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SIMPLIFIED PLEADING, MEANINGFUL
DAYS IN COURT, AND TRIALS ON THE
MERITS: REFLECTIONS ON THE
DEFORMATION OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE
ARTHUR R. MILLER*
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938, they
reflected a policy of citizen access for civil disputes and sought to promote their
resolution on the merits rather than on the basis of the technicalities that characterized earlier procedural systems.The federal courts applied that philosophy of procedure for many years. However, the last quarter century has seen a dramatic
contrary shift in the way the federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have
interpreted and applied the Federal Rules and other procedural matters. This shift
has produced the increasingly early procedural disposition of cases prior to trial.
Indeed, civil trials, especially jury trials, are very few and far between today.
The author examines the significant manifestations of this dramatic change, and
traces the shift in judicial attitude back to the three pro-summary judgment decisions by the Supreme Court in 1986. Furthermore, he goes on to discuss the judicial
gatekeeping that has emerged regarding (1) expert testimony, (2) the constriction of
class action certification, (3) the enforcement of arbitration clauses in an extraordinary array of contracts (many adhesive in character), (4) the Court’s abandonment
of notice pleading in favor of plausibility pleading (which, in effect, is a return to
fact pleading), (5) the intimations of a potential narrowing of the reach of in personam jurisdiction, and (6) a number of limitations on pretrial discovery that have
resulted from Rule amendments during the last twenty-five years.
All of these changes restrict the ability of plaintiffs to reach a determination of their
claims’ merits, which has resulted in a narrowing effect on citizen access to a meaningful day in court. Beyond that, these restrictive procedural developments work
against the effectiveness of private litigation to enforce various public policies
involving such matters as civil rights, antitrust, employment discrimination, and
securities regulation.
Concerns about abusive and frivolous litigation, threats of extortionate settlements,
and the high cost of today’s large-scale lawsuits motivate these deviations from the
original philosophy of the Federal Rules, but these concerns fail to take proper
account of other systemic values. The author argues that these assertions are speculative and not empirically justified, are overstated, and simply reflect the self-interest
of various groups that seek to terminate claims asserted against them as early as
possible to avoid both discovery and a trial. Indeed, they simply may reflect a
* Copyright  2013 by Arthur R. Miller, University Professor, New York University
School of Law. What follows is a substantial elaboration of thoughts expressed in my
Inaugural University Professorship Lecture on March 19, 2012, at the New York University
School of Law. I am grateful to my colleague (and coauthor, on other publications) Helen
Hershkoff for her suggestions and intellectual provocations.
286

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strong pro-business and pro-government orientation of today’s federal judiciary.
The author cautions that some restoration of the earlier underlying philosophy of
the Federal Rules is necessary if we are to preserve the procedural principles that
should underlie our civil justice system and maintain the viability of private litigation as an adjunct to government regulation for the enforcement of important societal policies and values.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION: THEN AND NOW . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE DEFORMATION OF PROCEDURE IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Summary Judgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Expert Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Class Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Federal Arbitration Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. Pleading Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Personal Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF AND PURPORTED
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DEFORMATION OF FEDERAL
PROCEDURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

287
288

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309
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INTRODUCTION
For over half a century, my professional life has centered around
federal court procedure in civil cases.1 Thinking about what I perceive
to be happening at present and what used to be leads me to feel that
the time has come for a few reflections. As I begin, I am reminded of a
recurring scene in corporate intrigue and mob movies. Just as a terrible fate is about to befall someone, the villain often says, “It’s not
personal; it’s business.” But for me, the following reflections about
what I have seen and experienced as an academic, commentator, and
practitioner in the world of federal civil procedure over these years
are both “business” and “personal.” And the reader should be
advised, some are very personal.

1 I was extremely fortunate to have learned the basics of civil procedure from a stellar
teacher and scholar at the Harvard Law School—the late Professor and Judge, Benjamin
Kaplan—who was to become my mentor and, in time, my Harvard Law School colleague
and friend. It was Ben who made me a procedure wonk. Arthur R. Miller, In Memoriam:
Benjamin Kaplan, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1354 (2011).

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I
FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION: THEN

AND

NOW

Throughout the years, I always have believed in the purposes of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) as embedded
in Rule 1 by the people who wrote them a little more than seventyfive years ago.2 As Rule 1 tersely states, the goal is “the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”3 I
have come to believe that we have strayed from that mandate. The
drift is producing negative consequences for our civil justice system, as
well as for some of the democratic principles underlying it. The drift
creates a need for adjustment and redirection.
When the Federal Rules were promulgated in 1938, they
embodied a justice-seeking ethos. As has been recognized repeatedly
by the Supreme Court, the distinguished proceduralists who drafted
the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts and in the
resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.4 To that end, the original rulemakers established a relatively
comprehensible, plainly worded, and nontechnical system. The
drafters provided generalized provisions relating to the various procedural structures, often drawn from federal equity practice—thereby
promoting discretion, flexibility of judicial application, and simplicity
of operation.5
Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in the history of the
debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior
2 I entered the profession when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were twenty
years young. These reflections are being published as the Federal Rules have reached their
seventy-fifth anniversary.
3 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1011, 1029 (3d ed. 2002) (explaining the
history and purpose of the Federal Rules).
4 See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373 (1966) (“The basic purpose of the Federal Rules is to administer justice through fair trials, not through summary
dismissals as necessary as they may be on occasion.”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
181–82 (1962) (reversing a lower court’s dismissal on technicalities due to the preference
for resolution of disputes on their merits); see also 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3,
§ 1029 (discussing Rule 1 as an example of the drafters’ intent that disputes be resolved on
their merits); B.H. Carey, In Favor of Uniformity, 18 TEMPLE L.Q. 146, 146 (1943) (using
the purpose of the Federal Rules to argue for their uniform state court adoption); John J.
Parker, Improving the Administration of Justice, 3 F.R.D. 245, 245–46 (1944) (discussing
the impact of the Federal Rules on federal court procedure).
5 The history of the Federal Rules and the philosophical objectives of those who
drafted them are chronicled in Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,
943–75 (1987). See also Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297,
316–17 (1938) (noting the improved flexibility and simplicity of the Federal Rules as
promulgated in 1938).

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English and American procedural systems—that is, the common law
forms of action and then the codes6—the Rules established an easily
satisfied pleading regime for stating a grievance that abjured factual
triviality, verbosity, and technicality. Relatively little was demanded of
the plaintiff.7 As exemplified by several of the skeletal Official Forms
attached to the Rules,8 the pleader merely had to say that she felt
aggrieved and state what was desired9—something metaphorically
analogous to Oliver Twist’s simple request, “ Please, sir . . . I want
some more [gruel].”10
This pleading regime was followed by rules that made available a
wide-angle discovery into the facts underlying the dispute’s merits,
enabling the parties to secure any information relevant to the subject
matter of the action.11 The objective was obvious and seemingly unobjectionable: The parties should have equal access to all relevant data;
litigation was to be resolved based on the revealed facts, not on who
was better at chicanery or hiding the ball.12 A summary judgment procedure was available when there was no “genuine dispute as to any
material fact,” enabling a district judge to resolve a lawsuit as a matter
of law, but the Supreme Court cautioned that the motion was to be
granted infrequently.13 Philosophically, the gold standard of federal
6 The rigidity and technicality that characterized common law procedure and the codes
is illustrated in JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN
HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 501–53 (10th ed. 2009).
7 Id. (explaining the Federal Rules’ purpose).
8 E.g., FED. R. CIV. P. forms 4–7, 11. Since 1948, the Forms are said to be “sufficient
under these rules” in Rule 84. The Advisory Committee’s Reporter called the forms “the
most important part of the rules.” Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12
WYO. L.J. 177, 191 (1958).
9 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)–(3). One of the architects (indeed, probably the chief
architect) of the Federal Rules referred to this as the cornerstone of the new system. See
Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 144, 154–55 (1948) (stressing that the Federal Rules should abandon “detail” and
embrace “brevity”).
10 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 29 (1839).
11 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (discovery rules).
12 As articulated by the Supreme Court, because of the discovery rules, “civil trials in
the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear . . . for the
parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.”
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947); see also United States v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (“Modern instruments of discovery . . . with pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues of facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.”).
13 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Examples of that restrained use of the procedure are found in
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159–60 (1970), and Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962). Indeed, in Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co.,
334 U.S. 249, 256–57 (1948), the Court remarked: “[S]ummary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues
of far-flung import, on which the Court should draw inferences with caution . . . .”

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civil dispute resolution was a trial. When appropriate, that meant trial
by jury.
Trying to reach the right result after an adversarial contest on a
level litigation field seemed a worthy raison d’être for a procedural
system. Thus, the Rules always have felt very American in spirit—like
apple pie, baseball, and the flag. Promoting the Rules’ objectives
appeared to be a useful outlet for one’s professional energies; thinking
about my labors since graduating from law school in 1958, I would like
to think it has been time well spent.
The bench and the bar pursued that vision of the civil justice process, and law schools taught it for many years following the promulgation of the Federal Rules.14 But, of course, both our society and our
profession have changed dramatically, and American civil litigation
has been altered substantially over the years. Before examining the
deviations from the original philosophical objectives of the Rules that
concern me, I will identify in brief compass some of the significant
phenomena that have impacted federal litigation since 1938 that bear
on what has happened in the world of procedure.
The typical lawsuit when the Rules became effective involved a
single plaintiff and a single defendant jousting about what usually
were relatively simple matters. Dockets were more modest in length,
and the federal judiciary was a fraction of its present size. Today,
issues of science, technology, communications, economics, national
policy, and legal complexity characterize federal litigation. Moreover,
in the past few decades, we have experienced a tremendous growth in
multiparty, multiclaim, and multidistrict disputes. In addition, of
course, there has been an extraordinary expansion of class and mass
actions—a development that, to this point, largely has been unique to
the United States but in various forms has begun to take on the indicia
of a multinational trend.15 These actions feature disputes about a
14 See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1029 (discussing the purpose and construction of the Federal Rules). The Federal Rules have been embraced in whole or in part in a
significant number of states. See John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State
Courts, 3 NEV. L.J. 354, 356–57 (2003) (identifying thirty-three states that have adopted all
or most of the Federal Rules).
15 Often characterized (and rejected) as an exemplar of American exceptionalism, the
class action has been a subject of considerable study around the globe in recent years as
many other judicial systems have begun to feel the pressure of litigation arising out of mass
phenomena. See OSCAR G. CHASE, HELEN HERSHKOFF, LINDA SILBERMAN, YASUHEI
TANIGUCHI, VINCENZO VARANO & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CIVIL LITIGATION IN
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 390–400 (2007) (observing the American class action system
through a comparative perspective); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND
REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE 1–3 (2008) (rejecting the widely held belief that
European aggregate litigation reform should aim to emulate American class actions);

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tremendous range of highly intricate matters often having a scale previously thought inconceivable that challenge even the most gifted
attorneys and jurists—dangerous pharmaceuticals, asbestos and other
toxic substances, mass disasters, mind-numbingly complex financial
transactions, technology disputes, defective products, and improper
governmental conduct.
The appearance of behemoth-like lawsuits has led to the recognition that disputes arising out of conduct having mass consequences
and today’s globalized commerce, communication, and information
flow cannot be resolved the old fashioned way—one by one. That has
put enormous pressure on our courts to modify existing procedural
norms and has led some to question the limits of traditional civil litigation.16 Not surprisingly, these developments have been accompanied
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON CONSUMER COLLECTIVE REDRESS (2008) (discussing options for resolving mass consumer claims; no action has
yet been taken by the European Union); Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will
Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 192–97 (2009) (noting that
the relationships between counsel, parties, and courts in European systems would be markedly different than in American class actions); Edward F. Sherman, Group Litigation
Under Foreign Legal Systems: Variations and Alternatives to American Class Actions, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 401, 401–03 (2002) (discussing other countries’ views toward American
class actions as a procedural device worth studying but not adopting). Indeed, several
nations have adopted a variety of aggregate litigation procedures, including Brazil, Denmark, Israel, Sweden, and the Netherlands, although none of them can be characterized as
American-style class actions. See Deborah H. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation:
Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307
(2011) (noting that at least twenty-one countries have some type of “class action”);
Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American
Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 21–25 (2009) (identifying the differences and similarities between United States and European class action devices). The Dutch initiative is
particularly striking because it permits representative organizations and defendants to
reach out-of-court settlements and petition the Amsterdam Court of Appeals for approval.
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Code of Civil Procedure) [Rv] art. 1069
(Neth.); see also James M. Newland, Brian P. Moher & Jason W. Reynar, A Touch of
Dutch: Group Actions in the Netherlands, 6 CLASS ACTION 394, 395–96 (2012) (describing
the Dutch system in the context of several prominent cases).
16 See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement:
An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1631–34 (2004)
(discussing the administrative nature of class action settlements); Judith Resnik, Compared
to What? ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’
Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011) (discussing two divergent conceptions of
aggregate litigation from a due process perspective); Symposium, Aggregate Litigation:
Critical Perspectives, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 293 (2011) (discussing future of aggregate
litigation in class and nonclass contexts). Two striking legislative developments in this vein
are the enactment of the Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Trial Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1369
(2006), in 2002 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1469,
1711–1715 (2006). Both statutes replaced the historic requirement of complete diversity of
citizenship, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806), with one of minimal
diversity to facilitate and expand federal subject matter jurisdiction over certain categories
of complex cases having multistate characteristics. The American Law Institute also has

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by an increase in judicial caseloads, the protraction of lawsuits, a
movement toward modes of “alternative dispute resolution,” and a
growing incidence of transnational litigation presenting yet another
set of complexities.
The societal, legal, and technological revolutions that followed
World War II transformed the business of our national courts. Over
the past sixty-five years, we have witnessed the most extraordinary
growth in federal and state substantive law in this country’s history.
The workload of the federal courts in the 1930s, when the Federal
Rules were birthed, consisted of a relatively limited number of subject
areas of significance—there was a touch of antitrust, a little copyright,
a few patent cases, various interstate commerce matters, and a range
of diversity of citizenship cases. The securities laws were in their
infancy, the civil rights revolution was yet to happen, due process and
equal protection doctrines were relatively underdeveloped, and
textually neuralgic statutes like the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO),17 the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA),18 and the impenetrable Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 200119
were not yet enacted. Yesterday’s actions based on federal question
subject matter jurisdiction represent a very small element of what is
now on the dockets of our national courts. Much contemporary diversity litigation has magnified in dimension and complexity. Today’s
worlds of civil rights, employment discrimination, environmental, consumer protection, pension, high-tech, and product safety litigation
largely did not exist when the Federal Rules were formulated. Most of
them still did not exist when I was in law school; there were not even
law school courses on those subjects in the 1950s.20
This combination of increased complexity, expansion of the substantive law, and the growth of multiparty, multiclaim, and multidistrict litigation that have accompanied the development (and proven
been very active on the subject. First it approved the Complex Litigation Statutory
Recommendations and Analysis with Reporter’s Study in 1994, which I served as
Reporter. See AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS
AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTER’S STUDY, at vii (1994) (listing author as reporter). Then
the Institute approved the Aggregate Litigation Project in 2010, which I served as an
advisor. See AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION, at v
(2010) (listing author as advisor).
17 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006).
19 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
20 A perusal of the catalogues of top-tier law schools demonstrates the enormous curriculum enrichment that has taken place in the years since.

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essential to the effectuation) of many of the new fields of law has
given rise to one of the most striking changes in the culture and
processing of civil litigation I have witnessed during my professional
life—the emergence and magnification of judicial management. The
genesis of judicial management lies in the problems, attention, and
judicial experimentation generated by large or complex cases that
began to arise in the late 1940s.21 When a flood of private electrical
supply-conspiracy damage actions in the early 1960s inundated the
federal courts, Chief Justice Warren responded by appointing a select
group of district judges who developed a systematic approach for
processing the cases that led to their much faster resolution than
anyone anticipated.22 That successful experience was followed by the
enactment of the Multidistrict Litigation Act in 1968, which established the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation and provided for
the intrasystem transfer of related cases for consolidated pretrial
treatment.23 That, in turn, caused many to focus on the special procedural issues that often arise in “big” cases and that have proven to be
a significant factor in promoting the utilization of management techniques by federal judges. Indeed, some view the Panel’s application of
the 1968 statute over the years as the “primary vehicle” for the
processing of complex and dispersed civil litigation.24
Some of the judicial experiences and methods employed during
these years were captured initially in the Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases and then incorporated
21 See 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3861 (3d
ed. 2007); see also Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward
a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV.
2245, 2274–77 (2008) (linking the development of more involved case management to the
Judicial Panel of Multidistrict Litigation).
22 The background of these events is described in Phil C. Neal & Perry C. Goldberg,
The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial Administration, 50 A.B.A. J. 621,
621–22 (1964), and James R. Withrow & Richard P. Lark, The “Big” Antitrust Case:
Twenty-Five Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1976).
23 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006); see also 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21,
§§ 3861, 3865 (discussing the operation of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation). At
one point, I expressed the hope that aggregation through the section 1407 transfer mechanism would be an effective way to deal with the enormous backlog of asbestos cases in the
federal courts. See Arthur R. Miller & Price Ainsworth, Resolving the Asbestos PersonalInjury Litigation Crisis, 10 REV. LITIG. 419, 453–60 (1997). Today’s reality is that multidistrict litigation (MDL) practice has grown enormously across the substantive spectrum.
See Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775,
793–98 (2010) (reporting on a Federal Judicial Center study showing the tremendous
number of federal civil cases involved in the MDL process).
24 Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324 (2008).

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into the influential original Manual for Complex Litigation (the
“Manual”)25 in 1968. The Manual has been revised and updated several times in the years since.26 A number of the Manual’s general principles regarding judicial control, the scheduling of the pretrial process,
the pretrial elimination of extraneous matters, and the promotion of
settlement and alternative dispute resolution were encapsulated in an
extensive revision of Federal Rule 16 in 1983, while I was serving as
the Reporter to the Federal Rules Advisory Committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. A 1993 amendment further elaborated that Rule.27 As a result, the notion of judicial management was
officially validated by the Rule’s amendment, making it applicable to
all actions in the federal district courts.28 Management was further
enshrined in the civil justice system when Congress enacted the Civil
Justice Reform Act in 1990,29 which led to the promulgation of district
25 25 F.R.D. 351 (1950); see also 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21,
§§ 3861, 3868 (describing the process that created the Manual for Complex Litigation). The
document originally was entitled the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation (the
“Manual”). The antecedent of the Handbook was the Prettyman Report on Procedure in
Antitrust and other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62 (1951), but the profession was not ready
to utilize its contents at the time of its publication. The original Manual had no official
status, and some district court judges felt it was inconsistent with their perception of the
judicial function and how best to allocate their time. That resistance was one of the motivations for the 1983 revision of Rule 16. See ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE
CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984).
26 I had the honor of serving as an informal reporter to assist the panel of experienced
judges selected by the Coordinating Committee for Multiple Litigation of the U.S. District
Courts (who were veterans of the electrical supply-case experience) in drafting the original
Manual. The motor force behind the drafting of the Manual was the leadership of William
H. Becker, Chief Judge of the Western District of Missouri. He was a fervent believer in
the importance of early judicial control of cases and of an absolutely firm scheduling set at
the outset. I still remember his oft-repeated message: “Put a case on a schedule with trial
on a certain day and never deviate. If everyone understands that, the case will settle if it
can be settled.”
27 The amendment clarified a number of details of Rule 16 practice, such as deadlines,
matters covered by the scheduling order, and the district court’s authority. In 2006, the
Rule was amended again to take account of discovery relating to electronically stored
information. See generally 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY
KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1521–1522 (3d ed. 2010)
(explaining the Rule’s amendments).
28 Id.
29 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The Act’s requirements governing delay
plans were sunset in 1997 and no longer are in effect. Id. § 103(a). However, there are
questions as to whether certain aspects of the Act and the plans produced under it remain
in force. Carl Tobias, Fin-de-Siècle Federal Civil Procedure, 51 FLA. L. REV. 641, 661–62
(1999). The independent utility of the statute and the plans are questionable given Rule 16
and the Manual. See Laurens Walker, The End of the New Deal and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1269, 1281–85 (1997) (discussing the tension between the
Civil Justice Reform Act and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

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court expense and delay plans embodying many of the principles and
practices described in the Manual and in Rule 16.30 The combined
effect of these developments has been profound. Their application
over the years has made judicial management a basic characteristic of
civil practice in the federal courts,31 one that empirical evidence suggests has been considered useful by many litigators32 and judges.33
As a result of the passage of time and the profession’s everincreasing experience with the multidistrict litigation statute, Rule 16,
and the Manual, the role of the district judge (or the magistrate judge
in many actions) as a case manager generally is accepted today by
most practitioners and jurists. Indeed, many federal litigators apparently would prefer firmer and more constant judicial control of their
cases.34 This shift in judicial orientation toward management (and, in
many cases, toward facilitating pretrial settlement) and away from
(some would say at the expense of) traditional modes of adjudication
30 All ninety-four district courts issued plans, which typically provided for differentiated case management, limitations on discovery, greater use of alternative dispute resolution, and various forms of judicial settlement assistance. Judicial Conference of the United
States, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 Submitted by the Judicial Conference of the
United States, 175 F.R.D. 62 (1997).
31 See United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1, 24 (D. Mass. 2011) (“Today
the mantra is judicial management: management and more management.”); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 877, 888 (2008) (characterizing judicial management as a basic aspect of civil litigation that the Twombly decision ignores).
32 See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE:
DETAILED REPORT 3, 6, 11, 123–44 (2009) (observing very high satisfaction with judicial
case management practices among lawyers); EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING,
NATIONAL CASE-BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 27–33 (2009), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (observing that the
majority of both plaintiffs’ and defense lawyers thought that discovery rules achieved their
stated goals effectively).
33 See WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX
CASES: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES 1–7 (1982) (detailing the evidence in
favor of close judicial case management in antitrust cases); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial
Response to the Costs of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning, and
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 255–60 (1985) (arguing for
increased case management to reduce litigation costs); see also James S. Kakalik, Deborah
R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana,
Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data,
39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 676 (1998) (concluding that a substantial majority of lawyers and a
“vast majority” of judges favor judicial management of discovery).
34 I heard this view expressed by several speakers at the May 2010 Litigation Review
Conference at the Duke Law School convened by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee of
the Judicial Conference. The meeting was attended by an impressive array of judges, litigators, corporate counsel, and academics. For a summary of the Conference, see John G.
Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 542 (2010), in which the author, a
distinguished federal district judge, notes the substantial agreement on the need for the
active judicial management of litigation.

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has been controversial,35 however. Some commentators have
expressed the view that the shift toward judicial management has
transferred too much power and discretion to the district judge,
impaired the ability to secure a trial on the merits, diluted the stature
of jury trials, and diminished the autonomy of the advocates.
Although the intensity of this cross-current of opinion has diminished
in recent years, the difference in viewpoints on the subject has hardly
been eliminated.36
Whatever the merits of the debate may be, one thing seems clear:
Judicial management represents a significant modification, and perhaps an unquantifiable debilitation, of the historic bilateral adversary
system that has characterized civil proceedings in common law courts
for centuries. That bilateral model has been replaced to some degree
by a process that is more akin to a triangulated shared power and
functional relationship between the judge and the lawyers. Perhaps
the shift is an inevitable byproduct of the multidistrict litigation
statute, Rule 16, and the Manual, as well as the growing pressure on
the system from “big” cases. Indeed, when I was called upon to discuss the 1983 amendment of Rule 16 with various groups in my role as
Reporter, I opined (somewhat rhetorically) that the then-new rule
reflected the view that “the adversary system as we know it has
become too costly and inefficient a device for resolving civil disputes.”37 The reality is that it is no longer accurate to say that a lawsuit is the “lawyer’s case” or to view the judge as a relatively passive
referee or umpire. Increased judicial management and participation
35 See Robert E. Keeton, Time Limits as Incentives in an Adversary System, 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 2053, 2057 (1989) (arguing that judges should devote themselves to judging and
the duties of “care and control, stewardship over the trial, superintendence . . . direction
and leadership”); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 494, 528 (1986) (discussing the growing view of both judges and consumers of
judicial resources that the ultimate goal is to facilitate settlement); Michael E. Tigar,
Pretrial Case Management Under the Amended Rules: Too Many Words for a Good Idea,
14 REV. LITIG. 137, 152–53 (1994) (explaining that management emphasizes efficiency and
speed at the expense of other values). Compare Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982) (arguing that case management could lead to due process concerns), with Stephen Flanders, Blind Umpires: A Response to Professor Resnik, 35
HASTINGS L.J. 505, 520–22 (1984) (arguing that not all types of case management are cause
for concern).
36 Currently, a lively discussion centers on the question of what is the most appropriate
and effective utilization of the time of district judges, a question that is related to widespread concern about the so-called “vanishing trial.” See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text; see also Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 689–97 (2010) (outlining the arguments for and against judges
using their time to manage cases).
37 Arthur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1,
20 (1984).

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may be a contributing factor to the willingness of judges to terminate
litigation short of trial, a major theme developed below.
Judicial involvement in matters traditionally left to the adversary
process is most extensive in class actions because—in addition to the
management matters described in Rule 16 that apply to all civil
actions—Rule 23 requires the district court to determine (1) the adequacy and selection of the class’s representative and counsel, (2) the
contours of the class and any subclasses, (3) the relationship between
class counsel and class members, (4) the content of notices sent to
class members, (5) the fairness of any proposed settlement, and (6)
the fees, if any, to be awarded to the class’s attorneys.38 But it is not
uncommon to see extensive management by district judges (and magistrates) in mass or complex cases that lie outside the ambit of Rule
23. Recent years also have seen the emergence of what has been
called the “quasi–class action,” which supposedly justifies judicial control over collective settlements and attorneys’ fee matters that previously were left to the advocates in non-representative, non–class
action certified cases.39 The magnitude of this tectonic shift in the handling of civil cases has yet to be measured or evaluated systematically,
and precisely how the balance eventually will be struck between judicial management and the traditional adversary methodology remains
to be seen.40
38

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268, 271–72 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 424 F. Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re Vioxx
Prods. Liab. Litig., 574 F. Supp. 2d 606, 611–12 (E.D. La. 2008); In re Guidant Corp.
Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708, 2008 WL 682174, at *6
(D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2008), amended by 2008 WL 3896006 (D. Minn. Aug. 21, 2008). For a
discussion of the Zyprexa, Vioxx, and Guidant MDL proceedings, see Charles Silver &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing Multi-district Litigations:
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 113–20 (2010) and AM. LAW INST.,
AGGREGATE LITIGATION PRINCIPLES 174–76 (2010). In the litigation brought by the 9/11
responders seeking compensation for respiratory ailments, a non–class action, District
Judge Hellerstein initially rejected the proposed settlement of over 10,000 claims and
sought the reduction of attorneys’ fees. An enhanced settlement was approved. See Alvin
K. Hellerstein, James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron O. Twerski, Managerial Judging: The
9/11 Responders’ Tort Litigation, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 127 (2012) (describing the various
stages of the 9/11 litigation). Judicial authority for these interventions in a nonclass setting,
which lacks some of the procedural safeguards made available for class actions by Rule 23
is controversial. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Aggregation, Community, and the
Line Between, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 889, 898 (2010); Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270–74 (2011).
40 There are other examples of this shift. For example, the limited mandatory disclosure
provision now found in Rule 26(a) calling for the automatic turning over of certain categories of information as a precursor to formal discovery is thought by some to be inconsistent
with the adversary model. See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 632 (2010). The provision has
had a checkered history, and its utility remains unclear. See generally 8A CHARLES ALAN
39

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In a different but perhaps no less significant category of change
since the promulgation of the Federal Rules, law has become a business as much as a profession. Like many, I mourn that shift. Law practice today is highly competitive and territorial. Professional courtesy
in some respects is in eclipse. Lawyers on both sides of the “v.”—and
often even on the same side of the “v.”—troll for clients and play turf
games to secure control over potentially lucrative lawsuits. In some
contexts there is so much money on the table that the litigation stakes
promote unprofessional motivations and behaviors. The mega law
firms, some now global in character, are partnerships in name only.
The pressure of contemporary business economics has destroyed several marquee firms: The most recent stunning example is the bankruptcy of the highly regarded Dewey & LeBoeuf.41 As has been said,
“Money is weak glue.”42 The Supreme Court—sadly in my view—has
validated lawyer advertising in the name of free speech,43 leading
some members of the bar to become TV pitchmen. Law firm marketing, replete with wining and dining, networking meetings at posh
resorts, and glossy brochures, is now commonplace. Sometimes the
dealmaking among plaintiffs’ lawyers vying for leadership in a case
(and a larger portion of the potential attorney’s fees) has the feel of
haggling in the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul. The defense side similarly
sees itself as being in the legal business as much (or more than) the
legal profession. The difference on the defense side is that the acquisition and retention of clients and the division of a litigation’s workload
and its spoils among firms simply is a more genteel and less visible
process. In sum, all too many firms have become bottom-line profit
maximizers.
On a more positive note, the profession has become more diversified and heterogeneous at all levels and in all categories. Moreover,
because of the wide-ranging, significant legal developments designed
to meet the quest for social justice that emerged in post–World War II
America, we now have something that really did not exist in
1938—the public interest and social action bars. They are composed of
professionals who deserve the greatest respect and gratitude because
WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2053–54 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining Federal Rule 26(a)’s history and
pitfalls); Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Unintended Consequences of
Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753 (1995) (describing uncertainty as to whether
mandatory disclosure reduces or increases costs of litigation).
41 Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012,
at B1. It is the largest law firm bankruptcy in history. Id.
42 Id. (quoting Professor William Henderson).
43 See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 381–83 (1977) (holding that lawyer
advertising is protected speech under the First Amendment).

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they resort to the civil justice system for various ideological, egalitarian, and humanitarian reasons in an attempt to promote public policies and expand the rights and remedies of the people they
represent.44
Much wonderful and creative legal work in the public interest has
been done by lawyers pursuing the private enforcement of public policies—indeed, we sometimes refer to them as private attorneys general.45 They typically are supported by donations, foundations,
contingent fees, or the hope of a court awarded fee, the latter two
modes subjecting them to enormous financial risks. Closely related to
the core of public interest practitioners are lawyers whose motivations
are, in fact, entrepreneurial and others who are both altruistic and
entrepreneurial in outlook.46 Often embedded in the entrepreneurial
aspects of the activities of both of these groups lies a strong desire to
further the public policies underlying particular cases. Because of the
dramatic expansion of substantive rights in recent decades, many
more litigation fields now exist for plaintiffs’ lawyers—whether
entrepreneurial, public interest, or a mixture of the two—to pursue
the enforcement or expansion of various regulatory objectives by way
of litigation.
The efforts of public interest attorneys go well beyond the classic
civil rights and legislative reapportionment battles. Asbestos is held in
check by the private bar.47 Tobacco is cabined by the private bar.48
44 See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1183–86 (2009) (detailing the sudden rise of the public interest bar in the late 1960s). Not
to be ignored, of course, is the rise of the conservative bar as exemplified by the growth of
the Federalist Society, now countered by the emergence of the American Constitution
Society.
45 See Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) (referring to the
term “private attorney generals”—for possibly the first time in American case law),
vacated, 319 U.S. 739 (1943). See generally William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private
Attorney General” Is—and Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004) (discussing the
history and the role of private attorneys general). The origins of the private enforcement of
public policy is traced in Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, The Civil Rights Movement, and the
Silent Litigation Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1977–85 (2004).
46 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 888–89 (1987)
(describing lawyers who pursue litigation for private gain); Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for
Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5–11 (2008) (discussing the implicit
expectation of entrepreneurial motivations for lawyers through the perspective of Supreme
Court case law).
47 See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV.
899, 908–14 (1996) (discussing asbestos litigation by private attorneys); see also Steve
Olafson, 21 Steelworkers Who Contracted Asbestos Disease Win $115 Million, HOUS.
CHRON., Feb. 20, 1998, at 1, available at http://www.lanierlawfirm.com/law_firm_news/
asbestos_disease_lawsuit_brazoria.htm (describing an asbestos-related verdict against The
Carborundum Company).

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Defective pharmaceuticals such as diet drugs, Vioxx, and other
products are removed from our midst.49 Illicit financial and market
practices of companies such as Enron are halted by the private bar.50
Today, a number of attempts are underway to hold accountable some
of those responsible for the recent financial crisis.51 Fewer Americans
die or become incapacitated by defective products or toxic substances,
and important social and economic policies are enforced because of
the work of these lawyers.52
48 See Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of
Extraordinary Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiffs’ Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51
DEPAUL L. REV. 219, 226–28 (2001).
49 See Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of
Unconsented Sperm Harvesting and Drug-Induced Multiple Pregnancies, 44 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 451, 484 (2000) (mentioning several products that have been eliminated by the private
bar); Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
20, 2005, at A1 (discussing a verdict against Vioxx).
50 See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & “ERISA” Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2008 WL
4178151 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 8, 2008) (approving the plan for allocation of the more than $7
billion settlement fund recovered in various Enron cases); Gary J. Aguirre, The Enron
Decision: Closing the Fraud-Free Zone on Errant Gatekeepers?, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 447,
453–60 (2003) (describing a class action suit challenging Enron’s fraud); Milton C. Regan,
Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORD. L. REV. 1139 (2005) (describing the Enron machinations
and the participants).
51 Several actions have been brought arising out of the mortgage securitization practices that took place during the recent recession. However, today’s pleading burdens have
been difficult to negotiate. See infra notes 170–219 and accompanying text; see also
Landesbank Baden-Württemberg v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11-4443-CV, 2012 WL
1352590, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2012) (holding that allegations of fraud in marketing collateralized debt obligations were insufficient despite a showing of Goldman’s extensive subprime exposure and knowledge of the deterioration of the market). But cf. Dodona I, LLC
v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 648–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (denying a motion
to dismiss and ruling that whether the plaintiff could have uncovered defendant’s fraud in
marketing collateralized debt obligations was a question of fact). The Landesbank and
Dodona cases are further discussed infra at note 209. A few cases suggest that plaintiffs
may hold at least some financial institutions responsible under the new pleading regime.
See Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11 Civ. 733 (WHP), 2012 WL
2847732, at *18–19 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (upholding a complaint alleging that the bank
knew of legal problems growing from its method of monitoring mortgages); Tsereteli v.
Residential Asset Securitization Trust, No. 08 Civ. 10637, 2012 WL 2532172, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (granting class certification in a suit alleging that Credit
Suisse Securities (USA) LLC failed to tell investors about the poor quality of loans behind
$642 million in mortgage-backed securities offered in 2006); Mark Hamblett, Goldman
Loses Bid to Dismiss CDO Suit, N.Y. L.J., June 25, 2012, at 1, available at
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202560558742&slreturn=1;
Federal Court Approves $40 Million Settlement in Lehman Brothers Residential MortgageBacked Securities Class Action Lawsuit, BUS. WIRE (June 22, 2012), http://www.
businesswire.com/news/home/20120622005424/en/Federal-Court-Approves-40-MillionSettlement-Lehman (approving the settlement and ending a four-year securities class
action against individuals who were associated with Lehman Brothers).
52 See Reingold, supra note 46, at 29–31 (discussing beneficial effects that no longer
exist due to de facto elimination of private plaintiffs’ lawyers litigating in that area).

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The rise of the public interest bar, now nurtured by many law
schools, has furthered the enforcement of constitutional and statutory
public policies. In effect, we now have an indispensable satellite regulatory system that augments and sometimes serves as a substitute for
the work of official governmental agencies that typically are under
resourced, captured by the industries they are expected to regulate, or
ossified by internal regulation. The Enron debacle has become a
poster child exemplifying governmental and private institutions being
“asleep at the wheel.”53 In the face of limited official oversight, the
public interest bar watches both commercial and government conduct.54 In many contexts, the private enforcement of these norms is
pursuant to statutory,55 common law,56 or constitutional principles;57
in other instances, it has come as a result of the implication of private
rights of action by the courts.58 Thus, today there are private civil
actions under laws relating to antitrust, securities, consumer
53 John R. Kroger, Enron, Fraud, and Securities Reform: An Enron Prosecutor’s
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 60 (2005) (condemning the Securities and Exchange
Commission, Enron’s board of directors, the accountants, securities analysts, and the federal criminal laws in the terms quoted in the text).
54 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1283–84 (1976) (describing differences between the historical adversarial
system and the current public law model); see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 6–10 (2010) (characterizing private lawsuits to enforce legislation as essential to legal infrastructure in the United
States); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 71–72 (2010) (discussing the negative effects
Twombly and Iqbal have on the ability for private parties to assist government agencies in
the enforcement of substantive law); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public
Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1289–94 (1982) (discussing the
necessity of private rights of action for the enforcement of substantive law). In Samuel
Issacharoff, Class Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 372 (2012), my
colleague characterizes this duality of enforcement as “regulatory pluralism” and describes
this state/private division in various contexts.
55 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (authorizing antitrust suits).
56 See, e.g., CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WILLIAM FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF
THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF
FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 18–20 (1986) (outlining the common
law argument for fairness and its modern application); see also Helen Hershkoff, “Just
Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and Economic
Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1555–69 (2010) (detailing common law pathways available
for enforcement of state constitutional rights).
57 E.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (holding that state laws
requiring separate Black and White schools are unconstitutional); see also Brown v. Plata,
131 S. Ct. 1910, 1941 (2011) (finding conditions in the California prison system unconstitutional); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (finding that the Equal Protection
Clause required correction of political malapportionment).
58 Perhaps the most notable example of the judicial implication of private rights of
action is in securities fraud case law. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S.
723, 737 (1975) (describing securities fraud actions as a “judicial oak which has grown from
little more than a legislative acorn”).

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protection and unfair business practices, civil rights, employment discrimination, the disabled, and—my personal favorite—age discrimination. The enforcement of the underlying policies by private litigation
is incentivized by statutory provisions for multiple damages and the
possibility of securing attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs, as well
as fee awards under the judicially created common fund doctrine.
But a backlash has set in against the private enforcement of
public policies—a backlash that favors corporate and governmental
interests against the claims of individual citizens.59 Politicians and special interests, sometimes aided, perhaps “innocently,” by the media,
vilify the plaintiffs’ bar as fee-hawking ambulance chasers.60
Americans have been defamed as fortune hunters trying to win the
litigation lottery. Bogus caseload statistics are propagated, while
empirical data is ignored, and fears are spread by claims that there is a
litigation explosion in this country and that Americans are paying a
litigation tax that renders our businesses uncompetitive.61 Political
59 Interest groups have expended considerable efforts over the years, seeking to reduce
the effectiveness of several federal statutes and policies. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE
OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW
167–73 (2008) (documenting the Federalist Society’s rise and impact on the law); Leslie M.
Kelleher, Amenability to Jurisdiction as a “Substantive Right”: The Invalidity of Rule 4(k)
Under the Rules Enabling Act, 75 IND. L.J. 1191, 1194 (2000) (describing the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act from the perspective of special interest groups devoted to
reducing the threat of securities lawsuits). In Michael S. Greve, Atlas Croaks. Supreme
Court Shrugs., 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 15, 17–20 (2011), the author attempts to justify the
business orientation of the Supreme Court because of what he asserts is the “Constitution’s
commercial structure.”
60 See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW AMERICA’S
LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM 14–27 (2001) (arguing that the theory of
personal rights has led to excessive litigation); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 5–11 (1991)
(arguing that personal injury lawsuits have crippled the medical industry and unjustly
enriched the legal profession); James R. Copeland, K Street: A Report on the Litigation
Lobby, 2010: A Message from the Director, TRIAL LAW. INC.,
http://www.triallawyersinc.com/kstreet/kstr01.html (arguing that the cost of tort litigation
in the United States constitutes a tax that the Democratic Party is intent on raising); see
also Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 719 (1998) (describing backlash against the plaintiffs’ bar as
an artificial attack on the legal system); Robert S. Peck & John Vail, Blame It on the Bee
Gees: The Attack on Trial Lawyers and Civil Justice, 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 325–26
(2007) (outlining the history of antipathy toward the plaintiffs’ bar). The motivation and
economics of the enforcement of public policies through litigation by entrepreneurial lawyers is frequently misunderstood or reflexively criticized. See, e.g., Mosi Secret, Disabilities
Act Used by Lawyers in Flood of Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2012, at A1.
61 See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71
DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 77–91 (1993) (describing and debunking various inaccurate statistics
used to attack the American legal system); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The
Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395–96 (1994) (“We believe America is the most

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candidates and office holders score cheap points with attacks on our
justice system, cloaking themselves in the deceptive mantle of “tort
reform.”62 Finally, urban legends about certain cases—and sometimes
even imagined cases63—abound, typically in highly distorted form.
The so-called McDonald’s coffee cup case,64 for example, has been
grotesquely misdescribed and, with the aid of simplistic media
accounts, has become a cosmic anecdote recounted countless times in
the most disparaging terms.65 Sometimes this backlash makes it feel as
if a class struggle between consumers and corporate America is being
waged in our courts.
At times, the campaign against private enforcement has been
waged at the highest levels. In 1983, President Reagan created a
Council on Competitiveness, on which Vice President Dan Quayle
later served as chair.66 One of its avowed objectives was to protect the
business community from the so-called “litigation explosion” and its
alleged social costs through “deregulation” and “reform” of the justice
system. Indeed, one of the Council’s products was a 1991 report entitled “Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America,” apparently a
euphemism for reducing the effectiveness of private enforcement of
litigious society on earth not because this is true but because the media have told us so
over and over again.”); Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1116–23 (2012) (analyzing
various factors, including media distortion, contributing to the effectiveness of the costand-delay narrative); Randall Samborn & Rorie Sherman, Quayle Spices Up ABA
Meeting, NAT. L.J., Feb. 12, 1992, at 1 (describing a debate between Vice President Dan
Quayle and the American Bar Association president over inaccurate statistics).
62 See LAWRENCE J. MCQUILLAN & HOVANNES ABRAMYAN, U.S. TORT LIABILITY
INDEX; 2010 REPORT 12 (2010) (conducting an empirical study on tort liability regulation
enacted without concrete justification as to the need for such regulation); Paul V.
Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort System,
90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1417–21 (2004) (arguing for legislative limits on potential tort recoveries based on extreme cases alone); Dan Quayle, Vice President of the United States,
Address to the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 13, 1991) (using
questionable statistics to argue for drastic reforms to the civil justice system).
63 See, e.g., THE STELLA AWARDS, http://www.stellaawards.com/ (last visited Feb. 2,
2013) (collecting urban legends).
64 Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated, 1994 WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov. 28, 1994).
65 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 987–88 & n.15 (2003) (describing the effect of the
McDonald’s case). Two years ago—seven years after the case ended—HBO aired a documentary entitled Hot Coffee that finally puts the matter in proper prospective. HOT
COFFEE (The Group Entertainment 2011).
66 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
IN AMERICA 6 (1991). President Reagan also led the fight to eliminate the Legal Services
Corporation and has been quoted as referring to public interest lawyers as “‘a bunch of
ideological ambulance chasers.’” Michael S. Greve, Why “Defunding the Left” Failed, 89
PUB. INT. 91, 91 (1987).

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various regulatory regimes affecting the business community.67
Although the Council was disbanded, various “reform” efforts to
quell the mythical “litigation explosion” were advanced in Congress
during the presidencies of George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton;
most were not adopted.68 Then, in 1995, heavy lobbying by corporate
interests brought about the enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act69 over President Clinton’s veto. The Act
erected a number of substantial procedural hurdles designed to
encumber private securities fraud actions despite the lack of any real
empirical proof that there was a need for such hurdles. In retrospect,
the enactment seems even more inappropriate given the significant
amount of marketplace misbehavior that was going on at that time
and in the roughly twenty years since. Much of that marketplace misbehavior required, but was not given, regulatory attention by the
Securities and Exchange Commission or other government agencies,
making the necessity of an efficacious private enforcement alternative
even clearer.70
All of these manifestations of the backlash have been given traction by the Supreme Court, which seems to have placed a thumb on
the justice scale favoring corporate and government defendants.
These manifestations have impaired both access to the federal courts
for many citizens and the enforcement of various national policies.71
67 PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 66. The document’s political and special interest character was obvious to many. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note
40, at 628–30.
68 The “litigation explosion” is debunked and the attempts at procedural “reform” are
discussed in Miller, supra note 65, at 985–1003. The statistics relied on by Vice President
Quayle in his speeches and the Council Report were extremely shaky at best. See Deborah
R. Hensler, Taking Aim at the American Legal System: The Council on Competitiveness’s
Agenda for Legal Reform, 75 JUDICATURE 244, 245–48 (1992) (examining the sources and
logic behind the figures used in Vice President Quayle’s speech).
69 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007)
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006), the statutory passage requiring the pleading of
a “strong inference” of scienter); Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 600 (2007) (indicating
that the pleading requirements of the PSLRA have deterred meritorious as well as meritless securities actions). In 1998, Congress preempted virtually all class actions that might
relate to the federal securities acts, thereby ending any doctrinal growth in state securities
law. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006)).
70 The shortfall in governmental oversight is best illustrated, of course, by the havoc
wreaked by the Madoff and Stanford Ponzi schemes. Certain provisions of the 1995 legislation did improve some practices in securities cases, however, such as rationalizing the process for selecting the lead representative and class counsel to eliminate the race-to-thecourthouse process that preceded the statute. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (2006).
71 Others have also voiced this critique. E.g., ALAN B. MORRISON, AM. CONSTITUTION
SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, SAVED BY THE SUPREME COURT: RESCUING CORPORATE

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On the substantive side of the law, for example, the judicial creation
of new federal rights and remedies by implication from statutes has
become extremely rare.72 In addition, existing rights under certain
statutes have been limited.
A few illustrations drawn from interpretations of our securities
laws are instructive. First, Supreme Court decisions have eliminated
liability in certain legal contexts for aiding and abetting improper marketplace activities no matter how egregious the conduct and the
number of people hurt, thereby limiting the opportunity for aggrieved
citizens to secure compensation, particularly when the primary
offender is insolvent.73 Next, despite the global nature of the securities
market—making the location where a transaction is executed irrelevant (indeed, in many instances fortuitous)—the Supreme Court’s
decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd. 74 sharply limited
the right of various groups of investors who did not purchase or sell on
a domestic exchange to sue for alleged fraud under our securities laws,
even when the defendant company has taken advantage of the
American capital marketplace and a meaningful portion of the
AMERICA 14 (2011) (“I can think of no truly significant case in the last decade that
Corporate America has lost.”); Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in
2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637, 637 (2012) (inferring from the Goodyear and McIntyre decisions
that business interests have influenced the Court’s views on personal jurisdiction); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors: October Term 2010, 14 GREEN BAG 375, 389
(2011) (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s 2010 term may have been influenced by probusiness justices).
72 See, e.g., Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2864 (2010)
(refusing to recognize a tort claim under section 301(a) of the Labor Management
Relations Act for interference with the collective bargaining agreement); McKesson Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 672 F.3d 1066, 1075–77 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (not recognizing federal common law because of a lack of legislative guidance and the imprudence of exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns).
73 Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302–03 (2011)
(eliminating secondary liability by reading “make” in the Exchange Act narrowly);
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–64 (2008)
(restricting “scheme” liability under the Exchange Act); see also Cent. Bank of Denver v.
First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 176–77 (1994) (limiting aiding and abetting liability);
Elizabeth Cosenza, Is the Third Time the Charm? Janus and the Proper Balance Between
Primary and Secondary Actor Liability Under Section 10(b), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1019,
1051–75 (2012) (discussing the narrowing of secondary liability under Stoneridge and
Janus); Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2129–38
(2010) (discussing the Stoneridge decision under duty theory in order to identify more
novel responses).
74 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); see also William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 49 SW. L.
REV. 687 (2011) (discussing the future of extraterritoriality after Morrison); Marco
Ventoruzzo, Like Moths to a Flame? International Securities Litigation After Morrison:
Correcting the Supreme Court’s “Transactional Test,” 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 405, 430–39 (2012)
(discussing the effects of Morrison on other areas of law).

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misconduct occurred in this country.75 Other obvious exemplars of the
orientation of today’s Supreme Court are its campaign financing decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission 76 and its
repeated diminution of punitive damage awards.77 Decisions such as
these have blunted the effectiveness of several of our regulatory
statutes.
This transformation of substantive legal doctrine has been accompanied by a comparable modification of the judicial processing of civil
cases. In particular, I am increasingly concerned about procedural
changes that have resulted in the earlier and earlier disposition of litigation, often eviscerating a citizen’s opportunity for a meaningful
adjudication on the merits of his or her grievance. Remember the
image suggested earlier—the civil litigation gold standard—trial
before a jury. Today, there are hardly any federal civil trials—let
alone jury trials.78 Most courtrooms in federal courthouses are empty
75 The Morrison decision also held that when unlisted securities are involved, the protections of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006), and Rule 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006), only apply to “domestic transactions.” Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2884; see also Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 67–68 (2d
Cir. 2012) (holding that the “domestic transactions” requirement can be satisfied only by
creating a plausible inference that either party incurred irrevocable liability within the
United States or by alleging that the title to the shares was transferred within the United
States).
76 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
77 See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 503–15 (2008) (limiting punitive
damages under admiralty common law); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 423, 425–26 (2003) (limiting punitive damages under the Due Process Clause);
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585–86 (1996) (same); see also Lauren E.
Hume, Note, Are We Sailing in Occupied Waters?: Rethinking the Availability of Punitive
Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1441, 1468–73 (2011)
(explaining the Court’s justifications for, and the economic impact of, limiting punitive
damages).
78 Only 1.0% of the more than 300,000 civil terminations in the federal courts over
twelve recent consecutive months occurred after reaching trial. U.S. District Courts—Civil
Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken, During the 12-Month Period
Ending March 31, 2011, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=?/
uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/C04Mar11.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2013). In 1952, the figure was 12.1%, and in 1938, it was 19.9%. See Marc
Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REV.
1255, 1258–59 (2005) (highlighting the decline in trials and jury trials). Jury trials were only
0.73% of total dispositions in 2010, down from 5.49% in 1982. MARC GALANTER &
ANGELA FROZENA, POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INST., THE CONTINUING DECLINE OF CIVIL
TRIALS IN AMERICAN COURTS 3–4 (2011). Even the character of the jury trial has been
debilitated. Although historically juries had twelve persons, federal juries now may have
anywhere from six to twelve members. FED. R. CIV. P. 48(a); 9B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 3, § 2491 (describing the history of the jury size requirement). Numerous studies
clearly indicate that twelve jurors is preferable to a smaller number for a variety of reasons.
See Richard S. Arnold, Trial by Jury: The Constitutional Right to a Jury of Twelve in Civil
Trials, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 29–32 (1993) (describing predictability and representation
issues typical of smaller sample sizes with juries of six as opposed to twelve).

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much of the time as judges try fewer and fewer cases. Indeed, a
contemporary cliché refers to the “vanishing trial.”79 Cases simply do
not survive until trial; they are settled or, increasingly, dismissed.80 As
the late Judge Richard Arnold of the Eighth Circuit observed:
“[S]ome judges will do almost anything to avoid deciding a case on the
merits and find some procedural reason to get rid of it, coerce the
parties into settling or whatever it might be.”81 This is most unfortunate. Trials are open to the public, often use citizen jurors as fact
finders and law applicators, provide transparency, are an important
aspect of our democratic tradition, and preserve the credibility of our
civil justice system.82

79 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004); see also
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Where Have You Gone, Spot Mozingo? A Trial Judge’s Lament
over the Demise of the Civil Jury Trial, 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 99, 101 (2010) (discussing “the
vanishing jury trial”); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006) (stating that the “civil jury trial has all
but disappeared”). It is interesting that two of these three authors are federal district
judges. Judge William Young of the District of Massachusetts has been indefatigable in his
efforts to combat the vanishing trial. See, e.g., United States v. Massachusetts, 781 F. Supp.
2d 1, 21–27 (D. Mass. 2011) (arguing, in an addendum, against an “administrative model”
of the courts).
80 See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1919, 1951–56 (2009) (evaluating the empirical evidence on settlement). Given the
pressures on our courts and the expense and delays so common in litigation, a high level of
settlement is to be expected and is generally thought of as highly desirable. Of course, the
critical question is how high should that settlement rate be and what judicial pressures to
achieve settlement are legitimate. There is some disagreement as to the answer to that
question. Compare Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075,
1087 (1984) (arguing for a lower settlement rate), with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose
Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some
Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2669, 2692 (1995) (arguing for a higher settlement rate).
81 Richard Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Little Case, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 663,
670 (1999). Two federal judges have remarked to me that they consider it a failure if a case
on their docket reaches trial. Thus, the development of a possible judicial predilection to
promote early disposition of cases as a docket control mechanism should not be overlooked. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 59–62 (1996) (outlining two themes for such
development—information and incentives). Nor should the economic incentives of the
prevalent billing-by-the-hour methodology employed by defense firms be overlooked
either. There is much talk in the profession of developing new compensation models.
82 See generally ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 64–65,
71–75, 117–20, 132–33 (2009) (describing some populist themes of the American court
system); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 270–76 (J.P. Mayer ed.,
George Lawrence trans., HarperCollins Publishers 2006) (1835) (describing the importance of the jury system as a political institution); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N.
Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 399, 401–03 (2011) (explaining the origin and benefits of the traditional
American trial system).

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Many reasons have been offered for the paucity of trials. One is
that most lawyers today either lack trial experience or believe their
courtroom skills have become too rusty to trust.83 Another possibility
is that when the litigation stakes are high, one or both sides may deem
merit adjudication too risky—reflecting to some degree a lack of
faith in the trial process and perhaps even less in our jury system.84
Merit-phobia undoubtedly promotes a willingness to settle or, on the
part of the defense, an incentive to delay and embrace every possible
way to terminate a case short of trial. That mindset, coupled with the
reality that a substantial portion of judicial time and energy is being
diverted to the management dynamic, may be producing a joint-liminal or subliminal settlement orientation among trial judges and litigators. Indeed, the combination of emphasis on management and
today’s settlement, or work-out, culture85 has led one of the nation’s
most distinguished federal judges—one with both trial and appellate
experience—to refer to our federal courts as being more like administrative agencies than judicial tribunals.86
83 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts,
60 DUKE L.J. 745, 750, 755–56 (2010) (lamenting the decline in the trial experience of
attorneys).
84 See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 208 (“Fear of juries leads defendants to settle suits, whatever their
merits.”); D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 453,
467–68 (2d ed. 2007) (arguing that trials represent an “unacceptable risk and expense” for
the modern litigant). The diminished faith in the judicial system also is manifested by the
growth in utilization of alternative dispute resolution techniques, most notably by mediation (often court ordered) and contractually imposed arbitration. Federal judges now commonly divert cases into mediation, which often proves time consuming, and accord
arbitration provisions extremely expansive construction. See infra Part II.D (describing the
Court’s increasingly liberal reliance on the supposed policies of the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA)). Professor John Langbein argues that the “discovery revolution” and other
forms of nontrial procedure, which include judicial management and expanded motion
practice, has rendered the trial obsolete, and along with it, jury trial. John Langbein, The
Disappearance of the Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 552 (2012). One writer
has even suggested that, because settlement is the dominant form of case resolution today,
a new set of rules is needed to guide litigants during the settlement process as to the merits
and value of their claims, which tend to be distorted otherwise. See J. Maria Glover, The
Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 1750–51 (2012).
85 The quest for global litigation peace in multiparty cases has motivated the emergence
of mechanisms such as the quasi–class action and bankruptcy to achieve the widest possible
finality and closure. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. The burgeoning literature
reveals a wide range of views on the wisdom of this trend. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee
Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 6–11
(2009) (describing the correlation between a procedure’s perceived fairness and legitimacy); Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 39, at 318–21 (questioning and qualifying the
importance of closure when consent is diminished). An excellent discussion of the use of
the bankruptcy model appears in Troy A. McKenzie, Toward a Bankruptcy Model for Nonclass Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 1015–23 (2012).
86 Higginbotham, supra note 83, at 747, 760.

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In my view, one of the more significant reasons for the “vanishing
trial” phenomenon is that in various ways judges are terminating cases
earlier and earlier during today’s highly elaborate and elongated pretrial phase of litigation. Of course, most dismissals are largely done on
motion papers in a manner reminiscent of the old equity practice. It
has been a gradual, largely invisible process of the type that my television mentor, Fred Friendly, often would characterize as making policy
by one-degree-itis. The plaintiffs’ bar might characterize what is happening more graphically as litigation death by a thousand procedural
cuts.
II
THE DEFORMATION OF PROCEDURE
THE FEDERAL COURTS

IN

This acceleration of case disposition has come about because the
federal courts have erected a sequence of procedural stop signs during
the past twenty-five years that has transformed the relatively uncluttered pretrial process envisioned by the original drafters of the
Federal Rules into a morass of litigation friction points. Each of these
stop signs reflects a truism: Control over court procedure is a source
of societal (not simply litigation) power, and the interpretation and
alteration of that procedure frequently is advocated or undertaken to
advance some non-litigation objective that may be substantive, economic, philosophical, or all three. There is much that reflects these
realities in today’s world of procedure.87 For example, subject matter
jurisdiction statutes, many of the Federal Rules, and the judicial interpretations and clarifications thereof represent inevitable tradeoffs
between what often appear to be reasonable competing systemic
policy objectives.88
One always hopes that the overall procedural system represents a
reasonable balance among the competing viewpoints and reflects the
core values of society. But when one considers the collective impact of
the procedural stop signs posted in the recent past, the result appears
to be favoring one side rather than the other, even though various
rules and earlier precedents may not have been drafted or decided
87 See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing the work of the Council on
Competitiveness); see also Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219,
2224–27 (1989) (rejecting contentions that the Federal Rules are applied neutrally and
equally to any given party); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil
Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 544 (2001) (exploring the influence of
politics on the trajectory of the Federal Rules).
88 The subject is admirably developed in Alan B. Morrison, The Necessity of Tradeoffs
in a Properly Functioning Procedure System, 90 OR. L. REV. 993 (2012).

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originally to achieve that result. Of course, procedural fashions and
trends, as found in other societal systems, tend to have a pendular
movement, which generally is seen as acceptable. What is unacceptable in my judgment, and what characterizes many of the developments of the past quarter century, is the transformation of the
procedural landscape to suit the economic or political agendas of powerful interest groups at the expense of the original philosophical
objectives of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Once conceptualized as party neutral, their construction and application no longer
appear to be providing a level playing field for the contesting litigants.89 Let me sketch the early-termination developments that
trouble me in a roughly chronological fashion.
A. Summary Judgment
I mark the beginning of the stop sign era at 1986 when the
Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases invigorating the summary
judgment motion.90 My successor as Reporter to the Rules Advisory
Committee—and others—share my view that the Court in essence
was unilaterally “rewriting” Rule 56 in these cases.91 Because summary judgment is largely a defendant’s litigation weapon and a grant
89 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial
Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158
U. PA. L. REV. 517, 519–22 (2010) (suggesting the disparity has had the greatest impact on
civil rights and employment discrimination cases); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as
a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 827, 836–39 (1993) (warning
that procedural changes often are made for “supposedly neutral” reasons when that is not
the case).
90 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (holding that the petitioner-defendant was not required to negate decedent’s asbestos exposure if respondent-plaintiff
lacked evidence to prove that exposure, although the petitioner had been the moving
party, thereby easing the movant’s burden on the motion); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (holding that actual malice must be “shown with convincing
clarity”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986)
(requiring “sufficiently ambiguous” evidence of a conspiracy to be “plausible”). The judicial attitude toward summary judgment in these three cases, found above, is markedly different from that manifested in the formative years of the Federal Rules. See cases cited
supra note 13. The literature on these cases is voluminous. See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal,
Cases on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 770, 787 (1988) (predicting increased grants of summary judgment
motions); Samuel Issacharoff & George Lowenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 79 (1990) (categorizing the trilogy’s influence in two ways: (1)
easing the moving party’s burden as to nonexistence of facts and (2) increasing district
court judges’ discretion in granting these motions); Miller, supra note 65, at 1055–56 (concluding that Rule 56 has become a “powerful tool”); Melissa L. Nelken, One Step Forward,
Two Steps Back: Summary Judgment After Celotex, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 55–56 (1988)
(commending the Celotex Court’s intent but also accusing the Court of wrongly deciding
the facts and, thus, instituting an unclear standard).
91 Carrington, supra note 40, at 646.

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of the motion terminates a case before trial, the three decisions have
encouraged escalated invocation of the motion by defendants. Judges,
following what they perceive to be the Supreme Court’s message, and
possibly affected by the length of their dockets, the age of many of
their cases, and formal and informal institutional pressures to increase
their “throughput,” have employed summary judgment more frequently.92 The motion has taken on an Armageddon-like significance;
it has become both the centerpiece and end-point for many (perhaps
too many) federal civil cases.93
Unfortunately, one fears that occasionally judges inappropriately
resolve trial-worthy disputed fact issues or characterize cases as
implausible,94 thereby disposing of them on motion rather than
allowing them to proceed to trial.95 Stated differently, the ambit of
what is a “genuine dispute as to any material fact,”96 which must be
left for trial according to Rule 56(a) (and, of course, in many cases to
a jury according to the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution), has
92 See Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A QuarterCentury of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL &
LEGAL STUD. 861, 896 (2007) (showing an increase in motions made from 12% to 20% of
the sample cases from 1975 to 2000 and an increase in the grant rate from 6% to 12% in
those years). In John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522,
539–43 (2007), the author argues that summary judgment is inherently pro-defendant. In
conversation, a retired federal judge suggested that because summary judgment grants produce written district court and court of appeals opinions and denials generally do not,
other judges may be influenced by the apparent frequency and broadened bases on which
those grants are made.
93 I have written about the implications of the 1986 trilogy at length in Miller, supra
note 65, at 1044–73.
94 The Supreme Court seemed to authorize such case disposals on summary judgment
in one of the three cases. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 595 (“The Court of Appeals did not
take account of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory
pricing conspiracy.”).
95 In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007), the Court upheld summary judgment
based on its own viewing of a videotape of a police car chase that resulted in a crash giving
rise to a civil rights action. The Court concluded that the police conduct was reasonable. Id.
Justice Stevens believed that the videotape was ambiguous, that the majority was speculating, and that the matter should have been left to jurors. See id. at 394–96 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Others who have viewed the video have concluded that the police’s use of
deadly force was unjustified. See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Framan,
Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 866 (2009) (noting that twenty-six percent of the
people in a test group who viewed the video at least slightly disagreed with the Court’s
conclusion). One would think the issue’s very nature rendered it jury triable.
96 Prior to a 2010 amendment, Rule 56(c) called for a determination of whether there
was a genuine “issue” as to any material fact. The Advisory Committee Notes state that the
word “dispute,” now found in Rule 56(a), “better reflects the focus of a summaryjudgment determination.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 12A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, MARY KAY KANE & RICHARD L.
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 494 app. C (2012).

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been reduced. Conversely, what is being decided by judges “as a
matter of law” on summary judgment has been enlarged.97 Put yet
another way, a motion designed simply for identifying trial-worthy
issues has become, on occasion, a vehicle for resolving trial-worthy
issues. Even when the motion is unsuccessful, summary judgment has
become an expensive and time-consuming pretrial stopping point with
attendant delay, expense, and risk of premature termination.98 The
effect is to compromise the due process underpinnings of the day-incourt principle and the constitutional jury trial right99 without any
empirical basis for believing that systemic benefits are realized that
offset these consequences.100 As will be discussed, this previously
impermissible fact-finding now manifests itself as early as the pleading
context.101

97 See generally 10A WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, §§ 2725–28 (discussing
the grounds for summary judgment and judges’ discretion on the motion).
98 Some writers, particularly in the years following the trilogy, expressed the view that
enhancing summary judgment would increase efficiencies, lower expenses, and serve as a
wake-up call for the litigants and district judges. See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 90, at 771
(claiming that summary judgment “could leave judicial resources free to concentrate on
those actions for which a trial is required”); William W. Schwarzer, Summary Judgment
and Case Management, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 213, 220 (1987) (arguing that even ungranted
motions save resources by drawing focus to disputed issues). It is doubtful that time has
proven these predictions accurate, given the enormous resources now devoted to summary
judgment motions, their frequency, and appeals from their grant. See Diane P. Wood,
Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
231, 249–50 (2011) (stating that attempts to strengthen summary judgment have “unintended consequences”). Moreover, even the statistics showing an increased incidence of
Rule 56 motions and their grant, see supra note 92, do not tell the full story. As Professor
Brooke Coleman points out, the existing scholarship and empirical work do not tell us
“whether summary judgment sifts out meritorious cases and at what rate.” Brooke D.
Coleman, Summary Judgment: What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know,
43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 706 (2012). She continues: “We also need to know how the
summary judgment process deters individuals with meritorious claims from filing. And, we
need to know this information across the board, at both the state and federal level.” Id.
After exploring what we do not know and what may be unknowable, Professor Coleman
concludes: “The real question is not so much about the efficiency or fairness of the summary judgment process, but really just about one critical issue—the jury trial.” Id. at 725.
99 See Miller, supra note 65, at 1132–34.
100 See generally id. at 1074–1132; David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of
Summary Judgment in the Administration of Civil Justice, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES
359, 386–87 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., Thomson/Foundation Press 2d ed. 2008) (2004) (summarizing the tension between summary judgment and constitutional concerns); Suja A.
Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 139, 148–58 (2007)
(contrasting the summary judgment motion with English common law procedural devices).
101 See infra Part II.E.

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B. Expert Evidence
Seven years after the summary judgment trilogy, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 102
continued the trend of stop-sign erection by emphasizing the concept
of judicial “gatekeeping,” which has become a pretrial management
article of faith. Daubert directs district judges to oversee the introduction of economic, scientific, and technological evidence, particularly
when it takes the form of expert testimony, in an understandable
attempt to screen out unreliable evidence, typically characterized as
“junk science.”103 But that attempt is not cost free. The enormous
growth (indeed, in the view of many, excessive growth) in the use of
expert testimony, which literally has become a cottage industry, in the
years under discussion has made Daubert hearings a significant aspect
of contemporary federal civil litigation.
Daubert’s high threshold has been particularly burdensome—financially, logistically, and sometimes both—for plaintiffs.
This is because plaintiffs often must provide expert testimony or
reports about a wide range of subjects—for example, the relevant
technology, pharmacology, the environmental impact of the defendant’s conduct, or the statistical and economic significance of certain
phenomena or behaviors. Since judicial gatekeeping potentially
requires screening every challenged expert, it represents another procedural obstacle, another motion, another hearing, and another potential issue on appeal, all causing more delay and expense. This, like
other stop signs, plays into the hands of the billing-by-the-hour regime
of the law firms that usually represent corporate and other economically powerful interests. It has precisely the opposite effect on contingent fee and public interest lawyers who must bear the increased cost
and time investment without any assurance of reimbursement, let
alone compensation.104 And when the defense succeeds on a Daubert
102 509 U.S. 579, 589, 597 (1993). Two other cases fill out the so-called Daubert trilogy.
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999) (applying Daubert to technical
and specialized expert witnesses); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146–47 (1997)
(holding that Daubert allows a court to exclude evidence “connected to existing data only
by the ipse dixit of the expert”). The Daubert Court proceeded without employing the
statutory rulemaking process governing the Federal Rules of Evidence, as it had in the
Civil Rule context in connection with the summary judgment trilogy and would do the
same—even more dramatically—in the pleading context. See supra Part II.A (explaining
the summary judgment trilogy); see also infra Part II.E (critiquing the Court’s recent
pleading jurisprudence). The substance of Daubert is now embedded in Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
103 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
104 There is an analogy, admittedly a rough one, between the expanded assumption of
pretrial judicial decisionmaking power reflected in the Daubert hearing and the Markman
hearing in patent litigation, which calls upon the district judge, not a jury, to interpret a

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challenge and eliminates an important plaintiff’s expert, the plaintiff’s
case often is so weakened that it may be vulnerable to summary judgment or abandonment—thereby establishing Daubert challenges as
another avenue for the potential early disposition of cases.
C. Class Actions
Over the years following Daubert, judicially established heightened class action certification requirements and related matters have
become a major impediment to the survival and forward movement of
these representative proceedings.105 This reflects the latest redirection
in the almost half-century debate over whether Federal Rule 23
should be employed as a regulatory device that can be used to enforce
and promote various public policies or whether it should be interpreted more strictly and employed simply as an updated version of
traditional joinder procedure.106 In many instances, these judicially
established class action stop signs effectively oblige plaintiffs to establish certain aspects of their cases pretrial, at least to the extent they
involve matters deemed related to the Rule 23 certification prerequisites—a rather uncertain benchmark.107 This can mean litigating
patent claim and thereby define the scope of the patent well before trial. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). Both are fact-laden pretrial processes
that can be extremely resource consuming and dramatically affect the litigation’s outcome.
See COMPLEX LITIG. COMM. OF THE AM. TRIAL LAW., ANATOMY OF A PATENT CASE
95–102 (2d ed. 2012) (describing the potentially elaborate character of the Markman process); Edward Brunet, Markman Hearings, Summary Judgment, and Judicial Discretion, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 93, 98–109 (2005) (drawing analogies between the Markman
process and summary judgment proceedings).
105 The various ways in which federal courts have limited the class action are catalogued
in Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2013) (manuscript at 19–101) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
106 The cyclical character of the judicial treatment of the class action and the dual philosophies underlying it are effectively described in David Marcus, The Creation and Renewal
of the Modern Class Action System, 1953–1999, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013)
(on file with the New York University Law Review).
107 The judicial scrutiny of class certification requests has expanded dramatically. See,
e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592, 594, 596–97, 605 (3d Cir. 2012)
(reversing class certification and demanding higher factual proof of class definition, class
ascertainability, numerosity, and causation); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552
F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (remanding the certification decision because the district court
occasionally departed from the “rigorous analysis” standard); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v.
Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 268 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Rule 23’s requirements must
be given their full weight independent of the merits.”), abrogated by Erica P. John Fund,
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011); In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that class certification requires a ruling on each Rule 23
requirement regardless of overlap with merit issues). The commentators have voiced divergent opinions on this development. Compare Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 324, 349 (2011) (arguing that merits scrutiny during class certification simply is part

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various aspects of the merits long before trial, without testimony or a
jury, and possibly with incomplete discovery—thereby increasing the
occasions for pretrial judicial fact-finding. That, for example, has
become a significant problem in the securities fraud and antitrust contexts with regard to particular critical issues, such as reliance, causation, or materiality.108
The extensive revision of Rule 23 in 1966109 was designed to
rationalize practice under the class action rule and eliminate its metaphysical 1938 text so that it would provide a useful procedural vehicle,
particularly for civil rights cases.110 But more was intended. The
amendment also clearly envisioned the use of the class action to
empower those without “effective strength” to advance their claims,
of the ordinary process of judging), and Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class
Action Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 84–87 (2004) (arguing that the best level of
merit inquiry in class certification is when “doing so is convenient and useful to analyzing
the certification requirement of Rule 23”), with Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The
Misguided Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification
Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 939 (2009) (stating that these developments make “class
certification a more onerous and less efficient process for litigants and the court”). At an
earlier time, the Supreme Court expressed the view that a federal court lacked the
“authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit” to determine whether
it could proceed as a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974).
108 The Supreme Court recently declined to require actual proof of loss causation as a
prerequisite to class certification. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2186. The quantum
of factual proof and legal analysis that should be required and what standard of review
should be employed at the certification point are in dispute. See Alan B. Morrison,
Determining Class Certification: What Should the Courts Have to Decide?, 8 CLASS ACTION
LITIG. REP., 541, 541 & n.1 (2011) (noting the struggle of several circuits with these questions). Even more recently, the Supreme Court decided Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, No. 11-1085, 2013 WL 691001 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2013), a
securities class action, and concluded that the materiality of a misrepresentation need not
be proven but need only be plausibly alleged at the class certification stage to invoke the
critical “fraud on the market” presumption (since it is a common question for purposes of
determining performance and requiring proof would put the cart before the horse). The
Court has also granted certiorari in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012), to
determine whether a class may be certified without deciding whether the class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to show the case is susceptible to
awarding damages on a class-wide basis. Based on oral arguments, the Court also may
consider the probity of expert opinions at the class certification stage. Transcript of Oral
Argument at 21–23, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012) (No. 11-864) (considering whether a district court should consider more than pure Daubert admissibility at the
class certification stage).
109 The history of the class action since the advent of the Federal Rules and the almost
constant controversy over the limits of its utilization and the construction of Rule 23 are
fully chronicled in Marcus, supra note 106. I have described my modest involvement in the
1966 revision elsewhere. Arthur R. Miller, Some Very Personal Reflections on the Rules,
Rulemaking, and Reporters, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 651 (2013).
110 The original Rule 23 divided class actions into three highly confusing categories
based on jural relations that became known as “true,” “hybrid,” and “spurious.” See 7A
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, § 1752.

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most notably when each individual’s damages were so small that
economically they had no independent litigation value.111 Permitting
the aggregation of claims in this latter context incentivizes private
remediation of wrongdoing and promotes the important goal of deterrence even if the compensatory payment to each individual is low,
thereby enhancing the regulatory utility of Rule 23.112 When private
class actions supplement or substitute for official regulation—as often
occurs in the antitrust, consumer, and securities fields, for
example—the effect can be to overcome the inefficiency and limitations inherent in governmental enforcement. In combination, the private attorney general concept and the class action serve to subsidize
the much-needed private enforcement of public policies as well as to
provide access and legal services to those whose economics or claim
size deny them any possibility of legal recourse.113 Over the years following the 1966 amendment, not surprisingly, Federal Rule 23 was
employed in an ever-widening range of substantive contexts in cases
asserting claims of both a public and a private character.
The significant growth in the utilization of class actions that followed the 1966 revision began to encounter judicial resistance in the

111 Benjamin Kaplan, Prefatory Note, “The Class Action—A Symposium,” 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) (expressing the views of the Advisory Committee’s
Reporter); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397–98
(1967) (arguing that an opt-in rule would “freez[e] out” “small claims”); Arthur R. Miller,
Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action
Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 674 (1979) (discussing the misconceptions about the
1966 revisions of Rule 23 and the utility of class actions). As Judge Posner famously
remarked, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
112 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the
very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries
do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her
rights.”); see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375–79, 430 (2005) (arguing
for the unenforceability of class action waivers because of the public good such lawsuits
can achieve); William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation? A Positive Externalities
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 709, 720–25 (2006)
(arguing that society should protect the class action lawsuit because it “generates a range
of positive externalities”); Klonoff, supra note 105, at 91–92 (explaining that collective
action waivers substantially impede negative value claims).
113 See Issacharoff, supra note 54, at 10 (noting this subsidization phenomenon); id. at
15 (“In important areas of consumer law and economic damages . . . the private class action
overcomes distinct disabilities of public enforcement: the problem of insufficient resources
. . . .”); Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and
Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119,
2144–47 (2000) (arguing that Rule 23 was designed to accomplish such subsidization).

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late 1980s, particularly in mass tort114 and multistate class cases
involving the application of different bodies of substantive law.115
Federal courts increasingly found that plaintiffs did not satisfy the
Rule 23(b)(3) requirements of predominance of common questions,
the superiority of class action adjudication, and manageability.116 In
the last few years of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court issued
opinions making it clear that strict adherence to the requirements of
Rule 23 was necessary; it did so first in Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor 117 and then in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp. 118 (both nationwide
asbestos cases presenting precertification settlements for judicial
approval).119 Although both cases were circumstantially unique and
could have been contextually limited, the opinions clearly signaled the
114 See generally RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT
71–94 (2007) (summarizing various themes in the Supreme Court’s rejection of the class
settlements in Ortiz and Amchem).
115 See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that class certification requires that “all litigants are governed by the same
legal rules”); Genevieve G. York-Erwin, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class
Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009) (noting that denial is normal in such
situations). See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled
Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006)
(noting the mismatch between current choice-of-law rules and a national market, and
arguing for a default rule of applying the laws of the defendant’s home state); York-Erwin,
supra at 1802–10 (describing the shift in attitude by the federal judiciary toward class
actions with choice-of-law implications).
116 Three virtually contemporaneous court of appeals decisions set the restrictive tone.
Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a nationwide class of addicted smokers); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1074, 1081–83,
1085–86 (6th Cir. 1996) (decertifying a product liability class regarding defective penile
implants); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297, 1299–1300, 1302 (7th Cir.
1995) (decertifying a class of hemophiliacs claiming damages for contaminated blood). I
was the appellate advocate for the classes rejected in two of these cases. See generally John
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1384–1421 (1995) (describing class certification attempts in various contexts).
117 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
118 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
119 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 861–64 (“[W]e are bound to follow Rule 23 as we understood it
upon its adoption . . . .”); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–21 (stating that compliance with Rule
23 is of “overriding importance”). Even before Amchem and Ortiz, the Court had
demanded strict scrutiny of the class action prerequisites in General Telephone Co. v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982) and Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176, 178
(1974), and sharply limited its utility in diversity of citizenship cases in Zahn v.
International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(2006), as recognized in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005).
The six most recent Supreme Court Rule 23 decisions are discussed in Mary Kay Kane,
The Supreme Court’s Recent Class Action Jurisprudence: Gazing into a Crystal Ball, 16
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1015 (2012), which concludes that “there is no overarching theme
or theory underlying the Court’s most recent class-action jurisprudence . . . .” Id. at 1030.
Although Professor Kane’s point seems sound as articulated, the direction of decisions
seems clear.

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containment of the class action by the Court. Justice Breyer dissented
in both cases, arguing that the Court was denying class members valuable settlement benefits and that the exigencies of the asbestos crisis
called for a much more pragmatic and creative approach to the
application of the class action rule that would not undermine its utility
as a procedure for achieving the global resolution of large-scale disputes.120 These cases have signaled what some would call a formalistic
construction of Rule 23 and chilled much of its innovative
application.121
It must be acknowledged, of course, that bringing suits in the
class action form precludes some plaintiffs from choosing their own
representation and managing their own lawsuits. Claims obviously are
instituted, managed, and adjudicated or settled collectively.122 But
because of the costs of litigation, a formalistic reading of Rule 23 and
the Due Process Clause provides plaintiffs with only a hollow day in
court that never reaches the merits. Realistically, the choice for class
members is between collective access to the judicial system or no
access at all.
In the employment discrimination context, for example, the
Supreme Court’s recent highly publicized decision in Wal-Mart Stores,
120 Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 880, 882 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing against the majority’s
“literal” interpretation); Amchem, 521 U.S. at 629, 631–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
the case’s unique need for settlement through a detailed recitation of the facts); see also
Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 1476
(2005) (describing the cases as an example of “the perfect” being the enemy of “the
good”); McKenzie, supra note 85, at 977–78 (concluding that the Court’s approach was
formalistic and rigid).
121 The restraints on Rule 23 have led litigators to seek other methods of aggregation,
including the use of quasi–class action techniques that often employ the Multidistrict
Litigation Panel as an organizing and facilitating device for multistate litigation situations.
See supra note 39 (providing examples and describing the 9/11 settlement). An excellent
illustration of this phenomenon is the Vioxx pharmaceutical litigation. See Fallon, Grabill
& Wynne, supra note 24, at 2230–37 (focusing on the economy of information sharing in
such an approach); McKenzie, supra note 85, at 983–86 (elaborating on the example Vioxx
provides). It also has encouraged the direct filing of actions in pending multidistrict proceedings. See generally Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice
of Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file
with the New York University Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2118219& (discussing the conclusion as to the applicable choice of law
rule in direct actions).
122 See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 846 (identifying the tension between the class action and the
“historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” (quoting 18A WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 4449)); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process,
and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1063–68 (2002)
(discussing the tension between litigant autonomy and class actions). Rule 23(b)(3) class
members do have the right to opt out and pursue their rights, but the modest size of the
individual claims usually makes that course economically unrealistic.

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Inc. v. Dukes 123 (a national class action on behalf of women
employees alleging various forms of workplace discrimination pursuant to company-wide policy) has increased the burden of showing
“significant proof” of a general policy of discrimination in order to
secure class certification.124 It did so by insisting on a showing of a
higher level of “commonality” under Rule 23(a)(2) than previously
thought necessary by requiring that class members “have suffered the
same injury” and that the common questions be “capable of classwide
resolution” and “central to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke.”125 Nothing in the language of Rule 23(a)(2), the
123 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rodgers, 125 HARV. L. REV.
79 (2011) (analyzing Wal-Mart through the lens of fairness). The Wal-Mart class embraced
1.5 million women employees at 3400 locations in forty-one regions; it was clearly too
ambitious an effort. To borrow from the title of Cornelius Ryan’s brilliant analysis of the
failure of Operation Market Garden in World War II, Wal-Mart was “A Bridge Too Far.”
The Wal-Mart class is now being subdivided with an eye to bringing regional actions. Plaintiffs have commenced several different statewide class actions against the company on substantially identical legal theories. Twelve years after she filed her initial complaint, Betty
Dukes returned to the Northern District of California; Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim and lack of timeliness has been denied. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. C 01-02252 CRB, 2012 WL 4329009 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2012). However, the class
action brought by former Wal-Mart employees in Texas was held to be barred by the
statute of limitations. Odle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:11-cv-2954-0, 2012 WL 5292957
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 15, 2012).
124 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553. See, e.g., Luiken v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, No. 12-1216,
2013 WL 399248, at *5 (8th Cir. Feb. 4, 2013) (decertifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class of drivers
for lack of commonality because questions of whether an obligatory charge was a payment
for personal services depended on “varying circumstances”); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale
Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir. 2011) (remanding a gender discrimination class action
because the district court failed to resolve factual disputes to determine “whether there
was a common pattern and practice” that affected the class as a whole).
125 Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. One wonders whether the threshold commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) has now been converted into a predominance requirement
previously textually limited to cases under Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 2565–66 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of “blend[ing]” the two standards); see also Robin J.
Effion, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 789–804 (2012) (reading
Wal-Mart as creating an implied predominance requirement). On the other hand, one also
wonders whether it has been infused with something in the nature of the “plausibility”
requirement now employed in the contexts of Rules 12(b)(6) and 56. See infra Part II.E
(discussing pleading standards); supra Part II.A (discussing summary judgment standards).
The Wal-Mart decision also significantly limited the utility of the Rule 23(b)(2) injunction
class action by restricting any monetary element accompanying the required request for
injunctive or declaratory relief to those that are “incidental.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557
(majority opinion). This may encourage more hybrid class actions—combined Rule
23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)—and single-issue class actions under Rule 23(c)(4). See, e.g.,
McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 483 (7th Cir.
2012) (reversing the denial of certification under Rule 23(c)(4)); Chen-Oster v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950(LBS)(JCF), 2012 WL 205875, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012)
(“[D]istrict courts should take full advantage of [Rule 23(c)(4)] to certify separate issues
. . . .”), adopted in relevant part by 83 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 64 (2012). See generally 7A

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provision’s history, or prior jurisprudence justifies these limitations.126
This burden of pretrial persuasion represents another way of denying
class certification well short of any determination of a case’s merits,
let alone a bench or jury trial. Wal-Mart exemplifies and continues a
substantial line of decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary heightening the barriers to class certification in various ways.127
Compounding these judicial restraints is Congress’s acquiescence
to institutional lobbying by providers of goods and services, leading to
the federalization of virtually all substantial class and mass actions by
enacting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).128 That
statute burdens the federal courts with an increased number of these
cases. It also eliminates state courts as alternative fora and sources for
the development of other potentially innovative class action procedures (as well as possibly more welcoming judicial attitudes in some
state courts, which clearly was an objective of the legislation’s proponents).129 Yet the Act does nothing to ameliorate the difficulties that
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, §§ 1784.1, 1790 (discussing the certification of
hybrid and partial class actions). Some courts have extended Wal-Mart to class actions
under Rule 23(b)(1). See, e.g., Daskalea v. Wash. Humane Soc’y, 275 F.R.D. 346, 364
(D.D.C. 2011) (extending the restriction of incidental monetary relief to Rule 23(b)(1)).
126 The history of the commonality requirement and the defects in the Court’s Wal-Mart
analysis of it are ably described in A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened
Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file
with the New York University Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2113374.
127 See, e.g., M.D. ex rel. Stukenberg v. Perry, 675 F.3d 832, 841 (5th Cir. 2012) (indicating that the commonality requirement has been transformed); supra notes 107 and 116
and accompanying text (discussing the heightened standards for class certification); see
also Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d 527, 534 (3d Cir. 2012) (deciding that to
certify a Fair Labor Standards Act case the district court, after considering all the evidence,
must make a finding of fact that all the class members are “similarly situated”); Gates v.
Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 265–67 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting expert evidence on calculating damages based on averages and modeling because it was not “common”). But cf.
Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 606 (6th Cir. 2012) (reversing a denial of class certification in a pattern of employment discrimination case). The Fair Labor Standards Act
cases appear to be an exception to the trend. See ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2011
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS
125–28 tbl.C-2 (2012), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf.
128 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1447 (2008) (decrying CAFA’s affront to federalism); Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 1861–62 (“[T]he motivation behind the legislation
was to take multistate class actions out of the hands of state courts . . . .”). See generally 7A
WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, § 1756.2 (describing CAFA).
129 See Burbank, supra note 128, at 1447 (arguing that CAFA “represents an affront to
federalism”). A basic concern is that CAFA shifts almost all significant class actions to the
federal courts and subjects them to heightened certification requirements and eventual
dismissal.

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have arisen in multistate and national diversity-based class actions.
Most particularly, it does not answer the frequent choice-of-law question of whether the district court has to apply the law of multiple
states or can identify and apply the law of a single state (a defendant’s
principal place of business being an obvious, and one would think
unobjectionable, example of the latter). When each state’s law must
be applied, courts are more likely to declare an action unmanageable
or lacking in predominance of common questions and thus decline to
certify it.130 An amendment designed to address this obstacle to certification was voted down in the Senate,131 suggesting that facilitation
and simplification of the class certification process were not on the
agenda of CAFA’s proponents.
The class certification motion thus has become yet another procedural stop sign undermining the utility of one of today’s most basic
and important joinder mechanisms—admittedly a controversial one in
certain applications—for handling relatively modest claims arising
from conduct impacting numerous people. Fortunately, some distinguished judges continue to recognize the aggregation of claims
through the class action as a “powerful instrument[ ] of social and
130 See, e.g., Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc.,
601 F.3d 1159, 1177–78, 1180–84 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing both predominance and manageability concerns); Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724–25, 730 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citing predominance concerns); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741–44 (5th Cir.
1996) (citing manageability concerns); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in
National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2009–10 (2008) (explaining that choice of
law is a “monumental barrier to class certification”).
131 Senator Diane Feinstein proposed an amendment to encourage the application of a
single state’s law to interstate class actions and the use of subclasses whenever possible. 151
CONG. REC. S1157, S1167 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2005); see also David Marcus, Erie, the Class
Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1247, 1308–10 (2007) (describing the reaction to the amendment and its
ultimate failure); cf. Issacharoff, supra note 115, at 1862 & n.87 (noting Congress’s inability
to deal with the choice-of-law problem); Legal Experts Enter Class Action Debate, Meet
With Senate Staff to Discuss Bill, 72 U.S.L.W. 2446 (Feb. 3, 2004) (describing efforts by
Professors Issacharoff, Neuborne, and myself in opposing the passage of CAFA). In addition to the pro-business and anti–class action politics underlying CAFA’s enactment, some
writers have argued that the application of a single state’s law would be inconsistent with
federalism principles. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 578–79 (1996) (deeming such application “iron[ic]” when justified by
the national character of the case); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, State Sovereignty,
and Federally Mandated Choice of Law in “Mass Tort” Cases, 56 ALB. L. REV. 855, 861
(1993) (arguing that this concern makes such application “highly undesirable”). But see
Mary Kay Kane, Drafting Choice of Law Rules for Complex Litigation: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 10 REV. LITIG. 309, 320–21 (1991) (arguing that the federalism concern should
be considered on a case-by-case basis). That does not seem to be a barrier when the constitutional standards for choice of law have been satisfied in the selection of a single governing law. See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (applying
constitutional limitations on choice of law to multistate class actions).

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economic policy.”132 As a result, many cases will not be pursued
because they are not economically viable on behalf of individual class
members, most particularly those having negative-value claims. The
result leaves broad-based harms unredressed. Even when an attempt
to block class certification does not succeed, the very elaborate Rule
23 process called for by recent decisions imposes significant additional
cost and delay, particularly when interlocutory appellate review of a
certification decision is sought and especially when it is granted.133
The increased costs and heightened risk of noncertification inhibits
the institution of potentially meritorious class cases, which often
leaves public policies underenforced and large numbers of citizens
uncompensated.
D. The Federal Arbitration Act
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 134 is another of the Court’s
recent class action decisions, this one involving the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).135 The case established a further impairment
of the day-in-court and jury-trial principles.136 It upheld a clause in a
cellular telephone contract calling for the arbitration of disputes but
barring arbitration on a class basis. The five-to-four decision137 overrode the California court’s conclusion that the clause was unconscionable, suggesting that anything that represented “an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives” would be swept away by
preemption.138 This decision effectively replaces judges and juries with
one-by-one arbitrators in many contexts better served by class actions
132 Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 340 (3d Cir. 2011) (Scirica, J., concurring);
see also supra note 111 and accompanying text (explaining the 1966 amendment’s purpose
of providing compensation to those with negative-value claims).
133 Cf. 7B WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 27, § 1802 (noting the drain on judicial
capacity by various attempts at appellate review prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f)).
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) (authorizing such appeals); 7B WRIGHT, MILLER &
KANE, supra note 27, §§ 1802–1802.2 (discussing the application of the discretionary interlocutory review provision in Rule 23(f)). Interlocutory appellate review, not surprisingly, is
used most frequently by defendants.
134 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
135 Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–14
(2006)).
136 See Resnik, supra note 123, at 132–33 (criticizing the Court for failing to analyze due
process despite making process-based arguments in favor of arbitration).
137 The arbitration provision at issue provided for a payment of at least $7500 and twice
the Concepcions’ attorneys’ fees if they were awarded more than AT&T Mobility’s settlement offer, leaving open the possibility of a contrary result in a case involving a more
onerous one. Moreover, the Court’s opinion also made it clear that the arbitration procedure must be a realistic one. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (describing the required
procedure).
138 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.

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or other forms of claim aggregation. As a result, powerful economic
entities can impose no-class-action-arbitration clauses on people with
little or no bargaining position—through adhesion contracts involving
securities accounts, credit cards, mobile phones, car rentals, and many
other social amenities and necessities.139 The practice undoubtedly
will proliferate, as exemplified by Microsoft’s June 2012 announcement that it is changing many new contracts to eliminate the possibility of class arbitration.140 The effect, of course, is that the vast
majority of people who would comprise a judicial or arbitration class
and possibly secure legal relief are not in a position to invoke their
contractual “right” to arbitrate. As a result, these people remain remediless, leaving the challenged conduct undeterred.141
Concepcion demonstrates the judiciary’s willingness to allow boilerplate arbitration clauses to trump access to the court system in the
name of the FAA, a statute enacted in 1925 with the seemingly limited
purpose of overcoming the then-existing “judicial hostility” to the
arbitration of contract disputes between businesses, which was most
commonly manifested in diversity cases.142 That hostility has
139 The single issue in Concepcion was the legitimacy of a $30.22 sales tax fee for a
phone advertised as being free, making class treatment extremely appropriate and efficient. A slight variation on Judge Posner’s ringing observation springs to mind: “[O]nly a
lunatic or a fanatic [arbitrates] for $30.” Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656,
661 (7th Cir. 2004).
140 David Lazarus, Microsoft Pulls Plug on Class Actions, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2012, at
B1. Dire consequences have been forecast for years. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 112, at
373, 379 (claiming that if permitted to proliferate, class action waivers ultimately will cause
“the near-total demise of the modern class action”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1638–39 (2005) (discussing the
prevalence and impact of mandatory arbitration clauses); Klonoff, supra note 105, at 62–63
(suggesting that collective action waivers substantially impede negative-value claims).
141 See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008) (noting companies’ wider use of arbitration provisions in consumer contracts than nonconsumer contracts); Sternlight, supra
note 140, at 1638–39 (discussing the prevalence of mandatory arbitration clauses); see also
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T
Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 639–52 (2012) (exploring the wide-ranging
consequences of Concepcion).
142 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (describing pre-FAA hostility towards arbitration in
general); see also IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION,
NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 22–23 (1992) (suggesting that pre-FAA hostility may have been greater than it appeared because judges dismissed cases through jurisdictional means). Concepcion was preceded by Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds
International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), which established a “default rule” that when the
contract is silent, a party cannot be compelled to submit to class arbitration unless there is
a “contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.” Id. at 1769, 1775
(emphasis omitted); see also Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 227 F. App’x 135, 137–38
(3d Cir. 2011) (finding, without citation to Stolt-Nielsen, no “clear intent to opt out of the
FAA rules”).

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dissipated. Nonetheless, over the years the Act has been transformed
by the Supreme Court through constant expansion into an expression
of a “federal policy” favoring arbitration, whether it involves a bilateral business dispute or not.143 Indeed, the Court has said that the Act
“reflects an emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.”144 Concepcion strikingly exemplifies the extraordinary judicial
extension of the Act’s application to a vast array of consumer contracts that are characterized by their adhesive nature and by the individual’s complete lack of bargaining power (as well as a probable lack
of understanding of the arbitration clause’s significance). Federal
courts apply the Act even when the judicial forum’s law would render
an arbitration clause unenforceable, or when the claims are worth
much less than the cost of litigating (or arbitrating) them on an individual basis.145 This occurs despite the passage in the 1925 Act

143 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); see also Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (extending the application of the FAA to
employment contracts); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (extending the application of the FAA to
some statutory claims); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that the
FAA’s national policy favoring arbitration prevented a state court from providing a judicial
forum when the parties had contracted for class arbitration); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The
Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law,
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1425–43 (2008) (arguing that the FAA has evolved into a “broadly
sweeping muscular statute”).
144 KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 See In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 459 F. App’x 855, 858–59 (11th Cir.
2012) (reversing the district court’s finding of unconscionability under Georgia law because
the arbitration clause in a forty-page checking account agreement allowed the defendant
banks to recover expenses and attorneys’ fees relating to claims it prevailed on and allowed
them to seize funds jointly owned); Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir.
2012) (holding that the FAA preempted state law’s invalidation of a class-action waiver);
Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1214 (11th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a factual
record regarding the cost-effectiveness of individual claims as foreclosed by Concepcion);
Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048–50 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(rejecting a showing that it would not be cost effective for an attorney to pursue a claim
without class aggregation); see also In re Gateway LX6810 Computer Prods. Litig., No.
SACV 10-1563-JST, 2011 WL 3099862, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2011) (finding a mere
assertion that a contract is adhesive insufficient to establish procedural unconscionability).
The European Communities Council’s Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
forbids binding consumers to unfair contractual terms, defined as those “which ha[ve] not
been individually negotiated” and “cause[ ] a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights
and obligations . . . to the detriment of the consumer,” such as “requiring the consumer to
take disputes exclusively to arbitration not covered by legal provisions . . . .” Council
Directive 93/13, arts. 1, 6, annex 1(q), 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29, 31, 33 (EEC); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 831, 844–48 (2002) (elaborating on Europe’s stance toward arbitration).

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authorizing an arbitration clause to be overridden “upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”146
The Court’s accepting attitude toward the judicial enforcement of
arbitration clauses now extends to disputes involving federal statutory
causes of action, unless the applicability of the FAA is overridden by
what the Court described as a clear “contrary congressional command.”147 Similarly, arbitration clauses will preempt established state
146 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). The statutory clause was given effect in In re Checking Account
Overdraft Litig., 459 F. App’x at 858–59 (finding unconscionable an arbitration clause
automatically imposing the defendant’s costs, losses, and expenses on the consumer, and
distinguishing Concepcion). The Supreme Court also has given the Act’s prerequisites and
exclusions extremely narrow construction. See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118–19 (construing narrowly an exclusion for certain contracts of employment). But see Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (construing broadly “transaction
involving commerce” (emphasis omitted)). The Supreme Court’s expansion of the
Act beyond its original intent is criticized sharply in Margaret L. Moses, Statutory
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted
by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 (2006).
147 Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). The Court’s broad
reading of the FAA appears to have coincided with fears of the so-called “litigation explosion.” See David Horton, Arbitration as Delegation, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 451 (2011)
(suggesting that the Court used the FAA as a “release valve” for increasing litigation). For
nearly sixty years, the Court recognized that the “resolution of statutory or constitutional
issues is a primary responsibility of courts . . . .” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415
U.S. 36, 57 (1974), overruled in part by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20 (1991). As a result, courts routinely held that the FAA did not require individuals to
arbitrate statutory causes of action. See, e.g., McDonald v. W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290
(1984) (concluding that a section 1983 claim was not subject to arbitration), abrogated by
Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20 (1991), as recognized in Wiedemann v. Oklahoma City, 76 F. App’x
931, 932 (10th Cir. 2003); Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49 (holding a collective-bargaining arbitration agreement cannot displace a Title VII cause of action); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427,
434–35 (1953) (excluding Securities Act claims from arbitration), overruled by Rodriguez
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v.
J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that an antitrust claim cannot
be decided through the arbitration system), overruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), as recognized in Kotam Elec., Inc. v. JBL
Consumer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 724, 726–28 (11th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, reversed
course in Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640. The holding in Mitsubishi was extended to permit
arbitration of other statutory rights. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79,
84 (2000) (allowing arbitration of Truth in Lending Act actions); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35
(allowing arbitration of age discrimination disputes); Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 483–84 (overruling Wilko and allowing the arbitration of Securities Act claims); McMahon, 482 U.S. at
238 (upholding a compulsory arbitration clause in a brokerage account agreement for
claims under the Securities Exchange Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO)). In Mitsubishi, the Court placed the burden on Congress to
state clearly when it intends to exclude a statutory right from arbitration. See Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 628 (“[I]f Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given
statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention
will be deducible from text or legislative history.”). Congress would have to have been
clairvoyant when it was legislating prior to cases like Mitsubishi and Gilmer, let alone prior
to the enactment of the FAA, to include the anti-arbitration declarations suggested by the
Court. Congress has chosen to protect automobile dealers from arbitration clauses in

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principles of law barring certain conduct, thereby interfering with the
enforcement of state public policies when arbitration principles or
procedures are singled out for special treatment.148
Two other recent Supreme Court decisions graphically illustrate
the impairment of federal and state policies by an almost automatic
honoring of adhesive arbitration clauses. First, in Compucredit Corp.
v. Greenwood,149 the Supreme Court insisted that a statute contain a
clear statement showing Congress’s intent to exclude arbitration of
disputes under the enactment and overrode the notice of the right to
sue and nonwaiver passages in the Credit Repair Organizations
Act.150 Justice Ginsburg thought these passages had been designed by
Congress to protect consumers’ right to a judicial forum for violations
of the statute.151 But she was alone in expressing the view that
Congress had given consumers a “nonwaivable right to sue” that

franchise agreements by an amendment to the Automobile Dealers Day in Court Act. See
15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2006) (“An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile
manufacturer engaged in commerce . . . .”). Congress similarly has protected farmers from
such clauses in food producers’ printed contracts. See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act
of 2008, 7 U.S.C. § 197c (Supp. II) (“Any livestock or poultry contract that contains a
provision requiring the use of arbitration to resolve any controversy that may arise under
the contract shall contain a provision that allows a producer or grower, prior to entering
the contract to decline to be bound by the arbitration provision.” (footnote omitted)).
Special interest lobbying obviously was behind both pieces of legislation.
148 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (ruling that the
FAA preempted a Montana statute that conditioned the enforceability of an arbitration
clause on compliance with special notice requirements); Coneff, 673 F.3d at 1161 (holding
that the FAA preempted Washington’s substantive unconscionability law); Kilgore v.
KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (preempting a state court’s ability
to issue an injunction against deceptive practices on behalf of the public), reh’g en banc
granted, 697 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2012). But cf. Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 128 Cal. Rptr.
3d 854, 860–61, 863 (Ct. App. 2011) (invalidating a no-representative-action arbitration
clause on a nonwaivable statutory rights theory), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1910 (2012). Some
Justices have expressed the view that the FAA does not apply to proceedings in state
courts. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
149 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
150 Id. at 672–73 (discussing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1679f & 1679g (2006)). In 2011, a proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act was introduced to amend the FAA to invalidate mandatory
predispute arbitration clauses in consumer, employment, and civil rights situations. S. 987,
112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011). No action has been taken on the
proposal.
151 Compucredit, 132 S. Ct. at 678 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s
“target audience” favors her position); see also Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., No. 11-04258CV-FJG, 2012 WL 1192005, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2012) (holding that the right to sue
under the Fair Labor Standards Act takes precedence over an arbitration agreement). But
see Morvant v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., No. 11-CV-05405 YGR, 2012 WL 1604851,
at *10, *12 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) (finding nothing in the National Labor Relations Act
or the Norris La Guardia Act overriding the FAA).

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overcame the FAA’s supposed policy favoring arbitration.152 Second,
in a per curiam opinion in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v.
Brown,153 the Court rejected West Virginia’s decision not to enforce
arbitration clauses in nursing home contracts in actions involving the
death of a patient. The Justices recited the now common proarbitration catechism, found no exception in the Act for personal injury or
wrongful death claims, and preempted a West Virginia categorical rule
prohibiting arbitration of the particular type of claim before the
Court.154 In both of these cases clear, statutorily expressed public policies were overridden by judicial intuitions about a national policy
favoring arbitration extrapolated from a 1925 law that appears to have
been designed for a relatively limited purpose.155
The Supreme Court’s broad reading of the FAA’s scope of application and purpose can be compared to its contemporary refusal to
find private rights of action under other federal statutes. The Court
often has cited the FAA drafters’ intent—not the FAA’s text—when
invalidating state legislation affecting adhesive consumer agreements
to arbitrate.156 In doing so, the Court has relied on its obstacle
152 Justices Sotomayor and Kagan concurred in result essentially because of stare
decisis. See Compucredit, 132 S. Ct. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (finding
the arguments equal, and breaking the tie with precedent).
153 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203–04 (2012) (stating that West Virginia’s law was contrary to the
FAA’s terms).
154 Id. Some courts have been willing to make exceptions when the contractual terms for
the arbitration are patently one sided. In In re Checking Account Overdraft Litigation, 459
F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2012), the court struck down a cost-and-fee-shifting provision that
operated automatically regardless of who prevailed but operated only in the defendant’s
favor because South Carolina’s general unconscionability doctrine applied to all contracts
and did not single out or interfere with the fundamental attributes of arbitration. Therefore, Concepcion did not preempt the state contract principle.
155 See supra note 142 and accompanying text (stating that the FAA initially was
designed to counteract judicial hostility to businesses arbitrating their disputes).
156 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (finding
that California’s rule created an obstacle to FAA’s objectives). When determining whether
a state law poses an obstacle to the FAA, the Court’s reading of legislative history appears
selective. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984), the Supreme Court
extended section 2 of the FAA to disputes in state courts involving state substantive law.
The majority opinion paid little attention to Justice O’Connor’s documentation of the
FAA’s legislative history, which strongly suggested that the drafters intended the FAA to
apply only in federal courts. See id. at 25 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“One rarely finds a
legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA’s. That history establishes conclusively that
the 1925 Congress viewed the FAA as a procedural statute, applicable only in federal
courts . . . .”); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[O]ver the past decade, the Court has abandoned all pretense
of ascertaining congressional intent with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act, building
instead, case by case, an edifice of its own creation.”); id. at 285 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(advocating this same point); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
420 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]here are clear indications in the legislative history
that the Act was not intended to make arbitration agreements enforceable in state courts

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preemption doctrine, a form of federal common law,157 and overlooked its presumption against preemption.158 In contrast, since the
1980s, the Court has followed a strict textualist approach in refusing to
employ federal common law to find implied causes of action under
federal statutes. In this context, the Court recognizes a private right of
action only when a statute’s text is clear.159 In some respects, the
Court’s presumption against creating federal common law appears to
have morphed into a presumption against access to both state and federal courts for remedial purposes when an arbitration clause—even an
adhesive one—is present.160
Compelled private adjudication essentially is now competing with
the public adjudicatory system and replacing access to the courts, the
. . . .”); MACNEIL, supra note 142, at 104 (concluding that no one believed that the FAA
would apply in state courts); Moses, supra note 146, at 102–03 (arguing that legislative,
scholarly, and judicial history indicates the FAA should be treated as a federal procedural
law). Although Justice Thomas previously endorsed this reading of the FAA, he no longer
appears to support this interpretation. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[C]ourts cannot refuse to enforce arbitration agreements because of a state
public policy against arbitration . . . .”).
157 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 278 (2000) (explaining that
obstacle preemption, depending on one’s proclivities, can be labeled either “statutory
interpretation” or a “doctrine of federal common law”).
158 See, e.g., Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When considering pre-emption, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947))); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393,
425 (2004) (identifying “the notable absence of the presumption in the Court’s FAA preemption decisions to date”); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption:
An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 458 (2008) (“[T]he presumption
does yeoman’s work in some cases while going AWOL altogether in others.” (footnote
omitted)).
159 Many have documented the demise of the implied private right of action. See, e.g.,
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1083 (1997) (“The creation of wholly new implied rights of action has largely passed
from the scene.”); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 54, at 1196 (“The Supreme Court . . . has
created a strong presumption against judicial recognition of private rights of action.”).
After Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204,
1213 (2012), the Court also appears willing to limit Ex Parte Young actions. See Stephen I.
Vladeck, Douglas and the Fate of Ex Parte Young, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 13, 14 (2012),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/04/30/vladeck.html (noting that Justice Kennedy likely
would have sided with the dissent if the majority chose to reach the issue in Douglas). For
a discussion of the importance of private rights of action to the enforcement of constitutional and statutory public policies, see supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
160 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Access to Courts and Preemption of
State Remedies in Collective Action Perspective, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919, 927–28
(2009) (juxtaposing the Court’s consistent reliance on “a negative inference from
Congress’s failure to provide an express cause of action” with the Court’s less than “equal
vigor” when applying the presumption against preemption).

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possibility of jury trial, and any process transparency.161 It thus has
enabled business entities to capture control over the manner and
means for resolving disputes with their customers. Compounding the
deleterious effects of the current extreme applications of the FAA,
business entities have a built-in adjudicatory and tactical advantage in
arbitration in as much as they are better resourced, more experienced
with the arbitration process, and are repeat players in that arena,
raising the possibility of favoritism by arbitrators.162 Moreover, permitting business entities to deny customers the ability to advance
claims on an aggregate basis, as Concepcion does, quite likely undermines consumer protection and other important public policies.163
Surely the Justices forming the majority in Concepcion,
Compucredit, and Marmet well understood the pragmatic, economic,
and policy implications of extending the 1925 statute across the
universe of disputes and areas of substantive law that could not
possibly have been anticipated by Congress. In addition, it does not
seem reasonable to me to assume that when subsequent Congresses
created new federal substantive rights, they intended that their
enforcement would be remitted to arbitration by the simple contractual expedient—inserting an adhesive mandatory-no-class arbitration
clause—imposed by the party who allegedly violated those rights.
Congress also would not have intentionally designed the FAA to jeopardize important state contract or other substantive decisions. Nor
does it seem reasonable to assume that someone contracting for a cell
phone, acquiring software, or investing with a broker knowingly has
waived his or her right to seek the protection of the courts, the potentially claim-saving vehicle of aggregation, or adjudication before a
jury. There was a time when the procedural protections in the Fifth,
161 See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 507, 507 (2011) (discussing the growth in private rules of procedure agreed to
before a dispute arises); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
593, 594–96 (2005) (noting the increase in procedural bargaining as an instrumental part of
civil law).
162 Justice Scalia’s opinion in Concepcion expresses a concern that class arbitration
poses risks for defendants by noting that “when damages allegedly owed to tens of
thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error
will often become unacceptable.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740,
1752 (2011). None of the Justices express concern about “the risk of error” of no compensation or under compensation for plaintiffs, however.
163 The tension between the need to respect contractual autonomy and the desire to
protect statutory rights is well illustrated by comparing Kilgore v. KeyBank National Ass’n,
673 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2012), in which the court held that the arbitration clause in
student loan contracts are enforceable, with In re American Merchants’ Litigation, 667 F.3d
204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), in which the court held that arbitration clauses are not enforced in
actions challenging credit card terms under antitrust laws.

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Seventh, and Fourteenth Amendments were treated more
deferentially.
A legislative corrective of the current judicial construction of the
FAA would be desirable but is politically unlikely at this time.164
Fortunately, several judges have shown some resistance to extreme
applications of the statute. In In re American Express Merchants’
Litigation,165 the latest entry in the seemingly endless litigation over
the arbitration question in that case, a two-judge panel of the Second
Circuit concluded that a class action waiver provision in an arbitration
clause was unenforceable in the antitrust action before them because
it effectively would bar the plaintiffs from vindicating their statutory
rights.166 After extensively analyzing and distinguishing many of the
Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions, including Concepcion and
Compucredit, the panel concluded: “Eradicating the private enforcement component from our antitrust law scheme cannot be what
Congress intended when it included strong, private enforcement
mechanisms and incentives in the antitrust statutes.”167 The panel’s
opinion made clear, however, that the party seeking to avoid arbitration bears the burden of establishing that the costs of individual arbitration would be prohibitively expensive.168 As expected, the Supreme
164 One bill has been presented to Congress. S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1873,
112th Cong. (2011). No action has been taken on the proposal. On January 2, 2012, the
National Labor Relations Board ruled that a company’s mandatory arbitration agreement
waiving class actions violated federal labor law. The ruling has been challenged in a case
that is now sub judice in the Fifth Circuit. D.R. Horton Inc. v. NLRB, No. 12-60031 (5th
Cir. 2013).
165 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
166 Id. at 219; see also Sutherland v. Ernst & Young, 768 F. Supp. 2d 547, 551–53
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that a class action waiver making individual claims effectively
valueless could not be enforced). The enforceability of the clause had been before the
Second Circuit twice before, as well as the Supreme Court. In re Am. Express Merch.
Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir.
2009), vacated sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). In
a somewhat related vein, the district judge in Cisneros v. American Financial Services, Inc.,
No. C11-02869 CRB, 2012 WL 3025913, at *2, *6 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012), refused to
compel arbitration of a contract deemed procedurally and substantively unconscionable
under California law. The contract was written in English but had been negotiated in
Spanish; the plaintiff could not read or write English; referenced documents were not
attached; and the defendant reserved to itself the right to enforce the contract in court.
167 Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 218. Some cases decided after American Express have
declined to apply it in actions arising under state law. E.g., Homa v. Am. Express Co., No.
11-3600, 2012 WL 3594231, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2012) (noting that the FAA preempts
the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224,
1234 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting as preempted an argument that a class action waiver was
unconscionable under Florida Unfair Trade Practices Act).
168 Am. Express, 667 F.3d at 216–18 (relying on Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000), and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth

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Court has granted certiorari in American Express.169 Depending on
how the issue ultimately is resolved, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals’s approach in that case might represent a useful, although
modest, ray of light in the stifling darkness of today’s arbitrationclause enforcement jurisprudence.
E. Pleading Requirements
Those cases not remitted to arbitration face another early impediment on the procedural road map erected by the Supreme Court:
heightened pleading requirements. I suspect it would be hard to find
an active federal litigator who has not employed or defended against a
motion based on the Court’s 2007 decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,170 and its 2009 extension and elaboration in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal.171 By demanding that the plaintiff plead facts demonstrating
that the claim has substantive plausibility, rather than a statement that
is legally sufficient and gives notice of the plaintiff’s claim, these two
cases represent a procedural “sea change” in plaintiffs’ ability to survive the pleading stage.172 They turn their back on over sixty years of
federal pleading jurisprudence as well as any possible alternative procedural approaches that might be better suited to meeting the concerns expressed in the Court’s opinions.173 Their effect has been so
Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 (1985)). Widespread use of favorable economic terms comparable to
those in AT&T Mobility’s contract at issue in Concepcion would limit the applicability of
American Express, even if it remains uncompromised further by the Supreme Court.
169 Id. at 594. The Supreme Court also has granted certiorari in Oxford Health Plans
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), in which the Third Circuit upheld an arbitrator’s
decision to proceed on a class basis under an arbitration clause that did not mention class
proceedings. The potential class of physicians, possibly 20,000 in number, asserts Oxford
Health Plans improperly denies, underpays, and delays reimbursement claims.
170 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
171 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
172 Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that
Twombly and Iqbal abrogated notice pleading); see also Alex Reinert, Pleading as
Information-Forcing, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 1–2 (2012) (noting the change in
pleading standards among lower courts).
173 See discussion infra notes 305–12. Justice Souter’s denigration of judicial management in his opinion for the Court in Twombly is particularly troubling. Relying on an
outdated law review article, he ignored the enormous development and improvements in
management technology; the 1983, 1993, and 2000 amendments of the discovery rules; and
the impact of the Court’s 1986 summary judgment trilogy. See Miller, supra note 54, at
54–61 (questioning Justice Souter’s opinion). Indeed, the Court spoke favorably of judicial
management only a few years before Twombly. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574
(1998) (describing judicial management as “efficient,” “prompt,” and “more useful and
equitable” than heightened pleading requirements); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1993) (summarizing judicial management’s role in regulating discovery and disposing of unmeritorious claims). Justice
Souter dissented in Iqbal, perhaps concluding that Twombly was being taken too far.

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dramatic that cartoons have appeared showing lawyers complaining to
their disappointed clients about having been “Twomblyed in the
Iqbals.”174 The two cases have been cited thousands of times and have
created heightened opportunities for defendants to seek dismissal or,
at a minimum, a deferral of discovery and any real consideration of
the merits.175 Not surprisingly, the Federal Judicial Center reports that
motions to dismiss are now being invoked with increased frequency,
which indicates that the Court’s decisions have magnified litigation
costs and affected lawyer behavior.176 But beyond that, a very close
analysis of the Center’s study has led one empirical scholar to warn
that the raw statistics mask the fact that the two cases have substantively impacted dismissal practices and outcomes and that the study
fails to measure other potentially important, deleterious effects of the
two decisions.177
Since 1938, the actual language of the core federal pleading provision, Rule 8(a)(2), only has required a “short and plain statement . . .
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”178 The rulemakers
174 COURTOONS, http://www.courtoons.net/2009/10/23/twombly/ (last visited Feb. 12,
2013). My less than complimentary views of Twombly and Iqbal are spelled out at length
in Miller, supra note 54. The current Reporter to the Advisory Committee explores the
post-Twombly/Iqbal universe, the difficulties facing the rulemakers, and notes a few possible amendments. Edward H. Cooper, King Arthur Confronts TwIqy Pleading, 90 OR. L.
REV. 955, 967–69, 971–72, 976–89 (2012); see also Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age
of Twombly and Iqbal, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2123325 (analyzing why neither
Congress nor the Advisory Committee has attempted to amend Rule 8 after Iqbal and
Twombly). A very comprehensive discussion of the two cases and their implications
appear in SCOTT DODSON, SLAMMING THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOORS? NEW
PLEADING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013).
175 See, e.g., Robert L. Rothman, Twombly and Iqbal: A License to Dismiss, 35 LITIG. 1,
70 (2009) (discussing the “high price imposed in Twombly and Iqbal”).
176 JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON,
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL:
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 8 (2011),
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf;
see also Patricia Hatamyer Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on
12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 613–14 (2012) (showing that grants of the
motion went from 46% in the Conley era to 48% following Twombly and increased to 61%
after Iqbal).
177 Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal
Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 36 (2011); see also
Hoffman, supra note 174 (manuscript at 41–42) (explaining that both the filing and grant
rates of motions to dismiss have increased after Twombly and Iqbal). Some writers have
concluded that the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11 represent increased procedural
hurdles and risk, Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth or Reality?
Boon or Bane?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 994 (1998), or are applied disproportionately against
plaintiffs, Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 870 (1992).
178 See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1215 (discussing the simplified pleading
contemplated by Rule 8(a)(2)).

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drafted it that way to permit relatively easy entre to the federal courts
without technicality or formality.179 They also recognized that the
elaborate and demanding pleading phases of prior systems had
become a quicksand of motion practice and a premature graveyard for
many potentially meritorious claims.180 Philosophically, at least, the
Federal Rules say: “Feel injured? Well, come on in, this is a friendly,
justice seeking litigation system, and we will sort the merits out after
everyone has access to the facts through discovery.” It should be
acknowledged, however, that during the two decades preceding
Twombly and Iqbal, a number of federal courts—despite an impressive unbroken string of Supreme Court decisions repeating and reinforcing the norm of notice pleading181—had begun to deviate from the
Supreme Court’s construction of the undemanding requirement set
out in Rule 8.182
The Court essentially rewrote Rule 8 without anyone’s assistance
or any pretense of honoring the statutorily prescribed—and far more

179 “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 48 (1957); see also 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1217 (discussing the
meaning of the phrase “short and plain” in Rule 8(a)(2)). Others have reached a similar
conclusion. See, e.g., Jonah B. Bell, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects
of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2270 (2012) (reporting
that a significant percentage of cases have been affected by the Court’s decisions); Clark,
supra note 9, at 154 (explaining the focus of the original Federal Rules).
180 “Under the common-law system the matter was bad enough with a pleading question
decided in every sixth case. But under the Hilary Rules [a collection of English pleading
rules] it was worse. Every fourth case decided a question on the pleadings. Pleadings ran
riot.” Clark B. Whittier, Notice Pleading, 31 HARV. L. REV. 501, 507 (1918).
181 E.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Leatherman v. Tarrant
Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Conley, 335
U.S. at 47. Dissenting in Twombly, Justice Stevens noted that the Court’s opinion was a
“dramatic departure from settled procedural law” and the first by any member of the
Court to doubt the adequacy of the Conley formulation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 578 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting). It also should be acknowledged that in order
to discharge its notice-giving functions a pleading inevitably must present some facts.
182 A number of commentators had noted this development. See generally Christopher
M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003); Richard L.
Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435 (1996). Two prominent proceduralists have labeled this trend
lawless. Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a
Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 408 (2011) (“Now the Court,
in Twombly and Iqbal, has rewarded that lawlessness with its own acts of lawlessness
. . . .”). The literature favoring the Twombly and Iqbal results is catalogued and critiqued
in A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal
Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (on file with the New York University
Law Review).

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transparent and democratic183—rulemaking process.184 The Rule
effectively has been changed. Initially, it required “notice” of the
claim. Now it requires facts—not conclusions185—“showing” (a word
in the Rule never previously judicially focused on or accorded any
significance) a “plausible” claim, with little guidance as to what that
means.186 And what does it mean? Justice Souter’s Twombly opinion
only tells us plausibility is something more than purely speculative or
possible, but it can be less than probable.187 Of course, that’s not very
helpful.
183 See Steve Subrin, Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Contempt for Rules, Statutes, the Constitution,
and Elemental Fairness, 12 NEV. L. REV. 571, 575 (2012) (“The Supreme Court has acted
lawlessly. It has amended a rule, without going through the explicit and detailed process
for amending the Federal Rules that has evolved through the years . . . .”). The rulemaking
process includes a notice-and-comment period and an opportunity for Congress to review
and possibly block a proposed rule amendment. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073, 2077 (2006).
Twombly and Iqbal have been characterized by some scholars in political terms, employing
words such as “judicial activism,” or as part of the “right/left” dichotomy, or furthering
“conservative” and “corporate” interests. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C.
Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 850 (2010) (“Many
observers . . . see the same old right/left story: the conservatives seek to protect rich or
powerful defendants, while the liberals stand with the little plaintiffs.”); Adam N.
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1325 (2010) (explaining that
Twombly and Iqbal can be read as favoring “corporate and business interests”).
184 A number of academics have criticized this process. See, e.g., Clermont & Yeazell,
supra note 183, at 850; Edward A. Harnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 474 U. PA.
L. REV. 473 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 454
(2008); Case Note, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 313 (2007). The Court repeatedly had
expressed its commitment to the rulemaking process. Indeed, it had done so only five
months prior to deciding Twombly in Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 212 (2007). In
Carrington, supra note 40, at 656–57, the author opines that the Court has “lost . . . selfdiscipline” and “lacks sufficient deference” to the other entities with a stake in rulemaking.
See also Miller, supra note 54, at 84–89 (discussing the rulemaking process and the effect
of Twombly and Iqbal). A few commentators have expressed the view that the rulemaking
process has lost some of its credibility, lacks representative composition, has been
politicized by pressures from special interests, and has been undermined by procedural
lawmaking in lieu of resorting to the rulemaking process. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 795, 798–99 (1991); Stempel, supra note 87, at 637. I have sketched briefly my witnessing of shifts in the workings of the Advisory Committee between 1962 and 1990 in
Miller, supra note 109 (manuscript at 8).
185 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. The Advisory Committee had rejected comparable
proposals, which may be why the Court took matters into its own hands. E.g., 1955 Report
of the Advisory Committee, Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the
United States District Courts, Rule 8 (1955), reprinted in 12A WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE &
MARCUS, supra note 96, at app. F (containing the advisory note reflecting proposed
amendments to Rule 8(a)(2)); see also 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1201
(describing the history of Rule 8’s modifications).
186 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (identifying the Court’s standard). “Plausible” thus has
become the mantra-like concept for motions under both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. But
does the word have one meaning or two?
187 Id. at 557. The potential for inconsistency of outcome is illustrated by contrasting two
recent antitrust cases. Compare Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 216 (3d Cir.

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The Court was more specific in Iqbal, saying “plausible” means
that the pleading must show there is a reasonable possibility of
relief.188 With regard to how district judges are supposed to divine
reasonable possibility, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the five-Justice
majority invited them to use their “judicial experience and common
sense.”189 In some circumstances that will suffice, but the formula is
far from a satisfactory one. Does it mean that a newly appointed judge
has no judicial experience to employ, or that we are supposed to be
comforted by assuming that judicial experience is homogeneous
among members of the federal bench, or that common sense is generously and equally distributed among them and will be applied in a
uniform manner? In addition to those two amorphous factors, the
Court instructed district and court of appeals judges to compare the
challenged conduct to a hypothesized innocent explanation for the
defendant’s actions. This sounds very much like an invitation to evaluate the merits of the plaintiff’s case on the basis of a single document—the complaint—without having the benefit of discovery, let
alone anything remotely approximating a trial or the input of a jury.
But a complaint does not speak to any aspect of judicial experience or judicial common sense; they both are irrelevant to stating a
claim for relief under Rule 8(a)(2). Nor do plaintiffs—even the most
masochistic of them—discuss hypothetical innocent explanations of
the defendant’s conduct in their complaints. So what is a plaintiff supposed to plead to state a legally sufficient claim? Not these extraneous
matters one would hope. Yet, some lawyers with whom I have discussed the subject fear that Twombly and Iqbal have so twisted the
pleading structure that they now must protectively negate potential
defenses and any possible innocent explanations for the conduct being
challenged. This extreme view—which sounds a bit like Chicken Little
warning that the sky is falling—cannot be correct, although one can
understand the apprehension. That is not the type of pleading the
rulemakers intended or what a rational twenty-first century pleading
system should require. It amounts to the plaintiff anticipating defenses
to his own claim and negating them in the complaint, which is inap2011) (finding the trustee did not show plausibility of agreement to restrain trade through
circumstantial evidence), with Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162,
167–68 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that the wholesaler sufficiently alleged a plausible
conspiracy).
188 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
189 Id. at 679. Why isn’t it “plausible” and a “reasonable possibility” and within one’s
“common sense” that the Twombly defendants wanted to prevent competition in their
regions and agreed not to compete outside their own respective regions or that in Iqbal the
Attorney General and the director of the FBI knew of the discriminatory practices suffered by the plaintiff and even condoned them?

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propriate pleading in every American procedural system I know
anything about.190 Moreover, one hopes that the district judge’s judicial experience and common sense and the merits of the hypothesized
innocent explanation do not become elements of the adversarial presentation on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Yet, that is what Iqbal
states are the judicial tools to be employed. Does that mean they now
are the central significant elements of the inquiry on the motion?
These “considerations” are being raised, of course,191 although the
factors of judicial experience and common sense must be presented, if
at all, discreetly.
The process described in Iqbal appeals too much to judicial subjectivity, which inevitably depends (at least in part) on an individual
judge’s background, values, preferences, education, and attitudes, as
the divisions among both the Justices on the Court and the judges of
the Second Circuit in Twombly and Iqbal indicate.192 One does not
have to be paranoid to be concerned that these highly individualistic
considerations are at work and impacting a district judge’s thinking on
a motion to dismiss, particularly with regard to assessing the complaint’s plausibility and the hypothesized innocent explanations for
the defendant’s conduct. There is simply too much potential for inappropriate merit determinations—based only on the complaint—in the
Iqbal regime.
190 The classic case on the subject is Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 153 (1908), in which the court relied only on a plaintiff’s claims and not an anticipated defense to determine subject matter jurisdiction. See also Holmes Grp., Inc. v.
Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830–31 (2002) (finding that a complaint,
not an answer, determines if a complaint arises under federal law); Arthur R. Miller, Artful
Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1781 (1998) (discussing the
artful pleading doctrine).
191 The Court’s opinions in both Twombly and Iqbal offered innocent explanations for
the defendants’ conduct; these explanations were employed in a manner akin to judicial
fact-finding. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
192 See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 95, at 903–05; see also Suja A. Thomas,
The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 B.C. L. REV. 759, 759 (2009) (asserting that judges
dismiss cases based on their own view of the facts). As a now retired district judge has
observed: “What is plausible to me, what my common sense indicates, coming from where
I come from, may not be what is plausible to other judges [or] what comports with their
common sense.” Nancy Gertner, A Judge Hangs Up Her Robes, 38 LITIG. 60, 61 (2012).
Others have noted that excessive judicial discretion may lead to decisions based on individual attitudes. E.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern
American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2009) (“The discretionary power of the
judge to follow his or her personal preferences in deciding the plausibility of a complaint is
enlarged to the extent that direct allegations of liability-creating conduct can be thus disregarded.”); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124,
1146–48 (2012) (analyzing how a judge’s already formed attitudes affect judicial decisionmaking); Marcus, supra note 182, at 482 (explaining that discretion allows judges to dismiss pleadings based on personal preferences).

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Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that the new plausibility
regime may lead to judges resolving fact issues on a motion to dismiss—as, I believe, has occurred in various contexts ever since the
Supreme Court’s 1986 summary judgment decisions described earlier193—thereby intruding on a domain historically committed to the
trial process and juries, something that even the fact and narrative
pleading systems of times gone by never allowed.194 The motion to
dismiss and its antecedents—for hundreds of years—have been
viewed as procedures that only determine the legal sufficiency of the
statements in the complaint.195 The motion asks a simple question—does the complaint state a claim the law recognizes? For
example, suppose I allege that one of my students gave me a dirty
look in class. Whatever procedural system you test that pleading
193

See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text (describing summary judgment cases).
I perceive a disturbing and growing judicial trend of judges characterizing allegations
that seem to be factual (and therefore to be accepted by the court as true on a motion to
dismiss) as conclusory and therefore not binding on the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
The fact versus conclusion dichotomy always has been a dubious basis for testing a
pleading. See Walter W. Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM.
L. REV. 416, 416–19, 423 (1921) (highlighting the impossibility of creating a simple fact
versus conclusion distinction); Miller, supra note 54, at 23–26 (warning that a fact pleading
system invites unbridled judicial discretion). That is why the original rulemakers did not
use those words but called for a “statement” of the claim. See United States v. Employing
Plasterers’ Ass’n of Chi., 347 U.S. 186, 188–89 (1954) (rejecting the fact versus conclusion
dichotomy); FED. R. CIV. P. form 11 (showing the low level of detail deemed sufficient);
5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1218 (explaining the Federal Rules’ rejection of
fact pleading and acceptance of a “statement” entitling relief). Also disturbing is the judicial tendency to ignore the purpose of the second sentence of Rule 9(b), which allows
conditions of mind to be alleged generally, and demand factual pleading. See, e.g., HDC,
LLC v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 612–14 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding allegations of “a
discriminatory intent, purpose, and motivation” insufficient to support an inference of
“discriminatory animus” but paying lip service to notice pleading). Demanding specificity
of these subjective matters is “unworkable and undesirable” and simply represents another
pretrial stop sign. 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1301.
195 A refreshing recognition of this point comes from Chief Judge Easterbrook in
Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2012):
We appreciate the judicial desire to resolve cases as swiftly as possible. Litigation is costly for both sides, and a doomed suit should be brought to a conclusion before costs are needlessly run up. Twombly designed its plausibility
requirement as a partial antidote to the high costs of discovery and trial. But
neither Twombly nor Iqbal has changed the rule that judges must not make
findings of fact at the pleading stage (or for that matter the summary-judgment
stage). A complaint that invokes a recognized legal theory (as this one does)
and contains plausible allegations on the material issues (as this one does)
cannot be dismissed under Rule 12.
See generally 5A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1355–1356 (explaining the history of
the motion). One writer questions the constitutionality of the motion to dismiss when utilized in its contemporary aggressive form. Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is
Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851, 1855 (2008) (arguing the new motion to
dismiss standard violates the Seventh Amendment).
194

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under—the Federal Rules, the Codes of the Nineteenth Century, or
the earlier common law demurrer196—it is vulnerable to dismissal if
directing a dirty look at another is not actionable under the governing
tort law. In the language of today’s Federal Rule 8(a)(2), the pleader
simply has failed to show he or she is “entitled to relief” even if it is
assumed that the dirty look was inflicted. However, if the governing
law recognized such a tort, the case would be allowed to proceed.
The pleading challenge never has had anything to do with what
actually happened to the plaintiff, let alone who should win on the
merits. Nor was it designed as a mechanism for screening cases based
on a judicial evaluation of the merits. As any good civil procedure
instructor tells his or her class each year: On a motion to dismiss, the
judge only looks at the four corners of the complaint (and what is
attached or incorporated by reference) and nothing else to determine
whether it is legally sufficient. Indeed, the judge is supposed to bend
over backwards, accept the facts as pleaded, and interpret the complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader.197 Even today, those
principles typically are recited in opinions as if they were catechism,
but, like many forms of catechism, they then seem to be ignored. At
least this reader of opinions suspects that the “bend over backward”
rule of construction has been reversed, and occasionally the judicial
eye surveys a complaint looking for a ground for dismissal.
Under the impetus of Twombly and Iqbal, the motion to dismiss
may well morph into a trial-type inquiry with the capability of terminating a case at its outset based on little more than judicial intuition
and a personal sense of what in the complaint seems convincing and
what does not.198 So, to use a colloquialism from Brooklyn, the land of
196 See, e.g., CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 1978, at 501 (2d ed. 1947);
SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 28 (3d ed. 1923).
197 See 5B WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1356 (noting that the purpose of a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a pleading); see also id. § 1286
(discussing the type of construction needed to evaluate pleading); James A. Pike,
Objections to Pleading Under the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 47 YALE L.J. 50,
60 (1937) (explaining that the then-new Federal Rules require interpretation of the complaint in the fashion most favorable to the plaintiff). The historic analytic mode of testing
the sufficiency of a complaint and the potentially dispositive (and preclusive) effect of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see infra note 208, distinguishes it from the fact-finding that occurs
on a jurisdiction motion or one for a preliminary injunction—which usually applies only to
the threshold matter, not the merits. See Warth v. Seldon, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (finding
plaintiffs’ standing “unsubstantiated by allegations of fact”).
198 See Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches and Civil Rights
Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 177 (2010) (noting the expansion of judicial
discretion). One distinguished commentator believes the process “offends our fundamental
procedural principles.” Kevin M. Clermont, Three Myths About Twombly-Iqbal, 45 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1337, 1348 (2010). The observation of the late Judge Richard S. Arnold
seems quite apt: “Although you pick up a file and say ‘Well, there is a ninety-eight percent

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my youth, in one “fell swoop” these two Supreme Court decisions
have destabilized both the pleading standard and the motion to dismiss practice under the Federal Rules.199 Indeed by empowering
district judges to use subjective factors, such as judicial experience and
common sense, and to evaluate possible innocent explanations for the
defendant’s conduct to determine plausibility, the motion to dismiss
begins to merge with summary judgment: It feels a bit like an invitation to resolve factual matters and the underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claims at the very beginning of the case.200
Merging the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 motions would produce a
result that is in sharp contrast to the Supreme Court’s previous
expressions—namely, that summary judgment was the initial point for
screening out cases because the facts supporting the claim were
thought to be implausible, but that discovery normally should be permitted until then.201 What seems to have been overlooked in the current rush to judgment is that sometimes what appears implausible on
the face of a complaint proves quite plausible when illuminated by
discovery. I cannot help but wonder, and I acknowledge it is nothing
more than surmise, whether today’s district judges’ involvement in the
maturation of cases through judicial management and the growing
judicial habit of advancing the disposition timeline have not subliminally led to intuitive fact-finding by some judges that is legitimized in
their minds on an “I know how this should come out” basis.
An example of the concerns I expressed in the preceding
paragraphs is TruePosition, Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co.,202 an
action charging a conspiracy to exclude the plaintiff’s technology from
chance that this is frivolous,’ that does not mean you read only two percent of the file.”
Richard S. Arnold, Money, or the Relations of the Judicial Branch with the Other Two
Branches, Legislative and Executive, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 19, 34 (1996).
199 The academic literature on these cases has become voluminous. See, e.g., Clermont
& Yeazell, supra note 183, at 823; Brooke D. Coleman, Essay, What If?: A Study of
Seminal Cases as If Decided Under a Twombly/Iqbal Regime, 90 OR. L. REV. 1147, 1148
(2012); Cooper, supra note 174; Miller, supra note 54, at 10; A. Benjamin Spencer,
Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009). One saving grace is the
recognition by some courts that Twombly and Iqbal have created uncertainty, warranting a
liberal attitude toward leave to amend a complaint deemed insufficient. See, e.g., Pruell v.
Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012) (reversing failure to grant motion for leave
to amend given circumstances); see also infra note 214 (noting other such cases).
200 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, How Motions to Dismiss
Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 62 (2007); Miller,
supra note 54, at 50–52; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 15 (2010).
201 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002); Crawford-El v. Britton,
523 U.S. 574, 600 (1998).
202 844 F. Supp. 2d 571 (E.D. Pa. 2012).

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certain industry standards. In the course of granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the district court said:
We find that Twombly requires a level of factual detail that makes it
more likely that the Defendants’ conduct was the result of an
unlawful agreement rather than some other independent and lawful
explanation and that such requirement is not a “probability”
requirement. In Twombly, the Supreme Court stated, “The need at
the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely
consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of
Rule 8(a)(2) that ‘the plain statement’ possesses enough heft to
‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”203

I am skeptical. I always thought “more likely” meant a fifty-one
percent likelihood or more. How is that not a probability requirement,
which is precisely what Twombly and Iqbal said is not required to
establish a complaint’s plausibility? Nothing in the Court’s opinions in
those cases supports a “more likely” innocence standard. Nonetheless,
the quoted passage from TruePosition suggests that a district court
effectively can treat Twombly and Iqbal as establishing a proof standard, rely on the complaint and nothing more to evaluate competing
licit and illicit explanations for the challenged conduct, weigh them,
make a judgment about their relative merits, and thereby effectively
decide the case’s merits without further ado. If that is true, it provides
a striking (in my view, a frightening) illustration of what Twombly and
Iqbal hath wrought.204
Moreover, Twombly and Iqbal both ignore the problem of information asymmetry.205 In many contemporary litigation contexts, critical information, such as the formulation and testing of a
pharmaceutical or the design and manufacture of other products, is
entirely in the defendant’s possession and unavailable to the plaintiff.
One can understand requiring a plaintiff to plead what he or she
knows or could know with reasonable effort—in many situations, of
course, the plaintiff does not know what happened to him—but it is
futile and a bit absurd to tell someone to plead what he or she does
not know and cannot access. We no longer live in the simple, long-past
203

Id. at 584 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
Far more benign applications of the two Supreme Court decisions have appeared.
Anderson News, LLC v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (observing
that “[b]ecause plausibility is a standard lower than probability, a given set of actions may
well be subject to diverging interpretations, each of which is plausible,” but “[t]he choice
between two plausible inferences that may be drawn from factual allegations is not a
choice to be made by the court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion”); Nguyen v. Bank of Am., No.
G-11-290, 2012 WL 33203, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 6, 2012) (“The defendant simply seeks to
have Twombly and its progeny accomplish what was never intended—a pretrial of the facts
of a plaintiff’s case via the defendant’s defenses to those facts.”).
205 See Miller, supra note 54, at 43–46.
204

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world that enabled a buyer to appraise the strengths and weaknesses
of products, such as an oxcart or plough, at the time of purchase. The
average consumer or investor (and even many sophisticated ones)
knows very little (indeed, probably nothing) about the formulation or
pharmacology of a pill, the hardware of a computer, or the underlying
details of a financial transaction, and has little or no realistic ability to
investigate these matters. Discovery was designed to provide each side
with the ability to obtain relevant information that otherwise was
beyond their reach so that the litigation playing field would be level,
settlements would be informed, and meaningful trials would be
possible.
Since the Supreme Court appears to have denied plaintiffs the
opportunity to employ even limited discovery before they plead a
plausible case,206 Twombly and Iqbal have shifted this informationaccess balance so that it favors those defendants best able to keep
their records, conduct, and institutional secrets to themselves.207 Yet, I
would think that judicial “common sense” suggests that when a plaintiff has no economically or logistically reasonable way of unearthing
important information that is in the possession of the defendant, the
plausibility barrier needs to be lowered somewhat to allow some contained discovery or to give the plaintiff, whose complaint must comply
with and is subject to the sanctions provided by Rule 11, the benefit of
the doubt. After all, the Supreme Court did say that the question of a

206 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009). But cf. Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 630
F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 498 (2011) (“Formal discovery is
necessary before a plaintiff [in a product case] can fairly be expected to provide a detailed
statement of the specific bases for her claim.”).
207 See Allison Frankel, Two More Iqbal Dismissals Emerge in Products Liability Cases,
AM. LAW. (Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432738346&slreturn=
20120905151932 (noting that Iqbal and Twombly require plaintiffs to plead information
available only after discovery). Recent private conversations that I had with a few sophisticated lawyers from European countries—places where it is fashionable to disparage
American pretrial discovery, at least publicly—yielded acknowledgements that our discovery system was much more likely to reach the truth of a situation then the no-discovery
approach of the procedural regimes of their own countries. Ironically, two of them
admitted seeking discovery assistance from federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1783
(2006)—a statute I participated in formulating fifty years ago—for use in litigation pending
in their own countries.

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pleading’s plausibility is contextual.208 Unfortunately, that notion frequently is not followed.209
208 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Cooper, supra note 174, at 986 (noting possible Rule
remediations for the asymmetry problem). Potential information asymmetry was one
reason the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend was reversed in Pruell v. Caritas
Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2012). My concerns about the application of Twombly and
Iqbal in an information asymmetry context, or any other for that matter, are exacerbated
by the prospect that claim preclusion will be extended to a judgment following a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal when the plaintiff’s lack of information makes further pleading impossible. See, e.g., Carey v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local 612, No. C12-5025 RBL,
2012 WL 1945427 (W.D. Wash. May 30, 2012) (precluding a pro se plaintiff from bringing a
second action after he was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim); Overview
Books, LLC v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 2d 409, 415–16 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“It is wellestablished that for res judicata purposes, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is deemed to be a
judgment on the merits.”), aff’d, 438 F. App’x 31 (2d Cir. 2011); Kuder v. Haas, No. 2:10cv-00404 MCE KJN PS, 2010 WL 4983455, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-cv-00404-MCE-KJN-PS, 2011 WL 346442 (E.D. Cal. Feb.
1, 2011) (finding that a prior judgment following a dismissal with prejudice for failure to
state a claim justified claim preclusion). But what if the plaintiff subsequently secures sufficient information to recommence? Will he or she be able to surmount a preclusion challenge? Will such a plaintiff, in the alternative, be able to open the original judgment under
Rule 60(b)(2)? How much litigation will be needed to provide my hypothetical plaintiff a
day in court? For an extended and more nuanced discussion of preclusion based on the
pleadings, see 18A WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 21, § 4439.
209 At the risk of being accused of being bitter, my experience as appellate counsel for
the plaintiff in Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 11-4443CV, 2012 WL 1352590 (2d Cir. Apr. 19, 2012), is illustrative. Had the panel fully stated the
facts in its conclusory Summary Order, the plausibility of Goldman Sachs knowing (1) that
the subprime mortgage market had previously deteriorated, (2) that the triple-A rating the
agencies gave the notes was totally unwarranted, and (3) that there was a substantial likelihood the notes would not be repaid despite the defendant’s representations, would have
been fairly obvious at the time it sold the certificates of debt obligation (CDO) to the
plaintiff in 2006. “Common sense” so dictated. Further, it was a clear case of information
asymmetry making the court’s demand for contemporaneous documentation unrealistic.
Thus, the panel’s statement—that the plaintiff should have pleaded facts of Goldman’s
intent—was a requirement to do something impossible as a practical matter, as well as,
seeming inappropriate as a legal matter given the second sentence of Rule 9(b). Ironically,
less than two weeks before argument, a district judge in Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs
& Co., 847 F. Supp. 2d 624, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), exercised “common sense” by recognizing
the plausibility that Goldman knew of the “increased risks” in the subprime mortgage
market and the need to reduce its “long exposure” by shorting the same CDO it was selling
to the plaintiffs in that case. Yet, in my case the panel said pleading the defendant’s profit
motive was not enough—even though the pleading actually alleged Goldman’s large inventory of junk, the need to unload it, and Goldman’s shorting the same notes to offset the
potential loss, just as it did with the notes at issue in Dodona. As to the question of the
plaintiffs’ reasonable reliance, the Dodona judge wisely concluded that reasonable reliance
was a question of fact that could not be resolved on the pleadings. The cases are basically
identical; the only difference is the notes in Dodona were sold approximately six months
after those in Landesbank. The Landesbank panel clearly was demanding proof based on
unobtainable (but easily discoverable) documents and facts that could not be pleaded.
Everyone in the financial and housing industries seems to have known what was going on
in the CDO market by 2006. Did “experience” and “common sense” not suggest the case
should proceed? Other mortgage-backed securities class actions also have fared better

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Employment discrimination cases provide a useful example. A
discharged employee often is not told why she was fired.210 If facts
must be pleaded to state a claim for discriminatory discharge, for
failure to promote, or for some other actionable practice, it will be
difficult if not impossible for the plaintiff to surmount the newly
minted pleading requirement. How does the plaintiff show
discriminatory conduct—let alone a pattern or practice of discrimination—without access to the history of the employer’s conduct
regarding not only the plaintiff but also other employees? The paucity
of employment discrimination cases in recent years indicates that in
some parts of the nation they are not being instituted with any frequency—let alone surviving.211 This stands in sharp contrast to the
earlier judicial commitment to enforcing the national policy against
discrimination in the workplace.212
than Landesbank. See, e.g., Richman v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 10 Civ. 3461(PAC),
2012 WL 2362539 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2012) (allowing a securities fraud claim).
210 Since the “at-will” doctrine absolves the employer of any obligation to provide reasons for the discharge, it is only the ability to resort to the employment discrimination
statutes that provides a basis for rooting out various nefarious workplace practices. As
recently as Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.), a distinguished judge wrote that a Title VII plaintiff only had to say, “I was turned down for a job
because of my race.”
211 Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in
Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 241 (2012) (discussing the increase in Rule 12(b)(6) motions and dismissals following Iqbal); Schneider,
supra note 89, at 524 (noting hurdles faced in employment discrimination and civil rights
cases); Miller, supra note 54, at 77 n.292 (identifying the significant drop in employment
discrimination cases after Twombly and Iqbal); Laura Beth Nelson, Robert L. Nelson &
Ryan Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment
Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL & LEGAL
STUD. 175, 176–77 (2010) (finding that victims of employment discrimination receive cursory legal attention and remedies). After years of dramatic increases in the number of
employment cases in the federal courts, the incidence of such cases has declined since the
turn of the century. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment
Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
103, 104 (2009). The success rate in these cases always has been below that in other litigation categories. Id. at 127; see generally Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 109, 123 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/10/16/gertner.html (“[J]udges have
made rules that have effectively gutted Title VII.”). The same tendency to categorize allegations as conclusory, and therefore not to be considered on a motion to dismiss, supra
note 194, manifests itself in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Khalik v. United
Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (10th Cir. 2012) (dismissing allegations of targeting false
investigation and criticisms, and holding that the discriminatory and retaliatory discharge
failed the conclusory test).
212 See, e.g., Hackley v. Roudenbush, 520 F.2d 108, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (explaining that
Title VII claims involve “the vindication of a major public interest”); Oatis v. Crown
Zellenbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1969) (describing Title VII as a congressional
policy “of the highest priority”). A good example of an employment discrimination complaint that survived the pleading hurdle is Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir.
2012). In reversing the district court’s dismissal, the court of appeals said: “Keys’s

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Similarly, how does a pleader challenge illegal or unconstitutional
governmental action—whether by municipal, state, or federal
employees—without deposing members of the department in which
that challenged conduct took place? But the Supreme Court appears
to have made even “pin-point” or “quick-look” discovery unavailable
until after the inevitable motion to dismiss has been denied and plausibility established—although the Federal Rules do not require that to
be the case, and Rule 26(c)(1)(A) might be read as requiring a
showing of “good cause” before the district court can proscribe disclosure or discovery.213 Fortunately, some judges have recognized the
catch-22 character of the Court’s prohibition on discovery and have
forged interesting solutions to provide some opportunity to overcome
the pleading barrier.214 Those solutions are appropriate invocations of
Amended Complaint tenders more than the ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual
enhancement’ that Twombly and Iqbal prohibit. . . . [It] contains allegations that are
neither speculative nor conclusory; it alleges facts that easily state a plausible claim. The
Amended Complaint alleges Humana had a pattern or practice of discrimination . . . .” Id.
at 610 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted). One wonders
why the district court failed to see the claim’s plausibility.
213 In both Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ requests for limited discovery
to establish that they could satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) and survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss. See generally Kevin J. Lynch, When Staying Discovery Stays Justice: Analyzing
Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss Is Pending, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 71, 77 (2012) (explaining courts’ usage of Rule 26(c) to create orders staying discovery). Scholars have argued that the apparent restriction on discovery in Iqbal should be
limited to cases involving the defense of qualified immunity. Hartnett, supra note 184, at
511; David L. Noll, The Determinacy of Iqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 143 (2010). As much as I
would applaud that result, it seems doubtful given the Court’s remarks indicating that its
analysis applied to all cases.
214 Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York, long a proponent of
“getting a sense of the litigation,” has conducted one or more meetings with counsel, and
others on occasion, before ruling on a motion to dismiss; the process has the feel of a
deposition or mini-trial. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing, Biagi v. McAllister Towing &
Transp. Co., No. 11-CV-3567 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2012). According to Judge Weinstein: “In
most cases . . . some claims can be orally trimmed as substantive dead wood on hearing the
motion. In cases where the plaintiff’s livelihood is involved, such as Fair Labor Standards
Act claims, the matter is expedited.” Letter from Judge Jack B. Weinstein to the author
(Feb. 16, 2012) (on file with the New York University Law Review); see also Talbot v.
Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-01766a-KJD-CWH., 2012 WL 1068763, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar.
29, 2012) (discovery not stayed when a motion to dismiss challenged only some of plaintiff’s claims). The district courts have largely unreviewable discretion to allow discovery on
the basis of a specific showing of need at the early pretrial conference. Judges also can
permit specific discovery pending the resolution of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or deny the
motion in favor of authorizing limited discovery and permit a second motion to dismiss
thereafter. See Bagg v. HighBeam Research, Inc., 862 F. Supp. 2d 41, 44 (D. Mass. 2012)
(authorizing limited discovery before considering a motion to dismiss); Harris v.
Scriptfleet, Inc., No. 11-4561, 2011 WL 6072020, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2011) (denying a
motion to dismiss a Fair Labor Standards Act claim because, reasoning backwards, “[i]t
cannot be the case that a plaintiff must plead specific instances of unpaid overtime or

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“judicial experience and common sense,” and a proper recognition of
the need to apply Twombly and Iqbal contextually.
The Court has said that the new pleading principles apply to all
federal civil actions,215 presumably to honor the principle that the
Federal Rules speak to all cases with a single voice (transsubstantivity), even though Twombly and Iqbal were two substantively highly
unique cases. One was an extremely large antitrust class action
involving an entire industry. The other was an emotionally charged
outgrowth of the events of 9/11, asserting a Pakistani Muslim’s claims
of illicit detention and very harsh treatment against high ranking federal officials, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI. It
was quite unnecessary for the Court to have reached beyond the cases
before it, let alone to all federal cases, especially without any assistance from the statutory rulemaking process.216
It makes no sense to apply the new pleading standard to the wide
swath of relatively simple lawsuits that do not require extensive fact
pleading or gatekeeping—with their attendant cost, delay, and risk of
premature termination. In one diversity of citizenship case that shows
the overextension of Twombly and Iqbal—one I hope is simply an
unfortunate outlier—the plaintiff had slipped and fallen in a grocery
store and alleged serious injuries. The court dismissed the action
because the plaintiff failed to plead what the substance on the floor
was, how it got there, how long it had been there, and whether anyone
else had slipped and fallen.217 How was the plaintiff supposed to know
these things without discovery? It is fortunate that a few courts have
minimum wage violations before being allowed to proceed to discovery to access the
employer’s records”); Club Caribe Condo. Ass’n v. Travelers Excess & Surplus Lines Co.,
No. 11-62673-CV, 2012 WL 529972, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2012) (allowing leave to file an
amended complaint and providing a brief discovery period). Many district courts have
allowed limited discovery. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Stolle, No. 2:11cv446, 2011 WL 6396592, at
*10 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2011) (authorizing limited discovery); Wilson Oilfield Servs., Inc. v.
Vishal Enter., No. 7:11-cv-00111-O, 2011 WL 6029948, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2011) (permitting limited discovery to cure pleading defects because, among other reasons, defendant
was a foreign corporation and defendant’s counsel previously had refused to schedule a
deposition); Coss v. Playtex Prods., LLC, No. 08 C 50222, 2009 WL 1455358, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. May 21, 2009) (ordering limited discovery and denying a stay “in the interest of moving
the cases forward”).
215 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684.
216 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (laying out the statutory process).
217 Branham v. Dolgencorp, Inc., No. 6:09-CV-00037, 2009 WL 2604447, at *1–2 (W.D.
Va. Aug. 24, 2009). It would be a mistake to dismiss this case and TruePosition, described
at supra notes 202–04 and accompanying text, as outliers. They are not. There are
numerous cases reflecting something akin to a merit determination at the pleading stage. A
number of these cases are described in the sources cited supra notes 174, 183, 209. These
decisions make it clear that those who assert that “nothing” or “very little” has been
changed by the Supreme Court are being Pollyannaish, are in denial, or are guilty of willful
blindness.

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taken the circumstances of a particular case’s context into account and
expressed a willingness to apply Twombly and Iqbal differentially.218
So where have Twombly and Iqbal left us? Pleading facts now
seems to be what is required of plaintiffs, which represents a throwback to the discarded era of code procedure.219 The Supreme Court
has moved the system from a notice pleading structure, which is what
Rule 8 was designed to be, to a fact pleading structure, which is
exactly what the Federal Rules were drafted to reject. As a result,
even when a potential plaintiff’s claims may have merit, cases may not
be initiated because the risk of loss without any prospect of compensation, or even the recoupment of expenses, is too great. Or, even if a
case is brought, it may be terminated without ever reaching the merits.
Twombly and Iqbal are producing more pleading motions, more
delays, more costs, more appeals, and potentially more inappropriate
dismissals.220 Indeed, the prevalence of the motion to dismiss and the
concomitant deferral of discovery seemingly mandated by Iqbal inevitably delay those cases that survive the motion to dismiss from progressing toward a resolution on the merits, potentially cloaking
wrongdoing with a de facto litigation immunity.221 Most distressingly,
Twombly and Iqbal were imposed without any empirical exploration
of whether the overall systemic benefits of the early dismissal they
engender, hypothesized by a majority of the Court, are greater or less
218 See, e.g., Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he height of the
pleading requirement is relative to circumstances.”).
219 Some commentators had warned that this regression was upon us even before
Twombly and Iqbal. Fairman, supra note 182, at 1011 (highlighting when courts have
required heightened notice pleading); Marcus, supra note 182, at 435 (documenting the
rise of heightened pleading standards).
220 The effects of the new pleading regime and the existing studies (as well as the
author’s own) are explored at length in DODSON, supra note 174, at 63–96. See also
THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMORY G. LEE, IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT
COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 25–27 (2010), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv3.pdf/$file/costciv3.pdf (arguing that
Twombly and Iqbal will likely increase litigation costs and unproductive Rule 12(b)(6)
motions); Alexander A. Reinert, The Costs of Heightened Pleading, 86 IND. L.J. 119 (2011)
(noting that preliminary data suggests that the costs of heightened pleading may be substantial and not provide the litigation benefits or economies suggested in Twombly and
Iqbal).
221 See Talbot v. Sentinel Ins. Co., No. 2:11-cv-01766-KJD-CWH., 2012 WL 1068763, at
*5 (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2012) (discussing the lack of speedy resolutions resulting from delays
in discovery because of partial Rule 12(b)(6) motions and arguing that “a stay of discovery
is directly at odds with the needs for expeditious resolution of litigation”). As meticulously
described in Hoffman, supra note 174, at 7 n.14, the Advisory Committee has discussed the
pleading question on numerous occasions but not advanced any proposals. Its members
apparently are awaiting more experience and research, their attitudes reflecting no “urgent
need.” What is striking about Professor Hoffman’s account is the apparent absence of any
real focus on the indirect effects of Twombly and Iqbal by the Advisory and Standing
Committees.

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than the systemic costs of their procedural and public policy side
effects.
F. Personal Jurisdiction
On the final day of the 2010–2011 Supreme Court Term, a plurality of the Justices tried to push the termination clock back even
further. In J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,222 the Court
divided four-to-two-to-three (a very unusual double-play combination
for you baseball fans), regarding the constitutional limits on the jurisdiction of courts over defendants who have not acted directly in the
forum and cannot be found there. The plurality departed analytically
and linguistically from the Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
going back sixty-five years to its seminal decision in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington,223 and clearly signaled a desire to contract the constitutional ambit of that jurisdiction. As to the actual result in the case,
a majority of the Justices (the plurality and the two concurring
Justices) concluded that the Due Process Clause did not permit a New
Jersey state court to assert jurisdiction over an English manufacturer
whose sizable metal-shearing machine allegedly seriously injured the
plaintiff in that state; the defendant marketed its equipment in the
United States through an exclusive Ohio agent that was bankrupt.224
According to the McIntyre plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Kennedy, the Constitution “permits the exercise of jurisdiction only
where the defendant can be said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might have predicted that
its goods will reach the forum State.”225 It emphasized that each of the
fifty states is a separate sovereign forum, and that reality “requires a
forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis,”226 because
222 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). On the same day, the Court also decided Goodyear Dunlop
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011), a general jurisdiction case of no
special significance, although references in Justice Ginsburg’s opinion to the defendant’s
being “at home,” id. at 2853–54, 2857, suggest a possible narrowing of that category of
jurisdiction. See Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear
Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 531 (2012) (analyzing Justice Ginsburg’s reference to “at
home”).
223 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe and subsequent Supreme Court decisions are
discussed in 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, §§ 1067–1067.4.
224 The distributor attended a number of trade shows in the United States, none of
which were in New Jersey. Nicastro’s employer apparently was persuaded to purchase the
offending machine at one of those shows. The facts of the case are described in great detail
in Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 488–91 (2012).
225 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788. The plurality opinion is analyzed at length in Steinman,
supra note 224, at 491–504.
226 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. Justice Kennedy’s opinion also stated that since the
United States is a “distinct sovereign,” a defendant may be subject to jurisdiction in a

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“each State has a sovereignty that is not subject to unlawful intrusion
by other States.”227 If that constrained view ultimately prevails with a
majority of the Justices, it would create the possibility that a company—domestic or foreign—could structure its distribution system
and send products or direct services to one or a few states while
avoiding the reach of other courts in a state that did not qualify as a
“target” of the defendant, even if the goods or services foreseeably
ended up and caused injury there. If that came to pass, in many circumstances consumers and employees would not be able to seek
redress in the state where they purchase or receive defective products
or services, or live, or were injured. Rather, plaintiffs potentially
would have to litigate in distant fora—possibly in foreign countries—or abandon their claims altogether.228
Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito, also
concluded that the defendant’s contacts with New Jersey did not meet
constitutional standards for personal jurisdiction because the plaintiff
had not established that the J. McIntyre company purposefully availed
itself of the New Jersey marketplace for selling its machines or placed
its machines into the stream of commerce in the United States with an
expectation that its products would be purchased by New Jersey users.
The two Justices only concurred in the result, however, noting the
“limited” factual record229—particularly the indication that only a
“single isolated sale” occurred in New Jersey230—and expressly
declined to join in Justice Kennedy’s analysis. In fact, the concurrence
negatively characterized the plurality opinion at one point as a “strict
no-jurisdiction rule.”231 Justice Breyer preferred to wait for a case that
federal court but not in any particular state. Id. It is not clear what that passage means. In
diversity of citizenship cases, at least the courts of appeal agree that federal courts must
follow the jurisdictional principles of the forum state. See 4A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 3, § 1075 (discussing what law governs questions of amenability to suit). Perhaps the
passage is an oblique reference to Federal Rule 4(k)(2). See 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 3, § 1068.1 nn.67–76 (explaining Rule 4(k)(2)).
227 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789.
228 As is true of his opinion in Iqbal, Justice Kennedy’s McIntyre opinion ranges far
beyond what was needed to reach the result the plurality was advocating.
229 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).
230 Id. at 2792. The plurality, however, states that “up to four machines ended up in New
Jersey.” Id. at 2790 (plurality opinion). The concurrence is evaluated in Steinman, supra
note 224, at 508–12, in which the author opines that Justice Breyer’s concurrence embraces
the “stream of commerce” rule rather than Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, and disagrees with
Justice Ginsburg because he believes that the factual record was not sufficiently robust to
support jurisdiction.
231 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). For example, the concurring
opinion explicitly rejects the plurality’s emphasis on sovereignty and the requirement that
the defendant “targeted” the forum. Id. at 2793. Similarly, according to Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977), in which the Justices divided as they did in McIntyre, it is the

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presented modern issues of commerce and communication before
establishing any new personal jurisdiction doctrine.232
The concurring Justices may have chosen to join the plurality, but
only in result, because there was an absence of facts suggesting that J.
McIntyre had delivered its goods into commerce with the expectation
that someone in New Jersey would purchase its machines.233 If that is
the case, the concurring opinion is within the range of the Court’s
prior precedents and even may be consistent with the stream-ofcommerce analysis reflected in earlier cases.234 If that is not the case,
McIntyre might indicate that six of the Justices reject the constitutional sufficiency of personal jurisdiction based on the stream-ofcommerce theory inasmuch as the plurality opinion cast that mode of
thinking aside, characterizing it as simply a metaphor for the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum. The four plurality Justices
apparently believe that “purposeful availment” requires a manifested
intent to “submit to the power of a sovereign”235—words a bit reminiscent of the nineteenth-century conception of personal jurisdiction.
Justice Kennedy’s opinion expressed concern about the possible
jurisdictional burdens that might be imposed on a hypothetical small
Florida farmer selling produce to a local distributor who in turn might
view of the concurring Justices “on the narrowest grounds” that represents the holding of
the Court. Id. at 193. That was the conclusion in several post-McIntyre decisions. E.g.,
UTC Fire & Sec. Ams. Corp. v. NCS Power, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 366, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Dram Techs. LLC v. Am. II Grp., Inc., No. 2:10–CV–45–TJW, 2011 WL 4591902, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011); Esoterix Genetics Labs., LLC v. McKey, No. 11 CVS 1379, 2011
WL 3667698, at *8 (N.C. Super Ct. Aug. 22, 2011). Justice Breyer’s opinion, however, does
not articulate any jurisdictional theory beyond the status quo, as Marks would dictate, that
can be used as a doctrinal pedestal for the future.
232 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794. In some ways the concurrence seems closer in spirit to
the dissent than the plurality. See Steinman, supra note 224, at 509.
233 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792. This seems to be the view taken in Adam N. Steinman,
The Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 417 (2012). Professor Steinman is of the
opinion that “understood correctly McIntyre does not mandate a more restrictive approach
to jurisdiction.” Id. at 420.
234 See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (dividing
four to four on whether the Constitution required a “plus” factor to augment the shipment
of goods into the stream of commerce with an awareness that they possibly would alight in
the forum). The theory can be traced back to World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 297–98 (1980) (holding that the Due Process Clause is not exceeded when
jurisdiction is asserted “over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of
commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state”). It was enunciated earlier in Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961). The plurality in McIntyre explicitly rejected Justice Brennan’s
pure stream-of-commerce opinion in Asahi, 131 S. Ct. at 2789–90. However, although the
plurality opinion does not apply it, Justice O’Connor’s stream-of-commerce-plus test is
cited favorably. Id. See generally 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1067.4 (discussing
Asahi and stream-of-commerce theory).
235 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.

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vend that produce to grocers across the country.236 Justice Breyer’s
concurring opinion indicated concern for an equally hypothetical
Appalachian potter being sued in Alaska or Hawaii because one of his
cups or saucers (or a coffee mug) had been sent there by a large distributor.237 Probably because the plurality Justices focused on contacts
with the forum (particularly the principle of purposeful availment),
state sovereignty, and evidence of the defendant’s intent to submit to
jurisdiction in the forum, their opinion did not contain any acknowledgement that the hypothesized farmer and potter could be protected
from improper assertions of jurisdiction by the principles of fair play
and substantial justice recognized in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington 238 and reprised in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior
Court,239 as well as other opinons of the Court.240 It is more surprising
that the concurring Justices did not advert to the possible application
of the fairness prong of the preexisting jurisdiction framework.241
Despite the concerns expressed for small entrepreneurs in these two
opinions, the obvious beneficiaries of the potential restriction on personal jurisdiction the plurality opinion favors will be commercial entities who will be able to secure access to the entirety of the nation by
structuring their marketing and distribution systems to avoid the

236

Id. at 2790.
Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
238 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
239 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
240 To the dismay of many in the profession who follow these matters, McIntyre failed to
undo the confusion sown by the three opinions in Asahi twenty-four years earlier. See, e.g.,
Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 386 (2012) (“[T]he clerks let their
Justices down, the Justices let their colleagues down, and the Court let us all down.”); Todd
David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 202, 228 (2011) (arguing that McIntyre not only does not resolve the ambiguities left by Asahi, it “further confuses the law of specific jurisdiction”).
241 The continued vitality of the fair-play-and-substantial-justice prong of constitutional
due process analysis is now in question, given the McIntyre plurality’s and concurrence’s
failure to advert to it. See Kidston v. Res. Planning Corp., No. 2:11–cv–2036–PMD, 2011
WL 6115293, at *3 n.2 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2011) (“After McIntyre, the relevance of fairness as
part of the jurisdictional inquiry is unclear.”); see also Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Fair
Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 761 (2012) (noting that although
McIntyre likely abrogated the Burger King due process analysis, lower courts continue to
apply it). Also left in disarray are personal jurisdiction questions relating to claims arising
from a defendant’s activities on the Internet and whether the analysis would be any different if the defendant were a U.S. manufacturer. One writer analyzes the Nicastro opinion
in terms of where it fits on a formalist-functionalist spectrum and concludes that the Court
“produced a dysfunctional consequence that ignores the reality of contemporary international commerce.” Glenn S. Koppel, The Functional and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism
in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 911 (2012).
237

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purposeful availment of most (or all in the case of a foreign enterprise) of the states.242
Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion was joined by Justices
Kagan and Sotomayor.243 Her opinion (1) reminded the plurality of
some of the Court’s prior jurisdiction decisions and the degree to
which her four colleagues were departing from them, (2) distinguished
other cases (particularly Asahi), (3) argued that since International
Shoe the Court had given “prime place to reason and fairness,”244 and
(4) offered a number of facts not noted in the other two opinions.245
The dissent concluded, consistent with the analysis of earlier opinions
of the Court, that since J. McIntyre had purposefully availed itself of
the U.S. market and sought “purchasers from anywhere in the United
States,”246 it also purposefully had availed itself of any state in which
its Ohio distributor sold its products.247
Taken together, the three opinions in McIntyre give the impression that the record was deficient on certain possibly critical matters
that might have affected the view of one or more of the Justices.248 For
example, it was assumed that the defendant’s large machine actually
was shipped from England to Ohio and then transported from Ohio to
New Jersey;249 it is possible (indeed it seems more logical) that it went
from England directly to New Jersey. It also is unclear whether the
company’s liability insurance covered accidents wherever they
occurred. Similarly, was the assumption that the Ohio distributor was
an independent entity accurate?250 Additional lacunae in the factual
elements relating to the jurisdiction question exist regarding the
242 Precisely this concern animated some of the criticism of the Asahi decision. E.g.,
David E. Seidelson, A Supreme Court Conclusion and Two Rationales that Defy
Comprehension: Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, 53 BROOK.
L. REV. 563, 579 (1987).
243 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg’s opinion is analyzed in Steinman, supra note 224, at 504–08
(noting Justice Ginsburg’s emphasis on the fairness prong of the jurisdictional inquiry).
244 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
245 The plurality opinion seems clear on its application to domestic defendants. Id. at
2790 (plurality opinion). The concurring opinion is much more guarded on the point. Id. at
2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring).
246 Id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247 Id. at 2801. Justice Ginsburg found it reasonable that the suit was brought in the
state of injury. Id. at 2796.
248 The three opinions contain varying descriptions of the facts. See generally Steinman,
supra note 224, at 489–91 (noting the disagreement among the opinions as to the method
of sale, relevance of trade shows, and number of machines defendant had sold in the forum
state). Justice Ginsburg appears to include matters not in the record. 131 S. Ct. at 2796
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing facts that postdate the case’s events); see also id. at
2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (criticizing sharply the use of nonrecord material).
249 McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion); id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring).
250 Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion); id. at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

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warranties on and the servicing of the machine in New Jersey.251
Clarity on some or all of these matters might well have changed the
jurisdictional calculus. The factual gaps in the record and their potential significance suggest that future counsel faced with a motion to dismiss based on McIntyre may be advised, indeed obligated, to pursue
expensive and time-consuming jurisdictional discovery that is likely to
be resisted by the defense.252 Thus, in addition to the retrogressive
feel of the McIntyre plurality opinion, and the potential restraint on
the plaintiff’s selection of a forum that may materialize from the views
expressed by four of the Justices, McIntyre may produce a burdensome front-loading of the pretrial process, once again leading to
increased costs and protraction.
I fear that if the plurality opinion’s analysis in McIntyre gains
traction in the lower federal courts or is adopted by a Supreme Court
majority in a future case, the personal jurisdiction defense will become
yet another procedural stop sign, one posted at the very genesis of the
case.253 At the least, McIntyre is an open invitation for defense
251 For elaboration on this thought, see Alan B. Morrison, The Impacts of McIntyre on
Minimum Contacts, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1, 4–5 (2011) http://groups.law.
gwu.edu/LR/ArticlePDF/Morrison_SME_Arguendo.pdf.
252 The reference in Rule 8(a)(1) to pleading jurisdiction generally has been read as a
reference to subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sterling Homex Corp. v. Homasote, 437
F.2d 87, 88 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that Rule 8(a) applies only to subject matter jurisdiction); AF Holdings LLC v. Does 1-1,058, No. 12–0048(BAH), 2012 WL 3204917, at *15
(D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2012) (“For purposes of Rule 8, ‘jurisdiction’ refers to subject matter jurisdiction.”); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 1206 (explaining that Rule 8(a)(1) refers
to subject matter jurisdiction). This clearly was the intent of the drafters of the Rules, as is
evidenced by the words “grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” These are words of subject
matter—not personal—jurisdiction. In addition, original Form 2 (now Form 7) only contains illustrations of pleading various types of subject matter jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P.
form 7; see also AM. BAR ASS’N, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C. 43 (1938) (referring to the provision for alleging jurisdiction as “necessary in the federal system”). Nonetheless, a few cases
have appeared in which the court erroneously extended Rule 8(a)(1) to the pleading of
personal jurisdiction and super-imposed the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard. E.g.,
Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, LLC No. 5:09–cv–00467, 2012 WL
1112162, at *8–9 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 30, 2012) (applying Iqbal and Twombly to pleading
personal jurisdiction); Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 775 F. Supp.
2d 790, 798–800 (D. Md. 2011) (same).
253 It is far too soon, of course, to know how the lower federal or state courts will react
to the jurisdiction-limiting passages in Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion. Certain early
opinions, however, do repeat some of the more controversial passages that seem to depart
from earlier doctrine. E.g., Pangaea, Inc. v. Flying Burrito LLC, 647 F.3d 745, 746 (8th Cir.
2011) (explaining that sovereignty is the key); Dejana v. Marine Tech., Inc., No.
10–CV–4029 (JS)(WDW), 2011 WL 4530012, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011) (holding that
defendant must have “targeted” the forum). A number of opinions factually distinguish
McIntyre. Some cases do so by noting that the McIntyre concurrence specified that only
one of the defendant’s machines had reached New Jersey. See, e.g., Original Creations, Inc.
v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Brooks & Baker, LLC v.

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attorneys to exploit this stop sign and reflexively challenge jurisdiction. What’s next? A sign on the courthouse door proclaiming,
“Closed”?
G. Discovery
Although it deviates somewhat from the chronological presentation, no catalog of the major procedural events of the last quarter century would be complete without mention of the significant change in
attitude regarding the commitment of the original Federal Rules and
their drafters to a relatively unfettered and self-executing discovery
regime. This shift is reflected in a series of periodic amendments to
the Rules that were stated to be motivated by an understandable
desire to reduce the density and the cost of discovery. When articulated in those terms, the amendments’ objective seems unobjectionable. But there certainly were other motivations, such as the ongoing
concern of defense interests that (in addition to discovery’s frequently
condemned burdensome character) unconstrained discovery allows
plaintiffs to look behind their clients’ curtains—thereby providing
access to otherwise unobtainable information that possibly cuts too
close to the substantive bone and endangers the defense’s position on
a dispute’s merits. Vulnerability to discovery, after all, always has
been a bête noire of both business and government defendants.
The changes in the discovery regime began in 1983, during my
service as Advisory Committee Reporter, when Rule 26 was amended
to eliminate a sentence that stated: “Unless the court orders otherwise
. . . , the frequency of use of these [discovery] methods is not limited.”254 Although that deletion appears innocuous, the elimination of
the passage was read by some—with some justification—to negate
any lingering notion that discovery was limitless and permitted
“fishing” expeditions.255 As the Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying the amendment makes clear, the deletion was a signal that
“excessive” and “needless” discovery was to be avoided.256 That message was reinforced by the simultaneous addition of the language now
found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) directing district judges to avoid discovery
that is unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, or obtainable from some
Flambeau, Inc., No. 2:10–cv–146–TJW–CE, 2011 WL 4591905, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 30,
2011). Possible doctrinal futures are explored in Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The
(Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires
v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617 (2012).
254 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee’s note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 216
(1983). See generally 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 40, § 2003.1 (discussing
the 1983 amendments).
255 See, e.g., In re Convergent Techs. Secs. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
256 97 F.R.D. at 216.

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other source, as well as discovery that is unduly burdensome or
expensive given the needs of the particular case. Thus was born the
concept of “proportionality” in discovery.257 The amendment also
emphasized the importance of judicial involvement in the discovery
process and was designed to work in tandem with the simultaneous
amendment of Rule 16, validating and promoting the judicial management discussed earlier.258
In describing the rule amendments at that time, I remarked on
several occasions that the changes represented a “180-degree shift” in
thinking about discovery.259 I must confess, from my Reporter’s vantage point, I did perceive the need for imposing some restraint on
cumulative and excessive discovery. Discovery’s cost seemed to be
rising (which at least in part appeared to be a product of it having
become a “profit-center” for many law firms working on an hourly-fee
basis), the overuse and high cost of experts was becoming apparent,
and discovery activity was thought to be causing marginal,
unnecessary, and even unethical lawyer behavior.260 The Advisory
Committee obviously was like-minded.
In retrospect, our collective judgment was more impressionistic
than empirical.261 The practice of invoking the aid of the Federal
Judicial Center to study and report on matters being considered by the
Advisory Committee and the development of sophisticated empirical
research techniques were to come later. Also the stimulus for the 1983
changes may have reflected too narrow a range of cases and outside
comments on drafts of the proposed amendments. Simply put, we may
have failed to consider the considerable array of lawsuits in which
257 See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 40, § 2008.1 (discussing the meaning
and application of the principle of proportionality in discovery). The Advisory Committee
Note also urged judges to be more “aggressive” in “discouraging discovery overuse.” 97
F.R.D. at 216. Additionally, the Advisory Committee is now considering a proposed revision to Rule 26(b)(1); the revision is expected to narrow the scope of discovery by “conditioning availability of information on ‘proportionality.’” See Memorandum from the
Center for Constitutional Litigation (n.d.) (on file with the New York University Law
Review) (highlighting the proposed changes to Rule 26(b)(1) and predicting that such
changes would fundamentally “transform the civil justice system”).
258 See supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text.
259 MILLER, supra note 25, at 32–33.
260 See Am. Bar Ass’n, Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of
Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 141–42 (1980) (“Discovery . . . is too easily abused . . . .”).
The Special Committee’s First Report is reprinted as an appendix to the Second Report.
Id. at 149. See generally David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary
System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055 (1979).
261 The one discovery study relied on by the Committee and cited in its Note did not
indicate that anything was fundamentally wrong with the discovery system. PAUL R.
CONNOLLY, EDITH A. HOLLEMAN & MICHAEL J. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND
THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (1978).

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discovery did not pose any particular difficulty or cases in which the
discovery needs of the parties were asymmetrical, making its availability especially necessary. I think time has cast doubt on some of the
assertions that were voiced at the time of the 1983 amendments to
Rule 26.262
The “shift” in attitude has continued over the years even though
there is considerable reason to believe that discovery usually works
well, is quite limited in most cases (indeed, it is nonexistent in many
cases), and its burdensomeness poses problems in a relatively thin
band of complex and “big” cases.263 In 1993, Rule 30 was amended to
limit the number and duration of depositions that could be taken
without judicial authorization,264 and Rule 33 was amended to create
a presumptive limitation on the number of interrogatories that could
be propounded.265 Then, in 2000, Rule 26(b)(1) was modified to limit
the scope of discovery to material “relevant to any party’s claim or
defense” rather than to the more open-ended “subject matter” of the
action as it had been since 1938.266 This last change sends a signal, but
it is one with rather Delphic qualities.
Although one might argue that these changes do not represent a
dramatic undermining of federal discovery, they clearly look in a
philosophically different direction than did the original rules. All of
262 See discussion infra, notes 281–87. Committee composition also may have contributed to its willingness to accept the representations concerning discovery hyperactivity.
263 See Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The
Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (1998) (reviewing studies showing that one-third to
one-half of all litigations involve no discovery). But cf. John H. Beisner, Discovering a
Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010)
(arguing that discovery is “dysfunctional, with litigants utilizing discovery excessively and
abusively”).
264 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (1992) (requiring leave of the court to take more than
thirty depositions) with FED. R. CIV. P. 30 (requiring leave of the court to take more than
ten depositions). See 8A WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 40, §§ 2104, 2113 (discussing this change).
265 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1992) (permitting service of interrogatories by each
party), with FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1993) (permitting service of up to twenty-five interrogatories by each party).
266 See 8 WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 40, § 2008 (explaining the 2000
amendment and its impact); Carl Tobias, The 2000 Federal Civil Rules Revisions, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 875 (2001) (analyzing the amendment); see also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A
Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery,
69 TENN. L. REV. 13 (2001) (warning that the 2000 amendment will increase procedural
barriers to relief without curbing litigation costs). The shift in orientation of the Advisory
Committee and other participants in the rulemaking process is evidenced by the fact that in
1978 a virtually identical proposal was rejected. See Memorandum from Walter R.
Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules to the Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure 6–8 (June 14, 1979). Rule 26(b)(1) does provide that on a showing
of “good cause,” the court may expand discovery to cover “any matter relevant to the
subject matter” of the action. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

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the enumerated rule alterations were designed to constrict
discovery.267 It seems fairly obvious that discovery restrictions can
impact other policies negatively and should be undertaken cautiously.268 Broad access to discovery is often a necessity in lawsuits by
private attorneys general because in many substantive contexts we are
quite dependent on that type of litigation to augment governmental
enforcement of federal normative standards. Recent events in both
the financial and real estate markets, for example, have laid bare the
consequences of underenforcement of federal regulatory policies.
It seems odd, therefore, to be impeding the efficacy of this important method of effectuating national as well as state policies. Discovery is often the key that opens the door to information critical to
the remediation of violations of important constitutional, statutory,
and common law principles. Therefore it is imperative that controls on
access to discovery (Twombly and Iqbal) and the scope of discovery
(the Rule amendments)—particularly controls that are inconsistent
with the underpinnings of the 1938 Rules—be shown to be justified
and carefully balanced against the need to preserve the civil enforcement role performed by elements of the private bar. Moreover, any
limitations on access to discovery or its scope must be flexible enough
to take account of the negative potential of constriction and differences in substantive context.269
Debates about the positives and negatives of wide-angle discovery have gone on for decades—often with great intensity—and
they undoubtedly will continue; the subject always has been an attractive target for defense interests. The focal point of contention occasionally changes: Sometimes it is the number or length of depositions,
and at other times the discussion centers on excessive or intrusive document discovery. At present, discovery relating to electronically
stored information is beginning to raise issues that may dwarf all that
has come before; it already is dramatically altering today’s discovery
debate and certainly will impact those that inevitably will take place in
the future.270
267 The discovery rules were amended on several other occasions during the period
under discussion in ways that are not presently relevant.
268 See generally Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 818 (1981)
(explaining that discovery is essential to “the evolution of substantive law”).
269 Higginbotham, supra note 83, at 751–52.
270 The burdens and challenges of e-discovery are being confronted by various groups
including the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Sedona Conference. In 2006,
Rules 26(f), 33(d), 34, and 37(f) were amended to deal with certain aspects of electronic
information. See generally 8, 8A & 8B WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, supra note 40,
§§ 2003.1, 2051.1, 2178, 2218–19, 2284.1 (explaining the process and impact of the

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III
THE CONSEQUENCES OF AND PURPORTED JUSTIFICATIONS
DEFORMATION OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE

FOR THE

When one steps back from the individual changes that I have
described and takes a panoramic view of these developments—as well
as the other issues that federal courts now demand be focused on
early in the proceedings, such as the great growth in challenges based
on defenses of preemption, standing, qualified or absolute immunity,
abstention, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and statutes of limitation and other time restrictions271—there is no secret about what is
happening, or frankly why, and whom it all benefits. To use a sports
metaphor, these cumulative procedural changes feel like judicial piling
on. The consequences of the procedural movements of the last
twenty-five years are seismic. Previously, we had a commitment to
trial and, when appropriate, jury trial—all in public view. Realistically,
of course, a trial has been a mere possibility because a settlement culture has dominated practice in the federal courts for many years.272
amendments). Rulemaking and other e-discovery efforts continue, and a second generation of Federal Rule amendments is likely. Some relief from the rigors and expense of
electronic discovery as well as greater accuracy of retrieval apparently can be achieved,
ironically, by the growing availability of sophisticated digital search techniques. See Moore
v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 607412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
24, 2012), adopted sub nom. Moore v. Publicis Groupe SA, 2012 WL 1446534 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 26, 2012) (holding that computer-assisted document review can be appropriate in
large-data-volume cases). See generally Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in E-Discovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient than
Exhaustive Manual Review, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11 (2011), http://jolt.richmond.edu/
v17i3/article11.pdf (analyzing and comparing automated and manual document review
techniques).
271 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418 (2003) (holding that an
action under California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act impermissibly interfered
with the President’s conduct of foreign affairs and was preempted); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign
Trade Councils, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (holding the Massachusetts law prohibiting the
state and its agencies from making purchases from Burma invalid under the Supremacy
Clause); In re ATM Fee Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that
ATM cardholders lacked standing to challenge price-fixing of interchange fees); Epps v. JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 675 F.3d 315, 318 (4th Cir. 2012) (rejecting a preemption
defense); Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to extend time
requirements of federal appellate rules for a motion to reopen, even when the untimely
filing was caused by court personnel); Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (rejecting a challenge to associational standing in a copyright infringement
case).
272 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORD. L. REV. 1177, 1200–01 (2009) (noting the growth of settlement in federal courts);
Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An
Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1625 (2004) (noting
that, of the nearly 20,000 asbestos cases filed each year in the 1990s, on average just sixty
reached a jury).

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Then the increased invocation of summary judgment began to replace
the possibility of trial. Now we have a potentially dispositive pleading
motion coming even earlier than the summary judgment
motion—which, when granted, prevents any discovery or trial. Finally,
McIntyre may prove to offer a heightened possibility of a dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction. The settlement culture now seems accompanied
by a dismissal culture.
Although the settlement of civil disputes generally is considered a
virtue, settlements either are less likely to occur given the leverage
defense interests have secured through the heightened prospect of
early termination, or they are more likely to result in under compensation without being accompanied by an acknowledgement of wrongdoing or an agreement to halt the challenged conduct. In either event,
the result will be to reduce the effectuation of important policies in
many contexts.
All of these pretrial obstacles have created procedural opportunities for defendants to avoid a trial on the merits—opportunities that
also generate billable hours—that are being used with increasing (and
statistically significant) frequency.273 Not surprisingly, for example,
Twombly and Iqbal have led to a constantly mounting number of
decisions in a myriad of substantive contexts, producing an increase in
the number of dismissals, particularly post-Iqbal.274 The resulting
reflexive defense response to a complaint is analogous to that of
Pavlov’s dogs to the dinner bell—move to dismiss.275 More motions,
more delays, more costs, more appeals, and earlier and possibly inappropriate dismissals. The system appears to be suffering from a significant case of premature termination.
We are moving toward a civil justice system in which an
increasing number of actions may be stillborn. Not only is case disposition occurring earlier, it is being based on less and less information
regarding the facts and merits of a dispute. A trial provides live evidence based on completed discovery, examination, cross-examination,
273 See CECIL, CORT, WILLIAMS & BATAILLON, supra note 176, at 8. The notion that
Twombly and Iqbal have not substantially impacted dismissal practices and outcomes is
forcefully contested in Hoffman, supra note 174. The author points to the additional costs
imposed by the significant increase in motions to dismiss, the greater incidence after Iqbal
of the motion being granted, and the limits inherent in the Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC)
study, such as the inability to measure the potentially meritorious cases that are not being
brought because of Twombly and Iqbal. CECIL, CORT, WILLIAMS & BATAILLON, supra
note 176, at 46–47, 55; see also DODSON, supra note 174.
274 See Hoffman, supra note 177, at 24–25 (critiquing the FJC study); see also CECIL,
CORT, WILLIAMS & BATAILLON, supra note 176.
275 As of February 25, 2013, Twombly has been cited in 75,634 cases and Iqbal has been
cited in 52,974 cases that are reported in the Westlaw service.

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and often the deliberation of a jury. Summary judgment (and class
certification), although primarily based on lawyers’ papers, often is
delayed until after merit (or class action) discovery has been completed and all the relevant informational cards theoretically are faceup. But even that is not always true. The motion to dismiss, however,
is based only on the complaint. Not discovery. Not evidence. Not witness testimony. Not cross-examination. Not the voice of the community. Adjudication based on paper should be the exception, not the
rule. Adjudication based on a single paper—the complaint—as evaluated by subjective factors such as judicial experience and common
sense and an abstract comparison to a hypothesized innocent explanation of the defendant’s conduct is a process that is alien to me. Personal jurisdiction challenges, of course, have nothing to do with the
central justice question—who should win and who should lose.
Supreme Court decisions, congressional enactments, and Federal
Rule amendments since the summary judgment trilogy have accorded
primacy to efficiency and cost reduction (at least as these goals are
seen through the eyes of defense interests). In some respects these
objectives are understandable since there are concerns—of uncertain
dimension and significance—about how effectively the civil justice
system is functioning in terms of various metrics, such as cost, delay,
and efficiency that provide some justification for what has happened
over the past quarter of a century. Federal judges have very real
docket pressures. Discovery, particularly e-discovery,276 can be
extremely resource consumptive in large-scale cases. Managing cases
through what often is a complex and lengthy pretrial process has
become exceedingly cumbersome and dilatory; the capacities of and
resources available to the federal judiciary are far from limitless.277
Not surprisingly, the Federal Rules, so simply and sparsely texted
originally, now read in significant part like the Internal Revenue Code
as amendments multiply and lengthen and the pretrial litigation field
has become littered with costly and time-consuming friction points.
Yet, ironically, much of the “mischief” in recent years that I have
described has come about because of the judicial reconstruction of
plainly worded rules with unambiguous intent.
It is axiomatic, of course, that there is a need for constant reevaluation of how civil cases are being processed by the federal courts,
and procedural change should be embraced when the need for it has
276

See supra note 270 (discussing electronic discovery pressure).
A distinguished court of appeals judge has discussed the problems of a court system
with limited resources when it is confronted by a world of “limitless expectations” and
“limitless litigation.” Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Access to Justice Within the Federal
Courts—A Ninth Circuit Perspective, 90 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1039, 1046 (2012).
277

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been demonstrated. However, the dimension and direction of the
changes I have described in these pages have tipped the scales against
access, the day-in-court principle, and jury trial. These are some of our
most important litigation values and they have been compromised by
the erecting of procedural stop signs. That has produced collateral systemic and societal costs that are far too high, especially when the supposed need for many of these changes and their efficacy lack any real
empirical support and the significance of the pressures and litigation
practices that are cited as reasons for bringing them about is suspect.
A majority of the Justices in Twombly and Iqbal offered three
propositions to justify the changes they were making in the pleading
regime: (1) The threat of abusive litigation behavior and frivolous lawsuits is present; (2) the possibility of extortionate settlements against
businesses must be avoided; and (3) litigation is expensive.278 Only the
dissenting Justices paid attention to the possibility that there were
procedural pathways other than heightened pleading that might ameliorate these concerns and that institutional and societal values also
were at stake.279 Presumably these and related concerns, such as that
about possible aggregate liability expressed in Concepcion,280 also
undergird the judiciary’s establishment of many of the other pretrial
stop signs of the recent past. But how real are they?
Assertions of abusive and frivolous lawsuits are not new. When I
was the Reporter to the Advisory Committee, in the late 1970s and
first half of the 1980s, the focus was on containing the pretrial process,
because that is where litigation cost and delay reside. Even then the
defense bar and their clients were voicing complaints about abusive
and frivolous litigation and the need for cost reduction—the drumbeat
was constant and noisy. Urban legends and cosmic anecdotes were
being propagated. Chief Justice Warren Burger sponsored a high visibility conference on litigation, one major theme of which was finding a
278 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558–59 (2007); see also Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) (dismissing the complaint for failing to plead harm with specificity, in part because a more
liberal pleading rule would allow plaintiffs to misappropriate scarce judicial resources for
the purpose of coercing a greater settlement); Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 412
(7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting in part) (lauding Twombly and Iqbal for “requir[ing]
the plaintiff to conduct a more extensive precomplaint investigation . . . creat[ing] greater
symmetry between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s litigation costs, and by doing so
reduc[ing] the scope for extortionate discovery”).
279 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer in Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687, and that of Justice Stevens joined by Justice Ginsburg
in Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
280 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) (identifying the
risks that class arbitration poses to defendants).

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way to “serve the interests of justice” that was “more speedy and less
expensive.”281
As the great baseball philosopher Yogi Berra might say, the complaints sounded in recent times are déjà vu all over again.282 But all of
this was new to me at the time. So, as a cub Reporter I spent several
months going to bar association meetings and judicial conferences,
asking people to talk to me about their experiences with abusive
behavior and frivolous litigation so that I could aid the Committee in
pursuing intelligent rule revision. Like Diogenes, the Greek philosopher, with a lamp searching for the truth about abuse and frivolity, I
listened and listened and listened. In due course, I reported to the
Committee that I had learned a great deal about these two litigation
evils. I could tell them with considerable confidence that, according to
the practicing bar, a frivolous lawsuit is any case brought against your
client and litigation abuse is anything the opposing lawyer is doing.
More than thirty years have now passed, and I really cannot do
any better. We never have defined either abusive litigation behavior
or frivolous lawsuits; we never have measured the frequency of either;
we do not know who is guilty of such conduct or which side of the
litigation is more prone to commit such conduct; and the line between
proper and improper advocacy is, as it always has been, obscure and
context dependent.283 Yes, there are cases that most people would
agree should not have been initiated and there are motions and discovery requests and objections that should not have been made.284
How many? We don’t know. In the main, most assertions of abusive
behavior or frivolous lawsuits are anecdotal and subjective. Abuse
and frivolity simply lie in the eye of the beholder. Despite the amorphousness and lack of real knowledge or common understanding
about what constitutes litigation misbehavior, these assertions motivate judicial decisionmaking, apparently including that of Supreme
Court Justices.
281

Warren E. Burger, Preface to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
FUTURE 5, 6 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
282 United States v. Manni, 810 F.2d 80, 81 (6th Cir. 1987); 39 Authors, The
Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J. 697, 714 n.100 (1997).
283 See AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 227 (2009) (characterizing the notion that there is
“widespread frivolous antitrust litigation” as a “myth[ ]”); Robert G. Bone, Modeling
Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520 (1997) (“We know remarkably little about
frivolous litigation.”); Mullenix, supra note 61, at 1395–96 (arguing that the myth of
American litigiousness is not grounded in fact).
284 See, e.g., Charles Yablon, Stupid Lawyer Tricks: An Essay on Discovery Abuse, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1996) (collecting tales of discovery abuse).
IN THE

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What of extortionate settlements (also known as legalized blackmail, or bounty hunting in some quarters)?285 How many times do
they occur? Again, we simply do not know. Nor do we even know
what an extortionate settlement is or how to recognize one.286 We do
not have benchmarks, let alone a consensus, of what one is or how
many there have been. But it is a charge that is easy to make. Yes, we
do sometimes hear a settling defendant or some third person proclaim
the following: “Oh, we were extorted.” “That was a lawyer’s case, only
they benefitted.” “We were forced to settle.” How do we know any of
these pronouncements are true? Cases are settled for a myriad of
varied human and business reasons that simply reflect the self-interest
of the parties. Many of them have little or nothing to do with the
litigation’s merits or costs, such as concerns about regulatory matters,
public perception, clearing a contingent liability off the books, the
preservation of privacy, or a lack of resources to continue the litigation.287 And when the size of an attorney’s fee award is contrasted
with the individual class member’s recovery, to imply that a settlement
was extortionate or that “only” the lawyer benefited, mention rarely is
made of the cumulative award to the class or its size, the societal therapeutics or deterrent value of the case, or the risks assumed by lawyers working on a contingent fee basis.
285 See Coffee, supra note 46, at 888 (referring to some plaintiffs’ lawyers as “bounty
hunter[s]”); Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer
Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 843 (1974)
(noting that class actions have been characterized by some as “legalized blackmail”).
286 Nonetheless, courts repeat the rhetoric. See, e.g., William O. Gilley Enters. v. Atl.
Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 668 (9th Cir. 2009) (dismissing conclusory allegations as “in
terrorem increment of the settlement value” (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 558 (2007))); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298–99 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that class certification creates “intense pressure to settle”); Leysoto v. Mama
Mia I., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 693, 698 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (denying class certification because of the
“potentially annihilating” effect of aggregate liability for the minimum damage remedy
prescribed by the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act). There are “intense pressures
to settle” and a fear of economic “annihilation” on both sides of the litigation. That does
not equate to “extortion,” although the leveraging effect of aggregation has to be acknowledged. However, the observation of Justice (then Judge) Sotomayor in In re Visa Checking
Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 280 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) seems apropos: “The
effect of certification on parties’ leverage in settlement negotiations is a fact of life for class
action litigants. While the sheer size of the class . . . may enhance this effect, this alone
cannot defeat an otherwise proper certification.” In Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to
Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003), the author
rebuts the claim that certification causes settlement of weak claims.
287 Was the $162 million settlement between Fred Wilpon and Saul Katz, the owners of
the New York Mets [baseball team], and the bankruptcy trustee of the Madoff Estate, who
has been trying to reclaim funds for the Madoff Ponzi scheme victims, extortionate, as
some assert, or just good “business” given the risks of continued litigation? See Ken
Belson, Mets and Picard Become Unlikely Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at B10.

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Finally, what about costs? Of course, no one likes them. But
again we really don’t have a sophisticated understanding of the economic aspects and behavioral implications of litigation, although that
is changing as research accumulates. The empirical studies we have
had, which often simply have been impressionistic or superficial, have
focused almost exclusively on defense costs—rarely on the plaintiff’s,
the system’s, or society’s costs. Ironically, they suggest that in most
cases costs are less than what they often are claimed to be; that costs
quite understandably correlate with litigation stakes; and that the very
high cost cases represent only a rather small portion of the federal
workload.288 Yet complaints about litigation expense by defense
interests are incessant and directed at all actions. Professor Danya
Shocair Reda calls this a persistent “cost-and-delay narrative” and
attributes it to “media distortion of legal stories,” “the interest of the
defense bar in propagating the narrative,” and “political battles over
what role law should play in society.” In her judgment, it all appears
to be yet another illusion propagated to further other self-interested
purposes.289 She concludes, “When these [cost] ranges are compared
with the dominant descriptions of discovery costs found in attorney
surveys, judicial opinions, and public discourse, it becomes clear that
the costs narrative is out of touch with the empirical data.”290 The last
factor she identifies, of course, is the contemporary echo of the

288 EMERY G. LEE, III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 1–2 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (reporting that costs represent between one and
three percent of total litigation stakes). See Miller, supra note 54, at 61–71, for a fuller
discussion. Empirical studies of costs have been relatively consistent over the years in concluding that litigation expenses, particularly discovery costs, are not excessive. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 185–87 (1968)
(finding that discovery costs are typically low, and that the conventional wisdom to the
contrary arises from a minority of very expensive litigations); CONNOLLY, HOLLEMAN, &
KUHLMAN, supra note 261, at 19–40 (finding that half of the cases surveyed involved no
discovery requests, and that eighty-eight percent of cases involved fewer than five depositions or interrogatories); THOMAS E. WILLGING, JOHN SHAPARD, DONNA STIENSTRA &
DEAN MILETICH, DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS
FOR CHANGE: A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES 2 (1997) (“Generally, discovery expenses represented 50% of litigation
expenses and 3% of the amount at stake in the litigation.”); see also Emery G. Lee, III &
Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J.
765, 787 (2010) (arguing that the myth of discovery abuse “has never been supported by a
single empirical study of costs”); Mullenix, supra note 263, at 685 (explaining that one-half
to one-third of litigations involve no discovery).
289 Reda, supra note 61, at 1116–17.
290 Id. at 1115–16.

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deregulation objective of President Reagan’s Council on Competitiveness discussed earlier.291
Even as to the high-cost cases, we do not know how much of the
expenditure and delay in a given case are the result of tactical decisions by defense counsel to interpose motions and to resist discovery—driven by economic self-interest or reflecting litigation
practices of attrition and dilatoriness—rather than of hyperactivity on
the part of plaintiffs. Yet the various procedural stop signs I have discussed—all of which are based on the triad of concerns articulated by
the Court in Twombly and Iqbal—apply to every federal case regardless of its dimension, policy significance, or the ability of particular
claimants to bear the attendant burdens.
The federal procedural system has shifted dramatically in recent
years in ways that impede and disadvantage substantial categories of
plaintiffs. Moving the specter of case termination forward in time
obliges potential plaintiffs to engage in preinstitution investigation to
the extent they can gain access or have the financial wherewithal. This
intrinsically is not a bad thing, but typically is far from an adequate
substitute for discovery. Often this includes finding informants among
a defendant’s employees or detrimentally affected customers (which is
what plaintiff’s lawyers often must do in the hope of pleading enough
to survive a motion to dismiss). Could it be that it is now the defense
bar that has been empowered to extort settlements that are artificially
low by subjecting plaintiffs to increased cost, delay, and the risks of
running afoul of the various procedural stop signs that dot the pretrial
landscape? In other words, maybe defendants extorting plaintiffs is
the real extortion phenomenon—not contingent fee plaintiffs
extorting settlements from defendants. Or maybe the fault lies on
both sides. Or maybe “extortion” really is a nonissue—little more
than rhetoric. The point is: We simply do not know. Yet despite this
vacuum of knowledge, dramatic procedural shifts have occurred based
on unsubstantiated assertions and assumptions.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Twombly, Iqbal, Wal-Mart, and
Concepcion, the plurality opinion in McIntyre, and other judicial pronouncements reveal that a number of federal judges (and Justices)
seem singularly concerned about the litigation burdens on corporations and government officials.292 But should we not also care about
the litigation burdens on plaintiffs? Or that mandatory arbitration
291 Id. at 1117; see also supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text (discussing the Council
on Competitiveness).
292 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
685 (2009); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1749 (2011); J. McIntyre
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011). The same might be said of the many

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clauses—particularly non–class action clauses—often allow defendants to shift costs to plaintiffs and deter the vast majority of those
detrimentally affected from seeking relief? Should we not care about
cases being dismissed prematurely despite obvious information asymmetry, or about cases involving important national policies and principles either not being commenced or dismissed because of some
pretrial stop sign? Should we not care, for example, that possible antitrust, civil rights, consumer violations, and product failures are not
being deterred—or that people who have been injured by such conduct are not being compensated or are being improperly detained or
otherwise mistreated by government action? Don’t these all represent
costs—perhaps unquantifiable ones—to society? Yet matters such as
these have not been evaluated or quantified and never appear on the
litigation cost-benefit balance sheet.293 These concerns are lost in the
cacophony about abuse, delay, frivolousness, extortion, and cost. For
some, the “cost-and-delay narrative” is an enticing elixir, one that is
easily consumed but perhaps one that is lacking in nutritional value.294
What I have described puts this nation’s longstanding legislative
and judicial commitment to the private enforcement of its public policies and constitutional principles in harm’s way. In Twombly, why did
the Court choose to grant a motion to dismiss the complaint—thereby
immunizing a significant industry from even a modicum of discovery
and the potential of merit adjudication? In doing so, the Court refused
to allow even a limited (judicially controlled) inquiry into the possibility that the private enforcement of the antitrust laws was necessary
to eliminate the conduct (if established) that was called into question.
Years earlier the Court had cautioned against using even the much
more mature summary judgment motion in antitrust cases given their
special character and complexity.295 If the procedural rules are not
receptive to lawsuits designed to vindicate the objectives of our
rulemaking changes in recent years regarding discovery matters. See discussion supra notes
256–71.
293 None of the available empirical evidence purports to measure these deterrent effects
or the deleterious consequences of inappropriate procedural dismissals. Indeed, it is
doubtful that they can be effectively or accurately researched. See Hoffman, supra note
177, at 27–31 (explaining the difficulty of measuring the number of prospective claimants
deterred, meritorious cases dismissed, and the kinds of motions rountinely made).
294 I occasionally wonder whether the Advisory Committee and I were under the influence of the “narrative” when we proposed the notion of proportionality in discovery now
found in Rule 23(b)(2)(C). See discussion supra notes 254–57 (explaining the Rule’s history). A rereading of the Committee Note, the preparation of which in my day was largely
a Reporter’s task, suggests that might have been the case.
295 Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (noting the presence of
difficult issues of motive and intent, proof largely in the possession of the alleged conspirators and hostile witnesses).

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constitutional and statutory policies, or if cases pursuing that end
cannot be lodged in a convenient forum or survive a motion to dismiss, such cases will not be instituted and those policies will not be
furthered. That is not what our procedural system, as reflected in the
words of Rule 1, is designed to achieve. Yes, we would like to resolve
lawsuits in a speedy fashion and the process should be as inexpensive
as possible. But remember that remaining word in Rule 1—“just.”296
Seeking a “just” result is at least as important as the other two objectives, and it requires that a meaningful and merit-oriented opportunity
be given to our citizens to present their grievances. I fear that after
seventy-five years, the application of the Federal Rules has lost its
moorings; I fear that some in the profession, both on the bench and in
the practicing bar, have lost sight of the goals our procedural system
should pursue.
By short-circuiting the civil justice process the Supreme Court has
downgraded our commitment to the day-in-court principle, diminished the status of the right to jury trial, and substituted accelerated
decisionmaking by judges—or arbitrators—for adversarial trials and
the occasional voice of the community. It should be obvious that procedural stop signs primarily further the interests of defendants, particularly those who are repeat players in the civil justice arena—large
businesses and governmental entities.
People frequently ask me: “Is this a business-oriented Supreme
Court?” Or occasionally, someone will assert, with a certain bite in his
or her voice: “The Chamber of Commerce seems to have a seat on the
Supreme Court; any truth to that?” I don’t believe that, but others
have voiced sentiments in that general vein.297 Despite that expression
of faith, I think it is fair to say that a number of the Justices (as well as
other federal judges) have a predilection (perhaps subliminal) that
favors business and governmental interests. Surely, a significant
number of opinions in recent years do show that orientation.298 Nor
296

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
See Adam Liptak, Justices Offer Receptive Ear to Business Interests, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 19, 2010, at A1; Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Right of Citizens to Aggregate
Small Claims Against Business, 46 MICH. J. L. REFORM 537 (2013); Ian Millhiser, Chamber
of Commerce’s Top SCOTUS Litigator Admits Justices Give Special Treatment to
Chamber, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2011, 2:01 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/economy/
2011/03/14/150447/scotu-hearts-the-chamber/?mobile=nc.
298 Admittedly, every once in a while a significant Supreme Court decision emerges that
looks in a neutral or opposite direction. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368
(2011) (holding that a state court consumer class action is not precluded by a prior federal
court refusal to certify a similar action); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S.
Ct. 2179 (2011) (holding that plaintiffs in a securities fraud action need not prove loss
causation to secure class certification); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (holding that a New York statute limiting a plaintiff’s ability
297

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do I think it unfair to say that some Justices on the current Court and
some members of the federal judiciary are disenchanted with civil litigation and wish to limit it,299 which, of course, negatively impacts
access and works against those in our lower and middle economic
classes who want entre to the civil justice system.300 That is an unfortunate echo of today’s societal inequities and reflects the stunning disparity in power, people’s income, and status in our nation.
It is far too simplistic to think that the mere ability to commence
a civil action suffices to discharge the justice system’s obligation to
provide citizens a day in court. The capacity to enter the courthouse
only to be diverted to arbitration or crucified once inside on a
pleading motion is hardly meaningful access. Additionally, access
without sufficient attention to procedural detail and process is little
more than the patina or trappings of a meaningful day in court—it is
not the substance of one. That is demonstrated by the dismal experience with the perfunctory handling of many of what possibly will turn
out to be millions of home mortgage foreclosures that have occurred
in the recent recession. It appears that in an unknown number of
instances, foreclosures have occurred despite a plethora of failures to
recognize serious procedural defects. Insufficient attention to
detail—usually regarding the documentation supposedly establishing
title in the party seeking foreclosure, the use of robosignatures, or the
failure to provide proper notice—has cost many Americans their
homes as a result of an invalid or inattentive process.301 Fortunately,
to seek class certification in a suit for recovery of a penalty was superseded by the text of
Rule 23).
299 The current enchantment with arbitration is evidence of that disenchantment. See
supra notes 135–69 and accompanying text (explaining the growth of, and Supreme Court
support for, arbitration). See generally Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84
TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court was consistently motivated by
its mistrust of civil litigation); Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil
Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 311 (2012) (asserting that the Roberts Court has
reshaped the rules of civil procedure to the benefit of business interests).
300 Other scholars have expressed concern that the various procedural restraints that I
have discussed have marginalized some people or social out-groups. See Brooke D.
Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 504 (2012) (arguing that
procedural limits on court access harm society by keeping marginalized plaintiffs from pursuing meritorious civil rights claims); A. Benjamin Spencer, Essay: The Restrictive Ethos in
Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 361–62, 366–70 (2010) (“Civil procedure
tends to . . . protect[ ] commercial defendants against claims by members of various outgroups.”).
301 The Inspector General of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
reported a significant number of affidavits not signed on personal knowledge or did not
follow a review of the underlying documents, as well as notaries not witnessing affiant
signatures. The Inspector General also has identified the possible use of falsified legal documents. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV.,

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that problem has now become visible. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, for example, has recognized the “substantial power” of
foreclosing parties employing the mortgage securitization process and
has insisted that they “follow strictly” the statutory requirements.302
What has occurred in the mortgage industry and the repetitive
appearances of Ponzi schemes and securities frauds are but exemplars
of two of the eternal truths of our (and perhaps any) society: “Greed
is a growth industry,” and “regulators are always one step behind
those they regulate.” Precursors to today’s financial debacles dot our
economic history. And even now we are witnessing a scandal relating
to the manipulation of a global benchmark interest rate, the London
Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), during the financial crisis. Lawsuits
have been filed, major banks have been fined,303 and more legal wrangling most assuredly will come.304 How will our civil justice system
react? Will today’s early-termination procedure deny us an
MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-FW-1802, BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION FORECLOSURE
AND CLAIMS PROCESS REVIEW 5 (2012), available at http://www.hudoig.gov/Audit_
Reports/2012-FW-1802.pdf; see also Pa. Pub. Sch. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am.
Corp., No. 11 Civ. 733 (WHP), 2012 WL 2847732, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2012) (finding
that signatures by bank officers used to secure mortgage foreclosures were not based on
personal knowledge and allegations to that effect allowed the complaint to survive a
motion to dismiss).
302 U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49–50 (Mass. 2011) (quoting Moore
v. Dick, 72 N.E. 967 (Mass. 1905)); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers
Extensive Flaws in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A1. The government has
secured an $8.5 billion settlement from ten banks to resolve claims of foreclosure abuse.
See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Banks to Pay $8.5 Billion to Speed Up Housing Relief, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at B1. Similar problems of meaningful access arise in the pro se litigant
context. One proposal for correction appears in Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal
Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 475, 478–83 (2002), in which the authors note that a pro se plaintiff’s “inability to
secure legal advice may prevent a meritorious claim from ever being presented to a judge.”
303 See, e.g., Katharina Bart, Tom Miles & Aruna Viswanatha, UBS Traders Charged,
Bank Fined $1.5 Billion in Libor Scandal, REUTERS (Dec. 19, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/19/us-ubs-libor-idUSBRE8BI00020121219
(explaining the Libor scandal, fines, and criminal prosecutions); Will Hutton, Bank RateFixing Scandals Reveal the Rotten Heart of Capitalism, THE OBSERVER (N.J.), Dec. 23,
2012, at 30 (describing the “Libor scam” and the huge fines imposed on the Swiss Bank
UBS); Timeline: Libor-Fixing Scandal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/business-18671255 (reporting on the investigations and consequences of attempts to
manipulate the Libor and Euribor rates).
304 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages, N.Y. TIMES,
July 11, 2012, at A1. Even more recently, reports of banks failing to monitor customer
activities involving money laundering have surfaced. See Landon Thomas, Jr. & Mark
Scott, HSBC Reveals Problems with Internal Controls, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012, 5:52
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/hsbc-to-apologize-at-senate-hearing; see also
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Regulator Says Bank Helped Iran Hide Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2012, at A1 (reporting that New York regulators have charged British bank Standard
Chartered with helping the Iranian government to launder billions of dollars illegally
through its New York branch that might be used to support terrorist activities).

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explanation and possibly an adjudication on the merits as to whether
the challenged conduct corrupted the financial marketplace?
What appears to be happening simply does not resemble the procedural process that some of us once knew. Frankly, I do not think a
system that focuses on gatekeeping, early termination, and erecting
procedural stop signs befits the aspirations of the American civil justice system. To me this is a myopic field of vision and, as suggested
above, betrays either an antilitigation, antiplaintiff, pro-business, and
pro-government orientation, or pro-management bias, or a combination thereof. At a time when the complexities of American life seem
to increase and acts of private and public misconduct constantly are
coming to light, our courts should focus on how to make the civil justice system provide a level litigation field that is receptive to promoting our public policies—deterring those tempted to violate
them—and providing efficient procedures to compensate those who
have been damaged.305 Our judges should concentrate on effectuating
the vision of the rulemakers of the 1930s by reviving and extending
the principles of citizen access and the resolution of disputes on their
merits,306 even though the realities of modern life and the limited
nature of our judicial resources necessitate that in many situations
access and adjudication must be on an aggregate rather than an individual basis.
It is said that necessity is the mother of invention. Perhaps the
time has come to declare that our civil justice system is in a state of
necessity and that we need to resurrect the system many of us were
proud to practice or teach (or adjudicate). If there are legitimate concerns about litigation costs or lawyer behavior, there are a myriad of
possibilities other than putting up procedural stop signs. Certainly
various aspects of judicial management—particularly with regard to
305 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1997) (“Calibration
of discovery is calibration of the level of enforcement of the social policy set by
Congress.”).
306 In J. Douglas Richards & John Vail, A Misguided Mission to Revamp the Rules,
TRIAL, Nov. 2009, at 52, two distinguished plaintiffs’ lawyers argue that the case has not
been made for major deviations from the original objectives of the Federal Rules. They
also criticize proposals by the American College of Trial Lawyers and the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System entitled Civil Case Law Management
Guidelines and Its Set of Pilot Project Rules. Id.; see AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAW. & INST.
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., UNIVERSITY OF DENVER FINAL
REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SYSTEM (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4008. The proposals are
criticized further in CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG. PC, NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY COURTS? AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF 21ST CENTURY
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2010).

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our treatment of pretrial motion practice and controlling excessive
discovery—should be viewed as works in progress and developed and
refined more than they have been.307 Greater attention needs to be
given to professional conduct, through more sophisticated education
and sanctioning techniques—although, admittedly, these efforts have
not been entirely successful in the past.308 Concomitantly, we should
try to come to grips with that basic question: How do we want our
judges spending their time? Other approaches may require experimentation by the Congress, the rulemaking process, individual judges,
and more empirical research and academic exploration. It also may be
that other disciplines that study or have experience with dispute resolution and various aspects of management and organizational science
have something to offer our civil justice system.
The legal profession owes it to the larger community to employ
its inventive skills and explore a wide range of possibilities, some previously viewed as unthinkable. For example, consideration should be
given to abandoning the transsubstantive principle requiring that the
Federal Rules be “general” and applicable to all cases—a notion that
supposedly is embedded in the Rules Enabling Act.309 In reality it
exists today in name only.310 That might encourage giving serious
307 See Miller, supra note 54, at 77–81 (discussing the theoretical evolution of case management). For example, some believe that judicial management should be enhanced and
made more meaningful. Others are of the view that judges should have more direct
involvement in the process and not delegate as much case management to magistrate
judges as some do. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
90, 96–97 (2009). In Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Twombly and Iqbal Reconsidered, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1621, 1643–46 (2012), the author discusses methods for controlling discovery and expresses the view that regulating pleading standards may not be the best
option because “judges . . . have neither the information nor the incentives to make wise
decisions about which cases are worthy of discovery.”
308 The subject has been given increased attention in recent years. See, e.g., David F.
Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect” Toward a Unified Measurement Project, 58 DUKE L.J.
1181 (2009) (describing a symposium at Duke Law School on measuring judges and justice). Some very promising work is being done in developing a new metric called “bench
presence” by District Judge Young and Professor Singer, designed to measure what they
consider to be benchmarks of judicial productivity: accuracy of adjudication and procedural fairness. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More
Complete Model of Federal District Court Productivity (2012) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with the New York University Law Review).
309 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006).
310 See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 324, 333–34 (2008) (advocating against the view that transsubstantivity
is an “independent value” of the Federal Rules); Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation
of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1940
(1989) (“[U]niformity and trans-substantivity . . . are a sham.”); David Marcus, The Past,
Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV.
371, 373 (2010) (predicting the demise of the transsubstantivity principle and discussing its
historical development); Miller, supra note 54, at 90–94 (“With Twombly and Iqbal, it is

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thought to putting cases on different litigation tracks and devising different procedures that are deemed appropriate for the characteristics
of the cases posted to each track.311 None of these is inconsistent with
or need be pursued at the expense of a continued commitment to the
speedy and inexpensive determination of lawsuits.312 Indeed, they
might be more consistent with our historic litigation values and a
quest for results that are just, than they have been with the procedural
stop signs erected in the recent past.
CONCLUSION
Each year I ask my first-year civil procedure students: “Why do
we have courts?” In times past I thought I knew the answer and could
guide my charges to it. But after asking the question for more than
fifty years and contemplating the procedural changes of the last
quarter century, I am no longer clear as to what that answer is in the
real world of litigation. More to the point, a Supreme Court that
appears preoccupied with early termination and magnifying ways of
avoiding adjudication on the merits or diverting disputes to arbitration
seems no further advanced in answering the question than my students and I have been throughout these years.
quite possible that the Court implicitly abandoned or compromised its devotion to the
transsubstantive character of the Rules.”).
311 I outlined the avenues of inquiry mentioned in text and a few other possible lines of
procedural modification in Miller, supra note 54, at 103–31; see also Brooke D. Coleman,
Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV.
261, 293–96 (2009) (proposing structural changes to the rulemaking process); Andrew D.
Hurwitz, Possible Responses to the ACTL/IAALS Report: The Arizona Experience, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 461, 472–79 (2011) (explaining Arizona’s success with tracking).
312 The tracking concept has been talked about for many years and, as a practical
matter, already exists in federal practice in several contexts. See Edward H. Cooper,
Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794 (2002) (critiquing the
Advisory Committee’s simplified rules project, and noting that the existing Federal Rules
allow for different approaches to different litigation tracks); Richard McMillan, Jr. &
David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431 (1985) (proposing the creation of a formal fasttrack litigation path in order to import the strengths of alternative dispute resolution into
the federal judicial system); Miller, supra note 54, at 118–25 (noting that the Rules allow
for tracking in judicial management of discovery and proposing the further adoption of
tracking, perhaps according to the British model); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87
DENVER U. L. REV. 377, 398–405 (2010) (proposing the adoption of a simple track for lowdollar-value cases, ensuring quick claim resolution and limiting litigant and systemic costs).
Tracking has been part of management practice in England and Wales for a number of
years. See Miller, supra note 54, at 118–25. Another possibility, admittedly counterintuitive
after Twombly and Iqbal, is limited and controlled pre-action investigatory discovery, currently unavailable under the Federal Rules. See, e.g., DODSON, supra note 174, at 147–48;
Miller, supra note 54, at 105–08.

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Our aspirations should be those that our Founders embedded in
the Constitution; that committed us to the rule of law; that prized the
image of a level litigation field; and that motivated engraving “equal
justice under law”313 above the entrance to the U.S. Supreme Court
building.314 They should not be to impede meaningful citizen access to
our justice system or to impair the enforcement of our public policies
and constitutional principles by constructing a procedural Great Wall
of China or Maginot Line around the courtrooms in our courthouses.

313 The phrase can be traced to the Funeral Oration by the Athenian leader Pericles in
THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 89 (W. Robert Connor ed., Richard
Crawley trans., Everyman 1993) (c. 431 B.C.E.). It also may paraphrase a passage in Chief
Justice Fuller’s opinion in Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891), in which the Justice
declares that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the States from depriving any person of
“equal and impartial justice under the law.”
314 Is it coincidence or symbolic that the entrance is now closed, ostensibly for security
reasons?