Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details
Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………… 1
Chapter 1: Eyewitness Identification Procedures……………………………………... 6
Panel Recommendations……………………………………………………………… 6
Panel Report…………………………………………………………………………. 10
Concurring Report…………………………………………………………………... 38
Chapter 2: Recording Custodial Interrogations……………………………………... 46
Panel Recommendations……………………………………………………………. 46
Panel Report…………………………………………………………………………. 48
Chapter 3: Discovery Procedures……………………………………………………... 75
Panel Recommendations…………………………………………………………….. 75
Panel Report…………………………………………………………………………. 76
Chapter 4: Post-Conviction DNA Testing and Writs of Habeas Corpus Based
on Changing Science……………………………………………………………….. 90
Panel Recommendations……………………………………………………………. 90
Panel Report………………………………………………………………………… 91
Chapter 5: Feasibility of Establishing an Innocence Commission………………… 106
Panel Recommendations…………………………………………………………… 106
Panel Report……………………………………………………………………….. 108
Chapter 6: Jailhouse Informant Testimony………………………………………… 118
Appendix A: Analysis of CSSB 117, 81st Legislature………………………………… 126
Appendix B: Supplemental materials to Concurring Report………………………….. 132
Appendix C: Model language relating to recording custodial interrogations …….….. 138
Appendix D: Remedy and exceptions to recording in other states …………………… 142
Appendix E: Model language relating to reciprocal discovery in criminal cases ……. 147
Appendix F: Model language relating to post-conviction DNA testing………………. 154
Appendix G: Model language relating to writs of habeas corpus based on
changing science………………………………………………………………...156

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions:
Research Details
Introduction
The Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions was created by HB 498
during the 81st Legislature in 2009. Named after Timothy Cole, the first Texan to be
posthumously exonerated of a crime through DNA testing, the Panel was directed to advise the
Task Force on Indigent Defense in the preparation of a study regarding the causes of wrongful
convictions; procedures and programs that may be implemented to prevent future wrongful
convictions; the effects on wrongful convictions of state law regarding eyewitness identification
procedures, the recording of custodial interrogations, post-conviction DNA testing, and writs of
habeas corpus based on relevant scientific evidence; and whether the creation of an innocence
commission to investigate wrongful convictions would be appropriate. 1
The Panel held its first organizational meeting on October 13, 2009, to set an agenda for
the following year and divide into workgroups based on each content area directed by statute. In
addition, the Panel expressed interest in discovery procedures and informant evidence, and
workgroups were created for these areas. Workgroup meetings were held December 7 and 8,
2009, followed by a trip to Tarrant County by the full Panel to observe the county’s electronic
discovery system. Workgroup and full Panel meetings were held April 21 and 22, 2010,
followed by the full Panel meeting on August 12, 2010. Numerous workgroup conference calls
and meetings were held to draft the report and the final recommendations.
The Panel’s report and the meetings that led to it were not meant to pin wrongful
convictions on “bad apples,” but rather to look for places in our system of criminal justice where

1

Tex. H.B. 498, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

errors occur. 2 While the Panel was not created to do in-depth analysis of errors in individual
cases (e.g., the important work pursued by the Harris County District Attorney Pat Lykos 3 and
the Dallas County Convictions Integrity Unit created by District Attorney Craig Watkins 4), the
Panel attempted to make recommendations that will impact multiple points of weakness in the
system as a whole: investigations (eyewitness identification procedures and recording custodial
interrogations), pre-trial and trial procedures (automatic discovery that permits electronic access
to or photocopies of materials), and post-conviction procedures (DNA testing, writs of habeas
corpus based on changing science, and creating a process for continued review of wrongful
convictions). In this way, the Panel viewed its task as one of defining “organizational
accidents,” 5 or perhaps more appropriately “systemic accidents,” rather than one of placing
blame on individual actors.
The Panel believes that this approach lends itself to the kind of justice Tim Cole’s family
spoke of when they stated that “There is no ‘perfect system.’” 6 Instead, the Cole-Session family
said that the collaborative approach taken by the Panel indicated that “Texas is on the path
toward the Zenith of Criminal Justice Reform. The Tim Cole Advisory Panel has brought
together a collaborative consensus from all three Branches of our State Government.” Tim’s
mother, Ruby Session, and brother, Cory Session, continued, “For our family’s great loss there

2

See James M. Doyle, Learning from Error in American Criminal Justice, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109
(2010).
3
See, e.g., OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY PATRICIA R. LYKOS, RACHELL REPORT (2009), http://www.patlykos.com/
linked_docs/rachell_report.pdf.
4
Conviction Integrity – Dallas County DA’s Office, http://www.dallasda.com/conviction-integrity.html (last visited
Aug. 5, 2010).
5
James, supra note 2.
6
Email from Cory Session, to Jim Bethke, Director, Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense (Aug. 5, 2010) (on file
with Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

are now great gains in the Justice System. We are pleased that the State of Texas is now in
pursuit of Equal Justice Under Law for all.” 7
The Panel submits to the Task Force the following materials: 1) a summary of the Panel’s
recommendations, 2) the Panel’s report, and 3) a comprehensive report of the Panel’s research.
In addition to the areas required by the statute, the Panel addressed discovery policies in its
deliberations and recommendations, and Prof. Sandra Guerra Thompson submitted a report on
informant evidence for inclusion in the Panel’s materials. To the extent possible, the report
represents the consensus of the Panel. Although there are additional opportunities for reform in
any system, the majority of the Panel believes that these recommendations represent an
important step forward for the State of Texas in the effort to prevent wrongful convictions.
The Panel takes seriously its duty to learn from the mistakes, revealed through postconviction DNA testing, that sent innocent Texans to prison for crimes committed by others.
The first 39 of cases were documented in a report by The Justice Project and included in the table
below. Since publication of that report, one additional man, Jerry Lee Evans, has been
exonerated, and three others have been released on new DNA evidence and await full
exoneration from the state.

7

Id.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

The Justice Project: The Texas DNA Exonerated 8

Last Name

First Name

ope

Alejandro

1m

Blair

1994 2008

Buder

1983 2000

Smith

8,..

1985 1997

H.Yris

Chatman
Cole·
Criner
Danziger

1981

TlTlOIhy Beiln

'''

Fuller

Giles

Jarres Osls

Good

",,'"

Gossett

"'""'"

Kauge

&.goo
Enlre Nax

Lavemia

Lindsey

Jltmie Earl

McGowan

Miller

M"',
Mumphrey
O<hoo
Phil~ps.

"'"

2007

19'"
1990 2001
1986 2003
1981 2006
1983 2007
1984 2004

Tho""

Tr""is

llIpe, mlJdef

Ellly J<mes

Ft,,,"

""'"
Tratis

1983 2008
1985 2008
1984 2006
1988 2005
1986 2006

"""

""'"
""'"

",,'

,n,,'"

./

12

16
20
10

./

10
7

./

./

2
7

op,

./

."

./

16
26
23

22

./

17

./

18

./

12

26

","" lug'"

""'"

ope

Harris

op,

1987 2004

./
./

./

,

15

./

10

./
./
./
./
./

./

./
./

./

17

1992 1997
1987 2006
1999 2004

Tr""is

op,

Haris

",,'

2007

Harris

ope

EO,

",,'

15

ope

4

!ape, mlJder

1986 2002
1983 2006

Patrldt

1983 2007
1992 2008

Wal6s

1969 2007

Washing~n

1987 2001

Md..enrnn

Webb
Woodard

1981 20CB

TOTALS
"Died (/ png)fl (/ 1999

27
13'

./

",,'

"""
""'"

Waller

"

./

./

0"
""
ope

1985 2000

Kelh E,

Waller

17

10

"''''

2003 2008
1987 2000

Taylor

""'"

1984 2006
1997 2004

Rachel

Sullon

LublxX:k

Christopher
2001
Sl:evm Oakls 1983 2007

""''"

14

./
op,
ope

200J 2007

1986 2001

Salazar
Smith

./

1990 2000

Pope
Robinson
Rodriguez

4

./

1987 2001

5

19
4

./

"

16
18
13

./

13
27

",,'

"""

1IlJ~

rape
33

7

11

5

5

7

548

8

THE JUSTICE PROJECT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: TEXAS JUSTICE DERAILED: STORIES OF INJUSTICE AND THE
REFORMS THAT CAN PREVENT THEM (2009), reprinted with permission from The Justice Project.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

Allen Wayne

1990

Harris

rape

Michael A.

1983

Harris

rape

Ernest

Porter**
Green**

Approximate Years in
Prison

kidnapping

Sonnier**

✓
✓
✓
✓

False Confession or
Plea
Suppression of
Exculpatory Evidence
or Other Misconduct

Harris

1986

Jailhouse Informant &
Accomplice Testimony

1986

Jerry Lee

Unreliable or Limited
Forensic Methods

rape

Evans

Faulty Forensic
Testimony

Crime

Dallas

First Name

Mistaken Eyewitness
Identification

County

2009

Last Name

Year Convicted

Year Exonerated

New and Pending DNA Exonerations 9

23

✓

23
19
27

**Released on new DNA evidence, awaiting final exoneration from the State of Texas

9

THE JUSTICE PROJECT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: TEXAS JUSTICE DERAILED: TEXAS DNA EXONERATION
UPDATE (2010).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

Chapter 1: Eyewitness Identification Procedures

What is the worth of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of
strangers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of this type of testimony are established by
a formidable number of instances in the records of English and American trials. These instances
are recent—not due to the brutalities of ancient criminal procedure. 1

Panel Recommendations
In a survey of 1,038 Texas law enforcement agencies, it was found that out of 750
responsive departments, only 88 (12%) had any written policies to guide investigators as they
prepare and administer eyewitness identification procedures. 2 Based on the seriousness of
eyewitness misidentification, the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions
recommends that the state adopt the following reforms:
1. The State of Texas should require Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management
Institute of Texas (LEMIT) to work with scientific experts in eyewitness memory
research and law enforcement agencies to develop, adopt, disseminate to all law
enforcement agencies, and annually review a model policy and training materials
regarding the administration of photo and live lineups. That model policy should
comport with science in the areas of cautionary instructions, filler selection, doubleblind administration, documentation of identification procedures, and other
procedures or best practices supported by credible research.
1

Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC MAG., Mar. 1927, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1969/12/the-case-of-sacco-and-vanzetti/6625/.
2
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN TEXAS 3 (2008), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/texas-eyewitness-report-final2.pdf.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

Because Texas statutes are currently silent on the subject of identification procedures,
suspects of crimes may be subjected to a wide variety of identification procedures across the
state. Surveys of current practices reveal that many of those procedures do not meet the
recommendations set forth by science and criminal justice organizations to reduce the risk of
erroneous identification, placing innocent suspects in jeopardy of wrongful conviction. By
working with experts in the field of eyewitness memory and identification procedures, LEMIT
can develop a standardized procedure that will guide the photo and live lineups conducted
throughout the state. Annual review of this model policy will ensure that eyewitness
identification procedures in Texas are guided by the most current science and best practices
available in the areas reviewed below.
As the leading factor in wrongful convictions, it is apparent that eyewitness evidence
must be collected and documented in ways that preserve the eyewitness’ memory. Studies have
indicated that cautionary instructions to the eyewitness that the culprit may or may not be
included in the lineup and the selection of fillers who resemble the description of the perpetrator
given by the eyewitness can help to ensure that lineup identifications are accurate.
Double-blind administration of lineups is equally important because it prevents (often
unintentional) cueing of the eyewitness as to which member of the lineup is the police suspect.
Blind administration also prevents confirming feedback that is sometimes given to eyewitnesses
after they select the suspect form the lineup. Research demonstrates that feedback can
artificially inflate eyewitness confidence levels—a phenomenon that can potentially reduce the
dependence on confidence to judge accuracy.
The Panel understands that, especially in small departments, there may not be an officer
who is unaware of which lineup member is the suspect. In those circumstances, the Panel

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

advocates the use of the “folder method” that has been adopted by other states. By randomly
placing individual pictures of lineup members in manila folders, numbering those folders, and
handing them to the eyewitness out of view of the officer, law enforcement can help to ward off
expectancy effects and post-identification feedback.
The Panel recommends that the results of the identification procedure and any statements
made by the eyewitness (including a contemporaneous confidence statement) must be
documented and available for later review at trial. This policy provides insight into the
procedure itself and can help to defend against confidence inflation between the time of the
identification and the trial.
The State of Texas should provide adequate funding to support this initiative.
2. The State of Texas should require all law enforcement agencies to adopt eyewitness
identification procedures that comply with the model policy promulgated by the Bill
Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas (LEMIT).
The Panel recommends that a model policy be developed and promulgated by LEMIT to
make implementation easy for Texas law enforcement agencies. The creation of a model policy
further allows LEMIT to be responsive to new science that may emerge in the field of eyewitness
identification, adding both flexibility and stability to our statewide policies and procedures. Law
enforcement agencies may choose to adopt that model policy or create their own policies that
substantially conform with the model.
3. The State of Texas should integrate training on eyewitness identification procedures
into the required curricula of the Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management
Institute of Texas (LEMIT) and the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement
Standards and Education (TCLEOSE).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

An important component of any change in policy is training to facilitate the
implementation of that policy. Training helps to ensure that policies are implemented and
executed effectively. The Panel believes the law enforcement community can benefit from
increased training on the science of eyewitness misidentification and how to prevent those errors
through the policies advocated above. Although this training has been adopted into the basic
course offered through TCLEOSE, the Panel encourages the Texas Legislature to expand the
training curricula offered through both TCLEOSE and LEMIT to provide background on how
errors can occur and scientifically-tested methods to prevent those errors. Conversations with
the two organizations have been initiated by the Panel to detail the resources, materials, and
procedure needed to adopt this recommendation. The Panel again recommends that the State
provide adequate funding to support this initiative.
4. The State of Texas should permit evidence of compliance or noncompliance with the
model policy to be admissible in court.
At this time, the Panel does not recommend that evidence of noncompliance bar the
admission of eyewitness identification testimony into the courtroom; rather, the Panel suggests
that because jurors must weigh the quality and value of the evidence that is presented to them in
order to determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, it is important for evidence of
compliance or noncompliance with the model policy to be presented to them during a criminal
trial. Without appropriate context for identification evidence, jurors may inadvertently rely on
testimony resulting from a flawed procedure in their deliberations—especially if that testimony
comes from a highly confident eyewitness. Fully vetting that evidence in the courtroom will
give jurors full knowledge of the procedures that were used to obtain an eyewitness identification
and whether those procedures were in line with those promulgated throughout the state.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

5. The State of Texas should allow law enforcement agencies discretion on the
adoption of sequential procedures.
Although several jurisdictions in Texas have included sequential presentation in their
eyewitness identification standard operating procedures, the majority of the Panel believes that
the science is not yet settled on whether sequential presentation is superior to simultaneous
presentation. With experiments currently under way at Austin Police Department and several
other jurisdictions around the nation, there may well be scientific evidence available to
reconsider this stance in the future. Until that time, the Panel does not recommend a mandate
that sequential procedures be adopted statewide. Leaders should continue to monitor this area of
eyewitness science.
These Panel proposals are in line with the language in committee substitute to SB 117
during the 81st Legislature (an analysis of that language can be found in Appendix A). These
consensus procedures were supported by a broad range of criminal justice stakeholders during
the session and continue to be supported by a majority of this diverse Panel.

Panel Report
Introduction
Erroneous eyewitness identification has played a role in over 80% of Texas exonerations,
making it is the most common factor that has contributed to wrongful convictions in Texas. 3 In
all, eyewitness error has contributed to 75% of the 255 DNA exonerations nationwide, with up to
three or more witnesses incorrectly identifying each would-be exoneree during a criminal

3

THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES IN TEXAS 1(2008), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/texas-eyewitness-report-final2.pdf.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

investigation or at trial. 4 In Texas, ten separate victims identified Steven Phillips as the
perpetrator of a series of crimes committed in Dallas. In another case, Thomas McGowan was
included in a live lineup (along with two other suspects) and a photo lineup that were shown to
the same eyewitness. McGowan was only chosen as the culprit after the second identification
procedure. Finally, Billy Smith was identified as the attacker in a crime that occurred at his
apartment complex after the apartment manager asked him to step onto his balcony. The
manager, who was also the victim’s boyfriend, did not see the attacker, but believed that Smith
may have assaulted his girlfriend. The victim identified him on the balcony in a highly
suggestive procedure that lacked police control and the fillers that are normally included in a live
lineup.
These are just three of the cases that have led researchers, law enforcement, and criminal
justice fact-finders to examine eyewitness identification procedures to determine how errors
occur and how they can be prevented. For this chapter of the report, the Panel reviewed the
existing laws that guide eyewitness identification procedures and evaluation, the science of
eyewitness identification, and recommended procedures put forth by a variety of organizations to
determine the best policy to prevent wrongful convictions in the State of Texas. The Panel
recommends that standardized eyewitness identification procedures and training are needed in
law enforcement agencies across the state to prevent wrongful conviction through erroneous
identifications, in line with the recommendations proposed in CSSB 117 during the 81st
Legislature. As thoroughly explored in the recommendations above, the legislation provides for
model policies and training to facilitate the transition in eyewitness identification procedures.

4

The Innocence Project, Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/EyewitnessMisidentification.php.

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

Eyewitness Identification and Texas Law
Currently, there is no Texas statutory law governing eyewitness identification procedures,
leaving methodology up to the discretion of local authorities. There is United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence on this matter, and the Court has held that the burden is on the government
to prove the procedure it used is not “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification.” 5 Without a clear picture of what constitutes “unduly suggestive
procedures,” however, it is difficult for the Supreme Court holding to be an effective tool in the
effort to prevent wrongful convictions.
In Neil v. Biggers, the United States Supreme Court identified five factors to be
considered by the judge or jury in evaluating the likelihood of an eyewitness misidentification:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of
attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and
the confrontation. 6 In Manson v. Brathwaite, the Court refined the application of the Biggers
criteria, holding that meeting these five measures implies an accurate identification, even if a
highly suggestive procedure was used by authorities to obtain the identification. 7

The State of

Texas follows federal jurisprudence on this issue, utilizing the Biggers criteria as the standard for
reviewing whether an in-court identification is admissible in light of an alleged impermissiblysuggestive pretrial photographic identification. 8

5

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1971).
409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
7
See 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1976).
8
See, e.g., Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (using Biggers criteria in review of trial
court's ruling on the suggestiveness of pre-trial photo array); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(weighing Biggers criteria against the corrupting effect of the suggestive pretrial identification procedure); Loserth
v. State, 963 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (vacating and remanding an intermediate appellate court
order because it erred in failing to consider the criteria in a review of identification procedures); Proctor v. State,
No. 01-08-01041-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 4832 (Tex. App. 2010).
6

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Concern over the lineup procedure methodology used by an officer was expressed,
however, in a concurring opinion by Judge Barbara Hervey in Luna v. State. 9 Judge Hervey
specifically noted trial testimony in which the officer who conducted a lineup first told the court
he had instructed an eyewitness that there was a suspect in the lineup he was about to view.
Upon further questioning, the officer stated that he must not have told the eyewitness that there
was a suspect in the lineup because he always used the same script. That script stated that the
person who committed the crime may or may not be included in the lineup. This conflicting
testimony (as well as additional testimony and statements from the trial record) caused Judge
Hervey to state her concerns about the identification and court procedures used. 10
The Supreme Court laid out the Biggers criteria to help judge the value of eyewitness
identification evidence, but these criteria may be insufficient to prevent wrongful convictions for
two reasons. First, the criteria are applied only after potentially flawed eyewitness evidence is
presented in court. Studies have indicated that jurors tend to believe that eyewitnesses who are
confident are accurate beyond the eyewitness accuracy rates found in experimental analysis, 11
and when confronted with a confident eyewitness, jurors overlook the witnessing conditions
themselves to judge the validity and reliability of an eyewitness identification. 12 This is
problematic because it indicates that jurors tend to over-rely on eyewitness evidence 13 when
there is reason for them to discount that evidence, potentially rendering a post hoc evaluation

9

268 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (Hervey, J., concurring).
Id.at 610-15.
11
See, e.g., John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate the Accuracy of
Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19 (1983).
12
Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their
Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 361 (1998).
13
See Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy: Assessing Their Forensic
Relation, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 817 (1995).
10

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ineffective. This pattern has been found to hold true even when expert testimony is permitted by
a judge that demonstrates the pitfalls and weaknesses inherent to eyewitness identifications. 14
The second reason that the Supreme Court criteria may be ineffective to prevent wrongful
conviction is that science indicates that there are many facets of the identification procedure
itself that can impact the outcome of the procedure. The composition of the lineup, the
instructions given to the eyewitness, the lineup administrator, and the method of presentation
may all play a role in: 1) whether an identification is made and 2) the lineup member who is
identified. In order to effectively prevent wrongful conviction due to eyewitness error, jurors
need the most reliable evidence possible. Thus, the errors in identification are best eliminated at
the investigatory phase, rather than post hoc in the courtroom. The studies reviewed below
provided the Panel with insight into how and under what conditions false identifications and
conviction can occur.
The Science of Eyewitness Identification
Lineup Composition
One of the first considerations of an identification procedure is the selection of fillers for
either a live or photographic lineup. Fillers (also known as “foils” or “distracters”) are people
investigators believe to be innocent of a crime (e.g., plain clothes officers or jail inmates, photos
taken from a mug book or database) and are shown to an eyewitness witness along with the
police suspect for a crime. The thought is that fillers provide a level of protection to innocent
suspects and ensure that the “test” for the eyewitness is to determine whether a picture or person

14

See Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Hedy R. Dexter, The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury,
13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311 (1989); Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod, & Hedy Red Dexter, Juror Sensitivity to
Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1990); Steven G. Fox & H. A. Walters, The
Impact of General Versus Specific Expert Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence Upon Mock Juror Judgment, 10
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 215 (1986).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

is the culprit of the crime. 15 Fillers also help to control for selection of the suspect by chance or
by guessing. An additional check that is served by fillers is to “assure that the lineup constitutes
a test of recognition memory rather than a test of recall.” 16 This asks the eyewitness to not only
be able to describe the culprit and details of the event (recall), but also to be able to identify him
or her by sight (recognition).
The recall/recognition test is one that investigators and researchers have grappled with
because studies have shown that the degree of similarity between the suspect and the fillers can
impact the identification procedure. A photo lineup that contains only one person (the suspect)
who resembles the description of the culprit may not be a true test of recognition. Conversely, a
lineup that contains fillers that look too similar to the suspect may make the task unduly difficult.
For these reasons, as explained below, research scientists have suggested that the initial
description of the culprit be used as a guide to select lineup fillers.
There are several approaches an investigator may take when selecting fillers for a lineup
(See Table 1 below). First, fillers may be chosen who do not match the eyewitness’ description
of the perpetrator (mismatch-description strategy), but “there is no serious debate about the
inadvisability of selecting distracters who fail to match the eyewitness’ pre-lineup description of
the culprit.” 17 Although this type of lineup may provide great returns when the police suspect is

15

Fillers as protection are also a main critique of the show-up procedure in which an eyewitness is shown only one
person or photograph and asked if that person or photograph is the person who committed the crime. See generally
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, SHOW-UPS IN TEXAS: A REVIEW OF SINGLE-SUSPECT EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICIES
(2009), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/tjp-show-ups-in-texas-final.pdf (reviewing
show-up practices in Texas compared to the recommendations made by the International Association of Chiefs of
Police); Nancy Steblay, Jennifer Dysart, Solomon Fulero & R. C. L. Lindsay, Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in Police
Showup and Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 523 (2003).
16
C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification and the Selection of Distracters for Lineups, 15
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 43, 45 (1991).
17
Gary L. Wells, Sheila M. Rydell & Eric P. Seelau, The Selection of Distractors for Eyewitness Lineups, 78 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 835, 835 (1993). See generally R. C. L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, What Price justice?
Exploring the Relationship of Lineup Fairness to Identification Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303, 308 (1980)
(study finding that in culprit-absent lineups where fillers did not resemble the innocent suspect, participant
eyewitnesses identified the innocent suspect as the perpetrator 70% of the time).

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Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions: Research Details

actually the culprit of the crime, it affords virtually no protection to suspects who are innocent.
There is consensus that the mismatch-descriptor strategy is ineffective for lineup filler
selection, but there has been debate over two additional strategies: the match- description
strategy and the match-suspect strategy, the goal being to “construct a lineup that reduces falseidentification rates without producing comparable losses in accurate-identification rates.” 18
Although the theory is that fillers should resemble the suspect in a lineup (match-suspect) so the
suspect does not unduly stand, some argue that the resemble-suspect strategy “promotes
Table 1: Filler-Selection Strategies

Filler-Selection Strategies
• Fillers are chosen who do not match the witness’ description of the
perpetrator

Mismatch-Description

• This strategy is not recommended by researchers
• Will likely cause the police suspect to unduly stand out from fillers
• Fillers are chosen who match the appearance of the police suspect

Resemble-Suspect

• May promote unnecessary similarities between the fillers and the
suspect
• May make the lineup task more difficult for an eyewitness
• Fillers are chosen who match the witness’ description of the perpetrator
originally given to police

Match-Description

• Must only match those elements described by the witness; other
undescribed traits may vary
• Promotes correct identifications while minimizing false identifications

unnecessary or gratuitous similarities between distracters and the suspect.” 19 These researchers
advocate the match-description strategy, arguing that as long as all fillers match the initial

18

Id. See generally Luus & Wells, supra note 16 (giving a detailed account of the theory behind the resemblesuspect and match-description strategies).
19
Wells et al., supra note 17, at 835; see also Luus & Wells, supra note 16 (suggesting that if the suspect does not
match the eyewitness’ description of the perpetrator, a combination of the resemble-suspect and match-description
tactics may be used. Also stating that fillers should be chosen who match the suspect on the features where there is
a discrepancy (e.g., eyewitness described curly hair, but the suspect has straight hair; fillers should have straight
hair), but they are free to vary on other features that were not described by the eyewitness.).

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description of the culprit given by the eyewitness, the police suspect should be sufficiently
hidden among the fillers to ensure that the procedure is a recognition test.
To test this theory, Wells, Rydell, and Seelau constructed a complex experiment in which
participants were asked to describe the perpetrator of a theft they viewed. They found that
eyewitnesses who saw a lineup created through the match-description strategy were better able to
determine when the culprit was in the lineup than those who viewed a resemble-suspect lineup.
The match-description group also made almost three times more correct identifications than the
resemble-suspect group, demonstrating the superiority of the match-description strategy.
Cautionary Instructions
When an eyewitness is given the task of reviewing a lineup, a reasonable expectation
may exist that the police would not make the effort to assemble a lineup and call upon the
witness unless they felt they had a viable suspect who they believe committed the crime. This
expectation can result in the witness feeling increased pressure to make a selection from the
lineup. 20 If the eyewitness assumes that the perpetrator is in the lineup, then he or she is likely to
simply select the subject who most closely resembles the perpetrator. 21
To guard against this potential problem, it has been recommended that lineup
administrators explicitly instruct the witness that the lineup may or may not contain the actual
perpetrator and to give additional guidance that it is just as important to free innocent people
from suspicion as it is to identify the guilty party. 22 Such cautionary instructions are defined by

20

Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 575, 575 (2005).
21
Gary L. Wells, Roy S. Malpass, R.C.L. Lindsay, Ronald P. Fisher, John W. Turtle & Solomon M. Fulero, From
the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 585
(2000).
22
Clark, supra note 20, at 575-76.

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researchers as being unbiased, given that they take a neutral position regarding the presence of
the perpetrator in the lineup. 23
The value of cautionary instructions has been established by a large number of studies
that have examined the effects of unbiased and biased lineup instruction. These studies
concluded that biased instructions produced an increase in the overall rate of identification, 24
defined as the proportion of witnesses who make any selection from the lineup, 25 and this biased
instruction effect holds true for both culprit-present and culprit-absent lineups. 26 This is
problematic because it reflects the construct of relative judgment, wherein an eyewitness chooses
the lineup member who most resembles the culprit, rather than the actual culprit. 27 Proper
cautionary instructions are one way to avoid identifications made through relative judgment.
Confidence, Accuracy, and Double-Blind Procedures
Although the Supreme Court set forth witness confidence as a factor to determine the
reliability of eyewitness identification,

28

research into the confidence-accuracy relationship has

raised questions about the value of this criterion because the relationship is inconsistent at best.
Part of the difficulty in assessing the confidence-accuracy relationship is that confidence is
malleable through both expectancy effects and post-identification feedback.
Expectancy effects exist when an administrator knows the identity of a suspect in an
eyewitness lineup and gives (often unintentional) verbal and nonverbal cues that enhance the
likelihood that the suspect will be chosen. Studies on this topic target one central concern:
whether an administrator’s expectation of the lineup outcome can affect the actual outcome.

23

Id. at 576.
Id. at 598.
25
Id. at 581.
26
Id. at 598.
27
Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 89, 92 (1984).
28
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200.
24

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This effect has been shown in medical trials and psychology experiments, causing scientists to
adopt double-blind (in which neither the administrator nor the participant know which condition
the participant is in) rather than single-blind (in which the administrator knows which condition
the participant is in, though the participant does not) procedures as the standard for testing
protocol. The same effects can be found in eyewitness identification procedures. 29
Several research studies have found that administrators who are not blind as to which
lineup member is the suspect can influence the selection made by the eyewitness. For example, a
test of non-blind participant-lineup administrators found that “in certain circumstances a
photoarray administrator’s knowledge of which lineup member is the suspect can increase the
likelihood that a witness will identify the suspect.” 30 Like other experiments, knowledge of the
preferred outcome of the identification procedure can inadvertently influence the outcome of the
procedure, cannot be guarded against (i.e., increased training cannot eliminate them), and
eyewitnesses have a hard time identifying them during a lineup procedure. 31
Apart from expectancy effects, lineup administrators who know the identity of a police
suspect in an eyewitness identification procedure may impact the confidence-accuracy
relationship through post-identification feedback. 32 This feedback occurs when police
communicate to an eyewitness that he or she has identified the suspect through either verbal
(“Good, you picked the suspect.”) or nonverbal (nodding, smiles, etc.) means, and studies have

29

See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth Luus, Police Lineups as Experiments: Social Methodology as a Framework for
Properly-Conducted Lineups, 16 PSYCHOL. BULL. 106 (1990).
30
Mark R. Phillips, Bradley D. McAuliff, Margaret Bull Kovera & Brian L. Cutler, Double-Blind Photoarray
Administration as a Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 948 (1999); see also Ryann
M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1110 (2004).
31
See Lynn Garrioch & C. A. Elizabeth Brimacombe (nee Luus), Lineup Administrators’ Expectations: Their
Impact on Eyewitness Confidence, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 299 (2001) (reviewing literature on inability to guard
against expectancy effects).
32
See Gary L. Wells, Amina Memon & Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 45 (2006) (reviewing the literature on confidence and accuracy).

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shown that post-identification feedback given to a witness can artificially inflate an eyewitness’
statement of confidence in that identification. 33
Due to the real and significant problems posed to eyewitness accuracy by expectancy
effects and post-identification feedback, researchers have tested ways to prevent these impacts
on the confidence-accuracy relationship. First, eyewitnesses may be asked for their confidence in
their identifications before any feedback is provided to them. This is valuable because “the
certainty of the witness at the time of the identification, uncontaminated by feedback, would then
be available at trial through discovery motions.” 34 Research has at least partially supported this
notion, but experts caution that “the effects of feedback are not entirely prevented by asking the
eyewitnesses about their confidence prior to their being exposed to feedback.” 35
Second, scholars suggest that law enforcement can ensure that the person who conducts
the lineup is unaware of which member is the police suspect. 36 As noted above, this is referred
to as “double-blind” identification procedures (also commonly referred to as “blind
administration” procedures in eyewitness literature) and follows the model established for
experiments by science. Virtually all experiments related to post-identification feedback
emphasize the need for blind lineup administrators in their findings. 37 Taken together,

33

Carolyn Semmler, Neil Brewer & Gary L. Wells, Effects of Postidentification Feedback on Eyewitness
Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 342 (2004); see also Amy L.
Bradfield, Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation
Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL., 112, 117 (2002); Wells &
Bradfield, supra note 12, at 369.
34
Bradfield et al., supra note 33, at 119.
35
Wells & Bradfield, supra note 12, at 372.
36
See generally Wells et al., supra note 21; Wells et al., supra note 32.
37
See Bradfield et al., supra note 33, at 118; Amy Bradfield Douglass, Caroline Smith & Rebecca Fraser-Thill, A
Problem with Double-Blind Photospread Procedures: Photospread Administrators Use One Eyewitness’s
Confidence to Influence the Identification of Another Eyewitness, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 543 (2005) (reviewing
literature that demonstrates confidence is malleable); Garrioch & Brimacombe, supra note 31, at 313; Phillips et al.,
supra note 30, at 948.

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researchers have found that these measures all but eliminate administrator influence from
identification procedures. 38
Sequential Presentation
One of the hazards of lineup identification procedures is that the eyewitness may choose
the member of the lineup who most resembles the perpetrator of the event they witnessed,
relative to the other members of the lineup, even if that person is not the actual culprit. One way
to mitigate this effect is through cautionary instructions, as reviewed above. Scholars argue that
this method will not eliminate relative judgment, however, because it seems unlikely that “an
actual witness [will] seriously believe that the police do not have a suspect in the lineup for
whom there is already some incriminating evidence in the case.” 39
To further address the problem of relative judgment, scholars began to test a sequential,
rather than simultaneous, method of lineup presentation. In the common simultaneous method,
eyewitnesses are shown six photos at once (one of the police suspect and five fillers) and indicate
to the administrator whether the culprit is in the lineup. By contrast, sequential presentation
occurs when an eyewitness is shown lineup members individually and asked after each photo to
determine if that photo is of the perpetrator. If the eyewitness indicates that it is, the lineup stops
there. If the eyewitness responds that it is not a picture of the culprit, the eyewitness is shown
the next photo and the process is repeated. Eyewitnesses in the experimental tests of sequential
lineups have not been allowed to see the photos again, and they are not told how many photos
they will view. 40 While this may not completely rid an eyewitness of the expectation that a
police suspect will be included in the lineup, keeping the witness blind as to the number of
photos they will view may help to minimize relative judgment.
38

Semmler et al., supra note 33, at 335.
Wells, supra note 27, at 94.
40
See generally Wells et al., supra note 32, at 63-64.
39

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Initial results using the sequential method seemed to find support for the superiority of
the method in its ability to improve or increase correct identifications while decreasing the
number of correct non-identifications when the culprit was not present in the lineup, 41 especially
when the lineup was conducted using double-blind procedures. 42 These early findings were
questioned, however, when a pilot study conducted with the Illinois State Police found that “the
sequential, double-blind procedures resulted in an overall higher rate of known false
identifications than did the simultaneous lineups.” 43
The Illinois pilot study subsequently received much criticism from researchers, largely in
the areas of methodology and biased circumstances. 44 First, the study was criticized because all
sequential lineups in the study were double-blind, whereas all simultaneous lineups were singleblind. Instead of testing four methodologies (double-blind/sequential; doubleblind/simultaneous; single-blind/sequential; single-blind/simultaneous), only two were tested.
This leaves the findings of the report ambiguous because one cannot determine whether the
known false identification rates were due to the double-blind procedure, the sequential
41

See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 281 (1988); R. C. L. Lindsay, James A. Lea & Jennifer A.
Fulford, Sequential Lineup Presentations: Technique Matters, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 741 (1991); R. C. L.
Lindsay, James A. Lea, Glenn J. Nosworthy. Jennifer A. Fulford, Julia Hector, Virginia LeVan & Carolyn Seabrook,
Biased Lineups: Sequential Presentation Reduces the Problem, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 796 (1991); R. C. L.
Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential
Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556 (1985).
42
Phillips, et al., supra note 30, at 948; see also Haw & Fisher, supra note 30.
43
SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM
ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLE-BLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES iv (2006). Also, a pilot program conducted in
Hennepin County, Minnesota, using double-blind sequential procedures notably reported results in line with
research expectations. See Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hillary Lindell Caligiuri, Improving
Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 381 (2006).
44
See Zack L. Winzeler, Whoa, Whoa, Whoa. . . One At A Time: Examining the Responses to the Illinois Study on
Double-Blind Sequential Lineup Procedures, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1595 (2008) (summarizing the responses to the
Illinois report); see also Roy S. Malpass, Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential Double-Blind
Identification Procedures, PUB. INT. L. REP., Summer 2006, at 5; State of Wisconsin Office of the Attorney General,
Response to Chicago Report on Eyewitness Identification Procedures (2006), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/dles/tns/
ILRptResponse.pdf; Nancy Steblay, Observations on the Illinois Lineup Data (2006), http://web.augsburg.edu/
~steblay/ObservationsOnTheIllinoisData.pdf; Gary L. Wells, Gary L. Wells’ Comments on the Mecklenburg
Report, http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/~glwells/Illinois_Project_Wells_comments.pdf.

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procedure, or the combination of the two. 45 Second, the Illinois study was criticized because
rather than being conducted by the Illinois State Police, it was conducted by the Chicago Police
Department who strongly opposed the double-blind sequential procedure, as survey results
documented in Mecklenburg’s report to the legislature revealed. 46 This left the study vulnerable
to critiques that the officers who conducted the study were biased against the procedure and
motivated to see that the study results did not favor sequential double-blind administration of
eyewitness identification procedures. 47
Subsequent studies on the double-blind sequential procedure have not provided a
definitive answer on the utility of sequential over simultaneous lineups, as results have shown
that although sequential lineups may reduce false identifications, they may also reduce correct
identifications. 48 Additionally, studies have indicated that the process of making an eyewitness
identification may be much more complex than can be compensated for through sequential
identification procedures. 49 In other words, although the methodology of lineup presentation
may be important, it may not be the most important of the many factors that can influence the
outcome of an identification procedure. Until these significant questions can be answered, there
45

See David L. Schachter, Robyn Dawes, Larry L. Jacoby, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Lempert, Henry L. Roediger
& Robert Rosenthal, Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3
(2008).
46
See Timothy P. O’Toole, What's the Matter With Illinois? How an Opportunity Was Squandered to Conduct an
Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Procedures, CHAMPION MAG., Aug. 2006, at 18.
47
See Winzeler, supra note 44.
48
See R. C. L. Lindsay, Jamal K. Mansour, Jennifer L. Beaudry, Amy-May Leach & Michelle I. Bertrand,
Sequential Lineup Presentation: Patterns and Policy, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 13 (2009); Roy S.
Malpass, A Policy Evaluation of Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 394 (2006);
Roy S. Malpass, Colin G. Tredoux & Dawn McQuiston-Surret, Public Policy and Sequential Lineups, 14 LEGAL
AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Public Policy and Sequential Lineups]; Roy S. Malpass,
Colin G. Tredoux & Dawn McQuiston-Surret, Response to Lindsay, Mansour, Beaudry, Leach and Bertrand’s
Sequential Lineup Presentation: Patterns and Policy, 14 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 25 (2009).
49
See Wendy Kneller, Amina Memon & Sarah Stevenage, Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups: Decision
Processes of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 659 (2001); R. C. L.
Lindsay, James B. Pezzule, Wendy Craig, Kang Lee & Samantha Corber, Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential
Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 391
(1997); Lindsay et al., supra note 48; Public Policy and Sequential lineups, supra note 48; Christian A. Meissner,
Colin G. Tredoux, Janat F. Parker & Otto H. MacLin, Eyewitness Decisions in Simultaneous and Sequential
Lineups: A Dual-Process Signal Detection Theory Analysis, 33 MEMORY & COGNITION 783 (2005).

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will likely continue to be dissention in the field over the use of sequential versus simultaneous
identification procedures.
Organizations’ Recommended Practices
The studies summarized above have led researchers to develop a set of recommendations
for the conduct of eyewitness identification lineups. Although there is some disagreement on the
utility of sequential presentation, in general scientists agree that lineups should contain only one
suspect, that the suspect should not unduly stand out from the fillers, appropriate cautionary
instructions are needed, the administrator of the lineup should not know who is the police suspect
(double-blind procedures), and the administrator should collect a confidence statement from the
eyewitness at the time of the identification before any feedback is given. 50 As reviewed below,
many of these recommendations have been adopted by a variety of criminal justice
organizations. The recommendations made specifically by the Department of Justice, the
American Bar Association, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police are summarized
in Table 2 below.
Department of Justice
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated a study51 in 1998 with the purpose of
recommending best practices and procedures for the criminal justice community to employ in
investigations involving eyewitnesses. The National Institute of Justice established the
Technical Working Group for Eyewitness Evidence to identify, define, and assemble a set of
investigative tasks that should be performed in every investigation involving eyewitness

50

See Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 615 (2006); Gary L. Wells,
Mark Small, Steven Penrod, Roy S. Malpass, Solomon M. Fulero & C. A. E. Brimacombe, Eyewitness Identification
Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1998).
51
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP FOR EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ nij/178240.pdf.

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Table 2: Summary Recommended Practices

Filler Selection

Cautionary
Instructions

Lineup
Administration

Documentation

Other

DOJ 52

ABA 53

IACP 54

• One suspect per lineup
• Fillers should match
witness’ description of
perpetrator
• Minimum of 5 fillers (4
for live lineups)

• Fillers should match
witness’ description of
perpetrator
• Sufficient number of
fillers needed

• “Just as important to
clear innocent persons”
• “Person who committed
the crime may or may
not be present”
• “Regardless of whether
an identification is
made, police will
continue to investigate”

• “Perpetrator may or
may not be in the
lineup”
• “Do not assume that the
person administering
lineup knows identity of
suspect”
• “Need not identify
anyone”

• Instructions for both
simultaneous and
sequential procedures
• Blind administration not
addressed
• Ask witness to state, in
her own words, how
certain she is of any
identification
• Preserve photos and
presentation order
• Video or audio
recommended for live
lineups
• Record identification
and nonidentification
results in writing
• Recommendations for
initial reports by first
responders, mug books
and composites,
procedures for
interviewing witness,
show-ups

• Blind administration
whenever practicable

• One suspect per lineup
• Individuals of similar
physical characteristics
• Minimum of 5 fillers (4
for live lineups)
• Photographs themselves
should be similar
• “Just as important to
clear innocent persons”
• “Person who committed
the crime may or may
not be present”
• “You do not have to
identify anyone”
• “Regardless of whether
an identification is
made, we will continue
to investigate”
• Blind administration
whenever possible
• Note that sequential
procedures have been
recommended by some
• Video or audio tape live
lineup whenever
possible
• Preserve photo array for
future reference

• Ask witness to state, in
her own words, how
certain she is of any
identification
• Video record
recommended of lineup
procedure
• Photos should be taken
of lineup

• Training for police and
prosecutors on how to
implement
recommendations,
conduct non-suggestive
lineups

• Recommendations for
multiple witnesses,
blank lineups, right to
counsel at eyewitness
identifications

52

Id.
ABA Criminal Justice Section, Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation of Best Practices for
Promoting the Accuracy of Eyewitness identification Procedures (2004), available at
http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/CR209700/relatedresources/ABAEyewitnessID
recommendations.pdf.
54
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY NO. 600, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2006).
53

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evidence to best ensure the accuracy and reliability of this evidence. 55 While the report
addresses a number of eyewitness issues, including answering 9-1-1 calls and conducting
eyewitness interviews, the Panel focused the review on portions of the report pertaining to photo
and live lineups.
Composition The DOJ’s guiding policy for the composition of photo and live lineups is
that the lineup should be composed in such a way that the suspect does not unduly stand out. 56
For photo lineups, this means selecting fillers who generally fit the witness’ description of the
perpetrator and creating a consistent appearance between the suspect and fillers with respect to
any unique or unusual features. The DOJ also recommends including only one suspect in each
photo lineup, using a minimum of five fillers per lineup, never reusing fillers in multiple lineups
shown to the same witness, and preserving the presentation order and actual photos used in a
photo lineup. 57 For live lineups, the report endorses the same composition standards as photo
lineups, with the difference of recommending a minimum of four fillers instead of five. 58
Instructions

The DOJ recommends that prior to presenting a lineup of any kind, the

investigator should instruct the witness to ensure that he or she understands that the purpose of
the lineup is to exculpate the innocent as well as to identify the actual perpetrator. 59 Specifically,
the administrator should instruct the witness that the person who committed the crime may or
may not be in the lineup. The witness should also be told that regardless of whether an
identification is made or not, the police will continue to investigate the incident. 60

55

Id. at 3.
Id. at 29.
57
Id. at 29-30.
58
Id. at 30.
59
Id. at 31.
60
Id. at 32.
56

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Administering the Lineup

The DOJ notes that the lineup should be conducted in a

manner that promotes the reliability, fairness, and objectivity of the witness’ identification. 61 To
do so, the administrator must conduct the lineup in a manner conducive to obtaining accurate
identification or nonidentification decisions. The report recommends doing so by giving the
cautionary instructions mentioned above, avoiding any statements that may influence the
witness’ selection, recording a confidence statement of the witness immediately after a selection
is made, and avoiding reporting to the witness any information regarding the individual he or she
has selected prior to obtaining the witness’ confidence statement. 62
Specifically for photo lineups, the report recommends that the administrator document in
writing the photo lineup procedures, including: identification information and sources of all
photos used; names of all persons present at the photo lineup; date and time of the lineup. 63 In
the case of live lineups, the DOJ endorses measures that include: instructing all those present at
the lineup not to make any statements that may influence the witness; ensuring that any
identification actions (e.g., speaking, moving) are performed by all lineup subjects; documenting
the lineup in writing, including identification information of lineup participants, names of all
persons present at the lineup, and the date and time the lineup was conducted. It is also
recommended that the lineup be recorded by photo or video. 64
Recording Results

The DOJ recommends policies that ensure the record of the

outcome of the lineup completely and accurately reflects the identification results obtained from
the witness. 65 The report endorses the recording of both identification and nonidentification
results in writing, including the witness’ own words regarding confidence. These results should
61

Id. at 33.
Id.
63
Id. at 34.
64
Id. at 35-36.
65
Id. at 38.
62

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further be signed and dated by the witness. Finally, the report notes that no materials indicating
previous identification results should be visible to the witness, and the witness should not be
permitted to write or mark on any materials that will be used in other identification procedures. 66
American Bar Association
In 2004, the American Bar Association (ABA) released a report containing a statement of
the organization’s best practices aimed at increasing the accuracy of eyewitness identification
procedures nationwide. 67 These practices address many causes of eyewitness error, including
administration bias, lineup size, foil selection, collection of confidence judgments, and lineup
method. 68 These issues and recommended practices are reviewed below.
Administration Bias The ABA recommends using double-blind procedures, where the
person who conducts a lineup or photospread and all others present during the procedure should
be unaware of which lineup member is the suspect. 69 ABA recommendations also state that
eyewitnesses should be instructed that the perpetrator may or may not be in the lineup, that they
should not therefore feel that they must make an identification, and that they should not assume
that the person administering the lineup knows the identity of the suspect. 70
Lineup Size Although the ABA does not recommend a specific number of fillers to
include in a lineup, they urge the use of larger lineups whenever practicable, in order to
reasonably reduce the risk of an eyewitness selecting a suspect by guessing rather than by
recognition. 71

66

Id.
ABA, supra note 55.
68
Id. at 10-14.
69
Id. at 3.
70
Id. at 13.
71
Id. at 3.
67

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Filler Selection The best practices endorsed by the ABA state that fillers should be
chosen for their similarity to the witness’ description of the perpetrator, rather than the foils’
similarity to the appearance of the suspect. 72 As reviewed in the studies above, the organization
also recommends that the foils be presented in a manner to avoid the suspect’s unduly standing
out, through either suspect appearance or suspect presentation. 73 For example, photographic
lineups should not include five mug shots and one snapshot of the suspect, a mix of black-andwhite and color photos, etc. Such considerations are vitally important to prevent wrongful
conviction, as evidenced by the case of Timothy Cole. We have learned since his wrongful
conviction was revealed that in at least one of the lineups presented to a witness, Cole’s was the
only Polaroid in a six-pack that included five other mug shots.
Collecting Confidence Judgments The ABA endorses the practice of collecting a “‘clear
statement… from the eyewitness at the time of the identification and before any feedback as to
whether he or she identified the accurate culprit.’” 74 The eyewitness should also never be told
whether he selected the suspect so that confidence is not artificially inflated. 75
Lineup Method The ABA has stated that the breadth of scientific evidence is insufficient
to endorse one method over the other at this time. 76 The ABA thus recommends a conservative
approach to utilizing sequential lineups, similar to that adopted by some states, 77 where select
police departments utilize sequential lineups and research their effectiveness and practicability.

72

Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
74
Id. (quoting Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: How Well Are Witnesses and Police Performing?,
18 CRIM. JUST. MAG., Spring 2003, at 37).
75
Id. at 14.
76
Id. at 12.
77
Id. at 20. See generally supra pp. 16-18 and accompanying notes (detailing Illinois’ conservative approach to
implementing sequential lineup procedure).
73

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International Association of Chiefs of Police
The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) is the world's oldest and largest
nonprofit membership organization of police executives, and the organization routinely publishes
“training keys,” documents on the most current practices of policing and related science that can
be used by members in departmental training. One such document details the IACP’s
recommendations for the administration of eyewitness identification practices. 78 Many of the
policies endorsed by the IACP align with the practices cited by various academic, legal and other
stakeholder groups. These policies include: preference for live or photo lineups over show-ups;
double-blind lineup administration; pre-lineup cautionary instructions stating that the perpetrator
may or may not be present and that no selection is required; barring multiple witnesses from
communicating until all have completed the identification process; sequential rather than
simultaneous lineup administration; selecting lineup fillers who do not so closely resemble the
suspect that correct identification is difficult; a lineup size of no less than five or six subjects; the
suspect not appearing in multiple subsequent photo or live lineups; documenting the witness’
confidence immediately after a selection is made; video or audio recording of the lineup
whenever possible; no congratulation or suggestive statements to the witness after an
identification is made; photographs used in photo lineups should be similar in size, color and
format; and preservation of the photo lineup used. 79
What distinguishes the IACP is first, the amount of detail that is included in each of the
recommendations because, as a practical guide and training document for law enforcement, this
maximizes its utility. Second, the IACP makes recommendations on additional facets of

78
79

INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 56.
Id. at 2-4.

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eyewitness identification procedures that come from its unique law enforcement perspective.
These recommendations are discussed below.
The IACP endorses in-person lineups as the generally preferable eyewitness
identification procedure and recommends measures in addition to the commonly cited practices
listed above. 80 Besides the normal statements included in pre-lineup cautionary instructions, the
IACP recommends informing the witness that the individuals present in the lineup may not
appear as they did on the date of the incident due to changes in features, such as head and facial
hair or scars. Furthermore, it is advised that the witness be told that whether an identification is
made, the police will continue with the investigation. 81 It is also stated that some authorities
caution against using plainclothes police officers as fillers in lineups because they do not
naturally look or act like suspects, or may have been seen by the witness in the community or in
other contexts. 82
The group makes a specific recommendation regarding the double-blind administration of
lineups, stating that if possible, officers who are not assigned to the case at issue should
administer the procedure. Doing so helps to minimize the possibility that the officers who are
conducting the investigation will influence (inadvertently or otherwise) the witness as to which
subject to pick, or put pressure on the witness to make a selection at all. 83
In preparation of the lineup, the IACP states that the witness should not be allowed to see
photos of the suspect, nor see the suspect in person, such as in an office or holding cell. 84 If
more than one witness is to view a lineup, it is noted that they should be kept separate prior to
the lineup and should not be permitted to discuss the case or compare descriptions of the
80

Id.
Id. at 3.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
81

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perpetrator. 85 Similarly, the group condemns the practice of having a group of witnesses view a
lineup simultaneously, instead advising that the lineup should be presented to one witness at a
time. In extenuating circumstances where more than one witness must be present
simultaneously, the witnesses should be required to make their identifications silently, in writing,
and should not be permitted to discuss the identification aloud with each other or with the
officers present. 86 It is also recommended that two or more lineups be conducted when possible,
where one lineup includes the suspect and the others do not (“blank lineups”). 87
The IACP makes numerous recommendations to the administration of photo lineups,
many of which mirror those made regarding live lineups. Specifically regarding photo lineups, it
is stated that there should be at least six photographs; that mug shots and snapshots should not be
mixed; that if mug shots are used, any identifying information regarding the subject of the
photograph should be concealed; and the lineup should never include more than one photo of the
same suspect. 88 Recommendations similar to those offered the DOJ, ABA, and IACP have also
been offered by advocacy groups such as the Innocence Project 89 and The Justice Project. 90
Eyewitness Recommendations from Texas Organizations
Governor’s Criminal Justice Advisory Council On March 14, 2005, Governor Rick Perry
announced the creation of the Governor’s Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) to advise
him on the “adequacy of criminal procedures from the initial stage of investigation into a crime

85

Id.
Id. at 3-4.
87
See Wells, supra note 27.
88
INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 56, at 4.
89
The Innocence Project, Eyewitness Identification Reform, (Oct. 2009) (on file with the Texas Task Force on
Indigent Defense).
90
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: A POLICY REVIEW, available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack_eyewitnessid-fin21.pdf.
86

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to appellate and post-conviction proceedings.” 91 Made up of elected officials, judges, attorneys,
and other stakeholders, CJAC recommended in its January 2006 report that “the state
immediately undertake a pilot project […] to test simultaneous and sequential identification
procedures under the direction of an expert.” 92 Although a study did not occur following the
recommendation, a study is currently underway in the Austin Police Department that is lead by
one of the top eyewitness identification research in the nation.
Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit The Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit (TCJIU)
is an ad hoc committee created by Judge Barbara Hervey of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals. The committee was established in June 2008 to review the strengths and weaknesses of
the Texas criminal justice system and bring about meaningful reform through education, training,
and legislative recommendations.
Eyewitness identification error is an ongoing area of consideration for TCJIU, and
several subject matter experts were invited to address the Unit in 2008 on how Texas can best
prevent wrongful conviction due to eyewitness error. Following presentations by Barry Scheck,
Director of the Innocence Project; John Terzano, President of The Justice Project; the Richardson
Police Department; and Dr. Gary Wells, Director of Social Sciences of the Institute of Forensic
Science and Public Policy located at Iowa State University, TCJIU’s 2008 Annual Report of
Activities concluded that “instituting reforms in the eyewitness identification procedures used by
law enforcement agencies throughout Texas should have the highest priority of any efforts in the
area of wrongful convictions.” 93

91

Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas, Address to the Texas Daily Newspaper Association (March 14, 2005),
available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/speech/9963/.
92
GOVERNOR’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY 22-23
(2006).
93
TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 7 (2008), available at
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/tcjiu/reports/TCJIU-2008-report.pdf.

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This concern was echoed in TCJIU’s 2009 report, in which the committee encouraged
law enforcement entities in Texas to follow the lead of Richardson, Dallas, and other
jurisdictions that have voluntarily reformed their eyewitness identification procedures. 94 Both
Richardson and Dallas Police Departments have adopted the double-blind approach to lineup
administration, along with other improvements to cautionary instructions, filler selection, and
procedure documentation in their standard operating procedures. In 2009, TCJIU was able to
report that the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards and Education had
adopted an eyewitness identification procedure course into its Basic Peace Officer Course
curriculum. 95 This achievement was the result of work initiated in 2008 to improve the training
of all officers in the area of eyewitness identification procedures. The report also stated that the
TCJIU is in the process of collaborating with other members of the criminal justice system to
develop legislation that will address the issue of eyewitness identification procedure reform
statewide. 96
Texas and State Practices
Practices Nationwide
Although the practices recommended by the Department of Justice and others have been
available to law enforcement for over a decade, only a handful of states have adopted eyewitness
reform. In Maryland, law enforcement agencies must adopt written policies that comply with the
DOJ standards. 97 North Carolina passed a law in 2007 that requires double-blind administration,
sequential presentation of lineup members, and appropriate cautionary instructions; guides filler
selection and lineup construction; makes provisions for multiple witnesses; asks for a
94

TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 7 (2009), available at
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/tcjiu/reports/TCJIU-2009-report.pdf.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
MD. CODE ANN., [Public Safety] § 3-506 (LexisNexis 2010).

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contemporary confidence statement from the witness; and requires documentation of the
procedure, including video for live lineups. 98 Wisconsin law requires law enforcement agencies
to adopt written eyewitness policies and procedures that can prevent wrongful convictions, and
the Attorney General makes model policies on blind administration, sequential presentation,
cautionary instructions, filler selection, and confidence statements available. 99 The Attorney
General also provides training to support implementation of these policies. Although not
codified in statute, the Attorney General of New Jersey made the state the first in the nation to
adopt DOJ recommendations. 100 Ohio mostly recently adopted reform that requires blind
administration and documentation of the procedure. 101
In statutes and best practices adopted by North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Ohio, provisions
were made to allow for blind administration through the use of alternative methods. These
methods may include administration on a computer or laptop, or blind administration may be
achieve through the “folder method.” Although described briefly in the North Carolina Statute,
the folder method received fuller treatment in both the Wisconsin and Ohio statues. Law
enforcement officers who use this procedure place a filler photo into a folder and mark that
folder number one. Four additional filler photos and one suspect folder are placed in separate
folders, shuffled so the officer does not know which folder contains the photo of the suspect, and
numbered two through six. Two or more empty folders are added at the end and numbered
consecutively from seven onward. In this way, an officer who is involved in the investigation of
a crime may administer an identification procedure to an eyewitness and still reap the benefits of
98

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A‑284.52 (2010).
WIS. STAT. § 175.50 (2008).
100
Memorandum from John J. Farmer Jr., Attorney General of the State of N.J., to all county prosecutors, Col.
Carson J. Dunbar, Jr., Superintendent, NJSP, all police chiefs, all law enforcement chief executives, Re: Attorney
General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr. 18, 2001),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf.
101
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2010).
99

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blind administration. The folder method may prove especially useful rural jurisdictions with few
or no officers available to administer a lineup who are unaware of the police suspect.
Texas Practices
Insight into Texas policies and procedures was revealed by a 2008 study conducted by
The Justice Project. 102 In a survey of 1,038 law enforcement agencies, it was found that out of
750 responsive departments, only 88 (12%) had any written policies to guide investigators as
they prepare and administer eyewitness identification procedures. Even fewer of those
procedures comported with recommended practices in the areas of cautionary instructions,
composition fairness, blind administration, and comprehensive documentation. For example,
only seven departments were found to use blind administration and only four require
documentation of an identification procedure. The Justice Project concluded that the “lack of
standardized protocol indicates that Texas is failing to reap the benefits of systematic scientific
research on eyewitness error. . . .” 103
Since this research was conducted, a few large departments have revised their eyewitness
identification procedures. For example, Dallas Police Department announced in January of 2009
that the department would adopt sequential double-blind procedures, 104 and Austin Police
Department is currently participating in a study to evaluate simultaneous and sequential lineups
that are administered by laptop. 105 There are still hundreds of departments, however, that may
use unnecessarily suggestive procedures. The recommends proposed by the Panel will help to

102

See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2.
Id at 3.
104
Jennifer Emily, Dallas Police Drop Study, Plan Photo-Lineup Changes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 2009,
at 1B, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/
011609dnmetsequentialblind.4311ff6.html.
105
Press Release, Iowa State Univ., ISU psychologist Wells is conducting two new studies on eyewitness
misidentifications, (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.news.iastate.edu/news/2009/nov/eyewitness; see also
MyFox Austin, Crimewatch: APD Photo Lineups (2010), http://www.myfoxaustin.com/dpp/news/
crimewatch/Crimewatch-APD-Photo-Lineups-20100712-ktbcw/.
103

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ensure that the best evidence possible is collected during criminal investigations and presented to
judges and juries at trial.

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Although the Panel agrees that the reforms listed above are necessary for the State of
Texas, additional policy reforms and approaches have been suggested and may be
considered by the Legislature, as outlined below in the concurring report.
Concurring Report to TCAP Eyewitness Identification Report
(Supplemental materials found in Appendix B)
By Prof. Sandra Guerra Thompson
University of Houston Law Center
1.

TCAP should make recommendations for the adoption of statutory rules to govern
the use of single-suspect showups.
a.

The failure to address single-suspect showups is a major and unnecessary
omission in the TCAP report. A large percentage of identifications are obtained
by means of single-person “showups.” In Dallas, three of the first 19 DNA
exonerations were due to erroneous identifications at showups. Twenty percent of
the DNA exonerations nationwide are due to the use of this highly suggestive
procedure. (see attachment)

b.

The Department of Justice Report, Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement (1999), requires administrators to (1) document a witness’s
description of the suspect prior to a show-up and (2) separate witnesses during a
showup. It recommends that if witness make a positive identifications,
investigators should consider using other types of identification procedures for all
subsequent confirmatory identifications, rather than this highly suggestive
method. As with lineups and photo arrays, the DOJ report also requires
investigators to give cautionary instructions to the witness that the person in the
showup may or may not be the perpetrator, and it urges investigators to obtain a
statement of the witness’s certainty following a positive identification and
maintain written documentation of that statement. Specifically, the DOJ report
requires written documentation of the time, place, and result of the showup. The
Innocence Project further recommends that the showups occur in a neutral, nonlaw enforcement location, without handcuffs (when practicable), and with the
suspect removed from the squad car. It also recommends that showups be
videotaped whenever practicable.

c.

Other states have adopted measures to limit and regulate the use of showups. The
Wisconsin, New York, and Massachusetts high courts, for example, refuse to
admit identification testimony if it is based on a showup, unless the showup was
conducted in the immediate aftermath of the crime or other exigent circumstances
necessitated it. Maryland requires its law enforcement agencies to adopt written
policies on identification procedures that comply with the Department of Justice
recommendations.

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2.

d.

The Dallas Police have good written guidelines for showups (see attached): only
to be used when necessary and appropriate, not when probable cause to arrest
exists, within a short window of time (30 minutes – 2hours), if suspect
apprehended near the crime, if public safety concerns exist. Also requires police
to instruct witness that the person may or may not be the perpetrator and that the
investigation will continue regardless of whether an ID is obtained, if one witness
makes an ID subsequent witnesses will be shown lineups, separate witnesses (one
witness per showup, other witness cannot be present), avoid suggestive statements
(use of the word “suspect”), document detailed description from witness
beforehand, do not use showup if suspect does not match witness’s description,
and documentation (completion of showup documentation form).

e.

Guidelines recommended by the IACP (International Association of Chiefs of
Police) in their Traning Key #600 are similar (see attached): no showup if
probable cause to arrest, obtain complete description from witness before a
showup, suspect should not be in a cell, handcuffed or in jail attire, separate
witnesses and do not allow them to talk about the ID before or after, same suspect
should not be shown to a witness more than once, suspect should not be required
to wear perpetrators clothing or speak similar words, police should avoid
suggestive statements about the suspect, witnesses should be warned the person
they view may or may not be the perpetrator, and confidence statement should be
obtained. However, these guidelines do not address any time limitations (2 hours
after the crime, etc), when showups are appropriate, or that if one witness makes
an ID subsequent witnesses should be shown a lineup instead.

TCAP should recommend that all witnesses who make an identification be asked for
a statement of certainty.
There is robust scientific research demonstrating the confidence is malleable, and can be
easily inflated by feedback received post-identification. Moreover, studies have found
that jurors place great weight on the confidence of eyewitnesses at trial, irrespective of
their accuracy. As long as witnesses are permitted to state their confidence in their
identifications at trial, it is critical that their level of confidence be documented, in the
witness’s own words, at the time of the out-of-court identification. While TCAP’s
recommendation that the police document anything the witness says is a good one, it
should recommend, specifically, that the witness’s confidence be documented, since there
may be witnesses who make identifications but do not, on their own, express their degree
of certainty.

3.

Regarding warnings to witnesses, while TCAP recommends the most critical
warning (the perpetrator may or may not be present), it should be noted that other
instructions could and should be given as well.

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A better and more comprehensive set of instructions can be found in legislation passed in
North Carolina in 2008 1:

4.

a.

The perpetrator might or might not be presented in the lineup,

b.

The lineup administrator does not know the suspect's identity,

c.

The eyewitness should not feel compelled to make an identification,

d.

It is as important to exclude innocent persons as it is to identify the perpetrator,

e.

The investigation will continue whether or not an identification is made.

TCAP should recommend blind and sequential lineups and photo arrays.
a.

Research experiments have shown time and again how some practices are
suggestive or conducive to erroneous identifications. Some law enforcement
officials have taken the position that laboratory studies are not relevant to real
police work, but the constant flow of DNA exonerations proves that the findings
of those laboratory studies were right all along. Those studies have
overwhelmingly demonstrated the problem of “relative judgment” that causes
erroneous identifications and that sequential identification procedures can
minimize this effect.

b.

Researchers distinguish between identifications based on “relative judgment”
(comparable to the use of a process of elimination) and “recognition memory.”
The following is a discussion about relative judgment by Gary Wells, one of the
top psychologists who has conducted decades of research on eyewitness
identifications:
“[P]eople have a tendency to select the person who looks most like the offender
relative to the other members of the lineup. At first glance, this relative-judgment
process would seem to be nonproblematic. In fact, however, the relative-judgment
process is extremely problematic. The problem is made apparent by considering
the fact that there is always someone who looks more like the offender than the
remaining members of the lineup, even when the lineup does not include the
offender. In these cases, eyewitnesses have a tendency to select that innocent
person and confuse this relative-judgment process with recognition memory.
The relative-judgment problem is well illustrated in an experiment in which a
crime was staged 200 times for 200 separate witnesses. All of the witnesses were
then shown one of two lineups. Every witness was warned that the offender might
or might not be in the lineup. Half of the witnesses viewed a six-person lineup in
which the offender was present. Of these 100 witnesses, 21% made no selection at
all, 54% picked the offender, 13% picked particular filler, and the remaining
witnesses spread their choices across the other lineup members. The other half of

1

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(b)(3) (2009).

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the witnesses viewed a lineup in which the offender was removed and was not
replaced. The critical question in this scenario is what happened to the 54% of
witnesses who would have chosen the offender had he been present; did they shift
to the no-choice category, thereby causing 75% to make no choice? No. Of these
100 witnesses, the no-choice rate increased to only 32% whereas the person who
was previously picked only 13% of the time was now picked 38% of the time. In
other words, even though all of the witnesses were warned that the offender might
not be in the lineup, removing the offender from the lineup led witnesses to shift
to the "next best choice," nearly tripling the jeopardy of that person. Controlled
eyewitness experiments consistently show that the most difficult problem for
eyewitnesses is recognizing the absence of the offender because, even when the
offender is not in the lineup, there is still someone who looks most like the
offender relative to other members of the lineup.
The majority of DNA exoneration cases represent instances in which the actual
offender was not in the lineup. This is precisely what eyewitness researchers had
predicted based on data from controlled experiments. Unfortunately, there are
hundreds of circumstances under which police might unknowingly place an
innocent suspect in a lineup. Sometimes police place an innocent suspect in a
lineup because they received an anonymous but erroneous tip that the person was
the offender; sometimes an innocent suspect is placed in a lineup merely because
the person fits the general physical description and was in the vicinity of the
crime; sometimes an innocent person came into possession of something linked to
the crime; and sometimes one or more detectives places a suspect in a lineup
based on a "hunch." Whatever the cause, it can never be presumed that the suspect
is the offender; if police knew that, they would not need the lineup at all.”
(Wisconsin Law Review, 2006)
c.

A large body of peer-reviewed research conducted over the last 20 years
demonstrates that sequential presentation, when coupled with a “blind”
administrator, greatly minimizes the likelihood of incorrect identifications.

d.

The Illinois State Police study that created controversy over sequential lineups
was worthless and should not impede important reform. This report has caused
some law enforcement agencies to oppose sequential procedures, but others have
rejected it.

e.

A distinguished panel of seven scientists outside the field of eyewitness
identification studied the Illinois experiment and found that it had a fundamental
confound in its comparison of double-blind sequential lineups with non-blind
simultaneous lineups, a flaw that has “devastating consequences for assessing the
real-world implications…[and] guaranteed that most outcomes would be difficult
or impossible to interpret.” In short, the study could not answer the research
question as to whether sequential lineup procedures are superior to simultaneous,
nor whether double-blind procedures are superior to non-blind. (2008)

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Moreover, a recent journal article summarized the data from the Evanston police
department, procured through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit filed by the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the MacArthur Justice
Center of the Bluhm Legal Clinic at Northwestern University School of Law,
raises even more serious concerns about the validity of the Illinois study (Chicago
and Joliet have not yet turned over their data), specifically about the lack of
random assignment. 2 Random assignment is a fundamental requirement of sound
scientific study. Underlying data Dr. Steblay’s comparison of the data from the
non-blind simultaneous lineups to data from the double-blind sequential lineups
reveals not only that the study’s cases were not randomly assigned to the two
conditions, but that the cases more likely to result in suspect identifications were
assigned to the non-blind simultaneous condition.

5.

f.

TCAP is not the correct forum to make political compromises on account of law
enforcement resistance to changes due to the confusion created by the Illinois
study. The proper role of this panel is to advise the legislature on the best
practices for reducing wrongful convictions.

g.

Other states have adopted sequential identification procedures, even after the
Illinois study was reported. The Attorney General of Wisconsin rejected the
conclusions on sequential procedures of the Illinois study and continued to require
blind and sequential procedures. (2006) New Jersey’s Attorney General had
adopted blind and sequential lineups and photo arrays in 2001 and made no
change in light of the Illinois study. The North Carolina legislature adopted
sequential, double-blind for lineups. (2007). Ohio reformed its procedures to
adopt a sequential “folder” method (2010).

TCAP should propose more active judicial oversight of eyewitness identification
evidence.
Texas law should address the inherent weaknesses in eyewitness testimony with
mandates to trial courts regarding reliability hearings, jury instructions, and expert
testimony. This approach is reflected in the framework proposed by the Innocence
Project and adopted by the Special Master in State v. Henderson. See. State v.
Henderson, A-9 Sept. Term 2008, 2009 N.J. LEXIS 45 (N.J. Feb. 26, 2009). Specifically,
reliability hearings should be conducted in every case to examine all relevant factors both
event and procedure-related, affecting identification accuracy, including suggestion by
non-state actors. In addition, remedial interventions such as jury instructions on the
numerous variables shown by robust scientific studies (and, in particular, meta-analyses)
to affect the reliability of identifications, admission of expert witnesses, requiring
corroborating evidence, or exclusion to address the inherent weakness of some
identifications. The lack of reliability of identifications may be the result of
contamination of the witness’s memory by other witnesses, family and friends, the media,

2

Nancy K. Steblay, What We Know Now: The Evanston Illinois Field Lineups, Law & Hum. Behav. (forthcoming
2010).

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or simply on account of factors inherent in the witness (including race 3, stress, age,
influence of alcohol) or factors inherent in the crime (including whether a weapon was
present, the distance between the witness and the perpetrator, lighting conditions, etc.).
The important thing to note here is that some identification testimony is too unreliable to
admit or may require some remedial intervention, even though the police may fully
comply with “best practice” procedures.
The TCAP proposals focus only on “system variables,” not “estimator variables.”
System variables are those factors that the legal system can control, for example, by
means of improved police procedures. Estimator variables are those qualities inherent in
the eyewitness such as the witness’s age or race, the ability to observe the suspect,
lighting conditions, etc.
In June of 2010, a Special Master appointed by New Jersey’s top court called for a major
overhaul of the legal standards for the acceptance of eyewitness testimony in court, citing
33 years of robust scientific research on memory and interview techniques. The Special
Master’s opinion was made public in a 64-page report following an unprecedented
hearing on eyewitness identification science and law that began in September 2009.
The New Jersey court recommended that prosecutors – not defendants – should bear the
burden of proof regarding the reliability of eyewitness testimony, and that juries as well
as judges should be fully informed as to the factors proven by science to impact
eyewitness identification reliability.
The court also found that not just law enforcement but “outside actors” (e.g., other
witnesses or family members) can contaminate a witness’ memory, and courts should
take this into account when reviewing the reliability of testimony.
In 2007 and 2009 respectively, the Tennessee and Utah Supreme Courts required that
expert testimony be admitted when the requirements of Rule of Evidence 702 are met,
removing the traditional discretion of trial courts to exclude the testimony.
6.

TCAP should not propose that the Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management
Institute develop a model policy and that law enforcement agencies be required to
adopt procedures that comply with the model policy.
If TCAP chooses to propose that the legislature delegate rulemaking authority to the Bill
Blackwood Institute, a number of procedural steps must be taken to properly implement
the regulatory authority of the Institute. Otherwise, the Institute would only be making
recommendations that would not be legally enforceable under the exclusionary rule of
Article 38.23.
a.

The purported advantages of delegation are said to be:

3

A major concern is the fact of reduced accuracy due to the witness being of a different race than the suspect. This
factor is so thoroughly established in the research as to be beyond dispute. New Jersey Supreme Court has
mandated jury instructions on cross-race identification when identification plays a key role and there is no
corroborating evidence (1999).

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b.

i.

that it enables a timely response to updated research; greater flexibility
than legislative rulemaking process;

ii.

the Institute has experts available to draft procedures; and

iii.

these same experts would provide police training.

Countervailing Considerations:
i.

Best practices and scientific research have already become wellestablished. Major changes to best practices are highly unlikely. Only
minor changes may be required, and the legislature can make these.

ii.

If all departments are required to follow the procedures, it does not make
sense to change the rules regularly. Changes would require re-training.
There should be stability, and only important changes should be made.
Legislative rulemaking process can address the few, important changes as
needed.

iii.

The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Institute is not a regulatory agency.
The Institute describes itself as a law enforcement training program:
The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas
(LEMIT) was created by the 70th Texas Legislature to develop the
administrative, analytical, and executive skills of current and future law
enforcement officials at no cost to either the participant or his/her agency.
Public administration, management issues, the political, legal, and social
environments of policing, and advanced technical issues are studied in
detail. It is the largest and most sophisticated statewide preparation
program for police management in the United States.
The Institute’s mission statement does not include acting as a regulatory
agency, but only as an educational organization:
OUR MISSION
We are committed to serving the law enforcement profession through
exceptional education, research, and training. Our aim is to inspire
excellence in management and leadership through personal and
professional development.

iv.

Under the TCAP proposal, the Institute would de facto be vested with new
rule-making authority since the proposed legislation would require all law
enforcement agencies to comply with the “model policy” of the Institute.
According to some members of TCAP, the “model policy” would have the
effect of law for purposes of the exclusionary rule in Article 38.23. Thus,
it is not accurate to call it a “model policy;” it would instead be a set of
legally-required procedures. Alternatively, if it is merely a “model
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policy,” then it is not subject to Article 38.23. The courts would not
consider the police department’s guidelines based on the model policy to
be legally required. In that case, the legislature would have succeeded in
creating a wish list of procedures, but no actual enforceable rules.
v.

How will the individuals within the Institute who will have rule-making
authority be appointed? The legislature will need to specify how
individuals will be appointed to the new rule-making body within the
Institute. The Institute is not a politically accountable body, so the
legislature would need to implement the means for the participation of
individuals representing a variety of viewpoints and areas of expertise so
that the rulemaking process is not anti-democratic.

vi.

Will the legislature provide a time table for promulgating the rules?

vii.

Will the legislature provide the procedures by which the Institute will rule
make? Typically, notice and comment procedures are required for
administrative rulemaking. Notice and comment is standard in
administrative rulemaking legislation to give the public the opportunity to
take part in the rulemaking process. Is this contemplated, or will it be a
closed-door process with no system for input from outside the Institute?

viii.

Since the Institute would be making legally enforceable rules for all Texas
police departments, the rules the Institute promulgates should be readily
available to the public by means of publication in the manner of statutes
and administrative rules. Specifically, the public should have access to the
rules online and in print form.

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Chapter 2: Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations

“…[C]onfession evidence is inherently prejudicial and highly damaging to a defendant, even if it
is the product of coercive interrogation, even if it is supported by no other evidence, and even if it
is ultimately proven false beyond any reasonable doubt.” 1

Panel Recommendations
Although false confessions may never be completely eradicated from criminal investigations due
to personal or situational factors, statewide policies can be adopted to guide law enforcement,
judges, and juries on the best methods to document and preserve confessions in the context in
which they were elicited. To help prevent wrongful conviction due to false confessions in Texas,
the Panel recommends the following:
6. The State of Texas should adopt a mandatory electronic recording policy, from
delivery of Miranda warnings to the end, for custodial interrogations in certain
felony crimes. 2 The policy should include a list of exceptions to recording and the
judicial discretion to issue a jury instruction in the case of an unexcused failure to
record.
The Panel takes seriously the proposal that one way to prevent wrongful conviction due
to false confessions is to create a complete, accurate, and reviewable document that captures the
entirety of the custodial interrogation; thus, the Panel recommends that electronic recording be
made mandatory in Texas for custodial interrogations in certain felony criminal cases.
Specifically the Panel recommends recording in cases of murder, capital murder, kidnapping,
1

Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo. The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV.
891, 961 (2004).
2
See Appendix C for compromise model bill language.

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aggravated kidnapping, continuous sexual abuse of child, indecency with a child, sexual
performance by a child, sexual assault, and aggravated sexual assault. Audiovisual recording of
interrogations may be especially important in a multicultural state like Texas, where questions of
translation of rights, waivers, questions, and answers may arise. 3
The decision to limit the recommended recording requirement to these crimes in
particular was made for several reasons. First, the list of crimes included under Sec. 3g of the
Code of Criminal Procedures Chapter 42.12 is quite broad. By delineating specifically which
crimes require recordation of custodial interrogations, the obligation is much clearer for the law
enforcement officials who must conduct the recordings. Second, crimes are frequently added to
or subtracted from Sec. 3g. Defining the recording requirement through a list of crimes rather
than a statutory reference again provides clarity to those who must carry out the policy. The
Panel believes this policy will offer the best protection to innocent defendants and to the officers
who investigate crimes while taking into account the concerns about recording that have been
raised by Texas jurisdictions.
The Panel further recommends that exceptions to electronic recording be allowed for
good cause, such as equipment malfunction, uncooperative witnesses, spontaneous statements,
public safety exigencies, or instances where the investigating officer was unaware that a crime
that required recorded interrogations had been committed. This further takes into consideration

3

In an analysis of 560 separate warnings from more than 400 county and state jurisdictions across the United States,
an empirical study conducted by a University of North Texas professor found more than 225 variations of the
Miranda warnings. See Richard Rogers, et al., An Analysis of Miranda Warnings and Waivers: Comprehension and
Coverage, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 177 (2007). Individual warnings varied from simple descriptions of 6-10 words
to complex explanations that easily exceed 40 words. Some of the Miranda warnings required 2.8-grade level to
understand, while others required a post-graduate education to understand the warning given. Another linguistic
issue is the comprehensibility of the warning, while yet another is the fact that translation of the warning by a police
officer (rather than a neutral third party interpreter) can serve as a form of linguistic duress that results in a wrongful
waiver. See SUSAN BERK-SELIGSON, COERCED CONFESSIONS: THE DISCOURSE OF BILINGUAL POLICE
INTERROGATIONS 41, 46 (Mouton 2009).

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the contingencies that investigating officers may face when dealing with a witness or suspect in
the field.
The final recommendation from the Panel is that in instances where the Court determines
that unrecorded interrogations are not the result of good faith attempts to record or that none of
the exceptions to recording apply, the Court may deliver an instruction to the jury that it is the
policy of the State of Texas to record interrogations, and they may consider the absence of a
recording in evaluating evidence that arose from the interrogation. The Panel believes that this
three-tiered approach to electronic recording of custodial interrogations will best serve criminal
justice stakeholders in our state without placing undue burden on any one party.

Panel Report
Introduction
One of the factors that has contributed to wrongful convictions in Texas is that of false
confessions. Of the first 39 DNA exonerations documented by The Justice Project in 2009, 4 five
cases involved the false confession or plea of either the defendant or a co-defendant. 5 For
example, both Christopher Ochoa and Richard Danziger spent over 12 years in prison for murder
and sexual assault due to a false confession that was secured after Ochoa’s grueling two-day
interrogation. In addition, both Steven Phillips and Patrick Waller pled guilty to additional
crimes following an initial wrongful conviction by trial. In order to assess the adequacy of Texas
statutes that govern statement evidence and to determine the best policy for Texas, the Timothy
Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions (“the Panel”) conducted a wholesale examination
4

THE JUSTICE PROJECT. CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: TEXAS JUSTICE DERAILED: STORIES OF INJUSTICE AND THE
REFORMS THAT CAN PREVENT THEM (2009), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
convicting-the-innocent.pdf.
5
Id.at 28. False confessions or pleas were made by Eugene Henson, Christopher Ochoa, Steven Phillips, and
Patrick Waller. Ochoa’s false confession was used to secure a guilty verdict in the trial of Richard Danziger. Id.

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of the science behind false confessions, recommended practices promoted by a variety of
criminal justice organizations, and the policies adopted by U.S. and Texas jurisdictions. Based
on this examination, as is fully explored later in this document, the Panel recommends that Texas
adopt a statewide police to record interrogations in certain classes of crimes.
Texas Statutes Regulating Statement Evidence
The definition and use of statement evidence in Texas courtrooms are regulated by
Articles 38.21-.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedures (CCP). The statute defines a
statement as “a statement signed by the accused or a statement made by the accused in his own
handwriting or, if the accused is unable to write, a statement bearing his mark, when the mark
has been witnessed by a person other than a peace officer.” 6 These statements may be used in
court if they are “freely and voluntarily made without compulsion or persuasion” 7 and follow the
rules established in Miranda v. Arizona 8 and subsequently expanded in Art. 38.22. These rules
stipulate that the suspect must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that any
statement may be used in court, that he has the right to an attorney, and that he has the right to
end an interview at any time. Suspects must knowingly and voluntarily waive these rights in
order for an interview to commence. 9
Texas statute further regulates the use of audiovisual recordings of statements in the case
of oral and sign language statements. The statute specifically states that most oral and sign
language statements may only be used against the suspect if “an electronic recording which may
include motion picture, video tape, or other visual recording, is made of the statement.” 10 The
6

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 1 (Vernon 2010).
Id. art. 38.21.
8
384 U.S. 436 (1966). See also Montejo v. Louisiana, 130 S. Ct. 23 (2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475
U.S. 625 (1986), which sought to assure that the right to counsel is not lost during police interrogation); Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (ruling that a suspect must vocalize his or her wish to remain silent).
9
Miranda, 294 U.S. at 475.
10
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 2010).
7

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suspect must also be read his or her rights on tape and voluntarily waive those rights, all voices
on the recording must be identified, and the defendant’s attorney must be given a copy of the
recording no later than 20 days before trial. 11
Although the Texas statute does provide that statements in certain situations be recorded
through audiovisual means, the existing statute differs significantly with the interrogation
recording practices voluntarily adopted by many jurisdictions within Texas and several other
states. First, audio and/or video recording under the existing statute is only required for a
statement—not a custodial interrogation. In other words, statutory obligations are satisfied when
recordings capture the result of a custodial interrogation, but not the interrogation itself. Second,
recording is only required in the case of oral or sign language statements, which are relatively
rare. Law enforcement agencies overwhelmingly rely on the written statements that are
described in CCP §38.22 Sec. 1.
To analyze whether current statutes are effective in preventing wrongful convictions, the
Panel examined the research on interrogations, false confessions, and policies that have been
implemented in other jurisdictions to address the problem of false confessions. As directed in
HB 498, the Panel paid particular attention to the recording of custodial interrogations in its
analysis of policy recommendations for Texas.
The Science of False Confessions
When asked if they would ever confess to something that they did not do, most people
respond with a resounding “no.” In fact, in a survey of jury-eligible individuals in the United
States, over 85% of respondents indicated that they would personally be very unlikely to confess

11

Id.

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to a crime that they did not commit. 12 We know through post-conviction DNA testing, however,
that people do indeed confess to crimes that they did not commit. Although upon first blush this
may seem unbelievable or reserved for those who are weak of mind, research has demonstrated
that false confessions can and do occur, and exonerations in Texas and other states reinforce this
finding. Even the respondents in the jury-eligible survey recognized that false confessions do
occur, with over 35% in general agreement that suspects sometimes confess to crimes that they
do not commit. 13 This indicates that although eligible jurors are unlikely to believe that they
themselves would falsely confess to a crime, they acknowledge that “others” may do so. Starting
with a known phenomenon of false confessions, scientists have documented, elicited, and
categorized the causes of false confessions.
Types of False Confessions
Researchers and theorists have classified the known cases of false confession into three
types: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-internalized. 14 In a voluntary false confession,
an innocent person may offer a false confession without being questioned by investigators for a
crime. In fact, those who offer voluntary false confessions may not even be a suspect at the time
he or she makes the false confession. In 2006, for example, John Mark Karr made a false
confession in the case of JonBenet Ramsey, a six-year-old girl who was killed in Colorado in
1996. After being apprehended in Thailand and flown back to Colorado to face prosecution,

12

Linda A. Henkel, Kimberly A. J. Coffman & Elizabeth M. Dailey, A Survey of People’s Attitudes and Beliefs
About False Confessions, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 555, 571 (2008).
13
Id. at 564.
14
Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5
PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 49 (reviewing the types and theories of false confessions). No Texas DNA exoneration
cases that involved false confessions were related to voluntary confessions; all were coerced, but the record does not
indicate whether any of the false confessions were internalized. See THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2.

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tests revealed that Karr’s DNA did not match the DNA taken from the crime scene and that Karr
had made a voluntary false confession. 15
The two types of coerced confessions, on the other hand, are elicited through the process
of interrogation and have been further categorized into compliant and internalized false
confessions. In coerced-compliant false confessions, the suspect “acquiesces to the demand for a
confession for instrumental purposes: to escape an aversive situation, to avoid explicit or implied
threat, or to gain a promise or implied reward.” 16 Suspects facing multiple charges may decide
to “go along with” an investigator’s theory of the crime and confess in order to avoid prolonged
interrogation or confinement. Those who provide coerced-internalized false confessions,
however, “come not only to capitulate in their behavior, but also to believe that they committed
the crime in question, sometimes confabulating false memories in the process.” 17 Suspects who
have memory problems due to drug or alcohol use, sleep deprivation, or other psychological
factors are at particular risk for this type of false confession.
The scientific research on coerced false confessions has spanned the entire timeline of
interrogations, starting with a suspect’s decision to waive his or her Miranda rights, through the
interrogation itself, to the internalization of the false confession. Researchers have also looked at
the impact of false confessions on the courtroom, with studies on jurors’ attitudes toward
confessions and false confessions. All of this research has led to the development of theories of
why people confess to crimes they did not commit and is summarized below.
Miranda Waivers
Although some false confessions are voluntary, most begin with a police suspect who
signs a Miranda waiver and agrees to be interviewed by investigators about a particular case
15

Kirk Johnson. Ramsey Case Suspect Cleared after DNA Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2006, at A1.
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 12, at 49.
17
Id. at 50.
16

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without the presence of an attorney. Following the Reid technique, 18 at some point during the
interview, the investigators become convinced of the person’s guilt and switch from interview to
interrogation, the hallmark feature of which is to refuse to accept a suspect’s statement of
innocence, instead continuing to pursue a confession until it is obtained. 19 Although this may be
effective and appropriate for those suspects who are truly guilty, it puts those who are factually
innocent at risk of making a false confession. Investigators are no longer allowed to use “third
degree” methods to secure confessions (i.e. physical abuse), but they are allowed to use
psychological techniques to convince suspects that it is in their best interest to confess (see
review of psychological techniques below and supra note 16).
The question, then, becomes why do people agree to waive their Miranda rights and
potentially subject themselves to a psychological interrogation? An experiment conducted by
Kassin and Norwick addressed this question in an experiment designed not only to test how
investigative techniques affect the decision to waive one’s rights, but also the impact of
innocence on that decision.
Kassin and Norwick designed a study in which 72 psychology students were told either to
take a $100 bill from a drawer in a nearby classroom, or to simply open the drawer without
taking the money. Each student was then confronted by a condition-blind investigator in a room
18
The Reid technique is a method of psychological interrogation that addresses both the setting and the content of a
custodial interrogation. As summarized by Kassin, “Proponents of the Reid technique advise interrogators to
conduct the questioning in a small, barely furnished, soundproof room” in order to isolate and produce anxiety in the
suspect. Kassin continues, “To further heighten discomfort, the interrogator may seat the suspect in a hard, armless,
straight-backed chair; keep light switches, thermostats and other control devices out of reach; and encroach on the
suspect’s person space over the course of the interrogation.” Regarding strategies to elicit a confession, the “Reid
operational nine-step process begins when an interrogator confronts the suspect with unwavering assertions of guilt
(1); develops ‘themes’ that psychologically justify or excuse the crime (2); interrupts all efforts at denial and defense
(3); overcomes the suspect’s factual, moral and emotional objections (4); ensures that the passive suspect does not
withdraw (5); shows sympathy and understanding and urges the suspect to cooperate (6); offers a face-saving
alternative construal of the alleged guilty act (7); gets the suspect to recount the details of his or her crime (8); and
converts the latter statement into full written or oral confession(9).” Saul M. Kassin, True Crimes, False
Confessions, 16 SCI. AM. MIND 24, 24 (2005).
19
See Drizin & Leo, supra note 1, at 911 (reviewing texts on how to conduct an interrogation through the Reid
technique, the most common form of interrogation in U.S. criminal investigations).

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set up as instructed by the leading interrogation manual, Criminal Interrogations and
Confessions. 20 The investigator approached the students in either a friendly, neutral or hostile
manner and asked them to sign a Miranda waiver. The students had previously been instructed
to “do whatever they see as necessary to protect themselves.” 21
Kassin and Norwick found that overall, “42 out of 72 suspects (58%) signed the waiver
option.” 22 Of those who were innocent, however, 81% signed the waiver, compared to just 36%
of the guilty students. When asked why they had waived their rights, 21 of the 29 innocent
students who signed the waiver “explained that they waived their rights precisely because they
were innocent—believing, apparently, in the power of this truth to prevail.” 23 The study
concluded that innocent suspects may waive their right to an attorney because they believe that
since they are innocent, they have nothing to hide, and therefore, have no need for an attorney.
This belief is complicated by the concept of “investigator bias,” as explored below.
Investigator Bias and Ability to Detect Deception
One of the features of police interrogations under the Reid technique is that only those
who are reasonably believed to be guilty are interrogated. 24 This is certainly an ideal scenario,
but we know from cases of wrongful conviction in Texas and elsewhere, however, that innocent
people are sometimes interrogated. For example, following the murder of a Pizza Hut manager
in Austin, Texas, police interrogated Chris Ochoa, who eventually confessed that he and a co-

20

Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley & Brian C. Jayne, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(4th ed.) (2001).
21
Id. at 213.
22
Id. at 215.
23
Id. at 216.
24
See Kassin, supra note 16, at 27. (“A 2004 conference on police interviewing attended by the two [authors]
illustrates the problem of bias during questioning. Joseph Buckley—president of John E. Reid and Associates
(which has trained tens of thousands of law-enforcement professionals) and co-author of the manual Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions (citation omitted) —presented the influential Reid technique of interviewing and
interrogation. Afterward, an audience member asked if the persuasive methods did not at times cause innocent
people to confess. Buckley replied that they did not interrogate innocent people.”) Id. at 26.

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worker, Richard Danziger, had assaulted and killed the woman. That confession was used to
secure a guilty plea from Ochoa and was the key piece of evidence used to convict Danziger at
trial. Years later it was revealed through DNA testing that both men were actually innocent of
the crime.
In light of this case and many others around the nation, how are we to reconcile the desire
to only interrogate the guilty with the fact that wrongful convictions have arisen from false
confessions secured through interrogation of the innocent? One explanation is revealed by
studies that demonstrate that investigators enter interviews with a bias that presumes the
suspect’s guilt. They are then more likely to interrogate suspects that are reasonably believed to
be guilty, regardless of the suspect’s actual guilt or innocence.
One such study was conducted by Kassin, Goldstein, and Savitsky, in which students
played the role of an interrogator and were divided into groups so that they would interrogate
either actually guilty or innocent suspects who were accused of stealing a $100 bill. 25 Within
each of these conditions, interrogators were primed to believe that suspects were generally guilty
or innocent. To prime the guilt-presumptive interrogators, experimenters told the interrogators
that “four out of every five suspects in the study (80%) actually commit the crime.” 26 To prime
the innocent expectation condition, the experimenter told the interrogators that only one out of
five in the study (20%) were guilty. Additionally, the interrogators were given two goals: “(1) to
secure a confession and (2) to make an accurate determination of the suspect’s guilt or
innocence.” 27 They were also given time to prepare a strategy and a packet of materials,
including an excerpt from the Reid technique training manual, and checklists from which they

25

Saul M. Kassin, Christine C. Goldstein & Kenneth Savitsky, Behavioral Confirmation in the Interrogation Room:
On the Dangers of Presuming Guilt, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 187 (2003).
26
Id. at 191.
27
Id.

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selected questions and techniques they may decide to use during the interrogation, The questions
checklist contained neutral (“Where were you during the past hour?”) and guilt-presumptive
questions (“How did you find the key that was hidden behind the VCR?”) derived from the Reid
technique manual, as well as from observational field studies of actual interrogation methods.
The techniques checklist included such strategies as “making repeated accusations, exposing
inconsistencies in the suspect’s story, threatening to involve others, [and] appealing to the
suspect’s self interest” among others. 28
The study found that “interrogators with guilty expectations chose more guiltpresumptive questions than did those with innocent expectations.” 29 The guilt-presumptive
investigators also used more techniques to elicit a confession than did the interrogators with
innocent expectations. Overall, 30% of the interrogators judged their suspect to be guilty. There
was, however, a significant difference between groups. As Kassin et al reported, “42% of those
with guilty expectations judged the suspect guilty, compared to only 19% with innocent
expectations.” 30 Actual guilt and innocence did not have an impact on their judgments, as half of
all suspects were guilty. One of the most interesting findings of the study was that, regardless of
guilt or innocence expectance, all interrogators “saw themselves as trying harder to get a
confession when the suspect was innocent than when he or she was guilty. . . . They also said
they had exerted more pressure on the suspect who was innocent than guilty.” 31 As Kassin et al.
concluded, “In short, interrogators saw themselves as the most aggressive when they interviewed
suspects who—unbeknownst to them—were truly innocent.” 32 These findings illustrate that an
innocent suspect’s decision to waive Miranda rights may cause them to be subjected to a
28

Id.
Id. at 193.
30
Id. at 194.
31
Id.
32
Id.
29

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particularly stressful interrogation, placing them in further danger of providing investigators with
a false confession.
Researchers have also tested our abilities to detect deception. In the Inbau et al. text,
claims are made that investigators and interrogators can accurately detect deception by analyzing
verbal and nonverbal cues from suspects. However, research indicates that people are poor
judges of truth and deception in interrogations, at least in part because “people who stand falsely
accused of lying often exhibit patterns of anxiety and behavior that are indistinguishable from
those who are really lying.” 33 To study this phenomenon in an experimental setting, Kassin and
Fong designed a study to “examine the extent to which people can distinguish between true and
false denials made in the context of a criminal interrogation” and “to test the hypothesis that
people can be trained in the use of verbal and nonverbal cues to increase the accuracy of these
judgments.” 34 To test these concepts, students were recruited to commit (or not commit) mock
crimes and be interrogated on videotape. In a second phase, observers were taught (or not
taught) Reid interrogation techniques on how to use verbal and nonverbal cues to detect
deception and asked to judge truth and deception in the videotaped interrogations. To conduct
the experiment, observers (trained and untrained) were shown a video of eight interrogations
generated during the first phase of the study and asked after each interrogation to judge whether
the suspect was truthful or lying. Observers were finally asked to rate their confidence in their
judgments.
The results of the study first revealed that the “naïve observers” (those who were not
trained in the Reid techniques) were significantly better at detecting deception than those who
had been trained (however, neither group performed significantly better or worse than chance).
33

Saul M. Kassin & Christina T. Fong, “I’m Innocent!”: Effects of Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception
in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 501 (1999).
34
Id.

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Although the untrained observers performed better than the trained observers at identifying
truthful or lying suspects, the trained observers were significantly more confident in their
decision than were the naïve observers. 35
Because the results of Kassin and Fong’s 1999 study were provocative, they were further
extended and placed into greater “real world” context by additional studies. First, Meissner and
Kassin replicated the study using trained police investigators from the U.S. and Canada to view
the video tapes that were created in the Kassin and Fong study. 36 They found that compared to
the college student participants in the previous study, the investigators demonstrated significantly
more confidence without exhibiting any additional accuracy. Meissner and Kassin specifically
examined “hits,” the ability to detect a true confession, and “false alarms,” indicating that a false
confession is truthful, among the participants in their study and the 1999 study conducted by
Kassin and Fong. They found that the trained investigators in the study did not produce
significantly more hits than the untrained students in Kassin and Fong’s study. The investigators
did, however, generate significantly more false alarms than the naïve students in the previous
study. According to Meissner and Kassin, these results indicate a significant investigator bias to
not just see deception, but to see guilt where there is none. 37 In fact, they concluded that training
does not improve one’s ability to detect actual deception, but rather increases the likelihood that
one will judge targets to be deceitful rather than truthful when proclaiming innocence. 38
The results of the Kassin/Fong and Meissner/Kassin studies were further tested by
Kassin, Meissner, and Norwick in 2005. 39 In this study, Kassin et al. asked college students and
35

Id.
Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “He’s Guilty!”: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception,
26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (2002).
37
Id. at 476.
38
Id. at 478.
39
Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner & Rebecca J. Norwick, “I’d Know a False Confession if I Saw One”: A
Comparative Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211 (2005).
36

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trained police investigators from Florida and Texas to judge the truthfulness or deception of true
and false confessions obtained from seventeen prison inmates recruited by the researchers. To
gain both true and false confessions, each inmate was asked to provide a true confession to the
crime for which he was convicted; he was then provided with the facts of another recruited
inmate’s crime and asked to construct a false confession from those facts. Those confessions
were used to create videotapes that consisted of ten segments, each containing five true
confessions and five false confessions. College students and police investigators viewed the
tapes and judged whether the person in each confession was guilty or innocent and to rate their
confidence in their judgments.
Similar to the Kassin and Fong study, the untrained students in this study were more
accurate in their judgments of guilt and innocence than were the police investigators.
Specifically, “investigators generated significantly more false alarms” than students, indicating
that the trained investigators erred on the assumption of guilt rather than innocence. 40 As Kassin
et al. summarized, “Once again, investigators were not more accurate than students, only more
confident and more biased.” 41 More precisely, the investigators’ error was to see guilt where
there was none.
Kassin et al. conducted a second phase of the experiment to attempt to explain their
results. First, they argued that the low accuracy displayed by the police in the study could be due
to the fact that “law enforcement training and experience introduce systematic bias that reduces
overall judgment accuracy.” 42 Second, they argued that “investigators’ judgment accuracy was
compromised by [the researchers’] use of a paradigm in which half of the stimulus confessions
were false, a percentage that is likely far higher than the real world base rate for false
40

Id. at 217.
Id. at 218.
42
Id.
41

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confessions.” 43 To test these hypotheses, the study was repeated with different students and
investigators. In this phase, however, students and investigators were told that half of the
confessions were true and half were false. Even with this instruction, students’ performance was
slightly (but not significantly) better than investigators’ performance; however, neither group
performed better than chance. 44 Similar to the results of the first study, investigators displayed
significantly higher levels of confidence in their judgments than students, though “confidence
levels were higher in the first experiment than in the second.” 45 In both experiments, Kassin et
al. concluded that “relative to students, investigators erred by accepting false confessions, not by
rejecting true confessions”—a pattern that continued even when guilt bias was removed from the
study. 46
What these studies indicate is that special care must be taken by all parties involved in a
criminal investigation and prosecution to compare statement evidence with known facts of the
case. Although most often unintentional, bias can enter the interrogation room and cause
investigators to see guilt where it does not exist. To help alert investigators, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and judges to situations in which bias may impact the outcome of interrogations,
researchers have sought to identify specific individual traits and interrogation tactics that may
lead innocent suspects to falsely confess. The findings of this research reinforce the notion that
interrogations are complex social interactions in which many factors and forces are at play.
Traits, Techniques, and Theories of False Confessions
Once the decision has been made to interrogate an individual, there are a variety of
factors that contribute to whether an innocent individual will make a false confession. These

43

Id. at 218-19.
Id. at 220.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 222.
44

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include individual factors such as youth, low intelligence or developmental or intellectual
disability, 47 and mental illness; psychological factors such as sleep deprivation and drug use or
withdrawal; as well as personality variables such as antisocial tendencies, anxiety, depression,
compliance, suggestibility, and low self esteem. 48 Many studies in particular have examined
how witnesses and suspects with intellectual disabilities respond to Miranda warnings and
interrogations, and the findings demonstrate that this population may require additional
protection to guard against false confessions. Research performed on defendants confined to a
state mental hospital in Texas showed that severely mentally disordered persons understand
neither their Miranda rights nor the effect of waiving those rights. 49 Further, a 10th grade
education was not predictive of Miranda understanding among the mentally disordered, 50 and
research further shows that individuals with IQs as high as 88 also do not understand the
Miranda warnings, nor the rights contained therein. 51 As the researchers noted, “On average,
defendants with the poorest understanding had completed the 10th grade and had 10 prior
arrests.” 52 Id. These finding are particularly important because recent studies show that between
6 and 20 percent of defendants in correctional settings have severe mental disorders. 53

47

See generally Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with Intellectual Disabilities: the List Keeps
Growing, 46 INTELLECTUAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 468 (2008) (discussing false confessions with
those who have intellectual disabilities); Morgan Cloud, George B. Sheperd, Alison Nodvin Barkoff & Justin V.
Shur, Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
495 (2002) (discussing problems associated with “knowing and intelligent” and “voluntary” waivers of Miranda
rights by those with mental retardation).
48
Jessica R. Klaver, Zina Lee & V. Gordon Rose, Effects of Personality, Interrogation Techniques, and Plausibility
in an Experimental False Confession Paradigm, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 71, 72 (2008).
49
Richard Rogers, Kimberly S. Harrison, Lisa L. Hazelwood & Kenneth W. Sewell, Knowing and Intelligent: A
Study of Miranda Warnings in Mentally Disordered Defendants, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 401, 416 (2007).
50
Id.
51
Cloud et al., supra note 45, at 538.
52
Rogers et al, supra note 47, at 403.
53
Id.

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Researchers are just beginning to study the impact of gender and ethnicity 54 on false
confessions and have taken a closer look at the variables of compliance 55 and suggestibility56 in
the context of false confessions. What this research indicates is that a myriad of individual
differences each play a part in whether an innocent suspect will provide investigators with a false
confession. Because these factors are complex, uncontrollable, and often not obvious in a
suspect’s physical appearance, special care must be taken to address those aspects of an
interrogation that is within the control of investigators.
This research has helped to inform categories of theories that explain why people confess
to crimes they did not commit. As Kassin and Gudjonsson summarized in a thorough review of
false confession literature, the psychoanalytic perspective argues that people may have an
“unconscious compulsion to confess in response to real or imagined transgressions.” 57 Catharsis
is required to overcome the fear of losing loved ones and the fear of retaliation. By contrast,
decision-making models assume that as suspects are subjected to interrogations, there are many
decisions that they must make (e.g., whether to request an attorney, whether to tell the truth, etc).
In this context, the decision to confess is just one more decision made during an interrogation.
False confessions arise because “suspects are markedly influenced by threats and inducements,
stated or implied,” and “interrogators impair a suspect’s decision making by manipulating his or
her subject assessments.” 58 The Reid techniques described above are designed to accomplish
exactly those ends.

54

Klavner et al., supra note 46, at 75.
See generally id. at 75-76 (reviewing Kassin and Kiechel paradigm and Gudjonsson Compliance Scale).
56
See generally J.P. Blair, The Roles of Interrogation, Perception, and Individual Differences in Producing
Compliant False Confessions, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 173 (2007); Klaver, et al., supra note 46, at 76 (reviewing
Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale).
57
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 12, at 45.
58
Id.
55

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Additional theories of false confessions take a cognitive-behavior perspective and argue
that “confessions arise from the suspect’s relationship to the environment and significant others
in that environment.” 59 If a suspect believes that he or she will lose social contact or standing,
experiences high level of anxiety or uncertainty, or has false notions of his or her rights, that
suspect may falsely confess to prevent those negative consequences. The social-psychological
perspective argues that “powerful, if not coercive, methods of social influence are used in police
interrogations.” 60 This influence has effects on the suspects, such that “suspects may even come
to believe their own police-induced false confessions through a subtle process of selfperception.” 61 Cultural approaches recognized that those from collectivistic, high power cultures
will have different attitudes and expectations for the interrogations process than will a person
from an individualistic, low power culture like that of the United States. 62 For example, people
from collectivist cultures that place high value on the welfare of the group and deemphasize
individual needs tend to waive their Miranda rights due to lack of familiarity with the American
legal system and because their culture places high value on cooperating with police. 63
Regardless of which theoretical approach is taken, Kassin and Gudjonsson summarize
that
[S]uspects confess when sufficiently motivated to do so; when they perceive, correctly or
incorrectly, that the evidence against them is strong; when they need to relieve feelings of
guilt or shame; when they have difficulties coping with the pressures of confinement and
interrogation; when they are the targets of various social-psychological weapons of
59

Id. at 46.
Id.
61
Id.
62
See Richard A. Leo, Mark Costanzo & Netta Shaked-Schroer, Chapter 2: Psychological and Cultural Aspects of
Interrogations and False Confessions: Using Research to Inform Legal Decision-Making, in 2 Psychological
Expertise in Court: Psychology in the Courtroom 25 (Daniel A. Krauss & Joel D. Lieberman, eds., 2009).
63
Id.
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influence; and when they focus primarily on the immediate costs and benefits of their
actions rather than long-term consequences. 64
Each of these individual and situational factors can lead to a false confession.
False Confessions and Wrongful Conviction
Regardless of the cause or type of false confessions, research indicates that false
confessions—even those that are known to have been improperly secured—have an impact on
jury verdicts and sentencing. For example, a study by Kassin and Neumann asked participants to
read summaries of criminal trials for murder, rape, aggravated assault, and automobile theft, each
containing circumstantial evidence and either a confession, an eyewitness identification, a
character witness, or no additional information. 65 In all cases but the auto theft, participants
were significantly more likely to vote guilty when the case contained a confession. The authors
summarize that “confession evidence proved to be significantly more incriminating than an
eyewitness identification or character testimony in three of the four cases.” 66 These findings
held over two subsequent experiments, leading Kassin and Neumann to conclude: “Taken
together, our findings demonstrate that confession evidence has a greater impact on jurors – and
is seen as having a greater impact by jurors – than other types of evidence.” 67
Similar results were found and expanded upon by another study that examined the effect
of admissible and inadmissible confessions obtained in low- and high-pressure interrogations. 68
Participants who read trial transcripts that contained confessions were influenced by the
confession evidence, although not at statistically significant levels. Even so, the researchers
64

Kassin & Gudjnsson, supra note 12, at 46.
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the
Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (1997).
66
Id. at 476.
67
Id. at 481.
68
Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the ‘Harmless Error’
Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1997).
65

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reported that “conviction rates were 29% in the low pressure-admissible group, 18% in the low
pressure-inadmissible group, 24% in the high pressure-admissible group, 29% in the high
pressure-inadmissible group, and only 6% in the no-confession group.” 69 The participants
convicted at the same rate in the low pressure-admissible group and in the high pressureinadmissible group. A second study was conducted to confirm the strength of these results, and
significant differences in conviction rates were found between confession and no-confession
groups, even if that confession was inadmissible, obtained through high-pressure interrogations,
and participants stated in self-report measures that they discounted the inadmissible confession in
their deliberations. As the authors concluded, “[M]ock jurors did not sufficiently discount a
defendant’s confession in reaching a verdict—even when they saw the confession as coerced,
even when the judge ruled the confession inadmissible, and even when participants said that it
did not influence their decision-making.” 70
In addition to scientific studies of the impact of false confessions of jurors, wrongful
conviction cases also reveal the strength of confession evidence. For example, Drizin and Leo
compiled information on 125 cases of proven false confessions in the United States. 71 Of those
125 confessions (including that of Christopher Ochoa), eight (6%) were proven false because it
was found that no crime occurred (i.e., a suspect confessed to murder, but the “victim” in the
case is later found alive). In 11 cases (9%), it was physically impossible for the suspect to have
committed the crime (i.e., the suspect was in a hospital or jail at the time the crime was

69

Id. at 35.
Id. at 42 (arguing that these findings call into question the Supreme Court’s “harmless error” rule established in
Arizona v.Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), in which the Court held that admission of a coerced confession did not
automatically require reversal of a conviction but was instead subject to harmless error analysis).
71
Drizin & Leo, supra note 1.
70

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committed). Fifty-seven false confessions (46%) were revealed through scientific evidence (e.g.
DNA), and 92 people (74%) were exonerated when the true perpetrator was identified. 72
Drizin and Leo’s analysis revealed that 35% of the suspects who falsely confessed were
under the age of 18 at the time of the confession, including two who were under the age of 10,
and over half of the false confessors were under age 25. 73 Those who provided false confessions
were also subjected to lengthy interrogations. Drizin and Leo report that more than 90% of
normal interrogations last less than two hours, but the 44 studied cases in which information on
length of interrogation could be found demonstrated that false confessors may be subjected to
lengthier interrogations. 84% of the studied interrogations lasted more than six hours, with two
interrogations lasting between 48 and 96 hours. The majority of the 44 interrogations (73%)
lasted between six and twenty-four hours. 74
It is important to note that over half (59%) of these cases did not go to trial because the
defendant was never charged (8%) or because the charges were dropped pre-trial (51%). Of the
remaining 51 cases, only seven (6%) were acquitted, 14 pled guilty (11%), and 30 were
convicted at trial (24%). When the authors looked specifically at those who confessed, recanted,
and pled not guilty, they found that 81% were found guilty at trial. 75 This provides post-hoc
evidence that jurors are unable to identify and/or discount false confessions in the trial phase. Of
the 44 people who either pled guilty or were convicted at trial, 17 spent less than five years in
prison and 27 spent more, including “nine convicted false confessors [who] served their

72

Id. at 953-54. The total number exceeds 125 because some cases may have more than one source of exoneration,
i.e. the suspect was exonerated and the true perpetrator were identified through post-conviction DNA testing.
73
Id. at 945.
74
Id. at 947.
75
Id. at 958; see also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of
Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429,
482 (1998) (finding that those false confessors who went to trial had a 73% chance of conviction).

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sentences and were never officially exonerated, despite the fact that their factual innocence was
subsequently proven.” 76
Juries sometimes do, however, react negatively to what are often particularly egregious
examples of coerced confessions. Leo and Ofshe noted in a study of wrongful convictions
related to false confessions that in the case of Betty Burns, a Minnesota jury not only acquitted
Burns, “but took the additional unusual step of publishing a thirteen page letter denouncing the
interrogation of Burns, expressing alarm that the true perpetrator remained at large, calling for
reforms both in the police and prosecutors’ office, and requesting that Burns’ record be
expunged and she be compensated for her ordeal.” 77 In Burns’ case, the victim and three
eyewitnesses indicated Burns did not commit the violent stabbing to which she had confessed
during the course of interrogation.
What each of these research and case studies demonstrates is that confession evidence is
extremely powerful evidence that must be treated with care. With personal and situational
factors and court procedures all at work, every member of the criminal justice system has a duty
to study the confession presented and compare that to known facts of the case and theories of the
crime. Below, the Panel reports on the practices promoted by a variety of organizations to help
accomplish just that.
Organizations’ Recommended Practices
In light of the research that has been conducted on false confessions and the wrongful
convictions that have resulted from them, legal scholars and associations, law enforcement
organizations, and policy organizations have made recommendations on practices to reduce the
likelihood that suspects will be falsely convicted of crimes to which they falsely confess. These

76
77

Drizin & Leo, supra note 1, at 958.
Leo & Ofshe, supra note 73, at 477.

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recommendations range greatly and include a call to overturn Miranda, 78 to limit who may make
confessions, 79 and to abandon the Reid technique and adopt of a new framework for the conduct
of interrogations. 80 By far, however, the most common recommendation has been to record
interrogations from the time a suspect is read his Miranda rights through the end.
Legal and false confession scholars have long called for complete documentation of
interrogations through audio and/or video recording 81 because, in the words of Drizin and Leo,
“the recording of police interrogation is not an adversarial policy suggestion; it favors neither the
defense nor the prosecution but only the pursuit of reliable and accurate fact-finding.” 82
Scholars specifically argue for audio-visual recording because it creates an objective record of
the interrogation that can be reviewed to resolve or avoid the “swearing matches” that can occur
between officers and defendants when interrogations are unrecorded. 83 Taping also lends
transparency to the process which, in turn, leads to better practices in the interrogation room. 84
Finally, scholars argue that recorded interrogations allow factfinders such as judges and juries to
78

See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost Confessions—And From Miranda,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998). Contra Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to
Scapegoat Miranda: Another Reply to Paul Cassell, 88 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557 (1998).
79
New Mexico declared oral confessions from children under 13 inadmissible. Amy Bach, True Crime, False
Confession, THE NATION, Feb. 8, 1999, 21-23.
80
See Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, “You’re Guilty, So Just Confess!”: Cognitive and Behavioral
Confirmation Biases in the Interrogation Room, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 85 (G.
Daniel Lassiter ed., Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press 2004) (reviewing C. H. Van Meter, PRINCIPLES OF POLICE
INTERROGATION (Thomas 1973)). Meissner and Kassin quote Van Meter as follows: “But you must remember that
the person that you are talking to might not be guilty. . . Maintain an impartial attitude throughout the interrogation,
and you will not be put in the position of having to make excuses. After all, the courts try the person; you are only
an investigator for the court, not the person who has to make the decision of guilt or innocence.” The van Meter text
instructs investigators to conduct the interrogation within an ethical framework “in which the interrogator’s primary
objective was to obtain evidence from suspects through the use of techniques that were not overly obtrusive or
aggressive.” Id. at 87. This approach is in contrast with the Reid technique, in which the ultimate goal of an
interrogation is to secure a confession and full admission narrative. See also Drizin & Leo, supra note 1, at 100104.
81
For historical overviews of false confession research, case law, and calls for complete recording, see generally
Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police
Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619 (2004);
Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall & Amy Vatner, Bringing Reliability Back In:
False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-First Century, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 479 (2006).
82
Drizin & Leo, supra note 1, at 995.
83
Id. at 997; Leo & Ofshe, supra note 73, at 488.
84
Drizin & Leo, supra note 1, at 997.

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make better assessments of voluntariness and reliability of confession evidence. Drizin and Leo
state that although recording will not prevent all false confessions, a videotaping requirement
“allows jurors to make a more informed evaluation of the quality of the interrogation and the
reliability of the defendant’s confession, and thus to make a more informed decision about what
weight to place on confession evidence.” 85 This is important because early studies indicate that
“seeing the interrogation may well lower the conviction rate among mock jurors who watch
innocent false confessions, without lowering the conviction rate among those exposed to guilty
true confessions.” 86
Both professional and policy organizations similarly recommend complete recording of
interrogations. As early as 1975 the American Law Institute adopted a Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure 87 that advocates complete recording of interrogations to “help eliminate
factual disputes concerning what was said to the arrested person and what prompted any
incriminating statements” 88 and because “police should not be left in doubt as to what is
expected of them.” 89 The New York County Lawyers’ Association and the American Bar
Association Section of Criminal Justice 90 recommends that all law enforcement agencies
“videotape the entirety of custodial interrogations of crime suspects at police precincts,

85

Id.
S. Kassin, R. Leo, C. Crocker & L. Holland, Videotaping Interrogations: Does It Enhance the Jury’s Ability to
Distinguish True and False Confessions?, paper presented at the Psychology & Law International, Interdisciplinary
Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland (July 2003), quoted in Meissner & Kassin, supra note 78, at 99; see also G. Daniel
Lassiter, Lezlee J. Ware, Jennifer J. Ratcliff, & Clinton R. Irvon, Evidence of the Camera Perspective Bias in
Authentic Videotaped Interrogations: Implications for Emerging Reform in the Criminal Justice System, 14 LEGAL
& CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 157 (2009) (discussing effects of camera angle bias).
87
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (1975), available at http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/
a1bf9dda21904164852566d50069b69c/e1a4d2c7cf86cbed852570820072a805/$FILE/ALI-Model_Recording_Code1975.pdf.
88
Id. § 130.4 note on subsection (3).
89
Id. §130.4 cmt.
90
The N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n & A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates 15,
available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/revisedmy048a.pdf.
86

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courthouses, detention centers, or other places where suspects are held for questioning,” 91 as
does the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 92 and bar associations in Michigan 93
and New York. 94 If videotaping is not feasible, the associations suggest that investigators
“audiotape the entirety of such custodial interrogations.” 95 The Justice Project 96 and the Chicago
Tribune 97 have made similar recommendations for interrogations in felony cases.
Perhaps the most ringing endorsement for recording interrogations comes from the
hundreds of jurisdictions around the country that routinely record complete interrogations. The
National Institute of Justice estimated from a 1990 survey that almost 2400 police and sheriffs’
departments videotaped interrogations in at least some cases; 84% of survey respondents
believed that videotaping improved the quality of police interrogations. 98 Following interviews
with over 300 departments in 45 states that record interrogations, former U.S. Attorney Thomas
Sullivan reported that “virtually every officer who has had experience with custodial recordings
enthusiastically favors the practice.” 99 Sullivan’s findings also reveal similar benefits cited by
many of the departments that record interrogations. First, the benefits of recording extend to
many criminal justice stakeholders because a “permanent record is created of what was said and

91

Id. at 15.
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers, Resolution of the Board of Directors Supporting Mandatory Videotaping
of Law Enforcement Interrogations (May 4, 2002), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/resolutions/
7cac8b149d7416a385256d97005.
93
State Bar of Michigan. Revised Resolution (September 21, 2005), available at http://www.michbar.org/
generalinfo/pdfs/ 9-22Custodial2.pdf.
94
New York State Bar Association. Memorandum No. 11 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www.nysba.org/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&section=Legislative_Memoranda_2007_2008&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.c
fm&ContentFileID=2009.
95
The N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n & A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice, supra note 88, at i.
96
THE JUSTICE PROJECT. ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS: A POLICY REVIEW (2009),
available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack_recording-fin2.pdf.
97
Editorial, No More Excuses. Go to the Tape, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 21, 2002, at C6.
98
William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and Confessions, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: RESEARCH IN
BRIEF, March 1993.
99
THOMAS SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS 6 (Nw. U. Sch. of L.
Center on Wrongful Convictions 2005), available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/
causesandremedies/falseconfessions/SullivanReport.pdf.
92

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done, how suspects acted, and how officers treated suspects.” 100 Second, defense motions to
suppress are greatly reduced because “voluntary admissions and confessions are indisputable.” 101
Officers also benefit from recordings because they do not have to take notes during the
interrogation and “they no longer have to attempt to recall details about the interviews days and
weeks later when recollections have faded.” 102
Although many departments that do not record worry that a suspect will “clam up” if
recorded, Sullivan reports that “in most instances, the ability to obtain confessions and
admissions is not affected by recording.” 103 Most jurisdictions that have mandated recording
make provisions for those suspects who refuse to be recorded by simply recording the suspect’s
refusal. Jurisdictions reported to Sullivan that they benefit from recorded interrogations because
“later review of recordings affords officers the ability to retrieve leads and inconsistent
statements overlooked during the interviews.” 104 In addition, recordings can be used to train
other officers, and the public’s confidence in law enforcement is increased when interrogations
are recorded. 105
Recording in the States and Texas
To date, 17 states and the District of Columbia record interrogations as either a result of
statutory law 106 or court rulings. 107 In contrast to Texas statutes, each of these states requires

100

Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1129 (2005).
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 1130; see also Brian Parsi Boetig, David M. Vinson & Brad R. Weidel, Revealing Incommunicado:
Electronic Recording of Police Interrogation, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL., 1 (2006) (discussing additional
benefits from a law enforcement perspective).
106
D.C. CODE § 5-116.01 (2010) (District of Columbia); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1 (2010) (Illinois); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(I)(K) (2010) (Maine); MD. CODE ANN., [Crim. Proc.] § 2-401 (LexisNexis 2010)
(Maryland); MO. REV. STAT. § 590.701 (2010) (Missouri); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4.4 (2010) (Montana); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-4501 (2010) (Nebraska); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (West 2010) (New Mexico); N.C. GEN. STAT.

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video and/or audio recording of interrogations from the reading of Miranda rights through any
confession that is given. In addition, some states have spelled out exceptions to recording in
order to meet the needs of local jurisdictions and have had to decide on the remedy for cases of
failure to comply. 108 These states have made policy changes of the type recommended by the
Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit’s annual reports in 2008 and 2009. 109 Both reports
included calls for legislation and increased training on the issue of false confessions and
documentation of interrogations.
Although not required by statute, many Texas jurisdictions record interrogations, at least
in some classes of offenses, as indicated by a 2008 survey of 1,034 Texas law enforcement
agencies conducted by The Justice Project, akin to the type of survey recommended by the
Governor’s Criminal Justice Advisory Council in their January 2006 report. 110 The survey asked
whether jurisdictions record interrogations and their reasons for doing so or not. Of the 441
responses received, 380 departments “indicated that they either routinely record custodial
interrogations, record interrogations for certain classes of felonies, or record interrogations at the
discretion of the lead investigator.” 111 When asked why they record, jurisdictions reported the
responses listed in Figure 1 below. 112 These jurisdictions have found that the practice of
recording custodial interrogations lends a variety of benefits to the officers, the defendant, and
the prosecution.
§ 15A-211 (2010) (North Carolina); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.81 (LexisNexis 2010) (Ohio); OR. REV. STAT. §
419C.270 (2010) (Oregon); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 972.115 (West 2010) (Wisconsin).
107
N.J. SUP. CT. RULE 3.17 (2005); Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985); State v. Hajtic, 724
N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006); Commonwealth v. Digiambattista, 442 Mass. 423 (2004); State v. Scales, 518 N.2d
587, 591 (Minn. 1994); State v. Barnett, 147 N.H. 334 (2001).
108
See Appendix D for a list of exceptions to recording and remedies for failure to record.
109
TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES (2008); TEXAS CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES (2009).
110
CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, RECOMMENDATIONS TO GOVERNOR RICK PERRY (2006).
111
THE JUSTICE PROJECT. ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS IN TEXAS: A REVIEW OF
CURRENT STATUTES, PRACTICES, AND POLICIES (2009), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/tx-recording-report-tjp-may-2009.pdf.
112
Id. at 3.

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Figure 1
Why Many Texas Departments Record
Allows officers to concentrate on interrogation
rather than note-taking
Tapes may be used for training purposes
Protects officers from false claims of abuse or
coercion
Recorded confessions strengthen prosecutors'
cases
Helps prevent wrongful convictions that stem from
false confessions
Provides an objective record of an interrogation
Helps develop the strongest evidence possible to
convict the guilty
Other

o

50

100

150

200

250

300

Of the jurisdictions that reported that they did not record, the majority (57%) indicated
that the cost of recording equipment was too expensive. Although several departments argued
that juries may react negatively to the tactics they see in an interrogation (5%) or that suspects
may refuse to speak if they know they are being recorded (1.6%), cost was by far the major
prohibiting factor.
In addition, a Public Information Act request from The Justice Project for the recording
policies of the largest counties and municipalities indicated that over half provided no written
policies or procedures on electronic recording of custodial interrogations beyond statutory
requirements for written or oral statements. By contrast, policies for departments in Amarillo,
Austin, Corpus Christi, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, Irving, Pasadena, and San Antonio provide for
more robust recording of interrogations. Because there is no uniform requirement to do so, each
department has unique language and procedures that guide the conduct of electronic recording of

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custodial interrogations. For example, Corpus Christi Police Department states that recorded
interviews are preferred while San Antonio Police Department provides only for the recording of
interrogations with juvenile suspects. Dallas County Sheriff’s Department indicated that
although they do not currently have a recording policy, money to purchase equipment had been
budgeted and policies will be adopted this year. 113
Communication with several departments in Texas indicates that the implementation of a
recording policy need not be cost-prohibitive. Dallas Police Department installed a system that
would record and store interviews for three months on a computer in five rooms for a total cost
of $12,000. 114 Technology systems and storage costs have improved since the system was
installed in 2005, and interrogation rooms could likely be constructed for less in 2010. Dallas
police officers also make use of a system that burns interviews directly to DVD. The costs of a
hidden camera, hidden microphone, DVD recorders, and required cable fall between $500 and
$600 per room.
These costs are in line with recording equipment purchased by Alpine Police Department,
a jurisdiction of about 6,300 people. Officers in Alpine make use of a standard, hand-held digital
video recorder and tripod, available for purchase at most electronics retail stores for under
$500. 115 In addition, the department purchased a small, pen-sized digital video recorder for
audio-only recordings. Recording are burned onto CD or DVD discs; one copy is saved in the
department, the other is sent to the prosecutor. Total cost of the recording equipment and discs is
well under $1000, and indicate that recording interrogations need not be cost-prohibitive.

113

Id. at 5-7.
E-mail from Edwin Colfax, Texas Policy Director, The Justice Project, to Jennifer Willyard, Grant Program
Specialist, Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense (Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with Texas Task Force on Indigent
Defense).
115
E-mail from Edwin Colfax, Texas Policy Director, The Justice Project, to Lieutenant Losoya, Alpine, Texas
Police Department (Aug. 2, 2010) (on file with Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense).
114

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Chapter 3: Effective Assistance of Counsel through Criminal Discovery
Practices

In criminal cases, perhaps the most significant disparity between the government’s capacity to
prosecute and the defendant’s capacity to defend derives from the government’s vastly superior
ability to discover information concerning the alleged crime. . . . It might be possible to reduce
this disparity by providing public defender programs with the resources necessary to locate
evidence favorable to the accused. A more efficient remedy, however, since it does not involve
costly duplication of investigative efforts, is to place the results of the government investigations
in the hands of the defense. 1

Panel Recommendation
7. The State of Texas should adopt a discovery policy that is mandatory, automatic,
and reciprocal, and requires either electronic access to or photocopies of materials
subject to discovery.
Texas is in the distinct minority when it comes to limiting discovery in criminal cases; as
explored below, many states and the federal courts currently operate under a system in which the
prosecution and the defense must share information, reports, witness statements, witness lists,
and more with the other party before trial. As such, the Panel agrees that Texas law should
follow the prevailing trend in criminal discovery, as well as recommendations made by criminal
justice organizations, and mandate reciprocal discovery in criminal cases, rather than leave the
process up to well-intentioned prosecutors. The Panel further recommends that in accordance
with policy that best prevents wrongful convictions, either photocopying of, or electronic access
1

Victor Bass, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 112 (1972).

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to, discoverable materials be required. Currently, Texas jurisdictions each have their own stance
on whether photocopying or even note-taking is permitted, and uniformity in this area will
greatly benefit the State.
We believe that these reforms will help to prevent wrongful conviction that results from
intentional or unintentional suppression of information that is material, favorable, or exculpatory
in nature. The Panel offers compromise legislative language in Appendix E and the report below
for consideration.

Panel Report
Introduction
One of the most important ways that jurisdictions can provide for effective counsel is to
adopt consistent discovery policies that allow the defense early and complete access to essential
documents in the case against the defendant. Without access to offense and expert reports until
the time of trial, the ability for defense counsel to provide a meaningful defense is diminished.
Although discovery policies cannot completely guard against ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, they set the foundation for a quality and meaningful defense.
Discovery as a component of effective counsel is especially important in helping to guard
against wrongful convictions. A relationship between discovery and wrongful conviction is
sometimes difficult to quantify solely from a trial transcript, but The Justice Project states, “The
record of wrongful convictions has demonstrated that exculpatory evidence can be withheld for
years, even decades, while an innocent person sits in prison.” 2 In fact, The Justice Project’s
report indicates that seven of Texas’ first thirty-nine DNA exonerations involved suppression of
exculpatory evidence or other prosecutorial misconduct. This statistic includes the case of
2

THE JUSTICE PROJECT. CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: TEXAS JUSTICE DERAILED: STORIES OF INJUSTICE AND THE
REFORMS THAT CAN PREVENT THEM 11 (2009), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/ uploads/
convicting-the-innocent.pdf.

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Timothy Cole, whose defense counsel was never informed that only one victim chose Cole out of
a photo lineup as the perpetrator of a rape on the Texas Tech campus.
Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland 3 provides defendants with
a constitutional right of access to exculpatory information held by the State and in the possession
of law enforcement, it is an insufficient tool to prevent wrongful convictions because Brady
complaints are made post-conviction. Since a wrongful conviction cannot be retroactively
prevented once it has already occurred, 4 other means of prevention must be explored. One way
to reduce the potential for errors is to increase the scope of discovery, the process of pre-trial
information exchange between prosecution and defense. As the Supreme Court commented,
“The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depends on full
disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.” 5 Legal scholars have
noted that “such fact development cannot take place without investigation. In turn, adversarial
balance cannot take place without investigation by both the prosecution and the defense.” 6 In
order for investigation to be meaningful, both sides in an adversarial system must have access to
the facts of the case. In the report that follows, the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel reviews the
3

373 U.S. 83 (1963). John Brady was charged with capital murder following a scheme hatched to rob a bank with
his friend, Donald Boblit, The key question in the case was which man – Brady or Boblit – had actually committed
the murder. Both men made several statements to the police following the crime in which Boblit confessed to the
murder, but Brady’s defense attorney would not learn of this statement until after the trial. With the evidence
presented to them at trial, the jury returned with a guilty verdict and capital punishment.
Following the trial, defense counsel learned of Boblit’s final statement in which he confessed to murder.
Brady’s attorney filed a motion for a new trial due to the fact that he had requested to inspect all of Boblit’s
extrajudicial statements pre-trial. All were turned over to him except for the final confession. The Supreme Court
affirmed Brady’s motion for a new trial and stated that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to
an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at 87. For holdings that helped to further define
Brady obligations, see United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois 408 U.S. 786 (1972); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967). See generally Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
4
See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial
Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097 (2004).
5
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
6
Roberts, supra note 4, at 1105.

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discovery requirements of Brady v. Maryland, current Texas law, and recommended practices to
guide discovery policies and their adoption in Texas and other states. The Panel concludes with
recommendations to help Texas avoid wrongful convictions due to failures of our system of
discovery.
Brady and Criminal Discovery Procedures in Texas
The Supreme Court ruled in Brady v. Maryland that defendants have a constitutional
right to any evidence the State may have in its possession that tends to exculpate the defendant.
As noted above, however, Brady does precious little to prevent wrongful conviction of the
innocent because the burden to determine what constitutes exculpatory information rests with
prosecutors who do not construct theories of the case for the defense. Further, cases in which the
State does not comply with this requirement are not revealed until after the defendant has already
been convicted. This has led some observers to argue that Brady is incompatible with an
adversarial system because prosecutors and defense attorneys have fundamentally adversarial
positions, the Brady holding provides for only weak enforcement, it excludes incriminating
evidence (which is much more common that exculpatory evidence), it is poorly suited to plea
bargaining 7 and informant testimony, 8 and it requires misconduct on the part of the state rather
than innocence of the defendant. 9 If we ask the prosecutor to be responsible for making all

7

See Stephanos Bibas, The Story of Brady v. Maryland: From Adversarial Gameship Toward the Search for
Innocence? in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 149 (Carol Steiker ed., 2005) (“Because defendants do not have
this information in time for plea bargaining, they must bargain in the dark. Typically, guilty defendants know that
they are guilty and have a rough idea of what witnesses and other proof might link them to the crime. But
defendants who are innocent or were intoxicated or mentally ill at the time of the crime have little knowledge of the
evidence against them. Defendants who may be the most sympathetic may thus be at the greatest disadvantage in
plea bargaining. They may be the most susceptible to prosecutorial bluffing.”), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1085&context=upenn_wps; John D. Douglas, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland
and Plea Bargains, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581 (2007); Lee Sheppard, Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading
Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981).
8
See Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Note, A Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made to
Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 HARV. L. REV. 887 (1981); Peter A. Joy, Brady and Jailhouse Informants:
Responding to Injustice, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 619 (2007).
9
Bibas, supra note 7.

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decisions regarding materiality, the exculpatory nature of evidence, favorability, and the like, we
are asking her to “exercise this function from a defense perspective, and it may be unrealistic to
suppose than an adversary can act with the objectivity this requires.” 10 The conflict associated
with reliance on prosecutorial discretion has been addressed by many in the Brady literature, as
has the question of whether there should be additional formal rules to address discovery
obligations. Many of these legal scholars and practitioners feel that there should be rules
because “there is no way in a system with human beings that you can rely totally on subjective
determinations.” 11
Even some prosecutors agree that the current discovery practices place them in a tenuous
role. Debra Graves, a North Carolina prosecutor whose failure to turn over required evidence led
to a wrongful conviction, stated, “‘When you’re an advocate for one side, you’re truly an
advocate for one side.’” 12 This situation is avoidable, however, through open discovery practices
that give the defense access to all unprivileged information possessed by the state. Bass concurs
with Graves and argues, “Open files would, of course, remove the burden on the prosecutor of
attempting to determine whether evidence is favorable and allow the defense attorney to decide
what evidence will help his case. It would thus greatly simplify the prosecutor’s task.” 13
Further, Brady is an inefficient tool to prevent wrongful conviction because Brady claims
occur post-conviction. Brady motions are not raised until after a defendant has been convicted of
a crime and some new evidence that was in the possession of the prosecution comes to light;
therefore, by definition, it cannot prevent wrongful conviction before it happens. In addition, the

10

Bass, supra note 1, at 121.
Steven M. Dettelbach, Commentary, Brady from the Prosecutor’s Perspective, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 615, 617
(2007).
12
Kenneth Jost, Prosecutors and the Law: Is Prosecutorial Misconduct a Serious Problem? 17 CQ RESEARCHER
937, 939 (2007).
13
Bass, supra note 1, at 112.
11

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standards of review are complex, as a Brady claim requires judges to weigh materiality and
relevance. As Bass noted, these factors are very difficult to measure separately, so judges
attempt to answer the question of whether the “evidence in question [would] have changed the
outcome of the trial.” 14 The “difficulty in making this decision, which is in any case necessarily
based on hindsight, is exacerbated by the fact that the trial may have been distorted by the
defendant’s inability to use the suppressed evidence to prepare.” 15 Based on the insufficiency of
post-conviction remedies, we must look to the State of Texas to provide guidance on pre-trial
discovery that will better prevent wrongful convictions from occurring.
Criminal Discovery Procedures in Texas
Texas discovery is controlled by Article 39.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. 16 Article 39.14 does not mandate automatic defense access to police reports and
witness statements and there is no provision specifically allowing the defense to obtain copies of
these items. Rather, defense counsel is required to file motions with the trial court to request
access to basic case information, including offense reports and expert reports. In order to receive
the requested access, the defense must make a showing of “good cause.” 17 There is no
certification process or specified timelines for either party, with the exception of the disclosure
of expert witnesses. Additionally, in some parts of the state, “access” means that defense
counsel may only make notes about items in the prosecution’s file. Furthermore, the prosecution
does not have access to reciprocal discovery. Unlike many other states, Texas law provides no
formal rules for case conferences, wherein the prosecution, defense, and judge meet to discuss
the evidence that is available and will be presented at trial. In addition, Article 39.14 does not

14

Bass, supra note 1, at 126.
Id.
16
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 2010).
17
Id.
15

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define “exculpatory evidence” to guide the prosecution in what material is subject to discovery
obligations. Therefore, although Texas does have a criminal discovery statute, policy groups and
practitioners argue that the statutes are “so minimal that they fail to guarantee the opportunity for
evidence to be fully investigated and meaningfully challenged.” 18
Texas case law has further held that the trial court must allow discovery of evidence that
is shown to be material to the defense of the accused, 19 but no general right to discovery exists. 20
Instead, the decision as to what is discoverable rests with the discretion of the trial court. 21 To
determine materiality, the omission is evaluated in the context of the entire record, and
constitutional error is found only if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist. As with other avenues reviewed in this section, existing Texas case law may not
provide an effective means to prevent wrongful convictions of the innocent due to suppression of
exculpatory evidence. The existing statute provides little direction to the courts, and statute has
been interpreted to leave discretion with prosecutors and trial courts. The end result has been a
wide range of discovery practices and policies across the state that may or may not provide
meaningful protection to innocent suspects under investigation for crimes they did not commit.
For the purposes of making policy recommendations on discovery to ensure that Texas
law is a more effective tool to prevent wrongful convictions, the Panel reviewed recommended
practices available to guide jurisdictions in pre-trial discovery and rules and statutes adopted
nationwide. These procedures were then used to evaluate the current practices in Texas
jurisdictions. The policies outlined below are recommended to provide the information necessary
for defense attorneys to prepare an appropriate defense, thereby reducing the chance for
18

THE JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 2, at 11.
See, e.g., Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 153 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
20
See, e.g., Kinnamon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 84, 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Whitchurch v. State, 650 S.W.2d 422,
425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
21
See Whitchurch, 650 S.W.2d at 425.
19

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wrongful convictions due to Brady violations or insufficient time to conduct thorough
investigations. First, we turn to a discussion of recommended practices and standards.
Organizations’ Recommended Practices
In 1996, the American Bar Association (ABA) released the third edition of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury. 22 These best practices address the
general principles of discovery, the obligations of the prosecution and defense, special
procedures, timing and manner of disclosure, depositions, general provisions, and sanctions if
discovery rules are not properly implemented. The areas of timing, obligations of the
prosecution and defense, and sanctions are reviewed below.
Timing Although the ABA standards outline no specific time requirement within which
discovery should be completed, the standards encourage discovery “as early as practicable in the
process.” 23 The ABA recommends that each jurisdiction adopts time limits and notes that the
prosecution should first disclose discoverable materials to the defense. 24 Under the ABA
standards, parties operate under a “continuing obligation to produce discoverable materials to the
other side.” 25
Obligations of the Prosecution and Defense The ABA standards specifically state that
the prosecution should “permit inspection, copying, testing, and photographing” of any statement
from the defendant or codefendant; names, addresses, and written statements of witnesses; any
inducements for cooperation between the prosecution and the witness; written statements from
experts; any tangible objects that pertain to the case (e.g., books, papers, documents, etc.); any
record of previous criminal history; information related to any identification procedures
22

A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed., 1995), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/discovery.pdf.
23
Id. § 11-4.1(a).
24
Id. § 11-4.1(b).
25
Id. § 11-4.1(c).

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conducted in the investigation phase; and any material that tends to negate or mitigate the guilt of
the defendant. 26 In addition, the defense should be informed of character evidence, evidence
gathered through electronic surveillance, and information or documentation of the acquisition of
evidence gathered through search and seizure. 27
The ABA standards promote reciprocal discovery and suggest a more limited list of
defense materials to be shared with the prosecution. These include the names and addresses of
all witnesses that will be called at trial; any expert reports or written statements; and any tangible
objects that will be introduced as evidence at trial. 28 The standards also recommend discovery of
character evidence not relating to the defendant and the names and addresses of witnesses who
will be asked to support an alibi or insanity defense. 29
Additional Recommendations In addition to timing and discoverable objects or
information, the ABA standards address where counsel must search for discoverable
information. The standards state that the obligation of the prosecutor and defense attorney
“extend to material and information in the possession or control of members of the attorney’s
staff and of any others who either regularly report to or, with reference to the particular case,
have reported to the attorney’s office.” 30 This extends the discovery standards to not only
prosecutors or defense attorneys, but also to investigators, previous attorneys, as well as other
staff.
Sanctions Should one or more party fail to fulfill their discovery obligations, the ABA
standards recommend one of the following actions on behalf of the court:

26

Id. § 11-2(a).
Id. § 11-2.1(b) to (d).
28
Id. § 11-2.2(a).
29
Id. § 11-2.2(b) to (c).
30
Id. § 11-4.3(a).
27

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(i) order the noncomplying party to permit the discovery of the material and information
not previously disclosed;
(ii) grant a continuance;
(iii)prohibit the party from calling a witness or introducing into evidence the material not
disclosed, subject to the defendant’s right to present a defense and provided that the
exclusion does not work an injustice either to the prosecution or the defense; and/or
(iv) enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 31
The standards also recommend that the court may find counsel in contempt if it is revealed that
she “willfully violated a discovery rule or order.” 32
Certification One area not included in the ABA standards is that of certification, an area
that has been addressed by advocacy groups such as The Justice Project. The organization
recommends that “a discovery certificate should be filed by the District Attorney’s office with
the court during pretrial procedures, and should specify when evidence was exchanged and by
what method of delivery.” 33 This type of certification creates a court record stating that both
defense and prosecution have fulfilled their discovery responsibilities, provides documentation
of information received from third parties, and makes it more difficult for evidence to be
willfully suppressed. 34
Organizations’ Recommended Practices and the States
Only five states have discovery provisions that are equivalent in scope to the current
ABA standards. 35 The ABA standards provide the broadest defense discovery, and, as LaFave et
31

Id. § 11-7.1(a).
Id. § 11-7.1(b).
33
THE JUSTICE PROJECT, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A POLICY REVIEW 6 (2007), available at
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/polpack_discovery-hirez-native-file.pdf.
34
Id. at 3, 6.
35
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.2(b) & n.34
(3d ed. 2009) (Alaska, Florida, North Carolina, Minnesota, and New Jersey).
32

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al. state, “[a] critical feature of defense discovery in all of these states is that it extends beyond
prosecution witnesses to all persons who have relevant information (and their recorded
statements).” 36 The majority of the remaining states have standards more in line with either
Federal Rule 16 37 (providing the most limited discovery) or some area in between the two
standards. 38 Current Texas law, however, is considerably more restrictive than Federal Rule 16.
To provide a clearer point of comparison and analysis, the Panel looked to evaluate existing
policies in light of the ABA recommended practices.
Analysis and Evaluation
The most comprehensive review of state discovery policies was conducted in 2004 by the
Federal Judicial Center (FJC) for the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. 39 The organization surveyed all fifty states and the District of
Columbia and reported the governing rules, orders, and procedures; definition of Brady material;
disclosure requirements; due diligence obligations, and sanctions for noncompliance. The study
found a patchwork of different policies across the nation. The results are summarized below,
although several states have reformed their procedures since this survey was originally

36

Id. at n.34.
Federal Rule 16 has required reciprocal discovery since 1974 and states that upon defendant request, the
government must disclose the defendant’s written or recorded statement, the defendant’s prior criminal record,
documents and objects that are material to preparing the defense or intended to be used by the government at trial,
reports of examinations and tests, and a written summary of any testimony to be offered by a prosecution expert.
The defense must permit review of documents and objects in possession of the defense and intended to be used at
trial, reports of examinations and tests, a summary of any testimony to be offered by a defense expert, and the use of
certain defenses such as alibi, insanity, or self-defense. Bibas, supra note 7, at 16 (reviewing FED R. CRIM. P. 12.12, 16(a)(1), 16(b), 16 advisory committee’s note). Although these requirements are included in the ABA discovery
standards, the ABA standards go beyond Rule 16 to include witness information, identification procedures, and
recommends adoption of a timeframe for discovery. See supra pp. 7-10.
38
LaFave et al., supra note 35, § 20.2(b).
39
LAURAL L. HOOPER, JENNIFER E. MARSH & BRIAN YEH, TREATMENT OF BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIAL IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTS’ RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES (Federal Judicial Center 2004),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/BradyMat.pdf/$file/BradyMat.pdf.
37

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conducted. For example expanded discovery procedures came into effect in Ohio on July 1,
2010, as part of a package of reforms meant to decrease the likelihood of wrongful conviction. 40
FJC found that “all fifty states and the District of Columbia address the prosecutor’s
obligation to disclose information favorable to the defendant,” 41 but that is where the similarities
end. The states differ in how Brady material is defined, 42 whether discovery is mandatory, 43 the
timing of discovery, 44 certification of complete discovery, 45 sanctions, 46 and whether
suppression of exculpatory evidence constitutes a violation of due process. 47
Texas statutes consistently fall into the narrowest of categories with no discovery
timeline or certification of discovery. Texas requires a written discovery motion, and the state is
also one of ten that places additional conditions on discovery and requires the defendant to
40

Janice Morse, Ohio’s New Criminal Court Rules Kick In, CINCINNATI.COM, June 30, 2010,
http://news.cincinnati.com/ article/20100630/NEWS010702/7010328/1167/NEWS/Ohio-s-new-criminal-courtrules-kick-in.
41
Hooper et al., supra note 39, at 17.
42
Twenty-three states, including Texas, have adopted language similar to the following: “‘any material or
information which tends to negate the guilty of the accused as to the offense charged or would tend to reduce the
accused’s punishment therefor[e].’” Id. at 18-19 (quoting IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(a)). Brady material is addressed by
ten other states that “expressly list exculpatory material as items of information that prosecutors are required to
disclose.” Id. at 19. Several states include such items as recordings of conversations obtained through electronic
surveillance; all inducements made to state witnesses who will testify at trial; and police, arrest, and offense reports
among others, in their lists of discoverable material. Id. at 21.
43
Thirteen states have mandatory disclosure requirements in place, requiring the prosecutor to disclose some
information without a discovery request from the defense. Other states (including Texas) and the District of
Columbia “require a defendant to request favorable information, sometimes in writing, before the prosecution’s
obligation to disclose is triggered.” Id. at 23.
44
Twenty-eight states include specific time mandates for disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant by the
prosecution. Ten states have established separate timelines—one that mandates when the defense must make a
discovery request and one that addresses when the prosecution must respond. The FJC also reports that “for a small
number of states, we were unable to determine a specific timetable for disclosure of Brady material.” Id. at 24.
Eighteen states at least have descriptive indicators of when discovery must occur, such as “timely” or “in advance of
the trial.” Id. at 26.
45
Although all states impose a continuing duty to disclose upon prosecutors, the FJC found that only five states
(Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Massachusetts, and New Mexico) require written certification that the prosecution has
exercised due diligence in locating favorable information and that their disclosure is as complete as possible. Id. at
27.
46
Eleven states include penalties beyond Federal Rule 16 that may be imposed upon those who willfully fail to
comply with discovery obligations; these penalties include contempt proceedings or an assessment of costs when
appropriate. In Idaho, failure to meet the time requirements for discovery may result in sanctions, and Connecticut,
Maine, and North Carolina allow for dismissal of a case as a sanction for particularly egregious discovery violations.
Id. at 27-28.
47
The West Virginia Supreme Court held that suppression does constitute a due process violation and Nevada
specifically articulates in their general statutes that it does not. Id. at 18.

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demonstrate that the materials are necessary to the preparation of the defense or “show ‘good
cause’ for discovery of such information.” 48 No provision in Texas’ current discovery statute
mandates that the defense be permitted to obtain copies of items such as offense reports and
witness statements. Further, Texas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania are the only states that
expressly limit the sanctions applied by the court to those other than dismissal. 49
Expanded discovery procedures are consistently recognized as an area of Texas law in
which reform is needed. 50 Several Texas counties, however, are leading the way to modernize
discovery procedures and broadening defense access to evidence; some point to Tarrant County's
system as a model for the state. 51 On January 28, 2010, the Advisory Committee travelled to
Fort Worth so that members could see firsthand how the District Attorney’s office there utilizes
computer technology to engage in electronic open-file discovery.
Tarrant County’s open file discovery process began with DA Tim Curry, whose
philosophy, according to ADA Tiffany Burkes, was: “if we can’t win a case based upon what we

48

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 2010), quoted in Hooper et al., supra note 39, at 23.
Hooper et al., supra note 39, at 28.
50
See Tex. H.B. 301, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); Tex. S.B. 1686, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (senate companion to HB301,
complete overhaul including early access & duty to disclose); Tex. S.B. 643, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007) (seeking to
implement timeline (30 days) and remove “good cause” requirement); Tex. H.B. 969, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (bill
passed, mandating discovery (but still obligated to make showing of “good cause”)); Tex. S.B. 560, 79th Leg., R.S.
(2005) (senate companion to HB969); Tex. H.B. 3151, 79th Leg., R.S. (2005) (seeing to require that agreements and
communications about potential agreements between state and prosecution witnesses be made in writing); Tex. H.B.
77, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (seeking to create separate discovery sections for defense and state; timelines;
enumeration of discoverable materials); Tex. H.B. 382, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (seeking to create dual discovery
sections; timelines; enumerated discovery materials); Tex. S.B.582, 77th Leg., R.S. (2001) (seeking to give trial
court discretion to permit defense counsel to obtain copies of certain information); Tex. H.B. 2675, 76th Leg., R.S.
(1999) (bill passed, giving trial court authority to disclose to the state, prior to trial, the names and addresses of
defense’s expert witnesses); Tex. S.B. 557, 76th Leg., R.S. (1999) (senate companion to HB2675); Tex. H.B. 972,
74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (seeking to create separate discovery sections for state and defense; timelines; enumeration of
discoverable materials); Tex. H.B. 2723, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995) (seeking to create reciprocal discovery; timelines;
enumeration of discoverable materials); Tex. H.B. 378, 73rd Leg., R.S. (1993) (seeking to implement timelines;
separate sections for state and defense; enumeration of discoverable materials).
51
Alex Branch, Tarrant County’s Electronic Open-File System Seen as Gold Standard for Reducing Wrongful
Convictions, FORT WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, March 18, 2010 (“‘Tarrant County does seem to be the gold standard,’
said Barry Macha, a member of the Timothy Cole Advisory Committee and the elected district attorney of Wichita
County. ‘It's state-of-the-art; the best system I have seen.’”) available at http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/
03/18/2048153/tarrant-countys-electronic-open.html.
49

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have, we have no business trying it.” The discovery policy initially allowed defense attorneys to
take notes from the DA’s paper files (with the exclusion of the work product file). Thereafter,
defense attorneys were permitted to make photocopies of their clients’ files. Several years ago,
the county implemented an electronic case filing system that now manages the discovery
process. As ADA Burkes told the Panel, “Now we have advanced from just having a paper file
to actually having all of our documents on a computer in electronic form.” She also told the
Panel that they strive to “make sure that every defense attorney has access to every offense
report, every witness statement, arrest warrant, crime scene photographs, anything and
everything that they can use to properly defend their client.”
To the detriment of those who are charged with crimes, not all counties have made
improvements in the discovery system as significant as those undertaken in Tarrant County.
Warren St. John, president of the Tarrant County Criminal Attorney’s Association, remarked that
he is extremely appreciative of the Tarrant County system because in other counties where he
practices, the attitude toward discovery is significantly different. “Other counties,” he stated, are
like “different worlds.” St. John told the Panel, “A lot of those counties will let you read stuff,
but not let you have copies of stuff. . . . I tried a capital case in Stephenville, the DA in
Stephenville will give you everything he has, but it’s not electronic. . . . And then you go to
another jurisdiction, you can’t look at anything. It doesn’t make any sense.”
What St. John’s comments indicate is that Texas’ discretionary policy has left the state
with a wide variance in discovery practices, where the quality of defense, investigation, and
preparation is at least partially dependent upon geography. All other factors being equal, cases
in two counties may have different outcomes due to the timing, manner, and nature of materials
that are—or are not—exchanged through discovery. This result is contrary to the general

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premise of discovery, which is to encourage case investigation and preparation, to support
efficient resolution of cases where the facts are not disputed, and, where the facts are disputed, to
ensure that those facts are fairly presented to the ultimate factfinder—the judge or jury. To
achieve those goals, the defense should have the opportunity to review and test the evidence that
the prosecution would use to convict and sentence, and the prosecution should have the
opportunity to obtain certain information from the defense that will enable the prosecutor to
carry out his or her duty “not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” 52 Because Texas lacks
such a system, the fairness and accuracy of its criminal justice system may be called into
question, especially when compared to the majority of other jurisdictions that employ a system
of reciprocal discovery. This is a strong motive behind many prosecutors’ and defense
attorneys’ calls for broad reciprocal discovery. It similarly informs the Panel’s recommendations
above.

52

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.01 (Vernon 2010).

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Chapter 4: Post-Conviction DNA Testing and Writs of Habeas Corpus Based
on Changing Science
The results of DNA testing reconcile two competing goals . . . . The first goal is to
prevent the conviction of an innocent person. The second goal is the finality of
judgments. Admitting DNA evidence meets both goals. If the evidence exonerates
the defendant, then the goal of not allowing an innocent person to stand convicted
is served. If the evidence incriminates the defendant, then the goal of finality of
judgments is met by adding certainty to the result. 1

Panel Recommendations
In the areas of post-conviction DNA testing and writs of habeas corpus based on changing
science, the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions recommends the following:
8. The State of Texas should amend the Chapter 64 motion for post-conviction DNA
testing to allow testing of any previously untested biological evidence, regardless of
the reason the evidence was not previously tested, or previously tested using older,
less accurate methods. 2
The Panel reached consensus that the language proposed in SB 1864 during the 81st
Legislative Session would make needed adjustments and improvements to the existing statute.
9. The State of Texas should amend the Chapter 11 writs of habeas corpus to include a
writ based on changing scientific evidence. 3

1

Davi v. Class, 609 N.W.2d 107, 113 (S.D. 2000). quoted in Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix,
Double Bind: Factual Innocence and Post-Conviction Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 609 (2002).
2
See Appendix F for model bill language.
3
See Appendix G for model bill language.

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The Panel agreed that a writ of the type proposed in SB 1976 during the 81st Legislative
Session would provide meaningful access to the courts to those with claims of actual innocence
following a conviction based on science that has since been falsified. Creation of a dedicated
writ and procedure will allow those with claims to be heard without opening all convictions up to
scrutiny. The Panel believes this is both valuable and important to the criminal justice system in
Texas.

Panel Report
Introduction
To date in Texas, 41 people have been exonerated of crimes for which they were
convicted after post-conviction DNA testing revealed that they were not the true perpetrators of
those crimes. One of the lessons we can learn from the wrongful convictions revealed through
DNA testing is that post-conviction access to DNA and other forensic tests are an important and
meaningful way to ensure the integrity of our criminal justice system and to see that justice is
done for victims of crime and the wrongfully convicted.
For this section of the report, the Panel chose to focus specifically on Texas statutes
related to post-conviction claims of actual innocence, as directed by the Panel’s enabling
legislation. We leave policy-making regarding federal criminal and civil avenues 4 to the
Supreme Court of the United States 5 and policy-making related to laboratories and the science
behind forensic science to the Texas Forensic Science Commission. 6 The Forensic Science
4

For an overview of claims of actual innocence made through federal writs of habeas corpus and Section 1983, see
Benjamin Vetter, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587
(2004).
5
See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 1, for an overview of Supreme Court jurisprudence on cases of actual
innocence. See also Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009) (establishing that inmates do not
have a constitutional right to DNA evidence for post-conviction testing).
6
According to the Forensic Science Commission, their mission is to: “strengthen the use of forensic science in
criminal investigations and courts by: developing a process for reporting professional negligence or misconduct,
investigating allegations of professional negligence or misconduct, promoting the development of professional

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Commission has not only the directive to handle scientific issues, they also have the experts to
answer questions about laboratory procedures, testing methods, and the like. Although the report
that follows is narrow rather than broad, it afforded the Panel the opportunity to examine a
particular facet of Texas law in detail and make appropriately focused recommendations for the
State.
Texas Law
Post-conviction DNA testing is controlled by Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, which was originally passed as SB 3 during the 77th Legislature in 2001. 7 The
statute allows those who have been convicted of crimes to petition the court for DNA tests to be
performed on biological material that
was not previously subjected to DNA testing:
(A) because DNA testing was:
(i) not available; or
(ii) available, but not technologically capable of providing probative
results; or
(B) through no fault of the convicted person, for reasons that are of a nature such
that the interests of justice require DNA testing; or
(2) although previously subjected to DNA testing, can be subjected to testing with newer
testing techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of results that are more accurate
and probative than the results of the previous test. 8

standards and training, and recommending legislative improvements.” Texas Forensic Science Commission,
http://www.fsc.state.tx.us (last visited July 19, 2010).
7
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01-05 (Vernon 2010).
8
Id. art. 64.01.

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Once the convicting court receives the motion, a copy is forwarded to the prosecuting attorney in
the case who must respond with the appropriate biological evidence or written notice of why the
evidence cannot be produced. 9 Assuming that evidence can be produced, the judge from the
convicting court may order testing if it is found that the evidence still exists, has been subjected
to a chain of custody, identity was at issue in the case, and the petitioner demonstrates that she
would not have been convicted if exculpatory DNA evidence had been available at the time of
the trial and that the motion is not being used to delay the execution of a sentence. Chapter 64
also specifies that identity may be at issue in a case even if a defendant pleaded guilty or nolo
contendre to a charge. This was an important provision for several Texas exonerations, as four
of the wrongfully convicted made false confessions or guilty pleas. 10
Those who have claims of wrongful conviction based on other types of forensic error
apart from DNA testing (e.g. bullet lead comparison, arson investigation, or dog scent evidence)
may petition the court with a writ of habeas corpus as defined in Article 11.07 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure for those who have not been sentenced to death, and Article 11.071 for those
who have been sentenced to death. Specifically, 11.07 states that “it shall be the duty of the
convicting court to decide whether there are controverted, previously unresolved facts material to
the legality of the applicant's confinement.” 11 If it is found that there are, “the court may order
affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, additional forensic testing, and hearings, as well as using

9

For an overview on reasons why prosecutors may object to post-conviction DNA testing, see Daniel S. Medwed.
The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004),
arguing that factors such as institutional culture and political pressure exert considerable inertia on prosecutors to
object to testing. See also Bruce A. Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Discretion and Post-Conviction
Evidence of Innocence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 467 (2009) (outlining the various approaches to the investigation of
post-conviction claims of innocence and times when prosecutors should support or oppose post-conviction forensic
testing).
10
See Chapter 2: Recording Custodial Interrogations for additional information.
11
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 § 3(c) (Vernon 2010).

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personal recollection” 12 to resolve those issues. Those convicted of crimes generally have one
writ of habeas corpus available to them, although subsequent writs may be considered if
the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously
in an original application or in a previously considered application filed under this article
because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant
filed the previous application; or by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation
of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. 13
This limitation on successive writs is certainly important and valuable from a court management
perspective, but it also places an additional barrier to successful claims of actual innocence for
those who were convicted of crimes using science that, years later, is found to be invalid. Such
was the case for those who were convicted in part due to comparative bullet-lead analysis.
One of the methods previously used by the FBI to link a criminal to a crime scene was to
match the composition of bullets found at the crime scene to bullets in possession of the suspect.
The theory was that bullets that were manufactured together would match each other chemically,
allowing investigators to conclude that a crime scene bullet could have come from a particular
box of bullets. Questions were raised about this methodology, however, and in 2004 the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released the results of a study on the technique. 14 The
results revealed that comparative bullet-lead analysis was shaky at best. The NAS stated, “In
practice, the detailed process followed by each manufacturer varies, and the process can vary

12

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 § 3(d) (Vernon 2010).
Id. § 4(a).
14
COMM. ON SCI. ASSESSMENT OF BULLET LEAD ELEMENTAL COMPOSITION COMPARISON, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.,
FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE (The National Academies Press 2004), available at
http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10924&page=1.
13

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even within a single manufacturer to meet demand.” 15 They found that some manufacturers
boxed bullets together, others only boxed bullets when an order was placed, and still others
added lead to the melt throughout the manufacturing process. These practices lead to a variety of
bullet compositions in each box of ammunition. The NAS stated, “In fact, the FBI’s own
research has shown that a single box of ammunition can contain bullets from as many as 14
distinct compositional groups.” 16 For these reasons, the NAS concluded that “the available data
do not support any statement that a crime bullet came from a particular box of ammunition,”
“Compositional analysis of bullet lead data alone also does not permit any definitive statement
concerning the date of bullet manufacture,” and “detailed patterns of the distribution of
ammunition are unknown, and as a result, experts should not testify as to the probability that the
crime scene bullet came from the defendant.” 17 Based on these findings, the convictions of
hundreds of people who had comparative bullet-lead analysis evidence presented against them
were called into question, including several cases in which convictions were overturned. 18
Although the weaknesses of old methods of comparative bullet-lead analysis have been
exposed, technology develops in ways such that new tests can often render older methods
obsolete or even erroneous. To help address defendants who may be affected by scientific
developments in the future, the Panel looked to the literature to identify recommended practices
related to post-conviction forensic testing that may guide the discussion of reform to existing
Texas law.
Recommended Practices
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence

15

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5.
17
Id. at 7.
18
John Solomon, FBI’s Forensic Test Full of Holes, WASH. POST, Nov. 1 2007, at A01.
16

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In 1999, under the leadership of Attorney General Janet Reno, the National Commission
on the Future of DNA Evidence released its publication, Postconviction DNA Testing:
Recommendations for Handling Requests. In it, the group outlined five categories of cases that
contain claims of actual innocence and request DNA testing and suggested responses for each
category. The categories are as follows:
•

Category 1. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected and still
exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, exclusionary results
will exonerate the petitioner. In these cases, prosecutors and defense counsel should
concur on the need for DNA testing.

•

Category 2. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected and still
exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, exclusionary results
would support the petitioner’s claim of innocence, but reasonable persons might
disagree as to whether the results are exonerative. The prosecutor and defense counsel
may not agree on whether an exclusion would amount to an exoneration or would
merely constitute helpful evidence.

•

Category 3. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected and still
exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting, favorable results will
be inconclusive. Future developments may cause such a case to be reassigned to a
different category.

•

Category 4. These are cases in which biological evidence was never collected, or
cannot be found despite all efforts, or was destroyed, or was preserved in such a way
that it cannot be tested. In such a case, postconviction relief on the basis of DNA
testing is not possible.

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•

Category 5. These are cases in which a request for DNA testing is frivolous. In these
cases, prosecutors and defense counsel should generally agree that no testing is
warranted. 19

Although no states have specifically codified these categories into statute, they may well provide
guidance to defense attorneys, innocence projects, prosecutors, and judges who receive letters
from those who claim actual innocence.
One of the lessons governments have learned in the intervening decade is that one cannot
always determine which category a case falls into until after the DNA testing has been
completed. Motions for DNA testing that at one time were considered frivolous because of a
confession or an eyewitness identification may actually fall into Category 1 cases. Not only has
our knowledge and technology of DNA testing advanced, so has our knowledge of the
vulnerabilities of other investigatory practices. For these reasons, the categories outline by the
Commission may be considered as general, rather than specific, guidelines.
Regardless of whether the categories outlined by the Commission should be considered
as “hard and fast” rules, the group offered additional recommendations for prosecutors, defense
counsel, the judiciary, victim assistance, and lab personnel regarding post-conviction DNA
testing. Although each party has its own interests in a claim of actual innocence, the
Commission recommended that communication play a central role between all parties in claims
of actual innocence. For instance, it is recommended that prosecutors “provide information to
the requestor” and “consult and notify victim/witness specialists, forensic DNA experts, defense
counsel, and prosecutors experienced in DNA technologies and postconviction relief.” 20

19

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA
TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS xiii-xiv (1999), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/177626.pdf.
20
Id. at xvi.

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Defense counsel should “conduct an extensive search for evidence, consulting with prosecutors
throughout the search,” 21 and judges are encouraged to “set an informal conference with counsel
to discuss issues such as they type of DNA analysis to be used, whether it will be necessary to
test the victim’s relatives or third parties, and whether additional samples need to be obtained
from the victim.” 22 This communication can help facilitate what can sometimes be a contentious
process for all stakeholders involved.
American Bar Association
Post-conviction DNA testing guidance is provided by the American Bar Association in
two documents. 23 In Resolution No. 115, the ABA states that “all biological evidence should be
made available to defendants and convicted person upon request and, in regard to such evidence,
such defendants and convicted persons may seek appropriate relief notwithstanding any other
provision of law.” 24 Standard 16-6.1 further states that those who have been convicted of serious
crimes should be granted post-conviction DNA tests if testing that was unavailable at the time of
the trial has become available or there is reason to believe that the testing conducted at trial is
now unreliable. 25
Like Texas statute, the ABA suggests that those who have pleaded guilty to a crime
should not be barred from post-conviction DNA testing. The ABA recommendations include an
additional provision that “the application should be denied unless the person, after consultation
with counsel, files a sworn statement declaring that he or she is innocent of the crime, did not

21

Id.
Id.
23
For information on the ABA’s recommendations on post-conviction matters generally, see ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES (2d ed., 1978), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/postconviction_toc.html. See also ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DNA EVIDENCE § 16-6.1
cmt. (3d ed., 2006) (quoting ABA House of Delegates Resolution No. 115 (August 2000)), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/ dnaevidence.pdf
24
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 23.
25
Id. § 16-6.1(a)(i)
22

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have the culpability necessary to be subjected to the death penalty, or did not engage in the
aggravating conduct that caused a mandatory sentence or sentence enhancement.” 26 While
Texas does not require this sworn statement, as described above, the judge in a Texas motion
must make finding on whether there is evidence to be tested and whether that evidence would
have sufficiently exonerated the defendant so that they would not have been convicted at trial if
that evidence had been available to jurors. DNA will only be tested in cases that meet both these
(and several other) criteria.
The American Bar Association made additional recommendations in Report to the House
of Delegates 111B 27 that “training in forensic science for attorneys should be made available at
minimal cost to ensure adequate representation for both the public and defendants.” 28 The Panel
would like to commend the Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit, chaired by Panel member and
Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Barbara Hervey, for leading efforts to train defense attorneys,
prosecutors, and judges on this very issue. The Panel would like to encourage stakeholders in
the criminal justice system to take full advantage of the training offered to them through the
Criminal justice Integrity Unit and other organizations.
Other Stakeholder Organizations
Policy and advocate organizations have also provided recommended practices related to
post-conviction DNA testing. For example, The Justice Project says that “states should ensure
that all inmates with a DNA-based innocence claim may petition for DNA testing at any time
and without regard to plea, confession, self-implication, the nature of the crime, or previous

26

Id. § 16-6.1(b)(2).
A.B.A. Section of Criminal Justice, Report to the House of Delegates No. 111B (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/policy/am04111b.doc.
28
Id. at 1.
27

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unfavorable test results.” 29 The organization also calls for stronger rules for evidence
preservation and standardized post-testing procedures, access to counsel and independent
forensic labs, and a requirement for judges to grant motions when the results of DNA tests would
provide exculpatory evidence or evidence of diminished culpability. The Innocence Project
similarly argues, among other considerations, that petitioners should be allowed “access to postconviction DNA testing wherever it can establish innocence, even if the petitioner is no longer
incarcerated, and including cases where the petitioner pled guilty or provided a confession or
admission to the crime.” 30 Each of these organizations provides recommendations that come
from the “on the ground” work of providing representation to those who make innocence claims
or the study of known cases of wrongful conviction.
Although the above recommended practices all relate specifically to post-conviction
DNA testing, several states have incorporated broader provisions into statute that provide
avenues for other types of post-conviction forensic tests. Idaho 31 and Minnesota, 32 for example,
allow petitions for DNA or fingerprint testing on evidence that was not previously tested or
tested with older methods. Illinois also permits Integrated Ballistic Identification System
testing, 33 and Arkansas permits fingerprinting, DNA testing, or “other tests which may become
available through advances in technology to demonstrate the person’s actual innocence.” 34
Recommended Practices Specific to Texas Law
During the last legislative session in 2009, two bills were introduced to increase postconviction access to the courts. Since the original post-conviction DNA testing statute passed,
29

THE JUSTICE PROJECT. IMPROVING ACCESS TO POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING: A POLICY REVIEW 3 (2008),
available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/post-convictiondna-fin.pdf.
30
The Innocence Project. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/304.php# (last visited July 20, 2010).
31
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4902 (2010).
32
See MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2010).
33
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2010).
34
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (West 2010).

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Texas has learned a great deal about how the innocent are convicted of crimes they did not
commit and the opportunities they need to prove their innocence. Dallas County has also
provided insight into how the innocent can continue to slip through the cracks, even with a postconviction statute, through the formation of a Conviction Integrity Unit in the district attorney’s
office that works in conjunction with the Innocence Project of Texas. 35 Created in 2007, the
Unit’s “charge is to examine more than 400 cases in which DNA testing was denied by a
court.” 36 The project is the first of its kind in the nation, and the collaboration has led to several
DNA exonerations, as well as the state’s first non-DNA actual innocence exonerations. 37 The
two post-conviction reform bills that could have addressed some of our increased knowledge did
not pass due to procedural time requirements at the end of the session, but the Panel agreed that
both were important starting points for conversation on how Texas can best address and rectify
wrongful convictions in the state.
The first bill, SB 1864, 38 went uncontested and was voted unanimously out of Senate and
House committees. SB 1864 would have amended §64.01, the motion for post-conviction DNA
testing, to provide “that a motion could be made for DNA testing if the material was not
previously subjected to testing, no matter the reason testing was not done, if the other stated
conditions were met.” 39 Supporters of the bill argued that this change was necessary because
although “current law provides that untested material can be tested if it is in the interests of
justice. . . [,] an unsympathetic judge still could deny the motion, even where material went

35

The Conviction Integrity Unit’s webpage is available at http://www.dallasda.com/conviction-integrity.html.
Green & Yaroshefsky, supra note 9, at 494.
37
Christopher Scott and Claude Simmons were exonerated after a confession from the true perpetrator of the capital
murder for which Scott and Simmons were convicted. Ex parte Scott, No. W97-02028-QH(A) (Dist. Ct. No. 1,
Dallas County, Tex. Oct. 23, 2009).
38
Tex. S.B. 1864, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (authored by Sen. Rodney Ellis and sponsored by Rep. Scott Hochberg).
39
House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1864, 81st Leg., R.S. at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba81r/sb1864.pdf#navpanes=0.
36

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untested due to failure on the part of the defense attorney rather than the defendant.” 40 Thus,
although the bill would preserve the judicial authority to rule on whether to grant post-conviction
DNA motions, the door would be opened wider to those who may apply for the testing.
One of the concerns prior to implementation of the original Chapter 64 language was a
“floodgate” concern—that once the doors to the courts were open for post-conviction DNA
testing, they would be flooded with requests for testing. While there has certainly been an
increase in the number of requests for this type of testing, most counties have not seen any
requests, much less an abundance of requests. A Chapter 64 survey of the state’s 154 felony
offices conducted by the Task Force on Indigent Defense revealed that the 75 responsive
departments received 1132 motions for post-conviction DNA testing between January 1, 2001
and April 2010. 41 Urban counties (including Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, and Travis) received
almost 87 percent of those motions, while rural counties received just 5 percent. Further, only
125 of those motions were granted, meaning that tests were conducted in only one percent of the
cases. Those tests lead to 23 exclusive findings and 18 exonerations. 42
Additional provisions in the bill would require unidentified DNA profiles revealed
through post-conviction DNA testing to be compared with profiles stored in the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) database. This would potentially
allow the state to identify a true perpetrator in the case of a revealed wrongful conviction and
reveal the threat to public safety that is posed by wrongful conviction. For example, of the 255
DNA exonerations across the country, 94 actual perpetrators have been identified in 111 cases.
Forty-four of those actual perpetrators went on to commit 91 additional crimes—61 sexual

40

Id.
Tex. Task Force on Indigent Def., Survey of Texas Felony Offices and Chapter 64 Motions [page #] (2010) (on
file with Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense).
42
Id.
41

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assaults, 21 murders, and 9 other violent crimes—while the innocent suspect was behind bars. 43
Identifying these culprits not only helps to prove the innocence of the wrongfully convicted, it
also helps to bring justice to the victims of the crimes that originally resulted in the wrongful
conviction.
A second bill from the 81st legislative session, SB 1976, would have addressed those who
had been convicted of crimes using science that had since been discredited. 44 According to the
House Research Organization, the bill “would authorize courts to grant relief on writs of habeas
corpus that, subject to criteria in the bill, raised relevant scientific evidence that was not available
at the time of a trial or that discredited scientific evidence relief on by the prosecution at a
trial.” 45 The language also provided that petitioners could file this writ even if a previous writ of
habeas corpus had been made. This provision is important because many writs of habeas corpus
“are filed without an attorney or soon after a conviction.” 46 Without the ability to file a writ that
is based on science, inmates may lose the opportunity to demonstrate that the science that
convicted them previously has since been disproved.
Although some may argue that the writ is unnecessary because those who have been
wrongfully convicted may take advantage of the procedures for writs of habeas corpus that
already exist, supporters of the bill stated that “it is clear that the current procedure is

43

E-mail from Nicole Harris, Policy Analyst, The Innocence Project, to Jennifer Willyard, Grant Program
Specialist, Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense (July 6, 2010) (on file with Texas Task Force on Indigent
Defense).
44
See Tex. S.B. 1976, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (authored by Sen. John Whitmire and co-authored by Sen. Juan
Hinojosa). See also Tex. H.B. 3579, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009) (companion bill, authored by Rep. Pete Gallego, who
also sponsored the Senate bill). Although the bill received unanimous passage from both the Senate Criminal
Justice and House Criminal Jurisprudence committees, there was one witness who testified against the bill (Harris
County District Attorney’s Office) and one who registered against the bill (Lubbock County District Attorney’s
Office) during the Senate committee hearing. Senate Comm. on Criminal Justice, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1976,
81st Leg., R.S. (2009). There was no opposition to the bill during the House committee hearing. . House Comm.
on Criminal Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 3579, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
45
House Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 1976, 81st Leg., R.S. at 2 (2009), available at
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/pdf/ba81r/sb1976.pdf#navpanes=0.
46
Id. at 3.

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inadequate.” 47 Examination of the rates of DNA exonerations before and after implementation
of the motion for post-conviction DNA testing provides us with insight into the effectiveness of
specific, rather than general, avenues to claim actual innocence in the Texas court system. In the
decade between the admission of DNA evidence into Texas courts and the creation of the
Chapter 64 motion, twelve wrongful convictions were revealed through post-conviction DNA
testing. Twenty-nine DNA exonerations have occurred in the years since. 48 While some of this
is certainly due to advances in technology, a standardized motion helps to facilitate the process
through the courts. Other areas of forensic science, such as bullet lead comparison and arson
investigations, have advanced, but those who may have been wrongfully convicted through old
scientific methods do not currently have the same standardized method to access the courts.
Governor’s Criminal Justice Advisory Council
Comprised of elected officials, judges, attorneys, and other stakeholders, the Governor’s
Criminal Justice Advisory Council (CJAC) was established in 2005 to advise the Governor on
the adequacy of criminal procedures at all stages of the criminal justice system. 49
In January 2006, CJAC released a report of recommended reforms to Governor Rick Perry. 50
The Council’s report included two proposals on the subject of post-conviction writs and DNA
testing.
The Council recommended that the legislature revise the Procedure After Conviction
Without Death Penalty51 to include additional judicial discretion and additional forensic testing

47

Id. at 3-4.
See generally Daryl E. Harris, By Any Means Necessary: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Texas’ DNA Testing Law
in the Adjudication of Free-Standing Claims of Actual Innocence, 6 SCHOLAR 121 (2003).
49
Rick Perry, Governor, State of Texas, Address to the Texas Daily Newspaper Association (March 14, 2005),
available at http://governor.state.tx.us/news/speech/9963/.
50
GOVERNOR’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, JANUARY 2006 REPORT (2006) (on file with the Texas Task
Force on Indigent Defense).
51
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 2010).
48

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paid by the state or a defendant with retained counsel. 52 The council also proposed in the report
that the Motions for Forensic DNA Testing 53 be amended to include “good cause” for ordering
and for State’s paying for DNA testing at laboratories other than the Texas Department of Public
Safety (DPS). 54 Both of these recommendations were subsequently passed into law by the Texas
Legislature in 2007. 55
Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit
The Texas Criminal Justice Integrity Unit (TCJIU) is an ad hoc committee created in
2008 by Judge Barbara Hervey of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. The committee was
founded to review the Texas criminal justice system and produce significant reform through
education, training, and legislative recommendations. The TCJIU has proposed policy reforms
regarding crime laboratory reliability and the auditing of DPS labs in order to hold them
accountable for compliance with professional standards. 56 The committee also supported a bill 57
that passed in 2009, establishing a system to enhance the preservation and storage of biological
evidence. 58 At this time, the TCJIU has not made any specific policy recommendations
regarding post-conviction writs and procedures for DNA testing.

52

GOVERNOR’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 14.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03 (Vernon 2010).
54
GOVERNOR’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 47, at 15.
55
See Tex. H.B. 681, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
56
TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 7 (2008), available at
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/tcjiu/reports/TCJIU-2008-report.pdf.; TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT,
2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 7 (2009), available at http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/tcjiu/reports/TCJIU2009-report.pdf.
57
Tex. H.B. 3594, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
58
TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTEGRITY UNIT, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF ACTIVITIES 7-8 (2009).
53

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Chapter 5: The Feasibility of Establishing an Innocence Commission

I knew I was innocent. Hardly anybody else did. 1

Panel Recommendations
After meeting with representatives from the defense bar, judiciary, law enforcement
agencies, prosecutor offices, and the innocence projects at the four state university law schools,
the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful Convictions makes the following
recommendations:
10. The State of Texas should formalize the current work of the innocence projects that
receive state funding to provide further detail in the projects’ annual reports and
distribute those reports to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker of the
House, and Chairs of the Senate Jurisprudence, House Corrections, House Criminal
Jurisprudence and Senate Criminal Justice Committees. Report input should be
solicited from other innocence projects, interested bar associations, judicial entities,
law enforcement agencies, prosecutor associations, and advocacy organizations.
In 2005, the Texas Legislature provided that funds are directed to the state’s public law
schools to support the work of the innocence projects. The Texas Task Force on Indigent
Defense administers an $800,000 biennial allocation to the Texas Tech University, the
University of Houston, the University of Texas at Austin, and Texas Southern University. One
accountability component of this funding provides that the innocence projects issue an annual
1

Dave Montgomery, Timothy Cole Panel Questions the Creation of a Texas Innocence Commission, FT. WORTH
STAR TELEGRAM, Apr. 23, 2010 (quoting Texas exoneree Stephen Phillips’ remarks to the Timothy Cole Advisory
Panel on Wrongful Convictions), available at http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/04/22/2136725/timothy-colepanel-questions-the.html.

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report to the Task Force that documents the number of students who participate in the program
and the number of requests received, screened, investigated, litigated, or rejected. The Panel
recommends that this report be filed jointly and amended to include analysis of the requests and
cases received, investigated, and litigated to identify any systemic criminal justice issues that are
revealed by claims of actual innocence. The Panel further recommends that this report be
presented to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Speaker, Senate Jurisprudence, House
Corrections, House Criminal Jurisprudence and Senate Criminal Justice Committees so that
legislators may be advised of any criminal justice issues that may require reform through
legislation. Input in those reports should further be solicited from other innocence projects,
interested bar associations, judicial entities, law enforcement agencies, prosecutor associations,
and advocacy organizations, and may address topics such as showups and informant testimony.
Following a Panel workgroup meeting, the innocence projects began to take steps that
would allow the projects to coordinate on their activities and would leave them well-situated to
meet this requirement. In May, representatives from the projects met to discuss the creation of a
coalition of innocence projects. They will begin monthly phone meetings and work to
standardize their forms and policies and procedures, as well as to discuss areas of needed reform.
These plans will allow the projects to present a united front on innocence-related reforms in
Texas. 2
11. The State of Texas should provide an FTE for the Task Force using the current
appropriation or other grant funding to administer these responsibilities, and
contracts between the innocence projects and the Task Force on Indigent Defense
should be amended to reflect the new administrator and additional responsibilities.
2

Email from Whitney Stark, Communications Director, Innocence Project of Texas, to Jennifer Willyard, Grant
Program Specialist, Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense (June 2, 2010) (on file with Texas Task Force on
Indigent Defense).

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Because the innocence projects are located in geographically diverse areas and have
many responsibilities to their students and the cases they investigate, the Panel recommends that
a full-time employee position be created that is dedicated to the coordination and administration
of the innocence projects. This FTE will further help the innocence projects meet the
recommendations listed above and serve to organize and audit the funding received from the
Task Force. The Panel recommends that the FTE be housed at the Task Force to encourage
equal utilization by the four projects, as should be reflected in amended contracts between the
projects and the Task Force.

Panel Report
Introduction
One of ways in which wrongful convictions can be prevented is for parties to study the
causes of error in cases of wrongful conviction and use those findings to enact policy reform.
These reforms will help to prevent those same errors from occurring in the future. The
possibility of establishing an innocence commission in Texas has been under consideration for
several years, with legislation filed in however many sessions. The debate was featured by the
House Research Organization (HRO) in 2008, with arguments laid out both for and against. 3
Questions have concerned how to establish a commission; the makeup of the commission and
method of appointment; the duties, power, and independence of a commission; and the quantity
and source of funding needed to create and sustain a commission. The HRO noted that the
conversation in Texas has generally “revolved around creating a commission that would study
cases after an exoneration, not one that would examine claims of innocence. . . .” 4 Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Texas, Wallace Jefferson, has supported this type of commission, while
3

Innocence Commission Debated in Texas, INTERIM NEWS (Tex. House Res. Org., Austin, Tex.), June 18, 2008 (No.
80-5), at 1, available at http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/interim/int80-5.pdf.
4
Id. at 4.

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Governor Rick Perry and Presiding Judge Sharon Keller of the Court of Criminal Appeals are
interested in learning how wrongful convictions occur and prevent those errors before an
innocent person is convicted. 5
Several states have established innocence commissions under a variety of formats to
achieve these ends. For example, study commissions like the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on
Wrongful Convictions have been created in California, Connecticut, Illinois, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin. North Carolina additionally created an innocence commission to
investigate claims of wrongful conviction (similar to the Criminal Cases Review Commission in
the United Kingdom), and an extra-governmental innocence commission made up of academic
and non-profit groups has been established in Virginia. The New York State Bar Associations
has also taken on this responsibility through the creation of a task force. The Panel reviewed the
approaches taken by other states and countries in order to determine if an innocence commission
is feasible for the State of Texas. Following a workgroup meeting with representatives from the
innocence projects, the Panel recommends formalization of the work already underway by
innocence projects.
Study Commissions
Several states have passed legislation creating commissions to study the causes of
wrongful conviction and recommend policies to prevent those errors in the future. For example,
the study commission established in Illinois made 85 recommendations to ensure that the system
of capital punishment was fair and just, but their recommendations on issues such as eyewitness
identification procedures and recorded interrogations speak to the larger criminal justice system. 6
The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice used a combination of
5

Id.
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT (2002), available at
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/summary_recommendations.pdf

6

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meetings and public hearings to make recommendations on a variety of subjects including
eyewitness identification, false confessions, informant testimony, problems with forensic
science, and others. The Advisory Commission on Wrongful Convictions made similar
recommendations for the state of Connecticut in the areas of false confessions and eyewitness
identification procedures.
Study commissions generally do not investigate claims of actual innocence, but rather
examine known (usually through post-conviction DNA results) cases of wrongful conviction. In
addition, study commissions are sometimes created to expire at a time certain. For example, this
Panel and the Task Force on Indigent Defense must deliver their final report to the Governor and
Legislature on or before January 1, 2011. In contrast, the study commission authorized by the
legislature in Pennsylvania in 2006 continues to conduct research has yet to issue a final report,
although a report is expected in summer of 2010. 7
One advantage of study commission is that, like innocence commissions, they are
comprised of a wide variety of criminal justice stakeholders including judges, academic
researchers, prosecutors and defense attorneys, law enforcement, spiritual and other community
leaders, representatives for governors’ and attorneys general offices, or state legislators. This
helps to ensure that the recommendations are based on the broadest level of consensus possible
and that those who have the power to implement or enact those changes are party to the research
and recommendation process. Another benefit is that study commissions are inexpensive. As

7

Email from Marissa Boyers Bluestine, Legal Director, Innocence Project of Pennsylvania, to Jennifer Willyard,
Grant Program Specialist, Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense (July 29, 2010) (on file with Texas Task Force on
Indigent Defense).

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the Innocence Project stated, participation in a study commission is often “consistent with most
members’ existing work, and in many cases can simply be an extension of their existing jobs.” 8
A disadvantage of the study commission method is that it is generally a one-shot
approach to wrongful conviction reform. Newly discovered systemic or evidentiary errors that
arise in the criminal justice system may require the creation of a new study commission if
support for reform cannot be generated through the legislative process. A second disadvantage is
that study commissions generally do not investigate claims of actual innocence; rather they study
cases where errors have already been revealed in order to recommend ways to prevent those
errors.
Innocence Commissions
In the United States, only North Carolina has established an operating innocence
commission that actively investigates claims of wrongful conviction. 9 The North Carolina
Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) was signed into law in August of 2006 following
recommendations by the North Carolina Chief Justice’s Criminal Justice Study Commission in
2002. Made up of eight members from the judiciary, law enforcement, prosecution, defense, the
victims’ rights community, and the public, “the commission and its staff carefully review
evidence and investigate cases in a non-advocatory, fact-finding manner.” 10
Cases reviewed by the NCIIC follow a three-step process: review, investigation, and
hearing. Upon receipt of a claim of innocence, it is evaluated to determine whether it meets the
criteria set by the Commission, upon which time it enters the review process. During review,
8

The Innocence Project, Criminal Justice Reform Commissions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/248.php#
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
9
Although Connecticut passed a bill authorizing a similar commission, the members voted for a broader focus and
instead issued the report noted above. The Innocence Project, Innocence Commissions in the U.S.,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/415.php (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
10
NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE 2009-2010 LONG SESSION OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 3 (2009), available at http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/Report2009.htm.

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information about the facts of the case and the claim of innocence are gathered. If the claim still
meets statutory requirements, it proceeds to the investigation phase. NCIIS states, “Investigation
is a detailed and lengthy process that involves interviewing witnesses, obtaining affidavits,
seeking court orders for evidence, testing of physical evidence, and compiling of
documentation.” 11 The investigation may be stopped at any time if it is revealed that the claim
no longer meets the statutory criteria. In the case of the NCIIS, all claims must involve felony
cases; they must make claim of “complete factual innocence;” 12 and new, credible, and verifiable
evidence of innocence must be available.
If the claim withstands these criteria, it will move to the first of two hearing phases. In
the first, the claim and evidence of actual innocence are presented before all NCIIS members,
and the Commissioners determine whether to send the claim to a three-judge panel for a final
hearing. At that hearing, the panel decides whether to dismiss the conviction. The first threepanel hearing was held in 2008. Three total hearings have been held, with one ending in
exoneration.
As of May 2010, the Commission reported the following number of cases in each phase:
NCIIS Case Statistics 13
Number of General Information Requests
Number of Cases Currently in Review
Number of Cases Rejected
Number of Cases Currently in Investigation
Number of Cases Currently in Formal Inquiry
Number of Cases in Hearing

84
128
532
4
5
3
(two cases are now closed)

Exonerations
Total Number of Cases

1
756

11

Id.
Id.
13
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, Statistics, http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/statistics.htm
(last visited Aug. 2, 2010).
12

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NCIIS also reported that their Fiscal Year 2010 budget was $372,879, and additional funds were
received through a federal grant. 14 This is comparable to the amount Texas pays to the four
innocence projects located at state universities, as described below.
Innocence Projects
Innocence projects are non-profit organizations that often work in conjunction with law
schools to investigate claims of actual innocence. Students from law schools, forensic science
programs, or journalism schools may participate in clinics to review claims received from
inmates; screen the claims and send questionnaires; conduct any necessary investigations; and
prepare motions for DNA or other tests, petitions for clemency, and writs of habeas corpus.
In Texas, state funds are provided to four innocence projects located at the four state
university law schools: 1) Innocence Project of Texas as Texas Tech University, 2) Texas
Innocence Network at the University of Houston, 3) Texas Center for Actual Innocence at the
University of Texas at Austin, and 4) the Thurgood Marshall Innocence Project at Texas
Southern University. Each of the four innocence projects is eligible to receive reimbursement of
expenditures up to $100,000 per year. They secure additional funding for expenditures through
grants and donations.
The most recent report shows that between September 1, 2004 and August 31, 2009, the
four projects received innocence claims from over 12,000 cases that met the selection criteria.
The offenses ranged from capital murder (473 cases) to sexual assault of a child (1,373 cases) to
felony DWI (65 cases). As of August 31, 2009, the projects reported the following status of
those cases: 15

14

North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, Reference Materials, http://www.innocencecommissionnc.gov/reference%20materials.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2010)
15
Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, Innocence Project, http://innocence.tamu.edu/CaseEntry/
SummaryReport.asp (last visited Aug. 2, 2010).

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Texas Innocence Projects’ Case Statistics
Case Status
Case Open: Pending initial review

TSU Tech U of H
52
51
77

Case Open: Questionnaire Sent

UT Total
164
344

9

3

78

502

592

18

396

1,191

226

1,831

Case Open: Under investigation

0 1,137

263

247

1,647

Case Open: In pursuit of legal remedy

0

2

2

13

1,828 2,283

6,726

Case Open: Initial review completed

Case Closed: Rejected

9

49 2,566

Case Closed: Rejected with Investigation

0

225

89

206

520

Case Closed: Referred to other institution

4

244

6

205

459

Case Open: Conviction overturned, pending result

0

0

0

0

0

Case Closed: Conviction Overturned

0

3

0

0

3

Case Closed: Conviction Sustained

0

0

0

4

4

Case Closed: Clemency

0

1

0

0

1

Although innocence projects rely greatly on students and have often lacked resources and
funding, 16 the projects in Texas have accomplished a great deal, including the posthumous
exoneration of Timothy Cole.
Analysis
Although the predominant model of post-conviction investigation in the United States is
the innocence project, the United Kingdom’s adoption of the Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC) has provided scholars with a way to compare and contrast the two systems.
Increased creation of innocence projects in the United Kingdom further augments the
comparison.
The CCRC has developed a three-stage review process to evaluate claims it receives.
Although commissions and innocence projects in the United States as a rule only accept claims

16

Stephanie Roberts & Lynn Weathered, Assisting the Factually Innocent: The Contradictions and Compatibility of
Innocence Project and the Criminal Cases Review Commission, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (2009).

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of actual innocence, the CCRC also accepts claims and may reject “unsafe” convictions. 17 In
stage one, applications are reviewed for eligibility. Claimants who have not exhausted their
appeals are ineligible for case review under the CCRC. A case manager and commissioner are
assigned in stage two, and police are employed if an investigation is needed. Stage three of the
CCRC process is the “real probability” test, 18 in which the case manager and commissioner
determine whether there is “‘more than an outside chance that the conviction will be found
unsafe.” 19 If the application fails to meet that test, the review is complete. If, however, the
application does meet that test, it proceeds to a panel of three commissioners who must
unanimously vote to send the case to the Court of Appeals. At that time, the CCRC’s
involvement ends, and the case is turned over to attorneys who will handle the appeal.
Compared to the United States court system, the system in the United Kingdom is more
liberal in adopting an inquisitorial process, accepting new evidence post-conviction, reviewing
claims of unsafe convictions, and overturning jury verdicts. This difference is also reflected in
how each system legally defines the task associated with wrongful convictions. Whereas the
United Kingdom “defines the problem as righting miscarriages of justice,” the United States
“defines it as correcting factually erroneous convictions.” 20 For these reasons, the United
Kingdom’s definition “has necessarily led to some mechanisms that might not be appropriate
under the narrower U.S. definition. . . .” 21 Some have recommended a CCRC- or NCIIC-like
body for all states, but these organizations have not been free from criticism. For example, the
CCRC experienced significant delays in reviewing claims of innocence. The Chairman of the

17

Id.
Lissa Griffin, Correcting Injustice: Studying How the United Kingdom and the United States Review Claims of
Innocence, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 107, 113 (2009).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 150.
21
Id.
18

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Commission reported in 2006 that it would take five years to relieve the backlog of cases in
queue. 22 The CCRC has also been criticized for its dependence on police to conduct its
investigations, 23 in part because it requires officers to re-investigate old crimes and reduces their
availability to investigate contemporary crimes. For these reasons (and perhaps others),
innocence projects continue to serve a valuable role in both the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Even with innocence commissions, innocence projects continue to play a vital role in
legal education and policy reform. Students involved in the projects learn writing and critical
thinking skills, how to conduct investigations and organize those findings into the law, and
ethical considerations related to the wrongfully convicted and victims of crime. 24 Moreover, the
work and research of the innocence projects is valuable information to policy makers and
legislators in helping craft effective legislation. Various representatives of the innocence
projects in Texas, for example, have served as a resource to the Texas Legislature and provided
information to improve eyewitness identification procedures, exoneree compensation, postconviction proceedings, and the bill that created the Timothy Cole Advisory Panel on Wrongful
Convictions. The founders of the Innocence Project of New York, Barry Scheck and Peter
Neufeld, do not discount the contributions made by their project and others, but they argue more
needs to be done and have called for the creation of innocence commissions in the United
States. 25

22

Roberts & Weathered, supra note 16.
Griffin, supra note 18, at 113.
24
Roberts & Weathered, supra note 16.
25
Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence Commissions” in America, 86
JUDICATURE 98 (2002).
23

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Innocence Commission Debate in Texas
To help further the conversation on innocence commissions in Texas, the Panel invited
representatives from the innocence projects at the four state universities to join a Panel
workgroup meeting on April 21, 2010. Together, the workgroup meeting participants suggested
a unique approach for the State of Texas. Instead of creating an innocence commission to
perpetuate the study of wrongful convictions, the Panel and innocence projects suggested an
approach that would formalize the work currently underway by the innocence projects.
Supporters of an innocence commission have suggested that innocence projects “focus on
individual cases and should not be depended on to examine systemic issues,” but each of those
cases provides insight into the systemic issues that may contribute to wrongful conviction. In
addition, the innocence projects provide a report of their activities to the Task Force each year as
part of the statute that provides state funding to the projects. By augmenting this report and
holding formal interim hearings on their findings, the State can benefit from knowledge of both
individual and systemic issues that require reform to prevent wrongful convictions. As nonprofits, innocence projects can further inform policy makers on behalf of those initiatives,
something that a governmental agency is limited in what it can do. Taken together, the Panel
believes that these recommendations will provide a novel approach to the study of wrongful
convictions that fits the unique association between the State of Texas and innocence projects.

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Although the Panel did not take action on informant testimony recommendations, the
Panel voted to incorporate the material below into the research document for future
consideration by the innocence projects or other wrongful conviction study commissions.
Chapter 6: Jailhouse Informant Testimony

I. Introduction
Since the end of the moratorium on capital punishment in the 1970s, 111 death row inmates
have been exonerated. 1 Accounting for 45.9 percent of those cases, jailhouse informant cases are
the leading cause of wrongful convictions in U.S. capital cases. 2 Wrongful convictions based on
jailhouse informant testimony occur for a number of reasons. First, because a jailhouse
informant can receive compensation in the form of a reduced sentence or a preferable prison
transfer, he has a strong incentive to come forward to authorities. 3 This incentive is coupled with
the small probability that the informant will be prosecuted for perjury if he is later found to have
fabricated the confession. These factors create an atmosphere of unreliability surrounding the
testimony of a jailhouse informant. Second, while cross-examination is thought to be
fundamental to uncovering the truth in the American justice system, many times defense
attorneys simply do not have the necessary pretrial information to conduct an effective crossexamination of a jailhouse informant. These pretrial disclosures can include such things as a
jailhouse informants’ criminal history, any prior inconsistent statements made to the authorities,
any benefit the informant is receiving for his or her testimony, and whether or not he or she has
ever testified as an informant in any other cases. Despite this, most states have failed to pass
1

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CENTER ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, THE SNITCH SYSTEM: HOW
SNITCH TESTIMONY SENT RANDY STEIDL AND OTHER INNOCENT AMERICANS TO DEATH ROW 3 (2004).
2
Id; see also Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 543-44 (2005) (explaining that roughly 50 percent of wrongful murder convictions involved
perjurious testimony, usually by jailhouse informants or other witnesses who received benefits for their testimony).
3
Because men make up approximately 93 percent of the prison population, this chapter uses the male pronoun when
referring to jailhouse informants. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2008 2 (2009). That is not to say
that every jailhouse informant is a man. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE INNOCENT MAN (2006) (in John Grisham’s
nonfiction book regarding a wrongful conviction in Oklahoma, the jailhouse informant was a woman).

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comprehensive legislation regarding the use of jailhouse informants. 4 Third, sometimes law
enforcement suffers from the syndrome of “falling in love with their snitch.” 5 This may
subconsciously cause tunnel vision in police and prosecutors, and make them focus only on the
defendant as the true perpetrator. 6 Despite mitigating evidence or the obvious unreliability of an
informant, police officers and prosecutors still might construe this information in a way that
confirms their original decisions. This section will overview the research and best practices on
the use of jailhouse informant testimony, examine the reforms adopted by other states and
current practices in Texas, and make a recommendation on the best policy for our state.
II. Current Practice in Other States and the Federal Government
A. California
California, like the federal government, regulate jailhouse informant testimony through
guidelines for prosecutors. A number of state and federal courts also have established rules to
regulate the use of jailhouse informant testimony. In addition, many states have statutes
regarding the use of accomplice testimony.
The California Department of Justice guidelines require prior approval by the senior assistant
attorney general before jailhouse informant testimony is used and lists a number of factors that
must be taken into consideration in making the decision. The guidelines require a written finding
of approval for the use of the testimony. Even if the jailhouse informant is only intended to be
used for investigative purposes, the California Department of Justice still requires prior approval

4

See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a (2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (Supp. 2009); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.075 (Vernon 2009).
5
See Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitching Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 107, 111-12 (2006).
6
See generally Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases,
2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006).

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based upon the reliability of the information in order to secure a warrant. One important factor
that must be considered is whether corroborative evidence exists.
B. Illinois
The State of Illinois has already taken steps to require certain disclosure when prosecutors
plan to use jailhouse informant testimony in capital cases. 7 The Illinois statute requires that
before the prosecution can use the testimony of a jailhouse informant in a capital case, they must
first make a series of discovery disclosures to the defense. 8 These disclosures include: (1) the
complete criminal history of the informant; (2) any “deal, promise, inducement, or benefit” the
prosecutor has made or will make with the informant; (3) the statements made by the accused;
(4) the time and place of the statements, the time and place of their disclosure to law
enforcement, and the names of all individuals present when the statements were made; (5)
whether the informant has ever recanted and if so, the time and place of the recantation, the
nature of the recantation, and the names of all people present at the recantation; (6) other cases
the informant has testified in and any promises, or inducements he received for that testimony;
and (7) any other information relevant to the informant’s credibility. 9 On top of these pretrial
disclosures, the prosecution must also disclose their intent to use the testimony of an informant. 10
The Illinois statute also requires pretrial reliability hearings in front of the judge when a
prosecutor plans to use jailhouse informant testimony in a capital murder case. In those
instances, the prosecution must prove that the informant’s testimony is reliable by a
preponderance of the evidence.
C. Oklahoma

7

See 725 ILCS 5/115-21 (Supp. 2009).
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
8

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In 2000, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma issued its opinion in Dodd v. State. 11 To ensure
defense attorneys are prepared to cross-examine jailhouse informants, the court expressly
required that prosecutors disclose certain information at least ten days before trial. 12 The State
must disclose the following information: (1) the complete criminal history of the informant; (2)
any deal, promise, inducement, or benefit that the offering party has made or may make in the
future to the informant; (3) the specific statements made by the defendant and the time, place,
and manner of their disclosure; (4) all other cases in which the informant testified or offered
statements against an individual but was not called, whether the statements were admitted in the
case, and whether the informant received any deal, promise, inducement or benefit in exchange
for or subsequent to that testimony or statement; (5) whether at any time the informant recanted
that testimony or statement, and if so, a transcript or copy of such recantation; and (6) any other
information relevant to the informant’s credibility. 13
D. Federal Government and the ABA
While the United States Attorney General’s guidelines specifically deal with the use of
confidential informants, the guidelines also provide that certain requirements be met before
federal law enforcement agents can use a prisoner as a confidential informant. In addition,
several federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have recognized the difficulty in using jailhouse
informant testimony. As the Fifth Circuit said, “it is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to
lie then the inducement of a reduced sentence.” 14 Allowing jailhouse informantes to testify
falsely undermines the purpose of our justice system. 15 In order to combat this problem, some
11

993 P.2d 778 (2000).
Id. at 784.
13
Id.
14
U.S. v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987).
15
See Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109, 115 (9th Cir. 2001). The mission of the justice system is
“utterly derailed by unchecked lying witnesses, and by any law enforcement officer who finds it tactically
advantageous to turn a blind eye to the manifest potential for malevolent disinformation.” Id.
12

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courts recognize the importance of broad disclosure when a jailhouse informant testifies. 16 In
cases with jailhouse informant testimony, trial judges must play a more integral role in
scrutinizing the testimony. 17 This is necessary because the jury does not posses the background
knowledge to properly assess the testimony of a jailhouse informant. 18
The American Bar Association has also made recommendations concerning the use of
jailhouse informants. In its recommendation, the ABA urges law enforcement to not convict an
individual based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a jailhouse informant. The report
urges that prosecutors follow a checklist when deciding whether or not to use a jailhouse
informant.
III. Current Practice in Texas
In Texas, the first law concerning the use of in-custody informants was passed during the
81st Legislative Session in 2009. Senate Bill 1681 bill, authored by Senator Hinojosa, amended
Chapter 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding Article 38.075. 19 The bill required
independent corroboration of any testimony offered by a jailhouse informant. Thus, an
individual can no longer be convicted based solely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant.
This bill was filed without the Governor’s signature and became effective September 1, 2009. 20

16

See Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 479 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Criminals who are rewarded by the government for
their testimony are inherently untrustworthy, and their use triggers an obligation to disclose material information to
protect the defendant from being the victim of a perfidious bargain between the state and its witness.”); see also Lee
v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747, 757 (1952) (“The use of informers, accessories, accomplices, false friends, or any of the other
betrayals which are ‘dirty business' may raise serious questions of credibility. To the extent that they do, a defendant
is entitled to broad latitude to probe credibility by cross-examination and to have the issues submitted to the jury
with careful instructions.”).
17
See United States v. Swiderski, 539 F.2d 854, 860 (2nd Cir. 1976); D’Agostino v. State, 823 P.2d 283, 284 (Nev.
1991).
18
See D’Agostino, 823 P.2d at 284 (“A legally unsophisticated jury has little knowledge as to the types of pressures
and inducements that jail inmates are under to ‘cooperate’ with the state and to say anything that is ‘helpful’ to the
state’s case.”).
19
Id.
20
Program Updates & Final Legislative Wrap-Up, (Tex. Criminal Justice Coal., Austin, Tex.) 2009, at 4.

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This new law is a step in the right direction; it places the same corroboration burden on the
government as applicable to the use of accomplice testimony. 21 Accomplice testimony and
jailhouse informant testimony, however, are vastly different. When accomplices testify, they
usually make self-incriminating statements placing themselves in risk of criminal prosecution.
This creates an internal safeguard in assuring that the accomplice’s testimony is reliable. When a
jailhouse informant testifies, that safeguard no longer exists. Because the informant’s testimony
is independent from the underlying crime, he or she does not face the same self-incrimination
risk as an accomplice. The importance of ensuring the reliability of a jailhouse informant’s
testimony is therefore greater.
IV. Policy Recommendations for Future Consideration
The innocence projects or other wrongful conviction study panels may consider the following
policies relating to the use of jailhouse informants in the State of Texas:
First, at the investigative level, law enforcement should be required to adequately document
all interactions with jailhouse informants.
Second, in order for defendants to adequately prepare to cross-examine a jailhouse informant,
certain disclosures by the prosecution should first be made. Implicitly, this would impose an
affirmative duty on prosecutors to gather the required information. Disclosed material should
include such factors as statements made by the informant, rewards or benefits the informant has
or will receive for his or her testimony, whether the informant has testified against other
defendants, and any inconsistent statements made by the jailhouse informant. 22 Because the

21

Article 38.14 of the Texas Criminal Code of Procedure requires the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated
by other independent evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.14
(Vernon 2009).
22
See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 192-94
(2009).

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amount of information disclosed varies from prosecutor to prosecutor, detailed guidelines are
necessary to ensure equal treatment.
Additionally, to further improve the process, courts should conduct pretrial reliability
hearings when jailhouse informant testimony is used. 23 At this hearing, the judge would hear the
jailhouse informant’s testimony and be required to find that the testimony is sufficiently reliable
before allowing the evidence to be presented to a jury. The judge would serve a gate-keeping
function, increasing the chances that the jury would hear reliable informant testimony. Finally,
in addition to the corroboration requirements in Article 38.075 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, Texas juries should be given cautionary instructions. These instructions would tell
the jury to consider factors such as the informant’s incentive to lie, whether the informant has
testified at other trials, and any inconsistent statements the informant has provided. Currently
California, Connecticut, Montana, and Oklahoma require jury instructions when a jailhouse
informant testifies. 24
V.

Conclusion

Texas has long been a leader in imposing swift and severe criminal punishment. The
discovery of 43 DNA wrongful convictions in Texas, as well as hundreds nationwide, has led to
a call for improved procedures to promote greater evidentiary reliability. Every wrongful
conviction represents at least two tragedies—the wrongful punishment of an innocent person and
the failure to apprehend the true culprit who instead remained free to further victimize society.
23

See Id. at 194-95; THE JUSTICE PROJECT, IN-CUSTODY INFORMANT TESTIMONY: A POLICY REVIEW 3 (2007).
See State v. Patterson, 886 A.2 777, 790 (Conn. 2005); State v. Grimes, 982 P.2d 1037, 1042 (Mont. 1999); Dodd
v. State, 993 P.2d 778, 784 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1127a (2009). It should be noted,
however, that some of these states differ as to when the jury instruction is necessary. For example, Connecticut
requires a jury instruction whenever a jailhouse informant testifies, while in Montana a jury instruction is only
required when the informant testifies for personal gain rather than an “an independent law enforcement purpose.”
Compare Patterson, 886 A.2d at 790 (requiring a jury instruction when a jailhouse informant testifies), with Grimes,
982 P.2d at 1042 (holding “that when a government informant motivated by personal gain rather than some
independent law enforcement purpose provides testimony, a cautionary instruction is the more prudent course of
action”).
24

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In each case, moreover, the community was led to believe that the dangerous person had been
convicted and incarcerated, giving the community a false sense of security.
The current criminal justice system does not possess the means to ferret out the truthful
jailhouse informants from the untruthful informants. Only a handful of states have legislation
concerning the use of jailhouse informant testimony. Even in those states, the laws do not
comprehensively deal with the jailhouse informant problem. When a jailhouse informant
testifies, Texas should implement law enforcement guidelines, an affirmative duty to gather
information regarding the informant’s history, pretrial disclosure of relevant information
regarding the informant, pretrial reliability hearings, independent corroboration, and jury
instructions.

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APPENDIX A
Analysis of C.S.S.B. 117
81st Legislature

By:

Ellis

S.B. No. 117

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
relating

to

photograph

and

live

lineup

identification procedures in criminal cases.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE
STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1.
Criminal

Chapter

Procedure,

38,

is

amended

Code
by

of

adding

Article 38.20 to read as follows:
Art. 38.20.
Bill Blackwood Law
Enforcement
Management Institute
of Texas (LEMIT)
works to develop the
administrative,
analytical, and
executive skills of
current and future law
enforcement officials.

PHOTOGRAPH AND LIVE LINEUP

IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Sec. 1.
means

the

In
Bill

this

article,

Blackwood

Law

"institute"
Enforcement

Management Institute of Texas located at Sam
Houston State University.
Sec. 2.

This article applies only to a

law enforcement agency of this state or of a
county,

municipality,

or

other

political

subdivision of this state that employs peace
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officers

who

conduct

photograph

lineup

identification

procedures

routine

performance

of

or

live

in

the

the

officers'

official duties.
Sec. 3.
Texas Statutes do not
currently require law
enforcement agencies
to address photo or
live lineups in their
standard operating
procedures.

agency

(a)

shall

Each

law

adopt,

necessary

amend

regarding

the

a

enforcement

implement,

detailed

and

written

administration

of

as

policy

photograph

and live lineup identification procedures in
accordance

with

this

article.

A

law

enforcement agency may adopt:
(1)

the

model

policy

adopted

under Subsection (b); or
(2)
conforms

to

Law enforcement
agencies may choose
to adopt a model
policy developed by
LEMIT, or a policy of
the department’s
choosing that is in line
with the model policy.

the agency's own policy that
the

requirements

of

the

model

policy adopted under Subsection (b).
(b)
LEMIT will work with
experts to develop an
identification model
policy and training
materials for law
enforcement agencies.

The institute, with the advice and

assistance of law enforcement agencies and
scientific

experts

research,

shall

in

eyewitness

develop,

memory

adopt,

and

disseminate to all law enforcement agencies
a

model

materials
photograph

policy

and

regarding
and

live

associated

the

training

administration

lineup

of

identification
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procedures.
(c)

The model policy must:
(1)

be based on:
(A)

scientific

research

on

eyewitness memory; and
(B)

relevant

guidelines

developed

government,

other

policies

by

the

states,

and

and

federal
other

The model policy
developed by LEMIT
must be based on
scientific research,
best practices
developed by the
government and other
organizations, and
policies adopted by
other states.

law

enforcement organizations and other relevant
information as appropriate; and
The model policy
developed by LEMIT
must address specific
content areas:
1. filler selection
2. cautionary
instructions
3. documentation
(including the
witness’ confidence
statement)
4. how to administer
the lineup to a
witness who is
illiterate or has
limited English
skills
5.blind administration
where the person
who administers the
lineup is unaware of
which member is the
police suspect

(2)

address the following topics:
(A)

photograph

and

the

selection

live

of

lineup

filler

photographs or participants;
(B)
witness

before

instructions

conducting

a

given

to

photograph

a
or

live lineup identification procedure;
(C)

the

documentation

and

preservation of results of a photograph or
live

lineup

including

the

identification
documentation

procedure,
of

witness

statements, regardless of the outcome of the
procedure;
(D)

procedures

for
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administering

a

identification
person

or

a

photograph
procedure

person

or

to

with

live

an

lineup

illiterate

limited

English

language proficiency;
(E)

procedures for assigning

an administrator who, as applicable:
(i)

is unaware of which

member of the live lineup is the suspect in
the

case

or,

alternative

if

that

is

procedures

not

practicable,

designed

to

prevent

opportunities to influence the witness; and
(ii)

is

capable

Blind administration
may be achieved
through the use of an
administrator who is
unaware of which
lineup member is the
suspect, or through
the use of an
alternative method,
such as the folder
method.

of

administering a photograph array in a blind
manner

or,

if

alternative

that

is

procedures

not

practicable,

designed

to

prevent

opportunities to influence the witness; and
(F)
best

practices

any

other

supported

procedures
by

or

credible

research or commonly accepted as a means to
reduce erroneous identifications and enhance
LEMIT must review
the model policy and
associated training
materials on an
annual basis. The
materials should be
updated as needed.

the

objectivity

and

reliability

of

eyewitness identifications.
Sec. 4.
an

annual

The

review

institute
of

the

shall

model

complete

policy

and
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training

materials

article

and

shall

adopted
modify

under

the

this

policy

and

materials as necessary.
Sec. 5.

(a)

Evidence of compliance or

noncompliance with the model policy adopted
under

this

article

is

relevant

and

admissible in a criminal case but is not a
condition precedent to the admissibility of
an out-of-court eyewitness identification.
(b)
failure

Notwithstanding
to

lineup

conduct

a

Article
photograph

identification

38.23,
or

procedure

a

Evidence that shows a
law enforcement
agency did or did not
comply with the
statute will be allowed
in court; however, that
evidence may not be
used to keep
identification evidence
out of the courtroom.

live
in

substantial compliance with the model policy
adopted under this article does not bar the
admission

of

eyewitness

identification

testimony in the courts of this state.
SECTION 2.
2010,

the

Bill

(a)

Not later than June 1,

Blackwood

Law

Enforcement

Management Institute of Texas shall develop,
adopt, and disseminate the model policy and
associated training materials required under
Article 38.20, Code of Criminal Procedure,
as added by this Act.
(b)

Not later than September 1, 2010,
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each law enforcement agency to which Article
38.20, Code of Criminal Procedure, as added
by this Act, applies shall adopt a policy as
required by that article.
(c)
5,

The change in law made by Section

Article

38.20,

Procedure,

as

only

a

to

added

by

1,

Criminal

Act,

applies

or

live

lineup

procedure

September

of

this

photograph

identification
after

Code

conducted

2010,

on

or

regardless

of

whether the offense to which the procedure
is

related

occurred

before,

on,

Act

takes

or

after

September 1, 2010.
SECTION 3.

This

effect

September 1, 2009.

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APPENDIX B

DNA exoneree fell victim to 'drive-by' identification
10:05 AM CDT on Monday, October 13, 2008
By STEVE McGONIGLE and JENNIFER EMILY / The Dallas Morning News
smcgonigle@dallasnews.com; jemily@dallasnews.com

Billy Wayne Miller was asleep in a back bedroom of his father's modest Oak Cliff home when
three Dallas police officers burst through the front door around 3 a.m., guns in hand, yelling
another man's name.
Video

Still groggy and clad only in his underwear, Mr. Miller was taken to the front porch. There he
spotted a woman in a squad car glance at him and nod to an officer seated beside her before the
car drove away.
That split-second, one-man lineup cost Mr. Miller 22 years of his life on a rape conviction that
DNA evidence later invalidated.
Almost a decade has elapsed since the U.S. Justice Department recommended stricter limits on
the use of "showups," as the practice is known in police circles. More than 40 years ago, the U.S.
Supreme Court deemed them dangerously suggestive and discouraged their use.
Yet showups have been cited as a critical flaw in at least 20 percent of the 220 DNA
exonerations nationwide. Three of the 19 Dallas County wrongful convictions involved a
showup, according to court records.
In each case, the suspect was brought before the victim under police escort. One man was
displayed to the victim a day after the crime. He and the suspect in a second showup asked to be
put in lineups but were refused.
"I may well have had a better chance if I'd had a lineup," said Billy James Smith, who was also
wrongly convicted of rape based on a showup. "With other black men, of course."

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Showups are also known as "drive-by" identifications because witnesses are driven in a squad
car past the suspect. In practice, they occur anywhere police choose: hospital rooms, police
station hallways, courtrooms. They can also be done by showing a single photograph.
The idea is to identify a suspect while an eyewitness's memory is fresh and before the perpetrator
can flee the area.
The danger, critics say, is that in the immediate aftermath of a crime police may stop someone on
little more than a hunch, and witnesses may be too eager to please.
"I think it sends a clear message to the witness the police must have a reason to think this guy is
a good suspect so he is probably the guy," said Jim McCloskey, executive director of Centurion
Ministries Inc., a nonprofit prisoner advocacy group based in Princeton, N.J.
Mr. McCloskey's work has helped free more than 40 wrongly convicted people nationwide,
several of them in Texas. He is investigating a robbery-murder in Dallas that rested on a showup.
"This is a clear case of slam-bam-thank-you-ma'am misidentification," he said.
Scant oversight
Showups continue in Dallas County and elsewhere because police value them, judges seldom
suppress them and juries are swayed by the results.
They are done with few rules and scant oversight. Street cops with little formal guidance on
identification procedures typically conduct them, and detectives trying to preserve a key part of
their case defend them.
No one keeps statistics on their use.
To better understand the prevalence of showups in Dallas County, The Dallas Morning News
reviewed more than 20 years of state appellate court opinions. The News found more than 100
felony trial convictions involving showups. Trials represent just a fraction of how charges are
disposed; many result in plea agreements.
How often showups result in misidentifications remains a matter of scholarly debate. But it is a
given that one-person showups can pose a higher risk of error than the standard six-person photo
array or live lineup.
Each of the Dallas County exoneration cases with a showup involved a rape that occurred
between 1982 and 1986, when genetic testing was unavailable. Police based the charges almost
entirely on the victim's one-on-one identification.
Mr. Miller, who was freed in 2006, denounced showups as contrary to the due process rights that
identification procedures are supposed to honor.

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"You just can't walk up and point and say he did so and so to me, and they go and arrest him
without anything other than 'I said.' "
And yet in his case, Mr. Miller said, "that's exactly what happened."
Police officials maintained the showups are both legal and an invaluable crime-solving tool when
used properly.
Dallas Police Chief David Kunkle said he thought showups were suggestive, but added, "I don't
feel comfortable banning showups right now. I don't think that would be in the interest of public
safety and the criminal justice system."
Larry Zacharias, Richardson's police chief, said that his department would soon issue guidelines
limiting the use of showups, but that it would be a disservice to crime victims not to afford them
the chance to identify a culprit quickly.
"You also have to remember that not all of them are wrong," he said.
Long controversial
Showups have been a source of controversy for decades in America.
In 1927, Harvard law professor Felix Frankfurter, later a U.S. Supreme Court justice, decried the
showups used to identify anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti in a prosecution
many historians view as a mockery of American justice.
The two Italian immigrants were sentenced to death in 1921 and later executed for the robbery
and murder of two clerks south of Boston. Several witnesses identified the pair at a local police
station while the accused men were directed by police to mimic actions of the robbers.
In 1967, in a decision that still controls the legal admissibility of showups, U.S. Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan noted that "the practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the
purpose of identification and not as part of a lineup has been widely condemned."
Reform advocates contend the danger of coercion warrants more education and restrictions on
the use of showups.
Gary Wells, one of the nation's leading researchers on eyewitness identifications, was part of a
U.S. Justice Department task force that urged stricter limits on showups.
In its 1999 report, the panel recommended that showups be conducted only when an officer
lacked probable cause for an arrest and after admonishing the witness that the detainee might not
be the actual perpetrator.

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"They virtually never do that," said Dr. Wells, a psychology professor at Iowa State University.
"They say, 'We got a guy, c'mon were going to show him to you.' And for all the witness knows,
they've already MO'd [identified] this guy. They know he did it."
The panel also suggested that police agencies adopt written policies memorializing the
appropriate way to conduct a showup. Few police agencies – in Dallas County or elsewhere –
noticed.
Of more than two dozen law enforcement agencies in Dallas County, only two (Duncanville and
Irving) responded that they had written policies governing showups, The News found.
Ron Waldrop, an assistant Dallas police chief, said he did not know what, if any, training patrol
officers receive on showups. The department's policies on identifications do not mention
showups, but new guidelines are being written.
In mid-September, after an innocent man was misidentified in a single-photo showup, the Dallas
Police Department banned the practice except when a witness knows the suspect by name or
face.
"It was inappropriate," Chief Waldrop said, "and we put an end to that."
On-scene identification
Mr. Miller was on parole for armed robbery when Dallas police arrested him Sept. 27, 1983, on
the sexual assault charge. The showup, he said, sealed his fate.
Police did not conduct a live lineup or present a photo spread. The victim testified that the first
time she saw Mr. Miller after the rape was in court five months later.
The 24-year-old woman, a beauty school student, said Mr. Miller was the man who offered her a
ride home as she left a friend's apartment in South Dallas. But instead of taking her home, the
woman said, Mr. Miller raped her in a vacant field near Hutchins and again at a house in Oak
Cliff.
She described her attacker as a black man with a short Afro. He had a gun and told her he had
just been released after 11 years in prison. He said his name was John. She gave a detailed
description of the attacker's car, his clothing and the inside of his home.
After she persuaded the man to drop her off at a friend's apartment, the victim summoned police.
Police said she led them to the house where Mr. Miller was staying with his father's girlfriend
and her grandson.
A car matching the victim's description was parked outside the house. The license plate was one
digit off of what the victim had said. A patrol officer testified he felt the car's hood, and it was
still warm.

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Once inside, police said they found Mr. Miller in a back bedroom. Clothes on the floor matched
the victim's description. So did a .357 Magnum revolver found in the top drawer of a nearby
desk. Even the Coors beer in the refrigerator matched what the victim had told them.
Her story tracked so closely with what police found that it prompted the lead prosecutor in the
case recently to tell The News that he could now "imagine a scenario" where police fed her the
details.
The arresting officer denied at trial that Mr. Miller was shown to the victim. But in two separate
reports and a sworn affidavit, the case detective, Robert Gage, affirmed Mr. Miller's account of a
showup.
"She identified him at the scene," his signed report stated.
Detective Gage – who is now retired and could not be reached for comment – did not testify at
trial. He stated in a report that he had interviewed the victim, who identified Mr. Miller at the
scene. The case was solved the day of Mr. Miller's arrest, the detective's report said.
The state's case at trial consisted of the victim, the arresting officer and the doctor who did the
rape exam. There were no fingerprints and no biological evidence linking Mr. Miller to the
crime.
"If you can't convict on this testimony, you might as well just shut the courthouse down," lead
prosecutor Kevin Chapman told the jury.
Jurors needed only an hour to convict Mr. Miller and another to decide he deserved a life
sentence.
Mr. Miller said he was stunned. He had rejected a probation deal, he said, and never expected the
case to go to trial.
In prison, Mr. Miller said he worked to free himself, reading law books at night, scrawling legal
motions with a pencil stub.
In October 2001, he filed a six-page, handwritten petition for a DNA test. It took almost four
years for a Dallas judge to agree and another year to win his freedom.
Today, Mr. Miller lives in a one-story home in Oak Cliff that bears the trappings of newfound
wealth. A large flat-screen TV and leather chair and sofa sit in an otherwise sparsely furnished
living room.
He purchased the house – and an orange Corvette he calls "my dream come true" – with some of
the $500,000 he received from the state as compensation for his wrongful imprisonment.
Now 56, Mr. Miller is recovering from pancreatic cancer and claims to be so broke that he
doesn't have enough money to buy gasoline for his lawnmower.
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He described himself as a victim of circumstance, a "nobody on parole" whose claims of
innocence were ignored.
He theorized that his accuser – who has since amassed multiple arrests for prostitution, arson,
assault and drug use – identified him to please the police. She could not be located for comment.
"The whole thing was a complete wake-up for how easy it is for you to wind up with zero," Mr.
Miller said, "your whole life gone."

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Appendix C
Model Language Offered by Kathryn Kase and Chief James McLaughlin
SECTIONA1.AAChapter 2, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended by adding Article 2.31 to read as
follows:
Art.A2.31.AAELECTRONIC RECORDING OF CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS.
(a) In this article:
(1)

“Electronic recording” means the use of digital or analog equipment for the purposes of creating
contemporaneous documentation of sounds and/or images, and includes audio-video and audioonly recording technologies.

(2)

“Custodial interrogation” means investigative questioning by a peace officer of a person being
held in custody in connection with a criminal investigation, and does not include routine
questions associated with booking which would not be reasonably expected to elicit an
incriminating response.

(3)

“Regular place of detention” means a building or a police station that is a regular place of
operation for a municipal police department or county sheriff department or other law
enforcement agency, at which persons are or may be held in detention in connection with
criminal charges against those persons.

(4)

“The entirety” of a custodial interrogation begins with the admonition of rights and ends when
questioning ceases and the suspect ceases communicating.

(b)AALaw enforcement officers shall electronically record in their entirety custodial interrogations
conducted in a regular place of detention of persons suspected of committing an offence under any of the
following sections of the Penal Code, unless good cause exists that electronic recording is not feasible:
(1) Section 19.02, Penal Code(Murder);
(2) Section 19.03, Penal Code (Capital Murder);
(3) Section 20.02, Penal Code (Kidnapping);

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(4) Section 20.04, Penal Code (Aggravated Kidnapping);
(5)Section 21.02, Penal Code (Continuous sexual abuse of child);
(6) Section 21.11, Penal Code (Indecency with a child);
(7) Section 43.25, Penal Code (Sexual performance by a child);
(8) Section 22.011, Penal Code (Sexual assault);
(9) Section 22.021, Penal Code (Aggravated sexual assault).
(c) Good cause that electronic recording was not feasible includes but is not limited to the following
circumstances:
(1)AAthe peace officer or agent of the law enforcement agency conducting the interrogation
attempted, in good faith, to record the custodial interrogation but the recording equipment did not
function, the officer or agent inadvertently operated the equipment incorrectly, or the equipment
malfunctioned or stopped operating without the knowledge of the officer or agent;
(2)AAthe suspect refused to respond or cooperate in an interrogation at which an electronic
recording was made, provided that
(A) the suspect’s refusal is electronically recorded, or;
(B) law enforcement personnel made a good faith effort to electronically record the
suspect’s refusal, and a suspect was unwilling to have the refusal recorded, and the officers
contemporaneously documented the refusal in writing and the suspect’s reasons for refusal, if
any;
(3)AAthe statement was not made exclusively as the result of a custodial interrogation, including
a statement that was made spontaneously by the accused and not in response to a question by a
peace officer; or
(4)AAexigent public safety concerns prevented or rendered infeasible the making of an audio or
audio-visual recording of the statement; or
(5)AAthe peace officer or agent of the law enforcement agency conducting the interrogation
reasonably believed at the time the interrogation commenced that the accused was not taken into

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custody for or being interrogated concerning the commission of an offence enumerated above in
CCP Article 2.31(b).
(d)E Complete, accurate, unaltered copies of electronic recordings of any custodial interrogations of a
defendant required by article 2.31(b) shall be:
(1)provided by the attorney for the state to the defendant in a
timely manner, and not later than 60 days prior to trial; and
(2)preserved until the later of the date on which:
(A)AAany conviction for an offense that is the subject of the interrogation or that
results from the interrogation
exhausted, and

is final, all direct appeals of the case are

the time to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus has expired;

or
(B)AAthe prosecution of the offense that is the subject of the interrogation or that
arises from the interrogation is barred by law.
(e)AAA recording of a custodial interrogation is exempt from public disclosure under Section 552.108,
Government Code.
SECTIONA2.AAChapter 38, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended by adding Article 38.24 to read as
follows:
Art.A38.24.AACONSTRUCTION WITH CERTAIN OTHER LAW CONCERNING RECORDING OF
INTERROGATIONS.
(a) Evidence of compliance or noncompliance with Article 2.31 regarding the electronic recording of
custodial interrogations is relevant and admissible before the trier of fact.
(b)AANon-compliance with Article 2.31 requiring the electronic recording of custodial interrogations is
not a condition precedent to the admissibility of a defendant ’s statement under Article 38.23,another
provision of this chapter, or another law.
(c)AAIf the statement of an accused made during a custodial interrogation is admitted in evidence during
the trial of an offense enumerated under Article 2.31(b), and if an electronic recording of the complete

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interrogation required under Article 2.31 is not available, the court shall determine whether the peace
officers acted in good faith with respect to the requirements of Article 2.31. If the court determines that
the peace officers did not act in good faith regarding the requirements of Article 2.31, the Court:
(1)AAif the court is the trier of fact, should consider the absence of an electronic recording of a
custodial interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to and resulting from the interrogation;
and
(2)AAif the jury is the trier of fact, may on request of the defendant instruct the jury that:
(A)AAit is the policy of the State of Texas to electronically record the custodial
interrogations of persons suspected of having committed offenses enumerated in CCP
Article 2.31(b); and
(B)AAthe jury should consider the absence of an electronic recording of a custodial
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to and resulting from the interrogation.
(d)AAThe court shall not give the jury instruction described by Subsection (c)(2) if the court finds that
the peace officers acted in good faith, or that one or more of the exceptions enumerated in Article 2.31(c)
applies.
SECTIONA3.AAArticle 38.24, Code of Criminal Procedure, as added by this Act, applies to the use of a
statement resulting from a custodial interrogation that occurs on or after September 1, 2012, regardless of
whether the criminal offense giving rise to that interrogation is committed before, on, or after that date.
SECTIONA5.AAThis Act takes effect September 1, 2012.

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Appendix D
TCAP: Recording Custodial Interrogations Remedy

State

Mandatory

Lege or Court

Remedy

Exceptions

Alaska

Yes

Stephan v. State

Inadmissible; can be overcome if
state proves by preponderance of
the evidence that confession was
knowing and voluntary and/or that
recording was not feasible; failure
to record part of interrogation does
not bar introduction of recorded
statements if unrecorded portion is
innocuous

None except those
listed in the remedy

Illinois

Yes (homicides)

725 ILCS 5/103-2.1

Presumption of inadmissibility; can
be overcome if state proves by
preponderance of the evidence that
the statement was voluntary and
reliable

Statement made in open
court, before grand jury;
recording not feasible;
voluntary statement that
has bearing on
credibility of accused;
spontaneous statement;
statement made after
routine questioning
following an arrest;
suspect who will not
respond to questions if
recorded; interrogations
conducted out-of-state;
statement given when
investigator is unaware
that a death has
occurred; any other
statement admissible
under law; used only for
impeachment

Iowa

No

State v. Hajtic

Maine

No; All law
enforcement
adopt written
policies
regarding
Digital,
electronic,
audio, video or
other recording
of interviews of
suspects
No; Law
enforcement
agencies should
make a
reasonable
effort to record
for certain
felonies

Tit. 25, 2803-B(I)(K)

None

2-401

None

Maryland

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Massachusetts

No

DiGiambattista v.
Commonwealth

The Court requires, upon a
defendant's request, that the judge
instruct the jury that the State's
highest court has expressed a
preference that custodial
interrogations and interrogations
conducted in a place of detention be
electronically recorded whenever
practicable.

Minnesota

Yes (where
feasible and at
place of
detention)
Yes (felonies
spelled out in
statute - audio
or video)

State v. Scales

Suppressed if violation of recording
requirement is deemed substantial
by the trial court

Determined on a caseby-case basis

590.701

None in court; governor may
withhold any state funds
appropriated to law enforcement
agencies that do not comply but
adopting a recording policy

Montana

Yes

HB 534

Inadmissible; can be overcome by a
preponderance of the evidence that
the statement is voluntarily reliable
or one of the exceptions applied. If
defendant objects to nonconforming evidence court finds
admissible, jury instruction will be
delivered

Nebraska

Yes (audio or
video in place
of detention in
felony cases

LB 179

Jury instruction; can be overcome
by a preponderance of the evidence
that the statement is a reasonable
exception for recording; failure to
comply does not bar the use of
otherwise admissible evidence
derived from statement; statements
made in another state, in a federal
investigation, and/or those that
contain good-faith inaudible
portions are admissible

Custodial interrogations
only; does not include:
a situation in which a
person voluntarily
agrees to speak meet
with law enforcement;
detention that has not
risen to level of an
arrest; questioning that
is routinely asked
during arrest;
questioning related to
alcohol influence
report; questioning
during transport
Statement made as part
of routine booking;
suspect declared they
would only respond to
questions if not
recorded; equipment
failure where
replacement was not
practicable; exigent
circumstances;
statements
surreptitiously
recorded; statements
made in another state;
spontaneous statements
Not practicable to
record, equipment could
not be reasonably
obtained, person in
custody refused to be
recorded, equipment
malfunctioned, officer
conducting
interrogation believed
there was no felony

New
Hampshire

Yes (exclusive
of Miranda
rights)

State v. Barnett

Inadmissible; evidence gathered
during the interrogation may be
admissible if interrogation is not
recorded in entirety subject to usual
rules of evidence

Missouri

None

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New Jersey

Yes (list of
felonies in rule;
those that occur
in place of
detention)

Supreme Court Rule 3:17

Jury instruction; can be overcome
by a preponderance of the evidence
that one of the exclusions applies; if
state intends to introduce an
unrecorded statement, defense must
be notified, defense must also be
notified of witnesses who can attest
to one of the exclusions

New Mexico

Yes (video or
audio; felonies;
when
reasonably able
to do so)

HJC/HB 382

None; cannot exclude otherwise
admissible evidence

North
Carolina

Yes (in places
of detention for
homicide cases)

HB 1626

Failure to comply considered in
suppression hearing; failure to
comply admissible in support of
claims defendant's statement is
involuntary/unreliable; jury
instruction

Ohio

No; statute
states that
recorded
statements in
first- or seconddegree felonies
are presumed to
be voluntary;
failure to record
will not be basis
for exclusion or
suppression

SB 77

None

Recording not feasible;
spontaneous statements;
statements made during
routine processing;
suspect indicated he/she
would not respond if
recorded; statements
made out of state;
statement is given when
investigators are
unaware that a felony
has been committed
Recording equipment
not available; recording
equipment failed and
obtaining replacements
not feasible; individual
refused to be recorded;
statements made in
open court; spontaneous
statements;
interrogations made
out-of-state; statements
used for impeachment
purposes; statements
made in a correctional
facility
Accused refused to be
recorded; equipment
failed and obtaining
replacements was not
feasible; statement
made in open court;
spontaneous statement;
statement made during
routine processing;
statements made in
another state; statement
obtained by federal
officer; statement made
when investigators
unaware of homicide;
statement used for
impeachment
Voluntary bill, but
states that recordings
made of custodial
interrogations (defined
in bill) in a place of
detention (defined in
bill) are presumed to be
voluntary.

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Oregon

Yes (in law
enforcement
facility for
aggravated
murder or other
felonies)

SB 309

Washington,
D.C.

Yes (violent
crimes when
conducted in
interrogation
room)
Yes (felony,
audio or video)

Electronic Recording Act of
2004 (Sec. 101 - 302)

Assumption of involuntariness;
rebuttable by clear and convincing
evidence that it is voluntary

972.115

Jury instruction; can be overcome
for good cause; lack of recording
does not affect admissibility of
otherwise legal statements

Wisconsin

Jury instruction; can be overcome
by a preponderance of the evidence
that an exception applies; court may
not exclude statement or drop
charges based on this requirement

Statement made before
grand jury; statement
made in open court;
interrogation conducted
in another state;
custodial interrogation
conducted by federal
investigator;
spontaneous statement;
statement made during
arrest processing; law
enforcement agency
that employs five or
fewer officers;
individuals committed
to or confined in a place
of incarceration or
detention; state
demonstrates good
cause for not recording
Individual refuses to be
recorded

Individual refuses to be
recorded; statement
made in response to
routine processing;
equipment malfunction;
spontaneous statements;
exigent public safety
circumstances; officer
believed interrogation
was not in a felony case

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TCAP: Recording Exceptions and Remedies by State
Exception to Recording
AK IL IA* ME*MD*MA*MN⁺ MO
Any other statement admissible under law
√
Custodial interrogations only
√
Detention that has not risen to level of arrest
√
Equipment could not be obtained
Equipment failure
Exigent circumstances
Investigator is unaware that class of crime that
requires recording has occurred
√
Law enforcement agency that employs 5 or fewer officers
Out-of-state interrogations
√
Person voluntarily agrees to speak w/ law enforcement
√
Questioning during transport
√
Questioning related to alcohol influence report
√
Recording not feasible
√
Spontaneous statement
√
State demonstrates good cause for not recording
Statement made before grand jury and/or in open court
√
Statement made during routine arrest processing
√
√
Statement made in a correctional facility
Statement obtained by federal officer
Statement surreptitiously recorded
Statement used for impeachment only
√
Suspect will not respond if recorded
√
Voluntary statement that has bearing on credibility
√
Remedy
Presumption of inadmissibility
√ √
√
Jury instruction
√

MT NE NH NJ NM NC OH* OR DC WI
√

√
√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√

√

√

√
√

√

√
√

√

√
√

√
√

√
√
√

√
√
√
√
√
√

√

√

√
√

√

√
√

√

√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√
√

√

√

* Recording not mandatory
⁺ Exceptions reviewed on a case-by-case basis

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√

√

Appendix E

By:

Dutton

H.B. No. 301

Substitute the following for H.B. No. 301:
By:

Miklos

C.S.H.B No. 301
A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT

relating to discovery in a criminal case.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1.

Article 39.14, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as follows:

Art. 39.14.

DISCOVERY

Sec. 1. DISCLOSURE BY STATE. (a) As soon as practicable after receiving a timely request
from the defendant, the attorney representing the state shall disclose to the defendant’s counsel and permit
inspection , photocopying, and photographing of the following materials and information in the
possession, custody, or control of the state or any of its agencies:
(1) any exculpatory impeachment evidence material to the defendant’s guilt or punishment;
(2) any written or recorded statements [(including electronically recorded statements)] that are
made by the defendant or by any witness the attorney representing the state intends to call at trial and that
are related to the case charged, including offense reports by law enforcement personnel, if any;
(3) any written record containing the substance of any oral statement that is made by the
defendant and that is related to the case charged, whether made before or after the defendant’s arrest, in
response to interrogation by any person whom the defendant believed to be a peace officer;
(4) the defendant’s prior criminal record;
(5) any record of a criminal conviction admissible for impeachment under Rule 609, Texas Rules
of Evidence, of a witness the attorney representing the state intends to call at the trial;

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(6) any affidavit, warrant, or return pertaining to a search or seizure in connection with the case;
(7) any physical or documentary evidence that was obtained from or that belongs to the
defendant or that the attorney representing the state intends to use at the trial and, on a showing of
materiality by the defendant, the opportunity to test that evidence;
(8) the names and addresses of the witnesses called to present evidence under Rules 702, 703,
and 705, Texas Rules of Evidence, and the names of all other witnesses the attorney representing the state
intends to call at the trial;
(9) any report produced by or for an expert witness the attorney representing the state intends to
call at the trial; and
(10) any plea agreement, grant of immunity, or other agreement for testimony issued by the
attorney representing the state in connection with the case. [Upon motion of the defendant showing good
cause therefore and upon notice to the other parties, the court in which an action is pending shall order the
State before or during trial of a criminal action therein pending or on trial to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing by or on behalf of the defendant of any designated documents,
papers, written statement of the defendant, (except written statements of witnesses and except the work
product of counsel in the case and their investigators and their notes or report), books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to
any matter involved in the action and which are in the possession, custody or control of the State or any of
its agencies. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking the
copies and photographs of any of the aforementioned documents or tangible evidence, provided, however,
that the rights herein granted shall not extend to written communications between the State or any of its
agents or representative or employees. Nothing in this Act shall authorize the removal of such evidence
from the possession of the State, and any inspection shall be in the presence of a representative of the
State.]
(b) If the defendant gives notice of a defense under Section 2(b), the attorney representing the
state shall disclose to the defendant’s counsel as soon as practicable the names of the witnesses of whom

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the state has knowledge and whom the state intends to use to rebut the defense or the testimony of any of
the defendant’s witnesses called to establish that defense [On motion of a party and on notice to the other
parties, the court in which an action is pending may order one or more of the other parties to disclose to
the party making the motion the name and address of each person the other party may use at trial to
present evidence under Rules 702, 703, and 705, Texas Rules of Evidence. The court shall specify in the
order the time and manner in which the other party must make the disclosure to the moving party, but in
specifying the time in which the other party shall make disclosure the court shall require the other party to
make the disclosure not later than the 20th day before the date the trial begins].
(c) This article does not authorize the removal of physical evidence from the possession of the
state, and any inspection of physical evidence shall be conducted in the presence of a representative of the
state.
Sec. 2. DISCLOSURE BY DEFENDANT. (a) As soon as practicable after receiving the initial
disclosure under Section 1 from the attorney representing the state, the defendant shall disclose to the
attorney representing the state and permit inspection, photocopying, and photographing of the following
materials and information:
(1) any written or recorded statement by a witness, other than the defendant, that is related to the
offense charged, if the defendant intends to call the witness at trial;
(2) any record of a criminal conviction admissible for impeachment under Rule 609, Texas
Rules of Evidence, of a witness, other than the defendant, the defendant intends to call at the trial, if that
information is known to the defendant;
(3) any physical or documentary evidence that the defendant intends to use at the trial and, on a
showing of materiality by the attorney representing the state, the opportunity to test that evidence;
(4) the names and addresses of the witnesses called to present evidence under Rules 702, 703,
and 705, Texas Rules of Evidence, and the names of all other witnesses, other than the defendant, the
defendant intends to call at the trial; and
(5) any report produced by or for an expert witness the defendant intends to call at the trial.

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(b) On a request by the state, a defendant planning to offer evidence of one or more defenses
listed in Chapter 8 or 9, Penal Code, or evidence of an alibi defense, shall file a good faith notice of intent
to raise the defense with the court and the attorney representing the state not later than the 30th day before
the date the trial begins or as soon as practicable after the date the defendant receives a disclosure under
Section 1 to which the defense is responsive, whichever is later. If the defendant intends to raise an alibi
defense, the notice must include the place at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the
alleged offense and the names of the witnesses the defendant intends to use to establish the alibi. Any
notice provided under this subsection is for purposes of discovery only and is not admissible at trial
unless the court finds the contents of the notice were not made in good faith.
(c) After the filing of the indictment or information, the court may require the defendant to
submit nontestimonial evidence to the state. This subsection does not limit any law enforcement agency
or prosecutor’s office from seeking or obtaining nontestimonial evidence to the extent permitted by law.
Sec. 3. EXCEPTIONS TO DISCLOSURE. (a) Neither the attorney representing the state nor the
defendant is required to disclose materials or information that is:
(1) recorded proceedings of a grand jury, except as provided by rule 615, Texas Rules of
Evidence;
(2) a work product other than an offense report by law enforcement personnel, including a report,
memorandum, or other internal document of the attorney representing the state, the attorney representing
the defendant, or an investigator or other agent of the attorney representing the state or the attorney
representing the defendant that is made in connection with the investigation, prosecution, or defense of
the case; or
(3) privileged under a rule of evidence, an express statutory provision, the Texas Constitution, or
the United States Constitution.
(b) This article does not authorize disclosure of the name, address, or telephone number of a
victim in violation of Chapter 57.

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(c) A victim impact statement is subject to disclosure before the testimony of the victim is taken
only if the court determines that the statement contains exculpatory material.
Sec. 4. CONTINUING DUTY TO DISCLOSE. If, before a trial begins, but subsequent to
compliance with this article or a relevant court order, a party discovers additional material or information
subject to disclosure, the party shall immediately notify the other party’s counsel of the existence of the
additional material or information.
Sec. 5. EXCISION. (a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), if a portion of material or
information is subject to discovery under this article and a portion is not subject to discovery, only the
portion that is subject to discovery must be disclosed. The disclosing party shall inform the other party’s
counsel that the portion of material or information that is not subject to discovery has been excised or
withheld. On request, the court shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the reasons for excision are
justifiable. Material or information excised pursuant to judicial order shall be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court and shall be made available to an appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(b) Excision of a witness statement produced in accordance with Rule 615, Texas Rules of
Evidence, is governed by that rule.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this article, the attorney representing the state,
without a protective court order or a hearing before the court, may excise from an offense report or other
report any information related to the victim of an offense that is listed under:
(1) Section 3g, Article 42.12; or
(2) Article 62.001 (5)
Sec. 6. PROTECTIVE ORDERS. On a showing of good cause, the court may at any time enter
an appropriate protective order that a specified disclosure be denied, restricted, or deferred. “Good
cause,” for purposes of this section, includes threats, harm, intimidation, or possible danger to the safety
of a victim or witness, possible loss, destruction, or fabrication of evidence, or possible compromise of
other investigations by law enforcement or a defense offered by a defendant.

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Sec. 7. IN CAMERA PROCEEDINGS. On request, the court may permit to be made in camera
an excision hearing under Section 5(a), a showing of good cause for denial or regulation of a disclosure
under Section 6, or any portion of a proceeding. A verbatim record shall be made of a proceeding in
camera. If the court excises a portion of the material or information or enters an order granting relief
following a showing of good cause, the entire record shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the
court and shall be made available to an appellate court in the event of an appeal
Sec. 8. CONFERENCE. On request of the attorney representing the state or the defendant, the
court shall hold a discovery hearing under Section 1(8), Article 28.01, not later than the 10th day before
the day before the trial begins to [ensure that the parties are fully aware of their respective disclosure
obligations and to] verify compliance by each party with this article.
Sec. 9. COMPLIANCE; SANCTIONS. (a) The disclosures required under this article may be
performed in any manner that is mutually agreeable to the attorney representing the state and the attorney
representing the defendant or that is ordered by the court in accordance with this article. The order issued
by the court may specify the time, place, and manner of making the required disclosures.
(b) On a showing that a party has not complied [in good faith] with this article or a relevant court
order, the court may make any order the court finds necessary under the circumstances, including an order
related to immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delay or prohibition of the use of a defense or the
introduction of evidence, or continuance of the matter. The court may also inform the jury of any failure
or refusal to disclose or any untimely disclosure under this article.
(c) The court may prohibit the use of a defense or the introduction of evidence under Subsection
(b) only if all other sanctions have been exhausted or the discovery violation amounts to willful
misconduct designed to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of crossexamination or the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence. The court may not dismiss a charge under
Subsection (b) unless authorized or required to do so by other law.

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(d) The failure of the attorney representing the state or the defendant to comply with this article
is not a ground for a court to set aside the conviction or sentence of the defendant, unless the court’s
action is authorized or required by law.
Sec. 10. COSTS. (a) All reasonable and necessary costs related to a disclosure required under
this article, including the photocopying of materials, shall be paid by the requesting party.
(b) The commissioners court of the county in which the indictment, information, or complaint is
pending may not, as a result of any payment by the defendant of the costs required by this article, reduce
the amount of money provided by the county to the office of the attorney representing the state.
Sec. 11. DISCLOSURE TO THIRD PARTIES. Before the date on which the trial begins, the
attorney representing the state, the attorney representing the defendant, or an investigator, expert, or other
agent for the attorney representing the state or the attorney representing the defendant may not disclose,
without obtaining approval from the trial court, information or witness statements received from the
opposing party to any third party, other than to an investigator, expert, or other agent for the attorney
representing the state or the attorney representing the defendant, as applicable. Information or witness
statements received under this article may not be made available to the public.
Sec. 12. PRO SE DEFENDANTS. This article, including the provisions regarding the
nondisclosure of a witness statement or an offense by law enforcement personnel, applies to a defendant
who has elected to proceed pro se only to the extent approved by the court.
Sec. 13. CONFLICT OF LAW. To the extent of any conflict, this article prevails over Chapter
552, Government Code.
SECTION 2. The change in law made by this Act applies to the prosecution of an offense
committed on or after the effective date of this Act. The prosecution of an offense committed before the
effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect when the offense was committed, and the former
law is continued in effect for this purpose. For purposes of this section, an offense is committed before
the effective date of this Act if any element of the offense occurs before the effective date.
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect September 1, 2009.

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Appendix F
By: Ellis

S.B. No. 1864

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
relating to postconviction forensic DNA analysis.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Subsection (b), Article 64.01, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as
follows:
(b) The motion may request forensic DNA testing only of evidence described by Subsection (a)
that was secured in relation to the offense that is the basis of the challenged conviction and was in the
possession of the state during the trial of the offense, but:
(1) was not previously subjected to DNA testing[:
[(A) because DNA testing was:
[(i) not available; or
[(ii) available, but not technologically capable of providing probative
results; or
[(B) through no fault of the convicted person, for reasons that are of a nature
such that the interests of justice require DNA testing]; or
(2) although previously subjected to DNA testing, can be subjected to testing with newer
testing techniques that provide a reasonable likelihood of results that are more accurate and probative than
the results of the previous test.
SECTION 2. Chapter 64, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended by adding Article 64.035 to
read as follows:

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Art. 64.035. UNIDENTIFIED DNA PROFILES. On completion of the testing under Article
64.03, the convicting court shall order any unidentified DNA profile to be compared with the DNA
profiles in the CODIS DNA database established by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
SECTION 3. Article 64.04, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended to read as follows:
Art. 64.04. FINDING.

After examining the results of testing under Article 64.03 and any

comparison of a DNA profile under Article 64.035, the convicting court shall hold a hearing and make a
finding as to whether, had the results been available during the trial of the offense, it is reasonably
probable that the person would not have been convicted.
SECTION 4. The change in law made by this Act applies to a motion for forensic DNA testing
filed on or after the effective date of this Act. A motion for forensic DNA testing filed before the
effective date of this Act is covered by the law in effect at the time the motion was filed, and the former
law is continued in effect for that purpose.
SECTION 5. This Act takes effect September 1, 2009.

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Appendix G
By: Whitmire, et al.

S.B. No. 1976

Substitute the following for S.B. No. 1976:
By: Gallego

C.S.S.B. No. 1976

A BILL TO BE ENTITLED
AN ACT
relating to procedures for applications for writs of habeas corpus based on relevant scientific evidence.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS:
SECTION 1. Chapter 11, Code of Criminal Procedure, is amended by adding Article 11.073 to
read as follows:
Art. 11.073. PROCEDURES RELATED TO CERTAIN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE. (a) This
article applies to relevant scientific evidence that:
(1) was not available to be offered by the convicted person at the convicted person's trial;
or
(2) discredits scientific evidence relied on by the state at trial.
(b) A court may grant a convicted person relief on an application for a writ of habeas corpus if
the convicted person files an application, in the manner provided by Article 11.07, 11.071, or 11.072,
containing sufficient specific facts indicating that:
(1) relevant scientific evidence is available and was not available at the time of the
convicted person's trial because the evidence was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable
diligence by the convicted person before the date of or during the convicted person's trial;
(2) the scientific evidence would be admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence at a
trial held on the date of the application; and

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(3) the court finds that, had the scientific evidence been presented at trial, it is reasonably
probable that the person would not have been convicted.
(c) For purposes of Section 4(a)(1), Article 11.07, Section 5(a)(1), Article 11.071, and Section
9(a), Article 11.072, a claim or issue could not have been presented previously in an original application
or in a previously considered application if the claim or issue is based on relevant scientific evidence that
was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence by the convicted person on or before
the date on which the original application or a previously considered application, as applicable, was filed.
(d) In determining whether relevant scientific evidence was not ascertainable through the
exercise of reasonable diligence on or before a specific date, the court shall consider whether the
scientific knowledge or method on which the relevant scientific evidence is based has changed since:
(1) the applicable trial date or dates, for a determination made with respect to an original
application; or
(2) the date on which the original application or a previously considered application, as
applicable, was filed, for a determination made with respect to a subsequent application.
SECTION 2. The change in law made by this Act applies only to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus filed on or after the effective date of this Act. An application for a writ of habeas corpus
filed before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect at the time the application was
filed, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.
SECTION 3. This Act takes effect September 1, 2009.

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