
Jewish prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claim that a prison's failure to provide
him with kosher meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner went through the state's entire grievance process
before filing suit. The court found that sufficient evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were
sincere, as required to support a claim against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA,
where the prisoner stated that he was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the
prisoner offered evidence that he requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department,
and while at another prison, he ate kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the
prisoner was harassed for his adherence to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that
the department transferred the prisoner for a time so he could receive kosher food. (Eastham Unit of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
EMPLOYEE UNION

New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc. v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 111 (N.D.N.Y.
2012). A state employees union representing correctional officers and police officers, and its president, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, brought an action against the State of New York and
various public officials, alleging that defendants unilaterally increased the percentage of contributions that
plaintiffs were required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement, and, thereby, violated the Contracts
Clause and Due Process Clause, impaired the plaintiffs' contractual rights under the terms of their collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), and violated state law. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the request of state employees union and its
president, for an order declaring unconstitutional the law increasing the percentage of contributions that
plaintiffs were required to pay for health insurance benefits in retirement, was prospective, and therefore not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
According to the court, the union and its president sufficiently brought a state law contractual impairment
claim against state officials, by alleging that the state officials' implementation of reduced contribution rates to
plaintiffs' health insurance benefits in retirement was not authorized by state law. The court held that the union
and its president sufficiently alleged in its § 1983 action that state officials' implementation of reduced
contribution rates to plaintiffs' health insurance benefits in retirement was beyond the scope of the officials'
authority as public officials, as required to defeat the state officials' motion to dismiss based on legislative
immunity. The court also found that the union and its president pled sufficient facts suggesting that the state
defendants' actions violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement (CBA), past state practices, and
representations made by the state, and were not reasonable and necessary to meet a stated legitimate public
purpose, as required to state a Contracts Clause claim against state defendants. (New York State Correctional
Officers & Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc.)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). An Illinois state prisoner, who was wheelchair-bound due to a
“nerve condition,” brought an action against several prison employees, alleging that refusing to allow him to
engage in physical outdoor recreational activity violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
prisoner was housed in segregation, therefore confined to his one-person cell 23 hours a day. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court
found that an alleged prison “quorum rule” that will not allow a disabled inmate to engage in outdoor recreation
unless at least nine other disabled inmates want to do so as well, seemed arbitrary. The court noted that
recreation, including aerobic exercises that cannot be performed in a cell, is particularly important to the health
of a person confined to a wheelchair. According to the court, whether seven weeks without such recreation can

2.82

result in serious harm to someone in the plaintiff's condition is a separate question not yet addressed in the
litigation. (Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2012). A non-profit publisher of a magazine about
prisoners' rights filed a § 1983 suit claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause by
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's (TDCJ) book censorship policy and procedures, as applied to the
publisher that was prohibited from distributing five books to prisoners. The district court granted the TDCJ
summary judgment. The publisher appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the TDCJ book
censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of two books graphically depicting prison rape was
rationally related to a legitimate penological goal of protecting prisoners from a threat to safety and security by
use of descriptions as templates to commit similar rapes, and thus, the policy as applied to the publisher's
distribution of the two books to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to free
speech. According to the court, the TDCJ book censorship policy that prohibited the publisher's distribution of
a book containing racial slurs and advocating overthrow of prisons by riot and revolt was rationally related to
the legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison's safety and security from race riots, and thus, the policy
as applied to the publisher's distribution of book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First
Amendment right to free speech. The court also noted that the prison had a legitimate penological goal of
protecting prisoners from the threat of violence due to the existence of race-based prison gangs and the
prevalence of racial discord. The court found that the TDCJ book censorship policy that formerly prohibited the
publisher's distribution of a book recounting sexual molestation of a young child was rationally related to the
legitimate penological goal of protecting the prison from impairment of the rehabilitation of sex offenders and
from disruptive outbursts by prisoners who were similarly victimized, and thus, the policy as applied to the
publisher's distribution of the book to prisoners did not contravene the publisher's First Amendment right to
free speech. The court noted that the TDCJ policy left prisoners and the publisher with ample alternatives for
exercising their free speech rights by permitting prisoners to read the publisher's newsletter and the majority of
books that the publisher distributed. (Prison Legal News, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.Iowa 2012). Misdemeanor arrestees brought a
civil rights action against a county and law enforcement officials, alleging that their Fourth Amendment rights
were violated when they were searched pursuant to a “blanket” policy authorizing strip searches of all arrestees
facing serious misdemeanor or more serious charges. Following the grant of summary judgment, in part, in
favor of the arrestees, the county moved for reconsideration. The court granted the motion, in part. The court
held that the recent Supreme Court decision in Florence, which held that reasonable suspicion was generally
not required to strip search pretrial detainees, subject to possible exceptions, was an intervening change in the
law, justifying reconsideration. According to the court, the county's strip search policy was reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether arrestees would be put into the general population. But the court
found that summary judgment was precluded on the arrestee's claim that the manner of a strip search was
unreasonable. (Woodbury County Jail, Iowa)

U.S. District Court
BUDGET
EMPLOYEE UNION

Roberts v. New York, 911 F.Supp.2d 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). Retired state employees brought an action against
the state of New York, state departments, and state officials, alleging that the defendants unilaterally increased
the percentage of contributions that retired employees were required to pay for health insurance benefits in
retirement and violated the Contracts Clause and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution,
impaired the retired employees' contractual rights under terms of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA),
and violated state law. The retirees sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgments and monetary damages. The
defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The district court
held that: (1) claims against the state of New York and state departments were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment; (2) the allegations stated a claim against state officials for violation of the Contracts Clause; and
(3) the allegations stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against state officials. According to the
court, the retired state employees' allegations that state officials did not issue a declaration or any other kind of
finding stating that it was necessary to raise the contribution rates, that raising the contribution rate was not part
of a state budget, that the only “rationale” or “purpose” asserted by the officials was that it was necessary to
implement negotiated agreement between the State and the bargaining unit, that a substantial impairment on the
retirees' rights defeated the significant public purpose, and that the unilateral implementation of the reduced
contribution rates violated the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and was an abuse of power, were
sufficient to suggest that the officials' actions were not reasonable and necessary, as required to sustain their
claim against state officials for violation of the Contract Clause. (Council 37, American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Schepers v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 691 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2012). Persons required to
register on Indiana's sex and violent offender registry brought a putative class action against the Indiana
Department of Correction (DOC) pursuant to § 1983, alleging that failure to provide a procedure to correct
errors violated Fourteenth Amendment due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the DOC
and the registrants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the DOC
had sufficient responsibility under state law and in practice over registry to be compelled to provide potential
relief. The court noted that the DOC, under state law, was ultimately responsible for the creation, publication,
and maintenance of the registry, the DOC contracted with a sheriff's association to publish the registry, and the
DOC decided what information was to be displayed. The court found that policies for review of information on
the registry were inadequate, noting that there was no process whatsoever for registrants who were not
incarcerated, that not all registrants were first incarcerated, and there was no guarantee mistakes would not be
made later after a registrant was released from incarceration. (Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registry,
Indiana Department of Correction)

2.83

U.S. District Court
STAFF CONTRACTS

Segura v. Colombe, 895 F.Supp.2d 1141 (D.N.M. 2012). An arrestee brought an action against a board of
county commissioners, alleging claims pursuant to § 1983 and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA)
following his arrest by a tribal police officer who was appointed and commissioned as a county deputy sheriff.
The board moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the tribal police officer, who was appointed and commissioned as a county deputy sheriff, was
not a salaried public employee of a governmental entity, as required to be a law enforcement officer under the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act (NMTCA). Therefore, the court found that the officer's conduct could not be
attributable to the board of county commissioners. The court noted that the commissioners did not have
immediate supervisory responsibilities over the officer, and the officer was not subject to sheriff’s department
rules. (Santa Fe Board of County Comm’rs, New Mexico, and Santa Fe County Adult Detention Facility)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Sledge v. U.S., 883 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2012). A federal inmate's relatives brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging claims for personal injury and wrongful
death based on the failure of Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employees to prevent or stop an attack on the inmate.
The attack resulted in the inmate’s hospitalization and death. The relatives also sought to recover for emotional
distress that the inmate and his mother allegedly suffered when BOP employees denied bedside visitation
between the mother and the inmate. Following dismissal of some of the claims, the United States moved to
dismiss the remaining claims based on FTCA's discretionary function exception. The district court granted the
motion. The court found that a correction officer's decision to position himself outside the housing unit, rather
than in the sally port, to smoke a cigarette during a controlled move was discretionary, and thus the United
States was immune from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act's (FTCA) discretionary function exception.
The court noted that the prison lacked mandatory guidelines that required correctional staff to follow a
particular course of action regarding supervision of inmates during controlled moves, and the officer's decision
implicated policy concerns, in that it required consideration of the risks posed by inmates moving throughout
prison, and required safety and security calculations. The court held that the mother of the deceased federal
inmate failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, under Missouri law, arising from the
Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) denial of bedside visitation between the mother and inmate, absent allegations that
the BOP should have realized that its failure to complete a visitation memorandum involved an unreasonable
risk of causing distress, or facts necessary to demonstrate that the mother's emotional distress was “medically
diagnosable” and was of sufficient severity as to be “medically significant.”
The court found that the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) alleged decision not to allow the mother of federal
inmate, who was in coma after being severely beaten by a fellow inmate, to visit her son after the BOP
allegedly failed to complete a visitation memorandum, was not so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable
in civilized community, thus precluding the mother's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under
Missouri law. (Federal Correctional Institution, Allenwood, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F.Supp.2d 228 (D.Mass. 2012). A state prisoner, a male-to-female transsexual, brought
an action against the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC), alleging violations
of her Eighth Amendment rights. Following a bench trial, the district court held that the prisoner's gender
identity disorder (GID) was a serious medical need and the treatment received by the prisoner was not
adequate. The court found that the Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's serious medical
need and the DOC's pattern of obstruction and delay was likely to continue, as required for the prisoner to
obtain injunctive relief on her Eighth Amendment claim, where the DOC's policy for treating GID imposed a
blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment surgery without exception. The court noted that the
transsexual prisoner's gender identity disorder was a “serious medical need” within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment, the prisoner's GID was diagnosed by a physician as needing treatment, and she had a history of
suicide attempts and self castration while in custody. The court found that the treatment received by the
transsexual prisoner was not adequate, although the DOC provided the prisoner with psychotherapy and
hormone treatment, it failed to perform an individual medical evaluation aimed solely at determining
appropriate treatment for her GID as a result of its blanket prohibition on cosmetic and sex reassignment
surgery. (MCI–Shirley, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Starr v. Moore, 849 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.N.H. 2012). A state prisoner brought an action against a prison
employee and others, alleging First Amendment retaliation and violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, in
connection with employee's alleged conduct of telling other inmates that they were no longer receiving special
meals on holidays as a result of a prior lawsuit filed by prisoner. The prisoner moved to exclude evidence of his
prior lawsuits and grievances. The district court held that evidence of the prisoner's subsequent grievances and
lawsuits against prison employees was relevant and that alleged prior statements by the employee, blaming the
prisoner for a prison policy of no longer providing special meals to prisoners on holidays, were admissible as
prior bad acts. (Northern New Hampshire Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET
STAFFING LEVELS

Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a civil rights action
challenging the adequacy of his treatment at the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
found that the offender had standing to bring the due process challenge to the adequacy of Missouri's fourphase treatment program for such offenders, where he demonstrated that his alleged injury of not advancing in
treatment was not due solely to his own recalcitrance and could have been due to the lack of adequate treatment
resources. But according to the court, the treatment received by offender did not shock the conscience, in
violation of substantive due process. The court noted that although budget shortfalls and staffing shortages
resulted in treatment modifications that were below standards set in place by the center's directors, temporary
modifications in the treatment regimen of eliminating psychoeducational classes and increasing the size of

2.84

process groups was neither arbitrary nor egregious, and the center sought to maintain essential treatment
services in light of the challenges it faced. (Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Sweet v. Northern Neck Regional Jail, 857 F.Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Va. 2012). An inmate, proceeding in forma
pauperis, brought a § 1983 action against a sergeant and a jail, alleging that a prohibition against speaking in
Arabic during prayer violated his First Amendment rights. The district court dismissed the case. The court held
that the jail policy requiring prayers or services be spoken in English when inmates from different housing units
and classification levels congregated, but allowing prayers to be offered in Arabic within individual housing
units, was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests of security and did not substantially burden
inmates' right to free exercise of their First Amendment rights. The court noted that the jail was concerned
about inmates plotting riots or escapes while congregating with other units, jail officers did not speak Arabic,
and inmates could gather within their housing units and pray in Arabic. (Northern Neck Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Washington v. California City Correction Center, 871 F.Supp.2d 1010 (E.D.Cal. 2012). A discharged AfricanAmerican employee, who worked as corrections officer, brought an action against her former employer
alleging, among other things, that she was discriminated against on basis of her race in violation of California
Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy. The
employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the discharged African-American corrections officer
exhausted her administrative remedies with respect to her claim that her employer failed to prevent racial
discrimination, and as to whether actionable discrimination occurred, precluding summary judgment as to the
employee's failure to prevent discrimination cause of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing
Act (FEHA). The court held that the African-American corrections officer's allegations in her administrative
complaint that her employer subjected her to a wrongful investigation of inappropriate behavior because of her
race, and that the employer retaliated against her by wrongfully investigating her behavior after she complained
to the employer about her supervisor's racially motivated discrimination, were sufficient to encompass claims
of retaliation under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), for administrative exhaustion
purposes. (California City Correction Center, Contrator CCA of Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Wilkins v. District of Columbia, 879 F.Supp.2d 35 (D.D.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee in a District of Columbia
jail who was stabbed by another inmate brought an action against the District. The district court entered
judgment as a matter of law in favor of the District and the detainee moved for reconsideration. The district
court granted the motion and ordered a new trial. The court held that the issue of whether the failure of District
of Columbia jail personnel to follow national standards of care for inmate access to storage closets and
monitoring of inmate movements was the proximate cause of the detainee's stabbing by a fellow inmate was for
the jury, in the detainee's negligence action, under District of Columbia law. Another inmate who was being
held at the D.C. Jail on charges of first-degree murder attacked the detainee. The inmate had received a pass to
go to the jail's law library, unaccompanied. Apparently he did not arrive at the library but no one from the
library called the inmate’s housing unit to report that he had not arrived. An expert retained by the detainee
asserted that failure to monitor inmate movements violated national standards for the operation of jails. En
route to the jail mental health unit, the detainee saw the inmate enter a mop closet. The inmate, along with
another inmate, approached the detainee and stabbed him nine times with a knife. During court proceedings
there was testimony that the inmates had hidden contraband in the mop closets. The closets are supposed to be
locked at all times, other than when the jail is being cleaned each afternoon. But there was evidence from which
the jury could infer that all inmates except those who did not have jobs cleaning in the jail had access to them.
According to the detainee’s expert witness, keeping mop closets locked at times when the general inmate
population is permitted to be in the vicinity of the closets is in accordance with national standards of care for
the operation of detention facilities. According to the district court, “In sum, the circumstantial evidence of Mr.
Foreman's [inmate who attacked the detainee] freedom of movement is enough to have allowed a jury to
conclude that the District's negligence was a proximate cause of Mr. Wilkins's injury…”. (District of Columbia
Central Detention Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Williams v. Herron, 687 F.3d 971 (8th Cir. 2012). A female correctional officer brought a § 1983 action against
a county and a former chief deputy sheriff, who were her employers, alleging gender discrimination in violation
of her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court entered an order denying the sheriff's motion for
summary judgment and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the sheriff's sexual
harassment was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of the officer's employment, and the
officer had a clearly established right to be free from a hostile work environment. The court found that the
female correctional officer's conduct in informing the chief deputy sheriff that she was uncomfortable
continuing their sexual relationship was sufficient to demonstrate that the sheriff's continued actions in
grabbing and hugging her were unwelcome, as required to prevail on her hostile-work-environment claim for
sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the chief deputy sheriff had
previously used sexual coercion to entice other female employees, and once an officer began viewing the
sheriff's conduct as unwelcome, her employment status became jeopardized. (Dakota County Jail, Nebraska)
2013

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
RECORDS

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance
procedure. The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants

2.85

appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the
California Penal Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the
discrimination suffered by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to
assist in preventing further Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials
to track and accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a
workable grievance procedure were consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act and did not infringe on California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Belbachir v. County of McHenry, 726 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2013). The administrator of the estate of a female
federal detainee who committed suicide in a county jail filed suit against the county, county jail officials, and
employees of the medical provider that had a contract with the county to provide medical services at the jail,
alleging violation of the detainee's due process rights and Illinois tort claims. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of all county defendants. The administrator appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court found that the jail inmate who was detained by federal
immigration authorities pending her removal hearing was in the same position as a lawfully arrested pretrial
detainee. The court noted that a pretrial detainee was entitled, pursuant to the due process clause, to at least as
much protection during her detention as convicted criminals were entitled to under the Eighth Amendment-namely protection from harm caused by a defendant's deliberate indifference to the inmate's safety or health.
The court asserted that persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled, under the due process
clause, to more considerate treatment during detention than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. The court found that the alleged conduct of a clinical social worker at the county jail who
interviewed the detainee, in noting that the detainee suffered from a major depressive disorder, hallucinations,
acute anxiety, and feelings of hopelessness, but allegedly failing to report those findings to the jail guards or
any other jail staff or to recommend that the detainee be placed on a suicide watch or receive mental health
treatment, amounted to deliberate indifference to the detainee's risk of suicide, in violation of the detainee's due
process rights. The court held that a nurse manager employed by the medical provider was not deliberately
indifferent to the detainee's risk of suicide, as would violate the detainee's due process rights, where the nurse
manager treated the detainee for panic attacks and anxiety, and recommended that she be given a cellmate and
transferred to a medical treatment area at the jail, both of which were done, and there was no showing that the
nurse manager knew that the detainee was suicidal. According to the court, the county sheriff's and county jail
director's failure to provide annual training to jail staff on how to recognize the risk of suicide in detainees, and
their failure to implement a suicide prevention policy, did not render the county liable under § 1983 for the
detainee's suicide during her detention at the jail, absent a showing that such failures caused the detainee's
suicide. (McHenry County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Benton v. Rousseau, 940 F.Supp.2d 1370 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A pretrial detainee, who alleged that he was beaten
by drivers while being transported to prison, brought a § 1983 action against drivers of a private company
which was in the business of transporting prisoners throughout the State of Florida. The district court held that
the inmate established a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim and a § 1983 Fourteenth Amendment
excessive force claim. According to the court: (1) the prisoner engaged in constitutionally protected speech
because he complained about conditions of his confinement in the transport vehicle; (2) the driver of transport
vehicle engaged in adverse or retaliatory conduct by pulling the inmate out of the van and onto the ground and
beating and kicking the inmate; and (3) there was a causal connection between the driver's retaliatory action
and inmate's protected speech, in that the incident would not have occurred but for the inmate's complaints
regarding conditions of his confinement. The court noted that the inmate's injuries included headaches and
facial scars, and his injuries, although perhaps not serious, amounted to more than de minimis injuries. The
court ruled that the inmate was entitled to $45,012 in compensatory damages because the inmate had scarring
on his face and suffered from headaches and numbness in his side, he suffered the loss of a $12 shirt, and he
suffered mental and emotional anguish as a result of actions of drivers of transport van, who kicked and beat
him. The court held that the inmate was entitled to punitive damages in the amount of $15,000 based on the
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the drivers. The court noted that although the drivers
were no longer employed by their private employer, the employer did not investigate after the incident nor did
it punish the drivers for their actions, and imposition of punitive damages would deter the drivers from taking
similar actions in the future. (United States Prisoner Transport, Hernando County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Borkholder v. Lemmon, 983 F.Supp.2d 1013 (N.D.Ind. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against state prison
officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to challenge the officials' decision to revoke his vegan diet.
Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the officials’ motion, granted the prisoner’s motion, and entered an injunction. The court held that the fact that the prisoner's vegan diet had been
restored did not render moot his declaratory judgment action against state prison officials, in which he alleged
that they violated his religious rights by revoking his vegan diet for purchasing chicken-flavored ramen noodles, because no vegetarian noodles were available to him, and his vegan diet was subject to revocation anytime
he ordered ramen noodles, regardless of whether he consumed the seasoning packet containing chicken. The
court found that the prisoner demonstrated a substantial burden to his religious practice, satisfying his initial
burden under The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), where the prisoner held a
religious belief that required him to adhere to a vegan diet, he purchased chicken-flavored ramen noodles from
the state prison commissary, the commissary did not carry a vegetarian noodle option, the prisoner did not eat
the meat flavoring packet but instead discarded it, and the prisoner's vegan diet was revoked solely due to his
noodle purchase. According to the court, prison officials' revocation of the prisoner's vegan diet was not the
least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest, and thus the officials did not meet their
burden under RLUIPA to justify such action,. The court noted that although the state prison policy dictated that

2.86

personal preference diet cards could be confiscated if a prisoner abused or misused the privilege by voluntarily
consuming self-prohibited foods, and such policy was legitimately geared toward weeding out insincere requests, the prisoner's purchase of noodles with a meat seasoning packet did not mean that his beliefs were insincere. The court’s decision opened by stating “It is not every day that someone makes a federal case out of
ramen noodles. But unfortunately that's what Joshus Borkholder had to do.” (Miami Corr’l. Facility, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Brooks v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 959 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action against
the Department of Justice (DOJ) alleging violations of the Privacy Act. DOJ moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion. The court held that a constitutional claim arising from alleged violations of the
Privacy Act was not cognizable. The court also found that the prisoner could not maintain an action under the
Privacy Act seeking reassessment of his custody classification by BOP and a designation to a lower security
facility, based on alleged errors in information in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that had been
prepared in connection with his prior offense, which BOP allegedly relied on in deeming him ineligible for
designation to a lower security facility. The court noted that BOP had exempted the Inmate Central Records
System and the files maintained therein from the substantive provision of the Act regarding its recordkeeping
obligations. (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Bustetter v. Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., 919 F.Supp.2d 1282 (M.D.Fla. 2013). A former inmate
brought an action against a sheriff's department, the sheriff, a medical services contractor, a doctor, a nurse, and
a pharmacy, alleging medical malpractice, negligence, and violations of § 1983. The inmate alleged that the
medical services contractor had a policy of not telling an inmate what medications he was being given, that the
contractor had another policy of providing no medications if an inmate refused to take any of his medications,
that measurement of his blood sugar levels and administration of his insulin to treat his diabetes was limited to
twice a day, that he was given excess levels of statins, and that he was not informed, upon his release, of what
medication he was given or of its side-effects. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate’s allegations were sufficient to state Eighth
Amendment claims against the contractor, nurse, and doctor. When he was taken into custody at the jail for a
non-violent traffic offense, the inmate informed the medical staff of his medical conditions and current
medications. The inmate’s medical conditions included Type I diabetes, for which he was insulin dependent
and taking two types of insulin three to five times per day, a prior heart attack, and blindness in one eye.
(Sarasota County Jail, Florida)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Corso v. Fischer, 983 F.Supp.2d 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A correctional officer brought an action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision's (DOCCS), alleging
DOCCS's work rule prohibiting personal association of DOCCS employees with current and former inmates
and their associates was overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment. The parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the officer’s motion. The court held that the work rule was facially
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment, where DOCCS had enforced the rule against the officer and
denied her the right to associate with her former husband and the father of her grandchild. The court found that
the rule was not narrowly tailored to further the State's compelling interest in maintaining safe and orderly
administration of its prisons, as applied to constitutionally protected close familial relationships, and thus, did
not withstand strict scrutiny on the First Amendment overbreadth claim. The court noted that the rule provided
no temporal or geographical limitation with respect to the former inmate's incarceration, nor did its prohibition
account for variations in the seriousness of that person's offense or his or her prison disciplinary history. The
court found that the rule was substantially overbroad, in violation of the First Amendment, as applied to close
familial relationships, where the rule would prevent a DOCCS employee from visiting, or even corresponding
with an incarcerated spouse if the couple had no children or if their children did not maintain a relationship
with the incarcerated parent, and the rule prohibited employees from ever reestablishing contact with a spouse,
child, sibling, or parent when that person was released and became a “former inmate.” (New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Davidson v. Bureau of Prisons, 931 F.Supp.2d 770 (E.D.Ky. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) suit against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking the results of an audit of his
prison that had been conducted by the American Correctional Association. Following dismissal of his suit, the
prisoner moved for reconsideration and for an award of costs. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled
to judicial relief given that the BOP had compiled the responsive documents and was awaiting only payment of
the $33 copying charge. The court found that the prisoner had substantially prevailed and was thus eligible to
recover his litigation costs, and that the prisoner was only entitled to recover his $350 filing fee. There had been
a two-year delay in the BOP's response. (Federal Medical Center, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROPERTY
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Devbrow v. Gallegos, 735 F.3d 584 (7th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 claim against two prison
officials, claiming that the officials denied him access to the courts by confiscating and then destroying his
legal papers in retaliation for a prior lawsuit he filed. The district court granted the prison officials' motion for
summary judgment, and denied the prisoner's motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the prisoner failed to authenticate a purported e-mail from a prison
official to a law librarian supervisor, where there was no circumstantial evidence that supported the authenticity
of the e-mail, and no evidence that the prisoner or anyone else saw the official actually compose or transmit the
purported e-mail. The court held that the official's removal of the prisoner's excessive legal materials from his
cell, to eliminate a fire hazard and to make it easier for officials to conduct searches and inventories of the
prisoner's property during prison searches, was not retaliation for the prisoner's filing of a prior lawsuit.
According to the court, the prisoner's speculation regarding the officials' motive could not overcome the
officials' sworn statements on the motion for summary judgment. (Westville Correctional Facility, Indiana)

2.87

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Duran v. Merline, 923 F.Supp.2d 702 (D.N.J. 2013). A former pretrial detainee at a county detention facility
brought a pro se § 1983 action against various facility officials and employees, the company which provided
food and sanitation services to the facility, and the medical services provider, alleging various constitutional
torts related to his pretrial detention. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that fact issues precluded summary judgment on:
(1) the conditions of confinement claim against a former warden in his official capacity; (2) an interference
with legal mail claim against a correctional officer that alleged that the facility deliberately withheld the
detainee's legal mail during a two-week period; (3) a First Amendment retaliation claim based on interference
with legal mail; and (4) a claim for inadequate medical care as to whether the detainee's Hepatitis C condition
was a serious medical condition that required treatment and whether the provider denied such treatment
because it was too costly. The court also held that the alleged actions of the food service provider in serving the
detainee one food item when another ran out, failing to serve bread with the inmate's meal, serving the inmate
leftovers from days before, serving juice in a dirty container on one occasion, serving milk after its expiration
date, and serving meals on cracked trays that caused the detainee to contract food poisoning, did not amount to
a substantial deprivation of food sufficient to amount to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, as would
violate the inmate's due process rights. (Atlantic County Justice Facility, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Estate of Henson v. Wichita County, 988 F.Supp.2d 726 (N.D.Tex. 2013). Family members of a pretrial
detainee who died from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) while being held in a county jail
brought a § 1983 action against a county and a jail physician, among others, for violation of the detainee's
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and asserted claims under state law for negligence and breach of
contract. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court granted
the motions in part, and denied in part. The physician and the county moved for reconsideration. The district
court granted the motion, finding that the physician was not subject to supervisory liability under § 1983,
absent any finding that the nurse refused to treat the detainee, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him
incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious
medical need. The court held that the county was not liable in the § 1983 claim brought by family members,
absent a showing of an underlying constitutional violation by a county employee or a county policy that
permitted or caused some constitutional violation. (Wichita County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Estate of Prasad ex rel. Prasad v. County of Sutter, 958 F.Supp.2d 1101 (E.D.Cal. 2013). The estate of a
deceased pretrial detainee brought an action against jail employees and officials, as well as medical staff,
alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted
the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) although the detainee died at a hospital, liability
for the jail employees and officials was not precluded, where the jail employees and officials could have
contributed to detainee's death despite the transfer to the hospital; (2) allegations were sufficient plead
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs by the deputies and medical staff; (3) allegations were
sufficient to state a claim for supervisory liability; (4) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for
supervisory liability against the corrections officers in charge; (5) allegations were sufficient to state a claim
against the county; (6) allegations were sufficient to state a claim for wrongful death under California law; and
(7) the health care provider was a state actor. The court found that a statement by health care providers, in an
attachment to the complaint, that even if the detainee had been transferred to the hospital sooner, it “probably”
would not have changed his death, was possibly self serving, and did not contradict the complaint's allegations
that the detainee's death was unnecessary and unavoidable. According to the court, allegations that the county
maintained customs or practices whereby no medical staff whatsoever were at the jail for one-sixth of every
day, that the staff lacked authority to respond to emergency and critical inmate needs, and that the jail records
system withheld information from affiliated health care providers, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim
against the county, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment after the pretrial detainee died.
The court held that allegations that deficiencies in medical care at the jail, including lack of 24-hour
emergency care, were longstanding, repeatedly documented, and expressly noted by officials in the past., and
that the doctor who was employed by the health care provider that contracted with the prison was aware of the
deficiencies, and that the doctor discharged the pretrial detainee to the jail were sufficient to plead deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs, as required to state a § 1983 action against the doctor for violations of
the Fourteenth Amendment after the detainee died. (Sutter County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Ezell v. Darr, 951 F.Supp.2d 1316 (M.D.Ga. 2013). Female county deputy sheriffs brought an action against a
sheriff and a city consolidated government, alleging under § 1983 that the sheriff retaliated against them for
their political support of a former sheriff's reelection bid, and that they were denied promotion and demoted
because of their gender. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in
part and denied in part. The court held that under Georgia law, loyalty to an individual sheriff and the goals and
policies he sought to implement through his office was an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of a deputy sheriff, and thus the sheriff did not violate the First Amendment by transferring
deputies who did not support him in an election. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sheriff's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
promoting a male deputy to the position of captain of jail administration, rather than the female deputies-2namely, that the male deputy had relevant experience and that he was the only candidate who had been
w2orking in that area for years under a captain the sheriff was seeking to replace-- was a pretext for gender
discrimination in violation of Title VII and § 1983. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the male county sheriff's proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for denying a female deputy
comp time, namely, that the deputy had been exempt from accruing comp time for 20 years, was a pretext for
gender discrimination. The court held that the newly-elected male sheriff's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for transferring the female deputy from the position of jail commander to a clerk of the

2.88

Recorder's Court-- that the sheriff was dissatisfied with the way jail had been operating under the deputy and he
felt that members of the deputy's staff were unprofessional-- was not a pretext for gender discrimination.
(Muscogee County Sheriff, Muscogee County Jail, Georgia)
U.S. District Court
POLICIES/ PROCEDURES

Grimes v. District of Columbia, 923 F.Supp.2d 196 (D.D.C. 2013). A juvenile detainee's mother filed a § 1983
action against the District of Columbia for violation of the Eighth Amendment and negligent hiring, training,
and supervision, after the detainee was attacked and killed by other detainees. After the district court ruled in
the District's favor, the appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the District moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that officials at the juvenile detention facility
were not deliberately indifferent to a known safety risk, and thus their failure to protect the detainee from an
attack by another detainee did not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, there was no evidence of a history of assaults on youth at the facility, such that any facility employee knew or should have
known that a fight between the detainee and another youth was going to take place, or that the youth who
fought with the detainee had a history of assaultive behavior while at the facility. The court also found no evidence that a municipal custom, policy, or practice caused any such violation. The court also held that the
mother’s failure to designate an expert witness barred her claim. (Oak Hill Det. Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while
housed at a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare
provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees
of the provider, individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants
were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to
federal court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in
part. The district court held that: (1) the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services
to an inmate was non-delegable; (2) intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county
defendants of liability for alleged negligence; (3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the
county was not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but
(6) a fact issue precluded summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment medical claim against the employees.
According to the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health
services to the 17-year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was nondelegable, and thus the county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged
medical malpractice of the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental
health services at the jail. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the
county or sheriff to delegate their duties and obligations they owned to the inmate.
The court found that the intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly
diagnose and treat the inmate's medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an
injection of a psychotropic medication, were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county
sheriff of liability for their failure to protect the inmate.
The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's policy or custom of placing inmates in
protective custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
the inmate, who died while on protective custody status. According to the court, there was no evidence that the
county had actual notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of the county jail officials' use of
isolation, or an administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing unit at the county jail, or that
any omissions in the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in which the inmate, died from a
purported cardiac event.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate's prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and
failed to timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate
was suffering from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so,
whether they were deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare
Management, Inc., Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFF LEVELS
VOLUNTEERS

Hartmann v. California Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 707 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2013). California state
prisoners brought a § 1983 action against, among others, the California Department of Corrections (CDCR),
alleging that the defendants violated their state and federal constitutional rights to exercise their religious
beliefs by refusing to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain and by failing to apply neutral criteria in
determining whether paid chaplaincy positions were necessary to meet the religious exercise needs of inmates
adhering to certain religions. The district court dismissed claims against the California State Personnel Board
and its individual members, and, dismissed claims against the state, its governor, and various other agencies
and individuals. The prisoners appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that: (1) the First Amendment did not
require CDCR to provide inmates with chaplain of their choice, regardless of whether the number of Wiccan
inmates was greater than the number of inmates practicing faiths for which CDCR did provide staff chaplain,
because the prisoners had a reasonable opportunity to exercise their faith via the services of staff chaplains and
a volunteer Wiccan chaplain that they already received; (2) the prison policy did not violate prisoners' rights
under the Equal Protection Clause where the prison provided the plaintiffs with a volunteer Wiccan chaplain
when available, made staff chaplains available to all prisoners to assist in their religious exercise, and the prison
administration considered the prisoners' requests at three different levels of review before determining that
services were sufficient without hiring a full–time Wiccan chaplain; (3) the prisoners did not plead that their
religious exercise was so burdened as to pressure them to abandon their beliefs, precluding their claim that the
prison administration violated their rights under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA); (4) two prison officials were proper official–capacity defendants on the prisoners' claim for

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injunctive relief where the prisoners sought an affirmative injunction requiring the prison administration to
adopt and apply neutral criteria in determining chaplain hiring needs and they alleged that each official was
responsible for the policies and practices of the California Department of Corrections (CDCR), as well as the
day–to–day operation of the prison; and, (5) permitting prisoners to amend complaint was unwarranted on
futility grounds. But the court found that the prisoners did state a claim for violation of the First Amendment's
Establishment Clause by alleging that the prison administration created staff chaplain positions for five
conventional faiths, refused to hire a paid, full–time, Wiccan chaplain, and failed to apply neutral criteria in
evaluating whether the growing membership in minority religions warranted reallocation of resources used in
accommodating inmates' religious exercise needs. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). A parolee, who was an atheist, brought an action against various
state officials and a state contractor, seeking damages and injunctive relief for the deprivation of his First
Amendment rights, after his parole was revoked following his refusal to participate in a residential drug
treatment program that required him to acknowledge a higher power, as a condition of his parole. The
contractor, Westcare, was a private regional substance abuse coordination agency, and made the arrangements
for the parolee’s placement in the program. After the parolee was granted partial summary judgment by the
district court, a jury awarded the parolee zero damages. The district court denied the parolee’s motion for a new
trial, and the parolee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the parolee was
entitled to an award of compensatory damages for each day that he spent in prison as a result of the violation of
his First Amendment rights by various state officials.
The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the contractor's conduct was the proximate cause of the parolee's unconstitutional imprisonment, when
it contracted only with drug treatment facilities offering solely religious based programs or services, and
counseled and arranged for the parolee to attend a religion-based facility as part of his state-imposed parole
program, despite having been informed that the parolee was an atheist and that he objected to such religious
programming.
The court held that the parolee's claim under California law for an injunction preventing both a state
contractor and various state officials from expending state funds in an unconstitutional manner that required
parolees to participate in religious treatment programs in order to be eligible for parole, failed to provide
parolees with secular or non-religious treatment alternatives, and revoked the parole of those who protested or
resisted participation in religion-based treatment programs, was not rendered moot after the state issued a
directive stating that parole agents could not require a parolee to attend any religious based program if the
parolee refused to participate for religious reasons, where the state directive had not been implemented in any
meaningful fashion. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitations, Board of Parole Hearings,
Westcare, and Empire Recovery Center, California)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Holscher v. Mille Lacs County, 924 F.Supp.2d 1044 (D.Minn. 2013). Trustees for the next-of-kin of a pretrial
detainee who committed suicide while incarcerated at a county jail brought an action against the county, alleging under § 1983 that the county provided inadequate medical care to the detainee, in violation of his due process rights. The trustees also asserted related claims for negligence and wrongful death under state law. The
county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county
had actual knowledge of the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, as to whether the county was deliberately indifferent to that risk, and as to whether the detainee's death was the result of an unconstitutional custom. The court
also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the county's
training of its jail employees on proper implementation of its suicide prevention policy was adequate, as to
whether the county was deliberately indifferent in failing to revise its training, and as to whether any inadequate training on the part of the county caused the detainee's suicide. (Mille Lacs County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFF DISCIPLINE

Keith v. Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2013). A female former prison inmate who was impregnated as a
result of her vocational-training instructor's unlawful sexual acts brought a § 1983 action against a former
warden and other Kansas Department of Corrections employees. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part, but denied qualified immunity for the former warden, who appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former prison inmate adequately alleged that the former warden
violated a clearly established constitutional right, precluding qualified immunity for the warden in the § 1983
action alleging that the warden was deliberately indifferent to sexual abuse by the vocational-training
instructor. According to the court, the inmate alleged that the warden had knowledge of the abuse but failed to
properly investigate or terminate staff when abuse allegations were substantiated, and that the prison's structural
policy problems contributed to abuse by failing to address known problems with the vocational program or to
use cameras to monitor inmates and staff. (Topeka Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
STAFFING LEVELS

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners brought a civil contempt action against a
private prison contractor, alleging the contractor violated a settlement agreement that required it to comply with
the staffing pattern specified in its contract with the Idaho Department of Correction. The district court found
that the contractor was in civil contempt for violating the settlement agreement, that the contractor's noncompliance with staffing requirements were significant, and the contractor did not promptly take all reasonable
steps to comply with settlement agreement. The court held that a two-year extension of the consent decree was
a proper sanction for the contractor's civil contempt in willfully violating the settlement agreement, where the
contractor's failure to comply with a key provision of the settlement agreement had lasted nearly as long as the
duration of the agreement. According to the court, the use of an independent monitor to ensure the private
prison contractor's compliance with the settlement agreement was an appropriate resolution, where such duty
was most fairly handled by a monitor with a direct obligation to the district court and to the terms of the

2.90

settlement agreement. The court noted that “…it is clear that there was a persistent failure to fill required
mandatory positions, along with a pattern of CCA staff falsifying rosters to make it appear that all posts were
filled.” The state assumed operation of the facility in July 2014, changing the name to the Idaho State
Correctional Center. (Corrections Corporation of America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional
Center)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
STAFFING LEVELS

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1237 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners moved for discovery and a hearing on the
issue of whether a private prison contractor should be held in civil contempt for violating the parties' settlement
agreement. The district court held that it had the power to enforce the settlement agreement, and that the
prisoners were entitled to a hearing and to discovery on the issue of whether the private prison contractor
should be held in civil contempt. The prisoners alleged that the contractor had been falsifying staffing records,
and the district court ordered discovery, noting that prisoners had offered affidavits from current and former
employees of the contractor, all alleging more unfilled posts than contractor had admitted to. (Corrections
Corporation of America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Kelly v. Wengler, 979 F.Supp.2d 1243 (D.Idaho 2013). Prisoners seeking to have a private prison contractor
held in civil contempt for violating the parties' settlement agreement moved to unseal related documents. The
district court held that the filings in the civil contempt proceedings would not be kept under seal. The court
noted that the settlement agreement did not state that disputes would be private. And the court found: “It is
hardly private spite, promotion of public scandal, or libelous, to contend that CCA is wrong, and to submit
sworn affidavits from past and current employees in support of that argument. Idaho taxpayers pay CCA to
operate one of their prisons. With public money comes a public concern about how that money is spent. Such a
public interest cannot be swatted away by calling it a desire for ‘public spectacle,’ or a form of ‘private spite,’
or any of the other labels that CCA offers.” In July 2014 the Department of Corrections assumed control of the
facility. (Corrections Corporation of America, Idaho Department of Correction, Idaho Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Konah v. District of Columbia, 915 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2013). A Liberian female formerly employed as a
Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) by a private health care corporation that contracted with the District of
Columbia to provide medical treatment to inmates in a penitentiary, whose employment was terminated after
she reported alleged harassment and assault and battery by inmates while administering medication to them,
sued the District and a correctional officer, claiming they violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Title VII,
the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), and common laws. The district court partially granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The employer and correctional officer moved for
summary judgment, and the District of Columbia moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court
granted the motions in part. The court held that under District of Columbia law, the correctional officer did not
assault, batter, or intentionally inflict emotional distress on the nurse absent evidence he delayed opening the
front gate to a corridor outside the unit, in response to the LPN's request so she could get away from inmates
making lewd and sexually threatening comments, with the intention that she suffer assault, battery or emotional
distress. According to the court, the reason for his delay was that there were inmates in the sally port who
would have been able to escape confinement if he opened gate. The court found that the private health care
corporation was not liable for a hostile work environment allegedly created for the LPN when on one occasion
inmates made lewd and sexually threatening comments toward her and one grabbed her buttocks while she was
administering medication to them. The court found that the corporation took reasonable and appropriate
corrective steps to prevent harassment and to ensure that the environment for its nurses at the detention facility
would be a safe and non-hostile job situation in a jail requiring direct contact with inmates could be, and the
LPN knew of escort policy and a sick call room policy and was apparently in violation of those policies when
the incident in question took place. (Unity Health Care, Inc., Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Konah v. District of Columbia, 971 F.Supp.2d 74 (D.D.C. 2013). A licensed practical nurse (LPN), formerly
employed by a private health care corporation that contracted with the District of Columbia to provide medical
care to inmates, brought a § 1983 action against the District, alleging that its failure to train correctional
employees to adequately respond to inmates' sexual abuse of staff violated her right to equal protection under
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The District moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the alleged inadequate training of correctional officers was not the
cause of the LPN's sexual harassment; (2) evidence did not show that the District was deliberately indifferent to
the risk of sexual harassment; and (3) even if the District was on notice of the risk to nurses, its response did
not show deliberate indifference. The court found that the precipitating cause of the sexual harassment of the
nurse by inmates while distributing medications at the jail was the LPN's decision to violate longstanding jail
policy and deviate from her standard practice of waiting for a correctional officer to escort her before entering
the jail's housing unit. The court noted that the District collaborated with the LPN's employer to institute a
policy directing nurses to distribute medications from sick-call rooms, and responded when the LPN was
sexually harassed by inmates by ordering an immediate medical evaluation, a meeting with the warden, and
offering criminal prosecution of the inmate. (D.C. Central Detention Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Lewis v. Sternes, 712 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials under
§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging removal of his
dreadlocks violated his religious rights and denied him equal protection. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that there was no evidence that the prison had no need to regulate hair length or hairstyle, or that the
need was not great enough to warrant interference with the inmate's religious observance. (Dixon Correctional
Center, Illinois)

2.91

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
STAFF DISCIPLINE
WORKING CONDITIONS

Meadors v. Ulster County, 984 F.Supp.2d 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). Female county corrections officers brought an
action under § 1983, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL) against a county, a
sheriff, a jail superintendent, and a deputy jail superintendent, alleging sex discrimination, hostile work
environment, sexual harassment, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the female
corrections officers' work environment was hostile and abusive; (2) whether the county had a good faith
complaint procedure; and (3) whether the county treated a female corrections officer differently than similarlysituated male officers with regard to discipline, for matters that occurred outside the workplace. The court held
that county officials did not retaliate against a female corrections officer, in violation of Title VII, for filing a
discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), even though her
supervisor revoked her shift change, another supervisor assigned her to an undesirable unit, and she was not
selected for a desirable intake position. The court also found that county jail officials' reassignment of a female
corrections officer to a different position after she verbally complained about a co-worker's sexual harassment,
even if it was a less desirable position, did not constitute a materially “adverse employment action” required to
support her Title VII retaliation claim. According to the court, county jail officials' rescission of a female
corrections officer's request for light duty assignments during her pregnancy, her reassignment to work in male
housing units, and her receipt of a written discipline report for noting her reassignment, did not constitute
materially “adverse employment actions” required to support her Title VII retaliation claim. (Ulster County
Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
DISCRIMINATION

Morris v. Carter Global Lee, Inc., 997 F.Supp.2d 27 (D.D.C. 2013). An African-American employee brought
an action against his former employer, a contractor for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, in
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging wrongful termination and violation of his civil rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII, § 1981, and other various statutes. The employer removed the
action to federal court and moved to dismiss. The federal district court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the employee stated a claim against his former employer under § 1981, even though
the employee's complaint contained no mention of his race or racial discrimination in the termination of his
employment contract, where the defendant attached to his amended complaint his charge of discrimination filed
with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, and made a presentation to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The employee alleged, “I was terminated for alleged gross misconduct,”
and “I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black American) and age (54), in
violation of Title VII.” (District of Columbia Jail, Carter Goble Lee [CGL] Contractors)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Morris v. Dallas County, 960 F.Supp.2d 665 (N.D.Tex. 2013) The parents of a detainee who died while in
custody at a county jail brought a § 1983 action in state court against the county, the county jail medical staff,
and officials, alleging violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and constitutional violations.
The action was removed to federal court. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was
precluded by fact issues with regard to: (1) the nurses who were defendants; (2) the claim that the county failed
to monitor the detainee’s health; and (3) failure to train officers on how to observe and assess the jail detainees'
medical needs and respond to those needs. The court noted that the way the jail infirmary was structured,
including the lack of direct access between the detainees and the nursing staff, and the absence of procedures
for communication between the nurses and the correctional officers concerning emergent medical symptoms,
were a county custom. According to the court, whether that custom was adopted or continued, even though it
was obvious that its likely consequence would be a deprivation of medical care for the detainees, precluded
summary judgment in favor of the county in the § 1983 deliberate indifference claim brought against the
county. (Dallas County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
INSPECTION

Moses v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 951 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y.2013). The estate of a
deceased prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a county, its department of corrections (DOC), and a
corrections officer, alleging state and federal claims after the prisoner was beaten by the officer. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the
family exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing the action, as required to equitably toll the limitations period
for the § 1983 action. The estate alleged that the corrections officer “kicked and stomped” on the prisoner’s
head, causing injuries that eventually led to his death. The officer was indicted in county court for assault and
the Federal Bureau of Investigations opened an investigation into allegations that the officer had used excessive
force against the prisoner. The officer was eventually convicted of reckless assault. The prisoner’s death also
prompted a federal investigation into conditions at the jail, and investigators found a number of instances of the
use of excessive force by jail staff, a failure to provide an adequate review system, and a failure to provide
adequate mental and medical health care. (Westchester Department of Corrections, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Mutawakkil v. Huibregtse, 735 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought an action alleging that a Wisconsin
prison policy that required inmates to use their committed names in conjunction with a second name unless a
state court approved a change-of-name application, in violation of the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court entered
judgment for the defendants and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that
the policy did not violate either the speech clause or the free-exercise clause of the First Amendment. The court
found that the policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, absent an allegation that any inmate, of any
race or religion, was allowed to change his name on his own say-so after being convicted. The court found that
the policy did not create a substantial burden on the inmate's religious exercise, as would violate RLUIPA. The
court noted that the dual name requirement served the compelling governmental interest of maintaining prison

2.92

security, and the requirement was the least restrictive means of satisfying that interest. The court commented on
the name of the statute: “…which often goes by the unpronounceable initialism RLUIPA but which we call ‘the
Act’ so that the opinion can be understood by normal people.” (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). A female former state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a private operator of a state prison, the warden, and corrections officers, alleging violation of her civil
rights arising under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state claims. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate’s complaint stated claims against the operator and the warden for violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment, and for First Amendment retaliation. The inmate alleged that the operator and the
warden engaged in practices of placing inmates who reported sexual abuse in segregation or otherwise
retaliating against them, violating its written policies by failing to report allegations of prison rape to outside
law enforcement, failing to conduct adequate internal investigations regarding rape allegations, and offering
financial incentives to prison employees for non-reporting of rape allegations. The inmate alleged that the
operator and the warden placed her in segregation for eight months because she reported a corrections officer's
rape and another officer's assault, that the operator and warden were aware of her complaints, and that her
placement in segregation was in close temporal proximity to the complaints. (New Mexico Women's
Correctional Facility, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET

Peralta v. Dillard, 704 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2013). An inmate brought a civil rights action against a prison
dentist, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court entered judgment in
favor of the dentist, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the dentist could
not be held personally liable for deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious medical needs if he could not
render or cause to be rendered the needed dental services because of a lack of resources that he could not cure.
The court noted that the dentist and other doctors tried to address the shortage through various means, including
requests for more resources and changing staff schedules to allow staff to see more patients, but they had no
control over the staffing budget, which was set at the state level. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983,
statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well
as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and
prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government
liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to
implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of
constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have
acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process
claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention
for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional
requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and
(4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process. The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison
officials under § 1983, by alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she
was mentally disabled, and that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on
that basis. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D.Ariz. 2013). A non-profit organization that produced and
distributed a monthly journal and books to inmates brought an action against county jail officers and mailroom
employees, alleging that the defendants violated its First Amendment and due process rights by failing to
deliver its materials to its subscribers at the jail. The parties cross-moved for partial summary judgment. The
court granted the motions in part, denied in part, and deferred in part. The court held that the jail's policy
limiting incoming inmate correspondence to one-page and postcards did not violate the First Amendment,
where there was an apparent common-sense connection between the jail's goal of reducing contraband and
limiting the number of pages a particular piece of correspondence contained, and sufficient alternative avenues
of communication remained open for publishers who wished to communicate with inmates at the jail. But the
court held that the jail’s failure to give the non-profit organization notice and the opportunity to appeal the jail's
refusal to deliver its materials to inmates violated the organization's procedural due process rights. The court
ruled that the blanket ban on newspapers and magazines violated clearly established law, and therefore neither
the county jail mailroom employees nor their supervisors were entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983
First Amendment claim arising from employees' failure to deliver the organization's materials to inmates.
According to the court, the law was clear that blanket bans on newspapers and magazines in prisons violated
the First Amendment, and it was objectively unreasonable for the employees to throw away mail, or refuse to
deliver it, based upon a perceived blanket ban on newspapers and magazines. Because the county jail mailroom
uniformly enforced the unconstitutional county policy and allowed books from only four publishers, the county
was subject to liability for First Amendment violations in § 1983 action. (Pinal County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Prison Legal News v. Columbia County, 942 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Or. 2013). A publisher filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a county and its officials violated the First Amendment by rejecting dozens of its publications and
letters mailed to inmates incarcerated in its jail and violated the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to provide it
or the inmates with the notice of, and opportunity to, appeal the jail's rejection of its publications and letters. A

2.93

bench trial was held, resulting in a judgment for the publisher. The court held that: (1) the policy prohibiting
inmates from receiving mail that was not on a postcard violated the First Amendment; (2) the county had a
policy of prohibiting inmates from receiving magazines; (3) the county failed to provide adequate notice of
withholding of incoming mail by jail authorities; (4) entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from
enforcing the postcard-only policy was warranted; and (5) a permanent injunction prohibiting officials from
enforcing the prohibition against magazines was not warranted. (Columbia County Jail, Oregon)
U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Reid v. Cumberland County, 34 F.Supp.3d 396 (D.N.J. 2013). An inmate filed a § 1983 action against a county,
its department of corrections, warden, and correctional officers alleging that officers used excessive force
against him. The inmate moved to compel discovery. The district court granted the motion. The court held that:
(1) information regarding past instances of excessive force by correctional officers was relevant to the inmate's
supervisory liability claims; (2) officers' personnel files and internal affairs files were relevant; (3) officers'
personnel files and internal affairs files were not protected by the official information privilege; (4) officers'
personnel files and internal affairs files were not protected by the deliberative process privilege; (5) internal
affairs files concerning the incident in question were subject to discovery; (6) the county failed to adequately
demonstrate that the inmate's request for prior instances of excessive force and accompanying documentation
was sufficiently burdensome to preclude discovery; and (7) complaints about officers' excessive force, statistics
of excessive force, the county's use of force reports, and related internal affairs files were not protected by the
official information privilege or the deliberative process privilege. (Cumberland County Department of
Corrections, New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Rich v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 716 F.3d 525 (11th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought an action
against the Florida Department of Corrections and corrections officials for money damages and injunctive
relief, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), based on
their failure to provide him with a strictly kosher diet. The district court entered summary judgment for the
Department and the officials. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held
that Florida's plan to provide kosher meals to prisoners did not render the prisoner's claim moot because the
new plan was not an unambiguous termination of its policy which had deprived the prisoner of kosher meals.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether denial of kosher meals was
in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and as to whether denial of kosher meals was the least
restrictive means to further the cost and security interests that were asserted. (Union Corr’l. Institution, Florida)

U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT
OVERTIME

Rother v. NYS Dept. of Corrections and Community Supervision, 970 F.Supp.2d 78 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A female
corrections officer brought an action against a state department of corrections, correctional facility, supervisors
and coworkers, alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, denial of equal protection pursuant
to § 1983, denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, First Amendment retaliation, conspiracy
under § 1985, and various state claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The officer alleged that a coworker told the officer, in front of inmates, coworkers,
and the officer's subordinates, that she had received an administrative-sergeant position by performing sexual
favors and that she was a “bitch and a backstabber,” “a stupid cunt,” and a “whining bitch” who “sucked.” She
alleged that she was subjected to discriminatory coworker shunning and tire-slashing threats, assignment
denials, performance criticisms, discipline, vigilant monitoring, and denial of overtime and leave pay denials.
The appeals court held that, through the description of the emotional and psychological toll of her treatment,
the officer subjectively perceived her work environment to be abusive.
The court found that the officer’s complaint alleged the “materially adverse action” element of a Title VII
retaliation claim against a correctional facility and the state department of corrections by alleging that she
endured unmerited criticism and discipline, failure to remedy a coworker's mistreatment, repeated coworker
shunning and threats of tire slashing, video-camera monitoring, denial of vacation pay, and delay in filling out
workers' compensation paperwork. The court also held that the officer's complaint stated a § 1983 claim against
the state department of corrections and the correctional facility for violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
where her complaint alleged that no male employee was subjected to the treatment of which she complained,
and that the officer was criticized and disciplined repeatedly for proper and innocuous conduct while a male
coworker received no criticism or discipline for his patently improper and inappropriate verbal tirade, which
included explicitly sexist language. According to the court, the state's commissioner of corrections, by virtue of
his supervisory position, had both a direct connection to the alleged gender discrimination against the female
corrections officer, and the authority to reinstate and transfer the officer, supporting her § 1983 equal protection
claim against the commissioner in his official capacity seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. (Coxsackie
Correctional Facility, N.Y. State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Stoner v. Arkansas Dep. of Correction, 983 F.Supp.2d 1074 (E.D.Ark. 2013). A nurse employed by a company
which contracted with the Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) to provide on-site medical services to
ADC inmates brought an action against ADC, a warden, and the company under Title VII and the Arkansas
Civil Rights Act for gender discrimination and retaliation. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the ADC was the prison nurse's
employer for purposes of the nurse's Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against ADC and a
warden. According to the court, although the nurse was hired by a company which contracted with ADC to
provide on-site medical services to inmates, ADC trained company employees on sexual harassment policies
and reporting requirements, the warden held company employees accountable to the same standards as ADC
employees, and the warden had the ability to ban the nurse from the prison complex, effectively terminating her
employment. The court held that the warden employed by ADC was subject to personal liability with respect to
the female former prison nurse's claims for gender discrimination under § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights
Act (ACRA), where the nurse's right to be free from gender discrimination was secured by the Equal Protection

2.94

Clause, and her right to be free from retaliation based on protected speech was secured by the First
Amendment, and the warden, as a prison authority, was acting under the color of state law.
According to the court, the alleged harassment of the nurse by the prison warden was not part of the same
employment practice as a correctional officer's prior alleged harassment of the nurse, and thus the warden's
alleged harassment did not constitute a continuing violation for the purposes of the nurse's Title VII hostile
work environment claim. The court noted that the alleged conduct was committed by different actors, and the
harassment seemed to have been motivated by different animus, specifically, the officer's harassment was based
on sex, while the warden's harassment was based on retaliation. The court held that ADC took prompt and
effective remedial action after learning of the male correctional officer's alleged sexual harassment of the
female nurse, and thus ADC could not be held liable under Title VII for the alleged hostile work environment
created by the officer's conduct, nor could the company be held liable as a third-party for such alleged conduct.
(Correctional Medical Services, and Arkansas Department of Correction, McPherson Unit)
U.S. Appeals Court
EMPLOYEE UNION
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

U.S. Dept. of Justice Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Fla. v. Federal
Labor Relations Authority 737 F.3d 779 (D.C.Cir. 2013). The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) petitioned for
review, and the BOP and the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) cross-applied for enforcement of
FLRA's order stating that the BOP was required to bargain with a labor union over proposals relating to the
BOP's use of metal detectors at a high security prison. The BOP moved to dismiss on the grounds of mootness.
The appeals court denied the motion, granted a motion to vacate in part, and granted a motion to enforce, and
remanded. The court held that the decision to use the federal prison's compound metal detectors to screen only
those inmates suspected of carrying contraband did not render moot the FLRA decision stating that the BOP
was required to bargain with the employee union over proposals relating to safety issues arising out of the
prison's use of metal detectors, absent a showing that there was no reasonable expectation that the union's
safety concerns would not recur. The court found that the FLRA's determination that the BOP was required,
under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act (FSLMRA), to bargain with the labor union over a
proposal that prison management have inmates turn in all watches that did not clear the compound metal
detector, treat such watches as contraband, and assure that watches sold in the prison store would not set off the
metal detectors, in order to avoid bottlenecks of inmates at the entrance to the compound/detector area, was
eminently reasonable and supported by the record. According to the court, the proposal was sufficiently tailored
to target employees likely to be harmed by the installation of outdoor metal detectors, was intended to reduce
nuisance alarms triggered by prohibited watches, thereby moving inmates through the compound-detector
bottlenecks more quickly, and would not excessively interfere with the BOP's management rights. The court
found that the FLRA determination that the labor union's proposal requiring construction of a block and mortar
officer's station near one of the prison's two metal detectors was non-negotiable as a whole under FSLMRA.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons Federal Correctional Complex Coleman, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFF DISCIPLINE

Volkman v. Ryker, 736 F.3d 1084 (7th Cir. 2013). An employee at a correctional center brought a § 1983 action
against various officials alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment arising from the issuance of a
written reprimand and suspension following his comments to a state attorney regarding the criminal
prosecution of a co-worker. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
employee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the employee failed to show that a
reasonable official would have known that to restrict or punish his speech regarding a co-worker's punishment
was unconstitutional at the time of his discipline, as required for the employee to defeat a supervisors' claims of
qualified immunity from the employee's § 1983 claim of retaliation in violation of his First Amendment speech
rights. According to the court, the Illinois Department of Corrections' interests in suppressing the speech of a
supervisor at a correctional facility regarding a co-worker's discipline outweighed the supervisor's interests in
making the speech, and, thus, the supervisor's First Amendment speech rights were not violated when he was
disciplined for such speech. The court noted that supervisors were tasked with enforcing rules and regulations,
and when the supervisor criticized a disciplinary decision it undermined respect for the chain-of-command, and
there was value in maintaining order and respect in the paramilitary context of a correctional center. (Lawrence
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706 (E.D.Va. 2013). Former food service and medical care contractors who
worked at a city jail brought an action against a sheriff, who oversaw the jail, and sheriff's deputies, alleging
under § 1983 that their being required to undergo strip searches at the jail violated their Fourth Amendment
rights, and that they were retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip searches of
contractors who worked at city jail, the nature of such searches, and the factual predicate for revocation of the
contractors' security clearances. According to the court, at the time the contractors were strip searched, it was
clearly established, for qualified immunity purposes in the contractors' § 1983 Fourth Amendment unlawful
search action against the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, that prison employees did not forfeit all privacy rights
when they accepted employment, and thus, that prison authorities were required to have reasonable and
individualized suspicion that employees were hiding contraband on their person before performing a “visual
body cavity search.” The court also found that summary judgment as to the contractors’ claims for false
imprisonment and battery was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to what triggered the strip
searches. (Aramark and Correct Care Solutions, Contractors, Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Vollette v. Watson, 978 F.Supp.2d 572 (E.D.Va. 2013). Employees of private contractors providing services to
inmates housed at a jail brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff and deputy sheriffs, alleging that they were
subjected to unlawful strip and visual body cavity searches at the jail. The next business day after the suit was
filed, the sheriff issued a blanket order revoking the security clearances of the contractor's employees who were

2.95

still working at the jail. The district court denied the employees' motion for a preliminary injunction ordering
the sheriff to reinstate their security clearances at the jail pending the outcome of the litigation. The district
court also partially granted and partially denied the defendants' summary judgment motion. A jury decided the
constitutionality of the strip searches. This left the First Amendment retaliation claim by six of the nine
plaintiffs. The district court entered summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the retaliation claim. The court held
that: (1) the contractor's employees suffered irreparable injury from the sheriff's revocation of their security
clearances for which there was no adequate remedy at law; (2) the balance of hardships plainly weighed in
favor of a permanent injunction; (3) the public interest would be enhanced by the entry of a permanent
injunction; and (4) the plaintiffs demonstrated violation of their First Amendment rights, and the sheriff had to
reinstate their security clearances and update any relevant internal jail records to reflect the same. The court
noted that the sheriff's candid statements that he felt betrayed by the federal lawsuits filed by the employees
who were subjected to strip searches for contraband, and that the suits “pushed [him] over the edge” were an
admission that the adverse employment action of revoking the employees' security clearances was taken against
them in response to their exercise of their First Amendment constitutional rights to free speech and to petition
the government for redress of grievances. (Portsmouth City Jail, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). A county and the medical corporation that treated a county
inmate sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under
the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). The inmate was in a county work program under the
sheriff's supervision, for which services he earned $10 per day to be credited “toward any and all charges of
F.T.A/cash bonds owed to the county.” He was seriously injured in a forklift accident while helping law
enforcement officials conduct a “drug bust” pursuant to that program. The inmate’s treatment cost more than
$640,000. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of provider. The county appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the inmate did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses under
MWCA. The appeals court noted that the county inmate was not an employee working under contract of hire,
and therefore, did not qualify for reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers'
compensation insurance under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA) after he was injured in a
county work program. According to the court, there was no express, written contract between the inmate and
the county, the inmate did not sign a document transmitted by the sheriff to a county justice court stating that
the inmate was placed on a work detail, the document was transmitted after he began working for the county,
and inmates were required to work under Mississippi law. (Tippah County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act
RECORDS

White v. Department of Justice. 952 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.D.C., 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking records pertaining to him.
Following denial of DOJ's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, DOJ renewed its motion for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) DOJ conducted a search reasonably
calculated to locate the responsive records; (2) Executive Office for United States Attorneys (EOUSA) had no
obligation to search for the records; and (3) EOUSA properly withheld the records as attorney work-product.
(U.S. Dept. of Justice, Mail Referral Unit, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847 (10th Cir. 2013). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a county sheriff,
several deputies, and the warden of the county's detention center, alleging that he was unlawfully detained, and
that his right to a prompt probable cause determination was violated. The district court denied the defendants'
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
in part. The detainee had been held for 11 days without a hearing and without charges being filed. The appeals
court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from the claim that they violated the
arrestee's right to a prompt post-arrest probable cause determination, where the Fourth Amendment right to a
prompt probable cause determination was clearly established at the time. The court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the arresting sheriff's deputy was personally involved in the deprivation of his Fourth
Amendment right to a prompt probable cause hearing, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the deputy. The arrestee alleged that he was arrested without a warrant, and that the deputy wrote out a criminal complaint but failed to file it in any court with jurisdiction to hear a misdemeanor charge until after he was released
from the county's detention facility, despite having a clear duty under New Mexico law to ensure that the arrestee received a prompt probable cause determination. According to the court, under New Mexico law, the
warden of the county's detention facility and the county sheriff were responsible for policies or customs that
operated and were enforced by their subordinates, and for any failure to adequately train their subordinates. The
court noted that statutes charged both the warden and the sheriff with responsibility to supervise subordinates in
diligently filing a criminal complaint or information and ensuring that arrestees received a prompt probable
cause hearing. The court found that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the warden promulgated policies that
caused the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the warden acted with the
requisite mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the warden, regardless of whether the
arrestee ever had direct contact with the warden. The arrestee alleged that the warden did not require filing of
written criminal complaints, resulting in the detainees' being held without receiving a probable cause hearing,
and that the warden acted with deliberate indifference to routine constitutional violations at the facility. The
court held that the arrestee sufficiently alleged that the county sheriff established a policy or custom that led to
the arrestee's prolonged detention without a probable cause hearing, and that the sheriff acted with the requisite
mental state, as required to support his § 1983 claim against the sheriff, by alleging that: (1) the sheriff allowed
deputies to arrest people and wait before filing charges, thus resulting in the arrest and detention of citizens
with charges never being filed; (2) the sheriff was deliberately indifferent to ongoing constitutional violations
occurring under his supervision and due to his failure to adequately train his employees; (3) routine warrantless
arrest and incarceration of citizens without charges being filed amounted to a policy or custom; and (4) such
policy was the significant moving force behind the arrestee's illegal detention. (Valencia County Sheriff's
Office, Valencia County Detention Center, New Mexico)

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U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Yeager v. Corrections Corp. of America, 944 F.Supp.2d 913 (E.D.Cal. 2013). A former correctional employee
brought an action against his private corrections employer, alleging failure to engage in a good faith interactive
process, disability discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), and
FEHA retaliation. The employer moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication. The district court
granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded in the
employee's failure to engage in a good faith interactive process claim, by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether, under California law, there were reasonable accommodations available to the employee who sought
them, due to a knee injury. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded on the employee’s disability claim, due to genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for terminating
the employee, that the employee did not pass a background check, was a pretext for disability discrimination.
(Corrections Corporation of America, California City Correctional Center, California)
2014

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
CONTRACT SERVICES
TRAINING

Awalt v. Marketti, 74 F.Supp.3d 909 (N.D.Ill. 2014). The estate and the widow of a pretrial detainee who died
in a county jail brought civil rights and wrongful death actions against jail personnel and medical care providers
who serviced the jail. The county defendants and the medical defendants moved for summary judgment. The
district court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) concerning
whether failure of the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider to provide adequate medical
training to correctional officers caused the detainee’s death; (2) as to whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s
medical services provider had an implicit policy of deliberate indifference to medical care provided to
detainees; and (3) as to whether the sheriff’s office and the jail’s medical services provider had an express
policy that prevented a nurse from restocking a particular medication until there were only eight pills left in
stock and whether that policy was the moving force behind the pretrial detainee’s seizure-related death. The
court denied qualified immunity from liability to the correctional officers and the sheriff’s office. (Grundy
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Edmondson v. Fremgen, 17 F.Supp.3d 833 (E.D.Wis. 2014). An indigent prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against the clerk of the state courts of appeals, alleging that the clerk violated various of his civil rights when
she froze his inmate trust accounts until filing fees had been paid in two of his state appeals. The clerk moved
to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for appointment of counsel. The district court granted the motion to dismiss
and denied the motion to appoint counsel. The court held that freezing the prisoner's trust accounts did not
violate his right to access the courts, did not violate the prisoner's right to procedural due process, and was not
an illegal seizure. . According to the court, the indigent prisoner's right to access the courts were not violated,
although not having the ability to spend money in his accounts prevented him from copying legal materials,
where allowing the prisoner's appeals to proceed in the first place, by having deductions for filing fees made
from his inmate trust accounts, did not injure his ability to access the courts. (Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT
WORKING CONDITIONS

Ellis v. Houston, 742 F.3d 307 (8th Cir. 2014). African American corrections officers brought an action under §
1981 and § 1983 against prison administrators and supervisors, alleging race based harassment and retaliation,
and disparate treatment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the officers had a subjective belief that the discrimination and harassment they experienced was severe and pervasive;
(2) the officers established a broad pattern of harassment, and thus specific individual acts had to be viewed as
illustrative; (3) the acts, comments, and inaction by a supervisor were purposeful and objectively actionable; (4)
the officers suffered materially adverse consequences after they filed an official complaint, as required for a
retaliation claim; (5) supervisors who permitted and participated in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned
inferior work assignments, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted that the officers
experienced anxiety, dread, and panic attacks, they felt like they were being treated more like inmates than
fellow officers, they initially enjoyed going to work but subsequently found their job to be depressing and
anxiety-producing due to discrimination and harassment, they felt personally at risk because they no longer
trusted that their fellow officers would come to their aid in a dangerous situation, and one officer's hair started
to fall out from the stress he suffered. The officers had alleged that they experienced racist remarks on a near
daily basis that supervisors had been present and laughing without objection to statements made by others, and
each officer became aware of offensive remarks even if each individual did not hear it first-hand. Supervisors
allegedly acted to intensify the pattern of harassment of African American corrections officers after they filed
an official complaint of a racially hostile environment, subsequently assigning them inferior or less desirable
jobs, “papering” their files with reports on trivial or invented misconduct, and singling them out for additional
work details and consistently forcing them to take unpopular details. The court held that these were materially
adverse employment actions sufficient to support the officer's prima facie case of retaliation under § 1981.
The court found that a reasonable prison supervisor would have understood that permitting and participating
in racially derisive remarks, and then assigning inferior work assignments for reporting such conduct, would
have violated the rights of the African American corrections officers, and thus the supervisors who did permit
and participate in racially derisive remarks, and then assigned inferior work assignments, were not entitled to
qualified immunity to the officers' hostile work environment and retaliation claims under § 1981 and § 1983.
(Nebraska State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Gethers v. Harrison, 27 F.Supp.3d 644 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A female employee of a county detention center
brought Title VII gender discrimination and retaliation claims against her employer after she was terminated for
allegedly being untruthful regarding a situation in which she was present while a male detainee on suicide
watch used the shower. The county moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion,

2.97

finding that the employee failed to demonstrate that she was meeting job expectations or that she was engaged
in a protected activity. The employee had been demoted for violating a detention center policy by being present
while a male detainee on suicide watch showered naked despite the presence of two male officers, and for
extracting the detainee from his cell by herself, creating a risk of danger. The court noted that the male
detention officers who assisted male detainees on a suicide watch to shower were not similarly situated to the
female detention officer who was also present, under the detention center's policy prohibiting officers of the
opposite sex from being present while a detainee showered; the court noted that the proper comparison would
be a male officer remaining in a shower area while a female prisoner showered, and there was no indication
that such male officer would not also be punished. (Wake Co. Sheriff's Office, Det. Center, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
TRAINING

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 70 F.Supp.3d 963 (N.D.Cal. 2014). Current and recently released inmates
from a county jail brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office, and the private company that
administered all jail health care facilities and services, alleging, on behalf of a class of inmates, that
substandard conditions at the jail violated the federal and state constitutions, the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and a California statute prohibiting discrimination in state-funded
programs. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The
district court denied the motions. The court found that the inmates sufficiently alleged that the private company
that administered all jail health care facilities and services operated a place of public accommodation, as
required to state a claim for violation of ADA Title III. The court noted that: “The complaint alleges a litany of
substandard conditions at the jail, including: violence due to understaffing, overcrowding, inadequate training,
policies, procedures, facilities, and prisoner classification; inadequate medical and mental health care
screening, attention, distribution, and resources; and lack of policies and practices for identifying, tracking,
responding, communicating, and providing accessibility for accommodations for prisoners with disabilities.”
(Monterey County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Holton v. Conrad, 24 F.Supp.3d 624 (E.D.Ky. 2014). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action against a constable, a
county jail, and a county jailer, asserting claims arising out of his arrest and treatment at the jail. The jail and
jailer moved for judgment on the pleadings on the arrestee's state law claim. The district court denied the
motion. According to the court, the arrestee's claim requesting records under Kentucky law did not form part of
same case or controversy as his federal claim in § 1983, where the arrestee's federal claim was based on the
constable's actions in allegedly beating him at time of arrest and at the county jail. (Estill County Detention
Center, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES
STAFFING LEVELS

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota
Sex Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims,
including failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the
right to religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the
plaintiffs’ motions. The court held that the patients’ allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially
amounted to lifelong confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling,
and run like, a medium to high security prison, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim
pertaining to the punitive nature of the patients' confinement. The court found that the patients’ allegations that,
based on policies and procedures created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or
seven hours per week in treatment, that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that
treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low,
sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate
treatment. According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against
state officials with allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be
monitored during religious services and during private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear
religious apparel or to possess certain religious property, and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate
their religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such policies and practices were not related to legitimate
institutional or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients’ allegations that state officials
limited their phone use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and removed or censored
articles from newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim that officials unreasonably
restricted their right to free speech. The court ordered that its court-appointed experts would be granted
complete and unrestricted access to the documents the experts requested, including publicly available reports
and documents related to the patients' lawsuit, as well as MSOP evaluation reports and administrative directives
and rules. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden and the
contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center violated their
constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found the operator to be in
contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt proceeding, by the contractor that
operated the state correctional facility, which provided an extension of the settlement agreement, required a
specific independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of the settlement agreement term, and offered
to pay reasonable attorney fees, did not give the inmates the same relief that they achieved in the contempt
proceeding, and thus the inmates' rejection of the offer did not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and
costs they incurred in the contempt proceeding. The court noted that the inmates were already entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in the event of a breach, and the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt
proceeding with regard to the extension and the addition of an independent monitor. After considering the
totality of the record and the arguments by counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in
fees and costs. (Idaho Correctional Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

2.98

U.S. District Court
INSURANCE

LCS Corrections Services, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 19 F.Supp.3d 712 (S.D.Tex. 2014). An insured prison
operator brought an action seeking declaratory judgment that an insurer had a duty under a commercial
umbrella liability policy to defend it in an underlying civil rights action. The underlying case was brought by
the representative of a deceased inmate who allegedly died because of the operator’s policy of not giving
inmates their scheduled medications. The insurer moved for partial summary judgment. The district court
granted the motion. The court held that the underlying claim for refusing to provide prescribed medications fell
within the scope of the policy's professional liability exclusion, despite the operator's contention that the claim
addressed administrative rather than professional conduct because it was a global administrative decision to
deprive inmates of that particular medical care, where the exclusion extended to “failure to provide professional
services.” (Lexington Insurance Company, LCS Corrections Services, Inc., Texas)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Mori v. Allegheny County, 51 F.Supp.3d 558 (W.D.Pa. 2014). An inmate who was seven and one-half months
into a “high risk” pregnancy brought an action under § 1983 against a county for deliberate indifference to her
health in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, and survival and
wrongful death claims for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, after the loss of the child following a
placental abruption. The county moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the
prisoner: (1) stated an Eighth Amendment claim based on failure to monitor the unborn child after the prisoner
complained of vaginal bleeding; (2) stated a claim against the county based on custom and practice; (3)
sufficiently alleged a causal link between the policies and the loss of the child; (4) stated a claim against county
officials for individual liability; and (5) stated wrongful death and survivor claims for the death of the child.
The inmate alleged that individual policy makers, including the chief operating officer of the county jail’s
health services, and the jail’s nursing supervisor, were responsible for the policies that led to failure to provide
adequate medical treatment. The prisoner also alleged that she was made to wait over 24 hours before being
sent to a hospital after her vaginal bleeding started, that she was transported by a police cruiser rather than
ambulance, that it was well known that bleeding late in pregnancy often indicated serious medical issues, that
the child was alive during birth, and that the delay in medical treatment contributed to the injuries during birth
and the death of the child shortly after birth. (Allegheny County Jail, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100 annual health
care services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the action. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor was entitled to Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice was the agency responsible for
administration and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were insufficient to plead deliberate indifference
where the inmate did not allege he was denied medical care or that he was forced to choose between medical
care or basic necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it
was not unreasonable for the prison to take funds from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical
care. The court noted that the prison posted notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee
and what it covered, and a regulation was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Stevenson Unit, Cuero, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
BUDGET
STAFF LEVELS

Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against a prison's
chief dental officer, its chief medical officer, and its staff dentist, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The district court granted judgment as a matter of law to the chief dental officer and the chief
medical officer at the close of inmate's case, and entered judgment on the jury's verdict in favor of the dentist.
The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held: (1) it is appropriate to consider the
resources available to a prison official who lacks authority over budgeting decisions, overruling Jones v.
Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, and Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978; (2) evidence warranted a jury instruction on the
lack of resources available to the staff dentist; (3) evidence did not establish the chief medical officer's
awareness of the inmate's dental needs; and (4) evidence did not establish the chief dental officer's awareness of
the inmate's dental needs. The court noted that there was evidence that budgetary constraints actually affected
the state prisoner's dental treatment: (1) where the staff dentist listed “staffing shortages beyond our control” as
an explanation for the waiting list for dental procedures; (2) evidence was presented that the prison had less
than half the number of dentists required by law; (3) there were no dental hygienists; and (4) that dentists
frequently had to work without dental assistants. The staff dentist testified that staff shortages limited the
amount of time he could have spent with the prisoner during any visit and that he focused on a prisoner's most
pressing complaint because he did not have enough time. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. District Court
RECORDS

Taha v. Bucks County, 9 F.Supp.3d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a county, a
county correctional facility, and companies that operated websites publishing mug shot and arrest information,
alleging that the defendants published his expunged arrest record in violation of Pennsylvania's Criminal
History Record Information Act (CHRIA), and that the companies violated a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting
the unauthorized use of a name or likeness and committed an invasion-of-privacy tort of “false light.” The
company moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the arrestee's allegations that the company selectively published his expunged arrest record and mug shot on its
website in order to falsely portray him as a criminal, and created a false impression regarding his criminal
history and character, were sufficient to state a “false light” claim against the company under Pennsylvania law.
(Citizens Information Associates, LLC, Bucks County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

2.99

2015
U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS
COMMISSARY

Carter v. James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, 134 F.Supp.3d 794 (D. Del. 2015). A state prisoner filed a pr
se complaint under § 1983 seeking injunctive relief against a prison. The district court dismissed the action.
The court held that the prisoner's claims that the prison's business office miscalculated and deducted incorrect
sums of money from his prison account when making partial filing fee payments, that there was poor television
reception, and that he was not allowed to purchase canteen items from the commissary, were not actionable
under § 1983, where all of the claims were administrative matters that should be handled by the prison. (James
T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
FOIA- Freedom Of
Information Act
COMMISSARY
TELEPHONE COSTS

DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that the Bureau
of Prison’s (BOP) response to his request for documents violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that
the BOP and its officials violated the Takings and Due Process Clauses by retaining interest earned on money
in inmates’ deposit accounts, and that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by charging excessively high
prices for items sold by the prison commissary and for telephone calls. The district court entered summary
judgment in the BOP’s favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The court held that the BOP did not violate FOIA by failing to produce recordings of the inmate’s
telephone conversations and that the inmate’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies precluded the court
from reviewing whether the BOP conducted an adequate search. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’
(BOP) alleged practice of charging excessively high prices for items sold by prison commissary and for
telephone calls did not violate Eighth Amendment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICES
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Gorman v. Rensselaer County, 98 F.Supp.3d 498 (N.D.N.Y. 2015). An employee in a county sheriff’s
department brought a § 1983 action against the county, sheriff, master sergeant, and the company which
provided psychological evaluations for public safety agencies. The district court dismissed the action finding
that under New York law, the employee did not a state claim for negligent misrepresentation against the
company, whose psychologist performed an independent medical examination of the employee in connection
with his applications for benefits while on medical leave. The court also held that the company was not a state
actor for the purposes of the employee’s § 1983 action. The court noted that although the company was
contracted by the sheriff to perform an independent medical exam of the employee, the mere fact that a private
actor was paid by state funds, or was hired by a state actor, was insufficient to establish a state action, and the
employee’s allegations that the company conspired or acted in concert with the county were wholly conclusory.
(Rensselaer County Sheriff’s Office, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
RECORDS

King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation arising from his transfer to a higher security prison due to his
participation in a state-court class action against the prison officials. After a bench trial, the district court found
in favor of the prison officials. The appeals court reversed with respect to three officials. On remand, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the prisoner and ordered compensatory damages and attorney fees,
but denied the prisoner’s request for punitive damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held that: (1) the district court properly awarded prisoner compensatory
damages; (2) the district court’s award of compensatory damages to equal $5 a day for each day he was kept in
a higher security prison was not a reversible error; (3) the district court relied on an incorrect legal standard in
concluding that the prisoner was not entitled to punitive damages; (4) the prisoner was not entitled to injunctive
relief requiring the department of corrections to remove certain documents from his file that allegedly violated
his due process rights; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in failing to charge up to 25% of the
attorney fees awarded to the prisoner against his compensatory damages award. (Conklin Unit at Brooks
Correctional Facility, Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). An inmate brought an action against a sheriff, prison
officials and a commissary, alleging that he was a diabetic and that, while incarcerated, he was not provided
with a medically appropriate diet, was not permitted to purchase food items from the prison commissary, and
was the subject of false misbehavior reports when he complained about his dietary issues. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate failed to allege that the prison commissary, operated by a private company, was acting under the color
of state law, as required to state constitutional claims against the commissary. The court noted that the inmate
did not allege that the commissary had a policy of denying commissary access to diabetic prisoners or had the
authority to override the prison's policy with respect to inmates with dietary restrictions, and instead, alleged
that the prison maintained a policy of limiting commissary access for prisoners with dietary restrictions. (Erie
County Holding Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act

Pinson v. U.S. Department of Justice, 104 F.Supp.3d 30 (D.D.C. 2015). A federal prison inmate brought an
action against the Department of Justice (DOJ), alleging DOJ withheld records from him in violation of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act. The inmate moved for sanctions, a protective order,
appointment of counsel, an order to show cause, production of documents, and a preliminary injunction. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate would be appointed
counsel for the limited purpose of reviewing correspondence withheld by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and
determining DOJ’s compliance with FOIA. The court found that sanctions for the DOJ’s failure to timely
comply with a court order were not warranted. The court noted that the BOP’s mail policy prevented the inmate
from reviewing the DOJ’s FOIA responses, preventing him from properly litigating his FOIA claims. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, ADX Florence, Colorado)

2.100

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom of
Information Act
TELEPHONE COSTS
COMMISSION

Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113 F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A requester
brought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for information related to prison telephone practices and policies,
including those at ICE’s federal immigration detention centers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted the requestor’s motion. The court held that the performance incentive rate
of the phone services contractor for federal immigration detention centers was not exempt from disclosure.
According to the court, the phone services contractor was not likely to suffer substantial competitive harm if
the performance incentive rate from its successful bid for federal immigration detention centers was disclosed,
and thus that rate, which reflected the percentage of revenue set aside in escrow and only paid to the contractor
upon the government’s determination that the contractor performed successfully, was not exempt from
disclosure. The court found that the defendants violated FOIA by failing to make a timely determination on the
requester’s requests for information. The court found the delays “egregious” where the requester did not
receive ICE’s first production of documents, or any other determination, until 361 days after mailing its first
FOIA request letter, seven months after mailing its second request letter, and almost four months after filing
this lawsuit, and production of the remainder of the requested documents was not completed for several
additional months. The court awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs to the requester, finding that it was the
prevailing party. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

U.S. District Court
FOIA- Freedom Of
Information Act
RECORDS

Sanchez-Alaniz v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 85 F.Supp.3d 208 (D.C.D.C. 2015). A prisoner filed suit against
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and others under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The BOP filed a
motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the BOP’s declaration about its document search did not demonstrate beyond a material doubt that its
search process was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents, and the declaration did not
adequately demonstrate that redacted information came within the exemption from disclosure for law
enforcement records that could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or safety of an individual. The court
noted that the BOP declaration provided no description of the search itself, and neither identified which files
were searched, nor explained why particular files were searched, or describe how the files were searched. The
court noted that the declarations were vague and conclusory, and the BOP demonstrated no causal connection
between the disclosure of redacted information and a threat of harm to any employee or inmate. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Sanders v. Glanz, 138 F.Supp.3d 1248 (N.D. Okla. 2015). A pretrial detainee's guardian filed a § 1983 action
against a sheriff, the jail's private healthcare providers, and a booking nurse to recover for injuries that the
detainee suffered from a severe assault by fellow prisoners. The defendants filed for dismissal. The district
court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who had been assaulted
by other county jail inmates, stated a plausible municipal liability claim under § 1983 against the corporation
that assisted in developing the sheriff's policies with respect to medical and mental health care of inmates,
where the detainee alleged that the corporation shared responsibility with the sheriff to adequately train and
supervise its employees, and that the corporation's policies, practices, and customs posed substantial risks to
inmates' health and safety, but failed to take reasonable steps to alleviate those risks.
The court found that the detainee's allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim against the sheriff in
his individual capacity by alleging that the sheriff was responsible for creating and enforcing regulations,
policies, practices, and customs at the county jail, and that pursuant to those practices, policies, and customs,
the jail maintained a longstanding, constitutionally deficient system of medical and mental health care.
According to the court, the sheriff knew of substantial risks created by that system but failed to take reasonable
steps to alleviate the risks, but instead took intentional and active steps to conceal the dangerous conditions at
the jail, and the sheriff disregarded known and obvious risks of severe harm from lack of adequate mental
health assessment and treatment, classification, supervision, or protection. (David L. Moss Criminal Justice
Center, Tulsa County Sheriff, Oklahoma, Correctional Healthcare Management, Inc. and, Correctional
Healthcare Management of Oklahoma, Inc.)

U.S. District Court
STAFFING LEVELS
POLICIES/PROCEDURES

Shepard v. Hansford County, 110 F.Supp.3d 696 (N.D. Tex. 2015). A husband brought an action against a
county and a county jail employee under § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to detainee health in violation
of the right to provision of adequate medical treatment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, following his wife’s suicide while in the county jail. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the jail
employee was entitled to qualified immunity; (2) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to
whether the jail employee violated the detainee’s rights, (3) the county had an adequate suicide risk prevention
training policy, where employees were required to attend training to learn about suicide risk detection and
prevention methods, and were required to read the county’s policy on conducting face-to-face suicide checks
with detainees; (4) the county adequately trained employees on cell entry; but (5) a fact issue existed as to
whether the county had an unwritten policy of understaffing the jail, precluding summary judgment. The court
noted that it was not clearly established at the time of the suicide that an employee was required to abandon
other duties to ensure that suicide watch checks were completed, and it was not clearly established that the
employee was prohibited from providing a detainee with a towel in a cell with “tie-off points,” since the
employee was not aware of any other suicides in that cell. According to the court, the jail cell entry policy
prohibiting jail employees from entering a cell alone did not amount to training employees to be deliberately
indifferent to the needs of detainees, and was not causally related to the detainee’s death, and thus the county
was not liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference to detainee health. (Hansford County Jail, Texas)

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U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Sluss v. United States Department of Justice, 78 F.Supp.3d 61 (D.D.C. 2015). A federal prisoner sought to
compel the Department of Justice (DOJ) to transfer him, pursuant to an international treaty, to his birthplace of
Canada to carry out the remainder of his sentence. The DOJ moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that decisions regarding the international transfer of prisoners constituted an agency
action, which was committed to agency discretion by law, and thus the decisions were not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). (Federal Correctional Center, Petersburg, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Smith v. Securus Technologies, Inc., 120 F.Supp.3d 976 (D. Minn. 2015). Consumers brought a putative class
action against the provider of inmate telephone services, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) and the Minnesota Automatic Dialing-Announcing Devices Law (ADAD), based on
claims that the provider made automated calls with prerecorded messages to their cellular phones without their
prior consent. The provider moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, finding that
the provider did not “make” calls as required to be liable under TCPA and ADAD and the platform used for
inmates’ calls was not an automatic telephone dialing system. The plaintiffs alleged that each call allegedly
informed them about the name of the inmate trying to contact them, the name of the correctional facility from
which the call was being made, and instructions on how to accept or decline the call. They argued that they did
not consent to receiving any of these non-emergency calls. (Securus Technologies, Inc & Minn. ADAD Law)

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
PROPERTY

Sorrentino v. Godinez, 777 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 2015). Two inmates purchased several items from a prison’s
commissary, but the prison later forbade the inmates to possess those items in their cells. Their property was
removed, as the new rule required. They responded by filing a proposed class action in the district court,
alleging that confiscation of their property was an unconstitutional taking and a breach of contract. The district
court dismissed the action. The appeals court held that the district court was correct to dismiss the action,
although the dismissal should have been without prejudice. One inmate had purchased a fan and signed a
“personal property contract” which obligated him to follow all Department of Corrections (DOC) rules related
to use, ownership, and possession of the fan. The other inmate purchased a typewriter and a fan, and he also
signed a personal property contract for his fan. When a new policy banned these items from prisoners’ cell, the
new policy offered several options for inmates who owned the newly prohibited types of property. Inmates with
typewriters could have them destroyed, give them to visitors, ship them to someone outside the prison at no
cost, store them in “offender personal property” which is returned to inmates upon release from prison, or
donate them to the prison library. Fans were simply placed in storage as “offender personal property.”
(Stateville Correctional Facility, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONTRACT SERVICES

U.S. v. Mujahid, 799 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2015). A federal prisoner was convicted in the district court for
aggravated sexual abuse and abusive sexual contact against other prisoners while in custody in a state prison,
awaiting transfer to a federal prison. The prisoner appealed his conviction. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the question of whether or not a contract to house federal prisoners existed between the
United States Marshals Service and the state department of corrections was a question of law that was within
the district court’s authority to decide. The appeals court found that a district court may determine as a matter
of law whether the facility at which an alleged crime took place was the one in which the persons were held in
custody by direction of, or pursuant to, a contract or agreement with the head of any federal department or
agency. (Anchorage Correctional Complex, U.S. Marshals Service)

U.S. Appeals Court
STAFFING LEVELS

U.S. v. Sanchez-Gomez, 798 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants filed challenges to a federal district court
policy, adopted upon the recommendation of the United States Marshals, to place defendants in full shackle
restraints for all non-jury proceedings, with the exception of guilty pleas and sentencing hearings, unless a
judge specifically requests the restraints be removed in a particular case. The district court denied the
challenges. The defendants appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court found that
the defendants’ challenges to the shackling policy were not rendered moot by the fact that they were no longer
detained. The court held that there was no adequate justification of the necessity for the district court’s
generalized shackling policy. According to the court, although the Marshals recommended the policy after
some security incidents, coupled with understaffing, created strains in the ability of the Marshals to provide
adequate security for a newly opened, state-of-the-art courthouse, the government did not point to the causes or
magnitude of the asserted increased security risk, nor did it try to demonstrate that other less restrictive
measures, such as increased staffing, would not suffice. (Southern District of California, United States
Marshals, San Diego Federal Courthouse)

U.S. District Court
CONTRACT SERVICE
EMPLOYEE
QUALIFICATIONS

Velez-Ramirez v. Puerto Rico, 98 F.Supp.3d 388 (D.P.R. 2015). An independent contractor brought an action
against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rico Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(DOCR), the company that managed the provision of healthcare services for DOCR, and the company’s
secretary, alleging that failure to renew her professional services contract violated the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Puerto Rico law. The defendants moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiff was not qualified to work as a
training and professional development coordinator, and the DOCR’s failure to renew the plaintiff’s contract
was not a pretext for retaliating against her for seeking a reasonable accommodation for her diabetic
retinopathy. (Bayamón Correctional Complex, Correctional Health Services Corporation, Puerto Rico)

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U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
SURVEILLANCE
SEARCHES

Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich. 2005). Twenty-two pretrial detainees
sued a county, sheriff=s department, sheriff and individual police officers, challenging the
county=s policy of housing uncooperative and disruptive detainees naked in administrative
segregation. The district court held that the policy violated the detainees= due process rights and
their rights to be free of unreasonable seizure. According to the court, the policy was an
exaggerated response to the county=s concerns about suicide, officer safety, and administrative
costs. The court declined to issue a preliminary injunction, and granted qualified immunity to
several of the defendants because the detainees= right not to have their clothes removed was not
clearly established at the time of the incidents. The court held that the forced removal of clothing
by an officer of the opposite sex was not justified by safety and security concerns. (Saginaw
County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Rowe v. Davis, 373 F.Supp.2d 822 (N.D.Ind. 2005). A state inmate brought a pro se ' 1983 action
alleging that his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) had been violated. The district court held that the inmate could proceed on his claim
for injunctive relief challenging the denial of his right to receive visits from a religious leader, on
his claim for injunctive relief challenging the refusal to allow him to have a Celtic Cross
necklace, and on his claim seeking individual review of his case to determine his eligibility to
participate in communal worship while in segregation. The court found that the alleged
confiscation of the inmate=s religious literature, even though it did not fall within the prohibition
against gang-related literature or literature supporting or encouraging prison disturbances,
substantially burdened the inmate=s exercise of his religion and stated a claim under RLUIPA.
The court also found a potential RLUIPA violation in the inmate=s allegation that denial of his
right to receive visits from a religious leader of his own faith. The court ruled that denial of the
Celtic Cross necklace might place a substantial and unnecessary burden on the practice of his
religion, where the inmate alleged that wearing such a necklace was part of the way in which he
practiced and expressed his religious beliefs. The court found a potential RLUIPA violation in
the enforcement of a prison policy that prohibited all religious services for prisoners in
administrative segregation. (Michigan Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
HEARING

Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil rights action

against prison authorities alleging due process violations from his segregation following his
killing of another inmate, and Eighth Amendment violations arising from his forced extraction
from his cell. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the authorities on two
claims, and judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the authorities on the remaining claim. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the immediate
transfer of the prisoner to a restricted area within the prison after the prisoner killed another
inmate did not violate his due process rights, given the exigent circumstances posed by the need
to isolate him for his own sake and for the protection of other inmates. The court found that the
prisoner was not deprived of liberty without due process when he was detained in a restricted
area for 40 days without a hearing. The court noted that the prisoner=s disciplinary hearing had
been indefinitely deferred and there was a need to isolate the prisoner from the general
population pending a criminal investigation. (New Hampshire State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
HYGIENE
SEARCHES

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a ' 1983 action
against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction,
deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district court denied
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held conditions of confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient,
where the detainee was placed in around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a fiveminute shower break every third day, all hygiene items were withheld from him, he could only
access water--including water to flush his toilet--at the discretion of individual officers, and was
subjected daily to multiple strip searches that required him to place his unwashed hands into his
mouth. (Hillsborough County Jail, New Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH
DUE PROCESS
ACCESS TO COURTS

U.S. v. Basciano, 369 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). A purported crime boss who was being held
as a pretrial detainee petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention in a
restrictive special housing unit. The district court granted the petition, finding that indefinite
solitary confinement of the detainee was not reasonably related to the government=s legitimate
objective of preventing the detainee from allegedly planning or approving violent criminal
conduct while behind bars. The court held that to justify such Aharsh@ detention, more
substantial proof was required that the detainee committed or directed the crime of murder in
aid of racketeering while in detention, or had conspired with another inmate to murder a federal
prosecutor. According to the court, the security restrictions placed obstacles on the detainee=s
communications with his attorneys, which was especially important because the detainee was
charged with a crime for which he could receive the death penalty. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

XX

3.61

2006
U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Davies v. Valdes, 462 F.Supp.2d 1084 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state prisoner brought a pro se action
against various corrections officials, alleging that they violated his due process rights in
connection with disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the defendants. The court held that the issuance of a report that the prisoner possessed a
weapon, and approval of the report during the administrative review, did not violate the
prisoner’s due process rights because they were supported by some evidence. The reporting
prison official stated that he found a nail with black electrical tape wrapped around its handle
end under the prisoner’s locker, and that he found a pencil wrapped in electrical tape in the same
manner. According to the court, the refusal to allow testimony at the disciplinary proceedings did
not violate the prisoner’s due process rights. Under the Due Process Clause, prison officials have
the discretion, within reasonable limits, to refuse to call witnesses in a prison disciplinary
hearing if their testimony would be unnecessary or irrelevant, or would impose hazards in the
prison. The court found that the prisoner did not have a liberty interest in avoiding confinement
in an administrative segregation unit (ASU) or special housing unit (SHU). The court concluded
that the disciplinary proceedings against the prisoner were not in retaliation for his filing of a
grievance, or for a grievance filed on behalf of other inmates in his role as an advisory committee
representative, so as to violate his free speech rights. The prisoner asserted that officials planted
a weapon on him. The prison officials were unaware of the prisoner’s prior complaints until the
prisoner filed suit. The court also held that requiring the prisoner to submit to a drug/urine test
did not violate his right to privacy, where he was found in possession of a weapon, his bed was
next to the bed of an inmate found with marijuana, and the prison had a legitimate interest in
attempting to curb drug use. (California Rehabilitation Center)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT
LENGTH
EQUAL PROTECTION

Dickens v. Taylor, 464 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2006). A prisoner filed a civil rights action against
various corrections defendants, alleging unlawful conditions of confinement and excessive force.
The district court dismissed the claims. The court held that: (1) placement of the prisoner in
isolation for not more than two months at a time did not implicate a liberty interest; (2) neither
Delaware law nor Department of Corrections regulations created a due process liberty interest in
a prisoner’s classification within an institution, and the prisoner had no property or liberty
interest in the prison classification program or his housing assignment; (3) the prisoner failed to
state an equal protection claim based on the allegation that a majority of the inmates in the
special housing unit were black; (4) the denial of the disciplined prisoner’s television privilege did
not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim since television privileges did not constitute
necessities; and (5) the failure to serve brand name cereals and cold fresh water during meal
time were not an Eighth Amendment violation. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE

Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252 (10th Cir. 2006). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action

U.S. Appeals Court
REGULATIONS

Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a ' 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging cruel and unusual punishment. After a jury returned a verdict in favor
of the inmate, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law for the defendants, and the
inmate appealed. The court of appeals affirmed. The court held that the prison's feeding rule
requiring that, when meals were delivered to an inmate's cell, the inmate had to be wearing
trousers or gym shorts, was a reasonable condition to the receipt of food in light of security issues
and respect for female security officers' privacy. The court found that prison officials' withholding
of food from the inmate when he refused to put on trousers or shorts did not constitute the use of
food deprivation as punishment, for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that prison officials' withholding of food from the
inmate when he wore a sock on his head when meals were delivered to his cell was a reasonable
condition to the receipt of the food, in light of security issues presented by the possibility that a
sock could be used as a weapon if something was inside it. According to the court, withholding of
food from the inmate when he refused to remove the sock from his head did not constitute the
use of food deprivation as punishment. Inmates in the Supermax are fed their three meals a day
in their cells. The prison's feeding rule requires that the prisoner stand in the middle of his cell,
with the lights on, when the meal is delivered and that he be wearing trousers or gym shorts. If
the inmate does not comply with the rule, the meal is not served to him. The inmate wanted to
eat in his underwear, and on a number of occasions over a two-and-a-half-year period he refused
to put on pants or gym shorts and as a result was not served. Because he skipped so many meals
he lost 45 pounds. (Wisconsin Maximum Security Facility, ASupermax@)

XX

against state prison officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the
district court abused its discretion when it found that the inmate=s three-year period of
administrative segregation, during which time the prisoner was confined to his cell for all but
five hours each week and denied access to any outdoor exercise, was not Aatypical@ in violation of
the prisoner=s due process rights. The inmate had escaped from a county jail when he was a
pretrial detainee by posing as a visitor and simply walking out of the facility. Although he was
quickly apprehended, the incident caused embarrassing media coverage for state prison officials.
(Limon Correctional Facility, Colorado)

3.62

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Gilmore v. Goord, 415 F.Supp.2d 220 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against prison officials and employees, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights in
connection with an administrative segregation hearing. The defendants moved for summary
judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the inmate's
administrative segregation for nineteen days did not implicate a protected liberty interest, nor
did his transfer from a medium-security facility to maximum-security facility. The court found
that the prisoner had no protected liberty interest in parole, and no justifiable expectation that
he would be incarcerated in any particular prison within a state, and therefore, transfers from
one facility to another generally do not implicate any due process-protected liberty interest, even
if the transfer involves a change in security classification as well. (Wyoming Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL TREATMENT

Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F.Supp.2d 574 (W.D.Mich. 2006). State prisoners filed a class action under
§ 1983 in 1980, alleging that conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights.
Following settlement of claims by consent decree, and termination of the enforcement of mental
health provisions of the consent decree, a prisoner moved to reopen the judgment regarding
mental health care and for the issuance of preliminary injunction. The district court granted the
motion. The court held that reopening the mental health provisions of the consent decree was
warranted where many recurrent problems noted by physicians concerned “cracks” between
medical and mental health care. The court noted that forcing separate enforcement actions on
related topics would do a disservice to prisoners and administrators by forcing them to function
under multiple enforcement regimes. According to the court, the prison’s failure to provide daily
psychologist rounds to mentally ill prisoners in a segregation unit violated their Eighth
Amendment rights, inasmuch as such prisoners often had psychiatric needs which could not be
accommodated without rounds due to their lack of movement and the prisoners’ inability to
request care, and that segregation often placed prisoners with mental illness at a heightened risk
of mental decompensation and in conflict with correctional officers. The court held that the
pattern and practice of non-treatment of prisoners with mental illness, and the uncoordinated
treatment of prisoners presenting complicated cases with interdisciplinary problems, violated the
Eighth Amendment, in that it deprived prisoners of necessary services for serious medical and
mental health needs. The court found that the prison’s use of mechanical in-cell restraints,
including “top of the bed” restraints consisting of chaining a prisoner’s hands and feet to a
concrete slab, as disciplinary method and/or control mechanism constituted torture and violated
the Eighth Amendment, notwithstanding a six-hour limit on bed restraints but which did not
prohibit the use of other dangerous restraint devices at end of the six-hour period. (Southern
Michigan State Prison, Jackson)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT

Herrin v. Treon, 459 F.Supp.2d 525 (N.D.Tex. 2006). The mother of a prisoner who committed
suicide while imprisoned brought suit against multiple corrections officers pursuant to § 1983,
alleging multiple Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. On defendants’ motion for
summary judgment the district court held that: (1) fact issues precluded summary judgment for
corrections officers in the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim alleging that officers
failed to properly react when finding the inmate hanging or attempting to hang himself; (2) there
was no evidence that indicated that any corrections officer was responsible for the initial decision
to send the inmate to administrative segregation, where the inmate subsequently committed
suicide; (3) there was no evidence that corrections officers actually intentionally murdered the
inmate; (4) there was no evidence that the prison warden and executive director were in any way
responsible for promulgating or enforcing a do-not-enter policy with respect to the inmate; (5)
claims could not be brought under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause; and (6) there
was no evidence that corrections officers were personally involved in any policy-making or
training, or that the officers had any special knowledge concerning the inmate and his suicidal
propensities. The mother alleged that, in spite of the inmate’s threats of suicide, he was placed in
an improperly equipped administrative segregation cell in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
(Allred Unit, Texas Department of Criminal Justice)

U.S. Appeals Court
MAIL

Johnson v. Goord, 445 F.3d 532 (2nd Cir. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights action against

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Keel v. Dovey, 459 F.Supp.2d 946 (C.D.Cal. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated her civil rights by placing her in administrative segregation pending
the investigation of a disciplinary charge against her, and by conducting a disciplinary hearing

XX

prison officials, challenging a regulation governing possession of stamps. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the officials and inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the
inmate did not have a constitutional right to unlimited free postage for non-legal mail, and the
regulation was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, and thus did not violate the
inmate's First Amendment right to send outgoing non-legal mail. The prison regulation
prevented certain inmates in keeplock from receiving stamps through the mail and permitted
them to receive only one free stamp per month for personal use. The court noted that stamps
could be used by inmates as a form of currency, and the regulation furthered the legitimate goals
of reducing thefts, disputes, and unregulated prisoner transactions. (New York State
Department of Correctional Services)

3.63

that violated her procedural due process rights. Officials moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a due process
liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation prior to a disciplinary hearing;
(2) the use of confidential information in a disciplinary hearing did not violate the inmate’s right
to procedural due process; and (3) the inmate was not denied due process as the result of the
officials’ refusal to permit her to listen to and read intercepted inmate phone calls. The court
noted that the administrative segregation the inmate endured pending disciplinary investigation
was not an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
According to the court, even if her cell was unsanitary, birds and mice were present in inmate
cells, and she lost her prison job and her ability to participate in religious ceremonies, the inmate
did not suffer forfeiture of time credits, she had non-contact visits of one hour in length, and
there was no evidence regarding conditions of cells outside of administrative segregation.
(California Institution for Women, Chino)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

McGoldrick V. Farrington, 462 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Me. 2006). An inmate brought a civil rights
action against state prison officials alleging cruel and unusual punishment and violation of due
process. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoner failed to
allege any physical injury, and was not deprived of due process. According to the court, the
inmate’s loss of mattress privileges while housed in the Special Management Unit failed to allege
any physical injury that resulted from the removal of his mattress, as required to bring a civil
rights action for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody. (Maine State Prison)

U.S. District Court
EXECUTION

Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D.Cal. 2006). A death row inmate filed a § 1983 action

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS

Nicholson v. Carroll, 458 F.Supp.2d 249 (D.Del. 2006). A state prisoner filed a petition for writ of

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
RESTRICTIONS

Pepper v. Carroll, 423 F.Supp.2d 442 (D.Del. 2006). A state inmate filed a ' 1983 action alleging
that prison officials violated his constitutional rights. The court granted the officials= motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the officials did not deny the inmate's request to call an
attorney, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to access courts, where
the officials made several attempts to contact the inmate's attorney but were told that she was
too busy or did not want to speak to the inmate, the attorney had filed a motion to withdraw as
the inmate's counsel, and the public defender's office informed the officials that the inmate was
not a client. According to the court, the officials gave the inmate adequate law library time and
legal assistance, and thus did not violate the inmate's First Amendment right to access courts,
even though the inmate did not have access to the prison's legal resources 24 hours per day. The
court noted that during a two-and-a-half month period, the inmate requested and received law
library services 23 times, and had access to the law library 77 times. According to the court, the
prison officials' denials of several privileges while the inmate was voluntarily housed in a
security housing unit, including extra visits, reading material, exercise, television, cleaning tools,
boiling water, ice, razors, and additional writing utensils, were not a sufficiently serious
deprivation to support the inmate's claim that the denials constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Thunderhorse v. Pierce, 418 F.Supp.2d 875 (E.D.Tex. 2006). A Native American inmate brought
a pro se action against state prison officials, alleging violations of his free exercise rights and of
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The district court granted
the officials= motion for summary judgment. The court held that prison officials did not violate
the inmate's free exercise rights by requiring him to send a medicine bag obtained from a nonapproved vendor through a unit warden's office for visual inspection. The court found that
officials were not required to distinguish between those who practiced shamanism and those who
did not, where only 1.66 percent of prisoners identified their religious preference as ANative

XX

alleging that California’s protocol governing executions by lethal injection violated the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that the protocol,
as implemented, violated the Eighth Amendment, even though the sequence of three drugs
described in the protocol, when properly administered, would provide for a constitutionally
adequate level of anesthesia. The court found that there were systemic flaws in the
implementation of the protocol that made it impossible to determine with any degree of certainty
whether inmates may have been conscious during previous executions or whether there was any
reasonable assurance going forward that an inmate would be adequately anesthetized. The court
noted “Any legal proceeding arising in this contest thus acts as a powerful magnet, an
opportunity for people who care about this divisive issue to express their opinions and vent their
frustrations.” (San Quentin State Prison)
habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of a disciplinary hearing that resulted in the
imposition of discipline in the form of administrative segregation. The district court denied the
inmate=s petition, finding that the claim that he was denied an impartial disciplinary hearing, as
guaranteed by the due process clause, was not cognizable on habeas review, where the
disciplinary sanctions imposed against the prisoner did not involve any loss of good time credit,
but only confinement to administrative segregation for 15 days. (Delaware Correctional
Institution)

3.64

American. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
2007
U.S. District Court
LENGTH
LIBERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS

Bonet v. Khahaifa, 512 F.Supp.2d 141 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials alleging denial of due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing that resulted in confinement in a
special housing unit (SHU) and loss of good-time credits. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that the inmate’s 180-day confinement in the special housing unit (SHU) did
not violate the inmate's procedural due process rights because it did not impose an atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate, as required to establish interference with a due process liberty interest. (Attica
Correctional Facility and Southport Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Garrett v. Department of Corrections, 589 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla. 2007). A female employee brought
gender discrimination and hostile work environment claims in state court against the Florida Department of
Corrections (DOC) and the State of Florida under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act. Following removal
to federal court, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in
part and denied in part. The court held that the DOC could be held liable for inmate sexual harassment directed
at the female employee, particularly when the department refused to take appropriate corrective action. The
court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employee
subjectively perceived the environment at a prison, in which male inmates made obscene comments and
masturbated in front of her, to be severe and pervasive, and as to whether the inmate's conduct constituted
objectively unreasonable sexual harassment. (Florida Department of Corrections, Lake Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
LENGTH
CONDITIONS

Hunt v. Sapien, 480 F.Supp.2d 1271 (D.Kan. 2007). An inmate sued prison officials, claiming that his
confinement in administrative segregation for more than 850 days violated his right to due process in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court
held that confinement of the inmate in administrative segregation for over 850 days did not impose an atypical
and significant hardship sufficient to deprive him of a protected liberty interest. The court noted that the inmate
was placed in administrative segregation due to his involvement with a prison gang, he was not deprived of
adequate clean clothing or food and was able to check out books, participate in some hobby craft projects, and
participate in mental health programs, and placement in administrative segregation did not affect his parole
eligibility. (El Dorado Correctional Facility, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS

Koerschner v. Warden, 508 F.Supp.2d 849 (D.Nev. 2007). A state prisoner brought a motion for appointment of
counsel for a federal habeas proceeding. The district court granted the motion. The court held that appointment
of counsel was warranted in light of the serious, and potentially constitutionally suspect, limitations placed by
the state prison on the due process right of access to courts by segregation-unit inmates. The court noted that
access to court for inmates in segregation consisted of a new “paging system,” under which inmates can request
a maximum of five specified legal materials at a time, and the assistance of essentially untrained inmate legal
assistants. (Lovelock Correctional Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
MAIL
PROGRAMS
VISITS

Maddox v. Berge, 473 F.Supp.2d 888 (W.D.Wis. 2007). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action under §
1983 against prison officials and employees, alleging that his administrative confinement for participating in a
riot violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that allegations that the prisoner was
confined to his cell 23 hours a day and that he was denied “outside recreation” while he was in administrative
confinement demonstrated injuries from an objectively serious deprivation, for the purposes of his conditions or
confinement claim. The court held that the allegation that the prisoner was subjected to 24-hour illumination
stated a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, although the prisoner did not allege that he suffered
any adverse effects as a result of the lighting. According to the court, the lack of educational or rehabilitative
programming while he was in administrative confinement did not deny the prisoner a minimal civilized measure
of life’s necessities, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court ruled that a prison requirement that the
prisoner leave all of his outgoing nonlegal mail open to be inspected by prison officials did not violate the
prisoner’s First Amendment rights, where his outgoing mail was not censored or delayed. The court allowed the
prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis on his claim that he was denied access to magazines and newspapers in
violation of his First Amendment rights. The district court held that placement of the prisoner in administrative
confinement, which subjected him to highly restricted non-face-to-face visits, lack of communication with other
prisoners, nearly complete idleness in a cell that was constantly illuminated, lack of recreation, extremely limited
out of cell time, and lack of access to any meaningful programming, was not clearly established as conduct that
violated a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights, and therefore the warden and secretary of the corrections
department had qualified immunity from the prisoner’s damages suit under § 1983. (Green Bay Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT
RETALIATION
TRANSFER

Montoya v. Board of County Com'rs, 506 F.Supp.2d 434 (D.Colo. 2007). A jail inmate brought civil rights and
civil rights conspiracy claims against sheriffs, a deputy sheriff, and officials of two counties alleging violation of
his constitutional rights when he was tasered by a correctional officer and later transferred and placed in
segregation in alleged retaliation for complaining to the press about the tasering incident. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that a civil rights claim was not
stated against counties and sheriffs in their official capacities for the inmate's transfer and placement in
segregated confinement in alleged retaliation for his complaints to press, given the inmate's complete failure to
allege any specific facts suggesting that segregation was the result of a custom or policy, rather than being
simply a single act of deprivation disconnected from any wider scheme. According to the court, the county

XXII

3.65

sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity on individual capacity claims involving conspiracy to transfer and
place jail inmate in protective, segregated confinement in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment
rights, absent any indication that the sheriffs, who never communicated with each other about the transfer, were
personally involved in the decision, exercised discretionary control over the decision, or failed to supervise jail
administrators who actually made the transfer. (Chaffee and Park Counties, Colorado)
U.S. District Court
EXERCISE

Moore v. Schuetzle, 486 F.Supp.2d 969 (D.N.D. 2007). A state prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
officials, claiming cruel and unusual punishment and violation of his right of access to courts. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that the Eighth Amendment rights of the
inmate, who had been placed in administrative segregation, were not violated when he was limited to five hours
of outside exercise per week. The court found that the inmate's right of access to courts, and right to counsel,
were not violated when prison officials inadvertently opened letters to the inmate from a state court judge and the
Department of Justice, on two occasions. (North Dakota State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLACEMENT
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

O'Brien v. Indiana Dept. of Correction ex rel. Turner, 495 F.3d 505 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a §
1983 action against a department of correction and a warden arising from an attack by other inmates, alleging
the warden was deliberately indifferent to his safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment. After denying the
prisoner's motion to add additional defendants, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to amend. The court found that the warden was not deliberately indifferent to a substantial
risk of harm to the prisoner by placing the prisoner, who was a former prison guard convicted of rape and other
charges, in a unit where other at-risk inmates were placed, notwithstanding that the prisoner was severely beaten
by other inmates some four and one-half years after his placement in the unit. The court noted that prison staff
initially brought the prisoner into segregation for his safety, and, having considered the nature of the threat
against him and the availability of placing him among the at-risk population, the prison chose to place him with
the other former police officers, guards, and prosecutors, a course of action that had been followed repeatedly in
the past. (Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
HYGIENE
RESTRAINTS

Platt v. Brockenborough, 476 F.Supp.2d 467 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that he was repeatedly placed in punitive segregation, was not permitted to exercise regularly,
and was denied an opportunity to appeal disciplinary decisions. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prison's failure to respond to the
prisoner's numerous grievances regarding his conditions of confinement did not infringe on the prisoner's due
process right of access to the courts, since the prisoner could file suit in federal court. The court found that the
prisoner failed to state a due process claim based on denial of access to a prison law library, where the prisoner
failed to explain even in minimal detail what injury he suffered as a result of the alleged denial of access. The
court noted that access to the prison law library is not a freestanding right, and a prisoner challenging the denial
of access must allege some actual injury to have standing to assert a claim on this basis.
The court found that the prisoner's allegations that he was placed in punitive segregation, denied the means to
maintain a clean cell, was not permitted to shower regularly, and that he was shackled everywhere he went,
failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. But the court held
that the prisoner's allegations that he was allowed to exercise only twice every month, and for one hour each
time, and that he suffered from depression and anxiety as a result of his placement in punitive segregation and
the restrictions on exercise, stated a claim of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. (Philadelphia Industrial Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS

Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3rd Cir. 2007). Three pretrial detainees filed a pro se § 1983 action against a
warden, alleging that their placement in restrictive confinement violated their substantive and procedural due
process rights. The district court dismissed the action and the detainees appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The court held that the detainees’ allegations stated a claim for violation of substantive due process
rights and a claim for violation of procedural due process rights. The court remanded the case for consideration
of the qualified immunity claim. The detainees alleged that they were punished prior to being sentenced by being
placed in restrictive confinement, that they were subjected to lengthy stays in isolation with prisoners who had
disciplinary problems or who were in protective custody, and that they were subjected to additional hardships
that were not shared by the general prison population. The court found that the detainees’ allegations were
sufficiently factual to raise the detainees' right to relief above a speculative level. The detainees also alleged that
they were placed in restrictive confinement indefinitely and removed from the general prison population while
awaiting resentencing after their sentences were vacated, and that they were not given any explanation or
opportunity to contest the restrictive placement. (Security Housing Unit [SHU], Delaware)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against two prison
officers, alleging that they violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to inhumane conditions of
confinement in a disciplinary-segregation unit. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
officers based on qualified immunity, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded,
finding that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officers were
deliberately indifferent to a serious condition. The prisoner alleged that, after a fight with his cellmate, he was
stripped of his clothing and placed in a cell in the disciplinary-segregation unit where he was not permitted to
take any personal property with him. The prisoner asserted that the floor of the cell was covered with water, the
sink and toilet did not work, and the walls were smeared with blood and feces. He was allegedly forced to
remain in the cell without a mattress, sheets, toilet paper, towels, shoes, soap, toothpaste, or any personal
property, for six days. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

XXII

3.66

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ISOLATION
LENGTH

Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F.Supp.2d 654 (M.D.La. 2007). Two state prisoners brought Eighth Amendment
claims for cruel and unusual punishment, and claims under state law, against state officials and prison officials,
including the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, a prison warden, and
members of the lockdown review board, relating to the prisoners' extended lockdown of approximately 28 to 35
years in the prison's closed cell restriction (CCR) unit. The prisoners asserted deprivation of sleep, exercise,
social contact, and environmental stimulation. Both prisoners had been charged with and convicted of murdering
a correctional officer during a riot. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that the Secretary of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections was
not liable, as a supervisory official, to state prisoners under § 1983 for the alleged violation of the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, absent evidence that the Secretary was aware that
the prisoners' extended lockdown allegedly was without a current legitimate penological justification. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prisoners'
extended lockdown, for from approximately 28 to 35 years, in prison's closed cell restriction (CCR) unit deprived
them of at least one of the basic human needs asserted by prisoners, i.e., sleep, exercise, social contact, or
environmental stimulation. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was lack of
legitimate penological justification for the extended lockdown of the prisoners, which was relevant to whether
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to state prisoners' basic human needs. According to the court, prison
officials had fair warning that continued confinement of the prisoners in extended lockdown for over 28 years
could be constitutionally infirm, and thus, they were not entitled to qualified immunity from the prisoners' §
1983 claims alleging cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. (Louisiana State Penitentiary
at Angola, Louisiana)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
EVIDENCE
PLACEMENT

Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2008). A prisoner sued a prison investigator and deputy sheriff under
§ 1983 alleging that they violated his constitutional rights during an investigation of a prison stabbing, for which
the prisoner was convicted and sentenced to death, but later exonerated during a habeas proceeding. Following
the death of the investigator, his estate was substituted as a party. The district court denied the prisoner's motion
to alter or amend judgment and the prisoner appealed. The court held that the investigator and deputy were
qualifiedly immune from the prisoner’s claim of unreasonable seizure, assuming that the prisoner's placement in
a detention cell by the investigator and deputy pursuant to the investigation of a prison stabbing was an arrest
that was supported by arguable probable cause, The court noted that inculpatory evidence against the prisoner
included evidence of a motive to kill the victim and exculpatory evidence included the officer's identification of a
third inmate as the inmate whom the victim was chasing, such that more than a minimal investigation was
required. (Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
RETALIATION
REVIEW
TELEPHONE

Bryant v. Cortez, 536 F.Supp.2d 1160 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights and state law by placing him in an administrative segregation unit (ASU)
for eighteen months pending resolution of a disciplinary charge against him. The district court granted the
officials’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate’s placement in ASU, and the six-month
interval between reviews of the inmate’s retention, did not violate due process. The court held that placement of
the inmate in ASU for eighteen months was not in retaliation for the inmate's refusal to cooperate in a prison
narcotics investigation, and therefore did not violate the inmate's due process rights, where prison officials kept
the inmate in ASU in order to maintain the integrity of an investigation involving the inmate's mother, an
unknown number of prison guards, and at least one other inmate. The court noted that the inmate was serving a
33-year sentence and that confinement in ASU did not affect the inmate's release date. The court held that the
inmate's loss of telephone privileges did not constitute a due process violation, given the availability of alternative
means of communication by mail or in person. (California State Prison, Los Angeles County)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LENGTH
LIBERTY INTEREST

Carmon v. Duveal, 554 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.Conn. 2008). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against several
prison officials, alleging various violations of his constitutional rights. The court held that absent any showing
that he was actually injured by a prison counselor's refusal to notarize certain court documents, the inmate was
not deprived of his constitutional right of access to the courts. According to the court, although the counselor's
refusal to notarize the papers was due to the inmate's failure to submit necessary documentation, the inmate did
not thereafter submit such documentation, he did not allege that the request for documentation was improper,
and he did not show how the lack of notarization hindered his efforts to pursue his legal claims. The court held
that the inmate’s allegation that he remained in administrative segregation for more than 19 months as the result
of a correction official's acts of improperly overruling a decision made at an administrative segregation hearing,
and improperly finding that the inmate's alleged assault on a correctional officer was sexual in nature, stated a §
1983 claim for a due process violation, even though the inmate did not assert additional facts indicating the
nature of the conditions of that segregation. The court found that the prolonged period of segregation might
implicate a protected liberty interest. (Cheshire Correctional Inst., Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
SEPARATION

Cerniglia v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1034 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A detainee who was involuntarily
confined as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under California law brought a § 1983 action, alleging that his
conditions of confinement in a total separation unit in a county jail violated his constitutional rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the detainee
on liability issues. The detainee moved to bar presentation of evidence to the jury of his status as an SVP. The
district court granted the motion, finding that the detainee’s SVP status was not relevant to the issue of whether
his conditions of confinement were reasonably related to legitimate, non-punitive governmental interests, and
that the probative value of the detainee’s status as an SVP was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(Sacramento County Jail, California)

XXII

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U.S. Appeals Court
PLACEMENT
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 2008). A federal prison inmate brought a Bivens action against several
corrections officers, alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment based on the officers'
failure to prevent an assault by a fellow inmate. Following a jury verdict for the inmate on the issue of
administrative exhaustion, the district court granted summary judgment for the officers. The inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. The court found that the subjective prong of the inmate's claim was unsatisfied, since
the inmate had given the officers inadequate details of the danger involved. The prisoner told officers that other
inmates were “pressuring” him and “asking questions,” but never gave more details despite the officers' requests,
preventing them from determining whether a true threat was at play. The inmate declined offers to remain in
protective custody. (Federal Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LENGTH
REVIEW

Harden-Bey v. Rutter, 524 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against several
prison officials challenging his placement and continued confinement in administrative segregation. The district
court dismissed the action, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. The court held that the prisoner's allegation that he was indefinitely placed in administrative
segregation alleged an atypical and significant hardship. The appeals court remanded the case to the district
court to consider the due process claim. (Michigan Department of Corrections, Alger Maximum Correctional
Facility)

U.S. District Court
SEARCHES

Hart v. Celaya, 548 F.Supp.2d 789 (N.D.Cal. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers, alleging excessive force and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that the officers did not use excessive force
in releasing pepper-spray into the prisoner's holding cell after he refused to submit to an unclothed body search.
The court found that the officer did not use excessive force in requiring the prisoner to lift his genitals during an
unclothed body search, even though the prisoner had pepper spray on his hands. The court held that officers
did not use excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they allegedly attempted to trip the
prisoner, pushed him into the frame of a holding cell door, and twisted and pulled his wrists as they put him in
leg restraints in order to move the prisoner from the cell to an outside area where he could be decontaminated
from the officer's use of pepper-spray. The court noted that the prisoner's medical evaluations, prior to and after
the incident indicated that the prisoner did not sustain any injuries, such as cuts, abrasions, swelling or bruises.
(Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL TREATMENT

Hernandez v. Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2008). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging
violations of his Eighth Amendment and due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to all
defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner failed to show
that he was placed at a substantial risk of serious harm when he was placed on lockdown status for 13 months,
and therefore he could not show deliberate indifference on the part of prison personnel to his health or safety, as
required for prison personnel to be liable under § 1983 for imposing conditions of confinement that constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that even if the prisoner suffered
from muscle atrophy, stiffness, loss of range of motion and depression, there was no indication that those
conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm. The court held that the prisoner failed to show that his
confinement on lockdown status for 13 months posed an atypical or significant hardship on him in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life, and he was therefore not deprived of a cognizable due process liberty interest.
According to the court, even if the prisoner was confined to a shared cell with permission to leave only for
showers, medical appointments and family visits, his assignment to lockdown was well within the range of
confinement to be normally expected for a prisoner serving a life sentence for capital murder. (Texas Department
of Criminal Justice, Polunsky Unit)

U.S. District Court
ASSIGNMENT
EVIDENCE
PROGRAMS
RETALIATION

Lindell v. Schneiter, 531 F.Supp.2d 1005 (W..D.Wis. 2008). A prison inmate brought a § 1983 action against
state prison employees, claiming violations of his Eighth and First Amendment rights. The defendants moved for
summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. The court held that the
employees did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the medical condition of the inmate, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, by limiting him to 2.5 hours of exposure to sunlight per week. The court found that the inmate
failed to show a health risk associated with his being forced to use unwashed outerwear when exercising. The
court ruled that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a corrections officer directly told
the inmate that he was being denied access to a desired program because he filed complaints, whether another
officer failed to intervene when the inmate was told he was being retaliated against, and as to the existence of
direct evidence of retaliation. The court noted that there was evidence that two prison security officers directly
stated that the inmate was being placed in restricted housing and denied participation in a desired program
because he brought administrative complaints. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
EXERCISE

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought
a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded. The court held that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading materials, mattresses and beds,
law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, dayroom access (not less than two hours each day), telephone
access and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to correct current ongoing violations of the
pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. Inmates had alleged that they were denied the opportunity for eight hours
of uninterrupted sleep on the night before and the night after each court appearance. The court found that an
injunction relating to restrictions of the detainees' religious rights based on security concerns was narrowly
drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial detainees in
administrative segregation. According to the court, providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative

XXII

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segregation only ninety minutes of exercise per week, less than thirteen minutes per day, constituted punishment
in violation of due process standards. The court also found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate
mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The court affirmed termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court erred in its
finding that two orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXERCISE
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
RESTRICTIONS

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought
a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their constitutional
and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and remanded. The court held that injunctive orders relating to the county jail’s reading materials, mattresses
and beds, law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, telephone access, and communication with jailhouse
lawyers were not necessary to current the current and ongoing violations of pretrial detainees' constitutional
rights. The court found that an injunction relating to restrictions of detainees' religious rights based on security
concerns was narrowly drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right
of pretrial detainees in administrative segregation. The injunctive order, with its provision for the curtailment or
elimination of pretrial detainees' religious rights based on security concerns, provided for no more than a
minimum level of ongoing participation in religious activities. The court held that providing pretrial detainees
housed in administrative segregation only 90 minutes of exercise per week, less than 13 minutes per day,
constituted punishment in violation of due process standards. The court found that an order requiring that
inmates in administrative segregation be permitted exercise at least twice each week for a total of not less than 2
hours per week was necessary to correct the current and ongoing violation. (Orange County Jail System,
California)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ISOLATION

Shine v. Hofman, 548 F.Supp.2d 112 (D.Vt. 2008). A federal pretrial detainee in the custody of the Vermont
Department of Corrections brought a pro se action, alleging violation of his constitutional rights. The detainee
alleged that his mail was opened and returned to him, thereby impeding his ability to communicate with his
attorney, that his placement in close custody limited his ability to access legal materials, and that his placement
in segregation barred him from contacting his attorney and potential witnesses. The district court dismissed in
part. The court held that the inmate did not state a First Amendment claim for deprivation of access to courts,
absent an allegation of actual injury in connection with his challenge to his conviction or sentence. The court
held that the detainee’s allegations that he was subjected to segregation, and that the conditions of segregation
included a small cell with no windows and no opportunity to interact with other human beings, did not state a
claim for violation of the due process clause. The court noted that prisons may impose restrictions on pretrial
detainees so long as those restrictions are related to a non-punitive governmental purpose. (Vermont Department
of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765 (7th Cir. 2008). A state inmate filed a civil rights suit against a prison official
and a correctional officer alleging violation of his due process rights in placing him in administrative segregation
for 59 days, and violation of his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment due to
unsanitary conditions in segregation. The district court granted the official's motion for partial summary
judgment. The court later denied the inmate's motion to amend to add a warden as a defendant and entered
summary judgment for the prison official and correctional officer. The inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that the discretionary placement of the inmate in
non-punitive administrative segregation for 59 days while officials investigated his possible role in a prison riot
did not give rise to a liberty interest entitled to protection under procedural due process. The court noted that the
federal Constitution does not create a liberty interest in avoiding transfer within a correctional facility. However,
the court found that the inmate's sleeping on a moldy and wet mattress involved a sufficiently serious prison
condition to deny a civilized measure of life's necessities, as required for an Eighth Amendment claim. The court
held that summary judgment on the issue of deliberate indifference was precluded by a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether a correctional officer knew about the condition of the inmate's wet and moldy mattress. (New
Lisbon Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
DUE PROCESS
LAW LIBRARY
RETALIATION

XXII

Bandy-Bey v. Crist, 578 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials. The district court awarded summary judgment for the officials, and the prisoner appealed pro se. The
appeals court affirmed. The court held that the discipline imposed on the inmate for his alleged
misrepresentations about a prison official in an officer kite form, in stating that the officer insisted that the
inmate write his legal documents by hand, was not retaliatory. The court noted that the officer's directly
contradictory incident report provided “some evidence” to support the disciplinary action. According to the court,
the discipline imposed on the inmate for his alleged failure to follow an officer's direct order to go to another
officer's office was not retaliatory, where the undisputed evidence showed that the inmate failed to follow the
direct order. The court held that the inmate was not deprived of substantive due process, where he was not
deprived of access to the courts and was not subjected to retaliatory discipline, and the disciplinary sanctions of
10 and 15 days' segregation imposed on him that prevented him from using the law library did not impede his
ability to pursue a non-frivolous claim or offend a protected liberty interest. (Minnesota Correctional Facility in
Lino Lakes, Minnesota)

3.69

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
HYGIENE
PLACEMENT
RESTRAINTS

Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.Supp.2d 977 (E.D.Wis. 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against correctional
facility officials, challenging the conditions of his confinement. The court held that the correctional facility's
enforcement of a behavior action plan that regularly denied the inmate a sleeping mattress, occasionally required
him to wear only a segregation smock or paper gown, and subjected him to frequent restraint did not deny the
inmate the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and was targeted at his misconduct, and thus the plan
did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights. The court noted that the inmate's cell was heated to 73
degrees, he was generally provided some form of dress, he was granted access to hygiene items, and he was only
denied a mattress and other possessions after he used them to perpetrate self-abusive behavior, covered his cell
with excrement and blood, and injured facility staff. The court held that the state Department of Corrections'
regulations governing procedures for placing an inmate on observational status to ensure his safety and the
safety of others, and the procedures for utilizing restraints for inmate safety were sufficient to protect the
inmate's liberty interest in avoiding an erroneous determination that his behavior required such measures. The
procedures governing observational status required the inmate to be orally informed of the reasons for placement
on the status and prohibited placement for more than 15 days without an evidentiary hearing. The procedures
governing restraints prohibited restraining an inmate for more than a 12-hour period. (Green Bay Correctional
Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
RESTRICTIONS

Crawford v. Clarke, 578 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2009). Muslim inmates confined in a special management unit (SMU)
sued the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction (DOC) under the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that he violated their right to freely exercise their religion
by preventing them from participating in Jum'ah Friday group prayer. The district court entered an injunction
requiring closed-circuit broadcasting of Jum'ah in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might
be housed in the future, and subsequently denied the commissioner's motion for reconsideration. The
commissioner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in issuing the injunction requiring corrections officials to provide closed circuit television
broadcasts of services in any SMU in which the plaintiff inmates were housed or might be housed in the future,
as opposed to the SMU in which they were currently housed, without making findings as to whether other SMUs
were suitable for closed circuit broadcasts. The court found that the injunction did not violate the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the prospective relief was narrowly drawn and providing closed-circuit
broadcasting was the least intrusive means to alleviate the burden on the inmates’ rights. The court noted that the
commissioner put nothing in the record to differentiate other SMUs on the issues of a compelling governmental
interest or least restrictive means. (Massachusetts Department of Correction, MCI-Cedar Junction)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Davis v. Barrett, 576 F.3d 129(2nd Cir. 2009). A state prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against a state
department of correctional services (DOCS) hearing officer, seeking damages for the alleged abridgment of his
procedural due process rights in connection with a disciplinary hearing resulting in the prisoner's administrative
segregation for 55 days. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the hearing officer and the
prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the prisoner adequately
exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an administrative appeal following his administrative disciplinary
hearing. The court noted that state prison regulations did not allow the prisoner to separately grieve the hearing
officer's alleged conduct in presiding over the hearing, and the prisoner was not required to grieve separately the
conditions of his administrative confinement to satisfy the exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to the
actual conditions of the prisoner's segregated confinement for 55 days, imposed following a disciplinary hearing.
(Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
ISOLATION
LIBERTY INTEREST

Gray v. Hernandez, 651 F.Supp.2d 1167 (S.D.Cal. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, seeking
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, against an acting warden, captain, and two employees in a prison
library. The prisoner alleged he was placed in administrative segregation pending the investigation of rule
violation charges filed by the two employees, accusing him of attempting to extort money from them by offering
to settle his potential suit against them. The district court held that the prisoner sufficiently alleged a chilling of
his First Amendment right to file grievances and pursue civil rights litigation by alleging that his placement in
administrative segregation caused him mental and financial harms. The court held that the prisoner's allegations
that his placement in administrative segregation forced him to endure 24-hour lock-down, lack of medical
treatment, only one shower every three days, and lack of exercise did not constitute an allegation of a dramatic
departure from the standard conditions of confinement, as would invoke procedural due process protections. The
court noted that an inmate does not have a liberty interest, for purposes of procedural due process, in being
housed at a particular institution or in avoiding isolation or separation from the general prison population, unless
the proposed transfer will subject the inmate to exceptionally more onerous living conditions, such as those
experienced by inmates at a “Supermax” facility. (Mule Creek State Prison, High Desert State Prison, Donovan
State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Greene v. Furman, 610 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action against
corrections officials, alleging various constitutional violations arising out of disciplinary proceedings instituted
after he allegedly spit at another inmate. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that an allegation
that a corrections officer issued a false misbehavior report against the inmate failed to state a claim for a due
process violation. The court noted that the issuance of false misbehavior reports against an inmate by corrections
officers is insufficient on its own to establish a denial of due process. According to the court, the allegation that
the inmate, who was being escorted to a mental health appointment when he became involved in an altercation
with another inmate and was not allowed to continue to his appointment, failed to state a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation. The court found that any delay in the inmate's mental health treatment did not cause him
actual harm or put his health at risk, and there was no evidence that the delay resulted from any sadistic or

XXII

3.70

otherwise impermissible motive. The court held that the allegation that the inmate was denied exercise, showers
and haircuts after he became involved in an altercation with another inmate failed to state a claim for an Eighth
Amendment violation based on his conditions of confinement, where the deprivations alleged were not atypical,
did not result in any physical injury, and did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Southport
Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE SPEECH
RESTRICTIONS

Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner who was formerly on death row and was
housed in a special confinement unit, filed a pro se lawsuit against various officials of the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), alleging that they violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy that
prevented prisoners in a special confinement unit from giving face-to-face interviews with the media. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the BOP policy that prevented prisoners in special confinement units at maximum
security prisons from giving face-to-face or video interviews with the media did not violate the equal protection
clause. According to the court, although the BOP did not prevent such media interviews with other prisoners in
a less secure confinement, the policy was rationally related to the BOP's need for greater security in situations
involving prisoners in special confinement units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could
increase tensions among prisoners, leading to an increased risk of violence among the more violent prisoners.
The court found that the BOP did not violate the prisoner’s free speech rights where the policy was rationally
related to the prison's need for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special confinement units in
maximum security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners, glamorize violence,
and promote celebrity, leading to an increased risk of violence. The court noted that the BOP did allow
correspondence from prisoners in special confinement units to media representatives, prisoners were free to file
lawsuits, and correspondence sent to courts and attorneys by prisoners could not be censored. (“Special
Confinement Unit,” U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
RELIGION
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Houseknecht v. Doe, 653 F.Supp.2d 547 (E.D.Pa. 2009). An inmate brought an action against current and
former deputy wardens alleging they violated his right to freely exercise his religion under the First
Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied in
part. The court held that the restriction of the inmate's religious rights due to his election to enter into protective
custody, under which there were no formal religious ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to
general population inmates, was rationally related to legitimate penological interest in maintaining security and
order, and thus did not violate inmate's First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. According to the
court, it was reasonable for an inmate who opted for more protective conditions to enjoy fewer amenities. The
court noted that the inmate had regular communication with a chaplain who regularly brought reading materials
to the inmates in protective custody, and the inmate was not prevented from sitting with other inmates and
doing his own Bible study in the unit day room. The court held that it could not require the prison to permit
inmates in protective custody to attend formal gatherings with other inmates, given the purpose of protective
custody to segregate inmates who believed that other inmates posed a danger to them, and the provision of
additional reading materials or access to additional religious media programming could likely not be
accomplished without significant cost. The court found that the Inmate's religious exercise was not substantially
burdened by his election to enter into protective custody, under which there were no formal religious
ceremonies or formal classes similar to those provided to general population inmates, as required to establish a
violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The court found that there
was no suggestion that prison officials placed substantial pressure on the inmate to substantially modify his
behavior or to violate his beliefs, he was not forced to choose between following the precepts of his religion and
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to other inmates, and he acknowledged that he received and
read the inmate handbook, which advised that protective custody carried with it restrictions on religious access.
(Berks County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Sital v. Burgio, 592 F.Supp.2d 355 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers, a hearing officer, and a deputy superintendent employed by New York State Department of
Correctional Services (DOCS). The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims, and the prisoner
moved for summary judgment on all but one of his claims. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that no evidence supported a finding that alleged false disciplinary reports
were issued with a retaliatory motive. The court held that the conditions of the prisoner's confinement in a drugwatch room, where he was held for six days so that officers could examine his feces to see if they contained
drugs, and during his nine-month stay in a special housing unit (SHU) did not constitute violations of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishments giving rise to the § 1983 claim. According to
the court, although the conditions were unpleasant, evidence did not support a finding that the conditions were
particularly severe, or that they jeopardized the prisoner's health or safety. The court found that legitimate
penological interests of maintaining prison security and discipline, particularly concerning the suspected
smuggling and possession of illegal drugs, outweighed any privacy right enjoyed by a state prisoner, and thus
the prisoner failed to state a § 1983 claim related to the prisoner being forced to defecate in full view of other
persons in the drug-watch room. (Attica Correctional Facility. New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL TREATMENT

Teague v. Mayo, 553 F.3d 1068 (7th Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against corrections officers.
The district court granted summary judgment for the officers on the claim of deliberate indifference to the
prisoner’s serious medical needs, and, following a jury trial, entered judgment for the officers on an excessive

XXIII

3.71

force claim. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that while the prisoner was in
segregation, two corrections officers could not have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
relating to his degenerative joint disease and other back problems, in violation of Eighth Amendment, where the
officers were not assigned to the segregation unit at the time. (Menard Correctional Institution, Illinois)
2010
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
LENGTH
LIBERTY INTEREST

Dodge v. Shoemaker, 695 F.Supp.2d 1127 (D.Colo. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action, proceeding
in forma pauperis, against prison officials, alleging that she was raped by a lieutenant while incarcerated, and
asserting various due process, equal protection, and Eighth Amendment violations. The officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the issue of whether
the state prisoner's placement in administrative segregation for a period of one year violated her due process
rights could not be determined at the motion to dismiss stage of the prisoner's § 1983 action against prison
officials, because of a factual dispute as to whether the duration of confinement was atypical and significant.
According to the court, the contours of constitutional law were sufficiently clear that the state prison officials
were on notice that assignment of a prisoner to administrative segregation under conditions that imposed a
significant and atypical hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life could give rise to a liberty
interest protected by due process, and, thus, the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity in the
prisoner's § 1983 action, with respect to her due process claim.( Denver Women's Correctional Facility,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
DIET

Greene v. Esgrow, 686 F.Supp.2d 240 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials improperly executed a restricted-diet disciplinary sentence. The district court granted the
officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that imposition of a forty-two meal restricted-diet disciplinary
sentence did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, absent a
showing that the food that inmate was given was nutritionally inadequate, or that his health was adversely
affected or jeopardized by his being placed on the restricted diet. (New York State Department of Correctional
Services, Southport Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
EXERCISE
LAW LIBRARY

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action
against prison officials, alleging denial of his right to court access and violations of the Eighth Amendment. The
district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations that prison officials denied him access to a prison
law library while the facility was on lockdown, and that he was prevented from filing a brief in support of his
state court appeal of his conviction, were sufficient to plead an actual injury as required to state a claim for
violation of his First Amendment right to court access, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The
court held that allegations by the state prisoner that prison officials forced him to choose between spending
eight hours per week for eight months on either exercising outdoors or using the law library to research his §
1983 complaint and state-law habeas petition were sufficient to plead claim of an Eighth Amendment violation.
(California State Prison-Sacramento C-Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LENGTH
LIBERTY INTEREST
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Orr v. Larkins, 610 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought a § 1983 claim against prison officials
alleging his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment
were violated when he was kept in administrative segregation for nine months. The district court dismissed the
complaint as frivolous and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's
nine-month stay in administrative segregation did not constitute an atypical and significant hardship when
compared to the burdens of ordinary prison life, as required to support the inmate's claim that his liberty
interests under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated. The court found that prison officials who provided
the inmate with anti-depressants, and later with anti-psychotic medication, during his nine-month stay in
administrative segregation, were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's worsening mental illness, as
required to support the inmate's Eighth Amendment claim. (Eastern Reception, Diagnostic and Correctional
Center, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
FREE SPEECH
RELIGION

Rupe v. Cate, 688 F.Supp.2d 1035 (E.D.Cal. 2010). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials
for violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), alleging that the officials failed to accommodate his Druid religious
practices and retaliated against him for protected activities. The officials moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the prisoner stated claim for retaliation by
prison officials for conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause by alleging that he was strip-searched as
harassment for writing letters to prison and government officials in which he complained about the lack of
accommodations for his religion. The prisoner also alleged that officials conspired to place him in
administrative segregation and ultimately to transfer him to requite his complaints about their previous adverse
actions against him, and that the actions taken against him were motivated solely by the officials' desire to
inhibit his religious worship. The court found that the prisoner stated a claim against prison officials for
violation of his right to equal protection by alleging that he and other Pagans were denied opportunities to
practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions and that the officials engaged in a pattern of
discrimination against Pagan practitioners. (Mule Creek State Prison, California Department of Corrections)

XXIII

3.72

U.S. District Court
ISOLATION
LIBERTY INTEREST
TRANSFER
LENGTH
CONDITIONS

Silverstein v. Federal Bureau Of Prisons, 704 F.Supp.2d 1077 (D.Colo. 2010). A federal inmate brought a civil
rights action against the Bureau of Prisons and correctional officers, challenging conditions of his confinement.
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. The court held that the allegation that the
inmate was indefinitely placed in solitary confinement, isolated from other inmates and correctional facility
staff, and subjected to continuous lighting and camera surveillance, was sufficient to allege a liberty interest in
conditions of his confinement. The court found that the allegation that the inmate was subjected to solitary
confinement for more than two decades was sufficient to state claim under the Eighth Amendment against the
Bureau. But, according to the court, the inmate did not have a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to
administrative segregation facility. (United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum facility, Florence,
Colorado)

U.S. District Court
RETALIATION
CONDITIONS

Tafari v. McCarthy, 714 F.Supp.2d 317 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
employees of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging, among other things,
that the employees violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force, destroying his
personal property, denying him medical care, and subjecting him to inhumane conditions of confinement. The
employees moved for summary judgment, and the prisoner moved to file a second amended complaint and to
appoint counsel. The court held that a state prison correctional officer's alleged throwing of urine and feces on
the prisoner to wake him up, while certainly repulsive, was de minimis use of force, and was not sufficiently
severe to be considered repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and thus the officer's conduct did not violate
the Eighth Amendment.
The court found that officers who were present in the prisoner's cell when another officer allegedly threw
urine and feces on the prisoner lacked a reasonable opportunity to stop the alleged violation, given the brief and
unexpected nature of the incident, and thus the officers present in the cell could not be held liable for failing to
intervene. The court found that even if a correctional officers' captain failed to thoroughly investigate the
alleged incident in which one officer threw urine and feces on the prisoner to wake him up, such failure to
investigate did not violate the prisoner's due process rights, since the prisoner did not have due process right to
a thorough investigation of his grievances.
According to the court, one incident in which state correctional officers allegedly interfered with the
prisoner's outgoing legal mail did not create a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of the prisoner's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, absent a showing that the prisoner suffered any actual injury, that his access
to courts was chilled, or that his ability to legally represent himself was impaired.
The court held that there was no evidence that the state prisoner suffered any physical injury as result of an
alleged incident in which a correctional officer spit chewing tobacco in his face, as required to maintain an
Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of medical care.
The court found that, even if a state prisoner's right to file prison grievances was protected by the First
Amendment, a restriction limiting the prisoner's filing of grievances to two per week did not violate the
prisoner's constitutional rights, since the prisoner was abusing the grievance program. The court noted that the
prisoner filed an exorbitant amount of grievances, including 115 in a two-month period, most of which were
deemed frivolous.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state
correctional officers used excessive force against the prisoner in the course of his transport to a different
facility. The court held that state correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the
prisoner's § 1983 excessive force claim arising from his alleged beating by officers during his transfer to a
different facility, where a reasonable juror could have concluded that the officers knew or should have known
that their conduct violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, and it was clearly established that prison
official's use of force against an inmate for reasons that did not serve penological purpose violated the inmate's
constitutional rights. The inmate allegedly suffered injuries, including bruises and superficial lacerations on his
body, which the court found did not constitute a serious medical condition.
The court held that state prison officials' alleged retaliatory act of leaving the lights on in the prisoner's cell
in a special housing unit (SHU) 24 hours per day did not amount to cruel and unusual treatment, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the prisoner failed to demonstrate a causal connection between
his conduct and the adverse action of leaving the lights on 24 hours per day, since the illumination policy
applied to all inmates in SHU, not just the prisoner, and constant illumination was related to a legitimate
penological interest in protecting both guards and inmates in SHU. (New York State Department of
Correctional Services, Eastern New York Correctional Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE

Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the officials' motion for
summary judgment and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
the prison officials knew that a serious risk of harm existed for the prisoner, who was denied exercise for nearly
14 months, as required for the prisoner's § 1983 action. According to the court, officials made and reviewed a
decision to keep the prisoner confined without out-of-cell exercise, and the prisoner submitted repeated written
and oral complaints. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether prison officials acted reasonably in confining the prisoner for nearly 14 months. The court noted
that officials may be more restrictive than they otherwise may be if a genuine emergency exists, and certain
services may be suspended temporarily, but the court found that even where security concerns might justify a
limitation on permitting a prisoner to mingle with the general prison population, such concerns do not explain
why other exercise arrangements are not made. (Salinas Valley State Prison, California)

XXIII

3.73

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Marion, 708 F.Supp.2d 1131 (D.Or. 2010). An inmate who was charged with assaulting a fellow inmate
moved to suppress evidence for lack of a Miranda warning during administrative interviews and disciplinary
proceedings at the prison. The district court held that the inmate, who was housed in a segregated housing unit
(SHU), was “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda, granting the inmate’s motion. The court noted that SHU
confinement imposed severe restrictions on the inmate's movements within the prison and the inmate's transfer
to SHU limited the freedom of movement he enjoyed when housed with the general prison population. The
court noted that in SHU, the inmate was in his cell 23 hours a day, could not eat with other prisoners, could not
access the same type of recreation or converse with other prisoners, and could not move freely to the various
destinations in the prison. (Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. District Court
LIBERTY INTEREST

Webster v. Fischer, 694 F.Supp.2d 163 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). An inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and violations of his constitutional rights, federal
statutes, state law, and regulations. The inmate sough declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, as well as
money damages in the amount of $500,000. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. The court held that misbehavior reports and disciplinary actions were not in retaliation for the
inmate's participation in an inmate liaison committee, where the inmate was found guilty of the charges in the
misbehavior reports based on admissions at a disciplinary hearing. The court found that the inmate did not
suffer from the infliction of any physical injury or pain as a result of a corrections officers' allegedly harassing
conduct. According to the court, the inmate did not suffer deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty
interest by confinement in a special housing unit for 90 days. The court held that the inmate's sleep apnea was
not sufficiently serious to warrant Eighth Amendment protection, where the inmate admitted that he did not use
a breathing machine for a 90-day period that he was confined to a special housing unit, and there was no
evidence that the inmate experienced any physical deterioration or other consequences as a result of the lapse in
treatment. The court held that there was no evidence that the inmate was placed on a mail watch or that any of
his mail was illegally opened or intentionally misdirected. (Cayuga Correctional Facility, New York State
Department of Correctional Services)
2011

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
HEARING
PLACEMENT

Abdur-Raheem v. Selsky, 806 F.Supp.2d 628 (W.D.N.Y. 2011.) A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against state
prison employees, alleging various constitutional violations. The employees moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner’s allegations that he did not
receive a written recommendation that he be administratively segregated for security reasons, and that he was
not informed of the hearing concerning administrative segregation until the day of the hearing, sufficiently
alleged that he was denied the opportunity to prepare and present a defense to allegations contained in the
recommendation, and thus stated cause of action against a state prison official for a due process violation.
(Elmira Correctional Facility, New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
REVIEW
PRIVILEGES

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been,
incarcerated in communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to
monitor high-risk prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and BOP officials, alleging that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
Four additional prisoners moved to intervene and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
motion to intervene, and granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that even
though a federal prisoner who had been convicted of solicitation of bank robbery was no longer housed in the
federal prison's communication management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue
constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for alleged violations since there was a realistic threat
that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The court noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in CMU
because of the nature of his underlying conviction and because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates,
and these reasons for placing him in CMU remained.
The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners housed within a communication
management unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were
monitored and subject to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month, and that
prisoners' telephone calls were limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First
Amendment right to family integrity, since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest. The court noted that prisoners assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or
domestic terrorism or had misused approved communication methods while incarcerated.
The court found that prisoners confined to a communication management unit (CMU), stated a procedural
due process claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by alleging that the requirements imposed on CMU
prisoners were significantly different than those imposed on prisoners in the general population, and that there
was a significant risk that procedures used by the BOP to review whether prisoners should initially be placed
within CMU or should continue to be incarcerated there had resulted in erroneous deprivation of their liberty
interests. The court noted that CMU prisoners were allowed only eight hours of non-contact visitation per
month and two 15 minute telephone calls per week, while the general population at a prison was not subjected
to a cap on visitation and had 300 minutes of telephone time per month. The court also noted that the
administrative review of CMU status, conducted by officials in Washington, D.C., rather than at a unit itself,
was allegedly so vague and generic as to render it illusory.
The court held that the conditions of confinement experienced by prisoners housed within a communication
management unit (CMU), did not deprive the prisoners of the “minimum civilized measure of life's necessities”
required to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), since the deprivation did not
involve the basics of food, shelter, health care or personal security.

XXIII

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The court found that a federal prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) by alleging: (1) that he was “an outspoken and litigious prisoner;” (2) that he had written books
about improper prison conditions and filed grievances and complaints on his own behalf; (3) that his prison
record contained “no serious disciplinary infractions” and “one minor communications-related infraction” from
1997; (4) that prison staff told him he would be “sent east” if he continued filing complaints; and (5) that he
filed a complaint about that alleged threat and he was then transferred to a high-risk inmate monitoring
communication management unit (CMU) at a federal correctional institution. (Communication Management
Units at Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute, Indiana and Marion, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EVIDENCE
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION

Collins v. Ferguson, 804 F.Supp.2d 134 (W.D.N.Y. 2011.) A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action asserting
due process claims against the Commissioner of a state Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and
corrections officers. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations that the official who conducted his disciplinary hearing
refused to provide him with documents relating to the testing of his urine sample, that he refused to ask
witnesses certain “vital” questions that the prisoner had requested, that he continually rephrased questions to the
officer witnesses in a way that was designed to elicit answers that were detrimental to the prisoner's defense,
and that he accepted the officers' testimony at face value, without any corroborating documentary support, were
sufficient to state a due process claim against the official. The court found that the prisoner's allegation that the
Commissioner of the state Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) initially modified the result of the
prisoner's superintendent's hearing, and later reversed that result after the prisoner had served his full sentence
of 180 days in a Special Housing Unit (SHU), was sufficient to state a due process claim against the
Commissioner. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Holmes v. Fischer, 764 F.Supp.2d 523 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials violated his constitutional rights by subjecting him to non-random urinalysis drug testing,
confining him in a special housing unit (SHU), and denying medical care. The defendants moved for a more
definite statement, to strike the complaint, and to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The inmate
alleged that, while incarcerated in a special housing unit (SHU): (1) he was routinely cuffed from behind,
aggravating left shoulder and leg conditions resulting from previous injuries, (2) he was subjected to continuous
illumination in his cell, rendering it impossible to sleep; (3) officials interfered with the inmate grievance he
attempted to file regarding constant SHU cell illumination; (4) he was denied dental floss; (5) he was denied,
during winter months, proper boots, gloves, hat, and thermos; (6) he was exposed to feces thrown by mentallyill inmates confined to SHU; (7) he was denied proper medical treatment and tests; and (8) he was subjected to
urinalysis testing which so traumatized him as to cause physical harm. The court held that these allegations
were sufficient to state claims under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate
indifference to necessary medical care. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was subjected to
urinalysis based on reports from confidential informants whose credibility and reliability had not been
confirmed, despite the complete absence of any history of drug use, and that two random urinalysis tests to
which he was subjected were done to retaliate against him for filing inmate grievances regarding non-random
urinalysis testing, were sufficient to state an unreasonable search claim under the Fourth Amendment, The court
found that the inmate’s allegation that, as a result of repeated non-random urinalysis drug testing to which he
was subjected, he suffered physical harm, including insomnia, nausea, headaches, burning eyes, aggravation of
an old gunshot wound, inability to exercise, and appetite loss, was sufficient to state a cruel and unusual
punishment claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Elmira Correctional Facility, and Southport Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURTS
LAW LIBRARIES

McCree v. Grissom, 657 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2011). A federal inmate brought a Bivens action against prison
officers, alleging denial of access to the courts. The district court dismissed the complaint and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate was not denied access to the courts in his
previous § 1983 action by being placed in special housing, which had a new research system he did not know
how to use and he was not instructed in its use. The court noted that the inmate filed a notice of appeal, a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion to reconsider the denial of that motion, and a motion to suspend
appeal. (Federal Correctional Institution Greenville, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MAIL
RELIGION
VISITS
WORK

Murphy v. Lockhart, 826 F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Mich. 2011). An inmate at a maximum correctional facility in
Michigan brought a § 1983 action against various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) employees
alleging that his placement in long-term and/or indefinite segregation was unconstitutional, that he was
prohibited from communicating with his friends and family, and that his ability to practice his Christian religion
was being hampered in violation of his First Amendment rights. The inmate also alleged that the MDOC's mail
policy was unconstitutional. The defendants moved for summary judgment and for a protective order. The court
held that the prisoner's statements in a published magazine article discussing an escape attempt were protected
speech, and that a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the retaliation claims against the other facility's
warden, resident unit manager, and assistant resident unit supervisor stemming from the prisoner's participation
in that article. The Esquire Magazine article discussed security flaws at the correctional facility, detailing the
prisoners' escape plan and revealing which prison staff he manipulated and how he obtained and built necessary
tools to dig a tunnel. The court noted that the prisoner's statements were not directed to fellow inmates, and
rather he spoke on issues relating to prison security and was critical of the conduct of Michigan Department of
Corrections personnel, which resulted in his near-successful prison break.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact, as to whether the
defendants' proffered legitimate grounds for removing the prisoner from his coveted administrative segregation
work assignment as a porter/painter/laundry worker--discovery that he possessed contraband--were a pretext to

3.75

retaliate for his protected speech in the published magazine article. (Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility,
Kinross Correctional Facility, Standish Correctional Facility, Michigan)
U.S. Appeals Court
RECREATION

Noble v. Adams, 646 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison officials
who were responsible for a post-riot lockdown of a prison, alleging that the lockdown resulted in denial of his
Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise. The district court denied the officials' motion for summary
judgment and subsequently denied the officials' motion for reconsideration. The officials appealed. The appeals
court reversed and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the state prison officials were
entitled to qualified immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the post-riot lockdown of prison resulted in
denial of his Eighth Amendment right to outdoor exercise because it was not clearly established at the time of
the lockdown, nor was it established yet, precisely how or when a prison facility housing problem inmates must
return to its normal operations, including outdoor exercise, during and after a state of emergency called in
response to a major riot. (Corcoran State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST

Thomas v. Calero, 824 F.Supp.2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate at a state prison filed a pro se § 1983 action
against prison officials alleging that they violated his civil rights by filing false misbehavior reports, testifying
falsely at his disciplinary hearing, denying him the right to call two witnesses at the hearing, then affirming the
findings of the hearing. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that: (1) the inmate had no constitutional right to be free from false testimony at a
disciplinary hearing; (2) the inmate's confinement in a special housing unit (SHU) for 291 days was sufficient,
for pleading purposes, to implicate a liberty interest; (3) his complaint stated claim for a due process violation
in the disciplinary hearing; and (4) the complaint sufficiently alleged the personal involvement of a prison
official in an ongoing constitutional violation, as required to state claim against the prison's director of special
housing for violation of the inmate's due process rights. (Department of Correctional Services, Special Housing
Unit, Sing Sing Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
CONDITIONS

Troy D. v. Mickens, 806 F.Supp.2d 758 (D.N.J. 2011.) Two juvenile delinquents brought a § 1983 action
against mental health providers and the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC), alleging that the actions
of the defendants while the delinquents were in custody violated the Fourteenth Amendment and New Jersey
law. One of the plaintiffs was 15 years old when he was adjudicated as delinquent and remained in custody for
a total of 225 days. For approximately 178 of those days, the delinquent was held in isolation under a special
observation status requiring close or constant watch, purportedly for his own safety. Although the delinquents
were placed in isolation for different reasons, the conditions they experienced were similar. Each was confined
to a seven-foot-by-seven-foot room and allowed out only for hygiene purposes. The rooms contained only a
concrete bed slab, a toilet, a sink, and a mattress pad. One delinquent was allegedly held in extreme cold, and
the other was allegedly isolated for four days in extreme heat. Both were denied any educational materials or
programming, and were prevented from interacting with their peers. One delinquent’s mattress pad was often
removed, a light remained on for 24 hours a day, and he was often required to wear a bulky, sleeveless smock.
Both delinquents were allegedly denied mental health treatment during their periods in isolation.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion. The court held
that there was no evidence that a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC)
facilities was educated about filing a form with a social worker as the procedure for filing an administrative
grievance, as required for the procedure to be available to the delinquent to exhaust his § 1983 claims against
JJC and mental health providers. The court also found that there was no evidence the New Jersey Juvenile
Justice Commission (JJC) provided written notice to the juvenile delinquent housed at JJC facilities of the
opportunity to appeal their disciplinary sanctions, which would have triggered the requirement that he appeal
each sanction within 48 hours of notice, as required to exhaust administrative remedies.
The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to: (1) whether
the New Jersey Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) and mental health providers were deliberately indifferent
towards conditions of confinement, in protecting and in providing medical care for the juvenile delinquent
housed in JJC facilities; (2) whether placing the juvenile delinquent housed in temporary close custody and
special observation status implicated a liberty interest; (3) whether a juvenile delinquent housed in New Jersey
Juvenile Justice Commission (JJC) facilities had procedural due process protections available to him upon a
change of status; (4) whether the juvenile delinquent had a liberty interest implicated in his transfer to a more
restrictive placement; (5) whether the juvenile delinquent had sufficient procedural due process protections
available to him upon transfer to a more restrictive placement; and (6) whether the New Jersey Juvenile Justice
Commission (JJC) and mental health providers acted with malice or reckless indifference. (New Jersey Juvenile
Justice Commission, Juvenile Medium Security Facility, New Jersey Training School, Juvenile Reception and
Assessment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH
REVIEW
DUE PROCESS

Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2011). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against deputy director
of a department of correction and various wardens alleging that his approximately 14-year continuous detention
in administrative segregation violated his procedural due process rights. Following a bench trial, the district
court found that four of the five defendants had denied the inmate due process, awarded $4,846 in nominal
damages, and denied punitive damages. Both parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that the inmate's administrative segregation reviews were not meaningful
under the due process clause. The court noted that one warden testified that the inmate's seven-years' worth of
clean history was irrelevant to him, another warden confirmed that even if the inmate proved to be a model
prisoner his vote would always be that the inmate remain in administrative segregation in light of his past
transgressions, and the wardens failed to explain to the inmate with any specificity why he constituted a
continuing threat to the security and good order of prison. The court found that the director conducted his

3.76

review in a meaningful fashion. The court ruled that the inmate was not entitled to a per-day nominal damages
award for each day spent in administrative segregation, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
not awarding punitive damages. (Tucker Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas)
2012
U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
LENGTH
LIBERTY INTEREST
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PROGRAMS

Anderson v. Colorado, Dept. of Corrections, 848 F.Supp.2d 1291 (D.Colo. 2012). An inmate brought an action
against a state, the Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden asserting violations of
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. The inmate moved for partial summary judgment and to reopen discovery, and the defendants moved for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the maximum security prison's denial of outdoor exercise to the inmate for the more
than 11 years of his incarceration was sufficiently serious and whether prison officials acted intentionally or
with deliberate indifference. The court also found genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate's lack
of outdoor exercise during his 11 years of incarceration caused his muscles to grow weaker, on the grounds that
the inmate could demonstrate a physical injury. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether prison officials arbitrarily administered a demerit program that would
allow the inmate to progress to higher levels and ultimately out of administrative segregation and into the general population, depriving him of a liberty interest without the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court held that summary judgment was also precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to
whether a primary reason that the inmate had not progressed out of administrative segregation and into the
general population was that he was denied a prescribed non-formulary medication, such that his mental illness
was improperly and inadequately treated, and whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious mental health condition when he did not receive certain medications prescribed by physicians for
the treatment of his mental illness. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to whether the inmate received adequate treatment for his mental illness, with regard to
his Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims against the state and prison officials. (Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
EXERCISE
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
MEDICAL TREATMENT
CONDITIONS

Anderson v. Colorado, 887 F.Supp.2d 1133 (D.Colo. 2012). A mentally ill inmate sued a state, its Department
of Corrections (DOC), the DOC's director, and a warden, asserting claims for alleged violations of due process,
the Eighth Amendment bar against cruel and unusual punishment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
and the Rehabilitation Act. Following a bench trial, the district court held that: (1) denying the inmate in
administrative segregation any opportunity to be outdoors and to engage in some form of outdoor exercise for
period of 12 years was a serious deprivation of a human need; (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to the inmate's mental and physical health; (3) the inmate failed to establish that he was denied a necessary and
appropriate medication in violation of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (4) the defendants had to assign a
bdepartment psychiatrist to reevaluate the inmate's current mental health treatment needs and take steps
concluded to be appropriate in the psychiatrist's medical judgment; (5) the inmate failed to establish a violation
of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act due to the alleged denial of
treatment provided by a multidisciplinary treatment team; (6) the inmate had a due process-protected liberty
interest in progressing out of administrative segregation; and (7) the new stratified incentive system that was
being implemented with respect to inmates in administrative segregation, if used fairly, was consistent with due
process. (Colorado Department of Corrections, Colorado State Penitentiary)

U.S. Appeals Court
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
RETALIATION

Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate brought a civil rights action against prison
officials and employees, alleging, among other things, that the defendants failed to protect him from inmate
violence, and that the defendants placed him in a special housing unit (SHU) in retaliation for exercising his
First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed
among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they fouled up the operation and the inmates
discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, the inmate contended he repeatedly
begged the officials responsible for help, but no one took any preventive measures. Later, one of the inmates
against whom inmate had cooperated, along with two others, beat him while they were together in a locked
recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon also attacked the inmate in
the recreation pen. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) the officials'
decision to keep the inmate, who had acted as an informant, in SHU after his cooperation with the officials was
not unreasonable; (2) the officials were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's safety when they placed him in a
recreation yard with prisoners who were aware of his complicity with officials by informing on them; (3) the
officials were not deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm when they placed the inmate in the yard with a
prisoner who had a history of violent assaults against other inmates; (4) the inmate stated a failure-to-protect
claim with respect to the officer's failure to intervene in the assault, where he intervened in another prisoner's
assault on the inmate in the special housing unit's (SHU) recreation yard “only after several minutes of
continued pummeling;” and (6) the inmate stated a substantive due process claim. The court noted that the
federal inmate, who was either not yet convicted, or convicted but not yet sentenced, when he was attacked by
other inmates in the prison's recreation yard, had a clearly established due process right to have prison officials
protect him from inmate violence. (Federal Detention Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
GOOD TIME
RETALIATION

Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533 (3rd Cir. 2012). A federal inmate petitioned for habeas relief arguing that the
federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) illegally referred him to the Special Management Unit (SMU) of a penitentiary
in which he was currently placed, as punishment for filing numerous lawsuits against the BOP. The district
court dismissed the action. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate's

3.77

petition for habeas relief did not concern the execution of his sentence, and thus the district court did not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over it, since the inmate did not allege that the BOP's conduct was somehow
inconsistent with the command or recommendation in the sentencing judgment; even if the inmate's placement
in SMU made him eligible to lose good time credits, he might not end up losing any. (United States
Penitentiary, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
REVIEW

Disability Law Center v. Massachusetts Dept. of Correction, 960 F.Supp.2d 271 (D.Mass. 2012). A nonprofit
organization, which represented mentally ill prisoners, brought an action against a state's Department of
Correction, alleging that the Department and its officials violated the federal constitutional rights of prisoners
by subjecting them to disciplinary and other forms of segregation for prolonged periods of time. After extensive
negotiations, the parties jointly moved for approval of a settlement agreement. The district court granted the
motion, finding the agreement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The court noted that the agreement
addressed the fundamental issue of prison suicides by providing a process for minimizing the possibility that
inmates with serious mental illnesses would be confined in segregation, and for reviewing their mental health
while in segregation. The court held that the agreement did not order any “prospective relief,” or in fact any
“relief” at all, thereby precluding the applicability of the requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), that prospective relief not extend further than necessary to remedy violation of a federal right.
(Massachusetts Department of Correction)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
MEDICAL CARE
PROGRAMS

Henderson v. Thomas, 891 F.Supp.2d 1296 (M.D.Ala. 2012). State prisoners, on behalf of themselves and a
class of all current and future HIV-positive (HIV+) prisoners, filed a class action against prison officials,
seeking declaratory judgment that the Alabama Department of Corrections' (ADOC) policy of segregating
HIV+ prisoners from the general prison population violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act, and seeking an injunction against further enforcement of the policy. The district court
denied the officials’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly
alleged that HIV-positive prisoners suffered from an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity,
as required to state claims that the ADOC HIV-segregation policy discriminated against prisoners on the basis
of a disability in violation of ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. According to the court, the complaint provided
information on the contemporary medical consensus regarding HIV treatment and alleged that each named
plaintiff was diagnosed with HIV, that HIV was an impairment of the immune system, that HIV substantially
limited the named plaintiffs in one or more major life activities, and that HIV qualified as a disability. The court
found that the prisoners' class action complaint plausibly alleged that they were otherwise qualified individuals
with a disability due to their HIV-positive status on the grounds that reasonable accommodations could be made
to eliminate the significant risk of HIV+ prisoners transmitting HIV while integrated with other prisoners. The
complaint alleged details of the programs and accommodations for which HIV+ prisoners were ineligible,
alleged that all but two state penal systems had integrated HIV+ prisoners into the general prison population,
and alleged that the National Commission on Correctional Health Care counseled against segregation.
(Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
ISOLATION

Johnston v. Maha, 845 F.Supp.2d 535 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county sheriff, employees of a county jail, and others, alleging, among other things, violations of his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the detainee appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the
district court held that: (1) a fact issue as to whether a correctional officer assaulted the detainee precluded
summary judgment on the detainee's Eighth Amendment claim; (2) summary judgment was precluded by fact
issue as to whether the detainee was twice placed in isolation as a form of punishment without being given
advance notice or opportunity to be heard; and (3) summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to
whether the detainee exhausted administrative remedies as to the claim that a correctional officer placed him in
an isolation cell without prior notice. (Genesee County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXERCISE
RECREATION

Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2012). An Illinois state prisoner, who was wheelchair-bound due to a
“nerve condition,” brought an action against several prison employees, alleging that refusing to allow him to
engage in physical outdoor recreational activity violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
prisoner was housed in segregation, therefore confined to his one-person cell 23 hours a day. The district court
dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court
found that an alleged prison “quorum rule” that will not allow a disabled inmate to engage in outdoor recreation
unless at least nine other disabled inmates want to do so as well, seemed arbitrary. The court noted that
recreation, including aerobic exercises that cannot be performed in a cell, is particularly important to the health
of a person confined to a wheelchair. According to the court, whether seven weeks without such recreation can
result in serious harm to someone in the plaintiff's condition is a separate question not yet addressed in the
litigation. (Pinckneyville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
MEDICAL TREATMENT

Parkell v. Danberg, 871 F.Supp.2d 341 (D.Del. 2012). A state inmate who developed a staphylococcus
infection brought an action against the corporation that contracted with the prison to provide medical services to
inmates and the corporation's employees, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of Eighth Amendment. The inmate also alleged that the
corporation violated his substantive due process rights by refusing to treat him while he was housed in isolation.
The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The district court held that the inmate stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment medical needs claim
against the employee with his allegations in his complaint that: (1) an employee of the corporation refused to

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examine the inmate; (2) the employee ignored the inmate's complaints of an infected arm, and refused to
administer a pain reliever; (3) over the next few days his condition worsened and correctional officers notified
the on-duty physician regarding the inmate's condition; and (4) the physician performed a medical procedure on
the inmate's elbow approximately one week following his visit with the employee. The court found that the
inmate stated a § 1983 Eighth Amendment medical needs claim against the corporation with his allegations that
the corporation had policies, customs, or practices of refusing to treat the inmate, who developed a
staphylococcus infection, particularly when he was housed in isolation. According to the court, the inmate
stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim against the corporation with his allegations that he was subjected
to conditions significantly worse than other inmates under similar circumstances, and that because of his
security classification, the corporation refused to treat him while housed in isolation, and refused to enter his
cell to provide treatment while he was housed in the infirmary. (Howard R. Young Correctional Institution,
Delaware)
U.S. District Court
LENGTH
CONDITIONS

Peoples v. Fischer, 898 F.Supp.2d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner who was housed in segregation for
over two years brought an action against prison officials, alleging the defendants violated his right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment. After the district court dismissed the prisoner's complaint in part, the
defendants moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the prison officials were arguably put on sufficient notice that a sentence of three years of special
housing unit (SHU) confinement for a non-violent infraction of prison rules could well be found to be grossly
disproportionate and, therefore, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, such that the conduct of the prison
officials in sentencing the prisoner to such a sentence could be found to have violated the prisoner's clearly
established right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The court denied qualified immunity for the
prison officials, noting that numerous courts had found that long stretches of segregation could constitute cruel
and unusual punishment, and courts had repeatedly determined that the conditions of segregated confinement
were unconstitutional if they did not meet certain minimum standards. The court noted that the prisoner was
housed in segregation for over two years even though there was never any finding that he posed a threat to the
safety of others or the security of the prison. (Upstate Correctional Facility, Green Haven Correctional Facility,
New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
RESTRICTIONS
REVIEW
TRANSFER

Rezaq v. Nalley, 677 F.3d 1001 (10th Cir. 2012). Federal inmates, who were convicted of terrorism-related
offenses, brought an action against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and BOP officials, alleging that they
had a liberty interest in avoiding transfer without due process to the Administrative Maximum Prison (ADX).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The inmates appealed. The appeals
court held that the action was not moot, even though the inmates were currently housed in less-restrictive
facilities when compared to ADX, where the inmates' transfers to less-restrictive facilities did not completely
and irrevocably eradicate the effects of the alleged violation because the inmates were never returned to their
pre-ADX placements, and some prospective relief remained available. The court found that the inmates did not
have a liberty interest in avoiding conditions of confinement at Administrative Maximum Prison (ADX), and
thus the inmates were not entitled to due process in the BOP's transfer determination. According to the court,
the inmates' segregated confinement related to and furthered by the BOP's legitimate penological interests in
prison safety and national security, conditions of confinement at ADX, although undeniably harsh, were not
extreme, inmates' placements at ADX did not increase the duration of their confinement, and the inmates'
placements at ADX were not indeterminate, as the inmates were given regular reevaluations of their placements
in the form of twice-yearly program reviews. (Administrative Maximum Prison, Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
HYGIENE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
RESTRAINTS

Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services, 675 F.3d 650 (7th Cir. 2012). Following a pretrial detainee's
death while incarcerated, his parents, representing his estate filed suit pursuant to § 1983, alleging among other
things that jail officials and medical personnel had deprived the pretrial detainee of due process by exhibiting
deliberate indifference to his declining mental and physical condition. The district court entered summary
judgment against the estate. The estate filed a second suit reasserting the state wrongful death claims that the
judge in the first suit had dismissed without prejudice after disposing of the federal claims. The district court
dismissed that case on the basis of collateral estoppel, and the estate appealed both judgments. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was
precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to the
pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement, and whether his conditions of confinement were sufficiently
serious to support his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court noted that whether the detainee
himself created the unsanitary conditions was a fact relevant to the claim, but given detainee's mental condition,
it did not foreclose the claim. The court found that the estate failed to show that the detainee's assignment to an
administrative segregation unit of the jail for approximately seven months violated the detainee's due process
rights, where the estate failed to identify feasible alternatives and to tender evidence supporting the contention
that the detainee likely would have fared better in one of those alternative placements.
The court held that jail officials did not employ excessive force, in violation of due process, to the pretrial
detainee who had been fighting with his cellmate and failed to comply with a directive that he step out of his
cell which he refused to leave for 18 hours, by spraying his face with pepper foam, and placing him in a
restraint chair. The court held that jail officials did not have notice of a substantial risk that the mentally ill
pretrial detainee might be assaulted by other inmates, as required to support the pretrial detainee's claim of
deliberate indifference in violation of due process. The court noted that while jail personnel were aware that the
detainee had a hygiene problem, they had no notice that he was at risk of assault because of that problem,
particularly within the more secure confines of the administrative segregation unit. The court found that neither
jail guards or supervisors were deliberately indifferent to the risk that the mentally ill pretrial detainee might
engage in a behavior such as compulsive water drinking that would cause him to die within a matter of hours

3.79

and did not consciously disregarded that risk, and therefore they were not liable for his death under § 1983.
According to the court, while a factfinder might conclude that the guards exhibited a generalized recklessness
with respect to the safety of the inmates housed in the administrative segregation unit by failing to conduct
hourly checks of the unit, there was no evidence that the guards or supervisors were subjectively aware of the
possibility that the detainee might injure himself to the point of death before anyone could intervene. (Elkhart
County Jail, Indiana)
U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
TRANSFER

U.S. v. Bout, 860 F.Supp.2d 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). A federal prisoner convicted of multiple conspiracies to kill
United States nationals, kill officers and employees of the United States, acquire, transfer, and use anti-aircraft
missiles, and provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization, who had been held in
solitary confinement, moved to be transferred to the general prison population. The motion was construed as a
habeas petition. The district court held that continued solitary confinement violated the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights. According to the court, the decision of the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to indefinitely
hold the federal prisoner in solitary confinement was not rationally related to any legitimate penological
objectives and thus violated the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that although the BOP
argued that the prisoner's release from solitary confinement would pose a high security risk, there was no
evidence that the prisoner had a direct affiliation with any member of a terrorist organization, or that he
personally engaged in violent acts. The court concluded that the prisoner did not present an unusually high risk
of escape or harm to others, any involvement that the prisoner had with the former Liberian dictator, Charles
Taylor, occurred several years ago and was not the basis of his criminal conviction, and the prisoner's release
into the general population would have minimal impact on guards, other inmates, and prison resources. (Special
Housing Unit, Metropolitan Correctional Center, New York)
2013

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
DUE PROCESS
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
RESTRAINTS

Allah v. Milling, 982 F.Supp.2d 172 (D.Conn. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against prison
officials, asserting claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment and his due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment based on his placement in an administrative segregation program. The officials moved
for summary judgment on the due process claims. The district court denied the motion, finding that summary
judgment was precluded by several fact issues. The court held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether the decision by prison officials to place the pretrial detainee, who had previously been in an
administrative segregation program before being discharged from the correctional facility, in administrative
segregation immediately upon his readmission for a subsequent offense, was for a punitive purpose or was
based on a legitimate non-punitive purpose. The court found that a fact issue existed as to whether the
restrictions imposed upon the detainee during his confinement in administrative segregation, including
handcuffs and leg shackles, constituted punishment. (Garner Correctional Institution, Connecticut)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

Dunn v. Killingsworth, 984 F.Supp.2d 811 (M.D.Tenn. 2013). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging that the officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not providing him with
adequate protection from gang-related violence. The district court conducted an initial review of the prisoner’s
complaint, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that the prisoner's allegations:
(1) that a gang member threatened his personal safety: (2) that the prisoner's family paid other inmates for the
prisoner's personal safety; (3) that the prisoner repeatedly requested to be placed in protective custody; and (4)
that prison officials denied such requests, were sufficient to state the serious deprivation prong of his claim for
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The court also found that the prisoner's allegations that prison
officials denied his requests for protection despite the stabbing of prisoners and a guard at the prison, and that
prison officials failed to take any effective steps to provide better protection for all inmates, were sufficient to
state a deliberate indifference prong of his claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (South Central
Correctional Center, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
LIBERTY INTEREST
CONDITIONS
EXERCISE
PRIVILEGES
RECREATION

Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner who had spent six months in segregation
as punishment for a disciplinary misconduct charge which was later expunged, filed a § 1983 action, alleging
that the segregation violated his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the prisoner's placement in
disciplinary segregation in a cell with a solid metal door and a confrontational cell mate for 182 days, with only
weekly access to the shower and the recreation yard, did not amount to atypical and significant hardships, as
required to establish a deprivation of the prisoner's due process liberty interests, where the prisoner was not
deprived of all human contact or sensory stimuli. The court found that the state prison officials were entitled to
qualified immunity for their conduct in placing the prisoner in disciplinary segregation, as the disciplinary
segregation did not violate any clearly established right. (Menard Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY
PSYCHIATRIC CARE

Harrelson v. Dupnik, 970 F.Supp.2d 953 (D.Ariz. 2013). The mother of 17-year-old inmate who died while
housed at a county jail brought an action in state court against the county, the county sheriff, the healthcare
provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health care at the jail, and employees
of the provider, individually and on behalf of the inmate's estate, alleging under § 1983 that the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs. The defendants removed the action to federal
court and moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The
district court held that: (1) the county defendants' duty to provide medical and mental health services to an
inmate was non-delegable; (2) intervening acts of the medical defendants did not absolve the county defendants
of liability for alleged negligence; (3) the mother failed to state a claim for wrongful death; (4) the county was
not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's rights; (5) the provider was not subject to liability; but (6) a fact issue

3.80

precluded summary judgment as to an Eighth Amendment medical claim against the employees. According to
the court, the duty of the county and the county sheriff to provide medical and mental health services to the 17year-old county jail inmate, who suffered from bipolar disorder and depression, was non-delegable, and thus the
county and sheriff were subject to vicarious liability, under Arizona law, for the alleged medical malpractice of
the healthcare provider which contracted with the county to provide medical and mental health services at the
jail. The court noted that there was no evidence that the legislature intended to permit the county or sheriff to
delegate their duties and obligations they owned to the inmate.
The court found that the intervening acts of the contract medical provider, in allegedly failing to properly
diagnose and treat the inmate's medical and mental health needs, both before and after the inmate received an
injection of a psychotropic medication, were not so extraordinary as to absolve the county and the county
sheriff of liability for their failure to protect the inmate.
The court found that there was no evidence that the county jail's policy or custom of placing inmates in
protective custody for their own protection amounted to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the
inmate, who died while on protective custody status. According to the court, there was no evidence that the
county had actual notice of a pattern of risk of harm or injury as a result of the county jail officials' use of
isolation, or an administrative segregation policy in the juvenile detention housing unit at the county jail, or that
any omissions in the county's policies necessarily gave rise to the situation in which the inmate, died from a
purported cardiac event.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
inmate's prescribing physician knew of the inmate's serious medical need for a full psychiatric assessment, and
failed to timely provide that assessment, and as to whether jail medical personnel were aware that the inmate
was suffering from a reaction to a psychotropic medication or unknown serious medical illness, and, if so,
whether they were deliberately indifferent. (Pima County Adult Detention Complex, and Conmed Healthcare
Management, Inc., Arizona)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
HEARING
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
REVIEW
TRANSFER

Payne v. Friel, 919 F.Supp.2d 1185 (D.Utah 2013). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, certain members of the state board of pardons and paroles, and lawyers working under contract with
the prison to provide limited legal services to inmates, alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district
court dismissed the complaint, and inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, dismissed in part, and
remanded. On remand, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held
that the inmate's initial placement in administrative segregation did not violate his due process rights, where the
inmate was promptly evaluated by proper officials and was assigned to ad-seg based on legitimate safety and
security concerns, and given the reason for the inmate's return to the state-- termination of his interstate
compact placement following his conviction for murdering another inmate while in ad-seg there-- there could
be little doubt that officials were justified in initially placing the inmate in the most secure housing available
pending future review. The court noted that the inmate promptly received a thorough evaluation under the
prison's standard review procedures which included a reasoned examination of his assignment. The court found
that the inmate was not entitled to a formal hearing regarding the implementation of an Executive Director
Override (EDO) and that the former director's failure to personally review the EDO for an 18-month period did
not violate due process. (Utah State Prison)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
RETALIATION

Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). A female former state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a private operator of a state prison, the warden, and corrections officers, alleging violation of her civil
rights arising under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state claims. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate’s complaint stated claims against the operator and the warden for violations of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment, and for First Amendment retaliation. The inmate alleged that the operator and the
warden engaged in practices of placing inmates who reported sexual abuse in segregation or otherwise
retaliating against them, violating its written policies by failing to report allegations of prison rape to outside
law enforcement, failing to conduct adequate internal investigations regarding rape allegations, and offering
financial incentives to prison employees for non-reporting of rape allegations. The inmate alleged that the
operator and the warden placed her in segregation for eight months because she reported a corrections officer's
rape and another officer's assault, that the operator and warden were aware of her complaints, and that her
placement in segregation was in close temporal proximity to the complaints. (N.M. Women's Corr’l. Facility,
Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS

Potts v. Moreci, 12 F.Supp.3d 1065 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
county, employees of the county jail in their individual capacities, and a sheriff, in his individual and official
capacities, alleging retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights, deprivation of his procedural due
process and equal protection rights, denial of access to the courts, municipal liability, and statutory
indemnification. The sheriff moved to dismiss the claims asserted against him. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court found that the detainee who allegedly was placed in a segregation
unit at the county jail without adequate grounds and without an opportunity to contest such placement stated a
claim for a procedural due process violation against the sheriff, in his individual capacity, under § 1983. The
court noted that the sheriff's personal responsibility for the detainee's placement in segregation could be
assumed in determining whether the detainee adequately pleaded the claim, and the detainee also sufficiently
alleged the sheriff's knowledge of the detainee's allegedly unconstitutional confinement in segregation by
asserting that the sheriff attended periodic meetings at which the detainee's confinement was discussed, which
permitted the inference that sheriff knew about the challenged conduct and facilitated, approved, condoned, or
turned a blind eye to it. The court held that the detainee sufficiently pleaded the sheriff's personal involvement
in the alleged misconduct of jail employees in singling out the detainee for arbitrary treatment during his

3.81

confinement in a segregation unit, subjecting him to living conditions that were inconsistent even with
conditions of other detainees in a segregation unit, and thus stated a § 1983 claim for class-of-one equal
protection violation against the sheriff. (Cook County Jail, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
HEARING
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION
RESTRICTIONS
SEARCHES
TELEPHONE
VISITS

Royer v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 933 F.Supp.2d 170 (D.D.C. 2013). A federal prisoner brought an action
against Bureau of Prisoners (BOP), alleging classification as a “terrorist inmate” resulted in violations of the
Privacy Act and the First and Fifth Amendments. The BOP moved for summary judgment and to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that BOP rules prohibiting contact
visits and limiting noncontact visits and telephone time for federal inmates labeled as “terrorist inmates”, more
than other inmates, had a rational connection to a legitimate government interest, for the purpose of the inmate's
action alleging the rules violated his First Amendment rights of speech and association. According to the court,
the prison had an interest in monitoring the inmate's communications and the prison isolated inmates who could
pose a threat to others or to the orderly operation of the institution. The court noted that the rules did not
preclude the inmate from using alternative means to communicate with his family, where the inmate could send
letters, the telephone was available to him, and he could send messages through others allowed to visit.
The court found that the inmate's assertions that the prison already had multiple cameras and hypersensitive
microphones, and that officers strip searched inmates before and after contact visits, did not establish ready
alternatives to a prohibition on contact visits for the inmate and limits on phone usage and noncontact visits due
to being labeled as a “terrorist inmate.” The court noted that increasing the number of inmates subject to strip
searches increased the cost of visitation, and microphones and cameras did not obviate all security concerns that
arose from contact visits, such as covert notes or hand signals.
The court held that the inmate's allegations that he was segregated from the prison's general population for
over six years, that he was subject to restrictions on recreational, religious, and educational opportunities
available to other inmates, that contact with his family was limited to one 15 minute phone call per week during
business hours when his children were in school, and that he was limited to two 2-hour noncontact visits per
month, were sufficient to plead harsh and atypical conditions, as required for his Fifth Amendment procedural
due process claim. According to the court, the inmate's allegations that he was taken from his cell without
warning, that he was only provided an administrative detention order that stated he was being moved due to his
classification, that he was eventually told he was classified as a “terrorist inmate,” that such classification
imposed greater restrictions upon his confinement, and that he was never provided with a hearing, notice of
criteria for release from conditions, or notice of a projected date for release from conditions were sufficient to
plead denial of due process, as required for his claim alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment procedural due
process. (Special Housing Units at FCI Allenwood and USP Lewisburg, CMU at FCI Terre Haute, SHU at FCI
Greenville, Supermax facility at Florence, Colorado, and CMU at USP Marion)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIBERTY INTEREST
DUE PROCESS
EVIDENCE
REVIEW

Selby v. Caruso, 734 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against a state prison and
its personnel, alleging violation of his due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The
appeals court held that: (1) the prisoner's confinement in administrative segregation for 13 years was
sufficiently atypical as to give rise to a protected due process liberty interest; (2) a factual issue existed as to
whether the prisoner received meaningful periodic reviews and whether state prison officials' decision to
continue the prisoner's confinement in administrative segregation for nearly 13 years was supported by “some
evidence”; (3) the defendant state prison and prison personnel could not be granted qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage on the prisoner's civil rights claim alleging violation of his due process rights; and (4)
the prisoner's First Amendment religious freedom claim was deemed abandoned. The court noted that a
reasonable prison official should have known that the prisoner could not be confined in administrative
segregation for pretextual reasons. (Marquette Branch Prison, Michigan Department of Corrections.)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL TREATMENT
PSYCHIATRIC CARE
REVIEW
DUE PROCESS

Slevin v. Board of Com'rs for County of Dona Ana, 934 F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.N.M. 2013). A detainee brought an
action against a county board of commissioners, detention center director, and medical director, alleging
violations of his rights with regard to his medical care. The detainee alleged that, because of his mental illness,
officials at the Detention Center kept him in administrative segregation for virtually the entire 22 months of his
incarceration, without humane conditions of confinement or adequate medical care, and without periodic review
of his confinement, causing his physical and mental deterioration, in violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. The jury awarded the detainee $3 million in punitive damages against the Detention Center
Director, and $3.5 million in punitive damages against the facility medical director. The jury fixed the amount
of compensatory damages at $15.5 million, which included $500,000 for each month that detainee was
incarcerated, plus an additional $1 million for each year since the detainee’s release from custody. The
defendants moved for a new trial or for reduction of the damages awards. The district court denied the motion,
finding that the compensatory damages award was supported by substantial evidence and it would not be set
aside on the ground that it was the product of passion or prejudices. The court also declined to set aside the
punitive damages awards as excessive. (Doña Ana County Detention Center, New Mexico)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
LAW LIBRARY
LIBERTY INTEREST
PLACEMENT

Tavares v. Amato, 954 F.Supp.2d 79 (N.D.N.Y.2013). An inmate who had recently been released from the
custody of a county jail filed a pro se suit against a sheriff and jail administrator, claiming his First Amendment
rights were violated by his inability to access a law library and to engage in religious worship while confined in
involuntary protective custody (IPC). The inmate also alleged that he was discriminated against and placed in
IPC because he was a sex offender, in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause, and that his conditions of
confinement violated the Eighth Amendment. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court
denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part. The court held that:
(1) there was no evidence of injury, as required to support a claim for violation of the First Amendment's right

3.82

of access to the courts; (2) there was no evidence that the inmate had firmly held religious beliefs, as required to
support a claim for violation of his First Amendment's right to free exercise of religion; (3) confinement of the
inmate in administrative segregation for 132 days was not cruel or unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment; and (4) the inmate's initial five-day segregation, for purposes of a determining a housing
classification, was insufficient to establish a liberty interest.
But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact: (1) as to whether
the county jail had a rational basis for housing inmates with sex offender criminal histories in administrative
segregation, rather than with the general prison population; (2) whether there was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause; and (3) on the officials' claim for qualified immunity.
According to the court, there was no evidence that the inmate suffered any type of actual injury as a result of
receiving only one trip to the facility's law library during his 132-day confinement in involuntary protective
custody (IPC). The court found that the inmate’s claims, even if proven, that jail officials confined him in
administrative segregation for 132 days, for 23 hours each day, only allowing him to shower during his one hour
long recreation period, prohibiting him from wandering around outside of his cell, and forcing him to pick and
choose which amenities he wanted to avail himself to given his limited amount of time outside of his cell, did not
amount to cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, since the officials' actions involved
no specific deprivation of any human need. (Montgomery County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEARCHES

Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 915 F.Supp.2d 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Arab and Muslim alien detainees who were held on
immigration violations in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks brought a putative class action against the government
and various government officials, alleging that they were physically and verbally abused, subjected to arbitrary
strip searches, and subjected to prolonged detention. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state claim.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) Department of Justice
(DOJ) officials were not liable for the alleged substantive due process violations; (2) the detainees stated a
substantive due process claim against federal detention center officials; (3) detention center officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from the substantive due process claim; (4) the detainees failed to state an equal
protection claim against the DOJ officials; (5) the detainees stated an equal protection claim against detention
center officials; (6) as an issue of first impression, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from claims
arising from a communications blackout; and (7) as an issue of first impression, a damages remedy under Bivens
would be implied to remedy the alleged deprivation of detainees' free exercise rights.
According to the court, the DOJ officials' failure to make explicit the expectation that its harsh confinement
policy, which was a directive to hold Arab and Muslim pretrial detainees in restrictive conditions under which
they would feel maximum pressure to cooperate with the investigation of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, should be
carried out lawfully, did not suggest punitive intent, as would subject the officials to liability under Bivens, where
they were entitled to expect that their subordinates would implement their directions lawfully. The detainees
alleged that the warden ordered the creation of an administrative maximum special housing unit (ADMAX SHU)
and ordered two of his subordinates to design extremely restrictive conditions of confinement for those assigned
to it, that the warden was made aware of the abuse that occurred through inmate complaints, staff complaints,
hunger strikes, and suicide attempts, and that other officials made rounds in ADMAX SHU and were aware of
the abusive conditions there. The court found that these allegations stated substantive due process claims against
the detention facility officials in a Bivens action. The court found that the detention facility officials were not
entitled to qualified immunity from the Bivens substantive due process claims. (Metropolitan Detention Center,
New York, and Passaic County Jail, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
EVIDENCE
PLACEMENT
RELIGIOUS SERVICES
RETALIATION

Uduko v. Cozzens, 975 F.Supp.2d 750 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A prisoner bought claims under Bivens, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), and conspiracy, against corrections officers, alleging that the officers had retaliated and discriminated
against him for lodging complaints and filing various grievances, by restricting his participation as a religious
inmate representative and in religious activities. The officers moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner alleged a substantial burden on his ability to
perform religious acts of significance to his faith. The court found that claims that a corrections officer failed to
give the prisoner an administrative detention order that explained why the prisoner was placed in administrative
detention and why the prisoner was cleared of all allegations against him after he was removed, along with claims
that the officers recruited inmates to supply false allegations against the prisoner, plausibly alleged a conspiracy
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss the prisoner's Bivens conspiracy claim against the officers. The court
held that claims that corrections officers restricted the prisoner's active participation in religious services, banned
him from attending and participating in any and all religious services and programs held in the chapel area, and
prohibited him from prophesying and laying hands on and praying for anyone, alleged a substantial burden on
prisoner's ability to perform religious acts of significance to his faith, as required to support prisoner's First
Amendment retaliation claims, and claimed violations of RFRA and RLUIPA. (Federal Correctional Institution in
Milan, Michigan)
2014

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
CIVIL COMMITMENT
RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Ballard v. Johns, 17 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D.N.C. 2014). A civil detainee being considered for certification as a
sexually dangerous person brought an action against federal employees, in their official capacities and in their
individual capacities under Bivens, challenging various conditions of his detention, including claims concerning
due process violations and inability to attend religious services. The employees moved to dismiss or for summary
judgment and the detainee moved to overrule objections to requests for document production. The district court
granted the employees’ motion and denied the detainee’s motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee did not
show that federal employees, by following Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations and policies, violated his

3.83

constitutional rights; (2) the detainee was properly subjected to restrictions and disciplinary consequences of the
BOP commitment and treatment program; (3) denial of the detainee's request to attend or receive religious
services while in disciplinary segregation did not unduly burden his free exercise of religion; and (4) the
employees did not violate detainee's right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by searching his cell
and seizing his property. (Federal Corr’l. Institution at Butner, North Carolina)
U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
LENGTH
MEDICAL CARE

Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068 (E.D.Cal. 2014). Nearly 20 years after mentally ill inmates prevailed on
class action challenges to conditions of their confinement and a special master was appointed to implement a
remedial plan, the inmates moved to enforce court orders and for affirmative relief related to the use of force,
disciplinary measures, and housing and treatment in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated
housing units (SHUs). The district court granted the motions in part. The court held that prison officials' excessive
use of force on seriously mentally ill inmates by means of pepper spray and expandable batons, pursuant to prison
policies and without regard to the impact on inmates' psychiatric condition, was not yet remedied, as required by
the prior judgment in favor of inmates. The court found that prison officials' changes in policies and practices of
housing mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation units (ASUs) and segregated housing units (SHUs)
were inadequate to remedy the systemic Eighth Amendment violations identified in the prior judgment in favor of
inmates. According to the court, the placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in the harsh, restrictive, and nontherapeutic conditions of administrative segregation units (ASUs) for non-disciplinary reasons for more than the
minimal period necessary to transfer the inmates to protective housing or a housing assignment violated the
Eighth Amendment. The court noted that nearly half of the suicides in ASUs were by inmates placed there for
non-disciplinary reasons, and such placement subjected inmates to significant restrictions including no contact
visits, significant limits on access to both exercise yards and dayroom, eating all meals in their cells, being placed
in handcuffs and restraints when moved outside their cells, and receiving mental health treatment in confined
spaces described as “cages,” with strip searches before and after treatment. (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS

Grenning v. Miller-Stout, 739 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought an action against prison officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days violated the Eighth Amendment's bar against
cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment for the officials and the prisoner
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court found that summary judgment was precluded by
factual issues as to: (1) the brightness of the continuous lighting in the prisoner's special management unit cell; (2)
the effect on the prisoner of the continuous lighting; and (3) whether prison officials were deliberately indifferent.
The inmate was housed in the Special Management Unit (SMU), an administrative segregation unit with singlecells that are continuously illuminated for twenty-four hours a day. Each cell in the SMU has three, four-foot-long
fluorescent lighting tubes in a mounted light fixture. A cell occupant can use a switch inside the cell to turn off
two of the tubes, but the center tube is always on. The tube is covered by a blue light-diffusing sleeve. Institution
policy requires welfare checks in the SMU to be conducted every thirty minutes, which is more frequent than
checks for the general prison population. Officials asserted that continuous illumination allows officers to “assess
the baseline behavior of offenders to ensure they are not at risk of harming themselves or making an attempt to
harm staff, cause property damage or incite problem behavior from other offenders.” The officials stated that
turning the cell lights on and off every thirty minutes would be disruptive to the cell occupants. The prisoner
alleged that the light was so bright he could not sleep, even with “four layers of towel wrapped around his eyes.”
He alleged that the lighting gave him “recurring migraine headaches” and that he could not distinguish between
night and day in the cell. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. District Court
PLACEMENT
LENGTH
CONDITIONS
LAW LIBRARY
PRIVILEGES
TELEPHONE
MEDICAL TREATMENT
LIBERTY INTEREST

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers and a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while
incarcerated at a county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motions, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected
liberty interest was implicated. The inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting classification
officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel had deemed a
continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate remained on suicide watch for eight days after a psychiatrist
and a social worker recommended his removal from the suicide watch. The court also found a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of confinement while he was placed on suicide watch imposed
an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, such that it
implicated a protected liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took away the inmate’s clothing and
required him to wear a suicide-safe garment-- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tear-resistant material and
Velcro. He was not allowed to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock. He was housed
in a stripped cell in the Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare mattress and a blanket
made out of the same coarse material as the smock. Corrections officers situated immediately in front of the
Plexiglass cell window constantly supervised the inmate. According to the county, suicide watch inmates have
access to the yard, a plastic spoon, a rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors, and medical and mental
health services, but the inmate claimed that he had no showers, telephone calls, prescription medications, food, or
access to the law library while in the BMHU. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
ASSIGNMENT
SEARCHES

Little v. Municipal Corp., 51 F.Supp3d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). State inmates brought a § 1983 action against a
city and city department of correction officials, alleging Eighth Amendment and due process violations related to
conditions of their confinement and incidents that occurred while they were confined. The defendants moved to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that: (1) the inmates failed to
state a municipal liability claim; (2) locking the inmates in cells that were flooding with sewage was not a
sufficiently serious deprivation so as to violate the Eighth Amendment; (3) the inmates failed to state an Eighth

3.84

Amendment claim based on the deprivation of laundry services; (4) the inmates failed to state that officials were
deliberately indifferent to their conditions of confinement; (5) the inmates’ administrative classification did not
implicate their liberty interests protected by due process; and (6) cell searches did not rise to the level of an Eighth
Amendment violation. The court noted that the cells flooded with sewage for up to eight-and-a-half hours, during
which they periodically lacked outdoor recreation and food, was undeniably unpleasant, but it was not a
significantly serious deprivation so as to violate the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court,
there was no constitutional right to outdoor recreation, and the inmates were not denied food entirely, but rather,
were not allowed to eat during periods of lock-down. (N.Y. City Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
MEDICAL TREATMENT
REGULATIONS

Palmer v. Flore, 3 F.Supp.3d 632 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The defendants asserted an affirmative
defense that the prisoner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA). The district dismissed the defendants’ defense with prejudice, finding that the prisoner's timely
submission of a Step-I grievance pursuant to the Michigan Department of Corrections' (MDOC) three-step
grievance process was sufficient to comply with the PLRA exhaustion requirement, even though the prisoner
received no response from prison officials. The court noted that the prisoner completed the required form an slid it
through the crack in his cell door, which was apparently a common practice that prisoners in administrative
segregation used for submitting grievances. (St. Louis Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
HANDICAP

Stoudemire v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 22 F.Supp.3d 715 (E.D.Mich. 2014). A female former prisoner,
who was a double amputee, brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) and
various MDOC-associated officers and healthcare professionals, asserting violations of § 1983, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and state law. The prisoner alleged failure to provide adequate health care and
accommodations for disabled individuals. The district court denied summary judgment to the warden and a
corrections officer on their qualified immunity defenses to the § 1983 claims. The defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. On remand the district court held that: (1) a fact
question as to whether the warden was aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm existed precluded summary judgment, and (2) it was clearly established that deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constituted the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain
proscribed by Eighth Amendment. The prisoner alleged that she acquired MRSA following the amputation of her
left leg. As a result of her condition, her housing assignment at the facility was changed from the infirmary to the
segregation unit. The prisoner alleged that there was an absence of handicap facilities within this unit, that she
was unable to safely transfer from her wheelchair to the bed or toilet, and that she was allowed only one shower
during the two weeks while housed in segregation. (Huron Valley Women's Correctional Facility, Michigan)
2015

U.S. District Court
HANDICAP
PLACEMENT IN
SEGREGATION

Armstrong v. Brown, 103 F.Supp.3d 1070 (N.D. Ca. 2015). Disabled state prisoners filed a motion for further
enforcement of an injunction applicable to all California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons, alleging that corrections officials were continuing to place class members in administrative segregation
due to a lack of accessible housing, in violation of the district court’s orders and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The district court granted the motion, holding that further enforcement would not be limited to the
least compliant correctional institutions. The court noted that while the majority of the violations took place at one
institution, the violations occurred at other institutions as well, and that transfers of disabled prisoners into noncomplying institutions occurred with the involvement of CDCR officials. (California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

Grenning v. Stout, 144 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D. Wash. 2015). A state prisoner commenced s § 1983 action against
prison officials, claiming that exposing him to constant lighting for 13 days in segregation management unit
(SMU) violated the Eighth Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted
summary judgment to the officials and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The
district denied summary judgment, in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine
issues of material fact as to: (1) whether the state prisoner suffered harm resulting from his exposure to
continuous light for 13 days; (2) whether state prison officials acted with deliberate indifference in exposing the
prisoner to continuous light for 13 days; (3) whether the prisoner had suffered an immediate injury from being
exposed to continuous light in the prison's segregation management unit; (4) whether legal damages would be
inadequate to compensate the prisoner for his alleged suffering or to restore his health, as to the costs of changing
the lighting; and (5) whether penological purposes would be undermined if the lighting was changed. The court
noted that the prisoner had offered evidence of the harm he already had suffered due to the lighting conditions,
including testimony of a board certified sleep medicine expert. (Airway Heights Corrections Center, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
LENGTH
CONDITIONS
REVIEW

Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the acting director
of a state department of corrections, alleging violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process in his placement in solitary confinement for
20 year following his participation in a riot. The inmate was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths
(“NOGE”), also known as the “Five Percenters.” Prison policy required the inmate to renounce his affiliation with
NOGE as a condition of being released from segregation. The inmate asserted that NOGE was a religion and that
he was being asked to renounce his religion in order to be released from solitary confinement, in violation of
RLUIPA. The district court granted the director’s motion for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the prison policy did
not force the inmate to choose between continued adherence to his religion or release from solitary confinement.

3.85

But the court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
prison’s review process for inmates in solitary confinement was adequate. The court noted that the inmate was
subject to near-daily cavity and strip searches, he was confined to a small cell for all sleeping and waking hours,
aside from 10 hours of activity outside the cell per month, he was denied educational, vocational, and therapy
programs, the inmate was socially isolated, and confinement was indefinite. (South Carolina Department of
Corrections)
U.S. District Court
VISITS
SEARCHES

Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147 F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A prison
visitor who suffered from a seizure disorder, and was subjected to a strip search and pat-down searches, brought
an action against the state Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging that the searches
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion, finding that: (1)the strip search and pat-down searches did not violate ADA; (2) guards
did not act with deliberate indifference in conducting a strip search; (3) the prison was not a place of public
accommodation, under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, as to visitors participating in an extended
family visitation program; (4) the guards' conduct was not sufficiently extreme to support an outrage claim; and
(5) the guards' conduct did not support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the
court, there was no showing that the guards proceeded in conscious disregard of a high probability of emotional
distress when ordering the strip search, as the visitor suggested the strip search as an alternative to a pat search
and the guards followed this suggestion, and all visitors were subjected to pat-down searches, which were
justified on safety grounds. (Monroe Correctional Complex, Washington)

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
GOOD TIME

Linton v. O’Brien, 142 F.Supp.3d 215 (D. Mass. 2015). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Corrections and prison officials, alleging that prison personnel
violated his due process, equal protection, and 8th Amendment rights by not providing rehabilitative educational
programs that awarded good time credits. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion,
dismissing the complaint. The court held that prison officials' refusal to allow the inmate, who was housed in a
disciplinary unit, an opportunity to participate in educational and rehabilitative programs in order to earn good
time credits to reduce his sentence, did not violate the inmate's due process rights. According to the court, the
inmate did not demonstrate that the officials' exercise of discretion to not provide good time credit opportunities to
inmates in a disciplinary unit constituted an imposition of an atypical and significant hardship not normally within
range of confinement expected for an inmate serving an indeterminate term. The court noted that the exercise of
discretion by the Department of Corrections in imposing different classifications upon inmates, with respect to
restricting the ability of an inmate housed in a prison disciplinary unit to earn good time credits to reduce his
sentence, did not lack a rational basis, was not otherwise based on suspect classification, and thus did not violate
the inmate's equal protection rights. The court found that the DOC had a legitimate public purpose in allocating
limited resources available for earned good time credit programs to inmates who were motivated to make best use
of them by improving their chances for successful return to society and as an inducement to control and reduce
those inmates' tendencies towards violence. (MCI—Cedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

Pierce v. District of Columbia, 128 F.Supp.3d 250 (D.D.C. 2015). A deaf inmate who communicated with
American Sign Language (ASL), but who had been forced to communicate with staff and other inmates only
through lip-reading and written notes due to the lack of an interpreter to assist him, filed suit against the District
of Columbia alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
and the Rehabilitation Act. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the inmate’s
motion in part and denied the defendant’s motion. The court held that: (1) the prison had affirmative duty to
evaluate the newly incarcerated deaf inmate's accommodation requirements, and its failure to do so denied the
inmate benefits under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA; (2) the prison was deliberately indifferent to the deaf
inmate's need for accommodation, as would support an award of compensatory damages; and (3) summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison had placed the inmate in
protective custody, and kept him there, because of the inmate's constant requests for accommodation. The court
noted that the inmate's need for accommodation was obvious, in that the inmate did not speak and communicated
only through American Sign Language (ASL), and the prison was required to identify precise limitations resulting
from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations by way of an interactive assessment of the inmate.
According to the court, the inmate's request for an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter to assist him
during anger management and substance abuse classes was sufficient to put the prison on notice that deaf inmate
might need a similar accommodation to communicate effectively in other prison situations, such as in inmate
programs, hall meetings, the orientation process, protective custody proceedings, graphic arts class, and medical
consultations. (Correctional Treatment Facility, District of Columbia)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
RESTRICTIONS

U.S. v. Mohamed, 103 F.Supp.3d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A defendant who was indicted for murder of an
internationally protected person and attempted murder of an internationally protected person, filed a motion to
vacate or modify special administrative measures governing conditions of his pretrial detention. The district court
denied the motion, finding that the measures were rationally connected to the legitimate government objective of
preventing the detainee from coordinating violent attacks. The detainee had been placed in a special housing unit
and limitations on communications between him and people inside or outside the prison were limited. The court
noted that the detainee had admitted allegiance to terrorist organizations, had previously broken out of prison two
times, one escape was allegedly coordinated between the defendant and a terrorist organization, and three prison
guards had been killed during one escape. (Metropolitan Correctional Center, Manhattan, New York)

3.86

2016
U.S. Appeals Court
PLACEMENT
TRANSFER

Saylor v. Nebraska, 812 F.3d 637 (8th Cir. 2016). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials retaliated against him by transferring and reclassifying him, that the transfer and classification review
process violated his due process rights, and that officials were deliberately indifferent to his post–traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). The district court denied the officials’ motion for summary judgment, and they appealed. The
appeals court reversed. The court held that the prison’s medical officials were not deliberately indifferent to the
inmate’s post–traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), in violation of Eighth Amendment, despite the inmate’s
contention that treatment that occurred after his treating psychiatrist left the prison rose to the level of cruel and
unusual punishment. The court noted that officials attempted to provide the inmate with another psychiatrist at the
facility, ultimately found him another psychiatrist at a different facility, continued medication as they saw fit
within their independent medical judgment, and gave him his requested private cell.
The court found that the officials’ decision to transfer the inmate to another facility and to place him in
administrative segregation was not in retaliation for his complaints about his medical care, in violation of the First
Amendment, where the reason for the transfer was to provide the inmate with necessary psychiatric care after his
treating psychiatrist’s contract with the state ended and the inmate refused to meet with the facility’s other
psychiatrist. The court noted that the inmate was placed in administrative segregation because he refused to share
a cell within any other prisoners, and there were no other private cells. (Nebraska Department of Correctional
Services, Nebraska State Penitentiary, Tecumseh State Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
ISOLATION
RESTRICTIONS
REVIEW

Szubielski v. Pierce, 152 F.Supp.3d 227 (D. Del. 2016). A state prisoner, acting pro se and in forma pauperis
(IFP), brought a § 1983 action against prison officials, relating to his continuing classification for solitary
confinement. At the screening stage of the case, the district court held that the prisoner stated a First Amendment
retaliation claim against a prison warden and an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement.
The prisoner complained of 24-hour cell confinement, limited recreation, extreme social isolation, environmental
deprivation, limited telephone calls, and limited visits. The prisoner suffered from schizophrenia, severe manic
depression, and an anxiety disorder. The court found that the prisoner's allegations that the prison warden
retaliated against him after a civil rights advocacy organization filed a lawsuit challenging solitary confinement of
prisoners, by keeping the prisoner in solitary confinement despite a classification committee's reclassification of
the prisoner for medium-security housing, stated a First Amendment retaliation claim. According to the court, the
prisoner's allegations that his continued solitary confinement, which had already lasted nine years, involved
extreme social isolation, inadequate medical care, limited recreation, and environmental deprivation, stated a
claim the under the Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of confinement. (James T. Vaughn Correctional
Center, Delaware)

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3.88

monitoring equipment, drug screening, and surveillance services. The court noted that the inmate did not
allege that he was denied free basic hygiene supplies. (Winfield Correctional Facility, Kansas)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
COST OF CONFINEMENT
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Slade v. Hampton Roads Regional Jail, 407 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee sued a jail,
challenging the constitutionality of a one-dollar per day charge that was intended to partially defray the
costs of incarceration. The district court dismissed the complaint and the detainee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed, finding that the charge was not punishment, and therefore did not violate due process.
According to the court, the state statute that authorized the charge expressed no intent to punish on its
face, was an effort to offset the cost of housing, had a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest, and was not excessive in relation to that purpose. The court also held that due process was not
violated by the lack of a hearing before the charge was deducted from the detainee’s account. (Hampton
Roads Regional Jail, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS

Young v. Wall, 359 F.Supp.2d 84 (D.R.I. 2005). A state prison inmate sued the director of a state
corrections department, claiming that the practice of not crediting accrued interest to his inmate accounts
funded through deduction from his wages violated his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed
the case in part, and denied the director’s motion to dismiss in part. The court held that a state statute that
provided for wage deductions and the release of funds to the inmate upon his release did not create a
property interest protected by the Takings Clause. The court found that the inmate was not entitled to
interest under the rule that interest generally follows principal. But the court held that the inmate stated a
procedural due process claim with regard to denial of interest in the face of an Inmate Account Policy that
seemingly requires the equitable distribution of interest. The court noted that due to the rehabilitative
nature of work assignments imposed on prisoners, payment for their labor is purely discretionary for the
state, although it is possible for a state to create a right to be paid for labor which could create a limited
protected interest in wages it chooses to pay prisoners. According to the court, the statute that provides
deduction of 25% of the wages earned by the prison inmate, to be turned over to the inmate upon his
release, did not confer upon the inmate full rights of possession, control and disposition of funds sufficient
to support a § 1983 action. (Adult Correctional Institution, Rhode Island)
2006

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS
TELEPHONE

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 464 F.Supp.2d 552 (E.D.Va. 2006). A federal inmate brought an
action against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and prison officials under Bivens and various federal
statutes, challenging an increase in the long-distance telephone rate. The court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that: (1) the telephone rate increase did not implicate the
inmate’s First Amendment rights; (2) the inmate’s procedural due process rights were not violated: (3) the
inmate failed to state an equal protection violation; (4) BOP’s increase in the telephone rates was not
subject to judicial review; (5) the inmate failed to state a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA); and (6) the inmate’s Freedom of Information Act (FIOA) claim would be transferred to another
court. According to the court, prisoners have no per se First Amendment right to use a telephone and are
not entitled to a specific rate for their telephone calls. The court found that the three-cent increase in the
long-distance telephone rate charged to the federal inmate, from twenty cents per minute to twenty-three
cents per minute, did not implicate the inmate’s First Amendment rights. Although prisoners have a due
process property interest in the funds held in their prison accounts, the court noted that the postdeprivation proceeding of the normal grievance process was available. The court also ruled that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) precluded a judicial review of the BOP increase in telephone rates.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
COST OF CONFINEMENT
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 439 F.Supp.2d 751 (E.D.Ky. 2006). Inmates, former inmates, and
relatives and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against counties, alleging that the methods used
by the counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration violated the
Due Process Clause. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that the Kentucky statute authorizing county jailers to adopt prisoner fee and expense reimbursement
policies did not require that prisoners be sentenced before fees could be imposed, and that due process did
not require a pre-deprivation hearing before prison fees were assessed. According to the court, the First
Amendment rights of non-prisoners who contributed funds to prisoners' accounts were not violated. The
court noted that the statute authorized jails to begin to impose fees, and to deduct them from prisoners'
canteen accounts, as soon as prisoners' were booked into the jail. (Campbell County and Kenton County,
Kentucky)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
RECOUPMENT

Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406
(8th Cir. 2007). A separation of church and state advocacy group, state prison inmates, and others, sued
the State of Iowa and a Christian provider of rehabilitation services, claiming that funding of a contract
with the Christian organization providing pre-release rehabilitation services to inmates violated the
Establishment Clause. The district court granted declaratory and equitable relief in favor of advocacy
group and the inmates. The provider and state corrections officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The appeals court held that the state funding constituted an endorsement of
religion, but that the district court abused its discretion in awarding recoupment of state funds that had

4.25
XXI

been paid to the provider. The court noted that even though the provider had the ability to repay the funds,
the district court gave no weight to the fact that specific statutes authorized the funding, made no finding
of bad faith by the state legislature and governor, and did not consider the testimony of state prison
officials that the program was beneficial and that the state received much more value than it paid for.
(Iowa Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Campbell v. Clarke, 481 F.3d 967 (7th Cir. 2007). A prisoner sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in
an action against prison officials, alleging deprivation of access to legal materials. The district court
dismissed the case and the prisoner appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the prisoner was
barred from proceeding in forma pauperis under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), until all the
fees for all of the prisoner's past and pending litigation have been paid in full. The prisoner alleged that
the jail violates the Constitution because it provides computer-assisted legal research rather than a library
of physical law books. The court noted that the prisoner had legal counsel in all criminal cases pending
against him and that access to legal materials is required only for unrepresented litigants. (Milwaukee
County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Samonte v. Frank, 517 F.Supp.2d 1238 (D.Hawai’i 2007). A prisoner, who had filed several civil rights
actions, moved to have funds withdrawn from his prison trust account sequentially, rather than
simultaneously, to satisfy court orders granting him in forma pauperis (IFP) status and directing collection
and payment of filing fees. The district court denied the motion. The court held that indigent prisoners are
required to pay filing fees on a per case basis, rather than per prisoner basis, and that per case payments
did not burden the prisoner's constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts. The court noted that
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) filing fee provision requiring indigent prisoners to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income should be applied by simultaneously
collecting fees for all of a prisoner's outstanding cases, as long as a minimum of $10 remains in the
prisoner's account. (Hawai’i)

U.S. Appeals Court
COST OF CONFINEMENT
FEES
DUE PROCESS

Sickles v. Campbell County, Kentucky, 501 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Inmates, former inmates, and
relatives and friends of inmates brought a § 1983 action against two counties, challenging methods used
by the counties to collect fees imposed on prisoners for the cost of booking and incarceration. The district
court entered summary judgment for the counties and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation
hearing to inmates prior to withholding a portion of money from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of
booking, room, and board. The court found that the relatives lacked a property interest in the money they
sent to inmates and that the counties did not violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in
withholding money. According to the court, the county inmates had a property interest protected by the
Due Process Clause in money withheld from their canteen accounts to pay the costs of booking, room, and
board, but the county was not required under the Due Process Clause to grant a predeprivation hearing to
inmates prior to withholding money from their canteen accounts where the amounts withheld were small,
the risk of erroneous deprivation was minor in that withholding involved elementary accounting and was
non-discretionary, the potential benefits of a hearing were small, and the government's interests of sharing
costs and furthering offender accountability were substantial. The court also found that the county did not
violate the free speech rights of relatives of inmates in withholding a portion of money that relatives had
sent to the inmates for their canteen accounts, notwithstanding that if the money had not been withheld the
inmates might have spent it making telephone calls. (Campbell County and Kenton County, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
FEES

Smith v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 517 F.Supp.2d 451 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner who had
requested information from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) several times under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) brought an action against the BOP, challenging the BOP's aggregation of the prisoner's FOIA
requests and denial of his fee waiver request. The BOP brought a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that the prisoner was required to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial review of BOP's aggregation of his FOIA requests, and
that he was not entitled to a fee waiver. The court held that the prisoner was not entitled to a fee waiver for
information he requested from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), where the prisoner did not specify the public interest that would allegedly be satisfied by
disclosure of the requested information, identify the government activity or operation on which the
prisoner intended to shed any light, or explain how disclosure would contribute to the public's
understanding of such activity or operation, as required by Department of Justice (DOJ) procedures for
disclosure of records under FOIA. (BOP FCI Gilmer, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act

Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) challenging its statutory authority to promulgate a regulation
through which it had established restitution payment schedules. The BOP requested that the court transfer
the suit to the federal district wherein the inmate was incarcerated. The district court denied the transfer,
holding that the convenience of the parties and the interest of justice did not weigh in favor of the transfer
of venue. According to the court, the federal inmate's Administrative Procedure Act (APA) action against
the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would not be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, so as
to justify a transfer of venue from the District of Columbia to the district within which the inmate was
incarcerated. The court noted that the success of the inmate's claim would not have affected the fact or
length of the inmate's confinement, but would only invalidate the BOP's restitution schedule. (Federal
Bureau of Prisons, Jesup, Georgia)

4.26
XXI

U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

U.S. v. Young, 533 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Nev. 2007). A federal prisoner who had been ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $457,740 and a penalty assessment in the amount of $3,300 moved to set aside
the schedule of payments. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the defendant's
participation in the federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP),
which allowed the BOP to withhold $50 per month from the defendant's account, was not under duress,
and that withholding 21 percent of the defendant's monthly income was not egregious or unreasonable.
The court noted that the prisoner earns approximately $57 while imprisoned and that he typically receives
a bonus of approximately $28 per month, bringing his total monthly earnings to approximately $85. The
prisoner also receives approximately $150 per month from family members, making his total monthly
income $235. (Nevada)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS

Ward v. Stewart, 511 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Ariz. 2007). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action
alleging violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights based on corrections officials'
withholding of a portion of his wages for “gate-money.” After dismissal of the inmate's claim was
reversed by an appeals court, a partial summary judgment for the corrections officials was granted. A
supplemental briefing was ordered as to the inmate's request for injunctive relief. The district court denied
the request for injunctive relief. The court found that the inmate had a constitutionally protected property
interest in his wages, based on an Arizona statute creating a cognizable property interest in inmate wages
for purposes of his action alleging that corrections officials violated his rights under the Takings Clause.
The court concluded that corrections officials did not violate the inmate's rights under the Takings Clause
by withholding a portion of his wages for “gate-money.” The court found that even though the money was
the inmate's private property, prison inmates forfeit all right to possess, control or dispose of private
property. The court also held that state correction officials did not act arbitrarily in withholding a portion
of inmate's wages for “gate-money” even though he was serving a life sentence, and therefore he was not
deprived of due process. The court noted that the withholding was intended to promote public welfare and
the common good, and that it was not arbitrary since the inmate might be able to obtain release prior to the
end of his life and if not, the money would be used to pay costs associated with his cremation or other
expenses. (Arizona Department of Corrections)
2008

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
MEDICAL COSTS

Burns v. PA Dept. of Correction, 544 F.3d 279 (3rd Cir. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 due process
claim against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's disciplinary
proceedings. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that as a matter of first impression, the
department of corrections' assessment of the inmate's institutional account, even absent an attempt to
deduct funds from it, constituted a deprivation of a protected property interest for the purposes of
procedural due process. The court found that the Department of Corrections' voluntary promise to refrain
from the future seizure of funds from the inmate's account, in a letter submitted more than three years after
it originally assessed that account for medical and other fees, did not render the inmate's appeal of his
procedural due process claim moot. The court noted that the alleged violation was complete at the moment
the inmate was deprived of a property interest without being afforded the requisite process, and, if proven,
would entitle the inmate to at least an award of nominal damages. The inmate had been disciplined for
assaulting another inmate and he lost his prison job, good time credits, and was assessed for medical costs
for the inmate who was injured. (SCI-Graterford, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a
class action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth
Amendment. After the court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties
entered into private mediation and reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a
class fund award of $25,648,204. The inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The
district court held that class counsel were entitled to an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the
settlement fund plus costs. The court noted that counsel obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary
results in a complex and risky case involving 150,000 class members, 20,000 claims, and five certified
classes, each of which presented unsettled legal issues. According to the court, tens or hundreds of
thousands of future inmates benefited from policy changes brought about by the suit, and the attorneys
were highly experienced and highly regarded civil rights lawyers with extensive class action experience.
(San Bernardino County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

Johnson v. Ozmint, 567 F.Supp.2d 806 (D.S.C. 2008). A state prison inmate brought a state court § 1983
action against the director of a state's department of corrections, alleging improper debiting of his trust
account to pay for legal copies and postage, improper classification, improper conditions of confinement,
and denial of rehabilitative opportunities. The director removed the action to federal court. The district
court granted summary judgment for the director and remanded. The court held that the inmate's written
requests to prison staff, and correspondence addressing issues of prison conditions, did not satisfy the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) administrative exhaustion requirement, so as to permit the
inmate's § 1983 action involving the same prison conditions to go forward. The court held that the state
corrections department's policy of debiting prison inmates' trust accounts to cover the cost of all legal
correspondence did not infringe upon theinmate's right of access to courts under the Due Process Clause,
where the inmate was not denied the use of a writing instrument, paper or postage for legal mail. The

4.27
XXII

court noted that the department had provided notice of its policy to debit accounts for the costs of such
correspondence, the department had a compelling interest in maintaining an orderly assessment process,
the inmate could contest any allegedly erroneous assessment via the prison grievance process, and the
state offered an adequate post-deprivation remedy. (South Carolina Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095 (N.D.Cal. 2008). In an action arising from a
publisher's allegations that a state corrections department illegally censored its publications, the parties'
settlement agreement provided that the publisher was the prevailing party for the purposes of a reasonable
attorney fee award and costs. The publisher, Prison Legal News, had alleged that the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) illegally censored its publications. The publisher
moved for a fee award for work performed by its counsel after the settlement agreement was executed,
and for the establishment of a semi-annual fees process. The defendants opposed the motion. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the allegedly minimal nature
of work performed after the agreement was executed did not preclude the publisher from being the
prevailing party entitled to the fee award; (2) the publisher could recover fees for time spent by its counsel
on such activities as drafting press releases and responding to media inquiries; (3) clerical tasks could not
be billed at the paralegal or attorney rate; (4) a reduction in the fee award was not warranted on grounds
that the publisher had multiple attorneys in attendance at two telephone conferences; (5) a fee reduction
was not warranted on grounds that the requested fees included hours spent on duplicative and excessive
tasks; and (6) the establishment of a semi-annual fees process was not warranted. (California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DAMAGES

Smith v. City of Oakland, 538 F.Supp.2d 1217 (N.D.Cal. 2008). After a jury rendered a verdict in favor of
a parolee and his girlfriend based on a finding that officers planted a semi-automatic rifle in his residence
in order to frame him, the officers filed post-trial motions seeking to overturn the jury's verdict on both
liability and damages. The district court held that substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict in favor
of the parolee but that the $5 million dollar emotional distress award to the parolee was grossly excessive.
According to the court, the emotional distress award to the parolee for malicious prosecution that resulted
in 4 1/2 months imprisonment, the indignity of having to defend himself against trumped-up criminal
charges and parole revocation proceedings, the uncertainty and apprehension about his fate and future
caused by the false arrest, and loss of his house and relationship with his girlfriend was grossly excessive.
The court granted a new trial on damages unless the parolee accepted a reduction from $5 million to $3
million. The court found that the parolee was not precluded from recovering damages that accrued after
the indictment on his malicious prosecution claim against the police officers. The court noted that the
parolee's testimony was corroborated by another witness, the lack of any fingerprints on the gun, expert's
testimony about standard police procedures, the testimony of a parole agent that an inspection of the
parolee's home was scheduled for that same day, the lack of any other guns or ammunition found in the
search of the house, and inconsistencies in the officers' testimony. The court also found that the award of
$750,000 to the parolee's girlfriend for emotional distress suffered when officers' conducted a
suspicionless search of the parolee’s residence while she was present was grossly excessive, and was
subject to reduction to $300,000. (City of Oakland, California)

U.S. District Court
FINES
TELEPHONE

Stanko v. Patton, 568 F.Supp.2d 1061 (D.Neb. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought two actions against jail
personnel alleging a number of constitutional violations. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court noted that the detainee “…is a white supremacist. He is also a prolific pro se
litigator who makes a habit of suing jail and prison officials when he is charged with a crime. Those facts
are central to understanding these related civil cases.” The court held that there was no evidence that
county jail officials charged the detainee more than the standard rate for telephone calls, as required to
establish that the rates charged violated the detainee's right to equal access to the courts. The court held
that a charge of $65 to the detainee's account by county jail officials, as discipline for ripping pages from
or otherwise defacing several law books, did not violate due process, as the disciplinary procedures the
detainee underwent provided him with all the process he was due and because he had additional remedies
in state court if such procedures were insufficient. (Douglas County Correctional Center, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
APA- Administrative
Procedures Act
RESTITUTION

Stern v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 537 F.Supp.2d 178 (D.D.C. 2008). A federal inmate brought an action
against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), challenging the BOP's statutory authority to promulgate a
regulation through which it had established restitution payment schedules. The district court denied the
BOP motion to dismiss. The court held that the inmate stated a cognizable claim under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). The court held that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) rendered
invalid the BOP regulation that established payment schedules for orders of restitution, because only the
courts could set payment schedules for restitution. (Federal Correctional Institution, Jesup, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
COST OF CONFINEMENT
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS

U.S. v. Peterson, 544 F.Supp.2d 1363 (M.D.Ga. 2008). A sheriff filed a motion to suppress his grand jury
testimony and a motion to dismiss certain counts of an indictment charging him with extortion by a public
official, obstruction of justice, perjury, and forced labor. The district court granted the motions in part and
denied in part. The court held that the sheriff, who charged inmates for room and board, could not be
guilty of extortion by a public official in violation of the Hobbs Act because he collected the funds and
remitted them to the county commissioners. The court noted that a public official who obtains property on
behalf of the government does not commit the offense of extortion, even if the government does not have
a lawful or legal claim to the property. (Clinch County, Georgia)

4.28
XXII

2009

XXIII

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Campbell v. Credit Bureau Systems, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 732 (E.D.Ky. 2009). An inmate brought an
action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) against collection agencies, stemming from
purported charges for medical care while incarcerated. The district court granted the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment. The court held that the inmate's certified letters to collection agencies, notifying
them that he disputed the debt and requesting validation, did not entitle the inmate to protection under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provision requiring agencies to temporarily cease collection
efforts and assist debtors in understanding the source and nature of the debt, where the letters were not
timely delivered. But the court held that the collection agencies failed to establish that the inmate initiated
the action in bad faith or with nefarious motive, for the purposes of a fee request. (Federal Medical Center
in Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The estate and minor sisters of an
18-year-old female prisoner who committed suicide while on suicide watch at a correctional institution
brought an action against correctional officers and staff, alleging violations of the prisoner's civil rights
and seeking $5 million for the estate plus $5 million for the sisters. After accepting the defendants' offer
of a judgment for $635,000, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting $328,740 in attorney fees. The district
court awarded $100,000 to the plaintiffs, with $1,500 to be taxed as fees for the guardian ad litem. The
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, holding that the fact that the case was
settled for $635,000 did not warrant a reduction in the requested attorney fees. The court noted that
$635,000 was not a nominal award, and the Farrar analysis for determining attorney fees, which
considered the extent of relief compared to the relief sought, was not relevant in cases in which the
recovery was not merely nominal. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding $1,500 in fees to the guardian ad litem. (Taycheedah Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
DAMAGES

Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). An individual who was raped by a trainee corrections
officer while she was a pretrial detainee, brought a § 1983 action against the trainee corrections officer
and other public officials and entities. After a jury found the trainee corrections officer liable and awarded
damages, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. The trainee corrections officer
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by admitting the plaintiff's psychologist's report as a supplemental report, and
the district court's jury instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court applied one
percent of the detainee’s $1.1 million judgment ($11,000) to attorneys' fees. With the detainee’s legal
expenses totaling $186,208.88, the defendant was responsible for $175,208.88 in attorneys' fees, in
addition to the $1.1 million judgment. The appeals court did not affirm the award of only one percent and
remanded the case for further proceedings. (Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
COURT COSTS
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against corrections
officers and others, alleging constitutional violations relating to a false accusation of threatening a guard.
Prior to trial, the defendants made a package settlement offer, which was rejected by the detainee.
Following the trial of one officer, a jury awarded the detainee damages in an amount less than the
settlement offer. The parties moved for attorney's fees and costs. The district court granted the detainee's
motion and denied the defendant's motion. The officer appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded.
The court held that the package settlement offer is to be taken on its own terms and compared with the
total recovery package in determining whether a defendant is entitled to costs following the detainee’s
success at trial. The court held that the officer was entitled to costs, excluding attorney's fees, and that the
detainee was entitled only to attorney's fees and costs accrued prior to the rejected offer. (Hillsborough
House of Corrections, New Hampshire).

U.S. Appeals Court
FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2009). A person who had been involuntarily committed to a
state hospital brought an action against hospital officials, asserting a variety of claims relating to the
conditions of his confinement and treatment, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district
court dismissed the action and the committee appealed. He was granted permission to proceed in format
pauperis (IFP) on appeal and ordered to make partial payments of the appellate filing fee through monthly
payments from his institutional account. The appeals court held that, as a matter of first impression, the
fee payment provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applicable to prisoners did not apply
to those who were civilly committed under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). (Sexual
Predator Treatment Program, Larned State Hospital, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
INDIGENCY
MEDICAL COSTS

Vuncannon v. U.S., 650 F.Supp.2d 577 (N.D.Miss. 2009). A parolee brought an action against a county
and others, alleging claims under § 1983 arising out of injuries he sustained in an accident while operating
a forklift as part of a work release project. The court held that summary judgment for the county on the
hospital’s claim was precluded by a genuine issues of material fact as to (1) whether the parolee was a
county prisoner, indigent, and unable to pay; (2) whether the parolee was in need of hospitalization for the
entire length of time; and (3) whether the hospital's charges were reasonable and customary. (Shelby
County Health Care Corporation, Tennessee, and Tippah County, Mississippi)

4.29

2010

XXIII

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS
RESTITUTION

Bradshaw v. Lappin, 738 F.Supp.2d 1143 (D.Colo. 2010). Inmates of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) brought actions against various prison defendants, alleging that the Director of the BOP violated
the inmates' rights, under the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP), by requiring them to
develop a financial plan addressing payment of their restitution obligations. The inmates moved to
consolidate, and defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court consolidated the cases. The
court held that allegations that prison officials improperly collected the sum of $25 per quarter from each
trust account of the two inmates, which in turn was credited against a debt that it was undisputed the
inmates actually owed, did not constitute a condition of confinement amounting to a “sufficiently serious”
deprivation of minimal civilized measure of life's necessities, thereby precluding the inmates' Eighth
Amendment claims. The court held that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the inmates'
Bivens claims that they were improperly placed on Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP)
“refusal” status, as it was not clear how, or even if, the inmates' constitutional rights would be implicated
by being improperly placed on IFRP “refusal” status, and if placement did violate some constitutional
right, that right was not so “clearly established” that officials could be expected to know their conduct
violated the Constitution. The court noted that participation in IFRP was voluntary and both inmates
voluntarily entered into written agreements to participate in the program, thereby expressly authorizing
the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to begin deducting funds from their accounts each quarter. (Federal Bureau
of Prisons)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Fletcher v. Menard Correctional Center, 623 F.3d 1171 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner subject to the
Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) three strikes provision brought a civil rights action against a
prison, warden, and various prison employees, alleging the defendants violated his federal constitutional
rights by using excessive force to restrain him and by recklessly disregarding his need for medical
attention. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to pre-pay the filing fee, and a motions
panel authorized the prisoner's appeal. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that that while the
prisoner's allegation of excessive force satisfied the three strikes provision's imminent danger requirement,
the prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA. The court noted that the prisoner
had an administrative remedy under an Illinois regulation providing an emergency grievance procedure
for state prisoners claiming to be in urgent need of medical attention. (Menard Correctional Center,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
COMMISSARY
TELEPHONE

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 681 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal prisoner brought an
action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that BOP's adoption of telephone rates and
commissary prices violated his due process and equal protection rights, as well as the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). He also alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy
Act. After BOP's motion to dismiss and for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, the
prisoner moved for reconsideration, and the BOP moved for summary judgment on remaining FOIA
claims. The district court granted the BOP’s motion. The court found no prejudicial error from the court's
dismissal of his claims in connection with BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices, as
would warrant reconsideration. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010). A nonprofit charitable organization
that published a monthly magazine containing news and analysis relating to the legal rights of prisoners
brought an action against state officials, in their individual and official capacities, seeking monetary,
injunctive, and declaratory relief under § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The organization challenged state institutions' refusal to deliver the organization's magazine to certain
prisoners. After a settlement agreement was reached, the district court granted the organization's first
motion for attorneys' fees and costs, and granted in part the organization's second motion for attorneys'
fees and costs. State officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
with instructions. The court held that the civil rights attorneys' fee statute authorized the organization, that
prevailed in its § 1983 action against state officials by obtaining a legally enforceable settlement
agreement relating to the delivery of its magazine to prisoners, to recover attorneys' fees for monitoring
the state officials' compliance with the parties' settlement agreement. The appeals court held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees for 31.5 hours of “correspondence with
inmates” where without such correspondence it would have been difficult for the organization to discover
or to document violations of the terms of the settlement. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Torres v. O'Quinn, 612 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2010). An inmate brought an action against state prison
officials, complaining that the officials failed to repair a malfunctioning night-light in his prison cell,
resulting in a disturbing strobe effect. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The inmate appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The inmate then
brought a separate action against prison officials, alleging a constitutional violation due to the prison's
prohibition of his subscription to commercially available pictures of nude women. The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the inmate appealed,
and the appeals court dismissed the appeal. The inmate then moved for a partial refund of filing fees that
had been collected from his prison trust account, challenging the prison's practice of withholding 40
percent of his account to satisfy the filing fee requirement for his two appeals. The appeals court found
that PLRA required that no more than 20 percent of an inmate's monthly income be deducted to pay filing
fees, irrespective of the total number of cases or appeals the inmate had pending at any one time. The

4.30

court held that granting the inmate a partial refund of fees was not warranted since the amounts withheld
from the inmate's account were actually owed and were properly, if excessively, collected. (Red Onion
State Prison, Virginia)
U.S. Appeals Court
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS
PRISONER ACCOUNTS

Ward v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2010). A state inmate who was serving a 197-year sentence brought
a § 1983 action against the director of the Arizona Department of Corrections, alleging the Department's
withholding of a portion of his prison wages for “gate money,” to be paid to him upon his release from
incarceration, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights since it was unlikely he would be
released from prison prior to his death. The appeals court reversed the dismissal of the claim. The district
court subsequently denied the inmate injunctive relief and granted summary judgment in favor of the
director. The inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the inmate did not have a current possessory
property interest in wages withheld in a dedicated discharge account, as required to establish a violation of
the Takings Clause. The court noted that Arizona statutes creating a protected property interest in prison
inmate wages did not give inmates full and unfettered right to their property. (Arizona Department of
Corrections)
2011

U.S. District Court
PRISONER ACCOUNTS
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS

English v. District of Columbia, 815 F.Supp.2d 254 (D.D.C. 2011). An involuntarily committed psychiatric patient brought an action against the District of Columbia, the mayor and various other officials, alleging constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, and various violations of District of Columbia law. The
defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the district court granted the motion. The court held that the process received by the patient at a public institution in regards to removal of money from his patient account
was sufficient to satisfy Fifth Amendment procedural due process. The court noted that the patient received a pre-deprivation notice reasonably calculated to make him aware that he owed money and that this
money would be taken from his account, the patient followed the procedures listed on the notice to challenge the invoice and availed himself of the appeals process, he received a response, and he requested and
received an external review. (Saint Elizabeths, District of Columbia Department of Mental Health)

U.S. District Court
INMATE FUNDS
COST OF CONFINEMENT

Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). A civilly committed sex offender and resident of
the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility brought a pro se action against the chief executive
officer (CEO) of MSOP, alleging the CEO violated the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) by withholding 50% of his earnings as a work-related expense to be applied toward
the cost of care. The CEO moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the
economic reality of the civilly committed sex offender's work within the MSOP vocational work program
was not the type of employment covered by FLSA. The court noted that the program was specifically
designed to provide “meaningful work skills training, educational training, and development of proper
work habits and extended treatment services for civilly committed sex offenders,” and to the extent that
the program engaged in commercial activity, it was incidental to the program's primary purpose of
providing meaningful work for sex offenders. According to the court, the program had few of the indicia
of traditional, free market employment, as the limits on the program prevented it from operating in a truly
competitive manner, and the offender's basic needs were met almost entirely by the State. The court noted
that the conclusion that the FLSA does not apply to a civilly committed sex offender should not be arrived
at just because, as a committed individual, he is confined like those in prison or because his confinement
is related to criminal activity, “…it is not simply an individual's status as a prisoner that determines the
applicability of the FLSA, but the economic reality itself that determines the availability of the law's
protections.” (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS
DUE PROCESS

Norris v. Premier Integrity Solutions, Inc., 641 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2011). An inmate brought a § 1983 due
process claim against a state department of corrections and prison officials arising out of the prison's
disciplinary proceedings. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that a hearing
officer's reliance entirely on the statements of a corrections officer, in determining whether videotape
evidence was relevant in a prison disciplinary proceeding, deprived the inmate of his right to due process.
According to the court, the inmate's right to present evidence was completely undermined by the hearing
officer's failure to independently determine whether the evidence was relevant. But the court held that the
hearing officer's denial of the inmate's request to call an alleged victim of the assault by the inmate as a
witness in the disciplinary hearing did not deprive the inmate of his right to due process. The court noted
that the hearing officer had asked the witness to testify, but the witness had refused, and the interest in
protecting the witness and managing the difficult relationships within the prison setting far outweighed the
inmate's right to call the alleged victim as a witness. The court found that a reasonable official at the time
of the inmate's misconduct hearing would not have known that the inmate was entitled to due process with
respect to an assessment against his prison account, and thus the hearing officer was entitled to qualified
immunity from the inmate's § 1983 claim that the officer violated his due process rights by imposing an
assessment prior to a hearing to determine the amount of money to be deducted from the inmate's prison
account. (State Correctional Institute at Graterford, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
ATTORNEY FEES

Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603 (2nd Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials and related defendants for alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district
court entered judgment upon a jury verdict for the prisoner against two of defendants. The prisoner moved
for post-trial relief. The district court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1.50. The prisoner

4.31

appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA)
attorney fee cap of 150% of the “monetary judgment” applied to limit the attorney fee award to $1.50,
where the jury had awarded the prisoner monetary relief of only $1.00 in actual damages. (Elmira
Correctional Facility, Hew York)
U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY
DUE PROCESS

Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2011). Seven inmates incarcerated at a state prison sued
current and former officials in the Illinois Department of Corrections, and the former Governor, for
marking up the price of commissary goods beyond a statutory cap. The district court dismissed the cases
for failure to state a claim and the inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded with
instructions. According to the appeals court, even if a statutory cap on the mark-up of the price of prison
commissary goods created a protected property interest, the prisoners did not state a procedural due
process claim based on the Department of Corrections' alleged cap violation where they did not allege that
post-deprivation remedies were inadequate to satisfy constitutional due process requirements. (Stateville
Correctional Center, Illinois)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
COURT COSTS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012). Following completion of litigation against the State of Idaho
and the state Department of Corrections, on state inmates' motion for clarification and motion for contempt for failure to comply with an injunction in state inmates' class action challenging conditions of
confinement in an Idaho jail, the inmates' attorneys sought fees and costs. The district court awarded costs
and fees, and denied the State's motion to stay pending appeal. The state appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the award of attorney fees was warranted. The court found that the award of fees to
the law firm appointed to represent the class of state inmates was warranted under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), although the inmates' motion for an order to show cause why the State of Idaho and
the Department of Corrections should not be held in contempt for violating the injunction was denied
because the defendants had brought themselves into conformity with the injunction between the time the
motion was filed and the time it was heard, and because the State did not intentionally violate the injunction. The court noted that the object of the motion was to obtain compliance, and counsel's monitoring
efforts, including the denied motion, played a key role in resolving the overcrowding issue at the prison.
The court awarded a slightly reduced amount: $76,185.60 in attorney's fees, $1,249.20 in costs and $46.94
in postage and office supply costs for the class representative. (Idaho State Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
COURT COSTS
DUE PROCESS
FINES
INDIGENCY

De Luna v. Hidalgo County, Tex., 853 F.Supp.2d 623(S.D.Tex. 2012). Two students, on behalf of
themselves and a purported class, brought a § 1983 action against state magistrates and a county, alleging
violation of federal due process and equal protection rights based on their placement in jail for unpaid
fines or costs related to violations of the Texas Education Code. The parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment and the students also moved for class certification. The district court held that: (1) the
students lacked standing to seek equitable and declaratory relief from magistrates' practice of incarcerating
individuals without an indigency determination; (2) the county's policy of jailing individuals charged with
fine-only misdemeanor offenses who had failed to directly inform the arraigning magistrate of their
indigency violated due process; and (3) the students did not waive their right to an affirmative indigency
determination by waiving their right to counsel at arraignment. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded on the § 1983 claim by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether one of the
students placed in jail for unpaid fines or costs related to violations of Texas Education Code knew that
she could tell a state magistrate that she could not pay the fines on her outstanding charges and obtain
either a payment plan or community service. (Hidalgo County Jail, Texas)

U.S. District Court
COURT COSTS
DAMAGES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ford v. Bender, 903 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.Mass. 2012). A law firm, which had been appointed to represent a
pretrial detainee in a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a state correctional facility's restrictive detention of the detainee in a disciplinary unit without a hearing, filed a motion for attorney fees
and a bill of costs, after the detainee was awarded $47,500 in damages and injunctive relief at a jurywaived trial. The district court allowed the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the Prison Litigation
Reform Act's (PLRA) cap on defendants' liability for attorney fees was not applicable; (2) one dollar of
the monetary judgment would be applied to attorney fee award; (3) the maximum hourly rate available
under PLRA to court-appointed counsel was 150 percent of the hourly rate authorized by the Judicial
Conference; (4) a 45 percent reduction of the law firm's proposed hours, to account for duplication of
work, was appropriate; and (5) an attorney fee award of $258,000 was appropriate. The law firm had
sought $345,542 in fees, and costs in the amount of $20,456. (Department Disciplinary Unit, MCI–Cedar
Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
SOCIAL SECURITY

Fowlkes v. Thomas, 667 F.3d 270 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prisoner, whose supplemental security income
(SSI) benefits were suspended while incarcerated, brought a pro se civil rights action against Social
Security Administration officials. The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. On remand, the district court refused to provide any
relief to the prisoner and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the Social
Security Administration was barred by the “No Social Security Benefits for Prisoners Act” from tendering
payment to the state prisoner while he remained incarcerated, even though the underlying obligation to
pay benefits arose before the Act's enactment. According to the court, the Act was not impermissibly
retroactive because it only altered the procedure and timing by which certain individuals received their
retroactive social security benefit payments, but it did not affect their substantive right to those benefits.
(Social Security Admin., New York)

4.32

U.S. Appeals Court
DAMAGES
FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Jimenez v. Franklin, 680 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2012). Pretrial detainee filed a civil rights action against a
deputy sheriff alleging use of excessive force to restrain him on three occasions while he was in pretrial
detention. The defendants were found to have violated the plaintiff's civil rights and held liable for
damages, and the district court awarded attorney's fees and ordered that all defendants were jointly and
severally liable for the fees. The district granted satisfactions of judgment after the defendants paid less
than the full amount of fee award. The plaintiff appealed. The appeals court vacated the district court’s
judgment. The court held that the proper time to challenge the joint and several nature of an attorney's fee
award as violating PLRA was on appeal of order which included the fee award and provided that the
defendants were jointly and severally liable for it. (Los Angeles County Sheriff, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
INMATE FUNDS

Moussazadeh v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781 (5th Cir. 2012). A Jewish state prisoner
brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, alleging that the defendant denied his
grievances and requests for kosher meals in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The district court entered
summary judgment for the defendant and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the state Jewish prisoner exhausted his administrative remedies with respect
to his claim that a prison's failure to provide him with kosher meals violated RLUIPA, where the prisoner
went through the state's entire grievance process before filing suit. The court found that sufficient
evidence established that the prisoner's religious beliefs were sincere, as required to support a claim
against state's department of criminal justice for violation of RLUIPA, where the prisoner stated that he
was born and raised Jewish and had always kept a kosher household, the prisoner offered evidence that he
requested kosher meals from the chaplain, kitchen staff, and the department, and while at another prison,
he ate kosher meals provided to him from the dining hall. The court noted that the prisoner was harassed
for his adherence to his religious beliefs and for his demands for kosher food, and that the department
transferred the prisoner for a time so he could receive kosher food. The court held that the prisoner was
denied a generally available benefit because of his religious beliefs, and thus, the state's department of
criminal justice imposed a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise under RLUIPA, where
every prisoner in the department's custody received a nutritionally sufficient diet, every observant Jewish
prisoner at the designated prison received a kosher diet free of charge, and the Jewish prisoner at issue
was forced to pay for his kosher meals. The court found that there was no evidence of a compelling
government interest in forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. The court also found
that summary judgment was precluded by a general dispute of material fact as to whether the state's
department of criminal justice employed the least restrictive means of minimizing costs and maintaining
security by forcing the Jewish prisoner to pay for all of his kosher meals. (Eastham Unit of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
DUE PROCESS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Pierce v. County of Orange, 905 F.Supp.2d 1017 (C.D.Cal. 2012). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail
facilities brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations
of their constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail
conditions, the district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, following a bench trial, the district court
entered a final judgment and a permanent injunction, and the detainees renewed their motion for attorney
fees. The district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) attorneys were entitled to compensation for time spent taking calls from inmates and performing pre-trial preparation; (2) time spent
unsuccessfully opposing a motion for sanctions was not compensable as part of fee award; (3) a 50%/50%
split between pre-appeal constitutional claims and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims was
appropriate; (4) reduction in the fee award in the amount of 30% was warranted based on the detainees'
limited success on their constitutional claims; and (5) application of a multiplier to the lodestar
calculations, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was not warranted. The
case began in 2001, a class of pre-trial detainees in the Orange County, California, jails, filed a lawsuit
against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights for the County's operation of the County jails in an unconstitutional manner. Allegations included
depriving detainees of opportunities for exercise and restricting their ability to practice religion. (Orange
County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
COPAYMENT
MEDICAL COSTS

Poole v. Isaacs, 703 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2012). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging that a required $2.00 copayment for dental care furnished at a correctional center violated his Eighth Amendment rights. The district court allowed the action to proceed against the center's
healthcare administrator after screening the complaint, but then granted summary judgment for the administrator. The inmate appealed. The appeals court held that the imposition of a modest fee for medical
services provided to inmates with adequate resources to pay the fee, standing alone, does not violate the
United States Constitution. According to the court, the issue of whether the inmate should have been
given the benefit of an exemption from the required copayment was state-law question that could not be
pursued under § 1983. (Big Muddy River Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DISPOSITION OF FUNDS
RESTITUTION

U.S. v. Beulke, 892 F.Supp.2d 1176 (D.S.D. 2012). After a defendant was convicted of embezzlement,
sentenced to prison, and ordered to pay restitution, the Government moved to enforce collection and to
order the defendant to apply all of his pension payments while in prison to the restitution order. The
district court granted the motion in part. The court held that, pursuant to the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA), the Government could seize the defendant's interest in his 401(k) and that any
interest the defendant's wife had in his 401(k) account was subject to the Government's perfected lien. The
court decided to exercise its statutory discretion so as to allow garnishment of 25% of the defendant's net

4.33

monthly pension, while allowing his estranged wife to continue to receive half of the pension payments
during the pendency of their divorce. (South Dakota)
U.S. District Court
RESTITUTION

U.S. v. Rush, 853 F.Supp.2d 159 (D.D.C. 2012). A defendant convicted of converting $104,000 of U.S.
Marshals Service (USMS) to her own personal use moved to amend a judgment to set her monthly
payments under the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP) to the
minimum amount allowable. The court held that modification of the was not warranted, where the court's
judgment did not require the defendant to participate in BOP's IFRP at all. The court noted that the
amount that the inmate had to pay under IFRP was a matter entrusted to the Executive Branch, and thus
the district court that ordered the defendant to pay restitution lacked the authority to set the defendant's
monthly payments under IFRP at the minimum amount allowable. (Federal Prison Camp, Alderson, West
Virginia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS
COPAYMENT

Weeks v. Hodges, 871 F.Supp.2d 811 (N.D.Ind. 2012). An inmate brought an action against a county
sheriff and a jail commander, in their individual and official capacities, alleging under § 1983 that the
defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in connection with his dental treatment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the
county sheriff and/or the jail administrator acted with deliberate indifference to the inmate's serious dental
needs when they took no action to follow through on the jail dentist's diagnosis that the inmate needed to
have his wisdom tooth removed, when it became clear that neither the inmate nor his mother were going
to pay for the procedure. According to the court, there was no evidence that the county jail had a
widespread practice of refusing inmates medical or dental care unless the inmates could pay for it
themselves, as would support the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the municipality
arising from his allegedly deficient dental care. (Whitley County Jail, Indiana)
2013

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Berke v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 942 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2013). A deaf federal inmate brought an
action alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and its director discriminated against him in violation of
the Rehabilitation Act by failing to adequately accommodate his deafness. After the court granted, in part,
the inmate's motion for a preliminary injunction, the inmate moved for attorney fees and costs. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate was the prevailing
party, and that a forty percent reduction in the attorney fee award was warranted, where the court did not
order the BOP to install videophones, only to investigate whether such a system could reasonably be
installed, and the BOP had not yet decided whether the system was feasible. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
ADMAX Satellite Camp, Tucson, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
FEES
RECOUPMENT

Davidson v. Bureau of Prisons, 931 F.Supp.2d 770 (E.D.Ky. 2013). A federal prisoner brought a Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) suit against the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) seeking the results of an audit
of his prison that had been conducted by the American Correctional Association. Following dismissal of
his suit, the prisoner moved for reconsideration and for an award of costs. The court held that the prisoner
was not entitled to judicial relief given that the BOP had compiled the responsive documents and was
awaiting only payment of the $33 copying charge. The court found that the prisoner had substantially
prevailed and was thus eligible to recover his litigation costs, and that the prisoner was only entitled to
recover his $350 filing fee. There had been a two-year delay in the BOP's response. (Federal Medical
Center, Lexington, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Foster v. Ghosh, 4 F.Supp.3d 974 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A state inmate brought an action against Illinois
Department of Corrections officials and an optometrist who treated him in prison, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The inmate moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to grant him access
to an ophthalmologist to evaluate his cataracts. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the optometrist and medical director were deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs
and that the inmate would suffer irreparable harm absent the issuance of an injunction. According to the
court, the only treatment the inmate received in prison was a prescription for eyeglasses, which was not
effective, and the inmate's request for a consultation was not expensive, unconventional, or esoteric. The
court noted that the cost the defendants would bear providing adequate care to the inmate did not
outweigh the irreparable harm the inmate would endure if his cataracts remained unevaluated. (Stateville
Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
DAMAGES

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C
virus (HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and
Community Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a
settlement agreement resolving injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary
judgment on the remaining damages claims. The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-ofpocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement agreement. The district court granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate
appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. On remand, the district court held that: (1) the
Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth Amendment claim against an officer in his official capacity; (2)

4.34

the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment claim based on initial denial of treatment due to his short prison
term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of
treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete a substance abuse program;(4) a fact issue precluded
summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap set forth in
the agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision)
U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
COURT COSTS
DAMAGES
DUE PROCESS

Jones v. McDaniel, 717 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted
summary judgment in part for the prisoner. The parties entered into a settlement agreement after a jury
verdict in the prisoner's favor. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal, holding that
the prisoner could not appeal the district court's grant of partial summary judgment after entry of a
judgment in favor of the prisoner on his due process claim. The officials had agreed, among other things,
to withdraw all post-trial motions, to pay the prisoner $11,000 in punitive damages plus costs and
attorney's fees, and to expunge all records of an improper disciplinary charge. (Ely State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL COSTS
RECOUPMENT

Vuncannon v. U.S., 711 F.3d 536 (5th Cir. 2013). A county and the medical corporation that treated a
county inmate sought reimbursement of medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation
insurance under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act (MWCA). The inmate was in a county work
program under the sheriff's supervision, for which services he earned $10 per day to be credited “toward
any and all charges of F.T.A/cash bonds owed to the county.” He was seriously injured in a forklift
accident while helping law enforcement officials conduct a “drug bust” pursuant to that program. The
inmate’s treatment cost more than $640,000. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
provider. The county appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmate did not qualify
for reimbursement of medical expenses under MWCA. The appeals court noted that the county inmate
was not an employee working under contract of hire, and therefore, did not qualify for reimbursement of
medical expenses from the provider of workers' compensation insurance under the Mississippi Workers'
Compensation Act (MWCA) after he was injured in a county work program. According to the court, there
was no express, written contract between the inmate and the county, the inmate did not sign a document
transmitted by the sheriff to a county justice court stating that the inmate was placed on a work detail, the
document was transmitted after he began working for the county, and inmates were required to work
under Mississippi law. (Tippah County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
LIMITATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). After a state prisoner prevailed in his civil rights action
against prison officials for deliberate indifference to his medical needs due to improper denial of two
grievance forms seeking dental care, and obtained an award of $1500 in compensatory damages and
$1000 in punitive damages, he moved for an award of attorney fees incurred in defending the favorable
judgment on appeal. The district court awarded the fees. One defendant appealed, arguing that the fees
award was limited by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held that, in a matter of
apparent first impression, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) attorney fees cap did not apply to fees
incurred by the prisoner in successfully defending the judgment on appeal. (California State Prison,
Solano)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Baker County Medical Services, Inc. v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 763 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2014). A hospital
commenced an action against various federal agencies and officials, seeking declaratory judgment that a
statute imposing Medicare rate as full compensation for medical services rendered to federal detainees
was an unconstitutional taking as applied to it. The district court dismissed the action. The hospital
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that requiring the hospital to treat federal detainees
at a Medicare rate on the basis that it had opted into the Medicare and Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA) was not a taking. (Baker County Medical Services, d.b.a. Ed Fraser
Memorial Hospital, Florida)

U.S. District Court
COURT COSTS
FEES
INMATE FUNDS

Edmondson v. Fremgen, 17 F.Supp.3d 833 (E.D.Wis. 2014). An indigent prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against the clerk of the state courts of appeals, alleging that the clerk violated various of his civil rights
when she froze his inmate trust accounts until filing fees had been paid in two of his state appeals. The
clerk moved to dismiss, and the prisoner moved for appointment of counsel. The district court granted the
motion to dismiss and denied the motion to appoint counsel. The court held that freezing the prisoner's
trust accounts did not violate his right to access the courts, did not violate the prisoner's right to procedural
due process, and was not an illegal seizure. . According to the court, the indigent prisoner's right to access
the courts were not violated, although not having the ability to spend money in his accounts prevented him
from copying legal materials, where allowing the prisoner's appeals to proceed in the first place, by having
deductions for filing fees made from his inmate trust accounts, did not injure his ability to access the
courts. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PREVAILING PARTY

In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases, 12 F.Supp.3d 485 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). Arrestees brought a class
action against county officials and others, challenging the county correctional center's blanket strip search
policy for newly admitted, misdemeanor detainees. Following a bench trial, the district court awarded
general damages of $500 per strip search for the 17,000 persons who comprised the class. Subsequently,
the arrestees moved for attorney fees in the amount of $5,754,000 plus costs and expenses of $182,030.
The court held that it would apply the current, unadjusted hourly rates charged by the various attorneys in

4.35

determining counsel fees using the lodestar method as a cross-check against the percentage method. The
court found that the lodestar rates were $300 for all associates, with two exceptions for requested rates
below $300, and $450 for all partners. The court awarded $3,836,000 in counsel fees, which was
equivalent to 33 1/3 % of the total amount recovered on behalf of the class, and $182,030.25 in costs and
expenses. (Nassau County Correctional Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden
and the contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center
violated their constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found
the operator to be in contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The
district court granted the motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt
proceeding, by the contractor that operated the state correctional facility, which provided an extension of
the settlement agreement, required a specific independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of
the settlement agreement term, and offered to pay reasonable attorney fees, did not give the inmates the
same relief that they achieved in the contempt proceeding, and thus the inmates' rejection of the offer did
not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and costs they incurred in the contempt proceeding. The
court noted that the inmates were already entitled to reasonable attorney fees in the event of a breach, and
the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt proceeding with regard to the extension and the
addition of an independent monitor. After considering the totality of the record and the arguments by
counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in fees and costs. (Idaho Correctional
Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS
INMATE FUNDS
DISPOSITION FUNDS

Montanez v. Secretary Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 773 F.3d 472 (3rd Cir. 2014). Inmates brought a
§ 1983 action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that the DOC's
implementation of a policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from their inmate accounts to cover
court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs violated their procedural due process rights. The district court
granted the officials' motion for summary judgment. The inmates appealed. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. The court held that the DOC’s refusal to provide exceptions to its across-theboard 20% rate of deduction, pursuant to a DOC policy that allowed automatic deduction of funds from
inmate accounts to cover court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs, did not violate due process, in light of
the fact that the DOC would not make deductions when an inmate's account fell below a certain minimum.
The court found that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
extent of the notice the inmate received with respect to his sentence and the DOC policy that permitted
automatic deduction of funds from his inmate account to cover court-ordered restitution, fines, and costs.
(Pennsylvania Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Morris v. Livingston, 739 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2014). A state inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983
action against a governor, challenging the constitutionality of a statute requiring inmates to pay a $100
annual health care services fee when they receive medical treatment. The district court dismissed the
action. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) the governor
was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity where the state department of criminal justice
was the agency responsible for administration and enforcement of the statute; (2) allegations were
insufficient to plead deliberate indifference where the inmate did not allege he was denied medical care or
that he was forced to choose between medical care or basic necessities; (3) the inmate received sufficient
notice that he would be deprived of funds; and (4) it was not unreasonable for the prison to take funds
from the state inmate's trust fund account to pay for medical care. The court noted that the prison posted
notices about the statute, the notices informed inmates of the fee and what it covered, and a regulation
was promulgated that provided additional notice. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Stevenson Unit,
Cuero, Texas)

U.S. Appeals Court
FEES

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). Two convicted sex offenders brought an action
challenging Wisconsin's statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring,
alleging violation of the prohibition against states enacting ex post facto laws. The district court ruled that
the act's $100 annual registration fee was unconstitutional, but upheld other provisions of the act. The
parties appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, modified in part, and reversed in part. The appeals
court held that: (1) the sex offenders had standing to challenge the registration requirement, even though
they did not intend to ever return to the state; (2) the sex offenders did not have standing to challenge
provisions of a monitoring requirement relating to working with and photographing minors because the
offenders no longer resided in the state; (3) the sex offenders did not have standing to challenge
Wisconsin's prohibition against a sex offender changing his name, where neither offender had expressed
the intent to change his name; (4) the sex offenders had standing to challenge monitoring of the act's
requirements of continual updating of information supplied to the sex offender registry; (5) the monitoring
act's requirements that sex offenders continually update information supplied to the sex offender registry
were not punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post factor laws; (6) the
$100 annual registration fee was not punitive; and (7) allowing the sex offenders to litigate
pseudonymously was not warranted where the sex offenders' convictions were matters of public record
and both sex offenders were currently registered in Wisconsin, making their names and other information
freely available. The court noted that the annual fee was intended to compensate the state for the expenses
of maintaining the sex offender registry, and since the offenders were responsible for the expense, there
was nothing “punitive” about making them pay for it. (Wisconsin)

4.36

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Scott v. Clarke, 61 F.Supp.3d 569 (W.D.Va. 2014). Female inmates brought a § 1983 action alleging that
a correctional facility failed to provide adequate medical care and that Commonwealth of Virginia
Department of Corrections (VDOC) officials were deliberately indifferent to that failure, in violation of
the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights. The inmates moved for class certification. The district court held
that class certification was warranted under the subsection of the class action rule pertaining to cases
where predominantly injunctive or declaratory relief was appropriate. The court found that the proposed
class of approximately 1,200 female inmates housed at the state correctional facility who were subject to
its medical care system was sufficiently large, on its face, to satisfy the size requirement for class
certification, and that the “commonality” requirement for class certification was met. The court noted that
one of the questions of fact was whether the VDOC medical contract system permitted improper cost
considerations to interfere with the treatment of serious medical conditions. (Fluvanna Correctional Center
for Women, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS

Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action
against the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC), a prison warden, and other
prison officials, alleging that his conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights, that he
was deprived of medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was subjected to race
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case, in part.
The court held that the prisoner stated claims against the warden and prison administrators for violation of
his equal protection rights and his conditions of confinement. According to the court, the prisoner stated
an Eighth Amendment claim against one prison nurse by alleging that the nurse failed to provide him with
appropriate medical treatment for ant bites he sustained, due to his inability to pay for treatment. The
prisoner alleged that the prison had a policy or custom of segregating blacks and non-blacks, and that
prison officials refused to place him in a non-black cell to get away from pests in his cell. The court held
that the administrators allowed ants to infest his cell for weeks and that as a result, he received ant bites
that caused him to scratch until his skin was broken due to severe itching, in violation of his conditions of
confinement rights under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. (Little Sandy Correctional Complex, Green
River Correctional Complex, Kentucky)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
COMMISSARY

DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that the
Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) response to his request for documents violated the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), that the BOP and its officials violated the Takings and Due Process Clauses by retaining interest
earned on money in inmates’ deposit accounts, and that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by
charging excessively high prices for items sold by the prison commissary and for telephone calls. The
district court entered summary judgment in the BOP’s favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court held that the BOP did not violate FOIA by
failing to produce recordings of the inmate’s telephone conversations and that the inmate’s failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies precluded the court from reviewing whether the BOP conducted an
adequate search. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) alleged practice of charging
excessively high prices for items sold by prison commissary and for telephone calls did not violate Eighth
Amendment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL COSTS
FEES
COPAYMENT

Gannaway v. Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2015). A state inmate brought §
1983 action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees, private companies and
healthcare professionals contracted to provide medical services to DOC institutions, alleging that he
received inadequate medical treatment throughout his incarceration, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, and that he was retaliated against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants
moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions. The court held that private
physicians employed by the vendor which contracted to provide medical services to state inmates were
acting under the color of state law for the purposes of inmate's § 1983 claim that he received inadequate
medical treatment in connection with an “internal stitch” from prior surgery, in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The court noted that the physicians consistently provided the inmate with medical care
throughout his incarceration, and there was no indication that the physicians were aware of, or acquiesced
in, the inmate's alleged deprivation of food while in a restricted housing unit (RHU). The court found that
the medical providers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation
of the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate received extensive medical treatment while in DOC custody,
including regular medical visits, prescriptions for medication to treat pain, acid reflux, high blood
pressure, and constipation, and various diagnostic testing.
The court found that there was no evidence that charges for medical co-payments and medications,
which were required by DOC policy, rendered the inmate unable to obtain treatment for his purported
serious medical needs, as would support his § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim.
(Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Rockview, and Prime Care Medical).

U.S. District Court
SOCIAL SECURITY

Mackey v. United States, 79 F.Supp.3d 57 (D.D.C. 2015). An inmate incarcerated in Indiana sought a
court order directing the Commissioner of Social Security to pay benefits for a period prior to his
incarceration. The Commissioner filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. The inmate in turn
requested transfer to another venue, rather than dismissal. The court granted the motion to dismiss the
case, holding that transfer to a federal court in Indiana, where the inmate was incarcerated, was not in the
interests of justice. (Federal Correctional Facility, Terre Haute, Indiana)

4.37

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
RESTITUTION

Ngemi v. County of Nassau, 87 F.Supp.3d 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). A father brought a § 1983 action against
a county, alleging he was denied due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in being arrested
and incarcerated for failing to meet his child support obligations. The county moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that the father received ample process prior
to his arrest. The court noted that father was present at the hearing where his failure to comply with the
order of support was addressed, an order of disposition was mailed to his home after the hearing and
warned him that failure to comply would result in imprisonment, the order afforded the father the
opportunity to object, the order of commitment was also mailed to the father and advised him of his ability
to appeal, the father never contested the orders, and the father never claimed over the course of four years
that he could not pay his child support arrears. (Nassau County Family Court, Nassau County Correctional
Center, New York)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE

Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113 F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A requester
brought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for information related to prison telephone
practices and policies, including those at ICE’s federal immigration detention centers. The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court granted the requestor’s motion. The court held
that the performance incentive rate of the phone services contractor for federal immigration detention
centers was not exempt from disclosure. According to the court, the phone services contractor was not
likely to suffer substantial competitive harm if the performance incentive rate from its successful bid for
federal immigration detention centers was disclosed, and thus that rate, which reflected the percentage of
revenue set aside in escrow and only paid to the contractor upon the government’s determination that the
contractor performed successfully, was not exempt from disclosure. (U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed
suicide while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful
death beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county,
sheriff, jail staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and
declaratory judgment. The defendants brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the
plaintiff, and subsequently moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor
another alleged policymaker could be held liable on a theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or
supervise, where the mother did not show that the training jail staff received was inadequate, and the
policy in place to determine whether the detainee was a suicide risk was not the “moving force” behind a
constitutional violation. The court held that the correct legal standard was not whether jail officers “knew
or should have known,” but whether they had gained actual knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide
and responded with deliberate indifference. The court held that neither party was entitled to attorney fees
as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)

U.S. Appeals Court
COST OF CONFINEMENT
INMATE FUNDS

Shinault v. Hawks, 782 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that prison
officials violated his constitutional rights when they froze funds in his inmate trust account to recover the
cost of his incarceration. The district court entered summary judgment in the officials’ favor and the
inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the decision to freeze and withdraw funds from
the inmate’s trust account did not violate the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the inmate’s
interest in the funds was substantial and there was risk of an erroneous deprivation, but the officials were
entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established that state prison officials were
required by the Due Process Clause to provide a pre-deprivation hearing before freezing funds in an
inmate’s trust account. The Department of Corrections transferred $65,353 into an account in the inmate’s
name and the inmate did not have access to the fund. (Oregon Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
COURT COSTS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
INMATE FUNDS

Siluk v. Merwin, 783 F.3d 421 (3rd Cir. 2015). An indigent state prisoner who had been allowed to file in
forma pauperis commenced an action alleging that the director of a county domestic relations section
deprived him of his federal income tax refund, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district
court dismissed the prisoner’s complaint, and ordered collection of an initial partial filing fee, followed by
monthly installments. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court held that under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), monthly income of an indigent state prisoner who owed two separate court fees was
subject to a single monthly 20% deduction. (State Correctional Institution, Rockview, Pennsylvania, and
Perry County Domestic Relations Section)

4.38

XIX

XIX

2006
U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Bynum v. District of Columbia, 412 F.Supp.2d 73 (D.D.C. 2006). Persons who had been, were, or

U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ginest v. Board of County Com'rs of Carbon County, 423 F.Supp.2d 1237 (W.D.Wyo. 2006).
County jail inmates filed a motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses after obtaining a
consent decree in a § 1983 class action against a county and sheriff in his official capacity, for
deliberate indifference to their medical needs, and a contempt order against the defendants. The
district court held that: (1) the class counsel for the inmates was entitled to attorney fees for
time and effort spent in monitoring compliance by the county and its sheriff with the remedial
plan; (2) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not preclude an award of attorney fees to
the class counsel; (3) the counsel would be awarded a 25% fee multiplier or enhancement; and (4)
the counsel was entitled to the award of expenses for his travel to Wyoming to review medical
records and perform other activities on behalf of the inmates. (Carbon County, Wyoming)

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Marriott v. County of Montgomery, 426 F.Supp.2d 1 (N.D.N.Y. 2006.) Arrestees brought suit,

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEE

Patterson v. Balsamico, 440 F.3d 104 (2nd Cir. 2006). An African-American former employee of a

XX

would be incarcerated by the District of Columbia Department of Corrections brought a § 1983
class action challenging the Department's policy of conducting suspicionless strip searches of
inmates who were declared releasable after their court appearances, and challenging alleged
over-detentions. The district court preliminarily approved a proposed settlement. Following a
final approval hearing, the district court held that final approval was warranted and that the
allocation of a sum for distribution to all class members who submitted claims was a fair method
of distribution. The court held that the distribution fund of $12 million was very favorable,
especially in view of the low number of opt-outs and objectors. The court found that there was no
collusion between the parties or their counsel and that the settlement comported with the rule
governing class actions and with due process requirements. The court found that the attorney
fee award of 33% of the settlement fund, or $4 million, was reasonable, noting that counsel had
engaged in protracted efforts over four years to obtain the outstanding settlement in both
monetary and injunctive terms, the case was complex and involved novel issues, the case carried
a serious risk of lack of success, and the settlement met with a high level of class satisfaction.
The court defined the “Over-Detention Injunctive Relief Class” as: (a) Each person who has been,
is or will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility
beginning in the three years preceding the filing of the action on or about May 16, 2002 up to
and until the date this case is terminated; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future will
not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court
order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired. (District of
Columbia Department of Corrections)

individually and on behalf of a class of others similarly situated, against a county sheriff's
department, county sheriff, county undersheriff, former county undersheriff, a jail administrator
and a lieutenant, challenging the constitutionality of the search policy of the county jail. The
district court held that the policy, pursuant to which arrestees being admitted to a county jail
were effectively subjected to strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment and that the
arrestees were entitled to permanent injunctive relief. The court found that the arrestees were
the “prevailing parties” entitled to an award of attorney fees. According to the court, the Fourth
Amendment precludes officials from performing strip searches and/or body cavity searches of
arrestees charged with misdemeanors or other minor offenses unless the officials have a
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or other contraband based on the
crime charged, the particular characteristics of the arrestee, and/or the circumstances of the
arrest. The court held that the indiscriminate strip-searching of misdemeanor arrestees is
unconstitutional. The policy required arrestees to remove their clothing in front of a corrections
officer (CO) and take a shower, regardless of the nature of their crime and without any
determination that there was a reasonable suspicion that they possessed contraband.
(Montgomery County Jail, New York)
county sheriff's department brought an action against another corrections officer, alleging the
existence of a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. After a jury trial, the district court awarded the former employee nominal
damages on the hostile work environment claim, $100,000 on the emotional distress claim, and
$20,000 in punitive damages. The court denied the corrections officer's motion for a new trial
and awarded the former employee attorney fees. The parties appealed. The court of appeals
affirmed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. The appeals court held that the district
court did not abuse its discretion when, pursuant to New York law, it declined to reduce
compensatory damages of $100,000 awarded to the plaintiff on his claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, arising from an assault in which the officer and others sprayed the
plaintiff with mace, covered him with shaving cream, and taunted him with racial slurs. The
court noted that the plaintiff had testified as to his humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of selfconfidence, as well as to his sleeplessness, headaches, stomach pains, and burning in his eyes

5.29

from the use of mace. The appeals court found that the punitive damages award of $20,000 did
not exceed the maximum permissible amount considering that this was a thoroughly
reprehensible incident, particularly in light of its racial motivation, and that the punitive
damages award represented a relatively small fraction of $100,000 compensatory damages
awarded on the emotional distress claim. The court noted that the officer against whom the
award was made should have appreciated the gravity of the racially motivated assault on a
fellow officer and should have understood that such conduct could have adverse economic
consequences. But the appeals court concluded that the $20,000 damage award was excessive in
light of the personal finances of the defendant corrections officer, who earned an annual salary
of approximately $37,632, was married and had two children. The court found that an award of
no more than $10,000 would provide sufficient punishment and deter future conduct. The court
remanded the case for a new trial on punitive damages, unless the plaintiff agreed to remit the
portion of the punitive damages award that exceeded $10,000. The plaintiff alleged that he had
been subjected to a racially discriminatory hostile work environment and that his employment
had been terminated because of his race. He alleged that he heard fellow employees use racial
slurs and make disparaging remarks about African-Americans on approximately 12 occasions
during his first three months of employment. (Oneida County Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PREVAILING PARTY
LIMITATION

Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate brought an action against prison
personnel, alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The district court entered
judgment upon jury verdict in favor of the inmate. Inmate appealed the court’s refusal to award
attorney fees and declaratory relief, and a prison warden and social worker cross-appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the inmate's oral complaints to prison
personnel about prison conditions, including the use of shackles in group therapy and denial of
yard time to prisoners in a pre-transfer unit, related to matters of public concern and were
designed to effect a change in prison policy, and thus, they were protected by the First
Amendment. The court held that the inmate, who was awarded only nominal damages under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) in his action against prison personnel, was not entitled to
an attorney fee award greater than 150% of the nominal damages based on his claim for
declaratory judgment, that his punishment by personnel was illegal. The court noted that the
only relief the inmate secured was nominal damages, and since the inmate had already been
transferred to another facility, a declaratory judgment would have been largely duplicative of
the jury's verdict concluding that personnel had retaliated against inmate. (Tamms Correctional
Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act
LIMITATION

Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). An arrestee was awarded nominal

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a prison official transferred him in retaliation for his exercising his First
Amendment rights. After a jury verdict in the inmate's favor, the official filed a motion for a new
trial, and the inmate moved for costs and attorney fees. The district court held that the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) that prohibited inmates from recovering mental
or emotional damages in the absence of a the physical injury, did not bar the inmate's claim for
emotional damages and that evidence supported the award of punitive damages. The court
applied only $1 of the inmate's damages award to his attorney fee award. The court noted that a
jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the defendant's
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless disregard
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. According to the court, the
jury's award of punitive damages against the prison official was supported by evidence that the
official transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment
free speech rights in complaining to the official's superiors about the official's misconduct, even
though the official was aware that the transfer would prevent the inmate from seeing his
attorney, from paying his attorney, and from seeing his emotionally-disabled daughter. The
court ruled that the inmate was entitled to reimbursement for the work of law students in
calculating his attorney fee award, even though the law students were supervised by an attorney
and obtained course credit for their work. The inmate had been represented by the law school's
clinical law program, and the law students participated as competent and professional attorneys
throughout discovery, dispositive motions, interlocutory appeal, and trial. According to the
court, in calculating the attorney fee award, the rate of $85/hour, rather than the $25/hour
proposed by the defendant, was the appropriate billing rate for time spent by law students on
the case, where affidavits from local attorneys stated that prevailing billing rates for the work of
summer associates and interns was between $100 and $130 per hour. The court applied only $1

XX

damages in his § 1983 action against a police officer who broke the arrestee’s car window when
trying to make an arrest. The district court awarded attorney’s fees and the officer appealed.
The appeals court affirmed. On rehearing en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded.
The court held that the arrestee was entitled to an attorney fee award that was limited to 150%
of the money judgment, as provided by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The arrestee had been
awarded $1 in nominal damages, and court held that the PLRA provision that limited fee
awards to 150% of the money judgment was “not absurd.” (Kansas City, Missouri)

5.30

of the inmate's $219,000 damages award to the $90,875 in attorney's fees awarded to the plaintiff, even
though the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) prescribed application of up to 25% of such damages
awards. (Michigan Department of Corrections)
2007
U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY
DETERMINATION

Agster v. Maricopa County, 486 F.Supp.2d 1005 (D.Ariz. 2007). An arrestee's parents and estate brought an
action against a county, police officers, county correctional health agency, and nurse, alleging federal civil
rights claims. Following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed two motions for
attorney fees and non-taxable costs, and the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' second motion for
attorney fees. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ motions and denied the defendants’ motions. The
court held that: (1) the reasonable hourly rate for the plaintiffs' lead attorney was $400; (2) reduction of
hours requested was warranted for the time plaintiffs' attorneys spent dealing with the media, and for the
hours spent on a duplication of effort, turnover of staff, and inefficiencies inherent in utilizing as many
timekeepers as the plaintiffs' attorneys used; (3) plaintiffs were entitled to an award of post-trial out-ofpocket expenses, including billed costs not taxed by clerk of court; and (4) apportionment of attorney fees
among the defendants was not warranted. (Maricopa County, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A. SEC. 1988
PREVAILING PARTY

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007). A domestic violence arrestee brought a § 1983
Eighth Amendment action against a county, county sheriff, and individual sheriff's deputies, alleging that
bail of $1 million was excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants
and awarded attorney fees in favor of the defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed
in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that bail was not excessive, and that the deputy
who requested a bail enhancement and the deputy's superior who authorized the enhancement request
were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that individual sheriff's deputies were not entitled to
the award of attorney fees under § 1988, but that the arrestee's post-discovery litigation of a Monell claim
was frivolous, supporting the award of attorney fees to the county. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, California)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION

King v. County of Gloucester, 483 F.Supp.2d 396 (D.N.J. 2007). A law firm moved for reasonable attorney's
fees after reaching a settlement in excess of $2 million on a civil rights claim against a county, brought on
behalf of the family of an inmate who was beaten to death in a county jail. The district court held that the
law firm was entitled to reasonable and appropriate attorney's fees in the amount of one-third of the
settlement amount. The court found that the contingent fee of 33-1/3%, requested by the firm, was
reasonable under New Jersey law. The court noted that the case was difficult to litigate and was
vigorously contested at all stages, the victim had been assailed in the press, the firm spent significant time
and effort as a small law office foregoing other potentially profitable engagements, and the firm
demonstrated exemplary care and skill, having convinced the county to settle for a sum eight times higher
than its initial offer. (Gloucester Co. Jail, N.J.)

U.S. District Court
LIMITATIONS
CONSENT DECREE
POST-JUDGMENT
SERVICES

Laube v. Allen, 506 F.Supp.2d 969 (M.D.Ala. 2007). A class action lawsuit was brought on behalf of
women incarcerated by the Alabama Department of Corrections, who claimed that various state officials
were deliberately indifferent to the denial of female prisoners' basic human needs, to the denial of their
serious medical needs, and to their substantial risk of serious physical violence. The district court
approved two four-year settlement agreements and the prisoners moved for attorneys' fees and expenses.
The district court held that: (1) the prisoners were the “prevailing parties” for purposes of imposing
attorneys' fees and expenses; (2) the number of hours billed through the date of oral arguments on the
motion for a preliminary injunction and the date on which the billing statement read “end of preliminary
injunction time” would be cut in half across-the-board; (3) the time spent challenging the prison officials’
second remedial plan was non-compensable; (4) fees relating to discovery disputes between the prisoners
and the non-state defendants were not compensable from the state defendants; (5) attorney fees that were
directly and reasonably incurred in obtaining the court-ordered relief contained within medical-settlement
agreement were compensable; (6) interest on attorney's fees and expenses runs from the date of the
judgment establishing plaintiffs' entitlement to the award; and (7) the prisoners were entitled to
compensable litigation expenses directly and reasonably related to their enforcement expenses. (Alabama
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403 (5 th Cir. 2007). Bail bondsmen brought a civil rights
action challenging a Texas statute restricting solicitation of potential customers, claiming it was a denial
of their First Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the
bondsmen and awarded $50,000 in attorney fees. The defendants appealed and the bondsmen crossappealed the award of fees, requesting more. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated
in part, and remanded. The court held that: (1) the court could consider evidence generated after
enactment of the statute; (2) the provision of the statute that restricted solicitation by bail bondsmen of
persons subject to an unexecuted arrest warrant by preventing solicitation unless the bondsman had a
prior relationship with the party violated the First Amendment; (3) the provision of the statute that
prohibited bail bondsmen from calling potential customers for 24 hours after an offender's arrest violated
the First Amendment; (4) the provision of the statute that prohibited bail bondsmen from contacting
potential customers between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. did not violate the First Amendment; (5) the
provision of the statute that prohibited bail bondsmen from contacting potential customers between 9:00

XXII

5.31

p.m. and 9:00 a.m. was not unconstitutionally vague; and (6) the defendants failed to show special
circumstances warranting reduction or preclusion of the attorney fee award. (Harris County Bail Bond
Board, Texas)
2008
U.S. District Court
CONSENT DECREE
DETERMINATION

Craft v. County of San Bernardino, 624 F.Supp.2d 1113 (C.D.Cal. 2008). County jail inmates brought a class
action alleging that a county's practice of routinely strip-searching inmates without probable cause or
reasonable suspicion that the inmates were in possession of weapons or drugs violated the Fourth Amendment.
After the court granted the inmates’ motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered into private
mediation and reached a settlement agreement providing for, among other things, a class fund award of
$25,648,204. The inmates moved for the award of attorney's fees and costs. The district court held that class
counsel were entitled to an attorney's fees award in the amount of 25% of the settlement fund plus costs. The
court noted that counsel obtained excellent pecuniary and nonpecuniary results in a complex and risky case
involving 150,000 class members, 20,000 claims, and five certified classes, each of which presented unsettled
legal issues. According to the court, tens or hundreds of thousands of future inmates benefited from policy
changes brought about by the suit, and the attorneys were highly experienced and highly regarded civil rights
lawyers with extensive class action experience. (San Bernardino County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PARTIAL SUCCESS

Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2008). County corrections officers brought a § 1983 First
Amendment retaliation action against a sheriff in his individual and official capacities, alleging that disciplinary
actions taken by the sheriff had been motivated by the officers' union activities. The officers also asserted statelaw civil rights and tort claims. The district court entered judgment on a jury verdict against the sheriff on the §
1983 claims against him in his official capacity, and against the sheriff on some state-law claims. The sheriff
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers' private speech to coworkers concerning a
planned picket, whose stated purpose was to allow union members to publicly express criticism of management
and to alert the public to the behavior of the sheriff was on a matter of public concern. According to the court,
there was no evidence of actual or potential disruption from the officers' brief statements to coworkers
concerning a planned picket by the union, and conversely there was ample evidence that the officers had been
suspended because of their pro-union activity rather than for reasons of disruption of public safety. The court
held that the attorney fee award to the officers’ attorneys of approximately $172,000 was not excessive, even
though the back-wages damages award was only approximately $18,000. According to the court, the award
under a civil rights attorney fee statute did not necessarily have to be proportionate to the amount of damages.
The court also held that the officers' lack of success on one of their claims did not preclude the fee award
because the officers were successful on the claim that had propelled the litigation. (Bristol County Sheriff's
Office, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PARTIAL SUCCESS

Hudson v. Dennehy, 568 F.Supp.2d 125 (D.Mass. 2008). Inmates in a state prison, who adhered to the
religious teachings of Elijah Muhammad and the Nation of Islam, filed a civil rights action against a
commissioner of a state department of corrections, alleging violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). After entry of partial summary
judgment in the inmates' favor, the inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the
motion in part. The court held that a fifteen percent reduction of the attorney fee award to account for time
spent on an unsuccessful prayer rug claim was reasonable, but a reduction of the attorney fee award was not
warranted on the ground that the court granted judgment only with respect to an RLUIPA claim. The court
ordered attorney fees to be calculated based on the hourly rate for court-appointed counsel authorized by the
Judicial Conference under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA). (Special Management Unit, Massachusetts
Correctional Institution- Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PREVAILING PARTY

Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J. 2008). An alien brought an action
alleging that a government contractor that detained her pending asylum proceedings violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and state law. After a jury verdict in the alien's favor, the alien moved for
attorney fees and expenses. The district court granted the motion, finding that the alien was the “prevailing
party, and that the alien's calculation of the percentage of attorney hours devoted to her RFRA claims was
reasonable. The attorney fees and expenses approved by the court totaled $642,399. The decision was vacated
and the case was remanded by an appeals court in 2009. The district court noted that “…the case arose out of
the appalling conditions that prevailed at the detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey”. The appeals court held
that the district court could not attribute a portion of the alien’s state law tort award to her RFRA claim but that
the court may consider the results on the tort claims. The appeals court affirmed the district court’s
determination of market billing rates. (Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., Elizabeth, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
LIMITATION

Lewis v. City of Albany Police Dept., 554 F.Supp.2d 297 (N.D.N.Y. 2008). An African-American arrestee
brought a civil rights action against a police officer and city, alleging excessive force, an equal protection
violation, and municipal liability based on failure to properly train, supervise, or discipline the officer.
Following entry of a jury verdict in favor of the arrestee, and denial of the officer's and city's motions for
judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, the arrestee moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court
held that the appropriate hourly rate for attorney fees was $210 per hour for an experienced attorney, $150 per
hour for an attorney with more than four years experience, $120 per hour for an attorney with less than four
years experience, and $80 per hour for paralegals. (City of Albany Police Department, New York)

XXII

5.32

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
POST-JUDGEMENT
SERVICES
PREVAILING PARTY

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 561 F.Supp.2d 1095 (N.D.Cal. 2008). In an action arising from a
publisher's allegations that a state corrections department illegally censored its publications, the parties'
settlement agreement provided that the publisher was the prevailing party for the purposes of a reasonable
attorney fee award and costs. The publisher, Prison Legal News, had alleged that the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) illegally censored its publications. The publisher moved for a fee
award for work performed by its counsel after the settlement agreement was executed, and for the
establishment of a semi-annual fees process. The defendants opposed the motion. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) the allegedly minimal nature of work performed after
the agreement was executed did not preclude the publisher from being the prevailing party entitled to the fee
award; (2) the publisher could recover fees for time spent by its counsel on such activities as drafting press
releases and responding to media inquiries; (3) clerical tasks could not be billed at the paralegal or attorney
rate; (4) a reduction in the fee award was not warranted on grounds that the publisher had multiple attorneys in
attendance at two telephone conferences; (5) a fee reduction was not warranted on grounds that the requested
fees included hours spent on duplicative and excessive tasks; and (6) the establishment of a semi-annual fees
process was not warranted. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
ENHANCEMENT
LIMITATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Estate of Enoch ex rel. Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The estate and minor sisters of an 18year-old female prisoner who committed suicide while on suicide watch at a correctional institution brought an
action against correctional officers and staff, alleging violations of the prisoner's civil rights and seeking $5
million for the estate plus $5 million for the sisters. After accepting the defendants' offer of a judgment for
$635,000, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting $328,740 in attorney fees. The district court awarded
$100,000 to the plaintiffs, with $1,500 to be taxed as fees for the guardian ad litem. The plaintiffs appealed.
The appeals court reversed and remanded, holding that the fact that the case was settled for $635,000 did not
warrant a reduction in the requested attorney fees. The court noted that $635,000 was not a nominal award, and
the Farrar analysis for determining attorney fees, which considered the extent of relief compared to the relief
sought, was not relevant in cases in which the recovery was not merely nominal. The court found that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $1,500 in fees to the guardian ad litem. (Taycheedah
Correctional Institution, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PREVAILING PARTY
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Graves v. Arpaio, 633 F.Supp.2d 834 (D.Ariz. 2009). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class
action against a county sheriff and a county board of supervisors, alleging violation of the detainees' civil
rights. The parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by
stipulation of the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered
a second amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The detainees moved
for attorney's fees and nontaxable costs. The district court held that: (1) the class of detainees was the prevailing
party entitled to attorney's fees; (2) the initial lodestar figure of $1,239,491.63 for attorney's fees was
reasonable; (3) Kerr factors provided no basis for downward adjustment of the initial lodestar; (4) the attorney's
fees award would not be reduced for limited success; (5) the amount requested as reimbursement for attorney's
fees was fully compensable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (6) PLRA did not require
appointment of class counsel for the award of attorney's fees and non-taxable costs; and (7) the class was
entitled to interest on the award of attorney' fees from the date of the court's order ruling in favor of the
detainees on the motion to terminate. The court noted that defending and enforcing the judgment for more than
five years and obtaining prospective relief required substantial time and labor, the issues presented were not
novel but many were difficult and complex, conducting discovery, marshaling evidence, and presenting that
evidence during a 13-day evidentiary hearing required considerable skill, commitment of attorneys' time and
advancement of costs limited attorneys' ability to take on new cases, and the attorneys would not receive any
compensation for their work representing the detainees except as awarded by the court. (Maricopa County
Sheriff and Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PREVAILING PARTY

Hall v. Terrell, 648 F.Supp.2d 1229 (D.Colo. 2009). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
correctional officer, alleging that he raped her while she was in custody. Following entry of default judgment
against the officer, a bench trial to determine damages, and the entry of a judgment awarding compensatory and
punitive damages, the detainee moved for prejudgment interest and attorney fees. The district court granted the
motion for attorney fees in part. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applied to the
detainee's request for attorney fees where the detainee was, at every stage of the lawsuit, a prisoner confined to
a correctional facility, she was the prevailing party in her suit, and the suit was an action in which attorney fees
were authorized under § 1988. The court held that the reasonable hourly rate for the lodestar amount, in
determining the award of attorney fees under PLRA, was the hourly rate for Criminal Justice Act (CJA)
appointments in Tenth Circuit and District of Colorado. According to the court, under PLRA, the appropriate
hourly rate for the award of paralegal fees was 64% of the average rate that she had requested for non-senior
attorneys, and for an assistant was 50% of such rate. The court held that under PLRA, 10 percent was the
appropriate percentage of the judgment obtained by the detainee against the corrections officer, where the
factor of the opposing party's culpability or bad faith favored the detainee, the factor of ability to satisfy the
award of attorney fees suggested that the detainee should bear some portion of attorney fees, and the factor of
the possibility that the award might deter other persons favored the detainee. The district court had awarded
$1,354,070 in damages, comprised of $354,070.41 in compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive
damages. (Denver Women's Correctional Facility, Colorado)

XXIII

5.33

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION

Kahle v. Leonard, 563 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2009). An individual who was raped by a trainee corrections officer
while she was a pretrial detainee, brought a § 1983 action against the trainee corrections officer and other
public officials and entities. After a jury found the trainee corrections officer liable and awarded damages, the
district court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees. The trainee corrections officer appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part and remanded in part. The court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the plaintiff's psychologist's report as a supplemental report, and the district court's jury
instructions did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The district court applied one percent of the detainee’s
$1.1 million judgment ($11,000) to attorneys' fees. With the detainee’s legal expenses totaling $186,208.88, the
defendant was responsible for $175,208.88 in attorneys' fees, in addition to the $1.1 million judgment. The
appeals court did not affirm the award of only one percent and remanded the case for further proceedings.
(Pennington County Jail, South Dakota)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION

King v. Rivas, 555 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought an action against corrections officers and
others, alleging constitutional violations relating to a false accusation of threatening a guard. Prior to trial, the
defendants made a package settlement offer, which was rejected by the detainee. Following the trial of one
officer, a jury awarded the detainee damages in an amount less than the settlement offer. The parties moved for
attorney's fees and costs. The district court granted the detainee's motion and denied the defendant's motion.
The officer appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the package settlement offer
is to be taken on its own terms and compared with the total recovery package in determining whether a
defendant is entitled to costs following the detainee’s success at trial. The court held that the officer was
entitled to costs, excluding attorney's fees, and that the detainee was entitled only to attorney's fees and costs
accrued prior to the rejected offer. (Hillsborough House of Corrections, New Hampshire).

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION

L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 645 F.Supp.2d 888 (E.D.Cal. 2009). Juvenile parolees brought a class action against
various state officials and agencies seeking to change parole revocation procedures. Following a settlement
which included injunctive relief, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs. The court granted the motion
in part. The court held that a five percent reduction of the lodestar amount (number of hours the prevailing
party reasonably spent on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate) was appropriate, resulting in an
attorney fee award of $4,421,173. The court held that the parolees could recover attorney fees related to their
unsuccessful motions to amend the complaint, and for time billed for communications among parolees' counsel.
According to the court, the hours billed by the parolees' attorneys for motion practice and drafting of complaint
were reasonable, but that time billed by the parolees' attorneys related to press about the case was not
reasonable. (California)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Miranda v. Utah, 629 F.Supp.2d 1256 (D.Utah 2009). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the State of
Utah, a warden, and corrections officers alleging the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Following a jury verdict against the officer, the
inmate moved for attorney fees. The district court held that the appropriate amount of the inmate’s judgment to
be applied to attorney fees was $2,500. The court noted that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA)
attorney fee provision, the court need not automatically apply 25 percent of a prisoner's monetary judgment to
pay attorney fees, but rather, the court has the discretion to apply a lower percentage. (Utah Department of
Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Parker v. Conway, 581 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against a prison guard.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the prisoner, and awarded attorney fees under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The prisoner appealed, and the guard cross-appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the PLRA's cap on attorney fee awards at 150% of the judgment in a prisoner civil
rights suit did not violate equal protection. The court noted that the PLRA's cap on attorney fee awards at 150%
of the judgment in a prisoner civil rights suit was rationally related to legitimate government objectives of
achieving uniformity in attorney's fee awards, reducing such awards, deterring frivolous lawsuits, and deterring
lawsuits that, while not technically frivolous, generate litigation costs that exceed any potential recovery. The
court held that the PLRA provision requiring the application of a portion of the judgment in a prisoner civil
rights suit, not to exceed 25 percent, to satisfy the amount of attorney fees awarded does not compel district
courts to apply 25 percent of the judgment to pay attorney's fees when the attorney's fee award exceeds that
amount, as long as it applies some portion of the judgment to satisfy the attorney’s fee award. (Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PREVAILING PARTY

Perez v. Westchester County Dept. of Corrections, 587 F.3d 143 (2nd Cir. 2009). Inmates brought a civil rights
action against a county Department of Corrections and officials, alleging refusal to provide Halal meat to
Muslim inmates. Following a settlement, the district court granted the inmates' motion for attorneys' fees and
the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the inmates were the “prevailing
parties” for purposes of a fee award, that a statutory fee cap applied to the award, and that the district court
properly calculated the fee award. (Westchester County Department of Corrections, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
ENHANCEMENT

El-Tabech v. Clarke, 616 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2010). A Muslim inmate, who was awarded attorney fees in a civil
rights action in which he prevailed on his request for kosher meals, moved for an order directing prison
officials to pay the fee award and to increase the post-judgment interest rate payable on that award. The district
court granted the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that
the award of post-judgment interest at a punitive rate of 14% on the attorney fees awarded to the inmate's

XXIII

5.34

counsel in the civil rights suit was an abuse of discretion, where most of the delay in the state's payment of the
fee award was due to the inmate's refusal to file a claim under state statutes governing payment of federal court
judgments. According to the court, there were no extraordinary circumstances warranting departure from the
statutory post-judgment interest rate. (Tecumseh State Correctional Institution, Nebraska)
U.S. Appeals Court
CONSENT DECREE

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded
attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the
sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and
requiring the sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of
Agriculture's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held that air temperatures above 85
degrees greatly increased the risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals taking psychotropic medications, and
thus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited housing such detainees in areas where the temperature exceeded 85
degrees. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Keup v. Hopkins, 596 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2010). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison officials,
alleging that they violated his First Amendment rights by preventing him from mailing drawings. The prisoner
had tried to send drawings of a marijuana leaf and a bare-breasted woman to his mother and the Maoist
Internationalist Movement (Maoists). The district court entered a directed verdict in the prisoner's favor at the
close of a jury trial, and granted the prisoner's motion for attorney fees. The officials appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the correctional services department's
decision to amend an operational memorandum to ban only drawings that advocated or were likely to incite
violent or illegal activity did not render moot the prisoner's claim for monetary damages for any violations of
his constitutional rights that had occurred prior to such an amendment. According to the court, the prisoner was
the “prevailing party,” entitled to attorney fees. The court found that the prisoner's award of $1.00 in nominal
damages was subject to the 150% cap sent by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and he thus was
entitled to only $1.50 in fees, rather than the $25,000 awarded by the district court. (Lincoln Correctional
Center, Nebraska).

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION

McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411 (2nd Cir. 2010). Pretrial detainees appealed an order of the
district court which approved the settlement of a class action arising from jail defendants' alleged violations of
their constitutional rights during strip-searches, but awarding less than the requested fee to their attorneys. The
appeals court affirmed, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award attorney
fees using a percentage-of-fund approach, in the extent of its reliance on the modified lodestar approach, or in
its application of the reasonableness factors. The court noted: “The parties vigorously litigated this action for a
period of more than three years, with various attorneys for the plaintiff class spending more than 1,000 hours
working on the case.” The parties eventually agreed to injunctive relief which included the creation of a
settlement fund totaling $2.5 million. The detainees' suggested a fee award of 26% represented a multiplier of
1.98-2.24 beyond what counsel would have earned based on their hourly rates, and the court's award was the
equivalent to 13% of the common fund, which the court found was squarely within the range of typical awards
in similar cases. (Schenectady County Jail, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
PREVAILING PARTY

Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608 F.3d 446 (9th Cir. 2010). A nonprofit charitable organization that
published a monthly magazine containing news and analysis relating to the legal rights of prisoners brought an
action against state officials, in their individual and official capacities, seeking monetary, injunctive, and
declaratory relief under § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The organization
challenged state institutions' refusal to deliver the organization's magazine to certain prisoners. After a
settlement agreement was reached, the district court granted the organization's first motion for attorneys' fees
and costs, and granted in part the organization's second motion for attorneys' fees and costs. State officials
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions. The court held
that the civil rights attorneys' fee statute authorized the organization, that prevailed in its § 1983 action against
state officials by obtaining a legally enforceable settlement agreement relating to the delivery of its magazine to
prisoners, to recover attorneys' fees for monitoring the state officials' compliance with the parties' settlement
agreement. The appeals court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding fees for 31.5
hours of “correspondence with inmates” where without such correspondence it would have been difficult for
the organization to discover or to document violations of the terms of the settlement. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
PREVAILING PARTY

Shepherd v. Wenderlich, 746 F.Supp.2d 430 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
prison officials and related defendants for alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion, as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district
court entered judgment upon a jury verdict for the prisoner against two of the defendants, awarding $1 in actual
damages. The prisoner moved for post-trial relief. The district court held that the prisoner was the “prevailing
party” in the action and that he had satisfied statutory requirements, under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA), for the award of attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” The court held that a cap on the award of
attorney fees of 150% under PLRA was applicable to the prisoner's action. The prisoner originally sought
attorneys' fees totaling $99,485.25, which were later reduced to $46,575. The district court awarded attorneys'

5.35

fees against the two defendants in the amount of $1.40 and awarded costs against the two defendants in the
total amount of $2,124. (Elmira Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
42 U.S.C.A. § 1988

Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010). Inmates incarcerated at the Florida State Prison (FSP)
brought a § 1983 action against various officers and employees of the Florida Department of Corrections
(DOC), alleging that the use of chemical agents on inmates with mental illness and other vulnerabilities violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The claims against individual
correctional officers responsible for administering the agents were settled. After a five-day bench trial on the
remaining claims against the DOC Secretary and the FSP warden for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, the district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court ended final judgment and a
final permanent injunction in the inmates' favor. The Secretary and warden appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that, notwithstanding his untimely death, the inmate who obtained declaratory and injunctive relief could still be the “prevailing party” entitled to attorney fees for the cost of district court litigation
under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1983, 1988.)
The court found that in reaching its conclusion the district court did not clearly err in finding that an inmate
was sprayed with chemical agents at times when he had no capacity to comply with officers' orders because of
his mental illness, or in finding that those sprayings caused the inmate lasting psychological injuries.
According to the court, the repeated non-spontaneous use of chemical agents on an inmate with a serious
mental illness constituted an extreme deprivation sufficient to satisfy the objective prong of the test for an
Eighth Amendment violation. The court noted that the inmate's well-documented history of mental illness and
psychotic episodes rendered him unable to comply at the times he was sprayed, such that the policy was unnecessary and without penological justification in his specific case. The court found that the DOC’s policy and
practice of spraying inmates with chemical agents, as applied to an inmate who was fully secured in his sevenby-nine-foot steel cell, was not presenting a threat of immediate harm to himself or others, and was unable to
understand and comply with officers' orders due to his mental illness, were extreme deprivations violating the
broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency embodied in the Eighth
Amendment. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that the record demonstrated that
DOC officials acted with deliberate indifference to the severe risk of harm an inmate faced when officers repeatedly sprayed him with chemical agents for behaviors caused by his mental illness. The appeals court held
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that injunctive relief was warranted and necessary, despite contentions that an inmate was currently incarcerated at a facility where he was not subject to
DOC's chemical agents policy. The court noted that the permanent injunction against violations of the mentally
ill inmate's Eighth Amendment rights from sprayings with chemical agents did not extend further than necessary to correct a constitutional violation and was not overly intrusive. According to the court, in addition to
being closely tethered to the identified harm, the district court's permanent injunctive relief was narrowly drawn
and plainly adhered to the requirements of Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Florida State Prison)
2011

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION

Drumgold v. Callahan, 806 F.Supp.2d 428 (D.Mass. 2011.) A plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against a state
prosecutor, alleging withholding of evidence resulted in his wrongful conviction and incarceration for 14 years.
After a jury verdict in his favor, the plaintiff moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court held that
counsel was entitled to $1,613,847 in reasonable attorneys' fees and $51,632 in costs. The court noted that the
proposed rates for the plaintiff's attorneys were reasonable based on their experience, the requested number of
hours was adjusted downward to reflect unsuccessful claims, and there was nothing to indicate that the time
records submitted were not contemporaneous. (City of Boston, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
LIMITATION

Link v. Luebbers, 830 F.Supp.2d 729 (E.D.Mo. 2011). After federal habeas proceedings were terminated,
federally-appointed counsel filed vouchers seeking payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), for work
performed on a prisoner's executive clemency proceedings and civil cases challenging Missouri's execution
protocol. The district court held that counsel were entitled to compensation for pursuing the prisoner's § 1983
action for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging denial of due process in his clemency proceedings, but that
counsel were not entitled to compensation for work performed in the § 1983 action challenging Missouri's
execution protocol. The court noted that the prisoner's § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution protocol
was not integral to the prisoner's executive clemency proceedings. (Missouri)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
PARALEGALS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Perez v. Cate, 632 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2011). A state inmate filed a class action under § 1983 alleging that prison
officials violated the Eighth Amendment in their provision of dental care to him. After the parties settled the
action the district court awarded attorney and paralegal fees, and the officials appealed. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that paralegal fees were subject to the same hourly cap as attorney fees, under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), even though that hourly rate exceeded a guideline established by the district
court for paralegals working for court-appointed counsel. The court noted that the award was below the
paralegal market rate in the area. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Shepherd v. Goord, 662 F.3d 603 (2nd Cir. 2011). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials and related defendants for alleged violations of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,
as well as his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The district court entered
judgment upon a jury verdict for the prisoner against two of defendants. The prisoner moved for post-trial
relief. The district court awarded attorney fees in the amount of $1.50. The prisoner appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) attorney fee cap of 150% of the
“monetary judgment” applied to limit the attorney fee award to $1.50, where the jury had awarded the prisoner
monetary relief of only $1.00 in actual damages. (Elmira Corr’l. Facility, Hew York)

5.36

2012
U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012). Following completion of litigation against the State of Idaho and
the state Department of Corrections, on state inmates' motion for clarification and motion for contempt for
failure to comply with an injunction in state inmates' class action challenging conditions of confinement in an
Idaho jail, the inmates' attorneys sought fees and costs. The district court awarded costs and fees, and denied
the State's motion to stay pending appeal. The state appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the
award of attorney fees was warranted. The court found that the award of fees to the law firm appointed to
represent the class of state inmates was warranted under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), although
the inmates' motion for an order to show cause why the State of Idaho and the Department of Corrections
should not be held in contempt for violating the injunction was denied because the defendants had brought
themselves into conformity with the injunction between the time the motion was filed and the time it was heard,
and because the State did not intentionally violate the injunction. The court noted that the object of the motion
was to obtain compliance, and counsel's monitoring efforts, including the denied motion, played a key role in
resolving the overcrowding issue at the prison. The court awarded a slightly reduced amount: $76,185.60 in
attorney's fees, $1,249.20 in costs and $46.94 in postage and office supply costs for the class representative.
(Idaho State Correctional Institution)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Ford v. Bender, 903 F.Supp.2d 90 (D.Mass. 2012). A law firm, which had been appointed to represent a
pretrial detainee in a § 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of a state correctional facility's restrictive
detention of the detainee in a disciplinary unit without a hearing, filed a motion for attorney fees and a bill of
costs, after the detainee was awarded $47,500 in damages and injunctive relief at a jury-waived trial. The
district court allowed the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) cap
on defendants' liability for attorney fees was not applicable; (2) one dollar of the monetary judgment would be
applied to attorney fee award; (3) the maximum hourly rate available under PLRA to court-appointed counsel
was 150 percent of the hourly rate authorized by the Judicial Conference; (4) a 45 percent reduction of the law
firm's proposed hours, to account for duplication of work, was appropriate; and (5) an attorney fee award of
$258,000 was appropriate. The law firm had sought $345,542 in fees, and costs in the amount of $20,456.
(Department Disciplinary Unit, MCI–Cedar Junction, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PREVAILING PARTY

Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2012). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and the Department's
Chief Medical Officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act.
Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement resolving the injunctive and
equitable claims. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining damages claims. The inmate's
attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred monitoring the settlement agreement.
The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, awarded fees to the inmate's
attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals
court vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the Chief Medical Officer on the
Eighth Amendment claim, due to the extreme brevity of the district court's opinion. The appeals court also
vacated the district court's decision granting summary judgment on the ADA claim on the ground that the
Eleventh Amendment precluded damages. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES

Luckert v. Dodge County, 684 F.3d 808 (8th Cir. 2012). The personal representative of the estate of her
deceased son, who committed suicide while detained in a county jail, filed a § 1983 action against the county
and jail officials for allegedly violating due process by deliberate indifference to the detainee's medical needs.
Following a jury trial, the district court entered judgment for the personal representative, awarding actual and
punitive damages as well as attorney fees and costs. The jury awarded $750,000 in compensatory damages and
$100,000 in punitive damages. The district court denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law
and the defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed the denial of the defendants’ motion and vacated the
awards. The appeals court held that while the detainee had a constitutional right to protection from a known
risk of suicide, the jail nurse and the jail director were protected by qualified immunity, and the county was not
liable. The court held that the county jail director's actions and omissions in managing jail's suicide intervention
practices did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to the pretrial detainee's risk of suicide, even though
the director delegated to the jail nurse significant responsibility for suicide intervention before formally training
her on suicide policies and procedures, and the jail's actual suicide intervention practices did not comport with
the jail's written policy. The court noted that the jail had a practice under the director's management of
identifying detainees at risk of committing suicide, placing them on a suicide watch, and providing on-site
medical attention, and the detainee remained on suicide watch and received medical attention including on the
day of his suicide. The court held that the county lacked a custom, policy, or practice that violated the pretrial
detainee's due process rights and caused his suicide, precluding recovery in the § 1983 action. The court found
that, even though the county had flaws in its suicide intervention practices, the county did not have a
continuing, widespread, and persistent pattern of constitutional misconduct regarding prevention of suicide in
the county jail. (Dodge County Jail, Fremont, Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Pierce v. County of Orange, 905 F.Supp.2d 1017 (C.D.Cal. 2012). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities
brought a § 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff, seeking relief for violations of their
constitutional and statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the
district court rejected the detainees' claims, and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, following a bench trial, the district court entered a final judgment
and a permanent injunction, and the detainees renewed their motion for attorney fees. The district court granted

5.37

the motion. The court held that: (1) attorneys were entitled to compensation for time spent taking calls from
inmates and performing pre-trial preparation; (2) time spent unsuccessfully opposing a motion for sanctions
was not compensable as part of fee award; (3) a 50%/50% split between pre-appeal constitutional claims and
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims was appropriate; (4) reduction in the fee award in the amount of
30% was warranted based on the detainees' limited success on their constitutional claims; and (5) application of
a multiplier to the lodestar calculations, under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was
not warranted. The case began in 2001, a class of pre-trial detainees in the Orange County, California, jails,
filed a lawsuit against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights for the County's operation of the County jails in an unconstitutional manner. Allegations
included depriving detainees of opportunities for exercise and restricting their ability to practice religion.
(Orange County, California)
2013
U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
PREVAILING PARTY

Berke v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 942 F.Supp.2d 71 (D.D.C. 2013). A deaf federal inmate brought an action
alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and its director discriminated against him in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act by failing to adequately accommodate his deafness. After the court granted, in part, the
inmate's motion for a preliminary injunction, the inmate moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the inmate was the prevailing party, and that a
forty percent reduction in the attorney fee award was warranted, where the court did not order the BOP to
install videophones, only to investigate whether such a system could reasonably be installed, and the BOP had
not yet decided whether the system was feasible. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, ADMAX Satellite Camp, Tucson,
Arizona)

U.S. District Court
ATTORNEY FEES
ENHANCEMENT

Hilton v. Wright, 928 F.Supp.2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). A state prison inmate infected with the Hepatitis C virus
(HCV) brought a class action against the New York State Department of Correctional Services and Community
Supervision (DOCCS) and its chief medical officer, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. Following class certification, the parties entered into a settlement agreement
resolving injunctive and equitable claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining
damages claims. The inmate's attorneys moved for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses incurred
monitoring the settlement agreement. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
awarded fees to the inmate's attorneys, but denied expenses. The inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated
and remanded. On remand, the district court held that: (1) the Eleventh Amendment barred an Eighth
Amendment claim against an officer in his official capacity; (2) the inmate waived the Eighth Amendment
claim based on initial denial of treatment due to his short prison term; (3) a fact issue precluded summary
judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of treatment due to the inmate's failure to complete
a substance abuse program;(4) a fact issue precluded summary judgment on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
claims; and (5) enlargement of the cap set forth in the agreement was appropriate. (New York State Department
of Correctional Services and Community Supervision)

U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
PREVAILING PARTY

Jones v. McDaniel, 717 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner filed a civil rights action against prison
officials, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary
judgment in part for the prisoner. The parties entered into a settlement agreement after a jury verdict in the
prisoner's favor. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court dismissed the appeal, holding that the prisoner could
not appeal the district court's grant of partial summary judgment after entry of a judgment in favor of the
prisoner on his due process claim. The officials had agreed, among other things, to withdraw all post-trial
motions, to pay the prisoner $11,000 in punitive damages plus costs and attorney's fees, and to expunge all
records of an improper disciplinary charge. (Ely State Prison, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PREVAILING PARTY

Wells v. City of Chicago, 925 F.Supp.2d 1036 (N.D.Ill. 2013). A representative of an arrestee's estate filed a §
1983 action against a city and its police officers and employees for claims arising from his arrest, confinement,
and death. After the entry of a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the plaintiff moved for the award of attorney
fees and expenses. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1)
reduction of the attorney fee award was not warranted due to the fact that the plaintiff prevailed against only
four of six individual defendants whom she sued; (2) a three-fourths reduction of the plaintiff's attorney fee
award was warranted due to the plaintiff's failure to prevail on her medical care claim; (3) reduction was not
warranted due to the fact that the pain and suffering award was less than requested; (4) a reduction was
warranted based on the plaintiff's limited success on punitive damages; (5) a two-thirds reduction of the
plaintiff's expense award was warranted; (6) housing expenses incurred during the trial by out-of-town counsel
were recoverable; and (7) neither party was entitled to recover its costs. The jury had been asked to award
punitive damages totaling $1,750,000 against eleven defendants, but the jury awarded a total of $150,500
against four officers, and the court later vacated the award completely. The jury awarded the plaintiff $1
million in compensatory damages against all of the defendants found to have been liable. (City of Chicago,
Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DETERMINATION
LIMITATION
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Wilkins v. Gaddy, 734 F.3d 344 (4th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action alleging an officer
maliciously and sadistically assaulted him with excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
prisoner alleged that the officer “lifted and then slammed him to the concrete floor where, once pinned,
punched, kicked, kneed, and choked” him until the officer was removed by another member of the corrections
staff. After a jury returned a verdict for the prisoner, the district court granted the prisoner's motion for
attorneys' fees, but only in the amount of $1.The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held

5.38

that the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), capping attorneys' fee award at 150% of the
value of the prisoner’s monetary judgment, satisfied a rational basis review. The court held that the PLRA
provision did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection component by treating the prisoner and nonprisoner litigants differently, where the provision rationally forestalled collateral fee litigation while ensuring
that the incentive provided by an attorneys' fee award still attached to the most injurious civil rights violations.
(Lanesboro Correctional Institute, North Carolina Department of Public Safety)
U.S. Appeals Court
ATTORNEY FEES
LIMITATION
PLRA-Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Woods v. Carey, 722 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2013). After a state prisoner prevailed in his civil rights action against
prison officials for deliberate indifference to his medical needs due to improper denial of two grievance forms
seeking dental care, and obtained an award of $1500 in compensatory damages and $1000 in punitive damages,
he moved for an award of attorney fees incurred in defending the favorable judgment on appeal. The district
court awarded the fees. One defendant appealed, arguing that the fees award was limited by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The district court held that, in a matter of apparent first impression, the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) attorney fees cap did not apply to fees incurred by the prisoner in successfully
defending the judgment on appeal. (California State Prison, Solano)
2014

U.S. Appeals Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Ford v. Bender, 768 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2014). A pretrial detainee commenced an action alleging that prison
officials violated his due process rights by holding him in disciplinary segregated confinement throughout the
period of pretrial detention and into the subsequent criminal sentence as punishment for conduct that had
occurred while he was imprisoned during a prior criminal sentence. The district court held that the detainee's
punitive disciplinary confinement violated due process, and largely denied the officials' claims of qualified
immunity. The court awarded the detainee partial money damages and equitable relief after a three-day bench
trial, and awarded attorneys' fees and costs on the detainee's motion. The court held that the detainee was the
“prevailing party” for the purpose of attorneys' fees and costs with regard to an injunction to ensure his access
to traditional programs that were available to the general population; and (5) the detainee was not the
“prevailing party” for the purpose of attorneys' fees and costs with regard to an injunction to deem his
administrative sanction satisfied. The court noted that conditions in the disciplinary unit are considerably more
onerous than conditions of confinement for the general population--an inmate is kept for twenty-three hours a
day in a cell measuring seven by twelve feet, each cell has a solid steel door with a small inset window, a
narrow window to the outdoors, a cement bed, desk, and stool, and a toilet visible through the inset window.
An inmate typically leaves his cell for only one hour a day to exercise (five days a week) and to shower (three
days a week). He is subject to strip searches whenever he enters or leaves his cell. When an inmate is out of his
cell for any reason, he is manacled and placed in leg chains. Inmates are socially isolated. Each inmate receives
his meals through a slot in the steel door and is given only twenty minutes to eat. The prison library is offlimits, although an inmate may receive law books from a “book cart,” which requires a formal request and
typically results in a wait of eight days. Communication with other inmates, guards, and the outside world is
severely restricted. (Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junction)

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Graves v. Arpaio, 48 F.Supp.3d 1318 (D.Ariz. 2014). Pretrial detainees in the Maricopa County, Arizona, jail
system brought a class action against the county and the county board of supervisors, seeking injunctive relief
for alleged violations of their civil rights. The parties entered into consent decree which was superseded by
amended judgments entered by stipulation of the parties. The defendants sought to terminate the remaining
court-ordered injunctive relief regarding medical, dental, and mental health care for detainees. The district court
denied the motion. The court held that: (1) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification,
assessment, and placement of detainees suffering from serious health conditions was not warranted; (2)
termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely identification, assessment, and placement of detainees
suffering from mental illness was not warranted; (3) termination of injunctive relief requiring the timely
identification, segregation, and treatment of detainees with communicable diseases was not warranted; (4)
termination of injunctive relief requiring that the detainees have ready access to care to meet their serious
medical and mental health needs was not warranted; and (5) the detainees were the prevailing party for the
purpose of awarding attorney's fees. (Maricopa County Jail, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY
CONSENT DECREE
POST-JUDGMENT
SERVICES

Kelly v. Wengler, 7 F.Supp.3d 1069 (D.Idaho 2014). State inmates filed a class action against a warden and the
contractor that operated a state correctional center, alleging that the level of violence at the center violated their
constitutional rights. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement the court found the operator to be in
contempt and ordered relief. The inmates moved for attorney fees and costs. The district court granted the
motions. The court held that the settlement offer made in the contempt proceeding, by the contractor that
operated the state correctional facility, which provided an extension of the settlement agreement, required a
specific independent monitor to review staffing for the remainder of the settlement agreement term, and offered
to pay reasonable attorney fees, did not give the inmates the same relief that they achieved in the contempt
proceeding, and thus the inmates' rejection of the offer did not preclude them from recovering attorney fees and
costs they incurred in the contempt proceeding. The court noted that the inmates were already entitled to
reasonable attorney fees in the event of a breach, and the inmates achieved greater relief in the contempt
proceeding with regard to the extension and the addition of an independent monitor. After considering the
totality of the record and the arguments by counsel, the court awarded the plaintiffs' counsel $349,018.52 in
fees and costs. (Idaho Correctional Center, Corrections Corporation of America)

5.39

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY
ENHANCEMENT
PARTIAL SUCCESS

Rodriguez v. County of Los Angeles, 96 F.Supp.3d 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2014). State detainees brought an action
against numerous defendants, including a county, a sheriff’s department, and individual jail guards and
supervisors, alleging excessive force under § 1983. Following a jury verdict in their favor, the detainees moved
for attorney fees. The district court granted the motion, holding that: (1) the detainees were entitled to recover
fully compensatory attorney fees, notwithstanding the fact that some individual defendants were dismissed or
prevailed at trial and that the detainees did not succeed on all motions, where the detainees succeeded on all of
their claims; (2) the detainees were entitled to a lodestar multiplier of 2.0; and, (3) the district court would
apply only a 1% contribution of the detainees’ $950,000 damages award to their attorney fee award, where the
defendants’ conduct involved malicious violence leaving some detainees permanently injured. The court
awarded over $5.3 million for attorney fees. (Men’s Central Jail, Los Angeles, California)
2015

U.S. Appeals Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015). The mother of a state inmate who suffered severe brain damage,
after he was attacked by two fellow prisoners while being escorted through an isolated prison passage by a
corrections officer, brought an action alleging a § 1983 Eighth Amendment claim against the officer and a
gross negligence claim against the state. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants and the mother appealed. The appeals court reversed, finding that summary judgment was precluded
by issues of material fact as to whether the corrections officer exposed the high-security inmate to a substantial
risk of serious injury when he: (1) escorted the inmate and two fellow high-security prisoners through the
isolated prison passage by himself; (2) did not require the prisoners to wear leg restraints; and (3) failed to
physically intervene once the prisoners attacked the inmate. The court also found fact issues as to whether the
officer was subjectively aware of the risk involved in the escort and acted with deliberate indifference to the
inmate’s safety. The court held that the mother was not the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorney’s
fees. (Morey Unit, Lewis Prison Complex, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

King v. Zamiara, 788 F.3d 207 (6th Cir. 2015). A prisoner brought an action against prison officials under §
1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation arising from his transfer to a higher security prison due to his
participation in a state-court class action against the prison officials. After a bench trial, the district court found
in favor of the prison officials. The appeals court reversed with respect to three officials. On remand, the
district court entered judgment in favor of the prisoner and ordered compensatory damages and attorney fees,
but denied the prisoner’s request for punitive damages and injunctive relief. Both parties appealed. The appeals
court vacated and remanded. The court held that: (1) the district court properly awarded prisoner compensatory
damages; (2) the district court’s award of compensatory damages to equal $5 a day for each day he was kept in
a higher security prison was not a reversible error; (3) the district court relied on an incorrect legal standard in
concluding that the prisoner was not entitled to punitive damages; (4) the prisoner was not entitled to injunctive
relief requiring the department of corrections to remove certain documents from his file that allegedly violated
his due process rights; and (5) the district court abused its discretion in failing to charge up to 25% of the
attorney fees awarded to the prisoner against his compensatory damages award. (Conklin Unit at Brooks
Correctional Facility, Chippewa Correctional Facility, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Prison Legal News v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 113 F.Supp.3d 1077 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A requester
brought a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for information related to prison telephone practices and policies,
including those at ICE’s federal immigration detention centers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted the requestor’s motion. The court held that the performance incentive rate
of the phone services contractor for federal immigration detention centers was not exempt from disclosure.
According to the court, the phone services contractor was not likely to suffer substantial competitive harm if
the performance incentive rate from its successful bid for federal immigration detention centers was disclosed,
and thus that rate, which reflected the percentage of revenue set aside in escrow and only paid to the contractor
upon the government’s determination that the contractor performed successfully, was not exempt from
disclosure. The court found that the defendants violated FOIA by failing to make a timely determination on the
requester’s requests for information. The court found the delays “egregious” where the requester did not
receive ICE’s first production of documents, or any other determination, until 361 days after mailing its first
FOIA request letter, seven months after mailing its second request letter, and almost four months after filing
this lawsuit, and production of the remainder of the requested documents was not completed for several
additional months. The court awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs to the requester, finding that it was the
prevailing party. (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement)

U.S. District Court
PREVAILING PARTY

Shaidnagle v. Adams County, Miss., 88 F.Supp.3d 705 (S.D.Miss. 2015). After a detainee committed suicide
while being held in a county jail, his mother, individually, on behalf of the detainee’s wrongful death
beneficiaries, and as administratrix of the detainee’s estate, brought an action against the county, sheriff, jail
staff, and others, asserting claims for deprivation of civil rights, equitable relief, and declaratory judgment. The
defendants brought a § 1988 cross-claim for attorney fees and costs against the plaintiff, and subsequently
moved for summary judgment. The court held that neither the sheriff nor another alleged policymaker could be
held liable on a theory of supervisory liability for failure to train or supervise, where the mother did not show
that the training jail staff received was inadequate, and the policy in place to determine whether the detainee
was a suicide risk was not the “moving force” behind a constitutional violation. The court held that the correct
legal standard was not whether jail officers “knew or should have known,” but whether they had gained actual
knowledge of the substantial risk of suicide and responded with deliberate indifference. The court held that
neither party was entitled to attorney fees as the “prevailing party.” (Adams County Jail, Mississippi)

5.40

until immediately prior to discharge of their criminal sentences did not violate their speedy trial
rights, because the department was under no duty to minimize time in custody by ensuring that
commitment proceedings overlapped substantially with criminal incarceration. The court found
that a seven-month average time for trying an SVP case after appointment of defense counsel was
not presumptively prejudicial. According to the court, a civil commitment candidate does not have
a speedy trial right, until such time as he is identified by the statutory process to be a candidate
for commitment. The court held that even though the SVP Act stated that the purpose of pretrial
detention was for evaluation, and the detainees were held for periods exceeding the time needed
for evaluation, the Act also provided for a safekeeping component. The court concluded that
denial of bail for the detainees did not violate their due process rights, where the detention was
premised upon a judge’s probable cause finding and a determination of mental abnormality and
dangerousness was made at the outset of confinement. (Iowa Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF BAIL

Bunyon v. Burke County, 306 F.Supp.2d 1240 (S.D.Ga. 2004). A detainee brought a § 1983 action
stemming from his arrest and the alleged refusal of jail authorities to release him on bail. The
court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the issue of whether the sheriff's
department failed to bring the detainee before a judicial officer within 72 hours after his arrest.
The court held that the sheriff's department contravened state statutes and violated the
detainee's procedural due process rights by refusing to release the detainee, despite his proffer of
sufficient funds to post the amount of bail that had been set. (Burke County Jail, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 322 F.Supp.2d 1045 (C.D.Cal. 2004). A detainee arrested for

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
DENIAL OF BAIL

U.S. v. Scales, 344 F.Supp.2d 213 (D.Me. 2004). A district court revoked the release of a
defendant. The court held that no conditions of release existed which could reasonably assure the
defendant’s appearance at trial on a weapons charge, even though home monitoring and thirdparty custody would reasonably have assured the safety of the defendant’s domestic assault
victims. The court noted that the defendant had apparently learned of a sealed indictment
against him and had taken steps to elude arrest, had a history of violating state-imposed
conditions of release or defaulting on appearance requirements, and was confronting his first
serious imprisonment time since becoming an adult. (Maine)

domestic violence brought a § 1983 Eighth Amendment action alleging that bail of $1 million was
excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court
held that bail of $1 million, enhanced from the $50,000 bail listed in the county's felony bail
schedule, was not excessive. The court noted that the alleged victim had both older and more
recent injuries, including a seven-inch laceration, and allegedly feared for her safety. The
detainee was a local attorney who had obtained bail within hours by paying $50,000 to post bond,
and the option of denying bail was unavailable under state law. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department, California)

2005
U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL
FAILURE TO APPEAR

Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259 (3rd Cir. 2005). A commercial bail bondsman brought an action
against the clerk of a state superior court, contending that the clerk wrongfully removed his name
from the bail bondsman registry following the discharge of his bail bond debts in a chapter 7
bankruptcy proceeding. The district court dismissed the action and the bail bondsman appealed.
The appeals court affirmed, finding that the judgments against the commercial bail bondsman
which arose from bond debts were “forfeitures,” excepted from discharge in a chapter 7
proceeding. The court noted that the judgments against the bondsman arose from the failure of
criminal defendants to appear in court and the bondsman’s nonperformance of his duty to
produce those defendants. (New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS

McLaurin v. New Rochelle Police Officers, 368 F.Supp.2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). An arrestee

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Russell v. Hennepin County, 420 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2005). A detainee sued a sheriff, deputies,

brought a § 1983 action against a county, alleging constitutional and state law violations after
being released on bail. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the arrestee who
alleged adverse conditions of release on bail, failed to establish a policy or custom of the county
that deprived him of his civil rights. The court noted that the court system, rather than county
government, was responsible for setting bail. The arrestee alleged that he was forced, as a
condition of bail, to attend a domestic violence program, and that he and another black man were
the only persons who were at the program as a condition of bail. (Westchester County, New York)

inspectors and a county, alleging that his six-day prolonged detention at a county detention
center violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and constituted false imprisonment
under state law. The district court granted the county’s motion for summary judgment and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the detention center’s policy
regarding the monitoring of inmates who were subject to conditional release was not deliberately
indifferent to inmates’ constitutional rights because of the lack of policies to expedite the process

6.13
XX

of conditional release. The court found that the detainee failed to establish that the detention
center’s policy regarding the monitoring of inmates who were subject to conditional release
caused his prolonged detention, where at worst, his detention for six additional days resulted not
from the executing of the policy, but from the failure to assiduously follow the policy. The court
held that the detainee did not demonstrate municipal liability where he failed to show a
widespread pattern of failing to follow the “check daily” policy with respect to detainees subject to
conditional release. (Hennepin County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)
U.S. District Court
BAIL

Sizer v. County of Hennepin, 393 F.Supp.2d 796 (D.Minn. 2005). An arrestee sued a county and
county officials asserting a state claim for false imprisonment and violations of state and federal
constitutional rights. The arrestee complained that his 10½ hour detention pending release on
bail was unreasonable. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The
court held that the 10½ hour detention was objectively reasonable and not unconstitutional. The
court found that the arrestee failed to prove a continuing, widespread, persistent custom or
practice of unconstitutional over-detentions, despite an alleged sign posted in a waiting area that
alerted inmates that they could expect delays of up to eight hours in processing their releases.
The county responded that the arrestee’s processing was delayed by problems with its security
count, which halted out-processing of detainees for two hours. (Hennepin County Adult Detention
Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
PRETRIAL RELEASE
VICTIM

U.S. v. Marcello, 370 F.Supp.2d 745 (N.D.Ill. 2005). In a pretrial detention hearing, the
government asked the court for permission to have the son of the murder victim offer an oral
statement opposing the release of the defendants. The district court denied the request, finding
that the statute that allows crime victims to be “reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the
district court involving release, plea, sentencing or any parole hearing” did not mandate oral
presentation of a victim statement. The court noted that a written statement could be considered,
but that the statement was not material to the “decision at hand.” (U.S. District Court, Northern
District of Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
PRETRIAL RELEASE
SEARCHES

U.S. v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant who was indicted for unlawfully
possessing an unregistered shotgun moved to suppress the shotgun and his statements
concerning it. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that warrantless searches, including drug testing, imposed as a
condition of pretrial release, required a showing of probable caused despite the defendant’s prerelease consent. According to the court, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the
government’s ability to exact waivers of rights as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits
are fully discretionary. The court noted that pat-downs and similar minor intrusions need only be
supported by reasonable suspicion. According to the court, searches were not necessary to ensure
that the defendant appeared at trial. Among the defendant’s conditions of release was his consent
to “random” drug testing “any time of the day or night by any peace officer without a warrant,”
and to having his home searched for drugs “by any peace officer any time day or night without a
warrant.” (U.S. District Court, Nevada)
2006

U.S. District Court
BAIL

In re Extradition of Chapman, 459 F.Supp.2d 1024 (D.Hawai’i 2006). Bail bondsmen and

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CONDITIONS
HOME DETENTION

Nguyen v. B.I. Inc., 435 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Or. 2006). Aliens from Cuba and Vietnam, who had

U.S. District Court
BOND

Olibas v. Gomez, 481 F.Supp.2d 721 (W.D.Tex. 2006). Bail bondsmen sued a sheriff and county,
alleging breach of a prior settlement agreement and new violations of § 1983, in violation of their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and breach of
their right of free speech under the Texas Constitution. The sheriff moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that the bail bondsmen stated a § 1983 claim for a First
Amendment violation against the sheriff, despite his argument that they had failed to identify a

television personalities arrested at the behest of Mexico, moved for bail pending hearing on
Mexico’s request for their extradition. The district court held that the defendants were entitled to
bail. (Hawai’i)
final orders of removal and had been released from custody on general orders of supervision, but
who had violated their orders by committing crimes, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging the validity of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Intensive Supervision
Appearance Program (ISAP). The district court denied the petition, holding that: (1) ISAP
regulations requiring participating aliens to remain in their residences between eight and 12
hours per day was not “detention” outside the statutory authority of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); (2) ISAP requirements did not violate the aliens' liberty interests under the
Fifth Amendment; (3) placement of the aliens in ISAP did not violate their procedural due process
rights; and (4) ISAP was not subject to Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements.
(Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program, Oregon)

6.14
XX

variety of details. According to the court, the Texas Constitution protected the right to earn a living by writing
bail bonds, and thus, the bail bondsmen's ability to have their bail bonds accepted at a county jail was a property
or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The bondsmen alleged that the
sheriff allowed other bonding companies to continue writing bail bonds in the county while denying such
privileges to them. (Reeves County, Texas)
U.S. District Court
BOND

White v. Crow Ghost, 456 F.Supp.2d 1096 (D.N.D. 2006). An arrestee brought a Bivens action against personnel
of a jail operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), alleging failure to provide adequate medical care,
unsanitary conditions, and delayed or prevented bond hearings. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that, absent any evidence that any of the named jail officials were responsible for
the delay in the arrestee's bond hearing and subsequent failures to respond to his numerous requests for a bond
reduction, the arrestee's bare allegations of such delay and failures were insufficient to demonstrate the deliberate
indifference necessary to establish the violation of any constitutional right against excessive bail. (Standing Rock
Agency, Fort Yates Detention Center, North Dakota)
2007

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL

Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652 (9th Cir. 2007). A domestic violence arrestee brought a § 1983
Eighth Amendment action against a county, county sheriff, and individual sheriff's deputies, alleging that bail of
$1 million was excessive. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and awarded
attorney fees in favor of the defendants. The arrestee appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded. The court held that bail was not excessive, and that the deputy who requested a bail
enhancement and the deputy's superior who authorized the enhancement request were entitled to qualified
immunity. The court held that individual sheriff's deputies were not entitled to the award of attorney fees under §
1988, but that the arrestee's post-discovery litigation of a Monell claim was frivolous, supporting the award of
attorney fees to the county. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Pruett v. Harris County Bail Bond Bd., 499 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2007). Bail bondsmen brought a civil rights action
challenging a Texas statute restricting solicitation of potential customers, claiming it was a denial of their First
Amendment rights. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the bondsmen and awarded
$50,000 in attorney fees. The defendants appealed and the bondsmen cross-appealed the award of fees,
requesting more. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The court
held that: (1) the court could consider evidence generated after enactment of the statute; (2) the provision of the
statute that restricted solicitation by bail bondsmen of persons subject to an unexecuted arrest warrant by
preventing solicitation unless the bondsman had a prior relationship with the party violated the First
Amendment; (3) the provision of the statute that prohibited bail bondsmen from calling potential customers for
24 hours after an offender's arrest violated the First Amendment; (4) the provision of the statute that prohibited
bail bondsmen from contacting potential customers between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. did not violate the First
Amendment; (5) the provision of the statute that prohibited bail bondsmen from contacting potential customers
between 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. was not unconstitutionally vague; and (6) the defendants failed to show special
circumstances warranting reduction or preclusion of the attorney fee award. (Harris County Bail Bond Board,
Texas)
2008

XXIII

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL

Garson v. Perlman, 541 F.Supp.2d 515 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). A state prison inmate, who had sought bail pending the
direct appeal of his bribery conviction, sought federal habeas relief after a state court denied his motion. The
inmate alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause and a substantive due process
violation. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the Excessive Bail Clause does not
encompass bail pending appeal. The court found that the inmate did not have a protected liberty interest in bail
pending appeal, precluding his due process claim. (Mid-State Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
BAIL

Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC v. Tunica County, Miss., 543 F.3d 221 (5th Cir. 2008). A surety company and its
agents, who were white, brought a § 1983 action against an African-American county sheriff in his individual
capacity and against the county, alleging that the sheriff's removal of the agents from the roster of approved bail
bond agents in the county constituted First Amendment retaliation and violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protection clauses. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and the
plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The court held that the
sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim since there was no clearly established law in
the state as to whether the agents had a property right to issue bonds in a particular county, and thus no clearly
established law that would render the sheriff's actions objectively unreasonable. The court found that the county
was potentially liable since, under the governing state's law, sheriffs were final policymakers with respect to all
law enforcement decisions made within their counties, and the sheriff's decision was the type of single decision
by a relevant policymaker that could form the basis of § 1983 “municipal” liability. According to the court,
summary judgment was precluded by a fact issue as to whether the African-American sheriff failed to place the
agents back on the approved roster after they satisfied the arrearages that had given rise to their removal, while
simultaneously reinstating black bail bond agents who had been removed for the same reason. The court also
found that there were fact issue as to the credibility of the sheriff's stated reason for not reinstating the bail bond
agents, namely that the agents had failed to satisfy arrearages that had given rise to removal. (Tunica County,
Mississippi)

6.15

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL

Hernandez v. Carbone, 567 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.Conn. 2008). An indigent arrestee brought an action against the
director of Connecticut court support services, alleging violations of § 1983, the Eighth Amendment, and the
Fourteenth Amendment arising from the arrestee's nearly year-long pre-trial detention, during which time the
arrestee was unable to post bail, before charges were dropped. The director moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion. The arrestee alleged that the director caused his bail to be set at $100,000. The court held
that the director's alleged misconduct in adopting unconstitutional policies and practices did not cause the
arrestee's bail to be set so high or cause detention. The court held that it was required to abstain from deciding
the arrestee's facial constitutional challenges to Connecticut's bail system. The court noted that the sentencing
judge not only ignored a bail commissioner's recommendation for a much lower bail, in an amount that was also
requested by the arrestee's counsel, but he also ignored the bail commissioner's statement that the arrestee could
not post any bail, and at a subsequent bail reduction hearing the judge declined to reduce the arrestee's bail.
(Connecticut's Court Support Services Division, City of Hartford)
2009

U.S. Appeals Court
BOND
DELAY

Campbell v. Johnson, 586 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2009). An inmate whom a jail allegedly refused release on bail
after a court approved a property bond, sued a sheriff under § 1983, claiming violation of his constitutional
rights. The sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in the sheriff's favor on
the constitutional claims and against him in his official and individual capacities. The inmate appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the sheriff personally participated in the inmate's alleged false
imprisonment, The court noted that the parties disputed whether the sheriff directed the jail not to accept
property in satisfaction of the inmate's bail bond, and whether the sheriff knew that property had been judicially
approved prior to the date he sent a brief memorandum advising a corrections officer at the jail to accept a
property bond. The appeals court held that the district court decision sidestepped the issue of whether the sheriff
had the authority in the first instance to modify the conditions of the prisoner's bail, and there was little
evidentiary basis for the conclusion that an in-county property requirement was not excessive. (Walton County
Jail, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOND
DELAY

Harper v. Sheriff of Cook County, 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009). A former detainee filed a class action against a
sheriff, claiming that new detainees remanded to the sheriff's custody after a probable cause hearing were
unconstitutionally required to undergo intake procedures at the county jail before release on bond. The district
court certified the class and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that
the former detainee's class action lacked a predominance of common issues, precluding certification of the class,
where the detainee had not challenged any particular intake procedure. The court noted that the reasonableness
of the delay between posting bond and release and the reasonableness of the time and manner of assigning
identification numbers prior to release required individual determinations based on the length of delay for each
detainee and the conditions and exigencies of the jail existing on that particular day. According to the court,
resolution of an equal protection claim could be satisfied in an individual suit. The court noted that the detainee
was not interested in a large damage award, and his constitutional claims required individualized liability and
damages determinations that could be better litigated in an individual suit. (Sheriff of Cook County, Cook
County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
BRA- Bail Reform Act
CONDITIONS

U.S. v. Cossey, 637 F.Supp.2d 881 (D.Mont. 2009). After prerelease conditions mandated by the Adam Walsh
Child Protection and Safety Act (AWA) amendments to the Bail Reform Act were imposed on a defendant
indicted on charges of receiving and possessing child pornography, the defendant moved for a declaration that
the AWA amendments were unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the AWA
amendments did not violate the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process Clause, or separation of powers
principles as applied to the defendant. The amendments mandated that certain prerelease conditions be imposed
on persons accused of receiving child pornography. The court noted the conditions were not imposed on the
defendant as a blanket prescription without making an individualized determination, and the conditions imposed
did not unduly restrict the defendant's movement or interfere with his ability to work. (Montana)
2010

XXIII

U.S. Appeals Court
DENIAL OF BAIL

Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010). An arrestee filed a § 1983 action against a former county
sheriff, in his individual capacity, for alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by
depriving the arrestee of his protected liberty interest in posting bail. The district court denied summary
judgment for the sheriff as to qualified immunity and the sheriff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the arrestee's due
process rights were violated by deprivation of his protected liberty interest in posting preset bail during his
detention in the county jail. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the county sheriff
caused the deprivation of the arrestee's due process rights by the sheriff's personal involvement in maintaining
policies at the county jail that prohibited the arrestee from posting preset bail during his detention. (Logan
County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
DENIAL OF BAIL

Schneyder v. Smith, 709 F.Supp.2d 368 (E.D.Pa. 2010). A detainee who was being held as a material witness
whose testimony was vital to a homicide prosecution brought a civil rights action against the prosecutor who had
secured the material witness warrant for her arrest, alleging the prosecutor failed to notify the judge that the case
had been continued for nearly four months. The detainee sought her release. The district court granted the

6.16

prosecutor’s motion to dismiss in part and the detainee appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On
remand, the district court denied the prosecutor’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that the detainee
had a clearly established constitutional right to be free from detention without probable cause and that a triable
issue existed regarding whether a reasonable prosecutor would have been aware of her duty to inform the judge
of the status of any detained material witness. The detainee had sought bail, but at the bail hearing, the judge
articulated his dislike for “setting bail on people who are not accused of a crime.” In open court, he told the
plaintiff, “[i]f the case breaks down, let me know early and I'll let you out.” (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
2011
U.S. District Court
DELAY

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 793 F.Supp.2d 260 (D.D.C. 2011). Inmates at local jails brought a putative class
action, under § 1983, against the District of Columbia, alleging that their over-detentions violated their Fourth,
Fifth and Eighth Amendments rights. Following certification of the over-detention class, the parties moved and
cross–moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the District of Columbia's over-detention of jail inmates did not constitute a “seizure,” precluding §
1983 claims alleging Fourth Amendment violations related to over-detentions stemming from the time it took to
process inmates' court–ordered releases. The court noted that the inmates were already in custody at the time
they were ordered released or their sentences expired, such that their freedom of movement had already been
terminated, and there was no evidence that the plaintiffs' over-detentions involved fresh “seizures” warranting a
Fourth Amendment analysis. The court found that the District of Columbia's enforcement of a local ordinance
with a “10 p.m. cut-off” rule, under which jail inmates were kept overnight if their court–ordered releases were
not processed prior to 10 p.m., violated the inmates' substantive due process rights for purposes of a § 1983
action. According to the court, the enforcement of the rule resulted in over-detention of individuals who were
entitled to release, such over-detentions were not the result of necessary administrative tasks or other reasonable
delays, and the District could have promoted a claimed interest in inmate welfare while simultaneously
respecting the entitlement of persons with court orders for release to prompt release.
The court held that the District of Columbia violated the inmates' substantive due process rights, for the
purposes of a § 1983 action, by over-detaining inmates and failing to release them by the end of the day on
which they were entitled to release. According to the court, although processing of releases generally should
have taken between two and two–and–a–half hours to complete, the average over-detention time for inmates was
approximately 36 hours, even though the District was on notice, via another litigation involving over-detention,
that prevailing release practices were deeply inadequate and that a fundamental change was required.
The court found that a significant reduction in the number of over-detentions after the District of Columbia
implemented measures to improve the manner in which inmate releases were processed demonstrated that the
District was not deliberately indifferent to inmates' substantive due process rights, precluding the inmates' §
1983 action against the District. (District of Columbia Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BOND

Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). A Senegalese detainee, who was subject to a voluntary
departure order or an alternate removal order, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a preliminary
injunction for immediate release from prolonged immigration detention. The district court denied the petitioner's
motion, and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an alien
subject facing prolonged detention is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is entitled to be
released from detention unless the government establishes that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the
community. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, San Pedro Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL

Morse v. Regents of University of California, Berkeley, 821 F.Supp.2d 1112 (N.D.Cal. 2011). A journalist
arrested while covering a demonstration at a university sued the university's board of regents, its police
department and various officers on the department, asserting § 1983 claims for violation of the First
Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment, as well as a
claim for violation of the Privacy Protection Act. The defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the journalist stated a § 1983 claim for
violation of the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment on the theory that the defendants added
unsupported charges for the sole purpose of increasing his bail. The court found that the theory was viable under
the Excessive Bail Clause, despite the indirect means the defendants allegedly used to obtain the higher bail, and
the intervening actions of the judicial officer who actually set bail. The court held that the journalist’s claims that
he was wrongfully arrested by university police and that his property was subject to searches and seizures
without proper cause and without the proper warrants, stated a claim under the Privacy Protection Act (PPA)
against the university police chief for failure to screen, train, and supervise. The court noted that the journalist's
claim related specifically to the statutory provisions of the PPA, that he alleged sufficient facts to support his
claim of a causal connection between the police chief's conduct and the statutory violation, and liability was not
limited to those personally involved in the statutory violation. (Univ. of California, Berkeley)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Rivas v. Martin, 781 F.Supp.2d 775 (N.D.Ind. 2011). A female detainee brought a § 1983 action against a sheriff
and jail officials, alleging they violated her right to due process by detaining her beyond their authority to do so.
The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the detainee stated a § 1983
claim for violation of her right to due process by alleging that the sheriff and jail officials held her, after she had
posted bond, without a probable cause determination for five days beyond the 48 hour limit in her immigration
detainer. The court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the defendants
allegedly violated the detainee's clearly established constitutional rights. (LaGrange County Jail, Indiana)

6.17

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BAIL

Tkochenko v. Sabol, 792 F.Supp.2d 733 (M.D.Pa. 2011). An immigration detainee filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus seeking review of her continuing custody by immigration officials. The district court granted the
petition. The court held that although the immigration detainee, a native and citizen of Ukraine who was
convicted of possessing small quantities of drugs, was subject to immigration laws' mandatory detention
provisions applicable to aliens convicted of drug offenses, the two-year duration of her detention by immigration
officials pending entry of a final removal order offended due process considerations. The court held that the
detainee was entitled to federal habeas relief in the form of bail consideration. The court noted that the detainee's
detention was almost five times the typical 5-month length of detention acknowledged as presumptively
reasonable by the Supreme Court, and the lengthy period of detention was largely attributable to litigation
decisions made by the government, and the period of detention had no fixed, finite, or identifiable duration.
(York County Prison, Pennsylvania)
2012

U.S. Appeals Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL
BAIL SCHEDULE

Fields v. Henry County, Tenn., 701 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2012). An arrestee filed a civil rights action alleging that a
county had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail and his Fourteenth Amendment
right to procedural due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the county and the arrestee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that setting the arrestee's bail at the same amount as
other defendants facing domestic-assault charges through the county's use of a bond schedule without
particularized examination of his situation did not violate the arrestee's Eighth Amendment right to be free from
excessive bail. The court noted that the mere use of a bond schedule does not itself pose a constitutional problem
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of excessive bail, since a schedule is aimed at assuring the presence
of a defendant, and the bond schedule represents an assessment of what bail amount would ensure the
appearance of the average defendant facing such a charge. The court found that a liberty interest protected by
due process had not been implicated by the county's policy of automatically detaining domestic-assault
defendants for 12 hours without bail. The court noted that a Tennessee statute providing that a person could not
“be committed to prison” until he had a hearing before a magistrate did not create a liberty interest, and release
on personal recognizance under Tennessee law lacked explicitly mandatory language needed to create a liberty
interest. (Henry County Sherriff's Office and Henry County Jail, Tennessee)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOND

Gay v. Chandra, 682 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012). A prisoner sued three mental health professionals at the prison
alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required the
cost bond without evaluating the merit or lack of merit of the prisoner's claims, and then dismissed the case with
prejudice when prisoner did not post the bond he could not afford, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the
prisoner's current ability to afford a bond before requiring one as a condition of prosecuting a civil rights lawsuit.
The court noted that a court's authority to award costs to a prevailing party implies a power to require the posting
of a bond reasonably calculated to cover those costs, even though no statute or rule expressly authorizes such an
order. The court may require a bond where there is reason to believe that the prevailing party will find it difficult
to collect its costs when the litigation ends. The appeals court described the plaintiff as a “deeply disturbed
Illinois inmate with a long history of self-mutilation.” (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
BOND
COURT
APPEARANCE

Holloway v. Delaware County Sheriff, 700 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2012). An arrestee brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that a sheriff, who was sued in his official capacity, violated his rights by detaining him without charges
for nine days, The district court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and the arrestee appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that the sheriff did not violate the substantive due process rights of the
arrestee, where the sheriff brought the arrestee before court for an initial hearing within 72 hours of his arrest,
followed the court's order in holding the arrestee without bond, and released the arrestee promptly, within 72
hours of the initial hearing, excluding intervening weekend days, when the prosecutor did not file charges within
the time permitted by the court. (Delaware County Jail, Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CONDITIONS
COURT
APPEARANCE
DENIAL OF BAIL

Leslie v. Holder, 865 F.Supp.2d 627 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An alien, a native, and citizen of Jamaica, petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus contending that his continued detention by United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) for four years without a bond hearing was unconstitutional. The district court denied the
petition. The alien appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded for the purpose of a bond hearing. The
district court released the alien on bond with conditions. The court held that the alien was entitled to the grant of
bail, pending a final removal order. The court noted that although the alien had prior drug convictions and a
history of drug abuse, all of the convictions were over a decade old, the alien suffered from multiple health
problems, including degenerative spine disease, high blood pressure, and gastro-intestinal ailments, he credibly
asserted that the passage of time and his age of 59 years tempered his conduct, the alien earned his high school
equivalency certificate in prison, he participated in drug treatment and counseling, one immigration judge had
found that the alien had learned his lesson and was not a danger to community, the alien had an extensive and
supportive family in the United States, two family members agreed to serve as custodians for the alien upon his
release, and the habeas claim that he was subjected to unreasonably prolonged detention had substantial merit.
The court imposed bail conditions that the alien not violate any laws while on release, that the alien advise the
District Court and immigration officials before making a change of residence or phone number, that the alien
appear as required for removal proceedings, that the alien be supervised by immigration authorities, and that the
alien be released to the custody of a third-party custodian, the alien's sister-in-law, who was required to certify
that she would ensure the alien's compliance with all bail conditions. (United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Pennsylvania)

6.18

U.S. District Court
BAIL REFORM ACT

Rogers v. District of Columbia, 880 F.Supp.2d 163 (D.D.C. 2012). A former prisoner brought an action against
the District of Columbia, alleging he was over-detained and asserting claims for negligent training and
supervision. The district moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied
in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to when the
prisoner was to be released. The district court began its opinion as follows: “Our saga begins with the tale of
plaintiff's numerous arrests. Plaintiff was arrested on four different charges in 2007: two felony charges for
violating the Bail Reform Act, one felony charge for Possession with Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance
and one misdemeanor charge for carrying an open can of alcohol without a permit.” During the prisoner’s time
in jail he was sentenced for all of the remaining charges. The prisoner claimed he was over-detained by
approximately two months, and that this was the direct result of the D.C. Jail's negligent training and supervision
of its employees with regard to calculating jail credits. (District of Columbia Jail)

U.S. District Court
EXCESSIVE BAIL
HOME DETENTION

Schwartz v. Lassen County ex rel. Lassen County Jail (Detention Facility), 838 F.Supp.2d 1045 (E.D.Cal. 2012).
The mother of a deceased pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action on behalf of herself and as successor in
interest against a county, sheriff, city, police department, and several officers, alleging violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that allegations that: (1) the undersheriff knew the pretrial detainee from
various encounters with the county, including his diverticulitis and congenital heart condition that required a
restricted diet; (2) the undersheriff gave testimony to set bail for the detainee at $150,000 on a misdemeanor
offense; (3) the detainee's doctor sent a letter explaining the detainee should be put on house arrest as opposed to
detention because of his medical condition; (4) the detainee had to be admitted to a hospital for emergency
surgery during a previous confinement; (5) the detainee's mother requested he be released for medical attention;
(6) the detainee lost over 40 pounds during two weeks of detention; (7) the detainee requested to see a doctor but
was told to “quit complaining;” and (8) the undersheriff personally knew the detainee was critically ill, were
sufficient to plead that the undersheriff knew of and failed to respond to the detainee's serious medical condition,
as would be deliberate indifference required to state a § 1983 claim alleging violations of Fourteenth
Amendment due process after the detainee died. The court found that allegations that the undersheriff owed the
pretrial detainee an affirmative duty to keep the jail and prisoners in it, and that he was answerable for their
safekeeping, were sufficient to plead a duty, as required to state a claim of negligent infliction of emotional
distress (NIED) under California law against the undersheriff after the detainee died. (Lassen County Adult
Detention Facility, California)
2013

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was
subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking
an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The
district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the statute authorizing
mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was entitled to a
bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County Jail and House of
Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth
County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
COURT
APPEARANCE
DENIAL OF BAIL

Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F.Supp.2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An alien, a native of Jamaica, filed a habeas petition
challenging his detention in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) pending
final determination of his removal proceedings. The district court denied the petition. The court held that the
alien, who was deportable by reason of having committed a statutorily enumerated drug offense, was subject to
the Immigration and Nationality Act's (INA) mandatory detention provision even though he was not taken into
custody by an ICE until nearly four years after he was released from criminal custody. The court found that the
fifteen-month detention of the alien during removal proceedings, without an individualized bond hearing, was
not unreasonably long in violation of due process, and that the public-safety concern of risk of flight justified
continued detention of the alien. (Orange County Jail, New York)

U.S. District Court
BAIL
COURT
APPEARANCE

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983,
statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well
as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and
prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government
liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to
implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of
constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have
acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process
claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention
for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional
requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and
(4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process. (East Baton Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

6.19

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
COURT
APPEARANCE

Pujalt-Leon v. Holder, 934 F.Supp.2d 759 (M.D.Pa. 2013). A detainee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging ICE's determination that he
was subject to mandatory detention and seeking bond hearing. The court held that the detainee was entitled to
bond hearing. According to the court, clear unambiguous language demonstrated that Congress intended to give
the Attorney General the authority of mandatory detention only if the government took an alien immediately
when the alien was released from custody resulting from enumerated offense. (Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
DENIAL OF BAIL

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging
prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued
detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an
immigration judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the
statute authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by
reason of having committed certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to
authorize mandatory detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens
subject to prolonged detention were entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result
from the government's reading of the immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens
subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The
court ruled that the class was comprised of all non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are
or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration detention statutes
pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have not been detained
pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether
their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND

Rosciszewski v. Adducci, 983 F.Supp.2d 910 (E.D.Mich. 2013). A lawful permanent resident (LPR) petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his continued detention in a county jail without a bond hearing, upon the
recent reopening of his deportation case after it lay dormant for 15 years. The district court granted the petition.
The district court held that the District Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in the district in
which the alien was being detained was the proper respondent, not the warden of the jail in which the alien was
being held. The court found that the provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) that required
mandatory detention of a criminal alien during the pendency of removal proceedings did not apply to the alien, a
citizen of Canada and a lawful permanent resident (LPR), who had been taken into immigration custody 15 years
after his deportation case had lay dormant, and, thus, the alien was entitled to an individualized bond hearing
before an immigration judge. (Calhoun County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND

Straker v. Jones, 986 F.Supp.2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An alien, who had been detained by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) under a statute that called for mandatory detention by DHS of any alien who had been
convicted of certain crimes “when the alien is released,” petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ordering the
administrator of a correctional facility to provide the alien with a bond hearing. The district court granted the
petition. The court noted that the detained alien was not required to exhaust administrative remedies, by making
an argument before an Immigration Judge that he had not been “released,” within the meaning of the statute,
before making such argument before the district court on a petition for habeas corpus, since making such an
argument before an Immigration Judge would have been futile, as the Immigration Judge would have been
bound to follow a contrary precedent from the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Orange County
Correctional Facility, New York)
2014

U.S. District Court
ALIEN

Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). Aliens brought a class-action lawsuit against the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other federal and state government agencies, alleging that the
defendants' acts of subjecting individuals to mandatory immigration detention violated the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause. The government moved to dismiss. The district court
declined to dismiss the alien’s claims for injunctive relief, finding that the aliens had standing to challenge the
adequacy of the Joseph hearing and associated mandatory detention procedures, and that allegations that the
Joseph hearings failed to afford aliens adequate protection were sufficient to state claims for due process
violations. (Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, District of New Jersey)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
DENIAL OF BAIL

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). A felony arrestee brought an action against state
officials challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona constitutional provision prohibiting state courts from
setting bail for detainees who were in the United States illegally. The district court granted summary judgment
and partial dismissal in the officials' favor, and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. On rehearing
en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the Arizona constitutional provision
forbidding any form of bail or pretrial release to undocumented immigrants arrested for serious felony offenses,
without regard to whether they were dangerous or a flight risk, was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes be available for trial, and thus violated substantive due
process. The court noted that there was no evidence that the provision was adopted to address a particularly
acute problem regarding an unmanageable flight risk of undocumented immigrants, the provision encompassed
an exceedingly broad range of offenses, including not only serious offenses but also relatively minor ones, and
the provision employed an overbroad, irrebuttable presumption, rather than an individualized hearing, to
determine whether a particular arrestee posed an unmanageable flight risk. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Maricopa
County Attorney, and Presiding Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court)

6.20

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND
DELAY
APPEARANCE

Reid v. Donelan, 2 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.Mass. 2014). Following the grant of a detainee's individual petition for
habeas corpus, and the grant of the detainee's motion for class certification, the detainee brought a class action
against, among others, officials of Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE), challenging the detention of
individuals who were held in immigration detention within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for over six
months and were not provided with an individualized bond hearing. The detainee also moved, on his own behalf,
for a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from shackling him during immigration proceedings
absent an individualized determination that such restraint was necessary. The defendants cross-moved for
summary judgment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. The court held that an individual
assessment is required before a detainee may be shackled during immigration proceedings, but that the
individual assessment performed by ICE satisfied the detainee's procedural due process rights, such that an
assessment by an independent Immigration Judge was unnecessary in the detainee's case. The court denied the
motion for an injunction, finding that the detainee would not suffer irreparable harm absent a permanent
injunction. The court noted that the detainee had an interest in preservation of his dignity, but ICE had safety
concerns about his immigration proceedings, including the logistical issues of escorting the detainee through
multiple floors and public hallways, and an Immigration Judge would be unlikely to overturn a decision by ICE
to shackle the detainee, given the detainee's extensive criminal history. (Immigration and Customs Enf., Mass.)

U.S. District Court
BAIL

Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A detainee, a Honduran citizen who had been arrested
for driving under the influence and fleeing officers after they effectuated a traffic stop of his vehicle, and
subsequently had been held on an immigration detainer from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
then on a federal material witness warrant, brought a pro se action against a village, police chief, police officers,
sheriff, jail deputies, and an Assistant United States Attorney. The detainee alleged violation of his due process,
equal protection, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the detainee
stated a claim against the village defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in
connection with his detention after he had posted bond; (2) the detainee stated a claim for violation of his
consular rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (3) the detainee stated a claim
against the county defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in connection with
his 29-hour detention; and (4) absolute prosecutorial immunity did not shield the AUSA from the plaintiff's
claims that the AUSA violated his Fourth Amendment and due process rights, along with the federal material
witness statute and the federal rules of criminal procedure. The court noted that following the detainee’s postarrest transfer to the county's custody, he was detained for approximately 29 hours pursuant to an Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer request, and that the county lacked probable cause that the detainee
had violated a federal criminal law, but instead detained him while the federal government investigated to
determine whether or not he had, in violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment and procedural and
substantive due process rights. (Village of Round Lake Beach, Lake County Jail, Illinois)
2015

U.S. District Court
COURT
APPEARANCE
PRETRIAL RELEASE

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based
on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets
and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one
case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did
not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily
determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to
sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene
products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were
denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction
preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for
failure to pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures
of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal
Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their
Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due
Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due
Process violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently,
with respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not
afforded counsel at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their
incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN

Mayorov v. United States, 84 F.Supp.3d 678 (N.D.Ill. 2015). A former state prisoner sued the United States,
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence and false imprisonment based on
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issuing an immigration detainer against him, despite his United
States citizenship, causing him to spending 325 days in prison that he otherwise would not have served due to
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) rules prohibiting a detainee from participating in a boot camp as
an alternative to a custodial prison sentence. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district court held
that fact issues as to whether the government breached a duty to reasonably investigate the prisoner’s citizenship
status prior to issuing an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer. (Illinois Impact Incarceration
Program)

6.21

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
BOND

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). A petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, on behalf of
himself and a class of aliens detained during immigration proceedings for more than six months without a bond
hearing, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief providing individualized bond hearings with the burden on the
government, certification of the class, and appointment of class counsel. The district court denied the petition.
The petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court entered a
preliminary injunction and the government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The district court then granted
summary judgment to the class and entered a permanent injunction, and the parties appealed. The appeals court
affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the aliens were entitled to automatic individualized
bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued detention. The court ruled that the government had to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien was a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify
denial of a bond at the hearing. (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Los Angeles, California)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
BOND

Rodriguez v. Shanahan, 84 F.Supp.3d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). An alien who was subjected to mandatory detention
pending removal proceedings, seven years after his criminal detention for narcotics possession, petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, seeking an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention by the
Department of Homeland Security. The district court granted the petition, finding that the alien was entitled to a
bond hearing pending removal proceedings and that his continued detention violated his Fifth Amendment due
process rights. (Department of Homeland Security, New York)

6.22

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XIX

XIX

XIX

report was in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment. According to the court, the
prisoner did not have any constitutional right to be free from cell searches of any kind, including
retaliatory cell searches. The court found that the prisoner suffered punishment as the result of
the officer’s alleged retaliatory issuance of a misbehavior report, when he was placed in less
desirable housing. (Green Haven Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT
USE OF FORCE

Skinner v. Cunningham, 430 F.3d 483 (1st Cir. 2005). A prisoner brought a civil rights action
against prison authorities alleging due process violations from his segregation following his
killing of another inmate, and Eighth Amendment violations arising from his forced extraction
from his cell. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the authorities on two
claims, and judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the authorities on the remaining claim. The
prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the immediate
transfer of the prisoner to a restricted area within the prison after the prisoner killed another
inmate did not violate his due process rights, given the exigent circumstances posed by the need
to isolate him for his own sake and for the protection of other inmates. The court found that the
prisoner was not deprived of liberty without due process when he was detained in a restricted
area for 40 days without a hearing. The court noted that the prisoner’s disciplinary hearing had
been indefinitely deferred and there was a need to isolate the prisoner from the general
population pending a criminal investigation. The court found no Eighth Amendment violation
arising from the force used to extract the prisoner from his cell. The prisoner’s face was gouged
during a struggle that was caused by his resistance to the cell extractions, and the incidents were
video taped. Officers were shown on the video tape offering repeated precautions to protect the
prisoner’s head from injury as he was being dragged from the cell while resisting. The court also
found no Eighth Amendment violation arising from the alleged harassment by officers, which
included making threats, showing discourtesy, using epithets, lodging false petty charges, and
slamming the prisoner’s cell door while he was being held in isolation. (N.H.State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DISCIPLINE
PRETRIAL
DETAINEE

Surprenant v. Rivas, 424 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2005). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action
against a county jail and jail personnel, alleging that he was falsely accused of an infraction,
deprived of due process in disciplinary proceedings, and subjected to unconstitutional conditions
of confinement. A jury found the defendants liable on three counts and the district court denied
judgment as a matter of law for the defendants. The defendants appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that a hearing officer deprived the detainee of due process because she
was not an impartial decision-maker. The officer testified that she declined to interview an alibi
witness based on her preconceived belief that the witness would lie, and the officer rushed to
impose sanctions on the detainee despite having been asked by officials to withhold judgment
pending the completion of a parallel investigation into the incident. The court held conditions of
confinement were shown to be constitutionally deficient, where the detainee was placed in
around-the-clock segregation with the exception of a five-minute shower break every third day, all
hygiene items were withheld from him, he could only access water--including water to flush his
toilet--at the discretion of individual officers, and was subjected daily to multiple strip searches
that required him to place his unwashed hands into his mouth. (Hillsborough County Jail, New
Hampshire)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation
Act

Tanney v. Boles, 400 F.Supp.2d 1027 (E.D.Mich. 2005). A former inmate brought an action
against his case manager at a state correctional facility, alleging violations of his due process and
free speech rights under § 1983, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
the Rehabilitation Act. The district court held that the former inmate’s § 1983 claim for
declaratory relief was moot and that the inmate failed to state a due process claim. The court
found that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether the deaf inmate was
denied reasonable access to a device which allowed him to communicate via the telephone, and
whether a state prison officials’ policy of keeping such a device locked in her office served a
legitimate penological interest. (Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center, Jackson,
Michigan)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS
SEARCH
TRANSFER

Thiel v. Wisconsin, 399 F.Supp.2d 929 (W.D.Wisc. 2005). A detainee held under the Wisconsin
Sexually Violent Persons Law (WSVPL) brought a § 1983 action alleging due process violations in
connection with his commitment. The district court denied the detainee’s motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and dismissed the action. The court held that no due process liberty interests
were implicated by the manner in which the detainee was treated, either in regard to his
commitment, or in regard to trips outside the facility to a county jail for court proceedings. The
court found that the maximum security classification imposed on the detainee was an ordinary
incident of such confinement and did not pose atypical or significant hardships. The court found
no violations with the manner in which the detainee was strip searched, dressed in prison clothes
and placed in restraints before being transported to a county jail for court proceedings. (Sand
Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)

XX

7.75

U.S. District Court
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

U.S. v. Ali, 396 F.Supp.2d 703 (E.D.Va. 2005). A pretrial detainee who was charged with

U.S. Appeals Court
PRETRIAL
DETAINEE
SEARCH

U.S. v. Scott, 424 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant who was indicted for unlawfully

U.S. Appeals Court
TRANSFERS

Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2005). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action
challenging their transfers to a higher-security prison. The district court granted summary
judgment for the defendants and the prisoners appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the prisoners’ suit challenging transfers to a
high security prison was not subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where the transfer review process was not
available to prisoners in disciplinary segregation, and the prisoners’ grievances were sufficient to
alert the prison that the transfer decisions were being challenged. The court held that the alleged
change in a prison policy that required transferring gang members to a high security facility did
not constitute an ex post facto violation. The court ruled that the prisoners stated a claim for
denial of due process, where the conditions at the high security prison were arguably different
enough to give the prisoners a liberty interest in not being transferred there, and there was a
dispute as to whether the state provided sufficient pre- and post-transfer opportunities for the
prisoners to challenge the propriety of the transfers. The court held that the transfers did not
violate the gang members’ First Amendment associational rights, noting that prisoners had no
right to associate with gangs. (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

terrorism-related offenses filed a motion for relief from conditions of confinement. The district
court denied the motion, finding that the measures imposed did not violate due process. The court
also found that judicial relief was not available because the detainee did not exhaust available
administrative remedies, even though the detainee completed an inmate request form seeking
permission to receive regular phone calls to his family and lawyers, and visits from his family.
According to the court, the detainee did not pursue succeeding options available to him when his
request was denied. The court held that the “Special Administrative Measures” (SAM) imposed on
the detainee at the request of the Attorney General did not violate the detainee’s due process
rights, where the SAMs were imposed to further the legitimate and compelling purpose of
preventing future terrorist acts. The measures prevented the detainee from receiving regular
phone calls from his family and lawyers, and from receiving visits from his family. According to
the court, there was no alternative means to prevent the detainee from communicating with his
confederates, and the special accommodations sought by the detainee would have imposed
unreasonable burdens on prison and law enforcement personnel. The court noted that the
measures did not restrict the detainee’s ability to help prepare his own defense. (Alexandria
Detention Center, Virginia)

possessing an unregistered shotgun moved to suppress the shotgun and his statements
concerning it. The district court granted the motion and the government appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court held that warrantless searches, including drug testing, imposed as a
condition of pretrial release, required a showing of probable caused despite the defendant’s prerelease consent. According to the court, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine limits the
government’s ability to exact waivers of rights as a condition of benefits, even when those benefits
are fully discretionary. The court noted that pat-downs and similar minor intrusions need only be
supported by reasonable suspicion. According to the court, searches were not necessary to ensure
that the defendant appeared at trial. Among the defendant’s conditions of release was his consent
to “random” drug testing “any time of the day or night by any peace officer without a warrant,”
and to having his home searched for drugs “by any peace officer any time day or night without a
warrant.” (U.S. District Court, Nevada)

2006
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Arce v. O'Connell, 427 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A purportedly hearing-impaired inmate

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Armstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2006). A prisoner incarcerated for civil contempt for

XX

brought a pro se suit against employees of a corrections department, alleging that they violated
his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments, by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for his hearing impairment and
retaliating against him after he filed grievances regarding the lack of such accommodations. The
defendants moved for summary judgment and the court dismissed the case. The district court
held that the inmate was not a member of the class protected by a consent decree addressing the
treatment of deaf or hard-of-hearing inmates and thus, he lacked standing to move for contempt
alleging violations of the decree. The court found that to the extent the inmate suffered from a
hearing loss, it was not such as would prevent him from participating fully in “activities,
privileges, or programs” as required for him to come within the protections of the consent decree.
(New York State Department of Correctional Services)
refusing to comply with an order, sought habeas corpus relief. The district court denied the
prisoner’s motion for bail and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, remanded, and
ordered the case to be reassigned. The court held that the Non-Detention Act did not eliminate
the lower courts' inherent power to order coercive civil confinement, and implicitly authorized

7.76

coercive confinement in the face of civil contempt. The court found that civil confinement only
becomes punitive, for the purposes of a due process analysis, when it loses the ability to secure
compliance. The court held that a seven-year length of imprisonment for refusing to produce
corporate records and property, so as to comply with an order issued in a civil securities fraud
action, did not violate the prisoner’s due process rights, where the property in question had a
“life-altering” value of $15 million, such that his refusal to comply indicated that he was willing to
suffer jail time in hopes of ending up in possession of the property. The court opened it’s opinion
with the following statement: “It has been said that a civil contemnor who is incarcerated to

compel compliance with a court order holds the key to his prison cell: Where defiance leads to the
contemnor's incarceration, compliance is his salvation.” (Metropolitan Correctional Center,
Federal Bureau of Prisons, New York)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Atkins v. City of Chicago, 441 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D.Ill. 2006). A former inmate sued the Illinois
Department of Corrections and state officials under § 1983, charging them with having violated
his constitutional rights by his wrongful month-long detention at a correctional center. The
district court held that the officials to whom the arrestee protested that he had been misidentified
were not entitled to qualified immunity, where the inmate claimed that his constantly reasserted
claims of misidentification were never investigated. The court noted that his date of birth,
physical appearance and Social Security number differed from that of the wanted suspect, and
the officials had ready access to both parties' fingerprints, such that it would have been easy to
confirm that he was not the man named in a warrant. (Stateville Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
RA-Rehabiliation Act
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade County, 410 F.Supp.2d 1280 (S.D.Fla. 2006). A deaf motorist brought an
action against a county, alleging that his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and
subsequent detention violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation
Act (RA). The motorist alleged that throughout the arrest process, the county failed to establish
effective communication because it did not provide him with any auxiliary aids as required by the
ADA and RA. The county moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the
motion. The court held that the motorist's arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) and his
subsequent stationhouse detention was not covered by the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act (RA).
According to the court, the motorist's arrest was due to his erratic and suspicious driving, not his
disability, and following his arrest the police merely communicated the breath test consent form
to the motorist, who foreclosed further questioning by requesting an attorney through his driver's
rights card. The court held that the detention of the motorist following his arrest for driving
under the influence (DUI) did not violate the Rehabilitation Act (RA), where the motorist was not
detained because of his disability, but instead was detained because Florida law required a DUI
arrestee to be detained for at least eight hours. The court found that a county police officer did not
intentionally discriminate, act in bad faith, or act with deliberate indifference during the initial
stop and arrest of the motorist, as required to support the award of compensatory damages under
the Rehabilitation Act (RA). As the officer became aware of the motorist's disability, the officer
allowed the motorist to get out of his car so they could speak face to face, and attempted to
communicate through sign language. The officer believed in good faith that effective
communication was established because the motorist responded to him, and the motorist read the
implied consent form. The court found that the detention of the deaf motorist in solitary
confinement following his arrest did not rise to the level of intentional discrimination or
deliberate indifference to the motorist's disability, as required to support the award of
compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act (RA). Corrections facility officers believed
that their communication with the motorist was effective and they detained the motorist in
solitary confinement as a good faith protective measure, not as a discriminatory act. (MiamiDade County, Florida)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought a civil rights action against
a female officer, who allegedly made him strip and masturbate for her enjoyment. The district
court dismissed the case and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court held the prisoner stated a
§ 1983 claim for violation of his privacy rights but that the officer's alleged solicitation of his
manual masturbation, even under the threat of reprisal, did not present more than de minimis
injury and therefore did not give rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. (Smith State
Prison, Glennville, Georgia)

U.S. District Court
RA-Rehabilitation Act
HANDICAP
MEDICAL CARE
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Degrafinreid v. Ricks, 417 F.Supp.2d 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate sued the superintendent
of a state correctional facility and other officials, claiming violation of his constitutional and
statutory rights when his hearing aid was confiscated during a search of his cell and then
destroyed. The district court held that the inmate stated a claim for monetary damages against
the state under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), through allegations that constituted a
showing of deliberate indifference to the inmate's medical condition in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The inmate claimed that officials destroyed his hearing aid during a search of his
cell, knowing he was deaf, and delayed replacement for many weeks. According to the court,
because the Rehabilitation Act (RA) was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause of Article I,
Congress can require states to waive their sovereign immunity as a condition of accepting federal

XX

7.77

funds. New York State's continued acceptance of funding, under the Rehabilitation Act, resulted
in a waiver of sovereign immunity as to claims of the deaf prison inmate. (Upstate Correctional
Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Doe v. Pataki, 427 F.Supp.2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2006.) Sex offenders filed a class action challenging
the retroactive application of the registration and community notification provisions of the New
York Sex Offender Registration Act. After entry of a stipulation of settlement limiting the
registration period for most class members, the state legislature passed an amendment extending
the registration periods. Class members moved to enforce the stipulation. The district court held
that it had jurisdiction to enforce the stipulation of settlement, the Eleventh Amendment did not
bar the court from enforcing the stipulation; and the court would enforce stipulation's provisions.
(New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Duquin v. Dean, 423 F.Supp.2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A deaf inmate filed an action alleging that

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Figueroa v. Dean, 425 F.Supp.2d 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). A state prisoner who was born deaf
brought an action against a superintendent of programs at a prison, alleging failure to provide
interpreters, visual fire alarms, access to text telephone, and a television with closed-captioned
device in contempt of a consent order in class action in which the court entered a decree awarding
declaratory relief to prohibit disability discrimination against hearing impaired prisoners by state
prison officials. The superintendent moved for summary judgment and the district court granted
the motion. The court held that the exhaustion requirement of Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) did not apply to an action seeking exclusively to enforce a consent order. The court found
that the superintendent was not in contempt of the consent order, noting that sign language
interpreters were provided at educational and vocational programs and at medical and counseling
appointments for hearing-impaired inmates as required by consent decree, the prison was
equipped with visual fire alarms that met the requirements of the decree, and diligent efforts
were being made to comply with the consent decree regarding access to text telephones. (Wende
Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
PAROLE
SELF INCRIMINATION

Folk v. Atty. Gen. of Commonwealth of Pa., 425 F.Supp.2d 663 (W.D.Pa. 2006). A state inmate

U.S. Appeals Court
INTERSTATE
COMPACT

Garcia v. Lemaster, 439 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2006). A New Mexico inmate housed in California

XX

prison officials violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
Rehabilitation Act, and a consent decree by failing to provide qualified sign language
interpreters, effective visual fire alarms, use of closed-captioned television sets, and access to text
telephones (TTY). Officials moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted in
their favor. The court held that the officials at the high-security facility complied with the
provision of a consent decree requiring them to provide visual fire alarms for hearing-impaired
inmates, even if the facility was not always equipped with visual alarms, where corrections
officers were responsible for unlocking each cell door and ensuring that inmates evacuate in
emergency situations. The court held that the deputy supervisor for programs at the facility was
not subject to civil contempt for her failure to fully comply with the provision of consent decree
requiring the facility to provide access to text telephones (TTY) for hearing-impaired inmates in a
manner equivalent to hearing inmates' access to telephone service, even though certain areas
within the facility provided only limited access to TTY, and other areas lacked TTY altogether.
The court noted that the deputy warden made diligent efforts to comply with the decree, prison
staff responded to the inmate's complaints with temporary accommodations and permanent
improvements, and repairs to broken equipment were made promptly. The court found that the
denial of the inmate's request to purchase a thirteen-inch color television for his cell did not
subject the deputy supervisor for programs to civil contempt for failing to fully comply with the
provision of a consent decree requiring the facility to provide closed-captioned television for
hearing-impaired inmates, despite the inmate's contention that a closed-caption decoder would
not work on commissary televisions. The court noted that the facility policy barred color
televisions in cells and that suppliers confirmed that there was no technological barrier to
installing decoders in televisions that were available from the commissary. (Wende Corr’l
Facility, New York)

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging a state parole board's denial of parole. The
district court held that requiring the inmate to admit to the sexual crimes for which he was
convicted, as a condition for completing a rehabilitation program, did not violate his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, nor the inmate’s substantive due process rights or
the inmate's First Amendment right not to be compelled to speak. The court found that the
requirement did not constitute sufficient compulsion to implicate the inmate's Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination, even though the inmate's chance at parole was diminished if he
did not successfully complete the program, where the inmate's failure to accept responsibility for
his sexual behavior did not automatically preclude him from parole. (State Correctional
Institution, Houtzdale, PA)

pursuant to an Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) filed a civil rights action against New
Mexico defendants challenging his classification and denial of recreation in California. The

7.78

district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the inmate
appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the inmate was required to bring his civil
rights suit challenging the conditions of his confinement against his California custodians, and
that the inmate did not have a state-created liberty interest in conditions of confinement in
accord with New Mexico regulations when he was housed in another state. According to the court,
an inmate incarcerated in another state pursuant to the ICC had no liberty interest entitling him
to the application of the sending state's classification and recreation rules while confined in the
receiving state. The court also found that the inmate had no statutory right under the ICC to be
classified and afforded recreation pursuant to New Mexico regulations, noting that the ICC
specifically provided that such inmates were entitled to treatment equal to that afforded similar
inmates of the receiving state. (New Mexico State Penitentiary, New Mexico Department of
Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305 (2nd Cir. 2006). Black and Latino inmates and parolees brought

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION

Lindell v. Houser, 442 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 2006). A white-supremacist inmate brought an action

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK

Loving v. Johnson, 455 F.3d 562 (5th Cir. 2006). A prisoner brought an action against a warden
asserting he was entitled to the legal minimum wage under the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) for work he performed as a drying machine operator in a prison laundry.
The district court dismissed the action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. The prisoner
appealed and the appeals court affirmed. The court held that a prisoner doing prison work in or
for the prison is not an employee under FLSA and is thus not entitled to the federal minimum
wage. According to the court, compelling an inmate to work without pay does not violate the
Constitution and the failure of a state to specifically sentence an inmate to hard labor does not
change this rule. The court reviewed the history of its rulings: “…In a similar situation, we held
that a jail was not the FLSA employer of an inmate working in a work-release program for a
private employer outside the jail…we have also held that inmates who work inside a prison for a
private enterprise are not FLSA employees for the private company…however, until today we
have not expressly stated whether there is any FLSA employment relationship between the
prison and its inmates working in and for the prison.” The court noted that other circuits
uniformly hold that prisoners doing prison work are not the prison’s employees under FLSA.
(Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT

Michau v. Charleston County, S.C., 434 F.3d 725 (4th Cir. 2006). A former state prison inmate

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Muntaqim v. Coombe, 449 F.3d 371 (2nd Cir. 2006). A felon filed an action alleging that New

XX

an action against the New York Governor, Chairperson of the Board of Elections, and
Commissioner of Corrections to challenge, as a violation of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), a statute
disenfranchising incarcerated and paroled felons. The district court dismissed the claim. The
inmates and parolees appealed and en banc review was granted. The appeals court affirmed and
remanded, finding that the VRA prohibition against voting qualifications or prerequisites that
resulted in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race or color did not apply to
vote denial and dilution claims. (Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)

alleging that prison official violated the Eighth Amendment by housing him with a black inmate.
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the official and the inmate appealed.
The court of appeals held that the official did not violate the inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights
by placing him in a cell with a black inmate, even though the official knew of the black inmate's
involvement with a gang and the white inmate's expression of fear. The court found that the
official did not have reason to believe that the white inmate was at a serious risk since eighteen
months had passed without incident after the cellmates' initial fight and nothing indicated
specific threats had been made by the black inmate or other members of the gang. The court
noted that the inmate had no constitutional right to be housed with members of his own race,
culture, or temperament. The court held that the inmate was not entitled to a court-appointed
lawyer to help him prosecute his case against prison officials, noting that the inmate was
experienced in litigation, and that any difficulty prosecuting his case was largely caused by the
inmate’s choice to pursue other cases at the same time. (Waupun Correctional Institution,
Wisconsin)

who was being detained under a state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) brought civil
actions. The district court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a claim and the inmate
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the former inmate was not a “prisoner”
for the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and therefore his complaint was not
subject to the PLRA’s screening requirements. The court noted that the former inmate was under
“civil detention” not “criminal detention.” The court held that the former inmate’s complaint
failed to state a claim for damages for denial of access to a law library, where the complaint did
not explain how he was injured by any limitations on his access to the law library. (Charleston
County Detention Center, South Carolina)
York's felon disenfranchisement statute violated the Voting Rights Act. The district court granted
the prison officials' motion for summary judgment, and the felon appealed. The appeals court held

7.79

that felon was not a resident of New York and thus did not have standing to challenge New York's
felon disenfranchisement statute as a violation of the Voting Rights Act. The court noted that
even though the felon had been incarcerated in New York prisons for the past 30 years, the
inmate was a California resident before he was incarcerated in New York, he was never resident
of New York, and he disavowed any intention to become a resident of New York in future.
(Shawangunk Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
CONSPIRACY
SEXUAL ABUSE
FAILURE TO
PROTECT

Newsome v. Lee County, Ala., 431 F.Supp.2d 1189 (M.D.Ala. 2006). A female county jail detainee
who had been raped by three inmates, sued a county and employees, alleging violation of her
federal and state rights. The district court dismissed the case in part, and denied dismissal in
part. The court held that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that
they retaliated against the detainee for her efforts to report the rape. The court found that the
detainee stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation against the officer who placed the
detainee in a cell with male inmates, but against no other jail personnel. The court also found
valid claims of conspiracy, and conspiracy to block the opportunity to report the rape, under §
1983 on the part of officer who placed the detainee in the cell with the male inmates. After the
incident, officers allegedly cut off the detainee’s access to phones and visitors and threatened that
there would be negative consequences if she persevered with her charges. (Lee County Jail,
Alabama)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Olibas v. Gomez, 481 F.Supp.2d 721 (W.D.Tex. 2006). Bail bondsmen sued a sheriff and county,
alleging breach of a prior settlement agreement and new violations of § 1983, in violation of their
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and breach of
their right of free speech under the Texas Constitution. The sheriff moved to dismiss. The district
court denied the motion. The court held that the bail bondsmen stated a § 1983 claim for a First
Amendment violation against the sheriff, despite his argument that they had failed to identify a
variety of details. According to the court, the Texas Constitution protected the right to earn a
living by writing bail bonds, and thus, the bail bondsmen's ability to have their bail bonds
accepted at a county jail was a property or liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. The bondsmen alleged that the sheriff allowed other bonding
companies to continue writing bail bonds in the county while denying such privileges to them.
(Reeves County, Texas)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Pennsylvania Prison Society v. Rendell, 419 F.Supp.2d 651 (M.D.Pa. 2006). An advocacy group

brought an action in state court challenging the legality of proposed changes to the state
constitution with regard to pardoning powers and the state Board of Pardons. Following approval
of the changes by the electorate, the defendants removed the action to federal court. After statelaw claims were remanded and the defendants prevailed on appeal before the state supreme
court, the group filed an amended complaint, alleging that the constitutional amendments
violated the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the
Eighth Amendment, and the Guarantee Clause. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
The district court held that including a crime victim on a state pardon board, even when the
recommendation for a pardon or commutation must be unanimous before it may be considered by
the governor, does not violate due process. The court found that the retroactive application of the
amendments providing for the inclusion of a crime victim on the Board of Pardons did not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clause, but the court held that the retroactive application of the amendments
requiring a unanimous vote for the Board of Pardons to recommend a commutation violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause. The ballot question that proposed the amendments read: Shall the

Pennsylvania Constitution be amended to require a unanimous recommendation of the Board of
Pardons before the Governor can pardon or commute the death sentence of an individual
sentenced in a criminal case to death or life imprisonment, to require only a majority vote of the
Senate to approve the Governor's appointments to the Board, and to substitute a crime victim for
an attorney and a corrections expert for a penologist as Board members? (Pennsylvania Board of
Pardons)

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
HARASSMENT
HOMOSEXUALS
SEXUAL HARASSMENT

XX

R.G. v. Koller, 415 F.Supp.2d 1129 (D.Hawai’i 2006). Three juveniles who either identified
themselves as, or were perceived to be, lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender and who had been
confined at a state juvenile correctional facility brought claims against the facility alleging due
process, equal protection, Establishment Clause, and access to counsel violations. The district
court granted the juveniles’ motion for a preliminary injunction in part, and denied in part. The
court held that the juveniles had standing to seek a preliminary injunction preventing the facility
officials from engaging in unconstitutional conduct and requiring them to implement policies and
procedures to ensure their safety at the facility. Although none of the juveniles were incarcerated
at the time the complaint was filed, the court found that enjoining certain unconstitutional
conduct and requiring officials to implement policies and procedures to remedy those conditions
would remedy the juveniles' injury, and, the juveniles showed a likelihood of repetition of the
injury given that each of the juveniles had been incarcerated at the facility two to three times
over a relatively short period of time, each had been released only to return to the facility a short
time later, and the juveniles' experiences indicated that, at the time the complaint was filed, each
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juvenile was likely to return to the facility. The court found that the facility's adoption of a youth
rights policy providing that youth should not be discriminated against on the basis of sexual
orientation did not render moot the juveniles' claims for injunctive relief from sexual orientation
harassment, absent evidence, aside from the policies themselves, that the facility had altered its
treatment of its lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards. According to the court, the facility's
use of isolation to “protect” its lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender wards was not within the
range of acceptable professional practices and constituted punishment in violation of their due
process rights. The court found that such practices were, at best, an excessive and therefore
unconstitutional, response to the legitimate safety needs of the institution. The court held that
officials at the facility acted with deliberate indifference in violation of due process in allowing
pervasive verbal, physical, and sexual abuse to persist against lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender juveniles. The juveniles complained of a relentless campaign of harassment based on
their sexual orientation that included threats of violence, physical and sexual assault, imposed
social isolation, and near constant use of homophobic slurs. (Hawai‘i Youth Correctional Facility)
U.S. District Court
MILITARY FACILITY
TORTURE

Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F.Supp.2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006). Former detainees at a military facility in
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers, alleging they
were tortured. The defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part,
and deferred in part. The court held that military personnel supervising the interrogation of
detainees at the facility had qualified immunity from a claim that they promoted or condoned
torture in violation of Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights of detainees, because the question as
to whether the detainees had rights under the constitution had not been resolved by high courts
and therefore personnel could not have known that their conduct was wrongful. The court noted
that District of Columbia law applied to the question of whether military personnel at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly
tortured detainees. The prisoners alleged various forms of torture, including hooding, forced
nakedness, housing in cages, deprivation of food, forced body cavity searches, subjection to
extremes of heat and cold, harassment in the practice of their religion, forced shaving of religious
beards, placing the Koran in the toilet, placement in stress positions, beatings with rifle butts,
and the use of unmuzzled dogs for intimidation. The court found “most disturbing” their claim
that executive members of the United States government were directly responsible for the
“depraved conduct the plaintiffs suffered over the course of their detention.” (U.S. Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Rose v. Mayberg, 454 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2006). A sex offender who had been civilly committed to a

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT

Senty-Haugen v. Goodno, 462 F.3d 876 (8th Cir. 2006). A civilly-committed sex offender brought
an action against the Commissioner of the Minnesota Department of Human Services, other
Department officials, and sex offender program employees, alleging violations of federal and state
law for being placed in isolation, receiving inadequate medical attention, and being retaliated
against. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the offender
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that placement of the civilly-committed sex
offender in isolation because of rule infractions did not infringe on his procedural due process
rights, given that his commitment was indefinite, that he received notice and had the right to be
heard, that the decision to use isolation was a discretionary decision by state officials, and that
the State had a vital interest in maintaining a secure environment. The court noted that a
civilly-committed sex offender was entitled, under the Due Process Clause, to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than a prison inmate. The court found that the fact that
the officials implemented a new isolation policy geared toward the unique security problems
caused by the conduct of the offender did not amount to a procedural due process violation. The
court held that the offender did not receive inadequate medical treatment in violation of his due
process rights, in that the alleged delays in treatment did not worsen his conditions, he provided
no expert evidence that the treatment he received was inadequate, and staff was not
unreasonable in requiring him to move away from the door of his room before he could be treated
for an injured leg, since they were unable to ascertain the extent of his injury until they could see
that it was safe for them to enter. The court found that the offender's transfer was not in
retaliation for his alleged advocacy for another patient, so as to violate the offender's speech
rights, where the sex offender program officials indicated that they transferred the offender to
lessen his contact with the patient, whom the offender was suspected of exploiting, and where the

XX

state hospital as a sexually violent predator (SVP), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
after exhausting claims relevant to his petition in state court. The district court denied the
petition and the offender appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The federal appeals court held
that the decision by a state appellate court-- that due process did not require a jury in a civil
commitment proceeding under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) to determine if a sex
offender was completely unable to control his behavior-- was not an objectively unreasonable
application of the decisions of United States Supreme Court, and therefore the sex offender was
not entitled to federal habeas relief. According to the court, only some showing of abnormality
was required, that made it difficult, if not impossible, for a dangerous person to control his
dangerous behavior. (California Department of Mental Health)

7.81

offender failed to present any evidence that the transfer took place for any other reason. The
court found that the officials' act of leaving lights on in his protective isolation unit was not in
retaliation for him filing grievances and contacting his attorney, in violation of his First
Amendment rights. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Minnesota Department of Human
Services)
U.S. District Court
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act
TRANSFERS

Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F.Supp.2d 811(E.D.Mich. 2006). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a prison official transferred him in retaliation for his exercising his First
Amendment rights. After a jury verdict in the inmate's favor, the official filed a motion for a new
trial, and the inmate moved for costs and attorney fees. The district court held that the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA) that prohibited inmates from recovering mental
or emotional damages in the absence of a the physical injury, did not bar the inmate's claim for
emotional damages and that evidence supported the award of punitive damages. The court
applied only $1 of the inmate's damages award to his attorney fee award. The court noted that a
jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in a § 1983 action when the defendant's
conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless disregard
or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. According to the court, the jury's
award of punitive damages against the prison official was supported by evidence that the official
transferred the inmate in retaliation for the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment free speech
rights in complaining to the official's superiors about the official's misconduct, even though the
official was aware that the transfer would prevent the inmate from seeing his attorney, from
paying his attorney, and from seeing his emotionally-disabled daughter. (Michigan Department
of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL
COMMITMENT
SMOKING

Thiel v. Nelson, 422 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D.Wis. 2006). Patients who were involuntarily committed

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Tucker v. Hardin County, 448 F.Supp.2d 901 (W.D.Tenn. 2006). Deaf detainees and their deaf
mother sued a county and a city, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court held that a
county court did not violate the ADA's Title II, which prohibits discrimination in public services,
by asking the deaf mother to serve as interpreter for her deaf sons at their plea hearing, despite
her contention that the request deprived her of her right to participate as a spectator. The court
noted that the mother expressed no reservations to the court about serving as an interpreter, that
she could have refused the request, and, even if the court were somehow responsible for her
service as an interpreter, its request was based on her skill in lip-reading and sign language, not
on her disability. According to the court, assuming that overnight incarceration was covered by
the ADA's Title II which prohibits discrimination in public services, and assuming that placing a
phone call was an “aid, benefit, or service” within the meaning of an ADA regulation prohibiting
public entities from providing a disabled person aid, benefit, or service that was not as effective as
that provided to others, the county did not violate ADA in using relay operators and notes to
allow the deaf detainees to communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with a
teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. The court noted that information was transmitted and received,
which was the same benefit non-disabled person would have received. While in custody, the two
brothers communicated with officers through written notes. The jail was not equipped with a
teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Instead, the officers acted as relay operators, using paper and
pencil, as they spoke with an operator acting on their behalf to complete the call, which lasted 45
minutes. (Hardin County Jail, and the City of Savannah Police Department, Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ABUSE
SEARCH

Turner v. Huibregtse, 421 F.Supp.2d 1149 (W.D.Wis. 2006). An inmate sued a deputy warden and

XX

to a mental health facility pursuant to a state's sexually violent persons statute filed state court
actions challenging a smoking ban enacted at the facility. After removal to federal court, the
patients moved to remand, and the officials moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court
dismissed the complaint. The court held that the decision to completely ban smoking at the
facility was rationally related to legitimate state interests of improving patients' health and
safety, reducing fire hazards, maintaining clean and sanitary conditions, and reducing complaints
and the threat of litigation from patients who did not smoke. The court found that the smoking
ban did not violate the patients' equal protection rights, even if another state detention facility
continued to permit its patients to smoke. The court noted that, unlike criminally confined
offenders who may be subject to punishment as long as it is not cruel and unusual under the
Eighth Amendment, persons who are civilly confined may not be punished. According to the
court, involuntarily committed patients may be subjected to conditions that advance goals such as
preventing escape and assuring the safety of others. The court also found that the patients were
not deprived of their due process right to adequate treatment as result of state's decision to
completely ban smoking at facility. (Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center, Wisconsin)

two correctional officers under § 1983, claiming that they violated his rights under the Eighth
Amendment when one officer sexually assaulted the inmate during a pat search and the other
officers failed to prevent the assault. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court held
that the inmate stated a claim against one officer who allegedly grabbed the inmate's buttocks
and fondled his penis during a search, and against a second officer who allegedly held the inmate

7.82

and laughed while the first officer grabbed the inmate's buttocks and fondled his penis. The court held that the
officers were not entitled to qualified immunity where, at the time of the search, it was clearly established that an
otherwise legal search that was conducted in a harassing manner intended to humiliate and inflict psychological
pain was unconstitutional. According to the court, if the inmate showed that he was sexually assaulted during the
search, but failed to show that he suffered any physical injury, he would not be entitled to compensatory
damages but he could be entitled to other forms of recovery, such as nominal and punitive damages. (Wisconsin
Secure Program Facility, Boscobel, Wisconsin)
U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Weems v. Little Rock Police Dept,, 453 F.3d 1010 (8th Cir. 2006). A registered sex offender brought a civil
rights suit challenging the provisions of the Arkansas Sex Offender Registration Act that required sex offenders
to register, and the provision of the statute that prohibited certain registered sex offenders from living within two
thousand feet of a school or a daycare center. The district court denied the offenders’ motion for class
certification and dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim. The offender appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held: (1) the residency restriction did not violate substantive due process; (2) the residency
restriction did not violate equal protection by treating the high-risk offenders who did not own property
differently from the property-owning high risk offenders or from low-risk offenders; (3) the restrictions did not
violate a constitutional right to travel; (4) the restriction did not constitute an unconstitutional ex post facto law
as applied to the offenders who sustained convictions prior to the enactment of the statute; and (5) the offenders
were not deprived of any liberty interest in avoiding a risk assessment without procedural due process. The court
held that the statute rationally advanced a legitimate government purpose of protecting children from the most
dangerous sex offenders by reducing their proximity to the locations frequented by children, that the statute was
intended to be regulatory and non-punitive, and was not punitive in effect. (Arkansas General Assembly, Sex
and Child Offender Registration Act)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
DISCIPLINE
DUE PROCESS
WORK
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Wilson v. Taylor, 466 F.Supp.2d 567 (D.Del. 2006). Thirty-one Black inmates filed a § 1983 action alleging that
state prison officials routinely denied their right to procedural due process during disciplinary hearings and
security classification determinations. The officials moved to dismiss the complaint and the inmates asked for
summary judgment. The motions were granted in part and denied in part. The court held that Delaware has
created no constitutionally protected liberty interest in an inmate’s security classification, even when the change
in classification is for disciplinary reasons. The court found that the black inmates did not have a liberty interest
in prison jobs, a particular security classification, or assignments to particular buildings, and thus the state prison
officials’ decision in those matters did not violate the inmates’ due process rights. The court noted that state
prison policies and procedures did not give a reasonable expectation of employment, a particular security
classification, or a particular building assignment. The court denied summary judgment for the defendants on the
issue of whether state prison officials consistently treated black inmates differently from similarly situated white
inmates in job assignments, disciplinary actions, and security classification, and racially segregated the inmates
within the facility. According to the court, the issue involved fact questions that could not be resolved on a
motion to dismiss the claim against officials for violating their equal protection rights. The court held that an
inmate’s allegation that he was transferred to a housing unit with far fewer privileges after filing a civil rights
action against the prison officials, in violation of his First Amendment right of access to courts, sufficiently
alleged a retaliation claim against the officials, and that a genuine issue of material fact as to the reason for the
inmate’s transfer to a more restrictive facility precluded summary judgment. (Delaware Department of
Correction)
2007

U.S. District Court
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

Avalos v. Baca, 517 F.Supp.2d 1156 (C.D.Cal. 2007). A county jail detainee brought an action against a county
sheriff and under-sheriff, alleging claims arising out of his over-detention and involuntary waiver of an overdetention claim. The defendants moved for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The
court held that the defendants did not maintain an unconstitutional policy, practice, or custom of over-detention
and that the sheriff and under-sheriff were not individually liable for the detainee’s over-detention under § 1983.
According to the court, evidence demonstrated that only 0.4 percent of persons released by the department
during the relevant time period were over-detained, the department had taken steps to reduce the number of overdetentions in recent years, and the total number of over-detentions by the department had dramatically decreased
over time. The court noted that the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of a coercive
waiver of rights and that the detainee failed to establish that the county sheriff and others conspired to violate his
constitutional rights. A member of the department’s risk management team had approached the detainee and
offered him $500 if he would release all claims. (Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
ACCESS TO COURT
MILITARY FACILITY

Bismullah v. Gates, 503 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Eight foreign nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base in Cuba petitioned for review of the determination by the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) that
they were enemy combatants. The detainees and government each proposed the entry of protective orders, the
detainees moved to compel discovery, and the government moved to treat seven detainees who had filed a joint
petition as though each had filed a separate petition. The appeals court ordered the government to provide the
detainees' counsel access to classified information not presented during the determination process. The
government moved for rehearing. The appeals court denied the motion, finding that the government was required
to provide the court with all reasonably available relevant information in its possession, and that the detainees'
counsel were entitled to access to classified information. (Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)

XXI

7.83

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Boulware v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 518 F.Supp.2d 186 (D.D.C. 2007). A federal prisoner brought a pro se
action against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and various BOP officials in their official and individual capacities,
seeking to compel them to provide the prisoner with some of the marketable vocational opportunities provided to
similarly situated offenders housed in other federal facilities. The defendants moved to dismiss and the court
granted the motion. The court held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) claim. The court found that the prisoner failed to state a claim against individual BOP
officials. According to the court, the prisoner did not have a liberty interest to participate in vocational programs
of his choice as required to sustain a due process claim and the prisoner could not sustain an equal protection
claim. The court held that the BOP's failure to provide additional programs did not violate the prisoner's right to
participate in programs. According to the court, the unavailability of a program at a particular prison is not an
atypical deprivation of rights in violation of the due process clause, but rather merely leaves the prisoner with the
normal attributes of confinement. (United States Bureau of Prisons' Rivers Correctional Institution (“RCI”) in
Winton, North Carolina)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEARCH

Bullock v. Sheahan, 519 F.Supp.2d 760 (N.D.Ill. 2007). Male former inmates of a county jail brought a class
action against a county and a sheriff, alleging that the defendants had a policy and/or practice of subjecting male
inmates to strip-searches prior to their release, and that such differing treatment of male inmates violated their
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' expert. The
district court denied the motion, finding that the expert’s testimony was admissible. According to the court, the
expert testimony of a registered architect who specialized in the design of prisons and jails, concerning whether
there was adequate space in the jail for the construction of additional bullpens to hold male detainees was
relevant and reliable. The court noted that while the expert did not review all of the written discovery in the case,
the expert reached his opinions after a tour of the jail and after reviewing other expert reports, jail floor plans, a
sheriff's status report and charts summarizing certain computer records on male detainees. (Cook County
Department of Corrections, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Burella v. City of Philadelphia, 501 F.3d 134 (3rd Cir. 2007). A wife who was shot by her husband brought a §
1983 action against police officers and a city, alleging due process and equal protection violations in their failure
to enforce restraining orders and protect her from her husband. The district court denied the officers' motion for
summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity, and the officers appealed. The appeals court reversed
and remanded, holding that: (1) the wife did not have a procedural due process right to have officers enforce the
restraining orders by arresting the husband when he violated the orders; (2) the wife did not have a cognizable
claim against the officers for violation of her right to substantive due process on the theory of a state-created
danger; and (3) the officers did not violate the wife's right to equal protection of the laws. (Philadelphia Police
Department, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONSPIRACY
NEGLIGENCE

Bush v. Butler, 521 F.Supp.2d 63 (D.D.C. 2007). An inmate sued two attorneys, an investigative reporter, a civil
liberties organization, and unknown defendants, alleging that the defendants engaged in a conspiracy to deprive
him of his civil rights and failed to prevent a conspiracy in violation of his civil rights. The inmate also asserted
state-law claims for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, constructive fraud, breach of contract, breach
of implied warranty, civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.
The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that the inmate
failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy to deprive him of his civil rights when he asserted that
the defendants agreed to punish him by interfering with his access to the courts, breaching their contract with
him, and making fraudulent misrepresentations. The court noted that the inmate failed to describe the persons
involved in the alleged agreement, the nature of the agreement, the particular acts taken to form a conspiracy,
and overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court held that it did not have diversity jurisdiction
over state-law claims. (Eastern Correctional Institution, Maryland)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER

Doe v. Schwarzenegger, 476 F.Supp.2d 1178 (E.D.Cal. 2007). Registered sex offenders brought an action
challenging the constitutionality of California's Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act (SPPCA), which
imposed residency restrictions and global positioning system (GPS) monitoring requirements on registered sex
offenders. The offenders moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the SPPCA's residency
and GPS monitoring provisions. The district court denied the motion. The court held that SPPCA did not apply
retroactively to offenders who were convicted, paroled, or otherwise released from incarceration prior to the
effective date of the statute. The court noted that the SPPCA was a voter initiative that was silent on the issue of
retroactivity, and extrinsic sources did not show that voters intended for it to apply retroactively. (California
Sexual Predator Punishment and Control Act)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE

Edwards v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 523 F.Supp.2d 462 (E.D.Pa. 2007). A prisoner filed a § 1983 suit,
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against a Board of Probation and Parole, claiming violations of the Ex
Post Facto Clause and Eighth Amendment, and asserting that his parole was denied in retaliation for exercising
his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the board. The court noted that
the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to a statute or policy change that alters the definition of criminal conduct or
increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Under Pennsylvania law, although parole is an alteration of
the terms of confinement, a parolee continues to serve his unexpired sentence until its conclusion. According to
the court, under Pennsylvania law, a “parole” is not an act of clemency but a penological measure for the
disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable of rehabilitation outside of prison walls; parole does not set
aside or affect the sentence, and the convict remains in the legal custody of the state and under the control of its
agents, subject at any time for breach of condition to be returned to the penal institution. The court held that
denial of the prisoner's re-parole by Board of Probation and Parole, after his conviction as a parole violator, was
not re-imposition of the prisoner's unexpired life sentence, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but rather,

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under Pennsylvania law, the prisoner's sentence was not set aside by his parole. According to the court, the
prisoner remained in the legal custody of the warden until expiration of his sentence, and the prisoner had no
protected liberty interest beyond that of any other prisoner eligible to be considered for parole while serving out
the remainder of a maximum sentence. The court held that changes to the Pennsylvania Parole Act did not create
a significant risk of increasing the prisoner's punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, based on the
Board of Probation and Parole's denial of the prisoner's re-parole due to factors of prior parole failures and lack
of remorse, since the relative weight of such factors in the parole calculus of amendments to the Parole Act did
not change, and the prisoner produced no evidence that the change in the Parole Act had any effect on the
Board's decision. (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole)
U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
TRANSFER

Farmer v. Kavanagh, 494 F.Supp.2d 345 (D.Md. 2007). A state prison inmate sued officials, claiming her
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment were violated when she was transferred from a medium to a maximum security
facility. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment for the officials
on the federal claims and dismissed the state law claim. The court held that the inmate had a liberty interest
in not being sent to a maximum security prison, as required in order to bring a claim that transfer to
maximum security facility without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard, was a violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court noted that the maximum security prison's strict control over
every aspect of an inmate's life, and almost virtual isolation from any human contact, imposed conditions
of confinement far worse than her previous situation in the general population of a medium security prison.
But the court found that the officials had qualified immunity from the inmate's due process claim because,
at the time of the transfer, it was not clearly established that an inmate could have a liberty interest in not
being transferred to a maximum security prison. (Maryland Correctional Adjustment Center
[“Supermax”])

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT

Greene v. Mazzuca, 485 F.Supp.2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A prisoner brought a pro se § 1983 action against
prison officials, alleging harassment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the
case. The court held that the prison employees' alleged actions of yelling at the prisoner, spitting at him,
and threatening him with time in a security housing unit (SHU), if proven, did not rise to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment. (Fishkill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL ILLNESS
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Herman v. County of York, 482 F.Supp.2d 554 (M.D.Pa. 2007). The estate of a prisoner who had committed
suicide in a county prison sued the county, a warden, the prison health service, and nurses, asserting
Eighth Amendment claims under § 1983, claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and
state medical malpractice claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motions in part and denied in part. The court found that, notwithstanding a Pennsylvania statute
stating that the safekeeping, discipline, and employment of prisoners was exclusively vested in a prison
board, the county could be held liable to the prisoner under § 1983 for the actions of the warden if he was
acting as an agent of the county. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the warden was acting as an agent for the county in allegedly failing to
prevent the prisoner's suicide, and as to the warden's role in ratifying county prison policies. The court
found that the county, warden, nurses, and prison health service were not deliberately indifferent to the
medical needs of prisoner who committed suicide, where alleged failures to check on the prisoner in his cell
was by officers other than the defendants, nurses could not have been deliberately indifferent if they were
unqualified as the prisoner's estate said, and the nurses' failure to place the prisoner on a suicide watch did
not fall outside their professional judgment, given the prisoner's denials of suicidal ideation and his family's
testimony. The court found that the prisoner was not denied access to county prison's programs or services
because of disability, and any failure by the county and warden to prevent his suicide thus was not
discrimination in services, programs, or activities of a public entity in violation of ADA. The prisoner
denied thoughts of suicide, he told a nurse that he did not wish to take anti-depressant medications which
had been prescribed for him, and a nurse told him to return to mental health services if necessary. (York
County Prison, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized
Persons Act

Hopkins v. Pusey, 475 F.Supp.2d 479 (D.Del. 2007). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, a state Attorney General, and civil liberties organization attorneys. The district court granted the
defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that prison officials and the Attorney General were not liable
under the theory of respondeat superior. The court found that the attorneys for a civil liberties organization
had no duty to prisoner to report alleged ongoing civil rights incidents to the United States Attorney under
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). The court noted that the organization had not
gratuitously agreed to report any alleged unconstitutional activities, and there was no attorney/client
relationship between the organization and prisoner. The prisoner alleged that former and current American
Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) employees maintain a file containing allegations of a pattern of assault
upon the prisoner and other inmates, but prevented and hindered the disclosure of the “on-going criminal
conduct.” (Delaware Correctional Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
SEARCH
USE OF FORCE

Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2007). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state
psychiatric hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against
various state officials under § 1983, challenging the conditions of their confinement. The district court
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. The court held that the First Amendment claims brought against state hospital
officials were based on clearly established law for qualified immunity purposes insofar as they challenged

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retaliation for filing lawsuits, however, officials had qualified immunity to the extent that the plaintiffs'
claim relied on a First Amendment right not to participate in treatment sessions. The court found that the
plaintiffs stated a § 1983 claim for violations of their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The court concluded that hospital officials were entitled to qualified
immunity with regard to procedural due process claims, but not substantive due process claims. The
offenders alleged that they were subjected to public strip searches, to retaliatory searches of their
possessions and to arbitrary seizure of their personal belongings, that they were placed in shackles during
transport to the hospital and during visits from family and friends, that they were subjected to restraint even
if they did not pose any physical risk, and that they were force-medicated. On appeal to the United States
Supreme Court (129 S.Ct. 2431) the court vacated the decision. (Atascadero State Hospital, California)
U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION
CORRESPONDENCE

Jordan v. Pugh, 504 F.Supp.2d 1109 (D.Colo. 2007). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that a
prison regulation prohibiting inmates from acting as reporters or publishing under bylines violated the First
Amendment. After a bench trial was held, the district court entered judgment for the inmate. The court
found that the inmate had constitutional standing to raise the First Amendment challenge against the
regulation, where the inmate had been punished twice for publishing under a byline. The court held that
the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulation violated the First Amendment, despite the BOP's concerns
of creating “big wheel” inmates who presented a security risk, a chilling effect on the performance or
speech of prison staff, or permitting inmates to conduct business. The court noted that a myriad of similar
publishing opportunities were available to inmates, there was no particular security risk associated with an
inmate publishing under a byline in the news media that was not present with other inmate publications,
the BOP had adequate authority to screen and exclude dangerous content coming into the prison, and
there was no evidence linking inmates' outgoing news media correspondence to inmates conducting
business. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Administrative Maximum Unit [“ADX”], Florence, Colorado)

U.S. Appeals Court
WORK
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2007). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983 alleging
discrimination and retaliation in his prison employment. The district court entered summary judgment for
the defendants and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) telling
admittedly noisy inmates to “shut up” on one occasion did not violate the equal protection clause, even if
equally noisy inmates of another race were not equally chastised; (2) the prisoner failed to present
affirmative evidence that the garment factory supervisor’s work assignments were motivated by race
discrimination; (3) the supervisor’s work assignments would not have chilled an inmate of ordinary
firmness from filing grievances, as was required for a § 1983 retaliation claim; and (4) the prisoner’s
protected activity of filing a grievance was not causally connected to the alleged retaliation of an increased
work load. (Maximum Security Unit, Arkansas Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RELIGION

Longoria v. Dretke, 507 F.3d 898 (5th Cir. 2007). A prisoner brought a pro se action against prison officials,
claiming his right to exercise his religion was denied when they denied him permission to grow his hair.
The district court dismissed the action and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
held that the prison's grooming policy did not violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) and did not violate equal protection. The court noted that even if the grooming policy
created a substantial burden on the prisoner's religious exercise, the policy served the prison's compelling
interest in maintaining order and safety in the prison, since long hair facilitated the transfer of contraband
and weapons and long hair could allow escaped prisoners to more easily alter their appearance. The court
held that the policy was the least restrictive means to achieve that interest. According to the court, although
female prisoners were not subject to the same grooming policy, the policy applied to all prisoners
incarcerated in the male prison, and the application of different grooming regulations to male and female
inmates did not implicate equal protection concerns. (Robertson Unit, Texas Department of Criminal
Justice-Institutional Division)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION

Safe Haven Sober Houses, LLC v. City of Boston, 517 F.Supp.2d 557 (D.Mass.2007). The operator of homes for
recovering alcoholics and drug users, its executive director, and manager sued a city and its inspectional services
department, alleging the department's regulatory and criminal enforcement actions against the operator and its
officials violated nondiscrimination provisions of Massachusetts General Laws, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction to stay pending state court criminal proceedings. The district court denied the motion,
noting that the plaintiffs failed to establish that other exceptional circumstances creating a threat of irreparable
injury were both great and immediate, and that the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) prevented the district court from
enjoining pending criminal proceedings. (Massachusetts Housing Court Department, Boston Division and Safe
Haven Sober Houses, LLC)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP
RELIGION

Sanders v. Ryan, 484 F.Supp.2d 1028 (D.Ariz. 2007). A hearing-impaired inmate brought a civil rights
action against a prison official and the State of Arizona, claiming his rights were violated under the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the First Amendment, Arizona civil
rights laws, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. The court held that a prison official's refusal to give the prisoner, who listened to
audiotapes of Baptist church services as part of his faith, two new tapes unless he exchanged two tapes
already in his possession to be destroyed, rather than stored, did not “substantially burden” the prisoner's
exercise of his religion, as required to establish a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA). The inmate had alleged that such conduct violated a state statute requiring the
return of authorized inmate property to the inmate upon his release. The court noted that the new tapes
were not authorized, as the prisoner already had the maximum number of tapes allowed, and the prisoner

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failed to show that he was unable to practice his religion absent receipt of the new tapes. According to the
court, the state department of corrections policy of limiting property an inmate could possess in his cell or
in storage did not violate the rights of prisoners under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA), where the policy served the “compelling governmental interest” of enhancing the safety
and security of prison facilities. The court found that the policy was the “least restrictive means” available
to accommodate the government's compelling interests in safety and security. The court noted that the
inmate was permitted to practice his religion by engaging in personal Bible study and prayer, receiving
pastoral visits from an accredited minister, and listening to religious tapes. The inmate was able to mail
excess religious tapes back to the church in exchange for new ones, and the inmate did not suggest an
alternative that was less restrictive but which would accommodate the State's interests of safety and
security. The court held that the state's failure to rebut the hearing-impaired inmate's evidence in opposition
to a summary judgment motion that the prison denied him access to his bi-aural headphones, allowed the
inference of discriminatory animus, as required to establish a claim under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The inmate had arranged to have four items, including the headphones, shipped to
the prison before the effective date of the rule limiting prisoners' possessions, and the prison issued a
television and a calculator but not headphones. The court held that the state's refusal to issue the hearingimpaired inmate bi-aural headphones so that he could watch television did not violate his First
Amendment rights, where the inmate did not have a right to watch television, he was still able to receive
information, ideas, and messages through books, magazines and newspapers, and the inmate
acknowledged in his complaint that he was able to hear his television without his hearing aids. (Arizona
Department of Corrections)
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

U.S. v. Carta, 503 F.Supp.2d 405 (D.Mass. 2007). The government sought an order against federal inmates
whose sentences had expired, finding that they were sexually dangerous and committing them to the
custody of the Attorney General. The inmates moved to dismiss, arguing that the commitment regime was
facially unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the motions, finding that the statute was a valid
exercise of legislative power, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, was civil rather than criminal in
nature, and did not violate the Due Process Clause. (Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMINTMENT
DUE PROCESS
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Shields, 522 F.Supp.2d 317 (D.Mass.2007). Releases were stayed with regard to persons in the custody of
the Bureau ofPrisons (BOP) who were certified as “sexually dangerous persons” under the Adam Walsh Act.
The government requested hearings to determine whether each person was a “sexually dangerous person”
subject to civil commitment to the custody of the Attorney General. The persons brought motions to dismiss.
The district court denied the motions. The court held that: Congress had the authority to enact a statute
governing civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons; the civil commitment had a rational relation to
congressional authority; the persons did not have standing to assert an independent constitutional claim alleging
that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment; the reasonable doubt standard applied to a backward-looking factual
finding required for commitment; the clear and convincing standard for a forward-looking determination was
sufficient to satisfy due process; the opportunity for a probable cause hearing before a neutral decision-maker
had to be afforded within a reasonable period of time after any detention resulting from a stay; and the Act was a
non-punitive civil measure not subject to criminal protections. (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDERS
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Webb v. Budz, 480 F.Supp.2d 1050 (N.D. Ill. 2007). African-American civil detainees in a state treatment
and detention facility for sexually violent persons brought a § 1983 action against facility officials, alleging
discrimination on the basis of race. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants. The court held that the African-American civil detainees who were placed on temporary
special/secure management status (SMS) for committing acts of violence toward staff members were not
similarly situated to five Caucasian detainees who were placed on SMS for committing acts of violence
toward staff members, as required to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory effect in violation of
equal protection. According to the court, after being placed on SMS, each of the Caucasian detainees
progressed out of SMS as a result of good behavior and acceptance of responsibility, while the AfricanAmerican detainees engaged in numerous acts of insubordination while on SMS, including threats on
security staff, concealing weapons and contraband, and throwing urine at staff members. (Illinois
Department of Human Services Treatment and Detention Facility for Sexually Violent Persons, Sheridan,
Illinois)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
DISCIPLINE
EQUAL PROTECTION
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
WORK

Wilson v. Taylor, 515 F.Supp.2d 469 (D.Del. 2007). Black inmates brought a suit against prison officials
asserting an equal protection claim that they were consistently treated differently from similarly situated white
inmates in job assignments, disciplinary actions and security classifications. One inmate also asserted a
retaliation claim against a deputy warden. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and
denied summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that an inmate failed to establish an equal protection
claim against a prison commissioner and warden, absent evidence of the involvement of the commissioner or
warden in the alleged incidents of racial discrimination. The court found that an inmate did not establish an equal
protection claim based on the allegation that he was not permitted to return to a particular prison building
following an investigation while a similarly situated white inmate was permitted to return. According to the
court, the exhaustion provision of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred an inmate's claim that his
transfer to another facility constituted retaliation for filing grievances and civil rights lawsuits. The inmate had
written a letter to the warden's office contesting his transfer, but filed no grievances raising a retaliation claim or
even his housing transfer generally. (Sussex Correctional Institution, Delaware)

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2008
U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Alves v. Murphy, 530 F.Supp.2d 381 (D.Mass. 2008). A person who had been civilly committed as a sexually
dangerous person (SDP) brought a civil rights action alleging that treatment center officials placed him at a risk
of harm by not adhering to certain mandatory procedures prior to implementing a double-bunking policy. The
plaintiff also alleged that the officials violated equal protection principles by granting privileges to certain
residents at the center, but not to others. A magistrate judge dismissed the action. The judge held that failure of
the state treatment center to follow its own procedures regarding double-bunking, standing alone, was not a
sufficient basis for a § 1983 claim. The court noted that the First Circuit analyzes the constitutional claims of
pretrial detainees, who, like civil committees, may not be punished, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But, according to the court, the court draws on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and
applies the “deliberate indifference” standard when analyzing a pretrial detainee's failure-to-protect claims.
(Massachusetts Treatment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
MILITARY FACILITY
ALIENS

Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 2008). An alien, who was an Algerian national, petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus to challenge his detention at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and moved for interim relief barring his
transfer to Algeria based on the likelihood of torture by the Algerian government and a terrorist organization.
The district court denied the motion and the alien filed a notice of appeal and simultaneously requested bar of his
transfer. A motions panel temporarily enjoined his transfer to preserve appellate jurisdiction. The appeals court
remanded the case to decide whether a preliminary injunction was necessary and appropriate. The court also
found that federal courts can preserve jurisdiction pending Supreme Court review of the same jurisdictional issue
in a different case. According to the court, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not displace the federal
courts' remedial powers. (Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
SELF-INCRIMINATION

Bellamy v. Wells, 548 F.Supp.2d 234 (W.D.Va. 2008). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against police
officers and a chief of police for initiating and surreptitiously recording conversations with him while he was in
custody on an indictment for rape. The district court entered judgment for the defendants in part. The court held
that the detainee's allegations that police officers initiated and surreptitiously recorded conversations with him
while he was in custody, and that incriminating statements he made during these conversations were
subsequently used against him at trial, stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. While in a hospital, the detainee spoke with an officer
who was guarding him. When police learned of these conversations, they had the officer wear a recording device
and they recorded subsequent conversations. The detainee was never given his Miranda warning during the
course of these conversations. (City of Waynesboro, Virginia)

U.S. Appeals Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
CLASSIFICATION

Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921 (6th Cir. 2008). A Black inmate, proceeding in forma pauperis, brought a § 1983
action after prison officials denied his request to share a cell with a white inmate in part because a “Black/White
move is more difficult to do than a same race move.” The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous. The
inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court found that the prisoner’s allegations--that
he was discriminated against based on his race because his race figured into the denial of his request to move
cells--was not frivolous, since prisoners were protected from racial discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. (Eastern Kentucky Correctional Complex)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS

Cerniglia v. County of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 1034 (E.D.Cal. 2008). A detainee who was involuntarily
confined as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under California law brought a § 1983 action, alleging that his
conditions of confinement in a total separation unit in a county jail violated his constitutional rights. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. On remand, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the detainee
on liability issues. The detainee moved to bar presentation of evidence to the jury of his status as an SVP. The
district court granted the motion, finding that the detainee’s SVP status was not relevant to the issue of whether
his conditions of confinement were reasonably related to legitimate, non-punitive governmental interests, and
that the probative value of the detainee’s status as an SVP was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS
SEARCHES
USE OF FORCE

Davis v. Peters, 566 F.Supp.2d 790 (N.D.Ill. 2008). A detainee who was civilly committed pursuant to the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act sued the current and former facility directors of the Illinois
Department of Human Services' (DHS) Treatment and Detention Facility (TDF), where the detainee was housed,
as well as two former DHS Secretaries, and the current DHS Secretary. The detainee claimed that the conditions
of his confinement violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and substantive due process. After a
bench trial, the district court held that: (1) the practice of searching the detainee prior to his visits with guests and
attorneys violated his substantive due process rights; (2) the practice of using a “black-box” restraint system on
all of the detainee's trips to and from court over a 15-month period violated his substantive due process rights;
(3) requiring the detainee to sleep in a room illuminated by a night light did not violate the detainee's substantive
due process rights; (4) a former director was not protected by qualified immunity from liability for the
constitutional violations; and (5) the detainee would be awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $30 for
each hour he wore the black box in violation of his rights. The court found that a 21-day lockdown following an
attempt at organized resistance by a large number of detainees at the facility, shortly after the breakout of several
incidents of violence, was not outside the bounds of professional judgment for the purposes of a substantive due
process claim asserted by the detainee. The court noted that strip searches of a detainee prior to his court
appearances and upon his return to the institution did not violate substantive due process, where detainees were
far more likely to engage in successful escapes if they could carry concealed items during their travel to court,
and searches upon their return were closely connected with the goal of keeping contraband out of the facility.

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The court held that the practice of conducting strip searches of the detainee prior to his visits with guests and
attorneys was not within the bounds of professional judgment, and thus, violated the detainee's substantive due
process rights, where the only motivation for such searches appeared to be a concern that a detainee would bring
a weapon into the meeting, and most weapons should have been detectable through a pat-down search.
(Treatment and Detention Facility, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EQUAL PROTECTION
VERBAL HARASSMENT

Douglas v. Gusman, 567 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D.La. 2008). A deaf prisoner brought a civil rights suit alleging
violation of his equal protection rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment
as the result of his limited access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) device for phone calls, lack of access to closed
captioning for television, and verbal abuse from officers. The district court dismissed the action. The court held
that the prisoner’s civil rights claims arising from denial of full access to a telephone typewriter (TTY) and
denial of closed captioning on a television in a parish prison accrued each time he was denied access to a TTY or
captioning or was threatened or assaulted for requesting access. The court found that the differential treatment
permitting other inmates unlimited telephone access, while permitting the deaf inmate only limited access, did
not violate the deaf inmate's equal protection rights where the deaf inmate, who required the use of telephone
typewriter (TTY) device for the deaf in a separate office, failed to show that limited access burdened a
fundamental right. The court found that the deaf prisoner was not similarly situated to hearing inmates who
could use inmate telephones, as required to support an equal protection claim based on failure to afford him the
same access that hearing inmates received to the phone system.
The court concluded that the limited access provided to the deaf prisoner was rationally related to legitimate
security interests of the prison, where a deputy was required to escort the prisoner outside his housing area each
time the prisoner used the phone, precluding the claim that he was denied equal protection based on the greater
phone privileges afforded to hearing inmates who had access to phones in the housing tier. The court held that
failure to provide a telephone typewriter (TTY) device on the deaf prisoner's housing tier, while providing
unlimited access to phones to other prisoners, did not discriminate against the disabled inmate in violation of
Title II of the ADA. According to the court, allowing the prisoner twice daily use of a TTY device on a prison
facility phone outside the housing tier was meaningful access, and lack of a TTY in the housing tier affected
disabled persons in general, precluding a finding of specific discrimination against the inmate in particular.
The court held that alleged verbal abuse from correctional officers when the deaf prisoner complained about
the lack of a telephone typewriter (TTY) was too trivial to rise to the level of a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. (Orleans Parish Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Farag v. U.S., 587 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). Airline passengers detained after a flight landed brought a
Bivens action against Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, a city police detective, and counterterrorism
agents, alleging that their seizure, detention, and interrogation after the flight landed violated their Fourth
Amendment rights, and false arrest and false imprisonment claims against United States under Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion in part
and denied in part. The court held that the agents did not have probable cause to detain the airline passengers and
that, as an issue of first impression, the agents could not rely on Arab ethnicity alone as probable cause to arrest
airline passengers. The court held that the detention of the airline passengers at the terminal after their plane
landed was a de facto arrest, rather than a Terry stop, for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment
claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that upon entering the terminal the
passengers were met by police dogs and at least ten uniformed police officers in SWAT gear carrying shotguns.
They were taken to separate locations about thirty-five to forty-feet apart, each accompanied by two police
officers, ordered to raise their hands, and frisked. They were held in separate cells at a police station. The
passengers were removed from the airline concourse and taken to a jail cell between five and fifteen minutes
away by car. The court found that the four hour detention of passengers in a city jail was not a justified Terry
stop for the purposes of the passengers' Fourth Amendment claims and common-law false imprisonment and
false arrest claims. (Port Authority Police Station, Kennedy Airport, New York)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE

Hubbs v. County of San Bernardino, CA, 538 F.Supp.2d 1254 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A civilly committed sexually
violent predator (SVP) brought a civil rights action against a sheriff and county claiming numerous violations of
his constitutional and statutory rights. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and
denied in part. The court held that the SVP stated a civil rights due process claim against the county and a civil
rights due process claim against the sheriff and county regarding conditions of his confinement at the jail. The
SVP alleged that policies regarding conditions of confinement and denial of medical care injured him, and that
the sheriff did not properly train his subordinate employees to prevent those injuries. The SVP alleged that the
defendants did not provide prescribed medications and that a holding cell was cold and did not have a mattress,
hygiene supplies, or bed roll. The court found that the SVP stated a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim
against the sheriff and county, on allegations that, pursuant to the sheriff's policies, he was neither provided with
prescribed medications in a manner directed by his treating physicians, nor allowed to have medications that
were sent with him, and those deprivations caused him severe pain and suffering, made him sick and listless, and
caused him to suffer from a migraine headache that lasted for four days. The SVP also alleged that he suffered
from severe urinary problems, which included great difficulty in emptying his bladder, as a result of the
deprivation. (West Valley Detention Center, San Bernardino County, California)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
USE OF FORCE

Hurt v. Birkett, 566 F.Supp.2d 620 (E.D.Mich. 2008). A state inmate brought an action against prison employees
under § 1983, alleging conspiracy, racial discrimination, retaliation, deliberate indifference, excessive force, and
failure to report in connection with an incident in which the inmate's arm was broken. The district court
dismissed the action. The court held that the inmate’s allegations, that state prison employees engaged in a
campaign of harassment based on race, failed to state an equal protection claim. The court noted that a single
allegation was insufficient to raise the inmate's right to relief above the speculative level. The court found that

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the inmate's allegations that prison employees conspired to deny him medical care after his arm was broken, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, failed to state a claim of conspiracy against the employees, absent details
and allegations of specific acts made in furtherance of such conspiracy. The court held that prison employees
were not liable for excessive force for breaking the inmate's arm, where a video of the incident in which the
inmate's arm was broken showed the inmate starting an altercation and needing to be subdued, and it was clear
that the force applied by the employees was applied in a good-faith effort to restore discipline. (Marquette
Branch Prison, Michigan)
U.S. District Court
ALIEN
MEDICAL CARE
MILITARY FACILITY

Husayn v. Gates, 588 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention as an enemy combatant. After
denial of the detainee's motion for disclosure of his medical records, the detainee moved for reconsideration. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that counsel was entitled to review the
detainee's medical records and staff records regarding his seizure-related episodes, despite the government's
contention that the records were inherently related to detention, treatment, or conditions of confinement, and thus
were exempted from judicial review. The court found that the records were necessary to permit counsel to assess
whether and to what extent the detainee's medical condition affected his right to habeas relief, and to determine
whether to challenge the legitimacy of his Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) hearing. The detainee
alleged that he suffered over 120 seizures since he was first detained in 2006, and that they are currently frequent
and severe. He alleged that they consist of excruciating pain in his head near the site of an old mortar injury that
left him unable to think clearly or speak for an extended period. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN
CONDITIONS
HABEAS CORPUS

In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F.Supp.2d 312 (D.D.C. 2008). In actions challenging the United
States' detention of alleged enemy combatants at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, one detainee brought an
emergency motion to compel access to his medical records and to order officials to provide him with a blanket
and mattress in his cell. The district court denied the motion, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the
claim. The court noted that no court, justice, or judge has jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ
of habeas corpus filed by, or on behalf of, an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination. The
court also noted that no court, justice, or judge has jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the
United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such a determination. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
ALIEN

Jama v. Esmor Correctional Services Inc., 549 F.Supp.2d 602 (D.N.J. 2008). An alien brought an action alleging
that a government contractor that detained her pending asylum proceedings violated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and state law. After a jury verdict in the alien's favor, the alien moved for attorney fees
and expenses. The district court granted the motion, finding that the alien was the “prevailing party, and that the
alien's calculation of the percentage of attorney hours devoted to her RFRA claims was reasonable. The attorney
fees and expenses approved by the court totaled $642,399. The decision was vacated and the case was remanded
by an appeals court in 2009. The district court noted that “…the case arose out of the appalling conditions that
prevailed at the detention center in Elizabeth, New Jersey”. The appeals court held that the district court could
not attribute a portion of the alien’s state law tort award to her RFRA claim but that the court may consider the
results on the tort claims. The appeals court affirmed the district court’s determination of market billing rates.
(Esmor Correctional Services, Inc., Elizabeth, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
VOTING

Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F.Supp.2d 1044 (M.D.Tenn. 2008). Convicted felons who had served their sentences
brought an action against state and local officials seeking to invalidate portions of a Tennessee Code that
conditioned the restoration of their voting rights upon their payment of certain financial obligations, including
restitution and child support. The district court granted judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court
held that the statutory provision: (1) did not create a suspect classification; (2) did not violate equal protection;
(3) did not violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; and (4) did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. According
to the court, the state had an interest in protecting the ballot box from felons who continued to break the law by
not abiding by enforceable court orders, the state had a strong public policy interest in encouraging the payment
of child support and thereby promoting the welfare of children, and the state had a legitimate interest in
encouraging convicted felons to complete their entire sentences, including the payment of restitution.
(Tennessee)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. Westchester County Department of Corrections Medical Dept., 557 F.Supp.2d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). A
county prisoner brought pro se action against a county corrections department, warden, and administrative
liaison, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The district court held that the prisoner's
complaint, stating that he was scheduled for necessary surgery to alleviate chronic and extreme pain, and stating
facts tending to show that prison officials denied him surgery in order to shift the cost to another agency,
sufficiently alleged that he was denied adequate care, as required to state a claim for deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs. According to the court, the prisoner's complaint, stating that his hips caused him
chronic and extreme pain, and that his pain would have been alleviated if he had been given hip replacement
surgery, sufficiently alleged that his medical needs were serious, as required to state a deliberate indifference
claim. The court found that the prisoner's complaint, stating that an administrative liaison made the final decision
not to let him have hip replacement surgery, and that she personally, and with deliberate indifference to his
suffering, put the county's financial concerns ahead of his medical needs, alleged with requisite specificity the
personal involvement of the administrative liaison, as required to state a cause of action against her for deliberate

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indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Westchester County
Department of Corrections, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
EXHAUSTION

Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C.Cir. 2008). A federal prisoner sought to enjoin application of the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (DNA Act), alleging the Act violated his rights under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The district court dismissed the
action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
court held that the prisoner’s allegation that DNA collection burdened his free exercise of religion failed to state
a claim under the First Amendment and RFRA. The court found that the potential criminal penalty for failure to
cooperate with the collection of a DNA sample did not violate RFRA. According to the court, the collection of
prisoner DNA furthers a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means. The court also found
that the DNA Act does not violate equal protection despite the fact that it requires collection of DNA only from
felons who are incarcerated or on supervised release, rather than those who are no longer under the supervision
of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), where the BOP's measure of control over supervised and incarcerated felons
makes it significantly easier to collect their DNA samples. The court noted that the extraction, analysis, and
storage of the prisoner's DNA information did not call for the prisoner to modify his religious behavior in any
way, did not involve any action or forbearance on the prisoner's part, and did not interfere with any religious act
in which the prisoner was engaged. (Federal Correctional Institution, Seagoville, Texas)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
MILITARY FACILITY

Khadr v. Bush, 587 F.Supp.2d 225 (D.D.C. 2008). A detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantánamo
Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The detainee moved for judgment on the pleadings or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment, and the government filed a cross-motion to dismiss or to hold the petition
in abeyance pending completion of military commission proceedings. The district court granted the motions in
part and denied in part. The court held that the Military Commissions Act (MCA) did not bar a challenge to
detention based on the detainee's capture as a juvenile, but the detainee's challenge to detention based on his
capture as a juvenile was barred by the habeas statute. The court found that a provision of the Military
Commissions Act (MCA) barring courts from having jurisdiction over habeas petitions brought by or on behalf
of an alien detained by the United States as an enemy combatant did not apply to the habeas claim brought by a
detainee at the United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba., where the detainee's claim was entirely
independent from the prosecution, trial, or judgment of a military commission. But the court held that the
detainee’s petition challenged the conditions of his confinement, rather than the legality of his detention, and,
thus, was barred by a provision of habeas statute barring the courts from having jurisdiction to hear or consider
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States as an
enemy combatant. The court noted that the detainee's request for relief was not tantamount to a request for
outright release and was more accurately characterized as a request seeking a different program or location or
environment. (United States Naval Base in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PROGRAMS

Kula v. Malani, 539 F.Supp.2d 1263 (D.Hawai‘I 2008). A state prisoner brought a pro se civil rights complaint
pursuant to § 1983 against a substance abuse counselor, social worker, and prison officer, seeking monetary
damages and injunctive relief. The prisoner alleged that while incarcerated, the defendants violated his due
process rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court held that the prisoner's
termination from a prison drug rehabilitation program because he was found guilty of an administrative
infraction, rather than by reason of his drug addiction itself, did not constitute discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), notwithstanding the prisoner's contention that prison officials had
fabricated misconduct charges against him. The court noted that the prisoner had no due process right to
participate in a drug rehabilitation program under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). (Saguaro
Correctional Center, Arizona)

U.S. Appeals Court
BRUTALITY

Levine v. Roebuck, 550 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008). A state inmate brought § 1983 claims against a correctional
officer and nurses alleging that they violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights by forcing him to undergo
catheterization to avoid prison discipline when he could not provide a urine sample for a random drug test. The
district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the prison nurses' actions in attempting catheterization of the inmate were
objectively reasonable and did not violate the inmate's Eighth Amendment rights against brutality. The court
noted that the nurses were following a request from a correctional officer, and the inmate had undergone
voluntary catheterization in the past when he was unable to urinate. (Western Missouri Correctional Center)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

May v. Rich, 531 F.Supp.2d 998 (C.D.Ill. 2008). A state prisoner brought suit against a prison employee,
alleging civil rights claims for denial of access to the courts and retaliation for filing grievances and litigation.
Following a jury trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the prisoner, awarding $2,388. The prison
employee moved for judgment as matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court granted
the motion, entering a judgment for the defendant as a matter of law. The court held that the prisoner did not
suffer an actual injury, as required for a denial of access claim. The court found that the employee did not
retaliate against the prisoner by filing a disciplinary report based on his possession of prison contraband. The
court noted that the employee had an absolute duty to file a disciplinary report against the prisoner for possession
of carbon paper, which was contraband in the prison system, such that reporting the prisoner could not be
deemed retaliation for the prisoner's exercise of First Amendment rights in filing civil rights suits. (Pontiac
Correctional Center, Illinois)

XXII

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U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Moonblatt v. District of Columbia, 572 F.Supp.2d 15 (D.D.C. 2008). A former inmate filed a § 1983 action
against the District of Columbia, alleging that correctional officers employed by a contractor hired to operate a
detention center violated his civil rights on account of his race, religion, and sexual orientation. The district court
denied summary judgment for the defendants. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact
issues as to whether the District had constructive or actual notice of the inmate's mistreatment, and whether the
contractor acted pursuant to a state custom or policy. The court found that an employee of a contractor hired by
the District of Columbia to operate a detention center, sued in his official capacity, was subject to liability under
§ 1983 for alleged deprivations of the inmate's constitutional rights by correctional officers. (Correctional
Treatment Facility, District of Columbia, operated by Corrections Corp. of America)

U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS
SELF-INCRIMINATION
SEX OFFENDER

Pentlarge v. Murphy, 541 F.Supp.2d, 421 (D.Mass. 2008). Detainees who had been civilly committed as
sexually dangerous persons (SDPs) under Massachusetts law brought a civil rights suit against officials seeking
damages and equitable relief against the enforcement of a policy requiring them to waive confidentiality as a
condition to receiving sexual offender treatment. The district court granted the officials’ motion to dismiss in
part and denied in part. The court held that the detainees stated a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief
against the policy that forced the detainees to choose between treatment and a waiver of the right against selfincrimination. The court found that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages as
they were not on notice of the potential unconstitutionality of the waiver policy. (Nemansket Correctional
Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act

Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). Pretrial detainees in a county's jail facilities brought a
§ 1983 class action suit against the county and its sheriff seeking relief for violations of their constitutional and
statutory rights. After consolidating the case with a prior case challenging jail conditions, the district court
rejected the detainees' claims and the detainees appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and
remanded. The court held that the injunctive orders relating to the jail's reading materials, mattresses and beds,
law books, population caps, sleep, blankets, dayroom access (not less than two hours each day), telephone access
and communication with jailhouse lawyers were not necessary to correct current ongoing violations of the
pretrial detainees' constitutional rights. Inmates had alleged that they were denied the opportunity for eight hours
of uninterrupted sleep on the night before and the night after each court appearance. The court found that an
injunction relating to restrictions of the detainees' religious rights based on security concerns was narrowly
drawn and extended no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right of pretrial detainees in
administrative segregation. According to the court, providing pretrial detainees housed in administrative
segregation only ninety minutes of exercise per week, less than thirteen minutes per day, constituted punishment
in violation of due process standards. The court also found that the county failed to reasonably accommodate
mobility-impaired and dexterity-impaired pretrial detainees in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA). The court affirmed termination of 12 of the injunctive orders, but found that the district court erred in its
finding that two orders were unnecessary. (Orange County, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIENS
TORTURE

Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Former detainees at a military facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
sued the Secretary of Defense and commanding officers alleging they were tortured. The detainees asserted
claims under the Alien Torture Statute, under the Geneva Conventions, under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA) and also asserted Fifth and Eighth Amendment claims on a Bivens cause of action. The
defendants moved to dismiss and the district court granted the motion in part and denied the motion as to the
RFRA claim. Both sides appealed. The district court affirmed in part and reversed as to the RFRA claim. The
court held that the acts of torture allegedly committed against aliens detained at the military base in Cuba were
“within the scope of employment” of military personnel who were allegedly committing such acts, for the
purpose of deciding whether the United states should be substituted as defendant. The court found that the aliens
were without property or presence in the United States and lacked any constitutional rights and could not assert a
Bivens claim against military personnel for alleged due process violations and cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted upon them. The court held that the term “persons” as used in the RFRA to generally prohibit the
government from substantially burdening a “person's exercise of religion” did not extend to non-resident aliens.
(United States Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARY

Shell v. Brun, 585 F.Supp.2d 465 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against the employees of
the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), alleging various constitutional violations.
Following the dismissal of certain claims, the defendants moved for summary judgment on access to courts and
failure-to-protect claims. The district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that a
prison superintendent knew of the inmate's alleged problems with the law library that allegedly caused him
difficulties in prosecuting a proceeding challenging a disciplinary report. According to the court, there was no
evidence that any limitations on prison law library hours and book withdrawals were unreasonable, made it more
difficult for the inmate to prosecute a state administrative proceeding challenging a misbehavior report, or that
the outcome of the inmate's administrative proceeding would have been different but for those policies. The
court noted that prison officials may place reasonable restrictions on inmates' use of facility law libraries, as long
as those restrictions do not interfere with inmates' access to the courts. (Attica Corr’l Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA-Americans With
Disabilities Act

Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526 (6th Cir. 2008). Deaf and mute arrestees and their deaf mother sued a city and
county, alleging that denial of an interpreter or other reasonable accommodations during criminal proceedings
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted the county's motion for summary
judgment and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the county's use of the deaf
mother's services as an interpreter during her deaf sons' dispositional hearing on criminal charges did not violate
Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in public services. The court noted that the mother
voluntarily served as the interpreter and that her service was requested in light of her sign language skills, not for

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any discriminatory purpose. The court found that the deaf and mute arrestees were not denied a “service,
program, or activity” when the city failed to provide an interpreter during a domestic disturbance call which
resulted in their arrest, and the city thus was not liable under ADA's Title II. According to the court, the arrests
were made not because the arrestees were disabled, but because the arrestees assaulted police officers, individual
citizens, or attempted to interfere with a lawful arrest. The court concluded that the arresting officers were able
to effectively communicate with the arrestees. The court held that the county did not violate Title II of the ADA,
which prohibits discrimination in public services, by using relay operators to allow the deaf arrestees to
communicate with their mother, rather than providing them with a teletypewriter (TTY) telephone. Jailers
assisted the arrestees in making their requested phone call by utilizing relay operators, the phone call lasted
nearly forty-five minutes, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) provisions did not mandate the presence of a
TTY telephone. (City of Savannah Police Department , Hardin County Jail, Tennessee)
U.S. District Court
PAROLE
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Wilborn v. Walsh, 584 F.Supp.2d 384 (D.Mass. 2008). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action against state parole
board members alleging that he was denied parole because of his sexual orientation. The members moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. According to the court, the issue of
whether the state parole board denied the homosexual prisoner parole because of his sexual orientation involved
fact questions that could not be resolved on a motion to dismiss the prisoner's due process claims against parole
board members. The court noted that even though a prisoner has no right to a valuable government benefit and
even though the government may deny him benefit for any number of reasons, it may not deny the benefit to the
prisoner on the basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests. (Bay State Correctional Center,
Massachusetts Parole Board)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP
PROGRAMS

Williams v. Hayman, 657 F.Supp.2d 488 (D.N.J. 2008). A state prisoner brought an action for violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging denial of various social and educational programs and services
at a prison because he was deaf, and naming as a defendant the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (NJDOC), the Executive Director of the New Jersey Parole Board, the prison's chief administrator,
the prison's assistant administrator, the prison's parole administrator, a corrections officer, two social workers at
prison, and the prison's psychiatrist. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants in part and
denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the prisoner's deafness inhibited his capacity to express his grievances comprehensibly in writing in
accordance with prison grievance program's requirements. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact
as to the prison social worker's ability to interpret effectively, accurately, and impartially, both receptively and
expressively, using any necessary specialized vocabulary. (South Woods State Prison, New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
HYGIENE
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
VERBAL HARASSMENT

Zavala v. Barnik, 545 F.Supp.2d 1051 (C.D.Cal. 2008). A state inmate filed a civil rights complaint in state court
alleging that a prison official threw a roll of toilet paper at him, spit on him, and yelled profanities at him. After
removal to federal court the official moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case. The court held that
profanities allegedly directed by the prison official to the inmate did not evidence racial or discriminatory
animus, where the official only referred to “you people.” The court held that the inmate's alleged deprivation of
toilet paper by the official did not rise to the level of an unquestioned and serious deprivation of a basic human
need necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, where the incident involved a de minimis,
apparently brief, one-time deprivation. The court found that the official did not violate the inmate's Eighth
Amendment rights by hitting the inmate on the leg with a toilet paper roll on one occasion, absent a showing of
any physical injury. (Ironwood State Prison, California)
2009

U.S. District Court
VERBAL HARASSMENT

Abney v. Jopp, 655 F.Supp.2d 231 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A federal prisoner brought a § 1983 action against three
corrections officers, alleging a verbal confrontation with one officer and impeding the progress of an
investigation into the incident by the other officers. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The court held that even if a correctional officer referred to the prisoner as a “snitch” in
front of other inmates, the officer did not, absent some other action, violate the prisoner's Eighth Amendment
rights, where the prisoner was never physically attacked, injured or threatened as a result of the officer's alleged
actions. The court found that an alleged verbal altercation between the federal prisoner and one correctional
officer, in which the officer called the prisoner a “pussy” and accused him of being afraid of “little women” did
not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim against the officer. The court noted that without more, allegations of
verbal threats or abusive language were insufficient to form the basis of a § 1983 claim. (Batavia Federal
Detention Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
MILITARY FACILITY

Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F.Supp.2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). Aliens who were alleged enemy combatants engaging in
voluntary hunger strikes while detained at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, moved to enjoin
measures taken as part of a forced-feeding program. The district court denied the motion. The court found that
the detainees failed to show a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an order
enjoining the government from using a restraint-chair in order to facilitate force-feeding them. The court noted
that pursuant to the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the complaints of detained alleged enemy combatants. According to the court, the government officials who
imposed various restraints on the detained alleged enemy combatants, including the use of a restraint chair, in
order to facilitate force-feeding them in response to their hunger strikes, were not thereby deliberately indifferent
to their Eighth Amendment rights. The court found that evidence that the detained alleged enemy combatants
had assaulted medical staff and guards during attempts to force-feed them after the detainees engaged in hunger
strikes, demonstrated that the government might suffer a substantial injury if the detainees' request for a
preliminary injunction against the use of a restraint-chair to facilitate such feedings were granted. (U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

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U.S. District Court
MILITARY FACILITY

Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F.Supp.2d 123 (D.D.C. 2009). A detainee being held at the United States Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was being unlawfully
detained by federal officials. The district court granted the petition, finding that the detainee was not lawfully
detainable as an enemy combatant pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and was
entitled to habeas corpus relief. The court held that the prior relationship between the detainee and al Qaeda or
the Taliban can be sufficiently vitiated by the passage of time, intervening events, or both, such that the detainee
can no longer be considered to have been “part of” either organization at the time he was taken into custody by
United States forces when determining whether the detainee may be held as an enemy combatant. (United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. Supreme Court
DISCRIMINATION
CONDITIONS

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. (2009). A Muslim Pakistani pretrial detainee brought an action against current and
former government officials, alleging that they took a series of unconstitutional actions against him in
connection with his confinement under harsh conditions after separation from the general prison population. The
detainee had been placed in a section of a federal detention facility known as the Administrative Maximum
Special Housing Unit, where detainees were kept in lockdown 23 hours a day, spending the remaining hour
outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. The district court denied in
part the defendants' motions to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court held that the appeals court had subject matter
jurisdiction to affirm the district court's order denying the officials' motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified
immunity, and the detainee's complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and
unlawful discrimination. The court noted that the detainee challenged neither the constitutionality of his arrest
nor his initial detention, but rather the policy of holding post-September 11th detainees once they were
categorized as of “high interest.” (Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Metropolitan Detention Center, Brooklyn, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
RA-Rehabilitation Act

Bahl v. County of Ramsey, 597 F.Supp.2d 981 (D.Minn. 2009). Two hearing-impaired arrestees, and their
respective girlfriend and husband, brought an action against a county, sheriff's department, and city, alleging that
they were arrested by city police officers without being provided an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter
and detained at an adult detention center (ADC) without access to an ASL interpreter or auxiliary aids that would
have permitted them to communicate with others outside of the ADC. The plaintiffs asserted claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA),
and for negligence. The district court dismissed the case in part. The court held that the girlfriend and husband
had standing to sue the county, sheriff's department, and city under state and federal anti-discrimination laws,
where they alleged that they experienced fear, anxiety, humiliation, and embarrassment because of the
defendants' failure to permit the arrestees to contact them. The court found that the girlfriend and husband stated
a claim for discrimination under the ADA by alleging that the arrestees requested auxiliary aids to communicate
with people outside of the ADC, and that the county's failure to provide such aids precluded their communication
with the arrestees. (Ramsey County Adult Detention Center, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Bailey v. Pataki, 636 F.Supp.2d 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Convicted sex offenders brought an action against state
officials, alleging that their involuntary psychiatric commitment deprived them of constitutional due process
protections. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, for a stay pending
resolution of certain pending state court proceedings. The district court denied the motion. The court held that
the allegations of the convicted sex offenders were sufficient to state a procedural due process claim against state
officials for deprivation of the offenders' liberty interests in not being confined unnecessarily for medical
treatment. The offenders alleged that: (1) they were involuntarily transferred to state-run mental institutions
based on the certification of doctors designated by the New York State Office of Mental Health and the New
York Department of Correctional Services, instead of independent, court-appointed doctors; (2) that some were
never served with a notice of petition for their involuntary commitment; (3) that notice was not provided to any
of the offenders' friends and family; (4) and that they were not provided an opportunity to request a precommitment hearing and an opportunity to be heard. The court found that the procedural due process rights of
the convicted sex offenders, to certain pre-transfer procedural safeguards, including notice, an opportunity to be
heard, and a psychiatric evaluation by court-appointed doctors, was clearly established at the time of their
involuntary commitment and transfer from prison to a mental hospital, so as to preclude any claim of qualified
immunity on the part of New York officials. The court noted that the offenders were certified for involuntary
commitment after being examined for short periods of time lasting no more than 20 minutes, and once certified,
all six offenders were transported in handcuffs and shackles where they were broadly evaluated for treatment.
(New York State Office of Mental Health, New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ASSAULT

Boyd v. Nichols, 616 F.Supp.2d 1331 (M.D.Ga. 2009). A female, who had been housed in a jail for violation of
her probation, brought an action against a former jailer, county, and former sheriff, under § 1983 and state law,
relating to the sexual assault of the inmate by the jailer. The county and sheriff moved for summary judgment
and the district court granted the motions. The court held that the sheriff was not “deliberately indifferent” to a
substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate under the Eighth Amendment or the Georgia constitution in failing
to protect the inmate from sexual assaults by a jailer, absent evidence that the sheriff had knowledge or
indication that the jailer was a threat or danger to inmates, or that male guards, if left alone with female inmates,
posed a risk to the inmates' health and safety. The court noted that the sheriff's actions in calling for an
investigation and terminating the jailer's employment upon learning of the jailer's actions was not an “indifferent
and objectively unreasonable response” to the inmate's claims, and thus, there was no violation of the inmate's
rights. The court held that the jail's staffing did not pose a “substantial risk of serious harm” to the inmate who
was sexually assaulted by a jailer, as required to show violation of the Eighth Amendment and Georgia
constitution, absent evidence that the jail was inadequately staffed. According to the court, the county did not

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have a policy or custom of underfunding and understaffing the jail, as would constitute deliberate indifference to
a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate, and thus the county could not be liable under § 1983 to the
inmate who was sexually assaulted by a jailer. The court found that the sheriff's failure to train deputies and
jailers in proper procedures for escorting and handling female inmates did not support supervisory liability on
the § 1983 claim of the inmate, where the sheriff had no knowledge of any prior sexual assaults at the jail or any
problems with jailers improperly escorting and handling female inmates, and the jailer who committed the
assault had been trained previously on how to interact with inmates and knew it was improper to have intimate
contact with inmates. During the time period in question, the county did not have a policy prohibiting a male
jailer from escorting a female inmate within the Jail. The court held that the county and sheriff had sovereign
immunity from the state law claims of the inmate, absent evidence that such immunity had been waived by an
act of the General Assembly. (Berrien County Jail, Georgia)

XXIII

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
SEARCH

Chehade Refai v. Lazaro, 614 F.Supp.2d 1103 (D.Nev. 2009). A German citizen, who was detained by
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials at a Nevada airport, and later transferred to a local jail, after
his name had been erroneously placed on a watch list, brought an action against the United States, DHS officials,
a police department, a city, and a police chief, alleging various constitutional violations. The district court
granted the DHS and United States motions to dismiss in part, and denied in part. The court held that DHS
officials could not bypass constitutional requirements for strip searches and body-cavity searches of nonadmitted aliens at a border by sending the German citizen to a detention facility where they allegedly knew strip
searches occurred in the absence of reasonable suspicion under circumstances in which the DHS officials could
not perform the strip search themselves. According to the court, regardless of any reasonable suspicion that
detention center officials had for a strip search, federal officials at the border needed reasonable suspicion for a
strip search. The court found that the Fourth Amendment right of a non-admitted alien to be free from a noninvasive, non-abusive strip search absent suspicion to conduct such a search was clearly established in 2006,
when the German citizen was detained at an airport, and thus, a DHS officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. The court held that the German citizen who was detained after arriving at a United States airport and
was asked to spy for the United States government in order to obtain an entry visa was not subjected to
“involuntary servitude” in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, where the German citizen never actually
spied for the United States. The court found that the German citizen adequately alleged that the defendant's
actions constituted extreme and outrageous conduct, as required to state claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Nevada law, where he alleged that DHS officials told him that if he did not spy for the
United States government, he would never be able to return to the United States where his daughter and
grandchild lived. According to the court, the detained German citizen's negligence claim, alleging that the United
States owed him a duty of care not to cause him to be detained in a local jail when he had not been and was
never charged with any criminal offense, was not barred by the discretionary function exception to the Federal
Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The court noted that although the government claimed that immigration officials had
discretion in choosing where to house aliens, under an Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
memorandum, the alien should never have been booked into local jail. (N. Las Vegas Detention Center, Nevada)

U.S. District Court
PAROLE
DUE PROCESS

Cusamano v. Alexander, 691 F.Supp.2d 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). A parolee brought a civil rights action for alleged
violations of his constitutional rights against, among others, the chairman of the New York State Parole
Division, parole officers, the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), commissioner of
DOCS, and the New York State Division of Parole (DOP). These defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, and the parolee cross-moved for summary judgment. The court held that the parolee does not have
a due process-protected liberty interest in being free from special conditions of parole and the parolee failed to
state claim for violation of his Fourth, Fifth Sixth and Eighth Amendment rights. The court held that the parolee
adequately alleged the adverse action element of his First Amendment retaliation claim against the chairman of
New York State Parole Division, which was based upon the chairman's purported conduct in requiring the
parolee's enrollment in a drug treatment program in response to the parolee's speech, via letters, challenging his
special conditions of confinement. The court also found that the parolee sufficiently alleged the personal
involvement of the chairman where the parolee alleged that his parole officer identified the chairman as the
individual responsible for ordering the parolee's enrollment in a drug treatment program. (New York State
Division of Parole, Bare Hill Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION

Delaney v. District of Columbia, 659 F.Supp.2d 185 (D.D.C. 2009). A former inmate and his wife brought a §
1983 action, on behalf of themselves and their child, against the District of Columbia and several D.C. officials
and employees, alleging various constitutional violations related to the inmate's incarceration for criminal
contempt due to his admitted failure to pay child support. They also alleged the wife encountered difficulties
when she and her child attempted to visit the husband at the D.C. jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that District of Columbia judges and
court clerks were entitled to quasi-judicial immunity against the § 1983 claims for monetary damages for alleged
infringement of Fifth Amendment due process rights. According to the court, the defendants’ acts of issuing
court orders regarding the plaintiff's child support obligations, calculating the plaintiff's probation period, issuing
hearing notices, filing court documents, and posting the plaintiff's child support payments, were performed
pursuant to judicial functions. The court held that the inmate's wife did not allege that any District of Columbia
custom or policy caused the alleged violation of her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure,
precluding her § 1983 claim against a D.C. corrections official, even if the corrections officer's request that the
inmate's wife wait to speak to a corrections official prior to exiting the visiting area constituted a seizure. The
court held that an attorney, who was an African-American woman, stated a § 1983 claim against the District of
Columbia and D.C. jail official for violations of her Fifth Amendment due process rights by alleging that an
official refused to allow her to visit her clients at the jail based on her gender and race. (Lorton and Rivers
Correctional Centers, District of Columbia Jail)

7.95

U.S. District Court
CORRESPONDENCE
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ill. 2009). Federal prisoners brought an action against prison officials,
alleging that the officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of their marriage and to grant them a spousal
exemption to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other violated their equal protection and due
process rights. The officials moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. According to
the court, the prison officials' failure to acknowledge the validity of the marriage of two prisoners and to grant
them a spousal exemption to the rule that inmates could not correspond with each other did not violate the
prisoners' equal protection rights where there was no showing that officials singled out the prisoners based on
their Islamic religion or any other improper consideration. The court found that the prison had a legitimate
security interest in generally preventing unrelated prisoners from corresponding, the face of the prisoners'
marriage certificate did not strictly comport with the statutory requirements, the marriage certificate was not
registered, as required by state law, and there was some evidence that the marriage was not valid due to one
prisoner's failure to terminate a prior marriage. (Federal Correctional Institution, Greenville, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
FHA-Fair Housing Act
SEX OFFENDERS

Fross v. County of Allegheny, 612 F.Supp.2d 651 (W.D.Pa. 2009). A group of convicted sex offenders brought a
civil rights action against a county, alleging that a county ordinance that restricted the residency of sex offenders
violated their constitutional rights, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), and state law. The district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the ordinance was preempted by state law. The ordinance
barred offenders from residing within 2,500 feet of any child care facility, community center, public park or
recreation facility, or school. According to the court, the ordinance was contradictory to and inconsistent with
various provisions of state law, and interfered with the state's express objectives of rehabilitating and
reintegrating offenders, diverting appropriate offenders from prison, and establishing a uniform, statewide
system the for supervision of offenders. (Allegheny County, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CLASSIFICATION
SEX OFFENDER

Gilmore v. Bostic, 636 F.Supp.2d 496 (S.D.W.Va. 2009). A state prison inmate brought an action against a
probation officer, the state parole board, and state correctional facility employees, asserting that his
constitutional rights were violated by allegedly false information in his presentence report for a burglary
conviction and in the prison file which resulted in the inmate's classification in the state penal system at a higher
level than was appropriate and in a sex offender designation. The district court held that: (1) the board was
entitled to absolute immunity; (2) employees were not liable in their official capacities on claims for
compensatory relief but the employees sued in their individual capacities were liable; (3) the inmate stated a
violation of a protected liberty interest in parole release under the state constitution; (4) the inmate stated a claim
under the state constitution for violation of a protected liberty interest in not being required to undergo sex
offender treatment; and (5) the inmate adequately alleged a physical injury required to recover for mental or
emotional injury. (Kanawha County Adult Probation Department, West Virginia Board of Probation and Parole,
Huttonsville Correctional Center, West Virginia)

U.S. District Court
LOWER BUNK

Goodson v. Willard Drug Treatment Campus, 615 F.Supp.2d 100 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner filed a pro
se § 1983 action against prison officials and a prison's drug treatment facility, claiming violation of his rights
under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants. The court held that the prison's assignment of the prisoner to a top bunk from which he fell and
was injured while confined in the prison's drug treatment facility, where he was sent for medical reasons relating
to a herniated disc in his lower back, did not deprive the prisoner of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the prisoner did not have a serious medical need for a lower
bunk, and the prison did not make the top bunk assignment in deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical
needs. (Willard Drug Treatment Campus, New York State Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION

Hammer v. Ashcroft, 570 F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 2009). A federal prisoner who was formerly on death row and was
housed in a special confinement unit, filed a pro se lawsuit against various officials of the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), alleging that they violated his First Amendment and equal protection rights by enforcing a policy that
prevented prisoners in a special confinement unit from giving face-to-face interviews with the media. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court held that the BOP policy that prevented prisoners in special confinement units at maximum
security prisons from giving face-to-face or video interviews with the media did not violate the equal protection
clause. According to the court, although the BOP did not prevent such media interviews with other prisoners in a
less secure confinement, the policy was rationally related to the BOP's need for greater security in situations
involving prisoners in special confinement units in maximum security prisons, since media attention could
increase tensions among prisoners, leading to an increased risk of violence among the more violent prisoners.
The court found that the BOP did not violate the prisoner’s free speech rights where the policy was rationally
related to the prison's need for greater security in situations involving prisoners in special confinement units in
maximum security prisons, since media attention could increase tensions among prisoners, glamorize violence,
and promote celebrity, leading to an increased risk of violence. The court noted that the BOP did allow
correspondence from prisoners in special confinement units to media representatives, prisoners were free to file
lawsuits, and correspondence sent to courts and attorneys by prisoners could not be censored. (“Special
Confinement Unit,” U.S. Penitentiary, Terre Haute, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXECUTION

Harbison v. Little, 571 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2009). A state prison inmate under death sentence brought a § 1983
action challenging a state's lethal injection protocol. The district court granted judgment in favor of the inmate,
holding that the protocol violated the Eighth Amendment, and the state appealed. The appeals court vacated and
remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) lack of a physical inspection to determine unconsciousness after the
administration of the first drug in the three-drug protocol did not create a substantial risk of severe pain; (2)
procedures for selecting and training personnel involved in executions did not create a substantial risk of severe
pain; (3) the procedure for visual monitoring of the administration of drugs used in the protocol did not create a

XXIII

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substantial risk of severe pain; and (4) the state's rejection of a one-drug lethal injection protocol did not create
an objectively intolerable risk of serious harm. (Tennessee Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
USE OF FORCE

Harris v. City of Circleville, 583 F.3d 356 (6th Cir. 2009). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against a
city and police officers, alleging that he was subjected to excessive force and inadequate medical care, and
discriminated against on account of his race, while being booked at a jail. The district court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues on the excessive force claim, the deliberate
indifference claim, and the equal protection claim. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
genuine issues of material fact as to whether police officers' use of force against the detainee, in yanking at the
detainee's necklace and kicking his leg out from under him causing the detainee to fall and hit his head, in using
a takedown maneuver to get the detainee down on the floor in a booking area, and in kicking the detainee in the
ribs, was objectively reasonable or shocked the conscience. According to the court, summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detainee had a serious need for medical care that
was so obvious that even a layperson would easily recognize the need for a doctor's attention, following the
police officers' exercise of force against him. The court also held that summary judgment was precluded by a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether police officers used excessive force and delayed medical treatment
of the detainee on account of his African-American race. (Circleville City Jail, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE COSTS

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 611 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.D.C. 2009). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons, alleging that the Bureau's conduct in adopting telephone rates and commissary
prices violated his constitutional due process and equal protection rights. The district court granted the Bureau’s
motion to dismiss in part. The court noted that the prisoner had previously litigated claims against the Bureau of
Prisons arising from an increase in telephone rates, and barred the prisoner from bringing additional claims
based on that same cause of action, regardless of whether the prisoner's claim invoked different provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act. The court held that the prisoner did not have a constitutionally protected property
or liberty interest in commissary pricing, as required to state a claim for the violation of due process based on
allegedly unfair prices. The court noted that an inmate has no federal constitutional right to purchase items from
a prison commissary. According to the court, the Bureau of Prisons used the same mark-up guidelines in all of
its institutions to set commissary prices, and thus there was no evidence that commissary prices violated the
federal prisoner's equal protection rights. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Virginia)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
VISITS

Hill v. Washington State Dept. of Corrections, 628 F.Supp.2d 1250 (W.D.Wash. 2009). An inmate and his wife
brought a § 1983 action against a state department of corrections and various prison officials, alleging a prison
regulation regarding extended family visits (EFV) violated their equal protection rights. The district court
dismissed the action as moot. On subsequent determination, the district court held that: (1) the inmate did not
have a constitutionally protected right to conjugal visits with his wife; (2) the inmate and his wife were not
absolutely entitled to equal treatment under EFV policy; (3) EFV regulations were rationally related to a
legitimate penological interest; (4) prison officials were entitled to summary judgment; and (5) prison officials
had Eleventh Amendment immunity from the § 1983 action. The court noted that denial of prison access to a
particular visitor is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence, and
access to a particular visitor is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause. The challenged EFV
policy only allowed those spouses who were legally married to inmates prior to incarceration to participate in
extended family visitation. (Washington State Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
MENTAL ILLNESS

Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Com'n v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 642 F.Supp.2d
872 (S.D.Ind. 2009). The Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission (IPAS) brought an action
against the Indiana Department of Correction, alleging violations of federal and state law in the conditions of
custody of mentally ill prisoners. The Department moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The district court
denied them motion. The court held that IPAS had an associational standing under the Protection and Advocacy
of Mentally Ill Individuals Act (PAMII) to bring suit, and the action was not an intramural dispute between two
state agencies that could be resolved by the governor. The court noted that mentally ill prisoners would have
standing to sue on their own behalf for violations of federal and state law in the conditions of their custody, and
the interests that IPAS sought to protect were not merely germane to the IPAS's purpose, they were its reason for
existence. According to the court, IPAS was not a traditional state agency, was independent of the governor, was
funded by the federal government under the Protection and Advocacy of Mentally Ill Individuals Act (PAMII),
received no state funding and had authority independent of the state to pursue administrative, legal, and other
appropriate remedies to ensure the protection of individuals with mental illness who are receiving care or
treatment in the state. (Indiana Department of Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923 (10th Cir. 2009). A person who had been involuntarily committed to a state
hospital brought an action against hospital officials, asserting a variety of claims relating to the conditions of his
confinement and treatment, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the action
and the committee appealed. He was granted permission to proceed in format pauperis (IFP) on appeal and
ordered to make partial payments of the appellate filing fee through monthly payments from his institutional
account. The appeals court held that, as a matter of first impression, the fee payment provisions of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applicable to prisoners did not apply to those who were civilly committed under
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act (KSVPA). (Sexual Predator Treatment Program, Larned State
Hospital, Kansas)

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U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Mitchell v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2009). A prisoner brought an action against the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that he needed medical treatment for Hepatitis B and C and that an omitted
notation regarding his need for protective custody resulted in his improper transfer to a high-security facility
known for murders and assaults on anyone known as a snitch. The district court denied the prisoner's motion to
proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). Prisoner moved to proceed IFP on appeal. The appeals court denied the motion.
The court held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) did not bar the prisoner from proceeding IFP, but
the prisoner qualified as an abusive filer under Butler v. Department of Justice, which held that a court could
deny IFP status to a prisoner who, though not technically barred by the PLRA, had nonetheless abused the
privilege. The court noted that the prisoner had 63 prior cases, only two of which were “strikes” under the
PLRA. (USP Florence, Colorado, Federal Bureau of Prisons)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F.Supp.2d 1025 (D.Ariz. 2009). Detainees of Hispanic descent brought an
action against a county sheriff for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that deputies from the sheriff's office
profiled, targeted, and ultimately stopped and detained persons based on their race in violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court ruled against the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that:
(1) allegations were sufficient to state Fourth Amendment claims; (2) allegations were sufficient to state equal
protection claims; (3) the county was subject to municipal liability; and (4) the court would not dismiss the
county sheriff's office as a non-jural entity. The plaintiff was detained for four hours in a police holding cell
without being apprised of any charges against him, and was then handed over to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement officials. The court held that an allegation that deputies placed the Hispanic passenger of a
speeding vehicle in full custodial arrest for violating United States immigration laws, even after the passenger
provided them with sufficient immigration documents, including a United States Visa containing a fingerprint
and picture, a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) permit, and a Mexican Federal Voter Registration Card
with a picture and fingerprint, was sufficient to state a claim for a Fourth Amendment violation for being placed
into full custodial arrest without probable cause. The court noted that an allegation that the deputies' request for
an Hispanic driver's Social Security card was not “standard procedure” for all routine traffic stops conducted by
the county. According to the court, allegations that the county sheriff made a public statement that physical
appearance alone was sufficient to question an individual about their immigration status, that the county's crime
suppression sweeps had been allegedly targeted at areas having a high concentration of Hispanics, and that the
county had used volunteers with known animosity towards Hispanics and immigrants to assist in crime sweeps,
were sufficient to allege a discriminatory purpose, as required to state a § 1983 equal protection claim.
(Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, Cave Creek Holding Cell, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT
MILITARY FACILITY
TORTURE

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F.Supp.2d 1005 (N.D.Cal.2009). A detainee, a United States citizen who was designated an
“enemy combatant” and detained in a military brig in South Carolina, brought an action against a senior
government official, alleging denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court, unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, unconstitutional interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of right of information, denial
of right to association, unconstitutional military detention, denial of right to be free from unreasonable seizures,
and denial of due process. The defendant moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and
denied in part. The court held that the detainee, who was a United States citizen, had no other means of redress
for alleged injuries he sustained as a result of his detention, as required for Bivens claim against the senior
government official, alleging the official's actions violated constitutional rights. The court noted that the Military
Commissions Act was only applicable to alien, or non-citizen, unlawful enemy combatants, and the Detainee
Treatment Act did not “affect the rights under the United States Constitution of any person in the custody of the
United States.” The court found that national security was not a special factor counseling hesitation and
precluding judicial review in the Bivens action brought by the detainee. Documents drafted by the official were
public record, and litigation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the law. The court held that the
detainee sufficiently alleged that the official's acts caused a constitutional deprivation, as required for the
detainee's constitutional claims against the official. The detainee alleged that the senior government official
intended or was deliberately indifferent to the fact that the detainee would be subjected to illegal policies that the
official set in motion, and to a substantial risk that the detainee would suffer harm as a result, that the official
personally recommended the detainee's unlawful military detention and then wrote opinions to justify the use of
unlawful interrogation methods against persons suspected of being enemy combatants. According to the court, it
was foreseeable that illegal interrogation policies would be applied to the detainee, who was under the effective
control of a military authority and was one of only two suspected enemy combatants held in South Carolina.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was detained incommunicado for nearly two years with
no access to counsel and thereafter with very restricted and closely-monitored access, and that he was hindered
from bringing his claims as a result of the conditions of his detention, were sufficient to state a claim for
violation of his right to access to courts against a senior government official. According to the court, the
detainee's allegations that a senior government official bore responsibility for his conditions of confinement due
to his drafting opinions that purported to create legal legitimacy for such treatment, were sufficient to state a
claim under the Eighth Amendment, and thus stated a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
detainee alleged that while detained, he suffered prolonged shackling in painful positions and relentless periods
of illumination and intentional interference with sleep by means of loud noises at all hours, that he was subjected
to extreme psychological stress and impermissibly denied medical care, that these restrictions and conditions
were not justified by a legitimate penological interest, but rather were intended to intensify the coerciveness of
interrogations. The court held that federal officials were cognizant of basic fundamental civil rights afforded to
detainees under the United States Constitution, and thus a senior government official was not entitled to
qualified immunity from claims brought by the detainee. The court also held that the official was not qualifiedly
immune from claims brought by the detainee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). (Military
Brig, South Carolina)

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U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEARCHES
SEX OFFENDERS

Serna v. Goodno, 567 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 2009). A patient of a state mental hospital, involuntarily civilly
committed as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to a Minnesota sex offender program, brought a § 1983
action against a program official and against the head of the state's Department of Human Services. The patient
alleged that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients as part of a contraband investigation violated
his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the patient
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that visual body-cavity searches performed on all patients
of a state mental hospital, as part of a contraband investigation following the discovery of a cell-phone case in a
common area, did not infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights of the patient involuntarily civilly committed
to the facility as a sexually dangerous person. According to the court, even though facility-wide searches may
have constituted a disproportionate reaction, cell phones presented a security threat in the context of sexually
violent persons, there was a history of patients' use of phones to commit crimes, and the searches were conducted
in a private bathroom with no extraneous personnel present and in a professional manner with same-sex teams of
two. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program, Moose Lake, Minnesota)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CONDITIONS
HANDICAP

Shariff v. Coombe, 655 F.Supp.2d 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for
mobility filed an action against a state and its employees asserting claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), Title V of Rehabilitation Act, New York State Correction Law, and First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the
motion in part and denied in part. The court held that a state prisoner who depended on a wheelchair for mobility
was not required by the administrative remedy exhaustion requirement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) to appeal a grievance regarding the height of a food service counter before bringing suit, where the
grievance that he filed conceivably was resolved in his favor. The court noted that although the height of a
counter was not lowered in response to the grievance, the prison had attempted to remedy the situation by
changing the way in which hot food was served from the counter. According to the court, the inability of
disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility to access restrooms throughout a state prison rose
to the level of an objective violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the prisoners soiled themselves up to
several times per week. The court noted that the sheer frequency with which those incidents occurred, not to
mention the physical injuries that at least some prisoners had suffered in attempting to use an inaccessible
restroom, indicated that the prisoners had been denied a minimal civilized measure of life's necessities or there
was an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their future health. The court held that summary judgment was
precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the prison and its employees were deliberately
indifferent to the prisoners' restroom needs. The court found that the height of a food service counter and the
absence of accessible water fountains throughout the state prison were not conditions that deprived disabled
prisoners, who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, of minimal civilized measure of life's necessities and they
did not pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their future health, as required for a violation of the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that although one prisoner
suffered a burn on his hand caused by hot food or liquid falling from a food service counter, falling or spilled
food did not create an unreasonable risk of serious damage to the prisoner's health. The court held that the
existence of potholes and broken concrete in state prison yards did not constitute a violation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as to disabled prisoners who depended on
wheelchairs for mobility, even if those prisoners had fallen and suffered injuries as a result. According to the
court, the inaccessibility of telephones throughout a state prison, inaccessibility of a family reunion site,
inaccessibility of a law library, and malfunctioning of a school elevator, that did not cause any physical harm or
pain to disabled prisoners who depended on wheelchairs for mobility, were not the kind of deprivations that
denied a basic human need, and thus did not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. (New York State Department of Correctional Services, Green Haven Correctional
Facility)

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2009). Incarcerated felons brought an action challenging the validity of
an amendment to the Massachusetts constitution disqualifying currently incarcerated inmates from voting in all
Massachusetts elections. The district court denied the Commonwealth's motion for the entry of judgment on the
pleadings on the inmates' Voting Rights Act (VRA) claim but granted the Commonwealth's motion for summary
judgment on the inmates' Ex Post Facto Clause claim. Both the Commonwealth and inmates appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The appeals court held that the vote denial claim
challenging the amendment that would disenfranchise incarcerated felons was not cognizable under the Voting
Rights Act (VRA). According to the court, the Act was not meant to proscribe the authority of states to
disenfranchise imprisoned felons. The court found that the amendment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
where the amendment did not impose any affirmative disability or restraint, physical or otherwise, and felon
disenfranchisement had historically not been regarded as punitive in the United States. The court noted that there
was a rational non-punitive purpose for the disenfranchisement. (Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
PRIVACY
VISITS

Sparks v. Seltzer, 607 F.Supp.2d 437 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). A psychiatric patient, on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated, brought a § 1983 action against a director and a treatment team leader at a psychiatric center
in a New York state psychiatric hospital. The patient was housed in an inpatient, long-term locked ward which
normally houses a mixture of voluntary patients, patients who have been involuntarily committed under the civil
law, and patients committed as a result of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect or a
finding of incompetence to stand trial. The patient alleged violations of his First Amendment rights and his
“zone of privacy” concerning a supervised visitation policy. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants. The court held that the psychiatric patients' speech during supervised visits at a state psychiatric
hospital was not wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, although the speech was casual and among family
members or friends. According to the court, the reluctance of psychiatric patients in the state psychiatric hospital
to discuss various matters within the earshot of a supervising guard during supervised visitation did not give rise

XXIII

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to a cognizable injury to their free speech rights. The court noted that no patient had lost privileges, had the term
of involuntary hospitalization extended, or had otherwise been punished or threatened with being punished for
anything he or a visitor had said in a supervised visit. Patients were not required to speak loudly enough to be
heard, guards did not generally report the contents of conversations to hospital authorities, and no sound
recordings of the visits were made. The court held that the state psychiatric hospital's supervised visitation policy
imposed upon patients did not invade their “zone of privacy” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, since
patients had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a hospital visiting room which could be entered by anyone
during a visit and which was used by more than one patient at a time for visits. The court found that the
supervised visitation policy did not, on its face or applied to patients, infringe upon their privacy rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. (Creedmoor Psychiatric Center, New York)
U.S. District Court
DISCIPLINE
HARASSMENT

Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 664 F.Supp.2d 218 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). A state prisoner brought an action under § 1983
against a prison superintendent, corrections sergeant, corrections officers, and others. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The district court denied the
motion, finding that the prisoner's allegations were sufficient to allege a corrections sergeant's personal
involvement in a civil rights violation, as well as the superintendent's and corrections officers. The court found
that the prisoner's allegations that a prison corrections sergeant supervised corrections officers, that the sergeant
“allowed” officers to harass the prisoner by filing multiple false misbehavior reports, that the sergeant “abdicated
his duty” to prevent such harassment, and that the sergeant “participated in” the harassment, were sufficient to
allege the sergeant's personal involvement in a civil rights violation. According to the court, the prisoner's
allegations that he wrote to the prison superintendent challenging his false imprisonment in a special housing
unit (SHU) because he had done nothing wrong, and that the superintendent responded but did not remedy the
situation, were sufficient to allege the superintendent's personal involvement in constitutional violations, as
required to state a claim against the superintendent under § 1983. The court also found that allegations that
prison corrections officers issued false misbehavior reports against the prisoner, and that he was not allowed to
question witnesses at a hearing and was ejected from the hearing, were sufficient to state claims under § 1983
against the officers for filing false misbehavior reports and violations of due process. (Wende Correctional
Facility, New York)
2010

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2010). A class of disabled state prison inmates and
parolees moved for an order requiring state prison officials to track and accommodate the needs of disabled
parolees housed in county jails, and to provide access to a workable grievance procedure pursuant to the
officials' obligations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and prior court
orders. The district court granted the motion and the state appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and
vacated in part. The appeals court held that: (1) contractual arrangements between the state and a county for
incarceration of state prison inmates and parolees in county jails were subject to ADA; (2) the district court's
order was not invalid for violating federalism principles; (3) the state failed to show that the order was not the
narrowest, least intrusive relief possible, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); but (4) there
was insufficient evidence to justify the system-wide injunctive relief in the district court's order. The court noted
the state's recent proposal to alter its sentencing practices to place in county jails approximately 14,000 persons
who would otherwise be incarcerated in state prisons. The court also noted that the state's contracts with counties
were not simply for incarceration, but to provide inmates and parolees in county jails with various positive
opportunities, from educational and treatment programs, to opportunities to contest their incarceration, to the
fundamentals of life, such as sustenance, and elementary mobility and communication, and the restrictions
imposed by incarceration meant that the state was required to provide these opportunities to individuals
incarcerated in county jails pursuant to state contracts to the same extent that they were provided to all state
inmates. The district court’s order did not require the state to shift parolees to state facilities if county jails
exhibited patterns of ADA non-compliance; rather, the order required that, if the state became aware of a class
member housed in a county jail who was not being accommodated, the state either ensure that the jail
accommodated the class member, or move the class member to a state or county facility which could
accommodate his needs. In finding that statewide injunctive relief was not needed, the court held that evidence
of ADA violations was composed largely of single incidents that could be isolated, and the district court's order
identified no past determinations that showed class members in county jails were not being accommodated.
(California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
WAIVER OF RIGHTS

Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583 (9th Cir. 2010). A detainee brought an action against officers of a county sheriff's
department in their official and individual capacities for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights based on his over-detention and the officers' alleged efforts to procure an involuntary waiver
of his civil rights claim. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers. The detainee
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the officers were not liable under § 1983 in their
official capacities on the over-detention claim, absent evidence that they had a policy, practice, or custom of
over-detaining inmates. According to the court, the detainee had no freestanding constitutional right to be free of
a coercive waiver, and even if the detainee had a right to be free from a coercive waiver, the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity on the involuntary waiver claim. The detainee had been arrested on a warrant
from another county for domestic abuse and was transported to the arresting county jail. The arresting county
had the responsibility to notify the other county, under state law, but failed to do so. Over two months later the
arresting county realized that the detainee had been over-detained and released him. On the day of his release, a
deputy in street clothing asked the detainee, who did not speak English, to sign papers that were an offer to settle
his claim for over-detention for $500. The detainee asserted that he did not know what was in the papers. (Los
Angeles Sheriff's Department, California)

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U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS

Bailey v. Pataki, 722 F.Supp.2d 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). State prisoners brought a § 1983 action against the former
governor and governor's staff, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court
denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether civil confinements of prison inmates comported with Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state
inmates' right to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to a civil commitment at the end of their prison sentences was
clearly established. (New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Clark v. California, 739 F.Supp.2d 1168 (N.D.Cal. 2010). The state of California, Governor and various state
prison officials filed a motion pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to terminate the prospective
relief in a 2001 settlement agreement and an order that required them to comply with a remedial plan designed to
ensure that California prisoners with developmental disabilities were protected from serious injury and
discrimination on the basis of their disability. Developmentally disabled prisoners moved for enforcement of,
and further relief under, the settlement agreement and order. The court held that for the purposes of a motion
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), testimony from a few prison staff members at individual
prisons did not prove systemic compliance with the remedial plan. The court held that termination of the
settlement agreement and order entered pursuant to Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) was unwarranted since
the state defendants failed to carry their burden to show the absence of current and ongoing rights violations
under ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and the prospective relief contained in the settlement agreement and order
remained necessary, was sufficiently narrow, and was minimally intrusive. According to the court, the
defendants failed to fulfill their obligation to provide developmentally disabled California prisoners with the
accommodations and program modifications that would enable them to gain access to prison programs, services,
and activities afforded non-disabled prisoners. The court found that the state defendants were not deliberately
indifferent, so as to violate the Eighth Amendment, even though the state defendants had not adequately
implemented the remedial plan, where the correction department's policies provided for constitutionally
acceptable treatment. The court ruled that further relief was necessary under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) to secure the rights of class of developmentally disabled prisoners, where the defendants demonstrated
an ignorance of conditions for developmentally disabled prisoners and an inability to recognize the gravity of
and to remedy the problems that had been identified by the court expert and others. According to the court, the
defendants demonstrated an inability to take remedial steps absent court intervention, evidence reflected that the
defendants had failed to comply with the remedial plan even nine years later, and the remedial plan in its current
form did not go far enough to ensure compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
SECURITY
LIABILITY

Dean v. Walker, 743 F.Supp.2d 605 (S.D.Miss. 2010). Motorists injured when a squad car commandeered by an
escapee collided with their vehicle brought a § 1983 action in state court against a county sheriff and deputy
sheriffs, in their individual and official capacities, the county, and others, asserting various claims under federal
and state law. The case was removed to federal court where the court granted in part and denied in part the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. The defendants moved to alter or amend. The court denied the
motion. The court held that the “public duty” doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability to the motorists
under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The court found that the county sheriff and deputy sheriffs who
were in vehicular pursuit of the escaped jail inmate when the escapee's vehicle crashed into the motorists' vehicle
owed a duty to the motorists as fellow drivers, separate and apart from their general duties to the public as police
officers, and thus the “public duty” doctrine did not relieve the county of tort liability in the motorists' claims
under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA). (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act
TELEPHONE COSTS
VISITS

Durrenberger v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 757 F.Supp.2d 640 (S.D.Tex. 2010). A hearing impaired
prison visitor brought an action against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), alleging failure to
accommodate his disability during visits in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and
Rehabilitation Act. The district court denied summary judgment for the defendants and granted summary
judgment, in part, for the visitor. The court held that acceptance by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
(TDCJ) of federal financial assistance waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity from the prison visitor's action
alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, where the Act expressly stated that
acceptance of federal funds waived immunity.
According to the court, the hearing impaired prison visitor was substantially limited in his ability to
communicate with others, and therefore, was disabled for the purposes of his action alleging the prison failed to
accommodate his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. The court noted that it was difficult for the
visitor to hear when a speaker was not in close proximity to him or when background noise was present, he
could not use telephones without amplification devices, and he could not use the telephones in prison visitation
rooms. The court held that the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) failed to provide accommodations
to the visitor that would allow the visitor to participate in the visitation program, even though TDCJ allowed the
visitor to use the end booth furthest away from the noise of other visitors and made pen and paper available. The
court noted that the end booth was not always available, the visitor was still unable to hear while in the end
booth, and passing notes was qualitatively different from in-person visitation.
The court held that the prison visitor's request for contact visits with the inmate was not a reasonable
accommodation for his disability, for the purposes of his Rehabilitation Act failure to accommodate claim,
where the inmate was in prison for violently assaulting the visitor, and contact visits required additional staffing
and security. According to the court, the provision of a telephone amplification device to the visitor would have
been a reasonable accommodation for his disability, where the devices were readily available for approximately
$15 to $100. The court also found that allowing the visitor to use an attorney client booth during visitation would
have been a reasonable accommodation for his disability, where use of the booth would not fundamentally alter

XXIII

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the visitation program, and the booth could be searched before and after visits for contraband.
The court held that summary judgment as to compensatory damages was precluded by a genuine issue of
material fact as to the amount of damages suffered by the visitor by the prison's failure to accommodate his
disability. The court found that a permanent injunction enjoining future violations of the Rehabilitation Act by
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) was warranted in the hearing impaired prison visitor's action
alleging failure to accommodate, where TDCJ had not accommodated the visitor in the past, continued to not
provide accommodations and gave no indication that it intended to provide any in the future. (Hughes Unit,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division)
U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). Convicted felons filed a suit challenging the State of
Washington's felon disenfranchisement law, alleging that it violated the Voting Rights Act (VRA) by denying
the right to vote on account of race. The district court granted Washington summary judgment, and the felons
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the district court again
granted Washington summary judgment. The felons appealed again. The appeals court found that a VRA
challenge to the felon disenfranchisement law requires intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system,
and Washington's disenfranchisement law did not violate the VRA. (State of Washington)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D.Cal. 2010). Aliens, who were diagnosed with severe
mental illnesses, filed a class action, alleging that their continued detention without counsel during pending
removal proceedings violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due
Process Clause. The aliens moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion in part. The
court held that the aliens were not required to exhaust administrative remedies, since the very core of the aliens'
claim was that without the appointment of counsel, they would be unable to meaningfully participate in the
administrative process before the BIA, and the BIA did not recognize a right to appointed counsel in removal
proceedings under any circumstances; therefore, resort to the BIA would be futile. The court held that the
mentally ill aliens who were detained pending removal proceedings, without counsel and for prolonged periods
without custody hearings, were entitled to a mandatory preliminary injunction requiring the immediate
appointment of qualified counsel to represent them during their immigration proceedings and custody hearings.
(Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Northwest Detention Center,
Tacoma, Washington)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL ILLNESS

Graves v. Arpaio, 623 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir, 2010). Pretrial detainees in a county jail system brought a class action
against a county sheriff and the county supervisors board, alleging violation of the detainees' civil rights. The
parties entered into a consent decree which was superseded by an amended judgment entered by stipulation of
the parties. The defendants moved to terminate the amended judgment. The district court entered a second
amended judgment which ordered prospective relief for the pretrial detainees. The district court awarded
attorney fees to the detainees. The sheriff appealed the second amended judgment. The appeals court affirmed.
The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ordering prospective relief requiring the
sheriff to house all detainees taking psychotropic medications in temperatures not exceeding 85 degrees and
requiring the sheriff to provide food to pretrial detainees that met or exceeded the United States Department of
Agriculture's Dietary Guidelines for Americans. The district court had held that air temperatures above 85
degrees greatly increased the risk of heat-related illnesses for individuals taking psychotropic medications, and
thus that the Eighth Amendment prohibited housing such detainees in areas where the temperature exceeded 85
degrees. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Jail, Maricopa County Supervisors, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
TELEPHONE COSTS

Harrison v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 681 F.Supp.2d 76 (D.D.C. 2010). A federal prisoner brought an action
against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), alleging that BOP's adoption of telephone rates and commissary prices
violated his due process and equal protection rights, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). He also
alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act. After BOP's motion to dismiss
and for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part, the prisoner moved for reconsideration, and
the BOP moved for summary judgment on remaining FOIA claims. The district court granted the BOP’s motion.
The court found no prejudicial error from the court's dismissal of his claims in connection with BOP's adoption
of telephone rates and commissary prices, as would warrant reconsideration. (Federal Bureau of Prisons,
Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). Several convicted felons brought action against Tennessee's
governor and secretary of state, state coordinator of elections, and several county elections administrators,
alleging that, by conditioning restoration of felons' voting rights on payment of court-ordered victim restitution
and child support obligations, Tennessee's voter re-enfranchisement statute violated the Equal Protection Clause,
the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the Ex Post Facto and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the federal and
state constitutions. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and the
felons appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that Tennessee had rational basis for the challenged
provisions of the state's re-enfranchisement statute, the challenged provisions of the state's re-enfranchisement
statute did not violate the Twenty-Fourth Amendment or Privileges and Immunities Clause, and the challenged
provisions were not punitive in nature, and thus did not violate the state's Ex Post Facto Clause. The court noted
that the felons, having lost their voting rights upon being convicted of felonies, lacked any fundamental interest
in their right to vote, and wealth-based classifications did not constitute discrimination against any suspect class.
According to the court, Tennessee's interests in encouraging payment of child support and compliance with court
orders, and in requiring felons to complete their entire sentences, including paying victim restitution, supplied a
rational basis sufficient for the challenged provisions to pass equal protection muster. (Shelby County, Madison
County, and Davidson County, Tennessee)

XXIII

7.102

U.S. Appeals Court
DEATH
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE

Jones v. Muskegon County, 625 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 2010). A father, as the personal representative of the estate of
a deceased pretrial detainee, brought an action against a county and various corrections officers and medical
staff, alleging constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The father appealed. The
appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. The court held that assignment charts listing
corrections officers assigned to the pretrial detainee's area during the period in which his health deteriorated, and
affidavits from other detainees who witnessed his deterioration and the officers' alleged failure to assist the
detainee, were insufficient to create a fact issue as to whether the officers were deliberately indifferent towards
the detainee's serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that the
affidavits referred to “guards” in a general sense without specifying wrongdoing attributable to any particular
officer, and did not specify which officers observed the detainee's deterioration or ignored his requests for
medical care. The court found that a correctional officer's failure to immediately call an ambulance upon
observing the pretrial detainee's deteriorating health condition was not deliberate indifference towards his serious
medical needs as would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, where the officer believed the decision to call an
ambulance was not hers to make but was command's, and the officer attended to the detainee's medical needs
and made efforts to make him more comfortable. But the court found that summary judgment was precluded by
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison nurses were aware of the risk to the pretrial detainee's health
and chose to disregard the risk, and whether the prison nurses were grossly negligent under Michigan law as to
the pretrial detainee's medical care. (Muskegon County Jail, Michigan)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
DEATH
MEDICAL CARE

Lum v. County of San Joaquin, 756 F.Supp.2d 1243 (E.D.Cal. 2010). An arrestee's survivors brought an action
against a county, city, and several city and county employees, alleging § 1983 claims for various civil rights
violations and a state law claim for wrongful death arising from the arrestee's accidental drowning after his
release from the county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss portions of the complaint and the survivors moved
for leave to amend. The district court granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part, and granted the
plaintiffs' motion. The survivors alleged that the city's police sergeants made a decision to arrest the individual
for being under the influence in public, despite lack of evidence of alcohol use and knowledge that the individual
was being medicated for bipolar disorder, and to book him on a “kickout” charge so that he would be released
from jail six hours later. The court found that the arresting officers, by taking the arrestee into custody, created a
special relationship with the arrestee, similar to the special relationship between a jailer and a prisoner, so as to
create a duty of care for the purposes of wrongful death claim under California law, arising from the arrestee's
accidental drowning following his release from the county jail. The court noted that it was foreseeable that the
arrestee needed medical attention and that there was a risk posed by releasing him without providing such
attention. The court held that the county, city, and arresting officers were entitled to immunity, under a
California Tort Claims Act section related to liability of public entities and employees for the release of
prisoners, for the wrongful death of the arrestee, only as to the basic decision to release the arrestee from the
county jail, but not as to the defendants' ministerial acts after the initial decision to release the arrestee. The court
noted that the arrestee had a lacerated foot, was covered with vomit and had trouble walking, and had a seizure
while he was in a holding cell. The arrestee’s body was found floating in the San Joaquin River, approximately
two miles west of the county jail, shortly after he was released. (San Joaquin County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
HANDICAP

Paulone v. City of Frederick, 718 F.Supp.2d 626 (D.Md. 2010). An arrestee, a deaf woman, brought an action
against a state, a county board, and a sheriff alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
the Rehabilitation Act, and related torts. The state and sheriff moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for
summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that the
arrestee failed to allege that any program or activity she was required to complete following her arrest for driving
under the influence (DUI) and during her subsequent probation, received federal funds, as required to state
Rehabilitation Act claims against the state for discriminating against her and denying her benefits because of her
deafness. The court found that the arrestee stated an ADA claim with her allegations that, after her arrest and
during her detention, police officers denied her the use of a working machine that would have allowed her to
make a telephone call, help in reading and understanding forms, and access to a sign language interpreter.
(Frederick County Board of County Commissioners, Frederick County Adult Detention Center, Maryland)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIENS
USE OF FORCE

Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322 (10th Cir. 2010). An immigration detainee brought a § 1983 excessive force
claim against a jail employee, sheriff, and the sheriff's successor, related to an incident in which a stun gun was
used on the detainee. The district court granted the sheriff's motion for summary judgment and the successor's
motion for summary judgment. The detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that the
sheriff who was not present during the incident in which a stun gun was used on the detainee while he was
restrained was not liable under § 1983, where the sheriff did not employ any force on the detainee, was not
present when the force was applied, and did not give any advance approval to the use of the stun gun on the
detainee. The court found that the county jail's policy of training jailers to use stun guns only if and when an
inmate should become violent, combative, and pose a direct threat to the security of staff did not exhibit
deliberate indifference to the immigration detainee's due process rights against the use of excessive force, as
required for § 1983 liability. (Jefferson County Jail, Oklahoma)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
WORK

Reynolds v. Barrett, 741 F.Supp.2d 416 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). Four African-American inmates brought an action
under § 1983 and § 1985 against New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees,
alleging that they were subjected to discrimination on account of their race in connection with their inmate jobs
in a print shop. The actions were consolidated for discovery purposes. The inmates moved to amend their
complaints and to certify the class, and the employees moved for summary judgment. The district court granted
the motion. The court held that: (1) the first inmate failed to establish that white workers were treated differently
under similar circumstances; (2) there was no evidence that the second inmate's race was a motivating factor in

XXIII

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his removal from the shop; (3) fact issues precluded summary judgment as to third and fourth inmates'
discrimination and retaliation claims against a supervisor. The court held that genuine issues of material fact
existed as to whether a prison print shop supervisor acted out of retaliatory motives in recommending that an
African-American inmate, who filed a grievance over an inmate counseling notification issued by the supervisor,
be removed from his job in shop, and as to whether the supervisor acted toward the inmate based on
discriminatory animus, precluding summary judgment as to inmate's § 1983 retaliation and racial discrimination
claims against supervisor. The court noted that a poster hanging in a prison print shop supervisor's office on
which there was a photograph of an ape staring directly into camera with the words “whoever regards work as
pleasure can sure have a HELL of a good time in this institution” was not probative of discriminatory animus on
the supervisor's part. According to the court, documents authored by a New York State Department of
Correctional Services' (DOCS) diversity trainer regarding the prison print shop supervisor's allegedly
discriminatory statements at a training session did not create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to
overcome summary judgment on the African-American inmate's racial discrimination claim under § 1983 arising
from his bonus deductions, demotion, and eventual removal from his job in the shop. (Elmira Correctional
Facility, New York)
U.S. Appeals Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666 (9th Cir. 2010). An African-American state prisoner brought a § 1983
action against a prison warden and correctional officers, among others, alleging that he was subjected to racial
discrimination during prison lockdowns, and that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need to
exercise, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The district court held
that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether reasonable men and
women could differ regarding the necessity of state prison officials' racial classification in response to prison
disturbances that were believed to have been perpetrated or planned by prisoners who were African-American,
and whether the officials' lockdown of all African-American prisoners in the unit containing high-risk prisoners
following disturbances was narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. The court also found
that summary judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact as to whether state prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to the need for exercise of a prisoner who was subjected to prison lockdowns. (High
Desert State Prison, California)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
HARASSMENT

Shariff v. Poole, 689 F.Supp.2d 470 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). A state prisoner who was a paraplegic brought a § 1983
action against current and former New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees,
alleging that the employees conspired and retaliated against him. The employees moved for summary judgment.
The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoner failed to show
that the employees acted with racial or related class-based discriminatory animus, as would support his claim
that the employees conspired to interfere with his civil rights by denying him rights and privileges. The court
held that the alleged actions of the employees, including subjecting the prisoner who was paraplegic and who, as
vice-chairman of the prisoners' liaison committee, had filed grievances against employees, to an excessive
number of cell searches, filing false misbehavior reports, confiscating legal documents, verbally threatening the
prisoner, and excessively pat frisking and searching the prisoner, amounted to adverse actions for the purposes of
the prisoner's § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the employees, although such actions did not
necessarily amount to violations of the prisoner's constitutionally protected rights. The court held that summary
judgment was precluded by a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether a state correctional officer
acted with retaliatory motive in confiscating an unfinished grievance of the prisoner who was vice-chairman of
prisoners' liaison committee. (Five Points Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
SEX DISCRIMINATION
VISITS

Shuler v. District of Columbia, 744 F.Supp.2d 320 (D.D.C. 2010). An inmate's wife, who was an AfricanAmerican attorney, brought a § 1983 action against the District of Columbia and a jail captain, alleging an equal
protection violation due to the captain's alleged refusal to allow her to visit the inmate. The defendants moved
for summary judgment and the district court granted the motion. The court held that there was no evidence that
the captain terminated the wife's visits with the inmate based on a discriminatory purpose or intent, or that the
District had a custom or policy of treating women or African-Americans differently than others. (District of
Columbia Jail)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Taylor v. Watkins, 623 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2010). A state prisoner filed a § 1983 action against officers and
employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections, claiming violation of his civil rights by allegedly
contaminating his food, tampering with his mail, depriving him of sleep, and assaulting him. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the prisoner's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), upon
concluding that he was not in imminent danger as required for the three-strikes provision of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA), and subsequently dismissed action after the prisoner failed to pay the filing fee. The
prisoner appealed and requested leave to proceed IFP. The appeals court denied the request. The court held that a
prior evidentiary hearing was required to consider contested imminent danger allegations, ordering the prisoner
to pay the filing fee if he wanted the case to go forward. (Illinois Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Graham, 683 F.Supp.2d 129 (D.Mass. 2010). The federal government brought a civil action seeking to
commit a federal prison inmate as a sexually dangerous person pursuant to the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act. At the conclusion of a bench trial, the parties proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The court held that the government failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the inmate suffered
from nonconsensual sex paraphilia as would make him sexually dangerous to others. According the court,
despite a criminal history involving three sex offenses, there was no evidence that the inmate was aroused by,
fantasized about, or fixated on non-consenting partners. The court noted that the inmate's criminal history
included a number of non-sexual offenses, including assault, battery, and petit larceny, which further indicated

XXIII

7.104

the paraphilia diagnosis was inappropriate, and the testimony and report of the government's licensed
psychologist supporting a paraphilia diagnosis not only conflicted with conclusions of the court-appointed
psychiatrist and psychologist, but contained a number of factual inconsistencies and evinced a reluctance to
credit contradictory evidence, which pointed to a bias in finding that inmate suffered from paraphilia that
detracted from a government psychologist's credibility. (Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
Federal Bureau of Prisons)
U.S. District Court
MIRANDA WARNING

U.S. v. Marion, 708 F.Supp.2d 1131 (D.Or. 2010). An inmate who was charged with assaulting a fellow inmate
moved to suppress evidence for lack of a Miranda warning during administrative interviews and disciplinary
proceedings at the prison. The district court held that the inmate, who was housed in a segregated housing unit
(SHU), was “in custody” for the purposes of Miranda, granting the inmate’s motion. The court noted that SHU
confinement imposed severe restrictions on the inmate's movements within the prison and the inmate's transfer to
SHU limited the freedom of movement he enjoyed when housed with the general prison population. The court
noted that in SHU, the inmate was in his cell 23 hours a day, could not eat with other prisoners, could not access
the same type of recreation or converse with other prisoners, and could not move freely to the various
destinations in the prison. (Federal Correctional Institution, Sheridan, Oregon)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDERS

U.S. v. Sanders, 622 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). A defendant charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act (SORNA) by traveling in interstate commerce without updating his sex offender
registration, moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that SORNA's registration requirement exceeded
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. The district court denied the motion. The appeals court
affirmed, finding that SORNA did not exceed Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause. (Mississippi and
Wisconsin)
2011

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ABUSE
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT

Amador v. Andrews, 655 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 2011). Current and former female inmates filed a class action § 1983
suit against several line officers employed at seven state prisons and various supervisors and other corrections
officials, claiming that they were sexually abused and harassed by the line officers and that the supervisory
defendants contributed to this abuse and harassment through the maintenance of inadequate policies and
practices. The district court dismissed, and the inmates appealed. The appeals court dismissed in part, and
vacated and remanded in part. The court held that the female inmates who made internal complaints, investigated
by an Inspector General (IG), that sought redress only for the alleged actions of a particular corrections officer
and did not seek a change in policies or procedures, failed to exhaust their internal remedies, as required by the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to proceed in federal court on § 1983 claims of sexual abuse and
harassment. But the court found that the female inmates' claim of a failure to protect was sufficient exhaustion
with regard to a § 1983 class action litigation seeking systemic relief from alleged sexual abuse and harassment.
(New York Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
VISITS

Aref v. Holder, 774 F.Supp.2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011). A group of prisoners who were, or who had been,
incarcerated in communication management units (CMU) at federal correctional institutions (FCI) designed to
monitor high-risk prisoners filed suit against the United States Attorney General, the federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP), and BOP officials, alleging that CMU incarceration violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments.
Four additional prisoners moved to intervene and the defendants moved to dismiss. The district court denied the
motion to intervene, and granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court held that even
though a federal prisoner who had been convicted of solicitation of bank robbery was no longer housed in the
federal prison's communication management unit (CMU), he had standing under Article III to pursue
constitutional claims against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for alleged violations since there was a realistic threat
that he might be redesignated to a CMU. The court noted that the prisoner had originally been placed in CMU
because of the nature of his underlying conviction and because of his alleged efforts to radicalize other inmates,
and these reasons for placing him in CMU remained.
The court found that the restrictions a federal prison put on prisoners housed within a communication
management unit (CMU), which included that all communications be conducted in English, that visits were
monitored and subject to recording, that each prisoner received only eight visitation hours per month, and that
prisoners' telephone calls were limited and subjected to monitoring, did not violate the prisoners' alleged First
Amendment right to family integrity, since the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate penological
interest. The court noted that prisoners assigned to the unit typically had offenses related to international or
domestic terrorism or had misused approved communication methods while incarcerated.
The court found that prisoners confined to a communication management unit (CMU), stated a procedural
due process claim against the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) by alleging that the requirements imposed on CMU
prisoners were significantly different than those imposed on prisoners in the general population, and that there
was a significant risk that procedures used by the BOP to review whether prisoners should initially be placed
within CMU or should continue to be incarcerated there had resulted in erroneous deprivation of their liberty
interests. The court noted that CMU prisoners were allowed only eight hours of non-contact visitation per month
and two 15 minute telephone calls per week, while the general population at a prison was not subjected to a cap
on visitation and had 300 minutes of telephone time per month. The court also noted that the administrative
review of CMU status, conducted by officials in Washington, D.C., rather than at a unit itself, was allegedly so
vague and generic as to render it illusory. The court held that the conditions of confinement experienced by
prisoners housed within a communication management unit (CMU), did not deprive the prisoners of the
“minimum civilized measure of life's necessities” required to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP), since the deprivation did not involve the basics of food, shelter, health care or personal

7.105

security. The court found that a federal prisoner stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against the Bureau of
Prisons (BOP) by alleging: (1) that he was “an outspoken and litigious prisoner;” (2) that he had written books
about improper prison conditions and filed grievances and complaints on his own behalf; (3) that his prison
record contained “no serious disciplinary infractions” and “one minor communications-related infraction” from
1997; (4) that prison staff told him he would be “sent east” if he continued filing complaints; and (5) that he filed
a complaint about that alleged threat and he was then transferred to a high-risk inmate monitoring
communication management unit (CMU) at a federal correctional institution. (Communication Management
Units at Federal Correctional Institutions in Terre Haute, Indiana and Marion, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
MEDICAL CARE

Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir. 2011). A Massachusetts civil detainee, who was anatomically male but
suffered from gender identity disorder (GID), brought an action against Massachusetts officials alleging
“deliberate indifference” to her medical needs, and seeking an injunction requiring that hormone therapy and
female garb and accessories be provided to her. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief, and the
state officials appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the record supported the district
court's conclusion that Massachusetts officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the civil
detainee or exercised an unreasonable professional judgment by denying her female hormone therapy. The court
noted that it had been fifteen years since the detainee first asked for treatment, and for ten years, health
professionals had been recommending hormone therapy as a necessary part of the treatment. According to the
court, when, during the delay, the detainee sought to castrate herself with a razor blade, state officials could be
said to have known that the detainee was at a “substantial risk of serious harm.” (Massachusetts Treatment
Center for Sexually Dangerous Persons)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011). A probationer, who had been convicted of false
imprisonment under New Mexico law, brought § 1983 claims against a probation officer and the New Mexico
Secretary of Corrections, alleging that he was wrongly directed to register as a sex offender and was wrongly
placed in a sex offender probation unit, in violation of his rights to substantive due process, procedural due
process, and equal protection. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the complaint
was insufficient to overcome the Secretary's qualified immunity defense, but the probation officer's alleged
actions, if proven, denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to
the court, the probation officer's alleged actions of placing the probationer in a sex offender probation unit and
directing him to register as a sex offender, after the probationer had been convicted of false imprisonment under
New Mexico law, if proven, denied the probationer of a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The
court noted that false imprisonment was not a sex offense in New Mexico unless the victim was a minor. (New
Mexico Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL ABUSE

Chao v. Ballista, 806 F.Supp.2d 358 (D.Mass. 2011). A female former inmate brought an action under § 1983
and the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (MCRA) against a prison guard and superintendent, alleging that the
guard violated her constitutional rights by sexually exploiting her while she was incarcerated, and that the
superintendent failed to protect her from the guard's repeated sexual battery. Following a jury trial, the district
court entered judgment in the inmate's favor. The defendants subsequently moved for judgment as matter of law
or for a new trial. The district court denied the motions. The court held that the question of whether the prison
guard's misconduct in sexually exploiting the inmate while she was incarcerated rose to the level of “sufficiently
serious harm” necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, was for the jury. The court also found that
the issue of whether the prison guard and superintendent were deliberately indifferent to the rights, health, or
safety of the inmate was for the jury. The court found that the jury verdict finding that the prison superintendent
was not liable for punitive damages because the superintendent's conduct was not “willful, wonton, or
malicious,” was not inconsistent with the verdict finding that the superintendent was “sufficiently culpable” as to
have been deliberately indifferent to the inmate's needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted
that malicious conduct is not required to sustain an Eighth Amendment claim for supervisory liability for
deliberate indifference. According to the court, issues of whether the prison guard knew, or should have known,
that emotional distress would result from his sexually exploiting the inmate while she was incarcerated, and as to
whether the guard's conduct, including demanding fellatio in 23 separate places with the inmate, was extreme
and outrageous, were for the jury. The court found that the superintendent was not entitled to qualified immunity
from the former inmate's § 1983 claim alleging that the superintendent failed to protect her from the prison
guard's repeated sexual exploitation, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, where the law was clearly
established that prison officials had a duty to protect their inmates by training and supervising guards, creating
and sustaining a safe prison environment, and investigating allegations of sexual misconduct or abuse when they
arose. (South Middlesex Correctional Center, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
SAFETY
SECURITY
LIABILITY

Dean v. Walker, 764 F.Supp.2d 824 (S.D.Miss. 2011). Vehicular accident victims brought an action against a
county, sheriff and deputies, stemming from a head-on collision with an escaped inmate whom the defendants
were chasing. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court held that the
accident victims failed to establish a pattern of unconstitutional conduct by county, as required to maintain a
claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that the victims introduced no evidence at all with
respect to other police pursuits in the county or other instances where inmates were not made to wear handcuffs.
According to the court, the victims failed to establish that the sheriff acted with an intent to harm, unrelated to
his pursuit of the inmate, as required to maintain a substantive due process claim. The court noted that the
sheriff's pulling in front of the inmate in an attempt to stop him, even if reckless, was consistent with the sheriff's
legitimate interest in apprehending the inmate. (Jefferson–Franklin Correctional Facility, Mississippi)

7.106

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIENS

Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011). A Senegalese detainee, who was subject to a voluntary
departure order or an alternate removal order, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a preliminary
injunction for immediate release from prolonged immigration detention. The district court denied the petitioner's
motion, and the petitioner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that an alien
subject facing prolonged detention is entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is entitled to be
released from detention unless the government establishes that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the
community. (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, San Pedro Detention Facility, California)

U.S. District Court
SELF INCRIMINATION
SEX OFFENDER

Doe v. Heil, 781 F.Supp.2d 1134 (D.Colo. 2011). A state prisoner convicted of a sex offense filed a § 1983
action, alleging that Department of Corrections (DOC) regulations requiring him to provide a full sexual history
and to pass a polygraph examination in order to participate in a sex offender treatment program violated his
constitutional rights. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that
the regulations did not violate the prisoner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. According to
the court, the DOC had a legitimate penological interest in having convicted sex offenders complete a treatment
program before being released on parole. The court found that the prisoner lacked a due process liberty interest
in participating in a sex offender treatment program. (Colorado Department of Corrections Sex Offender
Treatment and Monitoring Program)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
MENTAL ILLNESS
ACCESS TO COURT

Franco-Gonzales v. Holder, 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D.Cal. 2011). Immigrant detainees brought a putative class
action on behalf of mentally disabled detainees being held in custody without counsel during removal
proceedings, asserting claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Rehabilitation Act, and Due
Process Clause. A detainee who was a native and citizen of Belarus, and who had been deemed mentally
incompetent to represent himself in removal proceedings, moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court
granted the motion in part. The court held that: (1) the detainee was entitled to a custody hearing at which the
government had to justify his continued detention on the basis that he was a flight risk or would be a danger to
the community; (2) a qualified representative for a mentally incompetent immigrant detainee may be an attorney,
law student or law graduate directly supervised by a retained attorney, or an accredited representative; (3) the
detainee’s father could not serve as a qualified representative for detainee at a custody hearing; (4) appointment
of a qualified representative to represent the detainee at a custody hearing was a reasonable accommodation
under the Rehabilitation Act; (5) the likelihood of irreparable harm and the balance of hardships favored the
detainee; and (6) a mandatory injunction was warranted. (Sacramento County Jail, California)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT
FAILURE TO PROTECT
TORTURE

Green v. Floyd County, Ky., 803 F.Supp.2d 652 (E.D.Ky. 2011). The guardian for an inmate, who was severely
beaten by fellow inmates during his incarceration, brought a § 1983 action against prison guards for injuries
arising from the beatings. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court denied the
motion. The court held that the § 1983 one-year statute of limitations was tolled (postponed) by a Kentucky
statute since the inmate was “of unsound mind.” According to the court, allegations that prison guards stood by
while prison inmates led another inmate around by a leash and forced him to act like a dog were sufficient for
the inmate's guardian to state a claim of the tort of outrage, under Kentucky law, against the prison guards. The
guardian alleged that jail employees improperly classified the inmate, assigning him to a communal cell, and told
his cellmates that he had pled guilty to abusing a minor. The guardian alleged that for several days, three of the
defendant prison guards turned a blind eye as the cellmates brutally tortured the inmate. According to the
guardian, one guard saw the cellmates lead the inmate around by a leash and merely asked them to remove it,
and later "egged the prisoners on" by asking them “where's your dog tonight?” After prolonged beatings, the
cellmates finally alerted the guards when it appeared the inmate might be dying. The guardian alleged that the
inmate suffered a number of broken bones and was in a near-vegetative state, and that, as a result of his injuries,
he was incapable of making decisions for himself. (Floyd County, Kentucky)

U.S. District Court
HARASSMENT

Jordan v. Fischer, 773 F.Supp.2d 255 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). A state inmate brought a pro se § 1983 action alleging
that corrections officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights through the use of excessive force, failure to
intervene, and deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The
district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material fact as to whether the inmate was subjected to excessive force by correction
officers, given the existence of some medical evidence supporting the inmate's claims of an assault, as well as
another inmate's statement that he saw the plaintiff inmate being pulled out of line, which was inconsistent with
the correction officer's statements. The court found that the alleged “sexual slurs” made to the inmate by a prison
nurse did not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation even if the inmate felt insulted or harassed,
where the inmate alleged that the nurse, while inspecting the inmate's injuries, asked him how much the inmate
could bench press and told him he had nice muscles. (Great Meadow Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PROGRAMS
RA- Rehabilitation Act
DISCIPLINE

Keitt v. New York City, 882 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). An inmate brought a pro se suit against a state, state
agencies, a city, city agencies, and state and city officials, and corrections officers, claiming that he was dyslexic
and that the defendants failed to accommodate his disability in the public school system and in education programs offered in juvenile detention facilities and adult correctional facilities, as well as in prison disciplinary
proceedings. The court dismissed some claims and denied dismissal for other claims. The court held that the
inmate's Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) claims accrued for limitations purposes no later
than the year in which he reached the age of 21, where under New York law, a child was no longer entitled to the
protections and benefits of the IDEA after the age of 21 and did not have a right to demand a public education
beyond that age. The court found that the inmate adequately alleged the personal involvement of the Commissioner of the New York Department of Correction in an alleged ongoing violation of the inmate's constitutional
rights, stating a § 1983 claim against the Commissioner. The inmate alleged that: (1) he repeatedly gave the
Commissioner complete details of the failures of a correctional facility to accommodate the his disability; (2) the

7.107

Commissioner had “full knowledge” of the refusal to accommodate from both grievances and disciplinary appeals; (3) the Commissioner had upheld every decision denying accommodation; and (4) the Commissioner
failed to take action to remedy the ongoing violation. The court held that the inmate stated ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for compensatory damages against state and correctional officials in their official capacities
when he alleged that at least some of the accommodations he sought at a correctional facility would allow him to
overcome obstacles to his meaningful participation in existing programs and existing educational services, without fundamentally altering the programs. The court noted that New York's continued acceptance of federal funds
after 2001 waived its sovereign immunity with respect to the inmate's Rehabilitation Act claims arising after that
date, where the state's continued acceptance of federal funds was a knowing relinquishment of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The court ruled that the inmate's allegations suggested a discriminatory animus against
him because of his alleged disability, dyslexia, and thus, 11th Amendment immunity did not apply to shield the
state, state agencies and state employees from the inmate's ADA claims. (New York City Dept. of CorrectionRikers Island, State of New York Dept. of Corr'l. Services, Elmira Corr'l. Facility)
U.S. District Court
EXECUTION

Link v. Luebbers, 830 F.Supp.2d 729 (E.D.Mo. 2011). After federal habeas proceedings were terminated, federally-appointed counsel filed vouchers seeking payment under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), for work performed on a prisoner's executive clemency proceedings and civil cases challenging Missouri's execution protocol. The district court held that counsel were entitled to compensation for pursuing the prisoner's § 1983 action
for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging denial of due process in his clemency proceedings, but that counsel
were not entitled to compensation for work performed in the § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution
protocol. The court noted that the prisoner's § 1983 action challenging Missouri's execution protocol was not
integral to the prisoner's executive clemency proceedings. (Missouri)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
WORK

Martin v. Benson, 827 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Minn.2011). A civilly committed sex offender and resident of the
Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) facility brought a pro se action against the chief executive officer
(CEO) of MSOP, alleging the CEO violated the minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) by withholding 50% of his earnings as a work-related expense to be applied toward the cost of care. The
CEO moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the economic reality of the
civilly committed sex offender's work within the MSOP vocational work program was not the type of employment covered by FLSA. The court noted that the program was specifically designed to provide “meaningful
work skills training, educational training, and development of proper work habits and extended treatment services for civilly committed sex offenders,” and to the extent that the program engaged in commercial activity, it
was incidental to the program's primary purpose of providing meaningful work for sex offenders. According to
the court, the program had few of the indicia of traditional, free market employment, as the limits on the program
prevented it from operating in a truly competitive manner, and the offender's basic needs were met almost entirely by the State. The court noted that the conclusion that the FLSA does not apply to a civilly committed sex
offender should not be arrived at just because, as a committed individual, he is confined like those in prison or
because his confinement is related to criminal activity, “…it is not simply an individual's status as a prisoner that
determines the applicability of the FLSA, but the economic reality itself that determines the availability of the
law's protections.” (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Maxwell v. South Bend Work Release Center, 787 F.Supp.2d 819 (N.D.Ind. 2011). An inmate who worked for a
metal products production facility pursuant to a work release program brought an action against the employer
alleging discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The employer moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the metal products production facility which employed prisoners in a work-release center was not a public entity within the
meaning of Title II of the ADA, where the facility was a private for-profit corporation, and merely contracting
with a public entity for the provision of some service did not make the facility an instrumentality of the state.
The court noted that the production facility was not a program or activity receiving federal assistance, as required to support the prisoner's claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the facility was a private employer,
and even if the facility participated in a joint venture with the state's department of corrections, it did not actually
receive federal financial assistance. (Indiana Dept. of Corrections, South Bend Work Release Center, Indiana)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
VICTIMS

McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011). The administrator of a decedent's estate brought a
state court action against the City of Chicago and several of its officials, and the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and its director, alleging an equal protection violation arising from a shooting incident. The action
was removed to federal court. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim. After the district
court denied the administrator's request for leave to conduct limited discovery in the hope of finding a basis for a
personal-capacity equal-protection claim against the IDOC director, the administrator appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The court found that the administrator failed to state a Monell claim against the City for violation
of the right to equal protection of the decedent, who was killed by her ex-boyfriend while he was in violation of
parole. According to the court, the complaint contained only generalized legal allegations that the City failed to
have specific policies in effect to protect victims of domestic violence from harm inflicted by those who violated
parole or court orders of protection by committing acts of domestic violence. The court noted that the complaint
did not contain factual allegations required to support plausibility of the claims, as the allegations were entirely
consistent with lawful conduct, a lawful allocation of limited police resources. (Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
DISCIPLINE

Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412 (7th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff, who had been involuntarily committed under the
Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, brought a § 1983 action against various officials of a state
institution who served on committees that disciplined him, alleging the defendants denied him due process of
law by failing to provide adequate procedural safeguards before disciplining him. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held

7.108

that the disciplinary measures to which the civil detainee was subjected were not so atypical and significant as to
constitute the deprivation of a liberty interest, and thus procedural due process protections were not triggered.
(Rushville IYC, Illinois)
U.S. Appeals Court
CORRESPONDENCE
FREE SPEECH

Perry v. Secretary, Florida Dept. of Corrections, 664 F.3d 1359 (11th Cir. 2011). An individual who operated
two pen pal services that solicited pen pals for prisoners, as well as another pen pal service, brought a civil rights
action challenging the constitutionality of a Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) rule prohibiting inmates
from soliciting pen pals. The district court granted the FDOC's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs
appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the plaintiffs, whose interests as publishers in
accessing prisoners had been harmed, had standing to bring their claims, but that the FDOC rule at issue was
rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. The court found that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in
accessing inmates and they were afforded constitutionally required due process. The court noted that the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Procunier v. Martinez set forth a three-part test to decide whether there are proper
procedural safeguards for inmate correspondence of a personal nature: (1) the inmate must receive notice of the
rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, (2) the author of the letter must be given reasonable
opportunity to protest that decision, and (3) complaints must be referred to a prison official other than the person
who originally disapproved the correspondence. (Florida Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011). A prisoner brought a § 1983 action for damages resulting from a
violent attack he allegedly suffered while he was an inmate in a county jail. The district court dismissed the
prisoner's supervisory liability claim for deliberate indifference against the sheriff in his individual capacity, and
the prisoner appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the inmate sufficiently
alleged a supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against the sheriff in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments based on allegations that the sheriff failed to act to protect inmates under his care
despite his knowledge that they were in danger because of the culpable acts of his subordinates and despite his
ability to take actions that would have protected them. The court noted that the complaint specifically alleged
numerous incidents in which inmates in county jails had been killed or injured because of the culpable actions of
the subordinates of the sheriff, that the sheriff was given notice of all of those incidents, was given notice, in
several reports, of systematic problems in the county jails under his supervision that had resulted in deaths and
injuries, and that the sheriff did not take action to protect inmates under his care despite the dangers created by
the actions of his subordinates of which he had been made aware. (Los Angeles County Jails, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
NEGLIGENCE
DUE PROCESS

Stein v. Ryan, 662 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2011). A former prisoner brought an action in state court against the state
and prison officials, alleging claims for negligence and violations of his civil rights, and seeking damages for the
time he spent in prison pursuant to an illegal sentence. Following removal to the federal court, the district court
dismissed the complaint. The former prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the officials had
no duty to discover that an Arizona court imposed an illegal sentence, they did not violate the former prisoner's
right to due process, and the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's liberty interest, as would
violate his Eighth Amendment rights. (Arizona Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
TORTURE

Tillman v. Burge, 813 F.Supp.2d 946 (N.D.Ill. 2011). A former prisoner, who served nearly 24 years in prison
for rape and murder before his conviction was vacated and charges were dismissed, brought a § 1983 action
against a city, county, police officers, police supervisors, and prosecutors, as well as a former mayor, alleging
deprivation of a fair trial, wrongful conviction, a Monell claim, conspiracy under § 1985 and § 1986, and various
state law claims. The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part
and denied in part. The court held that the former prisoner’s allegations that police officers engaged in
suppressing, destroying, and preventing discovery of exculpatory evidence, including instruments of torture used
to coerce the prisoner's confession, stated a § 1983 claim against the police officers for a Brady violation, despite
the officers' contention that the prisoner was aware of everything that he claimed was withheld at the time of the
trial. The court found that the former prisoner’s complaint, alleging that municipal officials acted in collusion
with a former mayor and a state's attorney and high-ranking police officials to deflect public scrutiny of the
actions of police officers that suppressed and prevented discovery of exculpatory evidence, which prolonged
prisoner's incarceration, stated a § 1983 claim against municipal officials for deprivation of fair trial and
wrongful conviction. According to the court, a prosecutor was not entitled to absolute immunity from the § 1983
complaint by the former prisoner, alleging that the prosecutor personally participated in the prisoner's
interrogation and that of a codefendant, and then suppressed the truth concerning those events. The court found
that the allegation put the prosecutor's conduct outside the scope of his prosecutorial function.
The court held that the complaint by the former prisoner, alleging that the former prosecutor encouraged,
condoned, and permitted the use of torture against the prisoner in order to secure a confession, stated a § 1983
claim against the prosecutor for coercive interrogation, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The court noted that the allegations supported the inference that the prosecutor participated in an investigatory
rather than a prosecutorial role. According to the court, the “Plaintiff's 46–page complaint sets forth an account
of the murder of Betty Howard and Plaintiff's arrest and prosecution for that murder, including the torture he
alleges he endured at the hands of Area 2 police officers. The complaint also details the history of torture at Area
2 and the alleged involvement of the various Defendants in that torture and in subsequent efforts to cover it up.”
(Cook County, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Broncheau, 645 F.3d 676 (4th Cir. 2011). Former federal prisoners, who had been certified, pursuant to
the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, as sexually dangerous persons and were being detained
pending hearings on the government's petitions for their commitment, moved to dismiss those petitions. The
district court granted the motions and denied the government's motion for a stay. The government appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court improperly ordered the

7.109

government to release from the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody prisoners who had upcoming terms of
supervised release, and whom the government had certified as sexually dangerous under the civil commitment
provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, and that the district court further improperly
required the government to first seek a commitment order under a competency statute before seeking civil
commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. The court noted that although the prisoners' sentences included terms
of supervised release, they fell within the class of persons in the custody of the BOP subject to certification as
being sexually dangerous, and the competency statute did not provide for a commitment on the basis of the
prisoners' sexual dangerousness. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of
2006)
2012
U.S. District Court
ALIENS
TORTURE
MILITARY FACILITY

Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315 (D.C.Cir. 2012). Survivors of detainees who died at the Guantanamo Bay
Naval Base sued the United States and a host of government officials under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The survivors asserted that the
detainees had been subjected to physical and psychological torture and abuse, inadequate medical treatment and
withholding of necessary medication, and religious abuse. The district court granted the government's motion to
be substituted as the defendant on the ATCA claims and its motion to dismiss both the ATCA and the FTCA
claims. The appeals court later denied the survivors' motion for reconsideration. The survivors appealed. The
appeals court affirmed on other grounds. The appeals court held that habeas corpus statute amendments barred
federal court jurisdiction over the action. (Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2012). The United States District
Court for the District of Nevada, issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the retroactive application of an
Assembly Bill expanding the scope of sex offender registration and notification requirements, and a Senate Bill
imposing, among other things, residency and movement restrictions on certain sex offenders. The State of
Nevada appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, dismissed as moot in part, and remanded.
The court held that the requirements of the Nevada law expanding the scope of sex offender registration and
notification requirements did not constitute retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause or
the Double Jeopardy Clause. The court noted that the intent of the Nevada legislature in passing the law was to
create a civil regulatory regime with the purpose of enhancing public safety, and the law was not so punitive in
effect or purpose that it negated the Nevada legislature's intent to enact a civil regulatory scheme. The court
found that the question of the constitutionality of retroactive application to sex offenders of the residency and
movement restrictions of the Nevada law was moot. (State of Nevada)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXECUTION
PRIVACY

Associated Press v. Otter, 682 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 2012). A coalition of media corporations filed a § 1983 action
alleging that a state's denial of the right to witness all stages of executions violated the First Amendment. The
district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, and they appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded, finding that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim. The court
held that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail, gaining access to all steps in the execution process, beginning with
the condemned prisoner's entry into the execution chamber, through insertion of intravenous lines into his body,
reading of the death warrant, and pronouncement of death. The state's asserted interests in protecting the dignity
of condemned prisoners and the sensibilities of their family and fellow inmates, and in protecting the identity of
medical team members who participated in the execution. The court noted that the state already offended the
dignity of condemned inmates and the sensibilities of their families and fellow inmates by allowing strangers to
watch as they were put to death, that medical team members could wear surgical garb to mask their identities,
and there was no evidence that the state was unable to recruit and retain medical team members to participate in
executions. (State of Idaho)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
SEARCH
MEDICAL CARE

Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 2012). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 action against Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS)
officials and Minnesota Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, alleging that various MSOP policies and
practices relating to the patients' conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and the patients appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals
court held that: (1) the MSOP policy of performing unclothed body searches of patients was not unreasonable;
(2) the policy of placing full restraints on patients during transport was not unreasonable; (3) officials were not
liable for using excessive force in handcuffing patients; (4) the officials' seizure of televisions from the patients'
rooms was not unreasonable; (5) the MSOP telephone-use policy did not violate the First Amendment; and (6)
there was no evidence that officials were deliberately indifferent to the patients' health or safety. According to
the court, the MSOP identified reasons for its policy requiring 13–inch clear-chassis televisions or 17– to 19–
inch flat-screen televisions--that the shelves in patients' rooms could safely hold those televisions, and that a
clear-chassis or flat-screen television would reduce contraband concealment. According to the court, those justifications implicated both patient safety and MSOP's interest in maintaining security and order at the institution
and making certain no contraband reached patients. The court also found that the (MSOP) telephone-use policy
did not violate the First Amendment free speech rights of patients who were civilly committed to MSOP. According to the court, the policy of monitoring patients' non-legal telephone calls and prohibiting incoming calls
was reasonably related to MSOP's security interests in detecting and preventing crimes and maintaining a safe
environment. The court upheld the 30-minute limit on the length of calls, finding it was reasonably related to the
legitimate governmental interest of providing phone access to all patients, and that patients had viable alternatives by which they may exercise their First Amendment rights, including having visitors or sending or receiving
mail, and patients had abused telephone privileges prior to implementation of the policy by engaging in criminal
activity or other counter-therapeutic behavior by phone. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

7.110

U.S. District Court
CONSPIRACY
CLASSIFICATION
DISCIPLINE

Brown v. Hannah, 850 F.Supp.2d 471 (M.D.Pa. 2012). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against prison
officials, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The officials filed a motion to dismiss
and the district court granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the inmate did not have a liberty interest
in remaining free from disciplinary confinement; (2) placement in confinement was not an atypical and
significant hardship; (3) the inmate did not have a constitutionally protected right in the prison setting to use
inappropriate, disrespectful, and derogatory language to a prison official; (4) rejection of his grievance was not
an attempt to frustrate his ability to pursue a lawsuit; and (5) allegations were insufficient to state a conspiracy
claim. (State Correctional Institution, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
VICTIMS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEX OFFENDER

Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 881 F.Supp.2d 833 (N.D.Ohio 2012).The estate of a murder victim brought an
action against police officers, cities, and other defendants under § 1981, § 1983, and state law. The defendants
moved for dismissal and judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motions. The court held that
the wrongful death claims brought by the estate of the murder victim against the County Board of
Commissioners, alleging actions or inactions of the County through its officials and employees, with respect to
the monitoring of the murderer as a registered sex offender, were based on the County's provision or nonprovision of police services or protection, and/or enforcement of the law, and therefore they fell within the
general grant of immunity in the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act for political subdivisions engaged
in governmental functions. The court found that the wrongful death claims brought by the estate against the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (ODRC) were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, since the
ODRC had not consented to suit in the district court. The court noted that as a state agency, ODRC is not a
“person” that can be held liable for money damages under § 1983. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Corrections, Cuyahoga County Board of Commissioners, Ohio)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
SEX OFFENDER

Doe v. Caldwell, 913 F.Supp.2d 262 (E.D.La. 2012). Offenders convicted of violating Louisiana's Crime Against
Nature by Solicitation statute filed a class action against state officials, challenging the enforcement of
Louisiana's sex offender registry law. State officials moved to dismiss, and the offenders moved for class
certification and for summary judgment. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court
held that allegations that a provision of the sex offender registry law requiring individuals convicted of violating
Louisiana's Crime Against Nature by Solicitation statute to register as sex offenders, but not requiring
individuals convicted under the Louisiana Prostitution statute to register as sex offenders, was without any
rational basis, and stated a § 1983 equal protection claim. (Louisiana Crime Against Nature by Solicitation
Statute)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER

Doe v. Nebraska, 898 F.Supp.2d 1086 (D.Neb. 2012). Sex offenders who were required to register under the
Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act and the offenders' family members brought an action against a state
alleging that portions of the Act violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Ex Post Facto
Clause, and the Fourth Amendment. The district court held that: (1) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of
social networking web sites, instant messaging, and chat room services accessible by minors was not narrowly
tailored; (2) the statute criminalizing registrants' use of web sites was overbroad; (3) the statute requiring
registrants' disclosure of domain names and blog sites used was not narrowly tailored; (4) the statute
criminalizing registrants' use of web sites was vague under the Due Process Clause; and, (5) the statutes violated
the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court noted that a statute is “narrowly tailored” to regulate content-neutral speech
under the First Amendment, if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the evil it seeks to
remedy. The district court opened its opinion with the following: “Earlier I paraphrased Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes and observed that if the people of Nebraska wanted to go to hell, it was my job to help them get there.
By that, I meant that it is not my prerogative to second-guess Nebraska's policy judgments so long as those
judgments are within constitutional parameters. Accordingly, I upheld many portions of Nebraska's new sex
offender registration laws even though it was my firm personal view that those laws were both wrongheaded and
counterproductive. However, I had serious constitutional concerns about three sections of Nebraska's new law….
I have decided that the remaining portions of Nebraska's sex offender registry laws are unconstitutional.”
(Nebraska)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Doe v. Raemisch, 895 F.Supp.2d 897 (E.D.Wis. 2012). Two offenders, one from Connecticut and one from
Florida, who were subject to Wisconsin's sex offender registration and notification statutes, sued the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections (DOC), its Secretary, and the Director of the DOC's Sex Offender Program, alleging
that application and enforcement of registration requirements violated their constitutional and statutory rights.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in
part. The court held that: (1) the registration requirement was not punitive; but, (2) a provision authorizing the
imposition of a $100 annual fee violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) the statutes did not violate the offenders'
constitutional equal protection rights; (4) the statutes did not violate the offenders' equal protection or
substantive due process rights by denying them an individualized, risk-determination-based judicial system; (5)
the registration law did not constitute an unconstitutional legislative impairment of the offenders' plea
agreements; (6) the offenders had no First Amendment cause of action regarding requirements to provide e-mail
addresses and websites they maintained; and (7) the defendant officials were entitled to qualified immunity. The
court noted that, except for an annual fee requirement, Wisconsin's sex offender registration law was reasonable
in light of its non-punitive objective, and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the fact that the
registration law might deter sex offenders from violating the law did not establish that the registration
requirement itself was punitive, and the fact that offenders had to travel to specified law enforcement facilities to
have their photographs taken and to be fingerprinted was not sufficiently severe to transform an otherwise nonpunitive measure into a punitive one. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

7.111

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

Edmond v. Clements, 896 F.Supp.2d 960 (D.Colo. 2012). A parolee brought a civil rights action alleging that his
constitutional rights were violated when he failed to receive a $100 cash payment upon his release from a state
prison to parole, and by state corrections officials' failure to perform a proper sex offender evaluation, which
resulted in the parolee being improperly ordered to participate in sex offense treatment that included a
requirement that he have no contact with his children. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion. The district court held that: (1) the private sex offender treatment program that contracted
with the state and its employees did not qualify as “state actors,” and thus, could not be liable in the parolee's §
1983 claim; (2) the claim against the executive director of the state department of corrections in his official
capacity for recovery of a cash payment was barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the executive director was
not personally liable for the cash payable to the parolee upon release; (4) the officials were not liable under §
1983 for their alleged negligent supervision, failure to instruct or warn, or failure to implement proper training
procedures for parole officers; (5) the parolee's equal protection rights were not violated; and (6) the allegations
stated a due process claim against corrections officials. According to the court, allegations by the parolee that
Colorado department of corrections officials failed to perform a proper sex offender evaluation prior to releasing
him on parole, as required by Colorado law, which allegedly resulted in a parole condition that he have no
contact with his children, stated a due process claim against the corrections officials. (Bijou Treatment &
Training Institute, under contract to the Colorado Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
ACCESS TO COURT
CONDITIONS

Gay v. Chandra, 682 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2012). A prisoner sued three mental health professionals at the prison
alleging constitutionally inadequate treatment and retaliation for a prior lawsuit. The district court required the
cost bond without evaluating the merit or lack of merit of the prisoner's claims, and then dismissed the case with
prejudice when prisoner did not post the bond he could not afford, and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court
reversed and remanded. The court held that the district court abused its discretion in failing to consider the
prisoner's current ability to afford a bond before requiring one as a condition of prosecuting a civil rights lawsuit.
The court noted that a court's authority to award costs to a prevailing party implies a power to require the posting
of a bond reasonably calculated to cover those costs, even though no statute or rule expressly authorizes such an
order. The court may require a bond where there is reason to believe that the prevailing party will find it difficult
to collect its costs when the litigation ends. The appeals court described the plaintiff as a “deeply disturbed
Illinois inmate with a long history of self-mutilation.” (Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act

Gibson v. City Municipality of New York, 692 F.3d 198 (2nd Cir. 2012). A detainee in the custody of a state's
mental health commissioner filed a civil rights action against city officials. The district court dismissed the
complaint, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the detainee was a
“prisoner” within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). According to the court, a detainee in
the custody of the state's mental health commissioner pursuant to a temporary order of observation was a
“prisoner” within the meaning of PLRA, and thus could not proceed in forma pauperis in a civil rights action
against city officials because of his previous frivolous filings, where the criminal proceedings against the
detainee were merely suspended during his confinement and observation, and would only terminate if he was
still being held at the time a temporary order expired or the criminal charges at issue were otherwise dropped.
(Kirby Forensic Psychiatric Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
MEDICAL CARE

Gonzalez v. U.S., 681 F.3d 949 (8th Cir. 2012). A former federal inmate filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), alleging that employees of the United States negligently caused a significant delay in the proper
treatment of leg injuries that he suffered while playing softball in federal custody. Following a bench trial, the
district court found the government liable and awarded compensatory damages of $813,000. The government
appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that the damages award of $813,000 was not excessive. According
to the court, the award was not excessive for the former federal inmate's pain and suffering and mental anguish
suffered from the morning he sought medical treatment for an injury to his left leg and ankle sustained in a
prison-sanctioned softball game until the date x-rays were taken approximately one month later, and the pain and
suffering and mental anguish reasonably certain to be experienced for the remainder of the former inmate's
expected life, which the district court determined to be 22 years, where the government breached a duty of care
by failing to treat the ankle in four weeks prior to the taking of x-rays, and the inmate suffered a continuing
injury following his surgery. (Federal Correctional Institution, Forrest City, Arkansas)

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION
FALSE ARREST
FAILURE TO TRAIN

Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F.Supp.2d 1231(N.D.Okla. 2012). A musician brought an action against a marshal of
the Cherokee Nation and a deputy county sheriff, sheriff, casino employees, county police officer, jail employees, and a nurse, alleging false imprisonment, assault and battery, and violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory judgment that Oklahoma law governing flag burning and
desecration was unconstitutional. The musician had been arrested and detained at a local county jail. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that
the musician's allegations that his use of an American flag during his performance at a casino was a constitutionally protected activity, that the county sheriff failed to train his deputies as to the constitutional nature of the
activity, and that the sheriff adopted an unconstitutional policy and/or custom which led to the musician's arrest
and imprisonment, stated a § 1983 claim against the sheriff in his individual capacity as a supervisor for violations of the musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court found that the musician's
allegations that the county sheriff was, at all times relevant to the musician's claims related to his arrest and
imprisonment, a commissioned law enforcement officer and the duly-elected sheriff and chief policy maker for
county sheriff's office, that the deputy sheriff was a commissioned law enforcement officer acting as a marshal
for Cherokee Nation and a deputy sheriff for the county's sheriff's office, and that the deputy sheriff was acting
as the sheriff's employee during events giving rise to the musician's claims, were sufficient to demonstrate that
the sheriff was responsible for the deputy's training and supervision, as required for the musician's § 1983

7.112

inadequate training claim against county sheriff in his official capacity. According to the court, the musician's
allegations that the county had policy or custom that was the moving force behind the alleged violation of the
musician's First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and that the policy/custom encouraged the
confinement of the musician in response to his use of an American flag during a concert for allegedly expressive
purposes, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity. The court held that the
musician's allegations that the seizure and search of his person were unconstitutional because the underlying
conduct for which he was seized was legal and did not provide lawful grounds upon which to base his arrest and
the subsequent searches of his person, stated a § 1983 claim against the county sheriff in his official capacity.
(Cherokee Casino, Rogers County Jail, Oklahoma)
U.S. District Court
AIDS- Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
CLASSIFICATION
MEDICAL CARE
PROGRAMS
RA- Rehabilitation Act
TRANSFERS
WORK

Henderson v. Thomas, 913 F.Supp.2d 1267 (M.D.Ala. 2012). Seven HIV-positive inmates brought an action on
behalf of themselves and class of all current and future HIV-positive inmates incarcerated in Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) facilities, alleging that ADOC's HIV segregation policy discriminated against them
on the basis of their disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act.
After a non-jury trial, the district court held that: (1) the class representatives had standing to sue; (2) the claims
were not moot even though one inmate had been transferred, where it was reasonable to believe that the challenged practices would continue; (3) inmates housed in a special housing unit were “otherwise qualified,” or
reasonable accommodation would render them “otherwise qualified;” (4) the blanket policy of categorically
segregating all HIV-positive inmates in a special housing unit violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act; (5)
housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not impose an undue burden on the state; and (6) foodservice policies that excluded HIV-positive inmates from kitchen jobs within prisons and prohibited HIV-positive inmates from holding food-service jobs in the work-release program irrationally excluded HIV-positive
inmates from programs for which they were unquestionably qualified and therefore violated ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The court also found that female HIV-positive class representative had standing to challenge
ADOC policies that HIV-positive women were segregated within the prison from general-population prisoners
and that women were allowed work-release housing at one facility, but not at ADOC's other work-release facility
for women. The court held that modification of the ADOC medical classification system to afford HIV-positive
inmates individualized determinations, instead of treating HIV status as a dispositive criterion regardless of viral
load, history of high-risk behavior, physical and mental health, and any other individual aspects of inmates, was
a reasonable accommodation to ensure that HIV-positive inmates housed in the prison's special housing unit
were “otherwise qualified,” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, for
integration into the general prison population. According to the court, requiring ADOC to dismantle its policy of
segregating HIV-positive female inmates in a particular dormitory at a prison would neither impose undue financial and administrative burdens nor require fundamental alteration in the nature of ADOC's operations. The court
suggested that it was almost certain that ADOC was wasting valuable resources by maintaining its segregation
policy, in that a large space at a prison filled with empty beds was being used to house only a few women. (Alabama Department of Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 2012). Sexual offenders who were civilly confined in a state
psychiatric hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVP) filed a class action against various
state officials under § 1983, challenging conditions of their confinement. The district court denied the
defendants' motion to dismiss, and the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in
part and reversed in part. Certiorari was granted. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded. On
remand, the appeals court held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court,
the civilly committed persons failed to plead plausible claims against the state hospital's administrators and
supervisory officials in their individual capacities, and thus the administrators and officials were entitled to
qualified immunity from liability for money damages under § 1983, where there was no allegation of a specific
policy or custom that caused constitutional deprivations, and no specific allegations regarding each defendant's
purported knowledge of deprivations. (Atascadero State Hospital, California)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
EXECUTION

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 906 F.Supp.2d 759 (S.D.Ohio 2012). Following consolidation of
several § 1983 actions brought by state death row inmates to challenge the constitutionality of various facets of a
state's execution protocol, one inmate moved for a stay of execution, a temporary restraining order (TRO), and a
preliminary injunction. The district court denied the motion, finding that the inmate was not likely to succeed on
the merits of his equal protection claim. The inmate alleged that the state's execution policy, including its
allegedly discretionary approach to written execution protocol and informal policies, violated his right to equal
protection by codifying the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals without sufficient justification,
entitling him to a stay of execution. (Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Jaros v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 684 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2012). A former inmate sued the Illinois Department
of Corrections, its Director, and several employees claiming violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim, and the former inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. The appeals court held that the inmate’s allegations that his use of the toilets and showers at the
prison was made more difficult by the absence of grab bars did not state an Eighth Amendment claim, where the
inmate was able to shower four times a month. He also missed meals on occasion because he could not walk fast
enough to the cafeteria. The court found that the prisoner pleaded a plausible claim for failure to make
reasonable accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act where he alleged that the Department of Corrections
refused to accommodate his disability, and consequently kept him from accessing meals and showers on the
same basis as other inmates. (Vandalia Correctional Center, Illinois)

7.113

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2012). Convicted sex offenders who, after completing their sentences,
remained in state custody as civil detainees pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act,
brought a § 1983 action, alleging constitutional problems with the conditions of their confinement at a treatment
facility. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and the detainees appealed. The appeals
court affirmed. The appeals court held that security restrictions on face-to-face interactions between the civil
detainees held in different units within the state's treatment facility for sexually violent persons (SVP) did not
constitute treatment decisions which, as a matter of due process, had to be made by health professionals, merely
because the security restrictions affected treatment options. The court found that requiring the civil detainees to
use United States Mail, rather than the facility's internal mail system, to send letters to detainees in the facility's
other units did not violate the detainees' First Amendment associational rights, even if the facility's internal mail
system was a superior means of sending letters. The court noted that commitment under the Illinois Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act is civil and may be for purposes such as incapacitation and treatment, but not
for punishment. As a general matter, persons who have been involuntarily civilly committed are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. (Rushville Treatment and Detention Center, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
SERVITUDE
PRETRIAL DETAINEE
WORK

McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505 (2nd Cir. 2012). A pretrial detainee filed an action against state prison officials
alleging that compelling him to work in a prison laundry under the threat of physical restraint and legal process
violated the Thirteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action and the detainee appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee stated a civil rights claim under
the Thirteenth Amendment, on allegations that his work in a prison laundry was compelled and maintained by
the use and the threatened use of physical and legal coercion, where state prison officials threatened to send him
to “the hole” if he refused to work and that he would thereby be subjected to 23 hour-per-day administrative
confinement and shackles. The detainee also alleged that he had been threatened with disciplinary reports, which
are alleged to be taken into consideration when making recommendations for a release date and, therefore,
lengthen any period of incarceration. The court found that the prohibition against prison officials from
rehabilitating pretrial detainees had been clearly established, and thus it was not objectively reasonable for the
prison officials to compel and maintain the pretrial detainee's work in the prison laundry by the use and
threatened use of physical and legal coercion. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified
immunity at the pleading stage of the detainee's civil rights claim. According to the court, officers of reasonable
competence should have known that compelling a pretrial detainee, as a person not “duly convicted,” to work in
the laundry for up to 14 hours per day for three days per week, doing other inmates' laundry, reasonably could
not be construed as personally-related housekeeping chores. The court found that the work constituted hard labor
solely to assist in defraying of institutional costs in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. (Chittenden
Regional Correction Facility, Vermont)

U.S. Supreme Court
JUVENILE
SENTENCE

Miller v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012). Following transfer from a state juvenile court to a state circuit court, a
defendant was convicted of capital murder, for an offense he committed when he was 14 years old. The
defendant appealed his conviction and the resulting sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.
The state appeals court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court combined this case with another similar case. The
court reversed and remanded, finding that that mandatory life imprisonment without parole for those under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments. (Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIENS

Mirmehdi v. U.S., 689 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2012). Aliens who were not lawfully in the United States filed an action
against the United States seeking monetary damages on a claim of constitutionally invalid detention, inhumane
detention conditions, witness intimidation, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court
dismissed some claims and the parties settled the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The appeals court held that: (1) Bivens did not provide a remedy for aliens not lawfully in United
States to sue federal agents for monetary damages for wrongful detention pending deportation; (2) the aliens had
not been prejudiced by witness intimidation; and (3) the decision to detain an alien pending resolution of
immigration proceedings fell within the discretionary function exception to a waiver of sovereign immunity
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, California)

U.S. District Court
VERBAL HARASSMENT
FAILURE TO PROTECT
USE OF FORCE

Morrison v. Hartman, 898 F.Supp.2d 577 (W.D.N.Y. 2012). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against
several state corrections officers, alleging use of excessive force and sexual and verbal abuse in violation of his
Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion
in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment was precluded by genuine issues of material
fact as to whether, and to what extent, the corrections officers' alleged beating of the prisoner caused injuries or
exacerbated pre–existing injuries, and whether the officers acted in a good–faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or rather with malicious and sadistic intent to cause harm. The court found that the prisoner's
allegations that a corrections officer pinched his left nipple and forced him to touch his own buttocks and then
his mouth were not severe enough to be considered objectively and sufficiently serious to support the prisoner's
§ 1983 claim of sexual abuse in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, the prisoner's
allegations of verbal abuse by a corrections officer during an incident in which officers allegedly beat the
prisoner did not state an independent § 1983 claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, but those
allegations were potentially admissible in support of the prisoner's excessive force claim against the officer in
relation to the beating. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)

7.114

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
LIABILITY

Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012). Insurers that, pursuant to commercial
general liability policies, provided law enforcement liability coverage to a city and its employees acting within
the scope of their employment, brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking declarations that they had no duty
to defend or indemnify the city or its employees in a third-party action in which a civil rights plaintiff alleged
that the city and its police officers played a role in his wrongful conviction. The district court granted summary
judgment for the insurers and the defendants appealed. The appeals court affirmed, finding that coverage did not
exist for a claim alleging false arrest and imprisonment. (Waukegan, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL ILLNESS

Paine v. Cason, 678 F.3d 500 (7th Cir. 2012). The guardian of the estate of an arrestee, who allegedly suffered
from bipolar disorder, brought a § 1983 action against a municipality and police officers, alleging civil rights
violations in connection with the arrest and subsequent release from custody without being provided access to
mental health treatment. The arrestee was raped at knifepoint after her release and either jumped or was pushed
from a window, causing permanent brain damage. The district court denied summary judgment in part for the
defendants. The defendants sought relief through interlocutory appeal. The appeals court affirmed in part, denied
in part, and remanded. The appeals held that: (1) the arrestee, as a person in custody, had clearly a established
right for police to provide care for her serious medical condition; (2) whether the police should have understood
that the arrestee had a serious medical condition, and thus should have provided care, was a factual issue that
could not be decided on interlocutory appeal; (3) causation was a factual issue not suited to resolution on
interlocutory appeal of denial of qualified immunity; (4) the arrestee did not have a clearly established
constitutional right for her release to be delayed pending mental-health treatment; (5) the arrestee had a clearly
established due process right for the police to not create danger, without justification, by arresting her in a safe
place and releasing her in a hazardous one while unable to protect herself; (6) the arresting officer was entitled
to qualified immunity; (7) the watch officer was not entitled to qualified immunity; and (8) a detention aide was
not entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, a police officer who was responsible for preparing the
arrestee's individual-recognizance bond and collecting possessions that were to be returned on her release, and
who received a telephone call from the mother of the arrestee regarding the arrestee's bi-polar condition and did
nothing in response and who did not even note the call in a log, was not entitled to qualified immunity to the
civil rights claims that the police had created a danger, without justification. The court found that the detention
aide who was responsible for evaluating inmates, observed the arrestee behaving in a mentally unstable way,
such as smearing menstrual blood on her cell walls, and transferred another person out of the arrestee's cell
because of her inappropriate behavior, and yet did nothing to alert other personnel at the stationhouse, was not
entitled to qualified immunity to the civil rights claims that the police did not arrange for medical treatment of
serious conditions while the arrestee's custody continued. (Eighth District Station, Second District Station,
Chicago Police Department)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
RESPONDEAT
SUPERIOR
DUE PROCESS

Patel v. Moron, 897 F.Supp.2d 389 (E.D.N.C. 2012). A federal prisoner brought a Bivens action against prison
officials, alleging, among other things, deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, violation of due process, retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, and denial of access to
courts. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a protective order and stay, and the
prisoner moved for a temporary restraining order, for a continuance to permit discovery, and to strike portions of
the defendants' motion to dismiss. The district court held that: (1) the prisoner was not responsible for failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the prisoner’s
allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim; (3) the prisoner’s
allegations were sufficient to state a due process claim that he was placed in solitary confinement in violation of
the Bureau of Prison's regulations and without having a legitimate investigation or a pending disciplinary charge;
and (4) the allegations were sufficient to state a claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The
court dismissed claims that were based on the theory of respondeat superior. According to the court, prison
officials' refusal to provide grievance forms and interference with the prisoner’s efforts to exhaust administrative
remedies did not violate the prisoner's First Amendment right of access to courts. (Federal Correctional Center in
Butner, North Carolina, and Rivers Correctional Institution, operated by the GEO Group, Inc)

U.S. Appeals Court
EQUAL PROTECTION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
WORK

Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193 (2nd Cir. 2012). African–American inmates brought actions under § 1983 and
§ 1985 against New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) employees, alleging that they were
subjected to discrimination on account of their race in connection with their inmate jobs in a print shop. The
actions were consolidated for discovery purposes. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants and the plaintiffs appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The appeals court held that the disparateimpact theory of liability was not applicable to the African-American inmates' class claims against individual
state officials under §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, which relied on an equal protection racial discrimination
violation as the underlying basis, since equal protection always required intentional discrimination, and disparate
impact did not. At the time the suits here were filed, inmates employed in the prison print shop were paid an
hourly wage, which ranged from sixteen cents to sixty-five cents per hour depending on the inmate's experience
and expertise. In addition, inmates were eligible to receive an “incentive bonus” as a reward for good work.
Civilian supervisors determined, in their discretion, whether a particular inmate merited promotion and higher
pay. Similarly, these supervisors could recommend to the prison Program Committee—the entity tasked with
assigning and removing inmates from various prison programs—that inmates be terminated from employment in
the print shop. As a general matter, an inmate would be removed upon two requests. The plaintiffs alleged that
print shop supervisors demoted minority inmates more often than white inmates, confined minority inmates to
low-paying positions, and unfairly docked the pay of minority inmates. (Elmira Corr’l. Facility, New York)

7.115

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
NEGLIGENCE

Ruffins v. Department of Correctional Services, 907 F.Supp.2d 290 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). A plaintiff brought a §
1983 action against a state's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its commissioner and several
employees, and the state's Division of Parole and its chairperson and several employees, alleging wrongful
detention for violations of an allegedly illegally-imposed term of post-release supervision (PRS), false arrest and
imprisonment, negligence, and a New York state claim for gross negligence. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion. The court held that the individual defendants, who were employees of New
York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) or Division of Parole, were entitled to qualified immunity
for their actions during the time between the administrative imposition of a term of post-release supervision
(PRS) and a court decision, which found that such imposition of PRS violated due process guarantees. (New
York State Division of Parole, Department of Correctional Services for the State of New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

Schepers v. Commissioner, Indiana Dept. of Correction, 691 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2012). Persons required to
register on Indiana's sex and violent offender registry brought a putative class action against the Indiana
Department of Correction (DOC) pursuant to § 1983, alleging that failure to provide a procedure to correct errors
violated Fourteenth Amendment due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the DOC and the
registrants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the DOC had
sufficient responsibility under state law and in practice over registry to be compelled to provide potential relief.
The court noted that the DOC, under state law, was ultimately responsible for the creation, publication, and
maintenance of the registry, the DOC contracted with a sheriff's association to publish the registry, and the DOC
decided what information was to be displayed. The court found that policies for review of information on the
registry were inadequate, noting that there was no process whatsoever for registrants who were not incarcerated,
that not all registrants were first incarcerated, and there was no guarantee mistakes would not be made later after
a registrant was released from incarceration. (Indiana Sex and Violent Offender Registry, Indiana Department of
Correction)

U.S. District Court
EXHAUSTION

Sieverding v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 910 F.Supp.2d 149 (D.D.C. 2012). A litigant who had been arrested and
detained for civil contempt based on abusive litigation practices brought a pro se Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), and Privacy Act claims against the Department of Justice (DOJ). The DOJ moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the litigant failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies in her action to obtain documents from the United States Marshals Service (USMS)
related to her arrest and detention for civil contempt. The litigant and her husband originally sued dozens of
individuals and entities for damages arising out of a property dispute with her neighbors in Idaho. (U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Strutton v. Meade, 668 F.3d 549 (8th Cir. 2012). A civilly-committed sex offender brought a civil rights action
challenging the adequacy of his treatment at the Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center. The district court
entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiff appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court
found that the offender had standing to bring the due process challenge to the adequacy of Missouri's four-phase
treatment program for such offenders, where he demonstrated that his alleged injury of not advancing in
treatment was not due solely to his own recalcitrance and could have been due to the lack of adequate treatment
resources. But according to the court, the treatment received by offender did not shock the conscience, in
violation of substantive due process. The court noted that although budget shortfalls and staffing shortages
resulted in treatment modifications that were below standards set in place by the center's directors, temporary
modifications in the treatment regimen of eliminating psychoeducational classes and increasing the size of
process groups was neither arbitrary nor egregious, and the center sought to maintain essential treatment services
in light of the challenges it faced.
The court found that the treatment center's use of the “restriction table” and the later use of a restriction
area in treating the civilly-committed sex offender did not shock the conscience, and thus did not violate
offender's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. A resident assigned to the Restriction Table, which was
located near a nurses' station, was not permitted to speak to another person unless that person was also seated at
the table, and was only allowed to leave the table for meals, classes, process groups, and for an hour of exercise.
Residents would remain at the table from early morning until late evening. Despite its name, residents assigned
to the Restriction Table were not physically restrained and were allowed to stand, stretch, get a drink of water, or
use the restroom as needed. Use of the table was discontinued and it was replaced with a “Restriction Area.”
According to the court, residents assigned to a restriction table or restriction area retained a comparatively free
range of movement and activities, including the ability to get up and stretch, to leave to attend group sessions
and meetings, to converse with other residents, to work on homework or legal issues, and to play cards.
(Missouri Sexual Offender Treatment Center)

U.S. Appeals Court
VOTING

Swann v. Secretary, Georgia, 668 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2012). A former inmate at a county jail brought a civil
rights action against a state and county officials, alleging that the officials failed to mail him a presidential
absentee ballot at the jail. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The former
inmate appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the
former inmate lacked standing to bring an action against county officials for their failure to mail him an absentee
ballot for the presidential election at the county jail, where the inmate's non-receipt of a ballot was not fairly
traceable to any action of the officials, but only to inmate's own conduct, since the inmate failed to provide the
address of the jail on his absentee ballot application. (DeKalb County Jail, Georgia)

7.116

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
MENTAL ILLNESS
SEX OFFENDER

U.S. v. Wetmore, 700 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 2012). The government brought an action seeking the civil commitment
of an inmate as a “sexually dangerous person” under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act. The
district court entered an order directing the inmate's commitment, and the inmate appealed. The appeals court
affirmed. The court found that the inmate was “in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons” (BOP) when the civil
commitment proceeding was instituted, the inmate had been diagnosed with pedophilia, and with paraphilia
characterized by hebephilia and therefore suffered from a “serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder,” as
required for him to be subject to civil commitment. According to the court, evidence clearly and convincingly
showed that the inmate would have serious difficulty refraining from child molestation if he were released.
(Federal Bureau of Prisons, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION

U.S. v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2012). The government commenced a proceeding to commit an inmate as
a “sexually dangerous person” under the civil-commitment provisions of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act (Act). The district court dismissed the government's petition and ordered the inmate released. The
government appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that: (1) application of
the Act to the inmate did not violate Due Process or Equal Protection; (2) the district court's determination that
the inmate no longer suffered from pedophilia, and therefore did not suffer from a serious mental illness,
abnormality or disorder, was clearly erroneous; and (3) the district court's determination that the inmate would
not have “serious difficulty refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released” was clearly
erroneous. (Federal Correctional Institute, Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
CLASSIFICATION
DUE PROCESS
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
TRANSFER

Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2012). Past and present inmates in the custody of the Illinois Department
of Corrections (IDOC), who had been incarcerated in a supermax prison, brought a § 1983 action against IDOC
officials and employees, alleging that defendants violated their right to procedural due process by employing
unconstitutionally inadequate procedures when assigning inmates to the supermax prison, and seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief. The district court granted injunctive relief, and the defendants appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded with instructions. The appeals court held that the scope and specificity of the district
court's injunction exceeded what was required to remedy a due-process violation, contrary to the terms of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and cautionary language from the Supreme Court about remedial
flexibility and deference to prison administrators. The court held that the IDOC's ten–point plan should be used
as a constitutional baseline, revising the challenged procedures and including a detailed transfer-review process.
According to the court, this would eliminate the operational discretion and flexibility of prison administrators,
far exceeding what due process required and violating the mandate of the PLRA. The court found that, under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), injunctive relief to remedy unconstitutional prison conditions must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional violation, and use the least
intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right. The court noted that informal due process, which is
mandatory for inmates transferred to a supermax prison, requires some notice of the reasons for the inmate's
placement and enough time to prepare adequately for the administrative review. The court found that, to satisfy
due process regarding inmates transferred to a supermax prison, only a single prison official is needed as a
neutral reviewer, not necessarily a committee, noting that informal due process requires only that the inmate be
given an opportunity to present his views, not necessarily a full-blown hearing. Similarly, the informal due
process does not necessarily require a written decision describing the reasons for an inmate's placement, or
mandate an appeal procedure. (Closed Maximum Security Unit, Tamms Correctional Center, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
HABEAS CORPUS
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT

Wiley v. Buncombe County, 846 F.Supp.2d 480 (W.D.N.C. 2012). A pretrial detainee brought an action under §
1983 and § 1985 against a county, sheriff, jail, and court official, alleging that the defendants unlawfully
subjected him to multiple periods of involuntary commitment and failed to take proper action on a state habeas
corpus petition that he filed challenging the periods of commitment. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion. The court held that: (1) the detainee could not maintain a § 1983 action
challenging the terms of his confinement; (2) the clerk had quasi-judicial immunity from the pretrial detainee's §
1983 claim; (3) the jail was not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983; (4) the county could not be liable to the
pretrial detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff; and (5) the county could not be liable to the pretrial
detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the county clerk. The court noted that under North Carolina law, the
county had no control over the sheriff's employees and/or control over the jail, and therefore county could not be
liable to the detainee under § 1983 for the actions of the sheriff or those of his detention officers for events that
occurred at a jail operated by the sheriff. (Buncombe County Detention Facility, North Carolina)
2013

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS

Allen v. Clements, 930 F.Supp.2d 1252 (D.Colo. 2013). Inmates in the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) who had been sentenced to indeterminate terms of imprisonment under the Colorado Sex Offender
Lifetime Supervision Act (SOLSA) brought a class action against CDOC officials, alleging under § 1983 that the
officials were arbitrarily denying them sex offender treatment and interfering with their access to counsel and
courts. The officials moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion. The
court held that: (1) the inmates failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim; (2) terminating one inmate's
treatment because of polygraphs did not violate due process; (3) denial of re-enrollment requests did not
implicate the inmates' liberty interests; (4) termination procedures comported with procedural due process; and
(5) the inmates failed to state a substantive due process claim. The court found that terminating two inmates'
treatment because one had a rash and the other reported a telephone call in which his cousin mentioned seeing
his children implicated the inmates' liberty interests protected by due process because the reasons for termination
were not reasonably related to the goals of their treatment. But the court noted that there was no indication that

7.117

the alleged deprivation extended the inmates' sentences, and that procedures providing for a treatment waitlist
and for state judicial review of CDOC termination decisions existed, and the two inmates had already been able
to re-enroll in treatment multiple times. (Colorado Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION
RA- Rehabilitation Act

Armstrong v. Brown, 732 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2013). Disabled state prisoners and parolees brought a class action
against state prison officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act. Seventeen years later, the plaintiffs moved for an order requiring officials to track and
accommodate the needs of the class members housed in county jails and to provide a workable grievance
procedure. The prisoners and parolees filed a renewed motion, which the district court granted. The defendants
appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part. The court held that: (1) Amendments to the
California Penal Code relating to the legal custody of parolees did not relieve officials of responsibility for the
discrimination suffered by disabled parolees housed in county jails, past and present, or of their obligation to
assist in preventing further Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations; and (2) orders requiring officials
to track and accommodate the needs of disabled prisoners and parolees housed in county jails and to provide a
workable grievance procedure were consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Rehabilitation Act and did not infringe on California's prerogative to structure its internal affairs. (California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
PRIVACY
SEARCH
SEX OFFENDER

Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369 (8th Cir 2013). Patients at a state Civil Commitment Unit for Sex Offenders
(CCUSO) brought a § 1983 complaint against CCUSO administrators, challenging placement of video cameras
in CCUSO restrooms, and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop their use. The district court denied the
motion as to cameras in “dormitory style restrooms” but granted an injunction ordering that cameras in
“traditional style bathrooms” be pointed at a ceiling or covered with lens cap. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that CCUSO conducted a “search” by capturing images of patients while occupying singleuser bathrooms, and that CCUSO did not conduct a reasonable search by capturing patients' images, thereby
constituting a Fourth Amendment violation. The appeals court found that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in issuing preliminary injunctive relief. The court noted that the patients had a reasonable expectation
of privacy in a single-person bathroom when there was no immediate indication it was being used for purposes
other than those ordinarily associated with bathroom facilities, and that involuntarily civilly committed persons
retain the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches that is analogous to the right retained
by pretrial detainees. According to the court, the facility did not conduct a reasonable search of its involuntarily
committed patients by capturing images of patients while they occupied single-user bathrooms in a secure
facility, thereby constituting a violation of Fourth Amendment, where the cameras did not provide administrators
with immediate alerts concerning patient safety or prevent assaults or dangerous acts, and less intrusive methods
were available for administrators to use to prevent illicit activities by patients. (Iowa Civil Commitment Unit for
Sex Offenders)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION

Barnes v. Ross, 926 F.Supp.2d 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). A mentally ill inmate brought a § 1983 action against the
Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and
employees of the New York Office of Mental Health asserting Eighth Amendment and equal protection claims.
The mentally ill African-American inmate alleged that he and other minorities were subject to discriminatory
treatment because of their race, in that white inmates were sent to the hospital for proper treatment, while
African-Americans and Latino inmates were placed in observation for long periods and then were sent back to
their cells, where they would harm themselves or try to commit suicide. The defendants moved to dismiss. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) requirements of class
certification were not satisfied; (2) the inmate failed to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs; (3) the inmate stated a claim of racial discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause; (4) the inmate adequately alleged the personal involvement of an
employee; but (5) the inmate did not adequately allege the personal involvement of the Commissioner. The court
held that the employees were not entitled to qualified immunity because the right of a prisoner to be free from
racial discrimination was clearly established, and the inmate adequately alleged that the employees intentionally
discriminated against him on account of his race. (Sullivan Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CONDITIONS
DUE PROCESS
HYGIENE
MEDICAL CARE
OVERCROWDING

Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2013). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that, as a pretrial
detainee, he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement at a county jail and that the sheriff was
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. The district court dismissed the complaint, and the inmate appealed.
The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The appeals court held that the detainee's
allegations were sufficient to state a plausible claim under the Due Process Clause for subjecting him to
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The prisoner alleged that: (1) on one occasion he was confined with
eight inmates in a portion of the county jail intended for three; (2) he had to sleep on the floor alongside broken
windows and cracked toilets; (3) on another occasion he and other inmates had to sleep on the floor even though
shower water leaked there; (4) cells had broken windows, exposed wiring, extensive rust, sinks without running
water, toilets covered in mold and spider webs, and a broken heating and cooling system; (5) inmates were
denied any recreation; and (6) the jail furnished inmates with no supplies to clean for themselves.
The appeals court found that county jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to the pretrial detainee's
serious medical needs, in violation of the Due Process Clause even if he was dissatisfied with the treatment he
received from a jail nurse. The court noted that the detainee was taken to see a nurse as soon as he informed the
officer on duty about his leg wound, he was taken to a hospital promptly after writing a letter to the sheriff
asking to see a doctor, and the detainee received medical attention, medication, testing, and ongoing observation
at the hospital. (Edgar County Jail, Illinois)

7.118

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
RA- Rehabilitation Act
WORK

Castle v. Eurofresh, Inc., 731 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2013). A former state prisoner brought an action against the
state, the state department of corrections (DOC), prison officials, and a private employer who contracted with the
state to provide off-site work to prisoners pursuant to a DOC program, alleging violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court dismissed claims against the private
employer, and granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants. The prisoner appealed. The court
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The court held that the state prisoner who performed work for a
private employer that contracted with the state department of corrections (DOC) to provide work opportunities to
prisoners through DOC's off-site work program was not “employed” by that private employer, within the
meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), where the prisoner had a legal obligation to work under
state law. According to the court, the Rehabilitation Act did not apply to the private employer, where the
employer did not affirmatively choose to receive any federal funding, either directly or indirectly. But the court
found that the DOC could not “contract away” its liability for the alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitations Act by the private employer, and the district court should not
have granted judgment for the DOC. (Arizona Department of Corrections, Work Incentive Pay Program,
Arizona Correctional Industries)

U.S. District Court
CONDITIONS
OVERCROWDING

Coleman v. Brown, 922 F.Supp.2d 1004 (E.D.Cal. 2013). State prison inmates brought Eighth Amendment
challenges to the adequacy of mental health care and medical health care provided to mentally ill inmates and the
general prison population, respectively. The inmates moved to convene a three-judge panel of the district court
to enter a population reduction order that was necessary to provide effective relief. The motions were granted
and the cases were assigned to same panel, which ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5% of
its design capacity. The state moved to vacate or modify the population reduction order. The district court denied
the motion. The three-judge panel of the district court held that: (1) the state's contention that prison crowding
was reduced and no longer a barrier to providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment did not
provide the basis for a motion to vacate the order on the ground that changed circumstances made it inequitable
to continue applying the order; (2) the state failed to establish that prison crowding was no longer a barrier to
providing inmates with care required by the Eighth Amendment; and (3) the state failed to establish it had
achieved a durable remedy to prison crowding. (California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL ILLNESS

Coleman v. Brown, 938 F.Supp.2d 955 (E.D.Cal. 2013). California state prisoners with serious mental disorders
brought a class action against various prison and state officials, alleging failure to provide mental care in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. After a three-judge court found that overcrowding was the primary cause of
ongoing constitutional violations, and was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, officials moved to
terminate all prospective relief and vacate the judgment. The district court denied the motion, holding that: (1)
there remained an ongoing violation of the Eighth Amendment in inadequate assessment, treatment, or
intervention regarding prisoner suicides; (2) prisoners placed in administrative segregation units continued to
face a substantial risk of harm; (3) prisoners continued to face delays in access to care; (4) prisons continued to
have shortages in treatment space and access to beds; and (5) officials were deliberately indifferent in
implementing policies to remedy the Eighth Amendment violations. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

U.S. District Court
LAW LIBRARIES
ACCESS TO COURT

Cox v. LNU, 924 F.Supp.2d 1269 (D.Kan. 2013). A state inmate brought a pro se civil rights action in state
court. The defendants removed the action to federal court. The inmate moved to secure case law cited in the
defendants' court filings and for the appointment of counsel. The district court denied the motions. The court
held that: (1) the defendants were not required to furnish copies of unpublished cases that were available through
electronic providers; (2) the court would not exercise its discretion to require the defendants to provide copies of
published decisions; (3) the inmate's declaration that he was “broke” and had “no money or assets for anything”
did not qualify as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis; and (4) even if the inmate qualified for in forma
pauperis status, discretionary authority to request appointment of counsel would not be exercised. (Johnson
County Jail, Kansas)

U.S. District Court
FALSE ARREST
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Donahoe v. Arpaio, 986 F.Supp.2d 1091 (D.Ariz. 2013). A former member of a county board of supervisors
brought an action against the sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, a former county attorney, and deputy county
attorneys, asserting claims under § 1983 and state law for wrongful institution of civil proceedings, malicious
prosecution, false imprisonment and arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful search. The
parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion, and granted in part
and denied in part the defendants’ motions. The court held that summary judgment for the defendants was
precluded by fact issues: (1) with respect to the malicious prosecution claims; (2) as to whether
misrepresentations and omissions of evidence in a search warrant affidavit were material; (3) as to unlawful
search claims against the sheriff and deputy county attorneys; (4) with respect to the false arrest claim; and (5)
with respect to the claim for wrongful institution of civil proceedings. The court noted that a reasonable
magistrate would not have issued a search warrant based on the accurate and complete representation of known
evidence. The court held that the retaliatory animus of the county sheriff and prosecutors would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from criticizing the sheriff and prosecutors and from vigorously litigating against them.
According to the court, fact issues as to whether the county sheriff and prosecutors acted outrageously and either
intended the arrestee harm, or were recklessly indifferent to whether their actions would infringe on his rights
and cause him severe distress, precluded summary judgment for the defendants with regard to the claim for
punitive damages in the action for unlawful search, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment
violations. (Maricopa County Sheriff and County Attorneys, Arizona)

7.119

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
VERBAL HARASSMENT
CLASSIFICATION

Fletcher v. Little, 5 F.Supp.3d 655 (D.Del. 2013). A state prisoner brought a § 1983 action against a prison
official, alleging that the official failed to protect him from an attempted rape by a known sexual offender and
that she discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation as a homosexual. The prisoner filed motions to
compel, for appointment of counsel, for partial summary judgment, and for a preliminary injunction, and the
official filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court denied the prisoner’s motions and granted the
official’s motion. The court held that the prison official was not deliberately indifferent to the risk that the
prisoner would be assaulted by a cellmate because of the prisoner's homosexuality, where the official did not
ignore the prisoner's concern. The court noted that before the assault, the official had the prisoner and cellmate
removed from their cell and separately interviewed them. Each reported they feared the other, the official
instructed them to “stop bickering” or face time in isolation, they agreed to stop and were returned to the cell,
and when the official conducted a check 30 minutes later, the prisoner and cellmate were asleep in their beds.
The court found that the prison official's alleged statements to the homosexual prisoner, including a comment
that because he was a “gay man,” he should expect harassment from other inmates who had “not been with a
woman in a long time,” and that he should “man-up and stop coming to jail,” did not support an equal protection
claim, no matter how offensive or derogatory the alleged statements were, because they were merely verbal
abuse. (James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Delaware)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
DUE PROCESS

Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F.Supp.2d 258 (D.Mass. 2013). An alien, a lawful permanent resident who was
subjected to mandatory detention pending removal five years after his arrest for narcotics possession, petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, seeking
an individualized bond hearing to challenge his ongoing detention. The government moved to dismiss. The
district court allowed the petition, finding that the phrase “when the alien is released” in the statute authorizing
mandatory detention of criminal aliens meant “at the time of release,” and that the petitioner was entitled to a
bond hearing for consideration of the possibility of his release on conditions. (Franklin County Jail and House of
Correction, Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Sheriff of Bristol County, Sheriff of Plymouth
County, Sheriff of Suffolk County, Massachusetts)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F.Supp.2d 987 (C.D.Cal. 2013). An Hispanic state inmate, whose ethnicity was
classified as “other,” brought an in forma pauperis civil rights action against California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) officials, alleging, among other things, that the officials discriminated
against him on basis of his race, in violation of his equal protection and due process rights, and that the officials
violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The officials moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to state claim. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that state prison officials applied a suspect racial classification to Hispanic inmates, who were
ethnically classified as “other,” when the officials placed those inmates on modified program status in lockstep
with the lockdown of Mexican inmates, while non-Hispanic inmates who associated with the Mexican inmates
or disruptive inmates of other ethnic groups were not subjected to same lockstep treatment. According to the
court, prison policies were not narrowly tailored to control prison disturbances, as required to survive strict
scrutiny of the § 1983 equal protection claim brought by Hispanic inmate.
The court held that the state prison warden's authority and discretion to justify modified programs imposed on
the Hispanic inmate and to deny the inmate relief at the administrative level were sufficient to show the warden's
personal involvement in the alleged deprivations of the inmate's equal protection and Eighth Amendment rights
so as to subject the warden to supervisory liability under § 1983. The court found that state prison officials were
not entitled to qualified immunity from the § 1983 equal protection claim brought by the Hispanic inmate where
it would have been clear to a reasonable official that it was unlawful to place the inmate on a modified program
on the basis of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. (Ironwood State Prison, California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Hernandez-Cuevas v. Taylor, 723 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought a Bivens action against
FBI agents, alleging that the agents' unlawful conduct caused him to be held in custody for three months without
probable cause. The district court denied the agents' motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. The
agents appealed. The appeals court affirmed and remanded. The court held that: (1) allegations by the detainee
that FBI agents witnessed a black male, short, stocky, and in his late fifties, transfer $321,956 in drug proceeds
to an undercover informant; (2) after a year passed without the FBI being able to locate or identify that suspect,
they were under pressure to make an arrest; (3) agents worked with the informant to arrange a tainted photo
array, during which informant identified the detainee, who was a tall, thin, 40-year-old, black male, and who had
strikingly dissimilar appearance to the suspect; (4) that one agent either knowingly or with reckless disregard for
the truth made sworn statements in a warrant affidavit identifying the detainee as the suspect who delivered the
tainted cash; (5) that based on the affidavit, a magistrate issued an arrest warrant; and (6) that the detainee was
bound over and held in federal custody for three months, stated a Bivens claim against agents for violation of
detainee's Fourth Amendment rights. (Puerto Rico)

U.S. Appeals Court
HARASSMENT

Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509 (2nd Cir. 2013). A pro se prisoner brought a § 1983 action against various
correction officers alleging that three masked officers sprayed him with an unknown substance while he was in
his cell. The substance was apparently a mixture of fecal matter, vinegar, and machine oil. The district court
dismissed the complaint and the prisoner appealed. The appeals court vacated in part and remanded. The appeals
court held that the prisoner stated a § 1983 claim against prison officials for cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment, by alleging the officials approached his cell wearing masks and proceeded
to spray him with a mixture of feces, vinegar, and “some type [of] machine oil.” The court found that the
officials' alleged conduct was unequivocally contrary to contemporary standards of decency, and, given the

7.120

context, the assault obviously was not a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, but rather was an
attempt to maliciously and sadistically cause harm. (Attica Correctional Facility, New York)
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDERS

John Does 1-4 v. Snyder, 932 F.Supp.2d 803 (E.D.Mich. 2013). Sex offenders filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA). The state defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) SORA did not
violate the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) SORA's quarterly reporting requirement did not offend due process or
substantially burden registrants' rights to interstate or intrastate travel; (3) SORA did not implicate registrants'
due process right to engage in common occupations of life; (4) the registrants satisfactorily alleged that SORA's
loitering prohibition, which did not contain any exemption for parental activities, could be proven to infringe
upon their fundamental due process right to direct and participate in their children's education and upbringing;
(5) a jury question was presented as to whether retroactively extending the registration period of sex offenders
from twenty-five years to life was justified by a legitimate legislative purpose; and (6) jury questions were
presented as to whether provisions of SORA requiring sex offenders to report information about their online
accounts and activities violated their First Amendment rights. (Michigan Sex Offender Registry Act)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
DISCRIMINATION

Kvech v. New Mexico Dept. of Public Safety, 987 F.Supp.2d 1162 (D.N.M. 2013). A convicted Colorado sex
offender who was on probation brought a § 1983 action against an employee of the New Mexico Department of
Public Safety, alleging his placement on the New Mexico sex offender registry violated his Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The employee moved for summary judgment based on qualified and statutory immunity. The
district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the employee’s statement that the
offender was a sex offender under New Mexico law was false, the statement was derogatory and injured the
offender's reputation, and the employee imposed a burden on the offender that significantly altered the offender's
legal status in New Mexico. The court held that the employee’s refusal to remove the Colorado convicted sex
offender from New Mexico's sex offender registry, despite the state court dismissing the failure to register
charges, without any pre-determination notice or hearing, did not satisfy procedural due process for the purposes
of the offender's Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus procedural due process claim. According to the court, the
employee determined that the offender was subject to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA) without providing the offender any opportunity to contest her conclusion. But the court determined
that the employee was entitled to qualified immunity because an offender’s right to a pre-determination hearing
before being placed on New Mexico's sex offender registry was not clearly established at the time. (State of New
Mexico Department of Public Safety)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
FAILURE TO PROTECT

Lucia v. City of Peabody, 971 F.Supp.2d 153 (D.Mass. 2013). The administrator of the estate of an individual
who died from acute and chronic substance abuse while in protective custody brought an action against a city
and its mayor, as well as the police department, its chief, and four other individual officers, alleging claims under
§ 1983 for various constitutional violations and claims of negligence and false imprisonment under state law.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The district court held that:
(1) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that they violated the individual's constitutional
rights by failing to call a treatment center; (2) the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the claim that
they violated the individual's constitutional rights by failing to monitor him and provide proper care; (3) the
administrator failed to establish municipal liability based on failure to train; (4) the administrator failed to
establish supervisory liability against the supervising officer; (5) police were immune from negligence liability
under statutory exception to Massachusetts Tort Claims Act; and (6) the officers were not liable for false
imprisonment. The court noted that at the time of the relevant events, a reasonable officer would not have known
that determining that a suitable treatment facility was not available was a Fourth Amendment prerequisite to his
ability to constitutionally detain an intoxicated individual who was not charged with any crime, as required for
the right to be clearly established, and therefore the individual officers who detained the individual were entitled
to qualified immunity under § 1983. (Peabody Police Department, Massachusetts)

U.S. Appeals Court
DUE PROCESS
EXECUTION

Mann v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2013). A death row inmate filed a civil rights action, challenging the
method of execution in Florida as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim. The inmate moved for a stay of execution and expedited consideration
of his appeal of the dismissal of his complaint. The appeals court denied the motions. The court held that the
inmate failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim, and that the
process which the inmate received in his clemency hearing satisfied due process. The court noted that Florida's
substitution of pentobarbital for sodium pentothal in its method of execution did not constitute a significant
alteration to the method of execution in Florida so as to commence running of a new period of limitations on the
death row inmate's claim challenging the method of execution in Florida. (Florida State Prison)

U.S. District Court
SMOKING

Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F.Supp.2d 776 (W.D.Pa. 2013). State inmates, proceeding pro se, brought an action
against prison officials and employees, alleging that exposure to environmental tobacco smoke (ETS) violated
the Eighth Amendment, as well as asserting First Amendment retaliation claims. The defendants moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the prisoners'
allegations were sufficient to plead they were exposed to unreasonably high levels of environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS), as required to state a § 1983 claim for violations of the Eighth Amendment against various prison
officials and employees. One prisoner alleged that he was exposed to constant smoking by cellmates, inmates in
neighboring cells, and by corrections officers and staff, which resulted in his suffering from constant coughs,
headaches, chest pains, shortness of breath, vomiting, and fatigue. A second prisoner alleged that he was
constantly exposed to second hand smoke by other inmates and employees while in certain housing, which

7.121

resulted in his suffering from constant headaches, coughs, dizziness, breathing difficulties, and burning
sensations in his chest. The prisoners alleged that officials and employees had actual knowledge of their
exposure to ETS and of the risks of harm to the prisoners' health, but failed to rectify conditions and to enforce
the prison's zero tolerance smoking policy. The court found that the prisoners' allegations that they had made
requests to unit managers to be housed with non-smoking cellmates, that the managers had knowledge of the
prisoners' need to be housed with non-smokers, that the managers denied the requests, that the prisoners suffered
various health conditions from exposure to smoke, and that the prisoners submitted grievances about smoke
exposure, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against case managers for violations of the Eighth Amendment.
(State Correctional Institution at Greene, Pennsylvania)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
DUE PROCESS

Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F.Supp.2d 822 (D.Ariz. 2013). Latino persons brought a class action against a sheriff
and sheriff's office, seeking injunctive relief based on allegations of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
violations in the policy of using race as a factor in determining reasonable suspicion and in investigating or
detaining Latino occupants of motor vehicles suspected of being in the country without authorization, without
any basis for state charges. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The court held that: (1) the
policy of the sheriff's office directing deputies to detain vehicle occupants because of the belief that occupants
were not legally present in the United States violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) the policy permitting deputies
to use race or Hispanic appearance as a factor in determining whether there was reasonable suspicion violated
the Fourth Amendment; (3) the policy permitting deputies to use race as a factor in forming reasonable suspicion
that persons violated state laws relating to immigration status was not narrowly tailored; (4) the sheriff's office
intentionally discriminated against Latino persons; (5) deputies investigating the identities of, and arresting,
vehicle passengers on immigration violations without reasonable suspicion during a traffic stop lengthened the
stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (6) deputies could not use reasonable suspicion of unauthorized
presence in the United States, without more, as probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a state law had been
violated. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

U.S. District Court
LOWER BUNK
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
PRETRIAL DETAINEES
MEDICAL CARE
HYGIENE
SANITATION

Newell v. Kankakee County Sheriff's Department, 968 F.Supp.2d 973 (C.D.Ill. 2013). A disabled federal
detainee who was housed at a county jail for two months brought an action against the county sheriff's
department and county officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee's allegations that the
county officials developed, supervised, and enforced policies and practices of the jail, ensured that grievances
were received in the proper manner and were properly responded to, and were aware of his serious medical
needs and his grievances, yet turned a blind eye to the situation, were sufficient to state a claim against the
officials in their individual capacities in his civil rights action alleging he was denied medical care and kept in
unsafe and unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail. The detainee allegedly had multiple
disabilities that he sustained in an auto accident, including weakness and numbness in his left side and he
partially dragged his left leg. He also had incontinence with urine and bowel movements and required the use of
adult diapers. He was unable to stand still without assistance, which made showering and using the toilet
difficult. The detainee alleged that despite his obvious disabilities and medical issues, he was assigned to a
regular dorm on the top floor of the jail, and a to a top bunk. He had to hop on one leg to go up or down the stairs
and needed assistance from other inmates to get into and out of his bunk. He was allegedly not given adult
diapers until his third day at the jail, and even then, he was not given an adequate supply of diapers and would
sometimes sit in a soiled diaper for days, and in clothes with urine and feces on them. He alleged that he was not
given enough biohazard bags, and the soiled diapers and bags piled up in his cell. One day, when there was no
one to assist the detainee, he fell while attempting to get out of his bunk and he sat for two hours until someone
came to help him. As a result, his left leg worsened and his right leg was numb, he could not walk at all and was
forced to crawl down stairs on his buttocks, and scoot along the floor and walk on his hands.
The court found that the detainee's allegations that he was denied medical care and kept in unsafe and
unhealthy conditions while he was housed at the county jail, and that the jail was not an exceptionally large
facility, were sufficient to state claim against the corrections officer working at the jail in his individual capacity.
According to the court, the situation described by the inmate, if true, would have been obvious to any
correctional officer working in the area in which the inmate was housed. The court held that the detainee's
allegations that correctional staff at the county jail acted pursuant to an official policy or custom not to perform a
medical intake, investigate inmates' medical issues or complaints about problems with walking if they were
ambulatory, nor provide sufficient medically-necessary hygiene items such as adult diapers to inmates, among
other things, were sufficient to allege that an official policy or custom was a “moving force” in the alleged
violation of his rights, as required to state official capacity claims under Monell. The court held that the
detainee's allegation that he was barred from basic facilities on the basis of his disabilities while he was housed
at the county jail was sufficient to allege discriminatory intent, as required to state an ADA claim against the
county sheriff's department. (Jerome Combs Detention Center, Kankakee, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
SEXUAL ABUSE

Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187 (D.N.M. 2013). A female former state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a private operator of a state prison, the warden, and corrections officers, alleging violation of her civil
rights arising under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and various state claims. The defendants
moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the
inmate’s complaint stated claims against the operator and the warden for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment, and for First Amendment retaliation. The inmate alleged that the operator and the warden engaged
in practices of placing inmates who reported sexual abuse in segregation or otherwise retaliating against them,
violating its written policies by failing to report allegations of prison rape to outside law enforcement, failing to
conduct adequate internal investigations regarding rape allegations, and offering financial incentives to prison

7.122

employees for non-reporting of rape allegations. The inmate alleged that the operator and the warden placed her
in segregation for eight months because she reported a corrections officer's rape and another officer's assault, that
the operator and warden were aware of her complaints, and that her placement in segregation was in close
temporal proximity to the complaints. (New Mexico Women's Correctional Facility, Corrections Corporation of
America)
U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
INVOLUNTARY
COMMITMENT
PROPERTY
SEX OFFENDER

Pesci v. Budz, 730 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). A civil detainee, who was involuntarily committed as a sexually
violent predator, brought a civil rights action against a facility director, claiming that the facility's policy barring
residents from copying the detainee's newsletter violated his expressive freedoms under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The district court granted final summary judgment in favor of the facility director, and the
detainee appealed. The appeals court vacated and remanded. The court held that the constitutionality of the
facility's policy of banning outright all possession and distribution of the detainee's newsletter should have been
considered along with the facility's prior policy limiting the means of the newsletter's propagation in the ruling
on the facility director's motion for summary judgment. The appeals court found that Turner 's rational relation
standard was the appropriate standard against which to measure the detainee's First Amendment claims,
however, the government could not justify limitation on the detainee's expressive freedoms based on retribution
or general deterrence. (Florida Civil Commitment Center)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
FAILURE TO TRAIN
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Poche v. Gautreaux, 973 F.Supp.2d 658 (M.D.La. 2013). A pretrial detainee brought an action against a district
attorney and prison officials, among others, alleging various constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983,
statutory violations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), as well
as state law claims, all related to her alleged unlawful detention for seven months. The district attorney and
prison officials moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The court
held that the detainee sufficiently alleged an official policy or custom, as required to establish local government
liability for constitutional torts, by alleging that failures of the district attorney and the prison officials to
implement policies designed to prevent the constitutional deprivations alleged, and to adequately train their
employees in such tasks as processing paperwork related to detention, created such obvious dangers of
constitutional violations that the district attorney and the prison officials could all be reasonably said to have
acted with conscious indifference. The court found that the pretrial detainee stated a procedural due process
claim against the district attorney and the prison officials under § 1983 related to her alleged unlawful detention
for seven months, by alleging that it was official policy and custom of the officials to skirt constitutional
requirements related to procedures for: (1) establishing probable cause to detain; (2) arraignment; (3) bail; and
(4) appointment of counsel, and that the officials' policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty
without due process.
The court also found a procedural due process claim against the district attorney under § 1983 by the
detainee’s allegation that it was the district attorney's policy and custom to sign charging papers such as bills of
information without reading them, without checking their correctness, and without even knowing what he was
signing, and that the attorney's policy and custom resulted in a deprivation of her liberty without due process.
The court found a substantive due process claim against the district attorney in the detainee’s allegation that after
obtaining clear direct knowledge that the detainee was being wrongfully and illegally held, the district attorney
still failed to correct the mistakes that caused the detention, and to cover up his failures in connection with the
case, the district attorney made a conscious decision to bring belated charges against the detainee.
The court held that the detainee stated an equal protection claim against the prison officials under § 1983, by
alleging that the officials acted with a discriminatory animus toward her because she was mentally disabled, and
that she was repeatedly and deliberately punished for, and discriminated against, on that basis. (East Baton
Rouge Prison, Louisiana)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION
FAILURE TO PROTECT
MENTAL ILLNESS
SAFETY
SECURITY

Randle v. Alexander, 960 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). An African-American state inmate with a history of
serious mental illness brought an action against officials of the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (DOCCS), correctional officers, and mental health personnel, alleging under § 1983
that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and that he was retaliated against,
in violation of his First Amendment rights, among other claims. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the correctional officers' alleged actions
in forcing the inmate to fight a fellow inmate, and threatening to beat the inmate with a baton and engage in a
joint cover-up if the two inmates did not “finish” their fight within a specified area of the prison, which
ultimately resulted in the fellow inmate sustaining fatal injuries in the fight, had no legitimate penological
purpose, and was far afield of the species of force employed to restore or maintain discipline. The court held that
the alleged actions reflected indifference to inmate safety, if not malice toward the inmate, as supported the
inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.According to the court, the alleged forced fight
between the inmate and a fellow inmate, orchestrated, condoned, and covered up by correctional officers was an
objectively serious violation of the inmate's Eighth Amendment right to reasonably safe conditions of
confinement, and the intent evinced by such activity was, at the very least, one of indifference to inmate safety,
supporting the inmate's § 1983 Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against the officers. The
court held that the African-American state inmate's allegations in his complaint that a correctional officer
arranged inmates in his company so that white inmates were close to officers' posts, whereas black inmates were
placed further away, that white inmates were given superior jobs, that the officer's efforts in forcing a fight
between the inmate and a fellow inmate were done purposefully for his amusement because both inmates were
black, and that the officer's treatment of the inmate and other black inmates was motivated by his intent to
discriminate on the basis of race and malicious intent to injure inmates, stated a § 1983 equal protection claim
against the officer. The court ruled that the correctional officers were not entitled to qualified immunity from the

7.123

inmate's § 1983 Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims because inmates had a clearly established right to
remain incarcerated in reasonably safe conditions, and it was objectively unreasonable to threaten inmates until
they agreed to fight each other in front of prison officials. The court found that the inmate stated an Eighth
Amendment inadequate medical care claim against mental health personnel. The inmate alleged that he had a
history of serious mental illness, that his symptoms increased following a forced fight with a fellow inmate, that
the inmate attempted suicide on three occasions, two of which required his hospitalization, that prison mental
health personnel evidenced deliberate indifference to his medical needs, as they recklessly disregarded the risk
the inmate faced as result of special housing unit (SHU) confinement, and that the inmate was confined to SHU
despite a recommendation that he be placed in a less-restrictive location. (Green Haven Correctional Facility,
Protective Custody Unit, New York State Department of Corrections)
U.S. Appeals Court
ALIEN
PRETRIAL DETAINEE

Rodriguez v. Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). Aliens subject to detention pursuant to federal immigration
statutes brought a class action against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and others, challenging
prolonged detention without individualized bond hearings and determinations to justify their continued
detention. The district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the holding of bond hearings before an
immigration judge (IJ). The government appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held that: (1) the
statute authorizing the Attorney General to take into custody any alien who is inadmissible or deportable by
reason of having committed certain offenses for as long as removal proceedings are “pending” cannot be read to
authorize mandatory detention of criminal aliens with no limit on the duration of imprisonment; (2) aliens
subject to prolonged detention were entitled to bond hearings before IJs; (3) irreparable harm was likely to result
from the government's reading of the immigration detention statutes as not requiring a bond hearing for aliens
subject to prolonged detention; and, (4) the public interest would benefit from a preliminary injunction. The
court ruled that the class was comprised of all non-citizens within the Central District of California who: (1) are
or were detained for longer than six months pursuant to one of the general immigration detention statutes
pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not and have not been detained
pursuant to a national security detention statute, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether
their detention is justified. (Los Angeles Field Office of ICE, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
EXECUTION
DUE PROCESS

Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2013). A state death-row prisoner filed an action against the
Governor of Louisiana, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and various state officials
under § 1983, alleging, among other claims, that the state's refusal to disclose details of its execution protocol
violated the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Another death-row prisoner intervened. The district
court entered a preliminary injunction and a stay of execution. The state appealed. The appeals court reversed.
The appeals court held that the prisoner failed to establish the likelihood of success on the merits of his claim
that substitution of a one drug lethal injection protocol for a three drug protocol violated his procedural due
process rights. The appeals court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting an untimely motion
for a stay. (Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
MEDICAL CARE
MENTAL ILLNESS

Spavone v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 719 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir. 2013). A state prisoner
brought a suit against corrections officials under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),
alleging, among other things, that the defendants' denial of his request for a medical leave to obtain additional
treatment for his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
protection of the law and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual
punishment. The prisoner had traveled to Nicaragua in the 1980s to join the Contra rebel forces and saw combat
while fighting with them in that country's civil war. He also was working on the scaffolding of a building across
the street from the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, and was credited with risking his life to rescue
several of his coworkers. He witnessed victims of the attack jump from the towers. The district court denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and the defendants appealed. The
appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the corrections officials were entitled to
qualified immunity on prisoner's equal protection claim, and on the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim.
According to the court, even if the prisoner was in need of absolutely necessary medical care, neither official had
reason to conclude that such care was not available to him in the prison, and thus there was a rational basis for
distinguishing between leaves of absence for the treatment of mental illness as opposed to other sorts of illness
for which leave was available. The court noted that there no evidence that either official thought that denying the
prisoner's request for a leave of absence would cause him harm, much less harm so serious that it would be
objectively unreasonable for them to believe that the policy of restricting leaves of absence for mental health
treatment was consistent with prisoner's right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. (New York State
Department of Correctional Services)

U.S. District Court
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Taylor v. City of Mason, 970 F.Supp.2d 776 (S.D.Ohio 2013). A deaf arrestee brought an action against a police
department and a city, alleging that denial of a qualified interpreter during questioning prior to arrest at the jail
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and that he was falsely
imprisoned. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district court denied the motion.
The court held that the deaf arrestee's allegations, that police officers denied him the benefits of effectively
communicating with them prior to arrest by failing to provide an appropriate auxiliary aid, were sufficient to
state a claim under ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The arrestee alleged that he initiated a phone call to police
because he had been assaulted, and that, although officers requested an American Sign Language (ASL)
interpreter, they did not wait for the interpreter to arrive before they began questioning him, but instead used his
alleged attacker as an interpreter, and she reported that the arrestee sexually assaulted her. The court found that
the allegations were also sufficient to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, where the arrestee alleged that

7.124

he expressed dissatisfaction with the interpreter provided at the jail, who was not certified in ASL, that he did
not fully understand his Miranda rights as explained by the interpreter, and that the lack of a qualified interpreter
was directed at him particularly. (City of Mason Police Department and Jail, Ohio)
U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
LIBEL

Von Kahl v. Bureau of Nat. Affairs, Inc., 934 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.D.C. 2013). A prisoner brought an action against
a legal publisher, alleging libel in summary of his mandamus petition published more than 20 years after his
criminal convictions. The court held that: (1) the publisher's statement that the prisoner “showed no hint of
contrition” withrespect to the murders of deputy United States Marshals was actionable; (2) the prisoner was not
“libel-proof”; (3) the prisoner was a limited purpose public figure, but the complaint alleged sufficient facts
supporting a claim of actual malice; (4) the summary did not falsely impute that the prisoner had been accused of
a crime and thus was not libelous per se; and (5) the prisoner pled sufficient facts showing special harm to
support a claim for special damages. (Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Criminal Law Reporter, District of
Columbia)

U.S. District Court
ACCESS TO COURT

Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F.Supp.2d 1122 (W.D.Wash. 2013). Indigent criminal defendants brought a
class action in state court against two cities, alleging the public defense system provided by the cities violated
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that the
defendants were deprived of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and that the deprivation was caused by
deliberate choices of the city officials who were in charge of the public defense system. The court noted that the
cities were appointing counsel in a timely manner, but the public defenders were assigned so many cases that the
defendants often went to trial or accepted plea bargains without meeting with counsel. The court required the
cities to re-evaluate their public defender contracts and to hire a public defense supervisor to ensure indigent
criminal defendants received their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (City of Mount Vernon and City of
Burlington, Washington)

U.S. District Court
FAILURE TO PROTECT
HARASSMENT
PRIVACY
SEXUAL ABUSE

Williams v. Community Solutions, Inc., 932 F.Supp.2d 323 (D.Conn. 2013). State prison inmates brought an
action against state department of corrections (DOC) officials and others, alleging that they were subjected to
sexual abuse, harassment, and threatening conduct at a residential reentry work-release program, and asserting
both federal constitutional claims and state law tort claims. The state officials moved to dismiss. The district
court granted the motion in part, and denied in part. The court held that the alleged sexual abuse, harassment,
and threats perpetrated against the state prison inmates by staff did not rise to the level of a deprivation of the
inmates' Eighth Amendment rights. According to the court, although staff allegedly stayed in the bathroom with
inmates and watched them give urine samples, touched inmates on their buttocks and genitals on a few
occasions, and made inappropriate comments toward inmates, such alleged conduct involved isolated incidents
and was not sufficiently serious or severe to amount to cruel and unusual punishment. The court found that the
inmates failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim for violation of their constitutional right to bodily privacy,
absent an allegation of an invalid search or seizure. (Connecticut Department of Corrections, Residential Reentry Work-Release Program, Community Solutions, Inc., Bloomfield Connecticut)

U.S. Appeals Court
VISITS

Williams v. Ozmint, 716 F.3d 801 (4th Cir. 2013). An inmate, proceeding pro se, brought a § 1983 action in state
court against a warden, alleging that suspension of his visitation privileges for two years violated the First, Fifth,
Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments. Following removal to federal court, the district court granted the warden's
motion for summary judgment. The inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part and dismissed in part.
The appeals court held that: (1) the inmate did not have clearly established right to visitation; (2) the inmate’s
claim for injunctive relief was rendered moot when the inmate received restoration of his visitation privileges;
(3) there was no evidence that the inmate would be deprived of his visitation privileges in the absence of any
culpable conduct on his part; and (4) the inmate's request for “any other relief that seems just and proper” was
insufficient to state a claim for declaratory relief. (Evans Correctional Institution, South Carolina)
2014

U.S. District Court
EXECUTION
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION

American Civil Liberties of Missouri Foundation v. Lombardi, 23 F.Supp.3d 1055 (W.D.Mo. 2014). An
organization brought an action against the director of the Missouri Department of Corrections (DOC),
challenging the constitutionality of a Missouri statute prohibiting unauthorized disclosure of execution team
members. The director moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion, finding that: (1) the organization
had standing to bring the action; (2) the action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (3) the organization
stated viable claim under the First Amendment; and (4) the organization stated a viable due process claim.
(Missouri Department of Corrections)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS

Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F.Supp.3d 185 (D.D.C. 2014). The Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona, brought an action
against the President of the United States, alleging that executive actions deferring action with respect to certain
programs affecting undocumented immigrants were unconstitutional and otherwise illegal. The sheriff moved for
a preliminary injunction to enjoin the programs, and the President moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the action. The district court held that the sheriff did not suffer an injury
in fact, and therefore lacked standing in his personal and official capacities to bring an action. The court noted
that the sheriff sought to vindicate only a general interest in the proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and, although the sheriff alleged that undocumented immigrants had targeted him for assassination as a result of
his “widely known stance on illegal immigration,” the programs in question did not cause threats to the sheriff's
life, and the sheriff's stance pre-existed the instant action and the challenged programs. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Arizona)

7.125

U.S. District Court
VOTING

Davidson v. City of Cranston, R.I., 42 F.Supp.3d 325 (D.R.I. 2014). Citizens brought an action against a city,
challenging a municipal ward redistricting plan, in which the entire population of a state prison was placed
within one of the city's six wards. The city moved to dismiss. The district court denied the motion. The court
held that the citizens alleged that the redistricting plan was not justified by the principle of electoral equality, and
that the plan was not justified by the principle of representational equality. The court noted that the majority of
the prisoners in the state prison were not eligible to vote, and that the prisoners who were eligible to vote were
required by Rhode Island law to vote by absentee ballot from their pre-incarceration address. (City of Cranston,
Rhode Island, and Rhode Island Adult Correctional Institutions)

U.S. Appeals Court
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014). A former prisoner who was wrongfully convicted of murder
and sentenced to death brought an action against, county prosecutors, among others, alleging a § 1983 claim of
violation of his due process rights and related state tort claims. The former prisoner had been incarcerated for 17
years before the conviction was overturned. The district court partially granted and partially denied a defense
motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. On remand, the former
prisoner moved for reconsideration. The district court granted the motion for reconsideration and vacated its
prior order to the extent that it dismissed the former prisoner's federal claim against prosecutor arising from the
prosecutor's pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence, and retained jurisdiction over the state claims. The
prosecutors appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. The appeals court held
that: (1) the prosecutor did not have absolute or qualified immunity from § 1983 claims arising out of his preprosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; (2) the prosecutor did not have absolute
immunity under Illinois law for his pre-prosecution fabrication of evidence that was later introduced at trial; and
(3) remand was required to allow reconsideration of the determination that the prosecutor did not have immunity
from state law claims arising out of use of fabricated evidence at retrial. The court noted that absolute immunity
afforded to prosecutors is only for acts they commit within the scope of their employment as prosecutors; when
they do non-prosecutorial work they lose their absolute immunity and have only qualified immunity. (Illinois)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
DUE PROCESS

Gayle v. Johnson, 4 F.Supp.3d 692 (D.N.J. 2014). Aliens brought a class-action lawsuit against the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and numerous other federal and state government agencies, alleging that the
defendants' acts of subjecting individuals to mandatory immigration detention violated the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and the Due Process Clause. The government moved to dismiss. The district court
declined to dismiss the alien’s claims for injunctive relief, finding that the aliens had standing to challenge the
adequacy of the Joseph hearing and associated mandatory detention procedures, and that allegations that the
Joseph hearings failed to afford aliens adequate protection were sufficient to state claims for due process
violations. (Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, District of New Jersey)

U.S. District Court
PRIVACY
DISCIPLINE
CONDITIONS

Houston v. Cotter, 7 F.Supp.3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). An inmate brought a § 1983 action against corrections
officers and a county, alleging a due process violation in connection with his placement on a suicide watch while
incarcerated at a county correctional facility. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district
court denied the motions, finding that summary judgment was precluded by fact issues as to whether a protected
liberty interest was implicated. The inmate alleged that the county had a policy or custom permitting
classification officers to keep an inmate on suicide watch as a form of punishment, after mental health personnel
had deemed a continued suicide watch unnecessary. The inmate remained on suicide watch for eight days after a
psychiatrist and a social worker recommended his removal from the suicide watch. The court also found a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the inmate's conditions of confinement while he was placed on
suicide watch imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life, such that it implicated a protected liberty interest. While on suicide watch, officials took away the inmate’s
clothing and required him to wear a suicide-safe garment-- a sleeveless smock made of a coarse, tear-resistant
material and Velcro. He was not allowed to wear underwear, socks, or any other undergarment with the smock.
He was housed in a stripped cell in the Behavioral Modification Housing Unit. The cell contained a bare
mattress and a blanket made out of the same coarse material as the smock. Corrections officers situated
immediately in front of the Plexiglass cell window constantly supervised the inmate. According to the county,
suicide watch inmates have access to the yard, a plastic spoon, a rubberized pen, the law library, showers, razors,
and medical and mental health services, but the inmate claimed that he had no showers, telephone calls,
prescription medications, food, or access to the law library while in the BMHU. (Suffolk County Correctional
Facility, New York)

U.S. District Court
EXECUTION

In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation, 994 F.Supp.2d 906 (S.D.Ohio 2014). An inmate, who was scheduled
to be executed, brought a challenge to Ohio's two drug execution protocol of midazolam and hydromorphone,
claiming that the protocol would subject him to a substantial risk of severe pain that would constitute cruel and
unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The inmate moved for a stay of execution. The
district court denied the motion. The court held that the inmate's physical and medical characteristics which
placed the inmate at risk for obstructive sleep apnea did not preclude the use of Ohio's two drug execution
protocol on the grounds that the protocol would subject the inmate to a substantial risk of severe pain, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, expert testimony that the inmate would experience
air hunger, or a terrifying inability to obtain a breath to satisfy the ventilatory drive, failed to consider the
execution protocol's use of a massive dose of hydromorphone, an analgesic. (State of Ohio)

7.126

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
DUE PROCESS
PROGRAMS
RELIGION
SEARCH
SEX OFFENDER

Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F.Supp.3d 916 (D.Minn. 2014). Patients who were civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought a § 1983 class action against officials, alleging various claims, including
failure to provide treatment, denial of the right to be free from inhumane treatment, and denial of the right to
religious freedom. The patients moved for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, and the officials moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the defendants’ motion in part and denied in part, and denied the plaintiffs’
motions. The court held that the patients’ allegations that commitment to MSOP essentially amounted to lifelong
confinement, equivalent to a lifetime of criminal incarceration in a facility resembling, and run like, a medium to
high security prison, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process claim pertaining to the punitive nature
of the patients' confinement. The court found that the patients’ allegations that, based on policies and procedures
created and implemented by state officials, patients spent no more than six or seven hours per week in treatment,
that their treatment plans were not detailed and individualized, that treatment staff was not qualified to treat sex
offenders, and that staffing levels were often far too low, sufficiently stated a § 1983 substantive due process
claim based on the officials' failure to provide adequate treatment.
According to the court, the patients stated a § 1983 First Amendment free exercise claim against state
officials with allegations that MSOP's policies, procedures, and practices caused the patients to be monitored
during religious services and during private meetings with clergy, did not permit patients to wear religious
apparel or to possess certain religious property, and did not allow patients to “communally celebrate their
religious beliefs by having feasts,” and that such policies and practices were not related to legitimate institutional
or therapeutic interests. The court also found that the patients’ allegations that state officials limited their phone
use, limited their access to certain newspapers and magazines, and removed or censored articles from
newspapers and magazines, stated a § 1983 First Amendment claim that officials unreasonably restricted their
right to free speech. The court found that the patients stated a § 1983 unreasonable search and seizure claim
under the Fourth Amendment with allegations that, taken together with the patients' other allegations
surrounding the punitive nature of their confinement, state officials violated their Fourth Amendment rights
through their search policies, procedures, and practices, and that they were subjected to cell searches, window
checks, strip searches, and random pat downs,. The court ordered that its court-appointed experts would be
granted complete and unrestricted access to the documents the experts requested, including publicly available
reports and documents related to the patients' lawsuit, as well as MSOP evaluation reports and administrative
directives and rules. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. Appeals Court
ALIENS
DUE PROCESS

Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014). A felony arrestee brought an action against state
officials challenging the constitutionality of an Arizona constitutional provision prohibiting state courts from
setting bail for detainees who were in the United States illegally. The district court granted summary judgment
and partial dismissal in the officials' favor, and the arrestees appealed. The appeals court affirmed. On rehearing
en banc, the appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the Arizona constitutional provision
forbidding any form of bail or pretrial release to undocumented immigrants arrested for serious felony offenses,
without regard to whether they were dangerous or a flight risk, was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes be available for trial, and thus violated substantive due
process. The court noted that there was no evidence that the provision was adopted to address a particularly
acute problem regarding an unmanageable flight risk of undocumented immigrants, the provision encompassed
an exceedingly broad range of offenses, including not only serious offenses but also relatively minor ones, and
the provision employed an overbroad, irrebuttable presumption, rather than an individualized hearing, to
determine whether a particular arrestee posed an unmanageable flight risk. (Maricopa County Sheriff, Maricopa
County Attorney, and Presiding Judge of the Maricopa County Superior Court)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER

Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 2014). Two convicted sex offenders brought an action challenging
Wisconsin's statutory scheme of sex offender registration, notification, and monitoring, alleging violation of the
prohibition against states enacting ex post facto laws. The district court ruled that the act's $100 annual
registration fee was unconstitutional, but upheld other provisions of the act. The parties appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, modified in part, and reversed in part. The appeals court held that: (1) the sex offenders
had standing to challenge the registration requirement, even though they did not intend to ever return to the state;
(2) the sex offenders did not have standing to challenge provisions of a monitoring requirement relating to
working with and photographing minors because the offenders no longer resided in the state; (3) the sex
offenders did not have standing to challenge Wisconsin's prohibition against a sex offender changing his name,
where neither offender had expressed the intent to change his name; (4) the sex offenders had standing to
challenge monitoring of the act's requirements of continual updating of information supplied to the sex offender
registry; (5) the monitoring act's requirements that sex offenders continually update information supplied to the
sex offender registry were not punitive and therefore did not trigger the constitutional prohibition of ex post
factor laws; (6) the $100 annual registration fee was not punitive; and (7) allowing the sex offenders to litigate
pseudonymously was not warranted where the sex offenders' convictions were matters of public record and both
sex offenders were currently registered in Wisconsin, making their names and other information freely available.
The court noted that the annual fee was intended to compensate the state for the expenses of maintaining the sex
offender registry, and since the offenders were responsible for the expense, there was nothing “punitive” about
making them pay for it. (Wisconsin)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
MENTAL ILLNESS

Pierce v. Pemiscot Memorial Health Systems, 25 F.Supp.3d 1198 (E.D.Mo. 2014). A mental health detainee
brought a § 1983 action against a medical director and a program director employed by the company that
contracted to provide psychiatric services to a county hospital, alleging violations of her due process rights and
Missouri law. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, granted the
defendants’ motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment on the issue of punitive

7.127

damages was precluded by genuine issue of material fact as to whether the conduct of the medical director and
the program director in continuing to detain the mental health detainee was motivated by an evil motive or
involved reckless indifference to the detainee's rights. The detainee brought the action to challenge her detention
in an inpatient psychiatric unit following the expiration of a 96–hour detention order. She alleged that her
continued detention violated her due process rights under the United States and Missouri Constitutions,
governing involuntary commitment procedures. (Pemiscot Memorial Hospital, Missouri)
U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER
SELF INCRIMINATION
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION

Reinhardt v. Kopcow, 66 F.Supp.3d 1348 (D.Colo. 2014). Inmates, parolees, and probationers, as well their
family members, brought a § 1983 action against various employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections
(CDOC) and members of the state’s Sex Offender Management Board, alleging that the state’s treatment of
persons convicted of sex crimes violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment.
The plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The defendants moved to dismiss.
The district court granted the motion in part and a denied in part. The court held that the potential penalty
resulting from a Colorado policy that requires inmates in the state’s sex offender treatment program to admit to
prior acts, was so severe as to constitute compulsion to testify, and would violate their privilege against selfincrimination. The court noted that inmates who chose to participate in the program would be compelled to make
incriminating statements that could be used against them during any retrial.
The court found that individuals classified as sex offenders, both imprisoned and on probation, sufficiently
alleged that Colorado policies restricting their contact with family members, and particularly with their children,
were not rationally related to any legitimate penological interest, as required to support their claims that these
policies violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights related to familial association and due process.
The court noted that some of these individuals were not convicted of sex offenses involving children, and some
of them were not convicted of any sex offense at all. The court held that CDOC employees were entitled to
qualified immunity from liability, where the rights of individuals classified as sex offenders that were
purportedly violated by Colorado policies restricting their contact with family members were not clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation. (Colorado Dept. of Corr., Sex Offender Management Board)

U.S. District Court
SEX DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS

Sassman v. Brown, 73 F.Supp.3d 1241 (E.D.Cal. 2014). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), claiming violation of the Equal Protection Clause by exclusion of men from California’s Alternative
Custody Program (ACP). The California Penal Code allows only female inmates to participate in the voluntary
ACP in lieu of confinement in a state prison. The prisoner moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent
continued exclusion of male prisoners from ACP based on their gender. The district court denied the motion for
an injunction. The district court held that the prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of the claim, but
that it was unlikely that the prisoner could show irreparable harm absent an injunction. The prisoner had
unsuccessfully applied to participate in the ACP and was similarly situated to female state prisoners who applied
and were approved. According to the court, where the male prisoner met all gender-neutral eligibility criteria
required by regulations implementing the ACP, and assuming that female prisoners and their children would
benefit more from ACP than male prisoners and their children, perpetuated the stereotype that women were more
fit to parent and more important to their families than men. The court found that restricting applicants to only
women state prisoners was not substantially related to the important government interests of family reunification
and community reintegration, and thus, the male prisoner had a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim.
(Alternative Custody Program, California)

U.S. District Court
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
EQUAL PROTECTION

Sherley v. Thompson, 69 F.Supp.3d 656 (W.D.Ky. 2014). A state prisoner filed a pro se § 1983 action against
the Commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (DOC), a prison warden, and other prison
officials, alleging that his conditions of confinement violated his Eighth Amendment rights, that he was deprived
of medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and was subjected to race discrimination in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court dismissed the case, in part. The court held that the
prisoner stated claims against the warden and prison administrators for violation of his equal protection rights
and his conditions of confinement. According to the court, the prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim
against one prison nurse by alleging that the nurse failed to provide him with appropriate medical treatment for
ant bites he sustained, due to his inability to pay for treatment.
The prisoner alleged that the prison had a policy or custom of segregating blacks and non-blacks, and that
prison officials refused to place him in a non-black cell to get away from pests in his cell. The court held that the
administrators allowed ants to infest his cell for weeks and that as a result, he received ant bites that caused him
to scratch until his skin was broken due to severe itching, in violation of his conditions of confinement rights
under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment. (Little Sandy Correctional Complex, Green River Correctional
Complex, Kentucky)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
DUE PROCESS
EQUAL PROTECTION
PROGRAMS

Stauffer v. Gearhart, 741 F.3d 574 (5th Cir. 2014). A state prisoner brought a civil rights action against prison
employees in their individual and official capacities, claiming that they violated his First Amendment rights by
confiscating his magazines under a Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) rule, violated his due process
rights by failing to provide any meaningful review of a mailroom employee's decisions, and violated his equal
protection rights by applying the policy solely to inmates participating in the SOTP. The district court granted
summary judgment for the prison employees. The prisoner appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The court held
that the state prison's rule providing for confiscation of the magazines of prisoners in the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) was neutral, as required to not violate the prisoner's free speech rights, despite not banning newspapers and religious materials, since the purpose of the rule was to facilitate treatment and the prison
did not have any ulterior motive in promulgating the rule. According to the court, the rule was rationally related

7.128

to the prison's legitimate interest in sex-offender rehabilitation, as required to not violate the prisoner's free
speech rights, since the rule placed restrictions on reading material in order to facilitate treatment by preventing
distractions. The court noted that the magazines that the prisoner requested undermined the goals of the SOTP in
the professional judgments by prison officials tasked with overseeing program. According to the court, confiscation of the magazines of the prisoner in the SOTP, pursuant to the rule, did not deprive the prisoner of due process, since the prisoner could, and did, use the prison's grievance system to claim that he had been wrongly denied those magazines, and prison administrators responded by investigating his claims and giving written
justification that explained why he was not entitled to relief. (Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Goree Unit)
U.S. District Court
EXPUNGEMENT
PRIVACY

Taha v. Bucks County, 9 F.Supp.3d 490 (E.D.Pa. 2014). An arrestee brought an action against a county, a county
correctional facility, and companies that operated websites publishing mug shot and arrest information, alleging
that the defendants published his expunged arrest record in violation of Pennsylvania's Criminal History Record
Information Act (CHRIA), and that the companies violated a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the unauthorized
use of a name or likeness and committed an invasion-of-privacy tort of “false light.” The company moved to
dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the arrestee's
allegations that the company selectively published his expunged arrest record and mug shot on its website in
order to falsely portray him as a criminal, and created a false impression regarding his criminal history and
character, were sufficient to state a “false light” claim against the company under Pennsylvania law. (Citizens
Information Associates, LLC, Bucks County Correctional Facility, Pennsylvania)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER

Thomas v. Adams, 55 F.Supp.3d 552 (D.N.J. 2014). Civilly-committed sexually violent predators (SVP) brought
an action against corrections officials, and other defendants, challenging the adequacy of treatment after they
were transferred to a new facility for SVPs. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted the
motions in part and denied in part. The inmate’s claimed that he was diagnosed as a sexually violent predator
(SVP) requiring treatment, and after he was transferred to a different facility his prescribed amount of therapy
was reduced, and eventually denied without any mental health evaluation. The inmate alleged that the denials
were based on his placement in a segregated housing unit (SHU). The court held that the inmate sufficiently
alleged a substantive due process challenge against high-ranking, supervising corrections officers involved in the
decision to transfer SVPs to a new facility, despite the contention that the officials played no role in the inmate’s
day-to-day affairs. (N.J. Sexually Violent Predator Act, Special Treatment Unit at East Jersey State Prison)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
CIVIL COMMITMENT

U.S. v. Antone, 742 F.3d 151 (6th Cir. 2014). The government filed a certification attesting that an inmate was a
sexually dangerous person under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, and seeking the inmate's
civil commitment. The district court committed the inmate to civil custody. The inmate appealed. The appeals
court reversed. The court held that the government failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
sex offender, who suffered from an antisocial personality disorder and polysubstance abuse, would have serious
difficulty in refraining from sexually violent conduct or child molestation if released. The court noted that the
offender did not test positive for any substances or engage in any sexual misconduct or hostility toward women
during his extended incarceration, the offender had no disciplinary infractions, the offender completed his GED
as well as other professional programs, and readily sought out the prison's mental health resources, and the
offender expressed remorse for his past acts. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, FCI–Butner, North Carolina)

U.S. Appeals Court
CRIPA- Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons
Act

U.S. v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514 (3rd Cir. 2014). The United States commenced an action against
the Territory of the Virgin Islands pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), seeking
to enjoin the Virgin Islands from allegedly depriving inmates at a correctional facility of their Eighth
Amendment rights. The district court denied an inmate's motion to intervene and the inmate appealed. The
appeals court affirmed. The appeals held that the inmate did not make a compelling showing that his interests
were not adequately represented, and the United States would have been prejudiced by allowing the inmate to
intervene. (Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility, St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Villars v. Kubiatowski, 45 F.Supp.3d 791 (N.D.Ill. 2014). A detainee, a Honduran citizen who had been arrested
for driving under the influence and fleeing officers after they effectuated a traffic stop of his vehicle, and
subsequently had been held on an immigration detainer from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and
then on a federal material witness warrant, brought a pro se action against a village, police chief, police officers,
sheriff, jail deputies, and an Assistant United States Attorney. The detainee alleged violation of his due process,
equal protection, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants filed motions to dismiss.
The district court granted the motions in part and denied in part. The district court held that: (1) the detainee
stated a claim against the village defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in
connection with his detention after he had posted bond; (2) the detainee stated a claim for violation of his
consular rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; (3) the detainee stated a claim
against the county defendants for violation of his Fourth Amendment and due process rights in connection with
his 29-hour detention; and (4) absolute prosecutorial immunity did not shield the AUSA from the plaintiff's
claims that the AUSA violated his Fourth Amendment and due process rights, along with the federal material
witness statute and the federal rules of criminal procedure. The court noted that following the detainee’s postarrest transfer to the county's custody, he was detained for approximately 29 hours pursuant to an Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer request, and that the county lacked probable cause that the detainee
had violated a federal criminal law, but instead detained him while the federal government investigated to
determine whether or not he had, in violation of the detainee's Fourth Amendment and procedural and
substantive due process rights. (Village of Round Lake Beach, Lake County Jail, Illinois)

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U.S. District Court
RELIGION
DISCRIMINATION

Williams v. King, 56 F.Supp.3d 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action alleging that
prison officials violated his rights to free exercise of religion and due process. The officials moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that summary judgment
was precluded by issues of fact as to: (1) whether the alleged burdens imposed on the free exercise rights of
Shiite Muslim State prison inmates actually served, or were intended to serve, any legitimate penological
interests; (2) whether the inmate was denied the right to participate in a religious celebration despite having
complied with the prison’s registration policy; and, (3) whether the prison’s selective registration policy was
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests rather than motivated by discriminatory purposes.
The court found that the prisoner’s allegations that the prison’s Muslim chaplain and superintendent of
programs were personally involved in the discriminatory policies were sufficient to state a free exercise claim
and that the chaplain and superintendent were not entitled to qualified immunity. The inmate alleged that the
chaplain made various decisions regarding inmates’ celebrations of Muslim holy days which had the effect of
allowing Sunni Muslim inmates to follow their practices while not allowing Shiite Muslim inmates to follow
certain Shiite practices. He also alleged that the superintendent, despite responding to several grievances based
on the chaplain’s alleged denials of religious accommodations, allowed those denials to continue and
consciously administered an alleged selectively discriminatory policy. (Woodbourne Correctional Facility, New
York)
2015

U.S. District Court
RELIGION
EQUAL PROTECTION
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Ajala v. West, 106 F.Supp.3d 976 (W.D. Wisc. 2015). An inmate brought an action against prison officials for
alleged violation of his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the
Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. The inmate challenged a
prison policy that allegedly prohibited the inmate from wearing a “kufi,” a head covering worn by some
Muslims, unless he was in his cell or participating in congregate services. The prison officials moved for
summary judgment, and the inmate moved for an extension. The district court held that: (1) the policy imposed a
substantial burden on the inmate’s religious exercise; (2) the policy was not the least restrictive means of
furthering the prison’s interest of preventing prisoners from using a religious head covering as a potential gang
identifier; (3) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s interest in preventing
prisoners from hiding contraband; (4) the policy was not the least restrictive means of furthering the prison’s
interest in preventing prison violence; and (5) prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity from the
inmate’s constitutional claims. The court noted that the law was not clearly established that the inmate had a
constitutional right to wear a kufi at all times. (Wisconsin Secure Program Facility)

U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disability Act
SEGREGATION

Armstrong v. Brown, 103 F.Supp.3d 1070 (N.D. Ca. 2015). Disabled state prisoners filed a motion for further
enforcement of an injunction applicable to all California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
prisons, alleging that corrections officials were continuing to place class members in administrative segregation
due to a lack of accessible housing, in violation of the district court’s orders and the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA). The district court granted the motion, holding that further enforcement would not be limited to the
least compliant correctional institutions. The court noted that while the majority of the violations took place at
one institution, the violations occurred at other institutions as well, and that transfers of disabled prisoners into
non-complying institutions occurred with the involvement of CDCR officials. (California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans With
Disabilities Act
RA- REHABILITATION
ACT
CONDITIONS

Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584 (5th Cir. 2015). Death row inmates brought a § 1983 action against a state
department of corrections and state officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations that
heat in the prison violated the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the
Rehabilitation Act (RA). Following a bench trial, the district court sustained the Eighth Amendment claims,
rejected the disability claims, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the state to install air conditioning
throughout death row. The department and officials appealed and the inmates cross-appealed. The appeals
court affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part. The court held that: (1) the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence of, or relying on heat index measurements of death-row facilities; (2) the
district court did not clearly err in finding that heat in death-row cells posed a substantial risk of serious harm
to inmates and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the risk posed to death-row inmates by the
heat in prison cells; (3) housing of death-row inmates in very hot prison cells without sufficient access to heatrelief measures violated the Eighth Amendment; (4) inmates were not disabled under ADA or RA; and (5)
permanent injunctive relief requiring the state to install air conditioning throughout death-row housing violated
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), where acceptable remedies short of facility-wide air conditioning
were available. (Department of Public Safety and Corrections, Louisiana State Penitentiary)

U.S. District Court
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
SEARCH
GRIEVANCE
CONSPIRACY
RESTRAINTS

Barnes v. County of Monroe, 85 F.Supp.3d 696 (W.D.N.Y. 2015). A state inmate brought a § 1983 action
against a county, county officials, and correctional officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force against
him and that he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement during his pretrial detention. The
defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part.
The court held that the former pretrial detainee’s allegation that a county correctional officer used excessive
force when he responded to a fight between the detainee and fellow inmates, and jumped on the detainee’s back,
striking him in face and knocking out a tooth, and that the officer was not merely using force to maintain or
restore discipline but that the entire incident was “premeditated,” stated a § 1983 excessive force claim against
officer under the Due Process Clause. According to the court, the former detainee’s allegations that county
correctional officers used excessive force when they pushed him face-first into a glass window, pushed him to

7.130

the floor, kicked, stomped on and punched him, and used handcuffs to inflict pain, that as a result of the
altercation, the inmate urinated and defecated on himself and experienced dizziness and a concussion, and that
the force used on him was in response to his reaching for legal papers and attempting to steady himself, stated a
§ 1983 excessive force claim against the officers under the Due Process Clause.
The court found that the former detainee’s allegations that a county correctional officer who responded to a
fight between the detainee and other inmates “collaborated” with fellow officers to delay an emergency call,
allowing the detainee to be attacked by inmates, stated a conspiracy claim in violation of his constitutional rights
under § 1983. The court held that the former detainee’s allegations that, before being placed in a special housing
unit (SHU), he was subjected to a strip search by a county correctional officer, that during the course of the strip
search the detainee felt that he was degraded and humiliated, and he subsequently filed grievance against the
officer, that later the same day the officer approached the detainee’s cell and made sexual comments and
gestures, and that other officers filed a false misbehavior report against him in retaliation for the detainee’s
grievance, stated a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the officers. The court found that the
former detainee’s allegations that, after he was released from a special housing unit (SHU), county correctional
officers placed him in a poorly ventilated cell where he was exposed to human excrement and bodily fluids over
the course of multiple days, and that he was subjected to extreme conditions in the SHU by way of 24-hour
lighting by the officers, stated a § 1983 conditions-of-confinement claim against the officers under the Due
Process Clause. (Upstate Correctional Facility and Monroe County Jail, New York)
U.S. District Court
PROGRAMS

Buckley v. State Correctional Institution-Pine Grove, 98 F.Supp.3d 704 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A state prisoner, a
young adult offender, brought an action alleging that a prison had violated the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA) by failing to provide him with a free appropriate public education, and appealing a ruling
to the contrary by an administrative hearing officer. The parties filed cross motions for judgment on the
supplemented administrative record. The district court held that the prison violated IDEA, and the prison was
required to provide compensatory education as a remedy. The court noted that the prison failed to make a
particularized determination that the security interest specific to the prisoner could not otherwise be
accommodated, by effectively nullifying the prisoner’s individualized education program (IEP), and by not
providing a free appropriate public education. After placing the prisoner in restrictive housing in response to the
prisoner’s assaultive behavior and rules violations, the prison did not modify the prisoner’s IEP, but instead
merely applied a blanket policy requiring all prisoners in restrictive housing to receive in-cell instruction only,
using non-individualized “self-study” packets and with access to a teacher only once or twice a week through a
locked solid metal door in a cacophonously loud housing unit. (SCI–Pine Grove, Pennsylvania)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEXUAL ABUSE

Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252 (2nd Cir. 2015). A current state prisoner and a former state prisoner brought
an action against a corrections officer, the officer’s supervisor, and state officials, alleging that the corrections
officer sexually abused them in violation of their Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the action for failure to state
a claim. The current and former prisoners appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held
that one prisoner’s allegation that the corrections officer, in frisking the prisoner during the prisoner’s visit with
his wife, fondled and squeezed the prisoner’s penis in order to make sure that prisoner did not have an erection,
stated a claim for sexual abuse in violation of his Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual
punishment. The court found that a prisoner’s allegation that the corrections officer, in searching the prisoner
after the prisoner left a mess hall, squeezed and fondled the prisoner’s penis and roamed his hands down the
prisoner’s thigh, while making demeaning comments such as “[t]hat doesn’t feel like a penis to me” and “I’ll run
my hands up the crack of your ass if I want to,” stated a claim for sexual abuse in violation of the Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. (Eastern Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
TELEPHONE COSTS

DeBrew v. Atwood, 792 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A federal inmate brought an action alleging that the Bureau
of Prison’s (BOP) response to his request for documents violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), that
the BOP and its officials violated the Takings and Due Process Clauses by retaining interest earned on money in
inmates’ deposit accounts, and that officials violated the Eighth Amendment by charging excessively high prices
for items sold by the prison commissary and for telephone calls. The district court entered summary judgment in
the BOP’s favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The
court held that the BOP did not violate FOIA by failing to produce recordings of the inmate’s telephone
conversations and that the inmate’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies precluded the court from
reviewing whether the BOP conducted an adequate search. The court found that the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP)
alleged practice of charging excessively high prices for items sold by prison commissary and for telephone calls
did not violate Eighth Amendment. (Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C.)

U.S. Appeals Court
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
JUVENILE

Doe v. Cook County, Illinois, 798 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2015). Detainees at a county juvenile detention center
brought a class action against the center and the county, alleging that some employees at the center violated their
constitutional rights by abusing their charges. The facility administrator, who was appointed to run the detention
center as part of a settlement between the parties, proposed to terminate the employment of 225 direct-care
employees and require them to apply to fill the new positions. The union for the employees intervened to oppose
the administrator’s plan, arguing that the proposal violated Illinois employment law by overriding the collective
bargaining and arbitration statutes. The district court authorized the administrator to implement the plan. The
union appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The appeals court held that the district court’s
approval of the administrator’s plan was not a simple enforcement of the order appointing the administrator, and
thus the district court was required pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to make findings that
the relief requested by the administrator was narrowly drawn, extended no further than necessary to correct the

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violation of a federal right, and was the least intrusive means. (Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention
Center, Illinois)
U.S. District Court
DUE PROCESS
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
CONDITIONS

Fant v. City of Ferguson, 107 F.Supp.3d 1016 (E.D. Mo. 2015). City residents brought a class action lawsuit
against a city, asserting claims under § 1983 for violations of Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments based
on allegations that they were repeatedly jailed by the city for being unable to pay fines owed from traffic tickets
and other minor offenses. The residents alleged that pre-appearance detentions lasting days, weeks, and in one
case, nearly two months, in allegedly poor conditions, based on alleged violations of a municipal code that did
not warrant incarceration in the first instance, and which were alleged to have continued until an arbitrarily
determined payment was made, violated their Due Process rights. The residents alleged that they were forced to
sleep on the floor in dirty cells with blood, mucus, and feces, were denied basic hygiene and feminine hygiene
products, were denied access to a shower, laundry, and clean undergarments for several days at a time, were
denied medications, and were provided little or inadequate food and water. The plaintiffs sought a declaration
that the city’s policies and practices violated their constitutional rights, and sought a permanent injunction
preventing the city from enforcing the policies and practices. The city moved to dismiss. The district court
granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that: (1) allegations that residents were jailed for
failure to pay fines without inquiry into their ability to pay and without any consideration of alternative measures
of punishment were sufficient to state a claim that the city violated the residents’ Due Process and Equal
Protection rights; (2) the residents plausibly stated a claim that the city’s failure to appoint counsel violated their
Due Process rights; (3) allegations of pre-appearance detentions plausibly stated a pattern and practice of Due
Process violations; (4) allegations of conditions of confinement were sufficient to state a plausible claim for Due
Process violations; and (5) the residents could not state an Equal Protection claim for being treated differently,
with respect to fines, than civil judgment debtors. The court noted that the residents alleged they were not
afforded counsel at initial hearings on traffic and other offenses, nor were they afforded counsel prior to their
incarceration for failing to pay court-ordered fines for those offenses. (City of Ferguson, Missouri)

U.S. District Court
DEATH
MEDICAL CARE
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Fisher v. Miami-Dade County, 114 F.Supp.3d 1247 (S.D. Fla. 2015). A former pre-trial detainee brought a §
1983 action against a county, alleging that during his detention in a county jail, county employees were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The county moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
The district court denied the motion. The court held that the detainee: (1) sufficiently alleged that the county had
policy that constituted deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs (2) sufficiently alleged that
County policymakers had notice of a pattern or practice of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical
needs; and (3) sufficiently alleged that county policymakers failed to take action after being put on notice of the
pattern of deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs. According to the court, detailed allegations
of a pattern of deliberate indifference to county jail detainees’ medical needs, including 117 inmate deaths in the
years preceding the plaintiff’s detention, and 20 specific instances in which county employees withheld
necessary medical care from detainees, or provided insufficient medical care, resulting in severe injury or death
to those detainees, were sufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under § 1983. The court noted that
direct complaints by detainees had been made to county officials, there were widespread news accounts in local
newspapers and on local news television programs regarding treatment of detainees, the Department of Justice
(DOJ) had conducted a three-year DOJ investigation into county employees’ violations of detainees’
constitutional rights, including the right to medical care, and there were more than half a dozen judicial orders
from federal, state and county courts relating to detainees’ medical treatment. The court noted that the detainee
sufficiently alleged that county policymakers chose not to take action after being put on notice of county
employees’ deliberate indifference to jail detainees’ serious medical needs, where the detainee alleged that
systemic deficiencies occurred, including two deaths, following the mayor’s promise to correct such
deficiencies. (Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department, Florida)

U.S. District Court
VERBAL HARASSMENT

Gannaway v. Prime Care Medical, Inc., 150 F.Supp.3d 511 (E.D. Pa. 2015). A state inmate brought § 1983
action against Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) employees, private companies and healthcare
professionals contracted to provide medical services to DOC institutions, alleging that he received inadequate
medical treatment throughout his incarceration, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and that he was retaliated
against, in violation of the First Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court
granted the motions. The court held that private physicians employed by the vendor which contracted to provide
medical services to state inmates were acting under the color of state law for the purposes of inmate's § 1983
claim that he received inadequate medical treatment in connection with an “internal stitch” from prior surgery, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court noted that the physicians consistently provided the inmate with
medical care throughout his incarceration, and there was no indication that the physicians were aware of, or
acquiesced in, the inmate's alleged deprivation of food while in a restricted housing unit (RHU). The court found
that the medical providers were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate's serious medical needs, in violation of
the Eighth Amendment, where the inmate received extensive medical treatment while in DOC custody, including
regular medical visits, prescriptions for medication to treat pain, acid reflux, high blood pressure, and
constipation, and various diagnostic testing. (Penn. State Corr. Inst. (SCI) Rockview, and Prime Care Medical).

U.S. District Court
JUVENILE
PAROLE
EQUAL PROTECTION
DUE PROCESS

Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000 (E.D.N.C. 2015). A prisoner, a non-homicide juvenile offender, brought a
§ 1983 action against a parole commission and others, alleging denial of his constitutional right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment and due process under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as a result of being
denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district
court denied the defendants’ motion and granted the prisoner’s motion in part. The court held that the prisoner
was denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain parole release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,

7.132

as required by the Eighth Amendment. According to the court, the parole commissioners and case analysts did
not distinguish parole reviews for juvenile offenders from adult offenders, thus failing to consider the children's
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change. The court noted that caseloads were enormous, with
each parole case analyst having responsibility for approximately 4,338 offenders, and the opportunity to appear
for a parole hearing seemed to exist mainly for those who were on notice, with no notice to the offender being
required. (North Carolina Post–Release Supervision and Parole Commission, and North Carolina Department of
Public Safety)
U.S. District Court
DISCRIMINATION
ADA-Americans with
Disabilities Act
EXERCISE
RELIGION

Hernandez v. County of Monterey, 110 F.Supp.3d 929 (N.D. Cal. 2015). The plaintiffs, current and recently
released jail inmates seeking relief on behalf of a class, brought an action against the county, the sheriff’s office,
and the private company that administered jail health care facilities and services, alleging that substandard
conditions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure
to accommodate in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs moved for a
preliminary injunction. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits in their action, alleging that county jail conditions constituted deliberate indifference in
violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and failure to accommodate in violation of ADA. According to
the court, there was significant evidence that the jail’s policies and practices with regard to tuberculosis (TB)
screening, suicide and self-harm prevention, alcohol and drug withdrawal, and continuing medical prescriptions,
were noncompliant with contemporary standards and guidelines, placing inmates at risk and constituting
deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The court noted that there was significant evidence that
inmates with disabilities were excluded from access to exercise, religious services, and other meetings that were
conducted in inaccessible locations, or from sign language interpreters, in violation of ADA. The court found
that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm, absent preliminary injunctive relief, where the jail
continued to fail to provide proper tuberculosis (TB) identification, isolation, diagnosis and treatment, to
eliminate potential suicide hazards for unstable mentally ill patients, to continue community medications, and to
properly treat inmates withdrawing from drugs and alcohol, and inmates with disabilities would continue to
suffer access exclusion and lack of sign language interpreters.
The court also found that the preliminary injunction, targeting discrete county jail conditions, would be in the
public interest where the public had an interest in preventing the spread of communicable diseases, enforcing the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and eliminating discrimination on the basis of disability. (Monterey
County Jail, California)

U.S. Appeals Court
GRIEVANCE
PLRA- Prison Litigation
Reform Act
USE OF FORCE

Hubbs v. Suffolk County Sheriff’s Dept., 788 F.3d 54 (2nd Cir. 2015). A county jail detainee brought a § 1983
action against a county sheriff’s department, and sheriff’s deputies, alleging that he was severely beaten by the
deputies while in a holding cell at a courthouse. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants based on the detainee’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The detainee appealed. The
appeals court vacated and remanded, finding that the affidavit of a county jail grievance coordinator, along with
a handbook detailing a grievance procedure, did not establish that the detainee had an available administrative
remedy, and neither the handbook nor the affidavit demonstrated that the county or sheriff’s department, or any
official, handled grievances arising from occurrences in the courthouse holding cells or whether remedies for
such grievances were actually available. According to the court, the deputies forfeited any arguments that
statutory remedies were available to the county jail detainee where the deputies failed to identify in the district
court or on appeal any statutes or regulations showing that administrative remedies were available for events that
took place in the courthouse holding facility. (Suffolk County Correctional Facility, New York)

U.S. Appeals Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
SEXUAL ABUSE
HOMOSEXUAL

Hughes v. Farris, 809 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 2015). A detainee civilly committed as a sexually violent person filed a
§ 1983 action against a supervisor and the director of the facility, alleging he was sexually abused by an
employee, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He further alleged that as a result of his complaints of
abuse, his treatment was discontinued, in violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action, and the detainee appealed. The appeals court
vacated and remanded, finding that the detainee’s complaint stated a claim against the supervisor for violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment based on threats of grave violence based on the detainee’s homosexuality, and the
complaint stated a claim for retaliation under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (Treatment and
Detention Facility, Rushville, Illinois)

U.S. Appeals Court
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION
VISITS

Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2015). A wife brought an action under § 1983 against corrections
officials, claiming that revocation of her visitation privileges with her incarcerated husband who was on a hunger
strike violated the First Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment, based on qualified immunity,
in favor of the officials, for their decision to terminate the wife’s visitation privileges during the time of hunger
strike. The court denied summary judgment to the officials for the period following the end of the hunger strike,
ruling that the question of whether the officials continued to enjoy qualified immunity after the hunger strike
ended was one for a jury. The officials appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded, finding that the
officials were entitled to qualified immunity. According to the court, the officials’ decision had been motivated
by lawful considerations even though it had consequences in the future, where the husband had a considerable
amount of influence over other prisoners and considered himself, and was viewed by others, to be the leader of
the hunger strike. The court noted that evidence suggested that the wife had urged her husband to prolong that
strike after the strike had ended, and the officials were legitimately concerned that the strike might spread, about
the disruption caused by the strike, and about the security and safety of staff and inmates. (Georgia Department
of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison Special Management Unit)

7.133

U.S. District Court
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION

Jamal v. Kane, 105 F.Supp.3d 448 (M.D. Pa 2015). Inmates who engaged in written and oral advocacy, prisoner
advocacy groups, and entities that relied on prisoners’ speech brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment
that the Pennsylvania Revictimization Relief Act, which authorized civil actions seeking injunctive and other
relief when an offender engaged in any conduct which perpetuated the continuing effect of the crime on the
victim, violated the First and Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief. The actions were consolidated. After a bench trial the district court granted the requested relief. The court
held that: (1) the Act was content based; (2) the Act impermissibly infringed on free speech; (3) the Act was
unconstitutionally vague; (4) the Act was unconstitutionally overbroad; and (5) a permanent injunction enjoining
enforcement of the Act was warranted. The court noted that the Act did not define the term “offender,” and the
public thus could not know whose conduct the Act regulated. According to the court, the Act’s prohibition on
“conduct that causes a temporary or permanent state of mental anguish” offered no guidance to state courts in
determining whether a victim was entitled to relief, and did not specify whether reactions to such conduct would
be measured by an objective or subjective standard, or what level of anguish would constitute a violation.
(Revictimization Relief Act, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Attorney General)

U.S. District Court
VICTIM
FREE SPEECH AND
ASSOCIATION

Jamal v. Kane, 96 F.Supp.3d 447 (M.D. Pa. 2015). Incarcerated individuals who engaged in written and oral
human rights advocacy, prisoner advocacy groups, and entities that relied on prisoners’ speech, brought actions
alleging that Pennsylvania’s Revictimization Act violated the First Amendment. The Act authorized civil actions
seeking injunctive and other relief whenever an offender engaged in any “conduct which perpetuates the
continuing effect of the crime on the victim.” After several actions were consolidated, the state attorney general
and a district attorney moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The
court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring an action against the district attorney, but that the plaintiffs
had standing to bring a suit against the attorney general, even though the Act had not been enforced against
anyone since its enactment,. According to the court, the Act was plainly applicable to the plaintiffs, the attorney
general failed to foreswear enforcement of the Act, and the Act authorized any victim of a personal injury crime
or any family member of a homicide victim to file suit. (Pennsylvania’s Crime Victims Act)

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
TORTURE
DUE PROCESS
MILITARY FACILITY
CONDITIONS

Jawad v. Gates, 113 F.Supp.3d 251 (D.D.C. 2015). A plaintiff, a citizen of Afghanistan and a former detainee at
the United States Naval Facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and at other U.S. military bases, brought an action
against the U.S. Government and four individual defendants under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), the
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), and the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments. The plaintiff alleged that he was detained without adequate due process, tortured, and otherwise
subjected to inhumane treatment. Government moved to dismiss the ATCA and FTCA claims, and the individual
defendants moved to dismiss the TVPA and constitutional claims. The district court granted the motions, finding
that the United States was properly substituted as the defendant, the complaint failed to state claim for violation
of TVPA, and the Military Commissions Act (MCA) divested the district court of jurisdiction to hear claims
regarding a former detainee’s detention, transfer, treatment, and conditions of confinement. (Forward Operating
Base 195, Afghanistan, and United States Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)

U.S. District Court
CIVIL COMMITMENT
SEX OFFENDER
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F.Supp.3d 1139 (D. Minn. 2015). Patients civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex
Offender Program (MSOP) brought an action against various officials and employees of the MSOP pursuant to §
1983, asserting Fourteenth Amendment due process clause challenges to the Minnesota statute governing civil
commitment and treatment of sex offenders. The district court granted the patients’ motion for class certification
and granted in part and denied in part the officials’ motion to dismiss. After a bench trial, the court held that: (1)
the patients had standing to bring a class action; (2) the statute was unconstitutional on its face; and (3) the
statute was unconstitutional as applied.
According to the court, each patient was harmed by not knowing whether he continued to meet the criteria for
commitment through regular risk assessments, each patient was harmed by the program’s structural problems
that resulted in delays, patients were deprived of their right to liberty, and a favorable decision would likely
redress their injuries. The court noted that no patient had been released from MSOP in over 20 years and MSOP
failed to initiate the petitioning process when it was aware that individual patients were likely to meet statutory
discharge criteria. (Minnesota Sex Offender Program)

U.S. District Court
MEDICAL CARE
EQUAL PROTECTION

Kelly v. Ambroski, 97 F.Supp.3d 1320 (M.D. Ala. 2015). An African–American prisoner who had injured his
back brought a § 1983 action against state prison officials, medical personnel, and the company providing prison
medical services, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical need in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and various state claims. The
defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that the prisoner:
(1) failed to show that the company maintained a policy or custom which contributed in any way to the claimed
constitutional violations, as required to support a § 1983 claim; (2) did not show that the physician and the
prison’s health services administrator were deliberately indifferent to his back pain; (3) failed to establish that a
warden and an assistant warden had any direct involvement in his medical treatment, as required to support a §
1983 claim against them for deliberate indifference to his serious medical need; and (4) the prisoner’s
conclusory allegations were insufficient to support an equal protection claim. According to the court, the
African–American prisoner had no personal knowledge of white prisoners’ medical and treatment history or
their individual diagnoses to establish that they were similarly situated to him, and allegations did not establish
that decisions by prison officials and medical personnel regarding his medical care were motivated by his race.
The court noted that medical evidence showed that medical staff regularly examined the prisoner for his
complaints of back pain, prescribed him pain medication, scheduled multiple diagnostic procedures for him, and
sent him to several specialists outside of the prison, and the fact that the prisoner disagreed with the efficacy of

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the treatment recommended or simply preferred a different course of treatment did not amount to a constitutional
claim. (Bibb Correctional Facility, and Corizon Correctional Healthcare, Alabama)
U.S. District Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
VISITS
SEARCH

Knight v. Washington State Department of Corrections, 147 F.Supp.3d 1165 (W.D. Wash. 2015). A prison
visitor who suffered from a seizure disorder, and was subjected to a strip search and pat-down searches, brought
an action against the state Department of Corrections (DOC) and DOC officials, alleging that the searches
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The defendants moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted the motion, finding that: (1)the strip search and pat-down searches did not violate ADA; (2) guards
did not act with deliberate indifference in conducting a strip search; (3) the prison was not a place of public
accommodation, under the Washington Law Against Discrimination, as to visitors participating in an extended
family visitation program; (4) the guards' conduct was not sufficiently extreme to support an outrage claim; and
(5) the guards' conduct did not support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. According to the
court, there was no showing that the guards proceeded in conscious disregard of a high probability of emotional
distress when ordering the strip search, as the visitor suggested the strip search as an alternative to a pat search
and the guards followed this suggestion, and all visitors were subjected to pat-down searches, which were
justified on safety grounds. (Monroe Correctional Complex, Washington)

U.S. District Court
VERBAL HARASSMENT
DISCIPLINE

Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F.Supp.3d 678 (M.D. Pa. 2015). A state prisoner brought a n action against prison
officials under § 1983, alleging that officials violated his constitutional rights by harassing him, filing
false misconduct reports, and denying him due process at disciplinary hearings. The defendants moved
to dismiss. The district court granted the motion in part. The court held that the prisoner's allegations
regarding verbal harassment by prison officials were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim only with respect to an
incident where a corrections officer's verbal threat allegedly escalated into violence. The court noted that other
incidents did not escalate beyond mere words and did not involve threats conditioned on the prisoner's
exercising a constitutional right. (Pennsylvania State Correctional Inst. (SCI) Graterford).

U.S. District Court
ALIENS
FALSE IMPRISONMENT

Mayorov v. United States, 84 F.Supp.3d 678 (N.D.Ill. 2015). A former state prisoner sued the United States,
pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claiming negligence and false imprisonment based on
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issuing an immigration detainer against him, despite his United
States citizenship, causing him to spending 325 days in prison that he otherwise would not have served due to
the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) rules prohibiting a detainee from participating in a boot camp as
an alternative to a custodial prison sentence. The parties moved for summary judgment. The district court held
that fact issues as to whether the government breached a duty to reasonably investigate the prisoner’s citizenship
status prior to issuing an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainer. (Illinois Impact Incarceration
Program)

U.S. District Court
SEX OFFENDER

McGuire v. Strange, 83 F.Supp.3d 1231 (M.D.Ala. 2015). A sex offender registrant, who had previously been
convicted of sexual assault in Colorado, brought an action against an Alabama city, county, and state officials,
challenging the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), which
required a citizen to register as a homeless sex offender in-person at both the city police department and the
county sheriff’s department every week. After the defendants’ motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied
in part, leaving only the registrant’s claim that ASORCNA violated the Ex Post Facto Clause, a bench trial was
held. The district court held that the in-person registration requirement and the travel-permit requirement were so
punitive in effect as to negate the Alabama legislature’s stated nonpunitive intent, in violation of the Ex Post
Factor Clause. (City of Montgomery and Montgomery County, Alabama)

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
MEDICAL CARE

Mead v. Palmer, 794 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2015). A civilly committed sex offender brought a § 1983 action against
a nurse and the civil commitment unit’s director, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. The district court denied the defendants’ motion for qualified immunity from suit. The
defendants appealed. The appeals court reversed and remanded. The court held that the nurse and the civil
commitment unit’s director did not deny the offender essential dental care by refusing his request for dentures,
and thus were not deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court noted that the offender was never prescribed dentures as a medical necessity, and despite
his claims of inability to chew and discomfort, he was still able to eat and consume adequate calories and
nutrition, he actually gained weight, and he never asked for a soft diet. (Iowa Department of Human Services,
CCUSO Unit Cherokee Mental Health Institute)

U.S. District Court
EQUAL PROTECTION

Sassman v. Brown, 99 F.Supp.3d 1223 (E.D. Cal. 2015). A male prisoner filed a civil rights action against the
Governor of California and the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), alleging that the exclusion of male prisoners from California’s Alternative Custody Program (ACP),
under which female prisoners were allowed to apply for release from prison to serve the last 24 months of their
sentence in the community, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The male prisoner moved for summary
judgment. The district court granted the motion. The court held that California’s ACP violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provision excluding male prisoners from applying to
the ACP would be stricken to expand the ACP to male prisoners. (California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation)

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U.S. District Court
CONSPIRACY
USE OF FORCE
PRETRIAL DETAINEES

Senalan v. Curran, 78 F.Supp.3d 905 (N.D. Ill. 2015). A pretrial detainee brought a § 1983 action against
corrections officers at a county jail, the sheriff, and the sheriff’s office, alleging unlawful detention and
excessive force, as well as conspiracy. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The district
court granted the motion in part and denied in part. The court held that the detainee’s allegations were sufficient
to plead excessive force and were sufficient to state a conspiracy claim. The court found that the detainee’s
allegations that he was pushed, pepper sprayed, stunned, beaten, and subdued in his cell by correctional officers,
that he was naked and prone on the floor of a booking cell when four officers jumped on him and violently
restrained him, and that he was not threatening or resisting, were sufficient to plead excessive force, as required
for the detainee’s § 1983 claim against the officers. According to the court, the detainee’s allegations that
correctional officers used excessive force against him, and that the officers communicated with each other prior
to engaging in their use of force, were sufficient to state a § 1983 claim against the officers for conspiracy to
deprive him of his constitutional rights. (Lake County Jail, Illinois)

U.S. District Court
MENTAL ILLNESS
RIGHTS RETAINED
CLASSIFICATION

Trueblood v. Washington State Dept. of Social and Health, 101 F.Supp.3d 1010 (W.D. Wash. 2015). Members
of a class of pretrial detainees suspected of being mentally incompetent, the next friends of such pretrial
detainees, and a disability rights organization brought an action seeking a permanent injunction and a declaratory
judgment establishing a time frame within which due process required that the Department of Social and Health
Services provide a competency evaluation and restoration of services to such detainees. After a bench trial, the
district court held that: (1) the disability rights organization had standing to bring the action; (2) the next friends
of the pretrial detainees had standing to bring an action; and (3) due process balancing favored the interests of
the pretrial detainees, and thus seven days was the maximum justifiable period of incarceration while awaiting a
competency evaluation and restoration of services. A permanent injunction was ordered. The court noted that
jails could not provide an environment or type of care required for such detainees, especially as they were often
held in solitary confinement without access to medication, and that confinement in jails actively damaged
detainees’ mental condition and each additional day of incarceration caused further deterioration of the
detainees’ mental health, increased the risk of suicide and victimization by other inmates. (State of Washington,
Department of Social and Health Services)

U.S. Appeals Court
ADA- Americans with
Disabilities Act
DISCRIMINATION
MEDICAL CARE
CONDITIONS
REHABILITATION ACT

Turner v. Mull, 784 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2015). A state inmate filed a § 1983 action alleging that correctional
officials violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and Rehabilitation Act by failing to transport him in wheelchair-accessible van,
exposing him to unsanitary conditions in the van, and retaliating against him for filing a complaint. The district
court entered summary judgment in the officials’ favor and the inmate appealed. The appeals court affirmed. The
appeals court held that the officials were not deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s serious medical needs when
they precluded him from using a wheelchair-accessible van, even if the inmate was required to crawl into the van
and to his seat. The court noted that the inmate was able to ambulate, stand, and sit with the use of leg braces and
crutches, the inmate did not ask to use a readily available wheelchair, no physician ordered or issued a
wheelchair for the inmate, and improperly using or standing on a lift was considered dangerous due to the
possibility of a fall.
According to the court, officials were not deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of the inmate in
violation of Eighth Amendment when they required him to be transported and to crawl in an unsanitary van,
where the inmate was exposed to unsanitary conditions on a single day for a combined maximum of
approximately six hours.
The court found that prison officials did not discriminate against the inmate on the basis of his disability, in
violation of the Rehabilitation Act, when they refused to transport him in a wheelchair-accessible van, where the
prison’s wheelchair-users-only policy was rooted in concerns over undisputed safety hazards associated with
people standing on or otherwise improperly using a lift, and the inmate did not use a wheelchair or obtain a
physician’s order to use a wheelchair-accessible van. (Eastern Reception Diagnostic Correctional Center,
Missouri)
2016

U.S. Appeals Court
SEX OFFENDER
PRIVACY

Belleau v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929 (7th Cir. 2016). A citizen, who had previously been convicted of second degree
sexual assault of a child but was no longer under any form of court-ordered supervision, brought an action
against Wisconsin state officials, alleging that a Wisconsin statute, requiring certain persons who had been
convicted of serious child sex offenses to wear global positioning system (GPS) tracking devices for the rest of
their lives, violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause and the Fourth Amendment. The district court
entered summary judgment in the citizen’s favor. The appeals court reversed the decision. The court held that the
statute did not violate the Fourth Amendment, where the loss of privacy from the requirement to wear the
device-- that the Department of Corrections used device to map the wearer’s whereabouts so that police would
be alerted to the need to conduct an investigation if the wearer was present at a place where a sex crime was
committed-- was very slight compared to the societal gain of deterring future offenses by making persons who
were likely to commit offenses aware that they were being monitored. According to the court, the statute did not
impose punishment, and thus did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. (Wisconsin Department of Corrections)

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