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The Social Psychology of Isolation:
Why Solitary Confinement is Psychologically Harmful
Craig Haney is Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Santa Cruz.
As everywhere else in society, social context matters a
great deal in prison. However, even the best correctional
environments are inherently problematic places; they are
extremely difficult for staff to operate humanely and for
prisoners to survive unscathed. They are also highly
improbable places—ones where large numbers of people
must be involuntarily confined under conditions of
severe restriction, deprivation, and dependency. In this
brief article, I review the some of psychological effects of
living in a particular kind of prison environment where
the inherent problems and improbabilities are made
much worse—solitary confinement.1
The Empirical Status of Solitary Confinement Effects
The social extremes of confinement—intense
overcrowding and, at the other end of the spectrum,
enforced isolation or solitary confinement—intensify the
challenges that are faced by both prisoners and guards
during their prison terms. Thus, the ecology of an
overcrowded prison creates heightened levels of
psychological stress by multiplying the sheer number of
potentially problematic interactions that occur. Overcrowding
also insures that too many prisoners will be vying for too few
already scarce resources. As an overcrowded prison ‘runs out’
of space, programming, mental health services and the like,
the number and magnitude of unmet prisoner needs begin
to multiply. Prison staff members are often pressed to
manage the inevitable chaos and conflicts in increasingly
repressive ways.
Solitary confinement presents a different set of
psychological challenges. It subjects prisoners to a deeply
monotonous existence, and to unparalleled levels of social
and material deprivation. There is also typically a pejorative or
stigmatizing component to the experience; prisoners are
usually sent to solitary confinement because they are thought
to be ‘bad,’ even in comparison to other prisoners (in some
jurisdictions they are literally referred to as ‘the worst of the
worst’). Correctional officers who must implement the extra1.

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punitive measures that are used to maintain these especially
harsh regimes risk having their behavior descend into
outright cruelty.2
Prison officials and administrators are not oblivious to
these commonsense psychological notions about the
extremes of confinement. Thus, they try to ameliorate
overcrowding when they can and they put prisoners in
isolation when they want to punish them. However,
overcrowding is regarded as an unwanted anomaly—
something that prison systems never seek out but
nonetheless are forced to reluctantly accommodate to.
Solitary confinement, on the other hand, is a practice that
prison systems can choose to employ (or not).
Indeed, despite its problematic history in corrections,
there is some evidence that certain prison systems are once
again resorting to the use of long-term solitary
confinement. The trend is a regrettable one. We have
known for well over a century that placing people in
conditions of severe isolation for long periods of time places
them at dire risk of grave psychological harm. For example,
in 1890 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that ‘it is within the memory of many persons interested in
prison discipline that some 30 or 40 years ago the whole
subject attracted the general public attention, and its main
feature of solitary confinement was found to be too
severe.’3 The Court also noted that ‘[i]n Great Britain, as in
other countries, public sentiment revolted against this
severity and… the additional punishment of solitary
confinement was repealed.’4 No new insights about human
nature have surfaced in the intervening years to raise
doubts about the wisdom of these early precedents.
In fact, solitary confinement came to be seen as so
painful and destabilizing an experience that it emerged as a
common feature in torture and so-called ‘brainwashing’
protocols.5 In addition, domestic and international human
rights organizations have concluded that solitary
confinement poses such a serious risk of psychological harm
that they roundly condemned its use and called for the

In the United States, at least, “solitary confinement” is a term that encompasses a relatively wide range of prison housing arrangements to
which various labels are applied. I will use it here to mean segregation from the mainstream prisoner population in attached housing units or
free-standing facilities where prisoners are involuntarily confined in their cells for upwards of 23 hours a day or more, given only extremely
limited or no opportunities for direct and normal social contact with other persons (i.e., contact that is not mediated by bars, restraints, security
glass or screens, and the like), and afforded extremely limited if any access to meaningful programming of any kind.
For a discussion of these dynamics, see: Haney, C. (2008). ‘A culture of harm: Taming the dynamics of cruelty in supermax prisons’, Criminal
Justice and Behavior 35: 956-984.
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890), at p. 168.
Medley, at p. 170.
For example, see: Hinkle, L. & Wolff, H. (1956). ‘Communist interrogation and indoctrination of ‘enemies of the states’’, Archives of Neurology
and Psychiatry 76: 115-174; Louw, J. & O’Brien, C. (2007). ‘The psychological effects of solitary confinement: An early instance of psychology
in South African courts’, South African Journal of Psychology 37: 96-106; Ristow, W. & Shallice, T. (1976, August 5). ‘Taking the hood off
British torture’, New Scientist: 272-274; Suker, P., Winstead, D., Galina, Z., & Allain, A. (1991). ‘Cognitive deficits and psychopathology among
former prisoners of war and combat veterans of the Korean conflict’, American Journal of Psychiatry 148: 67-72; Whittaker, S. (1988).
‘Counseling torture victims’, Counseling Psychologist 16: 272-278.
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severe restriction or outright abolition of the practice.6
Moreover, proof of the adverse psychiatric consequences of
long-term solitary confinement led a number of courts in
the United States to formally prohibit the placement of
mentally-ill prisoners inside so-called ‘supermax’-type
housing units.7
Nonetheless, the myth continues to be perpetuated in
some quarters that the psychological effects of enforced
isolation have not been carefully enough studied and, as a
result, too little is known about its harmful consequences to
require its strict regulation or the outright elimination of its
most extreme forms.
I believe this view is misguided. In the admitted absence
of a single perfect study of the phenomenon,8 there is a
substantial body of published literature that clearly
documents the distinctive patterns of negative psychological
effects that can and do occur when persons are placed in
long-term solitary confinement. This work has been reviewed
in detail elsewhere and I will not belabor it here,9 except to
say that these broad patterns have been consistently
identified in personal accounts, descriptive studies, and
systematic research on solitary and punitive segregation. The
6.

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studies have now spanned a period of over four decades, and
were conducted in locations across several continents by
researchers with different professional expertise, ranging
from psychiatrists to sociologists and architects.
Of course, just as solitary confinement regimes vary in
severity, and people differ in their capacity to tolerate noxious
stimuli, the nature and magnitude of the adverse effects of
prolonged isolation are not entirely uniform.10 Yet, even
researchers who seem to be at pains to minimize the negative
consequences of solitary confinement are hard pressed to
ignore them (especially if they have interviewed a significant
number of prisoners who have undergone the experience).
For example, Canadian researcher Peter Suedfeld has
sometimes been cited for the proposition that solitary
confinement is not particularly problematic or harmful.
Indeed, he has acknowledged beginning his research on
solitary confinement already ‘convinced’ that reduced
environmental stimulation and social isolation were ‘extremely
beneficial’ for many of the people exposed to it,11 and publicly
recommended its use in curing a remarkably wide range of
maladies, including addictive behaviors,12 snake phobias,13 and
the negative after effects of electroshock therapy.14

For example, see: Gibbons, J., and Katzenbach, N. (2006). Confronting Confinement: A Report of the Commission on Safety and
Abuse in America’s Prisons. New York: Vera Institute of Justice; Hreski, T. (2006). ‘In the cellars of the hollow men: Use of solitary
confinement in U.S. prisons and its implications under international laws against torture’, Pace International Law Review 18: 1-27;
Human Rights Watch. Out of Sight: Super Maximum Security Confinement in the United States. New York: Human Rights Watch
(2000). Available online at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/supermax/index.htm#TopOfPage; International Psychological Trauma
Symposium, Istanbul Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary Confinement. Istanbul, Turkey (December 9, 2007).
Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F.Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal., 1995); and Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F.Supp.
2d 855 (S.D. Texas, 1999), rev’d by 178 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 1999).
No more than basic knowledge of research methodology is required to design the “perfect” study of the effects of solitary confinement:
dividing a representative sample of prisoners (who had never been in solitary confinement) into two groups by randomly assigning half to
either a treatment condition (say, two or more years in solitary confinement) or a control condition (the same length of time residing in a typical
prison housing unit), and conducting longitudinal assessments of both groups (i.e., before, during, and after their experiences), by impartial
researchers skilled at gaining the trust of prisoners (including ones perceived by the prisoner-participants as having absolutely no connection to
the prison administration). Unfortunately, no more than basic knowledge of the realities of prison life and the practicalities of conducting
research in prisons is required to understand why such a study would be impossible to ever conduct. Moreover, any prison system that allowed
truly independent, experienced researchers to perform even a reasonable approximation of such a study would be, almost by definition, so
atypical as to call the generalizability of the results into question. Keep in mind also that the assessment process itself—depending on who
carried it out, how often it was done, and in what manner—might well provide the solitary confinement participants with more meaningful
social contact than they are currently afforded in a number of such units with which I am familiar, thereby significantly changing (and
improving) the conditions of their confinement.
For example, see: Arrigo, B., & Bullock, J. (2008). ‘The psychological effects of solitary confinement on prisoners in supermax units: Reviewing
what we know and what should change’, International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 52: 622-640; Haney, C.
(2003). ‘Mental health issues in long-term solitary and ‘supermax’ confinement’, Crime & Delinquency 49: 124-156; Haney, C., & Lynch, M.
(1997). ‘Regulating prisons of the future: The psychological consequences of solitary and supermax confinement’, New York University Review
of Law and Social Change 23: 477-570; Smith, P. (2006). ‘The effects of solitary confinement on prison inmates: A brief history and review of
the literature’, in M. Tonry (Ed.), Crime and Justice (pp. 441-528). Volume 34. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
It is useful to think about real-world conditions of solitary and solitary-like confinement along a continuum of harshness, comprising different
dimensions of confinement that are imposed in differing amounts in any given unit. It is these dimensions—primarily the severity of isolation,
amount of deprivation, number of restrictions, and degree of degradation—that facilities impose in varying degrees—amplified by the length
of confinement and the amount of control prisoners perceive themselves to have over whether and how they can end it—that primarily
account for the negative effects and amount of psychological harm. Thus, the characterization of the literature on solitary confinement as
somehow “inconsistent” because some studies show few if any negative effects, without any attention being given to the particular conditions
of confinement, the duration of the isolation, or other variables (such as whether the prisoners were involuntarily confined to the units in
question or chose to be there for protection or other reasons) seems inapt. In fact, solitary confinement is only ever embodied in actual places,
ones that exist in any given instance as an amalgam of different conditions that vary along dimensions of harshness and harm, rather than as
some sort of Weberian “ideal type.” For precisely this reason, its effects would not be expected to be independent of the particular form it
took. Rather than “inconsistency,” the differential results merely confirm the basic point with which I began this article: context—here, specific
conditions of confinement—matter.
Suedfeld, P., Ramirez, C., Deaton, J., & Baker-Brown, G. (1982). ‘Reactions and attributes of prisoners in solitary confinement’, Criminal Justice
and Behavior 9: 303-340. p. 312.
Suedfeld, P. (1983). ‘The restricted environmental stimulation technique in the modification of addictive behaviors: Through the centuries to
frontiers for the Eighties’, Bulletin of the Society of Psychologists in Addictive Behaviors 2: 231-237.
Suedfeld, P. & Hare, R. (1977). ‘Sensory deprivation in the treatment of snake phobia: Behavioral, self-Report, and physiological effects’,
Behavior Therapy 8: 240-250.
Suedfeld, P., Ramirez, C., Remick, R., & Jonathan Fleming, J. (1989). ‘Reduction of post-ECT memory complaints through brief, partial
restricted environmental stimulation (REST)’, Progress in Neuro-Psychopharmacology & Biological Psychiatry 13: 693-700.

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But a close reading of Suedfeld’s best-known empirical
piece on solitary confinement in prison complicates things
considerably.15 It is true that Suedfeld concluded that the
experience of isolation was not ‘overwhelmingly’ damaging
and did not result in ‘deterioration of personality or intellect’
in the prisoners that he and his colleagues assessed. Given
the fact that only 15 of the 65 of his participants had ever
served more than 90 days in solitary, the negative conclusions
he reached about these drastic outcomes—the absence of
‘overwhelming’ damage or ‘deterioration’ of prisoners’
‘personality or intellect’—were certainly not surprising.16
However, a careful look at the actual results of
Suedfeld’s study—not just his vaguely worded conclusions—
reveals that, despite the limitations in duration and other
caveats about the circumstances of the prisoners’
confinement,17 he and his colleagues found and reported that
prisoners who had spent more time in solitary confinement
were ‘inhibited, anxious, cautious, dissatisfied, dull,
submissive to authority, and lacking in self insight.’18 In
addition, they reported that ‘inmates who had spent longer
periods of time in segregation scored higher on depression…
and hostility,’ and there was a ‘significant correlation
between length of the current sentence and hostility.’19 At
the one institution among the several he studied that
appeared to be most similar to an actual long-term
segregation unit, Suedfeld et al. reported that ‘longer time in
SC was associated with suspicion, distrust, and forceful and
self-seeking behavior’ and also that there was ‘a significant
relationship’ between ‘longer time in SC [and] higher levels of
hostility.’20 Despite the relatively modest amounts of solitary
confinement the participants in Suedfeld’s study had
experienced, the negative effects he found were similar in a
number of respects to those reported by others.
What of the possibility that a disproportionate number
of the prisoners who are placed in solitary confinement

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suffer from psychiatric disorders that account for the high
levels of psychological symptoms and distress that are
manifested there? There are several factors that mitigate
against this as a likely explanation for many if not most of
the negative effects that have been identified in the
literature. The first is that the prisoners themselves attribute
their acute suffering to the painful conditions of solitary
confinement. Many of them report experiencing their
psychiatric symptoms and psychological distress only after
coming into solitary confinement. In addition, most prison
systems have screening procedures that are supposed to
prevent at least the most seriously mentally prisoners from
going into solitary confinement. No matter how imperfect
these procedures and how imperfectly they are
implemented—and in some systems they are extremely
so—it is reasonable to assume that the most obviously or
flagrantly mentally ill prisoners have been culled from the
population of persons in solitary confinement and spared
this experience.
At the same time, it is certainly true that—despite these
screening procedures—we know there are elevated
percentages of mentally ill prisoners found in solitary
confinement. Several studies have estimated that about a
third of prisoners in solitary confinement are mentally ill.21 In
my own experience, in some poorly run systems or special
units, the number may even be higher. In addition, as David
Lovell points out, ‘mental health issues, variously conceived’
are much broader than the category of those diagnosed or
diagnosable with ‘serious mental illness.’22 Thus, he and his
colleagues found that some 45 per cent of supermax
prisoners suffered from overall ‘psychosocial impairments’—
the cumulative percentage of prisoners suffering serious
mental illness (based on prison documentation), marked or
severe psychiatric symptoms (based on the administration of
a brief psychiatric rating scale), psychotic or self-injurious

Suedfeld, Ramirez, Deaton, & Baker-Brown, at p. 312.
Id. at 335, 336. By the norms that prevail in many jurisdictions in the United States nowadays, unfortunately, 90 days in solitary confinement
hardly qualifies as “long-” or, frankly, even “medium-term.” See, also, Zinger, I., Wichmann, C., & Andrews, D. (1999). ‘The psychological
effect of 60 days in administrative segregation’, Canadian Journal of Criminology 43: 47-83, who reported few if any significant negative
effects of solitary confinement in an extremely small sample of prisoners (N=10) who were involuntarily housed there for only 60 days (under
conditions where they could anticipate being released even more expeditiously).
For example, an unspecified number of Suedfeld et al.’s participants were not actually in solitary confinement (SC) at the time they were
assessed, and the participants in general were described as having “experienced SC at this or another institution.” At p. 324. Moreover, 12 of
the participants were in solitary confinement either voluntarily or for their own protection. At p. 325. Finally, as Suedfeld et al. acknowledged,
“[i]ndividuals who were completely unable to adapt to SC and became psychotic or committed suicide were obviously not included.” At p.
335. Another potential group—those who may have been so negatively affected by the experience that they were either unable or unwilling
to come out of their cells and voluntarily participate in the research project—also were not included.
Id. at p. 328.
Id. at p. 328.
Id. at 329. In fairness to Suedfeld and his colleagues, they also concluded their study with this statement: “We would strongly recommend that
attempts be made to assess prisoners’ ability to adapt to SC, and that close and objective monitoring and release procedures be set up to
identify and transfer individuals for whom the experience may be damaging.” Id. at 337. Suedfeld also has been quoted as saying, in
testimony that he gave in a case concerning the effects of solitary confinement in Canadian prisons, that: “I would expect that for many
people after some prolonged period of time, especially if there is no hope of being released from that environment, things would tend to
become inadequate and an individual would then take on another form of reaction to the environment. That may take place in the form of
apathy, fantasizing, general withdrawal from the external environment, some kind of inner life, and in some cases, I expect it would lead to
psychosis.” Quoted in Jackson, M. (1983). Prisoners of isolation: Solitary confinement in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, at p. 79.
Specifically, two separate studies have found that 29% of the prisoners in solitary or supermax confinement suffer from a “serious mental
disorder.” Hodgins, S., and Cote, G. (1991). ‘The mental health of penitentiary inmates in isolation’, Canadian Journal of Criminology 33: 177182; Lovell, D., Cloyes, K., Allen, D., & Rhodes, L., (2000). ‘Who lives in super-maximum custody? A Washington State study’, Federal
Probation 64: 33-38.
Lovell, D. (2008). ‘Patterns of disturbed behavior in a supermax population’, Criminal Justice and Behavior 35: 985-1004, at p. 990.
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episodes (derived from prison files), or brain damage (again,
as indicated in prison medical charts).23
Yet even if we assume that most or all of the
psychosocial impairment Lovell et al. uncovered was preexisting (an assumption that I think is highly unlikely,
especially with respect to the subset of prisoners identified
through the psychiatric rating scale), it does not entirely
account for the very high levels of psychological distress and
other symptoms documented in at least some of these units.
For example, my own direct assessments of prisoners in harsh
solitary confinement facilities located in several jurisdictions in
the United States indicated that two-thirds or more of them
were suffering from a variety of symptoms of psychological
and emotional trauma, as well as some of the
psychopathological effects of isolation.24 In some cases these
symptoms of trauma and distress appeared to have been
related to more chronic forms of mental illness that the
prisoners brought into the solitary confinement unit (which,
in many instances, also appeared to have been exacerbated
by the harsh conditions of their solitary confinement).
However, in others that was clearly not the case, and the
negative psychological effects and impairments appeared to
have originated in solitary confinement.
Danish researchers reached similar conclusions in their
study of a group of prisoners in solitary confinement. In the
first study they reported that the probability of being
admitted to the prison hospital for a psychiatric reason was
about 20 times as high for prisoners who remained in solitary
confinement for longer than 4 weeks than it was for those
housed in the mainline prison population.25 The researchers
attributed causal responsibility to the conditions of
confinement themselves, concluding that prisoners placed in
solitary confinement ‘are forced into an environment that
increases their risk of hospitalization to the prison hospital for
psychiatric reasons.’26 In a follow-up, longitudinal study they
were able to identify some 28 per cent of solitary
confinement prisoners who suffered psychiatric disorders
during their imprisonment and, further, to determine that in
more than 2 out of 3 cases the disorder was not present prior
to their incarceration. They concluded that solitary
confinement was ‘a significant risk factor for the
development of… psychiatric morbidity in comparison with
[mainline] imprisonment’ and that placement in solitary
confinement was medically ‘questionable.’27
Some commentators have suggested that although
solitary confinement is so clearly harmful to mentally-ill
prisoners that most or all of them should be removed from
such conditions—a proposition that seems indisputable—
these same painfully harsh environments are unlikely to have
23.
24.
25.
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any negative psychological effects that put those who are not
mentally ill at risk. It is a position that seems to me difficult to
defend. The adverse effects of severe stress and painful,
destabilizing trauma on mental health are not restricted to
only those who already suffer from serious mental disorders.
Moreover, there are a number of incipient or ‘pre-morbid’
emotional conditions that seem likely to be aggravated by
the psychological demands of solitary confinement. And then
there are those mildly—perhaps undetectably—mentally-ill
prisoners who can effectively manage their psychiatric
symptoms in mainstream prison settings but who
decompensate under the rigours of prolonged isolation. But
whether and how often long-term solitary confinement
makes healthy people ‘crazy,’ or drives those predisposed to
mental illness across some diagnostic line, it certainly appears
to cause significant distress and even anguish in many
people, and puts them at risk of serious psychological harm.

Theoretical Bases for the Harmfulness of Isolation
The scientific analysis of the effects of a real-world
environment such as solitary confinement is necessarily based
in part on research conducted under less than ideal
conditions. Some empirical questions simply cannot be
examined in a controlled laboratory setting. Under these
circumstances, as I noted in the preceding section,
researchers and analysts look to patterns in the data that
have been collected to discern whether consistent and
apparently corroborating findings exist. In the case of the
harmful effects of solitary confinement, as I have also noted,
they clearly do. It is also important in this context to draw on
knowledge gained from scientific research that has been
conducted on analogous circumstances or phenomena. In
the case of solitary confinement, this parallel literature
includes research on the effects of isolation in a range of
other contexts and settings that, although certainly not
always directly applicable, are highly suggestive.28 Finally, it is
essential to examine whether there is a theoretical logic or
valid conceptual apparatus that helps to account for the
patterns of results—that is, to determine, essentially, if the
findings ‘make sense.’
In fact, situating solitary confinement in broader body of
knowledge provides some very clear insights into how and
why it is likely to produce certain negative effects. Thus, in
addition to the empirical literature that documents the
harmful psychological effects of solitary confinement, and a
parallel literature on analogous settings and circumstances
that reaches a number of highly compatible conclusions,
there is a conceptual framework that helps to explain how

Lovell, supra note 22; Cloyes, K., Lovell, D., Allen, D., & Rhodes, L. (2006). ‘Assessment of psychosocial impairment in a supermaximum
security unit sample’, Criminal Justice and Behavior 33: 760-781.
Some of these results are reported in Haney, supra note 9.
Sestoft, D., Andersen, H., Lilleback, T., & Gabrielsen, G. (1998). ‘Impact of solitary confinement on hospitalization among Danish prisoners in
custody’, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 21: 99-108.
Id. at p. 105.
Andersen, H., Sestoft, D., Lillebaek, T., Gabrielsen, G., Hemmingsen, R., & Kramp, P. (2000). ‘A longitudinal study of prisoners on remand:
Psychiatric prevalence, incidence and psychopathology in solitary vs. non-solitary confinement’, Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica 102:
19-25, at p. 23.
Some of this research is discussed in Haney & Lynch, supra note 9, at p. 496-510.

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and why this kind of prison environment is psychologically
painful and places those exposed to it at grave psychological
risk. This series of theoretical propositions underpins the
many concerns that informed scholars and practitioners have
voiced about the potential of long-term isolation to produce
adverse psychological consequences. It also provides a way of
understanding the nature of the negative effects that do
occur. Below I briefly discuss some of the theoretical and
conceptual explanations for these adverse psychological
effects.
For one, the deprivation of social contact can
undermine social identity and destabilize one’s sense of self.
Like the rest of us, of course, prisoners are social beings.
Although they vary in their levels of sociability, they are
nonetheless dependent on social context and interaction
with others to remain psychologically grounded in their
thoughts, feelings, and actions. There is a long line of
research in social psychology that confirms the centrality of
social interaction in establishing and maintaining selfknowledge and anchoring personal attitudes and beliefs
through social comparison processes.29
Precisely because so much of our individual identity is
socially constructed and maintained, the virtually complete
loss of genuine forms of social contact and the absence of
routine and recurring opportunities to ground thoughts and
feelings in recognizable human contexts is not only painful
and but also personally destabilizing. This is precisely why
long-term isolated prisoners are literally at risk of losing their
grasp on who they are, of how and whether they are
connected to a larger social world. Indeed, a number of
prisoners whom I have interviewed in long-term isolation
admit to having ‘acted out’ while confined there literally as a
way of getting a reaction from their environment, to prove to
themselves that they were still alive and capable of eliciting a
human response—however hostile—from other human
beings. If they can still at least provoke others into responding
to them, then they must still exist.
As Joane Martel has poignantly phrased another aspect
of this phenomenon, ‘to be, one has to be somewhere.’ She
observed that as prisoners in solitary confinement lose their
temporal and spatial grounding—by being placed in
environments where the ‘space-time continuum of the
prison’s ‘ordinary’ life flies into pieces’ 30—their very identity is
placed in jeopardy. Segregated prisoners ‘vanish in time and
space’ which is ‘akin to losing connection to one’s prior
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

34.

35.
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experiences and subsequent ones in a biographical narrative,
thus to one’s memory of [oneself] in the social world.’31
The fact that they lack any tangible connection to their
previous biographical narrative—who they were before their
solitary confinement—does not obviate the need for
prisoners to fashion some kind of identity that can sustain
them. A number of prisoners facing this dilemma come to
define themselves in terms of who they have recently
become—that is, the way they are defined in the punitive
isolation unit that surrounds them. Some isolated prisoners
turn this process on its head, and instead reconstitute their
identities primarily in opposition to the prison administration.
They gradually develop a conception of self that is anchored
by the overarching goal of thwarting and resisting the control
mechanisms that are increasingly directed at them. But, even
here, it is still the prison that sets the terms of their selfdefinition. Moreover, as I have noted elsewhere, ‘the material
out of which their social reality is constructed increasingly
consists of the only events to which they are exposed and the
only experiences they are allowed to have—the minutiae of
the [solitary confinement unit] itself and all of the nuances
with which it can be infused.’32
Depriving people of contact with others for long periods
of time is psychologically hurtful and potentially destabilizing
for another set of related reasons. The importance of
‘affiliation’—the opportunity to have contact with others—in
reducing anxiety in the face of uncertain or fear-arousing
stimuli is long-established in social psychological literature.33
People who are denied the opportunity to express these
affiliative needs and tendencies—especially when confronted
with uncertainty, stress, and danger—may become
increasingly frightened, anxious, even panicked. Similarly, the
significance of social cues and a larger social context in
providing specific content and meaning to our emotional
states is well understood.34 Thus, one of the ways that people
determine the appropriateness of their feelings—indeed,
how we establish the very nature and tenor of our
emotions—is through contact with others. Harry Stack
Sullivan once summarized the clinical importance of social
contact by observing that ‘[w]e can’t be alone in things and
be very clear on what happened to us, and we… can’t be
alone and be very clear even on what is happening in us very
long—excepting that it gets simpler and simpler, and more
primitive and more primitive, and less and less socially
acceptable.’35

For example, see: Festinger, L. (1954). ‘A theory of social comparison processes’, Human Relations 7: 327-346; Symposium (1986). Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 12: 261-299.
Martel, J. (2006). ‘To be, one has to be somewhere’, British Journal of Criminology 46: 587-611, at p. 587.
Id. at p. 609.
Haney, supra note 9, at p. 141.
For example, see: Schachter, S. (1959). The psychology of affiliation: Experimental studies of the sources of gregariousness. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press; Sarnoff, I & Philip Zimbardo, P. (1961). ‘Anxiety, fear, and social affiliation’, Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology 62:
356-363; Zimbardo, P. & Robert Formica, R. (1963). ‘Emotional comparison and self-esteem as determinants of affiliation’, Journal of
Personality 31: 141-162.
For example, see: Fischer, A., Manstead, A., & Zaalberg, R. (2003). ‘Social influences on the emotion process’, European Review of Social
Psychology 14: 171-2001; Saarni, C. (1999). The development of emotional competence. New York: Guilford Press; Schachter, S. & Singer, J.
(1962). ‘Cognitive, social, and physiological determinants of emotional state’, Psychological Review 69: 379-399; Tiedens, L. & Leach, C. (Eds.)
(2004). The social life of emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press; Truax, S. (1984). ‘Determinants of emotion attributions: A unifying
view’, Motivation and Emotion 8: 33-54;
Sullivan, H. (1971). ‘The illusion of personal individuality’, Psychiatry 12: 317-332, at p. 326.
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Precisely because people’s emotional reactions are so
coloured by the social environment in which they live,
subjecting them to severe and prolonged social isolation
makes them especially vulnerable to a range of emotional
disturbances.36 For many prisoners, solitary confinement is an
especially unfamiliar, threatening, and hostile environment.
Not surprisingly, then, the empirical literature on solitary
confinement documents a number of negative emotional
effects, including heightened levels of anxiety, the increased
risk of panic attacks, and a sense of impending emotional
breakdown among prisoners who are denied normal social
contact with others on a long-term basis.37
Whatever else it does, of course, solitary
confinement drastically restricts or completely eliminates
opportunities for normal social interaction. The claim is
sometimes made that prisoners who are housed in certain
punitive or administrative segregation units are not ‘really’ in
solitary confinement. After all, the prisoners are almost
always afforded between 5-10 hours a week out of their cells
and, in addition, most of them have managed to devise
limited forms of communication with each other—no matter
how strained and denatured. Moreover, they all have routine
cell-front ‘interactions’ with correctional officers who—given
the fact that the prisoners are confined to their cells nearly
around-the-clock—must administer to their basic needs. This
argument seems to me to be somewhat disingenuous. Total
and absolute solitary confinement—literally complete
isolation from any form of human contact—does not exist in
prison and never has. Although I am aware of at least one
prisoner who lived under an official ‘no human contact’ order
for over two decades, even he had some contact with others
or he could not have been maintained in prison.
In any event, I would take issue the contention that
prisoners are being afforded remotely normal, adequate
‘social communication’ when they are reduced to yelling to
one another within or between cellblocks, or from one
concrete enclosed or caged exercise pen to another, or can
36.

37.

38.

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only talk to one another through toilets or plumbing chases.
The assertion that prisoners are engaged in remotely normal,
adequate forms of ‘social interaction’ when the only face-toface contact they have with each other is mediated by iron
cell doors or bars or the wire mesh or metal fencing of the
individual cages in which they are increasingly enclosed
(nowadays, both indoors and out) similarly misses the point.
So, too, does the contention that the often brusque or hostile
but at best perfunctory exchanges that they have with
correctional officers is a genuine and psychologically
adequate form of meaningful social intercourse.
In this sense, then, solitary confinement is a socially
pathological environment that forces long-term inhabitants
to develop their own socially pathological adaptations—ones
premised on the absence of meaningful contact with
people—in order to function and survive. As a result,
prisoners gradually change their patterns of thinking, acting
and feeling to cope with their largely asocial world and the
impossibility of relying on social support or the routine
feedback that comes from normal contact with others. These
adaptations represent ‘social pathologies’ brought about by
the socially pathological environment of solitary confinement.
Although they are functional and even necessary under the
circumstances, they can become painful and disabling if
taken to extremes or internalized so deeply that they persist
long after the time in solitary confinement has ended.
For example, some prisoners cope with the asociality of
their daily existence by paradoxically creating even more. That
is, they socially withdraw further from the world around
them, receding even more deeply into themselves than the
sheer physical isolation of solitary confinement and its
attendant procedures require. Others move from initially
being starved for social contact to eventually being
disoriented and even frightened by it. As they become
increasingly unfamiliar and uncomfortable with social
interaction, they are further alienated from others and made
anxious in their presence.38 In extreme cases, another pattern

Isolation correlates with psychiatric and other symptomatology in society at large. For example, see: Cacioppo, J., Hawkley, L., & Bernston, G.
(2003). ‘The anatomy of loneliness’, Current Directions in Psychological Science 12: 71-74; Chappell, N., & Badger, M. (1989). ‘Social isolation and
well-being’, Journal of Gerontology 44: 169-176. Conversely, there is a diverse literature on the beneficial effects of social contact and support. For
example, see; Cohen, S., & Wills, T. (1985). Stress, social support, and the buffering hypothesis’, Psychological Bulletin 98: 310-357; Heller, K.
(1979). ‘The effects of social support: Prevention and treatment implications’, In A. Goldstein & F. Kanfer (Eds.), Maximizing treatment gains:
Transfer enhancement in psychotherapy. New York: Academic Press; House, J., Landis, K., & Umberson, D. (1988). ‘Social relationships and health’,
Science 241: 540-545; Reblin, M., & Uchino, B. (2006). Social and emotional support and its implication for health’, Current Opinion in Psychiatry
21: 201-205; Uchino, B., Cacioppo, J., & Kiecolt-Glaser, J. (1996). The relationship between social support and physiological processes: A review
with emphasis on underlying mechanisms and implications for health’, Psychological Bulletin 119: 488-531.
For example, see: Andersen, et al., supra note 27; Brodsky, S., & Scogin, F. (1988). ‘Inmates in protective custody: First data on emotional effects’,
Forensic Reports 1: 267-280; Grassian, S. (1983). ‘Psychopathological effects of solitary confinement’, American Journal of Psychiatry 140: 14501454; Haney, supra note 9; Hilliard, T. (1976). ‘The Black psychologist in action: A psychological evaluation of the Adjustment Center environment at
San Quentin Prison’, Journal of Black Psychology 2: 75-82; Koch, I. (1986). ‘Mental and social sequelae of isolation: The evidence of deprivation
experiments and of pretrial detention in Denmark’, in B. Rolston & M. Tomlinson (Eds.), The expansion of European prison systems, Working Papers in
European Criminology No. 7 (pp. 119-129). Belfast: Print Workshop; Korn, R. (1988). ‘The effects of confinement in the High Security Unit at
Lexington’, Social Justice 15: 8-19; Korn, R. (1988). ‘Follow-up report on the effects of confinement in the High Security Unit at Lexington’, Social
Justice 15: 20-29; Toch, H. (1975). Men in crisis: Human breakdowns in prisons. Aldine Publishing Co.: Chicago; Volkart,R., Dittrich, A., Rothenfluh,
T., & Werner, P. (1983). ‘Eine kontrollierte untersuchung uber psychopathologische effekte der einzelhaft (A controlled investigation on
psychopathological effects of solitary confinement)’, Psychologie - Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Psychologie und ihre Anwendungen 42: 25-46;
Walters, R., Callagan, J., & Newman, A. (1963). ‘Effect of solitary confinement on prisoners’, American Journal of Psychiatry 119: 771-773.
For evidence that solitary confinement may lead to a withdrawal from social contact or an increased tendency to find the presence of people
increasingly aversive or anxiety-arousing, see: Cormier, B., & Williams, P. (1966). ‘Excessive deprivation of liberty’, Canadian Psychiatric Association
Journal 11: 470-484; Haney, supra note 9; Miller, H., & Young, G. (1997). ‘Prison segregation: Administrative detention remedy or mental health
problem?’, Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 7: 85-94; Scott, G., & Gendreau, P. (1969). ‘Psychiatric implications of sensory deprivation in a
maximum security prison’, Canadian Psychiatric Association Journal 12: 337-341; Toch, supra note 38; and Waligora, B. (1974). ‘Funkcjonowanie
Czlowieka W Warunkach Izolacji Wieziennej (‘How men function in conditions of penitentiary isolation’), Seria Psychologia I Pedagogika NR 34, Poland.

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emerges: this environment is so painful, so bizarre and
impossible to make sense of, that they create their own
reality—they live in a world of fantasy instead.39 Indeed, at
least for some prisoners, solitary confinement appears to be
associated with paranoia and the presence of both visual and
auditory hallucinations.40
Not surprisingly, some prisoners in long-term isolation
also report that these adaptations to asociality are painful,
and that they feel their lives have been drained of meaning
and happiness. John Bowlby characterized intimate
attachments with others as the ‘the hub around which a
person’s life revolves,’ and elaborated that ‘[f]rom these
intimate attachments a person draws his strength and
enjoyment of life and, through what he contributes, he gives
strength and enjoyment of others.’41 Prisoners who cannot
manage without such a ‘hub’ may find themselves becoming
increasingly joyless, depressed, and even suicidal.42
Virtually every solitary confinement unit with which I am
familiar subjects prisoners to more than simply social
deprivation. Life in these units also typically includes a high
level of repressive control, enforced idleness, reduced
environmental stimulation, and physical deprivations that are
much greater than in other prison settings. Indeed, most of
the things that we know are beneficial to prisoners—such as
increased participation in institutional programming, visits
with persons from outside the prison, and so on43—are either
functionally denied them or greatly restricted. The model of
profound deprivation on which most solitary confinement
units are built and run constricts virtually all aspects of the
isolated prisoner’s day-to-day existence. Thus, it is not
surprising that, in addition to the social pathologies that are
generated, the imposition of these other stressors produces a
number of other negative psychological effects.
39.

40.

41.
42.

43.
44.

45.

46.
47.
48.

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For example, we know that psychological health,
adjustment, and well being depend in part on people being
able to attain and maintain a sense of autonomy and
purpose, a modicum of what Albert Bandura broadly termed
‘self-efficacy.’44 When people are placed in environments or
situations where little that they do seems to make a
difference, or their plight seems insurmountable and beyond
their control, they are likely to become despondent, lethargic,
even depressed. Years ago Martin Seligman coined the term
‘learned helplessness’ to describe the consequence of being
kept in environments where negative outcomes appeared
unavoidable45 or environmental stressors could not be
controlled or reduced.46 In analogous ways, the numerous,
seemingly insurmountable restrictions of long-term solitary
confinement increase the likelihood that a potentially
disabling sense of helplessness will become chronic, global,
and internalized—the form that Seligman and colleagues
regarded as most likely to produce debilitating depression.47
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of solitary confinement is
that it constricts and constrains the already limited
opportunities that prisoners have to initiate behavior. Since
they can do very little—even less than in mainlstream prison
settings—they cannot exercise autonomy or efficacy over
much at all.48 They are forced to become highly dependent
upon the institution to authorize, organize, and oversee even
the most minute and mundane aspects of their daily life. In a
related way, some prisoners in solitary confinement find
themselves struggling to initiate behavior on their own, in
part because they have been stripped of the opportunity to
organize their lives around meaningful activity and purpose.
They report being unable to begin even mundane tasks or to
follow through once they have begun them. Or they find it
difficult to focus their attention, to concentrate, or to

For example, compare the description in: Cooke, M., & Goldstein, J. (1989). ‘Social isolation and violent behavior’, Forensic Reports 2: 287294, at p. 288: A socially isolated individual who has few, and/or superficial contacts with family, peers, and community cannot benefit from
social comparison. Thus, these individuals have no mechanism to evaluate their own beliefs and actions in terms of reasonableness or
acceptability within the broader community. They are apt to confuse reality with their idiosyncratic beliefs and fantasies and likely to act upon
such fantasies, including violent ones.
For example, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 38; Cormier & Williams, supra note 40; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Koch,
supra note 38; Korn, supra note 38; Suedfeld, P. & Roy, C. (1975). ‘Using social isolation to change the behavior of disruptive inmates’,
International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 19: 90-99; and Volkart, et al., supra note 38.
Bowlby, B. (1980). Attachment and loss: Loss, sadness, and depression. New York: Basic Books, at p. 442.
Andersen, et al., supra note 27; Benjamin, T., & Lux, K. (1975). ‘Constitutional and psychological implications of the use of solitary
confinement: Experience at the Maine prison’. Clearinghouse Review 9: 83-90; Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 38; Cormier & Williams, supra
note 40; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Hilliard, supra note 38; Korn, supra note 38; and Patterson, R., & Hughes, K. (2008).
‘Review of completed suicides in the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1999-2004’, Psychiatric Services 59: 676-682.
Wooldredge, J. (1999). ‘Inmate experiences and psychological well-being’, Criminal Justice and Behavior 26: 235-250.
For example, see: Bandura, A. (1997). Self–efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: Freeman; Karademas, E. & Kalantzi-Asisi, A. (2004). ‘The
stress process, self-efficacy expectations, and psychological health’, Personality and Individual Differences 37: 1033-1043; Maddux, J. (1991).
‘Self-efficacy’, in Snyder, C. & Forsyth, D. (Eds.), Handbook of social and clinical psychology: The health perspective (pp. 57-78). New York:
Pergamon. See, also: Goodstein, L., MacKenzie, D., & Shotland, L. (1984). ‘Personal control and inmate adjustment to prison’, Criminology: An
Interdisciplinary Journal 22: 343-369.
Seligman, M. (1975). Helplessness: On depression, development, and death. San Francisco: Freeman. See, also: Collins, A., & Kuehn, M.
(2007). ‘The construct of hope in the rehabilitation’, in Power, P. (Eds.), The psychological and social impact of illness and disability (pp. 427440). 5th Edition. New York: Springer.
Evans, G., & Stecker, R. (2004). ‘Motivational consequences of environmental stress’, Journal of Environmental Psychology 24: 143-165.
For example, see: Abramson, L., Seligman, M., & Teasdale, J. (1978). ‘Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation’, Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 87: 49-74.
In addition, in many solitary confinement settings prisoners report feeling that they have little or no control over whether and when they will
be released from this painful form of imprisonment. They may literally not know what if anything they can do that will lead to their release, or
find the stated requirements arbitrary or unreachable (for example, to be judged as having displayed a “positive attitude” by staff members
whom they view as harboring considerable animosity toward them), or be officially that they have simply been placed on “indefinite” solitary
confinement status.
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organize sustained activity. In extreme cases prisoners may
literally stop behaving.49
In fact, in most of these units in the United States
prisoners cannot even come out of their cells without first
being cinched up in elaborate security devices and
hardware—handcuffs, leg irons, restraint chains and the like.
Along with the other degrading ways in which they are often
treated, these procedures undermine their sense of dignity,
value, and worth. But because almost every aspect of the
prisoner’s day-to-day existence is so carefully and completely
circumscribed in these units, some of them also lose the
ability to set limits for themselves or to control their own
behavior through internal mechanisms. They may become
uncomfortable with even small amounts of freedom because
they have lost confidence in their own ability to behave in the
absence of constantly enforced restrictions, the tight external
structure that surrounds them, and the ubiquitous physical
restraints into which they are repeatedly placed.
As might be expected, then, research confirms that
persons who have been kept in solitary confinement under
these conditions report having more negative attitudes and
affect as well as developing a sense of hopelessness, feeling
chronically lethargic, and becoming depressed.50 In more
extreme cases, solitary confinement has been associated with
self-mutilation, and suicidal ideation and behaviour.51 The
comparatively high number of suicides and suicide attempts
that occur in segregation and solitary-type confinement is
due in some part to the increased opportunity that being
housed apart from others provides prisoners who are intent
on taking such a drastic, tragic step. But it is also in part the
result of the heightened levels of ‘environmental stress’ that
are generated by ‘isolation, punitive sanctions, [and] severely
restricted living conditions.’52
In addition to the profound social deprivation and
nearly complete undermining of self-efficacy that such
extraordinary levels of segregation, restriction and control
bring about, prisoners in long-term solitary confinement
must endure prolonged and extreme monotony and idleness.
They are subjected to certain forms of sensory deprivation,

49.

50.

51.
52.

53.
54.
55.
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and to a lack of cognitive or mental stimulation that exceeds
that of the mainstream prison population. Of course, we
know that people require a certain level of mental and
physical activity in order to remain healthy.
In this context, some defenders of solitary confinement
have belittled the research that shows its negative effects by
distinguishing the conditions that prevail in the typical prison
isolation unit from those created in the total sensory
deprivation studies that were done decades ago. Of course,
the differences between the two environments are obvious,
and I know of no knowledgeable commentator on solitary
confinement who would equate or confuse one with the
other. That said, one of the basic lessons of that early sensory
deprivation research and the related research that followed—
that people are ‘dependent on adequate and changing
amounts of sensory and social stimulation in order to
maintain [their] psychic and physiological functioning’—does
seem useful in understanding at least some of the negative
consequences of solitary confinement.53 Of course, this
implies that low levels of cognitive stimulation and severe
restrictions on activity are problematic for a variety of reasons.
Not surprisingly, prisoners subjected to the emptiness of
isolated confinement for long periods of time report
becoming concerned (even obsessed) about their own
potential physical and mental deterioration. In addition, they
can suffer from lethargy, a loss of direction and
purposefulness, hypersensitivity or a tendency to overreact to
certain stimuli, ruminations, and certain forms of cognitive
dysfunction (such as an inability to concentrate, focus, and
remember).54
Finally, numerous studies provide support for the
commonsense proposition that frustration makes people
angry. When persons believe that their desired goals have
been blocked for what they perceive to be unjustified or
illegitimate reasons, such frustration tends to produce even
greater levels of ‘angry aggression,’55 even very serious forms
of aggression in society at large.56 Yet, many solitary
confinement units are structured to deprive prisoners of most
of the things that all but the most callous commentators

For examples of this range of symptoms, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 38; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Hilliard, supra
note 38; Koch, supra note 38; Korn, supra note 38; Miller & Young, supra note 40; Scott & Gendreau, supra note 49; Suedfeld & Roy, supra
note 42; and Volkart, Dittrich, Rothenfluh & Werner, supra note 38.
For example, for studies that document some or all of these symptoms as manifested by people who are or have been in solitary confinement,
see: Andersen, et al., supra note 27; Bauer, M., Priebe, S., Haring, B., & Adamczak, K. (1993). ‘Long-term mental sequelae of political
imprisonment in East Germany’, Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease 181: 257-262; Brodsky & Scogins, supra note 38; Cormier & Williams,
supra note 40; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Hilliard, supra note 38; Koch, supra note 38; Korn, a & b, supra note 38; Miller &
Young, supra note 40; Suedfeld, et al., supra note 11; Suedfeld & Roy, supra note 42; and Scott & Gendreau, supra note 40.
For example, see; Benjamin & Lux, supra note 44; Cormier & Williams, supra note 40; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Patterson
& Hughes, supra note 44; and Toch, supra note 38.
Patterson & Hughes, supra note 44, at p. 678. The authors reported that “the conditions of deprivation in locked units and higher-security
housing were a common stressor shared by many of the prisoners who committed suicide.” Ibid. See, also: Leibling, A. (1995). ‘Vulnerability
and prison suicide’, British Journal of Criminology 36: 173-187; and Liebling, A. (1999). ‘Prison suicide and prisoner coping’, Crime and Justice
26: 283-359.
Leiderman, H. (1962). ‘Man alone: Sensory deprivation and behavioral change’, Corrective Psychiatry and Journal of Social Therapy 8: 64-74
(1962), p. 73.
For examples of this range of symptoms, see: Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 38; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Koch, supra note
38; Korn, a, b, supra note 38; Miller & Young, supra note 40; Suedfeld & Roy, supra note 42; and Volkart, et al., supra note 38.
For example, see Berkowitz, L. (1989). ‘Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reinterpretation’, Psychological Bulletin 106: 59-73.
For example, see: Huff-Corzine, L., Corzine, J., & Moore, D. (1991). ‘Deadly connections: Culture, poverty, and the direction of lethal violence’,
Social Forces 69: 715-732; and Williams, K. (1984). ‘Economic sources of homicide: Reestimating the effects of poverty and inequality’,
American Sociological Review 49: 283-289.

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would concede are basic necessities of life—minimal freedom
of movement, the opportunity to touch another human
being in friendship or with affection, the ability to engage in
meaningful or productive physical or mental activity, and so
on. These deprivations, restrictions, and the totality of control
fills many prisoners with intolerable levels of frustration that,
for some, turns to anger, and then even to uncontrollable
and sudden outbursts of rage.57
Others channel their anger by ruminating over the
course of the countless empty hours of uninterrupted time
during which they are allowed to do little else. Some
occupy this idle time by committing themselves to fighting
against the system and the staff and officials whom they
perceive as intent on provoking, thwarting, and oppressing
them. There are solitary confinement prisoners who
become consumed by the fantasy of revenge, and others
who sometimes lash out against those who have treated
them in ways they regard as inhumane. As two
commentators wisely observed: ‘Modern experts certainly
imagined that they could shape and monitor the identities
of those whom they segregated, but empirical studies
based on institutional records and memories expose the
limits on those ambitions. Exclusion produces submission
but it also provokes non-compliance at the very least, and
organized rebellion at the extreme.’58 Ironically, but
sometimes uncontrollably, some prisoners are driven by
these deprived and oppressive conditions to pursue courses
of action that further ensure their continued deprivation
and oppression.

Conclusion
A very high percentage of the persons placed in longterm solitary confinement are truly suffering, and many are
deeply disturbed—emotionally and in other ways. In some
cases a prisoner’s pre-existing psychiatric disorder has

57.

58.

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contributed to the disturbing behavior that has resulted in
his placement in solitary confinement, making him more
susceptible to the painful stresses of the harsh and deprived
environment in which he is housed. In other cases,
however, the painful effects and negative consequences
stem more fully and directly from the harsh conditions—
the stresses and traumas—of isolated confinement.
Moreover, as I have tried to show in this article, there is a
theoretical framework within which the harmful effects of
solitary confinement can be understood. The resulting social
pathologies and other adverse reactions are precisely the
ones that would be expected, given what is known about
the importance of social context and contact, and the
effects of severe deprivation and repressive control. Thus,
there is a logic to the way isolation hurts and can damage
those subjected to it.
These are extraordinary—I believe often
needless and indefensible—risks to take with the
human psyche and spirit.
I do not see any other way to interpret the renewed
use of this long-discredited punishment except as a
concession to the punitive age in which we now live, one in
which it has become acceptable—even routine—within
certain prison systems to resort to extraordinarily harsh
practices that are motivated by little more than
administrative convenience (absent any penological
justification or psychological rationale), no matter how
much they may ‘hurt’ prisoners (sometimes precisely
because they do hurt them), and no matter the risk that the
painfulness of the experience will do real harm. Modern
and humane policy makers would do well to reflect on the
range of perverse outcomes that may occur when they are
designing regimes that are intended to control problematic
behaviour in prison.

For examples of some or all of these symptoms among present or former solitary confinement prisoners, see: Bauer, et al., supra note 52;
Brodsky & Scogin, supra note 38; Cormier & Williams, supra note 40; Grassian, supra note 38; Haney, supra note 9; Hilliard, supra note 38;
Koch, supra note 38; Miller & Young, supra note 40; Suedfeld, et al., supra note 11; Suedfeld & Roy, supra note 42; and Toch, supra note 38.
Bashford, A., & Strange, C. (2003). ‘Isolation and exclusion in the modern world: An introductory essay’, in C. Strange & A. Bashford (Eds.),
Isolation: Places and practices of exclusion (pp. 1-19). London: Routledge, at p. 13
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