Mule Creek State Prison Staff Safety Eval 2005
Download original document:
Document text
Document text
This text is machine-read, and may contain errors. Check the original document to verify accuracy.
~~V-20-2006
I
.'~ ..
.. ,.'
;;'
~-
.::
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
13:17
.t
I"
"
'.
.
209 274 4861
P.02
.
J '" ·::·/··::::;·.~·.:.'~';0~·~f'.:~::~·;'·L ·.: . . .:...." . ... . .
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
\
I
'.
. ,
-.,
«,' ... :. .
0
0 ':
':.':
"
,' •••••
.,..':
.'''
..
...
MULE CREEK STATE PRISON
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION
Corrections Standards Authority
600 Bercut Drive, Suite A
Sacramento, California 95814
www.csa.ca.gov
,
II
I
I
.
NDU-20-2006
~
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:17
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.03
MNOI.D SC~IWARZl:N5CClER. GOVERNOR
STATE OF CALIFORNIA - DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABIl.ITATION.
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY
WM~ DEN'S OF FiCE
HCSP
600 Bercut Drive
Sacramento, CA 95814
'05 ~JUL 22
D5· 25
July 19, 2005
Secretary Roderick Q. Hickman
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1515 S Street, Suite 205 South
Sacramento, California
95814
Dear Secretary Hickman:
The Staff Safety: Evaluation Team, created by the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) in response
to your concern about institutional safety, conducted its evaluation of Mule Creck State Prison
(MCSP) July 5-8, 2005. The enclosed report. which will be presented to the CSA at the next
scheduled meeting in September, lists a number of findings for your consideration.
On behalf of the eSA Staff Safety Evaluation Team (Team), I would like to express our sincere
appreciation to MCSP Warden Rosanne Campbell and her staff, who provided all written materials
requested and gave the Team full access to all areas of the institution. Staff members were open and
candid during the evaluation, and it was clear that they understood their n,le and the mission of the
institution. which was very clean and well maintained. There is a very positive working atmosphere at
MCSP, and I believe this translates into a safer work environment. The Team reported observing
Warden Campbell in the prison yard talking to inmates. MCSP staff indicated that this is a common
occurrence and expressed an appreciation that she takes the time to do so.
This first evaluation allowed the Team to pilot test the staff safety criteria developed by the panel of
subject matter experts. Based 011 this experience, the Team made several modifications to tl,le origulal
criteria. The following "lessons learned" fron1 the staff safety evaluation of MCSP will be
incorporated into future evaluations.
• Staff assault trend data alone are insufficient for conducting an adequate evaluation. The Team
will collect infonnation before arriving that will be helpful in dle evaluation and increase the
efficiency of the team when it is on-site. Most of the needed data can be obtained froIn the
CDeR Adult Operations Data Analysis Unit.
• Half ofthe fIrst day was conswned by a facility tOUf. The Team leamed that four days was too
little time to conduct the evaluation. Future evaluations are scheduled for five days and will
not include a tour.
•
•
The Team added an assessment of the physical plaut: staffing, training, and inmate population
(e.g., classification, housing), all of which were deemed critical to a thorough evaluation of
staff safety.
TIle Team also recognized that it is imperative to interview staff on safety related issues. A
structured set of interview questions was developed and pilot tested. Based 011 this experience,
NDV-20-2006
,
f
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:18
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
Secretary Hickman
•
Page 2
209 274 4861
P.04
July 19,2005
the list of questions will be reduced and perhaps modified to facilitate the sununarization of
responses.
The panel criteria focused exclu&ively on custody staff. However, it became apparent after the
first day at MCSP that this approach was shortsighted. As a result, the Team's evaluation also
included interviews with non-custody staff.
In closing, I want to again extend our thanks and appreciation to Warden Campbell and her staff for
their professionalism and the cooperation they extended to the Team. If you have any questions or
comments, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Karen L. Stoll, Executive Officer (A)
Corrections Standardl) Authority
Enclosure
cc:
Warden Rosanne Campbell, Mule Creek State Prison
Joe McGrath, Chief Deputy Secretary, Adult Operations
NOU-20-2006
I
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
13:18
209 274 4861
P.05
~
TABLE OF CONTENTS
f
BACKGROUND ..
111
,.
1
, ••••••••••• " ••••••••
EVALU'ATION 1\mTHODOLOGY •.••••••••••,
,
1
FACILITY PROFILE •.••.•••••.•••.••••••• .,1••••••••••,•••••,.".,•••••••,••••••,••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••,•••••••••• 3
Facility Description
,
Current Useage
tt
f
.t ••••••••••••.• t ' t · ••• tt ••• t·, ••••••••• ,. ~~
Staff Assault Incident Repolts
4
,
" ••••••••••••••••••••••••• It ••••••••••••• " •• " ••••••••••
~
REVIEW OF DOCUMENTAnON
Trai11ing. ~~
3
10 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 10
Population SUlDmary.••.•......•••..••.
Staffing
3
,
, '
5
'lt
f ••••••••••• , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
t~
t
4
,
, • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , ••
Safety Equipment
5
7
8
PHYSICAL PLANT & STAFFING•••.•••••••
~
IJ• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • , • • • • • • IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
10
Findings Corrunon To Facilities A. B, & C
11
Findings Specific To Facility A
11
FindinfiS Specific To Facility B
1
"
, •••••••• •••••••••
,.1I
,
12
Findings Specific To Facili.ty C
12
Findings Specific to Central Services
12
ST.APF INTERVIEWSlJt
13
IJ., •• IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • " " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • _ • • • • • • • • • , •• ,
Interviews with Managers
13
Interviews with Supervisors
14
Interviews with Line Staff
,.,
If
,.,
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION •••••.••••••••••••.••••,•.•.••••••••,••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••
ENTRANCE LETTERu•.••••
DATA MATRIX
t ..t
,
14
,.,
IJ • • • • • • • • • • • • • ,
,
, •••
,.." ,
15
Attachment A
Attachment B
DESIGN CAPACITY v. CURRENT CAPACITY
Attachment C
STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE•.•••••••••.•.••.•.•....,
AttRchment D
EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSIGNMENT
Attachment E
RepOrt MCSP .d~.:7/19f200S
""""",Q,,:'iiii,,,ii,(i!4wa:::::;
.,j,"!!!3!i,!I!!,\i.
;;;;;;;::;;;;,.".,,~,
.
NDV-20-2006
\
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:18
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.06
BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority
(CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state's adult and youth detention
facilities. At the May 19,2005 meeting of the BOe) the proposal was presented and accepted.
On May 24-25) 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to
establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, e.
team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.
On July 5.8, 2005, a team comprised of staff from The California Departn1ent of Corrections and
Rehabilitation ceDeR) CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice staff conducted the firS!
Staff Safety Evaluation at Mule Creek State Prison. The evaluation protocol consisted of a
request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and perpetrator data, a preliminary site
visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various custody and non-custody staff, a
review of applicable written policies and procedures goveming the operation of the institution
and a review of documentation including incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, inmate
population and safety equipment.
EVALUATION ~ETHODOLOGY
Mule Creek State Prison was selected as the initial adult facility for review and an entrance letter
was sent to Warden Roseanne Campbell infonning her of the July 5·8, 2005 site visit dates and
the proposed operational plan (Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data
matrix to record information from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staff to
determine if any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports
and complete the matrix before the site visit. (Sec attachment B). The evaluation team asked that
all incident reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the
evaluation progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at
the institution provided copies of existing documents or researched their records for information.
The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team. The team
was divided into three teams, each comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and
Juvenile Justice (each team had a member from each discipline - see Attachment E for a roster
oHeam members and assignment).
The evaluation began on Jnly 5, 2005, at the institution, with an entrance conference with
Warden Campbell, appropriate it1stitutional adminisb'ativc staff and evaluation team members.
The conference included an operational overview of the institution by Warden Campbell as well
as an overview of the evaluation process by CSA Deputy Director Jerry Read. Following the
entrance conference, the evaluation team members were provided a tour of the facilities.
Using a conference room in the Administrative Building as the base of operation, the team broke
into workgroups and began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their
observations.
Available documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant
configuration, policies, safety equipment, staffmg levels, staff assaults and inmate population.
The group looked for any trends or related issues.
RcpcJtMCSP.uO~;7/l91200S
NDV-20-2006
13: 18
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.07
..
The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it reiated to staffing, and the inmate
population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect staff safety such as iIunate
crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of communication.
Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were
interviewed to provide an opportunity identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A
questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the
interviews, and is included as an attachment to this report (see Attachment D). The responses
were categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of
this report (page 13-14). Conflicts between ,the documentation. the staffs' perception of the
practice and staffs' concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included
in this report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted.
An exit conference was conducted with Associate Director Darrel Adams t Warden Campbell and
the institution management staff to provide a summary of the results the evaluation. The exit
conference included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a
summary of comments made by staff.
Report MCSP.doc:;7/19/200S
2
NQV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:18
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
FACILITY PROFILE
Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) is located 40 miles southeast of Sacramento in lone, California.
It was first opened in June 1987 as a general population institution with vocational training
programs. educational programs and Prison Industries Authority programs. USillg a 270-degree
design, the institution was originally constructed to house 1500 Level III inmates in three
facilities and up to 200 inmate workers in the mjnimum~security support unit housing for a total
institutional capacity of 1700.
Facility Description
There are three facilities within a secure perimeter, Facilities A, B, and C. Each facility is
essentially a mirror of the others, containing five buildings, located in a semi~circulD1' fashion
creating a perimeter on one side of the exercise yard of each facility. The buildings each contain
100 individually secured cells; originally designed to be single occupancy cells that were
equipped with two beds.
Each cell also contains a toilet/washbasin combination unit.
Additionally, each facility has a gymnasium that has been converted to an inmate dormitory ~
each containing 160 beds. An administrative complex comprised of various staff office space,
inmate vocational, academic and PIA programs, inmate chapels, inmate medical, dental and
mental health, canteen, clothing and plant operations are located within each facility.
Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the minimum
support facility (MSF). Each dormitory was designed to hold 100 beds but currently contain 200
open bunk beds. Additionally, the MSF has an exercise yard area, medical clinic. visiting room,
library, irunate canteen and clothing, education and chapel area, kitchen/dining facility, and
various offices that make up the facility.
CUlTeot Usage
MCSP is currently used as a medium to high security institution housing general population
inmates up to a Level IV. It is a mental health hub institution for Enhanced Out Patient Program
(EOP) and CCCMS inmates and houses inmates with sensitive needs (Sensitive Needs Yard or
SNY). EOP inmates are those inmates with acute mental health needs. SNY imnates require
special housing because of the high profile nature of their crimes, threats from other inmates or
because they have "dropped out" from some previous gang affiliation and are now targets for
assaults. The designation of being a "hub" institution means the prison bas the capability of
providing the enhanced services needed for the appropriate carc of inmatcs with more acute
needs within these classifications. MCSP is the only institution in the state designated to house
inmates classified as being both, EOP and SNY. The institution continues to provide inmate
programs including vocational training for several trades and professions (e.g., graphic arts,
cabinet, grounds.keeping, meat cutting, geographic infonnation systems, etc.), educational study
for high school diploma/OED, Prison Industries, and other various programs to either support the
community or otherwise better prepare the inmate for reentry into the community.
I
I
I
P.08
Report MCSP.doc;7/J 912005
3
NOV-20-2006
,
.,.
I
I
I
13:19
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.09
REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION
The Data/DocumentatioD Review Team reviewed available documentation, records and policy
manuals to identify any trends or commOll themes among the incidents. The items reviewed
included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Incident reports for staff assaults or attempted assaults (CDC 837).
Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
State Compensation Reports (SClF) for assaults on staff.
Imnate appeals (602).
Inventories of authodzed safety equipment.
Use afForce Executive Review Committee (ERe) findings.
Facility training records.
Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
Employee safety grievances.
Daily chrollologicallwatch commander's report.
Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
Staffing infonnation.
Classification records.
Inmate files.
Department Operations Manual (DOM) - Relevant sections only.
Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) - Re)evant sections only.
Staff Assault Incident Reports
FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were
no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery. Other than imllate classification
(see discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among the
various incidents.
DISCUSSION: Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted battery on staff were reported
during the time perio~ July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at Mule Creek State Prison. The
institution reports that over 40 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during
incidents:
•
Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of correctional officers and two were sergeants.
The remaining ten victims included five MTAs and five health care workers.
• The average age of the victims w~ approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of service.
• Twenty-nine ofthe victims were male and ten were female.
• Twenty-six of victims were white, six were black, six were hispallic, and two were reported
as '·other".
The team was unable to contion whether the victim demographics were consistent with those of
the institutions as those statistics were not readily available.
Report MCSP.doc:7/191200S
I
I
,
I
I
.
NOU-20-2006
,
13:19
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.10
FINDING: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies.
DISCUSSION: In the reports reviewed. no serious injuries I we~e initially reported by the
victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's
infhmary. In all but three incidents, no staff workdays were lost. In the most serious case, no
initial serious injuries were reported; however, two staff members have been off duty for over 40
days as a result of their injuries and have not retumedto work.
Three additional officers were injured, although not reported to be serious, during the process of
responding to the incident. The Return to Work Coordinator provided statistics from the same
time period showing a category described as "Responding to alarms" as being the third leading
category of frequencies of staff injury, with 15 reported injuries during the las! fiscal year. 111ese
statistics would support the need for training ways to safely respond to incidents.
FINDING: Race and age do not appear to be significant assault factors.
DISCUSSION: No significant variances were noted when comparing the race, age or connty of
commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic
and white inmates were responsible for 29 incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed
among the other races. The inmates had been committed from twelve counties with none being
unusually represented.
The average age of involved inmates was 36. consistent with the prison population's average age
of 38 and they had been incarcerated for an average of 1357 days including 725 days at Mule
Creek. The average classification score of the involved inmates was 95 which would qualify as a
Level IV. The documentation reflected only three incidents that involved inmates on a modified
program.
FINDING: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more
likely to commit assaults on staff.
DISCUSSION: As in any facility, an inmate's housing location is largely detennined by his or
her classification score. Twenty-three of the incidents involved inmates with high security
Ten of the incidents occurred in the
classifications or s~ious mental health issues.
administrative segregation unit, which hO'L1SeS as many ali 175 iml1ates already identified as being
the most disruptive or assaultive in the prison. Another 10 incidents occun·ed in areas located
within Facility "A U which houses almost 1000 Level IV General Population (GP/SNY) inmates,
the highest security level within the prison and an additional 160 Level III inmates housed in the
gymnasium. Three incidents occurred in Facility a, Building 6, the Enhanced Out Patient (EOP)
irunate housing unit. EOP imnates, While generally described as mental health patients because
of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care. Facility B, Building 6 has
I A serious injury is defined by Title I S. Section 3000 ll.'> U serious impairment uf physicll1 condition. including, but not limited to,
the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted los:; or impairment of function of any bodily member
or organ; a wound requiring suturing; and disfigurement.
RepOI1 MCSP.doc;7J 1912005
NOlJ-20-2006
\
I
I
I
I
I
~
13:19
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
P.ll
been housing approximately fifty Level VI EOP/SNY inmates. The institution has just activated
an EOP unit in a Level IV building in Facility A, housing 6 inmates as of this review date.
FINDING: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor in assaults on staff.
DISCUSSION: bunate manufactured weapons were not involved in any of the incidents
reviewed. Imnates threw or attempted to throw an unknown liquid substance o~ staff in 6 of the
incidents. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by
head-butting, kicking or unlawfully touching with their hands. In the incident resulting in the
most serious injury to staff, the inmate was able to head butt the officer, knock him off balance,
kick him several times and finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred during escorts and
three during meal service when officers opened food ports.
The days of the week with the least frequent incidents were Wednesday and Thursday and the
remainder of the incidents was divided among the other days of the week. The number of
incidents was evenly distributed between second and third watch and none occurred during first
watch.
l'raining
FINDING: Custody staff appear to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non·custody
staff; however,receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in attending training.
DISCUSSION: The training manager provided documentation of mandated training and
institutional orientation training for both custody and non-custody staff. MCSP provides 40
hours of orientation training all new employees including approximately 10 hours 011 safety
related issues.
Mandated training topics are specified by both Califomia law and the DOM. Each institution
may add training that would be considered as being site-specific. Depending on the institution's
mission and construction, site-specific training topics are detemlined by the Warden.
Sergeants and Lieutenants are scheduled to receive approximately 57 hours of annual training, 10
of wllich are related to staff safety. Twelve of the hours are optional and based on monthly
training bulletins proyided from headquarters. MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training
based on the employee's birthday. Each employee's training year begins on their birthday, not a
calendar or fiscal year, therefore, using the CUtTent 1ST tracking program, we were unable to
confrrm that all of the training mandates were being met. The training files reviewed indicated
that regular, ongoing training was being performed. The training manager reported that all of the
supervisors, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the training
mandates.
The remaining custody personnel are scheduled to receive approximately 40 hours of annual
trainiug including approximately 21 hours related to staff safety. Again, we were unable to
confinn that all of the training mandates were being met. The training manager reponed that all
Report MCSP.doc; 111912005
7
.
,NOV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:19
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.12
of the custody officers, with exception of those on extended leave, were compliant with the
training mandates.
The non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive 8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are
related to staff safety. The training manager reported that 80% of the non-custody personnel
were compliant with the training manda.tes. The sample files reviewed supported that
percentage.
FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from
specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff
intervIewed identified the need for more meaningful training.
DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell
extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with
EOP and CCCMS inmates.
Safety Equipment
TIle Department Operations Manual, Section 55050 addresses equipment involving weapons.
chemiC$l agents and the annory. This section, in part identifies departmentally approved
chemical agents and munitions. MCSP issues chemical agents to correctional officers during
each shift. Additional chemical agents, impact munitions and less-lethal devices are maintained
in the control booths and armory and at designated areas within the institution. The equipment
inventory records did not make any deficiencies apparent.
FINGING: Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment.
DISCUSSION: The Correctional Officer assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance cells was not
equipped with a personal alann, intercom capabilities or radio (although post orders reflect a
person alann is to be worn). Additionally. the camera did not monitor the hall where the staff
person is stationed but was positioned to mOlutor the inmate.
Only one radio is issued to the two correctional officers working inside the housing unit as floor
officers. Typically the position designated as "floor one" is assigned to maintain the radio. This
position is also designated as the primary respOlldent, during Code I and II emergencies. This
process results in the second correctional officer remaining in the unit without radio
communication. A radio was assigned to the Facility A Gym. In an effort to maximize the use of
a single radio, staff had secured the radio to the podium as a point of centralized use. The
evaluation team agreed that the institution should consider providing all floor officers with a
radio.
FINDING: There are 87 officers and many MTAs and CC that have not been issued a stabresistant vest.
DISCUSSION: The soft body annor stab resistant vest inventory records were reviewed. The
armory Sergeant infonned us that 651 officers have been designated to be issued a stab resistant
Rcpon MCSP.doc;7/1912005
8
NQU-20-2006
13:19
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
vest. The records reflect that 54 officers within the ranks of correctional officers, sergeants and
lieutenants have been fitted for vests; however, thc vests have yet to be issued. Thirty-three
officers have not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of the evaluation. Sufficient vests are
available at the facility for those officers to check out for use during their shift until their
personal vests are available. Officers reporttld a reluctance to wear these vests. saying that the
vests were not cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that the remaining 564 officers, have
been fitted and have been issued a vest.
.
The MTAs and Correctional Counselors (CC), who are custody staff, are not included in the
above numbers. The team was informed that many of these personnel have been fitted for vests
but have not received vests. The team was funher informed that the bargaining unit representing
MTAs and CCs has filed a grievance (with the agency not the institution) over this matter.
I
I
I
I
P.13
NDV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:20
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.14
PHYSICAL PLANT & STAFFING
Activated in 1987, Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) was originally designed to house male adult
Level I-ill inmates. The institution currently operates as a Level I, II, III, and IV general
population facility. The Level III and IV housing is constructed on a 270 design. celled housing
criteria. There are three facilities maintained within a secure perimeter (Facilities A, Band C
each containing five buildings) and a Level I housing facility is located outside of the secure
perimeter. The Institution was originally designed to house 1700 inmates. At' the time of this
staff safety evaluation. the institution was housing 3517 inmates within the secure perimeter and
330 inm.ates within the Level I facility. See the Facility Profile section of this report for further
information.
During the second and third watches, each building was staffed with two correctional officers
designated as floor one and floor two, and an armed correctional officer posted in a secure
location above the dayroom designated as the control booth offic~. First watch bas one
correctional officer assigned floor duties and one control booth officer. The gymnasiums were
staffed with two floor officers and only the gymnasium in Facility A had an anned observation
booth officer, which was assigned during all three watches.
Facility A houses level IV inmates. Building 5 in Facility A is currently coming online to house
the Level IV EOP inmates that were previously housed in Facility B, Building 6. An additional
floor officer is assigned to this unit due to the increased supervision needs ofEOP imnates.
Facility B, Building 6 houses the EOP inmates. An additional floor officer is assigned to this unit
due to the increased supervision needs of EOP inmates. Buildings 7, 8, 9, 10 eaeh have 60
additional E-beds located in the dayroom area. Only 40 of the 60 beds are currently utilized.
Buildings containing E-beds are provided one additional cOlTectional officer assigned as a floor
officer during the first and third watch.
Facility C, Building 12 contains administrative segregation housing, and Building 13 (Facility C)
serves as overflow administrative segregation housing. Buildings 1l.14 and 15 contain 60 Ebeds in the dayroom area and again, only forty of these beds are used. As with other buildings
containing E-beds, an extra floor officer is posted on the first and third watches.
Each facility contains a large inmate exercise yard. Facility A has three correctiom~l officers
assign~d to supervise the exercise yard while Facilities B and C each have two officers assigned
to the exercise yard.
Located outside of the secure perimeter are the two dormitories that comprise the Minimum
Support Facility (M5F). Each dormitory contains 200 open bunk beds. Additionally, an
exercise yard, visiting space, inmate canteen, combination education/chapel area, classrooms and
various offices are included in the facility. One correctional officer is posted in each dormitory
during each watch.
Additional correctional officers were posted in other locations in the institution (i.e.: central
services, vocational/educational areas, towers, infirmary, etc.).
Repon MCSP,do/:;7119J20D5
10
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
P.1S
The evaluation team toured the institution, reviewed institutional procedures and interviewed
staff at various classification levels. The evaluation team looked specifically at the overall
conditions of the physical plant. the staffing levels within each areEl of the institution, and the
number of inmates and their classification within each building of the institution. The evaluation
revealed the following concerns within each facility:
Findings Common To Facilities A. B. & C
•
The gymnasium was being utilized for the housing ofinmates. Imnatcs housed in the
gymnasiwn were observed draping towels, blankets and clothing from their bW1ks. This
practice obscured the already limited visibility within this area. Staff stated that this issue
has been reported to facility management and some managers allow this practice while
others do not.
• Each of the buildings had a pad lock that was applied to each cell during the sleeping
hours. The locks became necessary when it was discovered that inmates could lift the
sliding door off of the track providing a means of exiting the cell. Teal'D members are
concemed about inmate and officer safety during emergency situations requiring
immediate removal of an inmate from a cell. as the padlocks arc located at the top of the
cell doors. During a fue situation. lock removal could be hampered by the collection of
smoke in these areas (as opposed to being able to maintaining a low position to mitigate
the effects of smoke) and shorter staff having a difficult time reaching lock.... Team
members recommend consulting the State Fire Marshal for an opinion on this practice of
pad locking the doors during sleeping hours.
• The team' recommends the institution consider placement of convex security mirrors at
the end of the dayroom of each building, to enable correctional officers at the control
desk to see blind spots near inmate telephone areas.
Findings Specific To Facility A
•
The inmate exercise yard in this facility is very large; particularly considerulg it is used
by Level IV inmates. Three correctional officers were assigned to the Facility A yard.
These officers were not assigned specific sections of the yard for supervision
responsibilities. Additionally: yard officers were observed leaving the yard without
notifying their fellow officers. Sergeants were unable lo locate yard officers when asked
to do so. While the team felt three correctional officers were sufficient. the practice of
not having specific areas of coverage responsibility within the yard and leaving the yard
without notifying other officers could possibly comprise staff safety. Due to the
classification of the inmate population in this facility. the team recommends diViding the
yard with fencing or masomy to aid in the supervision of inmates.
• Inconsistencies were noted in the responses provided by correctional officers within
several buildings regarding incident response procedures. Post orders and practice were
not consistent. When interviewed. staff gave inconsistent infonnation regarding incident
response responsibilities.
• Building 5 has office furniture and equipment being moved into the dayroom for EOP
staff. This furniture and equipment may pose a staff safety issue. as it could be used a
Report MCSP.doc:;7IlSl12005
11
NDV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:20
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
P.16
weapon or used to make weapons. The team recommends that the office furniture be
replaced with detention grade furnishings.
Findings Specific To Facilitv B
•
Only two officers were assigned to this exercise yard. The team agreed this was an
insufficient number of yard officers. The evaluation team suggests that the institution
consider assigning an additional officer to this yard as well as in the exercise yard of
Facility C. The issue of yard officers not having specific areas of supervision
responsibility was also observed in these exercise yards.
• E-beds contained in Buildings 7. 8. 9 and 10 (as well as Buildings II, 14 and 15 in
Facility C) present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to inmates draping items
between the bUl1ks and inability to secure these inmates contribute to this concern.
Additional staff are provided on third watch, but not second. Logic is that inmates,
during the second watch, are on the yard or attending vocational programs. Each
building containing E-beds was observed with inmates in the dayroom area during the
second watch. These inmates were not assigned to a vocational program and chose not to
be on the yard. As a result, these inmates wcre either on their bunk. or in the dayroom
area. The team recommends a third correctional officer be assigned to these units to
provide supervision of these additional inmates.
Findings Specific To Faciliw.c
Officers in Building 14 stated that the inmates have the ability to control the TV volume
and the volume becomes loud enough to hinder verbal communications between officers.
• Officers in Buildings 11) 14 and 15 reported that work orders are not addressed
consistently. Team members observed lights that were burned out and doors located near
the showers with locks that were sticking.
• Staff in Buildings 11, 14 & 15 reported concerns about 110t having adequate coverage
during the AM feeding release and recall.
•
Endings Specific to Central Services
The institutional fire identification system alarm was not working properly. Staff
reported that the system ~s historically not functioned correctly and that during the rainy
season, the problems with the system are exacerbated.
• The Correctional Officer assigned to the Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) did not
have a personal alarm.
• In the CTC, Bl'l electrical room has been convened into a staff break room/inmate clerk
office. The room contained cleaning supplies and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk
was not being directly supervised md had access to officer food.
•
Rl:pon MCSP.doc:711 9/2005
12
NOV-20-2006
13:20
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.17
f
,
I
t
I
t
I
I
I
,
I
l
I
I
I
I
I
STAFF INTERVIEWS
Random interviews were conducted with custody and non-custody staff from Wednesday, July 6
through Friday, July 8, using a questionnaire (questionnaire included as Attachment D)
developed by the Corrections Standards Authority. Due to limited staff resources and time
constrclints, the interviewing team chose to conduct random interviews with custody staff
assigned to facility A, B, C (e.g. ad seg, ad seg overflow, gymnasiums, EOP, SNY, central
services, and CTC), Minimum Security, and selected support functions (lSU, and transportation).
For purposes of this report, responses from custody managers, supervisors, and line staff ate
grouped and perceptions concerning staff safety are detailed. Staff safety interviews were
conducted on Friday with non~custody staff (managers andlor supervisors in each program area);
however: their responses have not been grouped together for this report out due to a lack of time
for preparation. However. the review tcam did find that the supervisors and managers (non.
custody) shared many of the custody concerns.
Interviews with Managers
We meet with the captains on Wednesday, July 8, and we asked them to comment on their staff
safety concerns. They unanimously agreed that the two major issues affecting staff safety were
crowding and the increase in SNY program inmates.
FINDING: Level IV inmates with mental health issues and sensitive needs are being housed in
inappropriate facilities (270 versu.'l 180 design).
DISCUSSION: Staff shared with us that Mule Creek State Prison is considered the uhub" for
EOP/SNY inmates, designating it as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY inmates.
Compounding the situation, many of the 8NY inmates have Level IV classification points
requiring 180 design housing; however this institution was designed as Level III with 270 design
housing. As a result, staff safety becomes a concern when SNY inmates. with assaultive
histories, are housed in these facilities. The team was informed that the department has no 180
design facilities to house these Level IV SNY inmales.
FINDING: Crowding leads to a potentially unsafe environment.
DISCUSSION: A second concern is the overcrowding in the facilities. which result ill E beds
(extra beds). or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit dayrooms, and double and triple bunking
of the gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up to 40 inmates sleeping in E beds. While
an additional floor officer is assigned to supervise these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to
supervise these inmates due to obstructed sightJines. Gymnasium A uses triple bunks, and
Gymnasiums Band C use double buw to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium A has two
floor officers and one gunner, and Gymnasium B and C have two floor officers but no gunner,
because the inmates are cla.c;sified as Level 1-2. These gymnasiums are perceived as staff safety
issues, as it is difficult to supervise the inmates due to the large number of beds and diminished
sightlines.
!tepa" MCSP,doc;7119I2UOS
13
.
NOV-20-2006
13:20
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.18
FINDING: Post and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.
DISCUSSION: Additionally, the captains believe that "post and bid" (a process in which
lieutenant. sergeants and COs request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts
their ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. The best-qualified individual
is not always placed in a position, based solely on seniority.
Interviews with Supervisors
FINDING: Supervisor concerns mirrored those of the managers in the following:
• Crowding with E·beds and the using gymnasiums as dormitories.
• Post and bid - supervisors were restricted from diverting an officer from one position to
another based on operational needs.
FINDING: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from
specified training.
DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell
extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with
EOP and CCCMS inmates.
Interviews with Line Staff
FINDING: Staff reported that safety equipment is adequate for performing their duties and rated
the equipn1ent as "good" to "okay".
DISCUSSION: Line staff said the type of safety equipment issued to them includes personal
alanns, radios in designated positions, handcuffs, side-handle batons, and OC spray. They
indicated that equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths, or from the
person being relieved at shift change.
FINDING: Not all custody staff have been issued stab-resistant vest and are reluctant to wear
vests from the '~vest pool".
DISCUSSION: Of the staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab-resistant vests, but not all
had been issued a vest. The evaluation team reviewed the body armor report, and noted that 567
custody staff had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had not. Staff indicated that if they were
assigned to a position which required a vest, they would not wear a vest from the "vest pool" as
they believed that these vests are not maintained in a sanitary condition, and they were concerned
with the integrity of the material to withstand an attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with
department policy which requires that a vest be worn by staff in specified positions, but did not
always comply.
Report MCSP.doc;7/191200S
14
.:
,
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
NDV-20-2006
13:21
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
P.19
SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
This was the first of fony-one Staff Safety Evaluations which will be conducted at California's
state prisons and youth detention facilities. The initial evaluation pilot tested the criteria that was
developed by a panel of subject maner experts. The evaluation team made a number of
modifications to the process as a result of the pilot test; nevertheless, several observations and
recommendations are contained in this report.
The majority of observations were the result of crowding at the institution. classification issues
(BOP, SNY, and Level IV inmates) including classification overrides, safety equipment issues
(stab-resistant vests, communications, etc.), training issues, labor issues (management limitations
due to post and bid), physical plant issues and staffing concerns. Institution management cannot
address many of the issues identified in this report. as they require a funding source or changes in
overarching policy andlor labor agreements.
As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority. the fmdings from this evaluation will be
presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to
CSA members, CDeR administration and Warden Campbell. It is outside the scope of this
project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan; appropriate action will be the
responsibility of CDCR Adult Operations.
,
I
I
I
\,
RCJlort MCSP.dllC;71191200S
15
I;
NOlJ-20-2006
13: 21
MULE CREEK-wARDEN
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I .
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
ATTACHMENT A
ENTRANCE LETTER
209 274 4861
P.20
NOU-20-2006
-
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
13: 21
Attachment A
209 274 4861
P.21
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR
BOARD OF CORRECTIONS
600 BERCUT DRIVE, SACRAMENTO, CA 95814
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
9161445·5073
WWW.BOCORR.CA.GOV
June 20, 2005
Rosanne Campbell, Warden
Mule Creek State Prison
P.O. Box 409099
lone, CA 95640
Dear Warden Campbell:
The Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) asked the Board of Corrections (aOC) to develop a
plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Department of Corrections (CDC) and Department of the Youth
Authority (eYA) detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the Bonrd unanimously approved a
proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety
evaluations.
The panel met on May 24-25,2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted.
As a result, a team comprised of BOC, CDC and CYA staff will be conducting the evaluations over the
next 28 months beginning with the MuJe Creek State Prison on July 5-8, 2005. We expect to be on site tor
four days and plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible.
We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative staff on
July 5, 200S at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be conducted
and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.
In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while:: a1 Mule
Creek State Prison:
•
A contact person with whom the team may coordinate theil' activities {plea.qe call or e-mail this
infonnation when the contact is identified}.
•
An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs and a telephone in which a team of nine
may work.
•
Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned
work areas a~d we will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.
•
Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff- CDC 837:
o A data collection form was sent to Chief Deputy Bill Des Voignes. asking that facility staff
code staff assault incident reports for the past year in the identified fonnat, addressing
incident information, inmate information and vic1im(s) information (please provide an
electronic copy of this data as soon as practical).
.
.
NDV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
13:21
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
Attachment A
Page 2
Warden Campbell
P.22
June 20. 2005
•
Staff Assault Committee Minutes
•
State Compensation Reports (SClF) for assaults on staff
Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator
•
A copy of the Confidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)
The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment. Please keep in
mind that Mule Creek Stale Prison is the first facility for which staff safety evaluations will be conducted,
so all needed information is still being detelmined.
Supplemental Data Sources - to be accessed as needed
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes·
o Grievances, Recommendations. Actions
hunate Appeals (CDC) '"
Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities*
Authorized Equipment and Functionality
Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommelldations*
Employee Training records for selected areas'"
Corrective Action Plans for previous audits'"
Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes*
Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference
with you andlor appropriate members of your staff (on or about July 8. 2005). The results of the evaluation
will be reported to the BOC at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to
YACA with a courtesy copy sent to you.
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please
feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or jread@bdcolT.ca.gov.
Sincerely,
Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)
*= 2004 and 2005 to date
co:
J. S. Woodford, Director
Department of Corrections
NDV-20-2006
13:21
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
1
ATTACHMENT B
STAFF ASSAULT DATA
209 274 4861
P.23
---_._--_... - ..
Mule Creek State- Prison
Siaff AsS8Ull Data FY 2004105
Page 1 of2
Dale
1Q'-1\lI1·UIl1-Q261
I11Z1IZ1l'J~
'neat Se<\"".
Assllalt
In)Jly
i'J:
tlln....
WOlIp;n
ItMYAI
IILK
iii
RtlCdCOC
~
c;.YA
R<ll
ReL'd rast DaltIPllD
H"'JlIIlg
IAQII
Loe
5111'$
2UlI 1Mn
oIT A3-117
CCCIolS
t6A
UNK
U
liar...
2!1
2.tT Rue
4 M-13JL
CCCMS
tM
UNK
f
NT'"
311
ua WIlT
:IS
CCCA\S
NtA
U'I!(
F
MfA
40
:u IwKT
..'"
CO
'2
WHJ
00
43
111.25 WHJ
00
!3
111.$' WHJ
K1Sl138
Il!5P
145 SUN
BLDG 4
NO
PI26U
WIll
MCP-Aa.-o4lO6·e12! llII5IZOH
115 ruES
... ClINe
StoTTEflY NO
NO
1R!05<12
',111
liICI'o.ACt..Q4IIl1~ I.e!
11612004
910 lUES
EDIICA'DII IlIJ1GlY NO
NO
P40Z43
llISP
UCP.J\DIl.U/ID-OZt1
IW2120N
IlII8 SAT
DN!HG
s:..nelY NO
AMI
111
2ol51r.l8li
lICP.ADiI-44110002C
lW2120D4
eelS SAT
DNlHG
GASSING NO
D21014
1JIl
111
lICP"'DII·t4JlOo~
1OI11naD4
1~
ClI'(lNG
"nENPr flO
-
DUOI4
NO
TlI1513
HlSP
S6
DNING
O",lTERY NO
lID
~16&ZI
H1SP
II
1ZlM1XXl 4I2ilaGlU
1121202
EDUCAllOO IAmIlY NO
HO
K22P.33
WKT
II lon:rnMil M23QOD.'I
1/11,'2OlI
1lO
IuUDJlI
ILK
1M' 7110119!l1 :m11211G3 Un
4Z
CCCUS
HlSP
lU tJUlI
3.5 CI2.U1L
!ttA
3112·uR
ECIP
SQ5Il!DI:I
41 12·I:NL
MCP-AE044005·0IJ
6/24t2GD4
S\I11
1730 '''ED
B5lI lHUR
18:l5 SUH
A. ClINIC
NO
111 tL'fI2/1996 12l1812l1ll3 5l2!l!'lDIJ
"-
SIlS
23
NO
!J 1I1ll12lll11l 8n212OO3 UFE
YrlIaf
11••
m
~
!lII9IZOa~
010 or
flO
~a
lot
NO
mUla05
GlInller
BIIRRIO lINK
~nEUPf NO
1fQ2J1D!16 &11 DI:lODl
~
NIA
s"nan
JAllII(JI 1 l 1 _ 211111106
81
Glr4
21 At·21tL
BlJ)G3
125
~~
Wolk
'""'9'-
1915 rUES
MCP..AO... HJI 1-OZ50 111101200.
~IOU
$4 AHlll
iliA
Nt"
U*
tIf"..<JQlII!O L.lfI'
42 ....
till.
ORPr
U~
%/5/tlllill 8tSOll\lllO If'E
42 ....
tIIA
DRPr
UflK
fnar:m 3Il4l1l11D D:z1lll11
48 CI3-tI2L
CCXUS
fLOPet UN!<
42/lG,1I!Ia
iliA
IlIA
UIO<
CCCUS
IlIA
1,,11(
F
IlIA
UNlC
F
MfA
2&
N SIRe
UN''(
F
MfA
37
2 ftIr
IN/A
lJH·
CD
31
S WIlt
EOP
NJ.
1mX
'"
MrA
57
NlA
U
0
31
942 WHf
N
0
:IS
512 WH'
2.11 WilT
51 5fZ4n999
4IBt1OlIO UQQI2l1ZS
...
AD:J~1.IL
A~15L
.'"
..
co
!ll
lOll \"flit
SCI
:Ill
ItI!llI HlSP
1BOiEF
54
9..5 MiT
,~
loICP..u:D4W11-DI41
1.'CQG04
'YCP.ASU~Ul9-DI9
9114QtO~
1(;1]0
lUES
1:&.1
Il"TrEftY HO
IlO
!nuN
thO-blOt i,UmIlltG4
114'5
lHORS
~
AtTENpl' NO
NO
11'140
\'Hr
61
!U:P.ASUJWII·1I25
11~41ZQ(JS
17JO
Ms
,\SO
GIlSSING 110
NO
mow
II'Mr
15'.1
1ICP..,o,su.t5.Q'·DI4
II24QIlOS
1320 ~OH
ASU
BAUERY NO
I«)
P419:t6
IISP
191
8IWIllI9 121l1'20U
911121:0'
2612-23SL
EOI'
NzA.
.~
"Ill.OI.
II24QOO~
1320
NON
ASU
OAnER\' NO
I.IJ
:NUWI
IIISS>
161
II/!IIISsg 121llllIlN4
tnl2llll5
21i 12·Z3'l
lOOP
NIl.
iliA
ua>-I,SU·ISID5IlIr&
51II1:lDOS
",S
V.ED
ASU
IU,TlERY ..0
NO
BUIll
I/'l'lIr
4'
1lQJ2Qll4
~
2·219L
EOP
N/I\
WA
~
CO
011
IlIA
JJ
co
3t
17 VI'"
MIA
II
co
211
UB HlSP
• •o,
G:.SSi.'IG tlO
LIFe
61llflOO3 1lII'21Q1lO1
~19118
lI.'3llI2OJ4
12l1'nOH
11/4I'l1I1!lI
' 'omlOS
.
Wltr
• ItI.J(
'Acp·,lSlJ.lsm-on
5fil200S
730 FlU
IASU
8AnERr NO
NO
f45i!tS
IBLK
4B
:l(4J2OlIZ
41281'ZOIl5
1amaJ5
Z4 IZoZl)l
EOP
N/I\
"CPoASU·G5JOl!j-OU
l!IJ3l.2oo5
13!Q FRt
ASu
IlAnEAr NO
NO
1017~B
WIll
~l&
IntllG
ZI2/1Cltl4
!1lI2012
~
12·129L
cc~s
WHY
M::N\SU.e.ws-011
M:v21J115
1300 FRI
I'.5U
WITTER\'
NO
NO
)(..W48
WHl
315 1/l11l'Jll7
V2t1GD4
mJ2012
~
1l-1ZSL
CCCNS
~HT
HI'"
\:
I.CSW
31
D nHf
316 1/l1l1991
'U2nlJ1)f
31211012
ll.Z ll-t2!lL
1ccQ.1$
\IIHr
IU...
M
IGl
D
2l1.B3 \1Hr
'*1199 lGl.!JIW09
311 A4-215U
IfIjl,
iliA
UNK
IF
co
<4lI
UII HSP
28 JlIB.I4l1U
EOP
HlA
UNK
F
Ln
2lI
1."tHY
5I1312DD:5
BATTERY NO
NO
K3l"748
WIlt
IIICP-AYlJ.I.l411o-llZl' 1G",2004
1110 RtHU5 AYMII
BATTERY NO
NO
JJQZ&l
lIUC
17
/I~IBI
1U5 MoOtI
BLDG'
8AnEAV NO
NO
r"'l~
0111
~I
ltUl2C02 6/19mlD2 ~1OQOO6
,otOH
NO
DOailII
WIlT
I~
IOOglaOlI 't3IRlIlXI 11/14I1B33
M::P-IoSU·lWlI:>.QI1
...
SAl
SiIIo Ir>II
lccalltJ.
i~
S,odd
Nlw;parod
I1IlI351
MCP-NI-l.cl~194
I"l
Weell
fiB
8
~
Il1.OO 1
).rzp.HJ3-D1Jl19.0tB8 !l/U1200ol
....
t'\l
0"'/°'
rne
\lIC1lU1.FOllUA.noa
.J
18l1lTl!lWARD 11IF0/INA1101C
lfU:lDElI'I.FOIUtIA'PDN
IMIll'
Attacbment B
lWa2DN
iW:P-8lIl-D4I'I 1-025IJ 111l212QD4
ICI'-8II6-DUlI-02S1 1tlJOl'"dID4
MCl'-8Dll-lMIIl1.(J16' 713012G04
"CP-IDe-04/Ot..clJllI
9/23/ZGD4
1350 FRt
1BI5
ASlf
44 1&:244U
EOP
HlA
UNK
..
co
41
2.SlI HSP
HlSP
15 3Q~.11l9!I
11151211(I) 1l/20W00i
311 es:z4OU
ECf>
"''''
lHl!(
F
AN
sa
211.42 I"IHr
"Iff
5I1112llOO
eJ4nOOJ 1111!JJZllOS
~llB-ISIL
NIA
"''A
UtI!(
III
co
n
'-'3 01H
J1lea·142\J
iruA
""
UIII(
fll
56T
3Z
OM liSP
aLOGa
-nERY NO
1510 lUES
BlDGIl
....t1ENpr
No
tlO
~
1415 FRI
OlOGB
~lNG
lO
110
P'819l1
P.~
~sp
143S ll1UR& B1QGO
IlAnEllY ~Q
flO
al91ltlM
3:1
Q~211_
5.'1Dr200l
Il/MlIO!i
-'~-'
Attachment B
Mule Creek Slale Prison
Staff Assault Data FY 2004/05
Page 2of2
Q.
~~.IG! 8I1llGOOS
II., IiUH
8CS
SAnER'f l:O
NO
.HIm
WHT
9' 1U1lltl9M
1N2IlCI3
311211012
~
IIIIIlQOO5
16511 SAT
81llN1t«i
AnEIIpr IlO
110
Wll14
WHr
21 1GfI2t2OO4
215QOOS
S/22I10~
21l11S-1OSU
MCP-801I-1l6AJ6.104
llCStl
35
t 81K
2lI C15-l14\J
""
Nu.
IJIll(
F
co
43
n
CCCUS
HIA
Ull1C
F
NI""
35
sa ell·2om
IIL\
Nu.
UM;c
u
co
311
23 el5·I3JU
co::us
HlA
UMIC
Ii
co
44
9.41 vntT
51 12·1211
CCCUS
WI..
UMIC
W
co
53
lUI WIl'
31 CTCG9
CO::US
NIA
WA
F
CO
41
1925 81K
NIA
MIA
WA
F
'5
U WIlT
Nl.\
NIA.
..
fIN
UMlI
Co
35
1 WIll
NIA.
lJNlC
101
00
32
95 "lItJ
UIOC
.505 SAT
BlOO1.5
ilATTEfn 110
HO
103116
&lK
:u
I2tZ2tzallII
7Il12llCM 1Ol23t2017
11110 UON
ceulne
GASSING NO
tlO
iII'olllGr.
WHT
.4
IIl82ll03
12JZJ2003
'''112017
47 Cl4-lOU
COINltlG
!lAnEJlY
PROJ
Dnle8
\1IHT
:14 7/W19117 112312004
111411.52
19511 SAT
CflAGU
NO
ol522~~
HlSP
111 '.lQ8I2004
I leO LlC»l
eTe
IlATlEAY 1(0
NO
CI54l1
\VHI
201 12Q0118B:1
MCI'.etC4501l5-Q1l2
~
.r..a
WEO
eTC
"nEUr'T 1:0
NO
1/'24120
HlSP
31
McP-CTC4UIl-lOl
5Q112Oll5
T\I£S
etc
IlAnERY NO
110
~
OlK
2J !Q4I199S 8/1111915
~12IN04
111812005 .t.z:ll2Ql1
2IlQllCl2
IFE
:lIMIlCIS tll1r20llll
IQll/2OSS
~
lI$
cron
UcP~44.QT-OI!i!
1Q5Q~
1625 SUN
eyARO
NO
NO
DIGH8
HlSP
~~s.oJ-Oll7
tn.aar.s
1445 SAT
CYAAD
8ArrERY lID
KO
lc24211ll
IilSP
2' 1_1998 IIJllII_ 1111maiS
34 CIJ. lO7t.
NIAo
&oI!CP-G\'t).G5lQ 1.(Jf11 111_
1445 SAT
CYAAD
9A.TTEm NO
"0
TII8200
IIISP
26 ellCll2GOJ :11121200.
25 UlIK
Nl.\
NIA.
Ii
Co
33
U
k:o
.8
FA
k:o
42
118
3r19118lili :112112001 Mtl4l2010
1V11'2812
n
A2·121U
511112005
18211 ruES
AU
AnEIIPJ NO
1:0
1/'24!>20
HlSP
50 2l11/lCD1 511712llCM 2Qlfl1Ill6
37 12-119L
fOP
SUflENl Nl.\
iNCP-RaR-l),505~ SlISl20tlS
IlIDO WED
R4A
BArTERY tiO
!CO
1/'24520
IIISP
!D 2111ml04 5/U12OO4 21211'lD01i
3112-126L
EOP
StlANO NIA
INCP-RIIR-45D5-OaS
.-4
N
M
.-4
- -
z.u
40
co
MCP-C Is.ocnO~1
4IWt.!005
..
co
MIl_
MCP.cl~12.(1211 'l2t27Q01l'
lie Wltl
U
2. 111I3I'I991
~5D4-l1ll1
4!l
11IO<
OTHl
AnEIJPT /(0
co
11IO<
lOJ~&
NO
M
Nio\
7n12OO3 'JIlMOlM
HO
830 11J£S
lU6 YJ1Ir
Nu.
44 3QMillQ
~nEliPT NO
I.ecP-CO,"4m.oIJl 11/2912004
44
EOP
WHT
BlDG. 1'1
llCP-CCl-D«64l3E &n1ll2OO4
WHrPR UNI<
co
lff,A
TeleU
101lI FIlr
1Ot2_
EOP
It
lIIS-I3RL
110
NCP-C~1'()ln 712_
3/'l3/2OU
NIo\
CI5-IJ1L
1034 UOtI
PflOGIIAIoI 8AnERY NO •
MCP-IlPG.o.-017
lff,A
IolHC8
tII!J'
vntr
0..51 ASIR
I~ll
BLK
95 yntJ
2055
8lJ(
118UC
NOV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
,
I
..
13:22
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.26
ATTACHMENT C
DESIGN VERSUS CURRENT CAPACITY
.i
I
I
!
I
I~
NOV-20-2006
"
,
13:22
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.27
Attachment C
Design Capacity Versus Current CapacIty
Designed Bed
Area
Desi~med
Capacity
Count
Current Capacity
Current sed
Count
Facllltv A.
Bulldlnrl1
Buildinll 2
Building 3
Bulldln~4
Building 5
GvmnaslumA
exerclse Yard
FacllltvS
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100 Single OccuDancv Cells
100 Single Occupancy Cens
100 Single OccupanCy Cells
100
100
100
100
100
0
Bulldlna6
100 SlnQle Occupancv Cells
100
Bulldlna7
100 SlnClle Occupancy Cells
100
Buildlna8
100 Sinale Occupancy Cells
100
Building 9
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100
Isulldlng 10
Gvmnasium B
Execrclse Yard
100 Sinale Occupanev Cells
100
0
100 Double OccuDancv CeU5
100 Double Occupancy Cella
100 Double OccucanC'Y Cells
100 Double OCCUDanC\l Cells
100 Double OccupanC\l Cells
160 Bed Open Dorm
94 Double Occuopancy Cells +
6 single Occupancy level IV
EOP Beds
98 Double Occupancy Cells"' .j.
40 E-beds
98 Double Occupancy Cells" +
40 E-beds
98 Double Occupancy Cells· +
40 E·beds
98 Double Occupancy Cells" +
40 E-beds
160 Bed Open Dorm
200
200
200
200
200
160
194
236
238
236
236
160
Facility C
Building "
Building 12
8ulldlna 13
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100 Smgle Occupanev Cells
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100
100
100
Building 14
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100
BuildIng 15
GvmnasiumC
Minimum Security
Dorm 1
Dorm 2
100 Single Occupancy Cells
100
Total
100 Bed Open Dorm
100 Bed Open Dorm
100
100
98 Double Occupancy Cells" +
40 E-beds
. 100 DOUble Occupancy Cells
100 Double Occupancy Cells
98 Double Occupancy Cells" +
40 E.beds
98 Double Occupancy Cells· +
40 E·beds
1eo Bed Open Dorm
200 Bed Open Dorm
200 Bed Open Dorm
1700
• Two cells In these buildings were converted to restroom facilities for the E-bed inmates.
236
200
200
236
236
160
200
200
4126
NOlJ-2el-2006
..
13: 22
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
ATTACHMENTD
STAFF INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
P.28
i
I
:L
.
;
~
.~
~
r, ,
\'
i:
::
t'
:
NOV-20-2006
I
I
.I
I
f
13:22
MULE CREEk-WARDEN
209 274 4861
P.29
Mule Creek State Prison
July 5 - 8, Z005
Line Staff:
1.
What is your current job title?
2.
What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (post Orders)?
3.
When did you start working for the department as..• ?
4.
How long have you been assigned to this facility?
S.
How many inmates do you supervise? What is their general classification (EOP)?
6.
What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at
all times, otherwise have access to, or have to check out from ~ central location?
I
f
I
J
I
I
I
,r.
..!
7.
Do you have a stab vest? Have you been titted for one? Do you wear it at all
times?
f
I
!
I;
!
8.
What is the general condition of your safety equipment?
9.
Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for yourjob duties?
10.
If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?
1
NDU-20-2006
•
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
13:22
209 274 4861
11.
On a scale ofl to la, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?
12.
Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and
when do you feel the most safe? How do other staff feel about this?
13.
What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the
most as you are performing your duties?
P.30
i
i
i
I
;
iI
!
j~
f;
14.
Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staffsafety?
r
I
;
•
ti'
o.
15.
What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?
r
!
[
1,
"
"
f
[
!0,
16.
How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's
supervisor? The warden?
r.
~
~
[
!:.
17.
Are protocols in place for emergency responses?
18.
(policy?)What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is
injured, where do they go for first aid or fol' emergency treatment in more serious
cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?
2
,tJ.JUWW*,*,::W:;;
i "",tii
.#Q'w.x.a.z
:
Z4#".&$5M $N.%$MI4MtttQt:;::JJ:;U:;:;:40i:;;:m:t:;: h
;,:z:v;.. ~ ..
2
Supervisors:
1.
How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?
2.
How many years do you have as a supervisor?
3.
Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institution?
4.
Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a
routine shift.
5.
How many officers do you directly supervise?
6.
How many do you indirectly supervise?
7.
What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your
subordinates?
8.
Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff?
i
!
!
I:"
9~
-- What safety equipment is issued and carried by your-staff?
--
-
~'
-I;'·
:i
10.
I
Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff s use?
4t
ij
;~
'I
il
II
:
~
::I
~
"
smm::lII..
. 6JQ.J6iQ.QiQiWiQ.MiWiQi"',:;.M.((i::.Q.W;::;.Q •. w.«n:.C3 .•. ( . . J • .' .
..
.0'
.!
,
U
:1
Q
n
,.
:1
~I
•1
1
"
:1
:1
~
3
!I
,.'-.
~QQ,
t (3i (6 .#.!b
.-* ,0,,1(
.{3,$. .
..".: .. &>.3...
-_._---_. -'- ..__ ._---_.- .......
••
••
• • • _ • . 4_.••
•
•
_ _ ···-·
------------_..
~--
-._-.-._.._
~
.._._._---_
"
'~
_----_ .._._- .. ... ----- .----- - -
-
... !.i.'!'*"!'l)';;;(;;;;;;;;;;;::)ji#'::'l..i~"i!i««.ei"(JiM.(ii
. '.M hP.e':ZZ;WZ .0PM.as
..3. .0&(3,&0:«« "".".QQ'''S ..•{3.3•.• e.&''''Z;:''; pi< .. 'i'Q'iWiiJR
-.&/-':.':"
NOV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
13:22
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
11.
If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?
12.
Do you have II stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all
times?
13.
Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure
that they wear it at all times?
14.
How often do you see your supervisors?
15.
How many of your available officers are on overtime? Ordered over? Voluntary?
16.
On a scale of 1 to 10. with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility?
17.
What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?
P.31
!.
18.
19.
What kind ofcomplaints do you get from staff? Ate there any patterns that
emerge? How do you handle them?
What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?
4
j"
,
NOV-20-2006
13:22
209 274 4861
MULE CREEK-wARDEN
I~
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
20.
What would you like to do or see chl:lIlged to improve staff safety and reduce staff
assaults?
21.
What protocols in place for emergency responses?
22.
What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured,
where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases?
How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?
5
P.32
I \
I
I
I
I
I
I
NDU-20-2006
13:22
21219 274 4861
MULE CREEK-wARDEN
P.33
Managers:
1.
How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager,?
2.
How many years experience do you have as a manager?
3.
Have you been a manager at any other CDC institution?
4.
Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a
routine shift.
5.
Have often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general
staff safety practices? .
6.
Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is
available for them to use?
7:
Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff's use?
8.
lfthe answer is yes. what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?
1
I
I
I
6
I
I,
NOV-20-2la06
I
I
I
I
9.
13:22
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
2139 274 4861
P.34
How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been
fined? What is the timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive
them?
10.
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you feel working at this facility?
11.
When considering staffsafety, what types of concerns do you have?
12.
From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?
13.
What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?
14.
What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that
emerge?
15.
Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff
assaults?
16.
Do you have anyone assigned to monitor staff assaults or track occurrences to
identify trends?
i
ii
,I
I
7
I
NDU-20-2006
13:23
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
2139 274 4861
]7.
If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make
to your operation to reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical
plant, service and supply, operational changes and/or staff changes?
18.
Have the number of vacancies, 4850's. other leave of absences affected staff
safety? Do you have mandated overtime for· staff and supervisors?
19
Do you have any staff off duty as a result of an assault? How long? Have you
had contact with them whUe they were off duty?
20.
What level of repair is your facility? Have you made requests for service or
special projects that affect the level of staff safety? Have those requests been
approved?
21.
What protocols in place for emergency responses?
22.
What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where
do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How
long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?
8
P.35
NOV-20-2006
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
-
13:23
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
209 274 4861
ATTACHMENTE
EVALUATION TEAM ROSTER AND
ASSIGMENTS
P.36
NOU-2e-2006
MULE CREEK-WARDEN
13:23
209 274 4861
P.37
Attachment E
Evaluation Team Members
Mule Creek State Prison
Team 1
Staff Interviews:
Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative
John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II
Jeff Plunkett, Juvenile Justice, Captain
Team 2
Physical Plant. Staffing and Population:
Gary Wion, eSA Field Representative
Mark Perkins. Adult Operations, FaciliLy Captain
Gerry Garcia, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant
Team 3
Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:
Don Allen, eSA Field Representative
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant
Bob Moore, Juvenile Justice, Major
Robert Takeshta, Field Representative
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-322-8346
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail:.btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov
Mark Perkins. CaptaIn
Adult Operations
Phone: 916·358-26.2.6
Fax:
916·356-2499
E-Mail: moerklns@corr.ga.90v
Gary Wion, Field Representative
Correetions·Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324·1641
Fax: 916-327-3317
e-Mail: gwion@bdcarr.ca.gov
Jeff Plunkett, Captain
Juvenile Justice
Phone: 916-262-0802
Fax:
916-262-1767
E-Mail: jolunKett@cys.ca.oov
Don Allen, Field Representative
Bob Moore, Major
Juvenile Justice
Phone: 209-.2.74-8115
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-9153
!
1-- .
I
I
Fax: 916-327-3317
E-Mail: dallen@bdgorr.ca.gov
Fax:
209·
E-Mail:
bmoore@cya.c~.gov
John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2628
Fax: 916-358·2636
e-Mail: iQjJn.meaullffe@corr ca,90v
Gerry Garcia, Uelltenant
Juvenile Justice
Phone: 209-944-6113
Fax:
209-465·2968
e-Mail: agarcia@cya.ca.gov,.
Dave Stark, Lieutenant
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-.2.473
Fax: 916·358-2499
E-Mail: dave.stark@sorr.ca.gov
TOTAL P.37
a,s XU).
\:'M
hiM"
m WlM4itw
Lb.,. ;,
. !.ok }.4',.«,3,o, , .. .4.>...w•. o.v.3.G.v,.
z. .,wS&. .. .R);:r:.t!S!,.bl':'~:;, .. lAI
mw&t l . .&..z 431.;,,%:, fuM
t
&)ltt¢!ti}:tX?!
<.f ••
!#.'~~.. is i4
l
Il..
.n ~3~
.:::.'.'. .
