U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 300
Washington, D.C. 20036-4505

The Special Counsel

July 30, 2021
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Subject: OSC File Nos. DI-16-1098, DI-18-1075
Dear Mr. President:
I am forwarding to you a report provided to the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) in
response to disclosures of wrongdoing at the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Port-auPrince, Haiti Country Office. Because the DEA is a component of the Department of Justice,
OSC referred the allegations to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions for investigation pursuant to
5 U.S.C. § 1213(c) and (d). The Attorney General delegated the responsibility for conducting
the investigation and signing the report to the DEA Administrator. DEA’s Office of Global
Enforcement conducted the original investigation and issued a report with the coordination and
assistance of the agency’s Office of Chief Counsel and Inspections Division. In response to
OSC’s request for additional information, the Acting DEA Administrator issued a supplemental
report1 based on further investigation by the DEA’s Operations Division. I have reviewed the
agency report and whistleblower comments, and in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e), provide
the following summary of the report, the whistleblowers’ comments, and my findings. As
summarized below, I have determined that the DEA’s findings and report are unreasonable.
The Whistleblowers’ Allegations
The whistleblowers,
and
, who consented to the release of
their names, are former DEA Special Agents who worked in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. They
disclosed to OSC that the DEA Port-au-Prince, Haiti Country Office failed to take appropriate
measures to implement an effective seaport security program to appropriately assist Haiti with
strengthening its counter-narcotics law enforcement program. They also disclosed that DEA
failed to properly conduct its investigation of the 2015 M.V. Manzanares drug seizure.2
Specifically, the whistleblowers raised concerns regarding (1) inadequate training of Haitian law
enforcement; (2) inadequate office space and equipment, such as surveillance cameras, at Haitian
seaports; (3) insufficient vetting of Haitian law enforcement partners; and (4) inadequate support
for the Manzanares investigation.
1

The original report and supplemental report collectively comprise the agency report.
The M.V. Manzanares is a cargo ship from which Haitian authorities seized a large cache of drugs hidden in its
hold in April 2015.
2

The President
July 30, 2021
Page 2 of 4
DEA’s Investigation and Original Report
DEA did not substantiate the whistleblowers’ allegations. Specifically, the agency
concluded that it had provided adequate training to Haitian law enforcement, including nine
training seminars held in Port-au-Prince, Haiti in the last five years and ad-hoc, hands-on
training. It reported that the U.S. Coast Guard Defense Attaché, rather than DEA, is responsible
for assessing port security measures in Haiti. It stated that while there were limits to how much
input U.S. government agencies can have over Haitian port security, DEA, in conjunction with
the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), has
been involved with some improvements. It reported that, currently, a group of Haitian law
enforcement officers has a permanent office located in a shipping container at the port and
Haitian law enforcement has a presence in the port 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. In its report,
DEA explained that a “trusted police unit” was created in Haiti in 2016 through an interagency
agreement with INL, but that the Haitian counter-narcotics law enforcement unit was not
considered a formal “vetted unit.” The report stated that DEA removed the Haitian law
enforcement commander of that unit in 2018 after the current Port-au-Prince Country Attaché
requested his removal due to corruption concerns. DEA did not find sufficient evidence to
support the whistleblowers’ allegation that DEA denied resources for the Manzanares
investigation.
In their comments on DEA’s report, the whistleblowers criticized the agency for failing
to take their disclosures seriously and contended that the report failed to address the issues
referred for investigation. They further asserted that DEA had a conflict of interest in
investigating its own operations. The whistleblowers also stated that the training DEA has
provided to Haitian law enforcement is insufficient and ineffective to ensure basic knowledge of
seaport law enforcement and that DEA misrepresented management’s responses to the
whistleblowers’ requests for training by stating in the report that the whistleblowers failed to
provide specific examples of formal training requests that were denied. As to the
whistleblowers’ allegations regarding inadequate equipment, DEA reported that it requested an
x-ray machine for Haitian law enforcement at the seaport, but the whistleblowers noted they still
do not have one. The whistleblowers criticized DEA for claiming, without support, that the local
law enforcement that it works with in Haiti is not a “vetted unit” and believe that DEA’s
response to corruption concerns about the Haitian law enforcement commander had been slow.3
The whistleblowers also disputed DEA’s conclusion that it has pursued the Manzanares
investigation appropriately. Specifically, they criticized DEA for ignoring evidence about a
manager conspiring with a Haitian law enforcement commander to destroy evidence, not
permitting pursuit of appropriate leads, and inappropriately deactivating confidential sources.

3

One of the whistleblowers claims to have reported back in 2015 that the Haitian commander at issue failed a
polygraph test and DEA did not seek his removal until 2018.

The President
July 30, 2021
Page 3 of 4
DEA’s Supplemental Report
At OSC’s request, DEA provided a supplemental report to address the whistleblowers’
comments. In that report, the agency explained the steps it took to investigate the
whistleblowers’ allegations and reiterated that, despite seaport security being outside the mission
or responsibility of DEA, the agency nonetheless engaged in efforts to improve port security. In
response to the question about additional scanning and x-ray equipment, DEA inexplicably
stated that it did not have any record of the current status of the request, much less that it was
approved. In response to the whistleblowers’ concerns about the DEA conducting the
investigation of its own operations, DEA claimed that no conflict existed because the Office of
Chief Counsel had limited involvement with, and influence on, the investigation, without
addressing the roles of the Office of Global Enforcement and Inspections Division charged with
investigating the whistleblowers’ allegations. With regard to the whistleblowers’ allegation that
a DEA official conspired with Haitian law enforcement to destroy drug evidence seized from the
Manzanares, DEA stated that, while there were different opinions about whether the seized
drugs should have been destroyed, Haitian officials had the authority to destroy the drugs and
coordinated with DEA regarding the destruction process—indeed the DEA reimbursed Haitian
officials $1,500 for costs associated with the destruction of the drugs. DEA continues to
investigate the Manzanares seizure and is coordinating with the United States Attorney’s Office
regarding potential criminal charges.
In response to the supplemental report, the whistleblowers asserted that DEA ignored the
additional information they provided. The whistleblowers also criticized the agency for allowing
the destruction of evidence and for failing to explain why a DEA official paid Haitian law
enforcement to destroy drug evidence seized from the Manzanares. The whistleblowers contend
that the Office of Chief Counsel’s involvement in the investigation created a conflict of interest
and that, contrary to DEA’s assertions, its involvement impacted the findings. The
whistleblowers also commented that the DEA’s assertions regarding its limited role in Haiti do
not withstand scrutiny and that the supplemental report confirmed that DEA is unwilling to take
responsibility or consider the need for corrective action against the unimpeded flow of illegal
drugs through Haiti.
OSC’s Determination
OSC acknowledges that DEA’s role in promoting seaport security in Haiti is limited,
given that DEA is operating in a foreign country and the U.S. Coast Guard has primary
responsibility for coordinating maritime security. However, since the U.S. government expends
resources for DEA to operate in Haiti, it is incumbent on the agency to be as effective as possible
in its mission to disrupt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. DEA’s apparent position
that, because of its limited role, it is not accountable for the effectiveness of its work in Haiti, is
not reasonable. In its reports, DEA does not adequately explain why it did not provide additional
training and resources for seaport security and does not clarify whether DEA ever received the
screening equipment it requested. Nor does it adequately explain DEA’s payment for the
destruction of drugs in the Manzanares investigation, which it claims is still open. Moreover,
DEA failed to explain why there was a significant delay in severing ties with a corrupt Haitian

The President
July 30, 2021
Page 4 of 4
official. Accordingly, I cannot determine that the agency’s findings are reasonable. I urge DEA
to more closely review its operations in Haiti and implement measures to improve its
effectiveness.
As required by 5 U.S.C. § 1213(e)(3), OSC has sent copies of the agency report, this
letter, and the whistleblowers’ comments to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Senate and
House Committees on the Judiciary. OSC also has copies of these documents and a copy of the
original referral letter in our public file, which is available at www.osc.gov. This matter is now
closed.
Respectfully,

Henry J. Kerner
Special Counsel
Enclosures