GAMING THE SYSTEM:
HOW THE POLITICAL STRATEGIES OF PRIVATE PRISON
COMPANIES PROMOTE INEFFECTIVE INCARCERATION POLICIES
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE | JUNE 2011

JUSTICE
Pf)LICY
INSTITUTE
Justice Policy Institute is a
national nonprofit
organization that changes the
conversation around justice
reform and advances policies
that promote well-being and
justice for all people and
communities.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 2
THE TRIANGLE OF PRIVATE PRISON POLITICAL
INFLUENCE ...................................................................... 3
THE PLAYERS: TWO COMPANIES ARE AT THE
CENTER OF PRIVATE PRISON POLITICAL INFLUENCE
.......................................................................................... 5
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA ............. 6
GEO GROUP (FORMERLY WACKENHUT
CORRECTIONS CORPORATION).................................... 7
THE STAKES: MORE PRISON MEANS MORE REVENUES
FOR PRIVATE PRISONS ......................................................... 9
MORE PRISON….............................................................. 9
MORE REVENUE… .........................................................12
BUT, STATE PRIVATE PRISON POPULATIONS ARE
FALLING. .........................................................................13
THE STRATEGIES: A THREE-PRONGED APPROACH TO
INFLUENCING POLICY, CREATING MORE
INCARCERATION, AND MAKING MORE MONEY ................15
STRATEGY 1: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS ...............15
STRATEGY 2: LOBBYING ..............................................21
STRATEGY 3: RELATIONSHIPS AND ASSOCIATIONS 25

th

1012 14 Street, NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20005

LOSING THE GAME ...............................................................31

TEL (202) 558-7974

TAXPAYERS LOSE. ........................................................31

FAX (202) 558-7978

THE COMMUNITY LOSES. .............................................32
PRIVATE PRISON EMPLOYEES ....................................34

WWW.JUSTICEPOLICY.ORG

PEOPLE IN THE PRISONS .............................................35
RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................37

GAMING THE SYSTEM

2

PART 1

INTRODUCTION

At a time when many policymakers are looking at criminal and
juvenile justice reforms that would safely shrink the size of our prison
population, the existence of private prison companies creates a
countervailing interest in preserving the current approach to criminal
justice and increasing the use of incarceration. 1
Approximately 129,000 people were held in
While private prison companies may try to
privately managed correctional facilities in the
present themselves as just meeting existing
2
United States as of December 31, 2009; 16.4
‚demand‛ for prison beds and responding to
percent of federal and 6.8 percent of state
current ‚market‛ conditions, in fact they have
populations were held in private facilities. Since
worked hard over the past decade to create
2000, private prisons have increased their share
markets for their product. As revenues of
of the ‚market‛ substantially: the number of
private prison companies have grown over
people held in private federal facilities increased
the past decade, the companies have had
approximately 120 percent, while the number
more resources with which to build political
held in private state facilities increased
power, and they have used this power to
approximately 33 percent. During this same
promote policies that lead to higher rates of
period, the total number of people in prison
incarceration.
increased less than 16 percent. Meanwhile,
spending on corrections has increased 72
The pro-incarceration policies that private
percent since 1997, to $74 billion in 2007.3 The
prison companies promote do nothing to
two largest
The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the
private
relaxation of enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and
prison
sentencing practices or through the decriminalization of certain activities that are
companies,
currently proscribed by our criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect
to drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the number
Corrections
of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing
Corporation
demand for correctional facilities to house them. Legislation has been proposed in
of America
numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent
(CCA) and
crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior.
GEO Group,
Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on
combined
probation with electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated.
had over
Similarly, reductions in crime rates or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce
$2.9 billion
crime could lead to reductions in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring
incarceration at correctional facilities.
in revenue in
4
2010.
~ CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE
building relationships, networks, and
associations. 5

Campaign
Contributions

Goal:
Mont PrillOf1,
More Revenue

Lobbying

Relationships
&
Associations

improve communities or cut costs, and may
actually have the opposite effect. Policymakers
should be focused on long-term solutions to
improving public safety, saving money and
promoting healthy communities by looking at
ways to reduce the number of people in prison,
not increase them, and by finding ways to keep
people out of the justice system before they
become involved. Private prison companies are
in it for the money. Policymakers should be in it
for healthy, safe communities.

THE TRIANGLE OF PRIVATE
PRISON POLITICAL INFLUENCE
While there are many pieces of the for-profit
private prison industrial complex, this report
will focus on for-profit private prison
companies’ political strategies to influence
legislators responsible for criminal justice
policy and, in some cases, influence legislation
and policy, themselves. Therefore, any use of
the term private prison refers only to forprofit private corrections companies and
facilities.
For-profit private prison companies primarily
use three strategies to influence policy:
lobbying, direct campaign contributions, and

Over the years, these political strategies have
allowed private prison companies to promote
policies that lead to higher rates of
incarceration and thus greater profit margins
for their company. In particular, private
prison companies have had either influence
over or helped to draft model legislation such
as ‚three-strikes‛ and ‚truth-in-sentencing‛
laws, both of which have driven up
incarceration rates and ultimately created
more opportunities for private prison
companies to bid on contracts to increase
revenues. The recent Supreme Court decision
in Citizens United vs. FEC further facilitates
this influence by allowing corporations to
engage freely in paid political speech such as
television and radio ads and programs.
As policymakers and the public are
increasingly coming to understand that
incarceration is not only breaking the bank,
but it’s also not making us safer,6 will this
shrink the influence of the private prison
companies? Or will they use their growing
financial muscle to consolidate and expand
into even more areas of the justice system?
Much will depend on the extent that people
understand the role for-profit private prison
companies have already played in raising
incarceration rates and harming people and
communities, and take steps to ensure that in
the future, community safety and well-being,
and not profits, drive our justice policies. One
thing is certain: in this political game, the
private prison industry will look out for their
own best interests.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

4

WHAT IS A FOR-PROFIT PRIVATE PRISON?
While the private sector provides services to correctional institutions including health care, education,
transportation and counseling, for the purpose of this report, a for-profit private prison is a facility
managed by a for-profit organization through a public-private partnership with a government contract.
Private prison companies contract with federal and state governments to either take over management of
a state-run facility or to house people in a privately constructed prison. Private prisons generally charge a
7
daily rate per person incarcerated to cover investment, operating costs, and turn a profit. This daily rate
varies depending upon facility, population and security level, but usually pays for correctional officers,
8
support staff, food services, programmatic costs and partial medical care among other services.

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

PART 2

THE PLAYERS: TWO COMPANIES ARE AT
THE CENTER OF PRIVATE PRISON
POLITICAL INFLUENCE

In 2011, the major players of the political game to sustain
incarceration are the Corrections Corporation of America and the
GEO Group, having recently acquired Cornell Companies in 2010.
These companies have the most to gain by influencing legislation
that could lead to more or less incarceration.
The involvement of the private sector in
public corrections dates back to the late 18th
century, when local jails were run by forprofit providers paid by local governments to
hold people awaiting trial.9 The shift from
private for-profit run jails to a governmentrun penitentiary system began with the first
U.S. state prison established in Philadelphia in
1790.10 Shortly after government assumed the
role of incarcerating people, private firms
began contracting with prisons for the use of
labor,11 as well as to provide medical, food
and a variety of other services.12
Correlating with the increased use of
incarceration, prison overcrowding, and rising
corrections costs, private sector involvement in
prisons moved from contracting of services to
complete management and operations of entire
prisons.13
The incarceration rate of people sentenced to
more than a year of prison more than tripled

over the past 30 years, growing from 139
people in prison per 100,000 in the general
population in 1980 to 502 per 100,000 in
2009.14 The number of people in state and
federal prisons alone increased 722 percent
since 1970 from 196,429 people to 1.6 million
people in 2009.15
The incarceration explosion created two
practical problems: where to put the
increasing number of people being sentenced
to prison and how to pay for it. In 1984,
Hamilton County, Tennessee and Bay County,
Florida were the first local governments in
modern times to enter into contracts with the
private sector for operating correctional
facilities.16 With the promise of comparable
corrections services at a greatly reduced cost,17
state, federal, and local governments have
increasingly contracted with the private sector
for the financing, design, construction,
management, and staffing of prisons, jails,
and other correctional facilities.18

GAMING THE SYSTEM

6

People incarcerated in state and federal prisons

The state and federal prison population increased 722 percent
between 1970 and 2009.
1,800,000

1,613,740

1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000
1,000,000
800,000
600,000
400,000

196,429

200,000
0

Sources: Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners 2000 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2001); Allen J. Beck and Darrell K. Gilliard, Prisoners 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1995); Paige M.
Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000);
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006: Number and rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of
sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal correctional authorities on December 31.
www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf

The basis for the belief that private prisons
would be more economical is that market
competition would drive down costs.19 And
since private firms must compete not only
with industry rivals, but also the government,
it was assumed they’d have increased
incentives to develop less expensive
corrections practices and streamlined
operations in order to win government
contracts.20 Despite no conclusive evidence in
the cost savings of private corrections,21 and
growing evidence of significant collateral
expenses borne by the public of incarcerating
people in private prisons,22 the trend of forprofit prison privatization continues.
Today, two companies own and/or operate
the majority of for-profit private prisons, with
a number of smaller companies running
facilities across the country.

CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF
AMERICA
Founded in 1983, the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) is the first
and largest private prison company in the
U.S.23 According to the company’s website,
CCA specializes in owning, operating, and
managing prisons and other correctional
facilities. In 2010, CCA operated 66
correctional and detention facilities, 45 of
which they owned with contracts in 19 states,
the District of Columbia and with the three
federal detention agencies: Bureau of
Prisons, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and the U.S. Marshal Service. 24
In 2010, CCA saw record revenue of $1.67
billion, up $46 million from 2009. 25 The
majority of that revenue (50 percent or $838.5
million) came from state contracts, with 13

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

percent ($214 million) from the
state of California;26 approximately
10,250 people from the state of
California are held in prisons run
by CCA.27 The other significant
portion of their revenue was from
federal contracts, which accounted
for 43 percent of revenue in 2010.

50 percent of CCA's revenue comes from
state contracts.
Bureau of
Prisons
15%

Other
7%

U.S.
Marshals
16%

States
50%

Immigration
Customs
Enforcement
12%
Source: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report
(Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010).

CCA HAD POLITICAL CONNECTIONS FROM THE BEGINNING.
A prime example of the influence underscoring the private prison industry is the development of
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA cofounder, Tom Beasley, then-chairman of the
Tennessee Republican Party, had served on a committee tasked with choosing a new state corrections
28
officer. Beasley‟s research uncovered a system plagued by overcrowding, tight budgets and high
turnover, convincing him that with a few simple applications of business practices the corrections system
29
could be transformed from an inefficient bureaucracy to a profitable business. Joined by two friends,
Doctor Crants, a lawyer and MBA Harvard graduate and Don Hutto, who at the time was the president of
the American Correctional Association, CCA entered the market by attempting to take over the entire
30
Tennessee prison system. The combination of Beasley‟s political connections, Crants‟ business savvy,
and Hutto‟s correctional credentials allowed for easy access to the necessary contacts and investors to
launch America‟s first private prison company.

GEO GROUP
(FORMERLY
WACKENHUT
CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION)
According to their website, the GEO Group is
a private corporation that specializes in
correctional and detention management,
community residential re-entry services and
behavioral and mental health services.31
Currently, GEO operates 118 correctional,
detention, and residential treatment facilities

encompassing approximately 80,600 beds in
the United States, Australia, South Africa, and
the United Kingdom.32 The U.S. Corrections
Business Unit is the company’s founding
operating unit and accounts for over 60
percent of GEO’s total annual revenue.33
Founded in 1984 under the name Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation, the company
solidified its first contract, the Aurora ICE
Processing Center with the Bureau of
Immigration and Custody Enforcement, in
1987.34

GAMING THE SYSTEM
Wackenhut was acquired by Group 4
Falck (now G4S) in 2002, and a year later
repurchased all of its stock shares to
become an independent company. In 2003
Wackenhut Corrections Corporation
officially changed its name to The GEO
Group, Inc.35 As of 2010, GEO contracts
with 13 states, the Federal Bureau of
Prison, the U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.36
In 2010, 66 percent ($842 million) of GEO’s
$1.27 billion in revenue was from U.S.
corrections contracts.37 Of the $842 million
in revenue, 47 percent came from
corrections contracts with 11 states.38
On August 12, 2010 the GEO Group
acquired Cornell Companies—a for-profit
private prison company with revenues of
over $400 million in 200939—in a merger
estimated at $730 million.40 The acquisition of
Cornell by GEO signifies a change in the
landscape of the private prison industry with
the majority of private prisons now under the
management of either GEO or CCA.

The majority of GEO's corrections revenue
comes from state contracts.
Bureau of
Prisons
14%

U.S.
Marshals
19%

States
47%

Immigration
Customs
Enforcement
20%

Source: The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report (Boca
Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2011).

8

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

PART 3

THE STAKES: MORE PRISON MEANS MORE
REVENUES FOR PRIVATE PRISONS

Over the past 15 years, while the incarceration rate in the U.S. has
grown, it has been outpaced by the growth in the number of people
placed in private prisons.
for private prison companies to implement
Due to ineffective criminal justice policies
an aggressive, multipronged strategy to
that promote incarceration over more
ensure their growing revenues.
effective alternatives, an increasing need for
prison beds has resulted in more private
prison contracts and subsequently more
revenue for private prison companies as
Some of the most rapid increases in
states have less money to pay for the
incarceration occurred during the 1980s and
construction of their own prison beds. As a
1990s , in part fueled by a policy shift toward
result of this increasing trend of
‚tough on crime‛ measures such as
incarceration, private prison companies have
mandatory sentencing and ‚three strikes‛
seen exponential growth in revenues,
laws, ‚truth-in-sentencing‛ laws that limit
benefiting greatly
from more people
The number of people in private facilities grew between
being placed behind
2000 and 2008.
bars. However,
140,000
between 2008 and
State
120,000
2009 the number of
Federal
people in state prisons
100,000
declined for the first
80,000
time in 40 years.41
60,000
While the number of
people in federal
40,000
prisons continues to
20,000
rise, the decline in the
0
state prison
population—private
prison companies’
largest revenue
Source: Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 Appendix table 19 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).
stream—sets the stage
People in Private Prisons

MORE PRISON…

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf

Total People in Prison

Similar to the overall number of people in prison, the number of
people housed in private prisons has steadily increased over the
past decade.
1,800,000
129,336 140,000
1,600,000
1,400,000
1,200,000

1,613,740 120,000
1,078,542

100,000

1,000,000

80,000

800,000

60,000

600,000
400,000

40,000

35,567

20,000

200,000
0

-

Total Prison Population

10

Number of People in Private Prisons

GAMING THE SYSTEM

Private Prison Population

Sources: Allen J. Beck, Prisoners 1999 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000)
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p99.pdf; Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 1995. Table 1.96: Private Correctional Facility Management Firms (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996);
Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 and Appendix Table 19
(Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in 2000 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001); Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006: Number and
rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal correctional authorities
on December 31. www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf

parole eligibility and keep people in prison
longer, and the ‚war on drugs.‛ Such policies
have sent more people — especially people
convicted of drug offenses42 — to prison, and

keep them there longer, thus increasing the
total number of people in prison. Such
sentencing policies have been a primary
contributor to the number of people in
prison.43

Average annual change, 2000-2008

Over an 8-year span, federal prisons have
seen the largest average annual increase in
their private prison populations.
12%
10%
10%
8%
6%

5%
3.7%

4%
2%
0%
Total

Federal

State

Source: Heather C. West, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009 - Table 11 (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf

During the time that prison
populations grew, so, too, did the
number of people in private prisons.
By 1995 there were 36,567 people
housed in private prisons in the
U.S.,44 in 2000 that number climbed
to 87,369 and in 2009 there were
129,336 people housed in private
correctional facilities in the U.S.45

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE
In 2009, 8 percent ofthe state and federal prison population was housed in private prisons.

vr
668
1.434

13

227

4,957

5.989
2.825

H1

19,207

1.648

Private Prison Population:

State:

95,249

Federal: 34087
Total: 129,336

Number of people in private prisons by state.
Source: Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Appendix table 20 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2010). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf

In 2009, the majority of people in private
prisons were in state contracted facilities,
with 8 percent of the total state and federal
prison population in private prisons. Out of
the 129,336 people housed in private prisons
in 2009, 74 percent were within state
contracted facilities.46 The federal
government accounted for the remainder of
the private prison contracts – housing 34,087
people47 for the U.S. Marshals, Federal
Bureau of Prisons, and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. The five states with
the highest number of people in private
prisons in 2009 were Texas, Florida, Arizona,
Oklahoma, and Mississippi – all of which
had over 5,000 people housed in private
prisons.

In the last decade, the federal government
has had the fastest growing number of
people in private prisons, largely due to
federal agencies contracting with private
prisons for immigration detention. Between
2000 and 2008, the largest annual percent
change in the private prison population was
from federally contracted private prisons,
potentially making the federal government a
more important source of revenue than states
for private prisons in years to come.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

12

Corrections Corporation of America revenues continue to increase.

Total Annual Revenue in Millions

$1,800
$1,541

$1,600

$1,629

$1,675

$1,403
$1,400
$1,126

$1,200
$1,000

$888

$910

$1,193

$1,256

$1,008

$800
$600
$400
$200
$0

Source: 2010 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2010); 2006 Annual Report (Nashville, TN:
Corrections Corporation of America, 2007); 2002 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2003).

MORE REVENUE…
Steady increases in the number of people in
private prisons, especially those coming from
federally contracted beds, translate into
increased revenues for private prison
companies. Since private prison companies
are in the business to make money, policies
that maintain or increase incarceration boost
their revenues; from a business perspective,
the economic and social costs of mass
incarceration are ‚externalities‛ that aren’t
figured into their corporate bottom line.

percent, with the portion of their revenue
coming from their U.S. corrections division
seeing a 87 percent increase – earning the
company $842 million in 2010.
Despite their increasing portfolios of federal
facilities, the largest portion of CCA and GEO
Group’s contracts are still with state
governments, which accounted for about half
of their revenues in 2009.49 About threequarters of the people held in private prisons
that year were under state custody, adding up
to 95,249 people.50 Therefore, state criminal
justice policies play a significant role in the
profitability of both companies.

Since securing their first contracts in the
1980s, private prison companies have
experienced over two decades of growth. In
2010 alone, GEO and CCA saw
Our industry benefits from significant economies of scale,
combined revenue of over $2.9
resulting in lower operating costs per inmate as occupancy
billion.48 Since 2001, CCA has
rates increase. We believe we have been successful in
seen an 88 percent increase in
increasing the number of residents in our care and continue
their revenue, consistently
to pursue a number of initiatives intended to further
earning over $1 billion
increase our occupancy and revenue. Our competitive
cost structure offers prospective customers a compelling
annually for the past eight
option for incarceration.
years. From 2002-2010, GEO’s
total revenue increased by 121

~ CCA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

The GEO Group has seen increasing revenues in corrections the past six
years.

Total Annual Revnue in Millions

$1,400

$1,270
$1,141

$1,200
$1,043
$976

$1,000

$861

$800

$711
$615

$600

$842

$784

$517
$451

$567
$483

2002

2003

$613
$511

$629

$613
$473

$400
$200
$2004

2005
Total

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

U.S. Corrections

Source: The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2011); The GEO Group, 2006 Annual Report
(Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2007); 2005 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL: The GEO Group, 2006).

BUT, STATE PRIVATE
PRISON POPULATIONS
ARE FALLING.

It is hard to say exactly how much money states
and the federal government spend on private
prisons in a year, but an estimate based on the
average cost to incarcerate one person for one
day in 2008 ($78.88)54 sets the figure at
approximately $3.7 billion. At that rate, the loss
of 1,071 people in prison at the state level
translates to about $30 million in savings.

The trend of increasing incarceration and
revenues for private prison companies which
has existed over the last 15 years may be
changing. Recently, a number of states have
been working to reduce the number of people
Recognizing the opportunities behind
sentenced to prisons,51 resulting in 4,574 fewer
increasing federal incarceration and the
people in state prison - 1,071 of whom were
challenges around decreasing state
serving their time in private prisons.52 The
incarceration, private prison companies must
number of people in prison continued to rise in
work hard to expand or maintain their market
2009, in part, because more people are entering
share. At the same time that some states may
and staying in federal prisons, largely due to
be looking to close private facilities, others
increased penalties for drug law violations.
may continue to move people to private
Between 2008 and 2009, the number of people
facilities for a variety of reasons.55 Stricter
sentenced to a year in federal prison
increased by 5,553 people or 3 percent,
We believe the long-term growth opportunities of our
with the number of people in private,
business remain very attractive as insufficient bed
development by our customers should result in a
federal facilities, increasing by 925 people
return to the supply and demand imbalance that has
or 2.8 percent.53
been benefiting the private prison industry.
~ CCA 2010 ANNUAL REPORT

GAMING THE SYSTEM

14

Change in the number of people
sentenced to prison from 2008 to 2009

immigration laws and
While the number of people sentenced to state
enforcement increase the
prison fell between 2008 and 2009, federal
number of people in
numbers increased.
8000
federal detention facilities,
6000
and increases in the
925
number of offenses listed
4000
as federal crimes leads to
4628
2000
more people held in
0
federal prisons.56 While
State
Federal
private prison companies
-3503
-2000
may claim that changes in
-4000
criminal justice legislation
-1071
are ‚outside our
-6000
Public
Private
control,‛57 they are in fact
Source: Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 (Bureau
engaged in a number of
of Justice Statistics, Washington, DC: 2010). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf
activities aimed at
increasing their control of the market; this
includes applying political pressure to
lawmakers, working to influence elections,
and building relationships within agencies or
with government officials to directly
formulate policy.

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JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

PART 4

THE STRATEGIES: A THREE-PRONGED
APPROACH TO INFLUENCING POLICY,
CREATING MORE INCARCERATION, AND
MAKING MORE MONEY

Since private prison contracts are written by state and federa l
policymakers and overseen by state and federal agency
administrators, it is in the best interest of private prison companies
to build the connections needed to influence policies related to
incarceration.
In order to ensure that they have a stable or
increasing ‚market share‛ of incarceration
(and therefore increasing revenue), private
prison companies engage in a political game
to influence policy and incarceration. Over the
last two decades private prison companies
have developed a three-pronged approach to
influence incarceration policy and secure
government contracts. Through campaign
contributions, lobbying and building
relationships and associations, private prison
companies engage in an aggressive political
strategy to influence criminal justice policies
in ways that lead to more people in prison
and more money in their pockets.

STRATEGY 1:
CAMPAIGN
CONTRIBUTIONS
As elected policymakers initiate or approve
decisions to enter into private prison

contracts, establishing positive connections to
politicians is an important business strategy
for private prison companies. By maintaining
contacts and favorable ties with policymakers,
private prison companies can attempt to
shape the debate around the privatization of
prisons and criminal justice policy. One way
to do that is to make direct, monetary
contributions to political campaigns for
elected officials and specific policies.

Where do the Big Private Prison
Companies Spend their Money?
Private prison companies, through their
Political Action Committees (PACs) and
contributions by their employees, give
millions of dollars to politicians at both the
state and federal level.58 Since 2000, the three
largest private prison companies—CCA, GEO

GAMING THE SYSTEM

16

Total Political Giving by CCA, GEO and
Cornell

State political giving by these private prison companies
and Cornell
has been increasing over the past five major election
i
Companies —have
cycles.
contributed
$2,500,000
$835,514 to federal
$2,223,941
candidates,
$2,000,000
including senators
and members of
$1,500,000
the House of
$840,885
$1,000,000
Representatives.59
Giving to state$500,000
level politicians
during the last
$0
five election cycles
was much higher:
$6,092,331.60 This
Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction &
likely reflects two management/for-profit Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
factors: that states www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000
collectively
private prison companies are offering
continue to be their largest client, and that at
policymakers a way to transfer, rather than
the federal level, elected officials may be less
reduce, the number of people they lock up.65
involved in the decisions to award private
CCA gave $1 million in these three states
prison contracts than non-elected bureaucrats.
combined between 2003 and 2010, accounting
Contributions to state politicians have been
for two-thirds of its total giving in all states.66
increasing over the past five major election
GEO Group had a similar pattern, with more
cycles. For instance, 2010 marked the highest
than two-thirds of giving focused on
recorded year of state political giving by these
California, Florida, and New Mexico.67 These
private prison companies since 2000.61
contributions signify a concentrated effort to

These private prison companies tend to
concentrate their efforts in specific states,
particularly California, Florida, and to a lesser
degree, Georgia. Florida, the home of the GEO
Group, not only has the second highest
private prison population in the country,62 but
has budgetary mandates that certain prison
beds be privatized.63 Attention to California is
likely based on the state having the largest
incarcerated population, and the existence of a
U.S. Supreme Court-order to reduce its
overcrowded prison system by as many as
46,000 people over the next two years;64
Cornell Companies was bought by The GEO Group
in August of 2010. The impact of this merger on
campaign contributions and prison policy is yet to be
seen.
i

influence policy in those states.
With most states and the federal government
operating under record deficits and
decreasing budgets, private prison companies
have a growing desire to establish influential
connections with policymakers, with two
goals: pitching private prisons as a lower cost
alternative to building or maintaining state
facilities; and fighting policies that might
reduce the use of incarceration.

17

JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

California
Florida
Georgia
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 27 states
Florida

State Campaign Contributions
Corrections Corporation of America (2003 to 2010)
State
Contributions
$459,150
$300,000
$241,750
$1,000,900
$1,552,350
GEO Group (2003 to 2010)
$1,455,609

California
New Mexico
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 23 states

$227,000
$220,150
$1,902,759
$2,400,679
Cornell Companies (2006 to 2009)

Georgia
Texas

$25,000
$24,000

Pennsylvania

$16,050

Three-state TOTAL

$65,050

Total in 6 states

$72,650

Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – Corrections Corp of America,‛ accessed
May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552; National Institute on Money in
State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – GEO Group,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – Cornell Companies,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=103304
Notes: For a better picture of contributions given by this client, see the Noteworthy Contributor on the Institute for
Money in State Politics website for Corrections Corporation of America, GEO Group, and Cornell Companies.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

18

FOR PROFIT PRISONS AND THE DANGER OF CORRUPTION AND ABUSE
The extent to which corporate campaign contributions influence elected officials‟ decision-making is a
matter of much debate. But in one recent case, a private juvenile correctional facility crossed the line,
making outright payments to judges in a clear quid pro quo with tragic results.
In Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, two local private youth prisons made illegal payments to two judges
totaling over $2.6 million. In what came to be known as the “kids for cash” scandal, the Mid Atlantic Youth
Service Corporation paid the judges for sentencing youth to confinement in their two private youth prisons.
It is estimated that over 5,000 children appeared before the two judges over the past decade, and half of
those who waived their right to counsel were sentenced to serve time in one of the private correctional
facilities. According to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, privately owned
i
corporations operate more than 50 percent of youth correctional facilities in the United States.
Over the years, media attention has brought to light allegations of child abuse, sexual assault, and neglect
regarding privately owned and operated youth correctional facilities. For instance, in 2003, the Department
of Justice concluded that the private prison company operating the Swanson Correctional Center for Youth
in Tallulah, Louisiana was unfit to manage the facility. Such allegations raise questions about the human
cost of privatization of prisons, especially when private prisons profit when more youth are incarcerated –
which research shows produces the worst outcomes for youth (and for public safety as well).
Sources:
Stephanie Chen. February 23, 2009. “Pennsylvania rocked by „jailing kids for cash‟ scandal.” CNN Justice.
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-02-23/justice/pennsylvania.corrupt.judges_1_detention-judges-number-of-juvenileoffenders?_s=PM:CRIME
i
Private facilities amount to 56 percent of all entire correctional institutions for persons under the age of 20.
Department of Justice, Louisiana Juvenile Findings Letter 1. United States of Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division.
www.justice.gov/crt/split/documents/lajuvfind1.php
Justice Policy Institute, “Costs of Confinement” (Washington, D.C.: 2009).

Contribution Strategies
Private prison companies have
developed a strategic method of
political giving and are less
interested in political party,
values or philosophy than in
access to policymakers.68
According to the Institute on
Money in State Politics, private
prison companies support
incumbents who win elections,
regardless of party.69 Access to
power, clearly, is more important
than supporting particular
political beliefs.
Recent giving, when analyzed by
political party, reinforces the lack
of adherence to a political
ideology. Although on the
whole, most private prison

From 2003-2010, CCA, GEO, and
Cornell largely contributed to winning
campaigns.
Losers $266,867
(16%)

Winners $1,257,161
(75%)

Not up for
election $162,350
(10%)

Sources: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Corrections Corp of America –
Figure C: Contributions to Candidates by Election Status from 2003 to 2010,‛ accessed
May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=695&y=0;
National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚GEO Group – Figure C: Contributions to
Candidates by Election Status from 2003 to 2010,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=1096&y=0; National
Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Cornell Companies – Figure C: Contributions to
Candidates by Election Status from 2003 to 2010,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/topcontributor.phtml?u=6448&y=0

19

JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Contributions to Federal Candidates

Hawai‘i Governor Linda
Lingle. Prior to 2009,
Hawai‘i primarily relied on
private prisons in the
$180,000
continental U.S. to help
$160,000
$140,000
manage their prison
$120,000
population. During
$100,000
Governor Lingle’s
$80,000
administration the number
$60,000
of people in private prisons
$40,000
grew 58 percent from 1,347
$20,000
$0
in 2002 to an all-time high
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008*
2010
of 2,129 in 2007.72 In 2004,
CCA– the largest
Democrats
Republicans
beneficiary of Hawai‘i’s use
Source: Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Miscellaneous Business: PAC Contributions to
of private prisons–
Federal Candidates – 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,‛ February 2011.
contributed $6,000 to
www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=N12&cycle=2010
Governor Lingle.73
company contributions have gone to
Interestingly, CCA’s
Republican candidates (67.2 percent), 2010
contribution, the maximum contribution limit
saw the majority of contributions from these
for a gubernatorial candidate,74 was given on
private prison companies going toward
an off election year – Lingle wasn’t up for refederal Democratic candidates (63.4 percent).70
election until 2006. CCA’s contribution to
Governor Lingle’s successful reelection bid
At the state level, both Democrats and third
came in the middle of the rapid increase of
party candidates have received a combined total
Hawai‘i’s efforts to ship people to private
of over $2.4 million in contributions since 2000.
prisons on the ‚mainland.‚ Although there is

Private prison companies give to federal candidates
from both parties.

In addition to mainly supporting winning
candidates over those from a particular
party, private prison companies are
strategic in the timing of giving to
campaigns. The pattern of giving shows
these companies tend to contribute early
and late in campaigns.71 By contributing
early and late in election cycles, private
prison companies are able to achieve two
goals: 1) solidifying a positive association
with the candidate early and 2)
reinforcing their connections to
candidates who will become
policymakers.
An example of CCA’s strategic giving can
be seen in its contribution to former

While most state money goes to GOP
candidates, almost a third goes to
Democrats and almost 9% to ballot
measures.
Ballot
Measures
Third Party
8.7%
0.3%

Democrats
31.8%
Republicans
59.1%

Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities
construction & management/for-profit Contributions to All Candidates and
Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000

GAMING THE SYSTEM

20

In 2010, these private prison companies spent over
$2 million on state politics.

Gubernatorial
Candidates
16% ($347,388)

Party Committees
48% ($1,057,594)

Senate/House
Candidates
18% ($401,065

Ballot Measures
16% ($367,500)

Other Statewide
Office Candidates
2% ($46,400)
Court Candidates
>1% ($3,995)

Sources: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to
All Candidates and Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Gubernatorial Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=G&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Senate Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=S&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to House/Assembly Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=H&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Other Statewide Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=O&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to High Court Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=J&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Appellate Court Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=K&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=B&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State Politics,
‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Party Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=P&s=0&b[]=G7000

no clear ‚quid pro quo‛ between CCA’s
contribution to Lingle and increased contracts,
the company did benefit greatly from the
Lingle administration’s increased use of
exporting people in prison from Hawai‘i to
their private prisons on the ‛mainland.‚ The
number of people in private prisons
continued to grow during the Lingle
administration, until reports of sexual abuse
and other abuse allegations of Hawaiians in
private prisons forced the administration to
start bringing women home in 2009.75

In addition, these private prison companies
have contributed over $600,000 to ballot
measure campaigns since 2000.76 Such a wide
range of state contributions by these
companies indicates the attempt to influence
both the public and policymaking debate
around criminal justice and the privatization
of prisons.
In 2010, the three largest private prison
companies spent $2,223,941 on state political
contributions with the majority ($1,057,594) of

21

JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

REDUCING THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN PRISONS IN HAWAI„I:
COMMUNITY ALLIANCE ON PRISONS
Community Alliance on Prisons (CAP) works on a variety of issues related to criminal justice reform and
maintains a strong presence in the Hawai„i Legislature and media.
CAP supported the effort to bring women home who were held on the continent in the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA)-operated Otter Creek Correctional Center after Hawaiian officials
discovered that the women housed there were subjected to sexual abuse. CAP also is monitoring
Governor Neil Abercrombie‟s proposal to bring home men currently housed in another CCA-owned facility
in Arizona. For the last several years, suspicious deaths and complaints regarding the ability of people in
the prison to participate in Native Hawaiian rituals have concerned advocates in Hawai„i.
i

CAP has recently been advocating for the passage of a bill (SB106/HD141), which addresses the 2005
decision by the Department of Public Safety (PSD) to recalculate the sentences of all the people serving
multiple terms of imprisonment. Previously, unless otherwise specified by a judge, sentences were
concurrent. PSD, without approval from the judiciary or legislature, recalculated all concurrent sentences
to be consecutive, thus adding to the length of time that a person serves behind bars. Given that in 2005
around half of the people serving a sentence of a year or more were serving their sentences in a CCA
facility, such an extension of the length of confinement would be in the interest of CCA.
A previous bill had made legislation conform to the practice of giving concurrent sentences unless
otherwise specified, but it was prospective. The current bill would make the practice retroactive, potentially
reducing the number of people in prison, especially in CCA facilities.
For more information about the Community Alliance, please visit:
www.lifeofthelandhawaii.org/Community_Alliance_on_Prisons.html

money going to state party committees.77 Most
notable is that every possible avenue of
influence was covered in the contribution
period – from work on state ballot measures to
high court candidates. While the majority of
contributions in 2010 went to state party
committees over 30 percent of political
contributions went directly to candidates
running for various positions in state
government.78

STRATEGY 2:
LOBBYING
Lobbying efforts by companies, organizations,
and constituencies are a well documented
part of politics in the United States. Similar to
other industries, private prison companies
employ lobbying firms and lobbyists to
advocate for their business interests in
Congress and state legislatures. While giving

to political candidates must be coordinated
through employee contributions and PACs
and is governed by donation limits,
corporations can directly fund lobbyists
without any spending limitations to push
their business agenda. Since private prisons
make money from putting people behind
bars, their lobbying efforts focus on bills that
affect incarceration and law enforcement,
such as appropriations for corrections and
detention.
Limited information is available to the general
public regarding the paid lobbying efforts of
private prison companies, and when this
information is available it is often unclear how
the company lobbied on a particular piece of
legislation. The chart on page 23 highlights
CCA’s 2010 lobbying efforts on federal
legislation; lobbyists are not required to report
whether they supported or opposed the bills.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

22

A NEW WAY TO INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNS
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission
On January 21, 2010 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on a challenge to a portion of the McCain-Feingold
Campaign Reform Act barring corporations from using their general treasury funds to participate in
i
independent election–season activities. In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the court
knocked down this restriction on corporate spending on political advertising, saying the use of their funds
for such actions was protected under the First Amendment‟s freedom of speech provision. The ruling did
affirm however, the requirement that corporations making election-related speech must be clearly
identified as the author of such messaging.
The controversial 5-4 decision has been met with criticism largely concerning the effect of corporate
money in politics. Retired Justice Sandra Day O‟Connor stated “no state can possibly benefit from having
that much money injected into a political campaign.” Justice O‟Connor‟s concerns also extended to the
justice system and the potential impact of the ruling on an independent judiciary. Considering 80 percent
of state court judges face elections at some point during their careers, the impact of corporate involvement
in the judicial election process is unclear. With the increased ability for corporations to be actively involved
in the political dialogue, it remains to be seen whether private prison corporations will use general funds
for independent campaign expenditures, but the Citizens United ruling certainly opens the door for them to
do so.
Sources
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, No. 08-205, Supreme Court of the United States (2010). www.scotusblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2010/01/citizens-opinion.pdf
i
This includes for-profit and non-profit corporations as well as unions.
Matthew Mosk, “O‟Connor Calls Citizens United Ruling „A Problem,‟” ABC News, 26 January 2010.
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/oconnor-citizens-united-ruling-problem/story?id=9668044

Knowing that private prison companies bring
in revenue from holding people in prison, it is
likely that their lobbying efforts contribute to
promoting the current approach to
incarceration, and decrease the impetus for
reform. By working to shape the debate on
penalties, sentencing, and privatization of
correctional services, private prison
companies can galvanize the support from
policymakers they need to secure private
prison contracts for correctional services. Over
the last decade, CCA, GEO and Cornell
Corrections spent, on average, hundreds of
thousands of dollars to employ lobbyists to
represent their business interests to federal
policymakers. Since 2003, CCA has spent
upwards of $900,000 annually on federal
lobbying.79 In addition to direct political
giving and work on model legislation,
companies like CCA and GEO continue to pay
lobbyists hundreds of thousands of dollars to
promote their business interest in Congress.

These three companies also hire lobbyists for
state legislation, as their clients are currently
primarily states. In Florida alone, these
companies utilized 30 lobbyists to advocate
for private prison contracts and policies to
promote the use of these prisons.80
Tracking state-level lobbying can prove
challenging, as private prison company
lobbyists often meet behind closed doors and
do not necessarily testify in public,81 and
reporting requirements vary by state. The
combined executive and legislative branch
lobbying reported for GEO in the state of
Florida from January 1 through March 31,
2011 ranged between $120,000 and $199,992,

23

JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

CCA LOBBIED ON SEVERAL PIECES OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION IN 2010.
Bill Number
H.R. 2450

Bill Title
Private Prison
Information Act
of 2009

S. 251

Safe Prisons
Communications
Act of 2009

S. 3607

Department of
Homeland
Security
Appropriations
Act, 2011

S. 3636

Commerce,
Justice, Science,
and Related
Agencies
Appropriations
Act, 2011
Military
Construction
and Veterans
Affairs and
Related
Agencies
Appropriations
Act, 2010

H.R. 3082

Bill Description
To require non-Federal prisons and
correctional facilities holding people in
federal custody under a contract with the
federal government to make the same
information available to the public that
Federal prisons and correctional facilities
are required to make available
Prohibit the provision of federal funds to
state and local governments for payment
of obligations, to prohibit the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System
from financially assisting state and local
governments, and for other purposes
Appropriations for the Department of
Homeland Security for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2011

Appropriations for the Departments of
Commerce and Justice, and Science, and
Related Agencies for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2011

Making appropriations for military
construction, the Department of Veterans
Affairs, and related agencies for the fiscal
year ending September 30, 2010, and for
other purposes.

Specific Issues Lobbied
All provisions

Outcome of Bill
Died in House subcommittee

All provisions

Passed Senate, died in House
subcommittee

FY2011 provisions and funding related
to Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE); provisions related
to ICE detention; FY2012 budget provisions and funding related to the
Office of Federal Detention Trustee and
ICE.
FY2011 provisions and funding related
to the Bureau of Prisons and the Office
of the Federal Detention; provisions
related to private prisons.

Continuing resolution for FY
2011 budget included 5.3%
increase in funding for the
Federal Detention Trustee,
while Department of Justice
generally had a 17% decrease
in funding.
Continuing resolution for FY
2011 budget included a 3.4%
increase for the Bureau of
Prisons, while the Department
of Justice generally had a 17%
decrease in funding.
Became Public Law No: 111322

FY2011 provisions and funding related
to the Bureau of Prisons, the Office of
the Federal Detention Trustee and ICE;
FY2012 budget -provisions and funding
related to the Office of Federal
Detention Trustee and ICE.

Sources: Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Lobbying Corrections Corp of America – Bills 2010,‛ February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientbills.php?lname=Corrections+Corp+of+America&year=2010;
Govtrack, ‚Federal Legislation,‛ May 2011. www.govtrack.us/congress/legislation.xpd
Note: Blue rows are justice-related pieces of legislation. All bills were introduced in the 111th Congress.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

24

Total expeditures on federal lobbying by CCA, GEO and Cornell have
fluctuated over the past decade.

Total Lobbying Spending

$3,500,000
$3,000,000
$2,500,000
$2,000,000
$1,500,000
$1,000,000
$500,000
$-

CCA

GEO

Cornell

Sources: Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Lobbying Corrections Corp of America – Summary 2010,‛ February 2011.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Corrections+Corp+of+America&year=2010; Center for Responsive Politics,
‚Lobbying GEO Group – Summary 2010,‛ February 2011.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=GEO+Group&year=2010; Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Lobbying Cornell
Companies – Summary 2010,‛ February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Cornell+Companies&year=2010

while in that same time period, CCA’s
combined legislative and executive branch
lobbying ranged between $10,000 and
$29,998.82 That the private prison industry
sees lobbying as critical to its bottom line is
clear. Even in Montana, which has only 1.5
percent of the total population of people
under state jurisdiction held in private
prisons, CCA spend $36,666 in the off-year of
a biennial session cycle.83

•

•
While the broad scope of private prison
lobbying makes it too numerous to catalog,
below are a few examples that have garnered
media attention:
• In 1996, three former lobbyists from
Wackenhut (now The GEO Group) sued
the Texas Department of Corrections,
alleging that agency officials pressured
Wackenhut to have them fired because
they were too successful at expanding

private prisons at a time when the
Department of Corrections did not want
private contracts.84
Due to lobbying largely led by the GEO
Group, the Florida state legislature
approved a budget deal that would
require privatizing all of the prisons in
South Florida – home to about one-fifth of
the statewide prison population of
101,000.85
Although there has been a lengthy
courtship by CCA of the town of Milo,
Maine to build a private prison, a CCA
lobbyist recently assured a legislative
panel that there had been no ‚quid pro
quo‛ involved. Currently Maine does not
house any of its prison population in
private facilities because Maine Law
forbids people under state custody from
being sent to private facilities.86

25 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Florida
Tennessee
Nevada
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 32 states
Florida

State Lobbying
Corrections Corporation of America (2003 to 2010)
State
Number of State Lobbyists
17
12
12
41
179
GEO GROUP (2003 to 2010)
13

Texas
California
Three-state TOTAL
Total in 16 states

8
7
28
63
Cornell Companies (2006 to 2009)

Illinois
Ohio

5
1

Alaska

1

Three-state TOTAL

7

Total in 4 states

8

Source: National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – Corrections Corp of America,‛ accessed
May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552; National Institute on Money in
State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – GEO Group,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – Cornell Companies,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=103304
Notes: Total # of lobbyists may include the same lobbyist working in multiple states. For a better picture of
contributions given by this client, see the Noteworthy Contributor on the Institute for Money in State Politics
website for Corrections Corporation of America, GEO Group, and Cornell Companies.

STRATEGY 3:
RELATIONSHIPS AND
ASSOCIATIONS
Networks and relationships are immensely
important to all businesses. Organizational
theories about relationships and leadership
indicate that individual people influence the
operations and behavior of an organization

through prior relationships, associations,
experiences, and networks.87 In other words,
people bring with them the lens of previous
affiliations, and a sense of obligation to
represent their world view; they may also be
subject to pressure from previous professional
relations to act in ways that benefit these
relations.

GAMING THE SYSTEM
As government regulation impacts all
businesses, there is always a desire for
relationships with government officials. But
for private prison companies, whose profits
are almost completely dependent on public
policies and funding, their relationships with
those who can influence government
decision making are paramount. Private
prison companies have benefited from their
relationships with government officials as
evidenced by appointments of former

26

employees to key state and federal positions.
The relationship between government
officials and private prison companies has
been part of the fabric of the industry from
the start; Tom Beasley, one of the founders of
CCA, was a former government official in
Tennessee. The pervasiveness of these
connections is evidenced with these recent
examples:

AN IMPOSSIBLE TASK: TOTALING UP STATE LOBBYING EXPENDITURES
Each state has different laws around the disclosure of lobbying activities. Some states require
lobbyists to disclose the dollar amounts of lobbying contracts, either in exact figures or in ranges;
others just require lobbyists to identify tangible expenditures, such as meals and gifts. Some don‟t
require lobbyists to say what legislation they are being paid to try to influence, while others require
both the bill numbers and whether the lobbyists are in support of or opposition to the legislation.
To show the challenges facing those trying to “follow the money,” below is one example of one lobbyist
in New Mexico, the state with the highest percentage (43.3 percent) of people in prison being held in
private facilities. The Secretary of State‟s website allows a search by “Groups” engaging lobbyists;
both CCA and Geo Group employ lobbyists. Judging by the disclosure reports, CCA‟s principal
lobbyist in 2010 and 2011 was Edwin T. Mahr. In his May 1, 2010 report, Mahr indicated spending on
meals and beverages in January and February of $1,938.22, including four dinners with named
elected officials and $1,123.01 in undisclosed “lump sum expenditures under $75;” there were also
expenditures for an “HB100 Party” and the “Senate Demo Caucus.” In 2011, Mahr reported 10 dinners
in January and February with individual legislators or committees totaling $2,033. In these reports,
Mahr was not required to report what legislation he was lobbying for, or the cost of his services.
Additionally, Mahr represented several other clients, and was not required to identify which client‟s
account paid for each dinner.
New Mexico also requires lobbyists to disclose their political contributions; Mahr made a $200
donation to the re-election campaign of Sen. Tim Eichenberg (D) on 4/25/2011, whose website reads,
“A healthy, robust democracy is one in which legislators listen to and are beholden solely to the voters
in their districts -- not big campaign donors and lobbyists.” Sen. Eichenberg is a member of the
Judiciary Committee; two bills he sponsored but which died in committee, S.B. 453 and S.B. 519,
would likely have resulted in longer sentences of incarceration and greater costs. Mahr‟s January 15,
2011 report of political contributions showed 68 donations totaling $20,700, all made either before May
th
15 or after October 1st; $6,500 of these were noted as being “CCA” donations.
Sources:
Edwin T. Mahr, 2010 Lobbyist Reporting Form (Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Secretary of State, April 2010).
http://www.sos.state.nm.us/2010LobbyistReports/MahrE512.pdf
Edwin T. Mahr, 2011 Lobbyist Reporting Form (Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Secretary of State, January 2011).
http://www.sos.state.nm.us/2011LobbyistReports/MahrET.pdf
Edwin T. Mahr, 2011 Lobbyist Reporting Form (Santa Fe, NM: New Mexico Secretary of State, April 2011).
New Mexico Secretary of State, “Lobbyist Information,” May 2011. http://www.sos.state.nm.us/sos-Lobbyist.html
New Mexico State Legislature, “Bill Locator,” May 2011. http://www.nmlegis.gov/lcs/_locatorcom.aspx?year=11
Tim Eichenberg, “Issues,” May 2011. http://eichenbergfornewmexico.com/issues

27 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

•

•

Stacia Hylton and The GEO Group:
President Obama’s appointed Director of
the United States Marshals Service, Stacia
Hylton, has strong ties to the private
prison industry.88 In 2010, Hylton started
a private prison consulting firm, called
Hylton Kirk and Associates, while still
working at the Department of Justice as
the Federal Detention Trustee.89 After
retiring from the trustee position, Hylton
agreed to a consulting contract with The
GEO Group worth $112,500.90 As Director
of the U.S. Marshals, Hylton will head an
agency that has a long-standing
contractual relationship with The GEO
Group. In 2010, the U.S. Marshal’s
accounted for 19 percent of GEO’s
revenue.91 With Hylton in a position to
oversee government contracts with
private prisons, the ongoing influence of
private prison companies in the public
sphere is virtually guaranteed.
John Kasich, Lehman Brothers and CCA:
After serving 18 years in the U.S. House of
Representatives John Kasich retired in
2000 and took a managing director
position in Ohio with Lehman Brothers.92
Lehman Brothers has a long standing

•

history with private prison companies,
spending most of the late 1990s and 2000s
before their collapse underwriting bonds
and managing credit for both CCA and
Cornell.93 After winning the governorship
of Ohio in 2010, Kasich laid out his plans
for privatizing state prison operations
along with appointing a former CCA
employee to head the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction.94 Rounding
out Kasich’s connections to CCA is his
close friend and former Congressional
chief of staff whose lobbying firm was
hired to represent CCA in January 2011.95
Former CCA Warden and Maine:
Governor Paul LePage appointed former
CCA Warden Joe Ponte as the
Commissioner of the Maine Department of
Corrections.96 While Maine currently does
not have any private prisons, according to
news reports, CCA has been in discussions
with the town of Milo for the past 3 years
over the possibility of building a $150
million facility.97 The appointment of Ponte
and the $25,000 in campaign contributions
LePage received from CCA raise concerns
of increased access for CCA to open private
prisons in Maine.98

TENNESSEANS AGAINST PURYEAR: A FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
In 2007, President George W. Bush nominated CCA‟s general counsel, Gustavus Puryear IV, to a
lifetime appointment on the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.
Alex Friedmann, currently of Prison Legal News, organized a campaign to prevent his appointment.
Beyond the concern that general counsel of CCA would be serving as judge in a district where CCA
Headquarters is also located, Puryear did not have the qualifications to hold the position. Among the
most prominent issues, Puryear lacked litigation and trial experience, received a comparatively low rating
in the American Bar Association‟s review of judicial nominees, had close, personal and professional ties
to Vice President Dick Cheney, and was involved in representation of people involved in the case of a
suspicious death of a woman held in a CCA facility.
In addition to compiling information about Puryear for the Senate Judiciary Committee tasked with
approving the appointment, Friedmann also organized other organizations, including Alliance for Justice,
Grassroots Leadership, and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, among
others, to oppose his nomination. On January 2, 2009, the nomination was returned to the White House,
effectively denying Puryear the appointment.
Source: Paul Wright and others, “Deconstructing Gus: A Former CCA Prisoner Takes On, and Takes Down, CCA‟s Top Lawyer,”
Prison Legal News, March 2009. www.againstpuryear.org/plncoverstory.pdf

GAMING THE SYSTEM

•

Former New Mexico Secretary of
Corrections and GEO: Former New
Mexico Secretary of Corrections Joe
Williams was criticized in 2010 by a state
senator for not fining GEO and CCA for
contract violations. Prior to being
Secretary of Corrections, Williams had
served as a warden in one of GEO’s
correctional facilities. 99

For private prison companies, their
connections between the private and public
spheres has provided access to the people
with the most influence over policies that
drive incarceration rates. Certainly, the firms
might argue that this access is used primarily
to secure their market share. But with two
companies now controlling most of the
private prisons, it is clear that increasing the
size and scope of their business – is an ever
more important target.
Arguments that political contributions and
lobbying from private prison companies have
little influence over policymaking because
public facilities and agencies do their own
lobbying100 ignore the relationships that
influence policymaking and the appointment
of former private prison company officials
and friends.

Moving Policies Forward Through
“Friendly” Associations
With former employees in positions within
state and federal administrations, private
prison companies have been able to gain
access to the executive branch. In order to
build relationships with the legislative branch,
these firms have become active members of
associations that include policymakers and
are involved in formulating new policies. In
this way, private prison companies have been
able to insert their own agenda into the
process of drafting new legislation that
strengthens their bottom line.

28

The American Legislative Exchange Council
(ALEC) is a Washington D.C.-based public
policy non-profit organization whose stated
mission is to advance conservative principles
of free markets, limited government and
individual liberty.101 It is a membership
organization comprised of state legislators,
business professionals, and private
corporations and seeks to build partnerships
between state legislators and the private
business sector. State legislators can join by
paying an annual $50 membership fee, while
private corporations such as Exxon Mobil,
Pfizer, and CCA pay tens of thousands of
dollars in dues annually.102 According to an
investigative report by NPR, ALEC’s tax
records show that corporations, collectively,
pay as much as $6 million a year for
membership and access to legislators at three
yearly conferences.103
In 1981, ALEC‘s chairman was selected as a
member of President Reagan’s national Task
Force on Federalism,104 which encouraged
direct interaction between ALEC’s corporate
members and administration officials.
Subsequently, in 1986, ALEC developed
internal Task Forces to respond to state
policy105 and develop model legislation. Now,
ALEC primarily functions to develop model
legislative proposals that advance free market
principles with a significant focus on
privatization.106
On average, ALEC drafts approximately 1,000
pieces of model legislation in a year, which
are then introduced by ALEC’s legislative
members.107 Annually, approximately 20
percent of its proposed legislation is passed
and enacted as laws in various states
throughout the country.108
Since its inception, ALEC has taken a strong
interest in public safety and criminal justice
policy, directing the Public Safety and
Elections Task Force (formerly the Criminal

29 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Justice and Homeland Security Task Force)
that drafts legislation designed to ‚hold
criminals accountable for their actions < and
provide swift and certain punishment for
their crimes – without adding more
government intrusions into law abiding
citizens’ lives.‛109
Both CCA and GEO are members and
supporting contributors of ALEC, with both
companies represented on ALEC Task Forces.
CCA pays an additional annual membership
fee for a seat on the Public Safety Task Force,
110 having, at times co-chaired the Task Force.
111 Belonging to ALEC allows these companies
the opportunity to advocate for continued
reliance on incarceration, generally, and the
use of privately-run prisons, specifically, to
state policymakers and even provide the
legislation that meets that agenda.
Since the 1980s and 1990s, ALEC facilitated
the production of model bills focusing on
mandatory minimums, three strikes laws
(giving 25 years to life in prison for repeat
offenses), and ‚truth-in-sentencing‛
legislation (requiring people to serve most or
all of their time without chance for parole),112
all of which are significant contributors to the
dramatic increase in incarceration in the last
30 years.113 Although ALEC did not invent
these ideas, they did play a significant role in
helping to make them law in states.114

Being able, through ALEC, to have a hand in
drafting model legislation and promoting its
passage was a strategic move by the industry
that has to date helped ensure continued
profits.115 However, with all legislators—
including ALEC members—becoming
increasingly interested in reducing
correctional costs, there is no longer a
guarantee that ALEC will support policies
that result in higher rates of state
incarceration. In competition with private
prisons are other industries which are coming
up with solutions to reduce incarceration
costs that will benefit them. For instance, a
2007 brief by ALEC recommended releasing
people early from prison with conditional
release bonds, similar to bail bonds,
effectively setting up bonding companies as
private parole agencies.116 ALEC’s workgroup
platform states that legislators should ‚pass
legislation that expands community
supervision, reinvest in and create treatment
programs that work, and identify the
individual needs of offenders and address
those needs directly to help ensure successful
reentry into the community.‛117 Interestingly,
much of CCA’s lobbying in at least one state
(Montana) was directed toward making it
possible for a for-profit corporation such as
themselves to provide such services.118

GAMING THE SYSTEM

30

CCA AND THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE IN ARIZONA
In the spring of 2011, National Public Radio (NPR) investigated the role that CCA played in influencing
Arizona legislation that would increase one of its fastest growing revenue bases – immigration detention.
The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB 1070) increases police power to
question and detain anyone who cannot prove they are in the country legally. It was originally conceived
and drafted at an ALEC meeting that included officials from CCA. When the legislation was brought to the
Arizona statehouse floor as a bill in January 2010, 36 legislators co-sponsored it – two-thirds of whom
either attended the meeting where the bill was written or were members of ALEC. Over the next six
months, 30 of the bill‟s co-sponsors received campaign contributions from private prison lobbyists or
companies, including CCA and The GEO Group.
While CCA played a significant role in influencing state legislators, the connection between the private
prison industry and SB 1070 did not end on the statehouse floor. Two of Arizona Governor Jan Brewer‟s
top advisers had direct ties to the private prison industry. Prior to joining the Brewer administration, two
senior advisors both worked as lobbyists with private prison companies as clients.
SB 1070 is expected to result in more people being placed into Immigration and Customs Enforcement
custody, increasing the need for immigration detention beds and the likelihood of private prison contracts.
The events surrounding the passage of SB 1070 in Arizona demonstrates the ability private prison
companies have to influence policymakers and legislation to increase profits. As GEO Group President
Wayne Calabrese put it, “… [Now] there‟s going to be enhanced opportunities for what we do.”
Since SB 1070 was signed into law in April 2010, five other state legislatures have introduced similar bills,
including HB 87 in Georgia which became law on May 13, 2011. In Tennessee, home to CCA, 2011
immigration legislation may be stalled due to projected increased costs to law enforcement.
Sources:
Laura Sullivan, “Prison Economics Help Drive Arizona Immigration Law,” NPR, October 28, 2010.
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833741&ps=cprs;
Laura Sullivan, “Shaping State Laws with Little Scrutiny,” NPR, October 29, 2010.
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130891396&ps=cprs
Nate Rau, “Tennessee Efforts to Copy Arizona Immigration Law Bring Fears,” The Tennessean, December 5, 2010.
www.tennessean.com/article/20101205/NEWS01/12050356/TN+efforts+to+copy+Arizona+immigration+law+bring+fears
USA Today, “Georgia governor signs immigration bill into law,” May 14, 2011. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-13-georgiaimmigration-law_n.htm
Sam Stockard, “Carr‟s immigration bills appear stalled,” DJN.com, May 12, 2011.
http://www.dnj.com/article/20110512/NEWS05/105120317

31 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

PART 5

LOSING THE GAME

When private prison companies are successful at the game of
political influence, their profits rise, benefitting their stockholders
and top management. However, growing evidence shows that many
people lose in this political game at the individual and community
levels.
The policies that private prison companies
promote negatively impact communities in
terms of costs and public safety. And the
increasing use of private prisons due to rising
incarceration rates negatively impacts private
prison employees. But the biggest losers in
this political game are the people who are
taken away from their families and
communities due to the policies private prison
companies promote to increase the number of
people going into prisons and the length of
time they spend behind bars.

TAXPAYERS LOSE
Policies that promote incarceration over more
effective public safety strategies cost more in
both the short and long term. The average cost
to incarcerate one person for one day in the
U.S. is $78.88.119 Thus, policies that increase
the length of time that someone is
incarcerated can have a significant fiscal
impact. For example, one study found that 10
years after California enacted its Three Strikes
law, the people added to the prison system
under the law between March 1994 and
September 2003 would cost taxpayers an
additional $10.5 billion in prison and jail
expenditures, including $6.2 billion in added

costs attributed to longer prison terms for
nonviolent offenses.120
Most people agree that they would pay
anything to be safe, but incarceration does not
satisfy this requirement. Some of the most
prominent criminologists in the country have
found that incarceration has minimal, if any
impact on public safety.121 And serving time
in prison has been shown to increase the risk
of future offending, not decrease it.122
Additionally, the trend of increasing prison
sentences does not improve public safety.
Data from the Department of Justice shows
little difference in recidivism rates for people
who spend short sentences in prison
compared to those who are in prison longer.123
Research shows that investing in services and
programs that keep people out of the justice
system is more effective at improving public
safety and promoting community well-being
than investing in law enforcement.124 Despite
evidence that investing in education and other
positive social institutions can improve public
safety and save states money, policymakers
continue to invest in incarceration.125 Over the
past 38 years corrections’ spending has
increased to three times that of state spending
on education.126 This misallocation of funding

GAMING THE SYSTEM
has the potential for a significant negative
impact on the future of our youth and
communities.

little to no cost savings from private
prisons.128

•

THE COMMUNITY
LOSES
Communities primarily lose out when it
comes to private, for-profit prisons in two
ways: hidden costs and public safety. There
may appear to be an immediate cost savings
compared to that of facilities run by a
government, but long-term costs negate those
savings. In addition, the safety of
communities is compromised as increasing
incarceration rates are not shown to improve
public safety—and may even make it worse—
and adequate and appropriate reentry
services are not available to ensure that
people returning to the community are
prepared to succeed in terms of employment
and reintegration.

Private Prisons are not
Necessarily Cheaper than
Government Facilities.
Communities often build private prisons
because they are promised that they are
cheaper and more quickly constructed than
going through a typical governmental
approval process to site, fund, and build a
government-owned and operated prison.
However, hidden costs related to the actual
operation, lawsuits, and instances in which
private prison companies don’t fill their
facilities end up costing communities more
than anticipated.
Some studies, like those cited on CCA’s
website, purport to bring significant savings
to communities.127 Those studies, however, do
not include assessments by the General
Accounting Office, the National Institute of
Justice, and the University of Utah, which find

32

•

•

•

A 2008 National Institute of Justice report
compared a Bureau of Prisons study129
with another study by Abt Associates on
the same facilities and found that Abt
Associates did not include overhead and
indirect costs, thus making private
facilities appear most cost effective.130
In 1996, the General Accounting Office
compared public and private prisons in
five states (Texas, California, Tennessee,
New Mexico, and Washington) and found
little difference in costs.131
A 2009 meta-analysis by researchers at the
University of Utah found minimal costsavings associated with prison
privatization and that any cost savings are
not guaranteed.132
An Arizona Department of Corrections
study looking at 2007 comparison costs
between state and private prisons, found
some savings for private medium security
facilities, but significant losses for
minimum security private prisons,
$954,069 and $1,297,308 respectively.133

Many studies, including those by the General
Accounting Office and National Institute of
Justice, cite the difficulty in comparing private
and public facilities. This is due to differences
in how each facility operates under separate
organizational styles, prison size, location,
types of people they house, and programs and
services provided,134 as well as inadequate
data and oversight of private facilities.135
Private prison firms generally only run
minimum- to medium-security facilities and
can choose not to house people with serious
medical or mental health issues.136 One
advocate in Hawai‘i mentioned that
Corrections Corporation of America prefers
Native Hawaiians for their facilities in

33 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Arizona because they believe them to be
docile.137 By contrast, public facilities cannot
choose who they imprison and are responsible
for maintaining security and services
regardless of the cost.
Issues related to a lack of available medical
care, safety incidents in prisons, and poorly
trained staff also result in lawsuits. The state
or jurisdiction could be named in the suit in
addition to the private prison company, but in
some cases the state sues the private prison
company directly. Either way, taxpayers
shoulder the burden of the cost of damages
and legal fees, either directly or through
increased costs for future prison contracts.
Examples include:

•

•

•

In November 2008, the State of Texas
indicted The Geo Group in the death of
Gregorio de la Rosa, Jr.138 One of the
outcomes of the case was a $42.4 million
dollar civil suit settlement out of court.139
In 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center
and the ACLU National Prison Project
filed a law suit against The GEO Group,
the prison administration, and state
officials for abuse, violence, sexual contact
with staff, and other conditions at the
Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility
in Mississippi.140
On March 11, 2011, the American Civil
Liberties Union filed a class action lawsuit
regarding the violent conditions inside the
Idaho Corrections Center, which became
known as ‚Gladiator School.‛ The state
corrections agency was originally
implicated in the lawsuit as well as CCA
and facility staff. However, the ACLU
dropped the IDOC from the lawsuit to
save the state taxpayers money.141

The community can also be hurt if they decide
to pay for the construction of a private prison,
in anticipation of future ongoing contract

revenues. There is no guarantee that once a
private prison facility is built that it will be
filled and stay filled.

•

•

In 2000, the town of Littlefield, Texas
borrowed $10 million to build a prison
that would be operated by The GEO
Group and filled with contract beds from
Idaho and Wyoming. But, given ongoing
state budget crisis, Idaho removed all out
of state prison contracts and the prison is
now empty. GEO abandoned the prison
too, which is now for sale or contract. As
of early 2011, Littlefield was paying
$65,000 per month against the original
loan for construction.142
In Hardin, Montana the city entered into a
deal with a group of private investors to
finance the construction of a private
prison in 2006.143 The idea behind footing
the bill for the prison was that opening
such a facility would bring jobs and
revenue to the small town of 3,600 people.
However, since construction was
completed in 2007 the facility has
remained vacant, leading to a technical
default on $27.4 million in revenue bonds,
further devastating the town’s economic
development prospects.144

Private Prisons do not Improve
Public Safety.
Non-monetary costs to taxpayers for private
prisons are difficult, if not impossible, to
capture. For instance, cost cutting techniques
create safety concerns both for the people in
the facility, as well as after a person is
released.145
By 2008 there were only four known academic
studies attempting to compare public and
private prison recidivism rates.146 At best, the
most recent found no empirical evidence that
private prisons reduce recidivism better than
public prisons.147 At worst, holding people in

GAMING THE SYSTEM
private prisons far from home, like the in case
of the 1,500 people from Hawai’i held in
Arizona, does little to ensure their success
upon release from prison.
While the overall lack of research148
measuring recidivism rates for people serving
time in private prisons makes it difficult to
draw any substantial comparative
conclusions,149 it can be reasoned that without
the same types and levels of services as public
facilities that are intended to prevent returns
to prison upon release,150 recidivism may be
higher for private facilities than public. Given
that private prisons tend to hold people at
minimum and medium-security levels, most
of the people held in these facilities will be
released and many will need services to
succeed in the community.

PRIVATE PRISON
EMPLOYEES
People held in prison are the most vulnerable
to abuse and violence, but people who work
in private prisons are not immune from
injury. Poor training and other cost-saving
measures make the people who staff private
prisons losers in the political battle for private
prisons, too.

Training and Benefits
Private run facilities often provide less
training, pay substantially less, and have a
higher turnover rate of staff than most staterun public facilities.151 Private prisons often
hire correctional officers who have less
education and less training than those in
public facilities. By using cheap and less
skilled labor, private prisons are able to
further reduce their spending and increase
revenue. Most private prisons do not allow
the formation of correctional officer unions,
which helps to reduce the overall cost of

34

running a private prison, but limits the staff’s
ability to negotiate pay, benefits, and proper
training. Although proponents of private
prisons argue that unions drive up prison
costs, they appear to offer a level of stability
and training that is not present in most
private prisons.152

Worker Safety
As a result of lower pay, less training and
higher staff turnover in private facilities there
is an increased likelihood of conflict between
people in prison and prison staff. Working in
a prison is a stressful job and training is key to
preventing staff from abusing people in the
prison, minimizing injuries to staff and to
prevent violence between people held in
prison.153 When staff lacks adequate training
covering topics such as procedures and
conflict resolution it can often lead to more
incidents occurring between officers and those
incarcerated.154
Although some research shows similar rates
of violent incidents between public and
private facilities,155 other studies comparing
private and public prisons found that assaults
on people in private facilities were nearly
double that of public facilities, while assaults
on correctional officers remained largely the
same.156 Since private prisons have greater
control over who enters their facilities, likely
if they held the same types of people as public
prisons, there would be significant safety
concerns due to under-qualified, poorlytrained staff. Given that private prisons are
generally not subject to state or federal

The data presented here indicate that less
costly workers in private prisons have not
produced an acceptable level of public safety
or inmate care to date.
~ SCOTT D. CAMP AND GERALD G. GAES,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, GROWTH AND
QUALITY OF U.S. PRISONS, 2001

35 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

‚Freedom of Information‛ or ‚Sunshine‛
laws, it can be difficult to obtain accurate
information.157

•

PEOPLE IN THE
PRISONS
The people who lose the most in the game
that private prison companies play to increase
incarceration are people in prison. Between
the lack of services, violence, abuse, and an
incentive to hold people for as long as
possible, people in private prisons are the
most vulnerable. And as incarceration
disproportionately affects communities of
color, it follows that private prisons also
disproportionately affect communities of
color.
While even public prisons have these
problems, evidence suggests that private
prisons are worse.158 Incentives to keep costs
low drive many of the problems that make
private prisons more detrimental than public
ones.

Violence and Assault
Numerous reports have listed the abuses that
people in private prisons have experienced.
The Private Corrections Working Group
keeps a list of cases involving abuses at
private facilities.159 Some of the more recent
cases include:

•

Otter Creek Correctional Center,
Kentucky: Investigators from the Hawai‘i
Department of Public Safety found that at
least five staff members at the facility,
including a chaplain, had been charged
with having sex with the women in the
prison, including three cases of rape. As a
result, all of the women returned to
facilities in Hawai‘i.160 According to the
New York Times, the rate of sexual assault
at the facility was four times higher than

the state-fun facility for women in
Kentucky. Kentucky also removed women
from the facility.
Walnut Grove Youth Correctional
Facility, Mississippi: In a lawsuit filed by
the Southern Poverty Law Center and the
ACLU, boys and young men held in the
facility operated by The GEO Group were
subjected to physical, psychological, and
sexual abuse, unlawful solitary
confinement, abuse of youth with
disabilities, withholding of medical
treatment for youth who were injured
during abuse, and withholding of
educational opportunities for students
with learning disabilities.161

Services
Private prisons have an incentive to minimize
costs by cutting services and treatment.162
Whether a private prison provides
rehabilitative services (such as job training or
drug treatment) is dependent upon the
private prison company’s contract, which is
drafted by legislators and susceptible to
political influence by private prison
companies.163 Although most private prisons
offer similar programming as state-run
facilities as stipulated in their contracts, they
are often not of the same caliber as those
offered within public institutions.164 For
instance, most private prisons have control
over who is placed in their care, often leaving
people with the most expensive needs, like
those who are the highest security risk and
those with serious medical or mental health
issues, in state run facilities.165 Additionally,
most private prison companies provide
limited medical coverage, with advanced and
additional costly care falling on the state.166
For instance, when a person in a privately run
facility requires medical treatment beyond the
established contractual coverage of the
private- prison, the private prison company

GAMING THE SYSTEM
then bills the state for the additional medical
costs.

36

community when people are eventually
released without proper treatment or skills to
effectively re-enter the community.

This lack of services not only causes harm to
the people in prison, but it also affects the

FIGHTING FOR-PROFIT PRISONS IN TEXAS AND BEYOND:
GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP
For over 30 years, Grassroots Leadership has helped organize people on the ground to fight injustice.
Based in the south and southwest, Grassroots Leadership works to abolish for-profit private prisons and
reduce reliance on detention and criminalization.
Grassroots Leadership‟s victories include a campaign that successfully stopped Shelby County,
Tennessee (the county that includes Memphis) from privatizing its massive county jail and doubling its
size. Grassroots Leadership also played a pivotal role in the movement that successfully ended immigrant
family detention at Corrections Corporation of America‟s T. Don Hutto Prison in Taylor, Texas. In 2007, a
campaign to prohibit the construction of a private prison in Pike County, Mississippi resulted in the plans
being defeated in a special election, the first time that had ever happened in Mississippi.
“In the south and southwest, the private prison industry has consistently targeted poor communities. We
believe that it’s important to fight in these places to end for-profit incarceration and reduce reliance on
criminalization and detention, and ultimately build lasting movements for social justice,” said Bob Libal,
Texas Campaigns Coordinator for Grassroots Leadership.
For more information on Grassroots Leadership, please visit: www.grassrootsleadership.org.

37 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

PART 6

RECOMMENDATIONS

States and the federal government should
look for real solutions to the problem of
growing jail and prison populations. A
number of states are already utilizing
innovative strategies for reducing the number
of people behind bars in their state.ii Reducing
the number of people entering the justice
system, and the amount of time that they
spend there, can lower prison populations,
making private, for-profit prisons
unnecessary, and improving public safety and
the lives of individuals.
Invest in front-end treatment and services in
the community, whether private or public.
Research shows that education, employment,
drug treatment, health care, and the
availability of affordable housing coincide
with better outcomes for all people, whether
involved in the criminal justice system or not.
Jurisdictions that spend more money on these
services are likely to experience lower crime
rates and lower incarceration rates.167 An
increase in spending on education,
employment and other services not only
would improve public safety, but also would

For examples of innovative strategies see: Amanda
Petteruti and Jason Fenster, Finding Direction:
Expanding Criminal Justice Options by Considering
Policies of Other Nations (Washington, D.C.: Justice
Policy Institute, 2011).
www.justicepolicy.org/research/2322; Justice Policy
Institute, Due South: Looking to the South for Criminal
Justice Innovations (Washington, D.C. 2011).
www.justicepolicy.org/research/2472
ii

enhance and enrich communities and
individual life outcomes.
Additional research is needed to effectively
evaluate the cost and recidivism reduction
claims of the private prison industry. With
conflicting research on both the cost savings
and recidivism reduction of private prisons,
additional research is needed to determine the
accuracy of such claims. Moreover, a clearer
dialogue surrounding the difficulties of
comparative research between private and
public facilities would also be beneficial in
providing a better understanding of the
implications of prison privatization.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

38

Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America, 2011).
http://phx.corporateir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDE5MTEwfENoaWxkSUQ9NDMyMjg1fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1
2 Heather C. West, William J. Sabol, and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Washington, DC: 2010). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf
3 Camille Graham Camp and George M. Camp, The Corrections Yearbook, 1997 (South Salem, NY: The Criminal Justice
Institute, 1997); Tracey Kyckelhahn, Justice Expenditure and Employment Extracts 2007, Table 1(Washington, DC:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010).
4 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011; The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL:
The GEO Group, 2011). http://www.geogroup.com/AR_2010/images/Geo_Group-AR2010.pdf
5 Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, The Prison Payoff: The Role of Politics and Private Prisons in the Incarceration Boom
(Portland, OR: Western States Center and the Western Prison Project, 2000).
1

See Justice Policy Institute, Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety (Washington, D.C.:
2010) www.justicepolicy.org/research/1928
6

Brad W. Lundahl et al., ‚Prison Privatization: A Meta-analysis of Cost and Quality of Confinement Indicators,‛
Research on Social Work Practice 39, no. 4 (2009): 383-394.
8 Brad W. Lundahl et al., ‚Prison Privatization,‛ 2009.
9 Mary Sigler, ‚Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment,‛ Florida University Law Review 38,
no. 1 (2010): 1-29.
10 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf
11 Mary Sigler, ‚Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment,‛ 2010.
12 Douglas McDonald and others, Private Prisons in the United States: An Assessment of Current Practice (Cambridge,
MA: Abt Associates Inc., 1998).
13 Amy Cheung, Prison Privatization and the Use of Incarceration (Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project, 2004).
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf
14 U.S. Department of Justice, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1997 (Washington, D.C.; Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2000). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus97.pdf; Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in
2005 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006); William J. Sabol, Heather Couture and Paige M. Harrison,
Prisoners in 2006 – Appendix table 6 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007); William J. Sabol, Heather
C. West and Matthew Cooper, Prisoners in 2008 – Appendix table 10 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics,
2009); Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
15 Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman. Prison in 2009 - Statistical Tables. Table 1 (Washington,
D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010); Allen J. Beck and Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners 2000 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2001); Allen J. Beck and Darrell K. Gilliard, Prisoners 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 1995); Paige M. Harrison, Prisoners in Custody of State or Federal Correctional Authorities, 1977-98
(Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000); Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online, Table 6.28.2006:
Number and rate (per 100,000 resident population in each group) of sentenced prisoners under jurisdiction of State and Federal
correctional authorities on December 31. www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t6282006.pdf
16 Brad W. Lundahl et al., ‚Prison Privatization,‛ 2009.
17 Mary Sigler, ‚Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment,‛ 2010.
18 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
19 Mary Sigler, ‚Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment,‛ 2010.
20 Mary Sigler, ‚Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment,‛ 2010.
21 Brad W. Lundahl et al., ‚Prison Privatization,‛ 2009.
22 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
23 Corrections Corporation of America, ‚About CCA,‛ November 2010. www.cca.com/about/
24 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
25 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
26 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
27 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
7

39 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Funding Universe, ‚Corrections Corporation of America,‛ January 2011. www.fundinguniverse.com/companyhistories/Corrections-Corporation-of-America-Company-History.html
29 Funding Universe, ‚Corrections Corporation of America,‛ January 2011.
30 Randall G. Shelden, The Prison Industry (San Francisco, CA: Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 2010).
31 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Who We Are,‛ December 2010. www.geogroup.com/about.asp
32 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Who We Are,‛ December 2010.
33 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Who We Are,‛ December 2010; The GEO Group Inc., 2009 Annual Report (Boca Raton, FL:
The GEO Group, 2010). www.geogroup.com/AR_2009_ClientDL/images/GEO_Group-AR2009.pdf
34 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Historic Milestones,‛ December 2010. www.geogroup.com/history.asp
35 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Historic Milestones,‛ December 2010.
36 The GEO Group, Inc., ‚Federal, State, and Local Partnerships,‛ December 2010. www.geogroup.com/federal-statelocal.asp
37 The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
38 Alaska, Louisiana, Virginia, Indiana, Texas, Oklahoma, Mississippi, California, Arizona, New Mexico and Florida;
The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
39 Cornell Companies, Inc., 2009 Annual Report – Form 10-K (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2010). www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1016152/000110465910010293/a0936304_110k.htm#Item15_ExhibitsAndFinancialStatem_125526
40 The GEO Group, Inc, The GEO Group Completes Transformational Merger with Cornell Companies (Boca Raton, FL:
2010). www.thegeogroupinc.com/documents/Merger.pdf
41 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
42 Alfred Blumstein and Allen J. Beck, ‚Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996,‛ Crime and Justice 26 (1999):
17-61.
43 Alfred Blumstein and Allen J. Beck, ‚Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996,‛ 1999.
44 Kathleen Maguire and Ann L. Pastore, eds. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995. Table 1.96: Private
Correctional Facility Management Firms (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996).
45 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
46 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
47 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
48 Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011; The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.
49 Corrections Corporation of America, 2009 Annual Report (Nashville, TN: Corrections Corporation of America,
2010). http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irolSECText&TEXT=aHR0cDovL2lyLmludC53ZXN0bGF3YnVzaW5lc3MuY29tL2RvY3VtZW50L3YxLzAwMDA5NTAx
MjMtMTAtMDE2MzA5L3htbA%3d%3d; The GEO Group Inc., 2009 Annual Report, 2010; Cornell Companies, Inc.,
2009 Annual Report – Form 10-K, 2010.
50 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
51 See for example, Justice Policy Institute, Due South: Looking to the South for Criminal Justice Innovations (Washington,
D.C. 2011) www.justicepolicy.org/research/2472
52 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
53 Heather C. West and others, Prisoners in 2009, 2010.
54 American Correctional Association, Correctional Yearbook, 2008 (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional
Association, 2009).
55 Associated Press, ‚Alleged youth prison abuse detailed during hearing,‛ State News, January 12, 2011; Rebecca
Boone, ‚Idaho Man Sues Prison Company Over Severe Beating,‛ The Associated Press, April 27, 2010; Craig Malisow,
‚Prison Pays: Despite a history of abuse and bad conditions, private prison corporation GEO keeps getting contracts
from the state,‛ Houston Press, December 30, 2010; Ian Urbina, ‚Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Sex Abuse
Charges,‛ The New York Times, August 26, 2009; Brett Barrouquere, ‚Ky. inmate sues CCA, claims sexual assault,‛
Associated Press, January 7, 2011; Gary Grado, ‚Series of prison security failures in Kingman allowed inmates’
escape,‛ Arizona Capital Times, September 20, 2010.
56 Erik Luna, ‚Overextending the Criminal Law,‛ in Go Directly to Jail: The Criminalization of Almost Everything
(Washington, D.C.: CATO Institute, 2004), 1-7.
28

GAMING THE SYSTEM

40

Corrections Corporation of America, 2010 Annual Report, 2011, p. 22-23.
Edwin Bender, Private Prisons, Politics & Profits (Helena, Montana: National Institute on Money in State Politics,
2000). www.followthemoney.org/press/ZZ/20000701.phtml; Edwin Bender, A Contributing Influence: The PrivatePrison Industry and Political Giving in the South (Helena, Montana: National Institute on Money in State Politics, 2002).
www.followthemoney.org/press/ZZ/20020430.pdf; Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Miscellaneous Business: PAC
Contributions to Federal Candidates,‛ February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=N12&cycle=2010
59 Includes 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010. Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Miscellaneous Business: PAC
Contributions to Federal Candidates,‛ February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=N12&cycle=2010
60 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000
61 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,‛ February 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000
62 Heather C. West, William J. Sabol and Sarah J. Greenman, Prisoners in 2009 - Appendix table 20 (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2010). http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf
63 Joni James, ‚Private prison contracts may get a pass,‛ St. Petersburg Times, May 5, 2005.
64 David G. Savage, ‚Supreme Court orders California to release tens of thousands of prison inmates,‛ Los Angeles
Times, May 23, 2011. www.latimes.com/news/local/sc-dc-0524-court-prisons-web-20110523,0,2337401.story
65 Solomon Moore, ‚Court Orders California to Cut Prison Population,‛ New York Times, February 9, 2009.
www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/us/10prison.html
66 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – Corrections Corp of America,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100552
67 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – GEO Group,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0
68 Edwin Bender, Private Prisons, Politics & Profits, 2000; Edwin Bender, A Contributing Influence: The Private-Prison
Industry and Political Giving in the South, 2002; Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, The Prison Payoff, 2000.
69 Edwin Bender, Private Prisons, Politics & Profits, 2000; Edwin Bender, A Contributing Influence: The Private-Prison
Industry and Political Giving in the South, 2002.
70 Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Miscellaneous Business: PAC Contributions to Federal Candidates – 2000, 2002,
2004, 2006, 2008, 2010,‛ February 2011. www.opensecrets.org/pacs/industry.php?txt=N12&cycle=2010
71 Edwin Bender, Private Prisons, Politics & Profits, 2000; Edwin Bender, A Contributing Influence: The Private-Prison
Industry and Political Giving in the South, 2002.
72 Paige M. Harrison and Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2002 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003); Heather
C. West and William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2007 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2008).
73 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Candidate Summary: Linda Lingle,‛ April 21, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/uniquecandidate.phtml?uc=3360
74 State of Hawai’i Campaign Spending Commission, ‚Candidates and Candidate Committees,‛ April 21, 2011.
http://hawaii.gov/campaign/contribution-limits/candidate-committees1
75 Nelson Daranciang, ‚Isle Inmates Brought Home,‛ Honolulu Star Advertiser, January 28, 2011.
www.staradvertiser.com/news/hawaiinews/20110128_Isle_inmates_brought_home.html; Kevin Dayton, ‚Female
Inmates Claim Prison Staff Sex Abuse,‛ Honolulu Star Advertiser, February 26, 2005.
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2005/Feb/26/ln/ln03p.html; Ian Urbina, ‚Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over
Abuse Charges,‛ New York Times, August 25, 2009. www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html
76 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
77 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
78 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to All Candidates and Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=0&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Gubernatorial Candidates,‛
57
58

41 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

accessed May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=G&s=0&b[]=G7000; National
Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to
Senate Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=S&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to House/Assembly
Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=H&s=0&b*+=G7000;
National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit
Contributions to Other Statewide Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=O&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to High Court Candidates,‛
accessed May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=J&s=0&b[]=G7000; National
Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to
Appellate Court Candidates,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=K&s=0&b[]=G7000; National Institute on Money in State
Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees,‛
accessed May 3, 2011. www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=B&s=0&b[]=G7000; National
Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Correctional facilities construction & management/for-profit Contributions to
Party Committees,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/IndustryTotals.phtml?f=P&s=0&b[]=G7000
79 Center for Responsive Politics, ‚Lobbying Corrections Corp of America – Summary 2010,‛ June 2011.
www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Corrections+Corp+of+America&year=2010
80 National Institute on Money in State Politics, ‚Lobbyist Link – GEO Group,‛ accessed May 3, 2011.
www.followthemoney.org/database/lobbyistclient.phtml?lc=100516&y=0
81 For lobbying disclosure laws for states, see the National Conference of State Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?TabID=746&tabs=1116,84,211#211
82 Florida State Legislature, ‚Lobbying Firm Compensation Reports by Principal,‛ accessed May 19, 2011.
http://olcrpublic.leg.state.fl.us/#C
83 State of Montana, Office of Political Practices Website, https://app.mt.gov/cgi-bin/camptrack/lobbysearch/
lobbySearch.cgi?ACTION=PRINCIPALDETAIL_ALL&PRINCIPALID=3974&SESSION=2012. Accessed May 12, 2011.
84 Mike Ward, ‚Ex-lobbyists file lawsuits against state prisons office; Three former employees of private-prison
company Wackenhut say corrections officials turned on pressure to have them fired,‛ Austin America-Statesman,
January 17, 1996.
85 Tom Brown, ‚Private prison business eyes big Florida prize,‛ Reuters, May 12, 2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/12/us-usa-prisons-florida-idUSTRE74B49B20110512
86 Marian McCue, ‚Bill would ease path for private prison in Milo,‛ The New Maine Times, May 4, 2011.
http://www.newmainetimes.org/articles/2011/05/04/bill-would-ease-path-private-prison-milo/
87 Christine Oliver, ‚Determinants of Interorganizational Relationships: Integration and Future Directions,‛ The
Academy of Management Review 15, no. 2 (1990): 241-265.
88 ‚President Obama Announces More Key Administration Posts,‛ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary,
September 17, 2010. http://m.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/17/president-obama-announces-more-keyadministration-posts; Jim McElhattan, ‚Senate approves Hylton as marshal: Critics note ties to private prisons,‛ The
Washington Times, December 23, 2010. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/dec/23/senate-approves-hylton-asmarshal/
89 Jim McElhatton, ‚Marshalls Service Nominee Answers Critics’ Conflict-of-Interest Charge,‛ The Washington Times,
November 17, 2010. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/nov/17/marshals-service-nominee-answers-criticsconflict-/; United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Questionnaire for Non-Judicial Nominees, Stacia Hylton,
October 6, 2010. http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/111thCongressExecutiveNominations/upload/StaciaHyltonPublicQuestionnaire.pdf
90 Jim McElhatton, ‚Marshalls Service Nominee Answers Critics’ Conflict-of-Interest Charge,‛ November 17, 2010.
91 The GEO Group, 2010 Annual Report, 2011.

GAMING THE SYSTEM

42

New York Times, ‚Lehman Hires Kasich,‛ January 11, 2001. www.nytimes.com/2001/01/11/business/lehman-hireskasich.html
93 Public Services International Research Unit, Prison Privatization Report International (London, England: University of
Greenwich, 2001). www.psiru.org/justice/ppri44.asp
94 Mark Niquette, ‚Private-prison Consultant Chosen to Run ODRC,‛ Columbus Dispatch, January 4, 2011.
www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2011/01/04/private-prison-consultant-chosen-to-run-ODRC.html
95 Joe Hallett, ‚Kasich: Ex-advisers Won’t Get Lobbying Favors,‛ Columbus Dispatch, February 2, 2011.
www.dispatchpolitics.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2011/02/02/copy/kasich-ex-advisers-wont-get-lobbyingfavors.html?adsec=politics&sid=101
96 Corrections Corporation of America, ‚CCA Nevada Southern Warden named Commissioner of Depart of
Corrections in Maine,‛ accessed May 5, 2011. www.cca.com/newsroom/news-releases/240/
97 A.J. Higgins, ‚Maine Lawmakers Debate Bill to Allow Private Prisons,‛ Maine Public Broadcasting Network, April 29,
2011. www.mpbn.net/Home/tabid/36/ctl/ViewItem/mid/3478/ItemId/16203/Default.aspx
98 Lance Tapley, ‚At a turning point: LePage’s nominee to head Corrections has the skills to fix Maine’s broken prison
system. Will the governor and lawmakers give Joe Ponte the tools?‛ The Portland Phoenix, February 9, 2011.
http://portland.thephoenix.com/news/115404-at-a-turning-point/?page=1#TOPCONTENT
99 Trip Jennings, ‚Sen. Smith: Williams’ work for GEO casts ‘cloud’ over decision not to fin firms,‛ The New Mexico
Independent, September 21, 2010. http://newmexicoindependent.com/63562/sen-smith-williams-work-for-geo-castscloud-over-decision-not-to-fine-firms
100 Alexander Volokh, ‚Privatization and the Law and Economics of Political Advocacy,‛ Stanford Law Review 60, no. 4
(2008). www.stanfordlawreview.org/content/article/privatization-and-law-and-economics-political-advocacy
101 ALEC, ‚Our Mission,‛ November 2010.
www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=11127
102 Laura Sullivan, ‚Shaping State Laws with Little Scrutiny,‛ National Public Radio, October 29, 2010.
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130891396&ps=cprs
103 Laura Sullivan, ‚Shaping State Laws with Little Scrutiny,‛ October 29, 2010.
104 ALEC, ‚History,‛ November 2010.
105 ALEC, ‚History,‛ November 2010.
106 Brigette Sarabi and Edwin Bender, The Prison Payoff, 2000.
107 ALEC, ‚History,‛ November 2010.
108 ALEC, ‚History,‛ November 2010.
125 ALEC, ‚Public Safety and Elections,‛ December 2010.
www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Public_Safety_and_Elections&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Content
ID=13312
110 John Biewen, Corrections Inc (American RadioWorks: April 2002).
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/corrections/laws4.html
111 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
112 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
113 Alfred Blumstein and Allen J. Beck, ‚Population Growth in U.S. Prisons, 1980-1996,‛ 1999.
114 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
115 John Biewen, Corrections Inc., April 2002.
116 ALEC, The State Factor: A Plan to Reduce Prison Overcrowding and Violent Crime (Washington, D.C.: 2007).
http://www.alec.org/am/pdf/Criminal_Justice_2007_State_Factor.pdf
117 ALEC, ‚ALEC Corrections and Reentry Working Group,‛ accessed June 13, 2011.
http://www.alec.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Corrections_and_Reentry_Working_Group
118 Montana Office of Political Practices, https://app.mt.gov/cgibin/camptrack/lobbysearch/lobbySearch.cgi?ACTION=PRINCIPALDETAIL&BACKACTION=PRINCIPALSEARCH
&SEARCH_TYPE=PRINCIPAL&PRINCIPALID=3974&SESSION=2012&ENTITYNAME_SEARCH=Corrections and
‚LAWS‛ state legislative database, http://data.opi.mt.gov/bills/2011/billhtml/HB0344.htm
119 American Correctional Association, Correctional Yearbook, 2008 (Alexandria, VA: American Correctional
Association, 2009).
92

43 JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE

Scott Ehlers, Vincent Schiraldi and Jason Ziedenberg, Still Striking Out: Ten Years of California’s Three Strikes
(Washington, D.C.: Justice Policy Institute, 2004) www.justicepolicy.org/research/2028
121 See Ryan S. King, Incarceration and Crime: A Complex Relationship (Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project, 2005)
www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_iandc_complex.pdf
122 Lynne Vieraitis and others, ‚The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment: Evidence from State Panel Data, 1974 –
2002,‛ Criminology & Public Policy 6, no. 3 (2007): 589-622. A number of other studies also found serving time in prison
increases the risk of future offending.
123 Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf
124 See Justice Policy Institute, Pruning Prisons and Costs of Confinement, www.justicepolicy.org
125 Nastassia Walsh, Amanda Petteruti, and Ava Page, Education and Public Safety (Washington, DC: Justice Policy
Institute, 2007).
126 National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, Table 30: Amount and percentage distribution
of direct general expenditures of state and local governments, by function: Selected years, 1970-71 through 2007-08, August
2010. http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d10/tables/dt10_030.asp
127 Corrections Corporation of America, ‚Independent Studies on Prison Privatization,‛ April 19, 2011.
www.cca.com/cca-research-institute/research-findings/independent-studies-prison-privatization/
128 For a compilation of studies, see: American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, Prisons For Profit: A Look at Prison
Privatization (Cleveland, OH, 2010). www.acluohio.org/issues/CriminalJustice/PrisonsForProfit2011_04.pdf
129 Julianne Nelson, Competition in Corrections: Comparing Public and Private Sector Operations (Alexandria, VA:
CNA Corporation, 2005). www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/cnanelson.pdf
130 Gerry Gaes, ‚Cost, Performance Studies Look at Prison Privatization,‛ NIJ Journal/Issue No. 259.
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/221507.pdf.
131 General Accounting Office, Private and Public Prisons: Studies Comparing Operational Costs and/or Quality of Service
(Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, 1996). www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96158.pdf.
132 Brad W. Lundahl et al., ‚Prison Privatization,‛ 2009.
133 Arizona Department of Corrections: State versus Private Prison FY 2007 Cost Comparison (Scottsdale, AZ: Maximus,
2009). www.azcorrections.gov/adc/reports/ADC_FY2007_cost_comparison.pdf
134 David W. Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization: An Analysis of State
Correctional Systems,‛ ProQuest Discovery Guides, February 2010. www.csa.com/discoveryguides/prisons/review.pdf
135 Private prisons are not subject to Freedom of Information Act requests; a bill to address this at the federal level has
been re-introduced in the 112th Congress: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c112:H.R.74:
136 Kevin Pranis, Cost-Saving or Cost Shifting: The Fiscal Impact of Prison Privatization in Arizona (Tallahassee, FL:
American Friends Service Committee, 2005). www.afscme.org/docs/AZ.pdf
137 Anonymous Interview, April 18, 2011.
138The State of Texas v. GEO Group Incorporated Formerly Wackenhut Corrections and David Forrest, 2008-CR-0127-A,
November 17, 2008. Found on Private Prison Working Group: www.privateci.org/private_pics/WillacyGEO2.pdf
139 ‚Texas court upholds $42.4M verdict in prison death,‛ Seattle Times, April 8, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2009009800_apprisoncompanymurder.html.
140 John Burnett, ‚Town Relies On Troubled Youth Prison For Profits,‛ NPR, March 2011.
www.npr.org/2011/03/25/134850972/town-relies-on-troubled-youth-prison-for-profits
141 American Civil Liberties Union, ‚Riggs, et al. v. Valdez, et al. - Second Amended Complaint‛, March 11, 2010,
www.aclu.org/files/assets/2010-3-11-Riggs-SecondAmendedComplaint.pdf.; Brad Iverson-Long, ‚ACLU drops IDOC
from prisoner abuse lawsuit‛, Idaho Reporter, June 3, 2010, www.idahoreporter.com/2010/aclu-drops-idoc-fromprisoner-abuse-lawsuit/.
142 John Burnett, ‚Private Prison Promises Leave Texas Towns In Trouble,‛ NPR, March 28, 2011.
www.npr.org/2011/03/28/134855801/private-prison-promises-leave-texas-towns-in-trouble
143 Suzanne Smalley, ‚Development Scheme: How a small Montana town nearly handed over control of its prison to a
mysterious security company headed by a former convict known as ‘Captain Michael’,‛ Newsweek, October 14, 2009.
www.newsweek.com/2009/10/13/development-scheme.html
144 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
120

GAMING THE SYSTEM

44

Cost cutting techniques include: lower paid/less trained staff, higher ratio of correctional officers to people in
prison, limited contractual coverage of health services/costs, control over facility population (i.e. limited people with
mental health and serious medical conditions) and running only medium and minimum security facilities. David W.
Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,‛ February 2010.
146 William D. Bales et al., ‚Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida,‛ Criminology & Public
Policy 4, no. 1 (2005): 57-82; David W. Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,‛
February 2010. www.csa.com/discoveryguides/prisons/review.pdf
147 William D. Bales et al., ‚Recidivism of Public and Private State Prison Inmates in Florida,‛ 2005.
148 To date all academic research conducted to compare private versus public prison recidivism has been conducted in
Florida.
149 David W. Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,‛ February 2010.
150 John Hall and Kelly Walsh, Are Florida’s Private Prisons Keeping Their Promise? Lack of Evidence to Show They Cost Less
and Have Better Outcomes than Public Prisons (Tallahassee, FL: Florida Center for Fiscal and Economic Policy, 2010);
Dina Perrone and Travis C. Pratt, ‚Comparing the Quality of Confinement and Cost-effectiveness of Publics Versus
Private Prisons: What we know, why we do not know more, and where to go from here,‛ The Prison Journal 83, no. 3
(2003): 301-322.
151 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010; Scott D. Camp and Gerald G. Gaes, Growth and
Quality of U.S. Private Prisons: Evidence from a National Survey (Washington, DC: Bureau of Prisons, 2001).
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
152 David W. Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,‛ February 2010.
153 James Austin & Gary Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, (Washington DC: Bureau of Justice
Assistance, 2001).
154 David W. Miller, ‚The Drain of Public Prison Systems and the Role of Privatization,‛ February 2010.
155 James Austin & Gary Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons, 2001.
156 Curtis R. Blakely and Vic W. Bumphus, ‚Private and Public Sector Prisons—A Comparison of Selected
Characteristics,‛ Federal Probation 68, no. 1 (June 2004): 27-33.
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/PPS/Fedprob/2004-06/prisons.html
157 Govtrack, ‚H.R. 74: Private Information Act of 2011,‛ accessed May 5, 2011.
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h112-74
158 Scott D. Camp and Gerald G. Gaes, Growth and Quality of U.S. Private Prisons, 2001.
www.bop.gov/news/research_projects/published_reports/pub_vs_priv/oreprres_note.pdf
159 Private Corrections Working Group, ‚Lawsuits,‛ April 19, 2011. www.privateci.org/lawsuits.html
160 Ian Urbina, ‚Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over Abuse Charges,‛ New York Times, August 25, 2009.
www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html
161 American Civil Liberties Union, ‚C.B., et al. v. Walnut Grove Correctional Authority, et al. – Complaint‛,
November 16, 2010, www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights-racial-justice/cb-et-al-v-walnut-grove-correctional-authority-etal-complaint.; Clarionledger.com, ‚Mississippi lawmakers probe conditions at Walnut Grove youth prison‛, January
11, 2011, www.clarionledger.com/article/20110111/NEWS010504/110111015/Miss.+lawmakers+probe+youth+prison.
162 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010.
163 D.M. Levine. ‚What’s costlier than a government run prison? A private one.‛ CNNMoney.com, August 18, 2010.
http://money.cnn.com/2010/08/17/news/economy/private_prisons_economic_impact.fortune/index.htm
164 Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Economic Impacts of Prison Growth, 2010; Dina Perrone and Travis C. Pratt, ‚Comparing the
Quality of Confinement and Cost-effectiveness of Publics Versus Private Prisons,‛ 2003.
165 John Hall and Kelly Walsh, Are Florida’s Private Prisons Keeping Their Promise? 2010.
166 Craig Malisow, ‚Prison Pays: Despite a history of abuse and bad conditions, private prison corporation GEO keeps
getting contracts from the state.‛ Houston Press, December 30, 2010.
167 Justice Policy Institute, Public Safety Series (Washington, D.C.: 2007) www.justicepolicy.org
145

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
GAMING THE SYSTEM

This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the Open Society
Foundations and the Public Welfare Foundation.
The Justice Policy Institute (JPI) would like to express gratitude to Mike Tartaglia, Bob Libal, Kat
Brady, Mike Brickner, Shakyra Diaz, Ari Wohlfeiler, Paul Wright, Alex Friedmann, and Gail Tyree
for their valuable insight on this report.
JPI would also like to thank Ashley King, Jessie Oxley, Matt Scalf, Keith Towery, Elisabeth
Mulholland, Brad Merrin, Andrew Price, and Adrea Hernandez for their assistance gathering data
and research and Nastassia Walsh for her significant contributions to the report.
JPI staff includes Paul Ashton, Jason Fenster, Zerline Hughes, Amanda Petteruti, Kellie Shaw, Tracy
Velázquez, Keith Wallington and Nastassia Walsh.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
PAUL ASHTON, RESEARCH ASSISTANT
Prior to joining JPI, Paul spent time as a sexual assault victim advocate and conducting research
examining intimate partner violence in the LGBT community. Paul’s experience with victim issues
led him to author JPI’s white paper: Moving Toward a Public Safety Paradigm: A Roundtable Discussion
on Victims and Criminal Justice Reform. He has also served on the policy committee of the Delaware
HIV Consortium – working to educate the Delaware State Legislature on the need for increased
funding to address homelessness and HIV. Paul received his Bachelor's Degree in Criminology from
The Ohio State University and a Master's Degree in Criminology from the University of Delaware.

AMANDA PETTERUTI, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
Amanda Petteruti is a researcher and policy analyst with approximately seven years of combined
experience in education and criminal justice policy. Early in her career, she organized a writing
program for youth at the National Campaign to Stop Violence and provided general support to the
National Juvenile Defender Center. Prior to joining the staff of the Justice Policy Institute, she
conducted research on issues pertaining to urban education at the Council of the Great City Schools.
Petteruti has earned a Master of Arts in education policy and leadership from the University of
Maryland College Park and a Bachelor of Arts in sociology from Bates College. Petteruti has
contributed to several JPI reports related to education policy and co-authored The Vortex: The
Concentrated Racial Impact of Drug Imprisonment and the Characteristics of Punitive Counties and
JPI's Public Safety Policy Brief series.

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