The Right to Counsel
in Maine
EVALUATION OF SERVICES PROVIDED
BY THE MAINE COMMISSION
ON INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES

April 2019

6AC

SIXTH
AMENDMENT
CENTER

The Right to Counsel in Maine: Evaluation of Services Provided by the Maine
Commission on Indigent Legal Services
Copyright © 2019 by the Sixth Amendment Center.
All rights reserved.
Publication Number: 2019.002
SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER
PO Box 15556
Boston, MA 02215
www.sixthamendment.org
PREPARED BY
The Sixth Amendment Center is a non-partisan, non-profit organization
providing technical assistance and evaluation services to policymakers
and criminal justice stakeholders. Its services focus on the constitutional
requirement to provide effective assistance of counsel at all critical stages of
a case to the indigent accused facing a potential loss of liberty in a criminal or
delinquency proceeding.
PREPARED FOR
The Maine Legislative Council is a ten-member body consisting of five
members from each legislative chamber, including: the President of the
Senate, Speaker of the House, bi-cameral Republican and Democratic Floor
Leaders and their Assistant Floor Leaders. The Legislative Council governs the
administration of the Maine Legislature.

executive summary
In 1963, the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Gideon v. Wainwright that it is an
“obvious truth” that anyone who is accused of a crime and who cannot afford the cost
of a lawyer “cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.” In the
intervening 56 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel means every person who is accused of a crime is entitled to have an
attorney provided at government expense to defend him whenever that person is facing
the potential loss of his liberty and is unable to afford his own attorney. Moreover,
the appointed lawyer needs to be more than merely a warm body with a bar card. The
attorney must also be effective, the U.S. Supreme Court said again in United States
v. Cronic in 1984, subjecting the prosecution’s case to “the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing.” Under Gideon, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is
an obligation of the states under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Through legislation enacted in 2009, the legislature created the Maine Commission
on Indigent Legal Services (MCILS) and commanded that it: “provide efficient, highquality representation to indigent criminal defendants, juvenile defendants and children
and parents in child protective cases, consistent with federal and state constitutional
and statutory obligations”; “ensure the delivery of indigent legal services by qualified
and competent counsel in a manner that is fair and consistent throughout the State”;
and “ensure adequate funding of a statewide system of indigent legal services, which
must be provided and managed in a fiscally responsible manner, free from undue
political interference and conflicts of interest.” Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1801
(2018).
Since its inception, MCILS has never used governmentally employed attorneys to
provide representation. Instead, MCILS either pays attorneys $60 per hour or, in
Somerset County, pays a consortia of attorneys a fixed fee under contract. Maine is
the only state in the country that provides all indigent defense services through private
attorneys.
There are two principal reasons that other states have moved away from using only
private attorneys to provide all indigent defense services, and Maine has struggled
with both since the creation of MCILS. First, it is difficult to predict and contain costs
in a private attorney system. A system can estimate future caseloads based on prior
year trends and apply average estimated costs per case, by case type, to calculate what
funding will be required to deliver its mandated services, but there is no guarantee
that past averages will continue to apply to future years. Second, it is difficult to

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
supervise private attorneys to ensure they can and do provide effective representation.
For example, despite the statutory command for MCILS to provide “high-quality”
representation, the State of Maine expects MCILS to maintain oversight of nearly 600
attorneys, handling cases in 47 courthouses presided over by approximately 90 justices,
judges, and magistrates, with a staff of just three people (excluding financial screeners
that perform no oversight functions).
In 2017, the Maine legislature created the Working Group to Improve the Provision
of Indigent Legal Services that determined that MCILS does not have systemic
oversight and evaluation of attorneys and is in need of stronger fiscal management
and recommended an independent assessment. In March 2018, the Maine Legislative
Council contracted the Sixth Amendment Center (6AC) to evaluate right to counsel
services provided by MCILS and to recommend any needed changes. Limitations of
time and resources prevent most indigent defense evaluations from considering every
court, public defense system, and service provider in a given state, and so this study
looks closely at five counties: Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Somerset, and
York.
Chapter 1 (p. 5 to 23) provides introductory information on the history of the right
to counsel in Maine, an explanation of Maine’s justice systems, and the study
methodology. Chapter II (p. 24 to 35) begins the assessment by evaluating Maine’s
attorney qualification, training and supervision and makes the following finding:
FINDING 1: MCILS attorney qualification standards are too lenient, resulting
in an excessive number of attorneys on panels, and there are no attorney
recertification requirements. MCILS has only limited new attorney training
and lacks requirements that ongoing attorney training relate to defense-specific
subject areas. MCILS lacks appropriate supervision of attorneys.
Under MCILS’ qualification requirements, an attorney who graduated from law school
two years ago and hung out their shingle in a private practice, with no supervision
or training, can have two jury trials and two judge trials and then be appointed to
represent indigent defendants in every type of criminal case other than a homicide or
sex offense. More worrisome perhaps is that indigent defendants charged with Class
E crimes, carrying up to six months in jail, can be represented by an attorney who just
received their bar card and completed a single training course in criminal law, as long
as the lawyer has an email address, telephone number, and a confidential space to meet
with clients.
MCILS does not require attorneys appointed to represent the indigent to obtain training
in the fields in which they provide indigent legal representation (beyond that required
to first be placed on the roster for appointments in operating under the influence or
domestic violence cases). Similarly, MCILS has not established any requirements for

Executive Summary
supervision of attorneys appointed to provide indigent legal representation. After the
start of the assessment, MCILS identified 25 attorneys statewide to serve as resource
counsel and provide mentoring to less experienced attorneys. However, these attorneys
are each capped at providing only 10 hours of mentoring per month, and the resource
counsel attorneys do not have authority to require any mentee to cooperate.
Chapter III (p. 36 to 62) assesses how and when in the criminal justice process
defendants are informed about their right to counsel, how they are approved or
denied for MCILS services, and when attorneys are appointed to represent indigent
defendants. After a description of the criminal process in Maine, Chapter III makes
four findings:
Finding 2: Although the courts’ advice of rights video has many admirable
qualities, few courts follow up with a colloquy to ensure that indigent defendants
saw the video and comprehend their rights before waiving counsel. Some
prosecutors in some jurisdictions engage in plea discussions with uncounseled
defendants, and some courts actively encourage such negotiations. These practices
result in actual denial of counsel.
In every courtroom observed in all of the sample counties, the same video is played
before the judge is on bench enumerating defendants’ rights. No one ensures that
defendants have watched the video, understand the language spoken in the video, or
have the mental capacity to understand the video, and it is often the case that tardy
defendants enter without ever seeing the video at all.
Moreover, under U.S. Supreme Court case law a plea negotiation is a critical stage
of the case, meaning the negotiation cannot happen unless counsel is present or
the defendant’s right to counsel has been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
waived. Despite this, throughout the sample counties, prosecutors talk to uncounseled
defendants to negotiate guilty pleas. This was most prevalent in the south where larger
court populations, and not enough lawyers of the day, exacerbate the problems.
Finding 3: Oversight of financial screeners by MCILS creates the appearance of
a conflict of interest with its duty to provide zealous representation to indigent
defendants.
MCILS employs eight people to conduct financial screening of defendants who
request appointment of counsel. Indigent defense systems must require their
participating attorneys to adhere to their ethical duty to zealously defend in the stated
interests of the client, including advocating against the imposition of fines, fees, and
other assessments. MCILS cannot assure that appointed attorneys fight against the
imposition on indigent defendants of fees related to the cost of the defense, while

v

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
MCILS is simultaneously tasked with trying to collect fees assessed for the cost of
representation.
A situation in Cumberland County transformed this appearance of a conflict of interest
by MCILS into an actual conflict of interest. A statewide hiring freeze left vacant the
MCILS financial screener position that covered Cumberland County. At the time of
our site visit, the MCILS lawyers for the day were signing as notaries the financial
affidavits of the defendants they advise and represent, which are then submitted to the
court. This process places the lawyer in the position of a potential witness against the
client, in the event the affidavit is challenged. Finally, conflict of interest concerns
aside, having lawyers perform at $60/hour a service that is normally performed by a
financial screener paid $12.75/hour is simply not cost efficient governance.
Finding 4: MCILS’ “lawyer of the day” system primarily serves the need to
move court dockets, while resulting in a lack of continuous representation to the
detriment of defendants. There is often a critical gap in representation while a
substantive lawyer is identified and appointed. Additionally, the lawyer of the day
practices under the Somerset contract result in a direct conflict of interest.
MCILS provides for a “lawyer of the day” to appear at 48-hour hearings for in custody
defendants and at initial appearance for out of custody defendants. The number of
lawyers serving as lawyer for the day is generally insufficient to even meet with,
much less actually provide representation to, the number of defendants scheduled on
each day’s docket. For example, on an average day in Cumberland County’s Portland
District Court there are two lawyers for the day to handle 80 defendants.
The lawyer for the day system provides limited representation because it is only “for
the day,” not for the case. In most instances the “lawyer of the day” does not continue
with the case. Instead, courts make a formal appointment off of a roster of MCILS
approved lawyers. Some judges like to select the individual attorney to appoint in
a given case, some leave it to their clerks to do after the hearing, and some use a
rotational system where the next attorney on the list is appointed. However, a gap in
representation occurs when those appointments are delayed.
The lawyer of the day program in Somerset County produces a direct conflict of
interest. The contract attorneys can be hired by non-indigent defendant who appear
in court while the contract attorneys are serving as lawyer for the day. That is, the
attorney could reject a defendant for appointed counsel and then accept the case as a
private retainer. This central role of the contract attorneys in meeting as lawyer for
the day every person who is hailed into court creates a monopoly of sorts, as attorneys
outside of Somerset County said they are effectively prevented from establishing a
practice in Somerset County. That is, the contract attorneys keep not only all the

Executive Summary
assigned work but also most of the private work, since the contract has provided them
a personal introduction to all defendants.
Finding 5: Despite there being many excellent assigned lawyers providing
representation to the indigent accused throughout Maine, there are also too many
attorneys throughout the state who do not perform adequately.
In one of the studied counties, the Sheriff estimated, due to the volume of prisoner
complaints, that about 25% of assigned attorneys do not visit their clients in jail to
prepare their cases. He was also concerned about attorneys not accepting calls from the
jail. He said prisoners stop calling when their calls are not accepted. Consistent with
that report, one judge estimated that 25% of assigned counsel have not met with their
clients before the first dispositional conference date. She reported that up to 10% of
attorneys withdraw or become a second chair if the case goes to trial.
MCILS data tends to confirm these observations of the sheriffs. For example, the 6AC
requested three years of data on jail visits on cases billed out of Cumberland County.
The data reveal a number of attorneys that often visit clients, but a concerning number
of folks that do not. For example, in 2017, one attorney billed MCILS $111,771 for
cases arising in Cumberland County, including $3,024 for 96 jail visits. By contrast,
another attorney billed MCILS $171,880, but did not bill any time for even a single jail
visit. Certainly it is possible, though unlikely, that the attorney simply decided it was
not worth the time to bill jail visits, but the point is that MCILS and the State of Maine
do not know because of a lack of oversight.
The final substantive chapter, Chapter IV (p. 63-70), assesses the extent to which
MCILS ensures that lawyers have sufficient time to work on cases, especially in
relation to attorneys being assigned too many cases. This Chapter makes one finding:
Finding 6: Despite the lack of MCILS workload limits, excessive caseloads may
not be an issue in most counties in Maine. However, insufficient time is an issue
in Somerset County, where the combination of high caseloads and the fixed fee
contract system produce financial incentives to dispose of cases without adequate
preparation.
Even factoring in “lawyer of the day” duties in most jurisdictions, the attorneys with
the most cases handled in Aroostook, Androscoggin, Cumberland, and York Counties
do not appear to have excessive appointed caseloads. The one place where there are
definitely time sufficiency issues is in Somerset County. Over the past six years, the
average number of hours spent per indigent defense case has declined. For example, in
FY 2013, on average the lawyers spent 6.78 hours per adult case in FY 2013. By FY
2018, the number dropped to 2.99 hours on average per adult criminal case (a decrease
of approximately 56%). Importantly, MCILS does not require from the Somerset

vii

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
County Project reporting of adult criminal cases to be distinguished by severity, which
would allow MCILS to more accurately track attorney workloads. That said, 2.99
hours per adult criminal case is extremely and unreasonably low, even if every case
was a class D or E charge.
Chapter V (p. 71-85) discusses attorney compensation and evaluates MCILS ability to
provide fiscal oversight of state resources. The Chapter makes two findings:
Finding 7: MCILS’ fixed fee contract causes a financial conflict of interest.
MCILS’ hourly rate is inadequate to both cover overhead and provide lawyers an
adequate fee.
Fixed fee contracts, in which a lawyer earns the same pay no matter how many cases
he is required to handle, create financial incentives for a lawyer to dispose of cases as
quickly as possible, rather than as effectively as possible for the client. In FY 2017,
the average fee per case under the Somerset contract was $573.16, slightly higher than
the average billed by the assigned counsel elsewhere (statewide $554.80). The average
hours per case spent in Somerset, at 3.27, was much lower than the statewide average
of 9.25 (assuming the 2017 rate was $60/hour), resulting in the Somerset hourly rate
paid for counsel being $174.97. So, in Somerset County, the State of Maine is paying
attorneys three times the rate it pays everyone else and getting approximately one third
less work.
The hourly compensation rate in Maine ($60/hour) is not enough to cover overhead
and ensure a reasonable fee. As a comparison, the South Dakota Supreme Court set
public counsel compensation hourly rates at $67 per hour in 2000. To ensure that
attorneys are perpetually paid both a reasonable fee and overhead, the court also
mandated that “court-appointed attorney fees will increase annually in an amount
equal to the cost of living increase that state employees receive each year from the
legislature.” Assigned counsel compensation in South Dakota now stands at $95 per
hour. For comparison purposes, a $95 hourly fee in South Dakota in 2019 is equivalent
to a $114.95 hourly fee in Maine in 2019.
Finding 8: A significant number of attorneys bill in excess of eight hours per
day, five days per week, for 52 weeks per year. MCILS does not exert adequate
financial oversight of private attorneys.
“Over-billing” was a topic raised frequently throughout the state. In Maine, attorneys
do not submit vouchers under penalty of perjury. No statutes or MCILS rules limit
attorney hours by day or by year. MCILS conducts no audits. Not surprisingly, a
review of MCILS vouchers over the past five years generated serious concerns in some
instances about whether limited taxpayer resources are being used effectively.

Executive Summary
If an attorney works eight hours per day, five days per week, for 52 weeks a year,
that attorney should make no more than $124,800 at the current $60 per hour MCILS
rate. In FY 2018, 25 attorneys billed MCILS in excess of 40 hours per week. The top
biller in FY2018 billed more than 88 hours per week. As part of this review, the 6AC
reached out to the Federal Defender Services Division of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts. Although they are not allowed to confirm the number of
cases appointed, the Federal Defender Services, Legal and Policy Division, confirmed
that eight of these 25 lawyers received federal court appointments during this same
time period.
To remedy these issues, Chapter VI (P. 86-96) sets out a series of recommendations:
RECOMMENDATION 1: The State of Maine should remove the authority to
conduct financial eligibility screenings from the Maine Commission for Indigent
Legal Services. The reconstituted Task Force on Pretrial Justice Reform should
determine the appropriate agency to conduct indigency screenings.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The State of Maine should statutorily bar
communication between prosecutors and unrepresented defendants, unless and
until defendants have been informed of their right to appointed counsel, a judge
has conducted the legally required colloquy, and a defendant has executed a
written waiver of the right to counsel in each case to ensure that all waivers of the
right to counsel are made knowingly and voluntarily.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Except for ministerial, non-substantive tasks, the State
of Maine and the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services should require
that the same properly qualified defense counsel continuously represents the
client in each case, from appointment through disposition, and personally appears
at every court appearance throughout the pendency of an assigned case.
RECOMMENDATION 4: MCILS should use its current statutory power to
promulgate more rigorous attorney qualification, recertification, training,
supervision, and workload standards. The State of Maine should statutorily
require financial oversight by requiring that MCILS limit the number of
permissible billable hours, subject to waiver only upon a finding of need for
additional capacity. The State of Maine should fund MCILS at a level to ensure
rigorous training and effective substantive and financial oversight of attorneys.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The State of Maine should statutorily ban all public
defense contracts that provide financial disincentives to or that otherwise
interfere with zealously advocating on behalf of the defendants’ stated interests,
including the use of fixed fee contracts. Maine should require that any public
defense contract include reasonable caseload limits, reporting requirements on

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
any private legal work permitted, and substantial performance oversight, among
other protections.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The State of Maine should fund MCILS at a level
that allows private attorneys to be compensated for overhead expenses plus a
reasonable fee (i.e., $100 per hour). MCILS should be authorized to provide
additional compensation of $25 per hour for designated case types such as
murder, sexual assaults, and postconviction review.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The State of Maine should authorize and fund MCILS
at an appropriate level to employ state government attorneys and support staff to
operate a statewide appellate defender office and a Cumberland County trial level
public defender office.

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN Maine
EVALUATION OF SERVICES PROVIDED
BY THE MAINE COMMISSION
ON INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES

April 2019

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION

The birth of the right to counsel
The right to counsel in Maine

Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services
The current study

5
5
6
9
11

Methodology

12

U.S. Department of Justice application of assessment
criteria

14

Assessment criteria

Maine’s criminal justice system
Law enforcement
Prosecution
Trial courts

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
Finding 1

Attorney qualifications

12

18
19
20
21
24
25
27

Attorney training & supervision

30

Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services
example

32

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Summons or arrest

36
38

Bail setting (following arrest)

39

Probable cause determination (following warrantless
arrest)

40

Finding 2

42

48-hour hearing (in custody) or initial appearance (out of
custody)

41

Advice of rights video

43

Denial of counsel to defendants receiving
suspended sentences

43

Prosecutors negotiating pleas with
unrepresented defendants
Chilling of the right to counsel
Finding 3

Indigency determination

Reimbursements assessed against indigent
defendants

Finding 4

Appointment of counsel

Continuous representation from appointment
through disposition

44
45
45
46
49
51
53
53

Delayed appointment of counsel

56

Conflict of interest in Somerset County

56

Institution of prosecution & arraignment
Finding 5

Contact with in custody defendants
Motions practice

Use of investigators

Case preparation and zealous advocacy

57
57
57
58
60
60

IV. SUFFICIENT TIME

63

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

71

Finding 6

Finding 7

Fixed fee contract
Hourly rate

Finding 8

Attorney billing

Financial oversight

66

72
75
76
79
79
83

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

86

Recommendation 2

88

Recommendation 1
Recommendation 3
Recommendation 4
Recommendation 5
Recommendation 6
Recommendation 7

86
89
90
91
92
94

Appendix A

Appendix B

Appendix C

97

100
103

Chapter I
Introduction
The birth of the right to counsel
The adversarial system of justice is rooted in the very fabric of our nation.1 Many of
the people who arrived on the shores of our continent had been subject to persecution
in their native courts, so they were not content to adopt the justice systems of their
mother countries. Having experienced tyranny first hand, the people of America’s
colonies were suspicious of concentrated power in the hands of a few.
The English justice system was transitioning during the colonial era from what
today would be called the “inquisitorial model” of criminal justice. The presumption
of innocence does not exist in the inquisitorial system. Instead, because the judge
makes a final verdict based on the evidence that he himself has collected, there is a
presumption of guilt inherent in the trial proceedings. In the inquisitorial system of
justice, the burden of proof rests with the defendant accused of a crime to establish
his own innocence. Until the 1800s in England, the accused in most felony cases were
prohibited from having an attorney represent them other than to argue legal points to
the judge – a defendant was own their own in proving the facts of a case to show their
innocence.
An individual’s right to liberty in the American colonies came to be recognized as
self-evident, and there therefore needed to be a high threshold to allow government to
take away the liberty endowed in each and every individual. With the introduction of
defense lawyers in colonial America,2 criminal trials started to become actual trials.
Procedural rules started to be written down and codified. Evidence, including hearsay,
could no longer be introduced without restraint. Allegations of criminality were
increasingly contested.

See generally Randolph Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before
England, 14 Widener L. Rev. 323 (2009), available at http://widenerlawreview.org/files/2009/06/01jonakait-final-323-356.pdf.
2
As an example of the degree to which the new world Americans were committed to the right to
counsel, the following preamble accompanied the right to counsel law passed on March 11, 1660 in the
colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations:
Whereas it doth appeaere that any person . . . may on good grounds, or through mallice or envie
be indicted and accused for matters criminal, wherein the person is so [accused] may be innocent,
and yett, may not be accomplished with soe much wisdom and knowl¬edge of the law to plead his
own innocencye, &c. Be it therefore inacted . . . that it shall be accounted and owned from henceforth the lawful privilege of any man that is indicted, to procure an attorney to plead any point of
law that make for clearing of his innocencye.
1

6

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
This was the birth of the adversarial system3 – a system based on the simple notion that
the truth is best made clear through the back and forth debate of opposing perspectives.
When the north American colonies revolted against the British crown, the right to
counsel was quickly enshrined in all but one of the original 13 state constitutions.4
Having thrown off the shackles of a tyrannical monarchy, the patriots were not about
to create a new tyranny through the federal government that could infringe on the
rights of individuals. Thus, the framers of the U.S. Constitution created a Bill of Rights
to specifically protect personal liberty from the tyranny of big government. All people,
they guaranteed, are free to express unpopular opinions, or choose one’s own religion,
or take up arms to protect one’s home and family, without fear of retaliation from the
government.
Preeminent in the Bill of Rights is the idea that no one’s liberty can ever be taken away
without the process being fair. A jury made up of everyday citizens, protections against
self-incrimination, and the right to have a lawyer advocating on one’s behalf5 are all
American ideals of justice enshrined in the first ten amendments to the United States
Constitution and ratified by the states in 1791.

The right to counsel in Maine
Although the 1963 U.S. Supreme Court case Gideon v. Wainwright6 is often haled as
the point in time when states began to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendants,
the simple truth is that most of the states were already providing counsel in felony
cases before the landmark case was handed down.7
Randolph Jonakait, The Rise of the American Adversary System: America Before England, 14
Widener L. Rev. 323, 353 (2008) (“[A]n adversary system was widely in operation before the nineteenth
century began. Attorneys for the prosecution and defense presented and challenged evidence. The
judges did not dominate or orchestrate factual presentations, but acted as arbiters between the two sides
and gave instructions to the juries. Defense lawyers were not limited to only one part of the trial, but
participated at every stage, from jury selection, opening statements, and the presentation and challenging
of evidence to summations. Perhaps most important, the attorneys acted as advocates. Evidence was
marshaled to support theories of the cases. Juries were not just left on their own to contemplate the
meanings of and inferences to be drawn from the evidence, but rather lawyers’ arguments on both
sides were directed to the juries to support advocates’ theories of the case. These are examples of a full
adversary system, and the number of examples and the lawyers’ skilled performances at least indicate
that a full adversarial process was not a rare aberration but an accepted way of trying American cases
even at the end of the eighteenth century.”).
4
Virginia was the lone state without the right to counsel in its constitution. See William Beaney, The
Right to Counsel in American Courts 17-1, n.47 (U. Mich. Press 1955).
5
U.S. Const. amend. VI (stating that in “all criminal prosecutions” the accused shall enjoy the right,
among others, to “have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”).
6
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7
Only thirteen states did not provide counsel in all felony cases at the time of the Gideon decision.
Among the states that provided the full right to counsel is Nevada - the first state to require not only
the appointment of counsel in all cases (including misdemeanors) but also the payment of counsel for
services rendered (1877). For a fuller understanding of the events leading up to the institutionalization of
the right to counsel in Nevada, see the Sixth Amendment Center report Reclaiming Justice, available at
3

I. Introduction

7

The geographic territory that is today Maine was part of Massachusetts at the time
the United States Constitution was adopted and followed the custom of appointing
counsel in serious cases. With statehood in 1820, Maine adopted its own constitution,
stating that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by
the accused and counsel to the accused.”8 The Maine legislature codified the right to
appointed counsel in capital cases in 1870.9 In the 20th century, “in spite of the absence
of statutory or decisional fiat, individual Justices . . . almost uniformly felt a moral and
social obligation to furnish counsel to indigent persons charged with felonies in the
Superior Courts. Their practice of making informal appointments, and the willingness
of members of the bar to perform such unpaid public service, long preceded Gideon
v. Wainwright and doubtless explain the absence of this issue before the Courts of
Maine.”10
Maine’s commitment to the right to counsel and its general practice of appointing
counsel to the indigent accused of felony charges is perhaps best demonstrated in
1962 when Maine’s then-Attorney General Frank E. Hancock joined an amicus curiae
brief in support of Clarence Earl Gideon’s right to an attorney.11 At the time, Maine
was among the 15 states that did not require counsel in all felony cases. Nonetheless,
Maine advocated for the Supreme Court to determine that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to provide Sixth Amendment lawyers to the indigent accused in all
felonies. The United States Supreme Court agreed, announcing it to be an “obvious
truth” that anyone who is accused of a crime and who cannot afford the cost of a
lawyer “cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.”12
The Maine legislature responded to the Gideon decision promptly by enacting
P.L.1963, Chap. 273, “which required both the Justices of the Superior Court and
Judges of the new District Court system to assign counsel for indigents charged with
felonies and permitted it (without compensation) in cases of misdemeanors.”13 Four
years later, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court ended the practice of distinguishing
between felony and misdemeanors cases, declaring in Newell v. State:
We are convinced that the time has come when due process demands
that we abandon the felony-misdemeanor distinction as a basis for
appointment of counsel and construe our own constitution to require
appointment of counsel for needy persons charged with serious
misdemeanors, unless waived. . . . Therefore, we hold that all indigent
http://sixthamendment.org/reclaiming-justice/.
8
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
9
See Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731, 734 (Me. 1971).
10
Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731, 735 (Me. 1971).
11
See Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
12
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
13
Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731, 735-36 (Me. 1971) (emphasis added).

8

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
persons who are without attorneys and who are facing criminal charges
which might result in the imposition of a penalty of imprisonment for a
period of more than six months or a fine of more than $500 or both . . .
must be informed by the Court of their right to appointed counsel and
must have such counsel appointed unless they waive this right.14
The next year, the U.S. Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all
misdemeanors with a potential jail sentence regardless of duration.15
The Fourteenth Amendment requires Maine, as it does all states, to enforce Sixth
Amendment case law. Since Gideon, the U.S. Supreme Court has expressly clarified
that the Sixth Amendment requires the appointment of counsel for the poor threatened
with jail time in misdemeanors,16 misdemeanors with suspended sentences,17 direct
appeals,18 and appeals challenging a sentence imposed following a guilty plea where
the sentence was not agreed to in advance.19 Children in delinquency proceedings,
no less than adults in criminal courts, are entitled by the Fourteenth Amendment due
process clause to appointed counsel when facing the loss of liberty.20 Moreover, the
appointed lawyer needs to be more than merely a warm body with a bar card.21 The
attorney must also be effective,22 subjecting the prosecution’s case to “the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing.”23
Newell v. State, 277 A.2d 731, 737-38 (Me. 1971).
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
16
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
17
Alabama v. Shelton, 505 U.S. 654 (2002).
18
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
19
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
20
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). “[I]t would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require
the procedural regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’ Under our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” Id. at 27-28. “A proceeding
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance
of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity
of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child
‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.’ . . . [T]he assistance
of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, [and] we hold now that it is equally essential
for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state
institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21.” Id. at 36.
21
As the Court noted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984), “[t]hat a person who
happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the
constitutional command.”
22
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been recognized that the
right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”). To be effective, an attorney must
be reasonably competent, providing to the particular defendant in the particular case the assistance
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases under prevailing professional norms, such as those “reflected
in American Bar Association standards and the like.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89
(1984).
23
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
14
15

I. Introduction

“States are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than
the Federal Constitution requires,”24 but they cannot provide less. Though the federal
Constitution does not require it,25 Maine statutorily guarantees appointed counsel to
indigent defendants in post-conviction review proceedings from a criminal conviction,
a judgment of not criminally responsible by reason of insanity, or a delinquency
adjudication.26 The U.S. Supreme Court has yet to expand Gideon’s promise to civil
matters, but Maine provides a right to counsel to indigent parents/custodians in child
protection proceedings and to individuals in hearings for their involuntary commitment
to a psychiatric hospital or involuntary treatment therein.27
Today in Maine, all indigent legal services in every type of case are provided under the
auspices of the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services.28

Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services
Historically, Maine’s counties were responsible for funding all indigent defense
services, except the state paid for public defense in post-conviction proceedings, and
individual justices and judges appointed attorneys on a case-by-case basis.29
Within two years of the Gideon decision, the manner in which Maine funded and
administered its Fourteenth Amendment obligation to provide the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was questioned. In 1965, the Maine Judicial Council expressed
“dissatisfaction” with the “functioning of the assigned counsel system,” noting the lack
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014 (1983). See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719
(1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967); O’Connor v. Johnson, 287 N.W.2d 400, 405
(Minn. 1979) (“The states may, as the United States Supreme Court has often recognized, afford their
citizens greater protection than the safeguards guaranteed in the Federal Constitution. Indeed, the
states are ‘independently responsible for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.’”); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673, 674 (S.D. 1976) (“There can be no doubt that this court has the power to
provide an individual with greater protection under the state constitution than does the United States
Supreme Court under the federal constitution.”).
25
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-57 (1987);
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610-12, 617-18 (1974).
26
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2129 (2018); Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 69.
27
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, §§ 4005(2), 4052(3)(H) (2018) (child protection proceedings); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 3864(1)(D),(5)(D) (2018) (involuntary commitment/treatment hearings).
There are a number of other civil proceedings in which Maine allows, but does not require, courts to
appoint counsel at public expense. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2138(3) (2018) (indigent
petitioners in post-judgment of conviction motions for DNA testing); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §
2183(2) (2018) (indigent victims of identity theft seeking a factual determination of innocence and to
correct court records); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4005(1)(F) (2018) (children in child protection
proceedings); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3506-A(3) (2018) (children in petitions for emancipation).
28
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 1801, 1804(3)(A) (2018).
29
Judicial Council of Maine, The Report of the Judicial Council to the 103rd Legislature on the
Subject of Defense Systems for Indigent Persons Accused of Criminal Offenses 3-6 (1967), available
at http://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/Rpts/kf9646_z99m22_1967.pdf.
24

9

10

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
of uniformity between counties based on disparate funding levels,30 and in 1967, the
council recommended to the legislature that all indigent defense funding should come
from the state.31 In 1971, the Institute of Judicial Administration reviewed limited
court data and concluded that, although the data could not determine conclusively that
the assigned counsel system was defective, “neither do they justify much confidence
that the assigned counsel system is working well.”32 Study after study questioned the
manner in which Maine administered the right to counsel.33 Despite these concerns,
the State of Maine did not take over 100% responsibility for funding indigent legal
services until 1976.34 Even then, the provision of attorneys to represent the indigent
remained a court function, with judges maintaining lists of private attorneys willing to
take cases and individually appointing lawyers to cases.
Through legislation enacted in 2009, the legislature created the Maine Commission
on Indigent Legal Services (MCILS) and commanded that it: “provide efficient,
high-quality representation to indigent criminal defendants, juvenile defendants
and children and parents in child protective cases, consistent with federal and state
constitutional and statutory obligations”; “ensure the delivery of indigent legal services
by qualified and competent counsel in a manner that is fair and consistent throughout
the State”; and “ensure adequate funding of a statewide system of indigent legal
services, which must be provided and managed in a fiscally responsible manner, free
from undue political interference and conflicts of interest.”35 MCILS is required to
promulgate standards for: eligibility for indigent legal services; attorney qualifications,
experience, and training; attorney caseloads; attorney evaluations; conflicts of interests;
See Institute of Judicial Administration, The Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court of
State of Maine 57-58 (1971).
31
Judicial Council of Maine, The Report of the Judicial Council to the 103rd Legislature on the
Subject of Defense Systems for Indigent Persons Accused of Criminal Offenses 15 (1967).
32
Institute of Judicial Administration, The Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court of the
State of Maine 57-58 (1971).
33
See, e.g., Indigent Legal Services Comm’n, Report of the Indigent Legal Services Commission 4
& n.5 (2009), available at https://www.courts.maine.gov/reports_pubs/reports/pdf/Report%20of%20
ILSC%202009%20(2-13-09).pdf.
34
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 22 (2018) (“Beginning with the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1976,
the Legislature shall appropriate funds for the expenses of the Judicial Department.”); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 15, § 810 (2018) (courts to compensate appointed defense counsel).
State funding of indigent defense services has proven, across the nation, to be the most stable for
two principle reasons. First, local governments have significant revenue-raising restrictions placed
on them by the state while generally being statutorily prohibited from deficit spending. Second,
the jurisdictions that are often most in need of indigent defense services are the ones that are least
likely to be able to afford it. That is, the factors that cause property values to be low and limit a local
government’s revenues – such as high unemployment, high poverty rates, limited household incomes,
and limited education, etc. – are often the exact same circumstances that lead to an increased need for
right to counsel services. In high poverty areas, a larger percentage of people accused of crime will be
indigent and qualify for public defense services. Further, the counties with high levels of poverty have to
spend more on other social services, such as uninsured medical treatment or housing assistance, leaving
less money available for protecting people’s rights under the Sixth Amendment.
35
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1801 (2018).
30

the

I. Introduction
reimbursement of expenses; and all “[o]ther standards considered necessary and
appropriate to ensure the delivery of adequate indigent legal services.”36

The current study
In 2017, the Maine legislature created the Working Group to Improve the Provision
of Indigent Legal Services and charged it to “develop recommendations to improve
the delivery of indigent legal services to those eligible to receive such services.”37
In December 2017, the Working Group
final report found, among other items, that
Sample counties selected for statewide study
MCILS “does not have systemic oversight
and evaluation of attorneys” and is in need
of stronger fiscal management.38 Among
its recommendations, the Working Group
advocated for “an outside, independent,
nonpartisan study of Maine’s current system
of providing indigent legal services” to
determine if alternative methods of delivery
would “increase quality and efficiency.”39 In
March 2018, the Maine Legislative Council
contracted the Sixth Amendment Center
(6AC)40 to evaluate right to counsel services
provided by MCILS and to recommend any
needed changes.
Limitations of time and resources prevent
most indigent defense evaluations from
considering every court, public defense
system, and service provider in a given
state, and so this study looks closely
at a representative segment of services
throughout Maine. On June 19, 2018, the Joint Legislative Judiciary Committee
selected the following counties as a representative sample of Maine’s diversity
in population size, geographic location, and methods of providing indigent legal
representation: Androscoggin, Aroostook, Cumberland, Somerset, and York. The
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804 (2018).
An Act Making Unified Appropriations, 2017 Me. Acts ch. 284 at 701-03, § UUUU-17, available at
https://mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/getPDF.asp?paper=HP0281&item=57&snum=128.
38
State of Maine, 128th Legislature, Working Group to Improve the Provision of Indigent Legal
Services, Report 1 (2017), available at http://legislature.maine.gov/doc/2013.
39
State of Maine, 128th Legislature, Working Group to Improve the Provision of Indigent Legal
Services, Report 14 (2017), available at http://legislature.maine.gov/doc/2013.
40
The 6AC is a non-partisan, non-profit organization that objectively evaluates public defense systems
using Sixth Amendment case law and national standards for right to counsel services as the uniform
baseline measure for providing attorneys to indigent people, along with the requirements of local and
federal laws. See 6AC & Our Work, Sixth Amendment Center, http://sixthamendment.org/about-us/.
36
37

11

12

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
6AC’s work on site in these sample counties began in August 2018 and concluded in
January 2019.

Methodology
The 6AC’s assessment of public defense services in Maine has been carried out
through three basic components.
Data collection. Information about how a jurisdiction provides right to counsel
services exists in a variety of forms, from statistical information to policies and
procedures. 6AC obtained and analyzed relevant hard copy and electronic information
at both the local and state levels.
Court observations. Right to counsel services in each jurisdiction involve interactions
among at least three critical processes: (1) the process individual defendants experience
as their cases advance from arrest or summons through disposition; (ii) the process the
defense attorney experiences while representing each individual at the various stages of
a case; and (iii) the substantive laws and procedural rules that govern the justice system
in which public representation is provided. Throughout the sample counties, the 6AC
conducted courtroom observations in the trial courts to clarify these processes.41
Interviews. No individual component of the criminal justice system operates in a
vacuum. Rather, the policy decisions of one component necessarily affect another.
Because of this, the 6AC conducted interviews with a broad cross-section of
stakeholder groups before, during, and after site visits to the various counties.42 In
addition to speaking with public defense attorneys, the 6AC interviewed judges,
prosecutors, court clerks & administrators, and law enforcement & jail administrators,
among others, and also interviewed members of the MCILS and staff.

Assessment criteria
The criteria used to assess the effectiveness of Maine’s indigent legal services system
and attorneys come principally from two U.S. Supreme Court cases, decided on the
same day: United States v. Cronic43 and Strickland v. Washington.44 Strickland is
used after a criminal case is final to determine retrospectively whether the lawyer
provided effective assistance of counsel; it sets out the two-pronged test of whether the
appointed lawyer’s actions were unreasonable and prejudiced the outcome of the case.
Cronic explains that, if certain systemic factors are present (or necessary factors are
absent) at the outset of the case, then a court should presume that ineffective assistance
of counsel will occur.
The 6AC conducted observations in ten courtrooms across the five sample counties.
The 6AC interviewed 83 individuals, many on more than one occasion. Some interviews were
conducted in person and others by telephone before or after the site visit.
43
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
44
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
41
42

The U.S. Supreme Court says: “While a criminal trial
is not a game in which the participants are expected
to enter the ring with a near match in skills,
neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to
gladiators.” Unfortunately, where systems fail, it
leaves the fundamental fairness of criminal
and delinquency court proceedings in doubt.

How can you
tell if it’s a
fair fight?
NO

Are defendants
denied access to
counsel entirely?

Are defendants
subjected to subtle or
direct pressure to waive
the right to counsel?

NO

I

YES

YES
PREJUDICE PRESUMED

YES

·►

Burden of proof is on the state to
show that ACTUAL or
CONTRUCTIVE denial—whether by
financial disincentive, inadequate
time, government interference,
etc.—did not impact the defendant’s
right to have the government’s case
subjected to the “crucible of
adversarial testing.”

Are appointed
attorneys absent at
critical stages of the
indigent defendants’
case?

NO
Apply
Cronic
Standard

Does the system allow
the trial court to have
excessive or inappropriate
authority over the
selection, compensation,
or termination of
appointed counsel?

YES

◄-

YES

Does the system allow the
appointed attorney to
represent a defendant,
when the attorney or his
law office previously or
currently represents an
individual whose interests
are adverse to the new
defendant’s case, without
both clients waiving that
conflict where allowed?

-- YES 7

NO

Does the system allow the
appointed attorney to
handle a limitless number of
cases at the same time OR
proceed without sufficient
time to adequately prepare
for and zealously advocate
on behalf of every client?

YES

NO

YES

_J
...

NO

···►

Does the system allow any
branch of state or local
government to have
excessive or inappropriate
authority over the selection,
compensation, or
termination of appointed
counsel?

Does the system allow the
method of compensation
to place the appointed
attorney’s personal financial
interests in conflict with one
or more of his clients’
case-related interests?

NO
Apply
strickland
Standard

appeal
rejected

◄----

NO

◄---- - ---------------------------------- - -----------

Did appointed
counsel's performance
fall below an objective
standard of
reasonableness?

Successful
I.A.C. Claim

YES

NO
How Can You Tell if it’s a Fair Fight?
Sixth Amendment Center © 2016

Did appointed
counsel's performance
give rise to areasonable
probability that, if
counsel had performed
adequately, the
result would have been
different?

YES

_J

NO

14

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
Understanding Cronic through the American Bar Association’s
Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System
Adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in 2002, the ABA Ten Principles a are
self-described as constituting “the fundamental criteria necessary to design a
system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal
representation for criminal defendants who are unable to afford an attorney.” The
Ten Principles include the markers of a Cronic analysis: independence of the
defense function (Principle 1); effective representation by counsel at all critical
stages (Principles 3 and 7); sufficiency of time and resources (Principles 4, 5, and
8); and qualifications, supervision, and training of attorneys (Principles 6, 9, and
10).
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (2002), available
at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
a.

Hallmarks of a structurally sound indigent defense system under Cronic – as will
be discussed in subsequent chapters – include the early appointment of qualified
and trained attorneys with sufficient time to provide effective representation under
independent supervision. The absence of any of these factors can show that a system is
presumptively providing ineffective assistance of counsel.

U.S. Department of Justice application of assessment criteria
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) urges this application of Cronic. On
September 25, 2014, the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest45 in a class action lawsuit,
Hurrell-Harring v. New York, brought by the New York Civil Liberties Union alleging
a systemic denial of counsel in five upstate New York counties.46 The Statement of
Interest provides DOJ’s expertise to the court on what constitutes a “constructive”
denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. In short, the DOJ statement establishes
that a court does not have to wait for a case to be disposed of and then try to unravel
retrospectively whether a specific defendant’s representation met the aims of Gideon
and its progeny. If it is shown at the outset of a case that state or local governments
create structural impediments that make the appointment of counsel “superficial” to
the point of “non-representation,” a court can step in and presume prospectively that
Statement of Interest of the United States, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., filed Sept. 1, 2014), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PD-NY-0002-0010.
pdf.
46
In March 2015, the case settled on the eve of trial with the State of New York agreeing to pay
100% of all indigent defense costs in the counties that were named defendants. Stipulation and Order of
Settlement, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 8866-07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed Oct. 21, 2014). The state
agreed to pay $5.5 million in attorneys’ fees and costs to the NYCLU and the law firm representing
the plaintiffs. The lawsuit settlement has sparked greater advocacy for the state to pick up 100% of all
indigent defense costs in the remaining upstate counties.
45

I. Introduction
the representation is ineffective. The types of government interference enunciated
in the DOJ Statement of Interest include (but most assuredly are not limited to): “a
severe lack of resources,” “unreasonably high caseloads,” “critical understaffing of
public defender offices,” and/or anything else making the “traditional markers of
representation” go unmet (i.e., “timely and confidential consultation with clients,”
“appropriate investigations,” and adversarial representation, among others).47
In another Statement of Interest48 filed August 14, 2013, in Wilbur v. City of Mount
Vernon, the DOJ comments specifically on the issue of public defense attorneys
having sufficient time to provide adequate representation. At the heart of the Wilbur
case was the issue of how excessive caseloads of public defense attorneys resulted in
deficient representation under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.49 At the
A trial court denied a motion to dismiss the lawsuit, but an intermediate court granted the dismissal.
In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals reinstated the lawsuit. (Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 930
N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010). The court found that the complaint alleged claims of both outright denial of
the right to counsel and constructive denial of counsel where attorneys were appointed in name only but
were unavailable to assist their clients, thus “stat[ing] cognizable Sixth Amendment claims.” “These
allegations state a claim, not for ineffective assistance under Strickland, but for basic denial of the right
to counsel under Gideon.”
Quoting Strickland, the Court went on to note that “’[i]n certain Sixth Amendment contexts,
prejudice is presumed. Actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally
presumed to result in prejudice.’” The Court held that the allegations contained in the class action
lawsuit “state claims falling precisely within this described category. . . . Given the simplicity and
autonomy of a claim for non-representation, as opposed to one truly involving the adequacy of an
attorney’s performance, there is no reason . . . why such a claim cannot or should not be brought without
the context of a completed prosecution.” Further, the court observed: “the right that plaintiffs would
enforce – that of a poor person accused of a crime to have counsel provided for his or her defense – is
the very same right that Gideon has already commanded the States to honor as a matter of fundamental
constitutional necessity. There is no argument that what was justiciable in Gideon is now beyond the
power of a court to decide.” Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d, at 227.
After seven years of litigation, the lawsuit settled by agreement in October 2014 and was approved
by the trial court on March 11, 2015 (Stipulation and Order of Settlement, Hurrell-Harring v. New York,
930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010) (No 8866-07)). Under the settlement, the state was required to: (1)
pay 100% of the cost in the five named counties: (2) ensure that all indigent defendants are represented
by counsel at their arraignment; (3) establish and implement caseload standards for all attorneys; and (4)
assure the availability of adequate support services and resources.
48
Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL
(W.D. Wash., filed Aug. 14, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/
wilbursoi8-14-13.pdf.
49
“The notes of freedom and liberty that emerged from Gideon’s trumpet a half a century ago cannot
survive if that trumpet is muted and dented by harsh fiscal measures that reduce the promise to a hollow
shell of a hallowed right.” Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
Thus concluded U.S. District Judge Robert Lasnik in the court’s decision granting injunctive relief
against the Washington cities of Mount Vernon and Burlington for “regularly and systematically”
providing deficient right to counsel services to the indigent accused. Announcing that “adversarial
testing of the government’s case” was so infrequent as to be a “non-factor in the functioning of the
Cities’ criminal justice system,” the court found the appointment of counsel in Mount Vernon and
Burlington to be “little more than a formality,” resulting in plea bargains having almost nothing to do
with the individualized nature of each case. Importantly, the court found the cities culpable because this
47

15

16

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
time the original complaint was filed in 2011, the cities of Mt. Vernon and Burlington,
Washington, jointly contracted with two private attorneys to represent indigent
defendants in their municipal courts, as they had done “for nearly a decade.” Under
the contract, the two attorneys served together as “the public defender” and were paid
a flat annual fee out of which they had to provide all “investigative, paralegal, and
clerical services” without any additional compensation. In other words, the more work
and non-attorney support they dedicated to their clients’ cases, the less each attorney’s
take-home pay. And each contracting attorney handled between 950 and 1,150
appointed cases each year, in addition to maintaining a healthy private practice on the
side. With such heavy caseloads, the contract defenders were alleged to “regularly
fail to return calls” or “meet with” or “interview” their clients and “rarely, if ever,
investigate the charges made against” their clients. And the cities’ failure to adequately
“monitor and oversee” the system they operated by way of the contract amounted to a
“construct[ive] denial of the right to counsel” as guaranteed under Gideon.50
The DOJ has twice filed amicus briefs furthering their position on constructive
denial of counsel. Most recently, on May 12, 2016, DOJ filed an amicus brief51 in
the Supreme Court of Idaho in Tucker v. Idaho, in which the ACLU of Idaho alleges
systemic denial of counsel for the indigent accused. As in Hurrell-Harring, the
DOJ states in Tucker that a “constructive denial of counsel violating Gideon occurs
where the traditional markers of representation are frequently absent or significantly
compromised as a result of systemic, structural limitations.”52 On September 11,
lack of adversarial testing of the prosecution’s cases was “natural, foreseeable, and expected,” given the
deficient structure of indigent defense services.
50
Pointing to the ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, the DOJ urged the court to
consider that every jurisdiction should have caseload controls, but that:
caseload limits alone cannot keep public defenders from being overworked into ineffectiveness;
two additional protections are required. First, a public defender must have the authority to
decline appointments over the caseload limit. Second, caseload limits are no replacement of
a careful analysis of a public defender’s workload, a concept that takes into account all of
the factors affecting a public defender’s ability to adequately represent clients, such as the
complexity of cases on a defender’s docket, the defender’s skill and experience, the support
services available to the defender, and the defender’s other duties.
Statement of Interest of the United States at 9, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C11-1100RSL
(W.D. Wash., filed Aug. 14, 2013).
51
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, Tucker v. Idaho, No.
43922-2016 (Idaho, filed May 11, 2016), available at https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/851311/download.
52
On April 28, 2017, the Idaho Supreme Court found that indigent defendants “suffered ascertainable
injuries by being actually and constructively denied counsel at critical stages of the prosecution, which
they allege are the result of deficiencies in Idaho’s public defense system.” (Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922
at 18.) The alleged injuries are “fairly traceable” to the state and the public defense commission, since
the state “has ultimate responsibility to ensure that the public defense system passes constitutional
muster.”( Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922 at 9.) Importantly, the court explained that the two-pronged
ineffective assistance of counsel test of Strickland “is inapplicable when systemic deficiencies in the
provision of public defense are at issue. The issues raised in this case do not implicate Strickland.”
(Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922. at 7.) Instead, the court held the appropriate standard is that of United
States v. Cronic: “[a] criminal defendant who is entitled to counsel but goes unrepresented at a critical

I. Introduction
2015, the DOJ filed an amicus brief53 in Kuren v. Luzerne County at the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. The Kuren class action lawsuit alleges that the county so poorly
funded right to counsel services as to constructively deny counsel to the indigent
accused. The DOJ amicus brief makes clear that a civil constructive denial of counsel
claim is an “effective way for litigants to seek to effectuate the promise of Gideon,”
and “[p]ost-conviction claims cannot provide systemic structural relief that will help
fix the problem of under-funded and under-resourced public defenders.”54
The DOJ has also made clear that its Cronic analysis applies equally to juvenile
delinquency proceedings, through its Statement of Interest55 in N.P. v. Georgia, filed
March 13, 2015. The Southern Center for Human Rights filed the class action lawsuit
alleging that children were regularly denied their right to counsel and instead treated
to “assembly-line justice” in the Cordele Judicial Circuit. According to lawsuit’s
allegations, children regularly appeared in court without lawyers, and those who did
receive representation were assigned lawyers who did not have time to talk with them
before court. The suit claimed that the Cordele Circuit Public Defender Office was
structurally unable to provide meaningful representation due to chronic underfunding
and understaffing. The DOJ statement provides the trial court with a Cronic framework
to evaluate the claims.56
stage of prosecution suffers an actual denial of counsel and is entitled to a presumption of prejudice.”
Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922, at 7).
53
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Kuren v. Luzerne County,
Nos. 57 MAP 2015 (Pa., filed Sept. 10, 2015), available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/769806/
download.
54
In 2016, Pennsylvania’s high court ruled that indigent defendants have the right to prospectively
challenge “systemic violations of the right to counsel due to underfunding, and to seek and obtain an
injunction forcing a county to provide adequate funding to a public defender’s office,” at the outset of a
case before having to suffer from denial of counsel. (Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d 715, at 718.)
The court said it was “obvious” that “the mere existence of a public defender’s office and the assignment
of attorneys by that office” was not sufficient to satisfy the right to counsel, because “[i]t is the defense
itself, not the lawyers as such, that animates Gideon’s mandate.” Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d
715,. at 735.) If the appointed lawyers cannot provide a defense, “the promise of the Sixth Amendment
is broken.” The court observed that “Strickland does not limit claims asserting Sixth Amendment
violations to the post-conviction context,” and it found that the Strickland test of ineffective assistance
of counsel should be used by courts in evaluating post-conviction claims, but that “[a]pplying the
Strickland test to the category of claims at bar would be illogical.” (Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146 A.3d
715, at 746).
55
Statement of Interest of the United States, N.P. v. Georgia, No. 2014-CV-241025 (Ga. Super.
Ct., filed Mar. 13, 2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/
attachments/2015/03/13/np_v_state_of_georgia_usa_statement_of_interest.pdf.
56
A month after the DOJ filed its statement of interest, on April 20, 2015 the defendants in the class
action lawsuit – the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council, the Cordele Circuit Public Defender,
and the four counties in the circuit – agreed to settle the matter. Consent Decree, N.P. v. Georgia, No.
2014-CV-241025 (Ga. Super. Ct., filed Apr. 20, 2015). The approved consent decree seeks to address
a number of structural flaws. Specifically, it will: increase the size of the public defender’s office staff;
require public defenders to meet with clients (a) within three days of their detainment to determine
indigency, and (b) within three days of assignment to their case; and require defenders to receive
training, including specific training for juvenile defenders. The consent decree requires public defenders

17

18

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Finally, the DOJ has taken action to enforce the four main principles enumerated
in Cronic. On April 26, 2012, the DOJ Civil Rights Division delivered a report,
Investigation of the Shelby County Juvenile Court,57 to officials in Shelby County
(Memphis), Tennessee, stating that the juvenile court of Memphis and Shelby County
(JCMSC) “fails to ensure due process for all children appearing for delinquency
proceedings” in direct violation of the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Gault.58
An agreement was reached requiring the county and JCMSC to ensure, among other
things, that “juvenile defenders have appropriate administrative support, reasonable
workloads, and sufficient resources to provide independent, ethical, and zealous
representation to children in delinquency matters” at “all stages of the juvenile
delinquency case, including pre-adjudicatory investigation, litigation, dispositional
advocacy, and post-dispositional advocacy,” for as long as a case is active.59 The
agreement additionally requires “the promulgation and adoption of attorney practice
standards” and the “supervision and evaluation” of defense attorneys “against such
practice standards.”

Maine’s criminal justice system
Indigent legal services are one component of the broader justice system. The system
that provides representation to the indigent has no control over the number or type of
cases it is required to handle each year; those decisions are made by law enforcement
officers as they make arrests and by prosecutors as they institute cases. The right to
counsel is carried out most visibly in the courts. Because the indigent legal system is
intertwined with these other components of the criminal justice system, this section
describes Maine’s law enforcement, prosecution, and trial courts.
Throughout the balance of this report, a detailed description of Aroostook County
serves as an example of how criminal justice is administered locally throughout Maine.
These bulleted sections are set apart from the body of the report. Aroostook County is
chosen as the example because its dispersed population across a larger geographic area
relative to other Maine counties and its unique court structure present some issues not
present in the other sample counties.60
to advise juvenile defendants seeking to waive their right to counsel what a lawyer could do for them
and also requires the public defender office to comply with the terms of the Georgia Indigent Defense
Act of 2003 including by creating a specialized juvenile division.
57
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Investigation of Shelby
County Juvenile Court (Apr. 26, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/
legacy/2012/04/26/shelbycountyjuv_findingsrpt_4-26-12.pdf.
58
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Memorandum of Agreement
Regarding the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County (Dec. 17, 2012), available at http://
sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/DOJ-ShelbyAgreement.pdf.
60
Quick Facts: Aroostook County, Maine, U.S. Census Bureau (July 1, 2017). Aroostook County is
the geographically largest county east of the Mississippi, covering more square miles than Connecticut

I. Introduction

19

AROOSTOOK COUNTY
court and detention facility locations, and distances between

Madawaska

Fort Kent

Madawaska
Madawaska District Court
Fort Kent
Fort Kent District Court
Caribou
Aroostook County Superior Court, Caribou
Caribou District Court
District Attorney's Office, Caribou
Presque Isle
Presque Isle District Court
District Attorney's Office, Presque Isle

44

46

Caribou

AROOSTOOK

13

Presque Isle
41

Houlton

Houlton
Aroostook County Superior Court, Houlton
Houlton District Court
District Attorney's Office, Presque Isle
Aroostook County Jail

Law enforcement
Various law enforcement organizations and state agencies61 may refer criminal cases to
district attorneys for prosecution across the state. Generally, state police, county sheriff
departments, and municipal police departments62 are the primary law enforcement
and Rhode Island combined. It has 6,671 square miles with a population of 67,653; approximately 10.8
people per square mile. The county seat is Houlton, where only approximately 8.59% of the population
lives (pop. 5.813). A greater percentage of the county’s population lives in two other municipalities:
Caribou (pop. 7,684) and Presque Isle (pop. 9,078). There are two other less populated centers in the far
north: Madawaska (pop. 4,035) and Fort Kent (pop. 4,097). Aroostook County’s population is 94.1%
white and 2% Native American. Only 18.1% of the population has a college degree or higher. The
median household income is $38,087, with 16.3% of the population living in poverty.
61
The following state agencies may refer criminal cases: Maine Department of Corrections, Maine
Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife, Maine Marine Patrol, Maine State Police, Maine Bureau
of Capitol Police, Maine Drug Enforcement Agency, Maine Forest Services, Office of the Maine
Attorney General Investigations Division, and Maine Campus Police (University of Maine – Orono;
University of Southern Maine; University of Maine – Farmington). 2008 Census of State and Local
Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at https://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216 (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
62
There are 112 municipalities that fund local police departments in Maine. 2008 Census of State and
Local Law Enforcement Agencies, U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, available at https://www.bjs.gov/

20

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
agencies in Maine. Each county has a sheriff’s office that carries out both a police
function and a detention function.63 The counties pay for the sheriff’s police function,
and the state pays for the sheriff’s detention function.
•

In Aroostook County, nine towns have local police departments that may
refer cases to the district attorney.64 The Aroostook County Sheriff polices
everywhere outside of these municipalities,65 except the State Police oversee
state highways. Arrests in Aroostook County can also be made by the Maine
Warden Services (fisheries and wildlife offenses) and the Maine Forest Rangers
(offenses within Maine State Parks).66

Prosecution
Maine has eight elected district attorneys,67 each elected to a four-year term of office.
Three are elected from single county districts (Aroostook, Cumberland, and York),
and five are elected from multi-county districts (District 3: Androscoggin, Franklin,
and Oxford; District 4: Kennebec and Somerset; District 5: Penobscot and Piscataquis;
District 6: Know, Lincoln, Sagadahoc, and Waldo; and District 7: Hancock and
Washington).68 The state funds salaries of district attorneys and assistant district
attorneys,69 and the counties pay for support staff and overhead (office space, utilities,
etc.).70 District attorneys and assistant district attorneys may not engage in private
practice.71
•

The Aroostook County District Attorney has offices in three locations (Caribou,
Houlton, and Presque Isle), with the principal office in Caribou.72 There are

index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216 (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
63
The sheriff in each county is elected to a four-year term. Me. Const. art IX, § 10.
64
These towns are Ashland, Caribou, Fort Fairfield, Fort Kent, Houlton, Limestone, Presque Isle, Van
Buren, and Washburn.
65
The law enforcement budget for the Aroostook County Sheriff in FY 2017 was $1,530,034.
See County of Aroostook, 2018 County Budget at 25, available at https://www.aroostook.me.us/
images/2018_County_Budget.pdf.
66
Although the Warden Services and Forest Rangers have the authority to arrest, it is rare for them to
do so and most offenses are dealt with through a summons.
67
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 254 (2018).
68
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 254 (2018).
69
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 256 (2018).
70
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 281 (2018).
71
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 256(2) (2018).
72
The Caribou office also oversees prosecutions in Fort Kent and Madawaska. The county’s costs for
the Aroostook County district attorney in FY 2017 were $470,796. County of Aroostook 2018 County
Budget at 7 (2018), available at https://www.aroostook.me.us/images/2018_County_Budget.pdf. State
costs for the Aroostook County district attorney office in FY 2017 were $776,917.50. Email from Mark
A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services
Office of the Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth
Amendment Center (Mar. 12, 2019). Therefore, in FY 2017 the combined state and local budget for the

I. Introduction

21
two assistant district attorneys in each office, and the assistant district attorneys
reportedly have “significant discretion” in the handling of their cases.

Trial courts
Maine has two types of trial courts with criminal jurisdiction: superior court and
district court.73 The Maine Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure implement a “unified
criminal docket,”74 allowing all criminal proceedings to be heard by any superior court
justice or district court judge at a courthouse located in the county where the criminal
conduct occurred,75 maximizing access to courts to speed the resolution of cases.
Justices and judges of each court can sit on the other court as assigned by the chief
justice.76 The unified court docket for criminal proceedings was implemented in all
counties as of July 1, 2015.77 Jurisdiction over and responsibility for civil proceedings
continues to be divided between the superior court and the district court.78
Maine has a single superior court made up of 17 justices (plus seven active retired
justices) who each have exactly the same authority and can sit anywhere in the state.79
There is one superior court courthouse in each county, except for in Aroostook
County which has two (in Houlton and in Caribou), for a total of 17 superior court
courthouses.80 The chief justice of the superior court determines when the grand jury is
convened.81

Aroostook County District Attorney office was $1,247,713.50.
73
Probate courts are not addressed in this report because they do not have criminal jurisdiction. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 251 (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-C, §§ 1-201(8), 1-302 (eff. July 1,
2019; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 18-A, §§ 1-2-1(5), 1-302 in effect until July 1, 2019).
74
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 57(i).
75
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 57(d); Establishment of Judicial Regions, Me. Admin. Order JB-08-1
(eff. July 1, 2008). This unified procedure eliminated what had been a two-tiered system for criminal
cases, with the superior court having in the past handled all felonies & jury trials and the district court
having been limited to misdemeanors & non-jury trials. The two trial courts also had separate docketing
systems, which had caused some cases to be separately docketed with different numbers in different
courts, creating duplication of effort for court clerks.
76
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 121, 157-C (2018); Authority of Judges/Justices to Sit in Either
District or Superior Court, Me. Admin. Order JB-07-3 (eff. Nov. 1, 2007).
77
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 1(e).
78
Me. R. Civ. Proc. 1; Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 1(b).
79
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 101, 148 (2018). An active retired superior court justice may also be
assigned to sit in the superior court. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 101, 104 (2018). See Superior Court
Justices, State of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/superior/justices.
shtml.
80
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 115 (2018). See Superior Courthouse Directory, State of Me. Jud.
Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/superior/directory.shtml.
81
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 110 (2018).

22

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
Maine has a single district court made up of 39 judges (plus 11 active retired judges)82
located in 29 courthouses across the state.83 District court judges must be lawyers and
are appointed by the governor with consent of the joint standing committee of the
judiciary.84 The district court hears juvenile cases, including juvenile crimes.85 The
district court includes a specialized family division, with eight family law magistrates
(plus one active retired magistrate),86 that hears all family law cases including child
protection proceedings and termination of parental rights.87
•

The courts in Aroostook are greater in number and farther apart geographically
than in the other sample counties.88 There are seven courthouses in Aroostook
County.89 One active retired superior court justice and one active retired district

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 151 (2018). See District Court Judges, State of Me. Jud. Branch,
https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/district/judges.shtml.
83
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 115, 153, 154, 162 (2018). See District Courthouse Directory, State
of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/district/directory.shtml.
84
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 157 (2018). Any judge who has retired from a district court may be
appointed by the governor, with consent of the joint standing committee of the judiciary, to serve as an
active retired judge to hear cases as appointed by the chief judge of the district court. Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 4, § 157(b) (2018).
85
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 165(2) (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101 (2018). A juvenile
is any person less than 18 years of age. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3003(14) (2018). A juvenile
crime is committed by a person less than 18 years of age, including: conduct that would be a crime if
committed by an adult – what other states often call juvenile delinquency; and certain conduct that is
generally legal but illegal for persons under a certain age – what other states often call juvenile status
offenses. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 3003(16), 3103, 3103-A (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A,
§ 4-A(2-A),(3) (2018).
86
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4 ,§ 183(1) (2018). See Family Law Magistrates, State of Me. Jud.
Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/family/magistrates.html.
87
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 152, 183 (2018).
88
Androscoggin County has one superior court located in Auburn and one district court located in
Lewiston. The courts are approximately a three-minute drive apart.
Cumberland County has one superior court located in Portland and two district courts located one
each in Portland and Bridgton. The courts in Portland are in the same building, and the court in Bridgton
is a 70-minute drive away. The only criminal matters processed in the Bridgton District Court are initial
appearances; any case that is not resolved at initial appearance is transferred to the Portland unified
criminal docket and all further proceedings take place in the Portland courts.
Somerset County has one superior court and one district court, both located in Skowhegan and
within walking distance of each other.
York County has one superior court located in Alfred and three district courts located one each in
Biddeford, Springvale, and York. Of the district courts, Biddeford is the busiest and is located about
24 minutes east of Alfred. The Springvale courthouse is about 10 minutes west of Alfred. The York
courthouse is a 35 to 40 drive south of Alfred.
89
Starting from the southernmost courts to those located the furthest north, the seven courts in
Aroostook County are:
two in Houlton (south): Aroostook County Superior Court – Houlton, and Houlton District Court;
one in Presque Isle (central): Presque Isle District Court;
two in Caribou (north): Aroostook County Superior Court – Caribou, and Caribou District Court;
and
two in Fort Kent and Madawaska (far north): Fort Kent District Court, and Madawaska District
82

I. Introduction

23
court judge preside as needed to cover vacations and/or active court dockets.
Despite the unified criminal docket, the majority of criminal jury trials continue
to be held in what traditionally were superior courts because those courthouses
and courtrooms were built to accommodate juries and jury pools, while many
of the district court buildings do not have the physical capacity.

Effective January 15, 2016, the Supreme Judicial Court authorized the chiefs of the
trial courts “to establish and, when approved, operate specialty dockets.”90 The use of
specialty courts is limited in Maine, but there are two types of specialty courts in which
indigent legal services are provided: drug courts,91 and veterans’ courts.92
•

There are no specialty courts in Aroostook County.

Court.
Establishment and Administration of Specialty Dockets, Me. Admin. Order JB-16-1 (eff. Jan. 15,
2016).
91
The Portland District Court in Cumberland County runs the largest drug court in Maine, and there
are smaller drug courts in Androscoggin County Superior Court, Hancock County Superior Court,
Washington County’s Calais District Court and Machias District Court, and York County Superior
Court.
The Family Treatment Drug Court is a specialty docket that works with families whose children
have been at risk of abuse or neglect due to parental substance use disorders. These court sessions are
operated at the Maine District Courts in Augusta, Lewiston, and Bangor.
92
The Maine Co-Occurring Disorders and Veterans Court accepts adults with substance abuse
disorders, mental illness, and serious criminal charges since 2005. Although located at the capital
judicial center in Augusta, the court accepts referrals from throughout the state.
90

Chapter II
ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
Every state in the nation must have a system for providing an attorney to represent an
indigent defendant who is charged with a crime and facing the possible loss of their
liberty, and attorneys provide representation to indigent people within the structures of
the systems states create. In United States v. Cronic,93 the U.S. Supreme Court explains
that deficiencies in these systems can make any lawyer – even the best attorney –
perform in a non-adversarial way that results in a “constructive”94 denial of the right to
counsel.
The Cronic Court explains further that, when a lawyer provides representation within
an indigent defense system that constructively denies the right to counsel, the lawyer
is presumptively ineffective.95 The government bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption. The government may argue that the defense lawyer in a specific case
will not be ineffective despite the structural impediments in the system, but it is the
government’s burden to prove this. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted
over 30 years ago in Wahlberg v. Israel,96 “if the state is not a passive spectator of an
inept defense, but a cause of the inept defense, the burden of showing prejudice [under
Strickland] is lifted. It is not right that the state should be able to say, ‘sure we impeded
your defense – now prove it made a difference.’”97
In Cronic,98 the U.S. Supreme Court pointed to the deficient representation received
by the defendants known as the “Scottsboro Boys,” in Powell v. Alabama,99 as
representative of the constructive denial of the right to counsel.100 The trial judge
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (“The Court has considered Sixth Amendment
claims based on actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether, as well as claims
based on state interference with the ability of counsel to render effective assistance to the accused.”)
(citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)).
95
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657-62 (1984).
96
766 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1985).
97
Wahlberg v. Israel, 766 F.2d 1071, 1076 (7th Cir. 1985).
98
466 U.S. 648 (1984).
99
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
100
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-60 (1984) (“[I]f counsel entirely fails to subject the
prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment
rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable. . . . Circumstances of that
magnitude may be present on some occasions when, although counsel is available to assist the accused
during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective
assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual
conduct of the trial. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), was such a case.”).
93
94

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
overseeing the Scottsboro Boys’ Alabama trial appointed a real estate lawyer from
Chattanooga, Tennessee, who was not licensed in Alabama and was admittedly
unfamiliar with the state’s rules of criminal procedure.101 The Powell Court concluded
that defendants require the “guiding hand” of counsel;102 that is, the attorneys a state
provides to represent indigent defendants must be qualified and trained to help those
defendants advocate for their stated legal interests.
This report is concerned principally with the right to counsel that is mandated by
the Sixth Amendment, as it is provided to adults at the trial level in Maine; that is,
representation provided to indigent adults who face the possible loss of their liberty
as punishment for a crime. Throughout Maine under the indigent legal system
administered by the MCILS, many of the same attorneys provide all indigent legal
representation – both that required under the federal constitution and that required
or allowed under Maine law though not mandated by the Sixth Amendment. This
means that attorneys are appointed to represent adults and children in a variety of
case types, at both trial and appeal, and must be competent not only in criminal and
delinquency law but also in a broad range of civil law areas.

Finding 1: MCILS attorney qualification standards are too lenient, resulting in an
excessive number of attorneys on panels, and there are no attorney recertification
requirements. MCILS has only limited new attorney training and lacks
requirements that ongoing attorney training relate to defense-specific subject
areas. MCILS lacks appropriate supervision of attorneys.
The first thing that must occur in a system to provide effective assistance of counsel
is to select the attorneys who are available to provide that representation. National
standards, as compiled in the ABA Ten Principles, require that, “[w]here the caseload is
sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office
and the active participation of the private bar.”103

A retired local attorney who had not practiced in years was also appointed to assist in the
representation of all nine co-defendants.
102
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). (“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he may have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.”).
103
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 2 (Feb.
2002).
101

25

26

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
Since its inception, MCILS has never used governmentally employed attorneys to
provide representation to the indigent accused, leaving Maine as the only state in the
country that provides all indigent defense services through private attorneys.104 There
are two principal reasons that other states have moved away from using only private
attorneys to provide all indigent defense services, and Maine has struggled with
both since the creation of MCILS. First, it is difficult to predict and contain costs in
a private attorney system. (See Chapter V.). A system can estimate future caseloads
based on prior year trends and apply average estimated costs per case, by case type,
to calculate what funding will be required to deliver its mandated services, but there
is no guarantee that past averages will continue to apply to future years. Second, it
is difficult to supervise private attorneys to ensure they can and do provide effective
representation. For example, continual changes in technology make digital evidence
such as video surveillance, social media posts, and smart phone searches crucial for
defense discovery and investigation in many criminal cases. Likewise, the opioid crisis
has added layers of complexity to the resolution of many criminal, delinquency, child
protection, and mental health cases.
MCILS struggles to oversee the services provided by private lawyers. Indigent legal
services in Maine are provided at trial and appeal by nearly 600 private attorneys,105
handling cases in 47 courthouses presided over by approximately 90 justices, judges,
and magistrates.106 Despite the statutory command for MCILS to provide “highFor comparison, 25 states in addition to Maine fund all appellate and trial indigent defense
services: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas (except counties responsible for office facilities, equipment, and
supplies), Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. In each of these states, some
portion of services are delivered through state government employees. For example, even though
Massachusetts primarily uses private counsel, serious felonies and primary juvenile delinquency services
are provided by governmentally employed public defenders. Similarly, even though trial services in
Oregon are provided by private attorneys under contract, a significant portion of appellate services are
provided by state government employed lawyers.
In the other 24 states that require counties to fund some portion of indigent defense services, there
is at least one public defender office employing government attorneys (either state- or county-funded) in
every state.
105
Five hundred ninety-three individual attorneys were appointed to one or more cases during fiscal
years 2014 to 2018. Attorney billing reflects an extremely wide range in the number of hours each
attorney devotes to providing indigent legal services. For example, one attorney billed the state a total
of $1,189,361 over those five years (and average of $237,872.27 per year); while one attorney billed the
state for just $144.00 in one year (2018).
106
Maine has one Supreme Judicial Court, 24 superior court justices (including active retired) in 17
different courthouses, 50 district court judges (including active retired) in 29 different courthouses,
and nine family law magistrates (including active retired), each of whom can potentially preside over
a case in which counsel is appointed to provide indigent legal services. See Supreme Court, State of
Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/supreme/index.shtml; Superior Court
Justices, State of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/superior/justices.
shtml; Superior Courthouse Directory, State of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/
maine_courts/superior/directory.shtml; District Court Judges, State of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.
104

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
quality” and “conflict-free” representation, the State of Maine expects MCILS to
maintain oversight of these approximately 600 attorneys with a staff of just three
people.107

Attorney qualifications
Although attorneys graduate from law school with a strong understanding of the
principles of law, legal theory, and generally how to think like a lawyer, no graduate
enters the legal profession automatically knowing how to be an intellectual property
lawyer, a consumer protection lawyer, or an attorney specializing in estates and trusts,
mergers and acquisitions, or bankruptcy.108 Specialties must be developed. Just as
you would not go to a dermatologist for heart surgery, a real estate or divorce lawyer
cannot be expected to handle a complex criminal case competently. As the American
Bar Association explained more than 20 years ago, “[c]riminal law is a complex and
difficult legal area, and the skills necessary for provision of a full range of services
must be carefully developed. Moreover, the consequences of mistakes in defense
representation may be substantial, including wrongful conviction and death or the loss
of liberty.”109

courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/district/judges.shtml; District Courthouse Directory, State of Me. Jud.
Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/district/directory.shtml; Family Law Magistrates,
State of Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/family/magistrates.html.
107
MCILS employs an executive director, a deputy executive director, and an accounting technician,
who collectively provide the entirety of the oversight of the indigent legal services in Maine. Staff
Directory, Maine Comm’n on Indigent Legal Servs., https://www.maine.gov/mcils/about/staff.html
(last visited Mar. 19, 2019). MCILS also employs eight financial screeners, whose role is limited to
interviewing defendants to determine indigency in the courts.
For comparison, there are approximately 600 private attorneys who provide conflict representation in
Colorado through the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel, which has a central staff of 14 employees.
See Staff, Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel, https://www.coloradoadc.org/oadccontacts/oadcstaff (last visited Mar. 19, 2019). This is in addition to the 13 staff in the central administrative office
of the Colorado State Public Defender, who administer the public defender offices serving Colorado’s
17 counties. See Central Administrative Office, Office of the Colorado State Public Defender, http://
www.coloradodefenders.us/offices/central-administration/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2019).
108
Christopher Sabis and Daniel Webert, Understanding the Knowledge Requirement of Attorney
Competence: A Roadmap for Novice Attorneys, 15 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 915, 915 (2001-2002) (“The
American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) provide that
an attorney must possess and demonstrate a certain requisite level of legal knowledge in order to be
considered competent to handle a given matter. The standards are intended to protect the public as well
as the image of the profession. Failure to adhere to them can result in sanctions and even disbarment.
However, because legal education has long been criticized as being out of touch with the realities of
legal practice and because novice attorneys often lack substantive experience, meeting the knowledge
requirements of attorney competence may be particularly difficult for a lawyer who recently graduated
from law school or who enters practice as a solo practitioner.”).
109
American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing Defense Services, Standard 5-1.5
and commentary (3d ed. 1992).

27

28

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
For these reasons, national standards require that each attorney must have the
qualifications, training, and experience necessary for each specific case to which they
are appointed.110 Attorneys must know what legal tasks need to be considered in each
and every case they handle, and then how to do them. As national standards explain,
an attorney’s ability to provide effective representation depends on his familiarity with
the “substantive criminal law and the law of criminal procedure and its application in
the particular jurisdiction.”111 Rule 1.1 of the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct
requires all lawyers to be “competent” in carrying out their duties to clients.112 Failure
to adhere to the state’s Rules of Professional Conduct may result in disciplinary action
against the attorney, up to and including the loss of the attorney’s license to practice
law.113
MCILS is statutorily required to develop standards “prescribing minimum experience,
training and other qualifications” for the attorneys who provide indigent legal
representation.114 MCILS also must “establish minimum qualifications to ensure that
attorneys are qualified and capable of providing quality representation in the case
types to which they are assigned, recognizing that quality representation in each of
these types of cases requires counsel with experience and specialized training in that
field.”115
Attorneys desiring to be appointed to represent indigent people in Maine must apply to
MCILS.116 The minimum requirements for every attorney are that they: must have an
office or use of confidential space, a telephone number where messages can be left, and
a working email account;117 and must either demonstrate to MCILS proficiency over
the preceding three years in the area of law in which the attorney wants to be appointed
or complete an MCILS approved training course for that area of the law (law areas as
designated by MCILS are criminal defense, juvenile defense, civil commitment, child
protective, or emancipation).118
See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System,
Principle 6 (Feb. 2002) (“Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of
the case.”). The ABA explains further in commentary that: “Counsel should never be assigned a case
that counsel lacks the experience or training to handle competently, and counsel is obligated to refuse
appointment if unable to provide ethical, high quality representation.” American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten
Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, commentary to Principle 6 (Feb. 2002).
111
National Legal Aid & Defender Association, Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense
Representation, Guideline 1.2(a) (1995).
112
Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.”).
113
Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 8.4(a), 8.5(a).
114
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804(2)(B) (2018).
115
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804(3)(E) (2018).
116
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 2, § 2 (Sept. 17, 2015).
117
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 2, § 3 (Sept. 17, 2015).
118
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 2, § 4 (Sept. 17, 2015).
110

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION

29

MCILS has promulgated slightly greater qualification requirements for certain types
of cases that MCILS considers to be “complex in nature due to the allegations against
the person as well as the severity of the consequences if a conviction occurs.”119 The
cases requiring greater qualifications are homicide, sex offenses,120 serious violent
felonies,121 operating under the influence, domestic violence,122 juvenile defense,
protective custody matters, Law Court appeals, and post-conviction review.123 The
additional qualifications MCILS requires an attorney to have to be placed on the roster
for appointment at the trial level for the designated criminal cases are:124

Homicide

Practice
experience

5 yrs
crim law

Trial experience

Sex offenses

3 yrs
crim law

First chair 3 fel trials (at least 2 jury) in
past 10 yrs

Serious violent
felonies

2 yrs
crim law

First chair 4 trials (at least 2 jury; at least 2
crim) in past 10 yrs

Operating
under the
influence

1 yr
crim law

First chair 2 crim trials and 2 contested
hrgs in past 10 yrs

4 hrs OUI defense
CLE in past 3 yrs

Domestic
violence

1 yr
crim law

First chair 2 crim trials and 2 contested
hrgs in past 10 yrs

4 hrs dom viol CLE in
past 3 yrs

Case-Type

First chair 5 fel trials (at least 2 jury; at
least 2 homicide, ser viol fel, or sex off) in
past 10 yrs;
AND
First chair homicide trial in past 15 yrs OR
second chair homicide trial in past 5 yrs

CLE or Knowledge

Knowledge of
evidentiary issues
in homicide cases,
including DNA,
fingerprint analysis,
mental health,
eyewitness ID

References

3 letters

In any of these specialized case types, an attorney can request from the MCILS
executive director a waiver of either the practice experience or trial experience
requirements (but not both).125
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 1(5) (June 10, 2016).
Sex offenses are defined by MCILS as being the commission of, conspiracy to commit, attempt
to commit, or solicitation of sexual assaults, sexual exploitation of minors, incest, violation of privacy,
aggravated sex trafficking, and patronizing prostitution of minor or person with mental disability. 94-649
Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 1(4) (June 10, 2016).
121
Serious violent felonies are defined by MCILS as being the commission of, conspiracy to commit,
attempt to commit, or solicitation of aggravated attempted murder, aggravated assault, elevated
aggravated assault, elevated aggravated assault on a pregnant person, kidnapping, burglary with a
firearm, burglary with intent to inflict bodily harm, burglary with a dangerous weapon, robbery, arson,
causing a catastrophe, aggravated trafficking of scheduled drugs, aggravated trafficking of counterfeit
drugs, and aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs. 94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 1(3) (June 10, 2016).
122
Domestic violence cases are defined by MCILS as being the commission of, conspiracy to commit,
attempt to commit, or solicitation of domestic violence, any class D or E offense against a family or
household member or dating partner, class D stalking, and violation of a protection order. 94-649 Code
Me. R. ch. 3, § 1(2) (June 10, 2016).
123
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 3 (June 10, 2016).
124
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 3(1)-(5) (June 10, 2016).
125
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 3, § 4 (June 10, 2016).
119
120

30

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
In short, under MCILS’ qualification requirements, an attorney who graduated from
law school two years ago and hung out their shingle in a private practice, with no
supervision or training, can have two jury trials and two judge trials and then be
appointed to represent indigent defendants in every type of criminal case other than
a homicide or sex offense. More worrisome perhaps is that indigent defendants
charged with Class E crimes, carrying up to six months in jail, can be represented by
an attorney who just received their bar card and completed a single training course
in criminal law, as long as the lawyer has an email address, telephone number, and a
confidential space to meet with clients.

Attorney training & supervision
The Maine Rules of Professional Conduct recognize that ongoing training is necessary
for attorneys to maintain their familiarity with criminal law and procedure, as well
as their competence to provide effective representation.126 Similarly, all national
standards, including those of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals,127 require that the indigent defense system provide attorneys with
access to a “systematic and comprehensive” training program,128 at which attorney
attendance is compulsory, in order to maintain competence from year to year.129
Training must be tailored to the types and levels of cases for which the attorney seeks
public appointment. If, for example, the lawyer has not received training on the latest
forensic sciences and case law related to drugs, then the government should ensure
that lawyer is not assigned to drug-related cases. If a public defense provider does not
have the “knowledge and experience to offer quality representation to a defendant in
a particular matter,” then the attorney is obligated to move to withdraw from the case,
Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.1, cmt. [6] (“To maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer
should keep abreast of changes in the law and its practice, engage in continuing study and education and
comply with all continuing legal education requirements to which the lawyer is subject.”).
127
Building upon the work and findings of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Justice, the Administrator of the U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration appointed the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals in 1971, with DOJ/LEAA grant funding to develop standards for crime reduction and
prevention at the state and local levels. The NAC crafted standards for all criminal justice functions,
including law enforcement, corrections, the courts, and the prosecution. Chapter 13 of the NAC’s
report sets the standards for the defense function. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on the Courts, ch.13 (The Defense) (1973).
128
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task
Force on the Courts, ch. 13 (The Defense), Standard 13.16 (1973) (“The training of public defenders
and assigned counsel panel members should be systematic and comprehensive.”).
129
See American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle
9 (Feb. 2002) (“Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal education”).
The commentary explains: “Counsel and staff providing defense services should have systematic
and comprehensive training appropriate to their areas of practice and at least equal to that received
by prosecutors.” American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System,
commentary to Principle 9 (Feb. 2002).
126

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
or better yet to refuse the appointment at the outset.130 Ongoing training, therefore, is
an active part of the job of being a public defense provider. Finally, public defense
attorneys must be supervised and regularly evaluated.131
All Maine attorneys are required to complete 12 hours of continuing legal education
each year, at least one hour of which must be in professional responsibility,132 while
MCILS only requires that attorneys representing the indigent complete eight hours of
continuing legal education each year.133 Most assigned counsel report meeting their
CLE requirements by attending a court-run two-day conference each year. MCILS
does not require attorneys appointed to represent the indigent to obtain any CLE or
training in any specific area of practice and, in particular, there is no requirement
for CLE or training in the fields in which they provide indigent legal representation
(beyond that required to first be placed on the roster for appointments in operating
under the influence or domestic violence cases).
MCILS has not established any requirements for supervision of attorneys appointed
to provide indigent legal representation. In June 2018, MCILS began a “Resource
Counsel Program” to assist MCILS staff by having experienced assigned counsel
eventually provide “mentoring, supervision, and evaluation of private assigned
counsel.”134 In the fall of 2018, MCILS identified 25 attorneys statewide to serve as
resource counsel and provide mentoring to less experienced attorneys. That said, the
25 resource counsel attorneys are each capped at providing 10 hours of mentoring
per month, and the program is not available in the mental health practice area. The
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task
Force on the Courts, ch. 13 (The Defense), Standard 13.16 (1973); see also National Legal Aid &
Defender Association, Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation, Guidelines
1.2(b), 1.3(a) (1995) (“Prior to handling a criminal matter, counsel should have sufficient experience
or training to provide quality representation,” and “[b]efore agreeing to act as counsel or accepting
appointment by a court, counsel has an obligation to make sure that counsel has available sufficient time,
resources, knowledge and experience to offer quality representation to a defendant in a particular matter.
If it later appears that counsel is unable to offer quality representation in the case, counsel should move
to withdraw.”).
131
See American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle
10 (Feb. 2002) (“Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency
according to nationally and locally adopted standards”). The commentary adds, “Counsel and staff
providing defense services should have systematic and comprehensive training appropriate to their areas
of practice and at least equal to that received by prosecutors.”
132
Me. State Bar R. 5 (“Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision, every attorney required
to register in accordance with these rules of this state shall complete 12 credit hours of approved
continuing legal education in each calendar year. At least one credit hour in each calendar year shall
be primarily concerned with professionalism. . . . Qualifying professionalism education topics include
professional responsibility, legal ethics, substance abuse and mental health issues, diversity awareness
in the legal profession, and malpractice and bar complaint avoidance topics including law office and file
management, client relations, and client trust account administration.”).
133
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 2, § 5 (Sept. 17, 2015).
134
MCILS, June 12, 2018 Commissioner’s Meeting Packet, Agenda item 3, available at https://www.
maine.gov/mcils/meetings/minutes/Commission%20Packet%20June%202018.pdf.
130

31

32

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
resource counsel attorneys do not have authority to require any mentee to cooperate,
and MCILS has no plan to assist the resource counsel attorneys with identifying
performance problems or training needs.
A criminal justice representative in Androscoggin County stated that: a handful of
attorneys are so obviously disorganized, unreliable, and incompetent that they should
not be on the roster at all; another handful are competent only for simple low level
cases; another handful are excellent; and the rest are uneven. The deficiencies of the
least competent attorneys are obvious to all, so it is troubling that they remain eligible
for assignments without accountability.

Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services example
To best understand the lack of MCILS oversight of attorneys, it is useful to look at
another jurisdiction that relies in large part on private attorneys to provide indigent
legal services: Massachusetts. The Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel
Services (CPCS) is a judicial branch agency overseeing the delivery of indigent
defense services in all courts across the state of Massachusetts.
Attorney qualifications. Private attorneys in Massachusetts who desire to be appointed
to represent indigent people must apply and be certified. Attorneys are never
automatically certified based on attendance at a training program or meeting a certain
set of criteria; there is always a role for discretion to serve the client population who
cannot choose their lawyers. Attorneys can only be certified to receive appointments in
a maximum of two counties, and they must apply separately in each county.
For misdemeanor and lesser felonies, attorneys submit their application to the county
assignment program. The leadership of the county assignment program interviews the
applicant, checks their references, and determines whether they meet the CPCS criteria
demonstrating competence and commitment to the needs of the client population.
Attorneys selected by the county assignment program must attend the Zealous
Advocacy training program (or obtain a waiver;135 a waiver is not ordinarily granted
to an attorney seeking misdemeanor and lesser felony appointments unless they have
tried 5 criminal defense jury trials to verdict within the preceding 5 years.) Zealous
Advocacy training is a 7-day program including both lectures and small group skills
exercises daily, with substantial reading and presentation preparation every night.
An attorney either passes or fails the training program. Once an attorney is selected
by the county assignment program and successfully completes the training program,
A request for a waiver of the Zealous Advocacy training program will be considered only if the
applicant has exceptional experience in the practice area in which they seek certification. The applicant
requesting a waiver must submit a letter to the director of the appropriate certification panel explaining
in detail why the training requirement should be waived. The letter must include descriptions of cases,
including docket numbers and issues presented, relied upon by the applicant to demonstrate the requisite
experience.
135

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
the attorney is provisionally certified to represent indigent adults in misdemeanors
and lesser felonies in that county. The attorney can only be fully certified after a
performance evaluation conducted within 12 to 24 months of provisional certification.
For major felonies or murder cases, attorneys must apply to CPCS deputy chief
counsel. The application must include a list of complex cases the attorney has tried
to a jury verdict as lead counsel within the preceding five years; at least six for major
felonies certification and at least 10 for murder certification. Additional materials like
original memoranda of law may also be required. The applications are circulated to
a blue-ribbon panel of leading senior private defense lawyers for confidential input
before CPCS makes a certification decision.
CPCS’s electronic billing system enforces the certification requirements. The billing
system automatically rejects any assignments for which an attorney is not certified and
generates a contemporaneous notice to the attorney, the county assignment program,
and the court that the case must be reassigned.
Attorney recertification. Because attorneys in private practice are free to change
the areas of law in which they concentrate based on their own interests or market
conditions, their qualifications to handle criminal cases may change over time. To
assure that public funds are used efficiently to retain qualified attorneys, all attorneys
must apply for recertification every five years.
The criteria for recertification are evidence of substantial recent criminal defense
litigation experience, including appropriately vigorous motion and trial practice. Data
to support the decision-making process comes from the attorney’s recertification
application, records maintained by CPCS of performance assessments, complaints,
and electronic billing records that show what actions the attorney has taken in assigned
cases. The amount of data available from detailed electronic billing records to which
the attorney has attested assures that these decisions have a solid basis in facts that the
attorney can understand.
CPCS will not recertify attorneys who have not vigorously defended their assigned
cases (evidenced by filing original pleadings, using investigators, summoning
witnesses, litigating evidentiary motions, and conducting trials) or who have been the
subject of substantial true complaints of substandard representation. If an attorney’s
performance in assigned cases needs improvement, CPCS may conditionally recertify
the attorney for one or two years, with conditions, as an opportunity for the attorney
to correct identified problems but with appropriate supervision or caseload limitations
to protect clients. The Massachusetts experience is that about 20% of applicants for
recertification for adult criminal case assignments do not qualify for full recertification,
but in almost all instances these attorneys are given a one-year conditional

33

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
recertification to correct deficiencies. Of that group, about 80% have corrected the
deficiencies when they reapply at the end of the one-year period, while the other 20%
tend not to reapply.
Attorney training. All CPCS attorneys must annually complete eight hours of
continuing legal education approved by CPCS as relevant to the panel on which the
attorney receives assignments. An attorney who receives assignments in more than one
practice area must satisfy the CLE requirement for each panel.
All attorneys who lack the recent experience required for the certification level they
seek may be required to attend the Zealous Advocacy training program, described
above.
Attorney supervision. The funders of public programs should assure that attorneys
paid with public funds are doing a good job. Oversight of private attorneys appointed
to represent indigent people in criminal cases presents particular challenges, because
the attorney-client privilege requires the attorney to keep confidential many aspects of
the representation. Also, private attorneys may resist the implementation of oversight
where none previously has been in place.
In Massachusetts, the private attorneys who handle criminal case assignments are
organized in every county into groups. These groups contract with CPCS to perform
various functions, including calendaring attorneys to cover courts where they receive
case assignments.
CPCS selects from the most experienced members of these group the attorneys who are
paid by CPCS to be mentors. CPCS assigns a mentor to all attorneys until such time as
they obtain certification for major felonies.
Attorneys who are certified for major felonies or murder are eligible to apply to CPCS
for a one-year contract position as a county supervising attorney. CPCS vigorously
recruits potential supervising attorneys and publicly honors those who serve in the role.
Supervising attorneys are selected jointly by CPCS and the county assignment program
leadership, and both state and local leaders must support the candidate for a contract
to be awarded. Supervising attorney contracts are for relatively few hours per week,
so that highly respected successful lawyers can be recruited to take on the role while
maintaining their private practices. Supervising attorneys participate in the selection
of attorneys who have applied for certification, lead local training events, conduct
in-depth performance evaluations of every assigned counsel in their county every two
years (or in neighboring counties in case of conflicts due to local relationships), and

II. ATTORNEY QUALIFICATIONS, TRAINING & SUPERVISION
investigate complaints by clients or court personnel about the performance of assigned
counsel. The supervising attorneys also provide a trusted point of contact for judges
and consistent advice to CPCS about the myriad local issues that arise in the courts.
The number of supervising attorneys needed for a county depends on the number of
courts and attorneys receiving assignments in the county, as well as the geography of
the county. Currently there are about 30 supervising attorneys across Massachusetts,
each serving 10 hours per week.

35

Chapter III
EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
As the U.S. Supreme Court states in Cronic, there are circumstances “that are so
likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular
case is unjustified. Most obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel.”136 All
crimes in Maine are classified as either murder, Class A, Class B, Class C, Class D,
or Class E crimes.137 Conduct that is punishable by a fine only, without the possibility
of incarceration, is a civil violation and “expressly declared not to be [a] criminal
offense.”138 All crimes in Maine carry the possible loss of liberty,139 so every adult and
juvenile140 charged with any crime, and who cannot afford to hire their own attorney,
is entitled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to have counsel provided at
public expense at trial and on direct appeal.141

U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59 (1984).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 4, 4-A (2018). Murder, and Class A, B, and C crimes are akin to
what other states usually call a felony; Class D and E crimes are akin to what other states usually call a
misdemeanor.
Where a statute outside of the Maine Criminal Code defines a crime but does not designate its class,
then the penalty provided in the particular statute determines the classification of the crime: greater than
10 years is Class A; greater than 5 years and up to 10 years is Class B; greater than 3 years and up to 5
years is Class C; greater than 1 year and up to 3 years is Class D; and up to 1 year is Class E. Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 4-A(3) (2018).
138
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 4-B (2018).
139
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 4-A(3), 1251, 1252 (2018). The crimes carry the following
possible sentences: murder – 25 years to life; Class A – up to 30 years; Class B – up to 10 years; Class
C – up to 5 years; Class D – up to 1 year; in county jail and Class E – up to 6 months in county jail. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, §§ 4-A(2-A), 1251, 1252(2) (2018). All Class D and Class E sentences are
to be served in county jail. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1252(1)(A) (2018). All Class A, B, and C
sentences of 9 months or less are to be served in county jail, while sentences of more than 9 months are
served in the department of corrections. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 1252(1)(B) (2018).
140
A juvenile is any person less than 18 years of age. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3003(14) (2018).
A juvenile crime is committed by a person less than 18 years of age, including: conduct that would
be a crime if committed by an adult – what other states often call juvenile delinquency; and certain
conduct that is generally legal but illegal for persons under a certain age – what other states often call
juvenile status offenses. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 3003(16), 3103, 3103-A (2018); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 17-A, § 4-A(2-A),(3) (2018). A juvenile convicted of a juvenile crime may be committed to
a Department of Corrections juvenile correctional facility. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 3103(2),
3314(1)(F) (2018). A juvenile who is charged with murder or a class A, B, or C offense may be tried as
an adult. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 3101(4) (2018).
141
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005); Alabama v. Shelton, 505 U.S. 654 (2002); Argersinger
v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
136
137

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In 2008, the Court reaffirmed in Rothgery v. Gillespie County that the right to counsel
attaches when “formal judicial proceedings have begun.”142 For a person who is
arrested, the beginning of formal judicial proceedings is at “a criminal defendant’s
initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charge against him and
his liberty is subject to restriction,”143 without regard to whether a prosecutor is aware
of the arrest.144 For all defendants, the commencement of prosecution, “whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment,”
signals the beginning of formal judicial proceedings.145
The Rothgery Court carefully explained, however, that the question of whether the
right to counsel has attached is distinct from the question of whether a particular
proceeding is a “critical stage” at which counsel must be present as a participant.146
“Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed
counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment proceedings . . ..”147 In other
words, according to the Court, the Constitution does not necessarily require that
defense counsel be present at the moment the right to counsel attaches, but from that
moment forward, no critical stage in a criminal or juvenile delinquency case can occur
unless the defendant is represented by counsel or has made an informed and intelligent
waiver of counsel.
The Court states that “a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage
of his trial.”148 Over the decades, the Supreme Court has inch-by-inch delineated many
case events as being critical stages, although it has never purported to have capped the
list of events that may fall into this category.149 Events that are definitely critical stages
are: custodial interrogations both before and after commencement of prosecution;150
preliminary hearings prior to commencement of prosecution where “potential
142
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008). See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S.
625, 629 n.3 (1986); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 388-89 (1977).
143
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008).
144
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008).
145
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 n.3 (1986).
146
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008).
147
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008).
148
U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).
149
The critical stages in a case are the moments when the defendant has to make choices – when
“counsel would help the accused ‘in coping with legal problems or . . . meeting his adversary.’”
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16 (2008) (quoting United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300, 312-13 (1973)). None of these proceedings can occur unless counsel is present or has been waived
because, as the Supreme Court has noted, “the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most
pervasive for it affects [an accused person’s] ability to assert any other rights he may have.” United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (citing Shaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956)).
150
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966);
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).

37

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
substantial prejudice to defendant[s’] rights inheres in the . . . confrontation”;151 lineups
and show-ups at or after commencement of prosecution;152 during plea negotiations
and at the entry of a guilty plea;153 arraignments;154 during the pre-trial period between
arraignment and the beginning of trial;155 trials;156 during sentencing;157 direct appeals
as of right;158 probation revocation proceedings to some extent;159 and parole revocation
proceedings to some extent.160
This chapter explains the criminal justice process in Maine, including the events that
trigger attachment of the right to counsel and those that are critical stages at which
counsel must be present on behalf of an indigent defendant. Throughout this chapter,
as elsewhere in this report, a detailed description of Aroostook County serves as an
example of how criminal justice is administered locally throughout Maine. These
bulleted sections are set apart from the body of the report.

Summons or arrest
When a person is suspected of having committed a crime, they may either be issued a
summons161 or (for most crimes) arrested with or without a warrant.162
When issuing a summons, the law enforcement officer provides a court date and
location to the defendant directing them to appear in court to answer the allegation.163
For a defendant who receives a summons, their first appearance before a judge will be
at the initial appearance (explained below) held on the date they are told to appear in
court.

Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).
Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967).
153
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,
373 (2010); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 771 n.14 (1970).
154
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-55 (1961).
155
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-99 (1977); Powell v. Alabama, 387 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
156
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37, 40 (1972);
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1967); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
157
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1386 (2012); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 538
(2003); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 137
(1967).
158
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
159
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
160
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973); cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)
(leaving open the question “whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained counsel or to
appointed counsel if he is indigent”).
161
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 15-A (2018).
162
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 704 (2018); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 15 (2018).
163
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17-A, § 15-A(1) (2018).
151
152

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
•

When law enforcement issues a summons in Aroostook County, the officer
provides a court date to the defendant to appear in the district court assigned
to the geographic area where the crime is alleged to have occurred. That is,
if the Fort Kent police department issues someone a summons, that person is
summoned to the Fort Kent District Court on the next criminal arraignment/
initial hearing docket date. Police departments and the county sheriff are
provided a calendar of court dates by the court clerks.164

If arrested, the defendant is taken to the local police station or the county jail to be
processed. The amount of bail and conditions under which a defendant can be released
from jail (if pretrial release is available) are set initially by either a court or a bail
commissioner. A defendant who was arrested without a warrant is entitled to have a
judge consider and determine whether there was probable cause for the arrest. Both the
initial bail setting and the probable cause determination can occur outside the presence
of the defendant and without the involvement of either a prosecutor or defense
attorneys. For a defendant who is arrested, their first appearance before a judge will be
at the “48-hour hearing” (explained below).
•

Persons who are arrested anywhere in Aroostook County are first taken before
a bail commissioner and then, if not released, taken to the Aroostook County
jail, located in Houlton and attached to the courthouse. On average, 90% of
the jail population is defendants detained pre-trial, while only 10% have been
convicted and sentenced.165

Bail setting (following arrest)
For a person who is arrested, the process of attempting to be released begins with a
police department or county sheriff calling a local bail commissioner.166 Generally, the
bail commissioner comes to the police department, although they could be called to the
roadside for vehicular crimes.
Court schedules are publicly available on the Maine Courts website. See Regional Schedules, State
Me. Jud. Branch, https://www.courts.maine.gov/maine_courts/schedules/quarterly_schedules.shtml.
165
The jail has a capacity to house 117 people. The average number of persons in jail is 102, with
a low of 95 and a high of 124 during the six months prior to this report’s publication. The annual
budget for the jail in FY 2019 is approximately $3.285 million. County of Aroostook 2019 Jail Budget,
available at https://www.aroostook.me.us/images/2019_Jail_Budget.pdf. At the time of the site visit,
the jail administrator did not know the average daily bed cost for his jail. Using a rough calculation of
multiplying the average jail population (102) by the number of days in a year (365) and then dividing
that product by the annual jail budget ($3.285 million) results in an average daily bed cost of $88.24.
166
The chief judge of the district court appoints bail commissioners. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §
1023 (2018). Although the number fluctuates, as of November 2018 there were 83 bail commissioners
across the state. Though all bail commissioners have statewide jurisdiction, most work in the county in
which they reside.
The only qualifications required for bail commissioners are Maine residency, completion of a bail
training program within one year following appointment, and a term of not more than 5 years. Id. Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1023 (7) (2018).
164

of

39

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

If a person was arrested on a warrant, the court that issued the warrant may have set
the type and amount of bail and any bail conditions to be imposed.167 If a person was
arrested without a warrant or a court did not set bail terms when issuing an arrest
warrant, then the bail commissioner is responsible for setting bail terms for most
arrests, although there are a significant number of crimes and circumstances for which
a defendant must appear before a judge to have bail set.168 A bail commissioner may
release an arrestee on personal recognizance, an unsecured bail, or a secured bail, and
may impose conditions on the defendant while on pretrial release.169
If a defendant is unable to meet the bail set by the bail commissioner, or if a bail
commissioner is prohibited from setting bail in the defendant’s circumstances,
bail may be reviewed or set at the 48-hour hearing.170 Defendants who are released
pursuant to this bail setting procedure are given a court date and location directing
them to appear in court to answer the allegation; if the defendant is released before
the “48-hour hearing,” then their first appearance before a judge will be at the initial
appearance (explained below) held on the date they are told to appear in court.
•

Eleven of the 83 bail commissioners in Maine operate out of Aroostook County
(and are generally assigned based on the five populations centers in the county).
Statewide, bail commissioners tend to be people at the end of their careers who
want to stay active, and, in overly general terms, they tend to be people who
had a career in criminal justice (e.g., ex-law enforcement, retired judges, and
retired court clerks). However, the bail commissioners in Aroostook County do
not fit this general background and are generally people looking to supplement
their income and/or who want to contribute to the community. For example,
three of the bail commissioners in the county are an auto salesman, a pizza shop
owner, and a jail booking officer.

Probable cause determination (following warrantless arrest)
In County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,171 the United States Supreme Court held that
a judge must make a probable cause determination – probable cause that a crime
has been committed and that the defendant committed it – within 48 clock hours
of a warrantless arrest or the government risks being held responsible for an illegal
detention.

167
168
169
170
171

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1021, 1022 (2018).
Me. Const. art. I, § 10; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1023(4), 1027 (2018).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1026 (2018).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1026(1),(6), 1027, 1028 (2018); Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 46.
500 U.S. 44 (1991).

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
A judge can make this determination without ever seeing the defendant and based
solely on paperwork filed by the officer or prosecutor.172 If the judge finds that there
was not probable cause for the arrest, the person is released from jail; if the judge finds
that there was probable cause for the arrest, the person remains in jail.173
Because a defendant who has been arrested in Maine is brought before a judge for a
48-hour hearing, the probable cause determination is almost never made in Maine prior
to the 48-hour hearing, and it is typically waived as part of the 48-hour hearing.
•

Almost universally in Aroostook County, the probable cause determination
is waived as part of the 48-hour hearing. Local criminal justice system
participants could only remember a single instance in which a defendant
refused to waive the probable cause determination at the 48-hour hearing. In
that instance, the judge made the probable cause determination from the bench
based on the police report.

48-hour hearing (in custody) or initial appearance (out of
custody)
A defendant’s first appearance before a judge is the 48-hour hearing for in custody
defendants174 and the initial appearance for out of custody defendants. This is the
proceeding at which the right to counsel attaches under Rothgery and is when an
indigent defendant will have the opportunity to request appointed counsel. (A 48-hour
hearing is actually held not later than 48 hours after the arrest, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, legal holidays, and court holidays,175 so in many instances it may be as much
as five days after a defendant’s arrest.)
Throughout Maine, prosecutors and defense attorneys are always in attendance for
these proceedings. 48-hour hearings for in custody defendants are conducted by video
conference, with the defendant and the MCILS “lawyer of the day” located at the jail,
and the judge and prosecutor located at the courthouse. Out of custody defendants
appear in the courtroom for initial appearances, along with the MCILS “lawyer of the
day,” the prosecutor, and the judge. At 48-hour hearings and initial appearances, the
court informs the defendant of the charges against him and his rights,176 indigency is
determined for any defendant requesting appointed counsel,177 counsel is appointed for
any defendant determined to be indigent,178 and for in custody defendants bail may be
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 4A.
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 4A.
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5.
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(a).
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(b)-(c).
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(e), 44.
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(e), 44.

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
reviewed. A defendant charged with a Class D or E crime is also called on to enter a
plea.179
•

Aroostook County defendants not released by a bail commissioner at a local
police station are transferred and held in the county jail in Houlton and are to
be brought before a judge within 48 hours of arrest. Although any judge in any
court in Aroostook County can conduct the 48-hour hearings (for example,
depending on trials schedules, vacation, etc.), it is generally true that 48-hour
hearings are conducted from the jail to the court via video conference at 11:30
a.m. every Monday in Houlton District Court, Wednesday in Superior Court
– Caribou, and Friday in Caribou District Court. This means that in custody
defendants who are arrested on a Friday after 11:30 a.m. will not go before a
judge until the following Monday.

Initial appearances for out of custody defendants are scheduled only once or twice
per month per court. Therefore, it may be up to a month after arrest that the initial
appearance occurs.
Finding 2: Although the courts’ advice of rights video has many admirable
qualities, few courts follow up with a colloquy to ensure that indigent defendants
saw the video and comprehend their rights before waiving counsel. Some
prosecutors in some jurisdictions engage in plea discussions with uncounseled
defendants, and some courts actively encourage such negotiations. These practices
result in actual denial of counsel.
Maine courts are required to advise every defendant (in person or through a video
recording) of:
(1) the substance of the charges against the defendant;
(2) the defendant’s right to retain counsel, and to request the
assignment of counsel and to be allowed a reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel before entering a plea;
(3) the right to remain silent and that the defendant is not required
to make a statement and that any statement made by the defendant may
be used against the defendant;
(4) the maximum possible sentence, and any applicable mandatory
minimum sentence; and
(5) the defendant’s right to trial by jury.180

179
180

Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(d).
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 5(b).

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Advice of rights video
At the beginning of 48-hour hearings and initial appearances, all courts play a
20-minute video explaining due process rights.181 The video is produced by the Maine
Administrative Office of the Courts and is played uniformly in all counties. The video
advises defendants that they should consult a lawyer, warns immigrants to get legal
advice, and shows people through the use of mock case examples what occurs at an
arraignment and the dangers of pleading guilty without a lawyer.
•

As is true throughout the state, the advice of rights in Aroostook County is
conducted via the Administrative Office of the Courts video.

There are many admirable qualities about the Administrative Office of the Courts’
video, including a demonstration of what proceeding without a lawyer may look like.
However, the video is definitely not a substitute for a judge speaking directly to a
defendant to advise them of their rights personally. In every courtroom observed in
all of the sample counties, the video is played before the judge is on bench. No one
ensures that defendants have watched the video, understand the language spoken in the
video, or have the mental capacity to understand the video, and it is often the case that
tardy defendants enter without ever seeing the video at all.

Denial of counsel to defendants receiving suspended sentences
Despite defendants being advised of the right to request assignment of counsel,
throughout the sample counties many courts take the position that a defendant is not
entitled to appointed counsel for a crime if prosecutors do not seek jail time. In fact,
the Rules of Unified Criminal Procedure expressly state that, if a defendant is charged
with a Class D or Class E crime and is indigent, “the court shall make an initial
assignment of counsel, unless the court concludes that in the event of conviction a
sentence of imprisonment will not be imposed.”182
The U.S. Supreme Court in Alabama v. Shelton made clear that the right to counsel
attaches to any case involving the potential for jail time, no matter how remote the
possibility.183 The Court held that courts are prohibited from ever sending an indigent
defendant to jail following a suspended sentence unless the defendant originally
received or waived their right to an attorney, because a “suspended sentence is a

The video is available publicly. See Criminal Cases, State of Me. Jud. Branch, http://www.courts.
maine.gov/citizen_help/criminal.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
182
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 44(a)(1) (emphasis added).
183
535 U.S. 654 (2002). The potential for time in jail includes misdemeanors with suspended sentences
in which the defendant remains at liberty unless the defendant fails the probationary terms.
181

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
prison term imposed for the offense of conviction. Once the prison term is triggered,
the defendant is incarcerated not for the probation violation, but for the underlying
offense.”184
Of greater concern, though, is that indigent defendants who are told by the court
that they are not entitled to appointed counsel frequently give up and plead guilty
because they cannot afford to hire an attorney. In York County, many indigent
defendants submitted to guilty pleas after being told they have no right to counsel
unless the prosecutor asks for a jail sentence, and they were then convicted and
sentenced to fines they cannot afford to pay. When the imposition of a fine is made a
condition of probation, revocation of that probation and imposition of the suspended
sentence violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights under these circumstances.
Throughout the state, the 6AC observed courts imposing fines and fees as a condition
of probation on uncounseled indigent defendants.

Prosecutors negotiating pleas with unrepresented defendants
Systems that encourage or otherwise direct unrepresented defendants to meet with
prosecuting attorneys to discuss plea deals, before making appointed counsel available
to them, violate a defendant’s right to counsel. The United States Supreme Court
confirmed in Lafler v. Cooper185 and in Missouri v. Frye186 that a defendant has the
right to “effective assistance of competent counsel” during plea negotiations. The plea
negotiation is a critical stage of the case, meaning the negotiation cannot happen unless
counsel is present or the defendant’s right to counsel has been knowingly, voluntarily,
and intelligently waived.187 Despite this, throughout the sample counties, prosecutors
talk to uncounseled defendants to negotiate guilty pleas. This was most prevalent in the
south where larger court populations, and not enough lawyers of the day, exacerbate
the problems.
For example, at the Biddeford District Court in York County, an assistant district
attorney addressed the defendants en masse, stating that the defendants will receive
a police report and an offer sheet so they can decide if they want to resolve their case
that day. The district attorney tells all people with court business (including lawyers,
represented defendants, and unrepresented defendants) to sign their names on a sheet
taped to the door of a conference room in order to be allowed to talk with an assistant
district attorney. Although the prosecutor encouraged all defendants to meet with the
lawyer of the day, defendants were also told that to resolve the case that day they could
not meet with the lawyer of the day until they first saw the judge.

184
185
186
187

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002).
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 88 (2004).

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Chilling of the right to counsel
In York County’s Biddeford District Court, the judges address to the crowd overtly
discourages requesting appointment of counsel and encourages guilty pleas at initial
appearance. The judge says, “I must advise you of your right to trial. Your first option
is to accept the state’s offer and I won’t make you pay today but will give you time
into the new year in order to pay. We are willing to give you time. All fines include a
20% surcharge to raise revenue for the legislature and another 15% surcharge to pay
for the court’s new computer system. The financial screener is not here this week.
Typically, people talk to the lawyer for the day and can later today resolve their case.”
In Somerset County, a judge routinely encouraged defendants to talk with the district
attorney, and the judge used the possibility of indigent defendant’s being required to
pay fees for appointed counsel to discourage defendants from requesting appointment
of counsel. For example, in the Skowhegan District Court, a defendant was told he
would have to pay $500 for appointed counsel because he makes $16 per hour working
full time, although he has two children. Believing himself unable to pay the $500 fee
for appointed counsel, the defendant waived his right to counsel, pled guilty, and was
sentenced to 30 days in jail.
Finding 3: Oversight of financial screeners by MCILS creates the appearance of
a conflict of interest with its duty to provide zealous representation to indigent
defendants.
If a defendant requests that counsel be appointed to represent him in a case carrying
the possible loss of liberty, the Maine courts are required to appoint counsel “when it
appears to the court that the accused has not sufficient means to employ counsel.”188
The first step, then, for any defendant requesting appointed counsel is for the court to
determine whether the defendant is indigent.189
In 2008, the Brennan Center for Justice published a set of guidelines for how to
determine whether defendants are financially eligible for appointment of counsel.190
The guidelines say jurisdictions must ensure that “screening is performed by someone
who does not have a conflict of interest”191 and then announce unequivocally: “Do
not allow individual defenders and public defender programs to screen their own
clients.”192 The Brennan Center quotes the American Bar Association Model Rules
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 810 (2018); see also Me. R. Uniform Crim. Proc. 44(a)(1) (“If the
defendant is without sufficient means to employ counsel”);
189
See Me. R. Uniform Crim. Proc. 5(e) (“the determination of indigency . . . shall be governed by”
Rule 44), 44(a)(1) (“If the defendant is without sufficient means to employ counsel”).
190
Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel
(2008).
191
Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel 8
(2008).
192
Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel 10
188

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
of Professional Conduct in stating that “the lawyer’s own interests should not be
permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client.”193 Because an
indigent defense system may have conflicting interests – between the rights of the
defendants, and the system’s desire to limit the number of cases they must defend and
“reject cases that are time-intensive, controversial, or undesirable in some other way” –
the screening function should be independent from the defense function.194

Indigency determination
MCILS employs eight people (one position is currently vacant) to conduct financial
screening of defendants who request appointment of counsel. MCILS screeners go to
the county jails to conduct screening for in custody defendants at 48-hour hearings
and to the courthouses to conduct screening for out of custody defendants at initial
appearances.
MCILS is statutorily required to develop standards “governing eligibility for indigent
legal services.”195 MCILS has promulgated a form, entitled “Motion and Affidavit
for Assignment of Counsel,” that defendants must complete in writing and swear to
under penalty of perjury, providing financial information to MCILS and the court.
The MCILS-employed financial screeners use the standards MCILS has adopted to
gather information from defendants and make a recommendation as to whether they
are financially eligible to receive appointed counsel196 – counsel selected and paid
by MCILS. In FY 2018, MCILS financial screeners interviewed 11,031 defendants
statewide: 7,704 were found indigent (70%); 2,322 were found partially indigent
(21%); and 1,005 were denied (9%).
Automatic MCILS denial
If the cash assets of the defendant and their family are more than a specified amount
based on the most serious crime with which the defendant is charged, MCILS
automatically recommends the defendant be denied an appointed attorney,197 without
any consideration of the defendant’s expenses, liabilities, or dependents. Cash assets
are defined by MCILS as cash on hand, money in deposit accounts, stocks and bonds
that can be sold, and cash bail unless posted by someone other than the defendant or
(2008).
Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel 10
(2008) (quoting American Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.7, cmt. 10 (2018)).
194
Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense Counsel
10-11 (2008).
195
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804(2)(A) (2018).
196
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, summary (June 23, 2012) (“These guidelines govern the work of
financial screeners employed by the commission and are intended to provide guidance to the courts in
their determination of financial eligibility”).
197
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(B) (June 23, 2012).
193

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

47

their family.198 The amount of cash assets that triggers denial of counsel is: $1,000 for
Class D or E; $2,000 for Class C; $3,000 for Class B; and $4,000 for Class A.199
Next, the financial screener considers other assets of the defendant and their family to
determine whether they can be converted into cash. If the cash assets and convertible
other assets together are more than the specified amount for the most serious crime
with which the defendant is charged, MCILS automatically recommends the defendant
be denied an appointed attorney,200 again without any consideration of the defendant’s
expenses, liabilities, or dependents. Other assets are defined by MCILS as: equity in
real estate sufficient to obtain a home equity loan; cash value of insurance policies,
pension, retirement, or profit sharing; equity value of property not needed for work or
family transportation; and any personal property, such a jewelry or antiques, that could
be sold, exchanged, or used to get a loan.201
Automatic MCILS approval
Next, the financial screener considers the income of the defendant and their family. If
the income of the defendant and their family is less than 110% of the federal poverty
guidelines, based on family size, MCILS automatically recommends the defendant
be appointed an attorney.202 Income as defined by MCILS is total before-tax annual
receipts of all family members from: wages, self-employment, rents & royalties,
child support & alimony, SSI & SSDI & social security & VA and TANF benefits,
unemployment & workers comp, insurance & pension & strike benefits, interest
& dividends, and military family allotments; and “potential wages from seasonal
employment when the applicant has a history of seasonal employment.”203

94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(1)(B) (June 23, 2012).
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(B) (June 23, 2012).
200
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(C) (June 23, 2012).
201
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(1)(C) (June 23, 2012).
202
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(C) (June 23, 2012). Income calculated at 110% of the 2018
federal poverty guidelines results in the following amounts based on family size:
198
199

Gross Income @ 110% of Poverty Gdln
Family Size

203

Poverty Gdln

Annual

Monthly

Weekly

1

$12,140

$13,266

$1,105.05

$255.11

2

$16,460

$17,864

$1,488.66

$343.53

3

$20,780

$22,462

$1,871.83

$431.96

4

$25,100

$27,060

$2,255.00

$520.38

5

$29,420

$31,658

$2,638.16

$608.80

6

$33,740

$36,256

$3,021.33

$697.23

7

$38,060

$40,854

$3,404.50

$785.65

8

$42,380

$45,452

$3,787.66

$874.07

94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(1)(A) (June 23, 2012).

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
Possible MCILS approval
It is only when the defendant has not been automatically denied or automatically
approved that the financial screener considers the necessary expenses of the
defendant and their family: a defendant “may be eligible for assigned counsel if they
have extraordinary necessary monthly expenses that render them unable to retain
counsel.”204 MCILS defines necessary monthly expenses exclusively as food, shelter
(mortgage, rent, utilities), medical care (including insurance premiums and medical
debts payments), employment (including payments on vehicle to get to work and
required uniforms), and debts (including credit card minimum payments, student loan
payments, and long-term personal loan payments).205
•

The MCILS financial screener for Aroostook County works, on average, a
20-hour week and is paid $12.75/hour (approximately $14,000/year). Upon
completing the financial review, the MCILS financial screener in Aroostook
County goes back to the office to verify social security information and to fill
out an affidavit with recommendations to be faxed to the court.206
The MCILS financial screener never travels to the two most northern courts
(Fort Kent and Madawaska). Only out of custody defendants appear in
these courts, and the court clerks do the financial eligibility screening and
recommendations. The MCILS financial screener does travel to and perform all
eligibility screening in the Houlton, Presque Isle, and Caribou courts.

A situation in Cumberland County transformed the appearance of a conflict of interest
by MCILS attorneys into an actual conflict of interest. A statewide hiring freeze left
vacant the MCILS financial screener position that covered Cumberland County. At
the time of our site visit, the MCILS lawyers for the day were signing as notaries
the financial affidavits of the defendants they advise and represent, which are then
submitted to the court.207 This process places the lawyer in the position of a potential
witness against the client, in the event the affidavit is challenged. Moreover, the lawyer
ethically should not participate in the financial screening that will produce for him a
fee generating assignment. Finally, conflict of interest concerns aside, having lawyers
perform at $60/hour a service that is normally performed by a financial screener paid
$12.75/hour is simply not cost efficient governance.

94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(F) (June 23, 2012).
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(1)(D) (June 23, 2012).
206
In Aroostook County, the MCILS financial screener’s office is located in a secured area of the
Houlton County Superior Court clerk’s office.
207
Some appointed attorneys reportedly refuse to notarize the affidavit.
204
205

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Court determination of eligibility
By statute, MCILS is required to “provide the court . . . information used to determine
indigency for guidance to the court in determining a defendant’s . . . ability to obtain
private counsel.”208 Upon completing the financial review, the MCILS financial
screener goes back to their office to verify social security information and to fill out
an affidavit with recommendations to be faxed to the court. The judge ultimately
determines the defendant’s eligibility to receive court appointed counsel.
•

In FY 2017 and FY 2018, there were no instances in Aroostook County in
which a judge did not follow the MCILS financial screener recommendation.
In FY 2017 (the last year for which full information is available for
Aroostook County), MCILS screened 808 individuals in Aroostook County
(approximately 15 people per week). Of those, the screener determined 682 to
be indigent (84%), denied counsel to 96 people (12%), and determined that 30
were partially indigent (4%).

Reimbursements assessed against indigent defendants
MCILS’s eligibility standards are required by statute to “take into account the
possibility of a defendant’s . . . ability to make periodic installments payments toward
counsel fees.”209 MCILS must “administer and improvement reimbursement” by
indigent defendants, and MCILS is required to petition a court to reassess indigency
of any defendant if MCILS “determines that indigency should be reassessed.”210 In
addition to gathering financial information and making a recommendation to the court
about a defendant’s eligibility for appointed counsel, the MCILS financial screeners
make recommendations about whether and to what extent an indigent defendant should
be required to make reimbursements for the cost of their indigent legal representation.
For every defendant who received automatic MCILS approval for appointment of
counsel based on income less than 110% of the federal poverty guidelines, the financial
screener must compare the monthly income of the defendant and their family to
their necessary monthly expenses.211 To whatever extent that income exceeds those
expenses, MCILS standards decree that the defendant “should be required to make
periodic payments . . . to reimburse the State for the cost of assigned counsel . . . up
to an amount equal to the maximum fee” set by MCILS for the type of case to which
counsel is assigned to represent that defendant.”212
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1805-A(2) (2018).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804(2)(A) (2018).
210
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1805-A(1) (2018).
211
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(E) (June 23, 2012).
212
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 401, § 1(2)(E) (June 23, 2012). As of 2018, the maximum fees set by
MCILS that indigent defendants may be required to reimburse the State of Maine for the cost of their
appointed counsel are:
208
209

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

For every defendant whose combined family income exceeds 110% of the federal
poverty guidelines but who received appointed counsel because of “extraordinary
necessary monthly expenses,” MCILS requires that “an order for reimbursement
should be entered unless the interests of justice demand otherwise.”
The MCILS financial screener makes these reimbursement recommendations to the
court. If the court finds that a defendant is “able to contribute,” the court is required to
order a defendant represented by appointed counsel to “make installment payments up
to the full cost of representation or to pay a fixed contribution.”213
The remainder of the MCILS financial screeners’ time is spent on collections.214 That
entails mailing an initial letter to any defendant ordered to make a reimbursement,
letting them know of their financial obligation and where to make payments. The
screeners track (via a spreadsheet or index file system) whether a defendant is
current on making payments. If a defendant is delinquent, the screener will send out
a “dunning” letter informing them they are behind in making payments and what the
consequences will be (a show cause hearing). Courts schedule a small number of
these show cause hearings each month for defendants who are not making payments.
The final piece of collections is a yearly submission by each screener of a spreadsheet
Type

Amount

Class A

$3,000

Class B & C (against person)

$2,250

Class B & C (against property)

$1,500

Class D & E (Superior or UCD)

$750

Class D & E (District Court)
Post-Conviction Review

$540
$1,200

Probation Revocation

$540

Miscellaneous

$540

Juvenile

$540

Child Protective
Termination of Parental Rights (with hearing)

$900
$1,260

Application for Involuntary Commitment

$420

Petition for Emancipation

$420

Petition for Modified Release Treatment

$420

Petition for Release or Discharge

$420

Criminal Direct Appeals & Appellate work

$1,200

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1805-A(3)(A) (2018); Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 44(b).
214
A few miscellaneous tasks performed by the MCILS financial screeners include reporting the
number of screenings done each month with a breakdown of how many were found indigent, partially
indigent, or denied (and whether the court followed the screener’s recommendation); doing screening for
waiver of fee cases (civil matters); and submitting three financial affidavits each week to the Investigator
Financial Screener, for closer scrutiny. The screener gathers data from the Maine Department of Labor
and from several other internet resources (Westlaw’s CLEAR service, Facebook, Google, etc.) to
determine whether the indigency affidavit was completed accurately.
213

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
listing all the defendants who either have never paid or have not made any recent
payments. This spreadsheet is called the “tax offset spreadsheet” (lists defendant name,
social security number, docket number, and amount owed), and it is submitted to the
judicial branch to go along with the courts’ submission to the Maine Revenue Service
of defendants who owe fines. The Maine Revenue Service will intercept state tax
returns of anyone on this list and will apply the money toward counsel fees owed.
In FY 2017, MCILS collected $677,735 in partial indigency payments from indigent
defendants statewide represented by appointed attorneys.
•

In FY 2017, MCILS collected $1,787 in partial reimbursements by indigent
defendants in Aroostook County.

Indigent defense systems must require their participating attorneys to adhere to
their ethical duty to zealously defend in the stated interests of the client, including
advocating against the imposition of fines, fees, and other assessments. MCILS cannot
assure that appointed attorneys fight against the imposition on indigent defendants of
fees related to the cost of the defense, while MCILS is simultaneously trying to collect
those fees.
Finding 4: MCILS’ “lawyer of the day” system primarily serves the need to
move court dockets, while resulting in a lack of continuous representation to the
detriment of defendants. There is often a critical gap in representation while a
substantive lawyer is identified and appointed. Additionally, the lawyer of the day
practices under the Somerset contract result in a direct conflict of interest.
If the court appoints a defense lawyer early enough in the process, that lawyer can
effectively represent the client if afforded the time, training, and resources to do so.
Yet, early appointment of counsel will not result in effective representation if that
process is truncated by actual case preparation being delayed for days or weeks. Until
the defendant has counsel who is responsible to interview the defendant in depth,
investigate defenses, and preserve evidence, the defendant cannot be said to have the
effective assistance of counsel.
MCILS provides for a “lawyer of the day.” The lawyer of the day attorneys appear at
48-hour hearings for in custody defendants and at initial appearance for out of custody
defendants, and the attorneys are present throughout the court’s docket. Some counties
have attorneys who regularly fill the lawyer of the day role, while others do it on a
semi-rotational basis.
•

In Aroostook County, MCILS has an “in-custody lawyer of the day” available
for in-custody defendants at the 48-hour videoconference hearing and the
lawyer is with the defendant at the jail while the district attorney is with the

51

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
judge in the court. Although any rostered lawyer could sign up for this duty, in
Aroostook County two local lawyers predominantly handle this function.215
“Lawyer of the day” duties for out of custody defendants are more evenly
dispersed among attorneys than the practice of one or two attorneys handling
most of the lawyer of the day duties for in custody defendants. This is because
it is more likely that an attorney will be appointed to cases for which they
appear as the lawyer of the day.216
The Cumberland County system relies on group announcements to apprise defendants
of legal rights, including an invocation that they may have to wait hours to consult
with the lawyer for the day. As elsewhere in the state, the number of lawyers serving
as lawyer for the day is generally insufficient to even meet with, much less actually
provide representation to, the number of defendants scheduled on each day’s docket.
On an average day in Cumberland County’s Portland District Court, there are two
lawyers for the day to handle 80 defendants; about 12 of the cases are serious crimes
and only about half of those defendants have retained counsel.
When the judge takes the bench in Cumberland District Court, the lawyers for the day
exit the courtroom carrying stacks of financial affidavit forms. They set up a makeshift
office in a conference room where out of custody defendants line up to meet with them.
The lawyer for the day tries to describe constitutional rights in the lockup to a whole
group of in custody defendants. There is a lack of confidentiality for both of these
interviews. One defense lawyer hates to be assigned as lawyer for the day because he
believes a group waiver of rights is unconstitutional.
Another defense attorney reports being expected to represent up to 30 people on
a single docket as lawyer of the day. The lawyer of the day is required to advise
all defendants at court, whether indigent or not. the lawyer is supposed to receive
discovery with a written plea offer from the district attorney’s office on the day before
court, and is expected to meet the client the next day and advise them. Some attorneys
advise defendants without having received discovery. This lawyer believes there
should be MCILS standards on follow-through by the lawyer for the day to provide
information to successor counsel, because many attorneys do not do so. MCILS did not
offer or provide any training for the role as lawyer of the day.
In Androscoggin County, two lawyers of the day are typically expected to represent
200 defendants. One lawyer, who will no longer accept assignment as lawyer for the
Over the past four years, one attorney handled 617 in-custody lawyer of the day cases (32.25%) and
a second attorney handled 11.55%. Twenty-eight other lawyers handled at least one day of in-custody
lawyer of the day duties in Aroostook County over the past five years, but each handled less than 5% of
the possible in-custody days.
216
Nineteen lawyers were paid for out of custody lawyer of the day duties in Aroostook County from
FY2014 to FY2018. The lawyer serving most frequently staffed 45 dockets (12.20%).
215

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
day, estimated having about five minutes to spend with each defendant.
Making the lawyer for the day available to non-indigent litigants exacerbates the denial
of counsel to indigent defendants, conflicts with Maine state law on the scope of the
right to counsel, and creates an unreasonable risk of solicitation in violation of ethical
rules.

Appointment of counsel
Once a court determines that a defendant is eligible for appointment of counsel, then
the court must appoint an MCILS attorney to represent that defendant.

Continuous representation from appointment through disposition
ABA Principle 7 requires that the same attorney initially appointed to a case
continuously represent the defendant through disposition of the case.217 Commonly
referred to as “vertical representation,” the continuous representation by the same
attorney is contrasted with “horizontal representation” – a representational scheme
whereby one attorney represents the client during one court proceeding before handing
off the client’s case to another attorney to cover the next stage.
As the American Bar Association explains, “horizontal representation” is uniformly
implemented as a cost-saving measure in the face of excessive workloads and to the
detriment of clients. In fact, the ABA rejects the use of horizontal representation in
any form, stating specifically that: “[c]ounsel initially provided should continue to
represent the defendant throughout the trial court proceedings and should preserve the
defendant’s right to appeal, if necessary.”218
In explaining why horizontal representation is so harmful to clients, the ABA states:
Defendants are forced to rely on a series of lawyers and, instead of
believing they have received fair treatment, may simply feel that they
have been “processed by the system.” This form of representation
may be inefficient as well, because each new attorney must begin by
familiarizing himself or herself with the case and the client must be reinterviewed. Moreover, when a single attorney is not responsible for

American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 7
(2002).
218
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 7 cmt.
(2002).
217

53

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
the case, the risk of substandard representation is probably increased.
Appellate courts confronted with claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel have commented critically on stage representation practices.219
The nexus between the requirement that trial counsel be appointed as early as possible
and the requirement that the attorney who is appointed initially to represent the client
remains with that client’s case through to completion is to ensure that the minimum
level of advocacy necessary to mount a meaningful defense commences as soon as
possible. In defender systems relying on horizontal representation schemes, the delay
in appointing the actual trial lawyer has negative consequences for the client, as
exculpatory evidence like video tapes are routinely destroyed within days, physical
evidence like bruises fade away quickly, and witnesses can become harder and harder
to track down.220
Early assignment of the lawyer for the day provides limited if any representation
because it is only “for the day” not for the case. In most instances the “lawyer of the
day” does not continue with the case. Instead, courts make a formal appointment off of
a roster of MCILS approved lawyers. Some judges like to select the individual attorney
to appoint in a given case,221 some leave it to their clerks to do after the hearing, and
American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice – Providing Defense Services, Standards
5-6.2 cmt. (3d ed. 1992).
220
One defense lawyer pointed out the risk of ineffective assistance posed not only to clients but also
to lawyers. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has said that the lawyer for the day has an attorney client
relationship for the purpose of whatever she advises the client about, but has not addressed the issue of
the responsibility of the lawyer for the day for guilty pleas entered by defendants they have counseled,
which often occur when the lawyer is not present in court.
221
Judicial control of indigent defense representation has been criticized in a number of U.S. Supreme
Court cases. In the “Scottsboro Boys” case of Powell v. Alabama, the Court observed that the right to
counsel rejects the notion that a judge should direct the defense:
[H]ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively discharge the
obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it that, in the
proceedings before the court, the accused shall be dealt with justly and fairly. He
cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate in those
necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes partake of the
inviolable character of the confessional.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). Future U.S. Supreme Court cases would make clear
the constitutional requirement for independence of the defense function. In the 1979 case of Ferri
v. Ackerman, the Court states that independence of appointed counsel to act as an adversary is an
“indispensable element” of “effective representation.” Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
Two years later, the Court determined in Polk County v. Dodson that each state has a “constitutional
obligation to respect the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages.” Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1981). Observing that “a defense lawyer best serves the public
not by acting on the State’s behalf or in concert with it, but rather by advancing ‘the undivided interests
of the client,’” the Court also noted that “a public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in
the same sense as other state employees” because he “works under canons of professional responsibility
that mandate his exercise of independent judgment on behalf of the client.” Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979)). This is confirmed in
Strickland v. Washington, where the Court states that “independence of counsel” is “constitutionally
219

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

55

some use a rotational system where the next attorney on the list is appointed. One
judge told us, as did almost all defense attorneys, that the reason the lawyer for the
day is not assigned the case from that day’s docket is that the judiciary in Cumberland
County feared lawyers would encourage client’s to reject prosecution plea offers if the
lawyers could keep the cases.
•

Appointments in Aroostook County are not rotational. Aroostook County does
not generally have a large number of indigent cases,222 so judges generally
know which lawyer is taking cases and what strengths the attorney possesses
as far as specialties. Defendants remaining in custody are prioritized for
appointments and are told who their lawyer is as soon as possible (generally
within 24 hours).

The problem of non-continuous representation also arises with policies that allow for
attorneys to “stand in” for one another. MCILS’ fee schedule policy currently directs
attorneys to stand in for each other:
When doing so will not adversely affect the attorney-client relationship,
Commission-assigned counsel are urged to limit travel and waiting time
by cooperating with each other to stand in at routine, non-dispositive
matters by having one attorney appear at such things as arraignments
and routine non-testimonial motions, instead of having all Commissionassigned counsel in an area appear.223
In child protection cases in Androscoggin County, one attorney reports that lawyers
stand in for each other, but only on court dates of uncontested matters like scheduling.
protected” and that “[g]overnment violates the right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain
ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
222
For example, the following table shows the total numbers of new criminal and family cases over the
past five years:
CRIMINAL
New Filings
Probation
Violation
Total
FAMILY

2015

2016

2017

2018

2934

2585

2483

2299

2695

210

162

176

188

230

3144
2014

2747
2015

2659
2016

2487
2017

2925
2018

Parental Rights

148

133

154

113

99

Guardianships

0

0

0

5

2

Child Protective

89

69

30

70

61

Protection from
Abuse

332

336

367

323

353

92

134

92

2107

92

661

672

643

2618

607

Juvenile
Total
223

2014

96-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, §4(1)(D) (June 10, 2016).

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
However, a different attorney reports that standing in is very common among child
protection attorneys, including for proceedings called judicial review, which are status
reports to the court on the client’s progress.
“Standing in” is also a problem when larger firms have one attorney covering all of
that firm’s cases. Larger firms receive additional assignments because the courts assign
cases to attorneys or firms who have previously represented the client. In this way,
larger firms increase their market share and defeat the concept of rotation.

Delayed appointment of counsel
In a number courts, defendants sometimes are not told at their first appearance the
name of the attorney who will be assigned to represent them. Even if defendants are
given the name of an attorney at court, attorneys report that the notice to the attorney
of the assignment often takes several days.
It can take up to ten days for appointed counsel to contact defendants after first
appearance. For example, in Aroostook County, judges or their clerks must call around
to assigned counsel attorneys to see who is available to take cases. This takes effort
and considerable time. Similarly in York County, the assignment of counsel takes
weeks, almost always, and lawyers for the day do not communicate with successor
counsel.
Some juvenile defendants do not have an attorney even after weeks in detention,
because their parents did not request one. The family’s wealth is counted against
the eligibility of juveniles for assigned counsel unless the juvenile is charged with a
family-based offense. Thus, many juveniles may go without counsel altogether.
Juvenile cases may require reassignment after initial appearance due to the lack of a
sufficient number of juvenile-qualified attorneys in rural parts of the state. Reportedly,
many juveniles are diverted from the court system. When a juvenile is arrested, the
police call the juvenile community correction officer who has the authority to divert
the case from court. If the case is not diverted, the child may be detained in a local
jail or taken to Long Creek detention facility in Portland or Mountain View Youth
Development Center which is part of a prison in Bangor. Outside of Cumberland and
York counties, where there are fewer specific juvenile court days, a juvenile could be
represented by a lawyer for the day who is not on the juvenile roster.

Conflict of interest in Somerset County
The lawyer of the day program in Somerset County produces a direct conflict of
interest. The Project’s contract attorneys can be hired by non-indigent defendant who
appear in court while the Project attorneys are serving as lawyer for the day. One

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
Project attorney gives a speech to all the people at the court, explaining his role and
inviting them to talk with him whether they are indigent or not. The Project attorney
is then free to be hired by people who meet him as lawyer for the day, or he can refer
clients he meets at court to other attorneys of his choosing. The Project attorneys
also have input on the defendants’ eligibility for assigned counsel, creating a direct
conflict of financial interest because the Project could reject a defendant for appointed
counsel and then accept the case as a private retainer. This central role of the Project
attorneys in meeting as lawyer for the day every person who is hailed into court creates
a monopoly of sorts, as attorneys outside of Somerset County said they are effectively
prevented from establishing a practice in Somerset County. That is, the contract
attorneys keep not only all the assigned work but also most of the private work, since
the contract has provided them a personal introduction to all defendants. In this way,
the contract model exacerbates rather than resolves the problem of lack of capacity of
legal service providers in this rural county.
No valid purpose is served by the policy that the lawyer for the day is free to accept
retainer by non-indigent defendants he meets through this system.

Institution of prosecution & arraignment
For a Class D or E crime, the 48-hour in custody hearing or the out of custody initial
appearance also serves as the arraignment. Class D and E crimes are next set for a
dispositional conference usually about four to six weeks later.
For crimes of Class C and higher, the next court setting is the arraignment, usually
about four to six weeks after the 48-hour in custody hearing or the out of custody
initial appearance. After arraignment, the next event in these cases is a pre-trial
dispositional conference.
Finding 5: Despite there being many excellent assigned lawyers providing
representation to the indigent accused throughout Maine, there are also too many
attorneys throughout the state who do not perform adequately.

Contact with in custody defendants
During the past year a group of judges and attorneys interviewed juvenile detainees at
Long Creek and sent a letter of complaint to MCILS, informing MCILS that detained
children had told them their assigned lawyers had not communicated with them enough
for them to understand their own cases. MCILS acknowledged receiving similar
complaints in the past.
In one of the studied counties, the Sheriff estimated, due to the volume of prisoner
complaints, that about 25% of assigned attorneys do not visit their clients in jail to

57

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
prepare their cases. He was also concerned about attorneys not accepting calls from the
jail. He said prisoners stop calling when their calls are not accepted. Consistent with
that report, one judge estimated that 25% of assigned counsel have not met with their
clients before the first dispositional conference date. She reported that up to 10% of
attorneys withdraw or become a second chair if the case goes to trial.
In another studied county, the Sheriff says pretrial detainees there complain about lack
of attention from their attorneys. We were informed that that Sheriff called a couple of
attorneys over the Christmas holiday to say that their clients felt neglected.
In a third studied county, the Sheriff’s staff also acknowledged complaints by prisoners
most often involving inability to connect with their attorney. Assigned attorneys visit
detainees less frequently than retained counsel, and complaints are relatively common
with somewhat over 50% of prisoners stating that there is a lack of pretrial preparation
and that they are not able to connect with their attorneys before court hearings. Most
attorneys provide telephone numbers but the prisoner usually has to leave a message,
which the attorney does not respond to. When the lack of contact is a repeated problem
the jail staff allows the prisoners to use a regular phone so they can make a call without
it being a collect call. Occasionally prisoners do not know who their attorney is, but
this is not common. The jail has private rooms and allows contact visits. Attorneys can
bring in a laptop. The jail also has equipment for viewing digital evidence by prisoners
alone (without the attorney present) but this facility is not private. Often the assigned
attorneys do not have time to view digital evidence with their clients and ask the jail
staff to arrange to show the evidence to the client at the jail facility even though it is
not private.
MCILS data tends to confirm these observations of the sheriffs. The 6AC requested
three years of data on jail visits on cases billed out of Cumberland County. The data
reveal a number of attorneys that often visit clients, but a concerning number of folks
that do not. For example, in 2017, one attorney billed MCILS $111,771 for cases
arising in Cumberland County, including $3,024 for 96 jail visits. By contrast, another
attorney billed MCILS $171,880, but did not bill any time for even a single jail visit.
Certainly it is possible, though unlikely, that the attorney simply decided it was not
worth the time to bill jail visits, but the point is that MCILS and the State of Maine do
not know because of a lack of oversight.

Motions practice
Not every MCILS case requires that a motion be filed. Indeed, there may be specific
reasons why an attorney may decide not to file a motion. As such, it is difficult to
review data on motions practice at a general level. That said, when few motions are
ever filed statewide, it points to issues of concern.

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

59

In FY 2018, private attorneys billed MCILS for the following types of motion
practice:224
MOTION TYPE

Bill of Particulars

NUMBER

21

COST

$948.00

Continuance

2,457

$55,935.00

Discovery

1,029

$29,226.00

112

$8,337.00

Expedited Review

42

$1,245.00

Forensic evidence

108

$3,516.00

Dismiss

New Trial
Review Bail
Suppress
Total

11

$936.00

1,476

$41,764.20

984

$41,766.00

6,240

$183,673.20

Interpretation of this data is difficult at best, because district attorney practices can
affect the need to file certain types of motions. For example, even though MCILS’
numbers look very low for motions for discovery, such motions might be minimal due
to the fact that prosecutors routinely provide “open file” discovery.
Perhaps the most telling category to is suppression motions in criminal and
delinquency cases. In any criminal/delinquency case in which arguably illegallyobtained evidence is part of the government’s case against the defendant, there should
be a billing voucher item for the preparation and filing of a suppression (even if the
motion produced a plea bargain and thus was not litigated). Defense counsel should
prepare and put forward any non-frivolous suppression argument, which often have
the effect of causing the government to make a fairer plea offer. Suppressible evidence
could be any statement by the defendant, any tangible evidence found by police and
attributed to the defendant, any arguably unfair identification of the defendant, or any
evidence obtained through an arguably improper arrest. Motions to suppress should
almost always be researched, even if not always filed, in drug cases and DWI cases.
Defendants, especially juveniles, make statements in many cases that warrant
suppression motions because the prosecution must prove a voluntary waiver of Fifth
Amendment rights. Regardless of how progressive prosecutors are, the variability of
police actions in the process of arresting, searching, and interrogating people should
make suppression motions commonplace by vigorous defenders anywhere. And
since suppression motions are litigated pretrial, the practice does not preclude plea
bargaining. Usually, the threat of litigating the motion is a plea bargaining tool.

Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 6, 2019).
224

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
So, the 5.5% figure here looks unreasonably low (984 bills in 17,701 adult and juvenile
criminal cases). Even if this billing category is used by some participating attorneys
only when a suppression motion is litigated (as opposed to researched, prepared, and
filed), it would still appear too low, since prosecutors can agree to suppression motions
that are clearly correct, but they cannot agree to the many suppression motions that rely
on the credibility of witnesses challenging police versions of events.
Because MCILS has no systems or capacity to provide oversight, the State of Maine
cannot know either way if the low number of motions filed statewide indicates poor
performance.

Use of investigators
The MCILS expenditure on litigation expenses, at $1M per year, is very low for the
annual caseload of approximately 15,000 new adult criminal cases, 2,000 probation
surrenders, 1,000 juvenile cases, 2,500 child protection cases, and 1,000 mental health
cases. While good practice would indicate use of investigators in most criminal cases,
social work or mental health experts in most child protection cases, and independent
psychiatric experts in many mental health cases, these litigation supports are used very
infrequently throughout Maine.
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined that the failure to conduct adequate
investigation can be grounds for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.225
Moreover, it is crucial that an investigator be available to assist the attorney with
interviewing witnesses, else “the attorney may be placed in the untenable position of
either taking the stand to challenge the witnesses’ credibility if their testimony conflicts
with statements previously given or withdrawing from the case.”226 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also held, for example, that an indigent accused is entitled to the assistance
of a psychiatrist at public expense to assert an insanity defense.227

Case preparation and zealous advocacy
Assigned counsel representation is quite variable in quality. In observations of
Androscoggin County’s Lewiston District Court, lawyers often sought time for their
clients to pay the fines and fees being assessed, but never argued that payment would
be impossible due to the defendant’s inability to amass funds. A respected defense
attorney in Androscoggin County for juvenile delinquency cases reports that most

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”).
226
American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice – Providing Defense Services, commentary
to Standard 5-1.4 (3d ed. 1992).
227
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
225

III. EARLY APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
attorneys on the Androscoggin roster have not had a jury trial in over 10 years. He says
that typically independent psychiatric experts are not used for necessary evaluations;
rather the parties agree upon a state employed expert.
Another defense attorney in Androscoggin County who handles mental health cases
explained it is very common for hospital staff to persuade a client to accept a voluntary
commitment even after counsel has been assigned, causing many commitment cases
to be dismissed. He explained that this may account for the very low average cost
per case; a three-hour bill should mean the case was dismissed before hearing. A
contested hearing should involve eight to ten hours of legal work, with about one to
three hours of that being the actual hearing. This attorney reports that he has never
seen an assigned attorney use a psychiatric expert in a mental health case other than the
“independent evaluators” chosen and provided by the court. Although most of these
independent experts are competent and fair, he notes that some are “terrible.” He had
never considered seeking an independent expert through funding from MCILS.
In observations in Somerset County, some defendants did not know the last name of
the attorney who had been appointed to represent them and had to ask court officers to
identify their attorney. Project attorneys were observed asking people in the courthouse
for their names and calling out names of their clients whom they did not recognize.
One Project attorney stood in the courthouse lobby calling out, “Does anyone have
a case with me?” This occurred on a date when cases were scheduled for disposition
conferences, so competent defense counsel should have already met with all clients
for in-depth interviews and prepared their cases before that date. Court in Somerset
County is often delayed due to lack of pretrial preparation. The court officers say
they delay the calling of the list so that the attorneys can prepare by talking with their
clients.
A Project attorney interviewed by the 6AC could not recall the last time he conducted
a jury trial or an appeal for an assigned client, despite his caseload of over 700
assigned cases per year and his 20 years with the Project. He said he did a jury trial for
a retained client the previous year.
A judge reports that “the clerks think the attorneys do not meet with the clients until
the disposition conferences.” The judge notes there is less use of private investigators
and experts by defense attorneys in Somerset County than in Franklin County. He
states it is okay to have more than 60 dispositional conferences with only one judge in
Somerset County, but it is not okay in Augusta, because in Somerset there are more
agreements between defense and prosecution. He says, “I wouldn’t be surprised if
a retained attorney saw the client more than an assigned attorney… If I had a magic
wand, I would go to a public defender system in all counties or a contract system in all
counties because the courts would run more efficiently, and representation would be
better because the attorneys would be focusing on criminal law.”

61

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Another judge estimates that in 90% of Somerset County cases the defense attorney
has had no contact with the client before the dispositional conference. He too notes
there are fewer trials in Somerset than in Augusta. He believes there were less than
seven or eight trials in Somerset last year, compared to seven or eight per month
in Augusta. Somerset County’s population of 50,000 is less than half of Augusta’s
population of 130,000. Yet, the judge says that 50% to 60% of defendants plead guilty
at arraignment in Somerset, whereas in Kennebec County almost no one does.

Chapter IV
SUFFICIENT TIME
The U.S. Supreme Court in Powell v. Alabama notes that the lack of “sufficient
time”228 to consult with counsel and to prepare an adequate defense was one of the
primary reasons for finding that the Scottsboro Boys were constructively denied
counsel. Impeding counsel’s time “is not to proceed promptly in the calm spirit of
regulated justice, but to go forward with the haste of the mob.”229 One state supreme
court observed over twenty years ago, “as the practice of criminal law has become
more specialized and technical, and as the standards for what constitutes reasonably
effective assistance of counsel have changed, the time an appointed attorney must
devote to an indigent’s defense has increased considerably.”230 Insufficient time is,
therefore, a marker of constructive denial of counsel. The inadequate time may itself
be caused by any number of things, including but not limited to excessive workload or
contractual arrangements that create fiscal incentives for lawyers to dispose of cases
quickly rather than in the best interests of their clients.
No matter how complex or basic a case may seem at the outset, no matter how little
or how much time an attorney wants to spend on a case, and no matter how financial
matters weigh on an attorney, there are certain fundamental tasks each attorney must
do on behalf of every client in every criminal case. Even in the simplest case, the
attorney must, among other things:
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
228
229
230

meet with and interview the client;
attempt to secure pretrial release if the client remains in state custody (but,
before doing so, learn from the client what conditions of release are most
favorable to the client);
keep the client informed throughout the duration of proceedings;
request and review discovery from the prosecution;
independently investigate the facts of the case, which may include learning
about the defendant’s background and life, interviewing both lay and expert
witness, viewing the crime scene, examining items of physical evidence, and
locating and reviewing documentary or video evidence;
assess each element of the charged crime to determine whether the prosecution
can prove facts sufficient to establish guilt and whether there are justification or
excuse defenses that should be asserted;
prepare appropriate pretrial motions and read and respond to the prosecution’s

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 59 (1932).
State v. Wigley, 624 So.2d 425, 428 (La. 1993).

64

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

•
•
•
•
•

motions;
prepare for and appear at necessary pretrial hearings, wherein he must preserve
his client’s rights;
develop and continually reassess the theory of the case;
assess all possible sentencing outcomes that could occur if the client is
convicted of the charged crime or a lesser offense;
negotiate plea options with the prosecution, including sentencing outcomes;
and
all the while prepare for the case to go to trial (because the decision about
whether to plead or go to trial belongs to the client, not to the attorney).231

The lawyer owes all of these duties to every client in every case, and so Maine’s Rules
of Professional Conduct232 and national standards, as summarized by the American Bar
Association, agree that “[d]efense counsel’s workload [must be] controlled to permit
the rendering of quality representation.”233 Workload includes the cases an attorney
is appointed to handle within a given system (i.e., caseload), but it also includes the
cases an attorney takes on privately, public defense cases to which the attorney is
appointed in other jurisdictions, and other professional obligations such as obtaining
and providing training and supervision.234 In addition to considering the raw number
of cases of each type that an attorney handles, all national standards agree that the
lawyer’s workload must take into consideration “all of the factors affecting a public
defender’s ability to adequately represent clients, such as the complexity of cases on a
defender’s docket, the defender’s skill and experience, the support services available to
the defender, and the defender’s other duties.”235
The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC)
created the first national defender caseload standards as part of an initiative funded
by the U.S. Department of Justice.236 It is these NAC caseload maximums to which
See generally National Legal Aid & defender Ass’n, Performance Guidelines for Criminal
Defense Representation (1995).
232
Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.3 cmt (“[a] lawyer’s workload must be controlled so that each matter can
be handled competently”).
233
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 5 (Feb.
2002).
234
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, commentary to
Principle 5 (Feb. 2002).
235
Statement of Interest of the United States at 9, Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, No. C111100RSL (W.D. Wash., filed Aug 14, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/
documents/wilbursoi8-14-13.pdf. See, e.g., Mary Sue Backus and Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in
Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L. J. 1031, 1125 (2006) (“Although national caseload
standards are available, states should consider their own circumstances in defining a reasonable defender
workload. Factors such as availability of investigators, level of support staff, complexity of cases, and
level of attorney experience all might affect a workable definition. Data collection and a consistent
method of weighing cases are essential to determining current caseloads and setting reasonable workload
standards.”).
236
Building upon the work and findings of the 1967 President’s Commission on Law Enforcement
231

IV. SUFFICIENT TIME
national standards refer when they say that “in no event” should national caseload
standards be exceeded. NAC Standard 13.12 prescribes absolute maximum numerical
caseload limits of:
•
•
•
•
•

150 felonies per attorney per year;
400 misdemeanors per attorney per year;
200 juvenile delinquencies per attorney per year;
200 mental health per attorney per year; or
25 appeals per attorney per year.237

This means a lawyer handling felony cases should not be responsible for more than
a total of 150 felony cases in a given year, counting both cases the lawyer had when
the year began and cases assigned to the lawyer during that year, and including all
of the lawyer’s cases (public, private, and pro bono). The NAC standards can be
prorated for mixed caseloads. For example, an attorney could have a mixed caseload
over the course of a given year of 75 felonies (50% of a maximum caseload) and 200
misdemeanors (50% of a maximum caseload) and be in compliance with national
caseload standards. The caseload limits assume that the lawyer does not have any other
duties, such as management or supervisory responsibilities.
The NAC caseload limits were established and remain as absolute maximums. Yet,
policymakers in many states have since recognized the need to set localized workload
standards. Localized standards are able to consider unique demands made on defense
attorneys in each case, such as the travel distance between the court and the local jail,
or the prosecution’s charging practices, or increased complexity of forensic sciences
and criminal justice technology. Demands of these types increase the amount of time,
beyond that contemplated by the NAC standards, that is necessary for the lawyer to
provide effective representation. For these reasons, many criminal justice professionals
argue that the caseloads permitted by the NAC Standards are far too high and that the
maximum caseloads allowed should be much lower.238

and Administration of Justice, the Administrator of the U.S. Department of Justice Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration appointed the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals in 1971, with DOJ/LEAA grant funding to develop standards for crime reduction and
prevention at the state and local levels. The NAC crafted standards for all criminal justice functions,
including law enforcement, corrections, the courts, and the prosecution. Chapter 13 of the NAC’s
report sets the standards for the defense function. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force on the Courts, ch.13 (The Defense) (1973).
237
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task
Force on the Courts, ch.13 (The Defense), Standard 13.12 (1973).
238
See, e.g., American Council of Chief Defenders, Statement on Caseloads and Workloads
(Aug. 24, 2007), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_train_caseloads_standards_ethics_opinions_combined.
authcheckdam.pdf (“In many jurisdictions, caseload limits should be lower than the NAC standards.”).

65

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Massachusetts’ Committee for Public Counsel services
implements caseload controls
To see how the NAC standards can be implemented, we again look to
Massachusetts’ Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS). CPCS uses a
weighted system of caseload limits, with a particular weight for each type of case
and an absolute limit of 250 weighted cases assigned per year. Misdemeanors and
lesser felonies within district court jurisdiction are weighted as “1,” while superior
court felonies are weighted as “2” for calculating the limit for a mixed caseload. So,
if an attorney accepted 100 district court cases in a year, he could also accept no
more than 75 superior court cases that year. Attorneys handling only superior court
felonies are limited to 100 per year. Murder cases are assigned in the discretion
of the Chief Counsel or designee, but no attorney may have more than four open
murder cases.
CPCS’s electronic billing system enforces the caseload limits by rejecting
assignments exceeding the limits. Attorneys are expected to keep track of their
own caseloads, and they may seek a waiver of the limit in an unusual situation
where a waiver is needed to benefit a client. To assist the county administrators
in assigning duty days, CPCS provides them with quarterly reports showing the
numbers of cases assigned and the numbers of hours billed so far in the fiscal year
by each attorney. The county administrators and supervising attorneys use this
data to promote reasonable workloads and to check on the work of any attorney
who seems to be taking on too much. Attorneys’ workloads are also restrained by
fiscal controls, including a presumptive though waivable daily cap and an annual
cap on hours billed. Attorneys are deterred from taking on more work than can be
performed within these fiscal limits, because they will likely not be paid for it.

Finding 6: Despite the lack of MCILS workload limits, excessive caseloads may
not be an issue in most counties in Maine. However, insufficient time is an issue
in Somerset County, where the combination of high caseloads and the fixed fee
contract system produce financial incentives to dispose of cases without adequate
preparation.
Maine does not have any statewide limits on the number of cases that an attorney
representing indigent clients may handle in a year.
Even factoring in “lawyer of the day” duties in most jurisdictions, the attorneys with
the most cases handled in Aroostook, Androscoggin, Cumberland, and York Counties
do not appear to have excessive appointed caseloads. That said, MCILS has no way of
knowing how many cases each attorney handles in their private practice.

IV. SUFFICIENT TIME

67

Aroostook239

County

Name

Androscoggin

2016

2017

2018

Total

159

135

137

195

800

Hunter

143

128

128

157

123

679

97

143

125

106

156

627

115

115

136

112

144

622

-

-

127

158

268

553

Ward
Kenney
McIntosh
Swanson
Wells-Puckett
Smith

Cumberland

2105

174

Tebbetts

70

117

118

62

50

417

137

173

102

-

-

412

-

-

13

133

264

410

55

131

114

27

49

376

Charest

357

330

253

251

296

1,487

Dolley

179

170

218

189

205

961

Howaniec

177

121

156

122

173

749

McMorran

141

151

148

110

146

696

Lobozzo

216

175

158

92

46

687

Ranger

124

135

108

113

151

631

Fairbanks

65

126

116

118

191

616

Pushard

96

134

104

127

130

591

Hornblower

129

125

117

115

84

570

Hess

134

113

89

86

66

488

LeBrasseur

146

183

181

157

238

905

Moynihan

165

169

150

160

180

824

Chmelecki

145

103

78

77

70

473

Yamartino

88

80

104

66

116

454

Peltier

74

108

97

79

92

450

Hewes

76

105

70

74

104

429

-

73

111

92

145

421

Ruffner

67

130

79

100

42

418

Hanly

51

72

126

93

75

417

Gonzales

McKenna

York

2014

Hanson

20

71

87

113

107

398

Winling

179

213

210

172

188

962

Ashe

184

207

126

176

129

822

Fairfield

177

217

226

99

91

810

Locke

158

178

173

120

148

777

Champagne

118

169

167

117

176

747

Houde

154

161

154

103

109

681

Mekonis

127

111

117

113

130

598

Strike

132

131

113

58

116

550

-

55

118

145

164

482

39

75

120

106

121

461

Gordon
Capponi

6AC removed one Aroostook County lawyer from this table because he primarily handles all of the
in custody lawyer of the day assignments, making his caseload appear excessive when it is not. In the
other counties, where lawyer of the day duties are more rotational, the 6AC left those “cases” in the case
counts.
239

68

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
The one place where there are definitely time sufficiency issues is in Somerset County.
Over the past six years, the average number of hours spent per indigent defense case
has declined.240 For example, in FY 2013, on average the lawyers spent 10.11 hours on
each adult criminal case. The data indicates that there was one adult criminal case that
year in which two Project attorneys worked a combined 1,444.24 hours. Eliminating
this one case from the mix results in an average of 6.78 hours spent per adult case in
FY 2013. By FY 2018, the number dropped to 2.99 hours on average per adult criminal
case (a decrease of approximately 56%).
FY 2013
Attorney

Attorney A

ADULT
Closed

Attorney B

104

1,040.72

10.01

Attorney C

96

976.73

10.17

Attorney D

55

503.70

9.16

46

565.65

12.30

431

4,358.45

10.11

Total
FY 2014
Attorney

9.78

ADULT
Closed

Hours

Hrs/Case

Attorney C

96

331.65

3.45

Attorney A

78

529.40

6.79

Attorney B

61

187.20

3.07

Attorney E

37

211.00

5.70

Attorney D

1

1.00

1.00

273

1,260.25

4.62

Total
FY 2015
Attorney

ADULT
Closed

Hours

Hrs/Case

Attorney A

102

664.75

6.52

Attorney C

89

515.35

5.79

Attorney E

84

205.16

2.44

Attorney F

1

1.00

1.00

Attorney B

			

Hrs/Case

1,271.65

Attorney E

			

Hours

130

Total

0

-

N/A

276

1,386.26

5.02

Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
240

IV. SUFFICIENT TIME

69

FY 2016
Attorney

ADULT
Closed

Hours

136

275.46

2.03

Attorney A

119

584.30

4.91

98

521.70

5.32

353

1,381.46

3.91

Attorney C
Total
FY 2017
Attorney

ADULT
Closed

Hours

Hrs/Case

Attorney E

110

225.34

2.05

Attorney A

84

387.10

4.61

70

330.20

4.72

264

942.64

3.57

Attorney C

			

Hrs/Case

Attorney E

Total
FY 2018
Attorney

ADULT
Closed

Hours

Hrs/Case

Attorney E

133

295.25

2.22

Attorney A

99

361.90

3.66

Attorney C

98

342.40

3.49

7

8.50

1.21

337

1,008.05

2.99

Attorney G
Total

Importantly, MCILS does not require from the Somerset County Project reporting
of adult criminal cases to be distinguished by severity (e.g. felony or misdemeanor),
which would allow MCILS to more accurately track attorney workloads. That said,
2.99 hours per adult criminal case is extremely and unreasonably low, even if every
case was a class D or E charge.
Using the NAC misdemeanor standard of 400 cases per year, divided into a 2,040hour year, indicates that attorneys should be spending 5.1 hours per misdemeanor
case. As mentioned above, the NAC standards created in the 1970s have been
challenged by indigent defense advocates for not providing sufficient time per case.
One organization looking to determine more realistic caseload standards is the
American Bar Association, which has carried out a series of studies to determine the
appropriate amount of time attorneys should spend on the average case, by case type,
to effectively bring the case to disposition. Caseload studies in four jurisdictions show
that the average number of hours needed to complete a standard misdemeanor case is

70

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
significantly higher: Colorado (11.4),241 Louisiana (12.06),242 Missouri (11.7),243 and
Rhode Island (12.7).244
The issues with time sufficiency in Somerset County carry over to the juvenile
delinquency realm. Although the amount of time spent on juvenile delinquency cases
has remained more consistent than adult cases – with a high of 5.2 hours spent per
delinquency case in FY 2015 and a low of 2.97 hours per delinquency case in FY
2016 – juvenile delinquency matters should require more hours per average case than
misdemeanors. Again, using the NAC standard of no more than 200 delinquency cases
per attorney per year, when applies against a 2,040-hour work year, means that 10.2
hours should be spent on the average delinquency case. And, since the NAC standards
were created in the 1970’s, juvenile delinquency representation has become a very
specialized practice requiring significant time per case as practitioners have recognized
the importance of addressing the factors in the child’s life which have contributed to
court involvement. For example, looking to a state in the same geographical region,
the ABA has determined that in Rhode Island, the average juvenile delinquency case
should take 46.1 hours to defend.245
These issues extend to the representation of juveniles charged as delinquents at initial
appearance. Each year in Somerset County, there are 12 court days requiring lawyer
of the day for juvenile delinquency cases. In FY 2014, Project attorneys spent 6.83
hours per lawyer-of-the-day appearance. That number has decreased to 2.29 hours per
appearance.

American Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants & RubinBrown,
The Colorado Project: A Study of the Colorado Public Defender System and Attorney Workload
Standards 20 (2017), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_co_project.pdf.
242
American Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants & Postlethwaite
& Netterville, The Louisiana Project: A Study of the Louisiana Public Defender System and
Attorney Workload Standards 2 (2017), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_louisiana_project_report.pdf.
243
American Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants & RubinBrown,
The Missouri Project: A Study of the Missouri Public Defender System and Attorney Workload
Standards 6 (2014), available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_
indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.pdf.
244
American Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Nat’l Ass’n of
Criminal Defense Lawyers & BlumShapiro, The Rhode Island Project: A Study of the Rhode Island
Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards 6 (2017), available at https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_ri_
project.pdf.
245
American Bar Ass’n, Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Nat’l Ass’n of
Criminal Defense Lawyers & BlumShapiro, The Rhode Island Project: A Study of the Rhode Island
Public Defender System and Attorney Workload Standards 6 (2017), available at https://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_ri_
project.pdf.
241

Chapter V
ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
The U.S. Supreme Court explained in Cronic that “[t]he right to the effective
assistance of counsel” means that the defense must put the prosecution’s case through
the “crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.”246 For this to occur, states must ensure
that both the prosecution and the defense have the resources they need at the level their
respective roles demand. “While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants
are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”247 If a defense attorney is either incapable of or
barred from challenging the state’s case because of a structural impediment – “if the
process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries”248 – a constructive
denial of counsel occurs.
The annual legislative appropriation to MCILS has not kept pace with actual costs. In
the eight years since its inception, the MCILS total annual funding has slightly more
than doubled (from $11,085,696 in 2011 to $22,695,219).249 The greatest portion of the
MCILS budget is dedicated to attorney fees. For example, in FY 2018, 83.62% of the
MCILS budget went to attorney fees ($18,978,078). But in each year, MCILS runs out
of funding at some point during the budget cycle and requires supplemental funding to
meet that year’s caseload requirements. (See table below). During such times, attorneys
may go without pay while MCILS secures supplemental appropriations.250
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984) (“The right to the effective assistance of
counsel is thus the right of the accused to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been conducted – even if
defense counsel may have made demonstrable errors – the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth
Amendment has occurred. But if the process loses its character as a confrontation between adversaries,
the constitutional guarantee is violated.”).
247
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (citing United States ex rel. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1975)).
248
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57 (1984).
249
The financial data reflects information obtained from the Maine State Law and Legislative
Reference Library. Email from Ryan Jones, Reference Librarian, Maine State Law and Legislative
Reference Library, forwarded to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center,
by Margaret J. Reinsch, Esq., Legislative Analyst, Joint Standing Committee on Judiciary, Maine
State Legislature Office of Policy and Legal Analysis (Feb. 15, 2019). Part of the increased funding
requirements beginning in 2015 results from MCILS increasing the hourly rate paid to private attorneys
from $50 to $60, effective July 1, 2015. 94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2015).
250
See, e.g., David Carroll, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services to Run Out of Money in
April 2013, Sixth Amendment Center (Feb. 20, 2013) (recounting then-current newspaper and media
accounts of the MCILS funding crisis in that year), available at http://sixthamendment.org/mainecommission-on-indigent-legal-services-to-run-out-of-money-in-april-2013/.
246

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

MCILS

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Appropriation

$10,579,199

$11,140,632

$11,458,721

$13,350,710

$16,325,689

$19,097,259

$16,325,676

$21,901,722

Supplemental

$506,497

$596,497

$596,497

$628,497

$628,497

$777,497

$793,497

$793,497

$11,085,696

$11,737,129

$12,055,218

$13,979,207

$16,954,186

$19,874,756

$17,119,173

$22,695,219

Total

Finding 7: MCILS’ fixed fee contract causes a financial conflict of interest.
MCILS’ hourly rate is inadequate to both cover overhead and provide lawyers an
adequate fee.
The Cronic Court clearly advises that governmental interference that infringes on a
lawyer’s independence to act in the stated interests of defendants or places the lawyer
in a conflict of interest causes a constructive denial of counsel.251 Maine’s Rules of
Professional Conduct require that “a lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . there is a
significant risk that the representation . . . will be materially limited by . . . a personal
interest of the lawyer.”252 When the needs of a client’s case require the lawyer to
spend money out of his own compensation, there is a conflict between the lawyer’s
personal interests and that of the client. In short, any structure of services that places
the attorney’s personal financial wellbeing in direct competition with the stated interest
of a defendant is a constructive denial of counsel. The State of Maine, therefore, has
a constitutional obligation to ensure the system it has established for providing Sixth
Amendment services is free from financial conflicts that interfere with counsel’s ability
to render effective representation to each defendant.253
There are three categories of financial resources that are needed for the defense
of every case: law office overhead; case-related expenses; and fair lawyer
compensation.254
•

Law office overhead. For an attorney to simply show up and be available
to represent clients each day, there are certain expenses that must be paid.
These include office rent, furniture and equipment, computers and cellphones,
telephone and internet and other utilities, office supplies including stationery,

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-61 (1984).
Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.7(a)(2).
253
See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981) (“Where a constitutional right to counsel
exists, our Sixth Amendment cases hold that there is a correlative right to representation that is free
from conflicts of interest.”); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 US 335, 346 (1980) (“Defense counsel have an
ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict
of interest arises during the course of trial.”); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (“‘[A]
ssistance of counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be
untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent
conflicting interests.”).
254
See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System,
commentary to Principle 8 (Feb. 2002) (“Assigned counsel should be paid a reasonable fee in addition to
actual overhead and expenses. Contracts with private attorneys for public defense services should never
be let primarily on the basis of cost; they should . . . separately fund expert, investigative, and other
litigation support services.”).
251
252

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
malpractice insurance, state licensing and bar dues, and legal research
materials, plus the cost of staff such as a secretary or legal assistant. All of
these expenses, commonly referred to as “overhead,” must be incurred before a
lawyer represents a single client.255
•

Case-related expenses. Once an attorney is designated to represent a specific
client in a specific case, there are additional expenses that must be paid.
These are the expenses that the attorney would not incur but for representing
that client, and they include, for example: postage to communicate with the
client and witnesses and the court system, long-distance and collect telephone
charges, mileage and other travel costs to and from court and to conduct
investigations, preparation of copies and exhibits, costs incurred in obtaining
discovery, along with the costs of hiring necessary investigators and experts in
the case. These costs vary from case to case – some cases requiring very little
in the way of expense; other cases costing quite a lot. The individual expenses
that are necessary, though, must be paid for in every client’s case.

•

Fair lawyer compensation. Compensation is the attorney’s take home pay.

All national standards require that: “Assigned counsel should be paid a reasonable fee
in addition to actual overhead and expenses. Contracts with private attorneys for public
defense services should never be let primarily on the basis of cost; they should specify
performance requirements and the anticipated workload, provide an overflow or
funding mechanism for excess, unusual or complex cases, and separately fund expert,
investigative, and other litigation support services.”256 The American Bar Association’s
Standards for Criminal Justice explain that attorneys must have adequate resources
and support staff in order to render quality legal representation.
Among these are secretarial, investigative, and expert services, which
includes assistance at pre-trial release hearings and sentencing. In
addition to personal services, this standard contemplates adequate
facilities and equipment, such as computers, telephones, facsimile
machines, photocopying, and specialized equipment required to perform
necessary investigations.257
“The 2012 Survey of Law Firm Economics by ALM Legal Intelligence estimates that over 50
percent of revenue generated by attorneys goes to pay overhead expenses,” National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of Assigned Counsel Systems 8
(Mar. 2013), and overhead tends to be a higher percentage of gross receipts as a law office gets smaller.
See ALM Legal Intelligence, 2012 Survey of Law Firm Economics, Executive Summary at 4 (showing
overhead ranging from 38.9 percent of receipts in the largest law firms to 47.2 percent in smaller law
offices).
256
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, commentary to
Principle 8 (Feb. 2002).
257
American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice – Providing Defense Services, commentary
to Standard 5-1.4 (3d ed. 1992).
255

73

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

The government is responsible for providing the resources needed in each defendant’s
case. It can do so by providing a government paid-for building stocked with all the
necessary supplies and equipment and a budget for investigation, experts, and support
staff. Or it can do so by paying or repaying the public attorneys for these expenses.
What government cannot do, as has been held by state supreme courts all across the
country, is place the burden of paying for the indigent defense system onto the public
attorneys.258
MCILS provides all indigent legal representation by paying private lawyers in one of
two ways: a fixed fee annual contract amount, or an hourly rate.

See, e.g., Wright v. Childree, 972 So. 2d 771, 780-81 (Ala. 2006) (determining assigned counsel
are entitled to a reasonable fee in addition to overhead expenses, in case where state’s Attorney
General had issued an opinion against paying the overhead rate and the state comptroller subsequently
stopped paying); May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (determining indigent
defense attorneys were entitled to overhead expenses, presumptively set at $30 per hour, in addition to
a reasonable fee); DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 443 (Alaska 1987) (determining
that appointed cases did not simply merit a reasonable fee and overhead, but rather the fair market rate
of an average private case. “[R]equiring an attorney to represent an indigent criminal defendant for
only nominal compensation unfairly burdens the attorney by disproportionately placing the cost of a
program intended to benefit the public upon the attorney rather than upon the citizenry as a whole.”
Alaska’s constitution “does not permit the state to deny reasonable compensation to an attorney who is
appointed to assist the state in discharging its constitutional burden,” because doing so would be taking
“private property for a public purpose without just compensation.”); State ex rel Stephan v. Smith, 747
P.2d 816, 242 Kan. 336, 383 (Kan. 1987) (the state “has an obligation to pay appointed counsel such
sums as will fairly compensate the attorney, not at the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate
which is not confiscatory, considering overhead and expenses;” testimony showed the average overhead
rate of attorneys in Kansas in 1987 was $30 per hour); State v. Wigley, 624 So.2d 425, 429 (La. 1993)
(finding that “in order to be reasonable and not oppressive, any assignment of counsel to defend an
indigent defendant must provide for reimbursement to the assigned attorney of properly incurred and
reasonable out-of-pocket expenses and overhead costs.”); Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss.
1990) (determining that indigent defense attorneys are entitled to “reimbursement of actual expenses” in
addition to a reasonable sum; defining “actual expenses” to include “all actual costs to the lawyer for the
purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle this case,” and allowing defense attorneys to receive
a “pro rata share of actual overhead”); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990) (finding that
state government “has an obligation to pay appointed lawyers sums which will fairly compensate the
lawyer, not at the top rate which a lawyer might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, after
considering overhead and expenses;” “provision must be made for compensation of defense counsel’s
reasonable overhead and out of pocket expenses” in order “to place the counsel for the defense on an
equal footing with counsel for the prosecution”); Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 540 (W. Va.
1989) (raising the hourly rate paid to court appointed attorneys on a finding that they were forced to
“involuntarily subsidize the State with out-of-pocket cash,” because the then-current rates did not cover
attorney overhead shown to be $35 per hour in West Virginia in 1989. “Perhaps the most serious defect
of the present system is that the low hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to advise a client to
plead guilty, although the same lawyer would advise a paying client in a similar case to demand a jury
trial.”).
258

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
Fixed fee contract
In only Somerset County, MCILS has a single contract with three private attorneys259
to collectively provide all trial level indigent defense services absent a conflict of
interest, to carry out any appeals from those cases, and to handle post-conviction
review proceedings where they did not represent the petitioner at trial.260 In exchange
for that representation, MCILS pays the three attorneys collectively a fixed monthly
compensation of $22,687.50 (an annual equivalent of $544,500, then divided among
the three attorneys).261 Additionally, the contract attorneys are reimbursed by MCILS
for case related expenses including expert witnesses, investigation, and discovery, but
the contract attorneys “shall pay for all costs, fees and expenses incurred in providing
the contract services” other than the specific expense types itemized in the contract.262
The contract currently in force was originally let for the 22-month period of September
1, 2014 to June 30, 2016,263 and it has been extended three times for one year in each
extension,264 with the current extension expiring on June 30, 2019. The Somerset
contract attorneys are referred to colloquially as “The Project.”265 When a Project
attorney has a conflict of interest, the case is reassigned to one of the other Project
attorneys. If all Project attorneys have a conflict, the court appoints a private attorney
to be paid by MCILS at the hourly rate described below.266
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Agreement to Purchase Services,
AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723 (Aug. 25, 2014).
260
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Agreement to Purchase Services,
AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723, Rider A ¶¶ 1, 2, 7 (Aug. 25, 2014).
261
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Agreement to Purchase Services,
AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723, Rider A ¶ 9 (Aug. 25, 2014); State of Maine, Maine
Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Contract for Special Services - Amendment, AdvantageME CT
No. 95F 20140826-723 (Apr. 30, 2018).
262
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Agreement to Purchase Services,
AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723, Rider A ¶ 10 (Aug. 25, 2014).
263
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Agreement to Purchase Services,
AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723 (Aug. 25, 2014).
264
State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Contract for Special Services
- Amendment, AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723 (June 17, 2016); State of Maine, Maine
Commission on Indigent Legal Services, Contract for Special Services - Amendment, AdvantageME
CT No. 95F 20140826-723 (July 11, 2017); State of Maine, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal
Services, Contract for Special Services - Amendment, AdvantageME CT No. 95F 20140826-723 (Apr.
30, 2018). The final extension from (July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2019) explicitly notes that no RFP process
is being conducted due to the expectation that the 6AC study will make recommendations regarding the
provision of indigent legal representation in Somerset County.
265
This contract system predates the creation of MCILS and was originally a contract between the
Maine Judicial Branch and the Somerset County Private Defender Program. At one time, the contract
included seven attorneys from five separate law firms. MCILS issued a Request for Proposal for the
Somerset contract in 2011 and 2014, and “The Project” was the only respondent each time.
266
The contract could be read to require the Project to pay for conflict counsel, however, MCILS
confirms that MCILS (rather than the Project) pays for attorneys appointed when all Project attorneys
have a conflict of interest. Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal
Services, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 8, 2019).
259

75

76

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Fixed fee contracts, in which a lawyer earns the same pay no matter how many cases
he is required to handle, create financial incentives for a lawyer to dispose of cases as
quickly as possible, rather than as effectively as possible for the client. Even where the
defendant has a winnable case, the lawyer’s incentive nevertheless is to resolve it by
plea. The attorney is not rewarded with additional pay for the additional work involved
in zealous advocacy. Instead, the attorney is hurt financially the more he does for his
clients.
Moreover, the average fee per case under the Somerset contract for FY 2017 was
$573.16, slightly higher than the average billed by the assigned counsel elsewhere
(statewide $554.80). The average hours per case spent in Somerset, at 3.27, was much
lower than the statewide average of 9.25 (assuming the 2017 rate was $60/hour),
resulting in the Somerset hourly rate paid for counsel being $174.97. So, in Somerset
County, the State of Maine is paying attorneys three times the rate it pays everyone
else and getting approximately one third less work.

Hourly rate
Other than the three attorneys under contract in Somerset County as described above,
throughout Maine MCILS pays attorneys a set rate of $60 per hour for all types of
work in all types of cases.267 The maximum compensation an attorney can be paid for
each case is capped, based on the type of case, and the maximum can be waived by the
MCILS executive director).268 When an attorney serves as “Lawyer of the Day” (see
267
268

94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2015).
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2015). The presumptive fee caps set by MCILS are:
trial level – criminal and delinquency:
murder (set by MCILS executive director on case by case basis);
class A ($3,000;)
class B and C, against person ($2,250);
class B and C, against property ($1,500);
class D and E, in Superior or Unified Criminal Court ($750);
class D and E, in District Court ($540);
post-conviction review ($1,200);
probation revocation ($540);
miscellaneous, i.e. witness representation on Fifth Amendment grounds ($540);
juvenile ($540).
trial level – child protection:
child protective cases ($900 each stage);
termination of parental rights with a hearing ($1,260).
trial level – other civil:
application for involuntary commitment ($420);
petition for modified release treatment ($420);
petition for release or discharge ($420);
petition for emancipation ($420);
appeal, following grant of petition for certificate of probable cause ($1,200). Id.

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
discussion at pages 51 to 57), they are allowed to bill a minimum fee of $150 even
if their time spent is less than 2 ½ hours.269 Additionally, attorneys are reimbursed
by MCILS for case related expenses like collect calls, copying more than 100 pages,
and travel other than to and from the attorney’s “home district and superior court.”270
Attorneys are not reimbursed for their overhead expenses (e.g., rent, office utilities,
professional insurance, legal research tools & resources, etc.).271
In 2013, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers published a
comprehensive study of the rates of compensation paid to private attorneys to provide
representation to indigent people, whether under contract or appointed on a case by
case basis, in all fifty states272 and found generally that the low compensation rates
provided to lawyers across America are a “serious threat to our criminal justice
system.”273 The requirement that attorneys who represent the poor be adequately
compensated does not arise out of concern for the welfare of the attorneys. Rather,
adequate compensation for the attorney is required to ensure that the attorney provides
effective representation to each client. Inadequate compensation “leads to a decrease
in the overall number of attorneys willing to accept court appointments”274 and can
“encourage some attorneys to accept more clients than they can effectively represent in
order to make ends meet.”275
To underscore just how a $60 per hour rate does not afford both a reasonable fee and
coverage of actual overhead expenses, one need only to look at a few other states
whose assigned counsel compensation rates were challenged through litigation:
•

West Virginia: The West Virginia Supreme Court determined in 1989 that court
appointed attorneys in that state were forced to “involuntarily subsidize the
State with out-of-pocket cash,”276 because the then-current rates did not cover
attorney overhead. “Perhaps the most serious defect of the present system,”
the court found, “is that the low hourly fee may prompt an appointed lawyer to
advise a client to plead guilty, although the same lawyer would advise a paying
client in a similar case to demand a jury trial.”277 A now 30-year-old survey of
more than 250 West Virginia lawyers who were taking appointed cases (i.e.,

94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 5 (eff. July 1, 2015).
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 3.2. (eff. July 1, 2015).
271
94-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, § 3.1. (eff. July 1, 2015).
272
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of
Assigned Counsel Systems (Mar. 2013).
273
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of
Assigned Counsel Systems 12 (Mar. 2013).
274
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of
Assigned Counsel Systems 15 (Mar. 2013).
275
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Rationing Justice: The Underfunding of
Assigned Counsel Systems 16 (Mar. 2013).
276
Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
277
Jewell v. Maynard, 383 S.E.2d 536, 540 (W. Va. 1989).
269
270

77

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
not a survey of all private attorneys, but of only those accepting public cases)
determined that in 1989 the average hourly overhead was $35 per hour. The
cumulative rate of inflation since 1989 is 103%,278 making the 1989 overhead
rate today in West Virginia likely to be $71.05. And, Maine has 13% a higher
cost of living than in West Virginia, suggesting that overhead rates in Maine
may be $80.29.279
•

Mississippi: In 1990, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that indigent
defense attorneys are entitled to “reimbursement of actual expenses” in addition
to a reasonable sum, and defined “actual expenses” to include “all actual
costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door open to handle
this case.”280 This allows defense attorneys in Mississippi to receive a “pro
rata share of actual overhead.”281 The Mississippi State Bar determined that
overhead costs almost 30 years ago in that state were $34.86, although the court
eventually settled on an overhead rate of $25 per hour.282 Even using this lower
rate, the cumulative rate of inflation since 1990 is 92.6% making the overhead
rate in Mississippi likely to be $48.15.283 Maine has a cost of living that is 28%
greater than Mississippi,284 meaning the comparative cost of overhead in Maine
may be $61.63.

•

Oklahoma: In the same year as the Mississippi decision, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court found that state government “has an obligation to pay appointed

See U.S. Inflation Calculator, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
Cost of Living Portland, Maine vs. Charles Town, West Virginia, PayScale, https://www.payscale.
com/cost-of-living-calculator/Maine-Portland/West-Virginia-Charles-Town (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
280
Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1990).
281
Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340 (Miss. 1990).
282
Wilson v. State, 574 So.2d 1338, 1340-41 (Miss. 1990). (“Following our rule of statutory
construction, we are able to save this statute from unconstitutionality by interpreting this language to
include reimbursement for all actual costs to the lawyer for the purpose of keeping his or her door open
to handle this case, i.e., the lawyer will receive a pro rata share of actual overhead. The appellant urges
us to adopt a figure of $ 34.86 per hour for overhead. This figure is derived from a survey conducted
by the Mississippi State Bar in 1988. See, 35 Mississippi Lawyer, No. 5, at 45 (March-April 1989).
However, we choose rather to adopt a $25.00 per hour figure, which is also based on the survey. For
ease of administration and to avoid a lot of satellite litigation, we create a rebuttable presumption that a
court appointed attorney’s actual overhead within the statute is $25.00 per hour. However, the trial court
is bound by this only in the absence of actual proof to the contrary -- proof offered by the lawyer that it
is more or by the State that it is less.”) (emphasis original).
It is important to note that Mississippi sets a statutory cap on the total payments possible to appointed
attorneys, for example, $1000 for a felony case, plus “actual expenses.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17
(2017). The Legislature has directed the State Office of the Public Defender to “coordinate the collection
and dissemination of statistical data and make such reports as are required of the divisions, develop
plans and proposals for further development of a statewide public defender system in coordination with
the Mississippi Public Defenders Task Force.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-18-1 (2017).
283
See US Inflation Calculator, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
284
Cost of Living Portland, Maine vs. Jackson, Mississippi, PayScale, https://www.payscale.com/costof-living-calculator/Maine-Portland/Mississippi-Jackson (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
278
279

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
lawyers sums which will fairly compensate the lawyer, not at the top rate which
a lawyer might charge, but at a rate which is not confiscatory, after considering
overhead and expenses.”285 Based on the existing salary structure for Oklahoma
district attorneys, the court determined a reasonable appointed counsel fee to
be between $14.63 and $29.26 (based on experience) and “[a]s a matter of
course, when the district attorneys’ … salaries are raised by the Legislature
so, too, would the hourly rate of compensation for defense counsel.”286 In
addition to this reasonable fee, and “to place the counsel for the defense on an
equal footing with counsel for the prosecution,” the court also determined that
a “provision must be made for compensation of defense counsel’s reasonable
overhead and out of pocket expenses.”287 The court found that the two lawyers
involved in the case at dispute should be paid their actual overhead costs. The
overhead costs for the Oklahoma attorneys in 1989 were respectively $50.88
per hour and $48.00 per hour.288 Again, taking the lower rate and accounting for
inflation, the Oklahoma overhead compensation rate is likely $92.45.289
Finding 8: A significant number of attorneys bill in excess of eight hours per
day, five days per week, for 52 weeks per year. MCILS does not exert adequate
financial oversight of private attorneys.

Attorney billing
“Over-billing” was a topic raised frequently throughout the state. A Cumberland
County attorney complained that there is currently no limit on the number of cases
an attorney can accept, creating the ability to bill for an unlimited number of hours
overall, and that a few outlying attorneys bill well over $200,000 per year at $60 per
hour. One Androscoggin County attorney expressed annoyance that some attorneys bill
much more than he does for similar cases, especially cases that he takes over when the
case must go to trial. He notes that in one case alleging a gross sexual assault, another
attorney had already charged $14,000 before he took over before trial.
In Maine, attorneys do not submit vouchers under penalty of perjury. No statutes or
MCILS rules limit attorney hours by day or by year. MCILS conducts no audits. Not
surprisingly, a review of MCILS vouchers over the past five years generated serious
concerns in some instances about whether limited taxpayer resources are being used
State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990).
287
State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Okla. 1990).
288
In 1991, the high attorney compensation rate hastened the creation of the Oklahoma Indigent
Defense System – a state-funded agency in the executive branch that provides trial-level, appellate and
post-conviction criminal defense representation to the indigent accused in 75 of the state’s 77 counties.
Both Tulsa County (Tulsa) and Oklahoma County (Oklahoma City) established public defender offices
prior to statewide reform and were allowed to continue to provide services outside of the OIDS system.
289
See US Inflation Calculator, https://www.usinflationcalculator.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2019).
285
286

79

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
effectively. Although the demands of complex cases may require an attorney to work
well over eight hours per day for certain periods ,such as during trials, average billing
that greatly exceeds full time hours over long periods should trigger inquiry.
If an attorney works eight hours per day, five days per week, for 52 weeks a year,
that attorney should make no more than $124,800 at the current $60 per hour MCILS
rate. This assumes that the attorney never takes a day off (neither personal, holiday,
medical, nor vacation day) and never has a case capped by the MCILS director for
fewer hours than billed. For fiscal years 2014 and 2015, when MCILS paid a rate of
$50 per hour, the total compensation an attorney could make under the above scenario
would be $104,000.
Yet, in all five years of data reviewed, a small but significant number of attorneys
surpassed those thresholds – with some surpassing the thresholds by a large margin.
For example, 11 attorneys billed and were paid more than $104,000 in FY 2014,. This
reflects a total of $336,105.00 more than if each attorney averaged a 40-hour work
week.
FY2014

ANNUAL PAY

HOURS/WEEK

ATTORNEY 1

$

194,488

74.80

ATTORNEY 2

$

180,766

69.53

ATTORNEY 3

$

165,313

63.58

ATTORNEY 4

$

133,921

51.51

ATTORNEY 5

$

129,055

49.64

ATTORNEY 6

$

122,736

47.21

ATTORNEY 7

$

116,315

44.74

ATTORNEY 8

$

111,533

42.90

ATTORNEY 9

$

110,515

42.51

ATTORNEY 10

$

108,023

41.55

ATTORNEY 11

$

107,440

41.32

Fourteen attorneys billed, on average, in excess of 40 hours per week for all 52 weeks
in FY 2015. This includes ten of the 11 attorneys that billed in excess of 40 hours
per week in FY 2014. This reflects a total of $321,790.00 more than if each attorney
averaged a 40-hour work week. The top biller in FY 2015 billed an average of 91.5
hours per week.
FY2015

ATTORNEY 2

ANNUAL PAY

HOURS/WEEK

$

285,491

ATTORNEY 1

$

160,086

91.50
51.31

ATTORNEY 4

$

159,167

51.02

ATTORNEY 5

$

149,361

47.87

ATTORNEY 3

$

145,739

46.71

ATTORNEY 15

$

141,694

45.41

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

81

ATTORNEY 13

$

138,656

44.44

ATTORNEY 11

$

135,624

43.47

ATTORNEY 16

$

131,701

42.21

ATTORNEY 14

$

131,145

42.03

ATTORNEY 7

$

127,939

41.01

ATTORNEY 8

$

125,033

40.07

ATTORNEY 10

$

119,786

38.39

ATTORNEY 9

$

117,568

37.68

Thirteen attorneys billed in excess of 40 hours per week in FY 2016. This reflects a
total of $421,487.00 more than if each attorney averaged a 40-hour work week. The
top biller in FY 2016 billed over 98.5 hours per week.
FY2016

ATTORNEY 2

ANNUAL PAY

HOURS/WEEK

$

307,381

ATTORNEY 16

$

191,122

98.52
61.26

ATTORNEY 13

$

183,227

58.73

ATTORNEY 8

$

174,319

55.87

ATTORNEY 9

$

141,961

45.50

ATTORNEY 11

$

133,812

42.89

ATTORNEY 7

$

132,961

42.62

ATTORNEY 18

$

132,719

42.54

ATTORNEY 10

$

130,741

41.90

ATTORNEY 4

$

130,085

41.69

ATTORNEY 17

$

126,163

40.44

ATTORNEY 14

$

125,854

40.34

ATTORNEY 19

$

124,542

39.92

In FY 2017, eleven attorneys billed in excess of 40 hours per week. This reflects a total
of $307,172.00 more than if each attorney averaged a 40-hour work week. The top
biller in FY 2017 billed over 70 hours per week.
FY2017

ANNUAL PAY

HOURS/WEEK

ATTORNEY 13

$

218,804

70.13

ATTORNEY 17

$

185,185

59.35

ATTORNEY 8

$

166,374

53.33

ATTORNEY 15

$

155,099

49.71

ATTORNEY 21

$

143,790

46.09

ATTORNEY 11

$

142,676

45.73

ATTORNEY 23

$

141,202

45.26

ATTORNEY 2

$

140,111

44.91

ATTORNEY 7

$

131,050

42.00

ATTORNEY 22

$

130,074

41.69

ATTORNEY 20

$

125,606

40.26

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Finally, 25 attorneys billed in excess of 40 hours per week in FY 2018. This reflects a
total of $813,531 more than if each attorney averaged a 40-hour work week. The top
biller in FY2018 billed more than 88 hours per week. On top of this, these attorneys
may also work on private cases. As part of this review, the 6AC reached out to the
Federal Defender Services Division of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. Although they are not allowed to confirm the number of cases appointed, the
Federal Defender Services, Legal and Policy Division, confirmed that eight of these 25
lawyers received federal court appointments during this same time period.290
FY2018

ATTORNEY 2

ANNUAL PAY

HOURS/WEEK

$

275,612

88.34

ATTORNEY 21

$

263,804

84.55

ATTORNEY 17

$

220,804

70.77

ATTORNEY 8

$

216,707

69.46

ATTORNEY 22

$

200,761

64.35

ATTORNEY 9

$

174,890

56.05

ATTORNEY 7

$

150,221

48.15

ATTORNEY 14

$

148,546

47.61

ATTORNEY 5

$

148,298

47.53

ATTORNEY 11

$

143,202

45.90

ATTORNEY 23

$

140,956

45.18

ATTORNEY 24

$

139,287

44.64

ATTORNEY 25

$

137,366

44.03

ATTORNEY 10

$

136,072

43.61

ATTORNEY 26

$

135,321

43.37

ATTORNEY 27

$

135,196

43.33

ATTORNEY 20

$

134,915

43.24

ATTORNEY 28

$

132,025

42.32

ATTORNEY 29

$

131,715

42.22

ATTORNEY 30

$

131,357

42.10

ATTORNEY 31

$

129,725

41.58

ATTORNEY 13

$

129,673

41.56

ATTORNEY 32

$

126,391

40.51

ATTORNEY 33

$

125,643

40.27

ATTORNEY 34

$

125,044

40.08

The table below shows the top earners over the five-year period. These top ten earners
collectively billed more than 40 hours per week in 78% of the combined 50 billing
years (5 years for each of the 10 attorneys). And, three of these top ten earners work at
the same law firm (Attorney 2, Attorney 8, and Attorney 11).
Email from Adriane Cleveland, Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Defender Services, to
David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 6, 2019).
290

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT

ATTORNEY 2

FY2014

$180,766

FY2015

$285,491

83

FY2016

$307,381

FY2017

$140,111

FY2018

$275,612

5-YEAR
TOTAL

$1,189,361

ATTORNEY 8

$111,533

$125,033

$174,319

$166,374

$216,707

$793,967

ATTORNEY 13

$74,952

$138,656

$183,227

$218,804

$129,673

$745,312

ATTORNEY 5

$129,055

$149,361

$115,545

$122,801

$148,298

$665,059

ATTORNEY 11

$107,440

$135,624

$133,812

$142,676

$143,202

$662,753

ATTORNEY 7

$116,315

$127,939

$132,961

$131,050

$150,221

$658,487

ATTORNEY 9

$110,515

$117,568

$141,961

$112,963

$174,890

$657,896

ATTORNEY 3

$165,313

$145,739

$112,464

$88,598

$109,560

$621,673

ATTORNEY 4

$133,921

$159,167

$130,085

$99,884

$95,029

$618,087

ATTORNEY 10

$108,023

$119,786

$130,741

$115,471

$136,072

$610,093

To be clear, the 6AC staff members are not financial auditors, and we do not take a
position on why there are so many billings in excess of 40 hours per week. We simply
note that until this study was initiated, MCILS – and therefore the State of Maine –
were unaware of the issue because of a lack of financial oversight.291

Financial oversight
As previously stated in Chapter II, to pay and oversee nearly 600 private attorneys
handling cases in 47 courthouses before approximately 90 justices, judges, and
magistrates, MCILS has a staff of three: an executive director, a deputy executive
director, and an accounting technician. The three staff essentially spend the majority
of their time approving payments & trial-related expenses and providing a minimal
amount of training to appointed attorneys.
To best describe the absence of financial oversight at MCILS, it is again useful
to look toward Massachusetts. All attorneys accepting CPCS case assignments
During the drafting of this report, State Senator Lisa Keim sent a letter to the Maine Government
Oversight Committee requesting that the committee “take action to direct the Office of Program
Evaluation and Government Accountability to conduct a rapid review of the Maine Commission on
Indigent Legal Services (MCILS) and the Indigent Legal Services in the State,” because of an alleged
lack of accountability on the part of the agency. Letter from Senator Lisa Keim to Maine Government
Oversight Committee (Feb. 21, 2019).
Although MCILS states in its own letter to the Government Oversight Committee that internal
reviews show, at least in one instance, an attorney “identified the extent of overbilling and has agreed to
make substantial reimbursement to the Commission,” MCILS determined that other apparent overbilling
was the result of attorneys in larger firms submitting the work of other lawyers in the lawfirms under
the name of the lead attorney. Letter from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent
Legal Services, to Maine Government Oversight Committee (Mar. 7, 2019). The 6AC notes that these
MCILS efforts at financial oversight do not address the five-years of data reported above and that a
comprehensive audit is appropriate.
291

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
in Massachusetts do so subject to certain overall fiscal controls as well as audit
procedures in particular cases. In all cases assigned by CPCS, private attorneys must
maintain contemporaneous time records by tenths of an hour, with sufficient detail to
show the need for the task.292
Private assigned counsel must use the CPCS electronic billing system (known as
“EBill 2.0”) in order to be paid for their work. To be registered by CPCS as a vendor
able to access that system, every attorney must sign and submit to CPCS an EBill
Access Agreement which includes the following provision: “I certify under pains
and penalties of perjury that for all my bills filed with CPCS through the ‘EBill2.0’
system, I have been assigned to each case indicated on my EBill; I have provided the
services described on the dates and for the times listed; I have provided representation
consistent with CPCS Performance Guidelines and Standards; and all charges for
legal services reflected on the EBill are based on my contemporaneous time records
maintained in accordance with CPCS Assigned Counsel Manual’s policies and
procedures.”293
Although Massachusetts does not set caps on the number of hours attorneys may bill
for particular case types, CPCS does set a waivable cap on hours which may be billed
per day. This presumptive cap is ten hours per day, except on days when actual trial
time is billed the cap rises to 12 hours. The electronic billing system enforces the cap,
unless a waiver is allowed.
CPCS conducts random prepayment audits requiring attorneys to provide sanitized
versions of their contemporaneous time records to support their billing. CPCS also
conducts prepayment billing inquiries when interim billing in individual cases reaches
certain unpublished thresholds that are unusually high for that type of case. Finally,
when indicated, CPCS conducts full audits of the billing practices of individual
attorneys, with procedural safeguards including a hearing before a CPCS Committee
member.
CPCS is required by statute to enforce other billing controls. CPCS cannot pay a
private attorney for more than 1,650 hours in a fiscal year,294 nor may a private attorney
accept any new case assignments (except murder cases) after billing CPCS 1,350 hours
in a fiscal year.295

For example, “legal research” would not be sufficiently descriptive, but “legal research on
voluntariness of statement for memorandum on suppression motion” would be adequate.
293
Private Attorney Ebill 2.0 Access Agreement, The Committee for Public Counsel Services,
available at https://www.publiccounsel.net/cfo/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2016/11/Ebill-2.0-AccessAgreement_Final.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).
294
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 211D § 11(b) (2018).
295
MASS. GEN. LAWS c. 211D § 11(c) (2018).
292

V. ATTORNEY COMPENSATION & FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT
CPCS is required to reduce payment for late bills. Pursuant to statute,296 bills must be
submitted within 60 days of the conclusion of the case or 30 days of the end of the
fiscal year. Late bills must be reduced by 10%, and the statute provides that bills more
than 30 days late shall not be paid unless the chief counsel finds that the delay is due to
extraordinary circumstances beyond the attorney’s control.

296

Mass. Gen. Laws c. 211D § 12 (2018).

85

Chapter VI
RECOMENDATIONS
The recommendations set out below will be greatly aided by important changes to the
MCILS made by the Maine legislature and taking effect in 2018.
MCILS is expanded to a nine-person commission, with all members appointed by
the Governor and confirmed by the legislature.297 There are seven voting members –
one with administration & finance experience; one with child protection proceeding
experience; and five chosen from lists recommended variously by the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court.298 The two non-voting members are attorneys who provide
indigent legal services as a majority of their law practices and are chosen, one each,
from lists recommended by the president of the Maine State Bar Association and by the
president of another statewide organization representing criminal defense attorneys.299
All recommendations and appointments must “consider input from individuals and
organizations with an interest in the delivery of indigent legal services.”300
Sitting judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials, and employees of people
in those positions, cannot serve on the commission.301 Any person who is paid by the
commission (whether as an employee or otherwise) cannot be a voting member, nor
can their immediate household family members.302 Two of the nine members must be
non-attorneys or non-practicing attorneys.303 Finally, all members of the commission
“must have demonstrated a commitment to quality representation for persons who are
indigent and have the knowledge required to ensure that quality of representation is
provided in each area of law.”304
In short, once the new board members are appointed, Maine will have a more
professional MCILS to consider implementing the recommendations of this study.
RECOMMENDATION 1: The State of Maine should remove the authority to
conduct financial eligibility screenings from the Maine Commission for Indigent
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(1) (2018).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(1) (2018).
299
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(1) (2018).
300
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(1) (2018).
301
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(2) (2018).
302
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(2) (2018). This limitation applies to members commencing their
term of appointment on or after April 2, 2018.
303
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(2) (2018).
304
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1803(2) (2018).
297
298

VI. RECOMENDATIONS
Legal Services. The reconstituted Task Force on Pretrial Justice Reform should
determine the appropriate agency to conduct indigency screenings.
The State of Maine currently has several agencies involved in critical pretrial functions
of bail determination, criminal history check, risk assessment of pretrial release,
supervision of defendants released, and indigency screening: Maine Commission
on Indigent Legal Services, the bail commissioners of each county, and Maine PreTrial Services.305 The Sixth Amendment Center are not experts on the delivery of
pretrial services and thus are not prepared to making sweeping recommendations
about agencies outside of the purview of indigent defense services, except to note that
indigency screening should not remain a responsibility of MCILS. A conflict exists
because indigent defense systems must require their participating attorneys to adhere
to their ethical duty to zealously defend in the stated interests of the client, including
advocating against fines and fees. MCILS cannot assure that MCILS attorneys
fight against the imposition of fees related to the cost of the defense while MCILS
simultaneously tries to collect those fees.306
On February 6, 2019, Chief Justice Leigh I. Saufley reconstituted the Task Force on
Pretrial Services.307 We respectfully suggest that the Task Force take up the question of
the appropriate agency to conduct financial screenings. To assist that effort, we offer
the following for informational purposes.
The Brennan Center for Justice notes that a number of entities can appropriately serve
as screeners without the conflicts presented by the indigent defense system doing so,
including: “1) the committing magistrate, court personnel, or judges other than the
presiding judge; 2) the pretrial services branch of the adult probation department; 3)
an independent pretrial services division; 4) another government agency; or 5) a nongovernment (‘third-party’) organization with a government contract.” We note that
the financial information needed for a bail/pretrial release decision and the financial
information needed to determine indigency are pretty much the same and that it may
make sense for the State of Maine to consolidate these practices.
For example, in Massachusetts neither defense counsel nor the indigent defense system
is involved in determining eligibility for their services. Rather, statutory language
directs the probation department to obtain financial information relevant to indigence
Maine Pretrial Services reports that this agency has about 40 to 50 employees statewide and
offices in every county but Aroostook. They supervise defendants pretrial. They also screen people
who have been arrested before they appear in court to see if they are eligible for services, and then tell
the prosecutor and defense counsel. During this screening they have the defendant sign a release of
information.
306
Data obtained by 6AC shows that in FY 2018, MCILS financial screeners interviewed 11,031
defendants: 7,704 were found indigent (70%), 2,322 were found partially indigent (21%) and 1,005 were
denied (9%). MCILS collected $677,735 in FY2017 in partial indigency payments.
307
See Charter, Pretrial Justice Reform Task Force (Feb. 6, 2019), available at https://www.courts.
maine.gov/maine_courts/committees/charter-PJRTF.pdf.
305

87

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
determinations from other state agencies, including the departments of revenue,
transitional assistance, and the registry of motor vehicles, and to re-evaluate each
defendant’s indigence every six months to determine if the assignment of counsel
should be revoked.308 Defendants seeking counsel are required to provide financial
data under penalty of perjury, however, information provided by defendants in support
of their request for counsel may not be used against them in any proceeding except
for perjury, and defendants may not be required to provide information regarding
their citizenship or immigration status.309 A finding of indigence is made by the judge
at arraignment,310 in partial reliance on a financial report and recommendation by a
probation officer.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The State of Maine should statutorily bar
communication between prosecutors and unrepresented defendants, unless and
until defendants have been informed of their right to appointed counsel, a judge
has conducted the legally required colloquy, and a defendant has executed a
written waiver of the right to counsel in each case to ensure that all waivers of the
right to counsel are made knowingly and voluntarily.
Prosecutors who speak directly with defendants, on their own volition or at the
suggestion of the judge, risk violating their ethical duties. As the report of the National
Right to Counsel Committee, Justice Denied, notes: “Not only are such practices of
doubtful ethical propriety, but they also undermine defendants’ right to counsel.”311
The National Right to Counsel Committee report notes further:
Beyond the court’s role in making certain that a defendant’s waiver of
counsel is valid, prosecutors have a professional responsibility duty
“not [to] give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the
advice to secure counsel.” Similarly, the ABA has recommended that
prosecutors should refrain from negotiating with an accused who is
unrepresented without a prior valid waiver of counsel. Prosecutors also
are reproached by the ABA to ensure that the accused has been advised
of the right to counsel, afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel,
and not to seek to secure waivers of important pretrial rights from an
accused who is unrepresented.312
Mass. Gen. Laws c. 211D § 2A (2018). Defense counsel’s only role in this process is to zealously
represent the client in opposing a later unwarranted revocation of the assignment of counsel.
309
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:10.
310
Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:10. The basic standard used for indigence is 125% of the current federal
poverty guideline. People with income between 125% and 250% of that guideline may be deemed
indigent but able to contribute and assessed some of the cost of assigned counsel. People with liquid
assets beyond 250% of that guideline may be assigned counsel in superior court felony cases if the court
determines they cannot pay for counsel. See id; see also Mass. Gen. Laws c. 211D §§ 2-2B (2018).
311
National Right to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our
Constitutional Right to Counsel 88 (2009).
312
National Right to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our
308

VI. RECOMENDATIONS

The State of Maine should bar communications between prosecutors and unrepresented
defendants until such time as a court has conducted the legally required colloquy to
determine that the waiver is knowingly and intelligently made.
RECOMMENDATION 3: Except for ministerial, non-substantive tasks, the State
of Maine and the Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services should require
that the same properly qualified defense counsel continuously represents the
client in each case, from appointment through disposition, and personally appears
at every court appearance throughout the pendency of an assigned case.
In theory, Maine statutes and court rules already require this. Courts must appoint
counsel,313 and that counsel remains appointed until withdrawn by court order or other
counsel files a notice of appearance.314 However this does not always occur in practice.
The problem is that MCILS’ fee schedule policy currently directs attorneys to stand in
for each other:
When doing so will not adversely affect the attorney-client relationship,
Commission-assigned counsel are urged to limit travel and waiting time
by cooperating with each other to stand in at routine, non-dispositive
matters by having one attorney appear at such things as arraignments
and routine non-testimonial motions, instead of having all Commissionassigned counsel in an area appear.315
MCILS should repeal this policy, and the legislature should prohibit the practice
of attorneys standing in for each other, other than in an emergency or with advance
notice to the client and the court. How to best accomplish such a directive will be
based, in part, on how indigent defense services are organized in the future (see
Recommendation 7, page 94). To the extent that Maine remains primarily a private
counsel system, MCILS needs to assign an adequate number of lawyers to appear at
48-hour hearings, initial appearances, and arraignments, so that each case on that day’s
docket is directly assigned to one of the lawyers who is present.
Again, Massachusetts can serve as a model. CPCS provides counsel at initial
appearance by calendaring certified attorneys to cover all court days to receive case
assignments when the court determines that a defendant is indigent and has a right to
Constitutional Right to Counsel 88 (2009) (citing American Bar Ass’n, Model Rules of Prof.
Conduct 4.3); American Bar Ass’n, Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function 3-4.1(b),
3-3.10(a), 3-3.10(c) (3d ed. 1993). Contra Me. R. Prof’l Conduct 4.3 (permits attorneys to “negotiate
with” unrepresented parties and states they “may” encourage an unrepresented party with adverse
interests to secure counsel).
313
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 810 (2018).
314
Me. R. Unified Crim. Proc. 44, 44A, 44B.
315
96-649 Code Me. R. ch. 301, §4(1)(D) (June 10, 2016).

89

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
counsel. The scheduling is done by an administrator in the county who communicates
directly with the local attorneys and court personnel, and who constitutes, with a parttime assistant, the staff of the county assignment program. The county administrator is
familiar with the usual volume of cases in the local courts and assigns an appropriate
number of attorneys to cover each court day, so that each attorney will receive enough
cases to make business sense without impairing the quality of representation.
In the unlikely event that an attorney receives no cases on a court duty day, the
attorney is to be paid for the time spent in court that day. Attorneys may receive two
duty days per month in up to two county programs. Attorneys ordinarily keep the cases
they receive from arraignment through disposition, so that clients receive vertical
representation.
Some cases inevitably will need to be reassigned. If an attorney certified for superior
court felonies is not on duty in a court when such a case is arraigned, the duty attorney
who is certified for lesser criminal cases handles the arraignment and non-evidentiary
bail hearing and notifies the county administrator. The county administrator contacts
superior court certified attorneys and reassigns the case, the same day if possible. If,
due to unexpected volume on a court duty day, an attorney receives too many cases (or
in any event more than 10), the attorney contacts the county administrator to reassign
the excess cases. Thus, attorneys who do not accept duty days may nevertheless
receive case assignments.
CPCS is explicitly empowered to assign counsel for a pre-arraignment procedure or in
such other proceedings as the chief counsel shall determine necessary.316 This authority
is used to assign counsel prior to arraignment for people arrested and held in custody
for murder, juveniles facing custodial interrogation, and people in mental health
facilities who are accused of crimes.
RECOMMENDATION 4: MCILS should use its current statutory power to
promulgate more rigorous attorney qualification, recertification, training,
supervision, and workload standards. The State of Maine should statutorily
require financial oversight by requiring that MCILS limit the number of
permissible billable hours, subject to waiver only upon a finding of need for
additional capacity. The State of Maine should fund MCILS at a level to ensure
rigorous training and effective substantive and financial oversight of attorneys.

Substantive oversight
MCILS should develop and adopt standards related to attorney qualification,
recertification, training, supervision, and workload as detailed in the section on
Massachusetts’ Committee for Public Counsel services (see discussion at p. 32.).
316

Mass. Gen. Laws c. 211D §§ 5-6(b) (2018).

VI. RECOMENDATIONS

Financial oversight
The State of Maine should adopt statutory language to require MCILS to limit
attorneys’ billable hours in a day and year, subject to waiver for complex cases and
systemic capacity needs, and require attorneys to submit bills under the penalty of
perjury (see discussion at p. 84.).
To provide this recommended substantive and financial oversight, MCILS will
need to increase its staff. Indeed, most indigent defense systems have substantially
larger administrations than the three employees allotted to MCLIS. For example, in
Massachusetts, the CPCS administration has 11 senior management positions,317 each
of whom has significant attorney and non-attorney staff.
MCILS should be resourced to build on the effort it has begun to provide oversight
and mentoring in the field. MCILS should expand its network of Resource Counsel
(currently 25 attorneys at 10 hours per month) and require them to conduct assessments
of attorney performance in all practice areas measured against the MCILS performance
standards, to investigate complaints from clients or judges, and to inform MCILS of
local training needs. MCILS should use the information developed by its Resource
Counsel, together with information drawn from its billing records, to devise and
implement a program of periodic recertification for all participating attorneys. MCILS
should also be resourced to assign experienced mentors to assist attorneys with
complex issues at least in their first two years of practice to promote efficiency by
those providers.
Appendix A sets out a recommended budget and budget narrative for an expanded
MCILS administration. The projected annual cost of the office is $1,424,740.70.
RECOMMENDATION 5: The State of Maine should statutorily ban all public
defense contracts that provide financial disincentives to or that otherwise
interfere with zealously advocating on behalf of the defendants’ stated interests,
including the use of fixed fee contracts. Maine should require that any public
defense contract include reasonable caseload limits, reporting requirements on
Directories – CPCS Management Team, Committee for Public Counsel Services, https://www.
publiccounsel.net/dir/management/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). The senior management positions
at CPCS are: chief counsel, general counsel, deputy chief counsel for the children and family law
division, director of the mental health division, deputy chief counsel of the private counsel division,
deputy chief counsel of the public defender division, director of the youth advocacy division, director
of administration & operations, chief financial officer, chief information officer, and director of
human resources. Massachusetts’ caseload is over ten times that of Maine, so all of these CPCS senior
management positions have significant attorney and non-attorney staff. For example, in the central
administration offices, there are 11 FTE in house attorneys, all with 20+ years’ experience, and six FTE
administrative assistants. In the county offices, there are 30 supervising attorneys and 17 administrative
assistants.
317

91

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
any private legal work permitted, and substantial performance oversight, among
other protections.
The contract currently used in Maine to cover the existing caseload in Somerset
County without substantive oversight causes conflicts of interest between the indigent
defense attorney’s financial self-interest and the legal interests of the indigent
defendant. The contract also can cause concurrent conflicts of interest between indigent
defendants, and between the indigent defendants and the attorney’s retained clients.
Maine should follow the lead of other states that have recently banned these practices,
including:
•

Idaho. County commissioners may provide representation by contracting with
a defense attorney “provided that the terms of the contract shall not include
any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the services and
expenses of the attorney.”318

•

Michigan. The Michigan Indigent Defense Commission is statutorily barred
from approving local indigent defense plans that provide “[e]conomic
disincentives or incentives that impair defense counsel’s ability to provide
effective representation.”319

•

Nevada. Announcing that the “competent representation of indigents is vital
to our system of justice,” the Nevada Supreme Court banned the use of flat fee
contracts that fail to provide for the costs of investigation and expert witnesses
and required that contracts must allow for extra fees in extraordinary cases.320

•

Washington. The Washington Rules of Professional Conduct decree that
“A lawyer shall not: (1) make or participate in making an agreement with a
governmental entity for the delivery of indigent defense services if the terms of
the agreement obligate the contracting lawyer or law firm: (i) to bear the cost
of providing conflict counsel; or (ii) to bear the cost of providing investigation
or expert services, unless a fair and reasonable amount for such costs is
specifically designated in the agreement in a manner that does not adversely
affect the income or compensation allocated to the lawyer, law firm, or law firm
personnel.”321

RECOMMENDATION 6: The State of Maine should fund MCILS at a level
that allows private attorneys to be compensated for overhead expenses plus a
reasonable fee (i.e., $100 per hour). MCILS should be authorized to provide
Idaho Code § 19-859 (2018).
Mich. Comp. Laws § 780-991(2)(b) (2017).
320
Order, In re Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and
Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. filed July 23, 2015).
321
Wash. R. Prof’l Conduct 1.8(m)(1).
318
319

VI. RECOMENDATIONS
additional compensation of $25 per hour for designated case types such as
murder, sexual assaults, and postconviction review.
Numerous judges and other criminal justice stakeholders report that finding counsel
to accept assignment of sex assault and postconviction cases is increasingly difficult.
Many assigned defense attorneys say these case types present such difficult challenges
that they handle them only when privately retained. The most severe cases are
relatively few in number, require a very high level of expertise, and thus warrant a
higher compensation rate than ordinary crimes. Permitting MCILS to pay a higher rate
for the most serious cases is needed to assure the availability of qualified counsel.
All national standards require that “counsel should be paid a reasonable fee in addition
to actual overhead and expenses.”322 There is also a significant amount of state case law
that requires states to pay attorneys a reasonable fee in addition to overhead expenses.
We highlight two:
•

Kansas. In 1987, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that the state has an
“obligation to pay appointed counsel such sums as will fairly compensate the
attorney, not at the top rate an attorney might charge, but at a rate which is not
confiscatory, considering overhead and expenses.”323 Testimony taken in the
case set the average overhead rate of attorneys in Kansas in 1987 at $30 per
hour. Kansas now compensates public defense attorneys at $80 per hour. Maine
has a higher cost of living than Kansas, making the rate an equivalent of $98.40
per hour in Maine.324

•

Alabama. In 1993, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals determined that
indigent defense attorneys were entitled to overhead expenses (set at $30 per
hour) in addition to a reasonable fee.325 A decade later, when the Attorney
General issued an opinion against paying the overhead rate and the state
comptroller subsequently stopped paying it, the issue went to the Alabama
Supreme Court, which determined that assigned counsel are entitled to a
reasonable fee in addition to overhead expenses.326 After this litigation, the
Alabama legislature increased the hourly rate to $70. Maine has a higher cost
of living than Alabama, making the rate an equivalent of $86.80 per hour in
Maine.327

American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 8 cmt.
(2002).
323
State ex rel Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 242 Kan. 336, 383 (Kan. 1987).
324
Cost of Living Portland, Maine vs. Wichita, Kansas, PayScale, https://www.payscale.com/costof-living-calculator/Maine-Portland/Kansas-Wichita (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). Portland, Maine has a
23% higher cost of living than Wichita, Kansas.
325
May v. State, 672 So. 2d 1307, 1308 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993).
326
Wright v. Childree, 972 So. 2d 771, 780-81 (Ala. 2006).
327
Cost of Living Portland, Maine vs. Birmingham, Alabama, PayScale, https://www.payscale.com/
cost-of-living-calculator/Maine-Portland/Alabama-Birmingham (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). Portland,
322

93

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Furthermore, the South Dakota Supreme Court set public counsel compensation hourly
rates at $67 per hour in 2000. To ensure that attorneys are perpetually paid both a
reasonable fee and overhead, the court also mandated that “court-appointed attorney
fees will increase annually in an amount equal to the cost of living increase that state
employees receive each year from the legislature.” Assigned counsel compensation in
South Dakota now stands at $95 per hour.328 For comparison purposes, a $95 hourly
fee in South Dakota in 2019 is equivalent to a $114.95 hourly fee in Maine in 2019.329
We recommend that the State of Maine adopt similar statutory language to ensure that
Maine’s assigned counsel compensation rate stays current.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The State of Maine should authorize and fund MCILS
at an appropriate level to employ state government attorneys and support staff to
operate a statewide appellate defender office and a Cumberland County trial level
public defender office.
MCILS does not currently have the statutory authority to establish governmentally
employed public defender offices. The relevant part of the statute says: “The
commission shall [d]evelop and maintain a system that uses appointed private
attorneys, contracts with individual attorneys or groups of attorneys and consider other
programs necessary to provide quality and efficient indigent legal services.”330 The
statute needs to be amended to give MCILS express authority to create staffed public
defender offices.
To be clear, there is no pre-existing, uniform “cookie-cutter” indigent defense services
delivery model that states must apply. The question for Maine policymakers, in
conjunction with criminal justice stakeholders and the broader citizenry of the state, is
simply how best to do so given the uniqueness of the state.
The 6AC does not presume that the full-time public defender offices recommended
here are the only jurisdictions or case types best served by public defender offices
in Maine. Indeed, we were struck that, as far back as 1971, the Institute of Judicial
Administration, the Supreme Judicial Court, and the Superior Court of the State of
Maine recommended a “hybrid public defender/assigned counsel delivery model” with
Maine has a 24% higher cost of living than Birmingham, Alabama.
328
See Letter from Greg Sattizahn, State Court Administrator, South Dakota Unified Judicial System,
to Andrew Fergel, State Bar of South Dakota, RE: 2019 Court-Appointed Attorney Fees and Mileage
(Nov. 15, 2018), available at https://ujs.sd.gov/uploads/docs/2019CourtAppointedAttorneyFees.pdf.
329
For comparison purposes, the cost of living in Portland, Maine, is 21% higher than in Sioux Falls,
South Dakota. See Attorney/Lawyer Cost of Living Portland, Maine vs. Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
PayScale, https://www.payscale.com/cost-of-living-calculator/Maine-Portland/South-Dakota-SiouxFalls/Attorney--Lawyer (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). Thus, a $95 hourly wage in South Dakota is
equivalent to $114.95 in Maine.
330
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, § 1804(3)(a) (2018) (emphasis added).

VI. RECOMENDATIONS
public defender offices located in Portland, Augusta, and Bangor.331 We note that both
Kennebec County (Augusta) and Penobscot County (Bangor) appear to have enough
adult criminal cases to justify public defender offices, but because we did not conduct
site visits in those two counties we refrain from making that recommendation at this
time.332 That said, MCILS and Maine policymakers should consider expanding public
defender office to these two counties once the state appellate defender and Cumberland
County public defender offices are created and operating.

State appellate defender office
Many states have found it appropriate to separate the public defense appeals system
from the public defense trial system to ensure that the direct appeal is a check against
potentially ineffective trial representation. For example:
•

Florida. Each of the state’s 20 judicial circuits (together covering the state’s
67 counties) has a public defender office, overseen by an elected chief public
defender, with full-time attorneys who provide representation to indigent
defendants at trial. Five independent state appellate defender offices provide
representation in all appeals.

•

Louisiana. Each of Louisiana’s 42 judicial districts (together comprising
the state’s 64 parishes) has a local chief defender who oversees the public
defender office or the contract defenders that provide representation to indigent
defendants at trial. For all indigent appeals, the Louisiana Public Defender
Board contracts with a non-profit that itself contracts with individual attorneys
to provide representation.

•

Michigan. The State Appellate Defender Office, overseen by the Appellate
Defender Commission, provides appellate representation to indigent defendants
statewide. Separately and independently, the Michigan Indigent Defense
Commission oversees trial representation.

•

North Carolina. The North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services
oversees the provision of right to counsel services throughout the state. Staff
public defenders are employed in a centralized unit to provide appellate
representation, separate and apart from the trial services.

See Institute of Judicial Administration, The Supreme Judicial Court and the Superior Court of
State of Maine 57-58 (1971).
332
Based on MCILS data, Penobscot County and Kennebec County had the second and third highest
indigent defense caseloads after Cumberland County.
331

the

95

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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

•

Oregon. Oregon provides trial level indigent defense services entirely through
contracts with private attorneys. The Office of Public Defense Services has an
appellate division of full-time staff attorneys to provide representation in most
direct appeals.

Appendix B sets out a budget and budget narrative for a state appellate public defender
office that assumes 80% of direct appeals and post-conviction cases statewide will be
represented by the new state appellate defender office (based on FY2018 caseloads).
The total projected cost of the office in the first year is $2,369,659.22, including
$55,100 in one-time capital outlay (furniture, computers, and phones).333

Cumberland County trial level public defender office
The American Bar Association states in its ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System that, wherever there is a “sufficiently high” caseload, the public
defense delivery system should consist of “both a public defender office and the
active participation of the private bar.”334 Although the ABA has never defined what
it means by “sufficiently high,” there is little doubt that the number of cases arising in
Cumberland County meets this threshold.
Appendix C sets out a budget and budget narrative for a Cumberland County trial level
public defender office that assumes the office will provide representation in 80% of
all adult criminal and juvenile crime cases (based on FY2018 caseloads). The public
defender office would not handle any civil cases; those would continue to be handled
by appointed private attorneys. The projected annual cost of the office is $3,042,048.
The 2018 cost for providing trial level representation in 80% of Cumberland County’s
adult criminal and juvenile crime cases was $1,921,804, so creation of a public
defender office to handle these cases will cost an additional $1,120,244 over 2018 cost.

The current cost for representation in 80% of the appellate cases is $622,215.
American Bar Ass’n, ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, Principle 2 (Feb.
2002).
333
334

APPENDIX A
MCILS Administration
PERSONNEL

TITLE

SALARY

ATTORNEYS

Executive Director

BENEFITS

POSITIONS

TOTAL

$101,002.17

$54,385.78

1

$155,387.95

Deputy Director

$96,906.00

$54,267.36

1

$151,173.36

Training Director

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

1

$111,412.95

Family Law Resource
Attorney

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

1

$111,412.95

Delinquency Resource
Attorney

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

1

$111,412.95

Adult Trial Resource Attorney

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

1

$111,412.95

Mental Health Resource Atty

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

1

$111,412.95

Audit Director

$70,675.00

$39,578.00

1

$110,253.00

Training staff

$37,408.00

$20,948.48

2

$116,712.96

Auditing staff

$37,408.00

$20,948.48

2

$116,712.96

Sub-Total

$1,207,304.98

NON-PERSONNEL EXPENSES

CURRENT

PROJECTED

Risk management insurances

$1,795.39

$7,181.56

Mailing/postage/freight

$4,675.71

$18,702.84

Cellular phones service

$1,406.69

$5,626.76

Service center

$3,095.00

$12,380.00

Office supplies & equipment

$2,062.61

$8,250.44

Office equipment rental

$1,274.45

$5,097.80

Eyeglasses reimbursement

$300.00

$1,200.00

$27,774.75

$111,099.00

Subscriptions

$327.75

$1,311.00

Dues

$585.00

$2,340.00

OIT/TELCO

Annual report prorated
Annual parking permit fee

$9.58

$38.32

$1,140.00

$4,560.00

Printing/binding
InforME annual fee

$22.00

$88.00

$2,640.00

$10,560.00

Sub-Total
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

$188,435.72
RATE

NUMBER

TOTAL

Laptop computer

$1,400.00

10

$14,000.00

Furniture

$1,200.00

10

$12,000.00

$300.00

10

Cell phones
Sub-Total
GRAND TOTAL

$3,000.00
$29,000.00
$1,424,740.70

98

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Budget narrative
In addition to the current Director and Deputy Director, the 6AC recommends the
addition of five attorney positions: Training Director, Family Law Resource Attorney,
Juvenile Resource Attorney, Mental Health Resource Attorney, and Adult Trial
Resource Attorney. Each of the Resource Attorneys will provide direct supervision
and provide help desk assistance to attorneys in the field. The Training Director will
be responsible for developing and instituting new attorney and on-going training
programs, as well as periodic topic-specific trainings to be delivered regionally and
remotely. The Training Director will oversee a staff of two to help with logistics
and training development. MCILS should also have a dedicated professional with
an auditing background to oversee all financial auditing functions, supported by two
professional staff members.
With the additional staff, the 6AC recommend that the Director position be paid on
par with the salary and compensation of a District Attorney ($155,387.95)335 and
that the Deputy Director be paid what the MCILS Director is currently being paid
($151,173.36).336 The new attorney positions are paid salaries and benefits at the
rate paid to assistant district attorneys ($111,412.95).337 Although the 6AC are not
experts in the prosecution function, 6AC staff has travelled all across the country
and interacted with numerous prosecutors, and it is our general observation that the
prosecution function in Maine is under-resourced, especially in relation to salaries
and compensation. Still, we present these recommendations because the prosecution
function offers the best current comparison.
The Auditing Director is projected at the salary and compensation of the current
MCILS Deputy Director ($110,253). The four training and auditing staff are
compensated at the current salary and benefits package of the existing rate for the
Accounting Technician ($58,356.48).338
Non-personnel expenses reflect the current MCILS budget,339 less line items dedicated
specifically for financial screeners. Each expense was prorated based on the existing
three MCILS staff members (excluding financial screeners and costs associated
Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
336
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
337
Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
338
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
339
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
335

Appendix A: MCILS Administration
primarily for screening) and then multiplied by the recommended staff of twelve.
Capital outlay expenses for new computers, furniture, and cell phones are calculated at
available retail rates.

99

APPENDIX B
State appellate defender office
PERSONNEL

TITLE

SALARY

BENEFITS

POSITIONS

TOTAL

ATTORNEYS

Chief Public Defender

$101,002.17

$54,385.78

1

Deputy Public Director

$96,906.00

$54,267.36

1

$151,173.36

Assistant Public
Defender

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

11

$1,225,542.45

Investigator

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

1

$67,186.08

Social Worker

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

1

$67,186.08

Paralegal

$38,500.00

$21,560.00

3

$180,180.00

Office Manager

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

1

$155,387.95

$67,186.08

Sub-Total

$1,913,842.00

NON-PERSONNEL EXPENSES

COST/STAFF

Risk Management Insurances
Mailing/Postage/Freight
Cellular Phones
Service Center (payroll processing, etc.)

PROJECTED

$598.46

$11,370.80

$1,558.57

$29,612.83

$468.90

$8,909.04

$1,031.67

$19,601.67

Office Supplies/Eqp.

$687.54

$13,063.20

Office Equipment Rental

$424.82

$8,071.52

Eyeglasses reimbursement

$100.00

$1,900.00

OIT/TELCO

$9,258.25

$175,906.75

Subscriptions

$109.25

$2,075.75

Dues

$195.00

$3,705.00

Annual report prorated
Annual parking permit fee

$3.19

$60.67

$380.00

$7,220.00

Printing/Binding
InforME Annual Fee (webhosting, etc.)
Rent

$7.33

$7,500.00

$880.00

$16,720.00

$5,000.00

Sub-Total
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

$95,000.00
$400,717.22

RATE

NUMBER

TOTAL

Laptop computer

$1,400.00

19

$26,600.00

Furniture

$1,200.00

19

$22,800.00

$300.00

19

$5,700.00

Cell phones
Sub-Total
GRAND TOTAL

$55,100.00
$2,369,659.22

Appendix B: State appellate defender office

Budget narrative
For 2018, MCILS reports that there were 235 direct appeal cases and 96 postconviction cases statewide. Assuming 80% are handled in-house, that means a new
statewide appellate office will handle approximately 265 direct appeal and postconviction cases. The NAC standards are nationally recognized as the absolute upper
limit of cases that a defense attorney can be expected to handle and still provide
effective, zealous representation to each and every client. For appellate services, the
NAC Standards prescribe that attorneys should handle no more than 25 appeals in a
single year.340 Thus eleven attorneys are needed to staff the office.
National standards require one supervising attorney for every ten attorneys carrying a
full caseload.341 Therefore, in addition to a Chief Appellate Defender, a Deputy Chief
Defender is required for supervision.
Although national standards require one investigator for every three staff attorneys342
and one social worker for every three attorneys,343 these standards are generally seen
as applying to trial practice. Therefore, we are recommending one investigator and
one social worker for the appellate office to assist on the post-conviction workload.
National standards also require one paralegal for every four staff attorneys.344
The 6AC recommends that the Director position be paid on par with the salary and
compensation of a District Attorney ($155,387.95)345 and that the Deputy Director
be paid what the MCILS Director is currently being paid ($151,173.36).346 The new
attorney positions are paid salaries and benefits at the rate paid to assistant district
attorneys ($111,412.95).347 Again, although the 6AC are not experts in the prosecution
National Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force
Courts, ch. 13 (The Defense), Std. 13.12 (1973).
341
National Study Comm’n on Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the
United States 4.1 (1976) (“Proper attorney supervision in a defender office requires one full-time
supervisor for every ten staff lawyers, or one part-time supervisor for every five lawyers.”).
342
National Study Comm’n on Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the
United States 4.1 (1976) (“Defender offices should employ investigators with criminal investigation
training and experience. A minimum of one investigator should be employed for every three staff
attorneys in an office. Every defender office should employ at least one investigator.”).
343
National Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Model Contract for Public Defense Services § VII.F,
available at http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/model-contract/black-letter
344
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Pub. No. NCJ185632, Keeping Defender
Workloads Manageable (2001).
345
Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
346
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
347
Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
340

on the

101

102

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine
function, 6AC staff has travelled all across the country and interacted with numerous
prosecutors, and it is our general observation that the prosecution function in Maine is
under-resourced, especially in relation to salaries and compensation. Still, we present
these recommendations because the prosecution function offers the best current
comparison. Support staff salaries and benefits are based on support staff compensation
in the Cumberland County District Attorney Office.
Non-personnel expenses reflect the current MCILS budget, less line items dedicated
specifically for financial screeners. The rent projection is based on $25 per square foot
charged against 200 square feet per staff (or $5,000 per staff member). Capital outlay
expenses for new computers, furniture, and cell phones were calculated at available
retail rates.

APPENDIX C
Cumberland County trial level public defender office
PERSONNEL

TITLE

SALARY

BENEFITS

POSITIONS

ATTORNEYS

Chief Public Defender

$101,002.17

$54,385.78

1

Deputy Public Director

$96,906.00

$54,267.36

1

$151,173.36

Assistant Public Defender

$72,418.42

$38,994.53

12

$1,336,955.40

Investigator

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

4

$268,744.32

Social Worker

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

4

$268,744.32

Paralegal

$38,500.00

$21,560.00

3

$180,180.00

Office Manager

$43,068.00

$24,118.08

1

$67,186.08

Sub-Total

TOTAL
$155,387.95

$2,428,371.43

NON-PERSONNEL EXPENSES

CURRENT

Risk Management Insurances

PROJECTED

$598.46

$15,560.05

Mailing/Postage/Freight

$1,558.57

$40,522.82

Cellular phones service

$468.90

$12,191.31

$1,031.67

$26,823.33

Office Supplies/Eqp.

$687.54

$17,875.95

Office Equipment Rental

$424.82

$11,045.23

Service Center (payroll processing, etc.)

Eyeglasses reimbursement

$100.00

$2,600.00

$9,258.25

$240,714.50

Subscriptions

$109.25

$2,840.50

Dues

$195.00

$5,070.00

OIT/TELCO

Annual report prorated
Annual parking permit fee

$3.19

$83.03

$380.00

$9,880.00

$7.33

$190.67

Printing/Binding
InforME Annual Fee (webhosting, etc.)
Rent

$880.00

$22,880.00

$5,000.00

$130,000.00

Sub-Total
CAPITAL EXPENDITURES

$538,277.39
RATE

NUMBER

TOTAL

Laptop computer

$1,400.00

26

$36,400.00

Furniture

$1,200.00

26

$31,200.00

$300.00

26

$7,800.00

Cell phones
Sub-Total
GRAND TOTAL

$75,400.00
$3,042,048.82

104

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN Maine

Budget narrative
For 2018, MCILS reports 1,232 murder, class A, B, and C cases, 2,022 class D and
E cases, and 329 juvenile crime cases in Cumberland County. Assuming 80% are
handled in-house, that means a new trial level public defender office would handle
985 felony cases, 1,618 misdemeanor cases, and 263 delinquency cases. The NAC
standards are nationally recognized as the absolute upper limit of cases that a defense
attorney can be expected to handle and still provide effective, zealous representation
to each and every client. For adult trial level services, the NAC standards prescribe
that attorneys should handle no more than 150 felonies in a single year, or 400
misdemeanors, or 200 delinquency cases.348 Thus twelve attorneys are needed to staff
the office.
National standards require one supervising attorney for every ten attorneys carrying
a full caseload.349 Therefore, in addition to a Chief Public Defender, a Deputy Chief
Defender is required for supervision.
National standards require one investigator for every three staff attorneys350 and one
social worker for every three attorneys.351 This means that the new Cumberland County
public defender office will need four investigators and four social workers. National
standards also require one paralegal for every four staff attorneys,352 requiring the new
office to have three paralegals.
The 6AC recommend that the Director position be paid on par with the salary and
compensation of a District Attorney ($155,387.95)353 and that the Deputy Director
be paid what the MCILS Director is currently being paid ($151,173.36).354 The new
attorney positions are paid salaries and benefits at the rate paid to assistant district
National Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Report of the Task Force
Courts, ch. 13 (The Defense), Std. 13.12 (1973).
349
National Study Comm’n on Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the
United States 4.1 (1976) (“Proper attorney supervision in a defender office requires one full-time
supervisor for every ten staff lawyers, or one part-time supervisor for every five lawyers.”).
350
National Study Comm’n on Defense Services, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the
United States 4.1 (1976) (“Defender offices should employ investigators with criminal investigation
training and experience. A minimum of one investigator should be employed for every three staff
attorneys in an office. Every defender office should employ at least one investigator.”).
351
National Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Model Contract for Public Defense Services § VII.F,
available at http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/model-contract/black-letter.
352
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Pub. No. NCJ185632, Keeping Defender
Workloads Manageable (2001).
353
Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
354
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
348

on the

Appendix C: Cumberland County trial level public defender office
attorneys ($111,412.95).355 Again, although the 6AC are not experts in the prosecution
function, 6AC staff has travelled all across the country and interacted with numerous
prosecutors, and it is our general observation that the prosecution function in Maine
lacks adequate funding, especially in relation to salaries and compensation. Still, we
present these recommendations because the prosecution function offers the best current
comparison. Support staff salaries and benefits are based on support staff compensation
in the Cumberland County District Attorney Office.
Non-personnel expenses reflect the current MCILS budget, less line items dedicated
specifically for financial screeners. Each expense356 was prorated based on the existing
three MCILS staff members and then multiplied by the recommended staff of eleven.
The rent projection is based on $25 per square foot charged against 200 square feet
per staff (or $5,000 per staff member). Capital outlay expenses for new computers,
furniture and cell phones were calculated at available retail rates.

Email from Mark A. Toulouse, Division Chief – Finance & Administrative Services, Office of the
Attorney General State of Maine, to David Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center
(Mar. 12, 2019). This amount reflects salary plus benefits calculated at approximately 35% of salary.
356
Email from John Pelletier, Director, Maine Commission on Indigent Legal Services, to David
Carroll, Executive Director of Sixth Amendment Center (Mar. 7, 2019).
355

105

6AC
www.sixthamendment.org