New York City Department of Investigation
The Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD)
Using Data from Lawsuits and Legal Claims
Involving NYPD to Improve Policing
Mark G. Peters
Commissioner
Philip K. Eure
Inspector General for the NYPD
April 2015

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Table of Contents
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................i
I.

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

II.

The Rise and Impact of Police-Related Litigation and Legal Claims ........................... 2

III.

Litigation Data as a Tool for Improvement ................................................................. 4
a. Identifying Trends and Patterns ............................................................................. 5
b. Early Intervention Systems ..................................................................................... 7
c. Changing Departmental Culture and Building Community Trust ......................... 11
d. The Limitations of Litigation Data ......................................................................... 13

IV.

The Current Use of Litigation Data within NYPD ..................................................... 15

V.

Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 19

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Executive Summary
Over the past decade, legal claims and civil lawsuits against the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) have been increasing in number. According to NYPD, in the past five fiscal
years alone, the City has seen more than 15,000 lawsuits filed against NYPD, a 44% increase in
total number, that in sum have cost the City over $202 million. These cases result in a substantial
financial burden on New York City taxpayers. The City’s response has ranged from removing the
most-sued officers from the streets to allocating new and greater resources to the attorneys who
must defend these lawsuits. The Mayor recently announced that the New York City Law
Department would receive an additional $4.5 million to hire 30 new attorneys and 10 new
paralegals to defend the City against such lawsuits. While parties may differ on what has caused
this high volume of lawsuits, the byproduct has been a large quantity of lawsuit and claims data
which, if used correctly, can assist NYPD and the City with taking necessary corrective
action. However, various agencies with responsibility for different aspects of this litigation are
not tracking the data from these cases in the most effective way possible. This Report discusses
the necessary steps needed for the efficient collection and use of this data.
While the high number of legal claims and lawsuits being filed against NYPD is concerning,
the careful collection and analysis of data regarding legal claims and civil lawsuits (hereinafter
“litigation data”) has the potential to reduce costs while improving both officer performance and
police-community relations.

Although litigation data is not a perfect indicator of police

performance, when the correct litigation data is collected and used properly, it can help result in
changes that benefit individual officers, the police department, community members, and the
City at large.
As outlined in this Report, NYPD can use litigation data in three ways: First, a quantitative
and qualitative review of litigation data can be used to help law enforcement identify patterns
and trends of police misconduct that warrant remediation. Second, by coupling litigation data
with “Early Intervention Systems,” law enforcement agencies can identify at-risk officers who
may be in need of enhanced training or monitoring. Third, litigation data analysis can contribute

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to improvements and positive shifts in departmental culture. In this Report, OIG-NYPD looks at
how law enforcement agencies in other jurisdictions have successfully used litigation data in
these three ways to effect change and reduce costs, and how NYPD can do the same.
While litigation data has the potential to bring improvements, the limitations of the
information must also be taken into account. For example, the fact that a claim or lawsuit is
settled is not necessarily proof of liability or improper conduct. Cases are not always resolved on
the merits, and non-meritorious cases are sometimes settled for lower amounts to avoid the
costs and uncertainties of litigation. Moreover, litigation data cannot, by itself, drive change in
how plaintiffs and the City choose to litigate and resolve lawsuits.

Separate strategies,

independent of this Report, are required to address how claims and lawsuits are managed by
agencies and counsel. But when the data is properly gathered and analyzed, litigation data can
still be used for positive, proactive improvements in policing.
While this Report lists several steps that should be taken, OIG-NYPD notes that NYPD is,
in some ways, ahead of many other police departments with respect to tracking and analyzing
litigation data. For example, NYPD has been improving its system for using data – including
litigation data – to track and monitor the performance of individual officers. NYPD also recently
revamped its internal team responsible for reviewing and identifying trends in legal claims and
litigation. Finally, NYPD has been exchanging data more regularly with the two agencies that also
track litigation data against NYPD and its officers: the Office of the Comptroller of the City of
New York (Comptroller’s Office) and the New York City Law Department (Law Department).
Notwithstanding this progress, more should be done. OIG-NYPD sees several
opportunities for enhancing how litigation data is collected and utilized in the long-term. OIGNYPD therefore makes the following three recommendations:

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1) NYPD should perform a qualitative review of the most relevant data contained
within legal claims and lawsuits against NYPD. A more thoughtful examination of
certain litigation metrics generates the greatest benefit from a risk management
perspective, police oversight perspective, and accountability perspective. Specifically,
NYPD, the Comptroller’s Office, and the Law Department need to start tracking more
details about the nature of the claims and the core allegations, information about the
subject police officer, the location of the alleged incident, and the address of the
plaintiff. A more qualitative review of claims and final outcomes will also help to
distinguish potentially meritless cases from more substantive claims and, therefore,
will help to determine which cases can best help with an Early Intervention System or
a trend analysis system.

2) NYPD should more closely coordinate the collection and exchange of litigation data
through the creation of an interagency working group with the Comptroller’s Office
and the Law Department. Beyond the current bilateral discussions that NYPD has
with both the Comptroller’s Office and the Law Department, an interagency working
group would allow all three agencies to better understand the optimal path forward
in facilitating and exchanging the review of police-involved litigation data. This
includes identifying what data exists and where, how data should be classified, what
additional data should be collected, what resources are needed to capture data that
is not readily available, and how to best balance the benefits of data review with the
practical realities of data collection.

3) NYPD should be more transparent in its emerging work in litigation data analysis so
that New York City residents can better understand how the officers serving their
community are evaluated and how NYPD is using litigation data to identify trends in
the Department as a whole. In addition to revealing details about both officer
performance monitoring and litigation data analysis, NYPD should also solicit public
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comment regarding these systems. With increased transparency and openness to
comment will come greater public confidence in NYPD’s plan for analyzing litigation
data.
Reliable data on police activities is a foundation of oversight and review. This Office, as
well as NYPD, must therefore take all practical steps to harness the most accurate data from all
available sources and render it useful. If the recommendations in this Report are implemented,
litigation data analysis may further this goal by helping to reduce the number of legal claims and
lawsuits directed towards NYPD, while also reducing costs and improving policing and policecommunity relations in New York City as a whole.

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I.

APRIL 2015

Introduction
Civil lawsuits and legal claims against the New York City Police Department (NYPD) are

increasing in number and presenting a material financial burden on New York City taxpayers. The
City’s response has ranged from removing the most-sued officers from the streets to allocating
new and greater resources to the attorneys who defend these lawsuits. However, the City has
not yet succeeded in coordinating the three agencies with the most access to data from these
claims and lawsuits so that the relevant information from these claims and lawsuits can be
analyzed and acted upon.
While the high number of legal claims and lawsuits being filed against NYPD may be
concerning, NYPD should use the data generated from such lawsuits to consider potential
changes and reforms. Even given the limitations of such data, aspects of the data from this
growing pool of legal claims and lawsuits can be used to identify and analyze trends of both
individual officer performance and department performance as a whole. Addressing such trends
can ultimately lead to positive shifts in departmental culture. Other cities have harnessed the
power of litigation data to bring about positive change, and NYPD, which has taken steps in this
direction, should continue to do so as well.
In this Report,1 the Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD) analyzes how
the careful collection and analysis of data from legal claims and civil lawsuits can be used by NYPD
to self-monitor, implement reforms, and ultimately reduce the costs on the City overall. OIGNYPD sees at least three areas in which the City could further improve its performance with this
emerging trend. First, certain relevant quantitative and qualitative categories of litigation data
should be identified, collected, and tracked by NYPD, the New York City Law Department (Law

1

Commissioner Mark G. Peters and Inspector General Philip K. Eure thank the staff of OIG-NYPD for their efforts,
persistence, and insight in researching and writing this Report, especially Sandra Musumeci, Deputy Inspector
General; Asim Rehman, General Counsel; Rebecca Engel, Examining Attorney; and Michael Acampora, Special
Investigator. Commissioner Peters and IG Eure also recognize the important contributions made by Lesley Brovner,
First Deputy Commissioner, and Jeri Powell, Director of Intergovernmental Affairs. Commissioner Peters and IG Eure
also extend thanks to the New York City Police Department, the New York City Law Department, and the Office of
the Comptroller of the City of New York for their cooperation during the investigation of this Report.

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Department), and the Office of the New York Comptroller (Comptroller’s Office). Second, these
three agencies need to better align their litigation data collection, exchange, and coordination.
Third, NYPD needs to be more transparent in its emerging work in litigation data analysis, to help
New York City residents better understand how the officers serving their community are
evaluated and how NYPD is using data to identify trends in the Department as a whole.
II.

The Rise and Impact of Police-Related Litigation and Legal Claims
In recent years, New York City has seen a notable rise in the number of pre-litigation legal

claims and lawsuits filed against NYPD.2 In 2014, the Comptroller’s Office reported that the
number of legal claims filed against NYPD had risen by 71% in the past nine years.3 The majority
of these claims have consisted of allegations of police misconduct, civil rights violations, and
injury or damage from accidents involving police vehicles.4 According to the Comptroller’s Office,
the Bronx is by far the borough with the most complaints, as it is home to the five precincts with
the highest number of personal injury police action claims (when adjusted for the crime rate).5
In addition to Notices of Claim, the number of lawsuits against NYPD remains concerning.
According to NYPD, in the last five fiscal years, there have been more than 15,000 lawsuits filed
against NYPD, a 44% increase in total number. In sum, these lawsuits have cost the City over $202
million.6

2

In this Report, legal claims and lawsuits against NYPD refer both to those against individual officers and against the
Department as a whole.
3

Office of the New York City Comptroller, CLAIMSTAT: PROTECTING CITIZENS AND SAVING TAXPAYER DOLLARS 1 (July 2014).
City Council has also taken note of the rise of lawsuits and legal claims by introducing Proposed Int. No. 119-A in
February 2014, a proposed local law that called for tracking more information about civil actions filed against NYPD
and its officers.
4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Risk Assessment Unit, ANALYSIS OF LITIGATION, FISCAL YEAR 2010-2014, at 2. (The Risk Assessment Unit is now known
as NYPD Risk Management Bureau, Enterprise Liability Assessment Unit).

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While parties may debate the causes behind the rise of these lawsuits, the bona fides of
legal claims and lawsuits brought against NYPD, and how such cases should be litigated and
resolved, the overall impact of these claims and lawsuits is undeniable. First, these actions take
a significant financial toll on the City. In 2013 alone, settlements and judgments against NYPD
cost the City $137.2 million.7 In April 2014, NYPD removed an officer from street duty an officer
who reportedly had been sued 28 times and had cost the City at least $884,000 in settlements.
Overall, the costs of claims related to NYPD have been the highest of any agency in the City since
2010.8 Moreover, beyond the pure monetary costs of these settlements and judgments, the rise
in claims has placed an increased resource burden on the various personnel and institutions
involved, including City attorneys, City claims administrators, courts, and law enforcement
professionals. In fact, the Mayor recently announced that the Law Department would receive an
additional $4.5 million to hire 30 new attorneys and 10 new paralegals to defend the City against
such lawsuits.
Unfortunately, as is discussed more fully in Section IV below, data from these lawsuits
remains elusive. Generally speaking, the Comptroller’s Office tracks the number and type of prelitigation legal claims filed and the amount paid in any claim settlements; the Law Department
tracks the number of lawsuits filed, the court in which they were filed, any named defendants,
and, after closure, the disposition type and total disposition amount; and NYPD tracks
information about individual officers, such as their rank, precinct, and Internal Affairs Bureau and
Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) complaint histories. However, there is currently no
effective method of merging this data to allow a complete picture. As a result, for example, there
is no simple way now to determine what percentage of the 15,000-plus lawsuits filed in the last
five years resulted in legitimate findings of excessive force, despite the obvious value of such
information.

7

CLAIMSTAT, supra note 3, at 1.

8

Id. at 5.

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Legal Claims against NYPD
Notices of Claim
Under Section 50-e of the General Municipal Law, parties seeking to file personal injury
tort claims or property damage tort claims against the City of New York – including claims
against NYPD – are legally required to file a “Notice of Claim” with the Comptroller’s Office
before they can file a lawsuit in court. The Notice of Claim contains basic information
about the claimant, the incident, and the injury or damages. The Notice of Claim process
allows the Comptroller’s Office, as the City’s chief fiscal officer, to investigate, evaluate,
and settle claims before they proceed to litigation. A Notice of Claim is required for state
tort claims against NYPD but may not be required for other types of claims.
Lawsuits
Parties also file lawsuits against NYPD and individual officers in state and federal court. In
some situations, lawsuits against NYPD are filed only after the Notice of Claim process does
not result in settlement or resolution. For other types of cases – including certain federal
claims – parties do not need to first file a Notice of Claim and may proceed directly to
court. Lawsuits are commenced by the filing of a Complaint, which contains detailed
information about the parties, the allegations, and the relief sought by the plaintiff.
Lawsuits against NYPD and individual officers are primarily defended by the New York City
Law Department.
For the purposes of this Report, information from Notices of Claim and information from
Lawsuits are being collectively referred to as “Litigation Data.”

III.

Litigation Data as a Tool for Improvement
While both costly and potentially indicative of larger problems, the rise in legal claims and

lawsuits against NYPD also presents the City with potentially valuable data. Done correctly, the
thoughtful collection and analysis of litigation data has the tremendous potential to reduce costs
to the City while also improving both officer performance and police-community relations.
First, a quantitative and qualitative review of relevant litigation data can help law
enforcement and police oversight agencies identify patterns and trends of police misconduct that

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warrant remediation. Second, by coupling litigation data with Early Intervention Systems,9 law
enforcement agencies can identify at-risk officers who may be in need of enhanced guidance or
training. Third, litigation data analysis can contribute to improvements and positive shifts in
departmental culture overall. By utilizing litigation data in these ways, not only will NYPD be
able to identify issues at both the officer and departmental level, but, in the long run, the City
may see a decline in the number and costs of legal claims and lawsuits filed against NYPD.10
a. Identifying Trends and Patterns
First, by reviewing litigation data, police departments can discover systematic problems
that might have otherwise gone unnoticed.11 In particular, litigation data can be used to identify
trends, breaking down how officer behavior and departmental policies generate litigation costs
and highlighting areas where corrections can be made through changes to policy or training. As
part of this process, some police departments compare information from concluded lawsuits
with information in their closed internal affairs files. In doing so, departments can analyze the
outcomes of their own investigations and evaluate current departmental training and policies, to
“‘assess how new training plays out on the street, or to determine whether new training is
needed.’”12

9

Early Intervention Systems (EIS) are discussed in greater detail on page 7 of this Report.

10

While not covered in this Report, the analysis of litigation data can also serve to better explain why lawsuits and
claims against NYPD are on the rise. For example, data analysis may suggest that the increases in legal claims and
lawsuits over the last five years reflect the current health of police-community relations. By contrast, the data could
underscore changes in litigation strategies by both plaintiffs and defendants, such as more aggressive filing by certain
plaintiffs’ bar attorneys who have an economic incentive in bringing questionable lawsuits that they believe are likely
to be settled.
11

Johanna Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 853 (2012).

12

Id. at 859 (quoting the Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s Special Counsel).

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Case Study:
Using Litigation Data to Identify Trends – Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
Nationwide, at least 16 police departments – including those in Seattle, Denver, and
Cincinnati – are analyzing litigation data in order to identify larger-scale trends in police
behavior.13 However, perhaps the most in-depth trend analysis is taking place within the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), the nation’s second largest law enforcement
agency. This department created the country’s first official Risk Management Bureau for a law
enforcement agency, which was designed to reduce both problematic incidents and liability costs
for LASD.
For approximately 20 years, the Special Counsel for LASD regularly produced public
reports analyzing the Department’s policies and practices. In its last report, the Special Counsel
described how the Risk Management Bureau gathers information about incidents alleged in
lawsuits and then works with County Counsel, “to determine whether the matter should be
settled quickly or if the Department should fight in court all the way through trial.” 14 Most
importantly from the risk management perspective, there is a “unified philosophy that
communicating information about misconduct by Sheriff’s personnel, discovered in litigation, is
a smart thing to do to benefit the Department in the long run.”15
More specifically, on at least an annual basis, LASD’s Risk Management Bureau informs
LASD leaders about how much the County is paying out in judgments or settlements, how much
each patrol division is costing in pay-outs, how many claims are being received, and the types of
claims being filed. For example, in 2012-13, LASD’s trend analysis revealed that 46.5% of the

13

See Joanna Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law Enforcement
Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1091 (2010).
14

Police Assessment Resource Center, 34TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL: LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT 31 (August 2014).
15

Id.

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cases alleged excessive force by the police, and another 25.5% related to “alleged ‘law
enforcement’ mistakes made in the field or jails.”16
While the Special Counsel’s report approved of the overall goal of the trend analysis being
carried out by LASD’s Risk Management Bureau, the reports opined that LASD’s informationsharing did not provide enough specific information to identify strategies for change, and
therefore did not “make it into the consciousness of Department members.”17 Accordingly, the
report suggested that in addition to providing regular reports on litigation to senior-level officers,
the Risk Management Bureau should do a more specific “break-down of what behavior is
generating the costs,” present “the identification of any patterns of cost-generating behavior
both in the station and unit, and throughout the Department,” and then “work more closely with
the Litigation Cost Manager to organize and distribute data.”18 In other words, trend analysis
must be carefully managed, distributed, and have its goals clearly defined in order to perform its
task in the most successful way.
b. Early Intervention Systems
Litigation data can be also utilized as one essential aspect of an “Early Intervention
System” (EIS), a data-focused system that law enforcement agencies are increasingly exploring
nationwide. An EIS is a computerized database system that allows police departments to monitor
individual police officers based on a series of “performance indicators.”19 The set list of
performance indicators may differ from department to department, but there is value in
including litigation data regarding the number and type of legal claims and lawsuits filed against
individual officers. Other potential data points include the number and type of use-of-force

16

Id. at 35.

17

Id. at 38.

18

Id. at 39.

19

Samuel Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of Making Police Reforms Endure,
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57, 77 (2012).

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incidents involving the officer, number of arrests made and/or tickets issued, recommendations
and awards, and line-of-duty injuries. Credited by some observers as “the most powerful police
accountability tool,” an EIS allows supervisors to quickly identify officers who are in need of
intervention while providing the department with global data regarding the performance of its
law enforcement professionals.20 Although a properly functioning EIS cannot rely on litigation
data alone and must always be mindful of the inherent problems presented by such data,
information about claims and lawsuits is an important performance indicator, and the effective
collection and integration of litigation data into an EIS can greatly aid the system. With an EIS
system, police departments can also investigate misconduct claims in a lawsuit the same way
that they would if the claims were alleged in a citizen complaint, and then counsel or retrain
accordingly.21
The EIS process may be understood in four procedural steps:
1) Review of Performance Indicator Data:

The department collects performance

indicator data (including but not limited to litigation data), and supervisors review and
analyze the data on a regular basis.
2) Identification: Supervisors identify officers who raise performance concerns based on
their EIS analysis.
3) Intervention:

The department counsels, educates, re-trains, and/or disciplines

officers, as needed.
4) Monitoring: The department performs post-intervention monitoring to promote
improvements or identify non-compliance.22
Research has shown that EIS systems not only act as a risk management system for
departments, but also create both a new obligation and a new tool for supervisors, requiring
20

Samuel Walker, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 137 (2nd Edition 2014).

21

Schwartz, supra note 11, at 856-7.

22

Walker, supra note 20, at 146-157.

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them to become “data analysts with an emphasis on identification of patterns of conduct.”23
With performance indicators such as litigation data at their command, supervisors using EIS
systems are held to higher standards of accountability, as they are expected to use this data in
“non-traditional models of problem solving,” to “enhance their management skills,” and to “help
round out their people interaction skills.”24 The Department of Justice’s Office of CommunityOriented Policing Services (COPS) has compared EIS systems to other data-driven systems which
“rely on the analysis of systematic data for the purpose of addressing problems and holding police
managers accountable for problems under their command.”25
Case Study:
Early Intervention Systems At Work – Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
The Los Angeles County Sheriff Department’s EIS system is one of the oldest in the
country. Following the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles in 1991, the Kolts Commission,
appointed to investigate LASD, identified a group of 62 “problem officers” in the department and
recommended the development of an EIS system.26 The Department’s Personnel Performance
Index (PPI), which was introduced in 1997, “soon became widely regarded as the best EIS in the
country.”27 As a process, it identifies officers who have been involved in a disproportionate
number of “risk” incidents. A Performance Review Committee, comprised of rotating panels of
three commanders, then screens each identified officer and assigns a lieutenant to prepare a
detailed Employee Profile Report. If the Committee decides to refer an officer to intervention,

23

Id. at 158.

24

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE 12 (2003).
25

Id. at 17.

26

Walker, supra note 20, at 140.

27

Id.

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then the Department also prepares a Performance Plan, which may include counseling,
retraining, or reassignment. 28
After LASD’s EIS system was put into place in 1997, use-of-force incidents dropped from
an average of 7.11 per month for officers before they were placed on Performance Review to .98
per month after they were placed on Performance Review. Likewise, the rate of shootings
dropped from .50 per month to zero per month after Performance Review. In addition, 11% of
all officers placed on Performance Review left the department completely after being placed on
review: ten retirements, six discharges, one resignation, and one for unknown reasons. Police
accountability experts have suggested that LASD’s EIS system “influenced these decisions,
sending a strong message to the officers that their performance did not meet department
expectations,” therefore effectively removing the most problematic officers from LASD.29
Nonetheless, by 2003, the Special Counsel for LASD did find some systematic weaknesses
with LASD’s EIS system: namely, that “Officer performance data were not being entered in a
timely fashion . . . some citizen complaint data were not being entered into the system, many
reports were incomplete or contained errors . . . and some commanders were not even aware of
the capabilities of the PPI.”30 In other words, an EIS can be enormously valuable in setting
standards for police accountability, but as an “extremely complex administrative tool[],” it must
be effectively managed.31

28

Id. at 150-1.

29

Id. at 165.

30

Id. at 188.

31

EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS, supra note 24, at 60.

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c. Changing Departmental Culture and Building Community Trust
Finally, if there is an effective trend analysis and/or EIS system in place, information from
legal claims and lawsuits can positively influence law enforcement leadership and lead to perhaps
the biggest change of all: that of departmental culture. More specifically, if used correctly,
litigation data can be used alongside leadership and other risk assessment changes to “solidify[]
the skill set of field leaders to guide their units through organizational culture change so that the
data is openly discussed and used to help guide how the Department functions on a day to day
basis.”32 Moreover, the effective collection, analysis, and use of litigation data can help improve
police accountability and engender greater trust in police-community relations when the public
is made aware of such efforts.

Case Study:
Shifting Culture – Portland, Oregon Police Department
The Portland, Oregon Police Department is one example of how departmental culture can
change over time as risk assessment practices evolve. In 2002, the Police Assessment Resource
Center (PARC) was hired by Portland to conduct a review of a number of officer-involved
shootings and in-custody deaths between 1997 and 2000. Initially, Portland’s Police Bureau (PPB)
officers acknowledged that within their departmental culture, “‘[W]e are hesitant to be critical .
. . we hate to call each other on the carpet,’ and ‘People are afraid to ask hard questions.’”33
Overall, when PARC first began its work at PPB, officers were resistant to the notion of any
departmental change whatsoever.

32

34TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF SPECIAL COUNSEL, supra note 14, at 40.

33

Walker, supra note 20, at 203 (citing Police Assessment Resource Center, THE PORTLAND POLICE CENTER: OFFICERINVOLVED SHOOTINGS AND IN-CUSTODY DEATHS 1-2 (2003)).

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Over time, PPB made numerous changes in its policies on officer-involved shootings and
in-custody deaths. Over the course of seven years, PPB accepted nearly all of PARC’s initial 89
recommendations, on everything from the use of different weapons by officers to the
management of records and information about officer-involved shootings.34 They also broke
“new ground nationally” with a new use-of-force policy that provided an “explicit recognition
that police officers must strive to use lesser levels of force even if higher levels of force might
otherwise be permissible in the circumstances.”35

In sum, these changes led not only to a

“substantial reduction in officer-involved shootings,”36 but changes in departmental culture as
well.
Data analysis has also become a part of PPB’s shift towards adopting a risk monitoring
culture. In 2006, at the same time that PARC was reviewing officer-involved shootings, Portland
also formed a Force Task Force that reviewed data collected on use-of-force reports filed by PPB.
The Force Task Force released a report in 2007 which analyzed patterns in the department’s useof-force; PPB agreed to all sixteen of the Force Task Force’s recommendations for reducing those
trends.37
Likewise, in 2004, Portland’s City Auditor began to look at lawsuits filed against PPB. The
Auditor’s analysis of lawsuits showed that a number involved the police entering homes and
making arrests without appropriate warrants. As a result of this analysis, the Auditor’s office, in

34

Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC), THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU: OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS AND IN-CUSTODY
DEATHS, THIRD FOLLOW-UP REPORT 1-2 (February 2009).
35

Id. at 5.

36

Id. at 2.

37

See Portland Force Task Force, USE OF FORCE BY THE PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU FOLLOW-UP ix (July 2009). (“[E]ach
member of the Task Force agreed that the Bureau followed through on its commitment, and fulfilled all of the
original recommendations”). This follow-up report analyzed the results of the 2007 study and did further data
analysis, showing that use-of-force complaints were down 58% since 2004, while citizen-initiated complaints were
down 42%. Id. at 15.

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conjunction with the City Attorney, produced a training video about this issue for all PPB
officers.38
After finishing its work with Portland, PARC observed that “PPB is making a commendable
effort to assume greater internal accountability and perform self-critical analysis. Should these
trends continue, strengthen, and become woven into the institutional fabric, the PPB should
become a more self-correcting enterprise.”39 In other words, changes in departmental culture
take more time than other forms of risk assessment and reduction, but they can be the most
meaningful and longstanding way of reducing costs for police departments and improving
policing and community relationships more distinctly.
d. The Limitations of Litigation Data
Litigation data by itself cannot provide answers to all the problems involving policing and
police-community relations. Lawsuits suffer from a number of weaknesses as sources of
information. Relatively few individuals ever file legal claims or lawsuits to begin with, even when
their rights are violated or they are harmed. Additionally, there is the tendency to allege as much
as possible in initial complaints, the potential for inaccuracies in claims and evidence, and the
fact that many lawsuits only assert charges against a “John Doe” as opposed to against a
particular officer. How and why cases are resolved is likewise not a perfect reflection of the claim;
plaintiffs with strong claims may lose and those with weak claims may prevail. Cases that are
dismissed by the court are less useful in showing overall departmental trends or the specifics
needed to improve officer behavior. Finally, there is the slow pace of litigation, as well as the
degree to which lawsuits generally emphasize the behavior of an individual, and not an
organization.40

38

Schwartz, supra note 13, at 1068.

39

PARC, supra note 34, at 5.

40

See generally Schwartz, supra note 11.

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In addition, even if NYPD or a named officer is not at fault, a case may be settled either to
avoid the uncertainty of litigation or expensive litigation costs. While settling potentially
meritless lawsuits occurs in many contexts – often for legitimate organizational reasons – these
settlements do have financial consequences, and the Mayor recently criticized some aspects of
the practice in the context of NYPD suits.41 Obtaining a better understanding of what percentage
of claims and lawsuit settlements are settled for these reasons will allow the City to understand
the cost-benefit arguments for settling or litigating such cases.42 Additionally, it will allow NYPD
to adjust its review of the entire litigation data set so that the existence of potentially meritless
cases is accounted for when reviewing relevant data: data collected from these cases will be of
little value for trend analysis, early intervention systems, or changes in overall departmental
culture. That said, there is no clear method for tracking these potentially unreliable cases.43
While NYPD data indicates that over 60% of the lawsuits against the police settled for $25,000 or
less in 2014, there is no current data that would help distinguish the bona fide low-value cases
from those which were potentially meritless and settled to avoid costly litigation. As discussed
below, further coordination is needed between NYPD and other agencies to determine if reliable
metrics can be generated regarding such settlements.44

41

Earlier this year, both NYPD Commissioner Bratton and Mayor de Blasio made their opposition to the settlement
of “frivolous” lawsuits known after the Law Department confirmed that it had settled a case for $5,000 with an
individual who was wielding a machete against NYPD officers.
42

During a January 30, 2015 press conference, the Mayor announced that the City will no longer settle “frivolous”
suits. The same day, First Deputy Mayor Shorris made the same announcement in a letter to several police unions
about changes in the City’s litigation strategy for lawsuits against NYPD. Letter from Anthony E. Shorris, First Deputy
Mayor to Mr. Roy Richter, President, Captains Endowment Association et al. (Jan. 30, 2015).
43

See e.g., Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997) (“Reliable empirical data is
extremely limited, and casual anecdotal evidence highly unreliable. We have no clear explanation of why frivolous
suits are filed or even common agreement on what constitutes a ‘frivolous suit.’”).
44

Litigation data cannot, by itself, drive change in how plaintiffs and the City choose to litigate and resolve lawsuits.
Separate strategies, independent of this Report, are required to address how claims and lawsuits are assessed and
managed by agencies and counsel.

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IV.

APRIL 2015

The Current Use of Litigation Data Within NYPD
In many ways, NYPD has already begun to utilize litigation data in both its EIS system and

in analyzing trends and patterns through its newly-organized Risk Management Bureau.45 First,
with respect to EIS systems, NYPD currently uses different computerized systems for tracking
officer performance and conduct. Within these systems, data such as CCRB complaints and civil
lawsuits filed against an officer, the officer’s disciplinary history, and the officer’s performance
evaluations are all entered into databases for tracking purposes. For example, NYPD’s Civil
Litigation Monitoring (CLM) database is used by NYPD’s Performance Analysis Unit to track civil
lawsuits filed against individual officers. Under these various EIS databases, if an officer meets
certain criteria demonstrating potential performance issues, then the officer is placed into one
of three performance monitoring levels. At Level One monitoring, officers are required to
develop a plan with a commanding officer to address their behavior and to undergo a 12-month
monitoring period; at Level Two, a commanding officer submits profiles on a quarterly basis and
the officer undergoes an 18-month monitoring period; at Level Three, a commanding officer
submits monthly profiles and the officer undergoes a 12-month monitoring period and is
prohibited from certain platoons, among other limitations. If an officer has had three or more
lawsuits filed against him or her in the last 12 months, or six within the last five years, he or she
is placed on Level Two Monitoring.46
NYPD is currently updating its EIS system to create a single, integrated database for both
officer performance analysis and department-wide risk assessment. NYPD is commissioning a
new system – the Risk Assessment Litigation System (RAILS) – which is intended to provide the
Risk Management Bureau, the Performance Analysis Section, and officer supervisors with realtime data regarding officers. Under the current system – which is managed by the Performance
Analysis Section – an officer’s direct supervisor is not made aware that an officer is deemed to

45

The Risk Management Bureau was established by NYPD in March 2015. See NYPD, INTERIM ORDER, ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE: DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, LEGAL MATTERS- ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RISK MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Mar. 19, 2015.
46

NYPD, Deputy Commissioner, Personnel, PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS SECTION (PowerPoint Presentation) at 7-11.

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be “at risk” and is under Performance Monitoring unless the supervisor manually searches the
EIS system for that officer.

According to NYPD, once the RAILS system is implemented,

supervisors will automatically be notified if certain thresholds for monitoring are met, including
whether an officer is the subject of a civil lawsuit.
With the RAILS database and other changes, the Performance Analysis Section aims to
“[i]dentify problematic trends and patterns in performance,” “[d]evelop programs and policies
designed to remediate deficiencies identified in members,” and “[i]dentify uniformed members
of the service whose behavior and method of performing duty increase the risk of their resorting
to the use of force in situations not normally dictating such use.”47 While these conceptual goals
are consistent with the basic principles behind early intervention systems, the new NYPD system
has yet to be implemented or tested.48 The RAILS system is currently in the very early stages of
procurement and its efficacy remains to be seen. The public is also currently unaware of what
categories of data NYPD has decided are most useful in reaching the goals of its new EIS system.
In addition to updating its EIS, NYPD recently enhanced its internal team responsible for
reviewing and identifying trends in legal claims, litigation, and related data. The newly-created
Enterprise Liability Assessment Unit – which is also housed in NYPD’s Risk Management Bureau
– is intended to “[i]dentify potential legal risks, mitigate, end or prevent the risks, and better
assist the New York City Law Department in defending lawsuits” and “[a]nalyze all lawsuits filed
against the Department and its members to determine the existence of patterns or trends.”49
However, although this Unit has already been collecting and analyzing litigation data in order to
identify trends, NYPD has yet to release any of its findings, including those about areas in which
lawsuits may be increasing or decreasing for different reasons and those areas where NYPD has
or seeks to take corrective action.

47

INTERIM ORDER, supra note 45, at 4.

48

OIG-NYPD will conduct a review of NYPD’s EIS system once NYPD has had sufficient experience with the updated
system.
49

INTERIM ORDER, supra note 45, at 3.

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In addition to the need to see how these systems work in practice, there are also problems
with what data is being tracked and with the coordination of tracking among agencies. First,
when it comes to the specific types of litigation data that is tracked, the Comptroller’s Office, the
Law Department, and NYPD all collect and track different information from legal claims and
lawsuits. For example, the Comptroller’s Office tracks the number and type of pre-litigation
Notices of Claim filed with the Comptroller’s Office, as well as the amount paid in any claim or
lawsuit. The Law Department tracks the number of lawsuits filed, the court in which they were
filed, and any named defendants; after the cases have closed, it also tracks the disposition type,
and if a settlement is involved, the total disposition amount. Both agencies also keep some
metrics regarding “police action” matters, but the specific definition of “police action” and the
categories of cases that fall under “police action” differ from agency to agency.
Unfortunately, NYPD’s access to this already-limited data is not sufficient. Because
Notices of Claim filed with the Comptroller’s Office are against the City as a whole, both NYPD
and individual officers have frequently been unaware when they were they subject of a Notice
of Claim. Likewise, since lawsuits are served on and managed by the Law Department, both NYPD
and individual officers have not always had knowledge of lawsuits filed against them. Similarly,
NYPD was often unaware of the ultimate settlement or resolution of pre-litigation claims filed
against the Department and individual officers. Recently, the Comptroller’s Office has begun to
provide NYPD with access to its “OAISIS” Notice of Claim database and has begun to meet
regularly with the Department.50 However, the OAISIS database has limited data and
functionality, and does not lend itself to efficient trend analysis without the manual inputting of
information from individual Notice of Claim forms.
The Law Department also provides NYPD with limited information about police-related
litigation.

For example, while NYPD does have some access to search and view lawsuit

50

See Office of New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stinger, Remarks as Prepared, Association for a Better New York
at 5 (Jan. 26, 2015) (“[W]e have launched the first real-ever, real-time data sharing agreement with the NYPD. The
department now gets claims data from our office through a dedicated portal, and we’re holding weekly conference
calls between front-line attorneys at both agencies.”).

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information on the Law Department’s “Law Manager” litigation database, it can only search
based on the name of a plaintiff and the docket number. Without being able to search by the
names of defendant officers, the current utility of Law Manager for NYPD is significantly
restricted. Likewise, while the Law Department has, for several years, provided NYPD with
monthly litigation reports containing several data points, the content in the reports is limited to
certain topics and the format of the report has, until recently, not been well-suited for NYPD’s
analytical needs. Moreover, the monthly reports still do not include certain details about the
nature of the claims and, according to NYPD, the information in these reports needs to be
manually inputted into NYPD’s multiple databases. Recently, the Mayor’s Office confirmed that
the Law Department will provide NYPD with thorough and consistent notification of civil cases
filed against individual officers and of any settlement of actions against individual officers. 51
Finally, many of the same concerns flow in the other direction.

While NYPD also

maintains information relevant to lawsuits, such as details about defendant police officers, those
data points may not be captured by either the Comptroller’s Office or the Law Department.52
Ultimately, while all three agencies have made improvements in how litigation data is collected
and shared, they do not yet have anything approaching a fully coordinated system.
Accordingly, while NYPD has made significant progress in accessing and reviewing
litigation data, there is still room for much improvement. OIG-NYPD sees several opportunities
for enhancing how such data is collected and utilized in the long term.

51

See Letter from Anthony E. Shorris, supra note 42.

52

Transcript of the Minutes of the New York City Council, Committee on Oversight and Investigations, May 4, 2014,
at 50.

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V.

APRIL 2015

Recommendations
The collection and analysis of litigation data regarding NYPD, if done properly, has the

potential to reduce police misconduct, improve public safety, control costs, identify training
opportunities, bolster public confidence, and advance law enforcement oversight. However, as
illustrated above, the collection and analysis of litigation data is not a simple, one-size-fits-all
endeavor. Rather, a tailored approach is required to understand what data is available in New
York City and how it can be best utilized.
Accordingly, OIG-NYPD makes the following three recommendations to NYPD so that it
can best move forward with its efforts to utilize litigation data in the future:
1) NYPD Should Perform a Qualitative Review of the Most Relevant Data Contained
Within Legal Claims and Lawsuits Against NYPD.
A thoughtful examination of certain litigation metrics generates the greatest benefit from
a risk management perspective, but also from an oversight and accountability perspective, when
that examination is supplemented by a more searching qualitative review and analysis of certain
facts underlying the litigation. In addition to data that is already being collected and reviewed,
NYPD should track, in conjunction with the Comptroller’s Office and the Law Department, the
following information for all legal claims and lawsuits pertaining to NYPD actions:
1.1 Nature of the claims/core allegations: Data regarding the nature and type of claims
would help identify trends in alleged police misconduct, as well as identify and prioritize
issues for further investigation and review. However, in order to properly capture such
data, one must not merely look at legal claims pleaded in the claim or complaint, but
actually consider the factual allegations themselves. Legal claims and lawsuit pleadings
do not always organize allegations according to specific categories of misconduct, and
they often list multiple causes of action relating to one core set of factual allegations.
Accordingly, analysis of claims data is most useful when based on a careful reading of
the factual allegations asserted, and not merely drawn from a laundry list of claims
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stated. (Such a careful reading might also help flag potentially meritless claims, which
should not be analyzed for either trend analysis or officer performance.)
1.2 Information about the subject police officer(s): OIG-NYPD’s research suggests that
tracking information regarding the rank, experience, precinct, and prior complaints
associated with officers named as defendants in lawsuits may provide value in the effort
to improve policing in the City. OIG-NYPD would recommend having these data point
descriptions capture the rank and precinct affiliation of the defendant officers at the
time of the alleged incident, and reflect years of service by reporting the year that the
defendant officers joined NYPD. Such data may identify specific categories of officers
who would benefit from additional training in certain aspects of policing. Similarly, data
regarding the number and result of complaints made to CCRB or the Internal Affairs
Bureau against individual officers would help identify individual officers who may
require specialized attention. Finally, OIG-NYPD would also suggest collecting data
about whether the officer was in uniform or plainclothes, to see how assignments or
perception of authority might affect officers’ behavior.

1.3 Location of the alleged incident and address of the plaintiff(s): Given that the
Comptroller Office’s analysis has already identified the Bronx as the borough with the
highest number of pre-litigation claims against NYPD, OIG-NYPD believes that it would
be helpful to determine such data for lawsuits as well. The collection of this data will
help identify trends — both the areas of the City where alleged incidents are occurring
and where the plaintiffs who file these lawsuits are living and still encountering the
police on a day-to-day basis — and to determine possible focus areas for improvement.53

53

However, OIG-NYPD believes that some other metrics would be less helpful in realizing these policing goals. These
include the number of claims in each action, the amount of time each claim has been pending, whether a case is in
state or federal court, and whether there was declination of representation by the City. OIG-NYPD believes that this
type of proposed litigation data, while perhaps useful from a work-flow management perspective, would have little
probative value with respect to actually identifying and addressing trends in alleged police misconduct.

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2. NYPD Should Create an Interagency Working Group between NYPD, the
Comptroller’s Office, and the Law Department to Improve Their Police-Involved
Litigation Data Collection, Coordination, and Exchange.
OIG-NYPD recognizes that collecting the aforementioned litigation data points will be no
simple task. As discussed, some are currently available to different City agencies, while other
litigation data points are currently not in the immediate control of any one agency. The fact that
varying types of data currently reside with different agencies – and that other types of litigation
data are not captured at all – is not surprising. NYPD, the Comptroller’s Office, and the Law
Department each serve different functions and each have different data needs. Moreover, the
practice of collecting and analyzing a broad set of litigation data points remains a relatively new
endeavor in law enforcement and police oversight circles.
However, considering the importance of sharing existing data and identifying methods
and resources for collecting currently unavailable data, OIG-NYPD recommends that, beyond
having bilateral discussions with the Comptroller and with the Law Department, NYPD create a
three-agency working group. This working group can allow all three agencies to better design
the optimal path forward in facilitating and exchanging the review of police-involved litigation
data. This can include identifying what data exists and where, what additional data should be
collected, what resources are needed to capture data that are not readily available, and how best
to balance the benefits of data review with the practical realities of data collection on both a
quantitative and qualitative level.

NYPD has recently made several positive strides in

coordinating data collection with the Comptroller’s Office and the Law Department, but more
steps can be taken to improve the identification and collection of data between relevant
agencies. Not only will these steps allow NYPD to improve officer performance and agency
practices, but better coordination will also allow law enforcement eventually to utilize the refined
litigation data for citywide review purposes.

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3. NYPD Should Provide the Public with Details about NYPD’s Early Intervention
System and its Litigation Data Analysis Team and Solicit Suggestions for Further
Development.
Finally, NYPD should increase the transparency of its infrastructure for litigation data
analysis. More specifically, OIG-NYPD recommends that NYPD make certain aspects of both its
EIS and its litigation data analysis team known, so that the public can become familiar with how
it is analyzing litigation data on both an individual officer and systemic level.
In particular, given NYPD’s recent efforts to enhance its EIS system and its litigation data
analysis team, OIG-NYPD recommends that NYPD provide the public with details regarding the
progress of both efforts. First, regarding its EIS system, NYPD should disclose more about which
performance indicators it tracks for officers and how the monitoring levels operate.54 Greater
transparency regarding the system will help New York City residents to better understand how
officers serving their community are evaluated and how NYPD actively takes steps to track and
address officer performance.
This transparency might take several different forms, as the experiences of other
metropolitan police departments demonstrate. For example, while the San Francisco Police
Department actively involved the public in the formation of its EIS system,55 other cities, such as
Seattle and East Haven, Connecticut simply make the procedural details of their EIS systems
available on their websites.56 San Diego, meanwhile, created an EIS through a Department of
54

This proposed transparency would involve information about NYPD’s processes in its use of an EIS system, and not
protected personnel information about individual officers.
55

Cicero A. Estrella, Early-intervention plan set for problem police/Tracking could start by end of year, deputy chief
says, Jun. 22, 2006, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, available at http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SANFRANCISCO-Early-intervention-plan-set-for-2516722.php (“In April, the Police Department presented a draft plan on
how to track officers’ behaviors. The plan drew criticism from the Police Commission, the Office of Citizen
Complaints, and the American Civil Liberties Union, among others . . . The department has been working with the
ACLU, the Police Commission, and the Office of Citizen Complaints to finalize its plan by July . . .”).
56

See Seattle Police Department, Seattle Police Department Manual: 3.070-Performance Mentoring Program,
http://www.seattle.gov/police-manual/title-3---employee-welfare/3070---performance-mentoring-program (last
visited Feb 24, 2015); East Haven Police Department, Policies and Procedures: No. 207.2, Early Intervention System

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Justice “Enhancing Cultures of Integrity Grant,” the details of which were then outlined in a
technical assistance guide on the crafting of such a program.57
In addition, NYPD’s litigation data analysis team should produce public reports disclosing
aspects of trends in such areas as incident location, nature of claims, officer rank, and the other
categories, as well as any improvements in trends, practice or policy, that have been revealed
through its study of police misconduct cases from the past few years.
When it comes to details such as these, with both its EIS system and its litigation data
analysis, NYPD should solicit the public’s thoughts and comments. With increased transparency
and openness to comment will come greater public confidence, as the public learns how NYPD
takes its officers’ behavior into account in mentoring, training, and new policies, all of which may
eventually affect overall departmental culture. If litigation data analysis becomes a transparent
process, it can also help to assure the public that analyzing and reducing the number of legal
claims and lawsuits directed towards NYPD is a critical goal, not just for the Department, but for
New York City as a whole.

(EIS), http://www.easthavenpolice.com/files/9014/0682/9564/207.2-Early_Intervention_System_Effective_09-01
2014.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
57

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
ENHANCING CULTURES OF INTEGRITY: BUILDING LAW ENFORCEMENT EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE GUIDE
(January 2011), available at http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p052-pub.pdf.

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*****
The Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD (OIG-NYPD) is a new oversight office
charged with investigating, reviewing, studying, auditing, and making recommendations relating
to the operations, policies, programs, and practices of the New York City Police Department
(NYPD). The goals of OIG-NYPD are to enhance the effectiveness of the police department,
increase public safety, protect civil liberties and civil rights, and increase the public's confidence
in the police force, thus building stronger police-community relations. OIG-NYPD is part of the
New York City Department of Investigation and is independent of NYPD.
The New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) is one of the oldest lawenforcement agencies in the country and is New York City’s corruption watchdog.

DOI

investigations may involve any agency, officer, elected official, or employee of the City, as well as
those who do business with or receive benefits from the City. DOI’s strategy attacks corruption
comprehensively, through systemic investigations that lead to high-impact arrests, preventive
internal controls, and operational reforms that improve the way the City runs.

24