DOC 70

U.S. Depatiment of Justrce
Office of Legal C(junse!
O.ffi~

of the Assistant Attorney Genera!

Waskhtgror.,D.C 205;0

Augu st 3I, 2006

John A. Rizzo
Actrng General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Dear John:
You have asked for our opinion whether the conditions of confinenient used by the
Centrallntelligence Agency ("CIA") in covert overseas facilitres that it operates as part ofits
authorized program to Capture and detain individuills who pose serious threats to the United
States or who are planning terrorist attacks are consistent with common Article 3 of the 1~1J.
Geneva COllventions. On Friday, June 30, 2006, 1advised you orally that the conditions of
confinement described herein are perrnitted by common Article 3. This lettermemotializes and
elaborates upon that advice.
Common Article 3, which appears in all fonr of the Geneva Conventi.ons of 1949, applies
if) the "case of armed conflic,t not of an international character ocCUrring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties." E.g., Geneva Convention (ill) Relaiive to the Treatment of
.
Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, oD.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. 3364 ("GPW'). It had been the
longstanding position of the Executive Branch that the phrase "not of an international character"
limited the applica&ility of common Article 3 to internal conflicts akin to a civil war and thus
that the provision was not applicable to the global armed conflict agaiIlSt alQaeda and its allies.
.See Memorandum of the President for the N'ational Security Council, Re: Humane Treatment of
al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees at 2 (Feb. 7, 2002) (accepting the legal conclusion of the
Department of Justrce that common A.rticle 3 "does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban
detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in 'scope and
common Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflicts not of an international character"').
In Hamdan v, Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,2795 (2006), however, the Supreme Court, by a
5-3 vote, concluded instead that the "term' conflict POt of an international character' is used here

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in contradistinclion to a conflict between nations." On that basis, the Court determined that
common Article 3 does apply to the armed conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. See
iii. aT. 2795-97. The Snpreme ,Court's decision meaJis that the "minimum protection" afforded by
~:::.?..n Articl:..~: . ~..~t ~!~..:, :?'~t~?~.e. ~l:~e...d. ~~rs:!: c.'!:~?::t_.~z...si:.~~~~::.'ti."~,-

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or any other cause" now appLies, as a matter of treaty law, to detainees held by the CIA in the
Global War on Terror GPW Art. 3. Where common Article 3 applies, the obligation to follow
it is also enfoi-ced by statute, as the \Var Crirnes' Act provides that :'any conduce' ihat l"constitl.lt~S
a violation" of common futicle 3 is a federal crime, punishable in some circumstances by the
de,.!h penalty. 18 U.Sc. § 2441 (2000):
Common Article 3 has been described as a "Convention in miniature." 3 TCRC, .
Commeniary: Geneva Canveniion Relative to Ihe lrealmentojPrisoners ofWat 34 (Jean Pictet,
ed. ! 960) ("GPW Conllnentarj'). It establishes a set of minimum standards applicable to the'
treatment of detainees held in non-intemational conflicts. The most important aspect of common
Article 3 is its overarching requirement that detainees "shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely, without any adverse distinction based O!i race, color, religion or faitb, sex, birth or
wealth,' or any other similar criteria." 6 U.S.T. at 3318. This requirement ofhumaJl<; treatment
supplemented and focused by the enumeration offour more specific categories of acts that "are
and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever." [d. Those forbidden acts

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ar0:

(a) Violence to life and person, in particular rnurder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture:
(b) Taking of hostages;
(c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiiiating and degrading
treatment;
(d) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guanintees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

ust_
_YOU
[d. As applied to the conditions of confinement used by the CIA, the prohibitions imposed by
subparagraphs (a) and (c) are clearly the most relevant.
.

The five conditions you have asked
facilities that the CIA uses to detain individuals
have advised us that those conditions are used to
~y concerns associated 'with holding extremely.
dangerous terrorist-detainees in the kinds of covert facilities' used by the CIA. The facilities in
which the CIA houses these high-value detainees were not built as ordinary prisons, much Jess as .
high-security detention centers for ,~olent and sophisticated terrorists. In order to keep their

I This iottor is UrrJted to evaluating the specilic conditions of confinement discussed herei.n, as described
to us by the CIA. We understand that the CIA is not CU:.'TcnlIy using any interrogatlon practices at its overseas
facilities tJl~.~9 . f~!~~ q,l~~ig.~~ .1}J14~L~~m~£l),,~1i_~~?..:,. _"'_._..... "..... ....,_._.... _
_

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·1fI1JtatlOns! In turn} require tilat speC12 secunty measures e used inside the aCIlit.ies to m~e up
for ihe bUildings' ,1rchitecturel shOl:comings. It is in this unique context that the CIA has
imposed the condiUons of confinement described herein.

To be sure the nature and locztion ofthese.facilities} \vhich prevent more elaborate and
conspicuous extemal security measures, is due to a choice thaltbe United States made to hold
these persons secretly. As explained below, however, such secret detention is a condition
expressly countenanced by tbe Conventions themselves for the d"tention of some persons. And'
accomplishing such s~cret detention has required increasingly discreet methods given the
advances in intelligence technology since 1949. There is some evidence th'at common Article 3
establishes certain "minimum" requirements for the treatment of det8jnees that cannot be
loosened by sole reference to toe purpose ofthe condition of confinement. See, e.g., GPW Art.
3(l)(providing that "'the following acts [subsections (a)-(d)) are and sball remain prohibited at
ally time and any place whatsoever"); 3 Pictet, Commentary, at 140 ("The requirements of
humane treatment and the prohibition of certain acts inconsistent with it are general and absolute
in character."). That does not mean, however; that the purpose underlying the conditions is
irrelevant to evaluating the nature of its prohibitions. Rather, some specific prohibitions in
common i\rtic1e 3 specifying the oYerarching requirement of humane treatment, however, may
very well turn on an e'faloation.ofnccessity and purpose. See GPW Art. 3(1)(a) (prohibiting
. "cruel treatment"); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536U.S, 730:737 (2002) (holding the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction ofpain" to be "cruel" under the Eighth Amendment). As explained below,
we believe the conditions of confinement imposed in these secret detention facilities meet those
minimum standards ciftreatment. And we make reference to the challenges posed by the secret
and unfurtified nature ofthese facilities to underscore that the United States is not imposing
wantonly whatever discomfort that these conditions might cause.
1

Before specifically eviiluat,ng each ofthe conditions of confinement under Common·
Article 3, we offer some general observations on the scope of that provision. In doing so, we
begin with the text ofthe treaty. See Societe NatiOliale lndustrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dis/. Court, 482 U.S. 522,534 (1987). There are other resources relevant here, including
Pictet's Commentaries, which were prepared on behalf of the Intemational Committee of the Red
Cress shortly after the treaties were signed and on which the Supreme Court relied in Hamdan in
its interpretation of 90mmon Article 3.
addition, the Supreme Court has held tbat the
decisions of foreign tribunals charged with adjudicaiing disputes between signatories should be
given "respectful consideration." Sanchez-Llamasv. Oregon, slip op. at 21 (June 28, 2006); see
also Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998). While not a tribunal given authority by the.
treaty to resolve such disputes, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY") has adjudicated war crimes prosecutions under common Article 3, and we address

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certain decisions of that tribu~al below. 2
First) common Article Ys overarching requlrement oC'hun1cnen tfe?tment dearly wonld
furbid housing detainees in conditions of confinement that are i.nhumane. That term suggests
conoitions that are ~'not worthy of or conrorrning to the needs of human belngs. Webster IS
Third New International Dictiona.ry 1163 (1967) (defining "inhuman"). Conditions that fail to·
satisfy the basic needs of all human beings-to food and water, to shelter ii'om extremes ofheat
or cold, to .reasonable protections from dis~se and ,"fectiOll-are thus ohvious candidates for
violating common Article 3, This focus on the basic necessities of life in the requirement of
humane treatment is further emphasized. by GP\V Article 20, vlhich loc11.1des its O\Yn huma.ne
tr~!ment requirement for prisoners of war under transport and explicates that requirement with
minimum standards offood, clothing, and shelter.· There is no indlcation, however, that the
CIA's facilities fall short on this score. To the contrary; we understand that all CIA detainees are
given adequate food and water._ The celis in which those detainees live are kept at nomaJ
temperatures atid are clean, hygienic, and protected from the element". In addition, you have·
informed us, and we coniide, it significant for purposes of common Article 3, that the CIA
provides regular medical care to all detainees in its custody, PI~4se take careful note that to the
extent these basic obligations are included in common Article 3, they are binding as a matter of
domestic criminal law tltrough the additional basis of the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C § 2441.
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Second, the text, structure, and purpose ofcommon A.rticle 3 suggest that its strictures are
aimed at treatment that rises to a·certain level'ofgravity and severity. l\fterall, the provision
"reflects the fundamental humanitarian principles which underlie international humanitarian
law." Prosecutor v. Delalic, ICTY-96-21·A (App.) (Feb. 20, 200 1) ~ 143. It protects against
treatment that is widely, if not universally, condemned as inconsistent with basic human values.
See id. (observing that common Article 3 incorporates the "most universally recognised
humanitarian principles"); GPW Commentary at 35 (common Article 3 "at least ensures the
application of the rules ofhumanity which are recognized as essen'tial by civilized uations")..
Only' conduct that is sufficiently severe can properly be characterized as warranting and
receiving such widespread condemnation. This severity requirement is i1Iustrated by the specific
examples that common Article 3 gives of acts that are "prohibited at any time and in any place,"
particularly those found in subparagraphs (a) and (c). As the ICRC ,Commentaries explain,
.
. :'[i]tcms (a) and (c) concern acts which world public opinion finds particularly revolting-acts
which were committed frequently during the Second World War." 112 at 39.
More specifically, the prohibition in subparagraph (a) on "violence to life and person"
suggests that not all physical contact\vith detainees is banned; the word "violence"'connotes "an
2 The apalysis se't forth in this letter re~resents our best interpretation ofcommon Article 3 based on a
rigorous exam.ination of the text,. history, and structure oflhe Conventions, as well as other interpretive resources,'
As ,ve have stressed on numerous occasions, ho'\Y,ever~ there are vague tenus in common A..rticle 3 that the United

SOltes has Iud Iiltle or no opponuniry previousty to apply in an actual copllic~ U,al are potentially malleable, and
lba! could be inte'l'reted qy courts to reach dttfcfcnt results.

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~x~rtion of physical force so as to [Djme ·or abuse.~l Flebster.'s T~ird l{ew ['1ternational
DictiolJwy 2554; see also id. (defining "violent" as "characterized by extreme force"). The

to;:t's examples offorb;dden forms ofviolence only reinforce this mean;ng: "murder ofaH
kinds, mDtilation~ cruel treatment and torture. . Thjs list suoO'q:ests
th3t~ ait.hough the use of
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physical force certainly need not .rise to the level of torture to be forbidden, it does need' to be:
more than incidental cr de minimis an'q must ~t least have the potential to cause a d~gree of
[doal harm to the detainee. See, e.g., Delotic, supra, ~ 443 ("[C]luel treatment is treatment
which causes serious meiltal or physic'" suffering or constituted a sedous attack upon human'
dignity, which is equivalent·to the offense of inhuman treatment in the framework of the grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions."); cf Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)
(observing that the term "cruel" in the Eighth AIilendment, requires "unnecessary or wanton
in!1iction of pain"). What murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture have in common 'is an
element of depravity and viciol,lsness; that common element suglSests the kinds of force that
common Article 3 seeks to prohibit. See gcner:allyDiJle v. United Steelworkers ofAm., 494 U.S.
26, 36 (1990) ("The traditionalcarion of construction, noscitur a sociis, dictates that words
grouped in a list should be given related meaning."). Also, the structure of the Geneva
Conventions makes clear that violence nece~sary to effect detention is peffilitted. See GPW Art.
42.(perrnitting the use afforce against ptisoners of war attempting to escape).
I>

. Sirnilarly, subparagraph (c)'s use of the phrase "outrages upon personal dignity" should
be understood to mean a relatively signIficant [onn of ill-treatment. In this context, "outrage"
appears to can-y the meaning of "an act or conditiOJt that violates accepted standards." Webster's
Third at 1603; see also Id: (defining "outrageous" as conduct that "is so flagrantly bad that one's'
'Sense of decency or omi's power to suffer or tolerate is violated" and giving as synonyms
"monstrous; heinous, [and] atrocious"); cj Knut Diinnann, Elements ofWar Crimes'uiu]er the
Rome Statute ofthe International Criminal Court J J5-16 (2002) ("Elemeltts of War Crimes")
(qbserving that the Cambridge Intemotional Dictionary ofEnglish (1995) define., "outrage" as
"shocking, moraJly unacceptable and uSl1ally·violentaction"). Under these definitions,
constitute an "outrage upon perSonal dignity" within the meaning of common Artic.le 3, an act
must violate some relatively clear and objective standard ofbeha\ior or acceptable treatment; ~t
must be something that does Dot merely insult the dignity of the victim, but that does so in an
obvious or particularly signitJcant manner.

to

The fact that the basic prohibition of subparagraph (c) focuses on "outrages" also must .
inform any analysis of what is covered by that provision's pronibit!on of "humiliating and
'degrading treatment:) suggesting that conduct must rise to a significant level of seriousness in
order to be forbidden. Importantly, the te>.1 is clear that "humiliating and degrading treatment" is
merely a subset of'~outrages upon personal dignity." This text stands in contrast to provisions in
other treaties, such as Article 16 ofthe Convention Against Torture, in which prohibitions on
"degrading" treatment stand·alone. As the JCTY has explained in addressing common Article 3:

[OJutrages upon personal dignity refer to acts which, without directly causing
. harm to the integrity and physical and mental weIJ-being.ofpersons, are aimed at
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which is animated by contempt for the human" dlgnHy of another person, The
coronary is that the act must cause serious humifiation or degradation to the

victim.

Prosecutorv. Aletkovski, ICTY-95·14/1, Trial Chamber I (June 25,1999) 1i1155-56. Similarly, in.
discussing an identical prohibition in Article 75 ofProtocol r to the Geneva Conventions, tbe
JCRC observed that it "refers to physical acts, which, without directly causing harm to the
integrity and physical and mental well-being of persons, are aimed at humiliating and ridiculing
them, or even forcing them to perform degrading acts." ICRC, Commentary on Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977, at 873 (1987) ("Additional Protocols Commentary"). In additio.n to
being purposive, "outrages upon personal dignity" generally must be defined in relation to an
objective standard of unacceptable behavior. Thus, according to ICTY, the subjective element of
.w outrage "must be tempered hy objective factors; otherwise, unfairness to the accused would
re.sult bepusehis/her culpahility would depend nbt on the gravity of the act but wholly on the
sensitivity of the victim. Consequ~ntly, an objective component to the actus. reus is apposite:
the humiliation to the victim must be so intense that the reasonable person would be outraged"
Aletkovski, supra, ~ 56 (emphasis added).
.

As with subparagraph (a), therefore, SUbparagraph (c) is properly understood as
proscribing condllct'of a particularly serious nature, conduct that is characterized by hostility to
human dignity. The prohibition does not reach trivial slights or insults, but instead reaches only
those that represent a more fundamental assault on the dignity'ofthe victim. See, e.g., id.137
("The victims were not merely inconvenienced or made uncomfortahle-, what they haC! to endure,
. under the prevailing circumstances, were physical and psychological abuse and outrages that any
huim.n being would have exporienced as such."). At the sanle time, however, it seems clear from
the text that subparagraph (c) prohibits a broader range of conduct than does subparagraph (a).
Subparagraph (a) is focused primarily, if noi exclusively, on physical violence; the actions that it
forbids are those that can be expected to impose some direct physical harm OIl the detainee. In
contrast, the text of subparagraph (c) does not necessarily include an element of physical force; it
reaches actions that assault the detainee's mental or psychological >yell-being, treatment that
amounts to a significant attack on his dignity as a humim being without necessarily causing him
to suffer physically.
This element of intent ~nd purpose also raises therelevarice of context in applying
subpa""graph (c). Certain activities may well be intended solely to humiliate and to degrade in
certain settings, but may be undertaken for a legitimate purpose in others. For example, a
systematic practice of marching detainees blindfolded in public with the intent to humiliate may
so evince a "hostility to human dignity" as to run afoul of common il.rticle 3. In'contrast,
obstructing the vision of the detainee during transport, with no needless exposure to the public,
for the purpose or maintaining the security afthe facility would not trigger the same concerns
under subparagraph (e).
With these basic principles in mind, we turn to all evaluation of each oflhe conditions of
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unng t lose t!lnes Wden a lowing th
cation, the layout of the facility
that could compromise the secunty ofthe facility. Used in this way, blindfolding is
,ess a general. conditlrin ofeonfinement than a special security measure employed on the
rdatively infr'equcnt occasions when the detainee is moved into or around the detention facility.
We see nothing in common Article 3 that would forbid the CIA from taking this precaution.
Blindfoldiilg no doubt requires mjnimal physical contact, but it' hardly involves' "violence"; none
of the methods the CIA uses to preve"t detainees From seeing is painful or poses any risk of
))hyslcal harm, and the detainees have no difficulty breathing freely while tileir vislon.is
obstructed. Nor <joes this limited use of blindfolds amount to an "outrageD upon j1ersonal
dignity." Neither its purpose nor effect is to humiliate the detainees; rathe" the aim is to ensure
the security of the facilities. And the use of blindfolds is carefully limited in ,scope so that it
directly serves that end. Moreover, the detainee is not needlessly ex))osed to other persons
during this ))fOCeSS, underscoring that the intent is not to .humlliate. More generally, such
blindfolding Is not inhuman; although this may still not be en~l1gh to raise ))roblems under
common .Article 3, t.his condition is not "sensory de))rlvatlon" aimed at \veakening t.he detainees
))sychologically and undermining t.heir sense ofpersonality. Accordingly, we conclude t.hat. the'
use of non-injurious means of t.emporarily blocking detainees' vision when allowing them to see
cv'Uld jeopardize institut.ional·security is consistent with common Artid e 3' s requirement of
humane treatment..
.
2. The CIA keeps

The detain

.

You also have Indicated t.hat detainees
ave aee:ess t.o 00 s, mu~lC, an mOVIes. I ese practIces hel)) relieve the strain of prolonged
isolation by providing ment.al and Int.ellectual stimulation' to the detainees. We also note that.
each detainee receives_psychological examinat.ion to ensure t.hat he is suffering no
adverse effects as a result oft.his aspect of his confmement. We do not conclude that t.hese
measures 'are necessary t.o satisfy common Article 3, but. t.hey do provide significant comfort. that.
the CIA's detention condition does not a))proach common Article 3 limits.
We first address whether the Incommunicado nature of the det.ent.ion, whereby the
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A,rtjcle 3. Examining the overall structure of the Geneva Conventions nF:kes clear that (',ommon
Article
3 does not give detainees an absolute fioht
of communication thet \~;ould forbid detention.
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of the sort used by the CIA in its covert facilities, As described above, common Article 3 sets a
minimu!"l1 level oftreatmen.t; its protections are thus dearly less robust ihan those afforded to
other categories of privileged persons whose treatment is regulated by the Geneva Conventions,
in particular, prisoners ohvar (protected by the Third Convention) and "protected persons"
(protected by the Fourth Convention), Indeed, the provisions of the Conventions dealing with
POWs and protected persons demonsttaiethat the drafters knew bow to afford communication
,rigbts to individuals beld in detention: For example, Article 71 of the Tbird Convention rlYJuires
that POWs "shall be allowed to send and receive Jetters and 'cards," Article) 07 ofthe Fourth
Convention gives the same rigbt to protecte<:l persons who have been interned, Moreover, otber
provisions in tile Geneva Conventions expressly allow for access to detention facilities by
reDresentatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and other state parties, and by
fa;Jlily members for particular protected groups, See GPW Art, 126 (pel1TIitting ICRC and state
party represehtatives to visit priso'ner of war detention facilities); GOV Alt, 76 (allowing visits
by rCRC representatives to protected persons); GCIV Ali, 116 (allowing detained protected
persons to receive visitors). In contrast, persons protected only by common AiiicJe 3 do not
share this express right of communication or to inspection by or notification to international
bodies,
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Even more important to our an~lysis tbe fact that Article 5 of the Fourth Convention
specifically provides that wbere in occupied territory "an individual protected per>on is detained
as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity, bostile to tbe security of
tbe Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases wbere absolute military security so
requires, be regarded as having forfeitM rights of communication under tbe present Convention,"
See generally 4,IeRC, Commentary: Geneva Convention Relative torhe Protection ofCivilian
Persons in Jime of War 57 (Jean Piciet, ed, '1958) (observing that the ligbts of communication
"obviously refer to [the detainCd person's] relations with the outside world"). The fact that tbe
Fourt!) Convention allows protected persons, who are afforded a panoply ofrigbts and
protectious that go well beyond the "minimnm" th~t common Article 3 provides, to be stripped
of their otherwise expressly protected rigbt to communicate witb the outside world wllere
"absolute military security so requires" is powerful evidence that common Article 3 was not
meant to confer on individuals ineligible for any specially protected stalUS under the Geneva
"Conventions a protection against incommunicado detention, Such a reading of common /Irticle
3 would upset the structural integrity of the Conventions, That approach also would be textually
unsound, For, immediately after allowing protected persons held as spies or saboteurs to be
stripped oftbeir express right to communicate, Article 5 insists that sucb persons ~shall
nevertheless be treated with humanity." This proviso clearly illustrates that t.he Conventions do
not view incommunicado detention as, incompatib'le with tbe obligation ofbumane treatment that
undergirds common Article 3, We therefore conclude that detainees may be prohibited from
communicating witb tbe outside world without rendering their treatment inhumane,

is

Nor do we perceive a basis for a blanket. conclusion that not allowing ,det.ainees to interact
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consistent with the requIrement of humane treatment, it is appropriate to !oo~ to cases 'evaluating
isolation under the Eighth Amendment ofthe Constitution. AJier all, like common Article 3, the
Eighth Amendment has been herd to require ((humane conditions of confinemei}C Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 US. 825,832 (1994); cf Trap v. [)ulles, 356 U.s 86, 100 (1958) ("The basic
cencept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man."). Conditicns
that our ovro courts have consistently found to be humane with regard to ordinary prisoners are
thus likefy to meet the comparable standard imposed.by COn1!110n Article 3 and applicabte to
'mlawful CDmbatants.
.
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Accordingly, it is of great significance that the federal COUlis have. generally held that
holding prisoners in solitary confinement, widl little or no personal contact vlith their fenow
inmates, does not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. See Novack v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661, 665 (5th Clr. 1972) (noting the "long line of
cases, to which we have found no exception, holding that solitary CDnfinement is not itself
Constitutionally objectionable"); cf. Huttov. FiiJrrey; 437 U.S. 678,686 (1978)(observing that it
is "perfectly·ObViol'-s that every decision to remove a particular inmate from tlie genera(prison
population fOf an indeterminate period could not be characterized as cruel and unusual"). In
Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 581 (J 5t CiL 1983), for instance, the First Circuit hdo tbat
even "very extended indefinite segregated confinement in a nleility that provides satisfactory
sheher, clothing, food, exercise, sanitation, lighting, heat; bedding, medical and psychiatric
attention, and personal safety, but virtually no communication or association with feHow
inmates" is not cruel and unusual. OUf courts also have rejected claims that isolation becomes
IlnCDnstitutionaHy cruel or inhumane merely oecause of its indefinite or exteI)ded nature, though
they have noted that the temporal element may be a factor. See in re Long TennAdministratii'e
Segregation a/Inmates Designated as Five Percenters, 17.4 F.3d 464,472 (4th Cir. J999); Sweet
v. South Carolina Dep't a/Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir. 1975). The cases illustrate
that isolating detainees and limiting their ability to CommuniCate with other detainees, even if
psychologically taxing, is not inherently inhumane. Indeed, as l):nut Dormann, a leading
commentator on international humanitarian Jaw, has "bserved, "[s]olitary confinement, or
segregation, of persons in detention, is not itself inhumane treatment. It is permissible for
reasons of security or di~cipl inc or to protect the segregated prisoner frqm other prisoners or vice
versa." Elements of War Crimes 68 (further suggesting that such measures should be evaluated
on a Case-by-case bitsis).
Nevertheless, we recognize the str~jn that extended isolation may exact, particularly if
tbit isolation is not relieved by giving detainees access to other forms of mental stimulation, such
as books, wTitiug materials, games: and music. We understand that all detainees currendy have
access to such materials. We further understan(! that some oft.hese detainees have been slibject
to this condition for a few years. However, we do not beJieve that the duration of the isolation
excee<;Js the strictures of cO[l1mon Article 3. We view it as important that the isolation imposed is
tailored to security and intelligence purposes-that is, preventing the coordination of attacks on
facility personnel or false stories among co,conspirators. But we think that, at least at present,
the CIA's practice of keeping detainees in solitary confinement in which they are unable to see

====. ·-til4'il!k"'Wf!lH)t1IeF"d'el'<ljfl"ee;R'~'n"0t'-f,",...:,i€·8l!,rbYl)ommB1FA..'"ti:Gl<f:37-·"-==========="===

~~
9

._.

__......• - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -..__.__._-

3. The CIA plays white noise in the walkways of the detention facilities to prevent the
detainees from being able tO~DJmmullic2.te with each. other while they are being moved within
the fac·ility. Significantty,. the noise is not piped directly into the det;'ir.ees' cens, although it is
possible that the detainees are able to hear some ofthat noise In their celis, as the wa!!s that
separate the walkway from the cells are not soundproof Nevertheless, we can safely assume t:';at
the noise level in the ceBs is considerably lower than the level in the walkways; recent
measurements indicated that the noise Jevel in the cells was in the range of 56,58 dB, compared
"..ith a range of 68-72 dB in the waikways. The volume in the cells is thus comparable to that of
normal conversation. There is no risk ofhe.aring damage or loss even ITom 24,hour-a,day
exposure 10 sound at that level. We also understand that the CIA has observed the noise to have
no effect on the detainees' ability to sleep,
Us~d in this very limited way you have described, white noise does not violate iommon
Article 3. There is nothing inhumane about the incidental exposure of detainees to nair that is
no louder than tIle level of ordinary conversation and thaUs certainly rtot.loud enough to cause
physical harm or to interfere with sleep. Being exposed to such relatively insignificant noise
levels ca'n in no way be described as an act ofviolence. Nor does it represent an "outrage upon
personal dignity" within the meaning of common Article 3, Neitherthe purpose nor effect of the
white noise is to "cause serious humiliation or degradation" to the detainees, Aletkovski, supra, ~
56; instead, the noise, much like temporary blindfolding, is simply a limited measure aimed at .
.protecting the security of the detention facility by preventing the detainees from communicating
with each other. It calmot be characterized as an affrolit to human dignity.

..
. 4. The CIA also keeps the detainees' ce!ls illuminated 24-. . . .of
confinement allows CIA staff to monitor the detainees at all times
In
evaluating this condition, we find it significant that the light is not unusua!ly bright and that it
has not been observed to interfere with the detainees' ability to sleep normally. Indeed, ifthey
Wish, the detainees are permitted to cover their eyes with the blankets In their ceUs (or with
eyeshades) in order to block out the light while they are sleeping. Although this practice
presents a closer issue than some of the other condit1ons of confinement used by the CIA, we
ultimately believe that it .is consistent with COmmon Article 3.
.
The fulJ,time illumination oftne detainees' cetls is not inhercntly inhumane; it is not used
'in amannerthat impairs the basic human needs ofthe detainees. Nor is the security surveil!ance
thaUhe illumination makes possible inhumane'or otherwise contra to common Artic!e 3. To
be sure, we recognize that being monitored around the clock
could result in some degree ofMmiliation. But the very nature o' detention, which COmmon·
Anicle 3 cCJiainly does not forbid, is such that one must surrender a certain degree ofprivacy
. along with one's personal freedom. See, e.g:,Bellv. Jfolfi~h, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)
(observing that "[1]oss of freedom of choice and privacy are inberent incidents ofc.onfincll1ent").
This Inescapable fact must infann any analysis of the sorts of humiliations and degradations
forbidden by common Article 3. And where, as here, the survei!1ance is not undertaken
~~·'--=-"'gf[fulm1Y,wif!ii'fiej;i;jipoi~iifsiilpplif.i\"tretailiees.·oi'rti1'i¥'huDlaifdlgru@""u-"t=-=·=======

10

.--_._,-,---------------------------.!

insle3.d for entirely legitimate security rea'sOlls, we think that it does not represent all "outrageD
DDOD personal di nit" within the meanin oEcommon Article 3, (It Is sl -nincant in this re,gud

Our conclusion should not be understood t6 suggest that concerns about security win
negate common Article 3 's prohibitions on inhumane treatment and outrages upon personal
dignity, Cf GPW Commentary at 140 ("The requirement of humane treatment and the
prohihltion of certain acts inconsistent with,it are general and absolute in character.'} Instead,
the point, Whlch is reflected in the International case law applylilg common Articie 3, is that in
determining whether certain forms of treatment are in fact sufficiently outrageous to warrant
condemnation, one must consider the context in which that treatment is used and the reasons for
whi ch it was imposed, See:, e,g.; Prosecutor v, Mucic, ICTY 96-12 (Nov, 16, 1998), ~. 514
(holding that whether treatment is inhumine is a "question of fact to' be judged in all the'
circumstances ofthe particular case',); Afel!wvski, supra, V57 ("An Qutrage upon personal
d,gility is an: act which is aniinated by contempt for the human dignity of auother Person")
(emphasis added), Conduct, like the CIA's use of consti..~t illumination, thads not characterized
by a desire to humiliate or, degrade, but that instead is carefully tailored to advance a specific and·
manifestly legitimate security objective; and does so without causing unnecessary hardship, will
generally fall outside the proscriptions of subparagraph (c),
There is also support for this condition in other prqvisions ofthe Conventions_ GPW
l\.ItIcJ Ii 92 allows the detaining authority to' subject even prisoners of war recaptured after an
unsnccessful escape to "special surveillance," rhis term is not further defined, except to exclude
surveillance that "affects the state oftheir heaith" or suppresses "safeguards granted them by the
present Convention." In Pictet's Comment81y, this "special surveiJlance" has been referred to as
a ''[' tened ard," 3 PiClet, Commentary, at 452, Given that the Hluminatiori and the constant
a not thre.aten t,he health of CIA detainees,~
unavailable at the time· the ConventioflS were ra e , may very we
constitute permiSSIble "special surveillance" under Article 92, As explained above, tbe structure
of the Conventions makes clear that treatment explicitly permitted in certain circumstances as to
prisoners nfwar or protected persons cannot be understood to violate tbe minimum protections
provided by common Article 3,
.

5, We next consider the practice ofshackling detalnees when they are being moved
around !he deten.tion facilities or ,,:l1en CIA perso,nnel are in the room wltb them, You have
informed us that detainees are only shackled in situations where the CIA believes they might
pose a threat to the facility or those who work there, Detainees thus are not shackled in their
celis unless they have previously demonstrated that they are a threat while in their cells, Like
blindfolding, therefore, shackling is Jess a general condition "fthe detainees' confinement than a
particularized secnrity measure limited in its scope and duration, Indeed, we understand that, at
present, ,nO detainee is shackled 24 hours per day, In addition, shackling'is done in such a

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1J

'''----------------------------

shackled, detail\ecs alC able to walk comfoJ1abiy. used in this limited and (".","cfully calibnited
way, shackling does not violate common·Articie 3:
fn setting minimum standards specifically intended to apply to those "placed hoI's de
combat by ... detention," common Article 3 plainly contemplates that detention may be

, efr"eetuated by restricting the £~eedom of movement of detainees. 'That, after aU, is inherent in
lhe nature of detention. As such, common Article 3 'cannDt be read as proscribing the use of
restraints, such aq shackl.es, in all circumstances. Indeed, ifusing physical restraints were inherently inhumane, common Article 3 would effectively prohibit the involuntary detention of
anyone covered by the provision, a result that the text clearly' does not contemplate. At the same
time, however, it seems obvious that shackles could be used in ways inconsistent ;,ith the
general obligation of humane treatment. To restrain a detainee with shackles that injure the body
or cut offthe flow of blood could represent "violence to life .and person," if the resulting
suffering or physical harm were expected to be severe. Similarly, to keep a detainee in highly
restrictive shackles around the clock, at least where no genuine security concern ju stifies such
restraint, might well raise. questions.. W1lere rio security rationale exists, and the purpose ofthe
shackling is merely to humiliate the detainee or to break his spirit, additional commori Article 3
considerations would be present. 'fn evaluating the use of shackling, therefore, the task set by
common Article 3 is to determine whether the restraints are being used legitimately and in ways
that minimize the potential for injury or suffering.
..
Judged by these standards, theCL>\'s use of shackling, as a limited security measure, and
as you have described it, iii permissible. Critical to our analysis is the fuct that the CIA Carefully
tailors its shackling regime to the danger posed by an individual detainee. The shackles are thus
used. only when the detainee is in a situation in which he' might pose a t·hreat'(such as when he is
being moved around the facility) or when his past conduct has clearly. demonstrated his danger.
Also significant is our understanding that, while shackled, detainees are able to move
comfortably and ihat the shackles are fitted to avoid causing any bodily harm. These points
iJ!ustrate that the 'shackling here is linked to genuine and h;gitimate concerns about institutional
security, and is not imposed on detainees vindictively or in a way indifferent to their well-being.
Indeed, our conclusion might well be different were detainees routinely shackled in su'ch a way
as to .cause them physical pain or suffering without regard to the security risks they pose. But to
shackle a demonstrably violent or escape-minded detainee while he is in close proximity to CIA
personnel, where the shackles are merely a restraint and not a source of injury, is not inconsistent
with the requirement of humane tr~tment.

we

6. The next condition
consider is the CIA's practice of shaving the h~d and facial
hair of each detainee with an electrrc razor when the detainee initially arrrves at the detention
facil iiy. The shaving is not done as a punitive measure; its primary purpose is to prevent
detainees from hiding small items in their hair or bea.rds;as well as to' ensure the hygiene of the
detainees. Importantly, mandatory shaving only occurs upon amval; once the detainee is
situated in the facility, he is allowed to grow his hair and bead to whatever length he desires
(j,;ithin..iim.its .ofhygiene_and. safety}._M.Q[Ci).l!..Gl:,.YiLu_.bn v~jDfQLI1!t&L !!5...1h.al t~Q!A. QI.QylQS'2.detainees with the option of shaving ot'her parts of their bodles~cogmtlon of speCIflc lslamlc

12

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_

practices. Although we recognize that facial hair has an important culturd and religious
dimension and that some might perceive being invoiuntc:ry shomoftheir hair and beard as
degrading, we coochide that the very,' limited form ofsnaving th3t the CIA. practices is consistent
. with common Article 3. Context is important here. The shaving is a one-time measure,
performed a(the moment \vhen it most clearly and directly advances the CIA' s iDter~t in the
seCurity of its facilities. The fact that the CIA subsequently aliows detainees to grow their hair'
end beards In a manner di.ctated by cultural or religious preferenc.es iHustrat.es that shaving is not
'used here as a form ofhumiliatioD or degradation, but instead as a bona fide security measure.
The CIA does not shave detainees in order to ta..1(e advantage oftheir cultural or 'religious
sensitivities, or to exploit whatever psychological wlnerability that practi~e may create, To the
contrary, the agency makes eveTy effort, consist~i1t with its overaH security objectives, to
accommodate their detainees' desires, if any, to grow their hair and thereby to cp:oid humiliating
them. Used as described above, therefore, shaving is not "aimed at humiliating alid ridiculing"
the detainees, Addifional Protoedls Commentary at 873, and does hot amount to the kind of
outrageous or inhumane treatment forbidden by common Article 3. Nor does the incidental force
needed to accomplish the shaving remotely rise to the level of "violence to' ... person" .
prohibited by subparagr~ph (a) .
1

. Finally, we discuss whether the use of these conditions' in combination complies with
common Article 3. To this· point, we have discussed wheth'er ally one of these conditions would
violate common Article·3. We understand, however, that the collective weight of these
conditions may raise different questions. The detainee is isolated from companions of his
choosing, confined to his cell for much of each day, under constant sUf'ieillance, and is never
permitted a moment to rest in the darkness and privacy that most people seek during sleep.
These are not conditions that humans strive for. But they do reflect the realities of detention,
realities that the Geneva' Conventions accommodate, where p'ersons will have to sacrifice some
measure of privacy and liberty while under detention. They also are justitied by the
extraordinarily dangerous nature bfthese detainees, and the risk: that they will conspire to
compromise the security ofthe detention facility.
.
The Third Geneva Convention strikes a different balance between security, on the one
hand, and privacy and Hberly, on the other, with regard to prisoners of war. That Convention
also establishes a reciprocal arrangement. between captor and.·detainee under which dptainees, in
exchange for these greater privileges, have intenlationallaw obligation· to foUow the
reasonable rules ofthe facility. AI Qaeda detainees, who do not follow the laws of war, are not
part of such a reciprocal arrangement. Common A1iicIe 3 rests on the premise that ce1iain
.
persons, not subject to the elaborate protections of the Third or Fourth G~neva'Conventions, will
h ''Ie to be detained during the course of non·international armed conflicts, and we do' not believe
thot conditions in CIA facilities fall below the minimum standards·that common Article 3
mandates for such persons.

an

The detainees subject to th.e program are kept in sanitary conditions and are provided
lakes
reasonable steps to mltlgate tbe psycholog1ca stram 0 150 atLOn t roug

.....~lEQ. th~n~ce.~.s.i!ies._of ad eg':!ge. [(>9.<:1, c1_ot!?i.£lg,_§.lJ.e.ll:?£'!llQ.~j~i!!S!!!~ .. Ib!1..

13 .

_._'-._.-------------------------~----

1I11I11l11'md other diversions in the form of books, music, videos, and games, short of
i.nteractions with their co-combatants. Other measures--oosfructjng vision and shackling-are
iimited (0 the t)mes when detainees pose the greatest risk to the security of the facility and those
who work there. We do not beli.eve that ihe combination ofthese features falls below the
"minimum standard" of humanity specified in common Article 3.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that none of the conditions of confinement used .
by the CIA at its covert, overseas detention facilities, 'as you have described those conditions to
us~ violates common Artide J.
Please let us know if we can be ofuHiher assistance.
Sincerely,

Steven G. Braqbury
Acting Assistant Attorney Genem!

14

DOC 83

18 pages are withheld in full
pursuant to FOIA exemption b(5)

t1:.J:I. lb. aJIM"

.

1: 41:1t-'M

,

-----'--:.:._---~-------.;..----

.-

THE SEOFlETAI\Y OF STATE
. WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

. , .

.

'.

. Yesterday we discussed how the Oepartment ofStatevlcwed the'
,lntemationallegat obligatlons'that flow ftomCottirnon Article 3 ofthe
Oen~va COQyentioris, in comparison with other relevmrt legal ~ in
U.S. Jaw.
. .

,

,

. Our ,International pllI1nem expect that ~~U undettakO·good faith
intewretaticrns of the Conventions' text,consiste.nt with their object and
pwpose.. In a case wh~ the treaty's _ are inherently vagqe, it is
appropriate fora state to look to its own legal fr~ p~ents,'
, .concepts, and nomui in interp.reting these terms and C81T)'iIig out its
.inten1at'iOnat obligations. Such practice in theappliCli.tionotatreaty is ~
acCepted reference point in intem.atlonallaw.Thepropose<l legislation
would strengthen U.S. adh~ce to CotnmO!1 Article 3 ot'the Geneva .'
C0.D;ventions because it would add $e8n!npwdefinitlonarid olaritication' to
vague terms In the treaties:. "
,
.' .
,, .',
,.

,

"

.'

II} th~ ;Department's view;

,

there is not,:~ sbocld not be, ,any'

lnc~cr with respect'to'~e sUbstantive b.Vior that is. pt(lhlbltlild in·

paragraphs (a) and (0) ofSecti<m. 1of:Comi:IumArtic1o 3 and the behl!.vior .

· that is prohibited aa "cnJel,inhum$n. ordegradlng treatment or punishment,"
· as ~ phrase is defined in the U.S. mcrvatfon to the Convention Ag$imrt·
'. TQrtute. That Slibstantivestandard WllIlaiso l1tfJked by Congms in ~
.
Detainee Treatment Act Thus it is 11 !Cll$O%lllble, ~d faith iritorprctation of
Common Article 3 to state, as ~ propowllegislation does, tbst the
pmbibitiqns found in the DctaJneo Treatnent Act of ZOOS fully satiSfy tho
obligations of~'umted States with respect tothestan~ for· detention '.
and trmn1cnt.established
jntbose paragraphs' of. Common Article 3.
. ..
'.,
,

'

The Honorable
.
" john Waml:r, .
Chairman,

Committee on .AnnW Services,'
.Unikld States Senate.

· ..

' .,

..

.

.....

NO.b4::J

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.(FRI)PEa 18 Z007 1 ••.

,

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. . . . . . '· •• a/3r. ":3~/NO. al004Z95S8

p'

The Departlnent Of State supports !hI1l.tegisrluion 1lI14 we beli~e It .
'WIll,help dem~ to our international partnet1 that we are Comn1itted to
oomplianu witltCQn'u;non Artic10 3.
.: .
.' .. .
.-'.
.

.

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.

,
'.

"

..

..

.

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,

'

.

"

..

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. .
"

:

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L:0540,;409

DOC 269

-.."

C05409409
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG.ENCY

'.1'..

. NOTiCe Td J1ECIPIE~T . .

", f)OCUMSNT RECEIPT. Sign ,nd.~etu;~.'·dih.wn,""ReY'!"Ald. ,
SE'NDER OF ODCUMENTIS} . ' , ' . : '" I.RoOM.
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i1""iro n" T",
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COURIER' REG, NO"

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7/12/05
! !

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FORM 6158

6·86

us~ PREVIOUS EDITIONS

\

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.

1':12 ,lui ',0.0;

":'lQAn iiPCUIv1~NTI~}SENT
I' . .,h? ::rulv?'nO~

OpcUMEtff PATe

Assistant United States Attorn¢y
Eastern District of Vlrgtnia .
Alexandria, VA 22314 .... ,

rDATE SENT

,

DOC 59

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DCI/OCA/LIAISONj
OCA 200.4-Xt23

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.-

9/16/04

-" I

,The Honorable Edward J.

Distribution:
Original "- Addressee

1 - D/OCA
1 - ,E1WjOC.l\. __ I
1 Chron File

1 - DAC'-(Official OCA File)

PD

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C01525585
/'

Central Intelligence AfplOf

23 September 2004

The Honorable Edward J, Markey

aouse

of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

20515-2107

Dear Mr. Markey,
I appreciate your interest in and concerns about the
important issue of terrorist renditions as reflected in your
letter to the Acting Director of central Intelligence dated
15 July 2004.
Your Concerns about renditions and the questions about them
raised in your letter are matters that are subj.ect to the
regular and necessary oversight functions of the various
congressional oversight committees, as well as to the applicable
laws and conventions of the United States. r can assure you
that it remains the pel icy and practice of this Agency to be
fully and promptly compliant with these authorities as they
apply to the matter of renditions.
Thank you. again for your concerns and attention to this
issue.
Sincerely,

Director of congressional Affairs

C05409415

DOC 127

~

O()~~~~~

UNCLASSIFIED/

6 September 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:

Conversation With U.S. Attorneyl

I

REF:

I

I

. 1.
On 6 September 2005, I told
Assistant
U.S .. Attorney, Eastern District· of Virgin~a(EDVA), that
defense counsel Frank Spinner is scheduled to visit the
Washington area this week in order to review selected
materia.ls,. especially interview reports, from the case file
for' case
I I told~ that I was letting him
know this because otthe overl~or exam~ m~an~~y __
i n t e r v i e w = . ) between the two cases (~
Il. I
also told
that if he wanted more information about
which mater~a s CIA's Office of General Counsel (OGC)
intends to show Spinner, he should contact aGC attorne~'
'>:-::-:c-,--;::-::-::----;:,,-,--;:--;:;-;:---;~:_::_::c_:_=~~~~_;_;::_:;_:cc_:_;;::"~
lIet
know, too, that Ft. Carson prosecutor Major Tiernan Do an
will visit here this week in order to review the materials
that aGC intends to show to Spinner.

I

I

I

I

I

2.
said that showing case materials to defense
counsel is not uncommon, but he said he would prefer that
the defense counsel not be given hardcopies of the interview
reports.

I

I

3.
is reviewing the contents of the
case
file and expects to consult with Major Dolan later this week
about them.
I told her about my conversation withe
~
and she said OGC would contact him to discuss his concerns.

UNC~ASSIFIED/~

.
(b)(3)

C05417001
'75..
-\".

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_---.----:---._

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(b)(3)

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,-

~0000013

DOC 35
---- Forwarded by

--.J 0910310407:40 AM ----

IL

HANDLE FL----5NNELS ONLY

09102104 07:11 PM

To:

ce:

RizzoISTFIAGENCY@DCI,
Subject: Approval Authority to Extend lJse '--

I

---'

Per our conversation regarding the need to obtain approv~is for EITsl
I spoke with ,
Ito confirm that (1) the NSC does nol need to be involved In extending Iheuse of EITs
,u, "tat it is within CIA's authority io extend the EITs if needed; and (2) that he will ask the ADCI
wnether he wishes to be involved in the approvaj of the extension, but advised me to consider the 000 to
be the approval authority for an extension and reapprovals
mless he calls me and tells me the .
ADCI wants to be involved.

,.C05417001
!'

:t"

t""

".>i :."

T~T//(
HANDLE VIA ( - SHANNELS ONLY

To: cc:

09107104 03:50 PM

JOhn A. RlzzoISTFIAGENCY@DCI,
Subject: r\e: Approval Authority to ~xtend Use of EITs \'

'1)

Your understanding is correct.
Origlna, fext of ~
- ..• ~~'"

HANDLE VI.

:HANNELS ONLY

09107/04 12:06 PM

To: cc:

SUbject: Approval Authority to Extend Use of EITs

Nice to talK to you .• the above is my lotus notes address for future. Per our conversation and re the
DDO's questions, I underst8Nj that lor extensions of EIT there is no requirement to revert back to the NSC
(as in the extension for
unless there is a request for additional measures or techniques. That
is, the NSC does naVnot need to vet the· authority every 30 days but the required extension (30 day
review) is under DOO authority only. Thanks lor confirming.
.
. on 09107104 It:41 AM .._
.•.:.. Forwarded by.
HANDLE VIP

~HANNELS ONLY

09103/04 07:41 AM

To:

.AGENC' l!I'
,-""3Ef"CY@00

co:
SUbject: Approval Aulhmily to Extend Use of EITs

DOC 71

30 December 2004

Transmi tted by Secure Facs~ 11'.1 Ie
Dan Levin
Acting Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530
Dear Mr. Levin:
(TS/
,)
Please find enclosed a paper
describing a generic int;errog'at.ion process" that sets forth how
the Agency would eXpect to use approved interrogation measures,
both in combination and in sequence'with other teclmiques,
Our
hope is that. this letter \'Jill permit your office to render
advice that an interrogation following the enclosed description
would not violat8 the provision of 18 U,S,C. § 2340A,

(U//FOUO) If you have any questions, or wo~ld like
briefings, please contact me and I will obtain answers and/or
arrange'the required briefings.
Sincer8ly,

Associate Gen8ral Counsel
Enclosure

':) IA.~ M..• 'ik.-d. -k,

Q Lr.~

:s D~~. t)'--f

'Jil 'd- (T?~ (C <1._.

Background Paper on CIA's Combined Use of Interrogation
Techniques
Note:
This paper provides further background info=ation and
details on High-Value Detainee (EVD) interrogation techniques to
support documents CIA has previously provided the Department of
Justice.
This paper focuses strictly on the topic of combined use of
interrogation techniques.
The purpose of interrogation is to persuade High-Value Detainees
(hVD) to provide threat information and terrorist intelligence
in a timely manner to allow the US Govern..rnent ,to identify and
disrupt terrorist plots,
and to collect critical intelligence on al-Qa'ida
I

In support
of information previously sent to the Department of Justice,
this paper provides additional background on how interrogation
techniques are used, in combination and separately, to achieve
interrogation objectives. Effective interrogation is based on
the concept of using both physical and psychological pressures
in a comprehensive, systematic, and cumulative manner to
influence HVD behavior, to overcome a detainee's resistance
posture. The goal of interrogation is to create a state of
learned helplessness and dependence conducive to the collection
of intelligence in a predictable, reliable, and sustainable
manner.
For the purpose of this paper, the interrogation
process can be broken into three separate phases:
Initial
Conditions; Transition to Interrogation; and Interrogation.
A.

Initial Conditions. Capture,
contribute to the physical and psychological condition
of the h~u prior to the start of interrogation. Of these,
\\capture shock" and detainee reactions
are
factors that may vary significantly between detainees

All Po/tions Classified
TOP fRET//

I

TOP / :;?ECRET/

N~/MRI

,

,~

Regardless of their previous environ.ment and .
experiences, once an HVD is turned over to CI?~ n predictable set

of events

occur~

1.)

!2-endit'on,
a.

The HVD lS flown to a Black Site
~
A medica1. eXctrnination is conducted prior to

the flight.

securely

During t.be flight f

sh~ckled

th.e detainee is

and is deprived of sight and sound

through the uee of blindfolds, earm\2frs f and hoods.
T'here is

no interaction~with the BVO during this rendition
.movement exc,ept for periodic, discree.t ass€ssmet~ts by
the on-board rt;edical officer.

Upon arrival at the d~Etination airfield, the
HVD is moved to the Black Site under the S~~~
b.

conditions and usj.ng appropriate security procedures.

2}

Reception at ,Black Site.

The HVD is subjected to

adminis'Ct'ativ6 pz:ovedlll'es anql medical ass'essment i.lpon .
arriv~l at the Black SitB.

the RVD finds himself in the complete
oontrol of F2Uericans;

the 9rocedures h6'is sUbjected fo are
precise r quiet, and almost clinical; and no one is
mistreating him. While each HVD is different, the
rendition and reception proc~ss generally Creates
significant apprehension in the HVD because of the enormity
- ~''''-'-"--'-"'' ..... -, -and.¥ suddenness, o'£,.the _chang.e_ in envirop...r r.€nt, ¥the
uncertainty about whet will happen next, and the potential
dread an HVD, might have of US custody, Reception
procedures include:
a.

The EVD's head and face are shaved,

2

-< -NO.69t-----p.5:--~IH~l<
D,

A se~ies of photographs are taken of the HVD

while nude to docu,luent the physical ccndi tion of the
HVD upon a.rrival.

c, A Medical Officer interviews the HVD and a
medical evaluation is conducted to assess the physical
oondi tioD. of th$ HVD. The !nedical office:c alBo
determines if there are any CQntraindications to the
use of interrogation teQhniques.
d. "A Psycnolo.gist interviews the RVD t,o assess
his In..sn.tal state, The psychologist also dete,rmines if
there are any contr3.indj,ca.tions to the use. of

interrogation techniques.
Tx:ansiticning to Interrocrat.ion - The Init,ial Interviev~~>
Interrog~t.ors use the Initial Intervieliv to assess the initial
resistance posture of thIS HVD and to deter.:mine--in
relati'rfely

a

benign envirorrment--if the' HVD inten.d,s to willingl)1 partici}?ate
with C~A interrogat.ors. The stan:dard on lJattioipa,tion is setr
very high durincr the Initial Interview, The(RVD would have to
wil1in.gly provide information on actionable threats and location

information on High-Value

Ta~gets

at large--not lower level

,
'i
·\'1·
"""'nf
- erma t '~o~--r.or
lnterro-gators
\:0
cont'nue
.1."C.::':. t h,e neu t ra ....1

app:t:oach.

/

/

3

~!/

IliIO:lfOIDT, OROON! !M~-

//NO~/MRl

NO,69i

P,6

to RQS.· Once approved} the int~rrogation process begins
provid.e.d the requl:;;::ed media,al and PRychological assessn)e.nts
contain no contreindicatl'Ons to intorrogat~on
C,

Int~rroqatioQ.

For
descriptive purposes, these tBchniques can be separated into
three categories: Conditioning Techni~weB; Correotive
T~echniquesi

and Coercive Techniques.

rro mcre completely

describe the three categories of techniq'J.es and their effects,
we begin with a SQ~iary of the detention ccnditions that are
Hsed in: all C!I~ EVO facilities and··that
interrogation.a.

1)

E~isting

mB.\T

be a faotor in

-

detention conditions.

P~tention

conditions are not interrcga,tion tec1'-~J'liques,. but they hav:e
an impact on the detainee undex."going interrogation',

Specifically, the HVD vfill be ezposed to ,:hite noise/lo\1d
sounds (not to exceed 79 decibels) and constant light
during portions of the interrogation process. These
conditions' ptovide aq.d.itional operational security: white
noisefloud sounds mask conversations of staff melt'tbe!.'$ apd
deny the BVD any aUditory clues about his surroundings and
deter and disrupt the HVD's potential efforts to
co~~nicate with other detainees,
Constant light provides
an improved environ.,nent for Black Site security, medical,
P~ychological( and interrogator staff to monitor t110 HVD,

2) Conditioni~,g Techgiques, ThG RVDia typi,cally
reduced-to a baseline, dependent state using the three
-- - - - - - - -il'lterrogation techni,ques-disoussed below in combinatioR,··· --- -_.- _.. -,Establishing this baseline state is important to
demonst.rate to the !lVD that he has no oontrol over basic
human needs. The baseline state also creates in the
detainee a mindset in which he learns to ~eroeive and valUe
his personal welfare, comfort, and Ulli~ediate needs mcre
tha.n the informa.tion he is protecting~ The l1S6 of these
4

, 'N~,
CReON? /MRl ,

~IO.69i

·

P.?

J/~CON//MRl

."

conditioning techniques do not generally bring immediate
results; rather r it is the cumulative effect of these
techniques, used over time and in C'crrtbination with other

inter::cogation tecl'H,iques and intelligence exploitation
methods r which achieve interrogation objectives. These
conditioning techniques require littl.e to no ph'ysical
interaction between the detainee and the interroqator. The

speci fie conditioning interrogation techniques are ~
a. Nuditv. The HVD's clothes are taken and he
remains nude \J.ntil t.he interrogators p:covide clothes
t.o htrw.

b.

Sl~ep

Deprivation.

The HVD is placed in the

vertical shackling position to b~gin sleep
de.privation, Other shackling-. prooedures may

during interrogations.

J~e

used

The detainee is diapered for

sa.nitC1ry purpos·as, a.lthoug-h the diaper is rlot used at

all times,
c.

Dietary

manipulation~

The HVD is fed Ensure

Plus or other' food at regular intervals. The HVD
:C6'Oeiv6s a ta.rge:t of 1.500 calories per day per Ot'1S

guidelines.
3)
physical

c:orr~g_tive

Techniques, Techniques 'that re~;.li.te
the interrogato!" and detairH38

intera~ticn b~t1;1een

are used princLpally to correct, i:ltartle, or to achieve
anotber enabling objective \{ith the detainee.

These

techniques-the insult slap, ~nal slap r facial hold,
and attention gresp-ere not used simUltaneously but are
often used interchangeablY during an individual
interrogation ses·sion.

:rhese techniques generally ar'e Used.

~hile

the detainee is SUbjected to the conditioning
techniques outlined above (nuditv, sleep deprivation, and

dietary

--, - ,---- - -

-'.-

--

,

m~nipulatian) ~

Ezamples of application inolude:

a. Jrtsult Slap. The insult slap often is the
first physical technique used \<fith an HVD once an
inte,,-ro9ation -beg:ins...As noted,. the HVD may ..alre.ady_._..__..... _....
be nuder in sleep deprivation, and subjact to dietary
manipulation, even though the detainee will likely
feel little effect from thesa techniques eaJ:ly in the
interrogation. The insUlt slap is used sparingly but
periodically throughout the interrogation process \'!hen
the interrogator needs to
5

i~~ediately

correct the

NO.59i

JYC:C. 30. 2004

P.B

detaines or i?rovide a cons'equence to a detainee's
response or nop-respons'e ,; The interrooator \qill
continually assess the effectiveness of thE: insult
slap and continue to emp.1oy it so long as it has the
desired effect on the detainee. Because of the
physical dynamics of t.he vad.. ous techniques, the
insult slap can be used in conminatioh with water
dousing or" knee ling stresS' posi cions, OtLlsr
ar.e possible but may not be practical.

combina~ions

b.

Abdo!?J.nal 81 ap.;

The abdcminal slap iB

similar to the insult slap in application and desired
resul t.

It provides the variation p.,ecessary to keep a

high level Of unpredictability in the interrogation
prpcess.

The abdominal Blap will be

us~d

sparingly

and periodically throughout the interrogation process
when the interrogator wante to immediately correct the
detB.inee

and the interrogator will

r

continually assess its effectiveness,

Because of the

phyeical dynamics of the various techni.q-cles { the
abdominal slap can be u:sed in combination with water

dousi.ng r stress positionsr and wall standing, other
cotr~inations are possible but may not be practi.cal.
c, Facial Hold~ The racial, hold is a
corrective tec~Lique and is used sparingly throughout

interrogation,

The facial hold is not painful and is

use? to correct the detainee in a way that

demonstrates the ihterrooator's control over the HVD,
Beoause of the physical, dynamics of the various
techn.i.ques r the facial hold can be used in oombination
with water dousing r stre~s positions, and \J.ral.l
stanqing. other combinations are possible but may net
be practical.
ri,

It may be used several times in the
same interrogation. Th1.s techniqt16 is usually applied
grasp the HVD and pull .him
6

T~Jfl'li

______
/1'10.691
I/N~OR.CONIbMRl

P.9

.Lni.:.o, close proximity of the inte'rrogato!' (face to

face). .Beoause of the physical dyn",'1'ics of the
various techniqu65 t the attention grasp caD be used in
corubination w~th water dQusing or kneeling stress
posit-ions. other' combinations are possib,l.e but may
not be practical.
4)

Coercive Techrlio-ues,

Certain interrogation

techn.iques place the detainee in more phy-slcal and
psychological stress and, therefo~e( are considered

~ore

effective tools in pe,rsuading a resistant. HVD to

participate Hith eli". inte:erogatol's .. These techniques-stress pOBit.i.ons, wall standinqr
and cramped confinement--are typioally not u~ed in
oonmination, although some oombined use is possible. Eor
example, an avo in stress ,poaition$ or wall standing can P8
water doused at the spme time. Other combinations of these
techniq~es may be used while the detainee is being
sUbjected to the ccndiLionina teohniaues
discussed above
.
walling, water dot,ising"

-

(nu.dity, sleep deprivation, and die.tary :1\anipulation),

Examples of coercive techniques includer
a. Walling. Walling is one of the most
effective interrogation teohniq~es becauss it weerS
down the aVD physically, heightens un~ertainty in the
detainee ab0~t what the .interrogator w~ydo to him,
and creates a sense of dread when the EVD knows he is
about to be 'walled ag'ain.

\1."Cer.r;ogator
An. HVD may
be walled one time (one impact with the wall} to make
a point or brenty to thirty times oor,secutively when
the interrogator requires a more significant response
to a question. During an' interrogation sess'ion that
is designed to be lntense, an RVD will be walled
mUltiple times in the session. Because of the
__ P0Y8j.C9-~ q,"YTi2J.]1'4QS· 0'£, walli·no" it is impractical to .iA~~

it simUltaneously
techniques,

'with ·othe; '~orrectiv~

or"

coeroive

b. Water Dousing. The freqliency and duration of
dous.ing applications are based on water
temperature and other safety considerations as

T~Tater

7

TO~ET!

established by OMS gUidelines.

It is an effective

interrogation technique and may be used frequently
\{Ithin those guidelines. The physical dynamics of

water dOllsing are such that it can be used in
combination with other corrective and coercive
techn.iques. A.s noted above, 2Xt HVD in stress
positions or' \'lall standing oan be \lister doused.
Likewise, it is possible to use the insult slap or
abdominal ;3}a? ~."ith an ,HVD during I-later dotLSing.
q,
St.ress: positions. 'I'he fr.equen.oy and duratio;rl
of use of-"-the st"ress positions are based on. the

interrocator's assessment of their continued
effeoti~eness during interrogation. These techniques
are usually se1f~liruiting in that temporary muscle
fatigue usually leads to the HVD being unable to
rr~intain the stress position after' a period of ti~e,
Stress b">ositions requiring the HVD to be in contact
Viith the wall can be used in cornbination with water
dousing and abdominal slap.' st,r<7;$S po~iticn$
requi-ringthe HVD to kt1eel can be used in c!,?mbination
with water dousing, in$~lt slap, abdominal slap;
facial hold r and attention grasp.
d. ;~all Standing. The frequency and duration of
wall standing arB based on the interrogator's
aaseBsrr~nt of its contin~ed effectiveness during
interrogation, Wall standing is usually self-limiting
in that telnporary muscle fatigue ,-,suaHy leads to the
HVD being unable to maintain the position after a

per iod of· t i me.
Beoause of the pnysica 1 dynamics of
"the' various technique,s r wall standing" can be uS'$d in
combination ;lithwatel: dousing and abdorninal slap.

While other
praotical.

.....

co~binations

are possible, they may not be

e,
Cramped Confinement" Current Ol~S gUidance on
the durat.ion of cra.mped confinement limits confinement.
in the large box to no more than 8 hours at a time for
. ng P\pJ;:e... :t:t!.an 18 hours a dav r and confinement in t.he

small box to

'...

2 ·"h·ol~rs-"

~-,...-

--,

---"------.-.--."---~--,

Because of the unique
- - ,-,.
aspects of cramped confinement, it cannot be used in
,

)

8
.,~

P.1i

combination with other Gortective or
techniques.

coerc~ve

0\
I~terrQq,'2iti..on - J.. day... to"'day look~
'U\J..S section
provides a 'look at a 9rotbtyp~cal inte,r,rogation with an 'ernphasis
on the. applica tion. of irlter?='oge.t'ion techniqu.2s/ in c?mbination
and s893.rately,

).
/

. - ._- - ,- - - -_··_-_.. ~"-.2_)~ _. Ses.s.i.on. Dne

...

*

..•

_ .•

._,~"_

.w • • _ _

•

__

•

~.,

. •_ , _ ••

••

.,. _ _

a. The HVD is brought into the interrogation
room! and under th 9 direction of the interrogators,
stripped of his clothes, and placed into shackles

9
i!!~

• __ •

._",_,.

__ ,

IJC:C. 32L 2004

18: 2SA!1

,

/ I~IQ;;'ORN i Oi-l/:'.O'if/ /1!i'R'l

T~f

'.

b.

1'!O.691

P.12

The KVD is placed standing with his back to

the tqalling \.;a11

<

The HVD remains h.ooded.

c.
Interrogators approach the HVD 1 -place the
\>falli:v; c;ollar OVer his head -and 2:r-ound his neck! and
stand in front of the HVD.

Ot

The interrogators remove the RVD's hood and

explain the HVO's situation to him( tell
hi!'(\. that the interrooat.ors will do :;lhat it tak.es .to

get important info::mil.Uon, and that he oa11 improve his
corHiitions lrtl!n€diatelY by participat.ing with the
interroqa.tc1:S. The insult slap ,is rtorrnally used as'
soon as tt1e HVD does or says anythin,g inconsiste.nt
with thB interrogators! instructions.
e.
If

i.nsul t slap or

_~£:domi.nal

appropriate, an

slao will £0110\1;

I

The interrogators will likely (lse \1aUing
becomes clear tbat the HVD is lying,
,·,itufl"olding infoz:mation r or using other !:'8sistanoe
techniques .
f.

ahce

Xl;

.

g~

The sequence

may continue for several more iterations as the
interrogators continue to 'measure the HVD 1 8 resistance
pastureahd apply a negative consequence to the aVD's
resistance efforts.

...... - -

h. The interrogators, assis~ea oy security
officers (for security purposes) will plaae the aVD in
_- _ th.e center. of .. the. interrog'atioo.rQom in.. toe. :l'el;:J:Jp_"l....__ __,
shackling position and diaper the RVD to begin sleep
deprivation. The aVD will be provided with Ensure
Plus (liquid dietary supplement) to begin dietary
manipUlation. The HVD remains nude-. White noise
(not to exceed 79d.b1 is used i.n the interrogation

10
'I/NOFOlt.!i,.("',.0GG:lI!JJifal
..:.:.

a

..

1','0.681

room.

P.13

rrhe first interrogation sess},on t.erminates at

this point.

..,

fro~

j.
This fieet .tnterrogation sessi.on may 'last
30 minutes to several hours based on the

interrogators) assessment of the

b~rD's

resistance

poetllre,

The three Conditioning Techniques were \l.s'ed to

bring the h\TD to a baseline, dependent state
conductive to meeting interrog'aticn objectives in
timely manner.

'0.

The tirue period

b~tween

5:

Session One and

Session Ti>lO could be as bd~f as one hour OJ:' more than

24 hours

.. ~'

11

·

//~

NO.691

P .14

In addition, the
medical and ~sychological persorillel observing the
tnterrogations must advise there are no
contrainclicatioDe to another interrogation se6sion.

b.

C,
Like the first session, interrogators
aJ;lproecr, the HVD, r1ace the walling collar ovel: his
head and around his neck, and stand in front of the

HVD.

d.

Should the HVD not respond
~~estioner the
interrogators will respond with an insQlt slap or

appropriately to the first

abdominal slap to set the stage for further
questioning, .

12

P.i5

e.

The interrogators
will likely use \')d,llinq: once, interrogators det.e.r.mine

the RVD is intent on maintaining his resistance
posture.
f. The sequ0Dce
may continue for mUltiple iterations as the
Lnter'rogators conttnue to measure the HViY s resistance

posture,

g.

To increase the pressure on the hvD[

water douse the HVD for several minutes.

b.. ''Ihe interx:oqators r assisted by security
.. ~.
officers, will place the HVD back into the vex'tical,-;"
~hackling position to resume sleep deprivat~on.
~
Diet.ary manipulation also continues, and t.he llVD
.
remaine nude, \1hite noise (hot to e""ceed 790b) is ,.

used in the interrogation room.. The interrogation
session ter~inates at this point.

r

i, As noted above, the du.ration of this session
may last f~om 30 minutes to several hours based on the
interrogators' assessment of the HVD's resistance
posture. In this example of the second session, the
following techniques vlere used: sleep deprivation,

nudity, dietary manipulation r \>lallinqf water dousi.ng,

attention grasp, insult slap, and abdorr~nal slap. The
three Conditioning Techniques Here used to keep the
HVD at a. baseline dependent state aJ1d to weaken hie:
r~$ 9.1 Ye~ q.]l9-. ~:.i].. ,,1 .to. ~~.§ _i,?.t..... ~., . .In QO!1lP.in-a~J-q21; wi tJ-l.. ti.'ts§e._.
three techniques, other Corrective and Coerciye_
i
Techniques were used throughout the interrogation
session based on interrogation objectives and the
interrogeto~Sr assessment of the RVDt's resistance
posture,
l

.- -'- . _. -- ,. - ,- - .. _<

T

/

13

~Tl

_ •••

,,0> _ _ "

._,

Lk.C.36.202J4

.

10:29AM

4)

'.

~//

.

.-.JIO' 691
.

'fN:~l

P.16

Session Three.
d.

In additi9n, the .medical and
psychological personnel obs~rvinq the interrogations
must find no contraindications to conti-nued
irrterrogatian,
b. The H'il'D remains in sleep dep;:) vatior~l gietafY_.
nla,nJ.pulation and is nude,

0,
Like the ~arlie'r sessions! i:ne HVD begins the
session standing against the walling wall with the
wa.lli~ng

collar around his neck.

ct,
I.f the Fv.D is still maintaining a rssLstaD;c$
posturer -inter'Z'oqatot"s will conti.l1ue to use 11all.ing
and water dousing. ~~11 of the Corrective Techniqu,es,
(insult slap, abdominal $laPr facial hold, §;ttentio,,"_
grasp) may 'be used several times during this sessio"
,based on the re~rpon3es and actions oI'the HVD.
St.t"e~s
pOEi tions and };Iall sts!lding will be integrated into

interrogati.ons
Intense questioning and walling would be repeated
mUltiple t.imes.

-. -

Interrogators will often use one technique to support
another. As an 6xample( inte~rogat'or$ 'Would tell cui
HVD in a stress position that he (KVD) is going back
to the ;ial.ling ,;a11 (for \,alling) if he fails to hold
,the stress position until told otherwise by the HVD.
This places additional stress on th.e HVD I,'lho typically
- ----- ---I'iilLtry to hold. the stress .position .fQra/\ .1ot\gM _._
possible to avoid the wallina wall.

the

14
'~M!<1 __ ..

_

.

inter:cogators

~!ill

'"',. r
,. ',c' J '!Mlh
•I'
~
',.

NO.69i

P.!?

remi.nd the HVD that hB. is

for this treatment and can stop it at any
time by cooperating \V'l th the interrogatoTs.
r€s~on3Lble

e.

The interrogators, 6ssiated by security

officers, will plece the HVO back into the vertic~l
shackling position to resume sleep deprivation.
Dietcry manipula.tion also continuEs, 2nd t:h<;; HVD
remains nude, White noi,=?8 (not to exceed 79db) is
u.sed itt the inter,rogation ,room. The inter:rogat:l.orJ
Bession term.inates at this point. In this exa;.'nple of
the. third session, the following tee-Dn:igues '''ere u.sed:

sleep deprivation, nUdity, dietalY manipulation,
walling, if/atec dousing, attention grasp I insult slap,
abdominal slap, stress positions, and NaIl st2.nding.

5)

Continuing Sessions,

Interrogation techniques assessed as being the most
effective \'!il1 be emphasized while t'echnique.s tl.1ill little

assessed effectiv$l1ess :;..Jill be minimized.
a.

b.

The use of cramped

conf~nement

may be

introduoed if interrogators assess that it will,have
the appropriate effect on the HVD.
c,

d.

S.le.e,p depri'tration may continue to the 70 to

120 hour range, or possibly beyond for the hardest
resisters, but in no case exceed the lBO-hour timelimi,t.

Sle-ep dep:ri vation tJlill end socner if the

medical or psychologist observer finds
15

T~!,

.

!L

TO~TII.

__ ~ __ •

~

_'I~dRv:JL'<1

contraindications to continued

sle~p

/MRl

N().b~'

.

.

1-l.18

deprivation.

e.

g. The int.ertogator$l objective is to transition
the H\TD to a point where he is participating in a
p.redictable, reliable,an,d sustain~ble manner ~
.
Interrogation techniques may still. be applied as
required, j;)ut become les8 rre<Iuent "

This transition perioJ lasts
trom several days to severa.l weeks based on the HVDs
responses and actionSt
h~
The entir~ interrogation process outlined
above, including-transition, may last fox thirty days

16
.{~1

//)iI.OrOffi;f 1 ORWISI/'7MRl ,-, ---

TO~'l'"

On everage, the actual-use of
interrcgat ion technique i
can vary upwards to fifteen days based
on. tbe resilience of the [1vD.

If the interrogation
team anticipates the potential need to USe
interrogation techniques b~yond the 30-day approval
perj.od( it \t!.ili submit a ne\4 interrogation pIe.n to HQS
for evaluation and approval.
2•

SUlllffia ry

1

~

Since the start of this progrcffi r interrogation techniques
have been used in cowbination and separately to achieve
critical intell:Lgence cotlect.ion objecti~ijes.

~

The use of interrogation techniques in combinatiorr ie
essehtial to the creation of an interrogation environment
oOliclucive to intelligence collection, HVDs are \>Ie11tra~nedr of~€n battle-hardened terrorist operatives, and
highly aorr:u"'ttitted to jihad. They are intelligent and
resourceful leader-s and able to resist standard

interrogation approaches .

•

•

Howeyer, there- is 110 template or .script that states IJlith
certainty when and how these techniques will be used in
combination during interrogation. However, the ex~mplar
above is a fair;" representation of hoy) these techniques
actually employed,

a~e

17

/I~i

~

All CIA interrogations axe Gbuducted en the basis of the
\\least coercive meas.ure ll principle, Interrogato.t's eIllploy
, 1 t erroga ;
" " ,In an escaJ.2 t_lng
'
.1.!'
,-lon
'Lec.on1.ques
rr.anner
consistent with the HVD's responses ."ind actions.
<

Int~lliqBnce

production. is more sustainable over the long

term if the actuf..l use of int6rrocrati.on
t.echniaues:
.
.
~

~

dirrd.nishes steadi ly and the inter:roga t ion envi.r.onlner-.. t

improves in accordance with the WVD!s demonstrated
consistent participation with the interrogators,

,
)

18

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.

OOCO()31

DOC 73
QUESTION: Under whatconditions were you holding these ItyDs"
·.i

ANSWER
•

We are not going to discuss the details of the program.

•. I can advise you, however, that thec~nditions were not abus;~eand cpmplied
with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture a6.d Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and, more r~ently, with the
provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
...

QUESTION: What interrogation techniques did you use against these pedple? Did you
.
torture them? Did you use waterboarding?
ANSWER:
•

We aie not going to discuss the details of the program.

•

I can ·advise you, however, that interrogations were conducted in COilfom\.~nce
with the US Constitution, US statutes, including the federal anti-torture statute,
and.US obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel;..
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
.

QUESTION:
ANSWER:

•

QUESTION:· Why did you need to detain these individuals in secret facilities for up to
four and 1/2 years?
.ANSWER:
•

Some of these individuals continued to provide.important and valuable
intelligence during the entire period'of their detention.

•

The primary reason to keep them detained was to keep them from returning to the
fight; to keep AQ off balance on exactly who we had captured and might be:
~ooperating; and so that 'at the appropriate time, they could be brought to justice
in America.

TOP

CRm

tr054 ~~?0 2 :':'·~?7ql!!,~f'~~1~~~i~!~1:~~'~;'ri'f"~;7"J'1r',.''::'. .'
·~~I

""

QUESTION:. Why didn't you mQve the individuais to Guantanamo once you detained
them? What was accomplished by a secret detention program that Couldn't be
accomplished at Guantanamo?
ANSWER:
•
! "

There was and

is no legal requirement to move them to Guantanamo.

•. By keeping their detention secret, we gained an advantage over a1-Qa'ida because
they could not be certain who was in US custody and possibly cooperating.

QUESTION: Did their countries of nationality know that you were holding them?
ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

QUESTION: Where were you holding them?
ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

QUESTION: Did the countries in which you were holding them know that yOll were'
running secret detention facilities in their territorY?
ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

QUESTION: How did each individual come into your custody?
ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing anyoperationalaspects of the program.

QUESTION: Did you transfer any ofthese individuals to other countries and laterre.assume custody of them?

.'.

~".'C'. 05409,3 0 2 "",,)1!r,f\'m';{(~<ft;~;!':i:9:'F:M£~~~!'~'"
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ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing any operatiomil aspects of the program.

QUESTION: What were the criteria for holding someone in secret detention, as opposed'
to transferring them to Guantanamo?
ANSWER:
•

We are not discussing any operational aspects ofthe program.

QUESTION: Were they individually screened? By whom?
ANSwER:
•

We are not discussing any operationa(aspects oftheprogram.

QUESTION: Did you pick up anyone who was not who you thought he was?
ANSWER:
•

....

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

QUESTION: How many people have been subject to this program over its lifetime?
ANSWER:

•

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

: C0 S:· 4" '0''9''''3 O· 2·''<''·'''''0,~~,,;.!Mj'1f\)il'.l@'l!l''l'Jmt:bi;l'3ili~'
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.

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.

TOrRET.
QUESTION: Did you transfer everyone who had been in yoUr custody? Did yciu
transfer every to Guantanamo?

ANSWER:

•

We recommend not answering this question because once we answer, we will be
expected to answer whenever we take a new a'etainee.

QUESTION: What did you do with the people you didn't transfer to Guantanamo?
ANSWER:

•

We are not discussing any operational aspects of the program.

QUESTION: If you transferred sOlne pack to their countries of origin, did you seek
humane treatment assurances? Are these people n()w being secretly held in those
countries?
ANSWER:

•

The CIA complies with US law and does not render any person to a country in'
which 'if it is more likelythan not that he would be tortured.
.

•

CIA obtains credible assurances from foreign governments that the rendered
person will be treated humanely and that their human rights will be respected.

QUESTION: Do any HVDs remain in undisclosed locations?
ANSWER:

•

We recommend not answering this question because once we answer, we will be
expected to allSwer whenever we take a nejjl detainee.
.

•

If we answer, no.

DOC 74
(b)(3)

TOP SECRET
Qs & As - CIA
Q: Under what conditions were you holding these BVDs'?
Q: \Vhal interrogation tcchniqlles did )'OU use against these p.:::.nplc'f Did yrm lorture

them? Did you use. v,;aterboardhig?

Q: ,\;Vhy did you .need to d.etain tllese individuals in secret facilities for up to five years?
Q: Why didn't you move the individuals to Guantanamo once you detained them? What
\',las acoompllshed by a secret detention program tl1ut eouldn't be accomplished at

Guantanmno?
Q: Did their countries of nationality know that you were holding them?

Q: Where wcreyon holding them"
Q: Did the cOlmtricsin whicl1 you were holding thew. know that you were running secret
detention: facilities in their territory?
Q: How did each bdividlial. come into your custody?
Q: Did you transfer any or these individuals to othereoul1tl1es and .Jater re-aSSUme
cu~tody

ofthem?

.Q~

\Vhat wete the criteria for holding someone in secret detention\ as opposed to'
transferring bim to Guantanamo?

Q: Were they individually screened? By wbom?
Q: Did yon pick up anyone who was not wboyou thought he was?
Q: How many people have beeo subject to tilis program over i,s lifetime?

Q: Did you transfer everyolle who had been in your custody? Did you transfer everyone
t() Guantanamo?
Q: \Vhll did you do with people you didu't transfer to OuanlamlUlo?
Q: If you transferred 80mB people back to their eountTies of origin, did you seek hillDanB

treatment assllIances? Are these peoplenDw being secretly held in those cOl1ntties?
Q: Do Ilny HVDs rcmaill in nndisclosed locations?

-

• Till¢'

Ri@l

'n

n

Nwrt

TOP SECRET
Qs &As- CIA

Q: Under what conditions were you holding these' BVDs?
Q: What interrogatjon ~echniqu6s.did you use againsl these pe.op1e? Did yon tonure
Chem? .Did y.ou
watel'boarding?

use

Q', \Vhy did Y0U need to detain thes~ Individuals hI sec.ret facHiti.6S for up to five y~ars?
Q: \Vhy didn~t you move theindividu<1ls to GUfllltaU8J1'lO once youdctdned them? \Vhat·
was accomplished by <:. secret detention program: that couldn't. be accomplished at
Gnant<:illUrUQ?

.Q: Did their countries of nationality know the,[ you were holditlg the.m?
Q: V,ihere were you holding them'?
Q: Did the. cQ\l1Jtries in which you were holding them know that you were rUJJl1hlg secret
deten60n facilities in their territory?

Q:How di.d each individual come into your custody?

Q: Did you transfer any o!'these individ\l1Jls to other countries and later re-assume
custody of them?
Q: \\il1at were the criteri~ for holding someone in secret det!lIltioil, as opposedto
tranufcrring him to Guantanamo?

Q: Were they individually screened? By whom?
Q: Did you pick up a~yol1e who was not who you thought he was?

Q: Bov,' many people have. been subject to this program over i.ts hfelime?
Q: Did yo~ tr,,"sfer everyone who had been in YO\1r custody? Did you transfer everyone

to Gual1tanamo?
Q ~ \Vhat did you do with people you didn l~ transfer to GU8nt.'t"1amo?
Q: If you tran~forred some people back to their countries of origin, did you seek humane
tre~tment assurances? Are tbese people now being secretly held in those cowltrles?
Q: Do any HVDs romaln in undisclosed locations?

aM

nlm

"milA

Doe 21
C05431961

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ROUTING AND RECORD sHEET

\
SUMeT !Opl[a,,3l)

(Vj Status of Action Pending on Insp~ctor General Report
EY~!""

FROM

Acting Director of Central

Jntalfig~oce

I

NO.

jO'"
-

TO [Ollie." du"Qf'l~ll'on. ,~m, ll>d I>vildi~1I'1

O.n;
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09/15/2004

COMMENTs l~vmlHH elll;h (;omm~nt tb"s'how from whom
to whom. Draw a Unit J,C/Q$$ c¢luml'l after each <:omment.)

Please note response date no later than 22

1. Deputy Director for Operations

2· AM.....,..

l"mAt.S

.

September 2004.

1

CQunsel

3.

4.

6.

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.'l'Ol?·SECRE,

'---------

15 September 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Acting General Counsel
Deputy Director for Operations

FROM:

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:.

(u)
Status of Action Pending on Inspector.
Gener.al Report
(.TS.)
.. __.:=bcI Memo to the Inspector
General; dtd'2l June 2004,
'Recommendations Contai~~d i~ the Special
Re\riew of Counterterro-r:\:,'1'1" /D<ltention and

REFERENCE;

Interrogation

Activitie~~

1.
(UllA±UO) I have recently reviewed the former
DCI's decisions regarding the Inspector General's
recommendations as set forth in the referenced memorandum.

2.

~":r::ill

th.ose act10ns
dp<,,;isi~ns

Please prepare a status report on
undertf~n to' comn]"

concerning

lAd th the fanner

1

DeT Sf
I

__. _. __

-1

c==:bontained in the "Special. KeVl.ew or: \..; I')l1ucerterrorism

Detention' and Interrogation Activities' I
_..-.1
Your response should be provided to me· and to the Inspector
General no later than 22. September 2004.

r

---~

.~.

McLaughlin

C05417002

I,
,

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(b)(.1 )
(b)(3)
(b)(6)

DOC 45

. ,,;'

OOOQ04i
0300202
--.--.

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To: JOlmA. RiuoISTFIAGENGY@DCI

02102105 01 :38 PM

CO:\-_·····

._-_.__._._,--

J

SUbjecl: M(,;: uran ULC opinIon on comomea techniques has arrived[i,

Agree this should be limited to lawyers. I thought, though, thal-perhapsC·"1'Ias EIT briefed. 'The
Gxperl:, of cour~e, 1s [
]
Original Text or John A. Rizzo@DGI -

- I

-

-'-'---==:1
John A. RIZ2o~OCI

-.

OGO
02102105 01 :26 PM

Subject: He: Draft OLe opinion on combined t~-ennlq1Jes has arrlved~

Who are 'a' few others" al DOD? r'~cleared Into EITs, and perhapsL•. :=:=:Xcheck on this) b~t
no one else In DOD OGG, as lar asr~ OUlslde of lawyers, I don't see this IS any 01 anyone else's
business on the DOD ooilev side.
Original Text 01

C-=--===J

- - - - - - - - ----------,
I
'-------;------1-----'
l._.
_
02l0?J05 12:56 PM

To: ~hn A. RlzzolSiF_:.-/::..A=G::EN~C::..Y:..:@::D::C:.:I,,--

cc:

i!

I
I

i

---'
Subject: ural't OLe opinion on combined tecnniques has arrived

==;:::=====rl

~T / /'e-

/20300202

OLC wants our comments ASAP (if w~ have any hopes of having it completed and signed by COB Friday).
OLe also asks if its QK to share this draft opinion with appropriately cleared DOD (Jim Haynes, I,-_~ ...
t
ind a few others) and Stats attorneys (currently only two, Will Taft and now also John Bellinger).

~ 
Jr--------"""~VI20300202

, .,

TO~CRETr,

lIA.!\'D!:EVU..

DOC 80

lil'r:m1

ONLY

_
FAX COYER s:mJIE;T
Central futellige:lloo Agen'eY

Wash.ingtOll, DC 20505

5 August 2@'04
To: i DOJ Com.mand Center
i POl'
Dan Llilvfn
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COn\l11enti: (ElfIN})) Dan, A letter :resp(J:.l'l.ding ttil' the
qucestimls yIJ'U pQs:ed at yesterday's meeting, T"lJJl;l1k Y-IHil..

NOTICll TO RECI?rENT

St,,,,,

irJer.dEd s61clPj"""l1e 'iSe ojtb. clJlit:y ~r l'limll m'lIIr.tl.buvo alianlsfJ III")' be af1ffll/l)'-erlell(
-eXGiJl.f.'1tfrtin1 dls~(J'e utU!lJf iWpllcrthle la.w. lfyou are no-t the ir.t-.;>r,d@1 reaipilmt f)ftM~facsimil;j, (r'!' th:~ empJuyee.. <Nt
agell.l 't'4!$pIJl'l:3ible for de/.fvenng ihr: mlMSage 'I" the lnr;md~.d- 1'Mlpient you ats hereby 1U;!ifi~d ff.t:: "MCetp: ojYMs W&8$t:trJa not a \+'4f\.'5!r or 'i'Ttle~
TiM illfermllfi<", Is prop"'1Y oftl", lln1td

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prohfbHed. ]JyOti have recetwxi tfJb ffl(ftelia1 if, &'!'Or, pl:uzs/t. fWffty tlli,s offiae at the a:bov-~ telephone 7ilf.'ilb$1' (GOl1eet) jOt 'ir,str~atIOlfS 1\!g"(t:n#~~git$
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ONLY
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F',2

'J)Ol? Jc.."UST!
HAND!':" V'Ll\. '

5

~~ugust

2004

Transmitted by Secure Facsimi.le
Da!l Levin
Acting Assistant Attcrney General
office of Legal Couuesl
Department of Justice
Washington, DC 20530
De-a:r Mr. Le'vi n r

(~I

,OC)

This letter responde to the questions

you aY(d membsrs of your office raised in a meeting yesterday
ce.nt.er regardir'-9' use

liJith officers from the- DcT Counterte.:crorist

o,f the '\>iaterboard

as

a·n inte,rrogation techn.ique"

SpecJ..ficallYt

you asked whether the Agency had limits in place for the
dUJ;'c,tion of each application of t;.Jater, tor eaoh ses'sion of the
"lateJ::board, for hOl~ many waterboard sessions may be held in any.
on.e day, and tor hOI'1 many days the \{sterboard techniqu<l .could be

applied.

Answers to your
. GC)

qu~stions

follow .

Our guidelines.

·Approvals for use of the waterbcard last for only 30
that 30-day period, the waterpoard may not pe used
en more than 20 days during that 30-day period.
a.

~lring

days.

b.
not

The

eXQ~ed

nurr~er

of waterboard 8$ssions on a given day may

four.

c. p.~ wate:cboard Ilsession rl is the period of t.itRe it'! whioh' a
subj eet is strapped to t...ite ~Jaterboard before being ,removed.
It
may involve multiple applications of w'at'er. You vl$.te informed

yesterday that our Office of Medical Services had established a
ses·.s~.ons. !'hat \.,'135 in

20 ....rninute ti1.n.e limit for waterboard

ll.lillDLB VIA

WOIi' spt:J.l..ElW/

'JO~M

'/~

'M:R1
JOIN,,!,,!
'-'

..

OMS has not established any' time limit f-or a.

0rror ~

session

i'J~at.erboard

f

d:.

An t1applioaticn 1r during a \'late:rboard ses·S.:Lon is the
time p$riod in i,'Jhich 1,":a~ter is poured on the cloth being beld on
the subj eot 1 s face. Under the DeI interrogation (juidelines ( the
time of total. contact of \"",ter l1ith the race ~lill not exceed 40
seconds.
B/.2con:ds f

The vast majority of applications are less than 40
many for fe'i,'ler than 10 seconds.
Indi'l:j.dual

applications lasting 10 seconds or longer will be limited to no
more than 10 applications during anyone waterboarq session.
(UIIFOUO) If you have any questions, or would like
briefings r pleas'S contact _.
He
\'Jbtain ans\\!ers and./or arrange those briefings,

i

i

JO:t'b'!WL!

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1,·JJ.I.!..

C05431963

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(b)(1)
(b)(3)

~_.
._~

DOC 27

1" November 2006

,MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:

SUBJECT·,

Inspector General

[

Ch~~L, ~~g~L Group
CIA CounterTerrorism Center

~updated DeIA Guidelines on
ConL"nement Con~tions, Responsive to
Recommendation 1 of the Inspector General's
Special Review of CounteFterrorism Detention
and Intertogation Activities <.2003-7123-IG)

.. iT£[

1: .(~
jAotion: None, this memorandUm.
forwards a· COpy ot tne upaated Guidelines on Confinement
C9nditions for CIA Detainees, signed by the Director of the
Central Intel!igence Agency on 31 October 2006. These updated
guideliriesrespond, in pa"t
Recommendation H of the'
Inspector Generai's Special Review 2003-7123-04.

to

next

Attachment

1'01' SEeltf:l' ' -

._._ _.

._.

C05431963

. ~===

StJBJECT:

(Ts-,.[

[Updated DCIA Guidelines on
Confmement Conditions, .Respsmsive to Recommendation 1
of the Inspector General's Special Review of
Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities
(2003-7123-IG)

(l

Nov 2006)

Cont'nemen.t Guidelines.doc
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
~"}\(:ting .OC-

1 - () / ADDCXA

1 L

==:J

1 - CTC/LGL Files

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EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING. SHEET
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C05431964
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CTC:

MEMOlV\NDUM FOR:

f!ROM:

Director of the Central Int~lligence Agency

I

c,c"·n"':t-'Oe"'t,..,rl.----------,-'I
,CIA

SUBJBCT:

1027(400)/2006

l.vUUI.o-.;;l,l,

Eu.., ,.....,l.. .:.... ,,~

qt;:u.• Lt::.t.

~/
Updated Guidelines on
Conf.inement Conditions fpr CIA Detainees

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. :L .. ~
Action Requested: YOUr approyal on.
the attached UpJ~~ec bu:tdelines. on confinement Conditions' for'
CIA Detainees;

.... " ..

.'.
2 (~A--------,Igacl<s:roundl Th~ attached guidelines
govern the cona:tC:tons of confinemen\: for CIA High Value
Detainees (HVDs) who.are detained at a CIA Detention Facility.
They have been updated' from the previous guidelines, issued in
... " .,. 209,3, .to. reflect the recent enactments..pf the Detainee Treatment
" ...... ·.Act:.· 'and 'the Militar;y .COllUllissions Act of 2006. These guidelines
. .' offe.r: broad coverage
recognition that environmental and other
conditions will vary from'case to case and location' to location.

in

3. t'l:S/
~ The Pll\, ¢ountel;'l'enorisll\ Center (CTC)
'remains respvfi&lble'for ensuring that these standards for
confinement conditions'will be fOllowed . . Direotor/eTC shall
ensure that at all times a specific Agency staff employee is
designated as' responsible for each detention facility;

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C05431964
Tel' SIlCRlW J

SUBJECT:

(trJ.[. .

1updated 'GuideHnes on Confin~ment ,
conditions for CIA Detainees "

That individual will be responsible for ensuring that all'1l.gency
personnel operating at the CIA detention facility adhere to
these guidelines.

(l.lmr\ - - - - - - ,-'htecommendation:

That you approve
the attached Updat",d GUide+lnes on Confinement CO!!ditionj to:!:
CIA Detainees. It has been reviewed byl
__ and
CTC/LGL.,
,
4•

Attacbl1\er ts
A. (~SI

B.

Standard conditions of
CIl\. Detention
Updated Guidelines ',on
Confinement Conditions for
CIl\. Detaitlees

(Ts:...

2

TeP SBC!RET.,

C05431964

'!lOP SBORB'l','

!updated GUide1ine~

('J:sA

SUBJFJCT:

cond~i~t~i-o-n-s-f~o-r~C~I~A~Detaineeg

on Confinement.

(27. October 2006)
Updated Guidelines on Confinement
Dist.ibution:
Orig :.. DlcTC
1 1 -

D/NCS
NCS/EA

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NCS se"re ... r1a

1 - CTC/LGL'~

:=J.:.. .

C05431964

S'l'ANDA:RD' CONDI'l'IOnS 011 CIA DETENTIOn

(~/I
ICIA sequrity needs ;requi;re that tbe
conditions ot detentio~for all detainees held in CIA facilities,
inolude ,the following:

C05431964

Shavinsl'

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.----:-__----'

!",ppUcat1on; A ·detainee is shaved (head and face) upon
arrival to the detention fabilitv

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White .Noise:

-- Purpose: white noise is used for security purposes to
mask sound and prevent communication among detainees. .

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.%'11 SECRET!I'

-- Applicationl White noise is
less than 79 'dB (calculated to avoid
hearing) .

decibel level
'detainees I '

In general, sound in the dB 80-99 range is ~xperienced as
loud,; above 100 dB as uncomfo'rtably loud. OSlll\. g-uidelines
require, ~mployer" to 'establish a noise monitoring program 'when
continuous noise is BS dB or above, See 29 CPR 1910.95 App G.

common reference points include garbage disposer (80 dB),
cockpit of ,propeller aircr~Ft caB dB), shouted conversation (90
dB), motorcycles at 25 feet: (90 dB), inside of subway car at 35
mph (95 dB), power mower (96 dBl; chain saw (110 dBI, and live
rOck band (114 dB).
'
'.

~

onere is no risk of permanent, hearing loss for
COnt1.,l..tU.V"'Ct . . . ->: "'uours-a-day exposures to' sound at 82 de

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Shackling: i'l;l used for security ,purposes.
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lmVe~~ CltVU~~~lon

or Lead to

permanent damage.

,.

-- Application, Shackling is done in such a manner as to
not restrict the flow cf blood or cause any bodily iniury .
.....
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saould

to abrasions.

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SECRB'l'I"--

impede circulation nor lead

C05431964
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DOC 85
C:777~_

us CI~(t~HkatioN!N(,H'1 USIISC1!fCodcWOld/iFGli/DI:s.scm

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\..Vlltlw,UI/NOI1,Ir;lcJliJDec:).:,J:>-s

(as ~pprop;iatc.f

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET
OlJice
12 Date
01/16/2007
Phone

Letter to SSCl Chairman regarding John Rizzo's nomination and offer to brief SSe] on the legal bases for the C!!",,'s
detention prOgram.

I-::--,--..",.;O::;G::;C,,-,-FO-2007-50003
6. J1Jstificntior; I S~mmtl'y fReqlJiroo

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DAC -0400'1-2006-1
fOf

Immediate and Priority Actions!

Routine

0

Priority

~ lrnrnediate

Per reqUGst qf ODCIA's office.

7. Coordination

Please note that the letter is unclassified. but the reference attached to Hro left side of the folder is classified,

DAC

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SIGNATURE

OCONCtJR

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TITLE

t-::S':::cr"N"'AT"'U"Ii"'E----------1 0

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THE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VIASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

16 January 2007

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman
Select Co~~ttee on Intelligence
United States Senate

Washington, D.C.

20510-2202

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing concerning the President's nomination of
John Rizzo to be the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA)
General Counsel. .';.s you know, I fully support John's',
nomination and look forward to his confirmation.
Since your August 23, 2Q06 letter, "hieh; among other
things, requested'information concerning the legal basis
for the CIA's detention program, I have provided
comprehensive briefings to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence regarding the details of the CIA's detention
progrfu~.
In those briefings, I made it clear that the
CIA's detention program had been, and would continue to be,
in full compliance with the Constitution, U.S. law', and
U.S. treaty obligations. r also informed the COITmittee
that I would work ,·,ith the Administration to provide you
additional information about the program. to include its
legal foundation.
After discussions wi th the A.ttorney General and others
\.;ithin ,the Administration. and in keeping ",ith my previous
statements to the Co~~ittee, I am offering your Committee a
briefing by officials from the CIA's Office of General
Counsel and the Department of Justice'S Office of Legal
Counsel on the legal bases for CIA's aetention program. By
doing so, we can address the Committee's outstanding
concerns about the progr~n, as well as address the issues

'l'he Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

in yonr Img\1st 23 letter. Hy Office of Congressional
Affairs will contact your staff t.o schedule this briefing,~
Sincerely,

41~j(~
Hichael V. Hayden
General, USAF

cc:

The Honorable Christopher Bend, Vice Chairman, SSCI

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C05431979

DOC 88

c::::::J_. '" .•. , ." ... - -. - .•....••• -.- ..... _.. -- _. --_.--

(b)(3)

0000061

EXECUTIVE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SHEET
2. Date

;. Origina11or Office

01/04/2007
Room No. and BUlJding

Phone

-------.,

Letter to Senator Carl levin in response to his 14 December 06 letter regarding the detention of high value

terrorists.

.
5a. ReSpOflSG to DAC

5. Originating Office Control I

11000!JHI~rmgOIfJc. If) C~tp)

51>: DAC Conuo' ,

IDACth, Only)

OGC-fO-2007-50001
\

o

6. Justification J Summary flfequJted lor Immediate and Prlorlty Actions}

~~.tJtineD Priority

Letter is to be processed ASAP per request

[gJ Immediate,

bYC~~-~----'

7. Coordination

OGC/fO ,ooordinated'whh OCA and CTC/LGL

TITtE

AN 04 2007

DeJA
SIGNATURE

TITlE
$lGNATURE

TITLE
SIGNATURE

TITLE
SIGNATURE
TfnE

o

coNCUR

OFY'
DSIGNAT\J1l.E

DcoNCUSl

o

'VI

O~GNA_
DCONCtJR

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SIGNATURE

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DS\GIiAT'\JRE

CONCUR

ClArA,sOH: _ _

~

__

C05431979.

mE DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 January 2007

The Honorable Carl Levin
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-2202
Dear Senator Levin:
Thank you for your letter of December 14, 2006 regarding
the detention of high value terrorists. As you know, on
September 6, 2006, all 14 of the high value terrorists held by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were transferred to
custody of the Department pf Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. I
was pleased to brief you· and the other members of tqe Senate
Select Committee" on Intelligence in advance of the President's
pubiic announcement regarding the transfer because .it served as
an excellent opportunity to discuss a wide range of issues
related to these detainees, including their previous conditions
·.of confinement and the critically important· intelligence
information obtained from them.
Asyou·are also aware, on November 16, 2006, consistent
with my obligations under the National security Act, I provided
a comprehensive briefing to the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence regarding detainees .and also briefed the House
Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence and House and Senate
leadership as well. I hope you would agree that the questions·
posed in your letter, as well as many other issues, have been
fully briefed to the members of both Committees. During these
briefings, I made it "lear that the CIA's detention program had
·been, and would con~inue· to be, in full compliance with the
Constitution, Q.$ .. law, and u.s. obligations under international
treaties. I also committed to provide·additional briefings to·
the Committees on these issues when. ·the need arises. That
commitment remains true today.

C05431979

The Honorable Carl Levin

Again, thank YOU for your letter. I look forward to
speaking to you and the other members of the Intelligence
Oversight Committees on these issues in the future.
Sincerely,

1l/;Wy¥.......-.' Michael V. Hayd",n
General, USAF

C05431979

The Honorable Carl Levin

DCI/OGe/Fol

C
Levin

Ltr re detainees. doc

~(3

0anuary 07)

]

OGO-FO-2007-50001

Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/OCA
1 -: ..~QfJc FO
1 ~ DAC

. :.

'..'

., ....... . ....
~.,

DOC 89
C05431980
(b){1 )
(b){3)

0000064
"

W..shington,

o.c. 20505

Inspector General

S April 2006

The Honorable John D, Rockefeller IV
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C, 20510-6475
Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

iTSC
This letter responds to your
correspondence of 10 March 2006 concerning the status of
significant recommendations identified in the Office of
Inspector General (OIG) Special Review, entitled
"Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities
(September 2001 - October 2003)," (2003-7123-IG).
This'
Report was issued on 7 May 2004.
Your letter ~sked for a
de~criptiQn of the corrective actions that have been take~
by ,CIA in respect to each recommendation and the Inspector
General's evaluation of whether the corrective actions
adequately resolved the issues addressed in the Report.
(Tsf!
J The following list provides the status
of actions taken in respo~se to the ten recommendatiqns in

the Report.
The recommendations are briefly surrunarized;
the full text of each recommendation ~s contained on pages
106-109 of the Report.
In nine cases, OIG has judged that
the actions'taken by the Agency have been sufficient to
warrant closing the recommendation.
In some of those
cases, the action taken by the Agency clearly and
defini~ively disposed of the,matter. In some other cases,
al,hough the recommendation is closed, the follow-up
actions are being implemented over a period of time.
Where
appropriate, the OIG will continue to monitor the
effectiveness of these actions in its ongoing program of
audits, inspections and investigations,
'

J

C05431980
.

\

\

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

•

Recornrnenda tioD J

I
I

1

I

L ___ .

I

•

ReconunennAt.i.on 7

•

I--

Recommenrlation

I
I

I
•

Rp~omwp~Gation

I,

~

~

C05431980
.

l

\

_____J

The Honorable John D_ Rockefeller IV

•

RecomrnpnnAtion ;;
"~

I
I

[

•

Recommendatio~

-7

-------

J

1

'l'~I,.----------

I

C05431980

TOP

SEeH~

J

.

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV

• r=rnIne.ndaJ:.inn.-LE--·----------

l

~---------_._------j
•

-l

Recommendation 9

!

•

Recommendation 10
~-,----_._~'------------,---,

I
(U//Feee) Given the classification and sensitive
issues discussed in this letter, I would ask that you'
handle it in the same restrictive way the Committee has
'handled the OIG report of May '2004 to which it refers.
Thank you for your support as we continue to examine Agency
activities concerning detentions, renditions, and
interrogations. If you have any questions about these
matters, please contact me or Assistant Insoector General
for Investigationb
Sine ereclc::.,Y,-,-'

,Jzrn L.
cc:

Helgerson

Chairman, Sena'te Select Committee on Intelligence
Director of National Intelligence
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
____________-'4'--

,_ _"

,

i

j

~

~c'o··"
)1"32 ~l· 9~--------.....' "";t ...... l) . .

-:-

.......

DOC 93

Central Intelligence Agency
Office of General Counsel
Washington) D.C. 20505

(

Date: 12/19/05

To:
Orl~!lllhatiol1:

Phone:

Steye Bradbury
Dep::lJ:{nl(';)ltof ]U,'ltjce!OLC

>l'.l",'); .Ff:"~'

FrQm:

Jo h'~l A. Riz;zo
Orgllnizatiqn: mficcQ.fGllueral Cotmsel
Phone:
Fax:
Number of Pages (Including Coyer) 5

,

CENTRAL INTELUGENOE AGENCY
WAS\~lHG1'OH.

T:r:~.p$irnit-,ted by

D.C. i{)5M

St3cure Fae-simile

S:teve :a±a'dhury
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en.ac:t€fd~

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c:on~~'t,i"t:ut'e cr'ttel,

whethe:r CIA'! s irlberrog.ation teclm;iq\);~s\'jJou1d
inhutl'!tth or deg:raditlgbreatment. a-s clefi,n~d, .in

the, McC$.i:n Atrlendrnent.
f~

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tiep'",r'Ent~:q,t ,o:,t
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if;~V'i.-~\o't th,€! CJ.:A/ 'i? s:t~11darr1 9~);rip-'i l:;'ions 9£
e4-vise ~Nh~~,,hl\Jr tp!?se. corid:t t,i.ontl: vj(:ru1'9-,c·o-ni'i1:it-?~~·
.irih\lnlal' t>~<1.e:gred~n!\T tr,,"tlli,mt "", defined in. U:;e W:::Cain

AI,\el1Qm,mt, £nclo$.ad please find a. des¢ripti·Orl or Our s.tondarcl
conditions of detent.ion.

Senior' Depu.ty

Enclosure,

G(~n~rt11

Cou,nsel

C05432619
~-'

waF SEC1&T/1L

-STANDARD CONDITIONS OF CIA DET!;:NTION

CIA security needs require that the conditions of detention
for all ~etainees held in CIA facilities include the following:
- Hooding '- ,shav~Ilg;~-

-,

-'
_

- use Ui uvuu ~U~iC or White Noise {at a decibel leve~ -

<79db - caloulated to avoid damage to detainees' hearing}_
- Constant Light- Shackling
Hooding:
-- Purpose:

I

Hooding is used for security purposeqC=

.-------,1---;- - - - - - - - ]

I

I
.·Shav-in!:11:

\

Application: A detainee is shaved (head and face) upon
arrival to the detention facilityl
=:J

I

L __
ALL PORTIONS CLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET

,TOP SFCRETC
__--_---_-_ _- - - - - - - -

I
I

Loud Hus,ic or White lilbis'",,:
-- Vurpos""t,\1u<'I music or\~hit<~ n<:l:t~;e is\lse,~ ~Qr
l?Ul(l~'li!le,a
l1$;",k "oU,nct "'ll<l pr<lveilt C9r~m\i,fdcati"" among

det:El i.:r:HZM3$ ,

"" J\,pp1icat,ion: urod ~ll"tic Qr
noise is
1"''101 1,,5$ thll" ')~ dll !calc,datoo to avo,id,
de,t:;e'±'J:10r.:,~

'he:a:rui.g} .

"II >I<1I1"","lO"'1"

1<::>1,1';1 i

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in the dil 1\0,·99 l:"!n1gi1t 1$ e;y,;pedi1tH'led S\$

"nov!! );00 dll ,,.1> \ll1comfott",hlYl,oqd.

OSH.l\,t:l1;lilill$'l111WlS

;reqL\d.rlil eml1'l"y,~" t<;> ei\\:;aJ:>H,,,h,, I1di~e lll<ln",tolting l?rogltam '\»'hE\n
OQPtillUOU!ii' ITois...
lJ5 dB or aDove, "",e tall C",'R 1910.95" l,p!?
C~,t\

refe¥"ellGi2I points iT,c:l,,,de ~<1J1bZi'!:li1!
Ill\) dE),
190
cockpi,1;; oii' plt"l'ell¢'l,' ailtGl:'etft (88 $},
dEl, m6Ml:'cydes <It :is ftliet (90 <:1'6), inl>):,<le of "UPw">' b<l:r at 35
mph 195 <i!'l); l'ow<t;"mowe:t: (96
chaitl bew (l1Q el!'ll, ~\lld live
rock bend, 1114. d$).

"m,

i$
cOJ:l:l:.ir.ruout$:,

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2

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,~ '"" Pt~;rp,d£Ha ~
Sh/ic)<l:l.pg b UiHilO fqr llf;lCll:rit:.y IJurl~O$<ai:;.
$ha",I~,Url9 e.'.t!lll"~CS lIccurtby :l:n ill1 aspects ofdetain<le

-co 54.3.2619-----""----

........

Distrib.ution:
ori g . """ Address'ee
1 - CTC(LGL ("(encl')
1 - Sl:lGC S:Lgner (",relicl)

2

,

DO~157

C05416919
i;

1 . ..... .

PR1NTED; TllUfsdny. Augusl II. 2005

AT:

~

14:51

L

\ (b)(3)

~

0000342

Memorandum for the Record'
EVENT:
PLACE:
FOR,
SUBJECT:

MBR PRE-TRW BRmF
DATE:
7E42
HEADQUARTERS
BASC
IRAQ -INSURGENTS AND TERRORISTS

ATTENDEEs:
ASSOCIATION
DCI/OCA
DCI/OCA
DIJCTC

(IMl'lL----1
\

r----·

-.J

~

DIJOIA
BASC

10:30 STATUS: COMPLETED

R.Q.!&
SUPPORT
SUPPORT
BRIEFER

HORACEK, JAMES

DI/OIA

1212112004 TIME:

KEY, C/2004-01145

--.JI

MARSHALL (D-GA), JIM

BRIEFER
BRIEFER
REP

Executive Sutnma~~
.
(CIINF) A team ofj----..l'nd CTC analysts provided Representative Jim Marsh,all (D/GA), member of the BASC, an
analytical, non-oversight briefing to address issues relating to Iraqi insurgents and terrorists.
Summary Text:
.'
.
I. (eIINF) A team OfC land eTC analysts provided Representative Jim Marshall (D/GA), member of the HASC, an
analytical, non-oversight briefing to address the following issues:
I) Iraq' -- lnsurgents and terrorists, Who are they? Bow much support do they have? ,
2) Bow much support is there' for the new government? Are Iragis interested in rebuilding their own society?
By way of additional background, Ihe briefing was arranged to support Rep. Marshall in his phoned late December
travel with General Schoomaker. Chief of Staff of the US Anny. to Afghanistan and liaq -- however, when the
Representative arrived here at Headquarters, he advised that his trip had been postponed.
'2. (SfINF) The session was largely give-and-take because Rep, Marshall, a former Army Ranger who studied
insurgencies at Princeton, had some strong opinions of his ow~. The discussion center~d around· nation-building and
reconstruction efforts in Iraq; counter-insurgency efforts by the US Military and Iraqi security forces; UJe challenge
posed by Zargawi. including his network's killing of 49 Iraqi national guardsmen fresh out of basic training; and the
possible ramifications of a pUll-OUI of Coalition troops. Rep. Marshall was very krtowledgeable about the subject
matter, bUl expressed surprise over the analysts' estimate of the number of suicide bombers. Toward the end of the
session, the, DCI stopped in to say hello to the Representative,

,L

IJ

Liaison Officer
Office of Congressional Affairs
Puge I of2

C05416919

Distribution'
DAC
,
111
,
- (Official
OCA Record)
_

I

Follow
.
- upAction Ite .
Additionallnformation:
ms,

Page 2 of2

DOC 99
1/

'C!1'\l") C"YJ.C!.n.r.::o.a::-- l
i~''-'':l.\.:.t.:'L ll{~

-!

FAX CQVER SHEET
Central IntelIigenceAgenc)'

Office of General Counsel
Washington, DC 20505

Comments: Per your request..
No Dissem - This Note and Attachment
are Attorney Work Product

Il!OP SECid\,fq....I

-'

OOOOOEJ3

""-""-'

NO. 717

...-VO i

TO~r,

ULE VIA

P.2

. /20300422
CHi\NNELS ONLY

Horizontal Sleep Depdvetioi1
On three occasions early in the program, thG IntGrrogation team and th~ attendant medioal
officers Identified the potential for unaceeptllble edema in the lower limbs of detainees
undergoing Interrogation, In order to permit tha limbs to recever Without impairing ,Bleep
deprivation requirements, the subjects undelWent horizontal sleep depdvajlon, Horizontal sleep
deprlv~tion oopurs when a datalnee Is placed prone on the fioor on top of athick towel or blanket,
a precaution deslgnad to prevent reduction of body temperature through direct centaot with the
cell ~QQr, The detainee's hands are manaoled together'and the arms placed in outstretched
pOllition .. either exiended beyond the head or extended fo either si<Je 'of the body - end
anohored to a far point on the floor in such a manner that the arms cannot be bent or used for
balance or comfort, At the same time, the ankles ars shackled together and the legs are
extended in a straight line wHh the body, and anohored to a far point on the floor In suoh a
,
manner that the legs o11Onot be bent elr used felr balance elr ctlmfort. The manacles and shackles,
are anohored Without additional slress on any of the arm or leg jOints that mlghtforoa the limbs
beyond natural extension or create tension eln any Joint The position is sufficiently uncemfortable
10 det<llnl"es to deprive them elf unbrelkeh sleep, while allowing their lower limbs to recover from
the effeots of standing sleep deprivation. All standard preClluUons end procedures for shOlckling
are observed fOr both hands and feet while In thiS position, Horizontal sleep deprivation has been
used unWlhe detain~'$ eHeeted limbs have dernelnstrated sufficient recovery to return'to sitting
or Btandlng $Ieep qepriVation mode, as warranted by the requirements of the interrogation team,
and subject to determination by medical offi,er that there is no centralndielation ttl resuming other
~ieep depr)vation mode~.,

(

~_1E~
~EiCRET/I'

f'~S

ONLY

1/ 40300422

P,3

//20300422
CID\NNELS ONLY

22 April 2005
Transmitted by Secure Facsimile
,

. ":4,

,

~

The following is tM Central
of the "waterboard" in
combination with two other techniques, The waterboard is
an interrogation teohnique as descr;!.bed in our BacJ.::ground
Paper on CIA'S Combined Use of Interrogation Teohniques,
provided to you previously.

Intel!i;~~ce Agency's use

~
I~ We also previously provided the
Department of Justice with our desoription of the
waterboard. The following is our description of the two
interrogation techniques we use in conjunction with the
waterboard. These techniques are dietary manipulation and
;>leep dl;lprivation. While an individual is physically on
the waterboard, we do not use the insult §lap, belly slap,
attention grasp,' facial hold, wall iug ,watar dousing,
stress positions t or oramped cpnfinement. Many or all of
those techniques almost certainly will have been used
before the Agency needs to resort to the waterboard (and,
indeed, since March 2003, the Agency has not had to resort
to uss of the waterboard to' transition ~~ individual from
resistance to oooperation). Further, it is possible that
one or more of these interrogation' teohniques might be used
the same day as a waterboard sesllion '
.l!J1$fi
~ As you are aware, the Central
Intelligence Agency has established specific guidelines' for
the use of eaoh of these tWO interrogation teohniques and
the waterboard. These guidelines incorporate the
guidelines established by the CrA Office of Medical
Services (OMS).

(4 '

~ As

we briefEild you, previoualy, an

individ~~i is always placed on a fluid diet before he may

be subjeoted to the waterboard in order to avoid aspiration
of regurgitated food. The individual is kept on the fluid
diet throughout the period the waterboard is used. .

HANIlLE VIA ,

~l

Cl:l1INNE:!.JS ONLY
/20300422

NO.7i7

~/I

.l1l>lfDLR VIA i

P.4

. /20300422
CRlI.NNELS ONLY

.~
f~~leep dep~~vation may be u~ed
prior to ~~d duting·the waterboard session. As nas been
previouslY noted, the time limitation on applioation of
sleep deprivation is· striotly monitored. In addition, the
detainee,' s physioal and mental state is also monitored to
ensure they are not harmed. ~here is no evidence in
literature oreb~er~enoe that sleep deprivation exaoerbates
any harmful effeots of the waterboard, but it does reduoe
the detainee's will to resist, contributing to the
effectiveness of the· waterboard as an interrogation
teohnique. In the event ·a detainee were to be perceived as
unable to withstand the affeots of the waterboard for any
reason, any member of the interrogation tea~ has obligation
to voipe doncern~ and if necessary to halt the proceedings.

CHANIDlLB ONLY
'20300422

.

C()~409304'

.

::.~

. :.'.'

,.'"

.

0: ,"

MEMORANbUMFOR:

See Distribution Sheet

SUBJECT:

Det"inee Working Group

Worki~g.

'. 1:{;\I'h"v.eestabliShEld an Petair,ee
Grl:!up to coordinate the ... '
. Age h9Y'sJ~sp~nS:e' t\ielctl\itnal.inquiries conC8rrilrlgilS<:i6tuaL ahd ~,lIeged _...... .
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C01525861
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(b) (21'

(bl (61

DOC 174

APPROVED ·FOR RELEASE

00529

DATE: APR 2008

. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

1'1 Squadron, 3'd Armored Cavalry Reglme~n_t ___
TIGER BASE, IRAQ 38S FT 985940
A FZC-R-I-S-3

':><-_ ___..

03 NOVEMBER.2003

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Standard Operating Procedures for Tiger Base Detention Center
1. Eiringing detaineeto Base compound/ enteri,ng Bilse compound
a. Notify Tiger X-Ray Immediately when detainees are picked up.
b. Always utilize the 5 S's (search, segregate, silence, speed, secure)
c. Have detainees blindfolded and zip "tied for movement:.
.
d. Capturing unit will oonduct a thorough searoh of all detainees.
e. Capturing unit will complete two copies of DA form 5976. One form is
worn by the detainee, the other form will be given to the S2
repr~sentative. .
f. Notify Tiger X-Ray when detainees are inbound.
g. Tiger X-Ray will notify S-2, and the guard force NeOIC.
h. All personal items and captured weapons will be handed over to the S-2
with a detailed description of who, what, where, and how the items were
.
confiscated.
i. A representative from the capturing unit will remain with the detainees
until released by the guard NCOle.
2. Guard Force Responsibilities
a. Guards will do a thorough search of all detainees and vehicles,
b. Guard detail will inventory personal items on DA 4137 (2 copies) and
maintain proper accountability of items.
c.' O,ne reoord of Items will be placed In 'a sealed bag along with the items,
the other. record will be given to the S-2.
d. The bag of personal items will be tagged with the detainees serial
number.
e. All detainees will be sepa'rated as the situation permits. They will not be.
allowed to speak to one another.
t. The NCOIO in cOnjunction with the CI/lnterrogatbr team will determine
when the detainees are given food and water.
'
.
3. Detention Oenter Battle Rhythm
a. The NOOIC will be overatl responsible for ensuring each detainee is
properly documented and serve as a liaison between the guard detail and
S2I CI sections.
b. Capturing unit representative back briefs the Battle Captain, who then
sends report to the S-2.
c. Initial Screening of all detainees will be conducted by the guard force
NCOle.
d. Detainee Screening reports are then sent to the S-2.
e. The 8-2 analyzes initial screening, then prepares INTREP for
CI/lnterrogator team.

C01525861
,

,

f.

CI/lnterrogator team conducts further Interrogation to collect intelligence
from detaine,es.
,
"
g. Interrogation report Is sent back toS-2 for analysis.
h. The $,2 det,ermlnes further usefulness of detainee. and determines
release time.
I. Upon release of detainees, the NCOIC will verify the identity of the
detainees and ensure they receive their personal belongings
J, If detainees are to be released the NCOIC will escort them to their
transportation, ensure they are properly logged out and notify the Battle
Captain before they are released.
'
k. If detainees are to be transferred to AI Asad detention cenler (OBJ
Webster) the NCOIC will ensure the guard accompanying the detainee
has the DA5976, DA4 j 37 and a copy of the interrogators summary
report. He will also ensure that the guard has the detainee's personal
belongings. The NCOIC will keep originals of all reports. He will ensure
the detainees are properly logged out and notify the Battie Captain before
they are released.
'

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4. Pesonnel Tasking and Logistical Support
a. The 8-3 will ensure the detention center guard force is properly manned
with a ratio of 5 detainees to one guard. The minimum is one' NCO and one
EM.
b. Guard shifts should, be no longer that 6 hours.
c. The NCOIC will send a daily report to the S73 of the number of detainees in
'
the holding center.
d. The S-3 will coordinate wilh the S·4 to ensure that MREs and Water are
being pushed to the Detention Center.
5. POC for this memorandum is Tiger S·2

MAJ,AR
Squadron XO

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C05409305

c=,·······

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DOC 182

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~Ubje~~~

DDO Talking Points

rL-=-_J

These are old DDO'TPs frotf-=:Jperhaps of USe in owr currentL__ ]taskings_ Yow will 'wont
to scroll down to the balded background for the DDO_ I don't think NE wrote these, although we
may 'have contributed bits as I recognize some from beiNE's note

L_=

Subject: ,DDO talking Points for HPSCI'Leadership on Issues
Surrounding I
jLeadershipand
Management

-------

The Issue:

--I wanted, to_ notify you in person 'of sc=me potentiaily very,_-,
serious leadershi1'..12:J2!'l,~k-l!!Y..Lormer _
--..J
and others [
As soon as we
realized the-scope-O! olie ptoDlems, we-~d' quickly to implement
changes,

r

--Our findings are preliminary at this point but based on our
review ofr=
I to date we have identified possibly
very serious shorccoID1ngs J in 3 key areas,
.

Managerial and Oversight lapses over
o
administrative issues

L-

_

--I will keep you advised of the results of our investigation
into these issues.

,1"1"

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C05409305
·ii

C05409305
.
"

Actions Taken

==:J

IIIL_ senior Officer Review Team.

Extensive reviews by DC/NEI
Jin early December identified the management problems and

~

sofutionJ§Lhave-l:>een-<:tu.9. are beinsa-implemented.

He was assisted

bYL.
~Lextensive operations
management experience who is now
I

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Changed out
Based on the initia=l
-.
~ings in December of the review team, r decided.-J;l1&_._
J
[----.J would not return
DC/NE returnedl.
January until the returnl
==:::J.!ast week
We
are also pulling bacl{_.
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] moved quiclli-,"9.-~U better management structure in
~;~~:d~~~S:oCnsuriL_.
Jkne~andJol1owed im..Q2rtant

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[_~in a short time in .an extremely dangerous~at~
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Accountability Board. Immediately after learning of
potential problems with thel~n early Jan' (check date), I
tasked ADOO/CI on 12 Jan to cna:t.'r an AccountabiliJ:z Board

t----.----.-.------Jl
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[---:J

ITrected theprrnapaLfocus tjbe
on tfiB[
---Jbut have asked them to identify
other l,?aoershipfailingTas well. I have asked for a preliminary
report by 12 February.

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_
Some Preliminary Illsues We are Reviewing Related to the Problem
-- 'rhe Number of peoPleC------------]grew very quickly
without simila~growth in tructure and' management,

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[_.==:=1

,----------------"

././77-l

C05409305

--~~~--Jleadership was not experienced enough to manage this
size operation as it grew together with such a complex playing
field in an extremely very dangerous environment
-- DO responded to missions we were given for which in some cases
our officers were not properly trained/experienced. (i.e.
jailers)

--l-------,jofficers

were very focused on collecting inte'l to
catch.HVTs, find WMD and prevent insurgent attacks which were
killing Americans; that focus appears to have been at the expense
of appropriate attention to policies, management oversight, and
basic good ops management procedures.

C05409305

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05/04/04 03:06 PM

To:
cc:
Subject-_ -DDO Talking Points

reC==-.J

Old TPs inilfor the hill
----- ForwoiaetbYC==-l'n 05/04/04 03:05 PM ---..

1-/77 ;:

C05409305
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01/27/04 il'49 AM

._ -DDO Talking P~ints r~=====]oc

---,---- ........

,

DOC 247

Alta ~lir<tib

p'li$;,;m

The abuse <~f A\)U Ol\l'<l<ib took p~~ <It lhe'haixl s11~:
vtl~lilriJ! vWOaibl1l' or ViOlant Pi'lson~rs mre Iwptlo
~lll!d~ng6 rather than tems ilke
,most of lhe detaitle>es,

complex

,..,.'.., '.··...""w~,..,,,··,,· '." . ,.''''''. "~'." •."""".",.., ..,., ""."

Jrawmgs'
,arebaood
on millt[:lry
diagrams from
2003 <lnd 1;>,004
and satlflJlile
Ill1;1gl;l$ cllh~

GOnlpl<lx from 4D02.
LOlibals Id~Hltify prioson
conflgUf<lIJon Whl;ll1

abuse WQ'k plaoe.
Cel!l!l<:>c\l wllllfe ,aIJU$e'(I!¢l;urrllot!
Tl1e abuse is sald lo have,
iOCcur,(El'a 10 T~er 1 of tl:re "hard
site." Each ceU Is aboll,1 6 by 10
feel with a burilibed, a ho]!!' in lhe

floor for a toilet ~nd a lilly Spi9l'1t
Most fiave no lighls 0/1 the il'lside,

til'! l;S,q!'<ltion,

lor 'hig'HiSk

or j'f;\ll,YJl;l.
milJk~

tA IJiiJt!l!lY '
lrrtlllli!j$l1oe 1111lds

detllil'!elii's'

C05407469

~20291117

DOC 186

/

C.__

Tc

11/17/0408:53 PM

C(

Subject: Discovery Requests impacting DIG documents

Although I have now been in contact with the OIG agents on·these cases regarding at least the existence
01 this discovery requests, 1wanted to provide them to you as well so that you can be aware of the issues.

0

(1) R.equest from Navy JAG in Navy prosecution of seals involved in AI·Jamadl case..
will provide
.
you with a copy of this request but basically it requests four types of information (a) a complete copy of the
OIG file on AI-Jamadi; (b) any documents In CIA's possession on rules and guidance concerning detenllon
and interrogation techniquesr-! (c) individuals to be mad.e available for interviews in preparation for
(a)arlY studies or reports regarding the effects of detainee abuse on
hearings/courts m~rtial;
insurgent activitie
'
.

at

As a preliminary matter, given the joint OIG-Navy invesltigatlon on AI-Jamadi I think we will need to
provide access to the OIG file, As I
understand it,
is providing me all the interview
reports from that tile ahd the prosecutor is alsc going to send me a separate request for
those
documents, However,.1 will probably need to review the entire file to ensure we comply with the
considering how to respond the other requests noted
prosecutor's request We are
above,
(2) Request from Army JAG in Iraqi General prosecution of army individuals (Ft. Carson case), That
request is provided below, c::Jforwarded the request to me, I think we need to know if there are any
completed repons of investigation on the followirig: (a) Detainee abus~ (b) Interrogation
procedurer~ (c) Use ofl
I and (d) MG Mowhosh. Also in 'general the deHmse asks for "any
other file or'-recom'kept by the agency relating to MG Mowhosh" which I think would include the OIG tile on
this case. Therefore, we probably need to review that file,
.
As we mentioned, we Ihink these are only the beginning of the requests, If you would like 10 meet on
these issues, please let us know,
Thank you,

I

']r

M ,\ -

CIA Discovery,doc

~0291117
r

C05407469
, ,

We're looking for any report of investigation conducted by the CIA or by an Agency investigating
CIA practices that covers:

'J

1. Detainee abusel
2. Interro ation rocedur-e~ L -_ _

3. Use Of =c--'
6 as
4. MG Mow
This should be construed broadly.
We're also looking for any informat'ion maintained by the CIA on:
1. MG Mowhosh and his prospective vaiue as a source 01 information
2. MG Mowhosh and his medical condition, what was known by the Agency prior to his capture?
3. Any other file or record kept by the Agency relating to MG Mowhosh.
Thanks.

DOC 250
(b}(6

..-

16 February 2006

FOR: Office of tile General Counsel i

J-5 Detainee Affairs DiY1s~Qg[:=::'~=:~=.-=-:J­
Office of Detainee AffairsL"....,_.,.__. ._,.,~
/'.~_._.

FROM~ Defense Sensitive SuppJlI~.Acd~ri!Y" ///
Special Advisory Stalf!_..,
V

L
,

,/

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!

Subject: Request for Security Review (S;.rs:n:060154)

-I

official statement. Specifically, the statement: refers to CIA
aetivities on pages 4. 15, and 17.

I

/1I
,
(3) The attached is a HQDA request for a security review of an

(U) Since this docwnent wiLl be introduoed during 827 Feb
l~earing and 11 March lri,gI•.lYRU~~t.You provide us your review by
25 Feb. Please call me G'
._. iifyou have allY questions.

CI~~~i!h:d

by: DoDD 531(J.J6

R-;:usvn: I j (rJ}, (C]
D~d;lssl(y()n: I Fd.l!\::H')'2t131

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(b)(3)

DOC 195

'UNCLASSIFIED/ I'MYO.

,.'

To;

10/24/03 Oe:28 AM

ec:
Subl..t,

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2nd Tr.nche cf Documents r.: Deteln... from DEC at I
II
-~

I have not yel caught up on my lotus notes so I don't know whether you already have the note
below. The first document is 3 sat of interro ation guldellnes.approved by General Sanchez and
apparently drefted by or approved by
the senior CENTCOM attorney in Iraq. T,he
senior CENTCOM attorneys in Tampa,
also approved lhe document.
Yesterday, the General Counsel obtain ad DOJ's verbal concurrence for the CENTCOM document.

o~ 10/24/03 09:22

•.•.• Forwarded by 1

1

10/22/03 04:03 PM

AM .....

To: John A. Rizzo@DCI
cc': Scott W. Mullor@DCI,1

I

I

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.

Subject; 2net Tranche of Dot:u~j(nhs 11£; Detail Ides

II

bm DEC a~

~~

Tho first doc below is the Oct 12 document for, DOJ
.•.•. Fcrw.rd.d by I
Ion 10/22/0304:02 PM ..--

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To'l
cc:--------~....,..----------

0008138
UNCLASSIFIED/fA!~

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UNCLASSIFIEDI!Ar6~

Subject: c=:=Jnoha of, Documani. fa: Datainaas from DEC otl

~,>li-~'

_

~

Reference:

A couple more documents for you below."
Original Text

ofl

I

Orlginel Text of

NOTE FOR:
FROM:
OFFICE:
DATE:
SU8JECT:

ltc-CoMMa-OFFICER
10/22/2003 01:04:45 PM
floppy docs

If

Interrogation and Counter-Resistanoe Policy

1

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co:
Sent on 22 October 2003 at 01:04:45 PM

(

0008139
UNCLASSIFIED! ~

DOC 125
C05431977
UNCLASSIFIED

DCI ACTION CENTER.
ROUTING SLIP

1
2

3
4
5

X
X

OCIA
OODCIA
EXOIR

E-COPY

12
13
14

E-COPY
e-GoPY

15
16

e-COPY

17

E-COPY
E·COPY

18
19

E-COPY

20
21

DI

DO

6

,7
8

OCA

9

OGe
IG

10

ACTION'

INFO

ACTION

e·coPY·

. 11

22

INFO

DAC

SUSpENSE DATE: 4 Ncivember 2005
DOCUMENT NO: DAC·04037-05
Action Officer:

.

COOROINATIONIROUTlNG:
OIG to respond as appropriate In coordination. with DCA.

SUMMARY:
24 Oclober 2005 letter 10 CIA, IG, from. Senalor Levin, Ranking Member SASC, requesting IG .fopM on Its
Investigation of CIA personnal Involvemenlln abuse' of detainees.

Dale of Document: 24lbtober 2005
R.ecelved In DAC: 28 October 2005

I

PO-BOARD 07310 1009 P os

I

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UNCLASSIFIED

* * COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES * *
FAX COVER'SHEET

.

TO: m~ iYOkAJ

Ill. U;;u,.rd))
C/O PJt: S71iV fJia.s /CfU)1'iZ-

.

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FAXNUMBER: Itl'~ 'Y,fZ -Q:7'L
PHONE NUMBER:

l.

Committee Oll Armed Services
United States Senate
Room 228 Russell Senate Office Building

Wasblngton, D.C. 20S1Q.6050
PHONE NUMBER: 202-224- 93S"Jj

THIS TRANSMISSION CONSISTS OF
SPAGES,

INCLuDING THIS COVER SHEET

._- --- ---

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--'BETH DOu;. NORTH CAAOUNA.
JDj4N C:OONYH. TI'UlI
JOHN 1ltUNE.laQUTh ~T"

CAflL LEVIN, MICHlOAN
WNMD at. CfIro1NSOY.~tluli"ETT'fl
f1:0Banc.BYRa,v.nr-mGINlA
JO&Wftl, uutIl:Mo\tl, Q)p,l~
JAC:J:.JlUD, f'IHDDf IiI.AJoIO

OAHJEL, !Co ~\CA,. HAWAJI
lULL NeUiPtt, F\OltDA

E,ll.J.UAM1N NIiI..5OfI. H~5'"
MAAX PA'I'TOH, JoLtit(f:&Q'TA

e""'UIlA'ttt, mIlS'"
HlUAnY RODtfAl4 ~tfTO)t NEW YORI(

cHAR~S &. A,IlEu.. STAff PlAeC1~

'!nitfd eStatts i'matc
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON. DC 20S11HlOSO

RIClWIP P. I).DCai'1I. PWOCft4Tr.trAfJl DlI'lEeT,""

October 24, 2005

Mr. John Helgerson
Office ofthe Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency
2X30NHB
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Helgerson:
Congress and the public have yet to receive an accounting of the role Central
Intelligence Agency (CTA) personnel have played in the mistreatment of detainees in U.S.
custody in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. I request that the Office of
Inspector General report on its efforts to assess the responsibility of the CIA and its
personnel for alleged abuses of detainees.
Senators have sought information on a number of occasions about the CIA's role
in alleged detainee ilbuses and the steps the CIA has taken to investigate these allegations.
For example, in FebrulUY of this year, I asked Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Goss
about the Inspector General's efforts to look into incidents of detainee abuse involving
CIA personnel. At ttlat time, DCI Goss was unable to say when the Inspector General
would be completing his review of abuse allegations. More recently, Senator Reed asked
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld at a Senate Anned Services Committee hearing on
September 29, 2005,for any infonnation he might have regarding the status ofthe CIA
Inspector General's investigation into the "ghost detainee" matter. Secretary Rumsfeld
testified that he had no infonnation about that CIA investigation.
The nearly a dozen reviews conducted by the Department of Defense have shed
little light on how CIA personnel may have contributed to detainee abuse., On September
9, 2004, Generals Kern and Fay testified to the Senate Anned Services Committee that, in
meetings with the CIA's Inspector General, the CIA denied their request for infonnation
relating to detainee al>uses, but that the CIA Inspector General agreed to conduct his own
investigation. The Schlesingt;r Panel report states that it "did not have full access to
infonnation involving the role ofthe Central Intelligence Agency in detention operations"
and recommended further investigation and review. The Church report states that the
CIA's cooperation with his investigation was limited to providing "infonnation only on

•• ",''v' vuv

\lvl; 7 " U;>\IOVj

lv'VI

Jti.Jv-1TII I'WI\ I II

I

activities in Iraq." The lack ofCIA cooperation with the investigations to date has left
significant omissions in the record.
General Kern also testified in September 2004 that both the Defense Department
Inspector General and the CIAInspector General had undertaken an investigation into
"ghost detainee" policy, whereby detainees were held unregistered and hidden from
monitoring by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). To date, the
Committee has rec.::ived no information on the progress of either of these investigations.
There have also been press reports ofnumerous covert CIA-operated detention facilities
where detainees are being held incoInmtmicado and outside IeRC monitoring.
Public reports indicate that CIA personnel were involved in numerous abuse
incidents, including several involving detainee deaths;
•

ManadelAI Jamadi died on November 4, 2003, while under CIA interrogation in a
shower stall in Tier IB ofthe Abu Ghraib detention facility in Baghdad. At the
time ofthe report of Major General George Fay on the role of military intelligence
in the Abu Ghraib abuses, the incident remained under CIA investigation.

•

Iraqi Major General Abed Hamed Mowhoush died on November 26, 2003 at the
AI Qaim facility. While General Mowhoush appears to have died from suffocation
during an interrogation by military intelligence personnel after being stuffed headfirst in a sleeping bag, according to news reports a classified Army report found
that "the circumstances surrounding the death arefurther complicated due to
Mowhoush being interrogated and reportedly beaten by members of a Special
Forces team and other government agency (DGA) employees two days earlier."
Your office reportedly initiated an investigation of at least one CIA operative in
connection with this incident.

•

Abdul Wali died on June 21. 2003 near Asadabad. Afghanistan, after being
interrogated for two days by a CIA contractor, David Passaro, who punched,
kicked and hil WaH with a large flashlight. The CIA referred the case to the
Department of Justice, which has brought criminal charges in connection with this
death.

•

Iraqi Lt. Col. Abdul .Ialeel died on January 9, 2004 at Forward Operating Base
(FOB) Rifles, Al ASlld, Iraq. Jaleel.was reportedly beaten during interrogation by
special operations forces, and died later after being tied to the top of his cell door
and gagged. A detainee autopsy summary released under a FOIA request lists an
early January 2004 death of a detainee at FOB Rifles as II homicide by "blunt force
-2-

vn<JV

-

1'lll'Vl\ l I I

.

... -::....::.: .. _-

"-"

.:....~

injuries & l\sphyxia." News reports indJcatepossible involvement of CIA
personnel ill this incident.
•

According to news reports, an Afghan detainee died of"hypothermia" in
November 2002 after a CIA case officer ordered the detainee to be stripped naked,
chained to the floor, and left overnight in an abandoned warehouse known as the
Salt Pit. The Salt Pit case was reportedly under investigation by your office.

Finally, the CTA has failed to respond to allegations that the Agency is engaging in
11 policy of rendition, reportedly resulting in dozens of individuals being secretly
transferred for intelTogation to foreign countries, including countries with a track record
of engaging in tortllre. An FBI docunlent recently released by the Justice Department
suggests that military intelligence at Guantanamo may also have been considering the use
ofrendition as part of interrogation plans for resistant detainees. The docurn.ent, entitled
"Legal Analysis of Interrogation Techniques" and dated November 27,2002, includes
among the categories of "coercive interrogation techniques" under consideration at
Guantannmo the following:
"Category IVI. Detainee will be sent off GTMO, either temporarily or
permanently, to Jordan, Egypt, or another third country to allow these
countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to obtain
the requisite information,"
'The report of Genemls Schmidt and Furlow on their investigation of FBI allegations of
detainee abuse at G4antanamo failed to address the question of whether U.S, officials at
Guantanamo were engaging in or threatening the rendition of detainees as an
interrogation technigue,
The American people need answers. It is insufficient to .say that the Chairman and
. Vice Chairman of the congressional oversight committee have been briefed on these
matters. There must be a forthright accounting ofboth the CIA's involvement ill the
treatment of detainees and what steps the CIA has taken to address the policies and
practices that may have contributed to alleged detainee abuse.
I request that yon provide answers to the following questions:
•

Have you completed your investigation into the "ghost detainee" policy referred to
by General Kern in his testimony before the Committee? If so, what were the

-3-

. , uuV, ........ u

fmdings ofyour investigation? Have you cooperated with the 000 Inspector
General in his investigation into the "ghost detainee" policy?
•

How many cases of alleged detainee abuse have you investigated? Have you
completed your review of these< cases? lfnot, what is the timeline for completing
the review of these cases?

•

How many oases of detainee abuse involving CIA personnel have been referred to
the Justice Department for their review? How many CIA operatives have been
named in the cases referred to the Justice Department? To what office within the
Justice Department have these cases been referred? How many of these cases does
the Justice Departmentplan to prosecute?

•
,?,"

Is the CIA cooperating ful1y with the Army's investigations into the ~.lleg.~ion~
. raised by Amiy Captain Ian Fishback and two non-commissioned officers of
having witnessed and heard about detainee abuse in Afghanistan and Iraq,
including abuse carried out by Other Government Agency, i.e.• CIA, personnel?

•

Have you investigated cases of individuals alleged to have been subjected to
rendition, resulting in their being transferred to foreign countries for interrogation?
If so, did you find any case in which these transfers resulted in detainees being
subjected to lreatrnent that violated U.S. obligations under the Convention Against
Torture and Cruel. Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment?

•

Did the CIA receive any requests for information from Generals Schmidt or
Furlow in cOImection with their investigation into FBI allegations of detainee
abuse at Guantanamo Bay, and if so, was the requested information proVided?
Have you looked into whether CIA personnel at Guantanamo Bay used rendition
or the threat of rendition as an interrogation technique or cooperated with military
intelligence in their doing so?

I look forward to receiving your responses. Should you have llI1Y questions. please
have your staff contRct Bill Monahan of my staff at (202) 224-9353.

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

·4·

U.1;.

Department Of Justice

DOC 75

Officc ofLegaJ Counsel

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

August 26, 2004

John A Ri7.zo, Esq.
Acting General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear John.:
~ You have asked our advice regarding whether the use offuur
particular interrogation techniques (d~puJation, uudity, water dousing, and abdominal
slaps) in the ongoing interrogation ofJlllBlll1-vould violate any United States statute
(including 18 U.S.c. § 2340A), the United States Constitution, or any treaty obligation of the
United States, We understand that.a high-value al Qaeda operative who is believed to
possess information concerning an llIlllUUent terror'
to the United States. This letter
confums our advice that the use of these techniques
utside territory subject to United
States jurisdiction would not violate any ofthese provislODS. We will supply, at a later date, an
opinion that explains the basis for this conclnsion, Our advice is based on, and limited by, the
following conditions:

~he use ofthese techniques will conform to: (i) the representations made ~
_ l e t t e r s to me' of July 30,2004 (and attachment) and August 25,2004; and (H) . the ..
representations made by CIA officials, including representatives ofthe Office ofMedical
Services, during our August 13, 2004meetlng. Based on that meeting, we understand that
arr.bient air temperature is the most important determinate for hypothennia in water dousing.
Additionally, we were informed that the Agency has based the safety margins set forth in its
water dousing procedures on experience with actua1elttended submersion in water of comparable
temperature. Thus, although water as cold as 41 degrees may be used for short periods of time,
in view of these factors and the comparatively small amount ofwater used, especially compared
to submersion, we were advised that the dousing technique as it will be employed poses virtually
no risk ofhypotherrnia or any other seriDus medical condition. We were further advised that the
dousing technique is designed to get the detainee's attention and it is not intended to cause, and
does not cause, any appreciable pain.
2. There is no material change in the medical and psychological facts and assessments for

_in

~-~

the attachment to your August 2 letter, and iJ~ugust 25, 2004,
letter, including that there are no medical ~chological contralndications to the use ofthese
techniques as you plan to employ them o n .

3. Medical officers will be present to observg"henever water dousing and/or
abdominal slaps are used and will closely monitor him while he is subject to dietary manipulation
(in addition to the normal monitoring ofhim throughout his deteoti.ensure thRt he does not
sustain any physical or mental harm. This includes making sure tha
an sustain a norrJlJll
body temperature idler dousing and that his intake of fluids and nutrition are adequate.
ugust 25,2004, letter that the
hysical. ability and mental. desire to resist
measures are "designed ... to weake
interrogation over the long run" (Letter at 3), and that "water dousing sessions, in col~unction
with sle;:,p deprivation, facilitates in weakening a detainee's ability and motivation to resist
interrogations" (Letter at 4), to be couswtent with the prior representations we have receivedi.e., these techniques are not physically painful and are not intended to, or expected to, cause any
physical or psychological harm. Rather, they are intended to reduce~esire to continue to
'engage in the counter-interrogation techniques he has been utilizing~. Indeed, you
consider these four techniques to be "more subtle" than some ofthe intelTogation measures used
to date (Letter at 3.)
.

~ We express no opinion on any other uses of these t~iues,
nor do we address any techniques other than these four or any conditions under which
r
other detainees are held. Furthermore, this letter does not constitute the Department 0 ustice's
policy approval for use ofthe techniques in tills or any othe~ case.
Sincerely,

Daniel Levin
Acting Assistant Attorney Genera!

DOC 78
u.s, Department of Justice
Office of Legal COlJl1Sel

TOP..,,",,,,,,,,
Office of Ihe Assistant Anomey Gen<t>l

OF

R

Washington, D,C, 20530

August 6, 2004

John A Rizzo, Esq.
Acting General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dcar John:

~ This lcttcr will con:fin:n our advice that, although it is a close and
difficult question, the use of the waterboard technique in the contemplated interrogation o f .
~utside territory subject to United States jurisdiction would not violate any United States
statute, including 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, nor would it violate the United States Constitution or any
treaty obligation of the United States. We will supply, at a later date, an opinion that explains the
basis for this conclusion. Our advice is based on, and limited by, the following conditions:
1. The use of the technique will conform [.0 the description attached to your letter to me of
August 2, 2004 (''Rizzo Letter").
2. A physician and psychologist will approve the use of the technique before each session, will
be present throughout the session, arid will have authority to stop the use of the technique at any
timc.
3. There is no material change in the medical and psychological facts and assessments set out in
the attachment to your August 2 letter, including that there are no medic.chOlOgiCal
contraindications to the use of the technique as you plan to employ it on
4. The technique will be used in no more than two sessions, of two hours each, per day. On each
day, the total time of the applications of the technique will not exceed 20 minutes. The period
over which the technique is used will not extend longer than 30 days, and the technique will not
be used on more than 15 days in this period. These limits are consistent with the Memorandum
for J()hn A. Rizzo, Acting General C(junse~ Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. Bybee,
Assistant Attorney General, Re: Interrogation ofal Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1,2002), and with
the previous uses of the technique, as they have been described to us. As we understand the
facts, the detainees previously subjected to the technique "are in good physiological and

.k,

1

psychological health," see Rizzo Letter at 2, and they have not described the technique as
physically painful. This understanding of the facts is material to our conclusion that the
technique, as limited in accordance with this letter, would not violate any statute of the United
States.

~ We express no opinion on any other uses of the tec~e, nor do we
address any techniques other than the waterboard or any conditions under whic~r other
detainees' are held. Furthermore, this letter does not constitute the Department of Justice's policy
approval for use ofthe technique in this or any other case.

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Levin
Acting Assistant Attorney General

DOC 87
u.s, Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

TOP~OF~
~--

"

Offi", of !he Assis1llnt Attomey Gen"I1l1

Washi"Sro", D.C. 20530

August 6, 2004

John A Rizzo, Esq.
Acting General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear John:

~ Tbis letter will confirin our advice that, although it is a close and
difficult question, the use of the waterboard technique in the contemplated interrogation o f .
BIIIoutside territory subject to United States jurisdiction would not violate any United States
statute, including 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, nor would it violate the United States Constitution or any
treaty obligation of the United States. We will supply, at a hiter date, an opinion that explains the
basis for tills conclusion. Our advice is based on, and limited by, the. following conditions:
1. The use ofthe technique will conform to the description attached to your letter to me of
August 2, 2004 (''Rizzo Letter").

2. A physician and psycholo gist will approve the use of the technique before each session, will
be present throughout the session, and will have authority to stop the use of the technique at any
time.
3. There is no material change in the medical and psychological facts and assessments set out in
the attachment tp your August 2 letter, including that there are no medic~chological
contraindications to the use of the technique as you plan to employ it o n _
4, The technique will be used in no more than two sessions, of two hours each, per day. On each
day, the total time ofthe applications ofthe technique will not exceed 20 minutes. The period
over wbich the technique is used will not extend longer than 30 days, and the technique will not
be used on more than 15 days in this period. These limits are consistent with the Memorandum
for John A. Rizzo, Acting General Counse~ Central Intelligence Agency, from Jay S. BYbee,
Assistant Attorney General, Re: Interrogation ofal Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1,2002), and with
the previous uses of the technique, as they have been described to us, As we understand the
facts, the detainees previously subjected to the technique "are in good physiological and

psychological health," see Rizzo Letter at 2, and they have not described the technique as
physically painful. This understanding of the facts is material to OUI conclusion that the
technique, as limited in accordance with this letter, would not violate any statute of the United
States,

~

We express no opinion on any other uses of the tec~e, nor do we
address any techniques other than the waterboard or any conditions under wbic~r other
detainees'are held, Furthermore, this letter does not constitute the Department of Justice's policy
approval for use of the technique in this or any other case,

Sincerely,

Daniel B, Levin
Acting Assistant Attorney General

DOC 86
U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel

TO
Office of the Assistant A110rney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

September 6, 2004

John A. Rizzo, Esq.
Acting General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

~ You have asked our advice regarding whether the use of twelve

(

particular interrogation techniques (attention grasp, walling, facia! hold, facial slap (insult slap),
cramped confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivatio diet m'
tion,
nudity, water dousing, and abdominal slap) in the interrogation 0
ould
violate any United States statute (including 18 U.S.C. § 2340A), the United States Constitution,
or any treaty obligation of the United States. We understand lha~s an al- Qa'ida
operative who "is believed to be involved in lhe operational planning of an al-Qa'ida attack or
attacks to take
.
'ted States prior to lhe November elections." September 5,2004
letter fro
to Dan Levin. This letter confmns our advice that the use of these
techniques on
utside territory subject to United States jurisdiction would not violate any
.of these provisIOns. e will supply, at a later date, an opinion lhat explains the basis for this
conclusion. Our advice is based on, and limited by, the following conditions:
1. The use of these techniques will conform to all representatIons previously made tous,
including those listed in my August 26, 2004 letter to you.
2. The medica! and psychological facts and assessments fo_indicate that there are
no medica! or psychological contraindications to the use of any of these techniques as you plan to
employ them.
3. Medical officers will be present to observ~henever any enhanced techniqu~
are applied and will closely monitor him while he is subject to sleep deprivation or dietary
manipulation, in addition to the nonnal monitoring ofbim throughout his detention, to ensure that
he does not sustain any physical or mental harm.

~

~

~ We express no opinion on any other nses of these techniques,
nor do we address any other techniques or any conditions under whic~r other detainees
are held. Furthermore, this letter does not constitute the Department o~ policy approval
for use of the techniques in this or any other case.
Sincerely,

.~

Daniel Levin
Acting Assistant Attorney General

VPl

---13 JulyZOCU

KhalidShaykh Muhammad:
Preeminent Source On
AI.. Qa'ida~
-- -

~-------~-

..

-

----_._-----------------

, ..

-----

.

.

r.au.Ud Bhllykh Mu/lamlIl.ld: l'rumlnenl
SoU1'Ce On A1-Qa'id~

Key F[ndlngs (U)

Slnee h!& Morel> 2003 capturt, ~d Shllykh Muhammad (KSM), tlte
drIving foree behllld the 11 September attacks uweU aJ ,evera!
lubseqllent pinta against US and WWflI targelli worldwide, IIl1J
become olle of the US Oo~'l key lOuteeli on'AJ..Qa'ida. Au
detaiMe, he baa provided~ that have shed light on
aI-Qa'ida'lltrlltegic doctrine,plolli and probable Wgclli. key operatives,
and the IUtely metOOds fur altaC!Ol in the US homeland, Iea.ding 10 the
c.limIption ot811veral plota against the United Sta.le$•

• lnfOflllllllcn fuHn KSM Iw not only dramatic:a1ly expanded our universe
oflmowledge on al-Qa'ida's plols but baa proviclcd leads that misted

=~tu~

KSM needfully maintains that h!& overriding priority WJlj to Itrike
lbe UDlted Staiea but sal'll that irnml'ilialely after II September he

.
_ _ _~rea"",~Jh.at.a.1bUow-on.attack-ln.the-Uun..d-States·would·be-diflil>lil"'----·------­
~ of new se<:Urity m_s. A:l.;esul~ KSM'a plots against the
US homeland fromla1ll200 I wm opportunislic and limillld, including a
plot 10 ill' • hijacked plane into the llllIc6t bulldinil on the US Weal Coas1
ll%ld a plan to sendll1-Qa'ida~eand US clti=J~ lletoff
bombs in high-rise apartm8llt buildi.tlga in a US city. iJi7-~

• CIA uaOlllN t1at KSM bOll revealed at least tlte broad outlInes of the
let of lllrroriJt attaela npon whith he lU1d hI! lieutenants focu.aed
!'rom about 1m until hb ~tentiJ>il four years later. We Judge t1at
KSM has beellllelUlrA!ly accurate becalW his information tendl to .
be conelJtellt, and much of It h~ by fellow
detainees and other reportJne.

..

_------------,

_.

---.-'

-- - - - - - - - - _ . _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

!OlaUd SluLyldt Muhammad,
PnenWil!llt 80=. On A1-Qa'ida

~
What KSM Ha. Told U. ~

Khalld Bhaykh

It wlIl take years to detel'mine definitively all tho
, plou in which KSM WIll involved lind of which he
lila! aware, but our ~"" debriei1ngs ofvarious
KtlM Ii."mo*"", sln<:e marly 2003 SUllll"'t 1hat he lUll
diw!god lit Iwttho bro&d outIlnea ofhl. netwoil.:',
I!l()lItlli8nifi= plots ogainat the Uniwd SlaWs lind
.1SlIlIIbeI;O in his mi. u al-Qa'ida's cb~ of
opet!llolls nU10idc Afgh.enlJt8ll.:

Mubllilmad (KSM), the
drl'llni (01'0<0 behind the
11 September ameki..
wen u aevel'll!
lublequllllt p10tl aga\nJt
US lIll<I w..l4rD tsl'getl
worldWIde, b.. become,
I!Iw! hIo eaptur. In
• SrrIJ:tnB r)" 1.Ill/ledSttzzu. ~ite KSM',
Msreh a003, • key
WOltiOll1hat a J'O"l.ll Sejltembor II!bI.ok in the
b1tOlllgtn<4 ..~ fur
Unllod Slstos would be dlfficult beoauie of tllOl"
lbe US Government on
Ifringent murlty mllllWll8. be has admit1ed to
~'\da' Iplotlllld
lIJllchjng a plot in !Jlte 200 I to uae JemJUIlt r.Iamiya
pel'lOllalll1el. Dcbri.fings slnt:ll his dttelition have
(JI) opmtlvei to ow!! a hijllQl;ed lith Into the
yielded.
,~ that bve shed light Cln_tho ~""",lh.c-US-W~-From-lato
-------plots;-C&pab~ Wl-~ of
2oo11llllil early 2003, KSM also oO_lvedsevera!
lll-Q"'lda o~vea, lind IffilWod hlttolUt
IOll/.1llvel plata, hwlwiblg m wIy 2002 plu to
Cll'gOl\luUollllllld networlQl. l{e hIl4 ptoVided
!llllld e1-Qa'lde openlfvolllld US citizen l00e
~ 011 a!'Q.'ld&',IItt&log\.~.
Padilla to let offbcmba in high·me apa/tl!lelll
probable targets, the i:mp&I:t ofsttlkiIlg...,h lorpt
l1uildlllgs in an WlipeClfiod ~or US city,llllC! an
set, and Iil<aIy mothods ofItWlb WIde tho Unllod
early 2003 plot to employ lll$lWOrk of
SIalN.
PeId!t>ni!-inoluding lyman Parla IlllC! Mojid
Khan-to t1rpt P 1ll<Ii=. railroad tw;ka, and
• KSM 1lU olIO provided in COllSi.mabLe detell tho
tho BtoOklynBrldge inN""" Yolk. KSMbaa also
spoken all=3\h IIhout operative la'flu aI-T.ry..,
tnit.I and prom.. that a1-QA'lda 40uglu in W
operati_ afteO' the Il
admi.IIlng that al-Qa'lda lllId tuked a!·Tayyv to
cue llpWji.li.:ge\lI in Now yotll; Cily in 2001.

1,-

I

,'

KSM'I R.olodex ABoon Por Optl'iWlOa !JPKlf)
KSM's decade.1nug e~ II,! a tettcrl!~ during
w!Jieh he met with jl. broad l'$ll£e of rallmJe
tt<tr<miAts from lll'Ound tht world, bu inAdo him a
I<.ey 00= of!l:li'omulim1 on ll1lmOtOllI al-Qa'id!
opm.nvea and oth¢r muJehidin. He bu provided
l.trtelligen<:ethAt hili Isd d\teelly to the capture of
opemiVtll c>!tloahed out our undenbolldlng ofthe
aetivltioJ of impoltant d4lalnaes, which In tum
uslaled in the dcbrietlngs of Ifuloe indly\dual&.

Sim.llarly, inlilnnAlion th!t ItSM
proYided to US onMsjid KhlnIln
the aprill8- of2003 wu the enu:ial
fiIst link in the oJWn tlat led 11.1 to
-tb'-"l'tufe'bf"p!i5I1tiiieiUJIliiiIOI'

._.- _ . -- '

and al-Qa'lda ""*od.tle lhmball

.

,

inAUS'l't2oo3 and mote then.

dozen Southeast AJ<illn opemiYCll
B1ated tar ottlIcb aplnst 1he US
hotnelBM.. ItSM told 1IIl about Khan'. tel. in
de1iverlna SSO,OOO in Deoembor 2002 to opmIi_
woolaled. with Hamha1l.

• rn lIIleullljl1n of how ~ from """

cIctainee can be U&ed in dobriefin,g _thcr dotal.twe
in a "bulldlllg-blook" pro-. r:han-wbo bad
b<to d,et:;lned in Poldstanin early200:l-wu
confiontcd with KSM'. iIlfor:malion about the
mQlUly and acknOwledged tb&l he doUyoted the
melle)' to an operaUve l1IImlId "Zuhaft." Klian &1lIC)
provided Zubalr'. pbyoioal ~n and C<lnllwt
number, Baled on tb&lld:m,,'t!on, Zubair w..
"'lllulOO in 1une 2003,

• Next, KSM-wheu explicitly queried on tbe
is~ed~'. brother, •Abd al·Hadi
II a
""Uv
.otto

· ..

.,

KSM'. Illt'o1"ll1ation Stems CredIble ••• ~
KS

_---------

-....----

....

I

~

,f

••

~~

Applllldl:ia Biography of K1uilld
Sbaykh MuhalnmJUI (KSM:) (1J)

Khalld Sheykh Muhm.msd (KSM) wu lx>rn on
24 April 1965; his Jluher, a cleru: who dled in
1969, moVed to Kuwait aIona with o1llar Balw:hf
relatives fum.l'ran in the 1950ll and early 196~
wben large riumbm ofllrlgrants ll'lM1ed to tile
Gulfrtgion ftoni 8Oro.. tile Musliln World eo Ul:e
a<!v>lltll.ge ottlle oil boOlll. Tn a lengthy
aueoologrsphiClll ufatwlent made atlcr hlJ capture,
I<8M note<! that he had • lllbelllous atrco.k from
child!ulod; he a_ad tblIl in grtd£ lohoo~ he and
his nephew, World Trad. Cotlle1' bomber Rallll!i
YO\I$af; tore down the KuW!.lti !hi from their
>ChooI. He alao utllted th&t be joma<! the Musllm
'.
Brolhethood .. a ~ u an cxprmion ofhfa
atllted that his CQlltI.olll with AmcriOlllll, whJle
detlanoe BgJIimt tho aecular world be ..w!l'Olllld ----lllinbnal, oonfjrmcd hia-viflW.1hal-tbe-United-SlaleS-------hlJ:n.-\llM1~lm<l~iBt=lty.
• Tn 8ddltion l<l Ramlti y 01I.Ief; anolller five
• After ~ from A&T in 1986 with •
"'1elives ofI<8M "'" !Im<lrlIta, tho
l:101able
degrtc ltllllJlClunlcol ~ lCSM!llIid
of whom llte nephew 'AU'Abel Ii·Aziz 'Ali
that be t!ll.vollld to A.fjjba.nUllul to particlp.", in
(..k... 'Ammar),.
fllcUiwot
!be fighting "i!inIt the Soviet Army tbe«. H.
II
a
atllted thatlll<>llt ofhill limo In Afghaoi.am
<!llrins this perlod WB.I~ work

a.

=

for o1llar mujt<hidln.

KSM also hoa identified tho temri.st activiti.. of
hill lltpbow lUmzl '{ourer, oIcnog with hfa angant
the US O<lv=!', "'Ppott otr..me~ sa playing
I pivotal role in his de<rlslon to engage in terrorism
againIt the United SllI1c8. In I992,lCSM ""yo he
provided about $1,000 to bolp tUl>d ¥o"""ra
bombing oftbt World Trade Ccotl:r, adding that
be WU ~ed by the .... with which his
oepb<n>: wu abl. to openue in the United Statoo,

----~-~-----

He thonjoined Youaeflllihe Phillpplma in 1994
to plan tho "Bojw" plol-lhe simull8lleOUI
bombing;! of a00_ TJS -t\aued COlIllIltNlaI
airlinctl over tho PWfie.
• After the SojiWplot waa <!l$tIlpllld md Youaef
wu ewgltI ill ....ly 1995. KSM ..eaped b\ll wa&
JUbseq\len1ly iIldiQled in l:!l! Unit«! Stw:ll for his
role In tho plot and l\IOIll lnlo hiding.

ol-Qa'lda'. Media Commlttee and ovenaw
otl.ixta c!llring 2000-2001 ttl war!< with :East
A$i8l1 jeniuh Jslamiya (J1) opmtivOs to launeh
ton'ot!at ettW:s In SO\llbIlaat Alia aga\nol US and
laracli tatgeta•

• Before September 2001, KSM w.. neilher a
fotinal mamb<rofol-Qa'lw.l1Or a=ber ofi~
lcoderthip coullCl1, b\ll in addition III managing
the It S<:ptarnbet operotlol\, be beaded

• KSM ,b!Jll<I tb.ot he had. plamcd a IlOCOll.d waV<l
ofhijaeking lllW:ks even belixo September 2001
'but abillod his &Un frotn tbe United StatJ!S to tho
Unlt<d KJngdom bo<:aU6. oftbe Ullilell Swea'
pOOl-II September aocurlty pomtte and tbe
BrltiRb c»vemment'$ strong aupp(7rt for
W&.!bingtot1" global WIf an torror.

..
• In addition tc ll!Illlnpling to prepm thii ao-eallod
"Heath:ow Plot"-in which he plAnned 10 liave
m.ultiple aiImft atla<lk Heathrow Ailport Illid
other f:argetlln lIi# United ~KBM ilio
launchOO a number ofplota ~ the Unfuod
Statoe.

•

~._--

--------------------~

S~/~O~R

._--------------------

VP2

.-J

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for the War
Against AI-Qa'ida (S!J1>FF)

Key Findings (D)

Since II September· 2001, detainee reporting has become a crucial pillar of
US counterterrorism efforts, aiding intelligence and law enforcement
operations to capture additional terrorists, helping to thwart terrorist plots,
and advancing our analysis of the al-Qa'ida target. In addition, detainees
have been able to clarify and provide context for information collected
from other sources; they also have provided unique insights into different
aspects of the terrorist organization, including its leadership' attack
strate and tactics, and CBRN capabilities and ambitions.
the reporting is disseminated broadl within the US

Detainees have given uS a wealth ofusefu_information on

:~i_e
'n nearly every capture of al-Qa' ida members and
associates since 2002, including helping us unravel most of the network
associated-with-ihe-nowdetained-n-Septembenmlstermirrd-Khalid-Sha:yJeh-·----·-·····..··
Muhammad (KSM). KSM provided information that set the stage for the
detention of Hambali, lead contact of Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to al-Qa'ida,
and most of his network.
• Detainee information was also key to wra
al- a'ida members and associates a

One of the gains to detaining the additional terrorists has been the
thwarting ofa number ofal-Qa'ida operations in the United States and
overseas. Jose Padilla was detained as he was arriving in Chicago with
plans to mount an attack. Similarly, WaJid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a. KhalJad)
was captured on the verge of mounting attacks against the US Consulate in
Karachi, Westerners at the Karachi Airport, and Western housing areas .
..(.WNF)
Since 11 September, the capture and debriefing of detainees also has
transformed our understanding of al-Qa'ida and affiliated terrorist groups,

o~

providing increased avenues for so
of Abu ZUbaydah in March 2002,

• In the nearly four years since 11 September 2001, successive detainees
have helped us gauge our progress in the fight against al-Qa'ida by
providing updat"
.
of

iiIiIi~1
Despite the unquestionable utility of detainee reporting, uncorroborated
information from detainees must be regarded with some degree of
suspicion. Detainees have been known to pass incomplete or intentionally
misleading information; moreover, we assess that each detainee ve likely
has information that he will not reveal

-------------

~ET

Detainee Reporting Pivotal for
~ Against AI-Qa'ida

Since II September 200 I, reporting from high value
al-Qa'ida detainees has become a crucial pillar of US
counterterrorism efforts, contributing directly and
indirectly to intelligence and law-enforcement
operations against the al-Qa'ida target. In addition,
detainees have been able to clarify and provide
context for information collected from other sources;
they also have provided unique insights into different
aspects of the terrorist organization, including its
leadership, attack strategy and tactics, and CBRN
capabilities and ambitions.
• Detainee reporting since early 2003 has been a
major foundation for much of the Intelligence
Community's analysis on al-Qa'ida, both in tenus
of current intelligence publications and of more
in-depth intelligence assessments.

detainee reporting is disseminated
broadly among US intelli ence and law-

enforcement entities

-,¢

Helping Target Other Terrorists (~)

and medium value detainees have given us a
wealth ofuseful_inforrnation on al-Qa'ida
members and aSSOcIates, mcluding new details on the
personalities and activities of known terrorists.
Detainees also divulge, either wittingly or
unwittingly, details about terrorists who are unknown
to us. As is infonnation from other collection

streams, detainee reporting is often incomplete or too
general to lead directly to arrests; instead, detainees
provide critical pieces to the puzzle, which, when
combined with other reporting, have helped direct an
investigation's focus and led to the capture of

terrorists.
'''.

"~~'i"',"

, . . ,..,;... '.

DefiningiiltQ

~~ba~~~~f~

aGcess andjhe.

o_

This assessment wa~ prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's
r
d to the Chief,

~ET

Unraveling Hambali's Network
In March 2003, al-Qa'ida external operations chief
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) provided
infonnation about an al-Qa'ida operative, Majid
Khan, who he was aware had recently been captured.
KSM-possibly believing the detained operative was
"talking"-admitted to having tasked Majid with
delivering a large sum of money to individuals
working for another senior al-Qa'ida associate.

~R

• Bringing the story full circle, 'Abd al-Hadi
identified a cell of JI operatives whom Hambali had
sent to Karachi for training. When confronted with
his brother's revelations, Hambali admitted that
some members of the cell were eventually to be
groomed for US operations-at the behest of
KSM-possibly as part of KSM's plot to fly
hijacked planes into the tallest building on the US
l
west coast.

l\i"'N1Q

______ ~ In an example of how infonnation from ono.
_
detainee can be used in debriefing another detainee
in a "building block" process, Khan-confronted
with KSM's infonnation about the moneyacknowledged that he delivered the money to an
operat'ive named HZubair" and provided Zubair's
physical description and contact number. Based on
that infonnation, Zubair was captured in June 2003.
• During debriefings, Zubair revealed that he worked
directly for Hambali, who was the principle Jemaah
Islamiya (n) conduit to al-Qa'ida. Zubair rovided
infonnation

Bringing New Targets to Light
A variety of detainee reporting bas provided us initial
infonnation about individuals having links to
al-Qa'ida and has given us insight into individuals
about whom we had some reporting but whose
I See Appendix A: Capture of AI-Qa'ida's Southeast
Asian Chief Hambali (SiMl"). ~

~ET
._.

----.1

_.

__._--------------,

NO~

Aiding US Law Enforcement Efforts ~
Many actionable leads provided by detainee reporting
have assisted the efforts of the FBI, local law
enforcement, and the Department of Defense. Such
infonnation has led to arrests, helped in questioning
suspects, ~atelY be used in a judicial
process.
~
Soon after his arrest, KSM described an Ohio·based
truck driver whom the FBI identified as lyman Faris,
and who was already under suspicion for his contacts
with al·Qa'ida operative M'\iid Khan. The FBI and
CIA shared intelligence from interviews ofKSM,

Khan, and Faris on a near real~time basis and quickly
ascertained that Faris had met and accepted
operational taskings from KSM on several occasions.
Faris is currently serving a 20-year sentence for
consp~rac7 and~m.aterial
su ort to a terrorist
orgamzatIOn.

• Ja'far al-Tayyar first came to the FBI's attention
when Abu Zubaydah named him as one of the most
likely individuals to be used by al·Qa'ida for
operations in the United States or Euro e.

_

•.........•........•.

-

.-------

KSM's revelation in March 2003 that he was plotting
with Sayf aI-Rahman Paracha-who also used the
name Saifullah al·Rahman Paracha-to smuggle
explosives into the United States for a planned attack
in New York prompted the FBI to investigate
Paracha's business ties in the United States. The
investigation also involved questioning Paracha '8
son, Uzair Paracha, in New York and resulted in
designating in May 2003 Sayf al·Rahman Paracha an
enemy combatant. Sayf al·Rahman Paracha entered
into US custody in July 2003, and Uzair was indicted
in the Federal Court in Manhattan. Sayf ai-Rahman
Paracha remains in detention at Guantanamo Bay.

~~

- - - _..

_

----

......

~I

Revealing Plots, Potential Targcts

~

Detainee reporting has helped thwart a number of
al-Qa'ida plots to attack targets in the West and
elsewhere, Not only have detainees reported On
potential targets and techniques that al-Qa'ida
operational planners have considered but arrests also
have disrupted attack plans in progress.

s~
.....

4

-_._--------------------

tiOS;ettf'f/,/M R

• A key Somali operative working with al-Qa'ida and
..
ri
hmed
al-lttihad al-1s
Gnleed
after his captu
·al-Qa'ida leade
lanned to
attack the US military at Camp Lemonier in
Djibouti using explosive-laden water tankers.

In response to questions about al-Qa'ida's efforts to

acquire WMD, KSM also revealed he had met three
individuals involved in al-Qa'ida's program to
produce anthrax. He apparently calculatedincorrectly-that we had this information already,
given that one of the three--JI operative and
al-Qa'ida a s s o c i _ d been in
foreign custody
for unrelated
terrorist activity.
• After being confronted with KSM's reporting,
Sufaat eventually admitted hiS~.
.... .... in the
. anthrax program and p r o v i d e d _
_
_
----iiiformatJOn on his at-large assistants... Ultirri,ite!y;---"- Heathrow Airport Plot
the information from Sufaat and KSMIII!II
Shortly after his capture in March 2003, KSM
ed to the capture of
divulged limited information about his plot to use
Sufaat's two assistants in the anthrax program.

(Z/~

US Targets Here and Abroad
Abu Zubaydah was the first of several detainees to
reveal a siguificant quantity of general threat
information against targets abroad and in the United
States-including the White House and other US
symbols.
• Reporting from Abu Zubaydah has been used as a
baseline for debriefin other senior detainees

IIiIiIt~~attackS
Debriefings of mid-level al-Qa'ida operatives also
have reported on specific plots against US interests.

commercial airliners to attack Heathrow Airport and

other targets in the United Kingdom. He discussed
the plot probably because he suspected that key
al-Qli'ida II September facilitator and Heathrow
Airport plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who had been
detained six months previously, had already revealed
the infonnation.
• Debriefers used KSM's and Bin al-Shibh's
reporting to confront Walid Bin 'Attash (a.k.a.
Khallad) and Ammar aI-BaIuchi, who were caught
two months after KSM. Khallad admitted to having
been involved in t _ e d that he had
directed cellleade
to begin
locating pilots who con1d hijack planes and crash
~allad said he and operative
ad considered some 10
countneSas poss' e aunch sites for the hijacking
_ t h e

~II

" """""'/MR

• Khallad's statements provided leverage in
debriefings ofKSM. KSM fleshed out the status of
the operation, including i d e n t i f _ l
;~~dKingdomRevealing the Karachi Plots
When confronted with information provided by
Ammar al·Baluchi, Khallad admitted during
debriefings that al-Qa'ida was Iannin to attack the

Aiding Our Understanding of AI-Qa'ida

(~

Since II September, tbe capture and debriefing of
HVDs has significantly advanced our understanding
of al-Qa' ida and affiliated terrorist groups. Before
the capture of Abu Zubaydah in March 2002, We had
significant gaps in knOWledge about al-Qa'ida's
Organizatio~cmbersand associates,
capabilities
and its presence
around the g 0 e. .t m months of his arrest, Abu
-·----·-Zuoaydah-proviaoo det.,ISiiliout ar-Qil'ia.'-s- . - organizational structure, key operatives, and modus
operandi. Early in his detention, his information on
al-Qa'ida's Shura Council and i '
.

a

Since 11 September, successive detainees have
helped us gauge our progress in the fight against
al-Qa'ida by providing updated information on the

.

.

.

NO~

the organizations until his arrest in July 2004, he has
reported on how he forged passports and to whom he
supplied them.

also provided invaluable insights in
reports that have aided our analysis of
a - a 1 a s current organization, the personalities of
its key members, and al-Qa'ida's decisionmaking
process. His reporting has contributed to oUr
understanding of the enemy, how al-Qa'ida members
interact with each other, how they are organized, and
what their personal networks are like.

Ahmed Khalfam Ghailani (a.k.a. Haytham al-Kini,
a.k.a. Fupi) a Tanzanian aI-Qa'ida member who was
indicted for his role in the 1998 East Amca us
Embassy bombings, has provided new insights into
al-Qa'ida's skills and networks. As a facilitator and
one ofal·Qa'ida's top document forgers since the II
September attacks, with access to individuals across

s~

NO~

~ETI

in confronting detainees to persuade them to talk
about topics they would otherwise not reveal.
lit

For exam Ie lists of names found on the computer
a key al-Qa'ida financial
operative an aCI ,tator for the 11 September
attacks-seized in March 2003 represented
al-Qa'ida members who were to receive funds.
Debriefers questioned detainees extensively on the
names to determine who they were and how
important they were to the organization. The
informati

understand alexpenditures,
funds that were ava, able to families.
I)

The same computer contained a list of e-mail
addresses for individuals KSM helped deploy
aQroad who he hoped would execute operations;

Challenges of Detainee Reporting ~
Illuminating Other Collection

~

Detainees have been particularly useful in sorting out
the large volumes of documents and computer data

seized in raids. Such info

i

.

Detainees, by virtue of their circumstances, have an
adversarial relationship with their debriefers; they
often try pass incomplete or intentionally misleading
infonnation, perhaps hoping that the volume of the
r ortin will make it difficult to sort out the truth.
admitted outri ht that there were some

._---------------------'

elaborated on his plan to crash commercial airlines
into Heathrow Airport; he may have assumed that
Ramzi Bin al-Shibh, who was captured in
~J;1ad already divulged this plan.

Refusing To Budge on Certain Topics!JjJMFJ
We assess that each detainee very likel
information that he will not reveal

Detainees' information must be corroborated using
multiple sources of intelligence; uncorroborated
information from detainees must be regarded with
Some degree of suspicion. Sometimes the detainee
gives information he calculates-rightly or
wrongly-that the debriefers already know.
o

Uncharacteristic for most detainees, KSM almost
immediately following his capture in March 2003

S~T

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