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Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General

SPECIAL REVIEW

!
\

~ ) COUNTERTERROR1Slv1 DETENTION Al\TD
INTERROGATION ACTiv1TIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003)
(20O3-7123-IG)
7 May 2004

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1

BACKGROUND;., ............... " ....................................................... 9
DISCUSSIOl''-J"

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11

GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND Im'E.RROGATION
A·CTIVITIES ...... .............. 1............................................ ,. ................................ 11
THE CA.PTURE OF ABU ZUBA YDAH AJ.',ffJ DEVELOPMENT OF EITS

Do]

............ 12

LEGAL AJ-1ALYSIS ............ .-.................................................................. ; 16

NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION ivrrrr EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICL1LS ... ............................ : ....................................... : ........................... 23

GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE,- DETENTION,. AND INTER..TWGATION ......... :··· .... 24

................................... 25

DCI Confinement Guidelines ......................................................... 2'7
DCI Interrogation Guidelines ........... .............. ................................ 29

Medical Guidelines .............................................................................. 31
Training for Interrogations ................ ............. .. .................... ........... 31
DETE:NI'ION A1'lJJ INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT
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Videotapes of Interrogations ........ ... .......... ... .......... ..... ............... 36
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317

Background and Detainees ..................................... ... ....:............ 38 .·
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-··················.. ········ .. ·.. ··· ..................... ;.................................. 39

Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines ............................. ,............ .40
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques......... 41
Handgun and ·Pov,,rer Dri11 .................................................... .41

rrhreats ........................................................................................ 42
Stress Positions ......................................................................... 44
Stiff Brush and Shackies .............. ,..................... _. ........ :.......... 44
Waterboard Tecl1nique ............................................................ 44
........... 46
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...................................................................... 67

. Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ............. 69
Pressure Points ...................... .-........................................................ 69
Mock Executions .... :............................................................... ,....... 70

Use. of Smoke ........ '° ....... . ............................................................... 72
Use of· Cold ..........·........ ., .................... 'tt••·•~t••··-, . . ,-.a., ••• «" .... ".ij"·· ............ l,.,t. ... , •.••.•• 73

Water Dousing ............................................................................... 76

Hard Takedo°}vn ............................................ .'................................ 77

Abuse

at Other Locations Outside of the CTC
.................................... 80

ANALYIICAL SUPPORTTO TNTERROGATIONS ................ ,.... ...... , ........... , ... 82
EFFECTIVENESS ............................... ........................... ............................... ,85

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENITON
AND INTERROGA TTON PROGRA.Af ................................. ............................ 91

Policy Considerations .............. ......................................................... 92
Concerns Over Participation in the CTC Program ..................... 94
ENDG.AlvfE .................................................................................................. 95

CONCLUSIONS .. ~ ............ ~ ....................................................... 100
RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................... 106

APPENDICES
A. Procedures and Resouxces
B. Chronology of Significant Events

C. J:viemorandurn for JoI-rn. Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the
Cenlrnl Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an A.l-Qa 1ida
Operative, 1 August 2002
· D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Condilions for CIA Detainees,
28 January 2003

~

F. Draft Office of Medical Services Guidelines on I\tledical and
Psychological Support to Detainee Interrogations, 4 September
2003

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SPECIAL REVIEW
( ~ COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEl'vfBER 2001 - OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123·I G)
·7May2004

INTRODUCTION

j

. 2 . . ~ In November 2002, the Deputy Director for
Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
that the Agency had established a program in the Cmmterterrorist
Center to detain a1i.d interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC
Program"). He also informed OIG that he had ·ust learned of and had
dis a tched a team to mvestigate
In January 2003, the DDO informed OIG
that he had received allegations that Agency personnel had used
unauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee,
'Abd Al--:-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that

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OIG investigate. Separately, OIG received information that some
en1ployees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities_ at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of
hurrnui rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency
counterterrorism detention and interro ation activities and the incident with
eriod Se tember 20-01 to mid-

· suMMARY
th~ DCI assigned responsibility for
implementir\g capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the
Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D / CTC). vVhen U.S.
military forces began·d~tainin individuals in__Af hanistan and at
Guantanamo B_a , Cuba,

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the Agency began to detain and interrogate
directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial
Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydal1,
1 ~ Appeudix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that OIG employed in
conducting this Review. The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or
interrogations conducted jointly w i t h ~ e U.S. military.
.
2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significant events that occurred d~ring the period of this
Review.

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in March 2002, presented the Agency with a significant dilemma. 4
T1:"te Agen~y was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent
additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu
Zubaydah was withholding infonnation that could no.t be obtained
t..hrough then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials
believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat
information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly from other senior
_Al-Qa'ida high value detainees.
5. ( ~ The conduct of detention and interrogation
activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included
determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be
securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing
qualified persom1.el to manage and carry out detention and
interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa'ida
personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques,
another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that
Agency personnel coul¢1 lawfully use to overcome fue resistance. In
this context, CTCr with the assistance of the Office of Technical
.Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to
use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against
the backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoida..T1ce of
interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning
torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners
and det.ainees in the internalional. community.
6. ( ~ The Office of General Counsel (OGC) took
the lead in determinin.g and documenting the legal parameters and
constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted independent research
·1 ~ The use of "hi.gh value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and
detainees in this Review is based on how they have been generally categorized by CTC. CTC
distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be
able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United. States. Senior Al-Qa'ida
plaILrters and operators, such as Abu Zuhaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the
category of "high value" and are given the highest-pribrity for capture, detention, and
interrogation. CTC categorizes those individuals who are believed to have lesser direct
knowledge ·of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as "mediu..'11. value"
targets/ detainees.

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and consulted extensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) and
National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Working with
DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLCt OGC determined t.~at in most
instances relevant to the counterterrorism detention and
interrogation activities
the criminal prohibition
against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal
. constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In
August 2002, DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it
determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques"
(EITs) would notviolate the torture prohibition. This work provided
the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide
the CTC Program.

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7.

By November 2002, the Agency had Abu
Zubaydah and another high value detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim
Al-Nashiri, in custod
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and the Office of Medical Services (OMS)
provided medical care to the det~inees.

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From the beginning, OGC briefed DO officers
assign_e d to thes~acililies on their legal authorities, and Agency
personnel staffing these facilities documented interrogations and the
condition of detainees in cables .

10. ~ There were few instances of deviations
from approved procedurewith one
notable exception described in this Review. ·with respect to two
detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the
·waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as
originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured
oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for
purposes of DoJ's legal opinions.

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15. ~ Agency efforts to provide systematic,
clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention
ru.1.d Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have
improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems
have been identified and addressed~ CTC implemented training
programs for interrogators and debriefers.6 Moreover, building upon
operational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DO
~ Before 11 September (9 /11) 2001, Agen{:y personnel sometimes used the
terms interrogation/interrogator and debrie:fing/debn'efer interchangeably. The use of these terms has
since evolved and, today, CTC more clearly disting11ishes their meanings. A debriefer engages a
detainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator is a person who completes a
two-week interrogations !raining program, which ts designed to train, qua[i.fy, and certify a
person to administer ElTs. An interrogator can administer ElTs during an interrogation of a
detainee only after the field, in coordination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as
wifuholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee from a non-cooperative to a
cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can elicit acttonable i.nt~[ligence through
non-aggressive techniques during' debriefing sessions. An interrogator may debrief a detainee
during an interrogation; however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee.

6

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on 28 January 2003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions
for CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on Interro ations Conducted

be made aware of the
guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them.
The DCI Lr1terroga_tion Guidelines make formal the existing CTC
practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters
approvals prior to the application of all EITs. Although the DCT
Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI
Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for
rnisinJerpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and
interrogation activities.
16. ~ The Agencys detention and interrogation
of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the
identification and apprehension of other terrnrists and warned of
terrorist plots pl~TJ11ed for the United States and around the world.
The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of
individual intelligence reports ap.d analytic products supporting the
counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military
commanders.
17. ~ Thecu~entCTCDetentionand
Interrogation Prograw has been subject to DoJ legal review and
Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency
policy ru.i.d rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law
enforcement officers. Officers are concerned that public revelation of
the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal
reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency
itself.
18. (
recognized that detainees may
be held in U:S. Government custody indefinitely if appropriate law
enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted. Although there has been
ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC,

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Defense Deparhnent, and Justice Department officials, no decisions
on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior
Agency officials see this ·as a policy issue for the U.S. Government
rather than a- CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the
endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be
prosecuted 1v:ill likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.

19. ( ~ The Agency faces potentially seriou.s
long-tern-t political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC
'Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and
the inability of the U.S. Goyemment fo decide what it will ultimately
do with terrorists,detained by the Agency.
20. ~ This Review makes a number of
recommendations that are designed to strengthen the management
and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities.
Although the DCI Guidelines were an important step forward, they
were only designed to address the CfC Progi:am rather than all
A - enc debriefin or :interro ation activities.

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BACKGROUND

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The Agency has had intermittent involvement in the
interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of
the United States. After the Vretnam War, Agency personnel
experienced in the field of intenogations left the Agency or moved to
other assignments. In the early 1980s, a resurgence of :interest in
teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several
methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political
sensitivities the th.en-Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation."· The
Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE) .
training program designed to train. foreign liaison services on
jnterrogation teclmiques .
. 23. ~ In 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on
the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interro ations
and the death 0£ one individual
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Following that investigation, the Agency
took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on
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interrogations, debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters
sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance
to the field.
24. ~ In 1986, the Agency ended the HRE training program
because of alle ations _ofhuman ri hts abuses in Latin America.

which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation
policy:

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DISCUSSION
GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DITENTION /\ND INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES

25.~

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27. ~
· The DCT delegated responsibility for
implementation
to the DDO and D /CTC. Over time,
~TC a~o solicited as.s
. .
1 ce from other Agency components,
mcludin.g OGC, OMS
and OTS.

7 CU/ /FOUO) DoJ takes the position that as Cororn.ander-in-Chief, the President independently
has the Article U constitutional authority to order Lbe detention and interrogation of enemy
combatants to gain intelligence information.
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28. ( ~ T o a s s i s t A g e n ~
understandin the sea e and im l i c a t i o n s OGC researched, analyze_d, ·a nd

le le al issues. These included

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"draft" papers wfth Agency officers responsible
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THE CAPTITRE OF ABU ZUBA YDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITs
30. ~ ) The capture of senior Al-Qa 1ida operative
Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the
opportunity to obtain aclionable intelligence on future threats to the
United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody
at that time. This accelerated CIA's develo ment of an interroo-ation
program

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31. ~ To treat the severe wounds that Abu
Zubaydah suffered uport his capturer the Agency prov1.ded him
intensive medical care from the outset and 1eferred bis questioning
for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled
a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah usin
non-physical elicitation techniques.
The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah
was withholding imminent threat information.
·
. 32. ~ ) Several months earlier, in late 2001, CIA
had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, who had-experience hi. the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion,
~ c e , and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and ·
write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques.13
This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DoD)
psychologist who had-SERE experience in the U.S. Air
Force and DoD to p r o ~ p e r , "Recognizing and Developing
Countermeasures to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation
Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, the
two psychologists developed a list of riew and more aggressive EITs
that they recommended for use in interrogations.

12
l3 (U / /FOUO) The SERE training program I alls under the DoD foint Personnel Recovery .
Agency (JPRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include the training for SERE a.l"\d Prisoner of
War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. SE'.RE Training is offered
by the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Farce to its personnel, particularly air crews and special
operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations. SERE
students are taught bow to survive in va:rjous terrain,. evade and endure capiivily, resist
interrogations, and COrlduct themselves to prevent harm to themselves and fellow prisoners of
Vtar.

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33. ~ ) CIA's OTS obtained data on the use of the
proposed Errs and their potential long-term psychological effects on
detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicited from
a number .of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area
of psychopathology.
34. ~
OTS also solicited input from DoD/Joint
Personne1 Recove·ry Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its
SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students.
DoD /JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted
from use of the ElTs, including the most taxing technique, the
waterboard, on SERE stµdents.14 The OTS analysis was used by OGC
in evaluating the legality of teclmiques.

35. ~ Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption
in the CTC Inten-ogation Program. As proposed, use ofEITs would
be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological
state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed
t e c b n i q u e - - - a f t e r learnmg from DoJ that frus could
delay the l e ~ f o l l m - v i n g textbox identifies the 10 EITs
the Agency described to DoJ.

~ According to individuals vrith authoritative knowledge of the SERE program, the
waterboar<l was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a class.
Excepl for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued. because of its dramatic
effect on the students vv-ho were subjects.
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Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
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The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one
hand on each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the
same motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.

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During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled fonvard and then quickly and
-firmly pushed into a .flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His
head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash.

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TI1e facial hold is used to ho!d the detainee's head immobile. The interrogator
places an open pab:n on either side of the cletainee's face and the interrogator's
fingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes.

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With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The
j11terrogator's hand makes contact with the area ber-;•,een the tip of the detainee's
chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe.

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In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically a
small or large box, which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller space lasts
no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours,

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Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a hamiless insect in the box
with the detainee.
·

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During wall standing, the. detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet from a wall with
hls feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in
front of him and his fingers rest on th.e wall to support all of his body weight The
detainee is not allowed to reposition his hands or feet

♦

The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor
with his legs extended straight out in front of him with his amts raised above his
head or kneeling on the .floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.

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Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time.

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The application of the waterboard h:chnique involves hinding the detainee to a
bend, with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized
and an inte.noga tor places a cloth. over the detainee's mouth and nose while
pouring water onto the dolt1 in a controlled milll!1er. Airflow is restricted for 20 to
40 seconds and the technique produces the sensahon of droVv--ning and suffocation.

DoJLEGAL ANALYSIS
36. ~ CIA's OGC sought guidance from DoJ
arc:lin the legal bounds of EITs vis-a-vis individuals detained
The ensuing legal opinions focus on
the Convention Against Torture and Other _Cruel, Inhumane and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), 15
especially as implemented in the U.S. criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 23402340A.
.
37. (U i /FOUO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits
"torture," which it defines in Article 1 as:
· any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is inte:ntionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person inforroation or a confession,
punishing hitn for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
1..-ind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigatil?n of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.]

Article 4 of the Torh1re Convention provides that states party to the
Convention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses 1...mder
their criminal l_aws. Article 16 additionally provides t..hat each state
party "s.hall lw..dertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degradfog treatment or
punish.ment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in
Article 1."

15

(U / /FOUO) Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Trealy Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
(entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States

. on 20 November 1994.

~

38. (U / /FOUO) The Torture Convention applies to the United
Stat-es only in accordance with the reservations and understandings
made by the United States at the lime of ratification,16 As explained
to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification:
Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S. law. 111e phrase
··cruet inhwnan or degrading treatment or punishment" is a
standard formula in international instruments and is found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
• on Civil and Political Rights✓ and the European Convention on
Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the
context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhuman" treatment or
punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or
punishment barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatn,ent or punishment,
however, has been interpreted as potentially indudb.g treatment
that would probably not be prohibited by the U .S. Constitution.
[Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's
gender change might be considered ''degrading" treatment.] To
make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be
coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel,_
unusuaJ; and inhumane treahnent, the follmving understancting is
recommended :
"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading LTeatment or punishment,' as used in Article 16 of
U1e Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane
treatment or punishment 1.1robibitecl by the Fifth, Eighth
and/ or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."1 7 [Emphasis added.I

16 (U) Vienna Convenhon cm Uie Law ofTreaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.NTS. 331 (entered into
force 27 January 1980). 11,e United States is not a party to tile Vienna Convention on treaties, but
it generally regards its pro·,,risions as customary international law.
·
17 (U //FOUO} S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16.

.\

39. (U //FOUO) In accordance with the ConventioJ.1, the
United States criminalized acts of torture in 18 U.S.C, 2340A(a),
whlch provides as follows:
vV110ever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection, shall be punished by death or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other
than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
person with:in his custody or physical control." 18 "Severe physical
pain and suffering'' is not further defined, but Congress added a
definition of "severe mental pain or suffering:"

I

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[T}he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting frorn(A} the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pau, or suffering;

(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or' application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profmmdly the senses or
the personality;

I

(C) the threat of unm.inent death; or

(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected_
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . _19

These statutory definitions are consistent with the understand.in.gs
and reservations of the United States to the Torhue Convention.

18 (U/ /FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(1).

19 (U//FOUO) 18 U.S.C. 2340(2).

18
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40. (U / /FOUO) DoJ has never prosecuted a violation of the
torture statute, 18 U.S.C. §2340, and there is no case law construing
its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant
issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer
of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the
torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002
OLC legal memorandum set out OLCs conclusions regarcling the
proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that
"Section 2340A proscribes acts inJlicling, and that ate specifically
intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental·or
physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme
nature" anµ that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,
but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to
fall within Section 234.0A's proscription against torture." Further
describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated:
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily .function, or even death. For purely
mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2310, it
must result in significant psychological harm of significant
duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21

OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the
infliction of severe pain be fu.e defendant's "precise objective." OLC.
also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify
interrogation methods that would othervvise violate Section 234.0A.22
The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other
provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatm.en t, and
interrogation of detainees outside the United States.TI
20 (U/ /FOUO) Legal (\1emoi:andum, Re: Stand<"..tds of Conduct for interrogation under
18 U.S.C. 2340-234.0A (1 August 2002).
21 (U/ /FOUO} Ibid., p . l.
Tl (U/ /POUO) Ibid., p. 39.
23 l1J I /FOUO) OLC's analysis of the torture statute ,vas guided in part by judicial decisions
under the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVP A) 23 U.S.C. 1350, \Vhich provides a tort remedy
for victiJns of torture. OLC noted that the courts in thls context have looked at the entire course

~

41. (U I /FOUO) A second undassified 1 August 2002 OLC
opinion addressed the international law aspects of such
interrogations.24 This opinion concluded that interrogation methods
that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate the Torture
Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court.
42. ~ 1.n·addition to the two unclassified
opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at
the request of CIA.25 (Appendix C:) This opinion, addressed to
CIA's Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use
of EITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah woul~ violate the Title 18
prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on
Abu Zubaydah would not violate the tortw:e statute because, among
other.things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to
inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe
pain or suffering.

43. ~ This OLC opinion was based upon
specific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which EITs
would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. For
exarnpler OLC ,.vas told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "no
n-1ore than several days but could last up to thirty days.'' The EITs
would be used on "ai1 as-needed basis" and all would not necessarily
be used. _Further, the EITs were expected to be used "in some sort of
escalating fashionr culmin~ting with the wat~rboard though not
necessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the EITs

of conduct, although a single incident could constitute torture . OLC also noted that courts may
be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of "severe pain and
suffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of an
extreme nature have been redressed under the TVPA's civil remedy for torture." \<Vhlte House
CoW1Sel Memorandum at 22 - 27.
,
2'~ (Ui /FOUO) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC

· (1 August 2002).
.
5
2 ~ Memorandum for fohn Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency, '1nterrogation of al Qai.da Operatiye'' (l August 2002) at 15.

~
might be used more than once, "that repetition will not be substantial
because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several
repetitions." With respect to the waterboard1 it was explained that:
, .. the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench .... 11--ie
individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the
forehead and eyes. Water is·then applied to the doth in a
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and
completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. Til.i.s
causes an increase in carbon dioxitj.e level in the individual's blood.
This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort
to breathe. Th.is effort plus· the cloth produces the perception of
"suffocation and incipient panic;' i.e., the perception of clrovming.
The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those
20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12
to 24] inch.es. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the
individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full
breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the
removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The
water is usually applied from a ca..r1.teen cup or small watering can
with a spout. . . . [T]his procedure triggers an automatic
physiological sensation of dtowning that the individual cannot
control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not
drowning. [I]t is Ukely that this procedure would not last rn.Dre
than 20 minutes in any one application.

Finallyr the Agency presented OLC with a psychological profile of
Abu Zubaydah and ,-vith the conclusions of officials and
psychologists associated with the SERE program that the use of E!Ts
vvould cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these
representations to support its conclusjon that no physical. hann or
prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the
EITs, including the waterboard. 26
26

{'rS.f-

According to the Chief, Medical Services, OMS was neither consulted nor
involved ip the initial analysis of the risk and benefits of EITs, nor provided with the OTS report
dted in the OLC opinion. In reh:cspect, based on the OLC extracts of the OTS rep9rt, OMS
contends that the reported soph.ishcatio11 of the preliminary EIT review was exaggerated, at least
as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EIT was appreci<.1bly overstated in the

report. Furl-hermore, OMS contends that the expertise of th.e SERE psychologist/interrogators on

~

TOP"3E

44. ~ OGC continued to consult with DoJ as the
CTC Interrogation Program and the use of EITs expanded beyond the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of
an undated and unsigned .document entitled, "Legal Principles
Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured
Al-Qa'ida Personnel."27 According to OGC, this analysis was fully
coordinated with and drafted in substantial part by OLC. In additioh
to·reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torture statute, ·
the analysis concludes that the federal \,Var Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C.
24.41, does not apply to ·Al-Qa'ida because members of that group are
not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that "the
[Torture} Convention permits the use of Icruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment] in exigent circumstances/ such as a national
emergency or war." It also states that the interrogation of Al-Qa ida
members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
because those provisions do not apply exh'aterritorially, nor does it
viola.te the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons
upon whom. criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the
analysis states that a wide range of EITs and other techniques would
not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were t.hey to be
applicable:
1

· The. use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved
techniques does not violate ~my Federal statute or other law, where
the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the
detainee to undergo severe physical or mental pain or suffering
(i.e., they act with the good faiU1. belief that their conduct will not
cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so
long as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of
the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white
the waterboard was probably misrepresented at the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is
so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almos~ irrelevant. Consequently,
according to OMS, there was no a priori reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the
frequency ~d intensity,vith which it was used by the psychologist/intenogators was either
efficacious or medically safe.
27 ~ "Legal Pr,inciples Applicable to CIA Detention and lntenogation of

Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel," attached to

~

16 June 2003).

.

.. . ·. .. . .'

noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the
detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement,
wall standing, stress positions, s1€ep deprivation, the use of
diapers, the use of harrnless insects, and the water board.

Accordin.g to OGC, this analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the
reasoning of the classified 1 August 2002 OLC opinion extends
beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditiorrs that
were specified in that opinion .

. 'f'.JOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION vVI1R EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICIALS

45. ~ ) At th~ same time that OLC was reviewing
the legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency ·was consulting
· with NSC policy staff and senior Adn:unistration officials. The DCI
briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the
proposed EITs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership
of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of
both standard techniques and EITs.
46. ~ In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging
of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration
officials and the leadership of the C9ngressional Oversight
Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The
Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the
Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions .
The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with v\Thite House
Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Division
and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed
il1.ern on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Dete....nhon and
Interrogation Progran1.

47.

~

Representatives of the DO, in the
presence of the Director of Congressional Affairs and the General
Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence
Oversight Committees
the use of EITs and detentions in February

on

23

~eERE'.IJ

and ivfarch 2003. The General Counsel says that none of the
participants expressed any concern about the techniques or the
Program.

4 8 . - ~ On29Jilly2003, theDCiand the General
Counsel provided a detaileq. briefing to selected NSC Principals on
OA's detention and interrogation efforts involving "high value
detainees," to include the expanded use of EITs. 28 Accordin,g to a
Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel
following that meeti.i.7.g, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ
approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple
applications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said he
believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was
doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of
the effort. According to OGC1 the senior officials were again briefed
regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the
Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September
2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these
briefings-expressed any reservations about the program.
GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND fNTERROGATION

49. ~ Guidance and training are fundamental
to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally,
politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and
Interrogation Progr~. Soon after 9 /11, the DDO issued tti.dance on
the stand~ds for the ca ture of terrorist tar ets.

50. The DCI, in January 2003 approved
formal "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees"
(Appendix D).and "Guidelines on fo.terrogations Conducted

( ,-'\ppc-ldix El. whi,. h c1re di:,:,,:us~ed lei,,,,: Prior
to the DCI Guidelines. HecH..iquartl:rS provided gu1d·ance 1::2 i.nfcrmal
briefings and elecl,nnic communication.s, to include cc1bk-:: fro:r: CIA
Headquarters, to the field.

5]. ~ fn Novt~rnber 2002,. CTC i.nitiated tHining
courses for individuals i11volved in interrogc1tion.s .

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DCl Confinement Guidelines
57. ~ B e f o r e J;:i__nuary 2003, officers assigni~d to

manage detention facilities develo ed and im ,lern.cn tcd confi.nemcn t
condition ,rocedures.

The J~i.mtarv 2003
DCI Guideiines govern the conditib1~9.oftor1Ju1ement for Cl!-\
detainee,5 _1:-\el<:l in.ct~tentionJa_dliti~.s,
;

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review the Guide_Ll,.nes and sign

done so.

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They must .
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· ·· · · ·

59. ~ ) The UCTGui.delincsspecifylega]
"minimums" and require that "due pruvisi.on rnust be tc1ken to protect
the health and safety of all CIA detainees.'' The Guidelines do not
require that conditions of confinement at th1c: detention facilities
co~orm to U.S. prison or other standards. At a mi.nimum, hmvever,
detention facilities are to provide basi.c levels of medical care:

Further, the guidelines provide that:

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DCI Interrogation Guidelines
60. (S71NEi_ Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC
disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case
b_asi.s to address requests to use specific interrogation techniques.
Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations
to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or
agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency
maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been
briefed on :interrogation procedures.

Interrogation Guidelines require that all personnel directly engaged
in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these
Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation,
and have completed the applicable acknowledgement.
62. (StfNE)__ The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define
''Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless
otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other
personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use only Pemlissible
In.terrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques
consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced

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Techniques."33 Errs require advance approval from Headquarters, as
do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document
the use of both standard techniques .and EITs.

63. ~ The DCI Interrogation GuideUr1es define
"standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not
incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These
techniques include/ but are not limited to, all lawful forms of
questiorung employed by U.S. law enforcement and military
interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques
are the use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,34
reduced caloric in.take (so lon.g as the amount is calculated to
maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation of reading
.material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level
calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of
dia . ers for limited . eriod.s ( enerall . not to exceed 72 hours.
and moderate
psychological pressure. The DCI Interrogation Guidelines do not
specifically proh1bit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has
said, however£ that no one may empl_oy any technique outside
specifically identified standard techniques wiU1out Headquarters
approval.
64. ~ ElTs include physical actions and are
defined as ·"techniques th.at do -incorporate physica] or psychological
pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve
the use of each specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only
by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee
and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the
process.35

33 ~ The 10 approved ElTs are described in the textbox on page 15 of th.is Review.
34 ~ According to the General Counsel, in late December 2003, frie period for
sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours.
35 1"ffit
) Before EI
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~
Medical Guidelines
65. ~ OMS prepared draft guidelines for
medical and psychological support
to detainee interrogations.
.

.

.

Training for Interrogations

In November 2002,
initiated a pilot running ·of a two-week
Interrogator Training Course designed to train, q1:1alify1 and certify
individuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers,
3b (U! I AIUO) A 28 March 2003 Lotus Note from C/CTC/Legal advised Chlef, Medical
Services that the "Seventh Floor" "would rieed to approve the promulgation of any further formal
guidelines .... For now, therefore, let's remain at the cliscussionstage ...."
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including a former SERE instructor, designed th,; curriculum, \Vhich
included a week of classroom iJ1stTuction fo!io 1.ved by a week of
"hands-on" tra.Lt1in in Effs.

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completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign an
acknowledgment that they have read, understand, and yvill comply
with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines.

69. ~ In J-i:me 2003, CTC established a debriefing
course for Agency substantive experts-who are involved in questioning
detai11-ees after they have undergone interrogation and have been
deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train
non-interrogators to collect actionable _intelligence from high value
detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize
non~interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation
Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI
Interrogatio.r:t Guidelines, and the .roles and res · nsibilities of all who
interact with a hi h Value detainee-.

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74. (T'f-psvchol.:;e:,i::.t/ir.terrog,1tors- l e d e::ch inrPrrng,l\inn or ,:i.i,u Zut:-i,·,tih i11h: A>'.\'.-1shiri
where Ells were usc:d. The- ;.,,·~ \'chok)•jst / i; tt.-.cr :t".,:,~;1 h·•rs ( ,_·-n:',.·rri"·d
with
ka1n rnembers before each interru ·:,ation
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2002. The interrogati.on of Al-Nz.i.shiri proceeded zifter
- t h e necess,uy J-ic,1<..iq1.,.:ntc1·s auth0riz,ilicn.
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psychologist/interrogators began Al-Nashiri's interrogation using .
EITs immediately upon his arrival. Al:-Nashi.ri provided lead
information on other terrorists d u r ~ t day of interrogation.
On the twelfth day of interrogation-psychologist/
inter.rogators administered two applications of the waterboard to
Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced
int rro • ti n f Al N hiri o ti.nu d through 4 December 2002,■

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Videotapes of Interrogations
· 77. ~ Headquartershadintenseinterestin
~ r e a s t of all aspects of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation9I
- i n c l u d i n g compliance with the guidance provided to the
site relative to the use of EITs. Apart from this however, and before
the use of EITs; the interrogation teamsdecided to
videotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to
ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatm.ent
should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the
medical care provided to him by CIA. Li\nother purpose was to assist
in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the team
advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever, were used for that
purpose. There are 92 videotapes✓ 12 of which include EIT
applications. Ar:t OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in
November and December 2002 to ascertain compliance with the
August 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what achtally happened with
what v..ras reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no
deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record.

OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs, and
cables
in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard
lications,most of which lasted less than 10 seconds. 41

~ For the purpose of this Review, a waterboard application constitu.ted each
discrete instance in which water was applied for any period of time during a session.

41

~

36

blank. Two others were blankexcept for one or two minutes of
recording. Two (!thers were broken and could not be reviewed. OIG
compared the videotapes t o - l o g s and cables and identified
· a· 21-hour period of time, whi"ch included tvvo waterboard sessions,
that was not captured on the videotapes.
79. - ~ OIG's review of the videotapes revealed
that the waterboard tedutlque emplqyed a t - w a s different
from the technique as described in. the DoJ opinion and used in the.
SERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the
detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the
DoJ opinion,. the subject's airflow is disrupted by the.firm application
of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small
amount of water to the doth in a controlled manner. By contrast; the
Agency interrogator
continuously applied large volumes
of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of
the psychologists/interrogators a~knowledged that the Agency's use
of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and
explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for
real" ·and is more poignant ·and c_onvincing.

80

Durir1g this time, Headquarters issued

the formal DCI Confinement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation
Guidelines, and the additional draft guidelines specifically

42

~

addressing requirements for Oi\iS persomi.el. This served to
Str€ngthen the comn,2ncl a.nd conh-ol exercised over the CTC

Program.
Background dnd Oelclin~~s

1

~ ,--.. ~

,-~ I

!Vt'::i~.

,.::_ ;;

:-_.) 1~::~~=~?i:.~:.,..

~/

Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines

. the Agenc . •was roviding legal and operational
briefings and cables
that contained Headquarters~
guidance and discussed the torhrre statute and the DoJ legal opiluon.
CTC had l:lJ~o estf~blished a recedent of detailed cables between
and Headquarters regarding the
interrogation and debriefing of detainees. The written guidance did
not address the four standard intenogation techniques that,
according to CIC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as
November 2002.43 Agency personnel were authorized to employ
standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without
Headquarters' P!ior approval. The guidance did not specifically
43 lS)'iNEl_The four standard interrogation techniques were:

(1) sleep deprivation not to
exceed 72 hours, (2) continual use of light or darkness in a c~ll, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise
(background hum).

~

4D

address the use of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor
9,id it specifically address the issue of whether or not Agency officers
could improvise with any.other techniques. No formal mechanisms
were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed
on the existing legal and policy guidance.
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques

'1

\

\
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I

I

90. ~ This Review heard allegations of the use
of ~authorized techniques
The most significant, the
handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a
separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed
during the Review identified.other techniques that caused concern
because DoJ had not specifically approved them. These included the
making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress
positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on a
detain.ee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations
\Vere disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative
deterrninalion regarding the facts. Thus1 although these allegations
are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held bv individuals
associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance,
they did not warrant separate investigations or administrative action.
.

j

Handgun and Power Drill
91. ~

interrogation team members,
whose purpose·it was to. ~1-Nash.iri and debrief Abu
Zubaydah, initi_ally s t a f f e d - The interrogation team
continued EITs on Al-Nashlri for two weeks in December 2002they assessed him. to be "com liant." S-ubse uentl -, CTC officers at
Headquarters
sentenior operations officer (the debriefer)
to debrief and assess Al-Nashiri.
92. ~ T h e debriefer assessed Al-Nashiri as

withholding informa ti.on,. at which poin~reinstatedhooding, and handcuffing. Sometime betwe€n ·

28 pecember 2002 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an
unloaded semi~automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri
into disclosing information.44 After discussing this plan
- t h e debriefer entered the c.ell where Al-Nashiri sat shackled and
racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head. 45 On
1-v~at was probab.l~ t h e ~ ~ debriefer used a .power drill to
fnghten Al-Nashin. v V 1 ~ consent the debriefer entered
the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood
naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the
power drill.

withlll

93. ~ Theand debriefer did not request
authorization or report the use of these unauthorized techniques to
.-'It~~ .. - s. Ho1-vever1 in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers
who had leai-ned of these incidents reported them to
. ·- .
Headquarters. OIG investigated and.referred its findings to the
Cri:rrunal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to
prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition.
These incidents are f:he subject of a separate OIG Report of
Investigation.46
,

'

Threats

94. ~

During another incident-the

sam.e Headquarters debriefer, according to a - o
was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying ·that if he did not talk,
"We could g e - o
mother
u rin here/' and, "We can bring your family
in here." Th
debriefer reportedly wanted Al-Nashiri
to infer, for psychologica reasons, that the debriefer might b - i n t e l l i ence officer based on rus Arabic dialect, and that AlNashiri was in
custod because it was widely believed in
Middle East circ es
· tenogation technique involves

44 ~ This individual was not a trained interrogator and was not authorized to use EITs.
45 (U / /FOUO) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to cha.inber a bullet or
simulate a bullet being chambered.
.
··
46 CS'f,l.ME} UnauUwrized Interrogation Techniques-29 October 2003.

42

sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The
debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The
debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was
fron1 when talkin with Al-Nashiri. The debriefer said he never said
he wa,
· telligence officer but let
Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions.
95.
.An experienced Agency interrogator
reported that the
interrogators threatened Khalid
Sha kh Muha11U:ri.ad
According to this interrogator, the
interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that
if anything else happens in the United States, "We're going to kill
your c:tuldren." According to the interro ator, one of the_·
· terrogators sai _.

provided tQ him of the threaL
indicate that the law had been violated.

at report did not

Sn1oke

96. - , i \ n A g e n c
interrogat~r ~ i n December 2002, he and another
smoked cigars and blew·smoke in
Al-Nashiri's face during an inteirogation. The interrogator claimed
they did this to "cover tile stench" in the room and to he.lp keep the
:interrogators al~ late at night. This interrogator said he would not
do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency
interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions
with Al-Nashld to mask the stench in the room. He clai.med he did
not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri's face.

~

43

Stress Positions
97.
OIG received reports that :interrogation
team members emp oye potentially injurious stress positions on
Al-Nashiri. Al-Nash.in was required to kn.eel on the fl.oar and lean
back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed
Al-Nashiri backward wrule he was-in th.is s t r e s s ~ o t h e r
occasion
said he had to intercede a f t e ~
xpressed concern that Al-Nashiri1s a!fllS might be
dislocated from his shoulders. - e x p l ~ e d that, at the time,
the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashlri in a standing
stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his
arms while his arms were.bound behind his back with a belt.
Stiff Brush and Shackles
98.
· terrogator reported that
he witnessed other techniques used on Al-Nashiri th~t the
· interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoI. These
included the use of a stiff brush that was intended. to induce pain on
Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted in
cuts and bruises. When queslionedr an interrogator who was at
acknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe
Al-Nash:iri. He described the brush as the kind of brush one uses in a
bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the
incident attributed the abrasions on_Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency
officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles whlle
repositioning him into a stress position.

Waterboard Technique

-, ,,.

99. ~ The Review determined th.at the
interrogators used the waterboard on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in
a manner inconsistent with the SERE application of the waterboard
and the description of the waterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, jn that
the. technique was used an Khalid Shaykh M11J1ammad a large
number of times. Accordmg to the General Counsel, the Attorney

General acknowledged he is fully aware of U1e repetitive use of the
waterboard and that CIA is well within the scope of the DoJ opinion
and ~e authority given to CrA by that opinion. The Attorney
General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a
single individual. ,
100. ( T ~ ) Cables indicate that Agency
interrogato~pplied the waterboard techni ue to
·Khalid Sha kh Muhammad 18

.

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paragraphs 64~63 .

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Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques
was but
one event in ilie ear y man
Agency activity in
that involved the use of interrogatio~ techniques that .
DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnel
reported a range of improvised actions that int~rrogators and
debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining
informati.on from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative
of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the
Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations in ........ ·_ . . ~
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165.

and the death of a detamee at a rnilitatv base in Northeast
Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192). _These two cases
presented £acts that warranted criminal investigations. Some of the
techniques discussed below were used wi
and will be
further addressed in connection with a Repor
In othe.r cases of undocUill-ented or unauthorized techniques, the facts
are ambiguous or less serious, not warranting further investigation.
Some actions discussed below \Vere taken by employees or
contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency
manage~ent has also addressed administratively some of the actions.
.

•

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Pressure Points

.

July 2002
ns officer

detainee's nee
to restrict the detainee's carotid artery.

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on the
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167.~
ho was
facing the shackled deta:iriee, reportedly watched his eyes to the point
that the detainee would nod and start to pass out; then, the
shook the detainee to wake hhn. This
process was
·eated for a total of three applications on the detainee.
The
acknowledged to OIG that he laid hands
on the detainee and ma - have made him think he was going to lose
consciousness. Th
also noted that he h a years of experience debriefing and interviewing people and until
recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations.

re

168. (SlfNE) CTC mana.g ement is ;now aware of this reported
. incident, the se·verity of which was disputed. The use of presstffe
. oints is not, and had not be~n, au'thorized, and CTC has advised the
that such actions are not authorized.
Mock Executions

_ 169. ~ '.The debrie,!~..!~2!~.!f:i°Yed the
handgun ~d ~ A l - N a s h i r ~ _ d v i s e d that
those a,ctions were predicated on a technique he had artici ated in
- h e debriefer s·tated that when he wa
between September and October 2002,
fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while e debriefer
was i n t e r v i e w ~ was thought to be withholding .
infonnation.68-staged the incident, which included
screaming and yelling outside the cell by other 0A officers a n d .
guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the-interrogation
room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee,
lyiJ.1.g motionless on the ground, and made to- appear as if he had
been shot to death.

-~·-±~~-.
.

·.:--;~

170. ~ The debriefer claimed he did not think
he needed to report this incident because t h ~ a d
openly discussed this p l a ~ s e v e r a ~ and
after the incident. When the debriefer wa5 l a t e ~ n d
believed he needed a non-traditional technique to i11duce the
detainee to cooperate? he t o l d ~ e wanted to wave a handgun
in front of th.e detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not
believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique,
citing the earlier, unreported mock e x e c u t i o ~

.

171. ' ( ' f ~ A senior operations office
recounted that around September 2002-eard that the debriefer
had staged a_mock execution. llllwas not present b~lt unders~ood it
went b ~ t was transparen-uj:'ruse and no ·benefit was denved
from it-bserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it is
not considered torture. -tated that if such a proposal were made
now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begin
wi
management and would include CTC/Legal,

172. ~ The-admitted staging a "mock
execution" in the first d a ~ v a s open. According to the
the technique was his idea but was not effective
because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept,
from. SERE school, of showing something tl1at looks real, butis not.
The
recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later
told him about employing a mock execution technique. Thelall
did not know when this incident occurred or if it was
successful. He viewed this technique as :ineffective because it was not
believable.
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described staging a mock execution of a detainee.
Reportedly, a detainee who witnessed the "body" in the aftermath of
the ruse ''sang like a bird.'.'
174.
revealed that a roximately
four days before his interview with OIG, th
stated he
had conducted a mock executio
in October or
November 2002. Report_edly, the firearm was discharged outside of
the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly
possessed critical threat information
stated that he told
the
not to d ~ e stated that he has not heard
of a similar act occurring-ince then.
.

.

Use of Smoke

cigarette smoke was once used as an interrogation technique in
~ e d l y , at the request of
- a n interrogator, the officer, who does not
smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/ cigar in the detainee's
face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so the
smoke ceased.
heard that a different
officer had used smoke as an interrogation t e c h n i ~
questioned numerous personnel who had w o r k e ~ b o u t
the use of s·m oke as a technique. None reported any knowledge of
the use of smoke as an interrogation technique.
•
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·:·.-~-·
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"176. .~ .
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. . -= drnitted that he has personally used smoke
inhalation techniques on detainees to make them ill to the point
where they would start to "purge." After thls, in a weakened state,

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'th
inforrriation.70
denied ever physically
abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has.
Use of Cold

-In

178.
late Jul
detainee was being interrogate
Prior to proceeding with any of the~ethods,
officer responsible fol the detainee-requesting
Headquarters authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan
over a two-week period. The plan inclu:ded the following:
Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a window air
conditioner and a judicious provision/ deprivation of warm
dothing/blq.rtkets, believe we can increase [the detainee's} physical
discomfort level to the point where we may lower his
mental/trained resistance abilities.
·

CTC/Legal responded and advisedr "[C]aution must be used when
employing the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [the
deta~et:'s] dis.cOmfort do.es not lead to a serious illness or worse,"

70 ~This was sµbstantiated in part by the CIA officer who participated in this act with the

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183. ~ M a n y of the officers interviewed about

the use of cold showers as a technique cited that t;he water heater was
inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold showers.
However1
xplained that if a detainee was
.
cooperative, he would be given a wam1 shower. He stated that when
a detainee was uncooperative, the interrogators accomplished two
goals by combining the hygienic reason for a shower with the
unpleasantness of a cold shower.

repor~ed that a detainee was left in a cold room 1 shackled and naked,
until he demonstrated cooperation.

- 185. ~ When asked ~ 0 3 , if cold
was used as an interrogation tedmique,· the---responded,
"not per se." He explained that physical and environn1ental
discomfort was used to e:µcourage the detainees to :improve their
environment. - b s e r v e d that cold 1s hard to define. He
asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatenb.1g?"
He stated that cold water was still employed
however,
·showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no
specific guidance on it from H e a d ~ ~ a s leftto its
own discretion in the use of cold. ~ d d e d there is a cable
froni-docmnenting the use of ''manipulation of the
environment."
.
.
186. ~ A l t h o u g h the Dci Guidelines do not
mention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS
Guidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee
Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool
environment" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.)
The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe
temperature ranges, including the safe temperature range when a
detainee is wet or unclothed.

Water Dousing
187. _

. According to
and
"water dousing" has been used
since ·early 2003 when
officer.introduced
this technique to the facility. -Dousing involves ~ying a detainee
dm,vn on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to
15 minutes. Anofuer officer explained that the room was maintained ·
at 70 degrees or more; the guards usect water that was at .room
ten1perature while the interrogator questioned the detainee.
188.

l'fS,

A review
from April aµd
· sought permission from
C T ~ t o employ specific techniques for a number of detainees.
Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing. 72
Subsequent cables reportE;!d the use and duration of the teclmiques by
detainee per interrogation session..73 One certified interrogator,
noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique,
requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A reh1m
cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towei or sheet,
may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the afr
temperahrre must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried
iffilnediately .

May 2003 _revealed tha

. 189. ~ T h e DO Guidelines do not mention
water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS
Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standard
measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the
11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "water
dousing" in its guidelines.

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Hard Takedown

191. ~ According t o - t h e hard
takedown ~ a s ~ interrogations~art of the
atmospherics.'' For a time, it was .the standard procedure for moving
a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It ~as done for shock and
psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of
the interrogation. Th.e act of putting adetainee into a diaper can
cause abrasions if ihe detainee struggles because the floor of the
facility is concrete. T ~ t a t e d he did not discuss the
hard takedown with~a.nagers, but he thou ht the
understood what techniques were being used at
tated that the hard takedown had not been used recentl
After taking the interrogation class 1 he understood that i£

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he was going to do a hard takedown, he must report it to
Headquarters. Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address
physical techniques and treat them as requiring advance
Headquarters app1·oval, they do not otherwise specifically addsess

the "hard takedown."
192.
stated that he was generally
familiar with the technique of hard t3:i<edowns. He asserted that they
are authorized and believed they had been used one or more times at
in order to intimidate a detainee.
stated that he
would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not
consider it a serious enough handling technique to require
Headquarters approval Asked about the possibility that a detainee
mayhave been dragged on th~ ground during the course of a hard
takedown-responded that he was unaware of that and did
. not 1mderstand •the point of dragging someone _along the corridor in

Abuse

at Other Locations Outside of the CTC

Program

193. ~ Althou h not within the scope of the
CTC Programr two other incidents
were reported in
2003.
As noted above, one
resulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base76

194. (S;fN:E)_rn June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan
citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.S.
Army and OA position in Asadabad located in Northeast
Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003, this individual appeared at Asadabad
Base at U1e urging of the local Governor. TI1e individual was held in
a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During
76

~ For more than a year, ~IA referred to Asadabad Base a s -

the four days the individual was detained, an Agency independent
contractor/ who was a paramilitary officer, is alleged to have severely
beaten the detamee with a large metal flashlight and kicked bim
during interrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on
21 June; his body was tun1ed over to a local cleric and returned to his
family on
following date without an autopsy being performed.
Neither the conrractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been
trained or authorized to conduct ii1terrogations. The Agency did not
renew the independeht contractor/s contract which was up for
renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in .
concert with DoJ?7

the

195. (3HME) In July 20Q3·
officer

The objective was to determine if anyone at
· e school · ad information about the detonation of a remotecontrolled improvised explosive device that had killed eight border
guards several days earlier.
196.

Cst-f.WEl A teacher being interviewed

re · ortedl smiled and lau hed inappropriately,
whereupon
used the butt stock of his rifle
to strike or ''buttstroke" the teacher at least twice in his torso,
followed by several knee kicks to his.torso. This incident was
·witnessed by 200 students. 1'.he teacher was reportedly not seriously
injured. In response to his actions, Agency management returned the
to Headquarters. He was counseled and
given a do.mestic assignment.

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ANALYn CA.L SUP PO RT TO

INTER ROC.•t '['[0 :vs

204. ~ Oirectur;:ite of Tntelligence anJl y.s1·s
assigned to CTC prm:ide an0lyticc1l support to iJ1.terrng.1tion k'<1rns i.n
the field. Analysts are responsible for .:ievelopi.ng requirements for
the questionino- of detainees as well as conducb.n ciebrieh.ngs in
some cases.
. Analvsts, however, do not
participate in U1e application of interrogation techniques .

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According to a number of those
1
:interviewed for this Review, the Agency's intelligence on Al-Qa ida
was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Interrogation Program.
· The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts an.d
had very little hard kn?wledge of what particular Al-Qa1ida
leaders-who later becan1e detainees-knew. This lack of knowledge
led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know/' vice
information the anal st could objectively demonstrate the detainee
didknow.

a detainee did not respond to a question posed· to him, the
assumption at Headquarters was that the detahlee was holding back
and knew more; conseq.uently, Headquarters recommended
resumption of EITs_.

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evidenced in the final ,vaterbo<'lrd session of :\bu Zl1bi'l\'C18h .
~ to a senior CTC officer, the interroga.tion tea,1n ■
~ o n s i d e r e d Abu Zub.::iyda.h to be complicmt ,md w2..nted to
terminate EITs.
believed Abu Zubaydah continued to

generated substantial pressure from Headquarters to ·conlinue use of
tl1e EITs. According to this senior officer, the decision to resume use
of the waterboard on Abu Zuba dah was made b senior officers of
the DO
to assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnesse1 the
final waterboard session, after-which, they reported back to
Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu

Zubaydah.

E.fFEC11VENESS

211. ~ The detention of terrorists has prevented
them from ·engaging in further terrorist ac_tivity, arid tl:)eir
interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the
identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of
terrorists plo_ts planned for the United States and around the world,
and supported articles frequently used in the finished intelligence
publications for senior policymakers and war fighters. In this regard,
there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the
effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not
without some concern.
212.
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significant, actionable information, the measure of success of the
Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the
· detainees.
213. ~ Quantitatively, the DO has significantly
jncreased the nun1ber of c·o unterterrorism intelligence reports ·with
the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Betwe~n
9 /11 and the end of April 2003, the Agency produced over 3,000
intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from
- e provided by the high value detainees at ,' ·. '·. . :. :· t

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214.
ere frequently uses the.
information from. one detainee, as well as 0th.er sources, to vet the
information of another detainee. Altho1+gh lower-level detainees
provide less information than the high value detainees, :information
from these detainees has, on many occasions1 supplied the •
information needed to robe the hi h value detajnees fu.rt.li.er.
the hiangulation•of
intelligence provic:les a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than
would be possible from a single detainee. For example, lvfustafa
Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, the Al-Qa'ida financier who was
captured with Khalid Shaykh IVhtlrnmmad, rovided the Agency's
first intelligence pertaining to
another
participant in the 9 / 11 terrorist plot.
information to obtain additional details about
Khalid Sha kh Muhammad

215.
Detainees have provided
information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist g r o u ~
note includes: the modus operandi of A l - Q a ' i d a , . errorists who are capable of mounting attacks in the
United States,

216~ ~ Detan:i-ee inform.ati.on has assisted in the
identifi'Cation of terrorists. For example, infonnati.on from Abu
Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and
Binyam Muhammed-operatives who: had plans to detonate a
uranium-topped ~tybomb in either Washington, D..C., or New
York City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomudclin. provided infonµation·that
led to the arrest of previously unknown members of an Al-Qa'ida cell
in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack
·
inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower~level
detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to
other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid ·
Shaykh Muhammad. He provided informati.qn that helped lead to
tl---te arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paxacha and his son Uzair
Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muharrnnad planned to
use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a
sleeper operative m New York; and I'vfajid Khan, an operative who
could enter the United States easil and was tasked to research
attacks
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
information also led to the investigation and p r o s e c u ~
Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio. -

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217.
Detainees, both planners
and operatives, have also made the Agency aware of several plots
planned for th
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~plans
-attack
aft
to fl · into Hea
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.

blow up several
U.S. gas stations to create panic and havoci hijack and fly an airplane
into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the
World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges.in.
New York in an effort to make them calla se;

This Review did not Wl.c over any evidence that these plots
were inuninent. Agency senior managers believe that lives have been
saved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who
. were planning attacks, in particuJ.ar Khalid Shaykh ivfuhammad, Abu
Zubaydah, Hambali., and Al-Nashir1.
218.
1dge the reporting from
detaiq.ees as one of the most im
intelligence.
viewed
analysts'knowledge of the terrorist target as bav:ing much more
depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that
detainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles roduced
for the most senior olic makers.

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said he believes the use of EITs has proven to be extremely valuable
in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from ·
defaine_e s who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm
· in the hands of Americans.

220. ~ Inasmuch as EITs have been used only
since August 2002, and they have not _all been used with every high
value detainee, there is limited data on whlch to assess their
individual effectiveness. 'Ihis Review identified concerns about the
use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were
justified by the results, wheth.er it has been unnecessarily used in
some instances, and whether the fact that it is being applied in a
manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question
the continued applicability of the DoJ opinion to its use. Alth,ough
the waterboard is the most intrusive of the EITs, the fact that
precautions have_ been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in
the use of all EITs is evidence that their use poses risks.

221. ~ Determirung the effectiveness of each
EIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as to
which techniques should be used and for how long. Measuring the
overall effectiveness of EITs is ch;;illenging for a number of reasons
including: (1) the Agency cannot determine with-any certainty the
totality of the intelligence the detainee.actually posses~es; (2) each
·d etainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the
application of the same EITs by different interrogators may have

·····•·· · •··· " · · ··

- - -- - - - - - - - - - -- - -- - --

222. ~ The waterboard has been used on three
detainees: Abu Zuba dah1 Al-Nashlri, and Khalid Sha kh

Muhammad.

possessed perishable information about immment threats against the
United States.
223.
_Prior to the us~ of EITs, Abu Zubaydah
provided information fo
intelligence reports. Interrogators
applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during .
August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the
waterboa:rd and 30 April 2003, he provided information £or
approximately-additional reports. It is not possible to say
definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's
increased production/ or if another factor, such as the length of
detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard
however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative

·

224.

~ With respect to Al-Nashiri,_

reported nvo waterboard sessions in November 2002, after
psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-N 9shiri
-was com liant. However, after bein move
At-Nashiri was thought to be withholding
information. Al-Naslfui subsequently received additional EITs,
but not the waterboard. The Agency then
. detennined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant" Because of the- litany of
90

techniques used by different interrogators over a relatively short
period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri
became more willing to provide information. However, following
the nse -of EITs, he provided information about his most current
operational planning and
as opposed to
the historical information he provided before the use of EITs.
225. ~ On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few
intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of
that information revealedlhat much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or
incomplete. As a means of less active resistance, at the beginning of
th.eir interrogation, detainees routinely provide information that they
know is a1ready known. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad received 183
a lications of the waterboard in March 2003

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING I'HE DETENTION

AND INTERROGAITON PROGRAM

226. ~ The EITs used by tb.e Agency under the
CTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the
United States has taken regarding human: rights . This divergence has
been a cause of concern to some Agency personnel i.J.7.volved with the

Program.·

·

Poli~y Considerations
227. (U / /FOUO) Throughout its history, the Uni~ed States has
been an international proponent of hum.art rights and has voiced
opposition to to.rture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign.
countries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are
deeply embedded in the American legal strncture and jurisprudence.
The Fifth and Fow:teenth Amendments to the U.S. Cons_tituti.on, for
exampleF require due process of law, while tb.e Eighth Amendment
bars "cruel and unusual punishments."
228. (U / /FOUO) The President advised the Senate when
submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United
States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention
to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
acts of cruet inhuman, or degrading treah1:1ent or punishment which
do not amount to torture" as ''roughly equivalent to"- and "coextensive
with the Constitutional guarantees against cruet unusual, and
inhumane treatment."81 To this end, the United States submitted a
reservation to fhe Torture Convention stating that the United States
considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'crueL
in1mman or degrading treahnent or punishment' means the cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
Sth1 8th and/ or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United
Stales." Although the Torture Cqnvention e.,'<pressly provides that no
exceptional circumstances ·whatsoever; including war or any other
public emergency, and no order from 9- superior officer, justifies
torture, no similar provision was included regarding acts of "cruel;
inhuman or degradin.g Lreal1nent or punishment."

81 (U / /FOUO) See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting the
Conve!ltion Agai.ruit Tortu.re and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-20, lO()lh Cong.1 2d Sess., at 15, 1v1ay 23, 1988; Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Executive Report 101-30, August 30, 1990, at 25, 29, quoting summary and analysis
submitted by President Ronald Reagan, as revised by President George H.W. Bush.

229. (U / /FOUO) Annual U.S. State Department Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices have.repeatedly condemned
harsh interrogation techniques utilized by foreign governments. For
example, the 2002 Report, issued m ·March 2003, stated:
[The United States) have been given greater opportunity to make
good on our coi;nmitrrtent to uphold standards of human digniLy
and liberty .... (N)o country is exempt from scrutiny, and all
countries benefit from constant striving to identify their
weaknesses and improve their performance .... [T}he Reports
serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts,
pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and
continuing challenges,
In a world.marching toward qemocracy and respect for human
rights, the United States is a leader, a partner and a contributor.
\Ve have taken this responsibility with a deep and abidi!lg belief
that human rights are universal. They are not grounded
exclusively in American or western values. But their protection
worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest.

The State Department Report idenlified objectionable practices in a
variety of countries including, for example, patterns (?f abuse of
prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by
handcuffs, and threats against family members, ... [being} forced
constantly to lie on hard floors [and] deprived of sleep .... " Other
reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked.

230. (U / /FOUO) 1n June 2003, President Bush issued a
statement in observance of "United Nations lntemalional Day in
Support of Victims of Torture:" The statement said in part:
The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims
across the world. Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity
everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human
rights are respected and protected by the rule of law .

•

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Freedom from torture is an inalienable human right .... Yet
torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue
regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush
the human spirit .. . .
Notorious human rights abusers ... have sought to shield their
abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions
and denying access to international hwuan rights monitors ....

th~

The United States is committed to
worldwide elimination of
torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all
govei:nments to join with the United States an.cl the community of
law-abiding nations in prohibiting, inv:estigating, and·prosecuting
all acts o_f torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and
unusual punishment ....

Concen1s Over Participation in the

ere Program

· 231: ~ During the course of this Review, a number
Agency officers eA-pressed -i.msolicited concern about the possibility of.
recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the
CTC Progran1. A number of officers expressed concern that a hum.an
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t ursue them for activities '. ' .
Additionally, they feared that the Agency
vvould not stand behlnd them if this occurred.

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232. {S;tNE)_ One officer expressed concern that one day,
Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to apir before
the vVorld Court for war cr•imes stemming from .activities
-. .
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we're doing this ... [but} it has to be done." He expressed concern
that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited
particular concern about the possibility of being named in a leak
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The number of detai.nees in CIA custody
is relatively small by comp.---irison with those in U.S. military custody.
Nevertheless, the Agencv, like the militarv, has an interest in the
disposition of detainees and pcirhcular interest in those who, if not
kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the
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circumstances of their detention.

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245 _ r'K,·i;-lblt· rnss1bil I\, ,tl lc,:-:-l f· ir l'll,11; 1 ,kl ,1i ,·1 vc.
date, ho\vev1:.•r. n(i de(i:-..icln h"~ bn•11 it1:-1de l<.' JHl°i( t·•-·d \·.-i\h thi"
to prosecution

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CONCLUSIONS

2so: ~

The Agency's ~tention and
interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled
the identificati(?n an.d apprehension of other terrorists and warned of
terr01ist plots planned for the United States and around the world.
The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the
issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic
products supporting the counterterrorisrn efforts of U.S.
policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of
particular interrogation techniques in eliciting info1mation that might
not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured,
however.
251. ~ After11September2001,m.:imerous
Agency components and individuals invested immense time and
effort to implement the CTCProgram quickly, effectively, and within
the law_" The work of the Directorate of Operations, Counterterrorist
Center (CTC), Office of General Counsel (OGC),, Office of Medical
Services (OMS), Office ofTeclmical Service (OTS)
- h a s been especially. notable. In effect, they began with
almost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all
involvement in interrogations after entountering difficult issues Vvith
earlier interrogation progr~s in Central America and the Neai· East.
Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current
·
activities.
· 252. (StfWEl OGC worked closely with DoJ to determine the
legality of the measures that.came to be known as enhanced
interrogation techniques (EITs). OGC also consulted with White
House and National Security Co~cil officials regarcling the
proposed.teclmiques. Those ~fforts and the resulting DoJ legal
opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented. That legal opinion
. was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning
whether long-term psychological effects would result from use of the·
proposed tec...hniques.

253. (S71NE)_ The DoJ legal opinion upon which the Agency
relies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment and
the "intent'' of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailed
analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly
car:rying out EITs would not violate the Torture Convention's
prohibition of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal
prosecution under the U.S. torture statute. The opinion does not
address the separate question of whether the application of standard
or enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the
undertaking,. accepted conditionally by the United States regarding
Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "o:ue1, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."

254. ~ Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit
reaffirmation of Administration policy and DoJ legal backing for the
· Agency's use of EITs-as they have actually been employed-have
been well advised and successful. However, in this processr Agency
officials have neither sought nor been provided a ·written statement
of policy or a formal signed update of the DoJ legal opinion,
inclucUng such important determinations as the meaning and
applicability of Article 16 of the Tortu.re Convention. In July 2003, the
DCI and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officials
on the Agency's expanded use of EITs. At that time, the Attorney
General affirmed that the Agency's conduct remained
within the
scope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion.

we11

255. ~ A number of Agency officers of various
grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation
· activities are concerned that they may at some future date be
vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the
U.S. Government will not stand behind them. Although the current
detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal
review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply
from previous Agertcy policy and practice, rules that govern
interrogations by U.S. military and law enforcement officers;

statements of U.S. policy by the Departmen_t of State, and public

statements by very senior U.S. officials, inducting the President, as
well as the policies expressed by Members of Congress, other
Western governments1 international organizations, and human rights
groups. In addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation
activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written DoJ
opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the
CTC Program is inevitable and will seriously damage Agency
officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation and
effectiveness of the Agency itself.

·
256. ~ The Agency has generally provided
good guidance and su port to its officers who have been d · ·

In particular, CTC did a commendable ·ob in directin the
interrogations of high value detainees at
At these foreign locations, Agency personnel-with one notable
exception described in this Review-followed guidance and
procedures and documented their activities well.
257. ~
By distinction, the Agency-especially
in the -early months of the Program-failed to provide adequate
staffing,. · dance, and support
·
· ·
.· ·
·
.
.
.

258. ~ U n a u t h o r i z e d , improvised, inhumane,
and undocumented, detention and interro ation tee

used
referred

102

~

subject of a se
General.

unau onze tee ques were use m t e mterrogation o an
individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by
an Agency contractor in June 2003. A ·enc officers did not normally
conduct interrogations at that location
the Agency
officers involved lacked timely and adequa e gm an~e, training,
experience, supervisi.on,-or authorization, and did not exercise sound
judgment.
259. ~ The Agency failed to issue in a timely
manner comprehensive written guidelines for .detention and
interrogation activities. ·Although ad hoc guidance was provided to
many .officers through cables a~d briefings in the early months of
detention and interrogation activities.,. the DCI Confinement anq
Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several
1nonths after initiation uf interrogation activi · and after man of the
unauthorized activities had taken lace.

260. ~ Such written guidance as does exist to
address detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency officers
·s inadequate. The
Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a sin le ara raph that
is intended to .uide officers
Neither this dated guidance nor general
Agency guidelines on routine intelligence collection is adequate t.o
instruct and protect Agency officers involved in contemporary .
in,terro ation activities

•l

!

261. ~ During the interrogations of hvo
detainees, thewaterboard was used in a manner inconsistent with the
written DoJ legal opinion of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that

its advice ivas base9- upon certain facts that the Agency had
submitted to D03' observing, for example, that" ... you (the Agency)
have also orally infor:med us that although son::i-e of these techniques
may be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not be
substantial because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness
after several repetitions.II One key Al- a'ida ten-orist was sub'ected
to the waterpoard at least 183 times
and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours.
In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume
of water used cliffered from the DoJ opinion.
262.

attentio

OMS provided comprehensive medical
where EITs were

OMS did not issue formal medical guidelines
· 1u1til April 2003._Per the advice of CTC/Legat the OMS Guidelines
were thert issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued
in September 2003.
·

264. ~ Agency officers report that reliance on
analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence
may have resulted in the application of EITs without jwrtification. ·
Some participants in the Program, particularly field :interrogators,
judge that CTC assessments to the effect that deta:inees are
with.holding information are not always supported by an objective ·

TONEe?,

evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the
interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on preswnptions of
-..vhat the individual might or should know.

266. ~ The Agency faces potentially serious
long-term political and legal c;hallenges as a result of the CTC
Detention·and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of EITs and
tlte inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it ·will ultimately
do with terrorists detaine~ by the Agency.
·

~~ ~,

"'• U

1 VI' Jf:t:t<._ -

RECOrv1lv1E~ DATTO NS

~
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rol~ERfil

I

109

I

Appendix A

PROCEDURES .AND RESOURCES
1. ( I ~ A team, led by the Deputy Inspector
Generat and comprising th.e Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, the Counsel to the Inspector General, a senior
Invesligalions Staff Manager, three Investigators, two Inspectors, an
Auditor, a Research Assista1i.t, and a Secretary participated in this
Review.
2. ( ~ OIGtasked relevant components for all

information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all
individuals detained by or on behalf of CLA after 9/11. Agency
components provided OIG with over 3~1 000 page~ of documents.
OIG conducted over 100 interviews with individuals who possessed
potentially relevant information. vVe interviewed senior Agency
management officials, including the DCt the Deputy Director of
Cenh·al InteHigence, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and
the Deputy Director for Operations. · As new information developed,
OIG re-interviewed several individuals.

L

of.Ab

OIG personnel made site visits to the
interrogation facililies. OIG personnel also
to review 92 videotapes of interrogations

Appendix B

·.·.·.>.:.--.. ~

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Appendix C

TOP0n{cRET
t lJ

U.S. Departmcn t of Justice
Office of Legal Cou..."1.Sel

lf'/;,!,i~"-"'. D.C. 1GSJ()

August!, 2002

Memoran<lcun for John Rizzo
Acting Genernl Couasel of the Central Iatclligeuce Agency
lnierr<Jgalfon

ofal Qar,aLJ Operariw

You have asked for i:hl.s Office's views oq whether certE.in proposed con.duct would
violat-e the p,rohibition against torfllre found at S~tion 2340A of title 18 of the Unite4 States
Code. You have asked for this advrce iu the course ofcc1tducting interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah. As we understand it, Zubayd.ab is one oft.1-\e h.ighe...si: ranking members of the i;!l Qaeda
turorist organiwlion, with \Vbich the United States i.s cu;rentl"y engaged in an international <'-rmed
conflic-t foUowing the attacks on the \1/orld Trade Center md the Penl!!.gon on September l [,
2001. This letter ine.moria!izes our previous aral advice, given 011 July 14, 2002 and July 26,
2002, that tb.e proposed conduct woufd uot violate this prohibition.

l
Our advice is bas.ad upoµ die folµiwiogfact., wbidt you have provided.to us. We also
understand that y0u do not have WI.)' facts in your poss.cssion contrary to the f-auts oiJ.tlib,edJ1.C:re,
.md. this opinion is limited to these fuels. If the'se fucts were to cM!lgo, this advice would. not
necessarily apply. Zubaydah is cuae:ntly being held by the United States. The interrogation team
is certain that he has additional infonnetion iliat he refuses to divulge. Spccifioal.ly, he is
withholding glfurmatioo regard.iog cerrorist p_etwqrks in the United St.aies or in. Saudi Arabia and
infomation regarding plans ta conduct a~cks within the United States or against our interests
averS@..<;. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level of tteatmc::rit and displays .1+0 signs
of,vitliugness to dfac!ose further inform.alion:.. More.:iver, your intelligence indieates that th_ere is
currently a level of"chatrer" cqµa! to that which preceded t.'1.e September i l •atti.cks .. In iight of
the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of fur-eat you believe now exi:rt.s,
you _wish to move the m.tcrrogatious into what you have·rlescribed as an "increased pressure
phase."
·
As part ofdlis increased pressure phase, Zubaydah will have con.tact only with a new
iiiterrogation specialist, who!{! he ho: not met previously, and the Survival, Evasion, Rc.sistancc.
Escape ("SERE") training psychologist w!w has been involved with the interrogations since they
began. Tius phase will likely last no more than. several days but could las! up to thirty days. In
th.is phase, yon wouJd like to employ tea. tec.b.niqti.es tbat you believe will dislocate hls

~RET

T~Rfil
expectations rcg,"'l.fding the treatme.nt he b~lieves he will receive and eucourage him to disclose
the crucial infonnation mentione<l above. These ten techniques are: (l) attention grasp, (2}
walliug, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap (insult slap), (5) cramped confmement; (6) wall standing,
(7) stress positions. (S) sleep deprivation, (9-} insects placed in a confinement box, and (l 0) the
waterboard. You have informed us t:ha.t the use of these tech.niq_ues would be 011 an a-s-neede<l
·basis and that uot all of these techniques will necessarily be used. U1e interrogation team would
use th.ese techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah. that th_e ottly way .he can
influen.ce his sun:ou,.1.ding. environment is through cooperation. You have, however-, informed us
that you expect these techniques to be used in som~ sort of escclatiog fashlqn, culqi.inating with
the. watcttooard, UHmgh hot necessarily ent!ing with tm.s tecb.nique. Moreqve;t, you-:have-a!so
orally informed us that although some_ of these techniques 01.ay be us~d vtifu more than once, that
n;pe.tition will not be substmtial because the techniques generally !o~ their offectlv~uess after
several repeti-tions. You hav-e als'o--informed us Uiat Zabaytiah sUstained a WoUl).d d~uing bis
c,;pture, which is beiug treated..
Based on the: facts you have giveu us, we und.ersiand. eacb of tnl!Sc ~dmiques 10 be as
fqllows. The atteution grasp consists of gr:asping the individual -with both hands, one hand on

ea.ch side of the. col.lar opening, in a controlled and. quick motion. fa the same motion as the
grasp; the ihdividual is q.rawn towaqi ~ incerrogat-0r.
For walling, a flexibfo false wall will be constructed. The individual is placed with his
heels i:oucrung·tue·wall: The t:H:wo-gator pulls the intlivroual for.w:ard an<l.·then -qtti:ckJy ,s:nd
firmly push.es the individual iuto the wall. It is the indivrdual 's shoulder blades that hit the wall.
During this ·m:otioo., the head and neck <Jre supported with a ro Ii eci hood o_r towel that provides a
c-collar effect to help preve!lt whiplash. To further reduce the probability of inj_ury, the
individual. is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have orally informed us that the
false wa11 is in pert constructed to create a loud sound when the individua1 hlts it, which \Tiill
f1.1rther shock or surprise in the indiViduaJ. _In part, the, idea is lo crea_te a· souud th.al wilL make the:
tmpa.Gt seetn far i.vorse than it is and \:hat will be far wo~e than ab..y injun1-that 01ig4t result from
the action.
The facial hold is used to ho!,:!, the head iiiunc',b:ile. Ont: open l)4Uil isp~ed on ,either
side of _rhc:: indi\ridual's fa~. The fingertips are kept wel:I av,:ay from the iudivl~Vs eyes.

With the facial slap or insult slap, the interrogator' slaps i.he individual's face v-:ith fingers
slightly spread. Toe band m~kes contact with the area directlybetwetn the tip of the individual's
chin and the bottom of the correspondia.g earlobe. The interrogator invades tl1e individual's
personal space. The goal of the fucial slap is not to inflict physical pain that is severe or lasting.
lnstead, the purpose of the facial slap is to ioduce shock, surprise, andfor humiliafron.
Ctamped G-Oufincmenl invoives the placement of the indivi.dual ma confined space, the
dimensi,ms of which re-strict the h1dividua1's movement The confine<l space ts usually d.ark.

.

TO;rtRET

2

TO~M'f
The duration of confinement varies tia:sed up~n the sue of the container. For the fatger corirw.ed
space, the iruiividual can stand up or sit cawn.; the smaller space is large enollc,lrf:t for tlre~ubject to·
sit down. Confiaement in the larger space can last up_ t9 e~~teeu hours; for the smaller space,
confinement lasts for no more than two hours.
Wal! standi.Rg is used to induce muscle fatigue. The individual stands aboui four ro .five
feet from a wall, v,ith his feet spread approxirnat-ely io shoulder \ ,~dth. His arms are strdched
out i.n front ofhim, with his fingers rt!stiog ou·fue wall. His fingers support all of his body
weight. The individual is not peunitted to move or tepositico. his nano~ or fe::t.
0

A variety of stress positions ruay be used. You have i.Iifonned. us that these positiorrs are
not designed produce the pain associated with contortions or twisting of the body. Rather,
somewhat like walling, they are designed to produce the physical discomfort associaetd with
muscle fa.ti.goo. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zuba.yt!ah: (!)•sitting on
the ffoor wtth legs ei--tcnded straight out in front of Jilin with his
raised above hi.~ 4ead; and
.(2) kneeling oa the floor while leming back at a 45 degree angle. You b.a:ve also orally in...fonneci
us that through obswring Zubaydah in ce..ptivify, you have noted that he appears to be quite
flexible despite bis wouo.d.

to

arms

Sleep deprivatj.on may be used. You have.indicated that your purpose i:n using th.is
technique is to reduce the indi\•iducl's ahilityfo think on bJs feet and, through the clisc¢mfurt
a.ssotiate:d with fack ·of;;recp~· tcr111i:mvarei:um-w-cooperate: 1:he-efreci-of-suc:b:,ieep·dcpri,~on
will generally remit after one or two aightrnfunintclTtlptedslcep. You hn.ve-infcitmed u:, diat
your. resear:~h has. revealed that, in rare instan~, sottj.e inclividUEJs who areaircadyp'redisposed.
io psychological prob ferns may experience abnomial reactions to sleep deprivation. Even i.ri
those cases', however, rca,ction.s abate after the il1filvid11al is permitted to·sl~p. Moreover,
personnel with medical trai.nin,g .are available to and wilt u1ter-1eue in the unlikely event of an
abo.onlli\1 r~action. You.hav~ orally i.nfonned us tb~t yo1:1 would uot deprive Zubil-ycfah of sleep
~~ir more than eleven days at a time an.d that you have pre,iiously keot hiru a"'"ake for 72 hours,
from which no mental or physical harro. resu1rec1.
You ,vould like to place Zubaydah io a cramped confinement bor. witb. an in.sect. You
have infom1ed us that he appea.~ to have a fear of insects. fn particuler, you would like to tell
Zubaydah. tl:iat you mtend to place a stiugin.g rnsect into the. box with him. You would, however,
place a hannless insect io the box. Yoo. have Gtally informed µs tl-12.t \'ClU would in fact ~ce a
arm! s i sect.such. as a catt:roillar i..a tli.e box with.!iim-

Finally, you would Li.kc to use a tetlmiqµe c;al.led the "watetboai:d." In fuis procedun; the
individual is bound securely to .an i.ticlin.etl bench, which is approxiillilt:1ly four fret by seven feet
Tue individual's feet are gene.rally elevated. A cloth ispla=i civer tl1e forehead and e)li?S. Wat.er

T~

3

T~T
is thell applied io the cloth in a controlled manner. As th.is is done, the cloth is lowered until it
covers·both the nose and mouth.. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth
and nose, air fli)W is slightiyrestricled for 20 to 40 sec-0ruls due to the pmence of the cloth. This
catt5es an increase itJ carbon dioxide level in the individual's. blood. This increase in the carbon
dioxide level stirtrn!ate:rincrezsed effort ro br¢athe. This·effort plus the doth pfor:hiQt$ tµe
pi:rceplion 6f"suffocatiim afld incipient panic;1_i.e,,,_the percep.tion ,of dt0wrJag. TI)e-1ndivrd1a1al
<loe.S UO( 'breathe any water into his lungl!. Durmg Ui.ose 20 ld 40 Se9()f\OS, water is contml)c~ly
applied from a height of twelve to twenty-foot irrah~, After this-period. fby doth T$ tifteq, and
the individual is all.owed to breathe unimpeded fur three or fotll'-~1 breaths. '"fhe s.e!-1sation-of
drownmg is ilumedrateiy rdi-¢~ccl. by the removai of ihe cloth. The procedure may1hci:\ be··
repeat.ed. The water i.<! usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering cart with a spout.
You h:avc orally infunned us that this procedure triggers an automatic pby-siological sensation of
dro,vning that the individual canno't c.ontrol even though he may be aware: that he is- in fact not
drowning. You have also orally infonned us that it is likely that this procedure would not last
more than 20 minutes in any one application.
We also understand that a medical expert with SERE ex.periencc. will be present
through.out this phase and that ilie proce.di.Jre5 'vill b¢ stopped if deemed medically necessary to
prevent severe mental or physical harm to Zubaydah. A.s mentioned above, Zuhayc;lah suffered
an in.jury during his capture. You have informe.d It~ that steps v.-ill be taken to ~nsure tli!lt this
injtJr31 is not in any way exacerbated by the use of these m~thods and thai adeqooe medical
atreri.ffou. will· be gfveJl to ensure tlutl it wil! ·heaf prop~rly ..

IT.
In this part, we ceview tl:!e context within Which these procedures wtll be applied_ You
have informed us that you have taken var.ious steps to ascertain wlrat effeit, if any, -these
techniques wou[d have on Zubaydah's mental health. These same techciq1,1e~. wifh the·excepcion
of the insect in the cramped confined sw.ce, have been used ma continue to oe used on some
members of our military personnel during their SERE training. Because offue use ofth.ese
procedures iu training cur own military persooo.el to resist interrogations, yo1} have consulted
with various individuals who .have e>.'tensive 'e:-qrerience in the Ulie of these techniques. You have
done so in onler lo ensure that no prolonged mental hrum would result from th.e use of these
proposed procedures.
TI1raugh your consultation with various individuals responsible for such. 1taining, you
have learned that these techniques ha~e bee.·
conduct without. any
· e t of rolornred mental ha:mi.
f the SERE school,
as'report
Ui.t, during the sevenyear period that he spent in those pos1D.ons, em were two requeslS from Congress for
infoanation concerning alleged injuries resulting from the Lfaining. One of these inquiries was
prompted by the temporary physic_q{ injw-y a trainee sustained as result of beiog placed in a

-?~T

4

'-----

···-

..... .

········ ··-·

. ........

···· ··· ........... ········- .......... · ······ ........

·-·· --- ------ - -- - -

T~RET
cmi.finemeht box. ne other inauiriinvo!Ved claims that Lhe SERE training caused two
individuals to engage in criniin~ l;l;havior, nafne!y, felony shoplifting and do\VJlloaiiin~ clri\d
pomoii-apl1;)1 onto a triilitecy _co~tmter_ Accm:.ding_to this official, cll_ese claims were f ~
~ o r e o v e r , he. has indicated that dunug the three and a halfyears ·be s p e n t ~
~ f the SERE program, he trained I 0,000 ~tudeui:s. Of those stud:eulS1 01ily Mo
dropped out of-the traio.ing following tbe use oftl1ese techniques. Althougb on rnre occasions
·some students temporarily postponed ilie rem.aioder of their trafoi.ng and received psycl:iological
counseling, tbose sluden_ls were able to finish the program without any inili.catio~ of subsequent
menrnl health effects.

You have inf.armed us that·

:H.~·~tar . . '--~-. :onng ose
tenyears; insofllr as b.e is a\;,are, rione ofil.i.e·1o:uivrn6'.aJ.§';;vb.q cofi_i.p1,eted ilie prngram:suffered ip.y
adve.rsi: men.ta! health effects. He 1iifoIJ1ied- yu.tt:ihat there was one perso11 whQ did l'.iQt c~mpletc
th.e training. That person experience.cl· an adverse mental. heiilth reaction that lasted. oul)' two
hou;s. · After those two hours, the individual's symptoms spomanem.;sly: <l-issipated without
requiring treatment qr coun.'leling and no other symptoms v,ere evet reported by tltls in:div.iducL
According to the information you WI.Ve provide.cl to us, this assessment of the use of these
procedures includes the use of the wate.rboard.
l

fiom the

:,-iiid1·yoiisuppli&l to us.
has experience with the use ot n ·o ese proc ures ma course of conduct, wit . the·except1on
of the insect iJ.1 the confinement box and the waterboard. Thls memorandum ca.nfirms that tbe
use of these procedures has not resu.l led. in any reported. instances of prolonged mental h.arm, and
v: fuw ·nstances of immediate and temporary adverse psychologiC2l responses to the trair,jng,
eported that a small miMrity of students have had temporary adverse
psychol.o-giciil reactions during training. Of the 26,829 sludeu!s trained from 1992 tbro1.1-gh 2001
in d1e AtrForce. SERE training, 4.3 percent of those students h.a9 contact with ps·yc,h.ofogy
services. Oftl1ose4.3 percent, only 3.2 p.erc~Tit were pulle<;i .from tl;i.e-9,ro'.gra.rrt--f.or psychological
rc.aso?s-_ Thus, OU't of ~1e students trained·ov.eral~ only O.t4·~ . e;:.c. l.We¢, .u
ut~edffo~- che
pr.ogr-am for psycholog1cal reasons. Fl:U1hecmore, alt)1oug)1~F'licated tha~ surveys
of students havin$ coi:opl~d truS:tmining are not dope, 11ei-:r.pt6se'ii ciiiifi<lence that the f,<1U1ing
did not cause any long-term psychological impact He based.his corrclusioIJ: dn the debriefing of
students that is done after th.e training, More importantly, he based this assessment on the fact
foa( although training is required to be extremely stre:Ssfu! in order to be effective, ve.ry few
complaints have been ma-de regarding the training. During hiS' tenure, in which l 0,000 students
were !rained, no congr.essional complarn(s have been mad~. While them was· 0ne Inspector
General complaint, il W.a$ .not due to psychological concerns, t,foreovi:r, he was av..--al'e of onlv
on.e letter inquiring. about the loag.:.tenn impact of these rechniques from a□ individual tratned
.

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over twenty ~ o u u d . th2.t it 1,.vas impossible to anribute this individual's- symp(oms to
his lraining. ~ o n c l u t l e d tllat if lhere. are any long-term psychological effects. of the
United States Air Force lrailiirrg using the procedures outlined abo~,e they "are certainly,

minimal."
Willi resp-ecr to the w2.lerboard., you. have also orally illfomtcd us chat the. Nirvy continµes
that your on-site psycl1ologi,sES, who have extensive
experl<mce with the use of the mterboard in Navy t;r-ainfo.g, h.av'e not elicouril;,red any significant
long-term inentat health consequences from its use. Your on-site-psychologists have also
indicateci"that JPRA has likewise not repocted°any sigaifieant tong:-ti!nn. merital health
consequences from tl1e qse oft):ie ,1,.,.aterboard. Yo_u·ha.ve infonned us tbat.Qther-services ·ceased
use of the waterboatd because it was so successful as an intc:rrogEtion technique, but oat becz.us~
of any concerns over any hann, physical or ntenta~. caused by iL It WaE a
. ·.... .
almos_t 100 percent efiet.tive in producing cooperatioa among the trainees.
Jso
indicated tl1at he had obscrved the;use of the \.\'atethoard in Navy trainfug.som~ terr t6 · ., ve
times. Each time it resulted in COf:Jperati.on but it did not result in any ph.)·skal harmto th.estudent
lo use it in training. You haw: informed us

You have also reviewed the relevant literature and found llO empirical. data on the effect
of these techniq1i.e.s, v.ith the ex.ception-of sleep deprivation. With respect· ta sleep deprivati.on,
you have infoane<l us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours a.rid
still perform excellently on visual-spn.tial met-Or-tasks and sh.ort-te:rm.memory tests. Although
some individuaJs may experience hallucinations, at.cording to the literature yon surveyed, those
who ~perlence such psychotic symptoms hav¢- almost alway~·bad such episodes prior to tb.s':
sleep depdvation. You have iodicat.ed the studies oflen,,oth.y sleep depri'vation showed no
ps)'clrosis, loosening oftnough.ts, flatte.niug oferhQl;i.op..s, delusions, or parano'id id~~- fn oi,e
c;;se, even after eleven days of d~µriv,i.tioo., no nsychosis or·pctJJ!E4eut brain c¼magta.occurred.
In fact lh.c i:ndlv1.duaJ reported feeling almost back to li.omlBl after one ufg'ht's sleep. Further,
based on the e;::periences ,;,,ith its use i'.n military trai.o.ing (where his indMe.d for up to 48 bours) ,
you foup.d that rardy, if ever, will tbe individual suffer harm after the sleep deprivation is
diswb.tinu.ed . Instead, the effects remjt after a fow good nights of steep.
You have tak.~n the addltional step of consulting with U.S. intcrroge.ticns experts, and
other individuals with oversight over the SERE.training process. None of these individuals was
aware of any pralnngcl psychological effect caused by ihe use of any of the above. technillues
either separately- or as a coorse of conduct. MoreO\'eI, you ctinsuhe<l..:with ·outside psycbologisTs
who reported that they '-vere unaware ofsny cases where long-term problems have occtL'Teu <i:; B
result of these lcclmJques.
Moreover, i□ consulting with a number of mental health ex:perts, you have learned that
lhe effect of any oftbese procedures will be dopendant on the individual's personal history,
cultural history md psych.ologk:Rl 1,•.nc:ltt1ci(l~. Ta that tntl, you Ii.Jive inforrne.d. us that you have

. ·ro~1-

6

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ccmpleted a psychological assessment of Zubadyah. This assessmem is l>ased 011 interviews wi(h
Zubaydah., observations of him, and information collected from odier-sources such as intelligence
and press reports. Our undersranding o[Zubaydah'sc psychological profile, which we set forth
below, js based on that assessmenL
According to this assessment., Zu6aydah1 though _onlj; 31, rose 9.uick.ly ~om very !o'l.v
level mujahediu m thfrd or fourth man in al Qaec;I.a. Ht! has served as Usil.ma Bin, La,den's seiiior
lieutenant. In that capacity, he bas managed a network of training camps. He has been
instrumenta-f in the training of operatives· for al Qaeda, U1c Egyptian lsla.rnic Jilui:d, artd i:>ilicr
terrorist ekments. inside Pakistan and Afghani-st.an. He ac·ted as the Deputy Camp Commandeifor al Qaeda training camp in .A,.fghanistau, peFSonal\y approving entr-y and graduati'on of all
rrainees during I 999-2000. From 1996 until 1999, he approved all ir:.dividllals goiJlg ii1 and out
of Afghanistan to the training ca,..ips. f-'ur"Jier, no one went in ar.d out of Peshawar, Pakistan
withour his l<n.owledge and approva.l.. He also acted as al Qaeda's coordinator of external
contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, be has acted as al Qaeda's counrerince:lligence officer aud has been tn1st:ed to find spies wiG-Jri the organization.
Zul;iaydall has been involved in ev'ei.ymajortertor-ist.opetatiort carried .out by al Qaeda.
He was a plmmer for the Millennium plotto attackU,S. and L'irue.-li targets during the MiHenn.ium
celebrations iu Jordan. Two of me central figitres in 1hls plot who were a..rterted have ·identified
Zubaytlah as the supporter of their cell and the plot. He: also served as a pl armer for the Paris
Embassy plot in 200 l. Mor.eover; he was one of the planners of the September l l attacks, Pnq;r
i"o his capture, be was engaged in plani..ing future terto1isi attacks against U.S. interests.

Your psychological a.,,:;essr;:t~t indicates_ that it is believed Z:uoaydah wrote al Qaeda's
man.ua! on resistance tecb.niqucs. You also b~lie·,•e that his experiences in al Qaeda make him
well-<!-cquainted with an.d w~U-vers,etl Lr1 such' teohniqu.es. As part of'bis role in. al Qaeda,
Zubayd$-visited indivrduili-m prrson med helpl.d the'ril tipo.n their rel~e. 'fp.rough trus co.ntact
and a~v1tics vv'il:b. ofuet al Qaeda ~tjahedin,
beli~ve that he kn.ows man,y stories bf capture,
in.terrogatian, aud r~istance to such interrogation: Additionally, he has sp0kcn _
\¼ili Ayma.ri alZawahiri, and yon beli~ve it is likely tlillt the Nm c!iscussed Zawahiri' s e,:perie.uces as a pri~on.er
of the Russians and the Egyptians.

you

Zubaydah stated duririg interviews that he thinks of any aciivi.ryoutside of jihad as
"silly." He bas indicated that his hem nnd mirid are de<.·oled to serving Allah and l.slaiu 1hrough
- jihad and he has stated tlJat h~ has no do\lbt.5 or rt!grets about committing himself to jihad.
Zub.aydah belleves that the global victory ofislam i~ inevitable. You hive infonned us th;;.t lie
continues to express his trnabuted desire to kill A..mericans anti ]t;\ ,-,.
Your psychological assessment describes his personality as follows. He is ''a highly selfdirceted individual \.vho prizes his iadependence." He ha'S "narcissistic features," which are
evidenced in the attention he pays to his personaf appearance: and his "obvious 'effort.f to

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demo11!itrate that he is really a raiher_'humblil-:i.hd regular guy.'" He is "some,vnat compulsive"
in how he organizes his environment and business. T·Ie is confident, self-assured, ar-td possesses
an air of anthoriry. V/hile he admits to att1mes wrestling ,,_,-ith how to determine who is an
"innocent," he has ackno,.,.,iedged celebrating the destruction oftbe World Trade Center. He is
intelligent aud intel!eclually curi.ous. He displays "excellent self-discipline." 1l1e assessment
describes him as a perfcclionisl, persistent, private, and highly capa.bl~ in his ~ocial imeracLions.
He is very guarded about opening up 10 others and your assessment repeatedly emphasize!; that
he cends no( to trust others easily. He is also "'quick to recognize and assess the moods a11.d
motivations of other.s.'' Furthe!more, he is proud of.his l).bility to li'e and dece~ve.others
successfull9. Thro ~gh. his diweptfon he ha-s! among other things. prevented th:e locat1on. or al
QWa. sa-feh0uses and· evei1 acquired· a United Nati·on.s refugee identffiaa'don cai:d.

. Accortl{p.g to yout rtports, Zu.ba)'dah does. not have·any·_pre-extstiJ;ig· mental GOnq.iti:qns or
problemtrthat would make hlmlikeiy to stiffer prolonged nlel)!al li:m'n from yom-·-proposed
ir,terrogation metllads. Through reading bis diaries and interviewing him, you have £0\iod no
history of"mood disturbance or otber psychiatric pathology(,]" "thought disorder[,) _.. end.urin.g
mood or mental health problems." He is in. fact "ren;iarkably resiHeo.t and confident that he can
overcome. adversity." When he enco1L<1ters sfrcss or low mood., th.ls appears to last 01tlyfor a
shon time. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evalu2ti.og the coping resources availahle
to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally s~lf-suffi.cient and
relies 011bis understimding end applic-ation of religious and psycl--Ological principles, i:ntellig~r,ce
and di-sciphne to avoid and. ovcroome·prnblems." Mere&Ver, you hav~-foUE.d-tha! h@ bas a
"reliabl.e arid durable supporcsystem" in hi'! (aj~h; "thebles-sil;rgs of religious leaders, aad
camaraderie. oflike-miuded mujahedin brothers." Duriug detemion, Zubaydah h.as 1b.anaged his
mood, remaining at most points ''cirtums~. calm, c-outroJJed, arid delibenue." He has
maintai..ti.ed this demeanor during aggn:ssive interrogations 2nd reductions in sleep. You desccibe
that in an initial ccn.fronta(ional incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous sysrem
e.rousal, which you think w·JS possibly fear. Altllouglt this incident led him to disclose
intelli.gcnce infonnation, nc was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and
his "strong resolve" llOt to reveal 1l..r1y i11.fonna1ion.
O~:eral.l, you suinmarize h.is primary strengths as the following: ability to focus, goal.
<lircctt<l <lcsciplu16, i.inelllgeuce; emotional rcgiliew~c, street savvy, ability to orgqnize aucl
rn.a.nage people, keen obse[Vation skills, fl,utd _ad.aptabilicy (can inti-c.ipate :ind adapt under all!ess
,;.nd with mi.ni.m.al tesom:ces), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of othets, antl,abilh)• to
adjust goals to emerging oppor-mnities.
·

You anticipate that lle 1-,:ill draw upon his vast knowledge of interrogation tedmiques to
• cope with the interrogation.. Your assessmeu.t indicates th;it Zubaydah may be willi.u-g to die ,o
protect the most important information that he holds. Nonetl:ieless, you are of the view that his
belief tbal [slam will ultimately dominate the world and thai this victory is inevitable may
provide the chance th.at Zubaydab will
infrmnation and ratioualizc it solely as a tiunporary
/

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setback. Additionall}'. you believe lw may be willing co 1fac\0$e. some infonnation, pa.rticularly
information he dl!ems 10 not be critical, but which rna}' ultiiuru.eiy be U5eful to us when pieced
togc:rlicr with other imelligence infonnation you have gained .

. Sectton 2J40A makes it a crirf1Jii:al offeps~ (or aqy person "oursid~ of the Unite<l ·Srates
(10] cqmmit(j or attempt(] ro comm.it torture." Section 2340(1) defines torrure as:

a:n act committed by a persor. acting under the color oflaw specifioally interule<l to
inflict severe pliysical or mental pain or s\Jffcr1ng (other than paip or sw:rering
incidental lo lav.ful sanctions) upon another persdn within his custody of physical
conu:ol.
l S. U.S ,C. § 2340(1 ). A:; we outlined mour opinion on standards of conduct under $ct;t_ion,
2340A, a violation of2340A requireH shov,ilig lfuil: (1) tire torture occurred outside the United
Staes; (2) the~.efcndant acted.under the col9r of law; (3) the victim was within the defundaut's
custody or control; (4) the defendant spedficaliy intended tci inflict se.vere pain or saffuri'ng; and
(5) that the acted inflicted siwere pain or suffering. See Memorandum for Jolm Rizzo, Acting
General Counsel for the Centre! lnlelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney
Geo.era!, Office ofLegru Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct/or [ll;e,-rogation under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-234fJA at 3 (.A:ugust I, 2001) ("Section. 2340A Memorandum"). You haws asked. us to
assume that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States, Zu[n.yaci.ah is within U.S.
custody; and the interrogatots are acting under the color of law. A( issue is whether the la.st two
elements would be rnet by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these
procedures would have the requishe mentl.l state and whcfocr these procedures v:ould inflict ·
severe pain or suffering Within t11e mearung oft:he statqtc..
Severe Par.n or Sufferinrr. In t:ircier for palu or suffering fo rise to the level of torture, the
statute requir:es that ~t be seVere. As we have,previQusly explained, dlis recehes only extr.elne
acts. See id, ai 13 . Nonetheless, drawing upon cases under the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), which has a defiuition of tort\lre that is similar to Sectiort234-0's dclinhi.on, we fl)u1ld ·

thol a s.ingle event of suffioiently im:ense pain may fall within tht.s prohibition. See id. at 26. As
a result, we ltave a □ atyze<l each ofd1ese techniques separarely. ln further drawing upon U10se
cases, we also bave found rhat courts tend to cake a totality-of--the-citcumsrances approach and
con.sider an entire course of conduct to determine whether mrrure has occurred, See id. at 27.
Therefore, in addition to considering each lccb.nique separ.;tdy, we cousider them fogether as a

course of conduct.
Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental p/UD or
suffering. We will consider physic:!! pain and menu! pain sc.pa:rate!y. See I 8 U.S.C. § 2340(1 ).
With respect to physical pain, we previously concluded that ''severe pain" v.~1h.in the meaning of

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Section 234-0 is pain rhm is difficult for the individual to e~dure and is of arr i11tensity akin to the
pain accompanying serious physical injury. Se.e, Section 1340A Memon;ndort1 at 6. Ora wing.
upon the TVPA precedeui. we have hared that examples of acts inflicting severe-pain that typtfy
torture are, amot1g othej things., severe beatings wid1 weapons such as clubs, and· the burning of
prisoners. See id a{ 24. We conclude below that none of01e proposed teciuiiqoes inflicts such
pain.
The facial hold ai.1tl lhe attcncion gra.."]l involve tic physical p::in. In rhe absence of such
pain it is obvious that they cannot he said to ;:nflict sevefe physical pain or suffering. The stress
positions and ,.J.!.alJ stand!ng both may result in m1:iscle fatigue. Each involves the sustail,cd
holding of a position. fa wcll ~tanding, rt will be holding a position i...1 which all oith.e
individual's body weight i:s placed on his fo:!ge[ tips. Tue sttess positions will likely include
·sitting on the floor with legs extended straight out in front and arms raised above !he head, and
kneeling on tl1e floor and. leaning back at a l5 degree angle. Any p.rin associate.cl \Vith musele
fatigue is not of the inte.usiry sufficient to amot.,mt to "severe physical pain or s~¢dug" under the
st2tute, nor, d.esphe its discomfort, can it be said to be diffi<;;ult to endure. Moreover, you have
orally informed us thaJ. no· str~--s :position wilt· be used that co\J.ld interfere -.viUt fac healing of
Zubaydah's wound. TI,.eref-ore, we conclude that these tcchniqu.es involve disc;;omfort th:u falls
far below the thresl1old of se\=ere physical pain.

Similar.ly, although the confinement ~ s (both small and large} ?ft physkally
uuCGmfortable ·bec-i1x1se tbe.it size r~\cts mo--vemeo.t, tl-tey are not'So srnm:l as to re.quire the
individual to coiitort his body to- sit (small box) or stand (large box). You have also orally
h1fom1ed us that despite hii: wound, Zubaydaf1 remains quite flexible, which would.substantially
reduce any pain associated with bei11g pl-aced in the box. \Ve have no information from the
medical l!Xpcris you have consultw. that tbc limited duration for which the individual is kept in
,he. boxes c&.US<;S ariy substantial physical paiu. As a result, we do not think ihe use of the.<;e
boxes can be s?id to cause pain that is ofd1e intensity associal!!d with serious [)hysical injury.
The use. of one of these boxes with the introduction of an insect does □ .at alter this
ussessment. As we understand it, no act□ ;;lly hanufuI insect v.ill be placed in the box. Thus,
t\;ough. the introduation of an insect ma:.y pr<Jduce trepidation in Zubardalt (which we discUss
below), it-cert;iinly <lue~ 111.H 1.2tJ..Se pbysical ·puin.

As for sleep deprivatior., it is clear that depriving some<me of sleep doc.s 001 iuvolve
severe pbysfoal pain ,\iihin the rn€:a!ling of the statute. '\li1bile sleep deprivation may iuvol vc
s.ome physical discomfort., such as th~ fatigue or tbe discomfort e-.xperienccd in the difficulty of
keeping one's eyes open.., these effects remit after the individual is perm.irred lo sleep. Based on
the facts you have provided us, we are not aware of any e,~dence·tlw.t sleep deprivation re.mils in
Se.Ve:r-e physical pain or suffering. As a r~ult, its use does not vrolate Section 2340A.

Even those teclwlques that involve physical coflt:).ct between the intcrrogntor and the

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indiv1dual do not result in severe pain. The facial slap 2.nd w,;_llir.g coa1ain precautions to ensure
th<:t no pain even approaching thls level results. The slap is delivtred with fingers slightly
spread, which you have explained (o u-s is designed to be less painful than a closed-hru1d slap.
The slap is also delivered to the fleshy part of the. face, further reducing any risk. of physical
da.,-uage or serious pain.. The facial slap does oot produce pz.in that is diffu:;uluo endure.
Likewise, walling involv~ quickly pulling the person fo11va,daI14 then thrusting hlm agai°:5t a
flel;'.ible false wall. You bave informe.d.us that the sound nfhirting the wall will :i:ct11-alty be far ·
worse tli!in any possible injmy to the. individual. 11.e use of the rolled tov.•d around the nedc also
· reduces any dsk of iaju:ry. White it may hurt to be pushed against die wall:, any po.hi experience-d
is not of the i11tensify 2£scciated ""i:th serious· phssical injury.
A.s v..-e understand it, when the waterboaid is used, the subject's body responds as iftbe
subject were drowning--even though the rubjeci may be welt awire thut he is in fact not
drovming. Yoii have informed us that this procedure does not inflict 3ctu.al physical harm .. 111us,
altho11gh the subject may e:>..iierieoce the fear or panic associated wrth the feeling of drovlning,
L'le wr,terboard does not inflict physical pain. ru We eJCplaiaed in che Section 234OA
tvfomora.ndu.m, "pain and suff<;ring" 35 used in Section 2340 is best understood as a si.r'1gle
concept, not distinct CQneepts of"pain" as disliugtJished from nSl.iffering.'' Sea Section 234OA
Memorandum at 6 n.3 . The waterboard, wl:iich inflicts no pain or actual harm whatsoever, docs
1,ot, in our view inflict "severe pain or sl!fferiag." Evert if one were to pw;e the staJut.e more
findy to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept, the waterboard cou!d not be said to
inflict severe suffering. TI1e waterboarci is simply u controll<!d wu,c episode, lacking tlte
connotatioa of a protracted r..enod of time generally given to suffering.
Finally, as we discussed above, you have infonned us that in determining wb.ic::11
procedures to use and how you will use them, you hn.ve selectetl kchniqucs that v.ill not hami
Zubay-dah's wound. You have-also indicated that numerous step'.> will be ta.k{:fl to ensure ib.ac
nooe oftb.ese procedures in any way interferes with the proper he.sling of Zu.baydah · s wourtd..
You l:ia.ve also indicated that, should it appear at any time ihat.Zubaydcl1 is ~periencing. severe
pain or sufferlrtg, the medical persouncl. on hand will stop die-use ,if,an.y technique.
Evett when all of the:;e methods are considered combined in an overall course of cooduct,
t.!-iey still would not inflict severe physical pain or suffering. As di-scuss.ed abovt:i, a nutn0~-r of
these ace; result i11 no phydcal pain, other!; pro.luee only phrsicel rliscornfo-rt. · You have
;1,diceted that these acts will r,ot be used wi(h substamial rep~tition, sa that there is no possibility
tliat sc\'ere physical pain could arise from such repetition.. Ac.cordinily, w~ con.elude that thcs~
<'.cts nei thcr separately nor as part of a course of conduct would infliCT s?.were physical pain or
suffering within the meaning of th.e statute.

We next consider whether inc: use oftbese techniques would inflict severe nie;.ral pain
suffering with.in the meaning of Section 2340. Section 2340 defmes severe mental pai11 or
suffering as "ti)e prolonged mental harm caused by or resuiting from" one of seveeol predicate

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aCIS. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2). Those predicate acts are: (1) the int.emiona! infli.clion or threatened
· infliction of severe physical pain or sufferin{!; (2} the administration or appHcation. or threatened
adminisn:atio11 or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrur,t profouadly the senses or rlle personality; (3) the rhre.at of tmJnilienl deail1; or (4) the threat
1.h~t a11y of the preceding acrs win he-done li1 another person. Sie 18 U:S.C. § 2340(1)(AHD) .
. .-'\s we:have explained, this li:sl of predicate acts ls exclusive. See Stction 2340A Mem~l;antlum
at 8. No other acts can support a charge under Section 1340A based on the infliction of severe
mcn~al pain or S:ufforicg. See id. Thus= if the methods that you have dts<,.ribed do Liot citlter in
and of themselves constitute 011e of these acts or as a course of conduct futfill the predica.re act
,equirt':-me1tt, the prohib1~io11 ha.snot been violated. See id. Before aci.dressic.g these techn.iqu~,
. _,.,e lrnte thal,it is plain that none of these procedures .involves a direat to any third party, the use
of my kind of dn1.gs, or for the reasons described above, the iuflic,ion of severe physical pain.
Tirns, the question is wherher any of these ~cts, separately or as a eoursc cf co..'1.duct, con.stitutes i:
,hreat of severe physical pain or ~-u.ffering-, a procedure dcsi-gned to disrupt profoundly tile senses,
or a tlLre8t ofimmineut death. As we previously e:,cplauied, whether an action ·constitutes a threat
must be asse.ssed from the st:aruipci.i.1t o( ~ teasona:qle person in the subject's. posltion. See i.d at
9.

No argument can be made tbai the a~tention grasp or the facial hold constiillte threats of
irnroinent death or are procedures designed to disrupt profoundly the senses or peTSonality. !.n
general rhe grasp and the facial hold will. startle the subject, produce fe,o[, or even irisult him_ As
you bav6 infoo:ned us, d1e use of these. techniques-is.not accomp;;.n.iw by a:spei;ific verb?l.i:hre\lt
of severe physical pain or sufforing, Ta the extent that U1ese tecr.niques could be considered a
threat of severe physical pain or suffering_., such a threat would have to be infoiTed from t:he acts
thernselve.s . Because these acti.o.as thCID!5elves involve no pain, neither tould be interpreted by a
reasqnable person in Zubaydah"s position to C'onstitute a threat of se-verc pain or sufferii1g.
Accordittgly, these two teelmiques are 1101 predicate acts within the ·meariing of'Secti<m 2340.
The facial sll!.f) like\Vise falls outside the set of predicate ac,s. !( piain:ly is not a threa.1 of
imm.ihent death, under Sectio;; 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality, under Section 2340(2)(B). Thougb it may hurt, as discussed cbove; tl1e
effect is one of smarti.c.g or stinging ,md Slb.--prise or humiliation, but not severe pain. Nor does it
alone constitute a threat or sev<:re paia or suffering, under Section 2340(2)(A), Like the facici
hold aud the mtention grssp, the use of this slap is not accompanied hy a specific verbal threat or
furtl1cr escalating violence. Addi(iona\ly, you have infonned us that in one use this technique
· will ty'pica!ly involve at mos, two slaps. Certainly, the use of th.is sh,p may dislodge any
e),,-pectation that Zubayda.\.i b2.d thai he would not be touched in a physically aggreS!;ive manner.
Nonetheless, this alteration in h.is expectations could hardly be. construi':d by a reasonable person
in his situatiou to be tantamount to a threat ofsevete physical p.s.in or suffering. At mosl, this
technique suggcSts that the circumstances ofhi.s confinement and interrogation have {;;hanged .
Therefore, the facial slap is nm within the st.acute' s exclusive list of prediane acts.

/

TO~CRET

i2

TOrlET
Walling plainly is not a prc~ure calculated 10 disrup1 p(ofoundly the senses or
personality. While wallhig involves what might be c.haracte;ized as rough handling, it does not
involve the threat of imminenc death or, as discussed above, the irJl.iction of severe physical pain.
Mo1:eover, once again we. understand that use of ihis technique v.~l'l- not_ be accompnnied by any
specific verbal 1hreat tliat vio-lence will ei:isue absem cooperation. Tr.us, like tht facial slap,
walling cau 01tly constitur.e i; ilu-eat 0fsevere. plry~ical pain if a reasonable p....---rson would_ i.nfor
such a threat from the use of the technique. iL-;el( W-alling does nol in and of itsdfirtflict ~vcre
paiu or sufferiug. Like th~ facfal slap, ;,vaUfog may alter rhe subject's ·(!)..'pectarion as to the
treatment he believes he will receive. Nonetheless, ,he chmcter ofm.e a-diem falls so far short cf
inflkting severe pain or suffering wi.thin._rhe meaning of the sts:mte lhat•eveu.ifhe inferred that
greater aggressi Veness
to follow, the type of actions that could be reasonably be anticipated
would still full below art.ything sufficient to infljcl severe physi~l pain or suffering under the
statute. Thus, we. conclude that. this technique falls outside the proscribed- pre<lic.CJ.le acts.

,,,a.,

Like walling, siress positions and wall-standing are not proecdures calculated to disrnpt

r-rofoimd.ly the senses, nor arc tliey threats of imminent death. These proce.dutes, as discussed
nbove, involve the use of n'il.l.!:cie fatigue to encourage cooperation aod do not ihemselves

·cousl.itute the infliction of severe physical pain or suffering. Moreover, chcre is no a.sp...--cr of
·violence to cillter teclmique. th2i _remotely suggests fumre severe pain or suffering from which
sucb a threat of futur~ b2I:m could be i.nf=ed. They _simplf i._,wolvc forcing the-subject to re!T:ain
tr. l!!lCOmfortable positions. 'Nh.ile these ads may ind.i<:a!e to the subject that bc may be placed i11
1hese positions again ifhe docs rrot disclose i11furrnation, the use cf these teehn.iqn_es woulc\ not
sugg~st to a reasonable person in the subject's posi_tion that _he i.s being threc.teued w;th !it'.Vere
pain or surfering. Accordingly, we conclude rhat these ffi'O procedures do nol constiture any of
th.e predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2).
· As with ·tl1e other techniques discussed so far, crai-nped corlf,ncment is not a threat oi
i.:m.n1.inent death. rt may be argued drat, fucusing in_ part on the fact that the box.es will be -..vith:mc
light, placement in these boxes would. consritute a proeedurn designed to disrupt profoundly tlle
senses. As we explained in our recent opinion, howiver, to "di...9:1:lpt profoundly the senses" a
technique must produc~ an extreme effect iri the subject. See Section 2340A Memorandum at
l0--t2. We have previously concluded that this requires that the. procedure cause substantfal
inteffereuce with the indi-..idual 's cogrJ!ive abilities or [uru:l.a..'T!entally aiter llis personality. See
id. ?t 11. l\forcover, !be SJ.3.tute requires that sue~ procedures must be calculated tD produce di.is
effect. See id_ at 10; l8 U.S.C_ § 2340(2)(B).

With respect to the small c~.flli'7ment box, yr.n1 have informed us that he would spend e.r
most two hour.; in Chis box. You have informed us thE.t your purpose in using LI-Jese. boxt>.s is r1ot
io interfer:e with his senses or his personality, but to cause him physics! discomfort that will
encourage him lo disclose critical infonna"tion. Moreover, your i;uposition of time limitations on
the use ofeh!:-e.r of the box~ 2.lso indict.tes tha1 !he use of these boxes is □ot designed or
calcul:;Led f.o disrupt rrofoundly the !ienses or pe-tsona!i,y. For the larger box, in which he can
T~RE1·

.

I )'

rop&RET
both stand and sit, he may be placed ir. flus 6011 fu.,_.ur- to eightten ho\.!rs at a time, while yo_u h.ave
informed us thar Ile will never spend more thq.h an h(!ur at time in the smaller box. These: 11me
limits f,urtl1erensure that oo profound diSTUpti!:iti ef~ senses or personality, were it even
possible, would resulL As such. the use ef the co'nfiilement bo>,es does o.ot co1tstitute a

rirocedure calrulated to d~ru-pt profoundly the senses or pers.onality.
Nor docs the use oftl1e boxes threaten Zubuydali wirh .severe physical pai1_1 or suffui.J1g.
While additional time snenc in tl-ie boxes ruay be threatened, their use is nOl accompanied by a[>.y
express thrCllts of sever~ physical pain or suffering. Like the stress positions end \valling,

pln.cemeul in the boxes is physkaUy uncomfortable but any such discomfort docs not rise to the
level of severe physi.cal pain or suffering. A¢cordingly, a reasonable person in the _subject' s
position would not infer fr.om lli.e use ofthls technique that severe physical pain _is the next step
in his in.terrogator's treatment of him. Th.e.refor.e, \1/e conclude that the use; of the confinemenr
boxes ·d ocs not fall :witbin. tli~ statute's required predicate acts.
In additi-on to using tlie-confinement boxes alone, you also would Hketo intrqiiiice an
insect into one of the box:es with Z:uba.ydah. As we ur:dersnmd it., you plan to inform Zubaydah
that you are going. to pl.a~ a stinging insect into the box, but you wt!1-actus.lly place a harm.less
insect in the box, such as a cateipill.at. If you do so, to ensure that you are our.side the predicate
act requirement, you must inform him that the insects wrn not have a sti.ng that would -produce
death or severe pain.. [f, ho\vcver, you were ta place the insect in the box without informi..ng-hi.m
1hat yeu are -eemg·so,•!.h.ei3, ~ or,:;i&,tq-not commit a predicate aci, yOll should rm.t affirmativ..el.}L
lead him to believe that any iuscc ·s·nre.sentwbich has }l. : " "., ·
,uh_

o on.gas you

the appruaches ,vebave descri · , i ·e· insect's plncement in the box would not constitute a threat
of seve re physical pain or suffeci.ng to a re:;sonable person in his position . An individual placcci
in a box, even an. ir,dividual wit.ha fear of insects, would not reasonably feelthreatened with
severe physical pain or suffering if a caterpillar was placed inc.he box. Further, you have.
informed us that
are noL aware that Zubaydah has any allergies ,o insects, and you have not
inf9rmed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in th<!t same.situation to
beli.eve chat 3:n UJL"-IIU'.>!u instct would cause him severe ph)'Sical pain or death. Thus, we
conclude tl1at the. placement of the inscc.t in th~ confinement box wi.th Zubaydah would not
C-Onstitute a predicate ace

you

Sleep depriv•aticn -also clearly does nol involve a. Chteat of irnmiuent death. ,<\.ltlmugh it
produ~ physical discomfort. i1 caonoc b;:. said to constit;1te a tlu:eal of severe physical pain or
suffering from the perspective cf a reasonable person in Zubaydah ' s position. Nor could sleep
depriva.ti90 constitute a proce<!Ltre calcufated -to disrupt profoundly fue senses, so long as sleep
deprivation (as you have informed us is your intent) is used for limited periods, before
hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses wou.!d occ_ur. To be sure, sleep
cieprivatlon may reduce the subject's ability to think on h!s foeL Indeed, you indicate that mis is·
TO~T

i4

TOP~T
the LF1.te11ded result. His mere reduced ability to evade your questions and resJSt i!nswering does
11.ot, however, rise to the level cf cll.sri:ipt1ou r:e~\lifed by ti-ie statutt. As we exRlain.ed af;iov<!, a
distuptj.on within die meanLrlg of the stature isan exlreme one, su.bsIB..r1tially interfering with an
individual's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hatlucinatrans, o, driving him Co eugage i'1
uncharacteristic self-tlestni.ctiv~ behavior. See ;nfr'1 IJ; Section 1340A Memorandum at 11.
TI,erefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one of the fequired predicate
.ic.s.

We find tlw: the use ofth.e waterboard constitutes II tlueat of i.mcniuent death. As you
have explained the watetboard procedure to us, itctelll.es in the subject the uncont;rollable
physiological sensation that the subject is drowriin,g. Although the procedure will be monitored
by per.sorinel wfth medical t.raining and extensive SERE scli.oo{ expe1:ience with thjs prq~durc
v'110 V?i:H ei1sure the subject's mental an'd physical safety, the subject is not aware of any ofthes~
prcellutions. Prom the vanrage point of any reasonable person under~iug this procedure in su.th
circ1.,.,11st:ances, h.c would feel as ifhe is drovming at very momeni of the procedure due to the
uncontrollable physiological sensation he is e:qieriencing. Th~, !his- proce.dure cannot be
viewe9 as too uucertain to s-atisfythe imminence requirem!!nl. A.ccordir.gly, it constitutes a
threat of imminent dealli and folftlls lhe predic~ act requiremem under tl\e stal'ute.

Although che waterboar<l constitu.t-es a threat.of imminent dearh; prolon.ged mental harm
must nonetheless result to violate cb.e statut:ory-prohibition ou infliction of sever~ rne.nta:i p:rin or
:;ufferin~-- See Seeti.on 2340A Mern.Qralldum at 7'. We-ha-v,e pr-evious.ly concluded .thR1pwlonged
menu;:I harm. is mental harm of some lasting !liltation, e,g.,. mental hilli.tl 12S.ting lilontns or yeru;s.
See fd. Prolongeq mental harm is not simply fue stress experieoced in, for c..xample, ao
interrogation b)' state police. See id. Based on your research into the use of these met.hods at the
StR.B' school md cousultirtion wi.lh others wid1 experiise in the field ofpsychl:Jlogy and
interrogation, you do not anticirate that any prcilon.ged mental h:mn would result from the use of
the waterboard. Indeed, you ha.ve advised us thin the relkfis almost irmnediate. Vi•hen the cloth is
feruoved from th.c nose ~d mouth. ln the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental
.r~in or !;11ffr-.rinG w011ld h~w. hr.~r. inflicter!, and the use of these prnc,o...du.re-s would uot coast-inn~
iortu~e within I.he meuning of the staiute.
V/hen these acts are considered as a c-0urse of conduct., we arc unsure whether these acts
may constitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You hav!! indicated to us that you
hav:! no1 detenn.ined eilher the order or !he precise timing for Lmpleme.nting these procedures. le
is conceivabJe that tl.Jese procedures could be used in a course of escab{ing, conduct, moving
increm.entally and rapidly from l~t physically tf!(nisive, e.g., fuci3l hold., to the most physical
con(act, e.g., waJiing or the waterbo;,rd. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far,
Zubayda.h has come to expect that no physical hami wiU be done to him. By using ihese
techniques in increasing iniensi.ty and in rapid successiqn, the goal wo\,!ld be to dislodge thls
expectation. Based on the facts you have provi.ded to us, we cannot say definitively ~13.t the
entire course of conduct. would cause a reasonable ~erson to·believe that he is being threatened
TO~RET

!5

T~RET
with severe p3in or suffering \.\it!1in lue mcani11g of section 2340. On. lhe other hand, however,
under ccrt.aih circumstances-for example, rapid escalatior. in the use of tl-tese r.echniques
culminating in the waterhoard (which we acknowledt1,e consritm:es;; threat of inunin_er.t death)
accompanied by verbal. or other suggestions that physical -.~olencc \l,ill follow---mrght cause a
reasonable person'to believe drnt d1ey arc faced with such a thn:.at. Wilhout rnore inforrnaliou,
we are u1tcertai11 whether tiJe course of conducr would constilutc a predicate act utlder Sectiou
2340(2) .

Even if the course of conduct were thought to pose a threac of physicaf pain or suffering,
il would nevertheless-on the f.acrs before us-not constitute a viol.ad.on. of Secti.cn 2340A. Not
only ,:nUsl the course of conduct b~ a predica(e act, but also those who use the procedure must
actually cause prolooged mental harm. Based on the information that you. have provided to us,
in.diceting tha1 no evidence e:-dsts that.th.is course of conduct pro<iucres any pro)onged mental
h.arm, we conclude that a co\4--sc·of conduct using t:hBSe procedures a.rid culminating in the
waterboard would not violate Section 2340A.
Snecific fotenl To ·violate the statute; an fodividU;i\ mus( have the specffic intent L'O
inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific intent is ac; element of the off'erise, the absen.ee·
of specific intent negates the charge.of torture. As we pr.e·violisly opined, ru have the required
specific intent, an individual mus;: expressly intend to cause sucb severe pain or suffering. See
Section 234DA Memora.,-idun1 at j citing Carter v. Unired Suue.s, 530 U.S. 255, 267 (2000). We
have fortltet found cha( if a defendan.r acts with the good faith be.lief that his actions will not
c.1use ·such suffering, he has r,ot acted with specific· intenL See id. at 4 citing South A.Ii. Lmtd.
Ptrsltp. of Tam. v. Reise, 218. F.3d 518, 531 {4th Cir. 2002). A ddeudant acts in good faith
when he has an honest belief that his actions will hot resulrin severe pain ·or suffering. See id.
ci(lng Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 202 (1991 ). Alrhough a.'1 bnoest belief 11eed not be
rc:asenablo, such a belief is easier to establish where there is a reasonable ba.sill foe it See id. ai 5.
Good faith may be esl.abli.sltoo by, among other things, the. relianae on the aihice of experts. See
id. at 8.
Based OJl the in:fonnation you ha.-vc provided us, we believ.e th.at tnosc carrying out ,hese
procedures woul.d not have the specific intent to infi.ict: severe physic.al pain or suffering. The
O!:>jeetive of these l~cbniques is not to c;;.use scvtm! phys:ici:.l pain. Firsr, the con.star11 prese1lce of
pc:rsonnel with medical trc.iniug who have the authority to stop Llie interrogation should it appear
it is medic.ally m.-ce.ssary inr.iir..?lt~~ th;il ii is nn{ yfl\lr inlenl to cuusesevere physival pain. Th.c
personnel on site have e;..tensive experie.nce with these. specific 1edmiques as they are use.d in
SERE school training: Second, you have infonned us that you are taking steps to ensure that
Zubaydau 's injury is not wc.:sened or his recovery impeded by rht use. of £bese techniques.
Third, ~s l_OU_?~~'e described tlrem lo us, the propos.t:d tech..'lique.s involving physical
cont.act between the i.nterrogaior and Zubaydah actually contain precautions t.o prevent :my
serious physical harm to Zubaydah. fn "walling," a rolled hood or towel ,vi1l be used to preveut

.

TO~RET

16

.•

TO~RET
whiplash and he will be pennitted ip rebound from the fle-ldbl-e wall lo re.due~ the likelihood of

injury. Similarly, in the ''facial haldt the fingertips wiU be kept well away from the bis.eyes 'to
ensure that there 'is: no-injury to them. 11,e purpose of that facial hole! is not,injme him but ta
lmld the head iuunobile. Additionally, while-the stress positions and. wall sranding will .
un.doub~e-dly result in physical discomfort by tiring the muscles, it is obvious tbat tbes~ posi.tioos
are not intendc;d ta produce th~ kind of ex.treme pain required by the stature.
Funheonore. 110 soecific iment to cause severt! menial oain or s•Jffering appears to be

A.s we explained in our ream opinion, an iudivic!ual ~US! Ii.we the specific intent lO
c:suse prolonged mental h~rm in order to have the specific iment to inflic1 severe mental pain or
snffeting. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 8. Prolonged mental harm is substantial mcoral
harm of a sustained duratlou,, e.g., bann lasti!lg u1onths or even years after the acts were inllict.cd
upon the_prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith-beliefc.an. negate this clement.
Accordingly, i:{ an i11dividt12.I conducting ~e interrogation bas a good"faith belief that tire
proce-dur.e::; he wiU apply, separately ~rtogether, would not result inprolonged,rnentat harm, that
individual lacks the req_uisite specific l.nte."\t this conclusion c.oncemin.g ~ifio mtent is fu(thet
bo[m.re<l by the due diligence chat has been coll.ducted concem1.'1g the effocts of these
interrogation procedures,
preselll.

The menral health experts thai i-ou 'have eonslilted have indicated thal the psychological
impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference 10 the subject's psychological
hi5<ory al:.d current.mental bealt.l-i stan!S. The healthier th~ .i:nilividual, !he less likely that the use
of any one P.rocedure or sec of procedures as a course qf conduct will resuH in pi:olonged mental
harm. A comprch.en.sive psychological profile of:z'.ubaydah has been created. In creating this
profile, your personncl drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's ·diaries, obsmia.tion of Zubaydah
since his C!l- W,r. and :
fi
e ·nre1 i2:ence and ress reports.

A:s we indicated above, you hav{} informed us that your proposed iurerrogation methods
have been used and continue to be used in SERE training. ft is our l!Ilde.rscanding tl.J.ai these
!cehniques are not used one by one in isolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real
inte.rr-ogaiion. Thus, the iuforrnatioo. derived frqm SERE trair1Jng bears both upon the impact of
the use of the individual. techniques and upon their use as a course of coo duel You have found
that the use of these methods togeci1er or separately, including the use. of the waterboartl, lias not
resulted in any negative long-le$ mental health consequences. The continued use oftliese
methods ,vi.thout m.ertmJ hcal.lh l;unsequen.ces to che trainees indicates that it is l1ighly improbable
TO~RET

17

T~RET

that such consequences would re.suit he-re. B.ecause you have conducted the due diligence to
detemiine that these proc.edures, elther aicne ado e-0mbination, do not produce prolonged ment;I
· harm, we believe that you de not mcer the specific ln1ent requirement ne~ssary to violate
Secdon 2340A.
You !1avt:f atso- informed. us that ym1 have reviewed tbe televanl: literatwe on the subject,
and consulred with outside pss,chologi.sts, Your .r,eview of U,e liimtur-e unctivered n.0 entpirical
data on the use of these procedures, \\.'tlu the exception of ~l:e<Zp deprivation for ·whlch no long~
tera.1 health. cDnseqper.c~ resulted. TileQiJtside psychblogists with wl10m yo.µ ccnsu{!ed
indicated were Utia.Ware·of any cases wher.e long-term problems have occurred as a r~sutt of tb,ese
tedmiques.
As described above, it appears you llave conducted :!n e:dl',flsive ir,quiry to ascertain wi:nt
impact. if any, these procedures individually and as a course of conduct would have an

Zubaydah. You have consulce<l with interrogation experts, including those with substanJi.nl
SERE school expeiience, consulted with outside psychologists, completed a psychological
assessment and reviewed the relevant literature on. ti.1is topic. Based on this inquiry, you believe
tbat the use of the procedures, including the walerbo3l'd, arJd as a coursi!- of conduct would not
result iu ptolonged mental ha.rm_ Re.liance 011 thls information abo~Zubaydah and about the
·effeci of the use of these iedmiques mote generally d.emonst:rates th~ present~ of a good faith
beiief that no prolong~d mental ha.nu will result from using tl1ese methods in the interrogation of
Zubaydah. Moreover, v;e think that this represents not only an honest belief but also a
rea,onable belief based 011 the informa.tionth.at you have S\l.pplied to us. Thus, w1: believe tbs.t
the speeific intent to inflict prolonged memaf is not prese-nt,
cori&e.quently, there is no
sp·ecific in.tent to i.nilict severe menial pnin or suffering. Accocding_ly, -,ve conclude (hat ou the
facts in this case the use ofthex: methods separately or a course of couduct would ll.Ot violate

and

Section 2340A.

Based on the foregoing,. and based on the facts that you ha"e pro'i1ided, we dmclui:l.e that
tl1e interrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 1340.A. · We vvi:sh to
emphasize that this is our bes! readlug of the law; ho\vevcr, you should be a.ware tliat there are no·
cases constming l:his statu.te;just as there huve been no prosecutions brou.ght tm.der it.
Please let us k.now rfwe Call be of rurthe.r assistance.

~,,;.,..,..:...
~~,.~ ~

"i.;.,.::..

l3

Appendix D

.........

..... ".'. ·

_-;,_ :.:.-. ·

~

I

Guidatiµes on Con:finem.ent Conditions For CIA Detainees

.

These Guidelines govern the·conditions of confinement for
CIA Detainees, who are person
ion
facilities that are under the
control of
acilitie"S u ;
,:

i

These Guidelines recognize that
environmental and other conditions,.as - well. as particularized
considerations affecting any given Detention Facility, will.
vary from · case ~o case and location to locati~n.
·
l..

Minimu.ms

Due nrovision ~st be
safety of al· IA Detainees
medical ·care

2.

,·'.

.I
l

:tmpl~nting P:rocedm:es

and

-- -

---------- - ---·

Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees

3.

.l

ReS];:)6nsih1e Cl:A Officer

·The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall
erisl.lre. (a)· that, at ail tim\3s, a specific Agency staff
employee (the ~Responsible CIA Officer•) is designated as
responsible for each specific Detention Facility, . (b) that
each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of
these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached.
_Ac)mowledgment, and.. _(c) that each Re~onsihie. CL'l\ O;fficer and
each CIA o!ficer participating ·
· •
inclividuals a.etained ursuant to
Pursuant
and has
rev-1.ewed and ·signed the Ac .. ow edgment attached thereto. .
Subject· to operational and security considerations, -the
Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, o~ visit, each
Dete~tion Fa<;:ility at intervals appropriate to' the
circumstances.

APPROVED:

Date

·.~•~·' .·.·~·

·-i:'?~;

Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for-CIA Detainees
ACXNOWLE1JGMEN'l!

· I, _________ , am t.he ·.Responsible CIA Officer for the

Detention Facilitt known as _ _ _ _ _ _ • By my signature .
below, I acknowledge that I have read and understand.and will
cornply_with the ~Guidelines on Confinement conditions for CIA
Detainees• of _ _ _ _ , 2003.

ACKNOWLE~ED1

Name.

i
iI '
r.

Date

Appendix E

Ci•

• ,:

f ; ..

e I

,

.

t

'. 'f • • ~

• .! ;

• "

,•

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These Guidelines addres~ .the.conduct of interrogations of
·. pe.rs.ons who are detained urs11ant to the authorities set
forth -i

These Guidelines complement internal Directorate of
Operations guidance relating to the conduct of
interrogations. In the ev.eri.t of any inconsistency between
existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of
tbese Guidelines s _h all control_.
·
1.

Fermi::iaibJ.e Inta:rro~ation 'J.'ecbniques

Unless other'~ise approved by Headquartexs, CIA
officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA may use
only Permissible Interrogation ~echniques. Pennissible
Interrogation-Techniques consist of both (a) Standard
Techniques and (b} Enhanced Techni"ques.
·
· .

. Standard Techniques are techniques that do not .
incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure.
These technique.s inclu-de, but are not limitea to, all lawful
forms of questioning. employed );)y US law enfo.r cement and
military interrogation personnel. Among Standard .Techniques
.are the :us~ of isolation, sleep deprivation. not to exceed
72 hours; reduced caloric intake (so long as . the a~ount is
calculated to maintain the general · health of the detainee),
de:priva'tion of. reading material, · use of loud ni.us.ic· ar white

noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to . the
detainee's hearing), and the use of d i a p ~ d
eriods
er 1 not to exceed 72 hours, . . . . . .

· Enhance9, TegpniqUes are t:ech:piques tha~ do
incorporate physical 9r psycho.logica.l pressure beyond
Standard Techniques. The: tise of each specif~c Enhanced
Tech.11..ique .must be approv~d ~Y Headquarters in advance, and
may b~ employed only by approved interrogators for use with
the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and
psychological participation i'n the p~ocess. These techniques
are, the attention grasp, ·walling, the facial hold, the
_facial slap (insult slap)·, the abdominal slap, cramped
confinement, Wq.J.l standing; ,stress po•s itions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolong~d
periods, the use of. harmless inseots, the·water board, and
such other techniques as may . b.e specific'ally . approv:ed
pursuant . to paragraph 4 b.elqw. · The 1.1s.e of each Enhanced
Technique :ts subject to specific temporal, .phystcal, and
rel_ated conditions, iriclud.ing a competent evaluation of t.he
medical and psychological state of the ~etainee.
2.

M~dica.'J. and Psycho:logicaJ. Personnel

Appropriate medical and psychological per:;onnel shall
be ■lll■il■l■lill■lliiilillreadily_available for consultation and
travel to · tbe .int,errogation site during.all detainee
.interrogations employing.Standard Techniqu.es, and appropriate
medical and.psychological personnel must be on site during
~11 detainee interrogations employing.Enhanced Teclmiques.
In each case, the medical and psy~hological personnel shall

suspend the interrogation if they determine that significant
and prolonged _physical or mental injury, pain, or suffering
is likely to re:.,ult. if ·the int.errogat;i.on is not suspended.
!n any .such instance, the interrogation team shall
immediately report the facts to Headquarters for mar:iagement
and legal review to . determine whether the interrogation may
be resumed.
3 •. Interrogation Perao=el

The Director, DCI.Counterterrorist Center shall
ensure that all personnel d i r e c t l y . e n g a g e d ~
interro t ·
f
saris ·detained pursuant
have been appropriately spreene
rom
, psy
ogical, and security standpoints), have
reviewed )::hese Guidelines, have received appropriate training
in ,. their implementation, and have completed the attached

Acknowledgment.

TOP

Guideline on _In,J::.errogations Conducted Pursuaµt.to t:.he

4.

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~~pro¥ais Re.quired

Whenever feasible, advance approval is. required for

the use· of Standard ·T echniqu~s by an int.eriogation team.
In
· all instances, their use shall . be docunlented in cable
traffic'- . Pdor approval in writing ·(e.g., by written
memorandum or in cable traffic} from the Director, DCI
Counterterrorist Center, with the concurrence of the Chief,
C-TC Legal Group, is· r_equired for. the use of any -Enhanced
Technique{a); · and !Ilq.y)rn provid~d-orily where D/CTC has ·

detennined that- (a) the specific detainee is believed to

to

possess .information about risks
the citizens . of the United
States
other nations, (b} the ·use of the Enhanced
Tec.hnique·{s) ." is appro:9riate in order .to obtain that
information, (c) :appropriate· 11'.e~cal,
psychological

or

and

personnel have -concluded that the use of the -Enh:;Ulced
Tech.nique(s) is not expected to ~roduce ftsevere physical or
mental _pain 9r suffering," and (d)·· the ·personnel authorized
to .e,.-nploy the Enhanced. Technique_{s) .have completed the
attached Acknowledgment.

Nothing in these Guidelines alters

the r~ght to act in self-defense.
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Recordkeeping

In each interrogation sess·ion in which a...., EnI1anced
Technique ls employed, a contemporaneous record shall be
created setting·forth the nature and duration of each such
technique employed, ·the _identities of those present, and a

citation to the required Headquarters approval cable . This
information, which may be in the form of a cable, shall be
provided to Headquarters .

APP-ROVED:

.

.lv.:mo~
:C,

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acknowledge that I have read and

understand and will . comply with the "Guidelines on
:Cnt:erro

ti.ans Condqctecl Pursuant to

. ACKNOWLEDGED;

Name

..;

Date

Appendix F

,;.

DRAFT OMS GUIDELINES ON :tvIBDICAL Ai.'ID PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO
.
DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
. · S~ptember 4, :2.003

The following guidelines ·bffer general references for medical officers supporting
~.~ detention of terrorists captured

and

turned o~er to the Central Intclligence Agency for
interrogation and debriefing. There are three .different contexts in which these guidelines
m4y be applied: (1) during th~.pe.riod of irutial interrogation, 2 duriri the more
sustained eriad ofdebriefin · at an interrogation sit:, and (3

I/\irERROGATION SUPPORT

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Captured terrorists turned over tn the CJ.A. for interrogation may be subjected to
a, ~vide r~ge of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military
p~oimel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate"
the detainee, ma.ximize .his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or
eli,nunate his will to resist o~ efforts to obtain critical intelligence,

.

Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by
th~ Director, CTC in the ease of each individual case. They include, in approximately.
ascending degree of in~ensity:
.
Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure)

Shaving
·
Stripping
Diapering (generally for periods not greater than 72 hours)
Hooding
·
Isolation
White noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not damage hearing)
Contin,uous light darkness
Uncomfortably cool environment
Restricted diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain
· general health)
Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position
Water Dousing
Sleep deprivation (up to 7?, hours)
·Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above) .
A~ntion grasp
Facial hold

or

Insnlt (facial) slap
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AQdomiriaf slap
Prolonged diapering
Sle.ep deprivation (over 7_2 hours)
Stress positions
-on knees, body slanted forward or backward
· --leaning with forehead on wall
Walling . ..
. .
Cramped confinement (Confmenient boxes)

Waterboa:rd

·

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In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological imp.act, and
not some physical effect, with a specific _goal of ''dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding
the treatwent he believes he will receive ... '.'' The more physical techniques are
delivered in-a manner carefully limited to avoid seriqus physical harm. The slaps for
example ·are·d~igned ''to induce shock, surprise, andior humiliation" and "not to inflict
physical pain· that J:S severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a
specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is-ou).y against a
springfroard designed to be loud and bouncy (an..d cushion the blow). All walling and
most attention grasps are delivered only with the subject's head solidly supported with a
towel to avoid extens'ion-flex.ion injury.
.
OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency
detainees St!-bject to ''enhm1ced" interrogation techniques, and·for determining that the
authorized administration of these techniques would. not be expected to cause serious or
pe11Uanent harrn.. 1 "DCI Guidelines" bav~ been issued formalizing these responsibilities,
and these should be read directly.
Whenever feasible, advance approval is-required to use any measures beyond
standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced"
measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnel2 con.firming
from direct detainee examination that
enhanced techniq ue(s) is not expected to
produce "severe physical or mental pain of suffering." As a practical matter, the
detainee' s physical ·condition .must be such that these interventions will not have lasting

the

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The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental
harm," i.e., "ment~ harm of some·lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years."
"In the abs'ence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental pain or suffering \.VOuld have been
inflicted.11 Memorandum of August 1, 2002, p. 15.
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Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use ef !:he
watcrboard requires the presence of a physician.

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·effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will
result. ·
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The medica(implications of the DCI guidelines are discussed below.
General intake evaluation.

New ·detamees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with- a complete,
docume

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Although brief, the data should reflect what \".as checked and include negative fmdings.

Medical treatment

It is important that adequate medical care be provided t0 detainees, even those
undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chronic medications should receive
Ui.em, acute medical roblems shouldbetreate and ade uate fluids
nutrition

and

providec:l.

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The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrog'<ltion need not be palatable,
but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should oe
. monitored and reco

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tion.
there is any question
·tored and recorded.
Uncomfortably cool env:rrorrments

Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortab
lengths of time, ranging from hours day~_.

to

Core body temperature falls after more than 1 hours at an ambient temperature of
l0°C/50°F. At this. temperature increased mecabolic rate cannot compensate for heat
loss. The WHO recommended minimum indoor temperature is 18°C/64°F. The
"thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is re.quired to maintain core
temperature is 20°C/68PF to 30°C/36°F. Within the thermoneutral zone, 26°Cn8°F is

coru;idered o timall comfortable for p.ghtly clothed individuals and 30°C/86°F for mtlced

individuals.

If there is any possibility that ambient temperatureS are below the thermoneutral
range, they should be monitored and ~e actual t~mperatures documente: .

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White noise or.loud music

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As practical guide, there is no pe~anent hearing risk

for continuous, 24-hours.hours a day; 90 dB for

a-day exposures to sound at 82 dB. or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18
up to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, ·and 100 dB for 2 hours.. If necess ·
be provided _to measure these ambient sound levels.

instruments can

Shac.kling

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Shackling m. non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development
'th ''
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Assuming no medical contraindications ar~ found, extern.led periods (up to 72
hours) in a standing position can be approved if the hands ·are no hio er than he~d level
and wei hli$J:Jprne fu)J p .th.~ lowerextremiti~.

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Sleep ·deprivation

The sta,ncla'rd approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard ta shack.Un.g posiµon)
is 72_hours. Extension of slee .• de r:ivation be .ond 72 continuous hours is G.onsJg~d an

NOTE: Examinatkms perfonned during periods of sleep deprivation shoultfinclude the
current number of hours with.out sleep; and, if only.a brief reftpreceded this.period, the
specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded.
Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)

small box is allowable up lo 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8

consecutive hours,

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Waterboard

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11tls is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The
historical context here was limited knowledge of tlie use of the watetboard iri SERE
trai:aing (several hundred trainees experience it' eyeiy year or two). 'In the SERE rp.odel
the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered-with a cloth.
A stream, of water is cfuected at the upper lip._Resistant subjects then-have.the cloth ·
lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water contin~es to be .applied, fully
sa~tlng the cloth, and precluding the passage of air. -R~latively little water enters the
mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) lasts no more than 20 seconds. On removal
of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water
directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for several
minutes, and involve up to 15 canteen cups .of water. Ostensibly the primary ·~esired
effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily
occluding the nose and mouth, _and psychological impact of tp.e continued application of
water after-the 'cloth is removed; SERE trainees usri.ally have only a single exposure to
this technique, and never _more than two; ~ERE ~ers·consider it their mosf effective
technique•.and deem-it virtually irresistible in th.e tr~µg settin~.
.
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Toe SERE training program has applied the waterboard technique (single
exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications
without significant or lasting medical 90mplications. The procedure noneth~les$ carries
some risks, partl.cularly when repeated a large .number of times or when applied to an
individual less fit than a typical SERE trainee. Several medical din:iim.sions need to be
monitored to eJ?,Sure the safety of the subject.

In our lirmted experience, extensive sustained use of the w~terboard can introduce
new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue_ or psychological resignation,
the subject may simply give up, allowing ex~essive filling of the airways and loss
consciousness. ·An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the
interrogator should deliver a sub-Xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore
normal breathing, aggressive medical interven.tion.is required. Any s~bject who has
reached this degree of compromise is not considered ail appropriate candidate for the
waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of !he waterboard
without specific C/OMS consultation and approval.

of

A rigid guide to medically approved use.of the waterboard in ess~ntially healthy
individuals is not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and· the
specific response each time itis used. The following general'gnidelines are based on
very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjec!S whose experien~e and response
was quite varied. These rep~sent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are
operative and may be more· restrictive.

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A series (within a "session'') of several rel~tively rapid waterboard applications i~
medically acceptable in all health sJJb' ects, so lon as there is no indication of some

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Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed.without
apparent medical complication .. The exact number of sessions cannot be prescribed, and
will depend on the response to ea.ch. If more ·thari 3 sessions 6f 5 or more applications
· are envisioned within a 24 hours period, a careful medical reassessment must be made
.before each later session. ·
By days 3-5 of an aggressive program,.cumulative effects become a potential
concern. Withou·t any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages .of this
-technique, we believe that beyond this po~t continued intense.waterboard applications ·
may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive llile ~:>f the waterboard beyond ·
· this point should be reviewed b the 1IVT team in consultation with Head uq,rters rior to
any further aggressive use.

NOTE: In order to best infann }u.'ture medical judgments and recommendations, it is
important that every application ·of the waterboard be thoroughly tUJcumented: ho.w long
each application (and the entire procediire) lasted, how much ,vaterwas used .in the
process (realizing that much .splashes.oft), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal
was achie:ved, if the naso- or oroplw.rynx was filled, what sort of volume was expelled,
how long was the break between applications, and how the subject looked between each
treatment.

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