TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REPORT ON SUICIDE PREVENTION PRACTICES
WITHIN THE MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

A. INTRODUCTION
The following is a summary of the observations, findings, and recommendations of
Lindsay M. Hayes, Project Director of the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives,
following the provision of short-term technical assistance to the Massachusetts Department of
Correction (DOC).

During the past year, the DOC experienced a high number of inmate

suicides within its correctional system. Because the incidence of suicide was greater than in
previous years, the DOC quickly began to examine the deaths through a previously established
mortality review process, as well as review of various policy and procedural directives relating
to suicide prevention. In order to more independently assess current practices, as well as offer
any appropriate recommendations for improving DOC suicide prevention policies and practices,
Commissioner Kathleen M. Dennehy decided to seek the assistance of an outside consultant.

It should be noted that the DOC’s recent review of various suicide prevention protocols,
mortality reviews, and subsequent determination for the need of this writer’s assessment was not
prompted by litigation or critical investigation of any of the recent inmate suicides. Rather, these
actions were taken through the pro-active initiative of Commissioner Dennehy who was
committed to determining what steps, if any, were necessary to improve suicide prevention
practices within the Massachusetts Department of Correction.

In conducting the assessment, this writer toured various DOC facilities; met with and/or
interviewed several correctional, medical, and mental health officials and staff from both DOC

2
headquarters and individual prison facilities; reviewed numerous documents [including all DOC
and UMASS Correctional Health (hereafter referred to as UMCH) policies and procedures
related to suicide prevention, screening/assessment protocols, and suicide prevention lesson
plans/training curricula]; and reviewed the investigative reports and/or mortality reviews of 10
inmate suicides during 2005-2006. 1 The toured facilities and tour dates are listed as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Massachusetts Correctional Institution – Concord (September 27, 2006)
Bridgewater State Hospital – Bridgewater (September 28, 2006)
Massachusetts Alcohol & Substance Abuse Center – Bridgewater (September 28, 2006)
Souza-Baranowski Correctional Center – Shirley (October 11, 2006)
Massachusetts Correctional Institution – Cedar Junction (October 12, 2006)
Massachusetts Correctional Institution – Framingham (October 13, 2006)
Old Colony Correctional Center – Bridgewater (January 2, 2007)

As of December 2006, the Massachusetts Department of Correction held approximately
10,500 inmates in 18 correctional facilities. Since 2000, the DOC has experienced 18 inmate
suicides in its facilities, with more than 60 percent occurred during 2005-2006. As shown by
Table 1, the suicide rate within the Massachusetts Department of Correction during the past 10
years was 26.9 deaths per 100,000 inmates. According to the most recent national data, the
suicide rate in federal, state, and private prisons throughout the country during 2002 was 14
deaths per 100,000 prison inmates. 2

As such, the suicide rate within the DOC was almost

double the national average during this 10-year period, and several times greater than the
national average in 2006.

1

The complete reports for some of the cases were not yet unavailable for review.
Mumola, Christopher J. (2005), Suicide and Homicide in State Prisons and Local Jails, Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
2

3

TABLE 1
INMATE SUICIDES AND AVERAGE DAILY POPULATION WITHIN THE
MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 3
(1997 thru 2006)
Year

Suicides

Average Daily Population

Rate

1997
8
10,849
73.7
1998
2
10,847
18.4
1999
0
10,856
0.0
2000
2
10,465
19.1
2001
2
10,302
19.4
2002
1
10,068
9.9
2003
0
9,973
0.0
2004
1
9,949
10.0
2005
4
10,155
39.3
4
2006
8
10,463
76.4
______________________________________________________________________
1997-2006
28
103,927
26.9

In addition, this writer reviewed the investigative reports and/or mortality reviews of 10
inmate suicides during 2005-2006. 5 The following findings were noted in the reviewed cases:

3

•

The inmate suicides were distributed amongst several medium and
maximum security facilities: MCI – Cedar Junction (2), Old
Colony Correctional Center – (2), Souza-Baranowski Correctional
Center (2), Bridgewater State Hospital (1), MCI – Concord (1),
MCI – Framingham (1), and MCI – Shirley (1);

•

All but one (9 of 10) of the suicides were by hanging
(asphyxiation) -- with anchoring devices including a clothing
hook, shower knob, cell door, sink, ventilation grate, window, and
smoke detector;

•

All but one (9 of 10) of the suicides occurred in special housing
units -- with 5 in segregation, 3 in health services units, and 1 in
the multipurpose unit of a residential treatment program;

Data provided by the Massachusetts Department of Correction.
Includes a suicide attempt at Bridgewater State Hospital that left the victim without any brain activity.
5
Sufficient data on two cases were not available to be included in the analysis.
4

4

•

Half (5 of 10) of the victims had recently been on suicide
precautions (i.e. mental health watches), with discharge from that
observation level ranging from a few hours to a few weeks prior to
their deaths; and included one victim who was on mental health
watch at the time of the incident, and another victim was on a
medical watch (resulting from a hunger strike) at the time of the
suicide;

•

The majority (6 of 10) of the victims had documented mental
health histories, and half (5 of 10) had documented histories of
suicidal behavior; and

•

There were a variety of precipitating factors that were theorized
during the investigative/mortality review processes as possible
contributors to the deaths, including concern/anxiety at being
reclassified to a higher security institution, concern regarding
medical condition, grieving loss of a child, loved one having
extramarital relationship, and guilt regarding committing offense.

5
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Detailed below is this writer’s assessment of suicide prevention practices within the
Massachusetts Department of Correction. It is formatted according to this writer’s eight (8)
critical components of a suicide prevention policy: staff training, identification/screening,
communication, housing, levels of supervision, intervention, reporting, and follow-up/mortality
review. This protocol was developed in accordance with both Standard 4-4373 of the American
Correctional Association’s Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions (2003) and Standard PG-05 of the National Commission on Correctional Health Care’s Standards for Health Services
in Prisons (2003). 6 Where indicated, recommendations are also provided.

6

American Correctional Association (2003), Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, 4th Edition, Lanham,
MD: Author; National Commission on Correctional Health Care (2003), Standards for Health Services in Prisons,
Chicago, IL: Author.

6
1)

Staff Training
All correctional, medical, and mental health staff should
receive eight (8) hours of initial suicide prevention training,
followed by two (2) hours of annual training. At a minimum,
training should include avoiding negative attitudes to suicide
prevention, prison suicide research, why correctional
environments are conducive to suicidal behavior, potential
predisposing factors to suicide, high-risk suicide periods,
warning signs and symptoms, identifying suicidal inmates
despite the denial of risk, components of the agency’s suicide
prevention policy, and liability issues associated with inmate
suicide.

The key to any suicide prevention program is properly trained correctional staff, who
form the backbone of any correctional system. Very few suicides are actually prevented by
mental health, medical or other professional staff. Because suicides usually are attempted in
inmate housing units, often during late evening hours and on weekends, they are generally
outside the purview of program staff.

Therefore, these incidents must be thwarted by

correctional staff who have been trained in suicide prevention and are able to demonstrate an
intuitive sense regarding the inmates under their care. Simply stated, correctional officers are
often the only staff available 24 hours a day; thus they form the front line of defense in suicide
prevention.

Both the American Correctional

Association (ACA) and National Commission on

Correctional Health Care (NCCHC) standards stress the importance of training as a critical
component to any suicide prevention program.

ACA Standard 4-4084 requires that all

correctional staff receive both initial and annual training in the “signs of suicide risk” and
“suicide precautions;” while Standard 4-4373 requires that staff be trained in the implementation
of the suicide prevention program. As stressed in NCCHC Standard P-G-05 -- “All staff

7
members who work with inmates are trained to recognize verbal and behavioral cues that
indicate potential suicide, and how to respond appropriately. Initial and at least biennial training
are provided, although annual training is highly recommended.”

FINDINGS: The issue of suicide prevention is briefly addressed in both DOC and
UMCH policies. For example, DOC Policy 650.07 (Suicide Prevention Plan) requires that “all
staff members who work directly with inmates shall receive, on an annual basis, comprehensive
training in suicide prevention,” whereas UMCH Policy 53.00 (Suicide Prevention) simply
requires that “mental health staff will support and participate in the Department of Correction
training program as developed and implemented through the DOC Regional Training
Coordinator.”

Upon employment within the DOC, all correctional staff are required to complete a basic
training program at the Correction Training Academy. Over the past several years, the preservice training has varied from between two (2) and four (4) hours in length. For example,
when this writer conducted an assessment of suicide prevention practices at the Bridgewater
State Hospital (BSH) in June 2000, approximately 2.5 hours were devoted to suicide prevention
at the Correction Training Academy. 7 Based upon this writer’s recommendation to expand the
pre-service training from 2.5 to 8 hours instruction, the training program was scheduled to be
expanded to 4 hours. However, review of the following training curricula suggests that the preservice suicide prevention training program is currently at 2 hours duration.

8
In 1999, through a joint venture of DOC, UMCH, and Correctional Medical Services, a
training curriculum entitled Suicide Prevention: Risks, Roles and Responses for Massachusetts
Correctional Staff was developed.

The 56-page trainer’s manual, designed for 2 hours of

instruction, was very comprehensive and included the following topics: “prevalence of suicide in
correctional institutions, who commits suicide?, common methods of suicide, when and where
are suicides committed?, roles and responsibilities, and case studies.” The curriculum included
both research and possible risk factors to suicide that were exclusive to prison facilities.
However, as this writer noted in reviewing of the curriculum for the previous BSH assessment,
there was a concern as to whether all of the above topics could be adequately addressed in a 2hour format. Finally, this writer was recently presented with a lesson plan cover sheet and
training curriculum that represented the DOC’s current pre-service suicide prevention training
program. Although the lesson plan cover sheet, entitled “Recruit Training Program – Suicide
Prevention” listed the course at 4-hours duration, the companion training curriculum was the
same 2-hour Suicide Prevention: Risks, Roles and Responses for Massachusetts Correctional
Staff from 1999.

With regard to in-service training for suicide prevention, this writer reviewed two
distinct lesson plans

--

a 36-PowerPoint slide presentation entitled “In-Service Training

Program – Suicide Prevention Review” listed as 1-hour duration that was developed in 1999 and
revised in August 2001, and a computer lab-based program entitled “In-Service 2005 – Suicide
Prevention for Massachusetts Correctional Staff” listed as 30 to 60 minutes duration that was
developed in August 2004. Although brief in length, both curricula were quite good.
7

See Hayes, L. M. et al (2000), An Evaluation of Bridgewater State Hospital’s Suicide Prevention Policies and

9

Finally, this writer conversed with training coordinators at each of the toured facilities
regarding pre-service and in-service suicide prevention training. Although there was consistency
reported in all correctional staff being required to complete the 2-hour pre-service course at the
Correction Training Academy, there was little uniformity regarding annual in-service training.
For example, at MCI-Framingham, the mental health director offered a 1-hour block on suicide
prevention; at MASAC, a 30-minute workshop was optional for correctional staff; at MCIConcord, the computer lab-based program was available; at Souza-Baranowski, the 2-hour preservice course was repeated at the annual workshop; and at BSH, the in-service program had
been reduced to 45 minutes.

In addition, although most mental health clinicians appeared to

receive some suicide prevention training on an annual basis, many nursing personnel did not
receive any suicide prevention training on an annual basis.

RECOMMENDATIONS: Several recommendations are offered to strengthen both the
content and consistency of suicide prevention training within the Massachusetts Department of
Correction. First, although national correctional standards do not recommend a specific number
of hours for suicide prevention training, it is strongly recommended that the DOC increase the
pre-service suicide prevention training from 2 to 8 hours. At a minimum, the revised training
program should include much of information currently offered in the Suicide Prevention: Risks,
Roles and Responses for Massachusetts Correctional Staff training curriculum, with additional
emphasis placed on avoiding negative attitudes to suicide prevention, updated statistics and case
studies on inmate suicides within the Massachusetts DOC, identifying suicidal inmates despite

Practices, Mansfield, MA: National Center on Institutions and Alternatives.

10
the denial of risk, dealing with manipulative inmates, 8 components of the DOC/UMCH suicide
prevention policies, and liability issues associated with inmate suicide.

Second, it is strongly recommended that all correctional, medical, and mental health staff
complete the 8-hour pre-service suicide prevention training program, either at the Correction
Training Academy or respective agency.

Third, it is strongly recommended that DOC and UMCH officials ensure that all
personnel (i.e., correctional, medical, and mental health) receive a consistent and uniform 2-hour
block of suicide prevention training on a yearly basis. At a minimum, the annual 2-hour training
program should include a review of predisposing factors to suicide, warning signs and
symptoms, negative attitudes to suicide prevention, identifying suicidal inmates despite the
denial of risk, and review of changes in the DOC/UMCH’s suicide prevention policies. It is also
recommended that the training program include general discussion on any inmate suicides and/or
serious attempts occurring within the previous year.

Material from 1) the current Suicide

Prevention: Risks, Roles and Responses for Massachusetts Correctional Staff from 1999, 2) 36PowerPoint slide presentation entitled “In-Service Training Program – Suicide Prevention
Review,” and 3) computer lab-based program entitled “In-Service 2005 – Suicide Prevention for
Massachusetts Correctional Staff” could be utilized in developing this revised in-service
program. Finally, it is strongly recommended that the in-service suicide prevention training
program for correctional, medical and mental health staff be integrated, not separate and

8

This writer conversed with a number of correctional staff at varying facilities who offered the view that most
inmates on suicide precautions (mental health watches) were manipulative, engaged and/or threatened suicide for
secondary gain, and were at little risk for suicide.

11
overlapping, as currently administered.

Interdisciplinary training would prove to be more

efficient and insightful.

Fourth, it is strongly recommended the both DOC and UMCH suicide prevention policies
be revised to include a richer description of the requirements for both pre-service and annual inservice suicide prevention. Much of the inconsistency found in both the length and content of
in-service training at the toured facilities could be corrected with policy revisions that specified
the required length and description of the training programs.

12
2)

Identification/Screening
Intake screening for suicide risk must take place immediately
upon confinement and prior to housing assignment. This
process may be contained within the medical screening form or
as a separate form, and must include inquiry regarding: past
suicidal ideation and/or attempts; current ideation, threat,
plan; prior mental health treatment/hospitalization; recent
significant loss (job, relationship, death of family member/
close friend, etc.); history of suicidal behavior by family
member/close friend; suicide risk during prior confinement;
transporting officer(s) believes inmate is currently at risk. The
intake screening process should include procedures for
referral to mental health and/or medical personnel. Any
inmate assigned to a special housing unit should receive a
written assessment for suicide risk by mental health staff upon
admission.

Identification/screening is also critical to a correctional system’s suicide prevention
efforts.

An inmate can attempt suicide at any point during incarceration

-- beginning

immediately following reception and continuing through a stressful aspect of confinement.
Although there is disagreement within the psychiatric and medical communities as to which
factors are most predictive of suicide in general, research in the area of jail and prison suicides
has identified a number of characteristics that are strongly related to suicide, including:
intoxication, emotional state, family history of suicide, recent significant loss, limited prior
incarceration, lack of social support system, psychiatric history, and various “stressors of
confinement.” 9 Most importantly, prior research has consistently reported that at least two thirds
of all suicide victims communicate their intent some time prior to death, and that any individual
with a history of one or more suicide attempts is at a much greater risk for suicide than those

9

Bonner, R. (1992), “Isolation, Seclusion, and Psychological Vulnerability as Risk Factors for Suicide Behind
Bars,” in R. Maris et. al. (Editors) Assessment and Prediction of Suicide, New York, NY: Guilford Press, 398-419.

13
who have never made an attempt. 10 The key to identifying potentially suicidal behavior in
inmates is through inquiry during both the intake screening/assessment phase, as well as other
high-risk periods of incarceration. Finally, given the strong association between inmate suicide
and special management (i.e., disciplinary and/or administrative segregation) housing unit
placement, any inmate assigned to such a special housing unit should receive a written
assessment for suicide risk by mental health staff upon admission.

Both the ACA and NCCHC standards address the issue of assessing inmates assigned to
segregation.

According to ACA Standard 4-4400: “When an offender is transferred to

segregation, health care personnel will be informed immediately and will provide assessment and
review as indicated by the protocol as established by the health authority.” NCCHC Standard PE-09 states that “Upon notification that an inmate is placed in segregation, a qualified health care
professional reviews the inmate’s health record to determine whether existing medical, dental, or
mental health needs contraindicate the placement or require accommodation.”

FINDINGS: Overall, it would be this writer’s opinion that DOC and UMCH have very
good intake screening and assessment procedures to identify potentially suicidal inmates, but
that these procedures are in need of slight revision. Upon admission, booking/admissions staff
access the statewide Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) to perform a “Q-5 Inquiry” on
each inmate admitted into the DOC. Positive results of inmates who have a history of suicide

10

Clark, D. and S.L. Horton-Deutsch (1992), “Assessment in Absentia: The Value of the Psychological Autopsy
Method for Studying Antecedents of Suicide and Predicting Future Suicides,” in R. Maris et. al. (Editors)
Assessment and Prediction of Suicide, New York, NY: Guilford Press, 144-182.

14
“attempts or threatens” 11 in a correctional facility, county jail, or police lockup within the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts are recorded in the DOC’s computerized Inmate Management
System (IMS) and referred to medical staff for further assessment. In addition, all inmates
receive basic intake screening (via the “Medical History and Screening” form) by medical staff
upon admission into one of the DOC’s reception centers (MCI-Concord or MCI-Framingham).
The form contains the following pertinent questions regarding mental health and potential
suicide risk:
1) Have you ever been treated for a psychiatric illness?
2) During the past two weeks have you had on-going problems with your sleep,
appetite, energy level or mood?
3) Have you ever attempted suicide?
4) Do you have any thoughts or plans to hurt yourself or someone else?
5) Are you hearing voices?
6) Does the inmate appear tearful?
7) Is the inmate’s communication incoherent?
8) Is the inmate demonstrating bizarre/unusual behavior?

Within 14 days of admission, all inmates are subsequently administered a “Mental Health
Evaluation” by mental health staff. The evaluation contains inquiry regarding suicide risk.

Further, all inmates placed in segregation are given an “Initial Segregation Assessment”
by medical staff to determine whether existing medical and/or mental health problems
contraindicate the housing placement. This form contains the same lines of inquiry regarding
suicide risk that is found on the “Medical History and Screening” form. Inmates with a history
of mental illness and/or are considered “open” mental health cases are assessed by mental health
staff within 24 hours or the next business day. Inmates remaining in segregation beyond 30 days

11

See Massachusetts General Laws, Chapter 40, Section 36A.

15
are assessed by mental health staff via the “Mental Health Status Update” form which is
completed during the initial 30 days and then every 90 days.

In addition, during this writer’s visits to the toured facilities, several other good practices
were observed in the area of identification of potentially suicidal behavior. For example, at
MCI-Cedar Junction, all newly transferred inmates into the facility serving natural life sentences
were assessed by mental health staff upon arrival. At Old Colony Correctional Center, medical
staff briefly assessed all inmates returning from court hearings.

Finally, however, this writer found several areas of concern regarding the screening and
assessment process. First, the DOC reception centers (MCI-Concord or MCI-Framingham)
receive few, if any, medical and mental health records from county jurisdictions regarding the
inmate’s adjustment and possible suicide risk within the county jail. Second, although a “Q5
Inquiry” is performed upon admission, neither booking/admission staff or medical personnel
access the IMS to determine if the inmate was at risk for suicide and on suicide precautions
(mental health watch) during a prior DOC confinement.

This information is available in both

the “Medical/Mental Health Section” and “Mental Health Watch” screen of IMS but, according
to both correctional and medical personnel who were interviewed, is not accessed on a routine
basis. In addition, when an inmate is placed on a mental health watch for threatening or
engaging to suicidal behavior, that information is not entered into the Q5 Inquiry section of
CJIS.

Therefore, upon intake into the DOC, neither booking/admission staff or medical

personnel assessing the inmate are aware as to whether the inmate has a prior history of being on
mental health watch within the DOC.

16

Third, although DOC and UMCH have adequate policies requiring an assessment of
inmates designated to segregation to determine whether existing medical and/or mental health
problems contraindicate the housing placement, in reality, few, if any, inmates are ever diverted
from segregation based upon their serious mental illness because there are no alternative housing
and/or program options available. In fact, the mortality reviews conducted in at least two recent
cases (Inmate Case No. 1 and Inmate Case No. 2) indicated that, based upon serious mental
illness, both victims should not have been designated to segregation. These cases exemplify the
problem of inadequate alternative housing and programming within the DOC for seriously
mentally ill inmates who have co-existing disciplinary sanctions. Mental health personnel also
complain that they are not regularly invited participants in the institution’s segregation review
meetings.

RECOMMENDATIONS: A few recommendations are offered. First, consistent with
current Old Colony Correctional Center practices, it is strongly recommended that DOC and
UMCH explore the feasibility of formalizing into agency policy a requirement that medical staff
briefly assess all inmates returning from court hearings.

Second, in order to increase the

availability of information regarding an inmate’s suicide risk within the county correctional
system, it is strongly recommended that the sending agency (e.g., county jail, etc.) and/or
transporting personnel be required to complete and submit a brief discharge/transfer form to
DOC booking/reception staff documenting any immediate concerns about the newly arrived
inmate. The form should be reviewed by the intake nurse and subsequently placed in the
inmate’s health care file.

UMCH currently utilizes an “IntraSystem Transfer Form” to

17
communicate the health care needs of inmates between DOC facilities. This is an excellent form
and could be adapted for use by county jail personnel as a discharge and transfer form.

Third, it is strongly recommended that the Q5 Inquiry section of CJIS be updated each
time an inmate is placed on mental health watch for suicide risk (regardless of whether or not
actual injury occurs), and that booking/admission staff and medical personnel access both the
“Medical/Mental Health Section” and “Mental Health Watch” screen of IMS to determine if the
newly arrived inmate was on a mental health watch during a previous DOC confinement.

Fourth, in the recommendation sections of both the mortality reviews conducted for
Inmate Case No. 1 and Inmate Case No. 2, the following was stated:
•

The DOC will explore the feasibility of creating a work group to review the
current policies and procedures as they pertain to the placement of those seriously
ill inmates, who additionally pose significant security risks, in segregation units.
The goal of the group would be to ensure that the DOC is meeting established
national standards in the manner by which it provides the clinical programming
and security measures necessary to service the needs of this specific population;”
and

•

The DOC in conjunction with UMCH should work to develop effective
alternative placement options for those inmates suffering from severe and
persistent mental illness, but whose behavioral difficulties and security needs
require more strict containment than can be afforded in general population.”

To date, little progress appears to have been made in this area and few, if any, alternative
housing/programming options are available for inmates housed in segregation with serious
mental illness.

Therefore, the previous DOC recommendation is repeated here again for

emphasis -- it is strongly recommended that the DOC, in conjunction with UMCH, develop
effective alternative placement options for those inmates suffering from severe and persistent

18
mental illness, but whose behavioral difficulties and security needs require more strict
containment than can be afforded in general population. (In beginning to address this problem,
mental health personnel must be regularly invited participants in the institution’s segregation
review meetings.)

This issue should be among the highest priorities facing the DOC in its

efforts to improve suicide prevention practices within the agency.

19
3)

Communication

Procedures that enhance communication at three levels: 1)
between the sending institution/transporting officer(s) and
correctional staff; 2) between and among staff (including
medical and mental health personnel); and 3) between staff
and the suicidal inmate.

Certain signs exhibited by the inmate can often foretell a possible suicide and, if detected
and communicated to others, can prevent such an incident. There are essentially three levels of
communication in preventing inmate suicides: 1) between the sending institution/transporting
officer and correctional staff; 2) between and among staff (including mental health and medical
personnel); and 3) between staff and the suicidal inmate. Further, because inmates can become
suicidal at any point in their incarceration, correctional staff must maintain awareness, share
information and make appropriate referrals to mental health and medical staff.

FINDINGS: Effective communication between correctional, medical, and mental health
staff is not an issue that can be easily written as a policy directive, and is often dealt with more
effectively through recurring training sessions and shift briefings.

DOC Policy 650.03

(Communication Regarding Mental Health Status/Needs of Inmates) requires that each
superintendent meet with the mental health director of the facility on a daily basis. These
meetings typically occur during the superintendent’s daily meetings with other management
staff. During the meeting, inmates who are on the facility’s “Mental Health Risk List” are
discussed. According to policy, “this list shall contain the names, identification numbers and
housing assignments of those inmates who may be at risk to themselves or others because of
mental illness but who do not require placement on a mental health watch.”

20

In addition, correctional and medical/mental health personnel can communicate through
various established forms, including, but not limited to, the “Intrasystem Transfer Form,”
“Referral to Mental Health,” and the Health Status Report.” Finally, mental health staff meets
together during daily triage meetings to discuss inmates currently on mental health watches in
the facility.

However, despite these adequate policies and procedures, there are concerns regarding
the practices of communicating the management need of potentially suicidal inmates. For
example, in addition to the issue of communication between the sending institution (e.g., county
jail, etc.) and the DOC as described in the previous section, two other recent suicides involve the
issue of inadequate communication amongst both agencies and personnel. In the recent suicide
of Inmate Case No. 3, medical and/or mental health personnel from Lemuel Shattuck Hospital’s
Correctional Unit failed to inform medical and/or mental health personnel at the receiving DOC
prison that the inmate had been treated for both depression and suicidal ideation during his
hospital stay. For inexplicable reasons, this information was not contained on the inmate’s
“Intrasystem Transfer Form.” One clinician opined that psychiatric information is rarely, if ever,
included in the discharge summary.” How can this be? In addition, correctional staff failed to
initiate a mental health referral after determining that the inmate had a positive “Q5 Inquiry.” In
the case of Inmate Case No. 2, it appears that mental health personnel did not fully communicate
the seriousness of the inmate’s mental illness amongst themselves (e.g., he was placed on the
Mental Health Risk List at one prison yet left off the same list when transferred to another
facility) and, in Inmate Case No. 4, failed to work collaboratively with medical staff in

21
determining whether the inmate’s complaints were the result of a medical or mental problem, or
a combination of both.

Finally, this writer has concerns regarding the effectiveness of the Mental Health Risk
List. In theory, an institution having increased concern for “those inmates who may be at risk to
themselves or others because of mental illness but who do not require placement on a mental
health watch” is a good idea. In practice, however, how are these concerning inmates being
managed differently by both DOC and UMCH personnel? According to DOC personnel, the risk
list is “under-utilized” and “misunderstood,” while UMCH personnel refer to the process as
meaningless. Theoretically, any inmate who displays a dramatic change of behavior or whose
mental health is deteriorating should be referred to mental health personnel.

In practice,

however, few, if any, line correctional staff know the names of inmates on the Mental Health
Risk List and, therefore, are much more likely not to be observant of such behavior in specific
inmates. In sum, both DOC and UMCH acknowledge that there is little that currently
distinguishes the management of a mentally ill inmate on or off the Mental Health Risk List.

RECOMMENDATIONS: A few recommendations are offered. First, as previously
stated, effective communication is difficult to promulgate in a policy and correcting inadequate
communication amongst personnel and agencies is challenging. Both DOC and UMCH have
effective policies, but inconsistent communication remains. The most effective way to correct
such deficiencies is to regularly audit security files and health care charts before a sentinel event
occurs. As such, it is strongly recommended that DOC and UMCH embark upon a quality
assurance process to audit selective security files and health care charts on a regular basis and

22
take corrective action when appropriate. Initially, it is suggested that the files of inmates on the
Mental Health Risk List be selected for audit.

Second, it is strongly recommended that the process for developing and maintaining
inmates on the Mental Health Risk List be revised collaboratively by DOC and UMCH. In order
for the List to be effective, selected inmates must receive increased attention from both mental
health and correctional personnel. If the sole criteria remains that inmates are maintained on the
list when they are determined to be “at risk to themselves or others because of mental illness,”
then those inmates should be observed more frequently by correctional staff (e.g., at documented
30-minute intervals) and assessed more frequently by mental health staff (e.g., at least three
times per week). In addition, inmates on the List should be stronger candidates to be excluded
from designation to segregation. Simply stated, if there is increased concern regarding an inmate,
then DOC and UMCH must demonstrate increased attention to that inmate.

23
4)

Housing
Isolation should be avoided. Whenever possible, house in
general population, mental health unit, or medical infirmary,
located in close proximity to staff. Inmates should be housed
in suicide-resistant, protrusion-free cells. Removal of an
inmate’s clothing (excluding belts and shoelaces), as well as use
of physical restraints (e.g. restrain chairs/boards, straitjackets,
leather straps, etc.) and cancellation of routine privileges
(showers, visits, telephone calls, recreation, etc.), should be
avoided whenever possible, and only utilized as a last resort for
periods in which the inmate is physically engaging in selfdestructive behavior.

In determining the most appropriate location to house a suicidal inmate, there is often the
tendency for correctional officials in general to physically isolate and restrain the individual.
These responses may be more convenient for staff, but they are detrimental to the inmate. The
use of isolation not only escalates the inmate’s sense of alienation, but also further serves to
remove the individual from proper staff supervision. National correctional standards stress that,
to every extent possible, suicidal inmates should be housed in the general population, mental
health unit, or medical infirmary, located in close proximity to staff.

Of course, housing a suicidal inmate in a general population unit when their security
level prohibits such assignment raises a difficult issue. The result, of course, will be the
assignment of the suicidal inmate to a housing unit commensurate with their security level.
Within a correctional system, this assignment might be a “special housing” unit, e.g., restrictive
housing, disciplinary confinement, administrative segregation, etc., However, to every extent
possible, such inmates should be housed in suicide-resistant, protrusion-free cells. Further,
cancellation of routine privileges (showers, visits, telephone calls, recreation, etc.), removal of
clothing (excluding belts and shoelaces), as well as the use of physical restraints (e.g., restraint

24
chairs/boards, straitjackets, leather straps, etc.) should be avoided whenever possible, and only
utilized as a last resort for periods in which the inmate is physically engaging in self-destructive
behavior. Housing assignments should not be based on decisions that heighten depersonalizing
aspects of incarceration, but on the ability to maximize staff interaction with inmates.

FINDINGS: According to the DOC’s suicide prevention policy (650.07), the “plan shall
designate specific cells in the Health Services Unit that have been made appropriately suicide
resistant….The plan shall also provide that when an inmate is placed on watch, he/she may be
issued safety smock to promote his/her personal safety while decreasing any potential
humiliation and degradation.” According to UMCH’s suicide prevention policy (53.01), “The
inmate will only be allowed personal property/clothing appropriate to level of suicidal potential.
If the risk of suicide is clear and immediate, the inmate will be issued a paper gown or security
gown and/or security blanket.”

Currently, most suicidal inmates are housed in designated cells within the Health
Services Units (HSUs) of the DOCs. Contrary to the above directives, however, these cells are
not always suicide resistant. For example, at MCI – Concord, cells designated for suicide
precautions within the HSU had bed rails and ventilation grates above the sinks containing large
gauge openings that could act as an anchoring device in a hanging attempt. At BSH, suicidal
inmates were housed in the Intensive Treatment Unit, B-1 Unit, and Infirmary. These units had
bunk holes and ventilation grates containing large gauge openings that could act as an anchoring

25
device in a hanging attempt. 12

At Souza-Baranowski CC, cells designated for suicide

precautions within the HSU had bunk holes and ventilation grates containing large gauge
openings that could act as an anchoring device in a hanging attempt. On a restricted basis,
mental health watches could also occur in designated cells within the Special Management Unit.
These cells, however, contained bunk holes, clothing hooks (which could be jammed), and
window bars.

At MCI – Cedar Junction, cells designated for suicide precautions within both the HSU
and Departmental Disciplinary Unit contained ventilation grates with small openings that were
suicide-resistant. It should be noted, however, that the HSU at MCI – Cedar Junction was loud
and filthy, with a foul smell permeating the unit during the writer’s tour. The atmosphere was
certainly not conducive to housing and managing suicidal and other vulnerably mentally ill
inmates.

A similar, but not as harsh, environment was found within the HSU at MCI –

Framingham.

At MCI – Framingham, although cells designated for suicide precautions within the HSU
contained ventilation grates with small openings that were suicide-resistant, the cells also
contained dangerous window bars and bunk holes. This HSU was also the location of a recent
inmate suicide by hanging. At Old Colony CC, cells designated for suicide precautions within
the HSU had bunk holes and ventilation grates containing large gauge openings that could act as
an anchoring device in a hanging attempt. This HSU was also the location of a recent inmate
suicide by hanging from a ventilation grate above the sink.
12

These hazards were previously identified in this writer’s 2000 Evaluation of Bridgewater State Hospital’s Suicide

26

In addition, although both DOC and UMCH policies suggest that the issue of clothing
removal will be determined commensurate with the individual level of risk, almost all suicidal
inmates (regardless of risk level) are stripped of their clothing and issued safety garments.

Further, although there are no written directives contained in either DOC or UMCH
policies that prohibit routine privileges (family visits, telephone calls, recreation, showers, etc.),
virtually all inmates placed on suicide precautions (i.e., mental health watches) are prohibited
from family visits, telephone calls, showers, or any other out-of-cell-time. In fact, few inmates
on suicide precautions are even allowed out of their cells for daily mental health assessments -instead, the clinician conducts a cell front interview through the food slot which lacks privacy
and confidentiality. DOC Policy 650.07 places strict limitations on attorney visits for inmates on
suicide precautions by stating that “due to the acute nature of an inmate’s mental status if placed
on Mental Health Watch, visits of any kind, including attorney visits, are not permitted during
the Watch period.” 13

It would be this writer’s opinion that current management of suicidal inmates within the
DOC is overly restrictive and seemingly punitive. Confining a suicidal inmate to their cell for
24 hours a day only enhances isolation and is anti-therapeutic. Under these conditions, it is also
difficult, if not impossible, to accurately gauge the source of an inmate’s suicidal ideation. Take,
for example, the almost daily scenario of a clinician interviewing an inmate on mental health

Prevention Policies and Practices.
13
On a restricted basis, the policy allows for an attorney visit within 72 hours of the request for the visit as long as
the inmate is not on constant (“eyeball”) observation. DOC statistics, however, suggest that most mental health

27
watch in the HSU. The inmate has been in the cell for a few days, dressed in a safety garment.
He has not been out of the cell, not allowed to shower, not allowed a telephone call, or visit from
his family or attorney. The clinician asks “Are you suicidal?” Given the circumstances he finds
himself in, the likelihood of an inmate answering affirmatively to that question, the result of
which will be his continued placement under these conditions is highly questionable.

Therefore, it would be this writer’s opinion that the punitive environment of suicide
precautions within the HSUs influences an inmate’s suicide risk assessment by mental health
staff. In fact, several clinicians told this writer that, based upon the conditions of mental health
watches, they attempt to reduce an inmate’s length of stay on suicide precautions -- the result of
which might be an inmate’s premature discharge from mental health watch. It should be noted
that two inmate suicides during 2005-2006 came within 8 hours and 48 hours following
discharge from mental health watch.

In a related matter, with one noted exception, the DOC

lacks any type of transitioning or step-down housing to bridge the stark differences (e.g.,
environment and staffing) between the HSUs, segregation, and general population. The one
exception is MCI – Framingham, where a few beds in the residential treatment unit are
informally used on occasion to temporarily house inmates discharged from suicide precautions.

DOC officials stress that the conditions of mental health watches are not intentionally
punitive, but driven by concern for the safety of the inmate and staff assigned to the HSU. The
DOC’s commitment to safety is not being challenged here. Safety of the inmate is, of course, of
utmost concern when developing a suicide prevention policy. But the number and types of

watches average 3 days, thus it would appear that attorney visits under these circumstances would be infrequently

28
restrictions imposed in the name of safety must be reasonable and commensurate with the
inmate’s level of risk. Safety of staff is, of course, also of utmost concern when developing a
suicide prevention policy. But safety of staff also extends to all inmates housed in the HSU and
segregation units within the DOC. Yet inmates housed in the HSUs for medical issues are
permitted to have out-of-cell time, showers, and other activities that are prohibited to inmates on
suicide precautions. Ironically, inmates assigned to segregation also have more privileges and
out-of-cell time than inmates on suicide precautions.

DOC officials also argue that the rationale for these restrictions is that suicidal inmates
are unpredictable and bad news received from a family or attorney visit, or from a telephone call,
might result in an increased risk for suicide. This rationale, however, ignores the obvious -what better opportunity is there to observe an inmate’s reaction to potentially negative news then
when they are on suicide precautions, as well as the fact that interaction with the outside world
can be therapeutic and reduce isolation -- a leading cause for suicidal behavior.

It is also argued that these measures are effective in managing those inmates suspected as
being manipulative. However, as one observer has started, “There are no reliable bases upon
which we can differentiate ‘manipulative’ suicide attempts posing no threat to the inmate’s life
from those ‘true, non-manipulative’ attempts which may end in death. The term ‘manipulative’
is simply useless in understanding, and destructive in attempting to manage, the suicidal

granted.

29
behavior of inmates (or of anybody else). 14 Regardless, it is simply unfair and anti-therapeutic
to impose such prohibitions on all inmates placed on suicide precautions.

In addition, HSU cells designated to house suicidal inmates are also often utilized to
house inmates with medical problems, including those going through the detoxification process.
It would also appear that the number of cells designated for mental health watches within the
DOC has not kept pace with the increased number of mentally ill inmates entering the
correctional system. For example, between 2000 and 2005, the number of “open” mental health
cases increased from 1,724 to 2,619 -- yet the number of HSU beds designated for mental
health watch has remained virtually unchanged.

Several clinicians admitted they have received

subtle pressure from DOC staff to downgrade and/or discharge inmates from mental health
watches because those beds were needed for other inmates, and one clinician surprisingly
confided that there were occasions in which inmates at low risk for suicide were not placed on
suicide precautions because of the unavailability of cells.

Finally, while touring the facilities, this writer was informed that inmates who engage in
self-injurious behavior have, on occasion, been charged with destruction of property and
received disciplinary sanctions. It would be this writer’s opinion that any punitive sanction

14

Haycock J: Listening to ‘attention seekers:’ The clinical management of people threatening suicide. Jail Suicide Update 4
(4): 8-11, 1992. Other clinicians would disagree and argue that self-injurious behavior displayed by “truly suicidal” and
“manipulative” inmates should result in different interventions. For suicidal inmates, intervention that promotes close
supervision, social support, and access to or development of psychosocial resources is crucial. For manipulative inmates,
intervention that combines close supervision with behavior management is crucial in preventing or modifying such behavior.
Historically, the problem has been that manipulative behavior was ignored or resulted in punitive sanctions, including
isolation. Often, manipulative inmates escalate their behavior and die, either by accident or miscalculation of staff’s
responsiveness. Therefore, the problem is not in how we “label” the behavior, but how we react to it -- and the reaction
should not include punitive and isolative measures.

30
imposed upon any inmate (regardless of their mental status) is contrary to national correctional
standards and practices. 15

The issue of housing suicidal inmates within the DOC will be the most challenging
suicide prevention issue facing the agency and UMCH. The Health Services Units within the
DOC should be the safest environments to house suicidal inmates yet, as demonstrated by three
inmate suicides in these units during 2006, they simply are not. As detailed below, several
recommendations are offered to revise and strengthen the process by which suicidal inmates are
safety housed within the DOC.

RECOMMENDATIONS: First, consistent with existing policy, it is strongly
recommended that the DOC ensure that all cells designated to house suicidal inmates are as
reasonably “suicide-resistant” as possible. For example, wall and ceiling ventilation grates
should contain holes that are ideally 1/8 inches wide, and no more than 3/16 inches wide or 16mesh per square inch; clothing hooks should be removed; gaps between window bars and glass
should be closed; and bed rails and bunk holes should be removed.

This writer’s complete

recommended guidelines for removing obvious cell protrusions can be found in Appendix A.

Second, it is strongly recommended that the DOC work collaboratively with UMCH to
completely revamp the use of the Health Services Unit for suicide precautions. The revised
policy should include, but not be limited to, the following procedures:
15

See most recently the August 2006 settlement agreement in Vermont Protection and Advocacy v. Robert Hofmann and the
Vermont Department of Corrections (Civil Action No. 2:04-CV-245) which stipulated that the “DOC does not punish
inmates for engaging in self-harming behaviors….Under no circumstances may an inmate be placed in disciplinary
segregation based upon self-harming behavior….”

31
•

The removal of an inmate’s clothing and issuance of safety garment shall
be commensurate with the level of suicide risk as determined by mental
health staff;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall be allowed all routine privileges
(e.g., family visits, telephone calls, recreation, etc.) unless the inmate has
lost those privileges as a result of a disciplinary sanction;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall have unimpeded access to their
attorneys at any time;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall have shower access
commensurate with their security level; and

•

To every extent possible, mental health staff should avoid conducting
daily assessments through the food slot of the inmate’s cell door. In
addition, prior to discharging an inmate from suicide precautions, the
inmate must be provided with an out-of-cell mental health assessment. 16

Third, it is strongly recommended that the clinical decision regarding placement of an
inmate on any level of suicide precautions should not be dictated by the availability of bed space
and staff; rather it should be based upon the specific needs of the identified suicidal inmate. As
such, the DOC should ensure that it provides sufficient staff to the HSU and any other unit
housing suicidal inmates to ensure proper observation at constant or 15-minute intervals, as well
as to allow adequate out-of-cell time for the inmate. In addition, placement and length of stay on
suicide precautions should be based solely upon the clinical judgment of mental health staff, and
DOC officials and staff should refrain from interfering with, and/or unduly influencing, that
judgment.

Fourth, given the increase in suicides in the HSUs, it is strongly recommended that
correctional staff conduct documented observation at 15-minute intervals within these units.

32

Fifth, it is strongly recommended that no inmate (regardless of their mental status) should
receive a punitive sanction (i.e., disciplinary report) based solely upon self-injurious behavior.

Sixth, given the increase in the number of “open” mental health cases within the DOC
during the past several years, it is strongly recommended that additional suicide-resistant cells be
identified for the housing of suicide inmates. These cells need not be necessarily located in the
HSUs.

Seventh, it is strongly recommended that the DOC work collaboratively with UMCH to
create a transitional housing unit and/or step-down process following an inmate’s discharge from
mental health watch in the HSU. On a trial basis, it might be beneficial to identify beds in the
DOC’s residential treatment units to begin this initiative.

16

For example, at MCI- Framingham, an interview cage has been built in a room within the HSU that allows
clinicians to interview high-security inmates in an environment that maintains privacy and safety.

33
5)

Levels of Supervision
Two levels of supervision are generally recommended for
suicidal inmates -- close observation and constant observation.
Close Observation is reserved for the inmate who is not actively
suicidal, but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent
prior history of self-destructive behavior. In addition, an
inmate who denies suicidal ideation or does not threaten
suicide, but demonstrates other concerning behavior (through
actions, current circumstances, or recent history) indicating
the potential for self-injury, should be placed under close
observation. This inmate should be observed by staff at
staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes. Constant
Observation is reserved for the inmate who is actively suicidal,
either by threatening or engaging in self-injury. This inmate
should be observed by a staff member on a continuous,
uninterrupted basis. Other supervision aids (e.g., closed
circuit television, inmate companions/watchers, etc.) can be
utilized as a supplement to, but never as a substitute for, these
observation levels.

Experience has shown that prompt, effective emergency medical service can save lives.
Research indicates that the overwhelming majority of suicide attempts in custody is by hanging.
Medical experts warn that brain damage from asphyxiation can occur within four minutes, with
death often resulting within five to six minutes. In inmate suicide attempts, the promptness of
the response is often driven by the level of supervision afforded the inmate. Both the ACA and
NCCHC standards address levels of supervision, although the degree of specificity varies. ACA
Standard 4-4257 vaguely requires that “suicidal inmates are under continuing observation,”
while NCCHC Standard P-G-05 requires physical observation ranging from “constant
supervision” to “every 15 minutes or more frequently if necessary.”

FINDINGS:

For the most part, the DOC’s suicide prevention policy (650.07)

adequately addresses the issue of observation provided to suicidal inmates as follows: “Suicidal
inmates will be monitored by means of a mental health watch. The frequency of the watch

34
intervals shall be established by the mental health clinician. There are three levels of watch that
may be utilized: constant or eyeball, 15-minute checks, or 30-minute checks.”

Although UMCH’s suicide prevention policies (53.00 and 53.01) do not address the
varying levels of observation afforded to suicidal inmates, by practice this writer determined that
mental health staff and/or a correctional supervisor may authorize suicide precautions, but only a
clinician may downgrade or remove an inmate from suicide precautions. In addition, all suicidal
inmates are assessed by mental health staff on a daily basis. In at least one facility (SouzaBaranowski CC), an inmate would not be discharged from suicide precautions until their case
was reviewed during the daily clinical team meeting.

Following discharge from suicide

precautions, inmates are reassessed by mental health staff within 24 to 72 hours. In addition,
medical staff make daily rounds in segregation units, whereas mental health staff conduct cell-tocell segregation rounds three times a week. These are all very good practices.

Despite these very good practices, there remain a few areas of concern. First, neither the
DOC or UMCH policies adequately address the type of behavior and/or circumstances that
necessitates a specific level of observation. A policy that clearly delineates levels of observation
and the concerning behavior that necessitates a specific supervision level is important for
assessing clinical judgment during quality assurance audits. For example, when reviewing
health care files, this writer observed several instances in which progress notes were not
sufficiently descriptive of either a suicide risk assessment or justification for a particular level of
observation. The review of Inmate No. 5’s file found that he had been on mental health watch
for two months, vacillating between 15 and 30-minute observation. Yet the daily progress notes

35
documented virtually unchanged behavior during this period, with no justification for a specific
watch level or a treatment plan.

Further, observation at 30-minute intervals provides far too much opportunity for a
suicidal inmate to engage in suicidal behavior. This level of observation is not recommended by
any national standards and should never be associated with suicide precautions. In addition, it is
only appropriate to utilize the HSU when the inmate is in crisis only (i.e., suicidal), and
assigning a 30-minute level of observation to a crisis situation is inappropriate.

During tours of the facilities, this writer observed that several inmates on suicide
precautions were permitted to place blankets over their heads. As vividly demonstrated in the
suicide of Inmate No. 6, this is a very dangerous practice because it obscures an officer’s full
visibility of the inmate.

With regard to observation levels provided to inmates that were not on suicide
precautions, this writer found that although DOC policy (423.10) requires that inmates housed in
segregation are to be observed at 30-minute intervals, investigative reports in at least two recent
cases (Inmate No. 1 and Inmate No. 2) suggests that victims were found hanging in excess of 30
minutes. Further, correctional staff working in several HSUs who were interviewed by this
writer gave inconsistent responses regarding the frequency of rounds in those units -- ranging
from 30 to 60 minute intervals. These rounds were also not documented on a regular basis.
Similar concerns were found in the residential treatment units. Issues raised regarding the

36
frequency of rounds by correctional staff might very well be related to the adequacy of staffing
in these housing units. 17

Finally, while touring the facilities, this writer found that “security” or “administrative”
watches were sometimes being utilized by several superintendents. Although there is no DOC
policy that sanctions this practice, as the process was explained, these watches were often
utilized when an inmate was suspected of being in possession of contraband (e.g., they have
ingested drugs) and need to be observed accordingly. However, examples were also provided in
which inmates engaged in abnormal and/or bizarre behavior (e.g., smearing feces, banging their
heads against the wall, etc.) and both mental health clinicians and correctional officials viewed
the issue as a “behavioral” versus “mental health” problem. Although the inmate would still be
observed on constant, 15 or 30-minute basis, and seen daily by mental health personnel, their
behavior was “labeled” something other than requiring a mental health watch. This writer would
argue that making the “bad” versus “mad” distinction here is dangerous --

as is the fact that

this practice that has not been delineated in policy. If an inmate’s behavior is concerning enough
to require constant, 15 or 30-minute observation, then there must be agreement that the inmate is
in danger to themselves and/or others. As such, they should be placed on a mental health watch.
Despite its name, a mental health watch should not be limited to only those inmates with an Axis
I diagnosis, but to any inmate that is displaying concerning behavior that requires more frequent
observation and management.

This writer also sensed that, due to limited bed space in the

HSUs, superintendents were reluctant to house “behavioral” problem inmates in these units.

17

For example, at Old Colony CC, one rover officer was responsible for conducting rounds in segregation, special

37
RECOMMENDATIONS: This writer would offer several recommendations. First, it
is strongly recommended that both the DOC and UMCH suicide prevention policies be revised
to include a better description of the type of behavior and/or circumstances that necessitates a
specific level of observation. A proposed revision is offered as follows:
Close Observation is reserved for the inmate who is not actively
suicidal, but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent prior
history of self-destructive behavior and would be considered a low
risk for suicide. In addition, an inmate who denies suicidal ideation
or does not threaten suicide, but demonstrates other concerning
behavior (through actions, current circumstances, or recent history)
indicating the potential for self-injury, should be placed under
close observation. This inmate should be observed by staff at
staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes, and should be
documented as it occurs.
Constant Observation is reserved for the inmate who is actively
suicidal, either by threatening or engaging in self-injury and would
be considered a high risk for suicide. This inmate should be
observed by a staff member on a continuous, uninterrupted basis.
The observation should be documented at 15-minute intervals.

Second, it is strongly recommended that reference to 30-minute observation for suicidal
inmates be deleted from DOC Policy 650.07.

While this level of observation would be

appropriate for an inmate discharged from suicide precautions and transferred to a transitional
housing unit, it is not appropriate for an inmate in suicidal crisis in the HSU.

Third, the DOC should ensure that all facilities are utilizing the “Correction Officer
Observation Check Sheet” (DOC 650, Attachment B-4) that does not contain pre-printed 15minute time intervals. In addition, a “Mental Health Watch Form” (DOC 650, Attachment C),
completed by the assigned mental health clinician, should be attached to the door of each cell

housing unit/protective custody, and residential treatment/multipurpose unit during the overnight shift.

38
housing a suicidal inmate.

The report provides a daily listing of the inmate’s level of

observation, and personal items and privileges that are allowed/prohibited.

It is also strongly

recommended that the DOC develop and enforce a policy that prohibits it officers from allowing
inmates on suicide precautions to cover their heads with blankets or other bedding.

Fourth, it is strongly recommended that correctional officers conduct documented 30minute rounds of all special housing units, including residential treatment units. As previously
recommended (on page 30), documented 15-minute rounds should be conducted in the Health
Services Units.

In addition, to ensure compliance with these directives, it is strongly

recommended that DOC officials conduct more frequent audits (via review of closed circuit
telephone monitors) of these units, as well as the segregation units.

Fifth, it is strongly recommended that UMCH revise its suicide prevention policy to
ensure that an inmate is not discharged from suicide precautions until their case was reviewed
during the daily clinical team meeting. In addition an inmate placed on constant observation
should always be downgraded to close (i.e., 15-minute) observation for a reasonable period of
time prior to being discharged from suicide precautions.

Further, progress notes regarding

inmates on suicide precautions should always reflect a thorough suicide risk assessment and
justification for a particular level of observation.

UMCH should embark upon a quality

assurance process to audit selective health care charts on a regular basis and take corrective
action when appropriate.

39
Sixth, in order to safeguard the continuity of care for suicidal inmates, all inmates
discharged from suicide precautions should remain on mental health caseloads and receive
regularly scheduled follow-up assessments by mental health staff until their release from DOC
custody. As such, unless an inmate’s individual treatment plan directs otherwise or they are on
the Mental Health Risk List and receive recommended visits from mental health personnel three
times per week (see page 21), it is recommended that the current reassessment schedule
following discharge from suicide precautions be revised as follows: daily for 5 days, once a
week for 2 weeks, and then once a month until release from the DOC custody.

Seventh, it is strongly recommended that administrative or security watches should not be
utilized in cases in which staff is concerned enough about an inmate’s behavior that increased
observation is necessary. These inmates, regardless of their diagnoses, should be placed on
mental health watch. And as previously stated, these mental health watches need not necessarily
be conducted in the HSUs.

40
6)

Intervention

A facility’s policy regarding intervention should be threefold:
1) all staff who come into contact with inmates should be
trained in standard first aid and cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR); 2) any staff member who discovers an
inmate attempting suicide should immediately respond, survey
the scene to ensure the emergency is genuine, alert other staff
to call for medical personnel, and begin standard first aid
and/or CPR; and 3) staff should never presume that the inmate
is dead, but rather initiate and continue appropriate life-saving
measures until relieved by arriving medical personnel. In
addition, all housing units should contain a first aid kit, pocket
mask or mouth shield, Ambu bag, and rescue tool (to quickly
cut through fibrous material). All staff should be trained in
the use of the emergency equipment. Finally, in an effort to
ensure an efficient emergency response to suicide attempts,
“mock drills” should be incorporated into both initial and
refresher training for all staff.

Following a suicide attempt, the degree and promptness of intervention provided by staff
often foretells whether the victim will survive.

Although both ACA and NCCHC standards

address the issue of intervention, neither are elaborative in offering specific protocols. For
example, ACA Standard 4-4389 requires that -- “Correctional and health care personnel are
trained to respond to health-related situations within a four-minute response time. The training
program...includes the following: recognition of signs and symptoms, and knowledge of action
required in potential emergency situations; administration of basic first aid and certification in
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)...”

NCCHC Standard P-G-05 states -- “Intervention:

There are procedures addressing how to handle a suicide attempt in progress, including
appropriate first-aid measures.”

41
FINDINGS:

The “intervention” section of the DOC’s suicide prevention policy

(650.07) states that “The plan shall include information regarding how to handle a suicide in
progress, including how to cut down a hanging victim and other first-aid and emergency
response measures.”

In addition, DOC Policy 622 includes “Code 99/Medical Emergency

Responses Guidelines” that adequately address the proper emergency response to a suicide
attempt. UMCH addresses the emergency response to a suicide attempt in Policy 53.01 by
stating that “Any inmate who has attempted suicide will receive immediate medical attention.
Once emergency medical treatment is completed, mental health staff will complete an
evaluation.” Appendix B to UMCH Policy 53.00 contains a detailed description of the proper
disposition following a hanging attempt.

This writer has several concerns in the area of emergency intervention following a
suicide attempt within a DOC facility. First, despite the DOC’s “Code 99/Medical Emergency
Responses Guidelines” and UMCH’s “Disposition Following a Hanging Attempt” instructions,
there were several examples of incorrect responses by correctional and nursing personnel to
recent inmate suicides.

For example, in Case No. 1, initiation of CPR was delayed

approximately two minutes when a nurse requested that the inmate be carried from his cell to a
nurse’s protocol room. The victim was placed on a mattress outside the cell and then carried by
the mattress and then a sheet to the protocol room. Although the nurse later told investigators
that it took only 30 seconds to transport the victim to the protocol room and she believed it was
quicker to bring the victim to the code cart then the cart to the victim, the reviewed videotape of
the incident found that two minutes elapsed between the time the nurse entered the victim’s cell
and time the victim entered the protocol room. The videotape also indicated that correctional

42
staff struggled in their attempt to transport the victim using the mattress and sheet. The Quality
Assurance Mortality Suicide Review of this case incorrectly concluded that the response was
“felt to be timely and appropriate.” It would be this writer’s opinion that the victim should not
have been placed on a mattress (because CPR is best performed on a flat surface) and time
should not have been wasted transporting the victim to the protocol room. Instead, the nurse
should have responded to the Code 99 with the emergency response bag (which included a CPR
mask) and initiated CPR upon entering the cell and after taking vital signs. The code cart and
AED should have arrived at the cell by secondary responders following the initiation of CPR.

In another example, when Inmate No. 2 was found hanging in his cell, responding
officers first carried the victim down the tier to the landing area of the second floor of the
cellblock. He was then moved again to a more open area and placed on a mattress. CPR was
then initiated by both correctional and medical staff approximately two minutes after
correctional staff had entered his cell and removed the ligature. Again, carrying the victim away
from the cell risked neck and spinal cord injury, wasted time, and CPR should not have been
initiated on a mattress.

In other cases, staff delayed cell entry and the Code 99 announcement for almost 10
minutes, and the nurse had difficulty finding all the necessary emergency equipment of the code
cart in the case of Inmate No. 6; whereas in the case of Inmate No. 7, staff struggled to find a
functional CPR mask.

43
Although correctional staff involved in these incidents later received refresher training in
the proper emergency response techniques and other corrective action attempted, the fact that
these incidents took place in separate facilities during 2005-2006 suggests that the problem is
systemic and not limited to a few misinformed officers or nurses.

Finally, with regard to the two recent suicides at the Old Colony CC, it appeared that
arriving emergency medical services personnel from the Bridgewater Fire Department, assessed
both patients, determined that further life-saving measures would be fruitless, declined or refused
to transport each victim to the local hospital, and requested that UMCH nursing staff declare
each victim dead. Such a request was totally inappropriate and contrary to state law. Only a
physician can pronounce a victim dead. This issue seems to be limited to the Bridgewater Fire
Department and was not found in the other reviewed cases.

RECOMMENDATIONS: This writer would offer several recommendations. First,
both DOC and UMCH policies should be slightly revised to better ensure a proper response of
both correctional and medical personnel to a suicide attempt. At a minimum, policies should
reiterate that CPR should be initiated immediately (on a flat, hard surface) and the victim should
not be carried away from the cellblock area during the emergency. This writer’s complete
recommended guidelines for intervention following a suicide attempt can be found in Appendix
A. Second, it is strongly recommended that the DOC ensure that all housing units contain an
emergency response bag that includes a first aid kit; pocket mask, face shield, or Ambu-bag;
latex gloves; and emergency rescue tool. All staff who come into regular contact with inmates
should know the location of this emergency response bag and be trained in its use. Third, it is

44
strongly recommended that the health services administrator at each facility ensure that all
equipment utilized in the response to medical emergencies (e.g., Code 99 bags, code cart, oxygen
tank, AED, etc.) is inspected and in proper working order on a daily basis. Fourth, it is strongly
recommended that the DOC review and revise its “mock drill” training at each facility to ensure
that correctional and medical staff review specific instructions regarding the proper role in
responding to suicide attempts and providing first aid/CPR.

The mock drill training should

occur on an annual basis for all correctional and medical personnel.

45
7)

Reporting
In the event of a suicide attempt or suicide, all appropriate
correctional officials should be notified through the chain of
command.
Following the incident, the victim’s family
should be immediately notified, as well as appropriate outside
authorities. All staff who came into contact with the victim
prior to the incident should be required to submit a statement
as to their full knowledge of the inmate and incident.

FINDING: The reporting requirements following an inmate suicide are detailed in DOC
Policies 622.02 and 622.03 Although this writer did not have an opportunity to review all of the
required notifications and documentation in the recent inmates suicides, in the material that was
reviewed, all reporting procedures seemed to have been appropriately followed.

RECOMMENDATIONS: None

46
8)

Follow-up/Mortality Review
Every completed suicide, as well as serious suicide attempt
(i.e., requiring hospitalization), should be examined by a
mortality review. (If resources permit, clinical review through
a psychological autopsy is also recommended.) The mortality
review, separate and apart from other formal investigations
that may be required to determine the cause of death, should
include: 1) review of the circumstances surrounding the
incident; 2) review of procedures relevant to the incident; 3)
review of all relevant training received by involved staff; 4)
review of pertinent medical and mental health services/reports
involving the victim; 5) review of any possible precipitating
factors that may have caused the victim to commit suicide; and
6) recommendations, if any, for changes in policy, training,
physical plant, medical or mental health services, and
operational procedures.
Further, all staff involved in the
incident should participate in each process, as well as offered
critical incident stress debriefing.

Experience has demonstrated that many correctional systems have reduced the likelihood
of future suicides by critically reviewing the circumstances surrounding instances as they occur.
While all deaths are investigated either internally or by outside agencies to ensure impartiality,
these investigations are normally limited to determining the cause of death and whether there
was any criminal wrongdoing. The primary focus of a mortality review should be two-fold:
What happened in the case under review and what can be learned to help prevent future
incidents? To be successful, the mortality review team must be multidisciplinary and include
representatives of both line and management level staff from the corrections, medical and
mental health divisions.

FINDINGS: The DOC has both excellent policies and practices regarding the mortality
review process following an inmate suicide. In many ways, this mortality review process
represents the strength of the DOC-UMCH suicide prevention program.

Per DOC Policy

47
622.07, the death is investigated by the agency’s Office of Investigative Services. The DOC
Commissioner also normally designates a “Departmental Medical Investigation Team” to
investigate the death. The team is comprised of at least one individual from the Office of
Investigative Services (OIS) and either the Health Services Division (HSD)’s Mental Health and
Substance Abuse Coordinator or a Regional Administrator.

The team reports almost

immediately to the facility which sustained the death to begin its investigations. The OIS
investigation results in a report to the Commissioner. A copy is forwarded to the Quality
Assurance Mortality Review Committee. The HSD investigation results in an extensive written
narrative that is discussed by the Committee during the Quality Assurance Mortality Review. In
most cases, Quality Assurance Mortality Review Committee tries to meet within 30 days of the
inmate suicide. The Committee is comprised of both participants and observers, and includes
representatives from HSD headquarters, an independent psychiatric consultant, representatives
from UMCH, and the facility superintendent or designee. Interviewed staff may be those
correctional, medical, and mental health personnel who were involved in the care and custody of
the inmate, as well as those who responded to the emergency. A report of the mortality review is
completed and recommendations, if any, for corrective action are required to be, per policy,
“acted upon in an expedient manner.” It should also be noted that each death is also reviewed
through the UMCH morbidity and mortality review process -- a method that was not reviewed
by this writer.

This writer reviewed either the OIS, HSD, and/or Quality Assurance Mortality Review
reports on 10 inmate suicides occurring in 2005-2006. In each case, the reviews were very
comprehensive and insightful, and the recommendations were thoughtful and directly on-point.

48
In fact, these mortality reviews were among the most comprehensive that this writer has ever
reviewed. With that said, one area of concern is raised. Several mortality reviews contained
significant recommendations with very vague narrative that made it difficult to determine
whether (and when) corrective action would be instituted. For example:
•

“The DOC and UMCH will work to make the weekly institutional risk list a more
effective management tool,”

•

“The DOC in conjunction with UMCH should work to develop effective
alternative placement options for those inmates suffering from severe and
persistent mental illness,”

•

“The DOC and UMCH will explore the feasibility of purchasing an additional
Code 99 bag for each facility to function as a replacement in the event that the
Code 99 bag is being restocked,” and

•

“The DOC will explore the feasibility of creating a work group to review the
current policies and procedures as they pertain to the placement of those seriously
mentally ill inmates.”

RECOMMENDATIONS: This writer would offer only one recommendation. It is
strongly recommended that in order to ensure that all mortality review recommendations are
processed in a timely manner, a “corrective action plan” (CAP) should be developed in response
to each recommendation. Each CAP should include, but not be limited to, the following: 1) the
recommendation, 2) whether it has been accepted or rejected by the DOC Commissioner and
UMCH program medical director (or their designees), 3) the corrective action, 4) target date for
completion, 5) completion date, and 6) the mechanism for periodically monitoring continued
compliance. In addition, it is suggested that the recommendations contained within this report be
subject to the corrective action format described above.

49
C. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Staff Training
1) It is strongly recommended that the DOC increase the pre-service suicide
prevention training from 2 to 8 hours. At a minimum, the revised training
program should include much of information currently offered in the Suicide
Prevention: Risks, Roles and Responses for Massachusetts Correctional Staff
training curriculum, with additional emphasis placed on avoiding negative
attitudes to suicide prevention, updated statistics and case studies on inmate
suicides within the Massachusetts DOC, identifying suicidal inmates despite the
denial of risk, dealing with manipulative inmates, components of the
DOC/UMCH suicide prevention policies, and liability issues associated with
inmate suicide.
2) It is strongly recommended that all correctional, medical, and mental health staff
complete the 8-hour pre-service suicide prevention training program, either at the
Correction Training Academy or respective agency.
3) It is strongly recommended that DOC and UMCH officials ensure that all
personnel (i.e., correctional, medical, and mental health) receive a consistent and
uniform 2-hour block of suicide prevention training on a yearly basis. At a
minimum, the annual 2-hour training program should include a review of
predisposing factors to suicide, warning signs and symptoms, negative attitudes to
suicide prevention, identifying suicidal inmates despite the denial of risk, and
review of changes in the DOC/UMCH’s suicide prevention policies. It is also
recommended that the training program include general discussion on any inmate
suicides and/or serious attempts occurring within the previous year. Material
from 1) the current Suicide Prevention: Risks, Roles and Responses for
Massachusetts Correctional Staff from 1999, 2) 36-PowerPoint slide presentation
entitled “In-Service Training Program – Suicide Prevention Review,” and 3)
computer lab-based program entitled “In-Service 2005 – Suicide Prevention for
Massachusetts Correctional Staff” could be utilized in developing this revised inservice program. Finally, it is strongly recommended that the in-service suicide
prevention training program for correctional, medical and mental health staff be
integrated, not separate and overlapping, as currently administered.
Interdisciplinary training would prove to be more efficient and insightful.
4) It is strongly recommended the both DOC and UMCH suicide prevention policies
be revised to include a richer description of the requirements for both pre-service
and annual in-service suicide prevention. Much of the inconsistency found in
both the length and content of in-service training at the toured facilities could be
corrected with policy revisions that specified the required length and description
of the training programs.

50
Identification/Screening
5) Consistent with current Old Colony Correctional Center practices, it is strongly
recommended that DOC and UMCH explore the feasibility of formalizing into
agency policy a requirement that medical staff briefly assess all inmates returning
from court hearings.
6) In order to increase the availability of information regarding an inmate’s suicide
risk within the county correctional system, it is strongly recommended that the
sending agency (e.g., county jail, etc.) and/or transporting personnel be required
to complete and submit a brief discharge/transfer form to DOC booking/reception
staff documenting any immediate concerns about the newly arrived inmate. The
form should be reviewed by the intake nurse and subsequently placed in the
inmate’s health care file. UMCH currently utilizes an “IntraSystem Transfer
Form” to communicate the health care needs of inmates between DOC facilities.
This is an excellent form and could be adapted for use by county jail personnel as
a discharge and transfer form.
7) It is strongly recommended that the Q5 Inquiry section of CJIS be updated each
time an inmate is placed on mental health watch for suicide risk (regardless of
whether or not actual injury occurs), and that booking/admission staff and
medical personnel access both the “Medical/Mental Health Section” and “Mental
Health Watch” screen of IMS to determine if the newly arrived inmate was on a
mental health watch during a previous DOC confinement.
8) Consistent with previous mortality review recommendations, it is strongly
recommended that the DOC, in conjunction with UMCH, develop effective
alternative placement options for those inmates suffering from severe and
persistent mental illness, but whose behavioral difficulties and security needs
require more strict containment than can be afforded in general population. (In
beginning to address this problem, mental health personnel must be regularly
invited participants in the institution’s segregation review meetings.) This issue
should be among the highest priorities facing the DOC in its efforts to improve
suicide prevention practices within the agency.
Communication
9) It is strongly recommended that DOC and UMCH embark upon a quality
assurance process to audit selective security files and health care charts on a
regular basis and take corrective action when appropriate. Initially, it is
suggested that the files of inmates on the Mental Health Risk List be selected for
audit.
10) It is strongly recommended that the process for developing and maintaining
inmates on the Mental Health Risk List be revised collaboratively by DOC and
UMCH. In order for the List to be effective, selected inmates must receive

51
increased attention from both mental health and correctional personnel. If the
sole criteria remains that inmates are maintained on the list when they are
determined to be “at risk to themselves or others because of mental illness,” then
those inmates should be observed more frequently by correctional staff (e.g., at
documented 30-minute intervals) and assessed more frequently by mental health
staff (e.g., at least three times per week). In addition, inmates on the List should
be stronger candidates to be excluded from designation to segregation. Simply
stated, if there is increased concern regarding an inmate, then DOC and UMCH
must demonstrate increased attention to that inmate.
Housing
11) It is strongly recommended that the DOC ensure that all cells designated to house
suicidal inmates are as reasonably “suicide-resistant” as possible. For example,
wall and ceiling ventilation grates should contain holes that are ideally 1/8 inches
wide, and no more than 3/16 inches wide or 16-mesh per square inch; clothing
hooks should be removed; gaps between window bars and glass should be closed;
and bed rails and bunk holes should be removed.
This writer’s complete
recommended guidelines for removing obvious cell protrusions can be found in
Appendix A.
12) It is strongly recommended that the DOC work collaboratively with UMCH to
completely revamp the use of the Health Services Unit for suicide precautions.
The revised policy should include, but not be limited to, the following procedures:
•

The removal of an inmate’s clothing and issuance of safety
garment shall be commensurate with the level of suicide risk as
determined by mental health staff;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall be allowed all routine
privileges (e.g., family visits, telephone calls, recreation, etc.)
unless the inmate has lost those privileges as a result of a
disciplinary sanction;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall have unimpeded access to
their attorneys at any time;

•

All inmates on suicide precautions shall have shower access
commensurate with their security level; and

•

To every extent possible, mental health staff should avoid
conducting daily assessments through the food slot of the inmate’s
cell door. In addition, prior to discharging an inmate from suicide
precautions, the inmate must be provided with an out-of-cell
mental health assessment.

52
13) It is strongly recommended that the clinical decision regarding placement of an
inmate on any level of suicide precautions should not be dictated by the
availability of bed space and staff; rather it should be based upon the specific
needs of the identified suicidal inmate. As such, the DOC should ensure that it
provides sufficient staff to the HSU and any other unit housing suicidal inmates to
ensure proper observation at constant or 15-minute intervals, as well as to allow
adequate out-of-cell time for the inmate. In addition, placement and length of
stay on suicide precautions should be based solely upon the clinical judgment of
mental health staff, and DOC officials and staff should refrain from interfering
with, and/or unduly influencing, that judgment.
14) Given the increase in suicides in the HSUs, it is strongly recommended that
correctional staff conduct documented observation at 15-minute intervals within
these units.
15) It is strongly recommended that no inmate (regardless of their mental status)
should receive a punitive sanction (i.e., disciplinary report) based solely upon
self-injurious behavior.
16) Given the increase in the number of “open” mental health cases within the DOC
during the past several years, it is strongly recommended that additional suicideresistant cells be identified for the housing of suicide inmates. These cells need
not be necessarily located in the HSUs.
17) It is strongly recommended that the DOC work collaboratively with UMCH to
create a transitional housing unit and/or step-down process following an inmate’s
discharge from mental health watch in the HSU. On a trial basis, it might be
beneficial to identify beds in the DOC’s residential treatment units to begin this
initiative.
Levels of Supervision
18) It is strongly recommended that both the DOC and UMCH suicide prevention
policies be revised to include a better description of the type of behavior and/or
circumstances that necessitates a specific level of observation. A proposed
revision is offered as follows:
•

Close Observation is reserved for the inmate who is not actively
suicidal, but expresses suicidal ideation and/or has a recent prior
history of self-destructive behavior and would be considered a low
risk for suicide. In addition, an inmate who denies suicidal ideation
or does not threaten suicide, but demonstrates other concerning
behavior (through actions, current circumstances, or recent history)
indicating the potential for self-injury, should be placed under
close observation. This inmate should be observed by staff at

53
staggered intervals not to exceed every 15 minutes, and should be
documented as it occurs.
•

Constant Observation is reserved for the inmate who is actively
suicidal, either by threatening or engaging in self-injury and would
be considered a high risk for suicide. This inmate should be
observed by a staff member on a continuous, uninterrupted basis.
The observation should be documented at 15-minute intervals.

19) It is strongly recommended that reference to 30-minute observation for suicidal
inmates be deleted from DOC Policy 650.07. While this level of observation
would be appropriate for an inmate discharged from suicide precautions and
transferred to a transitional housing unit, it is not appropriate for an inmate in
suicidal crisis in the HSU.
20) The DOC should ensure that all facilities are utilizing the “Correction Officer
Observation Check Sheet” (DOC 650, Attachment B-4) that does not contain preprinted 15-minute time intervals. In addition, a “Mental Health Watch Form”
(DOC 650, Attachment C), completed by the assigned mental health clinician,
should be attached to the door of each cell housing a suicidal inmate. The report
provides a daily listing of the inmate’s level of observation, and personal items
and privileges that are allowed/prohibited. It is also strongly recommended that
the DOC develop and enforce a policy that prohibits it officers from allowing
inmates on suicide precautions to cover their heads with blankets or other
bedding.
21) It is strongly recommended that correctional officers conduct documented 30minute rounds of all special housing units, including residential treatment units.
As previously recommended, documented 15-minute rounds should be conducted
in the Health Services Units. In addition, to ensure compliance with these
directives, it is strongly recommended that DOC officials conduct more frequent
audits (via review of closed circuit telephone monitors) of these units, as well as
the segregation units.
22) It is strongly recommended that UMCH revise its suicide prevention policy to
ensure that an inmate is not discharged from suicide precautions until their case
was reviewed during the daily clinical team meeting. In addition an inmate
placed on constant observation should always be downgraded to close (i.e., 15minute) observation for a reasonable period of time prior to being discharged
from suicide precautions. Further, progress notes regarding inmates on suicide
precautions should always reflect a thorough suicide risk assessment and
justification for a particular level of observation. UMCH should embark upon a
quality assurance process to audit selective health care charts on a regular basis
and take corrective action when appropriate.

54
23) In order to safeguard the continuity of care for suicidal inmates, all inmates
discharged from suicide precautions should remain on mental health caseloads
and receive regularly scheduled follow-up assessments by mental health staff
until their release from DOC custody. As such, unless an inmate’s individual
treatment plan directs otherwise or they are on the Mental Health Risk List and
receive recommended visits from mental health personnel three times per week, it
is recommended that the current reassessment schedule following discharge from
suicide precautions be revised as follows: daily for 5 days, once a week for 2
weeks, and then once a month until release from the DOC custody.
24) It is strongly recommended that administrative or security watches should not be
utilized in cases in which staff is concerned enough about an inmate’s behavior
that increased observation is necessary. These inmates, regardless of their
diagnoses, should be placed on mental health watch. And as previously stated,
these mental health watches need not necessarily be conducted in the HSUs.
Intervention
25) Both DOC and UMCH policies should be slightly revised to better ensure a
proper response of both correctional and medical personnel to a suicide attempt.
At a minimum, policies should reiterate that CPR should be initiated immediately
(on a flat, hard surface) and the victim should not be carried away from the
cellblock area during the emergency. This writer’s complete recommended
guidelines for intervention following a suicide attempt can be found in Appendix
A.
26) It is strongly recommended that the DOC ensure that all housing units contain an
emergency response bag that includes a first aid kit; pocket mask, face shield, or
Ambu-bag; latex gloves; and emergency rescue tool. All staff who come into
regular contact with inmates should know the location of this emergency response
bag and be trained in its use.
27) It is strongly recommended that the health services administrator at each facility
ensure that all equipment utilized in the response to medical emergencies (e.g.,
Code 99 bags, code cart, oxygen tank, AED, etc.) is inspected and in proper
working order on a daily basis.
28) It is strongly recommended that the DOC review and revise its “mock drill”
training at each facility to ensure that correctional and medical staff review
specific instructions regarding the proper role in responding to suicide attempts
and providing first aid/CPR. The mock drill training should occur on an annual
basis for all correctional and medical personnel.
Reporting
None

55

Follow-up/Mortality Review
29) It is strongly recommended that in order to ensure that all mortality review
recommendations are processed in a timely manner, a “corrective action plan”
(CAP) should be developed in response to each recommendation. Each CAP
should include, but not be limited to, the following: 1) the recommendation, 2)
whether it has been accepted or rejected by the DOC Commissioner and UMCH
program medical director (or their designees), 3) the corrective action, 4) target
date for completion, 5) completion date, and 6) the mechanism for periodically
monitoring continued compliance. In addition, it is suggested that the
recommendations contained within this report be subject to the corrective action
format described above.

56
D. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the assessment provided by this writer, as well as the recommendations
contained within this report, will be of assistance to the Massachusetts Department of
Correction. During this assessment process, this writer met numerous DOC and UMCH officials
and supervisors, as well as officers, nurses and clinicians, who were genuinely concerned about
inmate suicide and committed to taking whatever actions were necessary to reduce the
opportunity for such tragedy in the future. And based upon a pro-active approach and high
caliber management and line staff, this writer is confident that implementation of the various
recommendations contained within this report will result in successful efforts to reduce the
likelihood of future inmate suicides within the Massachusetts Department of Correction.

In conclusion, this writer would be remiss by not extending sincere appreciation to
Kathleen M. Dennehy, DOC Commissioner, and Terre K. Marshall, DOC Health Services
Director. Special thanks goes to Lawrence Weiner, DOC Mental Health and Substance Abuse
Coordinator, for his assistance in scheduling the tours and interviews, fulfilling document
requests, and providing valuable insight to this assessment.

Without the total candor,

cooperation and assistance from these individuals, as well as from all correctional, medical, and
mental health personnel that were interviewed, this writer would not have been able to complete
this technical assistance assignment.
Respectfully Submitted By:

Lindsay M. Hayes
Project Director
January 31, 2007

57

APPENDICES

A)

Checklist for the “Suicide-Resistant” Design of Correctional Facilities

B)

Model Intervention Procedures for Suicide Attempts

58
APPENDIX A
CHECKLIST FOR THE “SUICIDE-RESISTANT” DESIGN OF CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES
The safe housing of suicidal inmates is an important component to a correctional facility’s
comprehensive suicide prevention policy. Although impossible to create a “suicide-proof” cell
environment within any correctional facility, given the fact that almost all inmate suicides occur
by hanging, it is certainly reasonable to ensure that all cells utilized to house potentially suicidal
inmates are free of all obvious protrusions. And while it is more common for ligatures to be
affixed to air vents and window bars (or grates), all cell fixtures should be scrutinized, since bed
frames/holes, shelves with clothing hooks, sprinkler heads, door hinge/knobs, towel racks, water
faucet lips, and light fixtures have been used as anchoring devices in hanging attempts. As such,
to ensure that inmates placed on suicide precautions are housed in “suicide-resistant” cells,
facility officials are strongly encouraged to address the following architectural and
environmental issues:
1) Cell doors should have large-vision panels of Lexan (or low-abrasion
polycarbonate) to allow for unobstructed view of the entire cell interior at all
times. These windows should never be covered (even for reasons of privacy,
discipline, etc.) If door sliders are not used, door interiors should not have
handles/knobs; rather they should have recessed door pulls. Any door containing
a food pass should be closed and locked.
Interior door hinges should bevel down so as not to permit being used as an
anchoring device. Door frames should be rounded and smooth on the top edges.
The frame should be grouted into the wall with as little edge exposed as possible.
In older, antiquated facilities with cell fronts, walls and/or cell doors made of
steel bars, Lexan paneling (or low-abrasion polycarbonate) or security screening
(that has holes that are ideally 1/8 inches wide and no more than 3/16 inches wide
or 16-mesh per square inch) should be installed from the interior of the cell.
Solid cell fronts must be modified to include large-vision Lexan panels or security
screens with small mesh;
2) Vents, ducts, grilles, and light fixtures should be protrusion-free and covered
with screening that has holes that are ideally 1/8 inches wide, and no more than
3/16 inches wide or 16-mesh per square inch;
3) Wall-mounted corded telephones should not be placed inside cells. Telephone
cords of varying length have been utilized in hanging attempts;
4) Cells should not contain any clothing hooks. The traditional, pull-down or
collapsible hook can be easily jammed and/or its side supports utilized as an
anchor;

59
5) A stainless steel combo toilet-sink (with concealed plumbing and outside
control valve) should be used. The fixture should not contain an anti-squirt slit,
toothbrush holder, toilet paper rod, and/or towel bar;
6) Beds should ideally be either heavy molded plastic or solid concrete slab with
rounded edges, totally enclosed underneath.
If metal bunks are utilized, they should be bolted flush to the wall with the frame
constructed to prevent its use as an anchoring device. Bunk holes should be
covered; ladders should be removed. (Traditional metal beds with holes in the
bottom, not built flush to the wall and open underneath, have often been used to
attach suicide nooses. Lying flat on the floor, the inmate attaches the noose from
above, runs it under his neck, turns over on his stomach and asphyxiates himself
within minutes.);
7) Electricity should be turned off from wall outlets outside of the cell;
8) Light fixtures should be recessed into the ceiling and tamper-proof. Some
fixtures can be securely anchored into ceiling or wall corners when remodeling
prohibits recessed lighting. All fixtures should be caulked or grouted with tamperresistant security grade caulking or grout.
Ample light for reading (at least 20 foot-candles at desk level) should be
provided. Low-wattage night light bulbs should be used (except in special, highrisk housing units where sufficient lighting 24 hours per day should be provided
to allow closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras to identify movements and
forms).
An alternative is to install an infrared filter over the ceiling light to produce total
darkness, allowing inmates to sleep at night. Various cameras are then able to
have total observation as if it were daylight. This filter should be used only at
night because sensitivity can otherwise develop and produce aftereffects;
9) CCTV monitoring does not prevent a suicide, it only identifies a suicide
attempt in progress. If utilized, CCTV monitoring should only supplement the
physical observation by staff. The camera should obviously be enclosed in a box
that is tamper-proof and does not contain anchoring points. It should be placed in
a high corner location of the cell and all edges around the housing should be
caulked or grouted.
Cells containing CCTV monitoring should be painted in pastel colors to allow for
better visibility. To reduce camera glare and provide a contrast in monitoring, the
headers above cell doors should be painted black or some other dark color.

60
CCTV cameras should provide a clear and unobstructed view of the entire cell
interior, including all four corners of the room. Camera lens should have the
capacity for both night or low light level vision;
10) Cells should have a smoke detector mounted flush in the ceiling, with an
audible alarm at the control desk. Some cells have a security screening mesh to
protect the smoke detector from vandalism. The protective coverings should be
high enough to be outside the reach of an inmate and far enough away from the
toilet so that the fixture could not be used as a ladder to access the smoke detector
and screen. Ceiling height for new construction should be 10 feet to make such a
reasonable accommodation. Existing facilities with lower ceilings should
carefully select the protective device to make sure it can not be tampered with, or
have mesh openings large enough to thread a noose through.
Water sprinkler heads should not be exposed. Some have protective cones; others
are flush with the ceiling and drop down when set off; some are the breakaway
type;
11) Cells should have an audio monitoring intercom for listening to calls of
distress (only as a supplement to physical observation by staff). While the inmate
is on suicide precautions, intercoms should be turned up high (as hanging victims
can often be heard to be gurgling, gasping for air, their body hitting the wall/floor,
etc.);
12) Cells utilized for suicide precautions should be located as close as possible to
a control desk to allow for additional audio and visual monitoring;
13) If modesty walls or shields are utilized, they should have triangular, rounded
or sloping tops to prevent anchoring. The walls should allow visibility of both the
head and feet;
14) Some inmates hang themselves under desks, benches, tables or stools/pull-out
seats. Potential suicide-resistant remedies are: (a) Extending the bed slab for use
as a seat; (b) Cylinder-shaped concrete seat anchored to floor, with rounded
edges; (c) Triangular corner desk top anchored to the two walls; and (d)
Rectangular desk top, with triangular end plates, anchored to the wall. Towel
racks should also be removed from any desk area;
15) All shelf tops and exposed hinges should have solid, triangular end-plates
which preclude a ligature being applied;
16) Cells should have security windows with an outside view. The ability to
identify time of day via sunlight helps re-establish perception and natural
thinking, while minimizing disorientation.

61
If cell windows contain security bars that are not completely flush with window
panel (thus allowing a gap between the glass and bar for use as an anchoring
device), they should be covered with Lexan (or low-abrasion polycarbonate)
paneling to prevent access to the bars, or the gap, should be closed with caulking,
glazing tape, etc.
If window screening or grating is used, covering should have holes that are
ideally 1/8 inches wide, and no more than 3/16 inches wide or 16-mesh per square
inch;
17) The mattress should be fire retardant and not produce toxic smoke. The seam
should be tear-resistant so that it cannot be used as a ligature;
18) Given the fact that the risk of self-harm utilizing a laundry bag string
outweighs its usefulness for holding dirty clothes off the floor, laundry bag strings
should be removed from the cell;
19) Mirrors should be of brushed, polished metal, attached with tamper-proof
screws;
20) Padding of cell walls is prohibited in many states. Check with your fire
marshal. If permitted, padded walls must be of fire-retardant materials that are
not combustible and do not produce toxic gasses; and
21) Ceiling and wall joints should be sealed with neoprene rubber gasket or
sealed with tamper-resistant security grade caulking or grout for preventing the
attachment of an anchoring device through the joints.

NOTE: A portion of this checklist was originally derived from R. Atlas (1989), “Reducing the
Opportunity for Inmate Suicide: A Design Guide,” Psychiatric Quarterly, 60 (2): 161-171.
Additions and modifications were made by Lindsay M. Hayes, and updated by Randall Atlas,
Ph.D., a registered architect. See also Hayes, L.M. (2003), “Suicide Prevention and “ProtrusionFree Design of Correctional Facilities,” Jail Suicide/Mental Health Update, 12 (3): 1-5. Last
revised in January 2004.

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APPENDIX B
MODEL INTERVENTION PROCEDURES FOR SUICIDE ATTEMPTS
1) All staff who come into contact with inmates will be trained in standard first aid and
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). All staff who come into contact with inmates will
participate in annual “mock drill” training to ensure a prompt emergency response to all suicide
attempts.
2) All housing units will contain an emergency response bag that includes a first aid kit, pocket
mask, microshield or face shield, latex gloves, and emergency rescue tool. All staff who come
into regular contact with inmates will know the location of this emergency response bag and be
trained in its use. The emergency response bag will be inspected by correctional staff each shift
to ensure all equipment is accounted for and in proper working order.
3) Any staff member who discovers an inmate attempting suicide will immediately respond,
survey the scene to ensure the emergency is genuine, alert other staff to call for the facility’s
medical personnel, and bring the emergency response bag to the cell. If the suicide attempt is
life-threatening, Central Control personnel will be instructed to immediately notify outside
(“911”) Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The exact nature (e.g., “hanging attempt”) and
location of the emergency will be communicated to both facility medical staff and EMS
personnel.
4) The first responding officer will use their professional discretion in regard to entering the cell
without waiting for backup staff to arrive. With no exceptions, if cell entry is not immediate, it
will occur no later than four minutes from initial notification of the emergency. (Should the
emergency take place within the Special Housing Unit and require use of the Cell Entry Team,
the Team will be assembled, equipped and enter the cell as soon as possible, and no later than
four minutes from initial notification of the emergency.) Correctional staff will never wait for
medical personnel to arrive before entering a cell or before initiating appropriate life-saving
measures (e.g., first aid and CPR).
5) Upon entering the cell, correctional staff will never presume that the victim is dead, rather
life-saving measures will be initiated immediately. In hanging attempts, the victim will first be
released from the ligature (using the emergency rescue tool if necessary). Staff will assume a
neck/spinal cord injury and carefully place the victim on the floor (not mattress or other soft
surface). Should the victim lack vital signs, CPR will be initiated immediately. All life-saving
measures will be continued by correctional staff until relieved by medical personnel. If cell
space is limited for CPR initiation, the victim may be carefully carried out onto the tier, ensuring
protection of both the neck and spinal cord. The victim should not be carried to the infirmary or
satellite nursing station.
6) The shift supervisor will ensure that both arriving facility medical staff and EMS personnel
have unimpeded access to the scene in order to provide prompt medical services to, and
evacuation of, the victim.

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7) Although the scene of the emergency will be preserved as much as possible, the first priority
will always be to provide immediate life-saving measures to the victim. Scene preservation will
receive secondary priority.
8) An Automated External Defibrillator (AED) is located in the Special Housing Unit. All
medical staff, as well as designated correctional personnel, will be trained (both initial and
annual instruction) in its use. The facility medical director will provide direct oversight of AED
use and maintenance. (See also policy on “Automated External Defibrillator Use.”)
9) The facility medical director will ensure that all equipment utilized in the response to medical
emergencies (e.g., crash cart, oxygen tank, AED, etc.) is inspected and in proper working order
on a daily basis.
10) All staff and inmates involved in the incident will be offered critical incident stress
debriefing. (See policy on “Critical Incident Stress Debriefing.”)