United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Report to the Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate

September 2002

SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Fugitive Felon
Program Could
Benefit from Better
Use of Technology

GAO-02-346

a

Contents

Letter

1
2
5

Results in Brief
Background
Technological and Other Barriers Contribute to Inefficiencies in the
Fugitive Felon Program
SSA’s Efforts to Obtain Data-Matching Agreements Have Not
Resulted in Comprehensive Data
Legislation Prohibiting OASI and DI Benefits for Fugitive Felons
Could Have a Substantial Impact on the Program
Increased Reliance on Other Agencies’ Databases Could Help
Enhance Fugitive Felon Program Operations
Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

23
25
26
27

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

35

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching Process

38

Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in Apprehending
Fugitives and Preventing Them from Receiving SSI
Payments

41

Comments from the Social Security Administration

43

Comments from the U.S. Department of Justice

49

Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive
Felon Program
Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process
Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated)
Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements

7
10
15
19

8
17
21

Appendixes
Appendix I:
Appendix II:
Appendix III:

Appendix IV:
Appendix V:

Figures

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Contents

Abbreviations
BOP
CMPPA
EVS
FBI
GAO
ITC
NCC
NCIC
OASI/DI
OIG
PRWORA
SSA
SSI
USMS

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Bureau of Prisons
Computer Matching Privacy and Protection Act
Enumeration Verification System
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. General Accounting Office
Information Technology Center
National Computer Center
National Crime Information Center
Old Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
Office of Inspector General
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act
Social Security Administration
Supplemental Security Income
U.S. Marshals Service

GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

A

United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

September 6, 2002

Leter

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Finance
United States Senate
Dear Senator Grassley:
The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, administered by the
Social Security Administration (SSA), is the largest cash assistance
program in the United States. For fiscal year 2002, SSA expects to pay SSI
benefits totaling approximately $31.5 billion to more than 6 million
financially needy individuals who are aged, blind, or disabled. Under the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,1
any individuals fleeing to avoid prosecution or confinement after
conviction for a crime that is a felony or who violate a condition of
probation or parole imposed under federal or state law are ineligible to
receive SSI benefits. SSA has the authority to suspend such benefits when
these individuals are identified. Further, under certain conditions, the act
allows SSA to disclose information on these individuals to law enforcement
agencies to aid in their location and apprehension.
In August 1996, SSA established the fugitive felon program to facilitate
identifying individuals in violation of the act and help protect the integrity
of the SSI program and ensure the public’s safety. SSA, state and local
governments, and federal law enforcement agencies rely on numerous
databases and information systems to carry out the fugitive felon program.
Accordingly, you requested that we review the technological aspects of the
program to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a) data matching
between SSA’s and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases
and (b) ongoing efforts by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with
state and local law enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological
impact on SSA and the FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI)
and Disability Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting
payments to fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases,
such as those maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons

1

Pub. L. No. 104-193, 202 Stat. 2105, 2186 (1996), commonly known as the Welfare Reform
Act.

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and the U.S. Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the
fugitive felon program.
In performing this review, we analyzed key documentation maintained by
SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and the U.S. Marshals Service. These
included data-matching policies and standards, operational and security
procedures, and technical infrastructure descriptions associated with the
fugitive felon program. We also analyzed data-matching agreements and
laws regulating data-matching activities with state and local law
enforcement agencies. We conducted site visits and telephone conferences
with 17 state and local law enforcement agencies to determine their
involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological
barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share data
with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns
affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA. In
addition, we interviewed officials at SSA’s Headquarters, Office of
Inspector General, and National Computer Center; at the FBI’s Criminal
Justice Information Services Division in Clarksburg, West Virginia, and its
Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and at the
Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service. Our review focused on the
ways in which information technology is being used to achieve fugitive
felon program efficiencies, but did not assess the program’s effectiveness.
We plan to issue a report later this year that will in part address the
program’s effectiveness. We performed our review from August 2001
through May 2002, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards. Additional details concerning the objectives, scope, and
methodology of our review are contained in appendix I.

Results in Brief

Since becoming operational in August 1996, the fugitive felon program has
provided a valuable service by helping SSA to identify and prevent
payments to ineligible SSI benefits recipients and helping law enforcement
agencies to locate and apprehend fugitive felons. Nevertheless, several
technological and other barriers are contributing to inefficiencies in the
program’s operations. As currently administered, the processing of fugitive
warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients is complex and
fragmented, involving numerous organizations performing multiple steps
to obtain and act on the information. In addition, while matches of fugitive
warrant records against SSI recipient files are conducted using computers,
most of the essential tasks of sharing and verifying warrant information are
performed manually. For example, SSA currently lacks the capability to
accept warrant information from law enforcement agencies on line; thus,

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the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and some participating state law
enforcement agencies must download this information from their
databases and information systems onto electronic media, such as
cartridges and tapes, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx. In
addition, certain information systems that SSA and the FBI use in
processing matched data are not interoperable or compatible, thus also
hindering the efficient exchange of warrant information. Collectively, the
manual activities in processing warrant information have resulted in an
inefficient and time-consuming operation that, based on our analysis of the
process used, can take up to 165 days to complete (from SSA’s receipt of
warrant information until SSI benefits are suspended). Contributing to
these inefficiencies is that no one office within SSA has been designated to
oversee and manage the overall performance of the fugitive felon program.
Consequently, no program officials could explain the overall data sharing
and matching process.
Largely because of SSA’s and states’ limited uses of information technology
to support the fugitive felon program, many state law enforcement
agencies have been reluctant to enter into data-matching agreements with
SSA. According to SSA and law enforcement officials, among the factors
that made some states reluctant to enter into the agreements were that
some states did not maintain central repositories of warrant information
and SSA’s guidance for formatting, downloading, and manually transmitting
the information created additional resource requirements that some states
were unable to meet. In addition, some states report warrant information
on a voluntary basis, and some states that have signed agreements have not
yet submitted any data to SSA. SSA officials acknowledged that the
agency’s efforts to obtain comprehensive warrant information have not
yielded anticipated results.
The enactment of legislation prohibiting OASI and DI payments to fugitive
felons could increase SSA’s recovery of improperly paid benefits and
prevent more potentially dangerous fugitives from fleeing justice. However,
the additional matches of warrant records against OASI and DI recipient
files could substantially increase the data processing workloads of both
SSA and the FBI’s Information Technology Center. The center plays a major
role in verifying the accuracy of warrant records and supplies fugitives’
addresses to law enforcement agencies. SSA and FBI officials recognize the
need for additional information technology support to conduct computer
matches of warrant information against the OASI and DI recipient files.
However, at the conclusion of our review, neither SSA nor the FBI had yet

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initiated evaluations to assess the anticipated technological impact on their
operations.
SSA may be able to improve the fugitive felon program’s operational
efficiency and outcomes by exploring its existing telecommunications
connectivity supporting other federal, state, and local programs. SSA
currently has direct, on-line connections with every state that transmits
and receives data supporting various other programs, including its program
to suspend SSI, OASI, and DI benefits to prisoners. In addition, while SSA
does not currently have telecommunications connectivity with the FBI’s
National Crime Information Center—a national database of warrant and
other criminal information—agency officials believed this database could
offer a more comprehensive and readily accessible means of obtaining
outstanding warrant information from the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, and
state agencies. However, all states report warrant information to this
database voluntarily. Further, while SSA officials viewed the database as a
potential single source of comprehensive warrant information, they had
not assessed the feasibility of this alternative or other options for using online connections with federal, state, and local agencies to more efficiently
obtain the information.
To ensure that the fugitive felon program is positioned to meet its current
and future obligations toward preventing payments of SSI benefits to
fugitive felons, we are making recommendations to the Commissioner of
Social Security that include (1) designating a program office and manager
to oversee and direct the program; (2) fully assessing the program’s current
operations and performance; and (3) examining and proposing options for
using technology to automate currently manual functions involved in
exchanging fugitive warrant information.
SSA and the Department of Justice provided written comments on a draft
of our report. These comments are reprinted in appendixes IV and V. In its
comments, SSA expressed disappointment with our report and generally
disagreed with our recommendations. Among its specific comments, SSA
disagreed with the need for a program manager and additional monitoring
and analysis of the program’s operations. Given the complexities of the
fugitive felon processes, we continue to believe that SSA’s program could
benefit from more focused program management and additional
monitoring and analysis to identify process improvements and
technological enhancements. In addition, as part of continual monitoring
and analysis, SSA needs to identify aggregate tracking data to assess the

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program’s overall cost and performance. The Department of Justice
provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background

Under the SSI program, SSA pays monthly benefits to individuals who have
limited assets and income and are aged, blind, or disabled. These benefits
are funded by general tax revenues and based on financial need. SSA has
estimated that, during fiscal year 2002, it will make SSI benefits payments
totaling approximately $31.5 billion to about 6.4 million individuals. Since
1997, we have designated SSI a high-risk program because of its
susceptibility to fraud, waste, and abuse and SSA’s insufficient management
oversight.2 Long-standing concerns regarding program abuses and
mismanagement, increasing overpayments, and the inability to recover
outstanding SSI debt have led to congressional criticism of SSA’s ability to
effectively manage and ensure the program’s integrity.
In addition to SSI, SSA administers the OASI and DI programs—together
commonly known as Social Security. These are entitlement programs
funded from trust funds supported by taxes that workers pay on their
wages. OASI provides monthly cash retirement to workers and their
dependents or, when workers die, benefits to their survivors. The DI
program provides monthly cash benefits to workers and their dependents
when workers are disabled. In fiscal year 2002, the OASI and DI programs
collectively are expected to pay approximately $447 billion in benefits to
about 46 million eligible workers, dependents, and survivors.
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) prohibited fugitive felons from collecting SSI benefits.
Specifically, under the law, an individual is ineligible to receive SSI
payments during any month in which he or she is
• fleeing to avoid prosecution for a crime that is a felony under the laws of
the place from which the person flees,3

2

U.S. General Accounting Office, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:
Social Security Administration, GAO-01-261 (Washington, D.C.: January 2001).
3

A felony is a serious offense that is usually punishable by imprisonment for more than
1 year.

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• fleeing to avoid custody or confinement after conviction for a crime that
is a felony under the laws of the place from which the person flees, or
• violating a condition of probation or parole imposed under federal or
state law.4
PRWORA provides SSA with the authority to suspend SSI payments to
fugitive felons and parole and probation violators and to provide
information to law enforcement agencies to aid in locating and
apprehending these individuals. The act does not provide similar authority
for OASI and DI benefits payments.
In response to PRWORA, SSA established the fugitive felon program and
entered into a partnership with its Office of Inspector General (OIG). SSA’s
OIG, with its 63 field divisions and offices, has both program integrity and
law enforcement functions and is the primary interface between SSA and
law enforcement entities. It can investigate and make arrests for program
fraud in collaboration with other law enforcement agencies pursuing SSI
recipients engaging in criminal activities.
Beyond OIG, numerous other offices also assist in implementing the
program. As shown in figure 1, these include SSA’s offices of operations,
disability and income security programs, and systems; its regional and field
offices; and the FBI’s Information Technology Center in Fort Monmouth,
New Jersey. Congress does not appropriate funds to administer the fugitive
felon program. Rather, according to SSA officials, each participating SSA
office (for example, the office of operations and OIG) and the FBI
Information Technology Center use existing funding to support the
program.

4

Parole is a conditional release from imprisonment that allows parolees to serve the
remainder of their term outside the confines of a penal institution if they satisfactorily
comply with all terms and conditions provided. Probation is a type of sentence imposed by a
court for the commission of a crime whereby a convicted criminal offender is released into
the community under the supervision of a probation officer. Violation of probation can
result in probation being revoked and a sentence of confinement imposed.

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Figure 1: Organizations Tasked with Implementing SSA’s Fugitive Felon Program

a

In commenting on our draft report, SSA stated that, as part of an Office of Systems’ reorganization,
the Office of Systems Analysis and the Office of Information Management have been replaced by the
Office of Earnings, Enumeration and Administrative Systems; the Office of Systems Design and
Development has been replaced by the Office of Disability and Supplemental Security Income
Systems.
Source: GAO analysis based on SSA’s data.

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Under the fugitive felon program, SSA relies on warrant information from
available federal and state sources to identify ineligible SSI recipients on its
rolls. SSA receives federal and state warrant information from several
sources, including (1) the FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC);
(2) state and local law enforcement agencies; and (3) the U.S. Marshals
Service (USMS). SSA receives warrant information from the FBI and USMS
under memorandums of understanding and from certain state and local law
enforcement agencies under matching agreements that establish
conditions for SSA’s use of the warrant information in its matching
operations. According to SSA, in calendar year 2001, it received
approximately 27 million warrant records from these federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies. Of these, about 2 million records were
eligible to be matched against SSI benefits files.5 Appendix II provides a
detailed description of the fugitive felon data-matching process.
OIG reports that, since 1996, the fugitive felon program data matching
operations (manual and automated) have helped identify about 45,000
fugitives who were paid approximately $82 million in SSI benefits; of these
fugitives, approximately 5,000 were subsequently apprehended. Appendix
III presents selected cases in which fugitives were apprehended and SSI
benefits were suspended as a result of the fugitive felon program.

Technological and
Other Barriers
Contribute to
Inefficiencies in the
Fugitive Felon
Program

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces several
technological and other barriers that create inefficiencies in its processing
of fugitive warrant information to identify ineligible SSI recipients. These
barriers include a complex, multistep process to obtain and act on fugitive
warrant information and a heavily manual approach to accomplishing
critical program tasks, such as exchanging and verifying warrant
information. In addition, where information systems are used to support
the program, many of them are not interoperable or capable of exchanging
data electronically. Consequently, key portions of the data-matching
process are complicated and time-consuming. Contributing to this situation
is that SSA has not designated a single, central point of management
accountability to direct the fugitive felon program’s operations.

5
According to SSA data, during an initial screening of these records against information it
had on all holders and applicants of Social Security numbers, a majority of the
approximately 27 million warrant records that it actually received could not be verified
against a Social Security number or other vital information, and therefore, were not
included in its match against files identifying SSI recipients.

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Fugitive Felon DataMatching Process Is
Complex and Highly
Manual

The steps in administering the fugitive felon program—from the point that
SSA receives the fugitive warrant information through the suspension of
SSI benefits—are complicated and include many back-and-forth exchanges
of warrant information among the participating entities. At the time of our
review, each of the organizations participating in the program had
responsibility for distinct segments of the tasks involved in processing
fugitive warrant information received from federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies. However, there was no single entity within SSA that
was able to provide a full explanation of the complete chain of activities
comprising the data sharing and matching process; as a result, we mapped
the process ourselves. We have depicted this overall process in figure 2.

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Figure 2: Overview of the SSA Fugitive Felon Program Process

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Source: GAO analysis.

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As figure 2 illustrates, SSA receives warrant records (usually on a monthly
basis) from the FBI’s national repository—NCIC—and from USMS and
state and local law enforcement agencies. Using its Enumeration
Verification System, SSA matches the warrant records against its master
files of Social Security number holders and applications to verify identity
information, such as the name, date of birth, and Social Security number of
the individual for whom the warrant was issued. Of those records for which
identities can be verified, OIG screens the data to eliminate
misdemeanors.6 Then, a second match is conducted against files
maintained in SSA’s supplemental security record to determine which of
the fugitives are receiving SSI benefits. The results of the second match
(addresses of the fugitive benefits recipients) are forwarded to OIG for
further processing.
OIG and its field offices work with the FBI’s Information Technology
Center (ITC) to verify that the felony, probation, or parole violation
warrants are active and that the appropriate individuals have been
identified. Once verifications are made, ITC provides address information
about each SSI recipient (called “leads”) to the appropriate federal, state,
or local law enforcement agency so that it can locate and apprehend the
individual. After action by the law enforcement agency, OIG refers its
findings to the appropriate SSA field offices, which initiate suspension of
SSI benefits.
In this process, SSA relies on its mainframe computers and systems to
match the fugitive warrant information that it receives against the master
files of Social Security number holders and applications and the
supplemental security record. Most other steps, including sharing the
warrant information used in the matching process, are performed
manually. For example, SSA does not have a telecommunications capability
that would allow it to accept warrant information on line. As a result, the
FBI, USMS, and state and local law enforcement agencies must download
warrant information from their respective databases and information
systems onto various electronic media (such as cartridges, tapes, and CDROMS) and send this information to SSA via the U.S. mail or FedEx.
Depending on the type of media used, two separate SSA offices—the Office
of Central Operations and the Office of Telecommunications and Systems

6
PRWORA does not specifically address, and SSA does not conduct data matches of,
misdemeanor charges, with the exception of high misdemeanors, which are considered
felonies under the laws of New Jersey.

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Operations—receive, log, and upload the information onto SSA’s
mainframe computer to begin the matching process.
Beyond manually sharing warrant information, many of the steps in
verifying and referring information contained in the matched records also
are performed manually. For example, to accurately identify and locate
fugitives, SSA’s field offices, OIG, and the FBI’s ITC exchange numerous
forms with law enforcement agencies.7 However, none of these forms are
automated, requiring SSA and ITC staff to manually prepare and fax or mail
them to the appropriate entities.
In addition, both OIG’s and ITC’s program activities are supported by
distinct systems that are not interoperable or compatible, thus further
preventing the efficient exchange of information. Specifically, OIG’s
allegation and case investigative system and ITC’s automated case support
system are used, respectively, to assign case and allegation numbers to
matched records and to verify duplicate instances of matched data.
However, these systems cannot electronically share the matched records
on which both offices must act. Rather, the OIG must download files
containing matched records and mail them to ITC. Further, OIG’s system
uses Microsoft Word and ITC’s system uses Corel WordPerfect; thus, when
ITC receives the files, it must convert them to a usable format to be able to
process the warrant information.

Manual Processes Have
Resulted in a TimeConsuming Operation

The various manual interventions in processing fugitive warrants all
contribute to a time-consuming operation that is less than optimally
efficient. According to program officials, the warrant files that federal and
state law enforcement agencies send to SSA sometimes are not formatted
in accordance with SSA’s specifications and must be returned to the
agencies for correction, delaying action on matching these files. In
addition, the electronic media containing warrant records are sometimes
lost during the mail delivery process or are misplaced before being entered
into SSA’s computers. As a result, this time-sensitive information may go
unaccounted for a number of days. SSA had not determined the extent to
which warrant records are being lost or mishandled and over what length
of time, but program officials acknowledged that the longer it takes to
match the warrant information, the greater the opportunity for fugitives to
7

These forms include the OI-5B (Referral Form), OI-5C (Law Enforcement Certification
Form), OI-5D (Investigative Certification Form), and OI-5E (SSA Feedback Form).

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remain unaccounted for and to continue to receive SSI benefits payments.
Further, the officials stated that the manual steps involved in verifying
fugitives’ identities and obtaining address information for referring leads to
law enforcement agencies often slow the overall process of locating and
apprehending fugitives.
SSA officials were unable to tell us how much time was actually required to
complete the processing of fugitive warrants. However, our analysis of data
that SSA provided on its existing procedures found that the steps required
to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such as lost or
mishandled files, or improperly formatted warrant information received
from states reporting warrant information for the first time, could take up
to 165 days.8 This approximate processing time could be increased up to an
additional 70 days if the fugitive SSI recipient decides to appeal SSA’s
decision to suspend benefits.
As figure 3 shows, the approximate processing time includes about 65 days
during which SSA and the FBI’s ITC conduct matches and initial
verifications of warrant information and refer leads to law enforcement
agencies.9 The approximate time also includes a total of 90 days that is
devoted to ensuring that individuals are correctly identified and that their
privacy and other rights are protected—60 days that state and local law
enforcement agencies are allowed to locate and apprehend fugitives before
SSA serves notice that benefits will be suspended and 30 days during which
OIG field offices conduct additional verifications prior to sending
summaries of actions taken on matched records to SSA field offices for
suspension of benefits. Program officials informed us that state and local
law enforcement agencies originally were allowed 14 days to locate and
apprehend fugitives; however, the number of days allowed was increased
to 60 to provide these agencies more time to identify and certify actions
taken on the fugitives. According to SSA, one of the difficulties with data
matches is that, because fleeing felons often use aliases, law enforcement
agencies frequently do not have accurate Social Security numbers or
identifying information for them. Moreover, unlike prisoners, fleeing felons
are not incarcerated and may not have been convicted of a crime.

8

The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of information
provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. To confirm the validity of our
timeline estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA officials.
9

The approximate 65 days includes certain unaccounted for activities, such as uploading and
initial processing, screening for misdemeanors, and sorting duplicate warrant records.

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Consequently, the time devoted to manually verifying the currency of
warrant information is vital for ensuring that the correct individuals are
identified and apprehended.

Figure 3: Fugitive Felon Process Timeline (Estimated)

Source: GAO analysis of SSA data.

Program officials added that some manual verifications of warrant
information are necessary to help ensure the program’s integrity. However,
automating key tasks, such as the capability to accept warrant information
from other agencies’ databases on line, could help eliminate much of the
time devoted to initially processing and matching warrant information and

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verifying and referring leads that results from the matched records (now
estimated to take about 65 days).
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials told us that they had recently
begun considering options to automate manual processes in the field
offices. For example, they stated that the agency was considering
eliminating many of the field offices’ benefits suspension activities, such as
providing due process notices and preparing OIG final reports and, instead,
performing these activities in one regional office with the use of
computers.
Although SSA’s consideration of options for improving the fugitive felon
process is a positive step, the agency has not analyzed or mapped its
existing fugitive felon data sharing and matching process. Without doing
so, SSA lacks critical information needed for targeting processes that are
most in need of improvement, setting realistic improvement goals, and
ensuring that it selects an appropriate approach for improving its manual
operations. The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 requires agency heads to
analyze, revise, and improve mission-related and administrative processes
before making significant investments in supporting information
technology. Further, an agency should have an overall business process
improvement strategy that provides a means to coordinate and integrate
the various reengineering and improvement projects, set priorities, and
make appropriate budget decisions. By doing so, an agency can better
position itself to maximize the potential of technology to improve
performance, rather than simply automating inefficient processes.

SSA Could Benefit from
Clear and Unified
Management Accountability
to Direct the Fugitive Felon
Program

Although the fugitive felon program is achieving results, it could benefit
from increased management accountability. SSA relies on multiple
agencies and offices to implement the fugitive felon program. However,
there is no unified source of management accountability to provide the
consistent oversight and program continuity that is essential to sustaining
program success. Consequently, staff assigned to administer the program
offered conflicting accounts as to what program tasks were being
performed and by whom. For example, program officials identified three
different SSA offices—operations, program support, and OIG—as having
responsibility for leading the program; yet no officials in these offices could
explain the overall data-matching process or had decision-making and
oversight responsibility for the other participating entities.

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In addition, critical data needed to make informed decisions about the
program’s operations, such as technological capabilities, program costs
and benefits, and resource requirements, were not being captured. For
example, none of the participating SSA and FBI offices could state with
certainty the amount of time they devoted to processing fugitive warrant
records. As discussed earlier, no one office within SSA had mapped the
overall fugitive felon data sharing and matching process to
comprehensively assess how many days were required from SSA’s receipt
of warrant information until SSI benefits payments to fugitive felons were
actually suspended. Further, although the program has been in place for 6
years, program officials were unable to provide data on the total costs of
the program.
In discussing their management of the fugitive felon program, SSA officials
acknowledged that the program lacked unified management accountability.
An OIG official stated that, while the agency had initially decided that both
headquarters offices and OIG would jointly administer the program, these
offices had only recently begun considering ways to improve their
management of the program. The agency was considering the development
of a management board to oversee and address program issues and
concerns. However, it had not developed any specific tasks or milestones
for this improvement effort. Given the inherent complexity of the fugitive
felon program and the many entities involved in its implementation,
effective management of operations and data is essential for determining
how best to achieve and sustain future program operations and reporting.

SSA’s Efforts to Obtain
Data-Matching
Agreements Have Not
Resulted in
Comprehensive Data

Having complete and comprehensive warrant information from states is
crucial to ensuring that the objectives of the fugitive felon program are
achieved. Yet, according to SSA, states currently report warrant
information to NCIC on a voluntary basis; therefore, not all outstanding
warrants are being included in the FBI’s NCIC database—a prime source of
SSA’s matching information. Since May 2000, SSA has been taking steps to
obtain more comprehensive state and local information by pursuing datamatching agreements with states that do not report all of their warrant
information to NCIC. However, a number of these states have been
reluctant to enter into agreements or, once they have, have not always
abided by them, largely because of SSA’s and the states’ concerns regarding
the lack of information technology and adequate resources to support the
program.

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SSA considers states to be fully reporting warrant information to NCIC if
they submit information on all felonies and parole or probation violators.
States are considered to be partially reporting warrant information if, for
example, they report felonies but not parole and probation violators.10 As of
May 2002 (the latest month for which data were available), SSA had
identified 21 states and the District of Columbia as fully reporting warrant
information to NCIC and 29 states as partially reporting warrant
information.
In pursuing data-matching agreements to obtain all of the states’ warrant
information,11 SSA reported as of May 2002 that it had signed agreements
with 18 states12 and was in various stages of negotiating agreements with 5
other states. SSA had been unsuccessful in reaching agreements with 3
states, all of which had declined to enter into the agreements. It had not yet
begun negotiating agreements with 6 additional states. Figure 4 reflects the
status of SSA’s attempts to obtain data-matching agreements with the states
as of May 2002.

10

According to two states that SSA identified as fully reporting to NCIC (Florida and
Kansas), most, but not all, felony warrants are reported to this database because the
submission of felony warrants is at the discretion of local agencies within these states.
11

At the time that SSA began pursuing data matching agreements, three states (Maryland,
New York, and Pennsylvania) did not maintain central repositories of state and local
warrant information. Therefore, to obtain a majority of the states’ warrant information, SSA
negotiated agreements with their largest local law enforcement agencies.
12
This number includes 3 states (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey) identified as
submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but from which SSA, for various
reasons, negotiated agreements to also directly obtain data.

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Figure 4: Status of the SSA Fugitive Felon Agreements

a

The states that SSA is pursuing agreements with include 3 (Delaware, Indiana, and New Jersey)
identified as submitting all of their warrant information to NCIC, but from which SSA, for various
reasons, negotiated agreements to also directly obtain data.

b

SSA does not pursue data-matching agreements with states that fully report to NCIC.

Source: SSA.

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SSA and state officials cited various factors—often related to their uses of
information technology—that had made negotiating data-matching
agreements difficult. For example, in explaining their decision to decline an
agreement, Iowa officials stated that, because SSA does not have the
capability to receive fugitive warrant records on line, state officials would
have to reformat, download to electronic media, and mail the warrant
information to SSA Headquarters. The officials believed that doing so
would not be cost-effective and, thus, elected to continue their practice of
submitting paper printouts of warrant information to the SSA OIG field
office in Des Moines. In Florida, officials explained that their state had not
entered an agreement with SSA and instead was fully reporting warrant
information to NCIC because of SSA’s specifications for formatting and
downloading the warrant information onto electronic media. They
expressed concern that additional resources would be required to perform
these formatting tasks and manually provide the warrant information to
SSA.
Further, SSA and state officials noted that negotiating data-matching
agreements had been hindered by the lack of centralized databases or
repositories of warrant information in some state and local law
enforcement agencies. For example, officials in Oklahoma told us that
because that state lacked a central repository, they did not want to enter
into a data-matching agreement with SSA. The officials explained that not
all of the states’ approximately 700 local law enforcement offices currently
report all of their warrant information at the state level and to NCIC. Thus,
to meet the intent of a data-matching agreement, each local agency would
have to provide their warrant information directly to SSA. However, most
local law enforcement agencies within the state do not have central
repositories for reporting the information to SSA.
Idaho officials added that, in addition to lacking a central repository, they
had chosen not to sign a data-matching agreement with SSA because of
privacy considerations. Specifically, the officials expressed concerns with
the privacy and security implications of submitting sensitive warrant
information via the U.S. mail.
Even when agreements had been reached, however, SSA had not fully
achieved its objective of obtaining comprehensive warrant information
from the states. Specifically, at the time of our review, of the 18 states with
which SSA had signed agreements, only 9 were actually submitting warrant
information to the agency. According to SSA, the remaining 9 states that
had signed agreements but had not yet sent warrant information provided

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similar reasons for not complying with the agreements. These included
states’ concerns about the privacy and security of the warrant information
and difficulties complying with SSA’s record layout or formatting
requirements. In addition, although having agreed to submit warrant
information to SSA, 3 states (Kentucky, Rhode Island, and Colorado) later
decided instead to report all warrant information to NCIC.
At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials acknowledged that the
process for obtaining data-matching agreements was difficult and had not
yielded the results that they had anticipated. States essentially provide
warrant information on a voluntary basis, and the agreements are intended
primarily to protect states’ data from unauthorized disclosure and use.
Nonetheless, SSA officials believed that, in the absence of a single and
complete source of fugitive warrant records from all states, the datamatching agreements were necessary for ensuring that the agency could
obtain comprehensive warrant information. We agree that comprehensive
warrant information is vital to the success of the fugitive felon program.
However, the data-matching agreements have not ensured that SSA will
obtain the comprehensive warrant information that it seeks.

Legislation Prohibiting
OASI and DI Benefits
for Fugitive Felons
Could Have a
Substantial Impact on
the Program

Under current statutory provisions, fugitives are prohibited from receiving
SSI benefits, but can continue to be paid OASI and DI benefits. Specifically,
SSA maintains address information on fugitives receiving SSI, OASI, and DI
benefits, but can only share information with law enforcement agencies on
those fugitives receiving SSI. However, the increasing realization that OASI
and DI benefits payments may also finance a potentially dangerous
fugitive’s flight from justice has prompted the Congress to pursue
implementing provisions to prohibit payments to fugitives in these
programs as well.13
Implementing a nonpayment provision would also permit SSA to share
address information on fugitives who receive OASI and DI benefits. In its
own consideration of such a measure, OIG projected that doing so could
result in substantial savings to the OASI and DI programs. Specifically, in
an August 2000 study, OIG estimated that between August 1996 and June

13

In February 2002, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Ways and
Means Committee, Subcommittee on Social Security introduced legislation (H.R. 4070) to
deny Title II (OASI and DI) benefits to fugitive felons and persons fleeing prosecution. In
April 2002, a similar bill (S. 2387) was introduced before the Senate Finance Committee.

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1999, about 17,300 fugitives had been paid at least $108 million in OASI and
DI benefits. In August 2001, the office revised its estimates, projecting that
OASI and DI benefits amounting to approximately $40 million would be
paid to fugitives through October 2001, and in each additional year that
legislation was not enacted to prohibit such benefits payments—for a 5year total payout of approximately $198 million.
Should this legislative proposal be enacted, the fugitive felon program’s
workload could increase substantially. SSA officials acknowledged that the
additional OASI and DI files could significantly increase the program’s datamatching activities. According to an analysis that the OIG performed, the
enactment of the legislative proposal would result in three times the
current work level of SSI matches.
The FBI believed that implementing the legislation could have varying
effects on its operations. Specifically, officials in the Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, which manages the NCIC database, stated
that implementing the provision would have no technological impact on
that organization’s ability to provide SSA fugitive warrant information.
They anticipated that the database would continue to supply SSA with
warrant records received daily from state and local law enforcement
agencies. However, FBI and SSA OIG officials stated that the additional
matched records for OASI and DI recipients could substantially increase
ITC’s workload associated with verifying the accuracy of the matched
records and supplying fugitives’ addresses to law enforcement agencies.
Further, based on its study, OIG officials, and those of the FBI, believed
that ITC’s workforce would have to increase substantially—from the
current staff of 7 to about 60—to accommodate the additional workload
associated with handling all the leads generated through the matching
process.
With the potential for workload increases in the fugitive felon program,
SSA and ITC officials recognized that additional information systems
support would be needed to conduct computer matches of warrant
information against the OASI and DI recipient files. However, neither SSA
nor the FBI had yet initiated any evaluations to assess the anticipated
technological impact on their operations. Such an assessment is critical to
helping SSA make an informed decision regarding its ability to ensure that
comprehensive and efficient data-matching operations would continue
under expanded operations. As discussed in our investment guide, good

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decisions require good data.14 Consequently, having solid data on a
program’s operations is essential for making informed decisions
concerning workload management and the technological solutions needed
to sustain efficient and effective performance.

Increased Reliance on
Other Agencies’
Databases Could Help
Enhance Fugitive
Felon Program
Operations

As SSA proceeds with implementing the fugitive felon program, having
efficient and effectively run operations will be essential to achieving
sustained program results. SSA officials have acknowledged inefficiencies
in the existing fugitive felon processes and have indicated that they expect
to rely more heavily on information technology to help improve the
program’s operations and outcomes. Information systems and databases
maintained by some of the federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies that currently participate in the fugitive felon program could offer
SSA opportunities for more efficiently obtaining warrant information to
enhance the program.
Much of the foundation for using information technology to improve the
fugitive felon processes may already exist among state and local agencies
participating in other programs. According to SSA systems officials, SSA
currently has a direct, dedicated on-line connection with every state’s
department of social services.15 States use these lines to submit information
to SSA covering various programs, such as child support enforcement.
Similarly, as part of the prisoner program, some state and local prison
facilities send federal prisoner data to SSA on line to aid in suspending SSI,
OASI, and DI benefits to incarcerated inmates.16
In discussing the exchange of states’ fugitive warrant information, SSA
officials told us that they had not evaluated how on-line connections with
state and local agencies could be used to receive information supporting
the fugitive felon program. They indicated that implementing an on-line

14

U.S General Accounting Office, Assessing Risks and Returns: A Guide for Evaluating
Federal Agencies’ IT Investment Decision-making, GAO/AIMD-10.1.13 (Washington, D.C.:
February 1997).
15

SSA’s receipt of state and local agencies’ data via dedicated on-line connections primarily
involve batch, rather than real-time, transfers of data.

16
In response to PRWORA, SSA also instituted the prisoner program. Under this program,
SSA has agreements with state and local correctional facilities to obtain information that is
used to suspend SSI and OASI and DI benefits to prisoners.

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connection to receive fugitive warrant information from each state law
enforcement agency would require each state to have access to a secure
(encrypted), dedicated telecommunications line with SSA. They believed
that data compatibility and privacy issues would also need to be addressed.
Nonetheless, at the conclusion of our review, an SSA official told us that
the agency had reached agreement with one state—Connecticut—to
exchange fugitive felon data via electronic file transfer. According to the
official, Connecticut is preparing to submit data via a Connect:Direct
electronic file transfer method, in which data will be encrypted and sent
from one mainframe computer to another over dedicated lines.
An alternative to each state sending data would be increased reliance on
the NCIC database, which could provide a comprehensive and readily
accessible means of attaining outstanding warrant records from the FBI,
USMS, and from the states. According to FBI data, NCIC’s technical
infrastructure includes high-level security controls and validation and
confirmation procedures for all warrant information exchanged with the
database. In addition, it is designed to interact in an on-line, real-time
capacity with other information systems and databases, including those of
USMS and all 50 states. For example, states transmit warrant data to NCIC
via state criminal justice systems that are linked to the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services’ network.17 As discussed earlier, all states transmit all
or some portion of their warrant information on line to the NCIC database
each month.
Within the Department of Justice, USMS relies on on-line connections to
transmit fugitive warrant information to NCIC. Like many state and local
law enforcement agencies, USMS transmits to NCIC the same warrant
information that it sends to SSA via U.S. mail. On the other hand, SSA
officials stated that the Bureau of Prison’s database of incarcerated
inmates, which supports SSA’s prisoner program, could not be used to
effectively support the fugitive felon program, because that database does
not maintain information on the status of fugitive felons.
Both SSA and its OIG officials believed that having a single source of
warrant information would help make the data-matching process less
laborious and eliminate processing inefficiencies. Accordingly, in

17

These systems, called control terminal agencies, provide statewide services such as
overseeing the transmission of all warrant information within a state, controlling security,
and providing information security program training.

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November 2001, OIG recommended to Congress the need for a national
warrant database. In addition, at the conclusion of our review, SSA officials
told us they that they viewed the NCIC database as a potential single source
of warrant information to support the fugitive felon program. The officials
believed that receiving USMS’s and state and local law enforcement
agencies’ warrant information on line via NCIC could potentially eliminate
much of the duplicate warrant information that now contributes to the
program’s inefficiencies. For example, according to federal, state, and local
law enforcement officials, USMS and all states currently transmit all or
some of their warrant information to the FBI’s NCIC. Thus, when the FBI
downloads warrant information from this database to mail to SSA, the
information duplicates some of that which federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies also send to SSA. Fugitive felon program officials
reported that, in calendar year 2001, SSA received approximately 60,000
duplicate warrant records (approximately 5,000 warrant records per
month) as a result of these dual exchanges.
SSA officials noted, however, that achieving a single source of fugitive
warrant information would require that SSA have the capability to accept
data from NCIC on line. At the conclusion of our review, SSA officials
stated that the agency had not explored using an on-line connection to
NCIC to enhance the sharing of fugitive warrant information. In addition,
they stated that, for NCIC to be effective as a single source of
comprehensive warrant information, state agencies would have to be
willing to report that portion of warrant information to NCIC that SSA
currently must obtain from them under data-matching agreements.
However, according to FBI officials, there is no statute or regulation
requiring the states to fully report warrant information to NCIC; rather,
states report information to this database voluntarily.

Conclusions

In administering the fugitive felon program, SSA faces significant
technological and other barriers to achieving and sustaining efficient and
effective program operations and, ultimately, helping SSI overcome its
high-risk status. While the program has helped prevent SSI benefits
payments to fugitives, its complex and manually intensive processes have
resulted in operational inefficiencies that could hinder the program’s longterm success. Further, difficulties in negotiating data-matching agreements
with the states have hindered SSA’s efforts to obtain comprehensive
warrant information needed to fulfill program objectives. In the absence of
essential management accountability, SSA lacks critical data needed to
make informed decisions about the program’s processes and activities, as

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well as existing and future plans for technology supporting the program.
Overcoming these inefficiencies and limitations will be critical to ensuring
that the fugitive felon program is organized and implemented to achieve the
greatest possible results and that SSA is effectively positioned to fulfill its
potentially broader role in preventing OASI and DI benefits payments to
fugitives.
SSA officials recognized that increased program efficiency and outcomes
could result from more substantial uses of information technology to
perform key data sharing and verification functions and to streamline datamatching operations. Further, given the potential increase in SSA’s
workload that could result from implementing an OASI and DI nonpayment
provision, having the necessary information technology to support its
operations will be even more critical. SSA already has a proven capability
to share data on line with federal, state, and local agencies in support of
other programs. However, SSA has taken few steps toward examining its
current data-matching operations and approaches to obtaining warrant
information or exploring how best to use technology to enhance the overall
fugitive felon process.

Recommendations for
Executive Action

To improve the fugitive felon program’s operational efficiency and ensure
sustained, long-term success in identifying fugitive SSI beneficiaries, we
recommend that the Commissioner of Social Security designate a program
management office and program manager to direct, monitor, and control
the program’s activities and progress. In addition, we recommend that the
commissioner direct the program management office and manager to
• conduct a detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current
operations and performance, including a complete analysis of the
organizations, processes, information flows, and time frames required to
administer the program, a full accounting of the program’s costs,
estimated and actual program benefits, and current workload
requirements;
• identify and prioritize, based on its assessment, those fugitive felon
processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for resolving
technological and administrative barriers preventing their efficient
operation;
• continue to examine and propose options for using technology to
automate the currently manual functions involved in exchanging

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fugitive warrant information with federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies and in completing the verifications and referral of
this information, including assessing alternatives to using data-matching
agreements to obtain fugitive warrant information, and determining
whether on-line connections with state and local law enforcement
agencies and/or direct telecommunications connections with the FBI’s
NCIC database could offer viable and more efficient means of sharing
warrant information; and
• assess the anticipated technological impact on fugitive felon operations
from the implementation of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits
payments to fugitives, including identifying the additional information
systems support that would be needed to conduct and process leads
resulting from computer matches of warrant information against these
benefits recipients’ files.

Agency Comments and
Our Evaluation

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Commissioner of Social Security (see app. IV) and from the Director, Audit
Liaison Office, Justice Management Division, Department of Justice (see
app. V). The Commissioner of Social Security expressed disappointment
with our report and generally disagreed with our recommendations. The
Department of Justice provided technical comments, which we have
incorporated, as appropriate.
Regarding the commissioner’s statement expressing disappointment in our
report, we believe our report provides a fair assessment of the efficiency of
the fugitive felon program. We identify those areas in which improvements
can be made that can benefit SSA’s future efforts at streamlining the
program’s inefficient processes, improving performance and operations,
and applying technology, where appropriate.
In SSA’s comments, the commissioner also stated that the report implied
that neither SSA nor the OIG had a vision for the fugitive felon program and
did not mention that SSA and OIG had embraced the program without startup funding or additional resources. We recognize the valuable role that SSA
plays in implementing the fugitive felon program to prevent benefits
payments to ineligible SSI recipients. In pointing out technological and
other barriers to the program’s operations, our intent was not to imply that
SSA and other participating components lack a vision for the program.
Rather, given the program’s complexity and multiple entities involved in its
administration, we believe it is important to highlight critical conditions

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and operational inefficiencies necessitating SSA’s continual attention in
order to ensure sustained program success. Also, our report does recognize
that funding has not been appropriated to administer the program. SSA, as
a steward of the program, has a responsibility to ensure that it consistently
carries out all aspects of the fugitive felon data-matching operations in an
efficient manner.
Regarding our recommendation to designate a program management office
and program manager to direct, monitor, and control the program’s
activities and progress, SSA disagreed that an agency-wide program
manager was necessary. SSA stated that managers within its office of
operations and OIG are responsible for the program and that all involved
offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
responsibilities. Further, SSA stated that the Inspector General Act does
not allow its OIG to take direction from or participate in administrative
decisions that appropriately belong to SSA. In addition, regarding our
statement that no program official could explain the overall data sharing
and matching process, SSA disagreed, stating that OIG and SSA officials are
able to explain the process in its entirety. SSA also stated that, to ensure all
involved offices are aware of the overall process and individual office
responsibilities, it had released a detailed process description and provided
a copy to us. Further, SSA added that because its officials had chosen not to
answer questions pertaining to other components’ work during our review,
we had mistakenly inferred that no one within the agency could explain the
overall process.
We recognize that the fugitive felon program is a joint effort and that there
are responsible and knowledgeable managers within each of the
participating components involved in administering the program. Our
recommendation is intended to ensure a unified management oversight
capability for the fugitive felon program that does not currently exist. It is
not intended to prescribe the exact nature or form of that management
oversight capability. With respect to comments regarding possible
limitations on joint efforts as a result of the Inspector General Act, the Act
does not prohibit coordination of joint action between the OIG and the
head of the establishment involved to ensure efficiency of operation and to
avoid duplication of effort, nor do we believe that such coordination would
affect OIG’s personal and professional independence. In this respect, as we
noted in our report, an OIG official has commented on the need for
improved coordination and management of the fugitive felon program.
That official also noted that OIG had already begun to work with SSA’s
Office of Operations to improve management of the program.

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Further, during our review, it was evident that management and staff in
each component could explain the distinct segments of tasks that they
were responsible for accomplishing; however, we could not identify any
officials within these organizations who had a clear perspective of overall
program performance and operations. As our report noted, staff within the
SSA and OIG offices provided conflicting accounts of the fugitive felon
data-matching process. While we acknowledge that SSA revised its policy
instructions in April 2002, outlining involved offices’ roles and
responsibilities, these instructions do not address SSA’s overall fugitive
felon processes. In addition, we were unable to identify any aggregate
tracking data to assess the program’s overall cost and performance. Given
the multiple agencies and offices involved in administering this complex
program, we continue to believe that having a unified source of
accountability and authority for the program is essential to effectively and
consistently oversee its progress and ensure that informed decisions are
being made about its implementation. In discussing our findings on May 10,
2002, SSA and OIG officials agreed that the program lacked uniform
management accountability and stated that they had just recently begun
considering the development of a management board to oversee and
address program management issues and concerns.
SSA also disagreed with our recommendation that called for it to conduct a
detailed assessment of the fugitive felon program’s current operations and
performance, including a full accounting of the program’s costs and
benefits and workload requirements. SSA stated that its analysis of the
program’s operations is an ongoing process and that enhancements are
made when deemed necessary. SSA further stated that it had completed
many of the tasks cited in our recommendation prior to starting the
matching process in calendar year 1999, and that OIG has regularly
reported its performance in the program. We agree that ongoing monitoring
and analysis of the program’s operations is essential for ensuring that
management is informed of the program’s cost and progress and to assess
risks to overall performance. However, during our review, SSA could not
demonstrate that it had made an aggregate assessment of the program’s
current operations and performance, including an awareness of the
processes, information flows, and time involved in administering the
program, as well as a full accounting of its costs and requirements. Such
information is vital for making informed decisions about the program’s
progress and for determining where process improvements are needed and
how best to achieve them. The fugitive felon program has been in place
since 1996 (with computerized matching since 1999), giving SSA sufficient
opportunities to perform these necessary and critical assessments. Further,

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while SSA stated that OIG has regularly reported its performance in the
fugitive felon program, it is important that SSA conduct its own program
assessment that includes all participating components, which ensures that
the program can be consistently and comprehensively controlled and
managed.
Regarding the need for an assessment, SSA stated that it had completed a
cost-benefit analysis of the fugitive felon program in January 2001. Our
review of the two-page summary found that it lacked substantial
information about the program’s overall costs and benefits. An operations
official who provided the document told us that the summary had
constituted only a rough estimate, rather than an accurate reflection, of the
program’s costs and benefits, and that it had been developed only for the
purpose of renewing SSA’s computer-matching program. The official added
that the development of actual cost and benefits data for the fugitive felon
program would require significantly more time than had been invested in
preparing the current summary.
SSA believed that our recommendation to identify and prioritize those
fugitive felon processes that need improvement and develop a strategy for
resolving technological and administrative barriers preventing their
efficient operation is unnecessary, stating that it provides for these actions
during normal operations. The agency added that it has a number of efforts
under way to automate some of the fugitive felon processes. However, SSA
stated that there are some manual processes in the program that contribute
to minor interruptions to the fugitive felon process.
While SSA stated that it has undertaken efforts to automate some fugitive
felon processes, it needs to develop a strategy for resolving the
technological and administrative barriers affecting the program’s
operations. As our report notes, an overall business process improvement
strategy will better position SSA to prioritize and integrate its various
reengineering and improvement projects and, thus, maximize the potential
of technology to improve the program’s performance. Further, at the
conclusion of our review, SSA provided us with documentation outlining
discussions to automate field office functions. However, the information
provided did not include enough detail on the initiative that it said was
being undertaken; therefore, we could not comment on these
developments. We recognize that there are many steps within the fugitive
felon process that must be completed manually. While we agree that some
of these manual processes are necessary, our report notes that technology
may enhance the program. Given our assessment of the length of the

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process (approximately 165 days), we continue to believe that SSA needs
to perform a complete analysis of the fugitive felon program to identify
areas for improvement, as well as areas where technology can be used to
support more efficient operations.
SSA found potential merit in our recommendation that it examine and
propose options for using technology to automate the currently manual
functions involved in exchanging fugitive warrant information with federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies and in determining the most
efficient means of sharing warrant information. Although our
recommendation included determining whether direct telecommunication
connections with the FBI’s NCIC could offer a viable solution, SSA believed
that the creation of a single national warrant database would be a better
solution to efficiently sharing warrant information. SSA stated that its OIG
had testified before the Congress on the benefits that would be derived if
such a database were established. SSA added that NCIC would be effective
as a single source of comprehensive warrant information only if entry of
states’ warrant information became mandatory.
We acknowledge in our report that the states enter warrant information
into NCIC voluntarily and agree that this could be an impediment to
achieving a comprehensive information repository. Nonetheless, achieving
an optimal solution will in large measure depend on SSA examining the
strengths and limitations of all of the potential alternatives to sharing
warrant information, including NCIC. Accordingly, this recommendation
remains in our report. However, we have also incorporated language
reflecting SSA’s views regarding a national warrant database.
Also in its response to this recommendation and in additional comments,
SSA noted several instances where it believed we had made incorrect
assumptions regarding the fugitive felon process. SSA disagreed with our
assertion that it cannot determine the amount of time that is actually
required to complete the processing of fugitive warrants and stated that it
was able to track the number of days it takes for each individual subject
(fugitive) to be processed. In addition, SSA stated that our analysis of the
fugitive felon processing timeline had incorrectly considered start-up/test
file processing times that can be associated with states’ first submissions of
warrant files, thus accounting for our approximation of 165 days. We
acknowledge that SSA has been able to track fugitive warrant information
on a subject-by-subject basis; however, our review did not find that SSA
had performed any aggregate tracking of the time required to process
fugitive warrants—data that would be helpful to SSA in gauging the

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program’s performance. Also, as our report noted, our analysis was limited
to case processing data that did not involve lost, mishandled, or improperly
formatted data. However, we have amended our report to specifically
reflect that we also did not include trial and error times for states reporting
warrant information for the first time.
In addition, SSA interpreted our discussion of states’ perspectives
regarding fugitive felon data formatting and transmission requirements as
an implication that the requirements were unduly restrictive. However, we
recognize the importance of prescribed standards for ensuring consistent
reporting of warrant information and other computerized data. In this
regard, our report aims only to highlight some of the circumstances that
currently prevent SSA from receiving comprehensive warrant information
from state and local law enforcement agencies.
Further, SSA stated that our report had included erroneous information
about the agency’s on-line connections with states’ departments of social
service and in describing its data exchanges with the Bureau of Prisons.
SSA stated that the agency has dedicated lines connecting to each state and
that these lines are used to exchange batch files, and that real-time
transfers are not occurring as indicated in our report. Based on
documentation that SSA’s Office of Systems provided, we determined that
SSA has direct, dedicated on-line connections with every state’s
department of social services. However, we do not imply in our report that
on-line connections mean real-time connections. We have added language
to clarify that SSA’s existing on-line connections with state and local
agencies primarily involve batch, rather than real-time, transfers of data.
Finally, regarding our recommendation that SSA assess the anticipated
technological impact on fugitive felon operations from the implementation
of provisions prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments to fugitives, SSA
stated that it and the OIG have already completed this task. In particular,
SSA stated that a joint SSA/OIG analysis of state and federal warrant files
had been started in January 2001 to determine what impact OASI and DI
legislation would have on the program. According to SSA, this analysis had
determined that the legislation would affect staff resources, but would not
affect its need for technology. Further, SSA stated that this information had
been shared with us during our review.
While conducting our review, OIG officials did inform us that they had
performed an analysis to assess the impact of the OASI and DI legislation
on fugitive felon program operations; however, by the conclusion of our

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review, the officials had not met our request for documentation supporting
this analysis. OIG officials subsequently provided the analysis to us while
reviewing and commenting on our draft report. We agreed to review the
analysis and make revisions to our report, as necessary. Our review of the
analysis found that OIG’s main objective had been to determine the
increase in the current fugitive felon program workload. However, the
analysis did not include any discussion of the technological implications
resulting from the OASI and DI legislation. Further, SSA commented that,
in June 2001, its Office of Systems had estimated that adding OASI and DI
to the fugitive felon program would require about 8 work years, but that the
agency did not envision any major new or unique information technology
expenditures. In discussing the impact of the legislation during our review,
SSA did not inform us of the Office of Systems’ projection or of
documentation supporting this evaluation. Thus, while we have modified
our report to reflect that OIG had performed analysis that assessed the
workload impact resulting from the OASI and DI legislation, we continue to
believe that additional assessment is necessary to determine whether and
what information systems support would be required to meet the broader
mission.
Beyond these comments, SSA offered clarifications to table 1, which listed
the organizations tasked with implementing the fugitive felon program and
to the definition of “high misdemeanors” discussed in footnote 6 to the
report.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of
this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the
report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to the
Commissioner of Social Security and to the Director, Office of Management
and Budget. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at
http://www.gao.gov.

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Should you or your office have any questions concerning this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-6253, or Valerie Melvin, Assistant Director, at (202)
512-6304. We can also be reached by E-mail at willemssenj@gao.gov and
melvinv@gao.gov, respectively. Individuals making key contributions to
this report were Nabajyoti Barkakati, Mary J. Dorsey, Sophia Harrison,
David L. McClure, Valerie C. Melvin, Tammi Nguyen, Henry Sutanto, and
Eric Trout.
Sincerely yours,

Joel C. Willemssen
Managing Director, Information Technology Issues

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Appendix I

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

AA
ppp
ep
ned
n
x
id
e
x
Iis

Our objectives were to examine the technological aspects of the fugitive
felon program in order to (1) identify technological barriers restricting (a)
data matching between the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) databases and (b) ongoing efforts
by SSA to obtain data-matching agreements with state and local law
enforcement agencies; (2) assess the technological impact on SSA and the
FBI should Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) and Disability
Insurance (DI) benefits be included in legislation restricting payments to
fugitive felons; and (3) determine whether other databases, such as those
maintained by the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and the U.S.
Marshals Service, can provide additional support to the fugitive felon
program.
To understand the fugitive felon data-matching process, we obtained and
analyzed various documentation maintained by SSA, the FBI, the Bureau of
Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service. These documents described data
sharing and matching policies, operational and security procedures, and
the technical infrastructure supporting the fugitive felon program. We
complemented our understanding of the data-matching process by
arranging a demonstration with SearchSoftwareAmerica, an industry
leader with expertise in data-matching software, to understand how datamatching software works in a database environment.
At the time of our review, SSA did not have documentation showing the
flow of warrant information through the fugitive felon data-matching
process, requiring that we map the process ourselves. To accomplish this,
we relied on the results of our document analyses and used business
process flow software to construct a graphical presentation of the fugitive
felon program’s process flow. We provided copies of the completed
business process flowchart to SSA Headquarters offices and its Office of
Inspector General (OIG) to verify the accuracy of our process depiction
and incorporated changes based on their review and comments. In
addition, to further confirm the process, we interviewed agency officials in
all of the offices involved in administering the fugitive felon program.
These included SSA’s OIG and office of operations, SSA and OIG field
offices, and the FBI Information Technology Center (ITC) in Fort
Monmouth, New Jersey.
Also, because SSA had not performed an analysis to determine how many
days it took to process warrant information, we determined the
approximate number of days involved in the process from the receipt of
warrant information from federal, state, and local law enforcement

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Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

agencies until the suspension of fugitives’ SSI benefits. We derived the
number of days by performing a detailed analysis of documentation
obtained from various SSA offices. For example, we reviewed completed
samples of incoming data included on log sheets from both the Office of
Central Operations and Office of Telecommunications and Systems
Operations to calculate the approximate number of days it took these
offices to process the warrant data from its receipt until they forwarded it
to OIG. We also interviewed officials in SSA Headquarters, its OIG, and the
FBI ITC regarding the number of days involved in processing fugitive
warrants. We shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA
officials to confirm the validity of our processing timeline estimate.
To identify technological barriers restricting data matching between SSA’s
and the FBI’s databases, we relied on our detailed analysis of SSA’s fugitive
felon process and assessed information describing its supporting technical
infrastructure. We also analyzed documentation describing the FBI’s
repository of fugitives and other criminals—the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC)—along with the agency’s approach to providing
warrant information to SSA. To support our analysis, we applied various
guidance, including Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130,
Appendix I: Federal Agency Responsibilities for Maintaining Records
about Individuals and Appendix II, Security of Federal Automated
Information Resources; and National Institute of Standards and
Technology computer security guidance.
Regarding SSA’s ongoing efforts to obtain data-matching agreements with
state and local law enforcement agencies, we applied the Computer
Matching Privacy and Protection Act (CMPPA) of 1988 (P. L. 100-503),
amending the Privacy Act (5 U. S. C. 552a); data-matching agreements fall
under the provisions of the Act, which protects unauthorized disclosures of
computerized data through data matching. In addition, we applied the
Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579), which stipulates provisions for protecting
individuals from unauthorized disclosure of non-computerized
information. We also applied knowledge gained through our detailed
analysis of the fugitive felon process, as well as SSA’s model data-matching
agreements, reports documenting the status of negotiations between SSA
and state and local law enforcement agencies, and other policy and
procedural documentation. We conducted site visits and telephone
conferences with 17 randomly selected state and local law enforcement
agencies—Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Montgomery County, Pennsylvania—to determine

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Appendix I
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

their involvement in the fugitive felon program, identify any technological
barriers prohibiting their ability to effectively and efficiently share data
with SSA and other federal agencies, and assess issues and concerns
affecting their efforts to negotiate data-matching agreements with SSA.
To assess the technological impact on SSA and the FBI should legislation
be enacted to prohibit fugitives from receiving OASI and DI benefits
payments, we analyzed applicable laws: the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P. L. 104-193), amending Title
XVI of the Social Security Act, as well as OASI and DI legislation proposed
by the House of Representatives and U.S. Senate. We also assessed SSA
OIG reports and testimony that highlighted the Inspector General’s position
regarding proposed legislation prohibiting OASI and DI benefits payments
to fugitive felons and determined SSA’s decisions and actions regarding the
potential impact of such proposed legislation. In addition, as part of our
analysis, we considered our recent correspondence to the House
Committee on Way and Means, which reported on whether SSA has the
authority to deny OASI and DI benefits to fugitive felons and provide law
enforcement agencies with the current addresses and Social Security
numbers of OASI and DI beneficiaries who are fugitive felons.18 Finally, to
determine whether other databases, such as those maintained by the
Department of Justice’s Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service could
provide additional support to the fugitive felon program, we obtained and
analyzed documentation describing the agreements between SSA’s OIG and
these agencies. In addition, we analyzed systems documentation pertaining
to the Bureau of Prisons and U.S. Marshals Service’s databases, as well as
the FBI’s NCIC and state and local law enforcement agencies’ databases.
This documentation included data standards, reporting requirements
(memoranda of understanding and data-matching agreements), policies,
and procedures. We also interviewed pertinent management and staff of
SSA’s Headquarters, field offices, and OIG; the FBI Criminal Justice
Information Services Division; the U.S. Marshals Service; and the Bureau of
Prisons to gain an understanding of how their databases could be used to
support the fugitive felon program.
We conducted our review from August 2001 through May 2002, in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

18

U.S. General Accounting Office, Social Security Programs: The Scope of SSA’s Authority
to Deny Benefits to Fugitive Felons and to Release Information about OASI and DI
Beneficiaries Who Are Fugitive Felons, GAO-02-459R (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2002).

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Appendix II

Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching
Process

Appendx
Ii

Under the fugitive felon program, the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service (USMS),
and state and local law enforcement agencies download warrant
information from their respective databases onto electronic media, such as
cartridges, diskettes, and CD-ROMs, and send it to SSA via the U.S. mail or
FedEx. Warrant information contained on diskettes, paper, and CD-ROMs
is sent to SSA’s Office of Central Operations (any warrant information
received on paper is keyed to diskette), whereas warrant information
contained on tapes, cartridges, or electronic files is sent to SSA’s Office of
Telecommunications and Systems Operations. Upon receipt, staff in these
two offices upload the warrant information onto SSA’s mainframe
computer, located at its National Computer Center (NCC), to begin the
data-matching process.
As part of the data-matching operations, the NCC staff makes backup
copies of the warrant information and processes the data in overnight
batches, using SSA’s Enumeration Verification System (EVS) to verify
fugitives’ names, Social Security numbers, sex, and birth dates. The NCC
staff then notifies SSA’s OIG that the data files are in production. The OIG is
responsible for ensuring that the data files include only individuals charged
with felony and parole or probation violations; it deletes any files naming
individuals charged with misdemeanors.
Following OIG’s review, NCC staff processes the data files against the
supplemental security record to identify fugitives receiving SSI benefits
payments. The records of fugitives identified—called matched records—
are then returned to the OIG for further processing.
OIG enters the files containing the matched records into its allegation and
case investigative system and assigns case numbers to them. Case numbers
are assigned based on whether the records represent “exact” matches or
“good” matches.19 OIG then sends the records containing exact matches
(on electronic media via FedEx) to the FBI’s ITC in Fort Monmouth, New
Jersey and to USMS for additional processing. OIG also notifies its field
offices via E-mail that exact and good matches have been entered into its
allegation and case investigative system.

19

Exact matches are those having only one person with a particular name, Social Security
number, date of birth, and sex. Good matches are those having one or two of the data
elements, such as name and date of birth, but not a Social Security number. Good matches
require the OIG field offices to perform additional identification and verification.

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Appendix II
Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching
Process

Upon receiving the exact matches, ITC staff then verifies the address and
status of each individual named in the NCIC matched warrant records to
determine whether the warrants are still active, using a personal computer
to access and query fugitives’ records that are maintained in the NCIC
database. ITC staff does not query NCIC to determine whether states’
matched warrant records are still active, but rather processes and mails the
records to the applicable states for their verification. ITC staff also obtains
from the NCIC database address information on the law enforcement
agencies that originally issued the arrest warrants on the individuals named
in the warrants and manually type each originating law enforcement
agency’s address onto a cover letter. The staff then uses the address
information to mail the “leads,” together with the cover letter, law
enforcement referral form (OI-5B), and the law enforcement certification
form (OI-5C) to the originating law enforcement agencies for their use in
locating and apprehending the fugitives. According to OIG, ITC generally
requires approximately 30 days to process the matched records.
State and local law enforcement agencies use information contained in the
“leads” to locate the fugitive felons and then return certification forms to
ITC indicating the action they have taken on the warrant. Before acting to
suspend SSI benefits, SSA generally allows the originating law enforcement
agencies 60 days to apprehend a fugitive based on the leads provided. By
allowing this “sunset” phase, SSA avoids letting fugitives know that their
status and whereabouts have been revealed before law enforcement
authorities can arrest them.
When ITC receives the certification forms from the law enforcement
agencies indicating the status of the warrants, it forwards the forms to the
appropriate OIG field offices. OIG agents have 30 days from the time that
the forms are returned to them to work the cases (a case consists of 50
subjects or felons) or perform additional verifications, enter the
information from these forms into the allegation and case investigative
system, complete summary and benefits suspension forms, and mail the
forms to SSA field offices. If law enforcement agencies do not return
certification forms indicating the status of the arrest warrant to ITC within
60 days, OIG agents follow up with the law enforcement agencies either by
letter or telephone to determine whether the warrant is still active. OIG
agents also perform additional identification activities for good matches
and send these matches to SSA field offices, where staff query the
supplemental security record for verification. If records cannot be verified
using the supplemental security record, OIG contacts the law enforcement
agencies for verification. If, after contacting law enforcement agencies,

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Appendix II
Fugitive Felon Program Data-Matching
Process

warrants still cannot be verified, records are either destroyed or mailed
back to the originating law enforcement agencies and a note is attached to
records contained in the allegation and case investigative system.
Once warrant records are verified and are determined to be still active, OIG
agents refer them to the appropriate SSA field offices, where action is
taken to suspend the fugitive’s SSI benefits, calculate the amount of
overpayment, and update the SSI files. SSA officials told us that the process
to suspend SSI benefits payments takes approximately 10 days.
Based on our analysis of data that SSA provided about its process, we
determined that from the date on which SSA first receives warrant data
from the law enforcement agencies to when it identifies fugitives who
receive SSI benefits, locates and apprehends them, and then suspends SSI
benefits, the process can take up to 165 days.20 This approximate
processing time includes 35 days for SSA systems, operations, and OIG
staff to process the matches, 30 days for ITC to verify and batch process
warrants, 60 days for state and local law enforcements agencies to locate
and apprehend fugitives before SSA serves notice of benefits suspension,
30 days for OIG field offices to act on information received from the law
enforcement agencies, and 10 days for processing the suspension of
benefits.
Following the suspension of benefits, fugitive SSI recipients are given due
process. That is, fugitive SSI recipients have 10 days to contact SSA for a
continuance of benefits and 60 days to appeal the suspension. If the fugitive
loses the appeal, SSA will suspend the SSI benefits and again update the
supplemental security record. SSA’s NCC runs master tapes once a month
and submits them to the Department of the Treasury, informing it of any
updated information. Treasury discontinues issuing checks to the identified
fugitive felons.

20

The approximate processing days were compiled based on our analysis of information
provided by several SSA offices involved in the process. Our analysis considered the steps
required to fully process a case that did not involve circumstances such as lost, mishandled,
or improperly formatted warrant information. To confirm the validity of our timeline
estimate, we shared the results of our analysis with appropriate SSA and FBI officials.

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Appendix III

Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in
Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing Them
from Receiving SSI Payments

Appendx
iI

SSA reports that, since its inception in August 1996, the fugitive felon
program has been instrumental in helping identify approximately 45,000
fugitives who improperly collected at least $82 million in Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits. In addition, SSA reports that, as a result of
sharing fugitive warrant information, officer and public safety throughout
the United States has increased. According to SSA’s OIG, among those
fugitives who have been identified as receiving SSI benefits, more than
5,000 have been apprehended since the fugitive felon program began.
The following cases highlight examples of how the fugitive felon program
has contributed to identifying and apprehending fugitives and preventing
improper payments of SSI benefits:
• On February 8, 2001, authorities arrested two fugitives as a result of
computer matching between SSA’s OIG and the FBI’s NCIC. Agents from
OIG’s New York field division, state troopers from New Jersey, and
deputies from the Essex County, New York sheriff’s office, arrested one
fugitive wanted on arson charges and a second wanted on charges of
producing and distributing a dangerous controlled substance. Both
fugitives were remanded to the custody of the Essex County jail, and
these cases resulted in the suspension of the fugitives’ SSI benefits.
• In New York, the field division of SSA’s OIG used leads from matched
fugitive warrant records to identify a fugitive wanted by the Union
County, New Jersey sheriff’s office on a burglary charge. This fugitive,
arrested in June 2001, with the assistance of an FBI agent, had 13 prior
arrests and 5 prior convictions, including one for homicide. This case
resulted in SSI benefits suspension.
• Under the direction of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District
of Michigan, agents from the OIG Detroit office participated in an
operation that focused on locating and arresting 400 adult and juvenile
chronic violent offenders. The 3-day operation resulted in the arrest of
82 individuals—67 of whom were receiving SSI benefits. The
apprehended individuals were wanted for offenses ranging from
criminal sexual conduct to armed robbery and assault with intent to do
bodily harm.
• In California on December 7, 2000, the Operation Pretenders Task
Force, (composed of agents from the SSA OIG, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and California state parole), assisted by
California’s Department of Health Services and Department of Motor

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Appendix III
Fugitive Felon Program’s Assistance in
Apprehending Fugitives and Preventing
Them from Receiving SSI Payments

Vehicles, arrested a registered child sex offender for a parole violation.
The fugitive had eluded officials for approximately 5 years by assuming
the identity of his deceased brother and had applied for and received SSI
benefits under the assumed identity. On January 31, 2001, a grand jury
indicted him on two counts of false statements for SSI benefits, two
counts of fraudulent use of a Social Security number, and three counts
of identity theft.

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Appendix IV

Comments from the Social Security
Administration

Page 43

Appendx
iIV

GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

Appendix IV
Comments from the Social Security
Administration

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Appendix IV
Comments from the Social Security
Administration

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Appendix IV
Comments from the Social Security
Administration

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Appendix IV
Comments from the Social Security
Administration

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Appendix IV
Comments from the Social Security
Administration

Now on p. 7.

Now on p. 12.

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Appendix V

Comments from the U.S. Department of
Justice

(310420)

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Append
x
iV

GAO-02-346 Social Security Administration

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