PROJECT MKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION
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JOINT HEARING
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BEFORE THE

SELEOT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENOE
AND THE

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SUBCOMMI'ITEE ON
HEALTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

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COMMITTEE ON HUMA.N RESOUROES
UNITED STATES SENATE
, NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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AUGUST 3, 1977

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Printed for the use ot the Select Co~lttee on Intelligence
'. and CommIttee on Human Resources
U.S. GOVERNKENTPRINTING OFFICE
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10"01' sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Go\'ernment Printing Office

Washington, D.C., 20402
Stock No. 052-070-04357-1

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Establ1shed b)' S. ReR. 400, n4th Cong., 2d scss.)
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HawaU, Chairman
BARR\: .GOLDWATER, A~.lzon.a, Vice. Chc:'r'!ll!'!.
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
ADLAI E. STEVE~SO~, Illinois
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, l\!alnc
WALTER D. HUDDLESTO~, Kentucky
JOSEPH R. RIDEN, JR.• Delaware
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
GARY HART, Colorado
DANIEL PATRICK MOY~IHAN, ~ew York

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-cr,IFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
J.\KE GARN, Utah
CHARLES McC. Z,!ATHIAS, JR., l\Iaryland
JAHES B. PEARSON, Kansas
JOH~ H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
RICHARD G. LUGAR. Indiana
MALCOL)! WAT,LOP. W)'omlng

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio Member
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, Ex Officio Ye71~ber
'WILLIAM G. l\IILLER. Staff Director
EARL D. EISEXHOWER, Minoritv Staff Di,'ector
AGDREI' H. HATRY, Chic! Clerk

CO~DHTTgE

ON HUMAN RESOURCES

HARRISON A. WILLIAl\IS JR.• Xew Jersc)', Chairman

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J BNNTNGS RANDuLPH. West Vlr~lnla
'CLAIBORXE PELL•. Rhode Island
EDWARD l\!. KENNEDY, l\lassachusetts
GAYLORD NELSON. Wisconsin
THOl\1AS F. EAGLETON, lllssourl
ALAN :CRA~STON. California
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY. Maine
DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR., Michigan

JACOB K. JA VI~S. New York
HICHARD S. SCHWEIKER. Pcnnsyl",anla
ROBERT T. STAFFOJ:tD. Vermont
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOHN H. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
S. I. HAYAKAWA, Callfornla

STEPHES J. PARADISE, General Coun8el and Staff Director
MARJORIE 1II. WHITTAKER, Chief Clerk
DON

A.

ZIMMERJUN,

Minority Ooun8el

SUBco~nUTTEE o~ HE.\LTH AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

EDWARD M. KENNEDY. Massllchusetts, Chairman.
'CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
RreHA-RD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsyh'ania
GAYLORD NELSON, WisconsIn
J'ACOB K. JAVI~S, New York
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
JOHN H. ;cHAFEE, Rhode Isl2.nd
HARRISON A.. WILLIAMS, JR., New Jersey
(ex omdo)
LAWRENCE HOROWITZ, Pro!euional Staff Member
DAVID WINSTON, Mlncirltv Ooun8el

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CONTENTS
Statements of:
Admiral Stansfield Turner, Dli'ector, Central Intelllgence Agency; accompanied by; Frank Laublnger, Office of Technical Senic'i!S, Central Intelligence Agency; Al Brady, Office of Inspector Gene<ral.
Central IntelUgence Agency; Ernest Mayerfield, Offic~"'1)f General
Counsel, Central Intelllgence Agency, and George Cary, Legislative
Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency.____________________________
Philip Goldman, former employee, Central Intelligence Agenc)"
John GIttlnger, former employee, central Intelligence Agency________
Appendix A.-XVII. Testing and Use of Chemic:al and Biological Agents
by the Intelligence Community__
Appendix
B.-Documents Referring to Discovery of Add~tional MKULTRA
]Jatenal
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.~ppendfx

C.-:-Documents Referring to Subprojects--------------------Material Submitted for the R~o~: •
t Psychological Assessments_______________________________________ _
"Truth" Drugs In Interrogation___________________________________
Construction of Gorman Annex___________________________________
Subproject-54____________________________________________________
Drug Testing in Foreign COuntnes__:.._____________________________
MKSEARCH, OFTENjCHICKWIT_______________________________
Employees Terminated Because of Their Participation in MKULTRA
Subproject 3___________________________________________________
QKHILLTOP Definition__________________________________________
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PROJECT ItIKULTRA, THE CIA'S PROGRAM OF
RESEARCH IN BEHAVIORAL rtlODIFICATION

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WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 3, 1977
U.S. SEXATE,
SELECT "CO~nnTTEE OX IXTELLIGEXCE,
AXD ScnCO~nn'I"I'EJo~OX HEALTH
'~-XD SCIEXTIFIC RESEARCH
OF THE CO~nn'I"I'EE OX Hu?tfAN RESOl.rRGES,

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Washington, D.O.

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The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 9 :07 a.m. in room 1202,
_Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Daniel K. Inouye-( chairman
of the Select Committee on Intelli~ence) presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye (presiding), Kennedy, Goldwater, Bayh,
Hathaway, Huddleston, Hart, Schweiker, Case, Gam, Chafee., Lugar
and Wallop.
Also present: William G. :Miller, staff director, Select Committee on
Intelligence; Dr. Lawrence Horowitz, staff director,' Subcommittee
on Health and Scientific Research; and professional staff members of
both committe.es.
Senator IxouyE. The Senate Select Ccmmittee on Intelligence is
meeting today. and is joined by the Subcommittee on Health and
Scientific Research chaired by Senator Edward Kennedy of 1fassachusetts and Senator Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania. Senator
Hathaway and Senator Chafee are members of both committees. 'Ve
are to hear testimony from the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm.
Stansfield Turner, and from othe.r A~ency witnesses on issues concerning new documents supplied to the committee in the last week on drug
testing conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency.
It should be made clear from the outset that in general, weare
focusin~ on events that happened over 12 or as long as 25 years ago.
It should be emphasized that the programs that are of greatest concern have stopped and that we are reviewin~ these past events in.
order to better understand what statutes and other guidelines might be
necessary· to prevent the recurrence of such abuses in the future. We
also need to know and understand what is now being done by the CIA
in the field of behavioral research to be certain that no current abuses
are .occurring.,
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I want to commend Admiral Turner for his' full cooperation with
thjs Conunittee and with the Subcommittee on Health in recognizing
that thiS issue' needed our attention. The CIA has assisted our committees and staffs in their investigative efforts and in arriving at
remedies which will serve the best interests of our country.
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The reappearance of reports of the abuses of the drug testing program and reports of other pr~viously unknown drug p'ograms a,nd
projects for behavioral control underline the nec.essity for effectrve
oversight procedures both in the executi.e branch and in the Congre!Ss. The Select Committee on Intelligence has ~n ,\orh-in~ \.ery
closely with President Carter. the Vice President. and AdmIral
Turner and his Associates in den'10pin~ basic concepts for statutory
guidelines which will gO\'ern all activities of the intelligence agencies
of the united States.
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In fact. it is my expectation that the President will soon announce
his decisions on how he has decided the intelligence. a~encies of the
United States shall ~ organized. This committee will be 'Workin~
closely with the President and Admiral Turner in placing this new
structure under the law and to develqp effecti\e onrsight pJrocedures.
It is clear that effectiyp oversight requires that information must
be full ano. forthcomin,{!. Full and timely information is ob'dously
necessary if the committee and the public is to be confident that any
trans,{!Tessions can be dealt with quickly and forcefully.
One purpose of this hearing- is to give the committee and the public
an understanding: of what. new information has been discovered that
:luds to the knowledge. already ayailable from previous Church and
Kennedy inquiries. and to hear the reason.s why these documents 'Were
not available to the Church and Kennedy committees. It is also the
purpose of this hearing to address the issues raised by any additional
illegal or improper acti\ities that have emerged from the files and to
dev~lop remedies to preyent such improper activities from occurring
agam.
Finally. there is an obligation on the pait. of both this committee
and the CIA to make eyery effort to help those individuals or institutions that may han been hanned by any of these improper or illegal
activities. I am certain that Admiral Turner will 'Work with this committee to S<'e that this will he done.
I would no'Wlike to welcome the most distinguished Senator from
:Massachusetts, the chairman of the Health Subcommittee, Senator
Kennedy.
Senator KEXXEDT'. Thank ,"ou yeIT much, ~{I'. Chairman. We are
de~ighted to j~in. together in' this' ,"cry important area of public inqUIry and publIc mterest.
Some 2 years a~o. the Senate Health Subcommittee heard chilHng
testimony about the human experimentation actiyities of the Central
Intell~encc Agency'. The Deputy Director of the CIA reyealed that
O\'er 30 universities and institutions 'Were invoh'ed in an "extensive .
. testing and experimE:mtation" program which included cO\'ert drug'
.t€$ts on unwitting citizens "at all social leyels, high and low. native
Americans and foreign." Severa] of these tests invohoed the administration of L8D to "unwitting subiects in SO<.'ial situations.:' '.
At least one death. that of D". Olsen. resulted from these act.ivities.
The AP.'eney itself acknowledg-ed that these tests made little scientific
sense. The a1Z'ents doinsz the monitoring were not qualified scientific
observers. The test sUbjects were seldom accessible beyond the .fiIb~
hours of the test. In a number or instances: the test subject became ill
for hours or days, and effecthoe followup was impossible.

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Other experiments were equally offensive. For example, heroin
addicts were enticed into participating in LSD experiments in order
to get a 1\ 'ward-heroin.
Perhaps most disturbing of all was the fact that the extent of experimentation on human subjects was unknown. The records of all
these activities were destroyed in Jnnuary 1973, at the instruction of
then CIA Director Richard Helms. In spite of persistent inquiries by
both the Health Subcommittee and t.he IntellIgence Committee, no
a.dditional records or information were forthcoming. And no one-ne.· sin~le individual-could be found who remembered the details, not
the Dln~et0r of the CIA, who ordered the documents destroyed, not
the official l\~sponsible for the program, nor any of his associates.
'Ve believed that the record, incomplete as it was, was as complete
as it was going to be. Then one individual, through a Freedom of Information request, accomplished what two U.S. Senate committees
could not. He spurred the agency into finding additional records pertaining to the etA's program of experimentation with human subjects.
These new records were discoveI'ed by the agency in :March. Their
existence was not made known to the Congress until July.
The records reveal a far rnore extensive series of experiments than
had previously been thought. Eighty-six universities or ,institutions
were involved. New instances of unethical behavior were revealed.
The int~lligence community of this Nation, which requires a shroud
of secrecy in order to oper:ate, has a very sacred trust from the
American people. The .CIA's program of human experimentation of
the fifties and sixties violated that trust. It was violated aj!ain on the
day the bulk of the agency's records were destroyed in 1973. It is
violated each time n res'ponsibJe official refuses to recollect the details
of the program. The best, safeguard against abuses in the future is a
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complete public accounting of the abuses of the past.
I think this is illustrated, as Chairman Inouye pointed out. These
are issues, are questions that happened in the fifties and, sixties, and
go back some 15; 20 years ago, but they are front page news today, as
we see in the major newspapers and on the television and in the media
of this country; and the reason thev are, I think, is because it just continuously begins to trickle out. sort of, month after month, and the
best way to put this period behind us, .obviously, is to have the full
information, and I think that is the desire of Admiral Turner and of
the members of this committee.
The Central Intelligence Agency drugged American citizens without their knowledg-e or consent. It used university facilities and perso.nnel without their knowledge. It funded leading researchers, often
wIthout their knowledge.'
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These institutes, these individuals, have a. rig-ht to know who they
are and how and when they were used. As of today, the Ag-ency itself
refuses to declassify the names of those institutions and individuals,
quite appropriately, I mightsny, with regard to the individuals under
the Privacy Act. It seems to me to be a fundamental responsibility to
notify those individuals or institutions, rather. I think many of them
were cau#!'ht up' in an unwittin~ manner to do research for the
A~ency. ]'fany researchers, distinguished researchers, some of our
most outstanding members of our scientific community, involved in

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this network, now really do not. know whether they were involved or
not, and it seems to me 'UUtt t.he whole health and climate in terms of
our university and our scientific and health facilities are entitled to
tha t. response.,
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Sv~ I intend to do all I can to p~rRundE' the Agency to, at t.he very
least, officially inform those institutions and individuals involved.
Two years ago, when these abuses were first revealed, I introduced
leg-i,slation, with Senator Schweiker and Senator tTavits, designed to
minimize the potential for any similar abu5es in the future. That
legislation expanded the jurisdiction of the National Commission 'on
Human Subjects of Biomedical llnd Behavioral Research to cover all
federally funded research involvin~ human sl1bjects. The research
initially was just directed toward HE'Y activities, but this legislation
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covered DOD as well as the CIA.
This Nation has a biom('dical and b('havioral research capability
second to none. It has had for subjects of HE'V funded research for
tho past 3 year.=; a system for the prot<.'ctioli of human subjects of biomedical and behayioral research sE'cond to none, and the Human Experimentation Commission has prO\'en its yalue. Today's 'hearings
and the record already established underscore the need to expand its
jurisdiction.
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The CIA supported that-legislation in 1975. and it passed the S~nate
unanimously last year. I belien~ it is needed in order to assure all
our people that they will have the degree of protection in .1l1lman exp~rimentation that they deserve and ha\'e, every right to expect.
Senator INOU1'"E•• Thank you very much. Now we -will 'proceed with
the hearings. AdmIral Turned
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[The prepared stateinent of Admiral Turner fo11o\\'s:]
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PREPARED STATEYENT OF AD~URAL STANSFIELD TuRNER, DIRECTOR OF CEXTRAL
. INTELLIGENCE

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Mr. Chairman: In my letter to ~'ou of July 15. 1977, I reported our ·recent disCover}" of seven boxes of documents related to Project l\IKULTRA, a closely held
CIA project conducted frQIU 1953-1964, As ~'ou may recall, MKULTRA was an
~·umbrella.project" under which rertnin senslth'e subprojects :were funded, Involving among other things research on drugs and behavioral modification. nurIng the Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations In 1975.
the cr}'ptonym became publlcly known:when details of the drug-related death of
Dr. Frank OlSon ",,'ere publlcized. In 1953 Dr. Olson, a ch'llian emplOYeE! of the
Army at Fort Detrick, leaped to his death from·1i hotel room window In New
York City about a week after having unwittingly consumed LSD administered to
him as an experiment at a meeting of I.SDresearchers called by CIA.
Most of what '·was known about, the Agency's Invol\"ement with behavioral
drn~s during the investigations In 1975 was contained In a report on Project
MKULTRA prepared by the Inspector General's office in 1003. As a result of
that report's .recommendations, unwitting tt'sting of 'drugs on U.S. citizens was
subsequently discontinued. The MKULTRA-related report was made available to
the Church Committee investigators and to the staff of Senator KenJled~"s Subcommittee on Health, Until the recent discovery, it was belleved tlJat all of the
,MKl,JLTRA files dealing with be~a~loral modlflcatlonhad, been destroyed In
1973 .Qri the orders of the then retiring Chief of the Office of Techn1<'al Sen'lce,
with the authorization of the then DCI,as has beeu previoush' reported. Almost
all of the I~ople w·ho had had any- connection with the aspects of the project
which interested Senate Investigators in 197G were no lon~er with the Agency
at that time. Thus, there was llttle detailed knowledge or the MKUI.TRA subprojects available to CIA during the Church Committee investigations. This
~ck of available details, moreover, was probably not wholly attributable to the

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destruction of )[KULTRA files in 1973; the 1963 report on l\IKULTRA b)' the
InS!lector General notes on page 14: "Present practice is to maintain no records
of the planning and approyal of test programs,"
When I reported to ~·ou last on this· mntter, my staff '}lad not yet had an
opportunity to reyiew the newly 10catedmatel'ial in depth. This has now been
accomplished, and I am in a position tog-ive ·)·ou a description of the contents of
the recovered materIal. I believe you will he most interested in the following
aspects of the recent disco.ery :
How the material was discovel'ed and why it was not preYiously found;
The nature of this recently located material;
How much new information there is in the materinl which rna)' nothaye
been prer-iously known and reported to Senate iuyestigators; and
What we belieye the most significant aspects of this find to be.
To begin, as to ho\V we discovered these materials. The material had been
sent to our Retired Hecords Center outside of "'ashington and \Vas discovered
there as a result of the extensiYe search efforts of an employee charged with reo
sponsibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding
to Freedom of Information Act requests on this subject. During the Chl'rcll
Committee investigation in 1975, searches fOt :"K:ULTRA-related material were
made by examining both the acth'e and retIr~d records of all branches of CIA
considered at all likel)' to have had association with l\IKULTRA documents. The
retired records of the Budget and l<'iscal Section of the Branch responsibl ~ for
such work were not searched, however. Tllis was because financial papers as·
sociated with sensitt\"e projects such as MKULTRA were norma lIS main~.aine<1
b~' the Branch itself under the project file, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section.
In the case at hand, hower-er, the neWly located material was sent to the Re·
tired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and l<'iscal Section as part of its
own retlrf:>d boldings. The reason for this departure from normal procf:>dure is not
kno\r-n. As a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval and destruction
in 1973 by the then-retiring Director of the Office as well as disco\-ery in 1975
by CIA officials responding to Senate investigators.
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone unturned
in his efforts to respond to FOIA requests. He reviewed all listings of material
of this Branch stored at the Retired Records Center, inclUding those of the
Budget and FIscal Section and, thUS, discovE'red the MKUL'l'RA·related documents which had been missed in the previous searches. In sum, the A~ency failed
to uncon>r these particular documE'nts in 1973 in the process of attempting to
destroy them; it similar\)' failed to locate them in 1975 in response to the Church
Committee hearings. I am convinced that there was no attempt to conceal this
material during the earlier searches.
. ' :r\ext, as to the nature of the recently located material, it is important to
realize tllat tile reco\'ered folders are finance folders, The bulk of the material in
them consists of appro\'alsfor advance of funds, vouchers, accountings, nnd the
like-mQstof which are not \:ery informative as to t.he nature of the activities
that were undertaken. Occasional I)roject proposals or mt>moranda commenting 011 some aspect of a subproject are scattered throughout this material.
In general, llOwever, the recovered material does not inclUde status reports or
other doeuments relating to operational considerations or progress bltlle "arious
subprojects, though some ~laboration of the activities contemplated does 9,ppear.
The recovered documents fall roughly into three categoriE's:
First, there are 149 MKULTRA subprojects, man)' of which appear to have
some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition
and testing or administering drugs surreptitiously.
Second, there are two boxes of miscellaneous MKULTRA papers, includin~
au~it reports and financial statement.s trom "cut-out" (I.e., intermediary)
fanding mechanisms used to conceal CIA's sponsorshil) of ,"adous research
projects.
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1"'ioa11y, there are 33 additional subprojectg concerning certain intelligence
acth'ftlesprer-iously funded under l\IKULTRA which have nothing to do
either with behavioral modification, dr\lgs~ and toxins or with any other re..
Inted m a t t e r s , ·
~ We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into
categories under descrfpth"e hea(lin~. In broad outline, at leal:t, this presents the
contents of these ftles, The actl\"it1es are placed in the following 15 categories:

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1. Research Into the etrects ot behavioral drugs and/or alcohol:
17 subprojects probably not Invol\'ing human tesHng;
14 subprojects definitely involving tests on human volunteers;
19 subprojects probably including tests on human ,·olunteers. While not
known, some of these subprojects may have included tests on unwitting subjects as well ;
6 subprojects involVing tests on unwitting subjects.
2. ResellJ:'ch on hypnosis: 8 subproject~, Including 2lnvoh'ing lI~'pnosis and drugs
In combination.
3. Acquisition of chemicals or drugs: 7 subprojects.
4. Aspects of magicians' art \1s('ful in covert operati~ns: e.g., surreptitious de1iver~' ot drug·related materials: 48uhproj('!cts.
5. Studies of human behavior, sleep research, and beha\'loral changes d\!ring
psyoootherapy: {) subprojects.
O. Library searches anll attendance at semin.:\'s and International conferences
011 hehavioral modification: 0 subprojects.
i. l\l()tlvatlonal studies, studies of dl"fedors, assessment, and training tecbnlques: 23 subprojects.
8. Polygraph research: 3 subprojects.
9. Funding mechanisms for ~IKULTRA external research activities: 3
SUbprojects.
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10. Research on drugs, toxins, nnd biolo~icais in humall tissue; provision ot
exotic pathogens nnd the cnpnblllt~· to incorporate them In effecth'e deli"ery
sYl':t('ms : G suhprojects.
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11. Acti,'ities whose objecth'es cannot be determinffi from available documentation: 3 subprojects.
12. SUbprojects In.oh1n?; funding support for unspecified activities connected
with the Army'S Special Operations Di...h;ion at. ~'t. Detrick, ~!d. Thl!ol acth'ity is
outline in Look I of the Church Oommittee Repurt, pp, 388-389. (See Appendix A,
pp. 68-69. Under CIA's Project MKNAOMI, the Army A~.,lsted CIA In de\"elopInlr. tE'sting, aud maintaining blo10gicrd ag('nts and deli...ery ssstems for use
a?;ainst humans as well as against nnimals and crops. The objectivE's of these
subprojects cannot 1J<> identf flell from the reeo,'ered material beyond th(' fact
that the money was to he used where normal funding channels would require
more written or oral justification tll!1.I1 appeared desirahlE.' for securit)' reasons
or where operational considt>raUons dictatE'rl Hhort leall tim('s for Ilurchast>s. About
$11,000 was 10\'01...£'<1 during this PE.'rlod 1953-1000: 3 subpl-ojects.
13. Single ~uI)pro;ects in such areas as E'ffE.'Cts ot electro-sho(~k. harassment techniquE'S for ofl'en~h'e use, analysis ot extrasensory perception, gas proIX'lled sprays
and I\erosols, and four subprojects 1n...olvlnl!: crop and material sabotage.
14. One or two snbprojects on each ot the following:
"Blood.GrouplnA''' researoh, controlling the acth1ty of animals, energy
storage find transfer in orgonlc systems: and
stimulu!l and response In biological systems.
15; Three subprojects cancell.ed before· an)' "'ork was done on them ha'\"ing to
do with lahoratory drug screening. research on brain concussion, and research
on lJto]ogfcally·actlve matenals to be t~ted through the skin on human volunteers.
No,,', as to how much new the recovered reaterlal adds to what has previously
b~n reported to the Church Committee and to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee
on Health on these toplCl'l, the answer Is addltlonal detail, for the most part: e.g.,
the names of previously unidentified researchers a.nd instltutioml associated on
either a witting or unwitting basis with MKUr~TRA activities, and the names of
CIA officials who approved or monitored the various subprojects. Some new subRtantlve material Is also present: e.g., details concerning proposals for experi- .
mentation anll cllnical testing associated with \"8rloWJ research projects, and ..
posslb1Yimproper contribution by: CIA to a private Institution. However, the
pri~clpaltypesof activities Inclqded haYe, for the most part, either been outlined
to flome ext~nt or generally described In what was prevlouRly a,"aflable to CIA
in the :way of documentation and was supplied by CIA to Senate In\"estlgator&
For example:
Financial dlsburRemE'nt records for the period 1960-1964 for 76 ot the 140
numbered IIKUT..TRA Rubprojects had heen recoyered from tbe Office of Finance
by CIA nnd were made available to the Church Committee Investigators In August
or 1ileptemher 1975.
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The 1968 Inspector G4!neral report on MKUT..TRA made available to both the
Church Committee and Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee mentions p.lectro-shock

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and l~urassment substances (pp. 4, 16) ; covert testing on unwitting U.S. citizens
(pp. I, 1(}-12) : the search for new materials through arrangements with specialists in unh'ersities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organizations (pp. i, 9) ; and the fact that the Technical Service Division of CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control
of human beha\'ior between 1953-1963 (p. 21).
The relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General report on the Technical Service Division was also made available to the Church Committee staff. That report
discusses techniques for human assessment and unorthodox methods of communication (p. 201) ; discrediting and disabling materials which can be covertly
ad.mlnlstered (pp 201-202) ; studies on magicians' 1I.rt8 as applied to covert operatIOns (p. 202) ; specific funding mechtmlsms for research performed outside of
CIA (pp. 202-203, 205) ; research being done on "K" (knockout) material, alcohol
tolerance, and hypnotism (p. 203); research' on I.SD (p. 204) ; anti-personnel
harassment nnd assassinatlnll dellver~' systems Including aerosol generators and
other spray devices (pP. 206-208) ; the role of Fort Detrick in support of CIA's
Biological/Chemical Warfare capability (p. 208) ; and materIal sabotage research
(p. 209). Much of this material is refiected in the Church Committee Report,
Book I, Pp.385-422. (See Appendix A, pp. 65-102).
.
The most significant new data dlsco,ered are, first, the names of researchers
and institutions who participated in the ~IKULTRA project and, se<.'Ondly, a
possitlly improper contribution b~' CIA to a private institution. We are now i.n
possession of the names of 185 non-go\'ernment researchers and assistants Who
are identified in the recovered material dealing with the 149 subprojects. The
names of 80 institutions where work was done or with WU~:' these people were
affiliated are also mentioned.
The institutions include 44 colleges or universities, 15 research foundations or
chEmllcal or pharmaceutical comPdnles and the like, 12 hospitals or clinics (In addition to those associated with uni\'erslties), and 3 penal institutions. While the
Identities of some of these people and institutions were known previously, the
discovery of the new identities adds to our knowledge of MKULTRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are as follows:
One project Involves a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private
medIcal institution. The fact that a ~ontrlbution was made was previously
known; indeed it was mentioned in a 1957 Inspector General report on the
Technical Service Division of CIA, pertinent portions of which had been renewed by the Church Committee staff. The newly discovered material, however,
makes it clear that this contribution was made through an intermediary, which
made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation, the contributio~
was then matched by federal funds. The institution was not made aware of the
true source of the gift. This project was approved by the the:l DCI, and concurred
in by CIA's top management at the time, including the then General Counsel who
wrote an opInion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents. gh'e a greater insIght into the scope or the
unwitting drug testing but contribute little more than that. We now have collaborating information that some of the unwitting drug testing was carried on
in safehouses in San Francisco and New York City, and we have identified that
three inclividuals were involved in this undertaking as opposed to the previously
reported one person. We also know now that [lome unwitting testing took place
on criminal sexual psychopaths confined at a State hospital and that, additionally, ;~search was done on a knock-out or UK" drug in parallel w~th reS\.."'8rch to
de\'f~lop pain klllers for cancer patients.
The~, then are the principal findings identified to date in (.fur review ot the
recovered material. As noted earlier, we ~lle\'e the detail on the identities ot
researchers and institutions involved in CIA's sponsorship ot drugs and behavioral modifteatlon is a new element and one which poses a considerable problem. :Most of the people and institutions involved are not aware ot Agency
.,:ponsorshtp. We should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions
which cooperated with CIA on a witting .bush~ acted in good fai·th and in the
belief that they were aiding1heh" government in.a legitimate and proper purpose.
I believe we all ba\'e a n1'oral obligation to these researehers and institutions t9
protect them from nny unjustified embarrassment or damage to their reputations
which re'\"elntion of their identl·ties might brIng. In addition, I have a legal
obligation under the Privacy Act not to publicly disclose the names ot the individual researchers without their con8ent. This is especially true, ot course, for

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those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants In CIAsponsoren activities.
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Xeverthelpss, recognizing the right and the need of both the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Senate SubclllllUlittee on Health to investigate
the circumstances of these activities in whaten>r tletnil they consider ne,"essar,\',
I nm prOViding your Committee with all of the uameR 011 a classili('d oasis. 1
hope that this will facilitate yonr investigation while protecting the individuals
and institutions involved. Let me emphasize that the )IKULTRA e\'ents are 12
to 25 sears in the past. I aSsure you that the CIA Is In no .\yay engaged in either
witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
Finally. I am workIng closely with the Attorney Genp.rnl and with the Secretar)' of Hefllth, Education and Welfare on this matter. '\Ve are making Rvallable
to the Attornev General whatever materials he mal' deem necessar)" to any
investi~ation he may elect to undertake. We are \\,orkiilg with both the Attorney
General and the Secretar;\' of Health, Edncntioll and W('lfllre to determine
whether it is practlcahle from this new evidence to ntte-mpt to identify an,\" of
the persons to whom drugs may have bepn administered unwittingly. No fo;1.1ch
names are part at these records, but we are working to determine if the-re lire adequate clues to lead to their identi ficn tion ; and if lOa, how to go about fulfil1iJ;'~
the Government's responsibilities in the matter.

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TESTI~ONY OF

ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY FRANK LAUBINGER, OFFICE
OF TECHNICAL SERVICES; AL BRODY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL; ERNES':!' MAYERFIELD, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL;
AND GEORGE L, CARY, LEGISLAT~VE COUNSEL

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Admiral 'ruRxER. Thank you, 1\[1'. Chairman. I would like to begin
by thanking you and Senator Kennedy for having n joint hearing this
morning. I hope. this will expedite and facilitate our getting all the
information that both of your committees need into the record quickly.
I would like also to thank you bot.h for prefadng the remarks today
by reminding us all that the events about which we are here to talk
are 12- to 24-years old. They in no way represent the current activities
or policies of the Central Intelligence Agency.
'Vhat we ar~ here to do is to give yon all the information that we
now have and which we did not previously have on a. subject known
as Project 1tfKULTRA, a project which took place from 1953 to 1964.
It was an. umbrella project under which there were numerous subprojects for research. among other things, on drugs and behavioral
modification. 1Vl1at the new mat,erial that we offer today is a supplement to the considerable material that was m'adc available in 1975,
during' 'the Church committee hearin!!'s. and also to the Senate Sub-'
committee on I-Iealth and Sdentific ReSearch.At that time, the CIA offered up all of the information and documents it believed it had available. The principal one available at that
time that gave the IZreatest amount of information on -this subject
was a report oJ the CIA'~ Inspector General ,,,ritten in 196~. and which
led directly to the termination_ of this activity in 1964, 13 JeRI'S ag-o.
The infonnation av·ailable in 197~ to the various investigating
I!l'oups was indeed sparsc. first. because of the -destmction of material
that ·took phice in 1973. a$l detailed by Senator KennC'dy a minute ago.
with tho concurrence of t.he then Director of Central Tntelli!!'ence and
under .the :iupervision-: of the DirE',ctor of the Office of Technical
Services that supervised Project: ~fKUI.lTRA. -

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The material in 1975 was also sparse because most of the CIA people
who had been involved in 1953 to 1904 in this acti,-ity had retired from
the Agency. I 'Would further add that I think the material was sp~rse
in part because it was the practice at that time not to keep detaIled
records in this category.
_..
For instance, the 1963 report. of the Inspector General notes:
Present practice is to maintain no ·.."cords of the planning and approval of
test programs.

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In br~ef: there were few records to b<>gi;l with and less after the
clest ructIOn of 1\)73_
.
W'hat I would like to do now~ though, is to proceed and let you know
what the new material adds to our knowledge of this topic, and I
will start by describing how the material was disco,-ered and why i~.
wa~ not previoHsl;y discovered. The material in question, some seven
boxes, had been sent to our Retired Records Center outside of the
"\Vashingtol1 area. It was discO\-ered there as the result of an extensive
search by an employee charged with the rE'spol1sibility for maintaining our holdings on behavioral drugs and for responding to Freedom
of Information Act requests on this subject.
During the Church committee innstigation of 1975, searches for
~rKULTRA-reJatedmaterial were made by examining both the active
and the retired records of all of the branches of CIA considered likely
to have had an association with MKULTRA documents. The retired
records of the Budget and Fisca I Section of the branch that was responsible for such work were not searched, however. This was because the
financial paper associated with sensitive projects such as MKULTRA
were normally maintained by the branch itself under the project title,
MKULTRA, not by the Budget and Fiscal Section under a special
budget file.
__
.
In the case at hand, however, this newly located material had heen
sent to the Retired Records Center in 1970 by the Budget and Fiscal
Section of this branch as part of its own retired holdings. In short, what
should have been filed by the branch itself was filed bv the Budget
and Fiscal Section, and what should have been filed under the project
title, MKUI.JTRA, was filed under budget and fiscal matters. The reason for this departure from the normal procedure of that time is simply
not known, and as a result of it, however, the material escaped retrieval
and destruction in 1973, as well as discovery in 1975_
The employee who located this material did so by leaving no stone
unturned in his efforts to respond to a Freedom of Information Act
request, or several o.f them, in fact. He reviewed all of the listings of
material of this branch, stored at the Retired Records Center, inc111din~
those of the Budget and Fiscal Section, and thus discovered the
l\fKULTRA-related documents, which had been missed in the previous
searches.
In sum, the agency failed to uncover these particular documents in
1973, in the process of attempting' to destroy them. It similarly failed
t-O locate them in 1975, in response to the Church committee hearin·~.
I am personally persuaded that. there is no evidence of any attempt to
conceal this material dnrin~ the earlier searches. ~foreover. ns we will
discuss as we proceed, I do not believe the material itself is such that

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t.here would be a motive on the part of the CIA to withhold this, having
disclosed what it didin 1975.
Next, let me move to the nature of this recently located material.
It is important to remember what I have just noted, that these folders
that were discovered are financp. rolders. The bulk of the material in
them consists of ap:proval~ for the advance of funds, vouchers, and
accountings and such, mo~t of which are not very informative as to
the nature of the activities that they were supporting.. Occasional project proposals or memoranda commenting on some aspect of a subproject
are scattcred throughout this material. In general, however, the recovered material does not include overall status reports or other documents relating to operational considerations, or to the progress on
yarioussubprojects, though some elaboration of the activities contemplated does appear from time to time.
There are roughly three categories of projects. First, there are 149
~nCULTRA subprojects, many of which appear to have some connection with research into behavioral modification, drug acquisition and
test.ing, or administering drugs surreptitiously. 'Second, there are two
boxes of miscellaneous ~fKULTRA. papers, including audit reports
and financial statements from intermediary funding mechanisms used
to conceal CIA sponsorship of various research projects.
Finally, there are 33 additional 'Subprojects concerning certain intelligence activities previously funded under ~fKULTRA but which
have nothing to do either with behavioral modifications, drugs and
toxins. or any closely related matter.
We have attempted to group the activities covered by the 149 subprojects into categories under descriptive headings. In broad outline,
at least, this presents the contents of these files. The following 15
categories are the ones we have divid2d these into.
First, research into the effects of behavioral drugs and/or alcohol.
Within this, there are 17 projects probably not involving human testing'. There are 14 subprojects definitely involving testing on humaIL.volunteers. There l::.re 19 subprojects probably including tcsts on human
'\'oluntee~ and. .6 subprojects involving tests on unwitting
hl~man bemgs.
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Second, there is research on hypnosis, eight subprojects, including
two involYinghypnosis and drugs in combination.
.
Third, lhere are seven projects on the acquisition of chemicals or
drugs.
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Fourth, four subprolects on the aspects of the magician's art, useful
in covert operations, for instance, tlie surreptitious delivery of drugrelated materials.
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Fifth, there are nine projects on studies ,of human behavior, sleep
research, a.nd,behavioral change during psychotherapy.
Sixth, there are projects on library searches and attendants at seminars and international conferences .onbehavioral modifications.
Seventh, there a~ 23 projects on motivational studies, studies of
defectors, assessments of behavior and training techniques.
Eighth, there are three subprojects on polygraph research.
Ninth, th~rc are three subprojects on funding mechanisms for
}"IKULTRA'sexternal research activities.

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Tenth, there are six subprojects on research on drugs, toxins, and
biologicals in human tissue, provision of exotic pathogens, and the
capability to incorporate them in effective deliv<:ry systems.
. Eleventh, there are three subprojects on activities whose nature
sImply cannot be determined.
Twelfth, there are subprojects involving funding support for unspecified activities conductel1 wit.h the Army Specin1 Operations Divi- .
Slon at Fort Detrich, }'fd. Thisnctivity is outlined in Book I of the
Church committee report, pages 388 to 389. (See Appendix A, pp..
68-69).
Under CIA's Project :MKNAOM:I, the Army assisted the CIA in
developing, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delhrery
systems for use against humans as well as against animals and crops.
Thirteenth, there are sing-Ie subprojects in such areas as the effects
of electroshock, harassment techniques for offensive use, analysi~ of
extrasensory perception, gas propelled sprays and aerosols, and four
subprojects involving crop and material sabotage.·
. .
Fourteenth, one or two subprojects on each of the following: blood
grouping research; controlling the activities of animals; energy storage a~d transfer in organic systems; and stimulus and response in
bIOlogICal systems.
.
Finally, i5th, there are three subprojects canceled before any work
was done on them having' to do with laboratory drug screening, research. on brain concussion, and research on biologically active
materIals.
.
Now, let me address how much this newly discovered material adds
to what has previously been reported to the Church committee and
to Senator Kennedy's Subcommittee on Health. The answer is basically additional detail. The principal types of activities included in
these documents have Jor thb most part been outlined or to some
extent generally described in what was previously available in the
way of documentation and which was ~upplied by the CIA to the
Senate investigators.
.
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For example, financial disbursement records for the period of 1960
to 1964 for 76 of these 149 subnrojects bld. been recovered by the
Office of Finance at CIA and ,;'ere made available to the Church
committee investi~ators. For example, the 1963 Inspector General
report on 1tfKULTRA made available to both the C'"I.urch committee
and the Subcommittee on Health mentions electrol:::~.JCk and harassment substances, covert testing on unwittin~ U.S. citizens, the search
for new materials through arrangements with specialists in hospitals
and universities, and the fact that the Technical Service Division of
CIA had initiated 144 subprojects related to the control 'of human
behavior.
.
For instance also, the relevant section of a 1957 Inspector General
report was also made available to the Church committee staff. and
that· rep:>rt discusses the techniques for human assessment and lln~
orthodox methods of communication, discreditinp: and disabling: materials which can be covertly administered, studies on magicians' arts
as applied to cm'ert operations, and other similar topics.
.
The most si~ificant ne\v data that has been discovered are,: first,
the names of researchers and institutio.ns who participated in

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l,IKULTRA. projects, and ~t'cond, n. possibly improper contribution
~y the CIA to n private institution. ,re are now in the J?ossesSlOn of the names of 185 nOIlO"overnment researchers and fi.SSlstants
who are identified in the reco7-ered material dealing with these 149
S~l bprojf'cts.
There are also names of 80 institutions where "·ork was done or
with which these people wert' affiliated. The institutions include 44colleges or universities. 15 research foundation or chemical or pharmaceutical companies 01' 'the like, 12 hospitals or clinics, in addition to
those associated with the universities, and 3 penal institutions.
'Yhile the identities of some of these people and institutions were
known previously, the discovery of the new identities adds to our
knowledge of ~:fKULTRA.
The facts as they pertain to the possibly improper contribution are
as follows. O:le project invo}yes a contribution of $375,000 to a building fund of a private medical institution. The fact that that con!ribution was made was previously known. Indeed, it wa~ mention.cd
In the 1957 report of the Inspector General on the Techm~al SerVIce
Division of CIA that supelTised JIKULTRA, and pertinent portions
of this had been reviewed by the Church committee staff.
The newly discowl'ed material. hO\"ever~ makes it clear tiu.t this
contribution ,,·as made through an intermediary, which made it appear to be a private donation. As a private donation. the contribution
was then matched by Fedt'ral funds. The institution was not made
aware 0'£ the true sourCe of the gift. This project was approve(l h··
the then Director of Central Intelligence and concurred in by CIA's
top management including the then General Counsel, who wrote an
opinion supporting the legality of the contribution.
The recently discovered documents also give greater insight into
the scope of the unwitting nature of the drug testing, but contribute
little more than that. ,Ve now do have corrobOrating information that
some Qf the unwitting- drug testing was c3rried out in what is known
in the intelligence trade as safe houses in San Francisco and in New
York City. and we ha"e identified that three individuals were inyolved in 'this undertaking, whereas we previously reported there was
only one person.
'Ve also know now that some un"'itting testing took place on criminalsexu1\1 psychopaths confined at a State hospital, and that additionally research was done on a knockout or K drng in parallel with
research to develop painkillers for cancer patients.
. These, then~ are the principal findings identified to date in our review of thi~ recovered material. As noted earlier, we believe the detail on the identities of researchers and institutions involved in CIA
sponsorship of drug and behavioral modification research is n· new
element and one which poses a considerable problem. Most of the people and institutions involved were not aware of CIA sponsorshi'(>. ,V<,
should certainly assume that the researchers and institutions which
cooperated with CIA on a w'itting basis acted in goood faith and in
the belief that they were aiding their Government in a legitimate and
proper purpo~e.
I believe that we all have a moral obligation to these researchers
and institutbns to protect them from any nnjustified embarrassment

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or damage to their reputations which revelation of their identities
might. bring. In addition, I have a legal obligation under the Pri\'acy
Act not. to publicly disclose the names of the individual rcsearchers
without theu' const'nt.
This is E'speciallv true. of course. for those researchers and institutions which were unwitting participants in CIA sponsored activities.
Nonetheless, ~fr. Chairman, I certainly recognize th~ right and the
need of both the Senat(' Select Committ('c on Intelhgence and the
Senate Subcommittee on Ht'alth and Scientific Research to investi~ate
tht', circumstanct's of tht'se aeti\'itit's in whate\'cr detaH you consIder
necessary. I am providing your committee with all of the documentation, including all of the nnmes, on n classified basis. I hope that thi!
will facilitate your investigation while still protecting the individuals·
and the institut,ions involved.
Let me emphasize again that the MK1JLTRA e\'ents ure 12 to 24
years in the past, and I assure you that CIA is in no way engaged in
either witting or unwitting testing of drugs today.
,
Finally. I am working closely with the Attorney General on this
matter. 'Ye are making available to the Attorney General whatever
mat<.'l'ials he may deem nt'ct'ssary to any im'estigations that he may
t'lect to undertake. Bt'yoml thnt, we are also working with the Attorney
General to determine whether it is practicable from this new evidence
to identify any of the persons to whom drugs may ha\'c been administerpd unwittingly. No such namps are part of these records. 'Ve have
not identified the individuals to whom drugs ,,~ere administered, but
we are trying now to determine if there are ad~quate clues to lead to
their identification, and if so ho\': best to go about fulfilling the Government's responsibilitil?s in this matter.
~fr. Chairman, as we proceed ,dtll that process of att('mpting to
identify the individuals and then determining what is our proper rcsJ?onsibility to them, I will keep both of these committees fully adv{sed. I thank you, sir.
Senator Ix-oUYF-. Thank vou very much, Admiral Turner. Your
spirit of cooperation is n1llc1i appredated. I would like to announce to
the committee that in order to gin~ every member an opportunity to
participate in this hearing, that we ,,:ould set a time limit of 10 minutes
per Senator.
.
Admiral Turner, please give this committee the gent'sis of~fKnI.J
TRA. 'VIlo or what committee or commission or aj!ency waf,:; responsible for dreaming up this grandiose and sinister project, and why was
it necessary? "That is the rationaie or justification for such a project
and was the President of the United States aware of this?
Admiral TURNER. :Mr. Chairman. I am 1!oine: to ask ]'fr. Brody on
my rip:ht, who is a lonp:-time member of the CIA to address that. in
more detail. I believe everything that we know about the genesis was
turned over to the Church t'ommittee and is contained iil thnt. material. Bnsically, it was a CIA-initiated project. It started out of a
concern of our being' taken advnnta~e of by other powers who would
use drugs against our personnel, and it. was armroved in tlle Agencv. I
hnve asked the question you just asked fl?,e, and have been assured'that
there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at hi1!her
echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval. That
does not say there was not, but we have no such evidence•

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:Mr. Brody, would you amplify on my comments there, please ~
:Mr. BRODY. :Mr. Chairman, I really ha,'e very little to add to that.
To my knowledge, there was no Presidential kil0w]cdge of this project at the time. It was a CIA project, and as the admif:d said, it was
a project designed to attempt to counteract what waS th~n thought to
be a sel'ious threat by our enemies of nsing drugs against us. Most. of
what else we know about it is in the Senate Church committee report.
Senator INOUYE. 'Vere the authorized members of the Congress
made aware of this project through the budgetary process ~
:Mr. BRODY. '\Vc have no knowledge of that, sir.
.
Senator INOUYE. Are you suggesting that it was intentionally kept
away from the Congress and the President of the United States1
Admiral 1'tmXER. No, sir. 'Ve are only saying that we r.:Lve no evidence one way or the other as to whether the Congress was informed
of this particular project. There are no records to indicate.
SE'nator INOUYE. Admiral Turner, are you personally satisfied by
actual investigation that this newly discovered information was not
intentionally kept away from the Senate of the United States ~
Admiral TVRxER. I have no way to prove that, sir. That is my conyiction from everything I have seen of it.
Senator I~ol:YF.. Now, we have been advised that these documents
were initially discovered in ~Inrch of this year, and you were notified
in .Tuly of this year, or .Tune of this year, and the committee was notified in .Tuly. Can you tell us why the Director of Central Intelligence
was notified ~ months after its initial discovery, why the delay~
Admiral TUR~ER. Yes, sir. All this started with several Freeuom of
Information 'Act reC]uests, and ~fr. Laubinger on my left was the indiyidual who took it upon himself to pursue these requests with great
diligence. and got permission to go to the Retired Records Center, and
then made the decision to look not only under what. would be the expected subject files, but throug-h every file w~t.h which the branch that
conducted this type of activity had any conceivable connection.
Very late in March, he discovered these seven boxes. He arranged
to have them shipped from the Retired Records Center to Washing.ton, to our headquarters. They arrived in early April. He advised ,his
appropriate superiors, who asked him how long he thought it would
take him to f!O through these and screen them appropriately, clear
. them for Freedom of Information Act release.
There are, we originally estimated, 5,000 pages here. ",Ye now think
that was an underestimation, find it may be clos€'.r to 8,000 pages. He
estimated it would take about 45 days or into the middle of May to
do that. He was told to proceed, and as he did so there was nothing
uncovered in the beginning of these 149 cases that appeared particularly startling or particularly additive to t.he knowledge that had already been given to the Church committee, some detllils, but no major
revelations..,
.
. . He and his ass(Y."iates ,proceeded with deliberateness, but not a great
sense of ur,g-ency. There were other interfering activities that came
and demanded his time also. He wns not able to put 100 percent of his
time on it,llJld there did not appear to be cause for a great rush here.
'\Ve were trying to be responsive to th(~ Freedom of Information Act
request within the limits.of our manpower and our priorities.

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In early .June, howc'"cr, he>, discovered two projects. the one rclated
to K drugs and tIl<' one r('lat£'d to the funding at thc'instit.ution. and
r£'alized immediately that he had substantial new information~ and
hc immediately reported this to his superiors.
.
Two actions were taken. One ~,as to notify the lawyers of the principal Freedom of Information Act recl.'lf>stor that we would hayc subst<l1l~.ial ne" material and that it would be forthcoming as rapidly ~s
possible, and th~ second was to start a 1l1(,/11ornndum up the cham
that indicated his bE>lief that we should notifv the Senate Select Committee on Int£'lligence of this discovery because of the character at least
of these two documents.
.
As that proceeded up fl'om the 1:1th of ,Tune, at each echelon we hfl.d
to go through the legal office, t}>" legislatin> liaison office and at ('ach
echelon about the same question was asked of him: Have you gone
through all of this, so that when we notify th(' Senate Select Committee we do n~t notify half of the important l'('le"ations and not the
other half? The last thing I wunt, ::\11'. Chairman. is in any way to
be on any topic, give the appearance on any topic of being recalcitrant,
I"£'luctant, or ha.ving to hav£', you drag things out of n1£', and mv subordinates, much to my pleasure, had each asked. have you reall~' gone
through these 8,000 pn.ges enough to h.-now that we are not going to
uncover a bombshell down at the bottom?
.
By late .June, about the 28th, this process reached my deputy. He
notified me a.fter his review of it on the 7th of ,July, whIch is the first
I knpw of it. I began reading into it. I asked the same probing question directly. I then notified my superiors, and on thc 15th delivered
to yon my letter letting yon know that we had this, and we have been
working, many people, many hours since then, to be sure that what we
a r(' telling von today does includ(' all the relevant material.
Senator- IXOUYE. i would like to commend Mr. Laubing-er for his
diligence and expertise. bllt was this diligence the result of the Freeclom of Information Act. or c0111d this diligence have been exercised
during the Church hearings? 'Vhy was it not exercised?
Admiral TURXER. There is no question that theoretically this diligence could have been exerciscd at any time, and it may well he th.at
the Freedom of Information Act has made us more aware of thIS.
'Vonld yOll speak for yourself, please.
~1r. T.lAUBIXGER. I really don't attribute it. Senator, to diligence so
much as thoroughness. If you can imagine the pressures under an
organization trying t? respond~ which I think the CIA did at the time
of the Church committee hearmgs, the hallways of the floor I am 011
were full of boxes from our records center. Every box that anyone
thought could possibly contain anything was called up for search. It
was one of a frantic effort to comply.
'Vhen the pressure of th!lt situation cools down, and l'on can start
looking at things systematIcally, you are apt to fin~ thmgs that you
wOllldn't under the heat of a crash program, and that IS what happened
here.
Senator IxouyE. Thank you very much. Senator Kennedy i
Senator KEXXEDY. Admiral Turner, this is an enormously distressing report that you give to the American Congress and to the American
people today. Granted, it happened many years ago, but what we are

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basic~]]y talking about is an activity which took place in the country
that Ipvoh"ed the per\"{'rs~on apd the cormption of many of our outstandmg reSl~arch centers ill thIS country! with CIA funds. where some
of our top re~arche~ wer~ unwittingly involved in reser.rch sponsored by the Agency In ~hIch they had no knowledge 01' the background or the support for.
:Much of it was done with American citizens who Fere completely
unknowing in tenns ?f taking yarious drugs, and there are perhaps
any numb€r of AmerIcans w·ho are walkinO' around today on the east
coast or west c?ast who were given drugs, with all the kinds of physical
and psychologIcal damage that can be caused. ·W"e have gone onr that
invery careful detail, and it is significant and severe indeed.
I do not know what could be done in a less democrntic country
that would be more alien to our own tradition~ than was really done
in this narrow area, and as YOU' give this report to the committee, I
would like to get some sense~ of your own concern about this ty~ of
activity, and how you react. 11a ving a~snmed ':his important respon~ibil­
ity with the confidence of President Carter and the m"erwhelming
support: ob\"iously, of the. Congress: under this set of circnmstances.
I d~d not get m?ch of a feeling in reviewing your stateme.n~ here t?is
mommg of the kmd of abhorrence to this type of past actl\,ty wInch
I think the American people would certainlY deplore and which I
believe th3:t you do. but could yon comment upon that guestion, and also
perhaps gIve us what ideas YOU have to insure that It cannot happen
again ~
•
Admiral Tt7RXER. Senator Kennedy. it is totallY abhorrent 1:0 me to
think of using a human being as a gtlinea rig and any way jeopardizing his life and his health: no matter how great the cause. I am not
here to pass judgment on my rredeces..~rs: but I. can a....~u~e .J~)U that
thi:; is totally beyond the pale of my contempla!IOn of actInhes that
the CIA or any other of our intelligence agenCIes should undertake.
I am taking and have taken what I }X>lieve are adpquate steps to
insure that such things ate not continuing today.
S~nator KEXXF.OY. Could vou tell us a little bit ahout that ~
Admiral TrRXER. I have a~keci for a special report a.s~uring me that
there-are no drug activities extant. that is. drug acti\"ities that im"oh'e
<.>xpp.rimentation. ObYiously: we collect intelligence about c1ru~ and
drug use in other countries. bllt ther~ are no experimentations being
conduct<'d by the C-entral Intelligence Agency, and I han' had a special
check made. "lx'cause of anoth<>r incident that waR ul1conred some years
ago about the unauthorized retention of some toxic material5 at the
CIA. I have had an actual inspection made of the storage place:' and
the certification from the people in charge of tho~ that there are no
such chemical biological materials present in our keeping, and I have
issued express orders that that shall not be the case.
Beyond that, I have to rely in large measure on my l;eIL';e of command and direction of the people and their knowledge of the attitude
I have just expressed to you in this regard.
.
Senator KEXNED1". I think that is ver)' commendable.
Admiral TUR~~R. Thank you, sir.
Senator KEN~"l:DY. I think it is important that the American people
understand that.

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You know, much of thc i'esenrch which is our area of interest. that
was being done by the Agency and the whole inyoh'cd sequC'ne(' of. activities done by the Agency, I am convinced could have been done Ill.n
legitimate way throu~h the research programs of thc. National InstItutes of Menbll Health, other sponsored acti"iti€'~. I mean, that is some
other question, but I think you went to an awful lot of trouble, where
these things could have been.
Let me ask you specifically, on the followup of ~fKULTRA, are
there now-1 think you han answered, but I wnnt to get a complete
anSwer about any exi)erimentations that nre. being done on human, beings, whether it 'iR drug;;; or behnvioral.alt['ratio,ns or patterns or n~y
sl1pport~ either directly or indirectly, bemg pronde<1 by the Agency 111
tC'rms of nny experimentation on human beings.
Admirnl'TunxEH. There is no experimentation with drugs on hnmnn
heings, witting or unwitting, being c0!1ducted in any. ,... r9
SC'nator KEXXEDY. All right. Or bemg supported mdlrectly ~ I mean,
are yOll contracted out.?
..\dmiral TunXEH. Or being in nny way supported.
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Senator Kl':xxEny. All right. How af'out the nondrng expC'rllnentation our COlllmittee has seen-psychosurgery, for example, or psychological resl'nrch?
Admirnl Tt:mxEH. lYe arc continually im'oln',d in what we· call assessment of behavior. For instance,
are trying .to continually improve our polygraph proc<>dllres to, you know, assess whether a person
is lying or not. This does not im'oh'e any tampering with the individual body, This im'oh'es studying records of people's behavior under
different circumstances, nnd so 011, but it is not an experiment.al thing.
Have I described that accurately, Al ~
Mr. BRODY. Yes.
Senator KEXXF.DY. 'Yell, it is limited to those arens~
Admiral TURxEn. Yes; it noes not invoh'e attempting to modify behavior. It only invoh'es studying behavior conditions. but not trying
to actively modify it, as was one of the objectives of :MKULTRA.
Senator KI-;XNF.DY. 'VeIl, we nrc scarce on time, but I am interested
in the_ other areas besides polygraph where yOI1 arc doing it. ~raybe
you can either respond noW" or submit it for the. record, if you would do
that. 'Vonld you provide that fOJ: the record!
Admiral TURNER. Yes.'
.
[The material on psychological assessments follows:]

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Psychological assessments are performed as a serYice to officers In tbeoperatlons dIrectorate who recruit nnd/orbandle agents. Except fur people inYolved
In training courses; the SUbjects of tbe assessments are foreign nationals. The'
assessments are generally done to determine tbe most successful tactic to persuade
the SUbject to accept covert employment uy the CIA, nnd to make an appraisal of
hIs relIability and truthfulness..
.A majority of the work is done by a statt of traIned· psychologIsts, some of
whom are stationed o\'erseas. The assessments they do may he either direct or
Indirect. DIrect assessments InYolve a personal interview of the subject by tbe .
psycbologist. Wben poss!ule tbe subject Is asked· to complete a formal "intelli·
gence test" whIcb-:Is actually a dIsguised psycbological test. Indh1duals being
assessed are not gIl"en drugs, nor are they subjectt>d to physical harassment or
torture. Wben operating condItions are sucb tbat a face-to-face Interview' Is not
possIble, tbe pS)'cbologist may do an IndIrt'Ct assessmt'nt, usIng as sonrce materials descrlpUol1s of the subject uy others, intervIews witb people who know
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bIm, specimens of Ills writIngs, etc.

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The other psychological assessments involve handwriting analYHls or graphologIcal assesswent. The work is done by a pair of traIned graphologists, assisted
by a small number of measurement technicians. 'l'he:r gene.ally require at least
a page ot handwritten script by the subject. Measurements are made of about
30 dilferent writiI.lg characteristics, and these are charted and furniHhed to the
graphologist for assessments.
~'he pSJ-'chologists also give courses in ps)'Chvloglcal assessment to group of
operations O'fficers, to sharpen their own capabilities to size up people. As part of
the training course, the instructor does a psychological assessment ot each
student. "The students an! witting participants, and results are discussed with
~em.
.
It iR important to reiterate that psychological assessments are only a s~rvice
to the op-;;i'ations officers. In the final analJ-'sis, it is the responsiblUty of the
operations officer to decide how a potential agent should be approached, or to
make a jt:dgement as to wbether an:r agent is telling the truth. .

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Admiral TURNER. The kind of thing we a.re interested in is, what
will motivate a man to become an agent of the United States in a difficult situation.'Ve have to be familiar with that kind of attitudinal
response that we can expect from people we approach to for one reason
or another become our spies, but I will be happy to submit a very
"specific listing of these.
Senator KENNEDY. 'Vould you do that for the committee ~
In the followups, in the ~lKSEARCH, in the OFTEN, and the
CHICK'VIT, could you give us also a report on those particular
programs¥
Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.
Senator lCENNEDY. Did they involve experimentation, human
experimentation ~
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. None of them ¥
AdmiraITURNER. Let me say this, that CHICK'VIT program is tho
code name for the CIA participation in what was basically a Depart"ment of Defense program. T:~;.s program was summarized "and reported to the Church committee, to the Congress, and I have since they
have been rementioned in the press in the last 2 days here, I have not
had time to go through and personally review them. I 11ave ascertained
that all of the files that we had"and made available ·before are intact,
and I have put a special order <Jut that nobody ,vill enter those files
or in any way touch them without my pennission at this point, but.
they are in the Retired Records Center outside of 'Vashington, and
they are available. .
"
I am not prepared to give you full details on it, because I simply
haven't read into that part of our historYl but in addition I would sug·
gest when we want to get into that we Should get the Department of
Defense in with us.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you will supply that information to the
Intelligence Committee, the relevant, I mean, the health aspects, obviou~ly, and the research we are interested in ¥
Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Will you let us know, Admiral Turner ~
Admiral TuRNER. I will be happy to.
[See p.169 for the material referred to.]
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. I am running out of time. Do you
support the extension" of the protection of human subjects legislation
to include the CIA and the DOD¥ You commented favorably on that

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before, and I am hopeful we can get that on the calendar early in
September, and that 15 our strong interest.
Admiral TuRNER. The CIA certainly has no objection to that proposed legislation, sir. It is not my role in the administration to be the
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supporter of it or the endorser of i t . .
Senator KENNEDY. As a personal matter, since you have reviewed
these subjects, would you comment Y I know it is maybe unusual, but
you can understand w'hat we are attempting to do.
Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir.
Senlltor KENNEDY. From your own experience in the agency, you
can understand the value of it.
Just finaiiy, in your own testimony now with this additional information, it seems <J.l1ite apparent to m~ that you can reconstruct in very
careful detail thIs whole project in terms of the responsible CIA
officials for the program. You have so indicated in your testimony.
Now with the additional information, and the people, that have been
revealed in the examination of the documents, it seems to be. pretty
cl~ar that you can track that whole program in very careful detail,
anq. I would hope, you know, that you would want to get to ~he bottom
of It, as the Congress does as well. I will come back to that In my next
round. Thank you very much.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Goldwater¥
Senator GOLDWATER. I have no questions.
Senator bwUYE. Senator Schwelked
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, 1tfr. Chainnan.
Admiral Turner, I would like to go ba~k toyonr testimony on page
12, where you discuss the contribution to the building fund of a
private medical institution. You state, "Indeed, it was mentioned in a
1957 Inspector General ref0rt on the Technical Service Division of
CIA, pertinent portions
which had been reviewed by the Church
committee staff." I would like to have you consider this question very
carefully. I served as a member of the original Church committee.
1tfy staffer did 'a lot of the work that you are referring to here. He
made notes on the IG's report. My ~uestion to you is, are you saying
that the section that specifically delIneates Jln Improp~r contribution
,vas in fact given to the Church committee staff to see j
Admiral TURNER. The answer to your question is "Yes." Thc information that a contribution had been made was made available, to the
best of my knowledge.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Only certain sections of the report were madc·
available. The reJ>Ort had to be reviewed out at Langley; it was not
reviewed here, ana copies were not given to us here. I just want you to
carefully consider what you are saying, because the only record we
have care the notes ~hat· the staff took on anything that was of
significance.
.
Admiral TuRNER. My understanding was that ~:fr. 1t:faxwell was
shown the relevant portion of this report that disclosed that the contribution had been made.
Senator SCHWEIXER. To follow this up further, I'd like to say that
I think there was & serious flaw in the way that the IG report waR
handled and the Church committee was limited. I am not making any
accusations: but because of limited accesS to the report, we have a situ-

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ation where it is not even clear whet.her we actually saw that material
or not, simply because we could not keep a coPy of the report under
the procedures we had to f('How. We' were limIted by notetaking, and
so it is rather nrnbiguous as to just what was seen and whilt was not
seen. I certainly hope that the new Intelligence Committee will not
be bount! by prOCedures that so restrict its abilit)' to exercise effective
uversight.
I have a second question. Does it concern you, Admiral, that we used
a subterfuge which resulted in the use of Federal construction grant
funds to finance facilities for these sorts of cxperime.nts on our own
people ~ n~cause as I undelostnnd what you are saying, ,....hile the CIA
maybe only put up $375,000, this triggered a response on the part of
the Federal Gon~rnment to provide on n. good faith bagis matching
hospital funds at the same level. We put up more than $1 million of
matching funds, some based on an allegedly private donation which
was really CIA money.
.
Isn't there something bnsically wrong with that~
Admiral TuR~ER. I certainly believe there. is. As I stated, the General Counsel of the CIA at that time r£>ndered a legal opinion that.
this was a legal undertaking, and again I am hesitant to go back and
re"isit the atmosphere, the laws, the attitudes at that time, so whether
the counsel was on good legnl ground or not, I am not enough of no
lawyer to be surl:', but it certainly would occur to me if it happened
today as a very questionable activity.
S;>nator SCJI\'·EIKER. "~ell, I think those of us who worked on nnd
amended the Hill-Burton Act and other hospital construction fiSsistnn~e laws over the years, would have n rat.hf'T rlifff>rent opinion on
the legnl intent or object.of Congress in passing laws to provide hospital construction project money. These funds weren't intended for
this.
.
It r<>minds me a little bit of the shellfish toxin situation which tnrned
up when I was on the Church committee. The Public Health Service
was used to produce a deadly poison with Publi('. Health money. Here
we are usine- general hospital constmction money to carryon a series of
drug experIments.
Admiral TURxER. Excuse me, sir. If I could jnst be, I think, accurate. I don't think any of this $375,000 or the mntching funds were
used to .conduct drug experiments. They were used to build the hospital. Now, tht'. CIA then put more money into a foundation that. was
conducting research on the CIA's behalf supposedlv in that hospita.l, so
the i~tent. \\:as certainly there, but the mOl1ey~ was not used for
experImentahon.
Senator SCHWEIKER. ell, I understand it was used for bricks and
mortar, but the bricks were used to build the facility where the experiments were carried on j were they not ¥
Admit'1l.! TURNER. 'l'"e do not have positiye evidence that thev were.
It certainly would seem that. that W:lS the intent, but I do not want to
draw inferences here. . .
Senator SCHWEIKER. Well, why else would they ¢ve this money for
the building fund if the building was not used for a purpose that
benefited the CIA progTam i
Admil'alTuRxER. I certainly drnwthe inference that the CIA
expected to benefit from it, and some of the wording says the General

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Counsel's opinion was that this was legal only if the CIA was going
to derive adequate benefit from it, but, sir, ther£'. is no evidence of what
benefit was derived.
Semitor SCllWEIKER. There must have been seme pretty good benefits
ut ~tnke. The Atomic Energy Commission was to bear a share of the
c~st, and when th('y backed out for some n;ason or an.other, the CIA
pIcked up part of their tab. So, at two (hfferent pomts there were
mdications that CIA decisiollmakers thought there was great benefit
to be d('rh'ed from whate"er happene~ within the brick and mortar
walls of that facility.
.
Admiral TIJRXJ-:R. You are absolutely right. I am only t~kmg the
position that I cannot substantiate that there was benefit derIved.
Senator SCIIWEIKF.fl. The agreement dopllnents .say that thl~ C.lA
would haY<' acc('ss to one-sixth of the space mvolved III the conshyctIon
of the wing, so how would you enter into an agreement that specIfically
says that you will have acCess to and use of one-sixth of the space and
not. perform something in that space~ I cannot believe it was empty.
Admirnl TunxER. Sir, I am not disputing you at all, but both of lIS
nre suying that the inference is that one-sixth of the space was used,
that exp('rinwntation wus done, and so on, but there is no factual e,:idence of what went on as n result of that payment or whut went on 111
that hospital. It is just missing. It is not that it didn't happen.
Senator SCllwEun:n. Admiral Turner, one other-Senator KEl\;XEOY. "\Yollld the Senator yield on that point ~
S('nator SCIIWEIKER. I understand that in the agency's documents
on the ngre£'ment it was explicitly stated that one-sixth of the facility
would be designated for CIA use and made available for CIA r~­
search. Are YOU famiiiar-:Mr. BRODY. Senator, as I recall, you are right in that there is IL mention of one-sixth, but any mention at all has to do with planning. There
ure no subsequent. reports as to what happened after the construction
took place.
Senator SC'H\\'EIKlm. Admiral Turner, I rC'ud in the New York Times
that pnrt of this seri('s of :MKUI"TRA experiments involved an arrangement. with the Federal Bureau of Karcotics (-0 test LSD Rurreptitioi!sly on unwitting patrons in bars in New York and San
Francisco. Some of the subjects became violently ill and were hospitalized. I wonder if you would just briefly describe what we were
doing t.here and how it was carried out ¥ I assume it was through a safe
house operation. I don't believe your stat.ement went into much detail.
Admiial TunxER. I did mention the safe house operation in my
statement, sir, and that is how these were carried out. What we ha,:e
learned from the new documentation is the location and the dates at
which tlle safe houses were run by the CIA and the identification of
t.hree individi'mls who were assochited with running those safe houses.
'Ve know something about. the construction work that was done in
them becau~e t~ere were contracts for:this. Beyond that, we are pretty
much d.rawmg mferences as to the thmgs that went on as to' what you
are saymg here.
.
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Senator SCIIWEIKER. 'Yen, the subjects were unwitting. You can
infer that m~~ch, right.!
Admiral TonNER. Right.

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Senator SCHWEIKER. If you happened to be at the wrong bar at the
wrong place and time, you got it.
Mr. BRODY. Senator, that would be--contacts were made, as we
understand it, in bars, et cetera, and then the people may hale been
invited to these safe houses. There really isn~t any indication as to
the fact that this took place in the bars.
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Admiral TuRNER. We are trying to be very precise with Sou, sir, and
not draw an inference here. There are 6 cases of these 149 Wl.lere we
have enough evidence in this new documentation to substantiate that
there was unwitting testing and some of t.hat involves these safe
houses. There are other cases where it is ambiguous as to whether the.
testing was witting or voluntary. There are others ,vhere it was clearly
voluntary.
Senator SCHWElKER. Of course, after a few drinks, it is questionable
whether informed consent means anything to a' person in a bar
anyway.
.
Admiral TuRNER. Well, we don't have any indication that all these
cases where it is ambiguous involved drinking of any kind. There are
cases in penal institutions where it is not clear whether the prisoner
was given a choice or not. I don't know that he wasn't ghren a choice,
but I don't positively know that he was, and I clas~ify that as an
ambiguous incident.
Senator INOUYE. Your time is up, Senator.
Senator Huddleston ~
Senator HUDDLESTON. Thank you, :Mr. Chainnan.
Admiral Turner, you stated in your testimony that you are convinced there was no attempt to conceal this recently dis~overed documentation during the. earlier searches. Did you question the individuals connected WIth the earlier search b~fore you made that judgment ¥
Admiral TuRNER. Yes; I haven't, I don't think, questioned eYerybody who looked in the files or is still on our payroll who looked in
the files back in 1975, but Afr. Laubinger on my left is the best authority on this, and I have gone over it with him in some detail.
Senator HUDDLESTON. But you.have inquired, you think, sufficiently
to assure yourself that there was no intent on the part of any person
to conceal these records from the previous committee ¥
Admiral TuRNER. I am persua.ded of that both by my questioning
of people and by the circumstances and the way in which these documents were filed, by the fact. which I did not and should have mentioned in my testimony, that these were not the official files. The ones
t.hat we have received or retrieved were copies of files that were working files that somebody had used, and therefore were slipped into a
different location, and a~in I say to you, sir, I can't imagine their
deliberately concealing these particular files and .revealing the other
things that they did- reveal in 1975. I don't see the motive for that,
because tpese are not that damning compared with the overall material
that was provided.·
.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Is this the kind of operation that if it were
co~ti~uing now or if t.here were anythiI!g simpar to it. that you would
feel compelled·to report to the Select CommIttee on IntellIgence ~
:Adm~ral ~NER. Y~~, sir. Y~:m mean, if I discovered that somethmg- hke thIS were gomg on WIthout my knowledge~ Yes I would
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Senator HUDDLESTOX. But if it were going on with your knowledge,
would you report it to the committee ~ I assume you would.
Admiral 'ltTRNER. Yes. 'VeIl, it would not be going 011 with my
knowledge, but theoretically the answer is yes, sir. . .
Senator HUDDLESTOX. 'VeIl, then, what suggestions would you have
as we devise charters for the various intelligence agencies ~ What
provision would you suggest to T.rohibit this kind of activity from
taking place ~ ",.ould you suggestthat it ought to be specifically outlined in a statutory charter setting out the parameters of the permissible operation of the various agencies ~
Admiral 'l.'uRNER. I think that certainly is something we must consider as we look at the legislation for charters. I am not on the face
of it opposed to it. I think we would have to look at the pa.rticular
wording as we are going to have to deal with the whole charter issue
as to exactly how precise you want to be in delineating restraints and
curbs on the intelligence activities.
Senator HUOOLESTON. In the case of sensitive type operations, which
this certainly was, which might be going on today, is the oversight
activity of the agency more intensive now than it was at that time ~
Admiral TURNER. ]':fuch more so. I mean, I ha.ve briefed you, sir,
and the committee on our sensitive operations. We have the Intelligence Oversight Board. We have a procedure in the National Security Council for approval of very sensitive operations. I think the
amount of spotlight focused on these a.ctivities is many, manyfold
what it was in these 12 to 24 years ago.
Senator HUOO:(,ESTOX. How about the record keeping~
Admiral Ttm......"'ER. Yes; I can't imagine anyone having the gaIl to
think that he can just blithely destroy records today with all of the
attention that has come to this, and certainly we are emphasizing that
that is not the case.
.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. Admiral, I was varticularly interested in the
activitythat took place at the U.S. Pubhc Health Service Hospital at
Lexington, Ky., in which a Dr. Harris Isbell conducted experiments
on people who were presumably patients there. There was a narcotics
institution, I take it, and Dr. Isbell was, according to the New York
Times story, Cf.Lrrying on a secret series of correspondence with an
indi\'idual at the agency by the name of Ray. Have you identified who
that person is Y
.
Admiral 'l'uRNER. Sir, I find myself in a difficult position here at
a public hearing to confirm or deny these names in view of my legal
responsibilities under the Privacy Act not to disclose the names of
individuals here.
Senator HUDDLESTON. I am just asking you if you have identified
the person referred to in that article as Ray. I am not asking you who
he was. I just want to know if you know who he is.
Admiral TuRl-."'ER. No. I am sorry, was this W-r-a-y or R-a-y~
Senator HUDDLESTON. It is listed in the news article as R-a-y, in
quotations.
Admiral TtmNER. No, sir, we have not identified him.
Senatpr HUDDLESTON. So you have no knowled,ge of whether or
not he is still a member of your stflff or C'onnected with the Agency in
any way. Have you attempted to identify him ~

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[Pause.].
Admi I TuR1
(
:\'"ER. Senator, we have u. former employee whose first
na&e IS ay who may have had some connection with these activities.
th t natohr. H?DDLESTOX. You suspect. that but you have not verified
. a hat t IS tl!lle,
at least you are not in a position to indicate that
you ave verIfied lU
Admiral Turoa:R. That is ~orrect.
Senaror HUDDLESTOX. Thank you.
Thank you, 1\1r. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Wallop?
Sena!or WALLOP. Thank you, :Mr. Chairman.
Adm.lral Tunler, not all of the-and in no way tryino- to excuse
you.of the hIdeous nature of some of these projects, but nOt an of the
proJects under :M:KULTRA are of a sinister or even a moral nature Is that a :fair statement ~
.
Admiral TuP.~LR. That is correct.
S~nator.:w-ALLOP. Looking down through some of these 17 projects
not mvolvmg human testing, a..spects of the magician's art it doesn~t
seem as thoug~ there is anything ,'ery sinister about that. 'Studies of
hu.man behaTIor and sleep research, library searches. Now, those
thlI~lgS i~ their way are still of interest, are they not, to the process
of mtellIgence gathering ~
Admiral TuR:\"'ER. Ye'3, sir. I have not tried to indicate that we
either are not doing or would not do any of the things that were
involved in MXULTRA, but when it comes to the witting or unwitting
testing of people with drugs, that is certainly verboten, but there are
other things.
Senator WALLOP. Even with ~olunteer patients ~ I mean, I am not
trying-to put you on the spot to say whether it is going on. but I mean,
it is not an uncommon thing', is it1 in the prisons of the. United States
for the Public Health Service to conduct various kinds of experiments
with vaceines and, say, sunburn crealI11s~ I know in Arizona they have
done so.
Admiral TURNER. 1fy understandin,g is, lots of that is authorized.
but I am not of the opinion that this is not the CIA's busint>ss, and
that if 'we need some infonnation in that cate.~ory, I wonld prefer
to go to the ot.her appropriate nuthorities of the Government and ask
them to get it for us r$lther than to in any way-Senator WALl.OP. Well, you know. you have library searches and a~­
tenrlants at the national seminars. This is why I wanted to ask you If
the bulk of these projeCts were in any way the kinds of things tha~ the
Agency might not do now. A President would not have been horrIfied
by the list of the legitimate types of things. Isn't that probably the
caSe 9
Admiral TuR~~. Y('s. sir.
.
Senator WALLOP. And if it did in fact appear in the IG report, is
there any reason to suppose that t.he President did not know of this
project f You said there was no reason to suppose that he did, but let
me reverse that. Is there -any reason to suppose ·that they did not ~
Admiral TuRNER. No.
.
Senator WALLOP. Well. you know. I jUst cannot imagine you or
literally -anybody undertaking projects of the ma~itude of dollars
here and just not knowing about it, not infonning your superior that

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these were ~oing on, especially when certain items of it appear in the
Inspect?r General's report on budget l?attel's.
..
Admiral TURxER. 'VeIl, I find It dIfficult when It IS that far back to
hypothesi:::e what the procedures that the Director was using in terms
of informing hi~ superiors were. It is quite adifterent climate from
today, and I think we do a lot more informing today than they dId
back then, but I find it very difficult to guess what the level of knowleage was.
Senator WALLOP. I am really not asking you to second-guess it, but
it just seems to me that, while the past is past, and thank goodne.ss we
are oper~.ting under different sets of circumstances, I think it is naive
for us to suppose that these things were conducted entirely without the
knowledge of the Presidents of the United States during those time~._
It is just the kinds of resC'arch inforlllation that was being sought was
vital to the United States, not the means,but the informution that they
were trying to find.
Adm·iral TORXER. I am sorry. Your qU2stion is, was this vital ~ Did
we view it as vital ~
Senator 'YALLOP. Wrell, your implication 'at the beginning was that
it was a respon~e to the kinds of behavior that were seen in Cardinal
Mindszenty's trial and other things. I mean, somebody must have
thought that this was an important defensive reaction, if nothing else,
on the part of the United States.
Admiral TunXER. Yes, sir, I am sure they did, but again I just don't
know how high that permeated the executive branch.
Senator 'YALLOP. But the kinds of information arc still important
to you. I mean, I am not suggesting that. anyone go back and do that
kind of tIling u,Q;ain, but I'm certain it would be of use to you to know
what was going to 'happen to one of your agents assuming someone hn.d
put one of these things into his bloodstream, or tried to modify his
behavior.
.
Admiral TURNER. Absolutely, and you know, we wouH b~ very conr.erned if we thought there were. things like truth serums or other:
things that our agents or others could be subjected to by usc or impropor use of drugs by other powers against our people or agents.
Senator WALLOP. Are there ¥ I don't ask you to name them, but nre
there such serums ¥
Admiral TmtNER. I don't know of them if there are. I would have to
answer that for the record, sir. . .
'.
Senator WALLOP. I w~>uld appreciate that.
[The material referred to follows:]
"TRUTn" DRUGS IN INTERROGATION

The search for etrectlve aids to interrogation is probably as old as man's need
to obtain information from. an uncooperative source and as persistent as his
impatience to shortcut allY tortuous path.' In the annals of polIce Investigation,
physical .coercion, has .at Urnes been substituted for painstaking and tirne-consurning inqUiry In the belief that direct ~ethods produce quick results. Sir 'James
Stephens, wr1ting~ In 1883, rationalIZes agrislJ· example of "third degree" practices by thepoUce of India; "It 18 far pleasanter to sit comfortably In the shade
rubbing rec:lpcPPer In a'pOor'de~'U'seyes than to go about In the sun hunting up
evidence.".
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More recently,' police officlnlR In some countrles"have turned to drugs fnr asslst·ance In extracting confessions. from accused persons, drugs which ar~ esumed

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til relax the indlvidual'~ defense~ to the poi.nt that he llnknowin~ly revealfl truths
he has been tryln~ to conceal. This iuvestig-ati'\'"e technique, however humanitarian
aR an alterna tl\'e to physical torture, :.till raises serious que~tion3 of indi'\'"l~ual
rights and liherties, In thi~ country, when' drug'S ha,e l!:!wlPd only ,margl~lf\l
nCN'ptancp in police work, their use has provoked ('rie:.; of "psychological thIrd
degree" nnd has precipitated medico-legal contr(l';ersies that nfter a lluluter of
n century still occasionally flar~ into the OJ)f'n.
The use of so-caned "trnth" dru:rs in police work is similar to the accepted
ps:rchlntrlc prnctiCf" of nnrco-(!l'iil.iysis; the difference in the two pr?cedures ~ies
in their different oujeC't!;-cl-:. The police investigator is concerned WIth empirical
truth that may Iii: used against the- susPt'ct, and therefore almost solely ~\'ith
probative tl'uth: the u!'.efulness of the suspect's revelntlons depends ultlma.telyon
th~ir accept.ance in evidence hy a court of law. Tlle psyclllatlst. on t1\e other hand,
using the same "truth" d.ugs in diagnosis and treatment of the mentally 111, is
primarn~' concernt"d with PS1fchological truth or pS,\'C'hological reality rather than
empirIcal fact. A patiE'nt's aberrations are reallty for him at the time they occur,
and an accurate account of these fantasies and delusions, rather than reliable
recollectio1l of past ennts. can be the key to reco\'ery.
The notion of drugs capable of illuminating hidden recesses of the mind, help'1I~ to heal the mentall,v ill and pre\'enting or re,ersin~ the miscarriage of justice,
hns provided an exceeclill~ly durable theme for the prei"S and poplllar literature.
Whlle acknowlecl~ing tha t "truth serum" Is a misnomer twice onr-the drugs
are not sera and they do not necessnrily hrin~ forth probative trnth-journalistic
accounts continue- to exploit the appeal of the term. The formula is to play up
a few spectacular "truth" drug successess alld to impl~' that the drugs are more
maligned than need he and more widely employed In criminal i!westigntlon than
can officlaI1~' l.H.·1I.UlUilleii.
Any te~hniq\1e that promises an Increment of soccess in extracting information
from an llncompllant source is ipso facto of interest ,in intelligence operations.
If the ethical considerations which in Western countries inhibit the use of narcointerrogation in police work are felt also In Intelligence, the 'Western ser,ices
must at least be prepared against its possible employm<:!nt by the ad'\'"ersary. An
understanding of "truth" drugs, theircharncteristic actions, and their potentlalltle.e>, positivE' Rnd negativE', for eliciting useful information is fundamental to an
adequate defense against them..
This discussion, meant to help toward such an understanding, ciraws primarilj.·
upon openl~' published materials. It has the limitations of projecting from crIminal Im'estIgatIve practices and from the permissive atmosphere of drug psychotherapy.

to

SCOP('.LAMINF: AS "TRUTH SERUJd."

\-.

Early in thIs century physicians he::-an to employ scopolamine, along with
morphine and chloroform, to induce a state of "twilight sleep" durIng childbirth,
.'\. constituent of henbane, scopolamine was kno,\\'n to produce sedation aud drowsi·
.. ness, confusion and disorIentation, illcoordination, and amnesia for events experiellced during intoxication. Yet physicians noted that women in twIlight sleep
ansl\'ered questions accurately and often volunteered exceedingly candid remarks.
In 1922 It occurred to Robert House, a Dallas, Texas obstetrIcian, that a sImilar
• technique might.be~mployed in the interrogation of fmspected criminals. and he
arranged to interview under scopolamine two. prisoners in the Dallas county
jail whose guilt 'seemed clearly confirmed. Under the drug, both men deni~ the
charges on which they were held; nnd both, upon trial, were found not guilty.
Enthusiastic at this success, House conclurled that a patient undel' the In:tluence
of scopolamine "cannot create a lie ., . und there is no power to think or rea·
son." [14] His experiment and this conclusion attracted wide attention, and the
idea of a "truth" drug was thus launched npon the public consciousness.
.
The phrase "truth serum" is believed to have appeared first iit a news 'report
of :Bouse's experiment In the L08 Angele8 Record. sometime in 1922. House resisted
the t~rm for a while but c\'entual1y came to employ It regularly himself. He pub·
lIshed some eleven nrtlcIes on scopolamine In the years 1921-1929 with a noticeable incre~se in polemical zeal as time went ·on. What had begu~ as something
of a sc1ent1~~ statement turned fi~alJy into a dedicated crusade by the "father of
truth serum on behalf of bis otrspring, wherein he was "grossly indulgent of its
~'aywat'd ~ha\ior 'and stllbbornly proud of its minor achievements."[ll]

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Only a handful of cases in which scopolamine was used for pollee interrogation came to publlc notice, though there is evidence suggesting that some pollce
forces ma;)" ha,"e used it extensively. [2, 16] One pollee writer claims that the
threat of scopolamine interrogation has been effective in extracting confessions
from criminal suspects, who are told they will first ~e rendered unconscious by
chloral h~'drate placed covertly in theil' L'Otree or drinkmg water. [lG]
Because of a number of undesirable side effects, scopolamine ~'as shortly disquallfied as a "truth" drug. Among the most disabllng of the side effects are
hallucinations, disturbed perception, somnolence, nnd physiological phenomena
~uch as headache, rapid heart. and blurred Yislon, which distract the subjed from
the central purpose of the interview. Furthermore, the physical action is long, far
outlasting the psychological effects. Scopolamine continues; in some cases, to make
anesthesia and surgery safer by drying the mouth and throat and reducing s~re­
tlons that might obstruct the air passages. But the fantastically, almost painfully,
dry "desert" mouth brought on by the drug is hardly conducive to free talking,
e\'en In R tree table subject.
THE BARBITURATES

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The first suggestion that drugs might· facllltate communication with emotionally dl~turlJed patients came quite uy accident in 1916. Arthur S. Lovenhart
and his associates at the University of Wisconsin, experimenting with respiratory
stimulants, were surprised when, after an injection of sodium cyanide, a catatonic
patient \vho had long been mute and.rigid suddeniy relaxed, opened his eye~, and
e\'en answered a few questions. By the early 1930's a number of psychiatrists
were experimenting with drugs as an adjunct to e~tablished methods of therapy.
At about this time police officials. still Ilttracted by the possibility that drugs
migh help In the interrogation of SURpects and witnesses, turned to a class of
depressant dnlgs. knowll a~ the barbiturates. By 1935 Clarence "'. )Inehlberger.
hend of the Michigan Crime Detection Laboratory at East Lansing, "'as using
barbiturates on reluctant suspect!';, though pollce work continued to be hampered
by the courts' rejection of drug-induced confessions except in a few carefully
circumscribed instances.
The barbitnrates. first synthesized in 1903. are among the oldest of modern
drug'S and the most versntile of aU depressants. In this half-century some 2,500
have been prepared. and about two dozen of these have won an important place
in medicine. An estimated three to four billion doses of barbitura.tes are prescribed by physicians in the United State£ each year. 'and they have come to be
known hy a variety of commercial names and colorful slang expressions: "goofballs," Luminal, Nembutal, "req devils," "yellow jackets," "pink ladies," etc.
Three of them which are used in narcoanalysis and have seen sen"ice as "truth"
drugs are sod~um amyta~ (amobarbital), pentothal sodium (thiopental), and to a
lesser extent seconal (secobarbital).
As one pharmacologist explains it, a subject coming under the inftuen~e of a
barbiturate injected. intravenously goes through all the stages of progressive
drunkenness. bnt the time scale Is on the order of minutes instead of hourS.
Outwardly the sedfl.tion effect is dramatic, especIally if the subject is a psychiatric
patient in tension. His features clacken, his body relaxes. Some people are
momentarily. excited; a few beocme sIlly and giggly. This usually pass.es, and
most subjects fall asleep, emerging later in disoriented semi-wakefulness;
The descent into na·rcosis and beyond with progre~ively larger doses can be
di'\"ided as follows:
.
'.
1. Sedative stage.
II. Unconsciousness, with exaggerated refiexes (hyperactive stage). ,
III. Unconsciousness, without retlex even to painful stimuli.
IV..Death.
.
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Whether' all these !'ltages can be distinguished in any given subject depends
largely on the. dpse and the rapidity with. which :the drug is induced; In
anesthesia,' stages I and II may last only two' or three seconds.
The first. or sedative stage can be fUTther divided:
Plane 1. No evident etrect, .or sUght sedative .effect.
Plane 2. Clo\}diness. calmness, amnesia.. (UpOn recovery, the subject will
not remember what happened at this or ,'~lower'~ planes or stages.) "
Plane ~. Slurred speech, old thought Patterns disrupted, inability to integrate or learn new patterns. Poor coordination. Subject becomes unaware
of panitul stimuU.
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Plane 3 is the psychiatric "work" stage. It may last only a few minutes, but

It can be extended by further slow injection of drug. The usual practice is to

bring the subject quickly to Stage II and to conduct the interview as he passes
back into the sedative stage on the way to tull consciousness.
CLINIC....L .... NO EXPERIMEl'iTAJ. sTtTOIF.A

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The gene~al abhorrence In Western countries for the use of chemical agents
"to make people do things against: their will" has precluded serious systematic
study (at least as published openly) of the potentialities cf drugs for interrogation. Louis A. GottSC'.halk, surveying their use in information-seeking interviews,[13] cites 13~ references; but only two touch upon the extraction of
Intelligence information, and one of these concludes merely that Russian techniqoes in interrogation and Indoctrination are derived from age-old police
methods and do not depend on the use of drugs, On the validity of confessions
obtained with drugs, Gott8('halk founu onlr three published experimental studieo
that he deemed worth reporting.
One oi these reported experiments by D. P. Morris in which intra~enous sodium
amytal was helprtll In detecting malingerers. [12] The subjects, soldier~, were
at first SUllen, nei;"1ltlvistlc, Rnd non-productive under amytnl, but as the interview proceeded they revealed the fact of and causes tor their malingering. Usually
the interviews turned up a neurotic or psychotic basis for the deception.
The other two confession 8tudies, being more relevant to the highly specialized, untouched area of drugs in intelllgence interrogation, deserve more detailed
review.
Gerson smd Victorotr[12] conducted amrtal interviews with 17 neuropsychiatric
patients. soldiers who had charges against them, at Tilton General Hospital,
Fort Dix. First they were interviewed without amytnl by a psychiatrist. who,
n~1ther ignoring nor stressing their situation as prisoners or suspects under
scrutiny, urged eech of them to discuss his social and famll~' background, his
army career, and Ws version of the charges pending against him,
The patients were told oniy a few minutes in advance that narcoanalysis would
be performed. The doctor was considerate, but positive and forthright. He indicated that they had no choice but to submit to the procedure. Their attitudes
varied from unquestioning compliance to downright retusal.
Each patient was brought to complete narcosis and permitted to sleep. As he
became semiconscious and could be stimulated to speak, he was held in this stage
with additional alJlytal l\'hile the questioning procf"eded. He was questioned
flrst about innocuous matters from his background that he had discussed b£>fore
receiving thp. drug. '''llenever possible, he was manipulated into bringing up
himselt' the charges pending against him before being questioned :tbout them.
If he did this In a too fully conscious state, it proT'ed more etrE'Ctive to ask him
to "talk about that later" and to interpose a topic that would diminish suspicion.
delaying the interrogation on bis criminal activity until he was back In the
proper stage of narco!U8.
'
The procedure dltfered from theraPeutic narcoanalysis in several ways: the
setting,. the type ot' patients, and the kind of "truth" sought. Also, the subjects
were kept in twilight consciousness longer than usual. This state pro"ed richest
In yield of admissions prejudicial to the subject. In it hi8 speech was thick,
mumbling, and disconnected, but his discretion was markedly reduced. This valuable interrogation period, lasting only five to ten minutes at a Ume, could be
reinduced by injecting more nmytal and putting the patient back to sleep.
The interrogation techuique varied from case to case according to background
information about the patient, the seriousness of the charges, the patte-nt'H attitude under nareosls, and his rapport with the doctor. Sometimes it was useful to
pretend, as the patient grew more tully Conscious, that he had already confessed· ,
dUring the amnestic period of the interrogation, and to urge him, while his memory aIid:sense of self-protection were still limited, to continue to elaborate the
details of what he had "already deScribed." When it was obT'-iotls that a subject
was withholding the truth, his denials were quickly passed over and ignored,
and the key questions would be reworded in a new approach.
_
Several patients Tevea~edfa:ntasies.tears, and delusions approaching delirium,
much of which could readily be distinguished from reaUt)". But sometimes there
was no way for the examiner to distinguish truth trom fanta~y l'xcept by reference to other 80Ul'C('S. One subject claimed to have a child that did not exist,

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:lnother threatened to kill on sight a stepfather who had beell dead a year, and
yet another c-onfessed to participating in a robber~' when in fact h~ had only
purchased goods from the participants. Tf'stJm()ny concerning uates and specific
places was untrustworthy and often cOlltradictor~' because of the patient's loss
of time-sense. His t'eracity in citing names and e\'ents lJro\'ed questionable, Be·
Cl\use ot his contusion about actual e\'eut~ Ilud whut he thought or teared had
happened. the patient ut times managed to conceal thE:' truth unintentionally.
As tlw subject renved, he would become aware that he was being questioned
about his secrets and. de~ndlng upon his personality, his fear of discovery, or
the degree or hiEi disillusionment with the doctor, grow negatlMstic, hostile, or
physically aggrpssit'e. Occasionally patients had to be forcihb' restraine-d during
this period to prevEont injury to themselws or othprs I\S the doctor continued to
interrogate. Some patients, mOt'ed by fierce and diffuse anger. the assumption
that they had already been tricked into confpssing, and a still llmlted sense of
discretion, defiantly acknowledged their guilt and cllUllenged the obser\"er to
. "do something about it." As the excitement passed, some fell hack on their originalstories and others t'erlfied the confessed material. During the to!iow-up
interview nine of thE' 17 admitted the vnliditv ot their confessions; eight repudiated their confessIons and reaffirmed their earlier accomits.
With respect to the reliability of the results of such interrogation, Gerson
and Victorolf conclude that ~rslstent, careful questionin!t can reduce ambiguities in drug Interrogation, but cannot elimlnute them altogether.
At least one experiment has shown that subjects are capable of maintaining a
lie wl~ile under the influence of a barbiturate. Redlich and 1Iis s'ssociates at
Yale[25] administered sodium amytal to nine volunteers, students and profes~!0n!11!!. ~hl) hllo prp... I()t1~l~·, for purposes ot the experiment, revealed shameful
and guilt-producing episodes of their past and then invented falSt> selt-protective
1>tories to cover thf'm. In nearl)' e.ery case the cot'er story retai~ HOme elements of the gullt inherent in the true Rtory.
Under the influence of the drug, the subjects 'Were crossexnmined on their
co,er stories by a second investigator. The results, though not definitive, showed
that normal individuals who had good defenses and no overt pathological traits
could stick to their in.ented stori~s and refuse confession. Neurotic individuals
wIth strong unconscious selt-punitit'e tendencies, on the other hand. both con·
fessed more easily and were inclined to substitute fantasy for the trut.h, con·
lessing to otrensf?iI nt.-\'i::' llctuaJ.ly committed.
In reeent ye-ars drug therapy has mHde some use of stimulants, most notably
amphetA!nine (Benzedrine) and its relative methamphetamine (Methedrine).
Tt<::re drugs, used either alone or following intraveno)ls barbiturates, produce
an outpouring of ideas, emotions, and memories which bas been of help in diagnosln~ mental disorders. The potential of stimulants in interrogation has recelt'ed UttlP. attention, unless in unpubUshed work. In one study of their psychiatric use Brossel et at [7] maintain that. methedr:ine gives the liar no time to
think or to organi?e his de<:eptions. Once the dnlg takes hold, they say. an insurmountable urge to pour out speech traps the malingerer. Gottschalk, on
the other hand, says that this claim is extra,agant, asserting without elaboration that the stUdy lacked proper controls. [13] It Is evident that the combined
use of barbiturates and stimulants. perhaps along with ataraxics (tranquilizers),
should be further explored.
OBSERVATIONS FROM PRACTICE

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J. M. MacDonald, who as a psychiatrist for the District Courts of Denver
has had extensive experience with narcoanalysis, says that drug interrogation
ls. of doubtful value In obtaining confessions to crimes. Criminal suspects under
tbe inftuence of barbiturates may deliberately withhold information, persist in
giving untruthful answers, or falsely confess to erimes they did not commit.
The psychopathIc personality, In particular, appears to resist successfully the
Infiuence of druJt8.
.
MacDonald tells of a crimin!.l psychopath who. baving agreed to narco-interrogation. receh'ed 1.5 grams of sodium amytal over a period of th'e hours. This
man feigned amnesia and gave a false account of a murder. "He displayed little
or no remorse as he (falsely) described the crime. including burial of the body.
Indeed he was very self-possessed and he appeared almost to enjoy the examination. From time to time be would request that more amy tal he injected."[21]
. MacDonald concludes thllt a person who glt'es felse Information prior to reo

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ceiving drugs is Hkely to give falae information also under narcosis, that the
drugs are of little vnlue for ~\'eaJing deceptions. and that they are more effective
in releasing unconBCiously repressed material than in evoking l'Onsciously suppresaed information.
Another psychiatrist known for hi!! work with crln:::Jn~~ L. Z. Fre-eilIuliu.
gii\'~ sodium arnYta! to men a~sed of various civil and military RDtisocial acts.
The subjects were mentally uostable. their conditions ranging tTom character
disorders to neuroses and IISych0'8e8. The drug internews proved psychiatrican~'
beneficial to the patients. bnt }o~~m9.n found that bis \;ew of objt'ctive reality
was seldom improve-d by their rere-lations. He was unable to say on the basis of
the narco-interrogation whether a given act had or had not occurred. Like :MacDonald, be fouod that ~ycbopathic indh;dua!s £"an dpn,; to the point of ullconli<:iousne88 erimetl that ereryobjeetive !>;gn indicates the}' han' committed.[lO}
F. G. lnuau. Professor of Law at ~orthwestern l"niversity, who has had conIiiderahle experiellC(' obServing and participating in ··truth" dru~ lests. claims
that the, aN:' ()(,,('3.sionall.v E.'ffecti\"E.' on persons who \vould have disclosed the
truth anyway had they ~n properly interrogated. but that a PE.>rson dE.'termined to lie will usually be able to continue the dereption under drugs.
The two military psychiatri!rt.s who ma~ the most extensive use of naro;)8nalyFis during the war yean:. Ray R. Grinker- and John C. Spiegel. concluded that
in almost all cases they ~uld obUlin from their pati('Dts (-ssentially th'E" same
material and give them the same em()(:ional release by tbel'8.py without thE' use
('.f drugg, provided t~y had sufficient time.
The esserx:e of the8e comments from proft'88ionals of long e:s:perience is that
dMlJ;8 provide rapid areess to information that is ps)·chi1l.tric·ally USEO'ful oot of
douutful ,aUdity as empirical truth. The same psychologkal illfon::::::.tlVii and ii
less adulterated empirical truth can hoe oot2 ined fl'Oeil fulJy conscious subjE."Cts
ThroUgh Doo-drug psychotherapj' and skillful l,.>lice interrogation.

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APPLICATIO!{ TO CI

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I!{TEK&OGATIO~

The almost total abse~ of controlled experimental studies of "truth" drugs
and the spotty and aneedotal nature of psy('.biatric and police endence require
that extrapolations to intelligence oPE.>rations be made with care. Still, enough
is known about the drugs' action to suggest certain considerations affecting the
possiblllties for their use in interrogatioDs.
It should be clE'ar from thE:' foregoing that at best 8. drug can only serve 8.8
an aid to an interrogator who has a Irore understanding of the psychology and
. t~hniques ot normal interrogation. In some respects. indeed. the demands on bis
skill will be increased LJs the batfling mixture of truth and fantasy in drug-induced
output. And the tendenc}' against wiJicb he mu.~t guard in the interrogate tQ give
the responses that seem to be wanted without regard for facts will be heightened
by drugt;: the literature abounds with warnings that a subject in narcosis is
.extremely suggesti ble.
It seems poSsible that this suggestibility and the lowered guard of the narcotic
state might be put to advantage in tbe case of a 8tJbject teigning ignorance ot a
language or some other' skill that had become automatic with him. Lipton[201
found sodium 8.mytal helpful in determining ~bether a foreign RUbject was merely
pretending not to understand English. By extension, one can guess that a drugged
interrogatee might have difficulty maintaining the pretense that he did not comprehend the idiom 1)f a profelSSion he was tl")'ing to hide.
There is the further .problem of hostility in the interrogator's rela.tlon&.-ip to
a resistance source. The accumulated knowledege about '"truth" drug reaction
has come largely from patient-physician relationships of trust- and «Infidence.
The subject in narcoanalysis is usually motivated a priori to cooperate with the
psychiatrist. either to obtain rellef from mental su1ferlng or to contribute to a
scientific study. Even in pollce work, where an atmosphere of anxiety and threat
may be dominant, a n-lationship of trust frequently asserts itself: the drug is
administered by a medical man bound by a strict code ot ethics; the suspect
agreeing to undergo narcoanalysis 10 a desperat~ bid for corroboration of hiB
testimony trusts both· drug and psychiatrist., however apprehensi:r-ely; and finally,
as Freedmansnd .MacDonald have indiC1l.ted. the polke psychiatrist frequently
deals with 8. "sick" criminal. and some order of patient-physician relationship
necessarily e~olves.

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Rarely has a drug interrogation in\'olved "normal" individuals in 11 hostlle
or genuinely threatening milieu. It Wi\S from a non-threatening experimental
setting that Elic Llndemann could say that his "normal" sUbjects "reported a
J:eneral sense of euphoria, ease and confidence. and they exhibited a marked increase In talkath'eness and communlcabllity."[18] Gerson and \'Ictorotr list poor
doctor-patient rapport as one factor interfering with the completeness and authenticity ot confessions hy th~ Fort Dix· soldiers, caught as they were in il
command performance and told they had no choice but to submit to uareointerrogation.
From all indications, subject-interrogator rapport is usually crucial to obtaining tile psychological release which may lead to unguarded disclosures. Role-playin~ on the part of the interrogator might be n possible solution to the prOblem
of establishing rapport with a drugged subject. In therapy, the British nareoanal~'st William Sargent recommends tbat the therapist deliberatel~' dIstort the
facts of the patient's life-experience to achieve heightened emotional response
and sbreacUon.(21l In the drunken state of narcoanalysIs patients are prone to
accept the therapist's false constructions. There is reason to exped that a drugged
subject would communicate freely with an interrogator playing the role of relative. colleague, phl·siciall. immediate superior, or any other person to whom his
hackground indicated he would be responsil"c.
Even when rapport is poor. however, there remains one facet of drug action
eminently exploaable in interrogation-the fnct that suhjects emerge from
narcosis feeling they have revealed a great deal. even when the~' ha"e not. As
Gerson and Victoroff demonstra.ted l1t Fort Dix, this psychological sE"t provides a
major openIng for obtaining genuine confessions.

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P08SIBLE YARIATIONS

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In studies by Beecher and his as8Oclates, (3-6) one-third to one-half the
individuals tested proved to be placebo reuctors, SUbjects who respond with
symptomatic relief to the administration of any syringe, pill, or capsule, regardless of wbat it contains. Although no studies are known to have been made of the
placebo phenomenon as applied to narco-interrogation, it seems reasonable that
when a subject's sense of guilt interferes with productive interrogation, a placebO
for pseudo-narcosis could have the effect of absolving him of the responsibility
for his acts and thus clear the wa~' for free communication. It is notable that
placebos are most likely to be effective in situations of stress. The individuals
most likely to react to placebos are tbe more anxious, more self-centered, more
dependent on outside stimulation, those who express their needs more freely
socially, talkers who drain ott anxiety by conversing with others. The nonreactors are those clinically more r:gid and with better than average emotional
control. No sex or I.Q. dUferences hetween r('actors and non-reactors have been
found.
Another possibility might be the combined use of drugs with hypnotic trance
and post-hypnotic ~uggestit)n: hypnosis could presumably pre\'ent any recollection of the drug experience. Whether a subject can be brought to trance against
his will or unaw:are, however, iR a matter of some dIsagreement. Orne, in a survey
of the potential us('s of h)'pnosis in interrogation,[23] asserts that it is doubtful, despite many apparent indications to tbe contrary, that trance can be induced
in resistant subjects. It may be possible, he adds, to hypnotize a subject unaware,
but this would require a positive relationship with the hypno~ist not likely to
be found in the interrogation setting.
.
In medical hypnosis, pentothal sodium is sometimes employed when only light
trance has been induced and deeper narcosis is desired. This procedure is a
possibility for interrogation, but If a satisfactory level of narcosis could be
achieved through hypnotic trance. there would appear to be no need for drugs.
DEFENSIVE

]'(EAStJ~ES

There Is no known way of building tolerance for a "truth" drug without creating a. disabling addiction, or of arresting the action of a barbiturate once induced,
The only full safeguard against narco-interrogation is to prevent the administration of the drug. Short of thIs, the best defense Is to make use of the same
knowledge'that suggests drugs for otfensiveo;>erations": It a subject kn'ows that
on emerging from narcosis he wIll have an exaggerated notion ot how much he
has revealed. he can better resolve to deny he has said anything.
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The disadvantages and shortcomings ot drugs in offensi\"e operations b~ome
positive features of the defense posture. A subj~t in narco-interrogation is
intoxicated, wayering between deep sleE'p and semi-wakefulness. Hi!! spe~h is
garbled and irrational, the amount of output drasticall~' diminished. Drugs
disrupt established thought patterns, including the will to rel$ist, but they do so
indiscriminately and thus also ir;.terfere ,\"ith the patterns of substantiye information the interrogator seeks. E\"cn under the conditions most fa\"orable fo\'
the interrogator, output will be contaminated by fantasy, distortion, and untruth.
Possibly the most effediye way to arm oneself against nnrco-intE'rrogation
would be to undergo n "dry run." A trial drug interrogation with output taped
for playback would familiarize an individual with his own reactions to "truth"
drugs, and this familiarity would help to reduce the effects of harassment by
the interrogator hefore and after the drug has heen administered. From the ,-iewpoint of the intelligen<:e service, the trial exposure of a particular operati\"e to
drugs might provide a rough henchmark for assessing the kind and amount of
information he would divulge In narcosis.
.
There may be concern over the possibility of drug addiction Intentiol1.nlly or
accidentally induced by an ad\"ersar;r ser\"ice. ~Iost drugs will cause addiction
with prolonged lise. and the barhiturates are no exception. In recent studies at
the U.S. Public HE'lllth Servi~~ Ho~pital for addicts in Lexington, Ky., subject!!
recei\"ed large doses of harbitnratf's onr a period of months. Upon removal of
the drug, they experienced acute withdrawal s:rmptoms and behaved in e"er~'
respect like chronic alcoholics.
B~ause their fiction is extremely short. howeyer, and hecause there is little
likelihood that they would he administered rfgularly over a prolonged period,
barbiturate "truth" drug~ pri::ll~llt slIght l"i8k ur operational addiction. If the
ad"ersary sen"ice were intent on creating addiction in order to E'xploit withdrawal, it would hfi\"e other, more rapid .means Gf producing states as unpleasant
as withdrawal symptoms.
The halIucinA.tor~· ilnd p!;ychotomim~t.ic drugs such as mescaline. marihuana,
LSD-25. and ml('rotine are sometimes mistnkenl;r associated with narcoanal)'tk
interrogation: These drugs distort the perception and Interpretation of the sensory input to· the central nervous 8~'stem and affect \"Islon, audition. smE'lI. the
sensation of the 81ze of body parts and their position in space, etc. Mescaline and
LSD-25 have been used to create experllllental "psychOtic states." an(l in a
minor way as aids In psychotherapy.
.
Since information ohtained from a person in Ii psychotic drug state would be
unrealistic, bizarre, nnd extremely difficult to assess. the self·administration of
LSD-25, which is effecti\"e in minute dosages, might in special C'ircumstances
offer an operative temporary protection against interrogation. Conceiyably. on
the other hand. an ad\"ersary ser\"ice could use such drugs to produce anxiety or
terror in medically unsophisticated subjects unable to distinguish drug-induced
psychosis from actual insanity, Ail enli~htened operative could not be thus
frightened, howe\"er. knowing that the effect of t~:;:se hallucinogenic agents is
transient in normal indi\"iduals.
Most broadly. there is evidence that drugs have least effect on well-adjusted
individuals with good defenses and good emotional control, and.that anyone "...ho
can ,withstand the stress of competent interrogation in the waking state can do
so in narcosis. The essential resources for resistance thus ,s.ppear to lie within
the individual.

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CONCLUSIONS
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The salient points that emerge from this discussion are th€- follo",,·Ing. No such
magic brew as the'popular notion of truth serum exists. The barbiturates, by
disrupting defensiye patterns, may sometimes be helpful in interrogation, bqt
e\"en under the best conditions they wIll elicit an output contaminated bY'deception, fantasy, garbled speech, etc. A mnjor ","ulnerahillty they produce in the subject is a tendency to believe he has re\"ealed more than he has. It is possible, howe\"er, for both normal individuals and psychopaths to resist drug interrogation;
it seem~ likely that any individual who can withstand ordinary intensive interrogation can hold out in narcosis. The best aid to a defense against narco-interrogation Is foreknowledge of the process an<1 its limitations. There Is an acute
need for. controlled experimental studies of drug reaction, not only to depressants
but also to stimulants· and to combinatloJJs. of depressants, stimulants. and
.ataraxics. .
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REFERE:iCES

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1. Adams, E. Barhiturates. Sci. Am., Jan. Hl5S. 198(1), ('>0-64.
2. llarkham, J. Truth Drugs: Tbe new crime solver. Coronet, Jan. 1951, 29,
72-76.
.
3. Beecher, H. K. Anesthe!;ia. Rd. Am., Jan. 19:::;7, 198, p. 70.
4.
Appraisal of dru~s intended to alter subjectiYeresponses, symptoms.
J. Amer. .lIed. A.8sn., 19fifi, 158,300-401.
.
5.
. I<;vidence for increased effectiveness of lllucebos witb increased
stress. Amcr.•T. Physiol., I{r.)G. 187, 163-169.
6.
. EXllerlmental Ilhnrmacology and measurement of the subjective
response. Scie'71cc, 1953, 116. Hi7-162.
7. Brussel, J. A., Wilson, D. C., Jr., & Shankel, L. 'V. Tbe use of methedrine in
lls~'cblatric praetice. Psychiat. Quart., 1954, 28, 381-394.
8. Delay, J. Pharmacologic explorations of the personality: narcoanal)'sls and
"methedrine" shock. Proc. Roy. Soc. Med., 1949, 42, 492-400.
9. deRopp, R. S. D1'UgS ancl the Jfind. !IOew York: Groye Press, Inc., 1960.
10. l<'reedmall. L. Z. "Truth" drugs. Sci.•4m .• ~[nr('h 1000. 145-1rr.l.
11. Geis, G. In scopolamine veritas. The early history of drug·lnduced 'statements..1. of Orim. Latc, Criminal. & Pol. Sci .• Nov.·Dec. 1950, 50(4), 347-358.
12. Gerson, M. •T., & Ylctoroff, V. Experimental Inyestigatlon into the vulidit)·
of confessions obtained under sodium amytal narcosis. J. Clin. and E.rp. PsycholJath .• 1~8, 9, 3;J!)..--.17ii.
13. Gottschalk, L. A. The use of drugs iu informatlon·seeking iuten·lews. Tech'tical report #8, ARDC Study SR 177-D Contract AF 18 (600) 1797. De~. 1958.
Bureau of Social Sdence Reseurch, Jnc.
14. House, R. E. The use of scopolamine in criminology. Texas St. J. Of Med.,
1922.18,259.
15. Houston. F. A preliminary Im-estigation into abreaction comparing methedrine find sodium amytal with 'Otber methods. J. Ment. Sci., 1952, 98. 707-710.
16. Jnbau, F. G. Self-incrimination. Springfield: C. C. Thomas, 1950.
17. Kldd., W. R. Police interrogation. 1940.
.
18. Legal dose of truth. Nel081ceek, Feb. 23, 1959, 28.
19. Lindemann, E. Psychological changes in normal and abnormal indi.lduals
under the influence of sodium amstal. A mer. J. Psychiat., 1032, II, 10&~-1091.
20. Lipton. E. L. The am)·tallnterview. A re,·iew. Amer. Practit. Digest Treat.,
10f)().l,I48-163.
21. MacDonald, J. 1\1. Narcoanalysis and criminal law. Amer. J. P8ychiat., 1954,
111. 283--288.
22. Morris, D. P. Intrnyenous barbiturates: an aid in the diagnosis and treatment of conYerslon hysteria and malinA"ering-. MH. Surg., 194fi, 96, 509-513.
23. Orne, 1\1. T. The potential uses of hypnosis in interrogation. An e,'aluation.
ARDC Study SR 177-]) Contract AF 18(600) 1797, Dec. 1958. Bureau of SocIal
Science Research, Inc.
24. Pelikan, E. W .• & Kensler, C. J. Sedatiyes: Their pharmacology and uses.
Reprint from The Medical Clinics Of North America. 'V. B. Saunders Company,
Sept. 1958.
25. Redlich. F. C., Ravitz, L. •T.. & Dession, G. H. Narcoanalysis and truth.
Amer. J. PBYchfa.t.• 1951.107, fi86-593.
26. Rolin, J. Police Drugs. Translated by L. J. Bendit. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1956.
27. Sargant, W., & Slater, E. Physical methods of treatment in psychiatry. (3rd.
ed.) Baltimore: Williams Rnd Wilkins. 1954.
28. Snider, R. S. Cerebellum. Sci. Am., Aug. 1958,84.
29. Uhr, L., & Miller, 1.1. G. (eds.). Drugs and Behavior. New York-London:
John Wiley &: Sons, Inc;, 1960.
•

Senator WALLOP. If they are, I· would assume that you would 5tiil
try to find from either theirs or somebody ·else's information how to
protect our people from that kind of activity.
.
Admiral TuRNER. Yes.
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Senator WALLOP. Thank you very much. ~hank you, 1\fr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Sena.tor Chafee!
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Senator CHAFE&. Thank you, Mr. Chainnan.

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Admiral Turner, I &.ppreciate that these tawdry activities were taking place long before your watch, and I think you have correctly
labeled them as abhorrent, hut not onlJ ,,~ere they abhorrent, it seems
to. me they were rather bungled, amateurish exp~riments that don't
seem to have been halJ<lled ill a very scientific way, at least from the
scanty evidence we have.
n. seems to me that there were the minimum of reports and the
Agen~y didn't have the ability to call it ~uits. It went on for some 12
years, as you mentioned. What I would lIke to get to is, are you conyillCed HOW in YOUI' Ag<'ncy that those scientific experiments. legitimate ones that you were conducting with polygraph and so forth, were
being conduct.ed in a scientific manner and that you are handling it in
a correct manuel' to get the best information that you are seekmg in
the end?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, I am, and I also have a sense of confidence
that we nre limiting ourseives to the areas where we need to be involved as opposed to areas where we cun rely on others.
Senator CHAFEE. I am convinced of that from your report. I just do
hope that you have people who nrc trained in not only handling this
type of experiment, but in preparing the proper reports and drawing
the proper data from the reports. You are convinced that you have
this t.ype of people ~
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator CrrAFEE. The second point. I am interested in was the final
lines in your testimony here, which I believe are very important, and
that is that the Agencj i~ -doing all it can in cooperation with other
branches of the Government to go about tracking down the identity of
those who were in some way adversely affected, and see what can be
done to fulfill the government's responsibilities in that resp.ect. I might
add that I commend you in that, and I hope you wIll pursue it
vigorously.
A hospital in my State was involved in these proceedings, and it is
unclear exactly what did fake place, so I have both a parochial interest
in this and a national intei'est as well, and I do hope you will press on
with it. It involves not only you, I appreciate, but also HEW and perl1aps the Attorney General.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir. 'Ye will.
Senator CHAFEE. Thank you. Thank you, :Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much.
.
Admiral Turner, l\fKUI~TRA subproject 3 was a project im-olving
tho surreptitious administration of LSD on unwitting persons,. was it
nott
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Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
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Senator.INOUYE. In February 1954, and this was in the very early
st.ages of ~fKULTRA, the Director of C.cntral Intelligence wrote to
the technical services staff officials criticizing their judgment because
they had participated in an expei'iment involving, the administration
of LSD on an unwittjn~ basis to Dr. Frank Olson; who later committed
suicide; Now, the individuals criticized were the same individuals who
were responsible for this subproject 3,involvh~g exactly the same prnctices~ Even though these indh·idunls were 'clearIy aware of the dangers
of surreptitious administration and had been criticized by the Director
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of Central Intelligence, subproject 3 \vas not terminated immediately
after Dr. OlSO;1's death.
In fact: according to documents, it continued for a number of years.
Can JOU provide this committee with any C'xplanation of how such
testing could have continued under these circumstances?
Admiral TURXER. No, sir, I really can~t.
Senator Ixoun:. Are the individuals ill the technical services who
carried on subproject 3 still on the CIA payroll?
Admiral TURXER. I am ~orry. Are JOU asking, are they today 1
Senator INOUYE. Yes.
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
.
Senator r NOUYE. 'Vhat would you do if ~you criticized officials of the
technical services staff and they continued to carryon experimentation for. a number of years 1
Admiral TUFNER. I would do two things, s~r. One is, I \':ould be sure
at the beginning that I was explicit enough that they knew that I
didn't want that to be continued any\vhere else, and two, if I found it
being continued, I would roll some heads.
.
Senator INOUYE. Could you provide this committee \vith information as to whether the individuals involved had' their head~ rolled ~
Admiral TURNER. I don't believe therc is an)' evidence they did, but
I will double check that.
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[See p. 170 for material r.eferred to.]
. SenatorINoun:. As you know, Senator Huddleston and his subcommittee are deepl)' involved in the drafting of charters and guidelines
for the intelligence community. W"e will be meeting with the President
tomorrow. Our concern is, I think, a basic one. Can anything like this
Occur again l
Admiral TURXER. I think it wOQld be verY1 very unlikely, first, because we are all much more conscious of these Issues than we were back
in the fifties, second, because we have such.thorough oversight procedures. I cannot imagine that this kind of activity could take place
today without some member of the CIA itself bypassing me, if I were
authorizing this, and writing to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and
blowing the whistle on this kmd of activity.
I am also doing my very best, sir, to 'encourage an openness with
myself and a free communIcation in the Agency, so that I am the one
who finds these things if they should happen. The fact is that we must
keep you and your committee and now tlie new committee in the House
informed of our sensitive activities. I think all of these add up to a
degree of scrutiny such that this kind of extensive and flagrant activity
could not happen today without it coming to the attention of the proper
authorities to 'stop it.
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S~na'tor INOUYE. A sad aspect of the MKULTRA project was that
it natux:ally inv?lved t~e people who unwit~ing~y!>r wit~ingly got involved m experImentatIOn. I would appreCIate 'It If you would report
back to this committee in 3 months on what the Agency has done to
notify these individuals and these institutions, and furthermore, to
!lotify usas"to what steps have been. tak~n to identifJ: victims, an~ if
Identified, what you have done to aSSIst them, monetarIly or otherWIse.
Admiral TuRNER. All right, sir. I will be happy to.
.
Senat~r GoWWATER. 'VIII the Senator yield ~

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Senator hwUYE. Yes. sir.
Senator GOLDWATER. t wonder if he could include in that report for
our information only a complete listing of the individuals and the
experiments done on them, and whether they were witting or unwitting,
yolunteer or nonvolunteer, and what has been the result in each case.
1 think }hat would be interesting.
Admlrnl TURNER. Fine. Yes, sir.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Kennedy?
.S.enator KENXEDY. Thank you. It is your intention to t:otify the indIvIduals who have been the subjects of the research. IS that right,
Admiral Turner? Do you intend to notify those individuals?
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. If you can identifv them. you intend to notify
them?
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Admiral TuRNER. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. And you intend to notify the universities or research centers as well?
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I am torn on that. I understand your
opening statement. I put. myself in the position of the president of one
of thosf'. universities: let's say. If he were witting-if his university
had been witting of this activity with us, he has access to all that information today. If he were not witting, I wonder if the process of
Informing him might put his institution:s reputation in more jeopardy
tha~ lettingthem
on t.he way they are today, not knowi:1g. I really
d r ll1t know the eqUltIes here. '.
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Senator lCENNEDY. 'VeIl, the problem is, all you have to do is pick up
the newspapers and you see these universities mentioned. In many instances, I think you are putting the university people at an ext.raordinary disadvantage, where there is a complete change of administration, and they may for one reason or another not have information
that they are under suspicion. There is innuendo j there is rumor. I
cannot help but believe that it will just get smeared all over the llewSpapers in spite of all the security steps that have been taken.
It seems to me that those universities should be entitled to that information, so that the ones with other administrations can adapt procedures to protect those universities. The importance of preserving the
independence of our research areas and the communities seems to me to
be a very fundamental kind of question about the protection of the
integrity of our universities and our research centers.
.
Admiral TuRNER. You are saying that you feel that if we identify
them privatelyJo themselves, we can benefit them in an adequate way to
cover the risk that this will lead to a more public disclosure? There are
lots of the 80 who have not been identified publicly at this ,point.
Senator KENNEDY. I think the uniyersities themselves should be notified. I think then the universities' ~an take whatever steps in terms of
their settin~ up the procedures to protect their.own kinds of integrity
in terms of the future; I would certainly hope that they would .feel
that they: could rn.ake a rublic comment or a public statement on it.
I think it is of general public in~ere.~t, particularly for the people that
are involved in those universitie.~, to have som~ kind of awareness of
whether they were used or were not used and how they were used.
. I think they are entitled to it, and quite frankly, if there is a public
official. or an official of the university that you notify and he wants

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for his own particular reasons not to have it public, I don't see why
those in a lesser echelon or lower echelon who have been effectively used
by it should not ha\'e the information as well.
So. I would hope- that vou would notif" the universities and then
also indicate to the public: I can~t conceh'e that this information will
not be put out in the newspapers, and it puts the university people at
an extraordinary disadvuntage, and of course some of it is wrong,
which is the fact of the matter. and I think some university official
saying, well. it isn't so, is a lot (lifferent than if they know it is confirmed or it is not confinned in terms of the Agency itself. I think that
there is a responsibility there.
Admiral TeRNER. I have great sympathy with what you are saying.
I ha.ve already notified one institution because the involvement was so
exten:;ive that I thought they reRlly neE'ded to protect themselves, and
I am most anxious to do this in whatever way will help all of the
people who were perhaps unwitting participants in this, and the difficulty I will have is, I can't quite d·o, I think, what you suggested, in
that I may not be able to tell an institution of the extent and nature of
its participation.
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Senator KENNEDY. 'Yell, you can tell them to the best of your information, and it seems to me that just because. the university or an
individual is going to be embarrassed is not a reason for classifying
the information. So, I would hope--I mean, I ob\'iously speak as an
individual Senator, but I feel that that is an incredible disservice to
the innocent indi\riduals -and~ I think. a disservice to the integrity of
the universities unless they are notified, to be able to develop procedures you are developing with regards to your own institution and
we are trying to in terms of the Congrl?ss. Certainly the universities
are entitled to the same.
Admiral TURNER. Yes. Not all of these, of COUl's~, were unwitting.
Senator KENNEDY. That's right.
.
Admiral TURNER. :Many of them were witti:ag, and therefore they
can take all those precautionary steps on their own, but I am perfectly
open to doing this. I am only interested in doing it in a way thut when
identifying a university it will not lead to the public disclosure of the
individuals. whom I am not allowed to disclose, and so on.
Senator KENNEDY. That could be done, it seems to me.
Admiral TURNER. So, we win see if we can devise a way of notifying
these institutions on a private basis so that they can then make their
own decision whether their equities are best served by their announcing it publicly or their attempting to maintain it-Senator KENNEDY. Or you. I wonder. 'Vhat if they were to ask you
to announce or indicate ~
.
.
Admiral TURNER. :t.lv personal conscience, sir, at this time, is that I
would be doing a dissei've to these unh'ersities if I notified the public.
Senator KENNEDY. 'Vould you meet with some university officials
andllsk what their views-..-are or ,vhether they· feel that the preservation of the.integrity of the ulliyersities would be better served or not i
I think that would be useful to find out from small, large, private, and
public universities' officials how they view the integrity-Admiral TuRNER. Fine. I will phone several uI)ivel'sity presidents
today who are my friends and whonre not invoh-ed in tMs, and ask
them what they think the equities wou~d be.
.

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Senator KENNEDY. All right. You let us know. too.
Admiral TuRNER. But I a'm not sure that I see that there is nny great
benefit in my notifying the public fiS opposed to the university notifying them. Let him have his choice whether he. wants--ench -institution
wants to have it luade public.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Yes. The fact would remain that the institution's
credibility would be better selTed if the institut.ion's president were to
deny it and the university indicated that it did not participate in that
program than if the university were to deny it and the Agency says
nothing. It seems to me that that "'ould be the strongest, and the only
way that that is going to lli- credible. I ,,"ould YRlue it if you would get
some input from uni,;ersities 8S to what they believe is the fairest way
in terms of the presenation of the integrity of the universities.
Let me, if I could, ask on the question· of the uses of these safe
110uses, as I understand from information that was provided to us in
the course of our last committee, the testing of various drugs on individuals happened at all social levels, high and low. it happened on
native Americans and also on foreign nationals. That is what I understand was the nature of the project itself.
Now, I am just. wondering whether those tests were conducted at the
two locations on the east coast and the west coast which were 1."11own
as safe houses. To your knOWledge, is that correct?
Admiral TuR~ER. Yes.
Senator KENXEDY. In terms of the research in this particular prog-ram, it did not go beyond the safe houses located on the east coast and
the west coast? I believe. I am correct on that.
Admiral TUR~ER. That type of unwitting testing of sort of randomly selected individuals, yes.
Senator KENNEDY. It was just located in those two places ~
Admiral TuR.."ER. To the best of our knowledge, there were C'nly two
locations.
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, how do we interpret randomly selected ~
Admiral Tur..NER. Well, as opposed to prisoners in n prison who were
someho~· selected.
Senator KENNEDY. All 'right.
you know from this information
how many people were recruited during this period?
.
AdmiralTuRNF.R. No idea.
Senator KENNEDY. Do you lmow approximately ¥
.
Admiral TonNER. I as'ked that question the other day, and we just
don't have-apI>arently we are very-well, either there were no
records kept of the actual numbers and types of people tested or they
were destroyed.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank you, :Ur. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, I would like to come back to the experiments
which may have been conducted at the· hospital research facilities
which the CIA helped to finance. It wasn't clear to me from your previous answers what kind·of work was done there. Ig-ather you a~ unclear on that, too, from your remarks, yet I find in the CIA documentation which· you have supplied us, a list describing some of the
advantages the Agenc.y hoped to.gain. It says:

Do

. (G) One-&i1::th of. the total space In the new hosPital wing will be a'\"ailable to the
Chemical DI\"ision ot TSS. • • ; (b) Agency sponsorship ot sen~itive research

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projects will lIe completely deniable; (c) Full professional co'"er will be p~-ovided
tor. up to three hiochemical employees of the Chemical Division; (d) Human
patients find ,olunteers for experiment.:'ll use will be available under cont."olled
clinical contlitions with the full super,·ision of
.

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.,

and there is a blank, somdhing has been deleted.
It. seems pretty clear to me what they intended to do in that particular w.ing. DO€sn't it to you? W'hy w'ould you go to such elaborate
preparatlOns~ to buy part of the wing, bring three of your own personnel there, give them a cover, and give them access to patients ~
'Vhy would you go tci such trouble and expense to arrange all that, if
yOll weren't planning to cxp('riment on people in the hospital ~
Admiral TrnxER. I agree with you 100 percent, sir. Those were
clearly the intentions. I han"' no e,~idence that it was carried out in
that way. I am not trying to he defensive, Senator. I am only trying
to be absolut('ly precise here.
Senator ScnwEIKEn. 'Vell, tlH'n, as to the nature of what was done
there, the last paragraph on the same page of the document says",
"'The facilities of the hospital and the ability to conduct controlled
experimentations under safe clinical conditions using materiuls with
which any agency connection mllst be completely deniablE', will aug'~
ment and complement other programs recently taken over by TSS,
such as," and then there's another deletion.
Now', the words following "such as" have been deleted. That is still
classified, or at least it was removed when this document was sanitized
and released. It seems to be that whatever was deleted right there would
give you a pretty f{ood clue as to what. they were doing, since it says
that the activities would "augment and complement other 'Prog-rams"
undertaken by TSS. So, I have trouble understanding why you don't
know what was contemplated. •Tust the fact that similar programs are
referred to in the docnment, though what they are iss~ill deleted,
should enable you to check it out.
You could look at what went on in the similar programs mentioned
following the "such as" in the classified version of thIS document.
Admiral TUHNER. Senator, I have not said that we don't know what
was contemplated being done there. 'Ve do 'not know wlu~t was done
there.
:
.
Scnaf or SCIIWEIKEH. 'Vhy did you delete that reference ~ 'Vhy ia
that stiH classified, that particular project of whatever it is ~
Admiral TURNER. I don't know this particular case. 'Ve will get you
the exact answer to that one and inform you about it, but it is quite
probable that that other case is unrelated to this in the-well, not Ullrelated, but that that was a project that still deserves to be classified.
[The material referred to follows:]
Construction of the Gorman An~ex was begun in 1957" and the Annex was
dedicated in March 19"".>9. Of the several MKULTRA projects conducted at
Georgetown only one involving human testing covered 11 time span subsequent
to March 1959. Subproject ·15 ran from 1955 to 1963, thus it is possible that
the finaltonr years (1959-1963) of the subproject couldba,"c been spent in
the Gorman Annex. Howe,'er, there is no. reference to the GormaQ Annex or a
"new Annex" in SulJproject 45 papers, neither is there any mention of the sulr
project mOYing to a new location In 1959 or later ~·ears.
Authorization to contribute CIA tunds tciward construction of the Gorman
An.llex is contained in Subproject 85 of MKULTRA. Recently discovered material
indicated that Dr. Geschickt1!l' continued his research for sleep- and amnesiaproducing drugs i.mder Project MKSEARCfI through July 1967 at Georgetown
Uni\"ersity Hospital. But it is impossible· to determine it the tacilities of the
Gorman Annex were involVed.

--~

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Senator SCHwEIKEn. I think that would gin us a pretty good clue
as to what was going to be done in the wing the CIA helped to finance.
'Vas there any indication at all in the records \'ou found that the
project. ult.imately used canc.er patients or termillally ill patients in
connection with this faeilit:r ~
.
•~dmiral TURxEn. I'm sOI:ry. I missed your question beeallse I was
tr:ym~ to get the data on the last one. I will read you the blank.
Senator Scm:wEIKER. Go ahead.
'
Admiral TURXER. QI\:HILLTOP. It doesn't help you~ but-.-.
SE'nator SCHwEIKEn. Can you tell us what thnt is. or is It stIll
.
classified 1
Admiral Tt:.rn...·mn. I don't know, nnd I assume fl'ol11 the fact that
we delet~d it~ it is still classified~ but I will get you that answer, sir.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Thank ~ou. I'd like to see that information.
[See p. 171 for material refelTed to.]
Now my next question was: Is there any indication, Admiral, that
projects in that particular center inYoh-ed experimentation on terminally ill cancer patients ~
Admiral TURXER. I missed the first part of your question, sir. I am
very sorry.
.
Senator SCHWEIKER. Do you have an)' indication that some experiments in the facility used terminally ill cancer patients as subjects?
You do acknowledge in your statement and it is cIaI' from other documents that these kinds of experiments were at some point being done
somewhere; l\fy question is, is there ~ny indication that cancer patients
or terminally ill patients were experimented with in this wing?
Admiral TUR~ER. Yes, it does Rppear there is a connection here, sir.
Sen~tor SCIIWEIKER. The other question I had relates to the development of something which has been called the perfect concussion.
A series of experiments toward that end were described in the CIA
documents. I wonder if you would just tell us what your understanding
of pl~rfect concussion is.
Admiral TURN~R. Is that in my testimony, sir, or in some other
document~

Senator SCHWEIKER. SubprojeCt 54:, :MKULTRA, which invoh'ed
examination of techniques to cause brain concussions and amnesia by
using weapons or sound waves to strike individuals without. giving
warning and without leaving any clear physical marks. Someone
dubbed it "perfect concussion"-maybe that was poetic license on the
part of our staff rather than your poets over there. I wonder if you
could just tell us what brain concussion experiments were about i
Admiral T'U"RNER. This project, No. 54, was canceled, and never
carried out.
.
Senator SOHWEIKER. Well, I do believe the first year of the project
in 1955 was' carried out by the Office of Naval Research, according to
the information that you supplied u~. The CIA Seems to have been participating in some way at. that point., because the records go on to say
that the experimenter at ONR found out about- CIA's role, discovered
that it waS" a cover, and. then the project was transferred to
M::KULTRA in 1956. Again, this is all from the backup material you
have given us. So, it was canceled at some time. I am not disagreeing

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with that, but apparently for at least a year or two, somebody was
inve::;tigating the producfion of brain ,concussions with special blac1\:jaeb,sound wayes, and other methods as detailed in the iJuckup
material.
.
Admiral TURNER. The data available to me is that this proje.ct was
never funded by the CL\.: but I will cl mble-check that and furmsh the
information for the record for you as to whether there was ever any
connection here and if so, what the nature of the work was.
[Th~ material referred to follows:]

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~Ir. Laubinger corrected his testimony regarding Subproject 54 during the
S€"lltemIJer 21, 1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific
Research of the Human Resources Oor:unitt~. The rele'\"ant portion is reproduced
b~ow:
.
:'IIr. LAUBIXGER. On project 54, it has got a rather sensational proposal in there,
in terms of the work that they propose 'to do, and you asked about the proposal
and I said. in fact, it was never fuuded under :\TKVLTRA. Xow, I overlooked--at
least, DIJ' memorj' did not serve me correctly when I went through that file folder
to see oue memorandum dated January 10, 1956, which makes it quite Clear, as 11
matter of fact, that that proposal was based on prior work that was funded .b~...
the Agency.
Senator SCHWEIKER. By what?
~Ir. LAUBINGER. By the CIA. So, that information was in their file folder. It
did not happen to blC' in my hMcl when I testified.
Senator SCU ......EIKER. I think I might have read you that, and that is why I
argued at the time with :rou, hecause I think I had in front of me, as I recall,
sOllle indication that it was funded there. I did read that to you. So, you did
supply it to us; there is no argument about that intonnation.
M!'. Liu!!!!\GER. Perhaps I am sort of headstrong, myself, and in my own view,
I am reading under the UL'l'RA project, that if it had been funded under
rLTRA, it would ha'l"e had a project number and identified as such. The thing
that threw me "'as that it wa~ funded, apparently, outside of any MKULTRA
acth·it~· and it was under the normal contracting process, 00 that it was not
included in )IKULTRA as nny work done under that funding umbrella.
The flle folder that you ha'\"e and I have, right here, makes it quite clear,
howe"er, that a year's work was done through navy funding-~ navy funding
mechanism-on whIch the proposal was 1>ased that ultimately came into the
~IKULTRA program. That second proposal was ne'\"er fundp.d; So, there was
conflIct and I, personally, I think, introduced a little bit ot coninslon in that in
m~' testimony.
.Senater SCHWEIKER. Well, do you agree or not agree with DOD's statement
here that even though the initial funding was navy, it was really n conduit for
the CIA?
Mr. rJAUBI~GER. I think that is correct,

Senator SCHWEIKER. Yes; I would appreciate that. I would like to
know how it went from ONR to CIA after a year. Somebody made a
decision to make that transfer, ~nd to make this an !\IKUVi'RA subject. There had to be some sort of review that led to a decision to
continue that kind of concussion-total blackout, maximum amnesia,
and whatever else it was .you were interested in-study and testing.
:Mr. LAUBINGER. Senator, if I may try to say a few words on that,
~he files that were avajlable to us for inspection, which are limited,
mdicated that there was a project being carried on by the Navy having
to do with the effects of brain concussion. The CIA developed an interest in that, and considered fundin~ it, but actually never diel, and as
the admiral testified, the :MKULTRA is merely a funding mechanism, ..
a place they go for money to do such things, but there is no ~vidence
thAt I know o~ that that project was ever funded.
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Senator SCIlWEII\.En, W"ell, I am confused, because here again is another quote from a document that we haye seen, which yOU ha \'c released and supplied to us:
.
l:'ollo\\ing·fs the technical progress made under the current [deleted] contrnct:
Spcc!e.liz~d fD1:tl'llmenrotion and numerous testing techniques ba\'e bei!n
de\'eloped to obtain the desired dynamic data; (b) considerable data hils now
been oL~i~ed supporting the resollance-cn'\"llntion theory of brain concussion; and
(c) prehuunllry Ilcceleration threshold data has been obtained for a lluid-filled
glass simulated skull.
(a.)

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It goes on to talk about a blast range and a 2,;,)OO-sfjuare-foot laboratory. The document notes that "Three blast test series lUl\'e been run
~o dat~.': It c1es~l'ibes a special blackjack device, "a pancake-type blackJack glvmg a lllgh peak impact. force with a low Ulllt surface pressl1re.~'
I ~gree t~l(.~ records are inconclusive as to the results of this work,
but It certmnly seems that some testing was done.
l\~r, LAumxG1'~n. Senator, you are putting us in the same position
J thmk you were stating that you were in earlier in referrinO' to documents not before us, but I belie"e you are quoting from a~ proposal
that someone sent to the Agency to fund this work, and he is referring
t? past work. The past wOl:k would have encompassed a lot of things
lIke that, but CIA was not m,-olvec1 with that.
Senator SCIlWEIKEH. 'Vhat do you mean, Admiral, on page 6 of yo·ur
testimony wben you mention projects using magician's art? How do
magicians get into the spook business ~
Admiral TunxER. I have interpreted this as to how to slip the mickey
into the finn, but I would like to ask my advisers here to comment.
Mr. BnODY. I think that is essentially it, Senator. It is surreptitious
administration of material to someone, deceptive practices, how to
distract someone's attention while you are doing something else, as
I understand it. It was also some' type of a covert communication
project involved with the study of how magicians and their assistants
perhnps communicate in formation to one another without having other
people know it. This is the type of thing that was involved, sir.
Senator SCIlWEUU-:R. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Huddleston ¥
Senator HUDDLESTOX. Thank JOu, 1\fr. Chairman.
Admiral, in your chec.king these newly discovered documents and
interviewing members of the CIA staff, did you find information that
would confirm the contention described by the reporters for the New
York Times' that this type of experimentation was begun out of a
fear at the Agency that foreign po,:ers-might ~aYe ~a~ drugs whicb
would allow them to alter the behaVIor of AmerIcan CItizens or agents
or members of the Armed Forces who were taken into custody, and
which would have resulted in false confessions and the like ~ Is my
question elead
._.
.
.
Admiral TunKER. Yes, SIr. I haven't personally read the docum~n­
tation on that. In my discussions with· the people .who are well mformed in: this 14rea at the Agency, I am told that that IS t~e <:ase..
.
.Senator Ht.TDDJ.ESTON. 'Vas there any evidence or any mdicatIon that
(here were other motives that the Agency might also be ~o?kil!g for
dr'nas that could be applied for other purposes, such as debilItatmg an
individual or even killing another person ~ 'Vas this part of t.his kind
of experimentation ¥

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Admiral TrnxER. Yes; I think there is. I ha ve not seen in this series
of documentation evidence of desire to kill, but I think the project
turned its character from a defensive to an offensive one as it went
along, and there certainly was an intention here to develop drugs that
could be of use.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The project continued for some time after it
was learned that, in fact, foreign powers did not have such a. drug as
was at first feared, didn't it 1
Admiral TURXER. That is my understanding. Yes, sir.
Senator HlmDLESTOX. Is there Rny indication that knowledge ~ained
as a result of these experiments has been useful or is being applied in
any way to present operations ¥ .
Mr. BRODY. Senator, I am not sure if there is any body of knowledge.
A gr<>at deal of what there was, I gather, was "destroyed in 1973. I
would like to defer to Frank here. Do 3'011 know of any Y
Mr. LA t.~I~GER. I 1-..110W of no dru~ or anything like that developed
under this program that ever reached operational use or are in use
-··-today. ...
. . . . ..... --- .- _.
. Senator HUDDLESTOX. So apparently any information that was
gathered was apparently useless and not worth continuing, not worth
further development on the part of the Agency.
Mr. LAUBINOER. I am having difficulty hearing your questions.
Senator HUODLF..BTON. I can hardly hear myself.
Admiral TURNER. I think the answer to your question is that we have
no evidence of great usefulness on this, and yet I think we should
remember-Senator HuooLESTOx.Well. is it Rccurateto say th~t this experimentation P!'oduced few useful results or had little application at all to the
operations of the Agency or anybody else as far as we know!
Admiral TuRNER. I think that is basically correct. At the same time,
I would point out that we had two CIA prisoners in China and one in
the Soviet Union at this time. and we were concerned as to what kinds
of things might be done to them, but I am not saying thti.t-·Senator H UDDLESTOS. Have you detected any sign that any other nation is continuin~ or has in the past conducted experiments similar to
this or with a similar objective ~ :
Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared to answer that one off the top
of my head, sir, but I will get it to you.
[The material referred to follows:]
We maintain no files of up-to-date Information Qn the testing Qf drugs In
foreign conntrles. SQme years ago we occasionally wouldrerlew foreign research
on antibiotics and pharmaceuticals I'll connection with public health and civil
defense assesments. For a few yea.rs beginning in 1949 we assessed foreign
-research on J~SD under Project AR';l'ICHOKE beeause of concern tha.t such
drugs might be employed galnst Agency and other U.S. personnel. Information
relative to this work has already been provided to relevant Committees. In thi5
early work we also occasionally looked at foreign human experimentation; we
long ago eliminated our holdings on this subject and no collection requirements
are any longer served. As consumer Interest in this area has dropped Qff
and higher priority areas need attention. we have virtua.lly no present coverage
with the possible exception of au oceulonal scanning of the literature for a
specific program. To the best of our knowledge no other unit In the Intelligence
Community Is tracking this subject now.

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SenatDr .HUDDLESroX. You don~t know whether any of your agents
anywhere In the world ha\'e been subjected to an\" kind of procedure
~
like this ~
Admiral TlJRXER. 1Ve c.ertainlv know of other powers conducting
research in these areas, yes.
.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. Do you lrnow how they go about that research ~
Admiral TuRxER. It is pretty sketch", the informntion we have.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you lrnow of any other organization in this
country or any institution that has conducted extensive research on
unwitting individualf.: and through unwitting institutions ~
Admiral TUR~""ER. 1Vell, I have read something in the newspapers
about this~ but I have not familiarized myself with it in specifics.
Senator HUDDLES-roX. It is not a normal mode of operation for human research, is it'
Admiral TUlL....r :R. No. sir.
Senator HUVDLF.srox:Thank vou. :\fr. Chairman.
Senator Ixoun:. Sem,tor Wailop'~
Senator 'VALLOP. :\fr. Chairman, I only have one to follow up on
Senator Huddleston's questions and my earlier ones. You are not really
~aying, are you, Admiral Turner, that there arc no mind-altering
dr-.lg'S or beha~ior modification procedures which hal"e been used by
foreign powers Y
Admiral 'I'uRXER. No, sir, I am not.
Senator WALLOP. I drew that inference partly in answer to my question that vou lrnew of no truth sernm. ~fa\"be that is n misnomer, but
surely there are relaxants that make tongi.les looser than they would
otherwise be. Isn~t that true Y
Admiral T(7RXER. Yes.
Senator WALLOP. So I think it is fair to sav, too, that the experience
of many American prisoners of war in the Korenn conflict would
indicate that there are be.havior modification procedures in use by
foreign powers of a fairly advanced de~e of sophistication.
Admiral Tun:N-ER. Yes. sir.
Senator WALLOP. Again, I will just go back find say I think this
must have been part of the motivat.ion. I don't think you would have
mentioned Cardinal :Mindszent:v had you thought his behavior was
nonnal at the time or had anybody else. So, I would just again say
I think it is a little bit scapegoating. I don't think the object of this
hearinlZ is in any way to lay blame on those passed or those dead or
otherwise, but I think it is a little bit scapet!oating to say that it
sropped with the directors of the CIA or the DCI's of the time. Also
I think it is a little bit scapegoating to ~y they didn't even know it,
but that it was some lower echelon actinlZ alone.
I think this was a behavior pattern that was prevalent in those
years, and I think the object les...~n is that we have disco~e~~, we
think and we hope, throu1!h your assurances and other actIVIties of
the CongTess, means of avoiding- future incidents of that kind. I thank
you, Mr. Cha.innan.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Chafee ¥
Senator CHAFEE. No questions.
Senator IxoUYE.· Senat-or Kennedy, I think you have another
question.

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Senator KEXXEDY.•rust talking about. the two safe houses on the
east and m~st. coast as being the sources for the linwitting trials, now,
the importance of this and the magnitude of it, I think, is of significance, bet.'(lUS~ we have seen from your records that these were used
over n, period of 8 or !) ~'ears, anel the, numbers could have been considerable. You are unahle to determinC', at least in your own research,
what the numbers would be and whntth'e drugs were, how many people
were involved, but, it. could have been considerable during this period
of time.
.
It would certainly .appear to me in examining the documents and
the flow charts of cash slips that were. expended in these areas that it
was considerable, but that is a judgml:'lltal factor on it, but I think
it is important to try and find out. ,,-hat the Agency is attempting to
do to get to the bottom of it.
Now, the principal agent that was involved as I understand it is
dccea:-ed and has been dc<:eased for 2 years. The overall agent, ~fr.
Gottlieb~ has indicated a. fuzzy memory about this whole area. He
has tl:'stified before the Intelligence Committee. Yet he was responsible for the whole program. Then, t}le Director had indicated the
destruction of the various materials and. unfamiliarity with the
project.
. ,
Now, you have indicated in your testimony today that there are two
additional agents on page £I
your te....'i,imony, you indicated there
are two additional agents which you have uncovered at the· bottom of
it, and you say, the names of CIA officials who approved or monitored
the various projects. Yon talk about the two additional agents in yoUl:
testimony.
.Now, I am just wondering if you intend to interview those agents
to find out exactly what is being done. r suppose, first of a.ll, shouldn't
the project manager know what was being-done ~
,
Admiral TlIRXER. Our first problem, Senator, is that ,ve ha.ve been
unable to associate an individual with those names at this p~int, ",Ve
are still burrowing to find out who these people are. ",Ve haven't identified them as haying been CIA employees, and we don't know whether
these were false names.
.
Senator J{EXXEDY. You are tracking that down, as I understand it?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
'
Senator KENNEDY. You are tracking' that down, and you have every
intention of interviewing those people 'to find out whatever you can
about the program and project ~
,..,
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Admiral TuRNER. i\{y only hesitation here is whether I will do this
or the Justice Department.
Senator KENNEDY. It will be pursued, though, I understand ~
. Admil·aITURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator'KENNEDY. Either through the Agency or through the Justice Pepartment ¥
'
,
Admiral TURNER. [Nods in the affirmative.]..
.'
Senatot'KENNEoY. Is it plausible that the director of the program
would 'not underStand .or know about the details of the program ¥
Isit plausible that Dr~ GottJieb would not understand the full range
of actiVitie~'inthose particular safe houses ¥.

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Admiral Ttm.';'ER. Let me say it is llnlikely. I don~t know ,Mr. Gottlieb.
Senator KEXXEDY. Has anybody in the Agency talked with ~II·.
Gottlieb to find out about this ~
Admiral TuRNER. Not since this revelation has come out..
Senator KENNEDY. Not since this revelation ~ 'Yell, why not ~
Armiral TURNER. He has left our employ, Senator.
Senator KENNEDY. Does that menn that anybody who leaves is, you
lmow, covered for lifetime 1
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator KENXEDY. 'Vhy wouldn't you talk with him and find out?
You have new information about this program. It has been n matter
of considerable interest both to our committee and to ,the Intelligence
Committee. 'Vhy 'wouldn't you talk to :Mr. Gottlieb ~
Admiral TURNER. 'VeIl, again, I think the issue is whether this
should be done by the .Tustice Department or ourselves.
Senator KENNEDY. 'Yell, are we wrestling around because you and
Attorney General Bell can't agree-- '
Admiral TuRNER. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY [continuing]. On who ou~ht to do it ~
Admiral TuRNER. 'Ve are proceeding together in complete agreement
as to how to go. I have, in connection with trying' to find all of these
Americans or others who were unwittingly tested, I have some considerable concern about the CIA running around this country interviewing and interrogating- people, because I don't want to give any
impression that we are doing' domestic intelligence.
Senator KENNEDY. I am just talking about one, in this case. That
was the man who was responsible for the whole progTam, and to
find out whether anyone within the Agency since you have had this
new material has talke.d to Gottlieb since 1975, and if'the answer is
.
no,.! want to know why n o t . '
Admiral TURNER. The reason he was not interviewed in connection
with the 1975 hearings was that he had left the employ of the CIA
and there was a concern on the part of the Agency that it would appear
to the investi~ators that the CIA was in some way tryin~ to influence
him· and influence his testimony before the committee. If these
committees have no objection, we would be happy to contact Dr.
Gottlieb and see if he ean augment anything here· in this new infor.mation, t.hough I don't think there is much in this new information
that he can add to as opposed to'what was available in 1975..
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you see, Admiral Turner, you come to the
two committees this morning and indicate that now at last we have the
information. We don't have to be concerned about anything in the
future on it. Now, I don't know how you can give those assurances to
the memberS of these committees as well as to the American people
. when you haven't since 1975 even talked to the principal person that
, w~s in char~e of the program, and th.e records were destroyed. He is
.the fellow that was running the prop:ram, and the Agency has not
",talked to him since the development of this new material.
. Admiral TuRNEn. Our only concern here is the proprieties involved,
and we will dig into this and work with the Justice Department on

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who, if either of us, should get into discussions with Dr. Gottlieb so as
not to prejudice any legal rights that may be involved here, or to ap1
pear in any way to be improper.
Senator KENNEDY. ell, do J understand you Ilave not contacted the
Justice Department about this particular case since the development
of this new material about Gottlieb ~
Admiral TuRNER. K ot about Gottlieb specifically. 'Ve have contacted
him.
Senator KENNEDY. "Tell, it is amazing to me. I mean, can you under?tand the difficulty that any of us might ha~'e in terms ~f comprehendmg that when you develop a whole new serIes of matenals that are on
the front page of every newspaper in the country and are on every tele,·ision, I mean, that means something, but it docs not mean nearly as
much as the interest that we havein the fact about the testing of unwitting Americans, and every single document that the staff reviews
has Mr. Gottlieb's 11ame on it and you come up to tell us that we don't
have to worry any more, we have these other final facts, and ~lr. Gottlieb has not been talked to~
Admiral TURXER. Sir, I am not saying that these nre in any way the
final facts. I am saying these are all the facts we have available.
'
Senator KB~~EDY. And you have not talked to the person who was
in charge of the program, so what kind'of value or what kind of weight
.
can we ~ive it ~
AdmIral TURNER. We are happy. to talk to him. I think-the issue
here again is one of propriety and how to go about this.1Ve have not,
I believe, enough new information about Gottlieb's participation here
to signal that his interview would be that much more revealing than
what was revealed in 1975.
Senator KENNEDY. The importance of it, I think, from our point
of view, is, he would know the drugs that were administered, the volume of drugs, how it was administered, and in terms of your ability
to follow up to protect these people and their health, to the extent that
it can be done, that opportunity is being lost.
"
"
I want to get on to some others, but will you give us the assurance
that you will get ahold of Gottlieb or that you will talk to Attorney
General Bell and talk with Gottlieb ~
Admiral TURXER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And let us know as to the extent of it. I don't
see how we can fufill our responsibility in this area on the drug test.ing without our l1~aring from Gottlieb as well, but I think it is important that you do so, particularly since, all of the materialshaye
been destroyed.
These other two agents~ have t,hey talked to them i
Admiral Tun~~R. We don't know who they are, sir. 'Ve are trying
to track down and see whether these names can be releated to anybody.
Senator KENNEDY. That is under acth'e investigation by the Agency ¥
- Admiral TuRNER. Yes, s i r . ,
"
Senator KENNEDY. And you have the intention of talking to those
people when you locate them. Is that correct ¥
Admiral TuRNER. Yes, sir, under the same circumstances as Gottlieb.
Sena~or KEN~~DY. And you have people working on it ~
AdmIral TuRNER-Yes, sir.:,

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Senator KEXXEDY. 'Vitl~ regards to the activities that took place in
these safe ho"uses,as I understand from the records, two-way mirrors
wp-re used. I~ that your understanding ~
Admiral TURxER. Yes. sir. 'Ve have records that. construction was
done to put in two-way mirrors.
Senator KE~'n'~-EDY. And th~y were placed in the bedroom, as I
understand.
fPause.]
_
.
SenatorKESXEDY. 'VeIl, we havc documents-Admiral TURXER. I believe that was in the Church record. but I
don't hayc the details.
.
Senator KEXNEDY. And rather elaborate decorations were added, as
I understand, at l<:'ast., to the one in San Fmllcisco, in the bedroom,
~hic~ n~e French can-can. danceri:>, floral pictures, drapery, including
Installatlon of bedroom n11rrors, threc fram('d Toulonse Lautrec posters with black silk mats, nnd 11 number of other-red bedroom curtains and recording- equipment, and then a series of documents which
were provided to the committee which indicate a wide proliferation
of different cash for $100, ~nerally in the $100 range over any period
of time on the particular checks. E'1£>11 the names are blocked out, as
~o the person wh.o is receiving it. Cash ~()r lmdp;r~ovf'~ nRP_nt~, Orp.rn~.­
mg expenses, drmks, entertamment whIle adminIstermg. and then It
is dashed out, and then the other docnments. that would snggest, at
least with the si~nature of your principal agent out there, that-·
"called to the operation, midnight, and climax."
'Vhat can you teU' us that it might suggest to yon about what. techniq~es were being used by the Agency in terms of reachinJ.! that sort.
of broad-based group of Americans that were being evidently cnticed
for testing in terms of drugs and others? Do you draw any kind of
conclusion about what might have been going on out there in these
safe houses?
.
_
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
,
[General laughter.]
Senator KENNEDY. There is a light side to it, but there is also an
en0rmously serious side. And that is that at least the techniques which
are used or were used in terms of testing, and trying to find out exactly the range of drugs used ~lld the numbers of people involved and
exactly what that operation was about, as well as the constant reiteration of the use of small sums of cash at irregular intervals. A variety
of different techniques were employed but ,there is an awful lot of
documentation putting- these matters together.
_'Vhen you look at the fact that it is a broad range population that
has been tested, tested ill these two areas, with the kind of cash slip~
that we:r:e used in this, payment mechanisms and decorations and all
of the rest, we are not-able to put a bottom line on it but one thing' is
fo~ sure, and that is, Gottlieo knows. That is one thing for sure, because "his name appears on just about" everyone of these docnments,
and -it is, I think, very important to find out what his understanding
is of the natnreof that. So, we will hear more about that.. ..
Admiral ~NF.R. I believe Gottlieb has been interv~ewed by the
Congress. ."'
Senator KE~NEr5Y. That's ri~ht. he has, and in reviewin~ the record,
it is not very satisfactory, Hnd it just seems with the new infonnation

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and the new documentation and the new memoranda-and he did not
have the checks at that time-and with the wide variety of different
memoranda with his name on it, his memory could be stimulated on
that.
Thank you.
Senator IKOUYF.. I would like to thank the admiral and his staff for
participating in this hearing. I believe the record should show that this
hearing was held at the request of the Agency and the admiral. It was
not held because we insisted upon it. It was a yolunteer effort on the
part of the Agency. I think the record should also indicate that ~d­
miraI Turner has forwarded to this committee a classified file includmg
all of the names of the institutions and the persons involved as the
experimentors.
I shm; i~~ also indicate that this hearing is just one step im'olved in
the eommi;.tee's investigation of drug abuse.•rust as you have haCl much
work in going o',er the 8.000 pages, the staff of this committee has had
('qual problems, but. I would like the record to show that you have
mad(', these papers and documents available to the 'committ.ee. I thank
you for that.
As part of the ongoing inYestigation, we had intended to call upon
many dozens of others, experimentors, or those officials in charge, and
onp of those will be Dr. Gottlieb.
In thanking you, I would like to say this to the. American people,
that what we ha'-e experienced this morning in this committee room
is not being duplicated in anv other committee room in any other part
of the world. I doubt that. very much. Our Agency and our intelligence
community has been under much criticism and has been subjected to
much abuse, in many cases jllstifie<l, but this is the most open ~ociety
that I can think of. For example, in Great Britain there are about six
people who are aware of the identity of the.man in charge of intelligence. In other countries, similar cOilditions exist. Here in the United
States we not: only know Admiral Turner, we have had open hearings
with him, such as this. The ~onfirrnation hearings were all open.
In a few weeks, the Senate of the United States will debate It resolution to decide upon whether we should disclose the amounts and funds
being used for counterintellig-ence and national intelligence. I "'ould
hope that in presenting this issue to the public, the media will take note
that ,tIle Agency has cooperated and will 'continue to. The abuse that
we have learned about this morning is one I .hope will never happen
aunin, but without constant oversight on the part of the Executive
Office, on the part of the Congress, it could happen again. It isimportnnt therefore that we continue in this oversight activity.
So, once agairt,Admiral, I thank you very much for helpin::r us~ We
will continue to call upon you for your assistance. 1Ve would like to
submit to you several questions that the members and st.aff haNe pree hope you~will look them oyer earefully and prepare repared.
sponsesfor the record, .sir.
.
.
Senator KENNEDY. ~{r. Chairman ~
Senator INOUYE. Yes, sid
.
Senator KENNEDY. I. too, want to thnnk Admiral Turner for his
responsiveness. I have had ineeting-s with him in the committees and
also conversations, telephone conversations, and private meetings, and

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I have found him personally to be extremely responsiYe, and it is a
very difficult cha]]enge which he has accepted in heading this Agency.
I want you to know, pe~sonnlly, I, too, woulcllike to!'ee thiil. put. behind
us. I don't. think we are quite there yet in terms of this particular area
that we ar~ interested In. I think the Intelligence Committee has
special re~ponsibilities in this area of the testing, so we look forward
to working with you in expediting the time that we can put it behind,
but it does seem to me that we have to dig in and finish the chapter.
So, I want to persona]]y express my appreciation to you, Admiral
Turner, and thank yon for your cooperation and your help, and I look
forward to working with you.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
Senator HUnnT,ESToN. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure you emphasized
this enough, but. I think the record ought to show that Admiral Turner
informed the Select Committee on h.is own initiative when the new
documentation was found. The documentation has been made avail.
ablo to liS voluntarily, in a spirit of cooperation.
'
I think this shows a vast difference from the mode of operation that
existed prior to the formation at least of the Church committee, and
a. difference that is very hel pfn1.
.
Senator INOUYT.. Thank vou very much. Thank vou very much,
Admira1.
.
~
'Ve would now like to can upon Mr. Philip Goldman and ~1r. Jo11l.1
Gittinger.
~fr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger, will you please rise and take the
oath.
Do you solemly swear that the testimony you are about to give is
the truth, the "'hole truth aI:\d nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. GOLD:o.rAx. I do.
1\11'. GITIIXGER. I do.
Senator IXOUYE. Thank you, sir.
~ .1\fr. Goldman, will you identify yourself, and nfter that, :Mr.
..l"lttmger.
.
Senator KEXNEDY. Before we start in, we had a third witnes.c;, Mr.
Chairman, ~fr. Pasternac, who planned to testify, traveled to Washington-he lives in 'Vashington, and waf; contacted recently-with
the intention of testifying this morning-. And somethin~-he called
us Jate this morning and indicated that h,e wanted to get a counsel
before he would wish to testify.
Senafor INOUYE. j\fr. Goldman.
1\!r. Goldman, will you identify yourself, sir.

TESTIMONY OF PHILIP GOLDMAN, FORMER EJrIP;LOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

. ~rr. GOLD!'t!AN. I

am Philip Goldman.' '
.
Senator INOUYE. And you· are a rormer employee' of the, Central
Intelligence Agency~
!fr. GOLD!t!AN. Over 10 years ago.
Senntor INOUYE. And you were employed at the time when
1\fKULTRA was in operation ~ .
. ~fr. GOLDMAN. There were some j\{KULTRA's.in operation at the
time I was there.
.
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Senator I:s-oUYE. And :Mr. John Gittinger, are you a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency?

TESTIMONY OF JOHN GITTINGER, FORMER EMPLOYEE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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:Mr. GITrINGER. I am.Senator INOUYE. Are YOu still an employee W
1fr. GITrINOER. No.
Senator INOUYE. 'Vere you a member of the Agency at the time
MKUL'TRA was in operation ~
~rr. GlTrINGER. Yes.
Senator INOUYE. Thank you. Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENl-."EDY. I want to welcome bot.h of you to the committee.
If we could start with :Mr. Goldman. 'Vere you the project engineer
for the safe houses in either San Francisco or New York ~
___ Mr. GOLDMAX. I know of no safe house in-San'Fral!cisoo~ -Senator KEN:r..""};DY. How about in New Y ork ~
Mr. GOIDMAN. I knew of one facility that was established there,
but I didn't know anything of its operatIOn.
.
Seng,tor KENNEDY. Were you a monitor on any testing- of drugs on
unwitting persons in Sa.n Francisco ~
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. No.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, we have a classified document here that was
provided by the Agency that lists your name as a monitor of the program and I would appreciate it if you would look-1.fr. GOLD1trAN. I think the misunde.rstandinJ; arises because I was
project officer.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, wQuld you take a look at that i
[Mr. Goldman inspect~d the document.]
~fr. GOLDM:.A.N. This document as it states is correct. However,

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Senator KENNEDY. That document is correct 9
Mr. GOLDMAN. As far as I see. on the first page, the project. But.
my-Senator KENNEDY. Well, could I get it back, please.
That would indicate that you were a monitor of the progratIl.
Mr. GOLDMAN. I was in charge of disbursing the moneys to Morgan
Hall. . .
Senalor KENNEDY. To whom was that ¥.
Mr. GOLDMAN. To the individual whose name was listed at the top
of that document.
.
Senator KENNEDY. And you knew that he was running the project
in San Francisco¥ ;.
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. I knew he was the person who was in charge out
there.
..
.
.
.
. Senator KENNEDY. All right.
Mr. GoWM:AN. But I had no knowled~e nor did I seek knowled~ of
actually what he was doing, because there would be other things
involved.
..
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.I did receive-.:...-- .
.Senator ~NNEDY. What were you doing'
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~!r. GOLD:~!.:\X. I was collecting-I had to be sure that all the receipts that ever were turned in balanced with the moneys that were
paid out to 5~e that everything wus run all right. There was no illegal
use of funds as far as we could determine by the receipts and cash.
Senator KEXXEDY. So even though the Agency document indicates
that you were a monitor for the program, one of the few monitors of
that particular program which you mentioned for San Francisco and
~Iil1 Valley, Calif., you described your responsibility only as a carrier
of money, is that correct ~
.
:Mr. GOLD~1AX. I would say as a disburser or carrying out-seeing
that the moneys were handied properly. There was within that-I
don~t know what:s done or what he did do in conjunctil)n with other
peopla
.
Senator KEXXEDY. 'Vere you responsible for the disbursement of
all the fURds ~
:Mr. GOLmrAN. I was responsible for turning over the check to him.
Senator KEX!'EDY. And what did you know of the program itself ~
~fr. GOLD)!AX. The only thing I knew of the program' was what he
fulnished us in terms of receipts and that sort of thing. I didn't indulge or conc~rn myself in that.
Senator KE~l\L:DY. Y\.jU still wrote. and I'll let vou examine itit's a classified document-but vou wfote a rather stlbstantive review
of the program in ~Ia~" of 196"'3, talkinr. about the e.x~eriments,. the
factual data that had b'.· n collected, cm'ert and realIstIc field trIals,
about the necessity of those particular-and talked about the effecti-venes..'3 of the. various programs, the efficiency of various delivery
systems. That doesn't sound to me like someone who is only-~fr. GOLD:-.rAx. 'VeIl, if you would refresh my memory, if I could
read this I would certainly agree with whatever is said there, if it was
written.
Senator KEXXEDY. I am trying to gather what your role was. You'ye
indicated first- of all that you didn't know abont-}"ou knew about a
safe house in New York; now we find out that YOll're the carrier for
the resources as well and the -agent- in San Francisco. 'Ve find out now
that the CIA put you as 8 monitor. You're testifying that you only were
the courier. and here we have just one document, and there are many
others that talk about the substance of that program with your name
on it and I am ju5t trying to find out exactly what role you were
playin~.
.
.
~fr. Gor DMAX. The only thing I can tell you about this and Tam
drawing completely on my memory is that this individual who was
in charge out there conducted thto;;ie thin~ and reported them back to
the An-ency. I didn't participate in any of them. All I know was that he
furnished me with receipts for things that ,vere done and told of the
work that they had done. .
.
Senator KEN1IoTEny. W~ll. that document covers more than receipts.
':M:r. GOLDMAN. Yes, it tells of what-they had conducted work out
there.
Sen{'.tor KENXEDY. It descrihes, does it not? Read the paragraph 2..
. ~!r.· GorD!lr~\N. "A nllmher of co-vert"-- .
.
Senator KEN~"'EDY. Well, you can't read it. it's a classifiE'd document,
and I don't know why, quite frankly, but it relates to the substan~('·

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of those progrnms and your name is signed to the memorandums on
it. I am not interested in you trying to review for us 110W what is in the
document, but I think it would be unfortunate if we were left with the
opinion tha.t nIl you were was a courier of resources when we see a
document with your name or- it, signed, that talks about the substance
of the program. And what we'n~ interested in is the substance of the
program. 1Ye have the recent documents that were J?rovided by the
Agency, which do indicate that you were at least Involved in the
substance, and I'm just trying to find out whether you're willing to
tell us about that.
.
:Mr.GoLD~IAX. I am perfectly willing to tell you everything that
I can remember.
Senator KENNEDY. But you can't remember anything.
:M:r. GOLD~IAX. I can't remember the subst antive parts of these
things, I really can't.
Senator KEXNEDY. Of the program that was taking place.
Do you ha,ve any greater familiarity with what was happening in
New York~
~!r. GOLD~IAN. No, no.
Senator KENNEDY. And you have the same function with regards
to New York~
:Mr. GOLDlIrAN. The same function with regard to Now York.
Sena.tor KENNEDY. Did you ever go to San Francisco?
~Ir. GOLD:.\IAN. Yes.
Senator KENNEDY. Did you m~et with the agent in charge.~
:Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
SenRtor KEN!'."'EDY. And why did you meet with him ~
~fr. GOLDMAN. To discuss some of the receipts and things that were
there to find out if th!::se were indeed true expenditures and to find out
if everything was going aiong all right for the work that was being
d.one.
Senator KEN1'I"'EDY. 'Vhat work was being done Y
~Ir. GOLmIAN. No, the reports of these things and whatever \~as
being done. I don't know who he reported to but he did report to
somebody.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You travel out there to find out about the work
that's bein,g done, and what does he tell you, that the work is being
done well and-.
}'fr. GOLDMAN. He told me that the work that they were;doing was
going along, progressing satisfactorily, but to be very frank with
you-' .
Senator KENNEDY. But he didn't tell you what the work was Y
}'fr. GOLDMAN. To be very frank with you, Senator, I cannot re·
member the things that happened back in those days. I've been away
from the company-from the A~ncy for over 10. years, and that is
evan farther back than that, and that was just about the time when I
first engaged in this, so it was my first-Senator KENNEDY. Did they disburse a series of $100 checks; to
your recollection 9
... .
.. .
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. I don't recollect it, but if you have it there, then
theydid~,
"
. Senator KENNEDY. Did you know Dr. Gottlieb ¥
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
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Senator KEN~"EDY. How did you mow Dr. Gottlieb i
1tIr. GOLDMAN. He had been head of the division when I was recruited.
Senator KEN~'"EDY. Did you talk to him about these programs ~ Did
you have anything to do with him during this J?eriod of time?
}rIr. GOLD~IAN. I didn't have anything to do wIth him until I would
say probablv in the sixties.
'S~nator KENNJo,:DY. And can you tell us what you had to do wHh
him theni
~rr. GOLD1tIA!'. Just what you see there on the papers.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is the request for the money and he
approves it.
'
M:r. G0:....TlMAN. That is the request -for money and he approves it,
and I am quite sure thut I probably discussed with him whether the
work was going along all right, whether his reports were being turned
in, and whether he was satisfied with the way things were going
and did he have any complaints about the way other people were
requesting him, but I did not ~ngage myself i~ anyth~ng he was doiz:g.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, dId you get the ImpressIOn that Gottlieb
knew what was going on ~
1;1r. GOL.T)MAN. I didn't ask.
Senator KENNEDY. But you told him that your impression that what
~as going on even though you didn't know what 'Was going on, was gomg on well, I guess? [Laughter.]
~Ir. GOLD~IA!'. I told Gottlieb what you saw in there was that the
t.hings appeared to be going along all rIght. I was repeatmg and parroting back the words that were given to me while I was there. '
Senator KENNEDY. What was the money being spent for, do you
know!
Mr. GOLDMAN. No; I can't recall that, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you remember if we told you it was red
curtains and can-can pictures1tfr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Floral pictures and the rest..
l\fr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
'
Senator KENNEDY. Recorders.
~fr. GOLDMAN. No, sir.
'
,
,
Senator KENNEDY. Recorders and two-way mirrors.
Mr. GoLDMAN. Wait, hold on. You're slippinA' a word in there now.
Senator .~NNEDY. But you would have authorized those funds,
would,you not, since you were th~
Mr~ GOLDMAN. :Pid you say two-way mirrors¥
Senator KENNEDY. Yea.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Where'
Senator KENNF..DY. In the safe houses.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Where' '
Senator KENNEI)Y. San Francisco.
J.fr. GoLDMAN. No.
Senator KENNEDY. How about New York'
Mr. GOLDHAN..Yes.
.
Senator KENNEDY. You, remember 'now that you approved expenditu~s for New York¥
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:Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes.
Senator KEXKEDY. 'Vhat were those expenditures for i
:J\Ir. GOLD?IAX. That was a transfer of money over for the use in
an apartment in New York by the Bureau'of ·Narcotics. It was for
their use.
~enator KENNEnY. Do you have any knowledge of what was going
on In the apartment i
~fr. GOLD)!AN. No, sir, other than I know that it had been used, according to the information that I have been given, it was used by the
Bureau of Narcotics to make meetings with individua.ls who they were
interested .in with regard to pushing dope-not pushing dope, but selling narcotics and that sort of thing.
Senator KE~NEl)Y. 'VeIl, I am sure you had many responsibilities and
it.'s a long time ago, but the Agency does indicate that you were projer.t
monitor for that particular program.
.
}Ofr. GOLD)ZAN. That's correct.
.
Senator .KENNEDY. Your own testimony indicates you went out to review the expenditures of funds to find out whether they were being
wisely used, that you came back and talked to the project director, }Ofr.
Gottlieb, to give him a progress report about what \vas going on out
there.
.
Mr. GOLDMAN. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator KENNEDY. All those things are true, and yet you draw a
complete blank in terms of what was the project itself. That's where
the record is no\v.
.
~fr. GOLD!tf.AN. I did not go out there to review the projects nor did
I come back and talk with :Mr. Gottlieb and review what I had observed
in terms of -any projects that they-that is, other parts of the Agency
might have in operation there. I simply reported back those thin~
which were told to me by the individual out there who-and I carried
them back and they are contained in the rBport that you have in front
of you, word for word, just as it was given to me.
Senator KENNEDY. The report that you examined here is a substant.ive report on the particular program and project. And I don't think
anyone who wasn't familiar with the project-this is a ,personal evalun.tion~ould write a report on the substance of it without knowing
about it. Now, that's mine. }Ofaybe you can't remember and recollect,
and that's-.
1fr. GOLDMAN. No; everything I put down in there is things that I
was told while I was out there, and if there was any ancillary information involved in there I can tell you I just don~t remember that. I really
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At the time-that was some years ago. At th~ time-a lot of time has
passed since then and I have made quite sure that if I could recollect it
at all; I would do it. If you have some papers and you want me to certify whether yes, this is so or that is so, I can do th~t, but I can't recall
it mentlilly..
....
.
Senator KENNEDY. You just certified the principal. There are others
up here~ . ,.
. '
I would like to go to Dr. Gittinger.
Mr. GITrrNOER. It's Mr. Gittmger. .
,
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SenatOr KENNEDY. How long did you serve with the Agencyi
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GITrINGER. Twenty-six years.
Senator KEXXEDY. Excuse me ~
,Mr. GIlTIXGER. Twenty-six years.,
Senator KE?'NEDY. Twenty-six years.
And -at some point you moved into the operational support side, is
that correct ~
Mr. GITrIXGER. Yes.
Senator KEXXEDY. And did you know Sidney Gottlieb?
:Mr. GITIINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. And did he inform you about the research projects involving LSD W
:Mr. GrITIXoER. Yes, sir.
Senator KEXNEDY. It is my understanding tllat yon were also aware
of some of the dru~ testing projeyts conducted on unwitting subjects
on the west coast usmg the Bureau of Narcotics people in the operation.
Is that true ~
Mr. GrITIXGER. I was.
Senator IxouYE. Excuse me. 'Vould you speak into the microphone?
I cannot. hear you.
Mr. GITIIXGER. Sorry.
.
Senator KEXXEDY. Do you know which drugs were involved in those
tests?
Mr. GrITIXGER. LSD. And I can't remember for sure much of the
others. 'Vhat is the substance of marihuana, cannabis, is that right, that
can be delivered by other than smoking?
Senator KENNEDY. Cannabis?
,Mr. GrrTIXGER. There had been some discussion of that; yes.
Senator KEXNEDY. And was heroin also used?
1:fr. GITIIXGER. Heroin used by CIA?
Senator KEXNEDY. No. In the west coast operation.
!\lr. GIITIKGER. Absolutely not..
Senator KENNEDY. Now, to your knowledge, how were the drugs administered to the unwitting subjects?
!\fr. GITIIKGER. I have no direct knowledge.
Senator KENNEDY. "Thy did you go to the safe houses?
!\fr. GITrIKGER. It's a very complicated story. Just in justification of
myself, this came up just day before yesterday. I have not really had
enough time to get it all· straightened in my mind, so I ramble.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, you take your time and tell us in your own
words. We've got some time here.
!\fr. GXTTINGER. !\fy responsibilities which would involve any of the
period of time that you were talking about really was not directly
related to drugs at alL I was a psychologist charged with the responsibility of trying to develop as much information as I could on various
cultures, overseas cultures, anthropological type data, if you follow
what I mean. Iwas also engaged in trying to work out ways and means
of assessing- people and understanding people.
.
I originally became involved in this throu~h working on Chinese
culture, and over a series of time I was introduced to the problem of
.brainwashing, which is the thing that really was the most .compelling
thing in relationship to this, and 'became charged with the responsibility of trying to find~ut 0.. little bit about interrogation techniques.

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And among other things, we decide-d or I decided that one of the best
sources of interrogation techniques would be trying to locate and L,'1terview and become involn'd with experienced police interrogators in
the country and experienced people who had real practical knowledge
of interrogation. The reason for this is that we had become pretty well
convinced after the experience of the brainwashing problems coming
out of China, that. it was the techniques of the interrogators that were
causing the individuals to make confessions and so forth in relationship
to this, rather tha.n any kind of drugging and so forth. So we were
yery much interested in interrogation techniques, and this led to me
being introduced to the agent in the west coast, and I began to talk to
him in connection with these interrogation techniques.
Senator KE~~"'EDY. OK. NoW', that is the agent that ran the tests
on the west coast on the unwitting people. That's where you come in,
correct 1
Mr. GITI'Il"GER. If I understand-would you say that again 1
Senator KE~NEDY. The name :Morgnn'lIall has been-that is the
name that has been used.
Mr. Grrr.rNGER. Yes.
Senator KE~NEDY. And that is the agent that you met with.
:Mr. GITTI~GER. That is right.
Senator Kt:~~EDY. And you met at the safe house.
Mr. GrrrINGER. Y (>s. sir.
Senator KEXXEDY. iVhom did you meet with in the safe house?
Mr. GI'ITIl':lIER. This is the part that is hard for me to say, and I am
sorry that I han to. In connection with some work that we were
doing, we needed to han, some information on sexual habits. Morgan
Hall prodded informants for me to talk to in connection with the sex
habits that I was interested in trying to find information. During one
period of time the safe house, as far as I was concerned, was used for
just these particular type of interviews. And I didn't see the red
curtains.
Senator KEXNEDY. Those were prostitutes, were they ~
lIre GITTINGER. Yes, sir.
Senator KF.~NEnY. How many differe.nt times were you there that
you had similar-. Mr. GITTINGER. I couldn't possibly say with any certainty on that.
Fonr or five times.
'
Senator KENNEDY. Four or five times.
~rr. GITrINGER. Over-you remember now, the period that I'm talking about when I would haye nny involvement in this is from about
1956 to 1961. So it's about a 4- or 5-year period which is the only time
that I know anything about what you are talking about here today.
- Senator KE~NF.Dr. Did l\IorJ;Un Hall make the arrangements for
the prostitutes to meet with you'
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Mr. GI'ri'INGER.' Yes, sir.
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Senator KENNEDY. Did the interviews that you had have anything to
do with dru~¥.
.
.
:Mr. GI'ITINGER. Well~ as I tried to explain earlier when this was
being discussed a little bit beforehand, again I think it iR pretty hard
for most- people now to recognize how -little there was known abopt
drugs at the period of time that we are talking about, because the

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drug age or the drug culture comes later on. Consequentl)', those of
us who had any responsibility in this area were interested in trying to
get as much information as we could on the subculture, the subculture
drug groups, and obviously the Bureau of Xarc.Qtic~ repre....~nted R
means oi doing this. Consequently, other types of thinQ'S that were
involved in discussions at that time would ha ,'e to do wit~ the underground use of drugs. \\lIen I am talking about this I am talking about
the folkw~ys in terms of unwitting use of drugs. Did these people that
I was talkmg to have any information about this and on rare instances
they were able to tell me about their use, and in most cases this would
largely turn out to be a ~lickey Finn or something of that sort rather
than anything esoteric.
I also was very much interested because we had relatively little
information, belie\'e it or not, at that time, in tenns of the various
reactions that people "'ere having to drugs. Therefore, these people
were very informative in terms of they knew a great deal of information about reactions.
.senator KEXX.EDY. At least you gathered--or am I correct in assuming that you gathered the impression that the prostitutes that you had
talked to were able to slip the drugs to people as I understand it. Did
you form any impression on that?
.
]'fr. GITTIXGER. I certainly did not form the impression that they
did this as a rule or-Senator KEXXEDY. But they had the knowledge.
:Mr. Gl'ITD.-GER. ThE'.y had the h.~owledge or some of them had had
kno';dedge of this being done. But again, as it turned out, it was largely
in this area of knockout drops.
Senator KEXXEDY. Looking back now did you form any impression
about how the Agency was actually testing the broad spectrum of social
classes in these safe houSes ~ 'Vith the large disbursal of cash in
small quantities, $100 bills and the kinds of elaborate decorations and
two-way mirrors in the bedrooms and all the rest, is there any question
in your own mind what was going on in 'the safe houses, or the techniques that were being used to administer these drugs ~
~fr. GITTIXGER. I find it very difficult to answer that question~ f'ir. I
had absolutel)' no direct knowledge there was a large number of this. I
had no knowledge that anyone other than-than :.\forgan Ha.ll was in
any way involved in the unwitting administration of drugs.
Senator KEXXEDY. But Gottlieo would know, would he not? .
1tfr. GITTI~GER. I believe so, yes, sir.
Senator KEX~EDY. Could we go into the Human Ecology Foundation and talk about that and how it was used as an instrument in terms
of the support of research ~
:Mr. GI'ITI~GER. Yes, sir.
Senator KE~~'"EDY. Could you describe it to us ~ Could you describe
the Human Ecology Foundation, how it functioned ~nd how it wor~ed~
:Mr. GlTI'I~GER. l\fay I tell something about how It evolved, whIch I
think is important?
Senator KEN~EDY. Sure.
.:Mr. GI'ITIXGER. The Society for the InYestigatio~ of Human Ecology, so-ealled, was actually a-.I am confused here now as to whether
I should name you names.

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Senator KENNEDY. "'VeIl, we're not interested in names or institutions, SO· we prefer that you do not. That has to be worked out in
arrangements between Admiral Turner and the individuals and the
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But we're interested in what the Foundation really was and how it
functioned and what its 'purpose was.
Mr. GITTIKGER. 'VeIl, It was established to undertake research in the
general area of the behavioral sciences, It definitely had almost no
focus or interest in, say, drug-related type of activities except in a very
minor way, because it was largely set up to attempt to gam a certain
amount of information and to fund projects which were psychological,
sociological, anthropological in character. It. was established in the
sense of a period or time that a lot of us who are in it ,,,ish we could
do it over again, but we were interested in trying to get together a panel
of the most representative high-level behavioral scientists we could to
oyersee and help in terms of developing the So~iety for the InvestigatIon of Humari Ecology type of program.
.
The Agency in effect provided the money. They did not direct the
projects. Now, the fact of the matter is, there are a lot of innocent people who received the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology
money which I know for a fact they were never asked to do anything
for the CIA but they did ge~ through this indirectly. They had no
.
.
knowledge that they were gettmg CIA money.
Senator KENNEDY. Over what period of time did this take place ¥
:rtfI'. GITTINGER. As far as I was concerned, it was the period of time
en.ding in 1961. I believe the Human Ecology fund finally phased out
in 1965, but I was not involved in this phasing out.
Senator KENNEDY. Can you l{ive the range of the different sort of
individual projects of the universities in which it was active!
.
]'fr. GITIINGER, Well, it would have as many as-I am very fuzzy
on my memory on the number of projects. It is over 10, 20, 30.
Senator KEN1'.""EDY. After it made the grants, what was the relationship of the Agency with the results of the studiesf The Foundation
acquired the money to make the grants from the Agency, and then it
made the grants to'these various research programs.
. :Mr. GI'ITINGER. Yes, sir.
.
Senator KENNEDY. And that included eight universities as well as
individual researchers!
.
:Mr. GI'ITINGER. Yes. sir.
Senator KENNEDY. Then what follow-up was there to that, sir ¥
. Mr. GITrINGER. Well, in every sense of the word, the organization
was run exactly like any other foundation, and it carried with it the
same thing in terms of makin~ certain that the people that they had
~iven money to used it for the purpose for which it had been ~nted,
that they had access to any of the reports that they had put out, but
there were no string$ attached to anybody. There wasn't any reason
they couldn't publish nTlvthinl!' thflt th~v put out.':
. .
Senator KENNEDY. What sort of bud~t are we talking; about here'
Mr. GITrINGER. I honestlv do nOt remember. I would P.11ess we aro
,talking in the realm of about $150,000 a year, but don't hold me to that,
becauSe I don't know.

00

Senator KENNEDY. What is your vlew about such funding as a professional person, in terms of compromising the integrity of a university, sir' _
Mr. GITI'INGER. Well, obviously, El~!', insofar as today there is no
question about it. I will have to say at the time that we were doing this
there was quite an entirely different kind of an attitude, and I do
know for a :fact that we moved to start towards phasin~ out the Society for the Investigation of Human Ecology and the Human Ecology Fund for the very reason that we were beginning to recognize that
it was moving into an area but tills would be compromised.
Senator KENNEDY. Well, that is commendable, both your attitude
and the reasons for it, but during- that period of time it still was involved in behavior research programs, as I understand it.
Mr. GrrrrNGER. Yes, sir. On its own, in connection with this, it
participated again, and thpse again were not CIA-directRd projects,
but these were all things which would theoretically contribute to the
rreneral lmowledge at the time where the things like the study of the
Hungarian refugees-obviously, the study of the Hungarian refugees
who came to this country after the Hung-arian revolt was n very useful exercise to try to get information about the personality characteristics of the Communists Rnd so forth.
Senator- KENNEDY. Were there other foundations that were doing
similar kinds of work?
~fr. GITTlNOER. Not to my knowledge, sir.
Senator KENNEDY. You believe-?\fr. GrrrrNGER. You mean, CIA, other CIA?
Senator KENNEDY. Right.
. _
_
:Mr. GrTrINGER. Well, my answer is in the sense that I know of no
other CIA foundations, no. There ,vere, of course, other foundations
doing simiIflr kinds of work in the United States.
Senator KENNEDY. Have you heard of the Psychological Assessments Foundation ~
~fr. GITI'INGER. I certainly have.
Senator KENNEDY. What was that? What function did that have?
~fr. GrrrrNGER. Now, this was bringing- us up to a different era. I
believe the functions of that organization have -nothing whatsoever
to do with the things that are being talked about here ·while I was
associated with it.
Senator KENNF.DY. Rnther than getting into the work, it was another
foundation, was it not' It was another foundation supported by the
A~ency'
.
Mr. GrrrrNGER. Whflt, the Psychological Assessment?
Senator KENNEDY. Yes.
Mr. Gl'rrrNGER. No, sir, it was not.
$ena:tor KENNEDY. It. did not get any support at all from the
Agencyt
.Mr. GrrrINGER. Oh, yes, sir. It did get support, but it was a business
firm.
_
Senator _KENNEDY. It was a business but it got support from the
A~ency¥
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- Mr. GrrrrNGER. It got money from it, but it definitely was not in
1\fKULTRA or in any way associated with this.
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Senator KEXXEDY. All right. I want to thank you for your helptul
testimony, ~Ir. Gittinger. It is not easy to go back into the past. I
think you have been very fair in your characterizations, and I think
it is quite appropriately indicated that there are different standards
now from what they were 25 :rears ago, and I think you have responded
very fairly and completely to the inquiries, and I think with a good
deal of feeling about it.
You are a person who is obviously attempting to serve the country's
interest, so I want to thank yOll \;ery much for your statement and
for your helpful timeliness.
~fr. Gl'rnNGER. Thank you, sir.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Case ~
Senator CASE. Thank you, :Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I had
rnother committee that I had to complete the hearing with this ~orning before I got here.
,'
I shall read the testimony with very great interest, and I appreciate your testimony as I have heard it. I would like to comment just on
one point, and that is, it relates to a story in the press yesterday about
part of this program involving the funding of a grant at a foreign
university. I would like to elicit from you a comment as to theadditional sensitivity and difficulty that that practice involves from your
standpoint as a scientist, as well as a citizen, if you will.
:Mr. GrITIXGER. I \vill say it was after the fact thinking. It was utter
stupidity the way things worked out to have used some of this money
outside the United States when it was CIA money. I can categorically
state to my knowledge and I don't claim a complete knowledge all the
way across of the human ecol0::o' functions, but to my knowledge, and
this is unfortunate, those people did not know that they were getting
money from CIA, and they were not asked to contribute anything to
CIA as such.
'
Senator CASE. It would be interesting to try to examine this by turning the thing around and thinking what we would think if thIS happened from a foreign official agency to our own university. Thank you,
~Ir. Chairman.
Senator INOUYE. Senator Schweiker.
Senator SCHWEIl{ER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. .
Dr. Goldman, I wonder if you would tell us what your training and
educational background is ~
,
Dr. GOLD?tIAN. I have already given a ·bio,graphy for the record.
Senator SCHWEIKER.·I have not seen it. 'Vho has it ~ 1s it. classified ~
We may have it for the record, but may I ask you to. briefly describe
your training and back~round for us now! I hope it is no secret.
'
Dr. GOU>MAN. Well~ I was told if I was nsked this to say that. I was
told that by 'your, staff people, but I have no objection to telling you.
I a.m a. resident from· Pennsylvania, southwest Pennsylvania, Lancaster County~ I went to Perin State, and I am in'nutrition.
'
Senator SCHWEIKER. In what'
-'Dr. GOLDMAN. Nutrition. '
Senator SClIWEIKER.Were you in charge of a section or segment of
t.he CIA in your past capacity '1
.
, Dr. GOLDMAN. During the time I was with that organization, I was
in charge of one small section of it, one small segment of it; yes.

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Senator SCHWEIKER. 'Vhat was the function or purpose of that section that you headed ~
Dr. GOLDMAN'. To provide support for the other parts of the division.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. 'Vhere In the chain of command would thntput
you in relation to Dr. Gottlieb ~
Dr. GOLD!>fAN". Pretty far down the line.
Senator SCIIWEIKER. :Mr. Gittinger, I would just like to ask you a
few questions. 'Ve appreciate ;your frankness and candor with the comtnitt~, and we realize this is a very difficult area to go into. I am not
quite clear on two matteI'S that were raised earlier. First, were the safe
houses we were talking about here used 011 occasion by the prostitutes
you referred to ~
i\Ir. GITI'IN'GER. I really haye not the slightest ider!.
Senator SCHWEIKER. 'Vere the prostitutes used in any way to slip
the customers drugs for observation purposes ~
:Mr. GrI'TIN'GER. Not to my direct knowledge.
. SenatorSCIIwEIKER. 'Vould you have been in a position to h."Jl0'V the
ans'rer to either of these questions?
1\11'. GITTIXGER. May I say, probably not, and may I make an nside
to expJ ain a little bit of this, please, sir ~
Senator SCHWEIKER. Mr. Gittinger, a moment HgO you mentioned
brainwashing techniques, as one area that you had, I guess, done some
work in. ·How would you characterize the state of the art of brainwashing today? 'Vho has the most expertise in this field, and who is
or is not doing it in terms of other governments ~
.
During the Korean war there was a lot of serious discussion about
brainwashing techniques being- used by the North Koreans, and I am
interested in finding- out what the state of the art is today, as you see it.
l\fr. GIITINGER. 'Vell, of course, there has been a great deal of work
on this, and there is still a great deal of controversy. I can tell you that
as far as I knew, by 1961, 1962, it was at least proven to· my satisfaction that brainwashing, so called, is some kind of an esoteric device
where drugs or mind-alterin~ kinds of conditions and so forth were
used, did not exi~ even though "The l\fanchurian Candidate" as a
movie really set us back a long time, because it made something im:possible look plausible. Do you follow what I mean? But by 1962 and
1963, the general idea t.hat we were able to come up with is that brainwashing was 'largely a process of isolating a human being, keeping
him out of contact, putting him under long stress in relntionshi p to
interviewing and interrogation, and that they could produce any
change that way. without having to resort to' any·kind of esoteric
means.
.
.
Senatql' SCHWEIKER. Are there ways that .we can ascertain this from
. a distance' when we see it 'captive prisoner either go on television, in
a photograph, or at a press conference 1 In other words, are there certain signs that you have learned· to reCognize from your tee.hnical
background, to tell when brainwashing ·has occulTed ~ Or is that very
difficult to do ¥
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Mr.GITrINGER. It is difficult to do. ~I think it is posible now in terms
of lookingata picture of somebody ,....ho haslJeen in enemy hands for
a long period of time. We can 1{Ctsame pretty good ideas of what kind
of circumstances he has been under, if t!lat is what you mean.

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Senator SCHWEIKER. That is all I have, :Mr. Chairm~n. Thank you.
Senator INOUYE. Thank JOU very much.
Before adjourning the hearings, I would like to have the record
show that Dr. Goldman and Mr. Gittinger have voluntarily cooperated
with the committee in staff interviews, that they appear this morning
voluntarily, and they are not under subpena.
Gentlemen, I realIze that this experience may have been an unhappy
one and possibly a painful one. Therefore, we thank you very much
for participating this mornin~. 'Ve also realize that the circumstances
of that time differed yery much from this day, and po...~ibly the national attitude, the national political attitude condoned this type of
aotivity. So, we have not asked you to come here as persons who have
committed crimes, but rather in hope that you can assist us in studying
this problem so that it will not occur once again. In that spirit we
thank you for your participation, and we look forward to working
with you further in this case.
Thank you 'very much.
Senator KEXNF.DY. Mr. Ohairman, I would like also to thank the
witnesses. These nre difficult matters, and I think all of us nre very
grateful.
Senator SCHWEIKER. I think the witnesse,.c.; should know that though
it may not always seem that way, what we are trying to do is to probe
the past and look at I,he policies of the past to affect the future. I think
our emphasis really is on the future, not the past, but it is important
that we learn from the past as we formulate policies and legislation
for the future, I hop!'. that all of the witnesses who did come before us
voluntarily this morning, including- Admiral Turner respect the fact
that we are questioning the past to learn about the future. I think it
should be looked at in that light.
Senator KENNEDY. I think that is the spirit in which we have had
these hearings. It seems to me that from both these witnesses and
others, Got~Jieb knows the information and can best respond, and we
are going to make every effort in the Senate Health Committee to ~et
1t~r. Gottlieb to appear, and we obviously look forward to c;oope;atmg
WIth Senator Inouye and the other members of the commIttee "In getting the final chapter written on this, but we want to thank you very
much for your appea,rance here.
Senator INOUYE. The hearing will stand in recess, subject to.tbe call
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f'Vhereupon, at 12 :12 p.m., the hearing was recessed, subj~t to the
call of the Chair.]
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APPENDIX A
XVII. TESTIKG AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGE:NCE CO~rMUNITY

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Under its mandate 1 the Select Committee has studied the testing and
use of chemical and biologiclll Rgents by intelligence agencies. Detailed
descriptions of the programs conducted by intelligence agencies involving chemical and biological agents will be included in a separately
published appendix to the ~cnate ~elect Committee~s report. This section of the report will discuss the rationale for the programs, their
monitoring and control, and what the Committee's investigation has
revealed about the relntionships among the intelligence agencies and
about their relations".ith other gorerlUnent agencies and private institutions and individua.Is. 2
Fears that countries hostile to the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led
t<:l the development of a defensive program designed to disco"er t€chniques for American intelligence agencies to detect and cotmteract
chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became
secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information
from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.
Research and deve10pment programs to find materials which could
be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 19-10s and
early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing
of drugs involYing witting human subjects, and culminated in tests
using unwitting, nonvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to derermine the potential effects of chemical or biological
agel1:ts when used operationally against individuals unaware that they
.had received a drug.
The t€sthlg programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the
agencies, kriew of the programs and there is no evidence that either
the executive branch or Congress were ever informed·of th~m. The
highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in
part by an observation made bv the CIA Inspector General that, "the
knowledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activi1 Senate Resolution 21 dir~cts the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities to investigate a number of issues:
"(a) Whether agencies within the intelllgence community conducted megal
domestic act,lvities (Section 2 (l) and (2» ;
"(b) .Tbe extent to which agencies witIl1n the intelligence community cooperate (Section 2(4) and (8» ;
.
.
"Cc) Tbe adequacy of uecutlvebranch and Congressional oversight of intelligence actlvittes(Section 2(7) o.nd (11» i
"(d) Tbeadequacy' of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2 (13»."
. '
.• The details of these programs may neve: be known. The programs "'ere highly
compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for
the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.
(385)

(M) .

66
386
ties would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic circles
and would be detrimental to the accomplishment of its missions." 3
The research and development program, and particularly the covert testing programs, resulted in massive abridgments of the rights
of American citizens, sometimes with tragic consequences. The deaths
of two Americans 31l can be attributed to these programs; other participants in the testing programs may still suffer from the residual effects. '\V'hile some controlled testing of these substances might be defended, the nature of the tests, their scale, and the fact that they were
continued for years after the danger of surreptitious administration
of LSD to unwitting individuals was known, demonstrate a funda.
.
mental disregard for the value of hu.rnan lite.
The Select Committee's investigation of the testing and use of chemical and biologic<"1..l agents :lIso raise serious questions about the adequacy of command and control procedures ""ithin the Central Intelligence Agency and military intelligence, and about the relationships
among the intelligence agencies, other governmental agencies, and
private institutions and individuals. The CIA's normal administrath'e
controls were waived for programs inYoh-ing chemical and biological
agents to protect. their seCUrlty. According to the head of the Audit
Branch 01 the CI.:\.. these' waivers produced "gross administrative
failures." They pr(":~'nted the CL<\.'s internal review mechanisms (the
Officeaf General Cuunsel, the Inspector GeneI'd, and the Audit Staff)
from adequately supervising the programs. In general, the waivers had
the paradoxical effect of providing less .restricti\"e administrative controls and less effective internal r<;vie:- for controve~sial and highly
sensitive projects than those governing normal Agency activities.
The security of the programs was protected not only by waivers
of normal administrative controls, but also by a high degree of compartmentation within the CIA. This compartmentation excluded the
CIA's j\fedical Staff from the prindpal research and testing program
employing chemical and biologlcal agents.
It also may have led to agency policymakers receiving differing
and inconsistent responses when they posed questions to the CIA
compon.ent involved.
. .
Jurisdictional uncertainty within the CIA was matched by jurisdictional conflict among the various intelligence agencies. A spirit of
cooperation and reciprocal exchanges of informatlon which initially
characterized the programs disappeared. },filitary testers withheld inIormation from the CIA, ignoring suggestions for coordination fro~
their superiors. The CIA similarly failed to provide information to
the military on the CIA's testing program. This failure to cooperate
was conspicuously ~anifested in an attempt by the Army to conceal
a CIA Inspector Gen~re1'8 Survey of TSD,

1951: p. 217.
On January 8, 1953. Mr. Harold Blauer died of cIrculatory collapse and heart
fallure following an intrave~()tis injection of a synthetic mescaUne derIvative
while a subject of tests·r.onducted by New York State PsychIatric Institute under
a contract let by the U.S. Army Chemical Corps. The Committee's investigation
into drug testing by U.S. Intelligence agencies f<>eused on the testing of LSD, however, the committee did receive a copy of the U.S. Army Inspector General's
RepOrt, issued on October 1975, on the events and circumstances ot Mr. Blaner's
death. His death was directl;r atribut:able to the administration of the synthetIc
mescaline derivative.
k

•

" 11
,

,

'~

-~

...
f

I,:

:1 ;

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67
,._;

387
,

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their overseas testing prograin, which inciuded surreptitious administration of LSD, from the CIA. Learning of the Army~s program,
the Agency surreptitiously attempted to obta~ll details of it.
, The-<.1ecision to instit~te one of t~he Armis ~SD field testing proje?ts
had been based, atleust m part, on the findmg that no long-term reSIdual effects had ever resulted from the drug's administration. The
CIA's failure to inform the Army of a death which resulted from the
surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting Americans, may well
have resulted in the institution of an unnecessary and potentially lethal
pr~m.
"
'.
.
. The development, testin~, and use of chc:nical and biological agents
by intelligence agencies raIses serious questions about the relationship
between the intellicrence community and foreign governments, other
a~encies of the Federal Government, and other institutions and indIviduals. The questions raised range from the le~itimacy of American
complicity in actions abroad which violate AmerIcan and foreign laws
to tIie possible compromise of the integrity of public and private institutions used as cover by intelligence agencIes.
A.

•

...

•

THE PROGRAMS I~vESTIGATED

1. Project OHATTER
Project CHATTER was a Navy program that began in the fall of
1947. Respoilding to reports of "amazing results" achieved by the
Soviets in using ".truth drugs," the program focused on the identification and testing of. snch drugs for use in interrogatiorts and in the
recruitmenLof agents. The research included laboratory eXIleriments
on animo!s and hum:· ~ subjects involving Anabasis aphylla, scopolamine, und mescaline ill ')rder to determine their speech-inducing qualities. Overseas experiments were conducted as part. of .the project.
The project expanded substantially during the Korean 'Var, and
ended shortly after the war, in 1953.. _
fiJ. Project BLUEBIRD/ARTIOHOKE"'
The' earliest of the CIA's major programs involving the use of
chemical and biological agents, Project BLUEBIRD, was approved by
the Director in 1950. Its objectives were:
.
'(a) discovering means of conditioning personnel to··prevent
unauthorized extraction of information from them by known
means, (b) in\'estigating the possibility of control of an individual by application of special interrog~ti<?n te~hniq·:es,
(c) memory enhancement, and (d) estaohshmg defensIve
. means: for preventing hostile control" orAgency personne1. 4
a result of interrogati~nscond,,!cted overse8:s during the project,
%l110ther goal wasadded-theevaluatlon of offenSIve uses of unconventl()llal interrogation techniques, including hypnosis ILnd drugs. In '.
·_-\.ugust 1951, the project was renamed ARTICHOKE. Project ARTICHOKE includea in-house experiments on interrogation. techniques,
cop.ducted"under. m~.dica.land security ~Qntrols which ~ould ensure

As

•. _j

--.....;... ' CIA·memorandum to the Select Committee, "Behavioral Drugs and Testing,"
. '

2/11/15.

t> ...

- : . '

. ' .. . . . .

. . ..

...

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that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer for the experi- .
ments." I Overseas interrogations utilizing a combination of sodium
pentoth?-l und hypnosis after physical and psychiatric examinations of
the subJects were also part of ARTICHOKE.
.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), which studied scientific
advances by 'hostile powers, initially led BLUE-BIRD/ARTICHOKE
efforts. In 1952, overall responsibility for ARTICHOKE was transferred from OSI to the Inspection and Security Office (I&SO), predecessor to the present Office of Security. The CIA's Technical Services and Medical Staffs were to be called upon as needed; OSI would
retain liaison function with other government agencies. 6 The change
in leadership from an intelligence u.nit to an operating unit apparently reflected a change' in emphasis; from the study of actions by
hostile powers to the use, both for offensive and defensive purposes,
of special interrogation techniques-primarily hypnosis and truth
serums.
Representatives.from each Agency unit involved in ARTICHOKE
met almost monthly to discus.s theIr progress. These discussions included the plannin~ of overseas interrogations 8 as well as further
experimentation in the U.S.
. Infonnation about project ARTICHOKE after the faU of 1953
is scarce. The CIA maintains that the project ended in 1956, but evidence suggests thaJt Office of Security and Office of ~redical Services
use of "special interrogation" techniques continued for several YC:lrs
thereafter.

1
~
~

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~
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d

3.1rlKNAOMI
MKNAOMI was. another major CIA pI'Of!l'am in this area. In 1967,
the CIA summarized the purposes of ~IKNAO~II :
(a) To provide for a covelt support base to meet clandes.
tine operational requirements.
(b) To stockpile severely incapacitating and lethal matenals for t~le specific use of TSD [Technical Services Division].
'
(c) To maintain in operational readiness special and unique
items for the dissemina.tion of biological and chemical materials..
.
..,
. (d)' To 'provide for the required surveillance, testin/Z, upgradin~, 'and evalua:Holl of materials and i~ms i.n. order to
assure absence of, defects ·and comploce predlctabIlIty' of re,suIts to·oo expect.e~f under opemtional conditions.s '"
Under an agreement 'reaChed with :the Army in 1952, the Snecial
Operations Division (SOD) ,at Fort Detrick was ,to assist CIA. in
d~veloping, testing, and maintaining biological agents and delivery

---_.
• Memorandum ,from Rohprt ,Tavl()r, O';nDIP to thp. A~slstant :Qeputy
'

.,

(Inspectlo,n,llnd Security) and Chief of the ~redlcal Staft',3/22152.:
..
• Memorandum from H. Marshall ChadwE'11. Al;ll:(stant Dlret'tor. SclentltlclntelUgence, to the Deptity Dfrector/P]an~ (nnp) ·!p~iect ARTICHOKE," 8/29/52.
• "ProgTess'RePf)rt, ProjeCt ARTICHOKE." 1/12/53. .
'.
.
• Memorandum from·Cbief. TSD/Blolog1cal Brallf"ll to Chief. TSD ")lKNAOMI :
FundlnJr. Ohfeettvps. pnftAceomn]leh"""nt.,." 10/18/R7. 'P. 1. Fo!' a tuller description ot. )IKNAO~II and _the
relatfonslilpbetween CIA and SOD. see p. 860 ft.
.
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systems. By this agi-eement, CIA acquired the knowled~e, skill, and
f&..cilities of the Army to deveiop biological weapons sUlwd for CIA
use.
SOD developed darts coated with biological agents and J?ills containing several ditr~rent biological agents which could remam ~te~t
for weeks or months. SOD also developed '8. special gun for firing
darts coated with a chemical which could allow CIA agents to incapacitate a guard dog, enter an installation secretly, and return the dog to
conscicusness when leaving. SOD scientists were unable to develop
a similar incapacitant for humans. SOD also phJsically transferred
to CIA personnel biological agents in "bulk" form, and delivery
devices, including some containing biological agents.
In addition to the CIA,'s interest in biological weapons for use
against humans, it also asked SOD to study use of bioloaical agents
against crops and animals. In its 1967 memorandum, the 6IA stated:
Three methods end systems for carrying out n covert attack
against crops and causing severe crop loss ha\·e been developed and evaluated under field conditions. This was accomplished in anticip~tion of a req·uirement which was later
deYeloped .but was subsequentljO scrubbed just prior to putting into action. o.
l\fKNAO~II was terminated in 1970. On November 25, 1969, President Nixon renounced the use of anv form of biological weapons that
kill or incapacitate and ordered the"disposal ot existing stocks of bacteriological weapons. On February 14, 1970, the President clarified the
extent of his enclicr order and hidicated that toxlrls~hcmicalsthat
are not IhrinS organisms but are produced by 1ivin~'or~nisms-~ere
considered bIOlogical weapons subject to hIS preYIOUS directive and
were to be destroyed. Although instructed to relinquish control of
material held for the CIA by SOD, a CIA scientist acquired approximately 11 grams of shellfish toxin from SOD personnel at Fort Detrick whicli were stored in a little-used CIA laboratory where it went
undetected for five years. 10
0>

.. 4-. MK17LTRA

•
p

.-

•

.

1\IKlJLTRA was the principal CIA program involving the .research
and development' of chemical· and biological agents. It was "concerned \vith the research and development of chemical,.biological, and
ra?iological materIals. capable of employment _in clandestine operations to control humah behavior." 1 1 '
.
In January 1973, l\IKUIJTRA records w~re destroyed by Technical
Servicf$ Division personnel actinrr on the verbal orders of Dr. Sidney
Gottlieb, Chief of TSD. Dr. Gottlieb has testified, and former Director Helffi$' has confirmed, that in orderinO" the records destroyed, Dr.
Gottlieb was. carrying out the verbal order of then DCI Helms.
:MKULTRA .began with a. proposal from the Assistant·· Deputy
Director for Plans, Richard Helms, to the. DCI, outlining a specilil
b

,
.;..

Ibid. p.2.

."

".-

Senate Se~ect Committee, 9/16/15; Hearings, Ve.1.
,U Memorandum trom tbe CIA Inspector General to tbe Director,
.
.
.
M

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7/26/6S~

70

390

"

.....

"...

funding mechanism for highly sensitive CIA research and devel.opment projects that studied thellseof biological and chemical materIals
in altering hpman behavior. The projects involved :
Research to develop a cap~gility i~Jhe covert use of biological and chemical material~'Thisnr:e.'\ involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support
present or future clandestine operations. Aside from the offensh'e potential. the developme.nt of a comprehensive capability in this field of covert chemical and biological warfare
gives us a thorough kno"led~e of the enemy's theoretical
potential. thus enabling us to defend ourseh'es against a foe
who might not be as restrained in the use of these techniques as we are. n
,
~naJLTRA '"as approved by the DCI on April 13, 1953' along the
lmes proposed by ADDP Helms.
Part of the rationale for the establishment of this special funding mechanism was its extreme sensitivity. The Inspector General's
survey of ~IKl'LTRA in 1963 noted the following reasons for this
sensitivity:
.
'.
.
a. T~i':-'earch ill th~ maliipulation of human behavior is con- .
sidel'ed bv mo.:, ~'. :ldhorities in medicine and related fields
to be 'profession:tily unethical, therefore the'reputation of
professional participants in the ~IKlJLTRA.PI'Qgramare on
.
.
occasion in jeopardy.
b. Some :MKULTRA activities raise questions of iege.1ity ,
.
implicit -in the original charter.
. c. .A. finalphase of the testing of l\fKULTRA products
places the ri,g-hts and inte,rests of U.S. citi7.(·n~ in jeopardy.
, d. Publk disclosure of some aspects of ~fKULTRA activity could induce seriol1~ ad,~erse reaction in U.S..·public
opinion. as well as stimulate offensi\·e and defensive action
in this field on the part of. foreign intelligence services. 13
O\~er tIle ten~:rear life of the proO'ram. many "additional avenues to
the contrOl of human beha"ior" ,~re designated as appropriate for
investig-ation under thel'fKULTRA charter. Thpse include "rRdiation.
electroshock, various fields ofps'ycholoJtY~' psychiatry, sociology. and
ant~rop()lo~·~$trapholog-y,ha.rnssment,
substances,and 'paramilitary
nc.., ces and materials." a
' ."
'.'
.
. The res('arch and development of mateHalsto be used tor altering .
. human be,haYior consisted of' threenhases: first; the search forma. teri~ls suitable-. for shid,,: second. laboratory,testing- on'lolnnt.arv
humfu:, snhieds in varions types of in~titntions;third, the a.pplication
of ?tfKULTRA materials in nonnallife. settin1!S. .
. .
. The S('arc.h" for suitable matE--rials was conducted through standing
,nrrn~!!pm('nts \vith' snE>Cinlists in unh'ersities, phn.nnaceuticnl houses,
. hospltn.1~~ state ,and federal institutions, and priyate research organi·
u~rE'mornnd\1m from ADDP Hplms to DCI DulleS, 4/3/53. Tab A, pp.1-2.
: I.G. Report on ){KULTRA,l983, pp.1-2.
. "
.
'
,
[bU, p. 4.
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391

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zations. The annual grants of funds to these specialists were made
undfr ostensible l'€'search foundation auspic{!6, t.hereby concea.ling tho
CIA's interest from the sppciali~t's institution.
The next pha..c;e of the :MK1TLTRA program involved physicians,
toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general
hospitals, and in prisons. Utilizing the products and findings of the
basIc researc.h phase, they conducted intensive tests on human subjects.
, One of the first studies was conducted by the National Institute of
:Uental Health. This study WllS intendPd to test various dn1lIs. incll1d~ng hallucinogenics. llt the NIMH Addiction Research Center in LexIngton, Kentucky. The "Lexin~ton Rehabilitation Center," as it. was
t~en ~alled, was a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for dnlg
nolatIOns.
The test subiects were \'olunteer prisoners who, nfter taking a brief
physiral examination and signing a genera 1consent form, were administered hallucinogenic drugs. As a reward for participation in the
prog'ram~ t he addicts were provided with the drul! of their addiction.
LSD was one of the materials testcd in the ~iKULTRA program.
The final phase. of LSD testing im'olved surreptitious administration
to unwitting nonvolllnteer subjeCts in nonnal'life settings by undercover officers of the Bureau of Narc.otics acting for the CIA.
The rationale for such testing was "that tE-sting of materials under
accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full patt.ern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations." 15
Aecordina to the. CIA, the ach'antage of the relationship with the.
Bureau was that
test subjects could be sOught and culti\'ated within the setting
of narcotics control. Some subiects have been informers or
members of suspect criminal elements from whom the [Bureau of .Narcot.icsl has obtained rE'Sl1}tR of onprational "alne
through the tests. On the other hand, the effeCUl)eneSS of the
substances on indhofduals G.t all social levels, high arnd low,
na.tivP- American and l(Yreign, is of great s(qnificance and
testi71,q has been performed on a 'l.·artety Qj individual8 within
these ca.teg07ies. [Emphnsis added.] 18
A special procedure. dpsilmnted ~{l{DELTA. was es~nblished to
gm'ern t.he use of l\IKULTRA materials abroMl. Sl1f'h mnterials were
used on a number of occasions. Because ~IKULTRA records were
dr#rovp.n. it is imnossible· to reconstnlet the operational use of
~n{ULTRA materials by the "CIA overseas; it has been dctermined
that the use of thesc II~n.terials abroad began in 1953, and possibly as
earlv as 1950.·
' . . . .
Di·uS!"S were nsen primarily as an aid to interrogations. but
~IKULTRA.;:\IKDEr..TAmaterials were also used for harassment,
discreditinp:. or disabling- pnrposes. According to an Inspector General
Sttrvev of the Technical Services Division of the CIA. in 1957-nn
inspect.ion which did not discover the ~n\:t.JLTRA nroject inyolving
the surreptit.ious administration of LSD t~ unwitting, nonvohmteer
J5

'. .

,.

Ja

Ibid. p. 21.

Ibid:-. pp. 11':'12•

72
392
subjects-the CIA had developed six drugs for 'operational use and
they had been used in six differentoperations on a total of thirty-three
subjects. 17 By 1963 the humber of operations and subjects had increased substantially.
In the spring of 1963, during a wide-ranging Inspector General
survey of the Technical Services Division, a. member of the Inspector
General's staff, John Vance, learned about ~fKULTRA a,nd about
the project involving the surreptitious "administration of LSD to unwitting, nonvoluntary hwnan subjects. As a result of the discovery
and the InsJ2ector General's subsequent report, this testing was halted
and much tIghter administrative controls were imposed on the program. According to the CIA, the project was decreased significantly
each budget year until its complete termination in the late 19605.
5. The Te8iing 01 LSD by the Army
There were three major phases in the Army!s testing of LSD. In the
first, LSD was administered to more than 1,000 AmeriC<'ln soldiers who
volunteered to be subjects in chemical warfare experiments. In the
second phase, ~raterial Testin¥ Progr9..ffi EA 1729, 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical expenments designed to evaluate potential
intelligence uses of the dnlg. In the third phase, Projects THIRD
CHAXCE and DERBY HAT, 16 unwitting nonvolunteer subjects
were interrogated after receiving LSD as part of operational field
tests.

-"•

B. CIA

.

.

DRC"G TESTING PROGRAMS

1. The Rationale for the Te8ting Program8
The late 19405 and· early 19505 were marked by concern over

the threat posed by the activities of the Soviet Union, the People's
Republic of China, and other Communist bloc countries. United States
concern over the use of chemical and biological agents by these powers
was acute. The belief that hostih... nowers had used chemical and biological agents in interrogations, brainwashing, and in attacks designed
to harass, disable, or km Allied ~rsonnel created considerable pressure for a "defensive" program to investigate chemical and biological
agents so that the intelligence {'.ommunity could understand the mechanisms by which these substan~ worked and how their effects could
be defeated. 18
Of particular concern was the drug LSD. The CIA had r~ived
reports that.the Soviet Union was engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD; and that the Soviet Union liaa attempted to purchase the
world's supply of the chemical. As one CIA. officer who was deeply
involved in work with this drug described the climate of the times:
"[It] is awfully hard in this day and age to reproduce how frightening
all of this was to us at the time, particularly after the drug scene has
become as widespread and as knowledgeable in this count-~j' as it did.
But we were literally terrified, because this was the oue material that we
Ibid, 1957, p. 201. -:
':
..
.
Thus
offiCer In'the O1ftce ot security ot the OIA stress£"d the "urgency ot
the discot'ery ot techniques nnd method that would permit our personnel, in the
. event ot their C4pture vy the enemy, to resist or deteat enemy iIiterrogation."
IT

11

""

an

(~l1nutes ot

..

the ARTICHOKE conference ot 10/22/53.)

.

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73
393

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had ever been able t.o locate that. rea.lly had potential fantastic possibilities if used wrongly." 19
. But the defensive orientation soon became secondary. Chemical and
biological agents were to be studied in order "to perfect techniques .••
for the abstraction of information from individuals whether willing or
not" and in order to "develop means for the control of the activities and
mental capacities of individuals whether willing or not." 20 'One
Agency official noted that drugs would be useful in order to "gain control of bodies whether they were ,villing or not" in the process of removing personnel from Europe in the event of a Soviet attack. 21 In
other programs, the CIA began to develop, produce, stockpile, and
maintain in operational readiness materials which could be used to
harass, disable, or kill specific targets. 22
Reports of research and development in the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the Communist Bloc countries provided
the basis for the transmutation of American programs from a defensive to an C'ffensive orientation. As the Chief of the :Medical Staff of
the Central Intelligence Agency wrote in 1952 :
There is ample evidence in the reports of mnumerable interrogations that the Communists were utilizing drugs, physical
duress, electric shock, and possibly hypnosis against their enemies. 'Vithsuch evidence it is difficult not to keep from becoming rabid about our apparent laxity. 'Ve are forced by this
mountmg evidence to assume a more aggressive role in the
development of these techniques, but must be cautious to
maintain strict inviolable control because of the havoc that.
could be wrought by such techniques in unscrupulous hands. 23
In'order to meet the perceived threat to the national security, substantial programs fo: the testing and use of chemical and biological
agents-including projects involving the surreptitious administration of I~D to unwitting nonvolunteer subjects "at all social levels,
high and low, native American and foreigll"-were conceived, and
implemented. These programs resulted in substantial viola.tions of the
rights of indi vidual:; within the United States•
Testimony of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 33.
Memorandum from. the DIrector ot Security' to ARTICHOKE representati"es, Subject: "ARTICHOKE Restatement ot Program."
n ARTICHOKE memorandum, 7/30/53.
II The Inspector General's Report of 1951 on the Technical Ser"ices DIvIsion
noted that "Six specific products have been developed and are a\'allable for operational use. Three ot them are discrediting and disabliug materIals which can be
admInistered unwittingly and permit the exercise ot a measure ot control over the
actions of the subject."
"
.
A memorandum, for the Chief, TSD, Biological Branch to the Chief, TSD,
10/18/61, descrIbed two ot the objectives of the CIA's Project ::\IIOiAO::\II as:
"to stockpile severely Incapacitating and lethal materials ter tbe specific use of
TSD" and "to maintain in operational readiness special and unique Items for
the dissemination of biologIcal and chemical materals,"
.
II Memorandum fr;om the Ch~ef' of the Medical Statr. 1/25/52.
III

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394
Although the CIA recognized these effects of LSD to unwitting individuals ~vithin the United States, the project continued. 2 • ·A~ the
Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, wrote the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence during discussions which led to the cessation of unwitting testing:
While t share your uneasiness and distaste for any program which tends to intrude upon an individual's private
and legal :prerogatives, I believe it is necessary that the
Agency maIntain a central role in this activity, keep current
on enemy capabilities the manipulation of human behavior,
a~d maintain an offensive capability.lIs
..
There were no attempts to secure approval for the most controversial
aspects of these programs from the executive branch or Congress.
The nature llnd extent of the programs were closely held secrets; even
DCI :McCone was not briefed on all the details of the program involving the surreptitious administration of LSD until 1!>63. It was
deemed imperative that these programs be concealed from the American people. As the CIA's Inspector General wrote in 1957:
Precautions must be taken not only to protect operations
from exposure to enemy forces but also to conceal these activities from the American public in general. The knowledge
that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activities
would have serious repercussions in political and diplomatic
circles and would be detrimental to the accomplishment
of its mission. 26
f. The Death 01 Dr. Frank Olson
The most tragic result of the testing of LSD by the CIA was the
death of Dr. Frank Olson, a civilian employee of the Army, who died.
on November 27, 1953. His death followed his participation in a CIA
experiment with LSD. As part of this experiment, Olson unwittingly
received approximately 70 micrograms of LSD in a glass of Cointreau
he drank on November 10, 1953. The drug had been placed in the bottle
by a CIA officer, Dr. Robert Lashbrook, as part of an experiment
he nnd Dr. Sidney Gottlieb performed at a meeting of Army and
CIA. scientists.
Shortly after this experiment, Olson exhibited symptoms of paranoia and schizophrenia. Accompanied by Dr. Lashbrook, Olson sought
psychintric assistance in New York City from a physician, Dr. Harold
Abramson. whose research on LSD had been funded indirectly by
the CIA. lVhilein New York for 'treatment, Olson fell to his death
from a tenth.st0rY window in the Statler Hotel.

.
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• '14 Even.;.durfng the: discussions which led to the termination ot the unwitting
testing, .the DDP turned down the option ofhRltlng such tests within the U.S.
and continuing th£>m abroad despite the tact that the TechnIcal Services DIv!. slon had conducted numerous operations abroad making use of J,.SD. The DDP
made this decision· on the basis ot security noUng that the past etrorts overseas·
had resulted In "maklng an inordinate number of foreign nationals wltUng of
our rol¢,"ln the very sensitive acU\,fty."(MerilornnduDl for the Deputy Director
of Cenfral Intellfgence trom the Deputy Director tor Plans, 12/17/63, p. 2.)
~.;

-lbid;,pp.2-3.
.
• I.G. survey ot TSD, 1957, p. 211.

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a.. Background.-Olson, an expert in aerobiolog)' who was assigned
to the Special Operations Division (SOD) of the U.S. Army Biologic~l Center at, Camp Detrick, Maryland. This Division had three
prImary functIons:'.
.
(1) assessing the vulnerability of American installations
to biological attack;
(2) developing techniques for offensive use of biological
weapons; and
(3) biological research for the CI...-\...21'
Professionally, Olson was well respected by his colleagues in both
the Anny and the CIA. Colonel Vincent Ruwet, Olson~s immediate
superior at the time of his death, was in almost daily contact with
Olson. According to Colonel R~ wet: "As a professional man ... his
ability . . . was outstanding." 28 Colonel Ruwet stated that "during
the period prior to the experiment . . . I noticed nothing 'whicn
would lead me to believe that he was of unsound mind." 29 Dr. Lash..
brook, ,vho had monthl)' contacts with Olson from early 1952 until
the time of his death, stated publicly that before Olson received LSD, '
"as far as I know, he was perfectly normal." 30 This assessment is in
direct contradiction to certain statements evaluating Olson's emotional stability :made in CIA internal memoranda written after
Olson's death.
'
b. The Experiment.-On ~o\~ember 18, 1953, a group of ten scientists ,from the CIA and Camp Detrick attended a semi-annual review
and analysis conference at a cabin located at Deep Creek Lake, ~Iar)"­
land. Three of the participants were from the CIA's Technical Services Staff. The Detrick representatives ,vere all from the Special
Operations Division.
' .
According to one CIA official, the Special Operations Division
participants "agreed that an unwitting experiment ,vould be
desirable." 31 This account directly contradicts Vincent Rmvet's recollection. Rm",et recalls no'such discussion, and has asserted that he
would l'em~mber any such discussion becau~ the SOD participants
would have strenuously objected to testing on unwitting subjects. 32
In l\fay, 1953, Richard Helms, Assistant DDP; held a stnffmeeting
which the Chief of Technical Services Staff attended. At this meeting
Helms "indicated that the drug [LSD] was dynamite and that he
should be advised at all times when it was intended to use it." 33 In
addition, the then DDP, Frank 'Visner, sent a memorandum to TSS
sta~ing .the requirement that the DDP personally appro,·e the use of
,LSD. ,Gottlieb went ahead with the experiment,at secur~g the ap: Staff 'summary of VIncent Ruwet IntervIew, 8/13/75. p. 3. ", ' .
,,'
Memora,ndu,mof Col. Vil1centRuwet, 'roWbom It May Concern, no date,
p.2. ,.'.' ", -.",'.-, , •
.' ., . :s;. '
,. Ruwet Memorandum, p. 3.
'"
' \\'>, .
.. JosephB. Treaster, New,York Time" 7/19/75;'~p. 1.'
11 :\Iemot,llndpm for the Record from Lyman Kirkpatrick,. 12/1/53, p. 1.
Zl Ruwet,(staft' SUDlmary), 81lSn5; p. 6.
"
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• Inspector General DIarY,12/2/53. '. ,'.' "
'
,
'~Ibid.. Dl'. Gottleillbas testltle11,tbat h.e~~ties not remember either the me'etlng
with Helms nor "the WIsner memo!andum;' (Gottlleb. 10/18/15, p.16.)
,

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396
proval of his immediate supervisor. Neither the Chief of TSS nor
the ppp specifically autho!"~ze4the ,f:x~r.i~ent in which Dr. Olson
partlcIpated. as
According to Gottlieb.as a "very small dose" of LSD was placed in
a bottle of Cointreau which was served after dinner on Thursday,
November 19. The drug was placed in the liqueur by Robert Las~­
brook. All but two of the SOD participants received LSD. One dId
not drink; the other had a heart c'ondition. 37 About twenty minutes
after they finished their Cointreau, Gottlieb informed the other participantsthat they had received LSD.
Dr. Gottlieb stated that "up to the time of the experiment," he
observed nothin"g tmusual in Olson~s behavior. 3T Once the experiment
was underway, tiottlieb recalled that "the drug had a definite effect on
the group to the point that they were boisterous and laughing and the.}:
could not continue the meeting or engage in sensible conversation. '
The meeting continued until about 1.: 00 a.m., when the participants
retired for the evening. Gottlieb recalled that Olson, among others,
complained of "wakefulness" during the night. 3s According to Gottlieb
on ,l1'ridav mornine- "aside from some evidence of fatigue,.! observed
nothing unusual in [Olson's] actions, conversation, or general behavior." 39 Ruwet recalls that Olson "appeared to be agitated" at
breakfast, but that he "did not consider this to be abnormal under the
circumstances." 40
c. The Treatment.-The following :Monda,y, November 23~ Olson
was waiting for Ruwet when he came in to work at 7 :30 a.m. For ~he
next two days Olson~s friends and family attempted to reassure hurr
and help him "snap out" of what appeared to be a serious depression.
On Tuesday, Olson again came to Ruwet and, after an hour long co,n-

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.. Dr. Gottueb testified that "gi~en the Information we knew up to this time,
and ,based on a lot of our OVl"Il self·administration, we thought it was a fairly
benign substance In terms ot potential harm." This Is in confiict not only with ~r.
aelms' statement but also with material which had been supplied to the Technical
Ser\'lces Stair. In one long memorandum on current research with LSD which
was supplled to TSD, HenrY Beecher described the dangers Invol~ed with such
research in a prophetic manner. "The second reason to doubt Professor Rothland
came when I raised the ,question as to any accidents which had arisen from
the use of LSD-25. He said in a very positive way, 'none.' As it turned out
this answer could be called overly pOSitive, for later on In the e~ening 1" was
discussing the matter with Dr. W. A. Stohl" Jr., a psychiatrist hi Bleulera's
Cllnlc In Zurich where I had gone at Rothland's insistence. Stohl, when asked
the same question, replied, 'yes,' and added spontaneously" 'there is a case
Professor Rothland knows about. In Geneva a woman physician who bad been
subject to 'd,epresslon to BOme extent took LSD-25 'In an experiment and became
severely arid suddenly depressed and committed suicide three weeks later.
While the connection Is not definite, common knowledge of this could hardly
have allowed the posltivestatement Rothland permitted himself. This easels
a warning to us to avoid engaglng,subjecl:.$ ",-ho are depressed, orwhoba\'e been
subject to depression;''' Dr. Gottlleb testified th'at he had no'recollection ot
either the report or that particular section of it. (Sidney Gottlieb testimony,
10/19/75, p.78.)
"
'.'
":\Iemorandum of Sheffield Edwards for the record, 11/28/53, .p. ,2.
n Lashbrook (statf summary), 7/19/75, p.3;
,
17& Gotttleb Memorandum, 12/7/53. p. 2.
III Edwards memorandum, 11/28/53, p.3.
, • Gottlieb memorandum, 12/7/53, p.3.
to Ruwet memorandum, p. S.

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versation, it was decided th3.t, medical assistance for Dr. Olson was
de.si rable. <11
Ruwet then called Lashbrook and infonned him that "Dr. Olson
was in serious trouble and needed immediate professional attention."<l2
Lashbrook agreed to make appropriate arrangements and told Ruwet
to bring Olson to Washington, D.C. Ruwet and Olson proceeded to
Washington to meet with Lashbrook, and the three left for New York
at about 2: 30 p.m. to meet with Dr. Harold Abramson.
At that time Dr. Abramson was an allergist and ill'l111unologist
practicing medicine in New York City. He held no degree in pS>'cniatry, but wa.c::. associated with research projects supported indIrectly
by the CIA. Gottlieb and Dr. Lashbrook both followed his work closely
in the early 19505. 43 Since Olson needed medical help, they turned to
Dr. Ab~amson as the doctor closest to 1Vashingtol1 who was experienced with LSD and cleared by the CIA.
Ruwet. Lashbrook, and Olson remained in New York for two days of
consultations with Abramson. On Thursday, November 26, 1953, the
three flew ba~k to 'Vashin~ton so that Olson could spend Thanksgiving
with his family. En route from the airport Obon told Ruwet that he
was e.fcaid to face his family. After a lengthy discussion. it was decided that Oison and Lashbrook would return to New York, Rl1d t.hat
Ruwet would go to Frederick to explain these events to )I~. Olson.<I<I
Lashbrook and Olson flew back to New York. the ::lame dny,ag-ain
for consultations with Abramson. They spent Thursday night m a
Long Island hotel and the next morning returned to the city with
Abramson. In further discussions with Abram~on, it was agreed
that Olson should be placed under regular psychiatric care at an
institution closer to his home. <I~
d. The Death;-Because they could not obtain air tra,nsportat.ion for
a return trip on Friday night, Lashbrook and Olson made reservations
for Saturday morning and checked inlo the Statler Hotel. Between
the time they checked °in and 10 :00 p.m.; they watched television,
visited the cocktail lounge, where each had two martinis, and dinner.
According to Lashbrook, Olson "was cheerful and appeared to enjoy
the entertainment." He "appeared no longer particulary depressed,
and almost the Dr. Olson I knew prior to the experiment." <1&
After dinner La~hbrook and Olson watched television for about
an hour, and at 11 :00, Olson suggested that they go to bed, saying that
"he ~elt more relaxed °and contented th3,n ·he had since [they] came
to New York." 41 Olsdn then left a call ldth the hotel operator to wake
them in the morning. At approximately 2 :30 a~m~ Satu,rday, Novemher 28, Lashbrook was awakened by a. loucl "crash of glass." In his
report on theincident, he stated only that Olson "had crashed through
the closed window blind and the cloSed °window and- he fell to his death
from the window of our room on the 10th floor." <1&
O

'I Ibid.,

pAy

0

0

Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p. 1.
.. Statr summary of Dr, Harold Abramson interview, 7/29/75, p. 2.
"Lashbrook memorandum, 12/7/53, p.3.
0
.. Abramson memorandum. 12/4/53.
.. Lashbrook memorandum,012/7/53, p. 3.
u

n Ibid., p. 4.
"Il?id.
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398
Immediately after finding that Olson had leapt to 'his death, Lashbrook telephoned Gottlieb at his home and informed him of the incident. 4D Gottlieb called Ruwet and informed him of Olson 1s death
at approximately 2 :45 a.m. 50 Lashbrook then called the hotel desk
and reported the incident to the operator there. 'Lashbrook called
Abramson and infonned him of the occurrence. Abramson told Lashbrook he "wanted to be kept out of the thing completely," but later
changed his mind and a~reed to assist Lashbrook. 51
Shortly thereafter, umformed police officers and s0IIl;e hotel. e~­
ployees came to Lashbrook!s room. Lashbrook told the pollee he dIdn t
know why Olson had corrunitted suicide, but he did luiO\v that Olson
"suffered from ulcers." 52
e. The Aftermath.-Followinb Dr. Olson's death, the CIA made
a substantial effort to ensure that his family received death benefits,
but did not notify the Olsons of the circumstances surrounding his
demise. The .Agency also made considerable efforts to prevent the
death being connected with the CIA, and supplied complete cover for
Lashbrook so that his association with the CIA would remain a secret.
After Dr. Olson's death the CIA conducted an internal investigation of the incident. As part of his responsibilities in this in\-estigation, the General Couns~l wrote the Inspector General, stating:
I'm not happy with what seems to be a very casual attitude
on the part of TSS representatives to the way this experiment was conducted and the remarks that this is just one of
the risks running with scientific experimentation. I do not
eliminate the need for taking risks, but I do believe, especially when human health or life is at stake, that at least the
prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable
negligence. The actions of the various individuals concerned
d
after effects of the experiment on Dr. Olson became manifest
also revealed the· failure to observe normal and reasonable
precautions. 53
. ;"'::.: As a result of the investi~tion DCI Allen Dulles sent a personal
1etter to the Chief of Technical Onerations of the Technical Services
'Staff who had approved the exp"eriment criticizing him for "poor
.judgment ... in authorizing the use of this drug on such an unwittinl?:
,pbnsis and without p:oximn~e medical safeg~lards.~' ~-& .Dulles also sent
'::fia letter to Dr. GottlIeb, Chlef of the ChemIcal DIVISIon of the Tech'. ·di'lcal Services Staff, cri.tici~ing him for recommending the "unwitting
'". ~pplication of the drug" in that the proposal "did not give suffic.ient
emphasis for medical collaboration and tor the proper consideration
.':;:'of the righ.ts of the individual to whom it 'was being-administered." 55

•

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.;, ';.7 .. CIA Field Office Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
.'

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Ruwet )Iemorandum, p. 11.

'- ... ' ·...:.,,11 CIA Field Office·Report, 12/3/53, p. 3.
'.'

>._~i.~~;:~~o~andum
from t~e General Counsel to t.he•
·..;."'·.tor
.
Gener~i, 1/4/54.
Memorandum from DCI to Chief, Te<'hnical
tlons. '.DSS, 2/12/54.
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The lett.ers were hand carried to the individuals to be read and
returned. Although the letters were critical, a note from the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence to ~fr. Helms instructed him to in.form the individuals that: ·'These are not reprimands and no personnel file notation are being made." S8
Thus, although the Rockefeller Commission has characterized them
as such, these notes 'Were explicitly not reprimands. Nor did participation in the events which led to Dr. Olson's death have any apparent
effect on the advancement within the CIA of the individuals iln-olved.
3. The SurreptitiQu8 Administration of LSD to Unwitting NonVolunteer Human Subjects by the OIA After the Death of Dr.
Olson
The death of Dr. Olson could be viewed, as some argued at the time,
as a tragic accident, one of the risks inherent in the testing of new substances. It might be argued. that LSD was thought to be beni~.
After the death of Dr. Olson the dangers of the surreptitious admmistration of LSD were clear, yet the CIA continued or initiated Sl a
project involving the sUl'l'eptitious administration of LSD to nonyolunteer human subjects. This program exposed numerous individuals
in the United States to the risk of death or serious injury without their
informed consent, without medical supervision, and without necessary
follow-up to determine any long-term effects. .
.
Prior to the Olson experiment, the Direc~Gr of Central IntelligenCd
had approved MKULTRA, a research program designed to develop
a "capability in the covert use of biological and chemical agent
matenals." In the proposal describing ~lKULTRA :Mr. Helms, then
ADDP, wrote the Directorthat:
'We intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state,
the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted
for each individual. This material ·could potentially aid in
discrediting individuals, eliciting information, and lmplanting suggestions and other f?rms of mental control."
On February 12, 1954, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency wrote TSS officials .;riticizing them for "poor judgment" in
adminIstering LSD on "an unwitting basis and without proximate
medical saf~ards" to Dr. Olson and for the lack of "proper consideration of the rights of the indhridual to whom it was bemg administered." S9 On the same day, the Inspector General reviewed a report
on Subproject NUlnber 3 of lllCULTRA, in which the same TSS
officers. wh<? had just received letters from the Director 'were quoted
as st.atmg that one of the purposes of Subproject N ~ber 3 was to
Xote from DDCHo Richard Helms, 2/13/54.
.
The 1963 IGReport, which described the project involving the surreptitious
administration. of LSD, placed the project beginning In 1955. Other CIA documents reveal that it was In existence I1S early as February 1954. ,The CrA ha~
told the Committee that the project began in 1953 and that the e~riment which
led to Dr. Olson's death was part ot the project. .
.,.
,
.
.. ~Iemorandum from A'DDP items to DOl Dalles. 4/3/53, tab A, p.2.
.. :Memorandum from DcI to Sidney Gottlieb, 2/12/54; and memorandum from .
DCI to Chief ot·Operations, TSS, 2/12/54.
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400

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"observe the behavior of unwitting persons being questioned after
having been given a drug." eo There is no evidence that Subproject
Number 3 was terminated even tl10ugh these officers were uneqUIvocally aware of the dangers of the surreptitious administration of LSD
and the necessity of obtaining informed consent and providing medical
safeguards. Subproject Number 3, in fact, used methods which showed
even less concern than did the OLSON experiment for the safety and
security of the participants. Yet the evidence indicates the project
continued until 1963.61
In the project, the individual conducting the test might make
initial contact with a prospecti ve subject selected at random in a bar.
lIe wouid then invite the person to a "safehouse" where the test drug
was administered to the subject through drink or in food. CIA personnel might debrief the indindual conducting the test, or observe
the test by using a on:;-way mirror and tape recorder in an adjoining
room.
Prior consent wa~ obviously not obtained from any of the subjects.
There was also, obviously, no medical prescl'eening. In addition, the
t~ts were conducted by indh~duals who were not qualified scientific
obsen--ers. There were no medical personnel on hand eit.her to administer the drugs or to 'Observe their effects, and no follow-up was conducted on the test subjects.
As the Inspector General noted in 1963 :
A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is
the infeasibility of performing scienti.fic observation of results. The [indnriduals oonducting the test] are not qualified
scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of th~ test. The testing may be useful in
perfectin~ delivery techniques, and in identifying surface
characterlstics of onset, reaction, attribution, and side-effect. 62
This was particularly trouble.c;;ome as in a
number of instances~ ... the. test subject. has become ill for
hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case,
and the agent could only follow up by guarded inquiry
after tthe test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness
and attendant economic loss are inherent ~ontingent effects
of the testing. 63
Paradoxically, greater care seems to have been taken for the safety
of foreigIl nationals against whom LSD was used ahroad. In several
cases medical examinations were performed prior to the use of LSD.a.

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.. Memorandum to Inspector General from Chief, Inspection and Review, on
Subproject #3 of MKULTRA, 2/10/54.
II. IG Report on MKULTRA, 1963a Ibid., p. 12.
.
tIIIbi~. According to the IG's survey In 1963, physicians assocIated with
MKULTRA could be made available In an emergency.
H The Technice,l services Division which was responsible for the operational
use of LSD abroad took the position that "no physical examination ot the subject
Is required prior to administration of "[LSD] by TSS traJ~ed personnel. A physl-

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~foreover,

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the administration 8.Jbroad was marked by constant observation made possible because the material was heing used. Re0'8.inst
prisoners of foreign intelligence or security organizations. Finally,
during certain of the LSD interrogations abroad, local physicians
wero on call, though these physicianshad h"ad no experience with LSD
and would not 00 told that hallucinogens h;d ooen administered. 6s
. The CIA's project involving the surrept1:tOUS administration of
LSD to unwitting human subjects in the United States was finally
halted in 1963, as a result of its discovery during the course of an
Inspootor General suryey of the Technical Sen":ices Division. 'Vhen
the Inspector General learned of the project, he spoke to the Deputy
Director for Plans, who agreed that the Director should be briefed.
The DDP made it clear that the DCI and his Deputy were generally
familiar w.it.h MKULTR.\. He indicated, however, that he. was not
sure it was necessary to brief the DDCI at that point.
On l\fllY 24,1963, the DDP advised the Inspector General that he had
briefed the Director on the ~IKULTRA program and in particular
had coV'~reJ the question of the surreptitious administration of LSD
to unwitting humull subjects. According to the Inspector General, the
DDP said that Hthe Diredor indiC'.ated no disagreement and therefore
the 'testing' will continue." lIIJ
One copy of an UEyes Only" draft report on MKULTRA was
prepared by the Inspector General who recommended the termination
of the ~un'eptit'ious administration project. The p':vject was suspended
follOWIng the Ins~ctor ilinernPs report.
On December 17, 1963, Deput)' Director for Plans Helms wrote a
memo to the nDct who with the Inspector General and the Executive
Director-Comptroller had opposed the covert testing. He noted two
Bl;PCCts of the problem: (1) 1'101' over a decade the Clandestine Services hIlS had the mission of maintaining a capabiHty for influencing
human behavior;" and (2) Utesting arrangements in furtherance of
this mission l\hould be as operationally realistic and yet as controllable
as possible." Helms argued t.hat the mdividuals must be Uunwitting"
as this was Uthe only realistic method of maintainin~ the capability,
considering the intended operational use of materIals to influence
human behavior as the operational targets will certainly be unwitting.
Should the subjects of the testing not 00 unwitting, the progrom would
only 00 "pro forma." resulting in u. ufalse sense of accomplishment and
readiness." If Helms oontinum:
clan 1If'f'd not be present. Tbtte II no danger medically In the use ot this material

_It beacHed by TSS tl'31ned ~nonneL" The OftIce or ~Iedlcal ServIces had taken
the posltlon that LSD .".8 "medIcaUy dangerous. Both the Omce of Security
and the omee of Medical Services arcued that LSD "sbonld not be administered
1t

unless preced~ b)' • mecUcsl t'GmllUldon ••• and .hould be o.dmlnlstered only
lJ,)· or In tbe PrHene'e of a pb,f5lcll.D who bad studied it. and Its efrect." U1emo--

randum from J'amflft Ancletoa, Chief. CounterlntelUgence Sto.tr to Chief ot Operatlonl, 12/12/51. pp. 1-2Q Ph,tddaM might be called with the bope that they would make a diagnosIs
of mental breakdown wbleb would be useful in dlsttedlting tbe lndlv!duo.l who
,,·u thE' subjeoct of the CIA interest.
• 11emorandum. tor the Ra.'Ord prepared bl the Inspector General. 5/15/63, p. 1.
., /bIL. P. 2.

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If one grants the validity of the mission of maintaining this
unusual capability and the necessity for unwitting testing,
there is only then the question of how best to do it. Obviously,
the testing should be conducted in such a manner as to permit
the opportunity to observe the results of the administration
on the target. It also goes without saying that what(lver testing arrangement we adopt must afford maximum safeguards
for the protection of the A~ency's role in this activIt yo, <.\5
well as minimizing the possIbility of physical or emotIOnal
damage ,,0 the individual tested. 68
In another memo to the Director of Central Intelligence in June,
1964-, Helms again raised the issue of unwitting testing. At ~hat time
General Carter, then acting DCI, approved several changes in the
~IKULTRA program proposed by Mr. Helms as a result of negotiations between the Inspector General and the DDP. In a handwritten
note, however, Director Carter added that "unwit.ting testing will be
subject to a separate decision." 69
No specific decision was made then or soon after. The testing had
been halted and, according to \-Valter Elder, Executive Assistant to
DCI ~IcCone, the DCI was not inclined to take the positive step of
authorizing a resumption of the testing. At least through the summer,
the DDP did not press the issue. On November 9, 1964, the DDP,
raised the issue again in a memo to the DCI, calling the Director's
attention to what he described as "several other indications during
the past year of an appar~.nt Soviet aggressiveness in the field of
covertly administered chemicals which are, to say the least, inexplicable and disturbing." TO
.
Helms noted that because of the suspension of covert testing, the
Agency's "positive operational capability to use drugs is diminishing,
owing to a lack of realistic testing. '\Vith increasing knovdedge of the
state of the art, we are less capable of staying up with Soviet adyances
in this field. This in turn results in a lmninl! capability on our part
to restrain others in the intelligence community (such as the Department of Defense) from pursuing operations in this area." 11
. IIelms attributed the cessation of the unwitting testing to the high
risk of embarrassment to the Agency as well as the "moral problem."
He noted that no better covert situation had been devised than that
which had been· used, and that ~'wehave no answer to the moral
issue." 72
Helms asked for either resumption of the testing project or its definitive cancpllation. He argued tha.t the status quo of a research and developnlent program without a realistic testing program was causing
the Al!encv to live "with the illusion of a capability which is becoming
minimal aild furtherm.ore is expensive." 73 Once again no formal action
,vas taken in response to the Helms' request.
0

)femorandum from DDP Helms to DODOI Carter, 12/11/63.
)Iemorandtim trom DDP Helms to DCI, 6/9/64, p. 3.
~ Ibid., 11/9/64, p. 1.
.
n Ibid., pp. 1-2.

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Ibid., p. 2.
Ibid.

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83
403

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From its beginning in the early 1950's nntil its termination in 1963,
the program of surreptitious administration of LSD to unwitting non~
volunteer human subjects demonstrates a failure of the CIA's leadership to pay adequate attention to the rights of individuals and to provide effective guidance to CIA employees. Though it was known that
the testing was dangerous: the lives of subjects were placed in jeopardy and their rights were ignored during the ten years of tl~sting
which followed Dr. Olson's death. Although it was clear that the laws
of the United States were being violated, the testing continued. 'Vhile
the individuals involved in the Olson experiment were admonished
by the Director, at the same time they \vere also told that they were
not being reprimanded and that their "bad judgment" would not be
made part of their personnel records. When the covert testing project
WP.s terminated in 1963, none of the individuals involved were subject
to ~ny dl!"'ciplinary action.
4.. 11fonitoring and Oontrol of the Testing and Use
Chemical and
Biological Agents by the 01A
The Select Committee found numerous failures in the monitoring
and control of the testing and use of chemical and 'biological agents
within the CIA.H An analvsis of the failures can be divided into four
sections: (a) the \taiver c~f nor'.nal regulation~ or requirements; (b)
t.he problems in authorization procedures; (c) the failure of internal
review mechanisms such as the Office of General Counsel, the Inspector
General, s,md the Audit Staff ~ and (d) the effect of compartmentation
and competition within the CIA.
a. The Waive?' of Administrative Oontrols.-The internal centrols
within any agency rest on': (1) clear and coherent regulations; (2)
clear lin!:.., of authority j and (3) clear rewards for those who conduct
themseli;es in accord with agency regulations and understandable llnd
immediate sanctions aga.inst those who do not. In the case of the testing and use of chemical and biolol1'ical llgents, normal CIA administrative controls were waived. The destruction of the documents on the
largest CIA program in this area constituted a prominent example of
the waiver of normal Agency procedures by the Director.
These documents were destroyed in early 1973 at the order of then
DCI Richard -Helms. According to Helms, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, then
Director of TSD:
••. came to me and said that he was retiring- and that r was
retiring and he thought it would be a good Idea if these files
were destroyed. And I also believe part of the reason for
our thinking this was advisable was there had been relationships with outsiders in government agencies and other organizations and that these would be sensitive in this kind of a
thing but that since the program was over and finished and
done with, we thought we would just get rid of the files as

or

u Section 2{9) ot S. Res. 21 instructs the Committee to examIne: the "extent
to whlch Unlted States intelllgence agencies are governed by Executive Order3,
rules, or regulaUons either pubUshtl or secret."

84
404
well, so that anybody who assisted us in the past would not
be subject to follow-up or questions, embarrassment,: if you

will 7S

The destruction was based on a waiver of an internal CIA regulation, CSI 70-10, which regulated the "retirement of inactive records."
As Thomas Karamessines, then De!>uty Director of Plans, wrote in
regulation C8I-70-10: "Retirement is not a matter of convenience 'or
of storage but of con:5cious judgment in the 'appli('.ation of the rules
modified by knowledge of individual component needs. The heart of
this judgment is to ensure that the complete sto~7 can be reconstructed
in later years and by people who may be unfamilIar with the events." 16
The destruction of the :MKULTRA documents made it impossible
for the Select Committee to determine the full ran~e and extent of the
largest CIA research program involving chemlcal and biological
agents. The destruction also prevented the CIA from locating and proVIding medical assistance to the individuals who were subjects in the
program. Finally, it prevented the Committee from determining the
full eAt-ent of the operations which made use of materials developed in
the 11KULTRA program. 17
From the inception of )fl{ULTRA normal Agency procedures were
waived. In 1953, .Mr. Helms, then Assistant Deputy Director for Plans,
proposed the establishment of i\IKULTRA. 'Under the proposal six
percent of the research and development budget of TSD would be
expended "without the establishment of formal contractual relations"
~cause contracts would reveal government interest. Helms also voted
that qualified individuals in the field "are most reluctant to enter. into
signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity
since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputs.n Richard Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 5.
.
'Many Agency documents recording confidential relationships with Individuals
and organizations are retained without public disclosure. )Ioreo~er. in the case of
ZllKULTRA the CIA. had spent millions of dollars de~eloping both materials and
deli~ery systems which could be used by the Clandestine Sen-ices; the reconstruction of the research and development program would be difficult if not Impossible, without the documents, and at least one assistant to Dr. Gottlieb protested
against the document' destruction on those grounds,
75 Clandestine Servires Institution
(CSI) 70-10. When asked by the Select
Committee about the regularity of the procedure by which he authorized Dr_
Gottlieb to destroy the MKULTRA records, .Helms responded:
"Well, that's hard to say whether it would be part of the regular proeedl.!re or
not, because the record destruction program is conducted according to a certain
pattern. There's a regular record destruction pattern in the Agency monitored by
certain people and done a certain way. So that anything outside of that, I suppose,
would ha"e been unusual. In other words, there were documents being destroyed
because somebody had raised this specific issue rather. than because they were
encompassed in the ~egular records destruction program. So I think the nuswel'
to your question is prpbably yes." (Helms testimony, 9/11/75, p. 6.)
'1'7 Even prior to the destruction of docum~nts, the ~IKULTRA records w~re tar
from complete. As the Inspector General noted in 1963 :
"F!les are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in eT'aluaU"e statements that might give perspecth'e to management policies o,'er time. A substantial portion of the )IKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the prin,cipaI officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with theIr departures."
(IG Report onlIKULTRA., p. 23.)

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~ions".1S Other Agency procedures, i.e., the forwarding of documents
In support of invoices and the provision for regular audit procedures,

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were also to be waived. On April 13, 1953, then DCI Allen Dulles
approved 1fKULTRA, noting that security considerations precluded
handling the proj.ect th.rou~h usual contractual agreements.
Ten years later lUvestlgatlOns of ~IKULTRA by both the Inspector
General and the Audit Staff noted substantial deficiencies which resulted from the waivers. Because TSD had not reserved the right to
audit the books of contractQrs in l\IKULTRA, the CIA had been
unable to verify the use of Agency grants by a contractor. Another
firm had failed to establish controls and sn.feguards which would assure "proper accountability" in use of government funds with the
result that "funds ha\·e been used for pnrposes not contemplated by
~rants or a;lIowable under usual contract relationship." 19 The ent.ire
~IKULTRA o..rran~ement was condemned for ho..ving a.dministrative
lines which were unclear, overly permissi . .-e co!~trols, and irresponsible supervision.
The head of the Audit Branch noted that inspections and audits:
led us to see )IKULTRA as frequently ha dng provided a
device to escape normal administrative cOl:trols for research
that is not espl'cially sensitive, as having allo',ed practices
that produce gross administrative failures, as having permitted the establishment of special relationships with unreliable organizations on an unacceptable basis, and as having
produced, on at least one oc~asiol1, a.cavalier treatment of a
bona fide cont racting organization.
'Vhile admitting' that there may be a need for fpecial mechanisms
for handling sensitive projects, the Chief of the Audit Branch wrote
that 'fboth the terms of reference and the ground rules for handling
such special projects should be spelled out in ad\rance so that dh-er':'
sion from normal channels does not mean abandonment of Gontrols.
Special procedures may be necessary to ensure the security oI highlS
sensitive operations. To prevent the erosion of normal internal control mechanisms, such waivers should not be extended to less sensit.ive
operations. ~foreon~r, only those re~ulntions which. would endanger
security should be waived; to waive regulations generally would
result in highlv sensitive and controversial projects havin~ looser
rat-her than stricter ndmihistmtive controls. ~fKNAO)II, t.he Fort
"Detl·ick CIA project for research and development of chemical and
biological agents, provides another example where efforts to protect
the security of agency activties overwhelmed administrath·e controls.
.X'o written records of the transfer of agents such as anthrax or shell-"
fish toxin were kept, "beeause of ·the sensitivity of the area and th~'·
desire to keep any possible use of materials like this reoordless." 81 The
Memorandum from ADDP Helms to DCI Dulles, 4/3/53, Tab. A, p. 2.
Memorandum trom IG to Chief, TSD. 11/8/63, as quoted In memorandum
from Chief. Audit Branch.
• The memorandum RUggested that administrative exclusIons, ·because of tbe
Importnnce ot such decIsions. should require the personal approvalot the Deputy
Director of Central Intelllgence on an Indhidual case basis. Pre!ient CIA pollC1
is that onlytbeDCI.can a~thorlze certain exemptions trom regulationS'.
n SIdney Gottlieb testimooy, 10/18/15, Hearings, Vol. I, p. 51.
n

'19

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result was that the Agenc;y had no way of determining what materials were on hand, and could not be certain whether delIvery systems
such as dart guns, or deadlv substances such as cobra venom had been
.
issued to the t i e l d . "
b. Authorization.-The destruction of the documents regarding
MKULTRA made it difficult to determine at what level specific projects in the program were authorized. This problem is not solely a result of the document destruction, however. Even at the height of
~!KULTRA the IG noted that, Rt least with respect to the surreptitious administration of LSD, the "present practice is to maintain no
records of the planning and approval of test programs.~' 82
\Vhile it is clear that Allen Dulles authoriZed .\!Ku"LTRA, the record is unclear as to who authorized sl?ecific projects such as that involving the surreptitious administratlOn of LSD to ~nwitting nonvolunteer hwnan subjects. Even given the sensitive and controversial
nature of the project, there is no evidence that when J olm ~IcCone
replaced. Allen Dulles as the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency he was briefed on the details of this project and asked whether
it should be continued. 53 Even during the 1963 discussions on the propriety of unwitting testing, the DDP questioned. whether it was "necessary to brief General Carter," the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the Director's "alter ago," because CIA officers felt it necessary to keep details of the project restricted to an absolute minimum
number of people.a.
In :May of 1963, DDP Helms told the Inspector General that the
cO\'ert testing program was authorized because he had gone to the
Director, briefed him on it and "the Director indicated no disagreement and therefore the t.esting will continue." 8~ Such authorization
13ven for noncontroversial matters is clearly less desirable than explicit authorization; in areas such as the surreptitious administration
of drugs, it is particularly undesirable. Yet according to testimony
IG Report on ~IKULTRA, 1963. p. 14.
Acco!"ding to an assistant to Dr. GottlIeb. there l\'ere annual briefings ot the
DCI and the DDP on MKULTRA by tbe Cbief of: TSD or bis deputy. However, a
)Iay 15, 1963 :Uemorandum tor the Record trom tht> Inspector General noted that
~Ir. :\IcCone had not been briefed in detail about the yrogram. ~Ir. McCone's Executive Officer, Walter Elder, testified that It was "perte<~tly apparent to me" that
neither :\1r. McCone nor General Carter, then the DDCr, was aware ot the sur·
reptitious admInistration project '·or it they had ·been briefed they had not understood it." (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 13.) Mr. McCone testified that he "did not know"
whether he talked to anyone about the project but that no one had told him about
it in a way that "would ha\"e turned on all the Hghts." (John :\IcCone testimony,

•

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or.

~i3/76,

p. 10.)

.

According to Elder's testimony, "no Deputy Director, to Dlj knOWledge,
has e....er been briefed or ~'as it ever thought necessary to brief them to the extent
to which you would brief the Director."
Q 10 Memorandum tor the Record. ti/15/63.
On the question of authorization ot the covert testing program, Elder testified
as tollows:
"But my reasonable judgment is that this was considered to be in the area of
continuing approval, having once ~n appro,ed by the Director."
The theory ot authorization carrying over from one administration to the next
~eems partlcularly inappropriate for less visible, highly sensitive operations
which. unless brought to his attention by subordinates, would not come to the
attention ot the Director.
H

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407

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before the Committee, authorization through lnck of agreement ·is
even more prevalent in sensitive situations.S6
The unauthorized retention of shellfish toxin by Dr. Nathan Go:rdon
and his subordinates; in violation of a Presidential Directive, may have
resulWd from the failure of the Director to issue written instructIons to
Agency officials. The retention was not authorized by senior officials in
the Agency. The Director, ~fr. Helms, hali instructed ~:Ir. Karamessines, the Dep"lty Director of Plans, and Dr. Gottlieb, the Chief of
Teclmical Services Division, to relinquL~h control to the Army of any
chemical or biological agents being retained for the CIA at Fort Detrick. Dr. Gottlieb passed this instruction on to Dr. Gordon. 'Vhile
orders may be disregarded in any organization, one of the reasons that
Dr. Gordon used to defend the retention was the fact that he had not
receiyed written instructions forbidding it.87
.
In some situations the existence of written instructions did not prevent unautho.rized actions. According to an irivestigation by the CIA's
Inspector General TSD officers had been informed orally tluzt 1.111'.
Helm.s was to be "advi~ed at all times" when LSD was to be used. In
addition TSD had received a memo advising the staff that LSD ,vas
not to be used without the pennission of the DDP, Frank 'Visner. The
experiment invol ving Dr. Olson went ahead without notification of
either 1\1r. l\Tisner or ~fi" .. Helms. The absence of clear and immediate
punishment for that act must undercut the ·force of other internal instructions and regulations.
One last, issue must be raised about authorizat.ion procedures within
the Agency. Chemical agents were used abroad until 1959 for discreditmg or disabling operations, or for the pu:tpose of interrogations
with the approval of the Chief of Operations of the DDP. Later the
approval of the' Deputy Director for Plans was required for such
operations. Although the medics.! staff sought to be/art of the approval process for these. operations, they were exclude because, as the
Inspector General wrote in 1951 :
Operational determinations are' the responsibility of, the
DDjP and it is he who should advise the DCI in these
respects just as it is he who is responsible for the results. It
is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the Chief,
::Medical Staff, (what, in effect, would be authority over dandes~ine operations.) 88
Ghren the expertise and training of physicians, participation of the
1\Iedical Staff might well have been useful.
.
.
Questions about authorization a.lso exist in regard to those agencies
whi~h. assisted. tl~e. CI~. For instance, th~ p,roject involving the surreptItIOuS admImstratlon of LSD to unwIttmg non-volunteer human
subjects was conducted in coordination with the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. There is .some.question as to the Commissioner
of. NarcotICS' knowledge about the proJect.
..
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... ~Ir. Elder was asked whether the pl'OCess of brInging forward·a descrIption of
actions by the Agency in getting approval through the absence ot disagreement
was 11 common one. IJe responded, "It was not uncommon... ". The more sensitive
the project the more likely 'it would lean toward being a common practict', based
on the need to keep the wr'ltten record to a minimum." .
11 Nathan Gordan testimony; 9/16/15, HearIngs, Vol. 1.
-1957 IG Reoort.

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In 1963, the Inspector General noted that the head of the BNDD
had been briefed about the project, but the IG's report did not indicate the level of detail provIded to him. Dr. Gottlieb testified that "I
remember meeting :Mr. Anslinger and had the general feeling that he
was aware." 89 Another CIA officer did not recall any discussion of
testing on un',"7itting subjects when he and Dr. Gottlieb met with Commissioner Anslinger.
In a memorandum for the record in 1967 Dr. Gottlieb stated that
Harry Giordano, who replaced ~Ir. Anslinger, told Dr. Gottlieb that
when he became Commissioner he was "only generally briefed on the
arrangements, gave it his general blessing, and said he didn't want to
know the details." The same memorandum states, however;that there
were several comments which indicated to Dr. Gottlieb that :Mr. Giordano was aware of the substance of the project. It is possible that
the Commissioner provided a general authorlzation for the arrangement without understanding what it entailed or considering its' propriety. A reluctance to seek detailed information from the CIA, and
the CIA's hesitancy to volunteer it, has been found in a nwnber of
instances during the Select Committee's investigations..This problem
is not confined to the executive branch but has also marked congres'
sional relationships with the Agency.
c. Inte1'1U1l Review.-The waiver of regulations and the absence of
documentation make it difficult to determine now who authorized
which activities. :More importantly, they made internal Agency review
mechanisms much less eft'ective.90 Controversial and highly sensitive
projects which should havebeen subject to the most rigorous inspection
lacked effective internal review.
Given the role of the ~neral Counsel and his reaction to the surreptitious administration of LSD to Dr. Olson, it would have seemed
likely that he would be asked about the legality or propriety of any
subsequent projects involving such administration. This was not done.
He did not learn about this testing until the 1970's. Nor was the General Counsel's opinion sought 0]:1 other :MKULTRA projects, though
these had been characterized by the Inspector General in the 1957
Report on TSD as "unethical and illicit." 91
There is no mention in the report of the 1957 Inspector General's
survey of TSD of the project involving the surreptitIouS administration of LSD. That proJect was apparently not brought to the attention
of the survey team. The Inspector who' discovered it during the IG's
1963 survey of TSD recalls coming upon evidence of it inadvertently,
• Gottlieb, 10/18/75, p. 28.
to ,The IG's !."eport on MKULTRA,in 1963 stated:
"The'orJgInal charter documents sraecified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA actl'rities. In so doIng, howe\'er, TSD has pursued a phi·
losophyof minimum documentation in keeping wIth the high sensitil"lty of some
of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record,
including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectf.es contained
little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine
inspection procedures and raised a variety of questions concerning manage·
ment and fiscal controls. II
. ' ,
•. n CIA, l:~ General's report on TSD, 1957, p. ~11.

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409
rather than its having been called to his attention as an especially
sensitive project. 92
. '
Thus both the Geners.! Counsel and the Inspector General, the principal intelnal mechanisms for the control of possibly improper actions,
,,,ere excluded from regular reviews of the project. 'Vhen the project
was discovered the Executive Director-Comptroller voiced strong opposition to it; it is possible that the project would have been terminated in 1957 if it had been called to his attention when he then served
us Inspector General.
The Audit Staff, which also serves an internal review function
through the examination of Agency expenditures, a.}so encountered
substantial difficulty with ~IKULTRA. "\Vhen ~IKULTRA was first
proposed the Audit Staff was to be excluded from any function. This
was soon changed. However, the waiver of normal "contractual procedures" in :\U{:T1LTRA increased the likelihood of '~irregular.ities~'
as wen as the difficulty in detecting them. The head of the Audit
Branch characterized the l\lKULTRA procedUl'cs as "'having allowed
practices that produced gross administrative failures/, including a
lack of controls within outside contractors which would "assure proper
accountability in use of government funds." It also diminished the
CIA~s capacity to verify the accountings provided by outside firms.
d. Oompartmentation and Jurndictional Oonflict Within tke
Agency.-As has been noted, the testing and use of chemical and
biological agents ')"as treated as a highly sensitive activity within the
CIA. This resulted in a hi~h degree of cC'mpartmelltation. At the same
time substantial jurisdictIOnal conflict existed within the A~ency between the Tee-hnical Services Division, and the Office of lrledlCal Ser,,·
ices and the Office of Security.
.
This compartmentation and jurisdictional conflict may well have
led to du:phcation of effort within the CIA and to Agency policymakers bemg deprived of useful information.
.
During the early 1950's first the BLUEBIRD Committee and then
the ARTICHOKE Committee were instituted to bring together representatives of the Agency components which had a legitimate inter~
est in the area of the alteration of human behavior. By 1957 both these
committees had fallen into disuse. No information 'Tent to the Tech·
nical Services Division (a component s~oSedly represented on the
ARTICHOKE Committee) aDout ARTICHOKE operations being
conducted ·by the Office of Security and the Office of Medical Services.
The Technical Services Division whi~h was providing support to the
Clandestine Services in the use of chemical and biological a~ents, but
provided little or no information to either the Office of SecurIty or the
Office of M:edical Services~" As one TSD officer involved in these programs testified: "Although we were acquainted, we certainly dian't
share experiences.~'93
" "Even after the Inspector' came upon it the IG did not perform e. complete
Investigation of it. It was discovered at the end of an e:!:tenslve sUl"V'ey of TSD .
aDd the Inspector was in the process of being transferred to another post within "
the Agency.". .
. . .
'."
.
.
. ft TetitimoDr. of CIA officer, 11/21/75, p. 14.

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90
410
9KHILLTOP, another group designed to coordinate researc,h in
thIS area also had little success. The group met infrequently-onl)
tv; ice a year-a~d little specific information was exchanged.S'
Concern over security obviously played some role in the failure to
share information,95 but this appears not to be the only reason. A TSD
officer stated that the Office of ~ledical Services simply wasn't "particularly interested in what we were doing" and never sought such
information. 96 On the other hand, a representative of the Office of
:Medical Services consistently sought to have medical persoIUlel participate in the use of chemical and biological agents suggested that
TSD did not inform the Office of l\Iedical Services in order to prevent their involvement.
J urisdictionnl conflict was constant in this area. The Office of
Security, which had been assigned responsibility for direction of
ARTICHOKE, consistently sought to bring TSD operations involving psychochemicals under the ARTICHOKE umbrella. The
Office of Medical Services sought to have OMS physicians advise and
participate in the operational use of drugs. As the Inspector General described it in 1957, "the basic issue is concerned with the extent
of authority that should be exercised by the Chief, Medical Staff, over
the activities of TSD which encroach upon or enter into the medical
field," and which are conducted by TSD "without seeking the prior
approval of the Chief, :Medical Stu,ff, und often without info,rming
him of their nature and extent." 97
As 'Was noted previously, because the projects and programs of
TSD stemmed directly from operational needs controlled by the
DDP, the IG recommended no further supervision of these activities by the :Medical Staff :
It is completely unrealistic to consider assigning to the
Chief, Medical Staff, what, in effect, would be authority over
clandestine operations. Furth errMl'e, some of tlte activiti(!8
of Chemical Division are not only unorthodox bu,t unethical
and-unnetimes illegal. 1'he DDP ia i-n a bette1' IJositio'n to
evaluate the ju.'3tiji<:ati(m fol' 8Uah operatioils tlta.n the Olde!,
llfedical Staff.os [Emphasis add,ed.]
Bec.'\use the adyice· of. the Director of Security was needed for
"evaluating the risks involved·' in the programs and because the
knowledge that the CIA was "enga~ing in unethic.'l.l and illicit activities would have serious repercussIOns in political and diplomatic
circlest the IG recommended that the Director of Security be full)'
advised of TSD's actiyities in these areas.
Even after t.he Inspector Genernl's Report of 1957, the compnrtmentation and jurisdictional conflict continued. They may have had a sub-

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., The one set·ot· minu.tes frolU n QKHIJ.LTOP mf>eting indit'atE'd that Indil'iclUllls In the Office ot :\Iedicnl Ser\1ces stressed the need for more contllct.
B:I When nsked wby Intorwiltion 01.1 the surrel,tltlous ndmlnh;trntlon of LSI)
wns not preselited to the ARTICHOKE committee, D~. Gottlieb re~pon<~f'd: "I
hnllgflle th<.> onl)' .re3l:;on would M\'e been a COllct'rufor hroadening the awarelIess of Its exlstt!nce:'
•
CIA uffiN"r, 11/21/75. 1'. 1·1. '
10: IG ~tlr\"('~' of 1.'~J). 1057, p. 217.

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91
411
stantialnega.tive impact on policymaking in the Al5ency. As the Deputy Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff noted In 1958, due to the
different positions taken by TSS, the Office of Security, and the Office
of .Medical Services on the use of chemical or biological agents, it was
possible that the individua.l who authorized the use of a chemical or
biological agent could be presented with "incomplete facts upon which
to make a decision relevant to its use." Even a committee set up by the
DDP ill 1958 to attempt to rationalize Agenc)' policy did not have access to records of testin~ and use. This was due, in part, to excessive
.compaltmentatiOll, and Jurisdictional conflict. "
C. CovEnT TESTIXG o:s- Hu1\IAN SUBJECTS BY ~fILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Gnoups: MATERIAL TESTING PROGRAM: EA 1729, PROJECT THIRD
CHANGE, AND PROJECT DERBY HAT

•

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EA 1729 is the designator used in the Army drug testing program
for IY~(>f~i(' acid diethylamide (LSD). Interest in LSD was originally
aroused at the Army's Chemical 'Yarfnre Laborntories by open literature on the unusual effects of the compound. 99 The positive intelligence and counterintelligence potential envisioned for compounds like
LSD, and suspected Soviet interest ill such materials,loo supported the
d('n~lopment of an American military capability and resulted in experiments conducted jointly by the U.S. Army Intelligence Board and
the Chemical '\Varfare Laboratories.
These expe.{'iments, designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses
of LSD. wcre known collectively as "M:aterial Testing Program EA
1729." Two projects of particular interest conducted as part of these
experiments, "THIRD CHANCE" and "DERBY HAT", involved
the administration of LSD to unwitting subjects in Europe and the
Fai' East.
In many respects, the Army's testing programs duplicated research
which had alI'ead)1 been conducted by the CIA. They certainly involved
th(' risks inhcrent in the early phases of dru:r testing. In the Army's
tests, as with those of the CIA, individual rights wereelso subordi.
natcd to national security considerations; informed consent and follownp examinations of subjects were neglected in efforts to maintain the
secrccy of the tests~ Finally, the command and control problems which
werC', apparC'nt. in the CIA's programs are paralleled bv n. lack of clear
authorization and super,·ision in the Army's programs.
"USAI~TC j:\taf'f ~tudy, "MaterIal TestfnJt Program, EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 4.

This l;nme U~ArXTC ~tudy cited "A 1952 (se"eral years prior to initial U.S.
lnterE'j:\t in LSD-:-25) rE'portthat the SO"IE'ts purchased a large quantity of r..S0-25
from the" Sandoz Company in 1951, reputed to be sufficient for 50 mlIlion doses."
(Ibid., p. ' 1 6 . ) "
.
Generally accepted Soviet-methods and counterintelligence concerns were also
strong moth'aUng factors in the initiation of this research:
"A Ilrlmnr;r justification for ftf'ld experlmE'ntntfori in intelUgE'nee with EA 1729
i~ thE> coulIt£>r-lntellig£>nce or c1ef£>nse lmpll<'atlon. We know that the enemy IlhiImmII1i~' condone!'! any kinc1 of co{'rclon or "iolE'nce for intelligence pUrIIO~E's. ThE>re
lo:t proof that hIs Intellh~'E'ncf> ~(>rvlce JUts I1sed drn~ In the past. There is strong
e"idence of keen interest in EA 1729 hy him. It for no other purpose than .to know
what to exp(>ct from enemy intelliJ;'ence use or the materlnl llnd to. thl1~, be preImrE'<1 to cdimtE'r it. field .xperimelltntion.ls justifiE'd." (lbirl, p. 34)
100

9
."

~

92
412
1. Scope of Testing

Between 1955 ancl1958 research was initiated by the Army Chemical

Corps to evaluate the potential for LSD as a chemical warfare inca-

','

pamtating agent. In the course of this research, LSD was administered
to more than 1.000 American \'olunteers ,...ho then participated in a
series of tests designed to ascertain the effects of the drug on their
ability to function as soldiers. ",Vith the exception of one set of tests
at Fort Bragg, these and subsequent laboratory experiments to evaluate chemical warfare potential were conducted at the Army Chemical
'Varfare Laboratories, Edgewood, ~faryland.
In 1958 a new se·nes of laboratory tests were initiated at Edgewood.
These experiments were conducted as the initial phase of ~faterial
Testing Program EA. 1729 to evaluate the intelligence potential of
LSD, and included LSD tests on 95 volunteers. lOl As part of these
tests, three structured experiments were conducted:
1. LSD was a.dministered surreptitiously at a simulated
social reception to volunteer subjects who were una,vare of
the purpose or nature of the tests in which they were
participating;
,
. 2. LSD was administered to volu!ltenI'S who were subsequently polygraphed; and
3. LSD was administered to volunteers who were then
confined to "isolation chambers".
These structured experiments were designed to evaluate the validity
of the traditional security trrdning n11 subjects had undergone in the
face of unconventional, drug enhanced, interrogations.
At the conclusion of the laboratory test phase of :Material Testing
Program EA 1729 in 1960, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff ior
Intelligence (ACSI) authorized operational field testing of LSD. l'he
first field tests were conducted in Europe by an Army Special Purpose Team (8PT) during the period from ~fay to August of HJ6l.
These tests were' known as Project THIRD CHANCE and iI1\'oln~d
eJeyen separate interrogations of ten subj('cts, None of the s\tbje~ts
were voh'llteers and none were aware that they n'ere to receIve
LSD. All but one subject, n U.S. soldier implicated in the theft of
clnssified documents, were alleged to be foreign intelligence sourc.es
or agents. "''''hila interrogations of there individuals were only moderately sllccessful, at least one subject (the U.S. soldier) exhibited
symptoms of severe parnnoia while under the influence of t.he drug.
The second series of field tests, Project DERBY HAT, were conductrld b)' an Army SPT in the Far East during the period
from Alll!llst to-NO"ember of H>G2. S(l"en subjects were interrogated
under DERBY H~\T, all of whom were foreign nationals either S11Spect('dof dealing in narcotics or' implicated in foreign intelligence
operntion~. The purpose of this second set of experiments was to coi,
lect additional data 011 the utility of T.....';D in field interrogations, and
to e,'nll1nte any differ(>nt effects tIl(' drug might hayc on "'Orientals.':

-,---IQl

.0.-,

,.

InJ:lpector GE'nE'rnl of the Army neport. "rse of Volunteers in Chemical Agf'nt
:VlO/7G. p. 138,

n('~l'n rC'h,"

,.

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. l!

93
413
f. Inadequate Ooordination A-m,eng Intelligence Agencle.'J
On October 15, 1959, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center prepared
lengthy staff study on :Material Testing Program EA.1729. The stared
purpose of the staff study was: "to determine the desirability of EA
1729 on non-US subjects In selected actual operations under controlled
conditions. 202 It was on the basis of this study that operational field
tests were later conducted.
After noting that the Chemical 'Varfare Laboratories began experiments with LSD on humans in 1955 and had administered the drug
to over 1,000 volunteers, the "background" section of the study
concluded:
There has not been a single case of residual ill effect. Stndy
of the prolific scientific lit{)rature on LSD-25 and personal
communication between US Army Chemical Corps personnel and other researchers in this field have failed to disclose
an authenticated instance of irreversible change being produced in normal humans by the drug. loa
This conclusion was reached despite an awareness that there-vere
inherent medical dangers in such experimentation. In the body of this
snme study it is noted that:
The view has been expressed that EA 1729 is a potentially
dangerous drug, whose pharmuceutical actions are not fully
understood and there has been ciled the possibility of the
continual~~e of a chemically induced psychosis in chronic'
form, particularly if a latent schizophrenic were a subject,
with consequent claim or representation against the U.S.
Government. 104
An attempt was made to minimize potential medical hazards by careful selection of subjects prior to field tests. Rejecting evidence that
the dnlg might be haznrdous, the study continued:
The claim of possible permanent damage cau~d by EA 1729
is an unproven hypothesis bnsed en the characteristic effect
of the material.'Vhile the added stress of a real situntion
may increase the probability of permanent adverse 'etrect,
the resulting riJJk is deemed to be Blight by the medical research personnel of the Ohemical Warfare' La:Oora~orie.'!. To
prevent even such 8. sli~ht risk, the proposed plan for field
experimentation calls for overt, if possible, or contrived-.
through-ruse, if necessary, physi<,al and mental examination
of any reul situation subject prior to employment of the
subject.105.
.
This c.onc1usion wns drawn six years after one d~th had occurred
which could be attributed, at least in part., to -the effects of the
verydnlg the Army was proposinito field test'! The. rSAINTC staff,
howeve·i". \vas apparent.lv unaware of· the dre'umstances surroundir~- DI·. Olson's death. This lack of knowledge is indicative of t.he

' IS lT~AINTC

Ibid., p. 4.
... Ibid •• p. 25.
llri Ibid•
UI

.....

,.

.

.

'.

86-408 0 - " _ '7

flta'lf Rtud,r.

"~rftt~rlal T~tinli1: Pr~~rnm EA 1729." 10/15/59, p..4.
-.

.

94
414
general tick of !nterngellcy communication on drug related r;.sear~h.
A!=; the October 105n stu<ly not~d. "there has been no COOI'<illlntIon
with other inteHigNlce figencit's l'p to the present." lOG
On Dc-cclllber 7, 105n, the ArlllY Assistant Chief of Staff for lntelli·
g-encl' (ACSI, apparently a General n"illems) WfiS briefc<l on the
pl'Opose<l operntionalllsC'. of LSD by FSAINTC Project Officel' Jacob·
SOil, in preparatioll for Pl'oj('ct. THIRD CHANCE. Genernl 'Yillellls
(,xpl'esseel concem that. tIl(' project hnelnot been coordinated with the
FBI and the CIA. He is qllotNl as sayillg "that if this project. is gointr
to he worth all)ihillg it [LSD] should be used on higher types of
non-l~.S. subjects'~ in othC'\' words "stl1lf<'l'S.!' He indicated thl!=; could
be nccolllplishe<l if the CIA wcrE' bronght in. The summar)' of the
bl'idillg' prepared by a )Injol' )Icho\"sky continues: "Of pal'ticular note
is that .\CSI <lid 110t eEl'ect ,-'oorelination with CIA and the FBI but
ollly 111eutiollc<1 it· for consideration by the plfinnel's.!~ 10.
..\. fter the bl"i('fi ng'. fOllr colonp.ls~ two I ieutC'nant colonc Is ane I :\Iaj 01'
~fC'ho\'sk\' \lIC't to discuss intel':1gencv coopC'ration with eTA and FBI.
1'h(' grOtll) consC'llSUS WfiS to PostI)One efforts to\Yfll·<1 coordination:
Lt. Col. .Jacobson commented that before \YC' coordinate with
('1.\ WC' ShOlll<1 IHl\"(> ll1or~ fnctnal filldin~l"S from field experilllC'ntatioll with countcrintelligence' cases that will strenf,1'hen
our position and proposal for cooperntion. This approach
was agrced to by the ('onfer<;~s.lo~

I fad such coordination beell achi(>\,(>('l, th~ safety of thesc eXperilllE.'llts
mig-ht ha\'o been viewcd differently and the tC'sts th('l\lseh'es might
have been secn as unnecessary,
.1. SUb01'dillation of Illdiridual Riqltts to .Yational Security Consid-

eratio1ls
.rust

fiS many of tht>se eXIwriments lIlay hfi\Oe been llllllccessury, the
of the operational tests (poly~rnph.assistcd intclTogations of
drugged suspects) reflE.'cts n ba:;i(' disregard fOl' the fundallleutnl
human rights of the subjects. The intC'rrogatioll of an .\.mcricfill
soldier fiS part of the THIRD CH.\.XCE 19G1 tests is an eXlllllple of
this disregard..
.'
The. "trip report,!' for PI'oject THIRD CHAXCE, <luted Septemher fl, 1!lG!, l'(,cOlm~s th{,' circumstances SUlToIllHling and the results of
the tests as foHo\,'s:
.
[The subject]wns n U.S. soldier who had confessed to theft
of cIl1ssified documents. Com'entional methods hnd failed to
ascertnin whether cspionnge intent was invol vea A significant
llew nc1ll1ission by subject thnt he told n lellow soldier of tho
theft while·he still hnd.the .documents in his possession was
obtaiJ1ed durinO' the EA. 1729 interroWltion nloIl~ with otllei'
'·llrintioJls.. of· Snbjl'cf'S' p~\'io~s nccount. The interrogut ion
· results \\"ere .deemed by the local ope.rntiOlial authority 'satis· fudoljO e\'i~l~~lCC of Subject's cJnim of innoccnce. in regard to
· espionngc iiltcmt. lo ,
Jllltlll"C

,

.

-fWd.. po·6.
.
In 3.leho\'Rky Fnct Sh~t, 12/9/60. p. 1•
Iell Ibid., p. 2.
.•
I_

.

8FT TrIo Renort.· Onerntlon THIRD CHANCE. Q/6/B1.

D.

5.

-1
$,
~.

.~

.~

95
415

'.
...

i

I

The subject apparently reacted verv strongly to the drug, and the
interrogatIOn, while productive, ,wnsdifficult. The trip report
concluded:
'
(1) This case demonstrated the ubility to interrogate a
subject profitably throughout a highly sustained and almost
incapacitating reaction to EA 1729.
'
(2) The apparent value of bringing 0. subject into the EA
1729 situation in a highly stressed state was indicated.
(3) The usefulness of employing as a duress factor the device of inviting the subject's attention to his EA 1729influenced state and threatening to extend this state indefinitely even to a permanent condition of insanity, or to
bring it to an end at the discretion of the interrogators was
shown to be effective.
(4) The need for preplanned precautions against extreme
paranoiac reaction to EA 1729 was indicated.
(5) It was brought to attention by this case that where subject has undergone extended intensive interrogation prior to
the EA 1729 episode and has persisted in a version repeatedly
dm'ing conve:ational interrogation, adherence to the same version while under EA 1729 iJ1fiuenc~. howe\'(~r extreme the reaction, may not necessarily be evidence of truth but merely the
ability to adhere to a well rehearsed story.u o
This strong reaction to the drug and the accompanyin~ discomfort
this individual suffered were exploited by the use of tradItional interroglltion techniques. 'Vhile there is no evidence that physical violence
or torture were employed in connection with this interrogation, physical and psychological techniques ,vere used in the THIRD CHANCE
experiments to exploit the subjects' altered mental state, and to maximIze the stress situation. Jacob~on described these methods in his trip
report:
'
Stl'essing' techniques employed included silent treatment before or after EA 1729 ndministL'ution, sustained conventional
interrogation prior to EA 1729 interrogation, deprivation of
food, drink, sleep or bodily evacuation, sustained, isolation
prior to EA 1729 administration, llOt-cold switches in approach, duress "pitches", verbal degradation and bodily discomfort, or dramatized threats to subject's life or Ulental
"
'
health. l l l
Another gross violution of an individual's fundamental rights occurred iIi September 1962 as part of the Anny's DERBY HAT tests
in the Far East. A suspected Asian espionaO'e ng-ent was given 6
microg-rnms of LSD per kilogram of bodyweight. The administration
of the drug was completed nt 1035 that morning:
At 1120, sweating became evident, his pulse became thready.
He was placed in n supine position. He began groaning with
expiration and became semicomatose.112
Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Ibid., p. 13.
ns "DERBY HAT" Medical and Pharmacological Report: Case #1, 9/20/62,
p. D 1 0 - 2 . ·
.
110
11\

96
416
For the next 28 minutes, the sl:bject remained s~mi~omatose.
At 1148, responses to painful stimuli w~re slightly improved.At 1155, he was helped to n sitting position.' "
" .
At 1200, he became shocky again and was returned to snpIne
position.
'
At 1212, he was more alert and able to sit up 'with help:
'At 1220, Subject was assisted to the i~teITogationtable.
A~ 1230, he be~n moaning he 'Wanted to die and \~sually
Ignored questIOns. Rarely he stated "he didn't know."
}It 1250, hIS phasic alertness persisted. He frequently refocllse.d his eyes with eyelid assistance. He freqnently threw
, his head back with eves closed.
At 1330, he was sli~hti'y more alert. He was forced-walked for
!) minutes..He physically would cooperate until he bCCallll'!
"
sho~ky agam (swf.>ating, thready pulse, pale).l1~
Fo~' the llrxt three hours the subject remained in about the same condition. Continued attempts at .interrogation yielded no relevant
ans,Yers. Six honrs after. receivin,u- the drug, the subject began giving
rclenLnt answers to questions. Eight and one-half hours after the
initial dosage, the subject was polYgrnphed. The interrogation continued for seventeen arid one-half hours after the drug was admin istered.
There ,ms some psychological and medical screening of' the indiyidllnls t<,ste<1 within the United States~ in Enrope, nnd in
Asia. The proposal for the field experimentation in fact called for
such ~xaminations. 'fhe fact of prescreellin~ did not eliminate the
risk of injury; the availability of ~edical staff :did~ 'ho\vever, limit.
inju.ry and may wen !laY<'. prevented the death of one or.more of th,e
subjects. As the mechcnI corps member of the team whIch surreptIt.iously administered the LSD noted, "one subject ... did collapse after
the interrog-ation and 'tIl(> presence of the medical officer was not only
of yalue to the subject but to the interrogation team who were thus
assured that an unnecessary untoward r('sult would not ocelli'.:" lU
In the October 15, 19n9:USAINTC staff' study, moral and legal
ramifications of COYeIt administrntion of LSD in field conditions were
considered.
.
It was always n tenet of' Army Jnt~1lig-ence that the basic
Alller'ican principle of the dignitv and welfare of the fndh'idllal will not be violated..•. A. more mt>ticul0l.1S regard
for the prohibition ag-ainst viol('nce or duress is taken in
practice when the suspect is a US citizen or ally as against'
an adunl or pot<.'ntial enemy, in peace as a~ainst war, and in
l'e~pect. to the nuture of the crime•.•• In inte']li~ence, the
stake~ ·h1\'oh·ecl .and the int€'rcsts of nntional secnrity may
permit a more toll'mnt interpretation of mornl-:-ethical yalues;
but not· legal limits, thronp;h, necessit.y...• Any claim
1\.1

ns

"

' .. '

lb;fl., p. D1G-3.

.

-

RPT Trill RE'port, Orwratlon THIRn CHANCE. 7/2!'i/61. p.l.

'"1
-,

.~

r

-:'I

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97
417

...

"-

..

'9

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•

"

against the US' Go'"ernmentfor alleged injury due to ~A
1729 must be legally 5hown to ha,-e been due to the materIal.
Proper security and appropriate operational techniques
can protect the fact of employment of EA 1729pe
On the basis of this evaluation, the stl!dy concluded that in view of
"the stakes involved and the interests of national security," the propo~~d plnn for.fi~ld testin~~houl~ be approved.
'..
'.
..
lhe surreptItious admmlstrntlon of drugs to unwIttmg subJects by
the Army rnises serious coiistitutional and legal issues. The consideration ~iv('n these issues by the: Army was wholly insufficient. The charncter of the Army's volunteer testing program and the possibility that
drugs \\ere simplv substituted for other forms ofviolence or duress in
field iJiterrogatioils raises serious doubts as to whether national security imperatives were properly interpreted. The "consent" forms
which each American volunteer signed prior to the adHiinistr.ation of
LSD are a cnse in point. These. forms contained no mention of the
medical and psychological risks inherent in such testing, nor do they
mention the nature of the psychotrophic drug to be administered:.,
The general nature of the experiments in which I have
volun.teered. have been explained to me from the standpoint
of pi,:;sib]~ haz:lrds to 'my he~lth. It t., my understandi1lg that
the cxperIm£·::I..': nre so deslgned, based '011 the results of
nnililnls and l'redous human experimentation, that the anticiZJated re8ult!1 'l.cill jU8tify tI,e performar..cc of tIle experiment. I understand further that experiments will be so conducted ns to a'"oid all unneces5ai'Y ph)'sicnl and 'medical
suffering and intury, and thfLt f 'l.~i[l be at liberty to 'request
. that tIle experiments be te1"lninated at any time if in my opinion 1 ha,·e renched the physical or mental stnte where continuation of the experiments 'becomes undesirable.
I 1'ecognize tllOt in the pursuit of certnin experiments
tramntory discomfort may occur. I recognize. also, that under
these circumstances, I mu.~t'rely upon tIlt] akill and 'l.visdom
of tlU! plll/sician supen.'ising the experiment to institute whatever medical or surg'icril measures arc indi·cnted. [Emphasis
added.] 1111
.
The exclusion of an)' specific discussion of the nature of LSD in
these forms raises serious doubts as to their "alidity. An "uuderstandi.ng ..• that the nnticipated results will justjfy the pcrfonnnnce of
- the experiment" without full know]ed~e of the nnture of the cxrerimelit is an incomplete "understanding." Similarly, the nature 0 the
experiment limited the ability of both the subject to request its request. its termination.and the experimenter to implement sueh n. request.
Finally, the euphemistic chnraderizntion of "transitory discomfort"
nlld t.he a~rcement to "rely 011 the skin and wisdom of the physician"
combine to cOllcenl inherent risks in the experimentation and mny be
"icwed ns disolving the experiml"nter of personal responsibility for
dnmnJtin~ aftereffects. In summary, n "volunteE'r" program in ,'\"hich
subjects are not fully informed of potential hnzards to their persons
is ""'olunteer~' in name only.
.•
.

e.

uc USAI~"TC 8bI.tr study.
11.

"Material Testing Program EA 1729," 10/15/59, p. 26.
Sample volunteer consent form.

,

'-'lI

. i:

'Ji

J
"

98

<:

"11

418

]':

This problem was compounded by the security statements signed
by each volunteer before he pa.rticipated in the testing. As pa.rt ·of
this statement, pot~ntial subjects agreed that they. would:
•.. not divulge make available any information related
to U.S. Army Intelligence Center interest-or partidpation in
the Department of the Army :Medical Research Volunteer
Program to any individua.l, nation, organization, business,
association, or other group or entity, not officially authorized
to receive such information.
..
.
I understand that any action contrary to the provisi,ons of
this statement will render me liable to pWlishment under the
provisions of the. Uniform Code of ~lilitary Justice. H9
Under these provisions; a volunteer expcriendn~ aftereffects of the test
mi~ht have 'boon unable to Seek immediate. medIcal nssistance.
This disreg~~rd for the well-being of subjects drug tcst-il~g is inexcusable, Further, the absence' of any comprehensive long-term
medical assistance for the subjects of these experiments is not only
unscientific; it is also unpL·ofesslOnal.
4. Lack of Nornial A'Utlwrization and SupervWon
It is apparent from documents supplied to the Committee that the
_~rmy's test~ng l'rograms often operated under inf?rmal and noniOUtme aut~orizatl0n, Potentudly dangerous operatIOns such as t.hese
testing pro~rams are the very projeets which ought to be subject to
the closest mternal scrutiny at the highest levels of thl'l militll,ry command structure. There are numerous I~xnmples of inadequate review,
pa.rtial consideration, and incompletE'; approval in the administration
of these programs."
'
W1len the first Army program to use LSD on American soldiers in
"field stations',' was authorized in 1tlny 1955, the Army violnted its
own proccdures in obtll.ining approvaL., Under Army Chief of Staff
1t{emoran'dum 385, such prcposals were to be pel'SonalJjT approved by
the Secretary of the Ann)'. Although the p'lan was submitted to him
on April 26, 1056, the Secretary issued no, written authoriznti.oll fol'
t.he project, and there is no eVIdence that he either reyiewed or approved the plan. Less than a month later, the Anny Chief of Staff
issued a memorandum nuthol'izing the tests. no
S\lbsequent ~sting of'LSD under ~{uterinl Testing Program EA
1729 opera~edgener~lly under this aut.horization, 'Vhen the plans for
Ulis testing ~;e'~ originally discussed in ,e~rly 1958 by officials. of the
Army IntellIgence Center at F~J;t HolabIrd and representah\'es of
t.he Chemical 'Vnrfare Center n,t Edgewood Arsenal, an informal proposal was form~llated" This pro~l ,,"'as submitted to the ~Iedical
~e~earch, Dire~torate a~ ']:dgewOOd,by ~h~ ~resid~nt of the Army Intelhge.nce Boai;d on June 3, 1958. There'ls no eVIdencc that the pJnn
wns appro,vcd at nny Jevel h~gher tha~ the P.residcntof the Intelligence ~9:ar4 .01' th~ Commanding G~lleral of Edgewood. ~he t1J?pl'O~'al
.a.t' Edgewodq ~ppears to have been Iss~ed })y tlle Conull~nder's 'Ad] 11tanto The AIedicnl Research Lnboratol'lcS dId not submIt thE' plnn to
the Sur~n General for nppro\-al' (a standard pl'ocedure.) liecause

']

or

..:.

..•

u. S;1mple Yolunt~r

Security Stntement.
.. '
uo In!lpector General of the Army Rt»port; "lU~ ot

Al!pnt Rp_nrt-h." 3/10178. n. 109.

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99
419

.

.

the new program was ostensibly covered by the authorizations granted
in ]!ay 1956.121 _
The two projects -in70lving the operational use of LSD (THIRD
CHANCE and DERBY HAT) were apparently approved by the,
Anny Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (General'Villems) on
December 7, 1960.1: 2 This verbal approval came in the course of a
briefin~ on previo}ls drug program~ and on the pIan.ned .field experimentatIon. There IS no record of wntten approval bemg Issued by the
ACSI to authorize these specific projects Wltil January 1961, and
. there is no record of any specific kriowledge or approval by the Secretary 01 the Army.
On February 4, -1W3, ~fa.jor General C. F. Leonard, Army ACSI,
forwarded 0. copy of the THIRD CHANCE Trip Report to Army
Chief of Staff, General Earl 'Vheeler. us 'Vheeler had apparently
requested- a copy on February 2. The-report was routed through a General Hamlett. 'Yhile this report included background on the origins
of the LSD tests, it appears that General 'Vheelerms.y only have read
the conclusion and recommendations.1U The office memorandum
n.ccompanyin~ the Trip Report bears 'Vheeler's initials. us
-

5. Termination of Testin.g

-

..
II.

On April 10, 1963, a -briefing was held in the ACSI's office on the
results of Projects THIRD CHANCE and DERBY HAT. Both
8PT's concluded that more field testing was required before LSD
could be -utilized as an integral aid to counterintelligence interrogations. During the presentation of the DERBY HAT results, General
Leonard (Deputy ACSI) dir/~..d th~t no further fieldtest-ing be
undertaken. ue After this meeting the ACSI sent & letter to the Commanding General of the Anny Combat Deve.lopments Command
(CDC) requesting that he review THIRD CHANCE and DERBY
HAT and "make a net evaluation concerning the adoption of EA 1729
for future use as an effective and profitable aid in counterintelligence
interrogations." U1 On the same day the ACSI requested. that the CDC
Commander revise regulution FM 30-17 to read in part :
. . . in no instance will drugs be used as an aid to interrogations in counterintelligence OT security operations without
prio~ pernassion of the Department of the Army. Requests
to use drngs 9.S an investigative aid will be forwa,Tded through
intelli~('nce channels to the OACSI, DA, for approval. ...
!.{edica.l ~arch has established that infonnation obtained
through t}le use of these drugs is unreliable and invalid. _..
It 'is Considered that DA [Army] approval must be a prerequisite for use of such drugs because of the moral, legal,
meClical and political problems inherent in their use for intelligence purposes. u,--~..-..o:_
In

,

Ibid•• pp. 135, 187, 138.

Mehovsk,. Fact Sheet. 12/9/60.
lIemoranduDl froDl I.eonard to Wheeler. 2/4/63.
• 26 SGS memorandum to Wheeler through Hamlett, 2/5/63.

I:.

U:I

.'

J. Ibid

,. llaJ:F. Barn~tt, memorandum tor the record: 8/12/63.
127. Ynmakl memorandum for the record, 7/16/63..
.
•
Ibid;

,

-

•

100
420
TI~e

sl.!-bsequent adO~tiOll of thisreguJ~tion marked the effective termmatlon of field testmg of LSD by the Army.
.
The official termination date of these testing programs is rather
~clea.r, but a later ACSI memojndicates that it may hav~ occurred
IlL September of 1963. On the 19th of that month a meeting was held
between, Dr. Van Sims (Edgewood Arsenal), :M:ajor Clovis (Chemical Research Laboratory) , ~nd· ACSI representatives (General
Deholm and Colonel Schn:Udt). "As a result of this confei'ence a determination was made to suspend the program and any further activity
pending a more profitable and suitable use.." 1211
.

"1j

~

. :1
j

D.

COOl.au-noN AND CoMPETITION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE COM:MUNITY AGEXCIES AND BETWEEN THESE AGENCIES AXD OTHER
. IXDIYIDu.U.5 AXD INSTITUTIONS

,

"

1. Relationships Among Agericies lVithin the Intelligence Oommunity
Relationships among intelligence community agencies in this area
varied considerably over time, ranging from full cooperntiQJ'l to intense
and wasteful competition. The early period was marked by a high
degree of cooperation among the agencies of the intelligence community. Although the military dominated research involving chemical
and biologicn.l agents, the information de,-eloped wa's shared\\"ith the
FBI and the CIA. But the spirit of cooperation did not continue. The
failure by the military to share irlfonnation appa.rently breached the.
spirit, if not the letter, of conunands from above.
.
As noted llbove, the Army Assistant Chief of Staff fOl' Intelligence
was briefed on the proposed operational testing of LSD under Project
THIRD CHANCE, and expressed concern' that the project had not
been coordinated with FBI and CIA. Despite this request, no coordination was achieved between the Arm)' and either of these agencies.
Had such cooperation been forthcoming, this project may ha\"e been.
.' .
.
e,·aluated in a different-light.
The competition between the agencies ill this area reached bizarre
Je,·els. A military officer told a CIA. representative in confidence abont
the military~s field testing of LSD in Europe under Project THIRD
CHANCE, and t·he CIA promptly attempted to learn surreptitiously
the nature nnd extent of the program. At roughly the. sar.ne time Mr.
. Helms argued to the nneI that the unwitting testing program should
be continued, as it contributed ·to the CIA's capability in the area and
thus allowcd the CIA "to restrain others in t~e intelligencc community
(such as the Departmcnt of Defcnse) from piirsuil1g opcrations.~~ 130
The )[KNAOlII program was filso marked by a IaHure to share
illformatioli. The Army Special Forces' (the pl·illcipal customer of the
SpeCinrOpe~~ioris.Di\'is}onat F?rt Dietri~k) and ~he qIA rather
than attemptmg tocoordmnte thelr efforts pI'9l"nulgated dIfferent requirem('nts which varied only slightly. ThIS apparently resulted in
sollie dupli('atio~ of effort. In order to insurc the . security 'of CIA
operations, the Agency would request materials froUl SOD for 0peratIonnl nse without fully or accurately describing the operatloI~al
requirements. This resulted in limitations on SOD's ability to assist
the CIA.
.
Ut

~

Undated ASCI memomnduD't. ;po 2.
Memorandum trom the DDP to the

.

ncI. 11/9/64. I). 2.

•

....]
.'·-1

J

101

421
~. Relati~hi'P8

.

.....

..

....

Between the .Intelligence Commu:nity A5/enciea and
Foreign Liai8onService8
_
The sllujec.ts of the CIA's operationlll testing of chemical and biological ng('nts abroad Vi"ere generally being held for interrogation by
foreign intelligence or security organizations. Although information
about the use of drugs was generally withheld from these organizations, cooperation 'With them necessarily jeopardized the security of
CIA interest in these materials. Cooperation also placed the American
Government in a position of complicity in actions which violated the.
rights of the subjects, and which may have violated the laws of the
country in which the experiments took place.
Cooperation between the intelligence agencies and organizations in
foreign countries was not limited to relationship~ with the intelligence
or internal security organizations. Some ~IK{;LTR.A research was
conducted abroad. 'Vh ile this is; in itself,· not a questionable practice,
it is important that such research abroad not be undertaken to evade
Al)lel'ican laVi"s. That this was a possibility is suggested by an ARTICHOKE memorandum in which it is noted that working with the
scientists of a foreign country ;:might be very advantageous" since
that government "permitted c(:rtain activities which were not p~r­
mitt-ed by the United States government {i.e., experiments on anthrax,
etc.)." 131
3. The Rela.tion8hips Between the Intelligence Com-munuy Agenc-ieJ
and Other Agendes of the U.s. Government
CE'rtain U.S. government agencies actively assi!:>ted the efforts of
intE'l1igcnce agencies in this area. One form of assistance was to provide "cover" for research contracts let by intelligence agencies, in
order to'disguhe intelligence community interest in chemical and
Liologicalagents.
.
.
Other forms of assista.ncc raise more seriQus questions. Although
the CI.\"s project involving the surreptitious administration of LSD
was conducted by Bureau of Narcotics personnel, there was no open
connection between the Bureau personnel and the Agency. The Bureau
was serving as a "cut-out" in order to make it difficult to trace A.gency.
part.icipation. The cut-out arrangement, howeYer, reduced the CIA's
ability ·t~ control the program. The. Agency could not control the
process by which subjects were selected and cultivated, and could not
regulate follow-up after the testing. ~Ioreover, as the CIA's Ins}1eCtor
General noted: "the handlin~ of test subjects in the last analysis rests
with the [Bureau of N"arcohcs] agent worJdng alone. Suppression of
, h'l1owledgc:'of critical results from·the top CIA management is an
inherent risK in th~ operations..." 132 The arrangement also made it
impossible 'f9r the Agency to be certain that the decision to end the
surl"eptitious a'dministrat-ion of LSD would be honored by the Bureau
personnel'~

The arrn"hgeme~t with the. Bureau of Narcoticswas described as
"informal;" 133. The infonllality of the arrangement compounded the
problem isngpavated by the fact that the 40 Committee has had virARTICHOKE ~emorandum. 6/13/li2.
10 Rf>port on llKULTRA. 1963, p. 14.
..
-Ibid. This ml8 taken by one Agency official to mean that tbere would be hO
writtf'n contrnchind no fo·rmnl.mecbo.nism for parm.en~. (Elder, 12/18/75, p. 31.)
J"&

I:

102
422
apparent unwillingness on the part of the Bureau's leadership to .ask
for details, and the CIA's hesitation in volunteering informa;tlO.n.
These problems raise serious questions of command and control wltlun
the Bureau.

4. Relationships Between the Intelligence Oommunity A.qcncies and
Other Institutions and Individuals, P.ublic and Pri1Jate
The Inspector.· General's 1963 . ..sun'ey of ~~KULTRA noted
that "the research and development" phase was conducted through
standing arrangements with "specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private. research organizations!' in a manner which concealed "from the instItution the interests of the CIA." Only a few "key individuals" in each
institution w~re "made witting- of Agency sponsorship." The research
and de\'elopment phase was succeeded by n phase involving "physicians! toxIcologists, nnd other specialists in mf.mtal, narcotics, and
general hospitals and prisons, who are provided the products and
findings of the basic research projects and proceed with intensi,'e testing on human subjects." 134
.
According to the Inspp-ctor Gp-lleral, the ~IKULTRA testing programs were "conduded under accepted scientific procedures ...
where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the
programs." 135 This was clearly not true in the project involving the
Rurreptitious administra.tion of LSD: which was marked by a com·
plete lack of screening, medical supervision, opportunity to observe. or
medical or psychological follow-up.
The intelligence agencies allowed iudi ,'idual researchers to design
their project. Experiments sponsored by these researchers (which included one where narcotics addicts were sent to Lexingtq.n, Kentucky,
who werE.'- rewarded with the drug of their addidion in return for
participation in experiments with LSD) call into question the decision by the agencies not tb fix guidelines for the experiments.
ThE.' ~nCULTRA resen reh an(l development progmm raises other
questions, as well. It is not clear whether individuals in prisons, mental,
narcotics alld general hospitals can. provide "informed cQnsent" to
participation in experiments snch asthese. There is doubt as to whether
institutions should be unwittin,tr of the ultimate sponsor of research
being done in their facilities. The nnture of the arrangements also
mnde it impossible for the individuals who were liot awa~ofthe,
sponsor of the research.to exercise any choice. Il.bout their participation based on the sponsoring organization. .
:..
Although greater precautions are :now being ta,ken in reSe~lrch conductedon behalf of the intelligenc-ccoJJnnunity ngencies, the dilemma
of clnssification remains. These ngC'ncies obviously .wisht:'d toconct>al
~h('ir int;rest in certain forms of resenrch in order to avoid stimulating
mterest m the same areas b)f hORtilcgovernments. Insom~ cases today
contrnrtors or resenrchers wish to conceal tht>ir cOnIlection with theSE"
agencies. Yet the fnct of classification pre,·ents open· discussion and
debate upon which schol.nrlY \\"ork dt>pends.
. ~ Ibid. p. 9.
,'Ia.Ibid. p. 10,

·'1

j

1J
P'

~

.,

~'

'~

.'

:. B

1Ir-'

103

APPENDIX B
DOCU~1ENTS

REFERRING TO DISCOVERY OF ADDITIONAL ~1KULTRA ~fATERIAL
22 ,June 19;7

'r

~

:,

• :

"10;. '.

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• •

.

.:

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~: '.:• • • ~ ~

•

':. '.':. ;

•

" :';IEHOR.~"DIDI FOR: 'Deputy Qirec'tor'of C~~tral, Intelligenc.e .:,
,.' .'~~'~'- .• ~~''':'~''':' _:.'". ='.. '

THROUGH
.. M

,~

...;::.:." •• ;';

.. , '.:

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SUBJECT

':.

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: ::.'.:;:.:.:.:..·I· .. ·~~·

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'.. ~ ..... ;;...:,...... : . " , .... ~. ".: . -:"

:::".0 '.

:

,,.

~.~-

.. :::; .. .;.

,'

.

Deputy Director for Science and Jechnolo,f;:'·
: ::::''":": ..•.: ••." :}.",:

-Request for ~uidance ~n Handling
Recently
Loca~ed )iKULTRA ~Iaterial
.. '
..
.

;

"

"-1.
(U!AIUO) This oenorandu::l is to advise you that
additional ~1li:ULTRA doculOlents have been discovered and to
obtain your approval for folloK-on ac~ions required.
Paragraph 7 contains a recoo~ended course of action.

) 2.
(U!AIUO) As a result of John Harks FOIA Tequest (F-76-374). all of the ~·IKl!LTRA J:latcrial in OTS
Poss.ssion Kas revieKed for possible release to hilOl.
'FolloKing tha~ revieK. the OIS caterial in the Retired
Records Center Kas searched, It K2S during that latter
search that the subproject files Kere "locatedaJ:long the.
retired records of the OTS Budget and Fiscal Section,
These files "ere-not discovered earlier as the eaTlie~
sea,rches "ere lioi ted to the 'exar;lination of the..-active
and retired records of those branches considered most
likely to have generated or ha\'e had access t.P f-IKULTRA'
documents, Those branches included: Che,mistT)'._
.
Biological;' Beha\'ioral Activities. and Contract's J.lanagement. Because Dr. Gottlieb retrieved and des~royed all
,the "IKULTR.~ docul:\ents he ,~as abl:e to locate. it is not
surprising that the earlier search for }!I(ULTR.O\ documents.
directed. at areas ,..here the}' \,ere most likel:r to be found,
"'as unsuccessful. The purpose of establ~shing the :-IKliLTR.-\
mechanism Kas'ta limit knoKled~e of the sensitive ~ork .
. being performed to those ~ithan absolute nc~d to knoK., ,
If those precepts had been followed. the recently found •
B&F files should h~ve 'contained,onlv financial and
adrninistr3tive docu::lents. (In rctr~spect.
I realize that .
-

.

05ef!U'if'~~'l'5-d:t9
~
,
'191
. _., -'---, ..
'2 9 J\,l~
"

"

104
s:n:.EZ:T:

!

J

RcquC'st for Guid~nl;e on H:;n~l in;
Located ~~ULTRA ~2tcrial
'.

R~c,,::::::

" 11

ij
~

......

j

~!erio~s error ~~s n~dc in not ba~in~ B5f file~ i=~ cth~~
~e~~in~l: innocuous files s~~rched e2~ti~r.}

~~~:. ~~=-?~~;

the~individu~l sub~rciect foJd~rs conta!: ;=cje:=
:propos31~ 2r.~ *,e~oranda :or:the record, which i:'~~:~~~;

.PO!t of
.

;desre~s.

~i~e

oTli:l:ial

o ,,,,,,:"
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0; t:'e

reaso~ablv cOh.~lete oic~u~e

.t'und~c· t~rou"~

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se:-:!:!I: u,

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;·o'l;~'" -:~ ':_--00;.- .;--~.:-._

·~11\.\JtlRA. Sl~=~':'

=:::

is also a::'lor.~ :he.sc do=u:~ents- ~ c.:-;:.- :: .. :.~
Decoran~u~ ii attached.
. .
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......: _..
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:: .,S~o_~~~~~u~~_~~~~t~;$.t~.:ln~~,:~c:~~ ~~::~~~.:~~_
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the :·j:~vLT?-~ ~::!·.·::.i!'~ \",·e:-E' Ot:.':-fo ';':-:':~::~.!\.;'
nor~ ~~::~=ove~si~2 tl1~n i~di:atet by th~ S~~~:~ S~:~:~
(Ch~rc~) :c=~i~r~e ae~~or:.
I~ a~~·:,hi~~~ t~~ r~~~~i~ i~
trt.:·~ t i. c., r.".C·S:
th~'" ~:-::~·ly 1~·~ ~t.::'?:-cj:-=':= .a':'":- :':::-.:-:~..:;.
Tht.;s J ~::'"' o"':~~·\""i~~",·
:-'i:::"'~T~~ i~ c~5!';::i~1!~· u:::·:.. ~:-.;:-=.

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t?":.~- ~ez.:"'::~ fo:- ktockout ~~t.c:-ial~ ar:;: 3ne~thC?~ti.:s :,;~~
,
cocpa:i~lc ~:~i~ities.
Ho~cvcr. the re$~=rc~'?~:;=lzl
!
sta-::cc t~:.~ "che:::i~~l :t~~nt$ ..... \..· ill be 5ubjectC':.:: ':li:1:=~:.
s;:reeni?; .•. Q:-. 2.~\";:tnced CClnce:'" ;:'3 :.ie~~s··. ~:

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con:sb::: ::.::!.! :",::;il,r-

of C"I"A'!" ::-::::-!hu:io~ of S375,(1(1(\ to 'the ~5'n-:"+' <e g;~;.~ ......

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I':CTC'

lr

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'j

105
f\c-~ue~': fOT GuiduncC' on Handlins··Recentl)·
L::-=:l t~::\ :·i!:ULT!~,\ ~1:J te r i:ll
.

SU;'"..1i';CT:

. Th,· cent:-i:-:.::ic~ co~J.c be contro\'c:-~ial in ,th:lt it "as
m:tdc thrc:.:;::: a :::cchanisr.:T.1:l1~:in~ it ajlpe3T to be a p-rinlte
(lon:ni 0:1. F:-i':2~C don:Jtions qual i:icc!. for. and P;:'-T::g.<c::.0!b
GG# W~ ':'!.'.:eh·e~. an ecu:ll :!.no~~Jt of Federal T.l3.L.chin&
funds. ~ ~c::~~ fTO~ the 'Office'of GcneT:!l Counse1'~ate~
- 11 Febru3.:-y J;SJ attestin~ to the 1e:ality of this fundins
. is in ~~e =i1~. ' . .
.
, . . . . : . ;....:.:. ' , . t•. ' •
" I.'.

.

~

..... ;

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···6 ..·· -(:..: ';'=:':~j
The Le~iS""1atiYc'Coun:sc1 he.:s been
..
mace a"2:-:= c: :::e e:'dstc:lce of these additional ~IKULTR:\
docu:::en:s~;-.i~::' a:-e. still undeT re"ie', a;ld sa:li~i:atior..
The ~ARKS =a~~ is in 1iti~ation'an! we are c6mT.1itted to
adyise ~:-~ ~~t~s of the existence of these files shortlYr
and_~o c::;~=: ~::e r~1~as3ble ~st~rial
his att?rneys
by ~1 J~~?
~~e~:er XTO~ the In;or~3:1cn and Prlyacy.
St~~f to ~:-. ~3~kF' a~torneys infor~in~ the~ of ~he .
ex~s~en~~.~: :t~s~a:eria~ is in t~c coc:-cination process
a~a ~s S~~f=~;~= to oe c311ed en ~J Jun~ •.

;0

,.
{:':':.:"I:;C J
be take:l:
~

~r.

.'

'::':le~sc O!,;1!'opTiatel~' s:l.:iiti=ec! mate • .inl to
~~r~.· ~tto~neY5 0$ TCG~ired by FaI:\ liti;~tion•
....
~.

.'.

!~~~rn ~he 5enat.·S~lcct Co~nittce

of the

·e~is~~;l~~.C~ the recently locztcd records prior to
in:c:-=!~; ~T. ~~rks'

Jt:

3ttorn~rs.

.

1.s re.:o::::::er:.1ec ~h3t. you appro\'e of beth of these:. actio::.;;.

S#
(~/.;!UC')
I f adclitior.:tl detail$ on th~ contents
of this 1:::te:-l:li 3rc d17sil'cd', the Ot5 o!ffcers ·rno.st f:l:r.ilia.:.,;itl~ it o:-c p~ep;lred to brief roc at roul' con\·enience.
.

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.
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D;l\'id S. Br3ndl\cin .
Di r('ctor
.
•
Office of TC'chnic:l.l Serdc~
'r

...

106
The DirectorofCenldlnldllge~­

•

~'\OC.2050S

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye. Chai~n
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington. D.C. 2051~

.'

Dear Kr. Chainman:
During the course of 1975 when the Senate Committee. cbair~d
by Senator Church, was investi~a~ing intelligence activities. the
.
CIA was asked to produce documentation on a program of experimentation
wi th tha effect of drugs. Under th is proj ect conducted from 1953
to 1964 and known as "HK~ULTRA.u tests were conducted on American
citizens in some ~es without their knowledge. The CIA. after"
searching for such documentation. reported that most of the documents
on this matter have been destroyed. I find it my duty to report
to you now that ".our continuing search for drilg related. ~s well as
other documents, ~,s uncovered certain papers which bear on this
~tter. Let me hasten to add that I am persuaded that there was no
previous attempt to conceal this· material in the original 1975·
exploration.='- The mat~r.ial recently discovered was in the retired .
. archives filed under f1ti~ncial accounts and only uncovered by using
extraordinary and extensive search efforts. In this connection.
inc1dentally, 1 have personally commended the employee whpse diligence
produced this find.
.
Because the ne~ material now on hand is pri~arily of a financial
nature, it does not present a complete p1ctul'e of the fi~ld of drug
experimentation activity but it does prov1.de lIY..Jre detail than was
previously available ·to us. For exalllJle,. the following ty~s of.
activities were undertaken:.
a. Possible additional cases of drugs being tested on
Amer,can citizens. without their knowledge.
b. Research was undertaken cn.surreptitious methods of
administering drugs.
c. Some of the persons chosen for experimenta.ticn were
drug addicts or alcoholics.
d. Research into the development at a knockout or "K"
drug was performed in conjunction with being done to
.
develop pain killers for advanced canter patients, ~nd te$~S
on such patients were ~arr,ed out•

•

J: .

..' .

107

z
e. There is a possibility of an improper
private institution.

p~yment

to a

The drug related activities described in this new1~ located material
began almost 25 years ago. I assure you they were discontinued over
10 years ago and ·do not take place today•.
In keeping with the President's commitment to disclose any errors
of the Intelligence Community which are uncovered, I would like to
volunteer to testify before your Committee on the full details of this
unfortunate series of events. I am in the process of reading the
fairly voluminous material involved and do want to be certain that
I have a complete picture when I talk with the Committee. I will be
in touch.with you next week to discuss when hearings might be
scheduled at the earliest opportunity.
I regret having to bring this issue to your attention, but I know
that it is essentia1 to your oiersight procedures that you be kept fUlly
infonned in a tirrely manner•.
Yours

STANSFIELD TURNER

.:

.,

-,,~

~.

109
APPENDIX C

DOCU~fENTS REFERRING TO SUBPROJECTS
~te ---.J6lZ.....J'IL.:/1"V...l12~Z147=--

1.

Msy

1953

Project M!OJI:IR.\,· S1.lbproJ e<: t 2

StlBJi:CT:

.....

. DR.UT

_

. . : -.' -.....
.. .

-.

~

a..

1. 8Ul)l'roJe<:t 2 11 be1.cg set up to prov1de a lIe=o And
eU1cieat 1:lS&UI to exploit
~~•
11:1 rega:'d to the Jm!L'I:!U. proe;nu:.
. .,
." .

.

C

. ~

~
2.
US . 'S11 11 ~~i~~;syc¥~~·et.~6'e.;.
am. a ta.eult)' ce=ber at the £ AS
1
1l1/r
.
~aL

tn.ll.k\~

Chief lieurapsychi:.trirt at__
' _
~Ch1ef a! tbe P.,-chatric See~1on at •
~~ . . . . . ard. OSS ~rienc" d~ World Var" II. JIe b&s bet:n or
Talue 11:1 the general ~ field . . an overall ad'T1~OT am'
.
cOlIsultlU1t.· he·b&s been or value 11:1 coutactit18 1cd,1:rldualJl 11:1 the
C---zd'I:SIH .a.rea ani ill settin8 up projects 1:here, s.M he bas
done work !W:laelt 'Ihich baa contributed. tl) the HXm.'OA field • . n,
~eSlionaJ. eclhitiel a::d mown· cOI:.tlect1:ms \lith the
"
..;..-

13

(

poll1tiOl1c bave

c - Ai;

,LA
3.

II

.:.-: . . . .

. ._.;: _

~

M

13

Q

t / .-

__ .

SubProject 2 voul.d. 1.."ellk1e:

a. K1scell.a.:1eous resenreh e.od test1I:g se:-viees 1:1 t!le·
ger.cral.tie14 or HKOI.'tllA.
.

.

.

b. SerTices as a eOlltact a.od. cut-out tor p:-oJeetll 11:1 t11e
MKIlL'mA. tield, p:-i=rll;r those ·locClted. 1:1 th«tl
:::::::. _~

ares..

.

Hordtor..ng ot .:elected. projects 1:1 the HKUtTRA'iield. 1
¥ area.

e.

Yl::eIl located 1%1 tho cent:ul:;S·

e..

d • . SerTiees e.s a ge:lel-nl eonsultlU1t and e.dvisor 1:1 the
MKOLTRA neld •

•

4. Tb~ total cost or this p:-OJ~et is l10t to exceed $4,650.00"

tor a period. at one :feU.

:

..

c ---- 5••'IJtII.aM.__ is
basis •

"

eleued. tbrcu,;;h TOP ~

011

a, eont.uet

..

:]
.,

;..

j
gs-401 0 - 11 -

e

110
.,-{
"

(

.,10 • ..:,

~CCRAM

~

•••

&'PROVED

AXDRECa~:

.

.

.•...•

'-

At~~tlt:·

. _ - - PropoIS&l.

•

-._.~

....

. i
~

.,

....
.-. . . ..._2_.~
.
<

.

.

.

.>:

111

... ,. ...

~ ~

\.

~

,

~,

'J•

PROr'OOAL•.:

To .tudy the pos.ible synergistic actioo of drugs

Objective:

Vh1ch cay be apprept tate tor use ill abol1ahitlg cOt1Sciou.snesa.

Then ia re&son to "t:elie"e that tvo or IIlOre drugs,

Situation:

•

used in ccmb1naUon, are IlIOre d'!ectiv8 tbau' tiDgJ.e drugs,

..

Tl:e =biued ettect of sace ~" .uch as ce=biat1OllS of
.
"bar~iturates, are,kneva.
With other c~ications,_the ~eoree
of syeergim 1.11

not

~0V'l1.

U considerable synersi~... 15 ~oW)d

to exist, tvo pouibUit1es must be cO:1S1dered:

(1) t~t a

p&rtic:ularly use:tal ccabicat10n -J" b«1 tound, acd. (2) ·thAt

&

pe.r1:icul&r eanb1.tlat1oa _7 be hazardous "bec&U.Se of its etteet

....
oU%7sp1.nLtiot1
bA:.ard~,

.".,.
::

~'.

~ .Clllle

other vital tunc:tioa..

'.

To minimize

an1l::laJ.- expenments should prec:ede ht:%lZl1 experiments.

~

-

-~

:i

J
Protlosal:

Allocation

dravn ~u e.s needed.

B

...

at

~V1thout &

•

or $1000 tor

That

ac1'ul e~r1:leuts, to be

eXiler1:leI1... a be coaduc:ted

spec:1t'ic graut, aud V1th

"

. ..

.:~

1ct'cmcallY

appr~ste cover.

112

,

..

.~

.

Obj~~: . ,!,~.~~t!:dy Cl!thotis.

'''1;t;hcu.t the bl.ovledge d

Method:

A

S\lr'f'q

tor t1:.e s.dm:!nistraUon

t.l:.e ~tien~.

~ drut;s

Pi-e~rst1{)n c;! 4\ mau\U!Ll.

,.,

of metho:d$ 'ilhic:i1 !:lave

heell tU~ b'y

....j

er1minalJl
,

for mrrepUtiClU.lll adtlin1stnAtion of drugs •.. A.r.Al7s11; oZ the
P5Ye~od.j''l:lJ!!tii~:I\

...

.

of situations of this mtTJ:1"e.

~J'("'"'"

~:?Eo~l:

'P...s.t $1000 be 81_1oc:t...t~ for thill parpose r fu...'"<illl to

am

"ee reqw:stea

ue~e-d.

{

1;:

.

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j.

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::.

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113

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C~

•

.

.

1. ~j4tCt au be1::lc 1b.1t.1aW to ~.. a :.eecm"8 Q4 «t"t1cd eat -=a ~ cplc1t.iD1Q
-.,.
_ _ ~t.b..ftCU'l1 to tAe )CtIt:m A ~ • -- • " .

-

"a. • • "

C
c..

~'~'~_tzoUt.1A

tM_

.m4 ."hGaltJ-.-be of
S. !lq bMIl ~ ft.1.De 1A the
ItK!lC'IIl.L.MtmnU FO~ect, ~ u c &.I:trUar 'aM
OOCftlt&At,- ~ 1JIdt~ 1ft
ana, aDd ~ " 0l0rt. b1a ow ~ ~

hbproj~ 2i"~

3.
(a)

in"'.

t!wa'

-G

t~t

H1.."......;~&D4~"~

U the

~

t1Alc1·ot J'E1IL1U.

Scrtoee".

C.

oaata.ct cd ~ tor IX"OJe0t4
~ tbo.-loc&W U

c.. _

(0) W\ori1II c£ ~ proj~ 1A the
~ 1oc&t04 in to. ccntnJ.

. (lI)

c-

(4) Scrr10tN u .. ~ 00CSlUt.a.at aD4 ~
1A
rcmm t1a14.

*

.c."- " ~act
~oal
I4YUo%' aD! ~tclt
to
~
~bl1ab_
;

Co

"r

.

----_.-..

.....

~
v1ll be ~M4 tor h1a 8C'T1oea
m4 ap«IM8 11pCa noe1pt of Q izn'o1Olt at 1rz'qU1&r
~ WMD tnwl ~"a an ~ . ~
~ at. ~ oaz:01ez', t.hq v1ll ~ d.ozlWtntec! ud
n1.liIbca%lJI4 izl tbI ~ -=*'~ thI$ la, ~ v1t.b.
~ 00ftZ1lMat "'Cl!WMM.
.~_
.

.
._--.--_... _._._--...
.. - , .

...

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..

114

"1
:.

OJ

1
...
1 •. SUbprojec:~ 16 1. . . <:out:1nUat1on or'Subproject 3, which
1::lTOlved the eetabUahlIIent and z::a.1nte:lA11Ce or 'f&c1l1t1~. 'for ~.
reaUat1.c tes'tag_~ cert31.n research and deTe1~nt01tema crt
tnterest to CD/TSS aZll1 J:PJJ/TSS. '!be f&C1Ut1ea vere set up under
SUbproject 3, &:ld- SUbproject 16 14 intended to provide for the
cont1zNed aa1nteca.nc:e of' the t3C1l1t1e••

2.

~ject 3 YU orlgjnal]:- 1ntende4 to proT14e :f"lmd.s far ~
the taclllt1ea far ODe ,-ear; but 110 tarn. out that the

~e

or

coatact ILlterat1OZl:', e~~t,
e.t~ted 1%1 ~~ject
benc:~

3;

16 at th1.a
:!.

t1JlI£.

am
the

1n1t1Al
~e..

~Ues YUe

under-

1t7 to establish SUbproject

#

S'ft~~j~t 16 V1ll

'be

eamUt:ted by _ !ZD'S .....

. . . . . Certa.1n support act1rtt1ea Y1ll be proT1ded b7 CD/TSS
a.zxi An/1SS.
.
~.

'"

1'be est1=ated ~t 'far a peried crt

ODe ;year.~

<1-

.-

..~
I

$7 "1~.OO.

.

.~

.'

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• ' - - ' A-

"=Z=·:====__

D&te:;..'

:

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. o'

-.

'&-7.? . :-rOo:" '''_.Is:.
•• _1.
~

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115

•

,J

. -J
.. J

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116
~

1"O!l 'I'::z M:CQ.'U>

~:

t~ose

P:-oJect UXUI...
"'lU., Subpro~e(:t 23

aC~

1..' 'rbe
e.ctl-rit1u

L~l
at tMII pro.leet 1'5 Inten1.::iO eneCI!tpUs :111

.' -

in b7 tee & F. . .
:"\
1:0. itD c::vn !Q.C';1Ut1u UDier t~ d.1ree~101l at CD/TS3L,Ltl J
At the ~5ent .t1::e tbe V'3...-tcus !"%"'O~eets at tMII t'cc1Ut~·
lao
F
em.
•• are be~ eotldUl1d ~ it i. ~...ed. du1..-t1b1.e
troc:l. the atD.:1:ipo1::t at secu:ti!;7 and ~t!1e1et:cy to npl3:'" tbese prOJe~ta '.r1~ a. s1J:Slt: project 1:000e ~etle:':l.l 1:1 1ta 11~.
••
nO\/'

llno-u...t:"ed

(*.

2.

~

,i-opoll~ ~rec. Dr. ..

~el1tes

sttacbd.
the
1.lrrutio-nttoes tbAt his ~ac!lllf;1es vtU 0110-1 hU1 to
corry out on .the cater1:Us developed. 1:1 the t~ pr:l~eet3' :"'"'..!erred
to Ul_.,e...-egrc.ph 1., lU ",jeU ns ee~:l!: other =ter1:l.ls at tn"::2!:'e:Jt to
Cd./TS3.' Or. .
~o 3erves as 0. ~er:lJ. co:sul t:3.llf; to this
~o;-i3i.0Il"
.. rov1:!.l!S cO'Ver ~ c~t...:lUt :~il1t1es to ths .o\c;en:;-.
e:::te.nt at

.

~e.

(c,

~.

.

'!.'be to':.:11 eost
tlC~ ~ed ~2, jOO.C<l.

Dr.. ee

at

t~s ~j3c:t

c:l..

.b.c.s

tor a. :tetioi 'Jt one ;'eC': vill

't~

4.
been z:-=td :l.
Sec:oot Cle:U-..:lce 'b:"
the A....-e~cy e:ld. is :£''1.111:: I.::'P"o".Jle ~ ~l:ec"1~ tba se<:u:oit:.r cr tal!!
Go":e~tlt '3 i:lte::'est in S'Uc!l :=.ttoers o.S this.

.~

~;

:~

.J

~.O"';::D

01 rr.,,-:J);3:

10 O:l3!.I·::.;.r:IO=

...

'0

".': ..;j;i]

.• jJ
c

117
In

•

I!ltt~T8

1. - lot

pruC1; ~ ~ 1M e=.<:u'DOd. od'!:b ~caJ. ~.....u vlUc....
~ t:ba ~r ~ 1\m.;o:d.r.II\ of Ua4 c:.m.tnJ. ~ ~ ,

'fl1Ioa

114

m-

ig ~ to ~ & ftrietT of
~ ill. ~ ~cclop.C:IIJ. c.-JLu
eM aDd. 1;0 ~.'dM.&i£. new chllIIl:J.t'Al I.(Cb 01" ~'md.i!Y

tbaot &r1 1D. pnaea.i: "'"

~ WAIl U

~ ..,.

dllll£Zlli.

=

=-

Z - 'l:he ~ ~ qc~ ilrnl'ti;a~t4
~we4 uill b4l ~
aw.la 't:Q ~rAl 't:bi.Ll:' e.=;ce aar:i ~ 'tCiX1d.tT. tbd.r' ~p.e&l
ei.'t.etl'v.UJ, M r.:a.llad. lrT" ftrlsq ~ IlUlq ~.., '~,:!I. u 'b1ooc! FS-~
~t:iClu, 'brancM.U dUll=.t1AlQ~, ~ ~!~~ O1:C. Cc:r:P
p1Ire. aa:iJa&l tadllt:14s wl...1l "~ tflr =.u paz'POM aM. Pll:d:t.olc~
I't:Dr:iT v1ll b8:.ClI.rl"14i ~ .. dao &Utet:N ~ ~ ~ tlI:I1-.1s &"S MCrif1ce4.

_ ..1

:s -

~ ellId~ 1Dwr~

c:hmcal aceU, _

Q.a ~~,
~

.

'II"...u 110

ea.rri.td CiIlIt

~te ~,. ~

GO. t:M 1IIfn"'J~.
'idU. k pa"fmaed, Ullch
cbIr aiI!e

~i rtc. 1:0 ~.the d't~'l"lIII:ie'I!1Ad

CJl ths Iir.7.p mtllI;'

~~Uc!B.

.

4 - ~u ~rt:3 vUllwl W"..llml.t'tecl of 'tb8 1'.iIVi~ at ~l;y 1.tt~•
~

- hvpoMld baiptl
,~'!&S!
!iyn1:brt!.a Cl. pw"te ~

$1,:::00.00

~~u~

5.500.00

~1oa~'

::1.400.00

<"mlea] ~

f=,=:7D:J 1S2

5,500.00

~~u-:i&ttI

aa.1e,.,,1 u.&i8Cut

4,000.00

3,GOO.00

C ird col ':"<:!Ed d.m .

..

'llrt:!I.l u.1arl.ltlI

"

tin>

~

~&1""!"tm.l

kUmlJI l Il;fi..f.IIIJ.

17I1.in't~ (I

~CiJ, 6' ~UlrJ ~es

,

~ eqgipsmt
IlIIId.1e.lll~, tIt.C.

X1... e-""'-.f

Tnnl,

f'&e1llt:f.u

Total other

~l.6i

4,000.00

d,OOO.OO

2,000.00'"

,..L~
... ~

~~m"tt#

$ 42,700.00

---------_.. _--_.

..

..

'.'

~

. .;"

.'

118
'.1
JJ=:f-.
4

tlRAn'

e

.

l€)

.

.'

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Ou~ol>er l.~

.

1. INe ·~o ..,{ClDJl14erable 1Dereaae 1n the .cope at th8 V'01'k underb111111l, 2
at the ~t1ClZ1 at rrsslr::IJ \md.ezo Subproject 23,

taken

Project !mJt'nlA, ~ $42,700.00 I'\lII orlgf"'''7 obUpte4. tozo thi. YOrk
1. 1naut':1c1e.d to COTeZO tbe ,-.U'" cc.~. It 1e tberetore ~.1Ied to
aM $15,000.00 to that a.l..""U4y obUgate4 1m!U' tl:t1. SUbproJect.

~. The tl,tal coat ~ We &1bproJect tar the paned 28 Jazm.arr 1954
to 28 J~ 1.955 riU thua uoant to $5'7,700.00.

II

3. '!'he ~':n&" U1 aeope n~'ble tar tbi. ~ cona1st. ot
tbA deTel~t Md. p-ut1al t ~ gt tvo MY .ouree. at 'b101ogieall)o
acUTe e ~ at inUNS" in the prognm TSS/CD 1a_~ cut.
.~.

f

J

\_.

.
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.';"

.,

'

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..

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, 1

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119
'_.~'

D

~
• • •

• ' . . • • • • ~ . . . . II

" 25 AllgU!t 1955

,
",

~0R.A.litUM

FOR:

..

SU~.m::'I'

-::.:. .-

:

T:l:I:::REC CRD

. ..
'

Authorl.ut100. for Payment of Certain FJcpenses Uncler
:':~'~ Pr:?ject ~ I SubproJect 23

. ,"

,.
1.' In order

try

"., .; .. ,

'.

cs.rr.r rothe York 'Of: the above Su"bI-rroject y '1. t

...

vas nec:euary to test the ef'fee1;s of ::1':rt.a.1ii. eh~lll..tc:e.I:au'b8Um!.:es
.
'lhen e.d:n1n1ate:t'l!ci to ~ bc:tni'1;s. Certain ,of. the s.ntie1pated
et1"ectal involved rr.enta..l t\mctions vh1cl'1 predtuL.--d "the 'Use or .-a.ental '
dd'e c::ti VelS tr.:ir tM. ~ I'U'ti ,.::uJ,il,!" 115 tudy•
.
2. Ir.1 v1ev' ~ tl:Ieae ci,~tanee$ the proj~et engineer: "'"'1th
ver:a.l a.p-p:r.-'~ fraI;, h1s ~..h1d.'p authorize;! the contrt.ctor to pay "the
bOBpi tal.t'l fl-XpeWUHt of certain, persons 8u.1'ferlng 1'::'om ineure.ble cancer
for the l'rtviJ.ege of att.ld,ying the effect.a of these ehem1ull$ durl!ll.\
their te1"'llt1..u.al 1llne3se~. The tot.al 1'ur.Id.a e:.xpended. ill this fash10n
amounted. to :$658.0,5 lind f'ull.va1".1$ YU reee1~.
;,:.

_.

,

•

•

0"

,~

_ :3. 'It is requested that t.be Chtef j ~ '1 -"4 ~te his ]mO\ofletlge
and. apprc.-.-al of th!.s :pa.rl1cul8.r ~tld1tura tor ,,&ud1 t !'U%'Poses. .
"1""

•

TSsjChem.1cal Div:t81on
IJ?l'ROYED:

..

D1strtbut1on:
0l'1So - ;,'lSS/CD
~

"I5Mt'WW

i·;

I'

,i

! .

i

.it.

....

'.'1.·

-]

120
21 December

19;~

,"

la:,lCRA1IDtm FeR:

•

Director of Central !.utlill1gence

Project !.:-a.'L'tRA, SUbproject 35

1. "/hUe tlle Director's statuwr:: fl,uthor1ty to ~end funds
for co~1dent1a1 purposes is not l~ted by laY, we believe that
a gift of Goverr.::ent :f\.mds as such wuld exceed the intent of the
Co::gress in grs.Ilt1ng ttat power. 1!O'...ever, wae:-e s girt is lIl:1de·
for the ex!,re~s 'pu.t;tC:;e of ;produc:1r-.g s::lr:ethir..g of value to this
M;,e:ncy ·...hieh ca."lI1ot ctbo-....ise be obtair.~.i end. tbel"e is a reasona.ble e-xpectation that the valt.e cay be rece1\'ed, the gift cay in
effect 'be a~ ex:;> end i tl:.re for 'P1'0per off1c1~ ;;n.::'pos es •

2. In S~project 35, it is stated tha~,the,donation in
q.uestioll would ach~eve cer~1n ends desired by TSS;- '!:"aeJ."'e seeiilS
to be no question that those eLds Mvuld be ad'/Sn~eous, so the
main questions appear to be wether they could cot be attained
by core direc t, nor.::lal methods,: and" 1t' not, whether the return
is necessary and reasonable in relntion·to the donation.

3. We ere in no position to re"fiew the require=ents ot TSS
or to a.p!,:"O:\ise the 8.dva.ntazes that \..ould result from this project.
We do Dot co:::nent, thereforeJon the value received i f :the
project re&ult~ in the be~efits foreseen. We fee~ we should
~o~ent on factors affecting tbe probab1~it7 of achieving those
enlis. In to lesal s~nse, there is little or no cO':1trol. ' Once
the i'ur.ds ore dor~ied, the 1.ndividualJ his foundat10n J or the
hospital cculd conceivab~y refuse to work for us or allow us the
u::e of the f:lcil1ties.
4. Practically, the c~ntro~ see.':15 to be estab~1!hed e.s, ....ell
a.s circ\:D~tances :per::lit. CertainlYJ as ~ong as ih~ indi\-1duaJ. is
alive llr.d in bb pl'escnt position, we Mve every reaSon to eY.pect
his cO::lplete cooperation 1:1 the' future as 1:l the past J unless
tb..""Ougb sc;~C! act or fault. of our own he is a,l'ieno.ted. Even in the
event ot his death or incapacity, there appears to be a re~sonQble

....

•

'. ly

>.J

. -y:.'-j
~

.

.

Copy 1# 1 of 1 copy

...?"

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.

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.

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LA

121
f: ...... r.c.

c~ .. c~n~1~.\'o:'~~

:.u.r::e:'c:n~

to:.

ehe.i!.:1

U;o :,,:"C~ect.

11:1. a~eQ.~t.e

e~~ b~ ~o 2e~ obj~e~1on

~: t.~e=e ;:ro\.:o.:c!li~1-=:'J er:~:nr

re~'..:-~ £cr 't~e c:<;e~:11t~e, tl:~re

to this G$F~ct o~ ~~~ p.cJQC~.

ere

It should. be r.oted t~t there
t·..ro e1:'cu::sta.nce3 ':bich
consideration in a fi~l det~inatico. As stated in
Section V, ou: contribution, by ~ppear1ng to be troc a priv~te
source, ~~uld·incre~se th~~tc~inz CoverT~en~ contribution by a
si~il~ ~~o~t ~hicb VCtud not be the case if it were y~~~~ that
this ~~s in fect a GO'le~~~Dt cor.~ribut1cn also. Secondly, it is
th~ stated ~l1cy of the hosp:'tal
cr~g~ the Cover.-.:ncn-:; e:.d
co~erciel orc&~1zatic~5 SO ~er cent ove~heed on research contracts,
vbere~s ncnprofit fO\L~~ntic~ P~J or~y ~1:'cct costs but no ov~r~ead •
Dcc~use of t~e oste~s1blc so~ce, our projects 1r.Lll not be c~~ged
o·..erhead. This could be construed ~s l:oreJ.ly Y.:"C~fu:!. to the
hospi tu,· .as nor;:s.l.l:r we \lOuld ~ey the SO per cent oVeJ.'heed
cbarg~ tor ~~oj~cts perfo~.ed ~1rectly !or ~S, but I ~r.11cve
this can be offse<;, at le~st to tbe e:::o'u:lt o~ our do~tioc, end
pe::.-~~s by the fu.."'"ther ~Ou:lt by wbic~ tt.e othe=· eo...-err..::er.t contributions are increased by our dcr-.s.tion. In o.."1y case, if th~

5.

r~~u1re

to·'

...
•

1z a ~rcp~ O~2 ~ ~~~ be ~e~fo~ei in t~is ~~~~~J
sect.:.ri·:Y d1cta~e:; these circt=Ste.r.ces end the;,', therefore, Clo
not ~~ese~t a le~al cbst~cle e.s s~ch.
pro~cct

6

0

He ra~sed the qu"est1c:l' \-"hether f-~s 'for 'the bospital

construction could ~ot be cb~.ined t=c~ otccr ~or--zl ~ha=1~ble
sources. It 3P9~ared tt.at there was a'stroi~ poss~:ility th~t
the 1nd1"/1d~ cocce~edcould raise adeq~tp. f~ds fr~ p~i~~te
resources, but it vas the position of TSS that 1f this Yer~ t~e
c~se ";'·e wtluld not obt3.1n the~o:I:!:1t:1ent ·from the indi vidl.:L'~ e.'1U
the de..... 0< cont:<>l ,1>'ch thlO ,roy; h.e~"ii;.,ev~,

~~c.e ~
IAr~C:::

~~-{;I

R. HOtiS'l'.:::t

General COl1:lscl

:::::1:: •

,- '\··::~.~':"~~ed to: c.:~:i::
~".:'::~:" itj" ot: 18;'..75
-

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?y authority cr: lS7~i5
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Copy f# 1 of 1 C;)py

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122
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8 April 15155
...;:'
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for this

~cje~t.

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docz not

arf~ct

in a:lY

Gen .• !ll C...uns __

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~7 c~th~~1ty

or: 187475

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A p:>:-t1cn or th,

Ro:~~ci:1

~oll:r,.r~ I::.3.~icl:l

e.!ld

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the

c:!ci m,a'l;hoda: .

1. S'J.bsta:1ee~ lo1hich vill
~~i~~.!l99:J to ths pobt

di3erediti!d in

~~e::t of
\iiiJCOVerr or the ,

and,De7e1c.7-cnt

TSS/Ci:.~c.sJ. Di-t.i=ic;n i~ d~oted. 0(,0'

prc::ota

1llcGi~ th1nl:11lg
rccip~Gnt \lould be

....harl3 tho

~ubllc.

2. Subllltances loibioh 1::cru:e the et!'ieicnC1' of' z::enta.tion acd perception.

J

3. l-'-~t3rlal3 \:hiob .....i l l prcrwGtlt
intcle9.t~ Gf'l'rJ;:t., of alcoi.lo1.
.

or COQtars.ct

~3

'-

4.

l,~to!l'i::Us

tect ot o.1co1101.

\lhieh will prO::'Jta the intoxieatir..;

a.~­

. s.

H9.torie.le w~ch vill. p:":):!uee the fJi~3 ~~ S7~t=zJ
of' nco¢=acl lli~~G in a =evorsib1~ 'b-a.y eo that ~q r:::!.'¥
bEl w;,..-l

6.

::'0;;' me.l.iuger~,

eta.

.

l·~ter..::UG "Mob \Iill :'C!lder t.he

eaa!5:- or

otharwi~~ ~ce

its

1::auct1on ~ h~osiB

~e~ess.

7. £ub~e~ \;h!o.h Yill w..snea tho o.billt1' or il:M- ..
rldU!U.s to \dth:::t.'lz:d p:-iv:?tion, tort':a and coercion C;;1J:'1;:l.';
interrco·lti~

~ ~~J'sd l:b:-a.1n-\o-e.ahiDg~.

8. V.s.teriala llJ:.i phjr:.iw ::ethod:l llbich \lill 'proQ.u~e
8lm8sh tor ovanta procoi1::g ~ d'~ th~ u=o.
_
9. PlJy:iesl t:~tbods of precuc1r g cho~ e.:ld e~":Jion
over c::tended peri0<i.3 ot t1::s &:lei earab1e ot GU.."TC?t1 tio~
u:::,s.

•

,

_

as

SUbSt.3nC3~ \-!h1ch prodtlce p~:J1eo.l. d1:sablw.ant 6'u.011
pe.raly~1S o~ the lOBs, -e.cute s.nem14J et.c.

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G">1baeq,ueJ1t .le to-<:icvn..
S\\b5ts:'.ee~

12.

-----',----- -

-:z~hioh

'Jill produoe lIFttt' e ll" euphor....a. .1.:t.h no

\.'h1-:h uter

por~nallt,.

a "'"'3.1 ·:;~t the ~cl~m~ of tea racipiE::lt
~cn eJ::other pa],'~cn is cr~ccd•.

struoture :1n wah

;.~1

to bacc::.e de;mlC!ent

"j

13. L r..3t~r1~ \i~ch w-ll C:lU::le E~ntal ~o~.lSion of cuoh
a. t]pv tbt tha i:::Urlc.t;!ll c::::d~ i"v" Wluc~c:s ...- ill !i.'"l.ii 1~
ditt1ccl.t to ms.inta.in

Q,

1'.::.bdcatioIl. u:::ier

q1:.~:;tio%Jing.

14. Sub3t&ncos 'othich vill. l=,...~ tho e.::lbitio an:i

g~nsral ~v~~ e!fic1cn~J
ur.dat~~ble aIW'Jnta.

or :en

"'~3n.ad~1n~~tared in

"j.'
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,

f

.

.

15.

&.lb~C$:'J ...· h.ich pro=()ts ll~es:J or diDtortion
OJ"e:::i;hi 0:' he:!.:'ing ic.cultie:l, Froi'e~h1.7 vit1lcut
Fer:ar.~~t cl:ta:t3.

ot

th~

16.

A kno:kcut r-Ul 'Jhich c:m

~tit1~17

bo

8d~1n13tG:'~ in ~ink3, £ced, ol£arettcB, ~s en eerceol,
etc~, uhich ,,-:.11 be s~o to WZ9, provide a r:x:1:::ul:1
t.=1G::i::., cr.::' ce ::t:.1~1~ !cr ~:~ bj ~=t t~'l-e~ C:1 e:1

ot

Ad boo basj.s.

17.

A

~t!.r1al

uhich enn be

crorroptiti~ly 3drn

1,,1a-

t"red 117 t:.o neove routea c.nd vhich i%J vGrj ~ CO\:1ts
\lill l::9..~e i t i:~x..:n:iblg for a =t1 to per!'o:'C e:.."7 p1;7oica.l
3.ctivit.-y \!Catover•.

.
ThG deve1orsn1o of a..ter1!.ls or this '"1on:s .follO"'.l! 1o~e
et.?_"1dc.:od "'r~ctic3 of such ethicoJ. c....... !>' beu:c::I nD ~ _ )'"
4 ; 7 1; i~ 0. :'~l.a1o~..: o17 :rt'U't1%:o P;;cfiC.t:..'""O to d ~ . ~
to the );Xli.!lt or h~ t.e:::t1.~. C~·di.~, Cl3 ~ hcu:1~:; cope.nd
u!l0~ tho :,:rrl.cos c~ privAto !'h:rcic1:l.ns ter ~., ti:al cJ.:.n~~..-l
t~G1o~.. ~0l3 phy'c1oinns nrc v:U.l.iJ:s' to a::~o the ro~el".s1b1llt,.
.of au·.:a t~'HltlJ in c:'dcr to t'.d-.u.ce tho sci~~e ot med1oi.!l!!l. It
is dJ.:!'iC"ilt e::.d ~O:r.cti!:.9" 1l..-possible tor TSSjCD to of:£:::r euch
r.n 11:61C:::::on1o ldth r.o~cct to Uti prcCW2h. I:1 ~et1~e, it hu
been fO~s1b16 to US3' out.:oic.e olcal'er! contra.ct"rs tor the p:'aH ... ~
~~::~::I 0'£ this \:o:ok. f:.:r..v vor. t~.:~t p:u-t w.,fCh ~volve3 hu--m
,toDt:l:ls at t'l'.t'zoU..e d03t9 levelD prasento e~co.tr1t,. prOblf;U vhich
~ot b" h.~c:U.$d bY' the ortUJ:&.-r ccntr&ctcr.
.

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126

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10 May 1955
SUBPROJECT 3S OF PROJECT

~ULTRA

.

.

the".

..

'

1•. Subproject :!5 u approved by the DCI on IS January 1955 contemplated ;:.
fi~nciu contribution of $lZS, 000 to
?ESa
to
partic:ipll.te in the construction of a new.re.. ea~ch wing to COlt $Z, 00 ,000
~xclulive of furnilhingl &n4 eqwpment.· ";Agency fundI will be transmitted
the . • •
t~uOu:lh ul

ixth

M2

8'.

•

B

8

•

$1.000.000 - Contributed b y .
I 2 'S
250,000 - Donation from
•
78 of which $IZS.000 to be supplied by CIA
1,250,000 - Matching fundi under Public Law 221 equ&1
to the amount of t:,e two above cont~ibution.
. . " ..... ~:
'
500.000 •

..

~3:

B

I

2. At that time (IS JanUA~Y 19S51
I with CIA
encolUagement indlcated a williogile .. to contrib~.te $SOO, 000 to the consuuction fund. The building fund wa. to have been ~:tiled as follows:

I

JJ

IJ

- JJ

000, 000 • 'TOTAL

3.

Since it now appearl teat t.:,e expected contribution br •
win n:>t be
permission is requested to increase the Agency'l contribution
by $250.000 which will ruult in a financial lituation as' follows:'
I"rt~coming.

bY.!
'S !
_.1 __

.

- /38

$1.000. 000 ~ Contributed
500.900 • Donation from
including
$375,000 lupplied ';)y CIA
1.500,000 • Matchin:; {undl under Public La ....• 221 equal
to the amount of the two above contributions

$J, 000. 000 - 'TOTAL
4. T~e Agency's c:ontribution w0l11d ~us toW $375: 000. This in".restment,
together with the eqUAl awn resulting {rom matchea tn.rIal. il fully justified
i" the o?inion ot TSS for realonl which will be ex?h,il'.cd by
Chid, 'TSS. a.nd Dr. Sic!.ney Cottlieb. Chief. TSS/Cilemic:~l Division.
'The Icope of lubproject 35 hal not changed since the Director ori;}inally ..
approved a request by TSS for permiulon to spend $12.5,000 of aV:l.Uable

<-

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"

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.,.~

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;

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XW j as in th e ne .... re.ear 2 vri ng"'bcu.t-out
wdhich "QT"Cie'" Ipace
eUlg ma e
-

reI t ln one-.
.1
avaibble {or Agency-sponsGred r~lea.rch involving covert biologicu and
chemical techniques of warfare.

W1.

I3

:."'"

I

127

.. / H

~',r.• l~ !":' this ylU'pose throul:h the eoEltx'oh tlJ3.d p::ocechuell cllu,bU,;\ed
t.~ :.~i.t:L.Til...... .o\t lh@ time I~l:>p::",iec~, 35 WAI u~ up wiiliil\ U:e Iicope of

\.... ; .";s !u. n i,ro;;rOl.m, security eonsidera.tiolO.lB

a.~d co...er :ll"rar.&eme~t•
... <"TC ",\rC::'~\ly .rc:.... i.~ ... ed, and the Office of Gener:&! CeuJ:i.jlel auillted in lCid
.1.' h- nr,:n:ltiCl:ls. With tbe ~ception of !,W\ding &rrll.r.;:.emen~•• no chaniea in
:':.~ ;,r0J;Z':Lm h'1.... e nince been made.

./11

II

.

.... F·.,,,d. to cover ;tfle previouitly il.?pro·.. e,d. IlUm.
"'''\''in the TSS ~budget lor FY 55 a.nd !lave b en aet •• ide. Tbe "rSS
t.."i :C't. bo.... e»·er. b.!=xa funde with which to co r the lupp1ement.&l .Uln of
$l~O. oeo, m.nd it i, requested ~t the TSS'~ud6dbe increased by thia
"mount. Su.pplementary fundi •. V1.ilable fOIr a:1~bp:ro~"ct 35 ca.n ddi.:c.itely be
oblil:i3.ted by the ellc! of: FY 55.

r.~;;n~rtl·l~c1

to,-.I . .

:';' .:.::O:orHy of I lG7.~?5
l::I\e: J:::l(1 l!l71

•

•

.2.-

J
j

128
-------------- ..
AMENDMENT TO

SUB~On::CT

....

. .- - '

35.

~O.T£CT

""1
j

MKULTRA

For the Purpol·e aI EUablilhins .. Cover Orgl.rU&atlon Cor Highly Senlitive
Projecu in the Field of Biologic&l, Chemical and Radiological W&rfare

Y.

Background of Subproject 35.

ii.,.~n by the DCI tD Subproject 3S of Project
MKULTRA. The documentl which lel.d to thil I.pprovd (inclu~ini com.menu
of the OGC) .ne I.ttl.ched herewith &1 Tl.b. 2, A l!.nd 3.

In Janu.a.ry 1955 I.pproval WI.ll

Project MXULTRA h tl:.e frame .....ork of procedures &lid controla under which
research projectl in certain biShly lensitive fields are carried out by TSS.
A description of the background of Project MKULTRA may be {ound on
pl.ge 10fT&bA.

F~.".·l·

d

Subproject 35 utabUsbel cov"r 'under wbich the Chemical Division of
DD IP lTSS -..ould conduct certAin le~sitive projectl in the liellis of biological
~nd chemical wadl.re 1.00 conlilltl of ... propoled arra.ngement whereoy the
Agency covertly coo.tributea fundi to a .. ilt the I dB
II F - 8
c • • in tbe co:utruction of I. new resel.rch wing. Contribution oC these'
Cund. i~ 'to be ml.de U1.Z'ouJh the pi
g
... - [j
. . j . cut.out 10 that ~ _
'
..... oul:1 re:o::a;" _ I;
unwitting of Agency participl.tion in tbe buildin~ program. ProjecU would
ll.ter be cl.rrie~ out by the ChemicAL Division using the Ca.cilitiea of the
new r".euch wins, and Agency employees would be I.ble to participate
in the work without the University or the HOlpital authorities being aWolre
. of Aee:l.cy interest. Su.bproj~ct 3S contemplated the contribution oC Agency
fund. to a ..ist in the construction oC Cacilitiel. Future releuch work
would be carried out througb theM
&II cut-out &lid would be - f!,
lep,"!.rate1y funded Wlder exbtins procedures &nd controll.

1'.'"

~==;::::=:::~~~'~r~r~7~'~i~~~~
the backcround oC
'iIIJ!
mltrp
7
• are delcribed on page 2and
oC Tab A. On the

-

lame pace tbere will be Cound & flU'ther deacription of the •

{J,

'. •
II.

r_

•

n

IF

B uilc!lng Fund..

The Unlveraity will require $3, ODD, 000 Cor tbe silt-Itory addition to the
hO'pitAI exclusi'1e oC tbe cost oC l~d, heating and powe.r .upply ....hich are
being provided by the Univerlity. Under Public l.aoar 221, Subap?ropr~&tlon

.

··.·1.·
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.

r ,":->.,...-egp~ ,j, r ~"!!n!F!?!*
~

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663, d~:cd 26 August 195", !u::.d. are
this pu.rpoJe by the Univc:rsity.

avail~ble

to m ... e.:b !u:ld. raised lor
•

Wi:en Su!lproje.:t 35 was first prepared, it w,n hoped A.6>d expected that the .
required ",ou~d t.e provi<!e<! ~. !ollo",",: The Uni,'(:r:lity ha.. allocated
$1,000,000 to this project aM will assue.c u?keep z.."a .~...1!ir.i obU::a.tiOIU.
agreed that II the Agdcy ",ould proYide ~~j.rr
0
'-,;;i.th a.gun.t ol 5125,000, the FUl:ld ,",ould rn.at<::b UiD a.lr.<>W!t and
malte. toul donation oC $250,000 to the Uni...ersity Building ~·~d. At that
tilne, d.cussion. with
.
!
$ ft> .i..
indicated that ~ Sf.i!i!lIJhvol11d contrib\1te $500,000
to the building project on the batis that rad~giCal re.ea.zch would be
conducted in tbe new .ing ~cl t.hu the constru~.tion ol the new Cadlitics
....a. oC ineerest t:l that Al:ency. I.::1 1lU.-nm.a.ry, tl:i i:.na..c.c:ial si.tu.a.tion was
to bave been ~. !ollo.... :
6
Cu.~d.

n-

<:. •. . . . . .

n"

•

T;7

n, 000, coo.""

•••

all' _. -

f!,

HO,OOO - Don.a.tion ! r o m . I
M{o! which
$125,000,",&1 supplied \)y CIA)
1,2 50,000 - Matched F=ds w:der Public La. 221
500.000 7
_ &
$~.
000 - TOTAL

coo.

[J

- 13

B

It was rec0l:;lized that the Federd c:onn-ibution
1,250,000· Wlder Public
La ... 221 would be .eemingly in!1atec! by re~.
01 ~e inc:lIuion o! the CI.A
contribution in that o! 'Xl
• It was Ielt that the value to
the Agen;:y ""a' .ucb th.a.t thh inflation oC the Fc~eral contrib\1tiotl .... as more
tha n justilicd by the importance ol the over-all proj"ct al:l.d that !urt:ermore,
the inclu.ion of the CIA eOlltributiotl iJ2 t.ha.t o!
was the
but mun. oC maintaini.n. uC\:rity.
...... lJ

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.- 8

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./ /3

The origil\.:l1 informal commitment cn,,~e
o!
.. at {irlt obtail:l.ed
throu::h verbal di.cu.. iotlS with 1
which were !cllo.... ed
up by .:In exch&l:l.gc ol eorrespoac!en.le"betweel:l. the-DCI a...d: _
t!nlortu=tely &( that time ~ & I Cully occupied with the col:l.t:'over'\" concerning the ~ and continued cOl:l.tact with _
1f,!_5.:!~0Z:dilUtu ruu1t~ in a ~eiaion ~t
eQu.ld ~ot or
....o"'lcI not contribute to the S'uilding ~d, but would !:If . inC.to 8.Jpport
3n ':'l\nll.:ll re.eueh pr0l:u.m amount; : to $50,000· to $75: 0
It il not
i.
.
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130

..

•
kno ...·n .... he:ther thi. eha..nge: in policy was .uggested tp q
._ or
whether it originate:d with him. Be: thu a. it may, whe:n the: change in
policr be:came: appare:nt, it was evident that additi"r,al funds would be required to comi'lete the hospital construction.
IV.

c.

Su:;:::cste:d Funding.

1j

It h now IUl;gelted that the $3,000,000 required Cor the hospital wing be
provided a. 10110wI:

Ili!=.-••l~.(in~lUdin8

°

$1.05 °0 0 ,, °0°0
.
....
-m
...
.
0 0 -- DIS.
onanon f r o
~
_
~
$375.000 .upplied by CIA)
1,500,000 - Matched Funda from Public Law 7.Z1
$3,000,000 - TOTAL

- &

'.

Thc donation from QiI
a.lSilwould thua con.iU of the original
$lZS, oon to be :lupplied by CIA plu. th-= sum of $1 Z5, 000 to be provided oy
the: Fund and a aupplemental CIA contribution of $Z50, 000. Ori~in311y
SUb"roject .35 requested permiuion to m~~;: a cO%ltribution of $lZ5, 000 to
the uuilding fund and approval 'Rae give:ll, This approval ia enclo.ae:d
herewith aa Tab Z, The purpoae: of thin unendrnent to Subproject 3S is to
requcst permillion to contribute ~ ..dditional $Z50, 000 to the building
construction fund through d fl.·• • d
P It ahould be noted thoU IJ
t:>c toUl Government contribution to the hOlpit&l tund ItUI re~ina
unchansed u $1,875,000. The incl:"ea.;e in the aize of the contribution
by Ihe Fund h noC out 0/ keepinr with other operationa of rUts and will - iJ
Dot arouse undue comment becauae of ita magnitude, The origin&lly approved
contd~ution has not aa yet been t"ranl>:nitted t o i _ . and neither the
- 11
orisi~al contribution %lor the auppleml!nt lllIould be p.id to
until
~
funds ",uec;.uOlte to complete the project are m;l.de available·, Thia condition
VI . . . . . peciIicd by the DCI in approvini the original contribution.

T:

V.

Source o! CIA Fundi.

FU:\lJs to covc:r the initially approved 'um of $125; 000 Ilre a.vailable and have
been ICsrC:l:ated for thia purpoae within the TSS FY 1955 Bud;et lor Reaearch
lind Dc:vel0l'ment, Inau!!icient funda remain in the TSS budget to cover the
aUl'l'l"mcnt~ry aurn of $ZSO. aDO, lUld it is therc!ore rc:quut.:d that the TSS
but!:-:,·t be increased by thia amount Olnd that the inc,rea.ae ~e made: aVOlilab!e
to SUbproject 3S of Project MKULT1tA,
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...
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the Of!ice of General C.:lul'Uel.

Tab 3 iii & memorandum from the Genera.l Counllel to the DCI dated Zl
December 1954, cornmenting on Subproject 35, a.cd etatinr in part that
there ar'!! no fundamcnta! legal objectiono U the probable benefitll .arc considered a fai!" !return for this expenditi.!rc. The lunendment to t.he Subproject
contempl_tu only an in<:.u:~se in funds and in no viay changea any other
aspect of the project. Tb,~ pk·oject haa been referred back to the eGC even
though no change in its structure ie contempla.ted, and Tab <4 contains his . I
commentll.
VU.

Ju!tiCleati.m.

The advantilgclI and benefits accruing to the .Agenr.y eutiined in Tab A are
felt by TSS to· provide adequate and complete justification for the expenditure
of the additional 8um her ein requel!ited which bdngs the total CIA contribution to $375. OllD. The mo~t imporunt of theGe advllntages atld benefitll
may bl:: samniarizc:d 3;' !oUow.: (1:u\1o:1' e:ll:pianationa m.ay be round in TAb .'\).
One-l!ixth of the total .pace In the new hClspital wing will be
aVo\1i1able to the Chemical Di.."hion or 1:S:3, thereby pl;oviding h.bor3.tory and oHice sp ..c:e, technical ll.esiltants, equipment a.nd. experimental l>ni.malll.
II.

b. Agetlcy ipO!"1sorsbip of senlliti·"e rellOluch projects will be
eompletdy denh.b\e.
.

c. Full pro{euional cover witl be provlded tar ''''p ta three biochemlcal.o:mployees of the Che:nic.:al Divillion.
•
d. Human pat!entll ~d vctuntoee:r. lor u:perimco.tal U'5e will be
AVAilable under controlled clinical conditiont within the futi
.upervl.ion of
- II

Subproject 35 W/U originally conceived in Octobu And November oK 1954,
ami lhe ~f\'lling .Lv. months have indieated that increAlIing emphaail and
iml'ort:\nce Are being placed on the Chemical Dl.vioion'lI work in tbls lleld.
The (,'leIliUel of the hO'pital and the ability 'to conduct contro1lCld e"pelt'imenta under lip.(e clinical conditions u.ing l'I'l;,tcrlah with which ~ny.Agency
•. t:onn~r:ti()n mUll~ b~ completely deniable ,"~ll aUGment and comph::mcnt other
V'"°l;,":t.mlll ,"ccently takd!n ove? by TSS, !luch.
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JP
It was ori;;inally thought that at least 18 months wou1.d elap.se after the
bUilciin:: funcis had been raised before the facilities would be !inished and
could ~e occupied by TSS. This lengthy delay has now been overcome.
When·
.
.~

l3'

has railoed the $500,000 hich his FUZld will ostensibly contri:'ute,he will then be allowed to t\se existing space in the present hospital in
order that he may build up the organization which will later occupy the new
,wing. This means that TS5 will be able to begin to take advanta:;e of this
cover situation within a matter of months instead of waiting for a year and ..

...

•

ab~

VIII.

J

I

S"c\lrity.

Security matters. and details are being co-ordinated with the 1'55 Liaison
and Security OUicer. Security of t:'Ulsmittal of the funds and cover arrangements are described in Tab.A and remain unchanged.
LX.
,~

'Ul •

A!:reement with"

va.

.

e.

~
~

C

The af!~eemcnt witl-.
ill described in Tab A, and t.':.e extent
of his co-operation and the conLrol ove-:- hill actions remain unchanged.
X.

R e ! .. ltant Financial Saving.

The tot31 contributi.cn 'of $375,000 by CIA will result in an 3.dditional
$375, 000 in matching f\L").ds provided under Public Law ZZl. It is felt that
the expenditure o(these total funds is justified by the importance of the
proj;ums which will be pursued at the new facility. Even though the CIA
contribution is increa:;ed u.nder this &lnended project, the total of Federal
funds remains unchanged. The use of this facility will allow work to
proceed wHier conditions of coyer aDd security wbich would be impou\ble
to obl~in elsewhere without an expenditure of equivalent or greater funds.
tn addition. by funding indi'rid\U.l projects lo'l' this facility through the
t1
no ch:1rBe will be incurred for overhead expense. U
ruearch projects
• I
are oE'cnly sponsored by the u. S. Covernment, it is eustomllr}' to pay an ove"bead rate equivalent
to 1l0'r.
salaries._.Ho'!'lever, U a non-profit lund, luch al '8
~ sponson research, the funda; granted for the wor~ are customarily
uled .only to plly Cor .alazies, equipment and supplies, but not overhead•
. " The I\~Cl'lc}' thus bUoY. considerably more research. through""
........,3n ·.....ould be the cue if no cut~out ~erc u.ed.
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134
-T

-

.. b A

-/I

SUBPROJECT 35- PROJECT MKULTRA
. For the purpos e of utablishing a c~ver organization for highly'
s~nsiUve projects In the field of covert Biological, Chemical
and Radiological Warfare

I.

Background of Project MKULTRA.

In 1953 the DCI approved Project MKULTRA which established procedures
and controla under ~hich research" projecu In certain highly sensitive
fields could be carded out by TSS without the necessity of signing the
usual contracts. The approved proced\!res apply"""
over-all Research &Zld Development budget, and no additional £ ~
are required. Contrah cltablbhed in the Project Review Committee
approval of the: RCllClU'ch and Devclopm",nt frogrOlm (other thlln the
slgnHl-i al ... e.ontract) remain unchanged, and special provisions for
" al;,~';t~re Included. All filu ,are retained by TSS. "

i

-"'Ii

Thele proc"duru and controll were approved since it is highly undClirable fnlm a polic:y and sec:urity point of vi~w tba.t CO:l.tracta be
signed Indicating Atenc:y or"c.~vcrnment interest In this field of endeavor. In a areat many in~tances the worK must be conducted by individuala whQ are not a.nd .hould not be a":l,lare of Agency intereat. In
othu ca.les the indlviduh involved are unwilling to have -their name'
on a contract whicb remains out o£ their control in our files. Experience
has .ho·...n that quaWied, competent individuab in the field of physiological, psychiatric' and o~r biological .ciences are very reluctant
to enter 'Into .igned agreements of any .ort which would connect them
..with thl. activity &in~e such connection might .eriously jeopardize
their profeSliional reputation••
When Project MKULTRA was approved, it Wo1' not contemplated that
it would be u,ed for the e.tablishment of cover. Over forty Individual
research and development projects have been established under this
framework and have been carried out extremely succes sfully, both
lr"m technical and administrative points of view. The experience
gained in ha.ndllng the.e project. hal emphasized that establishment
of better cove.r "both for the projects and for "&lociated Agency sc:ientisu
is of utmost importance. Subproject 35 would establish .uch cover •

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Background

The

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I! 'R.
. It hal a Board of Directo~. oC .ix

a

11

members, one of whom is
I
£ . who act. a' Executive
C.
Director of the Fund.
. I it'
lolicited £=d. {rom V:ldoUI - f1
inc!ividuall to £inallcc a program o! ba.ic re.e-arch in the chemotherapy
.,C cancer, asthma, hyperten.ion, psycho.om&tic disorders and other
'.
chrbnic disea.eI. Since 19'51'
lo~pllZ'-at~.w.iUl..the._,.. -.
Chemical Divilion
1'SS and acted unoothly and efficiently, both al
z. cut-out tor dealing with contractors in the {ields c>£ cO~'ert chemical •.
and biologic&1 wa.r!are, and 1.1 a prime contractor Cor certain area.. e!
biological relearch. Project. prcsently being handled for the Aiency
by the FlUId are administered under the coct:ol. and procedures
pHviously approved £:)1: MKULTRA.

na.

B,....

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m.

'Backgroundo!W'-'_

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In the lield o!

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been alloc:iated in
a reaureb capacity with-both t h e .
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D\;.~ing the war
9
Hrved u " . , . .
11 Co
in the Bureau o! Medicine U1d Surgery ill the :-fl.":'. Since then he· hI.'
maintained a con.ultin! relationship to the Navy medical research program.
J ia TOP SECRET cleared. and witting oC Agency - Co
.pon.or.hip o!.the progr&rns carried out by the Fund I., are two other
member5 o! the Fund's Boardo! Directors.

m ,

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£,'

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1
en actiyeiy ensal:ed in a calnpalgn 'to rai.e {unds
or tne purpo'lIe of erecting a new clinical resea.rch wing on the existing
I
7 •
The rueArch wing will cmsist o{ a building llix Itories high, 3Z0 teet luna And 50 Ceet wide. Two~tl1irds
of lhe space will be rue:trch 1&boratoriu anll oUlcet while 100
research bedll'will occupy the remainder.
•
particl~ pUiol! in th.e !und-rai,ing campaign ou.tlinc:d belqw will reault In his
haVing control o! one.si"rt!\ of the tot~l 'pace in addition to the bas!l~
r. "''''':".-:.!:d to: C ..Ttl!!!!.'.!"'
•
t· ::':l:o:-lty or: In;~'IS '\,
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136

ment and general out-patient facilith:s. In this effort,
has scc,ured thE. enthusia~tic support of the medical fa.:ulty and the
o!!icers of the University who have carried the preliminary arrangl!men:s
for .....ard to the maximum extent of their re!ourcc ••

...

V.

C

'-1

j

Financial Situation•

The University will require about ~3, 000, 1)00 for the . s t o r y addition~
This surr. is exclusive of the cost of land and the heating and power supply i
whicb are already available n the .ite: At the present tioe under Public
Law 221, funds are available to match funds raised by the Univer=lit)".
The, Uni\'ersi~y has allocated $1,000,000 to thi! project and will anume
upkeep and staUing obligations.
7 lras-a;rreed that if CIA - C
will provide
':Il!Il!Ir.!l!l\ a grant of $125,000, qr U• • will
- 13 ~
match this amount .. nQ rr.a ... iP,'5tal donation of $250, 000 to the University
Building Fund. Thi~ Agency's contribution will be ma~e under the con\.
dition that it will be re!\,,,ded if construction does IIOt take. place.

e

C..

III

$1,000,000
250,000
,
I, Z50, 000
500,000
$3,000, 000

. .J

•• J!

TSS hAS discu&Sed this situation with" SF
/1
CU;W...... and has encou::-aged.. 7'to dO%late
~
$500,000 to tho: building project Oil the buh that ..... Ii
I t ~ ~
will be conduct:d'in tho: Xl:W ".<"i:lS" .<it • • II' thougH a"".are <:If our
'- I:)
~nterest in the building, is u,Qwitting of our specific 'fields of reseaz:ch ",
,-and individual projects •. 1:0 s';;'mmary, tbe iinanci,ll situ:ltion would be a.
f,,11oW5:
' .

<!WS

"1

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- D,onation fr0rTl ~ .
($125,000 supplied by ClA)
- h1atche:' !~~s .~;-om Public l"Ci.W ZZI
- ai- '5 . ••
- IJ. . ' "
- TOTAL

\.

-'
~

Although it is recogni:ted that 'the Feder..l contribution of $1,250, 000 u:\der

~

~

:~ti~~ Z~~hi:t:~e.~1%cJ1mes~f,;.as::t::l~~e~~c~~~~~~t:!t~~ec~1Ai:ontri:
IJ .~ "

$250,000 and not just $125, 000, ,the am~unt of CIA's contributi0!1; fu~ther- If
more the inclusion of the ClA contribution in that of •
3
- I.)
, - i s t!,c best metbod of maintaining security•.

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-----_._-VI.

-

Dif!iculties Faced t>y TSS.

It ha.s been generally recosnlzed for .ome time that the external releareb activities of the Chemica! Division of TSS in the field of covert
biological, cbemical and radiological warfare are sorely in need of
proper cover. Although Project MKULTRA provide. excellc.nt admini.
IHrative and financial cover f..,r project., it does nnt aUord cover for
scientifie or technical personnel. Ml~ULTRA has been used EoI'
dealing through 1l2:.
a, a cut-out and for working
directly with individuah op-private Gompalliu. The use of'"
~1l the future will be h:l.I::rea.ingly lirrrited'due to ' .

T?

IPst-1.

L. -

(ar The increa.sing number of people who, albeit
properly cleared, are aware of the Agency
connection with
il

r

•

(b)

a

The feeling by •
that the Agency - C
employee. contacting him (Dr •• Gottlieb,
etc.) ha.ve no cover of any sort and - C
consequently expose him to unnece.sary and
highly undesirable personal risk; and

c:a:..
(c)

:rhe widesprc'ad intr:l-Agency av'arenesa of
the nature of the relatien.hip between the
Fund and the Agency.

Another aerious problem faced by TSS/CO as a result of lack of suitable cover is the difficulty in planning career. for technical and
scientific personnel in the biological field. A loni-range career
concept oi activities in this field inevitably includes proper cover for
the individual concerned. T!)e availability of resear·ch 'facilities
at.
£ zpe... m oUer an e;:::e11ent opportunity' -13
to .olve many of the above problems, ane."
"=uti is willing - C
and able to make 3.ny r";lsonable arrangemenu to .uit our needs. Up
to three Chemical Divi.ion employees can be integrated i n t o . - c:
7
_
program for work in the new hospital wing on the
Agency'. re.earch projects. Although career plannin, w:u not a
consideration when plar.ning the procedures and controls est;lbli.hed
by Project MKULTRA. nevertheless this particula.r .ubproject, in
adcJition to its primary objective. will be o~ very great ~econ~ary help

n •

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in dmplitying and elirniDAting rn&ny G! the very .....l<ward and dangerous
co..ditions racing certai.. Chemical Div1sio .. employee ••

vu.•

Advantafu and Bene!!u ....ccruing to TSS.

The co..templated arrangemen~. wiq.;result in many adva..tage ...nd
be..efits. including the !ol1owi1\g:
(a)

I.

O.. e •• i.xth of the total .pace In the new research

&

·.······.1
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wing is to 1:rc availa\71e to '
and
in turn. will be anilable to the Chemical
Divhion o! TSS. This ....ill provide laboratory
and oUlce .pace, technical .... istants. equipJ:-ent and experimental a.nirn.al. lor 'I.e o! Chemical
Divi.io.. per.olUlc1,in cOJ:nection with .pecific
future project••
(b)

The co.t o! Chemical Division projects .·"ieh are
to be carried out UDder this cover will be covered
by !UDd. made available through Project MKULTRA.
And projects will be .ubject to the procedure.
:...~d ee:.t:elc el:~bUshcd I"r }..(I{ULTRA.
The
!Wlds will be pas.ed through _ l i EII'
...
_
P.
Clf.::~.u has been done in the put.
•
,j
in hlrn will either pay expen.es directly or
,uansler the money to the Univer.ity !or this
purpo"e. Each project will be individually
funded based on ita particular budget. and there
will be ftC other continuing or recurrinl cbal:'ge.
for ituns .uch a. apace, !acilitie., cte.

(c)

The .... gency' ••ponsor.hip o! .en.itive l"c.carch
projects would be, completely <leniable since no
connection ....ould exi.t between the Univer.ity
and the Agency.

(dl

rc"':':.~r:\~~4

Excellent professional cover would be provided
lor up to three bio-chemical employee. o! the
Chemical Divi.ion oC TSS. This would aUow open attendancc at .cientific mecting••. the advancement
o! pet'.onal standing in the scientific wot'ld, and.
a. '.uch. would con.titute a major efficiency an<l
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139
rnor ..le boouer.
(el

Human pa..ients .. nd votunte~r. fot' experimental
use will be avail&ble under excelle"t clinical
~on<1ition. with ~b.e full supervision or "'ClllP
... -

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is

D

(t)

There would be i1LvailaMe the equi.va.lent of a.
bospiu..l sdehou"e.

(il

It is expecnci that tl:r'e output of useful l:'uults
of the Chemical Division in the hio-chemical
field will be gre&~ly improved throurh the more
efficient use of teclu1ical persoc.nel ....bo .... ollid
be able to sElena more of their dme or. actual
laboratory worl>:.

(h)

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(i)

ExceUent bciHties would hi: provided lor
recruiting new scientiIic persolUld sine e
members of the Chemical Division working under
W. cover will be in daily .::oatact with members
of the Cra<:'.uUe Scbad of thl.' University"

(Jl

The usul.1l.1" Univeulty llbr:Al'''\' <l.od l"l!:print
servke will be available a, a source of
~echnica.l iniormatict'.•

Fundinj.

!t it proposed that $lZ~, 000 be ;:unt~d to ~ _ . II
approvd il grAnted. ToSS win .I,;range for p;s.ymenl tt) be In&clc: under
the procedures and controb of MJ<ULTRA. Thu~ .fund. ,",culd come
cut of the pruently approved TSS RClearch and Development budget
for FY 1?5S and no new fund~ a.u invDl"~d. T!\e fuM$ wCluld be
trllnllfernd AI .. gnout
In t u r n .
if
. - will m~tch thellc funds with aD equAl amount and dOnAte a toul
of $250,000 to the Univ<l:uity
outlined in paragraph V. The Ilum of
_ $125,000 would be entirely i.n the na.ture of a grant a.nd would in due

to.....

a.

t.·~::::-:l~~d to:

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eoul'se be merged ..ith the entire $3.000.000 rai,ed fol' the eonltructi~!l of the, wing. TJ2e A&ency would retain no 1'elidual' interelt in the
building or title to any e-quipment 01' facilitiel purchaled with thil
money.

I

.'

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This single grant will constitute the Aiency's entire participation in
the new hospital wing, and there will be no I'ecurring obligations in
the for:n 01 alU1ual'llupport of the hOlpital or additional granta. Transmission of Agency fl:ndl to
• will be mad>! .
lJ
thro,ugh previoully utab1i~ed covez:..eha•.;:' ~!: set up by t h e ' "
I
1 ' . f o r similar transmittals in the past.': .." ~::-=tio"n. .o.n."'
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....
~ books will be Ibown .. s having been received from.

_LIS-

J

In the future "'hCll TSS 'pOUIO!'! len.itiv" research projecu whicb are
to be c:arried out 10.
I • ~ach pro;~ct _
~ill be individually fina01ced thr.,)ugh
,
' as'it h .. s
been in the paH in accordance with previously establilhecfproco:dures
and controll using allotted portions of the Ulnu.&l RCllearc:h and Development t.udget. The University will be totally unwitting of Agency
spollso~::hip. and the projects to eve:l'y outward appearance will be
spon.ored by

is

as

-c

r

.

r-,

will c:onti%lue in
In the event of I,
death,
•
being and any activities under thio project will be continued t."'rough" f.IIIIIIiwnd. will be unaUeeted by his death.

lX.

,if

,]

Memorandum of Ag1'eement.

IF P

_

A memorandum of agreement will be signed "nth
Co
outlining to the greateH extent poa.ible: the arrangements under which
the hospital space under his control will be made avallable to Chemic.d
Division peraonne1 And the m ..nne:r in which cover wll1 be pro\'ided and
other benefits ol:-t&lned. No contract wi~l be siped alnce
I lUI
would be unable to reflect any'of the Agency's cDntractual term.s in his
arnng"ment. with the University when
n'Aku the
d onation in questiol\, The memorandum c! agreement will be retained
in TSS.

2

X.

., ' R

B

bSsrt

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Sccurity.

All security ma~ters and details are being cO"ordinll.ted witl'i the TSS/
Liai'Qn and S .. curitv OCfice•.
:'.:,~:,,:·~...~,~c..l to: ~=C~"""'I'"
t :,;,;':.~~w;·:ty 0:: 1",174":'5
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XI.

.....

Resultar-t Fir-and,.1 Savitll.:..

The $125.000 to be eontributed by CIA plu" the $145. ceo in mat<:hins funds
provided under P. L. 27.1 to the Building Fund ",HI be more than o£iset
In a few ye".~s by the savings ",hich wiil result {rom use of this non-pront
fund. If a. r"sez.r<:h prclject at
or other edu<:aIJ
tional non-profit izutltution Is sponsored by the U. S. Government, it
is c:.lstoma::.-y for the Government t; pay for salari~s. equipment.
.
supplies, etc. a:~d f<:>r overhead as well. In th~ C&,;o: of ~
fJ,
th~ o~·erh ... ad am\Ull'1h to B9.~ of sala:-!e,. Ho..... cver. if a non- I
profit fouz:.dation such iU~' _""4JIIM'.1lponsor s research at a
- B
no~.proCit ir.stitution. the (ul:lds srilMed for the WOX'K are customarily
used to pay Cor n.1aries, eq'~i?rr1'l~nt and :iupplies but not for overhead.
The Government dollal:' thus 'buys considc:rably more re~ear<:h through
~ t h a l : lw:,"ld be the case it no cut-out were used.
- g

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XII.

Legal

Matte~.:..

This r:-..atter has 'be"" di~<:\lSStd With.~~ofthe OC!ice
of General CounHI. and h~ is fully aware oC all duai;5 s;J.rrour.ding this
6'" .......

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7 April 19;)3

1. Tho ~urpo.e of tbI. trilJ ~. to m~e arrlLD-;;e:ncnfl £01'
do.lllS OIU t~~" ?:'oj.:c:. "',i~ci been blvol1 a.::::p10 ;ll'eviou.
Dotiea \h:.t IlU::'1 ~'l~' ~ely tc bo th.: ~eo1& of ~~o vi.lt, =:.! be pro.
?,ueu 1Um. eU a.ccorcili1,I1y.

&

2. It ...u u:?!&L\ed to
I _ tb:.t it wou.ld nut b.
po'llibio tel carry oYer fW\cl. be1Ol1d tno end of tho c:urro011 !isc:~
y~r. Tuoreioro;111 ...-01'1- wou.ld h:woiI to bo c:o:%lpletcd a.ad all payment. :n~e prior to 30 J,:ce. T:-.i:l ci:::WUl1. 3;p:l:lr~ llc:c:o."tabll3 to '
l:W:1. a::.:! U waa ;qree<1 t,"~t I 'I7Ou1<l I:1UO =y ~ visit there to
rec:eivo report:l ~ a.ttend to !L:ul c;::ulb Oil 16 Jw:o. ,,-..lld not
have & C:lOZrec: u=c:.iolJ report, but ho e.t!=ato::l Uu.: f=as c:urr=t1y
CA ~d weul:! co iLhout sl:!ucl=: for re:r.:U.-uog =p=c!lt\:ro~. Ull
&:1r~cx1 to IOdd tl:lo Socie~y vr.~ t~e ncx~ 10 rJ::.ya ~ 11:101'11I e.x:Ict .a:csm.wt oI c:uroc!1t b ..lIJ..nco =d •• ti.:n0l.Cc::l re:ntici>:.s =pan<li~r::s. I
tried to 1m.preu ~ 1Y.!:::l. Gtrong1y tho.t trlLD-de:, oi a,c;d!.tio=l iucde Ultll
or re!'J:'D of =O::X?~lld~ !l:nd!l C!ust ~': <:~rl:te1 ....:1! ::.:!=:-c :!:e e::::l
ot the theAl you.
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bOe:! =plcUJ (~l:t only" have t,C~:1 t~&llo.c:ribed from the tail"")' la
&dr.11tioll ttlezoe are 8 c:z.¥e. 10 pro..'Tc:u (oI Yhlea two :lore ;t1::e:1uy 111
U:.tcrylowa.nd 6 era -orr.~ Ui' to tho poLot o! h~v1l1S tho lilts ol quo.tion.
prepared). It r.u a;Jr:o!<! ttut to meet ~o cea.dliAe we woWu ~vo to
1.Lt:Jit th. dc.lgrl ~ thc5!l Z6 ca••••

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pl'ob1c=. of the proj.~ ttu.t bll i. lOot FAyiAg &ny at1entl~u to) t!\o r.~u1U.·
S1.Il.co to UOlto o;11y " ca.e. !lAve b.oeQ t .. ~zucribed ~crlf i. nQ way ot tclliL.J
w~t la C=~8 oul: of 1t. 1 a ••
ttlere wero DO d:::u:t:lUc: re:lC:~o:U, baQu.a the ~;:ryiewer. ~0111d bay. let h.im bo..., eb:>ut tt1t·~ u... d tboy cr.\~r~c:::.
It 1. poc.lblo, bo........ er. t~t ou~ Oo;"'!1 &o&ly:l15 n:!
d::.U may drcd.e \1"
8Qa:lat.b.!CS of V::llU. &1tl~l;~ 1 -.:n tll1bioue 011 t4l. poUlt.

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:lo,:couot ;01' tl1e delay.. l'h aho b1:'ed Q& .cme

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&rll mill1y ~:--r~ll'l:", ;-~\y lAO ~ltl q~t. 0. pi-lea ,;O~ co"'tl..=...d.~"

soroo 'Clcb projeC\ Dol Ul.la noltt "(l:U', "'l::7l~ rwh;ic, ';lDci!!c c1ellcUloA ......
1 told t.i.=l 'Oil wt.l\l.ll;\ rihc;usl ~os~.\lI~UUo....LtC? t.bo PfCWc<lt i'r~j .. ct
=?lctcd UlY we baLl .a.. el-~co HI clQ'<lly clQ,,":J:!u.e ttl. t~,

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July 16, ,1956

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The'exper1ment des1gned to test the effect1veness or
certain ;n~1cat1on in causing 1ndivi.dwtis to release gua:ded 10fo.:-:nation has been C01:Ipleted in accordance Ilith tae orig1nal exper~enta1 des1gn, Yi~~ ~~e exception that 25 instead of 30 cases
waTa used. This catteT was discussed in ~or( detail L~ my letter
~ J~y 15.
Abstracts on all 25 cases, transcr1ptions of the interviews, _echsler~Bellevue Intellige~:e :ests given at the hospital and ~reviously given at this cl1r~c, post-experimental
rauk~ngs and evaluation sheets, and a schedule covering t~e drug
a~n1stration have all been submitted to you ~der separate
cover.
Enclosed is a financial state::ient ..m1cn repr"sents the
f1nal acco~~t1ng of the f~ds allocated by you for use in this
project. If, for your purpose, you require a more detailed sucmary of vhat specific professional services were performed or
more detail ~th reference to travel expenses or aL7 other item,
kindly let me k:cOIi.
"
:",
You \rill note, 1n this co~e~iOnl' that Dr . . . . vas
compensated in an amount exceeding tQat'pa~d to Dr. ~ This
vas occasioned by the fact that Dr.~ sent much t~ng
the files ar.d records at the g
and
~\11.
...... Pr~son selecting cases that m1gAt e stab e for our purpose. It vas fro~ the cases selected by him that the $UbJects
used in the ezper1gent vere tinally chosen.
I have been instructed to vrite & cbeck to the Soc1etT
for the balance, in the acco\mt as 01" todar. I would like to

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delAy this matter for a few days. Several checKs have been vr1tten dur1n~ recent ~ays, and 1 .~ould like to be sure. they cleared
the bank 1r
b efore cio-sins out the account. 'Xou ~1l1
rece1ve a cheek 1n the aco~~t of $1356.26 early next Yeek.

It there is any additional lnform3tlon required, I will
be happy to cooperate.

Ene •

..

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30 Janus.ry 1561

Y.Ell,ORAliDUH FOR T5E: R:;CORD-

SUAJECT:
·1.

Project YAULTRA, Subproject 42
Subproject 42 is to be~ontinued'fcr the same· purposes a~
.~;

.

'Ilhen orlr.1Da1lY-estabtished: to support

cover-t
.

and.realistic field trinls or certain research nod
ot interest to TSD,

~nd

to calntain

~he

physical

develo~nt

,.,

..;:::...

iteca

faciliti~s re~u1red

I

tor

these trials.
2.

In the past yenr a

n~er

of covert

&Cd

realistic field

#

t:-ie.ls

b;::.ye

e~r1ceots

been successrully carried out.

c~.ert

results of: these

h::Lve provided factual data essen;;ial to estabtisloiog

protocols for a
or

The

and

D~ber

of

~3tistic

conte~plated

operations.

A contiouation

field tri31s are necessitated by the

produc~ion

of new caten313 in TSD programs, particularly -in areas requirtog
deta;le~ kn~Jledge

ot the effectiveness

~nd

efficiency of

del~verJ

systems. 'Additiocal trials are also cecessitated by the need tor
'better controlled "field-type" expericeota.----·· - .-.'- '--" .-' -.--

3. .The esti&ated cost ot the project is $5.000:CO for

~ pe~iod

f

ot six l:Iocths. Charges should. be made Qg3.inst Allotment 11.25-1390-3902.
4.

Accountina tor funds aod equipment under this SUbproject bs

been established
on a. detailed basis With the auditor nnd '\(ill continue
,
as in the past.

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approved for TOP SECRET

~y
,.

1~

the Agency and.

operntes under cover tor purposes of this subproject.

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APPROVED FOR OBUGATIOIi Ot' FUlIDS:

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l-:E!·:DWJJUM FOR THE P.Ero:m

SUBJECT:

Project

~TRA,

Subproject 42

1. Subproject 42 is being • .
tao~shed to provide fcr the
continued support of the
'facilities, ane as such,
is a con~1nuation ot Subo~o;ect 1~ Under SUbprcject 42, it
L) ~s intended that.· tt'.~lacili~iesbe moved trem _ _
.0 .~; U• • .t!=l ~nmt 'l')1ese facilities,
in the new 10caticn, ~~ continue to provide a means tor the
realistie testin~_or certcin R and D items ot interest to
r::n/TSS and APDI'!SS.
.
C

It_I-

2. Subproject 42 rlll be concucted' by Hr. ~. .
a seaman. Cerlilin suppor.. activities w.Ul. be prcvic.e;:y
CD/rSS and ~D/TSS.

3. The estimated cost tor a period ot one year is
$-'3~3CO.CO,

starting 1 l{arch 1955 •

. ~:&::
.

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!Dl:EY G<.TTLI3B . •
. Chief
T3S/Ch~cal Division

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SUBJECT

ProJeet.-K':UL1RJ., ~~roJect 45,

r,

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HU'oh ~ . _

~'illtlX Fat:

=..,

direction of" TSS, Che.=ical DivisIon. ~ese activities vill
. take the tOn:l. or t.hree lines ot bIocbec.1cal 1nves~16ation;
~a17, the curare-like affect ot certain.thiols, the pre,aration of b]drogecated quinol1nes L"1d ~le alkaloids, &.Cd. the
continued stuc!.T ot diphenollc co::pounds. In &ddition te t.he
above i.cYestigatiolls; the preaent biologic.U testing and CLSsaying techniques"Will be elaborated cd bro&dened to 1."1clude
cardiovascular and an ticarcinogenic eftects of cODljlOunds' resulting fro:ll the above progn=. .
{(i:J

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.~

~

.~

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C',~

total cost or this project. f"or a period of C:le 7"lU'

vill not exceed $100,000.00. At the present ti=, .the SU:lI of
$40,000.00 1s be1.ng co=1tted, the balance _ot the total to .be
C~ted at. a later date.
.
_
'

' -'

,

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'U,!E~dice.tes

C!

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2. The' attached proposal fr:=<JGl=
the extent. of Ule investigations tl'.a.t his f"acilities vill allo....
~ to cerry out. O:l ~e lIl&~rIals deYeloPed hl the three lines
of research referred to in parsgra.,h 1, as well as certain ot.'le®, ,
_~ria.ls of interest to TSS/CD • .t4 I 5&#£ iii also serves
!') e.
~ a general consU1tant to this DIvision and provides 'cover ~~d ~
c:ut-out facUi Ues to the ~er.r:]'.
~e

'J

=-.

:
1. ~e scope or this project is intended to encoc;lus
/G')
all those actiT1ties nov engaged in b7 the &-:a
=~ ~
"'t!!'!3:iJa;S!5I'?iR . .
ill its ova tacilities under the

3.

"1

0• •

'£

; ....

."

:~

,

:~

of the GoVernl:lellt's interest in this ::atter.

,

,.~

: ~~

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FOR OBLIGATIOll

. OF rmlDS:

~t,

I.

,
4. ~f#i5lOO:basbeen ~ted a TOP S::CiL~ clea:a.::.ce
b7 the AgencT, and is !'ullT capable of protectL~ the :!eeU:1t,.

'IJ'PR.QVEI)

~

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Attach:1entsl
. Propos~

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3. Tl::" t.otAJ. eo,t: of this PT'OJect tor & per1cKl of one reAr vU~
tlDt er:eed $100,000. Charge, ,hou.ld be ~e &gU!lBt illot:uent
6-2502-10-001.

'" other tba:o lts &ctivities aa a eut-ol.lt

"...·1.

J

156
......

-

~

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~~ )

"- 6, It...,u =:tl.:&J.l1 agreed that dO=e:ltaUol1 Il.l1d I.CCOl:."1t1.cg for
t.-avel ex;:1l.l1'U vb.1c:.h &.."'e no~ re~,a.ble bT tbe" 4
;.
~'ha.ll oontor:a vj,~.i&ceepte<1 pnet1C:8lI of the i
_
.

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. 7,"

ri

E_ ~e~

the Ke.:loralX1a:a of 4:eel:8Zl t.

u:

eo::pl1'

]

v:l,;h ;!3e :equ1rt=Il.l1t.;:of
.i
(

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U?P::NFD FCR 03UCJ.1ION
CF iir.;DS:

ittaCbnellt:

"-

Propo~.

DllIt.r1but1o:H
Cr1g1na.l ~

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157

-- "•...

.

-

pertod lor~tch lt~r~~l support ts re¥~.t4~ ~~ll-Se de:ote~
to

~

conetll..ec:= cr.cl¥,tI'. of

tr~

•

.~---

:l4cr.ents,~

1\4lJr::.l er.G er..doertM

.'.:.1

01 stress

~~ ~e er~.tecl cger.t~. ~~t t~f~:er.4e ~t.

~~. ser~~.~r.g

.~-

stress cr.G

t~

tr~~luer~BS

of thts

pr.~stolc~te ber.e~'cr ee~~le~

upon both bod~ cn4 s~'n te~per::.:ures cs ~e~tled tr. ~e ccec~.:ar.ytn~

report.

S:.l;:en~s~cr. O!~-'r
ur4er

er~ su;er~~ston

.....

sutt-able

torlctt~

r::.r-.,"I:z:'"tl1 ..!ie s:.lbJecte-! to clr..r.tc(;l screer.tr.," on

cppropr1.c te pc tt e,..ts~

project rr..J.1 be

ti"~

sCree,..e'!~

~,..t t

':;1 screer-.tr.," 1;e tr.; ca rrt.ec out en

parttc~larl~

etVler rc:tstng or lor.:ertn.g Z;odll

_. __ ._--.....-

those er.c;t ere ccttVI:

te::~en:ture

'n.

•

.... _.~.- - - ,•• ".~,. .. ';.,,:':h
... -.... .... _- .. - -.
~

__ - tra1tSZllant
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158
:.':: J'i<~" 2·~"7,''''~

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~.

.

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,..,.~..~··~?-~->J1¥!FY:P¥;;;:Z0= .
..

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.

....

...

Q71t.mal .tun:ors aM on OC7\cer patt.ents.
"

•

Tht.

...

_

]

.

. ' ...... .LSU PAl

C07\O-.,.
;'h4.. ·o/, ~~' ._t
•. ::.i1.
_
o

1

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• project zctil be ·c~t.·i,red·~ bV.pr'oduct 01 tM maJ~" ObJ!oth7.I·_~-

_...

.

~t.ch ~ll
~.

-

b.·dt.reeted to

t~

problem 01 stress.

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159
...
SUBJECT

1.

-:

~ontiQu.ation

o! MKULTR~.

(

;'.~:;:.~~
SubproJect

~;.' .~"~__

The ~cope of tllis 8ubPreec~ i:1cludes all those activities

now enga.ged ie b y ~ · g ~ ~ n l ~ ,
1"$.)

.,/< ,1

und.er the direction of i'SSte'f). with the exceptioD of those cutout
!u"ction~

!ped!ic2.l1y mentioned i" connection '.vito other MK!..!LTRA

8ubprojecf5:' In general, tbe research eUort under this subproject
will contin,ue alor..g the lines Iud down i:l previous years.
ievolve: the syotbe sis and

",;;

ot compound., of

tbo~e

pb~r:Tlacologie...l

clinic~l

evaluation

chemical families known to have applJcation

in the p5·,.~b<5,:ber.:'li,a1 and "K" fields.
p,os,.e~s. has

aQd

Thesll

During the p~st year import~Qt

been made ir. the area related to

stre~sor co,npo'~nds

and tae rel ...tionship of these materials to the .,by,iological pathwa:y,
througb whi.c!'. beth ,tress and, the reactioo. to it are mediated io
human beil'lgs.[

(.'\5 is ind,icatec in the ~~tached proposal,

the ;:ork ..-

'of t~e po1.,t year has progressed to the poiet where more deficitive
experiments 00 the slr es B reaction cal> be carriea out.

?ril':'larily

tbl' was brought abo'ut by the characteri:atiol> of several new
materials wbicb pr"duce strells reaction in hwnans a.nd the appUcatiO" of SCU1\e new clinical l1)etbods of measuring the extent of the
n

.r'

~

...

..

'~
~

UI

.--j

disturbance proclJced.

During th'e next year proportionally more

effort will be expended

~n

the ?roble::> of the developoent of oew

,
..•....

j

160
:-~h"' • • ak-::cu..&U &yp • • • 1 . . . .

.-

G, •• inc_

p .. oC • • • • h ... b • • Q

.~

.lo_er "h ...

~

·ts desirable b.t.bie .direction and becaun a new Approach to the
problem bas

.

2."

bee~' ~orked .?ut./(
.C

-or

_.

.

.

t «~ also nrvell as a general c:onsulta~t to

. the Agency, provides eervice. o( a sensitive nature on ao ad hoc:
bA.h, and serve. aa a.

cut~out

•

. ,.c

]

10 procurement problem ••

3. The total cost o( this ('roject (or a period o( one year
'1~,~ .a~

will aot exc:eea $71,500.00.
Allotmeat 0525.1009-4902.

-

C.

Chargee .hould be mAde against

_

4. ~ ~ bu been requested to sub:-r.it A .=::.ary
acc:ouaticg or a copy o( tbe Fucd I a aCDual audit report {or the
spoasor' ~ inspectioa:

Aho, it bas been. reqc.uted that any unexpeoded

!uada .bal.l be returned to tbe Agency.
5.

Title to a.ay perma.neot equlpoeot

~

purc!:1a:~ ld ~y !~r.c:!a

£3

graoted ~ sball be retained b~"'i'%d"!Il :

.=

j!r( /oZl;;;-~ •• ,p;Q::, 10 lieu o( highe:- $lve:-b.ead ratet".

,

6.
!or t:-avel

.. ¥

It waa mutually agreed taat docwneoutloll and f's.countiag

.

e,,&,e~se. wb.i~b

are oormally reimbur.able

8

by~

'~8hall con!orm with the lLccepted ;ra.cticu o! the
c ]..
:i'-:

I:~"::IS:-;::!~d to: 'CC,tfDUlTl},l
~j ~·.::t~:o:"1 t7 0:: 101475
~;:1.:: :~e

1971

E:2 I~~!T; CL J!I 187415

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161
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-'U'~'~ .. ~.•,:.:.~;i"f

. Ccmt:.mo&t1OQ at ~ , S~.1ect !lo', 10:; -

..

_. ...
.
~ ,cOp. 01' th1.a IIll1:llro.1ect 1zl.cl\ld.ea all those activities
'.

1.
<"oj

.,

....... -

Mw!~~b)''''''''''~.lt7" .•" . l!:>";
u:l4.er tbe· c11recticm O!

'!S!J/pa y1th

~.~pt1.c.n o~·tho.~ ~teut-

..-

tlmet10lll .pec1t1.~ I:lenUoned 1r. COC%lAlct1on V1 th other IGU'llA

)

~roJecta.

.i
!

In ge=ral, the ruea:ch d:ort under thu _\1b1lroJect

Yl.ll calt1nue &long tbe

1.1=_

la1c1 40w 1n pnT1ou. ,-ears.

'%he_e

1Jl.T01Te the. ':ruthe51_ a::d pbL-mactllogica.l &Zl4 cl1n1ca.l evalYAUOl1
c~

or

those clleCl1ea.l 1'lSlll1Uu kl10vn W haTe ..pplication 1zl.

During the cClCl1ng )"eu 1t is p1aml~

to concent.rate care e;t.rectl:1

the =1"8 practica.l aapecu o.t the

Y1 th t..'U.s chaz1e;e 1 ~ ahO\lld be

•

~

,!

1zl.~..,bu1•.vo.rtiM:l1.J.4,
1l0ted

,

~

.!A&t certain f1.Ild.ir.gs made 1.u

-

be neeU8lS.t7' to

&_

in tbe

tu~, lor

lI~aent ~ t~

t1J:le to tlme dur1.:;.g. the }"lIu dus to 1z1crea.u_

2,

In c=ect1on

proJect ..t " vt11ch eamlot.be turther explo11;ec1 .. t

that tacil1t,. Y1ll be pursued. ..t
reuc= 1t

.

a1

Enoush!leV potent .ubstances ha70 'beCOClll ..~le

latel:1 to IlIlSke Rc:h .. cha:Iga

c..

~e

JlsyclloclleCl1ea.l and "r' t1e.lda.

"knoclteut" preblelll.

C
;B

a:

11 E '" &lao serves ... 4 'reccral

th1.a

o.t this lIUbproJeet

ot scope,
consulta.D.t

U)

tbe

]
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162
Tb_ ~at.&J.. GO.eo ~ 1:J:ls.. p.ro",.c,,"

3...
n~

ezceed

fJIO,OOO.OO,

!to "'SI3• • •81f-IIlIi'~•• hu

....

~cCW1t1ns

.po~or·.

or

&

~

copy

the

.!
been~quelted. 'to .ubm1t

lUnd'.

I

&

0Q4

~]

~&Z" V1..U

Al.lotmllnt

..

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1I1.l1:llll1lo.r,

I.ll.llual a.u41 t report tor the

']

Also, it bAa been requelted. that a:rJ.Y Wlexpended

1.napectiou.

.
5.

period. ~

1
.
Cb&rgu Ibould be -.1e apimt

. 2l2'' ::'1' 390-3902.
t:::, .

ror._

.,

,~

"

''1'1 tle to eony po'r:e.neut equipment purc:b&ae4 by tw:ds granted

.]

C, "?*2E~sbAll be ret&1IJe4 by - "1 =id*?&ii!iGtt='p':' ~
13 ..MiiJ.... 111 lieu ~ h1~er overhead rate••
6. It

YU lIlUtu&lly agreed tha~ doc:umeatat1ou e.nd a.CCO\l::ltiug tor

.

"

travel ~ales vllich

&re

aona.lly re1.:bursable by

ahall coo.fOl"lll, v1 th the acc:el'ted practices c4

e

*

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Ch1et
'rSD IRe search !ra.t1c:h

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Distribution:

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Att=bmeat:

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163

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DRAFT

24 January. 1;64 J

TIU: REeD an

SUBJECT

1:'(GL-.r?.A, Subproject

1.

::;

.

I~

that certain very

f

,/

t/!~I-

deve10Pt:le~~;''i~ is sOI:leti:nes
necessary eAperi~ents or tests are

During the course ot

,

,.,

14~9"
.'1t" I
- - ;fQ 7. ,{ .',..,A ,'',.)'.I~" !".'·t.-f,
V cPT''''' /1 /:"
II:'
established f.or the purpose ,,: '; .I ,-

delivery syste:lS of interest, to 'rsD/sB.

!cu~d

j

/",:~i"
.~ . Lv .' \

/
.
\ l,~t/·b.LV/
of supportiol .~::.Sti:.-::..sts of ce!..}~~elOPlr.entlit~7. ,an~

2.

(;.y.

~~'I
-,
Ii "tJ/1./1;,P:"':~

.r.J.A'l"

Thi.s sUbproj ect is be ing

.1/\'"

L;
/..tzLi .,(.
// . vt..JIP:.
t0;At /,yp.'.
r'" ':,
L

Ja:l:ORANDtnI FOP.

~

I

,

SUited to ordinary laboratory tacilities.

/

'/,L

.

not

~

I

"..,

/ ,'~-:::

At the same tir.le

it would be difficult if not impcissible to conduct such tests
as operatiQoal field tests.

!bis project is designed to prQ-

vide a capability aDd !acilltie~ to iiI 1 this inter~ediate '
req,ulrel:lent.
3,

The activities

un~er

ducted bj' Mr. ~._.

,this SUbprOject will be con-

IH'

.:tn'dividual in tbe i::tport and

export business, it:l . . . . .~

Mr',

~ holds 'a TOP

SECRET Treasuz'¥ Dep:l.rtment clell.ranc~ and ~ SECRET Agency
He is cOQpletely witting of the aims and goals of

approval.

c....

-

his activities.

C

4.

A I r . " ' " possessE:S: uniClue facilities and personal

I1bilit:l~s which ~:lkeS him invaiuablc in this kind of testini;
oper:\t1on.

,1

.

;;.

1ft'. 1II~ because of -his peculin.'_..t:l.uui:.S, Dnd

<:!-.

------=

'lJ
.

'....

..

164
- z cap~bllities

as

w~l~

]

as his excellent connections with all'of

the local law enforcement .agencies, wi1l.provide a unique and
essential c~pabi1ity.
.....

sident 'Of

Because Hr. dE_11lr·~s no longer re-~'

~~'.'
.,.•.J

th~~. area: it is necessary that .~

..';.,J

suitable replacement be provided in order that a capability
for continuance of our activities be maintained.
5.
a

p~riod

The estimated cost of the project is $10,000.00 for
of one year.

Number 4125-1390-3902.

Charges should be made

again~t

Allotment

Reimbursement will be madq for services

(

. rendered.
6.

Accounting for funds advanced and any

e~uipment

under

this-subproject will be in accordance with accounting proce ures

~stabl1Shed by ·the::::;.~.:~#-:"":"CL::fc.vfb((tn

7.

A memorandum of agreement

~long

lines

est~b

.

".~'

I"'u

shed-by

previous audit recommendations in like situations will be
executed_

~A
~

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TSD/Bio1ogical Branch.

Distribution:
Ori~inalonly

(.:.]....
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165
SU9JEC'r:

1.

This is a request tor tinancial sup~rt tor research on the mechanism or
brain concussion tor the period 1 Feb 19056 to 1 Feb 1957.

2.

The resonance-cavitation theo:"'J upon which this research is to be based
.
has been presented in the proposal sub.'litted to t h ~ ~
dated 27 l'.arch 1954.
"

,.

The prog4alll as originally sub....ltted estiMa'.ed the duntion o! the progrm
to be trom three to five years requesting a total of $72,109 tor the initial
;year.

f3

-'

Request for SU;>poM. or Researc:h on the 1'.!Ic:hani5:l\ or Brain Concussion

~

6. '!be progrus I".ade to date under the above contract can
tollows:

be su."'r..arized as

'.

A. RESEARCH FACn.nIES

(

The following research facilities have been established tor the
investigation ot the very diver:;e aspects or the problems being
studied:

!3

a.

P93e•

Atotal ot 250 square feet of laborator,r and office space
. equipped With ""uch of the diversUied r.l!1c:hi.nery and "p~ratU!l
necessary tor research in this field.

b. Blast P.ange
.
•
A bhst range h25 been estnblished at , ~ located
approx1r.lately ~ r the /!lOI'J.n labOr.. clj'. 'I'h.1s
area is owned bY-t~and is closed to the j:Ublic.
'!bros blast test.-series have been run to dAte.

C.~I1~

'.-

"

ArrM(;,"ents hQve been '":Ide with t.he ~S 1lI'ln~
~liQ :snX@tef,,'\WtQO L UM-tor use ot their
hU.1loUl c:ldavcrs. A. te:;t ar~a h::s been .2:::ois:nccl tor this

WARI~ING 1\:"'-'
'oj

(

j

,,<""-

:.

r(LLlC:;~:CE

;:401-5/,(.0 :.iETIIODS INVCLVE"D

, I

.. _..... - - . .

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1:_l.J
166
..l

;-e-~~ ...~
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.•.
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.

.

Both full-t~e tecr~ical personnel and part-time preCessional
research personnel have been acquired and indoctrinated relative
to their spec1tic function.
I

c.

TECHNICAL PROORESS

:

~~]
...

' .•.. :

!
I

Following is the tech.:u.cal progress lIIade IUlder the current
.JISMilI. c o n t r a c t : .
: ' .
~.
I.
.
If··
a. Speciall~ed instnl/l\entation and nUlllerous testing techniques
have been developed to obtai{l.the desired ~aJIlic data.
b.

Censiderable data has now been obbined suPPOr:t1ng the
resonance-cavitation theor,y of brain concussion.

c.

Prelir.~ar.r

acceleration thr~shold data has been obtained
tor a fluid-tilled glass simulated skull.

d.

Data 1'-as been obtained on the nature and the lIIagn1tu.:le'

pressure fluctuations within a glass s1MUlated skull
to either 1mpact or /Sound waves propagated 1n lUre
e.

Ir~tial

u·.'·
'.

:

':l:

ot

s~ject

studies have been made on th6 s1mulated glass skull

atte~pt1ng to est~blish the cavitation patterns for v;rious

type.'5
7.

l

or

~ct.

The propo.'5ed method an<! pregra:n plan re;!:ain the s8llle as stated in the
original proposal, except for the tempora~·deletion or the ~ersion
blast·study.
.

8. The C".Irrent level of activity on this ps'Oject can be indicated
IIIOst recent billing to the~~ for the :nonth of
to $4,0)4.61.
. -"~
~
,

Nov~.ber,

by the

which

arno~~ted

9. In the interest of efficiency and econa,y it is requested that at least
this level or activity be lIIa1ntained for the corning year.

WA.RNING Nr1 T

,..

...

:.'..j

n.
~

167

--

. '
._--" ..
.
.".....;.:~~=-. 10 •• . _~,,. .. ... 1I"T"S..I&.&.a'l"J ....... CI" .~... 1"!&::I&.A.I'\c.:u rUt.&II'••UII
".•• 1~.1 'I"~Ot.tc~~· ~~ ~o~1:~e·~· br.:a·l·n~ ;;~~u:t-s·1~~··~;·s----a~-e",~';nt1~1.1y ... -

_.

"

tran51~nt state ~ue to head 1njur,y Yh1eh is or instantan10us
unset. ~~n1re5t5 videspread 5~?ton5 or purely paralytic
kind. does not as such co~prise ~ny evidence of structural
cerebral injury. and is alyays follo~ed by a~~es~a for the
actual ",o",ent of the accident."

1.
·1

10.2 The ~plication of the underlined portion of the above statc~ent
is that if , technique vere devised to induce brain concussion
vithout ~~v1ng either advance vaming or c~using external physical
tra~~a. the person upon recover; would be unable to r~call vhat
had happened t~ h~. Under these conditions the s~~e technique
of producing the concussion cc-..ld be re-used ",any times without
disclosure of its nature.
10.) First,

I

the possibilities of direct i::lpact to the
it should ~.possible rre~ the findings of this
research program to dete~ine the follOWing:
a. Opt1Jl'.U/lI design of 1r:1p;1cting devices.
b. Optir.:~"11 point.s of Unpact en skull or body
for the specUic e.rrects desired.
c. Intensity of the blow for the effect desired.
consider1~g

head_£r_bod~.

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10.4 In re~3rd to the potential 1r:Ipactin~ devices, there are
design requsites.t~At are appare~~ at this tilTle:
a. The 1Jnr act should 'be delivered" without
advance warning.
b.

certaL~

~: :~~: ~! ~~~::t ;~~ ~c~:c ~i:t~bwticn

shouli be such that surface trauna does
not OC(.;IlI".
c. The intensit7 o£ the ~pacting :orce and
its duration should be such as to obtain
the desired effect.
d. The device should be as s~all·and as silent
as possible.
10.5 The ·specific impacting devices mignl tate tne ior.n oi any of
the .rollowing:
a. A panc~ke type black-jack giving a high peak
i~pact .rorce with a low ur.it surface pressure.
b. Concealed or camouflaged spring-loaded i~pacting
devices that trige£r upon contact With the head.

(Oric1nal ~nd sole copy

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168
."'4'" •• _'"

o. It. proje.ot.I.1.. t)"p. ~pa4w.er
.\or _un
ue1nc & am&11~hot t~11ed •• ~k CO~ & proJOQt.~1••

10.6

d. An explosive pad detonated 1n contact wi~h the
head or the body.
i
Let us naw consider the pos:ibilities ot exciting the resonance
cavitation directly ~itho~t ~~?act. There is co~siderable eVidence
that re~onance cavitation can be induced directly in the following
~ays:

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a. A blast ~ave propagated in air. (Blast Concussion)
b. Physical excitation With a mechanical driver
or horn, 1:.~.ed to the resonant frequency ot
the head.
l)
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10.7 A single blast pressure wave propagated in air ~ust have considerable
intensity in order to produce br3in concussion, h~Jever, there is
considerable eVidence (Carver & Dinsley) that ~od1tication of the
pressure wave can produce profound effects •
.10.8

Excitation of tne resonance cavitation by using a tuned driver
at this tiMe a~pcars to be well within the relm of pcssibility.
1~e neurotic-like Man1t~statlons no~.ally associated With blast
c,ncussion ~ould possibly be induced by this method. Use of
this met~od,Qowev:r, would require actual physical contact with
the drivers.

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10.9 Excitaticn of the resonance caVitation by tuned sound waves also
a~r.ears tG be 'a reasonable possibility.
Concentration of the sou~~­
tield at s~me re~ote point could be effected With accoustical lenses
-and ronectors. The blast duration would be in the order of a
tenth of a second. Y.sking of a noise ot this duration should not
be too d1ticult.
11.0

It would possibly be advantageous to establish the etfectivness
of both ,of. the above methods as' a tool in brain-~ash therapy.
A tull knoWledge ot the ~ethod and the r,s~lting sequela should be
of aid to any person rorced to su~it to such treatment.

12.0

Possibly the ~ost significant potential aspect of this.stu~y would
be in the develOp"_ent of practical means of giVing a person ~unitj,
even thou;h tempo~ary. to brain concussion. One technique that appears
to have potentialities involves the introd~ction of a s~all quantity
ot Gas, approxi~ately 1 cc, into the spinal cord. This gas bubble
would then no~ally migrate to the ventricles located at the cent~~
ot the,brain•. The ability ot this bubble to expand under dynamic
loading would be most effective in preverit~ng resonance cavitation
frOlll occurlng.

(Orlgin3l

a~d

sole eopy

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:ag~)

196",

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MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
:,)iKSEARCH: OFTES/CI-IIClnYIT
)IKSEAllCH was the Hame given to the continuation of tht.' '-'IRTLTH.-\. program, Fundinl! commenced in FY 19C>6, find end~d ill FY W7:.!. Its lJUrpoi>'e was to
d9velol', test, finll evaluate capabilities in tll(:, ('overt u:<e of hiologlenl, chemical,
and radioacti \"(~ lIl11terial s,Ystl'llIS und techniques for llrodllciug llredietuble human
heha "ioralllnd/or php:iologieu 1 dJD.lJges in gupport of highl)" Hensitjy(' opera tional

requirements,
OFTEX/CHICKWIT
In 1901 the Otfic:e of Resenrdl llml De\'elopment (OUD) and the Edgewood
Ar:-;enal Re~nrcll Laboratories undertook Ii llfogrlllll for doing r<.'~eurch on the
identification Hud cllnl'ncteri7.ntioll of drugs that could influence human behavior.
Edgewood had tIll' flltilities for the full mn~\' nf lulJorntor,;: Ilnd ('!inlenl tl'!sting.
A IlllfiSe.i vrogrnm wus t.'llrisio::ed that would cOllsL-:t of acquisitfon of drugs and
chemical cOlllpounds believed to !lilye effeeti-: 011 the lx--lwvlor of lJuwans. and
testing and enlluating these materials through lalio'lJ.tol'Y fll'o,:€:{lures fino toxicological studie;;. Compound!' oplienxl liwl1lising ns II result of tests 011 animals
were then to be e\'a!unted clinically with human subjectl-: at Edgewood. Substances
or potential use would then tJe anul,r:c;ed i;trtlctllrnll;~ as a basis for identifyiul{ and
synthel-iizillg possible Xlew derivatives of ,(;reater utilit~".
'The program \vas divided into two projeet~. l'roj(>ct OFTEX was to deal with
testing the toxicological, trunsmisi ..itS find IJel1avio.ul effects of drugs In animals
and, ultimf1tel~', humans, Proj£>ct CHICKWIT Will': ('onN'!'n>'d-with acquiring information 011 uew drug de\"eJ.ovmellts in Enrolle and the Orient, and with acquiring
S!lmilles.
'
There is n discrepancy between the testimoll~' of DOD and CIA regnruillj{ the
te~"tillg at Edgewood Ars€'nal 'in June 1973. While tllere is agreement that human
tei"tillg occurred at that place llnd time, tIlere is (li~a~reelllent us to who wa~
responsible for flullncinJr and ::;ponsorship. (See hearings before the Subcommittee
on Het\lth and ScIentific Research of the Senate Hmnnn Resources Committee,
Septe:nuer 21, 1977.)
(169)

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170
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINCTON. O. C. ~505

Office of legiilati'fe Couniel

23 December 1977

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washi~gton, D.C.
20510

T

Dear Mr. Chairman:
During Admiral Turner's 3 August 1977 testimony
before your Committee and the Senate Human Resources
Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research, you asked
whether any Agency employees had been terminated because of
their participation inMKULTRA Subproject 3. Admiral
Turner indicated he did not believe any employee had
been terminated, but would have Agency records searched
on this question. Our records have been searched and the
results confirm the Director's testimony that no such
actions were taken.
Sincerely,

~~~.~

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'171
QKHILLTOP DEFIXITIOX
QKHILLTOP "as n cryptonym assigned in 1954 to a project to study Chinese
Communist brain"ashing teclmiques and' to de.elop interrogation techniquE's.
~ost of the early studies nre helieYed to haye been conducted b~' the ComeU
Universlty ~redical School HUijlan Ecology Study Programs. The effort "8S
absorbed into the ~!K'CLTR.-\. program and the QKHILLTOP ('rypton~·lll became
obsolete. The Society for the in>estigatioll of Human Ecology, later the Human
Ecology Fund, "as an outgro~th of the QKHILLTOP.

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