Reconsidering Incarceration:
New Directions for Reducing Crime
January 2007

By Don

Stemen

Director of Research, Center on Sentencing and Corrections

From the director
After falling for more than a decade, in many parts
of the United States crime rates appear to be inching up again. Although it is still too early to call this
a trend, it is not hard to imagine this shift in direction
leading to calls for tougher sentences and more incarceration—even though our prisons are already full and
corrections in many states already absorbs so much of
the available resources.
The last time we embarked down this path, there
was little empirical evidence showing that jails and
prisons represented the best way to reduce crime. 
Today, in contrast, researchers have so much data to

Executive Summary

draw on that, for anyone not schooled in research protocols and analysis, it can sometimes seem like there’s

Current research on the relationship between incar-

too much information.

ceration and crime provides confusing and even

This report from Don Stemen, director of research

contradictory guidance for policymakers. The most

in Vera’s Center on Sentencing and Corrections, seeks

sophisticated analyses generally agree that increased

to make sense of the current body of research literature

incarceration rates have some effect on reducing

on the relationship between crime and incarceration.

crime, but the scope of that impact is limited: a 10 per-

As a comparison and analysis of what we now know

cent increase in incarceration is associated with a 2 to

about the relationship between crime and incarcera-

4 percent drop in crime. Moreover, analysts are nearly

tion, it should help policymakers and others understand

unanimous in their conclusion that continued growth

information that is complex, and sometimes seemingly

in incarceration will prevent considerably fewer, if any,

contradictory. However, it also goes a step further,

crimes than past increases did and will cost taxpayers

examining research in related fields that suggest alter-

substantially more to achieve.

natives to incarceration that promise similar or better
results—sometimes at lower cost.

These outcomes raise the question of whether or
not further increases in incarceration offer the most

This report could not be more timely. For the past

effective and efficient strategy for combating crime.

several years, political leaders on both sides of the aisle

Additional research examined in this report reveals

have been looking for cost-effective ways to increase

several other variables that have also been shown to

public safety. Given the pragmatic demands of our

have a relationship with lower crime rates. An increase

times, we hope this report provides much needed

in the number of police per capita, a reduction in

guidance on the optimal use of incarceration, as well

unemployment, and increases in real wage rates and

as alternative investment choices.

education have all been shown to be associated with
lower rates of crime.
Although these latter findings do not necessarily
indicate a cause and effect relationship, they do suggest that policymakers with limited resources should
weigh the modest benefits of more incarceration

Michael P. Jacobson

against potentially greater reductions in crime that

Director, Vera Institute of Justice

might be realized from investing in other areas.

In the 1970s the United States embarked on one of the largest policy
experiments of the 20th century—the expanded use of incarceration to
achieve greater public safety. Between 1970 and 2005, state and federal
authorities increased prison populations by 628 percent.1 By 2005,
more than 1.5 million persons were incarcerated in U.S. prisons on any
given day, and an additional 750,000 were incarcerated in local jails.2
By the turn of the 21st century, more than 5.6 million living Americans
had spent time in a state or federal prison—nearly 3 percent of the U.S.
population.3 Having so many people imprisoned over the course of 30
years raises an obvious question: Has this experiment worked?

 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

The most sophisticated studies available generally agree that increased
incarceration rates have some impact on reducing crime rates, but the scope of
that impact is limited.4 For example, while the U.S. experienced a dramatic drop in
crime between 1992 and 1997, imprisonment was responsible for just 25 percent
of that reduction.5 Seventy-five percent of the crime drop through the 1990s was
attributable to factors other than incarceration.6 As a result, many commentators
argue that the pivotal question for policymakers is not “Does incarceration increase
public safety?” but rather, “Is incarceration the most effective way to increase
public safety?”
The emerging answer to the rephrased query is “no.” Analysts are nearly unanimous
in their conclusion that continued growth in incarceration will prevent considerably
fewer, if any, crimes—and at substantially greater cost to taxpayers.7 In the future,
policing strategies, unemployment, wages, education, and other factors associated
with low crime rates may account for more significant reductions. Yet, policy and
spending for public safety continue to focus heavily on imprisonment, effectively
limiting investment in these promising alternatives.
This paper seeks to help officials understand the complexities and limitations
of current research on incarceration and crime in the United States. It also
examines research on several of the other factors that might be developed as
part of an expanded notion of public safety.8 Informed by this more inclusive
understanding of current research, it suggests that effective public safety strategies
should move away from an exclusive focus on incarceration to embrace other
factors associated with low crime rates in a more comprehensive policy framework
for safeguarding citizens.

Estimating the Impact of Incarceration
on Crime

Research has consistently shown crime rates to be affected by many factors,

including economics, social and demographic characteristics, culture, politics,
and incarceration rates. To date, policymakers’ emphasis on incarceration for
reducing crime has been premised, largely, on theories about its influence in
incapacitating active offenders and deterring would-be offenders. However,
thanks to rapid increases in crime and imprisonment through the 1970s and
1980s, followed by a sharp decrease in crime in the 1990s, we now have a
large body of recent empirical work on the effects of incarceration to draw on
as well.9
Much of this research seeks to quantify the association between the size of
a jurisdiction’s incarceration rate and its crime rate.10 Led primarily by economists, these analyses have become increasingly sophisticated, examining
many factors and looking at data across jurisdictions and over long periods
of time.11 Much of this research has confirmed a relationship between higher
incarceration rates and lower crime rates. However, as Table 1 summarizes,
recent studies vary widely in their conclusions about how strong this relationship is and, in some cases, whether it really exists after all.12
For example, using national-level data, researchers have found that a 10 percent higher incarceration rate is associated with anywhere from a 9 percent to a
22 percent lower crime rate.13 In contrast, analyses using state-level data found
a weaker association, concluding that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is
associated with a crime rate that is anywhere from 0.11 percent to 4 percent
lower.14 Similar estimates have been generated from studies using county-level
data, ranging from a 2 percent to a 4 percent crime-rate difference.15 Moreover,
several studies have found no relationship between incarceration rates and
crime rates.16 One study even found that higher incarceration rates were associated with higher crime rates in states with already high incarceration rates
(incarceration rates above 325 inmates per 100,000 population).17
As these disparate findings suggest, the impact of incarceration on crime
is inconsistent from one study to the next. One could use available research to
argue that a 10 percent increase in incarceration is associated with no difference in crime rates, a 22 percent lower index crime rate, or a decrease only in
the rate of property crime.18 Therefore, to be guided by the available empirical
research, policymakers clearly need to develop a more nuanced understanding
of the literature.

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 

Table 1. Summary of Studies Estimating the Impact of Incarceration Rates on Crime Rates

Studies that do not account for simultaneity
Study	
	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates  	
due to a 10% increase in incarceration rates

	
Devine,
		
Sheley, and Smith (1988)19	
National — 1948–1985
		

–28.4 (violent offenses)
–19.9 (property offenses)
–22.0 (index offenses)

	
		
Marvell and Moody (1997, 1998)20	
National — 1958–1995
		

–7.9 (violent offenses)
–9.5 (property offenses)
–9.3 (index offenses)

Marvell and Moody (1994)21	

–1.6 (index offenses)

49 states — 1971–1989	

	
Besci
		
(1999)22	
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		
Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001)23	
50 states — 1971–1997
		
Donahue and Levitt (2001)24	
50 states — 1973–1997
		

–0.46 (violent offenses)
–0.91 (property offenses)
–0.87 (index offenses)

	

not significant (violent offenses)
–1.1 (property offenses)

	

not significant (violent offenses)
–1.6 (property offenses)

	
Levitt (2001)25	
50 states — 1950–1999
		

–0.76 (property offenses)
–1.3 (violent offenses)

		
DeFina and Arvanites (2002)26	
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1998
		
		

	

not signifiant (murder, rape, assault, robbery)
–1.1 (burglary)
–0.56 (larceny)
–1.4 (auto theft)

Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)27	

not significant (index offenses)

57 Florida counties — 1980–1998 	

Washington State Institute 		
39 Washington counties — 1980–2001	
for Public Policy (2003)28	

–2.4 (index offenses)	

	
		
Liedka, Piehl, and Useem (2006)29	
50 states and D.C. — 1970–2000
		
		

–0.118 (index offenses) 				
(states with incarceration rates <325)		
+0.05 (index offenses) 	
(states with incarceration rates >325)

Kovandzic and Vieraitis (2006)30	

not significant (index offenses)

58 Florida counties — 1980–2000 	

Studies that do account for simultaneity
Study	
	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates  	
due to a 10% increase in incarceration rates

	
Levitt (1996)31	
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		

–3.8 (violent offenses)	
–2.6 (property offenses)	

Spelman (2000)32	

–4.0 (index offenses)	

50 states and D.C. — 1971–1997	

	
Spelman (2005)33	
254 Texas counties — 1990–2000
		

–4.4 (violent offenses)	
–3.6 (property offenses)

Evaluating the Findings: The Limits of Research. All stud-

ies are not equal in design and value, of course. Different findings often arise
because of crucially important methodological choices that researchers make
and which the literature has only recently begun to address and settle. These
include:

• 	 the choice of whether to study the relationship between incarceration
and crime at the county, state, or national level (i.e., the level of aggregation used);34

• 	 whether

a study accounts for the fact that incarceration and crime

occupy a two-way street in which each influences the other (i.e., whether
an analysis controls for simultaneity); and

• 	 the

number of other factors affecting crime that a study takes into

account (i.e., the specification of other factors potentially associated with
crime rates).
Such technical decisions can produce tremendous differences in results, leading researchers and policymakers to strikingly different conclusions.
On which findings should policymakers rely, then? “[I]f...results are to
converge on a defensible estimate,” argues William Spelman, perhaps the
leading researcher in this area, “[t]hey must measure effects at the lowest level
of aggregation possible,” “account for simultaneity,” and control for as many
other factors as possible.35 Accordingly, the most reliable studies are those con-

Supporters take the findings
as a confirmation that
prison works, concluding
that every 10 percent
increase in incarceration
rates will produce a 2 to 4
percent decrease in crime
rates. Opponents, on the

ducted at the state or county level that account for simultaneity and consider

other hand, see the findings

a significant number of crime-related factors. To date, only three studies—two

as a confirmation that

by Spelman and one by Steven D. Levitt—include all three of these criteria.36
Interestingly, all three have produced a fairly consistent finding, associating a

prison does not work very

10 percent higher incarceration rate with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate.37

well at all.

Levitt’s and Spelman’s findings have garnered a great deal of attention from
both supporters and opponents of a continued emphasis on incarceration.
Supporters take the findings as a confirmation that prison works, concluding
that every 10 percent increase in incarceration rates will produce a 2 to 4 percent decrease in crime rates. Opponents, on the other hand, see the findings
as a confirmation that prison does not work very well at all. They maintain that
even a 4 percent decrease in crime is not much for a 10 percent increase in
incarceration.38 Indeed, Spelman himself characterizes a 2 to 4 percent crime
reduction as a fairly limited impact given the sizable financial obligation states
have incurred in incarcerating so many people.
An even more complex picture emerges from analyses focusing on the
neighborhood level.39 A growing body of research examining specific neighborhoods finds that more incarceration can actually lead to increasing crime rates.40
Several recent studies maintain that communities may reach an incarceration
“tipping point.” Dina Rose and Todd Clear, for example, found that the level of
crime in several Florida communities increased after the incarceration rate of

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 

 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

individuals from those communities reached a certain level.41 Rose and Clear
argue that high rates of imprisonment break down the social and family bonds
that guide individuals away from crime, remove adults who would otherwise
nurture children, deprive communities of income, reduce future income potential, and engender a deep resentment toward the legal system. As a result, as
communities become less capable of maintaining social order through families or social groups, crime rates go up.42

Applying the Research Findings: Perils for Policy. Setting

aside the possibility of such tipping points, even if a limited relationship
between crime and incarceration were established, a precise ratio could not be
applied to policymaking in every location. This is because empirical research
on incarceration and crime is not meant to be a prescription for future imprisonment policies at the local level, even though this is how some seek to use
it. Research only provides an estimate of average relationships between incarceration and crime rates across jurisdictions. Thus, such findings are a blunt
instrument whose applicability to any specific jurisdiction is dubious.
Research, therefore, cannot predict the impact of future prison increases
in a given state. What happens in any particular jurisdiction will depend on a
variety of factors that have yet to be contemplated by crime and incarceration
research. Some of these are environmental, such as social preferences, economic changes, and political activity. Others are practical: the size of a state’s
current prison population, the way offenders are sanctioned or incarcerated,
and the types of offenders a state chooses to incarcerate. In the debate about
the impact of incarceration on crime, such issues are generally overlooked by
both sides and largely absent in the academic literature they draw upon. This
is surprising given the practical influence these considerations can exert on
the bigger issue of how crime and incarceration interact. The following brief
discussion of each of these factors may help illustrate the limitations.

The Size of State Prison Populations
The size of a state’s prison population and crime rate will influence the impact
of increases in incarceration rates. To date, most arguments for more incarceration to further reduce crime have relied on Spelman’s estimate that a 10
percent increase correlates with a 2 to 4 percent lower crime rate. Even if that
estimate is accurate, however, for a state with an already high incarceration rate
the costs of increasing incarceration by 10 percent to achieve a 2 to 4 percent
reduction in crime could be tremendous. For example, California and Nebraska
had very similar crime rates in 2003 of approximately 4,000 index offenses

per 100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 2 to 4 percent reduction,
California, with a prison population of 162,678 inmates, would have to incarcerate an additional 16,089 inmates.43 To achieve the same rate of reduction,
Nebraska, with a prison population of 3,976, would have to incarcerate just 400
additional inmates. If the average cost to incarcerate an offender for one year is
$22,650, California would spend $355 million more than Nebraska to achieve
the same level of public safety.44 The cost incurred per unit of crime reduction,
then, is substantially larger for California. Thus, an increase in incarceration
in a state with an already large prison population may require a huge boost in
actual prison populations that may be difficult to sustain economically.
Raymond Liedka, Anne Piehl, and Bert Useem have confirmed, moreover,
that increases in prison populations in states with already large prison populations have less impact on crime than increases in states with smaller prison
populations.45 States experience “accelerating declining marginal returns, that
is, a percent reduction in crime that gets ever smaller with ever larger prison
populations,” they argue.46 Thus, increases in incarceration rates are associated
with lower crime rates at low levels of imprisonment, but the size of that association shrinks as incarceration rates get bigger. Eventually, they say, there is
an “inflection point” where increases in incarceration rates are associated with
higher crime rates. This inflection point occurs when a state’s incarceration
rate reaches some point between 325 and 492 inmates per 100,000 people. In
other words, states with incarceration rates above this range can expect to experience higher crime rates with future increases in incarceration rates. (This
state-level phenomenon recalls the neighborhood effects of high incarceration
rates cited by Rose and Clear.)

The Content of Punishment
Incarceration is not the only punishment that may reduce crime rates. Other
types of punishment, including fines, probation, community service, drug
treatment, or other sanctions have also been shown to suppress crime. These
alternative sanctions are not considered in the crime control studies noted
above, however. Had they increased at the same time as the expansion of imprisonment, these sanctions may have contributed—in part or even completely—to
the effects found in those studies. Similarly, the content of incarceration—the
quality of inmates’ experience in prison—may matter greatly as well. Studies
so far have only considered how the size of prison populations affects crime
rates. Although some research has examined how related factors like the
length of stay in prison or changes in supervision policies after release influence recidivism, no studies apparently have considered how or whether such
factors affect crime rates.

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 

 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

The research on crime rates has not examined the impact of prison-based
programming, either. States vary a great deal in the amount and content of programs offered to inmates. A large body of literature has found that the design
and content of specific programs can reduce individual recidivism rates.47 For
example, drug treatments using therapeutic community models or rehabilitative programs tailored to the risks and needs of offenders have been shown to
reduce recidivism, while boot camps and unstructured rehabilitation programs
have been found to have no positive influence on recidivism.48 Given this demonstrated impact on recidivism, it stands to reason that programming during
incarceration could also affect incarceration’s influence on crime rates.

The Types of Offenders in Prison
The type of offenders a state decides to incarcerate may also be a relevant factor.
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins argue that continued expansion of the
prison system does little more than increase the number of individuals in the
criminal justice net without reducing criminal offending or crime rates.49 U.S.
prisons already housed the most serious violent offenders in the early 1980s,
they argue; prison expansion since then has resulted in nothing more than the
imprisonment of large numbers of nonviolent, “marginal” offenders. Thus,
since the worst offenders had already been incarcerated, Zimring and Hawkins
contend that increasing incarceration rates through the 1990s did nothing to
impact the crime rate.
Others have noted as well that the increased incarceration of drug offenders has helped reduce the effectiveness of incarceration.50 Between 1980 and
2005, the number of inmates incarcerated for drug possession in state prisons or local jails grew by more than 1,000 percent.51 By 2004, 419,000 drug
possessors were incarcerated in state prisons or local jails at a cost of nearly
$8.3 billion annually.52 Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt argue that the
continued increase in the number of drug offenders in prisons may lead to a
“crowding out” effect, in which the high number of incarcerated drug offenders
prevents the incarceration of offenders prone to more serious crime, thereby
reducing the effectiveness of incarceration to reduce crime. 52a
Analysts agree with apparent unanimity that future increases in incarceration rates for such offenders will do less and cost more.53 Washington State,
for example, concluded that while more incarceration has led to less crime
in the state, the benefits of additional prison expansion will be smaller and
more expensive to achieve.54 Specifically, an increase in the incarceration rate
in 2003 prevented considerably fewer crimes than did previous similar-size
increases. The state further concluded that while incarcerating violent and
high-volume property offenders continued to generate more benefits than

costs, in the future each additional person incarcerated will result in fewer prevented crimes. Washington even found that increasing the incarceration rate
for drug offenders in the 1990s actually had a negative impact overall, as it
now costs more to incarcerate additional drug offenders than the average value
of the crimes prevented by their imprisonment. Money should not be the sole
measure by which policymakers evaluate the effectiveness or attractiveness of
a policy, of course. However, financial implications are a relevant concern of
officials facing limited public resources and a seemingly endless list of areas in
need of investment.

Estimating the Impact of Other
Factors on Crime
Between 1990 and 2005, the crime rate in the United States fell dramatically to
its lowest point in 30 years.55 However, as noted earlier, according to Spelman
only 25 percent of this crime drop through the 1990s could be explained by
increasing incarceration rates.56 The remaining 75 percent, therefore, must be
due to factors other than incarceration. Indeed, researchers have identified a
number of such factors including, for example, fewer young persons in the
population, smaller urban populations, decreases in crack cocaine markets,
lower unemployment rates, higher wages, more education and high school
graduates, more police per capita, and more arrests for public order offenses.57
An examination of just a few of these indicates that future investment in other
policy areas may be not only more effective but also more cost effective than
continued investment in increased prison populations (see Table 2).
CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 

10 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

Policing. Several authors have found an association between increases in

the number of police per capita and lower crime rates. For example, using citylevel data, Levitt found that a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police
force was associated with an 11 percent lower violent crime rate and a 3 percent lower property crime rate.58 Thomas Marvel and Carlisle Moody similarly
found a 10 percent increase in the size of a city’s police force associated with
a 3 percent reduction in index crime rates.59 Using county-level data, Tomislav
Kovandzic and John J. Sloan also found associations between the size of police

Future investment

forces and crime, concluding that a 10 percent increase in the number of

in other policy areas may

level, however, Marvel and Moody found no association between the size of the

police was associated with a 1.4 percent lower index crime rate.60 At the state-

be not only more effective

police force and crime rates. This disparate finding suggests that the impact of

but also more cost effective

Using Marvel and Moody’s estimate tying a 10 percent increase in the size

than continued investment

of a city’s police force to a 3 percent decrease in the index crime rate, we can

in increased prison

say, New York City, where the 2004 index crime rate was 2,800 offenses per

populations.

increased police presence may be felt only at the local level.61

imagine how a crime reduction policy focusing on policing might operate in,
100,000 people in the population. To achieve a 3 percent reduction in the crime
rate by increasing incarceration, New York City—with a prison population of
33,564 inmates—would have to incarcerate an additional 3,300 inmates at a
cost of approximately $121.5 million per year.62, 63 With a police force of 39,110
sworn police officers, the city could achieve the same reduction in crime by
hiring 3,911 more police officers at a cost of $97.2 million per year.64, 65 Compared to policing, then, incarceration would cost the city $24.3 million more to
achieve the same level of public safety.66
It is important to note that in the same way the content of incarceration
policy may affect how imprisonment relates to crime, so too may the content
of policing policy influence how crime develops. Poorly structured policing
policies could negate the positive potential of an increase in officers. Also, an
increase in the number of police would not necessarily translate directly into
more law enforcement and arrests. Provided such concerns are taken into
account, however, this example illustrates the promise of increasing policing
as an alternative to increasing incarceration.67

Unemployment and Wages. Incarceration, employment, and income

interact on several levels in the United States. Incarceration creates problems
of low earnings and irregular employment for individuals after release from
prison by dissuading employers from hiring them, disqualifying them from
certain professions, eroding job skills, limiting acquisition of work experience, creating behaviors inconsistent with work routines outside prison, and
undermining social connections to good job opportunities.68 Research has

Table 2. Summary of Studies Estimating the Impact of Other Social Factors on Crime Rates

Police per Capita
Study	
	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates 	
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Marvell and Moody (1996)	
	
Marvell and Moody (1996)	

56 U.S. cities — 1971–1992	

–3 (index offenses)

49 states — 1971–1992 	

not significant (index offenses)	

	
Levitt (1997)	
59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992
		

–11 (violent offenses)	
–3 (property offenses)

Kovandzic and Sloan (2002)	

57 Florida counties — 1980–1998	

–1.4 (index offenses)	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates 	
due to a 10% increase in indicator

	

Unemployment Rate
Study	
	

Levitt (1996)83	
50 states and D.C. — 1971–1993
		
Levitt (1997)	
59 U.S. cities — 1970–1992
		
Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer (2001)	
50 states — 1971–1997
		

	

	

	
Gould et al. (2002)	
705 counties — 1979–1997
		

	

	

not significant (violent offenses)	
10 (property offenses)
not significant (violent offenses)	
10.4 (property offenses)
not significant (violent offenses)	
16.3 (property offenses)
not significant (violent offenses)	
16.6 (property offenses)

Real Wages
Study	
	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates 	
due to a 10% increase in indicator

	
Gould
et al. (2002)	
705 counties — 1979–1997
		
		

–25.3 (violent offenses)	
–12.6 (property offenses)
–13.5 (index offenses)

	
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001)	
50 states — 1971–1997
		

–1.6 (violent offenses)
not significant (property offenses)

Grogger (1998)	

–10 (index offenses)

Individual survey data (1980)	

	

High School Graduation Rate
Study	
	

Data 	
	

Estimated percentage change in crime rates 	
due to a 10% increase in indicator

Lochner and Moretti (2004)	

50 states — 1960, 1970, 1980	

–9.4 (index offenses)

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 11

	

12 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

shown that men with criminal records experience no growth in earnings and,
therefore, have few choices other than day labor.69 At the community level,
neighborhoods with high incarceration rates may be shunned by employers.
Further, as John Hagan argues, incarceration can generate social connections
to illegal rather than legal employment, thus, potentially increasing crime.70
Indeed, researchers have found that economic shifts have significantly
affected crime rates in the last decade. Using state-level data, Steven Raphael
and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer found that a 10 percent decrease in a state’s unemployment rate corresponded with a 16 percent reduction in property crime rates;
the researchers concluded that, between 1992 and 1997, “slightly more than
40 percent of the decline [in the overall property crime rate] can be attributed
to the decline in unemployment.”71 Liedka, Piehl, and Useem produced similar findings, also using state-level data.72 Analyses using county-level data have
produced estimates that find a similar association between unemployment and
crime; Eric Gould, Bruce Weinberg, and David Mustard, for example, found
that a 10 percent reduction in unemployment rates was associated with a 16.6
percent reduction in property crime.73 Both studies found no association, however, between unemployment and violent crime.74 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer
conclude that “the magnitudes of the crime-unemployment effects...suggest
that policies aimed at improving the employment prospects of workers facing
the greatest obstacles can be effective tools for combating crime.”75
Research has also considered the relationship between real wages and
crime. Using national-level data, Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard determined
that a 10 percent increase in real wages saw a 13 percent lower index crime
rate—specifically, a 12 percent lower property crime rate and a 25 percent lower
violent crime rate.76 At the state level, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer found that a
10 percent increase in per capita income saw a 1.6 percent lower violent crime
rate; Liedka, Piehl, and Useem found similar associations at the state level.77
Using individual-level data, Jeffrey Grogger found that a 10 percent increase in
real wages was associated with a 10 percent decrease in crime participation at
the individual level.78 In examining the crime drop of the 1990s, Grogger and
Michael Willis suggested that a better economy allowed more young people
opportunities in the labor market rather than in crime. They attributed the
crime drop largely to the expanding economy.79

Education. The link between crime and education has also begun to

attract research attention. Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, for example,
have shown an increase in citizens’ education levels to be associated with lower
crime rates: specifically, a one-year increase in the average education of citizens results in a 1.7 percent lower index crime rate. In addition, they associated
a 10 percent increase in graduation rates with a 9.4 percent lower index crime

rate. Combined with Gould and his colleagues’ findings on the link between
wages and crime, Lochner and Moretti argue that “a 10 percent increase in
high school graduation rates should reduce arrest rates by 5 to 10 percent
through increased wages alone.”80 “[A] 1 percent increase in male high school
graduation rates would save as much as $1.4 billion” nationally through crime
reduction, they conclude.81
Moreover, prison-based education programs have been found to significantly reduce recidivism rates for offenders after release.82 In their recent
examination of the effects of prison education participation across three states,
researchers Stephen Steurer, Linda Smith, and Alice Tracy did not consider the
impact of such education programs on overall crime rates, but their findings of
significantly reduced recidivism for individuals who participated in such programs underscore the impact of education on reentry success.

Beyond Incarceration
Given the demonstrated influence of these other factors on crime and the
decreasing impact of incarceration, criminal justice policymakers appear to have
placed undue emphasis on incarceration. As William Spelman has cautioned, “It
is no longer sufficient, if it ever was, to demonstrate that prisons are better than
nothing. Instead, they must be better than the next-best use of the money.”84
Yet, in the past two decades, spending on these other factors has been cut.
Corrections expenditures were the only state budget category other than Medicaid to increase as a percentage of total state spending over the past 20 years.85
Between 1985 and 2004, states increased corrections spending by 202 percent. By comparison, spending on higher education grew by just 3 percent,
Medicaid by 47 percent, and secondary and elementary education by 55 percent; spending on public assistance decreased by more than 60 percent during
the same period (see Figure 1).86 Public opinion appears to be in harmony with
a move away from incarceration spending. Whereas 75 percent of Americans
believed that too little money was spent on halting rising crime rates in 1994,
by 2002, this had declined to 56 percent. In contrast, during the same period
the proportion of Americans responding that too little money was spent on
welfare increased from 13 percent to 21 percent.87
Such approaches are not new to criminal justice policy discussions. Many
commentators have argued for a crime reduction policy that focuses on the
labor market by addressing employment, wages, and education.89 In the lim-

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 13

14 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

ited areas where such policies have been implemented, they have targeted
individuals believed to be at high risk of crime involvement, such as high
school dropouts, inner-city youth, offenders, and ex-offenders. But a broader
approach would require a shift in criminal justice policy away from reactive
responses to criminal offending and toward a proactive attempt to address the
underlying causes of criminal offending. It also requires a more general shift
in policymaking attitudes toward the view that public safety may best be served
by protecting citizens from the factors that can contribute to crime.

Figure 1. Percentage Change in State Spending, 1985-2004
250

200

N

T

50

0

P ERCE

100

CH A

N

G

E

150

-50

-100
TOTAL

CORRECTIONS

SECONDARY AND
ELEMENTARY
EDUCATION

MEDICAID

HIGHER
EDUCATION

TRANSPORTATION

PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE

Source: National Association of State Budget Officers, State Expenditure Reports annual series.

Moreover, the public favors a policy that addresses the underlying causes of
crime rather than simply responds to crime after it occurs. Polling by Peter D.
Hart Research Associates, for example, shows the public questioning whether
incarceration is the best crime control policy. In 1994, 42 percent of Americans favored responding to crime with stricter sentencing; by 2001, this had
decreased to just 32 percent. Conversely, in 1994, only 48 percent of Americans said they favored addressing the underlying causes of crime; by 2001, this
had increased to 65 percent (see Figure 2).88

n = TOUGHER RESPONSES TO CRIME
n = ADDRESS THE CAUSES OF CRIME

Figure 2. Public Support for Approaches to Crime, 1994 and 2001

70

60

50

P
ERCE N

40

T

30

20

10

0
1994

2001

Source: Peter D. Hart and Associates.

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 15

16 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

Toward a New Approach to Public Safety
After 15 years of declining crime rates, many analysts are claiming that “prison
works.” But, as Elliot Currie notes, “if ‘prison works’ is the answer, what was
the question?”90 If the question is whether it is possible to prevent individuals from committing crimes by putting them in prison, then prison certainly
works; it works to punish and incapacitate those who have committed crimes.
But if the question is what is the best way to reduce crime, “prison works”
may not be the most helpful response. Does a five-year prison sentence “work”
better to reduce crime than a two-year prison sentence? Does a two-year prison
sentence for nonviolent offenders “work” as well as a two-year prison sentence
for violent offenders?
The most salient question of all may be, Do the resources devoted to prison
“work” better to ensure public safety than if those resources were devoted to
something else?91 Prisons are not the only way to fight crime. Policymakers
could spend money on more judges, better staffed or equipped law enforcement, or better-trained probation and parole officers. They could invest, as this
paper indicates, in other, non-criminal-justice areas shown to affect crime: education, employment, economic development, etc. The impact of incarceration
on crime is limited and diminishing. The public’s support for reactive crime
control is also in decline. It is therefore fitting that we reconsider the continued
emphasis on and dedication of resources to incarceration.
Public safety cannot be achieved only by responding to crime after it
occurs; research shows that it may also depend on protecting people against
those factors that have been shown to be associated with high crime rates,
such as unemployment, poverty, and illiteracy. By pursuing crime reduction
chiefly through incarceration, states are forgoing the opportunity to invest in
these other important areas. As state policymakers continue to feel pressure
to introduce measures to keep crime rates low, they would therefore do well to
look beyond incarceration for alternative policies that not only may be able to
accomplish the important task of protecting public safety, but may do so more
efficiently and more effectively.

Endnotes
1	 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners 1925-1985 (Washington, DC:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986). Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck,
Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005 (Washington, DC: Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2006).
2	 Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, 2006.
3	 Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U.S. Population,
1974-2001 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003).
4	 William Spelman, “What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us about
Imprisonment and Crime” Crime and Justice 27 (2000): 419.
5	 William Spelman, 2000.
6	 These include factors such as lower unemployment, higher wages, and
more police per capita.
7	 William Spelman, 2000; William Spelman, “Jobs or Jails? The Crime
Drop in Texas” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24 (2005):
133-165; Steven D. Levitt, “Understanding Why Crime Fell in the
1990s: Four Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2004): 163-190 (“…sharply
declining marginal benefits of incarceration are a possibility” p. 179);
Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt, “An Empirical Analysis of
Imprisoning Drug Offenders” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004):
2043-2066 (“For typical values of the costs of crime, even the most generous estimates of the crime reduction attributable to prison…suggest
that current levels of incarceration are excessive.” p. 2063); Tomislav V. Kovandzic and Lynne M. Vieraitis, “The Effect of County-Level
Prison Population Growth on Crime Rates” Crime and Public Policy 5
no. 2 (2006): 213-244; Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and
Bert Useem, “The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale
Matter?” Crime and Public Policy 5 no. 2 (2006): 245-276 (“The findings
developed here go beyond the claim…that continued prison expansion
has reached a point of declining marginal returns. Instead, accelerating diminishing marginal returns were found.” p. 272); Washington
State Institute for Public Policy, The Criminal Justice System in Washington State: Incarceration Rates, Taxpayer Costs, Crime Rates, and Prison
Economics (Olympia, WA: Washington State Institute for Public Policy,
2003); Anne Morrison Piehl and John J. DiIulio, “‘Does Prison Pay?’
Revisited” The Brookings Review 13 no. 1 (1995) (findings indicate that
when drug offenders are included in calculations, continued prison
expansion is not cost effective).
8	 Several recent publications have made a similar effort to provide policymakers with a resource to use in the policy debate over crime control.
See, e.g., James Austin and Tony Fabelo, The Diminishing Returns of
Increased Incarceration: A Blueprint to Improve Public Safety and Reduce
Costs (Washington, DC: JFA Institute, 2004); Eric Lotke, Deborah
Stromberg, and Vincent Schiraldi, Swing States: Crime, Prisons, and the
Future of the Nation, (Washington, DC: Justice Policy Institute, 2004);
Jenni Gainsborough and Marc Mauer, Diminishing Returns: Crime and
Incarceration in the 1990s (Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project,
2000); Ryan S. King, Marc Mauer, and Malcolm C. Young, Incarceration
and Crime: A Complex Relationship (Washington, DC: The Sentencing
Project, 2005). The most recent publication by The Sentencing Project
(2005) provides the most thorough treatment to date, highlighting the
contradictory descriptive evidence used to support continued increases
in incarceration and discussing the findings of empirical studies on the
topic. However, these worthy publications leave room for further analysis of the academic studies on which policy arguments are based in a
way that allows policymakers to critically engage with the research and
assess the strengths and weaknesses of alternative arguments.

9	 For a thorough review of the literature, see, e.g., William Spelman,
“The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion,” in The Crime Drop in
America, eds. A. Blumstein and J. Wallman (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000).
10	 The incarceration rate is defined as the number of sentenced persons in
prison per 100,000 population. Analysts use either the national incarceration rate (the number of sentenced persons in state or federal prison
per 100,000 U.S. population) or state incarceration rates (the number
of sentenced persons in a particular state’s prisons per 100,000 state
population). The crime rate is defined as the number of crimes reported
to police per 100,000 population, based on the Uniform Crime Reports
produced annually by the FBI. When analysts or the media refer to the
“crime rate,” they generally mean the index crime rate, which is based
on a set of eight violent and property crimes—murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. Analysts may also use the violent
crime rate (which is based only on the crimes of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, aggravated assault, and robbery) or
the property crime rate (which is based only on the crimes of burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft).
11	 These studies principally attempt to estimate the “elasticity of the crime
rate”—that is, the percentage change in the crime rate that is associated with a certain percentage change in the incarceration rate. These
studies are not looking at changes or growth in incarceration and crime
rates; rather, they are looking at associations between different levels
of incarceration and crime rates. Research is not, however, making a
causal connection between the increase in one state’s incarceration rate
and a direct decrease in that state’s crime rate. This is often misstated in
both the research and the polemical and political uses of the research.
12	 Research estimating the elasticity of crime rates has generally relied on
one of two sets of data to reach this conclusion: national data or state
data. Analyses relying on national-level data include incarceration and
crime rates for the entire United States and examine relationships
between these rates over time. Analyses relying on state-level data
include incarceration and crime rates for each state and examine relationships between these rates both across states (i.e., comparing states
to each other) and within states over time (i.e., comparing a state to
itself over time). A third approach is slowly emerging—using countylevel data to examine the relationship between incarceration and crime
in a single state. Analyses relying on such data include incarceration
and crime rates for each county in a particular state and examine relationships between these both across counties (i.e., comparing counties
to each other) and within counties over time (i.e., comparing a county
to itself over time). Combined, all of these studies have produced
little consensus on how strong that relationship may be, resulting in
widely divergent estimates of the association between incarceration and
crime.
13	 Joel A. Devine, Joseph F. Sheley, and M. Dwayne Smith, “Macroeconomic and Social-Control Policy Influences on Crime Rate Changes,
1948-1985” American Sociological Review 53 (1988): 407-420; Thomas
B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, “The Impact of Prison Growth on
Homicide” Homicide Studies 1 (1997): 205-233; Thomas B. Marvell and
Carlisle E. Moody, “The Impact of Out-of-State Prison Population on
State Homicide Rates: Displacement and Free Rider Effects” Criminology 36 (1998): 513-535.
14	 Zsolt Besci, “Economics and Crime in the States” Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Economic Review First Quarter (1999): 39-56; William Spelman,
2000.
15	 Washington Institute for Public Policy, 2003; Spelman, 2005.

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 17

18 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

16	 See Tomislav V. Kovandzic and John Sloan, 2002; Tomislav V. Kovandzic and Lynne M. Vieraitis, 2006. In other cases, they conclude that
incarceration rates are unrelated to violent crime rates, in particular
(see, e.g., Rapheal and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Defina and Arvanites,
2002; Levitt, 2001). For example, a Florida study by Tomislav Kovandzic and Lynne Vieraitis (2002) found no association between
incarceration rates and crime rates. In contrast, researchers Thomas
Marvel and Carlisle Moody (1994) found that higher incarceration rates
were generally related to lower index crime rates—but they also found
“little or no impact on murder, rape, or assault.” Indeed, according to
Marvel and Moody, higher incarceration rates were associated with
lower crime rates only for robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle
theft. Researchers Robert DeFina and Thomas Arvanites (2002) similarly found that higher incarceration rates were associated with lower
crime rates for burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, but not for
murder, rape, assault, or robbery. In one of the most sophisticated
studies, Steven D. Levitt (2001) established a very modest association between incarceration rates and property crime rates—with a 10
percent higher incarceration rate associated with a 1.6 percent lower
property crime rate—but no association between incarceration and violent crime (Steven Levitt, “Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link
between Unemployment and Crime” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 17 (2001): 377-390).
17	 Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, 2006.
18	 See also William Spelman, (2000, 2005) and Steven Levitt (2004),
which provide thorough reviews of the research.
19	 The estimates of the effects on index, violent, and property crime rates
are taken from William Spelman (2000). Devine, Sheley, and Smith
(1988) report only estimates for the effects on homicide (-18.8), robbery
(-30.9), and burglary (-19.9).
20	 Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, 1997; Thomas B. Marvell and
Carlisle E. Moody, 1998. The estimates of the effects on index, violent,
and property crime rates are not reported in Marvell and Moody (1997,
1998); the estimates here are taken from William Spelman (2000).
21	 Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, “Prison Population Growth
and Crime Reduction” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 10 (1994):
109-140. The estimates of the effects on index, violent, and property
crime rates are not reported in Marvel and Moody (1994); Marvel and
Moody report only estimates for the effects of individual offenses—
homicide, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle
theft. The estimates here are taken from William Spelman (2000).

29	 Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, “The
Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?” Crime and
Public Policy 5 no. 2 (2006): 245-276.
30	 Tomislav V. Kovandzic and Lynne M. Vieraitis, “The Effect of CountyLevel Prison Population Growth on Crime Rates” Criminology and Public
Policy 5 no. 2 (2006): 213-244.
31	 Steven D. Levitt, “The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates:
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 111 no. 2 (1996): 319-351.
32	 William Spelman, 2000.
33	 William Spelman, 2005.
34	 William Spelman (2005) noted similar differences in studies looking at
the effects of unemployment rates on crime rates. Studies using high
levels of aggregation (i.e., at the national or state level) were unlikely to
show that unemployment had any effect on crime rates. In other words,
when studies used national or state-level data, researchers found that
unemployment has no effect on crime rates. However, when analyses
used county, metropolitan, or city-level data, researchers found that
unemployment did affect crime rates; most of these studies found that
a 10 percent decrease in the unemployment rate leads to a 2 percent
decrease in the crime rate. At the neighborhood level, the impact is
even greater, with a 10 percent decrease in the unemployment rate leading to an 11 percent decrease in crime rates.
35	 William Spelman, 2005: 137.
36	 Steven D. Levitt, 1996; William Spelman, 2000, 2005.
37	 Note that the county-level work by the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy (2003) found a similar decrease of 2.4 percent in the
crime rate; however, the Washington study did not account for simultaneity in its analysis. For a contrary finding, see Kovandzic and Sloan
(2002), which also uses county-level data without accounting for simultaneity; in this study, the authors found no effect of incarceration on
crime rates.
38	 For example, in 1972, when the prison population was 196,000, the
U.S. would have needed to incarcerate an additional 19,609 offenders
to achieve this 2 to 4 percent reduction in crime. However, in 2004,
when the prison population was nearly 1.5 million, an additional
149,422 offenders would have had to have been incarcerated to achieve
the same result—nearly the entire 1972 prison population.

22	 Zsolt Besci, 1999: 39-56.
23	 Steven Raphael and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, “Identifying the Effect of
Unemployment on Crime” Journal of Law and Economics 44 (2001):
259-283.
24	 John J. Donohue and Steven D. Levitt, “The Impact of Legalized
Abortion on Crime” Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 no. 2 (2001):
379-420.
25	 Steven D. Levitt, “Alternative Strategies for Identifying the Link between
Unemployment and Crime” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 17 no. 4
(2001): 377-390.
26	 Robert H. Defina and Thomas M. Arvanites, “The Weak Effect of
Imprisonment on Crime: 1971-1998” Social Science Quarterly 53 (2002):
407-420.
27	 Tomislav V. Kovandzic and John Sloan, “Police Levels and Crime Rates
Revisited: A County-Level Analysis from Florida (1980-1998)” Journal
of Criminal Justice 30 (2002): 65-76.
28	 Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2003.

39	 Such a local focus makes sense since crime and law enforcement
are local phenomena that are best understood by close examination
of their smallest constituent parts. Indeed, decisions and policies on
how to respond to specific instances and levels of crime are not made
at the national or state level but are made at the county, municipal,
precinct, or beat-level. And, as the growing literature on the neighborhood effects of incarceration indicates, imprisonment and its effects
are local phenomena as well, with incarcerated populations mostly
coming from and returning to the same neighborhoods or even the
same blocks. Crime data, for example, is now collected and tracked at
the block-level in many places. Police departments make staffing and
resource decisions based on detailed analyses of trends in such data
across municipalities, neighborhoods, and blocks. Research increasingly shows that prison and jail populations are not made up of a cross
section of state or county residents that is equally dispersed across a
region. Rather, incarcerated populations mostly come from and return
to the same neighborhoods or even the same blocks. See e.g. James P.
Lynch and William J. Sabol, Prisoner Reentry in Perspective (Washington,
DC: Urban Institute, 2001).
40	 Dan Kahan, “Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence” Virginia Law Review 83 (1997): 349; James P. Lynch and William J. Sabol,
“Assessing the Effects of Mass Incarceration on Informal Social Control in Comunities” Criminology and Public Policy 3 (2004): 267-294;

Richard B. Freeman, “Why Do So Many Young American Men Commit
Crimes and What Might We Do About It?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (1995): 25-42; Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, “The Effect
of Conviction on Income through the Life Cycle” International Review
of Law and Economics 18 (1998): 25-40; Joel Waldfogel, “The Effect of
Criminal Conviction on Income and the Trust Reposed in the Workmen” Journal of Human Resources 29 (1994): 62-81; Bruce Western and
Kathy Beckett, “How Unregulated is the U.S. Labor Market: The Penal
System as a Labor Market Institution” American Journal of Sociology
104 (1999): 1030-1060. A growing body of literature has examined the
socially detrimental “unintended” consequences of incarceration (see,
e.g., Dina R. Rose and Todd Clear “Incarceration, Social Capital, and
Crime: Implications for Social Disorganization Theory” Criminology 36
no. 3 (1998): 441-480; Mark Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind, Invisible
Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment (New
York: New Press, 2002); Mary Pattillo, David Weiman, and Bruce Western, Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass Incarceration (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2004)). Unfortunately, the
same types of sophisticated statistical analyses that have been conducted
at the national, state, and county levels do not yet exist at the neighborhood level. As a result, there are no existing numerical estimates of how
differences in crime rates may interact with incarceration rates at the
neighborhood level. Nonetheless, the neighborhood research conducted
so far and the conclusions drawn from it should temper the willingness
of observers to unquestioningly embrace findings from studies based
on higher levels of aggregation, especially those at the state or national
levels.

crime-prone offenders; see Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt, “An
Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders” Journal of Public
Economics 88 (2004): 2043-2066, p. 2059.
51	 Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2005 (Washington,
DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005).
52	 The estimated number of inmates is based on an analysis of data collected through the Survey of Inmates in Local Jails and the Survey of
Inmates in State Correctional Facilities conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The costs of incarceration are based on the conservative
estimated cost of $20,000 per inmate per year.
52a	Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven Levitt, 2004
53	 See, e.g., William Spelman, 2000, 2001; Steven D. Levitt, 2004; Anne
Morrison Piehl and John J. DiIulio, 1995; Washington State Institute
for Public Policy, 2003; Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl,
and Bert Useem, 2006; Tomislav V. Kovandzic and John Sloan, 2002;
Tomislav V. Kovandzic and Lynne M. Vieraitis, 2006; Ilyana Kuziemko
and Steven D. Levitt, 2004.
54	 See, e.g., Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2003.
55	 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.
56	 William Spelman, “The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion,”
2000.

41	 Dina Rose and Todd R. Clear, 1998.
42	 Richard B. Freeman, 1995; Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, 1998; Joel
Waldfogel, 1994; Bruce Western and Kathy Beckett, 1999. Others argue
that an expanding prison system also does little more than increase
the number of individuals in the criminal justice net without reducing criminal offending or crime rates. For example, Franklin Zimring
and Gordon Hawkins (1997) argue that U.S. prisons already housed
the most serious, violent offenders in the early 1980s and did not need
to expand to get more violent offenders off of the streets; the prison
expansion since the 1980s resulted in nothing more than the imprisonment of large numbers of nonviolent, “marginal” offenders. Thus, the
authors argue that, at the neighborhood level, increasing incarceration
rates over the last 30 years did nothing to impact the crime rate since
the worst offenders were already incarcerated. See Franklin Zimring
and Gordon Hawkins, Crime Is Not the Problem: Lethal Violence in America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997).
43	 This corresponded to an incarceration rate of 692 inmates per 100,000
population.
44	 Bureau of Justice Statistics, State Prison Expenditures, 2001 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004).
45	 Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, 2006:
259.
46	 Ibid.
47	 See, e.g., Lawrence W. Sherman, Denise C. Gottfredson, Doris L.
MacKenzie, John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn D. Bushway, Preventing
Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising (Washington, DC:
National Institute of Justice, 1998).
48	 Lawrence W. Sherman, Denise C. Gottfredson, Doris L. MacKenna,
John Eck, Peter Reuter, and Shawn D. Bushway, 1998.
49	 Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins, 1997.
50	 Anne Morrison Piehl and John J. DiIulio, 1995; Washington State Institute for Public Policy, 2003. Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven Levitt also
argue that the continued increase in the number of drug offenders in
prisons may lead to a “crowding out” effect, in which the high number
of incarcerated drug offenders prevents the incarceration of more

57	 Thomas B. Marvell and Carlisle E. Moody, 1996; Steven D. Levitt,
1996; Zsolt Besci, 1999; William Spelman, “The Limited Importance
of Prison Expansion,” 2000; Steven Rapheal and Rudolf WinterEbmer, 2001; Steven Rapheal and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2001; William
Spelman, 2005; Steven D. Levitt, 2001; Steven Rapheal and Rudolf
Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Jeff Desimore, “The Effect of Cocaine Prices on
Crime” Economic Inquiry 39 no. 4 (2001): 627-643; Jeff Grogger and
Michael Willis, “The Emergence of Crack Cocaine and the Rise in
Urban Crime Rates” Review of Economics and Statistics 82 no. 4 (2000):
519-529. Grogger and Wills, for example, maintain that, in the absence
of crack cocaine, the crime rate in 1991 would have remained below
its previous peak in the early 1980s. Using data from 29 large U.S.
cities for the period 1981 to 1995, Desimore also finds that increases
in cocaine prices reduce crime. This is consistent with prior analyses
that found that the introduction of crack cocaine in the 1980s increased
violent crime; the resulting increase in market competition for crack
lowered cocaine prices and raised cocaine demand. Desimore concludes that increased drug enforcement raised cocaine prices in the
1990s and, in turn, reduced crime; Steven D. Levitt, 1996 (finds that
unemployment only affects property crimes); John J. Donahue and
Steven D. Levitt, 2001 (find that unemployment only affects property
crimes); Zsolt Besci, 1999 (finds that unemployment only affects
property crime, auto theft, and murder); Steven D. Levitt, 2001 (finds
that unemployment only affects property crimes); Steven Rapheal and
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2001 (finds that unemployment only affects
property crimes); Thomislav V. Kovandzic and John J. Sloan, 2002;
Thomislav V. Kovandzic and Lynne M. Vieraitis, 2006 (unemployment
affects robbery, assault, and larceny, but not homicide, rape, burglary, or
auto theft); Steven Rapheal and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Raymond
V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, 2006; Jeff Grogger,
“Market Wages and Youth Crime” Journal of Labor Economics 16 no.
4 (1998): 756-791 (higher wages are associated with lower individual
crime participation); Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, “The Effect of
Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and SelfReports” American Economic Review 94 no. 1 (2004); Thomas B. Marvell
and Carlisle E. Moody, 1996 (more police per capita is associated with
lower crime rates at the city level, but not the state level); Steven D.
Levitt, “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of
Police on Crime” American Economic Review 87 no. 3 (1997): 270-290;
Thomislav V. Kovandzic and John J. Sloan, 2002; Hope Corman and H.
Naci Mocan, “A Time-Series Analysis of Crime, Deterrence, and Drug
Abuse in New York City” American Economic Review 90 no. 3 (2000):
584-604; Steven D. Levitt, “Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to

CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N 19

20 CRIME A N D I N C A RCER ATIO N

Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime: A Reply” American Economic
Review 92 no. 5 (2002): 1244-1250; William Spelman, 2005.
58	 Steven D. Levitt, 1997.
59	 Thomas B. Marvel and Carlisle E. Moody, 1996.

74	 See also Theodore G. Chiricos, “Rates of Crime and Unemployment:
An Analysis of Aggregate Research Evidence” Social Problems 34 (April
1987): 187-212. Chiricos’ review of research through the early 1980s
similarly shows a significant positive effect of unemployment on property crimes but a weaker effect on violent crimes. He also finds that
the association between unemployment and property crime is generally
more significant for lower levels of aggregation.

60	 Thomislav V. Kovandzic and John J. Sloan, 2002.
61	 Thomas B. Marvel and Carlisle E. Moody, 1996.
62	 According to the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services,
New York City accounts for 53 percent of the admissions to New York
State prisons. In 2004, there were 63,751 inmates in New York State
prison; thus, New York City accounted for roughly 33,564 of these
inmates. See http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/
index.htm.
63	 New York State spends approximately $36,835 per inmate per year for
incarceration. See James J. Stephan, State Prison Expenditures, 2001
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004).
64	 In 2004, New York City employed a total of 39,110 police officers. See
New York City Police Department web site at http://www.nyc.gov/html/
nypd/html/misc/pdfaq2.html#41 for number of sworn officers.

75	 Steven Rapheal and Rudolph Winter-Ebmer, 2001: 281. A separate
body of literature has considered the relationship between poverty and
income inequality and crime. See, e.g., Ching-Chi Hsieh and M.D.
Pugh, “A Meta-Analysis of Recent Aggregate Data Studies” Criminal
Justice Review 18 no. 2 (1993). In a review of recent studies, the authors
find a strong association between poverty and violent crime.
76	 Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard, 2002.
77	 Steven Rapheal and Rudolph Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Raymond V. Liedka,
Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, 2006.
78	 Jeffrey Grogger, 1998.
79	 Jeffrey Grogger and Michael Willis, 2000; William Spelman (2005) also
finds that less income inequality is associated with lower crime rates.
80	 Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, 2004: 177.

65	 See New York City Police Department web site for current starting
salaries of police officers at http://www.nypd2.org/html/recruit/salary.
html.
66	 This estimate does not take into account the fact that an increase in the
number of police officers may lead to additional arrests and, as a result,
higher incarceration rates in the long run. Thus, the actual difference
in cost between additional police officers and higher incarceration may
be less than the $24.3 million estimate here.

81	 Lance Lochner and Enrico Moretti, 2004.
82	 Stephen J. Steurer, Linda Smith, and Alice Tracy, Three State Recidivism
Study (Washington, DC: Office of Correctional Education, United State
Department of Education, 2001).
83	 Steven D. Levitt, 1996.
84	 William Spelman, 2000.

67	 An increase in the number of police would not necessarily mean simply
an increase in law enforcement and arrests. Several authors have considered the relationship between changes in policing strategies and the
levels of police presence on crime rates. John Eck and Edward Maguire,
for example, considered the impact of community policing and zero-tolerance policing on crime rates in the 1990s, and while the authors find
little consensus in previous research on the impact of different policing
strategies on crime rates, they conclude that police have a direct impact
on crime when they focus on a specific place or on a problem with such
policing strategies. John E. Eck and Edward R. Maguire, “Have Changes
in Policing Reduced Violent Crime?” The Crime Drop in America eds. A.
Blumstein and J. Wallman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000): 207-265.
68	 See, e.g., Bruce Western, Becky Pettit, and Josh Guetskow, “Black
Economic Progress in the Era of Mass Imprisonment,” in Invisible
Punishment: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Imprisonment eds. Marc
Mauer and Meda Chesney-Lind (New York: New Press, 2003).
69	 See, e.g., Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, 1998; Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling, and David F. Weiman, “The Labor Market Consequences
of Incarceration” Crime and Delinquency 47 (2001): 410-427.
70	 John Hagan, “The Social Embeddedness of Crime and Unemployment”
Criminology 31 (1993): 465-491.
71	 Steven Rapheal and Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, 2001: 281.
72	 Raymond V. Liedka, Anne Morrison Piehl, and Bert Useem, 2006. See
also Zsolt Besci, 1999.
73	 Eric D. Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard, “Crime
Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States:
1979-1997” Review of Economics and Statistics 84 no. 2 (2002): 45-61.
See also Thomislav Kovandzic and Lynne Vieraitis (2006) showing an
association between unemployment and crime for robbery, assault, and
larceny only.

85	 National Association of State Budget Officers, Annual Reports.
86	 In actual dollar amounts, the difference is more striking. Between 1985
and 2004, states increased spending on corrections by $23 billion and
cut spending on public assistance by $20 billion; spending on higher
education increased just $1.7 billion during the same period.
87	 While not as dramatic, public opinion regarding spending on health
care changed as well. Between 1994 and 2001, the proportion of the
public responding that too little money was spent on improving education increased from 71 percent to 73 percent (Sourcebook of Criminal
Justice Statistics Online 2003 Table 2.41.)
88	 The focus on crime itself is diminishing in importance among the
public. The relative importance of social factors such as unemployment,
income, and education has increased in the public’s opinion in recent
years, displacing crime as a primary public concern. In 1994, 36 percent
of Americans thought that crime was one of the two most important
issues for government to address; by 2004, this had decreased to just 3
percent. Crime is now much less of a concern for Americans, relative
to other issues. Citizens ranked the economy (31 percent), health care
(16 percent), employment (16 percent), education (11 percent), and the
environment (4 percent) as more important issues for the government
to address.
89	 See, e.g., Daniel Nagin and Joel Waldfogel, 1998; Bruce Western, Jeffrey R. Kling, and David F. Weiman, 2001; John Hagan, 1993; Eric D.
Gould, Bruce A. Weinberg, and David B. Mustard, 2002.
90	 See Elliott Currie, Crime and Punishment in America (New York: Owl
Books, 1998): 54.
91	 See Elliott Currie, 1998.

© 2007 Vera Institute of Justice

This report was supported by a grant from the Open Society Institute. It is a publication of the Center on Sentencing
and Corrections at the Vera Institute of Justice. For more information about the Center on Sentencing and
Corrections, please contact its director, Barbara Tombs, at (212) 376-3176 or btombs@vera.org. Additional copies
are available from the communications department of the Vera Institute of Justice, 233 Broadway, 12th Floor, New
York, NY 10279, or call (212) 334-1300. An electronic version is available on Vera’s web site at www.vera.org.
The Vera Institute of Justice is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing safety and justice, promoting
fair and efficient policy and practice, and working with leaders of government and civil society to improve the
systems people rely upon for safety, security, and justice. Vera is a founding member of the Altus Global Alliance.

Edited by: Robin Campbell
Design: Jeanne Criscola | Criscola Design
Photography: Cover–Ken Light; pages 1, 3, 6, 9, 12, 16–Brenda Ann Kenneally

Suggested citation: Don Stemen. Reconsidering Incarceration: New Directions for Reducing Crime.
New York: Vera Institute of Justice, 2007. Available at http://www.vera.org/publications.