THE PENNSYL VANI A DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTI ONS

ALBION

D E CE MB E R 2 0 0 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

2.0

SCI-Albion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.0

2.1

Description of SCI-Albion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2.2

Institution Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Inmate Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1

4.0

5.0

Malcolm Kysor (AJ-1746) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.1

Physical Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

3.1.2

Institutional Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Chronology of Events and Contributing Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
4.1

The Escape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4.2

Institutional Detection, Response and Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Policies, Procedures and Practices & Recommended Corrective Action . 22
5.1

Areas Reviewed and Inspected . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.1

Sallyport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1.1.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Sallyport Construction
Section 3 - Perimeter Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.1.2 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Vehicle Security
Section 11 - Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1.1.3 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.1.1.4 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

5.1.2

Main Control Center/CCTV Camera Monitoring Officer . . . . . 28
5.1.2.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Facililty Security Procedures
Manual - Section 2 - Facility Control Center. . . . . . . . 29
5.1.2.2 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.1.2.3 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

5.1.3

Inmate Accountability and Count Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.3.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 Section 9 - Counts and Inmate
1

5

Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.1.3.2 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.1.3.3 SCI-Albion Count Procedures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5.1.3.4 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1.4 Managerial Visits and Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1.4.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Section 19 - Managerial Visits
and Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
5.1.4.2 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.4.3 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
5.1.5

Dietary Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.5.1 Dietary Management and Supervision . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.1.5.2 Removal of Food Waste (Pig Slop) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
5.1.5.3 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

5.1.6

Alertness Monitoring - Complacency Drills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.6.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Section 28 Alertness Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.1.6.2 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1.6.3 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

5.1.7

Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1.7.1 DOC Policy 6.3.1 - Section 8 - Vulnerability
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
5.1.7.2 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.1.7.3 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

5.1.8

Incident Command System - Emergency Procedures . . . . . . 56
5.1.8.1 DOC Policy 6.7.1 - Incident Command System . . . . . 56
5.1.8.2 Official Timeline of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.1.8.3 SCI-Albion Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1.8.4 Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2

6.0

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix A - Aerial Photograph of SCI-Albion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

1.0

Executive Summary
On Sunday afternoon November 25, 2007 at approximately 1445 hours, Inmate

Malcolm Kysor (AJ-1746) escaped from the State Correctional Institution at Albion (SCIAlbion) by hiding in a garbage can as a state employee (Dietary Food Service Instructor)
drove the pickup truck through the vehicle sally port.
Sergeant assigned to the sally port.

Kysor was undetected by the

The entire escape has been captured on recorded

surveillance video that was eventually retrieved at approximately 2030 hours the same
day. The officer assigned to monitor the surveillance cameras was monitoring other
areas of the facility and did not observe the cameras that actually captured the escape at
1445 hours. SCI-Albion has a total of 140 cameras that are randomly monitored by the
assigned officer. At the time of this report, the escaped inmate remains at large and a
nation-wide search is underway.
The escape should not have occurred. Both DOC and SCI-Albion's
procedure, if followed, would have prevented this escape. The Shift Commander should
have ensured the assigned sally port Sergeant was aware of his post responsibilities. If
the commissioned officer in Main Control would have observed the sally port operations
via the CCTV system, he may have noticed the Sergeant's failure to perform a proper
search.
Complacency is always a concern in DOC facilities. To combat complacency, the
Department has incorporated alertness checks into policy, making it mandatory for each
facility to conduct "alertness checks" of the staff monitoring the security systems and the
inmates. This investigation did not reveal any evidence that meaningful alertness checks
were conducted at the sally port.

4

Every post that corrections officers are assigned have post orders that outline the
expectations of the assigned officer.

The Sergeant assigned to the sally port did

acknowledge that he read and understood the sally port post orders. He also signed a
training roster indicating that he had been trained on the "heartbeat detector", however,
he clearly failed to follow them and did not make any requests to the Shift Commander
for assistance or clarification.
The Department of Corrections has also incorporated the use of Vulnerability
Assessments (VA) at each facility.

These assessments are intended to identify

weaknesses in security, primarily to lessen the likelihood of an escape.
SCI-Albion's VA was conducted in October 2005 and the report identified a similar
scenario to the escape that occurred on November 25, 2007, as a possible means of
escape from the facility. Had SCI-Albion conducted a review of their trash procedures
following the VA, the escape may not have occurred. The Regional Deputy Secretary is
required by policy to review the VA findings and approve Plans of Action for identified
discrepancies in the VA. In this particular case, there is no evidence of a Plan of Action
being submitted or follow-up actions by the Regional Deputy Secretary (who retired in
June 2007).
The investigation revealed that there were no written procedures regarding the
removal of pig slop (food waste). Had there been written procedures, the larger gray
garbage can may have never been utilized, thus making it less likely for Kysor to be able
to escape. There was no evidence of any orders to hold the garbage through at least
one inmate count prior to taking it through the sally port. The practice at SCI-Albion was
to take the pig slop out through the sally port seven (7) days a week, even though the
sally port is closed on weekends, thus requiring a potentially less experienced officer to
5

open the sally port.

The Shift Commander did not put any additional security or

safeguards in place when the sally port was opened on a weekend.
The Dietary Department has been an area of concern for some time, relative to
various security concerns and complacency.

The investigation revealed no evidence

that the Food Service Manager, the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services or
the Superintendent were effective in dealing with these issues. The dietary practice that
permitted inmates to work on their off days and for lifers to work in the back hallway, in
spite of written direction to the contrary, directly contributed to the escape.
Failure to comply with DOC policy regarding inmate movement whereby inmates
are to be issued passes for movement other than major line movements, also contributed
to the escape.
The institutional response to the escape was generally good, however, the
investigation revealed that the activation of the Community Alert Network System
(CANS), the escape siren, and the notification of the media were all delayed and should
have occurred sooner. While no evidence that any of these delays had an adverse
impact on the actual escape more prompt, notification may have allowed local citizens to
spot unusual activity. The delay did have an adverse impact on public confidence.
The Department of Corrections' response to the findings in this investigation will be
as follows:
•

Discipline employees who failed to follow policy and procedure

•

Add to policy, any trash and other such items must be searched and held
through at least one inmate count

•

Add to policy that weekend/holiday usage of the sally port is limited to
emergency use only. If authorized to be opened, a Lieutenant or higher
6

authority must be physically present with the Sergeant assigned to the sally
port in the absence of the regular/relief sally port Sergeant.
•

Require that the local media outlets be included in the CANS notification
broadcast.
This report will provide a description of SCI-Albion and a profile of the

inmate involved. It will also outline the manner in which the escape was planned
and executed. A review of operational procedures such as inmate accountability,
inmate counts, vehicle security, and staff inspections will be discussed. The report
will review and discuss issues where complacency or operational failures had an
adverse effect that could have contributed to the escape and finally, the report will
provide recommended actions to prevent future escapes.
As a result of the escape, there have been several questions and inquiries
raised by the media and the local community regarding the timeliness of the
notifications initiated by the institution. This report will closely look at the timeline
of events from the time the inmate actually escaped until all appropriate entities
and authorities were notified.
This is the first escape from the State Correctional Institution at Albion since
its opening in 1993. The last escape from a secure facility that occurred from a
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections facility occurred in August 1999. Two
escapes occurred that year, one from the State Correctional Institution at Dallas
that involved two (2) inmates, and one from the State Correctional Institution at
Huntingdon. Both escapes resulted in the inmates being apprehended and the
inmates are back in custody.

7

2.0

SCI-Albion
This section will present a description of the facility

2.1

Description of SCI-Albion

The State Correctional Institution at Albion was one of five prototypical
institutions dedicated in 1993.

The facility was built by a cooperative effort

between state and county governments, in which the Erie County Prison Authority
built the prison on a fast-track basis to accommodate quick expansion of the
system. SCI-Albion is a medium-security facility designed to house and maintain
adult male offenders.

It is fully accredited by the American Correctional

Association. The institution is comprised of 290 acres, 67 of which are inside the
perimeter fence. There are a total of 25 buildings 10 of which are housing units.
8

SCI-Albion is a Security Level 3 (medium security) facility, located in the city
of Albion, Pennsylvania, approximately 20 miles south of Erie, Pennsylvania.
SCI-Albion houses approximately 2300 adult male inmates of all custody levels.
The breakdown of SCI-Albion’s inmate population is as follows:
SCI Albion Custody Level Breakdown
8.4%
3.7%
38.1%

Level 2 (minimum)
Level 3 (medium)

19.0%

Level 4 (close)
Level 5 (restricted)
Unclassified

30.8%

The racial breakdown of SCI-Albion is as follows:
SCI Albion Racial Breakdown
9.0% 0.7%

White
45.3%

Black
Hispanic
Other

45.0%

SCI-Albion currently houses 196 inmates serving a life sentence and 106
inmates are serving a minimum sentence of 20 years or more (this does not
include those serving a life sentence). SCI-Albion completed its first accreditation
audit in June 1996 with the panel hearing completed in August 1996. Since then it
has been re-accredited every 3 years. The last accreditation audit occurred in
March 2005 and the institution is scheduled for re-accreditation in May 2008.
SCI-Albion employs a total of 606 staff; 347 are Corrections Officers and 259 are
support staff.
9

2.2

Institution Security
SCI Albion has two 14’ fences. The bottom portion of this fence is

constructed of 8-gauge 2” diamond mesh wire, with heavy gauge wire on the
upper portion. The inner fence has one roll of razor wire installed halfway up the
fence and one roll or razor wire at the top of the fence. The outer fence has six
rolls of wire installed at the bottom and one roll at the top. These areas are heavily
reinforced with razor wire to prevent an individual from climbing them.

The

perimeter is also protected by a Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) that
includes strategically mounted cameras. When a specific fence zone alarms, the
cameras in the effected zone it automatically come up in the Central Control
monitor.
There is a continuous mobile perimeter patrol. The armed Mobile Patrol
officer is equipped with a mobile graphic map of the perimeter fence and all of the
designated zones. In the event that the Perimeter Intrusion Detection System
(PIDS) alarms, the Mobile Patrol officer receives a visible and audible alert on the
mobile map and immediately responds to the affected zone to determine the
source of the alarm. They are instructed to check the affected zone and the
adjoining zones for evidence of escape or tampering. The Main Control Center
has a larger graphic map of the perimeter and camera monitors that automatically
capture a camera view of the activated zone.

The Control Center officer

immediately contacts the Mobile Patrol Officer in the event of an alarm and
monitors the perimeter cameras until the officer assigned to the Mobile Patrol
reports the area “all clear.” At that time the alarm is reset.

10

SCI-Albion only has one (1) vehicle entry into the facility that is referred to
as the “sally port”. The sally port is staffed by a Corrections Officer II (Sergeant)
and is the only ingress/egress point for vehicular traffic. The sally port is equipped
with a “heart beat detector” to aid staff in the detection of unauthorized inmates
hiding in vehicles and surveillance cameras that are monitored by an assigned
officer in the Main Control Center. There is also a “crash gate” located on the
inside of the inner vehicle gate that the Sergeant must manually unlock and open
to permit passage through the sally port. The “crash gate” was installed to prevent
an inmate from overpowering a staff member or vendor, commandeering their
vehicle and ramming the sally port gates in order to escape. The sally port is
routinely used by institutional staff to deliver institution supplies or for vendors to
pick up garbage compactors or deliver supplies. The sally port is only staffed and
operational Monday through Friday between the hours of 0800 and 1600. If the
shift commander deems it necessary to open it on a weekend/holiday or after
hours, an available Sergeant is assigned for the time needed to open and secure
the sally port.
The sally port consists of two (2) mechanically operated gates that are
never to be opened at the same time. The assigned Sergeant is the only staff
member authorized to have the gates opened or closed.

According to

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy and the SCI-Albion Post Orders
for the sally port Sergeant, the Sergeant is to ensure that all vehicles are properly
searched both entering and exiting the facility.

11

Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1 Facility Security Manual Section 11
- Vehicles: “… all vehicles shall be searched, both entering and leaving in
accordance with Department policy 6.3.1 “Facility Security,” Section 11,
Vehicles”
SCI-Albion Post orders state: “…All vehicles entering or leaving the
Institution must be thoroughly searched by Correctional Staff as
follows:
The Sergeant will proceed to search the glove compartment and
passenger area thoroughly, including lifting the seats when
appropriate.

Unlock and search the cargo area or trunk.

Inspect the top and undercarriage of the vehicle.

The

undercarriage will be searched utilizing the wheeled mirror.

When appropriate, loads such as liquid waste barrels or other
deep containers shall be probed with a sharpened probe to
ensure that an inmate is not concealed inside the container.

Inspect all packages and equipment.

Clear vehicle through Micro Search System. Any discrepancy
will be reported to the Central Control immediately……..”

12

3.0

Inmate Profile
3.1

Malcolm Kysor (AJ-1746)
At the time of his escape Malcolm Kysor, Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections Inmate Number AJ-1746 was age 53. He was serving a Life sentence
for Criminal Homicide. The Honorable Fred P. Anthony, from Erie County
Pennsylvania, imposed the sentence. There are no detaining sentences
associated with his charges. In 1974 he served a 2-year sentence in Alabama for
Burglary. In 1977 he served an 8-month commitment in Warren County,
Pennsylvania for Retail Theft. In 1984 he served a 4-year to 8-year sentence in
Pennsylvania as AP-6480 for Receiving Stolen Property. This sentence was
connected to the murder conviction he is currently serving.

3.1.1 Physical Description
At the time of his escape, Malcolm Kysor was 5’8” tall, and weighed

13

160 pounds. He has brown eyes and brown hair. He is Caucasian with a
light complexion and slim to medium build. His date of birth is 7-20-54. He
has a flower and an Eagle tattoo on his right arm. He has a rose with 2
hearts and a flower tattooed on his left arm. His chest has a devil, a heart,
and a snake tattoo. On his abdomen is a devil with a woman and an angel
on a horse.

Right Arm

Left Arm

Chest

Abdomen

3.1.2 Institutional Adjustment
His institutional adjustment during his years of incarceration had
been generally good.

After serving 10 years of his sentence without

incident, he qualified for and received an incentive based transfer from SCIFayette to SCI-Albion where he had been housed since April 3, 2007.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 11.2.1
Reception and Classification Procedures Manual Section 8 Transfer
Petitions System states:
“…Subsection E.3.c. The inmate must meet the following
criteria to be considered for an incentive based transfer:

14

be in compliance with his/her Correctional Plan, DC-43;

must be a CL-2;

not be scheduled for parole review within the next six months;

free of Class I misconducts for one year and have no more than
one Class II misconduct in the past year;

an inmate transferred away from his/her home region for
disciplinary reasons (including assault, escape, and drug
related misconducts) shall not be eligible for transfer back for a
minimum of five years;

must have served at least one year of his/her sentence…”

“………A Lifer must meet the criteria listed in Subsection E.3.c.
Above, as well as the following: …has served a minimum of 10
years in the Department with overall positive adjustment and;
may be a custody level 2 or custody level 3."
Inmate Kysor received only one minor misconduct report (behavior
infraction) during his incarceration in the Pennsylvania Correctional system.
This infraction was for Refusing an Order and Failure to Report the
15

Presence of Contraband for which he received a sanction of 30 days of cell
restriction.
4.0

Chronology of Events and Contributing Factors
This section will describe the chronological details of the escape from SCIAlbion. It will also present a discussion of the operational failures that contributed
to the escape. (See the fold-out timeline.)
4.1

The Escape
On Sunday, November 25, 2007 inmate Malcolm Kysor (AJ-1746) escaped

from the State Correctional Institution at Albion by hiding in a forty-gallon plastic
trash can that was used for transporting wet food waste (pig slop).

Intelligence

gathered has proven that this was a well-planned escape dating back to at least
February 2007 when he was housed at the State Correctional Institution at
Fayette.
Inmate Kysor arrived at SCI-Albion on April 3, 2007. At the time of his
escape, Kysor was making $.42/hour as a garbage worker in the Dietary
Department. Inmate Kysor worked Tuesday through Saturday from 1300 to 1900
hours. On the day of the escape (Kysor’s scheduled off day), at approximately
1300 hours, he made his way from his housing unit to the Dietary Department
during the general line movement to work, and “volunteered” to work.

His

supervisor collected his I.D. card and permitted him to remain in the Dietary
Department.
Every day at approximately 1430 hours, the pig slop is taken out of the
kitchen to the rear loading dock and loaded on a Department of Corrections pickup
truck (see Fig 1, 2, & 3).
16

Fig 1: View with doors closed,
from back hall to dock

Fig 2: View from doors
to loading dock

Fig 3: Rear view of loading
dock

On this particular day, Inmate Kysor was in the back hallway in the loading
dock area with two other inmates, John Gromer (GL-4861) and another inmate.
From interviews with staff and his accomplice (Gromer) it has been determined
that he had been spending considerable time watching the sally port operations
through the windows of the Dietary Department (see Fig 4) and had performed the
garbage duties many times prior.

Fig 4: View through loading dock door window

17

From interviews conducted, it appears that Inmate Kysor watched the same
Sergeant perform his duties at the sally port the day prior and allegedly told
another inmate that if the same Sergeant was working at the sally port on Sunday,
it was “good for him”. At approximately 1433 hours, Inmate Kysor brought an

Fig 5

Fig 6

empty gray trash can and other unidentified objects in a trash bag into the hallway
adjacent to the loading dock area (see Fig 5 & 6). Kysor walked to the double
doors where his accomplice was standing with a food service instructor and
another inmate.

Fig 7

Fig 8

He tapped Inmate Gromer on the back (see Fig 7) and the two of them walked to
the area where Kysor previously placed the gray garbage can (see Fig 8).

18

Fig 9

Fig 10

Kysor climbed into the garbage can (see Fig 9) and his accomplice placed plastic
bags over his head to conceal Kysor’s identity (see Fig 10).

Fig 11
Once Kysor was concealed inside, Gromer pulled the garbage can to the loading
dock (see Fig 11) and eventually placed it onto the pickup truck, against the cab on
the passenger side (see Fig 12).

Fig 12

19

A third inmate removed empty garbage cans from the pickup truck.

Gromer was

observed (on recorded surveillance video) making sure the plastic was in place on
top of Kysor so that he would remain concealed. After the remaining cans were
loaded onto the back of the pickup, Gromer and another inmate returned to the
inside of the Dietary building with the food service instructor.

The other food

service instructor got into the pickup and departed for the sally port (see Fig 13).

Fig 13

The assigned Sergeant called Main Control via the radio and requested for them
to open the inside gate. The pickup was driven inside the sally port between the
two gates (see Fig 14).

20

Fig 14

The Sergeant called Main Control via the radio to, “close the inside gate.”
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy, 6.3.1 Facility Security Procedures
Manual Section 11, E. (Vehicles) and SCI-Albion’s operating procedures and
Security post orders are very specific as to the type of search to be conducted on
all vehicles departing the secure perimeter.

The assigned Sergeant walked

around the vehicle, searched the under-carriage and opened the engine
compartment. It was learned from recorded surveillance video that he neglected
to use the metal poker to probe the garbage cans and did not use the “heartbeat
detector”. He then notified the Main Control officer via radio to “open the outside
gate”. The food service instructor drove out of the sally port toward the institution’s
warehouse. He parked the vehicle next to the corner of the warehouse with the
garbage cans left on the back of the pickup for the pig farmer to retrieve later that
afternoon (see Fig 15).

21

Fig 15
The food service Instructor got out of the pickup and returned to the institution with
Kysor still in the back of the pickup, hiding in the garbage can. The time that the
pickup truck departed the sally port was approximately 1447 hours. It is unknown
exactly what time Kysor climbed out of the garbage can and continued his escape
from SCI-Albion but we do know (as a result of recorded surveillance video) that it
occurred sometime after 1447 hours. According to interviews with the pig farmer,
he arrived at the institution at approximately 1605 and off loaded the cans on to his
pickup. When questioned, he stated that he did notice an empty can but did not
report it to the institution.
4.2

Institutional Detection, Response and Notification
On Sunday, November 25, 2007 at 1615 hours SCI-Albion began its regularly

scheduled inmate count. The Shift Commander ordered that the institution “cease all
movement” and commence with the count. Like every other day, the housing unit officers
announced count and ordered all inmates to turn their lights on and stand for count. The
dietary supervisors counted the inmates who were permitted to be out of their cells for the
1615 hrs count, to prepare the evening meal.

22

At 1650 hours the individual counts were all collected by the Main Control staff and
tabulated.

The count revealed they were one inmate short.

The Shift Commander

ordered a “re-count” of the inmates. The results of the recount were the same as the
prior count, one inmate short. The recount was completed at 1724 hours. The Shift
Commander ordered a recall of all inmates to their housing units for a 3rd count at 1735
hours. At the same time, he sent officers to search the loading dock area behind the
Dietary Department and also dispatched officers to search the Activities building. He
wanted to make sure that an inmate wasn’t hiding behind the Dietary building or in the
Activities building. Religious services were conducted in the Activities building earlier that
day and he wanted to be sure the missing inmate was not hiding there.
Re-counts are not a frequent occurrence at SCI-Albion; in fact, a review of the
“miscount log” indicated that only 12 miscounts have occurred since the beginning of
2007. A third count (recall) is a very infrequent occurrence at any of the Department’s
facilities, especially on a weekend. Officers were sent to conduct an inspection of the
perimeter fence looking for any evidence of breach or attempted breach.
The Shift Commander notified the Superintendent of the count situation at 1755
hours and passed on information about the missing inmate (Kysor AJ1746). The recall
count was completed at 1758 hours with Kysor still being unaccounted for.

The

Superintendent ordered the CERT team (Corrections Emergency Response Team) to be
activated and all SCI-Albion senior staff were called to report to the institution. The Shift
Commander ordered all housing unit officers to, again go cell-to-cell making a positive
identification of every inmate, in every cell.
At 1815 hours the Pennsylvania State Police were notified of a “possible escape”
of Inmate Kysor AJ-1746.

At approximately 1816 hours, corrections officers were
23

mustered and dispatched to pre-determined escape checkpoints and sent out to conduct
roving escape patrols. A call was placed to the Central Office duty officer that SCIAlbion’s count did not clear and they had a “possible escape”.

Corrections Officers

continued to search the inside of the facility since there were no visible signs of the
perimeter fence being breached and there were no perimeter fence detection alarms
indicating that an inmate breached the secure perimeter of the facility.
The Superintendent arrived at the facility at approximately 1815 hours and
according to a review of command post logs and checklists, "activated the Incident
Command System" at 1852 hours. The Community Alert Network System (CANS) was
activated at 1916 hours to notify all surrounding residents via phone of the “possible
escape”. The recorded message that the Albion resident’s heard was as follows: “This is
an Emergency Message from the State Correctional Facility at Albion. There has been
an escape. You are being advised to stay indoors and secure your vehicles. If you have
any information or observe any suspicious individuals, contact the Pennsylvania State
Police at number 814-774-9611.

For updated information, please watch your local

news.” At approximately 1935 hours, the Superintendent directed the escape siren to be
activated for one (1) minute.
It wasn’t until approximately 2030 hours that the Corrections Electronics
Tradesman Instructor was able to retrieve pre-recorded video that confirmed Inmate
Kysor did actually breach the secure perimeter by hiding in a garbage can. At that time
all institutional resources were directed to focus their search outside of the facility.
At approximately 2154 hours, the Public Information Officer arrived and put out a
press release to officially notify the media of the escape of Inmate Malcolm Kysor. The
CERT teams from surrounding facilities (SRCF-Mercer and SCI-Cambridge Springs)
24

were activated and assisted in searching the grounds and the wooded areas surrounding
SCI-Albion.
5.0

Policies, Procedures and Practices and Recommended Corrective Action
This section will address the areas reviewed as a result of the escape of Malcolm

Kysor. It will examine the Department of Corrections policies and procedures, the written
operating procedures in place at SCI-Albion and the “SCI-Albion practice”. Finally, this
section will reveal investigative findings and suggest recommended actions that, if in
place, could have prevented the escape, and/or lessen the likelihood of a similar type of
escape from occurring in the future.
5.1

Areas Reviewed and Inspected
5.1.1 Sally Port
The sally port at the State Correctional Institution at Albion is located
on the south side of the institution. The sally port building is constructed of
cement block, with an additional room added for the purpose of inmate
processing.

Staffing for the sally port is one (1) Sergeant posted from

0800-1600 hrs. five (5) days a week, Monday through Friday. The sally port
is closed on weekends and holidays unless authorized to be opened by the
Shift Commander due to emergency or other occurrence. The sally port
has two 14’ wide x 15’3” high vehicle gates along with two 36”x 80” walk
through gates for pedestrian traffic. The institution’s Main Control officer,
using cameras and voice recognition prior to opening the gates,
electronically controls each of the gates. Main Control operates the gates
with an electronic panel with four camera monitors located above the panel.
The Main Control officer monitors the cameras and the sally port Sergeant.
25

A fixed camera is positioned to monitor each of the two vehicle gates, with
an additional pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) camera mounted on the Dietary building
facing the sally port area. The sally port is equipped with a walk-thru metal
detector as well as a “Heartbeat Detector” system, and a Biometrics
(fingerprint identification) system. The sally port has crash barriers installed
for the protection of the sally port vehicle gates/perimeter.
5.1.1.1

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy

regarding Sally Port Construction 6.3.1 Facility Security
Procedures Manual Section 3 – Perimeter Construction
states………

“Each facility shall have no more than two access/egress
points in the security perimeter unless otherwise approved by
the Secretary/designee. Entrances to the facility security
compound shall be limited to one pedestrian sally port and one
vehicular sally port. Both entrances shall be with sally port
arrangements, with gates, permitting only one gate to the sally
port to be opened at one time. The access/egress points shall
be monitored and controlled via closed circuit television
cameras by the facility control center or controlled from a
secure control station located at the access point. Vehicular
traffic, particularly, shall be kept to an absolute minimum, and
all vehicles shall be searched, both entering and leaving in

26

accordance with Department policy 6.3.1 “Facility Security,”
Section 11, Vehicles…”

5.1.1.2 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1
Facility Security Procedures Manual Section 11 –
Vehicles states:
“…Facility vehicles must be searched when they enter and exit
the facility enclosure….”
The SCI-Albion Post Orders for the sally port Sergeant state:

“…All vehicles entering or leaving the Institution must be
thoroughly searched by Correctional Staff as follows:
•

Have engine turned off.

•

All vehicle occupants shall exit the vehicle.

•

Raise the hood and inspect the engine area.

•

The

Sergeant

will

proceed

to

search

the

glove

compartment and passenger area thoroughly, including
lifting the seats when appropriate.
•

Unlock and search the cargo area or trunk.

•

Inspect the top and undercarriage of the vehicle.

The

undercarriage will be searched utilizing the wheeled
mirror.
•

When appropriate, loads such as liquid waste barrels or
other deep containers shall be probed with a sharpened

27

probe to ensure that an inmate is not concealed inside
the container.
•

Inspect all packages and equipment.

•

Clear

vehicle

through

Micro

Search

System.

Any

discrepancy will be reported to the Central Control
immediately…… “
5.1.1.3 SCI-Albion Practice – Sally Port Operations – Vehicles
Departing from the Facility
The practice at SCI-Albion for searching and clearing vehicles
to exit the secure facility through the sally port are the same
regardless of the time of day or the day of the week. When the
vehicle pulls up to the inner gate, the sally port Sergeant contacts the
Main Control Center via radio and requests the inner gate to be
opened. The driver of the vehicle is directed to drive through the
inner gate and the sally port Sergeant contacts the Main Control
officer to “close the inside gate”. The driver is instructed to shut off
the vehicle and depart the vehicle for search and inspection. If the
driver is a DOC employee, he/she is directed to log out of the
biometric fingerprint identification system. The sally port Sergeant is
responsible to search the vehicle to ensure that unauthorized items
or unauthorized inmates are not hidden in or on the vehicle. This is
accomplished by utilization of mirrors, cameras, a sharpened poker
for garbage cans and other containers, and a “heartbeat detector” to
detect the presence of a heartbeat on the vehicle. The use of the

28

metal probe and the “heartbeat detector” are not optional and must
be used to determine if the vehicle is “cleared” to depart the facility.
On Sunday 11-25-07, the Sergeant assigned to the sally port
did not follow Department of Corrections Policy or SCI-Albion local
procedures and post orders. He did not use the “poker” to probe the
garbage cans nor did he utilize the heart-beat detector. He did walk
around the vehicle, search the under carriage with a mirror, and was
observed opening the engine compartment of the pickup truck.
(Upon being interviewed, he admitted to not utilizing the “heartbeat
detector” on several other occasions when he was previously
assigned to the sally port).
5.1.1.4 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The Sergeant assigned on 11-25-07 did sign a training roster
indicating he was trained on the heartbeat detector system.

During

the investigation, it was determined that not all of the sergeants
assigned to the sally port are familiar with sally port operations and
the use of associated equipment.
Recommendation
It is strongly recommended that all Sergeants and their supervisors
(Lieutenants) receive hands-on training on the use of the “heartbeat
detection” system.

They should also receive training on the

operation of the sally port and the associated security equipment; this
training should be conducted, at a minimum, once each year. Shift
29

Commanders must ensure that sergeants assigned to this post are
qualified and familiar with sally port operations.
Issue
The computerized “heartbeat detection” system did not have vehicle
data entered into the system in order to generate an activity report. If
such a report were generated, it would provide a means of comparing
the heartbeat detector log with the vehicle log to ensure that the
system is being utilized on all vehicles.
Recommendation
The system must have data entered and a printer installed to print
the daily activity report. This will enable supervisors to compare the
sally port vehicle log with the heartbeat detector log to ensure the
equipment is being utilized as directed. This will be a system-wide
recommendation.
Issue
The sally port post orders do not contain specific instructions on the
use of the “heartbeat detector”.
Recommendation
The post orders should be amended to include step-by-step
instructions (including illustrations) on the operation and use of the
“heartbeat detector”. This will be a system-wide recommendation.

30

Issue
The sally port Sergeant completely disregarded the DOC policy and
the SCI-Albion post orders and neglected to properly search the
pickup and the garbage cans in the back of the pickup truck.
Recommendation
Sally port operations should be limited to only Emergencies on
weekends/holidays and after hours.

In the event that the Shift

Commander authorizes the sally port to be opened at a time other
than normal business hours (0800 – 1600 Mon. through Fri.), a
commissioned officer should be dispatched to the sally port with the
assigned sergeant to ensure proper search procedures are
conducted. DOC policy should be amended to ensure all garbage
and slop being removed through the sally port must sit through at
least one count prior to being permitted out of the facility.
5.1.2 Main Control Center / CCTV Camera Monitoring Officer
All Pennsylvania Department of Corrections facilities have surveillance
cameras (intended to supplement the observation provided by corrections officers)
and a dedicated officer assigned to monitor them, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
The location of the monitoring equipment is at different locations at each facility,
due to the physical construction and space limitations. The officer assigned to the
Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV System) monitoring post is only assigned
for a maximum of two (2) hours. This practice is mandated so that complacency is
minimized and the assigned officer remains vigilant during his/her assignment.

31

The CCTV monitoring equipment at SCI-Albion is located in the rear of the
Main Control Center and consists of five (5) DVR’s.

Each DVR has a DVD

recorder and can record up to 30 cameras. The average amount of recorded time
is 15 days per camera.
5.1.2.1 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1
Facility Security Security Procedures Manual Section 2
– Facility Control Center outlines the duties of the Shift
Commander and the staff assigned to the Main Control
center as follows:

“…..Each Shift Commander shall be responsible for the
operation of the Control Center. In the absence of the Shift
Commander, during tours of the facility and meal periods, a
Commissioned Officer will be designated as the Control Center
supervisor….”
The policy goes on to state:
“…..monitor the status of internal and external security
systems, i.e. housing unit control centers, electronically
controlled locks and internal systems, facility security towers/
observation posts, and roving perimeter patrols ….”
“…a Commissioned Officer shall be present in the Control
Center at all times…”
The staffing in the Main Control Center consists of one (1)
Commissioned Officer, one (1) Corrections Officer 2 (Sergeant) and two (2)

32

Corrections Officer 1’s. One of the Corrections Officer 1’s is assigned to
the CCTV cameras to monitor the institution's surveillance cameras. There
are a total of 140 cameras installed throughout SCI-Albion that are
randomly and systematically monitored by the CCTV officer; 75 are fixed
position cameras, and 65 have pan, tilt, zoom (PTZ) capabilities. Assigned
officers randomly view selected cameras based on institutional activities
and the presence of inmates.
The CCTV post is located at the rear of Main Control, adjacent to the
Shift Commander's office.

This post consists of four seventeen-inch

monitors that are used to monitor all interior and exterior cameras of the
institution. There is a VCR that may be utilized for instantaneous recording
as directed by the Shift Commander. The computerized perimeter intrusion
detection system is also operated from this post. The computer monitor
displays a map of the institution and delineates the alarmed zones for the
perimeter. The assigned officer must assist with investigating alarms and
re-setting them once determined “all clear”.
Post Order
A specific set of Security Post Orders for the CCTV Post officer
outlined the following specific duties:

“…To remain alert for all emergency transmissions, fire calls,
emergency alarms, and to dispatch officers to the scene of an
emergency as directed by the shift commander….”

33

“…To record patrol and security checks as necessary…”

“…To monitor all security systems in the Control Center and to inform
the shift commander of any pertinent information….”

“…To notify the shift commander immediately if an emergency occurs
within the Control Center. Video monitoring officers will not leave
his/her post until properly relieved except in a life-threatening
situation….”

“…To perform duties as directed by the Control Sergeant..”

“…To be familiar with the operation of the equipment designated to
this post….”

“…Primary duty is monitoring the cameras located around the
perimeter that are an integrated part of the perimeter intrusion
detection system….”

“…To maintain constant observation of video monitors….”

“…Other duties as assigned….”

34

5.1.2.2 SCI Albion Practices for CCTV Monitoring (specifically
on 11/25/2007)
The investigation revealed that the CCTV officer assigned to
the post on 11-25-07, at the time of the escape, was monitoring yard
activities and inmate movement on the sidewalks. The officer did not
monitor the rear of the Dietary building where the pig slop was being
loaded on to the pickup truck and ultimately driven out through the
sally port. There are 140 cameras and only 4 monitors. Since there
are no specific directions in the post orders as to which cameras are
to be monitored at specific times, the assigned officers are left to
their own discretion and have the freedom to choose which cameras
they wish to monitor.
5.1.2.3 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The post orders for the CCTV officer are very vague and nondescriptive. Even though the post orders list the monitoring of the
perimeter cameras as the primary function of this post, when
observed, the post officers paid more attention to the interior
cameras monitoring the yard and walkways.
Recommendation
The post orders should be re-written to establish more specific
orders for the assigned officer. During specific events (opening and
closing of the sally port, loading and unloading at the rear Dietary
dock, etc.) the post orders should mandate that the officer be
35

required to monitor specific activities that are deemed “high security
areas or activities."

More specific direction needs to be given

regarding the cycling of cameras through the Control Center
monitors.

Shift Commanders should ensure that the assigned

officers are familiar with the monitoring equipment and the
associated responsibilities.
Issue
The CCTV monitoring officer has other duties such as equipment
inventory, radio battery maintenance, operation of the PIDS
computer, etc. These extra duties have the potential to distract the
officer from their primary duty to monitor the cameras.
Recommendation
The CCTV monitoring officer should not be assigned duties not
associated with the post.

The duties assigned to the CCTV

monitoring officer should be reassigned to other Control Center staff.
Shift Commanders must ensure that this occurs.
5.1.3 Inmate Accountability and Count Procedures
One of the primary functions of all correctional employees is to
maintain the accountability of the inmates. This is accomplished in a variety
of ways outlined in Pennsylvania Department of Corrections policy.
Reference the section outlined below.
5.1.3.1 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1
Section 9 - Counts and Inmate Movement states:

36

“…The DSFM/DSIS is responsible for maintaining the count
system on an ongoing basis and ensuring compliance with the
inmate pass/movement procedures.

“….In addition to formal counts, all staff with inmates under
their supervision shall make irregular but periodic (at least
hourly) census checks of the inmates under their supervision.
Any discrepancy in a census check must be immediately
reported to the Control Center.

“…Procedures shall be established for announcing and
supervising general line movements. Movement shall be by
specific purpose such as work lines, school lines, yard-out, etc.
to ensure that movement is controlled, and that staff know the
destination of each line movement. Staff shall maintain direct
and

indirect

supervision/observation

or

point-to-point

observation of all general line movements…”

“…Inmate Pass System (IPS)
Except when under direct escort or for general line movements,
the IPS shall be employed to regulate inmate movement.
If an inmate is scheduled on the DMS (Daily Movement Sheet) a
pass will be issued by staff prior to the inmate's scheduled
appointment.
37

Staff who need to see an inmate not listed on the DMS will
contact the appropriate area and inform the staff person that the
inmate(s) has been called….”

“…Accountability
All employees share the responsibility for inmate pass control
and accountability. Random checks of inmate passes at points
other than the origin and destination shall be conducted and
verified by staff completing the “Trip Pass Verification" form.
(Attachment B)…”

“…Staff who receive or detect unauthorized inmates in their
area (by pass or otherwise) must immediately report the matter
to the Control Center and take corrective action….”
5.1.3.2 SCI-Albion Practice
Inmates were observed leaving the housing units without
passes for destinations unknown to the housing unit officer. The
general line movements that are conducted upon the clearing of the
noon count permit any inmate to leave the housing unit whether he is
authorized or not. This practice enables inmates to be unaccounted
for up to 3 to 4 hours if unit officers do not take an informal census of
the inmates assigned to their unit.

38

In the case of Kysor, he was able to leave the housing unit
and report to work on his off day.

His Dietary work supervisor

permitted him to work, which was unknown to the housing unit
officer. He should not have been permitted off the unit with work
lines and the supervisor should have issued him a pass and sent him
back to the housing unit and called his unit officer.
Several officers related that they did not issue passes to
inmates on the Daily Movement Sheet (DMS), which is a violation of
policy. Inmate passes that contain a time of departure, time of arrival
both departing the housing unit and then returning to the housing unit
from the authorized appointment, are the primary means of
maintaining accountability for inmates. Inmates who have scheduled
appointments and are “no shows” are to be reported to the housing
unit officer by the individual who scheduled the appointment.
Likewise, if an unauthorized inmate shows up at an unauthorized
location, the housing unit officer is to be notified. The investigation
revealed that several of the housing unit officers did not have a good
understanding of “inmate accountability”.
5.1.3.3 SCI-Albion Count Procedures
The actual count procedures used are in accordance with
policy. If there is a miscount, it is logged into a designated logbook.
The staff who miscount must complete a DC-121 Report of
Extraordinary Occurrence. There have only been twelve miscounts

39

for the entire year, indicating that this procedure emphasizes the
importance of having a good count.
The first count established the absence of the missing inmate
and the housing unit officer’s last known location of the inmate,
which was the food service area where the inmate was employed.
SCI-Albion's count procedures require all housing units to list
the inmate name, number, and location of inmates assigned to their
unit who are counted off of the housing unit during a count period.
The officer verifies the presence of the inmate at a non-housing unit
area by phone conversation with the staff member who is
supervising the non-housing unit area.

The name of the staff

member contacted to verify the out count is included on the unit
count sheet. In this instance, the officer was unable to verify the
presence of the inmate with food service. This was due to food
service staff not knowing who was present in the area.

The

procedures in place at SCI-Albion for inmates working in the Dietary
department during count, involve the work supervisor collecting the
inmate's identification card when he reports to work.

When the

direction is given to count the inmates, a physical count is compared
to the identification cards. The investigation revealed that Inmate
Kysor's I.D. card was never located, which would indicate: 1) he
never turned it in; 2) it was given back to him; or 3) the I.D. cards
were left unsecured and someone removed it.

40

5.1.3.4 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The Deputy Superintendent for Facility Management is responsible
for maintaining the count system on an ongoing basis and ensuring
compliance

with

the

inmate

pass/movement

procedures.

Discussions with several unit officers indicate that pass procedures
are not being followed.
Recommendation
Ensure that all staff members who issue passes do so in accordance
with the aforementioned policy.

Direct the commissioned officers

and department heads to conduct follow up training with their
respective staff members.
Issue
All staff members with inmates under their supervision are not
making irregular but periodic (at least hourly) census checks of the
inmates under their supervision. Any discrepancy in a census check
must be immediately reported to the Control Center. This includes
inmates in their area that should not be present. In this specific
instance, an inmate was at work on his day off.
Recommendation
Ensure that all staff members who supervise inmates are responsible
for accountability of inmates under their supervision.

Direct the

commissioned officers and department heads to conduct follow up

41

training with their respective staff members.

Alertness checks

should be conducted to test the staff.
Issue
Movement shall be by specific purpose such as work lines, school
lines, yard out, etc. to ensure that movement is controlled, and that
staff knows the destination of each line movement. Line movements
at the clearing of the noon count are not controlled in a manner so
that staff members know the destination of each movement.
Recommendation
Segregate work lines, school lines, and yard out in accordance with
policy. The unit staff must know which inmates they are sending out
of their unit for work, school, groups, and activities. Most affected
times would be at the start of morning lines following the breakfast
meal, and again following the clearing of the noon count.

Work

schedules, school rosters, callouts are available on the unit as a
reference for tracking inmates. These rosters and schedules must
be utilized to appropriately track their inmates. Any deviations from
the established schedules must be cleared with the Shift
Commander.
Issue
Inmate passes are not being utilized in accordance with policy.
Inmates listed on the daily move sheet (DMS) are to be issued
passes prior to reporting to their scheduled appointment. This is not
occurring. Staff members who need to see an inmate not listed on
42

the DMS are not contacting the appropriate area to inform the staff
person that the inmate(s) has been called.
Recommendation
Staff must issue a pass in accordance with policy.

DOC Policy

should be amended to state that staff who need to see an inmate not
listed on the DMS, a pre-established roster, or work schedule must
be approved by the Shift Commander.
Issue
The Trip Pass Verification forms that are mandated by policy to
ensure the pass system is being administered properly are not being
used sufficiently. Staff members are not being held accountable for
the presence of unauthorized inmates in their area.
Recommendation
Shift Commanders must be held accountable to ensure that a
minimum and maximum range of random checks are completed at
housing units, non housing units areas such as the program services
area, and outside at the pedestrian gates.

The respective zone

lieutenants and unit managers must review the forms daily to ensure
compliance. The shift commanders to ensure compliance on their
respective shift assignments should then collect these forms for
subsequent review.

Managerial staff members, when completing

their required rounds should complete periodic “spot checks”.

43

Issue
Inmate Kysor should not have been able to leave the housing unit for
the purpose of reporting to work on his day off.
Recommendation
The work schedules should be adhered to in accordance with policy.
This inmate was not scheduled to work overtime at any period while
confined at SCI-Albion. This was confirmed through a review of his
pay records for May-November 2007.
5.1.4 Managerial Visits and Inspections
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy mandates the
number and frequency of managerial visits and inspections of all areas of
the facility.

The responsibility to inspect the facility is vested with the

Superintendent, Deputies, Majors, CCPM (Corrections Classification and
Program Manager), Intelligence Captain, and Shift Commanders.

Each

Facility is required to establish local procedures to ensure that the
managerial inspections are conducted per policy.
5.1.4.1 DOC policy 6.3.1 Section 19 Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections Policy 6.3.1 Section 19 Managerial Visits
and Inspections states:
“….Visits/inspections

shall

focus

on

reviewing

security

practices and safety and sanitation procedures. Issues to be
reviewed include, but are not limited to: tool control; key
control;

inmate

movement

and

pass

system;

security

equipment and radios; fence, cell and bar checks; inmate
44

searches; cell block/facility searches; staff searches; cell
content policy; coverings on walls, bars, windows; general
cleanliness of all areas; caustic/flammable/toxics; inmate and
staff morale. These visits/inspections/reviews, along with the
regular facility reports, annual inspection reports, and SCAN
information

will

be

used

to

determine

if

correctional

facilities/boot camp(s) are functioning properly….”
The policy goes on to state:
“….The

Facility

Manager,

DSCS,

DFSM/DSIS,

Majors,

Intelligence Gathering Captain or Security Lieutenant and the
Corrections Classification Program Manager (CCPM) shall
inspect

each

housing

unit

once

per

week,

to

include

unoccupied areas. In addition, he/she will each inspect all other
major areas of the facility, at least once per month. Visits
should occur at different times on different days, and the noted
individuals should not all visit at the same time….”

“…The Facility Manager shall establish sign-in logbooks which
will be bound books with sequential page numbers, in all
housing units and each major area of the facility (maintenance,
correctional industries, education, food services, activities,
construction sites, etc.). Each manager required by this policy
to inspect any area, shall annotate the appropriate logbook. . . "

45

“…Each housing area shall be inspected daily by either the
Shift Commander or Alternate Shift Commander and all other
areas of the facility will be inspected on at least a monthly
basis. The Shift Commander or Alternate Shift Commander shall
annotate the log in each area visited and note findings and
deficiencies on the daily Shift Commander's report.
Each Area/Zone Lieutenant shall inspect each housing unit on a
daily basis in his/her area/zone of responsibility…”
5.1.4.2 SCI-Albion Practice
The investigation revealed that managerial staff were not
making their visits and inspections as required by Department of
Corrections policy. Many of the logbooks were reviewed for the last
several months from the housing units, program areas and other
institutional buildings including the sally port. The Commissioned
Officers appeared to be making their rounds with few exceptions, as
were the majors. The rounds by the Deputy Superintendents were
sparse in some areas and those required by the Superintendent
were practically non-existent. The logbook from the sally port did not
contain the Superintendent’s signature for the last several months.
The investigation revealed that the Superintendent is not leading by
example or following policy in this area and the remaining
managerial staff is not being held accountable for making required
visits and inspections.

46

5.1.4.3 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The Deputy Superintendents are missing housing units during their
weekly rounds. The Superintendent is not completing weekly and
some monthly rounds.
Recommendation
Establish a checklist for the above listed staff to fill out and sign
indicating

that

they

have/have

not

made

their

required

visits/inspections. This list will specifically reflect those areas that
require weekly rounds and monthly rounds.

This will serve as a

reminder for staff to make their mandated tours and inspections. It
will also serve as a tracking form and will provide a means of
accountability.
Issue
The monthly report required by DOC policy indicating that
managerial staff were making their weekly/monthly inspections was
not correctly reported to the Regional Deputy Secretary. The current
procedure of spot checking log books was inadequate and provided
false information.
Recommendation
The Corrections Superintendent's Assistant should utilize a form that
is submitted to her monthly by the Superintendent, Deputy
Superintendents, Majors, CCPM, and Intelligence Captain.

This

form must be used to document the completed weekly and monthly
47

rounds in accordance with policy. The staff members who submit
the forms must sign to attest the date of the completed rounds. It will
serve as documentation of compliance with policy. The form may
also be utilized to check directly against the housing units logbooks
to ensure compliance.
5.1.5

Dietary Operations
An extensive review of the Dietary operations and the general

security of the Dietary Department was conducted since this was the area
where Inmate Kysor was able to move about freely and was assigned to a job
in the back hallway, processing garbage.
5.1.5.1 Dietary Management and Supervision
During the course of our review and investigation of the
Dietary Department it was found that there were very few of the daily
operations and procedures committed to writing as local procedures.
It was discovered that several memos and emails as opposed to
local procedures, had been written over the past few years informing
Dietary Staff of various operating procedures, however, very few of
them were being followed by staff assigned to the Dietary
Department.
For instance, multiple memos were reviewed directing Dietary
Staff to not permit inmates to work in the Dietary Department other
than their pre-established workdays and shifts, but the practice was
to permit inmates to report to work on their days off. In fact, Inmate

48

Kysor was a Tuesday through Saturday worker and the investigation
revealed that he worked seven (7) days a week.
Another email from the Corrections Food Service Manager
directed the Supervisors to not permit Custody Level 4 inmates and
“Lifers” to work in the back hallway, adjacent to the dock area.
Inmate Kysor, who was serving a life sentence, worked in the back
hallway every day that he worked.

Due to the disregard for the

verbal direction given by the Dietary Manager, a set of written orders,
referred to as “Areas of Responsibility” for each of the Food Service
Instructors and Food Service Supervisors were established but never
finalized and disseminated to staff. It was stated that the Human
Resources Director deemed them to be too specific and therefore
the process stopped.
A review of the Dietary Department and reports generated
from this area indicates that this has been a “problem area” for some
time. Approximately one month prior to the Kysor escape, a general
search of the area turned up several homemade weapons and other
contraband items hidden in the ceiling and other hiding places
throughout the Dietary Department. SCI-Albion recently developed a
plan-of-action to address the complacency in the Dietary Department
after the search that yielded the weapons cache and other
contraband.
During the course of the investigation it was both observed
and confirmed through interviews of staff and inmates that the
49

inmates spent a considerable amount of time just standing at the
rear windows looking at the sally port operations and the outside
warehouse. The Dietary building has large windows along the entire
length of the rear wall with an unobstructed view of the sally port,
Utility Plant, garage and outside warehouse. The proximity of the
sally port to the Dietary Department enables the inmates to easily
observe the vehicle search procedures and all other operations
occurring at the sally port.
From interviews conducted, it was found that this has been a
permitted practice for years in the Dietary Department. In fact, a
smoking area has been established next to the windows where
inmates were observed continually smoking and staring out of the
windows.

Interviews conducted with Security staff and other

administrators revealed that the Dietary Department has been a
troubled area for quite some time and many of them have made
attempts to enhance the security in this area without success.
5.1.5.2 Removal of Food Waste (Pig Slop)
One of the procedures reviewed was the procedure for
processing food waste (pig slop) from the collection point to the
delivery/staging area where the local farmer picked it up. It was
found that only verbal direction for the entire process had been given
and that no written procedures existed. When the process began
approximately two years ago, trash containers were purchased,
specifically for the removal of the pig slop.
50

They were all yellow

containers and they were thirty-two (32) gallon capacity. According
to the staff interviewed, everyone knew that the yellow garbage cans
were intended for transporting the pig slop.
Sometime over the last weeks or months, gray cans began
being utilized due to a “shortage” of the yellow cans. They were the
same size and type and it appeared that the practice wasn’t
questioned and became common. On the day of the escape, Kysor
cleaned out a larger forty-gallon gray garbage can, climbed into it
with the assistance of Inmate Gromer, rode out of the facility
undetected. It is quite possible that Kysor initiated the introduction of
the gray cans to determine if they would go through the process
unchallenged and when staff became accustomed to using them, he
substituted a larger can that he was able to fit inside more
comfortably. This entire event, which has been captured on prerecorded surveillance video, happened within a few feet of a
Corrections Food Service Instructor and another inmate who we
have not determined to be an accomplice or that he was even aware
of what was occurring.

The Office of Professional Responsibility

(Special Investigations) continues to interview staff and inmates as of
the writing of this report.
5.1.5.3 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
Inmates are permitted to report to work in the Dietary Department at
times or days other than when they are scheduled.
51

Recommendation
Strict enforcement of the inmate accountability policy starts at the
housing unit whereby the Unit Officer must know which inmates are
being left out of their cells and subsequently permitted to exit the
housing unit to other areas of the facility. A system needs to be
developed for the Unit Officers whereby they have an easy reference
as to who is permitted off the unit and when. In conjunction with
housing unit accountability, all other areas must be required to
enforce the established facility practices.

Managerial Inspections

and supervisory visits should focus on whether the written
procedures are being followed.

Ultimately, staff should be held

accountable for their actions and progressive discipline should be
utilized for acts of non-compliance and complacency.
Issue
Only verbal orders could be confirmed regarding the procedures for
the removal of food waste (pig slop) from the Dietary Department.
Recommendation
An immediate review of the various security procedures that are
conducted in the Dietary Department needs to be conducted and
written procedures must be developed and disseminated to staff.
Staff must receive training on the various procedures and must be
held accountable to enforce them as written.

52

Issue
Inmates working in the Dietary Department have an unimpeded view
of the sally port and other outside areas and activities. This allowed
Kysor to gain valuable intelligence on security procedures that
ultimately facilitated his successful escape.
Recommendation
The windows in the Dietary Department should be “frosted” from the
seven (7) foot level down to the bottom of each window. Windows in
security doors having a view of the sally port should be evaluated
and if not in a restricted area under direct staff supervision,
consideration should be given to “frosting” them.
Issue
There was a general atmosphere of complacency in the Dietary
Department that has existed for a long time. Several memos were
collected from the Deputy Superintendent for Centralized Services
and the Food Service Manager that recognized areas where staff
complacency existed and gave orders for corrective action but our
investigation has shown that the “accepted practice” has not
changed. Written orders and emails from the Food Service Manager
were totally disregarded.
Recommendation
The Management and Supervision of the Dietary Department should
be given a very close review. Realizing that the production of the
53

inmate meals is vitally important, security is being overlooked and
complacency has become the norm as opposed to the exception. A
performance review of the current manager and supervisor needs to
be

conducted

immediately

and

specific

benchmarks

and

expectations need to be established. Staff must be held accountable
for not following orders whether they’re verbal or written.
5.1.6 Alertness Monitoring – Complacency Drills
Most of the duties performed in a correctional facility are routine and
repetitive. Prisons run on a “daily routine” that becomes, at times, boring
and mundane. One of the biggest challenges facing today’s Corrections
managers is combating complacency with their staff. Although Emergency
Preparedness training is essential for all corrections employees, dealing
with emergencies or crises is a very small part of the Corrections
employees' job.

The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has

recognized the battle against complacency to be of utmost importance and
has issued policy on the subject.
5.1.6.1 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1
Facility Security Manual Section 28 – Alertness
Monitoring states:
“…each Facility Manager shall ensure that a series of alertness
monitoring checks are developed to monitor the alertness of
staff. These checks are not intended as a means to evaluate an
individual’s job performance or every aspect of a particular

54

function, but rather to evaluate key components of a function as
they relate to the security of the facility. …”

“…Each of the checks must be conducted in a controlled
manner under the supervision of the Facility Manager, Deputy
Superintendents, Majors, Intelligence Gathering Captain, or
Shift Commander to ensure that staff is alert to certain
situations that could indicate a potential or actual problem.
Samples of proposed drills are contained in the Alertness
Monitoring Example Guide. Each check is to have a measurable
goal and a minimum timetable for checks to be conducted…”

“…One or more of the following shall be used monthly to check
sally port Officers’ alertness:
An employee can be placed in a vehicle wearing a tag
that clearly states “Alertness Check - Escapee” to see if
the individual is detected.

A package clearly marked as “Alertness Check Contraband” can be placed in a vehicle that is to
enter/egress the facility to see if it is detected.

An employee can try to bring an unauthorized vehicle into
the facility…”
55

5.1.6.2 SCI-Albion Practice
SCI-Albion practice is not in compliance with DOC policy 6.3.1
section 28.

While the documented reports were completed, they

were generally reports of observed staff behavior, and not actual
drills in accordance with policy.
5.1.6.3 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The Security Office is responsible to conduct a certain number of
complacency drills both quarterly and/or monthly. Per Policy 6.3.1,
Section 28, a monthly complacency drill shall be conducted at the
sally port. Checks of the quarterly complacency drills show that this
has not been done. Simply observing the heartbeat detection system
being used does not qualify as a drill.
Recommendation
Ensure that the Security Office comes into compliance with the
policy.
Ensure that an actual sally port drill is held monthly.
5.1.7 Vulnerability Analysis

Each facility must undergo a vulnerability analysis once every three (3)
years. This inspection is conducted by a team of trained DOC employees and is
utilized to identify weaknesses in the Institution’s Security by testing systems and
staff to determine the likelihood of escape. The report is very detailed and lists
possible scenarios where an escape could most likely occur due to physical

56

construction, perimeter detection, lighting, etc.

The report is forwarded to the

Superintendent who is required to submit a plan of action to the Regional Deputy
and a follow-up progress report within six months of the analysis.
5.1.7.1 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.3.1
Section 8 Vulnerability Analysis states:
“…A vulnerability analysis is a systematic performance-based
approach used to determine the type of threats that exist within
a

facility.

This

analysis

attempts

to

evaluate

practices,

procedures, and policy compliance and test the physical
protection systems in place, in an effort to prevent or limit
opportunity for the threat to occur. A vulnerability analysis
includes planning, facility characterization, threat definition, and
identification of undesirable events, performance testing the
physical protection systems, generation of path sequence
diagrams, scenario development, timelines development, and
determination of risk for worst-case scenarios….”

“…Ensure that the corrective plan-of-action for addressing
issues or recommendations disclosed by the vulnerability
analysis

team

as

outlined

in

Vulnerability

Analysis

Deficiencies/Plan-of-Action (Attachment 8-A) is prepared and
submitted to the Regional Deputy Secretary and the VA Team
Leader within 30 calendar days following receipt of the
vulnerability analysis report. The corrective plan-of-action must

57

describe corrective action(s) to be taken, staff responsibilities,
and a timetable for completion of each task….”

“…Ensure a corrective plan-of-action progress report is
prepared and submitted to the Regional Deputy Secretary six
months following the date of the analysis….”
5.1.7.2 SCI-Albion Practice
The vulnerability analysis was conducted in October of 2005
and the report identified a scenario similar to the actual escape that
occurred on November 25, 2007.

A plan-of-action or a six-month

progress report could not be located. The Superintendent could not
produce either report.
5.1.7.3 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
Potential weaknesses were identified in the vulnerability analysis
report that should have been addressed in a plan-of-action. A plan
of action and a progress report was not located nor could one be
provided by the Superintendent. Had the areas in the report been
addressed, the escape could have possibly been averted.
Recommendation
Systems need to be reviewed to ensure that vulnerability analysis
discrepancies and weaknesses are addressed at the facility level
and by the respective Regional Deputy Secretary.

58

5.1.8 Incident Command System – Emergency Procedures
It is mandatory for every corrections employee to receive annual training on
the Incident Command System. Superintendents are also charged with having
drills and exercises to test the Emergency Preparedness of the staff. Even though
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has very few “major incidents”, staff
must be aware of the Incident Command System to be able to understand their
role and the role of Command Staff in the event of a facility emergency. Each
facility maintains a set of “Emergency Plans” that have guidelines and checklists
for specific types of emergencies.
5.1.8.1 Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy 6.7.1
“Incident Command System”, states:
“…In the event of a critical incident within a Department facility,
the highest-ranking official in the Chain of Command present at
the facility at the time of the incident shall assume initial
command of the emergency….”
This means that in the absence of the Superintendent, the
Shift Commander is in charge of the facility until the Superintendent
arrives on scene and receives a full briefing of the incident.
5.1.8.2 Official Timeline of Events
The following is the “official timeline” of events that have been
verified by a comprehensive review of all Command Post logs,
Extraordinary Occurrence Reports, logbooks, and other related
checklists, beginning at the time Inmate Kysor climbed into the forty

59

gallon garbage can and ending with the official notification of the
media (via fax) at 2154 hours.
¾ 1440 Hours: Camera footage obtained by the SCI-Albion Security
Office shows inmate Malcolm Kysor, AJ-1746, being assisted into a
forty-gallon plastic pig slop refuse can by inmate John Gromer, GL4861.

Inmate Gromer then placed plastic over the can to hide

Inmate Kysor. The can was then loaded onto a green institutional
truck and driven by a CFSI into the sally port.
¾ 1429 – 1444 Hours: According to the sally port log, a CO2 arrives to
the sally port and logs the truck in and out. The CO2 issues verbal
direction to open the sally port and admits in his DC-121 Part 3,
Employee Report of Incident, that he used neither the heartbeat
monitor nor a sharpened poker. He was observed on camera using
only a rolling mirror to check the undercarriage of the truck.
¾ 1605 Hours: The pig farmer picks up the pig slop and notices an
empty can.

Although he thought it strange, he does not notify

anyone.
¾ 1615 Hours: An institutional count is conducted.
¾ 1645 Hours: A corrections officer in F/A-Unit reports that they are
unable to locate inmate Malcolm Kysor, AJ-1746. Inmate Kysor is
assigned as a dietary worker but is supposedly off on this date.
¾ 1650 Hours:

1400-2200 Shift Commander is notified by a Shift

Lieutenant that the institutional count did not clear indicating they
were one (1) inmate short. A subsequent recount is directed.
60

¾ 1708 Hours:

A Main Control officer is directed to initiate an

emergency log.
¾ 1715 Hours: 1400-2200 Shift Commander directs a search of the
Activities Building.
¾ 1724 Hours: The recount did not clear showing inmate Malcolm
Kysor, AJ-1746, as missing. Yard officers are deployed to the
housing units to verify inmates returning to their housing units for a
recall count.
¾ 1729 Hours:

A second Outside Security Perimeter Patrol is

deployed.
¾ 1730 Hours: An Activities Specialist and a corrections officer are
assigned to search the Activities Building again.
¾ 1735 Hours: All inmates are returned to their housing units and a
recall and staff accountability count is initiated. Yard officers are
deployed to search the loading dock and trash dumpsters behind the
Dietary Department.
¾ 1745 Hours: A perimeter fence check is conducted to ensure the
integrity of the fence and to look for signs of a breach or attempted
breach.
¾ 1755 Hours:

The 1400-2200 Shift Commander notifies the

Superintendent at her residence. Details regarding the recall count
and search actions taken to that point, including the identification of
the missing inmate, are relayed. The Superintendent orders a senior
staff recall and activates SCI-Albion CERT.
61

¾ 1758 Hours:

The recall count does not clear and again shows

Inmate Kysor as missing. All housing unit officers are directed to
conduct a cell-by-cell inspection to verify the identity of each inmate.
¾ 1806 Hours: All senior staff and CERT personnel are notified to
report to the institution. Critical Incident Manager (CIM) is called
and/or paged.
¾ 1815 – 1816 Hours:
completed.

A staff accountability count is successfully

Team “A” responders are directed to report to Main

Control to deploy escape patrols.

PSP is notified of a possible

escape and provided a description of Inmate Kysor.

The

Superintendent reports to the facility.
¾ 1818 Hours: Central Office is notified of a possible escape.
¾ 1830 Hours:

The 1400-2200 and 2200-0600 Shift Commanders

report to the Superintendent’s Office to receive a briefing with the
Superintendent and both Deputies.
¾ 1835 Hours:

Escape patrols are deployed, as well as a search

undertaken of the institutional grounds and surrounding woods by
SCI-Albion CERT. Note: Search is hampered by cold/windy/rainy
conditions.
¾ 1837 Hours: An officer is dispatched to secure the front gate and
limit access to authorized personnel only. The parking lot and all
vehicles are searched.
¾ 1844 Hours: PSP arrives at the institution and are escorted to the
Command Post.
62

¾ 1852 Hours: The Superintendent activates the Incident Command
Post. The Critical Incident Manager (CIM) arrives at the institution
and assists the Superintendent with setting up the Incident
Command Post.
¾ 1916 Hours: The Community Alert Network (CANS) and escape
whistle are activated for Albion and the surrounding areas. (ICS Log
214 denotes this time for both actions). (The actual CANS report
sent the calls at 1943 Hours).
¾ 1930 Hours: A Unit Manager is directed to contact the Office of
Victim Services.
¾ 1935 Hours: Per the Extraordinary Occurrence Report (EOR), the
institutional emergency whistle is activated for one (1) minute per the
Superintendent. (ICS Log 214 states this occurred at 1915
Hours).
¾ 1955 Hours: The Unit Manager re-calls the Camp Hill Duty Officer
to assure the identity of the Duty Officer and verify that the Office of
Victim Services was contacted.
¾ 2000 Hours: A thorough search of all remaining buildings and the
perimeter fence is conducted with negative results.
¾ 2030

Hours:

(Approximately)

The

Corrections

Electronics

Tradesman Instructor retrieves recorded video that confirms Kysor
escaped by hiding in a garbage can and being transported,
undetected through the sally port.

63

¾ 2043 Hours: The ICS 214 Unit Log states that the local media is at
the front gate being briefed by the PIO. (This time is in dispute with
2154 Hours reported on the extra ordinary occurrence report when
the press release was faxed).

5.1.8.3 SCI-Albion Practice
A review of the incident from the time Inmate Kysor was
identified as “missing” revealed that SCI-Albion staff performed as
expected and followed the guidelines as established in Department
of Corrections Policy.

After comparing various reports, minor

discrepancies were noted with regard to the times listed on various
reports. Those discrepancies did not have a direct bearing on the
escape but did, however, affect the level of community sensitivity
and confidence.
5.1.8.4 Findings and Recommendations
Issue
The third count did not clear at 1758 hours. The Community Alert
Network System and the escape siren was not activated until
approximately 1916 hours. Even though the automated message on
the Community Alert Network System informed residents to tune into
their local news for additional information, the press release was not
sent to the media until 2154 hours. The Office of Victim Services
was notified at 1930 hours of a “possible escape” and a follow-up call
was never made to confirm that an “actual escape” had occurred.

64

Recommendation
The media should have been notified shortly after the third count
(recall) did not clear. The Community Alert Network System and the
escape siren should have been activated at that time (1758 hours).
Although a follow-up call to Victim Services should have been made
to confirm the escape, it is recommended that Victim Services
notifies the registered victims upon initial notification of a “possible
escape” to ensure they are made aware at the earliest possible time.
If it is found that the inmate did not escape, a follow up call should be
made.

DOC Policy should be amended to include language on

prompt notification, eliminating managerial discretion.
Issue
According to Extraordinary Report #ALB-186-07, the escape siren
was activated at 1935 hours; the ICS Unit log shows that this
occurred at 1915 hours. The Office of Victim Services was notified
at 1930 hours on the Unit log; but not until 1955 hours on the SCIAlbion Critical Incident Checklist (Volume

#1,

Section

#9(C),

Escapes). The Community Alert NetworkSystem was activated at
1915 hours as per the Unit logs; however, the actual CANS Report
show that the calls were activated at 1943 hours. It appears that
unfamiliarity with the CANS created approximately a 30-minute delay
in community notification.

65

Recommendation
Accurate times need to be ensured on all ICS documents. According
to Exercise/Drill requirements, CANS test activations are to be done
quarterly. Familiarity with the CANS system is crucial.

All

Commissioned Officers should be familiar with CANS activation.
The Critical Incident Manager (CIM) is the only individual that
tests/activates the CANS for the quarterly drills. All Commissioned
Officers, or all shifts, need to be trained on the system. Add phone
numbers for media notification to CANS.

This is a system-wide

recommendation.
Issue
An initial ICS Worksheet was never completed.

An initial ICS

Worksheet has been formulated by Central Office to assist initial
Incident Commanders and contains numerous benchmarks for any
type of emergency; this sheet would aid a Shift Commander in a
Transfer of Command/Operational Briefing and assure that timelines
were accurate.
Recommendation
Incorporate the use of an initial ICS worksheet in both training
exercises and actual emergencies. A supply of ICS worksheets
were in the Main Control Center at the time of the incident.

66

6.0

Conclusion
The escape that occurred at the State Correctional Institution at Albion on Sunday

November 25, 2007 at approximately 1447 hours should not have occurred.

The

investigation revealed that there were physical barriers, detection systems, and written
Department of Correction Policy that should have prevented it.
One of the greatest concerns of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is
complacency. Most days in a correctional facility are mundane and even boring; the
same routines are faced day after day. There’s a saying that is frequently heard by
Correctional Staff, “A boring day in Jail is a good day”. Superintendents are challenged
to keep their staff working at peak performance.

The unfortunate reality of the

Corrections profession is that the longer a facility (or Department) goes without
experiencing an emergency or significant event, the more complacent they become. In
essence they become victims of their own successes. Since the last breach escape in
Pennsylvania occurred in 1999, many of the newer employees have never experienced
such an event, or any type of emergency for that matter. Complacency was the major
contributor to the successful escape of Malcolm Kysor; from the Sergeant who permitted
the truck to exit the sally port without properly searching it, to the Managers who didn’t
make required inspections and conduct follow up to ensure policy and procedure were
being followed.

The PA Department of Corrections recognized the seriousness of the

complacency factor and has spent millions of dollars over the last several years adding
staff and technology such as heartbeat detectors, additional cameras, and more
sophisticated perimeter detection systems. Another initiative the Department took was
creating policy that made it mandatory for facility managers to conduct realistic alertness
67

checks (complacency drills) to help their staff combat complacency. This investigation
has revealed that regardless of the systems and physical barriers in place, if the
managers and line staff are not following established policy and procedure, critical
incidents can and will occur.
The concerns raised by the Albion community and the media that the Facility did
not make notifications in a timely manner are valid, but after a closer review, the
notifications were not as untimely as it originally appeared.

Kysor escaped at

approximately 1447 hours and the community was not notified by the Community Alert
Network System and the activation of the escape siren until 1916 hours (approximately
4.5 hours later). This time frame, at first glance, appears extremely excessive but in
reality he was missing from 1447 hours until approximately 1758 hours (approximately
3.5 hours) without SCI-Albion staff being aware that he had escaped.
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy mandates that all staff is to
conduct an “informal” census at least once each hour to determine the whereabouts of
the inmates assigned to them. This did not occur and it wasn't until the formal standing
count that commenced at 1615 hours that staff became aware he was missing.
Department of Corrections Policy for counting inmates also states that if the count
doesn’t clear on the first count, the Shift Commander shall initiate a recount. If after a
recount, the count still doesn’t clear, a third count (referred to as a recall) is to be
conducted. A recall involves inmates being returned to their cell for a standing count.
This was all done according to policy and as a result the official confirmation that Kysor
was missing came at 1758 hours.
The Community and the Media should have been notified shortly after the official
confirmation, (1758 hours) but a feeling that Kysor was still inside the secure perimeter
68

hiding, as opposed to escaped, delayed the notification to the community.

The

manager’s decisions were based on the fact that the perimeter fence inspection did not
reveal any signs of breach or attempted breach and the Perimeter Intrusion Detection
System did not alarm.

It wasn’t until approximately 2030 hours when the recorded

surveillance video was retrieved from the digital recording system that Command Staff
confirmed Inmate Kysor escaped through the sally port hiding in a garbage can.
As a result of this very unfortunate incident, changes have already been made to
the operations at SCI-Albion and changes are pending to Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections policy and procedure. As with other similar occurrences in the past, this one
will serve to make Department of Corrections Staff more vigilant and aware of just what
can happen if the basics are not followed and made part of their daily routine.

69