calbudgetcenter.org

DECEMBER 2015

Sentencing in California:
Moving Toward a Smarter, More Cost-Effective Approach

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Contents

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

California Budget
& Policy Center

How Does Sentencing Work in California? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

The California Budget & Policy
Center was established in 1995
to provide Californians with a
source of timely, objective, and
accessible expertise on state
fiscal and economic policy issues.
The Budget Center engages in
independent fiscal and policy
analysis and public education
with the goal of improving the
economic and social well-being
of low- and middle-income
Californians. Support for the
Budget Center comes from
foundation grants, subscriptions,
and individual contributions.
Please visit the Budget Center’s
website at www.calbudgetcenter.
org.

Shifting the Focus to Alternative Sentencing Options
and Shorter Prison Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Diversifying Sentences Could Both Increase Public
Safety and Be More Cost-Effective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Conclusion: Moving California Toward More
Effective Sentencing Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Acknowledgments
Selena Teji prepared this report
with assistance from Scott Graves
and Steven Bliss.

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Executive Summary

C

alifornians have a collective interest in living in a safe and healthy environment. The state’s criminal
justice system is responsible for reducing crime and intervening when crime occurs, including
apprehending and sentencing the perpetrator, in order to promote safe communities. In recent

decades, however, harsh, one-size-fits-all sentencing laws contributed to the creation of a bloated and costly
correctional system that generally fails to serve the interests of Californians.

 

California has adopted significant criminal justice reforms over the past several years. In 2014, voters approved
Proposition 47, which reclassified several drug and property crimes as misdemeanors. In addition, in 2011 state
policymakers “realigned” to the state’s 58 counties responsibility for supervising many people convicted of
nonserious, nonviolent, and nonsexual felonies. Despite these positive steps, California’s sentencing laws continue
to overly rely on incarceration as the consequence for committing a
felony or a misdemeanor, rather than promoting community-based
interventions that could provide better avenues for rehabilitation.

QUICK TAKE

To be sure, California counties have adopted many alternative
sentencing options following the 2011 realignment of responsibility
for people convicted of low-level felonies. However, these approaches
are not the norm across the state, and state sentencing laws continue
to emphasize incarceration.

California must develop a
sentencing system that is
proportionate, practical, and takes
into account the diverse situations
in which crimes occur.

 

Research casts serious doubt on the effectiveness of mass
incarceration as a means of promoting public safety. Given the high social and financial costs of incarceration,
California could revise its sentencing laws to more fully embrace alternative interventions intended to hold
accountable people who commit a crime, correct problematic behaviors, and help communities and survivors
of crime heal. Moreover, while incarceration will continue to be warranted for many offenses – including
violent crimes – the question for state policymakers is whether sentence lengths are appropriate and reflect an
efficient use of public resources. As one step forward, policymakers could establish a sentencing commission to
examine the impact of sentence length on targeted populations, with the goal of ensuring that sentences are
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime as well as to the risk that the person will reoffend. Policymakers also
could amend the state’s sentencing laws to generally scale back sentence lengths.
In sum, significantly divesting from incarceration as a sentencing tool – and moving toward alternative sentencing
options – could both increase public safety and be more cost-effective.

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How Does Sentencing
Work in California?
California law identifies three types of “crimes and
public offenses” each having a certain range of
potential consequences:1

• Felonies are the most serious offenses – such
as homicide or robbery – and are punishable by
incarceration in a local jail or in a state prison,
depending on the circumstances; supervision
by a probation officer in the community; or
incarceration followed by probation.2 In some
cases, adults convicted of homicide can be
sentenced to death.3 Due to the passage of
Assembly Bill 109 in 2011 (criminal justice
“realignment”), many nonviolent, nonserious,
nonsexual felony crimes are punishable by
incarceration in local jails rather than in state
prisons. This transfer of key criminal justice
responsibilities to the counties significantly
reduced the state prison population, although
not the overall cost of the state correctional
system.4

• Misdemeanors are moderately serious offenses
– such as possession of drugs for personal
use or petty theft – and are punishable by
incarceration in a local jail for a maximum of one
year, supervision by a probation officer in the
community, a fine, or some combination of the
three.5 Due to voter approval of Proposition 47
in November 2014, various nonviolent drug and
property crimes were reclassified from felonies
or “wobblers” (crimes that could be treated as
either a misdemeanor or felony for sentencing
purposes) to misdemeanors, reducing the
potential sentence for these crimes to a
maximum of one year in local jails. As a result,
both state prison and local jail populations have
declined.6

• Infractions are minor offenses – such as

California’s criminal justice system uses three types
of sentences for people who are convicted of crimes:
probation, indeterminate sentencing, and determinate
sentencing.

People Sentenced to Probation Are
Supervised in the Community
In 1903, California developed a sentence of
“probation,” through which the court suspends the
sentence of incarceration and orders the person to be
supervised in the community by a probation officer.8
The court may do this in cases where it believes the
individual can be safely supervised in the community
or where it would be “in the interest of justice” to do
so.9 The court may also place conditions on probation,
such as requiring that the individual attend therapy
or perform community service. If the person violates
such conditions, the court may revoke probation and
impose a sentence of incarceration instead. Probation
can also be granted in combination with a period
of incarceration, a sentencing approach known as
“probation and jail.”
Eligibility for probation has been narrowed several
times.10 However, probation remains a common
sentence in California. In fact, in 2014, of the 217,688
felony convictions in California, more than half (56
percent) resulted in a sentence combining probation
and jail.11

KEY TERMS
PROBATION: A sentence in which a person is
supervised in the community, either in lieu of or in
combination with a period of incarceration.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE: A minimum term
of imprisonment with no prescribed maximum.
After serving the minimum term a person remains
incarcerated until a parole board determines the
person should be released.
DETERMINATE SENTENCE: A fixed term of
imprisonment with a defined release date.

seatbelt violations or littering – and are
punishable by a fine.7

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Indeterminate and Determinate
Sentencing Establish a Period of
Incarceration
Individuals who are not eligible for probation and
who are sentenced to a period of incarceration
are assigned a sentence according to one of two
schemes: indeterminate or determinate sentencing.
Broadly speaking, indeterminate sentencing focuses
on the individual who committed the crime, whereas
determinate sentencing focuses on the nature of the
crime itself.

California Used Indeterminate Sentencing
From 1917 Through the Mid-1970s
From 1917 to 1976, California used indeterminate
sentencing, under which judges sentenced individuals
to incarceration for a range of time – for example,
five years to life for robbery – and individuals were
released at some point after serving at least the
minimum term, when a parole board determined
that they had sufficiently rehabilitated.12 Under
indeterminate sentencing, the parole board was
originally developed in California as a means
of relieving prison overcrowding. However,
indeterminate sentencing failed to eliminate
overcrowding, and the public became disillusioned
with a system that often seemed arbitrary and with
rehabilitative efforts that did not appear to produce
measureable results. Today, only certain serious
crimes, such as first-degree murder, remain subject to
indeterminate life sentences (or capital punishment).

In 1976, the Legislature Moved California
Toward a Focus on Determinate Sentencing
In response to the concerns with indeterminate
sentencing, the Legislature enacted the determinate
sentencing law (DSL) in 1976 – ushering in the state’s
current sentencing structure – with the goal of
increasing transparency and uniformity in sentencing.13
The DSL also aimed to reduce prison overcrowding by
providing for shorter base sentences and restricting
sentencing “enhancements,” which are sentence
extensions made by the judge based on the particular
circumstances of the case.

Under the DSL, a judge must impose one of three
specified terms for each criminal law violation, and
the individual must serve a minimum portion of the
term imposed.14 For example, California’s Penal
Code specifies terms of two, three, or five years of
incarceration for second-degree robbery.15 The DSL
also allowed for some enhancements that increased
the length of the base sentence, including for specific
conduct during the crime, such as the use of a gun.16
Sentenced individuals’ release dates are calculated
automatically and do not depend on a showing of
rehabilitation. Upon release, the individual is typically
supervised in the community by a parole or probation
officer. Incarcerated individuals receive credits for
time spent in custody prior to sentencing and can
earn credits for good behavior or for working while
serving their sentence, thereby reducing the length of
their incarceration.
With the move toward determinate sentencing, the
overall purpose of sentencing shifted. The focus
was less on the rehabilitation of the incarcerated
person and more on a “do the crime, do the time”
philosophy that focused primarily on punishment.

State Policymakers Increased
Sentence Lengths, Which
Contributed to a Rising State
Prison Population
While the DSL originally provided limited periods of
incarceration and constrained the ability of the courts
to lengthen sentences, legislators began to enact
many new sentencing laws and enhancements in
response to public and political pressure.17 These new
laws typically sought to increase sentence lengths
and were often fueled by specific high-profile crimes
without concern for the potential financial or societal
consequences. Laws like these add complexity to
the system and have resulted in disproportionate
sentences. For example:

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• In 1994, the Legislature approved the “Three
Strikes and You’re Out” law in response to
the kidnapping and murder of 12-year-old
Polly Klaas, thereby increasing prison terms
for certain felony crimes.18 Individuals with

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one prior conviction for a violent or serious
felony who are convicted of any new felony –
a “second-strike” offense – receive a prison
term that is twice what it would otherwise be
under state law. Individuals with at least two
prior “strike” convictions who are convicted
of a new violent or serious felony – a “thirdstrike” offense – receive a life sentence with
a minimum term of 25 years.19 California’s
prisons housed 34,353 second strikers and
8,064 third strikers as of June 30, 2013 –
almost one-third (31.9 percent) of the total
population incarcerated by the state.20 A study
of California’s three-strikes law showed that it
had no demonstrable impact on violent crime
levels.21 The law has been widely criticized as
overly broad and – before it was amended
in 2012 – resulted in life prison sentences for
minor crimes, including petty theft and simple
drug possession.22

• In 1997, the Legislature passed the “Use a
Gun and You’re Done” law that significantly
increased sentencing enhancements for
possessing a gun at the time of committing a
specified felony, such as robbery, homicide,
or certain sex crimes.23 Under the law, if
someone uses a gun while committing one of
the identified crimes, their sentence is extended
by 10 years, 20 years, or 25 years-to-life,
depending on how the gun was used. Often
the enhancement for gun use is longer than the
sentence for the crime itself. For example, in
the case of second-degree robbery, a person
could serve a maximum of five years for the
robbery and an extra 10 years for brandishing
a gun during the robbery, even if the gun was
unloaded or otherwise inoperable. Someone
convicted of first-degree murder would be
sentenced to at least 50 years-to-life if a gun
was used, whereas if the murder was carried out
using another method – such as strangulation
– the sentence would be half the length (25
years-to-life). A judge has no discretion in
applying this enhancement; if a gun was used, a
judge must apply it.

Shortly after the DSL was enacted, the number of
adults incarcerated by the state rose substantially
and quickly outstripped the “design capacity” of
the state’s prisons (Figure 1).24 Morever, for about
30 years after enactment of the DSL California’s
incarcerated population continued to grow.25 These
trends were largely due to changes in drug law
enforcement, an increased share of felony convictions
resulting in prison sentences, and sentencing
enhancements – such as the three-strikes law – that
greatly extended sentence lengths.26

California’s Prisons Remain
Overcrowded Despite Recent
Reforms
In recent years, California has enacted a series of
policy changes – including to the state’s sentencing
laws – intended to reduce the number of adults
incarcerated in state prisons and boost investment
in rehabilitation.27 These reforms were largely
prompted by a 2009 federal court order requiring
the state to reduce – although not eliminate –
prison overcrowding.28 The most significant change
was criminal justice “realignment,” which was set
in motion by Assembly Bill 109 of 2011. This bill
transferred to the state’s 58 counties responsibility
for supervising many people convicted of nonserious,
nonviolent, and nonsexual felonies.29 In addition,
state officials have implemented a number of
postsentencing measures intended to reduce the
prison population.30 These include creating new
options for people to be released before the end
of their sentence. Most recently, voter approval of
Proposition 47 in November 2014 reclassified several
drug and property crimes as misdemeanors, thereby
excluding prison as a sentencing option for these
crimes.31
These sentencing law changes diverted thousands of
people from the state prison system. Consequently,
the prison population has fallen below the courtordered level. However, it is not yet clear that the
state can maintain the requisite reductions over
the long term.32 Furthermore, even if the state can
maintain the prison population at the reduced level,
state prisons would still be extremely overcrowded.

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FIGURE 1

California Incarcerates More Adults Than State Prisons
and Fire Camps Were Designed to Hold
Incarceration Level Has Exceeded System Capacity Since 1980
200K
180

Assembly Bill
109 enacted
(2011)

Three Strikes
Law enacted
(1994)

160

Number of Adults
Incarcerated by the State
in State Prisons and
Other Facilities*
Design Capacity of State
Prisons and Fire Camps**

140
120
100
Determinate
Sentencing
Law enacted
60
(1976)
80

40
20
1978

1984

1990

1996

2002

2008

2014

* Figures include adults housed in state prisons, fire camps, private prisons, state hospitals, and other
facilities as of December 31 each year.
** Reflects the number of adults these facilities were designed to house as of June 30 each year.
Source: California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Shifting the Focus to
Alternative Sentencing
Options and Shorter
Prison Sentences
California’s sentencing laws overly rely on
incarceration as the consequence for committing
a felony or a misdemeanor rather than promoting
community-based interventions that could provide
better avenues for rehabilitation.33 Governor Jerry
Brown highlighted this imbalance in his 2015 inaugural
address, in which he questioned the use of lengthy
sentences and endorsed finding “less expensive, more
compassionate and more effective ways to deal with
crime.”34 To be sure, California counties have adopted
many alternative sentencing options following

the 2011 realignment of responsibility for people
convicted of low-level felonies. These alternatives
include electronic monitoring, community-based
treatment programs, and day reporting centers.35
However, these approaches are not the norm across
the state, and state sentencing laws continue to
emphasize incarceration.
Research casts serious doubt on the effectiveness
of mass incarceration as a means of promoting
public safety.36 Given the high social and financial
costs of incarceration, California could revise its
sentencing laws to more fully embrace alternative
interventions intended to hold accountable people
who commit a crime, correct problematic behaviors,
and help communities and survivors of crime heal.
Moreover, while incarceration will continue to be
warranted for many offenses – including violent
crimes – the question for state policymakers is
whether sentence lengths are appropriate and reflect
an efficient use of public resources. As one step

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process that focuses on addressing underlying
problems such as addiction.38

forward, policymakers could establish a sentencing
commission to examine the impact of sentence length
on targeted populations, with the goal of ensuring
that sentences are proportionate to the seriousness
of the crime as well as to the risk that the person will
reoffend. Policymakers also could amend the state’s
determinate sentencing scheme to generally scale
back sentence lengths.

Policymakers Should Diversify the
Sentencing Toolkit With Alternative
Sentencing Options
When criminal justice intervention is warranted, there
are a number of graduated sanctions available that
do not involve a prolonged period of incarceration
and that show promising public safety outcomes.
The experiences of counties in implementing these
alternatives since the 2011 realignment provides
a foundation for creating a comprehensive state
framework to help expand and deepen the impact of
community-based sentencing options.

Initial Contact Diversion, Problem-Solving
Courts, and Deferred Case Resolution
These are interventions in which a person charged
with a crime agrees to fulfill certain requirements,
such as participation in a work, educational, or
rehabilitative program in the community. Upon
completion of the requirements, the criminal charges
are dismissed. If a person fails to complete the
requirements, the more traditional intervention
process can be invoked and the person may face
incarceration. These alternative approaches allow for
less restrictive interventions to be pursued first, giving
the defendant a chance to avoid the lifetime harm of
a criminal record.

• Initial contact diversion programs allow

• Deferred case resolution is a mechanism
available through the traditional court process,
by which a prosecutor defers the filing of
charges or the court delays entering a judgment
to allow an individual the opportunity to fulfill
certain requirements in lieu of incarceration.39
Programs that result in the dismissal of criminal
charges usually target specific populations with
complex needs that state prisons are not equipped to
address, such as untreated problematic drug use or
untreated mental health issues.40 California operates a
range of diversion programs for less serious first-time
offenses as well as problem-solving courts to address
more complex issues such as problematic drug
use, drunk driving, veteran-specific issues, mental
illness, homelessness, and truancy and other youthspecific issues. These approaches promote targeted
accountability by crafting interventions that require
individuals to address their problematic behaviors
and also provide an opportunity for the criminal
justice system to address the broader needs of the
community. When compared to incarceration, these
types of alternative interventions have been shown to
lead to improved public safety outcomes.41

Electronic Monitoring, Community-Based
Supervision, and Graduated Sanctions and
Rewards
These are community-based sentences that are
carried out locally – typically by the probation
department – and that require a person to meet
certain terms and conditions for a specified period
of time. Individuals are subject to varying levels of
supervision, depending on their risk of reoffending.
Specifically:

a police officer to refer a person to a drug
treatment program in lieu of taking them into
custody.37

• Problem-solving courts provide judicial
supervision combined with rehabilitative
services to individuals in a collaborative court

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• Electronic monitoring tracks individuals’
location in real time to ensure that they
are complying with curfews or geographic
restrictions. Electronic monitoring is often
used to enforce a sentence of home detention,
by which a person serves out a sentence in a

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community supervision, such as failure to enroll
in a court-ordered program.47

specific residence rather than in a prison or
jail.42

• Split sentences assign part of a low-level felony

• Community-based supervision is most often

sentence as incarceration in jail and the other
part as community supervision. Since 2014,
California law has required a split sentence for
people convicted of nonviolent, nonserious,
nonsexual offenses, unless the court finds that a
such a sentence would not be in the interest of
justice.48

used for people who commit low-level drug or
property crimes and are deemed at low risk to
reoffend. A probation officer monitors a person
through regular meetings and follow-ups in
order to ensure that the individual is abiding
by the terms of the sentence, such as obeying
all laws, maintaining sobriety, or attending
rehabilitative programs.43

•

• Local incarceration paired with a workrelease program allows incarcerated people to
participate in community service in exchange
for a reduced jail sentence. For example,
working an eight-hour day could reduce a
jail sentence by one day. State law provides
a maximum one-year sentence in jail for
misdemeanors and sentences of varying lengths
for nonviolent, nonserious, nonsexual felonies.49

Graduated sanctions and rewards can
be used to ensure compliance and punish
noncompliance with the terms of the sentence.
Strategies include increasing or decreasing
the level of oversight, altering the terms
and conditions of supervision, or verbally
reprimanding or congratulating the supervised
person.44

Research supports the use of community-based
supervision combined with both graduated sanctions
that are applied quickly and targeted rehabilitative
services for people across a broad spectrum of risk
to reoffend.45 This approach ensures accountability
through the swift imposition of sanctions, targets
treatment to address problematic behavior, and
is less disruptive to communities compared to
incarceration because it allows for family ties and
other relationships to be maintained and restored
rather than curtailed or severed.

Flash Incarceration, Split Sentences,
and Local Incarceration Paired With a
Work-Release Program
These are alternatives to state incarceration in
situations when some period of incarceration
is deemed necessary.46 Graduated lengths of
incarceration can be used to ensure an effective
allocation of jail resources. For example:

• Flash incarceration allows probation officers
to impose up to 10 days of incarceration in
jail for more serious violations of the terms of

Compared to a prison term, incarceration in a local
jail provides a greater opportunity for individuals
to maintain ties with family as well as with other
community supports. In addition, rehabilitative
treatment providers can engage people who are
incarcerated locally in programming that could
continue in the community after individuals are
released from jail.50 Shorter periods of incarceration
in jail paired with community-based interventions
allow courts to hold people accountable for their
actions while permitting law enforcement to work
with individuals in the community in which they will
continue to live upon exiting the justice system.

Sentencing Should Focus on
Appropriate Sanctions and
Treatments While Considering
How to Repair the Harm Caused
to Crime Victims
All of the sentencing options described above
should involve matching an individual’s action with
the appropriate sanction and treatment based on (1)
the seriousness of the criminal conduct and (2) the
person’s risk of reoffending.51 In addition, all of these

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sentencing options can include restorative justice
practices that focus on repairing the harm caused to
the crime victim.52 Research shows that many survivors
of crime are repeatedly subject to victimization, that
a majority of them do not receive help in dealing
with the resulting trauma, and that being subject to
violence is a risk factor for future criminal behavior.53
In fact, people who work in the criminal justice system
generally recognize that most people who commit
crime have been previously victimized themselves.54
Including, as part of sentencing, access to trauma
recovery services – for both survivors and people
who commit crimes – could help to break cycles of
violence and heal communities.

high in California despite recent criminal justice
reforms and the substantial drop in the number of
people involved with the state correctional system.56
Cutting the length of prison terms would further
reduce the number of incarcerated adults and thereby
allow the state to close prisons and other correctional
facilities, generating substantial ongoing savings
that could be redirected to other public services and
systems.57 To achieve this outcome – a smaller state
prison system – policymakers would have to reduce
the length of imprisonment for a broad range of
crimes, not simply for nonviolent offenses.58 Experts
note that reducing prison lengths of stay has little to
no impact on either crime rates or recidivism.59

Policymakers Can Help to Expand
and Deepen the Impact of
Alternative Sentencing Options
Across California

Of course, the effects of violent crime can be
devastating and lethal. As a result, prolonged
incapacitation of people who have committed such
crimes is often necessary. However, even under
California’s current sentencing laws, the majority of
people serving prison terms for violent crimes will
eventually return to their communities. In addition,
there is wide variation in the types of violent crimes, in
the motives of the people who commit these crimes,
and in the circumstances under which these crimes
occur. As a result, blanket sentencing schemes that
increase sentence lengths are both ineffective and an
inefficient use of public resources.

California counties have been implementing
sentencing alternatives – such as those discussed
above – and related risk- and needs-based practices.
However, the state could take a more systematic
approach to implementing these various methods,
with an emphasis on expanding and deepening their
impact. For example, California could increase the use
of risk and needs assessments during sentencing, use
community-based sentencing options for a broader
set of crimes, and expand eligibility for diversion
programs so that alternatives to incarceration are
used whenever possible.

Policymakers Should Reevaluate the
Length of Prison Sentences
Incarceration will continue to be warranted for a
range of offenses, including violent crimes. The
question for policymakers is whether sentence
lengths are appropriate and reflect an efficient use of
public resources, particularly in light of the fact that
“longer prison terms have been a key driver of prison
populations and costs,” according to one national
study.55 State corrections spending remains stubbornly

As a key step toward improving the state’s sentencing
policies, policymakers could create a sentencing
commission to evaluate the impact of sentence
length on targeted populations. The goal would
be to modify sentences in order to ensure that
they are proportionate to the seriousness of the
crime as well as to the risk that an individual will
reoffend. In addition, policymakers could amend
the state’s determinate sentencing scheme to scale
back sentence lengths generally. Reforms such as
these would bring about a more flexible approach
to sentencing that accounts for the particular crime
as well as the characteristics of the person who
committed it.

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Diversifying Sentences
Could Both Increase
Public Safety and Be
More Cost-Effective

In addition, there is reason to doubt the deterrent
effect of incarceration. Many people are under
the influence of alcohol or other drugs when they
commit the crimes for which they are incarcerated.64
Furthermore, many incarcerated people have
significant mental health issues that likely influenced
the behavior that resulted in their incarceration.65

KEY TERMS
California’s criminal justice system should balance
the use of sentencing options based on their
demonstrated public safety benefits and the efficient
use of public resources. This section discusses
research on various sentencing options, including
state incarceration, to weigh the benefits against the
related costs. This review suggests that while people
who have committed violent crimes may need to
be incarcerated for a period of time to protect the
public, significantly divesting from incarceration as
a sentencing tool – and moving toward alternative
sentencing options – could both increase public safety
and be more cost-effective.

A Heavy Reliance on State
Incarceration Does Not Appear to
Promote Public Safety
Incarceration is thought to reduce crime in two ways:
incapacitation and deterrence. As an added means of
crime reduction, California’s corrections system aims
to promote rehabilitation both while individuals are
incarcerated and after they have been released to
state parole.60
Research casts doubt on the efficacy of prolonged
incarceration as a crime-fighting tool.61 Studies
show that heavy reliance on incarceration is not
necessary for public safety, and that, in fact, states
can experience lower crime rates when they
incarcerate less.62 For example, during periods
when California, New Jersey, and New York were
significantly decreasing their prison populations
relative to nationwide trends, these states saw greater
reductions in violent crime than did the rest of the
country.63

INCAPACITATION: Incarcerating individuals removes
them from society and physically prevents them from
committing more crime in the community during their
sentence.66 The longer individuals are incarcerated,
the less opportunity they have to commit new crimes
in the community. Incapacitation is only effective as
a crime-reduction tool if an individual would have
reoffended in the community absent incarceration.
DETERRENCE: Incarceration sends a message to
society about the consequences of violating the law,
with the aim of discouraging others from committing
a crime. In addition, the experience of incarceration
may dissuade the person who is incarcerated from
committing another crime in the future for fear of
facing incarceration again. For incarceration to have
a deterrent effect, individuals must think rationally
about the possible punishment for their actions and
weigh that punishment against the potential benefits
of the crime before committing it.67
REHABILITATION: The California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) defines
rehabilitation as “chang[ing] the criminal mindset,
so offenders leave prison prepared to be healthy,
productive members of society.”68 One measurable
outcome of successful rehabilitation is reduced
recidivism, which the CDCR defines as “relaps[ing]
into crime resulting in a return to prison.”69 To
this end, the CDCR provides various educational,
vocational, and health treatment programs to certain
eligible people in its prisons and in the community
under the supervision of parole agents in order to
reduce the likelihood that they will reoffend.

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Evidence that many people’s judgments are impaired
– either through drug use or untreated mental
illness – when committing crimes runs counter to a
basic premise of incarceration’s deterrent effect: that
people are able to rationally assess the costs and
benefits of their criminal behavior at that moment.
Even for individuals who do not have mental health
or drug use issues, they are often unaware of specific
sentencing outcomes, thereby diminishing the
deterrent effect.70
When a deterrent effect is apparent in sentencing,
studies show that this effect depends more on the
certainty of being caught than on the severity of the
punishment.71 However, for violent crime the certainty
of punishment is typically lacking. California’s rate of
“clearance” for violent crimes – that is, the number
of cases considered “solved” by law enforcement
as a percentage of all crimes reported – has been
in the range of 40 percent to 47 percent over the
last 10 years.72 In other words, many violent crimes
in California do not result in an arrest – even when
reported to the police – let alone a conviction and
subsequent incarceration, a fact that potentially
reduces the deterrent effect of the possible sentence.
Finally, state imprisonment currently may not
work well to rehabilitate people and help prevent
reoffending. In California, more than half (54
percent) of adults returned to prison within three
years from release, according to the CDCR’s most
recent recidivism study.73 Almost half of the adults
who reoffended within three years did so within the
first six months of release. Moreover, longer periods
of incarceration in state facilities – which are often
located far from individuals’ homes – can break
community and familial ties that have been linked with
decreased recidivism.74

Incarceration Is Expensive
At most, about one-quarter of the drop in violent
crime can be attributed to increases in incarceration.75
Yet, this reduction has come at a high price,
considering that California annually spends more

than $10 billion on the state corrections system. This
includes the cost of staffing and operating 34 state
prisons, which outnumber the combined campuses of
the California State University (CSU) and the University
of California (UC).76
Staffing adult prisons is expensive because many
custodial and security positions must be filled 24 hours
a day, 365 days a year.77 Each of these round-the-clock
positions needs approximately three to five staff to fill
it.78 If an employee is unavailable – due to an illness,
for example – the position must still be filled, either by
a relief officer who is specifically retained on a full-time
basis to fill empty positions as needed, or by an officer
working overtime.79 In 2012-13, the state spent about
$279 million on correctional officer overtime, almost
two-thirds of which was related to staff absences.80
In addition, partly due to a federal court order to
improve prison medical care as well as an aging prison
population with greater health care needs, per capita
spending for adults in state prisons has more than
doubled in recent years, rising from $25,307 in 200001 to $63,848 in 2015-16.81

Incarceration Presents a Health Risk
In addition to being costly, incarceration raises
significant health and safety concerns for incarcerated
individuals as well as for their families. Incarceration
causes significant harm to an individual’s physical
and mental health. Researchers have observed
hypervigilance, social withdrawal, and post-traumatic
stress among incarcerated people.82 There are
also higher rates of contagious diseases – such as
tuberculosis and hepatitis – in correctional facilities.83
Elderly people in prison are more susceptible to
chronic diseases, infirmities, and physical disabilities.84
Older incarcerated adults also tend to require more
intensive medical care and accommodations that
are difficult to provide within existing state prison
facilities.85 Finally, incarceration often results in
extreme familial instability, which has been linked
to poor health outcomes among the children of
incarcerated parents.86

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Community-Based Interventions
Can Be Cheaper and Result in
Better Outcomes Than Incarceration
Community-based interventions that work in
conjunction with or as alternatives to incarceration
can be less expensive and result in better outcomes.
(These interventions are discussed in the previous
section: “Shifting the Focus to Alternative Sentencing
Options and Shorter Prison Sentences.”) In particular,
problem-solving courts demonstrate significantly
lower recidivism rates among participants, compared
to nonparticipants.87 For example, a study of problemsolving courts focusing on problematic drug use in
California found that arrest rates for participants
declined by 85 percent within two years, compared
to the two years prior to participation.88 Orange
County drug court and mental health court graduates
have about a 29 percent recidivism rate for any
crime, significantly lower than the 74 percent rate for
the drug court control group, according to a 2013
report.89 These alternative sentencing options are
much less expensive than incarceration because of
reduced operating costs. For example, San Francisco’s
drug courts estimated savings of $48 million over 13
years from lower case-processing costs and reduced
recidivism.90 Orange County collaborative courts,
which serve a range of populations, have saved an
estimated $75 million from reduced use of the jail
between 1995 and 2013.91
Moreover, the benefits of community-based
sentences, such as electronic monitoring and intensive
supervision, often outweigh the costs of these
approaches as a result of reduced crime.92 While
the cost of community-based approaches varies
depending on the intensity of the supervision as well
as on each individual’s treatment needs, on average
supervision costs amount to about $1,500 per person,
per year.93
When incarceration is necessary, shorter periods
of local incarceration may be preferable to state
incarceration. In 2011, the cost of incarceration in jail
averaged $113.87 per person, per day – or about
$41,563 per year – which is significantly less than the

cost of state prison and has the advantage of being
closer to the incarcerated person’s home.94 This allows
family and other social supports to be maintained and
thereby decreases the likelihood that individuals will
reoffend.95 Moreover, shorter periods of incarceration
that are swift and certain – such as flash incarceration
– have been shown to deter reoffending.96

Conclusion: Moving
California Toward More
Effective Sentencing
Policies
Research shows that investing in a broader range of
sentencing options that target the underlying causes
of criminal behavior and work within the affected
community can hold accountable people who commit
a crime, reduce reoffending, and strengthen
communities. In addition, prioritizing communitybased sentencing options and reducing lengths of stay
when incarceration is necessary can save the state
money through decreased operational costs and
reduced crime. In order to ensure that such reforms
are successful, California would need to strengthen its
investment in community-based corrections
infrastructure, including day reporting centers, drug
and mental health treatment programs, problemsolving court systems, and services for survivors of
crime.

FOR MORE
INFORMATION
For a historical overview of California’s sentencing
laws, see Kara Dansky, “Understanding California
Sentencing,” University of San Francisco Law Review
43 (Summer 2008), pp. 45-86. For a detailed review
of the application of current sentencing laws, see
J. Richard Couzens and Tricia A. Bigelow, Felony
Sentencing After Realignment (Revised August 2015).

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ENDNOTES
1 California Penal Code, Section 16.
2 California Penal Code, Section 17(a).
3 California Penal Code, Section 190.2.
4 Scott Graves, Corrections Spending Through the State Budget Since 2007-08: Still High Despite Recent Reforms (California Budget &
Policy Center: November 2015).
5 California Penal Code, Section 19.2. There are some offenses that can be charged either as a misdemeanor or a felony depending on the
circumstances.
6 Marcus Lofstrom and Brandon Martin, Public Safety Realignment: Impacts So Far (Public Policy Institute of California: September 2015).
7 California Penal Code, Sections 19.6 and 19.8(b). There are some offenses that can be charged either as an infraction or a misdemeanor
depending on the circumstances.
8 See California Penal Code, Section 1203(a); David H. Melnick, “Probation in California: Penal Code Section 1203” California Law Review
50 (1962), pp. 651-671; and Legislative Analyst’s Office, Achieving Better Outcomes for Adult Probation (May 29, 2009).
9 Criteria affecting eligibility for probation are found in California Rules of Court, Rules 4.413 and 4.414.
10 For example, people with prior convictions for certain serious and/or violent crimes are not eligible for probation. Individuals who commit
offenses using deadly weapons are presumptively ineligible for probation and may only be granted probation if it would be in the interest
of justice to do so. See California Penal Code, Sections 1203(e) and (k).
11 Criminal Justice Statistics Center, Crime in California 2014 (Department of Justice: 2015), Table 40, p. 53.
12 Information in this paragraph on indeterminate sentencing is from Kara Dansky, “Understanding California Sentencing,” University of
San Francisco Law Review 43 (Summer 2008), pp. 58-66; Albert J. Lipson and Mark A. Peterson, California Justice Under Determinate
Sentencing: A Review and Agenda for Research (Rand: June 1980), pp.1-2; and Paula A. Johnson, “Senate Bill 42 – The End of the
Indeterminate Sentence,” Santa Clara Law Review 17 (1977), pp. 133-134. According to Dansky, prior to 1917, California used a criminal
code based on definitions contained in the common law of England. Judges had unguided discretion to impose a sentence within a
particular range specified for the crime, and the sentenced individual was required to complete the full sentence imposed.
13 Information in this paragraph on determinate sentencing is from Kara Dansky, “Understanding California Sentencing,” University of San
Francisco Law Review 43 (Summer 2008), pp. 67-68, and Paula A. Johnson, “Senate Bill 42 – The End of the Indeterminate Sentence,”
Santa Clara Law Review 17 (1977), pp. 145-146.
14 Information in this paragraph on determinate sentencing is from Albert J. Lipson and Mark A. Peterson, California Justice Under
Determinate Sentencing: A Review and Agenda for Research (Rand: June 1980), pp. 2-3, and Kara Dansky, “Understanding California
Sentencing,” University of San Francisco Law Review 43 (Summer 2008), pp. 67-71.
15 California Penal Code, Section 213(a)(2).
16 Originally, the total sentence including the enhancements could not exceed double the base term except for a violent crime or when
certain other conditions were met. Albert J. Lipson and Mark A. Peterson, California Justice Under Determinate Sentencing: A Review and
Agenda for Research (Rand: June 1980), p. 6.
17 Albert J. Lipson and Mark A. Peterson, California Justice Under Determinate Sentencing: A Review and Agenda for Research (Rand: June
1980), pp. 6 and 15, and Kara Dansky, “Understanding California Sentencing,” University of San Francisco Law Review 43 (Summer 2008),
pp. 68-69.
18 Mike Males, Daniel Macallair, and Khaled Taqi-Eddin, Striking Out: The Failure of California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” Law (Justice
Policy Institute: March 1999), p. 2. The three-strikes law was signed by Governor Pete Wilson in March 1994 and subsequently reaffirmed
by the voters through passage of Proposition 184 in November 1994. Proposition 184, a citizens’ initiative, was essentially identical to the
law approved by state policymakers.
19 The requirement that the third strike be a violent or serious felony – as opposed to any felony – was added in 2012 with the passage of
Proposition 36, which also allowed people serving third-strike sentences for nonviolent or nonserious felonies to apply for resentencing as
second strikers. J. Richard Couzens and Tricia A. Bigelow, The Amendment of the Three Strikes Sentencing Law (Barrister Press: February
2015), p. 5.
20 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Office of Research, Second and Third Striker Felons in the Adult Institution
Population (June 30, 2013), Table 1. This is the most recent CDCR report on the three-strikes prison population as of December 10, 2015.
21 Mike Males, Striking Out: California’s “Three Strikes And You’re Out” Law Has Not Reduced Violent Crime. A 2011 Update (Center on
Juvenile and Criminal Justice: April 2011).
22 A requirement that the third strike be a violent or serious felony was added in 2012 with the passage of Proposition 36. Proposition 36
also allowed people serving third strike sentences for nonviolent or nonserious felonies to apply for resentencing as second strikers.
J. Richard Couzens and Tricia A. Bigelow, The Amendment of the Three Strikes Sentencing Law (Barrister Press: February 2015), p. 5;
and Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project and NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Progress Report: Three Strikes Reform
(Proposition 36) – 1,000 Prisoners Released (September 2013), p. 4.

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23 California Penal Code, Section 12022.53. Information in this paragraph on the “Use a Gun and You’re Done” law is from Little Hoover
Commission, Sensible Sentencing for a Safer California (February 2014), pp. 9-10.
24 ”Design capacity” refers to the number of people the facilities were designed to hold based on one person per cell, single bunks in
dormitories, and no beds in spaces not designed for housing. See Corrections Independent Review Panel, Reforming Corrections
(California Performance Review: June 2004).
25 In 2006, California began using private prisons to house incarcerated adults in order to address overcrowding in state prisons. Kara
Dansky, “Understanding California Sentencing,” University of San Francisco Law Review 43 (Summer 2008), p. 69, and Randall G. Shelden
and Selena Teji, Collateral Consequences of Interstate Transfer of Prisoners (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice: July 2012), p. 2.
26 Legislative Analyst’s Office, A Primer: Three Strikes – The Impact After More Than a Decade (October 2005), pp. 4-7, and Franklin E.
Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, “The Growth of Imprisonment in California,” British Journal of Criminology 34 (1994), pp. 84-89.
27 For a summary of the major changes, see Scott Graves, Corrections Spending Through the State Budget Since 2007-08: Still High Despite
Recent Reforms (California Budget & Policy Center: November 2015), pp. 1-2, and Legislative Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget:
Administration’s Response to Prison Overcrowding Order (February 28, 2014), p. 2.
28 In August 2009, a panel of federal judges ruled that overcrowding was the main reason that California was failing to provide prisoners
with health care that met US constitutional standards. This three-judge panel ordered the state to reduce the prison population to 137.5
percent of the system’s design capacity, a decision that was upheld by the US Supreme Court in 2011. The court subsequently extended
the state’s deadline for complying with this order to February 28, 2016. For an overview of the three-judge panel’s order, see Legislative
Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget: Administration’s Response to Prison Overcrowding Order (February 28, 2014), pp. 2-3.
29 State policymakers also provided counties with an ongoing source of revenues to pay for their new responsibilities under realignment. For
a detailed overview of the 2011 realignment – which also included health and human services programs – see Scott Graves, Finishing the
Job: Moving Realignment Toward Completion in 2012 (California Budget & Policy Center: June 2012).
30 US Supreme Court, Brown v. Plata, 563 US ___ (2011), downloaded from http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-1233.pdf
on August 28, 2014. (As shown in the citation, the page number for this case is left blank because the US Supreme Court has not yet
printed the bound volume of the United States Reports.) Also see related court documents, “Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Defendants’ Request for Extension of December 31, 2013 Deadline” (available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3jp-Feb-2014/
Three-Judge-Court-order-2-20-2014.pdf); and “Defendant’s December 2014 Status Report in Response to February 10, 2014 Order”
(available at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/3JP-Dec-2014/December-2014-Status-Report.pdf).
31 In addition, Proposition 47 directs any state savings that result from the measure to drug and mental health treatment, victim services,
and K-12 truancy prevention. Selena Teji, Proposition 47: Should California Reduce Penalties For Drug and Property Crimes and Invest in
Treatment? (California Budget & Policy Center: September 2014), pp. 1-3.
32 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Spring 2015 Population Projections (May 2015).
33 California Penal Code, Sections 16, 18, 19, and 19.6.
34 Edmund G. Brown Jr., Governor Brown Sworn In, Delivers Inaugural Address (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr.: January 5, 2015),
available at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18828.
35 California Penal Code, Section 17.5(a)(8).
36 Steven Raphael and Michael A. Stoll, Do Prisons Make Us Safer? The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom (Russell Sage Foundation:
2009).
37 For example, see the Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program in Seattle and King County, Washington. Information available
at http://leadkingcounty.org/about/.
38 Robert V. Wolf, California’s Collaborative Justice Courts: Building a Problem-Solving Judiciary (Judicial Council of California,
Administrative Office of the Courts: 2005), pp. 2 and 5.
39 Robert Soo Song, “Deferred Entry of Judgment for Criminal Defendants,” Los Angeles Lawyer 29 (November 2006).
40 Robert V. Wolf, California’s Collaborative Justice Courts: Building a Problem-Solving Judiciary (Judicial Council of California,
Administrative Office of the Courts: 2005), pp. 2 and 5; Robert Soo Song, “Deferred Entry of Judgment for Criminal Defendants,” Los
Angeles Lawyer 29 (November 2006); Selena Teji, Proposition 47: Should California Reduce Penalties for Drug and Property Crimes and
Invest in Treatment? (California Budget and Policy Center: September 2014), p. 3.
41 Robert V. Wolf, California’s Collaborative Justice Courts: Building a Problem-Solving Judiciary (Judicial Council of California,
Administrative Office of the Courts: 2005), pp. 2 and 5, and Holly A. Wilson and Robert D. Hoge, ”The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs
on Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review,” Criminal Justice and Behavior 40 (May 2013).
42 Brandon Martin and Ryken Grattet, Alternatives to Incarceration in California (Public Policy Institute of California: April 2015), p. 3.
43 Chief Probation Officers of California, “Graduated Sanctions: Strategies for Responding to Violations of Probation Supervision” CPOC
Issue Brief 1 (Spring 2014).
44 Chief Probation Officers of California, “Graduated Sanctions: Strategies for Responding to Violations of Probation Supervision”
CPOC Issue Brief 1 (Spring 2014) and Peggy Burke, Filling in the Gaps: Increasing the Available Range of Responses to Violations (US
Department of Justice: 2001).

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45 Brandon Martin and Ryken Grattet, Alternatives to Incarceration in California (Public Policy Institute of California: April 2015), p. 6, and
Angela Hawken and Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers With Swift and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE
(National Institute of Justice: 2009).
46 Brandon Martin and Ryken Grattet, Alternatives to Incarceration in California (Public Policy Institute of California: April 2015), pp. 3-4.
47 Less serious violations of the terms of community supervision – such as failing to follow curfew hours – may be addressed through referral
to an appropriate treatment program or more intensive supervision requirements. For an example of the spectrum of violations and
sanctions under community supervision, see Chief Probation Officers of California, Sample Guidelines for Risk-Based Sanctions (Spring
2014), available at http://www.cpoc.org/assets/guidelines%20for%20risk-based%20sanctions%20and%20rewards.pdf.
48 California Penal Code, Section 1170(h)(5); and California Rules of Court, Rule 4.415.
49 California Penal Code, Sections 19.2 and 1170(h).
50 Selena Teji, Proposition 47: Should California Reduce Penalties for Drug and Property Crimes and Invest in Treatment? (California Budget
and Policy Center: September 2014), p. 4.
51 Pamela M. Casey, Roger K. Warren, and Jennifer K. Elek, Using Offender Risk and Needs Assessment Information at Sentencing:
Guidance for Courts From a National Working Group (National Center for State Courts: 2011).
52 California Community Justice Project, Restorative Conferencing (Judicial Council of California, Administrative Office of the Courts: 2006).
53 Heather Warnken, Untold Stories of California Crime Victims: Research and Recommendations on Repeat Victimization and Rebuilding
Lives (Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy: April 2014), pp. 9 and 17.
54 Abbe Smith, “The ‘Monster’ in All of Us: When Victims Become Perpetrators,” Suffolk University Law Review 38 (February 2010) and
Heather Warnken, Untold Stories of California Crime Victims: Research and Recommendations on Repeat Victimization and Rebuilding
Lives (Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Law and Social Policy: April 2014), pp. 9 and 17.
55 The Pew Center on the States, Time Served: The High Cost, Low Return of Longer Prison Terms (June 2012), pp. 1-2.
56 Scott Graves, Corrections Spending Through the State Budget Since 2007-08: Still High Despite Recent Reforms (California Budget &
Policy Center: November 2015), p. 1.
57 Scott Graves, Corrections Spending Through the State Budget Since 2007-08: Still High Despite Recent Reforms (California Budget &
Policy Center: November 2015), p. 7.
58 Ryan King, et al., Reducing Mass Incarceration Requires Far-Reaching Reforms (Urban Institute: August 2015); John Pfaff, “For True Penal
Reform, Focus on the Violent Offenders,” Washington Post (July 26, 2015); Marc Mauer and David Cole, “How to Lock Up Fewer People,”
New York Times (May 23, 2015); Dana Goldstein, How to Cut the Prison Population by 50 Percent (The Marshall Project: March 4, 2015);
Leon Neyfakh, “OK, So Who Gets to Go Free?” Slate (March 4, 2015); and James Austin, How Much Time Should Prisoners Serve?
(American Correctional Association: 2013).
59 According to Marc Mauer and David Cole, “We could cut sentences for violent crimes by half in most instances without significantly
undermining deterrence or increasing the threat of repeat offending.” Marc Mauer and David Cole, “How to Lock Up Fewer People,”
New York Times (May 23, 2015). Furthermore, according to James Austin, “The science on how much time prisoners should serve from a
public safety perspective is very clear. Increasing or decreasing prisoner [length of stay] has no impact on recidivism or crime rates. But it
has an extremely dramatic impact on the size of the prison population.” James Austin, How Much Time Should Prisoners Serve? (American
Correctional Association: 2013).
60 In 2004, an independent review panel appointed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger found that California’s correctional system was
defective in almost every way. The panel recommended 239 changes beginning with a reorganization to create the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, which went into effect on July 1, 2005. See http://cpr.ca.gov/Review_Panel/ for more information.
This reorganization reinstated the correctional system’s responsibility to rehabilitate rather than just to punish. See Office of Public and
Employee Communications, Successes and Challenges: The CDCR Story (California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation: no
date), pp. 1 and 3.
61 Anthony N. Doob and Cheryl Marie Webster, “Sentence Severity and Crime: Accepting the Null Hypothesis,” Crime and Justice 30 (2003),
pp. 143-195; Jamie Fellner, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison Population in the United States (Human Rights Watch: January 2012),
p. 92; and Mike Males, Daniel Macallair, and Megan Doyle Corcoran, Testing Incapacitation Theory: Youth Crime and Incarceration in
California (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice: July 2006), p. 13.
62 Marc Mauer and Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime: A Tale of Three States (The Sentencing Project: Revised July 2014),
p. 1; Mike Males, Daniel Macallair, and Megan Doyle Corcoran, Testing Incapacitation Theory: Youth Crime and Incarceration in California
(Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice: July 2006), p. 11; Ryan S. King, Marc Mauer, and Malcolm C. Young, Incarceration and Crime: A
Complex Relationship (The Sentencing Project: 2005), p. 4.
63 Marc Mauer and Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Fewer Prisoners, Less Crime: A Tale of Three States (The Sentencing Project: Revised July 2014), p.
1.
64 Christopher J. Mumola, Substance Abuse and Treatment, State and Federal Prisoners, 1997 (US Department of Justice: January 1999).
65 See Selena Teji, Proposition 47: Should California Reduce Penalties for Drug and Property Crimes and Invest in Treatment? (California
Budget & Policy Center: September 2014), p. 3, and Stanford Law School Three Strikes Project, When Did Prisons Become Acceptable
Mental Healthcare Facilities? (May 28, 2014).

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66 Incarceration does not prevent an individual from committing crimes while incarcerated. Jamie Fellner, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison
Population in the United States (Human Rights Watch: January 2012), p. 92.
67 Jamie Fellner, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison Population in the United States (Human Rights Watch: January 2012), p. 92; and Valerie
Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment (The Sentencing Project: November 2010), p. 2.
68 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), accessed on April 14, 2015 at http://www.
cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/faqs.html#rehabilitation.
69 There are many other definitions of recidivism, including committing a new crime that does not result in another prison term. Therefore,
CDCR recidivism figures may be conservative. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Frequently Asked Questions
(FAQs), accessed on April 14, 2015 at http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/rehabilitation/faqs.html#recidivism.
70 Valerie Wright, Deterrence in Criminal Justice: Evaluating Certainty vs. Severity of Punishment (The Sentencing Project: November 2010),
p. 3.
71 Andrew von Hirsch, et al., Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity: An Analysis of Recent Research (Hart Publishing: 1999) and Daniel
S. Nagin and Greg Pogarsky, “Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence:
Theory and Evidence,” Criminology 39 (2001), pp. 865-892.
72 According to the Department of Justice, “an offense is ‘cleared by arrest’ or solved for crime reporting purposes when at least one person
is arrested, charged with the commission of an offense, and turned over to a court for prosecution. Although no physical arrest is made,
a clearance by arrest can be claimed when an offender is a person under 18 years of age and is cited to appear in juvenile court or before
other juvenile authorities. An offense can also be ‘cleared exceptionally’ for crime reporting purposes when an investigation has definitely
established the identity of an offender; enough information exists to support an arrest; and the exact location of an offender is known but,
for some reason, law enforcement cannot take the offender into custody.” See http://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cjsc/prof10/
glossary.pdf for more information. Criminal Justice Statistics Center, CJSC Statistics: Crimes and Clearances database (Department of
Justice), accessed on April 14, 2015 at https://oag.ca.gov/crime/cjsc/ stats/crimes-clearances.
73 The study tracked a cohort of people released from state prisons during 2009-10. California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation, 2014 Outcome Evaluation Report (July 2015), pp. 11-12.
74 See for example, Grant Duwe and Valerie Clark, “Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of Prison Visitation on Offender
Recidivism,” Criminal Justice Policy Review 24 (2013), pp. 271-296.
75 Joel A. Devine, Joseph F. Sheley, and M. Dwayne Smith, “Macroeconomic and Social-Control Policy Influences on Crime Rate Changes,
1948-1985,” American Sociological Review 53 (1988), pp. 407-420; Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, “The Impact of Prison
Growth on Homicide,” Homicide Studies 1 (1997), pp. 205-233; William Spelman, “The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion” in
Alfred Blumestein and Joel Wallman (Eds.), The Crime Drop in America (Cambridge University Press: 2005), pp. 97-129; and Zsolt Besci,
“Economics and Crime in the States,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review Q1 (1999), pp. 38-56.
76 There are 23 CSU campuses and 10 UC campuses. The state budget for 2015-16 includes $10.2 billion for state corrections, excluding
state funds that pay for corrections-related infrastructure and for counties’ new criminal justice responsibilities under the 2011
realignment. See California Budget & Policy Center, First Look: The 2015-16 State Budget (June 2015), p. 18.
77 Legislative Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget: Governor’s Criminal Justice Proposals (February 19, 2014), pp. 23-24.
78 Barbara Krauth, Staff-Inmate Ratios: Why It’s So Hard to Get to the Bottom Line (September 1988, reprinted September 2006), p. 6, and
Legislative Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget: Governor’s Criminal Justice Proposals (February 19, 2014), p. 23.
79 A relief officer is a full-time employee assigned to a specific prison, but not a specific position. When they arrive for their shift, they are
assigned a role as needed. Legislative Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget: Governor’s Criminal Justice Proposals (February 19, 2014), p.
24.
80 Legislative Analyst’s Office, The 2014-15 Budget: Governor’s Criminal Justice Proposals (February 19, 2014), p. 25.
81 The 2015-16 figure is a projection as of the Governor’s proposed 2015-16 budget released in January 2015. These spending figures are
cited in Scott Graves, Steady Climb: State Corrections Spending in California (California Budget & Policy Center: September 2011), p. 8,
and Selena Teji, What Does the State Corrections Budget Pay For? (California Budget & Policy Center: March 2015).
82 Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment (January 2002), pp. 81-84.
“Hypervigilance” is an extremely heightened sense of one’s surroundings and potential dangers.
83 Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western, and Steve Redburn, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences
(National Research Council of the National Academies: 2014), p. 209.
84 Jamie Fellner, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison Population in the United States (Human Rights Watch: 2012), p. 73.
85 Jamie Fellner, Old Behind Bars: The Aging Prison Population in the United States (Human Rights Watch: 2012), p. 46-47.
86 Kristin Turney, “Stress Proliferation Across Generations? Examining the Relationship Between Parental Incarceration and Childhood
Health,” Journal of Health and Social Behavior 55 (2014), pp. 302-319, and Randall G. Shelden and Selena Teji, Collateral Consequences
of Interstate Transfer of Prisoners (Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice: July 2012), pp. 5-6.

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87 See Dale E. McNiel and Renée L. Binder, “Effectiveness of a Mental Health Court in Reducing Criminal Recidivism and Violence,”
American Journal of Psychiatry 164 (September 2007); David B. Wilson, Ojmarrh Mitchell, and Doris L. Mackenzie, “A Systemic Review of
Drug Court Effects on Recidivism,” Journal of Experimental Criminology 2 (2006); and Henry J. Steadman, et al., “Effects of Mental Health
Courts on Arrests and Jail Days: A Multisite Study,” Archives of General Psychiatry 68 (February 2011).
88 Joseph Guydish and Barbara Tajima, Drug Court Partnership Act of 1998, Chapter 1007, Statutes of 1998 Final Report (Drug Court
Partnership: March 2002), p. 15.
89 Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Collaborative Courts 2013 Annual Report, pp. 6 and 24.
90 Shannon M. Carey and Mark Waller, California Drug Courts: Costs and Benefits (NPC Research: September 2008), p. 9.
91 Superior Court of California, County of Orange, Collaborative Courts 2013 Annual Report, p. 3.
92 Stephanie Lee, Steve Aos, and Annie Pennucci, What Works and What Does Not? Benefit-Cost Findings from WSIPP (Washington State
Institute for Public Policy: February 2015), p. 6, and Washington State Institute for Public Policy, Benefit-Cost Technical Documentation
(July 2015), p. 40.
93 Chief Probation Officers of California, Probation Fact Sheet, downloaded from http://www.cpoc.org/assets/Realignment/ cpoc%20
factsheet.pdf on July 20, 2015.
94 Gary Wion, Average Daily Cost to House Inmates in Type II and III Local Detention Facilities (Board of State and Community Corrections:
September 14, 2012).
95 Selena Teji, Proposition 47: Should California Reduce Penalties for Drug and Property Crimes and Invest in Treatment? (California Budget
& Policy Center: September 2014), p. 4.
96 Angela Hawken and Mark Kleiman, Managing Drug Involved Probationers With Swift and Certain Sanctions: Evaluating Hawaii’s HOPE
(National Institute of Justice: 2009).

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