A Less Lethal Options Program
for
Seattle Police Department

A Report with Recommendations
submitted to R. Gil Kerlikowske, Chief of Police
submitted by
The Force Options Research Group
A/C Clark Kimerer, Chief of Staff and Chair
Lt. Dave Clavedetscher
Sgt. Liz Eddy
Sgt. Paul McDonagh
Officer Jeff Geoghagan
Officer Clay Stockwell
Officer Steve Ward
Leo Poort
Mimi Walsh

September 2000

Table of Contents
Introduction | Executive Summary | FORG Approach
and Activities

Legal and Training Issues in the Police Use of Force |
FORG Recommendations
Appendix Information is Not Available Online

INTRODUCTION
This report describes a Seattle Police Department initiative
to examine, acquire and deploy a "less lethal" weapons and
response capability.* The work supporting this initiative was
undertaken following the April 2000 incident that resulted in
the death of a former mental patient, David Walker. The
proposed initiative will provide officers with alternatives to
lethal force when circumstances warrant. At the outset, a few
words of introduction are needed to set the context and
describe the purpose of this less lethal initiative.
* "Less lethal" weapon is a tem of art that refers to weapons that are designed to
temporarily disable or stop a suspect without killing, thereby providing law
enforcement and military personnel with an alternative to lethal force (typically
represented by a handgun or rifle). These weapons are less lethal in the literal
sense because none can be guaranteed to avoid fatalities.

Two points are important by way of context. First, society
has done a poor job of addressing the needs of persons with
mental illness, particularly persons of limited means. Since
the mid-1970s, when budget constraints (rationalized by the
doctrine of community treatment) dictated the release from
institutions of all but the most severely afflicted mental
patients, it has become commonplace for individuals
suffering from observable mental problems to be left to
wander unsupervised day to day through the streets of our
cities, often ending up homeless. Many of these individuals
become the subject of law enforcement, either as
perpetrators of minor offenses or, more commonly, as

victims of criminal conduct. Occasionally, these individuals
endanger their own lives or the lives of others in dramatic
fashion.
The second point is that police, of necessity, have become
the social agency of last resort for these mentally disturbed
individuals. Particularly when these individuals threaten the
safety of themselves or others, police must intervene to
attempt to avert life-altering outcomes. In Seattle, during the
last two years (April through March 1998-2000),
approximately 5,000 incidents per year have been cleared
by officers using one of the two MIR codes (220 or 221) that
document incidents involving mentally disturbed individuals.
A smaller number of cases are cleared using codes that
denote specific offenses, such as assault. In total, between
one and two percent of roughly 400,000 dispatched calls or
on-view events annually will involve mentally disturbed
persons.
Against this backdrop, brought into sharp focus by public
concerns and the police Firearms Review Board inquiry
surrounding the Walker incident - SPD initiated in late April
2000 an "objective and comprehensive analysis of less lethal
force options." Toward this end, Acting Chief of Police
Herbert V. Johnson constituted a small Force Options
Research Group (FORG) to undertake the analysis. The
purpose of this work has been to provide officers with
options for containing and/or defusing situations involving
mentally disturbed persons as humanely as possible,
consistent with the need to ensure the safety of citizens
(third parties as well as the mentally disturbed person) and
the officers involved.

By the end of the year 2001, the recommendations of the
FORG presented below will yield significant results bearing
on the problem at hand, as follows:
*
CIT Trained Officers: Upwards of 200 Patrol officers (one
quarter of the force) will received 40 hours of training in ways
to handle the problems of mentally disturbed persons
involved in police incidents; these Crisis Intervention Team
(CIT) officers typically seek peaceful ways to defuse
potentially dangerous situations.
*
Patrol Familiarization: Approximately half of all other Patrol
officers will have attended training to familiarize them with
problems of the mentally ill, to give them basic skills for
communicating with these persons, and to orient them to
situations in which it is appropriate to call for back up by CIT
trained officers. The balance of the Patrol force will receive
this training by the end of 2002.
*
Less Lethal Weapons: 260 less-lethal weapons systems
will be deployed in the hands of fully trained officers (130
M26 Tasers and 130 Remington Beanbag Launchers); these
systems may be employed in situations where less lethal
force is appropriate.
Bottom Line: These results will establish Seattle Police
Department as a state-of-the-art police agency thoroughly
trained and familiarized with the problems of the mentally ill
and equipped with less lethal technologies for law
enforcement and order maintenance.

Executive Summary
The SPD Force Options Research Group (FORG) was
convened in April 2000, under the direction of Chief of Staff
Clark Kimerer. Its charge was to examine the state-of-the-art
regarding less lethal force options and their deployment by
law enforcement agencies, and where appropriate, to make
recommendations to ensure that SPD is at the forefront in
the training, deployment and use of such tactics and
munitions. Drawing on the knowledge and expertise of sworn
and civilian employees from across the Department, the
FORG began meeting in early May. Since that time, FORG
members have pursued an aggressive work program,
culminating in the following report.
The Report begins with a detailed discussion of the
methodology, approach and activities of FORG
members. As the Report makes clear, FORG members
have been engaged in a wide-ranging work program. This
work program has included review of relevant research
literature, case and statutory law, and training and
operational information; contact with vendors and distributors
of less lethal weapons and devices; surveys of other law
enforcement agencies concerning their training, equipment,
and deployment practices; testing of various less lethal
options; and consultation with national experts on less lethal
force deployment.
Next the Report focuses on the key legal and training
issues that shape the police use of force. Central to this
discussion is an understanding of and appreciation for, the
following:

*
The legal authority of police officers to use force, including
deadly force, to protect themselves and/or others.
*
The concept of the continuum of force, which guides officers
in the application of reasonable and necessary force to
resolve difficult situations with the least amount of risk of
death or serious injury to all involved.
*
The role of less lethal force options within the police
response arsenal, not as a substitute for deadly force, but as
a supplement to it under appropriate conditions and
circumstances.
*
How SPD trains and prepares officers to use force.
The Report next discusses recommendations to enhance
the less lethal force options available to Seattle police
officers. The recommendations, include the following:
*

Expanded CIT training to include all patrol lieutenants and
sergeants and to increase the number of CIT trained patrol
officers to ensure that at least one CIT-trained officer is
available per squad per watch on a 24x7 basis.
*
Provision for refresher and skill building training for CIT
officers which would include mandatory, annual classes.
*
Purchase and deployment of the M26 Taser to ensure that
there is one Taser-qualified officer in each patrol squad, on
each watch, on a 24x7 basis and that patrol supervisors are
trained and equipped to use the M26 Taser.
*
Purchase and deployment of less lethal launchers using
#23DS bean bag rounds to ensure that there is one qualified
bean bag officer per patrol sector squad and that Patrol
supervisors are equipped with less lethal bean bag kits.
*
Implementation of a training program for qualification and
certification of officers in the use of less lethal munitions to
include a 4 hour training programs on both the M26 Taser
and an 8 hour training program on use of the #23DS bean
bag rounds.
*

Provision for re-qualification and skill-building training on use
of less lethal munitions to include mandatory, annual recertification.
*
Adoption of appropriate policy and directives governing the
deployment of less lethal options and documentation of their
use.
*
Continuation of the FORG to oversee implementation of the
less lethal program, to develop and refine Department policy
and directives, to review deployments of the less lethal
options recommended here, and to assess and recommend
deployment expansions or new options for deployment.
Implementation costs for the recommended less lethal
program are discussed at the end of the recommendations
section, along with estimated annual costs for program
continuation. Also included is the training timeline detailing
the number of officers expected to complete CIT and less
lethal weapons-related training.
The comprehensive program recommended here will
result in approximately 50% of the SPD Patrol force
being trained or equipped with some form of less lethal
weapon or crisis intervention option by the end of 2001.

FORG Approach and Activities

Overview. In order to accomplish its objectives in a relatively
short period of time, the FORG adopted an approach
consisting of the following: FORG members took on
individual assignments in their areas of expertise, the Group
met regularly to report on progress and reassess or refocus
efforts as necessary, and the Group carefully documented all
of its activities and all materials gathered and reviewed. Key
aspects of the FORG approach and activities are
summarized here.
FORG Meetings. From the time it was created by Interim
Police Chief Herbert Johnson in late April 2000 (see the
letter from Chief Johnson to Mayor Schell announcing the
creation of the Group, at Appendix A), the FORG met
regularly. Each of these meetings was documented as was
the progress of the FORG work program. Since the FORG
represented a cross-section of skills and areas of expertise
in the Department, these meetings were an opportunity to
learn from each other as well as from the results of the
assignments being carried out by each FORG member.
The FORG was also diligent in keeping others apprised of its
work efforts and progress. In July 2000, for example, FORG
members briefed the Council Public Safety and Technology
Committee on its activities and likely schedule for completion
of its work. At that time, it was estimated that FORG
members had already devoted approximately 1,200 hours of
staff time to the Group’s work program.
Contact with other law enforcement agencies. In order to
assess how SPD’s approach to less lethal force options
compares with other agencies, a telephone survey was
conducted. The purpose of the survey was to determine
what special training in crisis intervention or other techniques
is provided in those agencies and what less lethal weapons

or devices are provided to officers. The deployment patterns
for less lethal options were also documented for the
agencies contacted. Twenty-five other departments were
contacted as a part of this survey and the findings are
summarized in a chart found at Appendix B.
Convening of citizens less lethal options work group.
When the FORG was initially created, the suggestion was
made that the Department should try to solicit the
perspectives of community members as less lethal force
options were considered. In order to accomplish this
objective, a Community Work Group on Less Lethal
Weapons Options was convened in June 2000. The work of
this Citizens Group was coordinated and facilitated by
Director Harry Bailey of the Police/Community Partnership
Program. The Citizens Group operated independently of the
FORG, but FORG members met with the Citizens Group and
provided information and demonstrations on request. In
particular, the SWAT team members of the FORG provided
a formal demonstration of all the less lethal options currently
available in SPD for the Citizens Group. Crisis Intervention
Training officers also met with the Group to explain and
answer questions about the CIT training program. A report
from the Citizens Group is imminent and is expected to be
consistent with the recommendations contained in the FORG
report.
Seminar attendance. In June 2000, three members of the
FORG flew to Los Angeles to attend a two day seminar on
the state-of-the-art weapons and tactics for addressing crisis
situations. All of the latest weapons and technology were on
display and vendor representatives and less lethal experts
were available to discuss their recommendations. As a result
of this conference, the M26 Taser was identified as a
possible device for consideration by the FORG. A

representative of Taser International later visited the Seattle
area and provided a demonstration for the SWAT team,
leaving one M26 Taser for further use and testing.
Expert consultation. In July 2000, Lt. Sid Heal of the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, an internationally
recognized expert on less lethal force options, flew to Seattle
to meet with the FORG. Lt. Heal described the approach he
recommends in considering less lethal options and made
concrete suggestions for consideration by the FORG.
Other activities. Other activities undertaken by FORG
members included review of research information
concerning police use of force and responses to it,
demonstrations and tests of various less lethal devices (it is
estimated that 12-15 such devices were examined by the
SWAT team), and contact with area experts on crisis
intervention techniques to identify additional resources for
officer training. The results of all these activities are to be
found in the recommendations contained in this report.
FORG timeline of events and activities. Below is a
chronology of the activities of the Force Options Research
Group. The FORG carefully documented all of its efforts and
has catalogued the large amount of information gathered.
These materials are available for review.
4-28-00: Chief Herbert V. Johnson sent a confirmation
memo to Mayor Paul Schell formally advising that he had
convened a Force Options Research Group (FORG) under
the direction of Assistant Chief Clark Kimerer. The memo
noted the FORG assigned staff, their expertise, and their
purpose of conducting an exhaustive study, national in
scope, of less lethal force options. In addition, their end
product would ensure that our Seattle Police policies and

procedures, training curricula, and the laws concerning the
police use of force are summarized and available for review
by the public.
5-2-00 FORG Meeting: In this initial FORG meeting,
Assistant Chief Kimerer stressed the priority of the project
and outlined the Group purpose and the specific roles
envisioned for each member. The intent was to operate as a
research team to document the legal, policy, training,
equipment, and deployment options available to law
enforcement. The Group was not expected to produce a
formal report, but rather to provide a compilation of research
and information. Lieutenant Clavadetscher was designated
as the official repository for the Group’s records.
5-19-00 FORG Meeting: Sergeant Eddy will attend a training
program on crisis intervention techniques and will gather
information on training programs of other departments.
Officers Ward and Stockwell discussed tactics, deployment,
and equipment and noted that the National Tactical Officers
Association (NTOA) keeps information on the field
experiences of reporting agencies. Officer Geoghagan
provided portions of the lesson plans for the Basic Academy
and the Officer Street Skills Class. Other members
discussed their progress to date.
5-30-00: Mimi Walsh submitted a 1996 and a 1999
Department of Justice study including summaries of both to
Lt. Clavadetscher.
6-2-00: Assistant Chief Kimerer submitted a copy of the
Advanced Taser M26 literature.
6-5-00 FORG Meeting: Assistant Chief Kimerer announced
that Director Harry Bailey, Seattle Police Office of

Police/Community Partnerships, is working with a community
advisory group for police use of force. Sergeant Paul
McDonagh reported on deployment options used by other
agencies around the nation and on conversations he had
with Seattle Police supervisors regarding Patrol needs.
Sergeant Liz Eddy discussed several issues related to Crisis
Intervention Team (CIT) training and deployment and
submitted a copy of her CIT training guide. Mimi Walsh
discussed her research on police use of force studies. Other
members reviewed their progress on gathering information
and gave Lt. Clavadetscher copies of materials they had
collected to date.
6-12-00: Officers Ward, Stockwell, and Geoghagan flew to
Los Angeles for a two day seminar sponsored by Jane’s, an
organization internationally recognized for weapons
expertise. The seminar, Unconventional Weapons: The
Response to Emerging Threats, examined a wide range of
potential urban threats and the state of the art weapons and
tactics for addressing those threats.
6-29-00 FORG Meeting: Officers Ward, Stockwell, and
Geoghagan reported on the unconventional weapons
seminar they attended in Los Angeles and noted that while
there they had the opportunity to meet with several national
experts to discuss issues of interest to the Group. They
reviewed what they learned, confirmed that FORG was
aware of all less lethal options presently available, and
stated that the experts seemed to agree that the Advanced
Taser was a new weapon of high potential.
7-6-00: Officer Geoghagan submitted a detailed notebook on
use of force policy, legal basis, training, and accountability.

7-10-00: Officer Ward submitted a catalog documenting the
less lethal weapons and munitions examined by SWAT team
members.
7-11-00: Rick Smith, President and CEO of Taser
International, flew to Seattle and gave a presentation and
demonstration of the Advanced Taser M-26 at the Seattle
Police Range. Several FORG members attended including
Swat Officer Steve Ward. Officer Ward was video taped first
being subjected to an earlier taser model with non-disabling
results and then to the M26 which was immediately
disabling.
7-12-00 FORG Meeting: Officer Ward demonstrated the M26
to the entire group and we reviewed the previous day’s
demonstration at the range. Officers Ward and Stockwell
reported they had made a less lethal options presentation to
Director Bailey’s Citizens Community Advisory Group.
7-18-00: Mini Walsh submitted a copy of her summary of
criteria for considering less lethal options.
7-19-00 FORG Meeting: We prepared for and gave a status
presentation to the City Council Public Safety and
Technology Committee.
7-20-00 FORG Meeting: We arranged for Los Angeles
County Sheriff’s Office Lieutenant Sid Heal, an
internationally recognized expert on less lethal options for
law enforcement, to fly to Seattle and address our group.
Our discussion covered the full range of less lethal options
and included the following key topics: 1) What less lethal
options can and can’t do, 2) You can train at a higher level
than you can maintain, 3) Understanding and managing the
risks with less lethal options, 4) A model deployment of less

lethal devices, 5) Technical issues with Extended Range
Options, and 5) The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Office Pilot
Testing Model for Less Lethal Options
8-10-00: SWAT Officers Clay Stockwell and Steve Ward
demonstrated the M26 Taser and numerous other less lethal
weapons to several FORG members and Director Bailey’s
Citizens Community Advisory Group in the Public Safety
Building Gym.
8-30-00 FORG Meeting: It became clear that the Group’s
efforts had become crystallized into a series of concrete
recommendations that could be presented in a formal report.
The Group discussed budget considerations and the final
recommendations, format, and content of a final report.
Responsibility for each part of the report was assigned.
Sergeant Eddy discussed planned CIT training. Officer Ward
reported and the Group discussed his detailed proposal for
policy, deployment, and training for less lethal weapons,
including an intranet to document every use of weapons.
Also included in this meeting was a presentation of the draft
recommendations of the Citizen Advisory Group, which
expects to issue a report about the same time as FORG.
8-31-00: Mimi Walsh submitted a copy of the 2001-2002
Seattle Police Department Budget Issue Paper providing the
rationale and estimated costs for a less lethal options
program.
9-12-00 FORG Meeting: Final details of the draft report were
determined and a review schedule established.

Legal and Training Issues in the Police Use of
Force

LEGAL BASIS FOR POLICE USE OF FORCE:
U.S. Constitution (Bill of Rights):
The first ten amendments specifically enumerate rights that
safeguard a citizen’s liberties against governmental
intrusion. Police officers as agents of local government are
empowered to make arrests (AKA seizures/governmental
intrusion). It’s the 4th Amendment that addresses these
seizures.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The use of force against a citizen constitutes a seizure.
Paraphrasing, in terms of the use of force, people have the
right to be secure against unreasonable seizures of their
persons. Therefore, any force used by police officers must
be REASONABLE as per the U.S. Constitution.
Who decides what’s reasonable? Ultimately, both civilly and
criminally, a judge or jury makes that determination. To do
that they use a balancing test called the OBJECTIVE
REASONABLENESS STANDARD. The test consists of a
citizen’s right to be secure against unreasonable seizures on
one hand and the need for government intrusion on those
rights (law enforcement). In other words, the force used by
an officer must be balanced against the heinousness of a
person’s activities and the threat they pose.
Constitutional Case Law:

Whereas the U.S. Constitution provides the framework,
constitutional law serves to define this standard.
TENNESSEE v. GARNER is the first case in which the U.S.
Supreme Court applied this "reasonableness standard"
found in the 4th Amendment, to police use of force.
TENNESSEE v. GARNER, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
Memphis Police Officer Hymon shot and killed an unarmed
fifteen-year-old burglar (Garner), who was fleeing a
residence. Hymon was "reasonably sure" that the suspect
was unarmed. He stated that he shot to prevent the
suspect’s escape. The officer’s actions were justified under
an existing Tennessee statute. Garner’s father filed a lawsuit
in Federal Court alleging various civil rights violations. The
following are the major points of the Supreme Court’s
decision:
*
State statues that allowed the use of deadly force against
non-dangerous fleeing felons were unconstitutional.
*
The 4th Amendment’s "reasonableness" scrutiny is the
appropriate measure for police use of deadly force against
non-dangerous fleeing felons.
*
Deadly force may be used if it is necessary to prevent the
escape of a suspect AND the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officer or others AND the officer

gives a warning of imminent deadly force if possible. When
deadly force used in this manner it is REASONABLE.

The decision in TENNESSEE v. GARNER only addressed
the use of deadly force. The issue of non-deadly force was
later examined in GRAHAM v. CONNOR.
GRAHAM V. CONNOR, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
Graham, a diabetic, asked a friend (William Berry) to drive
him to a nearby store for some juice to stave off an
oncoming insulin reaction. At the store, Graham decided the
line at the register was too long and opted to go to a friend’s
house for the needed juice. Charlotte Police Officer Connor
saw Graham running from the store. Connor became
suspicious and stopped Graham and his friend as they drove
away. Connor then called for back-up. When approaching
the car Berry told Connor that Graham was having a
reaction. Connor directed them to wait. While waiting for the
back-up Graham exited Berry’s car running around it twice.
Berry asked for Connor’s help in catching and restraining
Graham. In the ensuing confusion of the arriving back-up
Graham was handcuffed. At one point after being
handcuffed Graham passed out. Officers then placed
Graham on the hood of Berry’s car. Graham regained
consciousness and requested the officer’s verify his
condition via the diabetic decal he carried in his wallet.
Graham was told to "shut up" and was thrown head first into
a police car. As a result Graham suffered various minor
injuries. Graham later filed a lawsuit alleging officers used
excessive force. Graham also argued that, deadly or not, in
the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other "seizure"
of a free citizen the force used should be analyzed under the

4th amendment and it’s reasonableness standard. The
Supreme Court held that:
*
The

4th Amendment reasonableness standard regarding
seizures extended to all use of force (by an agent of the
government) not just deadly force.
*
The court also recognized that officers must often make,
"split second decisions-in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving". Therefore, the court made it
clear that the reasonableness standard was to be applied AT
THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. The court made it clear that
in recognizing the dynamic situations that officers find
themselves in, they should not be subjected hindsight. This
understanding also takes into account that officers are not
required to use the least amount of force required to
accomplish the task, only a standard of reasonable force.
*
The determination of reasonableness is based on the
perspective of a reasonable officer facing the immediate
threat. This is judged from an objective perspective rather
than subjective. This means, would a reasonably prudent
and well-trained officer make the same decision?
*
An officer determines that a particular level of force is
reasonable by considering the totality of circumstances
surrounding the incident. In GRAHAM v. CONNOR the U.S.
Supreme Court identified four factors that were inclusive in
the totality of circumstances:

1.
The severity of the crime;
2.
Whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the
safety of officers or others;
3.
Whether the suspect is actively resisting;
4.
Whether the suspect is attempting to evade arrest by flight.
(This by no means is an exhaustive list of the circumstances
that should be considered.)
State Law (Revised Code of Washington):
Non-Deadly Force: As we know, state law can be more
restrictive than federal law. RCW 9A.16.010 through
9A.16.040 specifically addresses the use of force against
another person. In terms of non-deadly force, aside from
specific provisions allowing for the use of force when dealing
with the mentally ill, incompetent, or disabled, during the
commission of their duties an officer’s use of force falls
under the auspices of RCW 9A.16.020(1).
The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of
another is not unlawful in the following cases:
1.

Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a
legal duty, or a person assisting the officer and acting under the officer’s
direction;

The essential part of this section is the term "necessary"
which is defined in RCW 9A.16.010 (1).
In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly required:
1.
"Necessary" means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of
force appeared to exist and that the amount of force used was reasonable
to effect the lawful purpose intended.

*
"Necessary" means that there may have been apparent
alternatives to the use of force but they were not reasonably
effective.
*
"Necessary" means that there may have been reasonably
effective alternatives. But these alternatives were not
apparent to the officers on scene.
*
"Necessary" means that the force used must be reasonable.
*
"Necessary" means that there must be a lawful purpose for
the use of force.
Deadly Force: The use of deadly force by a public officer is
covered under RCW 9A.16.040. Section (1) identifies three
cases when justifiable homicide or the use of deadly force is

justifiable. Use of force by a law enforcement officer
generally falls under Subsection (c).
(c)When necessarily used by a peace officer or person acting under the
peace officer’s command and in the officer’s aid:

Subsection (c) then lists four specific examples
during which the use of deadly force is justifiable:
(i)To arrest or apprehend a person who the officer reasonably believes has
committed, has attempted to commit, is committing, or is attempting to
commit a felony;
(ii)To prevent the escape of a person from a federal or state correctional
facility or in the retaking a person who escapes from such facility; or
(iii)To prevent the escape of a person from a county or city jail or holding
facility if the person has been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a
felony; or
(iv)To lawfully suppress a riot if the actor or another participant is armed
with a deadly weapon.

In addition to the use of deadly force having to be necessary,
Section 2 states when the officer is considering to use
deadly force they must have probable cause to believe that
the suspect, if not apprehended, poses a " Threat of serious
physical harm" to the officer or others. A "threat of serious
physical harm" consists of the following:
(a)The suspect threatens a peace officer with a weapon or displays a
weapon in a manner that could be reasonably construed as threatening; or
(b)There is probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed any
crime involving the infliction of serious physical harm

Lastly, the final words in Section 2 add that under these
circumstances deadly force may also be used if it’s
necessary to prevent the suspect from escaping from the
officer, where, if feasible, some warning is given.

COMMON QUESTIONS ABOUT POLICE USE OF FORCE:
1.
What is a use of force continuum?
A use of force continuum is a teaching tool used by training
instructors to teach new officers what would be considered
by experienced officers as a REASONABLE amount of
force. It is not a concrete directive that dictates a level of
force that an officer must use during certain circumstances.
2.
Don’t police officers have to follow the continuum?
Actually, police officers are expected to use a
REASONABLE amount of force. Whether the force a police
officer uses is REASONABLE depends on all the facts and
circumstances of the event.
*
Does the Seattle Police Department have a use of force
continuum?

No, several different use of force continuums have been
created. A copy of the continuum that is currently in use at
both the Seattle/King County Regional Police Academy and
the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Center has
been included in this notebook.
*
Don’t officers have to use the least amount of force?
No, the least amount of force implies subjectivity. It implies
that there is always one effective alternative that utilizes the
least amount of force. In reality it is impossible to believe that
given the dynamics of a rapidly evolving incident that officers
will always be able to discern which alternative would be the
least amount. Rather, officers are held to a standard of what
is REASONABLE. (For supporting case law see Plakas v.
Drinski 19F.3d 1143, 1146)
A section of SPD policy (1.145) requires Seattle police
officers to use the minimum amount of force necessary to
resolve a situation. However, language added to this section
states that the minimum force requirement is only for
departmental review and the entire section should not be
construed as creating a higher standard than state law.
*
What governs how much force a police officer is authorized
to use?
Above all, the U.S. Constitution governs the amount of force
a police officer is authorized to use. Specifically, the 4th
Amendment. It is the 4th Amendment that limits the amount
of force that a police officer is authorized to use to a
REASONABLE amount. The reasonable concept is further

defined in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor. At
the state level, the term NECESSARY is added. (See RCW
9A.16.010.) Lastly, SPD policies can also dictate the amount
of force an officer is authorized to use.
*
Who makes the determination of what is REASONABLE? In
terms of criminal or civil liability, ultimately a judge or jury
makes that decision. In terms of department discipline, a
supervisor makes the decision. However, the Supreme Court
made it clear in Graham v. Connor that for any party to make
this determination, they must do so while considering the
totality of the incident from the perspective of a reasonable
police officer. In other words, to what extent would a
reasonable police officer have made the same decision
based on all of the factors and circumstances of the incident.
CONTINUUM OF RESISTANCE: OFFICER’S PERCEPTION
OF VIOLATOR’S ACTIONS
VIOLATOR’S GOAL: ESCAPE/ASSAULT
NON-VERBAL
VERBAL
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
a violator who is trying to defeat your physical control
clenched fists, eyes stance
threats, statements that indicate an uncooperative subject
a suspect who will not move or "come along"
actively uncooperative static resistance, i.e. resistive tension is generated by the violator
egressive
a violator is attempting to escape control using reactive type movements
aggressive

the violator is attacking the officer and is attempting to injure the officer in the process of
resisting or escaping
aggravated aggression
the violator has pre-planned the attack or is implementing weapons and/or tactics that are
highly injurious or potentially lethal
LEVEL THREE TACTICS: LVNR, tertiary targets with impact weapons,
firearms, etc.

LEVEL TWO DEFENSIVE TACTICS: strikes such as knees, kicks, and elbows,
impact weapons (baton, flashlight, radio etc.) chemical agents in projectile forms, taser

LEVEL ONE DEFENSIVE TACTICS: pain compliance through distractions, counterjoint tactics, hair hold control tactics (OC Spray could be used at this level)

TOUCH CONTROL: guiding, escorting, and out muscling the individual who exhibits
on minor resistance

VERBAL INTERACTION: dialogue, open questions, persuasion, advice, or lawful
order
OFFICER PRESENCE: identification by: verbal announcement, badge, vehicle,
uniform etc.

OFFICER’S GOALS: CONTROL
IMPEDE
STOP
CONTINUUM OF ENFORCEMENT: REASONABLE
OFFICER’S ACTIONS

SUMMARY OF SPD USE OF FORCE TRAINING:
In-service training:

Currently the department is providing 1 hour of use of force
training to each officer attending the SPD Street Skills
course. During this time the following subjects are reviewed:
*
4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
*
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
*
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
*
Totality of the Circumstances
*
Use of Force Continuum
*
RCW 9A.16.010 (Definitions)
*
RCW 9A.16.020 (Use of Force-When Lawful)
*
RCW 9A.16.040 (Use of Deadly Force)
Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET):
Currently all SPD recruits are attending the Seattle King
County Regional Training Academy located at the former
Sandpoint Naval Station. The BLET recruits receive 112
hours worth of defensive tactics training. This includes 10

hours of use of force training. The following subjects are
covered during those hours:
*
4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
*
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
*
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)
*
Totality of the Circumstances
*
Use of Force Continuum
*
RCW 9A.16.010 (Definitions)
*
RCW 9A.16.020 (Use of Force-When Lawful)
*
RCW 9A.16.040 (Use of Deadly Force)
*
SPD Use of Force Policy

FORG Recommendations

Overview. The FORG did not initially anticipate that its work
would result in the concrete set of recommendations found
here. As the work progressed, however, some clear
directions emerged, permitting development of a
comprehensive and sustainable less lethal options program
for the SPD. Though the proposed program recommends
limited deployment of less lethal options, it is designed to put
at least one such option in the hands of about 50% of all
sworn officers in Patrol (including deployment of CIT-certified
personnel). Furthermore, the program is designed to ensure
that trained Patrol personnel are available to provide
redundant, less lethal options capability on a 24 x 7 basis.
FORG members were guided in their consideration of less
lethal options by a set of criteria that deserve mention here.
*
Needs assessment – identifies the routine and/or unusual
situations in which officers might benefit from the availability
of less lethal options and the characteristics of those
situations (e.g., daytime/nighttime, outdoors/indoors) that
might affect choices among options.
*
Practicality/useability/deployability – has to do with ease,
effectiveness, and flexibility of use, any special
environmental, transportation or deployment restrictions or
limitations an option might present.
*
Effectiveness – concerns the range of use and the short and
long range effects of a device, and in particular, how the

effectiveness of a device is balanced against potential
liability that may be associated with its use.
*
Safety and Operational Efficiency – refers to how reliable
and controllable are the effects of various options, and the
degree of safety provided to the officer who deploys them,
suspects against which they are used, as well as any third
parties who may be affected by use.
*
Political and Legal Liability – involves assessment of the
risks of injury or death of various options (virtually all less
lethal options have been "lethal" under certain
circumstances), of the degrees of officer and public
acceptance of different devices, and of how deployment may
affect liability.
*
Training/Policy and Procedure/Logistical and Maintenance
Issues – refers the level of training, guidance, maintenance
required for safe and proficient use of a device as well as
any special storage, testing or transportation requirements.
*
Cost considerations – involves assessment of start-up and
ongoing costs, training expenses, savings/losses associated
with reduced/increased liability for use of various options.

The specific recommendations made here reflect application
of these criteria. In addition, as this less lethal program is
reviewed, several caveats should be kept in mind.
First, the recommended program constitutes a limited
deployment of less lethal options, i.e., these options will
not be standard issue for all officers at all times. Cost
considerations certainly played a role in this
recommendation, but more important were issues
associated with training, practicality, and need. Operational
data from other agencies indicate that officers must receive
proper training if they are to use any device proficiently and
reliably and a department is best served by deploying only to
the limits of its training capacity. Similarly, until SPD’s field
experience with various devices is expanded, the need for
and practicality of these options cannot be fully assessed.
For these reasons, a limited deployment is prudent and
justified. The practical implication of such a deployment,
however, is that it will remain quite likely that there will be
circumstances where less lethal options are not available
initially to officers called to respond to specific incidents or
situations.
Second, the recommended deployment of less lethal
options does not guarantee their use, even when
available. Situational dynamics, in particular the timing and
volatility of an incident, will dictate the response of officers. A
high risk, rapidly evolving situation will not lend itself to the
application of a broad range of response options, even if
some of these options happen to be available. Officers on
scene will continue to exercise their best judgment in using
reasonable force and will not be expected to deploy a less
lethal option when such deployment is neither appropriate
nor likely to be effective. Moreover, it is important to
recognize that the capacity to deploy less lethal options

safely is dependent upon the ready availability of lethal force
as protection and back-up. Officers with tasers or with crisis
intervention skills, for example, can only use them safely
when other officers are available and in a position to support
and protect them.
Third, less lethal options must be clearly understood as
supplements to – and not substitutes for – deadly force.
The paramount duty of police officers to protect themselves
and the public does not change because of the deployment
of less lethal options. In this regard, less lethal options do
not constitute "first steps" in some progression of responses,
nor are officers required to employ or exhaust all less lethal
options before resorting to deadly force. Based on the
circumstances, officers may still respond with the lethal
options available to them if the situation warrants a deadly
force response. The recommended deployment of less lethal
options is intended in no way to compromise officer and
public safety.
Finally, the less lethal program recommended here is based
upon the best information currently available. FORG
members were impressed with how fast-developing the
marketplace for less lethal options is. For example, one
weapon (the M26 Taser) that is being recommended for the
SPD program was not available even six months ago. Six
months from now, other devices may come on the market
that hold even greater promise than those suggested here.
Nevertheless, the FORG is confident that it has chosen a
prudent course of action and that the limited deployment of
various devices recommended here will give SPD the
opportunity to consider other options, should they become
available.

With these caveats and criteria in mind, the FORG
recommends a three-pronged less lethal options program for
SPD, consisting of the following:
*
Expanded training in crisis intervention skills and
techniques
*
Acquisition and deployment of less lethal weapons and
systems
*
Continuation of the FORG as SPD’s mechanism for
planning and implementation, standards development,
and review of less lethal options.
Each of these recommendations is discussed further below.
Expanded Training in Crisis Intervention Skills and
Techniques.
Specific Recommendations:
*
Train an additional 60 CIT officers (the majority in Patrol) this
fall.
*
Provide CIT training to all sergeants in Patrol.
*

Continue training to maintain 200 CIT-trained officers in
Patrol at any time.
*
Provide mandatory, refresher and skill-building training to all
CIT officers at least annually.
*
Provide mandatory, one-day CIT familiarization and
orientation training to all sworn personnel in Patrol other than
those receiving full CIT training.
*
Issue directives on callouts and deployment of CIT officers.

SPD began its Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) program just
over two years ago. The first class of officers to go through
the 40-hour class graduated in February of 1998. Currently,
there are 75 CIT-trained officers assigned to Patrol
Operations. In addition, there are 47 other officers who have
received the CIT training, who work in a variety of other
assignments. All of SPD’s hostage negotiators have also
been through the CIT training. In addition to the initial 40hour training course, one-day refresher courses have been
offered at least one time/year for CIT officers to attend on a
voluntary basis.
The 40-hour CIT course includes the following subjects:
Mental Disorders; Geriatric Mental Disorders; Understanding
Mental Illness, a Family’s Perspective; The Law and Mental
Illness; Chronic Public Inebriates; The Crisis Cycle;
Children’s Crisis Response Team; Communication With
Mentally Ill Individuals; Intervention in High Risk Situations

(Suicides); Crisis Triage Unit. These subjects are taught by
local professionals who are experts in the specific subject
matter.
At this time, there are plans for two more forty-hour classes
before the end of 2000. Each class will have 30 attendees.
Upon graduation of the second class, the number CITtrained personnel in SPD will total 182. The majority of new
graduates will be assigned to the Patrol Operations Bureau.
Our recommendation is to maintain about 200 CIT-trained
officers assigned to Patrol.
Additional plans for training for the remainder of the year
2000, include at least two one-day training sessions,
directed to the non-CIT patrol officer, on how to
communicate better with the mentally ill. Additionally, there
are plans to do two, one-day refresher classes for those
officers already trained in CIT. These one-day refresher
classes will include training by a local expert, Dr. Ben
Johnson, who will focus on skill enhancements in identifying
and responding to aggression, officer safety, and situation
management. It is strongly recommended that the one-day
communication training for non-CIT officers and refresher
training for CIT officers be mandatory.
Future training goals include training all patrol officers in the
one-day, intensive course on how to communicate with
mentally ill persons. In addition, on-going 40-hour CIT
classes will need to be offered annually, in order to maintain
the recommended number of CIT-trained patrol officers, as
some will be lost because of attrition to other units and/or
promotion.
There are plans to take advantage of free training whenever
possible. One example is a twelve-week course offered by

Washington Alliance for the Mentally Ill. The class is offered
to families of mentally ill persons, but they are inviting
officers to attend, to help gain some insight into what families
with mentally ill persons have to go through. It is a FORG
recommendation that supervisors provide CIT officers who
wish to participate with training time to attend these evening
programs.
Many situations have occurred over the last two years that
were very likely resolved peacefully, due to the skills of the
CIT officer. One extreme example, was a domestic violence
assault, where a mentally disturbed man fled his house
wielding a machete. The man was very threatening and
hostile upon arrival of the police. CIT officers responded and
were able to convince the man to put down his weapon and
surrender. There have been numerous other calls involving
weapons and threats of violence to which CIT officers were
called, though we have no way of knowing for sure if the
skills of the CIT officers who responded averted tragedies in
those situations.
The future of CIT, and the best use of the Department’s CITtrained personnel, rests with those individuals responsible
for making sure that CIT officers are called to the scene of
critical incidents. Currently, there is no manual directive
specifying the types of situations likely to benefit from a CIT
officer response. FORG members are in the process of
developing a written directive on the use of CIT. Likely, this
directive will specify the types of calls that would require that
CIT be dispatched, as well as other recommendations for
their use. For example, any call from radio that indicates
mental illness is involved should require a response from a
CIT-trained officer. Similarly, calls that could turn into standoff situations should have CIT officers directed to the call as

a first responder, to be followed up by Hostage Negotiation
Team and SWAT officers, if necessary.
Support for the use of CIT officers by the Precinct
Commanders and Watch Commanders is also paramount.
Plans are being made to address the precinct Commanders
about ensuring their Watch Commanders know how to utilize
the CIT officers assigned to their precinct. In addition, the
understanding and use of CIT trained officers is a projected
agenda item on the patrol supervisor training program being
developed by the Patrol Operations Bureau. Until SPD has
enough CIT-trained officers to cover all squads, watches and
precincts, it is the FORG recommendation that officers and
sergeants request that Communications go outside of
precinct boundaries to find a CIT-trained officer, when the
need arises.
Other steps that might be taken to ensure the best use of the
CIT trained officers would include formal recognition of the
successful efforts of CIT-trained officers. This will
accomplish two purposes: it will make those officers feel
their training has been worthwhile; and it will educate other
officers about the benefits of calling for a CIT officer when
dealing with persons in crisis. Another step is to continue
CIT participation in training for new police officers to ensure
that these officers are equipped to deal with the mentally ill
and/or to recognize how to get CIT officer help in those
situations.
Partnerships are also important for advancing the CIT
program. CIT should continue to work closely with the
Mental Health Court, to ensure the best possible outcomes
for low level, misdemeanant mentally ill offenders; and with
the legislature and the community mental health
professionals, to devise intervention strategies that ensure

the safety of the public while addressing the needs and
rights of the mentally ill.
A future direction for the CIT program might include an onstaff mental health professional (MHP) - perhaps an intern,
working toward a doctorate - who would be interested in
being part of a police/mental health professional partnership
team. This team would be available to respond to crises in
the field, such that the MHP would be able to make a field
evaluation on the state of the mental illness, while the law
enforcement officer could evaluate the situation based on
the criminal laws.
Acquisition and Deployment of Less Lethal Weapons
and Systems.
Specific Recommendations:
*
Purchase and deploy the M26 Taser to one officer in each
patrol sector squad, on each watch, on a 24x7 basis, to bike
squads, foot beats, ACT teams, Seattle Center squads, and
to all sector squad sergeants.
*
Purchase and deploy less lethal Remington launchers using
#23DS bean bag rounds to ensure they are available to all
patrol sector squads and sector squad sergeants.
*
Implement a training program for qualification and
certification of officers in the use of less lethal munitions to
include a 4 hour training program on the M26 Taser and an 8
hour training program on use of the bean bag rounds.

*
Provide re-qualification and skill-building training on use of
less lethal munitions to include annual mandatory recertification on technique and tactics.
*
Adopt appropriate policy and directives governing the
deployment of less lethal options and documentation of their
use.
Two less lethal weapons are recommended for purchase
and limited deployment within Patrol and special response
units in the Department. Each is discussed in turn. The
overall deployment model applied to these weapons is to
provide less lethal options at the lowest operational level in
the Department since these units are most likely to be the
first responders to any incident. First responders generally
have the best chance of using a less lethal response before
the situation escalates and a lethal response becomes
necessary. Providing less lethal alternatives to first
responders, then, increases the opportunity for these
devices to be used successfully.
The M26 Taser. This weapon, developed by Taser
International, is a laser-sited weapon that fires two prongs at
a target up to 21 feet away. The two prongs deliver 26 watts
of electricity at over 50,000 volts, overriding the target’s
motor and sensory systems. As a result, targets are unable
to control large muscles and become totally compliant. The
M26 delivers its electrical charge over a five second cycle,
but once the weapon is turned off, the effects disappear
immediately.

The M26 Taser is recommended for five reasons. First, the
M26 delivery system is much like a service weapon, making
it an easy system for officers to learn to use proficiently.
Second, the M26 can be deployed at a safer range (up to 21
feet) than was true of earlier tasers. Third, the M26 provides
instant compliance without injury or lasting effects to the
target. (In over 40 deployments nationally, no injuries have
been reported.) Fourth, the M26 is equipped with a dataport
that automatically documents each use of the device and
that can be downloaded into a computer. And finally, the
initial cost and ongoing maintenance and munitions
replacement expenses are moderate.
The recommended deployment of the M26 is as follows: one
officer per squad per watch in Patrol, one officer per bike
beat and foot beat, one officer per ACT team, and per
Seattle Center squad, and all Patrol sector sergeants, for a
total of 130 tasers deployed. The M26 will be individually
assigned to officers who will have responsibilty for their
security and maintenance. Each Taser officer and sergeant
will attend a 4-hour Taser User Certification Course that will
include use of the device, department policy governing use,
live fire qualification, and training scenarios. Course
instructors will be SWAT team members. There will also be a
mandatory annual qualification on the M26 for officers to
retain certification in their use.
The #23 DS BeanBag. The #23DS (drag stabilized)
BeanBag, developed by Defense Technology Corporation, is
a less lethal round that can be deployed at a greater standoff
distance (20-50 feet), with greater accuracy than previous
less lethal munitions. In addition, this round has less
potential for penetration of the body than other less lethal
rounds examined.

The #23DS BeanBag is recommended for four reasons.
First, it provides officers with a less lethal option that can be
deployed at a safer range than the M26 Taser. Second, it
provides officers with a less lethal alternative that has
multiple rounds. The M26 does not. Third, the #23 DS
BeanBag uses a Remington shotgun as its launcher, a
weapon with which officers are familiar and have proficiency.
Finally, the degree of accuracy and the lower potential for
penetration with the #23 DS BeanBag reduce the chance of
serious bodily injury or death when deployed.
Recommended deployment of the #23DS BeanBag is as
follows: a total of 130 will be deployed, with approximately
30 per Precinct to be distributed among sector squads and
sector squad sergeants at the discretion of the Precinct
commander. The #23DS BeanBag systems would not be
individually assigned, but would be available for check-out
and use during each watch in each precinct by trained and
certified officers and sergeants. Accountability for
deployment of the BeanBag system will be on a sign-in/signout basis. Officers signing out these systems will be solely
responsible for them and accountable for any deployment or
use. Each BeanBag officer will attend an 8-hour training
class in the use of the #23DS Beanbag, which will cover
classroom instruction, practical scenarios, and live fire
qualifications. SWAT team officers will conduct the training.
There will also be a mandatory annual qualification on the
#23DS system to maintain certification for use. The plan is to
train 130 officers and sergeants in each of the next two
years, and then to continue the training program such that all
Patrol officers and supervisors are certified in BeanBag use.
In another aspect of the deployment, the less lethal
launchers will have orange buttstocks and foregrips, and the
rounds will be similarly designated to prevent officers from

mistaking less lethal systems for traditional systems and vice
versa.
Adoption of Appropriate Deployment and
Documentation Policies. The FORG recommends adoption
of formal policies governing use of the less lethal devices
proposed here. Revisions to the Department Manual and to
the use of force statement form will be provided separately
for Command Staff review and approval. In addition, it is
essential that officers and command staff learn from SPD’s
own field and operational experience with these devices.
This will not only serve to build officer confidence in these
options, but also signal the need for changes in training
curricula or directives, where appropriate. It is suggested
that the FORG would be the appropriate vehicle for
undertaking periodic review of operational data and for
making recommendations to Command Staff.
Continue the FORG as SPD’s mechanism for planning
and implementation, standards development, and review
of less lethal options.
Specific Recommendations:
*
Develop and execute an implementation plan for the less
lethal options proposed here.
*
Modify the Department’s use of force statement to capture
information relevant to less lethal force options deployments.
*

Review and recommend revisions to Department manuals
and directives appropriate for less lethal options.
*
Conduct periodic reviews of less lethal force deployments to
gain training, supervisory, and operational insights from field
experience.
*
Evaluate current and newly available less lethal systems on
an ongoing basis, to ensure that the Department is taking
advantage of the best available options and technologies.

The less lethal force options program recommended here is
both comprehensive and ambitious. Its success is important
not only to our officers, but also to the public we serve. This
success can be best assured by tasking specific individuals
with the responsibility for carrying out the recommendations
contained in this report. The FORG, it is suggested, would
be the appropriate vehicle for taking on this responsibility. It
is, therefore, recommended that the FORG be continued for
this purpose. In addition to implementation of the
recommended less lethal force program, continuation of the
FORG will accomplish two other purposes. It will
communicate within the Department the importance placed
upon less lethal force options, and it will ensure that the
Department remains current on the most recent
developments in the rapidly changing less lethal options
marketplace.
Costs and Training Timeline for the Recommended Less
Lethal Options Program

Estimated costs. The recommended less lethal options program is
estimated to cost approximately $350,000. SPD requested an
appropriation in this amount in the 2001-2002 budget, which the
Mayor is supporting. The $350,000 appropriation will cover less
lethal weapons acquisition and related training as well as CIT
program training and related costs. Of the total appropriation,
about 46% ($163,800) involves one-time costs for purchase of
weapons and accessories; 28% ($100,000) will be used for costs of
instructors, materials, and other training-related costs; 26%
($90,400) will be required for munitions and consumable supplies,
and for equipment repairs, replacement, and upgrades. The table
below details the expenditures for the less lethal program in 2001
and 2002.

SPD Less Lethal Weapons and Training
Budget for 2001-2002
Item
Unit Cost
# Units
Total Cost
# Units
Total Cost
Total Cost
2001
2001
2002
2002
2001-02
Operational Stockage
M26 Taser
$400
130
$52,000
$52,000
M26 Holster
$100
130
$13,000
$13,000

M26 Cartridge
$18
650
$11,700
160
$2,880
$14,580
Remington Beanbag Launcher
$760
130
$98,800
$98,800
#23DS Beanbag Rounds
$5
1040
$5,200
200
$1,000
$6,200
Subtotal
$180,700
$3,880
$184,580
Training Munitions
M26 Cartridge
$18
520
$9,282
520
$9,282
$18,564
#23 Beanbag Rounds
$5
2600
$13,000
2600
$13,000
$26,000
Subtotal
$22,282
$22,282
$44,564
Equipment Repair

$5,000
$5,000
$10,000
Equipment Replacement
$0
$15,000
$15,000
Training Costs
$80,000
$20,000
$100,000
Total Cost
$287,982
$66,162
$354,144

The ongoing, annual cost of the less lethal program is
estimated at $71,200, to include $25,000 per year for
training-related costs, $46,200 for munitions and
consumable supplies, and for equipment repairs, upgrades,
and replacements. Costs associated with any new less lethal
devices that may be recommended and acquired would be in
addition to these estimates.
Training Plan. An integral part of the recommended less
lethal options program is training to improve and expand
crisis intervention and communication skills and to ensure
proficiency and reliability in the use of less lethal weapons.
Training for all weapons will be delivered by members of the
SPD SWAT Team (Special Weapons and Tactics). All
members of the SWAT Team will be trained and certified by
the end of December 2000. Initial training and qualification
for all weapons systems will be completed by the end of
2001, with mandatory refresher training scheduled for the
following year. In total, 130 personnel will be trained on the
M26 Taser and 130 on the Remington Beanbag Launcher.

By the end of 2001, trained personnel will provide SPD
Patrol Operations with redundant less lethal weapons
capability 24 hours a day, seven days a week, throughout
the year.
SPD also will train approximately 300 CIT (Crisis
Intervention Team) officers by the end of 2001 to respond to
calls involving mentally disturbed persons. We also will
initiate a one-day program to familiarize all personnel
assigned to Patrol Operations with the protocols for calling
CIT officers to the scene. By the end of 2001, SPD Patrol
Operations will have trained or familiarized approximately
60% of its assigned strength in CIT; the balance will receive
familiarization training in 2002. In addition, all CIT trained
officers will attend a one-day refresher class annually.
The table below details the training timeline associated with
the recommended program for both CIT and weapons
training.

SPD Less Lethal Weapons Training Timeline
2001-2002
Initial Training
Refresher Training
12/31/00
06/30/01
12/31/01
06/30/02
12/31/02
M26 Taser
- newly trained
30
50
50

65
65
- cumulative total trained
30
80
130
65
130
Remington Beanbag Launcher
- newly trained
30
50
50
65
65
- cumulative total trained
30
80
130
65
130
Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
- newly trained
60
60
60
151
151
- cumulative total trained
182
242
302
151
302
CIT Familiarization
Initial Training (Cont.)

- newly trained
60
150
150
150

150
- cumulative total trained
60
210
360
510
660
Totals Trained per Period
180
310
310
431
431

------------------------------------------------------------------------