Too Good to be True
Private Prisons in America
Cody Mason
January 2012

For further information:
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This report was written by Cody Mason, program associate at The
Sentencing Project.
The Sentencing Project is a national non-profit organization engaged
in research and advocacy on criminal justice issues.
The work of The Sentencing Project is supported by many individual
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Copyright @ 2012 by The Sentencing Project. Reproduction of this
document in full or in part, and in print or electronic format, only by
permission of The Sentencing Project

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I

n 2010, private prisons held 128,195 of the 1.6 million state and federal
prisoners in the United States, representing eight percent of the total
population. For the period 1999-2010, the number of individuals held in private
prisons grew by 80 percent, compared to 17 percent for the overall prison
population. While both federal and state governments increasingly relied on
privatization, the federal prison system’s commitment to privatization grew much
more dramatically. The number of federal prisoners held in private prisons rose from
3,828 to 33,830, an increase of 784 percent, while the number of state prisoners
incarcerated privately grew by 40 percent, from 67,380 to 94,365. Today, 30 states
maintain some level of privatization, with seven states housing more than a quarter
of their prison populations privately.1
Prisoners Held in Private Prisons in the United States2
1999
2010
Change 1999-2010
Total Prison Population
Total Private
Federal Private
State Private

1,366,721

1,605,127

+17%

71,208

128,195

+80%

3,828

33,830

+784%

67,380

94,365

+40%

ORIGINS OF PRIVATE PRISONS
While the expansion of prison privatization is relatively recent, the presence of
privatized corrections can be traced back to early American history. At that time
local governments would reimburse private jailers to hold people who were facing
trial.3 This contracting was a result of criminal justice policies of the time that
focused on fines and public humiliation, including the stockades and branding.
During this period, jailers charged states high rates to incarcerate prisoners and were
known to imprison persons who owed debts until they were paid in full.4
This private-public relationship changed with the creation of the first publicly run
prison in 1790 and, with the notable exception of convict leasing for forced labor,
the next century saw private business involvement in corrections limited to providing
contracted services, such as food preparation, medical care, and transportation.5

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Nongovernmental organizations were also heavily involved in maintaining juvenile
detention facilities, but this was largely not for profit.6

REEMERGENCE OF PRIVATE PRISON COMPANIES
Public policies adopted during the 1970s and 1980s facilitated an increase in prison
privatization. The War on Drugs and harsher sentencing policies, including
mandatory minimum sentences, fueled a rapid expansion in the nation’s prison
population.7 The resulting burden on the public sector led private companies to
reemerge during the 1970s to operate halfway houses. They extended their reach in
the 1980s by contracting with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to
detain undocumented immigrants.8 These forms of privatization “on the ‘soft’ end of
the correctional continuum” were followed by the reappearance of for-profit prison
privatization.9
Established in 1983, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) claimed an ability
to build and operate state and federal prisons with the same quality of service
provided in publicly operated prisons, but at a lower cost. One year later, CCA was
awarded a contract for a facility in Hamilton County, Tennessee, the first instance of
the public sector contracting management of a prison to a private company.10 In
1985, CCA attempted to assume management of the entire Tennessee prison system,
but that offer was rejected by the state legislature after facing strong opposition over
CCA’s growing reputation for cost overruns and inmate escapes. Despite this
setback, the company garnered additional contracts in Texas, Tennessee, and
Kentucky by the end of 1987.11 Other startups and more established corporations,
such as Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (now the GEO Group, Inc.), also
entered into the prison business.
Today, CCA and GEO Group collectively manage over half of the contracts in the
United States, which resulted in combined revenues exceeding $2.9 billion in 2010.12
CCA, as the largest private prison company, manages more than 75,000 inmates and
detainees in 66 facilities.13 GEO Group, as CCA’s closest competitor, operates
slightly fewer. Smaller companies, including Management & Training Corporation,
LCS Correctional Services, and Emerald Corrections also hold multiple prison
contracts throughout the United States.

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•

•
•

•
•

•
•

Developments in Privatization
Gary Johnson’s platform during his initial 1994 run for governor of New
Mexico included a pledge to privatize every prison in the state. By the time
he left office in 2003 44.2 percent of the state’s prisoners were in privately
run facilities.14, 15
Ohio opened its first private prison in 2000 with the goal of saving $1.6
million per year.16 This raised the number of inmates held privately in Ohio
from zero in 1999 to over 3,000 in 2010.
North Carolina canceled two contracts with CCA due to concerns about the
company’s failure to meet contract requirements and banned the practice of
bringing in prisoners from out of state. California instituted a similar ban and
Arkansas ended two contracts with Wackenhut (GEO) in 2001.17
In 2004 Nevada Governor Kenny Guinn ended CCA’s contract with the
state after the company was alleged to have provided substandard services.18
Vermont agreed to start sending prisoners to CCA facilities in Tennessee and
Kentucky in 2004.19 This helped bring the proportion of inmates held
privately from zero in 2003 to over 20 percent in 2004. This trend led to
Vermont holding over 34 percent of its population privately in 2008, before
declining to 27 percent by 2010.
In 2011 California ended contracts for several GEO Group facilities as part
of its Criminal Justice Realignment Plan to reduce prison populations and
spending.20
States such as Florida, Ohio, Arizona, New Hampshire, and Utah have been
considering beginning or expanding private prison contracting.21, 22, 23

The form by which modern prison privatization occurs varies. Some facilities only
manage individuals from a certain region, while others hold inmates from across the
country. The latter of these situations complicates the already unwieldy task of
applying governmental regulations and oversight due to the variance in state laws and
bureaucracy. The transportation of inmates over far distances also negatively affects
prisoners’ ability to visit with family or consult with attorneys while incarcerated. The
scale of services involved in privatization also varies from prison to prison.
Companies may own and operate a facility, fully manage a state-owned institution, or
may only be partially responsible for operations.24

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Change in Private Prison Populations, 1999-201025
Jurisdiction
Alabama

Number in Private Prisons
1999

2010

Percent
Change

Percentage of Population
1999

2010

Percent
Change

0

1,024

--

0

3.2%

--

Alaska

1,387

1,873

35%

35.1%

33.5%

-5%

Arizona

1,392

5,356

285%

5.4%

13.3%

146%

Arkansas

1,224

0

-100%

10.7%

0

-100%

California

4,621

2,170

-53%

2.8%

1.3%

-54%

Colorado

*

4,498

--

*

19.7%

--

Connecticut

0

883

--

0

4.6%

--

Delaware

0

0

--

0

0

--

Florida

3,773

11,796

213%

5.4%

11.3%

109%

Georgia

3,001

5,233

74%

7.1%

10.6%

49%

Hawaii

1,168

1,931

65%

23.8%

32.7%

37%

Idaho

400

2,236

459%

8.3%

30.1%

263%

Illinois

0

0

--

0

0

--

Indiana

936

2,817

201%

4.8%

10.1%

110%

Iowa

0

0

--

0

0

--

Kansas

0

0

--

0

0

--

Kentucky

1,700

2,127

25%

11.1%

10.4%

-6%

Louisiana

3,080

2,921

-5%

9%

7.4%

-18%

Maine

22

0

-100%

1.3%

0

-100%

Maryland

131

70

-47%

0.6%

0.3%

-50%

0

0

--

0

0

--

301

0

-100%

0.6%

0

-100%

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota

80

0

-100%

1.3%

0

-100%

Mississippi

3,429

5,241

53%

18.8%

24.9%

32%

Missouri

0

0

--

0

0

--

Montana

726

1,502

107%

24.6%

40.4%

64%

Nebraska

0

0

--

0

0

--

561

0

-100%

5.9%

0

-100%

0

0

--

0

0

--

New Jersey

2,517

2,841

13%

8%

11.4%

43%

New Mexico

1,873

2,905

55%

38.6%

43.6%

13%

Nevada
New
Hampshire

New York

0

0

--

0

0

--

North Carolina

1,395

208

-85%

4.5%

0.5%

-89%

North Dakota

0

0

--

0

0

--

Ohio

0

3,038

--

0

5.9%

--

6,228

6,019

-3%

27.8%

22.9%

-18%

0

0

--

0

0

--

Oklahoma
Oregon

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Pennsylvania

0

1,015

--

0

2%

--

Rhode Island

0

0

--

0

0

--

South Carolina

0

17

--

0

0.1%

--

South Dakota

46

5

-89%

1.8%

0.1%

-94%

Tennessee

3,476

5,120

47%

15.4%

18.7%

21%

Texas

11,653

19,155

64%

7.1%

11%

55%

Utah

248

0

-100%

4.6%

0

-100%

Vermont

0

562

--

0

27%

--

Virginia

1,542

1,560

1%

4.8%

4.2%

-12%

331

0

-100%

2.3%

0

-100%

Washington
West Virginia

0

0

--

0

0

--

Wisconsin

3,421

25

-99%

16.8%

0.1%

-99%

Wyoming

281

217

-23%

16.4%

10.3%

-37%

Federal

3,828

33,830

784%

2.8%

16.1%

475%

State

67,380

94,365

40%

5.5%

6.8%

24%

Total

71,208

128,195

80%

5.2%

8%

54%

G R O W T H O F P R I V A T I Z A T I O N , 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 1 0 26
States Contracting for Private Prisons
In 1999 private prison contracts existed in 31 states. That figure grew to 33 states by
2004, before declining to 30 by 2010. Between 1999 and 2010:
• Six states -- Vermont, Ohio, Connecticut, Alabama, Pennsylvania, and South
Carolina began using private prisons.
• Nine states completely eliminated their reliance on prison privatization. They
were: Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, North
Dakota, Utah, and Washington.27 In addition, Wisconsin reduced its number
of privately held prisoners from 3,421 to 25.
• Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and West Virginia did not
utilize private prisons at all.
Changes in Private Prison Populations
In 2010, the number of inmates held privately in the 30 practicing states ranged from
a low of 5 in South Dakota to a high of 19,155 in Texas. Overall:
•

Florida had the second largest population with 11,000 inmates. Colorado,
Tennessee, Georgia, Mississippi, Arizona, and Oklahoma held between 4,500
to 6,000 inmates privately in 2010.

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•

•

Five states more than doubled the number of individuals in private prisons.
Idaho had the largest increase, holding 459 percent more inmates in 2010
than in 1999. Arizona, Florida, and Indiana each increased their population
by over 200 percent. Montana more than doubled its population. An
additional five states experienced increases of more than 50 percent –
Georgia, Hawaii, Texas, New Mexico, and Mississippi.
Wisconsin, South Dakota, North Carolina, California, and Maryland each
reduced their population by over 40 percent.
Private Prison Populations, 1999-201028

100,000
90,000
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000

State

40,000

Federal

30,000
20,000
10,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Overall Rates of Privatization
New Mexico had the highest proportion of its population held privately in both 1999
and 2010, with respective rates of 39 and 44 percent. By 2010:
• Five additional states incarcerated more than a quarter of their prison
population privately – Montana (40 percent), Alaska (33.5 percent), Hawaii
(32.7 percent), Idaho (30.1 percent), and Vermont (27 percent).
• Nine states held between 10 to 20 percent of their prison population
privately – Colorado, Tennessee, Arizona, New Jersey, Florida, Georgia,
Kentucky, Wyoming, and Indiana.

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THE ISSUES OF PRISON PRIVATIZATION
The growth of prison privatization has been sustained by claims that privately
operated facilities are more cost efficient at providing services than publicly-run
institutions. A look at the evidence shows that this assertion is not supported.
Moreover, there are significant problems when incarceration is turned into a forprofit industry.
Fiscal Savings through Cost Containment
Private prisons supporters assert that the private sector saves resources through
greater efficiencies. These claims are supported by some reports showing that private
prisons produce cost savings, largely through lower salaries and benefits by
employing mostly nonunion employees. It is also argued that governments can
benefit in the short term through the direct sale of correctional facilities to private
companies and can save money when constructing new facilities through publicprivate initiatives, rather than solely through government funding. However, studies
have shown these benefits to be mostly illusory.
A 1996 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) looked at four statefunded studies and one commissioned by the federal government. The
methodologies and results varied across the studies, with two showing no major
difference in efficiency between private and public prisons, a third showing that
private facilities resulted in savings to the state of seven percent, and the fourth
finding the cost of a private facility falling somewhere between that of two similar
public prisons. Another study also found significant cost savings associated with
private prisons, but the GAO criticized the report for using hypothetical facilities in
its comparisons. The authors noted that they could not definitively conclude that
privatization would not save money, but also established that, “…these studies do
not offer substantial evidence that savings have occurred.”29
Similar conclusions were reached in a 2009 meta-analysis by researchers at the
University of Utah that looked at eight cost comparison studies resulting in vastly
different conclusions. Of the eight studies, half of them found private prisons to be
more cost-efficient. The other four were evenly split between public facilities being
more cost-efficient and finding both types of prisons statistically even. This

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information led the researchers to conclude that, “…prison privatization provides
neither a clear advantage nor disadvantage compared to publicly managed prisons”
and that “…cost savings from privatization are not guaranteed.” While not directly
resolving the question of whether private or public facilities are economically
superior, the report did find the value of moving toward prison privatization to be
“questionable.” 30
The GAO’s critique of the methodologies used in comparisons is not unique.
Former Bureau of Prisons Director of Research Gerry Gaes made similar
observations when reviewing two reports that found different levels of savings when
comparing the same three public prisons with a private facility. In his 2008 report for
the National Institute of Justice he observed that the more favorable study for
privatization did not adjust the data on the prisons to scale and failed to take into
account the proper amount of overhead costs for the private prison. Gaes noted that
these types of cost comparisons are deceivingly complicated and that current
research is highly limited.31
Additional complications were raised in a 2004 study that found that state-run
prisons are generally left to take on a disproportionate number of expensive and
high-risk inmates. For example, inmates with minimum or medium levels of security
classification made up 90 percent of the private sector’s population, compared with
only 69 percent in the public sector.32
Many of these results have been replicated in individual states. In Ohio, state officials
contend that private facilities regularly meet or surpass the legal requirement of
containing costs at least five percent below a state-run equivalent.33 However, a
report by the nonpartisan Policy Matters Ohio criticized the state’s measurements for
comparing privately operated prisons to hypothetical public facilities, exaggerating
overhead and staff costs for public prisons, and failing to account for the higher
amount of expensive and high security inmates in public prisons. Holding these
factors to more realistic standards greatly reduced if not completely diminished the
purported advantages of private prisons.34

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In Arizona, which also has cost-saving requirements for private prisons, research
conducted in 2010 by the state’s Department of Corrections found that the state had
not saved money by contracting out minimum security beds, and that more money is
actually spent on private medium security beds than would be spent in a publicly
operated institution.35
Private Prisons as a Job Creator?
In 2000 the West Texas town of Littlefield used city bonds to build a prison to
be managed by Wackenhut Corrections (GEO). There was hope that this would
increase revenue and job opportunities, but the prison closed after it was
“plagued by mismanagement, riots and an inmate suicide.” Wackenhut soon
abandoned the facility and the town was forced to raise taxes, cut services, and
eliminate jobs in order to manage the resulting $9 million debt left by the
prison.36 This case is not unique, and recent research has found evidence that
even under normal circumstances “prisons have not and are not likely to make a
positive contribution to local employment growth.”37 As in Littlefield, prison
construction can actually leave communities in a worse situation than they were
before.
Despite these findings, privatization continues to be promoted as an effective cost
saving measure and job creator throughout the country. For example, in 2011:
• The federal government contracted with the GEO Group for two 650-bed
immigration detention facilities in California.38 This followed a deal with
GEO Group for a 600-bed detention center in Texas in 2010.39
• Ohio sold a prison to CCA and handed over operations of another facility to
Management Training Corp. as part of that state’s cost-saving privatization
plans.40, 41
• Florida Governor Rick Scott attempted to privatize 29 prisons and prison
healthcare services statewide. Florida has encountered oversight and financial
issues with private prisons in the past.42, 43
• Legislators attempted to reintroduce the use of private prisons in Maine. The
bill was ultimately killed in January 2012.44
• CCA was in negotiations to manage 9,000 beds in Harris County, Texas,
despite opposition by the county sheriff.45 GEO Group’s subsidiary, GEO
Care, also opened a mental health facility in Texas in 2011.46
• Pennsylvania hired an investment bank to assist in the privatization of state
functions and assets, which could include prison healthcare.47

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•
•

•

The city of Waurika, Oklahoma advanced plans for the construction of a
private prison in order to avoid “economic stagnation.”48
Georgia opened an $80 million prison that was created in partnership with
the GEO Group.49 CCA also announced plans to begin operating a new
1,150-bed facility in March 2012.50
Arizona attempted to add 5,000 new private prison beds, despite a budget
deficit that led to cuts in education and Medicaid spending.51, 52, 53

Services and Safety
Advocates claim that privatization has worked in other industries with equal, if not
superior, quality of service and that the same is true for prisons. However, private
companies face a challenge in attempting to reduce costs while offering all the
services necessary to maintaining safety in prisons. The main reason for this is that
personnel and programs, the two most expensive aspects of incarceration, are among
the services that receive comparatively less funding in order to contain costs.54 This is
particularly true for labor costs, which normally account for 60 to 70 percent of
annual operating budgets.55
“You can begin to squeeze money out of the system. Maybe you can squeeze a
half a percent out, who knows? But it’s not as if these systems are overfunded to
begin with. And at some point, you start to lose quality. And because quality is
very difficult to measure in prisons, I’m just worried that you’re getting in a race
to the bottom.”
- Former BOP Director of Research Gerry Gaes on the “McDonaldization” of
private prisons.56
Privately managed prisons attempt to control costs by regularly providing lower
levels of staff benefits, salary, and salary advancement than publicly-run facilities
(equal to about $5,327 less in annual salary for new recruits and $14,901 less in
maximum annual salaries). On average, private prison employees also receive 58
hours less training than their publicly employed counterparts.57 Consequently, there
are higher employee turnover rates in private prisons than in publicly operated
facilities.58

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These dynamics may contribute to safety problems within prisons. Studies have
found that assaults in private prisons can occur at double the rate found in public
facilities.59 Researchers also find that public facilities tend to be safer than their
private counterparts and that “privately operated prisons appear to have systemic
problems in maintaining secure facilities.”60, 61
Specific events that have endangered prisoners include:
• The Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility in Mississippi is currently
under federal investigation after receiving hundreds of brutality complaints.62
The facility, which is run by the GEO Group, is also the subject of a federal
lawsuit claiming that inmates “live in unconstitutional and inhumane
conditions and endure great risks to their safety and security” due to
understaffing, violence, corruption, and a lack of proper medical care.63
• In May 2011, a CCA prison psychiatrist in Florida was accused of asking
female inmates to give him lap dances and to expose themselves. It is also
alleged that he was offering to trade medication for sex.64
• CCA’s Idaho Correctional Center was accused of being run as a “gladiator
school” in 2010. Footage from the facility showed guards standing by as one
inmate beat another into a coma. It was alleged that staff members used
violence and the threat of violence to gain leverage of inmates.65
• In 2009, Hawaii Governor Linda Lingle announced plans to bring back all of
the state’s 168 female prisoners being held in the CCA-run Otter Creek
Correctional Center in Kentucky. The governor made the decision over
concerns of sexual abuse. The facility had a disproportionate number of male
workers for a female prison and was found to have four times the level of
sexual abuse compared to a state-run counterpart in 2007.66
• In February 2007 an African man was left dying on the floor from a head
injury for 13 hours at the CCA-run Elizabeth Detention Center in New
Jersey. At one time officials discussed sending the body back to Guinea in
order to deter the man’s widow from traveling to the U.S. and drawing
attention to the death.67
Private prison companies have also been cited for endangering inmates by providing
inadequate healthcare services. In 2001 a Florida grand jury found that CCA facility
staff, including a nurse, “failed to demonstrate adequate health training,” which
contributed to the death of an inmate who swallowed several Ecstasy pills.68 Another
complaint against CCA’s medical services involved an inmate who died after officials
allegedly refused to fill a $35 prescription for his hereditary angioedema.69 An
independent report to the Mississippi Department of Corrections found that the
GEO-run Eastern Mississippi Correctional Facility inappropriately downgraded

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mental health diagnoses, discontinued medicine, failed to clean feces and blood out
of cell units, and rarely provided mental health care, even when requested.70 One
report surmises that the failure to provide proper medical care is likely contributed to
by the maximization of profits at the expense of employee training.71
Politicization of Privatization
The overarching philosophy driving these developments is that privatization is often,
if not always, preferable to public ownership because of the purported efficiency of
private markets. The evidence does not support this point view, however, and a key
concern in this area relates to the for-profit prison companies’ financial motive,
which is summed up in Correction Corporation of America’s 2010 Annual Report:

Our growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to
develop and manage new correctional and detention facilities. This possible
growth depends on a number of factors we cannot control, including crime rates
and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions and acceptance of
privatization. The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely
affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole
standards and sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain
activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal laws. 72
In order to overcome these challenges, private prison companies previously joined
with lawmakers, corporations, and interest groups to advocate for privatization
through the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). This organization is a
nonprofit membership association focused on advancing “the Jeffersonian principles
of free markets, limited government, federalism, and individual liberty.”73 This is
pursued in part by advocating for large-scale privatization of governmental functions.
CCA paid between $7,000 and $25,000 per year as an association member before
leaving the organization in 2010. CCA contributed additional funds to sit on issue
task forces and sponsor events hosting legislators.74, 75 Some media reports have
listed GEO Group as a current or recent member of ALEC, but they have not been
a member for more than a decade, according to the company’s vice president for
corporate relations.76

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While no longer directly involved in ALEC, both CCA and GEO Group were
previously involved with the organization at a time when it worked with members to
draft model legislation impacting sentencing policy and prison privatization. CCA’s
involvement in the 1990s went as far as chairing the ALEC Criminal Justice Task
Force and having its senior director of business development serve as the private
sector task force chair when a series of tough-on-crime proposals were drafted.77, 78
CCA and Wackenhut (GEO) were acknowledged by ALEC in 1999 for their
substantial contributions to the organization.79
ALEC’s past model policies have included mandatory minimum sentences, three
strikes laws, and truth-in-sentencing, all of which contribute to higher prison
populations.80, 81 More recently, ALEC has been assisting with legislation that could
increase the number of people held in immigration detention facilities.82 Although
specific information on bills concerning criminal justice is unavailable, ALEC claims
that member lawmakers introduce an average of 1,000 bills based at least in part on
the group’s model legislation every year. About 20 percent of these bills end up being
enacted, although the proportion fell closer to 14 percent in 2009.83, 84
Private prison companies are also known to spend heavily on independent lobbying,
as well as on direct contributions to both state and federal candidates. CCA has
spent an average of nearly $1.4 million per year since 1999 on in-house lobbying, as
well as through high-profile lobbying firms such as Akin Gump Strauss Hauer &
Feld LLP and McBee Strategic Consulting.85, 86 In addition, CCA actively lobbies
state officials, employing an average of 70 state-based lobbyists per year throughout
the United States since 2003.87 These lobbying efforts have gone toward promoting
the use of private prisons, increasing the nation’s prison population, such as through
strict immigration laws, and have also been used to block unfavorable bills, such as
those that would put private prisons under the jurisdiction of the Freedom of
Information Act or ban private prisons entirely.88, 89

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CCA Funds Spent on Federal Lobbying90
$3,500,000
$3,000,000
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Since 2004 CCA’s political action committee has given an average of over $130,000
per election cycle to federal candidates and their political action committees (PACs).
CCA has traditionally favored giving to Republicans, but Democrats have received
about 20 percent of CCA’s federal contributions during this period. Private prison
companies have also spent heavily on contributions to Republican and Democratic
organizations such as the Republican Governors Association, the Republican State
Leadership Committee, and the Democratic Governors Association. CCA’s
contributions to these groups have averaged over $80,000 per election cycle, with
more than 80 percent going to the Republican Party.91 Company officials have also
made individual contributions to federal elected officials. For example, the 14 CCA
board members have given nearly $43,000 each over the past four election cycles.92, 93
CCA contributed an average of nearly $190,000 to state party organizations per
election cycle since 2004. As with other contributions, the majority has gone toward
Republicans (nearly 75 percent) and has been primarily aimed at states such as
Florida and California. From 2003 to 2011 the Florida GOP received nearly
$320,000, while the California GOP received over $140,000. The Democratic
counterparts in these states received $73,500 and $55,000, respectively. 94 CCA also
spent over $150,000 during this period on efforts to either promote or defeat ballot
measures. These referenda mostly focused on increasing state revenue, and spending.
However, CCA also supported proposals to implement harsher criminal penalties,

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make prosecutions easier, and eliminate bail for illegal immigrants charged with
violent or gang-related felonies.95, 96
Lobbying in California
States vary in the amount of information they make available on lobbying, making it
impossible to know exactly how much groups like CCA are spending and the issues
in which they focus. However, California provides complete lobbying reports online,
showing that CCA has spent an average of over $150,000 per year since 2001
lobbying the governor’s office, legislature, Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, Legislative Analyst’s Office, Department of Finance, Office of
Planning and Research, Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, and Department of
General Services.97 The issues in which CCA is engaged include budgets, prison
construction, youth facilities, out-of-state prison bed programs, the limitation of
judicial discretion in sentencing, legislation that would require inmate approval
before sending them out of state, and another bill that would outlaw private prisons
entirely.98 Although just one piece of the puzzle, California provides some context
for CCA’s involvement in the 32 states in which it has lobbied between 2001 and
2011.99
On the state level CCA has given an average of over $430,000 per election cycle,
with nearly 70 percent going toward Republican candidates. Since 2003, the states
receiving the largest amount of these funds have been California ($502,000), Florida
($438,000), Georgia ($241,000), Idaho ($93,000), Tennessee ($70,000), New Mexico
($62,000), and Louisiana ($50,000). Texas Governor Rick Perry, Idaho Governor
C.L. “Butch” Otter, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, and three influential Georgia
state lawmakers, of which at least one was involved in crafting harsh immigration
legislation, received the most individual contributions from 2003 to 2011. The
contributions made to these officials ranged from $10,800 to $20,000 each.100, 101

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CCA State and Federal Contributions by Election Cycle102, 103, 104
$1,200,000

$1,000,000

$800,000
Ballot Measures
Federal Parties

$600,000

Federal Candidates
State Parties

$400,000

State Candidates

$200,000

$0
2004

2006

2008

2010

The potential for a more sinister relationship between private prison companies and
public officials was revealed in 2010 and 2011 when two former juvenile court judges
in Pennsylvania were ensnared in the notorious Luzerne County “kids for cash”
scandal. The judges were convicted of playing a role in shutting down a public
juvenile detention center and steering defendants to new private facilities in exchange
for millions of dollars in kickbacks.105 They are now both serving lengthy prison
sentences. This extreme example highlights how the incentives of private prisons can
lead to questionable actions taken at the expense of those coming into contact with
the justice system.
This commingling of money and influence, while troubling, is not unique in
American politics and public policy. However, what makes this particular instance
noteworthy is that private prison companies use their influence to increase profits by
taking advantage of and continuing the nation’s longstanding reliance on
incarceration.

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TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE | PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA

CONCLUSION
Results vary somewhat, but when inconsistencies and research errors are adjusted the
savings associated with investing in private prisons appear dubious. Even minimal
savings are far from guaranteed, and many studies claiming otherwise have been
criticized for their methodology. The available data belies the oft-claimed economic
benefits of private contracting, and points to the practice being an unreliable
approach toward financial stability.
Even if private prisons can manage to hold down costs, this success often comes at
the detriment of services provided. Nationwide, public funds for prisons are already
limited, leaving little excess spending that can be cut. Therefore, private prisons must
make cuts in important high-cost areas such as staff, training, and programming to
create savings.106 The pressure that companies feel to maintain low overhead costs
combined with less direct oversight are likely what led researchers at the University
of Utah to conclude that, “quality of services is not improved” in private prisons.107
Finally, private prison companies’ dependence on ensuring a large prison population
to maintain profits provides inappropriate incentives to lobby government officials
for policies that will place more people in prison. This is evidenced by the creation
and coordination of model legislation through conservative lobbying groups, as well
as in the political contributions and lobbying efforts of individual companies. This
effort to increase reliance on incarceration comes at a time where America’s rate of
imprisonment is the highest in the world and when the prison population is far
beyond the point of diminishing returns in terms of public safety.
The available evidence does not point to any substantial benefits to privatizing
prisons. Although there are instances where private prisons result in small savings,
the structure and demands of for-profit prisons appear to produce a negative overall
impact on services. In order to reconcile this information with the continued claims
that private prisons are superior, one must assume that these contentions are
couched more in ideology than in facts.

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TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE | PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA

Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., & Sabol, P.M. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Available online here: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
2 Beck, A.J. (2000). Prisoners in 1999. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., &
Sabol, P.M. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Prisoners in 1999 available
online here: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf
3 Meskell, A.W. (1999). An American resolution: The history of prisons in the United States from 1777 to 1877.
Stanford Law Review, 51(4), 839-865. Available online here:
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/An+American+resolution%3A+the+history+of+prisons+in+the+United+States...a054494317
4 Ibid
5 Dolovich, S. (2005). State punishment and private prisons. Duke Law Journal, 55(3), 437-546.
6 Harding, R. (2001). Private prisons. Crime and Justice, 28, 265-346.
7 Kirchhoff, S.M. (2010). Economic impacts of prison growth. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Available online here: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf
8 Harding, R. (2001). Private prisons. Crime and Justice, 28, 265-346.
9 McDonald, D.C. (1992). Private Penal Institutions. Crime and Justice, 16, 361-419.
10 Mattera, P. & Khan, M. (with LeRoy, G., & Davis, K.). (2001). Jail breaks: Economic development subsidies given to
private prisons. Washington, DC: Good Jobs First. Available online here:
http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/jailbreaks.pdf
11 Mattera, P., Khan, M., & Nathan, S. (2003). Corrections Corporation of America: A critical look at its first twenty
years. Charlotte, North Carolina: Grassroots Leadership. Available online here:
http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/_publications/CCAAnniversaryReport.pdf
12 Hartney, C. & Glesmann, C. (2011). Responding to the growth of the private prison industry in the United States.
Oakland, California: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
13 Cohn, S. (2011, October 18). Private prison industry grows despite critics. MSNBC.com. Available here:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44936562/ns/business-cnbc_tv/t/private-prison-industry-grows-despitecritics/#.TrKmFPSsc80
14 Greene, J. (2000). Prison privatization: recent developments in the United States. Toronto, Canada: Center on
Crime, Communities & Culture. Available online here:
http://archive.epinet.org/real_media/010111/materials/greene2.pdf
15 Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2004). Prisoners in 2003. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available
online here: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p03.pdf
16 Private prison set to open in February. (1999, September 13). Portsmouth Daily Times. Available online here:
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=DNbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DVMNAAAAIBAJ&pg=2728,3978340&dq=private+prison+set+to+open+in+february&hl=en
17 Cheung, A. (2004). Prison privatization and the use of incarceration. Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project.
Available online here: http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf
18 A terrible idea. (2008, September 14). Las Vegas Sun. Available online here:
http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2008/sep/14/terrible-idea/
19 Dillion, J. (2004, January 2). Private prison company to house 700 Vermont inmates. Vermont Public Radio.
Available online here: http://www.vpr.net/news_detail/70230/
20 The GEO Group announces contract cancellations for three community correctional facilities in California. Retrieved
December 20, 2011 from http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1583791&highlight=
21 Haughney, K. (2011, August 26). Prison privatization to process despite resignation of Ed Buss. Orlando Sentinel.
Available online here: http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2011-08-26/news/fl-prison-privatization-buss-issues20110825_1_prison-privatization-privatization-process-privatization-debate
22 Ortega, B. (2011, August 19). Coolidge voices desire to land new prison. The Arizona Republic. Available online
here: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/08/19/20110819arizona-prisons-coolidge-voice-desire-newprison.html
23 Love, N. (2011, October 17). New Hampshire to seek bids for private prisons. Bloomberg Businessweek. Available
online here: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9QE2V2O0.htm
24 Hartney, C. & Glesmann, C. (2011). Responding to the growth of the private prison industry in the United States.
Oakland, California: National Council on Crime and Delinquency.
25 Beck, A.J. (2000). Prisoners in 1999. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Beck, A.J. & Harrison, P.M.
(2001). Prisoners in 2000. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2002). Prisoners
in 2001. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2003). Prisoners in 2002.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2004). Prisoners in 2003. Washington, DC:
Bureau of Justice Statistics; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2005). Prisoners in 2004. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice
Statistics; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2006). Prisoners in 2005. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Sabol,
W.J., Couture, H. & Harrison, P.M. (2007). Prisoners in 2006. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; West,
H.C., & Sabol, W.J. (2008). Prisoners in 2007. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Sabol, W.J., West, H.C., &
Cooper, M. (2009). Prisoners in 2008. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; West, H.C., Sabol, W.J., &
Greenman, S.J. (2010). Prisoners in 2009. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M.,
& Sabol, P.M. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
1

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TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE | PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA

Beck, A.J. (2000). Prisoners in 1999. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., &
Sabol, P.M. (2011). Prisoners in 2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics.
27 Kansas and North Dakota contracted out services to a certain extent after 1999 before discontinuing privatization
26

by 2009.
Beck, A.J. (2000). Prisoners in 1999. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf; Beck, A.J. & Harrison, P.M. (2001). Prisoners in 2000.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p00.pdf; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2002). Prisoners in 2001.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p01.pdf; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2003). Prisoners in 2002.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p02.pdf; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2004). Prisoners in 2003.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p03.pdf; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2005). Prisoners in 2004.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p04.pdf; Harrison, P.M. & Beck, A.J. (2006). Prisoners in 2005.
Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p05.pdf; Sabol, W.J., Couture, H. & Harrison, P.M. (2007). Prisoners in
2006. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p06.pdf; West, H.C., & Sabol, W.J. (2008). Prisoners in 2007. Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p07.pdf; Sabol, W.J.,
West, H.C., & Cooper, M. (2009). Prisoners in 2008. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online
here: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf; West, H.C., Sabol, W.J., & Greenman, S.J. (2010). Prisoners
in 2009. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf; Guerino, P., Harrison, P.M., & Sabol, P.M. (2011). Prisoners in
2010. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics. Available online here:
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf
29 Sloane, D.M., Alexander, D.P., Stolz, B.A., Rabinowitz, B.I., Williams, P.V., Hamilton, G.R., Burton, D.R., Boyles, S.D.,
& Svoboda, D.B. (1996). Private and public prisons: studies comparing operational costs and/or quality of service.
Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, General Government Division. Available online here:
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf
30 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
31 Gaes, G. (2008). Cost, performance studies look at prison privatization. National Institute of Justice Journal, 259,
32-36. Available online here: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221507.pdf
32 Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of select characteristics.
Federal Probation, 68(1), 27-31. Available online here:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4144/is_200406/ai_n9446513/
33 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, Ohio: Policy Matters Ohio.
Available online here: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
34 Ibid
35 Ryan, L.C. (2011). FY 2010 operating per capita cost report: Cost identification and comparison of state and
private contract beds. Arizona: Arizona Department of Corrections, Bureau of Planning, Budget, and Research.
Available online here: http://www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2010_PerCapitaRep.pdf
36 Ingram, S. (2011, July 28). Debt-ridden West Texas town sells empty prison for $6 billion. The Dallas Morning
News. Available online here: http://www.dallasnews.com/news/state/headlines/20110728-debt-ridden-west-texastown-sells-empty-prison-for-6-million.ece
37 Hooks, G., Mosher, C., Genter, S., Rotolo, T., & Lobao, L. (2010). Revisiting the impact of prison building on job
growth: Education, incarceration, and county-level employment, 1976-2004. Social Science Quarterly, 91(1), 229244.
38 The GEO Group announces contract for 1,300-bed detention facility in California. Retrieved December 20, 2011
from http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1569532&highlight=
39 The GEO Group announces contract for new 600-bed immigration Civil Detention Center in Texas. Retrieved
December 20, 2011 from http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1505751&highlight=
40 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, Ohio: Policy Matters Ohio.
Available online here: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
41 Associated Press. (2011, September 1). Ohio becomes first state to sell state prison to private company. Available
online here: http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2011/09/01/Ohio-private-vendors-to-buy-run-state-prisons.html
42 Tampa Bay Online. (2011, December 14). A public debate over private prisons. Available online here:
http://www2.tbo.com/news/opinion/2011/dec/14/meopino1-a-public-debate-over-private-prisons-ar-334431/
43 Bousquet, S. (2011, December 8). Scott’s budget boosts schools, hits hospitals. Tampa Bay Times. Available
online here: http://www.tampabay.com/news/education/k12/scotts-budget-boosts-schools-hits-hospitals/1205257
44 Associated Press. (2012, January 9). Maine private prison bill headed to dead files. Available online here:
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/09/2581262/maine-private-prison-bill-headed.html
28

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Carey, I. (2011, December 19). Some not in favor of privatizing Harris County jail. MyFOX Houston. Available online
here: http://www.myfoxhouston.com/dpp/news/local/111219-some-not-in-favor-of-privatizing-harris-county-jail
46 The GEO Group’s subsidiary GEO Care announces opening of the 100-bed Montgomery County Mental Health
Treatment Facility in Texas. Retrieved December 20, 2011 from http://phx.corporateir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=91331&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1536946&highlight=
47 Varghese, R. & Mider, Z. (2011, December 5). Pennsylvania hires Greenhill to weigh sale of state assets.
Bloomberg. Available online here: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-05/pennsylvania-hires-greenhill-toweigh-asset-sales-to-investors.html
48 Laughlin, D. (2011, December 9). JCEDA prison takes another step. Waurika News-Democrat. Available online
here: http://insurancenewsnet.com/article.aspx?id=310858
49 The Union-Recorder. (2011, December 7). New prison officially open. Available online here:
http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?storyid=%7B36b3bd4c-c37a-463b-8047-c37c0107381d%7D
50 CCA begins hiring at brand new Jenkins facility. Retrieved December 20, 2011 from
http://www.cca.com/newsroom/news-releases/279/
51 Pitzl, M.J. (2011, April 2). Arizona lawmakers approve $1.1 billion in budget cuts. The Arizona Republic. Available
online here: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/04/02/20110402arizona-lawmakers-approve-budgetcuts.html
52 Davenport, P. (2011, August 19). Arizona weighs decision on new private prisons. Associated Press. Available
online here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/08/19/2367005/arizona-weighs-decision-on-new.html
53 Hodai, B. (2011, December 15). Private prisons gone wild. In These Times. Available online here:
http://inthesetimes.com/article/12423/private_prisons_gone_wild
54 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, Ohio: Policy Matters Ohio.
Available online here: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
55 Gaes, G.G. (2010). The current status of prison privatization on American prisons. Florida State University.
Available online here: http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=gerald_gaes&seiredir=1#search=%22current+status+of+prison+privatization+research+on%22
56 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, Ohio: Policy Matters Ohio.
Available online here: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
57 Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of select characteristics.
Federal Probation, 68(1), 27-31. Available online here:
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa4144/is_200406/ai_n9446513/
58 Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
45

Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Available online here:
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
59

Blakely, C.R. & Bumphus, V.W. (2004). Private and public sector prisons—a comparison of selected characteristics.

Federal Probation, 68(1), 27-33. Available online here:
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2004-06/prisons.html
Camp, S.D. & Gaes, G.G. (2001). Growth and quality of U.S. private prisons: Evidence from a national survey.
Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Prisons, Office of Research and Evaluation. Available online here:
http://www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
61 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
62 Brumfield, P. (2011, May). Walnut Grove called “the depths of hell.” NEMS Daily Journal. Availble online here:
http://www.nems360.com/view/full_story/13303052/article-Walnut-Grove-called-%E2%80%98the-depths-ofhell%E2%80%99?instance=secondary_stories_left_column
63 Walsh, T.D. (2010, November 18). Brutal youth jail called a private goldmine. Courthouse News Service. Available
online here: http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/11/18/31944.htm
64 Cox, J.W. (2001, May 26). Ex-Hernando County jail psychiatrist sued, faces new accusation. St. Petersburg Times.
Available online here: http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/ex-hernando-county-jail-psychiatrist-sued-facesnew-accusation/1171862
65 Boona, A. (2010, November 30). ‘Gladiator school’: Cameras catch prison guards watching inmate-on-inmate
attack at Idaho prison. The Associated Press. Available online here:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/30/gladiator-school-cameras-_n_789780.html
66 Urbina, I. (2009, August 26). Hawaii to remove inmates over sex abuse charges. The New York Times. Available
online here: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html
67 Bernstein, N. (2010, January 10). Officials obscured truth of migrant deaths in jail. The New York Times. Available
online here: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/us/10detain.html?pagewanted=all
68 Associated Press. (2002, April 9). Florida grand jury says jail workers’ negligence was a factor in inmate’s death.
Available online here: http://www.corrections.com/articles/12044-grand-jury-blames-florida-jail-in-death
69 Abbott, K. (2003, March 25). Lawsuit blames prison in death of inmate. Rocky Mountain News. Available online
here: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-99187613.html
70 Killian, J. (2012, January 1). GEO Group’s record is under fire. News & Record. Available online here:
http://www.news-record.com/content/2011/12/31/article/geo_group_s_record_is_under_fire
60

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Mattera, P., Khan, M., & Nathan, S. (2003). Corrections Corporation of America: A critical look at its first twenty
years. Charlotte, North Carolina: Grassroots Leadership. Available online here:
http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/_publications/CCAAnniversaryReport.pdf
72 2010 annual report on form 10-K. (2010). Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America. Available online here:
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
73 The mission of the American Legislative Exchange Council. Retrieved August 2, 2011, from
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Our_Mission&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=15824
74 Ortega, B. (2011, September 4). Arizona prison businesses are big political contributors. The Arizona Republic.
Available online here: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/09/04/20110904arizona-prison-businesspolitics.html
75 Owen, S. Director of public affairs, Corrections Corporation of America. (personal communication, September 28,
2011).
76 Paez, P.E. Vice president for corporate relations, GEO Group. (personal communication, September 23, 2011).
77 Hodai, B. (2010, June 21). Corporate con game. In These Times. Available online here:
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/6084/corporate_con_game/
78 Ortega, B. (2011, September 4). Arizona prison businesses are big political contributors. The Arizona Republic.
Available online here: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/09/04/20110904arizona-prison-businesspolitics.html
79 Sarabi, B. & Bender, E. (2000). The prison payoff: The role of politics and private prisons in the incarceration boom.
Helena, Montana: Western Prison Project and Western States Center. Available online here:
http://www.iamsaam.org/userimages/Prison_Payoff_Report_WPP_2000.pdf
80 Ortega, B. (2011, September 4). Arizona prison businesses are big political contributors. The Arizona Republic.
Available online here: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/09/04/20110904arizona-prison-businesspolitics.html
81 American Legislative Exchange Counsel history. Retrieved September 23, 2011 from
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=History&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=13643
82 Shapiro, D. (2011). Banking on bondage: Private prisons and mass incarceration. New York, New York: American
Civil Liberties Union. Available online here: http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/bankingonbondage_20111102.pdf
83 Ibid
84 Hodai, B. (2011, July 11). Publicopoly exposed. In These Times. Available online here:
http://inthesetimes.com/article/11603/publicopoly_exposed
85 Ibid
71

2011 lobbying summary for the GEO Group from the Center for Responsive Politics’ opensecrets.org. Retrieved
January 6, 2012 from http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000022003&year=2011
87 Corrections Corp of America client summary from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’
followthemoney.org. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552&y=0
88 Sullivan, L. (2010, October 28). Prison economics help drive Ariz. immigration law. NPR. Available online here:
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833741
89 Hodai, B. (2010, January). Freedom Forum CEO tied to for-profit prisons. Fair. Available online here:
http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=3985
90 2011 lobbying summary for the Corrections Corporation of America from the Center for Responsive Politics’
opensecrets.org. Retrieved January 6, 2012 from
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2011
91 Corrections Corporation of America political action committee profile. Retrieved January 6, 2011 from the CQ
Moneyline database.
92 Corrections Corporation of America executive management, officers, and board of directors. Retrieved January 9,
2012 from http://www.cca.com/about/management-team/board-directors/
93 Retrieved January 9, 2012 from the CQ Moneyline database.
94 Corrections Corp of America noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’
followthemoney.org. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0
95 Ibid
96 Proposition 6. Criminal Penalties and Laws. Public Safety Funding. Statute. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from
California’s Legislative Analysts Office from:
http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2008/6_11_2008.aspx
97 This average is from January 1, 2001 to September 30, 2011. The stated yearly average will likely increase when
the fourth quarter report for the rest of 2011 is released. CCA spent nearly over 60 percent more in lobbying in the
first three quarters of 2011 than it did in all of 2010.
98 Corrections Corporation of America lobbying activity from the California Secretary of State’s Cal-Access. Retrieved
January 10, 2012 from http://calaccess.ss.ca.gov/Lobbying/Employers/Detail.aspx?id=1145409&view=activity&session=2009
86

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TOO GOOD TO BE TRUE | PRIVATE PRISONS IN AMERICA

Corrections Corp of America client summary from the National Institute on Money in State Politics’
followthemoney.org. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552&y=0
100 Corrections Corp of America noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics’ followthemoney.org. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0
101 Cardinale, M. (2011, May 26). Prison lobbyists help spread anti-immigrant laws to U.S. south. Inter Press Service.
Available online here: http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=55802
102 Corrections Corporation of America political action committee profile. Retrieved January 6, 2011 from the CQ
Moneyline database.
103 Corrections Corp of America noteworthy contributor summary from the National Institute on Money in State
Politics’ followthemoney.org. Retrieved January 9, 2012 from:
http://www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0
104 Federal contributions include contributions to federal candidates and contributions political action committees
aligned with federal candidates.
105 Richey, W. (2011, August 11). ‘Kids for cash’ judge sentenced to 28 years for racketeering scheme. The Christian
Science Monitor. Available online here: http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2011/0811/Kids-for-cash-judgesentenced-to-28-years-for-racketeering-scheme
106 Paynter, B. (2011). Cells for sale: Understand prison costs & savings. Cleveland, Ohio: Policy Matters Ohio.
Available online here: http://www.policymattersohio.org/pdf/CellsForSale2011.pdf
107 Lundahl, B., Kunz, C., Brownell, C., Harris, N., & Van Vleet, R. (2009). Prison privatization: A meta-analysis of cost
effectiveness and quality of confinement indicators. Research on Social Work Practice, 19, 383-395.
99

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