ORANGE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY INFORMANT
POLICIES & PRACTICES EVALUATION COMMITTEE
REPORT

DECEMBER 30, 2015

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Patrick Dixon
Robert Gerard
Blithe Leece
Laurie Levenson
The Honorable James Smith (Ret.)

IPPEC Evaluation Committee Report
December 30, 2015

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2014, a highly publicized controversy unfolded in the Orange County Superior Court regarding
the use of jailhouse informants. The controversy initially focused on a case entitled People v. Scott
Dekraai, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 12ZF0128. Dekraai involved a mass shooting in Seal
Beach, California, on October 12, 2011. During the course of the Dekraai case, the deputy public
defender assigned to the case noticed significant discrepancies in discovery produced by the Orange
County District Attorney’s Office (OCDA) involving a jailhouse informant in the Orange County jail. A
series of motions followed, and Judge Thomas Goethals, who was presiding over the case, issued a
ruling on August 4, 2014 (Exhibit No. 1). That ruling provides an overview of the issues and allegations.
Subsequently, the Public Defender brought additional information to the attention of the court, and
Judge Goethals issued a supplemental ruling on March 12, 2015 (Exhibit No. 2).
The court proceedings led to national press coverage regarding the use of jailhouse informants,
and resulted in an examination of numerous other past and pending Orange County prosecutions. The
press coverage included allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in other cases by the OCDA and
allegations of violations of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants by the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) and other law enforcement agencies. Specifically, there were allegations
that a “conspiracy” regarding jailhouse informants existed between the OCDA’s Office and the OCSD for
over 30 years, leading to the systemic1 deprivation of constitutional rights of criminal defendants in
Orange County.
In response to the controversy, District Attorney Tony Rackauckas assembled a group of lawyers
independent of his office and a retired Judge to examine the OCDA policies and practices regarding the
use of jailhouse informants. The committee, the Informant Policies & Practices Evaluation Committee
(IPPEC), promptly convened to conduct its evaluation. Its members include retired Orange County
Superior Court Judge James Smith, retired Los Angeles Assistant District Attorney Patrick R. Dixon,
former Orange County Bar Association President Robert Gerard, and ethics law and professional
responsibility attorney Blithe Leece. The IPPEC requested that legal scholar and ethics expert Professor
Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School advise the IPPEC on various ethics issues involved in its evaluation.
The IPPEC conducted a six-month evaluation. At its first meeting, it identified its mission
statement:
To conduct a thorough review and assessment of the OCDA policies and practices
regarding the use of jailhouse informants. Following such review, prepare a
report containing recommendations to the District Attorney regarding the OCDA
use of jailhouse informants to assist the District Attorney in ensuring that the
OCDA policies and practices, and its interactions with its law enforcement
partners, are lawful. The report should include an analysis of current issues
regarding adherence to relevant law and should include workable suggestions
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At the IPPEC’s request, the OCDA surveyed its office and provided felony filing numbers and jailhouse informant
numbers as of early December 2015. As of early December, jailhouse informants appear to have been used for
Grand Jury, Preliminary Hearing or Trial purposes in 3 of 8625 felony filings by the OCDA (.034%). If one includes all
cases in which a law enforcement agency used a jailhouse informant and a criminal case was filed, the number is
between 35 and 40 (approximately .463% of felony filings). While these numbers may not be exact given the lack
of a formal tracking process, they appear to be accurate based on the internal OCDA survey requested by the
IPPEC.

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regarding training of OCDA personnel and its law enforcement partners to ensure
that applicable law is followed.

OCDA:

Having completed its evaluation, the IPPEC hereby makes the following recommendations to the

•

No. 1: Revise OCDA policies and procedures regarding the use of jailhouse informants.

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No. 2: Establish a Confidential Informant Review Committee (CIRC) with defined protocols and
include an “outside” or independent member on the CIRC.

•

No. 3: Overhaul the OCDA training program, with extensive additional training regarding
discovery obligations and the use of jailhouse informants.

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No. 4: Coordinate with the OCSD and all law enforcement agencies in Orange County regarding
jailhouse informant protocols and procedures, including OCDA’s Jailhouse Informant Policy, and
engage in detailed training on the Orange County Informant Index (OCII).

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No. 5: Restructure and combine into one unit the OCDA Gang Unit and Target Unit.

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No. 6: Establish an OCDA Conviction Integrity Unit.

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No. 7: Establish an OCDA Chief Ethics Officer position.

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No. 8: Reinstate the Chief Assistant District Attorney position.

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No. 9: Eliminate “Chief of Staff” position and create a position of “Assistant District Attorney for
Media Relations.”

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No. 10: Appoint an independent “monitor” for a three-year period to oversee OCDA compliance
with the IPPEC’s recommendation.

Some of these recommendations have already been provided to the OCDA at his request and
are being implemented. These recommendations, and the reasoning underlying the recommendations,
are set forth in this Report and are respectfully submitted to the OCDA.

II. ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
The primary responsibility of state and local government is public safety. The duty of a
prosecutor is to do justice. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Berger v. United States (1935)
295 U.S. 78, 88: “The [prosecutor] is a representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, the [prosecutor] is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. [A prosecutor] may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor -- indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.”

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW
The IPPEC’s scope of review was limited to publicly available documents, including over 2,000
pages of legal briefs in various pending cases involving confidential informants, and voluntary interviews
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with over 75 individuals, including prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, judges, and law enforcement
officers, who have knowledge about the OCDA and/or the use of jailhouse informants. The IPPEC also
reviewed some internal OCDA training materials.
However, the IPPEC did not have subpoena power to obtain and review documents which were
not voluntarily produced, or to compel individuals to speak with the IPPEC, or to question individuals
under penalty of perjury. The work of the IPPEC is therefore more accurately characterized as an
evaluation, rather than an investigation. Although the members of the IPPEC come from different legal
backgrounds, each has extensive experience in evaluating and investigating various legal matters. Yet,
without subpoena power, the IPPEC cannot represent that it has “investigated” and uncovered the truth
as to what may or may not have occurred in individual cases involving the use of jailhouse informants.
As will be seen in this Report, the IPPEC evaluation identified numerous deficiencies in both
supervision and training at the OCDA which contributed to the jailhouse informant issues. The IPPEC’s
recommendations are targeted to eliminate these deficiencies.
Finally, in addition to the recommendations listed above, the IPPEC recommends that the
jailhouse informant controversy in Orange County be investigated by an entity with document subpoena
power and the ability to compel witnesses to be questioned under oath. The Orange County Grand Jury,
the California Attorney General, or the United States Department of Justice are possible entities with
such power. This recommendation is not meant to suggest that the IPPEC has reached any conclusion
regarding any allegations of criminal wrongdoing. It is worth noting that almost every member of the
OCDA’s Office who was interviewed said that he or she would welcome an investigation and was
confident the investigation would find, with perhaps one or two outliers, no intentional misconduct by a
member of the OCDA’s Office. The IPPEC respectfully suggests that at a minimum, the OCDA request
that an Investigative Grand Jury conduct such an inquiry to demonstrate transparency and foster
confidence in the Orange County criminal justice system.

IV. OVERVIEW OF APPLICABLE LAW
The following case law and statutes are relevant to the IPPEC’s inquiry:
Evidence Code Section 1040, Privilege for Official Information. Evidence Code section 1040
outlines which public entities may claim a privilege for official information which if disclosed violates a
Federal or State statute, or when disclosure is against the interest of the public and the publics’ interest
outweighs the interest of justice in disclosure of the information.
Evidence Code Section 1041, Privilege for Identity of Informer. Evidence Code section 1041
states which public entities may refuse to disclose a person’s identity when they have provided
information of a violation of the law, and to prevent another party from disclosing the informer’s
identity. Two conditions must apply in order to prevent disclosure: one, disclosure violates a Federal or
State statute; and two, disclosure of the informant’s identity is against the interest of the public, and the
publics’ interest outweighs the interest of justice in disclosure of the informant’s identity. The statute
further clarifies that the privilege only applies if the information is provided to specific government
agencies, or by a private citizen with the intent that it be transmitted to those agencies.
Evidence Code Section 1042, Adverse Findings of Fact in Criminal Proceeding; Specific Cases.
Evidence Code section 1042 describes the court process, including the in camera proceeding if
applicable, when a public entity legally authorized to claim a privilege does in fact claim a privilege
under Evidence Code section 1040 or 1041.

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Penal Code section 1054.1, Disclosure to Defendant. Penal Code section 1054.1 is the statutory
authority delineating prosecutors’ constitutional discovery obligations.
Penal Code section 1054.7, Time of Disclosure; In Camera Showing of Good Cause for Denial or
Regulation of Disclosures. Penal Code section 1054.7 states the time disclosures must be made; defines
good cause for late discovery; defines good cause for non-disclosure of evidence; and outlines the in
camera hearing to be conducted prior to a judicial order of non-disclosure for good cause.
Penal Code section 1111.5, Corroboration of In-Custody Informant. Penal Code section 1111.5
is the statutory embodiment of the corpus delicti rule enunciated in California case law prohibiting the
State from pursuing the conviction of a person based upon their uncorroborated confession. This
statute states that the uncorroborated testimony of an in-custody informant cannot be used to convict,
or find a special circumstance true, or used as a fact in aggravation.
Penal Code section 4001.1, In-House Custody Informant. Penal Code section 4001.1 states the
statutory limit that an informant can be paid for his/her testimony; and excludes the inclusion of
incidental payments from the statutory limit. This Penal Code section also incorporates the holding in
Massiah that in-house custody informants cannot take deliberate actions designed to elicit an
incrimination response from a defendant.
Penal Code section 1191.25, Notification of Victim of Crime Committed by In-Custody
Informant Before Testimony. Penal Code section 1191.25 states that the prosecution shall make a good
faith effort to contact the victims of the in-house informant’s crimes prior to his testimony. The notice
to the victim shall include the prosecution’s intention to provide a benefit to the in-house informant for
his testimony.
Penal Code section 1127a, Instruction on Testimony of In-Custody Informant. Penal Code
section 1127a defines an in-custody informant; provides the language for the cautionary jury instruction
on how a jury should view the testimony of an in-custody informant; describes the written statement to
be filed with the court by the prosecutor when an in-custody informant testifies stating the
consideration given or promised; and defines consideration.
Penal Code section 1424.5. Penal Code section 1424.5 goes into effect on January 1, 2016. This
Penal Code section permits recusal of a single prosecutor’s “bad faith” Brady violation and recusal of an
entire district attorney’s office if “other employees” “participated in” or “sanctioned” the Brady
violation in “bad faith” as part of a “pattern and practice.”
Case Law
The following seminal cases outline the Constitutional principles for the use of statements from
jailhouse informants: Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201; United State v. Henry (1980) 447
U.S. 264; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159; Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436; In re Neely
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 901; In re Neely 70 Cal.App.4th 767 (1999); and People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th
1223.
Massiah focused on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by holding that once a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, he is denied that right when law
enforcement deliberately elicits incriminating statements from him without his lawyer present.
Henry further defined what type of conduct is included in the concept of “deliberately elicits” by
stating that when an informant develops a relationship of trust and takes actions that would stimulate
conversation leading to incriminating statements, then a Massiah violation has occurred.
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Moulton held that law enforcement’s use of the defendant’s accomplice who was wearing a
wire transmitter as he discussed the pending charges against both of them violated the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the conversation was certain to result in incriminating statements
by the defendant.
The holding in Kuhlmann demonstrates that an informant who either voluntarily or by
agreement reports incriminating statements to the police does not create an automatic Massiah
violation. In order for a Massiah violation to occur, the law enforcement agency and the informant must
have taken some action designed to cause the defendant to make incriminating statements beyond
simply listening. There is no Sixth Amendment violation when law enforcement fortuitously obtains
incriminating statements by the defendant after the defendant’s right to counsel has attached.
In re Neely (1993) addresses the scope of an agreement between law enforcement and an
informant. Neely states that the agreement can be explicit or inferred from facts showing that the
parties behaved as though an agreement existed by looking to the past history of conduct between law
enforcement and the informant.
In re Neely (1999) discusses the suppression of evidence that is obtained as a direct result of a
Massiah violation, i.e., the fruit of the poisonous tree analysis.
Fairbank involved an informant who relayed voluntary statements made by the defendant to
law enforcement despite the fact that law enforcement told the informant that he would not receive
consideration for relaying the defendant’s statements. Fairbank pointed to the holding in Kuhlmann, as
well as other relevant California case law, in finding there was no Massiah violation.
The issues that surround the admission of evidence obtained through a jailhouse informant also
necessarily implicate a prosecutor’s obligations under Brady and its progeny. Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83, states that withholding evidence favorable to the defendant as to either guilt or
punishment violates a defendant’s due process rights irrespective of the intentions of prosecutors.
There is a “duty on the part of the prosecution, even in the absence of a request therefore, to disclose
all substantial material evidence favorable to an accused, whether such evidence relates directly to the
question of guilt, to matters relevant to punishment, or to the credibility of a material witness.” (People
v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406.) Prosecutors have a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence
possessed by, and known to, the law enforcement agencies participating in the case because law
enforcement is viewed as part of the prosecution team. (Kyles v. Whitley (1995) 514 U.S. 419.)
Prosecutors cannot shield themselves from disclosing exculpatory information by stating that they were
unaware the material and exculpatory evidence existed. Prosecutors are under a duty to make
reasonable efforts to search within the law enforcement team for exculpatory information. See In Re
Brown (1998) 17 Cal.4th 873. Brady and its progeny are fundamental tenets of the criminal justice
system.
Prosecutors wield the power of the sovereign state; and thus are held to the highest ethical
standards. The California Rules of Professional Conduct outline the statutory ethical guidelines that
prosecutors and all attorneys licensed in the State of California must follow.
Also, the State Bar of California has put on “fast track” the adoption of retitled CPRC 5-110,
Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor which closely tracks ABA Model Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities
of a Prosecutor.2
2

The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

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V. EVALUATION PROCESS AND METHODOLOGY
The IPPEC used the following process and methodology in its evaluation:
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Review and analysis of the Report of the 1989-1990 Los Angeles Grand Jury regarding
the investigation of the involvement of jailhouse informants in the criminal justice
system in Los Angeles County. This 153-page report provided an outstanding starting
point for the IPPEC evaluation and underscored the dangers to the justice system that
arise whenever a jailhouse informant is used by law enforcement and/or a prosecuting
agency.

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Review and analysis of the 2006 California Commission on the Fair Administration of
Justice Report and Recommendations regarding informant testimony.

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Review and analysis of the May 2015 Orange County Office of the District Attorney
Operational Audit titled “Improving the Long-Term Efficiency, Effectiveness, and
Economy of the Office of the District Attorney.”

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Review and analysis of various jailhouse informant policies and procedures of both the

(a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause;
(b) make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the
procedure for obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel;
(c) not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial rights, such as the
right to a preliminary hearing;
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal;
(e) not subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury or other criminal proceeding to present evidence about a past or
present client unless the prosecutor reasonably believes:
(1) the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any applicable privilege;
(2) the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an ongoing investigation or
prosecution; and
(3) there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information;
(f) except for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and extent of the
prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, refrain from making extrajudicial
comments that have a substantial likelihood of heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise
reasonable care to prevent investigators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or
associated with the prosecutor in a criminal case from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor
would be prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule.
(g) When a prosecutor knows of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that
a convicted defendant did not commit an offense of which the defendant was convicted, the prosecutor shall:
(1) promptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and
(2) if the conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction,
(i) promptly disclose that evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and
(ii) undertake further investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine
whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.
(h) When a prosecutor knows of clear and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the
prosecutor’s jurisdiction was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the prosecutor shall seek
to remedy the conviction.

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Los Angeles County and Ventura County District Attorney Offices.
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Review and analysis of the legal filings and Court Rulings in People v. Scott Dekraai
12ZF0128, People v. Daniel Wozniak, 12ZF0137, and other cases involving two specific
informants, Oscar Moriel and Fernando Perez. Some documents and legal briefs were
reviewed involving other gang-related cases in which confidential informants were used,
including People v. Leonel Vega, 07CF2786, People v. Isaac Palacios 11CF0720, People v.
Fabian Sanchez, 11CF0920, People v. Joseph Govey, 12ZF0134, and People v. Brian Isas
11CF2748.

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Review the OCDA’s OCII protocols. The OCII is the OCDA’s database of informant
information. This database was established to create a system by which prosecutors
and law enforcement can learn of credibility and reliability issues surrounding the use of
a potential informant. The OCII database facilitates the ability of the prosecution team
to carry out its disclosure obligations regarding the informant. Information about the
informant, his activities, and any benefits he received is inputted into the database.

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Review of the legal briefs and personal observations of some of the live testimony
presented on the motion for a new trial filed in People v. Eric Ortiz, 11CF0862 a case that
involved many of the same allegations that have been made in other cases involving the
use of jailhouse informants.

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Personal interviews of over 75 OCDA prosecutors, OCDA investigators, law enforcement
officers, criminal defense attorneys, and judges.

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Personal interviews of District Attorney Tony Rackauckas and Orange County Sheriff
Sandra Hutchins.

VI. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION
While the ethical prosecution of criminal charges is of paramount importance to the public, it is
of particular and more immediate importance to well-defined groups, including: criminal defendants;
crime victims; criminal defense attorneys; prosecutors; judges; juries; families of victims; and the
families of the accused. The confidence of these various constituencies in the prosecution of criminal
cases in Orange County that involve the use of jailhouse informants has eroded. However,
implementation of the recommendations in this Report can serve to restore confidence in the Orange
County criminal justice system.
During the IPPEC’s evaluation process, dozens of prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys
willingly participated in IPPEC interviews. The IPPEC appreciates the time that these lawyers spent with
the IPPEC. Many of the criminal defense attorneys interviewed by the IPPEC pointed out the high ethical
standards exhibited by many of their opposing counsel from the OCDA’s Office.
However, during the evaluation it became clear that over the years, some prosecutors at the
OCDA’s Office adopted what the IPPEC will refer to as a win at all costs mentality. This mentality is a
problem. Stronger leadership, oversight, supervision, and training can remedy this problem. Key to
addressing the problem is changing the culture of the office by not rewarding prosecutors with the
“must win” mentality with promotions. Prosecutors’ performance reviews should focus less on winning
trials, and reflect greater emphasis on legal knowledge, analysis of issues, and finding justice.
What also became clear during the evaluation was that, in many ways, the OCDA’s Office
functions as a ship without a rudder. While the high level of trust that the District Attorney has given to
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his senior deputies and supervisors is in many ways admirable and a credit to the experience of those
senior deputies and supervisors, there does not appear to be any consistent or clear cultural message
emanating from the top down to the bottom of the organization. In short, the office suffers from what
is best described as a failure of leadership.
This failure appears to have contributed to the jailhouse informant controversy. The
management in the office was unaware of the caseloads, use of jailhouse informants, and discovery
challenges of Deputy District Attorneys in the Target, Gang, and Homicide Units. The lack of oversight of
these serious cases led to repeated legal errors that should have been identified and rectified by
management long before the problems reached the current scale. Additionally, the lack of oversight by
management at all levels has resulted in implementation of inconsistent procedures and practices. This
is an issue that must be acknowledged, shouldered, and remedied by the entire leadership team at the
OCDA’s Office, including the District Attorney, Senior Assistant District Attorneys, and the Assistant
District Attorneys. In fact, the IPPEC evaluation revealed that the District Attorney himself was unaware
of many of the problematic issues that led to the jailhouse informant controversy.
The IPPEC evaluation also revealed that, within the OCDA’s Office, there is a palpable hesitation
to bring problematic information to the attention of the District Attorney. One readily apparent reason
for this hesitation is that senior management at the OCDA is subject to termination without cause.
When a Deputy District Attorney 4 accepts a promotion to Assistant District Attorney or Senior Assistant
District Attorney they become “at will” employees, and serve at the pleasure of the District Attorney. By
accepting these promotions, prosecutors give up all civil service protection. If terminated, these senior
prosecutors cannot revert back to their previous civil service protected position of Deputy District
Attorney 4. Rather, they must leave the OCDA. Such a policy does not promote the free exchange of
ideas on issues facing the OCDA. While the IPPEC recognizes that the District Attorney should have the
ability to select his executive staff, we recommend that if these prosecutors are removed from their “at
will” positions they should be returned to their previous civil service jobs, not terminated. This lack of
job security inhibits the free exchange of ideas among managers. Hopefully a change in the civil service
rules will result in more independent (and vocal) thinking by senior management level attorneys.
The IPPEC also learned that over the years a certain ambivalence has developed about making
suggestions or expressing concerns because, often times, despite acknowledgement of the concern or
an expression of thanks for the suggestion, “nothing ever happens or changes.” This ambivalence
underscored the need for more robust communication and leadership at the OCDA.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: REVISE OCDA POLICIES & PROCEDURES REGARDING THE USE OF
JAILHOUSE INFORMANTS
The OCDA needs a clear and consistent policy regarding its use of jailhouse informants. Below is
a suggested policy, the elements of which should be included in any policy adopted by the OCDA.
INTRODUCTION
It is the policy of the OCDA to carefully evaluate and strictly control the use of
jailhouse informants as prosecution witnesses. The use of a jailhouse informant
as a witness involves significant risks to the integrity of this office and fair
administration of justice. It is the policy of this office that the use of a jailhouse
informant as a witness in a criminal prosecution will be the rare and infrequent
exception. Accordingly, the District Attorney, as Chair of the Confidential
Informant Review Committee (CIRC), must give prior approval to the use of any
jailhouse informant as a witness in a criminal prosecution or a grand jury hearing.
Strong corroborating evidence is required to demonstrate that a jailhouse
informant is offering truthful testimony. A trial deputy who wishes to call a
jailhouse informant as a witness must comply with all relevant state and federal
statutes and the legal policies of this office.
OFFICE POLICY
A jailhouse informant is a person other than a co-defendant, percipient witness,
accomplice or co-conspirator whose testimony is based upon statements made by
the defendant while both the defendant and the jailhouse informant are in a
custodial setting. (Penal Code section 1127a.) This policy includes all jailhouse
informants, whether or not they seek leniency or any other benefit from this
office or other law enforcement officials in return for their testimony. An
informant witness in a so-called "Perkins Operation" (Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496
U.S. 292, 294) is deemed to be a jailhouse informant for the purpose of this policy
and must be approved by the CIRC prior to being called to testify in a criminal
prosecution or a grand jury hearing. A prosecutor shall notify his/her supervisor
immediately when the prosecutor becomes aware that a potential jailhouse
informant has come forward and offered his or her cooperation to this office or
any law enforcement agency.
No jailhouse informant shall be called to testify to a defendant's oral statements,
admission, or confession unless strong evidence corroborates the truthfulness of
the jailhouse informant's statements. This evidence must consist of more than
the fact that the jailhouse informant appears to know details about the crime
thought to be known only to law enforcement officials.
It shall be the responsibility of the CIRC to determine if and when a prosecutor
may offer the testimony of a jailhouse informant in a criminal prosecution or a
grand jury hearing. The CIRC shall consider the factors set forth in this policy in
determining whether to approve the use of a jailhouse informant. The members
of the CIRC shall include: the District Attorney, the Senior Assistant District
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Attorneys, the Assistant District Attorney of the Gang Unit, and the Assistant
District Attorney of the Homicide Unit. The District Attorney, at his or her
discretion, may appoint one additional temporary member to the CIRC for a term
of six months on a rotating basis. This temporary member shall be either a
Deputy District Attorney or an Assistant District Attorney who has significant jury
trial experience. The District Attorney shall also appoint a retired judge or a
neutral individual as a permanent member of the CIRC. The District Attorney shall
serve as chair of the CIRC and may designate a Senior Assistant District Attorney
as the acting chair in the District Attorney's absence.
A trial deputy who wishes to call a jailhouse informant as a witness in a criminal
prosecution or a grand jury hearing must obtain prior approval of the CIRC. All
such requests must be approved by the trial deputy's supervisor and submitted in
writing to the CIRC through the trial deputy's chain of command. The written
request to offer the testimony of a jailhouse informant must include the following
information:
-

-

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-

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the present status of the case in which the jailhouse informant's testimony
will be offered, including the crimes charged in the complaint,
information, or indictment;
a description of how contact was initiated between the jailhouse
informant and law enforcement;
a description of the facts and circumstances surrounding the jailhouse
informant obtaining the defendant's admission/confession;
a detailed description of the crime and the evidence (excluding the
jailhouse informant's proposed testimony) that supports the charges
and/or the special circumstance allegations;
the evidence/testimony offered by the jailhouse informant;
a description of the evidence that corroborates the jailhouse informant's
proposed testimony and whether or not that information was available to
the jailhouse informant other than through the statements of the
defendant. (e.g., newspaper articles or documents found in the
informant's jail cell or in his/her possession);
an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the prosecution's case with
and without the testimony of the jailhouse informant;
a complete description of the jailhouse informant's criminal background,
including his/her true name, all known aliases, all pending cases in any
jurisdiction, all misdemeanor and felony convictions, all arrests and
documented law enforcement contacts and any information regarding
gang affiliations. The trial deputy should also identify the jailhouse
informant's past crime partners and co-defendants and any connection to
the defendant in the present case;
any benefit promised or given to the jailhouse informant by any member
of the prosecution team, including, but not limited to, any law
enforcement officer or any employee of the District Attorney's Office on
the pending case or any other case in which the jailhouse informant has
been a cooperating witness regardless of jurisdiction;

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-

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a description of any prior offers to provide information by the jailhouse
informant to law enforcement, whether or not the informant testified, the
quality of the testimony and any and all promises made or benefits
provided to the informant, whether monetary or otherwise;
a description of how the trial deputy intends to comply with Penal Code
section 1191.25, which requires the prosecution to make a good faith
effort to notify the victims, if any, of any crime which was committed by or
alleged to have been committed by the jailhouse informant before the
jailhouse informant is called to testify;
a draft of the written statement of consideration to be lodged with the
trial court pursuant to Penal Code section 1127a(c); and
confirmation that the trial deputy has strictly complied with Penal Code
sections 4001.1(a) and 4001.1(b).

The CIRC shall consider the above factors in its decision to approve or disapprove
the use of a jailhouse informant's testimony. The Chair of the CIRC shall notify
the requesting trial deputy of the committee's decision in writing. The decision is
final and no jailhouse informant may be called to testify as a prosecution witness
unless prior approval is given by the CIRC.
Once a jailhouse informant who has been authorized by the CIRC testifies, the
trial deputy shall submit a memorandum memorializing the event through the
chain of command to the Chair of the CIRC. The memorandum shall include:
-

-

the name of the jailhouse informant;
the name of the case, the date of the testimony, the court case number,
the law enforcement DR number, the OCDA case number of the case in
which the jailhouse informant testified and the case numbers of the case
or cases in which the jailhouse informant received leniency or any other
benefit;
a synopsis of the jailhouse informant's testimony and evaluation of its
credibility; and
a description of any consideration that was provided or will be provided to
the jailhouse informant in exchange for the testimony.

Should any employee of this office or any member of law enforcement acquire
any information that suggests that a jailhouse informant is attempting to
fabricate or has fabricated evidence in any case, that employee or law
enforcement official shall immediately inform the Chair of the CIRC by a
memorandum through his/her chain of command setting forth the relevant facts.
Should the trial prosecutor learn during a trial that a jailhouse informant is
attempting to fabricate or has fabricated evidence, the prosecutor shall
immediately notify the court and defense counsel. The trial prosecutor shall also
prepare a memorandum setting forth all the pertinent facts and forward it
through his/her chain of command to the Chair of the CIRC.
It is the policy of this office that all employees and law enforcement officers have
a duty to preserve all records and documents relating to any jailhouse informants.
This duty includes any jailhouse informant they have transported, assisted with
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housing, interviewed, or called as a witness. This policy includes, but is not
limited to, all notes, memoranda, computer generated documents, any records of
promises made, any payments made or rewards given to a jailhouse informant or
to any other person for the benefit of the jailhouse informant.
It is the policy of this office that all prosecutors and investigators shall be familiar
with the statutory law relating to jailhouse informants and shall comply with all
provisions, including:
-

-

-

-

-

-

no law enforcement official shall give, offer, or promise to give any
monetary payment in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00) in return for an a
jailhouse informant's testimony in any criminal proceeding (Penal Code
section 4001.1(a));
the trial deputy shall make a good faith effort to notify the victims, if any,
of any crime that was committed by, or alleged to have been committed
by, the jailhouse informant before the jailhouse informant is called to
testify (Penal Code section 1191.25);
the trial deputy shall file with the court a written accounting of any
considerations or benefits promised or given to the jailhouse informant
(Penal Code section 1127a(c));
the trial deputy shall request that the court give a cautionary instruction to
the jury regarding jailhouse informant testimony (Penal Code section
1127a(b));
except where a defendant's right to counsel has not attached, no law
enforcement official and no jailhouse informant may take any action that
is designed to elicit incriminating statements from a defendant beyond
merely listening to the defendant's statements (Penal Code section
4001.1(b); People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 657; Illinois v. Perkins
(1990) 496 U.S. 292, 294); and
the trial deputy shall comply in all respects with Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83 and all state statutory and ethical discovery rules.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: ESTABLISH A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT REVIEW COMMITTEE (CIRC)
WITH DEFINED PROTOCOLS AND INCLUDE AN “OUTSIDE” OR INDEPENDENT MEMBER ON THE CIRC.
As discussed in Recommendation No. 1, is it critical that the OCDA continue the use of its
recently established CIRC. As previously stated, IPPEC also recommends that there be an “outside” or
independent member of the CIRC who participates in all the CIRC confidential informant review
meetings. To protect the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege and attorney work-product of the
OCDA, this independent member should be appointed by the OCDA as a part-time employee of the
OCDA’s Office. Preferably, this independent member of the CIRC should be a retired criminal defense
attorney or a retired judge who worked as a criminal defense attorney prior to taking the bench.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: OVERHAUL THE OCDA TRAINING PROGRAM, WITH EXTENSIVE
ADDITIONAL TRAINING REGARDING DISCOVERY OBLIGATIONS AND THE USE OF JAILHOUSE
INFORMANTS.
The OCDA Training Program is inadequate. IPPEC’s evaluation revealed that the lack of training
throughout the OCDA office was a primary contributing factor to the issues involving jailhouse
informants. The IPPEC urges the OCDA to recognize that science and technology are changing the way
law enforcement does its job. The legal and investigative tools that are best practices today may be
changed by a court decision tomorrow. The OCDA must stay on the forefront of these changes. Toward
this end, the OCDA must establish and support a full-time training unit, led by an Assistant District
Attorney and staffed by some of the best and most experienced prosecutors in the office. The mission of
the Training Unit should be to produce relevant and timely legal education to prosecutors and law
enforcement officers in Orange County. The unit should also partner with other prosecutorial and law
enforcement agencies throughout Southern California to develop the best training possible, and best
practices for, criminal prosecution.
The Training Division should establish the following programs:
A comprehensive multi-week training program for newly hired deputy district attorneys. This
program should include criminal law and procedure, discovery, ethics, office policy, calendar
management, courtroom presentations, including preliminary hearings, jury trials, and law and motion
practice. The prosecutor-instructors must give feedback to the new hires and to the office's executive
staff on the progress of the training classes. A graduation and swearing-in ceremony for those lawyers
who successfully complete the new prosecutors' training program should be considered to acknowledge
their accomplishments.
Monthly weekend morning seminars. Prosecutors will receive four hours of compensatory time
for their attendance. The seminars will cover criminal law, ethics, evidence, trial tactics, and mandatory
State Bar MCLE subjects. Saturday seminars will also focus on office policy, such as the Confidential
Informant Review Committee and Brady issues. The Training Division will obtain State Bar approval for
all seminars, and attendees will receive State Bar MCLE credits.
Office-wide DNA training. The goal of this training is to educate staff on the latest DNA science
and prepare every prosecutor to present DNA evidence to a judge or jury. Within one year, every
deputy district attorney will be expected to complete this training.
Office-wide AB 109 (Realignment) and Proposition 47 training. The enactment of AB 109 and
Proposition 47 have dramatically changed the landscape of the criminal justice system. The realignment
as to where felony inmates are housed and the sentencing of new felons has changed the way the
criminal courts dispense justice. The impact of these laws are not just felt in felony courts. In many
counties, AB 109 and Proposition 47 have changed the way misdemeanor crimes are prosecuted and
sentenced. Prosecutors must have the latest, up to the minute knowledge of how to deal with these
changes in the justice system. All deputy district attorneys will be required to complete this one day
training.
Domestic Violence Prosecution College. Domestic violence is one of the most devastating
crimes in our society. It can be a difficult crime to prosecute and often presents challenges to law
enforcement officers, as well as prosecutors. This training will present the latest techniques for
successfully prosecuting these crimes while dealing fairly with all parties.
Felony Prosecution and Sentencing College. For deputies moving from prosecuting
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misdemeanors to the Felony Panel, felony trials can be a challenging area of the law. This college will
prepare prosecutors for this assignment in such areas as calendar management, felony sentencing and
the impact of AB 109, prosecutorial discretion and the three-strikes law, victim's rights and Megan's
Law, mental health issues, law and motion practice and case settlement, and office policy. Completion
of this college is required before a prosecutor is assigned to the Felony Panel.
Homicide Prosecution College. For most prosecutors, a murder trial is an intense and
challenging experience. Homicide trials and capital litigation are complex areas of the law. This training
will prepare prosecutors for the most difficult cases of their careers. Among the topics that will be
covered are the law of homicide and capital case litigation, pre-trial investigation, jury selection, mental
health defenses, opening statement and final argument, presentation of penalty phase evidence, and
post-conviction remedies. Successful completion of this college should be a prerequisite to assignment
in the Homicide, Gang, and Target units. CIRC/OCII (see below)/Brady training must be a prerequisite to
assignment in the Homicide, Gang, or Target Units! One comment that the IPPEC heard repeatedly at
various levels throughout the OCDA was the erroneous belief that if a prosecutor does not use a
jailhouse informant at a preliminary hearing or a trial, the prosecutor does not need to turn over the
statements of the jailhouse informant. This clearly is not the law and the test for Brady is not whether
the information is used at a preliminary hearing or at trial. A number of prosecutors within the OCDA
appear to be confusing the requirements of Penal Code section 1050 (turning over a criminal
defendant’s statements that will be used at trial at least 30 days before trial) with the prosecutor’s
discovery obligations under Brady. These two obligations are separate and can create two different
discovery productions.
OCII Training. Currently the OCII is maintained by one Deputy District Attorney. This Deputy
District Attorney inputs all the information received by law enforcement and prosecutors, and notifies
prosecutors of witnesses who have an informant history. The current practice in the Office is for this
Deputy District Attorney to also train all law enforcement agencies on the protocols and procedures of
using the OCII. The OCII is the cornerstone of discovery production regarding jailhouse informants and
thus must be reliably maintained. Assigning one Deputy District Attorney to these three essential
functions of the OCII and training others on the protocol is inadequate. An additional Deputy District
Attorney should be tasked with a regular compliance check on all Orange County prosecutors and law
enforcement agencies to verify that the OCII contains all informants’ information, activities, and benefits
received.
Grand Jury College. The grand jury is one of the most important institutions in our criminal
justice system. This college will familiarize prosecutors with the resources of the grand jury; prepare
them to be more effective when appearing before this historic institution; and teach prosecutor’s duties
of discovery specific to grand jury proceedings.
Specific Training Re Relationship and Interaction with Law Enforcement (Particularly for Target
Unit and Gang Unit DAs). As a result of its interviews, and observation of the live testimony presented
during the hearing on the motion for new trial in People v. Ortiz, the IPPEC strongly recommends that
Target Unit and Gang Unit (or preferably a combined unit) deputies receive specific training regarding
maintaining an ever-important professional and detached relationship with law enforcement.
Particularly in the Target Unit, where deputies are actually embedded in the gang units of certain law
enforcement agencies, maintaining an objective and detached relationship is critical. The IPPEC heard
from numerous deputies that it is not uncommon for Target Unit deputies to be subject to inappropriate
pressure from their law enforcement counterparts to file cases that the deputies were otherwise not
comfortable filing. The IPPEC heard reports of deputies being ridiculed and even harassed by law
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enforcement for not being aggressive enough in filing certain gang cases. Additionally, to the degree
Target Unit deputies continue to be embedded in the same office space with their law enforcement
counterparts, it is inevitable that social relationships and friendships will develop between the Target
Unit deputies and their law enforcement counterparts. The IPPEC is strongly of the view that close social
and friendship-type relationships between embedded deputies and their direct law enforcement
counterparts are fertile ground for deputies (particularly young and impressionable deputies) to have
their judgment impacted in a way that does not benefit the constitutional role of the prosecutor. Should
the OCDA continue with its practice of embedding Target Unit deputies with law enforcement, the IPPEC
urges that there be: specific training regarding maintaining professional distance and detachment;
regular rotation (at least every two years) of Target Unit deputies; a careful screening process by which
only experienced and more senior deputies are placed in these positions; and a specific process by
which a deputy who feels pressured to sway from his or her independent legal judgment has an avenue
to express concern to his or her supervisor who in turn will immediately address the matter with the
involved law enforcement agency.
Develop a Program of "Brown Bag" Lunch-Time Lectures. The lectures should be specifically
targeted to meet the needs of individual units in the office.
OCDA Management/Leadership Training. It was clear to the IPPEC that while both dedicated
and hardworking, the OCDA management and leadership team is not exercising the quality of leadership
to run what is essentially the largest law firm in Orange County. Leadership training is needed on how
to form a cohesive office that implements and adheres to the same policies and procedures consistently.
There is also clearly a need for motivational, leadership, and team building training in the office.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 4: COORDINATE WITH THE OCSD AND ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN
ORANGE COUNTY REGARDING JAILHOUSE INFORMANT PROTOCOLS AND PROCEDURES, INCLUDING
OCDA’S JAILHOUSE INFORMANT POLICY, AND ENGAGE IN DETAILED TRAINING ON THE ORANGE
COUNTY INFORMANT INDEX (OCII).
Law Enforcement Training. OCDA must have regularly scheduled training with all Orange
County Law Enforcement Agencies, including all new hire classes. The training should include, but not be
limited to, the following:
•

The prosecution team’s discovery obligations;

•

Jailhouse informant statutory and case law;

•

OCDA’s Jailhouse Informant Policy; and

•

OCII Protocol and Procedures

Training Special Handling and Classification Unit Deputy Sheriffs at the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department. Other than interviewing Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchins, the IPPEC did
not interview any individual deputy sheriffs. However, during the IPPEC’s six-month evaluation, based
on various legal briefs and testimony in various jailhouse informant related cases, it appeared that the
Special Handling and Classifications Unit Deputies lacked training regarding law enforcement’s
obligations under both Massiah v. United States and Brady v. Maryland and applicable California laws
and ethical standards. These Units at the OCSD should receive detailed specific training regarding the
legal issues associated with jailhouse informants.
Due to the magnitude of training OCSD and local Orange County police departments, including
all new law enforcement hires, a Deputy District Attorney should be assigned to this position. This
Deputy District Attorney should also be responsible for ensuring that Brady information held by law
enforcement agencies regarding confidential informants is transmitted to the OCII unit for inclusion in
the database.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 5: RESTRUCTURE AND COMBINE INTO ONE UNIT THE OCDA GANG UNIT AND
TARGET UNIT.
Two different units prosecute gang-related cases within the Office - - the Target Unit and the
Gang Unit. The Gang Unit prosecutes all gang-related adult felonies and serious juvenile cases. Gang
cases can range in severity and complexity, but include a significant number of homicide and death
penalty cases. Gang cases often involve multiple defendants, again adding to the complexity of
prosecuting these cases.
The Target Unit was initiated with grant funds in the early 1990’s to specifically “target” serious
gang offenders. Office attorneys and investigators are out-stationed to, and embedded with, local police
agencies for the purpose of “targeting” gang members for apprehension and prosecution. The program
serves as a partnership between the OCDA’s Office, the Probation Department, and local law
enforcement. Although having prosecutors embedded with local law enforcement creates obvious
efficiency, it also has the potential to create undue, and at times unfair, pressure on the prosecutor to
file cases that he or she does not believe should be filed. The IPPEC is concerned that having Target Unit
prosecutors “housed” with law enforcement risks blurring the lines of the objective professional
distance required between prosecutors and law enforcement.
Both the Target Unit and the Gang Unit prosecute cases that can range in severity and
complexity, but include among the most violent and complex cases within the Office. Both units share
the same goals and expertise, but they do not collaborate on training or best practices.
IPPEC recommends combining the Gang and Target units to provide for greater collaboration on
training and best practices.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 6: ESTABLISH AN OCDA CONVICTION INTEGRITY UNIT.
The OCDA should join the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office and the Santa Clara
District Attorney's Office in establishing a Conviction Integrity Unit (“CIU”) that will be dedicated to reexamining post-conviction claims of innocence. This unit would have responsibility for investigating and
evaluating claims of wrongful convictions, including those involving jailhouse informants. Instituting
such a unit will improve the OCDA's ability to detect and remedy police and prosecutor mistakes earlier
in the judicial process and ensure that those with information regarding improper investigations and
prosecutions have a place to come forward with their claims. Establishment of this unit will also signal
to the public that the OCDA is open to learning about the mishandling of cases. It will also provide for a
neutral group of prosecutors whose job is not simply to defend convictions, but to critically examine
whether they were lawfully obtained.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 7: ESTABLISH AN OCDA CHIEF ETHICS OFFICER POSITION.
The OCDA should establish a senior position of “Chief Ethics Officer.” This attorney should be
an experienced criminal lawyer with particular expertise in professional ethics and discovery obligations.
The Chief Ethics Officer should work closely with the supervisor of the Training Unit to enhance the
professional integrity of the OCDA. This attorney should be given an employment contract with a
duration of at least three years, and the employment contract should specifically protect the attorney in
this position from retaliation for bringing matters to the attention of the OCDA. This attorney should
establish an internal mechanism for all members of the OCDA and for individuals outside the OCDA’s
Office, such as criminal defense attorneys and others, to report possible ethics violations or
improprieties by members of the OCDA’s Office. This position should also have the authority to conduct
investigations into internal ethical violations, and to make recommendations to the District Attorney
regarding discipline for any ethical breaches found. The IPPEC envisions the logistics of such an
operation being somewhat analogous to the Chief Ethics Officer and compliance positions established
by numerous corporations following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recommends that there
be such reporting avenues as a 1-800 number and an anonymous reporting mechanism.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 8: REINSTATE CHIEF ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY POSITION.
As the second-in-command, a Chief Assistant District Attorney (“CADA”) would assist the District
Attorney in the day-to-day management of the office. The Senior Assistant District Attorneys, the Chief
of the Bureau of Investigation, the head of the Training Unit, and the Head Supervisor of the office
clerical staff would report directly to the CADA. The CADA should take a daily “hands on” approach with
the head of the Training Unit. The CADA would chair the Special Circumstance Committee and the CIRC
in the District Attorney’s absence and oversee the scheduling and paperwork flow for those committees.
The District Attorney may wish to request that the CADA develop a protocol for the review of major
cases, perhaps a Major Case Review Committee, to assist the District Attorney in making important
decisions for prosecutions of significant import. A few managers expressed the hope that a CADA would
bring more structure to the management of the office which in turn would help avoid future issues such
as the current jailhouse informant issues. Among addressing numerous other needed management
concerns, the CADA should be tasked with implementing the Jailhouse Informant Policy recommended
by this Report.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 9: ELIMINATE “CHIEF OF STAFF” POSITION AND CREATE A POSITION OF
“ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR MEDIA RELATIONS.”
The Chief of Staff position should be re-designated as the Assistant District Attorney for Media
Relations, and be staffed with an Assistant District Attorney who will develop a transparent and
professional relationship with the press.
With one exception, every member of the OCDA’s Office who was interviewed expressed what
could only be described as an extreme level of concern regarding the toxic and combative relationship
between the OCDA’s Office and the press. While members of the OCDA’s Office were careful not to
attack the OCDA Chief of Staff or members of the OCDA Media Relations Unit personally, there is an
overwhelming frustration that the OCDA’s Office does not have a more transparent and less hostile
relationship with the press.
Most members of the OCDA’s Office believe that the jailhouse informant controversy had been
greatly overblown because of a lack of transparency, and the fact that the Chief of Staff and Media
Relations Unit did not immediately and openly address the issues and the problems in the Dekraai case.
The perception of most members of the OCDA’s Office is that the combative relationship between the
Chief of Staff and the press only furthered various members of the press, and certain members of the
public, to focus on the jailhouse informant issue so that it eventually took on a life of its own, well
beyond the level of the actual problems involved in the Dekraai matter and a handful of other cases.
While some of the press coverage – including articles, op-eds, and letters to the press –
contained inaccurate or unsubstantiated information, the OCDA must shoulder responsibility by its
failure to provide straightforward complete answers to press inquiries.

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RECOMMENDATION NO. 10: APPOINT AN INDEPENDENT “MONITOR” FOR A THREE-YEAR PERIOD TO
OVERSEE OCDA COMPLIANCE WITH THE IPPEC’S RECOMMENDATIONS.
To ensure that the IPPEC’s recommendations are taken seriously, the IPPEC recommends that
the OCDA appoint an independent Monitor. The IPPEC suggests that the Monitor be a retired Judge and
if asked, the IPPEC would appreciate the opportunity to provide potential nominees for the Monitor
position. For at least the next three years, the Monitor should provide an annual report to the public
reporting on the OCDA implementation and compliance with the IPPEC recommendations.

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VIII. CONCLUSION
While undoubtedly most prosecutors in the OCDA’s Office are ethical and hard working
professionals, there are significant issues within the office in the areas of training, supervision, and
overall culture. There is an immediate need for stronger leadership, training, supervision, mentoring,
and oversight to change the culture. The purpose of the recommendations of the IPPEC is to recognize
these issues and to help reinstate the public’s trust and confidence in our system of justice.
Each of us on the IPPEC has been honored to participate in this process and remains open to
providing further assistance to the Orange County District Attorney’s Office and the County of Orange.
Respectfully submitted,

__________________________________
Patrick Dixon
______________________________________
Robert Gerard
______________________________________
Blithe Leece
______________________________________
Laurie Levenson
______________________________________
The Honorable James Smith (Ret.)

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EXHIBIT 1
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EXHIBIT 2
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