ELIZAB ETH WARR EN

UNITED STATES SENATE
WASHINGTON , DC 20510- 2105
P: 202- 224-4543

MASSACHUSETTS

CO MMITTEES:

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR, AND PENSIONS

tinitcd ~tatcs ~cnatc

ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON AGING

May 31, 2019

Hugh Hurwitz
Acting Director
Federal Bureau of Prisons
320 1st St. NW
Washington D.C. 20534

2400 JFK FEDERAL BUILDING
15 NEW SUDBURY STREET
BOSTON , MA 02203
P: 617- 565-3170
1550 MAIN STREET
SUITE 406
SPRINGFIELD, MA 01103
P: 413 788-2690
www.warren.senate.gov

Dear Acting Director Hurwitz:
I write seeking information about the accreditation system used to hold private prisons and other
private detention facilities accountable for the safety and wellbeing of prisoners and the
responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars. The accreditation system is rife with perverse
incentives and has a demonstrated record of failure, resulting in cruel and inhuman conditions for
prisoners and detainees and a massive waste of taxpayer funds.
The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) currently contracts with 11 facilities operated by private
corporations to house federal inmates. 1 As of August 2016, these 11 BOP contract prisons held
over 22,000 inmates, approximately 12% of the BOP population. 2 Three private corporations run
all of these facilities - GEO Group (GEO), Management and Training Corporation (MTC), and
CoreCivic. 3 In addition to the 11 BOP prisons, these companies run an additional over 200
federal, state, and local corrections and detention facilities. 4
Private prisons have a poor record of protecting the health, safety, and security of their inmates.
A 2016 report from the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DOJ OIG) found
that "in a majority of the categories we examined, contract prisons incurred more safety and
security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions." 5 These included higher rates of
incident reports, contraband discovery, lockdowns, inmate discipline, assault rates, and other
selected grievances. 6 OIG found "a failure to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents"
over a 6-month period, and concluded that BOP "must improve its oversight of contract prisons
to ensure that federal inmates' rights and needs are not placed at risk." 7
Private prisons are required to comply with all local, state, and federal laws, and the facilities
"are required to adhere to some BOP policies such as, inmate discipline, use of force, sentence
computation, and inmate classification." 8 However, according to OIG, BOP conducts insufficient
U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, "Contract Prisons," https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/contract facilities.jsp
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring
of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf.
3 Id.
4 The GEO Group, Inc., "Our Locations," https://www.geogroup.com/locations; CoreCivic, "Find a Facility,"
http://www.corecivic.com/facilities; Management and Training Corporation, "U.S. Locations,"
https://www.mtctrains.com/corrections/.
5 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring
of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, "Contract Prisons," https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/contract facilities.jsp
1

2

1

direct oversight of these facilities. 9 BOP relies in large part on accreditation to ensure prison
quality. All contracted private facilities must obtain accreditation through the American
Correctional Association (ACA) within two years ofreceiving inmates. 10
Relying on a private organization to accredit and inspect private detention facilities that have a
sub-par health and safety record is a recipe for disaster. In industry after industry, outsourcing
accountability has allowed corporations to evade standards with little to no consequences. In this
case, the accreditation system for private detention centers appears to have paired perverse
incentives with a lack of oversight of private facilities. In many cases, the results have been fatal.

ACA Accreditation is Rife with Problems
The American Correction Association serves as the accreditor for private prisons. 11 ACA
accreditation is required for government contracts. 12 But the ACA is a conflicted party with
twisted incentives, a lack of transparency, and lax inspection policies that appear to have turned
accreditation into a rubber-stamp process that does little to hold facilities accountable.

Conflicts of Interest
The ACA's problems begin with the perverse incentives arising from its conflicts of interest. The
ACA is attempting to act as an objective accreditor while it simultaneously serves as the primary
trade association on behalf of the corrections industry, including private prisons. The ACA has
lobbied Congress on criminal justice, corrections, and detention-related issues. 13 CoreCivic,
GEO Group, and MTC are all members of the ACA; as the ACA provides accreditation for their
facilities, it also receives member dues from these organizations, 14 and advocates and lobbies on
their behalf.
The three primary private facility corporations provide a significant amount of funding to the
ACA. ACA-accredited facilities pay the ACA to conduct audits, creating an incentive for the
ACA to grant accreditation so it can continue to receive fees. As of 2014, those fees ranged from
9 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring
of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf
10 Id.
11 The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations also provides accreditation for the health
facilities at private prisons and detention centers.
12U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons, "Contract Prisons," https://www.bop.gov/about/facilities/contract facilities.jsp
13 U.S. Senate, "Query the Lobbying Disclosure Act Database,"
https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=processSearchCriteria; U.S. Senate, "Lobbying Report: American
Correctional Association," https://soprweb.senate. gov/index.cfm?event=getFil ingDetails&fi Iing!D=90C 1F6E4C36F-4295-9482-I2D9EE23736F &fi lingTypeID=60; U.S. Senate, "Lobbying Report: American Correctional
Association," https: //soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filinglD- 0F2DD26F-7C96-494E822E-62DF6F9E4A6E&filingTypeID=3; U.S. Senate, "Lobbying Report: American Correctional Association,"
https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?even - getFilingDetails&filingID=ABDC64B0-52CD-41 CB-86B52450BABF0135&filingTypeID= l l ; U.S. Senate, "Lobbying Report: American Correctional Association,"
https://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=74C25B04-8F8E-4306-BF8348F81 ACF941A&filingTypelD- 9.
14 American Correctional Association, "Gift Membership Application,"
http://www.aca.org/aca prod imis/Docs/GiftMembershipApplication 2014.pdf

2

$8,100 to $19,500 per facility. 15 In 2013, the ACA earned over half of its $9 million in revenue
from accreditation contracts, much of this from GEO, MTC, and CoreCivic, that have hundreds
of accredited facilities throughout the nation. 16 The big three private prison corporations also
sponsor the ACA's annual conferences. At the ACA's annual conference in 2018, for example,
GEO and CoreCivic sponsored the ticket-only E.R. Cass Banquet, and MTC sponsored a
giveaway that included two tablets and a new car. 17
The conflicts of interest seep into the staff that run ACA' s accreditation process, which includes
a 30-member Commission on Accreditation for Corrections (CAC), responsible for accreditation
decisions, and a 20-member Standards Committee, responsible for setting standards by which
facilities are judged for accreditation. 18 The former Chair of the Standards Committee, Harley G.
Lappin, is now a member of the Board of Directors at CoreCivic. 19 Todd Thomas, currently a
member of the CAC, works as a Warden for a CoreCivic correctional facility. 20 Mike Murphy,
another member of the CAC, serves as Vice President of Marketing Corrections at MTC. 21
Derrick Schofield, a member of the Standards Committee, works as Executive Vice President for
GEO Care, 22 a division of GEO focused on "in-custody offender rehabilitation programs and
evidence-based treatment. ,m

Lack of Transparency and Accountability in the Accreditation Process
These problems are exacerbated by the ACA's ineffective accreditation process and lack of both
transparency and accountability.
There are numerous indications that the ACA's accreditation process is barely more than a
rubber-stamp. First, facilities conduct a "self-evaluation," judging themselves on whether their
own "levels of expected compliance are sufficient for accreditation."24 The facility also submits
15 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https ://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jul/6/betraying-prom ise-accred itation-guis-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/.
16 Id.
17 American Correctional Association, "2018 Minneapolis Program Book,"
http:/!register .aca.org/DOCS/Conference/COC2018/2018%20Minneapolis%20Program%20Book FINAL WEB. PD

E
18 American Correctional Association, "Standards and Accreditation, Committee on Standards,"
http://www.aca.org/ ACA Prod IMIS/ ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/Standards/Standards Committee/
ACA Member/Standards and Accreditation/Standards Committee/Standards Committee.aspx?hkey=795105de6a67-4769-b58a-0de6dt7e8324; American Correctional Association, "Standards and Accreditation, The
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMIS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/About Us/CAC/ACA Member/St
andards and Accreditation/SAC Commission.aspx?hkey=90da0502-afd8-4685-97c2-b8c7e 1c803d3 .
19 CoreCivic, "Board of Directors," http://www.corecivic.com/investors/board-of-directors
20 Linkedln, "Todd Thomas," https://www.linkedin.com/in/todd-thomas-38555533/; American Correctional
Association, "Standards and Accreditation, The Commission on Accreditation for Corrections,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMIS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/About Us/CAC/ACA Member/St
andards and Accreditation/SAC Commission.aspx?hkey=90da0502-afd8-4685-97c2-b8c7e I c803d3.
21 Linkedln, "Mike Murphy," https://www.linkedin.com/in/mike-murphy-53876b5/
22 The GEO Group, Inc., "GEO Care Leadership Team," https://www.geogroup.com/GEO Care Leadership Team
23 The GEO Group, Inc., "GEO Care," https://www.geogroup.com/GEO-Care
24 American Correctional Association, "Manual of Accreditation, Policy and Procedure," March 15, 2017, p. 28,
http://www.aca.org/ ACA Prod IMIS/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ ALM-1-3 15 17-Final.pdf.

3

their own self-reported list of "significant incidents."25 Next, a facility may request an audit. The
ACA grants facilities three months' notice in advance of an audit, allowing facilities to prepare
before inspectors arrive. 26 At a facility's request, the ACA will first conduct a "mock audit" to
help the facility get ready for the actual audit. 27 Finally, the ACA then travels for on-location
audits.
The problems appear to continue once the audits finally begin. Incarcerated individuals in ACAaccredited facilities have reported never having the opportunity to speak with inspectors, despite
ACA accreditation guidelines indicating that the facility must extend the invitation to all
detainees. 28 The ACA often conducts "paper audits" - it examines the policies a prison has on
paper rather than their actual practices. According to the director of the Private Corrections
Institute, for example, "a prison ... can be accredited by the ACA even if officers at that facility
are in fact beating inmates," so long as the prison has a policy that says officers cannot beat
inmates. 29
The final decision on accreditation is neither transparent nor accountable, making it impossible
to tell how private prison corporations and their employees may influence standards and
accreditation. Accreditation decisions do not include public justification, and while inspections
result in a report for the Commission staff, that report is not made public. 30 The ACA "does not
disclose ... specific information in the [facility's] self-evaluation report, Visiting Committee
report, or information discussed in the hearing." 31 Outside oversight becomes impossible without
evidence of the audits. Decades ago, David Bazelon, a judge on the D.C. Court of Appeals,
resigned his position as an ACA board member in 1982 and described the ACA accreditation as
a "conspiracy of silence between corrections officials and the public," noting that the ACA had
"repeatedly refused to open the accreditation process to public scrutiny and participation." 32 The
ACA does not appear to have increased public participation or transparency in the 37 years since
Bazelon resigned.

Id.
Id. p. 29
27 Id. p 27.
28 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https://www .prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jul/6/betraying-promise-accreditation-qu is-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/; American Correctional Association, "Manual of Accreditation, Policy and Procedure," March 15, 2017, p.
30, http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod TM[S/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ALM- 1-3 15 17-Final.pdf.
29 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https://www .prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/ jul/6/betraying-prom ise-accreditation-quis-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/.
30 American Correctional Association, "Standards and Accreditation,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod TMTS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/ACA Member/Standards and Ac
creditation/SAC.aspx?hkey=7f4ct7bf-2b27-4a6b-b124-36e5bd90b93d; Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise
of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July 6, 2016,
https ://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jul/6/betraying-promise-accreditation-q uis-c ustodiet-ipsos-custodes/.
31 American Correctional Association, "Manual of Accreditation, Policy and Procedure," March 15,2017, p. 15,
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMIS/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ALM-1-3 15 17-Final.pdf.
32 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https://www .prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/ jul/6/betraying-promise-accreditation-qu is-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/.

2s
26

4

Finally, the Commissioners are permitted to supply waivers for "discretionary non-compliances"
with ACA guidelines and standards, rendering these standards toothless. 33
The ACA only conducts audits for re-accreditation every three years. 34 The organization allows
facilities to "conduct annual self-reporting" in the off years, judging their own compliance and
submitting their own summary of significant incidents. 35
As former Judge Bazelon put it, "the commission's audit techniques and deliberative procedures
are inherently unreliable." 36 Jody Owens, of the Southern Poverty Law Center, has referred to
ACA accreditation as "a rubber-stamping process," adding that problems at prisons are
"overlooked when these grades are passed out."37

Notable Failures of Oversight
The flaws in the ACA's accreditation process are evident at facility after facility that, despite
having received the ACA stamp of approval, allow inmates to live amid unsafe conditions, and
are rife with violence, health and safety hazards, and other systemic problems.

BOP Contract Facilities with Significant Problems
A number of facilities managed under contract with the BOP, and therefore subject to BOP's
requirements for ACA accreditation, have had major problems in the last decade.
In late 2008 and early 2009, the Reeves County Detention Complex (Reeves), in Pecos, Texas,
managed by GEO, had a riot in all three of its compounds, caused in part by "low staffing levels"
at the facility. 38 In 2015, the DOJ OIG found that GEO had "failed to comply with contractual
requirements in the areas of billing and payment, correctional and health services staffing, and
internal quality control" at its Reeves Compounds I and II. 39 The OIG found "no minimum
staffing requirements [in place] for the institution" between January 2007 and March 2009,
"because the BOP had sought to reduce costs." 40 Despite these problems, all three facilities in the
complex are listed as accredited facilities on the ACA website, and GEO has reported that

American Correctional Association, "Manual of Accreditation, Policy and Procedure," March 15, 2017,
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMIS/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ALM-1 -3 I 5 17-Final.pdf.
34 Id. p. 51
35 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https://www .prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/jul/6/betraying-promise-accreditation-quis-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/; American Correctional Association, "Manual of Accreditation, Policy and Procedure," March 15, 2017,
p.49, http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMTS/docs/standards%20and%20accreditation/ALM-1-3 15 17-Final.pdf.
36 Prison Legal News, "Betraying the Promise of Accreditation: Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?" Gary Hunter, July
6, 2016, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/ jul/6/betraying-promise-accreditation-quis-custodiet-ipsoscustodes/.
31 Id.
38 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
Monitoring of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf.
39 Id.
40 Id.
33

5

Reeves III received ACA accreditation and re-accreditation in 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2018 with a
score of 99.8%. 41
In February 2011, inmates at GEO's Big Spring Correctional Center (Big Spring) in Texas
"physically assaulted prison staff," reportedly after a lackluster response to a medical emergency
"that resulted in the death of an inmate."42 The facility received ACA accreditation and reaccreditation in 2010, 2012, and 2015 with a score of 99.28% and is listed on the ACA's list of
accredited facilities. 43
The following year, at CoreCivic's Adams County Correctional Facility (Adams) near Natchez,
Mississippi 250 inmates rioted due to the low quality of food and medical care, and poor
treatment from prison staff. 44 A correctional officer was killed and 20 people were injured. 45
Adams received accreditation and re-accreditation in 2013 and 2016, scoring 100%. 46 In 2015,
inmates at MTC's Willacy County Correctional Center (Willacy) in Raymondville, Texas, "set
fires and caused extensive damage to the prison."47 The BOP terminated their contract with the
prison as a result. 48
Other Facilities Operated by MTC, GEO, and CoreCivic
Problems at private facilities accredited by ACA go beyond those under contract with BOP, and
raise serious red flags about the agency's continued reliance on the ACA for accreditation and
oversight.
In May 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) OIG conducted an unannounced
inspection of GEO Group's Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California. 49 The OIG
found "significant health and safety risks," including "nooses in detainee cells[,] improper and
overly restrictive segregation[, and] untimely and inadequate detainee medical care. " 50 After I
41 American Correctional Association, "Search ACA Accredited Facilities,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod TMIS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/Accredited Facilities/Facility Dir
ectory/ ACA Member/Standards and Accreditation/ Accredited Facility Directory.aspx?hkey=86 l cb92c-7d8d4b 10-aa0c-c3990b905d63 ; The GEO Group, Inc., "Our Locations,"
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/75
42 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
Monitoring of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf.
43 American Correctional Association, "Search ACA Accredited Facilities,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod TMIS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/Accredited Facilities/Facility Dir
ectory/ACA Member/Standards and Accreditation/ Accredited Facility Directory.aspx?hkey=861 cb92c-7d8d4b I 0-aa0c-c3990b905d63 ; The GEO Group, Inc., "Our Locations, Big Spring Correctional Center,"
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilitylD/34.
44 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
Monitoring of Contract Prisons," August 20 I 6, https:// o ig.justice. gov/reports/20 16/ e 1606.pdf
45 Id.
46 CoreCivic, "CCA Facilities Earn Reaccreditation at Summer Congress of Corrections," Bethany Davis, August
26, 2016, http://www.correctionscorp.com/insidecca/cca-facilities-eam-reaccreditation-at-summer-congress-ofcorrections.
47 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, "Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
Monitoring of Contract Prisons," August 2016, https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e 1606.pdf
48 Id.
49 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "Management Alert Issues Requiring Action at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in Adelanto, California," September 27, 20 I 8,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2018- I 0/OIG-18-86-Sep 18.pdf.
so Id.

6

wrote to GEO about this facility, GEO responded by pointing to their ACA accreditation in 2014
and re-accreditation in 2017, with "a score of 99.6%" According to the ACA website, they have
retained their accreditation. 51
A December 2017 report from DHS OIG found systemic health, safety, and security violations at
several privately run immigration detention facilities accredited by the ACA. 52 The Stewart
Detention Center (Stewart) in Lumpkin, Georgia, run by CoreCivic, and the Otero County
Processing Center (Otero), in Chaparral, New Mexico, run by MTC, both violated standards
regarding the "segregation and lock-down of detainees." 53 Detainees at Stewart reported
excessive waits for urgent medical care. OIG observed "bathrooms that were in poor condition"
at both facilities, including a lack of hot water and water leaks throughout Stewart. 54 Both
facilities are currently accredited by the ACA. 55
Accredited private prisons used by state penal systems also reveal the inadequate of oversight
from the ACA. In 2010, three violent prisoners escaped from MTC's ACA-accredited Arizona
State Prison - Kingman (Kingman) and murdered two people during their attempted getaway. 56
Then, in 2015, a series ofriots caused so much damage to the prison, the state had to transfer
over 1,000 inmates. 57 Similarly, in 2012 a federal judge ruled that GEO's ACA-accredited
Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility (Walnut Grove) in Mississippi "paints a picture of
such horror as should be unrealized anywhere in the civilized world." 58 GEO was forced to give
up running the facility due to a failure to protect inmates from gang violence. 59
Walnut Grove closed in 2016. 60 The Kingman and Walnut Grove facilities are both still listed on
the ACA's website as accredited facilities, 61 and the Kingman facility received accreditation in
2017 with a score of 99.50%. 62
Office of U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, "Response to Information Request from The GEO Group," February 27,
2019, https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Attachment%202a%20%20Response%20Letter%i20from%20G EO%20Group%20re%20Compliance%20with%201mmigration%20Detenti
on%20Standards.pdf.
52 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Inspector General, "Concerns about ICE Detainee
Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities," December 11, 2017,
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017-12/0IG-18-32-Decl 7.pdf.
53 Id.
51

54

fd.

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "PREA Audit; Subpart A DHS Immigration Facilities Audit
Report," March 9, 2017, p. 2, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prea audit/20 l 7-Stewart-0919-21 .pdf; Management
and Training Corporation, "Corrections Facts Sheet, Otero County Prison Facility," May 2019, p. 1,
https://www.mtctrains.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Corrections Facts Sheet OTR l .pdf.
56 The New York Times, "Escapes, Riots and Beatings. But States Can't Seem to Ditch Private Prisons," Timothy
Williams and Richard A. Oppel Jr., April I 0, 2018, https://www .nytimes.com/2018/04/ 10/us/private-prisonsescapes-riots.html?smid=pl-share&module=inline.
57 Id.
5s Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 American Correctional Association, "Search ACA Accredited Facilities,"
http://www.aca.org/ACA Prod IMIS/ACA Member/Standards
Accreditation/Accredited Facilities/Facility Dir
ectory!ACA Member/Standards and Accreditation/ Accredited Facility Directory.aspx?hkey=86 l cb92c-7d8d4b I 0-aa0c-c3990b905d63 .
62 The GEO Group, Inc., "Our Locations, Arizona State Prison - Kingman,"
https://www.geogroup.com/FacilityDetail/FacilityID/30.
55

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Conclusion and Questions
The accreditation process for private detention facilities, including BOP contract prisons, is
broken. Perverse incentives, conflicts of interest and a failure to adequately oversee conditions at
private detention facilities have put detainees and corrections officers in danger. To help me
better understand the scope of this problems and the steps needed to address these concerns,
please respond to the following questions by June 14, 2019.
1. According to your website, "contract facilities must obtain accreditation through the
American Correctional Association ... within two years of receiving inmates."
a. Please provide the specific BOP contract provisions regarding accreditation.
b. What standards and conditions are in place at contract facilities that are within the
two year period and have not received accreditation?
c. What specific actions does BOP take if the facility has received inmates for more
than two years and has not been accredited? Please provide a list of any facility
that, in the last 10 years, has exceeded the two-year accreditation standard, and
the actions taken by BOP in response.
d. What specific actions does BOP take for facilities that have lost accreditation?

2. The American Correctional Association does not make public the results of their audits,
and does not make details other than the existence of accreditation public. Does the ACA
provide you with audit dates, results, accreditation reports, or other details or documents
related to accreditation of contracted facilities? If so, please provide my office with:
a. A full list of all audits of BOP-contracted facilities conducted in the last decade.
b. The results of all such audits.
c. Accreditation reports or other details or documents related to accreditation of
these facilities.
d. A 2015 DOJ OIG report found a series of problems at ACA-accredited facilities,
including Reeves I, II, and III, Big Spring, Adams, and Willacy.
1. Did any or all of these facilities have ACA accreditation at the time such
violations were discovered?
11. Have any or all of these facilities received ACA accreditation or reaccreditation in the time since this these violations were discovered?
111. Are you aware of any actions taken by the ACA to address the problems at
these facilities?
1v. Are you aware of any actions taken by the ACA to improve their
inspection, audit, or accreditation processes in light of this report showing
problems at ACA-accredited facilities?
v. Has BOP or DOJ considered alternatives to ACA accreditation in its
contracts, either before or since the publication of this report?
3. Given that you rely on ACA accreditation, how does BOP or DOJ assure the quality of
the accreditation process?
a. How and why did BOP decide to make A CA-accreditation the chief requirement
for contracting facilities?

8

b. What requirements does BOP have in place for ACA to assure the quality of its
accreditation process?
c. What steps does BOP take to determine if ACA accreditation meets these
requirements?
d. Does BOP have any standards in place to protect the accreditation process from
conflicts of interest?
4. The BOP states that it "places several staff on-site to monitor contract performance and to
ensure contractors perform in accordance with the contract terms and conditions." Please
provide more details, including:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

How many staff members are placed at facilities?
How often and for how long those staff members remain at each facility?
The rights and responsibilities of the staff members at each facility.
The qualifications and expertise of staff members at each facility.
What each staff members is told to inspect and review while at each facility.
Do facilities receive notice before staff members arrive?

5. The ACA only reviews and re-accredits facilities every three years. Do you require any
additional quality assurance measures, including inspections and audits, from ACA or the
facilities during the intervening years?
6.
Reports indicate that the ACA conducts "paper audits," looking primarily at a facility's
written policies, rather than their practice. Are "paper audits" sufficient to meet accreditation
quality standards for BOP contractors?
a. Has BOP determined if, in fact, ACA is conducting "paper audits"? If so, has
BOP determined if this is the case, and what action has the agency taken?

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Elizabeth Warren
United States Senator

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