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National Peoples Action Wells Fargo Banking on Immigrant Detention 2012

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JAILS

FARGO
Banking on
Immigrant Detention
Wells Fargo’s Ties to the
Private Prison Industry
September 2012

in collaboration with
National Prison Divestment Campaign

National People's Action (NPA) is a network of community power organizations from across the country
that work to advance a national economic and racial justice agenda. NPA has over 200 organizers
working to unite everyday people in cities, towns, and rural communities throughout the United States. For
40 years NPA has been a leader in the fight to hold banks accountable to the communities in which they
serve and profit.

Public Accountability Initiative (PAI) is a non-profit, non-partisan watchdog organization focused on
corporate and government accountability. PAIʼs mission is to facilitate and produce investigative research
that supports citizen-led accountability efforts. PAI's hardhitting research reports on topics such as
wasteful government subsidies, corporate lobbying efforts, conflicts of interest, and Wall Street fraud have
been cited by the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and numerous other media outlets.

Executive Summary
Private prison operators are profiting from the deepening immigration crisis in the United States.
Companies like CCA and GEO Group have seen steady growth due to the countryʼs policy of locking up
immigrants in privately-managed detention facilities. These companies have spent millions to shape this
policy, win contracts, and ensure that the rules are fixed in their favor – all at the expense of some of the
countryʼs most vulnerable people.
These companies would not be positioned to profit from the countryʼs immigration crisis without the help
of prominent Wall Street banks. The industry is capital-intensive and requires enormous amounts of
financing from banks that sit at the countryʼs financial and economic crossroads. One bank, in particular,
has distinguished itself from the competition as an investor in and lender to the industry: Wells Fargo.
This report details the financial ties between Wells Fargo and the top private prison operators in the
country: Corrections Corp of America (CCA), GEO Group, and Management and Training Corp (MTC).
The information compiled in the report shows that as a lender and investor, Wells Fargo has provided
critical support for the private prison industry.
In fact, Wells Fargo is unique among its peers in the financial industry in having strong financial
connections to the countryʼs three largest private prison operators:
•

CCA. Wells Fargo is a major lender to Corrections Corp of America (CCA), the largest private
prison company in the country, acting as the syndication agent and issuing lender on CCAʼs $785
million line of credit.

•

GEO. Wells Fargo is a major investor in GEO Group, with $95.5 million invested through its
mutual funds, and serves as trustee for $300 million of the companyʼs corporate debt.

•

MTC. Wells Fargo is a lender to Management & Training Corp (MTC). MTC is a private company
and so it is difficult to find data on its investors and lenders, but Wells Fargo is listed as a lender
to MTC in a Utah UCC filing.

The records reviewed for this report show that no other major bank has strong ties to each of the top
three private prison companies (CCA and GEO are the top two prison operators in the country, MTC is a
somewhat distant third).
The Private Prison Industryʼs Vicious Cycle. As a major investor in and lender to the private prison
industry, Wells Fargo is at the center of the industryʼs vicious cycle. This cycle involves profiting from the
detention of vulnerable immigrant communities by understaffing the prisons and cutting costs so that
basic food and medical needs are not met. The private prisons then use the profits to attract additional
capital and investment, and invest in lobbying and other political efforts to win prison contracts and laws
that result in higher levels of immigrant detention, which translates into increased profits from increased
detention, and so on. Increased detention also drains public dollars from state and federal governments,
money that could and should be used to invest in people and create jobs. By lending to and investing in
the private prison industry, Wells Fargo plays a crucial role in perpetuating this cycle, and if it were to
withdraw from it, this cycle would break down. This report details Wells Fargoʼs role in this cycle as an
investor and lender. A future report will also detail how Wells Fargo supports the political and economic
agenda of the private prison industry.

2

Preying on Immigrant Communities. The private prison industryʼs growth model is premised on the
exploitation and detention of undocumented immigrants. The report details how private prison company
executives recognized the opportunity to profit from immigrant detention in the wake of 9/11 and sought to
capitalize on it. Fundamentally, the industry profits from the mismatch between its own power and political
influence, and the extreme vulnerability of immigrant communities. As part of the vicious cycle, the more
the industry profits, the greater the magnitude of this imbalance of power.
Profiting from Unemployment. The report notes that the private prison industry contributes to
unemployment by supporting prison labor and profiting from it. Higher levels of unemployment translate
into higher levels of detention, a fact noted by industry executives.
Wells Fargoʼs Denials. As recently as April 2012, Wells Fargo denied significant ties to the private prison
industry, perhaps due to the reputational risks of financing such a controversial and predatory industry.
But this report clearly demonstrates that despite its stated commitment to “corporate social responsibility,”
Wells Fargo has made a business decision to profit from the private prison industry and, in turn, the
countryʼs immigration crisis. Now that their central role in the private prison industry has been
documented, will they continue to lend their financial support to these practices?
Future Report. This report is the first in a series. A future report will detail other aspects and
consequences of Wells Fargoʼs support for the private prison industry, and will raise further questions
about the bankʼs role in the private prison industry and the vicious cycle of imprisonment and detention,
profit, and political influence it facilitates.

3

I. The Private Prison Industry:
Preying on Immigrant Communities
Before documenting Wells Fargoʼs ties to the private prison industry, it is necessary to understand what
the industry is, how it is profiting from the immigration crisis, and ultimately why Wells Fargo is hesitant to
be associated with the industry. The following section offers background on the industry and places it in
the context of a decades-long trend toward the increasing privatization of public services, discusses how
private prison companies are profiting from the immigration crisis, details abuses at prisons run by the
three private prison operators discussed in this report (CCA, GEO, and MTC), and briefly examines the
use of private prison labor and what this means for the US economy.

Taking Prisons Private
The private prison industry is an outgrowth of a decades-long trend towards the privatization of public
services in the United States. Private prison companies do business by contracting with federal and state
agencies to house inmates, often in facilities of their own design and construction, though they have also
i
privatized formerly government-run prisons. At the end of 2010, the private prison population in the U.S.
was more than 128,000, comprising 8 percent of all federal and
ii
state inmates. Not included in this figure are the 400,000
undocumented immigrants held in civil detention centers in the
U.S., nearly half of which are administered by private prison
iii
operators. As detailed below, the detention of immigrants is a
key component of the private prison industryʼs business model,
which is premised on profiting from the exploitation of vulnerable
communities.
As rapidly as the total number of prisoners in the U.S. has
increased in recent years - combined federal and state prison
occupancy doubled between 1990 and 2009 - the for-profit prison
industry has grown at an even faster rate. The industryʼs two
giants, CCA and GEO Group, have doubled their annual revenue
iv
in just the last ten years to a combined $3.3 billion in 2011.

Immigrant Detention as Profit Driver
Much of this increased profitability comes from immigrant detention. The Detention Watch Network found
that, between 2005 and 2010, the number of immigrants detained doubled to approximately 392,000 at a
v
cost of $1.77 billion. On a 2008 conference call with investors, GEO Groupʼs chairman George Zoley
said: “The federal market is being driven for the most part as weʼve been discussing by the need for
vi
criminal alien detention beds. Thatʼs being consistently funded.” Indeed, GEO Group and CCA revenues
vii
from detaining immigrants have more than doubled since 2005. SEC filings from both companies
acknowledge that their profitability is dependent on tough immigration laws. From GEO Groupʼs 2011 10K statement:
In particular, the demand for our correctional and detention facilities and services
and BIʼs [a company with exclusive ICE contracts that GEO acquired in 2011]
services could be adversely affected by changes in existing criminal or
immigration laws, crime rates in jurisdictions in which we operate, the relaxation of

4

criminal or immigration enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction, sentencing or
deportation practices, and the criminalization of certain activities that are currently
proscribed by criminal laws or the loosening of immigration laws. For example, any
changes with respect to the decriminalization of drugs and controlled substances could
affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, sentenced and incarcerated, thereby
potentially reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Similarly, reductions
in crime rates could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring
incarceration at correctional facilities. Immigration reform laws which are currently a
focus for legislators and politicians at the federal, state and local level also could
viii
materially adversely impact us.
The growth in the immigrant detention sector began after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when the
federal government created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and shifted the enforcement of
immigration law from the Department of Justice to the new DHS agency, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). The private prison industry recognized this shift as an opportunity. Steve Logan, the
CEO of Cornell Companies (a prison company purchased by GEO Group), said in a quarterly earnings
th
call: “Itʼs clear that since September 11 thereʼs a heightened focus on detention…Some of that means
that people donʼt get through, but the other side of that is more people are going to get caught. So I would
ix
say thatʼs positive.”
The change in immigration enforcement was accompanied by an exponential increase in lobbying
expenditures by the prison industry. GEO Group spent $40,000 on lobbying in 1999, a number that
increased to $860,000 in 2005. CCA spent $200,000 lobbying in 2001 and $3.8 million in 2005. Since
x
2003, CCA has never spent less than $1.8 million on lobbying At the same time as the companiesʼ
xi
lobbying expenditures hit their peak, ICEʼs budget increased from $3.5 billion to $4.7 billion.
According to DHS, 75% of undocumented immigrants were born in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala,
xii
Honduras, and Ecuador.

Abuses at Private Prisons
Privately operated prisons are notorious for their abhorrent conditions, shoddy security, and blind eyes to
violence at the hands of both guards and other inmates. These abuses, a result of corporate cost-cutting
and competition for inmates, have led to investigations into and public outcry against all three of the
United Statesʼ leading private prison companies.
CCA has exhibited what Corazon de Tucson refers to as a “culture of brutality” for abuse on the part of its
xiii
guards and for neglectful conditions that have led to riots in the past. According to a 2007 report by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Torrance County Detention Facility, a prison run by CCA, had the highest
xiv
rate of sexual violence in the country: 13.4 percent of prisoners were victims of sexual violence. The
American Civil Liberties Union sued CCA after it “routinely exposed inmates to beatings from other
inmates and guards as a disciplinary strategy and then denied medical care to those injured in the
xv
attacks.”
GEO Group has a history of abuse and neglect in its facilities, coming under fire in 2007 for the squalid
conditions in an Idaho prison when an inmate committed suicide. An inspector said that prison was “the
xvi
worst heʼd ever seen” and that its guards “showed no concerns for the living conditions.” The
corporation was sued in 2010 after an inmate died of a seizure while in solitary confinement after being
xvii
denied epilepsy medication. In 2009, the company was found liable and assessed $42.5 million in
xviii
punitive damages after guards watched inmates beat a prisoner to death.

5

MTC-operated Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center was investigated by the Department of Justice in
2002 and 2003, which found that “persons confined suffer harm or the risk of serious harm from
deficiencies in the facilityʼs provision of medical and mental health care, suicide prevention, protection of
inmates from harm, fire safety, and sanitation. In addition, the facility fails to provide inmates sufficient
xix
access to the courts and opportunity to seek redress of grievances.” The DOJ reported that some
inmates went weeks without receiving underwear under MTCʼs management, that one guard was
expected to monitor 120 inmates 12 hours at a time, and that there had been one suicide and seven
xx
attempted suicides in the first seven months that MTC operated the prison.
A month after the investigation findings were released, MTC executive Lane McCotter, who was in charge
of the Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center, was chosen by the Justice Department to reopen the
prisons in Iraq. McCotter selected Abu Ghraib as Americaʼs main prison in Iraq and oversaw its
xxi
reconstruction.
Detained immigrants in particular face shocking conditions. Undocumented immigrants, including asylumseekers and victims of human trafficking, can be subjected to squalid conditions and abuse, sometimes
xxii
for months or years in Americaʼs for-profit detention centers. Children can be placed in the child welfare
xxiii
system and adopted while their parents await a disposition from the Department of Homeland Security.
The switch from “catch-and-release”, where undocumented immigrants remained free until their
deportation hearings, to “catch-and-detain”, and the lack of clear regulations for immigration cases
involving children can bring about challenges to parental rights and difficulty in reuniting families after
xxiv
parents are deported.
Children may also be imprisoned alongside their parents. The CCA-operated T. Don Hutto Residential
xxv
Center is a former medium-security prison in west Texas that, until 2009, housed families. There,
children as young as toddlers were made to wear prison scrubs and remain in cells up to 12 hours a day
xxvi
without toys, pencils, or crayons. In order to avoid licensing as a child-care facility, Hutto required
detainees to constantly supervise children, including during interviews to determine their eligibility for
xxvii
asylum where they may have to recount personal histories of torture, rape, or domestic abuse.
Lawsuits led to a mild improvement in conditions for children (they were allowed to wear pajamas, play,
xxviii
and attend classes) before Hutto stopped housing families in 2009.
Hutto is still used to house female
xxix
immigrants, and faced scandal in 2010 when a CCA employee sexually assaulted several detainees.
Detainees at the 2,000 bed Willacy County Processing Center, described in Mother Jones as “razor-wireringed compound holding 10 Kevlar tents of the sort used by troops in Iraq” and operated by MTC, have
reported appalling conditions including maggot-infested food and problems with heat and air
xxx
conditioning.
Willacy also had numerous reports of sexual assault, including an instance of a guard
xxxi
locking a female detainee in a room with a male detainee so that he could rape her.
All three of the largest private prison operators in the United States reap profits from contracts with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, capitalizing on the immigration crisis at the expense of the
xxxii
human rights of hundreds of thousands of immigrants, half of whom have never committed a crime.

Taking Jobs Out of the Economy
th

Long-outlawed in the United States, prison labor has come back in a big way in the latter half of the 20
century, and to the detriment of businesses that pay their workers a fair wage.

6

In 1979, Congress created a program called the Prison Industries Enhancement Certification Program
(PIE) which “encourage[d] states units of local governments to establish employment opportunities for
prisoners that approximate private sector work opportunities.” While PIE provided that prison laborers be
paid minimum wage, it allowed for “reasonable” deductions for room and board to “defray the costs of
xxxiii
inmate incarceration.”
This program was expanded in many states beginning in 1995 when the American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) (which both GEO Group and CCA have supported) circulated a piece of legislation
xxxiv
crafted by former Texas state representative and current GEO Group lobbyist Ray Allen.
The bill,
called the Prison Industries Act, allowed for deductions from
wages paid to prison laborers to “construct work facilities,
recruit corporations to participate as private sector industries
programs, and pay costs of the authority and department in
xxxv
implementing [these programs].”
The result is that prisoners can net as little as $0.20 per hour
making products from processed foods to eyeglasses to office
furniture, undercutting businesses that do not use such cheap
xxxvi
labor.
Prison Rehabilitative Industries and Diversified
Enterprises (PRIDE) operates Floridaʼs 41 prison work
programs and is one of the largest printing companies in the
xxxvii
state.
The president of Cornell Companies (a private prison company
now owned by GEO Group) once said: “We do not believe we will see a decline in the need for detention
xxxviii
beds particularly in an economy with rising unemployment among American workers.”
Replacing jobs
with pennies-per-hour or no-cost prison labor makes good business sense for an industry that views the
unemployed as a future source of revenue.

II. Wells Fargo’s ties to Private Prison Operators
Wells Fargo provides critical financial support to the countryʼs top three private prison operators:
Corrections Corp of America (CCA), GEO Group, and Management and Training Corp (MTC). CCA and
GEO are the top two largest private prison operators, by far, with MTC a distant third. Wells Fargo
supports these companies by both investing in them and lending them significant amounts of capital.
The below analysis of the ties between Wells Fargo and these private prison companies is based on
xxxix
public record financial filings made by Wells Fargo and the three companies.
Note: A catalogue of public filings related to CCA, GEO, and Wells Fargo and detailing the financial
relationships between them is available at http://wfdetentions.wordpress.com.

a. Corrections Corp of America (CCA)
Corrections Corp of America, or CCA, is the countryʼs largest private prison company. It is the fourth
largest prison operator in the country behind the federal government and three states, and is the largest
xl
for-profit prison company in America. CCA runs 67 prisons in 20 states and the District of Columbia, with

7

space for 91,000 inmates.

xli

How Wells Fargo Supports (and Profits from) CCA’s Operations
$785 million line of credit. Wells Fargo provides critical financing to CCA as the syndication agent and
xlii
issuing lender on CCAʼs $785 million line of credit.
The line of credit was amended January 6, 2012 – months after Wells Fargo first came under pressure for
xliii
its financial ties to the private prison industry – and expanded from $450 million to $785 million.
$75.4 million in interest payments to banks. The companyʼs high level of indebtedness resulted in $75.4
million in interest payments to its creditors in 2010, a percentage of which went to Wells Fargo. CCA pays
an interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.5% to its lenders, including Wells Fargo. Wells Fargoʼs relationship with
CCA is a legacy from its takeover of Wachovia in 2008; Wachovia was named as administrative agent on
CCAʼs line of credit in 2006.
$2.9 million in CCA stock. Wells Fargo also owned 98,731 shares of CCA stock, worth over $2.9 million
xliv
as of June 29, 2012 (the date of its last disclosure filing). Wells Fargo owns this stock primarily through
investments managed by Wells Fargo Advisors.

“Ethics. This is the foundation of how we’re perceived as a socially responsible company.
We want to go beyond what the law and industry standards require. We monitor and
refine our business practices to help ensure all team members are performing ethically
and with integrity.”
– Wells Fargo, “Vision and Values”xlv
b. GEO Group
Floridaʼs GEO Group is another giant in the private prison industry, with almost 75,000 beds in 115
xlvi
prisons nationwide.

How Wells Fargo Supports (and Profits from) GEO’s Operations
$95.5 million in GEO Group stock. Wells Fargo is one of GEO Groupʼs largest investors, owning 6.84% of
the company, or 4,201,468 shares of stock worth $95.5 million.
Wells Fargo owns and manages this stake through several of its mutual fund companies. Of these
companies, Wells Capital Management is the largest GEO Group shareholder, by far, with 4.15 million
xlvii
shares worth $94.5 million as of June 29, 2012. Most of this stake, over $60 million, is managed as part
xlviii
of the Wells Fargo Advantage Small Cap Value Fund.
Wells Fargo increased its stake in GEO Group
significantly beginning in 2005.
xlix

Senior Note. Wells Fargo is also the trustee for a GEO Group senior note in the amount of $300 million.
As the bond trustee, Wells Fargo manages bond payments from the issuer, GEO Group, to the
bondholders.

8

“Our responsibility goes far beyond protecting our customers’ assets. We’re responsible
for being leaders to promote the long-term economic prosperity and quality of life for
everyone in our communities.”
– Wells Fargo, “Vision and Values”l
c. Management & Training Corp, or MTC
Management & Training Corporation, or MTC, is the third-largest private prison operator in the country,
with the capacity to house 29,000 inmates at 22 facilities nationwide.

How Wells Fargo Supports (and Profits from) MTC’s Operations
Credit agreement with Wells Fargo. MTC is a privately-held company, and it is therefore difficult to obtain
information on its investors and financiers. However, UCC filings in the state of Utah, where MTC is
li
based, show that the company has two credit agreements with Wells Fargo dated 2008. UCC filing
searches turn up no other lenders to MTC.

9

III. Wells Fargo’s Response to Community Pressure
The private prison industryʼs predatory business model has made it a lightning rod for controversy. Private
prison operators acknowledge this dynamic publicly, and it may help explain Wells Fargoʼs responses to
public pressure to cut its ties to the industry.
In their SEC filings, both CCA and the GEO Group acknowledge that private prisonsʼ reputation for
brutality and inhumane conditions poses a risk to corporate profits. In the GEO Groupʼs 2012 10-K
statement, the company said: “Public resistance to privatization of correctional, detention, mental health
and residential facilities could result in our inability to obtain new contracts or the loss of existing
contracts, which could have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition and results of
lii
operations.” In its 2012 filing, CCA said: “Moreover, negative publicity about an escape, riot or other
disturbance or perceived poor conditions at a privately managed facility may result in adverse publicity to
liii
us and the private corrections industry in general.”
Perhaps sensing the reputational risk associated with financing the private prison industry, Wells Fargo
has made several attempts to downplay its ties to private prison companies in response to protests.
•

The bank responded to a July 2011 protest of private prison companies by arguing that it did not
liv
invest directly in CCA or the GEO Group, but rather managed investments on behalf of clients.

•

In April 2012, in response to protests about the ties between
Wells Fargo and private prison companies, Wells Fargo
repeated its assertion that it did not own private prison
company shares directly, but managed these investments
lv
on behalf of clients.

Wells Fargoʼs ties to the three major private prison companies
suggest that the company does not have a casual relationship with
the industry, as it has argued in the media, but rather that it has
sought out a profitable relationship with the private prison industry,
regardless of the industryʼs record of irresponsibility and unethical
practices.

Response to Apartheid
Wells Fargo has given in to calls for divestment in the past. In 1977, a spokesman for Wells Fargo told the
Los Angeles Times that though the bank “thoroughly abhors apartheid”, they would still make loans to
South Africa as loans were judged “on the ʻability of the borrower to repay and the purpose for which the
lvi
loan is to be usedʼ rather than on whether the bank liked the recipient countryʼs political stance.” By
1985, under multilateral pressure, Wells Fargo had not only stopped lending to the South African
government and its agencies, but also announced that it would not renew loans or make new loans until
lvii
apartheid had ended.

10

IV. Conclusion
Wells Fargo plays a central role in this countryʼs private prison industry, financing the three largest private
prison companies and profiting from these relationships. More than any other bank, Wells Fargo provides
the industry with the financial backing it needs. And so Wells Fargo is a key contributor to the vicious
cycle of immigrant detention and exploitation for profit that has done deep and lasting damage to the
countryʼs most vulnerable communities.
How can Wells Fargo repair its relationship with Latino and immigrant communities, considering the
damage it has done to the fabric of these communities by contributing to this vicious cycle? How can
Wells Fargo repair its relationship with the public, who are seeing their tax dollars wasted on excessive
detention and imprisonment?
It can start by acknowledging its role in the private prison industry, rather than denying it as it has in the
past. It should then end its relationships with private prison companies: divesting from them and exiting its
financing relationships with them.
Wells Fargo has an opportunity to take an important stand against the countryʼs immigrant detention
nightmare and the private prison companies that profit from it. Will it continue to support and profit from
this vicious cycle? Or will it begin withdrawing its financial backing from the industry?

i

Julie Carr Smyth, “Ohio 1st in US to sell prison to private company.” Associated Press, September 1, 2011. Accessed at:
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2016079275_apusprivateprisonsohio.html/
ii
Prisoners in 2010. United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, December 2011, revised February 9, 2012.
Appendix table 19. Accessed at: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf/
iii
Laura Wides-Munoz and Garance Burke, “Immigrants prove big business for prison companies.” Associated Press, August 2,
2012. Accessed at: http://hosted2.ap.org/NYBUE/f7ded15e4d4846268a17b79c1c4b7cb8/Article_2012-08-02-US-Private-PrisonsImmigrants/id-ad381f278aa646cda6777a3a1eb178a1/
iv
“Unholy Alliance: How the private prison industry is corrupting our democracy and promoting mass incarceration”, Public
Campaign and PICO National Network, November 15, 2011. Accessed at: http://publicampaign.org/reports/unholyalliance/ and SEC
Form 10-K, Annual Report, Corrections Corporation of America, February 27, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512081122/d231839d10k.htm and SEC Form 10-K, Annual Report,
GEO Group, March 1, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923796/000119312512090269/d259590d10k.htm
v
“The Influence of the Private Prison Industry in the Immigration Detention Business”, Detention Watch Network, May 2011.
Accessed at: http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf
vi
Id.
vii
Chris Kirkham, “Private Prisons Profit From Immigration Crackdown, Federal And Local Law Enforcement Partnerships”,
Huffington Post, June 7, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf
viii
GEO Group 2011 10-K
ix
Chris Kirkham, “Private Prisons Profit From Immigration Crackdown, Federal And Local Law Enforcement Partnerships”,
Huffington Post, June 7, 2012.
x
Id. and Private Prison Lobbying Data, Detention Watch. Accessed at:
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/sites/detentionwatchnetwork.org/files/PrivatePrisonPDF-FINAL%205-11-11.pdf
xi
Laura Wides-Munoz and Garance Burke, “Immigrants prove big business for prison companies.” Associated Press, August 2,
2012.
xii
“Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States: January 2011”, Department of Homeland
Security, March 2012. Accessed at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf
xiii
The Corrections Corporation of America: How CCA Abuses Prisoners, Manipulates the Public, and Destroys Communities”,
Corazon de Tucson. Available at: http://fuerzatucson.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/corazon-cca-report1.pdf
xiv
Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, “Sexual Violence in Local Jails Reported by Inmates, 2007”, United States Department of
Justice, June 2008. Available at: http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/svljri07.pdf/

11

xv

“The Corrections Corporation of America: How CC Abuses Prisoners, Manipulates the Public, and Destroys Communities”,
Corazon de Tucson. Available at: http://fuerzatucson.files.wordpress.com/2012/03/corazon-cca-report1.pdf
xvi
“Suicide reveals squalid prison conditions”, Associated Press, July 6, 2007. Accessed at:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19638219/#.UBvh13BItGF/
xvii
Eartha Jane Melzer, “GEO Group sued over inmate death”, Michigan Messenger, December 13, 2010. Available at:
http://michiganmessenger.com/44611/geo-group-sued-over-inmate-death/
xviii
Id.
xix
Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., “Re: Santa Fe County Adult Detention Center”, United States Department of Justice, March 6, 2003. Accessed
at: http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/santa_fe_findings.pdf/
xx
Id. and Fox Butterfield, “Justice Dept. Report Shows Trouble in Private U.S. Jails Preceded Job Fixing Iraq’s”, New York Times,
June 6, 2004. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/06/us/justice-dept-report-shows-trouble-in-private-us-jails-precededjob-fixing-iraq-s.html/
xxi
Id.
xxii
“About the U.S. Detention and Deportation System”, Detention Watch Network. Accessed at:
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/aboutdetention/
xxiii
Amy Bess, “The Impact of Immigration Detention on Children and Families”, National Association of Social Workers, 2011.
Accessed at: http://www.socialworkers.org/practice/intl/2011/hria-fs-84811.immigration.pdf
xxiv
“More on Family Separation & Parental Rights”, Women’s Refugee Commission. Accessed at:
http://womensrefugeecommission.org/programs/detention/parental-rights/more-on-parental-rights
xxv
Margaret Talbot, “The Lost Children”, The New Yorker, March 3, 2008. Accessed at:
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/03/03/080303fa_fact_talbot?currentPage=all
xxvi
Id.
xxvii
Id.
xxviii
Courtney Martin, “The Big Business of Family Detention”, The American Prospect, February 2, 2009. Accessed at:
http://prospect.org/article/big-business-family-detention/ and Karina Kling, “T. Don Hutto detention center will no longer house
immigrant families”, YNN Austin, August 6, 2009. Accessed at: http://austin.ynn.com/content/top_stories/248924/t--don-huttodetention-center-will-no-longer-house-immigrant-families/
xxix
Renee Feltz, “Guard’s arrest highlights sexual assault of immigrant detainees”, PBS Need to Know, August 27, 2010. Accessed
at: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-know/security/lax-regulations-lead-to-sexual-assault-of-immigrant-detainees/3149/
xxx
Stephanie Mencimer, “Why Texas Still Holds ‘Em”, Mother Jones, July/August 2008. Accessed at:
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2008/07/why-texas-still-holds-em/
xxxi
“Detained and at Risk: Sexual Abuse and Harassment in Untied States Immigration Detention”, Human Rights Watch, August
2010, 9-10. Accessed at: http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0810webwcover.pdf/
xxxii
“About the U.S. Detention and Deportation System”, Detention Watch Network.
xxxiii
Mike Elk and Bob Sloan, “The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor”, The Nation, August 1, 2011. Accessed at:
http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prison-labor
xxxiv
Id.
xxxv
Id.
xxxvi
Id.
xxxvii
Id.
xxxviii
“A Brief History of Private Prisons in Immigrant Detention”, Detention Watch Network. Accessed at:
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/privateprisons_note2
xxxix
A catalogue of filings related to CCA, GEO, and Wells Fargo can be found at
http://wfdetentions.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/2011-2-16-geo-8-8-ex4-12.pdf
xl
CCA 10-K http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512081122/d231839d10k.htm
xli
Id.
xlii
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512007644/d280228dex101.htm
xliii
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312512081122/d231839d10k.htm
xliv
SEC Form 13-F, Quarterly Report, Wells Fargo, August 10, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000007297112000589/wfc_13f-6302012.txt
xlv
https://www.wellsfargo.com/invest_relations/vision_values/5
xlvi
GEO Group 10-K http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923796/000119312512090269/d259590d10k.htm
xlvii
SEC Form 13-F, Quarterly Report, Wells Fargo, August 10, 2012. Accessed at:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/72971/000007297112000589/wfc_13f-6302012.txt
xlviii
“Wells Fargo Advantage Small Cap Value Fund Holdings”, Wells Fargo Advantage Funds. Accessed at:
http://www.wellsfargoadvantagefunds.com/wfweb/wf/portal/product/holdings/total.jsp?selFund=WBA7
xlix
http://wfdetentions.wordpress.com/lobbyist/geo-group-filings/2011-2-16-geo-8-k-exhibit4-1-wells-fargo-senior-note/
l
https://www.wellsfargo.com/invest_relations/vision_values/5
li
UCC Search: MTC. Accessed at:
https://secure.utah.gov/uccsearch/uccs/index?search=mtc&processSearch=Search&searchBy=1&bound=25#
lii
GEO Group 2012 10-K
liii
Corrections Corporation of America 2012 10-K

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liv

http://www.bizjournals.com/nashville/news/2011/07/01/cca-protest-wells-fargo-nashville.html?page=all
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/04/23/wells-fargo-expects-big-protests-at -meeting/
lvi
Tendayi Kumbula, “U.S. Banks Target of Apartheid Critics: Groups Urge Boycott Against Those Loaning Funds to S. Africa”, Los
Angeles Times, September 30, 1977. Accessed at: http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-C3D-84al.sff.document.acoa000466.pdf
lvii
Diana Bratcher and Timothy Smith, “United States Bank Policy and Apartheid’s Financial Crisis”, United Nations Centre Against
Apartheid, April 1986. Accessed at: http://kora.matrix.msu.edu/files/50/304/32-130-1701-84-32-130-1701-84-1986-4-486%20ICCR.pdf
lv

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