ST
TANFORD
saekeeFiigure

DRAF
FT FOR REV
VIEW AND
D COMMEN
NTS

Voicces fro
om th
he Fie
eld:
w Caliiforniia Stak
kehollders View
How
Pub
blic Saafety Realig
R
gnment
Joan P etersilia,, Ph.D.
With S ara Abar banel, Jo
ohn Butle
er, Mark FFeldman,, Mariam
Hinds, Kevin Ja son, Coriinne Kee l, Matt Ow
wens, an
nd
Camde
en Vilkin

DRAF
FT FOR REVIEW
R
W AND COMME
C
ENTS

NOVVEMBER

20
013

1

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Preface
This report summarizes the findings of a Stanford Criminal Justice Center study of the
intended and unintended effects of California’s 2011 Public Safety Realignment Act,
which shifts responsibilities for low-level offenders away from the state system to the local
county level. The purpose of the study was to describe, from the viewpoint of county
stakeholders charged with implementing the law, what is happening on the ground as
Realignment evolves and takes shape across California’s 58 counties.
The researchers interviewed police, sheriffs, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
probation and parole agents, victim advocates, offenders and social service
representatives. Additional findings can be found in:
Jeffrey Lin and Joan Petersilia. “Follow the Money: How California Counties Are
Spending Their Public Safety Realignment Funds.” Stanford Criminal Justice
Center (forthcoming, 2013).
Sarah Lawrence. “Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing
and Managing Risk in the Post-Realignment Era.” Stanford Criminal Justice
Center (June 2013).
Lisa Quan, Sara Abarbanel, and Debbie Mukamal. “Decarceration through
Realignment: Changes in the Correctional System in California, 2004-2012.”
Stanford Criminal Justice Center (forthcoming, 2013).
Robert Weisberg. “Assessing Judicial Sentencing Preferences After Public Safety
Realignment: A Survey of California Judges.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(forthcoming, 2013).
Jessica Spencer and Joan Petersilia. “Voices From the Field: California Victims'
Rights in a Post-Realignment World.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013).
Joan Petersilia and Jessica Greenlick Snyder. “Looking Past The Hype: 10
Questions Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment.”
California Journal of Politics and Policy 5, no. 2 (2013).
Sara Abarbanel, Angela McCray, Kathryn McCann Newhall, and Jessica Snyder.
“Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 20112012 Implementation Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2013).

2

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
W. David Ball and Robert Weisberg. "The New Normal? Prosecutorial Charging in
California After Public Safety Realignment." Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(forthcoming, 2014).
These and other papers are available at Stanford Law School’s Criminal Justice Center
website, http://www.law.stanford.edu/organizations/programs-and-centers/stanfordcriminal-justice-center-scjc/california-Realignment.
The intended audience for these reports includes policymakers, state and local
government officials, and others who are interested in understanding or influencing state
or federal policy decisions that have consequences for California counties. The reports
should also prove useful to legal scholars and criminologists. Our interviews and data
provide a window on how law-as-written becomes law-in-action as legal actors implement
Realignment in the real world.
This research was supported by Award No. 2012-IJ-CX-0022, awarded by the National
Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions,
findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Justice. The
James Irvine Foundation provided additional financial support.

3

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Abstract
Passage of California’s Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) initiated the most
sweeping correctional experiment in recent history. Launched on October 1, 2011,
Realignment shifted responsibility for most lower-level offenders from the state to
California’s 58 counties. By mid-2013, more than 100,000 felons had been diverted from
state prison to county jail or probation.
This report summarizes the results of interviews conducted with California stakeholders
responsible for implementing the law. Over the past nine months, Stanford Law School
researchers conducted 125 interviews in 21 counties to produce a snapshot of how
California is faring under Realignment so far. We talked with police, sheriffs, judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation and parole agents, victim advocates, offenders,
and social service representatives. Our goal was to determine how Realignment had
influenced their agency’s work and what changes they would make to the law.
Our interviews revealed a justice system undergoing remarkable changes, arguably
unprecedented in depth and scope. Stakeholders’ opinions varied widely, and their
comments reflected their role in the system more than the county they represented.
Overall, probation officials were the most enthusiastic champions of Realignment,
welcoming the momentum the legislation provided their rehabilitation focus. Probation
departments have opened day reporting centers, expanded the use of risk assessment
tools, and worked hard with community partners to establish quality evidence-based
programs for offenders. Public defenders are also optimistic but expressed concerns
about the longer county jail terms their clients face and the conditions under which they
are served. Conversely, prosecuting attorneys generally gave Realignment negative
reviews, lamenting their loss of discretion under the law. Judges expressed mixed
opinions, although most were concerned about a loss of discretion and said AB 109 had
greatly increased the courts’ workload. Law enforcement—both front line police and
sheriffs—varied more than any other group in their assessment of Realignment, with
their opinions largely influenced by local jail capacity. While most police applauded the
spirit of Realignment, including the expansion of local control and treatment options for
offenders, all of those interviewed worried about declining public safety. Sheriffs were
challenged by overloaded county jails, which in many counties have been strained by a
flood of inmates and a tougher criminal population that has increased the likelihood of
jail violence. Sheriffs also noted that longer jail stays were challenging their ability to
provide adequate medical and mental health care, and that crowding was forcing them to
release some offenders early. On the positive end of the spectrum, most stakeholders
said Realignment had spawned increased collaboration at all levels of the criminal justice
system and a more holistic view of offender management.
4

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
In just two short years, Realignment has changed the face of California’s criminal justice
system and everyone agrees that, like it or not, it is here to stay. Most of those interviewed
agreed that California’s worst-in-the-nation recidivism rate under the old system was
unacceptable, and that a new approach was needed. Although AB 109 was rolled out too
fast and still needs major tweaks, those interviewed endorsed the law’s foundation, with
counties accepting responsibility for lower-level offenders and the state handling the
most serious and violent criminals. Stakeholders recommended several changes to
Realignment, suggesting that the Legislature: (1) allow an offender’s entire criminal
history to be considered when determining whether the county or the state will supervise
a parolee; (2) cap county jail sentences at a maximum of three years; and (3) permit
certain repeated technical violations to be punished with a prison sentence. Other top
concerns related to jail overcrowding, the lack of a statewide offender database for
probationers, the disuse of split sentencing, and a lack of funding for evidence-based
programming, particularly for mentally ill offenders.
This report presents an overview of Realignment along with our methodology, findings,
conclusions, and recommendations. Separate chapters are devoted to Realignment’s
impact on police, sheriffs and jails, public defenders, district attorneys, judges, and
probation.

5

Executive Summary
In mid-2011, California embarked on a prison downsizing experiment of historical
significance. Facing a U.S. Supreme Court decision ordering the state to reduce its
prison population by roughly 25% within two years, Governor Jerry Brown signed the
Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109). Commonly known as “Realignment,” the law
shifted responsibility from the state to the counties for certain lower-level offenders and
parolees. Felons convicted of “serious,” “violent” and the most aggravated sex offenses
continue to serve their time in state prison, but sentences for hundreds of other felonies
now must be served through county jail time or probation. Realignment also prohibits
virtually all parolees who commit technical violations from being returned to state prison,
regardless of their conviction crime or prior record. The county workload pressures
created by Realignment cannot be overstated: By mid-2013, more than 100,000 offenders
had been diverted from state prison to county control. Moreover, counties now must
handle virtually all drug and property crime sentences, which represented 54% of all
adults convicted in California in 2010. The Legislature is giving California’s 58 counties
more than $1 billion annually to support Realignment, and encouraging them to invest
in locally run, evidence-based rehabilitation programs. Given California’s recent inability
to control recidivism despite its enormous investment in imprisonment, policymakers are
banking on counties to do a better job.
For a nation seeking new correctional approaches after the costly and arguably
unproductive era of mass incarceration, California represents a high-stakes test kitchen.
Realignment is anchored in the theory that by managing lower-level offenders in locally
run, community-based programs using evidence-based practices, the state will achieve
improved public safety outcomes by helping more former felons lead crime-free lives.
Will Realignment help the state reduce its 67% recidivism rate, nearly twice the national
average? It’s too early to answer that critical question. With this report Stanford
University researchers sought to assess the impact of Realignment on county stakeholders
during the initiative’s first 22 months (October 1, 2011-August 1, 2013). Our wideranging, often surprising findings are based on interviews with 125 staff in municipal
police departments, county sheriffs’ departments, courts, prosecutors’ offices, public
defender agencies, mental health and victim services agencies, and probation
departments. We also spoke with offenders.

6

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Findings
Broadly speaking, Realignment gets mixed reviews so far. Our interviews elicited a
portrait of counties struggling, often heroically, to carry out an initiative that was poorly
planned and imposed upon them almost overnight, giving them little time to prepare.
The first year was like “drinking from a fire hose,” as counties scrambled to cope with an
influx of offenders far larger than expected, and with more serious criminal histories and
needs. That said, everyone agreed Realignment is here to stay and that the old system
was yielding disappointing results – and siphoning too many taxpayer dollars from other
vital public programs. Those interviewed also agreed that Realignment has the
potential—as yet unrealized—to improve the handling of lower-level property and drug
felons. But as our conversations revealed, AB 109 has wrought tremendous change in
every phase and at every level of the criminal justice system, requiring many painful
adjustments. Realignment asks stakeholders to put aside personal agendas and work
collaboratively toward a shared goal of reducing recidivism. Although everyone embraces
that goal, getting there is proving a monumental, often frustrating challenge, and many
unintended consequences of this well-intentioned law are surfacing along the way.
Despite the obstacles, our interviews suggest that even in the early going, counties are
experiencing some success. Officials reported collaborating with one another in
surprising and unprecedented ways, embarking on jointly funded initiatives, eliminating
duplication, and approaching justice from a system wide, rather than a narrower agency
perspective. Realignment also has encouraged counties to take a more holistic view of
offender needs, treating them within their family and community contexts.
Overall, many stakeholders expressed a realistic attitude toward Realignment, noting that
when it comes to crime and punishment, pendulum shifts take time and achieving results
requires stamina and patience, Realignment represents a titanic policy shift and
tremendous opportunity for reform, but it will only deliver lasting benefits if counties can
make it work. As such, we must listen to these expert “voices from the field” and
continue tweaking AB 109 to ensure those in the trenches get the support they need to
make this ambitious law produce results on the ground.

Probation
Of all the agency staff interviewed, representatives of probation—the workhorse of the
criminal justice system, especially under AB 109—spoke with the most unified voice.
They unequivocally felt that Realignment gave them an opportunity to fully test whether
well-tailored rehabilitation services can keep lower-level felony offenders from
committing new crimes and returning to prison. If Realignment is to amount to more
7

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
than an experimental, emergency response to a court directive over prison crowding, it
will depend heavily on how well probation agencies deliver effective programs and
services. Probation is, in essence, the epicenter of Realignment, burdened with the
massive responsibility—unfair as it may seem—of determining how best to change
offender behavior.
With more than $90 million—or 25% the total AB 109 allocation—flowing into probation
in the first year alone, there is no doubt that the long-underfunded agencies are
producing positive results. Our interviews showed that across the state, probation
agencies have launched pilot projects that, if successful, will significantly strengthen
community corrections in California and nationally. One of the most promising options
is the Day Reporting Center (DRC), often described as “one-stop” centers where
offenders can access educational programs, cognitive behavioral therapy, and
employment services, and meet with probation officers. Offenders are assessed for needs
and then matched to services that best address those needs. There are now nearly 25
DRCs across California, virtually all of them receiving some AB 109 funding.
In addition, nearly all probation agencies reported adopting risk/needs classification
instruments to measure an offender’s predicted risk of recidivism and to help target
treatment to those most likely to benefit. The adoption of such actuarial tools has
professionalized probation, and allowed officials to better triage services and the level of
monitoring provided by officers.
While new funding has made new things possible, our interviews confirmed the hard
realities probation agencies are facing. Above all, probation chiefs expressed frustration
with the poor policy and planning that preceded Realignment, lamenting that it all
happened far too fast, and that at times, they simply feel overwhelmed. The
unanticipated volume of offenders was one problem. State prison officials provided
counties with a projection, but the numbers were often inaccurate, sometimes wildly so.
In Orange County, for instance, officials said they received twice as many inmates as the
state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation had forecast.
The seriousness of the realigned population’s criminal backgrounds was also unexpected
and remains a key challenge. Almost overnight probation caseloads were hardened by
the addition of many former prisoners with lengthy histories of crime, mental illness, sex
offenses, and substance abuse. The changing character of such caseloads has prompted
some probation agencies to arm its officers, a move that has stirred controversy given the
quasi-rehabilitative role such officers are expected to play.
Compounding these problems, offenders were shifted to county responsibility well before
probation departments and service providers had sufficient staff and programs in place to

8

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
handle them. Hiring new probation staff was one challenge, given cumbersome county
government requirements involving a lengthy process of advertising, interviewing
applicants, checking references, and giving preference based on seniority. Similar delays
slowed the signing of contracts for services, particularly with agencies that were not
already part of the county governance structure or community providers that did not
have existing contracts with probation, such as electronic monitoring companies. The
accelerated timeframe also deprived counties of time to assess programs described as
anchored in evidence-based practices or, once funded, to monitor the quality of services
being delivered. Almost two years into Realignment, probation chiefs said such pressures
were easing, and many felt confident in the quality of programs taking root in their
counties.
Even the best programs, however, cannot produce results if offenders are not
participating in them, and across the state, the lack of split sentencing remains a
problem. One of the core principles of “evidence-based practices” is the combination of
custody and aftercare. Without split sentencing, probation officials have no ability to
work with offenders or monitor their compliance. With 75% of all offenders not
receiving a split sentence—and hence experiencing no oversight or treatment through
probation—“evidence-based programming” really isn’t happening much at all. If that
pattern persists, recidivism rates will remain high. Aware of that likelihood, probation
officials support legislative changes that would mandate split sentencing, particularly for
the more serious realigned felons most in need of supervision and services.

Public Defenders and Prosecutors
Both district attorneys and public defenders believed Realignment had given defense
attorneys more leverage in their negotiations with prosecutors, but beyond that issue,
they did not agree on much in our interviews. Public defenders, who provide legal
representation for indigent defendants, supported Realignment as a long-overdue course
correction for a system that relied far too heavily on punitive approaches, especially
incarceration. By taking prison off the table for lower level offenders, Realignment gives
public defenders the ability to secure acquittals or obtain appropriate community
sanctions for more of their clients. They believe the state’s high recidivism rate was
caused by its high incarceration rate and that Realignment will result in better outcomes,
particularly for low-level drug crimes.
Despite being pleased with the increased use of Day Reporting Centers, specialized courts
and other community alternatives flourishing under Realignment, public defenders did
confess some concerns. The first involved the infrequent use of split sentences, a
reflection of many defendants’ desire to do flat jail time. Aware that the jails are

9

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
crowded, offenders know they will be released after doing a fraction of their sentence,
and thus avoid further monitoring and the probation conditions that go along with it.
Several public defenders were worried about the long-term implications for recidivism
reduction if offenders continue to eschew probation in favor of straight time. They want
their clients in programs that help them confront their criminogenic problems and
reduce the chance they will reoffend, but defendants view things from a more short-term
perspective.
Public defenders also identified a chasm between the ideal of Realignment and its reality
in many counties, noting that treatment was either unavailable or not intensive enough
for the most serious offenders. All of those interviewed agreed the most critical needs
were services for sex offenders and the mentally ill, as well as housing and crisis beds.
Finally, public defenders said they lacked sufficient resources to handle their increased
workload post-AB 109. Already stretched thin by oversized caseloads, public defenders
have been overwhelmed by new responsibilities, mostly undertaken without sufficient
new funding under Realignment.
As for prosecutors, they seemed less supportive of Realignment than any other group of
stakeholders. While they expressed a willingness to work within the new framework, and
acknowledged occasional feelings of cautious optimism, they also shared a strong sense of
frustration throughout our interviews. Among their misgivings was the perception that
taking prison “off the table” for some very serious, repeat offenders had resulted in less
deterrence, less incapacitation, and ultimately less public safety. The police arrest, the
detectives investigate, the district attorney files and makes the case, the judge passes
sentence, and then, under Realignment, the final outcome of this tremendous resource
expenditure is that the offender may get a very short stint in county jail, the prosecutors
lamented. Moreover, crowding is forcing early releases from jail. This sense of a poor
criminal justice “payoff” was expressed not only by district attorneys but also by police
and judges.
Steve Cooley, three-term former Los Angeles County District Attorney, was perhaps the
most vocal in his criticism, calling Realignment a “public safety nightmare.” Like Cooley,
most prosecutors believe that Realignment undermines their ability to keep dangerous
offenders off the streets—both newly convicted felons and former parolees. By taking the
“big hammer” of prison out of prosecutors’ hands Realignment has made negotiations
more difficult, leaving district attorneys with weaker cases and forcing them to agree to
plea bargains carrying shorter sentences.
Prosecutors also were troubled by AB 109’s definition of “low-level offenders,” with many
suggesting it vastly understated the seriousness of some crimes included in the original

10

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
bill. In response to that concern, the California District Attorneys Association pushed
clean-up legislation (AB 118) that added about 60 felonies to the prison-eligible category.
But prosecutors say many other serious crimes remain punishable only by a jail term,
such as commercial burglary, vehicular manslaughter, possession of weapons, identity
theft, elder abuse, hate crimes, and human trafficking.
Another key deficiency of AB 109 cited by prosecutors is the handling of offenders who
commit “technical” violations. Under Realignment, virtually no “technical” violator can
be returned to prison, a major change from the days when the state parole board sent
about 35,000 such violators each year to prison for up to a year.1 Now, courts must handle
the hearings for suspected violators, and the most serious penalty is a 90-day jail term,
even for those whose backgrounds include serious crimes. As a result, prosecutors said
repeat offenders were cycling through the system much more often, and that they must
charge serious transgressions as new crimes in order to ensure a dangerous offender
receives prison time.
More generally, prosecutors said that rather than adopting as far-reaching a plan as
Realignment, lawmakers instead could have provided state corrections the authority to
release lower-risk inmates and place them in community alternatives. Prosecutors also
favored another proposal considered by the Legislature before adoption of AB 109, one
that would have realigned only those offenders sentenced to 36 months or less in state
prison. That proposal used sentence length, rather than the conviction crime, as the
determining factor in realignment, and would have avoided the very long terms now
being served in county jails.
While all prosecutors noted shortcomings of AB 109, some also believe it can spawn
needed change and innovative strategies. In San Francisco, for example, District
Attorney George Gascón says Realignment has freed him up to accomplish things not
possible under the old state-dominated correctional system. Realignment, he said,
challenged those in the criminal justice system to think differently and find new policy
solutions to hold offenders accountable and help reduce recidivism. Gascón created a
new position, an Alternative Sentencing Planner, to help prosecutors determine which
punishment best fits offenders. He also created California’s first-ever county Sentencing
Commission, which analyzes sentencing patterns and outcomes and will suggest
sentencing changes to enhance public safety and offender reentry.
In Los Angeles, the newly elected District Attorney, Jackie Lacey, also expressed a
moderate view of Realignment. While acknowledging the serious challenges in the
sprawling county, Lacey said, “We’ve run out of room at the state prisons. We have run
1

The only exception is that individuals released from prison after serving an indeterminate life sentence
may still be returned to prison for a technical parole violation.

11

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
out of room at the county jail… Let’s peel the lower-risk people off and save room for
people who are very dangerous.”

Police
Police officers walking the beats in cities across California had few positive comments
about Realignment. They considered it an unfunded state mandate, imposed on them at
a time when they were already facing budget cuts that had led to officer layoffs and
expanded obligations. Most believed that more criminals are on the streets and that
crime has been rising as a result. In July 2013, the California Attorney General’s Office
released its Crime in California report, which confirmed these suspicions. Violent and
property crime increased about 3% to 5% between 2011 and 2012.
While scholars say it’s too early to link Realignment to an increase in crime, the numbers
are creating real problems for some cities—particularly those that had police layoffs
before Realignment. Oakland is one of them. In 2010, Oakland laid off 80 officers
because of budget cuts, and this year is grappling with a 21% spike in murders and other
major offenses. San Jose also experienced an increase in the homicide rate, which
reached a 20-year high in 2012.
In addition to coping with rising crime, police said they now had fewer options to control
offenders’ behavior. When an arrest is made in some counties, offenders are quickly
released due to jail crowding. From the police point of view, this means officers have
invested valuable resources and completed abundant paperwork with little perceived
benefit. Police expressed frustration not only with newly convicted felons being
sentenced to jail and promptly set free—“they beat me home,” one officer said—but also
with the handling of parole violators, who now face few consequences for breaking
supervision rules. Police said offenders appeared to be getting bolder as the penalties
grew weaker. The revolving door of state prison has become the revolving door of county
jail—and it swings faster.
Municipal police agencies provide service to more than three out of four Californians,
and their officers make almost two-thirds of all felony and misdemeanor arrests in the
state. Despite the importance and reach of these local crime fighters, the potential
impacts of Realignment on policing were not well examined by planners, and police
departments have not been fully compensated for the extra work AB 109 requires of
them. Struggling to cope, many police officers expressed anger and said their concerns
had been overlooked.
Specifically, they said Realignment threatened recent progress made through community
policing and other problem-solving techniques designed to proactively address crime—
12

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
strategies they believed had led to California’s crime decline over the past few decades.
Stretched thin, police departments reported that they can no longer engage in such
efforts and, in some cases, no longer respond to calls reporting lower-level crimes.
By far the largest concern expressed by police was the need for a statewide, centralized
database of probationers. In the past, an officer who stopped a suspect could check the
state parole database quickly to determine his status—and conduct a legal search if the
suspect was a parolee. That extra authority often meant the difference between a routine
traffic ticket and a drug bust. Now, officers lack that tool, which they said had seriously
eroded their effectiveness in controlling crime and apprehending criminals.

County Sheriffs
California’s sheriffs are responsible for running the county jails, but their role under
Realignment extends far beyond custody and basic crime control. As jails have become
more crowded with AB 109 offenders, and as both funding and the need for community
alternatives have increased, sheriffs have become central figures in offender treatment.
In some counties, they are making decisions about who should remain in custody, who
should be released pre- and post-conviction, and what community services and sanctions
an offender receives, both initially and in response to a technical violation of probation
or parole. Many sheriffs are even running their own work release and electronic
monitoring programs, very similar to the programs run by probation. Ironically, if the
state had given the same discretionary release authority and “relief valve” to prison
officials to control inmate populations, California might have avoided the Plata/Coleman
litigation that ultimately led to AB 109.
Sheriffs were divided over the impacts of Realignment. Despite their concerns about
glitches and unanticipated consequences, many sheriffs acknowledged that the old
system wasn’t working well, that the revolving door between jail and prison was not
protecting the public, and that a new approach was needed. As such, sheriffs said they
were working more closely than ever with probation departments to develop alternatives
to custody so they can keep jails at a constitutionally acceptable capacity. They also are
joining forces to create a fuller menu of appropriate treatment, following the principles
of evidence-based practices. Sheriffs said they understand the potential benefits of
community-based sanctions and services, noting in interviews that, “they are coming
home anyway…they are our citizens…we have seen them before…let’s see if we can’t do
something different this time.” Collaborating with probation, some sheriffs have created
a full continuum of sanctions, ranging from fines through county jail and onto electronic
monitoring and discharge. Some questioned this expanded role for law enforcement,
but others seemed enthusiastic about the countywide approach.

13

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
One key challenge faced by sheriffs is the deterioration of jail conditions as populations
swell to accommodate diversions from state prisons. In interviews with public defenders,
the one consistent concern was that some clients were suffering in deplorable jailhouse
conditions. In particular, some offenders needing mental or medical care have waited
weeks before receiving any treatment. Indeed, in talking with jail inmates about such
conditions, we found a surprising twist: Many offenders, particularly those facing long
terms, would prefer to do their time in prison. One reason: In jails plagued with
overcrowding, sheriffs often feel the only option to assure inmate safety and prevent
violence is to keep more inmates in lock down. As a result, few offenders have access to
rehabilitation programs, and extreme idleness is a problem.
Some of these conditions seem startlingly familiar, closely mirroring the problems that
produced the successful claim in Plata/Coleman that state prison conditions violated the
Eighth Amendment. Have we simply moved these constitutional violations from the state
prisons to the county jails? Currently, 37 of California’s 58 county jails are operating
under either a self-imposed or court-ordered population cap. Given the success of the
Plata litigation, a surge of county-level Eighth Amendment suits is likely to emerge. The
Prison Law Office has already filed class action lawsuits seeking to remedy Eighth
Amendment violations in the Fresno County and Riverside County jails. Sheriffs are
trying to intervene early and address jail conditions before the courts become involved.
New funding provided by AB 900 will help, providing 21 of California’s 58 counties with
dollars for jail construction—enough to add about 10,811 beds.2 But construction takes
time, and no new jails have yet been completed.
Meanwhile, many Sheriffs have become highly creative in managing their release
authority under Realignment, using risk assessments, and operating their own work
furlough programs, electronic monitoring systems, and day reporting centers. Sheriffs
also said they are using good time credits and flash incarceration for probation violators.
By necessity, their expanded duties under Realignment have turned these elected law
enforcement leaders into treatment providers, probation managers, and reentry
coordinators. For Sheriffs in counties rich in resources and with jail beds to spare,
Realignment has been an opportunity to expand and create innovative programming,
apply evidence-based practices to reduce recidivism, and absorb a population that they
firmly believe is best managed at the local level. One such county is San Francisco, where
jail and post-release systems are considered a model. Before Realignment San Francisco
County sent relatively few felons to state prison, so impacts under AB 109 were
comparatively minimal. The county jail had excess capacity and its population remains at
a historic low. Santa Clara County also has excess jail capacity.
2

“AB 900 Jail Construction Financing Program Board of State and Community Corrections Project Status
Update–Phases I and II.” Board of State and Community Corrections (2013).

14

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Sheriffs in these and other counties blessed with recovering economies, excess bed space
and relatively abundant program resources pre-AB 109 are adopting truly innovative
approaches that can serve as best practices models going forward. But for those with
overloaded jails, Realignment amounts to a stressful scramble to divert, sanction and
rehabilitate the inmate population before overcrowded conditions prompt early releases
and litigation.
Although population management is a key concern, many sheriffs interviewed said they
are even more anxious about the type of inmate now housed in local jails, and the length
of sentences imposed on those inmates. Jails were never intended nor designed to serve
as state prisons, and they are generally not equipped with medical facilities or vocational
and rehabilitation opportunities needed for long-term inmates. The California State
Sheriffs’ Association reported that by February 2013, there were 1,109 jail inmates
sentenced to 5 to 10 years in jail, and 44 who were sentenced to more than 10 years. The
most common crimes committed by those serving 10 years or more are drug trafficking,
although Riverside County sentenced one offender to a 12-year jail term for multiple
counts of child abuse.3 Complicating matters for Sheriffs, jails lack space to segregate
vulnerable inmates, a standard practice in state prisons. Consequently, Sheriffs
anticipated an increase in jail violence and inmate-on-inmate victimization.

Judges
Judges’ opinions regarding Realignment varied widely. All of those interviewed voiced
frustration that AB 109 was poorly drafted, was undergoing continual revisions, and,
given its 800-page length and multiple amendments, required extensive judicial training.
Most judges agreed that it would have made more sense to test Realignment on a smaller
scale before rolling it out statewide, especially given the lack of time for preparation and
planning. Summing it up compellingly, Los Angeles County Judge David Wesley said
adjusting to Realignment was “like trying to change the tires on the bus while the bus is
moving.” All judges also expressed concerns about the added workload under AB 109,
particularly given their new responsibility for nearly all parole, probation, and PRCS
revocation hearings.4
Some judges were strongly opposed to Realignment’s new mandates, saying that instead
of individualizing sentencing, as intended, AB 109 had done just the opposite. Other

3

“Letter for Survey of Sheriffs re Long Term Offenders in Jail.” California State Sheriff's Association
(February 26, 2013).
http://www.calsheriffs.org/images/SummaryMemoreLongTermSentences021913.pdf.
4
After July 1, 2013, the state Board of Parole (BPH) will only be responsible for parole considerations for
lifers, medical parole hearings, mentally disordered offender cases, and sexually violent predator cases.

15

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
judges, particularly those accustomed to collaborative courts, shared probation’s more
positive view of Realignment. These judges have experience working with probation and
community treatment specialists to provide services to offenders with mental health,
substance abuse, and domestic violence issues. They have seen evidence that investing in
a holistic and intensive community approach, one that is more patient with relapses and
not as quick to incarcerate, holds promise. Santa Clara County Judge Steve Manley, a
highly respected jurist who presides over drug, mental health, and veteran courts, said
Realignment opens the door for judges to not only impose sentences but to actively
manage offenders’ treatment and compliance post-sentencing. Manley said the coercive
power of the court can play a significant role in offender recovery, exerting not just a
punitive force but also a therapeutic one.
But collaborative courts are expensive, and not all judges favor them. Some said their
counties could not afford to spend so much money on such a small part of their
caseloads, noting that criminal work accounted for less than 20% of the total cases that
came before them. In addition, some judges said their counties simply don’t yet have the
community-based resources to make such courts work, rendering Realignment appealing
in principle but difficult to execute in reality.
One concern many judges shared was the lack of post-custody time and supervision that
they could impose on an offender. They worried that they lacked sufficient discretion to
ensure that criminals are both properly incapacitated and properly monitored when
released. Some judges said the limitations of PRCS do not allow enough time to change
criminal behavior and reduce recidivism. For many counties, this situation has become a
catch-22: judges do not have faith in probation to deliver effective programs, so they
sentence more and more inmates to straight time. As more flat time offenders recidivate,
probation may be blamed for ineffective programming. But research shows that
probation is most effective when it combines custody and aftercare (i.e., split sentencing),
and probation officials are not afforded that opportunity when offenders are sentenced
to straight time.
Finally and importantly, judges pointed out that while AB 109 was designed to give judges
more discretion and more flexibility to individualize sentencing, taking into account risk
factors and community alternatives, it has not done that. Rather, AB 109 has
undermined their discretion and shifted it outside of the courtroom and into the jails. In
most counties, judicial discretion has been reduced while the sheriff’s discretionary
authority has increased. Some judges said this increased authority of sheriffs threatened
the concept of independent and impartial judges and raised questions about due process
and the separation of powers.

16

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
One additional concern expressed by every judge interviewed was how victims were faring
under AB 109. California used to have some of the strongest victim rights of any state but
judges worried that Realignment was diluting some of these legal rights.

Recommendations: Where Do We Go From Here?
Despite the dramatically distinctive experiences unfolding under Realignment in
California’s 58 counties, several common concerns and suggested revisions emerged
from our interviews. The most frequently mentioned suggestions were:
(1) Create a statewide tracking database for offenders under probation
supervision in the counties. The change from state-based to county-based
supervision of offenders leaving prisons has created an information void for law
enforcement officials. There is no statewide or cross-county database of offenders
on PRCS, mandatory supervision or probation. Without this tool, officers lack
adequate information indicating whether those they encounter on the street are
a) entitled to the full range of Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections
because they are not under criminal justice supervision or b) a potentially
dangerous offender who is under supervision.
(2) Allow an offender’s criminal history to be considered when determining
whether the county or state will supervise a parolee. Complete adult and
juvenile criminal conviction records should be considered when determining if
the state or county will supervise an offender leaving prison. Those offenders with
extensive prior serious or violent convictions in California or elsewhere should be
ineligible for county supervision and required to report to parole. Under
Realignment, only the current conviction offense is considered when determining
whether inmates leaving prison will be placed on PRCS or parole. As a result,
offenders with serious and violent prior convictions—including moderate-risk sex
offenders—are reporting to county probation officers. Already shouldering
expanded caseloads, these officers are ill equipped to manage such sophisticated
offenders. Some counties are so concerned that they are arming their probation
officers. While this reaction is logical, it raises potential conflicts with the
rehabilitative role probation plays in the criminal justice system.
(3) Cap county jail sentences at three years. County jails were built to house
inmates for a maximum stay of one year, but under Realignment sentences are
extending well beyond that. Serving a five, seven, or ten-year sentence in a county
jail will likely deprive an inmate of adequate mental and medical healthcare,
addiction treatment, sufficient recreational time and space, regular visitation, and

17

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
other benefits, services and rights that are maintained in state prisons. To meet
these needs, county jails would need to overhaul, at a minimum, the medical and
mental health provision protocols and facilities they offer. This would require
funding that no doubt exceeds what sheriffs’ have received under Realignment.
Instead, lawmakers should amend AB 109 to cap jail time at three years and send
those with longer terms to prison.
(4) Impose a prison sentence for certain repeated technical violations. PreRealignment, technical violations of a parolee’s terms of supervision could result
in a return to prison for up to one year. Now violators are sent only to county jail,
and only for a maximum of six months. In counties where the jails are crowded
and sheriffs are releasing some inmates early, technical violators may be one of the
first groups freed to create room for more serious offenders. This cycle of
supervision, violation, brief punishment, and release gives an offender little
incentive to comply with supervision rules. Sex offenders, for example, have
begun to cut off their electronic monitors and abscond from supervision knowing
that the only consequence will be a brief stint in jail. To encourage compliance
with supervision conditions, certain repeated serious violations should bring
prison time.

Conclusion
On August 12, 2013, Attorney General Eric Holder delivered the keynote address at the
American Bar Association meeting in San Francisco. Holder announced that the federal
government was committed to reducing the nation’s bloated prison population and
directed all federal prosecutors to exercise more discretion toward the harsh sentencing
of low-level drug crimes. At the time of his speech, nearly half of all inmates in the
Federal Bureau of Prisons were held on drug offenses. “We need to ensure that
incarceration is used to punish, deter and rehabilitate,” Holder said, “not merely convict,
warehouse and forget.” He continued by urging new approaches for managing lowerlevel drug offenders, noting that they were “best handled at the local level.” Finally, he
directed federal officials to develop guidelines and programs to divert offenders to
community sanctions instead of prison.
Given that the Attorney General spoke in San Francisco, it is perhaps surprising that he
failed to mention the unprecedented prison downsizing experiment unfolding in
California. Just 9% of California’s prisoners are now held on drug crimes, down from

18

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
20% in 2005.5 California has cut the number of prisoners in state facilities for drug
convictions in half during the last two years. In short, Realignment has completely
transformed California’s criminal justice system in a very short time, and while opinions
about its effectiveness and potential vary dramatically, everyone agrees it is here to stay.
As with any piece of comprehensive legislation, it was impossible to anticipate how
Realignment would play out on the ground, and as our interviews demonstrate, AB 109
has caused the gears and levers of the criminal justice system to interact in unpredictable
ways, creating some unforeseen results. As highlighted above, the challenges are
significant. Without consistent, honest evaluation of the progress and problems by those
guiding the ship, Realignment will crash against the rocks, just another failed
correctional initiative run aground.
We can avoid that fate, but we must acknowledge—not ignore—the hard realities our
counties face in developing effective programs, transforming offender behavior,
incapacitating those whose crimes merit it, and, ultimately, reducing recidivism. Only
then will California’s Realignment experiment fulfill its potential and serve as a
springboard to change the country’s overreliance on prisons. It is an experiment the
whole nation is watching.

5

Reese, Phillip. “California drug criminals now half as likely to serve time in state prison.” Sacramento Bee
(April 19, 2013). http://www.sacbee.com/2013/04/19/5356761/california-state-prison-incarceration.html.

19

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Acknowledgements
First and foremost, the author wishes to thank the state and county officials who gave
generously and enthusiastically their time to help us understand the legislation and the
changes it has engendered. These individuals, named in appendix, not only took
valuable time from their very busy schedules, but also they reviewed our work, discussed
its implications, and helped us understand the intricacies of the law. We are also
appreciative of the offenders who participated in our panel discussions.
Many Stanford Law School students participated in the study. As part of a seminar taught
by Joan Petersilia and Robert Weisberg in Winter 2013, students studied the AB 109 law,
identified county stakeholders, constructed the questionnaires, conducted the interviews,
and wrote up their initial findings. This project could not have been completed without
their energy, insights, and dedication. Information from their interviews and research
reports is drawn upon heavily in this document. A special thanks goes to John Butler,
Meredith DeCarlo, Mark Feldman, Mariam Hinds, Kevin Jason, Corinne Keel, Marisa
Landin, Rachel McDaniel, Alex Miller, Matthew Owens, Jessica Snyder, Jessica Spencer,
Alyssa Weis, Jordan Wappler, Lindsey Warp, Jennifer Williams, and Camden Vilkin for
their tireless efforts on the author’s behalf.
Many of our colleagues at Stanford have also contributed valuable assistance to this
project. Robert Weisberg, Debbie Mukamal, Sara Abarbanel, Sarah Lawrence, and Lisa
Quan provided valuable assistance in the formulation of our approach and in a multitude
of other ways. Sara Abarbanel went above and beyond as the project’s main research
assistant.
We are grateful to our grant monitors who helped shepherd us through the process. In
particular, we are thankful to Angela M. Moore at the National Institute of Justice and
Amy Dominquez-Arms at the James Irvine Foundation.
Though indebted to the many who assisted on this project, the author remains solely
responsible for any errors and omissions.

20

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Table of Contents
Preface ......................................................................................................................... 2
Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 4
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 6
Findings .................................................................................................................... 7
Probation .......................................................................................................................... 7
Public Defenders and Prosecutors .................................................................................. 9
Police............................................................................................................................... 12
County Sheriffs ............................................................................................................... 13
Judges .............................................................................................................................. 15
Recommendations: Where Do We Go From Here? ............................................... 17
Conclusion .............................................................................................................. 18
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................... 20
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... 21
Chapter 1: The Road to Realignment........................................................................ 25
Brown v. Plata and the Mandate to Downsize California Prisons .......................... 25
The Promise of California’s Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) .................. 30
Study Goals and Contributions .............................................................................. 33
Organization of the Report .................................................................................... 35
Chapter 2: Overview of The Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) ..................... 36
Target Felon Population ........................................................................................ 37
Realignment Funding and State Monitoring ......................................................... 41
Community Corrections Partnerships (CCPs) and Discretionary Decisionmaking
................................................................................................................................ 43
How Did Counties Allocate Their AB 109 Funding? ................................................... 44
Evidence-Based Correctional Programming .......................................................... 46
Chapter 3: Study Methodology .................................................................................. 49
Selection of Study Counties ................................................................................... 50
Interview Administration and Questions Asked ..................................................... 57
Limitations of Our Approach ................................................................................. 60
Chapter 4: Police and Local Law Enforcement ......................................................... 61
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 61
Prior Research Studies ........................................................................................... 63
Findings .................................................................................................................. 65
Realignments’ Impact on Street Level Policing ........................................................... 65

21

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................ 81
Chapter 5: Sheriffs ..................................................................................................... 82
Findings .................................................................................................................. 85
County Profiles ............................................................................................................... 86
Population Shift and Jail Capacity ................................................................................ 91
Population Management ............................................................................................... 98
Chapter 6: Public Defenders .....................................................................................110
Findings .................................................................................................................110
Relationships with Sheriffs .......................................................................................... 115
Relationships with Probation ...................................................................................... 116
Relationships with Clients............................................................................................ 116
Criminal Justice Paradigm Shift .................................................................................. 118
The Creation of County Jail Felonies.......................................................................... 119
New Alternatives to Incarceration and Enhanced Conduct Credits ......................... 120
Jail overcrowding .......................................................................................................... 121
Chapter 7: District Attorneys ....................................................................................125
Factors Affecting Prosecutor Decision-Making .....................................................125
Charging Decisions ...................................................................................................... 126
Bail ................................................................................................................................ 128
Plea Bargaining ............................................................................................................ 128
Sentencing .................................................................................................................... 129
Internalization of Costs ................................................................................................ 130
Findings .................................................................................................................131
Post-Release Supervision .............................................................................................. 132
Long-Term Jail Sentences............................................................................................ 133
Fewer Charges Filed for Low-Level Crimes ................................................................ 136
“Charging Up” to Prison Eligible Offenses ................................................................ 137
Some Counties Report No Change in Charging Practices ........................................ 138
Longer Plea Offers ....................................................................................................... 139
Background Budget Shortfalls .................................................................................... 139
Shifting Incentives........................................................................................................ 140
Potential Increase in Trials .......................................................................................... 141
Contemplating Charging Realigned Felonies as Misdemeanors .............................. 142
Programming Emerging and Expanding ................................................................... 143
Increase in Felony Probation ...................................................................................... 144
Chapter 8: Judges ......................................................................................................152
Findings .................................................................................................................154
Judges Doing More with Less ...................................................................................... 154

22

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The Pressure to Use Split Sentencing ......................................................................... 155
Adjusting to New Responsibilities: The Handling of Technical Violations.............. 159
AB 109 and Collaborative Courts ................................................................................ 161
Sentencing, Jail Crowding, and Loss of Judicial Authority........................................ 163
A Concern for Victims Post-AB 109 ............................................................................ 166
Chapter 9: Probation ................................................................................................169
California Probation System Pre-Realignment .....................................................170
Probation Chronically Underfunded.......................................................................... 170
The Two Faces of Probation: Surveillance and Services ............................................ 171
Lessons Learned from California’s Previous Experiment With Intermediate
Sanctions ....................................................................................................................... 173
Applying Prior Intermediate Sanctions’ Findings to Current Realignment
Experiment ................................................................................................................... 176
Findings .................................................................................................................177
Chapter 10: Conclusions ...........................................................................................208
Probation and Community Service Providers .......................................................208
Public Defenders ...................................................................................................209
Prosecuting Attorneys ...........................................................................................210
Law Enforcement ..................................................................................................210
Sheriffs ...................................................................................................................212
Judges ....................................................................................................................213
Recommendations .................................................................................................215
Create a statewide tracking database for offenders under supervision in the
community. ................................................................................................................... 215
Allow criminal history to be considered when determining if the county or the state
will supervise a parolee. ............................................................................................... 216
Preempt forthcoming litigation based on conditions in the county jails. ................ 217
County jail sentences should be capped at a maximum of three years. ................... 217
Certain repeated, technical violations should warrant a prison sentence. ............... 218
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 218
Appendix A: List of Interviewees ..............................................................................220
Appendix B: Interview Questions .............................................................................225
Bibliography ..............................................................................................................235

23

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Figures
Figure 1: Pre-Realignment Preference for Incarceration, by County, 2009-2010 .............. 51 
Figure 2: Post-Realignment County Spending Preferences ................................................ 54 
Figure 3: Part I Crime per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Most Populous
Cities, 2008-2012 .................................................................................................................... 68 
Figure 4: Part I Crime per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Cities over
100,000 people with Highest Crime Rate, 2008-2012 .......................................................... 69 
Figure 5: Part I Crime per 100,000 overall population for California 2008-2012 .............. 70 
Figure 6: Part I Crimes per 100,000 population, 2008-2012, California compared to other
Western States ........................................................................................................................ 71 
Figure 7: Auto Theft per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Most Populous
Cities, 2008-2012 .................................................................................................................... 73 
Figure 8: Auto Theft per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Cities over
100,000 people with Highest Crime Rate, 2008-2012 .......................................................... 74 
Figure 9: Average California Daily Jail Population by Quarter ........................................... 83 
Figure 10: Monthly Early Releases from California Jails Due to Lack of Housing Capacity
.............................................................................................................................................. 107 
Figure 11: Share of jail sentences that are split sentences by county, October 2011September 2012 ................................................................................................................... 146 
Figure 12: California’s Correctional Populations, 2004-2012 ........................................... 178 
Figure 13: Programs and Services Discussed in Depth in AB 109 CCP Plans, First Year, All
Counties Combined ............................................................................................................. 194 

Tables
Table 1: Pre- and Post-Realignment County “Control” Orientation .................................. 56 
Table 2: Jail Crowding in Counties Studied ......................................................................... 84 

24

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Chapter 1: The Road to Realignment
It has been just over two years since the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed California’s
prisoner release order, spurring an unprecedented overhaul of California’s sentencing
and corrections system. In Brown v. Plata, the Supreme Court affirmed the three-judge
district court’s 2009 remedial order requiring the state to reduce its prison population to
137.5% of design capacity within two years.6 The Supreme Court declared that “without a
reduction in overcrowding, there will be no efficacious remedy for the unconstitutional
care of the sick and mentally ill” inmates in California’s prisons.

Brown v. Plata and the Mandate to Downsize
California Prisons
The Supreme Court found that California had violated the Eighth Amendment ban
against cruel and unusual punishment by providing constitutionally inadequate medical7
and mental health8 services in its prisons, and that overcrowding was the “primary” source
of the unconstitutional medical care. The Court determined that California had room
for just 80,000 prisoners in its 33 state prisons, but housed more than twice that number
in its cells, and as a result of such extreme crowding, medical and mental health care
could not be delivered.
The state had appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the grounds that the lower court
had violated the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), improperly intruding on
6

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). California’s Three Judge Panel issued its decision in 2009
addressing two consolidated class-action lawsuits, one filed in 1990 (Coleman), the other in 2001 (Plata).
The Court issued its ruling on May 23, 2011. Design capacity generally refers to the number of beds that
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) would operate if it housed only one
inmate per cell, used single-level bunks in dormitories, and had no beds in places not designed for housing
(e.g., gymnasiums). California’s current design capacity is 79,858. So how did the Court reach the 137.5%
number? A review of the Court testimony reveals that Joe Lehman, a former corrections director in three
states opined that 130% would give prison staff the ability to provide necessary services. A former Texas
prison executive also supported the 130% figure. A former Secretary of the CDCR agreed with the 130%
figure, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons has long used the 130% of design capacity benchmark. But the
state’s 2004 Corrections Independent Review Panel, chaired by former Governor George Deukmejian,
came up with a recommendation of 145% of design capacity. After considering all the expert testimony,
the three-judge panel concluded that the proper upper bound for the CDCR population with respect to
design capacity was lower than 145% but higher than 130%. Averaging the two estimates, the three-judge
panel settled on 137.5%. The Supreme Court found that this was a reasonable balance based upon the
evidence. Some, including Governor Brown and Justice Kennedy have called the 137.5% of capacity an
arbitrary number.
7
Originally filed as Plata v. Davis in 2001. (Plata v. Davis, 329 F. 3d 1101 (2003).
8
Originally filed in 1990. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E. D. Cal. 1995).

25

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
the State’s authority to administer its criminal justice system, and compromising the
state’s ability to reduce overcrowding in a manner that protects public safety. But the
high Court denied the State’s appeal on all grounds.9
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority in a 5-to-4 decision, described dismal
conditions where prisoners were denied minimal care and suicidal inmates were held in
“telephone-booth sized cages without toilets” and prisoners with mental illnesses
“languished for months” without access to care of any sort. He wrote:
Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided
adequate medical care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human
dignity and has no place in civilized society. If government fails to fulfill this
obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting Eighth
Amendment Violation.10
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a vigorous dissent, calling the order affirmed by the majority
“perhaps the most radical injunction issued by a court in our nation’s history…The
majority is gambling with the safety of the people of California.”11
The Supreme Court did not actually order prisoner releases, but the impact was the
same. Justice Kennedy wrote that, “The order in this case does not necessarily require
the State to release any prisoners. The State may comply by raising the capacity of its
prisons or by transferring prisoners to county facilities or facilities in other States.”
Because the order limits the prison population as a percentage of design capacity, it
nonetheless has the “effect of reducing or limiting the prison population.”12 Justice
Kennedy said there was “no realistic possibility that California would be able to build
itself out of this crisis,” in light of the state’s financial problems.13 In 2011, California was
facing a daunting $26 billion shortfall and future estimated annual budget gaps of $20
billion.
At the time of the Plata ruling on May 23, 2011, California’s in-state prison population
was approximately 162,000, down from an all-time high of 173,614 or 200% of design

9

For an excellent review of the legal issues, see Schlanger, Margo. “Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails,
Prisons, Courts, and Politics.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 48, no. 1 (2013): 165-216.
10
Justice Kennedy majority opinion, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf.
11
Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion, ibid. at 1.
12
Ibid. at 13.
13
Liptak, Adam. “Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population.” New York Times (May 24, 2011).
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html.

26

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
capacity in 2007.14 By upholding the three-judge panel’s population cap of 137.5%, the
Supreme Court was ordering the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR, the state’s prison system) to reduce its prison population to
109,805, a reduction of about 35,000 prisoners or 25% of all prisoners at the time. The
initial date for the CDCR to meet this population cap was December 27, 2012. For the
first time in the more than twenty-year litigation battle, the courts ordered the CDCR to
abide by very specific benchmarks and timetables, and to report their progress back to
the Court at six-month intervals. The task was not only daunting; it also represented the
largest court-ordered reduction in prison populations ever in the U.S.
The state continued to seek relief from the Plata benchmarks, but the courts made just
one accommodation, which was to allow the state a six-month extension for meeting the
court-ordered population cap. The new and (it appeared) final deadline for state
compliance was June 26, 2013. By that time, California was told it could house no more
than the 109,805 inmates in its 33 state prisons. California missed the target, housing
132,764 prisoners on June 26, 2013.15 The Court has threatened to hold the state and
Governor Brown in contempt of court for refusing to comply with their orders.
At the time of this writing, 120,027 inmates were housed in the State’s 33 adult
institutions, which amounts to 147.1% of design capacity.16 In fact, California’s current
prison population is at its lowest level since August 1995, when California had 6 million
fewer residents than it has today. But even with those steep population reductions, the
state will not meet the court-mandated number, as their projections show they will be
about 8,5000 above the cap on December 31, 2013.17 On September 24, 2013, the threejudge panel extended the deadline to achieve the court-ordered population reduction to
February 24, 2014.
On April 12, 2013, Governor Brown declared the state’s prison system no longer
overcrowded. At his press conference, he said:
14

See “Monthly Population Report as of Midnight May 31, 2011.” California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/T
POP1Ad1105.pdf; “Monthly Population Report as of Midnight August 31, 2007.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/TPOP1A/T
POP1Ad0708.pdf. In 2006, then-governor Arnold Schwarzenegger said conditions in the state’s prisons
amounted to a state of emergency.
15
The CDCR prison population figures can be found at: “Three-Judge Court Updates.” California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html.
16
“Defendants’ Request for an Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline and Status Report in Response to
June 30, 2011, April 11, 2013, June 20, 2013, and August 9, 2013 Orders.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910
(2011). (September 16, 2013).
17
Ibid.

27

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Since 2006, the inmate population in the state’s 33 prisons has been reduced by
more than 43,000. We have spent more than a billion dollars to build new health
care facilities and hire hundreds of new doctors, nurses and support staff. We are
providing constitutional level of care. The Court’s population cap is based on an
outdated one person per cell concept of design capacity that does not accurately
reflect the prison system’s true capacity. No other prison system in the country
uses this one-inmate-per-cell measurement to determine capacity. With all the
additional treatment space California has added, coupled with the dramatic
reduction in the inmate population, California’s prison system is no longer
overcrowded.
The inmates’ lawyers contend that we could release thousands of felons into
California communities without threatening public safety. That’s simply not true.
Any further forced reduction of the prison population is unnecessary and unsafe.18
On June 28, 2013, Governor Brown asked for an immediate stop to the judge’s order to
release those additional 10,000 inmates by the end of the year. The State’s central
argument was that all the lower-risk prisoners (e.g., property and drug offenders) had
already been released and that further releases mean letting out violent and dangerous
prisoners with a known high probability of recidivism based on the State’s own risk
assessment tool.19 But the Court again denied the state. In fact, the court’s blistering
rebuttal suggests that the Court has lost patience. The three-judge panel expressed
frustration with the State’s “intransigence,” “defiance,” “unwillingness to comply,” and
“repeated failure to take the necessary steps to remedy the constitutional violations in its
prison system.” The State was ordered to “immediately take all steps necessary to comply
with [the] Court's …Order …requiring defendants to reduce overall prison population
to 137.5% design capacity by December 31, 2013.” Failure to take the necessary steps or
report on such steps “shall constitute an act of contempt.”

18
“Fact Sheet: Three-Judge Panel Ruling on CDCR Inmate Population.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-April-2013/3JP-Fact-SheetApril-15-2013.pdf.
19
On June 28, 2013, the State filed a stay of the release order, arguing that all the lower risk inmates had
previously been released and that releasing an additional 10,000 prisoners “raises serious question about
public safety when even inmates deemed ‘low risk’ are released”—citing evidence from the University of
California risk assessment showing that even inmates classified as “low risk” recidivate such that 41% are
returned to California prisons within three years, and that 11% are such “low risk” offenders have been
“rearrested for a violent felony within 3 years of release.” But the argument fell on deaf ears, and just a
week later on July 3, 2013, the three-judge panel refused to delay its prison release order or timetable.
“Defendants’ Motion To Stay Three-Judge Court’s June 20, 2013 Order Requiring Defendants To
Implement Amended Plan Pending Appeal; Memorandum Of Points And Authorities, Brown v. Plata.”
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). (June 28, 2013).

28

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
On July 10, 2013, Governor Jerry Brown filed a request in the U.S. Supreme Court to
delay a federal court order to release any more prisoners. The state presented new
evidence of dramatic improvements prison healthcare, citing an Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) report that medical care of inmates has improved at the state’s prisons
since an initial round of inspections in 2011. The OIG report concludes that most
prisons’ overall medical care scores improved significantly, with all 33 prisons exceeding
the 75% minimum overall score. Four of the 33 prisons had overall scores exceeding
85% compliance with standards in 20 different areas of care.20
On August 2, 2013, a divided Supreme Court (6-3 vote) refused to grant the stay, and
ordered California to proceed with the release of about 9,600 more inmates—nearly 8%
of all state prisoners—by December 31, 2013.21 California now must bring its in-state
prison population down to 112,164 prison inmates by the end of the year. The ruling was
a major setback for Governor Brown. In a statement, CDCR Secretary Jeff Beard said the
state would continue its challenges to the release order. “While California’s stay request
was denied today, the state will pursue its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court so that the
merits of the case can be considered without delay,” he said.22
The long-running legal battle is basically between the three-judge panel, arguing that
prison officials are stonewalling and not moving fast enough to reduce the prison
population, and the State, arguing that just days before the Brown v. Plata case was
decided by the Supreme Court, Governor Brown signed the historic Public Safety
Realignment Act (AB 109), a comprehensive package of crime legislation and if
Realignment is given time, it will give the Court the prison downsizing it demands. In
their latest filing with Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy, the state argues that
being forced to obey the “court’s latest orders will require the release of inmates…[who]
pose a substantial risk of committing new and violent crimes.”23 Realignment, on the
other hand, is better public policy—balancing the state’s need for prison downsizing with
the public’s need for safety.
20
Barton, Robert A., Roy W. Wesley, and James C. Spurling, Office of the Inspector General. “Comparative
Summary And Analysis Of The First, Second, And Third Medical Inspection Cycles Of California's 33 Adult
Institutions.” (2013).
http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/MIU/SUMMARY/Comparative_Summary_and_Analysis_of_the_Fir
st_Three_Medical_Inspection_Cycles_of_Californias_33_Adult_Institutions.pdf.
21
The Court rejected Brown's plea over the objections of Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas, who all said they would have granted the state's request. Justice Scalia wrote that he did
not believe the federal courts have the authority to order California to remove thousands of inmates from
its prison system. He wrote, “The order goes beyond the power of the courts.”
22
“CDCR Responds to Supreme Court Denying a Stay.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (2013). http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2013/08/cdcr-responds-to-supreme-courtdenying.html.
23
“Application to The Honorable Justice Anthony M. Kennedy as Circuit Justice.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct.
1910 (2011). (July 10, 2013).

29

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

The Promise of California’s Public Safety
Realignment Act (AB 109)
Realignment shifts much of the responsibility for supervising and rehabilitating tens of
thousands of offenders from the state prison to the county-based corrections program. It
represents a fundamental shift to handling criminal offenders, and the state believes if it
is given more time to succeed, Realignment will prove far superior to the one-time prison
release orders the Court might favor. After all, Realignment took effect less than two
years ago, and it has already been credited with reducing the in-state prison population
by 25,000 prisoners in just the first year.24 The Governor believes that his Realignment
plan is safer and more sustainable; whereas the Court believes the state needs 10,000
more felons removed from state prisons post haste.
The State isn’t only worried about the sheer numbers, but also the seriousness of the next
round of potential prison releasees. California’s unprecedented prison reductions over
the last several years—down 42,000 since 2006—have narrowed the potential pool of safeto-release inmates. Under Realignment, inmates convicted of non-serious, non-violent,
or non-sexual offenses have already been diverted to local custody and supervision.
Accordingly, many of the remaining inmates have been convicted of serious, violent, or
sex offenses and releasing these more serious offenders poses an undue risk to public
safety.25 The state is essentially arguing that “they are no longer cutting fat, but now
cutting into muscle.”
Prison rights advocates believe there are still prisoners who can be safely released. They
argue that the harsh mass incarceration policies of the last two decades have so overincarcerated Californians that we haven’t yet reached bottom.
Law enforcement leaders, county executives, and elected officials throughout California
are siding with Governor Brown. They are resisting more prison releases, and their
coalition has intensified in recent months. Counties are feeling uniformly overwhelmed
with the Realignment changes that went into effect on October 1, 2011 and don’t believe
they can safely absorb additional offenders. County jail populations have increased
steadily since Realignment. Between June 2011 and June 2012, California’s prison
24

Since Realignment went into effect in October 2011, the population in the State’s 33 institutions has
decreased by approximately 25,000. The current population is 31,530 fewer inmates than when the Court
issued its prisoner reduction order in January 2010, 36,846 fewer inmates compared to the 2008 population
in the record at the evidentiary hearing, and 42,555 fewer inmates than when Plaintiffs moved to convene
the Court in 2006. “Declaration Of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support Of Defendants’ Response To April 11,
2013 Order Requiring List Of Proposed Population Reduction Measures; Court-Ordered Plan”, Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 2 (2011). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May-2013/Beard-May-2-Decl.pdf.
25
Ibid. at line 4, line 27.

30

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
population declined by roughly 27,100, while the average daily jail population grew by
about 8,600, or 12%. As a result, 16 counties are operating jails above rate capacity, up
from 11 counties the previous year.26 In a letter dated April 12, 2013, addressed to
Governor Brown, the California State Sheriffs’ Association requested that any future
responses by the Administration to the Court must include the option of additional
CDCR capacity. Realignment has also placed increasing demands on police, courts,
probation, and local mental health and drug treatment services.
Most of the major California justice organizations issued press releases supporting the
Governor’s request to stay the latest prison release order and appeal the Plata case back
to the U.S. Supreme Court.27 The California State Association of Counties, which
represents California’s 58 counties at the state and federal level, puts it this way:
Governor Brown and the State Department have made significant progress in the
past couple of years in reducing the prison population. Counties have shouldered
much of that burden through public safety Realignment…shifting responsibility
for more offenders to the county level would have a negative impact on the
progress we are already making.28
California’s four previous governors wrote a brief to the Supreme Court asking the Court
to support Governor Brown request to delay further prison releases. The former
governors filed a friend-of-the-court brief, which said freeing more inmates “threatens the
people of California with grave and irreparable harm from increased crime.”29 They
noted that preliminary statistics show an uptick in crime last year after the State began
sentencing thousands of inmates to county jails. Their brief uses recently released FBI
statistics to show that in the last year while the Realignment program was in effect, the
percentage change in number of violent and property crimes in cities of over 100,000 in
population has jumped more in California than in the nation. Murder, for example,
increased only 1.5% nationally but 10.5% in California. Rape declined by 0.3%
nationally but increased 6.4% in California cities. And property crime is even more
dramatic: California rates were sharply higher in every property crime category when
compared to national rates over the last year. Auto theft increased just 1.3% in large U.S.
cities, but in California, it increased 15%. While it is unclear whether or not AB 109 is to
26

Lofstrom, Magnus and Steven Raphael, Public Policy Institute of California. “Impact of Realignment on
County Jail Populations." (2013). http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_613MLR.pdf.
27
For examples, see “Three-Judge Court Updates.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html.
28
“Finigan Statement in Response to CDCR Filing, May 3, 2013.” California State Association of Counties
(2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May-2013/Finigan-Statement-CDCR-Filing-50313.pdf.
29
“Motion To File Amici Brief, Motion To File Under Rule 33.2, And Brief Amici Curiae Of Former
Governors Pete Wilson, George Deukmejian, Gray Davis, And Arnold Schwarzenegger In Support Of The
Application For Stay.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. (2011).
http://www.cjlf.org/briefs/Plata_MotionforStay.pdf.

31

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
blame, “If the reductions made already are a substantial cause of this spike, as is entirely
possible, then further releases of even more dangerous inmates will cause additional and
irreparable harm,” the former governors said.30
A central argument being made by the state and the counties is that, if given time,
Realignment will result in the prison reductions the Court desires. After all, AB 109 is
not California’s first Realignment experiment, and recent efforts have significantly
reduced state corrections populations.31 In 2007, the state passed landmark juvenile
justice legislation (SB 81), which began limiting admission to state juvenile facilities to
those who committed non-violent, non-serious, and non-sexual offenses.32 Dubbed the
“juvenile justice realignment,” the legislation set rigid eligibility requirements for
committing youth to state juvenile justice facilities, and in turn, passed the cost savings on
to county-run juvenile justice systems. SB 81 mandated that the juvenile courts commit
only the most serious and violent juveniles to the state. As a result of these new
standards, the state juvenile justice population dropped by 45% in the following six
years.33
Then, in 2010, the state made county probation departments responsible for supervising
juveniles released from state facilities, who the state had previously supervised. And in
2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the Corrections Performance Incentives Act (SB
678). SB 678 sought to “encourage the development of evidence-based intervention
programs” by establishing a Community Corrections Program in each county, to be
implemented by probation with the advice of a Community Corrections Partnership.
Under SB 678, it was required that the programs consist of evidence-based practices such
as “risk and needs assessment tools, . . .intensive probation supervision, intermediate
sanctions, program evaluation, and program fidelity.” SB 678 also created a means of
funding those practices based on each county’s success in reducing the number of felony
probationers going to state prison. By the time AB 109 was passed, the foundation had
already been laid for the CDCR to devolve some of its duties onto the counties.
State leaders, backed by research and expert panels, judged these previous (SB 678 and
SB 81) Realignment attempts hugely successful. If given time, the state argued, AB 109
could be similarly successful. But everyone agrees that Realignment is a struggle for
30

Ibid.
California also implemented the Probation Subsidy Act of 1965, which created financial payments to
counties that reduced the number of felons sent to youth and adult state prisons. Counties were not
required to participate in the Probation Subsidy Program, and over time, county participation dropped
significantly. It was replaced in 1978 by the California Justice System Subvention Program.
32
Taylor, Mac, Legislative Analyst's Office. “California's Criminal Justice System: A Primer.”(2013).
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/crim/criminal-justice-primer/criminal-justice-primer-011713.pdf.
33
Dawood, Noor, Prison Law Office. “Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads: The Future of Senate Bill 81 in
California.” (2009). http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/SB81report.pdf.
31

32

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
California counties, and mandating even more releases—particularly of more serious
offenders and as quickly as the Court demands—will threaten the very tenuous nature of
Realignment’s implementation so far. As the state’s filing on May 3, 2013 noted,
…Realignment was achieved because it was developed in collaboration with all
impacted stake-holders, including sheriffs, probation officers, police chiefs, district
attorneys, county officials, mental health providers, community leaders, and state
legislators….Piling on more responsibilities on the counties at this point could
jeopardize Realignment itself by eroding its support and creating a climate that
could lead to the law being changed….Now is absolutely not the time to impose
further obligations on already strained counties.34
A great deal of hope and promise resides within California’s Public Safety Realignment
Act (AB 109), and the importance of its implementation cannot be overstated. The
Economist recently called Realignment, “one of the great experiments in American
incarceration policy.”35 If it works, California will have shown that it can downsize prisons
safely by transferring lower-level offenders from state prisons to county systems, using an
array of evidence-based community corrections. If it doesn’t work, counties will have
simply been overwhelmed with inmates, unable to fund and/or operate the programs
those felons needed, which ultimately results in continued criminality and jail (instead of
prison) crowding.

Study Goals and Contributions
Which of the above scenarios prove true all depends on how California’s 58 diverse
counties choose to implement Realignment. Scholars have consistently demonstrated
that it is much easier to pass a law than to implement it. Laws are never self-executing,
and there is a huge disjuncture between laws-on-the-books and laws-in-action. To
understand whether Realignment will actually deliver on its promises and expectations,
we need to understand how those responsible with implementing Realignment are
operationalizing it in their day-to-day decisionmaking. Our main study goal is to learn
how Realignment is taking shape and being implemented at the county level. We wanted
to hear directly from county decision-makers about their experience in implementing

34

“Amended Defendants’ Response To April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List Of Proposed Population
Reduction Measures; Court ordered Plan”, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. (2011): page 3, line 20-23; page 4, line
4-5; and page 4, line 2-3. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May-2013/Coleman-03-03-13-AmendedReponse.pdf.
35
“Prison Overcrowding: The Magic Number.” The Economist (May 11, 2013).
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21577411-california-hasnt-emptied-its-prisons-enough-ittrying-magic-number.

33

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment so far. We believe these “voices from the field” will help us better
understand the implementation and impact of AB 109.
Lipsey’s (1980) classic study demonstrated how stakeholders (he calls them “street level
bureaucrats”) are the intermediary mechanisms through which abstract legal codes are
translated into day-to-day operational practice. He argued, “Policy implementation in the
end comes down to the people who actually implement it.”36
For Realignment, these street level bureaucrats include the hundreds of police officers,
judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, jailers, and probation officers who on a daily basis
are being asked to exercise their considerable discretion and provide the force behind
AB 109.
Studies have confirmed that legal statutes created at the highest levels are frequently
“decoupled” from the behavior of frontline agents, and if you don’t study this
decoupling, you will never know what worked and what didn’t.37 Researchers often are
asked to study final outcomes (e.g., recidivism rates of participants), but such studies are
insufficient. If the program reduced recidivism, for example, we often don’t know why
the result happened or how to replicate the program. If it didn’t work, we aren’t sure
why.
What happens between the passage of the law and the final outcomes is like a black box.
When an airplane takes off, a flight data recorder captures information of time, altitude,
airspeed, vehicle acceleration, heading, and radio transmissions. In the event of a crash,
black box data helps aviation scientists understand what happened and, perhaps more
importantly, inform strategies to promote airplane safety. Implementation research can
be thought of as a black box, providing information about the journey from theory or law
to actual practice.38

36

Lipsky, Michael. Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Russell
Sage Foundation (1980).
37
For an excellent review, see Jenness, Valerine and Ryken Grattet. “The Law-In-Between: The Effects of
Organizational Perviousness on the Policing of Hate Crime.” Social Problems 52 (2005): 337-359.
Interestingly, Jenness and Grattet found that this disjuncture between policymaking and policy
implementation is especially pronounced in the crime policy area, “given the pro innovation leanings of
legislatures and the anti-innovation tendencies of many law enforcement officers.” (at 354).
38
Woolsey, Katherine and Kathleen Biebel. “Implementation Research: The Black Box of Program
Implementation.” Center for Mental Health Services Research Issue Brief 4, no. 7 (November 2007).
http://escholarship.umassmed.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=pib.

34

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Our overall goal in this study is to describe, from the viewpoint of stakeholders charged
with implementing the law, what is happening on the ground as Realignment evolves and
takes shape over California’s 58 counties. We generally asked these questions:39
(1) What is happening? (Documenting)
(2) Is it what was expected or desired? (Assessing)
(3) Why is it happening as it is? (Explaining)
(4) How might things be improved? (Recommending)
We wanted to answer these questions both within criminal justice agencies (i.e., police,
probation) and across California’s 58 diverse counties. We suspect that counties, faced
with different economic and political environments, will have experienced Realignment
differently. Our methodology reflected that nested approach, and is explained in greater
detail in Chapter 3. Between November 2012 and August 2013, we interviewed 125
officials in 21 counties.
California is at a crossroads, a time of rethinking possibilities. The importance of
California’s Realignment experiment cannot be overstated. It will test whether the
nation’s largest state can reduce its prison population in a manner that maintains public
safety. Realignment’s significance is precisely why it needs to be closely monitored.
Answering these questions and many more will help state and local officials learn what
worked and what didn’t, what problems were encountered in implementation, and which
offenders benefited from the program. Ultimately, answering these questions will tell us
whether the accomplishments were worth the resources invested.

Organization of the Report
The remainder of this report presents our methodology, findings, and conclusions.
Chapter 2 presents a brief overview of Realignment, including the target population and
funding plan. Chapter 3 outlines our study methodology, discussing how the counties
and individual interviewees were selected for inclusion, and highlighting the questions
asked. Chapters 4 through 9 discuss our substantive findings, separated out by
stakeholder group. Chapters 4 focuses on the police; chapter 5 on sheriffs and jails;
chapter 6 on public defenders; chapter 7 on district attorneys; chapter 8 on judges; and
chapter 9 on probation. Our conclusions are contained in chapter 10.

39

Our approach is modeled after Werner, Alan. A guide to implementation research. Washington, D.C.:
Urban Institute Press (2004). They recommend the first three questions, but given our policy and
legislative focus, we added the fourth question.

35

Chapter 2: Overview of The Public
Safety Realignment Act (AB 109)
California’s Public Safety Realignment Act is quite comprehensive and complex. It
touches every aspect of criminal case processing, from arraignment and bail, through
discharge from parole. The initial Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) was signed
into law on April 4, 2011. It is now over 800 pages long, and has been clarified and
amended five times since its original passage.1 The most substantial clarifying legislation
was contained in AB 117 (Chapter 39, Statutes of 2011), which was clean up legislation to
AB 109, and removed the Division of Juvenile Justice from Realignment), and AB 118
(Chapter 40, Statutes of 2011), which clarified the local revenue funding framework. In
July 2012, SB 1023 revised further the felony crimes that are punishable by imprisonment
in state prisons, including sale of a controlled substance to a minor in a park, repeat
violation of various sex offenses with children under 16 years of age, and other serious
offenses. At the same time, SB 1023 revised statutes to make certain previously
designated prison-eligible crimes now punishable instead by county jail. These crimes
include several weapons crimes and check fraud.2 For ease, we will simply refer to all of
the combined legislation as Realignment or AB 109.
Despite the complexities contained in AB 109/AB 117/AB118, there are four
fundamental aspects to understanding Realignment:
(1) Target felon population—who is subjected to the new law, as of what date, and
what sentencing and supervision changes are required;
(2) Funding formula—how the money shifts from state coffers to county budgets;
(3) The Community Corrections Partnerships—how a county coalition of key
stakeholders decide what programs, custody, and/or sanctioning policies their
county will adopt and fund;
(4) Evidence-Based Programming—which programs and policies are recommended
for funding.

1

California State Assembly. Public Safety Realignment Act, AB 109. (2011).
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_0101-0150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html.
See summary of clarifying and additional amendments to AB 109 at “Fact Sheet: 2011 Public Safety
Realignment.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/Realignment-Fact-Sheet.pdf.
2
Warner, Nick. “Legislative Update.” California Sheriff (July 2012).
http://www.calsheriffs.org/images/MagazinePDFs/CSSA-Sheriff-Mag-July-2012.pdf.

36

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Target Felon Population
Realignment is prospective only and applies only to persons convicted after October 1,
2011. No prison inmates are transferred to county jails, and the law applies only to adult
sentencing. The Division of Juvenile Justice is unaffected by Realignment. Realignment
does not change the correctional placement of offenders convicted of serious, violent, or
high-risk sex crimes. Realignment basically revised the definition of a felony to include
specified lower-level crimes that would be punishable in jail or another local sentencing
option for more than one year, while maintaining the same length of sentences.
Prior to AB 109, a felony was defined as “a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in
the state prison.” AB 109 amended California Penal Code §17 to redefine a felony as a
crime punishable with death, or imprisonment in the state prison, or imprisonment in a
county jail for more than one year.3
Realignment primarily affects three major offender groups. They are:
(1) Newly-convicted felons, convicted of lower level crimes, are now kept under
county supervision (the N3s).
Lower-level felony offenders whose current and prior convictions are non-violent, nonsex-related, and non-serious (colloquially referred to as triple-non’s or N3s) now serve
their sentence under county jurisdiction rather than in state prison.4 Out-of-state prior
convictions for crimes that are the equivalent of a California serious or violent felony are
also disqualifiers. Juvenile crimes, however, are not disqualifiers. The final disqualifier,
which is very rare, is an enhancement pursuant to California Penal Code §186.11,
commonly known as the white collar enhancement.
Realignment amended about 500 criminal statutes eliminating the possibility of a state
prison sentence upon conviction. Virtually all drug and property offense are now

3

However, this definition was amended in ABX1 17: A felony is now a crime punishable with death, or
imprisonment in the state prison, or imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of subdivision of
§1170. This amendment avoids the unintended effect of reducing certain crimes punishable pursuant to
California Penal Code §1170(h) for less than one year in imprisonment is a misdemeanor. The upshot was
that felony sentences could now be served in county jails with no maximum time period specified (i.e., no
cap).
4
As enumerated by the statute under California Penal Code §1170(h). It is also fully discussed in Couzens,
J. Richard and Tricia A. Bigelow. “Felony Sentencing After Realignment.” Felony Sentencing Reporter 25
(2013). An excellent source of materials on the legal aspects of Realignment can be found at “Criminal
Justice Realignment Resource Center.” California Judicial Branch.
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/890.htm.

37

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
punished in county jail. These newly amended laws are contained in the California Penal
Code, the California Health & Safety Code, and the California Vehicle Code.5
Realigned crimes no longer eligible for prison include, for example, commercial burglary
(California Penal Code §459 2nd), forgery (California Penal Code §470); possession of
marijuana for sale (California Health & Safety Code 11359), vehicular manslaughter
(California Penal Code §192c), child custody abductions (California Penal Code §278),
and embezzlement from an elder or dependent adult (California Penal Code
§368(d)(e)(f)).6 All told, hundreds of criminal offenses now fall into the jail-only
category.
In addition, ABx17 added in about 80 felonies that were not serious, violent, or
California Penal Code §290 registerable in the penal code (and hence, not categorically
state prison felonies) and designated them as still punishable by state prison. Included in
this category are crimes such as Criminal Gang Activity (California Penal Code §186.33),
felony stalking (California Penal Code §646.9) and felony driving under the influence
causing injury (California Vehicle Code 23153). Collectively, these are often called
Excluded Felonies.7
California prisons are now generally reserved for convictions of robbery, rape, murder,
kidnap, residential burglary, and aggravated theft (loss of more than $100,000), and very
serious crimes involving children.
After October 1, 2011, any adult convicted of these non-non-non’s and other amended
felony crimes (California Penal Code §1170(h)) cannot be sentenced to prison unless
they have a prior “serious” or “violent” felony conviction (as defined by California Penal
Code §1192.7(c) or 667.5(c)).8
There is no limit to the amount of time that can be served in county jail for realigned
crimes, and AB 109 did make any changes to the length of sentence, it only stipulated

5
There are 62 additional crimes that are not defined in the California Penal Code as serious, violent or
California Penal Code §290 registerable offenses, but will be served in state prison. These crimes can be
found at “Crime Exclusion List.” California Mental Health Directors Association.
http://www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committees/forensics/1107_forensics/ab_109_cri
me_exclusion_list_%287-22-11%29.pdf.
6
For complete listing of crimes that no longer prison-eligible, see Couzens, J. Richard and Tricia A.
Bigelow. "Felony Sentencing After Realignment." Felony Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013) at Appendix I.
7
Ibid.
8
Offenders can be sentenced to prison even if they are currently convicted of an 1170(h) non-prison
eligible crime if any of the following apply: (1) conviction of a current or prior serious or violent felony
conviction listed in California Penal Code §667.5(c) or 1192.7c; (2) when the defendant is required to
register as a sex offender under §290; or (3) when the defendant is convicted and sentenced for aggravated
theft under the provisions of §186.1. See ibid. at 65.

38

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
that the sentence must be served in county jail and not state prison.9 While most
realigned crimes are punishable by a base sentence of three years or less, some crimes
carry weightier base sentences or may be subject to lengthy enhancements. All the
previous enhancements still apply, such as additional custody time for circumstances as
using a gun, gang involvement, and repeat offending.
Inmates serving felony sentences in county jails are eligible to earn half-time credit on
their terms. Time spent on home detention (i.e., electronic monitoring) is credited as
time spent in jail custody, and also eligible for the half-time credits.
The other big change for persons sentenced under §1170(h) to county jail is that they
will not be released to parole or any post-release supervision upon serving their term,
unless the court chooses to impose a post-jail supervision period (i.e., split sentence).
Once the jail sentence has been served, the defendant must be released without any
restrictions or supervision. State parole is now limited to offenders released from prison
whose current commitment offense is a serious or violent felony as defined by California
Penal Code §1192.7(c) or §667.5(c).
(2) Released prisoners who used to go to state parole now go to probation, with
shorter revocation terms for violations, to be served in jail rather than prison.
Released prisoners whose current commitment offense qualifies as a “non-non-non”
offense will be diverted to the supervision of county probation departments under “Post
Release Community Supervision” (PRCS). Before Realignment, state parole agents
supervised all individuals released from state prison. In fact, California was the only state
that placed all released prisoners on state supervised parole. Moreover, pre-Realignment,
almost every offender’s parole supervision period was for three years, although they
could be discharged at the end of 13 months if they had no new violations.
After Realignment, state parole agents will only supervise individuals released from
prison whose current offense is serious or violent (regardless of their prior criminal
record), as well as certain other individuals, such as inmates who have been assessed to be
Mentally Disordered or High-Risk Sex Offenders.
All other prisoners will be released from prison directly to county PRCS jurisdiction.
PRCS is also subject to a three-year maximum term, but individuals who do not violate
the terms of their release may be discharged by probation after six months, and must be
discharged after one year if they are violation free (§3456(a)). If PRCS offenders violate
their technical probation conditions, counties are encouraged to use alternative-to-jail
9

Storton, Kathryn B. and Lisa R. Rodriguez, California District Attorneys Association. “Prosecutors’ Analysis
of the 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment.”(2011): 3-4.
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/cdaarealignguide.pdf.

39

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
sanctions, but if they choose to incarcerate in county jail, the maximum revocation term
in jail is six months (and they can earn half-time conduct credits on the revocation term)
(§3000.08(g), §3455(d)). The maximum six months jail revocation term for technical
violations is half the maximum (1 year) prior to Realignment.
Eligibility for PRCS and county probation supervision has been one of the most highly
controversial aspects of AB 109, since regardless of prior criminal record, former state
parolees are now sent to county probation supervision. Prison officials estimate that
California county probation officers will now assume responsibility for supervising an
additional 40,000 to 60,000 prisoners who were released in 2012 and qualify for PRCS.10
§3451(a) recommends that PRCS be consistent with evidence-based practices. “Evidencebased practices” refer to “supervision policies, procedures, programs, and practices
demonstrated by scientific research to reduce recidivism among individuals under
probation, parole, or postrelease supervision.” (§3450(b)(9)).
(3) Parolees and probationers who commit technical (non-crime) conditions of
supervision.
Parole and probation violators will generally serve their revocation terms in county jail
rather than state prison. Before October 2011, individuals released from prison could be
returned to state prison for violating their parole supervision. Some of these violations
were non-serious, such as a failed drug test or absences at a required program. Prior to
Realignment, these non-serious technical violators—about 20,000 to 30,000 parolees each
year—were sent to prison.11 Technical violations include violations that are not
themselves crimes, such as failing a urine test, or failing to report to community service.
Now, under Realignment, offenders released from prison—whether supervised by the
state (on parole) or by the counties (on PRCS)—who violate the technical conditions of
their supervision (rather than committing a new crime) must serve their revocation term
in local jail or community alternatives (e.g., house arrest, drug treatment, flash
incarceration). The only exception to this requirement is that individuals released from
prison after serving an indeterminate life sentence may still be returned to prison for a
technical parole violation.
Individuals realigned to county supervision no longer appeared before the State Board of
Parole Hearings (BPH) for revocation hearings after October 1, 2011. And as of July 1,
10

“The Future of California Corrections.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2012).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
11
Petersilia, Joan. “California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation.” Crime and Justice 37, no.
1 (2008): 207-278.

40

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
2013, county trial courts now hear allegations of violations and impose sanctions for state
parolees. After July 1, 2013, the state Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) will only be
responsible for: parole considerations for lifers; medical parole hearings; Mentally
Disordered Offenders cases; and sexually violent predator cases.
In sum, the prison door has slammed shut on tens of thousands of offenders—estimated
to be nearly 100,000 offenders in 2012 alone—who used to be under state control and
faced prison but after October 1, 2011, remained in their communities where jail was the
most severe sanction they confront.

Realignment Funding and State Monitoring
AB 109’s sister-bill, AB 117, provided a plan by which counties would be awarded funds to
support their efforts. The California Department of Finance (DOF) used a formula to
determine each county’s funding level. Roughly speaking, the legislature split the
current cost of state supervision by about 50% with the counties. The current cost of
housing a California prisoner is about $56,000 per prisoner, per year. Front-end
Realignment is being funded at about $25,000 per prisoner, per year. The cost of a year
on parole in California is now about $8,500 a year, per parolee, and PRCS supervision was
funded at about $5,000 per year, per offender.12
Each county received a different amount of money based on this dollar amount and
allocated by a formula that considered the number of offenders that county historically
sent to state prison, the county’s adult population, and prior success with probation
outcomes.13 In the first fiscal year of Realignment, 60% each county’s funding allocation
was based on the county’s historical average daily state prison population (“ADP”) of
persons convicted of non-violent offenses from the particular county; 30% was based on
the size of each county’s adult (18 to 64) population; and the remaining 10% was based
on each county's share of grant funding under the California Community Corrections
Performance Incentives Act of 2009 (SB 678). SB 678 was based on a county’s ability to
divert adult probationers from prison to evidence-based programs.
The State has allocated about $2 billion through 2013-14 to implement Realignment, and
anticipates giving California’s fifty-eight counties roughly $4.4 billion by 2016-17,
12

The formula establishing the statewide allotment was developed by the State Department of Finance and
agreed to by County Administrative Officers (CAO) and California State Association of Counties (CSAC).
The formula may be adjusted in future years.
13
Hopper, Allen, Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, and Kelli Evans. “Public Safety Realignment: California At A
Crossroads.” ACLU of California (2012).
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_safety_realignment_california_at_a_crossroads.pdf.
at 10.

41

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
excluding the funding allocated for county planning, staff training, local courts, and jail
construction.14
The funding formula was controversial from the start. Critics contended that the meager
funding did not cover the true costs of “evidence-based” mental health treatment,
substance abuse, or the housing that such serious offenders required. The amount of
money each individual county received was based mostly (60%) on a funding formula
that weighed heavily the projected number of non-non-non’s each county would have
returning home from prison, using historical prison sentencing data. This formula
rewarded counties that had previously sent a higher percentage of their lower-level
offenders to state prison and penalized counties who historically had invested in
community alternatives and as a result, sent fewer offenders to prison.
In the second and third years of Realignment, counties were given the best result among
three options in which funding was based on: (1) the county’s adult population ages 18
to 64; (2) the status quo formula of FY 2011-2012; or (3) weighted ADP.15 Over a quarter
of counties benefited from the new weighted ADP option, in some cases almost doubling
what they would have received had their allocation been based on county population.16
Initially, counties worried that the State had not guaranteed funding beyond the first two
years. Some state leaders voiced concern that Realignment would prove nothing but a
shell game designed to dump the state’s responsibilities onto already overburdened and
underfunded counties. As Los Angeles County Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky put it, “This
has all the markings of a bait and switch. They promise us everything now, they shift this
huge responsibility from the state to the counties now, and then a year or two or three
from now, they will forget about that commitment, and it'll be—then was then and now is
now, and we'll be left holding the bag.”17

14

Email to Joan Petersilia, from Drew Soderborg at Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO) (September 6,
2013).; Brown, Brian, Legislative Analyst's Office. “The 2012–13 Budget: The 2011 Realignment of Adult
Offenders—An Update.” http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adultoffenders-022212.aspx. See also "Defendants’ Request for an Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline
and Status Report in Response to June 30, 2011, April 11, 2013, June 20, 2013, and August 9, 2013 Orders."
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). (September 16, 2013) at 9.
15
“AB 109 Allocation: Recommended Approach for 2012-13 and 2013-14, Briefing of County
Administrative Officers.” County Administrative Officers Association of California Realignment Allocation
Committee (2012). http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/12.05.15_ab_109_allocation-051412_briefing_on_yrs_2_and_3_formula.pdf.
16
“Estimated Funding Levels For AB 109 Programmatic Allocation.” California State Association Of
Counties. (2012). http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/12.05.16_attachments_1_and_2_for_5-14-12_caoac_briefing.pdf.
17
Kahn, Carrie. “L.A. County Prepares To Take On State Prisoners.” National Public Radio (September 28,
2011). http://www.npr.org/2011/09/29/140922171/l-a-county-prepares-to-take-on-state-prisoners.

42

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
But in November 2012, California voters passed Governor Brown’s Proposition 30, a sales
and income tax increase. Proposition 30 constitutionally guaranteed a source of funding
for Realignment.18 Proposition 30 is estimated to increase state revenues by about $7
billion annually, and the funds are to be used for education and to “guarantee funding
for public safety services realigned from state to local governments.”19 The voters were
never told how much would go to education and how much would go to Realignment,
but generally speaking, Proposition 30 was supposed to guarantee at least the same level
of Realignment funding going forward as had been given in the first two years.
Interestingly, since the economy has improved since 2012 and since Proposition 30
revenues are based on sales and income taxes, the dollars available for Realignment have
actually increased since its passage. Of course, if the economy falters, the AB 109 funding
would also decline.
This infusion of new funding—conservatively estimated at $1 billion annually—surpasses
any similar allocation for offender rehabilitation in California history, and the funding is
now guaranteed for the next several years. The $64,000 question is: How will counties
choose to spend their dollars? While the counties received substantial funding to cover
the cost of supervising realigned felons, the state did not establish any statewide
standards, nor provide any funding, for objectively evaluating county practices. Scholars
worry that instead of using AB 109 as an opportunity to invest in treatment and
alternatives to incarceration, the money will be used to increase law enforcement,
electronic monitoring, and jail capacity. If that happens, Realignment will have simply
been a very expensive and painful game of musical chairs. Whether that happens is
mostly up to the discretionary authority of the local Community Corrections Partnerships
(CCPs).

Community Corrections Partnerships (CCPs) and
Discretionary Decisionmaking
Not only did Realignment transfer an unprecedented amount of money and
responsibility to the counties, it gave them unprecedented discretion concerning how
they chose to spend it. Neither the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR), the Department of Finance, nor any other state agency needs to
approve these local plans. That is all in the hands of local governmental leaders.
18

Ballotpedia. “California Proposition 30, Sales and Income Tax Increase (2012).”
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_30,_Sales_and_Income_Tax_Increase_%2
82012%29.
19
Petersilia, Joan and Jessica Greenlick Snyder. “Looking Past The Hype: 10 Questions Everyone Should
Ask About California’s Prison Realignment.” California Journal of Politics and Policy 5, no. 2 (2013).

43

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The legislation (California Penal Code §1230.1) required that each county establish a
Community Corrections Partnership (CCP), comprised of the Chief Probation Officer as
chair, the District Attorney, the Public Defender, the Presiding Judge of the superior
court (or his/her designee), the Chief of Police, the Sheriff, and a representative from
social services.20 In its formation of Community Corrections Partnerships, AB 109
appears self-consciously designed to create cross-systems collaboration and buy-in among
the various actors responsible for implementing the new regime in each county. In
addition to requiring the participation of various county officials, the California Penal
Code also mandates a representative of a successful community-based organization and a
representative of victims to be part of the CCP. The CCP is tasked with developing and
implementing the county’s Realignment approach, including its spending plan.21
AB 109 also establishes an Executive Committee (EC) of the CCP, composed entirely of
county officials.22 The EC approves the plan of the larger CCP and sends it to the County
Board of Supervisors for approval. The plan shall be deemed accepted by the county
board of supervisors unless the board rejects the plan by a vote of four-fifths of the board,
in which case the plan goes back to the CCP for further consideration.23 The EC is
comprised of the chief probation officer, chief of police, sheriff, district attorney, public
defender, a presiding judge of the superior court (or designee), and a representative
from either the County Department of Social Services, Mental Health, or Alcohol and
Substance Abuse Programs, as appointed by the County Board of Supervisors.

How Did Counties Allocate Their AB 109 Funding?
So the threshold question for any assessment of Realignment is: How did these counties
choose to spend the available funds? How did they divide the funds among various
agencies (e.g., law enforcement, probation, social services)? And within the plans, have
the counties set-aside funding for specific offender groups (e.g., the mentally ill) or
community organizations (e.g., mentoring or faith-based programs)?

20

To effectuate Realignment, AB 109 and AB 117 took advantage of the Community Corrections
Partnership (CCP) previously established under SB 678 in 2009. SB 678 had authorized each county to
establish a CCP to allocate the state’s Corrections Performance Incentive Fund. To be eligible for SB 678
funds, the Chief Probation Officer in each county was required to chair the CCP and develop and
implement a program to divert adult probationers from prison.
21
California Penal Code §1230(b)(1). http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=pen&group=01001-02000&file=1228-1233.7.
22
See “Local Planning Process.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Local-Planning-Process.html.
23
The first year approved AB 109 plans are available at CalRealignment. “List of County Plans.”
http://www.calrealignment.org/county-implementation/list-of-county-plans.html.

44

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Stanford law students analyzed all of the 58 county plans approved in 2011-2012 and
found that most of them included estimates of the number of offenders to be realigned
to the county, a description of their local capacity and proposed programs for handling
these offenders, and an expenditure plan.24 While there was a great deal of variation in
the proposed county spending plans (shown fully in a companion report),25 the
California average funding allocation for the first year of Realignment was as follows:26







36% to the sheriff's department, primarily for jail operations;
25% to the probation department, primarily for supervision and programs;
16% for programs and services provided by other agencies, such as for substance
abuse and mental health treatment, housing assistance, and employment services;
5% for intensive supervision and detention alternatives;
2% for miscellaneous;
16% unallocated/reserved funds.

We have collected some of the 2012-2013 CCP plans and, at first glance, there do not
appear to be major changes in funding allocations within counties or across the state. We
do generally see fewer unallocated dollars and more money being allocated to treatment
and programming, with some counties signing new contracts with community-based
organizations.27 Counties are also continuing with hiring, as many were unable to hire
for all allocated positions during their first year.
This data is critical to understanding how spending aligns with–-or possibly thwarts-–the
legislature’s goals. We also analyzed how county characteristics (e.g., crime rate,
population characteristics, fiscal health, political preferences) were associated with
county choices on Realignment spending.28 Our comparative analyses show that AB 109
county spending choices are driven by complicated dynamics, but certain key factors can
be identified. Counties that have emphasized Sheriff and Law Enforcement spending are
24

McCray, Angela, Kathryn McCann Newhall, and Jessica Greenlick Snyder. “Realigning the Revolving
Door? An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 Implementation Plans (Working Paper).” Stanford
Criminal Justice Center (2012). The McCray et al. analysis has now been expanded to include all 58
counties.
25
Abarbanel, Sara et al. “Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 20112012 Implementation Plans.” Ibid. (2013). https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates%20for%2058
%20counties090913.pdf.
26
These percentages differ slightly than those reported in Petersilia and Snyder (2013), as a slight change
in the budget analysis was made after its publication in order to better include alternative detention
services/intensive supervision and insure consistency of program allocations.
27
For example, of the 23 counties for which we have 2012-2013 CCP budgets, only four counties allocated
more than 10% of their budgets to reserves, and only two allocated more than 15%. For allocations to
programs and services of the 23 counties’ 2012-2013 budgets we have, the average allocation was 21%,
compared to the 16% average in 2011-2012.
28
Lin, Jeffrey and Joan Petersilia. “Responding to Realignment: Examining County Variation in AB 109
Spending Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (forthcoming, 2013).

45

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
largely reacting to local needs around crime and law enforcement capacity, though these
needs may be conditioned by political-ideological factors (i.e., preference for using
prison to punish drug offenders). Counties that have emphasized Programs and Services
appear to do so because of public faith in law enforcement, and this public support is
conditioned by local and organizational need. Understanding why counties spent their
Realignment dollars in the way they did is an important threshold question.

Evidence-Based Correctional Programming
At its core, Realignment is designed to increase treatment for offenders. While Governor
Brown and the legislature clearly felt pressure due to the Supreme Court mandates, those
close to California politics were of the opinion that the pressure gave the State an
opportunity to cut costs and move to a more effective rehabilitation system. In fact,
Governor Brown’s AB 109 signing statement didn’t even mention the Court mandates
but focused almost entirely on the rehabilitation benefits that AB 109 could offer the
state. He wrote:
For too long, the state’s prison system has been a revolving door for lower-level
offenders and parole violators who are released within months—often before they
are even transferred out of a reception center. Cycling these offenders through
state prisons wastes money, aggravates crowded conditions, thwarts rehabilitation,
and impedes local law enforcement supervision.29
AB 109 added §17.5(d) to the California Penal Code, which states: “California must
reinvest its criminal justice resources to support community-based corrections programs
and evidence-based practices that will achieve improved public safety returns on this
state’s substantial investment in its criminal justice system.”
In 2007, California’s Expert Panel on Adult Offender Programming found that fewer
than 10% of all prisoners and parolees participated in substance abuse or vocational
education programs, despite the fact that nearly three quarters of all inmates had serious
needs in these areas. Moreover, 50% of all exiting prisoners did not participate in any
rehabilitation or work program, nor did they have a work assignment, during their entire
prison stay. Offenders didn’t get help on parole either: 60% of parolees didn’t
participate in any parole programs while under state supervision. In other words, most
California prisoners and parolees left the state system with their literacy, substance abuse,

29

“Governor Brown Signs Legislation To Improve Public Safety And Empower Local Law Enforcement.”
Office of the Governor. (2011). http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16964.

46

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
and employment needs unmet.30 It is not surprising that California’s three-year rearrest
rate for released prisoners was 70%—the highest in the nation.
Realignment proponents argue that shifting program authority and funding to local
governments will result in better programs and more accountability for outcomes.
Counties have a far greater stake than the state does in trying to rehabilitate as many
offenders as possible, because they have to live with them after they are released. Those
going to county jail will almost surely return to the same community after serving their
sentences, and are more likely to have the support that comes with having friends or
family close by. At its core, Realignment is designed to increase offender program
participation rates and improve offenders’ chances of success.
But for Realignment to actually make an impact on offender recidivism, two things must
happen. First, offenders must have the opportunity to participate in treatment programs,
and second, the program’s design must incorporate elements consistent with the
principles of effective correctional intervention.31 Each of these aspects is squarely within
the control of county leaders.
Research has shown that programs incorporating certain evidence-based principles
reduce recidivism 10 to 20%.32 If offenders don’t participate in these types of programs
post-Realignment, we shouldn’t expect recidivism reduction.
AB 109 recommends (but does not mandate) the use of evidence-based practices (EBP)
for activities and services funded through the enabling legislation. It states:

Evidence-based practices refers to supervision policies, procedures, programs, and
practices demonstrated by scientific research to reduce recidivism among
individual under probation, parole, or post-release supervision.

30

Petersilia, Joan and Marisela Montes (Co-Chairs). “Meeting the Challenges of Rehabilitation in
California’s Prison and Parole System: A Report From Governor Schwarzenegger’s Rehabilitation Strike
Team.” http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/docs/govrehabilitationstriketeamrpt_012308.pdf.
31
In “Looking Past The Hype: 10 Questions Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment,”
Petersilia and Snyder note that there is a third necessary element to reducing offender recidivism is less
within the counties’ control: Offenders must want to take advantage of the programs offered. Counties can
open up more programs, and those programs can be evidence-based, but if the offender doesn’t want to
take advantage of them, recidivism will not be reduced. After all, we must remember that many of these
offenders are the same ones who failed the last time they were “treated” or jailed in county facilities. You
can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink. In discussions of recidivism reduction, we often
forget this basic point: Counties can offer offenders opportunities, but if they don’t actively participate,
they will not succeed.
32
Cullen, Francis T. and Paul Gendreau. “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Practice, and
Prospects.” Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System, U.S. Department of Justice 3
(200): 109-175. https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03d.pdf.

47

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Consistent with local needs and resources, the CCP plan may include
recommendations to maximize the effective investment of criminal justice
resources in evidence-based correctional sanctions and programs, including, but
not limited to, day reporting centers, drug courts, residential multiservice centers,
mental health treatment programs, electronic and GPS monitoring programs,
victim restitution programs, counseling programs, community service programs,
educational programs, and work training programs. (AB 109 §458)
The term evidence-based practices is invoked in a variety of fields to refer to interventions
for which there are systematic evidence of more successful outcomes when they are used
than when they are not. Focusing on recidivism as a primary outcome measure, and
analyzing evaluations of a variety of programs, some researchers have declared a
consensus on the principles of evidence-based practices in corrections to include:






Risk. Target interventions at offenders with a higher risk (probability) of
re-offending. Lower-risk offenders may be harmed by excessive
intervention, e.g., putting a normally responsible wage-earner in jail and
causing loss of employment and interventions are more cost effective with
those more likely to re-offend. Furthermore, actuarial measures or
instruments that reflect, among groups of offenders, an observed
association between risk factors, such as lengthy criminal history or drug
abuse and likelihood of recidivism, should assess risk of re-offending.
Need. Target interventions to “criminogenic” needs, i.e., needs of
offenders known to lead to criminal conduct, such as poor education levels,
family dysfunction, drug or alcohol abuse, criminal associates, and
antisocial attitudes. Such needs are distinguished from other risk factors,
such as age and length of criminal history, because they are dynamic, i.e.,
subject to change as a result of intervention.
Responsivity and Appropriate Treatment. Use methods that have been
shown to work for the type of person being treated, adapted to their
distinctive challenges and learning styles, with enough intensity (e.g.,
contact hours) to address the severity of their needs, and which teach and
model practical skills. Cognitive-behavioral methods have generally been
more effective than some other approaches.

Realignment was fundamentally designed to infuse funding into local government to
enable counties to implement more scientific, evidence-based programming for
offenders.

48

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Chapter 3: Study Methodology
California has a population of more than 38 million residents, or 12.1% of the entire U.S.
population. With a state as big, as populous, and as complex as California, it is
impossible to adequately summarize how Realignment (AB 109), is playing out
“statewide” or in an “average” county. But we did want to understand how stakeholders
from divergent counties perceived Realignment’s impacts.
California’s 58 counties were very different from one another prior to Realignment—in
terms of crime rates, financial resources, politics, and demographics—and so we expect
their approaches post-Realignment will be different as well. Los Angeles County, for
example, has the largest population of any county in the nation (10.4 million residents),
exceeded by only eight states. Compare that to Alpine County, California’s smallest
county with just 1,129 residents, all rural. Crime rates also vary considerably by county—
from a high of nearly 7,000 violent and property crimes per 100,000 population in San
Joaquin County to a low of just over 2,000 per 100,000 population in Ventura County.1
Generally speaking, the California coast, where most of the population is clustered, has a
majority of liberal Democrats and inland California has a majority of conservative
Republicans. The Bay Area is especially left-leaning, and San Francisco is probably the
most liberal part of the state and one of the most liberal parts of the country. Per capita
income varies widely by geographic region. California’s Central Valley is the most
impoverished part of the state, with migrant farm workers often making less than
minimum wage. Recently, the San Joaquin Valley was characterized as one of the most
economically depressed regions in the U.S., on par with the region of Appalachia. On
the other hand, Northern California’s economy is booming with high-tech development,
and is experiencing some of the highest economic gains of anywhere in the U.S.2 These
county-level differences will certainly influence stakeholders’ pre- and post-Realignment
choices and behavior.
To capture this variability, we used a nested methodology, first selecting counties and
then within those counties, interviewing the major criminal justice stakeholders. If the
individual agreed to be interviewed, personal interviews were conducted, using questions
that were designed to elicit both general and specific details regarding their opinions and
practices pre- and post-Realignment. This chapter describes our sample selection,
interview administration, and questions posed.
1

“Collected Correctional Statistics.” Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice California Sentencing
Institute. http://casi.cjcj.org/.
2
Crawford, Mark. “Location California: Diversifying Economy Shows Promise.” Area Development Online
(April 2012). http://www.areadevelopment.com/stateResources/california/California-economy-on-themend-262626.shtml.

49

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Selection of Study Counties
We wanted to select counties for our interviews that differed in their pre-and postRealignment orientation to the use of state prison. To collect such information, we used
two sources of data: official felony case processing information for the pre-AB 109
measures, and an analysis of the county approved Realignment spending plans.
Prior to the start of the interviews, we collected detailed criminal case processing
information for each of California’s 58 counties pre-Realignment. The data came from
the California Attorney General’s Office. For each county, we then calculated the
percent of arrested felons sentenced to incarceration (i.e., prison or jail) in 2009. Then
we divided this percentage by the serious (Part I) crime rate per 1,000 residents in 2010.
The results are contained in Figure 1, Pre-AB 109 Preference for Incarceration, by
County. Conceptually, Figure 1 represents each county’s pre-Realignment “preference
for incarceration,” or punitiveness towards crime (e.g., counties that have a higher
percent of convicted felons sent to prison are more punitive than counties that impose
far fewer prison sentences, taking the level of crime into account).

50

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 1: Pre-Realignment Preference for Incarceration, by County, 2009-2010
Low control orientiation
0

1

2

High control orientation
3

4

5

6

7

8

Alameda
Alpine
Amador
Butte
Calaveras
Colusa
Contra Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Imperial
Inyo
Kern
Kings
Lake
Lassen
Los Angeles
Madera
Marin
Mariposa
Mendocino
Merced
Modoc
Mono
Monterey
Napa
Nevada
Orange
Placer
Plumas
Riverside
Sacramento
San Benito
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Shasta
Sierra
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Sutter
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura
Yolo
Yuba

51

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
For smaller counties with few felonies to process, the metric above may be
disproportionately influenced by a small sample size (see note on Table 1). Nonetheless
for our purposes, it enabled us to roughly array the counties by their preference for
incarceration vs. community-based sanctions for felony arrestees.
We then wanted some way to characterize counties’ preferences for incarceration postRealignment. Not only did we want to know how their official court processing might
change, but the details of exactly how they planned to approach sanctioning felony
offenders after they received AB 109 funding. To collect this information, we obtained
and coded in great detail each county’s approved 2011-2012 Realignment plan. All of
these documents were a matter of public record. The goal in coding these plans was to
capture how each county spoke about and planned to spend their 2011-2012
Realignment funding. We were interested in capturing not only which agencies (e.g.,
sheriff, probation, courts) were going to receive, but given their funding, what agencies
and programs received funding.
This proved to be a complex task, and is explained fully in “Realigning the Revolving
Door? An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 Implementation Plans.”3 We began by
creating a comprehensive list of virtually all the programs, tasks, and activities that any
county had mentioned in their plans (e.g., alternatives to incarceration, risk assessment,
reentry and rehabilitation, probation, jails, law enforcement, measurement of outcomes
and data collection, mental health treatment, substance abuse treatment, and housing).
We then coded each plan for whether the specific plan had “mentioned” the particular
topic, and secondly, whether each plan discussed the particular item “in depth.” This
allowed us to differentiate between plans that simply mentioned the programs, perhaps
in a bulleted list of things that they thought evidence-based, and plans that described in
detail how they planned to implement a specific program. We felt that counties that
described in-depth the programs they planned to fund, rather than simply listing them,
had probably given more serious thought to the idea and had a higher likelihood of
following through with implementing those programs.
We then analyzed each of the 58 county budgets and combined each county’s narrative
analysis with their budget allocations. Our goal was to array all of the counties on their
preference for programs and services on the one end of the continuum and
surveillance/custody on the other. To get this array, counties were assigned points

3

See Lin, Jeffrey and Joan Petersilia. “Responding to Realignment: Examining County Variation in AB 109
Spending Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (forthcoming, 2013). See also Abarbanel, Sara et al.
“Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 2011-2012 Implementation
Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2013). https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates%20for%2058
%20counties090913.pdf.

52

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
toward the low or high control part of the array based on the number of programs of
each type they mentioned, with extra weight given to mentions and depth discussion of
specific programs.4 Points were given also for county budget allocations based on where
the county fell in regards to the median and 75th percentile of percentage of total
planned expenditure on control. Positive points were given for low control narrative and
budget items; negative points were given for high control narrative and budget items. A
county’s total points were combined to equal their array score. Figure 2 contains our
results.

4

Specific items were given extra weight: five relating to high control, and five related to low control. The
items relating to high control are law enforcement helping with supervision of probation,
building/expanding jails, high risk probation unit, arming probation, and hiring law enforcement; the
items relating to low control are transitional housing, specialty courts, mental health (depth), substance
abuse (depth), or education services (depth).

53

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 2: Post-Realignment County Spending Preferences
High control orientation

Low control orientation
Santa Clara
Shasta
San Mateo
San Joaquin
Ventura
Santa Barbara
Humboldt
Modoc
Alameda
Riverside
Mariposa
San Francisco
Plumas
Nevada
Fresno
Mono
Yolo
Sonoma
Tehama
Yuba
Monterey
Mendocino
Inyo
Santa Cruz
El Dorado
Madera
Lassen
Sierra
Trinity
Sutter
Solano
San Diego
San Benito
Napa
Los Angeles
Sacramento
Tuolumne
Del Norte
Tulare
Amador
Placer
Butte
Merced
Calaveras
Lake
Glenn
Stanislaus
Siskiyou
Imperial
Contra Costa
San Bernardino
Marin
Colusa
San Luis Obispo
Orange
Alpine
Kings
8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

1

2

3

4

5

54

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Conceptually, our two indexes shown in Figures 1 and 2 are designed to roughly reflect a
counties’ pre- and post- orientation towards the use of incarceration versus local
community-based options.
The first was their “preference for prison” before Realignment, and the second was their
plan and planned spending post-Realignment, and we could then identify those counties
that planned to spend more than the average on law enforcement/surveillance activities
rather than on treatment/rehabilitation activities. For example, for the pre-Realignment
orientation, counties were split based on pre-Realignment conviction and incarceration
rates. Counties such as San Bernardino and Modoc Counties are in the high and low
control orientation pre-AB 109 boxes, respectively, in part due to the 72% of felons
incarcerated in 2009 in San Bernardino County, compared to 30% in Modoc County.
For the post-AB 109 control orientation, counties were split based on their narrative and
budgets of their county plans. Imperial County was classified as high control orientation
post- AB 109 in part due to allocating 58% of its budget to sheriff and law enforcement
and discussion in its plan on jails. This is compared to Monterey County, which was
classified as low control orientation post-AB 109 in part due to allocating only 31% of its
budget to sheriff and law enforcement, and 16% for programs and services, in addition to
speaking in depth about specialty courts and mental health programs. The next step was
to simply cross-tabulate these two indexes to create ranges of approaches pre- and postRealignment, as shown in the Table 1. The counties are distributed fairly evenly across
the nine cells.5

5

Some of the measures we used to assess pre-AB 109 control orientations were not reliable for the smallest
counties because the arrest numbers in these counties were so small. As a result, small county conviction
and incarceration rates were subject to substantial statistical noise and the low/medium/high ratings
assigned to them were not entirely believable.

55

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Table 1: Pre- and Post-Realignment County “Control” Orientation
AB 109 Implementation Plans

Pre-AB 109
control
orientation

Low control
orientation

Medium control
orientation

High control
orientation

Low control
orientation

Nevada, San
Francisco, Plumas,
Santa Cruz,
Alameda, Mono,
Humboldt,
Mendocino,
Modoc, Sonoma

Del Norte, Sierra,
San Diego

Alpine, Contra
Costa, Marin,
Calaveras, Imperial

Medium control
orientation

Fresno, Mariposa,
San Joaquin,
Ventura

Los Angeles, Napa,
Solano, El Dorado,
Inyo, Yuba, Lake,
Merced,
Sacramento

Glenn, Orange,
Stanislaus, Colusa,
Placer, San Luis
Obispo, San
Benito

High control
orientation

Monterey, Santa
Barbara, San
Mateo, Shasta,
Santa Clara

Tuolumne, Sutter,
Trinity, Madera,
Amador, Lassen,
Riverside, Tehama,
Yolo

Kings, San
Bernardino,
Siskiyou, Tulare,
Butte, Kern

*Small counties are those with fewer than 500 felony arrests in 2000. Due to their small
numbers, the pre-Realignment “preference for prison” estimates may be unstable. List of
small counties: Alpine, Amador, Calaveras, Colusa, Del Norte, Glenn, Inyo, Lake, Lassen,
Mariposa, Modoc, Mono, Plumas, Sierra, Siskiyou, Trinity, Tuolumne Counties.
Note: Counties highlighted in yellow are the counties in which interviewed county stakeholders.

The information in Table 1 was not only useful to fully understand the context in which
our interviewees and agencies were operating, but it also assured that we had
representatives from counties that reflected very different orientations to Realignment.
In all, we interviewed 125 individuals across 21 counties.

56

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Selection of Interviewees
Within each selected county, we began by requesting interviews with all of the members
of the CCP. In some cases, the CCP member referred us to someone they felt was more
knowledgeable concerning day-to-day Realignment operations. For instance, the Los
Angeles County District Attorney referred us to the chief charging deputy. As word
spread that we were conducting interviews on Realignment, people contacted us
indicating a willingness to be interviewed. This happened with some of the smaller
counties, who felt they might not have been interviewed otherwise. Over the course of
the study, we also sought the perspectives of victim advocates, parole agents, and county
mental health workers, and those findings are published in separate articles.6 The
complete list of persons interviewed is contained in Appendix A. To add the critically
important offender’s perspective, we sponsored two panel discussions with offenders who
came to Stanford Law School and met with the entire interview team in a question and
answer session.

Interview Administration and Questions Asked
We prepared for our interviews by compiling both general and specific questions for each
of our stakeholder representatives. General questions were both macro-level (how do
you think Realignment is going?) and questions about the county overall (how did the
CCP decide its funding priorities?) Specific questions asked about carrying out the
responsibilities associated with that office (e.g., for sheriffs: how has the decision to
detain pretrial inmates changed post-Realignment?). Appendix B lists the complete
questionnaire.
As Chapter 1 noted, our questions were organized around four broader themes:
documenting, assessing, explaining, and recommending. For example,
(1) What is happening? (Documenting)
o General questions: How well do you feel you understand Realignment?
What kind of training have you received? How and in what ways has you
and (your specific office) changed their behavior under Realignment?
Have resources been adequate? If not, in what ways have they limited
successful implementation? How has Realignment impacted your
6

See Spencer, Jessica and Joan Petersilia. “Voices From the Field: California Victims' Rights in a PostRealignment World.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013); Weis, Alyssa and Jennifer Williams. “From
The Shadows to The Forefront: How Realignment is Affecting the Mentally Ill Offender Population in Jails
and Upon Reentry.” (forthcoming); Vilkin, Camden and Jennifer Williams. “Post-Realignment Parole:
Loud Bark, Soft Bite.” (forthcoming).

57

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
relationships with other parties in the system? Has it resulted in more
collaboration or adversity, and in what ways have these relationships
materialized?
o Specific agency interviews:


Law Enforcement. Has street level enforcement changed postRealignment? If yes, in what specific ways? How has the profile of
the jail population changed? How are you handling the changes in
risk level, longer-term inmates, and increased medical and mental
health needs? To what extent are you implementing new
rehabilitation programs? What alternatives to detention are you
finding most useful? How are you handling jail overcrowding? What
pretrial policies have changed post-Realignment? Are you fearful of
litigation, and if so, what conditions are likely to trigger legal
intervention?



Prosecutors and Defense: How and in what ways have prosecutors’
charging decisions and decisions to negotiate pleas changed under
Realignment? Now that prison is “off the table,” has the bargaining
between prosecution and defense changed? How has Realignment
changed strategic decision-making processes and communication
among key stakeholders in the system? Are DA’s changing their
charging decisions because of Realignment? If so, how? What
factors impact whether charging decisions have changed in a given
county? How has crowding in county jails impacted bail decisions
and other aspects of case processing? Do you believe that the
courtroom workgroup (particularly judges, defense bar, and
prosecutors) has changed their practices post-Realignment, and if
yes, in what ways?



Courts: How has sentencing discretion changed post-Realignment?
Is your court using split sentencing, flash incarceration, alternative
bail schedules, or expedited case processing methods to handle
increased caseload? How have your interactions with key
stakeholders changed? How will you handle the new responsibility
of sanctioning parole violators within the county? Does the
limitation of alternative sanction programs constrain your
sentencing practices?

58

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS


Probation: How would you describe probation’s expanded role
under Realignment? How has your county balanced rehabilitation
versus surveillance? What concrete training has been initiated as a
result of Realignment? How are higher risk and specialized
offenders (e.g., Mentally Disordered, sex offenders) being handled
post-Realignment? What types of intermediate sanctions are being
developed post-Realignment, and how are they being utilized within
sentencing? Was the information you received from the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) adequate to
prepare for released prisoners and parolees? How are you using the
principles of evidence-based practices to guide your Realignment
practices?

(2) Is it what was expected or desired? (Assessing)
o General questions: Are program processes and systems operating as
planned? Which practices and policies seem to be working well and which
are in need to improvement? Do your practices reflect the priorities set
forth in your CCP spending plan? In what ways has the program’s
environment affects its implementation, operations, and results?
(3) Why is it happening as it is? (Explaining)
o General questions: If the program is not operating as planned, why? If
it is working (or not), what social, cultural, political, or economic factors
seem to explain the success (or failure) in your county? What are the
implications of these factors for program transferability?
(4) How may legislation, program processes, and/or systems be improved?
(Recommending)
Our interviews were rather informal, semi-structured conversations. About half the
interviews were conducted face-to-face, with the other half using video or telephone
conferencing. Most of the interviews were conducted with two to four questioners, and
these interview teams were composed of students and faculty at Stanford Law School.
Detailed notes were taken at each interview, and several interviews were tape-recorded.
Drafts of the notes taken were usually sent to the interviewee for approval, and in many
instances, the interviewee would provide clarifying feedback.

59

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Limitations of Our Approach
While our approach has many benefits for studying Realignment, it also has limitations
that impact the applicability of our findings. We interviewed representatives in just 21 of
58 counties, and although these counties were selected to encompass a broad range of
situations and strategies towards Realignment, we don’t know how representative they are
of the remaining counties. And each of our interviewees has their own unique
perspective, and there is no way to assess whether their perspective and experiences are
similar to others in their same county. If we had interviewed different stakeholders from
the same county, we might have received different answers to our questions. However,
we did interview several major stakeholders in each of these counties, and we were
surprised at the consistency in responses within a given county. The following chapters
summarize our major findings.

60

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Chapter 4: Police and Local Law
Enforcement1
Introduction
In many ways, city police are the forgotten actor in the Realignment (AB 109) discussion.
They were almost entirely left out of the initial Realignment debate and were not
included in many of the Community Corrections Partnerships that were formed in the
legislation’s wake. In part because of this, they were also left out of the major funding
granted to counties to aid in the policy implementation. In some ways this makes sense.
Unlike the other actors, police departments are highly localized—formed around towns,
cities, and communities rather than counties. Still, few actors are more affected by
Realignment than police. Despite this underprivileged position in the early debate and
implementation, police departments have become one of the focal points for
Realignment observers. Specifically, nearly every news agency, elected official, and
academic in California is struggling to understand how, if at all, Realignment has affected
crime levels.
The effect of the increase in local offenders is complicated by already dwindling police
budgets in many jurisdictions throughout the state. According to Krisberg and
Marchionna, the total number of sworn police officers in California has been steadily
dropping for years. The total number of sworn police officers in California’s large cities
dropped from 23,355 officers in 2008 to 22,129 officers in 2011, while California’s
resident population continued to grow.2 Police layoffs have been especially severe in
high-crime areas such as Vallejo, Sacramento, and Oakland, which all saw a rise in crime
after police were cut.3 A recent study by RAND found that increasing the size of the

1

This chapter was drafted by John Butler.
Krisberg, Barry and Susan Marchionna. “Fact Sheet: Police, Prisons, and Public Safety in California.” The
Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy (2013).
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/WI_Policing_Fact_Sheet_4.13.pdf.
3
White, Bobby. “California Cities Cut Police Budgets.” The Wall Street Journal (October 31, 2008).
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122540831980086085.html.; Goode, Erica. “Crime Increases in
Sacramento After Deep Cuts to Police Force.” The New York Times (November 3, 2012).
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/us/after-deep-police-cuts-sacramento-sees-rise-incrime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&; Preuitt, Lori and Kris Sanchez. “Suffer These Crimes in Oakland?
Don't Call the Cops.” NBC Bay Area (July 13, 2010). http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/SufferThese-Crimes-in-Oakland-Dont-Call-the-Cops-98266509.html.
2

61

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
police force could reduce crime.4 Studies also find that laying-off police officers can
contribute to a rise in crime.5 Though the effect of police numbers on crime rates is
debatable, it is important to note that there are factors beyond Realignment that have
shaped policing in California in the past several years.
The effect of police lay-offs was intensified by Realignment. While the police force
dwindled, Realignment allowed for the early release of more serious offenders from jail
than ever before. Realignment also sent more offenders to probation departments, and
probation was often ill-equipped to deal with this more difficult population, requiring
police to step in and help. Police were left with more work to do and fewer resources to
do it with.
Municipal law enforcement was not covered systematically in the AB 109 legislation.
They were not granted any money in the initial state allotment and were not included as
mandatory members of the Community Corrections Partnerships. Despite this, police
lobbied for and were granted $24 million in 2013 from the State to support Realignmentrelated expenses and $27 million for 2014.6 This figure, divided among the more than
300 police departments throughout the state, is much smaller than the $850 million
given to the 58 counties for the implementation of Realignment during the nine months
of Realignment.7
In this context we therefore chose to focus on interviews with police chiefs of a diverse set
of cities and municipalities, focusing on the following key questions:




How has street level enforcement of crime changed as a result of Realignment and
why?
What impact has Realignment had on crime rates in California?
What are the remaining barriers to implementation for front line law
enforcement?

4
Heaton, Paul, The RAND Corporation. “Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us
About Investing in Police.” (2010).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf.
5
See Levitt, Steven D. “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime:
Reply.” The American Economic Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 1244-1250.; Kovandzic, Tomislav V. and John J.
Sloan. “Police levels and crime rates revisited: A county-level analysis from Florida (1980–1998).” Journal of
Criminal Justice 30, no. 1 (2002): 65-76.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235201001234.
6
“Police departments to receive grant funding.” The Stockton Record (January 19, 2013).
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130119/A_NEWS02/301190315.
7
Edwards, Andrew and Brian Charles. “Southern California police say they need more resources to
confront potential inmate releases.” Los Angeles Daily News (June 19, 2013).
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130620/southern-california-police-say-they-need-moreresources-to-confront-potential-inmate-releases.

62

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS




Have police departments been forced to cut back on enforcement due to
additional duties and ongoing resource constraints?
What effect, if any, has Realignment had on police legitimacy with the populace?
How are police departments using the money they have been granted from the
state to implement AB 109?

Prior Research Studies
George Kelling and Mark Moore argue that the evolution of policing can best be
described as moving from a politicized system to professionalization, then to
constitutionalism and finally to community policing.8 In the first stages, the primary role
of the police was recognized as keeping “order.”9 In the 1970’s, scholars and police
departments were looking at how police could solve more crimes, gather better evidence
and generally perform their duties more efficiently, as opposed to pure ordermaintenance.
By the 1980’s, crime nationwide had continued to grow, especially in cities, and an initial
wave of studies showed that previous police practices were ineffective at tackling the
crime problem.10 These studies were paired with those showing increased effectiveness
for programs that engaged local communities in crime fighting.11 These studies were
buttressed by the 1982 article by Kelling and Wilson that coined the phrase “Broken
Windows Policing.”12 The theory was that “disorder and crime are usually inextricably
linked,” so by concentrating on lower-level offenses, police restore order in a community,
thus affecting citizen perceptions and lowering overall crime rates. “The essence of the
police role in maintaining order,” Kelling and Wilson write, “is to reinforce the informal
control mechanisms of the community itself.” The “Broken Windows Theory” as this
came to be known, represented the beginning of a sea change in policing towards
8

Kelling, George L. and Mark H. Moore. “The Evolving Strategy of Policing.” Harvard University Kennedy

School of Government, Perspectives on Policing 4 (November 1988).
9

Kelling, George L. and James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” The

Atlantic (March 1982).
10

See, e.g., Langworthy, Robert H. “Do Stings Control Crime? An Evaluation Of A Police Fencing
Operation.” Justice Quarterly 6, no. 1 (March 1989): 27-45. (Sting Operations); Loftin, Colin and David
McDowall. “The Police, Crime, and Economic Theory: An Assessment.” American Sociological Review 47,
no. 3 (1982): 393-401. (Hiring More Officers); Kelling, George L. et al. “The Kansas City Preventive Patrol
Experiment: Summary Report.” Police Foundation (1974). (Motorized Patrols); and Tien, James M., James
W. Simon, and Richard C. Larson. “An Alternative Approach to Police Patrol: The Wilmington Split-Force
Experiment.” U.S. Government Printing Office (1978). (Rapid Response to Calls).
11
See, e.g., Kelling, George L. et al. “The Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment: Summary Report.”
Police Foundation (1974).
12
Kelling, George L. and James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” The
Atlantic (March 1982).

63

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
community policing. By the end of the 1990’s, community policing had become the
“national mantra of the American police.”13
Though policing is a well-researched area of study, there hasn’t been a systematic study of
police behavior post-Realignment. A report by the Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice
attempted to determine whether or not Realignment was to blame for the rise in crime in
2012.14 Their study assumes that if Realignment is a causal factor in a county’s rise in
crime, the percentage rise in crime will correlate with the percentage of realigned
offenders under community supervision.15 The study concludes that realigning more
prisoners was not connected to increases in crime. Using Sacramento and Oakland as
examples, the study points out that the two counties have similar population sizes, similar
profiles, and similar sized realigned populations but vastly different increases in crime
(19.5% property crime rise in Alameda County, compared to 3.2% in Sacramento
County). This report marks an admirable first attempt at trying to uncover the
relationship between crime rates and Realignment, but more research is still needed.
First, as the authors rightly point out, the 2012 crime rate data is still preliminary and
represents only one year of Realignment implementation. More time and data will be
required to more definitively determine the cause of the recent statewide rise in crime.
Second, the study suffers from insufficient geographic specificity. The authors use
counties as the units of measurement, but policing happens locally. Future studies
should examine the effect of Realignment on individual municipalities. A more apt
comparison would have been between Oakland and Sacramento than Alameda County
and Sacramento County.
Crime rates are not the sole impact Realignment might have on policing. The current
state of policing in California might be in direct opposition to traditional broken
windows policing. Police departments are spending less time on minor crimes and
disturbances and more time monitoring more serious offenders. Broken windows
policing requires great attention to the “order-maintenance” functions of the police
force, but Realignment makes that difficult in many communities. Faced with resource
constraints, Realignment has effectively splintered the consensus on community policing
in California. Some communities seem to be moving to a fifth stage of policing—a
supervision model—where many police resources are being realigned to focus on roles
traditionally served by parole, probation and jails: the governance and monitoring of
offenders.
13

Greene, Jack R. “Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and Function of the
Police.” Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice System, U.S. Department of Justice 3
(2000): 299-370, 301. https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03g.pdf.
14
Males, Mike and Lizzie Buchen. “California’s Urban Crime Increase in 2012: Is “Realignment” to Blame?”
Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice (January 2013).
15
Ibid.

64

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Findings
Realignments’ Impact on Street Level Policing
Policing has been challenging for years now. Whether because of budget cuts, changes in
strategy, or responses to waves of crime, it is hard to isolate a single factor that has
impacted policing. After interviews with police officials, however, several factors have
stood out as likely being affected by AB 109 and its implementation. These factors are
discussed below.

After Realignment, front line law enforcement officers are responsible for doing more
probation compliance checks as probation struggles to catch up with the changing probation
population.

Already resource-starved police departments are being forced to divert further resources
to conduct compliance checks on the recently released probation population and other
offenders on community supervision. Some departments have used this as a conscious
strategy of crime reduction; others have simply had to step in to support a struggling
probation department. Realignment gave unprecedented responsibility to county
probation departments.16 By diverting felons to jails instead of prison, AB 109 was
ensuring that the probation population would grow and that probation would be
populated with people who had previously been on parole. In other words, probation
would be responsible for a larger and more serious caseload than ever before. Officials
throughout the state agree that probation was not immediately ready to supervise a more
difficult population.17 As a result of this lack of preparedness, police departments have
been picking up much of the slack—performing duties that would typically be done by
probation staff. In response to this, many probation departments are training their staffs
differently and increasing the number of armed probation officials (discussed more fully
in Chapter 9).
While the probation departments are growing, training and becoming accustomed to the
new population, police officers have provided crucial support. Despite being unfunded
by the state, many police departments have devoted a percentage of their officer time or
16

For more on this, see Chapter 9 of this report covering changes to the probation department.
This sentiment is commonplace, but the urgency of the problem was communicated passionately by
Sacramento Sheriff Scott Jones. “Prison realignment raises questions about crime rate.” Sacramento Sheriff
Scott Jones on News 10. http://www.news10.net/video/1184091988001/0/Prison-realignment-raisesquestions-about-crime-rate.
17

65

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
have provided overtime to officers to support the additional responsibilities. In Fairfield,
the sheriff’s office provided some monetary support for officer overtime and the
probation department, sheriff, and police chiefs have worked together to coordinate
compliance checks. The police chief of Fairfield has diverted police resources from an
existing drug task force into efforts to follow-up with probationers. Even in Alameda,
which has experienced less change since Realignment, front line law enforcement officer
are doing more compliance checks now than before AB 109. The Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) recently reported that it is devoting more than 100 officers and will
spend $18 million monitoring ex-offenders released from prison to county supervision.
The LAPD complained that while Los Angeles County received $720 million over three
years to deal with Realignment, police departments in the county split just $7 million to
cover the added AB 109 workload.18
In some counties, the increased role of police in probation compliance checks is a
function of multiple causes. In Sacramento County, for example, there is the
compounding of problems that existed even before Realignment. The county has 60 to
100 PRCS offenders now, and they are being added to 1,200 probationers and an
additional 200 sex registrants.19 Sacramento County was heavily hit by the recession and
laid off county employees, especially probation.20 Because of these cut backs, managing
the offender population was difficult before Realignment. Now that there is an influx of
new offenders, probation is not equipped to handle the expansion. As a result, the
police have been increasingly taking on responsibility for compliance checks and
managing the probation and PRCS populations. In fact, in Citrus Heights, the entire
crime fighting strategy is based on policing the PRCS and probation populations.21 In
that community, compliance checks are used as a preemptive strike against crime. Police
are not responding as much to more minor incidents, such as traffic accidents, and
spending more time focusing on the PRCS population.
Whether the shift is caused by resource constraints or proactive policing strategy, the
result is that police are spending more of their time dealing with the probation
population than they had previously. Though every police official we spoke to stressed
that they were still committed to community policing, the central tenant of community
policing—that police should reinforce existing community control mechanisms and
ensure an orderly community—is lost when police are concentrating their efforts on only
serious offenders.
18

Palta, Rina. “LAPD Chief Beck: More than 100 cops monitoring felons released under state prison
realignment.” California Public Radio, KPCC (August 20, 2013).
http://www.scpr.org/news/2013/08/20/38800/realignment-forcing-lapd-to-shift-resources-chief/.
19
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Citrus Heights Police Department (March 2, 2013).
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.

66

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Property and violent crime is up in many communities.

Police are seriously worried about how Realignment will impact the crime rate. Though
some studies have suggested that the rise in crime statewide is not related to
Realignment, police officers we interviewed believe crime is rising.22
Across the state, police officers have reported rising property crime in their communities.
As one Fresno police official explained, “the area that we’re not seeing any reduction, in
fact we’re seeing increases, is in property crimes. It is a direct correlation of
consequences at the jail as well as our court systems have been decimated over the last
year or so.”23 In Fresno, as elsewhere, police are seeing people arrested of burglary only
to be released before arraignment due to jail crowding and stressed court dockets.
Similarly, in Fairfield, police officials have seen an increase in property crime specifically
linked to Realignment:
Both violent crime and property crimes have gone down dramatically and then
our numbers in 2011 and 2012 are skyrocketing primarily on the property side.
What’s the one change in circumstances is the issue of realignment, the issue of
felons that nobody knows where they are, nobody knows who they are, and nobody
has anything to give the ability or the capacity to respond to either the support
perspective or a supervisory and accountability perspective. It’s been very, very
difficult.24
Police officer impressions seem to be reflected in the data. Reviewing FBI and Attorney
General crime data for 2012 reveals a slight uptick in property and violent (Part I) crimes
for the year almost across the board in all of the major cities in California.25 This data
lends some credence to the lived impression of police chiefs. In Oakland, for example,
overall Part I crime per 100,000 people increased in 2012 by 23% as compared to 2011.26
In San Jose, Part I crime per 100,000 people increased 24% from 2011 to 2012.27 There is
variation across cities, though—between 2011 and 2012, Part I crimes per 100,000 people
increased less than 1% in Stockton, and actually went slightly down in Fresno and Los
Angeles.
22

Males, Mike and Lizzie Buchen. “California’s Urban Crime Increase in 2012: Is “Realignment” to Blame?”

Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice (January 2013).
23
Interview with Police Official, Fresno Police Department (March 11, 2013).
24
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Fairfield Police Department (March 11, 2013).
25

“FBI Uniform Crime Repors, Crime in the United States.” Federal Bureau of Investigations (various
years). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#crime.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.

67

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 3: Part I Crime per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Most
Populous Cities, 2008-2012
Pre-Realignment

6,000

Post-Realignment

5,500

5,000
California Overall
4,500

Fresno
Los Angeles

4,000

San Diego
San Francisco

3,500

San Jose
3,000

2,500

2,000
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: Crime rates by city were calculated based on the crimes reported and city population listed in the
FBI Uniform Crime Report. Crime rate for California was calculated with the crime totals from the
California Attorney General’s Crime in California 2012 report and population and the overall population
totals from the U.S. Census.

68

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 4: Part I Crime per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Cities
over 100,000 people with Highest Crime Rate, 2008-2012 28
Pre-Realignment

9,500

Post-Realignment

8,500

7,500
California
Fresno

6,500

Modesto
Oakland

5,500

Richmond
Stockton

4,500

3,500

2,500
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: Crime rates by city were calculated based on the crimes reported and city population listed in the
FBI Uniform Crime Report. Crime rate for California was calculated with the crime totals from the
California Attorney General’s Crime in California 2012 report and population and the overall population
totals from the U.S. Census.

Looking at crime rates in California over this same period, violent crime rates have stayed
mostly flat, with a less than 3% growth in the rate of violent crime between 2011 and
2012, as compared to a growth of 7% in the violent crime rate in California over the same
period. The overall Part I crime rate mirrors the violent crime rate, increasing 6.3% from
2011 to 2012.

28

Vallejo was the city with the 5th highest crime rate, but was not included because it changed its reporting
practices during this time frame, and so its data is not comparable over time. Instead, Fresno, with the next
highest crime rate, was substituted.

69

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 5: Part I Crime per 100,000 overall population for California 2008-2012
Pre-Realignment

4,000

Post-Realignment

3,500

3,000

2,500

Overall Part I
Crimes per 100,000
Population

2,000

Violent Crimes per
100,000 Population

1,500

1,000

Property Crimes
per 100,000
Population

500

0
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: Crime rate for California was calculated with the crime totals from the California Attorney General’s
Crime in California 2012 report and population and the overall population totals from the U.S. Census.

Looking at California in context of surrounding states, the overall Part I crime rate
change looks similar to that in Nevada, where the Part I crime rate went up 9.4% between
2011 and 2012, as compared to the 6.3% increase in California over the same period.

70

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 6: Part I Crimes per 100,000 population, 2008-2012, California compared to
other Western States
Pre-Realignment

5,000

Post-Realignment

4,500

4,000
Arizona
California
3,500

Idaho
Nevada
Utah

3,000

2,500

2,000
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Source: For all states other than California: FBI, Crime in the United States, 2008-2012, Table 5. For
California: "Crime Data." Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice.
http://oag.ca.gov/crime.

Officers believe that property crime rates are rising because the types of offenders that
are being realigned are specifically those that have a record of property crime
convictions. Violent offenders are still being sent to prison. Property criminals are the
ones who are being released early and are going back to commit more property crimes.
All of this is intensified by the lack of supervision once released, as one Fairfield police
official said, “when you release a number of these individuals back into a community and
there is limited supervision of programs they do have an influence on the
neighborhood.”

Auto thefts are up in cities across California.

In addition to the general property crime rates, auto theft, in particular, has been up
throughout the State. Even in towns where other property crimes are down or stable,

71

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
auto theft remains high.29 We heard this reported almost universally from police chiefs.
The huge increases were striking, and merit investigation independent of the overall
property crime rate.
In Fresno, as elsewhere throughout the state, auto thefts have been rising after years of
decline. “We had reduced auto theft every single year from 2001 all the way through
2009 and then 2010 we started to see increases in auto theft,” explained one police
official. Many of these thefts were perpetrated specifically by the realigned population.
As one police official said, “the people that we were arresting for auto theft we were
arresting multiple times; the same people. Some of these individuals 15 and 18 times a
year.” The spike in auto thefts has even been reported in local press accounts. In
Redlands, the police report a 30% rise in auto theft.30 In Tracy, too, auto theft rose from
2011 to 2012 by 21%.31 These accounts are reflected throughout the state.
Looking at FBI projected crime statistics for 2012, the picture is less clear. Many
communities do seem to have experienced a slight uptick in auto thefts. In some cities,
such as San Jose, there seems to be a very large spike in the auto thefts per 100,000
residents from 2011 to 2012—67%.32 Similarly, in Stockton, the auto thefts per 100,000
residents increased 47% from 2011 to 2012. In others, such as San Diego, the change is
slight. Even in Fresno, a community that has been dramatically affected by Realignment
and jail overcrowding, the rate of auto thefts dropped in 2012.33

29
“FBI Uniform Crime Repors, Crime in the United States.” Federal Bureau of Investigations (various
years). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#crime.Thefts have risen 4% compared to a
43% increase in auto thefts.
30
Edwards, Andrew and Brian Charles. “Southern California police say they need more resources to
confront potential inmate releases.” Los Angeles Daily News (June 19, 2013).
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130620/southern-california-police-say-they-need-moreresources-to-confront-potential-inmate-releases.
31
“Crime Report, City of Tracy: 2011 and 2012 Comparisons.” Tracy Police Department.
http://www.ci.tracy.ca.us/common/images/uploads/Department%20Photos/Police%20Department/stats
_thumb.jpg.
32
“FBI Uniform Crime Repors, Crime in the United States.” Federal Bureau of Investigations (various
years). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucr-publications#crime.
33
Ibid.

72

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 7: Auto Theft per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Most
Populous Cities, 2008-2012
Pre-Realignment

1,000

Post-Realignment

900
800
California Overall

700

Fresno
Los Angeles

600

San Diego
San Francisco

500

San Jose
400
300
200
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

73

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 8: Auto Theft per 100,000 population for California Overall and 5 Cities over
100,000 people with Highest Crime Rate, 2008-2012 34
Pre-Realignment

2,100

Post-Realignment

1,850

1,600
California
Fresno

1,350

Modesto
Oakland

1,100

Richmond
Stockton

850

600

350
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Note: Crime rates by city were calculated based on the crimes reported and city population listed in the
FBI Uniform Crime Report. Crime rate for California was calculated with the crime totals from the
California Attorney General’s Crime in California 2012 report and population and the overall population
totals from the U.S. Census.

More quantitative research would be needed to determine the cause of the increase, but
police offered a few theories. Police speculate that auto theft represents the
quintessential crime committed by the Realigned population. It is non-violent, fairly low
cost, and a crime of opportunity rather than premeditation.
A second possibility is that auto theft represents a truer measure of property crime
because of the reporting requirement to obtain insurance payouts. Because many police
departments are responding less to lower level property crimes, more citizens are failing
to report them. The result is that reported property crime is actually a lagging indicator,
not reflective of the actual level of crime. Auto theft is exempt from this because in order
to claim insurance on the car, the victim must report the crime as stolen, therefore autos
34

Vallejo was the city with the 5th highest crime rate, but was not included because it changed its reporting
practices during this time frame, and so its data is not comparable over time. Instead, Fresno, with the next
highest crime rate, was substituted.

74

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
are more likely to be reported stolen, even when the police response is minimal or nonexistent.

Police do not have access to a statewide list of probationers’ names, risk levels, or prior
criminal records.

Perhaps the largest Realignment-caused barrier to police effectiveness is the lack of a
statewide database of probationers. With police departments taking a more active role in
supervision of probationers, there is an increasing need for access to probation records
just as that access is receding. In the past, most of the records police needed were held
by parole—a statewide department. Now, with a growing and higher risk population
being released to probation, the population that used to be on parole—a statewide
system—is now on probation—a county system. In the past, when police stopped a
suspect they were able to check their name against the parole database quickly and
effectively. Once the person was found to be on parole, the police could better interpret
the situation and the person they were encountering. As one officer put it: “Sadly, there
are times that we catch these [copper thieves], they get released, and then it’s only later
on through a repeat offense or from an offense in another city that we find out ‘Oh, hey.
Yeah, this was supposed to be a PRCS guy from somewhere else.’”35 Some police officials
speculate that people under community supervision will travel out of the county to
commit a crime in order to avoid being tracked as a probationer if they happen to be
stopped.
Police reply that obtaining probation records now is “very spotty.”36 An officer might
have to know someone personally in the local probation department and say, “Hey, I
know a cop here who knows a probation officer here and I can call them and they can get
me things.” Though line-level communication between probation and police is common,
it remains informal and not institutionalized at the upper levels. This problem presents
itself acutely in Citrus Heights, where the border of the town borders another county as
well—Placer County. Probationers in Placer County need only cross the street to commit
crimes in Citrus Heights, yet the police department has no way of formally accessing the
probation database of Placer County to retrieve information on people.
The most important impact of this lack of coordination is that it curtails their search
ability when they stop a probationer. Police are allowed more latitude to search
probationers without a warrant.37 Offenders under community supervision “do not enjoy
35

Telephone Interview with Police Official, Fairfield Police Department (March 11, 2013).
Ibid.
37
People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 764-766 (1971).
36

75

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.”38 This extra authority could mean
the difference between a traffic stop and a drug bust. In California, the courts have
consistently reaffirmed warrantless probation searches as a valuable tool of law
enforcement that “serve[s] to promote rehabilitation and reduce recidivism while
helping to protect the community from potential harm by probationers.”39 Without this
powerful tool, police are limited in their ability to search people on PRCS and lose the
powerful “deterrent purposes of the search condition.”40
This is the number one problem identified by the police chiefs we interviewed. The
simplest and most impactful thing the State can do to reform AB 109 would be to
centralize probationer data into a statewide system that local law enforcement officers
could access.

Many police departments have stopped responding to lower level crimes, overburdened by
budget cuts and other responsibilities and citizens have stopped reporting them.

The inability to respond to lower level crimes can have a deep impact on citizen
perceptions of police and acceptance by the citizenry of police authority. While heavyhanded “broken windows” policing can negatively affect police legitimacy in some
situations, the lack of response to citizen complaints is also damaging.41 Citizen
perception of police effectiveness is shaped significantly by their personal interactions
with the police and by what is portrayed in media.42
Though many officers do not admit to wholly ignoring citizen calls, almost all police
officials we interviewed shared stories where the department has stopped taking lower
level crime reports. The sorts of incidents that police are no longer being responded to
include traffic accidents with no injuries, petty theft, and even some auto theft.43
The result, contend police officers, is that citizens have become less likely to report
certain crimes. In Fairfield, for example, citizens are telling officers, “we’re just not going
to report it [burglary] because we know that nothing is going to get done with it.”44
38

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789, 795 (2000).
40
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 752 (1998).
39

41

Gallagher, Catherine et al. “The Public Image of the Police.” The International Association of Chiefs of

Police (2001).
http://www.theiacp.org/PoliceServices/ProfessionalAssistance/ThePublicImageofthePolice/tabid/198/D
efault.aspx#ch2.
42
Ibid.
43
Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
44
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Fairfield Police Department (March 11, 2013).

76

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Police seem to understand the frustration felt by citizens, faced with police who lack the
ability to strictly punish offenders. As one police officer quoted citizens as saying:
‘Hey, this is the fifth time I’ve been ripped off. I’ve got to report it now. We’re
the ninth or tenth car in the neighborhood that’s been broken into. We’re now
reporting it. We’ve had other things taken and missing. We just haven’t reported
it because we just know you can’t do anything about it but now this time we’re
filing a report.’45
Despite this impression, the police response time in Fairfield has only slowed a little and
the department still encourages victims to report all crimes—even lower level crimes.46
Not all cities have been similarly impacted. Our interviewees suggested that Alameda, for
example, has not been heavily impacted by Realignment. There have been some general
cuts to programs, but none of it was determined by Realignment. In fact, Alameda is one
of the few departments in the state that still responds to accident calls that have no
injuries.47 “We prefer face to face contact with our community versus online reporting,”
explained one officer.48 At a time when many police preferences are subsumed to the
realities of budget and increased crime, Alameda has been able to continue at the same
pace, with the same priorities throughout Realignment. They benefit from a small
community and a low crime rate that a larger department, such as the Oakland Police
Department right next door, don’t have.

Police perceive a loss of legitimacy from citizens.

With some departments less likely to respond to lower level crime and many citizens less
likely to report crimes, police sense a decline in their legitimacy with the population. In
town meetings across the state, police are sensing hostility from the citizenry in response
to a perceived spike in crime and lack of police control. Though often anecdotal, police
are concerned that the lack of transparency of Realignment and the perceived spike in
crime leaves citizens blaming their local police department for any victimization.
Police in Los Angeles County have heard citizens complain about the perceived lack of
accountability for crimes. One police officer explained; “if there is a crime committed
and you’re responsible for that crime there should be some consequences. I think
people are starting to doubt. Are there any sanctions or consequences for criminal
45

Ibid.
Ibid.
47
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Alameda Police Department (March 7, 2013).
48
Ibid.
46

77

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
behavior anymore?”49 For many, this begs a philosophical question about punishment
and culpability. In communities with overcrowded jails, such as Fresno and Riverside,
citizens are reporting crimes only to see the person they reported back on the street the
next day.50 Is justice being done? As one officer put it, “right now we have a criminal
justice system with no justice.”51 The stories from police officers are plentiful: “I had one
citizen who had their car stolen and the individual we arrested and put in jail, he got out
early release and a couple of days later stole that person’s car again.”52 In other
communities, this has led to citizens not reporting crimes. As a police official in Fairfield
said, “a lot of folks say that they aren’t reporting crimes because they know we’re down
and they feel like there is nothing that can be done. There is both anger and apathy
amongst much of the community.” The result, when combined with the fact that many
police departments are no longer responding to lower-level crime reports, is that citizens
have and will continue to lose respect for police authority. As one police chief
articulated;
I think they might be less likely to report crimes especially if you tell
them ‘I can’t send an officer out there but you can go to our website
and you can fill out a report on the website’… Some people might
think ‘If they don’t care I’m not going to waste my time.’53
Citizens feel “that they are on their own a little bit more than they used to be and that is
because of all the early releases that have occurred.”54 These comments echo a theory
proposed by Kelling and Wilson in 1982: that when police fail to respond, citizens will
cease to report and the crucial connection between police and the citizenry will be
severed. As Kelling and Wilson write, citizens call to report a crime,
Patrol cars arrive, an occasional arrest occurs but crime continues and disorder is
not abated. Citizens complain to the police chief, but he explains that his
department is low on personnel and that the courts do not punish petty or firsttime offenders. To the residents, the police who arrive in squad cars are either
ineffective or uncaring: to the police, the residents are animals who deserve each

49

Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
McAllister, Toni. “Early Release Possible For Inmates As Local Jails Fill.” Lake Elsinore-Wildomar Patch
(January 7, 2012). http://lakeelsinore-wildomar.patch.com/groups/police-and-fire/p/early-releasepossible-for-inmates-as-local-jails-fill.
51
Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
52
Interview with Police Official, Fresno Police Department (March 11, 2013).
53
Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
54
Interview with Police Official, Fresno Police Department (March 11, 2013).
50

78

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
other. The citizens may soon stop calling the police, because ‘they can't do
anything.’55
Communities that have taken a more proactive approach to Realignment have fared
better. Police in Citrus Heights, for example, have done a good job of preparing the
community for Realignment ahead of time. The police department has taken an active
role in educating the community on AB 109 and explaining the police role in managing
the offender population.56 They hold trainings and information sessions on what AB 109
is and how it affects the community. As a result, the police do not sense dissatisfaction
from the population.57 The department is focused on building relationships with the
community and using those relationships to seek the help of citizens in monitoring the
PRCS population through neighborhood watch organizations. The active education
campaign on the part of the police department helped soften the blow for the
community and prepared them for increases in crime. It also shifted blame from the
police to the criminals themselves and enlisted the support and contribution of citizens
in lowering the threat of the policy.
The result of this loss of respect and legitimacy in most departments might be the rise of
private security measures.58 Officers in Fairfield believe citizens are increasingly likely to
feel that the police are incapable of providing for their security. Business owners are
asking police, “Do I need to get guns in my business? Do I need to go ahead and ask you
for a concealed weapon permit?”59 Police worry that the increase in gun ownership will
lead to an increase in gun theft and then an increase in violent crime as a result.60

Police departments have started to collaborate more on the county level to deal with
Realignment.

As mentioned, police were almost entirely left out of the early Realignment planning.
Some of the reasoning for this is that Realignment is set up to function as a countywide
program. All of the planning, spending, and data monitoring happens on the county
level. This fits nicely with the other impacted agencies that are mostly county-based.
55

Kelling, George L. and James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.” The

Atlantic (March 1982).
56

Ibid.
Ibid.
58
Bayley, David H. and Clifford D. Shearing. “The Future of Policing.” Law & Society Review 30, no. 3
(1996): 585-606. A similar trend was identified in California during times of budget cuts and was covered
by the popular press. See Yoder, Steve. “As Police Budgets are Cut, Citizens Step In.” The Fiscal Times
(August 7, 2012). http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/08/07/Police-Budget-Cut#page1.
59
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Fairfield Police Department (March 11, 2013).
60
Ibid.
57

79

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Post-AB 109, local police departments are beginning to collaborate more on the county
level. Where existing countywide partnerships existed, police departments have had an
easier time collaborating now. As one police official said, “when you have centralized
state funding like this I think it does make more sense to work more together with all the
jurisdictions and the stake holders.”61
After the first year of AB 109 implementation, police lobbied for and were given a $24
million grant from the State to spend on Realignment related expenses for 2013, and a
second allotment of $27 million for FY 2013-2014. Like other Realignment money, the
grant was to be disbursed to the counties with each county getting a percentage of the
money in relation to how many prisoners were realigned.62 Each county assigned one
chief to manage the allotment and the various counties were allowed to distribute the
money between the departments however they saw fit.63 With the exception of Alameda
County, all of the counties are using the money almost exclusively for countywide
programs.
In Solano County there has long been a tradition of collaboration. Police officers already
collaborated on a countywide probation compliance team. The allotment for the
county—about $242,000—will be spent on providing two more officers to that
countywide team, based in Fairfield and Vallejo, the two cities with the most
probationers. In Fresno County, a lot of the money (50%) will likely go to support the
district attorney’s office. The remainder will be spent on a countywide crime analyst and
a new GPS system. Sacramento County is being very deliberate in their allocation. As
one police official involved with the allocation process said, “The basis for which we
decide this is not just on where they all live; it is on, as a county, how to best put together
a collaborative and regional model where we can address this at a countywide level rather
than focus on 81 jurisdictions.” To that end, the county is likely going to start a
countywide task force, with officers based in affected cities. The office will be based in
Sacramento—the most affected city—but would be coordinated countywide and have
countywide responsibilities.
Some counties are still reserving money for local police stations. Alameda, for example,
is spending some of the money on a countywide analyst, but the bulk of their $480,000
allotment will go directly to the Oakland Police Department, the most affected
community in the county, to support local policing activities.

61

Telephone Interview with Police Official, Citrus Heights Police Department (March 2, 2013).
“Police departments to receive grant funding.” The Stockton Record (January 19, 2013).
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130119/A_NEWS02/301190315.
63
Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
62

80

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Overall, the money represents an opportunity for collaboration between departments.
Many police chiefs see countywide spending as cost effective, since you can hire a few
analysts who do crime data analysis for all of the communities in the county. Other
police chiefs see the countywide collaboration as a truer reflection of crime patterns. As
one chief explained, offenders on PRCS may live in one town, work in another town and
commit crime in a third town. Having that person tracked and monitored by just the
town of the person’s residence does not make sense. Countywide collaboration is in part
a reflection of this. Some chiefs also acknowledge that countywide collaboration reflects
the governor’s demand for more collaboration in Realignment implementation. Taken
together, these actions represent a sea change in policing in California. Realignment has
contributed to the regionalization of policing at the county level and encouraged the
collaboration of various police departments in their spending.

Conclusions and Recommendations
After just over one-year of Realignment, police are still unsure of how to react. Most
police chiefs are content to let the policy continue without repealing it, but are nervous
about the effect it might have on their communities. It is still too early to be sure what
long-term effect Realignment will have on policing, but the short-term effect has been
huge. Police departments are operating in ways they never have before. Some of the
changes, such as countywide collaboration on crime analysis and enforcement, have been
beneficial and have resulted in practices that will likely continue. Other changes, such as
ceasing to respond to lower level crime reports have likely had a negative impact on
citizen perceptions of the police. Others have been mixed. On one hand, some police
departments have used probation compliance checks as an opportunity to be proactive
about crime fighting, others have seen compliance checks as a burden on already
strained resources.
The most critical and concrete change that police request is the development of a
statewide database of probationers. One police chief articulated it bluntly: “We need a
statewide database where officers on the street, if they come across somebody they are
checking the person looking for warrants and identification, finding out who the person
is. There needs to be a database so we can find out if they are on probation under
Realignment; what their offenses are and what the conditions are.” Though it was not
uncommon for a police chief to advocate for the full repeal of AB 109, the policy’s
proponents and opponents could all agree that it would be vastly improved by the
introduction of such a database.

81

Chapter 5: Sheriffs1
“Nine years ago you couldn’t have convinced me to be interested [in
programs]. But I’ve been involved with it enough, I’ve gone myself and
experienced the transformation these folks go through…. When you’re
talking about the long-term goal of reducing recidivism, I don’t think sixty
to seventy percent is a passing grade. I think we need to do it differently,
and I think AB 109 …has provided us with an opportunity to …change how
we incarcerate.”
- Chief Alexander Yim, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
“We can do a better job locally if properly funded.”
- Sheriff Margaret Mims, Fresno County Sheriff’s Office

In October 2011, Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109) passed with the full support of
the California State Sheriffs Association. As discussed, the legislation realigned those
charged with any of 500 non-serious, non-violent, non-sex offenses (“triple-non”), parole
revocations, flash incarceration and post release community supervision (PRCS) to serve
their time in county jail rather than state prison, regardless of the length of the sentence.
The sheriffs stood to inherit this population—their needs and their challenges.
One year later, many County jails were bursting at the seams. Under Realignment, tens
of thousands of sentenced individuals who previously would have served time in state
prison are now serving it in county jails. In the quarter preceding the start of
Realignment (Q3 2011) the average daily population (ADP) for California’s jails was 71,
293 (see Figure 9). Twelve months later Q3 2012), jail ADP was 79,229, an increase of
approximately 11% or an additional 7,936 inmates.2

1

This chapter was written by Mark Feldman.
Lawrence, Sarah. “Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and Managing Risk in
the Post-Realignment Era.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (June 2013).
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt%20July%202013.pdf. at 7.

2

82

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 9: Average California Daily Jail Population by Quarter
80,000
Pre-Realignment

Post-Realignment

Average Jail Ppoulation (California)

78,000

79,229

77,340

76,000
74,527
73,993
74,000

73,701 73,793
72,306

72,000

72,132
71,293

71,090
69,515

70,000

68,000

66,000

64,000
Q1
2010

Q2
2010

Q3
2010

Q4
2010

Q1
2011

Q2
2011

Q3
2011

Q4
2011

Q1
2012

Q2
2012

Q3
2012

Source: Board of State and Community Corrections, Jail Profile Survey

While sheriffs are having to adjust to remarkable changes post-AB 109, many have also
have seized the opportunity to reevaluate the county criminal justice system, and many
are creating innovative programs designed to facilitate reentry and reduce recidivism.
Out of principle or necessity, nearly every sheriff we interviewed has bought in to the
rehabilitative purpose of Realignment. Whether they are able to implement
rehabilitative practices is for many a secondary question. For counties that were near or
over capacity prior to Realignment, simply absorbing the AB 109 population has been
like “drinking out of a fire hydrant.” For those with beds to spare, Realignment has been
an opportunity to expand programming and implement evidence-based practices
targeted to reduce recidivism, and to take in a population that they firmly believe is best
incarcerated at the county level. And for those on the borderline, Realignment is a race
against the clock to develop successful programs and alternatives to incarceration, preand post-sentence, to divert and rehabilitate the inmate population before they are
forced to early release.

83

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment has posed a very different set of jail management issues for counties that are
at capacity compared to those that are not. Thus, we selected our counties based on pre
and post-Realignment capacity, aiming for a range of counties that were stressed prior to
Realignment, those with excess capacity post Realignment, and those on the borderline.
The "stressed" counties were at capacity and early-releasing inmates to comply with courtimposed or self-imposed population caps prior to realignment. Borderline counties were
approaching capacity, and non-stressed counties had excess capacity at the time of our
interviews.
Table 2: Jail Crowding in Counties Studied
Stressed Pre-Realignment

Fresno, Riverside, Los Angeles,
Santa Barbara, Amador

Borderline

Orange

Non-Stressed

Alameda, Santa Clara, San
Francisco, Lassen

In order to understand how the population has changed post Realignment, we began
each interview asking each sheriff to paint a picture of jail management in the county
prior to Realignment. This was a crucial starting point, since we have found the manner
and degree to which Realignment has affected each county is highly dependent on the
county’s capacity, resources, and criminal justice culture prior to Realignment. We then
asked how the population has changed post-AB 109, focusing on the numeric influx of
realigned inmates (1170(h), parole revocations, PRCS, and flash incarceration) and the
impact of the new population on the jail. In particular, we inquired about the
dangerousness of the population, and capacity issues related to housing long-term,
criminally sophisticated, and mentally ill populations.
The majority of our interviews focused on the tools at the sheriff’s disposal to manage the
inmate population. This section divided into two main subjects— in-custody
programming and release valves. We were interested in whether programs have
expanded or contracted with AB 109, and the county’s plans for future programming
once the population stabilizes. In discussions with stressed counties, we focused on the
release valves available to the sheriff, including alternative supervision for sentenced and
presentenced populations, early release, and contracts with the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and other counties to house inmates.
Ultimately, the Sheriff’s Department is only the back end of the criminal justice system,
and its role cannot be understood in a vacuum. The inmate population in the jails is a
direct function of other county actors—law enforcement, judges, district attorneys, public
defenders and probation— and if we are to comprehend the sheriff’s decisions as jailer

84

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
we must also understand his relationship with these other actors. Indeed, increased
collaboration between county criminal justice departments was frequently cited as a
positive outcome of Realignment. Given the direct impact on jail capacity, we were
particularly interested in judges’ willingness to issue split sentences and law
enforcement’s consideration of jail overcrowding when making arrests.

Findings
From the perspective of the sheriffs in most of the counties interviewed in this study,
Realignment been a net positive shift. Now that the counties have to house and treat
their offenders locally, they are increasingly forced to internalize the cost of their
criminal justice system. As a result, every sheriff reported that a major success of
Realignment is that departments across the county criminal justice system are
reevaluating the way they do business and working more closely together to reform the
system. In particular, sheriffs are working closely with probation to share information
about inmates and facilitate “warm handoffs” between the departments.
Sheriffs feel they can treat offenders better closer to home provided they have adequate
resources to do so. Many counties are now developing innovative community-based
incarceration programs geared towards reducing recidivism, and some are creating
reentry centers in the jail and in the community. Nearly every sheriff’s office has begun
to adopt risk assessment tools previously used by probation and the courts to determine
who is suitable for early release and community-based treatment.
Yet some counties, despite a stated desire to increase programming and implement best
practices, face seemingly insurmountable capacity and budget constraints. Lassen
County and Alameda Counties lost a significant source of income when the CDCR
canceled their contracts to house state inmates. Lassen County is a prime example of a
county that wants to provide better services, but does not have the resources to do so.
Programming quickly becomes a secondary consideration when the sheriff can barely
afford to hire enough staff to avoid early releasing inmates, or to provide adequate
medical care. Realignment has successfully shifted the discussion at the county level
towards rehabilitation and reducing recidivism, but if the rehabilitative purpose of
Realignment is to be fully realized, some counties may require additional financial
assistance.
The offender’s perspective merits further study. Some counties report that inmates are
disincentivized from participating in programming, in and out of custody, when they
know they will be early-released. They are returned to the community without having
participated in programming and armed with the knowledge that there is a reduced—or,

85

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
in some cases, non-existent—punishment for a given crime. Thus, without the threat of
incarceration, the offender may no longer be deterred from committing the crime in the
first place.
The importance of improved relations with other actors in the criminal justice system
cannot be overemphasized. Ultimately, while sheriffs have release valves at their disposal,
they are at the back end of the system and can only work with the population they are
given. To relieve pressure on the jail such that stressed counties can focus on
implementing evidence-based programs for those in custody, sheriff’s departments and
probation should simultaneously work to reform the front-end of the system.

County Profiles
One of the primary difficulties with AB 109 is that its funding structure was applied
uniformly, despite the fact that counties were in very different positions prior to AB 109
and would face very different obstacles post AB-109. While there are many similarities
across counties and lessons learned from cross-county comparison, no two counties tell
exactly the same story of Realignment. To comprehend how all the pieces fit together,
and to better understand how the sheriffs are responding to Realignment, it is of
paramount importance to examine the complete picture within individual counties.
Thus, we will begin by describing the story of Realignment in two counties—one stressed,
and one non-stressed. Then we will separately profile Los Angeles County, a county that
merits its own category as it accounts for one-third of California’s state prison population.

Stressed County Profile: Fresno County
Sheriff Mims has plans to improve programming in the future, but for now, Fresno
County is grappling with its bursting population. Fresno County has been at or near
capacity and under a consent decree since 1993 allowing them to release inmates when
they reach 90% capacity.3 Prior to Realignment, the economic downturn had forced
them to close three floors of the jail. With AB 109 funding, Sheriff Mims reopened two
of the floors. The first to reopen housed 432 minimum-security male inmates and filled
in 14 days; the second floor, also 432 beds, filled in 10 days. Sheriff Mims noted that
demand for jail space is so high that they would have reached capacity soon after the
floors reopened even without the addition of the AB 109 population.
For Fresno County, a county plagued by capacity and budgetary issues prior to AB 109,
Realignment was implemented too quickly and with too little assistance from the state.
3

“Criteria for Inmate Release from Custody Pursuant to Federal Court Order.” Fresno County Sheriff’s
Office Jail Division Policies and Procedures at 1.

86

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The AB 109 population was larger than initially expected. The CDCR had projected
Fresno County would house 508 realigned inmates on November 20, 2012; there were
743. The influx has caused Fresno County to reach deeper onto lists of increasingly
serious inmates for early release. Fresno County’s early release policy includes eleven
levels, the higher the number the more serious the offense. The highest levels are the
sentenced AB 109 populations. Since Realignment, Fresno County has early released up
to level nine.
Despite Sheriff Mims’ assertion that, as a result of the federal consent decree, “[Fresno
County is] not overcrowded; we’re prohibited from being overcrowded,” Fresno County
has already been sued by the Prison Law Office, alleging unconstitutionally inadequate
healthcare similar to the suit brought against the state in Plata.
In spite of seemingly hopeless capacity issues, Sheriff Mims sees Realignment as a catalyst
for refocusing the criminal justice system to reduce recidivism. Because of increased
pressure on the jails, Sheriff Mims said that“[t]he way we’re having to look at the justice
system now is ‘how do we keep people from reoffending?’ rather than ‘how long can we
put somebody away for?’” Using AB 109 funds, Fresno County has increased substance
abuse and mental health beds, and created a new pretrial alternative supervision
program. Additionally, Sheriff Mims has received a grant with the National Institute for
Justice to design a jail to community reentry program.

Non-stressed County Profile: Santa Clara County
In stark contrast to Fresno County, prior to Realignment, the Santa Clara County jails
were well below capacity, departments across the county criminal justice system
collaborated towards shared objectives, and evidence-based programs had been the
standard for years. In such an environment, AB 109 has been an opportunity to reach a
greater population of local offenders with programs targeted to their needs, and has
fostered further collaboration among county actors.
The Santa Clara County jail system faced capacity problems in the early nineties. Gary
Graves, now Chief Operating Officer, led a jail population task force comprised of judges,
the district attorney, public defender and pretrial services to reassess bail schedules and
open jail beds. Now, with a total population of 3,720 on January 21, 2013,4 Santa Clara
County has just over 5,000 beds available. Even after absorbing the AB 109 population,
the average daily jail population has actually decreased from two years ago when it
reached nearly 5,000.
4

See “Daily Jail Population Statistics.” Santa Clara County.
http://www.sccgov.org/sites/doc/Administration/Pages/About-Us.aspx.

87

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
With space to spare, the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department reports that they have
primarily used AB 109 funds to expand programming. Prior to Realignment, Santa Clara
County offered evidence-based life skills programs (e.g., drug, anger management, and
GED). Now, with AB 109 funds, they have been able to expand their services to include
programs targeted towards preparing inmates for reentry. The Community Alternative
Supervision Unit (CASU) is a new program currently only available to the AB 109
population that places select inmates who have successfully completed programming
under supervision in the community while they are still under the custody of the sheriff’s
department. The program will be described in further detail in the Post-Sentence
Alternative Supervision section of this chapter, and it should be studied as a possible
example of best practices with the AB 109 population. Santa Clara County has also
created a Reentry Resource Center available to all ex-offenders that assists with the
transition back to society by providing SSI, food stamps, and job training. Although the
county has significant resources, the sheriff’s department does not currently have
sufficient funds to expand the CASU program beyond the AB 109 population. It is
hoped that future funding formulas will allow them to offer these successful programs to
the greater population.

Los Angeles County
Since October 2011, all eyes have been on Los Angeles County. One-third of the state
prison population in California comes from Los Angeles County—if Realignment were to
fail in Los Angeles County, it would fail for California.
Prior to Realignment, Los Angeles County’s jails were already strained. Los Angeles
County has been under a federally imposed population cap since the 1980s. Although
their facilities contain roughly 21,000 beds, due to the economic downturn, they only had
staffed capacity to house 15,600 inmates in October 2011. Chief Alexander Yim of the
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Correctional Services Division noted that, in
2004, when he came to the LASD, the more serious sentenced inmates were serving only
25% of their sentence before release; less serious inmates were serving only 10% of their
sentence.
In the months leading up to Realignment, Los Angeles County braced for the PRCS
population. Probation was given resources to absorb the coming influx, and the police
geared up for increased activity. Perhaps because of the sheer number of PRCS inmates
that were projected to come back to Los Angeles County—some 11,000 over the first
year—the 1170(h) population that would be sentenced to county jail was more or less an
afterthought. That is, until two or three weeks prior to Realignment, when the
population forecasts predicted that after the initial surge, the PRCS population would

88

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
diminish to zero whereas the 1170(h) population would increase until it plateaued,
providing a constant flow into the jail system.
By March 2013, the Los Angeles County jail population had leveled at roughly 18,500
inmates, including 5,700 1170(h) inmates. As expected, the 1170(h) population has
largely stabilized. The total bed capacity is higher due to increased staffing paid for with
Realignment funds, but the number remains artificial since Los Angeles County is still
forced to early release a significant number of its inmates. Local inmates—those that
traditionally served sentences locally in the county jail—are the primary release valve of
the jail. As of late November 2012, non-1170(h) local inmates serving sentences for more
serious offenses serve 65% of their sentence; male inmates serving time for less serious
offenses serve 20% of their sentence, whereas females serve only 10%.5 The 1170(h)
population, on the other hand, serves 100% of their time after the state-mandated onefor-one custody credits.6 Although some inmates have received shockingly enormous
sentences—one as long as 42 years (21 with good time credits)—such lengthy sentences
are very rare.
Los Angeles County is one of a handful of counties developing community-based
treatment programs for the 1170(h) population, both to reduce recidivism and to relieve
capacity pressures in the jail. The local inmate population that remains in the jail is
generally too high risk to remove from custody, but the 1170(h) population includes
many low and medium-risk inmates that could benefit from community-based
programming. The Sheriff’s Department is seeking funding and support for the county
to expand contractual authority to run treatment beds in the community for 1170(h)
inmates that serve a portion of their time in custody and successfully complete in-custody
programming. This is effectively the sheriff’s way of working around judges’ reluctance
to issue split sentences in Los Angeles County (only 4% of sentences were split last year).
Thus, with this community-based treatment proposal, the sheriffs are essentially creating
their own split sentence program. The program has yet to begin, but Chief Yim was
optimistic it would start soon, and expressed a desire to eventually extend the program to
the local population as well as 1170(h) inmates.

5

“Public Safety Realignment Implementation Update-Year 1 Report.” Los Angeles County Countywide
Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (2012).
http://ccjcc.lacounty.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9NmiylYnCds%3D&tabid=602.
6
In practice, this means they serve 50% of their actual sentence, because they are receiving four days for
every two days served in custody. But this is not the same as being released early. 1170(h) inmates have
technically served their entire sentence when they complete a sentence as a result of applying custody
credits awarded pursuant to the California Penal Code. On the other hand, inmates that are released early
are released at the discretion of the sheriff authorized by a federal consent decree, regardless of how much
time the inmates have served or have left to serve.

89

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
In part to bolster judges’ and district attorneys’ confidence in the sheriff’s decisions to
send inmates to treatment beds in the community, the Sheriff’s Department has acquired
the COMPAS risk assessment tool and is in the process of adopting it for early release
decisions. Until now, the decision to early release an inmate in Los Angeles County has
been entirely based on the inmate’s current offense of incarceration. An inmate’s prior
history or behavior while incarcerated might have determined his classification within the
jail, but had no bearing on the decision of whether to release the inmate early. The
COMPAS tool will provide a more comprehensive assessment of an inmate’s risk of
recidivism.
Los Angeles County has offered in-custody, education-based incarceration programs for
years, but Realignment has allowed them to expand their offerings to include GED
testing on-site, and they have increased enrollment from 1,000 in October 2011 to several
thousand today.7 Chief Yim noted that the jail has immediately seen a reduction in
inmate violence as a result of increased programming—a shift that has turned him into a
true believer of the efficacy of rehabilitative programs.
Nine years ago you couldn’t have convinced me to be interested [in programs.]
But I’ve been involved with it enough, I’ve gone myself and experienced the
transformation these folks go through…. When you’re talking about the longterm goal of reducing recidivism, I don’t think sixty to seventy percent is a passing
grade. I think we need to do it differently, and I think AB 109 …has provided us
with an opportunity to …change how we incarcerate.
In addition to expanding in-custody programming, Los Angeles County is constructing a
new, on-site reentry center that will include a Federally Qualified Health Center (FQHC),
pharmacy, drop-off mental health assessments, and a serve as a base for other service
providers to prepare inmates to succeed when they are released.8
Unlike other overcrowded counties, Los Angeles County has made very limited use of
electronic monitoring for pretrial and sentenced populations. Indeed, it appears, at least
for the moment, the Sheriff’s Department has refrained from targeting the pretrial
population as a potential area for reducing pressure on jail capacity.
Overall, although it is too soon to know its long-term impact, Realignment has led to
what appears to be a net positive result in the Los Angeles County Jail. Los Angeles
County had already developed pre-release programming prior to Realignment, but the
7

Choate, Brant, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. “Maximizing Education Reaching Individual
Transformation–MERIT.” http://lawenforcementtoday.com/tag/los-angeles-county-sheriff%E2%80%99sdepartment/.
8
“Community Transition Unit is here to help while in Custody and after your release!” Los Angeles County
Sheriff's Department. http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/PageDetail.aspx?id=965.

90

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
pressures of the 1170(h) population and Realignment dollars allowed Los Angeles
County to expand existing programs, shift towards reentry and reducing recidivism, and
provided the catalyst for creating a risk assessment-based early release policy. According
to Chief Yim, the county is moving in the right direction. “[T]here’s going to be a lot of
good news coming out of Los Angeles County this year.” Los Angeles County Sheriff
Leroy Baca was one of the most positive about Realignment’s impact on county jail
systems, saying:
Realignment is an opportunity to be more inventive with incarceration. We can
deliver jail programs that improve offender reentry and reduce recidivism. I think
education-based incarceration is the most promising aspect of Realignment. We
now have 7,000 inmates going to school every day in the L.A. jail. Realignment is
providing funding to expand our jail education programs.

Population Shift and Jail Capacity
Before proceeding to a more general discussion of the qualitative changes in the county
jail population post-Realignment, it is useful to define what is meant by “capacity.”
Capacity is the number of inmates the jail can hold given its resources and given the
classification of each inmate. A medium or maximum-security inmate cannot be housed
in a minimum-security area, even if there is a surplus of minimum-security beds. Gang
members must be separated from members of rival gangs, and offenders often require
protective custody because of prior threats or acts of violence while incarcerated. Thus, a
county may have 5,000 beds, but it will reach full capacity for certain classifications long
before it houses 5,000 inmates.
Classifications can impose a significant burden on a jail’s resources. Some presentence
inmates in Riverside County are bused 60-70 miles each way to the courthouse because
there is no capacity for their classification level in nearby facilities. Orange County
described the very process of classifying and housing inmates as a “Rubik’s cube” that the
sheriffs are required to solve for every offender no matter how long they will remain in
the jail. Consequently, flash incarceration— often for periods of ten days or less—
requires a significant investment of resources for a very short turnaround.
Finally, it should be noted that seasonal fluctuations in the crime rate make it difficult to
fully isolate the effect of AB 109 on jail population trends, or to accurately predict the
future influx of AB 109 inmates. Sheriff Beliveau explained that, in Santa Clara County,
the jail population tends to peak in the summertime, slows in the fall, and then spikes
after the holidays when the courts return from vacation. When they are not

91

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
overcrowded, jails generally attempt to maintain a 5-10% vacancy rate to absorb these
periodic fluctuations.9

Realignment’s effect on jail populations has varied significantly across counties. While some
counties experienced little or no change, many were already at reduced capacity as a result of
the economic downturn and struggled to absorb additional inmates. Capacity constraints
were exacerbated by the fact that the CDCR initially underestimated the realigned
population.

There are, at a minimum, two distinct stories of Realignment: those counties that were at
capacity prior to Realignment, and those that were not. Alameda County, Santa Clara
County, and San Francisco County have easily absorbed AB 109 inmates— one year into
Realignment, Santa Clara County’s jail population was actually lower than one year
before Realignment. By contrast, for Fresno County, Realignment was like pouring water
into a glass that was already full. Five years of economic downturn and budget cuts
preceded Realignment. They had closed floors and, in some cases, entire facilities,
forcing them to early release increasingly serious offenders. When AB 109 passed, Fresno
County reopened over 800 beds and filled them in less than a month.
Similarly, Riverside County has been at or near capacity and releasing inmates since 1993
and under a federal injunction that orders the sheriff to release inmates when the jails
reach 90% capacity. In preparation for AB 109, using county funds, they expanded their
facilities by 600 beds to bring their population to 85% capacity. By January 2012, only
three months after the start of Realignment, Riverside County had returned to 90% and
restarted early releases. The county has 3,906 beds in five facilities; together they were
forced to early release over 6,800 inmates in 2012. It is important to note that counties
like Fresno County and Riverside County were at or near capacity prior to Realignment;
when new beds fill quickly it is not necessarily or even primarily resulting from the influx
of AB 109 inmates. As in Fresno County, it may be more indicative of a pre-existing
demand for jail space. The more direct, short-term impact of AB 109 is that, in counties
that have reached capacity, each time a judge sentences an inmate to jail under 1170(h),
the sheriff may have to release one or more inmates considered lower risk. As more AB
109 inmates are sentenced, increasingly high-risk inmates are being released.
Fresno County and Riverside County may be among the most stressed, but Realignment
came at a difficult time for many counties. Los Angeles County had 20,000 inmates prior
to the economic crisis; in 2011 they had reduced to 15,000—the maximum capacity their
9

“Do the Crime, Do the Time? Maybe not, in California.” California State Sheriffs' Association (June 2006).
http://www.calsheriffs.org/Documents/do_the_crime,_do_the_time.pdf.

92

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
staff could manage.10 Orange County had stopped hiring deputy sheriffs and closed
down multiple sections of jails and an entire women’s jail. Los Angeles, Orange, Fresno
and Riverside Counties have all used AB 109 funds to reopen facilities and have
essentially expanded their actual staffed capacity to near pre-economic crisis levels.
Orange County reopened the women’s jail and the other sections that had previously
been closed, but their hiring freeze left them spread thin on staffing. Making matters
worse, Orange County reported that there had been some miscommunication as to
whether the jails would receive parolees through AB 109. Consequently, Orange County
was in the middle of refurbishing a jail when they had to scramble to accommodate the
parolee population, many of whom required protective custody.
As discussed, many sheriffs reported receiving a significantly larger realigned population
than initially projected by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR), forcing them to scramble to find beds by combing through their sentenced
population for inmates suitable for early release or electronic monitoring. Although
some counties are still struggling to predict the impact of AB 109, Los Angeles County
reports that their realigned populations have mostly stabilized. Similarly, in Orange
County, the parolee population has since stabilized at around 300 inmates, and the
feeling in the Sheriff’s office is that they have more or less found their footing with
regard to AB 109. As the N3 population has momentarily plateaued around 700—they
have found the population tends to rise, stagnate, then rise again—Orange County is
approaching a crucial moment. Unlike many of the “stressed” counties, Orange County
has yet to reach capacity and has not been forced to release any inmates early, but they
have a small, ever decreasing margin to work with and may well find themselves at
capacity in the near future.

Sheriffs have had to prepare to house offenders for longer terms—some as long as 42 years—
but lengthy sentences are rare. Nearly all realigned sentences have been under three years.

County jails were designed to house all inmates until they receive their sentence. Shortterm inmates sentenced to one year or less would remain in the jail and long-term
inmates would move on to state prison. Since AB 109, primarily through the use of
enhancements, some offenders have received staggeringly long sentences to be served in
county jail. Riverside, Fresno and Orange Counties have all seen sentences of more than
ten years. Offenders have been sentenced to as many as 22 years in Santa Barbara County
and 42 years in Los Angeles County jails. Such sentences, however, are notably rare. Los
10

Phone interview with Mark Delgado, Los Angeles County Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination

Committee (December 19, 2012).

93

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Angeles County reports that approximately 98% of 1170(h) inmates had less than 2.5
years left to serve after receiving their sentence. Similarly, Santa Clara County reports
that their 1170(h) sentences have generally been two to five years, with very few receiving
five.
It should be noted that some jails are used to housing inmates for a number of years.
Although county jails have never been designed to be used as long-term housing,
it is something [Los Angeles County] does on a regular basis. Inmates with
complex or multiple cases, quite often, remain in our custody for 5-7 years while
their cases move through the judicial system. We also currently house sex
offenders under Civil Commitments, several of whom have been in our custody for
more than 10 years.11
Although it is too early to estimate the full effect, increasing numbers of long-term
sentences may eventually lead to capacity issues. Even Alameda County, currently a nonstressed county with over one thousand available beds, projects to be at or near capacity
in two years due to an estimated increase of twenty-five AB 109 inmates per month. The
average stay in the jail is currently thirty-four days, but beds are being filled for
significantly longer periods of time— as long as seven years— as more offenders are
sentenced to Alameda County under 1170(h).

Sheriffs disagree as to whether Realignment has resulted in a more violent jail population.

One of the questions that received the most varied responses was “How, if at all, has the
AB 109 population changed the nature of the jail population?”, and, in particular, “Are
the jails noticeably more dangerous?” Alameda, Santa Clara, and Riverside Counties all
held the view that it comes down to classification and the capacity to handle that
classification, not the type of sentence. Indeed, none of the counties interviewed
segregate based on the type of sentence. Each inmate is housed according to the
classification he receives when he enters the sheriff’s custody. Thus, an offender who is
flash incarcerated for 10 days may be double-bunked with an 1170(h) inmate serving a
25-year sentence if they share the same security classification. At the moment, no county
reported segregating pre- and post-sentenced populations, though some are exploring
options for doing so.

11

“Public Safety Realignment Custody Implementation Plan.” Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
(2011) at 4.

94

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Once an inmate is classified, it does not matter whether they were 1170(h) or flash
incarceration— a “triple-non” inmate sentenced to 25 years on drug enhancements could
be significantly less criminally sophisticated than an offender serving a short stint for
parole revocation. However, nearly every county added that “triple-nons are triple-non
for a reason”— the 1170(h) inmates, by definition, are not an especially serious or violent
cohort. And even if sheriffs do receive criminally sophisticated inmates as result of
Realignment, the counties stressed that they are used to housing every level of inmate
presentence, from the most minor misdemeanors to defendants on trial for murder.
Realignment has not significantly altered the type of inmates that pass through the jail; it
has altered whether or not those inmates stay in the jail post sentence.
By contrast, Los Angeles and Fresno Counties reported that the 1170(h) population is
high-risk and requires more mental healthcare than initially anticipated. But according
to Fresno County, parole revocations have been by far the most dangerous AB 109
population. Under AB 109, parolees who violate the terms of their parole return to jail
instead of prison if their most recent offense was a triple-non, regardless of their prior
history. Sheriff Mims reports that parolees are “pretty dangerous people” who bring a
prison mentality to the jail, and that her unsworn deputies are unequipped to handle
such a hardened, sophisticated population.
Orange County reported a marked increase in contraband and gang activity in the jail
since Realignment began. It is too early to pinpoint the origin of the shift, but their
hypothesis is that the nature of flash incarceration, rather than the sophistication of the
AB 109 population, accounts for the increase. They believe offenders are intentionally
getting flash incarcerated to enter the jail, deliver contraband and connect with gang
members, knowing that they will be released in a number of days.

While some sheriffs are satisfied with the funding formula, others feel it does not adequately
account for lost contracts with the CDCR, or for the long-term medical and mental
healthcare of the realigned population.

Counties Lost Contracts with the CDCR, Struggle with Funding Shortfall
Some counties that contracted to house CDCR inmates prior to Realignment report a net
loss in funding as a result of Realignment. Prior to AB 109, the CDCR contracted with
Alameda County to house 700 state prison inmates for $77 per day per inmate, to the
tune of $19.7 million per year. With the passage of AB 109, the state no longer required
Alameda County’s services and they lost the contract. In an instant, Alameda County lost

95

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
nearly $20 million in revenue and only gained $18 million in AB 109 funds, while
continuing to receive inmates through AB 109 that would have previously been under the
purview of the CDCR. To date, they have received far fewer AB 109 inmates—159 triplenon and 247 PRCS and parole revocations—than the 700 previously housed through the
contract.
Lassen County, covering 4,720 square miles with a population just under 35,000, may
have little in common with Alameda County, but they too lost significant contracts with
the CDCR as a result of Realignment. Lassen County had a 156-bed local jail and a
Community Correctional Facility in the same building that housed an additional 160 state
inmates. Three months before Realignment, the state canceled Lassen County’s
contract, resulting in a massive funding shortfall. The Lassen County Sheriff's
Department lost $2.2 million per year and received about $385 million in AB 109 funds
2011-2012. They had to cut 22 positions and round up $1 million in general funds just to
keep the jail running. Since the dormitories that used to house CDCR contract inmates
have been closed, Sheriff Growdon has had to segregate inmates by classification solely
within a 156-bed facility, and sometimes there is no workable solution. In early March,
Lassen County had 36 females in custody, yet they only had housing for 20. So they
moved the most serious male offenders out of their segregated space and placed them
into a dorm with lower-level offenders. Sheriff Growdon worried about exposing lowlevel offenders to more sophisticated inmates, but he had no choice.
Sheriff Growdon wants to focus on programming, but he does not have the money.
Lassen County’s jail is twenty years old, and Realignment came at a time when the jail
already required major renovation to safely house the inmates they already had. He
estimates the jail requires $3-4 million in repairs and renovations, but he does not know
where that money will come from now that the state contract is gone. Sheriff Growdon
took over in January 2011. Before that, he said, his predecessors were focused on
warehousing people and provided very few services to inmates. Sheriff Growdon has
been trying to create more programs—including vocational and behavioral health
programs new with Realignment—but there is little he can do with so many other
essential expenses.

The Cost of Long-term Medical and Mental Healthcare Provision
Inadequate mental and medical healthcare in California’s prisons was the catalyst for
Realignment. In measuring the success of AB 109, it is crucial to examine the level of
healthcare that inmates receive in the county jails, lest they repeat the failures of the
state.

96

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Many counties, even those that were comparatively well off, were unprepared for the
medical and mental healthcare costs of Realignment. Prior to Realignment, county jails
generally lacked the infrastructure to house long-term inmates with significant healthcare
needs. While AB 109 funds allowed counties to expand pre-existing treatment programs
and increase mental health beds, with a few exceptions, the funding has been insufficient
to meet the increased demand for medical and mental health services post-Realignment.
According to Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown, the funding formula was based on
the marginal cost of each inmate and did not sufficiently account for the fixed costs of
constructing medical infrastructure where none existed before. Prior to Realignment,
counties were used to triaging medical care. Former San Benito County Sheriff Curtis
Hill gave the example that, if an inmate had a hernia prior to AB 109, the jail’s medical
staff might have given him a compression bandage and advised him to seek treatment on
the outside post release. Now that the inmate may be in the jail’s custody for a number
of years, the jail will have to provide the full treatment to the inmate.
Most jails do not have the infrastructure to treat sick inmates in-house. Some, like Santa
Barbara County, are currently constructing medical facilities with AB 900 funds; others
are too small to maintain a full medical center. Thus, counties that cannot treat the
inmate in-house will have to find a specialist on the outside to confirm the diagnosis and
treat the inmate. In smaller, rural counties, the closest specialist willing to treat inmates
may be hours away, yet the jail will have to utilize its resources to transport the inmate to
receive treatment. Inmates in the 156-bed Lassen County jail are taken to a small hospital
in nearby Susanville for general medical care. If they require more serious medical
attention, the Sheriff has to fly them to Reno, Nevada. Sheriff Growdon did note that
Lassen County’s mental healthcare as improved since Realignment, primarily because of
a new director of behavioral health. However, Sheriff Ryan in rural Amador County
noted that, for the severely mentally ill who require hospitalization, finding mental health
treatment beds outside of the jail has been a significant challenge. He said it often takes
his deputies months to find an open mental health bed.
If counties are unable to provide adequate healthcare, they can expect to see a significant
increase in litigation costs. Not only did the funding formula overlook the full cost of
healthcare for counties that did not have pre-existing medical infrastructure, it
overlooked the litigation costs incurred when those same counties inevitably fail to
provide adequate healthcare.
Ultimately, because of actual medical and litigation costs, the marginal cost of treating a
mentally or medically ill inmate in a small county is likely higher than treating him in the
prison or in a larger county with a pre-existing medical infrastructure. Future iterations
of the funding formula should take this into consideration. Additionally, smaller
counties are considering creating shared medical facilities for multiple county jail systems
97

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
to allow them to share the fixed cost, but this is very much a dream for the future. It does
not solve the problem for the inmate in Colusa County with special needs today.
Although, for some counties, AB 109 was implemented too quickly given the lack of
medical infrastructure in the jails, every county we interviewed has used AB 109 funds to
expand pre-existing mental and medical healthcare programs to at least partially meet
the increased demand for services. Santa Barbara and Riverside Counties are currently
constructing facilities designed to provide medical care to long-term populations. San
Francisco County and Alameda County were already providing long-term healthcare to
inmates; Alameda County provided healthcare to CDCR contract inmates that stayed in
the county jail for their prison term. One potential benefit of Realignment, provided
counties have the proper medical infrastructure, is that they will be able to provide
continuous, long-term care for the inmate pre- and post-sentence. Francesa Anello, at
the County Mental Health Department in Los Angeles County noted that “[i]t used to be
that we saw people short term …[s]o was difficult to get them hooked up in the
community if they’re going in and out so quickly. And so we’d miss an opportunity …to
work with them long-term.”12 Long-term medical care at the county level may ultimately
be more successful than the state, but counties will need the resources and the
infrastructure to do it.

Population Management
Sheriffs believe that, if properly funded, they can incarcerate and rehabilitate more effectively
than the state. Counties without capacity issues have been able to use AB 109 funds to
develop in-custody programs targeted to reduce recidivism. Stressed counties have been less
able to devote resources to programming.

In-Custody Programming
Counties that had capacity to spare prior to AB 109 have been able to use their AB 109
funds to develop new in-custody programs and expand the scope of existing programs.
Santa Clara County already offered evidence-based life skills programs ranging from
substance abuse treatment to GED, and has used AB 109 funds to expand into
programming focused on reentry. Alameda County has held a reentry expo every six
months for the last two years that brings in partners from community-based organizations
12

“In L.A. Prison Realignment, a New Focus on Mental Health.” The California Report (August 21, 2012).
http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201208210850/a.

98

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
as well as state and county agencies to start preparing inmates for life on the outside.
Since 1999, Alameda County has implemented a successful program called MOMS
(Maximizing Opportunities for Mothers to Succeed) that connects incarcerated mothers
with their children while still in custody. The program is focused on helping mothers
and children plan for reentry, and includes a partnership with the Oakland Housing
Authority to provide transitional housing to recently released mothers and their families.
But even these comparatively well-off counties are not able to offer their programs to
every inmate who could benefit from them. Santa Clara County’s new MOMS reentry
program, paid for with AB 109 funds, is only available to 1170(h) inmates, and mothers
who wish to participate in MOMS will first have to make their way up the waitlist. Despite
these constraints, Sheriff Ahern believes that, properly funded, the county has the
programming and capacity to handle the AB 109 population better than the state.
Already, Alameda County has been able to expand its programming as a result of
Realignment. Alameda County had in-custody programs in place prior to AB 109, but
they were previously unable to offer them to CDCR contract inmates. With AB 109
funding, the county now offers programming to all inmates.
Stressed counties have been so far too preoccupied with capacity issues to invest
significant resources into in-custody programming. Riverside County has developed a
substance abuse program in Banning with a 75% success rate, but the program remains
small and they lack the capacity to expand it beyond that location. Moreover, increased
usage of early release is making it difficult to enroll eligible inmates in existing programs.
In-custody programs are often only available for low-level inmates— the same inmates
that have likely already been early released due to capacity constraints. As AB 109 forces
jails to release higher level offenders, sheriffs will need to develop programs targeted to
medium level inmates, since they may be the lowest level in custody. The second issue is
a derivative of the first. The low-level inmates that would qualify for programming know
that they are also first in line to be early released; absent further incentive to program,
some sheriffs report that inmates often choose to forgo programming and wait for early
release without program officers looking over their shoulder. Sheriff Mims reported that,
in Fresno County, inmates will not participate in GED or substance abuse programming
unless they are court-ordered to do so.
If Realignment is to fulfill its stated goal of reducing recidivism, offenders must be
incentivized to participate in evidence-based, in-custody programs. Santa Clara County
has devised such a model by requiring inmates to successfully complete in-custody
programming before they are eligible to return to the community via alternative
supervision. Los Angeles County is exploring implementing a similar program. Using incustody programs to funnel inmates into reentry programs is the ideal practice, but it
requires that the inmate knows he will not be released free and clear if he forgoes

99

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
programming and remains in the jail. As long as inmates know early release is likely— or
for some inmates, inevitable— there may be little incentive to participate in a program.

Realignment has forced much needed inter-departmental collaboration and reevaluation of
the criminal justice system. Sheriffs are working more closely with probation, law
enforcement, district attorneys, public defenders and judges to reduce recidivism and reserve
jail space for those who pose a danger to society.

Every sheriff reported increased collaboration among county actors in the criminal
justice system. In spite of Fresno County’s capacity issues, Sheriff Mims sees Realignment
as a catalyst for refocusing the criminal justice system to reduce recidivism. The Riverside
County Sheriff’s Department reports increased collaboration with other county actors as
a result of Realignment, particularly with probation. Prior to AB 109, the pretrial
population constituted 77% of Riverside County’s jails. As part of the AB 109 plan,
probation and the courts have expanded pretrial diversion programs to bring the pretrial
jail population down to 68%, and the Sheriff’s Department reports that number is
decreasing daily. Perhaps in response to overcrowding, Riverside County’s judges are
issuing split sentences at a much higher rate than most counties. Four-hundred of the
inmates currently in custody are serving split sentences— a little over 60% of the
sentenced population—and over the last three months, 80% of sentences in Riverside
County have been split. However, it should be noted that many sheriffs reported that
judges in their counties have been reluctant to issue split sentences.
Some counties reported that the Community Corrections Partnership (CCP) fostered
greater collaboration. According to Sheriff Growdon, the CCP brought the district
attorney and the sheriff together in Lassen County. The DA previously spoke against
electronic monitoring; now he and the sheriff have come to an agreement to utilize the
Ohio Risk Assessment System tool to determine eligibility for post-sentence electronic
monitoring. And although the DA was opposed to specialty courts in the past, the CCP is
now considering creating mental health, drug, and veteran services courts.
In Amador County, Sheriff Ryan reports that Realignment has led to increased
collaboration with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). HHS has
started a new Moral Recognition Therapy program outside of the jail, as well as a Sober
Living Environment with beds for three realigned inmates post-release.
Santa Clara County is proof of the benefits of long-term, inter-departmental
collaboration. In response to capacity issues in the early nineties, Santa Clara County
organized a jail population task force comprised of judges, the district attorney, public

100

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
defender, and pretrial services to reassess bail schedules and open jail beds. Now, with a
total population of 3,720 on January 21, 2013,13 Santa Clara County has over 5,000 beds
available. Largely free of capacity constraints, Santa Clara County has focused their
resources on evidence-based life skills programs (e.g., drug, anger management, and
GED) and they been able to use AB 109 funds to expand programming to prepare
inmates for reentry. Sheriff Beliveau places much of Santa Clara County’s success on
inter-departmental collaboration. “When it came to Realignment, a lot of …silos
disappeared and everyone was working together…. You get cooperation anytime you
open up a door at another department.”
Although not every aspect of Santa Clara County will be applicable in other areas, it may
be a helpful example of best practices in high resource counties, and its interdepartmental collaborative culture may be a useful model for counties that are for the
first time starting to band together as a result of Realignment and capacity pressures.

Jail Crowding Release Valves
For stressed counties and counties that project to be at capacity in the future, the
Sheriff’s release valves are crucial tools for relieving pressure on the jails and reserving
space for those who pose the greatest risk to public safety. The following is an analysis of
the options available to sheriffs for managing jail capacity post-AB 109.
Sheriffs have created and greatly expanded pretrial and post-sentence alternative supervision
programs aimed at freeing jail space and reducing recidivism.
Pretrial Home Detention
Stressed counties seeking to reduce capacity pressure would do well to start with
alternative supervision programs for their pretrial population. From the beginning of
2010 to the start of Realignment, the share of individuals in jail in California who were
not sentenced was remarkably stable at around 70%, and was notably higher than the
national average of 60%.14 But the composition of individuals in jail began to change
immediately after Realignment began. The share of jail inmates who had been sentenced
to a term in custody grew significantly from 29% in the months immediately before
Realignment began to 37% during the same period one year later. But as Lawrence
13

See “Daily Jail Population Statistics.” Santa Clara County.
http://www.sccgov.org/sites/doc/Administration/Pages/About-Us.aspx.
14
Lawrence, Sarah. “Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and Managing Risk in
the Post-Realignment Era.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (June 2013).
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt%20July%202013.pdf. at 7.

101

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
notes, behind the state average of 63% lies tremendous variation across California
counties, ranging from a low of 42% of the jail population in Lassen County being nonsentenced to a high of 84% in Merced County.15
Some of our interviewees suggested that high county bail schedules are filling California’s
jails with unsentenced inmates, not necessarily because they pose a risk to public safety,
but because they cannot afford to pay bail. Counties could reduce the pretrial
population in the jails by reforming the bail system, increasing pretrial diversion, and
creating pretrial alternative supervision programs under the purview of the sheriff. The
first two, while crucial to reserve jail space for those who pose a flight risk or threaten
public safety, are not the subject of this chapter since they are outside of the sheriff’s
authority. However, it is worth noting that probation and the courts can relieve
significant pressure on the jails by expanding pretrial diversion programs. In Riverside
County, as part of the original AB 109 CCP plan, the courts increased their pretrial ankle
bracelet program from 500 to 2,000, bringing the pretrial population down from 77% to
68% of the jail, and Riverside County reports that the pretrial population continues to
decrease daily.
AB 109 included a provision allowing the sheriffs to create home detention programs for
pretrial inmates in lieu of bail. Fresno, Orange and Los Angeles Counties have all
implemented or are in the process of implementing programs in which the sheriff
conducts an initial risk assessment of the inmate, and if the inmate is eligible, he may be
released on electronic monitoring. At present, Orange County is only utilizing the
program for pretrial misdemeanors, but may have to expand to pretrial felons once their
population exceeds capacity.
Alternative Supervision for Sentenced Inmates
When AB 109 was enacted, the legislature ostensibly gave the sheriffs multiple tools to
handle the influx of sentenced inmates in counties that were at or near capacity. One
such tool was to develop electronic monitoring programs for inmates in lieu of
confinement to county jail. Prior to Realignment, California Penal Code §1203.016
allowed the county board of supervisors to authorize the sheriff to implement voluntary
electronic monitoring programs; AB 109 amended the statute to include involuntary
placement in alternative custody. The implication was that sheriffs would be able to
remove inmates from custody and voluntarily or forcibly place them on electronic
monitoring.
There has been some confusion as to whether the amended California Penal Code still
requires sheriffs to obtain the consent of inmates when placing them on involuntary
15

Ibid. at 8.

102

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
electronic monitoring, and thus does not permit sheriffs to force inmates into the
program,16 and whether inmates released on the sheriff’s electronic monitoring program
receive the same one-for-one custody credits as they would accrue in jail. The Riverside
County Sheriff’s Department has interpreted the statute to require the inmate’s consent
even for involuntarily electronic monitoring, and they have found it difficult to obtain
consent because the department interprets the statute as only allowing straight time on
the sheriff’s electronic monitoring program, whereas inmates will receive one-for-one
custody credits if they remain in jail. Riverside County’s interpretation of the law may be
partially correct, as People v. Anaya, 158 Cal.App.4th 608 (2007), held that conduct
credits could not be granted to inmates released on electronic monitoring under
§1203.016. However, Anaya was a case involving presentence, voluntary participation; the
involuntary program did not yet exist. Denying a sentenced inmate conduct credits when
he is involuntarily removed from custody and placed on electronic monitoring may form
the basis for an equal protection claim,17 but has yet to be argued in the courts.
Furthermore, overcrowded counties like Riverside County may avoid the Anaya issue
altogether by placing inmates on electronic monitoring pursuant to California Penal
Code §1203.017(a), which provides that,
Upon determination by the correctional administrator that conditions in a jail
facility warrant the necessity of releasing sentenced misdemeanor inmates prior to
them serving the full amount of a given sentence due to lack of jail space, the
board of supervisors …may authorize the correctional administrator to offer a
program under which inmates committed to a county jail …may be required to
participate in an involuntary home detention program, which shall include
electronic monitoring, during their sentence in lieu of confinement in the county
jail…. Under this program, one day of participation shall be in lieu of one day of
incarceration. Participants in the program shall receive any sentence reduction

credits that they would have received had they served their sentences in a county
correctional facility. (emphasis added)
Thus, not only does there appear to be a statutory basis for involuntarily committing
inmates to electronic monitoring in counties at or under capacity, but there is a basis for
awarding custody credits equal to those accrued in jail to inmates involuntarily placed on
electronic monitoring as a result of overcrowding pursuant to 1203.017(a), as well as a
16

See also, “Public Safety Realignment Custody Implementation Plan.” Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department (2011) at 9. (“If involuntary, inmate must sign document that they will comply”). However,
the plain language of the statute appears to allow sheriffs to force inmates into the program without their
consent. See California Penal Code §1203.016. It reads, “[f]or involuntary participation, the inmate shall
be informed in writing that he or she shall comply, with the [program’s] rules ….”
17
Couzens, J. Richard and Tricia A. Bigelow. “Felony Sentencing After Realignment.” Felony Sentencing
Reporter 25 (2013).

103

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
viable argument for narrowing Anaya’s scope and awarding custody credits equal to those
accrued in custody to those involuntarily placed on electronic monitoring pursuant to
1203.016.
Despite these issues, Riverside County continues to expand their electronic monitoring
program post-AB 109. It used to be that courts would sentence offenders to the jail and
the sheriff would run a risk assessment to see if they would qualify for electronic
monitoring. Now, capacity issues are forcing the Riverside County Sheriff’s Department
to comb through the list of long-term inmates and attempt to persuade them to enter the
program. However, Riverside County has encountered multiple obstacles to
implementing such a program in a stressed county. First, inmates have to meet the
criteria for alternative supervision. In stressed counties, lower-level offenders are prime
candidates for early release. Thus, the same offenders who would have qualified for
alternative supervision have either already been released, or they know they will be
released, and prefer to wait in jail until they are released without a supervisory tail.
Second, the problem of overcrowding may undercut any alternative supervision or work
release program, since, unless the sheriff is able to release enough inmates to reduce
capacity below the population cap, there is no credible threat of re-incarceration upon
failure to comply with the terms of alternative supervision.
Particularly in counties where judges have been reluctant to issue split sentences, Santa
Clara County, Los Angeles County, and others have used their broad release authority to
create their own community treatment programs that resemble split sentences, but
remain under the purview of the Sheriff’s Department. Under these programs, rather
than early releasing inmates free and clear, sheriffs are conditioning release on the
successful completion of in-custody programming, and placing the inmate in community
treatment programs supervised by the Sheriff’s Department.
Santa Clara County’s Correctional Alternative Supervision Unit (CASU) has shown that
community treatment programs can be quite successful when the threat of incarceration
(“the hammer”) is credible. To be considered for the program, an inmate must be
sentenced under 1170(h) and must have successfully completed an in-custody program.
A program manager will review the inmate’s performance history, classification division,
in-custody behavior, gang affiliations and any other elements that might be of concern
when sending him back into the community, and the CASU sergeant will review the
inmate’s file for suitability in the alternative custody program. Before releasing the
inmate, CASU deputies will go into the community and prepare the inmate’s natural
systems of social support. Deputies frequently build such strong relationships with the
offender’s family that relatives and hosts self-report issues to deputies. Once the inmate
is accepted to CASU, they are placed either on house arrest, or they live in a Temporary
Housing Unit (THU) or a Sober Living Environment (SLE), and they can participate in
104

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
job training, go back to school, work, or attend classes through the Reentry Corrections
Program run by the Sheriff’s Department. Unlike many electronic monitoring programs,
the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department has full-time, sworn deputies monitoring
offenders in the program at a ratio of 1 to 15 (compared to 1 to 25 for probation). They
test inmates for drugs three or four times per week; if there are any issues, they will bring
them back into custody for ten or thirty days and enroll them in another in-custody
program, with the possibility of being released again on CASU if they are successful.
Santa Clara County has established contracts with Salvation Army, Catholic Charities and
Vida Nueva to monitor the inmates in THUs and SLEs. As of November, 110 inmates
have gone through the program and only five have committed new crimes.
Orange County’s alternative supervision program is somewhere between Santa Clara
County’s and Riverside County’s. They have recently received approval from the board
of supervisors to implement an involuntary electronic monitoring program for sentenced
misdemeanors. Unlike Riverside County, under the involuntary program, they plan to
award one-for-one custody credits as if the inmate were still behind bars.18 They may
eventually expand into the AB 109 population as they approach full capacity.
Additionally, Orange County is currently designing a residential reentry program. Like
Santa Clara County’s CASU program, inmates will qualify by completing in-custody
programming, and sheriff’s deputies will monitor the released inmates 24/7.

Although AB 109 provided for the possibility of contracting to send inmates to the CDCR,
other counties, and fire camps, few have been able to do so.

In theory, AB 109 allows for counties to contract with the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)or other counties to house their inmates.19
Although Riverside, Fresno and Santa Barbara Counties are exploring options to house
their inmates in other facilities, so far such contracts have generally proved to be
prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, counties that are at capacity require additional
medium and maximum-security long-term beds— they have either early released or can
easily house their minimum-security inmates— but most of the space available in nonstressed counties is rated for minimum-security inmates. Amador County is the only
county in this study that has successfully contracted with other counties to house Amador
County’s sentenced inmates. Sheriff Ryan has contracted for eight beds in El Dorado
County and is in discussion with others.

18
19

Santa Clara County’s CASU program also results in one-for-one custody credit.
See California Penal Code §4115.55.

105

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Although fire camps were initially presented as an attractive alternative custody program
that could relieve pressure in the jails and benefit the state, Riverside County reports that
they have been unable to send offenders because the program has stringent eligibility
requirements and will only take minimum security inmates. The state has allotted
Riverside County 280 beds in the fire camp, but because of early releases, Sheriff
Thetford does not believe there are 280 inmates left in Riverside County’s jails who meet
the criteria. At the time of this writing, with the exception of Amador County, none of
the stressed counties interviewed have successfully contracted to send their inmates to the
CDCR, another county or fire camps, and none of the non-stressed counties have found
it economically feasible to contract to house inmates from other counties.

As a result of Realignment, early releases have increased in some counties. Sheriffs have had
to release offenders of increasingly serious offenses earlier in their sentences.

Early release, either on limited supervision or, more likely, with no supervision, is the
sheriff’s last resort. To avoid overcrowding, the sheriffs of Fresno, Riverside, Santa
Barbara, and Los Angeles Counties are all under federal consent decrees that require
them to release inmates when the jail population reaches a certain threshold. Releasing
inmates early is not new with Realignment. However, as a result of Realignment, sheriffs
have had to release more inmates earlier in their sentences, and report having to release
offenders with increasingly serious offenses. Between July and September 2012, counties
reported releasing 6,000 sentenced offenders and 8,011 presentenced defendants early
each month (see Figure 10). The number of monthly early releases of presentenced
individuals has slightly increased since the start of Realignment (up 8%) but the number
of monthly early releases for sentenced individuals has increased by a remarkable 56% in
one year.20

20

Lawrence, Sarah. “Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and Managing Risk in
the Post-Realignment Era.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (June 2013).
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt%20July%202013.pdf. at 11.

106

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 10: Monthly Early Releases from California Jails Due to Lack of Housing
Capacity
9,000

Pre-Realignment

8,356
7,827

8,000

8,015

7,745
7,244

7,202

7,395
7,029

6,140
6,000
5,000

8,011
7,582

6,580

7,000
Number of Early Releases

Post-Realignment

5,991

6,000

Q2
2012

Q3
2012

5,383

5,203

5,021

4,511
3,6133,663

4,000

3,838

3,831

Q3
2011

Q4
2011

3,000
2,000
1,000
0
Q1
2010

Q2
2010

Q3
2010

Q4
2010

Q1
2011

Pretrial Early Release

Q2
2011

Q1
2012

Sentenced Early Release

Source: Board of State and Community Corrections, Jail Profile Survey

Santa Barbara and Riverside Counties use the COMPAS system, along with information
available in the jail’s records, to determine which inmates are eligible for early release.
Riverside noted that, when they first started releasing, they began with minor
misdemeanors. But in 2012, they were forced to early release more than 6,800 inmates—
nearly 1.75 times their jail capacity— and now nearly every misdemeanor offender has
been released. Both counties emphasized the importance of looking beyond the current
offense to determine eligibility for release. Sheriff Bill Brown of Santa Barbara County
mentioned one example of a gang member arrested on a warrant for an outstanding
drunk driving charge in 2006. Soon after the offender was released early, he committed
murder while high on methamphetamines.
Using proper risk assessments, some level of early release may be necessary in stressed
counties, particularly if the county has been historically over-incarcerating for low-level
crimes. However, as long-term, higher-need inmates fill capacity in jails that are already
stretched thin, sheriffs fear that higher-level inmates will need to be released and

107

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment will pose a threat to public safety. Ultimately, counties with capacity issues
will have to relieve pressure on the jails to the point that they no longer early release
offenders that would otherwise benefit from evidence-based programs and alternative
custody. Some sheriffs report that early release has removed “the hammer” of
incarceration and crippled the system from the moment the offender weighs the
consequences of committing the offense to the moment he forgoes alternative custody
and other programming because he knows he will be early released if he stays in jail.
Counties must relieve pressure on the jails through increased collaboration with
probation and the courts to further divert the pretrial population, expanded pretrial
alternative custody programs within the Sheriff’s Department for those who were not
diverted at sentencing, and increased usage of split sentences.

Jail capacity in California continues to expand.

Jail crowding should lessen over the next several years, as the legislature provided
counties with another stream of funding to expand jail capacity. In 2007, the California
Legislature passed AB 900, providing $1.2 billion in lease revenue bonds to build more
jail cells in two phases. AB 900 was amended in 2012 after AB 109 passed, making it
easier for counties to access this construction money, although to date no new jail has
been built.21 By June 2013, 21 of California’s 58 counties had received funding for
county jail construction, which when completed will add an additional 10,811 jail beds.22
Counties anticipate it will take three to five years to build new jails, but the redesign of
existing capacity will happen over the next year or so. Only a few counties such as Glenn,
San Francisco, and Santa Cruz Counties, have decided not to expand their jails.
Several sheriffs say that they plan to these new funds to not only expand jail capacity, but
also build a different type of jail that has space for more programming with a eye towards
reentry planning. Santa Barbara County Sheriff Bill Brown, for example, is building a
new $80 million state-funded jail in Santa Maria. But instead of building a traditional
brick and mortar jail, he is using this as an opportunity to rethink how the physical space
can be better used to foster offender reentry. Having visited jails across the nation, he is
considering a Reentry Pod where the last months of jail are spent learning job and living
skills, and reconnecting with family and community organizations that can assist after
release. Over time, added jail capacity and better in-custody programming might ease
21

Branan, Brad. “Years after California OK'd $1.2 billion for new jails, not one has yet been completed.”

The Sacramento Bee (August 30, 2013). http://www.sacbee.com/2013/08/30/5693654/years-aftercalifornia-okd-12.html.
“AB 900 Jail Construction Financing Program Board of State and Community Corrections Project Status
Update–Phases I and II.” Board of State and Community Corrections (2013).

22

108

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
the sheriff’s challenges, but that is in the future, and the immediate jail crowding
concerns are not trivial.

109

Chapter 6: Public Defenders1
The importance of studying Realignment (AB 109) from the public defender’s vantage
point cannot be overemphasized. By changing the California’s Penal Code, Realignment
changed how criminal cases are litigated in state courts. More than any other
institutional actor, public defenders understand the practical effect of these changes on
the population most affected—the defendants. By virtue of their close proximity to
defendants, public defenders are best positioned to report on defendants’ concerns,
treatment, well-being, and preferences. And, given the amount of time that public
defenders spend in litigation, they can provide important insight into how Realignment
has changed the very structure of the court system itself.
In interviewing public defenders, we either spoke with the county’s elected Public
Defender or a designee (typically an assistant or deputy public defender focused on
Realignment implementation). Interview content varied depending on the particular
interests or expertise of the subject, but each focused on the major research questions
listed in Appendix B. Broadly, we investigated how Realignment has changed the way
that public defenders represent their clients.

Findings
Public Defenders view Realignment as a hard-won victory after decades of advocacy.

When the Determinate Sentencing Law was enacted in 1977, “the legislation declared the
purpose of incarceration to be punishment.”2 Realignment turns away from this model
of criminal justice. The legislative findings and declarations in California Penal Code
§17.5 articulate a broader vision for criminal justice by:





Reaffirming California’s commitment to reducing recidivism;
Declaring that building more prisons is not sustainable and will not result in
improved public safety;
Stating that California must reinvest its criminal justice resources to support
community-based correction programs; and
Asserting that community-based punishment and evidence-based practices will
improve public safety and facilitate offenders’ reintegration back into society.

1

Findings in this chapter were drawn from reports written by John Butler, Mariam Hinds, and Matt Owens.
Dansky, Kara. “Understanding California Sentencing.” University of San Francisco Law Review 43, no. 1
(2008): 67.

2

110

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Public defenders view these amendments as a hard-won victory after decades of advocacy.
Public defenders have long campaigned for improved treatment, enhanced services,
alternatives to incarceration, and a rehabilitation-focused crime policy agenda. One
public defender told us that Realignment has forced judges, prosecutors, sheriffs, and
probation “to become aware of other alternatives in the criminal justice system.” Another
public defender reported that the mood in the county is “much more rehabilitation” and
“the pendulum…sw[ung] back to rehabilitation [of the 1960s].” Yet another public
defender believed that Realignment allows for “the recognition that basically maybe
there are…more intelligent ways to deal with [defendants] other than to lock them
up …the recognition that basically this is where the governor is going, this is what the
federal courts have said, this is what has happened in the law.” For all of these reasons,
Realignment represents a victory for which public defenders strenuously and
continuously advocated.

Public defenders feel responsible for ensuring Realignment’s success through education and
advocacy.

As discussed in the previous section, public defenders view Realignment as a victory after
decades of advocacy. Consequently, public defenders feel a certain amount of
responsibility for ensuring Realignment’s success. Whether through trainings, briefs, or
participation in the Community Corrections Partnerships, public defenders are using
Realignment’s statewide reforms to improve the criminal justice system. Although these
efforts have been met with varying success, public defenders across all counties are united
by a strong sense that they are the guardians of Realignment.
One particularly salient example of this advocacy is educating the court about
Realignment’s rehabilitative programs and sentencing alternatives. Public defenders
report that many judges are unaware of these aspects of Realignment. In order to
address this lack of knowledge, public defenders are using their clients’ cases to “educate
the court”: “[T]here is an awful lot of understanding that [judges and district attorneys]
get from [public defenders] by virtue of simply seeing the different lawyers come in with
the same arguments. After a while it’s like learning a new language.” In addition to
education through court appearances, public defenders prepare briefs that identify the
importance of evidence-based practices and the state’s reasons for undertaking

111

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment.3 Interviewees remain hopeful that, over time, judges will begin to
understand the importance of these programs.
Of the counties interviewed, Santa Clara County has used this tactic to the greatest
success. Santa Clara County has an abnormally high number of diversion programs and
probation programs. The sheer number of alternatives to jail enables the public
defender to “educate” by making a case for a particular program that would be better
suited to their client’s needs.4 That is, public defenders argue that “allowing access to
Realignment’s innovative programs…actually enhance[es] public safety” by increasing
the likelihood of rehabilitation. The office conducts trainings on how to assemble a
sentencing package that best explains the defendant’s need for evidence-based programs.
More than any other county interviewed, Santa Clara County has assumed the role of
educator, hoping to advance the use of rehabilitative services.

Although many judges have been reluctant to grant split sentences, public defenders expect
that the percentage of split sentences will increase in most counties.

In addition to reclassifying nearly 500 felonies as 1170(h) offenses, Realignment
introduced a new sentencing scheme for these felonies—the “split sentence.” Under
§1170(h)(5)(B) of the California Penal Code, judges may now “suspend execution of a
concluding portion” of a sentence. §1170(h)(5)(B) is permissive, not mandatory; judges
are under no obligation to use their discretion. If the judge does so, the defendant must
serve part of his sentence in county jail and part of his sentence under “mandatory
supervision.” Probation is tasked with overseeing the defendant’s mandatory supervision,
but is not authorized to release the defendant early “except by court order.” Judges have
significant leeway to tailor a split sentence to the needs of a particular defendant; that is,
judges may impose any distribution of incarceration and supervision as they see
appropriate. Even so, the discretion granted to judges is not unbounded: The total
duration of the defendant’s blended sentence—incarceration and mandatory
supervision—may not fall short of the minimum sentence, and may not exceed the
maximum possible sentence.
As we discuss later and show in Figure 11, counties vary significantly in their use of split
sentencing. There are many possible explanations for the variability of split sentences
across counties. First, and most significant, is institutional inertia: “People who have been
doing things the way they’ve been doing them for 20 years don’t want to change
3

Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public Defender (November
8, 2012).
4
Ibid.

112

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
overnight….[T]hat is ….why we haven’t gotten as many split sentences.” Second, many
judges are concerned about the split sentences themselves; they think that split sentences
are “a waste of money and resources.” For example, in Solano County, only 8% of
sentences are split sentences. When asked why this is the case, a Solano County Public
Defender explained that judges “don’t think any services are out there for the
probationers.” Third, some judges believe that split sentences encroach on their
authority. That is, they want to ensure that defendants to “do the time” and aren’t willing
to sacrifice jail time for participation in rehabilitative programs. Finally, a number of
judges simply lack knowledge about split sentences and the programs available under
mandatory supervision.
Split sentences are essential to Realignment’s success. They assist with jail population
management and divert offenders into rehabilitative programs. Most public defenders
we spoke with held out hope that split sentences would become the norm over time, as is
already the case in Riverside County. As jails start to overcrowd, and rehabilitation
success stories begin to emerge, public defenders expect that split sentences will be
granted with increased frequency in most counties.

Public defenders have adapted to Realignment by implementing training programs and
engaging in cross-collaboration and information sharing.

All offices interviewed had conducted some form of training program to prepare their
attorneys for Realignment. Most of these trainings focused on analysis of the law;
counties spent little time training their attorneys on strategy for leveraging Realignment
programs and reforms. This focus might change, however, as public defenders become
more comfortable with the new rules. As one public defender from Santa Clara County
put it, “we spent a lot of time figuring out what this law meant, how to apply it…now that
we’re getting used to it and people are figuring out their defined roles, we can start the
process of undergoing philosophical changes.”
Of the counties interviewed, Santa Clara County had the most extensive training
program, spending an estimated 2,000 attorney hours on preparation for Realignment.
Trainings were mostly conducted in-house, although attorneys also participated in
external trainings hosted by the probation department. To better understand the
shifting criminal justice landscape after Realignment, Santa Clara County also hired an
on-staff researcher.
Our interviewees reported some cross-collaboration and information sharing between
public defender offices. Through statewide training programs, public defenders are

113

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
developing a unified statutory interpretation of AB 109. For example, Sacramento
County participated in several out-of-county trainings, hosted for public defenders in the
Bay Area. Additionally, many counties have relied on Garrick Byers, a Senior Defense
Attorney in Fresno County’s Office of the Public Defender who is regarded as an expert
on Realignment. Mr. Byers drafted a white paper on Realignment that was distributed
widely, and has hosted trainings in a number of different counties.

The Community Corrections Partnerships have improved communication and collaboration
between institutional actors, though public defenders report that implementation has posed
difficulties.

Overall, the CCPs have greatly expanded communication between institutional actors.
Even where public defenders felt that they didn’t have a voice on the CCP, they praised
CCP meetings as a useful source of information on other institutional actors. Most public
defenders have found the CCP to be a valuable use of their time and an opportunity to
advocate for the use of evidence-based programs. Fresno County, for example, has
historically eschewed rehabilitative programming, and its original CCP plan focused on
increasing jail capacity. The public defender has since observed a number of positive
developments through the CCP. First, the CCP has shied away from expanding jail
capacity and has begun to put more money into programming. Second, the CCP has
formed partnerships with area universities to study the impact of evidence-based
programs. Third, and most startling, the sheriff has begun to mimic the earlier talking
points of the public defender. At CCP meetings, the sheriff has advocated for programs
and services, arguing that public safety depends on reducing recidivism.
Solano County is the one outlier. This might be explained by the absence of jail
overcrowding—without the pressure of jail overcrowding, institutional actors have little
incentive to reform their way of doing business. The public defender is almost always
outvoted at meetings of the Solano County CCP, with the social service organizations
being their only ally.5 Solano County is currently building a Day Reporting Center, which
could change the dynamic between the various actors. At the moment, however, there is
little collaboration in Solano County.
One concern voiced by public defenders is that CCP decisions might not be filtering
down to other actors, especially judges. Though each institutional actor is represented in
the CCP, the individual actors are responsible for ensuring that CCP decisions are
adhered to by their respective departments. As one public defender complained,
5

Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Solano County Public Defender (October 26, 2012).

114

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
“sometimes what we’re doing at the management level isn’t transferred down to the
people who actually have to do it, and those are the people behind the bench.”6 Still,
there has been progress, however slow. As another public defender explained, “you’re
not going to flip the switch and have everybody be happy about this.”7

Realignment has altered public defenders’ relationships with sheriffs, probation, and clients.

Realignment ushered in sweeping reforms to the criminal justice system. These reforms,
in turn, have altered the relationships between the public defender and other actors in
the system. In particular, our interviewees reported that relationships with sheriffs,
probation, and clients have changed significantly.

Relationships with Sheriffs
On the whole, the relationship between public defenders and sheriffs has improved since
Realignment. To manage jail populations, many sheriffs have begun to focus on
reducing recidivism; in general, sheriffs are more open to diverting offenders from
county jail. Public defenders, in turn, are beginning to find common ground with
sheriffs over rehabilitation programs and evidence-based practices for reducing
recidivism. In some counties, such as Santa Barbara County, this change preceded
Realignment. In most counties, however, public defenders report that this development
is new, and is likely motivated by jail overcrowding.
As evidence of this trend, public defenders point to meetings of the CCP. Public
defenders report that sheriffs have begun to speak in their language—that is, sheriffs
have become vocal advocates for rehabilitation programs. In the words of long-time
public defender, “[F]or us to hear Deputy Sheriffs and Probation officers talking about
what one of our clients needs to succeed….We’ve never heard that kind of stuff before,
I’ve been here for 22 years, never heard of it.”
While the general trend is positive, one county fell outside of this pattern. Public
defenders in Sacramento County reported that their sheriff still wants to “lock them up
and put them away….They want funding to create a new jail, to increase the size of the
jail, to increase the number of beds, to hire more of theirs.”

6

Ibid.
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public Defender (November
9, 2012).

7

115

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Relationships with Probation
Public defenders report that their relationships with probation departments have
improved after Realignment. Interestingly, this finding extends to Sacramento County
despite the fact that the sheriff maintains a “tough on crime” attitude. A Sacramento
County Public Defender explained, “Now the probation department, because of
funding…cuts they are looking for basically more of the evidence-based practices to be
implemented because it would bring back some of the people who have been cut.” Thus,
financial incentives have encouraged the Sacramento County probation department to
embrace (or at least superficially embrace) rehabilitation and treatment.
While the heads public defender offices generally reported improved relationships with
probation offices, the picture may be more complicated. In our interviews, we observed a
disconnect between heads of public defender offices and line attorneys. Perhaps because
they interact with probation during CCP meetings, and thus have a sense for probation’s
long-term policy goals, head public defenders are generally positively disposed towards
probation. They describe progressive probation chiefs who “identified that our clients
need housing, and jobs, and substance abuse help, and mental health help, and
partnered with the right community organization and other department heads to…get
that going.” However, line attorneys and clients are more skeptical of probation’s new
policies: “[T]raditionally our county probation has not been the client’s friend….Our
probation department has been very quick to violate people…So when we tell them that
there’s been a change in probation…they look at us like we’ve been smoking crack.”
This skepticism may dissipate overtime as probation demonstrates commitment to
treating and helping clients.

Relationships with Clients
Realignment has altered the relationship between public defenders and their clients in
two ways. First, although Realignment hasn’t changed how public defenders advise their
clients, it has increased the amount of information that must be explained to and
evaluated by the client. For instance, public defenders must explain the difference
between prison-eligible and county jail-eligible offenses. Public defenders must also
explain what happens when the defendant is released from incarceration; that is to say,
for a defendant to evaluate his options, he must understand the differences between
parole, mandatory supervised release, PRCS, and probation.
Second, some public defenders have reported increased contact with their clients. In
part, this is due to proximity: Many clients who would have served prison sentences are
now housed in county jails. Additionally, the shift to county jails has forced public

116

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
defenders to assume greater responsibility for the administrative aspects of their client’s
confinement. For example, public defenders have fielded calls related inadequate
medical care provided in certain jails—a responsibility that previously fell to state prisons.
Finally, because sheriffs are releasing offenders early with greater frequency, public
defenders have been representing offenders in a greater number of violation hearings.
This not only increases the amount of client contact, but also the public defenders’
caseloads:
I think the…hardest part has been, for us, the amount of cases. Our caseload has
just doubled because now we have all the violations. It’s been tough.
People are definitely picking up more cases when they get released. I mean, on
average, on a day, I probably have three or four guys with anywhere between five
and eight cases. And that’s just because they keep getting released, and
reoffended, and released, and reoffended. What we have seen come up is a very,
very big increase in the violation of mandatory supervision….That is where the
caseload is in the public defender’s office because when they are violated those
cases come back to us and they have increased.

In general, public defenders have not observed changes in prosecutorial behavior after
Realignment.

In our interviews with public defenders, we explored whether prosecutorial behavior had
changed after Realignment. In particular, we predicted that prosecutors might react to
the creation of county jail offenses by engaging in charge inflation. Based on reports
from public defenders, prosecutorial behavior and decision-making appears to vary by
county, with a majority of district attorneys not overcharging in reaction to Realignment.
Though district attorneys do not necessarily support or advocate for Realignment, in
general they do not actively undermine Realignment in their charging decisions.
One exception to this general trend is Fresno County. Public defenders believe that, if
anything, Realignment has intensified “tough on crime” tactics. One public defender
explained, “I think that AB 109 gives the District Attorney’s office an excuse as to why
they are doing what they are doing. Rather than say…we’re just tough on crime, or we
just don’t want to plea bargain, now we’re doing it to get the county money, we’re doing
it to put people in prison instead of the county jail, to get them out of your community.”
This behavior is consistent with Fresno County’s historical “tough on crime” agenda. It is
also consistent with Fresno County’s funding allocations: only 6% of AB 109 funding was

117

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
dedicated to programs and services, whereas 67% of the funding went to law
enforcement.
Fresno County sharply contrasts with Sacramento County, where prosecutors are offering
probation more frequently post-Realignment. This behavior appears to be motivated by
two factors. First, according to public defenders, they are cognizant of the resource
constraints within the county jails—Sacramento County’s jails are operating at 100.27%
of rated capacity. A Sacramento County Public Defender speculated that, “Intuitively
[prosecutors] recognize…[if the client is] still here in the county jail …he’s consuming
our resources,…we’re housing and feeding him and are taking some of the sentence
back.” By offering defendants probation, the county does not absorb the costs of housing
and feeding those defendants in county jail.
Second, prosecutors might be opting for probation to ensure continued supervision after
an offender is released from custody. Under Realignment, a client who serves a straight
jail sentence for an 1170(h) felony is released without supervision. Prosecutors are
inclined to keep some form of a tail on a client because then “you’ve got search and
seizure [and] you’ve got more of a leash on the guy to be able to control him in the
future.” A sentence that includes a period of probation accomplishes this goal.

Public defenders believe that, on balance, Realignment has benefited defendants, but
disagree over whether defendants have gained a plea bargaining advantage.

This section explores whether, after Realignment, public defenders have gained an
advantage in plea bargaining situations. The results are unclear. Most public defenders
felt that Realignment had benefited their clients; no public defenders reported a
decrease in plea bargaining power after Realignment. But many interviewees hesitated to
declare that a decisive bargaining advantage had been achieved. At the outset, we
predicted that four factors might improve the public defender’s bargaining position after
Realignment: the legislation’s criminal justice paradigm shift; the creation of so-called
“county jail felonies”; the introduction of new alternatives to incarceration, as well as
enhanced conduct credits; and jail overcrowding. Our findings for each of these factors
are considered below in turn.

Criminal Justice Paradigm Shift
Realignment is more than a collection of amendments to California’s Penal Code. It is a
paradigm shift; a new approach—some might say philosophy—of criminal justice. The

118

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Determinate Sentencing Law of 1976 explicitly declared “the purpose of incarceration to
be punishment.”8 Realignment swings the pendulum in the opposite direction,
encouraging rehabilitation through local community control and the use of evidencebased practices. One public defender described the enormity of this change as such:
“You’re coming from a twenty year swing of some of the most draconian, punitive
mentalities that the country has ever seen, let alone the State of California.”9
Public defenders have leveraged this new paradigm to the benefit of their clients in plea
bargaining situations. A Sacramento County Public Defender explained:
[T]here is a certain sentiment now to basically look at people differently. To a
certain extent it allows for the humanization of these people [their clients] and
the recognition that basically maybe there are smarter and more intelligent ways
to deal with them other than to lock them up…. [T]his is where the governor is
going, this is what the federal courts have said, this is what has happened in the
law. It’s here. It’s here to stay.
By appealing to this sentiment during plea bargaining, public defenders have been able
to advocate for incorporating or even substituting rehabilitative services for a county jail
sentence.

The Creation of County Jail Felonies
The foundation of Realignment is the creation of a set of felony offenses served in county
jail rather than state prison. These so-called “county jail felonies” were brought into
being by amendment to §1170(h) of the California Penal Code, which provides, “a felony
punishable pursuant to this subdivision shall be punishable by imprisonment in a county
jail for the term described in the underlying offense.”
Realignment removes the possibility of state prison for nearly 500 felonies. This change
has strengthened the position of public defenders in bargaining situations. As one public
defender explained in a report published before Realignment took effect, “plenty of
clients…have never been to prison and they don’t want to go, so they’ll take an offer no
matter how crappy it may be just to keep themselves out of prison.”10 Before
8

Dansky, Kara. “Understanding California Sentencing.” University of San Francisco Law Review 43, no. 1
(2008): 67..
9
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public Defender (November
9, 2012).
10
Freedman, Malaina and Craig Menchin. “Realignment's Impact on the Public Defender and District
Attorney: A Tale of 5 Counties.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2012): 47.
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Freedman_Menchin.pdf.

119

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment, prosecutors could frequently obtain guilty pleas by agreeing to forego state
prison sanctions; after Realignment, prosecutors no longer have this bargaining chip.
Santa Clara County expressed a strong belief that county jail felonies have improved the
public defender’s bargaining position:
I would say anytime you expand sentencing options that don’t send the person to
state prison…your bargaining power increases on the defense side….[A]ll of my
career, a big part of the fight has been, is this going to be local or is he going to
state prison? With the AB 109 …this person is going to stay here. And that’s a big
deal for a lot people. So it allows us to get more of what our clients are interested
in. And I think that’s an advantage for the defense.11
The attorney then elaborated, “Prior to Realignment, if your client committed a certain
crime and you wanted, for example, to keep your client local…and you didn’t want a
prison sentence, and you know the prosecutor wants additional time, sometimes we
waived [pretrial conduct] credits.”12 Sacramento County expressed a similar sentiment.
In Sacramento County, bargaining dynamics have changed “simply because [defendants]
are not eligible to go to state prison.”
Public defenders in two counties, Fresno and Santa Barbara Counties, reported that
prosecutors have responded to this shift in plea bargaining by inflating charges. An
attorney in the Fresno County Public Defender’s Office told us that “[a] lot of times the
DA will…trump you by adding additional charges.” Another attorney we spoke with
explained, “[T]hey don’t want to offer anything because [the defendants] are going to
get out anyways [because of early release]…there’s a lot more fighting …charges that
they can’t necessarily prove.” Similarly, an attorney we spoke with in Santa Barbara
County explained that it “balances out.” That is, “[F]or every chip that you think you
have, you can have a DA looking for strikes.”

New Alternatives to Incarceration and Enhanced
Conduct Credits
Public defenders tell us that Realignment also “added extra tools to [a public defender’s]
toolbox” during the plea bargaining process. Clients have additional entitlements under
Realignment that they can now bargain away to receive more favorable terms. These
entitlements come in one of two forms. First, the legislation created new alternatives to
incarceration. As one Santa Clara County Public Defender put it, “We used to have two
11

Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public Defender
(November 9, 2012).
12
Ibid.

120

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
levels of supervision or accounting: probation and parole. Now we have five. We have
regular probation, mandatory supervision on split sentences, we have PRCS, we have
parole, and we have this other thing called CASU [Community Alternative Supervision
Unit].” Consequently, public defenders have more options when proposing or
countering a proposal during plea bargaining with a district attorney.
Realignment also added smaller, more piecemeal entitlements. As one public defender
explained, “Under Realignment, our clients might have a right to certain benefits or
enhanced credits for Realignment, or access to certain types of programs or the big thing
is that our clients might have access to supervised early release. When you’re bargaining
for settlement, those are things that your client can give up and waive for a specific offer.”
Overall, it seems that Realignment took away the district attorneys’ hammer—the threat
of seeking a prison term—and gave the public defenders and clients several wrenches,
screwdrivers, and other smaller tools that, collectively, carry significant weight.
One particularly important bargaining chip is “conduct credits.” Realignment increased
the number of conduct credits that may be earned from six days for every four days
served to four days for every two days served. The increase applies to all 1170(h)
offenses, as well as to revocations of parole and Post-Release Community Supervision.
Conduct credits may be earned for any time served in jail, including pretrial detention.13
Enhanced conduct credits advantage public defenders in plea negotiations for two
reasons. First, enhanced conduct credits make the defendant’s threat of going to trial
more credible. As the projected amount of time served decreases, so too does the risk of
losing at trial. Second, because defendants receive conduct credits for pretrial detention,
these credits may serve as a bargaining chip in plea negotiations. For example,
defendants might agree to waive these credits in exchange for certain charges being
dropped. Enhanced credits increase the size of this bargaining chip, and thus strengthen
the public defender’s bargaining position.

Jail overcrowding
At the outset, we predicted that jail overcrowding would advantage public defenders in
bargaining situations. Interestingly, jail overcrowding was almost universally dismissed as
a bargaining advantage. This result was surprising, particularly since a recent Vera
Institute study found that resource constraints can lead prosecutors “to dispose of cases

13

Storton, Kathryn B. and Lisa R. Rodriguez, California District Attorneys Association. “Prosecutors’
Analysis of the 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment.”(2011).
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/cdaarealignguide.pdf. at 22.

121

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
in ways they would not otherwise have if adequate resources were available.”14 The
discrepancy might be explained by the type of resource constraint at issue. In the Vera
Institute study, the resource constraints at issue directly impeded the prosecutor’s ability
to bring cases: lack of courtroom access and insufficient personnel. Jail overcrowding, on
the other hand, in no way bars prosecution of a case. Consequently, it’s possible that
prosecutors are bringing cases without regard for management of the jail population.

Realignment has shortened the presentencing process and brought risk assessment tools into
question.

In addition to altering plea bargaining dynamics, Realignment has shortened the length
of time between disposition and sentencing. Whether because of increased caseloads, or
the greater number of options available for plea bargaining, public defenders observe
that the presentencing process is moving more quickly. So long as offenders aren’t
simply cycling through the system at a greater rate, this development can be seen as an
improvement. However, by some public defenders’ estimation, rapid cycling is precisely
what is occurring.
Another effect on the presentencing process is that Realignment has brought risk
assessment tools into question. Many public defenders are dissatisfied with the risk
assessment tools used by pretrial services and probation, which “look[] like an instrument
that a probation officer without any mental health training could [use to] practically
identify someone as a psychopath.”15 In Fresno County, for example, the public
defenders are partnering with a local university to investigate the efficacy of the Status
Risk Offender Needs Guide (STRONG). They question the utility of STRONG given that
it is not a clinical assessment, which “dives deeper into what really needs to be done to
address the risk needs of this population.”

Although public defenders have not observed increased violence in jails, they report other
significant problems, which will be exacerbated by overcrowding.

Conditions in the county jails may be the dark side of Realignment. Almost universally,
public defenders reported that their clients receiving long-term sentences preferred
prison to jail. This preference is most likely due to the inadequate recreation, health
14

Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision
Making. Vera Institute of Justice (2012) at 88.
15
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Solano County Public Defender (October 26, 2012).

122

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
care, and mental health care facilities in most jails. Public defenders expect that
conditions will further deteriorate as more jails become overcrowded.
The one positive condition reported by public defenders is that violence in the jails has
not increased. In Solano County, the sheriff reports increased violence, but offenders
have not. The public defender speculated that this discrepancy suggests that violence has
increased against corrections officers rather than the general jail population.
Putting aside violence in the jails, public defenders paint a bleak picture of the
conditions under which the clients are serving their sentences. Jails do not have exercise
yards, and thus lack the recreational opportunities of prisons. Furthermore, public
defenders are “see[ing] some pretty egregious issues with healthcare.” While the Plata
litigation was intended to improve healthcare conditions for state prisoners, Realignment
has left counties ill-equipped to deal with the health concerns of a new inmate
population. Inmates have experienced significant delays between a request for services
and when those services are actually rendered. Moreover, inmates with chronic
conditions have experienced unwillingness or inability to provide needed medication. A
Solano County Public Defender described a particularly troubling situation:
[T]he family came to our front desk very upset. [The] family said he [the client]
had lost 45 pounds in the past month. So my lawyer went to see him and was
absolutely shocked at his condition. [H]e said he had a toothache and they gave
him some antibiotics which apparently made him sick. He started vomiting and
pooping blood. And he told them that and they said well, keep taking the
antibiotics. And it came to the point where he couldn’t eat anything but crushed
pineapple. And he lost 45 pounds…. They never took him to the hospital.16
In order to get the client medical attention, the public defender was forced to submit an
emergency request to the court. And it is not only severe medical conditions that are
going untreated; public defenders have seen simple requests for eyeglasses go unfulfilled
for up to three months.
Offenders with mental illnesses are faring no better. Public defenders unanimously
agreed that mental health is a significant problem, not only in terms of inadequate
mental health services in jails, but also the county’s overall administration of mental
health services in the community. Whether in jail or under community supervision,
mentally ill offenders are not receiving needed medications and treatment. Many public
defenders believe the current situation echoes the deinstitutionalization of mental health
facilities in the 1980’s. As one Solano County Public Defender explained, “[T]he big
problem that we have in the state now is that the jails have become the new psych
16

Ibid.

123

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
facilities.” A Riverside County Public Defender described the problems he encounters
with his clients with mental illnesses as follows:
I think the problem with Realignment is that I think now there are so many clients
who have no places to go. The suicide rate is very high because we’ve had issues
where they get released and they don’t have their meds; they get released and they
say ‘Oh, you’re on probation.’ They are homeless. There is no place for them to
go. They get released and there is maybe one treatment center. ‘Well, take a bus.’
They don’t have a car. They don’t have any money for a bus.17
In other words, offenders with mental illnesses are left to fend for themselves. Once
released, they do not have access to their medication or basic services that would keep
them stable. Often this leads to a cycle whereby offenders are placed in the jails,
provided services, stabilized, released, and reoffend again.
Finally, Realignment significantly increased the size of many county jail populations—by
over 200%, in some counties—and has resulted in jail overcrowding. Public defenders
expect overcrowding to exacerbate problems already observed with jail conditions.
Indeed, some interviewees predicted another wave of litigation around jail overcrowding
and inadequate provision of healthcare.

17

Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Riverside County Law Offices of the Public Defender
(January 18, 2013).

124

Chapter 7: District Attorneys1
District attorneys have long had great power and discretion in determining criminal
justice outcomes, and have emerged in recent decades as the preeminent actor in the
system.2 Because they enjoy broad discretion, touching nearly every stage of the
adjudication and corrections process, California district attorneys have the potential to
make or break Realignment (AB 109) as a solution to prison crowding and high rates of
recidivism. Unlike probation departments and sheriff-run county jails, prosecutors
already interacted with the full gambit of felony offenders. While caseloads have not
changed as dramatically for prosecutors, their options and the incentives guiding their
choices have. District attorneys in California are the primary gatekeepers of the
corrections system, determining through office policies, charging decisions, and
sentencing recommendations which offenders enter the criminal justice system and how
they are treated within it. Prosecutors are also held politically accountable for public
safety, perhaps making them natural opponents to sentencing alternatives that may lessen
incapacitation or deterrence of offenders. Even with prison off the table as a sanction for
many felonies, prosecutorial discretion remains a powerful policy-influencing force. The
large-scale success or failure of Realignment will depend on the degree to which district
attorneys embrace or resist incarceration alternatives. If prosecutors insist on pursuing
incarceration as the primary response to crime, counties will likely fall victim to the same
overcrowding that has overwhelmed the state prison system. Indeed, many counties
already face jail crowding and, in some cases, are subject to federal orders limiting their
jail capacity.

Factors Affecting Prosecutor Decision-Making
A recent study by the Vera Institute of Justice explores some of the factors influencing
prosecutorial discretion and their implications for shaping adjudication outcomes. They
found that at all stages of the adjudication process prosecutorial discretion is influenced
by external factors.3 Office-wide and unit-specific policies often govern decision-making,
calling for prosecutors to “decline certain cases at screening, charge cases in a particular
way, and offer specific criteria in plea offers.”4 Availability of resources, both internal and
1

This chapter was drafted by Corrine Keel, drawing on materials from reports she wrote with Marisa
Landin and Lindsey Warp.
2
Misner, Robert L. “Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86,
no. 3 (1996): 717-777, 718.
3
Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision
Making.” Vera Institute of Justice (2012) at 71.
4
Ibid. at 80.

125

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
external, can also influence the path a prosecutor chooses to take on a particular case.
There simply are not enough hours in the day, courtrooms in the jurisdiction, or dollars
in state coffers available to give each case the same treatment. Established relationships
with other key parties in the criminal justice system (judges, public defenders, etc.)
impact prosecutors’ decisions based on their assessments of these parties’ norms,
expectations, and past behavior.

Charging Decisions
“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”5 The decision
whether to charge a crime is the broadest discretionary power prosecutors have.6
Prosecutors consider many factors in deciding whether to file charges in a given case.
According to the Vera Institute, prosecutors ask two primary questions: Can I prove the
case? and Should I prove the case?7 This first question goes to issues of proof and
sufficiency of evidence, while the latter frequently turns on factors such as offense severity
and criminal history.8
Not only does the prosecutor choose whether to prosecute a crime, but he also chooses
how to prosecute, i.e. how many charges to file, what kind of charges to file, and whether
to pursue sentencing enhancements. The California Penal Code criminalizes a broad
range of acts with many overlapping provisions. In his 1995 article, “Recasting
Prosecutorial Discretion,” Robert Misner points to the breadth of crime definition as a
major source of prosecutorial power. He writes that, “[b]y choosing to create a large
number of crimes, and by defining those crimes with the breadth proposed by the Model
Penal Code, legislatures make it impossible to enforce all criminal statutes, and, at the
same time, make it possible for a single act to be charged under many overlapping
provisions.”9 Thus, the DA has discretion to choose not only what crimes, but also how
many crimes, to charge. Prosecutors differ in how they approach the decision of how
many charges to file. Some only file charges they believe the defendant should plead
5

Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).

6

Vorenberg, James. “Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials.” Duke Law Journal 4 (1976):
651-697.; see Moore, Shelby A. Dickerson. “Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging
Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion-Knowing There Will Be Consequences for Crossing
the Line.” Louisiana Law Review 60 (2000): 371-404, 379, exploring arguments for and against such
unbridled discretion.
7
Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision
Making.” Vera Institute of Justice (2012) at 59.
8
Ibid. at 177.
9
Misner, Robert L. “Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 86,
no. 3 (1996): 717-777, 745.

126

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
guilty to, others only file charges they believe the defendant would be plead guilty to, and
a third group files all the charges available regardless of expected pleas.10 Whether a
prosecutor prefers to “negotiate up” or “negotiate down” in plea negotiations also
impacts the number of charges filed at the outset.11
Prosecutors also have broad discretion in determining the charging status of “wobblers”
in a particular case. Wobblers are crimes that can be classified as either felonies or
misdemeanors under the law. California Penal Code §17(b) provides prosecutors with
the discretion to reduce wobblers (which by default are classified as felonies) from
felonies to misdemeanors.12 In making the decision between charging a felony or a
misdemeanor, prosecutors consider factors such as severity of crime, eligibility for
probation, and prior record.13 In addition to these factors, a study conducted at Stanford
University found a correlation between charging practices and “liberalism” in a county,
finding that California counties with a larger percent of the population who voted for
Obama in 2008 have prosecutors that tend to charge such discretionary cases as
misdemeanors.14 Interviewees in the study also cited resource constraints as an important
factor to consider, but the quantitative analysis did not reveal a direct or linear link
between resource availability and wobbler charging decisions.
Finally, California prosecutors have opportunity to utilize their discretion by alleging the
applicable sentence enhancements, such as strike offenses in the “Three Strikes” context,
which will impact sentencing in the event of conviction. Prosecutors can also lessen
charges to avoid imposition of the mandatory sentencing enhancement when they see fit.
They also have “wide latitude to dismiss or ‘strike’ a prior offense in the interest of
justice.”15 In fact, Walsh finds that 92% of District Attorney Offices in California16 have

10

Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision
Making.” Vera Institute of Justice (2012) at 177.
11
Ibid. at 178.
12
California Penal Code §17(b) (2011).
13
Berwick, Megan, Rachel Lindenberg, and Julia Van Roo. “Wobblers & Criminal Justice in California: A
Study into Prosecutorial Discretion.” Public Policy Practicum, Stanford University (2010): xi.
http://ips.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/shared/DA%20Discretion%20Final%20Report.pdf.
14
Ibid.
15
Freedman, Malaina and Craig Menchin. “Realignment's Impact on the Public Defender and District
Attorney: A Tale of 5 Counties.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2012): 47.
http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Freedman_Menchin.pdf.
16
Walsh, Jennifer Edwards. “In Furtherance of Justice: The Effect of Discretion on the Implementation of
California's Three Strikes Law.” Claremont Graduate University (unpublished manuscript, 1999). The
study included a survey of District Attorney Offices in 25 of the 58 California counties (accounting for over
75% of the state's total share of three-strike convictions).

127

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
used their discretion to drop a strike in a three-strike case, citing the trivial nature of the
offense and/or remoteness of the criminal history as factors relevant to the decision.17

Bail
Though the bail decision ultimately falls to the judge, prosecutors may recommend bail
amounts or the denial of bail altogether. This recommendation has significant sway over
the final determination of whether a defendant will be released on bail or kept in jail
before the trial. In addition to this direct influence, a prosecutor can impact the ultimate
bail determination through his initial charging decision if the charge itself suggests that
the offender might present a risk to the safety of the community.18 In California, many
counties set local bail schedules that dictate the amount of bail and limit the ability of the
prosecutor to suggest departure.

Plea Bargaining
The criminal justice system is dependent on the use of plea bargaining as a tool to
manage caseloads due to the high incidence of reported crime and limited time and
prosecutorial resources. Over 90% of criminal convictions come from negotiated pleas.19
In managing their caseload, prosecutors have full discretion over whether to charge a
case, dismiss it, or offer a plea.20 While many view plea agreements as collaborative
negotiations between two adverse parties, usually only the prosecutor may initiate this
process, and he may end it at any time.21 As discussed above, a prosecutor’s discretion
over the plea process is closely tied to his discretion over the initial charging decision.
While it is considered unethical to charge someone with a offense for which there is
absolutely no factual basis in hopes of encouraging a plea,22 few other rules of
professional conduct constraint the prosecutor’s ability to “exacerbate the defendant's
fear of the trial penalty by utilizing an ‘overcharging’ strategy.”23 Further, nothing
prevents a prosecutor from charging offenses that would be difficult to prove in trial, but
17

Ibid.
See U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
19
“The Basics of a Plea Bargain.” Nolo Law for All. http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/the-basicsplea-bargain.html.
20
Vorenberg, James. “Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials.” Duke Law Journal 4 (1976):
651-697, 670.
21
Note, however, that a judge can still decide not to accept a plea deal.
22
“Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) Rule 3.8(a).” American Bar Association. The
Model Rules provide that “[t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall…refrain from prosecuting a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.”
23
Meares, Tracey L. “Reward for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives.” Fordham Law Review 64 (1995-1996): 868.
18

128

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
still might result in a guilty plea.24 The plea bargaining process is also tied to discretion
regarding sentence recommendations. While sentencing is technically within the
province of the judiciary, prosecutors often draft plea agreements to include sentence
recommendations that judges tend to follow.25 While prosecutors have great power over
the plea bargaining process, the Vera Institute found that there is disagreement over the
factors that prosecutors should consider in preparing their strategy. Some interviewees
in the study thought that plea-bargaining should focus on the expected sentence, while
others thought it should focus on the most serious charge, and still others on the total
number of charges. There was also disagreement amongst prosecutors over whether plea
offers should include sentencing recommendations or be left to the judge.

Sentencing
Due to changes California’s sentencing scheme in the 1970’s, prosecutors also have great
influence and discretion over sentencing even when there is no plea agreement. In 1976,
California passed its Determinate Sentencing Law, one goal and result of which was to
limit judicial discretion over sentencing decisions and increase uniformity in sentencing
across the state.26 This change, along with mandatory minimum sentencing, had the
consequence of shifting significant discretion over sentencing to the prosecutor. Even
though judges retain the final authority to impose a sentence, a prosecutor can greatly
influence (if not absolutely determine) an offender’s final sentence through his initial
charging decision, as the “charging decision determines the range of sentences available
to the court.”27 For example, a prosecutor can choose to prosecute a robbery that
involved a weapon as a “robbery” or an “armed robbery.” If charged as an “armed
robbery,” the judge is essentially forced to sentence the defendant according to the
legislative-mandated minimum sentence requirements for an armed crime.28 Thus, while
they are not authorized to impose sentences directly, prosecutors in California have
tremendous influence over the final sentence imposed under California’s current
sentencing laws.

24

Ibid.
Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision
Making.” Vera Institute of Justice (2012).
26
Edelman, Peter B. “Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives.” The Justice System Journal 9, no.
2 (1984): 134-150.
27
“Race and Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Leadership Conference.
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/prosecutorial.html.
28
Misner, Robert L. “Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
86, no. 3 (1996): 717-777. at 748.
25

129

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Internalization of Costs
The Vera Institute study found that the lack of resources is a major challenge for
prosecutors. Resource constraints impact everything from staffing levels and technology
platforms, to investigative resources and courtroom availably, and impact decisions to
charge, dismiss, and settle cases. Prior to Realignment, California district attorneys
enjoyed broad discretion to charge felonies and recommend lengthy prison terms with
limited fiscal consequences, because prisons were paid for with state funds. With the cost
of incarceration externalized, prosecutors did not need to “directly consider the
availability of prison space or prison resources when making charging, bargaining, or
sentencing decisions.”29 As a result, prosecutors were incentivized to prosecute to the
fullest, and had little pressure to create guidelines, alternatives to incarceration, or crime
prevention programs.30 Elected district attorneys could run on a “tough on crime”
platform without having to explain how their policies would impact the county budget or
resources, because the correctional costs from local prosecutions were largely passed on
to the state. Under Realignment, only certain felonies and offenders with particular
priors are eligible for a state prison terms, so prosecutors face a new reality where the cost
of incarcerating many more offenders is internalized by his county.
A 2012 study in Israel examined the consequences of shifting the responsibility of one
actor’s actions to another actor (i.e. externalizing the consequences).31 The study
examined an organizational reform that shifted the responsibility of housing arrestees in
Israel from the police to a separate prison authority, finding that the cost-externalizing
shift led to an 11% increase in the number of police arrests. This study illustrates the
concept that externalization of consequences can result in broader, unbridled use of
power and discretion. Long before Realignment, Robert Misner, concerned with the
criminal justice system’s “failure to force [prosecutors] to face the full cost of
prosecutorial decisions” (i.e. the externalization of costs), proposed a method by which
the consequences of prosecutorial decision-making could be internalized. He envisioned
a system where available state prison resources would be allocated to each prosecutor for
use during the next year.32 The prosecutor would then be responsible for crafting law
enforcement policy that could be supported by the resources given. If the prosecutor
used fewer resources, the savings would go to the county; if he used more resources than
allocated, the county must provide its own funds to make up the difference. While
different from Realignment in design, Misner’s vision contemplates a similar regime that
29

Ibid. at 720.
Ibid.
31
Ater, Itai, Yehonatan Givati, and Oren Rigbi. “Organizational Structure, Police Activity and Crime.”
(2012).
32
Misner, Robert L. “Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
86, no. 3 (1996): 717-777, 719.
30

130

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
forces counties to internalize the consequences of prosecutors’ decisions. Realignment
implements the kind of cost internalization Misner suggests, but does so on the front end
of the budgeting process instead of applying retroactive accounting.

Findings
District attorneys express cautious optimism for Realignment’s success, but remain
concerned about diminished public safety.

Nearly everyone we interviewed characterized his or her attitude toward Realignment as
one of “cautious optimism.” While most of our interviewees applauded the spirit of
Realignment, including the expansion of local control and treatment options for
offenders, all of our subjects worry about a possible rise in crime and decline in public
safety. Our interviewees worry about the impotence of prosecutors under the new regime
compared to the pre-Realignment status quo. District attorneys are left with a “shrinking
hammer” due to lesser sanctions (i.e. no threat of prison for many felony offenses),
“double time” conduct credits for jail inmates, and the lack of mandatory post-release
supervision for realigned offenders serving straight sentences. Realigned felons serve less
time behind bars and may be released from county lockup without supervision, whereas
prior to Realignment with prison available for all felony offenses, inmates served the
majority of their sentences, and prisoners served a mandatory three-year term of parole.33
Without the threat of prison and parole, prosecutors enjoy a less powerful bargaining
position, which they fear may translate into a lesser deterrent effect against realigned
drug and property crimes.
Some resistance to Realignment may be evidenced by reports that, despite increases in
jail populations, district attorney offices are continuing to recommend the same length of
sentence as they did pre-Realignment. Many offices, especially those in counties with
overcrowded jails, such as Sacramento and Santa Barbara Counties, have expressed
frustration with early releases. Since the implementation of Realignment, the sheriff in
Santa Barbara County is releasing misdemeanants earlier. Santa Barbara County’s
District Attorney, Joyce Dudley, expressed deep concern about public safety and the
negative effect on deterrence. She recognizes that her office’s job is the prosecute cases
and the sheriff’s job is to decide who to let out once the jail becomes crowded.
Anecdotally, she believes that there has been an increase in thefts as a result, but is not
33

Silbert, Rebecca Sullivan. “Thinking Critically about Realignment in California.” The Chief Justice Earl

Warren Institute of Law & Social Policy (2012): 2.

131

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
sure the magnitude of the increase. She is particularly worried about the potential rise in
home invasion robberies given that drug users released early seek money to feed their
habits. Many of our interviewees predict and (anecdotally) observe a rise in crime under
Realignment.
Regardless of whether they face jail crowding that leads to early inmate release, our
interviewees observe that the “revolving door” of the state prison system is replicated with
realigned felons at the local level—only with shorter exposures to incarceration. As a
result, they note that the “churning” or “cycling” of offenders through the system has
sped up. Deputy District Attorney Jennifer Contini, who, due to budget shortfalls, files
some charges for the section she leads in Orange County told us, “I can’t provide
numbers, but I can tell you anecdotally, every week I file at least a couple cases where I
just filed on this guy within the last three weeks.” Without the option of sending
supervision violators to prison, or even to jail for very long, some hope programming can
be used as a tool to slow the cycling process. But several interviewees pointed out
lingering uncertainties about the effects of Realignment. “Come back and see me in a
few years,” was a common refrain. Despite their concerns and lingering uncertainty, our
interviewees all expressed a willingness to work within the framework of Realignment
faithfully. Though some are jaded about the prospects of treatment improving outcomes
on a large scale, they also expressed hopefulness that at least some offenders would be
helped by rehabilitative sentencing options.

Prosecutors blame legislative defects for some implementation problems.

Many prosecutors are frustrated by perceived defects or “holes” in Realignment
legislation, which have created barriers to effective implementation. Contentiousness
around the substance of the law is exacerbated by the speed of enactment and
implementation without meaningful consultation of district attorneys. Another point of
resentment is perceived dishonesty about the purpose of Realignment. Though
legislators expressly state that Realignment “is not intended to relieve state prison
crowding,” our interviewees found this explanation disingenuous given the timing of the
legislation relative to the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown v. Plata.

Post-Release Supervision
The lack of routine post-release supervision was a central concern for many of the
prosecutors interviewed. Los Angeles County Deputy DA Kraig St. Pierre, for one, called
for corrective legislation. He disapproves of shortening the period of incarceration to

132

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
gain a period of supervision over offenders, which prosecutors must do (by utilizing split
sentences) to impose a “tail” under Realignment. A deputy district attorney from
Sacramento County echoed this frustration, citing the provision as a way for the
legislature to force split sentencing on the counties. In addition to lengthening the
overall period of correctional control, post-release supervision serves other practical
purposes, such as service delivery and restitution collection. These are discussed in more
detail below in terms of the utility of split sentences.

Long-Term Jail Sentences
Many of our interviewees called for reform in dealing with realigned felons serving
lengthy sentences in county jail. Jails are designed for exposures of incarceration up to
one year and most lack the appropriate amenities, including medical and recreational
facilities, to accommodate long-term incarceration. Realigned felonies carry longer
sentences than misdemeanors and are subject to enhancements that may add up to
sentences of a decade or more. In Los Angeles County one inmate has been sentenced
to 42 years in county jail. District Attorney Paul Zellerbach of Riverside County
collaborated with State Senator Bill Emerson on legislation proposed during the 20112012 legislative session to cap jail commitments at three years, with longer sentences to
be served in prison, regardless of the nature of the crime.34 The bill died in the Senate
Public Safety Committee, but Zellerbach is determined to reintroduce the legislation.
Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith of Alameda County also advocates legislation
to limit jail sentences, but suggests doing so by diverting drug offenders subject to weight
clause enhancements to prison, citing this group as a major source of excessive jail terms.
The longest jail sentence imposed in Riverside County to date is 12 years and two
months. Alameda County is operating under an informal, self-imposed limit of four-year
jail terms, though the total period of correctional may be longer with the imposition of a
split sentence that includes mandatory supervision.

District attorneys embrace increased collaboration with other system actors under
Realignment.

Our interviewees praised the legislative mandate for the Community Corrections
Partnership (CCP) and its impact on county decision-making nearly universally. Across
counties, interviewees reported that, because of the CCP planning process,
communication and collaboration between the agencies represented have increased and
34

California State Senate. SB 1441. (2012).

133

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
improved. Most reported that relationships were already collegial and productive, but
now the various actors are even more collaborative. Santa Barbara County’s District
Attorney, Joyce Dudley, said of her existing relationships with other department heads,
“[w]e are all friends; we all grew up together, essentially, in the criminal justice system.”
According to District Attorney Dudley, the group usually agrees on the best course of
action for the county, but when they do disagree, they’re “comfortable to do that.”
Dudley concluded, “I see more of them in meetings, but, aside from that, it hasn’t
changed the dynamic.”
Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith of Alameda County and others pointed out
that, aside from more collaboration in general, the CCP structure is different because it
gets management involved in regular conversations about criminal justice strategies, not
just the “line-level” attorneys and officers who interact regularly. Meredith sits in on the
CCP Executive Sessions in her county along with the District Attorney, Nancy O’Malley.
She remarked,
I think it’s been interesting to see the executives all kind of working together to
make a plan. Normally, the executives set the policy and the mid-level managers
create the plan….That’s an interesting dynamic and I think it has created both
increased collaboration and [conversation] about particular issues where they
might not have been doing so much of the minutia detail. And I think that’s a
good collaboration. I also think there are some tensions that develop over monies
…and control over the whole process….I see both. I see increased collaboration,
but I also see some tension.
While everyone valued increased communication and collaboration as an asset in
Realignment implementation, Riverside County Assistant District Attorney Creg Datig
made a finer point. He emphasized cooperation, not just as a positive development, but
as an essential component of his county’s success under Realignment. Riverside County
is under a federally mandated jail cap, a stricture that has complicated implementation,
as the sheriff is forced to release inmates from the jail on a nearly daily basis. Datig said:
[Riverside County] has really made an effort to work collaboratively on
Realignment implementation, if for no other reason than, if we didn’t work
collaboratively, the system would, to a certain extent, crash and burn…. So it’s
almost like whether we like it or not—we do say that we like it, I mean, I think that
it’s been a positive thing—but whether we like it or not we would have crashed
and burned if we didn’t work together.
Communication and collaboration have expanded even beyond the scope of the CCP
Executive Committee, in the form of cross-department committees, working groups, and

134

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
regular inter-departmental meetings. For example, Riverside County’s CCP has
established a number of working groups on various aspects of Realignment, including
budgeting and Post-Release Community Supervision (PRCS) revocation hearings, that
“provide a collaborative atmosphere to work out the nuts and bolts of implementation.”
Santa Clara County’s CCP has also set up cross-department working groups. Assistant
District Attorney David Howe serves on Santa Clara County’s Court Process Group, which
develops and revises county procedures related to Realignment; other groups focus on
emerging topics under Realignment, like data management. Los Angeles County Deputy
District Attorney Kraig St. Pierre serves on his county’s Legal Work Group, which is
responsible for making many day-to-day Realignment implementation decisions. Kern
County has not created working groups, but convened an interdepartmental committee
to allocate Realignment grant funds to local treatment programs. David Howe observed
that, between the various Realignment groups and the discussion of the policy’s impacts
in other contexts, “there’s almost a constant dialogue going” about Realignment.
Prosecutors also reach across county lines to seek and share information with
counterparts to varying degrees. One important course of cross-county collaboration was
the “Prosecutor’s Analysis of the 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment,” an early report
sponsored by California District Attorneys Association that attempts to demystify AB 109
and subsequent amendments to Realignment from a prosecutor’s perspective. The
document is available in electronic form and is updated periodically to reflect legislative
changes. The efforts of the authors, Kathryn Storton and Lisa Rodriguez, prosecutors in
Santa Clara and San Diego Counties respectively, were cited and applauded in almost
every interview. Others have reached out informally to friends in other offices to discuss
issues around Realignment. At the time of our interview with Sacramento County’s
Realignment-focused prosecutor, he was planning visits to Santa Clara and San Diego
Counties to observe their reentry courts in preparation for establishing a reentry court in
Sacramento County. Conferences on Realignment have provided another venue for
cross-county dialogue. However, none of the counties we interviewed had any regular or
systematic method for utilizing information from other counties. Neither does the State
facilitate such information sharing since one of the compromises in Realignment
legislation is the lack of mandated assessment of the counties. This highlights the need
for outside researchers to step in and capture data that might otherwise be missed so that
future policy planning can be informed by outcome measurement.
While collaboration between departments has increased dramatically during the early
planning and implementation process, it’s uncertain whether it will continue to the same
extent as counties move beyond a state of triage and settle into new practices. Still, the
ability to collaborate locally may enhance agility in the system, allowing for course

135

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
correction under changing conditions and making local policy-making an attractive
solution to systemic problems.

The internalization of costs may affect prosecutorial discretion in marginal cases.

As expected, our interviewees reported increased awareness of, and sensitivity to, county
resource constraints under Realignment. The biggest changes under Realignment are
local incarceration and supervision of would-be prison inmates and parolees. Thus, the
bulk of Realignment funds went to sheriff’s and probation departments. Prosecutors and
other adjudicatory actors, i.e. public defenders and judges, also expend additional
resources in staffing due to the expanded PRCS/mandatory supervision revocation
process and a moderate increase in filings. But, district attorney’s offices have
experienced only marginal operational cost increases under Realignment, compared with
sizeable expansion in the “correctional costs” of jails and the probation department.
However, public safety concerns contribute to an increased sensitivity amongst
prosecutors to county resource constraints on the whole. This is especially true in those
counties where jail crowding is already extant or pending.
In terms of managing correctional costs, the crucial “wobbling point” has shifted from
the cutoff between misdemeanors and felonies (which were automatically “prison
eligible” before Realignment, though not all felons served prison time) to the cutoff
between realigned crimes and the serious, violent, and sex crimes that are still prison
eligible. Though many of our interviewees reported no change to charging practices
post-Realignment, some counties have made changes to their practices at the margins.
Interestingly, the internalization of costs incentivizes both leniency (i.e. not charging
some crimes) and severity (i.e. “charging up” to a prison eligible offense) to avoid the
cost of housing and/or treating offenders. In some cases the underlying charges may not
be augmented to call for a prison term, instead prosecutors have incentive to discover
and allege facts that make the offender eligible to serve his sentence in prison.

Fewer Charges Filed for Low-Level Crimes
Since the enactment of Realignment, district attorney’s offices in some counties are filing
fewer charges for low-level crimes. In Sacramento County, a county under a courtordered jail cap, this practice is a response to resources constraints, whereas in Santa
Clara County this change is an initiative undertaken in the “spirit of Realignment.” Both
have the effect of freeing jail beds for more serious offenders. The Sacramento County
district attorney’s office declines to prosecute certain theft and low level drug possession

136

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
cases because Realignment has left the county without the resources to sanction these
offenders. For example, prosecutors no longer file charges pursuant to California Health
& Safety Code §11550 (under the influence of a controlled substance) and California
Health & Safety Code §11364 (possession of narcotics paraphernalia). Additionally the
Sacramento County office declines to file charges for drug possession cases in which the
alleged narcotic quantity is less than 0.2 grams, ten times more than the prior charging
threshold of .02 grams.35
In Santa Clara County, the district attorney’s office often refrains from charging certain
misdemeanor crimes such as petty theft, possession of stolen property, vandalism, and
trespass. Instead it channels these cases into its Pre-Filing Diversion Program. In the
“spirit of Realignment,” the office initiated this program in 2011 as an effort to divert
deserving offenders away from traditional prosecution. If an offender qualifies for this
program (essentially he must have a minimal criminal history), the office refers the case
to a private program vendor who contacts the offender. If he agrees to participate, he
pays a program fee and restitution, performs community service and attends
rehabilitative classes administered by this private vendor. If the offender successfully
completes the program, the office will not file criminal charges. The district attorney’s
office in Alameda County also files fewer charges for certain realigned property and drug
offenses, not because of prosecutorial discretion, but because Oakland Police
Department makes fewer arrests under its own resource constraints. Though that budget
shortage is not readily attributable to Realignment, background budget constraints may
impact local law enforcement in the facing more ex-offenders and supervisees in the
community.

“Charging Up” to Prison Eligible Offenses
Because of the local internalization of incarceration costs, we expected some prosecutors
to “charge around” Realignment when possible, i.e. elect to charge prison eligible
offenses whenever overlapping statutes provided the opportunity to do so. A deputy
district attorney from Sacramento County acknowledged his office charges around
Realignment whenever the option is available. He provided two examples in which his
office would charge around Realignment. If a suspect were arrested for possession of
methamphetamine and possession of a loaded gun, his office would charge the offender
under California Health & Safety Code §11370.1 (possession of a controlled substance
and a loaded optical firearm) instead of under California Penal Code §12022(a)
(commission of a felony while armed). If convicted of the former, the offender would
35

A Sacramento County Deputy DA noted that this increase to 0.2 grams is also in part attributable to
budget cuts before the enactment of Realignment.

137

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
serve his custody time in prison, whereas if found guilty of the latter, he would go to jail.
For realigned white-collar crimes, his office scours the defendant’s record and the facts of
the case for a second felony in order to impose a white-collar crime enhancement under
California Penal Code §186.11, which makes the case prison eligible under California
Penal Code §1170(h)(3). He cited several reasons for his office’s “charge around” policy,
including: local jail crowding, the desire to deflect the incarceration costs to the state,
disapproval of early jail releases (in jail, triple-non offenders can receive half time credits,
whereas in prison offenders likely will serve approximately a larger portion of their
sentences), and the lack of uniform periods of supervision under California Penal Code
§1170(h)(5) sentencing.
The prosecutors from Orange and Riverside Counties stated they do not intentionally
“charge around” Realignment, but do examine cases more closely, scrutinizing them for
factors like serious prior convictions or facts in the present case that might make it
eligible, for prison commitment case. In Riverside County, Chief Deputy Coffee noted
that his office inspects cases in greater detail to ensure that it files the appropriate
charges based on the evidence. In particular, prosecutors look for evidence making a
case prison eligible and if it finds this evidence, the office will not hesitate to adjust
charges as the case evolves through the system. District attorney’s offices now have an
additional step of informing the court and defense counsel if the case is not California
Penal Code §1170(h) eligible. When asked about this process, Solano County
prosecutors pointed out that such allegations were unnecessary prior to Realignment
when any felony offense could be prison eligible and that taking time to examine these
factors does not necessarily mean that they are “overcharging.”

Some Counties Report No Change in Charging
Practices
Interviewees from counties without jail crowding indicated that their charging practices
have not changed appreciably under Realignment. Their opinions differ as to whether
jail crowding might or should affect charging where it is an issue. When asked whether
the availability of jail beds allowed his office to maintain the status quo in charging
decisions, Assistant District Attorney David Howe from Santa Clara County rejected the
idea that crowding should ever impact charges. He noted, “grand theft doesn’t become
robbery just because we want to see a person in prison and thereafter on parole.” He
stressed that his office seeks to contribute to uniformity of charging practices across
counties and to avoid varying “standards of ethical and professional …discharging of
duties.” Solano County prosecutors echoed a similar attitude toward altering charging
practices post-Realignment. Solano County’s District Attorney, Donald duBain, said his

138

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
office has never charged a third strike just because it could and in a similar manner will
not alter charges beyond what it can prove. Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith
from Alameda County acknowledged that jail overcrowding might drive charging
decisions but, because her county does not have that problem, decisions in her office are
not so affected.
Kern, Orange, Riverside, and Santa Barbara Counties all face jail overcrowding; yet,
according to our interviewees, have not altered their charging practices as a result of
Realignment. As discussed above, interviewees from Orange and Riverside Counties
explained they are applying heightened scrutiny to realigned cases to discover
circumstances that make offenders prison eligible, and thus have modified their charging
procedures to some degree, but indicated they are not “charging around” Realignment.
Interestingly, despite jail overcrowding, District Attorney Dudley from Santa Barbara
indicated her office applies no extra layer of scrutiny. This deviation from Orange and
Riverside Counties could be explained by the difference in absolute jail population, with
Santa Barbara County being a significantly smaller county. Prosecutors from Orange,
Riverside, and Santa Barbara Counties indicated they favor split sentencing as a
mechanism to alleviate the influx of local offenders on the jails instead of altered
charging practices.

Longer Plea Offers
Realignment’s impact on plea offers varies by county and may be dictated by resource
local constraints. In Orange County, some prosecutors may make less lenient offers to
prison eligible offenders than they would have in the past. Deputy DA Contini said prior
to Realignment, her office would sometimes offer offenders who were on the cusp of
being sent to prison a “bullet” (a year in jail). Now, given the realities of overcrowding at
the jail, they are more reluctant to make that type of offer. Additionally, she is less likely
to strike a strike in a case or allow a strike-eligible offender to plead guilty to a non-strike
offense because that means the defendants will be released more quickly and back on the
office caseloads by way of PRCS and parole violations.

Background Budget Shortfalls
Some the current resource constraints reflect cuts made prior to Realignment,
diminishing county capacity to deal with realigned offenders and PRCS populations at
the outset of implementation. Realignment funds may be perpetually insufficient
because the existing resource gap is larger than the one created by AB 109. One
example of a preexisting budget deficiency is in the Mental Health Court in Sacramento

139

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
County, which could be an asset in managing realigned offenders, but was already
crippled by past budget cuts. Even in relatively affluent Santa Clara County, Assistant
District Attorney David Howe revealed that some planned projects and office functions
have taken a backseat to Realignment due to strained resources. District Attorney
Donald du Bain of Solano County says that Realignment funding for his office has been
sufficient to expand internal functions, allowing them to hire three new staff members, a
paralegal, a legal secretary, and an attorney, all dedicated to working realigned cases. On
the other hand, du Bain says of the overall funding situation in his county, “there’s not
nearly enough funding to accommodate all the needs we have for this population.” The
increased costs he cites include incarceration, supervision, treatment, medical needs,
and, lawsuits. Some counties already face law suits over poor jail conditions, a problem
that can only be expected to grow as more would-be prison inmates are diverted to serve
out sentences locally.

Prosecutors have lost some of their power in plea negotiations.

Power and preferences among prosecutors and defendants have shifted somewhat due to
Realignment. This has the potential to impact plea-bargaining, but because individual
actors have different goals, there is not one consistent identifiable trend in how this
change occurs. For example, Sacramento County prosecutors prefer a prison sentence
even if the sentence imposed is shorter. Prosecutors in Orange and Santa Clara Counties
prefer to resolve prison-eligible quickly to free county jail beds those defendants fill prior
to sentencing. In general, it appears that removing the threat of prison for many felony
offenses has weakened the district attorney’s bargaining position, but they still remain
quite powerful in negotiations.

Shifting Incentives
In some instances, changes in available sanctions under Realignment have the perverse
effect of making rehabilitative programs less appealing to defendants. In the adversarial
system, each side ostensibly tries to maximize benefit to their “client.” To a district
attorney that means more time in custody or under supervision, i.e. maximizing control,
while a public defender’s goals are naturally reversed. If a case is going to settle in a
guilty plea, the defense attorney has an obligation to negotiate for a lesser sanction for
the client when possible. Under Realignment, a defendant might prefer a straight
sentence over a split sentence or jail time over a rehabilitative program. Even if a split
sentence offers less time behind bars, attorney and client might see any post-release “tail”
as a negative outcome, threatening more time behind bars. Before Realignment, the
140

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
offer of probation or programming in lieu of a prison term was obviously less punitive.
Today double time credits, unsupervised release from straight jail terms, and crowding
that sometimes leads to early release combine to make the choices less clear. Under
these circumstances, a drug treatment program could be far more burdensome than a
short stay in jail.
Assistant District Attorney Karen Meredith of Alameda County points out that defendants
accused of “lesser” felonies were eager to serve their time locally or on probation to avoid
prison in the past. Now, with no threat of prison and the promise of double time credits
in jail, realigned felons may opt for straight time, even if it means they suffer a longer
term of incarceration. This way they avoid a tail and may spend less time under
correctional control. Deputy District Attorney Jennifer Contini of Orange County
pointed out the irony of this role reversal, saying “you can only [rehabilitate] if you have
some kind of [] program…but it’s hard to get our public defenders to do it, they are
against split sentencing, which is ironic.” She says she teases the public defenders that
they are “drinking the juice that this is a good [way to rehabilitate] …and then I’m trying
to give it to [them] and [they] won’t take it.” On the other hand, Ron Coffee of
Riverside County reports that, rather take advantage of jail crowding by opting for
straight time, the local defense bar welcomes split sentences. Riverside County District
Attorney Zellerbach has also been a major advocate for split (or blended) sentences.

Potential Increase in Trials
A budding concern in some district attorney’s offices is the possibility for an increase in
trials, which would consume more office and county resources. In Riverside County,
Chief Deputy Coffee noted that more felony drug offenders that will be sentenced
pursuant to §1170(h) are opting to take their cases to trial. His colleague, Assistant
District Attorney Datig further elaborated that low-level property and drug offenders have
a growing awareness that there is no room in jail for them and thus have little to lose by
pushing their cases to trial. In Santa Clara County there has also been an apparent
increase in trials since the enactment of Realignment. While jails in Santa Clara County
are not overcrowded, offenders with realigned crimes may be pushing their cases to trial
knowing they will not go to prison if they lose. In Los Angeles County, Deputy District
Attorney Kraig St. Pierre predicts the release of more pretrial detainees will make
defendants more likely to push a case to trial, knowing they can wait out the result at
home. At this time, we lack the data to compare pre and post-Realignment trial statistics,
but several interviewees opined that lower stakes in sentencing make some defendants
more willing to risk a trial verdict.

141

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Contemplating Charging Realigned Felonies as
Misdemeanors
Orange County Deputy District Attorney Contini and her colleagues have discussed the
reality that, post-Realignment, they could potentially achieve more control over a
defendant, and thereby protect the public and collect restitution more effectively, by
charging certain crimes as misdemeanors rather than felonies. She gave the example of
using this technique with a defendant who has a string of five commercial burglaries and
no strike. This offender is not prison eligible. If her office charges felonies, then the
offender faces custody exposure off five years and eight months. Realistically, her office
will never get this maximum time, and would likely offer a four-year split sentence (two
years jail time and two years on mandatory supervision). Given halftime credits, the
offender would likely do a year in jail before being released. If her office charges these
burglaries as misdemeanors, her office would may be able to get two years in custody
(again, one year in real time), but could seek three years of formal probation. This
longer probation term extends the period of correctional control and facilitates
restitution collection and monitoring the offender. Contini noted that while felony
charges have always been thought of as more severe, after the enactment of Realignment
the punishment for misdemeanors could actually be harsher.

Realignment has spurred a general shift toward rehabilitation in sentencing preferences.

The high degree of autonomy counties have to plan and spend for Realignment sets the
stage for local tension between a program-oriented approach (i.e. expanding probation
funding), on one hand, and a system more reliant on incarceration (i.e. expanding
sheriff’s department funding), on the other. The district attorney’s office doesn’t gain a
major funding windfall either way, yet prosecutors have a stake in these negotiations
because the public holds them accountable for public safety. Deputy District Attorney
Ron Coffee of Riverside County says that, though incarceration alternatives are a must
due to jail crowding, funding negotiations in his county are impacted by “turf wars
between the Sheriff’s Department and other partners in the criminal justice system
…[and whether they’re] willing to give something up in terms of their financial resources
to support alternative sentencing.” Realignment’s sentencing structure has influenced
the dialogue among prosecutors regarding the purpose of sentencing. Although our
interviewees mostly reported that they recommend the same sentence lengths since the
passage of Realignment, the new sentencing scheme affected their preferences for how
offenders serve their sentences, leaving room for the expanded use of split sentences and
felony probation. While prosecutors maintain a law enforcement role, each county
142

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
studied has made at least subtle shifts toward a more rehabilitative model of corrections,
through these and other practices.
While county practices are diverse, there is general shift away from simple incarceration
(straight sentences) toward alternative models of supervision and programming. In
general, we found that counties already utilizing programming have an incentive to
continue to use and expand programs—both to avoid or relieve jail crowding and to
decrease recidivism—within the population of realigned felons. In counties where jail
crowding is already an issue, there is an incentive to increase supervision and
programming because the early release of “straight term” offenders now results in no
supervision, or “tail,” at all—even when offenders are released early. In many counties,
it’s not a question of whether felons will be on the street, it is a question of whether they
will they be watched, served, or left to their own devices.

Programming Emerging and Expanding
Overall, counties are moving toward more rehabilitative sentencing structures (i.e. the
use of supervision, services, and programming) and away from retribution and
incapacitation in the form of incarceration alone. But counties are not changing
character overnight. In each county we studied there are at least subtle signals of a policy
shift. Alameda County and, to a lesser extent, Santa Clara County were already dedicated
to serving, rather than just punishing, offenders prior to Realignment. These counties
have continued or expanded their use of programming. Two emergent programs in
Alameda County are the Corrective Intervention Program and the Initiating Mentor
Program, which create possibilities for defendants to receive more lenient treatment.
The Corrective Intervention Program seeks to keep offenders, particularly young
offenders with no criminal record accused of less serious crimes (such as selling
marijuana) out of the system. Prosecutors will bring in qualifying offenders to their
office, admonish them and then drop charges. Under the Initiating Mentor Program
(which as a result of Realignment has expanded from only being in the Oakland offices,
to other offices as well), allows certain low level offenders charged with realigned crimes
to go through programming, which if successfully completed, can result in their case
being dismissed. Orange County already had some rehabilitative programming,
including a successful Drug Court, and is pushing for split sentences, hoping supervision
will have a rehabilitative effect. Riverside County was not particularly program-oriented
before, but has established treatment programs and strongly favors split sentences,
though our interviewees in Riverside County acknowledge that programs are not yet fully
developed. In Sacramento County program spending is low, but they have installed a
“Realignment-specific” district attorney position to develop a reentry court and
investigate treatment options.
143

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
When evaluating office-level policy changes under Realignment, it is important to
remember that implementation is still in its relatively early stages. Though increased
reliance on programming is subtle at this stage, over time more new offenders and
supervisees will come under local control and may threaten to overwhelm county
capacity, even in the best-resourced jurisdictions. Without incarceration alternatives, all
fifty-eight counties in California might suffer miniature versions of the state prison
crowding crisis. Solano County DA, Donald du Bain, foreshadowed this possibility when
we interviewed him in his Fairfield office. At this time, his county does not face jail
crowding. In fact, they have empty cellblocks they have been able to reopen to
accommodate realigned offenders, as well as a new jail under construction. They have
traditionally relied on incarceration as the primary sanction for criminal conduct in the
county and continue to do so under Realignment. In the course of our interview with du
Bain, he invited two assistant district attorneys, in charge of Realignment and charging
respectively, and the chief deputy district attorney into his office to join our conversation.
Even as the other attorneys reported that there had not been, and would not be, major
changes to sanctions in Solano County, du Bain chimed in with a caveat. He
acknowledged that, though his county has not faced a jail-crowding problem yet, “the
time will come when [it] will.” He went on to say,
I’m hopeful that, well before that, we’ll have these day reporting centers up and
running and we will start taking more advantage of split sentences. Some judges
…have not expressed any interest …so far in split sentences, but that can change,
especially when the courts find out that the jail is getting crowded…. If they don’t
start imposing sentences that allow for the jail to release inmates on mandatory
supervision, then the sheriff’s [department] is going to get to [release them] on its
own.
This anticipated shift in Solano County foreshadows the position of counties currently
assigning mostly straight sentences. Unless there is a dramatic drop in crime or a major
expansion of jail capacity, they will eventually have to adjust their sentencing structure or
face the same fate as the state prison system—overcrowding and litigation.

Increase in Felony Probation
Prosecutors from Sacramento, Santa Barbara and Riverside Counties commented that
they are increasingly relying on traditional probation per California Penal Code
§1170(h)(4). Santa Barbara County DA Dudley indicated that Realignment has made
felony probation sentences more attractive to prosecutors because the 3-5 year probation
period is often longer than supervision of split sentences. A Deputy DA in Sacramento
County echoed this reasoning indicated that since Realignment the number of felony

144

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
probationers has increased. Interviewees from Riverside County indicated that since
Realignment it has become more conscious of limited jail space and thus relied more
heavily on traditional probation for misdemeanors. It does not seem to advocate for
increased felony probations, but rather the judges in Riverside County are likely to use
probation to resolve cases due to an increasing number of felony drug offenders who are
choosing to take their cases to trial.

Split sentencing appeals to prosecutors as a means to increase the scope of correctional
control of realigned felons in several ways.

Over the first year of Realignment, just 24% of county felony sentences to local jail terms
were split sentences. This equates to approximately 7,000 sentences (compared to 22,000
straight jail time sentences). However, this state-level rate is somewhat skewed given that
the largest California counties are using split sentences at almost half the rate of the
remaining counties. In the ten largest counties in California, 20% of felony sentences
were split, compared to 40% in the remaining 48 California counties. Since Realignment
began, the use of split sentences has varied tremendously across counties, ranging from a
high of 94% of local sentences in San Benito County to zero split sentences in Sierra and
Modoc Counties (Figure 11).

145

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 11: Share of jail sentences that are split sentences by county, October 2011September 2012
San Benito County
Contra Costa County
Stanislaus County
San Mateo County
Mariposa County
Kings County
San Joaquin County
Napa County
Riverside County
Humboldt County
Merced County
Glenn County
Tulare County
Sonoma County
El Dorado County
Marin County
Tuolumne County
Shasta County
Del Norte County
Madera County
Sacramento County
San Francisco County
Santa Cruz County
Yolo County
Siskiyou County
Amador County
Nevada County
Fresno County
Calaveras County
Mono County
Tehama County
Colusa County
Santa Barbara County
Ventura County
Orange County
San Diego County
California Total
Santa Clara County
Trinity County
Mendocino County
Yuba County
San Bernardino County
Inyo County
Kern County
Alameda County
Solano County
Butte County
Placer County
Imperial County
Plumas County
Los Angeles County
Monterey County
San Luis Obispo County
Lassen County
Sutter County
Lake County
Modoc County
Sierra County

94%
86%
86%
81%
75%
69%
69%
68%
67%
64%
64%
63%
63%
56%
53%
52%
52%
47%
46%
46%
46%
46%
45%
42%
38%
35%
34%
33%
29%
29%
29%
27%
27%
27%
26%
24%
24%
22%
21%
19%
19%
18%
15%
13%
8%
8%
7%
7%
6%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
4%
2%
0%
0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%
50%
60%
Percentage of Split Sentences

70%

80%

90%

100%

Source: Sarah Lawrence, Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and Managing
Risk in the Post-Realignment Era, June 2013.

146

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
At least some offenders in all our sampled counties have received split sentencing. The
range of split sentences imposed in counties in our sample ranges from just 5% (Los
Angeles County) up to 60% in (Riverside County). Our interviewees gave diverse
responses explaining when and why they preferred split sentences and, in some cases,
why their offices refrained from imposing split sentences regularly. This section
elaborates on the various reasons prosecutors gave for seeking split terms of incarceration
and mandatory supervision. Interviewees from all counties see post-release supervision as
a central purpose of split sentences. Supervision offers opportunities to detect new
crime, including the ability to conduct warrantless searches and seizures of supervisees.
Our interviewee from Sacramento County was the only one to identify supervision as the
sole purpose of split sentences. He noted that attorneys in his offices and judges are “not
believers in rehab.” In Sacramento County approximately 45% of jail sentences are split,
but the reason for this high percentage is apparently explained by the desire for postrelease supervision alone. With no routine supervision following straight sentences
counties are forced to use split sentencing if they desire supervision. There is further
concern in Sacramento County that the period of supervision available under split
sentences is often not enough for offenders to complete programs, thus defeating a
major purported purpose of split sentencing. Many offices have other motivations for
imposing split sentences in addition to post-release supervision; these are discussed in
more detail below.

Addressing Jail Overcrowding
Some counties use split sentencing or are contemplating using split sentencing to address
jail overcrowding. Orange, Riverside and Santa Barbara Counties have used it in direct
response to jail overcrowding. Santa Barbara County District Attorney Dudley indicated
that all her attorneys are aware of the implications of recommending a straight versus a
split sentence as a measure to reduce crowding. Solano County District Attorney du Bain
indicated that because his county currently does not have jail overcrowding, his office has
not had to face a decision regarding whether to start changing sentencing practices to
accommodate the jail capacity. He indicated when the time for population management
comes, which will be soon, he hopes his office can start taking advantage of split
sentencing. In Solano County approximately 40% of the jail population consists of
realigned felony offenders (not including the revoked PRCS population) and the triplenon population is steadily growing.36 Pre-Realignment the average time spent in Solano
County jails was nineteen days; that period had stretched to thirty-one months at the time

36

Interview with Donald du Bain, Solano County District Attorney's Office in Fairfield (November 16,
2012).

147

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
of our interview. Santa Clara County prosecutor David Howe agrees that split sentences
could be a future tool to help control incarceration rates.

Program and Service Delivery
District attorney’s offices that are more receptive to rehabilitation use split sentences to
encourage offenders to participate in programming and take advantage of services.
Prosecutors in Alameda, Orange, Riverside, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, and Solano
Counties are amenable, although to differing degrees, to forwarding the rehabilitative
focus of Realignment through split sentencing. Out of the nine counties studied,
Riverside County has the most significant percentage of realigned felons who have
received of split sentences. The fact that 60% of realigned felons in Riverside County are
serving a split sentence is largely attributed to District Attorney Paul Zellerbach’s firm
commitment to the success of Realignment. Chief Deputy Coffee explained that
Zellerbach’s first priority is to public safety, and since the legislature has decided public
safety requires rehabilitative programs, District Attorney Zellerbach feels it is his duty to
enforce this decision and has done so in part by being supportive of split sentencing and
treatment programs.
Prosecutors from Santa Barbara and Santa Clara Counties said their support for split
sentencing reflects their county’s overall endorsement of programming. Assistant District
Attorney Howe from Santa Clara County noted his county is better able to deliver services
to offenders on mandatory supervision than to those in jail. Positive relationships and
confidence in other stakeholders serve to enhance prosecutorial support of split
sentencing. Chief Deputy Coffee highlighted the role of public defenders
recommending appropriate programming for defendants, while District Attorney Dudley
praised the Santa Barbara County probation department for taking an active role in
ensuring that offenders participate in the right programs so that they do not reoffend.
Dudley further applauded the judicial support for programming in her county,
indicating that whenever her office recommends split sentences, the judges grant them.
Deputy District Attorney Contini of Orange County is primarily interested in split
sentences for public safety purposes, as a way to monitor and control offender behavior,
but she sees split sentences as serving the secondary goal of providing services for those
who want to take advantage of them.
The availability of programming influences prosecutors’ interest in recommending split
sentences. Assistant District Attorney Howe would like to see an increase in split
sentencing in Santa Clara County, but says that would depend on resource availability.
Despite Santa Clara County’s relatively strong programming, his office is still cognizant of
resource limitations and recommends sentences relative to needs in other cases. Chief

148

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Deputy Coffee in Riverside County says in order for his office to rely more heavily on split
sentences, the county must develop more viable programming. In Solano County, where
just 8% of realigned offenders have received split sentences, District Attorney du Bain is
reluctant to rely on split sentencing because day reporting centers that will provide
services to offenders on supervision are not yet up and running. Interestingly, the
percentage of realigned felons that have received split sentences in Alameda County, a
county abounding in and supportive of programming, is the same as in Solano County.
Assistant District Attorney Meredith explained that this low percentage is attributable to
technical difficulties. Currently the county computer system cannot track when an
offender is out of jail and on mandatory supervision. Therefore, law enforcement on the
street will not know whether an offender is on supervision. As soon as the county
overcomes these difficulties, her office plans to start increasing its split sentence
recommendations.
Finally, district attorney’s offices take the potential effectiveness of programming into
account in deciding whether to recommend splits. Once the Solano County day
reporting centers mentioned above are operating, District Attorney du Bain says split
sentences recommendations will depend on the likelihood of rehabilitation and whether
appropriate services exist for an offender. He also noted that his office will watch out for
defendants trying to game the system. Santa Clara County Assistant District Attorney
Howe expressed a desire to increase split sentences as his office learns how to maximize
the utility of these sentences. Santa Barbara County District Attorney Dudley
underscored this point stating she is particularly interested in using more effective risk
assessment tools to support their sentencing recommendations.

Collecting Victim Restitution
There appears to be a trend of countries using split sentences as a way to collect victim
restitution. AB 109 did not originally include a provision allowing countries to collect
restitution for triple-non offenders.37 Prosecutors from Alameda and Los Angeles
Counties both mentioned that their offices worked on legislation, now in effect, which
allows the sheriff (or designated person) to take money off local inmates’ books to pay
toward restitution. Unlike prison, offenders housing in jails usually do not have the
opportunity to work and earn wages. By giving an offender a split sentence, restitution
can be collected while the offender is on mandatory supervision and, potentially,
working. Assistant District Attorney Howe in Santa Clara County cites split sentencing as
a way to increase restitution collection. However, some victims in Santa Clara County are
37

Spencer, Jessica and Joan Petersilia. “Voices From the Field: California Victims' Rights in a PostRealignment World.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013).

149

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
pushing back against split sentences (and Realignment in general) because offenders are
released earlier. Interviewees from Alameda, Orange, Riverside, and Santa Barbara
Counties also echo victim restitution collection as an important purpose of split
sentencing.

Parole, PRCS, and probation revocation proceedings are less efficient, demanding more
office resources, but yielding lesser sanctions for violators.

Realignment creates a larger role for district attorneys in supervision revocations than
they had in the past. Now prosecutors play an adversarial role in revocation proceedings
for technical violations, whereas before they would have only been involved in the
context of filing new charges where a violation constituted a new offense. Another
change is the sanction for revocation. Revocation of PRCS carries a maximum stint of
180 days to be served at the county jail, but because inmates in jails receive double time
credits under Realignment, the actual exposure time is typically 90 days and, due to
crowding, sometimes much less. This “shrinking hammer” removes much of the leverage
prosecutors and probation officers had to entice compliance with supervision terms.
Prosecutors are now spending more resources on the revocation process, but getting less
out of it, in terms of sanctions. Some counties are reacting by focusing efforts on
charging and trying new crimes in lieu of revocation when possible. Prosecutors also rely
on probation to apply intermediate sanctions and avoid hearings when possible.
The district attorney’s newly defined role in “prosecuting” revocation hearings increases
staffing demand. Besides the need for an attorney to review the files and participate in
the hearings, there is an uptick in clerical work that accompanies the process. There are
separate docket numbers for each revocation case and additional filings to be made by
the parties. Several counties we spoke with have used Realignment funds to fill gaps
created by this new process. Santa Clara County had to augment their court calendar
with two new weekly sessions just for revocations. Los Angeles County created a
dedicated PRCS/Parole position, now filled by Deputy DA Kraig St. Pierre, just to
coordinate the voluminous hearing schedule. In Solano County, a dedicated
Realignment prosecutor is focused both on revocations and new cases under
Realignment; Solano County also hired a paralegal and a legal secretary to support the
additional paperwork Realignment cases create. Riverside County has a dedicated
revocation attorney, as does Alameda County. When asked about their planned response
to the influx of parole revocations in July 2013, most said they are planning but, just as
with the initial roll out of AB 109, they can’t fully predict the impact of changes that lie

150

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
ahead. This is certainly an area to watch for future impacts on district attorney resources,
attitudes, and strategies.

Data collection challenges prevent prosecutors from measuring outcomes under
Realignment

The state has not imposed any method for tracking or evaluating county outcomes under
Realignment. Without a statewide data tracking system or defined measure of success,
counties face a two-fold information vacuum. First they lack the technical support to
“count” the output data related to prisoner tracking and recidivism. Second, without a
data capture or standard metrics, they miss opportunities to evaluate new policies. The
move away from one statewide to many local systems for housing and supervising
offenders also forced a move from one centralized tracking system to many local ones,
and left counties without the tools to track things like offender supervision status. Those
counties that are tracking Realignment data have been doing so on “patch” systems that
do not connect with other counties or a state system. Holes in these data systems create
logistical problems with the implementation of Realignment. For example, police may
not be able to tell whether someone they detain is on supervision, or a district attorney
may not be able to find a defendant’s out-of-county record easily.
Patchy data systems combined with the lack of consensus on how to define or measure
recidivism both contribute to a large-scale evaluation problem. What’s more, even with
58 intact and functioning data systems across the counties, counties would lack the ability
to compare success across counties. These data collection problems exacerbate and
complicate one another, leaving communities without effective tools to track, measure, or
compare outcomes under Realignment. This void undermines the utilitarian approach
of Realignment because counties cannot readily evaluate their own practices or borrow
best practices from others. San Francisco County DA George Gascón has initiated a
cutting-edge data collection effort within his office that he calls DA Stat. He hopes to
track demographics, crime categories, punishment and reoffense rates of defendants
coming through his office. He believes that over time, his database will reveal how
defendants are processed through his office and which programs have reduced
recidivism.38 If other counties followed Gascón’s lead, they would be creating a database
useful for evaluating how AB 109 impacted DA operations and outcomes.

38

Shahani, Aarti. “SF's Gascón Pushes For Data-Driven Approach in Tracking Offenders...and Prosecutors.”

KQED News (May 1, 2013). http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/04/30/sf-district-attorney-big-data-isoverdue/.

151

Chapter 8: Judges1
“What we had before was failing and had failed. I’m certainly hopeful that
[realignment] will succeed. There are a number of challenges to it – the
most significant is that there are limited resources at this time to make the
change. Given the fact that the old system was failing, is this better than
that? Well, we’re going to give it a try.”
- Judge Richard Loftus, Santa Clara County

Trial judges are ideally the gatekeepers of California’s correctional resources. Judges
interpret the law, assess the evidence presented, manage the settlement conferences,
approve plea bargains, and preside over jury trials. America has an adversarial system of
justice, with legal cases being contests between opposing sides. The judge is to remain
above the fray, providing an independent, impartial assessment of the facts and the
application of the law to those facts. This role can become compromised when a public
policy seeks to alter judicial behavior without a complete overhaul of the governing law.
When asked how judges are responding to the new realities created by the Public Safety
Realignment Act (AB 109), most of the judges we interviewed said they tried to disregard
jail capacity in imposing sentence. Los Angeles County Judge Charlaine Olmedo stated,
“[Judges] sentence according to the law, and if the sheriff chooses to release people
early, they do what they do.” She emphasized that judges only consider the statutory
factors that are meant to be considered—ignoring others like the county’s jail capacity.
She remarked, “We just follow the law as it is.” Los Angeles County Presiding Judge
David Wesley agreed, and noted that monitoring jail capacity was an “executive branch
function.” Solano County Presiding Judge Paul Beeman echoed this sentiment and said,
Look, I’m the judge. I’m supposed to figure out what happened here, and what’s
the appropriate sentence, and I’m going to make it. The money part of it, and
how these people are housed, or what kind of treatment they receive is the
probation department’s and the county’s responsibility—the sheriff’s
responsibility and not the court’s…. The judges in Solano County are doing their
job according to the law. Period. I can tell you 1000% [jail capacity] is not
influencing sentencing decisions. Realignment is the county’s problem and not
the court’s problem. [The judges] are there to make the appropriate sentence
and move on.

1

Kevin Jason, Rachel McDaniel, and Alyssa Weis contributed to this chapter.

152

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
In imposing a sentence, the judge is responsible for selecting an outcome that best
balances the competing goals of criminal sentencing: retribution, incapacitation,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. In theory, the judge should have many tools at his or her
disposal and resource constraints should not figure into criminal sentencing. But
Realignment challenges that theoretical archetype in a number of ways. Judges’
sentencing options of prison versus jail are significantly constrained currently, as over 500
felonies have now been designated by statute as ineligible for a prison sentence. Even
when judges impose a jail sentence, that decision is further impacted due to jail crowding
and the ability of the sheriff to reduce that sentence after it has been imposed. And if a
probationer or parolee violates the terms and conditions of parole or probation post-AB
109, the judge’s choices are limited further. This applies to not only the length of the
maximum sentence that can be imposed (180 days) and where it must be served (local
jail), but the offender also is automatically discharged at the end of one year if the
offender has no violations. In combination, these aspects of Realignment have the
cumulative impact of reducing the judge’s very important discretionary role in felony
sentencing.
It wasn’t supposed to play out this way. Realignment was designed to put the judge front
and center. As discussed, the overarching goal of AB 109 was to enhance and provide
funding for evidence-based rehabilitation programs. One of the core principles of
evidence-based programming is to combine treatment and court monitoring, and AB 109
ensured that combination would be encouraged. Under Realignment, judges have the
important new sentencing option of “split sentences,” which is an initial period of jail
custody followed by an intensive treatment program or probation supervision. They also
have the new option of “flash incarceration,” immediate periods of jail time between one
and ten days. In a practical sense, judges were to be active case managers and partners in
the delivery of appropriate treatment and custody sanctions—much like the model of a
drug court judge. And in some counties, this ideal has occurred. But due to a number of
unforeseen issues arising from incomplete or vague components of AB 109, split
sentencing is not being implemented as frequently as hoped in many counties. Counties
that are able to successfully implement a variety of sentencing options are usually those
counties with adequate jail space to assure that the initial part of the split sentencing (the
jail portion) is served in full, and that their probation and community treatment
providers have the necessary resources to provide adequate services and monitoring. In
those counties, judges are using Realignment as a means to expand drug and mental
health courts and further the goals of collaborative, problem-solving courts. But in the
most impacted counties, judges told us that their role and authority had decreased
because of Realignment. As mentioned earlier, other judges resist getting actively
involved in local crime policy, believing the judiciary should remain more neutral
regarding sentencing matters.

153

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Media outlets have given a great deal of attention to the jails that have become
overcrowded since Realignment started, but the critical impact on the courts and the
judiciary has gone unstudied and unaddressed. Our interviews with judges throughout
California revealed a mostly dissatisfied group of stakeholders. It wasn’t that they didn’t
believe in the concept of Realignment, but most felt its current unintended
consequences were further eroding justice and public safety in their counties. Their
frustration centered on their inability to feel confident that a sentence imposed in court
would actually “stick.” In addition, judges took on a major new role on July 1, 2013—the
sentencing of all parole and probation technical violators. Many complained about the
added workload at a time when court funding had gone through a decade of financial
cutbacks.

Findings
Judges Doing More with Less
Realignment assigns many new tasks to California’s superior courts, which were already
suffering years of funding cutbacks.

The vast majority of felony cases in California begin in one of the 58 superior courts,
located in each of the state’s 58 counties. Court facilities exist in more than 350
locations, and judges hear both civil and criminal cases, as well as family, probate, and
juvenile cases. Each year, California court filings equal almost 9.5 million cases, and
result in 8.4 million court dispositions.2 California has a unified court system, wherein
the State provides the majority of its funding. Since the recession of 2008, California’s
trial courts have suffered severe budget cuts, which have required them to shut down
some courtrooms permanently, shift certain types of court filings to an e-file system, and
reduce court staff and the hours they work.3
Not only do the judges have the additional workload for the AB 109 clients but they have
also taken on responsibility for parole and probation violation cases, discussed in more
2

“Annual Court Statistics.” The Judicial Branch of California Courts. (2012).
http://www.courts.ca.gov/19733.htm.
3
Robert, Amanda. “California courts continue cuts, closures.” Legal Newsline Legal Journal (June 17,
2013). http://legalnewsline.com/issues/tort-reform/242312-california-courts-continue-cuts-closures.;
Stock, Stephen. “California Superior Courts in Crisis.” NBC Bay Area (July 24, 2013).
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/California-Superior-Courts-in-Crisis-216668081.html.

154

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
detail below. And in November 2012 voters approved Proposition 36, which modified the
state’s three strikes law. The measure allows existing incarcerated offenders with three
strikes to petition the courts for a reduced sentence if the underlying offense for their
third strike was non-serious and non-violent. It is estimated that about 3,000 prisoners
will now ask judges to review their files for resentencing.4
Nearly all California criminal justice agencies have experienced recent budget declines,
but the courts’ budget reductions and how these budget shortfalls influence Realignment
have gone unnoticed. Without judges, commissioners, administrative personnel, and
courtrooms, it is unclear how the judiciary is supposed to take on the expanded duties
now required of them. Perhaps more so than any other stakeholder, there is a need for
extensive training on the intricacies of the new and very complex AB 109 law.

The Pressure to Use Split Sentencing
Under AB 109, judges have to decide how to sentence the newly convicted N3s or 1170h
cases. The ideal for rehabilitation is split sentencing but for complicated reasons, judges
often prefer straight jail time without a post-custody “tail.”

In general, the sentencing courts now have two felony sentencing options under AB 109:
1. Order a full term of imprisonment in the county jail up to the maximum possible
term. If a defendant is sentenced to serve the full term of imprisonment in county
jail, upon release, the defendant will not be supervised or have any conditions or
other type of parole supervision (“straight term”); or
2. Impose a sentence which is a combination of a term of imprisonment in county
jail and mandatory supervision, but the two periods cannot together exceed the
maximum possible sentence. Upon release to mandatory supervision, a defendant
will be supervised by the probation department under the same terms, conditions,
and procedures of formal probation for the unserved portion of the sentence
(“split sentencing”).
Probation prefers that the court sentence defendants to the second option above—a split
sentence, a combination of imprisonment and mandatory supervision. This would

4

Leonard, Jack and Maura Dolan. “Softer 3-strikes law has defense lawyers preparing case reviews.” Los
Angeles Times (November 8, 2012). http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/08/local/la-me-three-strikes-

20121108.

155

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
require an inmate to serve jail time and then be placed on probation where the released
inmate could be monitored and helped with their reentry.
Some judges are firmly in favor of split sentencing, and their county’s practices reflect
those preferences. A good example is Sacramento County, where 46% of their sentences
were split sentences from October 2011 to June 2012 (See Figure 11). Sacramento
County Judge Lawrence Brown said, “Split sentencing is a creature of Realignment. It
was created so as to allow a period of supervision on release of the defendant from county
jail prison.” Judge Brown believes that a split sentence should be used because “post
release supervision gives an offender incentive to behave themselves and gives law
enforcement the tools of search and seizure and gets an extra set of eyes watching over
them” while also helping to enforce the payment of victim restitution and fines.
How does Judge Brown determine where the split between custody and probation should
be? “I move the number up to get it back to where it would have been,” he says. By
getting both parties to agree to a higher term under correctional control than what the
person would have gotten had they gone to prison alone, he splits the term.
In an example, Judge Brown describes a defendant convicted of auto theft with a lengthy
record, but no strike prior conviction. Assume it were pre-AB 109 and assume the judge
denied probation and sentenced the defendant to state prison for the low term of 16
months (minus 50% credit, thereby serving an actual eight months). On release from
prison, the defendant would have been on parole for up to three years and if he violated
parole he could go back to prison for up to one year.
To illustrate some of the risks of Realignment, Judge Brown explains how things have
changed with AB 109. Now, if the judge denies probation and sentences the defendant
to low-term 16 months county jail prison, after serving his actual eight months (having
received 50% credits), there would be no supervision and thus no chance of being
reincarcerated. This is because AB 109 does not provide for parole for county jail prison
inmates. To address this limitation, Judge Brown explains that judges can create some
period of supervision on the defendant’s release, by insisting that the defendant receive a
middle term of 24 months or an upper term of 36 months. However, any time above the
16 months will be suspended so as to create the period of mandatory supervision. Thus,
if the defendant agrees to the middle term of 24 months, it would 16 months jail with
eight months mandatory supervision. The defendant’s exposure on mandatory
supervision is however much time is left on his supervision, i.e. the clock starts counting
the day he gets out. Assuming he violates mandatory supervision on his very first day out,
he could go back to jail for the eight months. Judge Brown concludes that with this
maneuvering, the 24-month sentence can look longer on paper without functionally
being so.

156

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
However, even if judges are in favor of a split sentences, defendants often aren’t, and
won’t agree to a plea bargain containing that sentence. Defendants talk to one another,
and judges reported that defendants will no longer accept a plea with a sentence that
includes probation as a “tail.” Additionally, defendants familiar with their local criminal
justice system often realize that if they don’t agree to a split sentence, they will serve just a
small portion of their jail term due to overcrowded conditions. Since about 95% of all
criminal cases are disposed of by a guilty plea, the prosecution and defense work to gain
an acceptable agreement. The court needs the plea-agreement to avoid the time and
expense of a trial. For the defendant, the plea usually boils down to jail time. And since
jail time is being significantly discounted in overcrowded jails, the defendant ironically
pushes more frequently now for straight term sentencing, without mandatory supervision
after release. Of course, the judge doesn’t have to agree to a plea agreement, but as a
practical matter, judges typically go along with the prosecution’s plea deals.
Of all the counties interviewed in this report, Los Angeles County had the lowest
percentage of split sentences administered. As of June 2012, the county average was at
5%. Judge David Wesley explained that while the district attorneys in northern counties
believe in split sentencing, the Los Angeles County district attorney often opposes the
practice and argues against it. Judge Wesley hypothesized that if a prosecutor walked into
court and asked for more split sentences, there would be more split sentences. When
asked about the sentiment among the judges of Los Angeles County, Judge Wesley
emphasized that he could not speak for the county’s judicial officers. In his personal
opinion, however, he expressed that he disfavors split sentences because most of those
who qualify for it are not first time offenders. Instead, they are people who the courts
have unsuccessfully tried to rehabilitate with programs in the past. He stressed that he
did not send an offender to prison on a drug charge to be a “tough guy,” and that he had
often sent an offender to prison on the condition that they participate in drug education
programs while incarcerated because the offender would refuse to do it locally. Since
Realignment has prohibited judges from sending certain offenders to state prison he
believes that a split sentence is akin to letting an offender out early to reward them for
not being successful in any of the state’s other attempts to rehabilitate him or her.
Judge Wesley feels like he has no good reason to use a split sentence, especially given the
opposition by the district attorney. He expressed that the police department wants split
sentences because they want a “tail” for the offenders. While a split sentence does offer a
means for monitoring offenders, Judge Wesley explained that the problem with split
sentencing is the manner in which a violator of the supervision could only be threatened
with serving the remainder of the supervised time in jail. In other words, if the offender
violates in the third month of a four-month mandatory supervision term, he can only be
punished with roughly one month of jail. This differs from probation where an offender

157

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
diverted from prison is threatened with serving a hefty period if he violates. If the
violation occurs towards the end of the probationary period, the elapsed time does not
factor into the subsequent sentence. Judge Wesley believes that the mandatory
supervision component of split sentences has diminished effects because of this
difference. Without this coercive aspect, it is difficult to alter the behavior of exoffenders.
It is also clear that judicial use of split sentencing is heavily influenced by how much faith
the judges have in their local probation departments to deliver on programming. Judge
Wesley feels that the Governor’s Office implemented Realignment backwards since the
local programs were not yet established at the time the offenders were shifted to the
county level. “They should have had all of the programs set up before they started
releasing people to us because we don’t have all the programs to deal with all of these
people. It’s like Proposition 36 because [just like then] we didn’t have the resources to
make it work.” (Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000).
Similarly, Solano County Judge Paul Beeman stated that he and his colleagues were
unlikely to rely on split sentencing more extensively until the probation department
assures them that they have treatment programs or services to provide to offenders
eligible for a split sentence. When asked about the possible use of split sentences as a
tool to address jail overcrowding, Judge Beeman was adamant that the judges’ behavior
would not be affected by the conditions of the jails until the judges were convinced that
there were good, meritorious programs being run for the purposes of split sentencing.
He conceded that he foresees the Solano County judges making modifications to their
sentencing procedures when the treatment programs are running so that the procedures
fit in with what probation and the sheriffs are doing.
While Judge Beeman maintained that the current status of the jails were not influencing
sentencing decisions, other judges cited jail overcrowding as a major reason behind
disfavoring split sentences. These judges no longer felt confident that the jail portion of
the sentence will actually be served since sheriffs often have to release inmates in order to
keep below their court-ordered capacity cap. If the offenders are released early, and
required to complete the rest of their sentence on probation supervision, probation may
also be too overwhelmed to provide sufficient monitoring or treatment. In that scenario,
the offender essentially received a “get out of jail free” card.
Navigating this complicated system now means that judges have to know much more,
often on a daily basis, about the capacity constraints in their local jails and the programs
offered by probation. Judges have to then determine what type of sentence will likely
actually be served and delivered, as opposed to what type of sentence to impose. Judges
often voiced frustration at the slippage that now occurs between imposition of sentence

158

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
and sentence actually served, saying that it was unpredictable, undermined their
authority, and reduced public safety.
Some judges suggested changing AB 109 to permit a new option, which would be a
mandatory county jail sentence, which could not be reduced by the sheriff, followed by a
mandatory post-jail community supervision term “tail” of their choosing, perhaps years.
But that is unlikely to happen, given the jail crowding conditions developing in most
counties and Realignment’s purpose of diminishing California’s overreliance on
incarceration and supervision.

Adjusting to New Responsibilities: The Handling of
Technical Violations
Judges are now responsible for probation, PRCS, and parole violation hearings, and the
maximum sentence that can be imposed for technical violations is six months county jail.
Judges often don’t have the intermediate sanctions to impose for technical violations (either
treatment or custody).

If changes in their initial sentencing decisions (the N3s) weren’t challenging enough, as
of July 1, 2013, judges are now responsible for sanctioning all offenders for technical
violations, regardless of the criminal status of the offender at the time of the violation. A
technical violation is when the offender fails to do something that he has been ordered to
do as part of their community supervision. Common technical violations include leaving
the county or state without prior approval, failure to attend or complete a drug or
alcohol program, testing positive for alcohol or drugs, associating with gangs, cutting off
electronic monitoring bracelets, and failure to report to the probation/parole officer.
Judges now decide sanctions for the following groups of offenders:
(1) Offenders sentenced to probation;
(2) Offenders currently on probation for their N3 crime;
(3) Former prisoners realigned to counties on PRCS; and
(4) High-risk parolees supervised by state parole.
Prior to Realignment, judges only were responsible for offenders sentenced to probation.
Each of these populations has historically required tens of thousands of parole and
probation violation hearings each year. Grattet et al., found that the the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s (CDCR) parole commissioners held

159

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
more than 20,000 parole revocation hearings in 2007.5 County judges must now conduct
all of these hearings. Governor Brown has increased the overall court budget 7% in
2013-2014 in recognition of their expanded responsibilities.
Complicating the additional workload is a reduction in the severity of the sanction that
can be imposed if a technical violation is found to have occurred. One of the most
dramatic changes that AB 109 contained was the prohibition against returning any
offender to prison for a technical violation. The only exception to this is for prisoners
released after serving a “life with the possibility of parole” sentence. No one can be sent
to prison post-AB 109 unless they are convicted of a serious, violent, or sex crime. Period.
Judges must choose a local county sanction from the menu of intermediate sanctions that
the county has available for probation, PRCS, and parole violators. And of course, as
discussed above, if the jails are crowded, the jail custody option is non-existent. Sheriffs
will prioritize new felony N3 convictions over technical violations. Without jail custody as
a realistic sanction, judges are often unable to deter offenders or compel them to attend
treatment, pay restitution, or remain in their approved legal residence. Flash
incarceration (e.g., short jail terms of 10 days) is another AB 109 option to accommodate
the need to quickly incarcerate a failing offender, and in some counties (with adequate
jail space), judges were using this option.
If judges want to identify other sanction options, they have to become much more
familiar with their local treatment programs, and monitor them for daily bed space,
openings, and criteria for acceptance. The judge will have to be much more than simply
the imposer of sentences; he or she will be the manager of treatment. If they don’t
become actively involved in the community’s treatment and sanctioning options, they are
in essence, left with no options to sanction technical violators. Of course, if there are no
programs in the community to become familiar with, the judge has virtually nothing to
impose to show the court’s distain for violating behavior—or intervene when there are
indications an offender is at risk of committing a new crime. When asked about the plan
for handling technical violations, Judge Beeman of Solano County expressed uncertainty
and stated that at the time of the interview he was waiting for the Administrative Office of
the Courts to take the lead and provide guidance on what judges will have to do in their
new role. Judge Gary D. Hoff of Fresno County echoed this uncertainty when asked
about this population who is no longer eligible to be sent back to prison. “I’m not sure
what we’re going to do with these people.”
Some counties are assigning a single judge and courtroom to the revocation hearings.
Alameda County decided to utilize a judge with an ancillary assignment on Fridays to
5

Grattet, Ryken, Joan Petersilia, and Jeffrey Lin. “Parole Violations and Revocations in California.” (2008).
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/224521.pdf.

160

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
hear the parole violations and to begin hearing the PRCS violations that the regular
judges had been handling previously. According to a judge in the county, the services for
those on parole will be similar to those available to offenders under PRCS, with programs
related to job training, alcohol abuse, mental health, and others areas. This judge
compared the expanded role regarding parole violators to the new responsibilities
associated with the PRCS population, where it took a few months to have the programs
established for those released.
In Sacramento County, policies regarding parole revocation are being discussed in a
Parole Revocation Work Group, where the participants include Judge Lawrence Brown,
the District Attorney, the Public Defender, Probation, the Sheriff, and State Parole.
Sacramento County has had success with flash incarceration on the violators of PRCS,
and the work group hopes that Parole can use this tool in a similar fashion with the
parolees. At the time of the interview, Parole had been very receptive to modeling
upcoming parole revocation hearings on how the PRCS violations were being handled
and the next step was focused on logistical issues, like incorporating these hearings into
the judicial calendar.
In Fresno County, AB 109 funds enabled the courthouse to hire a hearing officer to hear
PRCS violations. At the time of the interview, the county had not yet done that and
instead assimilated PRCS hearings into their current calendar configuration. Meanwhile,
a retired judge will be doing PRCS revocation hearings in Santa Clara County. There, the
hearing is aimed at informing the individuals re-entering society of their obligations to
report to probation, giving a mental health test, and connecting them with the local
housing authority, counseling, job training, and other services. This also aims to help the
person re-entering society to have an ongoing relationship with their probation officer
and, instead of acting out flash incarceration, as was the previous practice, the hearing is
the preliminary step to preventing someone from coming back into custody.

AB 109 and Collaborative Courts
The collaborative court model represents the ideal for implementing this new treatment plus
surveillance judicial model, but resource constraints limit its full implementation in most
counties.

Many judges were in favor of Realignment as they hoped it would continue the progress
California had made in recent years in “collaborative” or “problem-solving courts” to
resolve cases involving addictive behavior, mental health, homelessness, and other

161

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
specialized issues. Collaborative courts are distinguished by the following elements:
problem solving focus, team approach, integration of social and treatment services, and
judicial supervision of the treatment process. A key feature of the model is a proactive
role for the judge inside and outside the courtroom, and direct interaction between
defendants and judge. In order for the problem-solving model to work, judges must have
time to supervise both the sanction and the quality of the rehabilitation services.
California was instrumental in the national movement towards problem-solving courts,
and prior to AB 109, California was home to approximately 250 collaborative justice
courts, including domestic violence courts, drug courts, DUI Courts, veterans court,
mental health courts, reentry courts. Some judges felt that the workload and new
paperwork involved with Realignment threatened the progress California was making in
these alternatives to incarceration. Other judges felt that Realignment created the
opportunity for a systematic way to reorient some of the courts to a rehabilitation focus.
It injected funding into counties, allowing for an expansion and strengthening of courts,
while also creating room to test the model in different settings.
Research has demonstrated that, if implemented properly, problem-solving courts can
reduce recidivism, improve coordination among justice agencies, and increase trust in
the justice system. But despite evidence of effectiveness, such courts can be expensive
and limited in the short-run. The average adult drug court, for example, enrolls only 40
participants per year—a small fraction of the drug-involved offenders who might benefit
from them. Of course the hope is that these activities have the longer-term prospect of
reducing recidivism. Limited resources have presented a constant challenge for those
attempting to take courts to scale. Collaborative courts will likely provide pilot testing of
whether this successful model can now work for a more serious clientele. The courtinvolved model deserves close scrutiny because it is one of the most successful models
that exists for bringing together all of the elements of evidence-based practices.
But in order for the collaborative court model to work, judges have to have legal leverage;
they have to be able to impose a sentence when a participant violates a rule. The most
effective drug courts, for example, typically allow more relapses before putting someone
in custody, but they have to ultimately have the threat of custody to convince some
offenders to stay the course—or importantly, to incarcerate offenders who are at high-risk
of new crime. They also need that lengthy “tail” discussed above. As Judge Stephen
Manley, a Santa Clara County judge and drug court pioneer, put it: “If they want us to use
evidence-based programs to change the model from punishment to rehabilitation, we
need more time.” When asked how long would be ideal, he said “at least one year for
serious drug offenders.”

162

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Of course, treatment capacity is another key area of concern, particularly for substance
abuse treatment. Judge Manley continually stressed the need for residential substance
abuse treatment, which is far more expensive and difficult to site in local neighborhoods,
than outpatient services. Housing for the mentally ill is also particularly problematic. In
every county, there was a serious mismatch between the need for services and capacity in
programs.
The lack of more time post-custody (split sentencing) not only impedes the effectiveness
to monitor treatment and impose sanctions, it limits the ability of the court to protect
victims and collect court-ordered restitution. Of course, as discussed above, the judge
can impose the split sentencing, but whether that sentence actually gets served or not is
now often up to the discretion of the sheriff. Some believe the AB 109 legislation,
combined with the growing authority of the sheriff, has undermined the authority of the
judge and the court.

Sentencing, Jail Crowding, and Loss of Judicial
Authority
Sheriff are exercising more authority on time served, and shortened jail terms are
encouraging felons to plea-bargain for straight time. The authority of judges is being
undermined, as sentence severity is influenced more by system capacity than justice
concerns.

While the judge imposes the final sentence, the actual sentence served is now more a
function of jail capacity. Because of the aggressive jail release policy of the sheriff in
Fresno County, Judge Gary Hoff expressed distress and concern about how his role of
exacting justice in a timely manner is now potentially undermined. “When I sentence
someone I have no confidence that they’re going to do the time in custody.” With these
releases of low-risk offenders, judges of Fresno County are seeing offenders who have
been arrested nine, ten, or eleven times, yet have never made it to an arraignment. The
offenders were the first to adapt to the new circumstances and they have not hesitated to
take advantage of the fact that they may be released without even posting bail. This has
the opposite effect of deterrence, and is a major concern of the Fresno County Superior
Court.
Funding is an especially difficult issue for Fresno County. Judge Hoff stated there was not
enough money to buy more beds to relieve jail pressure, nor was there enough money to
fund risk assessment tools needed for programs. “There’s not enough money to fund

163

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
either independently and certainly not enough to do both.” Generally, Judge Hoff feels
that the quick and sudden change of Realignment “has really made a mess of our
criminal justice system.” The legislation was implemented too fast and the counties were
not given sufficient notice. The bill was poorly drafted, did not anticipate certain
situations, assumed things that did not come to pass, and left certain things unclear such
as what the time credits were and how they were applicable. While Judge Hoff believes
that the goal of AB 109 presents a great opportunity to reassess the criminal justice
system, he said, “We don’t have the resources to get the desired results.”
As previously discussed, crowding in county jails is an increasingly serious issue, and jail
overcrowding often means that the court-imposed sentence does not stick as the sheriff
has to “kick” cases out in order to stay below the court ordered jail cap. This isn’t
necessarily a new phenomenon in some jails (e.g., Los Angeles County), but the
“discount” between imposed- and served- sentences has increased.
The growing importance of sheriffs to criminal sentencing was continually mentioned in
our interviews. Most opined that the discounts would grow over the next few years, as the
new N3s felons and parole/PRCS/probation violations were sentenced locally. Over
time, as the new jails are built and unused portions of the jail are reopened, jail terms
should “hold” and the deep discounts on length of sentences should decrease. But jail
capacity will not significantly expand for at least five years, as jail construction typically
takes at least that long for completion.
San Diego Union Tribune columnist Don Thompson wrote about the issue with the
headline: “Overcrowding in many county jails is forcing local sheriff to assume the role
traditionally held by judges.” He notes that not only are judges influencing how long
convicts will serve but also who should get out on bail. He writes:
[The situation] is forcing sheriffs in many counties to make executive decisions on
releasing detainees early to ease crowding in their own lockups. The criminal
justice system is built on the concept that independent and impartial judges will
decide who will be detained and for how long, but sheriffs are, by necessity,
usurping that role. The trend raises serious questions about due process and the
separation of powers.6
The Little Hoover Commission, a non-partisan state organization, sent a letter to Gov.
Brown highlighting the issue. It reads:

6

Thompson, Don. “Agency: Realignment law undermines role of judges.” San Diego Union Tribune (May
30, 2013). http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/May/30/agency-realignment-law-undermines-role-ofjudges/.

164

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Current jail overcrowding ... has forced sheriffs of the executive branch into the
untenable position of making decisions traditionally made by members of the
judicial branch of government. This unintended consequence of overcrowding
threatens to make California's criminal justice system less reliable, less transparent,
and less accountable.7
Sheriffs in 17 counties told the Little Hoover Commission they routinely release parole
violators and offenders who have been sentenced to jail terms by judges, using their own
authority to ease jail crowding. Fresno County’s sheriff said she frees 40 to 60 offenders
each day. Assembly Minority Leader Connie Conway, R-Tulare, said in a statement that,
“Law enforcement is being tasked with responsibilities outside of their jurisdiction which
is unconstitutional and interferes with their primary mission of keeping our communities
safe.”
Here is how it happens. The judge sentences an offender to 16 months, but with half
time, he is to be in jail for a minimum of eight months. But due to crowding, he gets
placed on the sheriff’s electronic monitoring program, where he also earns half time
credit. So, the 16-month jail term turns out to be eight months on home confinement.
And may be significantly less. In essence a 16-month jail sentence turns out to be no time
behind bars.
Of course the sheriff has always had the ability to release inmates to keep the population
down, and in overcrowded jails this has been occurring for years. But the difference
since the implementation of Realignment is twofold: the discounts are applying to a
much more serious population, and if they violate their home confinement or early
release—no matter how many times they do so—by law they can’t go back to prison. The
most severe sanction they face is jail, where the “reduced” sentencing process starts all
over again.
Inmates are starting to manipulate the system of sentencing AB 109 introduced as well.
Judge Wesley said that inmates in their jails now know the ins and outs of the system and
their informal networks with other inmates means that most are opting to serve the
maximum term under the new Realignment sentencing guidelines because they know
they will be released much earlier and not have to be supervised upon their release. As
offenders hear about the bargains and how “imposed” time translates into “served” time,
they aren’t willing to take a plea bargain that includes the split sentence (mandatory
supervision option.

7

“Letter on bail to Governor and Members of the Legislature.” Little Hoover Commission. (2013).
http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/216/Report216.pdf.

165

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

A Concern for Victims Post-AB 109
Due to shorter imposed sentences and automatic probation discharge if the felon incurs no
new arrests, victim restitution and other victim-centered issues are not fully addressed.

Although the focus of AB 109 is clearly on what to do with offenders, it is important to
note that Realignment significantly impacts crime victims. Victims’ rights and safety is a
significant concern that has, for the most part, gone unmentioned in Realignment
discussions. Despite their centrality, victims were pretty much left out in the cold in
terms of planning for Realignment. They were not represented in major policy
negotiations when Realignment was being designed and the local Community
Corrections Partnership (“CCP”) is not required to provide a voting seat to victims.
Victims’ rights to notification, safety, and a place of primacy in custody determinations
were unaccounted for in the law’s original form, and there is no clear sign that they are
soon to be re-engaged. In short, in a rush to protect the constitutional rights of
offenders, the rights and needs of victims appear to have been cast aside.8
Realignment’s impact on crime victims is multifaceted. More felons may be granted early
release due to jail overcrowding, and these early releases may increase the risk of citizens
becoming crime victims. On the other hand, if counties divert offenders to more
effective treatment and work programs, reducing recidivism, overall victimization rates
will decline.
In addition to victimization issues, Realignment may threaten the due process and
statutory rights guaranteed California crime victims as a result of Marsy’s Law, the
California Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008. Marsy’s Law created a substantial
expansion of victims’ rights and imposed certain obligations on district attorneys, peace
officers, probation departments, parole, the courts, and the Governor. California victims
have the legal right to be notified of all court proceedings, receive notification of adult
inmate’s status in prison, request special conditions of parole for the inmate when he is
released from prison, and receive victim restitution. Victims have the right to reasonably
confer with the prosecuting attorney and, upon request, be notified of and informed
before any pretrial disposition of the case. Victims have a right to be heard at any
proceeding involving a post-arrest release decision, plea, sentencing, post conviction
release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue.

8

Spencer, Jessica and Joan Petersilia. “Voices From the Field: California Victims' Rights in a PostRealignment World.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013).

166

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Marsy’s Law added a public safety bail provision to the California State Constitution (Art.
I, §28(f)(3)), which requires that the protection of the public and the safety of the victim
be the primary considerations when setting bail or own recognizance release.
Importantly, Marsy’s Law requires that the safety of the victim, the victim’s family, and the
general public be considered before any parole or other post-judgment release decision
is made. It is not clear how Realignment is preserving and enforcing these victim rights.
What does seem clear is that the consequences of AB 109 on victim’s rights have not been
fully considered. The Crime Victims Action Alliance formally opposed AB 109 and sent a
strong opposition letter to the Governor asking him to veto it.9 Fearing that it will
negatively affect public safety, some victim lobbyist groups like Crime Victims United of
California have uniformly disapproved of AB 109 and called for its repeal.10
Realignment may also reduce the ability of victim’s to collect restitution. Under the
former system, victims would get their restitution payments through the parole system,
and failure to make those payments was considered a violation of parole. Prisoners
subject to longer periods of incarceration were required to work during their
incarceration, and the CDCR had the power to garnish any wages earned and put it
toward a restitution order that may have been in place. However, offenders sent to PRCS
instead of parole can be discharged from supervision at six months (half the minimum
length of time under the old parole system). When offenders are discharged from PRCS,
there is no administrative body responsible for monitoring restitution payments. Victims
often have little recourse to collect court ordered restitution under Realignment. In
addition, local authorities or the sheriff are now more responsible for collecting crime
victim restitution payments, but given their workload, it often doesn’t happen. As Kelly
Keenan, Chief Assistant District Attorney in Fresno County, told the California Lawyer,
“That's a major problem. We're struggling with it.” For the present, he says, crime
victims may have to go after restitution themselves in civil court.11 The CDCR tracks
restitution orders for inmates in state prisons, collecting even after they are released on
parole. But it's more difficult to track someone who serves a three-year jail sentence and
then leaves with no supervision or probation program.
Judge Lawrence Brown, a long time victim advocate, uses split sentencing to enhance
victim restitution orders. Judge Brown is relying on split sentences “to create supervision
to get that restitution as a condition” and effectively have a “hammer hanging over them”
to pay victims. But he thinks the policy needs to be updated to make restitution
9

“Letter to Governor Brown to Oppose Assembly Bill 109.” Crime Victims Action Alliance.(April 4, 2011).
“AB 109-Public Safety Realignment.” Crime Victims Action Alliance.
http://www.cvactionalliance.com/ab-109-public-safety-realignment.; "The Dangers of AB 109/Prison
Realignment." Crime Victims United of California. http://www.crimevictimsunited.com/lawsuit.
11
MacLean, Pamela A. “Prison Realignment: Now What?” California Lawyer (August 2012).
http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=923950.
10

167

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
payments and the monitoring of these payments a mandatory part of the Realignment
scheme and not an oversight. Judge Brown explains that the initial language in AB 109
created a loophole for victims to collect restitution. After AB 109 was passed, the
legislature had to amend California Penal Code §1202.45 to authorize that an equal
amount of mandatory restitution be imposed and stayed pending successful completion
of Post-Release Community Supervision or Mandatory Supervision, as the law has
traditionally mandated for parole and probation revocations.
Realignment has also seriously diminished the extent of notice given to crime victims,
mostly because it is not at all clear who is responsible for providing that notification and
when. Realignment created several new types of custodial sentences (e.g., electronic
monitoring, day reporting centers), and no one has yet determined which of those
sentences require notice to the victim under Marsy’s Law. The CDCR had an automated
system that allowed victims, family members of victims, or witnesses who testified against
the offender to request to be notified of the release, parole hearing, death, or escape of
their offender.12 Local police chiefs are also apprehensive because under state parole
supervision, there was a statewide database for checking criminals’ status on the street.
There is no similar statewide system for offenders on county probation. County jails and
probation usually lack these structures, and so now an AB 109 offender could be released
into the community without the victim being made aware of the release.
In some counties there are no processes to communicate with victims when the actual
sentence of the offender is determined. Thus, victims often have no way of knowing
whether the offender will be sentenced to county jail or state prison, the length of the
sentence, and whether they will be under any form of supervision when they are released.
This is all of grave concern to victims—and a violation of rights under Marsy’s Law. Such
legal conflicts could result in significant litigation challenging various applications of
Realignment. Additional administrative staff and resources could be required if
prosecutors have to notify victims so that they have the opportunity to be heard at all
stages of court processing. Such notifications will likely require additional court
appearances, increasing prosecutor, defense, and judicial resources. If they fail to
provide opportunities for victim and witness input, Realignment may indeed conflict with
existing law and the State Constitution.

12

“Request for Victim Services (CDCR 1707).” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Victim_Services/application.html.

168

Chapter 9: Probation1
“Realignment isn't just about reducing prison populations, it is also about
better equipping offenders to avoid reoffending. Those of us who have
worked in county probation know that realignment is working, which is why
the Chief Probation Officers of California have always been among
Realignment's most vigorous champions. But we also know that the full
effects of Realignment will take many years to realize -- perhaps 5 to 7 years
-- and we need to be patient and give Realignment a chance to work.
Ultimately, we believe that Realignment will lead to a better future in which
crime, incarceration and recidivism can all be reduced.”
- Linda Penner, Board of State and Community Corrections

Probation occupies Realignment’s (AB 109) center stage. In fact, the success of
Realignment hinges largely on the performance of probation—and in many ways the
future of California probation hinges on the success of Realignment. As the California
Administrative Office of the Courts observed,
Probation occupies a unique and central position in the local and state justice
structure. It serves as a linchpin of the criminal and juvenile justice systems and is
the one justice system partner that regularly collaborates with all stakeholders as
an offender moves through the system. Probation connects the many diverse
stakeholders, including law enforcement; the courts; prosecutors; defense
attorneys; community-based organizations; mental health, drug and alcohol, and
other service providers; the community; the victim; and the probationer.2
Probation’s central role was recognized by the legislature in designating the Chief
Probation Officer in each county to chair the Community Corrections Partnership
(CCP), and all of California’s 58 counties designated the probation department as the
lead agency for AB 109 program implementation. Part of that motivation was political,
since probation chiefs, unlike other major county stakeholders, are not elected and are
seen as less politically vulnerable. But probation is also the only county justice agency
whose primary mission is rehabilitation, and Realignment gives California’s probation
system an opportunity to test whether, with increased funding, it can reduce recidivism
through evidence-based programming.
1

Camden Vilkin, Alex Miller and Meredith Wall contributed to this chapter.
“Probation Services Task Force Final Report.” Administrative Office of the Courts and California State
Association of Counties (2003). http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fullReport.pdf. at 39.
2

169

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

California Probation System Pre-Realignment
Probation Chronically Underfunded
Probation has always supervised about two-thirds of all persons under correctional
supervision in California, but has never received resources commensurate with these
responsibilities. There were about 315,000 adults on probation in California in 2010
prior to Realignment, compared with about 162,000 people in state prisons. The
Legislative Analyst reported that California probation departments spent about $1,250
per year per offender, compared to $47,000 for each prisoner.3
California’s underfunding of probation is not unusual when compared to national
standards. According to a study by the Pew Center on the States, for every dollar spent
on prisons, the U.S. spends just six cents on probation and parole.4 But California is
unique in terms of its funding structure for probation. A comprehensive review of
California’s probation system by California’s Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC)
in 2009 found that only California and Indiana failed to provide a stable or continuous
revenue stream for local probation services. This study found that, on average, California
probation departments received about two-thirds of their total funding from county
rather than state revenues. Probation departments received just one-fourth of their
funding from the state. The remaining funds came from the federal government and
from other sources, including fees charged to probationers to help support supervision
and administrative costs.5 Over half of all the nearly 2,000 agencies that administer adult
probation services across the county are operated at the state level (26 states),6 others
have unified systems which integrate state- and local- supervision, but only in California
and Indiana is adult probation the sole responsibility of local government.
California’s probation funding was especially hard-hit in 1978 with the passage of
Proposition 13, the People’s Initiative to Limit Property Taxation. Proposition 13
reduced the property tax revenues collected by local governments, which, in turn,
reduced the overall level of resources that counties had available to fund criminal justice
3

“Achieving Better Outcomes For Adult Probation.” Legislative Analyst's Office. (2009).
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.aspx.
4
“One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.” The Pew Center on the States. (2009).
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
In the U.S., over 4.3 million adults—roughly twice the number of people in prison or jail—are under the
supervision of some form of probation, making it far-and-away the most frequently used sanction.
5
“Achieving Better Outcomes For Adult Probation.” Legislative Analyst's Office (2009).
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.aspx.
6
Nieto, Marcus, California State Library California Research Bureau. “The Changing Role of Probation in
California's Criminal Justice System.”(1996). http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/96006.pdf.

170

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
and other programs. Prior to the passage of Proposition 13, property tax revenue totaled
28% of state and local general revenue; in the 18 months following Proposition 13, it was
reduced to less than 15%.7 While Proposition 13 impacted all county agencies, a RAND
study concluded: “Probation departments emerged from Proposition 13 in a much
debilitated condition. They had the largest rate of decrease of any criminal justice
agency in 1979, and by 1980 were still lagging far behind.”8
In 1988, the Classroom Instructional Improvement and Accountability Act (Proposition
98), reduced probation funding even further. Proposition 98 mandated minimum state
spending of approximately 40% of general fund spending on K-12 education. The
impact on county services was severe, since the state now guaranteed an annual increase
in education spending and funded it by transferring property tax revenue from city and
county governments to schools. When the housing crisis hit, resulting in drastic
reductions in property values, overall tax revenues declined and Prop 98 had guaranteed
that a fixed (and growing) share of the declining funds went to education.
Proposition 13 and 98 caused increasingly less funding to be given to probation, while,
simultaneously, the state legislature passed stricter laws that sentenced a greater
proportion of adult felons to probation (and prison) for longer periods of time. For the
past thirty-five years, California probation agencies have faced the untenable position of
being asked to do more with less.

The Two Faces of Probation: Surveillance and
Services
Probation has always had dual responsibilities. They are to:




Provide supervision and control to reduce the likelihood of recidivism while the
offender is serving his/her sentence in the community (the “surveillance”
function), and
Provide assistance and services to the probationer to encourage noncriminal
behavior (the “rehabilitation” function).

Probation was originally designed to focus on rehabilitation. But over the years, as the
public’s mood and resources have shifted, so has probation’s role and identity.9
Moreover, since each of California’s 58 counties operates its own probation department,

7
Chaiken, Jan M. et al., The RAND Corporation. “The Impact of Fiscal Limitation on California's Criminal
Justice System.” (1981). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/90064NCJRS.pdf.
8
Ibid. at 39.
9
Petersilia, Joan. “Probation in the United States.” Crime & Justice 22 (1997): 149-200.

171

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
with an absence of statewide standards in most core program areas counties have
developed services and programs that best fit local needs.
And with reduced staff and the number of clients increasing, probation’s common
response has been to allow supervision caseloads to rise. Probation supervision is
generally regarded as a non-mandated program, which are often the first to be cut. The
law says that a county has to supervise probationers, but it does not say to what extent
they have to supervise. That’s the catch: When times get tough, probation caseloads can
increase to whatever level is affordable. The California Probation Officers Association
recommends a standard ratio of 25 to 50 offenders to 1 probation officer. There are no
legal standards in California or the nation for what the ratio for probation officer to
offenders should be. In California, individual counties determine the ratio.
Take, for example, the Los Angeles County Probation Department, the largest probation
department in the world. Since the mid-1970s, county officials have continually cut their
budgets as the number of persons granted probation and the number of required
presentence investigations has grown.10 As a result, serious offenders were often assigned
to 100-plus caseloads, where meetings occur at most once a month and employment or
treatment progress was seldom monitored. An increasing number of offenders were
assigned to “banked” caseloads—which can be as high as 500-1,000:1—and as long as no
new arrests occurred, offenders were discharged at the end of a set time period. By 1995,
66% of all probationers in Los Angeles County were supervised on “automated” or
banked caseloads. Los Angeles County was not alone. The same disconnect between
need for services and commensurate funding could be said about any large county in
California.
Probation agencies continued to pay less attention to supervising probationers and
focused more on functions that were required by other parts of the system, like providing
presentence reports for judges. The rehabilitation function of probation was
deemphasized. Reduced funding and the ensuing loss of positions forced departments
to scale back their front-end prevention and rehabilitation activities, leaving time only for
the public-protection aspect of probation services such as monitoring and surveillance.
This is the “baseline” where most California probation agencies were at the time
Realignment was implemented in October 2011.
But we have been here before, and our collective memories are short. The situation
described above is not new and it is not unique to California. Policymakers and program
planners have been trying to infuse probation and community supervision with funding
and new models since the mid-1980s. As California embarks on its Realignment

10

Ibid.

172

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
experiment, it is prudent to revisit the evidence of our last major community supervision
experiment. It was motivated by the exact same situation as is motivating California’s
Realignment experiment: prison crowding, court intervention, and the promise of a
better way.

Lessons Learned from California’s Previous
Experiment With Intermediate Sanctions
While the word “Realignment” is new when applied to corrections, just fifteen years ago
California and the nation were essentially implementing Realignment’s key tenants with
the use of intermediate sanctions.
Beginning in the 1980s, horrendous prison crowding in southern state prisons, economic
woes, and a court ruling spurred unusual experiments. When federal courts ordered
states to build new facilities or find some other way to punish offenders, the southern
states began experimenting with alternative sanctions. Georgia developed an intensive
supervision program (ISP) for probationers; the program yielded some evidence that it
reduced recidivism rates and also appeared to save the state the cost of building two new
prisons. This pilot project was given intense and positive coverage by major media and,
by the mid-1990s, virtually every state had passed some kind of legislation for
intermediate sanctions. These experiments—eventually funded as a national
demonstration project by the U.S. Department of Justice—are collectively referred to as
the Intensive Supervision Probation/Parole Demonstration Project (ISP).11
Probation and parole departments across the country implemented a variety of ISP
programs, including reduced high-risk caseloads, day reporting centers, and electronic
monitoring. The hope was that some offenders who normally would have been bound
for prison could be diverted from expensive prison cells to these intensive programs that
could supervise them and offer support services.
In theory, the model being tested was to increase funding for community supervision,
enabling probation agencies to focus on higher-risk probationers with enhanced services
in the hopes of reducing recidivism and prison commitments. An influential book
published at the time, Between Prison and Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a
Rational Sentencing System, argued that the reason prisons were so crowded in the U.S.
was the fact that judges faced a polarized choice between prison and probation, with a

11

Petersilia, Joan. “A Decade of Experimenting With Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We Learned?”
Perspectives on Crime and Justice-1997-1998 Lecture Series, Volume II, National Institute of Justice,
Washington D.C. (1998).

173

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
near vacuum of punishment options between these extremes.12 The book, written by two
of the nation’s leading criminologists, argued for a more graduated sanction system that
relied upon a range of sentences, including fines, community service, house arrest,
intensive probation, and electronic monitoring. A more rational system that matched
offender’s risk and needs was essential to reducing the nation’s growing prison-crowding
crisis.
By the time the ISP experiment ended in 1995, a decade after it began, we knew a great
deal about the implementation and impacts of such prison diversion efforts. Results
from an extensive study that used random assignment to evaluate the effects of ISP at 14
sites in nine states demonstrated that increased surveillance had no impact on rearrest
rates when compared to regular supervision or incarceration. Three California counties-Contra Costa, Ventura, and Los Angeles Counties—participated in the national ISP
demonstration and their results were consistent with these findings.13 In fact, ISPs were
associated with higher rates of incarceration due to increased detection of technical
violations. This latter finding suggested that surveillance-oriented ISPs were ineffective—
both from a cost and public safety perspective—because they do not reduce the
incidence of new crimes but do increase the likelihood that offenders will be returned to
jail or prison on technical violations.
But there was an additional important and tantalizing finding—consistent across all the
evaluations regardless of program designs—that points to the importance of combining
surveillance and drug treatment program participation. In Ventura County, offenders
who participated in treatment, community services, and employment programs—
prosocial activities—had recidivism rates 10% to 20% below those who did not participate
in such additional activities.
As Petersilia wrote in 1999:
The empirical evidence regarding intermediate sanctions is divisive: without a
rehabilitation component, reductions in recidivism are elusive…However,
programs that provided treatment and additional services obtained some
reductions in recidivism particularly for high-risk offenders, and drug offenders
more specifically.14

12

Morris, Norval and Michael Tonry. Between prison and probation : intermediate punishments in a
rational sentencing system. edited by Michael H. Tonry, New York: Oxford University Press (1990).
13
Petersilia, Joan and Susan Turner. “An Evaluation of Intensive Probation in California.” The Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology 82, no. 3 (1991): 610-658.
14

Petersilia, Joan. “A Decade of Experimenting With Intermediate Sanctions: What Have We Learned?”
Perspectives on Crime and Justice-1997-1998 Lecture Series, Volume II, National Institute of Justice,
Washington D.C. (1998) at 24.

174

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Researchers found similar results in many other states, and a recent meta-analysis of 175
evaluations of ISPs concluded that the combination of surveillance and treatment is
associated with 10% reduced recidivism.15 This research indicated that ISPs were more
effective when structured in accordance with the principles of effective rehabilitation,
combining treatment and rehabilitation programming with intensive monitoring.
Case studies of what programs were actually implemented in the ISP experiment were
revealing. Counties were allowed to customize their services and surveillance options.
Jurisdictions adopted those bells and whistles they wanted and those they could afford, so
that a wide variety of programs were implemented. As such, the name “ISP” really had no
commonly agreed upon definition. But when we looked back at exactly what got
delivered in the name of ISP, we found one common denominator: more surveillance
than treatment was implemented across the board. Electronic monitoring and drug
testing were the two most common features. Since drug offenders were the most
common ISP participants, the results were predictable: more drug testing meant more
uncovered violations, which ultimately meant more returns to custody. The main result
was that offenders who violated court conditions by using drugs, for example, were
identified more quickly and sent into custody more often.
Close surveillance uncovered more technical violations. Whenever this happened, many
ISP managers took punitive action—often revocation to prison or jail—to maintain the
program’s credibility in the eyes of the judiciary and the community. Programs that were
started primarily to save money and avoid the costs of incarceration often cost their
counties more over the long term. Despite the good intentions of probation agencies,
ISPs were associated with “net widening,” or a greater number of probationers being
returned to custody than would have been the case without the ISP intervention.
Probation staff, in retrospect, noted that the ISP funding had been insufficient to provide
the intensive types of treatment serious drug offenders needed. The additional funding
primarily was used to hire probation staff to supervise the smaller ISP caseloads. These
additional personnel were then rather easily (and cheaply) able to implement nonpersonnel intensive activities, such as drug testing or placing someone on electronic
monitoring. Even when the probation department had the intention of contracting with
community service providers, the government contracting procedures proved so
cumbersome such that many programs were so delayed—in many cases, being funded
just as the demonstration project was ending. Probationers would or could not wait
months on waiting lists in order to get into a drug treatment program. This lack of
treatment slots resulted in continued drug use and a high violation rate. Without drug
15

Gendreau, Paul, Tracy Little, and Claire Goggin. “A meta-analysis of the predictors of adult offender
recidivism: What works!” Criminology 34, no. 4 (1996): 575-608.

175

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
treatment programs and probation’s commitment to public safety, they ended up
violating a lot of probationers who might have succeeded if they had effective treatments.
Despite all the good intentions, probation had overpromised and under-delivered.
Within a decade, ISPs went from being “the future of American corrections,” as one
probation officer enthused in The Washington Post in 1985, to what seemed to be a
failed social experiment. Most of the programs were dismantled by the late 1990s. Some
advocates of the prison buildup pronounced that alternatives to prison had been tried
and did not work.

Applying Prior Intermediate Sanctions’ Findings to
Current Realignment Experiment
If we forget these important lessons, we are bound to repeat them. The population
targeted for Realignment is the same as was targeted by the prior ISP demonstration—
higher-risk probationers and parolees. The motivation for the demonstration was also
exactly the same: overcrowded prisons, threatened court intervention, and the promise of
reduced recidivism and cost savings through better and more rehabilitation. But the
take-away lesson from the prior ISP experiment is that without a well-designed and wellfunded treatment component (particularly for substance abuse)—Realignments’ goals
will remain elusive. The upshot will likely be that, while the returns to prison for
technical violations have been stopped by AB 109 law, decisionmakers will be pressured
to impose some violation response, and jail commitments will increase (particularly until
jail capacity has been expended). If counties don’t have access to intermediate sanction
programs that they have faith in, we will likely reproduce the findings of the ISP
experiment, just at the local level.
In the end, policymakers will again wring their hands about the failure of probation to
deliver rehabilitation, but the real story will be once again that “rehabilitation” was in
name only, and that the programs implemented were never of the intensity and quality
that research studies have shown are necessary to reduce recidivism.
It is within this historical context that probation is once again being asked to do the
nearly impossible. It is no accident that the Chief Probation Officer is the chair of the
CCP—the engine of change for each county under Realignment. Probation is the most
natural leader within each county to coordinate community-based punishments. The
Chief of Probation for Sacramento County, Don Meyer, was president of the Chief
Probation Officers of California (CPOC) in 2009. In his opinion, CPOC’s “fingerprints
are all over AB 109. We clearly worked with the Department of Finance, the Governor,
the state Sheriff’s Association, and the DA’s association” in shaping Realignment.

176

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Consequently, we’ve been the silent partners of the criminal justice system. Now we’re
out in front.”
Yes, probation has gotten what they asked for. But can they deliver? If history is any
guide, they have a very tough road ahead. They have a more difficult task ahead than in
previous demonstration programs—Realignment asks them to handle a higher risk
population than was targeted in the previous ISP experiments. But they are also being
given more money to do the job, the research-base is more advanced, and, most
importantly, this is a countywide initiative rather than the probation-only initiative of the
past. How they are adapting is the focus of our interviews.

Findings
Probation is struggling to supervise far more felons than anticipated; future projections are
unclear.

When Realignment went into effect, California’s 58 probation agencies were told to
expect about 13,473 new felons and about 27,907 new parolees in the first nine months
of Realignment (or about 41,000 new probationers over that nine month period). In
fact, they received 22,016 new felons and 30,041 new parolees in that time period (or
52,000 new probationers, 26% more than they expected). By the end of 2012,
California’s adult probation population had skyrocketed from 311,692 in 2010 to 416,414
in 2012, an increase of over 100,000 probationers (or 34% growth in just two years). This
growth rate is far beyond anything experienced in any other part of the corrections
system, and the sheer numbers alone created management and supervision challenges
for probation agencies.

177

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 12: California’s Correctional Populations, 2004-2012
Pre-Realignment

Post-Realignment

420,000
390,000
360,000
330,000
300,000
270,000
Prison

240,000

Jail

210,000

Parole
180,000

Probation

150,000
120,000
90,000
60,000
30,000
0
2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Sources and Notes: All population numbers are for December of the years listed. Prison and parole
population numbers are from the CDCR Monthly population reports. Jail population numbers are from
the BSCC Jail Profile Survey. Probation population numbers through 2010 are from the California
Attorney General’s Crime Profiles; probation population data from 2011 was left out because it was unclear
if it included or did not include 1170(h) and PRCS probation populations. Probation population for 2012
is from the CPOC probation survey. For more information about the correctional control populations, see
Quan, Lisa, Sara Abarbanel, and Debbie Mukamal. "Decarceration through Realignment: Changes in the
Correctional System in California, 2004-2012." Stanford Criminal Justice Center (forthcoming, 2013).

But it is important to understand probation’s growth in context—both relative to other
parts of the justice system and other states. As Sarah Lawrence found, California’s growth
rate between 1980-2010 was lower than the average of other states for probation and jail
populations and higher than average of other states for prison and parole populations.16
Over this thirty-year period, California’s prison population increased by 572%, the parole
population increased by 708%, while the probation population increased by just 94%.
California’s per capita measures of criminal justice populations also shows that California
16

Lawrence, Sarah. “California in Context: How Does California's Criminal Justice System Compare to
Other States?” The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute of Law and Social Policy (2012).
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/CA_in_Context_Policy_Brief_Sept_2012_Final.pdf.

178

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
was below the national average for probationers per capita, and higher than the national
average per capita parolees. She concludes: “Said another way, criminal justice
populations in California under the jurisdiction of state government grew significantly
faster relative to other states, while criminal justice populations under the jurisdiction of
county government grew at lower rates relative to the experiences of other states.” Of
course this imbalance between county and state corrections led to the desire to shift some
operations back to the counties, hence Realignment.
California probation agencies were provided with state funds to carry out the additional
offender management responsibilities those offenders would entail. State leaders
provided $850 million to California’s 58 counties in 2011 and an additional $1 billion for
the 2012-2013 fiscal year. Realignment allocations for 2013-2014 increased about 15%, so
the state is now spending more than about $1.2 billion a year on Realignment. At over $1
billion a year, California’s experiment with community corrections is, by far, the biggest
investment California (and the nation) has ever made to see whether investing in
community programs can reduce prison commitments. Of course, not all of the funds
(only 25%) were allocated to probation, as we discussed earlier.
The increase in probation populations appears to have stabilized, and officials speculate
that this stabilization is likely caused by the more frequent and quicker discharge policies
under AB 109. Offenders are frequently discharged from supervision at six months and
one year (rather than prior to AB 109, 18 months and 3 years) if they have no new
violations. Both probation and parole have also begun to look more closely at who was
on their supervision roster, and discharge from supervision those who had absconded
many years ago, were being jointly supervised by both probation and parole, were jointly
supervised in several counties, and even offenders who were still listed on rosters but were
deceased.

More probationers score high-risk on recidivism prediction tools, and have serious untreated
needs.

While probation welcomed the resources, they came with a very big string attached: Two
new offender populations would be coming under their supervision. The first population
is composed of newly convicted lower-level felons (N3s), and our interviews suggest that
probation officials are confident that their enhanced services will assist in reducing this
population’s recidivism. Many officials told us that this was exactly the kind of moderateto high-risk population that more intensive services were designed for, and had those
services existed in the past, the current crime might have been avoided. These newly
convicted felony offenders are known to local officials, and since they can’t have a prior
179

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
serious or violent prior crime, they are as a group seen as less serious than those coming
out on PRCS, all of whom have just served a prison term (the average term in California
prisons is about 28 months). In resource poor communities, probation officials often
had no programs to send offenders to for treatment, and so used jail as an option to
remove them from the streets, when good treatment might have made a difference. Our
interviewees suggest that while many offenders had participated in (and often failed)
previous programs, Realignment funding now allowed them to expand or extend these
programs—providing another “intermediate sanction” (e.g., day reporting centers) that
was more intensive and appropriate than previous offerings. There was virtually universal
enthusiasm from probation regarding their ability to work productively with the N3s or
1170(h) population.
Some of our interviewees urged caution, however, noting that these offenders were likely
to have already been given a chance at programming, and their new arrest and conviction
shows that they may not be interested in treatment. This opinion was often voiced from
counties that had a larger array of programming options pre-AB 109. Sometimes these
officials thought that the offender needed a “time out” (i.e., short jail term) to get
motivated to program, and that split sentencing and flash incarceration were useful tools
in that realm.
But the second population—those former parolees now assigned to probation—
represents a much more challenging task, and one for which many probation
departments felt ill-prepared and under-resourced. The Post Release Community
Supervision (PRCS) category is higher risk and higher-need. As noted earlier, the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) is required to classify
offenders only by their present commitment offense. In other words, a person with a
history of violence or serious crime, but has a less serious current conviction, qualifies for
local probation supervision pursuant to AB 109. In fact, the biggest point of controversy
with AB 109—across the board—is the fact that released prisoners are now reassigned to
county-probation regardless of their prior criminal record. Assignment to PRCS is
determined only by the current prison conviction offenses regardless of prior record,
mental health status, or in-prison behavior. Based upon the CDCR’s statistics, parolees
released from prison have a 67.5% chance of returning to prison in the first year of their
release, so this is indeed a high-risk group for probation to supervise. Petersilia found
that a large percentage of California prisoners have served six or more prior criminal
sentences (29%) and nearly 50% had served three or more prior sentences.17

17

Petersilia, Joan. “Understanding California Corrections.” (2006).
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/carc/understand_ca_corrections.pdf.

180

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The inclusion of these former parolees into local probation caseloads is accounting for
the higher-than-expected risk level of the realigned populations. The CDCR’s research
division is tracking the characteristics of prisoners being realigned to county
probation/PRCS versus those being retained on state parole. Their data reveal that in
the first year after Realignment passed, prisoners sent to PRCS were more likely to have a
“high” California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA) score than those retained by the state on
parole: 55% of PRCS offenders scored “high” risk compared with 44% of those retained
on state parole.18
In the first year of Realignment, Los Angeles County probation received 11,136 offenders
released from state prison and assigned to Los Angeles County probation. Of those who
reported to probation for assessment, 59% were classified as high risk, 40% as medium
risk and only 1% as low risk.19 The department originally projected that 50% of the
offenders coming out of state prison would be classified on the CDCR’s risk assessment
tool as high risk.
San Bernardino County reported similarly statistics showing that 58% of the offenders
the received during the first 18 months of AB 109 scored “high risk,” and of the 4,828
PRCS offenders that had been released to probation, fully 1,515 (32%) of them had a
prior conviction for a violent or serious offense.20 Not only did San Bernardino County
receive 26% more total offenders than they were told to expect, their risk level was far
more serious.21
It is critically important to remember that those identified as “low” and “medium” risk
prisoners using California’s risk assessment tool have historically had high recidivism
rates. A recent study by the CDCR tracked the cohort of prisoners released in 2007-2008
for three years. By the end of the three years, 41% of prisoners classified as “low risk” and
57% of those classified as “medium risk” were returned to a California prison. While
these recidivism rates were lower than for prisoners classified as “high risk” (who had a
74% return-to-prison rate within three years), most would not consider an average 50%
return-to-prison rate “low risk.” It is better thought of as lower risk (and it is important to
recall that this figure represents a return to a California prison, not re-arrest, return to
jail, or return to another state or federal prison). Susan Turner at the University of
California, Irvine, who developed California’s risk assessment tool, reported that 10% of
18

Seale, Lee. “A Preliminary Examination of Public Safety Realignment CDCR Institution and State
Parole/PRCS Data.” Association for Criminal Justice Research (California) 76th Semi-Annual Meeting
(2012). http://www.acjrca.org/images/ppf12/1seale.pptx.
19
Sewell, Abby. “L.A. County seeing high-risk offenders entering its probation system.” Los Angeles Times
(November 30, 2012). http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/30/local/la-me-realignment-20121130.
20
“AB 109 Public Safety Realignment Act: 18-month Overview.” San Bernardino County Community
Corrections Partnership (2013).
21
Ibid. at 4.

181

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
those classified as “low risk” and 21% of those classified as “moderate risk” were
rearrested for a violent felony within three years of release.22 So, regardless of how one
slices the data, California counties are dealing with a risky offender population. The
challenge in California’s Realignment experiment is whether evidence-based
alternatives—which for the most part have been tested on lower risk populations—can
work here.
Reintegrating former prisoners is further complicated by the fact that they now possess a
prior prison record, which carries its own social stigma and limits their ability to get
housing, employment, and the other types of social support needed. And prison is
thought to be criminogenic, meaning that offenders who have been there are likely to
have been made worse by the experience, initiating or strengthening gang ties, suffering
psychological and physical impairments, and severing ties with community and family
members needed for reentry success. Research also shows that rehabilitation
programming needs to be provided immediately upon release, as many parolees return
to crime very quickly without assistance. For all of these reasons, probation officials
voiced their concerns, not that they couldn’t ever deal with this population effectively,
but rather that a phased-in approach would have been more prudent.
As we have repeatedly stated, not all counties are similarly impacted. Sadly however,
those counties least able to handle the influx of sex offenders, the mentally ill, and
higher-risk offenders (often with gang ties) are the counties that getting a
disproportionate number of these offenders back. The economic situation in many
California counties has forced the reduction of mental health clinics and other social
services, as well as having to lay off law enforcement officers. Realignment certainly
infuses much needed funding to these hard-hit counties, but probation wonders whether
it will be enough.
Without exception, all stakeholders interviewed in this study said that the population that
showed up at probation’s door was more serious than the state had led them to believe.
Partly because Realignment passed through the legislature so quickly, many were
unaware of the details. Realignment was pitched as a money-saving measure for the state
that would transfer low-level offenders to less costly county supervision. Of course, the
devil was in the details. Probation officials said that not only did the overall number of
probationers increase due to their responsibility for two new classes of offenders, but the

22

“2012 Outcome Evaluation Report.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (October
2012).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY_0708_Recidivism_Repor
t_10.23.12.pdf.; For data on re-arrests and reconvictions, by crime type and risk level, see Turner, Susan UC
Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections. “California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA).”
www.acjrca.org/ppt08/2.pvdmt-turner.ppt.

182

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
seriousness of the new probationers increased as well. Newly-assigned probationers had
more lengthy and serious prior criminal records, more of them had been convicted of
sex offenses, and a greater number had diagnosed mental illnesses than probation had
originally thought.
There is simply no denying that the task for probation is more challenging than ever
before in its history—and much more difficult than in the prior ISP demonstration
projects tackled. Despite these challenges, probation remains cautiously optimistic about
their ability to work with these offenders in the community, particularly if they continue
to receive the necessary funding.

Sex offenders and offenders with mental illnesses are particularly costly and challenging for
probation agents.

For those not following the details of AB 109 closely, it appeared that serious, violent and
sex offenders would remain under state supervision. AB 109 specifies that state parole
will continue to supervise offenders released from prison whose current commitment
offense is a serious23 or violent felony as defined by California Penal Code §1192.7(c) or
§667.5(c).24 Additionally, all high-risk sex offenders,25 offenders convicted of a third
strike, or persons classified as a Mentally Disordered Offender also report to parole.
However, for sex offenders to remain on state parole post-Realignment, they must be
classified as high risk. To classify as high risk, California uses the Static-99R, a well
regarded actuarial assessment instrument that estimates the probability of sexual
recidivism. The Static-99R is administered by the CDCR for all offenders convicted of a
current registrable sex offense. This assessment is administered in an interview setting by
probation/parole officers, correctional case managers, and mental health professionals.26
This instrument classifies an offender’s risk level for a new sex offense as either low,
moderate-low, moderate-high, or high. Offenders that score moderate-high (4-5) or high
(6+) are classified as high-risk, are supervised by parole agents after release from prison,
and monitored with GPS technology. County probation officers supervise all low and
moderate-low risk sex offenders. High-risk sex offenders have between a 21% and 38%

23

California Penal Code §1192.7.All code sections refer to the California Penal Code.
California Penal Code §667.5(c).
25
California Penal Code §290.
26
Gies, Stephen V. et al. “Monitoring High-Risk Sex Offenders With GPS Technology: An Evaluation of the
California Supervision Program Final Report “ (2012).
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238481.pdf.
24

183

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
chance of re-offending, while non-high-risk offenders have between a 4% and 19%
chance of re-offending.27
Parole therefore supervises sex offenders released from prison with a high-risk
determination or sex offenders on parole for a serious or violent commitment offense.
As of August 29, 2011, parole supervised 9,912 sex offenders. Slightly over 2,000 of these
parolees were considered high-risk.28 So, it is estimated that parole will continue to
supervise just about 20% of all sex offenders being released from prison, but probation
officers were supervise the low and moderate risk sex offenders (about 80%) being
released.
And, if state supervised sex offenders (the high risk) violate their technical parole
conditions, they too (like all other revoked offenders) must be handled with county (not
state) sanctions. Prison is no longer allowed for sex offenders monitored by either the
state (high-risk) or monitored by the counties (low- and medium-risk) who violate
conditions of supervision. This parole revocation process shifted dramatically with AB
109; all technical violations of parole, which used to be served in state prison, are now
served in county jail. Technical parole violations now trigger a maximum six-month term
in county jail, as opposed to the pre-Realignment one-year prison sentence.
A similar misunderstanding is occurring in the handling of persons with mental illness.
AB 109 dictates that persons classified as a Mentally Disordered Offender (MDO) must
be released to parole and as a condition of their parole, they must receive treatment
either through the Department of Mental Health or through the Conditional Release
Program (CONREP). Being classified by the CDCR as a “Mentally Disordered Offender”
has a very specific meaning. The Board of Parole Hearings can classify an individual as
an MDO and impose mental health treatment as a condition of parole when it finds that
the parolee meets the following criteria: (1) the prisoner has a severe mental disorder,
(2) the prisoner used force or violence or caused serious bodily injury in one of the
prisoner's commitment crimes, (3) the severe mental disorder was one of the causes of or
was an aggravating factor in the commission of the crime for which the prisoner was
sentenced to prison, (4) the prisoner's severe mental disorder was not in remission or
cannot be kept in remission without treatment, (5) the prisoner had been in treatment
for the severe mental disorder for 90 days or more within the year prior to the prisoner's
parole or release, and (6) as a result of the severe mental disorder, the prisoner
represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.

27
28

Ibid.
Ibid.

184

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The CDCR found that 30% of the N3s and PRCS clients have mental health problems
(e.g., schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, severe depression).29 A comprehensive RAND
report on health care needs of prisoners returning home, reports an even higher figure.
That study found that 55% of California inmates report recent mental health problems
and 58% reported drug abuse or dependence problems.30 And with the new revocation
process, even high-risk sex offenders and those with mental illness who violate parole
conditions must get sent back to the county for treatment and sanctioning. They cannot
be returned to state prison. Only prisoners who were released after serving life terms or
three strikes sentences can be punished with prison revocation if they commit a technical
violation. This is an important often-missed point: While the initial post-prison
supervision for high risk sex offenders and those with serious mental health issues is still
handled by state parole agents, any violation of that parole is now handled by county
judges, county jail, and county probation supervision. Again, this adds to a higher-risk
offender population being under the supervision of county courts and probation
officials.
In 2013, Senator Ted Lieu D-Torrance became particularly concerned with a facet of the
violation procedure: The number of sex offenders who were cutting off their electronic
monitoring devices and facing no consequences. As of March 2013, California supervised
9,582 sex offenders on electronic bracelets, and if an active parolee violates a condition
of his curfew, leaves an inclusion zone, enters an exclusion zone or tampers with his
device, the officer is notified and some sanction should be implemented.31 Citing an
“alarming increase of parolees monitored by GPS” removing or disabling these devices
over the last few years, which is a parole violation, California State Senator Ted W. Lieu
introduced Senate Bill 57: Electronic Monitoring: Removing or Disabling GPS Device:
Offense (SB 57) on January 7, 2013.32 As the law currently stands, a parole violation
triggers a maximum 180 days in county jail—but the penalty is not mandatory and
violators often serve far less time due to good time credits and overcrowded jails.
In explaining the need for Senate Bill 57, Lieu said that “[a]n increasing number of
California parolees are cutting off their GPS monitoring devices because they’re

29

“Realignment Report: A One-year Examination of Offenders Released from State Prison in the First Six
Months of Public Safety Realignment.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Realignment/docs/Realignment%206%20Month%20Report%20Final_5%2016%
2013%20v1.pdf.
30
Davis, Lois M. et al., The RAND Corporation. “Understanding the Public Health Implications of Prisoner
Reentry in California.” (2011).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1165.pdf.
31
“Sex Offender Information Overview.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Sex_Offender_Facts/index.html.
32
Sen. Ted W. Lieu's statement on parolee arrested for murder after cutting off GPS-monitoring bracelet.
California State Senate (March 1, 2013).

185

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
convinced little will happen to them.” He continues, “Cutting off an ankle bracelet is a
parole violation, which can incur 180 days in county jail. When you count in the
overcrowded county jails and other factors, sometimes they don’t serve any time, or
sometimes just a few days.”33 Since amended, the current form of the bill provides for
specific penalties if a person who is required to register as a sex offender and who is
subject to parole supervision removes or disables an electronic GPS or other monitoring
device affixed as a condition of parole. For the first violation, parole shall be revoked
and the parolee shall be incarcerated in county jail for 180 days. The individual would
not be entitled to earn any time credits and will be required to serve all 180 days in actual
custody. For the second violation, parole shall be revoked and the parolee shall be
incarcerated in county jail for 365 days. Again, the individual will receive no time credits
and must spend all 365 days in actual custody. And for the third violation, the parolee
shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months,
two years or three years. And for any sex offender released from state prison after serving
a term for a third or subsequent violation of these provisions, he will be released on
parole as a sex offender.34
“When sex offenders know that there are little or no repercussions for cutting off their
GPS monitoring devices, it’s time to strengthen the deterrent,” Lieu said after the
legislation passed the Senate Floor. “Real deterrents for sex offenders drastically reduce
the likelihood they will commit another crime.” Sex offenders have significantly higher
recidivism rates when they are not being monitored, Lieu explains. SB 57 will give these
sex offenders second thoughts about roaming free while on parole.”35 He also asserts that
“[b]y making this crime a new felony under threat of returning dangerous parolees to
prison, we send the message that parolees can no longer cut off their ankle bracelets with
little or no consequence.”36 On April 30, 2013, SB 57 received enough votes for passage
out of the Senate Public Safety Committee, where it was amended to narrow the scope to
sex offender parolees, rather than all parolees. The bill is now being considered by the
Senate Appropriations Committee.
Offenders with histories of sex offenses and mental health issues not only are high risk
and high need, they are more costly to supervise. Such offenders present higher public
33

“Press Release: Sen. Ted W. Lieu introduces plan making it a felony for parolees to cut off GPS-aided
ankle bracelets.” (January 7, 2013). http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-01-07-sen-ted-w-lieu-introducesplan-making-it-felony-parolees-cut-gps-aided-ankle-bracele.
34
California State Senate. Electronic Monitoring: Removing or Disabling GPS Device: Offense SB 57.
(2013).
35
“Press Release: Sen. Lieu’s legislation a major deterrent for paroled sex offenders.” (May 28, 2013).
http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-05-28-sen-lieu-s-legislation-major-deterrent-paroled-sex-offenders.
36
“Press Release: New data supports Sen. Ted W. Lieu’s legislation to crackdown on parolees who remove
GPS-ankle bracelets.” (February 11, 2013). http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-02-11-new-data-supportssen-ted-w-lieu-s-legislation-crackdown-parolees-who-remove-gps-ank.

186

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
safety issues, are harder to place in residential housing and programming, and consume a
higher than average level of resources. A common complaint heard during our
probation interviews was that the Department of Finance (DOF) based its formula on the
“average” offender—but these offenders are not “average” and just as they cost the State
more than the current $50,000 average to house, so too will they cost the counties more
than the average “$25,000” per inmate that the DOF formula provides. Counties believe
that the formula should be weighted by a more detailed assessment of the risks and needs
each offender represents, not simply on the overall number of offenders returning to the
county.

The short implementation timeline exacerbated probation’s challenges in hiring staff and
securing rehabilitation programming, particularly in service poor counties. Highest-need
offenders may have been less likely to receive appropriate services in the first year postRealignment. The situation is improving.

All interviewed stakeholders lamented the short timeframe for AB 109 implementation.
This timeframe had the greatest impact on probation services, as these services need to
match an offender’s risk and need profile with appropriate local programming.
There were four practical problems with the quick implementation: only in rare instances
did probation have an opportunity to assess offenders prior to the probationer’s initial
“check-in,” the number of staff was insufficient to complete necessary assessments, and
once assessments were completed (usually within a month), the appropriate services were
not yet in place to serve the clients. Moreover, many departments’ risk assessment tools
had not yet been purchased or sufficient staff trained on how to administer it.
But by October 1, 2011, AB 109 funding had been allocated and offenders started
arriving at probation’s door. Counties had to assemble their CCPs, set up accounts and
procedures to receive state funds, and create a new system to support Realignment. This
initial phase often took several months.
The following provides an account of Los Angeles County Chief Probation Officer Jerry
Powers’ experience with Realignment’s timeline:
I would have preferred to have a much larger or longer period before this started,
but this was essentially cooked and presented to us in about a 90-day period, so if
you’re going to bring in a thousand new offenders a month, that’s going to take
additional resources, from probation staff to support staff to mental health staff,
staff, substance abuse treatment providers, and all of that. You can’t simply do
that within a 90-day period. Realistically, it takes a year to get up to speed for any
187

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
type of a program. Certainly something this large of a magnitude, it’s going to
take at least a year to ramp up and start providing the services that you want to
provide.37
The same sentiment was echoed by virtually all of our interviewees. Chief Taylor of Santa
Barbara County labeled the short time frame “the biggest challenge to date.” Chief Hake
described two troublesome aspects of Realignment in Riverside County, the first of which
was the short timeline (the second had to do with basing PRCS eligibility on the current
commitment offense). When asked what he would have done differently with
Realignment, Solano County’s Chief Hansen responded that it just “came too quickly.”
The quick pace of Realignment’s implementation has been a significant challenge for
hiring new staff given county government structure, which often includes a lengthy hiring
process of advertising, posting, interviewing, checking references, and giving preference
based on seniority.
The same delays were evident in contracting for services, particularly with agencies that
were not already part of the county governance structure (such as community based
organizations) or agencies that did not already have a contract with probation (such as
electronic monitoring companies). The short timeframe, coupled with the challenges of
navigating county contracting requirements, meant that any established vendors had a
competitive advantage for securing Realignment dollars. Several probation officers
mentioned that this was problematic given that these were the same providers failing to
decrease the currently high recidivism rates. The same providers dolling out the same
programs and services are not likely to reduce recidivism, but new vendors and programs
struggled to secure county contracts.
Sacramento County was challenged by this phenomenon when trying to contract with
community-based organizations, particularly non-profits and faith based groups. An
editorial in the Sacramento Bee alleged self-interest as the root of this problem:
The “deciders” on how counties divide up Realignment funds are the probation
chief, a chief of police, the sheriff, the district attorney, the public defender, the
presiding judge of the Superior Court and one department representative from
either social services, mental health or alcohol and substance abuse
programs…With this structure, no one should be surprised that the plan “deemed
to be accepted” by Sacramento County supervisors on Oct[ober] 16 allocated 69%

37

“With Realignment, Influx of Offenders Tests L.A. County : Interview of Jerry Powers.” The California
Report (December 11, 2012). http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201212110850/b.

188

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
of funds to the sheriff and 29% to the probation department—and not a dime to
successful community-based organizations. This is unacceptable.38
Given strict county governance, probation departments often needed six to nine months
to finalize contracts. The process was cumbersome and time consuming and involved
issuing requests for proposals (RFP), assessing the applicants’ quality and performance,
choosing contractors and negotiating terms. Before the RFP could be issued, the
probation department would have had to predict what services were needed—yet, as
noted above, probation did not have adequate time to properly assess their client’ needs
prior to writing the RFPs.
Several officers also mentioned a lack of infrastructure and administrative staff necessary
to monitor the quality of service providers and to ensure that probation functions
properly. Instead, the pressure to bring staff and services online quickly meant that
probation departments gave preference to in-house staff and services, often at the
expense of quality. But when the level of programming is insufficient, treatment falls to
the wayside and surveillance comes to the forefront. If history is any lesson, surveillance
without treatment uncovers more technical violations and leads to more offenders
returning to custody.
For residential treatment programs, the quick implementation process made service
delivery even more difficult, if not impossible. Residential programs, such as housing or
drug treatment, require conditional use permits to operate in neighborhoods. These
permits require a lengthy and bureaucratic process. Day reporting centers—where
offenders report daily but do not stay overnight—have the same challenge. Community
outcry against the residential programs or day reporting centers can stall or foreclose
both the possibility of a conditional use permit and a probation department’s desire to
expand residential rehabilitation programs.
Establishing rehabilitative programs has always been challenging, but the more serious
nature of the realigned clients on probation, particularly violent and sex offenders, has
further complicated this effort. Communities often restrict residential programs to nonviolent offenders, precluding those offenders with the greatest need for these services.
Ironically, because contracts for higher need inmates (e.g., sex offenders, residential
drug treatment) are more difficult to secure, probation staff are seeing offenders with the
lowest needs get services quicker than those with the highest needs.
In sum, most probation departments’ staffing levels and treatment options were
inadequate following Realignment’s implementation. This is particularly unfortunate
38

“Editorial: Flaws in prison realignment need to be fixed.” The Sacramento Bee (November 5, 2012).
http://www.sacbee.com/2012/11/05/4960488/flaws-in-prison-realignment-need.html.

189

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
given that a large proportion of parolees who return to prison fail in the first weeks and
months after release. As a National Research Council study on the topic concluded:
“Given these data, it is difficult to overstate the importance for parolees and their
communities of access to both supportive and transitional reentry services in those first
days, weeks, and months out of prison.”39 Realignment left a gap in supervision and
treatment for many of these offenders.
Those counties and offenders with the greatest need for programs and services have felt
these deficiencies most acutely. In resource-rich counties—counties that had historically
developed a fuller spectrum of intermediate sanction programs for offenders—the
existing contracts could simply expand capacity. For example, Santa Barbara County had
two Day Reporting Centers that were operational prior to AB 109’s implementation.
Those centers were expanded resulting in a rather seamless process of incorporating the
new AB 109 clients into services and programs. As a result, Santa Barbara County had a
rather seamless process of incorporating new AB 109 clients into the probation system.
Similarly, Santa Clara County, long known for historically investing in a full array of
therapeutic courts (for the mentally ill, veterans, substance abusers), had already worked
closely with community-based organizations and could simply expand treatment slots.
On the other hand, the challenge was much greater for counties with fewer resources
and a weak historical commitment to funding community treatment. Even though
Realignment set up statewide rules and mandates, the counties were required to
implement them, and each county has a distinct social and economic profile.
California’s wealthy dot the coastal counties and northern California. But California also
had the highest percent of any state population living below the poverty line. A new
supplemental measure released last year by the U.S. Census Bureau puts California at the
top of the list with a poverty rate of 23%. Amongst California’s counties, the highest
poverty rates are in the Central Valley and other agricultural regions. In Merced, Fresno,
Kern, Tulare, and Imperial Counties, more than a quarter of the households have
incomes below the poverty line.40 In fact, three of the five most impoverished
metropolitan areas in the nation are in the Central Valley. The poverty rate, combined
with the housing crisis—which decreased taxes for government services—has led a
number of counties and cities to seek bankruptcy protection for its budget shortfalls.
Stockton (the largest U.S. county to ever file bankruptcy), San Bernardino, and several
other cities in Los Angeles, Fresno, and Alameda Counties are now listed among the
nation’s most fiscally troubled cities.

39

“Parole, Desistance from Crime, and Community Integration.” National Research Council Committee on
Community Supervision and Desistance from Crime (2007).
40
Weintraub, Daniel. “California is richest, poorest state.” California Health Report (May 27, 2013).
http://www.healthycal.org/archives/12177.

190

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
These individualized and varied fiscal pressures heavily influenced Realignment’s
implementation in the different counties, particularly in the first year. In the years
leading up to Realignment, poorer counties had often cut social services, the exact kinds
of services probation departments needed to assist realigned offenders. Many probation
and police officers had lost their jobs in counties that decreased its workforce to address
budget crises. Realignment gave counties the funds and opportunity to hire back these
valued staff. These circumstances help explain why Realignment budget allocations
included very few treatment contracts (except in wealthier counties with existing
contractors) and mostly staff hiring (especially in the poorer communities).
This funding pattern may have been necessary in order to assess and monitor offenders,
but it will not prove sufficient in the long run if quality treatment is not secured. Of
course, the problem is compounded in more economically stressed communities--few
treatment providers exist in communities that do not historically invest in treatment.
Treatment providers have often had to shut their doors due to lack of funding. Many
have moved to wealthier communities. So even when funding became available, there
was a dearth of local providers to work with.
The lack of sufficient implementation time also meant that counties often did not have
time to assess programs established on evidence-based practices or, once funded, to
monitor the quality of services being delivered. Chief Meyer explains that the biggest
roadblock has been ensuring the proper use of evidence-based practices by the
community-based organizations. Probation must make requests for proposals, or “RFPs,”
for the community-based organizations, provide for oversight and accountability, and, in
certain cases, train the community-based organization—all of which takes time.
According to Chief Meyer, the process was taking four times longer than the department
had anticipated. For all of its programs, says Santa Barbara County Chief Taylor, “If we’re
paying for services, and it’s being contracted through probation, we want it to be an
evidence-based curriculum.”
The urgency to solve the state’s prison crowding crisis created an unrealistic timeline,
and failed to recognize the county context in which services were to be identified and
delivered to criminal offenders. As Los Angeles County Chief Jerry Powers observed:
None of us in local government asked to take this program on, but I think the
pragmatists among us who said, “well, the alternative was that the Supreme Court
say, ‘state prisons, open your doors and let out 30,000 individuals and get in

191

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
compliance.’” So, given the potential alternatives out there, I think this is probably
the best of the worst.41
Good policy would have dictated either a phased-in approach for AB 109 or pilot
programs in several smaller counties. As Angela Hawkins, a researcher studying
Realignment, observed, “California thinks small, and acts big.” She, like many others,
believes the state should have piloted Realignment before implementing the policy on a
statewide basis.
But almost two years into Realignment, most of the probation officials we interviewed
believe these pressures are now easing. The demand for offender programming is
beginning to bring good treatment providers into the harder hit California counties, a
necessity for reducing recidivism offender recidivism rates.

Despite challenges, virtually all probation departments are moving to evidence-based
principles and practices. Risk assessment tools now nearly universally used in California
probation agencies.

An assessment that measures an offender’s risk of reoffending and need factors is
foundational to the placement in and success of “evidence-based” practices. Correctional
assessments that measure an offender’s needs and risk of reoffending can be likened to
an intake exam when you go to the hospital. It is designed to provide the necessary
information to aid professionals in the treatment and management of one’s care.
Essentially, correctional risk/needs assessments provide the management tool to identify
what services an offender needs and what risks he poses to the community. Virtually all
risk assessment tools include a semi-structured thirty-minute interview with the client and
a review of the criminal record, ideally completed by a probation officer.
Once information on criminal history, alcohol/drug abuse and employment history is
collected, a computer program provides a recommended probation classification level.
This classification level is produced by on an algorithm (mathematical formula) based on
scientific research on other offenders. It identifies the offender’s probability of
recidivism and areas in need of services or surveillance. The most widely used
assessments are computerized and have several accompanying materials, including tools
for probation management, recording progress, and determining eligibility for
supervision discharge. Using these actuarial tools has been associated with reduced
recidivism.
41

“With Realignment, Influx of Offenders Tests L.A. County: Interview of Jerry Powers.” The California
Report (December 11, 2012). http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201212110850/b.

192

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
As discussed in Chapter 1, AB 109 strongly recommends that the county use its funding
to secure services consistent with evidence-based practices. As such, the first order of
business for most probation departments was to purchase an evidence-based risk
assessment tool. Many probation departments had already begun the process of
purchasing these risk assessment tools, as previous legislation (SB 678 and SB 81) had
provided seed money for assessing risk and need of juvenile and adult probationers.
Realignment provided counties with an opportunity to extend their risk assessment to
adult felons and parolees.
As shown in Figure 13, which summarizes programs counties described in detail (for at
least one paragraph) in their 2011-2012 AB 109 CCP plans, 48 out of the 58 spoke about
implementing or expanding risk assessment, either purchasing the tool or hiring or
training staff to complete the assessments.42

42

Note that Figure 13 includes AB 109 activities regardless of what agency is receiving the funding.

193

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Figure 13: Programs and Services Discussed in Depth in AB 109 CCP Plans, First
Year, All Counties Combined
Benefits and Economic Supports
Cognitive Behavioral Intervention
Community Meetings/ Education
Community Service
Contracting Out for Services
Day Reporting Centers
Education Support
Electronic Monitoring
Employment Support
Evidence-Based Programming
Expanding existing jails
Faith Based Organizations
Family Involvement
Flash Incarceration
Gender-specific Programming
High-Risk Probation Units
Hiring/ Training Law Enforcement
Hiring/training correctional staff
Hiring/Training for Probation
Data Collection
Mental Health Treatment
Mentoring Program
Parenting Classes
Partnership With Community Orgs
Physical Healthcare
Pre-Trial Programming
Reentry Team/ Program
Reopening closed jail space
Risk Assessment
Self Help and Peer Support Networks
Specialized Housing
Specialty Courts
Substance Abuse Treatment
Using LE for post-release surveillance
Vocational Training
Weapons /Arming Probation Officers*
Work Release
0

7
15
22
29
36
44
51
Number of Counties Discussing Program/Service
(Discussion of at Least 1 Paragraph)

58

Note: “Depth” was calculated as a county discussing a particular program or service for at least one
paragraph, or if the county spoke in particular detail (i.e. gave the name of a specific community
organization with which it planned to work. For more detail, see Abarbanel, Sara, Angela McCray, Kathryn
McCann Newhall, and Jessica Snyder "Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’
AB 109 2011-2012 Implementation Plans." Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2013).
*For Weapons/Arming Probation Officers, if a county mentioned doing this, it was given credit for this
graph. This was because talking in depth about either arming probation officers or weapons training is
difficult.

194

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment’s success story is the widespread adoption of risk assessment tools, which are
not only being used by probation agencies but also by sheriffs to make pretrial decisions.
Over time, this development will not only professionalize operations and make criminal
justice decision-making more predictable, but it should lead to reduced recidivism and
crime. It is another tool in the “Realignment tool belt” to assure that the most dangerous
are incarcerated and those who will respond to services are identified and treated.
Counties are using different types of assessments, mostly dictated by historical accident
(whether they purchased and provided training on an instrument before or after
Realignment). Sacramento County uses the Level of Service/Case Management
Inventory (LS/CMI), while Santa Clara County uses the Correctional Assessment and
Intervention System (CAIS). While just two years ago Santa Barbara County was just in
beginning stages, the county now uses COMPAS. Riverside County used to employ an
offense-based classification system, but now also uses COMPAS. Researchers have found
that the particular instrument being used is not particularly important because they all
record similar data and produce similar recidivism prediction accuracy.
Ideally, the risk assessment process should begin prior to release from prison or jail. For
example, Sacramento County is sending officers into prisons to meet with PRCS
offenders before their release. The prisons limit each visit to fifteen minutes, so officers
often visit with the offender twice. The officer will provide the inmate with literature
about the services available under PRCS.
While Santa Clara County initially did the same, the county eventually determined the
process to be impractical: The soon-to-be-released inmates are spread throughout the
state and, according to Deputy Chief Fletcher, the process drained resources. In
addition, because the rate of newly released prisoners not showing up to initial probation
appointments has been very low, the visits were not cost-effective. In the future, Santa
Clara County may transfer prospective PRCS clients to the local jail for their last thirty
days in custody—targeting high risk offenders, such as gang-involved, severely mentally
ill, and homeless individuals—in order to make building a relationship easier. In
contrast, Chief Hansen of Solano County has never had the ability to send officers into
non-local facilities to meet clients before their release. Santa Barbara County also has no
current plans to send officers into prisons.
Regardless of whether the assessment is conducted before or after release, the officer
must match the recommended protocol with quality services soon after the offender
returns to the community. Yet, as discussed above, an officer’s ability to send a
probationer to the recommended treatment or surveillance program is often impaired or
significantly delayed because of implementation challenges.

195

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Although these implementation challenges must be addressed, an upside of Realignment
has been California’s development of a statewide system of assessing the risk and needs of
its total adult offender population (the prison system began assessing all prisoners using
the COMPAS risk assessment tool in 2009). Probation has historically lacked the means
to effectively use data for planning and problem-solving. So if this information was
consolidated across the 58 counties, it could provide the first-ever statewide assessment of
the seriousness and needs of offenders--across counties, across agencies, and across time.
The importance of this achievement should not be overlooked. It could be incorporated
by the state Department of Finance in its future Realignment allocations. At a county
level, the data could be used by the county Community Corrections Partnerships and the
Board of Supervisors to divide state dollars, assuring that the funding allocation matches
the needs of each offender population. From a research standpoint, this data provides
baseline offender-level information and would allow for a comparison of offenders across
counties subjected to different types of programs and services. Eventually, the use of risk
assessment tools might be seen not only as an individual-level assessment to match needs
with services, but also as a planning tool to appropriately allocate revenue streams to
agencies and counties with the greatest needs. This database would also allow California
to track its offender profiles over time and could be used as a baseline evaluation tool for
assessing Realignment and other policy initiatives.

Probation agencies are implementing some truly innovative programs. The most promising
are collaborations with law enforcement and private corrections.

With respect to programmatic offerings for offenders, the second year of Realignment
looked quite different from the first. Programs delayed by hiring and contracting
holdups began accepting clients (e.g., Day Reporting Centers, One-Stop Centers in San
Bernardino, San Mateo and Santa Clara Counties). And the third year of Realignment
will likely result in many more program offerings. Probation staff across California
counties displayed heroic efforts in implementing these programs. In contrast to the ISP
experiments of the 1980s, program and surveillance efforts are being supported with
significant funding.
Some of the most promising program options being funded are Day Reporting Centers,
often described as “one-stop” centers for programs, services, and supervision. Individuals
can receive access to educational programs, employment assistance, and tutoring, among
other services. But given the high cost of operating a center, they were unlikely to be
funded without AB 109 money. In the first year of Realignment, 21 day reporting centers
were discussed in depth (at least one paragraph) to be implemented or expanded with

196

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Realignment dollars.43 Counties with plans to begin or expand day reporting include
Humboldt, Tuolumne, Sacramento, Butte, Merced, Kern, Lake, Madera, Napa, Orange,
and Yuba Counties. Currently, there is no research-based consensus on the effectiveness
of day reporting, as the wide range of services, differences in structure, and eligible
participants make it very difficult to draw any broad-based conclusions.
While we have not been able to evaluate these programs yet, we do know that many of
them contain some of the core ingredients that have predicted success in other
programs: the comprehensive offering of services and cross-agency collaboration.
In many ways, Santa Clara County is a model for other counties. Deputy Chief Karen
Fletcher has worked for the department for 23 years, including over seven as Deputy
Chief. According to Fletcher, the new population the county is serving is part of a
“continuum” that includes clients the county had been serving pre-Realignment. Even
though the county is also dealing with more sophisticated offenders, Santa Clara County
has succeeded in leveraging AB 109 funding to provide rehabilitative programming for
the entire continuum of probationers. The county has also prioritized data collection
and maintaining strong, open communication with other stakeholders.
Prior to Realignment, Santa Clara County had already begun implementing evidencebased programming. Realignment expanded the county’s ability to target clients based
on their individual risk and criminogenic needs. Originally, offenders relied heavily on
referrals to external organizations because the county could not provide services to its
clients. Realigned clients, however, now have access to services in-house and the county
has the infrastructure to use various intermediate sanctions.
Post-Realignment, Santa Clara County Probation directly supervises and contracts with
service providers. The county slowly and deliberately identified those programs that best
meet offenders’ needs and encouraged cross-agency collaboration. The Custody
Alternative Sentencing Unit is an example of county jail and probation working together
to make supervision a “fluid” process. After serving half of a 90-day term, offenders can
get released into programming. Similarly, because Santa Clara County does not yet face
overcrowding in its jails, probation has been able to rely on intermediate sanctions,
including flash incarceration, that give bite to the county’s authority to remonstrate
offenders that violate probation conditions.
An important change since Realignment, according to Chief Fletcher, is that the county
is now able to pay for substance abuse, mental health, and cognitive behavior treatment
services for its clients, whereas before it could only make referrals. The main service hub
is the Re-entry Resource Center, which houses many agencies under one roof, including
43

Thirty counties at least mentioned Day Reporting Centers in their CCP plan.

197

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
probation, the Sheriff, the Department of Alcohol & Drug Services, mental health, social
services, and community-based organizations. Community-based organizations compete
to serve the population through the county’s RFP process, many of which are still
“gear[ing] up” to provide services.
In light of such fundamental shifts, the county has approached hiring and training of
probation officers cautiously. Those officers supervising the AB 109 population were
handpicked from the pre-existing ranks for their experience with difficult caseloads.
Moreover, in hiring probation officers, Santa Clara County is now “looking for folks with
that balance of social services and criminal justice.” The county has also made a
significant investment in training officers to use assessment tools properly. Santa Clara
County has been able to reduce caseloads of high-risk offenders to 30 and offenders are
seen a minimum of three time a month, including at least one time at the offender’s
residence.
However, security concerns have led the county to choose to arm some probation
officers. Currently, 44 of 350 probation officers are armed. County officials say that the
choice to arm officers has not privileged applicants with law enforcement backgrounds.
Santa Clara County Probation is most concerned with ensuring that staff understand the
county’s mission to use probation as a platform for rehabilitation, not as an another arm
of law enforcement.
In addition to addressing offenders’ needs, Santa Clara County Probation is also
cognizant of victims’ concerns arising out of Realignment. Offender restitution accounts
for PRCS offenders are still maintained through the state—not the county—which has
proved problematic. However, the county created a restitution caseload with around five
hundred probationers. Santa Clara County has been vigilant in identifying whether an
offender’s crimes are associated with a victim and in monitoring whether or not the
offender is paying restitution. Though an offender with no probation violations for
twelve months should be released, probation can be revoked if the officer can prove that
the offender willfully failed to pay restitution.
Another exemplary component of Santa Clara County’s model is its dedication to data
collection. On a monthly basis, the county provides data to the County Executive, who
tracks what referrals have been made, which clients attend treatment, and what barriers
prevent clients from attending treatment. Probation and police both rely on databases
including the Criminal Justice Information Control (CJIC) and COPLINK, which not
only helps to improve communication between local probation and police, but also
between counties.

198

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Santa Clara County’s successes have not come without significant challenges. Santa Clara
County has struggled to expand services beyond the AB 109 population. The county has
interpreted the bill to limit the spending of AB 109 funding to that population only. Of
the 18,000 individuals on probation in the county, 5,000 are only subject to random drug
testing and restitution. Many of these 5,000 offenders are high-risk and would benefit
from access to AB 109 programs.
Several other counties were mentioned in interviews as exemplary models of innovative
AB 109 implementation. These included San Francisco, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara,
Santa Clara, San Mateo, Orange, and San Diego Counties. The San Francisco Adult
Probation Department (SFAPD) was awarded the prestigious American Probation and
Parole Association’s President’s Award in 2013 for its significant accomplishments. Their
efforts to implement evidence-based corrections post-Realignment are widely respected.
These efforts entailed the launch of an 18,000 square foot Reentry Community
Assessment and Services Center, a one-stop service center that co-locates SFAPD’s
probation supervision with wraparound support provided by Leaders in Community
Alternatives, Inc. and other vital public and community based partners. The SFAPD also
partnered with the Sheriff’s Department and the CDCR to return inmates to local jails to
receive individualized reentry services, education, parenting, housing, employment,
substance abuse treatment and other services 60 days prior to completion of their prison
sentence back.
Across the state, adult probation services are implementing pilot projects that, if
successful, will pave the way for strengthening community corrections statewide and
nationally. Given that Realignment funding is now constitutionally guaranteed, and the
California Penal Code requires counties to supervise many offenders at the local level,
California should serve as a hotbed for innovative community programs and sanctions.
This potential is not only promising for California, but should provide valuable lessons
that can assist communities and states searching for feasible prison diversion options.

Realignment exaggerates the two historical sides of probation: its rehabilitative side and its
tough-on-crime side. Arming more probation offices is emerging as a controversial and
unresolved issue.

Probation officers serve two primary roles. They provide supervision, which involves
monitoring the probationer’s compliance with court ordered conditions, and assist the
probationer in successfully dealing with the causes of his criminality. The traditional dual
roles have been described in simple terms as part police officer, part social worker.
Realignment exaggerates both sides of these roles because AB 109 emphasizes the use of

199

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
evidence-based practices aimed at reducing recidivism, while also simultaneously
introducing a higher-risk clientele in greater need of monitoring and surveillance.
The balance between rehabilitation and supervision is hard to strike. Chief Meyer of
Sacramento County explains his struggle with the current focus on surveillance. “This is
not a system that changes quickly,” he explains. “It has taken the better part of eight or
nine years to get our agency going in the right direction— that’s all the evidence-based,
we call it drinking the evidence-based Kool-Aid.” He explained that probation faces
strong outside resistance: “They still—as did I up until a number of years ago—thought
that hook ’em, book ’em, jail ’em, tail ’em, nail ’em…. Much of the culture still thinks
punishment is the only answer, but they don’t want to pay for it.” As for Sacramento
County’s hiring, Meyer does not believe that this rehabilitative shift within probation has
affected hiring—in fact, Sacramento County has not made any new hires in three years;
all of the hiring has been from a re-hire list of 400 people who were previously laid off.
According to Solano County’s Chief Hansen, the county is just now “changing the way
they do business,” and shifting toward the use of evidence-based practices. He believes
the transition will take some time; a similar shift took five years in his previous position in
the State of Nevada. To aid the process, Chief Hansen is using outside consultants to
help nudge the county in a “smart on crime” direction. His current goal is to convince
the “middle eighty percent” of employees to broaden their perspectives, as opposed to
focusing on 10% who “will run away from change” or the 10% already in support of
evidence-based practices. Chief Hansen also stated that is crucial for supervisors to
believe in these practices in order for line officers to follow.
According to Santa Barbara County’s Chief Taylor, the county had been incorporating
greater rehabilitation efforts before AB 109. But Realignment allowed the department to
make quicker and greater headway. Although Chief Taylor believes some probation
officers were using motivational interviewing before Realignment, staff are now being
properly trained and held accountable in that skill. Moreover, officers have been
positively influenced by witnessing a successful transformation of juvenile probation,
which coordinates with wrap-around services.
Yet, while probation is working to expand treatment opportunities, the overall higher risk
level of probationers has initiated a statewide conversation about whether to arm more
probation officers. After all, county probation officers are tasked with supervising former
state parolees—and state parole officers are armed because of the high-risk population
they supervise. If those offenders are the very same population now supervised by
probation, should probation officers also be armed?

200

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
California law (AB 1968) authorizes any probation officer or deputy probation officer to
carry firearms, but only as determined by the chief probation officer on a case-by-case or
unit-by-unit basis. While the vast majority of California probation departments
(approximately 80%) arm at least some of their officers,44 the actual number of officers
authorized to carry weapons is much smaller. And of those that were armed preRealignment, the majority supervised specialized gang or drug task forces or sex offender
compliance teams, not the general probation population.
Arming probation officers not only affects firearms training and ongoing resources, it
also can undermine probation’s rehabilitative focus. Whether an officer carries a gun
can drastically change the relationship between the officer and his client. As a result,
some counties have resisted the trend of arming officers.45 Moreover, the decision to arm
probation officers is potentially threatening to the role that probation has traditionally
played (and is expected to play) in the criminal justice system. One commentator
summarized the tension as follows: “The issue boils down to: Are these people law
enforcement officers, or are they treaters and helpers? …You can't be delivering
cognitive behavioral therapy with a gun strapped to your waist. The therapeutic
relationship is inhibited and destroyed by someone carrying a gun openly.”46
Regardless, many counties seem to be adopting the emergent view that firearms are a
necessary additional tool for protecting probation officers from the new higher risk
offender population.
In the late 1980’s, Santa Barbara County became the first probation department in the
state to arm its officers—specifically those with specialty caseloads. Ten years later, a
greater proportion began to be armed and currently, of the 340 probation staff
(including non-officers), 35 officers are armed. The County’s policy is that an officer has
“to demonstrate that the caseload presents a threat or is high risk.” Similarly, about 65 or
70 of over 300 probation officers are armed in Sacramento County—or, essentially all of
the officers assigned to adult fieldwork. Officers assigned to high-risk offenders in Santa
Clara County (44 of 350) are armed. Chief Hake of Riverside County estimates that once
hiring has caught up with the department’s needs, 60 of its 300 to 350 officers will be
armed.
Los Angeles County recently reported that using the LS/CMI (the most respected
risk/need assessment tool), over 65% of realigned probationers were “very high or high
risk.” The remaining 35% were “medium risk”—there were no low risk realigned
44

Senate Committee on Public Safety. Arming Probation Officers, AB 1968, 2011-2012 Regular Session,
California State Senate (July 3, 2012) at 13.
45
Alameda, Solano and Contra Costa Counties do not currently arm probation officers. Ibid. at 11.
46
Sá, Karen de. “Santa Clara County seeks to arm some probation officers.” San Jose Mercury News
(January 3, 2010). http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_14298168?nclick_check=1.

201

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
probationers.47 As a result, Los Angeles County Chief Probation Officer Jerry Powers is
making the unprecedented move of tripling the number of armed probation officers in
the county—from 30 to 100. “It is a natural response to an ever increasing number of
higher threat individuals and the operations that go along with supervising them,”
Powers told the Los Angeles Times.48
Although Riverside County intends to arm more probation officers, Chief Hake insists
that this decision will not necessarily change the culture of probation. In Riverside
County, probation officer training does not include weapons training. From the get go,
officers are instructed in “the traditional job of what probation is all about…just because
we give you a gun doesn’t mean that our goals in working these individuals [change].”
Instead, in order to be armed, officers must meet minimum experience requirements,
pass a psychological evaluation, and complete a rigorous arms training. Hake estimates
that 60% of his AB 109 caseload officers will eventually be armed.
Similarly, Los Angeles County Deputy Chief Perez stressed that the decision to arm more
probation officers does not mean the department is turning away from its traditional role
of making sure former inmates stay on the straight and narrow. “Ideally, arming is a
precautionary and defensive tool for our officers—particularly given that our officers are
expected to work with a dangerous population and, in some circumstances, in areas of
L.A. that may not be the safest,” she said.
Of the counties we interviewed, Solano County was the only one not currently arming its
officers—although that will likely change in the near future. Solano County’s Chief
Hansen is not in favor of officer’s openly carrying weapons because he believes this can
undermine an officer’s ability to build trust and understanding. However, he is in favor
of arming officers to the extent it is necessary for their safety.
Probation was designed for less serious offenders. Probation staff members work for the
county. They often have social-work degrees, they usually aren’t armed, and they are not
considered sworn law enforcement officers. Historically, probation is designed to be the
“helping” part of the criminal justice system. Yet many probation agencies are now
arming more of their officers, and there is more concern for staff safety.
Given many probation departments’ desire to arm more officers, probation departments
are looking to recruit laid off parole agents. Parole agents are being laid off in high
numbers as a result of Realignment, while probation departments are seeking to hire.
47

Perez, Margarita E. “Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011: Presentation to the L.A. County Board of
Supervisors.” (2013).
48
Villacorte, Christina. “Probation arms more of its officers to cope with Realignment.” Los Angeles Daily
News (June 3, 2013). http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130503/probation-arms-more-of-itsofficers-to-cope-with-realignment.

202

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
And because these laid off parole agents have been trained in using weapons and in
supervising high-risk offenders, they are ideal candidates for probation officer positions.
But there are serious implications to parole agents simply resettling into probation officer
positions. Parole agents are considered law enforcement officers—traditionally, they
supervised the most serious criminals. Will former parole agents be able to exchange
their “enforcement” hats for “rehabilitation” hats? Will rehabilitation programs suffer?

While probation programs are expanding, a key component of evidence-based practices is
often missing: aftercare enabled by a split sentence.

As discussed in Chapter 8, judges are not imposing split sentencing as frequently as many
county actors had hoped for. This phenomenon not only has public safety implications
given that offenders are not being monitored in the community, but it also has
implications for the effectiveness of treatment offerings. Because split sentencing is not
being used, offenders are not receiving aftercare, those re-integrative services and
resources that facilitate reentry into the community. But researchers have consistently
concluded that aftercare is necessary to reduce recidivism and should be a core principle
in all model correctional programs.
Realignment legislation offered “split sentencing” as a sentencing option to assure that
“aftercare” is delivered to offenders in need. The goals of split sentencing and aftercare
are to provide a period of formal probation or parole supervision to assist in the
transition from jail or prison to the community. Without aftercare or split sentencing,
the offender is simply released from custody into the community. So if the court does
not include a “split sentence” in its sentencing order (in which county jail felony
sentences include a mandatory period of probation supervision), neither probation nor
the sheriff can provide their post-release programmatic efforts.

Probation worries about ignoring those lower-risk probationers not funded by AB 109.

By design, AB 109 was intended to cause a chain reaction. As recently released offenders
shift to probation, probation will be forced to discharge all but the most serious
probationers. Sheriffs will be forced to release all but the most serious inmates. The
entire system will “realign,” focusing anew on the most serious offenders. This change,
and the need to guarantee public safety with scarce county resources, has meant that the
bulk of non-AB 109 probationers are now left without programming; either they are low-

203

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
risk offenders or counties have no residual funds for non-AB 109 probation populations.
Each interviewed county is painfully aware of this reality and hopes to address this deficit
with Proposition 30 funds.49
Interviewed officers expressed that the justice system virtually ignores low-level
probationers. While the “risk principle” of evidence-based practices suggests that the
most intensive resources should be applied to offenders who are at the greatest risk for
recidivism, deterrence theory suggests that if offenders are ignored, criminal behavior
may escalate and sanctions lose their deterrent value.
California policymakers are voicing concerns over this funding distribution. The state
currently invests close to $1 billion a year on AB 109 offenders. If we assume 30% goes
towards probation departments—and they invest in employment, education, and housing
opportunities for realigned offenders, the state is deploying perhaps $300 million a year
on services—a significant infusion of rehabilitation funding in California’s cash-strapped
social services system. Special need offenders outside of the AB 109 population—
including the mentally ill, developmentally disabled, and first time probationers—who
might be on lower-risk caseloads, may not have access to this significant and targeted AB
109 funding.
Also problematic is the fact that people supervised by the criminal justice system only
have access to certain programs—e.g., Section 8 housing, job training, substance abuse
counseling—because those programs sometimes limited funding and access for noncriminals.50 The Los Angeles County Housing Authority announced in September 2012
that it would move parolees to the front of the line for limited and much-sought-after
Section 8 housing vouchers, which provide rent subsidies to low-income individuals.51 A
mother, whose son is blind with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities, wrote to the
San Francisco Chronicle in an article titled “Would disabled receive better care in
prison?”52 She noted that California programs to support persons with disabilities—
including dental, healthcare, housing, work training, counseling—have all been
drastically reduced over the last five years to fund those exact programs for prisoners or
formerly incarcerated people.
49

In November 2012, Proposition 30 was passed by the California electorate ensuring continued funding
for AB 109. It is uncertain, however what limitations will constrain how Proposition 30 funds can be
expended.
50
Repke, Laura. “Would disabled receive better care in prison?” San Francisco Chronicle (March 31, 2011).
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Would-disabled-receive-better-care-in-prison2376903.php#ixzz1IIsIR99n.
51
“Helping homeless ex-cons.” Los Angeles Times (April 18, 2012).
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/opinion/la-ed-section8-homeless-lancaster-20120418.
52
Repke, Laura. “Would disabled receive better care in prison?” San Francisco Chronicle (March 31, 2011).
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Would-disabled-receive-better-care-in-prison2376903.php#ixzz1IIsIR99n.

204

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
The irony is that we might be ignoring the risky behavior of “regular” probationers,
individuals that might have benefited from programming before they committed a
serious felony, while spending large sums of money on much higher risk offenders simply
because they fall under the triple-non designate group targeted by Realignment
legislation. Ideally, we would have enough resources to deliver needed programming to
all offenders.

Probation’s major concern is that they have “lost their hammer.” Because offenders serve
little or no time for violations, the deterrent effect and incentive to comply have dissipated.

The one theme that ran through every interview and runs through every chapter is the
belief that Realignment has significantly undercut the ability of justice officials to
respond appropriately to new crimes and violations. For probationers, the threat of
revocation has lost its teeth because of the six-month cap in county jail. Pre-Realignment,
parolees faced a maximum one-year term in prison for violations. Now, former parolees
realigned to PRCS now serve a maximum six-month revocation term in county jail (which
is often reduced due to good time credits). And given how overcrowded county jails are,
the offender may be released immediately under a sheriff’s early release authority.
Agents have lost their most powerful tool for encouraging offenders to comply with
conditions of probation, including mandated treatment. Victims complain that officers
cannot collect on restitution orders, as previously discussed. The powerful hammer
probation officers once carried has shrunk dramatically. However, since officers do not
have guaranteed access to jail beds, probation agents might work harder to find
intermediate sanctions to respond to violations.

The ability to track former prisoners across counties has been diminished since no state
agency now tracks their whereabouts.

State parole’ online database, the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (LEADS),
provides law enforcement with information about every parolee under supervision.
LEADS 2.0, which was released in 2010, is accessible at all times and provides real-time
information about the status of parolees. The database provides names, photos,
commitment offenses, registration requirements, status and conditions of parole, and
tracks discharged parolees for one year after discharge.

205

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Probation, however, has no comparable system. All information about probationers is
siloed in the offender’s county of residence. This limitation makes successful supervision
of these individuals especially difficult when an offender travels outside of his home
county. So as more offenders are realigned from the state to the county, law
enforcement’s ability to track them is severely compromised.
While California had one unified state parole system, it has 58 different county probation
systems. Many probation officers noted that this absence of a centralized offender
database is a serious public safety threat that must be addressed. The issue of no
centralized state offender database (like the older parole LEADS system) is a concern for
many of our interviewees. California’s Attorney General, Kamala Harris, has begun to
look into the issue and plans to pilot test a statewide data system for probationers in 2014.

Realignment has raised probation’s voice—a silent partner no more. Probation has finally
found community partners willing to champion their cause. Close collaborations particularly
with sheriff.

Although Realignment has, in many ways, made probation’s tasks more difficult,
Realignment has also provided probation with a significant and powerful constituency of
community partners willing to champion their cause.
Because each county’s Community Corrections Partnership allows major agencies to
share perspectives and challenges, more cross-agency collaboration is occurring.
Virtually every interviewee praised both the community collaborations taking place as a
result of Realignment and how these new relationships are resulting in a shared
responsibility to provide high quality supervision and services. The effectiveness and
sustainability of these community-based initiatives stems from the power to leverage these
partnerships, particularly those involving law enforcement officials.
Probation officials are sensing a new countywide responsibility to help offenders living
within their community. CCPs are creating partnerships with county officials and noncorrectional stakeholders alike, including public and private entities and the faith
community. The task of addressing offenders’ needs is not just probation’s job, but
rather the county’s duty to do better collectively through a collaborative response. Both
common sense and science strongly support the effectiveness of community partnerships
for recidivism reduction. As noted in the National Council’s report on criminal
desistance, informal social support and community involvement are the only factors
consistently related to desistance outcomes. The community partnerships emerging as a
result of the CCP’s are increasing such support and community involvement. Ultimately,

206

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
the long-term sustainability of this evidence-based program initiative may well rest on the
success of these emerging community partnerships.
Probation officials have used these collaborations to reframe the conversation around
Realignment. Some law enforcement officials are talking about rehabilitation as a means
of communities protecting themselves. These officials are explaining that Realignment is
not just about building an offender support network system, but also a community
protection strategy. The conversation about services and surveillance has moved away
from a focus on helping offenders to one that recognizes the far-reaching benefits to the
community as a whole. The message is strongly reinforced by law enforcement support.
Changing both the language and the messenger are giving these arguments newfound
credibility.
Reframing the conversation and increasing Realignment’s potential beneficiaries are
likely to increase overall support for Realignment. The CCPs and the strong partnerships
developing among and across agencies should make Realignment less vulnerable to
political attacks. As public opinion also changes, politicians will become less likely to see
political advantage in dismantling probation’s hard work and Realignment’s many
benefits.

207

Chapter 10: Conclusions1
What is the result of California’s great prison experiment? Even after conducting 125
interviews with agencies across California, it remains a challenge to adequately
summarize the changes that Realignment (AB 109) has wrought across the state. The
responses from our interviewees were very divergent, mostly reflective of the agency in
which the person worked, rather than the county they represented. Overall, probation
officials have emerged as the most positive champions of Realignment, eagerly
harnessing the additional momentum the legislation has lent their cause. Public
defenders are similarly optimistic although they remain somewhat concerned about the
longer county jail terms that their clients face and the conditions under which they are
served. Conversely, prosecuting attorneys generally regard Realignment quite negatively,
actively lamenting the loss of their discretion. With a few exceptions of very involved
jurists, judges seem the least vocal about Realignment and often did not express strong
feelings towards the legislation one-way or the other. Finally, law enforcement—both
front line police and sheriffs—are the most divergent across the state with their opinions
being closely tied to their local jail capacity.

Probation and Community Service Providers
The probation representatives that we interviewed spoke with the most unified voice.
They unequivocally felt that Realignment gave them an opportunity to restore balance
between the incapacitation and rehabilitation purposes of punishment. The imbalance
between these purposes of punishment is reflected in California corrections data: Over
the last several decades, California state corrections—associated with incapacitation—has
grown (i.e., prison and parole), while county corrections—associated with
rehabilitation—has shrunk (i.e., jail and probation). Realignment, at its core, is designed
to rectify this imbalance and test whether rehabilitation services provided to lower-level
felony offenders can forestall their historically high recidivism rates and prevent the
(eventual) return to prison.
Despite their positive outlook, probation officials universally agreed that Realignment was
implemented too fast, leaving them scrambling to accommodate a greater number and
more serious offender than they had been led to believe. In addition, the dollars were
simply insufficient for them to fulfill their mandate. But even in the face of these
setbacks, they were pleased that the state was focusing on funding local offender services

1

This chapter was drafted by Mariam Hinds.

208

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
and relieved that the funding was secured by the California constitution, which gives
them several years to implement their plans for providing services and programming.
Community service providers were roughly in agreement with probation practitioners.
They were unified in their voices as well, often lamenting California’s march to a system
that over-invested in prisons and under-invested in the very programs that might have
prevented a prison term in the first place. The research concerning how to deliver
“evidence-based” programs and effective treatment to criminals has advanced
significantly from the days when “nothing worked.” Yet, as the scientific data and
evidence accumulated telling them what to do, the funding and staffing to implement
those programs was simultaneously cut. Virtually everyone we spoke to from the nonprofit or public health community mentioned that funding for community programs has
been reduced significantly over the past decade. Fed up with having the tools to
implement effective programs but lacking the funds to do so, both probation and
community service providers believe the prison tail has been wagging California’s crime
control policy for far too long.
Realignment ushers in a new crime control policy agenda and forces the counties to be
more self-reliant in handling convicted felons while giving them significant funding to
invest in the treatment infrastructure. The legislation furnishes probation practitioners
and community service providers with the first opportunity in decades to see whether
California can successfully implement programs that science has shown can reduce
recidivism. While eagerly rising to this challenge, they also uniformly urge patience, as
the full effect of the changes may take years to realize.

Public Defenders
Public defenders were generally supportive of Realignment. Both district attorneys and
public defenders agree that Realignment gives defense attorneys more leverage in their
negotiations with prosecutors. This additional leverage emerges from two principal
changes that Realignment introduced. First, for public defenders and their clients, more
options are on the table (i.e. mandatory supervision and split sentences) and, for
prosecutors, more things are off the table (i.e. prison). Pre-Realignment, plea bargains
were focused almost entirely on how much prison time the offender would serve.
Without prison as an option, the discussion now focuses on what programs, surveillance,
and length of probation and jail terms the offender is facing. With more nonincarceration options, public defenders’ bargaining position has strengthened.
Second, the spirit of Realignment favors the sentences that public defenders are likely to
advocate for—those that incorporate and include treatment and service. Although there

209

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
is some mention of public safety, the language in the law focuses on rehabilitation,
strengthening a public defender’s position that a prosecutor should sacrifice jail time for
additional programs and services.
While remaining supportive of Realignment, public defenders did express misgivings
with the new legislation. One interesting concern that some public defenders expressed
was the unwillingness of defendants to accept a plea bargain that might have included a
tail. Some public defenders we interviewed felt that even when they thought a term of
probation might assist the offender, for example, by making him eligible for programs
and services only available to those on formal supervision (e.g., supportive housing),
defendants wanted straight jail time instead.
Additionally, public defenders have a growing concern with the conditions that many of
their clients face while incarcerated, especially in counties experiencing jail
overcrowding. Faced with calls from severely sick clients who are going weeks without
treatment, public defenders continue to support Realignment, but urge policymakers not
to grow complacent simply because the prison overcrowding problem is “fixed” without
considering the emerging crisis in the county jails.

Prosecuting Attorneys
As a group, prosecuting attorneys seemed least supportive of Realignment statewide. The
district attorneys, understandably, expressed a real sense of frustration throughout the
interviews. Taking prison “off the table” for some very serious, repeat offenders results in
less deterrence, less incapacitation, and ultimately less public safety. The police arrest,
the detectives investigate, the district attorney files and makes the case, the judge passes
sentence, and then the final outcome of this tremendous resource expenditure is that the
offender may get a very short stint in county jail. Of course, this lack of significant
perceived “payoff” not only frustrated district attorneys; police and judges expressed
similar misgivings as well.

Law Enforcement
For police officers walking the beats in cities across California, there was little positive to
be said about Realignment. Most believed that more criminals were on the streets and
that crime was rising as a result. Our interviews took place between November 2012August 2013, and on July 25, 2013, the California Attorney General’s Office released its

210

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Crime in California report, which confirmed their suspicions.2 The statewide rates
(number per 100,000 population) of homicide (up 4%), forcible rape (up 1.3%),
robbery (up 3.2%) and aggravated assault (up 2.5%) all increased in 2012 compared to
2011. The same held true for the crimes of burglary (up 5.9%), auto theft (up 13.9%)
and larceny (up 5.5%). But several police opined that the level of reported crime might
also be an undercount, as some believe that certain communities are under reporting
crimes because of a lack of police responsiveness.
While this under reporting makes it difficult to accurately gauge changing crime rates,
many police officers believe that auto thefts are a more accurate predictor of property
crime and draw conclusions about the crime rate based on the increase in auto thefts.
Police departments are responding less to lower level property crimes and, over time,
citizens stop reporting those crimes. But with auto theft, because they need a police
report to collect on their insurance, they are more consistently reported. Every police
officer we interviewed told us that auto thefts were up significantly in their communities.
Because they believe that auto thefts are fairly accurately reported, many police officials
infer that this increase is reflective of a rising property crime rate. We lack the means of
verifying the accuracy of this perception, but it came up consistently.
In addition to coping with the rising crime rate, police now have fewer options to control
offenders’ behavior. Police have the option, under California law, to take individuals into
custody for a 72-hour holding period if they believe that, due to a mental disorder, they
are a danger to themselves or others. The law also allows the police to take an individual
into custody if they are a danger to themselves or others due to chronic alcoholism.
Police can also hold arrestees for up to 72 hours while the prosecutor considers charges.
In many instances, front-line police use jail to calm a situation (e.g., domestic violence
cases), but due to jail crowding caused by Realignment, these cells are not available for
these dry-out purposes. Again, this leaves more offenders in the community without the
cooling off period needed to diffuse tense, potentially violent situations. Additionally,
because jail time is not going to be frequently imposed, the deterrent value of arrest has
diminished. When an arrest is made, the offenders are quickly released, and the police
have expended valuable resources and completed a lot of paperwork without a perceived
benefit.
To add insult to injury, despite being the frontline responders to criminal activity in the
state, police departments were barely consulted before Realignment took effect and still
feel as if they are being left out of the major policy conversation. Those involved in
crafting the legislation have said that the basic job of the front-line law enforcement
officer has not changed post-Realignment. They are still responsible for responding to
2

“Crime Data.” Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice. http://oag.ca.gov/crime.

211

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
crime, identifying and apprehending suspects, and preparing the case for the prosecutor.
But police officials say that is short-sighted and that their jobs have changed significantly
post-Realignment. Simply put, with more crime reported, there are more crimes to
respond to and investigate. Hence more work for the police. But police were not funded
with the same formula funding as other agencies. In fact, they were given a one-time
funding allocation of $24 million in FY 2012-2013 (and $27 million for FY 2013-2014) to
be split among all the police agencies in the state. Many wonder if more law
enforcement participation in the crafting of Realignment would have resulted in
additional funding being granted to police agencies across California.
Unfortunately, the rise in crime across California cities, according to the police we
interviewed, is causing more citizens to question whether their local police are capable of
providing public safety. Several mentioned that local businesses were asking them about
getting concealed weapons permits to protect themselves. The combination of recent
police officer layoffs due to the economic crisis, more offenders on the streets due to
Realignment, crime increases, overcrowded jails that continually release arrestees in some
counties, and not getting their share of the AB 109 funding means that the police we
interviewed were skeptical of Realignment. One Fairfield police officials explained it this
way, “You can only sprint so long before things break and you get hurt.”

Sheriffs
California’s sheriffs are responsible for running the county jails and they provided mixed
reviews of Realignment. As the county jailer, sheriffs are working more closely with
probation departments to develop alternatives to custody so they can keep their jails at a
constitutionally acceptable capacity. As jails have become more crowded, and as the need
and resources for community alternatives have increased, sheriffs have become more
actively involved in providing treatment. In some counties, they are actively engaged in
deciding who should remain in custody, who should be released pre- and post-conviction,
and what community alternatives and sanctions will be imposed both initially and for a
technical violation of probation or parole. Many of them are even running their own
work release programs and electronic monitoring programs, very similar to the programs
run by probation.
We heard from many sheriffs that the old system wasn’t working well, the revolving door
in many communities between jail and prison was not protecting the public, and that a
new approach was needed. As such, sheriffs and probation are joining forces to create a
fuller menu of appropriate treatment, following the principles of evidence-based
practices. Sheriffs seem to understand the connection between community crime and
punishment, and we often heard comments such as, “they are coming home
212

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
anyway…they are our citizens…we have seen them before…let’s see if we can’t do
something different this time.” Collaborating with probation, the sheriff is often able to
create a full continuum of sanctions from fines through jail and onto electronic
monitoring and discharge. Some question this expanded role for law enforcement, but
others seem to welcome the county-wide response.
But sheriffs are also very concerned about the deterioration of jail conditions as the
county jail populations swell in direct proportion to the prison population decline. In
interviews with public defenders across the State of California, the one consistent
concern was that their clients were suffering in deplorable jailhouse conditions. Clients
are not receiving mental or medical healthcare for weeks after seeking treatment. In
terms of recreation and programs, there are no exercise yards in the jails. Clients do not
get to spend time outside and rarely get exposure to sunshine. They have limited outside
contact and there are very few programs available in the jails. Additionally, because of
overcrowding, clients may be on lockdown for up to twenty-two hours per day.
These conditions seem startlingly familiar; they closely mirror the conditions that served
as the basis for the successful allegation that the prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment in Plata. Have we simply moved the constitutional violations from the state
prisons to the county jails? The answer is very likely, yes. Currently, 37 of California’s 58
county jails are operating under either a self-imposed (20) or court-ordered (17)
population caps. But even despite these measures, the Prison Law Office has already
filed class action lawsuits seeking to remedy Eighth Amendment violations in the Fresno
County and Riverside County jails. In addition to alleging that they have received
inadequate physical, mental, and dental health services, the plaintiffs also contend that
they are exposed to preventable violence due to defects in the jail’s design, operation,
and staffing. Given the success of the Plata litigation, a surge of county-level Eighth
Amendment suits is likely to emerge. Sheriffs are trying to intervene early and address
the conditions in their jails before the courts become involved.

Judges
Perhaps because they are less engaged than other county actors, judges’ opinions
regarding Realignment varied widely between individuals. Some judges, particularly
those with experience in collaborative courts, share probation’s positive view. These
judges have experience in working with probation and community treatment providers to
provide services to offenders with mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence
issues. Results tend to support their beliefs that investing in a more intensive community
approach, one which is more patient with relapses and not as quick to incarcerate, holds
promise. Both probation and members of the judiciary believe that rehabilitation is not
213

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
for everyone, but that there are those who were sent to prison, but could have been
helped. Judges are advocating the kinds of collaborative court models that have worked
in the past for the newly realigned offenders.
But collaborative courts are expensive, and not all judges are in favor of them. Other
judges feel their counties can’t afford to spend so much money on such a small part of
their caseloads; after all they also handle family court, civil court, and criminal cases are
less than 20% of their overall caseload. Setting aside a judge to specifically handle a
model that might be effective in reducing recidivism seems imprudent. In large counties,
where the courtrooms are already being closed due to staff shortages, concentrating
resources in this way doesn’t seem efficient. In addition, some judges feel that the
collaborative court model turns the judge into a social worker, for which he/she has little
training, and makes the judge an activist—rather than an impartial—party in the judicial
proceedings. And finally, judges might like the collaborative court idea in general, but
say their particular county doesn’t have the community-based resources to make it work.
Given these realities, many judges are less supportive of Realignment.
One concern that many judges shared was the lack of post-custody time and supervision
that they can impose on an offender. They worry that they still do not have enough
discretion to ensure that criminals are both properly incapacitated and properly
monitored when released. Some California judges believe that the limitations of PRCS
do not allow enough time to change criminal behavior and reduce recidivism. Those
judges are asking for the option to put a parole “tail” on an offender for up to three
years, in addition to sentencing. Santa Clara County Superior Court Judge Stephen
Manley, who oversees a special courtroom for defendants facing drug addiction and
mental illness, explained, “It's really hard to motivate people. If they want us to use
evidence-based programs to change the model from punishment to rehabilitation, we
need more time.”
Retired Placer County Superior Court Judge J. Richard Couzens, who is considered the
leading judicial authority on Realignment, also supports the additional time for
monitoring the realigned offenders. However, he is not hopeful that it will be one of the
changes that are implemented right away, because of the severe financial constraints of
state budget. An increased monitoring period would not only increase probation costs,
but it could significantly increase the number of offenders returning to jails when they
fail probation. As Judge Couzens explained, “It's a question of how big is the bucket of
money and can we cover all the things we think are good ideas.”
Overall, many judges remain hopeful that Realignment will have a positive impact on
California’s criminal justice system. Santa Cruz County Superior Court Judge Paul
Marigonda remarked, “It isn’t changing the sentences, but it is changing where and how

214

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
they are served, and maybe, hopefully, we can now deal with them in a better way than we
have been.”3

Recommendations
Despite the differing attitudes and levels of engagement that counties and agencies
display towards Realignment, several recurring concerns and suggested revisions
emerged from our interviews. Outlined below, these recommendations symbolize a
needed shift from retrospectively lamenting the changes Realignment has introduced
towards prospectively considering how all counties and agencies can work to make it
successful.

Create a statewide tracking database for offenders
under supervision in the community.
Pre-Realignment, law enforcement officers had access to extensive information regarding
parolee’s names, addresses, physical characteristics, commitment offenses, and
registration requirements via a state parole database known as Parole LEADS (Law
Enforcement Automated Data System).4 Post-Realignment, most offenders who leave
prison are no longer on parole (they are now monitored on PRCS) and are, therefore,
not entered into the Parole LEADS system. Instead, each county has their own method
of tracking offenders released into the community.
The change from state-based to county-based supervision of offenders leaving prisons
creates a void of information and data for law enforcement officials on the ground.
There is no statewide or cross-county database for tracking offenders on PRCS,
mandatory supervision, or probation. Without this information, local law enforcement
does not have adequate information to know if a person they encounter on the street is
a) entitled to the full range of Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections
because they are not under criminal justice supervision or b) a potentially dangerous
offender who is under supervision. Consequently, police could potentially conduct
searches and seizures of people who are not under supervision—a clear Fourth
Amendment violation—simply because they do not have access to a database that tracks
offenders on probation or other forms of supervision.
3

Boysen, Ryan. “Santa Cruz 'Smart on Crime' Panel Looks at Pros and Cons of Adding State Convicts to
County Jails.” Santa Cruz Patch (November 9, 2011). http://santacruz.patch.com/groups/politics-andelections/p/smart-on-crime-panel-looks-at-law-that-adds-new-priso8b4517d429.
4
“Parole LEADS.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Non_Revocable_Parole/Law_Enforcement_Resources.html.

215

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Unless the state intervenes and addresses this gap, it is unlikely that the counties, already
struggling to manage the influx of new offenders in their communities, will coordinate
with one another in order to develop such a database. For local law enforcement, this is,
perhaps, one of the most detrimental aspects of Realignment to their daily operations.
Kamala Harris, California’s Attorney General, has begun to look into the issue.

Allow criminal history to be considered when
determining if the county or the state will supervise a
parolee.
An unanticipated consequence of Realignment is that, for state parolees leaving prison,
only their current conviction offense is considered when determining if they will be
placed on PRCS or parole. The offender’s criminal history is irrelevant to this
determination making it possible for offenders with both serious and violent priors to
report to county probation officers. For example, moderate- and low-risk sex offenders—
a population that was monitored by parole—are now monitored by probation (only high
risk sex offenders remain on state parole supervision). Los Angeles County Probation
Department has now found itself supervising more violent criminals than ever before—
499 “very high risk” and 7,197 “high risk” AB 109 offenders as of March 29, according to
the Los Angeles Daily News.5
Probation officers, already facing increasing caseloads, are ill equipped to manage such
serious and sophisticated offenders. Some counties are resorting to arming their
probation officers—a practice that would have been considered highly detrimental to
probation’s rehabilitation oriented mantra pre-Realignment. Los Angeles County
Probation Chief Jerry Powers is moving to more than triple the number of his armed
probation officers, from 30 to 100.6 While this reaction is certainly logical, it is potentially
threatening to the role that probation has traditionally played (and is expected to play)
in the criminal justice system. One commentator summarized the tension as follows:
“The issue boils down to: Are these people law enforcement officers, or are they treaters
and helpers? …You can't be delivering cognitive behavioral therapy with a gun strapped
to your waist. The therapeutic relationship is inhibited and destroyed by someone
carrying a gun openly.”7

5

Villacorte, Christina. “Probation arms more of its officers to cope with Realignment.” Los Angeles Daily
News (June 3, 2013). http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130503/probation-arms-more-of-itsofficers-to-cope-with-realignment.
6
Ibid.
7
Sá, Karen de. “Santa Clara County seeks to arm some probation officers.” San Jose Mercury News (January
3, 2010). http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_14298168?nclick_check=1. (internal quotation marks omitted).

216

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
In order to avoid this tension and permit probation to maintain their role in the criminal
justice system, Realignment should be revised such that the complete adult and juvenile
criminal conviction record is considered when determining if the state or the county will
supervise an offender facing imminent release from prison. Those offenders with prior
serious or violent convictions in California or elsewhere should be ineligible for county
supervision and required to report to parole.

Preempt forthcoming litigation based on conditions in
the county jails.
The conditions in the county jails are almost universally regarded as unacceptable and
are ripe for litigation. After seeing how effective the Plata plaintiffs were, there is no
doubt that, once they are satisfied with the conditions in the prisons, civil rights activists
will turn around and begin to sue the jails. As discussed, a few California jails are already
in litigation regarding jail overcrowding, and more may follow. A Solano County Public
Defender commented on the conditions in the jails stating, “I’m sure the sheriff is
expecting and I am expecting some lawsuits to come out of all this.”
Both potential plaintiffs and the county defendants (likely the Board of Supervisors)
should get a head start on investigating and cataloguing the conditions in the jails so they
can either paint a picture depicting the deplorable conditions and egregious issues with
healthcare or attempt to explain what actions the counties are taking to address these
problems. Waiting until the plaintiffs file discovery demands will not benefit anyone and
certainly not the county defendants.

County jail sentences should be capped at a
maximum of three years.
County jails were constructed to house inmates for a maximum stay of one year. A
consistent concern expressed by our interviewees was for the long-term inmates who,
post-Realignment, will be housed in county jails. Serving a five, seven, or ten-year
sentence in a county jail will likely deprive an inmate of adequate mental and medical
healthcare, treatment and programming services, sufficient recreational time and space,
regular visitation, and other benefits and rights that are maintained in state prisons. In
order to meet these needs, county jails would need to overhaul, at a minimum, the
medical and mental health provision protocols and facilities that they offer. This would
require a massive influx of funding that likely outstrips the additional funds that sheriffs
have received from Realignment.

217

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Instead, the legislation should be amended to cap county jail sentences at three years. An
offender convicted of a §1170(h) offense who is sentenced to serve more than three years
should no longer be eligible to serve his sentence in the county jail and should be sent to
the state prison.
The unfortunate consequence of implementing such an amendment is that it would slow
the decline of California’s prison population—the primary motivator behind
Realignment to begin with. California is still nearly 9,000 inmates short of complying
with the Supreme Court’s benchmark without considering “realigning back.” However,
without finding a solution for addressing the limited resources in the jails, both the state
and the counties will find themselves gridlocked in litigation with no additional place to
send inmates from overcrowded jails and prisons.

Certain repeated, technical violations should warrant
a prison sentence.
Pre-Realignment, technical violations of a parolee’s terms of supervision could result in a
return to state prison for a maximum of one year. Now, however, violators can only
return to county jail for a maximum of six months. In counties where the jails are
overcrowded and the sheriffs are exercising their early release authority, technical
violators may be one of the first groups to be released to make room for more serious
offenders. This cycle of supervision, violation, brief punishment, and release
disincentivizes compliance with the terms of an offender’s supervision. For example,
interviewees reported that sex offenders have begun to cut off their electronic monitors
and abscond from supervision knowing that the only consequence will be a brief stint in
county jail.
In order to create an incentives structure that encourages compliance with the terms of
supervision, certain repeated, technical violations should warrant a prison sentence. For
example, cutting off one’s electronic monitor should qualify an offender for a return to
prison. Without providing probation officers with adequate discretion to manage
offenders in the community, chronic noncompliance will adversely affect the efficacy of
post-custody supervision.

Conclusion
In the end, these divergent views—across counties, across stakeholder groups—were to
be expected. As with any piece of comprehensive legislation, it is impossible to anticipate
how a law will play out on the ground after it is enacted. But with Realignment especially,

218

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
it seems as if the gears and levers are interacting in unpredictable ways to create some
unforeseen results. Moving forward, researchers should continue to investigate the
consequences—both positive and negative—of Realignment and policymakers, advocates,
and practitioners should systematically address these findings in order to maximize the
positive outcomes and minimize the negative outcomes. Regardless of one’s personal
position on Realignment, it is clear that this legislation is here to stay. Once
consequences have been identified, it behooves everyone—legislators, the public, and
offenders—to move past lamenting the changes it introduces, and instead, dedicate
ourselves to ensuring that this legislation creates a safer and more effective criminal
justice system in the State of California.
 

219

Appendix A: List of Interviewees
Alameda County
Ahern, Greg
Meredith, Karen
Noonan, Mike
Smith, Phillip
Swafford, Millie
Thompson, Trina
Anonymous

Sheriff
District Attorney, Assistant
Police Chief, Alameda
Former Parole Agent, Oakland Unit 2
Director, Criminal Justice Mental Health Services
Superior Court Judge
Superior Court, Executive Judge

Amador County
Ryan, Martin

Sheriff

Contra Costa County
Peterson, Mark

District Attorney

Fresno County
Dyer, Jerry
Harbottle, Adrienne
Hoff, Gary
Mims, Margaret
Penner, Linda
Piearcy, Ralph
"Gomer"
Taniguchi, Kenneth
Willits, Lori

Police Chief, Fresno
Public Defender's Office
Superior Court, Presiding Judge
Sheriff
Former Chief Probation Officer of Fresno County; Current
Chair of the Board of State and Community Corrections
Parole Administrator
Public Defender
Victim Services

Kern County
Gonzales, Greg
Green, Lisa
Moore, Francis
Perez, Lupe
Youngblood, Donny

Lieutenant, Sheriff's Office
District Attorney
Chief Deputy, Sheriff’s Office
Victim Services
Sheriff

Lassen County
Growdon, Dean

Sheriff

Los Angeles County
Baca, Leroy

Sheriff
220

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Delgado, Mark
Fender, David L.
Lacey, Jackie
McDonald, Terri
Olmedo, Charlaine
Powers, Jerry
Raney, Kim
St. Pierre, Kraig
Wesley, David
Yim, Alexander
Zuzga, Cynthia
Madera County
Medina-Gross,
Katherine
Merced County
Ball, Scott
Pazin, Mark
Orange County
Boston, Gregory
Contini, Jennifer
Hutchens, Sandra
Kea, Steve
Mejico, Dominic
Trujillo, Lee
Wamsley-Goldsmith,
Sheryl
Riverside County
Adams, Stacy
Coffee, Ron
Crivello, Lachelle
Datig, Creg
Hake, Mark
Hasler, Karen
Johnson, Deborah
Powell, Jim

Executive Director, Countywide Criminal Justice
Coordination Committee
Chief, Custody Services Division, Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department
District Attorney
Assistant Sheriff, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
Superior Court Judge
Chief Probation Officer
CA Police Chiefs Association, President; Police Chief, Covina
District Attorney, Deputy in Charge, Parole Revocation
Section
Superior Court, Presiding Judge
Chief of the Los Angeles Sheriff Department, Correctional
Services Division
Superior Court Commissioner

Site Coordinator, Madera Community College Center

Chief Probation Officer
Sheriff

Sheriff Department, Director of Inmate Services, In-Custody
Transition Program
District Attorney, Deputy
Sheriff
Sheriff Department, Commander
Sheriff's Department
Sheriff Department, Assistant Sheriff
Admin Manager, HCA-Correctional Mental Health

Division Director for Special Projects, Probation Dept
District Attorney, Chief Deputy
Victim Services
District Attorney, Assistant
Chief Probation Officer
Public Defender's Office
Mental Health, Deputy Director for Forensic Services
Promising Programs (PP), AB 109 Clinical Coordinator,
221

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Wengerd, Jerry
Anonymous

DMH
Sheriff
Sheriff Dept, Asst Sheriff of the Courts Coroners Corrections
& Administrative Support
Director, Riverside Department of Mental Health
Parole Agent II

Sacramento County
Barroga, Ron
Boyd, Chris
Brown, Lawrence
Martin, Kerry
Meyer, Don
Silva, Melinda
Smith, Doc
Zielenski, Torr
Anonymous
Anonymous

Former Probation Officer, Deputy
Police Chief, Citrus Heights
Superior Court Judge
Victim Services
Chief Probation Officer
Parole Agent I
Parole Agent (retired)
Public Defender's Office
Deputy District Attorney
Parole Administrator, Regional

Sniff, Stanley
Thetford, Steven

San Benito County
Hill, Curtis

San Diego County
Goldstein, Earl

Former Sheriff of San Benito;;, Acting Executive Director,
BSCC

Lau, Karna

Mental Health, Sheriff's Dept Medical & Inmate Services
Division (retired)
Supervising Probation Officer

San Francisco County
Anderson, Tara
Beeman, Maria
Cairns, Joan
Gascón, George
Mirkarimi, Ross
Still, Wendy

Grants & Policy Manager
Victim Services
Mental Health, Director of Jail Psychiatric Services
District Attorney
Sheriff
Chief Probation Officer

San Joaquin County
Fowler, Jennifer
Hood, Jamie
James, Stephanie
Jaurequi, Gabriela

Program Coordinator, SJC Collaborative Courts
Probation Officer
Chief Probation Officer
Victim Services

San Mateo County

222

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Davis, Ronald
Santa Barbara County
Brown, Bill
Dudley, Joyce
Heitman, Tanja
Montes de Oca,
Raimundo
Riker-Rheinschild,
Megan
Taylor, Beverley
Santa Clara County
Beliveau, Troy
Bosel, Max
Brewer, Nancy
Caballero, Mariel
Donovan, Michelle
Fletcher, Karen
Gutierrez, Andy
Harris, Heather
Herceg, Garry
Howe, David
Kapp, JJ
Loftus, Richard
Manley, Stephen
O'Neal, Molly
Pena, Nancy
Seaman, Scott
Anonymous
Solano County
Alberg, Jannett
Beeman, Paul
Daugherly, John M.
du Bain, Donald
Hansen, Christopher
Howard, Denise
Ignacio, Melissa
Nguyen, Mary

Police Chief, East Palo Alto

Sheriff
District Attorney
Probation Officer
Public Defender
Victim Services
Chief Probation Officer

Sheriff Dept, Captain of Support Services
Police Capt, Mountain View Police Dept, CA Sex Offender
Management Board
Public Defender (Retired)
Public Defender's Office
Parole Agent II, San Jose Unit 5
Chief Probation Officer, Deputy
Public Defender's Office
Public Defender's Office
Director, Santa Clara Pretrial Services
District Attorney, Assistant
Public Defender's Office
Superior Court, Presiding Judge
Superior Court Judge
Public Defender
Director, Santa Clara Dept of Mental Health
President, CA Police Chiefs Association; Police Chief, Los
Gatos
Mental Health, Jail Services

Women’s Reentry Achievement Program, Staff Analyst,
Health & Social Services
Superior Court, Presiding Judge
District Attorney, Chief Deputy
District Attorney
Chief Probation Officer
Parole Agent I, Fairfield Unit 2 GPS
District Attorney, Deputy for Realignment
District Attorney, Deputy

223

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Tibbet, Walt
Wold, Carolyn
Anonymous

Police Chief, Fairfield
Victim Services
Public Defender

Ventura County
Deutsch, David
Dowler, Tim
Gean, Karen

Clinical director of VOICE
Supervising Deputy Probation Officer
Coordinator of VOICE

Additional Experts
Cate, Matt
Florez-DeLyon,
Cynthia
Salarno, Harriet
Selix, Rusty
Skeem, Jennifer
Strnad, Jeff
Ward, Christine

Executive Director, California State Association of Counties;
Law and Policy Fellow, Stanford Criminal Justice Center
Victim Services, CDCR
Crime Victims United
Executive Director, CA Mental Health Association
Professor of Psychology & Social Behavior, UC Irvine
Professor, Stanford Law School
Crime Victims Action Alliance (CVAA)

224

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Appendix B: Interview Questions
General Questions to all Criminal Justice Stakeholders
(1) What is your understanding of Realignment?
(2) What kind of training did you receive on Realignment and your new role? Is it
adequate and what resources would be beneficial?
(3) How do you view Realignment? (Your involvement in the solution, if any?)
(4) Has your/your agency’s behavior changed at all due to Realignment? How and
why?
(5) Have you experienced resource constraints as a result of Realignment?
(6) What would you have done differently if you had been in charge of crafting
Realignment?
(7) If you could change one thing about the Realignment legislation, what would it
be?
(8) What is the impact on your relationships with other parties in the system (e.g.,
judges, PDs, sheriffs, law enforcement)? Is there more collaboration between
certain parties, more adversity with others?
(9) What questions haven't we asked you that you think we should have?

Probation
(1) Relative to the increased burden on probation officers are resources dedicated
to Realignment sufficient?
a. Were you adequately equipped?
b. What additional resources do you wish you had in hindsight?
c. What would be helpful going forward?
d. In your county how much of that money goes to probation? Other
alternatives to incarceration? Programming?
e. What is probation’s role in the local community corrections partnership?
f. What kinds of investment in infrastructure would be necessary to make
Realignment work in the long run?
(2) How would you describe the transition to an expanded—and somewhat
changed—role for probation?
a. What has been the biggest challenge?
b. What has surprised you (what did you not anticipate)?
c. What about the pace of transition?
(3) How is the function of probation as a means of sentencing evolving?
a. Is there a trend towards greater dependency on other alternatives to
incarceration?
b. What forms of monitoring or technologies are increasingly depended on?
c. How quickly is the force expanding or are officers handling larger case
loads?
(4) Have you seen a shift in the use of split sentencing?

225

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

a. To what effect?
b. Is this beneficial/detrimental to an individual’s access to programming or
other resources?
c. Do you predict any influence on recidivism?
Will the lack of automatic supervision after terms impact recidivism?
a. It is important that recently released prisoners have some sort of
supervision?
b. Or does that just lead to unnecessary “technical” violations?
What is being done with high risk offenders that otherwise qualify for
community alternatives?
a. Mentally disordered offenders?
b. Drug addicts?
c. High risk sex offenders?
d. What services are available to this type of probationer?
What types of intermediate sanctions are being relied upon to avoid the
involvement of courts?
a. How do you decide?
b. Have they been effective? Or do you find yourself still deferring to the
courts?
c. In what situations is revocation of PRCS used?
What is and isn’t working with regard to Post-Release Community Supervision?
a. Are the pre- and post-release packets sufficiently informative to prepare for
inmate’s release?
b. Release into county of last legal residence makes sense?
c. Coordination with the CDCR?
Do you believe the CDCR’s share of responsibility for PRCS strikes the right
balance?
a. In general, how smooth is cooperation with the CDCR?
b. What improvements could be made to state-county coordination?
Could you describe the use of evidence-based practices in your county before
and after Realignment?

Public Defender
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

Has the public defender’s analysis in advising clients to take probation or plead
to the (§1170(h) or prison) felony changed? In what context?
Do you opt for county jail with probation even if prison would result in a shorter
total period of state supervision?
Do DA’s weigh the impact that their sentencing decisions will have on local
resources or jail capacity?
Have you observed DA’s attempting to inflate charges to prison-eligible offenses?
Are DA’s charging around Realignment?
Have you noticed whether prosecutors are increasingly using PDs as a conduit of
information about a particular case?

226

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)

(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)

(27)
(28)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)

How much communication is there between the PDs and DAs? Is this changing
after Realignment?
How do PDs respond to the different incentives prosecutors face?
Have plea negotiation dynamics changed under Realignment? How? Does the
offender have more/less leverage? In what ways?
Have PDs gained bargaining power (knowing that DA’s must consider
jail/prison population under Realignment)?
Are you always aware of jail crowding pressure under Realignment and does that
embolden you to at least purport to ask for trial?
Will PDs call prosecutors bluffs to go to trial?
Can you please explain your county’s pretrial/presentencing process?
What has been the historical policy towards bail arguments within the office?
Can you give examples of offenses where a PD would typically request low bail?
Medium bail? High bail? That the client be ROR’d?
Are clients being ROR’d more frequently because of Realignment?
Do PDs ask for lower bail in light of the resource constraints that the county jails
are facing?
Is there any sort of systematic tracking of the number of clients being ROR’d,
held in on bail, how much bail, or remanded?
What information to you give to the new clients about Realignment?
Do you think that clients prefer jail or prison sentences overall? (Why?)
Do clients complain of more violence in jails versus prisons?
Does knowing that they will serve a sentence in jail as opposed to prison change
the client’s behavior? Perhaps with regard to plea bargaining?
How often and under what circumstances did you seek a split sentence before
Realignment?
Since Realignment, have you increased (or decreased) the number of split
sentences you seek?
Do PDs worry about their clients having tails when they serve a split sentence?
Has this changed since clients cannot return to prison for a technical violation?
Rehabilitation efforts; is the county allocating $ towards rehabilitation or simply
building new jails (i.e. in Solano County, they are building a $100 million day
center)?
How has Realignment affected clients with mental health problems?
Are more PDs being hired?
Community Corrections Partnership
Are there other people in your county who you think have a good handle on
Realignment that we should be interviewing?
Did you feel well represented (were your interests well represented) in the
discussions surrounding Realignment?
Realignment’s effect on immigration and compliance/non-compliance with
ICE?

227

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Sheriff
(1) Changing Jail Population (all non-non-nons, PRCS and parole violators
(technical violations), longer terms...)
a. How has the makeup of the jail population changed since Realignment
began? What have you noticed about the population? What has been the
largest influx? More/less violent?
1. higher level of offender, more sophisticated criminals, seasoned
prison veterans (parolees)
2. What was the jail like beforehand? How crowded? What programs
were available? What about now?
3. Is it more dangerous to work there? Why? (how have you dealt with
it?)
4. Has the gang environment changed?
5. How is the jail changing to accommodate long-term inmates?
6. Has flash incarceration increased? How does it work? How does
that affect your jail management? (do you have a special ward for
them?)
b. What percent are parole revocations? How was that population changed?
What are your options when you receive someone who violated parole?
c. Generally-- where has your flexibility changed? What were your release
valves before-- what are they now? Do you feel unrestrained by
Realignment? or are your hands tied?
d. The CDCR can send state prisoners to jail for last 60 days of their sentence
to prepare for PRCS—how often does that happen? What are the terms of
that relationship? (SF does it)
e. How has the demography of inmates changed?
(2) Using Realignment Funds—Expansion vs. Rehabilitation/evidence-based
program, alternative incarceration
a. How have you dealt with the influx and changing population? Expanded
the jail? Reorganized the jail? Hired more staff?
b. Is the money fully carte blanche
c. Rehabilitative programs—evidence-based practices? What do you do to
evaluate new inmates? How do you separate them into programs? Have
you implemented new programs? What challenges have you faced in doing
so?
d. Home detention? Electronic monitoring? fire camps or sending inmates
elsewhere? Using it? Who are you contracting with to provide it? What
offenders do you use it for?
e. How much do beds cost in jail? What about community supervision?
Sending to fire camps/outsourcing to other jails?
f. Community Corrections Partnership—what was the initial plan for
implementing Realignment recommended to the county board of
supervisors—what was the plan? How closely have the actors followed the
initial plan? how did you feel about it? What did you want? If you were to
make the plan today, what would it be?
228

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
(3) Medical Care
a. What programs/treatment do you offer? What challenges have you faced
providing medical care?
b. Does medical care enter into your decision to release an inmate? pretrial
or sentenced?
c. How often do you transfer inmates because of medical conditions? Where
do you send them?
d. Are inmates housed in different areas based on medical conditions?
e. California Penal Code §1174.4-- what happens to pregnant women with
history of substance abuse in county jail? Can they participate in the prison
program for pregnant or parenting women with a history of substance
abuse?
f. Do you contract with the CDCR for clinical services for inmates released
with mental health problems?
(4) Release valves
a. Early Release programs
1. How do you decide who to release early? how often do you do it?
How do you do it (good time credits)? Have you released any higher
risk inmates?
2. How often are you held to No Early Release Programs (NERP)
issued by judges? Do you communicate with judges regarding your
early release practices? with law enforcement? DAs? victims?
3. do you feel political pressure re early release programs? how does
that inform your decision?
b. pretrial on bail (are they being sent out of the county?, can until July 1,
2015) 70% are pretrial-- have you been releasing them on bail? How was
your pretrial detention changed with Realignment? How do you decide
who to release on bail? How has that decision changed in the last year?
What are the consequences?
1. Place them on electronic monitoring?
2. What percentage don't show up to court?
3. What does pretrial bail look like? generally supervised, intensive
supervised, own recognizance...? How are your resources for this?
4. How long do you hold them before you release them?
5. For those pretrial who remain in jail, are they generally in there for
more violent crimes or just can't afford to post bail?
6. Are you coordinating with courts (DAs) to speed up lower-level cases
to get people out of pretrial custody?
c. Sending inmates out of the county
1. (out of state?, to other counties? to prison or state programs (like
fire camp) why? why not?)
d. Home detention? using it? who are you contracting with to provide it?
what offenders do you use it for?
e. Work release program?

229

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

(5)

(6)
(7)

(8)

f. What sort of offenders are you releasing? what sort do you think should
remain in jail?
g. Other reforms you're implementing to alleviate the stress on the jail?
h. Any resources to prepare inmates for reentry?
i. Any early release options if you're not at full capacity?
j. Generally-- where has your flexibility changed? What were your release
valves before-- what are they now? Do you feel unrestrained by
Realignment? or are your hands tied?
Collaboration with other actors
a. SF transfers low-level state prisoners to jail before discharge date to position
them to succeed in PRCS--> same happen in your county?
b. What's your relationship with law enforcement? Are they trying to fill beds
in the jail? Do you want to fill beds in the jail? What happens when you
release someone early-- how does law enforcement/DAs/judges respond?
c. How do you work with probation regarding split sentences?
d. Are you coordinating with courts (DAs) to speed up lower-level cases to get
people out of pretrial custody?
e. Are you sharing information with sheriffs in other counties?
Threat of litigation
a. How does that enter into your decisions?
Victims’ Rights
a. Do you notify the victim when early release?
b. Do you notify victims when you release inmates pretrial?
c. When you transfer an inmate to a medical facility?
Future Concerns
a. How would sheriffs respond to threat of realigning MORE offenses?
(Realignment missed some)-- can you take more? Are you at the ideal
level? Too many already?

Victims
(1) How well were victim’s rights enforced prior to Realignment?
a. How often did victims want to invoke and utilize their rights?
1. Were there particular types of cases in which victims were more
likely to want to be involved or to have their rights considered? If so,
what kinds?
2. What rights were most commonly enforced?
a. Consideration before bail or release?
b. Notification during prosecution?
c. Notification of incarceration?
d. Restitution?
e. Right to be present at trial? At release proceedings?
f. Right to speak:
1. When deciding charges?
2. Presentence report?
3. Parole/probation?
230

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
g. Other?
b. When victims wanted to enforce these rights, were there barriers to doing
so? If so, what?
1. Do you think the judge really took their interests into consideration
when setting bail?
2. How involved were victims in helping prosecutors decide which
charges to file?
3. How often did victims have trouble enforcing restitution orders?
4. Who gave victims notice of relevant developments? If notice wasn’t
given, who was responsible for remedying that?
5. Other barriers?
c. In what ways do you feel that the pre-Realignment system served the
interests of victims best?
(2) How has Realignment affected the enforcement of those rights?
a. Did you feel that your office’s need, and victim rights in general, were taken
into account when the Realignment funds were allocated?
b. Compared to pre-Realignment, has there been a shift in the extent to
which victims want to participate in the justice process?
c. When they do choose to participate, what new challenges have you
encountered?
d. Do you think the increased population in the jails has affected a judge’s
ability to fully consider victim safety when setting bail before trial?
1. In what way?
2. Can you give an example of a time that you think this was
particularly obvious?
e. How has the collection of restitution been affected?
1. Who is now responsible?
2. Are counties collecting restitution from offenders that they have in
custody?
3. How is that money being distributed to victims?
4. Given that offenders are under supervision for far less time, how is
restitution to be collected once they are no longer under
supervision?
5. Is that theoretical structure functioning?
f. How has victim participation been affected?
1. Does the victim impact statement still carry as much weight in
determining sentencing as it did before?
2. Are they still able to participate in pre-release hearings?
3. From a more emotional perspective, do victims still feel that their
input at sentencing/parole hearings has an impact?
g. Do counties have the necessary infrastructure to provide victims with the
notification to which they are constitutionally entitled?
1. Does your county have an “inmate tracker” system, like the state
prison system?

231

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
2. Do victims receive notice of the offender’s place of incarceration or
pending release dates? Escapes?
3. Are jails still notifying victims of parole hearings and release dates
for the offenders who didn’t make it to prison?
h. What other issues have arisen that are of concern to victims?
i. What steps could the state take to alleviate these issues, given that they must
reduce the prison population to comply with the court order? What would
make the process easier for victims?
1. Are victims feeling less secure than they were before?
(3) What is the impact of Realignment on your relationships with other parties in
the system?

District Attorneys
(1) General: Big Picture Questions
a. How has your office historically responded to resource constraints and
increases?
b. Has Realignment changed what you feel your constituents/voters want
from you? (i.e. what political pressures do you feel now?)
c. Are you collecting any data to track what works and doesn’t to inform your
future plans?
(2) Specifics: Stages of a Case
a. Would crowding in county jails impact your decision on bail
recommendations for indigent defendants?
b. Impact on charging decisions? (over-charging, charging "around"
realigned crimes, not charging at all, not contesting dismissals)
c. Exercise: create four charging hypos and ask what the usual
charge/sentence would be in their county for those different crimes
d. What is the impact on plea negotiations/ plea bargains?
e. What is the impact on pursuing strikes?
f. What is the impact on likelihood to suggest "split sentences?"
g. What is the impact on sentencing recommendations?
h. What is the impact on appeals? (In regard to both convictions and
sentencing)
i. Have you devoted more resources to a particular unit? Focused more on
particular types of crimes? (More oversight, etc.)
(3) Interaction with other parties
1. Who are your strongest allies in the system?
b. Do you think that other parties (judges and PDs, especially) have changed
their behavior/strategies because of Realignment? How have you
responded to those changes?
1. Do you feel or anticipate pressure to lower charges and sentencing
recommendations for judges out of concern for the budget?

232

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
2. Relationship with law enforcement; DA’s trying to encourage fewer
arrests, etc? Pressure from law enforcement to pursue different
types of crimes?
(4) Misc.
a. Under what circumstances might you dismiss a charge or an enhancement
if it raises the crime to a prison crime, on the assumption that you want to
avoid overburdening the prisons?
b. Do you feel any kind of responsibility for the future success or failure of
Realignment?
c. Are you working with sheriffs to speed up low-level cases to get inmates out
of pretrial custody?
d. Do you still petition for restitution in as many cases as you did before?
e. Who is responsible for collecting that restitution, and do they have
sufficient infrastructure/mechanisms to do so effectively?
f. Do you have a sense of whether victim satisfaction with the justice system
has been affected by Realignment?

Judges
(1) Before vs. after Realignment actions
a. Actions in:
1. Bail decisions: changed?
2. sentencing and split sentencing (triads)
a. Where the maximum charge is a triple-non, might you raise
the sentence (triad plus enhancement) over your pre-alignment choice because you think jail if less onerous than
prison, so you’re trading “quantity for quality?”
b. Conversely, might you lower the sentence out of concern for
jail overcrowding
c. How often are you using or do you expect to use the new split
sentence option? And how much faith (more or less now?)
do you have in county supervision of parolees, PRSC and split
–sentence convicts after Realignment?
3. technical violations
b. Discretion
1. What is your ability to drop charges?
2. Under what circumstance might you dismiss a charge or
enhancement?
3. Applying or striking strike charge?
4. knowledge of Realignment = pressure to exercise discretion?
c. Out-of-court actions/ Technicalities
1. Will you be more or less inclined to encourage plea negotiations?
2. How might Realignment affect your calendaring? (More trials?)
3. Is there a change in your relationships with DA? Pressure on them
or from them?

233

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
(2) Additional questions
a. How has Realignment affected the extent to which you can consider victim
safety when setting bail amounts?
b. Has the increased jail population made that more difficult?
c. Pressure from sheriff?
d. How do you deal with these pressures?
e. How often did you order restitution before Realignment?
f. Who was responsible for collecting and dispersing those orders?
g. How often did you receive complaints about issues getting that restitution?
h. Has that frequency (victim restitution) changed at all after Realignment?
i. Who is now responsible for implementing those orders?
j. Have you noticed any increase in requests for assistance enforcing them
since Realignment went into effect?
k. What do you do with those complaints?
l. To whom do you refer them for assistance?
m. Have you noticed any other change in the level of victim participation?
n. In 2009 California recorded 84,000 parole violations. How do you
anticipate managing these parole revocation hearings in July? What factors
will affect your decision-making process?
o. How often do you issue NERP orders? What is your thinking re early
release programs? Are sheriffs overusing them? Do you take them into
account at sentencing?
p. How have your bail policies changed? Do you consider jail conditions and
potential overcrowding when setting bail? How closely do you work with
sheriffs in setting bail and sentencing?

234

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS

Bibliography
“2012 Outcome Evaluation Report.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (October 2012).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/ARB_FY
_0708_Recidivism_Report_10.23.12.pdf.
“AB 109-Public Safety Realignment.” Crime Victims Action Alliance.
http://www.cvactionalliance.com/ab-109-public-safety-realignment.
“AB 109 Allocation: Recommended Approach for 2012-13 and 2013-14, Briefing of
County Administrative Officers.” County Administrative Officers Association of
California Realignment Allocation Committee (2012).
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/12.05.15_ab_109_allocation051412_briefing_on_yrs_2_and_3_formula.pdf.
“AB 109 Public Safety Realignment Act: 18-month Overview.” San Bernardino County
Community Corrections Partnership (2013).
“AB 900 Jail Construction Financing Program Board of State and Community Corrections
Project Status Update–Phases I and II.” Board of State and Community
Corrections (2013).
Abarbanel, Sara, Angela McCray, Kathryn McCann Newhall, and Jessica Snyder.
“Realigning the Revolving Door: An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 20112012 Implementation Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2013).
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%
20updates%20for%2058%20counties090913.pdf.
“Achieving Better Outcomes For Adult Probation.” Legislative Analyst's Office (2009).
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/Probation/probation_052909.aspx.
“Amended Defendants’ Response To April 11, 2013 Order Requiring List Of Proposed
Population Reduction Measures; Court ordered Plan”, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct.
(2011): page 3, line 20-23; page 4, line 4-5; and page 4, line 2-3.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May-2013/Coleman-03-03-13-AmendedReponse.pdf.
“Annual Court Statistics.” The Judicial Branch of California Courts (2012).
http://www.courts.ca.gov/19733.htm.
“Application to The Honorable Justice Anthony M. Kennedy as Circuit Justice.” Brown v.
Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). (July 10, 2013).
Ater, Itai, Yehonatan Givati, and Oren Rigbi. “Organizational Structure, Police Activity
and Crime.” (2012).
Ballotpedia. “California Proposition 30, Sales and Income Tax Increase (2012).”
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/California_Proposition_30,_Sales_and_In
come_Tax_Increase_%282012%29.
Barton, Robert A., Roy W. Wesley, and James C. Spurling, Office of the Inspector
General. “Comparative Summary And Analysis Of The First, Second, And Third
Medical Inspection Cycles Of California's 33 Adult Institutions.” (2013).

235

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
http://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/MIU/SUMMARY/Comparative_Summary
_and_Analysis_of_the_First_Three_Medical_Inspection_Cycles_of_Californias_33_
Adult_Institutions.pdf.
“The Basics of a Plea Bargain.” Nolo Law for All. http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/the-basics-plea-bargain.html.
Bayley, David H. and Clifford D. Shearing. “The Future of Policing.” Law & Society
Review 30, no. 3 (1996): 585-606.
Berwick, Megan, Rachel Lindenberg, and Julia Van Roo. “Wobblers & Criminal Justice in
California: A Study into Prosecutorial Discretion.” Public Policy Practicum,
Stanford University (2010): xi.
http://ips.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/shared/DA%20Discretion%20Final%
20Report.pdf.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
Boysen, Ryan. “Santa Cruz 'Smart on Crime' Panel Looks at Pros and Cons of Adding
State Convicts to County Jails.” Santa Cruz Patch (November 9, 2011).
http://santacruz.patch.com/groups/politics-and-elections/p/smart-on-crimepanel-looks-at-law-that-adds-new-priso8b4517d429.
Branan, Brad. “Years after California OK'd $1.2 billion for new jails, not one has yet been
completed.” The Sacramento Bee (August 30, 2013): 1A.
http://www.sacbee.com/2013/08/30/5693654/years-after-california-okd-12.html.
Brown, Brian, Legislative Analyst’s Office. “The 2012–13 Budget: The 2011 Realignment
of Adult Offenders—An Update.”
http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis/2012/crim_justice/2011-realignment-of-adultoffenders-022212.aspx.
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
California Penal Code §17(b) (2011).
California Penal Code §290.
California Penal Code §667.5(c).
California Penal Code §1170(h).
California Penal Code §1192.7.
California Penal Code §1203.016.
California Penal Code §1230(b)(1). http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgibin/displaycode?section=pen&group=01001-02000&file=1228-1233.7.
California Penal Code §4115.55.
California State Assembly. Public Safety Realignment Act, AB 109. (2011).
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_01010150/ab_109_bill_20110404_chaptered.html.
California State Senate. Electronic Monitoring: Removing or Disabling GPS Device:
Offense SB 57. (2013).
California State Senate. SB 1441. (2012).
CalRealignment. “List of County Plans.” http://www.calrealignment.org/countyimplementation/list-of-county-plans.html.
“CDCR Responds to Supreme Court Denying a Stay.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).

236

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
http://cdcrtoday.blogspot.com/2013/08/cdcr-responds-to-supreme-courtdenying.html.
Chaiken, Jan M., Warren E. Walker, Anthony P. Jiga, and Sandra S. Polin, The RAND
Corporation. “The Impact of Fiscal Limitation on California's Criminal Justice
System.” (1981). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/90064NCJRS.pdf.
Choate, Brant, Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department. “Maximizing Education
Reaching Individual Transformation–MERIT.”
http://lawenforcementtoday.com/tag/los-angeles-county-sheriff%E2%80%99sdepartment/.
Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282 (E. D. Cal. 1995).
“Collected Correctional Statistics.” Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice California
Sentencing Institute. http://casi.cjcj.org/.
“Community Transition Unit is here to help while in Custody and after your release!” Los
Angeles County Sheriff's Department.
http://shq.lasdnews.net/pages/PageDetail.aspx?id=965.
Couzens, J. Richard and Tricia A. Bigelow. “Felony Sentencing After Realignment.”
Felony Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013).
Crawford, Mark. “Location California: Diversifying Economy Shows Promise.” Area
Development Online (April 2012).
http://www.areadevelopment.com/stateResources/california/Californiaeconomy-on-the-mend-262626.shtml.
“Crime Data.” Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice.
http://oag.ca.gov/crime.
“Crime Exclusion List.” California Mental Health Directors Association.
http://www.cmhda.org/go/portals/0/cmhda%20files/committees/forensics/110
7_forensics/ab_109_crime_exclusion_list_%287-22-11%29.pdf.
“Crime in California, 2012, Table 40, Adult Felony Arrestees Convicted, 2007-2012.”
Office of the Attorney General California Department of Justice.
“Crime Report, City of Tracy: 2011 and 2012 Comparisons.” Tracy Police Department.
http://www.ci.tracy.ca.us/common/images/uploads/Department%20Photos/Pol
ice%20Department/stats_thumb.jpg.
“Criminal Justice Realignment Resource Center.” California Judicial Branch.
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/890.htm.
“Criteria for Inmate Release from Custody Pursuant to Federal Court Order.” Fresno
County Sheriff’s Office Jail Division Policies and Procedures.
Cullen, Francis T. and Paul Gendreau. “Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy,
Practice, and Prospects.” Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice
System, U.S. Department of Justice 3 (200): 109-175.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03d.pdf.
“Daily Jail Population Statistics.” Santa Clara County.
http://www.sccgov.org/sites/doc/Administration/Pages/About-Us.aspx.
“The Dangers of AB 109/Prison Realignment.” Crime Victims United of California.
http://www.crimevictimsunited.com/lawsuit.
Dansky, Kara. “Understanding California Sentencing.” University of San Francisco Law
Review 43, no. 1 (2008): 67.

237

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Davis, Lois M., Malcolm V. Williams, Kathryn Pitkin Derose, Paul Steinberg, Nancy
Nicosia, Adrian Overton, Lisa Miyashiro, et al., The RAND Corporation.
“Understanding the Public Health Implications of Prisoner Reentry in California.”
(2011).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG1
165.pdf.
Dawood, Noor, Prison Law Office. “Juvenile Justice at a Crossroads: The Future of Senate
Bill 81 in California.” (2009). http://www.prisonlaw.com/pdfs/SB81report.pdf.
“Declaration Of Jeffrey Beard, Ph.D., In Support Of Defendants’ Response To April 11,
2013 Order Requiring List Of Proposed Population Reduction Measures; CourtOrdered Plan”, Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 2 (2011).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May-2013/Beard-May-2-Decl.pdf.
“Defendants’ Motion To Stay Three-Judge Court’s June 20, 2013 Order Requiring
Defendants To Implement Amended Plan Pending Appeal; Memorandum Of
Points And Authorities, Brown v. Plata.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
(June 28, 2013).
“Defendants’ Request for an Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline and Status
Report in Response to June 30, 2011, April 11, 2013, June 20, 2013, and August 9,
2013 Orders.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011). (September 16, 2013).
“Do the Crime, Do the Time? Maybe not, in California.” California State Sheriffs’
Association (June 2006).
http://www.calsheriffs.org/Documents/do_the_crime,_do_the_time.pdf.
Edelman, Peter B. “Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives.” The Justice System
Journal 9, no. 2 (1984): 134-150.
“Editorial: Flaws in prison realignment need to be fixed.” The Sacramento Bee
(November 5, 2012): 9A. http://www.sacbee.com/2012/11/05/4960488/flaws-inprison-realignment-need.html.
Edwards, Andrew and Brian Charles. “Southern California police say they need more
resources to confront potential inmate releases.” Los Angeles Daily News (June 19,
2013). http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20130620/southern-californiapolice-say-they-need-more-resources-to-confront-potential-inmate-releases.
Email to Joan Petersilia, Drew Soderborg at Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO)
(September 6, 2013).
“Estimated Funding Levels For AB 109 Programmatic Allocation.” California State
Association Of Counties (2012).
http://www.csac.counties.org/sites/main/files/fileattachments/12.05.16_attachments_1_and_2_for_5-14-12_caoac_briefing.pdf.
“Fact Sheet: 2011 Public Safety Realignment.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/RealignmentFact-Sheet.pdf.
“Fact Sheet: Three-Judge Panel Ruling on CDCR Inmate Population.” California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-April-2013/3JP-Fact-Sheet-April-152013.pdf.

238

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
“FBI Uniform Crime Repors, Crime in the United States.” Federal Bureau of
Investigations (various years). http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/ucrpublications#crime.
“Finigan Statement in Response to CDCR Filing, May 3, 2013.” California State
Association of Counties (2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-May2013/Finigan-Statement-CDCR-Filing-50313.pdf.
Frederick, Bruce and Don Stemen. “The Anatomy of Discretion: An Analysis of
Prosecutorial Decision Making.” Vera Institute of Justice (2012).
Freedman, Malaina and Craig Menchin. “Realignment's Impact on the Public Defender
and District Attorney: A Tale of 5 Counties.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(2012): 47. http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/183091/doc/slspublic/Freedman_Menchin.pdf.
“The Future of California Corrections.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (2012).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/2012plan/docs/plan/complete.pdf.
Gallagher, Catherine, Edward R. Macguire, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Michael D. Reisig.
“The Public Image of the Police.” The International Association of Chiefs of Police
(2001).
http://www.theiacp.org/PoliceServices/ProfessionalAssistance/ThePublicImageof
thePolice/tabid/198/Default.aspx#ch2.
Gendreau, Paul, Tracy Little, and Claire Goggin. “A meta-analysis of the predictors of
adult offender recidivism: What works!” Criminology 34, no. 4 (1996): 575-608.
Gies, Stephen V., Randy Gainey, Marcia I. Cohen, Eoin Healy, Dan Duplantier, Martha
Yeide, Alan Bekelman, Amanda Bobnis, and Michael Hopps. “Monitoring HighRisk Sex Offenders With GPS Technology: An Evaluation of the California
Supervision Program Final Report” (2012).
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/238481.pdf.
Goode, Erica. “Crime Increases in Sacramento After Deep Cuts to Police Force.” The
New York Times (November 3, 2012).
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/us/after-deep-police-cuts-sacramento-seesrise-in-crime.html?pagewanted=all&_r=2&.
“Governor Brown Signs Legislation To Improve Public Safety And Empower Local Law
Enforcement.” Office of the Governor (2011).
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=16964.
Grattet, Ryken, Joan Petersilia, and Jeffrey Lin. “Parole Violations and Revocations in
California.” (2008). https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/224521.pdf.
Greene, Jack R. “Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and
Function of the Police.” Policies, Processes, and Decisions of the Criminal Justice
System, U.S. Department of Justice 3 (2000): 299-370.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_3/03g.pdf.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
Heaton, Paul, The RAND Corporation. “Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime
Research Can Tell Us About Investing in Police.” (2010).
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND
_OP279.pdf.

239

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
“Helping homeless ex-cons.” Los Angeles Times (April 18, 2012).
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/opinion/la-ed-section8-homelesslancaster-20120418.
Hopper, Allen, Margaret Dooley-Sammuli, and Kelli Evans. “Public Safety Realignment:
California At A Crossroads.” ACLU of California (2012).
https://www.aclunc.org/docs/criminal_justice/public_safety_realignment_califor
nia_at_a_crossroads.pdf.
“In L.A. Prison Realignment, a New Focus on Mental Health.” The California Report
(August 21, 2012). http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201208210850/a.
Interview with Donald du Bain, Solano County District Attorney's Office in Fairfield
(November 16, 2012).
Interview with Kim Raney, Covina Police Department (February 19, 2013).
Interview with Police Official, Fresno Police Department (March 11, 2013).
Jenness, Valerine and Ryken Grattet. “The Law-In-Between: The Effects of Organizational
Perviousness on the Policing of Hate Crime.” Social Problems 52 (2005): 337-359.
Kahn, Carrie. “L.A. County Prepares To Take On State Prisoners.” National Public Radio
(September 28, 2011). http://www.npr.org/2011/09/29/140922171/l-a-countyprepares-to-take-on-state-prisoners.
Kelling, George L. and Mark H. Moore. “The Evolving Strategy of Policing.” Harvard
University Kennedy School of Government, Perspectives on Policing 4 (November
1988).
Kelling, George L., Antony M. Pate, Duane Dieckman, and Charles Brown. “The Kansas
City Preventive Patrol Experiment: Summary Report.” Police Foundation (1974).
Kelling, George L. and James Q. Wilson. “Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety.” The Atlantic (March 1982).
Kovandzic, Tomislav V. and John J. Sloan. “Police levels and crime rates revisited: A
county-level analysis from Florida (1980–1998).” Journal of Criminal Justice 30,
no. 1 (2002): 65-76.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047235201001234.
Krisberg, Barry and Susan Marchionna. “Fact Sheet: Police, Prisons, and Public Safety in
California.” The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy
(2013). http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/WI_Policing_Fact_Sheet_4.13.pdf.
Langworthy, Robert H. “Do Stings Control Crime? An Evaluation Of A Police Fencing
Operation.” Justice Quarterly 6, no. 1 (March 1989): 27-45.
Lawrence, Sarah. “California in Context: How Does California's Criminal Justice System
Compare to Other States?” The Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute of Law and
Social Policy (2012).
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/bccj/CA_in_Context_Policy_Brief_Sept_2012_
Final.pdf.
Lawrence, Sarah. “Managing Jail Populations to Enhance Public Safety: Assessing and
Managing Risk in the Post-Realignment Era.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(June 2013). https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/childpage/440504/doc/slspublic/Paper%20on%20jail%20mgmt%20July%202013.pdf.

240

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Leonard, Jack and Maura Dolan. “Softer 3-strikes law has defense lawyers preparing case
reviews.” Los Angeles Times (November 8, 2012).
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/08/local/la-me-three-strikes-20121108.
“Letter for Survey of Sheriffs re Long Term Offenders in Jail.” California State Sheriff’s
Association (February 26, 2013).
http://www.calsheriffs.org/images/SummaryMemoreLongTermSentences021913.
pdf.
“Letter on bail to Governor and Members of the Legislature.” Little Hoover Commission
(2013). http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/216/Report216.pdf.
“Letter to Governor Brown to Oppose Assembly Bill 109.” Crime Victims Action Alliance
(April 4, 2011).
Levitt, Steven D. “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effects of Police
on Crime: Reply.” The American Economic Review 92, no. 4 (2002): 1244-1250.
Lin, Jeffrey and Joan Petersilia. “Responding to Realignment: Examining County
Variation in AB 109 Spending Plans.” Stanford Criminal Justice Center
(forthcoming, 2013).
Lipsky, Michael. Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public services.
New York: Russell Sage Foundation (1980).
Liptak, Adam. “Justices, 5-4, Tell California to Cut Prisoner Population.” New York Times
(May 24, 2011). http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/24/us/24scotus.html.
“Local Planning Process.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/Local-Planning-Process.html.
Lofstrom, Magnus and Steven Raphael, Public Policy Institute of California. “Impact of
Realignment on County Jail Populations.” (2013).
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_613MLR.pdf.
Loftin, Colin and David McDowall. “The Police, Crime, and Economic Theory: An
Assessment.” American Sociological Review 47, no. 3 (1982): 393-401.
MacLean, Pamela A. “Prison Realignment: Now What?” California Lawyer (August 2012).
http://www.callawyer.com/Clstory.cfm?eid=923950.
Males, Mike and Lizzie Buchen. “California’s Urban Crime Increase in 2012: Is
“Realignment” to Blame?” Center on Juvenile & Criminal Justice (January 2013).
McAllister, Toni. “Early Release Possible For Inmates As Local Jails Fill.” Lake ElsinoreWildomar Patch (January 7, 2012). http://lakeelsinorewildomar.patch.com/groups/police-and-fire/p/early-release-possible-for-inmatesas-local-jails-fill.
McCray, Angela, Kathryn McCann Newhall, and Jessica Greenlick Snyder. “Realigning the
Revolving Door? An Analysis of California Counties’ AB 109 Implementation Plans
(Working Paper).” Stanford Criminal Justice Center (2012).
Meares, Tracey L. “Reward for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and
Conduct with Financial Incentives.” Fordham Law Review 64 (1995-1996): 868.
Misner, Robert L. “Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 86, no. 3 (1996): 717-777.
“Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) Rule 3.8(a).” American Bar
Association.

241

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
“Monthly Population Report as of Midnight August 31, 2007.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Bran
ch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0708.pdf.
“Monthly Population Report as of Midnight May 31, 2011.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Bran
ch/Monthly/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad1105.pdf.
Moore, Shelby A. Dickerson. “Questioning the Autonomy of Prosecutorial Charging
Decisions: Recognizing the Need to Exercise Discretion--Knowing There Will Be
Consequences for Crossing the Line.” Louisiana Law Review 60 (2000): 371-404.
Morris, Norval and Michael Tonry. Between prison and probation : intermediate
punishments in a rational sentencing system. edited by Michael H. Tonry, New
York: Oxford University Press (1990).
“Motion To File Amici Brief, Motion To File Under Rule 33.2, And Brief Amici Curiae Of
Former Governors Pete Wilson, George Deukmejian, Gray Davis, And Arnold
Schwarzenegger In Support Of The Application For Stay.” Brown v. Plata, 131 S.
Ct. (2011), http://www.cjlf.org/briefs/Plata_MotionforStay.pdf.
Nieto, Marcus, California State Library California Research Bureau. “The Changing Role
of Probation in California's Criminal Justice System.”(1996).
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/96/06/96006.pdf.
“One in 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections.” The Pew Center on the States.
(2009).
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2009/PSPP_1in31_report_
FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
“Orange County CCP Plan 2011-2012.” Orange County County Corrections Partnership.
(2011).
Palta, Rina. “LAPD Chief Beck: More than 100 cops monitoring felons released under
state prison realignment.” California Public Radio, KPCC (August 20, 2013).
http://www.scpr.org/news/2013/08/20/38800/realignment-forcing-lapd-to-shiftresources-chief/.
“Parole, Desistance from Crime, and Community Integration.” National Research
Council Committee on Community Supervision and Desistance from Crime
(2007).
“Parole LEADS.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Non_Revocable_Parole/Law_Enforcement_Reso
urces.html.
People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 764-766 (1971).
People v. Reyes, 19 Cal. 4th 743, 752 (1998).
People v. Robles, 23 Cal. 4th 789, 795 (2000).
Perez, Margarita E. “Public Safety Realignment Act of 2011: Presentation to the L.A.
County Board of Supervisors.” (2013).
Petersilia, Joan. “California’s Correctional Paradox of Excess and Deprivation.” Crime
and Justice 37, no. 1 (2008): 207-278.

242

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Petersilia, Joan. “A Decade of Experimenting With Intermediate Sanctions: What Have
We Learned?” Perspectives on Crime and Justice-1997-1998 Lecture Series,
Volume II, National Institute of Justice, Washington D.C. (1998).
Petersilia, Joan. “Probation in the United States.” Crime & Justice 22 (1997): 149-200.
Petersilia, Joan. “Understanding California Corrections.” (2006).
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/carc/understand_ca_corrections.pdf.
Petersilia, Joan and Marisela Montes (Co-Chairs). “Meeting the Challenges of
Rehabilitation in California’s Prison and Parole System: A Report From Governor
Schwarzenegger’s Rehabilitation Strike Team.”
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/news/docs/govrehabilitationstriketeamrpt_012308.pdf.
Petersilia, Joan and Jessica Greenlick Snyder. “Looking Past The Hype: 10 Questions
Everyone Should Ask About California’s Prison Realignment.” California Journal
of Politics and Policy 5, no. 2 (2013).
Petersilia, Joan and Susan Turner. “An Evaluation of Intensive Probation in California.”
The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 82, no. 3 (1991): 610-658.
Phone interview with Mark Delgado, Los Angeles County Countywide Criminal Justice
Coordination Committee (December 19, 2012).
Plata v. Davis, 329 F. 3d 1101 (2003).
“Police departments to receive grant funding.” The Stockton Record (January 19, 2013).
http://www.recordnet.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20130119/A_NEWS02/3
01190315.
“Press Release: New data supports Sen. Ted W. Lieu’s legislation to crackdown on
parolees who remove GPS-ankle bracelets.” (February 11, 2013).
http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-02-11-new-data-supports-sen-ted-w-lieu-slegislation-crackdown-parolees-who-remove-gps-ank.
“Press Release: Sen. Lieu’s legislation a major deterrent for paroled sex offenders.” (May
28, 2013). http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-05-28-sen-lieu-s-legislation-majordeterrent-paroled-sex-offenders.
“Press Release: Sen. Ted W. Lieu introduces plan making it a felony for parolees to cut
off GPS-aided ankle bracelets.” (January 7, 2013).
http://sd28.senate.ca.gov/news/2013-01-07-sen-ted-w-lieu-introduces-plan-makingit-felony-parolees-cut-gps-aided-ankle-bracele.
Preuitt, Lori and Kris Sanchez. “Suffer These Crimes in Oakland? Don't Call the Cops.”
NBC Bay Area (July 13, 2010). http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/SufferThese-Crimes-in-Oakland-Dont-Call-the-Cops-98266509.html.
“Prison Overcrowding: The Magic Number.” The Economist (May 11, 2013).
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21577411-california-hasntemptied-its-prisons-enough-it-trying-magic-number.
“Prison realignment raises questions about crime rate.” Sacramento Sheriff Scott Jones
on News 10. http://www.news10.net/video/1184091988001/0/Prisonrealignment-raises-questions-about-crime-rate.
“Probation Services Task Force Final Report.” Administrative Office of the Courts and
California State Association of Counties (2003).
http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fullReport.pdf.

243

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
“Public Safety Realignment Custody Implementation Plan.” Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department (2011).
“Public Safety Realignment Implementation Update-Year 1 Report.” Los Angeles County
Countywide Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (2012).
http://ccjcc.lacounty.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=9NmiylYnCds%3D&tabid=602
.
Quan, Lisa, Sara Abarbanel, and Debbie Mukamal. “Decarceration through Realignment:
Changes in the Correctional System in California, 2004-2012.” Stanford Criminal
Justice Center (forthcoming, 2013).
“Race and Prosecutorial Discretion.” The Leadership Conference.
http://www.civilrights.org/publications/justice-on-trial/prosecutorial.html.
“Realignment Report: A One-year Examination of Offenders Released from State Prison
in the First Six Months of Public Safety Realignment.” California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (2013).
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Realignment/docs/Realignment%206%20Month%20Re
port%20Final_5%2016%2013%20v1.pdf.
Repke, Laura. “Would disabled receive better care in prison?” San Francisco Chronicle
(March 31, 2011). http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/Woulddisabled-receive-better-care-in-prison-2376903.php#ixzz1IIsIR99n.
“Request for Victim Services (CDCR 1707).” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Victim_Services/application.html.
Robert, Amanda. “California courts continue cuts, closures.” Legal Newsline Legal
Journal (June 17, 2013). http://legalnewsline.com/issues/tort-reform/242312california-courts-continue-cuts-closures.
Sá, Karen de. “Santa Clara County seeks to arm some probation officers.” San Jose
Mercury News (January 3, 2010).
http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_14298168?nclick_check=1.
Schlanger, Margo. “Plata v. Brown and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics.”
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 48, no. 1 (2013): 165-216.
Seale, Lee. “A Preliminary Examination of Public Safety Realignment CDCR Institution
and State Parole/PRCS Data.” Association for Criminal Justice Research
(California) 76th Semi-Annual Meeting (2012).
http://www.acjrca.org/images/ppf12/1seale.pptx.

Sen. Ted W. Lieu's statement on parolee arrested for murder after cutting off GPSmonitoring bracelet. California State Senate (March 1, 2013).
Senate Committee on Public Safety. Arming Probation Officers, AB 1968, 2011-2012
Regular Session, California State Senate (July 3, 2012).
Sewell, Abby. “L.A. County seeing high-risk offenders entering its probation system.” Los
Angeles Times (November 30, 2012).
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/30/local/la-me-realignment-20121130.
“Sex Offender Information Overview.” California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Parole/Sex_Offender_Facts/index.html.
Shahani, Aarti. “SF's Gascón Pushes For Data-Driven Approach in Tracking Offenders ...
and Prosecutors.” KQED News (May 1, 2013).

244

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
http://blogs.kqed.org/newsfix/2013/04/30/sf-district-attorney-big-data-isoverdue/.
Silbert, Rebecca Sullivan. “Thinking Critically about Realignment in California.” The
Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute of Law & Social Policy (2012): 2.
Spencer, Jessica and Joan Petersilia. “Voices From the Field: California Victims’ Rights in
a Post-Realignment World.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 25 (2013).
Stock, Stephen. “California Superior Courts in Crisis.” NBC Bay Area (July 24, 2013).
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/California-Superior-Courts-in-Crisis216668081.html.
Storton, Kathryn B. and Lisa R. Rodriguez, California District Attorneys Association.
“Prosecutors’ Analysis of the 2011 Criminal Justice Realignment.”(2011).
http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/cdaarealignguide.pdf.
Taylor, Mac, Legislative Analyst's Office. “California's Criminal Justice System: A
Primer.”(2013). http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2013/crim/criminal-justiceprimer/criminal-justice-primer-011713.pdf.
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Alameda Police Department (March 7, 2013).
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Citrus Heights Police Department (March 2,
2013).
Telephone Interview with Police Official, Fairfield Police Department (March 11, 2013).
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Riverside County Law Offices of the Public
Defender (January 18, 2013).
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public
Defender (November 8, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Santa Clara County Office of the Public
Defender (November 9, 2012).
Telephone Interview with Public Defender, Solano County Public Defender (October 26,
2012).
Thompson, Don. “Agency: Realignment law undermines role of judges.” San Diego
Union Tribune (May 30, 2013).
http://www.utsandiego.com/news/2013/May/30/agency-realignment-lawundermines-role-of-judges/.
“Three-Judge Court Updates.” California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(2013). http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/3_judge_panel_decision.html.
Tien, James M., James W. Simon, and Richard C. Larson. “An Alternative Approach to
Police Patrol: The Wilmington Split-Force Experiment.” U.S. Government Printing
Office (1978).
Turner, Susan. UC Irvine Center for Evidence-Based Corrections. “California Static Risk
Assessment (CSRA).” www.acjrca.org/ppt08/2.pvdmt-turner.ppt.
U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
Vilkin, Camden and Jennifer Williams. “Post-Realignment Parole: Loud Bark, Soft Bite.”
(forthcoming).
Villacorte, Christina. “Probation arms more of its officers to cope with Realignment.” Los
Angeles Daily News (June 3, 2013). http://www.dailynews.com/generalnews/20130503/probation-arms-more-of-its-officers-to-cope-with-realignment.
245

DRAFT FOR REVIEW AND COMMENTS
Vorenberg, James. “Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials.” Duke Law
Journal 4 (1976): 651-697.
Walsh, Jennifer Edwards. “In Furtherance of Justice: The Effect of Discretion on the
Implementation of California's Three Strikes Law.” Claremont Graduate
University (unpublished manuscript, 1999).
Warner, Nick. “Legislative Update.” California Sheriff (July 2012): 8-11.
http://www.calsheriffs.org/images/MagazinePDFs/CSSA-Sheriff-Mag-July2012.pdf.
Weintraub, Daniel. “California is richest, poorest state.” California Health Report (May
27, 2013). http://www.healthycal.org/archives/12177.
Weis, Alyssa and Jennifer Williams. “From The Shadows to The Forefront: How
Realignment is Affecting the Mentally Ill Offender Population in Jails and Upon
Reentry.” (forthcoming).
Werner, Alan. A guide to implementation research. Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute
Press (2004).
White, Bobby. “California Cities Cut Police Budgets.” The Wall Street Journal (October
31, 2008). http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122540831980086085.html.
“With Realignment, Influx of Offenders Tests L.A. County: Interview of Jerry Powers.”
The California Report (December 11, 2012).
http://www.californiareport.org/archive/R201212110850/b.
Woolsey, Katherine and Kathleen Biebel. “Implementation Research: The Black Box of
Program Implementation.” Center for Mental Health Services Research Issue Brief
4, no. 7 (November 2007).
http://escholarship.umassmed.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=pi
b.
Yoder, Steve. “As Police Budgets are Cut, Citizens Step In.” The Fiscal Times (August 7,
2012). http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2012/08/07/Police-BudgetCut#page1.

246