Justice Denied - America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel, NRCC, 2009

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Justice Denied - America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel, NRCC, 2009

• Aug. 1, 2016 • Locations: United States of America • Topics: Court Access, Indigent Defense

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Justice Denied
America’s Continuing Neglect of
Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Report of the
National Right to Counsel Committee

Justice Denied
America’s Continuing Neglect of
Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Report of the
National Right to Counsel Committee
April 2009

This Report and the work of the National Right to Counsel Committee have been supported by generous
contributions from the Open Society Institute and the Wallace Global Fund.
This Report is available at www.constitutionproject.org and www.nlada.org.

Copyright © 2009 by the Constitution Project and the National Legal Aid & Defender Association. All rights reserved. No
part may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright holders.
For information about this report, or any other work of the Constitution Project, please visit our website at
www.constitutionproject.org or e-mail us at info@constitutionproject.org.

National Right to Counsel Committee
Honorary Co-Chairs
Walter F. Mondale
Senior Counsel, Dorsey & Whitney LLP;
Vice President of the United States, 1977–1981;
United States Senator (D-MN), 1964–1977;
former Minnesota Attorney General who organized the amicus brief
of 23 states in support of Clarence Earl Gideon in Gideon v. Wainwright

William S. Sessions
Partner, Holland & Knight LLP;
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1987–1993;
Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 1974–1987, Chief Judge, 1980–1987;
United States Attorney, Western District of Texas, 1971–1974

Co-Chairs
Rhoda Billings
Professor Emeritus, Wake Forest University School of Law;
Justice, North Carolina Supreme Court, 1985–1986, Chief Justice, 1986;
Judge, State District Court, 1968–1972

Robert M. A. Johnson
District Attorney, Anoka County, Minnesota;
former President, National District Attorneys Association;
former Chair, American Bar Association Section of Criminal Justice

Timothy K. Lewis
Co-Chair, Appellate Practice Group, Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP;
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1992–1999;
Judge, United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 1991–1992;
former Assistant United States Attorney, Western District of Pennsylvania;
former Assistant District Attorney, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Members
Shawn Armbrust

Bruce R. Jacob

Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project; as a
member of the Northwestern University Medill School of
Journalism was instrumental in achieving the 1999 death
row exoneration of Illinois inmate Anthony Porter

Dean Emeritus and Professor of Law, Stetson University
College of Law; former Assistant Attorney General for the
State of Florida, represented Florida in Gideon v. Wainwright

Abe Krash
Jay W. Burnett
Former Judge, 351st Criminal District Court, Harris County
Texas, appointed 1984; Judge, 183rd Criminal District
Court, Harris County, Texas, 1986–1998; Visiting Criminal
District Judge, 2nd Judicial Administrative Region of Texas,
1999–2000

Alan J. Crotzer
Probation and Community Intervention Officer, Florida
Department of Juvenile Justice; wrongfully convicted and
sentenced to 130 years in prison; served 24.5 years in prison;
exonerated based on DNA evidence in 2006

Tony Fabelo
Director of Research, Justice Center of the Council of State
Governments; former Senior Associate, The JFA Institute;
former Executive Director, Texas Criminal Justice Policy
Council, 1991–2003

Retired Partner, Arnold & Porter LLP; former Visiting Lecturer,
Yale Law School; Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University
Law Center; represented Clarence Earl Gideon in Gideon v.
Wainwright

Norman Lefstein
Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Indiana University
School of Law—Indianapolis (served as one of the
Committee’s Reporters)

Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
Jesse Climenko Professor of Law; Executive Director, Charles
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard
Law School

Bryan A. Stevenson
Director, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama; Professor of
Clinical Law, New York University School of Law

Norman S. Fletcher

Larry D. Thompson

Of Counsel, Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson &
Davis LLP; Justice, Supreme Court of Georgia, 1989–2005,
Chief Justice, 2001–2005

Senior Vice President, Government Affairs, General Counsel
and Secretary, PepsiCo, Inc.; Deputy Attorney General of the
United States, 2001–2003; former United States Attorney,
Northern District of Georgia

Monroe H. Freedman
Professor of Law and former Dean, Hofstra University School
of Law; nationally-acclaimed scholar of lawyers’ ethics

Susan Herman
Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Pace University;
former Executive Director, National Center for Victims of Crime

iv | The Constitution Project

Hubert Williams
President, Police Foundation; former New Jersey Police
Director; former Special Advisor to the Los Angeles Police
Commission

National Right to Counsel Committee

Reporters
Norman Lefstein
Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis;
LL.B., 1961, University of Illinois College of Law; LL.M., 1964, Georgetown University Law Center.
Professor Lefstein’s prior positions include service as director of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, as an
Assistant United States Attorney, and as a staff member in the Office of the Deputy Attorney General of the U.S. Department
of Justice. His professional activities include serving as Chair, American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Criminal Justice in
1986–1987; and as Reporter for the Second Edition of ABA Criminal Justice Standards Relating to The Prosecution Function, The
Defense Function, Providing Defense Services, and Pleas of Guilty. During 1997–1998, Professor Lefstein served as Chief Consultant
to a Subcommittee on Federal Death Penalty Cases of the Judicial Conference of the United States, directing preparation of a
report on the cost and quality of defense representation in federal death penalty prosecutions. His publications include Criminal
Defense Services for the Poor, published by the ABA in 1982, and co-authorship of Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing
Quest for Equal Justice, published by the ABA in 2004. He also has served as a member of the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants and for nine years chaired its Indigent Defense Advisory Group. In 2007, Professor Lefstein concluded
seventeen years as Chairman of the Indiana Public Defender Commission.

Robert L. Spangenberg
Research Professor and Founder, The Spangenberg Project, Center for Justice, Law, and Society, George Mason University;
B.S., 1955, Boston University; J.D., 1961, Boston University School of Law.
Professor Spangenberg specialized in civil legal services early in his career, developing the Boston Legal Assistance Project,
a neighborhood civil legal services program, which he headed for nine years. After a two-year foundation study of civil legal
services in Boston and a statewide study of indigent defense in Massachusetts, Professor Spangenberg joined Abt Associates in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, where for nine years he conducted national and local studies of indigent defense systems across the
country. In 1985, he founded The Spangenberg Group to continue the study of indigent defense nationwide. During his 23 years
as President of the organization, he visited all 50 states, testified before legislative bodies about the justice system, and served
as an expert witness in court proceedings. The Spangenberg Group published hundreds of reports and studies pertaining to the
country’s system of justice in criminal and juvenile proceedings, and for more than 20 years, Professor Spangenberg has served
as a consultant to the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants. In February 2009, Professor Spangenberg
joined George Mason University, where he will continue his work on indigent defense matters.

The Constitution Project

Table of Contents
National Right to Counsel Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Honorary Co-Chairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Co-Chairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Members . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Reporters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
Executive Summary and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter 1—The Right to Counsel:
What is the Legal Foundation, What is Required of Counsel, and Why Does it Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A. The U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
The Landmark Decisions: Powell and Gideon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Expansion of the Right to Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Types of Cases Requiring Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Transcripts, Experts, and Other Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
At What Stage of the Proceedings Is Counsel Required? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Waiver of the Right to Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
The Cost of the Right to Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Standards for Organizing Defense Services and Client Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. Professional Duty of Lawyers Representing the Indigent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Difficulty of Correcting Mistakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
E. Conviction of the Innocent and the Importance of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
A. The Need for Reform is Decades Old . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
B. Insufficient Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Indigent Defense Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
State and County Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
General and Special Fund Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Funding Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Resource Inequities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
C. The Burden of Too Much Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Excessive Caseloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
“Tough on Crime” Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

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Collateral Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Criminalization of Minor Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Expansion of the Right to Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Deinstitutionalization Without Community Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Complexity of the Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Specialty Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Lack of Open Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
D. Other Impediments to Competent and Effective Defense Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Lack of Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Funding Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Selection and Assignment of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Failures in Providing Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
No Counsel and Late Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Invalid Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Absence of Law-Trained Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
Lack of Performance Standards, Training, and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Lack of Experts, Investigators, and Interpreters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Inadequate Client Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Lack of Technology and Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Erosion of Conflict of Interest Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Case Delays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Chapter 3—How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Litigation to Promote Systemic Change in Indigent Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A. Legal Theories Underlying Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Litigation Asserting Rights of Defense Attorneys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Litigation Asserting Defendant’s Right to Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
B. Litigation Options: When and How Cases Are Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Pretrial Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Cases Asserting the Rights of All Indigent Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Cases Asserting the Rights of a Class of Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Cases Asserting the Rights of an Individual Defendant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Quitman County v. State of Mississippi (Taxpayers’ Rights Case) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Post-Conviction Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
C. Judiciary’s Authority to Provide Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Inherent Authority of State Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Other Theories of State Court Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
Federal Court Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136
D. Lessons Learned from Prior Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
All or a Large Class of Indigent Defendants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

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Table of Contents

Pretrial Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
Experienced Practitioners Serving Pro Bono . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Factual Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Appropriate Court and Judicial Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Media and Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
Chapter 4—How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Legislation and Commissions to Produce Meaningful Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
A. Legislative Background of State Oversight Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Legislative Trends in the Use of Oversight Commissions Since 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Impetus for Legislative Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Obstacles to Legislative Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Battle Between State Oversight and Local Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
B. State Oversight Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Independence and Structure of State Oversight Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Appointing Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Membership Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Agency Placement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
Statutory Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Commission Size and Membership Tenure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Ensuring Quality Representation and Responsibilities of an Oversight Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
Scope of Authority and Its Impact on Independence and Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Full Authority Oversight Commissions and State Public Defender Agencies with Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . 166
State Public Defender Agencies without an Oversight Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
State Commissions with Partial Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
State Commissions with Limited Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
Keys to a Successful Oversight Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
C. Study Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Previous Study Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
Current Study Commissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Chapter 5—Recommendations and Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
B. Recommendations and Commentary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
What States Should Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Compliance with the Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
States Without a Board or Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
Qualifications, Performance, and Supervision of Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

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Compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
Adequate Support and Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
Eligibility and Prompt Assignment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Reclassification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
What the Federal Government Should Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
A National Center for Defense Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
Federal Research and Grant Parity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
What Individuals, Criminal Justice Agencies, and Bar Associations Should Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Adherence to Ethical Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Open File Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Education, Advocacy and Media Attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
Litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
Appendix A: Index of Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Appendix B: Index of States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
Appendix C: State Statutes Establishing Public Defense Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

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Preface

he National Right to Counsel Committee was created in 2004 to examine the
ability of the American justice system to provide adequate counsel to individuals
in criminal and juvenile delinquency cases who cannot afford lawyers. Decades after
the United States Supreme Court ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright and other landmark
Supreme Court decisions, which recognized the right to lawyers for those who cannot
afford them, there was disturbing evidence that states and localities were not providing competent counsel, despite the constitutional requirement that they do so.
The Committee’s charge was to assess the extent of the problem, the various ways that
states and localities provide legal representation to those who cannot hire their own
lawyers, and to formulate recommendations about how to improve systems of indigent defense to ensure fairness for all Americans. The result is Justice Denied: America’s
Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel.
In the years since the Committee began its work, there have been both measurable
improvements in systems of legal representation, as well as notable failures, and these
are documented in this report. In examining the nation as a whole, the accompanying report and recommendations cover a good deal of familiar ground. It is no longer
news that Gideon’s constitutional promise has not been fulfilled in many states and
counties around the country. But the extent and persistence of the problems are
greater than we realized. And the reasons for them are explained and analyzed in
Justice Denied to a far greater degree than has been done at any time recently.
As Justice Denied convincingly demonstrates, despite the fact that funding for indigent defense has increased during the past 45 years since the Gideon decision, there
is uncontroverted evidence that funding still remains woefully inadequate and is
deteriorating in the current economic difficulties that confront the nation. Because of
insufficient funding, in much of the country, training, salaries, supervision, and staffing of public defender programs are unacceptable for a country that values the rule of
law. Every day, the caseloads that defenders are asked to carry force lawyers to violate
their oaths as members of the bar and their duties to clients as set forth in rules of
professional conduct. In addition, private contract lawyers and attorneys assigned to
cases for fees receive compensation that is usually not even sufficient to cover their
overhead and that discourages their participation in defense systems. Equally disturbing, in most places across the country there is no oversight at all of the representation
that these lawyers provide, and the quality of the work they provide suffers as a result.

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In addition, defendants throughout the country, especially in the lower criminal
courts, are still convicted and imprisoned each year without any legal representation at all, or are “represented” by lawyers who have hundreds of other cases (thus
violating rules of professional conduct), and lack the requisite expertise and sufficient
support staff, including persons who can investigate their clients’ cases. Sometimes
people who cannot afford an attorney sit in jail for weeks or months before being
assigned an attorney; others do not meet or speak with their lawyers until the day of a
court appearance. Too often the representation is perfunctory and so deficient as not
to amount to representation at all.
But there also are structural problems in the delivery of indigent defense services,
such as a lack of independence for defenders and the management of their responsibilities. And there are policies respecting criminal prosecutions and rules of criminal
procedure that exacerbate the difficulty of providing effective defense services.
All of these problems, and more, are discussed in Justice Denied. And, unlike any
other recent report dealing with indigent defense, Justice Denied contains an in-depth
contemporary analysis of the various ways in which the 50 states have structured their
indigent defense delivery systems.
Additionally, Justice Denied breaks new ground in setting out a road map for those
seeking to improve their indigent defense systems. Besides a comprehensive discussion of the approaches that have been successful in achieving improvements, the
report contains a number of recommendations for achieving reform.
There is no doubt that Americans strongly support the right to counsel that Gideon
and subsequent cases established. Americans believe that the amount of money a
person has should not determine the quality of justice he or she receives. They understand that governments must play a fundamental role in securing a fair justice system
by providing independent lawyers to those unable to afford their own.
The problems detailed in Justice Denied are the responsibility not just of states and
localities. The federal government also has an obligation to ensure that the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution is enforced. It should be a full partner
with states through federal funding, as recommended in this report.
The Constitution Project, which coordinated publication of this report, has over the
years sponsored numerous committees of independent experts on a wide array of
issues. Like the National Right to Counsel Committee, these experts have issued consensus reports and recommendations under the auspices of the Constitution Project.
However, from the outset, this undertaking has differed from our sponsorship of
other committees because we partnered with the National Legal Aid & Defender
Association (NLADA), one of the nation’s leading expert organizations on issues of

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public defense in the United States. The Committee’s report is posted on the websites
of both NLADA and the Constitution Project. However, the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations contained in the report are solely those of the Committee.
The National Right to Counsel Committee includes an extraordinary group of individuals, with a diversity of viewpoints shaped by their service at the highest levels of
every part of federal and state justice systems. Committee members have experience
as judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and as law enforcement officials; members
also include nationally-known law school academics, bar leaders, a victims’ advocate,
and a court researcher.
The Committee’s honorary co-chairs are Walter F. Mondale, a former vice president
of the United States who, as the then-attorney general of Minnesota, organized a
remarkable amicus curiae brief joined by 23 states on behalf of Clarence Earl Gideon.
The other is William S. Sessions, a former Director of the FBI and former United
States District Court Judge. The Committee’s co-chairs are Timothy K. Lewis, a
former United States Circuit Court Judge; Rhoda Billings, a former Chief Justice of
the North Carolina Supreme Court; and Robert M. A. Johnson, chief prosecutor of
Anoka County, Minnesota, and a former President of the National District Attorneys
Association. Among the Committee members are Professor Bruce R. Jacob, who as
an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Florida opposed Mr. Gideon’s request
for counsel in his case before the Supreme Court. Another, Abe Krash, was on the
legal team that successfully represented Mr. Gideon before that Court. Another
member, Shawn Armbrust, then a journalism student and now a lawyer, played a
leading role in successfully establishing the innocence of Anthony Porter, who came
within 48 hours of being executed in Illinois. Yet another member, Alan J. Crotzer,
was wrongfully convicted of a whole host of offenses in Florida, including sexual battery, kidnapping, burglary, and robbery, and sentenced to 130 years in prison; he was
exonerated when DNA proved his innocence.
The Committee owes a great debt of gratitude to many people who contributed to
their deliberations and to the report and its recommendations. First and foremost
are its reporters: Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Indiana
University School of Law—Indianapolis, and Robert L. Spangenberg, Research
Professor of the Center for Justice, Law, and Society at George Mason University.
Professors Lefstein and Spangenberg are two of the nation’s most highly regarded
experts on issues of indigent defense. Together they drafted the Committee’s
report and assisted the Committee in crafting its recommendations. I also want to
acknowledge the efforts of Rebecca Jacobstein and Jennifer Riggs, two members of
the Massachusetts bar and former staff members of The Spangenberg Group. Both
devoted extensive time to the report and made extremely important contributions in
preparing drafts of several chapters of the report.
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Last, but by no means least, I want to recognize the valuable contributions to the
Committee’s work by its first team of reporters: Paul Marcus, Haynes Professor of
Law and Kelly Professor of Teaching Excellence, William & Mary Law School, and
Mary Sue Backus, Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of
Law. The early work of Professors Marcus and Backus for the Committee provided
a firm foundation for development of the Committee’s report. The materials they
prepared were transmitted to Professors Lefstein and Spangenberg and were used
by them in constructing their final report. Although Professors Backus and Marcus
were unable to put aside other demands on their time in order to continue as the
Committee’s reporters, their assistance deserves special mention and appreciation.
Much of their investigation of indigent defense is captured in their excellent law
review article on the subject. See Paul Marcus and Mary Sue Backus, The Right to
Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 Hastings L. J. 1031 (2006).
Finally, it is important for me to say a word about the intended audience for this
report. Justice Denied is not just for those who provide indigent defense services,
although everyone in the business of providing such services will surely find it of interest. Instead, the report should be required reading for legislators, executive branch
officials, judges, researchers, bar leaders, and everyone else who possesses the power to
remedy or influence the problems that this report vividly documents. Justice Denied
is the handbook that lights the way toward genuine and lasting improvement in the
delivery of indigent defense services in America, thus enhancing the quality of justice
for all. Its findings and recommendations must—at long last—be heeded.
Virginia E. Sloan
President and Founder
The Constitution Project
April 2009

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Introduction

ore than 45 years ago, the United States Supreme Court rendered one of its best
known and most important decisions—Gideon v. Wainwright. In memorable
language, the Court explained that “[i]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him.” Observing that “lawyers in criminal courts are
necessities, not luxuries,” the Court concluded that governments have an obligation
under the United States Constitution to provide lawyers for people charged with a
felony who cannot afford to hire their own.
Soon afterwards, the Court extended Gideon, applying the right to a lawyer to
juvenile delinquency cases and to misdemeanor cases where imprisonment results.
The right to counsel is now accepted as a fundamental precept of American justice. It
helps to define who we are as a free people and distinguishes this country from totalitarian regimes, where lawyers are not always independent of the state and individuals
can be imprisoned by an all powerful and repressive state.
Yet, today, in criminal and juvenile proceedings in state courts, sometimes counsel is not
provided at all, and it often is supplied in ways that make a mockery of the great promise
of the Gideon decision and the Supreme Court’s soaring rhetoric. Throughout the United
States, indigent defense systems are struggling. Due to funding shortfalls, excessive caseloads, and a host of other problems, many are truly failing. Not only does this failure deny
justice to the poor, it adds costs to the entire justice system. State and local governments
are faced with increased jail expenses, retrials of cases, lawsuits, and a lack of public confidence in our justice systems. In the country’s current fiscal crisis, indigent defense funding
may be further curtailed, and the risk of convicting innocent persons will be greater than
ever. Although troubles in indigent defense have long existed, the call for reform has never
been more urgent.

The National Right to Counsel Committee
For the first time since the Gideon decision, an independent, diverse group, whose
members include the relevant constituencies of the justice system, has examined the
nation’s ways of providing defense services for the poor and is sounding the alarm
about the grave problems that exist today nationwide. The National Right to Counsel
Committee was established to address the full dimension of the difficulties in indigent defense from a national perspective. The Committee’s members include persons
with judicial, law enforcement, prosecution, and defense experience, as well as policymakers, victim advocates, and scholars. The membership also includes a person who
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Executive Summary and Recommendations

was convicted of a crime that he did not commit, sent to prison, and later exonerated
due to DNA evidence. (A list of Committee members and brief biographies of our
Reporters precede this Executive Summary.)

Mission and Scope
The Committee’s two-fold mission was to examine, across the country, whether
criminal defendants and juveniles charged with delinquency who are unable to retain
their own lawyers receive adequate legal representation, consistent with decisions
of the Supreme Court and rules of the legal profession, and to develop consensus
recommendations for achieving lasting reforms.
In approaching these subjects, the Committee was mindful that there have been
numerous studies that have cataloged the problems with indigent defense, but these
reports have not had significant impact in bringing about improvements. For this
reason, the Committee was determined that its Report focus not simply on all that
ails indigent defense—although Chapter 2 of this Report clearly does that—but that
it also present detailed information on successful strategies for change. Chapter 3,
therefore, is an in-depth, first-of-its-kind analysis of indigent defense litigation instituted to achieve reforms, including approaches that have been successful; Chapter
4 describes the various statewide structures used in the delivery of indigent defense
services and suggests the kinds of oversight bodies most likely to succeed in promoting positive change.
Making a case for needed reform in the United States is not especially difficult
because the subject has often been examined and the difficulties in delivering defense
services are constantly in the news. In conducting its work, the Committee, through
its Reporters, had access to literally hundreds of national, state, and local reports of
indigent defense, as well as several thousand newspaper articles spanning even beyond
the past decade. This Report cites many of the most recent studies conducted in state
and local jurisdictions, a national report of the American Bar Association published
in 2004, and numerous newspaper articles. In addition, some site visits were conducted by independent researchers (other than our Reporters), retained on behalf of
the Committee, and the reports of these persons are referenced in Chapter 2. Because
the Committee desired a study that would withstand the scrutiny of any persons who
would doubt its findings, the statements in the five chapters of this Report are fully
supported, with numerous sources contained in more than 900 footnotes.

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The Committee’s focus purposely has not included the myriad of problems involved
in providing defense representation in death penalty cases. The Committee was aware
that The Constitution Project had issued several reports related to the death penalty.
See Mandatory Justice: Eighteen Reforms to the Death Penalty (2001); and
Mandatory Justice: The Death Penalty Revisited (2006), both of which are
available on The Constitution Project’s website (http://www.constitutionproject.
org/). There also are the 2003 ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance
of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf ). Moreover, by
excluding death penalty prosecutions, the Committee believed that it could better
concentrate its attention on defense representation in non-capital cases. Also, while
juvenile delinquency proceedings are discussed in this Report, the Committee
recognizes that its primary focus has been on defense services in criminal cases. For
further specific information about juvenile defense representation, the Committee
commends the materials available on the website of the National Juvenile Defender
Center (http://www.njdc.info/index.php), some of which also are cited in Chapter 2.
Before summarizing each of the chapters in this Report, we want to emphasize that
our overriding focus has been on the many current difficulties throughout the country
in providing indigent defense representation. Obviously, there has been considerable
progress since Gideon was decided in 1963. The sums spent by state governments and
local jurisdictions in defending accused persons have increased significantly during
the past four decades, and there are some places in which defense services are being
delivered by talented professionals who have the time, training, and resources to do
first-rate legal work for their clients. However, even in these places the progress that
has been made is at considerable risk given the fiscal problems that now afflict state
and local governments. Just as this Report was being completed, on December 10,
2008, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a non-partisan research and policy
organization, reported that “[a]t least 43 states faced or are facing shortfalls in their
budgets for this and/or next year.”
Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming that jurisdictions that have done reasonably
well in the indigent defense area are in a distinct minority. In most of the country,
notwithstanding the dedication of lawyers and other committed staff, quality defense
work is simply impossible because of inadequate funding, excessive caseloads, a lack
of genuine independence, and insufficient availability of other essential resources. In
addition, as our summary below of Chapter 2 points out, these are by no means the
only problems.

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Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1—The Right to Counsel: What is the Legal Foundation,
What Is Required of Counsel, and Why Does It Matter?
Our first chapter provides a primer on the right to counsel in America, which derives
from the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and is applicable to
the states. We explain the kinds of cases to which the right applies, which are the
vast majority of criminal cases at trial and on appeal as well as juvenile delinquency
proceedings at trial and on appeal. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States
has continued to extend and to elaborate upon the right to counsel. In 2002, the
Court declared that a defendant who receives a suspended sentence in a misdemeanor
case may not later be imprisoned for a probation violation unless counsel was afforded when the defendant was initially prosecuted. And, in 2008, the Court held
that the right to counsel attaches at initial court appearances at which defendants
learn of the charges brought by the state.
But an accused is entitled to more than just a lawyer. The right to counsel also
encompasses the right to experts and transcripts to assist in a person’s defense, and,
like counsel, those must be paid for by governments. While the Court has not held
that defendants must be represented by lawyers, it has declared that lawyers must be
provided unless defendants knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently decide to forego
the assistance of counsel. On the other hand, the Court has said virtually nothing
about how governments are to provide lawyers and, even more importantly, who
must pay for the experts, transcripts, and thousands of attorneys across the country
who must be provided to assist accused persons in criminal and juvenile cases. What
we do know is that these expenses entail substantial costs, and the financial burden,
as a result of the Court’s decisions designed to fulfill a requirement of the federal
Constitution, has fallen exclusively on state and local governments, who are called
upon to translate the right to counsel into meaningful indigent defense programs. As
we observe in Chapter 1, the Court’s decisions “are a significant high-cost, unfunded
mandate imposed upon state and/or local governments.”
One of the reasons that the right to counsel is expensive is because the lawyers
providing the representation must be trained and have offices, computers, and the
assistance of investigators and other paralegals. If they are private attorneys, they
must receive adequate compensation for their services. If they are employed as public
defenders, they must have reasonable salaries and benefits. In addition, the rules
of the legal profession require that all attorneys who represent clients, including
indigent clients, must be “competent” and “diligent” in doing so. Consequently, they
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cannot be allowed to have an unreasonable number of clients, lest they violate their
duties as members of the bar and deprive their clients of the kind of representation
that a private lawyer could be expected to provide. In addition, all states require
that legal representation be made available in situations where the right to counsel is
not constitutionally required, thus further straining the resources of public defense
programs.
Chapter 1 also addresses why the right to counsel matters. The most compelling
answer is that, in our adversary system of justice, fairness is served if both sides are
represented by lawyers who are evenly matched in areas such as available time to
devote to the case, training, experience, and resources. When the defense does not
measure up to the prosecution, there is a heightened risk of the adversary system
of justice making egregious mistakes. We have learned all too well during the past
decade, with the advent of DNA evidence, that an unknowable number of genuinely
innocent persons in the United States have been wrongfully convicted and sent to
prisons. Usually this has happened due to police and prosecution errors or because
of mistaken eyewitness identifications, though on occasion it has been due to clear
abuses of law enforcement powers. Wrongful convictions also have occurred as a
result of inadequate representation by defense lawyers. Whatever the reasons, for
innocent persons to lose their liberty is a travesty. Equally troubling, it means that the
guilty are free to roam without restraint, victimizing others, while the state pays to
incarcerate those who have not transgressed against society. Well-trained lawyers and
adequately funded systems of defense are essential to prevent this from happening.
Finally, effective programs of public defense are crucial to the public’s trust in the
legitimacy of its justice systems and confidence in its results. While politicians
frequently fail to support adequate funding of indigent defense, fearing a lack of
public support for such action, the evidence suggests that the public understands the
issue better than the politicians may appreciate. Several years ago, a national, independent public opinion research organization polled 1,500 Americans and requested
their views respecting indigent criminal defense. The results revealed overwhelming
support for appointing and paying for lawyers on behalf of persons who could
not afford one. The survey results are available at http://www.nlada.org/Defender/
Defender_Awareness/Defender_Awareness_Indigent.

Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform
Over a period of many years, there have been numerous national reports that have
exposed the countless problems in indigent defense and urged reforms, but the
problems have persisted. Although the funding of indigent defense among state and
local governments has increased considerably since the 1960’s, inadequate financial
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support continues to be the single greatest obstacle to delivering “competent” and
“diligent” defense representation, as required by the rules of the legal profession, and
“effective assistance,” as required by the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, the country’s
current fiscal crisis, which afflicts state and local governments everywhere, is having
severe adverse consequences for the funding of indigent defense services, which
already receives substantially less financial support compared to prosecution and law
enforcement.
Undoubtedly, the most visible sign of inadequate funding is attorneys attempting
to provide defense services while carrying astonishingly large caseloads. Frequently,
public defenders are asked to represent far too many clients. Sometimes the defenders
have well over 100 clients at a time, with many clients charged with serious offenses,
and their cases moving quickly through the court system. As a consequence, defense
lawyers are constantly forced to violate their oaths as attorneys because their caseloads
make it impossible for them to practice law as they are required to do according to
the profession’s rules. They cannot interview their clients properly, effectively seek
their pretrial release, file appropriate motions, conduct necessary fact investigations,
negotiate responsibly with the prosecutor, adequately prepare for hearings, and
perform countless other tasks that normally would be undertaken by a lawyer with
sufficient time and resources. Yes, the clients have lawyers, but lawyers with crushing
caseloads who, through no fault of their own, provide second-rate legal services,
simply because it is not humanly possible for them to do otherwise. Finally, to complete the picture, we discuss in Chapter 2 a variety of factors that exacerbate caseload
problems for indigent defense systems, such as “tough on crime” policies translated
by legislatures into additional criminal laws, the need for defendants to be aware of
the collateral consequences of conviction, the criminalization of minor offenses, the
ever-increasing complexity of the law with which defense attorneys must be familiar,
a lack of open file discovery practices by prosecutors, and specialty courts that impose
additional time demands on defense attorneys.
Beyond excessive caseloads, there are other impediments to having successful indigent
defense programs. Too often the problems stem from a lack of independence from
the authorities that provide funding for the defense program. We tell stories in
Chapter 2 of county officials, responsible for providing funds for indigent defense,
subjecting chief public defenders to political pressures because their lawyers challenged the prosecution and did exactly what they were required to do in representing
their clients. We also point out that a lack of independence from the judiciary sometimes impacts the selection, appointment, and payment of counsel. Lawyers deemed
to be too aggressive may be excluded from appointments, or favoritism may be
shown to certain lawyers, who are appointed to a disproportionate share of the cases.

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Other difficulties encountered in efforts to provide effective defense services include
a lack of experts, investigators, and interpreters; insufficient client contact; and
inadequate access to technology and data. Usually, there are no enforceable standards
governing the performance of defense counsel, little or no training of defense lawyers,
and a lack of meaningful supervision and oversight of their performance. Another
problem is that defense lawyers are not always appointed to clients’ cases in a timely
manner, causing defendants to remain in custody far longer than they would otherwise and counties to incur jail costs that could have been avoided had counsel been
appointed earlier in the process.
So far, we have focused on situations when lawyers are provided for the accused,
although sometimes later than they should be. But there is another dimension to
the problem, namely, the total absence of counsel because defendants either are not
advised or not adequately advised of their right to counsel. When a defendant is not
adequately advised of the right to counsel, the waiver almost certainly would not
withstand scrutiny as a valid waiver of the right to legal representation. The invalidity
of the waiver, however, typically fails to come to light, as the waiver process is of low
visibility and defects rarely surface in the appellate courts. There are still some lower
courts, moreover, that do not maintain a record of proceedings, so there is no way
to be sure exactly how counsel was offered to the accused and if the waiver of legal
representation was valid. There also is considerable evidence that, in many parts of
the country, prosecutors play a role in negotiating plea arrangements with accused
persons who are not represented by counsel and who have not validly waived their
right to counsel. Not only are such practices of doubtful ethical propriety, but they
also undermine defendants’ right to counsel.
Many of the Committee’s findings reported in Chapter 2 are virtually identical to a
recently completed study of indigent defense services in misdemeanor cases in the
United States conducted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
(NACDL). Publication of this study is expected to be released early in 2009. Among
the problems identified in the forthcoming NACDL report are the following: (1)
defendants unrepresented in misdemeanor courts because they have not properly
waived the right to counsel; (2) excessive caseloads of public defenders and assigned
counsel that undermine effective representation and lead lawyers to violate their
ethical obligations; (3) defendants pleading guilty to misdemeanor offenses without
an understanding of the applicable and potentially severe collateral consequences;
(4) a lack of investigators, experts, and mental health professionals; and (5) the
over-criminalization and prosecution of minor infractions and offenses, which drains
resources that would otherwise be available for more serious offenses.

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Chapter 3—How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Litigation to Promote Systemic Change in Indigent Defense
There is no better evidence of the problems in implementing the Supreme Court’s
right to counsel decisions than the enormous number of lawsuits that have been
brought over a period of many years and the litigation currently pending, in which
indigent defense representation has been challenged in the courts. Many times, as
reflected in Chapter 3 (and in other chapters), these challenges have been successful
and have led to improvements.
The lawsuits that we discuss were brought in federal and state courts in the following
jurisdictions: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and West
Virginia. In addition, as this Report was completed, litigation respecting indigent defense was pending in at least seven states, five of which are reviewed in Chapter 3. In
Michigan and New York, lawsuits have been brought challenging entire systems for
the delivery of indigent defense services. In Florida, Kentucky, and Tennessee, litigation is pending in which defense lawyers have challenged the actions of trial courts in
seeking to require public defense programs to handle caseloads alleged to be excessive.
In concluding Chapter 3, we sum up lessons learned in seeking indigent defense
reforms through litigation. We suggest that actions should be instituted pretrial on
behalf of all, or a large class of indigent defendants, in order to secure a favorable
remedy with broad impact. We also stress the importance of involving pro bono
counsel from large law firms or the involvement of lawyers from public interest legal
organizations, since systemic reform litigation is time consuming and requires an
expertise not typically possessed by public defense practitioners. We also stress the
importance of strong factual support on behalf of the claims asserted and discuss the
role of the media and public support in fostering a climate likely to lead to a successful outcome.

Chapter 4—How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Legislation and Commissions to Produce Meaningful Change
In this chapter, we set forth the organizational structures for delivering indigent
defense services in the 50 states and devote particular attention to developments since
the year 2000. We note that 11 states have enacted legislative changes during the past

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eight years and describe the kinds of changes that have occurred. In addition, we
review the impetus for legislative reforms and the obstacles to achieving change.
Currently, there are 27 states that have organized their defense services either entirely
or substantially on a statewide basis. Of these, there are 19 states that have a state
commission with supervisory authority over the state’s defense program headed by
either a state public defender or state director; in the other eight states, there is a state
public defender but not a state commission to provide oversight. In the remaining 23
states, there is either a state commission with partial authority over indigent defense
(nine states); a state appellate commission or agency (six states); or no state commission of any kind (eight states).
Based upon our study of defense programs, we offer a number of suggestions about
what is necessary in order to have a successful statewide oversight body. We urge that
the state’s commission be an independent agency of state government and that its
placement within any branch of government be for administrative purposes only. We
also suggest that the members of the commission be appointed by a diverse group
of persons so that the members are not responsible to just one or two appointing
authorities to whom they feel a sense of obligation. A range of other specific matters
are explored as well, including the duties that should be given to commissions so that
they will be able to improve the quality of representation in the state. Finally, we consider the role of study commissions in achieving indigent defense reforms, pointing
out the contributions that they have made in the past and noting the several current
commissions that are focused on indigent defense reforms.

Chapter 5—Recommendations and Commentary
This chapter contains the Committee’s 22 Recommendations. Each of the recommendations is accompanied by Commentary with cross-references to other
parts of the Report that explain and support our positions. All of the black-letter
Recommendations, without the Commentary, are reproduced below.
One of our most important recommendations is that indigent defense should be independent, non-partisan, organized at the state level, adequately funded by the state
from general revenues, and overseen by a board or commission. See Recommendation
2. Of equal significance is our recommendation that the federal government assist the
states in the delivery of indigent defense services. For more than 45 years, the states
and/or counties have struggled—and continue to struggle—to implement the Gideon
decision and its progeny. The right to counsel is a federal guarantee based upon the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and it is entirely fitting that the
federal government assist in its implementation. See Recommendations 12 and 13.

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Finally, we emphasize that, in order to achieve reform at the state level, it is vital that
a coalition of partners be engaged as part of a comprehensive strategy. The judiciary,
bar officials, community leaders, public interest organizations, national associations
of lawyers, and others need to be enlisted as partners to persuade the legislature of
the importance of an adequate statewide program of indigent defense. To succeed,
empirical documentation of the problems, as well as favorable media coverage, will be
needed in order to generate a positive climate of public support. All of these efforts
are essential investments in America’s future because, as Judge Learned Hand said
many years ago:
If we are to keep democracy, there must be a commandment:
Thou shalt not ration justice.

Recommendations
What States Should Do
Compliance with the Constitution
Recommendation 1—States should adhere to their obligation to guarantee fair criminal and juvenile
proceedings in compliance with constitutional requirements. Accordingly, legislators should appropriate
adequate funds so that quality indigent defense services can be provided. Judges should ensure that all
waivers of counsel are voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, and that guilty pleas are not
accepted from accused persons absent valid waivers of counsel. Prosecutors should not negotiate plea
agreements with accused persons absent valid waivers of counsel and should adhere to their duty to assure
that accused persons are advised of their right to a lawyer.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Compensation
Recommendation 7—Fair compensation should be provided, as well as reasonable fees and overhead expenses, to all publicly funded defenders and for attorneys who provide representation pursuant to contracts
and on a case-by-case basis. Public defenders should be employed full time whenever practicable and salary
parity should be provided for defenders with equivalent prosecution attorneys when prosecutors are fairly
compensated. Law student loan forgiveness programs should be established for both prosecutors and public
defenders.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

What Individuals, Criminal Justice Agencies, and Bar Associations Should Do
Adherence to Ethical Standards
Recommendation 14—Defense attorneys and defender programs should refuse to compromise their
ethical duties in the face of political and systemic pressures that undermine the competence of their representation provided to defendants and juveniles unable to afford counsel. Defense attorneys and defender
programs should, therefore, refuse to continue representation or accept new cases for representation when
faced with excessive workloads that will lead to a breach of their professional obligations.
Recommendation 15—Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers should abide by their professional obligation to report to disciplinary agencies knowledge of serious ethical violations that impact indigent defense
representation when the information they possess is not confidential. Appropriate remedial action should
be taken by persons with responsibility over those who commit such ethical violations.

Open File Discovery
Recommendation 16—Prosecutors should adopt open file discovery policies in order to promote the fair
administration of criminal and juvenile justice.

Education, Advocacy and Media Attention
Recommendation 17—State and local bar associations should provide education about the professional
obligations and standards governing the conduct of defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges in order to
promote compliance with applicable rules. State and local bar associations, defense attorneys, prosecutors,
judges, and their professional associations should support and advocate for reform of indigent defense
services in compliance with the recommendations contained in this report.
Recommendation 18—Criminal justice professionals, state and local bar associations, and other organizations should encourage and facilitate sustained media attention on the injustices and societal costs entailed
by inadequate systems of indigent defense, as well as those systems that function effectively.

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Recommendation 21—Whenever possible, litigation should be brought by disinterested third parties,
such as private law firms or public interest legal organizations willing to serve as pro bono counsel, who
are experienced in litigating major, complex lawsuits and accustomed to gathering and presenting detailed
factual information. Bar associations and other organizations should encourage law firms and public interest legal organizations to undertake indigent defense litigation and should recognize in appropriate ways
the contributions of private counsel in seeking to improve the delivery of indigent defense services.
Recommendation 22—Defense lawyers who provide representation in appellate and post-conviction
cases and organizations that advocate as amicus curiae should urge the United States Supreme Court and
state Supreme Courts to adopt a test for ineffective assistance of counsel that is substantially consistent with
the ethical obligation of defense counsel to render competent and diligent representation.

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Chapter 1
The Right to Counsel:
What is the Legal Foundation,
What is Required of Counsel, and Why Does it Matter?

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

A. The U.S. Constitution and the Supreme Court
The Landmark Decisions: Powell and Gideon

he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to … have the assistance
of counsel for his defense.”1 By its terms, the Sixth Amendment does not require that
counsel be appointed for the accused and, as part of the Bill of Rights which originally was applicable only to the federal government, it did not apply to the states at all.2
When adopted in the late 1700’s, it was a rejection of the English practice of denying
legal representation to persons charged with felony offenses.3 In addition, a number
of the original states granted persons a right to counsel in their state constitutions,4
but these provisions were not interpreted to require that counsel be appointed for
those unable to afford a lawyer.5
Today, the Sixth Amendment provision related to the assistance of counsel means
something entirely different due to several of the most famous decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. And, as a nation, consistent with the direction charted
by the nation’s highest court, we understand the importance of providing lawyers to
those unable to afford an attorney because persons who lack legal training cannot
adequately represent themselves in criminal and juvenile court proceedings.
The landscape respecting the right to counsel began to change with the Supreme
Court’s 1932 decision in Powell v. Alabama,6 in which nine poor black youths were
accused of raping two white women. Amidst “an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and

1
2

3
4
5

U.S. Const. amend. VI.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution are collectively referred to as the Bill of Rights and,
in accord with its specific language, originally applied only to restrain acts of the federal government. Gradually, through a process often referred to as “selective incorporation,” the Supreme
Court has applied most of the amendments to the States, concluding that they are embodied
within the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process of law clause because they are “fundamental to
principles of liberty and justice.” See Geoffrey r. Stone, et al., Constitutional law 702–10
(4th ed. 2001); Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet 93–99 (1964).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60–61 (1932).
See Floyd G. Feaney and Patrick G. Jackson, Public Defenders, Assigned Counsel, Retained Counsel:
Does the Type of Criminal Defense Counsel Matter?, 22 Rut. L. Rev. 361, 362, n. 11 (1991).
“The practical effect of this newly created right was limited because many defendants were too poor
to pay for counsel and the right was not always understood to be a right to have counsel appointed.
It took another 200 years to establish the principle that the state should provide counsel to those
who are unable to pay for the representation.” Id. at 362.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).

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excited public sentiment,”7 the defendants were hurriedly charged and tried by white
jurors, convicted, and sentenced to death, except for the youngest defendant who
was 12 years old and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. As
required by Alabama law applicable to death penalty cases, two defense lawyers were
provided to the defendants, but this did not occur until the morning of trial when
there was no opportunity for the attorneys to investigate their clients’ cases or otherwise prepare for trial. The Supreme Court reversed the defendants’ convictions, holding that they “were not accorded the right to counsel in any substantial sense”8 and
that the denial of counsel violated the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process of law clause applicable to the states.9
Although the ruling in Powell was limited to capital proceedings in state criminal
courts, its rationale regarding the need for legal representation has been invoked by
the Supreme Court in subsequent decisions and is just as compelling today as when
the words were penned more than 75 years ago:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.
If charged with a crime he is incapable, generally, of determining for
himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both
the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he has a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty,
he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence.10
Despite the foregoing rationale of the Powell decision, which applies not only to
capital cases but to non-capital criminal and juvenile delinquency proceedings as
well, legal representation as a matter of constitutional right was not extended beyond
7
8
9

Id. at 51.
Id. at 58.
The applicable language of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no “State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. For
a detailed account of the trials and history surrounding the Powell case, see Douglas O. Linder,
Without Fear or Favor: Judge James Edwin Horton and the Trial of the Scottsboro Boys, 68 UMKC L.
Rev. 549 (2000); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 Mich.
L. Rev. 48, 61–67 (2000).
Id. at 68–69.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

capital cases for another 31 years—not until the Supreme Court’s historic decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright.11 What happened in Gideon illustrates the enormous importance of providing defense lawyers for those who cannot afford to retain their own.
On June 3, 1961, there was a break-in at a pool hall in Panama City, Florida, resulting in the theft of some alcohol and change from a cigarette machine and juke box.
Clarence Earl Gideon was charged with a felony under Florida law, i.e., breaking and
entering with the intent to commit a misdemeanor. Gideon informed the trial judge
that he could not go to trial because he needed a lawyer, and he asked the court to
appoint a lawyer for him because he lacked money to hire an attorney. The judge
summarily refused the request, and Gideon proceeded to defend himself, claiming
that he was innocent. The jury, however, convicted Gideon, and he was sentenced
to five years in prison, the maximum penalty for the offense. Gideon then sought
relief from the Florida Supreme Court, arguing that the trial court’s refusal to provide
counsel for him violated his rights under the federal constitution, but again his claim
was rejected.
With the aid of a prison library, Gideon drafted a five-page petition to the Supreme
Court asking that his appeal be considered on constitutional grounds. The Court
agreed to hear his case, and assigned Abe Fortas, a prominent Washington, D.C.
lawyer from the firm of Arnold, Fortas & Porter to brief and argue Gideon’s appeal.12
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, rendered
on March 18, 1963, was written by Justice Hugo Black. Calling it an “obvious truth”13
that lawyers in criminal cases are “necessities not luxuries,”14 the Court held, for the
first time, that the Sixth Amendment’s effective assistance of counsel provision is
a fundamental and essential right made obligatory upon the states by virtue of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process of law clause.15
11

12
13
14
15

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). During the 25 years between Powell and Gideon, the
Court decided only two major right-to-counsel cases: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In
Zerbst, the Court held that an indigent criminal defendant had the right to the assistance of counsel
under the Sixth Amendment when charged with a federal crime and that it could only be denied if
based on a defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of counsel. In Betts, the Supreme
Court held that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the states. The Court reasoned that the
“appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial” and thus was not part
of the concept of “due process incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 472.
Gideon, at 336–38. See also, Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet (1964); Gideon’s Trumpet (CBS
television broadcast, April 30, 1980).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
Id.
The Court stated that, “We accept Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior cases,
that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made
obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong,

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With customary eloquence, Justice Black further explained:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours. From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.16
The “obvious truth” to which the Court referred was made apparent when Gideon’s
case was sent back to Florida for a new trial. This time Gideon had the “guiding hand
of counsel,”17 as a local attorney was appointed to represent him and in advance of
trial spent several days investigating the case against his client. At trial, the lawyer
skillfully exposed the weaknesses in the testimony of the state’s witnesses, demonstrating how the state’s eyewitness was likely the real culprit. He also called Gideon to the
stand, who denied any role in the break-in and provided evidence of his innocence,
rebutting testimony that went unchallenged during his first trial. The jury deliberated
only an hour and acquitted Gideon of all charges.18
Because Gideon was charged with a felony under Florida law punishable by a
maximum five-year sentence, Gideon has stood for the proposition that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to defendants charged with felonies in state
criminal courts. Like the Powell opinion on which Gideon relied, the Supreme Court’s
rationale in Gideon applies to all criminal and juvenile proceedings, not just felony
cases, as the Court’s decision was based on a desire to ensure that persons charged
in the justice system were treated equally and afforded a fair opportunity to defend
themselves.

16
17
18

in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel is not one of those fundamental
rights.” Id. at 342.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 345.
See Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet 234–50 (1964). The attorney appointed to represent
Gideon was W. Fred Turner of Panama City, Florida, who was appointed by the court upon
Gideon’s specific request. Turner spent considerable time in the vicinity of the alleged break-in
getting to know local people, interviewing witnesses, and understanding the case. In fact, Turner
went so far as to spend a day picking pears with the mother of the State’s chief eyewitness against
Gideon, Henry Cook. But Turner was not Gideon’s first counsel when the case was remanded from
the Supreme Court. Initially, two ACLU attorneys from Miami represented him. This infuriated
Gideon, and he demanded that they be dismissed because he was adamant about having a local attorney. The judge asked whether there was anyone he would like to have as his lawyer, and Gideon
requested Turner.

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Expansion of the Right to Counsel
In 1963, in the wake of the Gideon decision, numerous questions were unresolved.
Foremost among these was whether the right to counsel extended beyond felony
cases. For example, did the right to counsel apply in misdemeanor prosecutions and
in juvenile delinquency proceedings? Was it necessary to provide defense counsel the
services of experts, such as psychiatrists, and other kinds of ancillary assistance? At
what stage of a case must counsel be provided? Under what circumstances, if any,
may a defendant proceed without an attorney? And, perhaps most important of
all, who is responsible for compensating the defense attorneys who would now be
required and how should the delivery of defense services be structured?19

Types of Cases Requiring Counsel
The next major expansion of the right to counsel occurred in 1967 with the Supreme
Court’s In re Gault20 decision, in which the right to counsel was applied to juvenile
delinquency proceedings. Citing Powell and Gideon, the Court held that a child
found to be delinquent and “subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel
to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
19

Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gideon, states sometimes provided counsel to indigent
defendants in non-capital cases. For example, as early as 1854, the Indiana Supreme Court approved
appointing counsel for an indigent charged with burglary: “But that the services rendered by
Baird [the defense attorney] were necessary to be rendered by some attorney, will scarcely admit
of argument. It is not to be thought of, in a civilized community, for a moment, that any citizen
put in jeopardy of life or liberty, should be debarred of counsel because he was too poor to employ
such aid. No Court could be respected, or respect itself, to sit and hear such a trial. The defense of
the poor, in such cases, is a duty resting somewhere, which will be at once conceded as essential to
the accused, to the Court, and to the public.” Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 11, 13 (1854). In 1881, a New
York Criminal Procedure Law was amended to provide that in felony cases defendants were to be
asked whether they wanted an attorney, and if they did, a pro bono lawyer was to be appointed.
See Michael McConville and Chester L. Mirsky, Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A
True History, 36, n. 20 (2005). Moreover, the first public defender office in the United States was
established in 1914 in Los Angeles. See website of the Los Angeles Public Defender Office, available
at http://www.pd.co.la.ca.us/history.html. Nevertheless, as stated in an amicus curiae brief filed in
the Supreme Court in Gideon, “counsel is rarely appointed in non-capital cases, even if requested.”
Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Gideon v. Wainwright, 371 U.S. 335 (1963).
The extent to which counsel actually was provided in state non-capital criminal prosecutions prior
to Gideon is not well documented, but clearly as of 1963, no state provided the range of guarantees
that Gideon and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have required. For a discussion of the right
to counsel in the early American colonies and in States prior to the Gideon decision, see Note, An
Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogations, 73 Yale L. J. 1000, 1018–34
(1964); Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Law, 1955 Wis. L. Rev. 281 (1951); W. H. Beaney,
The Right to Counsel in American Courts 8–24, 80–100 (1955); James J. Tomkovcz, The
Right to the Assistance of Counsel 1–13 (2002).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

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regularity of proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare
and submit it. The child ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him.’”21
Then, in 1972, in the case of Argersinger v. Hamlin,22 the Sixth Amendment again
was invoked, resulting in another significant expansion of the right to counsel.
An indigent defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of carrying a
concealed weapon. Denied legal representation, he was convicted and sentenced to
jail. Emphasizing the defendant’s loss of liberty and the importance of counsel in
achieving fair trials, the Supreme Court reversed. As the Court explained, “absent a
knowing and intelligent waiver [of counsel], no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented
by counsel at his trial.”23
In 2002, Argersinger was applied to cases in which defendants, without being afforded
counsel, receive suspended jail sentences, are placed on probation, and later the probation is revoked and imprisonment imposed. In Alabama v. Shelton,24 the Supreme
Court held that “the Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel, as delineated in
Argersinger…, applies to a defendant in Shelton’s situation. We hold that a suspended
sentence that may ‘end up in the actual deprivation of a person’s liberty,’ may not
be imposed unless the defendant was accorded ‘the guiding hand of counsel’ in the
prosecution of the crime charged.”25 As the Court explained, when the prison term
is activated, incarceration is not for the probation violation but for the underlying
suspended offense for which the defendant was never provided the opportunity to
have legal representation.26
Based upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses,
defense counsel for the indigent also has been required in appellate cases. In 1963,
in Douglas v. California,27 a companion case to Gideon decided the same day, the
Supreme Court held that an indigent defendant may not be discriminated against
21
22
23

24
25
26
27

Id. at 36.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id. at 37. Following Argersinger, the Supreme Court emphasized that actual imprisonment is what
triggers the right to counsel. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), the Court held that the
Sixth Amendment is not violated when a defendant faces possible imprisonment but is only fined.
“[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointed counsel.”
Id. at 373.
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
Id. at 658.
Id. at 662.
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).

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by virtue of poverty and denied the right to an attorney to assist with the first appeal
granted by the state as a matter of right.28 More recently, in Halbert v. Michigan,29 a
case decided in 2005, the Court invoked the rationale of Douglas, holding that a state
may not deny counsel to a defendant who seeks to appeal following entry of a guilty
plea. In Halbert, the Court recounted the numerous issues that defendants who plead
guilty may raise on appeal in an effort to set aside their guilty pleas, as well as the difficulty of doing so without the aid of an attorney.30
This discussion of the expansion of the right to counsel deals with what states must
do as a matter of federal constitutional law. However, state courts have interpreted
their state constitutions and statutes in ways that have expanded the right to
counsel beyond what the Supreme Court has required.31 This is important because,
28

29
30

“The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that the discrimination
is not between possibly ‘good and bad cases,’ but between cases where the rich man can require the
court to listen to argument of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot. There
is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment….” Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357–58.
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005).
The Court stated that “one who pleads guilty or nolo contendere may still raise on appeal constitutional defects that are irrelevant to his factual guilt, double jeopardy claims requiring no further
factual record, jurisdictional defects, challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary
examination, preserved entrapment claims, mental competency claims, factual basis claims, claims
that the state had no right to proceed in the first place, including claims that a defendant was
charged under an inapplicable statute, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 621–22.
Further the Court pointed out that, “navigating the appellate process without a lawyer’s assistance
is a perilous endeavor for a layperson, and well beyond the competence of individuals, like Halbert,
who have little education, learning disabilities, and mental impairments.” Id. at 621. “Michigan’s
very procedures for seeking leave to appeal after sentencing on a plea, moreover, may intimidate the
uncounseled.” Id. at 622.
To illustrate, under the Oregon Constitution, defendants have the right to counsel at any criminal
proceeding, whether or not a term of imprisonment is imposed. See Or. Const., Art I § 11; Gaffey
v. State, 67 P.2d 634 (Ore. App. 1981). The right to counsel in Oregon also applies to all offenses
that have the character of criminal prosecutions, such as traffic infractions, whether or not they
are statutorily labeled crimes or have the possibility of imprisonment, if they retain penal characteristics. See Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 570 P.2d 52 (1977). Moreover, Oregon
provides counsel as of right in termination of parental rights proceedings, to both the parents and
the child, civil commitment proceedings, and dependency proceedings to both the parents and the
child. See ORS 138.510 et seq. Tennessee also has expanded the right to counsel in criminal proceedings, appointing an attorney to every person “accused of any crime or misdemeanor whatsoever”
(Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-102 (2005); and in all proceedings for the filing of a writ of habeas
corpus or of error coram nobis (Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-204 (2005). In Massachusetts, the right
to counsel is afforded to children and their parents, custodians, or guardians in care and protection
and related proceedings; persons in mental health proceedings, including civil commitment, medical treatment, sex offender registry, and sexually dangerous person cases; and elderly or disabled
persons in care and protection. See Art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights; Marsden v.
Commonwealth, 352 Mass. 564, 568 (1967); M.G.L. ch. 6 §§ 178L and 178M; M.G.L. ch. 123 §§ 5,
12(b), 35; M.G.L. ch. 123A §§ 13-14; M.G.L. ch. 201 §§ 6, 6A, 14(d); M.G.L. ch. 211D § 16; Rogers
v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health, 390 Mass. 489 (1983); Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass.

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oftentimes, indigent defense32 programs are called upon to provide the necessary legal
representation, which requires the time of defense lawyers and support staffs, as well
as additional cost.

Transcripts, Experts, and Other Assistance
The Supreme Court recognized, even before Gideon, that poverty must not prevent
a defendant from receiving fair and equal treatment in the courts. The Douglas and
Halbert cases discussed in the preceding section applied the reasoning of Griffin v.
Illinois,33 a 1956 Supreme Court decision in which the Court held as a matter of due
process and equal protection that a trial transcript must be furnished to an indigent
at state expense if it is required for a defendant’s appeal to be heard in the state’s
appellate court. As the Court in Griffin explained, “[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts.”34
The principle of the Griffin case was applied again by the Court in 1985 in Ake v.
Oklahoma35 to require that the state provide access to a psychiatrist for an indigent
defendant who makes a preliminary showing that his sanity will be an issue at trial.
The Ake decision has been invoked by federal and state courts to require that other
kinds of assistance, both expert and non-expert, are provided to indigent defendants,
thereby helping to ensure that the accused receives meaningful legal representation.36

33
34
35
36

415 (1981); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728 (1977); M.G.L. ch.
19A § 20; M.G.L ch. 19C § 7.
This report uses the terms “indigent defense” and “public defense” interchangeably to refer to programs in state and local jurisdictions used to provide legal representation in criminal and juvenile
cases for persons unable to afford an attorney.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Id. at 19.
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
See Moore v. State, 390 Md. 343 (Md. 2005) (citing cases that have extended Ake’s reasoning to nonpsychiatric experts); See, e.g., Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 313 (10th Cir. 1992) (battered-spouse
syndrome expert); Scott v. Louisiana, 934 F.2d 631, 633 (5th Cir. 1991) (ballistics expert); Little v.
Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis expert); Bright v. State, 265 Ga. 265 (Ga. 1995)
(toxicologist); Crawford v. State, 257 Ga. 681 (Ga. 1987) (serologist, psychologist, survey expert);
Thornton v. State, 255 Ga. 434 (Ga. 1986) (forensic dentist); People v. Lawson, 163 Ill. 2d 187 (Ill.
1994) (fingerprint and shoe print experts); James v. State, 613 N.E.2d 15, 21 (Ind. 1993) (blood
spatter expert); State v. Coker, 412 N.W.2d 589, 593 (Iowa 1987) (expert to assist with intoxication
defense); Harrison v. State, 635 So.2d 894 (Miss. 1994) (pathology expert); State v. Huchting, 927
S.W.2d 411, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (DNA expert); People v. Tyson, 209 A.D.2d 354 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994) (voiceprint expert); State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St. 3d 144, (Ohio 1998) (non-psychiatric
experts generally).

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At What Stage of the Proceedings Is Counsel Required?
The Powell, Gideon, Gault, and Argersinger cases held that the accused had a constitutional right to counsel at trial. These cases did not address the stage of the case at
which the right to counsel attaches. Timing is important because the earlier a defense
attorney enters a client’s case, the better the lawyer is able to protect the client’s rights
and provide effective representation. If, for example, representation begins just after
the client is charged, counsel can seek the defendant’s release from custody and begin
a prompt investigation of the facts.
In its Powell decision in 1932, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of counsel’s presence during the pretrial phase of a case: “[D]uring perhaps the most critical
period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is to say, from the time of
their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important, the defendants did not
have the aid of counsel in any real sense….”37
Although the Supreme Court has not specified the exact time by which defense counsel must be offered to the indigent accused, clearly, a defendant must be furnished the
right to an attorney well before the trial itself. As the Court has explained, “the right
to counsel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a
person is entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’”38 In 2008, the Court rendered
its most recent decision on the subject, holding that the right to counsel attaches at
a criminal defendant’s initial court appearance where he learns of the charges against
him and his liberty is subject to restriction regardless of whether the prosecutor is
aware of the proceedings.39 This ruling is consistent with what the Court previously
had stated, i.e., defendants are guaranteed counsel “at any stage of the prosecution,
37
38
39

Powell, 287 U.S. at 57–8.
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008). In Rothgery, the Supreme Court did not
actually decide that the initial court appearance at issue in the case was a “critical stage” at which a
lawyer had to be offered to the accused. As the Court explained: “Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment proceedings; what makes a stage critical is what shows the need for counsel’s presence.
Thus, counsel must be appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for adequate
representation at any critical stage before trial, as well as at trial itself…. Our holding is narrow….
We merely reaffirm what we have held before and what an overwhelming majority of American
jurisdictions understand in practice: a criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a judicial officer, where he learns the charges against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the start
of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”
Id. at 2591–92.

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formal or informal, in court or not, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the
accused’s right to a fair trial.”40
Thus, the Court has held that the right to counsel attaches at a preliminary hearing to determine whether a crime has been committed and if the accused is the
likely perpetrator;41 at a post-indictment lineup where the accused is exhibited to a
witness;42 at a court-ordered psychiatric exam conducted after the defendant has been
indicted;43 and when a defendant pleads guilty to a criminal charge.44 These decisions, as well as common sense, dictate that public defense45 systems should provide
legal representation either at or just after the commencement of adversary judicial
proceedings.46

Waiver of the Right to Counsel
A defendant may relinquish the constitutional right to be represented by counsel. In
numerous cases over a period of many years, the Supreme Court has spelled out what
is required for a valid waiver of counsel. Beginning with Johnson v. Zerbst in 1938,
while dealing with waiver of counsel in a federal criminal case in which defendants
proceeded to trial without legal representation, the Supreme Court explained:
‘[C]ourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver’ of fundamental constitutional rights…. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and
conduct of the accused…. The constitutional right of an accused to be
40
41
42
43
44

45
46

United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967).
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8–11 (1970).
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
See, e.g., Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004). Some situations have been held not to be “critical
stages” of a case for the defendant and hence, the right to counsel does not attach even though
the event occurs after the start of adversary judicial proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413
U.S. 300 (1973) (right to an attorney does not attach when a witness identifies defendant at a postindictment photographic array); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (post-indictment taking
of handwriting exemplars does not constitute a critical stage to which the right to counsel attaches).
For a definition of the meaning of “public defense” as used in this report, see supra note 32.
Although the right to counsel applies to suspects when they are interrogated in custodial settings
prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, the right to counsel is for the purpose
of implementing the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination. Denial of counsel
in such situations is not a Sixth Amendment violation. See Edwards v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 477, 482
(1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966).

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

represented by counsel … imposes the serious and weighty responsibility
upon the trial judge of determining whether there is an intelligent and
competent waiver by the accused. While an accused may waive the right
to counsel, whether there is a proper waiver should be clearly determined
by the trial court, and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to appear upon the record.47
In 1947, in a case where a defendant pled guilty to a felony charge without the assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court elaborated on what is necessary to constitute
a valid waiver:
To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against
waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate
as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him
demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his
right to counsel and desires to waive this right does not automatically
end the judge’s responsibility. To be valid such waiver must be made
with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof,
and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.
A judge can make certain that an accused’s professed waiver of counsel is
understandingly and wisely made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the circumstances under which such a plea is
tendered.48
In 2004, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position on waiver of counsel in the case
of Iowa v. Tovar.49 In this case, the defendant pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge
of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Citing its 1938 decision in Johnson v. Zerbst,50 the Court again emphasized that “any waiver of counsel
[must] be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.”51 The Court further explained that it
had not “prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he
elects to proceed without counsel. The information a defendant must possess in order
to make an intelligent election, our decisions indicate, will depend on a range of casespecific factors, including the defendant’s education or sophistication, the complex or
easily grasped nature of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.”52
47
48
49
50
51
52

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938).
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723–24 (1947).
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464–65.
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88.
Id.

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While conceding that its decisions concerning the right to counsel suggest that a lawyer is necessary in order to assure that a defendant receives a fair trial, the Supreme
Court in 1975, nevertheless, held in Faretta v. California53 that a defendant has a
constitutional right to proceed without counsel.54 However, before a defendant is
permitted to do so, the trial court should make clear “the dangers and disadvantages
of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing
and his choice is made with eyes wide open.’”55

The Cost of the Right to Counsel
The foregoing discussion shows that, in order to secure fair treatment for the indigent, the Supreme Court has required that lawyers be provided pursuant to the Sixth
Amendment in the vast majority of criminal and juvenile delinquency cases absent
an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel.56 It also reflects that counsel must
be provided soon after the start of adversary judicial proceedings and lawyers must
have access to experts and other assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense
of their clients. But since the Supreme Court is not a legislative body, the Court has
said relatively little about the huge costs that their constitutional decisions entail.
Taken together, the Court’s historic rulings, based upon the federal Constitution’s
53
54

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
The decision in Faretta was based upon the language of the Sixth Amendment, which speaks of the
“assistance” of counsel, thus implying that such assistance must be able to be refused. As the Court
remarked, “[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic
of the Amendment.” Id. at 820. The Court also thought it was important to recognize individual
autonomy, so that a person will not “believe the law contrives against him.” Id. at 834. After Faretta,
the Court authorized judges to appoint “standby counsel” even over a defendant’s objection, when
deemed necessary to assist a defendant engaged in self-representation. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465
U.S. 168 (1984).
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 835 (citing Adam v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269,
279 (1942)). But, the Court has refused to recognize a right to self-representation on appeal. See
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
However, the Court has not extended the right to counsel to all of the kinds of cases in which the
assistance of a lawyer could be exceedingly helpful. See e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)
(right to counsel applies to an indigent defendant’s first appeal as of right but does not extend to
subsequent discretionary appeals or to applications for review to the United States Supreme Court);
Murray v. Giarrantano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (right to counsel does not extend to state post-conviction
proceedings in a capital case); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (right to counsel does not
extend to state post-conviction proceedings in a non-capital case). Nor is there a right to counsel if
a defendant is only subjected to a fine. See infra note 23, Scott v. Illinois. A defendant also does not
have the right to an attorney when seeking to show that he or she was wrongfully convicted and
thus entitled to exoneration. The subject of wrongful convictions is discussed later in this chapter.
See infra notes 131–49 and accompanying text. (A cross reference in this report is to footnotes in the
same chapter in which the cross reference appears unless the chapter number is provided.)

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Sixth Amendment counsel provision, are a significant, high-cost, unfunded mandate
imposed upon state and/or local governments.57
So, what has the Supreme Court said about the funding of legal representation for
the indigent? In Gideon, the expense of defense services was not discussed at all.
However, in the Argersinger decision, which required that counsel be provided even
in misdemeanor cases in which the accused is imprisoned, Justice Powell, concurring
in the Court’s opinion, commented on “available funding,” referring to it as an “acute
problem.”58 In a footnote, Justice Powell elaborated, stating that “[t]he successful implementation of the majority’s rule would require state and local governments to appropriate considerable funds, something they have not been willing to do.”59 Quoting
a source published in 1972, Justice Powell noted that, despite the much larger size of
the American economy and its population compared to Britain, “American legal aid
expenditures are less than 2 times as high.”60 A more recent comparison of criminal
defense expenditures between this country and England and Wales shows that, on a
per capita basis, the United States lags well behind in providing financial support.61
57

59
60
61

The same point is made in Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England
and the Need for Federal Help, 55 Hastings L. J. 835, 843 (2004) [hereinafter Lefstein, Lessons from
England].
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 59. A number of states impose various fees on indigent
defendants to cover a small part of the cost of their legal representation. These fees are sometimes
referred to as recoupment, contribution, reimbursement, application fees, etc. The Supreme Court
has held that a defendant may be required to repay a portion of the cost of his defense services
where the trial court was required to consider whether imposing such a duty could result in a
substantial hardship to the defendant. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974). The ABA recommends
that “reimbursement” (payments required to be made at the termination of a case) should not be
required, whereas “contribution” (ordered at the time representation is provided or during the
course of proceedings) should be permitted. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Providing
Defense Services 5-7.2 (3d ed.) (1992) [hereinafter ABA Providing Defense Services]. See also
discussion of subject at website of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, available
at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/printerfriendly/A0408p50?opendocument
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 61 n. 30.
Id. See Cappelletti & Grodley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 24 Stan. L. Rev. 347 (1972).
Lefstein, Lessons from England, supra note 57, at 922–24. The author discusses the many differences
between legal aid expenditures for criminal defense in England and the United States and calculates
a comparison between the two countries in which the dollar cost of defense functions for which
England pays and the United States does not (e.g., police station housing legal representation
is routinely provided in England) are removed from consideration. Still, the analysis concludes
that, on a per capita basis, England’s expenditures far exceed those of the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government. Moreover, England does not have a death penalty, which
is easily the most expensive type of indigent defense case in which representation is provided in the
United States. Nevertheless, for 2001–2002, the author found that, in the United States, the federal
government and the states spent $11.72 per capita, whereas $26.67 per capita was spent in England
during 2002–2003. “… [T]here [are not] obvious explanations, such as the incidence of recorded
crime, that would account for England’s per capita expenditures for criminal legal aid being so
much higher than those in the United States. Instead, the real explanation for the disparity in

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One of the most specific statements about funding and the right to counsel is contained in a 1994 dissent of Justice Blackmun in a capital case. In Justice Blackmun’s
opinion, “the absence of funds to compensate lawyers prevents even qualified lawyers
from being able to present an adequate defense.”62 In fairness, the Supreme Court has
sometimes expressed concern for whether the states would be able to afford to implement its right to counsel decisions. In Scott v. Illinois,63 the Court explained that the
basis for its ruling in Argersinger was that “incarceration was so severe a sanction that
it should not be imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant
had been offered appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to
the States, implicit in such a rule.”64 The Court then refused to extend the right to
counsel to cases where only a fine is imposed against a defendant, reasoning that
any extension of the right to counsel where no incarceration results would “impose
unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on 50 quite diverse States.”65
The organized bar has long recognized that if effective defense services are to be
provided, government must pay for them. As stated in the American Bar Association
Standards Related to Providing Defense Services, “[g]overnment has responsibility
to fund the full cost of quality legal representation for all eligible persons….”66 This
standard reflects the enormous need for defense services in all of the kinds of cases to
which the right to counsel attaches and that it is totally unrealistic to expect that effective representation will be delivered unless systems of public defense are adequately
funded. In its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA strongly encourages
lawyers to provide pro bono legal services but excludes from the category of appropriate volunteer service those cases covered by the constitutional right to counsel.67

63
64
65
66
67

defense expenditures between the United States and England is simply that England spends more
on criminal legal aid…. Indeed, England’s commitment to legal services has resulted in its spending
more on public defense than on prosecuting criminal cases, which is also in distinct contrast to
the United States. Despite complaints of solicitors about a lack of fee increases, England’s criminal
defense system is considerably better funded than is its U.S. counterpart.” Id. at 923–24.
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1258 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In contrast, several years
earlier, in a dissenting opinion from a denial of certiorari, Justice White expressed the view that it
was unnecessary to provide any compensation to defense lawyers for undertaking defense representation even in a capital case. See Martin County, Florida v. Makemsom, 479 U.S. 1043 (1987)
(White, J., dissenting).
440 U.S. 367 (1979).
Scott, 440 U.S. at 372–73.
Id. at 373.
ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, at 5-1.6.
See Model Rules of Prof ’l Conduct R. 6.1 (2007) [hereinafter ABA Model Rules]. “Services
can be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty
appeal cases.” Id. at R. 6.1 cmt. 1.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

B. Standards for Organizing Defense
Services and Client Representation
Following Gideon and the Supreme Court’s other decisions extending the right to
counsel, it was inevitable that the number of lawyers engaged in furnishing defense
services would increase significantly and that new systems for providing counsel
would emerge. To guide these developments, national organizations have issued
important standards about the structure of defense services and the representation
of defense lawyers. The American Bar Association and the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association are the leading organizations that have published these standards. Although the standards of these organizations have proven influential, membership in both organizations is voluntary and compliance with the organizations’
standards is voluntary as well.
In 1992, the American Bar Association issued its third edition of ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice on Providing Defense Services.68 These standards, published in
a 106-page booklet, cover all of the important elements related to the structure of
public defense programs, such as securing the independence of the defense function,
assigned counsel programs, contract defense services, public defender programs,
eligibility for defense services, and waiver of counsel. On the important question of
professional independence for the defense function, the ABA calls for defense lawyers
to “be free from political influence and [to] … be subject to judicial supervision only
to the same extent as are lawyers in private practice.”69
In 2002, the American Bar Association published its ABA Ten Principles of a Public
Defense Delivery System.70 The purpose was to condense its detailed standards for organizing defense services and to make them readily understandable to the lay public
68

69
70

The black-letter standards (without commentary) are available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/
standards/defsvcs_blk.html. The second edition of the standards was approved by the ABA House
of Delegates in 1980 and the first edition in 1969. The standards are part of a multi-volume work
dealing with most facets of the criminal justice system. When the initial volumes were issued, Chief
Justice Warren Burger described the project as “the single most comprehensive and probably the
most monumental undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the American legal
profession in our national history.” See http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/home.html
ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, at 5-1.3(a).
ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System (2002), available at http://www.
abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/tenprinciplesbooklet.pdf [hereinafter
Ten ABA Principles]. The principles are based on an earlier work prepared by James R. Neuhard,
Director of the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office, and Scott Wallace, former Director of
Defender Legal Services for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA). See ABA
Ten Principles, at Acknowledgements. In order to improve services in the area of juvenile defense,
the National Juvenile Defender Center and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association have
issued Ten Core Principles for Providing Quality Delinquency Representation Through

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and non-lawyer legislators.71 Because these principles have gained wide acceptance
in public discussions of indigent defense and have been carefully considered by the
National Right to Counsel Committee in formulating our own recommendations,
we reprint them below:
1. The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of
defense counsel, is independent.
2. Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists
of both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.
3. Clients are screened for eligibility and defense counsel is assigned and notified
of appointment, as soon as feasible after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for
counsel.
4. Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which
to meet with the client.
5. Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation.
6. Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the
case.
7. The same attorney continuously represents the client until completion of the case.
8. There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and defense counsel is included as an equal partner in the judicial system.
9. Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend continuing legal
education.
10. Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards.
The most important standards dealing with the duties of lawyers in representing clients were first published in 1994 by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.

Public Defense Delivery Systems (2d ed. July 2008) [hereinafter Ten Core Principles], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/10_Core_Principles_2008.pdf.
“The Principles were created as a practical guide for governmental officials, policymakers, and
other parties who are charged with creating and funding new, or improving existing, public defense
delivery systems. The Principles constitute the fundamental criteria necessary to design a system
that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, conflict-free legal representation for criminal
defendants who are unable to afford an attorney. The more extensive ABA policy statement dealing
with indigent defense services is contained within the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice,
Providing Defense Services (3d ed. 1992)….” ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, at Introduction.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

The NLADA Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation are now
contained in a 146-page booklet, consisting of black-letter recommendations covering
a defense lawyer’s duty in representing a criminal defendant, from the very beginning
of a case through the time of conviction.72 Thus, the guidelines deal with such matters as the initial client interview, pretrial release of the defendant, case investigation,
filing pretrial motions, plea negotiations, trial preparation, the trial itself, sentencing,
and motions for a new trial. Although less thorough than NLADA’s standards, some
of the same subjects are dealt with in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on the
Defense Function.73 Separate standards pertaining to capital defense representation,
known as the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases,74 also have been approved, and there also are standards related
to the defense of cases in juvenile courts.75
In addition to national standards of the kinds mentioned above, a wide variety of
standards dealing with the performance of defense counsel have been issued by defender programs, state commissions, and bar associations, although the vast majority
of these are voluntary, and sanctions are not imposed in the event of violations.76 In
contrast, some state supreme courts have issued rules pertaining to defense services,
especially in the area of capital defense representation, and these typically are
mandatory.77
72
73

75
76

Performance Guidelines for Criminal Def. Representation (4th Printing) (National Legal
Aid and Defender Ass’n 2006) [hereinafter NLADA Performance Guidelines].
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Defense Function (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter
ABA Defense Function]. The black-letter standards (without commentary) are available at
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dfunc_toc.html.
ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Def. Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (rev. 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/deathpenalty/resources/
docs/2003Guidelines.pdf.
See, e.g., Juvenile Justice Standards (ABA & Inst. of Judicial Admin. 1981). See also Ten Core
Principles, supra note 70.
See, e.g., Standards for Public Defense Services (Washington Defender Association 1989)
(adopted by the Washington State Bar Association in January 1990), available at http://www.
defensenet.org/resources/standards/wda-standards-for-public-defense-services/; Wash. Rev. Code §
10.101.030 (2005), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211 § 9 (1996); Performance Standards and Complaint
Procedures (Committee for Public Counsel Services), available at http://www.publiccounsel.net/
private_counsel_manual/private_counsel_manual_pdf/chapters/chapter_4_sections/criminal/criminal_district_court_superior_court_murder_(trial_level).pdf. In contrast to voluntary standards,
at least one state has adopted standards that purport to be mandatory as a condition for receiving
funding from the state. See Standards for Indigent Defense Services in Non-Capital Cases
(Indiana Public Defender Commission 1995), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/pdc/docs/
standards/indigent-defense-non-cap.pdf. For a discussion and examples of defense standards, see
Scott Wallace and David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards
(2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/205023.pdf.
See, e.g., Ind. R. Crim. Proc. 24 (setting forth experience qualifications for appointment of
counsel in capital cases); Tenn. Supreme Ct. R. 13 (experience qualifications for assignment of

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C. Professional Duty of Lawyers Representing the Indigent
While almost all of the standards discussed in the preceding section are voluntary, an
indigent defense program could choose to require that its attorneys adhere to them.
For example, certain of the recommendations contained in NLADA’s Performance
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation could be made mandatory for an
agency’s attorneys, and sanctions could be imposed in instances of non-compliance.78
However, we are aware of no defense program that has actually developed a vigorous
process to monitor and strictly enforce compliance with performance standards.79
But every attorney who practices law in the United States, including all who
represent indigent clients, are subject to their respective states’ rules of professional
conduct.80 In each state, these rules were approved by the state’s highest court and,
virtually everywhere, the states’ rules are substantially similar in both form and
substance to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.81 In all states, moreover,
failure to comply with the state’s rules of professional conduct can lead to disciplinary
sanctions, such as reprimand, suspension, or even disbarment.82
In addition, pursuant to every state’s rules, a lawyer is required to furnish “competent” representation, defined in nearly all states in accordance with the ABA

counsel in capital cases, much like those in Indiana); La. Supreme Ct. R. XXXI (experience
qualifications for appointment of counsel in both capital and appellate cases); Ga. Superior Ct. R.
29.8 (general qualifications for appointment of counsel, not capital-specific, which state that cases
should be assigned based on sufficient levels of experience and competence, with less experienced
attorneys receiving cases within their capabilities). Additionally, there are state bar associations that
have adopted rules regarding capital defense representation. As an example, see Guidelines and
Standards for Texas Capital Counsel (Standing Committee on Legal Services to the Poor in
Criminal Matters 2006), available at http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=Texas_Bar_
Journal1&Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=16076.
“Use of judgment in deciding upon a particular course of action is reflected by the phrases ‘should
consider’ and ‘where appropriate.’ In those few instances where NLADA believes a particular action
is absolutely essential to providing quality representation, the Guidelines use the words ‘should’ or
‘shall.’” NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, at xii.
But see In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants
in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Issued by the Nevada Supreme
Court on January 4, 2008), available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/orders/
ADKT411Order.pdf.
“Each state has a set of ethics [rules] that govern the lawyers in that state. In addition, some states
have special statutes that govern the conduct of lawyers….” Mortimer D. Schwartz, et al.,
Problems in Legal Ethics 40 (6th ed. 2003).
See supra note 67, ABA Model Rules. The three states in which the ethical rules are most dissimilar in format from the ABA Model Rules are California, Maine, and New York. See Cal. Rules of
Prof ’l Conduct (1992); Me Bar Rules (2007); NY State Bar Association Lawyer’s Code of
Prof ’l Responsibility (2002).
See Problems in Legal Ethics, supra note 80, at 42.

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Model Rules as requiring “the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.”83 In most states, a comment contained
in the states’ rules of professional conduct is quite explicit: “A lawyer’s workload must
be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”84 However, as this
report shows, defense lawyers often have far too many cases—a major impediment to
“competent” representation—which prevents defenders from spending sufficient time
with their clients and adequately preparing their cases.85
Because defender caseloads are often unmanageable, in 2006, the ABA Standing
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued for the first time a formal opinion dealing with the obligations of public defenders and other lawyers confronted with too much work.86 As explained by the ABA’s ethics committee, the rules
of the profession “provide no exception for lawyers who represent indigent persons
charged with crimes.”87 Accordingly, overburdened defense lawyers, their supervisors,
and heads of defense programs have inescapable ethical duties. The individual lawyer
must take appropriate steps to seek withdrawal from a sufficient number of pending
cases and endeavor to stem the flow of additional case assignments.88 Supervisors
and heads of programs also must understand that they, too, are violating their ethical
duties if they permit their subordinate attorneys to provide representation in excessive
numbers of cases.89 The opinion is aimed at securing “competent” representation for
those clients who continue to be represented by the defender.90
Despite the legal profession’s requirement that competent representation be provided
and that workloads be controlled, there is scant evidence in the United States that
defense attorneys are ever actually disciplined for failing to represent their clients adequately. Disciplinary commissions in the 50 states normally act in response to com-

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, at R. 1.1 (2007).
See ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, at R. 1.3 cmt. 2. The black letter of Rule 1.3 requires that
lawyers “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”
See infra notes 95–124 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof ’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/06_441.pdf [hereinafter ABA Formal Op. 06-441].
Id.
Id.
“Rule 5.1 provides that lawyers who have managerial authority, including those with intermediate
managerial responsibilities, over the professional work of a firm or public sector legal agency or department shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyers in the agency or department
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
Id. The opinion is discussed in Norman Lefstein and Georgia Vagenas, Restraining Excessive
Defender Caseloads: The ABA Ethics Committee Requires Action, 30 The Champion 10 (Nat’l Assoc.
Crim. Defense Lawyers, December 2006).

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plaints from disappointed clients, but neither indigent defendants nor others on their
behalf often complain about counsel’s representation to disciplinary authorities.91
There is one area, however, in which the rules of professional conduct, bolstered
by decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Sixth Amendment, have made
an important difference with cost implications. Today, when multiple persons are
charged in criminal cases or in juvenile delinquency proceedings, normally, each person should have his or her own separate lawyer, as there are few occasions in which
a single defense attorney should represent more than one co-defendant.92 The ABA
91

See, e.g., Prosecutors, Defense Attorneys Rarely Disciplined, San Jose Mercury News, February 12,
2006: “When California prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys engage in conduct that violates
defendants’ rights, they can rest assured that they will rarely be held to account by the agency
in charge of policing lawyers. A Mercury News review of 1,500 state disciplinary actions over a
five-year period found that just one of them involved prosecutorial misconduct. Criminal defense
attorneys drew more notice from the State Bar of California, but not much more: Only five percent
of the actions concerned criminal defense attorneys targeted for their work on behalf of clients. The
findings came in the wake of a Mercury News investigation published last month that revealed the
trial and appellate courts also rarely act to curb prosecutors or defense attorneys…. Some experts
say that the situation is deplorable, although they are quick to add that California’s failures are not
unique.” See also California Commission on Fair Administration of Justice, Report and
Recommendations on Reporting Misconduct (October 18, 2007), available at http://www.
ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REPORT%20ON%20REPORTING%20
MISCONDUCT.pdf.
See ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, at R. 1.10 (2007). “The rule of imputed disqualification
stated in paragraph (a) gives effect to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers
who practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the premise that a firm of
lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from
the premise that each lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each lawyer
with whom the lawyer is associated.” Id. at R. 1.10 cmt. 2. Additionally, the ABA Model Rules
state that a “firm” is a “lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services
organization or the legal department of a corporation or other organization.” Id. at 1.1(c). The
foregoing suggests that a program providing indigent defense services should not be permitted to
have separate lawyers from the same office or program represent multiple co-defendants. However,
there are a number of states (e.g., Arkansas, California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, and New
York) that do not apply the rule of imputed disqualification to public defenders. Although not
provided for in the ABA Model Rules, some states have held that if a “Chinese wall” of separation
is established among lawyers practicing together, a presumption of shared confidence among the attorneys is rebutted and the rule of imputed disqualification does not apply. See Catherine Schaefer,
Imputed Disqualification: Do Ethics Screens Adequately Shield Public Defenders from Conflicts of
Interest?, 21 The Champion 29, 32 (Nat’l Assoc. Criminal Defense Lawyers 1997). South Carolina is
an example of a state that has adopted an exception for disqualification due to conflicts of interest
when a lawyer is a public defender: “A lawyer representing a client of a public defender office, legal
services association, or similar program serving indigent clients shall not be disqualified under this
Rule because of the program’s representation of another client in the same or a substantially related
matter if: (1) the lawyer is screened in a timely manner from access to confidential information
relating to and from any participation in the representation of the other client; and (2) the lawyer
retains authority over the objectives of the representation pursuant to Rule 5.4(c).” S.C. Rules of

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Model Rules preclude representation of multiple parties by a single attorney whenever the interests of clients are “directly adverse” or there is a “significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.”93 As the comment to the rule explains, “[t]he potential for
conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave
that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one co-defendant.”94
Similarly, the Supreme Court’s decisions have underscored the need for each defendant to have his or her own lawyer as a means of securing for each defendant conflictfree representation, thereby providing “effective assistance of counsel” as guaranteed
by the Sixth Amendment.95 Consequently, the number of lawyers needed for indigent
clients and the expense of indigent defense services nationwide is considerably greater
than it would be otherwise.
Neither rules of professional conduct nor standards governing the conduct of defense
lawyers discussed in the preceding section address the myriad of ways in which
indigent defense representation in criminal and juvenile cases has become increasingly complex during the past several decades. In 2007, the American Council of
Chief Defenders (ACCD) issued a statement that outlines how over the years legal
developments and procedural changes have made indigent defense much more difficult, placing on defense lawyers far greater time demands and requiring a higher
level of expertise.96 As the ACCD explains, defense attorneys now have to deal
with “entire new practice areas, including sexually violent offender commitment
proceedings, and persistent offender (‘three strikes’) cases which carry the possibility
of life imprisonment.”97 Further, the statement discusses the increased complexity
of juvenile defense work, the importance of defenders understanding the collateral
consequences of convictions, and the specialized knowledge needed by defense lawyers who provide representation in capital cases.98 Also, defense lawyers must be alert

93
94
95
96

97
98

Professional Conduct, R 1.10 (e). Compare Ethics Advisory Opinion 78-02 (South Carolina
Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. 1978) (a public defender office is the same as a law firm for conflict of
interest issues).
ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, at R.1.7(a) (1),(2) (2007).
ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, R.1.7 cmt. 23 (2007).
See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See also ABA Defense Function, supra note 73, at 4-3.5(c).
American Council of Chief Defenders Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, August 24, 2007
[hereinafter ACCD Statement on Caseloads and Workloads], available at http://www.nlada.org/DMS/
Documents/1189179200.71/EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCASELOADSTATEMENTsept6.
pdf. The American Council of Chief Defenders (ACCD) is comprised of heads of defender
programs from all over the country. ACCD is a unit of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 7–9.

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to numerous rules related to procedural default, pursuant to which defendants can
forfeit the opportunity to litigate in state and federal appellate courts absent timely
objection in the trial court. 99

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:
The Difficulty of Correcting Mistakes
The Supreme Court has long held that the “the right to counsel is the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.”100 In the case of Strickland v. Washington,101 decided
by an 8–1 majority in 1984, the Supreme Court held that, to successfully claim ineffectiveness, a defendant must establish that the facts of the case satisfy a two-pronged
test.102 First, counsel’s performance must have been deficient, meaning that “counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”103 Specific guidelines to determine whether an attorney meets an objective standard of reasonableness
were rejected, but instead “the proper measure remains reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.”104 However, in evaluating a claim of ineffectiveness, a court
“must be highly deferential”105 to defense counsel and “indulge a strong presumption
that counsel’s performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.”106

See, e.g., McQuinn v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 753, 460 S.E.2d 624 (en banc) (1995) (motion
to strike evidence is waived for appeal if not renewed at the close of all evidence); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (defendant
who objects to a trial court ruling on voir dire of the jury must also object to the seating of the juror
to preserve objection for appeal). For procedural default and its application to the death penalty,
see Larry W. Yackle, The American Bar Association and Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 171 (1998).
100 McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14 (1970).
101 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
102 While the focus of this section is on the two-prong test for determining ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant is also denied the effective assistance of counsel when the state “interferes in
certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the
defense.” Id. at 686. See infra note 124 for cases cited by the Supreme Court.
103 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
104 Id. The Supreme Court further elaborated on this point by stating that “prevailing norms of
practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like, e.g., ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice 4-1.1 to 4-8.6 (2nd ed. 1980) (“The Defense Function”), are guides to determining
what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Id.
105 Id. at 689.
106 Id.
99

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In addition, “any deficiencies in counsel’s performance must be prejudicial to the
defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution.”107
Assuming counsel’s deficient representation, there must be “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.108 The reason for this second prong of the ineffectiveness standard is
because “[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel is to ensure
that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the
proceeding.”109 Or, as further explained in the Strickland opinion, since the purpose
of the Sixth Amendment is “to ensure a fair trial, … [t]he benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”110
Only Justice Marshall dissented in Strickland, rejecting both the “performance” and
“prejudice” prongs of the Supreme Court’s majority opinion. Respecting the performance prong—the “objective standard of reasonableness”—Justice Marshall complained “that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will either have no grip at all or will
yield excessive variation in the manner in which the Sixth Amendment is interpreted
and applied by different courts.”111
As for the defendant’s burden to show prejudice, Justice Marshall observed that “it
may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to ascertain how the government’s evidence and argument would have stood up against rebuttal and crossexamination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer,”112 noting that “evidence of injury to
the defendant may be missing from the record precisely because of the incompetence
of defense counsel.”113 To Justice Marshall, it seemed “senseless to impose on a
defendant whose lawyer has been shown to have been incompetent the burden of
demonstrating prejudice.”114
Since Strickland was decided, commentators have been virtually unanimous in their
criticisms of the opinion.115 Some have echoed views of Justice Marshall,116 whereas
107 Id.

at 692.
Id. at 694.
109 Id. at 692.
110 Id. at 686.
111 Id. at 707.
112 Id. at 710.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure 1130–32 (10th ed. 2002). See also
infra notes 116–118 for law review articles discussing Strickland’s shortcomings and problems.
116 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity Standard,
88 J. Crim. L. & C. 242 (1997).
108

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others have accused the Supreme Court of being insensitive to the very serious problem of adequate representation.117 Most of all, the decision has been criticized due to
the exceedingly difficult burden of proof placed on defendants in challenging counsel’s representation118 and because it has led appellate courts to sustain convictions in
truly astonishing situations. One writer has summarized a few of the cases:
[T]he test has proved impossible to meet. Courts have declined to find
ineffective assistance where defense counsel slept during portions of the
trial, where counsel used heroin and cocaine throughout the trial, where
counsel allowed his client to wear the same sweatshirt and shoes in court
that the perpetrator was alleged to have worn on the day of the crime,
where counsel stated prior to trial that he was not prepared on the law or
the facts of the case, and where counsel appointed in a capital case could
not name a single Supreme Court decision on the death penalty.119
In a companion case to Strickland, the Supreme Court rejected an exception to its
Strickland standard based upon external factors related to the nature of the defense
services provided. In United States v. Cronic,120 the defendant was convicted of a
complicated mail fraud scheme following a jury trial in which he was represented
by a young, court-appointed lawyer with a real estate practice who had no jury trial
experience. Although the case involved thousands of pages of documents and the
government had taken four and one-half years to prepare its case, the defendant’s
lawyer was afforded only 25 days. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction, inferring that the circumstances of the
defendant’s representation meant that he had been denied the effective assistance of
counsel.121 The court’s opinion emphasized the following factors, among others: the
lack of time afforded counsel for investigation and preparation; the inexperience of
counsel; the seriousness of the charges; and the complexity of possible defenses.122
See, e.g., Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths - A Dead
End?, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 9 (1986).
118 See, e.g., Richard Klein, A Generation Later: The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1433 (1999); Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward
a Check-List Based Standard for Evaluating Effective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 Geo. L. J.
413 (1988); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drinks, Drugs, Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 Neb. L. Rev. 425 (1996) (stating
that one of the major problems with the Strickland decision is the “almost insurmountable hurdle”
created by the two prong test); Richard L. Gabriel, The Strickland Standard for Claims of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise of Due Process, 134 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1259 (1986).
119 David Cole, No Equal Justice 78–79 (1999).
120 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
121 United States v. Cronic, 675 F.2d 1126 (10 Cir. 1982), rev’d, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
122 Id. at 1128.
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Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and reinstated the
defendant’s conviction, thereby rejecting the proposition that ineffective assistance
of counsel could be inferred based upon the circumstances of the defendant’s case
and counsel’s situation. As in Strickland, the Court presumed that the lawyer was
competent and stressed that “the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation.”123
As a result of Cronic, it is extremely difficult to overturn a conviction by arguing
that institutional deficiencies in public defense mean that ineffective assistance of
counsel was rendered. Thus, for example, gross underfunding of a public defender
program leading to high public defender caseloads, with representation furnished by
untrained lawyers who have only meager support services, is not apt by itself to be
sufficient to establish Sixth Amendment violations. However, the Court conceded in
Cronic that, if there was a complete denial of counsel or “if counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been
a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.”124 In addition, the Court in Cronic recognized that there could be
circumstances where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one,
could provide effective assistance is so small that that a presumption of prejudice is
appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.”125
Like the U.S. Constitution, state constitutions typically contain provisions guaranteeing the assistance of counsel.126 State supreme courts, therefore, could avoid the
Strickland test for ineffective assistance by invoking their own state’s constitutional
provisions on counsel and devising tests for ineffectiveness less stringent than the test
contained in Strickland. In fact, however, only one state actually appears to have done
so. The Hawaii Supreme Court has held that “specific errors or omissions reflecting
counsel’s lack of skill, judgment, or diligence” must be shown and that these reflect “a
possible impairment, rather than a probable impairment, of a potentially meritorious
defense.”127 As the court further explained, Strickland’s test “has been criticized as beCronic, 466 U.S. at 658.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Cases cited in Cronic as examples of situations in which it would be appropriate to presume prejudice included the following: Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976)
(right to a fair trial deprived when attorney-client consultation is barred during overnight recess);
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (there is not a fair trial when summation is disallowed
during a bench trial); and Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) (prejudice presumed when counsel labors under an actual conflict of interest).
125 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–60. The Cronic decision is also discussed later in this report. See infra notes
24–30 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
126 See, e.g., H.I. Const. art. I, § 14 (“The State shall provide counsel for an indigent charged with an
offense punishable by imprisonment”); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 (“In any trial in any court whatever
the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel….”)
127 State v. Wakisaka, 78 P.3d 317, 327 (Haw. 2003).
123

124

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ing unduly difficult for a defendant to meet,” and thus “under Hawaii’s Constitution
defendants are afforded greater protection of their right to effective assistance of
counsel.”128
In recent years, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court has found ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland test in several capital cases.129 However, successful challenges under Strickland are the exception both in the Supreme Court and in
lower courts.130 Nevertheless, perhaps Strickland’s two-prong approach to ineffective
assistance of counsel could be justified if it achieved the objective that the Supreme
Court announced for its decision, namely, permitting society to have confidence
that the outcome of the case is a just result. As shown in the next section, however,
we cannot rely on our courts always to reach the correct result, and Strickland’s test
for judging effective assistance of counsel has been unsuccessful in protecting the innocent, let alone ensuring that counsel has performed competently.

Id. at 327 n. 10. In interpreting their state constitutional provisions for ineffective assistance of
counsel, several state supreme courts have articulated their standards in ways that differ from
the Supreme Court’s Strickland test. See e.g., Ryan v. Palmateer, 108 P.3d 1127 (Ore. 2005). Also,
although Massachusetts and New York courts have stated that their tests for ineffective assistance of
counsel under their state constitutions differ from the Strickland two-prong approach, an analysis of
cases from these states suggests that there does not appear to be any meaningful difference between
Strickland and what is required under state law. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Urena, 632 N.E.2d
1200 (Mass. 1994) (although the court acknowledges that there are apparently two different but
similar tests for ineffective assistance of counsel under Massachusetts and federal law, the nature of
the difference is left unresolved); People v. Sowizdral, 275 A.D.2d 473, 474, 712 N.Y.S.2d 203 (2000)
(“courts of this state have not adopted the Strickland two-prong analysis for ineffective assistance
of counsel”); People v. Acevedo, 2007 NY Slip Op. 6451 (2007) (analyzing facts under both federal
and state tests for ineffective assistance and reaching the same result).
129 See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (lawyers who failed to review a court file that would
have yielded possible mitigation evidence relevant to death penalty sentencing hearing failed
Strickland’s test and were ineffective); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (lawyer’s failure to
look beyond pre-sentence report and department of social services records to discover mitigation
evidence in a capital case that showed years of abuse, homelessness, foster care, and physical torment, failed Strickland’s test and was ineffective); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) ( lawyer’s
failure to discover and present certain mitigation evidence in a capital case sentencing hearing failed
Strickland’s test and was ineffective).
130 See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Check-List Based Standard for
Evaluating Effective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 Geo. L. J. 413, 457 (1988) (from the time of the
Strickland decision until the time of the article the Supreme Court has rejected all of the ineffectiveness claims that it squarely addressed and survey of circuit court ineffectiveness cases shows that
only 30 of 702 claims, or 4.3%, were successful).
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E. Conviction of the Innocent and the Importance of Counsel
Since the first DNA exoneration case in the United States in 1989,131 it has become
increasingly evident that state court justice systems all too often make egregious
mistakes, resulting in innocent persons being convicted while the guilty go free. Even
when Gideon and the Supreme Court’s subsequent right-to-counsel decisions were
rendered, there was reason to believe that innocent persons were sometimes convicted
or felt pressure to plead guilty to offenses brought against them.132 But the evidence
then was not nearly as compelling as it is now. Today, largely because of DNA, we
know for certain that our criminal justice systems are not nearly as accurate as some
have believed,133 and this reality furnishes compelling justification for ensuring that
indigent defense in the United States is well funded and soundly organized. Effective
lawyers not only can secure fair treatment for the indigent accused, they also can play
a vital role in protecting innocent persons from wrongful conviction.
While there is now a substantial body of literature dealing with wrongful
convictions,134 two recent studies are especially noteworthy because they explain
the scope of the problem and the reasons that mistakes occur. In Exonerations in the
United States 1989 Through 2003,135 researchers from the University of Michigan documented 340 exonerations of innocent defendants. Of this number, 144 were cleared
David Vasquez was exonerated by DNA evidence on January 4, 1989. He had been incorrectly
convicted in Virginia for second degree homicide and burglary in 1985 and sentenced to 35 years in
prison. See The Innocence Project, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/276.php.
132 See, e.g., Martin L. Radelet et al., In Spite of Innocence (1992).
133 Justice O’Connor has suggested that the Constitution provides “unparalleled protections
against convicting the innocent.” See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O’Connor, J.
concurring).
134 See, e.g., Adele Bernhard, When Justice Fails: Indemnification for Unjust Conviction, 6 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 73, 75–80, 90–92 (1999) (discusses how innocent persons can be convicted and
the difficult burden of establishing ineffective assistance of counsel); Penny J. White, Errors and
Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1265, 1287–95, 1296–98 (2001) (discusses Illinois
rules to eliminate causes of errors in capital cases and recommends additional remedies to provide
a reliable system in capital cases); James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital
Cases 1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 839, 1844 (2000) (study of 4,578 capital sentences in state appellate
courts and 599 capital sentences in the federal courts, concluding that capital sentences spend much
time under judicial review precisely because they are persistently prone to error); Barry Scheck et
al., Actual Innocence: Five Days to Execution and Other Dispatches from the Wrongly
Convicted (2000); Wrongly Convicted: Perspectives on Failed Justice (Saundra D.
Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001); C. Ronald Huff & Arye Rattner, Convicted
But Innocent; Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy (1996); Michael L. Radelet et
al., In Spite of Innocence: Erroneous Convictions in Capital Cases (1992); Martin Yant,
Presumed Guilty: When Innocent People Are Wrongly Convicted (1991).
135 Samuel L. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 523 (2005).
131

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by DNA evidence, whereas 196 were exonerated through other means. As a group,
the exonerated unjustly spent more than 3,400 years in prison, on the average about
10 years each.136
Of the 340 exonerations, 42 were cases in which an executive authority issued pardons based on evidence of innocence; 263 were cases in which courts dismissed the
charges due to evidence of innocence, including DNA; in 31 cases, defendants were
acquitted in a retrial based on evidence that they were never involved in the offense;
and in four cases, states posthumously declared that the defendants were innocent of
the crimes of which they were convicted.137 The problem is national in scope as the
340 cases were from 38 states, with the most populous states in the country having
had some of the largest number of exonerations, i.e., California, Texas, New York,
Florida, and Illinois.138 In developing their database, the researchers purposely excluded cases in which there were mass exonerations, such as the Rampart exoneration
cases from Los Angeles in which probably more than 100 defendants were convicted
based on police lies and the Tulia, Texas, cases in which 39 defendants were convicted
due to the false testimony of an undercover narcotics agent.139
The study also identified the most frequent, direct causes of wrongful convictions.
The researchers found that mistaken eyewitness identifications had occurred in 64%
of the exoneration cases (219 out of 340); 43% of the exonerations involved perjury
(146 out of 340); and in 15% of the exonerated cases the accused, often a juvenile or
defendant with a mental disability, falsely confessed in response to police pressures
(51 out of 340).140 One of the study’s most disturbing findings is that the vast majority
of the 121 rape case exonerations involved mistaken eyewitness identifications (88%
of the cases), whereas the study contains only six robbery exonerations even though
the number of robberies in the U.S. far exceed the number of rapes and invariably
involve eyewitness identifications.141 Obviously, DNA evidence a ccounts for the
difference in the number of exonerations in these two different kinds of cases. As the
authors of the study note: “If we had a technique for detecting false convictions in
robberies that was comparable to DNA identification for rapes, robbery exonerations
would greatly outnumber rape exonerations….”142 Ultimately, the authors conclude
that “[w]e cannot come close to estimating the number of false convictions that occur
Id. at 524.
Id.
138 Id. at 541.
139 Id. at 551. The erroneous convictions in the Tulia, Texas, cases, which were due to gross police
misconduct and abysmal representation of the defendants, is examined in Nate Blakeslee, Tulia
(2005).
140 Id. at 542–47.
141 Id. at 530.
142 Id. at 531.
136
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in the United States, but the accumulating mass of exonerations gives us a glimpse
of what we’re missing…. Any plausible guess at the total number of miscarriages of
justice in America in the last fifteen years must be in the thousands, perhaps tens of
thousands.”143
A second study of wrongful convictions by a University of Virginia law professor
published in 2008 tracks the first 200 cases of persons exonerated due solely to DNA
evidence.144 The study identified not only the causes of the wrongful convictions, as
in the University of Michigan study, but it also explored how the cases were dealt
with on appeal and during subsequent post-conviction proceedings. No previous
study had ever sought to examine how the cases of exonerated defendants have been
handled in the courts from start to finish.
As for the causes of wrongful conviction, the study determined that mistaken eyewitness identification was involved in 79% of the cases; false forensic evidence (e.g.,
blood, fingerprint, and hair comparisons) in 55% of the cases; false informant testimony in 18% of the cases; and false confessions of defendants in 16% of the cases.145
After their convictions in trial courts, the defendants did not fare much better:
… appellate courts did not effectively review the unreliable and false
evidence that supported these convictions…. Innocent appellants
rarely succeeded in litigating claims that challenged the false evidence
supporting their wrongful convictions. Frequently they did not even
raise claims challenging that evidence, perhaps due to the expense and
difficulty of raising such factual claims. For example, no conviction was
reversed based on a challenge to an eyewitness identification…. In many
innocence cases, courts denied claims finding that evidence of guilt offset
error, sometimes even referring to ‘overwhelming’ evidence of the appellant’s guilt.146
Given the often woeful state of indigent defense services in the United States, as we
describe in this report,147 it is entirely reasonable to infer that a substantial number of
defendants wrongfully convicted were inadequately represented. And while the foregoing studies point to specific reasons for wrongful convictions other than defense
counsel’s performance, sometimes it is perfectly obvious that a lawyer’s ineffective
assistance contributed significantly to the error along with other factors. One such
case is that of Jimmy Ray Bromgard, who after serving more than 14 years in prison,
Id. at 551.
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Columbia. L. Rev. 55 (2008).
145 Id. at 89–91.
146 Id. at 61.
147 See infra Chapter 2 of this report.
143

144

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Chapter 1—The Right to Counsel

was exonerated based upon DNA of a brutal rape of an eight-year old girl. While his
wrongful conviction was attributable directly to mistaken eyewitness identification
and faulty scientific evidence, Bromgard’s attorney clearly failed to do his job. As
explained in one summary of Bromgard’s case, the defense lawyer “failed to challenge
the girl’s courtroom identification…, undertook no investigation, gave no opening
statement, did not prepare a closing argument, … failed to file an appeal, … failed
to object when the state’s expert witness testified, without scientific basis, that the
chances were only one in one hundred thousand that scalp and pubic hairs found at
the crime scene were not Bromgard’s.”148
We are not so naïve as to believe that all wrongful convictions can be prevented if defendants are represented effectively by well-trained and able defense counsel. But we
are convinced that defendants who are innocent—and there are an unknown number
who are—stand virtually no chance of avoiding conviction absent dedicated representation by attorneys who can investigate the client’s case, find witnesses, cross-examine
skillfully, and otherwise offer an effective defense to counter the state’s false evidence.
The causes of wrongful conviction, such as mistaken eyewitness identifications, faulty
scientific evidence, and police perjury, are all matters that competent defense lawyers
can address. Former Attorney General Janet Reno had it exactly right: “[i]n the end, a
good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful conviction.”149

Lefstein, Lessons from England, supra note 57, at 860. This case illustrates one of the other costs
of inadequate systems of public defense besides imprisonment of the innocent. After Bromgard’s
release from prison, he sued the State of Montana and settled his claims out-of-court for $3.5 million, the largest sum Montana has ever paid to settle a civil-rights case. Recently, a lawsuit against
Yellowstone County for a violation of his civil rights because of its failure to provide him with
an adequate defense was dismissed by a federal judge, and an appeal of this decision is likely. The
complaint in this case alleges that “[M]r. Bromgard’s conviction was also caused by the deliberate
indifference of Yellowstone County officials who knowingly established a woefully inadequate
system of indigent defense representation in criminal cases, utterly lacking adequate compensation,
screening, supervision and training for its contract counsel.” Complaint, Bromgard v. State of
Montana, et al., Civil No. 04-192- M-LB, (D. Mont. 2004), available at http://www.sado.org/fees/
Bromgard%20complaint.pdf. See also Clair Johnson, Bromgard Appeals Ruling that Favors County,
Billings Gazette, December 24, 2008, available at http://billingsgazette.net/articles/2008/12/25/
news/local/20-bromgard.txt. The subject of civil rights claims is discussed infra notes 152–66 and
accompanying text, Chapter 3. Since the Bromgard case, Montana has changed its system of indigent defense representation. See infra notes 11, 29, and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
149 Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Nat’l Symposium on Indigent Defense
2000, at vii (2000).
148

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Chapter 2
Indigent Defense Today:
A Dire Need for Reform

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

A. The Need for Reform is Decades Old

ince the U.S. Supreme Court’s Gideon decision in 1963, several organizations have
conducted national studies of indigent defense over several decades. Invariably,
these studies conveyed a grim view of defense services in criminal and juvenile cases,
pointing out many problems in providing counsel across the country, including inadequate funding of defense systems as a whole;1 inadequate compensation for assigned
counsel; inadequate funding of public defenders who are “treated like stepchildren;”2
pressure to waive counsel on juveniles3 and adult defendants;4 inconsistent indigency
standards;5 incompetent or inexperienced counsel;6 late appointment of counsel;7 the
need for greater public financing of indigent defense;8 increased pressure on defendants by defense attorneys to accept guilty pleas to expedite the movement of cases;9
large differences between urban versus rural representation;10 disproportionate salaries
1

4
5
6
7
8

The report states that this is “the greatest problem faced by defender systems.” Nat’l Legal Aid
and Defender Ass’n, Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems in the United States: Report
of the National Study Commission on Defense Services 8 ( 1976) [hereinafter NLADA
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems].
Lee Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in American State Courts: A
Field Study and Report 149 (1965). Silverstein began his one-year study before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gideon. The study was commissioned by the American Bar Association (ABA)
and the Ford Foundation and targeted 300 sample counties with a mail survey sent to each county.
Patricia puritz et al., A Call for Justice: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and
Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 7–8 (reprint 2002) (1995) [hereinafter Puritz], available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/cfjfull.pdf.
Sheldon Krantz, et al., Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases: The Mandate of Argersinger
v. Hamlin 5 (1976) [hereinafter Krantz].
Id.
Id.
Id.
See ABA Special Committee on Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice in Crisis: A Report to
the American People and The American Bar on Criminal Justice in the United States:
Some Myths, Some Realities, and Some Questions for the Future 39–44 (1988) [hereinafter
ABA Special Committee on Criminal Justice].
National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Courts 43
(1973) [hereinafter NAC Courts]. In 1971, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, a federal agency within the United States Department of Justice, commissioned the National Advisory
Commission (NAC) on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals to produce “for the first time,
national criminal justice standards and goals for crime reduction and prevention at the State and local levels.” Id. at Foreword. The resulting report, published in 1973, is the only national source that
has attempted to quantify maximum annual public defender caseloads. In preparing its report, the
NAC drew on limited empirical data then available, but relied mostly on qualitative and anecdotal
information to formulate their recommended standards. This subject is further discussed in this
chapter and later in this Report. See infra notes 96–124 and accompanying text. See also infra notes
45–51 and accompanying text, Chapter 5.
Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, The Other Face of Justice 27 (1973) [hereinafter
NLADA Other Face of Justice]. This study was commissioned by the Law Enforcement

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Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform

between public defenders and prosecutors;11 overwhelming caseloads of juvenile
defenders;12 excessive caseloads of public defenders;13 lack of investigative resources;
and understaffing of public defense offices.14
In the 1970’s and 1980’s, most public defender programs employed lawyers who
provided representation on a part-time basis.15 County governments mostly organized
and funded indigent defense.16 In 1962, the year before the Gideon decision, it was
estimated that indigent defense expenditures for felony cases would cost $25 million
if representation were provided by assigned counsel at the average fee rates then being
paid by county governments.17 But by 1972, estimated expenditures for indigent defense were $87 million,18 $200 million in 1976,19 $436 million in 1980,20 $625 million

11
12
13

14
15

17
18
19
20

Assistance Administration of the U.S. Department of Justice. An NLADA survey administered for
this study documented information from 3110 counties in the United States. A field study of 20
randomly selected counties was conducted to ascertain how indigent defense services were being
delivered.
About 76% of full-time chief public defenders were being paid less than the chief prosecutor in
their jurisdiction. Id. at 19.
Puritz, supra note 3, at 6.
See NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, at 8. See also ABA, Gideon
Undone: The Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding (John Thomas Moran ed., 1982) [hereinafter
ABA Gideon Undone] (estimating the increase of felony defendants requiring counsel had gone
from 48% in recent years to 55% to 60% in 1982).
NLADA Other Face of Justice, supra note 10, at 36. See also Krantz, supra note 4, at 17.
NLADA reported that 650 defender programs existed in 883 counties throughout the country,
representing almost two-thirds of the country’s population. Of those defender offices that reported
information, more than 50% of the offices were part-time and nearly 75% of individual defenders
were part-time. NLADA Other Face of Justice, supra note 10, at 13, 16.
NLADA’s study showed that county governments primarily funded public defender systems in
most jurisdictions. As reported by defender offices, state governments contributed 28.7% of funding for public defender programs while counties funded 57.8%, the federal government provided
9.7%, municipal governments provided 2.8%, and private organizations furnished 1%. Id. at 31. A
1982 study also showed that county-based systems were the most dominant in the United States.
See Robert Spangenberg et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice,
National Criminal Defense Systems Study 9 (1982) [hereinafter Spangenberg, National
Criminal Defense Systems].
Silverstein, supra note 2, at 10.
County governments provided over $50 million of the $87 million in indigent defense funding.
Krantz, supra note 4, at 14.
This sum is a conservative estimate based on data collected by staff of the project. See NLADA
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, at 7.
Norman Lefstein, Criminal Defense Services for the Poor: Methods and Programs for
Providing Legal Representation and the Need for Adequate Financing 10 (ABA 1982)
[hereinafter Lefstein, Criminal Defense Services].

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in 1982,21 and $991 million in 1986.22 A 1973 study estimated that that the average cost
per indigent defense case was $122.23 Although funding of indigent defense increased
after Gideon, in 1982, nearly 20 years after the decision, one source revealed that
criminal defense services only accounted for 1.5% of total expenditures of the entire
criminal justice system.24 However, the criminal justice system as a whole was also
underfunded. A study in 1985 stated that “less than 3% of all government spending in
the United States went to support all civil and criminal justice activities.”25
These national reports made clear that there needed to be important indigent defense
improvements, as well as increased funding. Although funding has gone up, it is still
woefully insufficient, and many of the same problems exist today, more than four
decades later. Our country’s failure to provide adequate representation to indigent
defendants and juveniles is not just a problem of the past.

B. Insufficient Funding
Despite the progress since Gideon, there is still an urgent need for fundamental
reform. To understand this need, we begin by examining the funding of indigent
defense, including the methods and sources of funding. Later, we discuss the inextricable link between inadequate funding and the current crisis.
According to the latest available data on nationwide indigent defense expenditures,
the 50 states and their counties spent approximately $3.5 billion on indigent defense
in 2005.26 A current figure is unavailable, since there is no national source to maintain
and report on indigent defense data for the 50 states. Although the United States
21
22

24
25
26

See Spangenberg, National Criminal Defense Systems, supra note 16, at 23.
A survey performed in 1986 revealed that, of the increased funding for indigent defense, 61% was
derived from county governments, 38% from state governments, and 1% from other sources. See
The Spangenberg Group, U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Defense for the Poor, 1986, Bureau
of Justice Statistics Bulletin, Sept. 1988, at 4 [hereinafter TSG Criminal Defense for the Poor].
NLADA Other Face of Justice, supra note 10, at 32. Based on FBI data, the study reported that
in 1971 there were over 8 million non-traffic arrests—approximately 1.7 million felony arrests and
6.9 million non-traffic misdemeanor arrests (including over 1.7 million juvenile arrests). Of the 8
million people accused of crimes each year, more than half required that counsel be appointed to
defend them. Moreover, the NLADA study found that, on average, 65% of felony defendants were
indigent and, on average, 47% of misdemeanor defendants were indigent and in need of public
representation. Id. at 70–71.
See ABA Gideon Undone, supra note 13; see also Lefstein, Criminal Defense Services, supra
note 20, at 10.
ABA Special Committee on Criminal Justice, supra note 8, at 5.
The Spangenberg Group, State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services
in Fiscal Year 2005 37 (2006) (prepared with financial support of the ABA Standing Committee

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Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform

Supreme Court has mandated that governments supply counsel to indigent defendants, as discussed in Chapter 1, it has never mandated how such systems should be
created or funded. In implementing the right to counsel, both state and local governments are free to decide the type of indigent defense systems to employ and how to
fund them. Although states must ensure that counsel is provided, some have chosen
to place all or some of the burden on local governments.

Indigent Defense Models
State and local governments choose from three primary models for implementing the
right to counsel: public defender, contract counsel, or private assigned counsel. In
the public defender model, attorneys are hired to handle the bulk of cases requiring
counsel in that jurisdiction. Public defender attorneys are full- or part-time salaried
employees who frequently work together in an office with a director or administrator and support staff. Even when public defenders are the primary indigent defense
providers in the jurisdiction, because some cases present a conflict of interest,
public defenders cannot accept every case, and an alternative method for providing
counsel must also exist. In the contract model, private attorneys are chosen by a
jurisdiction—often after a bidding contest—and provide representation as provided
by contractual terms. Most contracts are annual and require counsel to handle a
certain number of cases or a particular type of case (e.g., misdemeanors), although
some require counsel to handle all cases except where conflicts exist. Finally, in the
assigned counsel model, private attorneys are appointed by the court from a formal or
informal list of attorneys who accept cases for a fixed rate per hour or per case. This
model is also typically used for cases when public defenders or contract counsel exist
but cannot provide representation.

State and County Funding
Across the country, funding for these indigent defense models is provided by states,
counties, or a combination of both.27 As the table below shows, the majority of states
(28) now essentially fully fund indigent defense (i.e., provide more than 90% of the
funding).

on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants) [hereinafter ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County
Expenditures].
In every state, indigent defense funding includes not only criminal and juvenile cases to which
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, but also other kinds of cases for which the state
provides counsel (e.g., abuse and neglect and termination of parental rights cases, child in need
of services cases, and mental health commitment cases). See supra note 31 and accompanying text,
Chapter 1.

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Table I: Sources of Indigent Defense Funding in the 50 States28
Full State Funding29
Alaska
Arkansas
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Hawaii
Iowa
Kentucky
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Missouri

Montana
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina
North Dakota
Oregon
Rhode Island
Tennessee
Vermont
Virginia
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming30

More Than 50%
State Funding

Full County
Funding

More Than 50%
County Funding

Kansas
Louisiana
Oklahoma
South Carolina

Pennsylvania
Utah

Alabama
Arizona
California
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Michigan
Mississippi
Nebraska
Nevada
New York
Ohio
South Dakota
Texas
Washington

Only Pennsylvania and Utah still require their counties to fund all indigent defense
expenses. Five states provide between 50% and 85% of the funds required for indigent
defense, and 16 states shift the burden of over half the funding to the counties.31 As
numerous statewide indigent defense studies have shown,32 when counties primarily
28
29
30
31

This table is based substantially on ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County Expenditures, supra note
26, at 35–37.
These states (except for Wyoming) fund 90% or more of indigent defense expenditures. In some of
the states, local governments contribute office space and/or a small amount of additional funding.
The State of Wyoming contributes approximately 85% of indigent defense expenditures.
The five states are Kansas, Lousiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wyoming. See also supra note
30. Beyond Pennsylvania and Utah, only six states contribute less than 10% of funding—Arizona,
California, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, and Washington. See ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and
County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 35–37.
See, e.g., The Spangenberg Group, Status of Indigent Defense in New York: A Study
for Chief Judge Kaye’s Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services (2006)
[hereinafter TSG NY Report]; Nebraska Minority and Justice Task Force/Implementation
Committee, The Indigent Defense System In Nebraska: An Update (2004) [hereinafter
Nebraska Update]; The Spangenberg Group, Status of Indigent Defense in Georgia: A
Study for the Chief Justice’s Commission on Indigent Defense Part I (2002) [hereinafter
TSG GA Report Part I].

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Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform

fund indigent defense, there are certain to be inequities among the locally funded
systems. Inevitably, urban counties have far more cases than rural counties and are
often overburdened. At the same time, a rural county, with fewer resources, may be
financially crippled by the need to fund the defense of a single serious homicide case.
Even populous counties sometimes struggle when faced with the cost of defending
capital or other complex cases. In Travis County (Austin), Texas, costs have been
rising and will continue to rise due to an increase in the number of cases, increased
fees for court-appointed counsel, and a rise in the number of complex cases. In the
past, the county normally had one or two death penalty or complex prosecutions a
year, but it appears that it may receive as many as five such cases during 2008–2009.
Consequently, during the next fiscal year, Travis County is likely to need $7 million for indigent defense, but the state’s last contribution to the county was only
$427,700.33
Fortunately, more states are beginning to recognize the importance of providing
greater state funding. In 1986, 10 states contributed nothing toward indigent defense.34 In 1986, the 50 states combined contributed 38% of the total funding of indigent defense, while the counties contributed 62%.35 In 2005, the states contributed
just over 50% of overall funding.36 In several states, the comparative share of state
funding has increased dramatically. For instance, between 1986 and 2005, Arkansas
went from contributing nothing toward indigent defense to contributing 91% of the
overall costs; Iowa went from contributing less then three percent to full state funding; and Minnesota went from 11% to 93% state funding.37
During the past several years, more states have begun to relieve the counties of
their funding burden. This has occurred along with the creation of more unified
statewide systems or oversight bodies, which is further discussed in Chapter 4.38 In
2002, Montana spent only slightly more than the counties to fund indigent defense.

33
34
35

37
38

Steven Kreytak, Big Money Set Aside for Major Cases. Defense Costs Mount for Indigent Defendants,
Austin American-Statesman, Oct. 18, 2008.
Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
Utah. See TSG Criminal Defense for the Poor, supra note 22, at 4.
Of the total cost of indigent defense ($991,047,250), the states contributed $377,698,104 and the
counties contributed $604,355,473. Other sources of indigent defense funding (e.g., municipal,
federal and private funding) included in the total amounted to $8,993,673. Id.
Of the total cost of indigent defense ($3,520,941,367), the states contributed $1,777,017,327 and the
counties contributed $1,684,389,040. See ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County Expenditures,
supra note 26, at 37.
See TSG Criminal Defense for the Poor, supra note 22, at 4; ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County
Expenditures , supra note 26, at 35–36.
See infra notes 11–38 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.

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In 2005, following a statewide study39 and class-action lawsuit,40 Montana created
a new statewide system and accepted full funding of the new system, substantially
increasing state expenditures.41 In 2006, including supplemental expenditures, state
spending again increased significantly.42 In Georgia, following the efforts of a study
commission and statewide study of indigent defense,43 the state created a statewide
system and in 2005, compared with 2002, more than doubled its share of funding.44
However, this increase in state funding did not totally relieve the counties. While the
state took over the funding of adult felonies, criminal appeals, and juvenile delinquency cases, the counties still must fund all misdemeanor and ordinance violation
cases. Between 2002 and 2005, the counties’ expenditures increased by 28%.45
In Texas, the Fair Defense Act of 2001 created the Texas Task Force on Indigent
Defense to help the counties improve their local indigent defense systems and provide
state oversight. Through the Task Force, state funds are awarded to counties whose
indigent defense programs meet certain criteria.46 Since 2002, following the creation
of the Task Force, Texas has nearly doubled its share of indigent defense funding.47
39
40

41
42
43
44

Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, An Assessment of Indigent Defense Services in
Montana (2004).
For information on the lawsuit, see American Civil Liberties Union website, available at
http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/10127prs20020214.html. See also infra note 29 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
In 2002, Montana spent $9.2 million on indigent defense; in 2005, the sum was $13.8 million. See
ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 36.
In 2006, the state spent $19.3 million on indigent defense. Fiscal Year 2008 Legislative Scorecard:
Developments Affecting Indigent Defense, The Spangenberg Rep., Nov. 2007, at 1.
See TSG GA Report Part I, supra note 32.
In 2002, when Georgia’s counties primarily funded local indigent defense systems, the state
contributed $9.4 million or 17% of overall funding; in 2005, for the new statewide system, the state
contributed $37.2 million or 40% of overall funding. See The Spangenberg Group, State and
County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services in Fiscal Year 2002 35 (2003) (prepared
with financial support from the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
[hereinafter ABA/TSG FY 2002 State and County Expenditures]; ABA/TSG FY 2005 State
and County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 35.
County funding increased from $44.6 million in 2002 to $57 million in 2005. See ABA/TSG FY
2002 State and County Expenditures, supra note 44, at 35; ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and
County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 35.
Grants in Texas have helped to create new public defender offices in at least 11 counties so far. See Task Force on Indigent Defense, FY 2008 Discretionary Grant Award with
Recommended Adjustments (Aug. 24, 2007), available at http://www.courts.state.tx.us/tfid/pdf/
FY08Discretionaryawards082407.pdf. For further discussion of Texas, see infra notes 52–58 and
accompanying text, Chapter 4.
In 2002, Texas contributed $7.2 million, or 6.3% of overall indigent defense funding, while the
counties contributed $114 million. In 2005 the state’s share increased to $16.4 million or 11.3% of
indigent defense expenditures. In 2006, Texas state funding was about 10% or $15,686,574 compared to $150,527,384 by the counties. See Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense, Task Force

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Chapter 2—Indigent Defense Today: A Dire Need for Reform

In Nevada, an effort is underway by the Nevada Association of Counties (NACO),
the Nevada Supreme Court’s Indigent Defense Commission, and others to establish
a fully state-funded indigent defense system. On behalf of NACO, a bill has been introduced in the 2009 legislative session that seeks to allow counties with populations
over 100,000 (i.e., Clark and Washoe counties) to use the State Public Defender’s
Office and require the state to fund all indigent defense expenses. Currently, only the
smaller Nevada counties may use the State Public Defender’s Office, and they must
pay 80% of the cost of doing so or otherwise fully fund their own local system.48
In 2005, Nevada contributed less than three percent of the overall cost of indigent
defense in the state.49

General and Special Fund Revenues
In the competition for state funds, indigent defense is frequently at the back of the
line. As a result, in some states indigent defense is not entirely supported by state
general funds. Special funds and other revenue sources are unpredictable and more
apt to fall short of indigent defense needs.50 In recent years, many states that have
increased their indigent defense funding have relied substantially on these latter funding mechanisms. Regrettably, this approach often undermines the goal of adequate
indigent defense funding.
In Georgia, for example, the legislature voted in 2004 to fund its new statewide
public defender system through additional fees and surcharges, including additional
fees in civil and criminal cases, surcharges on bail bonds, and an application fee for
indigent defendants. Unfortunately, as later discussed in this chapter, collection of
these special funds has not been sufficient to cover Georgia’s rising costs. Moreover,

49
50

on Indigent Defense Meeting Notebook 82 (2005); ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County
Expenditures, supra note 26, at 36; Fiscal Year 2008 Legislative Scorecard: Developments Affecting
Indigent Defense, The Spangenberg Rep., Nov. 2007, at 1.
Keith Trout, NACO Seeks Five Bill Drafts on Behalf of Counties, Reno Gazette-J., Oct. 10,
2008. Less than half (seven) of the 15 counties under 100,000 employ the State Public Defender’s
Office. Division of Internal Audits, Department of Admin., Audit of the State Public
Defender’s Office 4 (2005) available at http://dintaud.state.nv.us/ExecutiveBranch/AuditReports/
FY%202005/05-03_Public_Defender_Final_report.pdf.
ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 36.
For instance, when Wisconsin created an application fee program with funds earmarked for indigent defense, the program was projected to generate $7 million. However, actual collections during
the first four years of the program failed to exceed $100,000. See The Spangenberg Group, Public
Defender Application Fees: 2001 Update 19 (2001) (prepared with financial support from the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants), available at http://www.abanet.
org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/pdapplicationfees2001-narrative.pdf. For the
legality of requiring such payments from defendants, see supra note 58, Chapter 1.

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not all of the funds collected have been directed to indigent defense. Although the
fund collected $45.5 million in fiscal year 2008, indigent defense is receiving only
$40.4 million in fiscal year 2009, with the remaining $5 million being returned to
Georgia’s general fund.51
In Kentucky, 15% of indigent defense funding is derived from non-general fund
sources, including a portion of court costs imposed in all criminal cases and a portion
of a fee in DUI cases. Although these revenue sources were created to help defray the
cost of indigent defense, the legislature has in the past used the existence of these revenues to justify cutting general fund support for indigent defense.52 In other words,
alternative funding mechanisms run the risk of being used to supplant rather than
supplement general funds. The Kentucky approach, moreover, has failed to keep the
state’s indigent defense system from serious funding shortfalls.
Similar problems exist in states that rely primarily on counties to fund indigent
defense as well. In Louisiana, the state historically has contributed less than 20%
of indigent defense funding, and many local judicial districts have faced funding
crises. Under new legislation, 2008 state funding was increased to $28 million,53 up
from $4.3 million in 2005.54 In addition, state law requires the judicial districts to
establish an indigent defender fund55 that is primarily funded by a $35 fee imposed on
all persons convicted of state or local violations (except parking tickets),56 a fee that
fluctuates monthly. While Hurricane Katrina depleted the local parishes’ indigent
defender accounts, studies have shown that indigent defense in Louisiana was facing
serious funding shortages even before the natural catastrophe.57
In New York, where the state contributes less than 40% of indigent defense funding,
indigent defense has been described as “a patchwork composite of multiple plans
that provides inequitable services across the state to persons who are unable to afford

51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Bill Rankin, Public Defender Council Submits Budget Cuts, with Concerns, Atlanta J.-Const., Sept.
10, 2008.
The Spangenberg Group, Public Defender Application Fees, supra note 50, at 8.
See Louisiana Public Defender Act, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 15:141-15:184 (2007).
See ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 35.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:168 (2007).
Id.
See, e.g., Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, In Defense of Public Access to Justice: An
Assessment of Trial-Level Indigent Defense Services in Louisiana 40 Years After Gideon
(2004); The Spangenberg Group, The Orleans Indigent Defender Program: An Overview
(1998). See also The Louisiana Justice Coalition website, available at http://www.lajusticecoalition.
org/resources/reports+and+links. For later developments in Louisiana, see infra notes 13–15, 34,
97–98, and accompanying text, Chapter 4.

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counsel” and “in a serious state of crisis.”58 Nearly one-half of the state funding comes
from non-general-fund revenue sources.59

Funding Shortages
As the cost of indigent defense continues to increase nationwide, funding shortages
are guaranteed to worsen, given the country’s economic condition at the beginning of
2009. Even before today’s economic crisis, many indigent defense systems across the
country were already facing serious budget shortfalls and cutbacks. Between 2002 and
2005, when adjusted for inflation, many states that fully fund their indigent defense
systems actually decreased their level of financial support, including Connecticut,
Hawaii, Missouri, New Mexico, Oregon, and Wisconsin.60 Now, 37 states are facing
mid-year budget shortfalls for fiscal year 2009,61 and 22 of these states fully fund
their indigent defense systems. Obviously, when states reduce financial support for
public defense, which is already underfunded, there is a substantially greater risk
that accused persons will not receive adequate legal representation and that wrongful
convictions will occur.
A number of states can be cited to illustrate the current funding emergency in
indigent defense. For example, in 2008, Maryland was faced with the need to reduce
its budget by $432 million, and as a result, the public defender agency lost $400,000
in support staff salaries. Also, as of October 2008, the Public Defender announced
that it would cease to pay for private court-appointed attorneys in conflict cases. As a
58
59

TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at ii.
The estimate of one-half of funding from non-general revenue sources includes expenditures
for representation of juveniles in New York Family Courts and covers cases in which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches, as well as cases in which the Constitution does not require
that counsel be appointed. The funding sources are a fee for lifting a license suspension, a fee for
criminal history checks, an increased attorney registration fee, and a surcharge for parking violations. Id. at 26, 30.
See ABA/TSG FY 2002 State and County Expenditures, supra note 44, at 35–36; ABA/TSG
FY 2005 State and County Expenditures, supra note 26, at 35–37. To derive the FY 1986 dollars adjusted for inflation, the Consumer Price Index calculator of the U.S. Department of Labor
was used, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. The raw state expenditure data from
1986 was multiplied by the inflation rate from 1986 to 2005. (Expenditure reports prepared by
The Spangenberg Group do not compare expenditures between fiscal years and do not adjust for
inflation.)
Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin. McNichol and Lav, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities,
State Budget Troubles Worsen 2 (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-8-08sfp.pdf.

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consequence, the Chief Judge of Maryland’s highest court has ordered the counties to
pay the cost of attorneys who must be hired when the public defender has a conflict.
At least one county has stated that it does not have the funds to pay those bills.62
Similarly, budget cuts in Florida are hitting hard in a number of counties. In OrangeOsceola County, where the criminal courts are among the busiest in the state, both
prosecutor and public defender offices are facing combined budget reductions of $3
million.63 The result is that the public defender’s office has had to lay off 10 attorneys
and has suffered a loss of 40 positions. In addition, some costs are being transferred
to defendants who will be ordered, if convicted, to pay special fees of $50 in misdemeanor cases and $200 in felony cases. In Miami (Dade County), lack of funding
has led to a lawsuit challenging excessive public defender caseloads.64 Other public
defender offices, such as those in Broward and Palm Beach Counties, are close to
refusing cases.65
In Kentucky, the legislature in 2008 cut the indigent defense budget by 6.4%, totaling $2.3 million. As a result, the Department of Public Advocacy announced that
it will begin to refuse several categories of cases, including conflict of interest cases,
some misdemeanors, and probation and parole violation cases.66 In Minnesota, the
legislature cut the Board of Public Defense’s FY 2009 budget by $4 million, forcing
the layoff of 13% of public defender staff (23 public defenders). This is the largest staff
reduction since the state assumed full indigent defense funding in 1995. The layoff is
expected to cause public defender caseloads to go from bad (approximately 450 felony
cases per attorney per year) to worse (approximately 550 felony cases per attorney per
year).67 Similarly, due to budget cuts, the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council
in 2007 owed hundreds of thousands of dollars to attorneys representing indigent
defendants in capital cases and was forced to lay off 41 employees. 68 In 2008, it closed
a major conflict defender office as a cost-cutting measure.69
62
63
64
65

66
67
68
69

Scott Daugherty, Court: Counties Must Pay for Defense Lawyers, The Capital (Annapolis, MD),
Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://www.hometownannapolis.com/cgi-bin/read/2008/11_02-08/TOP.
Financial Crisis Takes Toll on Justice System, Courts Across Region Feel Budget Crunch, Nov. 10, 2008,
available at http://www.wesh.com/consumernews/17950079/detail.html.
See infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
Tonya Alanez and Missy Diaz, Broward County Public Defender’s Office Close to Refusing Cases,
Caseloads Are So Big, Representing Clients Becoming Impossible, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, Nov.
17, 2008.
Brandon Ortiz, Chief Public Defender Takes Case to Judges, Lexington Herald-Leader, May 29, 2008.
Richard Meryhew, State to Pare the Ranks of Public Defenders by 23, Star Tribune (Minneapolis-St.
Paul, MN), June 5, 2008.
4 Issues Facing Public Defender Program, Atlanta J.-Const., Apr. 3, 2008 [hereinafter 4 Issues
Facing Public Defender Program].
Jonathan Springston, Plan to Cut Public Defenders Could Leave Hundreds without Lawyers, The
Atlanta Progressive News, June 29, 2008.

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Resource Inequities
In the battle for adequate funding, indigent defense faces tough competition for
resources, especially in comparison to prosecutors. Even conceding that prosecutors
consider some cases that are never charged and that some cases are represented by
retained counsel, financial support of indigent defense typically lags well behind
that provided for prosecutors. The ABA has urged “parity between defense counsel
and the prosecution with respect to resources,”70 but this goal is not being achieved.
The inequities between prosecution and defense can take several forms, including
disparity in the amount of funds, sources of funding, in-kind resources, staffing, and
salaries.
In Tennessee, a one-of-a-kind study was conducted that illustrates the problem.
Using state budget information, the study compared the overall resources of prosecution and defense by examining the funding of all agencies related to the prosecution
and defense functions.71 The study reviewed both state and non-state funds and
concluded that total prosecution funding that could be attributed to indigent cases
amounted to between $130 and $139 million for FY 2005. In contrast, indigent defense funding amounted to $56.4 million, a stunning difference of over $73 million.72
Tennessee is not alone in this inequity. In California, where the counties fund indigent defense at the trial level, a comparison of FY 2006–07 county indigent defense
and prosecution budgets revealed that indigent defense was “under-funded statewide
by at least 300 million dollars.”73 Moreover, between FY 2003–04 and FY 2006–07,
the statewide disparity in indigent defense and prosecution funding increased by over
20%.74
In addition to disparity in the overall amount of funding, differences also exist in
funding sources and in-kind resources provided to the prosecution and indigent
defense. Beyond general funding, the prosecution frequently receives special
federal, state, and/or local funding for particular prosecution programs (e.g.,
70

72
73

See ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 8 (“There is parity between defense
counsel and the prosecution with respect to resources and defense counsel is included as an equal
partner in the judicial system.”)
The Spangenberg Group, Resources of the Prosecution and Indigent Defense Functions
in Tennessee (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/
TN_CompStudyFINAL_7.30.07.pdf.
Id. at 11, 16.
Laurence A. Benner and Lorenda S. Stern, Systemic Factors Affecting the Quality of
Criminal Defense Representation: Supplemental Report to the California Commission
on the Fair Administration of Justice 1 (2007), available at http://www.cpda.org/publicarea/
CCFAJ/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-and-Defenders/Professional-Responsibility-DAs-andDefenders/Supplemental%20Report%20Benner.pdf.
Id. at 3.

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domestic violence prosecutions, bad checks, highway safety, and drug enforcement
programs), while the defense is fortunate if it receives small amounts of grant funding. Furthermore, the prosecution has the benefit of accessing many federal, state,
and local in-kind resources that cannot be quantified, including the resources of
law enforcement, crime labs, special investigators, and expert witnesses. In contrast,
indigent defense must either fight for special funding in their budgets to allow for
these resources or seek prior approval from the court in order to access them, which is
often denied.
The overall disparity in funding frequently means that there are very real inequities
between prosecution and defense programs related to staffing levels and compensation. For example, in Cumberland County, New Jersey, the prosecutor’s office has
twice the number of attorney positions and over seven times the number of investigators handling criminal cases as the public defender’s office, even though public defenders handle approximately 90% of the county’s criminal cases.75 In Harris County,
Texas, the budget for the District Attorney’s Office is over twice the amount available
for indigent defense and includes 30 investigator positions compared with no investigators for the contract defenders.76 In Saratoga County, New York, the District
Attorney’s Office has five more full-time and two more part-time attorney positions
than the Public Defender’s Office, partly due to state grant funding for cases such as
domestic violence, sex crimes, car theft, and DWI cases.77
In New Orleans, prosecutors outnumber public defenders nearly three to one (90 to
32). The former Interim Chief Public Defender has stated that the disparity is likely
to grow as federal grant funding of $1.7 million of federal funds awarded in the wake
of Katrina is due to expire in 2009, leading to a lay-off of one-third of the program’s
attorneys.78 The disparity is not surprising considering that the City of New Orleans
provided nearly $5 million in funding to the District Attorney’s Office in 2008 but
nothing to the Public Defender’s Office, although the City Council has agreed to
consider a proposal to provide public defender funding in the future.79

75
76
77
78
79

John Martins, Tight Resources at Heart of Criminal Case Backlog, Press of Atlantic City, Apr. 21,
2008, at C1.
Lisa Falkenberg, An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, Houston Chron., Mar. 12, 2008.
TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 85.
Bigad Shaban, Public Defender’s Office Needs Funds, Oct. 17, 2008, available at http://www.wwltv.
com/topstories/stories/wwl101708mlpublicdefender.122ce87d3.html.
Id. See also Laura Maggi, Public Defenders Ask New Orleans City Council to Plug Holes in Budget,
Times-Picayune, November 20, 2008, which indicates that the District Attorney’s office is scheduled to lose $1.3 million in post-Katrina federal funds and is expected to ask the City Council for
additional financial assistance.

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Across the country, because of inadequate compensation, public defense programs
find it difficult to attract and retain experienced attorneys. With so many jurisdictions currently experiencing budget woes, compensation is not likely to improve
any time soon. Sometimes, prosecutors are also poorly paid.80 Both public defender
and prosecution offices lose experienced staff attorneys to the federal system, which
provides far better compensation.81
Also, throughout the country, public defender salaries are often significantly below
those of prosecutors. For instance, when salaries were frozen in Virginia in 2006,
over 27% of the attorneys in the public defender system resigned, and many turned
to higher paying jobs at prosecutor offices or to private law practice. Although
entry-level public defender salaries have risen since that time, because prosecution
offices receive supplemental funding from Virginia municipalities—from $6000 to
$20,000 per attorney—public defenders are still paid less than their counterparts.82
In Westchester County, New York, where county funding of indigent defense, as of
2006, was several million dollars below prosecution funding—not including over
$6 million in grant funding for prosecution—district attorneys’ salaries were approximately $6000 to $21,000 higher than public defenders’ salaries.83 In Missouri,
the salaries of public defender trial attorneys in 2005 ranged between approximately
$34,000 and $54,000. In contrast, prosecutors’ salaries were reported to range from
$40,000 to up to $100,000 or more. Public defender salaries are so low that some
attorneys are forced to work second jobs, and the cumulative turnover of public
defenders between 2001 and 2005 was an astounding 100%!84 Although Missouri’s assistant public defenders have since received a four percent salary increase,85 most have
large law school debts and are still struggling.86 As one public defender put it, “[i]f
you want to raise a family, buy a house and a car, that’s not going to happen.”87
80
81
82

83
84

85
86
87

See, e.g., Crocker Stephenson, State Assistant Prosecutors Quitting over Pay, Caseloads, Milwaukee
Wisconsin J. Sentinel, Oct. 27, 2008.
Kim Smith, Attorney Exodus Irks Public Service Officials, Ariz. Daily Star, July 7, 2008.
Peter Dujardin, Public Defender Staff Paid Lower Than Others, Daily Press (Charlottesville, VA),
Feb. 3, 2008. However, effective July 1, 2008, a new Virginia statute permits public defenders to ask
cities and counties to supplement salaries of public defenders. See Peter Dujardin, Public Defenders
Can Now Seek Equal Pay, Daily Press Aug. 28, 2008.
TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 84.
The Spangenberg Group, Assessment of the Missouri State Public Defender System 5, 6,
16 (2005) [hereinafter TSG MO Report], available at http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/legislation/
spangenberg.pdf.
Tara Cavanaugh, Timeline of Events for the Missouri Public Defender System, Columbia
Missourian, Oct. 19, 2008.
Tara Cavanaugh, Timeline of Events for the Missouri Public Defender System, Columbia
Missourian, Oct. 19, 2008.
Id.

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Similarly, compensation of assigned counsel is often far from adequate. Attorneys in
private practice across the country routinely bill between $178 and $265 per hour for
their work, a sum that is necessary in part to cover overhead expenses.88 When the
federal government retains private attorneys to provide representation in civil matters,
the lawyers are compensated at similar rates.89 In contrast, when an indigent person is
accused of a non-capital felony offense and faces a loss of liberty, the lawyer assigned
to defend that person is rarely paid over $90 an hour, and more often, the compensation is between $50 and $65 an hour.90 In several states, including Oklahoma, South
Carolina, and Tennessee, attorneys receive as little as $40 an hour for out-of-court
work in such cases.91 In Oregon, attorneys receive $40 an hour in non-capital felony
cases even for trials and other work performed in court.92 With few exceptions, assigned counsel are not given an additional payment to cover overhead expenses.93
Moreover, states frequently limit the amount assigned counsel can be paid for any
single case by setting maximum compensation levels. In order to exceed the maximum compensation level, an attorney must seek approval from the court—approval
that, in fact, may be denied even after the work has been performed. In Mississippi,
although attorneys are compensated for overhead expenses, the statutory limit is
$1000 for work performed in a non-capital felony case.94 This cap most likely has
a chilling effect on the right to counsel by providing a disincentive for attorneys to
perform work beyond the $1000 level, resulting in a conflict of interest between the
attorney and client.95

88
89
90

91
92
93
94
95

Lefstein, Lessons from England, supra note 57, Chapter 1, at 847, citing 2002 Survey of Law Firm
Economics Executive Summary 10 (Altman Weil, Inc. ed, 2002).
Id. at 847–8, n.57.
The Spangenberg Group, Rates of Compensation Paid to Court-Appointed Counsel in
Non-Capital Felony Cases at Trial: A State-by-State Overview 21–30 (2007) (prepared
with funding from ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants), available
at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/downloads/2007FelonyCompRatesUpda
te_Nonfelony.pdf
Id. at 21–28.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 21–28.
Id. at 25.
Litigation respecting assigned counsel fee rates is discussed later in this report. See infra notes
2–6, 41–48, and accompanying text, Chapter 3. Just before this report was completed, the South
Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense voted to suspend payments to assigned counsel in
that state because its budget was reduced more than 25%. Litigation respecting non-payment of
attorneys’ fees is planned by appointed counsel. See SC Attorney Seeks Delay in Trial Over Legal
Fees, Charlotte Observer, Jan. 13, 2009, available at http://www.charlotteobserver.com/233/
story/466476.html

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C. The Burden of Too Much Work
Because of inadequate funding, indigent defense attorneys in much of the United
States struggle with the burden of overwhelming caseloads. As a consequence, even
the best-intentioned lawyers cannot render competent and effective defense services
to all of their clients. In this section, we discuss not only the presence of excessive
caseloads, which is a problem virtually everywhere in public defense throughout the
United States, but we also examine a variety of policy decisions and other factors that
contribute to this excess.

Excessive Caseloads
When there are too many cases, lawyers are forced to choose among their clients,
spending their time in court handling emergencies and other matters that cannot be
postponed. Thus, they are prevented from performing such essential tasks as conducting client interviews, performing legal research, drafting various motions, requesting
investigative or expert services, interviewing defense witnesses, and otherwise preparing for pretrial hearings, trials, and sentencing hearings. Eventually, working under
such conditions on a daily basis undermines attorney morale and leads to turnover,
which in turn, contributes to excessive caseloads for the remaining defenders and
increases the likelihood that a new, inexperienced attorney will be assigned to handle
at least part of the caseload.
As explained in Chapter 1, professional rules of conduct governing lawyers require
that an attorney’s workload be controlled to allow for competent representation in
each case.96 In addition, the commentary to several of the Committee’s recommendations in Chapter 5 pertains to public defense workloads and adherence to ethical
standards.97 Because various rules pertaining to excessive caseloads are discussed
elsewhere, we emphasize here only two additional observations that we believe to be
especially important.
First, both the NLADA and the ABA have addressed the caseload issue in unambiguous language. NLADA guidelines require that, prior to accepting an appointment,
defense attorneys ensure they have adequate time available to provide quality representation; further, should this change during the course of a case, they should seek
to withdraw as counsel.98 The ABA has warned for years against excessive caseloads
96
97
98

See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text, Chapter 5, related to Recommendation 6; and infra
notes 84–96 and accompanying text, Chapter 5, related to Recommendation 14.
NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1, at 1.3(a).

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for indigent defenders, and its standards seek to guard against them.99 Moreover, the
2006 ethics opinion of the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, discussed in Chapter 1, emphasizes that the profession’s rules are
fully applicable to those who represent the indigent accused.100 Like the NLADA
guidelines and the ABA’s standards, the ethics opinion requires defense attorneys not
to accept too many cases and to seek court approval to withdraw from cases when
the workload is such that they cannot provide adequate representation. However, if
defenders ask to withdraw or request that they not be appointed to additional cases,
judges are not bound to heed their request and, if relief is not granted, the rules of
professional conduct require that attorneys continue to provide representation.101
Second, only one study has ever suggested national maximum caseload numbers for
use by defenders. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission (NAC) on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals, funded by the federal government, issued a series of
reports. In its report on the Courts, the commission recommended the following
maximum annual caseload for a public defender office, i.e., on average, the lawyers
in the office should not exceed, per year, more than 150 felonies; 400 misdemeanors;
200 juvenile court cases; 200 mental health cases; or 25 appeals.102 Because the NAC
standards are 35 years old and were never empirically based, they should be viewed
with considerable caution. In fact, the commentary that accompanied the NAC caseload numbers contained numerous caveats about their use, which have rarely been
cited. For example, the commission acknowledged the “dangers of proposing any national guidelines.”103 Further, while the commentary conceded that its numbers could
be used to measure a single attorney’s caseload, its report also contained a warning:
“It should be emphasized that the standard [referring to its numbers] sets a caseload
for a public defender’s office and not necessarily for each individual attorney in that
office.”104 Moreover, since the NAC’s report was published, the practice of criminal
and juvenile law has become far more complicated and time-consuming, as discussed
in Chapter 1 and later in this chapter.
See, e.g., ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-5.3; ABA Ten
Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 5 (“[d]efense counsel’s workload is controlled to
permit the rendering of quality representation”).
100 ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 86, Chapter 1.
101 Id. See also ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1:16 (c) (“When ordered to do so by
a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the
representation.”)
102 NAC Courts, supra note 9, at 276. The standards are disjunctive, so if a public defender is assigned
cases from more than one category, the percentage of the maximum caseload for each category
should be assessed and the combined total should not exceed 100%. Obviously, a public defender’s
pending or open caseload should be far less than the annual figure.
103 Id. at 277.
104 Id.
99

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Few jurisdictions or programs today have enforceable, maximum caseload standards,
either for individual lawyers or for a defense program.105 Even those that have caseload standards, often determined through weighted caseload studies, frequently exceed
them.106 Not only do the laws in many jurisdictions impose on defense programs the
duty to accept indigent cases when appointed by the courts,107 but also, there often
are substantial political pressures on defenders not to refuse cases due to overload.
The result is that indigent defendants frequently are represented by defense attorneys
who are so overburdened with cases that the attorneys are violating their professional
obligations as members of the bar and are constantly risking their clients’ rights to
effective representation.
During 2003, commemorating the 40th anniversary of the Gideon decision, the
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants held hearings at
four different locations across the country to document indigent defense problems,
including excessive caseloads. Numerous witnesses testified, revealing the presence
of excessive caseloads in many of the states in which they resided, including Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Virginia, and Washington.108 The examples outlined in the paragraphs below,
all of which are even more recent than the testimony of witnesses at the ABA hearings, provide a snapshot of the dimension of the caseload problem, but they are by no
means the only places where the caseloads are out of control.

New Hampshire appears to come as close as any jurisdiction in having enforceable, maximum
caseload standards. See infra note 95 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
106 However, weighted caseloads studies have proven useful to defense agencies in arguing on behalf
of budget increases. Such studies also provide empirical workload standards that can be helpful
to managers in administering the public defense program. E.g., The Spangenberg Group,
Updated Weighted Caseload Study: Colorado State Public Defender (forthcoming 2009)
[hereinafter Colorado Updated Weighted Caseload Study]; The Spangenberg Group,
Updated Weighted Caseload Study: Colorado State Public Defender (2002); The
Spangenberg Group, Weighted Caseload Study: Colorado State Public Defender (1996);
The Spangenberg Group, Maricopa County Indigent Defense Attorneys Case Weighting
Study (2003); The Spangenberg Group, King County Public Defender Case Weighting
Project (2003). These studies were commissioned by the above-listed defender organizations and
are not always available on the internet.
107 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-1-103 (2004): “The state public defender shall represent as counsel
… each indigent person who is under arrest for or charged with committing a felony….” While
certain exceptions to furnishing legal representation are contained in the statute, Colorado law also
provides: “Case overload, lack of resources, and other similar circumstances shall not constitute a
conflict of interest.” Id at § 21-2-103
108 See ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken
Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 18, n.165 (2004) [hereinafter ABA
Gideon’s Broken Promise].
105

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In January 2008, the Nevada Supreme Court ordered the two largest counties in
the state to perform weighted caseload studies after finding that, “by any reasonable
standard, there is currently a crisis in the size of the caseloads for public defenders in
Clark County and Washoe County.”109 In Clark County, in 2006, the average public
defender’s caseload was 364 felony and gross misdemeanor cases; in Washoe County,
the average caseload was 327 felony and gross misdemeanor cases.
During May 2008, the Knox County Public Defender in Tennessee sought permission from the court to refuse misdemeanor cases due to an overwhelming caseload
in the office.110 One attorney reported a pending caseload of 240 open cases, 144
of which were felonies, which is close to the NAC standard of 150 felonies for an
entire year. Another attorney reported that between January and February 2008, she
represented 151 clients, which averaged approximately 14 people per day. In 2006, six
misdemeanor attorneys handled over 10,000 cases, averaging just less than one hour
per case.
Recently, in Kentucky, despite the caseload of the Department of Public Advocacy
(DPA) (the state’s public defender) rising by an average of eight percent per year, the
legislature in 2008 indicated that it would cut the agency’s budget by $1 million during the next fiscal year. During the summer of 2008, DPA responded that, since the
caseloads of its public defenders already exceeded NAC standards by 40%, affording
attorneys an average of less than four hours per case, DPA would have to reduce its
services.111
In Florida, where litigation regarding the right of public defenders to refuse cases is
pending on appeal, average public defender caseloads in Miami (Dade County) have
risen in the past three years from 367 to nearly 500 felonies and from 1380 to 2225
misdemeanors.112 Despite these increases, the public defender office’s budget in the
past two years has been cut by 12.6%.113
High caseloads often force attorneys to continue cases. Worse yet, they can lead to
mistakes that seriously affect a client’s right to counsel and liberty. In Miami, for
instance, one public defender was so busy that he did not have time to check the cal109 In

the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in
Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. Jan. 4, 2008). See also infra note 31
and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
110 J. .J. Stambaugh, Motion Filed to Reduce Caseload: Public Defender Says Staff Doing Too Much,
Should Drop Misdemeanors, Knoxville News Sentinel, Mar. 27, 2008. See also infra notes 94–96
and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
111 Burton Speakman, Public Defenders Face Budget Problems, Bowling Green Daily News, Mar. 23,
2008. See also infra note 97 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
112 See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
113 Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2008.

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culation of a minimum sentence for a client charged with theft. Instead, the defender
accepted the prosecutor’s calculation of 2.6 years imprisonment. He and his client
were resigned to this sentence when the prosecutor discovered an error. The client’s
minimum sentence was in fact only one year.114 Another Miami public defender
handles 50 serious felony cases at a time. On a day when she had 13 of these cases set
for trial, she received a plea offer of one year for a client but did not have time to discuss it with him and to communicate in a timely fashion with the prosecutor. With
the case unresolved, the prosecutor rescinded the plea offer, and the client ultimately
pled guilty and was sentenced to five years.115
Excessive caseloads within a defender program also increase the likelihood that inexperienced attorneys will be forced to handle serious cases for which they are not fully
qualified. In California, a statewide survey of judges and indigent defense attorneys
conducted for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice
found “a statistically significant correlation between having an excessive caseload and
using attorneys with less than [three] years [of ] experience” to handle serious felony
and “three-strikes” cases.116
In Missouri, the Public Defender Commission found in 2005 that “excessive caseloads can and do prevent Missouri State Public Defenders from fulfilling the statutory
requirements [for representation] and their ethical obligations and responsibilities as
lawyers.”117 The State Public Defender Deputy Director stated that 2004 caseloads
required trial public defenders “‘to dispose of a case every 6.6 hours of every working
day.’” 118 He further described the situation: “‘The present M.A.S.H. style operating
procedure requires public defenders to divvy effective legal assistance to a narrowing
group of clients,’” remarking that the situation forces public defenders “‘to choose
among clients as to who will receive effective legal assistance….’”119 Since 2006, some
cases have been assigned to private attorneys to ease public defender workloads, but
this has not alleviated the problem. In October 2008, public defender offices in four

Id.
Id.
116 Laurence A. Benner and Lorena S. Stern, Systemic Factors Affecting the Quality of
Criminal Defense Representation: Preliminary Report to the California Commission on
the Fair Administration of Justice 28 (2007) [hereinafter Benner and Stern].
117 TSG MO Report, supra note 84, at 7 (citing Missouri State Public Defender Commission’s
Findings and Directive on Caseload Standards in Accordance With Professional and
Statutory Obligations, Finding 9 (Adopted June 10, 2005)) (Draft Copy).
118 Id. at 7 (citing Dan Gralike, Living Double in a World of Trouble – The Indigent Criminal Defense
Crisis in Missouri, ESQ. (Missouri Bar electronic weekly newsletter, available at http://www.mobar.
org), June 3, 2005).
119 Id. at 8.
114
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counties began to refuse certain categories of cases.120 In one of those counties, public
defenders have been averaging 395 cases a year. The State Public Defender maximum
caseload standard, which was fixed some years ago, is 235.121 In November 2008, the
State Public Defender Director said of the situation, “[w]e keep diluting the representation that the indigent person is able to get, and mistakes will be made, and are
being made.”122
Also, in November 2008, Hawaii’s Deputy Public Defender expressed concern about
the workload of Hawaii’s public defenders: “I think the quality of the representation
has suffered because we have to divide our time…. It’s hard to file motions, do legal
research and do what needs to be done.”123 Hawaii’s Public Defender noted that
inadequate staffing and increasing caseloads will ultimately require the office to refuse
cases.124

“Tough on Crime” Policies
For some years, there has been a national movement in the United States to get
“tough on crime.” For more than a decade, state legislatures have joined the federal
government in creating many more mandatory sentencing and “three-strikes” laws
that have greatly increased the stakes for the accused in criminal cases. Championing
a reduction in criminal sanctions, like championing indigent defense, is a risky move
for most politicians. As Ohio Governor Ted Strickland described it, “[t]here isn’t a
person in public office that’s not sensitive to the accusation of being soft on crime.”125
The effect of these laws can be seen in today’s record high jail and prison population.
The PEW Center on the States recently reported that the United States now incarcerates far more people than any other country in the world. At the start of 2008, our
country had over 2.3 million people locked up, followed only by China with 1.5
million persons behind bars.126 America incarcerates more people now than at any
Tara Cavanaugh, Timeline of Events for the Missouri Public Defender System, Columbia
Missourian, Oct. 19, 2008 [hereinafter Cavanaugh].
121 Id.
122 Jill Glavan, Public Defenders Overloaded, Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.komu.com/
satellite/SatelliteRender/KOMU.com/ba8a4513-c0a8-2f11-0063-9bd94c70b769/88c23c92-80ce-0971007b-5afa7b3128a6.
123 Michael Levine, Public Defenders Are Stretched Thin, The Garden Island (Kauai, HI), Nov. 17,
2008.
124 Id.
125 The Pew Center on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008 3 (2008) (citing
The Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Pew Center on the States].
126 Id. at 5.
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other time in our history; one person out of every 100 people is in jail or prison.127
This growth does not correspond to an equivalent increase in crime. In fact, crime
has significantly decreased in the past 10 years. For instance, between 1996 and 2005,
violent crime in this country decreased by 26% and property crime decreased by
14%.128 Rather, the growth corresponds to “a wave of policy choices that are sending more lawbreakers to prison and . . . keeping them there longer.”129 However, a
large number of the persons locked up are there for violating terms of their release.
For instance, over one-third of prison admissions in 2005 were due to violations of
parole.130 Additionally, half of the population in the nation’s jails is attributable to
violations of probation.131 Often, such violations are not for committing new offenses
but for violating other terms of release, such as failing a drug test or missing a scheduled appointment with a probation or parole officer.132 Overall, more than half of the
persons released from prison return within three years for committing a new crime or
violating the terms of their release.133
As a result of the “tough on crime” policy decisions, criminal cases have become more
time-consuming and costly to defend. The greater the potential consequences of a
conviction, the more time and effort a criminal defense attorney needs to expend to
avoid a conviction or to mitigate its consequences. A recent empirical workload study
of the Colorado State Public Defender found a significant increase in just the past six
years in the time it takes public defenders to handle their caseloads due to a variety
of factors, such as the creation of new crimes, enhanced penalties, and additional collateral consequences applicable upon conviction.134

Id. at 3.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Department of Justice, Crime in the
United States 2005: Percent Change in Volume and Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants for
2 years, 5 years, 10 years (2006) [hereinafter Federal Bureau of Investigation], available at
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01a.html.
129 Pew Center on the States, supra note 125, at 3.
130 Id. at 18, n. 31 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Prison and
Jail Inmates at Midyear 2006).
131 Id. at 18.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 4 (citing Patrick A. Langan and David J. Levin, U.S. Department of Justice, Recidivism of
Prisoners Released in 1994, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, June 2002).
134 Colorado Updated Weighted Caseload Study, supra note 106 (empirical workload study,
updated from 2002, reveals large increases since 2002 in the average time it takes a public defender
to dispose of low-level felonies, including a stunning 64% increase for class 6 felonies, 13% and 36%
increases for certain misdemeanors, and a 29% increase for juvenile cases).
127
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Collateral Consequences
In addition to harsher criminal sanctions, defendants today face many more civil
sanctions, or collateral consequences, as a result of criminal convictions. Collateral
consequences can result in more severe sanctions for a defendant than the actual
criminal sentence, including the loss of legal immigration status, public benefits,
housing, a driver’s license, and employment. Like tougher criminal sentencing laws,
the emergence of collateral consequences reflects a policy decision by legislators that
similarly raises the stakes in many criminal cases. State and federal laws that create
these civil sanctions not only impact criminal defendants, but they also make it essential for indigent defense attorneys to attend training programs and to conduct additional legal research so that they can appropriately advise clients of the consequences
of a criminal conviction.135 Moreover, when harsh collateral consequences will result
from a guilty plea and conviction, a defendant has a strong incentive to go to trial.
Although most states do not require defense counsel as a matter of law to advise a
client of the potential collateral consequences prior to entering a guilty plea, ABA
standards applicable to defenders state that they are ethically bound to do so.136
Additionally, ABA standards affirm that trial judges have an obligation to ensure
that defendants have been advised of collateral consequences when accepting a guilty
plea.137 Recently, several Nevada Supreme Court justices dissented from an order that
adopted indigent defense performance standards because they failed to require counsel to advise clients of collateral consequences prior to pleading guilty.138

Criminalization of Minor Offenses
Although national crime rates have decreased and fewer major crimes are being
committed,139 indigent defense providers remain burdened with excessive caseloads
consisting of all kinds of cases, as discussed earlier, including countless minor, petty
offense cases. Felonies and violent felonies in particular have decreased dramatically
in New York City, for example, but there has not been a concomitant decrease in
See, e.g., ACCD Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 96, Chapter 1, at 8–9.
See, e.g., ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Pleas of Guilty 14-3.2(f ) (3d ed. 1997) (“to the
extent possible, [to] determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in advance of the entry of any
plea, as to the possible collateral consequences that might ensue from the entry of the contemplated
plea”).
137 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Collateral Sanctions and Discretionary
Disqualification of Convicted Persons 19-2.3(a), 19-2.4(b) (3d ed. 2003). Standards 19-2.3(b)
and 19-2.4(c), however, state that failing to do so should not be a basis for withdrawing a plea or
challenging a sentence.
138 Brendan Riley, Standards on Public Defenders Issued, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 17, 2008.
139 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 128.
135

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indigent defense caseloads due to the proliferation of violation and low-level misdemeanor charges.140 It is now common in New York City to bring people to court
for violations of the health code, riding a bike on a sidewalk, and drinking beer in
public.141 As one scholar has noted, “never before have so many been arrested for so
little.”142
New York is not alone in this regard. In Georgia, offenses that are classified as civil
infractions in most states, such as speeding, following too closely, and other moving
violations are misdemeanors that carry the potential of up to 12 months in jail.143
With this classification comes the high cost of providing representation to indigent
persons charged with these offenses, unless any potential of jail time is removed.144
In Missouri, where the State Public Defender is currently seeking to refuse appointments in certain categories of cases, some persons are asking whether charging some
low-level offenses as crimes is worth the cost of defending them.145 For instance, in
one case, a public defender represented a high school student for yelling profanities
at a teacher. The State Public Defender’s Deputy Director asked, “[d]o the taxpayers
really need to pay for that kind of defense?”146
In Massachusetts, a commission created by the legislature quantified the costs of categorizing low-level offenses as crimes rather than as civil infractions. Over a four-year
period, the state paid for attorneys to represent indigent defendants in almost 59,000
cases for trespassing, writing a bad check, disturbing the peace, shoplifting, and
operating a motor vehicle with a suspended registration or license.147 Very few of the
offenders were incarcerated. Had these cases been dealt with as civil infractions with
monetary and administrative penalties, the state would have saved approximately $8.5
million in representation costs alone.148

140 TSG

NY Report, supra note 32, at 121. In New York, a violation is an offense, other than a traffic
infraction, for which a person may be incarcerated up to 15 days. Id. at 13, n.34, citing Penal Law
100.00(3). See also Steven Zeidman , Time to End Violation Pleas, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 1, 2008 (in 2007,
31% of adult arrests in New York City were for felonies, down from 56% in 1990).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 The Spangenberg Group, Status of Indigent Defense in Georgia: A Study for the Chief
Justice’s Commission on Indigent Defense Part II: Analysis of Implementing Alabama v.
Shelton in Georgia 50 (2003).
144 Id. at 51.
145 See Cavanaugh, supra note 120.
146 Id.
147 Report of the Commission to Study the Provision of Counsel to Indigent Persons In
Massachusetts, chapter 253 of the Acts of 2004 10 (Apr. 2005), available at http://www.
bristolcpcs.org/CommissionReport.pdf.
148 Id.

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This trend toward criminalizing bad or reckless behavior not only increases indigent
defense caseloads and costs, but it also diminishes public safety by “creating a permanent underclass” of persons with a criminal record that can handicap them for years
in various ways.149 The former chair of the Criminal Justice Section of the ABA, a
district attorney, characterized the problem as creating “a modern day scarlet letter.”150

Expansion of the Right to Counsel
Indigent defense providers across the country are handling more types of cases today
than at any other time since Gideon. First, with expansion of the right to counsel
under Supreme Court jurisprudence, as discussed in Chapter 1,151 there has been a
concurrent increase in the number of cases requiring the appointment of indigent defense counsel. Since 2002, for a person to be incarcerated for violating the terms of a
suspended or probated sentence, counsel must have been provided for the underlying
offense even if the defendant was not facing incarceration at the time of conviction.152
Second, states now provide counsel to indigent persons in certain non-criminal cases.
The number and cost of these cases can be quite significant and are usually considered part of the state’s total indigent defense caseload and expenditures. In Virginia,
for instance, court-appointed counsel are provided in dependency and termination
of parental rights cases and in cases requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem
(e.g., for a minor). In FY 2006, these two case types accounted for 27% of the total
cases handled by assigned counsel in Virginia.153 In Massachusetts, defense lawyers are
provided in numerous non-criminal cases, including dependency, guardian ad litem,
and mental health (e.g., civil commitment) cases. Similar to Virginia, in FY 2003,
non-criminal cases accounted for 27% of the total number of assigned counsel cases
in Massachusetts.154

Robert M.A. Johnson, Chair’s Column, Have All Convictions Become a Life Sentence?, Crim. Just.
Mag., Summer 2007 (U.S. Department of Justice data from June 2006 indicates that almost one
out of every six Americans has a criminal record. When ex-offenders apply for jobs or housing, an
easily accessible criminal record can be a barrier to a success if employers and others rely on this
information alone to determine a person’s character).
150 Id.
151 See supra notes 20–30 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
152 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
153 Fiscal year 2006 assigned counsel data on file with The Spangenberg Group. Juvenile, District
Court (misdemeanor), and Circuit Court (felony and juvenile appeal) cases totaled 106,964, while
guardian ad litem and dependency cases totaled 40,063. Data includes assigned counsel cases only.
154 Fiscal year 2003 data on file with The Spangenberg Group. Criminal cases totaled 209,050 and noncriminal cases totaled 76,739. Data includes assigned counsel cases only.
149

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Deinstitutionalization Without Community Support
More than ever before, indigent defense attorneys are representing clients with serious mental illnesses. In recent years, there has been a drastic reduction in the number
of beds available in mental health hospitals, accompanied by deinstitutionalizing persons with mental problems, but without significant growth in providing community
support for the mentally ill. At the same time, the criminalization of minor offenses
has increased the number of indigent defendants who are suffering from mental illness.155 Moreover, mentally ill defendants are more likely to be incarcerated for minor
offenses than are persons who are not mentally ill.156 In fact, more mentally ill people
are in jails or prisons today than are in mental hospitals.157
While the costs of incarcerating the mentally ill are apparent and well-documented,158
the additional expense of providing an adequate defense for these persons has not
been quantified. Mentally ill clients require more of a defender’s time and often
require additional public defense expenditures. For example, attorneys must spend
extra time and effort to communicate with their clients in order to gather necessary
information and ensure that their clients understand the legal concepts and case
proceedings. Defense lawyers must also determine if clients need to be evaluated for
competency to stand trial,159 whether the facts justify an insanity defense, or both. If
either is warranted, more time and resources are required to obtain expert witnesses
and litigate the issues. Also, attorneys frequently need to devote time to finding treatment opportunities for their clients. And when mentally ill clients are incarcerated,
See Human Rights Watch, Ill-equipped: U.S. Prisons and Offenders with Mental Illness
20–21 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/index.htm; see also Treatment
Advocacy Center, Criminalization of Individuals with Severe Psychiatric Disorders
(Apr. 2007), available at http://www.psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/documents/pdfBP
Criminalization.pdf.; Peter Wagner, Incarceration Is Not a Solution to Mental Illness, Mass Dissent,
Apr. 2000, available at http://www.prisonpolicy.org/articles/massdissent040100.html.
156 Frontline, Deinstitutionalization: A Psychiatric “Titanic” (May 10, 2005), available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/asylums/special/excerpt.html (“mentally ill jail
inmates were ‘four times more likely to have been incarcerated for less serious charges such as
disorderly conduct and threats’ compared with non-mentally ill inmates. These inmates were 3
times more likely than those not mentally ill to have been charged with disorderly conduct, 5 times
more likely to have been charged with trespassing, and 10 times more likely to have been charged
with harassment.”) excerpt from E. Fuller Torrey, M.D., Out of the Shadows: Confronting
America’s Mental Illness Crisis (John Wiley & Sons, 1997).
157 Sally Satel, Out of the Asylum, into the Cell, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 2003.
158 See, e.g., The Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Fact Sheet #7 Post-Booking
Diversion Jail-Based Diversion Programs, available at http://www.bazelon.org/issues/
criminalization/factsheets/criminal7.htm; Treatment Advocacy Center, Criminalization
of Individuals with Severe Psychiatric Disorders (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.
psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/documents/pdfBPCriminalization.pdf.
159 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (defendant must be able to consult rationally with
defense counsel and to have a rational and factual understanding of the legal proceedings).
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jail conditions often cause them to deteriorate,160 making representation even more
difficult and time-consuming.161
In Kentucky, where over half the people incarcerated are mentally ill or addicted to
drugs,162 the Department of Public Advocacy, Kentucky’s public defender program,
launched a pilot program that used social workers in four counties to divert eligible
defendants into substance abuse and mental health programs.163 The social worker
program reduced the costs of incarceration by $1.3 million dollars, covering its cost
and saving the state $300,000, while also reducing recidivism rates.164 Nevertheless,
Kentucky’s governor recommended against the program’s continued funding in his
proposed budget. 165

Complexity of the Law
With the emergence of science and technology and new criminal laws, many cases
have become more complex, requiring specialized training and greater time to
defend. Consider, for instance, the use of DNA and other forensic evidence, computer- or internet-based crimes, and the creation of sexually violent predator laws.
In Chapter 1, we discussed the statement on workload of the American Council of
Chief Defenders, which explains that such complex cases are a significant burden on
a defender’s time, requiring not only specialized knowledge but often also the review
of thousands of pages of discovery and the use of experts.166

160 Deborah

Circelli, Dignity Lost: Critics Slam Treatment as Jails Deal with Mentally Ill, The News-J.
(Daytona Beach, FL), Apr. 27, 2008.
161 In some jurisdictions in Texas, such as Travis County, mentally ill defendants found to be incompetent remain in jail for two months or longer while waiting for space in order to be transferred
to state hospitals. See The Spangenberg Group, Travis County Mental Health Public
Defender Program Evaluation: Initial Report 9 (2008).
162 Bob White, Finding a Solution to Kentucky’s Prison Boom: Advocates Want Treatment Not
Incarceration, The News-Enterprise (Hardin County, KY), Mar. 2, 2008.
163 Deborah Yetter, Social Workers Help Find Alternatives to Prison, Louisville Courier-J., Feb. 26,
2008.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 ACCD Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, supra note 96, Chapter 1, at 7. See also supra notes
97–99 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.

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Specialty Courts
Another development that affects public defender workloads is the growth of
specialty courts, which have been established across the country to handle various
types of cases (e.g., drug and domestic violence cases) separately from other criminal
prosecutions. While the goals of such specialty courts are laudable and may include
heightened attention to and more sentencing alternatives in particular cases, their creation places an additional burden on public defense. Typically, the indigent defense
agency does not receive additional funding when a specialty court is created, but it is
nonetheless expected to staff the court with attorneys who are often required to attend many more court appearances than in non-specialty courts.167 Similarly, specialty
courts may create an unfunded mandate for the prosecution and courts as well.

Lack of Open Discovery
Prosecution discovery policies are another area of decision-making that has a direct
bearing on public defense workloads and indigent defense costs. Discovery refers
to the evidence held by the state that is relevant to the case against the defendant,
including witness statements, investigation reports, and physical evidence. When
prosecutors provide to the defense all of the evidence in their possession, they practice open-file discovery. ABA criminal justice standards recommend the use of pretrial
procedures that “promote a fair and expeditious disposition of the charges,” which
means providing defendants “with sufficient information to make an informed plea,”
to allow for thorough trial preparation and “minimize surprise at trial.”168 Moreover,
the discovery should be provided “as early as practicable in the process” to allow for
sufficient trial preparation.169 However, since prosecutors are constitutionally required
only to turn over evidence that may be favorable to the accused,170 many prosecution
offices do not adhere to open file discovery practices. For the most part, the degree
to which discovery material must be turned over to the defense by prosecutors, and
when they do so, is determined by state laws and procedural rules. But even when a
state does not provide for open file discovery, prosecutors are not normally precluded
from adopting more generous discovery policies.
Open-file discovery not only promotes the prompt dispositions of cases; it can also
significantly reduce indigent defense workloads and costs. In order to represent
clients adequately and determine whether a defense is available, defense attorneys
See, e.g., TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 93.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury 11-1.1(a) (3d ed. 1996).
169 Id. at 11-4.1(a).
170 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
167
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must have a complete understanding of the prosecution’s case against the client. If the
defense does not obtain from the prosecution the relevant police reports and witness
statements, the information must be obtained elsewhere. Defense lawyers normally
can do so in various ways, all of which necessitate additional time, resources, and
costs, not only for public defense, but also for the courts and prosecution. Absent
knowledge of the state’s evidence, defense attorneys are likely to need to conduct a
more thorough investigation than might otherwise have been necessary and are more
apt to ask for preliminary hearings in order to learn about the case and obtain witness
statements. Attorneys may file and litigate motions that may have otherwise been
unnecessary had they been supplied with the facts through open file discovery. They
may also delay or refuse plea negotiations and perhaps even conduct trials that could
have been avoided. Worst of all, when defense attorneys are unaware of all of the
evidence against their clients, innocent clients are more likely to be convicted because
of the inability of their attorneys to prepare a proper defense.
To illustrate the foregoing, consider New York where defense attorneys rarely receive
adequate discovery, and even more rarely, receive it in a timely manner. A public
defender in Wayne County complained of last-minute discovery being provided by
the state and noted that “[t]rue open file discovery would save [everyone] a lot of
time, money and effort” through earlier plea agreements and less litigation overall.171
In addition, prosecutors in New York often require defendants to waive their right to
a preliminary hearing as a prerequisite to receiving discovery or withhold evidence to
force a plea agreement, thereby undermining the adversarial system.172 In Virginia,
attorneys report receiving discovery at 5:00 p.m. the night before trial or even the
day of trial, requiring last-minute continuances, thus resulting in added time and
costs not only to the defense but also to the court, sheriffs, witnesses, and jurors.173 In
California, according to a statewide survey conducted for the California Commission
on the Fair Administration of Justice, an “overwhelming majority” of experienced
criminal defense attorneys and indigent defense providers reported a failure by the
prosecution to provide exculpatory evidence and a delay in providing requested
discovery material.174
Lack of open and timely discovery also can result in defense lawyers learning after
substantial pretrial preparation that they have a conflict of interest. In a case in New
TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 81 (citing Public Hearing Before the New York State Commission
on the Future of Indigent Defense Services 31–32, Rochester, March 11, 2005) (statement of Andrew
Correia), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/rochester.pdf ).
172 Id. at 83.
173 The Spangenberg Group, A Comprehensive Review of Indigent Defense in Virginia 71
(2004) [hereinafter TSG Virginia Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf.
174 See Benner and Stern, supra note 116, at 3.
171

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York, the defendant had been incarcerated nine months when the attorney had to
withdraw due to a conflict discovered on the day of trial. Only then did the attorney
learn that he had previously represented a key prosecution witness.175 Consequently,
defendant’s newly appointed counsel had to repeat and be paid for much of the same
work performed by the defendant’s original lawyer. Continuances were required as
well, resulting in the expenditure of additional time and resources for all involved in
the court proceeding.
Finally, prosecutors have sometimes been cited for withholding exculpatory evidence,
which has resulted in cases being retried and in compensation being awarded to persons wrongfully convicted. In North Carolina, for example, a man spent several years
on death row because two prosecutors withheld evidence that was eventually used
to exonerate him.176 In such cases, not only does the retrial cost the state additional
funds for indigent defense representation, but the state also pays for the appeal of the
original wrongful conviction. In Texas, the state has paid $8.6 million in compensation in 45 wrongful-conviction cases since 2001, and nearly half (22) of these involved
prosecutors withholding evidence from the defense.177

D. Other Impediments to Competent
and Effective Defense Services
Throughout the country, nearly every state and local indigent defense system faces
various challenges that impede the delivery of competent and effective defense services for the indigent. This section describes and documents these many other threats
or roadblocks to fairly and fully implementing the right to counsel.

TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 82.
As a result of this case, North Carolina passed a law requiring prosecutors to turn over all of their
evidence to defense attorneys prior to trial. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-903 (Supp. 2008). See
also Kenneth Jost, Prosecutors and the Law: Is Prosecutorial Misconduct a Serious Problem?, 17 CQ
Researcher 937, 939 (Nov. 9, 2007); A.J. Flick, Judge Tosses Out Murder Conviction, Tucson
Citizen, Sept. 13, 2003 (prosecutor’s office to implement open-file discovery policy after case
dismissed against woman where prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence).
177 Jennifer Emily and Steve McGonigle, Dallas County District Attorney Wants Unethical Prosecutors
Punished, Dallas Morning News, May 4, 2008.
175

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Lack of Independence
Both the ABA and the NLADA have long recognized the importance of professional and political independence of indigent defense providers.178 When the defense
function lacks such independence, the integrity of the indigent defense system is
compromised. As discussed in Chapter 5, to ensure that the defense function is
protected, the establishment of an independent policy board to provide oversight is
strongly recommended.179 Such boards now exist in some states, but there still are
parts of the country where indigent defense is plagued by the oversight and influence
of governmental funding sources and the courts. This influence, which may be rooted
in a desire to control costs, assign cases to particular attorneys as a result of patronage,
or a preference for certain attorneys known to resolve cases without litigation, often
runs contrary to the duties of the defense provider and the interests of defendants. In
short, the lack of independence of the defense function threatens the right to counsel.

Funding Sources
Probably the greatest risk to independence of the defense function is the pressure
defenders receive from their funding sources. In New York, for instance, where the
counties are primarily responsible for funding their own indigent defense programs,
some county chief public defenders have publicly testified regarding the political
pressure they received. The former Essex County Public Defender described the difficulty he had in obtaining the county’s permission to hire a full-time assistant public
defender. He was told by one county supervisor that “these defendants don’t need to
have Johnny Cochran….” After obtaining approval to hire the assistant, the former
public defender was then pressured to fire him because the local judges did not like
the way he practiced. This public defender was also told by a county supervisor that
he “should join the District Attorney in his effort to keep the streets of Essex County

See, e.g., ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.3(a) (“The legal
representation plan for a jurisdiction should be designed to guarantee the integrity of the relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from
political influence and should be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the
same extent as are lawyers in private practice.”); and Std. 5-1.6 (“Under no circumstances should
the funding power interfere with or retaliate against professional judgments made in the proper
performance of defense services”); ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 1
(“The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel, is
independent”); NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, at 2.10..
179 See infra Recommendations 2, 3, and 4, Chapter 5. See also infra notes 56–81 and accompanying
text, Chapter 4; ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.3(b); Nat’l
Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Guidelines for Negotiating and Awarding Governmental
Contracts for Criminal Defense Services II-1 (1984).
178

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safe.”180 In Onondaga County, the Director of the Hiscock Legal Aid Society has
provided a powerful illustration of political pressure. Testifying before a legislative
committee, she was questioned at length about specific defense policies and practices
of her office, including not pleading cases at arraignment, filing defense motions, and
sending demands to the prosecutor for discovery. The program later lost a contract to
handle city court cases.181
Nebraska and its 93 counties, each with its own indigent defense system, has long
suffered from similar problems. In 2004, a committee of the Nebraska Minority and
Justice Task Force (established in 1999 by the Nebraska State Bar Association and the
Nebraska Supreme Court) reviewed the counties’ systems and noted a number of
areas that threaten the independence of the defense function.182 First, 23 of Nebraska’s
counties, like the judicial districts of Florida and Tennessee, publicly elect the heads
of their public defender offices.183 Because of this, the committee found that indigent defense representation in those counties does “not meet the standard of being
independent from political influence.”184 Second, the committee concluded that in
counties with contract programs, local policy boards are required in order to provide
independence and oversight, but many are failing to do so. Third, according to the
committee, many county boards enter into contracts directly with contractors “with
TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 41 (citing Public Hearing Before the New York State Commission on
the Future of Indigent Defense Services 24–25, Albany, May 12, 2005) (statement of Mark Montanye),
available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/albany_5-12-05.pdf ).
181 Id. at 42 (citing Public Hearing Before the New York State Commission on the Future of Indigent
Defense Services 230-232, Ithaca, Mar. 23, 2005) (statement of Susan Horn), available at http://www.
courts.state.ny.us/ip/indigentdefense-commission/NYS_Commision_032305.pdf ) (“A legislative
committee member asked me the following series of questions in a hostile tone of voice, starting
with, isn’t it true that the legal aid society has a policy of not disposing of cases at arraignment?
I answered that that was in fact our policy because we were never given adequate resources to be
able to meet our clients in jail before arraignment or to have staff present to discuss cases with
them before arraignment. Therefore, it would be a violation of an ethical [obligation] to our clients
to do so. The next question was, isn’t it true that you make motions in every case? The answer
unfortunately was no. We don’t have the resources to do that…. The next question was, isn’t it
true that you served demands to produce in every case? The answer was yes. That is the statutory
requirement to preserve our client’s rights to discovery. And, finally, I was asked, isn’t it true that
you require a written response from the DA’s office to those demands? … These questions were
very troubling because they imply that we were doing something wrong by fulfilling our legal and
ethical responsibility to our clients and that we were subjected to criticism for providing vigorous
representation to our clients. … I was subsequently told by a member of the judiciary … that the
word on the street was that we lost the city court program because we delayed cases. My response
then and my response [now] is, one person’s delay is another person’s due process.”).
182 Nebraska Update, supra note 32; see also The Spangenberg Group, Review of 2004 Update To
“The Indigent Defense System in Nebraska” by the Minority and Justice Implementation
Committee (2004).
183 Nebraska Update, supra note 32, at 8.
184 Id. at 3.
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no attempt to provide independence, [and] [t]he selection, funding and payment in
most of these situations are influenced by considerations of costs rather than quality
of services.”185 Sadly, similar problems had been found in Nebraska over a decade
earlier.186

Selection and Assignment of Counsel
In order to protect the independence of attorneys assigned to represent indigent defendants, the ABA has long recommended that the assignment of cases be made in an
orderly way to ensure that they are fairly distributed and to guard against patronage
and its appearance.187 This admonition, however, is routinely violated. Many jurisdictions lack uniform rules and procedures governing the selection and assignment of
counsel, leaving assigned counsel systems ripe for abuse. The result sometimes is an
unfair selection or exclusion of certain counsel and an inappropriate allocation of
cases, all of which erode the independence of the defense function.
In Texas, despite the passage of the Fair Defense Act in 2001, which created state
indigent defense standards, the counties retain discretion in creating the process and
procedure for the appointment of counsel to indigent cases in their local courts. In
Harris County, new standards and procedures for appointment of counsel in juvenile
cases were adopted in 2007, allowing judges to assign attorneys either according to
a computerized random selection process or by court request.188 The latter method,
which existed prior to the new standards, permits judges to favor some attorneys with
political or judicial connections. For instance, one attorney reportedly made $40,000
from receiving nearly 250 juvenile appointments, despite having had his Texas law
license twice suspended, having spent a day in jail for lying to the court, and having
his attorney fees garnished by the Internal Revenue Service for failure to pay taxes.
This attorney had reportedly been hired to represent the daughter of one of the three
Harris County juvenile court judges in a vehicular manslaughter case.189 Two other
attorneys, neither of whom was certified in juvenile law, made over $150,000 in 2007;
one of the attorneys received many juvenile appointments from a judge who had
been his law partner and for whom he had been a campaign treasurer.190
Id.
The Spangenberg Group, The Indigent Defense System in Nebraska (1993).
187 See, e.g., ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-2.1, 5-2.3.
188 Harris County Juvenile Board Fair Defense Act: Standards and Procedures for
Appointment of Counsel for Juvenile Respondents 13 (2007).
189 Rick Casey, Judge Sure Keeps This Lawyer Busy, Houston Chron., Oct. 16, 2007 (during trial of
manslaughter case, it was reportedly revealed that attorney had removed evidence from daughter’s
vehicle that would show the speed of the car at the time of the fatal accident).
190 Rick Casey, County Hires Bad Lawyers, Bans Good, Houston Chron., Oct. 19, 2007.
185

186

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While these Harris County attorneys were appointed in juvenile cases, three experienced, board-certified juvenile defense attorneys in Harris County were removed
from the juvenile court list without being given specific reasons for removal.191 Under
the Harris County rules, juvenile attorneys must be “approved by a secret ballot” by
a majority of the three judges.192 One of the three attorneys removed from the list
had reported to the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense for several years an unfair
allocation of appointments by one of the judges, and the judge was aware of the attorney’s complaints. The second attorney removed from the list was the law partner
and spouse of the first attorney. The third attorney surmised a couple of reasons for
her removal, including that she was aggressive in her defense of juveniles and caused
the docket to slow down.193
In Alabama, “there is little that is uniform in the way cases are handed out,” according to an attorney for the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts. 194 Rather, the
different circuits and courts employ their own methods with little or no oversight. In
Mobile County, attorneys have complained about an unfair distribution of cases that
favored some attorneys over others.195
In Nebraska, appointment of both assigned counsel and contract defenders is
handled by the judiciary on an ad hoc basis without the guidance of any standards
or uniform procedures.196 In 2006, data from statewide surveys of judges, court-appointed attorneys (excluding public defenders), and county commissioners reflected a

Id.
Harris County Juvenile Board Fair Defense Act, supra note 188, at 5.
193 Casey, supra note 190. At least two of the aggrieved Harris County juvenile attorneys appealed
the decision of the judges to remove them from the juvenile list, citing their extensive experience
in representing juveniles and their knowledge of juvenile law. Under the county’s new standards
and procedures for appointment (Harris County Fair Defense Act, Standards and Procedures for
Appointment of Counsel for Juvenile Respondents, Standard 9.2.), an attorney may appeal an
omission or removal from the list to the court’s appointment coordinator, yet the appeal requires
neither an independent review of the decision nor a second review by the three judges themselves.
In fact, the appeal involves no opportunity for a hearing at all but rather simply requires the appointment coordinator to re-count the three original votes of the judges. Not surprisingly, neither
appeal was successful. Additional and corroborating information for this Harris County, Texas, example was provided by the Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense. It has been widely reported that
Harris County—the largest county in the United States without a public defender—is considering
the establishment of such a program. See, e.g., Harris County to Consider Public Defender Office,
April 10, 2008, available at http://standdown.typepad.com/weblog/2008/04/harris-county-t.html.
194 Rob Holbert, Mobile Indigent Defense Cases and Payments Continue to Rise, Lagniappe (Mobile,
AL), Oct. 21, 2008.
195 Id. See also infra notes 251–253, and accompanying text.
196 See Nebraska Update, supra note 32, at 4.
191

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number of serious problems in the appointment process.197 For instance, 54% of district court judges surveyed responded that they do not maintain a list of attorneys for
indigent defense appointments. In county and juvenile courts, 23% of the judges reported that their courts do not maintain lists of attorneys for appointment. Although
systems that fail to use any rotation method are subject to abuse, one judge candidly
admitted that, as an attorney, the judge would view the lack of rotation as “a hidden,
secret system.” This judge also conceded that he knew of other judges who “have
‘paid attorneys back’ for too many trials or other offenses by not appointing them
again.”198 Not surprisingly, over 20% of attorneys surveyed in Nebraska perceived the
use of patronage in the appointment process.199
Similarly, a 2007 performance audit of the Office of Indigent Defense Services in
North Carolina noted that indigent defense attorneys in that state suffer from a lack
of independence from the judiciary.200 In areas with public defender offices, North
Carolina law requires that the chief public defender be appointed by the senior
resident superior court judge of the district in which the public defender will be
practicing. 201 As the State Auditor points out: “Since it is reasonable to assume that
each public defender has an interest in being reappointed to the next four-year term
and would like to remain in the judge’s favor during the interim, neither the public
defender, his or her staff, nor the private counsel they appoint can be considered free
from judicial influence.”202 The 2007 audit further found that, although each county
is required to establish a committee to create a roster of attorneys for indigent appointments, 41 of the 100 counties had failed to do so.203

Failures in Providing Counsel
While some indigent defendants are represented by overworked attorneys or attorneys lacking sufficient independence, other indigent defendants obtain representation
too late in the process or simply do not receive counsel at all. As discussed in Chapter
While the response rate of court-appointed attorneys was low (21% of all surveys mailed), the
response rate of judges was extremely high (93% in district court, 86% in county court and 80% in
juvenile court). Nebraska Minority Justice Committee, Report to the Nebraska Supreme
Court on Indigent Defense Systems and Fee Structures 2 (2006), available at http://www.
nebar.com/pdfs/mjic/2008/Progress_Report_07.pdf.
198 Id. at 8.
199 Id.
200 Office of the State Auditor of North Carolina, Performance Audit - Office of Indigent
Defense Services 1 (2007).
201 Id. at 6–7, citing N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 7A-498.7b (2008).
202 Id. at 7.
203 Id. at 7–8.
197

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1, Gideon and its progeny require that all indigent defendants facing the possibility of
incarceration—even the future possibility of incarceration after a suspended or probationary sentence is revoked—have a constitutional right to counsel.204 Moreover,
the right to counsel attaches at all critical stages of a case, beginning with the initial
court appearance when a defendant first learns of the charges.205 If a person elects to
proceed without counsel, the record must show that the individual fully understood
and voluntarily waived the right to an attorney.206

No Counsel and Late Counsel
Whether because of a desire to move cases through the court system, a desire to
keep indigent defense costs down, or ignorance, pervasive and serious problems exist
in misdemeanor courts across the country because counsel is oftentimes either not
provided, or provided late, to those who are lawfully eligible to be represented. Also,
when counsel is not provided, all too often, the defendant’s waiver of legal representation is inadequate under Supreme Court precedents.207 As a result, there is a shocking
disconnect between the system of justice envisioned by the Supreme Court’s rightto-counsel decisions and what actually occurs in many of this nation’s courts. These
conclusions were borne out by investigations conducted on behalf of the Committee
during 2006 by three experienced criminal justice professionals who visited court
proceedings in eight states across the country.208
Here are several illustrative findings of our investigators: “… the judge advised …
[approximately 15] … defendants [all of whom were in custody] that they had the
right to ask for counsel to be appointed, but the circumstances … almost impel indigent defendants to plead guilty and give up their right to counsel. There is no public
defender or appointed counsel present at the proceedings with whom defendants can
204 Alabama

v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002). See also supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text,
Chapter 1.
205 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008). See also supra notes 38–40 and accompanying
text, Chapter 1.
206 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304, U.S. 458 (1938).
207 For further discussion of requirements of a valid waiver, see supra notes 47–52 and accompanying
text, Chapter 1.
208 Our investigators were the Hon. Charles D. Edelstein, Senior Florida Judge; John Rubin, Professor
of Public Law and Government, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina; and Hon.
Shelvin R. Singer, retired judge of Cook County, Illinois. The courts visited were in California,
Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Texas, and Washington. Throughout this
report, we have identified specific jurisdictions contained in published studies and news reports.
However, we have not identified the courts in which our investigators made their observations.
Their observations and findings are not contained in prior reports, but instead in memorandums
furnished to the Committee. The interest of the Committee is in describing practices found to be
widespread, not in identifying the particular judges or courtrooms that were observed.

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consult. Consequently, a defendant who wants … counsel must wait several days for
counsel to be appointed and possibly several more days for appointed counsel … to
make contact.”209 All but one or two of the defendants pled guilty and received fines
and probation with suspended sentences.210 Another of our investigators summarized
his observations of a court in a different state: “For all practical purposes, this is [a]
court which provides appointed counsel infrequently and very late in the processing
of a case. The practices surrounding pretrial release place great pressures on detained
defendants to enter guilty pleas without the assistance of counsel.”211
The foregoing observations are supported by numerous other sources. In the State
of Washington, for example, despite court rules requiring early appointment of
counsel, many courts do not appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases, either by not
offering counsel to the accused or through accepting invalid waivers of counsel.212
In Mississippi, a woman accused of stealing $200 from a slot machine languished in
jail for eight months without receiving a lawyer; she finally pled guilty in order to be
released from jail.213
The late appointment of counsel not only affects the attorney-client relationship, but
it also undermines a defendant’s right to be heard on pretrial release and the ability to
prepare a defense. Unless counsel represents the accused soon after arrest, witnesses
may be lost, memories of witnesses may fade, and physical evidence useful to the
defense may disappear. Further, like the woman from Mississippi mentioned above,
without defense representation, defendants may plead guilty just to obtain their release. In many jurisdictions, counsel is not appointed when bail is initially set, forcing
indigent defendants to represent themselves and advance arguments for bail reduction and their release from custody. In Maryland, for example, indigent defendants
frequently appear at bail review hearings before a judge without counsel because the
state public defender’s office is not funded sufficiently to assign attorneys for them.214
As a result, indigent defendants arrested for relatively minor crimes were sometimes
incarcerated for 30 days or even longer. Yet, when law school students argued for bail
in these same cases, they were successful two-thirds of the time.215

209 Professor

John Rubin, Report to the National Right to Counsel Committee, April 25, 2006 (on file
with Committee’s Reporters).
210 Id.
211 Hon. Charles D. Edelstein, Report to the National Right to Counsel Committee, April 12, 2006
(on file with Committee’s Reporters).
212 ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, at 26.
213 Id. at 23.
214 Doug Colbert, Op-Ed., Can’t Afford Bail, So They Sit in Jail, The Baltimore Sun, Dec. 18, 2007.
215 Id.

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The late appointment of counsel has even more severe consequences for indigent defendants in Mississippi, where the delay in assigning lawyers for the indigent has been
described as a “pervasive problem.”216 Months may pass before counsel is appointed,
causing many people charged with non-violent offenses to serve more time in pretrial
custody than warranted for the offenses themselves.217 One 50-year-old woman
charged with shoplifting $72 worth of merchandise spent 11 months in jail before a
lawyer was appointed to her case, and an additional three months before pleading
guilty.218 Juveniles also are adversely affected by the late appointment of counsel.
A study conducted several years ago in Montgomery County, Ohio, reported that,
because of insufficient funding, lawyers were unavailable to juveniles at their initial
appearance, and many youths nevertheless acknowledged guilt without ever speaking
to counsel.219 Similarly, in Indiana, juveniles are frequently unrepresented at critical
court appearances, and many juveniles waive their right to counsel without fully
comprehending the right.220 In Illinois, due to untimely appointments, most attorneys are unable to speak with juveniles prior to the first court appearance, including
detention hearings, and are, therefore, unable to provide meaningful representation at
this stage.221
When jurisdictions fail to fund indigent defense sufficiently to allow for timely access
to attorneys and when courts fail to timely appoint counsel, the frequent result is
not a net cost-savings, but instead, a shifting of expenses to corrections. For example,
it cost Mississippi taxpayers over $12,000 to incarcerate the 50-year-old woman
charged with shoplifting discussed above.222 Despite cost savings that can result from
the timely appointment of counsel, legislatures may still refuse adequate funding of
indigent defense to make timely appointment possible. A recent story from Georgia
illustrates the point. A county sheriff in Georgia noted that once the public defender
office was opened, with a requirement that attorneys meet with incarcerated clients
within 72 hours of arrest, the average daily jail population was reduced from 220
inmates to 190 inmates, despite an increase in the number of persons arrested.223 As a
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., Assembly Line Justice: Mississippi’s Indigent
Defense Crisis 8 (2003) [hereinafter NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc.].
217 Id. at 6.
218 Id. at 3.
219 Justice Programs Office, American University, Management and Operational Review of
the Montgomery County Public Defender Office: Montgomery, Ohio 34, 44 (2000).
220 Elizabeth Gladden Kehoe and Kim Brooks Tandy, Indiana: An Assessment of Access to
Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 30 (2006).
221 Cathryn Crawford, et al., Illinois: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and Quality of
Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 2–3 (2007).
222 NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., supra note 216, at 2.
223 Lori Yount, Paying for Public Defenders, Chattanooga Times Free Press, Dec. 17, 2007.
216

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result, the county saved $40 per person per day in incarceration costs.224 Despite these
data, one of the proposed state legislative responses to a budget deficit in indigent
defense was to extend to five days the state’s 72-hour requirement for initial attorneyclient meetings. Ultimately, the proposal did not pass.225

Invalid Waivers
Although courts usually claim to offer counsel to those eligible, the way in which the
offer is made and the procedure for obtaining a defendant’s waiver of counsel often
undermine the right itself. Concerns over cost or movement of the court’s docket can
lead to a lack of proper notification of the right or to pressure to waive it. The legal
requirements for waiver of counsel, i.e., that it be “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” were discussed earlier.226 Beyond the court’s role in making certain that a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid, prosecutors have a professional responsibility duty
“not [to] give legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure
counsel.”227 Similarly, the ABA has recommended that prosecutors should refrain
from negotiating with an accused who is unrepresented without a prior valid waiver
of counsel. Prosecutors also are admonished by the ABA to ensure that the accused
has been advised of the right to counsel, afforded an opportunity to obtain counsel,228
and not to seek to secure waivers of important pretrial rights from an accused who is
unrepresented.229
Unfortunately, these legal and professional duties, as well as recommendations
regarding appropriate professional conduct, are ignored on a daily basis. Throughout
the country, many indigent persons, both adult criminal defendants and juveniles,
are not fully informed of their right to counsel and are asked to sign waiver of
counsel forms or speak to prosecutors without fully understanding their rights. The
Committee’s investigators found that, of the courts they visited in eight states,230
some failed to provide a detailed explanation of the right to counsel on the written
waiver form. Further, the right to counsel was not always explained individually to
224 Id.

4 Issues Facing Public Defender Program, supra note 68.
infra note 51 and accompanying text, Chapter 1. The ABA has urged that a proper waiver
include “a thorough inquiry into the accused’s comprehension of the offer” of counsel. ABA
Providing Defense Services, supra note 38, Chapter 1, at 5-8.2(a). Standard 5-8.2(b) further
recommends that when a defendant is facing the possibility of incarceration, a waiver should not be
accepted unless the accused has had an opportunity to confer with an attorney.
227 ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at 4.3.
228 ABA Standards For Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function 3-4.1(b), 3-3.10(a) (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter ABA Prosecution Function].
229 Id. at 3-3.10(c).
230 See supra note 208 for the names of the investigators and jurisdictions visited.
225

226 See

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the accused, but instead was provided to groups of defendants en masse, sometimes
through the use of a videotaped message. In a number of courts, judges made no
inquiry as to whether defendants understood the consequences of their waivers of
counsel. In one court, defendants were not informed of their right to counsel at all.
In several courts, the Committee’s investigators found that defendants were encouraged to negotiate with prosecutors without the assistance of counsel, and in one court
they were required to do so. These negotiations frequently involved a discussion of
the charged offenses and led to guilty pleas. As one of our investigators explained in
his report: “In … [this] County defendants are frequently told by the judge to negotiate with the prosecutors before … [the judge would consider] appointing a lawyer.
These negotiations usually result in guilty pleas. No lawyer for defendant is present or
involved.”231 Further, the courts often placed pressure on defendants to plead without
counsel by informing them that a request for a lawyer would delay their case or
release from jail, or that refusing a plea offer would result in a harsher sentence in the
future.
In many Georgia courts, defendants have been instructed to speak with prosecutors
about their charges and potential plea offers before their cases were called and often
before any admonition of the right to counsel.232 Further, courts frequently have
failed to explain the right to counsel to individual defendants prior to accepting
lengthy and complicated signed waiver forms.233 In one egregious example from
Georgia, a judge advised felony defendants that the court was prepared to follow the
prosecutor’s sentencing recommendation in exchange for a guilty plea, without ever
mentioning the right to counsel until the judge and defendant were halfway through
the plea colloquy.234 In a Rhode Island court, a judge offered a defendant six months
in jail for an immediate guilty plea without counsel, adding that if the defendant
requested a lawyer, he would likely be sentenced to three years in jail.235

Hon. Shelvin Singer, Report to the National Right to Counsel Committee, April 14, 2006 (on file
with Committee’s Reporters).
232 These examples occurred in misdemeanor cases prior to establishment in 2003 of Georgia’s
statewide indigent defense system that now funds felony and juvenile cases. It is unclear whether
significant changes have been made in local court practices since the study listed below. However,
misdemeanor cases in Georgia are still funded by the counties. The Spangenberg Group, Status
of Indigent Defense in Georgia: A Study for the Chief Justice’s Commission on Indigent
Defense Part II: Analysis of Implementing Alabama v. Shelton in Georgia 34–38 (2003).
233 Id. at 39–44.
234 ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, at 25.
235 Id.
231

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Absence of Law-Trained Judges
Following a yearlong investigation, in the fall of 2006, the New York Times published
three articles about serious errors and abuses of power by New York State town and
village court judges, the majority of whom are not attorneys and sometimes lack
adequate legal training.236 The conclusions of the New York Times investigation
concerning indigent defense representation are fully supported by a study of defense
services in New York, also released in 2006, and undertaken on behalf of a New York
commission on the future of indigent defense appointed by the state’s chief judge.237
While the articles in the New York Times and the New York study deal only with the
State of New York, the problems that they document almost certainly extend beyond
that state since there are still 30 states in this country that have limited jurisdiction
courts that are presided over by non-law trained judges.238
Specifically, in New York, of the 1,971 judges in its town and village courts, almost
three-fourths are non-lawyers,239 and none of the courts are “courts of record,” as
there is neither a verbatim transcript of their proceedings nor an audio recording.240
Each year, in New York, these judges preside over about 300,000 criminal matters
and sentence persons to jail for sometimes up to two years.241 According to the study
conducted on behalf of New York’s commission on the future of defense services,
problems in providing counsel include judicial ignorance or misunderstanding of
the law on the duty to provide representation, improper advisements of the right to
counsel, and the outright refusal to appoint counsel for certain offenses, even though
the right to counsel is clearly applicable.242 The problems are exacerbated by the
understaffing of public defender offices, which prevents them from appearing at all
first appearances in their jurisdictions, and county pressure on local judges to contain
costs by not appointing counsel.243
236 William

Glaberson, In Tiny Courts of N.Y.: Abuses of Law and Power, NY Times, Sept. 25, 2006
[hereinafter Glaberson, Tiny Courts]; William Glaberson, Small-Town Justice, With Trial and Error,
NY Times, Sept. 26, 2006; William Glaberson, How a Reviled Court System Has Outlived Critics,
NY Times, Sept. 27, 2006). All of these articles are available through the search engine of the New
York Times accessible on its website.
237 See TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 103–120.
238 Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 236. See also Mary C. McFarland, The Role of Quasi-Judicial
Officers in Today’s Changing Courts, 19 The Court Manager 18, 19 (2004) (“From the survey sent
to court administrators, 21 percent of quasi-judges are required to be legally trained…. However,
71 percent are not required to have legal training and are primarily found in limited jurisdiction
courts.”), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS_QuaJudRole.pdf.
239 Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 236.
240 TSG, NY Report, supra note 32, at 118.
241 Glaberson, Tiny Courts, supra note 236.
242 TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 110–113.
243 Id.

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According to a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, a person who is tried before a
non-lawyer judge is not denied due process of law under the federal Constitution
so long as there is an absolute right to a new trial before a judge who is a lawyer.244
However, if a defendant is unrepresented in a criminal proceeding in a New York
town or village court, the defendant is unlikely to be aware that he or she can request
a new trial before a law-trained judge since there is no requirement under New York
law that a defendant must be so advised.245

Lack of Performance Standards, Training, and Oversight
When counsel is provided, beyond the need for reasonable caseloads, as discussed
earlier,246 it is essential that the lawyers adhere to performance standards and that they
be appropriately trained and supervised. National professional standards require that
defense counsel’s knowledge, skill, and training be sufficient to provide representation
in each case.247 ABA principles also require oversight of an attorney’s performance
measured against national and local performance standards.248 As discussed in
Chapter 1, although national performance standards exist,249 they are not binding in
any state or local jurisdiction. Even when such standards are adopted by a jurisdiction
or defense program, due to lack of resources and high caseloads, compliance is not
usually monitored or enforced. As a result, untrained and unskilled attorneys often
fail to provide competent representation, as required by rules of professional conduct,
and the effective assistance of counsel demanded by the Sixth Amendment.
244 North

v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976). Despite the North decision, the New York Court of Appeals
held in the case of People v. Charles F, 60 N.Y.2d 474, 470 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1983), that appellant
charged with misdemeanor offenses as a juvenile and subject to incarceration did not have an
“absolute due process right under New York or Federal law to trial before a law-trained Judge….”
60 N.Y.2d at 477, 40 N.Y.2d at 343. The decision in Charles F. was 4 to 3, with the majority ruling
that the North case requires only that a defendant receive a fair trial, and that there was no showing
in this case that the juvenile’s trial was unfair and that transfer of the case pretrial to a law-trained
judge is not required under a New York statute that allows transfer for “good cause.” The dissent
argued that the appellant had an absolute right to have his case heard before a law-trained judge,
citing the North decision, since a lawyer-judge can deal more effectively with motions and evidentiary rulings. This issue does not appear to have been further litigated in the State of New York.
245 TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 120.
246 See infra notes 96–104 and accompanying commentary.
247 See, e.g., NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1, at 1.2(a), 1.3; ABA Ten
Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 6 (“Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match the complexity of the case.”) and 9 (“Defense counsel is provided with and required to
attend continuing legal education.”); and ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.1.
248 See ABA Ten Principles, Principle 9 (“Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend
continuing legal education.”) and 10 (“Defense counsel is supervised and systematically reviewed
for quality and efficiency according to nationally and locally adopted standards.”).
249 See, e.g., NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1.

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In recognition of the need to improve indigent defense representation in Nevada,
in 2008, the Nevada Supreme Court did what few other state supreme courts have
done—approved new indigent defense performance standards. However, Nevada’s
counties are responsible for 95% of the burden of funding indigent defense, and
many of the counties have declared that they cannot afford to ensure compliance
with the standards.250
In Alabama, where counties employ assigned counsel systems for indigent defense,
brand new attorneys out of law school are reportedly just as likely as experienced
attorneys to be assigned to serious cases, even homicide prosecutions.251 A September
2008 editorial said of the system: “It is unconscionable that a defendant facing serious
criminal charges can get stuck with a tax or real estate lawyer.”252 In recognition of the
problem, Alabama’s Chief Justice has called for indigent defense oversight across the
state.253
Similarly, in many upstate counties in New York, assigned counsel systems require no
experience or training to be eligible to receive court appointments.254 Some of these
programs also lack performance standards and oversight. Thus, attorneys fresh from
passing the bar can end up having their first criminal trial be a felony case and can
even be asked to represent someone charged with homicide.255 Similar problems exist
in counties with public defender offices, where there is little or no funding in the
budget to provide training or oversight. One new public defender, who was given a
felony caseload after only a few months of practice, described his training as “trial by
fire.”256
In 2007, in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, new public defenders with no training were
assigned the existing caseloads of their predecessors, regardless of prior experience.257
One attorney, right out of law school, started with a caseload of 270 felony drug cases. In Clark County, Nevada, where the public defender office was found to lack any
performance standards or oversight of its attorneys, public defenders were observed
to treat clients with disrespect and neglect their duties.258 Further, many attorneys
250 Martha

Bellisle, Defense Reform Needed for Poor, Reno-Gazette-J., May 4, 2008.
ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, at 17.
252 Stephen Stetson, A State of Unequal Justice, Huntsville Times, Sept. 14, 2008, at 1C.
253 Id.
254 See TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 58–62.
255 Id. at 59.
256 Id. at 53.
257 The Spangenberg Group, Review of the Caddo Parish Indigent Defender Office 11 (2007)
[hereinafter TSG Caddo Parish Report], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/downloads/Caddo_Parish_FINALReport2.22.07.pdf.
258 Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Evaluation of the Public Defender Office: Clark
County, Nevada 17 (2003).
251

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in the office did not have the necessary training to handle their caseloads. In Maine,
a 2003 study noted that attorneys need have no experience or training to represent
juveniles. Moreover, in some remote areas of Maine, juvenile attorneys must drive
eight to 10 hours just to attend continuing legal education training.259 In Washington,
lack of attorney training regarding effective communication, developmental issues,
mental health and learning disabilities contribute to inadequate communication with
juvenile clients.260
Also, in Mississippi, a lack of performance standards, training, and supervision of
indigent defense providers has been cited. In one egregious case, for instance, two attorneys who had been appointed to a death penalty case were disbarred or suspended
from practice after the trial and before the direct appeal.261 On other occasions,
attorneys have continued to receive appointments even after being found to provide
ineffective representation.262

Lack of Experts, Investigators, and Interpreters
Another area that seriously undermines the ability of indigent defense attorneys
to provide an effective defense is the lack of access to and funding of non-attorney
services such as experts, investigators, and interpreters. The outcome of a criminal
case can hinge on retaining an appropriate expert or conducting a thorough fact
investigation. In the case of non-English speaking clients, qualified interpreters are
critical for attorney-client communication. Not only do states have a constitutional
duty to provide these kinds of assistance, as discussed in Chapter 1,263 but professional
standards also require defense counsel to seek such services as are necessary to prepare
an effective defense.264
Investigators are needed to interview witnesses and collect physical evidence,265 while
experts are often necessary to present an effective defense (e.g., insanity or battered
ABA Juv. Just. Center and New England Juv. Defender Center, Maine: An Assessment of
Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings 26 (2003).
260 Elizabeth M. Calvin, et al., Washington: An Assessment of Access to Counsel and
Quality of Representation in Juvenile Offender Matters 26 (2003).
261 NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., Assembly Line Justice: Mississippi’s Indigent
Defense Crisis 17 (2003).
262 Id. at 17.
263 See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text, Chapter 1. See also ABA Providing Defense
Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.4.
264 See, e.g., ABA Defense Function, supra note 73, Chapter 1, at 4-4.1(a); NLADA Performance
Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1, at 4.1.
265 Indigent defense attorneys often do not have the time or ability to track down witnesses, travel to
distant locations, interview difficult witnesses, or survey crime scenes. Further, if attorneys perform
259

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woman’s syndrome), test physical evidence, or provide an opinion independent of
the prosecution’s state-supplied expert. As noted earlier, while the prosecution has
at its disposal the services of state and federal law enforcement and experts, indigent
defense attorneys commonly require prior court approval in order to access the same
services. Often, however, defense attorneys are denied the use of experts or investigators due to limited funds. When judges serve as the gatekeepers of the funds for
non-attorney services, they often feel pressure from elected officials to guard limited
financial coffers. Moreover, when attorneys know that requests for services are frequently denied, they sometimes fail to seek the needed services.
In California, a study of cases claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, conducted
for the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, revealed that,
of the 121 cases in which deficient attorney performance was found, 44% involved
a failure to investigate.266 In addition, a statewide survey of judges and indigent
defense attorneys disclosed that over two-thirds of respondent judges conceded that
their counties lacked adequate financial resources to fund indigent defense investigations.267 Similarly, with regard to expert services, nearly two-thirds of indigent defense
attorneys reported difficulty in obtaining approval for defense testing of DNA and
other forensic evidence.268
In Michigan, a 2002 task force reported that reimbursement requests for experts and
fees for investigators were often rejected.269 The same problems continued to exist
in Michigan in 2008, where investigative and expert services in some counties are
rejected by the court or simply never requested.270 In one county, rather than seeking
the necessary investigative services from the court, attorneys commonly ask the prosecutor to have law enforcement perform the investigation.271
their own investigations, they risk needing to become witnesses in their clients’ cases in order to
either introduce evidence or impeach the testimony of others. The problem of impeachment is
dealt with in ABA Defense Function, supra note 73, Chapter 1, at 4-4.3 (e): “Unless defense
counsel is prepared to forego impeachment of a witness by counsel’s own testimony as to what
the witness stated in an interview or seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to present such
impeaching testimony, defense counsel should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in
the presence of a third person.”
266 California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Report and
Recommendations on Funding of Defense Services in California 4 (2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-pros-official.html.
267 See Benner and Stern, supra note 116, at 28.
268 Id. at 3–4.
269 The Task Force on Improving Public defender Services in Michigan, Model Plan for
Public Defender Services in Michigan 5 (2002).
270 Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, A Race to the Bottom: Trial-Level Indigent
Defense Systems in Michigan 51, 86, 87 (2008) [hereinafter NLADA Michigan Report].
271 Id. at 68.

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In Virginia, some indigent defense attorneys are told by judges to use the state’s experts, while other attorneys struggle to find experts willing to work for unreasonably
low fees.272 Similarly, some judges in New York advise indigent defense attorneys to
use the state’s experts rather than authorize funds for independent defense experts.273
Some jurisdictions also fail to provide certified interpreters to assist at court proceedings and attorney-client meetings when non-English speaking clients are represented.
A study of the public defender’s office in San Bernardino, California, found that, instead of interpreters to translate, attorneys used a friend, family member of the client,
or another person on staff.274 In New York, many indigent defense attorneys have no
access to interpreters to conduct out-of-court communication with clients, but may
use friends or family members of the client.275 Moreover, some local courts in New
York have no official interpreter to assist in court proceedings.276

Inadequate Client Contact
Professional conduct rules require, and standards applicable to defense representation recommend, that attorneys keep clients informed of the status of their case and
promptly respond to client requests for information.277 Obviously, to represent a
client properly, defense attorneys must meet with their clients as soon as possible after
a case begins in order to review the facts and circumstances of the case, determine the
client’s wishes, and prepare a defense, including determining whether investigation
and legal research must be performed.278
The unfortunate reality is that indigent defense attorneys often are unable to comply
with their professional duty respecting client contact due to several factors, such as
excessive caseloads and the failure to be appointed in a timely manner. In addition, a
jurisdiction’s system of public defense sometimes lacks the resources to furnish counsel at the client’s first court appearance. Early client contact is crucial to establishing

272 TSG

Virginia Report, supra note 173, at 75.
TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 75.
274 Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Evaluation Report and Recommendations: San
Bernardino County Public Defender Office 65 (2001).
275 TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 71–72. (2006).
276 Id.
277 See ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.4; ABA Defense Function, supra note
73, at 4-3.8; NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1, at 1.3(c), 2.2(b).
278 See, e.g., Id. at 5(a) (“Counsel should develop, in consultation with the client, an overall defense
strategy.”)
273

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the attorney-client relationship, building trust, and, if the client is incarcerated, seeking the client’s pretrial release.279
When attorneys have too many cases, client contact suffers and is sometimes virtually
non-existent. Attorneys become unavailable to clients because they are constantly in
court, and initial attorney-client meetings are forced to take place in court. The situation is often worse for incarcerated defendants. Some defense counsel lack sufficient
time to visit their clients in jail or are unable to accept collect calls from the jail. For
example, in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, where many attorneys labor under excessive
caseloads, some public defenders cannot comply with an office policy to visit clients
in jail within 10 days of their appointment.280 One public defender admitted to not
visiting in-custody clients until after the preliminary hearing is held, which may be a
month or more after appointment to the client’s case. Another reported that his jail
visits were “sporadic” and that he usually only made telephone contact with incarcerated clients. A public defender representing juveniles described client contact as “kind
of nonexistent.”281 Some public defender clients in Caddo Parish have actually filed
pro se subpoenas for jail visitation records to alert the court that they have not been
visited by their attorneys.282 Given such a lack of client contact, it is not surprising
that public defenders rarely argue motions seeking pretrial release for their clients
within a month of being appointed.283
Out-of-court client contact is even more imperative when, as is often the case, courts
lack sufficient space for confidential attorney-client meetings, eroding the attorneyclient privilege and counsel’s ability to prepare a defense.284 In some courts in Missouri,
for example, attorneys must meet with their incarcerated clients while they are shackled to other inmates, thereby violating attorney-client privilege principles, making it
even more necessary to discuss their cases out of court.285 Nevertheless, due to overwhelming workloads, many public defenders do not consult with incarcerated clients
on even a monthly basis, as required by Missouri Public Defender Guidelines.286
279 See,

e.g., Id. at 2.1 (an attorney “has an obligation to attempt to secure the pretrial release of the
client under the conditions most favorable and acceptable to the client”).
280 TSG Caddo Parish Report, supra note 257, at 10.
281 Id. at 20.
282 Id. at 10.
283 Id. at 30.
284 See, e.g., ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 4 (“Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and a confidential space within which to meet with the client.”); ABA Defense
Function, supra note 73, Chapter 1, at 4-3.1 (“To ensure the privacy essential for confidential communication between defense counsel and client, adequate facilities should be available for private
discussions between counsel and accused.”).
285 TSG MO Report, supra note 84, at 8.
286 Id. at 8–9.

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In Oakland County, Michigan, attorneys cannot meet privately with in-custody
clients when they are in court but must do so while their clients are in the jury box
in the presence of sheriffs and other defendants. 287 In other counties in Michigan,
many court-appointed attorneys meet their clients for the first time in court, weeks
after their initial appearance. In Shiawassee County, many attorneys meet their incustody felony clients for the first time in court at the preliminary hearing.288 Worse
yet, in Chippewa County, attorneys regularly meet for the first time with their clients
charged with felonies at their circuit court arraignment, even though they have had
two to six weeks to do so after the preliminary hearing in district court.289 Client contact with indigent defendants is not necessarily better when their cases are on appeal.
In South Carolina, for example, the appellate office’s caseloads are so high that only
defendants in capital cases can expect to be visited by their attorneys.290 Moreover,
attorneys lack the time to properly respond to written correspondence, leaving clients
with little or no personal contact from their attorney.291

Lack of Technology and Data
Indigent defense systems often lack adequate technology and data systems. In this
day and age, the absence of computers and access to online legal research is really
quite remarkable. Yet, in Caddo Parish, Louisiana, discussed in the preceding section,
some public defenders appearing in juvenile court did not have computers, and their
secretary had no fax machine or copier, having to rely instead on the courthouse’s
equipment.292 Besides wasting attorney and staff time, sharing equipment raises
concerns regarding confidentiality. In New York, some public defender offices have
little or no access to online legal research. One large office did not even have updated
copies of New York’s penal law.293
Some public defender offices also do not have sufficient management information
systems and technical support, leaving them unable to compile relevant statistical
data regarding their caseloads. While the inability to collect and report on caseloads
and cost data is undoubtedly due to underfunding, it also becomes a cause of underfunding. Without accurate empirical data, the programs cannot demonstrate to gov287 See
288 Id.

NLADA Michigan Report, supra note 270, at 75.

289 Id.

at 76.
Spangenberg Group, South Carolina Commission on Indigent Defense: Appellate
Division Review 24 (2008).
291 Id.
292 TSG Caddo Parish Report, supra note 257, at 18.
293 TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 51.
290 The

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ernmental funding sources its cost-efficiency and need for additional appropriations.
Moreover, government policy-makers are unable to assess systemic deficiencies and
compare various programs to determine those that are most efficient.
For example, several years ago, a review of the Riverside County, California, Public
Defender Office found that the system used to track data was so old that the company that provided the software would no longer service it.294 Managers were unable
to use the system to track the number of cases attorneys were carrying and case dispositions, making it impossible to project accurate staffing needs. Similarly, in West
Virginia, because the agency that administers and oversees the state’s indigent defense
system was underfunded, it was unable to compare the cost-effectiveness of public
defender offices and private assigned counsel. 295 In Pennsylvania, there is no uniform
method for maintaining or reporting data on indigent defense, and some counties
cannot even estimate public defender caseloads.296 Similarly, California lacks reliable
data to compare the number of indigent cases handled by public defenders, contract
counsel, and private court-appointed counsel.297
Finally, when data systems are lacking or inadequate, potential conflicts of interest
cannot be sufficiently determined (e.g., concurrent or prior representation of a codefendant, victim, or witness). For programs that have appropriate data information
systems, potential conflicts can easily be checked by running various names through
the system. Without this information technology, conflict checks must either be
conducted manually or not at all.298 When conflicts are discovered late, new counsel
must be appointed, cases are delayed, efforts often are duplicated, and unnecessary
additional costs are incurred.

Erosion of Conflict of Interest Rules
As discussed in Chapter 1, there are few instances in which a single attorney, or multiple attorneys from the same office or program, should represent two or more accused
persons in criminal prosecutions and juvenile delinquency cases. Doing so not only
likely violates professional responsibility rules, but claims of ineffective assistance of

294 Nat’l

Legal Aid and Defender Ass’n, Evaluation Report on Riverside County Public
Defender Office 20–21 (2000).
295 The Spangenberg Group, Final Report to the West Virginia Indigent Defense Task Force
6 (2000).
296 ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, at 28.
297 California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice, Final Report 72 (2008),
available at http://www.ccfaj.org.
298 TSG NY Report, supra note 32, at 51.

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counsel are possible if the client is convicted.299 However, in public defense, in order
to avoid paying private, assigned counsel, some public defender offices allow different
attorneys from the same office or program to represent co-defendants, even when it
would normally be a conflict of interest for them to do so.300
Regardless of whether such conduct is permitted under the jurisdiction’s rules of
professional conduct, as interpreted by the state’s courts and bar ethics committees,
the practice provides less protection from conflicts of interest than accorded private
clients represented separately by retained criminal and juvenile defense lawyers.
For example, in Missouri, in order to avoid having to pay outside counsel in conflict
cases, the State Public Defender represents co-defendants by using public defenders
from different regional offices within the state agency.301 In this way, two public defenders from the same program represent two co-defendants with competing interests
at trial. Quite aside from appearances, the “conflict public defender” is disadvantaged,
as she does not have office space in the region to which she has been sent and is likely
to be unfamiliar with the local judges and court procedures in the county.302
Lack of available funds for outside counsel also was cited as a reason that the public
defender office in Clarion County, Pennsylvania, represents co-defendants.303
Similarly, in Georgia, recently public defenders were reported to be representing
co-defendants as a cost-saving measure.304 Such representation not only creates ethical
problems for the attorneys, but it may also increase the potential that a conviction
will be overturned on appeal.305 This problem is likely to become more pervasive in
Georgia, at least in Fulton County, where the conflict defender office was recently
closed as a cost-saving measure.306

Case Delays
Throughout the country, lack of funds for indigent defense sometimes lead to cases
being continued, prosecutions suspended, and new lawyers substituted for present
counsel. Ironically, when these sorts of events occur, governments that already are
299 See

infra notes 92–95 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
infra note 92, Chapter 1.
301 TSG MO Report, supra note 84, at 17–18.
302 Id. at 18.
303 The Spangenberg Group, A Statewide Evaluation of Public Defender Services in
Pennsylvania 40 (2002).
304 4 Issues Facing Public Defender Program, supra note 68.
305 Id.
306 Bill Rankin, Contracts Fail Poor Defendants, Critics Say, Atlanta J.-Const., July 3, 2008.
300 See

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underfunding indigent defense may end up incurring even greater costs. At the very
least, the quality of our system of justice is severely and negatively affected.
For example, in Minnesota, after a $4 million cut in funding and a 13% layoff of the
state’s public defenders, courts are now being staffed with fewer defenders. The reduction is causing inefficiencies, wasting time and resources. As described by the chief
public defender for the 5th Judicial District, when public defenders are scheduled in
two courts or counties at once, the whole system becomes inefficient; judges, prosecutors, victims, witnesses, law enforcement, and court personnel all must wait for
the public defender before the case can be heard.307 In Blue Earth County, where one
of two public defenders handling arraignments was laid off, the judge commented
that the remaining defender is overwhelmed and unable to resolve as many cases.
The result is that “[t]he whole process is slowed down,” and the court’s calendar is
“clog[ged].”308
In Miami (Dade County), where public defenders are facing serious case overload
and a lawsuit about their caseloads is pending on appeal, public defenders are overworked and need to continue cases. 309 During April 2008, one public defender had
13 cases set for trial on the same day and was forced to continue all but one of them.
In Orange-Osceola County, Florida, which, like Miami, has been hard hit by budget
cutbacks, felony cases also are being delayed.310 The local prosecutor has summed up
the situation: “Justice delayed is justice denied in many cases.”
In Oregon, a funding crisis several years ago resulted in a moratorium on appointing counsel in certain criminal and juvenile cases. Following a $50 million cut from
Oregon’s Judicial Department budget, the chief justice issued a funding reduction
plan that directed courts, for a period of four months, to cease appointing counsel
and suspend the arraignment of persons charged with certain felonies and misdemeanors, and to defer certain pending misdemeanor and probation violation cases.311
Case delays are particularly problematic in death penalty cases, which are the most
costly to defend. Recent news in Georgia has highlighted these problems. In 2008,
the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council was unable to pay private defense
attorneys in cases throughout the state, in some instances for more than six months
of work. A number of capital cases ground to a halt. In a highly publicized capital
307 Dan
308 Id.

Nienaber, Legislator Sees Impact of Court Cuts, The Free Press (MN), Oct. 11, 2008.

309 Erik
310
311

Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, The N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2008.
Financial Crisis Takes Toll on Justice System, Courts Across Region Feel Budget Crunch, Nov. 10, 2008,
available at http://www.wesh.com/consumernews/17950079/detail.html.
Oregon Indigent Defense Struggles with the Fallout of a Fiscal Crisis, The Spangenberg Rep., Nov.
2003, at 14 (citing State Ex Rel Metropolitan Public Defender Services, Inc. v. Courtney, 64 P.3d
1138 (Ore. 2003)); see also infra notes 134–36 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.

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case, for instance, which involved 54 separate charges and 478 potential state witnesses, a lack of funding caused the case to be halted several times over the course of
three years, one court-appointed attorney to be instructed to work fewer hours, and
new counsel from the state’s Capital Defender Office to be appointed as a cost-saving
measure, over the defense team’s objection.312 In another capital case, appointed
counsel requested a continuance on the grounds that there were no available defense
funds to enable the case to continue.313 The judge denied the motion and, at the
request of the prosecutor and over the defendant’s objection, appointed local public
defenders who sought to withdraw from the case, due in part to their already crushing caseloads.314 Still another attorney sought to withdraw from a capital case because
he had not been paid in more than one year, had received no money for investigators
or experts, and felt that he was being ineffective.315
The failure to provide adequate funds has resulted in delays in capital trials in
Louisiana as well. In 2005, in the case of State v. Citizen,316 the Louisiana Supreme
Court ruled that, if the state’s government failed to pay for defense counsel, the prosecution would be stayed until funding was provided.
Similarly, in Madison County, Indiana, attorneys who had represented a defendant
in a murder case for nearly four years sought to withdraw when the county refused
to pay for their services and for the cost of experts.317 One of the defense experts
commented that his fees were small in comparison to the “unlimited resources”
of the federal agency that had reviewed the prosecutor’s evidence. When the court
asked the defenders to negotiate the cost of the defense with the county’s Public
Defender Board, the attorneys responded that doing so would limit their ability to
prepare a defense and jeopardize their client’s right to effective assistance of counsel.318
Ultimately, the court appointed new attorneys, but doing so results in a duplication
of much of the four years of effort by the original attorneys and additional costs.

Georgia Public Defender Standards Council Out of Money; Capital Trials in Limbo, The
Spangenberg Rep., Apr. 2008, at 12.
313 Bill Rankin, Costs Stall Capital Cases, The Atlanta J.-Const., Jan. 18, 2008.
314 Id.
315 Amy Leigh Womack, Defense Lawyer: Lack of Funds Could Spur Appeal, The Telegraph (Macon,
GA), May 8, 2008.
316 898 So.2d 325 (La. 2005). See also infra notes 102–107 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
317 Shawn McGrath, Longtime Public Defenders Withdraw in Delph Case, The Herald Bulletin
(Anderson, IN), July 6, 2008.
318 Id.
312

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Chapter 3
How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Litigation to Promote Systemic Change in
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arious forms of litigation have been pursued over many years to address serious
problems in the delivery of indigent defense services due to the constant lack of
adequate funding, invoking a wide variety of legal theories. These lawsuits have had
varying degrees of success. This chapter discusses the most significant litigation, suggests lawsuits and motions likely to be successful, and draws some lessons believed to
be instructive.

A. Legal Theories Underlying Litigation
In order to effectuate change in indigent defense representation, some litigants have
asserted the rights of defense attorneys to equitable treatment and just compensation.
Others have sought to vindicate the rights of indigent defendants to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. Increasingly, these arguments are combined
with claims that continuing to provide representation will require defense lawyers
to violate their ethical duties under rules of professional conduct. While courts have
granted relief in all of these kinds of cases, court-ordered remedies seem to have had
the greatest impact when lawyers have taken action before trial to vindicate the rights
of indigent defendants.

Litigation Asserting Rights of Defense Attorneys
As officers of the court, lawyers historically were required to accept court assignments
and provide representation to indigent defendants without compensation. This practice predated the Supreme Court’s decision in Gideon by many years, and in some
cases, by more than a century.1 However, as the practice of criminal law became more
complex and the number of cases necessitating appointed counsel rose, attorneys
challenged the notion that they were required to take cases without reasonable compensation. While the U.S. Supreme Court has never ruled on whether court-appointed counsel are entitled to compensation, attorneys in several states have successfully
1

State supreme courts have discussed the historical practice of requiring attorneys to provide defense
services without compensation: “There is no doubt that it was the professional obligation of the
English and the American attorney to accept an assignment to represent an indigent defendant….”
State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 403, 217 A.2d 441, 443 (1966). “The issue of compelled representation in
criminal cases first arose in the context of a suit by the lawyer against a county government to collect a fee having been awarded to him by the trial court. With the exception of Iowa, Indiana and
Wisconsin, the majority of courts held [referencing cases from the 1800’s] that an attorney could
not maintain an action against the county unless there was an express statutory authorization for
funds.” Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Mo. 1985). The reference to Indiana undoubtedly was
based on the case of Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 11 (1854), discussed at supra note 19, Chapter 1.

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argued that a state’s refusal to provide adequate compensation amounts to a taking of
property under federal or state constitutions, and just compensation must therefore
be paid. There appear to be no recent decisions of state appellate courts requiring that
counsel provide pro bono service in indigent criminal and juvenile delinquency cases.
An example of attorney compensation litigation is State v. Lynch,2 in which the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled that, to compel lawyers to accept appointment
without sufficient, speedy, and certain compensation violated the state constitution’s
due process of law clause. The rights of attorneys in both capital and non-capital cases
were at issue in two consolidated cases. In the capital case, following a 10-week trial,
the two court-appointed attorneys petitioned the trial court for fees and expenses,
documenting a combined total of over 275 hours of work and more than $28,000 in
fees. The statutory fee limit was $3200 which, if split between the attorneys, would
have amounted to rates of $9 and $15 per hour. The court found that the fee cap
inadequately compensated defense counsel and held that the state had an obligation
to compensate attorneys “at a rate which was not confiscatory, after considering
overhead and expenses.”3 As a remedy, the court, asserting its constitutional authority,
ordered that fees for appointed counsel in capital cases be tied to the hourly rates of
prosecutors and public defenders, taking into account overhead expenses. Respecting
non-capital cases, the court gave the legislature 25 months to “allow … [it] to address
the problem, and enact corrective legislation.”4 Within a year after this decision, the
Oklahoma legislature established the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System (OIDS),
which is responsible for much of the state’s indigent defense services.5 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court’s concern that counsel not be required to provide defense services
in the absence of adequate compensation was preceded by decisions of other state
courts respecting compensation paid to appointed counsel, and these cases also led to
legislative action revamping indigent defense services in the respective states.6
2
3
4
5

796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1164.
Tulsa and Oklahoma counties are not under the jurisdiction of the OIDS. See http://www.ok.gov/
OIDS/. Rates of compensation for appointed counsel in Oklahoma still remain exceedingly low.
See ABA/TSG Rates of Compensation Paid to Court-Appointed Counsel in Non-Capital
Felony Cases: A State by State Overview (2007) [hereinafter ABA/TSG Compensation in
Non-Capital Felony Cases], available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/
reports.html#sal.
Hulse v. Wifvat, 306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981); Bradshaw v. Ball, 487 S, W.2d 294 (Ky. Ct. App.
1972); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966); State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va.
805, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976). See also Richard J. Wilson, Litigative Approaches to Enforcing the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. L. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 203, 209
(1986) [hereinafter Wilson, Litigative Approaches]: “Furthermore, case law on compensation for
services by assigned counsel is replete with decisions which examine compensation claims for representing a single individual. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in State

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Court-appointed attorneys in rural areas of Kansas and West Virginia have successfully argued that they were unfairly burdened with cases, whereas their urban
counterparts were not, thus violating the equal protection of the laws. In Stephan v.
Smith,7 the Kansas Supreme Court ruled that, because some areas of the state had
public defender offices and did not require participation from the private bar while
other, usually rural areas, mandated private attorney representation, the system violated the state’s equal protection clause because it treated private attorneys differently
based on geographic location. Following this decision, the legislature made service by
private attorneys on behalf of indigent defendants voluntary and increased compensation rates for assigned counsel.8
In Jewell v. Maynard,9 the West Virginia Supreme Court found that the indigent
defense system violated the equal protection rights of rural and younger attorneys.
Due to low rates of compensation for court-appointed counsel, a cap on the amount
of fees that could be earned, and the state’s failure to reimburse attorneys for expenses
in a timely manner, many attorneys were unwilling to accept court-appointed cases,
forcing trial courts to assign more cases to those attorneys still willing to accept cases
and causing them to be overworked. The court held that this situation imposed a financial hardship on the remaining attorneys serving indigent defendants, concluding
that attorneys in rural areas without public defender offices and younger attorneys
were disproportionately burdened, in violation of their rights to equal protection.10

7
8

9
10

v. Rush led to a revamping of the New Jersey system…. Similar restructuring followed decisions in
Kentucky, West Virginia, and Iowa.”
747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
The Kansas State Board of Indigents’ Defense Services reports that public defender offices became
a more cost effective approach to providing indigent defense services as a result of this ruling.
Consequently, the Board has focused on instituting a coordinated statewide approach to providing
indigent defense services, including expanded use of contracts and public defender offices. See
http://www.ksbids.state.ks.us/au_hi.html.
383 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
“[T]he evidence demonstrates that the current system inequitably distributes its burden depending
upon location and age. Those lawyers who live in rural circuits without public defender systems
bear a much greater burden than do their peers elsewhere, and, in general, younger lawyers bear
a greater burden than older lawyers. Indeed, there are many lawyers in rural West Virginia who
are required to devote an unreasonable percentage of their time to indigent representation.” Id. at
541. While the case was pending, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals named the West
Virginia State Bar as a party to the lawsuit. The State Bar contacted the ABA Standing Committee
on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants (SCLAID) for information about indigent defense and how
West Virginia compared to other states. Subsequently, in cooperation with the ABA SCLAID and
the State Bar, The Spangenberg Group conducted a study of the state’s indigent defense system.
See The Spangenberg Group, Analysis of Data on the Indigent Defense System in West
Virginia: How West Virginia Compares with the Rest of the Nation (1988). After the ruling
in this case and completion of the study, the legislature modified West Virginia’s indigent defense
system and established a state-funded program, i.e., the West Virginia Public Defender Services,

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The court increased the hourly compensation rates from $20 to $45 for out-of-court
work and from $25 to $65 for in-court work, effective one year after the date of the
opinion. In addition, the court ordered the legislature to establish a method for attorneys to receive cash advances for out-of-pocket expenses and limited the appointments that an attorney could be required to accept to no more than 10% of annual
workload. More than 15 years after this decision was rendered, the compensation rates
for court-appointed counsel remain unchanged.11
Additional illustrative cases are Makemson v. Martin County12 and DeLisio v. Alaska
Superior Court.13 In Makemson, the Florida Supreme Court held that maximum fee
limitations enacted by the legislature to reimburse attorneys for defense services were
unconstitutional as applied to the cases before the court because they interfered with
the judiciary’s inherent authority to ensure that defendants receive adequate legal
representation consistent with the Sixth Amendment. In DeLisio, the Alaska Supreme
Court held that court-appointed attorneys’ services are property under the state constitution’s “takings clause,” for which they must be fairly compensated.14 Accordingly,
the court ruled that attorneys could not be required to accept cases pro bono and
ordered that compensation should reflect that which is “received by the average competent attorney operating in the open market.”15
Even when courts have been unwilling to declare statutory schemes of compensation
unconstitutional, they have effectively increased compensation through alternative
means. In May v. State,16 an Alabama appellate court declined to declare a fee cap
of $1000 unconstitutional, but held that attorneys were entitled to reimbursement

11
12
13
14

an executive branch agency responsible for the administration, coordination, and evaluation of
indigent defense programs across the state. For the agency’s website, see http://www.wvpds.org/
See ABA/TSG Compensation in Non-Capital Felony Cases, supra note 5.
491 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 1986).
740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987).
“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” Alaska
Const. art. I, sec. 18. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in part: “… nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Supreme Court applied the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause in Chicago Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897).
DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 443. In reality, within Alaska and other states, fees paid to assigned counsel
are not comparable to “open market” fees for legal services. In Alaska, as of June 2007, attorneys
appointed on a case-by-case basis earned $60 an hour for in-court work, and $50 an hour for outof-court work. See ABA/TSG, Compensation in Non-Capital Felony Cases, supra note 5, at 8.
Alaska has a state Public Defender Agency, which provides defense representation in indigent cases.
See http://www.state.ak.us/admin/pd/; there also is the Alaskan Office of Public Advocacy which, in
addition to other duties, provides representation in cases in which the Public Defender Agency has
a conflict. See http://www.state.ak.us/admin/opa/.
672 So.2d 1307 (Ala. App. 1993).

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for reasonable overhead expenses. The court interpreted an Alabama statute, which
entitled attorneys to reimbursement for “expenses reasonably incurred,” to include
the cost of office overhead. Thus, in addition to the statutory fee limit, the court
established a presumptive rate of $30 of overhead for each hour billed, thereby raising
the total amount of compensation that attorneys could receive.17 Likewise, in Wilson
v. State,18 the Mississippi Supreme Court held that attorneys were entitled to reimbursement of actual expenses in addition to fees, setting the presumptive overhead
rate at $25 per hour.19
As the above cases illustrate, courts have often been receptive to requests of attorneys,
finding certain appointment schemes discriminatory and severe restrictions on
compensation to be unconstitutional. In the short-term, increased compensation presumably encourages attorneys to devote more time to their cases, thereby promoting
more effective representation. Increased compensation also diminishes the likelihood
of a shortage of private lawyers willing to accept appointed cases, as has sometimes
17

18
19

In 1999, the legislature increased the rates paid to court-appointed counsel in Alabama from $40
to $50 per hour in-court time and from $20 to $30 per hour out-of-court time. On October 1,
2000, a second round of increases went into effect raising in-court payments to $60 per hour and
out-of court payments to $40 per hour. Adding on the $30 an hour for overhead expenses, courtappointed attorneys were able to bill $70 an hour for out-of-court work and $90 an hour for incourt work. The per case caps on the total amount an attorney may bill were also increased to $3500
for Class A felonies, and up to $2500 and $1500 for Class B and Class C felonies, respectively. For
capital offenses and for offenses that carry a possible sentence of life without parole, the total per
case cap was removed. Regardless of these established limits, the new legislation allowed the court,
upon a showing of good cause, to approve attorney fees in excess of the maximum amounts specified. See Ala. Code § 15-12-21(d) (2000). This statute, which previously stated that defense counsel
was entitled to reimbursement for “expenses reasonably incurred in such defense,” was amended
to read, “for expenses reasonably incurred in the defense of his or her client.” This led to a dispute
over whether the legislature intended for overhead expenses to be eligible for reimbursement. In
February 2005, the Attorney General issued Opinion 2005-063, which stated that office overhead
did not qualify for reimbursement, even though the legislature passed a joint resolution stating
that overhead expenses were to be paid. The state comptroller stopped all office overhead payments
at that time. However, appointed attorneys filed a lawsuit challenging this opinion, and it was
unanimously overruled by the Alabama Supreme Court. As a result, the state was required to pay
overhead expenses both in the future and retroactively. See Wright v. Childree, decided December
26, 2006, discussed at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/alabama004
574 So.2d 1338 (Miss. 1990).
By ruling that attorneys were entitled to be compensated for actual expenses, the Mississippi
Supreme Court avoided declaring its statute unconstitutional, which capped fees at $1000. See
also Olive v. Maas, 811 So.2d 644 (Fla. 2002) (trial courts may grant fees in excess of the statutory
schedule where extraordinary or unusual circumstances exist in capital collateral cases); Bailey v.
State, 42 S.E.2d 503 (S.C. 1992) (fee caps are limitations on the funds the state is required to provide but counties are required to pay reasonable fees and expenses above and beyond those paid by
the state); White v. Board of County Commissioners, 537 So.2d 1376, 1380 (Fla. 1989) (based upon
Sixth Amendment, statute capping fees in capital cases is unconstitutional if it interferes with the
delivery of effective representation and thus, fees in excess of the cap must be paid).

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occurred.20 However, long-term, improvements generally have not been achieved,
as courts in these cases did not require that legislatures periodically increase rates
of compensation and, in fact, assigned counsel fees are not routinely adjusted. In
addition, litigation respecting compensation does not require courts to undertake a
thorough review of a jurisdiction’s indigent defense system. Even if fees are increased,
a host of other problems may continue, such as a lack of support services and supervision of lawyers, as well as excessive caseloads.
One writer, who has examined efforts of lawyers to increase compensation through
lawsuits, has offered this assessment:
[F]ee litigation addresses only a single facet of the complex arrangement
for providing criminal defense services. The more effective strategy is to
mount a systemic Sixth Amendment challenge to a jurisdiction’s mechanism for providing criminal defense services. A systemic challenge can
address a broad range of issues; it can focus on the rights of defendants,
not their lawyers and can analyze the quality of representation provided
to the entire class of individuals who receive criminal defense services,
rather than just the services provided in one particular trial. Further, the
approach can trigger broad remedies—injunctive or declaratory relief—
with the potential to prompt legislative response.21
On the other hand, earlier we noted several cases decided between 1966 and 1990 that
dealt with compensation paid to assigned counsel, and each of these cases prompted
legislative reforms of indigent defense.22 Later, we discuss cases in which broad
challenges were made to indigent defense systems, and a wide range of issues was
considered by the courts.23

21
22
23

See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text, discussing cases in which litigation was brought
on behalf of indigent defendants because low fee rates had led to a shortage of lawyers willing to
provide representation as assigned counsel.
Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Delivery of Criminal Defense
Services, 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 293, 322 (2002) [hereinafter Bernhard, Take Courage].
See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.

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Litigation Asserting Defendant’s Right to Counsel
In Cronic v. United States,24 the U.S. Supreme Court established an exception to
Strickland v. Washington,25 which requires that a defendant seeking post-conviction
relief show that counsel’s representation was not reasonably competent and that the
defendant was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s performance. The Cronic decision
spelled out three circumstances in which circumstances could give rise to a presumption of counsel’s ineffectiveness without a specific showing of prejudice:26 (1) the
complete denial of counsel, such as situations where counsel was prevented from or
failed to assist the accused during a critical stage of the proceedings; (2) circumstances
where “counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing;” and (3) circumstances where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a
fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption
of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial.”27
Lawsuits asserting that the jurisdiction’s defense system denies accused persons their
rights to counsel and due process of law have been filed on behalf of individual indigent defendants or classes of indigent defendants. Lawyers in these cases have argued
that indigent defense systems are so woefully inadequate that defendants pending
trial are receiving, or have a strong likelihood of receiving, ineffective assistance of
counsel.28 By analogy, the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronic provides a legal underpinning for these lawsuits. However, Cronic is not usually discussed by the courts in
their decisions and is not technically applicable because Cronic was a post-conviction
case. Consider, however, the third test for ineffective assistance of counsel listed by
the Supreme Court in Cronic, i.e., circumstances in which “the likelihood that any
lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that
a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of
the trial.” If this is an appropriate test for determining after a defendant’s conviction
whether counsel could have been effective, is it not also an appropriate test to be applied before trial? In other words, should not a court inquire before trial, assuming the
matter is properly raised, whether, due to the circumstances of the indigent defense
system, counsel can be effective? If the answer is “no,” the solution seemingly should
be to halt the prosecution temporarily, if necessary, and make other arrangements
24
25
26
27
28

466 U.S. 648 (1984).
For further discussion of the Cronic and Strickland decisions, see supra notes 100–30, Chapter 1, and
accompanying text; and infra note 80 and accompanying text.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–60.
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659, n.25; n.28 (ineffectiveness presumed if counsel has a conflict of interest).
See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004); New
York County Lawyers’ Association v. New York, 196 Misc. 2d 761 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2003); Doyle v.
Allegheny County Salary Board, No. GD-96-13606 (Allegheny County, Pa. Ct.C.P. filed 1997);
Rivera v. Rowland, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2800 (Oct. 22, 1996).

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for effective defense representation.29 Although this is essentially what courts have
done in several cases where challenges to defense systems were brought pretrial, we
have discovered only one case in which an appellate court specifically cited Cronic in
deciding a pretrial motion about whether effective assistance could be rendered in the
circumstances confronting defense counsel.30
In pretrial litigation, the most often cited systemic defect is that defense counsel
are so overburdened with cases that it is impossible for any attorney, no matter how
qualified and experienced, to represent effectively any client, thereby denying current
and future indigent defendants the right to the effective assistance of counsel. This
approach has been used successfully both at trial and on appeal,31 and courts also have
found that defenders have an inherent conflict of interest when excessive caseloads
force them to choose between clients.32 Still other courts have ruled that inadequate
funding by the state or insufficient compensation for attorneys has denied or will
lead to the denial of indigent defendants’ rights to effective assistance of counsel.33
Additionally, federal courts have found that delays in the appellate process due to disproportionately high caseloads are a denial of due process and may continue to lead

30
31

We are unaware of any cases in which a court has ruled, based expressly upon analogy to Cronic, that
excessive caseloads render it so unlikely that even a competent lawyer could be expected to render
effective assistance that prejudice to clients should be presumed. But it would seem to be an argument worth making. Consider, for example, the case of United States v. Morris, 470 F.3d 596 (6th
Cir. 2006), which arose from state proceedings in Wayne County, Michigan. The defense attorney
gave the defendant incorrect advice respecting the possible sentence the defendant could receive if
he pled guilty. As the Court of Appeals explained: “The district court based … [its] determination
on the extremely short time period that the system allows appointed counsel to prepare for the
hearing, the lack of privacy afforded in the bull pen, which prohibits counsel from having a confidential, privileged conversation with the client regarding the plea offer…. Further, defense counsel
is given very little time to review any discovery material before advising her client regarding a plea.
Although the district court did not explicitly state which type of ‘Cronic failure’ it found this situation analogous to, given its factual findings, we have no trouble agreeing that in this case ‘counsel
was placed in circumstances in which competent counsel very likely could not render [effective]
assistance.’ … As a result, Morris [the defendant] is presumed to have been prejudiced by the situation in which the attorney was placed, and has a valid claim of constructive denial of counsel.” The
court’s description of defense counsel’s situation is exactly the predicament faced by lawyers who are
overwhelmed with excessive caseloads.
See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
See State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La. 1993); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the
Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990). See also State v. Smith, 681 P.2d
1374 (Ariz. 1984) (post-conviction case in which indigent defense system was found to be constitutionally deficient). See infra notes 67–82 and accompanying text.
See Harris v. Champion, 15 F.3d at 1538 (10th Cir. 1994); Green v. Washington, 917 F.Supp. 1238
(N.D.Ill. 1996); In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Public Defender, 561 So.2d at 1130.
See State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138 (N.M. 2007); Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 895.

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to due process violations.34 Finally, in addition to a violation of the right to counsel,
excessive caseloads have been found to undermine the ability of defense lawyers to
provide competent representation, as required by rules of professional conduct.35

B. Litigation Options: When and How Cases Are Presented
The timing of litigation, as well as the persons for whom the case is filed, will likely
impact a court’s analysis of whether indigent defendants are being systematically
deprived of their right to counsel. Two critical factors are (1) whether the case is
brought pretrial or post-conviction; and (2) whether the case was brought on behalf
of an individual defendant, a class of defendants, or all indigent defendants. A review
of the cases suggests that litigation that was begun pretrial on behalf of all or a class of
indigent defendants is more likely to achieve systemic reform.

Pretrial Litigation
When determining a pretrial claim, courts often assess “the likelihood of substantial
and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”36 In Luckey
v. Harris,37 the court explained that “[p]rospective relief is designed to avoid future
harm.”38 Indigent defendants, therefore, need not show actual harm by the failure of
the state to provide constitutionally adequate representation; they must show only
that there is an on-going violation of their right to counsel and that they are at imminent risk of harm in the future.39 Accordingly, pretrial litigation must demonstrate
that the constitutional right to counsel is being denied or will be denied because
some aspect of the provision of indigent defense services makes it unlikely that
any attorney could provide competent representation under the circumstances. As
34
35
36
37
38
39

Harris, 15 F.3d at 1538; Green, 917 F.Supp. at 1238.
See, e.g., infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012, 1017 (11th Cir. 1988).
Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1012.
Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017.
See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017; see also Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 895; New York County Lawyers’
Association, 294 A.D.2d at 69; Rivera, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 2800. In cases of individual
defendants, courts have a pretrial duty to investigate claims of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Thus, in
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Supreme Court held that the trial court was required
to consider a pretrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. Similarly,
courts are required to consider a defendant’s claim that defense counsel was being ineffective due to
a failure to investigate properly defendant’s case. See United States v. Zilges, 978 F.2d 369 (7th Cir.
1992).

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discussed above, this approach is not unlike the third test for ineffective assistance of
counsel listed in the Cronic decision.

Cases Asserting the Rights of All Indigent Defendants
As noted above, legal action may be instituted pretrial for an individual defendant or
for all or a class of indigent defendants. For cases asserting the right to counsel for all
indigent defendants, both those with cases currently pending and future defendants,
the requirement of standing to bring the action has been met either through class certification or through action in a representative capacity.40 Generally, so long as actual
or imminent harm is alleged and factually supported, the cases have been deemed
“justiciable,” i.e., capable of being decided according to legal principles in a court of
law.41
To illustrate, in Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court,42 indigent defendants
in Hampden County, Massachusetts, sued the state for failure to provide them with
counsel at or after arraignment. Petitioners alleged that “chronic underfunding of the
assigned counsel system” resulted in an insufficient number of attorneys willing to accept assignments at the current compensation rates and requested that the court authorize increased compensation.43 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed
that indigent defendants were being denied their right to counsel under the state’s
constitution due to a shortage of attorneys, attributable to low rates of compensation.
The court ruled that there was no need to articulate a specific harm for each defendant since the on-going harm of depriving them of the right to counsel warranted
relief. Although the court was unwilling to increase assigned counsel rates, important
relief was ordered: any indigent defendant incarcerated pretrial in Hampden County
had to be released after seven days if counsel was not appointed, and any pending

42
43

See Rivera, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 2800 (to establish standing in a case for injunctive relief,
class of indigent defendants need only allege that they are at imminent risk of harm) citing Luckey,
860 F.2d at 1017 (federal class certified of present and future indigent defendants and their attorneys); New York County Lawyers Association, 294 A.D.2d at 69 (association of lawyers could assert
indigent defendants’ rights to counsel where their members in fact suffer injury).
See Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017, 1033 (prospective relief can protect constitutional rights as long as the
likelihood of injury is shown); Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 895 (likelihood of harm sufficient to state a
claim). But see Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (to be justiciable, public defender
must show actual or imminent injury; hypothetical injuries are insufficient); State v. Quitman
County, 807 So.2d 401 (Miss. 2001) (counties had standing to sue because the county-based system
adversely affected the county and its taxpayers).
See Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 895.
Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 900.

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case against an indigent defendant had to be dismissed after 45 days if no attorney
filed a court appearance on the defendant’s behalf.44
Similarly, in New York County Lawyers’ Association v. New York,45 a court held that the
rates for assigned counsel and caps on their fees per case denied indigent defendants
their right to counsel. As in Lavallee, the court found that there were an insufficient
number of available lawyers, leading to “less than meaningful and effective assistance
of counsel.” It concluded that the low rates of compensation and fee caps were the
direct cause of the attorney shortage.46 Noting “17 years of legislative inaction and
proof of real harm and immediate danger of irreparable constitutional harm,” the
court entered a permanent injunction ordering the City of New York to pay assigned
counsel $90 an hour until the legislature acted to remedy the situation.47 Although
this order applied only to the cases of assigned counsel in New York City, while the
case was on appeal, the New York General Assembly increased the compensation rate
for court-appointed attorneys in felony and family court cases to $75 per hour both
for in-court and out-of-court time and $60 an hour in misdemeanor cases.48
While the two preceding cases dealt with fee increases for assigned counsel and
achieved commendable results, the next two cases addressed indigent defense systems
in the respective jurisdictions more broadly. In Rivera v. Rowland,49 the American
and Connecticut Civil Liberties Unions filed a class action lawsuit seeking injunctive
relief on behalf of all indigent defendants, asking the court to order Connecticut
to provide a public defender system that ensured the constitutional rights of the
accused.50 In support of their request, plaintiffs argued that the public defenders’
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

Following this decision, several defendants were released pursuant to the court’s order. Afterwards,
the court, through a single justice, entered an “interim order” allowing judges in Hampden
County to assign counsel from the private bar even if they were unwilling or not certified to accept such cases and in contravention of a state statute granting authority to certify counsel to the
Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services. See Cooper v. Regional Administrative
Judge of the District Court for Region V, 854 N.E.2d 966, 969 (Mass. 2006); see also Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 211D. Meanwhile, a second lawsuit, Arianna S. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, SJ
2004-0282 (2004), was filed challenging the statewide assigned counsel system. Faced with the
Arianna petition and the initial Lavallee decision, the Massachusetts state legislature, during the
2005 legislative session, raised the compensation rates for assigned counsel to their current rates,
i.e., $100 per hour for homicide cases, $60 per hour for Superior Court cases, and $50 per hour for
all other cases. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D § 11 (2005). Additional funding also enabled about 100
new public defenders to be hired, doubling the size of the Massachusetts Committee for Public
Counsel Services.
196 Misc. 2d 761 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2003).
New York County Lawyers’ Association, 196 Misc. 2d at 764.
New York County Lawyers’ Association, 196 Misc. 2d at 790.
N.Y. County Law § 722b (2004).
1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2800 (Oct. 22, 1996).
Rivera, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 2800.

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overwhelming caseloads, lack of adequate supervision, client contact, investigation,
and trial preparation, as well as lack of resources, prevented indigent defendants from
receiving effective assistance of counsel.51 The court denied the state’s motion to dismiss, holding that these allegations, if true, would be sufficient to support plaintiffs’
claim under the state and federal constitutions.52 Prior to a trial on the merits, the
state entered into a consent decree, which required implementation of system-wide
improvements, including reduced public defender caseloads, increased staffing, and
enhanced training and supervision.53
A similar class action suit on behalf of all felony defendants in a county in the
State of Washington was filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of
Washington and Columbia Legal Services. In Best v. Grant County,54 the goal was
injunctive relief against the county on constitutional grounds, which, at the time,
provided defense services through public defenders and contracts with private
lawyers. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that funding for indigent defense was
inadequate, caseloads were excessive, there was no oversight of the defense system,
defense services lacked independence, and defendants were deprived of investigators
and experts.55 In October 2005, the presiding trial court judge ruled that defendants
had a “well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”56 Soon afterwards, plaintiffs’ lawyers and Grant County officials
entered into a settlement agreement in which the county agreed to “reduce excessive
caseloads, guarantee that public defense lawyers are qualified to handle serious felony
51
52
53

55
56

Id.
Rivera, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS at 2800, 19–20.
As a result of the consent decree, caseload goals were implemented in 1999. See Susan O. Storey,
Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, 3 Conn. Pub. Int. L. J. 22 (2003).
See also Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No. GD-96-13606 (Allegheny County, Pa.
Ct.C.P. filed 1997) (ACLU and Pennsylvania CLU brought class action against Allegheny County
and its Chief Public Defender alleging that overwhelming caseloads, understaffing, inadequate
resources, and other long-standing systemic problems prevented indigent defendants from receiving
effective assistance of counsel; case was resolved by consent decree requiring new standards for
public defender staffing levels, performance, policies and procedures, training, and resources; and
a consultant was retained after the decree to ensure compliance); State v. Perry Ducksworth, No.
1388-3, Circuit Court for the First Judicial District, Jones County, Mississippi (1994) (Mississippi
and Louisiana Trial Assistance Project filed lawsuit for alleged systemic failure ofJones County
Public Defender Office due to inadequate funding and excessive caseloads; county’s Board of
Supervisors more than tripled county’s indigent defense budget while case was on appeal).
Best v. Grant County (No. 04-2-00189-0), available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/library_files/200404-05--GrantComplaint.pdf. For a description of the case and related documents, see http://www.
aclu-wa.org/issues/subissue.cfm?&issuesubissue_id=3.
Compl. at 2, Best v. Grant County (No. 04-2-00189-0), available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/
library_files/2004-04-05--GrantComplaint.pdf.
For a summary of the decision and subsequent settlement agreement, see Grant County to Overhaul
Defense System, Nov. 7, 2005, available at http://www.aclu-wa.org/ inthecourts/ detail.cfm?id=302.

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cases, and provide adequate funding for investigators and expert witnesses.”57 The
settlement included a provision for appointing a monitor to oversee Grant County’s
compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement during the ensuing six years.58
In 2007, lawsuits similar to the Rivera and Grant County cases were filed in state
courts in Michigan and New York, charging that indigent defense systems in the
two states are completely broken. Both cases were still pending as this report was
completed. In Duncan v. State of Michigan,59 the ACLU and private attorneys filed
suit against the State of Michigan and its governor. In Hurrell-Harring v. New York,60
the New York Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys filed suit against the State
of New York. While the Michigan case focuses on indigent defense deficiencies in
three counties, the New York case alleges that indigent defense throughout New York
State is defective. Both cases allege, inter alia, violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983.61 In both Michigan
and New York, indigent defense is substantially organized at the county level; funding in Michigan is also from the counties, whereas in New York, the state contributes
about 40% of the funding with the balance from the counties.
In the New York case, the complaint charges that there are a host of indigent defense
problems because the State has “abdicated its responsibility to guarantee the right to
counsel for indigent persons and has left each of its sixty-two counties to establish,
fund and administer their own public defense programs, with little or no fiscal and
administrative oversight or funding from the State.”62 Among the specific deficiencies
claimed to exist are unnecessary and prolonged pretrial detention, restrictive client
eligibility standards, no performance standards for attorneys, no monitoring or
supervision of attorney representation, a lack of attorney training, a lack of resources
for support staff and access to investigators and experts, overwhelming caseloads, a
lack of independence from the judiciary, and inadequate compensation and resources

57
58
59

61
62

Id.
Id.
For the complaint in this case, filed in the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham, Michigan,
see the website of the American Civil Liberties Union, available at http://www.aclu.org/images/
asset_upload_file244_28623.pdf. There is also a recent evaluation of indigent defense in Michigan.
See NLADA Michigan Report, supra note 270, Chapter 2, available at http://www.michbar.org/
publicpolicy/pdfs/indigentdefense_report.pdf.
For the complaint in this case, filed in the Supreme Court of New York, Albany County, see
the website of the New York Civil Liberties Union, available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/
Amended%20Class%20Action%20Complaint.pdf
The text of § 1983 is quoted and its applicability to indigent defense is discussed at infra notes
150–69 and accompanying text.
Complaint in Hurrell-Harring, supra note 60, at 4.

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for those who provide defense services, especially in comparison to the prosecution.63
Similar allegations are contained in the Michigan lawsuit.
Not all cases asserting the rights of indigent defendants have been successful. In
Kennedy v. Carlson,64 the public defender for Hennepin County, Minnesota, filed
suit claiming that the state’s failure to provide sufficient funds for his office “may or
will”65 result in the violation of his clients’ Sixth Amendment rights. However, the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that the public defender had failed to establish an
actual and imminent injury to his clients, finding the claim that violations may or
will occur to be “too speculative and hypothetical.”66 While acknowledging the office’s
high caseloads, the court noted that there was no evidence that any attorney had
provided ineffective assistance of counsel or even substandard representation. Since
the public defender failed to provide evidence that clients had been prejudiced due
to ineffective assistance of counsel, the case was distinguished from those in other
jurisdictions where relief had been provided.

Cases Asserting the Rights of a Class of Defendants
Another approach to achieving change has been for public defender offices to seek to
withdraw from some of their cases and/or to halt the assignment of prospective cases,
thereby providing relief to a class of indigent defendants whose cases are not now being properly handled or would not be properly handled in the future. If the litigation
is successful, not only can improvements be achieved, but also, the court’s order can
lead state legislatures or local authorities to provide additional funding.
In 1990, the Florida Supreme Court in In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals
by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender67 found that the large workload and
enormous backlog of appellate cases of public defenders, caused by the “woefully inadequate funding of the public defenders’ offices,” was a “crisis situation of constitutional dimensions,” requiring a systemic response.68 The court noted that the number
of cases requiring briefing had grown from 408 to 1005 in less than three years and
that privately retained counsel filed briefs at least one year earlier than public defenders. The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the excessive caseloads were requiring
public defenders to choose between the rights of clients, creating a conflict of interest
and a violation of the right to counsel. To remedy the situation, the court ordered
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id. at 59–98
544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 15.
Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 8.
In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561
So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
Id. at 1132–33.

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lower courts to appoint alternate counsel upon public defender motions to withdraw
and stated that the legislature should appropriate sufficient funds for a “massive employment of the private sector on a one-shot basis.”69 The court further advised:
If sufficient funds are not appropriated within sixty days from the filing
of this opinion, and counsel hired and appearances filed within 120 days
from the filing of this opinion, the courts of this state with appropriate
jurisdiction will entertain motions for writs of habeas corpus from those
indigent appellants whose appellate briefs are delinquent sixty days or
more, and upon finding merit to those petitions, will order the immediate release pending appeal of indigent convicted felons who are otherwise
bondable…. There can be no justification for their continued incarceration during the time that their constitutional rights are being ignored or
violated.70
While the legislature approved funds to pay for private counsel to reduce the case
backlog, it did not increase funding of the public defender for the long-term and an
appellate case backlog later developed. So in 1993, the public defender office once
again moved to withdraw, asking to be excused from over 350 overdue appeals. This
time, a retired judge was appointed to sit as a special commissioner to hear evidence
and make findings of fact regarding both the efficiency and productivity of the public
defender’s office and to determine whether the allegation of case overload was supported by the facts. After a four-day evidentiary hearing, the commissioner concluded
that the public defender was working at capacity but was nonetheless overloaded with
cases and should be allowed to withdraw from certain of his cases.71
Although most challenges to excessive caseloads have been litigated in state courts,
one notable case, similar to the Florida cases discussed above, was filed in federal
court. In Green v. Washington,72 a federal district court in Chicago held that petitioners, indigent defendants incarcerated in Illinois prisons whose appeals had not been
69
70

Id. at 1138.
Id. at 1139. The court’s threat to “entertain motions for habeas corpus” if the legislature did not act
promptly to appropriate “sufficient funds” was similar to the approach adopted in several other
cases. See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, supra notes 42–44, and State v.
Peart, infra notes 76–79.
See In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw Filed by Public Defender of the Tenth
Judicial District, 636 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1994). At the time of the lawsuit, the Florida appellate public
defender offices were state-funded, whereas the fees for private appointed counsel were borne by the
counties. Subsequently, the legislature enacted legislation setting up state-funded regional conflict
offices. See Fla. Stat. § 27.511 (2007). See also Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So.2d 135 (Fla. 1978)
(judiciary has inherent authority to order local governments to pay higher witness fees in extraordinary cases to ensure an indigent defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process).
917 F.Supp. 1238 (N.D. Ill. 1996).

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filed for one year or more, were deprived of their rights to due process of law. The
cause of the problem, according to the court, was chronic underfunding of the
Illinois First District Office of the State Appellate Defender to handle its caseload.
Further, the court noted that the Illinois General Assembly had been on notice for at
least eight years that there was inadequate staff to represent an increasing number of
indigent appellants. Despite the lack of appellate staff, the Illinois General Assembly
decreased the appellate defender’s appropriation. Facing a history of inaction from
both the judicial and legislative branches of the Illinois government, the court held
that “[i]n the usual situation where a violation of constitutional rights has been
caused or permitted to continue despite full knowledge and ample opportunity to
cure on the part of governmental defendants, the appropriate remedy is one that
would grant prompt (perhaps immediate) relief to the victim of that violation.”73
Although the court asked the State of Illinois to propose an appropriate remedy, the
case ultimately was dismissed when the legislature appropriated additional funds
for the use of private attorneys to address the backlogged appeals and substantially
increased funding for the Office of the State Appellate Defender.
The judgment in Green was based upon the federal court decision in Harris v.
Champion,74 in which a federal court of appeals held that a violation of due process
and ineffective assistance of counsel could be found if an appellant’s direct appeal
from a state conviction was pending for more than two years without final state
action. As in Green, the delays were attributable to underfunding of the state’s appellate defense program. Further, the court stated that such cases merited a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice, permitting the federal courts to grant writs of habeas
corpus and release otherwise bondable defendants pending their state appeals.
However, the court noted in its opinion that none of the named defendants would
probably be entitled to such relief because, during the pendency of their cases, all of
the defendants received appointed counsel and were believed to have had briefs filed
on their behalf.75 Nevertheless, the remedy is potentially available for future indigent
defendants in the event underfunding of appellate counsel causes inordinate delays in
appellate review.
73

74
75

Green, 917 F. Supp. at 1281. In this case, as well as in numerous other decisions cited in this chapter,
expert testimony was presented by Robert L. Spangenberg, President of The Spangenberg Group,
which for many years, specialized in the study of indigent defense delivery systems throughout the
United States. For discussion of Spangenberg’s testimony in this case, see Green, 917 F. Supp. at
1250–51.
15 F.3d 1538 (10th Cir. 1994).
15 F.3d at 1570. See also Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1990) (six-year delay in pursuing appeal due to inaction of appointed counsel denied defendant due process of law but did not
entitle defendant to release from custody, as appeal was decided in state court during pendency of
defendant’s habeas petition).

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Facing an overload of cases at the trial level, a public defender in New Orleans filed
a pretrial “Motion for Relief to Provide Constitutionally Mandated Protection and
Resources,”76 contending that systemic deficiencies caused his caseload to be so high
that it prevented him from providing effective assistance of counsel to his clients. In
State v. Peart,77 the Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that, due to excessive caseloads
and insufficient support of Louisiana’s indigent defense system, “the services being provided to indigent defendants … do not in all cases meet constitutionally
mandated standards for effective assistance of counsel.”78 The court found that there
was a rebuttable presumption of ineffectiveness in all of the public defender’s cases
and remanded the case to the trial court for individualized determinations regarding
whether each indigent defendant represented by the public defender was receiving
effective assistance.79
Since Peart was a pretrial case in which the question was whether counsel could be
effective, the tests for determining post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel
contained in Strickland and Cronic were not applicable. The remedy that the
Louisiana Supreme Court fashioned, in which the trial court on remand was required
to conduct individualized hearings respecting each defendant to determine counsel’s
likely effectiveness, has not been adopted in cases by courts in other states.80 Nor do
76
77
78
79

State v. Peart, 621 P.2d 780, 784 (La.1993).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 783.
The court also stated that, in the event “legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense
reform does not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and inherent power and
supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to employ more intrusive and specific measures it has
thus far avoided to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective assistance of counsel.” Peart, 691 So.2d at 791. After the Peart decision, on July 1, 1994, the Louisiana Supreme Court
created the Louisiana Indigent Defender Board (LIDB), by Supreme Court rule, under the judicial
branch of state government. The legislature appropriated $5 million for the fiscal year to initiate the
program. The board’s powers and duties included developing policy for a capital litigation program,
an appellate program, an expert witness/testing fund, and a district assistance fund, as well as standards and guidelines for court appointed counsel payments and qualifications. Subsequently, the
LIDB’s sunset provision took effect, but the next year it was re-established by the state legislature
as the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board (LIDAB). In 2007, Louisiana replaced LIDAB
with a new public defender program. See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
One of the attorneys who argued Peart before the Louisiana Supreme Court believes that the
Court’s decision suffered from three deficiencies that rendered it a failure in the battle for systemic
defense reform in Louisiana: “First, the court failed to set forth principled standards governing
pretrial ineffectiveness claims that could guide public defenders, courts, and legislators in the
future. Second, the opinion mistakenly held that Strickland v. Washington’s rejection of attorney
performance standards when adjudicating pretrial claims precluded a court from applying caseload
standards when adjudicating pretrial ineffectiveness claims. Third, the court’s case-specific ‘rebuttable presumption’ of ineffectiveness was inadequate and unworkable.” John Holdridge, Judicial
Reticence and the Need for Compelled Compliance with Indigent Defense Caseload Standards: State v.
Peart’s Disappointing Legacy 1–2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with Reporters).

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there appear to be other cases in which courts have found that the indigent defense
services being provided create a rebuttable presumption that defendants are not being
effectively represented.
In re the Matter of Continued Indigent Representation by the District Public Defender’s
Office in Knox County General Sessions Court is another example of a public defender’s
office seeking relief from an overwhelming caseload.81 In 1991, the Public Defender
of Knox County, Tennessee, filed a motion requesting that the General Sessions
Court suspend appointments to his office for 60 days to allow the office’s caseloads to
become more manageable. In support of his position, the public defender presented
amicus briefs, affidavits, and statistical data regarding the office’s caseload. After an
evidentiary hearing, the court granted the motion to suspend. As a result of this ruling, the court appointed lawyers who were required to represent indigent defendants
pro bono, but soon afterwards, the legislature passed a law requiring reasonable
compensation for court-appointed work.82
In some of the prior cases involving excessive caseloads, public defenders did not
argue that their continued representation of existing clients or the defense of future
clients would cause them to violate their ethical duties as lawyers. Now, with increasing frequency, defenders are claiming not only that the constitutional rights of their
clients are jeopardized by excessive caseloads, so, too, are their responsibilities as
members of the legal profession pursuant to rules of professional conduct, which
require that competent and diligent representation be provided.83 This relatively
new approach has undoubtedly been fueled by the 2006 ethics opinion of the ABA
Standing Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which is discussed elsewhere in this report.84
In 2007, the Public Defender of Mohave County, Arizona, filed motions to withdraw
from 36 of the office’s pending cases, arguing that, unless relief was granted, defendants would be denied the effective assistance of counsel and attorneys would violate
their ethical duty to furnish competent services.85 During an evidentiary hearing, the
81
82

84
85

In re the Matter of Continued Indigent Representation by the District Public Defender’s Office in
Knox County General Sessions Court (General Sessions Court, Knox County, Tenn. 1991).
See TN Code 40-14-207(a). In March 2008, the same Public Defender filed a similar motion
requesting the suspension of assignments in the General Sessions Court due to underfunding and
overwhelming caseloads. See infra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
The professional duty of lawyers representing indigent defendants is discussed in Chapters 1, 2, and
5 See supra notes 78–99, Chapter 1, and accompanying text; supra notes 96–104, Chapter 2, and
accompanying text; and infra notes 84–96, Chapter 5, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text, Chapter 1; and infra notes 86–88, Chapter 5.
See Arizona v. Lopez, Number 2007-1544 (Mohave County Superior Court, filed December 17,
2007). The public defender had other pending motions to withdraw, which were not consolidated
with these 36 cases.

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chief public defender testified about the caseloads of each of his lawyers, indicating
that they could not accept additional cases and claiming that they were “overwhelmed.” Asked about his own caseload, the public defender replied that he “would
not be able to render effective representation to any additional people. Many times I
question whether I’m doing what I should be doing on the cases that I have.”86
After this evidentiary hearing, the trial court judge found that, given the office’s
caseloads, “[r]equiring or even allowing the Public Defender’s Office to remain as
appointed counsel in these cases would likely compromise them from an ethical
standpoint and deprive the Defendants … of their right to effective representation.”87
The court, therefore, granted the public defender’s motions to withdraw, declaring
that it would apply its order to other pending motions to withdraw, and further held
that future motions to withdraw need only reference the ruling in these cases. The
court refused to “concern itself with financial or funding implications of its ruling on
the motions to withdraw,”88 leaving to the county the problem of paying the fees of
private attorneys who would now be required to represent defendants in cases from
which the public defender would be excused.
While the litigation in Mohave County, Arizona, was successful, similar litigation
in New Orleans, also in 2007, resulted in a less positive result. A public defender
86

Id. Transcript of Record at 40. In an opinion in 1970, a California appellate court suggested that a
public defender adopt the sort of approach adhered to by the public defender in this case: “When
a public defender reels under a staggering workload, he need not animate the competitive instinct
of a trial judge by resistance to or defiance of his assignment orders to the public defender…. The
public defender should proceed to place the situation before the judge, who upon a satisfactory
showing can relieve him, and order the employment of private counsel … at public expense….
Boards of supervisors face the choice of either funding the costs of assignment of private counsel
and often, increasing the costs of feeding, housing and controlling a prisoner during postponement of trials; or making provision of funds, facilities and personnel for a public defender’s office
adequate for the demands placed upon it.” Ligda v. Superior Court of Solano County, 85 Cal. Rptr.
744, 754–55 (1st App. Dist., CA 1970).
Arizona v. Lopez, supra note 85, slip op. at 13. One of the earliest cases in which a court sought
to limit the caseloads of public defenders was Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (D.C.N.Y. 1973),
judgment reversed and vacated, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973). This was a class action civil rights lawsuit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (see infra note 153 for text of statute) on behalf of incarcerated
defendants, claiming that lawyers from the New York Legal Aid Society were failing to provide
effective assistance of counsel. The trial court ordered that the Society’s trial attorneys not carry a
caseload that averaged more than 40 felony indictments at a time because to do so “would prevent
… [Legal Aid] from affording its existing clients their constitutional right to counsel.” Wallace, 392
F. Supp. at 849. The decision was reversed on jurisdictional grounds, because the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the New York Legal Aid Society was not acting under color of state
law since it was a private, not-for-profit corporation. The District Court opinion, however, is still
persuasive authority for liability under § 1983, assuming that the other requirements of the statute
are met. Section 1983 litigation is discussed at infra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.
Arizona v. Lopez, supra note 85, slip op. at 11.

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employed by the Orleans Public Defender Office, with the support and assistance of
his agency, sought to withdraw from cases and to halt the assignment of additional
cases. During an evidentiary hearing, the public defender explained that his current
caseload was well over 100 clients, many of whom were charged with very serious
felonies. He also recounted his numerous defense counsel responsibilities for which
he lacked adequate time due to his overwhelming caseload. These included a failure
to conduct timely and adequate interviews of clients, investigation of his cases, seeking relevant records, identifying and interviewing witnesses, visiting crime scenes,
considering the use of experts, filing pretrial motions, and preparing for trials.89 In his
order in the case, the trial court offered the following assessment:
Indigent defense in New Orleans is unbelievable, unconstitutional,
totally lacking the basic professional standards of legal representation
and a mockery of what a criminal justice system should be in a western
civilized nation.
Equally shocking is the Louisiana legislature, which has known since
1972, constitutional violations and insufficient funding have plagued
indigent defense, not only in New Orleans, but also in other Louisiana
parishes.
The Louisiana legislature has allowed this legal hell to exist, fester and
finally boil over.90
The court’s order in the case, which contemplated allowing the public defender to
withdraw from some of his cases and stop accepting additional appointments, was
appealed to a Louisiana appellate court. This court held that the trial judge had failed
to conduct, consistent with the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Peart,91 “individualized hearings” respecting each defendant in which the public defender claimed
to lack sufficient time to provide adequate representation.92 Ultimately, the litigation
did not achieve its desired result. While the trial court appointed some private attorneys to handle some of the defender’s case overload, the public defender at the center
of the litigation and other public defenders assigned to other criminal courtrooms in
Orleans Parish continue to carry extremely high caseloads.93
In June 2008, in Knoxville, Tennessee, the city’s five misdemeanor court judges
conducted a day-long evidentiary hearing on a motion by the Public Defender of
89
90
91
92
93

Louisiana v. Edwards, No. 463-200 (D. La. March 30, 2007).
Id., slip op. at 11.
See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text.
Louisiana v. Edwards, No. 2007-K-0639 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2007).
Telephone interview by Norman Lefstein with Stephen Singer, official of the Orleans Public
Defenders Office (October 10, 2008).

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Knox County, who requested to be excused from assignments in future misdemeanor
cases.94 The public defender and two of his lawyers testified about their excessive caseloads and explained that they were incapable of doing what was required of them in
order to represent their clients competently, as required by the state’s rules of professional conduct and standards governing the defense function.95 As of January 2009,
however, the five judges had not yet rendered a decision on the public defender’s
motion, which reflects the difficulty sometimes encountered in obtaining a prompt
judicial resolution in this kind of litigation.96
Another unresolved case at the time of this report’s completion, which is pending before the Florida Supreme Court, is from Dade County (Miami), Florida.97 In late July
94

In re Petition of Knox County Public Defender, General Sessions Court for Knox County,
Tennessee, Misdemeanor Division, Docket No. Not Assigned, filed March 26, 2008. On July 25,
2008, this same public defender also petitioned to temporarily suspend appointments in felony
and misdemeanor cases in the Criminal Court for Knox County, Tennessee, Division 1, and to
withdraw and temporarily suspend such appointments in the Criminal Court for Knox County,
Tennessee, Divisions II and III. A hearing on these petitions was held in October 2008, and
substantial temporary relief was granted to the Public Defender. As of January 2009, a final order
on the petitions was being held in abeyance, pending negotiations between the Public Defender
and state budget officials. Telephone interview by Norman Lefstein with Mark Stephens, Sixth
Judicial District Public Defender, Tennessee (January 5, 2009). For copies of pleadings pertaining
to this litigation, see website of the Sixth Judicial District Public Defender, available at http://www.
pdknox.org/800main.htm
Mark Stephens, the Public Defender in Knoxville, Tennessee, testified that there was “a crisis in my
office” because the volume of misdemeanor cases was so high that his lawyers did not have time
even to interview in advance of court hearings all of the clients who requested an interview with
their public defender. Typically, the lawyers were in court every other week and during their week
in court were responsible for the cases of approximately 100 defendants. Here is how he explained
the situation: “… [s]o there’s [no time] … to do any on-scene investigations. There’s [no time] …
to do any contacting of [police] officers…. There’s … [no] time to interview any witnesses. You just
go into court you fly by the seat of your pants to see what you can accomplish…. The caseloads
that currently exist in my office, in my view, prohibit my lawyers from fulfilling their ethical obligations and duties that they owe to their client…. And, consequently, the constitutional right of the
accused to have a lawyer who is meeting his or her ethical responsibility to that client is not being
fulfilled, and it’s because of caseload, it’s not as a result of the commitment or effort on the part
of the lawyers.” In re Petition of Knox County Public Defender, General Sessions Court for Knox
County, supra note 94, Transcript of Record, 27–31.
A Tennessee Supreme Court rule contains language that the public defender had expected to be
helpful in pursuing his motion seeking prompt relief from excessive caseloads. The rule, which
applies to the appointment of counsel by trial judges, reads as follows: “The court shall not make
an appointment if counsel makes a clear and convincing showing that adding the appointment to
counsel’s current workload would prevent counsel from rendering effective representation in accordance with constitutional and professional standards.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 13 (e) (4) (D).
Still another case that was pending at the time of the completion of this report is a declaratory
judgment lawsuit filed by the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy (the state’s public defender
program except for Jefferson County) and the public defender agency in Jefferson County (which
includes Louisville). The lawsuit was filed due to 2008–2009 budget cutbacks in Kentucky, which

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2008, a trial court judge in Miami held a two-day hearing on the motion of the Dade
County Public Defender, who asked that his lawyers be excused from appointments
in all felony cases, except capital cases, in Miami’s 21 felony courtrooms. The public
defender argued that underfunding of his office had led to excessive caseloads and
that his lawyers could not ethically or legally accept additional non-capital felonies.
In an opinion dated September 3, 2008, a trial court judge ruled substantially in favor
of the public defender’s position, declaring that, until further review, the public defender would be excused from having to accept appointments to all class C felonies,
though appointments to class A and B felonies would continue.98 The court summed
up the situation with these words:
… [T]he evidence shows that the number of active cases is so high that
the assistant public defenders are, at best, providing minimal competent
representation to the accused…. [T]he evidence clearly shows that …
[the public defender] is in need of relief sufficient to ensure that the
assistant public defenders are able to comply with the Florida Rules of
Professional Conduct and carry out their constitutional duties…. The
Court concludes that the testimonial, documentary, and opinion evidence shows that … [the public defender’s] caseloads are excessive by any
reasonable standard.99
In these recent cases from Arizona, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Florida, in which public defenders invoked their ethical duty as a basis for objecting to excessive caseloads,
a great deal of statistical data was presented concerning past and current caseloads of
either the individual lawyer (Louisiana) or of the individual lawyers and the overall
office caseload (Arizona, Tennessee, and Florida). In addition, in all four cases, expert
witness testimony was presented concerning whether the individual public defender
(Louisiana) or the staff as a whole (Arizona, Tennessee, and Florida) could be expected to provide competent services given the size of the caseloads. Also, in the Arizona,
Tennessee, and Florida cases, dedicated and skilled attorneys from prominent private
law firms in their respective states, experienced in civil litigation, served as pro bono

adversely impacted hiring and retention of public defenders in the state and exacerbated excessive
caseload problems for defenders. The relief sought includes a declaration from the court that public
defender lawyers “may ethically and legally, … consistent with their ethical, constitutional and
statutory obligations, … legally decline to accept appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants when, in their objectively reasonable judgment, their respective caseloads render them unable to competently and diligently and effectively represent those defendants.” Lewis v. Hollenbach,
Complaint at 22, Franklin Cir. Ct., Civ. No. 08-C1-1094 (2008), available at http://dpa.ky.gov/
Lewis,%20et%20al%20v.%20Hollenbach,%20et%20al.pdf.
In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Public Defender’s Motions to Appoint Other Counsel in
Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No. 08-1 (Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in
and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, September 3, 2008).
Id., slip op. at 4, 5, and 6.

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counsel and represented the public defender offices in challenging their caseloads.100
In addition, in the Tennessee and Florida cases, private criminal defense attorneys
testified that they believed the defenders could not adequately represent all of their
clients and that, as private practitioners, they would not assume caseloads as large as
those of the public defender unless they had substantial additional resources.101

Cases Asserting the Rights of an Individual Defendant
When pretrial litigation is brought on behalf of all or a class of indigent defendants,
systemic reform is usually the goal. In contrast, when problems with the system of
indigent defense are raised pretrial on behalf of a single defendant or co-defendants,
the matter is normally presented to the trial court in a motion, and the relief sought
relates to the specific defendant or defendants before the court. It is, therefore, not
surprising that such actions do not normally result in systemic changes to the indigent defense system, as illustrated in the following cases.
In New Mexico v. Young,102 in an unusually complex capital case involving co-defendants and two defense teams, the lawyers “filed a motion asking to be compensated at
an hourly rate, to be allowed to withdraw, and/or to dismiss the death penalty.”103 The
attorneys argued that they would require an additional $100,000 per defense team
to represent the defendants even if the request for the death penalty was withdrawn,
but would require an additional $200,000 per defense team if the death penalty
remained an option. The New Mexico Supreme Court agreed that $100,000 was
inadequate under the extraordinary circumstances of the case. As the court explained,
“[t]he inadequacy of compensation in this case makes it unlikely that any lawyer
could provide effective assistance, and, therefore, as instructed by the United States
Supreme Court, ineffectiveness is properly presumed without inquiry into actual
100 In

the Arizona case, representation was provided by Osborn-Maledon of Phoenix; in the Tennessee
case, representation was provided by Chambliss, Bahner & Stophel of Chattanooga; and in the
Florida case, representation was provided by the Miami office of Hogan & Hartson. Other law
firms that have made substantial contributions as pro bono counsel in important litigation seeking indigent defense reforms include Covington & Burling, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Holland &
Knight, Jenner & Block, and Kirkland & Ellis.
101 For example, in the Florida litigation, a private criminal defense lawyer testified as follows:
“[M]y 25 years of experience tells me you can’t handle more than 50–100 cases in a year and give
quality, effective representation….” Transcript of Record at 15, Reassignment and Consolidation of
Public Defender’s Motion to Appoint Other Counsel in Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases, No. 08-1.
“If I had to handle 436 [felonies during a year]…, I would be up 24 hours a day, seven days a week,
365 days a year and I still would not be able to effectively represent that many people.” Id. at 16.
“There’s no way they can do the amount … of time and effort that any reasonable private practitioner should be putting on a case to effectively represent their clients.” Id. at 17.
102 172 P.3d 138 (N.M. 2007).
103 Young, 172 P.3d at 140.

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performance.”104 After considering various alternatives, the court determined that the
proper course was to stay the prosecution of the case in which the death penalty remained an option unless additional funding for defense counsel was appropriated by
the legislature. In doing so, the court remarked that it was making “no determination
that similar fees or rates are constitutionally required in other cases.”105
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar result in State v. Citizen,106 where
there were insufficient funds to compensate appointed counsel in two capital cases.
The attorneys for the defendants were to be paid by the then state-funded Louisiana
Indigent Defense Assistance Board. When the board failed to provide adequate funds
for the defense, the trial court ordered the local parish to appropriate the necessary
funds for defense counsel. In overruling the trial court’s decision, the Louisiana
Supreme Court found that, under state law, a local parish could not be ordered to
pay for indigent defense. Instead, the court noted that funding was the legislature’s
responsibility and that, even if the legislature were to reform the indigent defense system in Louisiana, which was then under consideration, changes would not be made
in sufficient time to help the defendants. Accordingly, the court concluded that “the
trial judge may halt the prosecution of these cases until adequate funds become available to provide for these defendants’ constitutionally protected right to counsel….”107

Quitman County v. State of Mississippi (Taxpayers’ Rights Case)
A different kind of strategy was pursued by Quitman County, Mississippi, in an effort to achieve systemic reform in the funding of indigent defense. On its own behalf
and on behalf of its taxpayers, Quitman County asked that the State of Mississippi
be ordered to pay for the cost of indigent defense representation, which by statute
in Mississippi is funded by the counties.108 In State v. Quitman County,109 the county
claimed that the state breached its duty under the state’s constitution to provide
representation for indigent defendants and that Quitman County could not afford
the expense. When the case was first appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court,
104 Young,

172 P.3d at 141. In reaching this conclusion, the New Mexico Supreme Court expressly relied
on the Supreme Court’s Cronic decision. For a discussion of Cronic, see supra notes 24–30 and accompanying text.
105 Young, 172 P.3d at 144. Subsequently, the New Mexico legislature decided that it would not provide
additional funds to support the work of defense counsel, and the death penalty request was dismissed. See http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/2345.
106 State v. Citizen, 898 So.2d 325 (La. 2005).
107 Citizen, 898 So.2d at 339. Since this decision, the system of indigent defense in Louisiana has been
reformed. See infra notes 13–15 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
108 For a discussion of what the U.S. Supreme Court has said about the state’s duty to pay for the right
to counsel, see supra notes 58–65 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
109 807 So.2d 401 (Miss. 2001).

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the court rejected the state’s motion to dismiss and remanded the matter for trial,
concluding that counties had standing to sue because the county-based system of
indigent defense adversely impacted counties and their taxpayers.110 The court also
indicated that, if the allegations of chronic underfunding by the state were shown
to lead to systemic constitutional deficiencies in providing the right to counsel, the
county would be entitled to relief in the form of increased state appropriations.111
After a trial, in which the trial court ruled against Quitman County, the case again
was appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court. The court sustained the trial judge’s
decision, concluding that Quitman County had not “met its burden of proving that
the funding mechanism established by statute led to systemic ineffective assistance of
counsel….”112

Post-Conviction Litigation
In post-conviction cases, it is sometimes possible to argue that not only did defense
counsel fail to provide appropriate representation on behalf of a specific client, which
would warrant an analysis of attorney performance under the Strickland standard
for ineffective assistance of counsel, but also, that no lawyer could have effectively
represented the client under the circumstances in which the jurisdiction provided
indigent defense services. To succeed with such an argument, which is predicated on
the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronic v. United States,113 courts have required proof
both that systemic deficiencies exist and that they prejudiced or were highly likely to
have prejudiced the defendant.
For instance, in Conner v. Indiana,114 counsel argued in a post-conviction proceeding
that the defendant was denied his right to an effective lawyer because the indigent
defense system was so defective that even experienced counsel could not provide
competent representation. Counsel pointed to the hiring of defense attorneys by
judges based on political affiliation, as well as a lack of trained staff and resources. But
the Indiana Supreme Court refused to provide relief, observing that the lower court
110
111
112

113
114

State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001).
Quitman, 807 So.2d at 410.
Quitman County v. State, 910 So.2d 1032, 1048 (Miss. 2005) (court noted that there was no
evidence of specific instances when the performance of court-appointed counsel was inadequate;
no evidence that any defendant in Quitman County had ever alleged ineffective assistance; no
evidence of any post-conviction proceedings challenging the effectiveness of counsel; no evidence
that indigent defense expenses were the cause of the county’s financial difficulties; and no evidence
that excessive caseloads caused court delays as plaintiff alleged).
466 U.S. 648 (1984). For a discussion of Cronic and Strickland, see supra notes 100–25, Chapter 1,
and accompanying text.
711 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind. 1999).

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did not find any systemic deficiencies at all and that the defendant did not demonstrate that the systemic deficiencies alleged were present in his case.115 While the court
conceded that the indigent defense system was less than ideal, it did not believe that
this particular defendant had been affected, finding that “political considerations did
not hamper or constrain trial counsel, that trial counsel received funds to hire an
investigator and a psychological expert, and that no evidence demonstrated that trial
counsel failed to pursue any aspect of the defense because of pressure or lack of funds
from the trial court.”116
Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief to the defendant in the postconviction case of State v. Smith,117 even though the Court found that the procedure
followed by Mohave County, Arizona, in providing indigent defense services, violated
the rights of indigent defendants to effective assistance of counsel and due process.
The defense system was ruled defective because the county contracted with individual
attorneys through a low-bid arrangement that failed to take into account the number
and types of cases to be represented, the experience of the attorneys, and the time required for each case. The court further noted that investigative services had to be paid
by the contracting attorney, thus reducing the likelihood that an investigator would
be used, and that there was no limit on the number of retained clients contracting
attorneys could have. Accordingly, the court found that the situation in Mohave
County created an inference of ineffectiveness in all cases and held that this inference
would prospectively apply to all counties using the same procedures for selecting and
compensating counsel. However, in the particular case before it, the court ruled that
the inference was rebutted.118 (In considering the Smith case, however, it is important
to note that the Arizona Supreme Court decision was not controlled by either
Strickland or Cronic because Smith was decided approximately six weeks before these
Supreme Court cases. If Cronic had been controlling, perhaps the Arizona Supreme
Court would not have relied upon an inference that was rebutted but instead would
have decided “that a presumption of prejudice … [was] appropriate without inquiry
into the actual conduct of the trial.”119)
On balance, however, it is undoubtedly difficult to achieve systemic indigent defense
reform when issues are litigated in post-conviction proceedings. Even if systemic
deficiencies are acknowledged by courts, as occurred in Conner, the problems will
rarely be found to raise “a presumption of prejudice,” thereby avoiding an examination of what actually occurred during the trial. The state invariably will argue that
115
116
117
118
119

Conner, 711 N.E.2d at 1255.
Id. at 1254.
681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
Id.
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 120–125, Chapter 1.

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the representation of the defendant should be analyzed under Strickland’s two-prong
test and that the representation was reasonably competent, and even if it was not,
there was no prejudice to the defendant notwithstanding deficiencies in the defense
system. Thus, as one author has noted, efforts to achieve systemic reform through
post-conviction litigation are unlikely to succeed.120

C. Judiciary’s Authority to Provide Relief
While the actual remedies fashioned by state courts for systemic indigent defense
deficiencies necessarily depend on the facts of the specific case, whether any relief
is provided will turn on the authority of the courts to act. Among the states, courts
have provided relief under their inherent authority to protect the core functions of
the judiciary, their equity jurisdiction, and their powers of general superintendence.
Most significant to the outcome, however, is the court’s determination whether the
doctrine of separation of powers precludes the requested relief. The federal courts
have asserted jurisdiction in systemic reform cases based upon habeas corpus petitions
and in cases brought as civil rights actions under § 1983121

Inherent Authority of State Courts
In most cases alleging the violation of indigent defendants’ right to counsel due to
systemic deficiencies, an infusion of funds to rectify the situation is required. Because
the appropriation of funds is normally a legislative task, an issue of separation of
powers arises when the judiciary is asked to order that additional funds be made
available. Nevertheless, when faced with severe underfunding of the defense function,
some courts have declared an inherent authority to compel the legislature to provide
adequate appropriations in order to ensure that the judicial branch remains viable.122
As the Mississippi Supreme Court has explained:

See Bernhard, Take Courage, supra note 21. Post-conviction Cronic analysis is much like Strickland
analysis in that the defendant must show prejudice to his defense. The distinguishing feature is
where the burden lies. Under Cronic, if systemic deficiencies are found to deny the defendant the
right to counsel, ineffectiveness is presumed and the burden shifts to the state to rebut the presumption. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659. Under Strickland, the competence of the attorney is presumed
and the burden to demonstrate prejudice remains with the defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.
121 For discussion of § 1983, see infra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.
122 An important function of the judiciary is to ensure that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
implemented and that there is a genuine confrontation between adversaries. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at
656–57.
120

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… this Court has recognized that where the Legislature fails to act, the
courts have the authority and the duty to intervene…. In Hosford, poor
courtroom conditions including loud noises and poor temperature control led the circuit court to petition this Court for assistance so that the
county courthouse would have adequate operating facilities. We noted
that while the three branches of government should remain separate and
co-equal, where the Legislature, in its allocation of funds to the judicial
branch, fails to fulfill a constitutional obligation to enable the judicial
branch to operate independently and effectively, then it has violated its
Constitutional mandate, and the Judicial branch has the authority to see
that courts do not atrophy…. Certainly, if adequate facilities are essential
to the administration of justice, so is effective representation.123
Thus, the court found that its inherent authority to protect the functioning of the
judicial branch extended to compelling the legislature to allocate sufficient funds to
uphold the rights of indigent defendants to meaningful representation.
Similarly, in the Peart decision discussed earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized not only that it “possesses inherent powers to do all things reasonably
necessary for the exercise of [its] functions,” but also that ensuring effective assistance
of counsel for indigent defendants was one of its functions that would justify the use
of its inherent powers.124 While the court in Peart did not exercise its authority to
order the legislature to provide adequate funding for indigent defense, it nevertheless
threatened to do so if the legislature failed to act to remedy the situation:
If legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform
does not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional and
inherent power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it necessary to
employ the more intrusive and specific measures it has thus far avoided
to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective assistance
of counsel…. We decline at this time to undertake these more intrusive
and specific measures because this Court should not lightly tread in the
affairs of other branches of government and because the legislature ought
to assess such measures in the first instance.125
New Mexico v. Young,126 also a case discussed previously, is another example where
a state’s highest court has declared that it has the authority to enforce the constituQuitman County, 807 So.2d at 409–10.
State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780, 790–91 (La. 1993).
125 Peart, 621 So.2d at 791.
126 172 P.3d 138 (N.M. 2007)
123

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tional right to counsel by ordering the expenditure of state funds. The New Mexico
Supreme Court explained:
The New Mexico Constitution vests judicial power in the courts of this
state. This power has been interpreted as granting courts the inherent
power to exercise authority essential to their function and management
of their caseloads. An essential function of the courts is to ‘serve as the
ultimate guardians of an indigent defendant’s constitutional rights.’ As
guardians of the constitution, we must enforce the rights guaranteed by
the constitution and further the intent of its provisions.127
Although additional funding was not ordered in Young,128 the court noted that, on a
prior occasion, it had enforced the constitutional right to counsel when it ruled that
pro bono counsel representing indigent criminal defendants “were entitled to apply
for and receive expert witness fees from the Public Defender … [and] that an indigent parent is entitled to the appointment of an expert witness at the State’s expense
in an abuse and neglect proceeding.”129
Finally, in State v. Lynch,130 still another case mentioned earlier,131 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held that it had the inherent power to regulate the compensation
paid to court-appointed attorneys. The court reasoned that, because lawyers are
an important part of the judicial process, the regulation of the practice of law was
intertwined with its state constitutional responsibility to ensure the efficient administration of justice.132 In exercising its authority, the court set forth guidelines for lower
courts to follow regarding appropriate compensation for court-appointed lawyers,
thus seeking to avoid different rates among the state’s counties.133
At least one state court, however, did not definitively resolve whether it could, consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, require the legislature to appropriate
funds to ensure the continued functioning of the judiciary. In Metropolitan Public
Defender Services, Inc. v. Courtney,134 the provider of indigent defense services for three
counties filed a mandamus action asking the Oregon Supreme Court to order the
legislature to restore funding for indigent defense. Due to appropriation reductions, a
four-month moratorium on the appointment of counsel was implemented in certain
Young, 172 P.3d at 142.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129 Young, 172 P.3d at 142.
130 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
131 See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text.
132 Lynch, 796 P.2d at 1163–64.
133 Id.
134 State ex rel. Metropolitan Public Defender Services, Inc. v. Courtney, 64 P.3d 1138 (Ore. 2003).
127
128

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criminal and juvenile cases. In response to the lawsuit, the court recognized that it
had the inherent power to “ensure that the judicial branch operates as an independent
branch of government, free from undue interference by the other branches,”135 and
it further assumed, without deciding, that its power included ordering the legislature
to provide funding for the core functions of the judiciary. It also acknowledged that
the impact of the budgetary crisis was “unprecedented and regrettable.” Nevertheless,
the court refused to order the restoration of funding because it did not find that the
judiciary was prevented from carrying out its core functions.136 Arguably, therefore, it
is still unclear in Oregon whether the court’s inherent authority extends to ordering
the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds to ensure the judiciary’s independence
and ability to meet its constitutional obligations.
In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court has stated categorically that it lacks the
authority to order the legislature to provide adequate funding for indigent defense,
citing the separation of powers doctrine.137 In In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal
Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender,138 the court held that it had the
inherent authority under the state’s constitution to address the backlog of appellate
cases at the public defender’s office when some indigent defendants were forced to
wait two years until their cases were briefed. Although the court placed the blame
squarely on the legislature for failing to provide sufficient funding for indigent defense, the court concluded it could not compel the legislature to act:
[I]t is not the function of this Court to decide what constitutes adequate
funding and then order the legislature to appropriate such an amount.
Appropriation of funds for the operation of government is a legislative
function. ‘[T]he judiciary cannot compel the Legislature to exercise a
purely legislative prerogative.’139
Courtney, 64 P.3d at 1139.
Courtney, 64 P.3d at 1141.
137 For prior discussion of this Florida case, see supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
138 561 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 1990).
139 In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender,
561 So.2d at 1136. A law review student note objects to the proposition that separation of powers
principles preclude the courts from addressing the fundamental constitutional issue of the right to
counsel for indigent defendants. Arguing that indigent criminal defendants lack political clout to
ensure that their constitutional rights are properly funded, the author explains: “For courts to label
indigent defense funding a purely legislative task, is not only an abdication of constitutional responsibility, it is also a failure to take advantage of the judiciary’s relative strengths and expertise in
this unique field. Courts have an institutional advantage in advancing politically unpopular ideas,
particularly when they raise important constitutional concerns, and should therefore capitalize on
their expertise in the realm of indigent defense.” Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts
to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1731, 1748 (2005). Another
commentator also has argued that “the judiciary holds the key to guaranteed enforcement of the
135

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At the other end of the spectrum is the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which
considered the separation of powers issue and came to a different conclusion than
most other courts that have addressed the matter. The court found that the state’s
separation of powers doctrine precluded the legislature from statutorily fixing the fees
paid to court-appointed counsel. Instead, the court concluded that it was up to the
judiciary to determine what constituted reasonable compensation. In Smith v. State
of New Hampshire,140 two court-appointed attorneys sued the state, alleging that the
statutory limits on the fees to be paid to court-appointed counsel were unconstitutional. Recognizing that upholding the constitutional right to counsel is a uniquely
judicial function and that “the obligation to represent indigent defendants is an
obligation springing from judicial authority,” the Court explained:
[I]t is peculiarly within the judicial province to ascertain reasonable
compensation when the person who performs the services is acting under
court appointment as an officer of the court. We view it implicit in the
constitutional scheme that the courts of this State have the exclusive
authority to determine the reasonableness of compensation for court-appointed counsel. The statutes in question intrude upon this judicial function in violation of the constitutional separation of powers mandate.141
The court concluded by acknowledging that, in order to comply with its ruling, the
legislature would need to allocate adequate funds for these purposes.142

Other Theories of State Court Jurisdiction
In addition to exercising their inherent authority to ensure the functioning of the
judiciary, state courts sometimes have taken action under their equity powers in order
to promote fairness and justice when there is no legal remedy available. New York
County Lawyers’ Association v. New York143 is a case in which systemic funding issues
were addressed based upon equity jurisdiction. In this case, also discussed earlier,144
the court entered a permanent injunction and ordered increased compensation
rates for court-appointed counsel to ensure that there were a sufficient number of
constitutional right to counsel, particularly when the legislative branch fails to exercise its fiscal
authority.” Wilson, Litigative Approaches, supra note 5, at 205.
140 394 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1978).
141 Smith, 394 A.2d at 838.
142 Sometimes court-appointed counsel fees are expressly dependent upon the legislature’s appropriation. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211D § 11, which sets rates for court-appointed counsel “subject
to appropriation.”
143 196 Misc. 2d 761, 778 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 2003).
144 See supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.

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attorneys available to represent indigent defendants. The court first decided beyond
a reasonable doubt that compensation then being paid was unconstitutional because
it impaired the judiciary’s ability to function. Although conceding that it would normally be up to the legislature to address the issue of appropriate funding, the court
concluded that increasing compensation rates was the proper equitable remedy in
order to provide access to justice:
This court has shown substantial deference to the Legislature, awaiting
legislation. Under these circumstances, equity can only be served by
intervention to protect the fundamental constitutional rights of children
and indigent adults who face present and future irreparable deprivations of these rights if injunctive relief is denied. The magnitude of the
problem is evidenced by the bellowing cries for reform sounding for
years from every corner of the New York legal community. The executive
branch has also recognized the inadequacy of the rates and the failure to
provide an increase for 17 years.145
Another basis for judicial action is the power of general superintendence, which
refers to the authority of the highest courts of the states to oversee and supervise
the lower courts. This responsibility includes providing remedies to correct errors or
injustices occurring in the lower courts when no other legal remedies are available. It
was through its power of general superintendence that the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court (SJC) addressed the systemic violation of indigent defendants’ rights
to counsel in Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court.146 Because of a shortage
of available private attorneys willing to accept assigned cases, the court was asked
to increase compensation rates to ensure the presence of an adequate number of
lawyers.147 While acknowledging the court’s inherent authority to order funding if
they cannot adjudicate cases due to inadequate facilities or supporting personnel,
the court held that the state’s failure to provide all indigent defendants with courtappointed counsel did not fall under this rubric. Instead, the court acted under its
power of general superintendence to protect indigent defendants who were being
denied their constitutional right to counsel. The court explained that, “while the constitutional rights of particular petitioners have not yet been adequately addressed, our
powers of general superintendence require us to fashion an appropriate remedy to the
continuing constitutional violation suffered by indigent criminal defendants….”148
Accordingly, the Court set forth rules for the lower courts in Hampden County
to follow to protect indigent defendants’ rights to counsel, including the release of
New York County Lawyers’ Association, 196 Misc. 2d at 784.
812 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. 2004).
147 For prior discussion of the Lavallee decision, see supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
148 Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 909.
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defendants incarcerated pretrial after seven days if no counsel was appointed and the
dismissal of cases after 45 days if no attorney filed an appearance during that time.
Because the court did not act under its inherent authority to ensure the proper functioning of the courts, the legislature was not ordered to appropriate additional funds.
The Michigan Supreme Court likewise exercised its power of superintendence in
ordering that the Wayne Circuit Court and the Detroit Recorder’s Court abandon
their fixed-fee system to compensate court-appointed attorneys. In the Matter of
the Recorder’s Court Bar Association v. Wayne Circuit Court149 is a case in which
several groups of Michigan defense attorneys filed a complaint in the state’s high
court for “superintending control,” seeking an order that the fixed-fee schedule of
payments did not reasonably compensate them as required by statute and the U.S.
Constitution. By statute, county courts were responsible for determining the rates
of “reasonable compensation” for the work performed by court-appointed counsel.
In implementing this directive, the defendant courts adopted a fixed-fee system
whereby an attorney was paid a specified amount based solely on the severity of the
charge, rather than on the work performed in the case or the costs incurred. In order
to resolve the issues, a special master was appointed who found, inter alia, that the
fixed-fee system encouraged counsel to pressure indigent clients to plead guilty and
discouraged the filing of even serious defense motions. Based on the special master’s
report, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the fixed-fee system did not reasonably compensate attorneys for their work. Accordingly, given the county court’s
failure to perform its legal duty under the statute and in the absence of an adequate
legal remedy, the court exercised its power of superintendence and directed the judges
to implement another method of payment.

Federal Court Jurisdiction
The foregoing discussion reflects that most lawsuits concerning deficiencies in the
delivery of indigent defense services have been filed in state courts. This is because
federal courts normally are unwilling to exercise jurisdiction in cases that might interfere with on-going state criminal proceedings. However, if state courts abdicate their
responsibilities, federal courts may be willing to enforce the right to counsel through
a habeas corpus petition or class action complaint.
More than 35 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that federal courts
should abstain from deciding cases when doing so would interfere with state criminal
proceedings. In Younger v. Harris,150 the Supreme Court held that, due to equity juris149
150

503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993).
401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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prudence considerations and federalism concerns, federal courts should not act under
their equity jurisdiction unless there are extraordinary circumstances in which there
is an irreparable injury that is both great and immediate. As the Court explained,
“[t]he threat to the plaintiff’s federally protected rights must be one that cannot be
eliminated by his defense against a single criminal prosecution.”151
In Luckey v. Miller,152 the Younger decision was held to apply to indigent defendants
seeking federal action to repair systemic failures in the provision of defense services.
In that case, the ACLU filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,153 alleging
that systemic deficiencies in the indigent defense system in Georgia denied indigent
defendants their constitutional right to counsel and asked the federal court to order
the state to provide constitutionally adequate services. The federal district court held
that it could not exercise jurisdiction in the case because a decision favorably impacting indigent defense would interrupt pending criminal cases and require the federal
court to monitor the state court’s compliance. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the federal district court and dismissed the lawsuit on these grounds.
Not all federal relief is necessarily precluded, however, as there is an exception to
Younger for defendants who are denied access to the courts due to a denial of counsel.
In both the Green and Harris154 cases, indigent defendants filed habeas corpus petitions in federal courts claiming that lengthy delays in the filing of their appeals,
resulting from severe underfunding of indigent defense systems, deprived them of
due process. In both cases, the federal courts concluded they had jurisdiction, even
though the petitioners’ appeals were still pending, because the denial of a timely apYounger, 401 U.S at 47.
976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992).
153 “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), the Supreme Court
held that a public defender is not subject to liability under § 1983 “when performing a lawyer’s
traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 325. However, the
Court left open the possibility of agency or governmental liability if it could be shown that agency
policy or custom caused the defendant’s injury. Id. at 326. Pursuant to this approach, a federal
court refused to dismiss a lawsuit against the head of a public defender office and the county that
funded the agency. The complaint alleged deliberate indifference to the Sixth Amendment rights of
defendants by the agency’s policies of allocating resources based on polygraph results of defendants
and assigning inexperienced attorneys to capital cases without training them. See Miranda v. Clark
County, 319 F. 3d 465, en banc (9th Cir. 2003).
154 See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.
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peal was considered a denial of access to the courts. As the court observed in Green,
“[t]o deny an indigent appellant access to his appeal and then to hold him or her
responsible for that denial would be truly Kafkaesque.”155
Federal courts usually require that persons seeking habeas relief from state court
rulings first exhaust all state court remedies.156 However, despite the pendency of the
state cases, the federal courts in Green and Harris were willing to get involved because
the state courts were aware of the problems and had consistently failed to provide a
remedy. As the court in Harris explained, “[w]here state procedural snarls or obstacles
preclude an effective state remedy against unconstitutional convictions, federal courts
have no other choice but to grant relief in the collateral proceeding.”157 Potential
remedies include addressing the state appellate delay, ruling on the merits of the
underlying claim, or granting a conditional writ releasing the defendant until denial
of the right to counsel is resolved.
While both Green and Harris addressed delay in appellate cases, the decisions in these
cases do not appear to hinge on whether denial of access to the courts is at the appellate or trial level. Several cases filed in federal district courts seeking redress under
§ 1983 for the lack of adequate counsel for indigent defendants have been resolved
through consent decrees. These cases were favorably concluded from a defense
standpoint, even though the state ostensibly could have moved to dismiss under the
Younger federal abstention doctrine. Arguably, where a denial of counsel limits or
denies access to the courts, the federal abstention doctrine does not apply.
For example, in Carter v. Chambers County,158 a federal class action lawsuit alleged
that the county did not provide counsel to indigent defendants held in jail pretrial,
depriving indigent defendants of their constitutional rights to due process and
equal protection. After the action was filed, an extensive study was conducted on
the Chambers County indigent defense system. In the end, the parties entered into
a consent decree in which the county agreed to provide counsel for all defendants
incarcerated prior to trial and unable to post bond within a prescribed period of time.
Stinson v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners159 was a similar federal class action
case, in which it was alleged that, due to lack of indigent defense funding, accused
persons were denied counsel between the time a bail bond was set and the defendant
was arraigned or indicted. Again, a consent order was entered pursuant to which

Green, 917 F.Supp. at 1273.
See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
157 Harris, 15 F.3d at 1555, citing Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52, 54 (1963).
158 Carter v. Chambers County, No. 88-T-1196E, (M.D. Ala.1989).
159 Stinson v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners, No. 1:94-CV-75 GET (No. Dist. Ga. 1994).
155

156

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Fulton County agreed to provide timely representation of counsel and make other
improvements in its system of indigent defense.160
In Doe v. Spokane County,161 the Spokane County Public Defender Office filed a §
1983 action seeking a federal injunction to compel the state courts to appoint private
counsel until the office’s caseload was reduced to allow them to provide effective assistance of counsel or, alternatively, to order the county to fund the office properly.162
At the time of the lawsuit, the average yearly caseloads of public defenders were far
in excess of any recognized national standards.163 Prior to filing its lawsuit, the office
repeatedly, albeit unsuccessfully, requested increased funding from the county.164
The office then obtained external support from various legal organizations and the
media.165 A month after the legal challenge was filed, the county offered a settlement
and agreed to increase the staff size of the office.166
There may be other paths, albeit limited ones, around Younger and the federal
abstention doctrine. One possibility is to allege the lack of an adequate state forum
due to bias or when state proceedings are unlikely to afford a remedy. In Gibson v.
Berryhill,167 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal courts are not required to
abstain from ruling on a question of federal law, even if that question is currently
pending before a state tribunal, if the state tribunal is “incompetent by reason of
bias,”168 to decide the issue itself. The Supreme Court’s reasoning was that dismissal of
a federal lawsuit “presupposes the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a
competent state tribunal the federal issues involved.”169
Based on this logic, the Supreme Court held in Gerstein v. Pugh,170 that the federal
abstention doctrine did not apply if state proceedings were unlikely to afford an opportunity to be heard or to offer an adequate remedy. The plaintiffs were being held
pretrial without a judicial finding of probable cause to support their continued detention. They sought injunctive relief from the federal courts, asking that the state be or160 Stinson

v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners, No. 1:94-CV-240-GET (No. Dist. Ga. 1999).
Doe v. Spokane County, No. C-83-406-RJM (E.D. Wash. 1983).
162 Nat’l Legal Aid and Defender Assoc., Indigent Defense Caseloads and Common Sense: An
Update, 56–57 (1992).
163 Id.
164 Id. at 57.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 411 U.S. 564 (1973) (federal abstention doctrine did not apply where administrative review board
comprised solely of optometrists was incapable of fairly adjudicating dispute before it because every
member had a financial stake in the outcome).
168 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 576.
169 Id.
170 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
161

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dered to provide a judicial hearing for a probable cause determination. Even though
plaintiffs were subject to pending state criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court
stated that federal intervention was not barred by the Younger abstention doctrine,
noting that the injunction was not aimed at the prosecution itself but at the failure
to provide a judicial determination of probable cause prior to pretrial detention. The
Court further noted that its decision ordering the state to hold such hearings would
not affect a trial on the merits in the cases. For this reason, state courts would not
have an opportunity to review the issue of illegal pretrial detention because it could
not be a defense at a state court trial. This case seemingly stands for the proposition
that federal courts have jurisdiction to provide injunctive relief in pending state
criminal cases under the inadequate state forum exception to Younger when a federal
constitutional violation may continue if the state judicial proceedings are unlikely or
unable to afford relief.
Another avenue around the Younger abstention doctrine is for the lawsuit to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances where there is a danger of irreparable injury
of constitutional dimensions that is both great and immediate. The Supreme Court
explained the requirements as follows:
Only if “extraordinary circumstances” render the state court incapable of
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be any
relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process.
The very nature of “extraordinary circumstances,” of course, makes it impossible to anticipate and define every situation that might create a sufficient threat of such great, immediate, and irreparable injury as to warrant
intervention in state criminal proceedings. But whatever else is required,
such circumstances must be “extraordinary” in the sense of creating an
extraordinarily pressing need for immediate federal equitable relief, not
merely in the sense of presenting a highly unusual factual situation.171
Arguably, if a state or local indigent defense system is consistently failing to provide
indigent defendants with effective and competent counsel, with state governments
and courts complicit in those systems, federal jurisdiction may be appropriate.

171

Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).

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D. Lessons Learned from Prior Litigation
Assuming that a public defense system is underfunded and otherwise in significant
need of reform, based upon the litigation discussed in this chapter, we believe certain
principles are worth considering when instituting legal actions aimed at promoting
systemic improvements. We list these principles here and then expand upon them
afterwards: (1) litigation should be instituted on behalf of all or a class of indigent defendants so that a positive result will impact a large group of defendants; (2) litigation
should be instituted pretrial, rather than post-conviction, thereby avoiding the need
to demonstrate prejudice; (3) legal representation should be provided by disinterested
lawyers experienced in civil litigation serving as pro bono counsel; (4) strong factual
support that shows how the system adversely affects indigent defendants should
be assembled and presented; 172 (5) counsel should present to the appropriate court
persuasive legal authority to justify judicial intervention; and (6) media coverage and
public support should be encouraged.

All or a Large Class of Indigent Defendants
Litigation seeking systemic change should be initiated on behalf of all or a large class
of indigent defendants in order to secure a favorable remedy with broad impact. For
example, indigent defense systems in Connecticut and Washington (Grant County)
were enhanced after successful class action lawsuits alleging violations of the right to
counsel.173 In contrast, lawsuits aimed solely at increasing fee rates for assigned counsel may be successful in obtaining higher compensation, which is surely important
in the short-term, but such cases will not necessarily reach broad systemic issues that
may plague the indigent defense system because the extent of the requested relief is
relatively narrow.174 Also, lawsuits on behalf of individual defendants do not typically
result in far-reaching changes, as the relief provided is confined to the particular
facts of the case before the court. The favorable outcomes in cases from Louisiana
and New Mexico in which the issue was the adequacy of compensation for defense

For example, the plaintiffs in Lavallee and New York County Lawyers’ Association supported their
cases with affidavits, amicus briefs, examples of adversely affected individuals, studies, and numerical data. The plaintiffs in Kennedy and Quitman County, on the other hand, failed to provide
specific examples of adversely affected indigent defendants, evidence of ineffective assistance, or
adequate data to support their contentions.
173 See supra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 42–48 for discussion of the Lavallee and New York County Lawyers’ Association cases.
However, in several states, increased fee rates contributed to the establishment or expansion of
public defense programs. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
172

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counsel in capital cases illustrate this point.175 Of course, such cases are precedent for
similarly situated defendants in the future.

Pretrial Litigation
The timing of litigation is important because it is preferable that legal actions be instituted pretrial rather than post-conviction. At various places within this chapter, we
have noted favorable results that were achieved through pretrial legal actions176. The
major disadvantage to a post-conviction claim is that the courts will usually undertake to determine whether there was prejudice to the defendant under the Supreme
Court’s Strickland decision, and satisfying Strickland’s two-prong test is exceedingly
difficult.177 The alternative is to argue that the defendant’s case should be considered
under the tests for ineffective assistance of counsel spelled out in the Cronic decision.
As noted earlier, pursuant to Cronic, if the state’s evidence has not been subjected to
meaningful adversarial testing or there is little likelihood that even a competent attorney could have been effective under the circumstances, prejudice may be presumed
without an inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. However, the example offered
by the Supreme Court in Cronic of a case in which prejudice could be presumed was
Powell v. Alabama, a capital case involving multiple defendants in which the attorney
assumed responsibility for the defense on the day of the trial. In the Cronic case itself,
even though counsel was inexperienced, had never before tried a jury case, and was
given a very short amount of time to prepare his defense for a complex federal mail
fraud prosecution, the Court held that the tests for ineffective assistance of counsel
specified in the decision were not met. As the Court explained:
This case is not one in which the surrounding circumstances make it
unlikely that the defendant could have received the effective assistance
of counsel. The criteria used by the Court of Appeals do not demonstrate that counsel failed to function as the Government’s adversary.
Respondent therefore can make out a claim of ineffective assistance only
by pointing to specific errors made by trial counsel.178

See supra notes 102–07 and accompanying text
See, e.g., supra notes 36–58 and accompanying text.
177 See supra notes 101–19 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
178 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 672–73.
175

176

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Experienced Practitioners Serving Pro Bono
Another factor in achieving successful systemic indigent defense reform is the selection of counsel. The broader the class of plaintiffs, the broader the possible remedies,
and the more complicated the litigation is likely to be. Indigent defense providers
are rarely in a position to compile the necessary evidence to substantiate claims of
systemic deficiencies, and they usually lack the requisite skill for the kinds of litigation discussed in this chapter. Accordingly, external counsel affiliated with law firms,
bar associations, or public interest organizations who are willing to provide pro bono
representation can make significant contributions. Besides possessing the necessary
experience, they are likely to have more time, personnel, and resources than do
public defenders to devote to a major systemic legal challenge. They also are used
to conducting extensive discovery, preparing exhibits, and may have funds to retain
necessary experts.
It is also possible that some public defenders and other indigent service providers are
reluctant to disclose their arguable ineffectiveness, either in a specific case or in general.179 In fact, some indigent defense attorneys may not fully appreciate their shortcomings or the defense system’s deficiencies. If defense attorneys have never worked
in another court system or in private practice, they may believe their standard operating procedures are just fine, even when they are not in compliance with standards
related to the defense function and the rules of professional conduct. Disinterested
private counsel may be able to play an important role in objectively assessing the
performance of defense lawyers in the indigent defense system, suggesting how the
lawsuit should be presented, and perhaps convincing indigent defense providers that
they should acknowledge that they are unable to represent their clients adequately.
As discussed previously, there is recent evidence that public defenders may now
be more willing than in the past to concede that, due to their excessive caseloads
and other problems, they cannot in the future provide—and may not now be
providing—competent representation consistent with standards governing defense
services.180 Such willingness appears in part to derive from the opinion of the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which made clear
that public defenders, just like all other lawyers, have a duty to provide competent
In analyzing the unsatisfactory outcome in Kennedy v. Carlson, supra note 64, one writer has
concluded: “The lesson to be learned from the failure of the Minnesota litigation is that a public
defender understandably will resist revealing how its own staff is causing or has caused injury to clients. The office would have to publicly admit error—a task that is unpleasant, bad for staff morale,
and potentially damaging to its credibility with the public. The Minnesota litigation might have
been more successful if it had been brought by a different plaintiff.” See Bernhard, Take Courage,
supra note 21, at 327. But see supra text at notes 86, 89, and note 95.
180 See infra notes 83–101 and accompanying text.
179

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service under the rules of professional conduct and that there is a duty to withdraw
from representation and seek to avoid additional appointments when caseloads are
excessive. It is also worth noting that there are virtually no cases in the country in
which disciplinary counsel have sought to sanction public defenders for undertaking
the representation of too many clients, perhaps because such counsel understand that
the caseloads of defenders are not entirely under their control.

Factual Support
One of the most important underpinnings for successful litigation is strong factual
support demonstrating the problems with the jurisdiction’s indigent defense system.
Obviously, it is not sufficient for plaintiffs merely to assert that the system is underfunded or otherwise broken. Instead, a thorough compilation of evidence to support
the claims is essential. Litigation will surely not succeed if proof is lacking or is in
serious doubt.181 If the factual record is unclear or the matter especially complicated, a
special master may be appointed182 or the case remanded for additional fact-finding.183
The importance of persuasive factual support is illustrated by the Quitman County
cases.184 The Mississippi Supreme Court’s initial ruling was favorable to the Plaintiff,
Quitman County. But when the case was remanded for a hearing in which the
county was called upon to show the systemic failures of its defense system, the
county failed to substantiate its claims with either empirical or anecdotal evidence.
Thus, when the case returned to the Mississippi Supreme Court on appeal, the court
upheld the lower court’s determination that Quitman County had failed to meet
its burden. The court noted that there was no evidence of specific instances when
the performance of court-appointed counsel was inadequate; no evidence that any
defendant in Quitman County had ever alleged ineffective assistance; no evidence of
any post-conviction proceedings challenging the effective assistance of counsel; no
evidence that indigent defense expenses were the cause of the county’s financial difficulties; and no evidence that the caseloads of the public defenders were excessive or
caused court delays as alleged. In fact, the public defenders themselves testified that
they did not feel overburdened with cases.

See Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996), discussed supra at notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
182 See In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw Filed by Public Defender of the Tenth
Judicial District, 636 So.2d 18 (Fla. 1994), discussed supra at note 71 and accompanying text.
183 See State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401 (Miss. 2001), discussed supra at notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
184 Id.
181

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If possible, lawsuits seeking systemic reform should provide two types of evidence—
empirical and anecdotal.185 If a defense system is alleged to be inadequate due to
excessive caseloads, lack of training, and underfunding, the claims must be backed
up by caseload data, training levels of attorneys, and amounts of funding. Statistical
comparisons with other jurisdictions and with prosecutors from the same jurisdiction
may provide persuasive proof that no attorney could provide meaningful and effective
legal assistance given the condition of the indigent defense system. It is also necessary
to provide anecdotal evidence, citing exceptionally egregious examples, so that the
court, as well as the general public, is aware of the insidious effects of an inadequate
system of indigent defense. Unsuccessful lawsuits have failed to present evidence on
one or both of these fronts. Sometimes, important factual information is available in
reports about the jurisdiction’s indigent defense system, and occasionally, such studies
have been developed by or on behalf of indigent defense study commissions.186

Appropriate Court and Judicial Intervention
Counsel seeking reform of indigent defense through litigation initially must determine the appropriate venue in which to file suit. Clearly, some cases must be brought
in the trial court, such as motions to withdraw or claims on behalf of an individual
defendant. However, in some instances, pretrial litigation on behalf of all or a class of
indigent defendants may be initiated by a writ of mandamus or other extraordinary
writ in the state’s highest court.187 Counsel must also decide whether to file in state
court or if a federal action can be maintained despite the various obstacles previously
discussed respecting federal jurisdiction. In addition, the decision where to file suit
may be influenced by whether the trial court will afford counsel time to make an
adequate record, whether the supreme court of the state will likely appoint a special
master or remand the case for an evidentiary hearing, the length of time each route is
apt to take, and an assessment of the overall likelihood of success.
Counsel also will need to be ready to justify the legal basis for judicial intervention.
A majority of courts have found that, if the circumstances are sufficiently compelling,
they have the authority to order indigent defense improvements. Courts have relied
“… a lawsuit must establish—at a minimum—that the services provided are causing actual injury
to clients. Actual injury can be established through a combination of anecdotal and empirical evidence. But without the facts to convincingly prove harm to the system’s clients…, courts will reject
complaints as not justiciable.” Bernhard, Take Courage, supra note 21, at 325. Respecting the need to
prove “actual injury to clients,” compare language of the court in Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017. See also
supra note 39, cases cited therein, and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., infra notes 121, 128, and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
187 See, e.g., State ex rel. Metropolitan Public Defender Services, Inc. v. Courtney, supra note 134 and
accompanying text.
185

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upon various theories, including their inherent authority to protect the judiciary as
a co-equal branch of government, as well as their equity jurisdiction and powers of
general superintendence.188

Media and Public Support
Theoretically, when judges resolve court cases concerning indigent defense reform, it
should be irrelevant whether the litigation is covered by print and other news media.
Nor should it matter whether prominent persons in the state or community speak
publicly in favor of necessary changes in the delivery of indigent defense services.
However, the reality is that news reports about problems in indigent defense and
strong public support for improvements may make a difference not only when
legislatures consider new laws,189 but also when courts decide difficult cases. For example, lawsuits in Connecticut and Washington, which resulted in favorable consent
decrees, were accompanied by favorable editorials and media attention.190 According
to one writer who has examined indigent defense litigation, essential ingredients for
success are “egregious conditions…, allegations of actual injury to clients, litigation
support from a law reform organization or bar association, and public favor.”191

See infra notes 123–39, 146–49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 29–31, Chapter 4.
190 See Bernhard, Take Courage, supra note 21, at 322.
191 Id.
188

189

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Chapter 4
How to Achieve Reform:
The Use of Legislation and Commissions to Produce
Meaningful Change

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majority of states have established, through legislation, some type of supervisory
authority1 to oversee some or all of the state’s indigent defense services. To be
successful, an oversight body needs to be independent from political and judicial influence and able to assure the quality of representation provided. Proper construction
and implementation of a statewide oversight body requires time, careful planning,
and political fortitude. It is worth the effort, though, as meaningful state oversight
can greatly enhance indigent defense representation.

A. Legislative Background of State Oversight Commissions
As depicted in Table II at page 151, currently 42 states either have a statewide authority that provides oversight for some or all indigent defense services or a statewide
agency that provides representation directly. Of these states, 27 have a statewide
public defender agency or supervisory body that provides oversight regarding almost
all aspects of indigent defense services.2 In all but two states,3 funding comes almost
entirely from the state. The majority of these statewide bodies with full authority over
the indigent defense function have been in existence for more than 20 years.
Another nine states4 have partial authority commissions that permit counties, to
varying degrees, to maintain important responsibilities for indigent defense services.
All but two of these states5 require the counties to provide the majority of indigent
defense funding, while the state usually allocates some supplemental funding. Partial
authority statewide commissions that allow the counties to retain control over much

3
4
5

The terms “commission” and “body” are used throughout this chapter in referring to a state board
or authority with oversight responsibilities for indigent defense. Citations to the statutes of the
state public defense programs and commissions discussed or listed in this Chapter are contained
in Appendix C. Also, we include in footnotes, as necessary, references to specific code provisions.
In preparing this chapter, a report on state indigent defense commissions completed in 2006 was
used as a starting point. See The Spangenberg Group, State Indigent Defense Commissions
(2006) (prepared with funding from the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants) [hereinafter ABA/TSG Indigent Defense Commissions].
Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont,
Virginia, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming. These 27 states are listed in the first three
columns of Table II, reading from the left.
Louisiana and South Carolina.
Indiana, Georgia, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Texas, and Washington.
Respecting developments in Nevada in 2008, see infra note 31 and accompanying text.
Kansas and Oklahoma.

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of the provision of indigent defense services are of more recent origin, as only three of
these bodies are more than 20 years old.
Eight states6 have neither a statewide public defender agency nor an oversight
body for trial representation but have established a state appellate, post-conviction,
capital, and/or conflict office that oversees or provides representation in these areas.7
Specifically, Illinois and Michigan have appellate agencies with a separate body that
exercises some degree of oversight; California and Tennessee have similar structures
for capital post-conviction cases. Nebraska’s agency, which represents defendants in
capital cases, capital post-conviction cases, appellate cases, post-conviction DNA
cases, and some serious felony cases, has a limited oversight board as well.8 Arizona,
California, Florida, Idaho, and Mississippi have agencies that provide direct representation in post-conviction, conflict cases, or in capital cases but do not have an
oversight body.9 While, with the exception of Tennessee and Florida, trial representation in these states is funded primarily by the counties, these offices are funded by
the states. Eight states do not have a statewide oversight body or statewide indigent
defense provider.10

Legislative Trends in the Use of Oversight Commissions Since 2000
During the past eight years, there have been important legislative developments
in providing indigent defense services in 11 states. Since 2000, eight states have
passed legislation forming new oversight bodies for indigent defense; two states
progressed from partial-authority to full-authority oversight bodies; and one state’s
6
7

Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
Florida has five regional offices that provide representation in indigent defense conflict cases.
Because these conflict offices are fully state-funded state agencies and each has a director appointed
by the governor, selected from among Supreme Court nominees, and confirmed by the state senate,
these regional conflict offices are somewhat similar to a statewide conflict office. For purposes of
Table II, infra, Florida is classified as a state without a statewide oversight body. Also, at the trial
level in Florida, public defenders are elected for each judicial circuit. Tennessee is the only other
state in which all public defenders are elected.
The board of the Commission on Public Advocacy is authorized by statute as a partial-authority
commission. It also distributes state money for indigent civil legal services. However, due to lack of
funds, the only oversight the Commission currently provides is choosing the chief defender for this
Nebraska program.
Arizona has a capital post-conviction appeals office. Although a commission provides three
nominees to the governor for the position of state capital post-conviction public defender, it does
not choose the head of the office nor does it provide any oversight. California has a capital appeals
office without an oversight body. Florida has five regional conflict offices, as discussed in note 7
supra. Idaho has a state appellate agency. Mississippi has multiple state agencies that provide direct
representation for appeals, capital trials, and capital post-conviction cases.
Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah.

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system evolved from a state agency of limited scope to an oversight body with partial
authority.
Six of the eight states that formed new oversight bodies established commissions
with full authority 11 and two established oversight bodies with partial authority.12
Montana created a statewide public defender with a full-authority commission, while
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, and Virginia created new state commissions
with state directors. West Virginia, which previously had a public defender system
administered by the state without an oversight body, established a full-authority commission to oversee indigent defense in that state.
In 2007, Louisiana enacted legislation enlarging the jurisdiction of its commission
so that it is now a full-authority commission as opposed to a partial-authority body.
The responsibilities of the Louisiana Public Defender Board (LPDB) now include
devising mandatory standards for providing indigent defense, establishing mandatory qualifications for public defenders, and monitoring and enforcing regulations.13
However, because existing indigent defense delivery systems are presumed adequate
throughout the state,14 the LPDB may find it difficult to modify an ineffective delivery model.15
South Carolina’s law was amended in 2008, giving the South Carolina Commission
on Indigent Defense (SCCID) the authority to appoint circuit public defenders
across the state to manage almost all aspects of indigent defense services in their
jurisdictions.16 The chief defenders now report directly to circuit defenders employed
by the commission, whereas previously, most counties had their own or a joint public
defender who was responsible to the county.17 Moreover, the SCCID now has the
authority to promulgate performance standards and monitor compliance.18 In 2006,
SCCID implemented a statewide case management system for public defenders and
an online vouchering system for appointed counsel payments. This system allows
for improved oversight and accountability, and assisted in the passage of the new
legislation by helping to project the cost of implementing the commission’s revised
11
12
13
14

15
16

17
18

Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Georgia and Texas.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:147 (2007).
Id. at § 15:165(C) (“Any delivery model in existence prior to April 30, 2007, shall be presumed to
be acceptable and meet standards [and] guidelines pursuant to rules adopted by the board, and as
provided by statute until the delivery model is proven not to meet those standards and guidelines.”)
Id. at § 15:165(D) (1)-(2).
The circuit public defenders for each judicial circuit are nominated by a Circuit Public Defender
Selection Panel composed of active, licensed attorneys within the circuit. S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3510(A) (West 2007).
Id. at § 17-3-520(B).
Id. at § 17-3-320(B) (1); § 17-3-340(H).

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structure. Judges and court clerks welcomed the online vouchering system because it
transferred the administrative responsibility for approving voucher payments to the
commission while leaving to judges the authority to approve waivers of voucher caps.
It also enables the commission to monitor the accuracy of vouchers submitted.
Prior to 2005, the duties of the Office of Public Defense (OPD) in Washington state
were limited to overseeing “the effective and efficient delivery of indigent defense
services for appeals.”19 In 2005, the state legislature appropriated funds for OPD to
establish a criminal indigent defense pilot program at the trial level.20 In 2006, and
again in 2008, OPD’s responsibilities were further expanded when the legislature
allocated funds for OPD to disburse to the counties and cities to improve indigent
defense at the trial level.21
Table II: Indigent Defense Systems of the 50 States

20
21

State PD
without Comm’n

State Comm’n
Partial Authority

State Appellate
Comm’n or
Agency

State PD
with Comm’n

State Director
with Comm’n

State

Year Est.

State

Year Est.

State

Year Est.

State

Year Est.

State

CO
MD
HI
KY
NH
CT
WI
MO
MN
AR
MT
WV

1969
1971
1972
1972
1972
1974
1977
1982
1986
1997
2005
2008

MA
NC
OR
VA
ND
LA
SC

1983
2000
2001
2004
2005
2007
2008

RI
DE
NJ
VT
NM
WY
AK
IA

1942
1953
1967
1972
1973
1977
1980
1981

NV
KS
OH
IN
OK
NE
TX
GA
WA

1971
1981
1984
1989
1991
1995
2001
2003
2006

CA
IL
ID
MI
MS
TN

AL
AZ
ME
NY
PA
SD
UT
FL

No State Comm’n
Prior
Study Comm.

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Office of Public Defense Sunset Review, Wash. Joint Legis. Audit and Rev. Comm., R.
No. 08-2, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.opd.wa.gov/Reports/Other%20Reports/080109%20
JLARC%20Report.pdf.
Id. at 22. OPD also operates a Parents’ Representation Program that contracts to provide counsel
for parents in dependency and termination of rights proceedings. Id. at 11.
Id. at 22.

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Impetus for Legislative Reform
Legislative reform of indigent defense does not normally occur unless deficiencies in
the state’s services are readily apparent. Sometimes, there also are concerns about the
cost-effectiveness of the system in use. Often litigation, statewide study commissions,
national and state reform organizations, and media coverage have played important
roles in persuading state legislatures to make improvements.
Montana is an example of a state where systemic litigation played a decisive role in
indigent defense reform. In June 2005, the Montana legislature enacted a statute
shifting responsibility for indigent defense funding and oversight from the counties
to a new state authority. Momentum to pass this legislation originated from a lawsuit
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), alleging that the system in place
denied indigent defendants their right to effective assistance of counsel.22 (Chapter
3 also discusses litigation that led to legislative reforms.23) Study commissions and
reports also promote the passage of legislation. In North Dakota, new legislation
establishing a full oversight commission was enacted in 2005 due to the work of
the State Bar of North Dakota’s Indigent Defense Task Force and a report about
the state’s defense system that the task force commissioned.24 Similarly, the Georgia
Indigent Defense Act was drafted in response to recommendations made by a study
commission appointed by the Georgia Supreme Court.25
Reform organizations also have played a vital role in indigent defense improvement
efforts. In Texas, Texas Appleseed, a non-profit, non-partisan public interest law center, conducted a comprehensive study that culminated in an extensive report issued in
December 2000. The legislature began considering changes immediately afterwards,
and the Texas Fair Defense Act was signed into law in June 2001.26 Similarly, the
Virginia Fair Trial Project and the Louisiana Justice Coalition contributed to their

23
24

25
26

The ACLU agreed to put the lawsuit on hold once the state indicated its intent to resolve the situation through legislation rather than wait for a court order. See ACLU, ACLU Agrees to Postpone Trial
Over Lack of Legal Defense for Montana’s Poor While Atty. General Seeks Legislative Remedy, May 7,
2004, available at http://www.aclu.org/crimjustice/indigent/10227prs20040507.html. See also White
v. Martz, 2006 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 136 (Mont. Dist. Ct. 2006).
See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
Further discussion of North Dakota’s study commission is at infra notes 127–28 and accompanying
text. See also report of The Spangenberg Group for the Task Force, available at http://www.abanet.
org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/northdakotareport.pdf.
See Landmark Indigent Defense Reform Signed Into Law in Georgia, The Spangenberg Rep., Nov.
2003, at 10.
See Robert Spangenberg, Governor Perry Signs Fair Defense Act in Texas, The Spangenberg Rep.,
Jul. 2001, at 1.

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states’ reform efforts.27 National organizations also have often provided funding and
other assistance in promoting legislative change.28
Finally, media coverage that portrays the unfairness of an indigent defense system
educates the public about the need for indigent defense reform and helps generate
the political will necessary to make changes. For example, a reporter for the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution wrote numerous articles describing the terrible condition of
indigent defense throughout Georgia prior to passage of indigent defense reform
legislation in that state.29 In Virginia, media coverage led to the formation of a public
defender’s office in Charlottesville and increased compensation statewide for assigned
counsel handling indigent defense cases.30 Additionally, an indigent defense study
commission was created in Nevada after the Las Vegas Review-Journal published a
series of critical articles about the Clark County (Las Vegas) public defender system.31

27
28

29
30
31

See Norman Lefstein, The Movement Towards Indigent Defense Reform: Louisiana and Other States, 9
Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 125, 127 n.20 (2008) [hereinafter Lefstein, Loy. J. Pub. Int. L.]
In Texas, for example, the Open Society Institute, the Public Welfare Foundation, Department of
Justice, the ARCA Foundation, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Hogg Foundation, and the
State Commissions Project supported by the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants, all contributed funding. See Spangenberg, supra note 26, at 1.
See, e.g., Bill Rankin, Unusual Legal Aid Group Helps Turn Lives Around, The Atlanta J.-Const.,
Dec. 2, 2002, at 1A.
See Equal Justice: Ongoing Goal, Op-Ed, The Daily Progress (Charlottesville, VA), Oct. 6, 2008.
See Brandon Riley, Nevada High Court Orders Indigent Defense Reforms, Las Vegas Rev. J., Jan.
4, 2008 [hereinafter Riley, Nevada High Court Orders Indigent Defense Reforms]. Specifically,
the Nevada Supreme Court ordered “that a permanent statewide commission for the oversight
of indigent defense shall be established and appointed by the Nevada Supreme Court….” See
In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in
Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter In the
Matter of the Review of Issues], available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/orders/
ADKT411Order01_04_08.pdf. However, as of the completion of this report in January 2009, the
commission had not yet been established. While it is unusual for a state supreme court to establish
a commission to deal with indigent defense issues, it is not unprecedented. In 1994, the Tennessee
Supreme Court established the Indigent Defense Commission of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
and gave it responsibility “for developing and recommending to the Court a comprehensive plan
for the delivery of legal services to indigent defendants in the state court system.” See In re Indigent
Criminal Justice System, 883 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tenn. 1994). However, recommendations of the
Commission were not adopted by the Supreme Court of Tennessee and the Commission lapsed.
Also, in 1994, the Louisiana Supreme Court established by court order Louisiana’s first indigent
defense commission, known as the Louisiana Indigent Defense Board, which was responsible for issuing “qualification and performance guidelines [for attorneys] throughout the state.” Nat’l Legal
Aid and Defender Assoc., In Defense of Public Access: An Assessment of Trial-Level
Indigent Defense Services in Louisiana 40 Years after Gideon 2 (2004).

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Obstacles to Legislative Reform
In several states, systemic reform legislation was introduced but failed to pass. Lack of
political resolve, refusal of localities and local judges to cede control of their systems
to state authority, and state unwillingness to pay for indigent defense are the major
reasons for legislative inaction. On occasion, there also have been objections from the
local bar, which sometimes stands to lose business if control is centralized.32
One state where legislative reform has consistently failed to garner sufficient support
is Mississippi. In 1998, the Mississippi legislature passed a bill establishing a statewide,
state-funded system for indigent defense, overseen by a commission. However, the
commission was funded for only one year, the system itself was never funded, and
in 2000, the legislation was repealed.33 Mississippi is the only state to rescind such a
commission.
As of 2005, Mississippi ranked last in the nation in per capita spending on indigent
defense,34 and studies indicate that representation at trial remains shamefully inadequate.35 In 2006, the Mississippi Public Defender Task Force, which was established
by the legislature to study the provision of indigent defense in the state and report
its findings to the legislature,36 once again recommended the creation of a statewide,
state-funded indigent defense system to be overseen by a board.37 In 2007, a bill to
implement this suggestion died in committee.
While the Mississippi legislature repealed statutory authority for a state commission, two statewide, state-funded offices for capital cases were established.38 Later,
Mississippi created the Office of Indigent Appeals to provide representation for
32
33

36
37
38

See ABA/TSG Indigent Defense Commissions, supra note 1, at 12.
See Miriam Gohara and Sarah Geraghty, In Mississippi, Scales of Justice are Tilted, The Com. Appeal
(Memphis, TN), Mar. 14, 2003, available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content.aspx?article=145. See
also Beverly Pettigrew Kraft, State Fund for Public Defenders Now Broke, The Clarion Ledger, Jul.
5, 1999.
In 2005, the population of Mississippi was 2,921,088 and the state’s indigent defense expenditures
were $12.8 million. ABA/TSG FY 2005 Indigent Defense Expenditures, supra note 26, Chapter
2, at 17, 36. Dividing total expenditures by population yields roughly $4.39 per capita as the amount
spent on indigent defense. This sum ranked Mississippi last in terms of state indigent defense expenditures. See Id. at 35 (Table of 50 State and County Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services
Fiscal Year 2005).
NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., supra note 216, Chapter 2, at 6. (right to counsel is
“functionally meaningless in Mississippi, a state which provides almost no regulation, oversight, or
funding for indigent defense”).
Miss. Code Ann. § 25-32-71 (2007).
See Mississippi Public Defender Task Force Makes Recommendations for Current Legislative Session, The
Spangenberg Rep., Feb. 2007, at 16.
See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-18-1 – 99-18-19 (2006) (creating the Office of Capital Defense
Counsel); §§ 99-39-101 – 99-39-119 (creating the Office of Capital Post-Conviction Counsel).

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indigent defendants convicted of non-capital felonies.39 The state also recently extended the life of the Mississippi Public Defender Task Force until 2011, expanded its
duties to include matters relating to youth and delinquency, and funded a division in
the appellate office responsible for training, education, and technical assistance to all
public defenders in Mississippi.40 Regrettably, the state’s persistent failure to improve
and adequately fund indigent defense will likely ensure that services at trial remain
woefully insufficient.
The state legislature in Alabama also has declined to reform indigent defense. In
2006, an Indigent Defense Task Force created by the Chief Justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court drafted legislation that would have established a statewide indigent
defense system.41 The proposed bill would have given the commission full authority
to determine the type of indigent defense system instituted in each district. Due
largely to objections of local judges, who would no longer have the authority to determine the type of system in their circuits, and the concerns of the criminal defense
bar that they would be assigned fewer cases and suffer a reduction in pay, the legislation failed to pass.42 Similarly, in 2001, Alabama legislative committees defeated a bill
to set up a statewide indigent defense commission.43
In New Mexico, the governor’s opposition stymied systemic reform. Currently, the
state public defender is an at-will employee appointed by the governor. The New
Mexico legislature sought to enhance the independence of this state official by establishing a commission that was responsible for appointing the public defender and
overseeing indigent defense in the state.44 Legislation to achieve these objectives in
New Mexico passed, but the governor vetoed the bill.

39
40
41
42
43

Id. at § 99-40-1.
Id. at § 25-32-71. See Legislative Update on Mississippi Public Defender Task Force Recommendations,
The Spangenberg Rep., Jul. 2007, at 3.
See Proposed Bill to Create Statewide Indigent Defense Commission in Alabama Failed, The
Spangenberg Rep., Jul. 2006, at 17–18.
Id.
See Fundamental Improvements to Alabama’s Indigent Defense System Defeated, The Spangenberg
Rep., Jul. 2001, at 12. Alabama is one of the states currently studying reform of its indigent defense
system. See infra note 129 and accompanying text; see also supra note 253, Chapter 2.
See House OK’s Bill to Detach Public Defender from Governor, Albuquerque J., Feb. 7, 2008. For
further information, see New Mexico Coalition for Justice website, available at http://www.nm
coalitionforjustice.org.

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Battle Between State Oversight and Local Control
When formulating a new indigent defense oversight body, legislatures have sometimes been called upon to balance the state’s desire to improve defense representation
with the local jurisdictions’ desire to retain control over indigent defense. If a state
is unwilling to provide all, or a majority, of the funding for defense services, stateimposed requirements with which local jurisdictions must comply are likely to be
viewed as unfunded mandates. And, if a locality is required to cover a good deal of
the expense, it will likely want to control how the defense services are provided in
order to contain costs. Several states have enacted indigent defense legislation that
illustrates this tug of war between state and local competing interests.
The Texas Fair Defense Act, enacted in 2001, endeavored to balance state oversight
with local control by granting the newly created Texas Task Force on Indigent
Defense partial authority over indigent defense throughout the state. By authorizing
the Task Force to develop mandatory minimum standards to enhance the quality
of indigent defense, monitor compliance with these standards, and distribute state
funds to counties in compliance, the legislature attempted to assure substantial state
oversight of indigent defense services.
The new system has led to some important improvements, such as earlier appointment of counsel and transparency in the appointment process so that the lawyers receiving cases can readily be determined.45 In FY 2002, only seven counties had public
defender programs, whereas in FY 2008, the number had grown to 15.46 One of these
is a regional death penalty defender office created by Lubbock County and serving 65
counties.47 The Task Force also has established mental health defender offices, “with
access to more resources to slow the recidivism of poor persons suffering mental
illness facing criminal charges.”48 In 2005, the Texas Legislature allocated $800.000,
to be administered by the Task Force, to assist the state’s four public law schools in
their work investigating the innocence claims of incarcerated defendants.49 Overall,
the Task Force reports that the number of persons receiving counsel to which they are
constitutionally entitled has increased 38%, and Texas indigent defense expenditures
have risen from $114 million in FY 2002 to $174 million in FY 2008.50

45
46
47
48
49
50

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.051; Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann. § 26.04 (2008).
Upholding the Constitution, Annual Report Texas Task Force on Indigent Defense 3
(2008).
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 3.

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However, the counties retain control over the mechanism by which defense representation is provided to indigent defendants, and local judges still control most aspects
of the appointment of counsel, including whether defendants are eligible to receive
counsel, selection of attorneys, and fee schedules to compensate assigned counsel.51
Nevertheless, given the difficulty of ensuring compliance with performance standards,
as well as the fact that local judges direct the delivery of indigent defense representation, the existing apportionment of power remains a hindrance to comprehensive
reform.
The Commission on Indigent Defense Services in North Carolina, on the other
hand, is a full authority oversight body but with one significant concession to local
control. The legislature granted the commission the authority to “determine the
methods for delivering legal services to indigent persons … and … [to] establish
in each district or combination of districts a system of appointed counsel, contract
counsel, part-time public defenders, public defender offices, appellate defender
services, and other methods for delivering counsel services, or any combination of
these services.”52 Yet, in order to establish a public defender office, the commission is
required, by statute, to give notice to and consult with local judges and the “affected
district bar.”53 After conferring with these parties, if the Commission decides that a
public defender office is the best mechanism for providing indigent defense representation, a legislative act is then required to establish the local public defender office.
This concession was made even though North Carolina’s indigent defense system is
fully state-funded.54

B. State Oversight Commissions
State oversight commissions or boards have shown a capacity to enhance the quality
and independence of indigent defense representation.55 The existence of an oversight
body, however, is not a panacea for all that ails a failing or underperforming defense
system. Absent adequate funding, the authority to make changes, and independence
51

52
53
54

Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Ann. § 26.04 (2008). In fact, the law specifically requires a local judge’s
written approval before the Commissioners Court (the county governing board) may “appoint a
governmental entity or nonprofit organization to serve as a public defender.” Id. at § 26.044(b).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-498.5(d) (2008).
Id. at § 7A-498.7(a).
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-498.7(a) (2008): “A legislative act is required in order to establish a
new office or to abolish an existing office.” See also supra note 29 and Table I (Sources of Indigent
Defense Funding in the 50 States), Chapter 2.
See ABA/TSG Indigent Defense Commissions, supra note 1, at i; ABA Providing Defense
Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.3(b).

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of the defense function, an oversight body is likely to be unsuccessful in fully transforming a state’s indigent defense system.
The main reasons for establishing an indigent defense oversight body are to protect
the independence of the defense function from political and judicial interference and
ensure quality representation. While quality representation can be addressed through
responsibilities delegated to the commission, the way the commission is constructed
has much to do with its independence. Statewide oversight of indigent defense and
funding at the state level can enhance the equitable allocation of resources throughout the jurisdiction while seeking to ensure uniform representation and implementing efficiencies in the delivery of defense services. Although there is no single perfect
statute that every state should enact, there are certain necessary components that
would seem to be essential to include in legislation establishing a statewide oversight
authority. If the principles underlying these components are ignored, it is unlikely
that the oversight body will succeed in effectuating positive change.

Independence and Structure of State Oversight Commissions
The importance of establishing an independent indigent defense system cannot be
overstated. Experience demonstrates that defense counsel will not fully discharge
their duties as zealous advocates for their clients when their compensation, resources,
and continued employment depend upon catering to the predilections of politicians
or judges. Even when political or judicial oversight of the defense function does not
actually impact the performance of counsel, clients and the general public may still
have doubts about the loyalties of those providing defense services.
There are several ways a legislature can ensure the independence of a state’s indigent
defense delivery system. Distribution of the appointment authority, delineation of
membership criteria, proper placement of the agency within the government, and
statutory directives are all mechanisms states can employ to secure the independence
of both the oversight body and the indigent defense system it supervises. In addition, special attention should be paid to the size of the commission and tenure of its
members.

Appointing Authority
One of the most important mechanisms for ensuring independence is to have appointments to the oversight board originate from a variety of sources. At a minimum,
the authority to appoint members to the commission should be allocated to all three
branches of government and relevant bar associations. For example, North Carolina
shares responsibility for making appointments among the chief justice, governor,

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house, senate, and six different bar groups, with the commission appointing three
additional members. In another state, the responsibility is shared among the governor, the chief justice, the chairman of the legislature, and the state bar association.56
Models such as these ensure a diverse commission that is neither beholden to nor apt
to do the bidding of any single branch of government, bar group, or individual who
selects the commission’s members.
In some states, the appointing authority is not distributed nearly as widely, but the
person making the appointments must select members from candidates nominated
by other government branches and specified groups. Thus, in Montana, although
the entire commission is appointed by the governor, the governor must appoint
two nominees whose names are submitted by the supreme court, three nominees
submitted by the president of the state bar, and two non-attorney members of the
general public submitted by the legislature. Other states grant appointment powers
to groups such as the board of trustees of the state’s criminal justice institute57 or the
interchurch conference.58

Membership Criteria
Some states also seek to achieve a diverse membership of the oversight body by
requiring that members meet certain criteria. States have required that the geography
of members,59 their political affiliation,60 and ethnicity61 be considered. Some states
also have required a certain number of non-attorney members,62 advocates on behalf
of underrepresented groups,63 or representatives of special interest groups such as the
mentally ill,64 whereas others exclude certain categories of individuals from membership such as judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials.65 While there are
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

North Dakota.
Indiana.
Louisiana.
See, e.g., Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and West Virginia.
See, e.g., Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Missouri, and Ohio.
See, e.g., Minnesota, North Carolina, and Tennessee.
See, e.g., Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Montana, and Oregon.
For example, Kentucky requires that one member of its commission “shall be a child advocate
or a person with substantial experience in the representation of children.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
31.015(1) (a) (2) (West Supp. 2008). Louisiana requires one member to be a juvenile justice advocate.
Montana requires one member that advocates for indigent persons and one that advocates for racial
minorities.
Both Montana and West Virginia require one member of its commission to be “a member of an
organization that advocates on behalf of people with mental illness and developmental disabilities.”
Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-1028 (2) (f ) (2007); W. Va. Code § 29-21-3b(b) (5) (West Supp. 2008).
For instance, Indiana excludes law enforcement officers and court employees; Kentucky excludes
prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and judges.

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states that jeopardize their commission’s independence by concentrating the authority
to appoint in a single person, these states usually have some provisions regarding the
backgrounds of persons who can be appointed as commission members in an effort
to enhance diversity.
At the very least, it is essential that an oversight body be composed of persons devoted to improving the delivery of indigent defense services and who fairly and equally
represent the state’s various constituencies committed to enhancing defense representation. Ideally, a majority of members would have experience in providing indigent
defense representation, and the membership would include leading members of the
state’s criminal defense bar. However, not all members need to have prior criminal
law experience if they are otherwise persons likely to be respected by members of the
state’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Judges and legislators should not be statutorily excluded from membership consideration, as they can
be effective contributors to a commission’s ability to promote positive change.

Agency Placement
Ideally, an indigent defense oversight body should be an independent agency of
state government. This allows the commission to retain decision-making authority
and advocate for adequate indigent defense funding. If a state’s indigent defense
system is financed primarily by the state, it is especially important that its budget
remain separate from those of other agencies, including the courts, so that resources
directed towards indigent defense are not seen as having a negative impact on other
worthwhile spending. For example, if the agency is housed in the judicial branch
and is part of the judiciary’s budget, the judiciary may be less likely to advocate for
increased indigent defense funding if it means less money will be available for judges,
court personnel, and facilities.66
Of the 43 states with agencies that have authority over indigent defense, 25 have
placed their indigent defense programs in the executive branch67 and 18 house
their agencies within the judicial branch.68 However, over one-third of the agencies
are merely placed in a governmental branch for administrative purposes, while
66

See, e.g., MSBA (Maine State Bar Association) Summer Meeting Focuses on Judicial Budget Cut
Impacts, Indigent Defense, The Supplement, Aug. 2008, at 2 [hereinafter MSBA Summer Meeting]
(“Because the state’s indigent defense fund is part of the judiciary budget, paying rising indigent
defense costs means taking money from other judiciary budget accounts, which in turn has forced
such measures as temporary court closures”).
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.

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permitting them to maintain control over their decisions and budget.69 For example,
Connecticut, Minnesota, and Oregon all have classified their oversight bodies as
autonomous divisions of the judicial department.70 In Idaho, the state appellate defender office is a self-governing agency under the executive branch.71 The Department
of Public Advocacy in Kentucky and the Public Defender Commission in Montana
are within the executive branch for administrative purposes only.72 In Massachusetts,
the Committee for Public Counsel Services is an independent agency whose budget
appears as a line item in the judiciary’s budget, but its submissions to the legislature
are not in any way controlled by the judicial branch.73

Statutory Directives
The statutes of some states include language confirming that the delivery of indigent
defense services is to remain independent. For instance, the Colorado State Public
Defender is an agency of the judicial department. However, Colorado’s statute states
that “the state public defender at all times shall serve his clients independently of any
political considerations….”74 Some states, such as Kentucky and Minnesota, specifically prohibit the commission overseeing the indigent defense delivery system from
interfering with the handling of individual cases.75
Unfortunately, simply declaring the independence of a commission does not make it
so. In Georgia, the legislature created the Georgia Public Defender Standards Council
(GPDSC) to assure that “adequate and effective legal representation is provided,
independently of political considerations.”76 However, Georgia’s indigent defense
system has not been adequately funded, and the legislature threatened to withhold
funding if changes to the system were not implemented. In 2007, the legislature
moved the GPDSC from the judicial branch to the executive branch in order to
allow greater state control over its budget.77 In 2008, the Georgia Senate, dissatisfied

70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-289(j) (2007); Minn. Stat. § 611.215 (1) (a) (2008); Or. Rev. Stat. §
151.213(1) (2007).
Idaho Code Ann. § 19-869(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.010 (West Supp. 2008); Mont. Code Ann. § 2-15-1028(6) (2007).
E-mail from William Leahy, Chief Counsel, Committee for Public Counsel Services, to Norman
Lefstein (Nov. 24, 2008, 14:48:00 EST) (on file with Reporters).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-1-101(1) (2008).
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 31.015(7) (West Supp. 2008); Minn. Rev. Stat. § 611.215(3) (2008).
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-12-1(c) (2008).
Terry Wolf, Public Defenders Cry Foul, Dublin Courier Herald, Oct. 1, 2008, at 1.

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with the costs of a pending death penalty case, even went so far as to pressure the
GPDSC to intervene in the case.78

Commission Size and Membership Tenure
Across the country, indigent defense commissions range in size from as few as three
members79 to as many as 15 members.80 Commissions need not be a particular size
but commissions of at least seven to nine members may be preferable so that they can
perform the necessary work, wield sufficient authority, and feel a sense of responsibility for the commission’s performance. Conversely, the larger the commission, the less
likely members may have a sense of personal responsibility for the commission’s success. On the other hand, since members of oversight bodies are usually uncompensated except for expenses, a commission larger than nine to 13 members will more likely
assure the presence of a quorum at meetings and sufficient persons to devote time to
essential tasks. Moreover, large and diverse commissions may be more effective since
there are more members to express public support on behalf of indigent defense.
The tenure of commission members is usually fixed by statute at three or four years.
To achieve continuity, however, terms should be staggered, requiring some members
initially to serve shorter terms so that all members are not up for reappointment at
once. Some state statutes limit the number of terms a board member may serve.81

Ensuring Quality Representation and
Responsibilities of an Oversight Commission
The responsibilities assigned to the oversight body should enable it to improve the
quality of indigent defense representation. If the statewide authority is not allowed
to perform certain tasks, the lack of power can undermine the rationale for its existence. Conversely, legislatures should not burden commissions with tasks that could
undercut defender offices providing representation, are a conflict of interest, or waste
limited resources.
In order to exercise their authority, oversight bodies require meaningful standards and
guidelines with which to judge the adequacy of the indigent defense delivery system.
These may be promulgated by the commission or delineated by statute. Some state
78
79
80
81

Stephen B. Bright, Georgia Beggars Indigent Defense: As Lawyers for the Poor Get a Pittance,
Prosecutors Enjoy a Blank Check, Want to Pick Opponents, The Daily R., Jan. 24, 2008, at 4.
Maryland.
Massachusetts.
See, e.g., Illinois and Kansas.

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statutes spell out the responsibilities of the commission in great detail, whereas other
statutes are skeletal, leaving the details to the commission and state public defender
or director.82 Arguably, the best statutory schemes permit the board to adopt broad
policies but make it clear that it is not to interfere with the daily operations of the
program.
To be successful, a commission should be empowered to determine the most appropriate method for delivering indigent defense services. As previously discussed, this is
often a contentious subject, raising the issue of control between state and local jurisdictions. However, a commission has limited ability to ensure cost-effective, quality
representation if it is unable to change an underperforming or expensive system from
one delivery method to another.
In addition, oversight bodies should have the authority to establish procedures to
certify that the defense attorneys providing representation are competent to do their
jobs. Accordingly, boards should be able to establish performance standards for
attorneys and require procedures to evaluate attorneys based on its standards or, alternatively, by standards enacted by the legislature or issued by the state’s highest court.
Minimum standards include ensuring that the attorneys have training in criminal
law; that the attorneys are participating in a certain number of relevant continuing
legal education classes; and that the experience level of the attorney matches the
severity of the case.
The board must also be able to assure that defense attorneys have sufficient support
services. Without adequate support staff such as trained investigators, paralegals,
social workers, and secretaries, defense attorneys must necessarily handle fewer cases
and will be less cost-efficient. Additionally, to provide quality representation, defense
counsel require research and technology capabilities, training, and access to independent experts.
To ensure quality representation, the board also must be able to control the workload
of defense attorneys. One of the board’s most important responsibilities should be
to devise workload standards and enforce compliance with those standards. Ideally,
every commission should complete a comprehensive study of the state’s indigent
defense system to develop appropriate workload limits.83 But since virtually all states
rely to a considerable extent on public defender programs to furnish much of the
82

For example, North Carolina’s Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000 is comprehensive, with eight
subsections regarding the commission’s responsibilities and, within one subsection, a list of specific
standards governing indigent defense that the commission is tasked with developing. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7A-489.5 (2008). Conversely, Maryland’s statute gives only a brief outline of the duties of
the commission’s Board of Trustees. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. § 16-302 (West Supp. 2008).
See generally discussion of excessive caseloads, supra notes 96–124 and accompanying text, Chapter
2.

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representation, in order for workload limits to be successful, defense systems must
also make provisions for participation of the private bar, with adequate funds to
compensate private assigned counsel or contract attorneys. For this reason, the ABA
has long recommended that all systems of public defense provide for “the active and
substantial participation of the private bar.”84
In order to monitor compliance with performance standards and workload limitations, the board should have authority to collect data and confirm its accuracy.
As part of its information gathering, the oversight body will need to define what
constitutes a case and establish a uniform case reporting system to ensure statewide
consistency in caseload numbers. At a minimum, this system should provide accurate
figures regarding the number of new appointments and case dispositions, by case type
and by the number of pending cases. It should also be the board’s responsibility to
maintain and publish records and statistics regarding the delivery of indigent defense
services so that funding sources understand how appropriations are being spent and
can plan for future needs.
Another significant commission responsibility is to provide vigorous support for indigent defense. Statutes should require commissions to submit budgetary requests each
year, and commissions should be authorized to represent indigent defense interests
before the legislature. Ensuring sufficient funding so that indigent defense providers
are fairly compensated for their work should be among the most important goals of
commissions. It should also be the function of commissions to formulate compensation plans for indigent defense counsel, whether they are public defenders, contract
attorneys, or assigned counsel paid on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, commissions should be in charge of appointing the state public defender or
director. If the commission is properly constructed, it will be an independent body
that will be able to hire the best-qualified candidate without regard to politics or
judicial interference. Chief defenders should be fired only for cause and should have
a set term of employment rather than serve at will. This enables the chief defender or
director to do his or her job knowing that he or she answers only to the commission
and the needs of indigent defendants.
Some states have given their oversight bodies responsibilities that are not essential for
the board to discharge. For example, in several states, the board is required to develop
standards to determine whether a person is eligible for court-appointed counsel.85
84

ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.2(b); see also ABA Ten
Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 2 (“Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the
public defense delivery system consists of both a defender office and the active participation of the
private bar”).
See, e.g., Arkansas, North Carolina, and Texas.

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While statewide standards are important to assure consistent determinations across
the state, the preparation of such standards need not necessarily be handled by the
board.
It is a problem, however, if an oversight body is assigned tasks that undermine the
independence of the defense function, are a conflict of interest, or lead to a perception of misplaced loyalty. While a board can develop eligibility standards, neither the
board nor defense providers should be asked to determine whether a particular individual meets the standards or be required to collect funds from defendants as partial
payments for their representation. Legislatures, local governments, and judges may
accuse providers of being too lax in their decisions about eligibility in order to obtain
increased funding if they think too many people are being found eligible for defense
services. Individual defendants may worry that their attorneys will not provide zealous representation or are not on their side at all if they are collecting monies for the
state. Moreover, it is a waste of limited resources allocated to indigent defense to force
the providers of services to undertake this responsibility.
Oversight bodies also should not be able to hire the personnel who work for the state
public defender or director. In Louisiana, the statute allows the Louisiana Public
Defender Board to hire and determine the salaries of the state public defender’s senior
management team.86 Conceivably, this could lead to problems if the state’s director
disagrees with a hiring decision or a senior staff member complains to the board
rather than resolves issues with the director.87
There are a multitude of other tasks that, if given to the board rather than the state
public defender or director, could lead to overreaching by the board. For example, in
Arkansas, the Public Defender Commission has the power to “allocate personnel for
each public defender’s office throughout the state”88 and “approve the reassignment
of cases from one public defender to another public defender in an adjacent area
for the purpose of avoiding conflicts or adjusting caseloads.” Language such as this
potentially affords the commission the opportunity to micromanage defense services
in the state and undermines the authority of the state’s executive director to control
the program’s resources. Moreover, if the commission does not act expeditiously, it
could lead to unwarranted delays in case reassignment or in maintaining proper office
staffing levels.

86
87
88

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:150(A) (Supp. 2008).
Lefstein, Loy. J. Pub. Int. L., supra note 27, at 133–34.
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-87-203(3) (Supp. 2008).

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Scope of Authority and Its Impact on Independence and Quality
The prior review of statewide systems of indigent defense can be summarized as
follows: Twenty-seven states have organized their defense services either entirely
or substantially on a statewide basis. Of these, there are 19 states that have a state
commission with supervisory authority over the state’s defense program headed by
either a state public defender or state director; in the other eight states, there is a state
public defender but not a state commission to provide oversight. In the remaining 23
states, there is either a state commission with partial authority over indigent defense
(nine states); a state appellate commission or agency (six states); or no state commission of any kind (eight states). While it is always hazardous to generalize, usually,
the greater the responsibility of the oversight body for managing the state’s indigent
defense services, the better and more consistent is the representation throughout the
state.
Oversight bodies with full authority and clear independence are best equipped to
have a positive impact on indigent defense. This is especially true when the commission controls most or all of the state’s funds for indigent defense. The relationship
between state funding and an indigent defense oversight body’s level of authority
is inextricable and, for the most part, directly proportionate. Without adequate
funding, even a well-designed and empowered commission will struggle to keep the
indigent defense system afloat.

Full Authority Oversight Commissions and State Public Defender Agencies with Commissions
Nineteen states have either a statewide public defender agency with a full-authority
commission and chief public defender89 or a full-authority commission with a state
director who acts as a chief public defender.90 Of these 19 states, 12 have public
defender agencies and commissions and are entirely state funded, and all of the eight
states with a state director are either entirely or almost entirely state funded.91 Because
these 19 commissions are overwhelmingly state funded, they are well situated to exercise authority over their states’ indigent defense systems.
The commissions discussed in the preceding paragraph are in the best position to
protect the independence of the defense function when selection of the state public
89
90
91

Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
New Hampshire, and Wisconsin.
Louisiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and
West Virginia.
In some states, local governments provide office space and/or a minimal amount of additional
funding. In South Carolina, the counties may not contribute less money to indigent defense than
the amount they allocated the previous year. In Louisiana, for fiscal year 2008–2009, the state is
contributing $28 million to indigent defense in addition to amounts contributed by the parishes.

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defender or state director is made by the commission.92 The proper construction of
the commission as a non-political body should insulate the defense function from political influence because the state defender or director is accountable, not to just one
publicly elected person, but to a diverse group of commission members. Moreover,
while some chief defenders serve at the pleasure of the commission, others are even
further protected from political pressures by having a fixed term with removal only
for cause.
These same states are in the best position to improve and maintain quality indigent
defense services throughout the state because they control the allocation of funds and
resources. Full-authority oversight bodies with statewide public defender offices are
usually responsible for monitoring costs and workloads, implementing and enforcing
attorney experience and training requirements, setting attorney performance standards, and determining compensation levels. They can assure that attorneys comply
with their standards by refusing to pay or hire those who do not meet requirements.
Full-authority commissions can control quality and efficiency in the use of resources
by modifying the delivery system for providing indigent defense services.93
Another crucial way that full-authority commissions and statewide public defender
offices can seek to assure quality representation is to limit attorney workloads, assuming sufficient funds are available to implement a feasible plan. For appointed
and contract counsel, it is possible to control workload by monitoring the number
and types of cases assigned and refusing to compensate for appointments once a
maximum permitted number of cases is reached. If attorneys will not be paid for
cases beyond a certain maximum allowed number of cases, the attorneys will almost
certainly seek to avoid being appointed.94
It is more difficult to control the caseloads of attorneys within public defender
offices, mainly because statutes in many states designate the public defender to be
appointed without regard to caseloads and the capacity of the defender to handle the
cases. Arguably, however, state legislatures never intended that defender programs
92

In Kentucky, the governor chooses the Public Advocate for a four-year term from a list of nominees
submitted by the commission. In West Virginia, the Executive Director of Public Defender Services
is chosen by the governor and serves as chair of the Indigent Defense Commission. West Virginia is
the only state where the chief defender is formally a member of the commission, although the chief
defender in Missouri is designated by statute as an ex-officio member.
Not all states grant their commissions this kind of broad authority. For example, Indiana has a
partial-authority commission and each of the state’s 92 counties may determine its own system for
providing defense services. See infra note 110 and accompanying text
See ABA Defense Function, supra note 73, Chapter 1, at 4.13(e) (“Defense counsel should not
carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size, interferes with the rendering of quality representation, endangers the client’s interest in the speedy disposition of charges, or may lead to the
breach of professional obligations.”).

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would undertake representation in circumstances where attorneys could not possibly
represent their clients competently in ways consistent with professional responsibility
rules. New Hampshire is one of the few states in which the issue of caseloads for public defenders is addressed through an innovative agreement between the state public
defender’s office and the state’s Judicial Council.95 Pursuant to the agreement, the
number of cases each public defender may have at one time is limited, and the public
defender agency is required to distribute the proper types of cases to the attorney
by level of experience. There also are contractual obligations regarding the number
of homicides that the staff can handle simultaneously. Finally, and perhaps most
important, the public defender’s office is required to notify the courts if their caseload
becomes too high, so that the courts may appoint private assigned counsel.
Even when a commission or public defender office is fully state-funded, the level and
regularity of funding provided sometimes depends upon the source of funds from
within the state government. The state government may pay for all indigent defense
costs through its general funds, cover a portion of the expense through the use of
special funds, or pay for all costs of indigent defense through special funds.96 Because
the amount of special funds available varies, and oftentimes does not correlate with
indigent defense needs, funding defense services through the use of general funds is
preferable, at least theoretically.97
While a state that funds a full-authority commission or a statewide public defender
agency with a commission is in the best position to provide high quality indigent
defense representation, this is not always the case. In Missouri, for example, the
commission is appointed solely by the governor, thus failing to assure the body’s
complete independence. Moreover, although the state alone is responsible for paying for indigent defense, Missouri’s public defenders are not well compensated, the
program historically has had high turnover, and some districts are currently refusing
to accept some types of cases due to unreasonably high caseloads, which has been a
problem for some time.98 As Missouri demonstrates, a commission and a statewide
public defender agency are not sufficient unless there also are adequate personnel and
resources.
95

96
97
98

The New Hampshire Public Defender (NHPD) is a non-profit organization that contracts with the
state to provide indigent defense representation. The Judicial Council enters into the contract on
behalf of the state to hire NHPD to be the primary provider of indigent defense representation.
Our review of funding sources in preparation for this report revealed that Texas is apparently the
only state in which state financing of indigent defense is derived entirely from special funds.
See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
Cavanaugh, supra note 120, Chapter 2. The Missouri Public Defender Commission promulgated
a rule, effective July 30, 2008, limiting public defender caseloads and adopting procedures for
refusing cases. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit 18, § 10-4.010. See also TSG MO Report, supra note 84,
Chapter 2.

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State Public Defender Agencies without an Oversight Commission
Eight states have statewide, state-funded, public defender programs without an
oversight body.99 Statewide public defender offices are in an excellent position to
assure quality representation and can provide the same quality control as state public
defender agencies with oversight commissions. Accordingly, they can monitor costs,
limit workloads, implement attorney performance standards, and provide training
and supervision to their attorneys.
The most significant difference between state public defender agencies with commissions and those without is that the independence of the latter is not protected from
external influences. In all eight states without commissions, the chief public defender
is appointed by the governor. Consequently, all of these agencies are housed in the
executive branch of government, though Iowa’s defense program is labeled an independent agency within the executive branch. In some states, the governor’s appointee
is subject to confirmation by the legislature.100 In at least half of these states,101 the
state public defender serves at the pleasure of the governor. While the current public
defender of Delaware has been in office since 1970, through both Democratic and
Republican administrations,102 other state chief defenders have been replaced for
political reasons. In New Mexico, after the governor took office in 2003, he fired top
executive officials throughout the state, including the chief public defender who was
appointed by the previous governor. In 2001, Vermont’s governor summarily dismissed the state’s defender general for persistently advocating for more staff to meet
rising caseloads.103 As suggested earlier in this chapter, chief defenders in states with
commissions designated by various appointing authorities enjoy greater protection
from political interference than do state public defender chiefs who serve without
oversight commissions.
Even if a chief defender retains employment with a new administration, the lack of
independence may impact how the chief deals with recommendations from the governor to decrease the budget of the public defender program or proposed legislation
detrimental to indigent defense. Obviously, it places a chief defender in an awkward
Alaska, Delaware, Iowa, Rhode Island, New Jersey, New Mexico, Vermont, and Wyoming. Iowa has
a commission that only makes recommendations to the legislature regarding hourly rates and per
case fee limitations; therefore, it provides no oversight and has no actual power. Vermont’s Office of
Defender General has seven county staff offices and five public defender contract offices, which are
law firms that contract with the state to provide public defender services.
100 Alaska, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
101 Iowa, New Mexico, Vermont, and Wyoming.
102 See State of Delaware, Office of the Public Defender website, available at http://publicdefender.
delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml.
103 No Exceptions Campaign, The Need for Independent Public Defense Systems, Jul. 2008, available at
http://www.noexceptions.org/pdf/july_pub.pdf.
99

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position to speak out against such actions. For example, in New Mexico, some
former assistant public defenders felt pressured by the chief defender to adhere to the
governor’s agenda for indigent defense.104 This same chief defender opposed establishing a commission that would have provided more independence for the statewide
public defender’s agency.105 There also is a separation of powers concern if the executive branch controls both the prosecution of crimes and the defense provided to those
accused of crimes. Finally, because governors are elected officials, some with term
limits, there may be frequent turnover at both positions.

State Commissions with Partial Authority
Nine states have partial-authority commissions that oversee certain aspects of the
state’s indigent defense system.106 The theoretical benefit of such a system is that it
encourages better practices while allowing for local autonomy. Unfortunately, partialauthority commissions have had limited success improving the quality of indigent
defense representation statewide, and none provide satisfactory independence for
defense services throughout the state.
The states with partial-authority commissions fall into two broad categories. Three
states have oversight bodies that employ staff who provide representation in particular
geographic areas or in specific types of cases.107 The other four states use a supplemental funding model whereby counties are encouraged to improve their systems through
supplemental state funding.108 Of these seven states, only Kansas and Oklahoma
provide more than 50% of indigent defense funding; in the remaining states, more
than half of the funding for indigent defense comes from the counties.
Partial-authority commissions with staff who provide direct representation to
indigent defendants are better able to ensure quality defense services than those
commissions that merely award supplemental funding. In the three states where the
state provides representation in some cases, the oversight bodies uphold standards
with which indigent defense representation must comply only in those cases. Because
the public defenders work for the state entity, the commissions can readily monitor
104 David

Alire Garcia, On the Defensive: Public Lawyers Lobby for Independence, Santa Fe Rep., Mar.
14, 2007, available at http://www.nmcoalitionforjustice.org/news_files/SF-Reporter_031407.pdf.
105 Id.
106 Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, and Washington.
107 In Kansas, the Board of Indigents’ Defense Services is responsible for all felony cases and counties
may contract with the Board for coverage of misdemeanor and juvenile cases. The Georgia Public
Defender Standards Council provides representation for felony and juvenile cases, along with appeals arising from these cases. As in Kansas, local governments may contract with the Council for
coverage of misdemeanor cases. In Oklahoma, the Indigent Defense System provides all indigent
defense services in 75 counties, excluding only Tulsa and Oklahoma counties.
108 Indiana, Ohio, Texas, and Washington.

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and control quality. But, inadequate funding remains a constant problem that undermines progress within these programs.109 Moreover, there is no oversight or quality
control of defenders who provide representation outside the commission’s jurisdiction. Therefore, the quality of indigent defense statewide is apt to be quite variable.
Likewise, statewide improvement through the use of the supplemental funding model
has been modest. Under this format, all or part of the commission’s authority is
linked to supplemental state funding, which is available if local jurisdictions comply
with state standards. Basically, states entice counties to improve their indigent defense
systems by awarding funds to those counties willing to adhere to state indigent defense standards. County compliance is voluntary, except in Texas, where compliance
is mandatory.
Experience suggests several problems with this model. First, unless these commissions
are adequately funded, they will not have enough revenues to encourage county compliance with state standards. Partial-authority commissions need to cover a significant
portion of the counties’ indigent defense costs to make compliance with standards
fiscally viable.
The experience of Indiana, which is one of the more successful partial-authority commissions, illustrates the difficulty with such programs. In Indiana, the state provides
less than half of the funding for indigent defense, although the commission has
persuaded the more populous of the state’s 92 counties to create independent local
boards to oversee indigent defense in their jurisdictions, which includes determining
the indigent defense delivery method. In order to qualify for 40% state reimbursement of the county’s indigent defense expenses, counties have had to adhere to the
commission’s caseload standards and increase their overall expenditures. In some
years, however, the commission has received less funding from the state than was
needed for its reimbursements to the counties, so reimbursements were reduced
to less than 40%, which in turn has frustrated the counties that were part of the
program. In addition, many of the smaller counties have never agreed to become
part of the commission’s reimbursement program, and therefore, have not been
obligated to increase their expenditures or improve their indigent defense systems.
Thus, in Indiana, there is not full statewide oversight and, rather than having just one
109 As

of 2005, Kansas and Oklahoma were 35th and 39th in the nation, respectively, in per capita
expenditures on indigent defense. In 2005, the population of Kansas was 2,774,687 and the state’s
total indigent defense expenditures were $23.4 million; the population of Oklahoma was 3,547,884
and the state’s indigent defense expenditures were $28.4 million. ABA/TSG FY 2005 Indigent
Defense Expenditures, supra note 26, Chapter 2, at 12, 25, 35–36. Dividing total expenditures by
population yields roughly $8.44 and $8.01 per capita, respectively, as the amount spent on indigent
defense. See Id. at 35. See also Greg Bluestein, Ga. Public Defenders Reluctantly Agree to Cuts, Forbes,
Sept. 26, 2008 (“The system’s budget has been whacked from $42 million to $35 million since it
started in 2005”).

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commission with full authority over the entire state, there is a single partial commission and numerous local boards, all of which are independent of one another.110
Second, the commissions must have meaningful standards either adopted by the
commission or statutorily defined, and be willing and able to withhold funds from
counties in non-compliance. In Washington, state monies are disbursed to all counties that apply for indigent defense improvement grants so long as they are using it
for an eligible purpose, although there are no mandatory state standards. However,
the counties themselves are required by legislation to formulate minimum standards.111 Whether or not the standards are binding, state commissions may overlook
a county’s non-compliance because they do not want to harm a struggling indigent
defense system by withholding funding. While this is understandable, it may render
the model less effective if county governments perceive they will receive funding
regardless of whether they improve their systems.112
Another difficulty with the supplemental funding model is that commissions and
their staffs are not always capable of adequately reviewing the performance of the
counties’ indigent defense systems. This has sometimes been due to a lack of sufficient personnel, such as in Indiana where there are only two full-time employees.113
Commissions, therefore, must rely on self-reported data from the counties while
lacking the necessary personnel to validate its accuracy. Moreover, because partialauthority commissions cannot mandate uniform case-counting methods and/or a
statewide data system, the consistency and reliability of indigent defense data suffers.
110

111

112

113

See the website of the Indiana Public Defender Commission and the Annual Report Cover Letter
for 2007–2008 and Cover Letters for Annual Reports of prior fiscal years, available at http://www.
in.gov/judiciary/pdc/.
“Each county or city under this chapter shall adopt standards for the delivery of public defense
services, whether those services are provided by contract, assigned counsel, or a public defender
office. Standards shall include the following: Compensation of counsel, duties and responsibilities
of counsel, case load limits and types of cases, responsibility for expert witness fees and other costs
associated with representation, administrative expenses, support services, reports of attorney activity and vouchers, training, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of attorneys, substitution of
attorneys or assignment of contracts, limitations on private practice of contract attorneys, qualifications of attorneys, disposition of client complaints, cause for termination of contract or removal of
attorney, and nondiscrimination. The standards endorsed by the Washington state bar association
for the provision of public defense services should serve as guidelines to local legislative authorities
in adopting standards.” Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.101.030 (West 2005).
See ABA/TSG Indigent Defense Commissions, supra note 1, at 11. In Georgia, the state legislature acknowledged that the supplemental funding model failed and switched to the current partial
authority system in 2005. While using the supplemental funding model, Georgia did not provide
an adequate monetary incentive to encourage county compliance with their extensive standards
and counties in non-compliance still received state funds because the commission did not wish to
withhold funds from struggling county indigent defense systems or anger state legislators.
See website of Indiana Public Defender Commission, supra note 110.

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Partial-authority commissions also lack the authority to assure meaningful independence of the defense function throughout the state. Local authorities typically
determine the method for delivering defense services, as in Indiana mentioned
above, as well as the amount of county funding to be allocated for indigent defense.
Consequently, in states with partial authority commissions, it is virtually inevitable
that there will be significant statewide variations in the quality of representation.
When establishing a full state commission or statewide body for public defense cannot be achieved, it may make sense to start with a partial-authority commission. On
the other hand, compromise legislation that ends with a partial-authority commission
may actually serve to delay the achievement of lasting reform if the legislature believes
that it has tackled the problem of indigent defense and that nothing further need be
done. In the end, progress through partial-authority commissions is apt to be unsatisfactory because uniformity and independence of the defense function is not assured
statewide, and funding typically continues to be inadequate.

State Commissions with Limited Scope
Four states have statewide commissions of limited scope that oversee particular aspects of indigent defense representation. California, Illinois, Michigan, and Tennessee
have commissions overseeing statewide agencies that provide direct representation
in appellate and/or capital post-conviction cases.114 These commissions vary in their
ability to protect the independence and quality of the defense function under their
jurisdiction.
The sole responsibility of California’s capital post-conviction board of directors is
to appoint the Executive Director of the capital post-conviction office. While this
protects the office’s independence,115 there is no external quality control or body to
advocate for the office. Conversely, in Illinois, the State Appellate Defender is appointed by the Supreme Court and subject to removal for cause, so independence of
the agency’s chief executive is not ensured by the agency’s oversight board. However,
the board has authority regarding the quality of representation because it can advise
the State Appellate Defender concerning policy and approve its budget. In contrast,
in Michigan, the State Appellate Defender is appointed by the commission, which
also is authorized to oversee the quality of the representation through its role in
developing standards for the program. Similarly, in Tennessee, the Post-Conviction
114
115

See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
California’s Habeas Corpus Resource Center has a five-member board of directors. Each of
California’s five Appellate Projects appoints one member to the board. (These projects are nonprofit organizations that assign attorneys to non-capital appeals and provide training, as well as
some direct representation of indigent appellants.)

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Defender Commission appoints the Post-Conviction Defender, prepares the annual
budget, and oversees the expenditures of funds.
Another commission of limited scope is Colorado’s Alternate Defense Counsel
Commission. In cases where the Colorado State Public Defender has a conflict,
counsel is appointed through the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel.116 The commission ensures the independence of that office, as it appoints the Alternate Defense
Counsel.117 The commission also advises the Office of Alternate Defense Counsel
regarding “the development and maintenance of competent and cost-effective
representation.”118 Thus, Colorado protects the independence of the defense function
through two separate commissions because a commission also oversees the Colorado
State Public Defender.

Keys to a Successful Oversight Commission
A successful oversight body ensures the independence of the defense function, seeks
to secure quality indigent defense representation throughout the state, and directs the
allocation of resources. Attributes that distinguish an effective commission include
strong leadership, effective oversight, adequate staff, and the collection of accurate
and reliable data.
Since members of an indigent defense commission represent the interests of a program that is usually unpopular, its leadership must be well-respected, persistent, and
capable of communicating effectively with potentially adverse groups. In order to
effectuate change, both the commission and the chief defender or state director need
the assistance of diverse constituencies. Accordingly, the leadership must be politically
knowledgeable, adept at garnering a consensus, and possess strong professional and
interpersonal skills.
The capacity to provide effective oversight is another crucial component for a successful state commission. Thus, a commission needs to develop comprehensive standards
for assessing the adequacy of representation provided. In order to confirm compliance
with its standards and other requirements, a commission also must have sufficient
staff and resources to evaluate indigent defense on a regular basis. Furthermore, these
evaluations must be conducted in a manner that is transparent and fair so that both
state officials and the indigent defense providers accept the results as credible.

116
117
118

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-2-101(1) (2008).
Id. at § 2 1-2-101(3).
Id. at § 21-2-101(4).

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Another key ingredient to a commission’s success is access to accurate and reliable
data regarding indigent defense cases. A state should have a standardized statewide
case-tracking system to compile information, and, if one does not exist, the commission should be empowered to establish one. Accordingly, all providers should have to
report relevant statistics uniformly across the state, allowing for accurate individual
assessments as well as precise comparisons among localities. Without reliable data, a
commission cannot be confident about implementing changes, nor can it be an effective voice in communicating to the legislature the appropriate amount of funding for
indigent defense across the state.

C. Study Commissions
Study commissions or task forces can act as catalysts to indigent defense reform.
Many states have sought to improve their indigent defense delivery systems after the
publication of a study commission or task force report. While some states that have
formed study commissions needed a complete indigent defense overhaul, other states
requested a report in order to update their existing system.
The purpose of a study commission is to conduct an exhaustive examination of the
state’s indigent defense delivery system and make detailed recommendations for
improvement. Study commissions usually have been created by the legislature or the
state’s highest court or through the initiative of the state’s bar. Typically, because the
study commission’s members are volunteers with outside employment, an expert
consultant has been hired to conduct the broad-based evaluation, including data collection and analysis, site work, and interviews.
A successful study commission has many of the same characteristics as a permanent
oversight body. First, the members of the task force should be diverse, well-respected
individuals and should represent the numerous stakeholders in the criminal justice
system. Generally, task forces have included judges, prosecutors, local government
officials, legislative representatives, bar association members, criminal defense lawyers,
and, in some instances, private sector attorneys.
Judges and prosecutors can be important members of study commissions, as their
suggestions and support can be highly useful. While, in order to ensure the independence of the defense function, acting prosecutors should not be members of a permanent indigent defense oversight body, their presence on a task force can be beneficial.
Judges and prosecutors can provide insights regarding necessary improvements and
the impact of any changes on the criminal justice system as a whole. Their presence,

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moreover, helps to establish the impartiality of the study commission and can lend
credibility to its final report.
Successful study commissions also require a highly competent chairperson. The
chairperson is responsible not only for directing the efforts of the task force but also
for setting the appropriate tone for the other task force members and orchestrating
the release of the commission’s final report. The chairperson also should be someone
who is capable of advancing the report’s recommendations in the legislature. For this
purpose, the chairperson may seek to assemble a coalition of respected and interested
persons to work on securing the passage of reform legislation.
The work of study commissions should be as transparent as possible, which is necessary in order to attract support for its legislative proposals, and the commission
should consult with affected constituencies. Thus, task force meetings should be open
to the public and held in various geographic regions of the state to afford interested
individuals the opportunity to voice their opinions. It is important for task force
members to seek the views of the many affected parties involved in the criminal
justice system, including public defenders, assigned counsel, judges, prosecutors,
probation officers, law enforcement and county officials, and community members.
Finally, prior task forces have found it helpful to hear from representatives of indigent
defense programs in other states who can discuss their experiences in reforming and
maintaining their defense programs.

Previous Study Commissions
Study commissions have had varying degrees of success implementing their recommendations. Study commissions in at least 15 states recommended permanent statewide oversight bodies that were then established.119 Other state study commissions
are still working to transform their recommendations into law.120 New York, which
has a study commission, has not yet enacted indigent defense reforms, whereas North
Dakota has passed legislation as a result of its study commission’s recommendations.
The experiences of these two states illustrate the work and influence of study commissions and are discussed below.
New York has a county-operated and primarily county-financed system of indigent
defense. In May 2004, the Chief Justice of New York’s highest court formed the
Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services to examine the effectiveness
Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Texas.
120 See infra note 129 for states that currently have groups studying their state’s indigent defense
systems.
119

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of this system and consider alternative delivery models. Its 30 members were appointed from each of New York State’s 12 judicial districts and had extensive experience in the prosecution, defense, and adjudication of criminal cases; experience in the
legislative and budget processes; involvement in court and criminal justice improvement organizations; and academic scholarship regarding criminal justice and indigent
defense systems.121
The commission undertook an exhaustive study over two years of all aspects of the
provision of indigent defense services.122 After holding four public hearings across the
state, analyzing documentation provided by witnesses and other parties, and reviewing the comprehensive report compiled by its consultant, the commission determined
there was a crisis in the delivery of defense services throughout New York State.123
Overall, the commission concluded that the failure to provide the right to effective
assistance of counsel was attributable to the lack of an independent statewide oversight authority that could set standards and ensure accountability in the provision of
indigent defense representation, as well as to a grave lack of adequate state funding.
To resolve these problems, the commission made numerous recommendations,
including adoption of a new statewide, state-funded defender program with a
full-authority oversight commission. Other suggestions included achieving parity
between prosecutorial and defense resources and the development of a comprehensive
data collection system to provide a clear picture of indigent defense across the state.
Consistently with the commission’s recommendations, in April 2006, the New
York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers issued a proposed draft bill
calling for a statewide indigent defense delivery model overseen by a Public Defense
Commission.124 In November 2007, the New York Civil Liberties Union filed a
civil rights lawsuit, citing the commission’s findings and requesting declaratory and
injunctive relief against the State of New York for failing to provide meaningful and
effective legal representation to indigent defendants in five counties.125 Meanwhile, as
this report is completed at the beginning of 2009, no legislation to reform indigent
defense in New York State has been enacted.126
See Commission on the Future of Indigent Defense Services, Final Report to the
Chief Judge of the State of New York (2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/
indigentdefense-commission/IndigentDefenseCommission_report06.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 5.
124 See John Caher, Draft Bill Outlines Proposal for State ‘Defender General’, N.Y. L. J., May 1, 2006.
125 See NYCLU Files Systemic Lawsuit Challenging the Adequacy of New York’s Indigent Defense System,
The Spangenberg Rep., Apr. 2008, at 1. See also supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text,
Chapter 3.
126 See also Joel Stashenko, Plan To Reform Indigent Defense Stalls In Albany, N.Y. L. J., June 10, 2008, at
1.
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In contrast, North Dakota was more successful in implementing the recommendations of its study commission. In 2003, at the direction of the North Dakota legislature, a State Bar Indigent Defense Task Force was formed to study indigent defense
services across the state. At that time, North Dakota was the only state in the country
that used an indigent defense model relying primarily on private attorneys working
on an unlimited number of cases through a flat-fee contract with judges.127
A statewide study documented many systemic problems, including a lack of independence, inadequate funding, excessive caseloads, disparities in attorney compensation
across the state, and a lack of standards and oversight.128 In 2005, due to the study
commission’s report, the legislature passed a bill reforming the state’s indigent defense
system. The statute created an oversight body, the Commission on Legal Counsel for
Indigents, to develop and monitor compliance with statewide standards governing
the provision of indigent defense services. Three public defender offices were opened
and the state’s indigent defense budget more than doubled. Finally, a director was
hired to administer and coordinate delivery of the state’s defense services and supervise compliance with the commission’s standards.

Current Study Commissions
Several states currently are reviewing their indigent defense systems.129 Consider the
situations today in Maine and Nevada. Neither state has a statewide oversight body
or an entity that provides representation to indigent defendants statewide and, in
both states, study commissions have been initiated by their respective supreme courts.
Maine’s study commission is still in the investigation stage, while Nevada’s study
commission has made recommendations that were incorporated into an order of the
Nevada Supreme Court.
In Maine, indigent defendants are represented by attorneys appointed by the courts;
there are no public defender offices in the state and no state oversight body. The indigent defense fund is part of the judicial branch’s budget. As a result, when indigent
defense expenditures rise, other court needs go unmet or unrelated court fees are
increased.130 There are no experience requirements for appointed counsel, no training
Proposed North Dakota Legislation Could Overhaul State’s Indigent Defense System, The Spangenberg
Rep., Nov. 2004, at 20–21.
128 Id. See also The Spangenberg Group, Review of Indigent Defense Services in North Dakota
(2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
northdakotareport.pdf.
129 States with current study commissions include Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, and New Mexico.
130 J. Harrison, Indigent Defense Solutions Sought in Maine, Bangor Daily News, Jun. 21, 2008.
127

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requirements, no oversight of court-appointed counsels’ caseloads, and no review
of the performance of appointed counsel.131 A review of indigent defense in Maine
determined that the state fails to comply with nine of the ABA’s Ten Principles of a
Public Defense Delivery System.132
On May 12, 2008, by order of the Chief Justice of the Maine Supreme Court, the
Indigent Legal Services Commission was established.133 The commission’s purpose
is to study Maine’s indigent defense system and suggest improvements.134 Its stated
goal is an “indigent defense system that makes quality legal representation available
to Maine’s indigent population from lawyers who receive adequate compensation,
training, and support services based on a sustainable and responsible funding
mechanism.”135
The commission is a diverse body with over 25 members, including participants
from all three branches of government, various stakeholder groups, and individual
attorneys.136 The commission is responsible for examining mechanisms for appointing
counsel, compensation paid to appointed counsel, funding methods, and the adequacy of training and support services, as well as considering alternative ways of organizing and funding indigent defense services.137 Like predecessor study commissions in
other states, Maine is dealing with issues such as how to ensure the independence of
the defense function and how to address concerns of criminal defense attorneys that
they will be put out of business if the system is modified and full-time public defenders are introduced.
Nevada’s study commission was established in April 2007, after a series of articles
highlighting the problems in indigent defense representation in Las Vegas.138 The
Commission on Indigent Defense is comprised of judges, public defenders, private

See Maine Indigent Defense Center, available at http://www.meidc.org/background.html.
MSBA Summer Meeting, supra note 66, at 2. For the ABA Ten Principles of a Public Defense
Delivery System, see supra note 71, Chapter 1, and accompanying text.
133 Order of Chief Justice Saufley, Judicial Branch Indigent Legal Services Commission 1 (May 12,
2008), available at http://www.courts.state.me.us/committees/ilsc_charter.pdf.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. There are six members from the judicial branch, five from the executive branch and six from the
legislative branch. The “stakeholder group” includes the Maine Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, Maine Civil Liberties Union, Maine State Bar Association, Maine Indigent Defense
Center, and Maine Trial Lawyers. For a complete list of commission members, see http://www.
courts.state.me.us/committees/ilsc_charter.pdf.
137 See Order of Chief Justice Saufley, supra note 133, at 1–2.
138 See Alan Maimon, Indigent Defense Changes Endorsed, Las Vegas Rev. J., May 16, 2007, at 7B;
Riley, Nevada High Court Orders Indigent Defense Reforms, supra note 31.
131

132

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defense attorneys, prosecutors, and several other interested parties.139 It was created
“for the purposes of studying the issues and concerns with respect to the selection,
appointment, compensation, qualifications, performance standards, and caseloads” of
assigned counsel.140
After conducting a statewide survey of the condition of indigent defense representation, the study commission wrote a report containing recommendations on a range
of topics. Public hearings were then held to obtain reactions to the report’s findings
and make recommendations. Based on the commission’s report, the Nevada Supreme
Court issued an order on January 4, 2008, which made comprehensive changes to
the state’s indigent defense delivery system. These included: (1) preparing a statewide
standard for determining indigency; (2) instructing each judicial district to formulate
and submit for approval a procedure for the appointment of counsel that is independent of the judiciary; (3) requiring performance standards for court-appointed counsel; (4) ordering several large jurisdictions to conduct weighted caseload studies; and
(5) forming a permanent statewide oversight body.141 Because of objections from various counties and some judges, however, the court modified its order and reconvened
the Rural Issues Subcommittee of the Commission on Indigent Defense Services to
review the court’s recommendations and consider their impact on rural counties.142 A
hearing was scheduled for January 2009 to examine the subcommittee’s findings.143

See In the Matter of the Review of Issues, supra note 31. A list of commission members may be found at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/ccp/commissions/idc/index.
php?pageNum_rs_documents=0.
140 See In the Matter of the Review of Issues, supra note 31.
141 Id. See also supra note 31 and accompanying text, which addresses the status of the permanent state
oversight body at the time of the completion of this report.
142 See In the Matter of the Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants
in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/orders/ADKT411Order03_21_08.pdf.
143 For the report of the Rural Issues Subcommittee, see http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/
reports/IDCRuralSubcommitteeReport.pdf
139

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Recommendations and Commentary

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A. Introduction

ased upon the foregoing report on indigent defense and after due deliberation,
the Committee has concluded that a number of important reforms of indigent
defense services are urgently needed. We are by no means the first group to offer
recommendations, and ours are not nearly as lengthy as those urged by the American
Bar Association (ABA)1 and the National Legal Aid and Defender Association.2
Instead, the Committee has limited itself to those matters that we deem absolutely
critical to achieving lasting improvements in defense representation. The first four
chapters of this report provide ample support for the 22 recommendations that
follow.
We begin, in Recommendation 1, with a plea to legislators, judges, and prosecutors—
persons entrusted with primary responsibility for implementing the right to
counsel—to do what is necessary to assure compliance with the Constitution. In
Recommendations 2 through 11, we call for each state to establish an independent,
statewide organization to oversee all aspects of providing defense services, and we address the duties of such an organization. Absent such an approach, we are convinced
that states will not succeed in meeting their obligations to provide effective legal
representation of the indigent. But full implementation of the promise of the Sixth
Amendment will still likely remain elusive even if each state establishes a statewide
oversight organization. For this reason, in Recommendations 12 and 13, we call upon
the federal government to assist the states in discharging their duty to provide effective representation, as required by the nation’s federal Constitution.
Recommendations 17 and 18 reflect our recognition that reform in the indigent defense area is exceedingly difficult and typically cannot be achieved without a coalition
of partners dedicated to achieving improvements. Accordingly, we call upon state and
local bar associations, as well as a wide variety of other groups and persons, to work
together to seek indigent defense reforms. Finally, if other efforts do not succeed or
appear unlikely to do so, we conclude with Recommendations pertaining to indigent
defense litigation based upon our analysis of prior litigation contained in Chapters 1
and 3.

1
2

See ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1.
See NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2.

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B. Recommendations and Commentary
What States Should Do
Compliance with the Constitution
Recommendation 1—States should adhere to their obligation to guarantee fair criminal and
juvenile proceedings in compliance with constitutional requirements. Accordingly, legislators should
appropriate adequate funds so that quality indigent defense services can be provided. Judges should
ensure that all waivers of counsel are voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and on the record, and that
guilty pleas are not accepted from accused persons absent valid waivers of counsel. Prosecutors
should not negotiate plea agreements with accused persons absent valid waivers of counsel and
should adhere to their duty to assure that accused persons are advised of their right to a lawyer.
Commentary—First and foremost, this report is about implementing the right to counsel guaranteed to accused persons under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.3 For this Constitutional requirement to be implemented effectively,
adequate funding of defense services is indispensable.4 Our recommendations begin,
therefore, with the fervent request that those responsible for assuring that defense
services are provided do what is necessary to make sure that the right to counsel is
honored. This means that legislators must appropriate sufficient funds for indigent
defense and that judges and prosecutors must discharge their duties in compliance
with decisions of the United States Supreme Court and their ethical responsibilities.
A recent opinion column published in a Portland, Maine, newspaper succinctly
summarized the problem of indigent defense funding in state legislatures. Noting
that Maine’s Legislature was not providing sufficient financial support for indigent
defense, the writer explained: “This issue is not going to get the attention it deserves
from the Legislature because it has come up at a time when budgets are being cut,
not increased…. [A]nd there is not political muscle behind indigent defense.” Then,
comparing indigent defense with health care for senior citizens and education, the
writer concluded: “But the difference is, none of those programs is required by the
U.S. Constitution. According to the Supreme Court, indigent defense is, so failing to
meet that responsibility is against the law.”5
3
4
5

The duty of governments under the Constitution to provide defense services for the indigent is
explained in detail in this report. See infra notes 6–55 and accompanying text, Chapter 1,.
The wide range of problems in indigent defense due to inadequate financial resources is set forth in
Chapter 2.
Greg Kesich, Criminal Defense Costs Could Be the State’s Next Crisis, Portland Press herald,
December 17, 2008.

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The ABA’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct requires that judges “uphold and apply
the law, and … perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.”6 Among
the many responsibilities of judges is the duty to make certain that no waiver of
counsel is accepted unless it is “voluntary, knowing, intelligent, and on the record.”
Moreover, no guilty plea should be accepted from an accused unless there has been a
valid waiver of the right to counsel. Not only are these requirements of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions,7 but also the duty is often spelled out in court rules or in statutes.8
Yet, this report and other studies point to evidence that judges do not always take the
necessary steps, especially in misdemeanor cases, to assure that all waivers of counsel
are in fact valid.9 Because of concerns about waiver of counsel, the ABA has long
recommended steps that go well beyond this Recommendation and constitutional
requirements. The ABA urges that judges not accept waivers of counsel unless the
accused has spoken to a lawyer and that judges renew the offer of counsel at each new
stage of the proceedings when the accused appears without counsel.10
In discussing the role of the United States Attorney, the U.S. Supreme Court in
1935 spelled out basic precepts to guide prosecutors that are as important today
as when they were written. The prosecutor’s responsibility in a criminal case, the
Supreme Court noted, “is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done…. But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”11
The Supreme Court’s admonition is expressed today in the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which have been adopted in states throughout the country.12
In explaining the Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor, the Comment section notes
that prosecutors have “the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply of an
advocate.”13 This means that prosecutors must take steps to assure that “the defendant
is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence.”14
In addition, the black-letter provisions of the Model Rules prohibit prosecutors
from “seeking waivers of … important pretrial rights from unrepresented accused
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.2 (2007), available at http://www.abanet.org/
judicialethics/ ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
See, e.g., Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.111(d); Md. Rule 4-215(b); Pa. R. Crim. P. 121. For a statute that deals
with waiver of the right to counsel, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 135.045(c) (2007).
See supra notes 207–08, 226–35, and accompanying text, Chapter 2. See also ABA Gideon’s Broken
Promise, supra note 108, Chapter 2, at 24–26.
ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-8.2.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
See supra notes 80–85, Chapter 1.
ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
Id.

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persons,”15 which obviously includes the right to counsel. Specifically, respecting the
right to an attorney, the Model Rules require that prosecutors “make reasonable efforts to assure that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for
obtaining, counsel and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.”16
Yet, evidence is cited in this report17 and in other studies18 that prosecutors sometimes
seek waivers of counsel from and negotiate plea agreements with unrepresented
indigent persons. When unrepresented defendants plead guilty pursuant to negotiations with prosecutors, the prosecutors likely have violated their duty “not [to] give
legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure counsel,” as
required by the Model Rules.19 Accordingly, the Committee recommends that prosecutors neither engage in securing waivers of counsel nor negotiate plea agreements
with persons who have not validly waived their rights to legal representation.

Independence
Recommendation 2—States should establish a statewide, independent, non-partisan agency
headed by a Board or Commission responsible for all components of indigent defense s ervices. The
members of the Board or Commission of the agency should be appointed by leaders of the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches of government, as well as by officials of bar associations, and Board
or Commission members should bear no obligations to the persons, department of government, or
bar associations responsible for their appointments. All members of the Board or Commission should
be committed to the delivery of quality indigent defense services, and a majority of the members
should have had prior experience in providing indigent defense representation.
Commentary—This recommendation embodies fundamental cornerstones for establishing a successful program of public defense. Thus, the Committee recommends
that public defense programs be “independent,” organized at the state level, and that
members of the program’s governing Board or Commission, with authority “for all
components of indigent defense,” be appointed by a diverse group of officials and
organizations.
The need for independence has been repeatedly stressed in national reports and standards dealing with public defense. The first of the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public
Defense Delivery System, approved in 2002, calls for “the selection, funding, and
15
16

17
18
19

ABA Model Rules at R. 3.8 (c).
ABA Model Rules at R. 3.8 (b). ABA Standards provide that, at an initial court appearance, a
prosecutor “should not communicate with the accused unless a waiver of counsel has been entered,
except for the purpose of aiding in obtaining counsel or in arranging for the pretrial release of the
accused.” ABA Prosecution Function, supra note 228, Chapter 2, at 3-3.10 (a).
See discussion at supra notes 227–235 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, Chapter 2, at 24.
ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 4.3.

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payment of defense counsel … [to be] independent.”20 In fact, the call for independence was embodied in the first edition of standards dealing with Providing Defense
Services, approved by the ABA in 1968.21 Independence also was stressed by the
National Study Commission on Defense Services, organized by the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association, which in 1976 issued a lengthy report and numerous
recommendations dealing with all aspects of indigent defense.22
It is exceedingly difficult for defense counsel always to be vigorous advocates on
behalf of their indigent clients when their appointment, compensation, resources,
and continued employment depend primarily upon satisfying judges or other elected
officials. In contrast, prosecutors and retained counsel discharge their duties with
virtually complete independence, subject only to the will of the electorate in the case
of prosecutors and to rules of the legal profession. Judges, moreover, do not select
or authorize compensation for prosecutors or for lawyers retained by persons able to
afford an attorney’s fee. At a minimum, judicial oversight of the defense function creates serious problems of perception and opportunities for abuse.
What is needed are defense systems in which the integrity of the attorney-client relationship is safeguarded and defense lawyers for the indigent are just as independent as
retained counsel, judges, and prosecutors. The system most frequently recommended
to achieve this goal includes an independent Board or Commission vested with
responsibility for indigent defense.23 In a number of states, this recommendation has
been effectively implemented, as noted earlier in this report.24 The reason for having
a number of different officials appoint the Board or Commission is to reduce the
20

ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 1. See also ABA Providing Defense
Services, 5-1.3, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.3. NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense
Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.10.
“The plan should be designed to guarantee the integrity of the relationship between lawyer and
client. The plan and the lawyers serving under it should be free from political influence and should
be subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as are lawyers
in private practice.” ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to
Providing Defense Services, 1.4 (1st ed. 1968).
“Whether organized at the state, regional, or local level, the goal of any system for providing
defense services should be to provide uniformly high quality legal assistance through an independent
advocate.” NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 145
(emphasis added).
“An effective means of securing professional independence for defender organizations is to place
responsibility for governance in a board of trustees. Assigned-counsel and contract-for-service
components of defender systems should be governed by such a board.” ABA Providing Defense
Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 1, 5-1.3(b); ABA Ten Principles, supra note 1, Chapter 1, at
Principle 1 cmt: “To safeguard independence and to promote efficiency and quality of services, a
nonpartisan board should oversee defender, assigned counsel, or contract systems.” See also NLADA
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.10.
See supra Table II, Chapter 4, p. 151.

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likelihood that members of the governing board may feel in some way beholden to
the persons or organizations responsible for their appointment. To guard against this
possibility, the Committee recommends that “Board or Commission members should
bear no obligations to the persons, department of government, or bar associations
responsible for their appointments.” It is also preferable if no single person or organization is authorized to appoint a majority of the Board or Commission members.25
In some states, for example, the governor appoints a majority of the commission or
board members,26 but this approach is not recommended.
The kinds of persons to be appointed to the statewide Board or Commission are not
specified, except for providing that “all [appointees] should be committed to the delivery of quality indigent defense services, and a majority of the members should have
had prior experience in providing indigent defense representation.”27 The recommendation, therefore, does not preclude service on Boards or Commissions by judges and
active indigent criminal defense practitioners. But while such persons may, in fact,
make important contributions to the work of the governing body, including advocating effectively on behalf of adequate indigent defense appropriations and explaining
to the public the importance of defense counsel in our adversary system of justice, it
is important that they remain vigilant, respecting possible conflicts of interest, and
that they not intrude upon the independence of the defense function.28
25

Consistent with this approach, the NLADA National Study Commission on Defense Services
urged that “[n]o single branch of government should have a majority of votes on the commission.”
NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.10(c).
This approach is followed, for example, in Missouri and Oklahoma. Montana’s governor also appoints commission members but must follow certain requirements, such as selecting from among
candidates submitted by the state supreme court, the president of the state bar, and the houses of
the legislature. Kentucky’s governor appoints five of the nine members, two with no restrictions,
two appointed from a list submitted by the Kentucky Bar Association, and one appointed from a
list supplied by the Kentucky Protection and Advocacy Advisory Board. See ABA/TSG Indigent
Defense Commissions, supra note 1, Chapter 4, at Appendix A.
The Committee’s recommendation can be contrasted with those of the NLADA National Study
Commission on Defense Services: “A majority of the Commission should consist of practicing
attorneys.” NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.10(e).
Similarly, ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.3(b) provides that
“[a] majority of the trustees on boards should be members of the bar admitted to practice in the
jurisdiction.”
The ABA recommends that “[b]oards of trustees … not include prosecutors or judges.” ABA
Providing Defense Services, 5-1.3(b). The commentary to this black-letter provision explains:
“This restriction is necessary in order to remove any implication that defenders are subject to the
control of those who appear as their adversaries or before whom they must appear in the representation of defendants, except for the general disciplinary supervision which judges maintain over
all members of the bar.“ See also NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, at 2.10(f ):
“The commission should not include judges, prosecutors, or law enforcement officials.” See also the
discussion of prosecutors serving on statewide commissions at supra Chapter 4, p. 175.

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The recommendation also calls for defense services in each state to be organized on a
statewide basis.29 Only in this way is it possible to assure that the quality of defense
services throughout the state is substantially the same. Experience demonstrates that
there is virtually certain to be wide variations in the quality of services if each county
or other jurisdictional subdivision is able to structure defense services in a way that it
deems best. On the other hand, organizing defense services at the state level enables
management of the defense function to be centralized, promotes the equitable distribution of resources, and provides improved cost effectiveness. The agency should also
be “responsible for all components of indigent defense,” which should include not
only those kinds of cases in which counsel is extended as a matter of constitutional
right, but also to cases where the state requires counsel to be provided, even though
not constitutionally required.30
Finally, a statewide agency with responsibility for all components of indigent defense
establishes a permanent mechanism for achieving many of the vital objectives of an
effective public defense delivery system, including:

Establishing qualification standards for appointment of counsel;

Assisting in the development of eligibility standards for the appointment of counsel and ensuring that persons are screened to ensure their eligibility for counsel;

Matching attorney qualifications with the complexity of cases;

Tracking caseloads, as well as monitoring and evaluating attorney performance;

Developing and providing training for all in persons in the state who provide
indigent defense services, including both entry-level attorneys and advanced
practitioners;

Offering access to technology and vital resources and support services; and

Providing an important voice in the political sphere by serving as an advocate in
support of indigent defense.

Currently, 27 states have a centralized state agency for administering either entirely or substantially
trial-level indigent defense services. See supra notes 2–10, Table II, and accompanying text, Chapter
2.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.

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Recommendation 3—The Board or Commission should hire the agency’s Executive Director or State
Public Defender, who should then be responsible for hiring the staff of the agency. The agency
should act as an advocate on behalf of improvements in indigent criminal and juvenile defense
representation and have the authority to represent the interests of the agency before the legislature
pertaining to all such matters. Substantial funding for the agency should be provided by the state
from general fund revenues.
Commentary—One of the most important responsibilities of the Board or Commission
is to retain the Executive Director or State Public Defender, who should have broad
responsibilities for the administration of indigent defense services in the state pursuant to policies established by the agency’s governing authority. Although not specifically mentioned in the recommendation, consistent with other standards in this area,
the Executive Director or State Public Defender should be appointed for a fixed term
and not be subject to removal except for good cause.31 Among the chief duties of the
agency’s head should be hiring the agency’s staff.32 This person, however, will likely
want to consult with the Board or Commission respecting hiring procedures, as well
as many other critical administrative matters.
In every state, the cause of indigent defense requires persistent and articulate advocates to speak both in support of reforms to enhance the fairness of the justice system
and address the need for adequate funding of the defense function. The latter is especially important because the indispensable role of defense counsel in the adversary
system of criminal and juvenile justice is not always appreciated or fully understood
by the public and legislators. While the head of the statewide agency should be a
leading spokesperson on behalf of indigent defense and systemic reform, members of
the agency’s governing body should also be involved in such efforts.
As noted earlier, there are now 28 states in which all, or almost all, of the funding for
indigent defense is provided by the state’s central government.33 Moreover, statewide
programs generally tend to be better financed than indigent defense systems funded
through a combination of state and county funds.34 But in recent years, in a number
of states, special fines, taxes, and assessments have been imposed frequently either
31
32

33
34

See ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-4.1; National Guidelines
for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.11(f ).
This is the approach most commonly used among the states. For example, Montana’s new statute
authorizes the state director for defense services to hire or contract for the necessary personnel. See
ABA/TSG Indigent Defense Commissions, supra note 1, Chapter 4, Appendix A. But see LA.
Rev. Stat. Ann § 15:150(A), which gives the Public Defender Board the authority to hire not only
the director of the office but also the senior management team. See also supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
See supra notes 29–30, Table I, and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
Compare Table I at supra note 28, Chapter 2, with ABA/TSG FY 2005 State and County
Expenditures, supra note 44, Chapter 2.

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against indigent defendants, who are the least able to afford the expense, or others as
a means of covering the state’s indigent defense budget.35 Because such charges can
sometimes chill the exercise of the right to counsel and serve as an excuse for the legislature not to appropriate sufficient funds for indigent defense, the recommendation
provides that “[s]ubstantial funding for … [indigent defense] should be provided by
the state from general fund revenues.”

States Without a Board or Commission
Recommendation 4—In states that do not have a statewide, independent, non-partisan agency
responsible for all components of indigent defense services, a statewide task force or study commission should be formed to gather relevant data, assess its quality as measured by recognized national
standards for the delivery of such services, and make recommendations for systemic improvements.
The members of the task force or study commission should be appointed by leaders of the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches of government, as well as by officials of bar associations, and task
force or study commission members should bear no obligations to the persons, departments of
government, or bar associations responsible for their appointments.
Commentary—The second recommendation of this report expresses the Committee’s
strong preference for “a statewide, non-partisan agency, headed by a Board or
Commission … responsible for all components of indigent defense services.”
Although this approach has been embraced by a number of states, the movement
toward centralized state control of indigent defense overseen by a board or commission is by no means complete, as structures of this kind do not exist in a majority
of states.36 Accordingly, the Committee recommends that in states without such
statewide programs, there should be “a statewide task force or study commission” for
gathering data and assessing the quality of the state’s indigent defense system against
national standards for the delivery of indigent defense services. This approach often
has served as the forerunner to establishment of a statewide indigent defense agency
headed by an independent board or commission, as discussed earlier in this report.37
35

See The Spangenberg Group Report, Public Defender Application Fees: 2001 Update
(2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/
pdapplicationfees2001-narrative.pdf. For examples of state statutes imposing public defender application fees, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 21-1-103 (3); N.M. Stat. § 31-15-12 (c) (2001). A constitutional
problem is present, however, if such fees cannot be waived. See State v. Tennin, 674 N.W.2d 403,
410 (Minn. 2004) (statute requiring a $50 co-payment for public defender assistance that could not
be waived violated indigent defendant’s right to counsel and was, therefore, unconstitutional). See
also supra note 50, Chapter 1.
See supra notes 2–21, 100–02, Table II, and accompanying text, Chapter 4. As reflected in Table II,
there are only 19 states that have a state public defender or a state director, as well as an oversight
board or commission with responsibility for indigent defense throughout the state.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.

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To assure independence of the undertaking, the Committee recommends the same
procedure for selecting members of the task force or commission as specified in
Recommendation 2, for the selection of members of a permanent statewide indigent
defense board or commission.

Qualifications, Performance, and Supervision of Counsel
Recommendation 5—The Board or Commission should establish and enforce qualification and
performance standards for defense attorneys in criminal and juvenile cases who represent persons
unable to afford counsel. The Board or Commission should ensure that all attorneys who provide
defense representation are effectively supervised and remove those defense attorneys who fail to
provide quality services.
Commentary—No system of public defense representation for indigent persons can be
successful unless the lawyers who provide the representation are capable of rendering
quality representation. Regardless of whether assigned counsel, contract attorneys, or
public defenders provide the defense services, states should require that the attorneys
be well qualified to do so. A tiered system of qualifications for appointment to different levels of cases, depending on the training and experience of the lawyers, will
help to ensure that the defender has the requisite knowledge and skills to deliver high
quality legal services, whether the charge is juvenile delinquency, a simple misdemeanor, or a complex felony.38
A meaningful assessment of attorney qualifications, however, should go beyond
objective quantitative measures, such as years of experience and completed training.
States should also implement other more substantive screening tools, including audits
of prior performance, in-court observations, inspection of motions and other written
work, and peer assessments.39 In assessing attorney qualifications, the use of performance standards such as those developed by the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association can be quite useful.40

The same concept has been embraced by the ABA: “Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience should match the complexity of the case.” ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at
Principle 6, n.21.
Recommendations of the American Bar Association (ABA) pertaining to death penalty representation contain provisions related to attorney qualifications and monitoring of attorney performance.
See ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases (2003) [hereinafter ABA Death Penalty Guidelines] Guidelines 5.1 and 7.1. England also
has developed extensive procedures for monitoring the performance of private lawyers who provide
representation in criminal legal aid. See Lefstein, Lessons from England, supra note 57, Chapter 1, at
899–900.
See NLADA Performance Guidelines, supra note 72, Chapter 1.

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It is not sufficient, however, just to make sure that attorneys who provide defense services are qualified when they begin to provide representation. It is also essential that
they be supervised during the early years of their careers as indigent defense counsel,
whether they serve in a public defender agency or other program for indigent defense. The oversight called for in this recommendation should not be undertaken by
members of the Board or Commission, but rather by experienced staff of the agency
or members of the bar with whom there are special arrangements to provide supervision or assessments.41
In addition, there should be procedures for removal from the list of lawyers who may
serve as assigned counsel or contract attorneys.42 The ABA has long called for procedures to remove from the roster of lawyers who provide legal services “those who have
not provided quality representation.”43 More recently, the ABA specifically endorsed
procedures for removal of unqualified lawyers from the list of defense lawyers who
provide representation in capital cases.44

Workload
Recommendation 6—The Board or Commission should establish and enforce workload limits for
defense attorneys, which take into account their other responsibilities in addition to client representation, in order to ensure that quality defense services are provided and ethical obligations are not
violated.
Commentary—The most well trained and highly qualified lawyers cannot provide
“quality defense services” when they have too many clients to represent, i.e., when
their “caseload” is excessively high. It is critical, moreover, that in addition to
caseload, an attorney’s other responsibilities (e.g., attendance at training programs,
41

This is consistent with recommendations of the ABA, which urge that Boards overseeing the defense function be responsible for establishing policy of the agency but “precluded from interfering
in the conduct of particular cases.” See ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter
1, at 5-1.3.
Removal from a list of lawyers eligible to receive appointments is different than the situation when
a defense lawyer seeks to withdraw from a case. Normally, court approval to withdraw from an
assigned case is required. See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
“The roster of lawyers should periodically be revised to remove those who have not provided quality
legal representation or who have refused to accept appointments on enough occasions to evidence
lack of interest. Specific criteria for removal should be adopted in conjunction with qualification
standards.” See ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-2.3(b).
“Where there is evidence that an attorney has failed to provide high quality legal representation,
the attorney should not receive additional appointments and should be removed from the roster.
Where there is evidence that a systemic defect in a defender office has caused the office to fail to
provide high quality legal representation, the office should not receive additional appointments.”
ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, supra note 39, 7.1 (c).

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administrative matters, etc.) be considered in assessing an attorney’s overall “workload.” Accordingly, the Committee urges that workload limits, which take caseload
into account, be established and enforced for all attorneys furnishing indigent defense
representation.
Similarly, the ABA Ten Principles call for the workload of defense counsel to be
“controlled to permit the rendering of quality representation.”45 This objective is
among the most important in this report, since excessive caseloads in public defense
is a pervasive national problem.46 As a result, indigent defense counsel are frequently
unable to render “competent” representation to their clients as required by rules of
professional conduct,47 let alone provide “quality” services as recommended in ABA
standards48 and in this report.
Although national annual caseload standards have been cited for many years and
both the ABA and the American Council of Chief Defenders have indicated that
the numbers of cases in these standards should not be exceeded,49 the determination
of the numbers of cases that a lawyer should undertake during the course of a year
must necessarily be a matter of assessment. This point was emphasized in an ethics
opinion in 2006 issued by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, which made clear that there could be no “mathematically set number
of cases a lawyer may handle as an ethical norm.”50 Ultimately, responsibility for a
lawyer’s ethical conduct rests with the independent professional judgment of the
individual attorney and cannot be determined by policies regarding caseloads, by a

46
47

“Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality representation.” ABA
Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 5. The commentary distinguishes workload
from caseload in that workload is “caseload adjusted by factors such as case complexity, support
services, and an attorney’s nonrepresentational duties.” Id. at cmt.
See supra notes 105–24 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”
ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.1. The requirement of “competent representation” has been accepted by state rules of professional conduct throughout the country. The ABA’s
rules are the model for ethics rules for almost all states. See http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/
model_rules.html
“The objective in providing counsel should be to assure that quality legal representation is afforded
to all persons eligible for counsel pursuant to this chapter. The bar should educate the public on
the importance of this objective.” ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at
5-1.1.
“National caseload standards should in no event be exceeded….” ABA Ten Principles, supra note
70, Chapter 1, at Principle 5 cmt. The same position has been adopted by the American Council of
Chief Defenders. See also supra notes 81–90, Chapter 1; and supra notes 96–107, Chapter 2.
ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 86, Chapter 1.

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contract with a governmental body, or by the directions of a supervisor.51 Obviously,
a lawyer’s annual caseload must take into account a wide variety of factors, such
as the extent of support services, especially including investigators and paralegals,
complexity of the cases, the extent of the lawyer’s experience, the speed at which cases
proceed through the courts, and the lawyer’s other duties as a professional.
The issue of workload is important not only to public defenders but also to assigned
counsel and to private attorneys who provide services pursuant to contracts. In the
case of private attorneys, this should include oversight of the extent of their private
practice in order to ensure that they have adequate time to devote to their indigent
cases.52 The goal should be to make sure that all attorneys who provide defense services have adequate time to devote to their cases and are thus able to meet established
performance standards for each client’s case, including fulfilling basic responsibilities
related to interviewing the client, conducting investigations, discovery and motions
practice, trial preparation, sentencing, and post-conviction matters.
This Recommendation should be read in conjunction with Recommendation 14,
which deals with the duties of defense lawyers and defender programs faced with
excessive numbers of cases. Also, Recommendation 15 addresses the duties of judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers to report to disciplinary agencies knowledge of serious ethical violations.

Compensation
Recommendation 7—Fair compensation should be provided, as well as reasonable fees and
overhead expenses, to all publicly funded defenders and for attorneys who provide representation
pursuant to contracts and on a case-by-case basis. Public defenders should be employed full time
whenever practicable and salary parity should be provided for defenders with equivalent prosecution attorneys when prosecutors are fairly compensated. Law student loan forgiveness programs
should be established for both prosecutors and public defenders.

However, if an attorney and supervisor disagree about whether competent representation has been
or can be provided to the client, and the matter is “arguable” as a matter of professional duty, the
attorney does not violate his or her professional duty in complying with a supervisor’s “reasonable
resolution” of the matter. See ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 5.2 (b).
Although the work of most private defense lawyers who serve as assigned counsel is not monitored,
there are a few notable exceptions in which there is some oversight. For example, in Massachusetts,
the Committee on Public Counsel Services (CPCS), which is the state’s agency for providing indigent defense services, makes an effort to evaluate the services of assigned counsel. Also, the CPCS
imposes strict limitations on the numbers of cases for which assigned counsel can be compensated
during the year. Also, assigned counsel may only be compensated for 1800 billable hours of service
per year. See Lefstein, Lessons from England, supra note 57, Chapter 1, at 909–10.

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Commentary—The compensation paid to defenders, as well as the fees provided
through contracts and to assigned counsel on a case-by-case basis, often discourages
well qualified lawyers from representing the indigent and adversely impact the quality of services provided by those who do. In defender offices, low salaries contribute
to high turnover and difficulty in recruiting experienced and skilled attorneys.
Inadequate compensation of court-appointed lawyers and contract attorneys contributes to lawyers accepting a high volume of cases that can be disposed of quickly
as a way of maximizing income and may serve as a disincentive to invest the essential
time required to provide quality representation. To avoid these kinds of problems, the
ABA urges “reasonable” compensation for defense counsel and, similar to the above
standard, “parity between defense counsel and the prosecution in resources….”53
This recommendation also calls for all salaried public defenders to be employed full
time “whenever practicable.” The Committee’s recommendation is largely consistent
with the approach of the ABA54 and the National Study Commission,55 while
recognizing that, in some jurisdictions. there may be especially rural areas in which
full-time defenders may not make sense. Overall, however, the Committee believes
that full-time defenders are more likely to have sufficient time to develop the requisite knowledge and skills necessary to provide quality legal services while avoiding
the temptation to devote a disproportionate amount of time to paying clients. Also,
funding sources cannot use the prospect of defenders acquiring retained clients as a
justification for keeping defender salaries unreasonably low.
Because of high student loan indebtedness, recent law school graduates are sometimes
discouraged from applying for positions in public interest law, including serving as
prosecutors and defenders.56 Recently, Congress enacted legislation that includes
“loan forgiveness,” pursuant to which law graduates who work as public defenders
and prosecutors may have a portion of their student loans forgiven.57 This legislation
is much needed and will assist the states in attracting recent law graduates to serve
as defense attorneys and prosecutors.58 But the need for loan forgiveness is enor-

53
54

55
56

57
58

ABA Ten Principles, supra note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 8.
“Defense organizations should be staffed with full-time attorneys. All such attorneys should be
prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law.” ABA Providing Defense Services, supra
note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-4.2.
NLADA Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 2.9.
See ABA Commission on Loan Repayment and Forgiveness, Lifting the Burden: Law
Student Debt as a Barrier to Public Service (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/lrap/lrapfinalreport.pdf.
The College Cost Reduction and Access Act, Pub. L. No. 110-84, § 401 (2007).
See generally Philip G. Schrag, Federal Loan Repayment Assistance for Public Interest Lawyers and
Other Employees of Governments and Nonprofit Organizations, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 27 (2007).

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mous, and thus, the Committee recommends that states also adopt and fund loan
forgiveness legislation for the benefit of prosecutors and defense lawyers.

Adequate Support and Resources
Recommendation 8—Sufficient support services and resources should be provided to enable all defense attorneys to deliver quality indigent defense representation, including access to independent
experts, investigators, social workers, paralegals, secretaries, technology, research capabilities, and
training.
Commentary—“Support services and resources,” as well as “training,” are indispensable
if attorneys are to provide quality defense representation. In their absence, criminal
and juvenile proceedings become fundamentally unfair. Yet, an enormous disparity
exists between the resources available to prosecutors, who can draw upon police and
state law enforcement agencies, and those furnished to public defenders, assigned
counsel, and contract attorneys. Providing defense lawyers with resources such as “independent experts,59 investigators, social workers, paralegals, secretaries, technology,
[and] research capabilities” not only creates a more level playing field between prosecution and defense, but also is substantially more efficient than asking overburdened
defenders to somehow compensate for their absence. Professionally trained and experienced investigators, for instance, can conduct factual investigations at lower expense
than attorneys, while freeing attorneys to devote their time to other important tasks,
such as filing motions, communicating with their clients, and preparing for court
appearances.60
Training is another of those requirements essential for providing quality service as defense attorneys.61 Not only must those serving as defense counsel possess the requisite
knowledge, especially in countless and sometimes complex subject areas of criminal
and juvenile law that are not covered in law schools, but they also need to hone
their advocacy skills in order to be effective in representing their clients. Training is
especially important when lawyers begin their service as counsel for the indigent,
just as new policemen and firemen must undergo training before they begin serving
59
60

The constitutional basis for furnishing experts on behalf of the indigent is discussed at supra notes
33–36, Chapter 1, and accompanying text.
The importance of support services is emphasized in prior standards related to defense services. See,
e.g., ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-1.4; NLADA Guidelines
for Legal Defense Systems, supra note 1, Chapter 2, at 3.1.
Training has been emphasized in prior standards related to indigent defense. “Counsel and staff
providing defense services should have systemic and comprehensive training appropriate to their
areas of practice and at least equal to that received by prosecutors.” ABA Ten Principles, supra
note 70, Chapter 1, at Principle 9, cmt. See also ABA Providing Defense Services, 5-1.5; NLADA
Guidelines for Legal Defense Systems, 5.7–5.8.

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to protect the public. As in other areas of law practice, training of defense lawyers
should continue throughout their careers, whether they are serving as public defenders, assigned counsel, or contract attorneys.62

Eligibility and Prompt Assignment
Recommendation 9—Prompt eligibility screening should be undertaken by individuals who are
independent of any defense agency, and defense lawyers should be provided as soon as feasible
after accused persons are arrested, detained, or request counsel.
Commentary—Consistent with this recommendation, the ABA has long recommended
that lawyers “be provided to the accused as soon as feasible and, in any event, after
custody begins, at appearance before a committing magistrate, or when formal
charges are filed, whichever occurs earliest.”63 As discussed earlier in this report, the
U.S. Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the proposition that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel “attaches” when the accused is brought to court for an initial judicial
hearing regardless of whether the prosecutor is aware of the proceeding.64 In the vast
majority of states, in the District of Columbia, and in the federal courts, counsel
is made available for the indigent accused before, at, or just after the initial court
appearance.65
In order to provide defense counsel as soon as feasible in accordance with this
Recommendation, “prompt eligibility screening” is essential. It is also highly desirable
that screening be undertaken pursuant to uniform written standards used throughout the jurisdiction.66 An agency with authority to administer indigent defense
services statewide, as urged in Recommendation 2, is in a position to adopt uniform
62

63
64
65
66

Forty-two states currently require some form of mandatory continuing legal education for all
attorneys, not just for lawyers practicing in the area of criminal defense. See Summary of MCLE
Jurisdiction Requirements, available at http://www.abanet.org/cle/mcleview.html.
ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-6.1.
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 Sup. Ct. 2578, 2586 (2008).
See Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice: Guidelines for Appointing Defense
Counsel at 6–8 (2008) available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/c8599960b77429dd22_y6m6ivx7r.
pdf. This report recommends that “screening for eligibility must compare the individual’s available
income and resources to the actual price of retaining a private attorney. Non-liquid assets, income
needed for living expenses, and income and assets of family and friends should not be considered
available for purposes of this determination…. [P]eople who receive public benefits, cannot post
bond, reside in correctional or mental health facilities, or have incomes below a fixed multiple of
the federal poverty guidelines should be presumed eligible for state-appointed counsel.” Id. at 2.
The ABA recommends, and the great majority of states provide, that the test to qualify for appointed counsel is whether the person is financially capable, without substantial financial hardship,
of retaining a private attorney. See ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at
5-7.1 and accompanying Commentary.

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eligibility standards for the state. Uniformity also helps states predict future costs of
the state’s indigent defense program while enhancing the public trust of the state’s
justice system.
It is also important to focus on the persons who conduct eligibility screening. This
Recommendation urges that all such screening be conducted by persons “who are
independent of any defense agency.” A recent national report on eligibility screening
in indigent defense sums the matter up this way: “Conflict of interest concerns,
confidentiality rules, and harm to the attorney-client relationship all caution against
screening by either the defender or the public defender program that represents a particular client. As a practical matter, many public defender programs do screen their
own clients, but as an ethical matter, they should not.”67 The report then provides
illustrations of defenders inappropriately limiting their caseloads through the use of
strict eligibility standards and notes the risk that defenders and defender programs
are sometimes tempted to reject cases because they appear to be time-consuming or
unpopular, or for other reasons. Instead of screening by defenders, it makes far better
sense for screening to be conducted by court personnel or by individuals employed
by a pretrial services agency.

Reclassification
Recommendation 10—In order to promote the fair administration of justice, certain non-serious
misdemeanors should be reclassified, thereby reducing financial and other pressures on a state’s
indigent defense system.
Commentary—A significant way in which the need to provide defense counsel can be
reduced is by reclassifying certain non-serious misdemeanors as civil infractions, for
which defendants are subject only to fines. If the potential for incarceration of the
accused is eliminated, counsel need not be furnished under the Sixth Amendment.68
There are a number of examples in which states have reclassified offenses, typically
involving violations where incarceration was rarely sought or imposed,69 but there are
67
68
69

Brennan Center for Justice, Eligible for Justice, supra note 66, at 10.
See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
For example, between 1971 and 2001, 25 states decriminalized sodomy and the state supreme courts
in 10 other states ruled that their statutes were unconstitutional. In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court
effectively ruled that sodomy statutes in 15 states were unconstitutional. Starting with the passage of
the 21st Amendment in 1933, which left decisions to criminalize alcohol to state and local control,
there has been a steady decriminalization of alcohol sales and use. Many aspects of gambling also
have been decriminalized over the years, as states now often operate lotteries or allow casinos
and off-track betting. Darryl Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223, 235
(2007). See also Kara Godbehere Goodwin, Is the End of the War in Sight: An Analysis of Canada’s
Decriminalization of Marijuana and the Implications for the United States War on Drugs, 22 Buff.
Pub. Int. L. J. 199 (2004). See also supra notes 140–50 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.

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undoubtedly other situations in which the approach is feasible. Not only does such
action reduce crowded court dockets, freeing up the time of judges and prosecutors
to devote to more serious matters, but it also decreases jail costs. Moreover, it lightens
defender caseloads, permitting savings to be used to fund other defense expenses.
Additional civil fines collected in lieu of jail time are also a revenue source.

Data Collection
Recommendation 11—Uniform definitions of a case and a consistent uniform case reporting system
should be established for all criminal and juvenile delinquency cases. This system should provide
continuous data that accurately contains the number of new appointments by case type, the number
of dispositions by case type, and the number of pending cases.
Commentary—Among the most vexing problems in indigent defense are predicting
the number of lawyers needed to provide quality representation in all cases eligible
for the appointment of counsel, as well as the costs of additional personnel such as
investigators, paralegals, and expert witnesses. If a public defense system is organized
on a statewide basis, as urged in Recommendation 2, the state agency is able to gather
uniform data throughout the state, thereby enabling annual budget projections to be
based upon “the number of new appointments by case type, the number of dispositions by case type, and the number of pending cases” that typically remain open at
the end of a fiscal year. For instance, Louisiana’s legislation enacted in 2007, which
established a statewide public defense system, provides that the agency’s governing
board shall ensure that “data, including workload, is collected and maintained in
a uniform and timely manner throughout the state to allow the board sound data
to support resource needs.”70 But even a “uniform case reporting system,” as the
Committee recommends, will not be successful unless there also are “uniform definitions of a case,” which will ensure that the reported data is consistent throughout the
state. To remedy this kind of deficiency, at least one state has required, by statute,
uniform case standards for reporting purposes.71 If possible, the definition of a case
adopted for the defense should be consistent with the definition used by prosecutors

70
71

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-148 (B) (f ) (11) (Supp. 2009).
A Tennessee statute provides as follows: “District attorneys general shall treat multiple incidents as
a single incident for purposes of this statute when the charges are of a related nature and it is the
district attorney general’s intention that all of the charges be handled in the same court proceeding.
If a case has more than one charge or count, then the administrative office of the courts shall count
the case according to the highest class of charge or count at the time of filing or disposition….”
T.C.A. 16-1-117 (a) (1) (2008).

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within the state, thereby facilitating comparisons between prosecution and defense
caseloads.72 .

What the Federal Government Should Do
A National Center for Defense Services
Recommendation 12—The federal government should establish an independent, adequately funded
National Center for Defense Services to assist and strengthen the ability of state governments to provide quality legal representation for persons unable to afford counsel in criminal cases and juvenile
delinquency proceedings.
Commentary—As discussed earlier in this report, the duty of providing defense
representation in criminal and juvenile cases derives from decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court and is based upon interpretations of the federal Constitution’s Sixth
Amendment.73 Taken together, the Court’s decisions are an expensive unfunded
mandate with which state and/or local governments have been struggling for more
than 45 years.74 Although the federal government established the Legal Services
Corporation in 1974 to assist states in providing legal services in civil cases, in which
there is not a constitutional right to counsel,75 the federal government has not
enacted comparable legislation to assist states in cases where there is a constitutional
right to counsel or where states require that counsel be appointed, even though it is
not constitutionally mandated. The Committee applauds the establishment of the
Legal Services Corporation but believes there should also be a federal program to help
the states defray the costs of defense services in criminal and juvenile cases.
Thirty years ago, the ABA endorsed the establishment of a federally funded “Center
for Defense Services,” and the Association reiterated its support for such a program
in 2005.76 The Center’s mission would be to strengthen the services of publicly
72

73
74
75
76

Standardized definitions for felony and misdemeanor cases have been recommended. See State
Court Guide to Statistical Reporting, National Center for State Courts 67–68 (n.d.),
available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/StCtGuide_StatReporting_Complete_
color10-26-05.pdf.
See supra notes 1–26 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
The Supreme Court has made relatively few comments about the cost to the states in providing
indigent defense services. See supra notes 58–65 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
See The Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. 2996 (1974).
ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Recommendation for
Establishment of a Center for Defense Services (1979), available at http://www.abanet.org/legal
services/downloads/sclaid/121.pdf; ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, Chapter 2, at
41 (Recommendation 2).

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funded defender programs in all states by providing grants, sponsoring pilot projects,
supporting training, conducting research, and collecting and analyzing data. The
original report submitted to the Association’s House of Delegates in 1979 explained
the proposal’s importance: “If adequately funded by the Congress, the Center could
have far-reaching impact in eliminating excessive caseloads…, providing adequate
training and support services … and in facilitating representation as well as ensuring
that quality defense services are available in all cases where counsel is constitutionally
required.”77

Federal Research and Grant Parity
Recommendation 13—Until a National Center for Defense Services is established, as called for in
Recommendation 12, the United States Department of Justice should use its grant and research capabilities to collect, analyze, and publish financial data and other information pertaining to indigent
defense. Federal financial assistance through grants or other programs as provided in support of
state and local prosecutors should also be provided in support of indigent defense, and the level of
federal funding for prosecution and defense should be substantially equal.
Commentary—As noted in the Commentary to Recommendation 12, the call for a
National Center for Defense Services is not new. Although Congress has not been
persuaded to enact such a program, the Committee is convinced that the proposal
still makes excellent sense. However, in the absence of such a program, there are valuable steps that the federal government can take through existing agencies of the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) to enhance indigent defense.
The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) of the DOJ, for example, develops and disseminates data about crime, administers federal grants, provides training and technical
assistance, and supports technology development and research. The OJP’s bureaus
include, among others, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), which gives assistance
to local communities to improve their criminal justice systems, and the Bureau of
Justice Statistics (BJS), which provides timely and objective data about crime and the
administration of justice at all levels of government.78 Also, the National Institute
of Justice (NIJ), the research and evaluation agency of DOJ, offers independent,
evidence-based knowledge and tools designed to meet the challenges of criminal
justice, particularly at state and local levels.79

77
78
79

ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, Recommendation for
Establishment of a Center for Defense Services, supra note 76, at 4.
See Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) website, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/about/
aboutbja.html.
See National Institute of Justice website, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/.

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Although the overwhelming majority of expenditures by these agencies have been
devoted to enhance law enforcement, crime control, prosecution, and corrections,80
a few successful defense-oriented projects have been funded, which suggest that
increased federal attention to indigent defense could have significant positive impact.
For instance, in both 1999 and 2000, BJA hosted two symposia that brought together
from all 50 states criminal justice professionals, including judges and leaders in
indigent defense, to explore strategies to improve the delivery of defense services.81
The National Defender Leadership Project, supported by a grant from BJA, offered training and produced a series of publications to assist defender managers in
becoming more effective leaders.82 Grant awards by the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, another bureau of OJP, have supported a national assessment of indigent defense services in delinquency proceedings as well as numerous
individual state assessments of access to counsel and of the quality of representation
in such proceedings.83
While the foregoing projects and programs are commendable, the financial support
of DOJ devoted to indigent defense is substantially less than the sum spent on the
improvement of prosecution services at the state and local level. For this reason, the
Committee calls for the financial support of “prosecution and defense … [to] be
substantially equal.”

81
82
83

Examples of such programs include the Targeting Violent Crime Initiative, The Bulletproof Vest
Partnership Program, Counter-Terrorism Training and Recourses for Law Enforcement, and Project
Safe Neighborhoods. See website for list of current BJA projects, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/BJA/programs/index.html.
See, e.g., National Symposium on Indigent Defense 2000, Final Report (Office of Justice
Programs 2000).
See The National Defender Leadership Institute webpage, available at http://www.nasams.org/
Defender_NDLI/Defender_NDLI_About.
For an example of such reports, see Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,
Juvenile Delinquency Guidelines: Improving Court Practices in Juvenile Delinquency
Cases (2005), available at http://www.ncjfcj.org/images/stories/dept/ppcd/pdf/JDG/juvenile
delinquencyguidelinescompressed.pdf.

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representation when faced with excessive workloads that will lead to a breach of their professional
obligations.
Commentary—This recommendation is based squarely on the rules of professional conduct that govern lawyers throughout the United States in representing their clients.
It is also a recommendation that has long been endorsed in standards of the ABA,84
in the ABA’s 2004 national report on indigent defense,85 and, finally, in a 2006
ethics opinion issued by the ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility.86 In this opinion, the most prestigious ethics committee in the country summed up the duty of defense counsel:
If workload prevents a lawyer from providing competent and diligent
representation to existing clients, she must not accept new clients. If
the clients are being assigned through a court appointment system, the
lawyers should request that the court not make any new appointments.
Once the lawyer is representing a client, the lawyer must move to withdraw from representation if she cannot provide competent and diligent
representation…. Lawyer supervisors, including heads of defenders’
offices and those within such offices having intermediate managerial
responsibilities, must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other
lawyers in the office conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.87
While the discussion that follows is based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (Model Rules), the key provisions cited here have been adopted almost verbatim by states virtually everywhere. Lawyers who fail to comply with the rules of the
legal profession are subject to disciplinary sanction, which can include a reprimand,
suspension from the practice of law, and even disbarment.88
Rules 1.1 and 1.3 of the Model Rules require lawyers to furnish competent and
diligent representation, which means that they possess “the legal knowledge, skill,
84
85
86
87
88

ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1, at 5-5.3.
ABA Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, Chapter 2, at 43 (Recommendation 4).
See ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 86, Chapter 1.
Id. at 1.
See, e.g., Martin v. State Bar, 20 Cal. 3d 717, 144 Cal. Rptr. 214 (1978) (suspension from practice
of law justified because of failure to perform legal services for clients and not excused by attorney
having accepted too many retained cases); Disciplinary Bd. v. Amundson, 297 N.W.2d (N.D. 1980)
(public reprimand justified for failure to communicate sufficiently with beneficiaries of estate and
not excused by attorney’s heavy workload); and Matter of Whitlock, 441 A.2d 989 (D.C. 1982)
(suspension from practice justified for failure to file briefs in two criminal appeals and attorney’s
conduct not excused by reason of caseload and other factors). Notwithstanding these few decisions,
defense attorneys who represent the indigent are rarely disciplined even when their caseloads are
excessive, and they fail to provide competent representation. See discussion supra note 91, Chapter
1, and accompanying text.

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thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation”89 and
that they are able to “act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.”90 If a lawyer cannot provide competent and diligent representation, whether
attributable to excessive workload, inadequate supervision, training, or other reasons,
the lawyer cannot discharge his or her duty as required by the rules of the legal
profession. In addition, if the lawyer’s difficulty in complying with Model Rules
1.1 and 1.3 is attributable to an excessive number of cases, the lawyer is faced with a
conflict of interest, pursuant to Model Rule 1.7, since “there is a significant risk that
the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s
responsibilities to another client….”91
But what is the lawyer to do if confronted with continued defense representation that
will violate the rules of professional conduct? Pursuant to Model Rule 1.16, the lawyer
has a mandatory duty to “withdraw from the representation …”92 and must resist
appointments to additional cases. When the lawyer’s cases are obtained by court appointment, applicable court rules typically require that judicial approval be obtained
in order to withdraw from representation and to avoid additional case assignments.93
In moving to withdraw and in resisting additional appointments, the lawyer should
make a detailed statement on the record of the reasons for the request, thus preserving the issue for appeal. Also, in the event a client is currently being represented, the
lawyer should inform the client that competent, conflict-free representation cannot
be provided.94 Similarly, if a plea offer is extended by the prosecution and the lawyer
has not had adequate time to investigate the client’s case or otherwise formulate a
recommendation about the plea offer, the client should be advised that counsel is unable to provide competent advice about whether the offer should be accepted. Such
direct communication with the client is required by Model Rules, which state that
a “lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.”95
If a defendant nevertheless decides to enter a plea of guilty, counsel should state on
the record that he or she has been unable to competently advise the defendant with
regard to the plea and that defendant has not had effective assistance of counsel in
agreeing to the plea. Similarly, if forced to trial in circumstances when counsel has
not had adequate time to prepare, counsel should state on the record that he or she

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.1.
Id. at R. 1.3 (2008).
Id. at R. 1.7(b).
Id. at R. 1.16(a).
Id. at R. 1.16(c). As stated in comment 2 to Model Rule 1.16: “When a lawyer has been appointed to
represent a client, withdrawal ordinarily requires approval of the appointing authority.”
ABA Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 86, Chapter 1, at 3, n.8.
ABA Model Rules, at R. 1.4.

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is unable to furnish competent representation or the effective assistance of counsel at
the ensuing trial.
Supervisors and heads of defender programs must also be concerned when their
lawyers are struggling with excessive caseloads, because these persons have a duty to
make sure that lawyers for whom they have either supervisory or overall responsibility
do not violate rules of the profession. If supervisors and heads of defender programs
fail to make reasonable efforts to prevent lawyers under their control from violating
ethical rules, they, too, will have violated the rules of the legal profession and are
subject to disciplinary sanction.96 (The duty of judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to report ethical violations in conjunction with excessive workloads of defense
attorneys is discussed in the Commentary below to Recommendation 15).
Recommendation 15—Judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers should abide by their professional
obligation to report to disciplinary agencies knowledge of serious ethical violations that impact
indigent defense representation when the information they possess is not confidential. Appropriate
remedial action should be taken by persons with responsibility over those who commit such ethical
violations.
Commentary—Pursuant to the ABA’s Model Rules, members of the bar have a duty
to report to “appropriate professional authority” another lawyer when they know
that the “lawyer has committed a violation of the rules of professional conduct that
raises a substantial question as to the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer….”97 This duty also extends to reporting judges when “a lawyer knows
that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct” that
raise a similar kind of “substantial question as to the judge’s fitness for office….”98
Although a lawyer is not authorized to disclose information protected pursuant to
principles of confidentiality (i.e., “information relating to the representation of the
client”), such information may be disclosed with client consent or if disclosure is
impliedly authorized.99 In addition, the ABA’s Code of Judicial Conduct requires
judges to report to “the appropriate authority” if they have “knowledge that a lawyer
has committed a violation of … the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question of the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer….”100
Consistent with the foregoing provisions, this recommendation relates specifically to
Id. at R. 5.1(c).
Id. at R. 8.3(a).
98 Id. at R. 8.3(b).
99 Id. at R. 1.6, cmt.5, R. 8.3(c).
100 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2.15 (B) (2007). See also Section 2.15 (D), which imposes
a duty on judges to “take appropriate action” when “information” is received that suggests “a substantial likelihood” that a lawyer has violated a rule of professional conduct.
96
97

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reporting non-confidential “serious ethical violations that impact indigent defense
representation….”
This report discusses instances in which both lawyers and judges have violated their
professional responsibilities in relation to the administration of justice. We have
noted, for example, that judges do not always properly advise the accused of their
right to counsel and that prosecutors sometimes improperly encourage waivers of the
right to counsel.101 Also, defense lawyers sometimes proceed to represent clients when
they have inordinately high caseloads that prevent their providing competent representation, but the lawyers do not seek to withdraw or otherwise take steps to protect
the rights of their clients.102 In addition, when defenders represent excessive numbers
of clients with the knowledge of supervisors and directors of defender programs,
these supervisors and agency heads commit professional misconduct.103
When the conduct of lawyers and judges raises a “substantial question” about their
“fitness” for the practice of law, the Committee recommends that such instances
of professional misconduct be reported. It has been forcefully argued, for example,
that if a public defender is ordered by a supervisor or agency head to undertake
representation in an excessive number of cases, thereby preventing the lawyer from
competently representing his or her clients, the defender should report these persons
to the appropriate disciplinary authority.104 Similarly, if a judge forces a defender to
provide representation in circumstances where the defender cannot provide competent service, the defender’s duty is to report the judge to the appropriate authority.105
While the Committee appreciates that such actions by lawyers require substantial
fortitude, it also believes that the profession’s rules about reporting misconduct are
clear and that compliance with the rules could lead to significant positive reform. The
Committee’s call for action, moreover, is not unprecedented. In 2005, for example,
the ABA House of Delegates passed a resolution calling on judges, in accord with
“canons of professional and judicial ethics … [to] take appropriate action with regard
to defense lawyers who violate ethical duties to their clients … [and] take appropriate
action with regard to prosecutors who seek to obtain waivers of counsel and guilty
See supra notes 207–35 and accompanying text, Chapter 2. See also supra notes 7–19 and accompanying text, which contains Recommendation 1 and addresses such practices.
102 See supra notes 96–108 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
103 ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 5.1.
104 See Monroe Freedman, An Ethical Manifesto for Public Defenders, 39 Val. U. L. Rev. 911, 921 (2005).
105 “A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct
that raises a substantial question as the judge’s fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authorities.” ABA Model Rules, at 8.3(b). Judges have a duty to “comply with the law” and to accord all
persons “the right to be heard according to law.” See ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 1.1,
2.6 (a) (2007).
101

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pleas from unrepresented accused persons, or who otherwise give legal advice to such
persons, other than the advice to secure counsel.”106

Open File Discovery
Recommendation 16—Prosecutors should adopt open file discovery policies in order to promote the
fair administration of criminal and juvenile justice.
Commentary—As discussed in Chapter 2, adherence to broad open file discovery
policies by prosecutors promotes just results while reducing the workload burden
on indigent defense providers.107 Such policies also promote the early resolution of
cases while ameliorating a lack of investigative resources available to the defense. A
similar recommendation was adopted by the ABA many years ago in its criminal
justice standards, which urge that documentary evidence, tangible objects, and witness lists, among numerous other matters, be made available to the defense “within a
specified and reasonable time” prior to trial.108 In the absence of open file discovery,
criminal and juvenile proceedings remain a form of trial by ambush, in which far less
information is available to the defense prior to disposition than is typically available
in ordinary civil proceedings.109

House of Delegates, Resolution 107 (adopted August 9, 2005) § 5(b), (c), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/res107.pdf. However, underreporting of lawyer misconduct by judges is a problem, as noted by the California Commission on
the Fair Administration of Justice. Under California law, judges are required to report to the State
Bar whenever a judgment in a judicial proceeding is reversed or modified due to “misconduct, incompetent representation, or willful misrepresentation of an attorney.” Based upon its research over
a 10-year period, the Commission concluded in 2007 that “reliance on the State Bar as the primary
disciplinary authority is hampered by underreporting.” See http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/
reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20REPORT%20ON%20REPORTING%20
MISCONDUCT.pdf.
107 See supra notes 168–77 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
108 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Discovery and Trial by Jury, 11-2.1 (3d ed., 1996).
109 There is an “expansive—and intrusive—approach to pre-trial discovery followed in most American
civil cases … discovery is much more limited in criminal cases than it is under civil rules.” Joseph
Glannon, Civil Procedure: Examples and Explanations, 363 (Aspen Publishers, 5th ed. 2006).

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Commentary—Among national bar associations, the ABA for many years has been at
the forefront of educating the legal profession, the public, and policymakers about
the criminal and juvenile justice systems; developing standards,110 principles,111 and
guidelines for its improvement;112 advocating on behalf of indigent defense; and
providing technical assistance to indigent defense programs across the country.113
In recent years, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL)
also has been an important voice for indigent defense reform.114 And, while not a
bar association, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) has
constantly developed informational materials, promulgated guidelines and standards,
offered technical assistance, and lobbied for improvements.115 Despite these vigorous
national efforts, the adversary system of justice and especially the function of defense
lawyers are still not always well understood or readily accepted by the public and
legislators. This lack of understanding and acceptance contributes to inadequate
funding of defense services, especially in comparison to the prosecution function.116
In order to inform the public and legislators about the adversary system, including
the role of defense counsel and the importance of sufficient funding, state and local
bar associations need to add their voice to those of national bar associations and other
organizations.
In its most recent report on indigent defense, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal
Aid and Indigent Defendants urged greater involvement of state and local bar associations, as well as others, in indigent defense reform.117 While a number of state and
local bar associations have demonstrated their commitment to improving indigent
defense, the Committee believes there is still much more to be done. Bar associations,
See, e.g., ABA Providing Defense Services, supra note 58, Chapter 1.
See, e.g., ABA Ten Principles, supra note 67, Chapter 1.
112 See, e.g., ABA Death Penalty Guidelines, supra note 39.
113 For more than 25 years, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
(SCLAID) contracted with The Spangenberg Group to provide technical assistance to defense
programs across the United States. Studies and other reports prepared by The Spangenberg Group
are on SCLAID’s website. See http://www.indigentdefense.org.
114 See National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers website dealing with indigent defense matters, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/DefenseUpdates/Index?OpenDocument.
115 See NLADA website dealing with indigent defense matters, available at http://www.nlada.org/
Defender/Defender_NIDC/Defender_NIDC_Home.
116 See supra notes 70–95 and accompanying text, Chapter 2.
117 “State and local bar associations should be actively involved in evaluating and monitoring criminal
and juvenile delinquency proceedings to ensure that defense counsel is provided in all cases in
which the right to counsel attaches and that independent and quality representation is furnished.
Bar associations should be steadfast in advocating on behalf of such defense services.” ABA
Gideon’s Broken Promise, supra note 108, Chapter 2, at 44 (Recommendation 6). “In addition to
state and local bar associations, many other organizations and individuals should become involved
in efforts to reform indigent defense systems.” Id. at 45 (Recommendation 7).
110
111

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for example, can evaluate, monitor, and assess their respective systems of criminal and
juvenile justice, issue reports, and thereby educate lawyers and the public about their
jurisdiction’s justice systems. If, for example, accused persons are being represented
by defenders who are routinely overwhelmed with cases, this should be a matter of
enormous concern to state and local bar associations. If persons are not being offered
the right to counsel in compliance with constitutional requirements, state and local
bar associations should speak out on behalf of those who lack legal representation.
In order to do so, however, state and local bar associations need to make indigent
defense a priority, devote resources to the activity, and at the very least, establish a
permanent committee with responsibility for oversight of the adversary system and
indigent defense.
Although it is essential that bar associations and those who provide defense services
participate in efforts to achieve reform, they also may be regarded with suspicion
by some persons since they are virtually certain to emphasize, among other matters,
financial support for fellow lawyers. On the other hand, because judges and prosecutors have very different roles from defense counsel in the adversary system, their
advocacy on behalf of indigent defense services is apt to be especially persuasive.
Recommendation 18—Criminal justice professionals, state and local bar associations, and other organizations should encourage and facilitate sustained media attention on the injustices and societal
costs entailed by inadequate systems of indigent defense, as well as those systems that function
effectively.
Commentary—Since media attention about the shortcomings of indigent defense can
play a vital role in educating the public and promoting public support for reform, it
should be encouraged and facilitated. In recent years, many compelling news articles
have highlighted deficiencies in the justice system, such as those dealing with defendants wrongfully convicted, excessive caseloads of public defenders, and the routine
failure of jurisdictions to implement effectively the right to counsel. As noted earlier
in this report, in addition to educating the public, the media can help to pave the
way for improvements.118 Although public opinion polling suggests that the public
generally supports the right to counsel,119 history demonstrates that this is not normally enough to persuade elected officials to act. But when favorable public opinion
is combined with news articles that pull back the curtain on a host of problems in the
delivery of defense services, it is considerably easier for legislators to support reform
measures because the public is more likely to understand the reasons for action.
118
119

See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text, Chapter 4.
See Public Opinion Research Finds Fairness Key to Support for Indigent Defense, Indigent Defense,
Vol. 4, No. 2 (October/November 2000), available at http://www.nlada.org/Publications/
Indigent_Defense/OctNovArticle5.

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Litigation
Recommendation 19—When indigent defense systems require defense attorneys to represent
more clients than they can competently represent or otherwise fail to assure legal representation in
compliance with the Sixth Amendment, litigation to remedy such deficiencies should be instituted.
Commentary—Chapter 3 of this report contains a detailed analysis of the various
litigation approaches to improving indigent defense that have been pursued. While
there have been notable successes120 that have brought about reforms, some lawsuits
have failed completely121 or have otherwise been unsuccessful in achieving systemic
change.122 Litigation, moreover, is time consuming, expensive (especially if pro bono
counsel is unavailable), and the results are uncertain. Yet, when other options have
failed to achieve necessary improvements, there may be no alternative except to
institute a lawsuit since the rights of accused persons are not being protected and/or
defense lawyers are unable to furnish competent representation.
In Recommendation 14, the Committee urges that “[d]efense attorneys and defender
programs should … refuse to continue representation or to accept new cases for
representation when faced with excessive workloads that will lead to a breach of their
professional obligations.” In order to implement this admonition, defenders have
sometimes filed motions to withdraw from cases and/or to stop the assignment of
additional cases.123 Moreover, as noted earlier, litigation has on occasion prompted
reforms, which would not have occurred except for the pressure of a lawsuit that challenged the jurisdiction’s indigent defense system.124 When the goal is broad systemic
reform, Recommendation 20 addresses the timing of such litigation and the persons
for whom lawsuits should be filed.
Recommendation 20—When seeking to achieve remedies that will favorably impact current and
future indigent defendants, litigation should be instituted pretrial on behalf of all or a large class of
indigent defendants.
Commentary—This recommendation is based upon lessons learned from the analysis
of indigent defense litigation set forth in Chapter 3. If the goal is broad systemic
reform, it is important that litigation “be instituted pretrial” and that it be “on
behalf of all or a large class of indigent defendants.” As noted earlier, a lawsuit that is
brought post-conviction requires that prejudice be demonstrated, which is invariably
See, e.g., supra notes 42–58 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
See, e.g., supra notes 64–66, 109–112 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
122 See, e.g., supra notes 76–79 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
123 See, e.g., supra notes 81–101 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
124 See, e.g., supra note 6 and accompanying text, Chapter 3; and supra note 22 and accompanying text,
Chapter 4.
120
121

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a significant hurdle to overcome.125 Litigation consistent with this recommendation
takes considerable time to prepare and, to be successful, should be supported with
ample empirical and anecdotal evidence.126 Moreover, unless the action is on behalf of
a class of indigent defendants, a court’s relief is unlikely to reach many defendants.127
Similarly, litigation that challenges the extent of attorney compensation, while it may
be entirely justified, is less likely to impact other significant areas of indigent defense
reform, even if it succeeds.128
Recommendation 21—Whenever possible, litigation should be brought by disinterested third
parties, such as private law firms or public interest legal organizations willing to serve as pro bono
counsel, who are experienced in litigating major, complex lawsuits and accustomed to gathering and
presenting detailed factual information. Bar associations and other organizations should encourage
law firms and public interest legal organizations to undertake indigent defense litigation and should
recognize in appropriate ways the contributions of private counsel in seeking to improve the delivery
of indigent defense services.
Commentary—Litigation dealing with issues in public defense requires expertise in civil
litigation, as well as resources that public defense programs typically lack. Fortunately,
some public interest organizations and private law firms have been willing to litigate
a variety of indigent defense issues, such as challenges to defense delivery systems, the
adequacy of compensation paid to assigned counsel, and the size of public defender
caseloads.129 Moreover, even if defender programs had the resources and expertise
to pursue these kinds of lawsuits, they invariably lack sufficient time to prepare and
conduct them due to their indigent defense commitments, not the least of which are
their caseloads, which often is one of the main reasons that litigation is undertaken.
The Committee commends the commitment of public interest organizations and law
firms to engage in pro bono indigent defense lawsuits, believing that their service is in
the highest traditions of the legal profession.130 While public recognition is undoubtedly not the motivation for private lawyers and their law firms to seek public defense
improvements through litigation, it is nonetheless appropriate that their contributions be recognized by bar associations and other organizations, which may in turn,
encourage others to become involved in the struggle for reform.
See supra notes 176–77 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
127 See supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
128 See supra note 174 and accompanying text, Chapter 3.
129 See, e.g., supra note 100, Chapter 3, which mentions private law firms that have made significant
contributions in litigating indigent defense issues.
130 The ABA Model Rules recognize that the pro bono responsibility of lawyers may be discharged
through “participation in activities for improving the law [and] the legal system….” ABA Model
Rules, supra note 67, at R. 6.1(b) (3).
125

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Recommendation 22—Defense lawyers who provide representation in appellate and postconviction cases and organizations that advocate as amicus curiae should urge the United States
Supreme Court and state Supreme Courts to adopt a test for ineffective assistance of counsel that
is substantially consistent with the ethical obligation of defense counsel to render competent and
diligent representation.
Commentary—In Chapter 1 of this report, we noted that the accused in our adversary
system of justice is entitled under the Sixth Amendment to the effective assistance
of counsel. And we also observed that, after a person has been convicted, the test
for determining whether the accused was provided effective assistance is embodied
in the Supreme Court’s decision in Strickland v. Washington,131 decided in 1984.
Pursuant to Strickland, the question is whether counsel’s representation was “within
the wide range of professional assistance”132 to be expected of a lawyer; and, if it was
not, whether counsel’s conduct was prejudicial to the defendant, i.e., did it lead to a
result that was different than would otherwise have occurred?133 Finally, we pointed
out that, while Strickland is the standard for determining ineffective assistance under
the Sixth Amendment, it has been widely accepted by state supreme courts in determining ineffective assistance of counsel under right-to-counsel provisions in state
constitutions.134
Further, as we noted earlier, the Strickland two-pronged test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel has been harshly criticized, proven to be difficult to apply,
and has led to appellate courts affirming convictions that should be unacceptable in a
society that genuinely values due process of law. In addition, the Strickland standard
has made it possible during more than three decades for states and local jurisdictions
to underfund indigent defense services, as this report and many others have amply
demonstrated. The Committee, therefore, calls for the Strickland standard to be replaced by a straightforward test: has the accused received “competent” and “diligent”
representation, as required by the rules of professional conduct adopted by the legal
profession?135 When defense counsel has failed to meet this requirement, thereby
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
133 See supra notes 101–11 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
134 See supra notes 126–28 and accompanying text, Chapter 1.
135 ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.1, 1.3. The Constitution Project’s report on
death penalty representation contains a recommendation concerning use of the Strickland standard
at capital sentencing proceedings. “Once a defendant has demonstrated that his or her counsel fell
below the minimum standard of professional competence in death penalty litigation, the burden
should shift to the state to demonstrate that the outcome of the sentencing hearing was not affected by the attorney’s incompetence.” Mandatory Justice: The Death Penalty Revisited,
The Constitution Project, Rec. 3, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/
MandatoryJusticeRevisited.pdf.
131

132

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Chapter 5—Recommendations and Commentary

justifying discipline under professional conduct rules, surely defendants have not
received the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
A requirement that defense counsel’s conduct conform to the disciplinary rules of
the profession is seemingly no different than what the Supreme Court called for in
Strickland. The Court in Strickland asked whether counsel’s performance was “within
the range of professional assistance” expected of attorneys and whether “attorney performance” … was “reasonable … under prevailing professional norms.”136 At the same
time, the Court cited with approval one of its prior decisions in which it held that a
guilty plea could not “be attacked as based on inadequate legal advice unless counsel
was not ‘a reasonably competent attorney’ and the advice was not ‘within the range
of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’”137 The Court also spoke of
the need for counsel “to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial
a reliable adversarial testing process.”138 “Competence” and “skill and knowledge” is
the language of the rules of professional conduct.139 However, we do propose that
the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard be eliminated. We agree with Justice
Marshall’s dissent in Strickland, who argued that you cannot determine prejudice to
the defendant because “the evidence of injury to the defendant may be missing from
the record because of the incompetence of defense counsel.”140
While the Committee appreciates that courts may be reluctant to alter the Strickland
standard, especially since it has endured for a number of years, it is nevertheless
convinced that the standard should be changed. For this reason, we call upon defense
lawyers and organizations that advocate as amicus curiae to seek a new test for determining ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, if the Strickland standard were
replaced with a less stringent test, there would be significant positive impact, whether
the decision was rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court or by a state supreme court
interpreting its state constitution. If, for example, the new test adopted by a state
supreme court was consistent with this Recommendation, it would become readily
apparent to the state’s legislature and to others in authority that, once and for all,
indigent defense must receive the essential resources in order to implement a defense
system consistent with the promise of Gideon and the Supreme Court’s other rightto-counsel decisions.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
138 Id. (emphasis added).
139 ABA Model Rules, supra note 67, Chapter 1, at R. 1.1.
140 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
136
137

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Appendices

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Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our Constitutional Right to Counsel

Appendix A: Index of Cases

Gaffey v. State 24

Adam v. United States ex rel. McCann 29

Gerstein v. Pugh 139

Ake v. Oklahoma 25

Gibson v. Berryhill 139

Alabama v. Shelton

Geders v. United States 42

Gideon v. Wainwright 2, 4, 10, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26,

23, 73, 74, 85, 89

Argersinger v. Hamlin 23, 26, 30, 31, 50

30, 32, 44, 50, 51, 52, 58, 67, 74, 85, 86, 89, 92, 98,

Arianna S. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts 114

104, 115, 153, 184, 185, 200, 203, 208, 213

Arizona v. Lopez 121, 122

Gilbert v. California 27

Bailey v. State 108

Glasser v. United States 38

Bartone v. United States 138

Green v. Washington 111, 112, 118, 119, 137, 138

Berger v. United States 184

Griffin v. Illinois 25

Best v. Grant County 115, 116, 141

Halbert v. Michigan 24, 25

Betts v. Brady 20

Harrison v. State 25

Bradshaw v. Ball 105

Harris v. Champion 62, 82, 83, 111, 112, 119, 136, 137, 138

Brady v. Maryland 77

Herrera v. Collins 44

Brewer v. Williams 26

Herring v. New York 42

Bright v. State 25

Holloway v. Arkansas 38, 112

Bromgard v. State of Montana, et al. 47

Hulse v. Wifvat 105

Brown v. Multnomah County District Court 24

Hurrell-Harring v. New York 116

Carter v. Chambers County 138

In re Certification of Conflict in Motions to Withdraw Filed by

Chicago Burlington and Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago 107

Public Defender of the Tenth Judicial District 118, 144

Coleman v. Alabama 27

In re Gault 22, 26

Commonwealth v. Urena 43

In re Indigent Criminal Justice System 153

Conner v. Indiana 128, 129

In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth

Cooper v. Regional Administrative Judge of the
District Court for Region V 114

In re Petition of Knox County Public Defender 124

Crawford v. State 25

In re Reassignment and Consolidation of Public

Cronic v. United States 41, 42, 110, 111, 113, 120, 127, 128, 129, 130, 142
Cuyler v. Sullivan

DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court 107

In re the Matter of Continued Indigent Representation

Doe v. Spokane County 139

by the District Public Defender’s Office in Knox

Douglas v. California 19, 23, 24, 25
Duncan v. State of Michigan 116

Defender’s Motions to Appoint Other Counsel in
Unappointed Noncapital Felony Cases 125

38, 42

Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board

Judicial Circuit Public Defender 111, 117, 133

County General Sessions Court 121
110, 115

In the Matter of the Recorder’s Court Bar Association
v. Wayne Circuit Court 136

Dunn v. Roberts 25

Iowa v. Tovar 27, 28

Dusky v. United States 75

James v. State 25

Edwards v. Illinois 27

Jewell v. Maynard 106

Estelle v. Smith 27

Johnson v. Zerbst 20, 27, 28, 85

Faretta v. California 29

Kennedy v. Carlson 113, 117, 141, 143, 144

Florida v. Makemsom 31

Kirby v. Illinois 26

Fuller v. Oregon 30

Kugler v. Helfant 140

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Appendices

Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court
110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 135, 141

Rose v. Palm Beach County 118
Ross v. Moffitt 29

Lewis v. Hollenbach 125

Rothgery v. Gillespie County 26, 85, 197

Ligda v. Superior Court of Solano County 122

Ryan v. Palmateer 43

Little v. Armontrout 25

Scott v. Illinois 23, 29, 31

Louisiana v. Edwards 123

Scott v. Louisiana 25

Luckey v. Harris

Scott v. Roper 104

112, 113, 145

Luckey v. Miller 137

Simmons v. Reynolds 119

Makemson v. Martin County 107

Smith v. State of New Hampshire 27, 43, 63, 106, 111, 129, 134

Marsden v. Commonwealth 24

Spencer v. Commonwealth 39

Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California 29

State Ex Rel Metropolitan Public Defender

May v. State 107

Services, Inc. v. Courtney 100

McFarland v. Scott 31

State v. Citizen 79, 101, 127

McKaskle v. Wiggins 29

State v. Coker 25

McMann v. Richardson 39

State v. Huchting 25

McQuinn v. Commonwealth 39

State v. LaVallee 118

Metropolitan Public Defender Services, Inc.

State v. Lynch 105, 132

v. Courtney 100, 132, 133, 145

State v. Mason 25

Miranda v. Arizona 27

State v. Peart 111, 118, 120, 123, 131

Miranda v. Clark County 137

State v. Perry Ducksworth 115

Moore v. State 25

State v. Quitman County 113, 127, 128, 144

Murray v. Giarrantano 29

State v. Rush 104, 105

New Mexico v. Young

State v. Smith 111, 129

126, 127, 131, 132

New York County Lawyers’ Association v. New
York

110, 112, 114, 134, 135, 141

State v. Wakisaka 42
State v. Young 111

North v. Russell 91

Stephan v. Smith 106

Olive v. Maas 108

Stinson v. Fulton County Board of Commissioners 138, 139

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel 138

Strickland v. Washington 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 70,

Partain v. Oakley 105

110, 120, 128, 129, 130, 142, 212, 213

Pennsylvania v. Finley 29

Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz 25

People v. Acevedo 43

Thornton v. State 25

People v. Charles F 91

United States v. Ash 27

People v. Lawson 25

United States v. Cronic 41

People v. Sowizdral 43

United States v. Morris 111

People v. Tyson 25

United States v. Wade 27

Polk County v. Dodson 137

United States v. Zilges 112

Powell v. Alabama

Von Moltke v. Gillies 28

18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 30, 142

Quitman County v. State 113, 127, 128, 131, 141, 144

Wallace v. Kern 32, 34, 122

Rivera v. Rowland

Webb v. Baird 22, 104

110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116

Rogers v. Commissioner of Dept. of Mental Health 24

White v. Board of County Commissioners 108

Rompilla v. Beard 43

Wiggins v. Smith 43

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Williams v. Taylor 43
Wilson v. State 108
Wright v. Childree 108
Younger v. Harris 136, 137, 138, 139, 140

Missouri 54, 59, 63, 69, 70, 73, 96, 99, 148, 159, 160,
161, 166, 167, 168, 176, 187, 219
Montana 136, 148, 149, 150, 152, 159, 160, 161,
166, 173, 178, 187, 189, 219
Nebraska 54, 55, 67, 81, 82, 83, 84, 148, 149, 160, 170, 178, 219
Nevada 9, 35, 54, 57, 59, 68, 72, 85, 92, 148, 153, 170, 178, 179, 180

Appendix B: Index of States

New Hampshire 9, 54, 59, 67, 134, 148, 160, 166, 168, 219

Alabama

New Mexico 59, 126, 127, 131, 132, 141, 148,

9, 18, 19, 23, 27, 54, 59, 73, 74, 83, 85,

89, 92, 107, 108, 142, 149, 155, 178
Alaska

9, 54, 107, 148, 160, 169, 219

New Jersey 9, 37, 54, 59, 62, 105, 106, 148, 160, 161, 169, 219
155, 160, 169, 170, 176, 178, 219
New York 9, 22, 35, 37, 42, 43, 45, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63, 67,

Arizona 9, 27, 54, 55, 59, 121, 122, 125, 126, 129, 149, 160, 219

72, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 90, 91, 92, 95, 97, 110, 112, 113,

Arkansas

114, 116, 122, 134, 135, 141, 149, 176, 177

37, 38, 54, 55, 112, 148, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166, 176, 219

California 9, 23, 27, 29, 35, 37, 45, 54, 59, 61, 69, 78, 85,
94, 95, 98, 122, 149, 160, 173, 207, 219

North Carolina 54, 59, 79, 84, 85, 148, 150, 157, 158,
159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 176, 219

Colorado 54, 59, 67, 71, 85, 148, 159, 160, 161, 166, 174, 219

North Dakota 150, 152, 159, 160, 166, 176, 178, 219

Connecticut

Ohio 25, 54, 59, 70, 87, 148, 159, 160, 170, 219

9, 54, 59, 114, 141, 146, 148, 159, 160, 161, 166, 219

Delaware 54, 59, 148, 160, 169, 219

Oklahoma 25, 54, 64, 105, 132, 148, 159, 160, 170, 171, 187, 219

Florida

Oregon 24, 30, 54, 59, 64, 67, 100, 132, 133, 148,

9, 20, 21, 31, 45, 54, 59, 60, 68, 81, 85, 100, 107,

117, 118, 124, 125, 126, 133, 149, 178, 219
Georgia

9, 36, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 73, 87, 89, 99, 100, 101,

137, 148, 150, 152, 153, 159, 160, 161, 162, 170, 172, 219
Hawaii

42, 43, 54, 59, 70, 148, 160, 161, 166, 219

150, 159, 160, 161, 166, 176, 219
Pennsylvania 9, 29, 54, 55, 59, 67, 98, 99, 115, 149
Rhode Island 54, 59, 67, 89, 148, 160, 169, 219
South Carolina 37, 38, 54, 59, 64, 85, 97, 148, 150, 160, 166, 176, 219

Idaho 54, 55, 59, 149, 160, 161, 178, 219

South Dakota 54, 59, 149

Illinois

Tennessee 9, 24, 54, 59, 61, 64, 68, 81, 121, 123, 124,

9, 23, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44, 45, 54, 59, 67,

85, 87, 118, 119, 149, 160, 162, 173, 219
Indiana

34, 54, 87, 101, 104, 128, 148, 159, 160,

161, 167, 170, 171, 172, 173, 219
Iowa

28, 54, 55, 57, 104, 105, 106, 148, 160, 161, 169, 176, 219

125, 126, 149, 153, 159, 173, 199, 219
Texas 9, 35, 45, 54, 55, 56, 62, 76, 79, 82, 83, 85, 148, 150, 152,
153, 156, 160, 161, 164, 168, 170, 171, 176, 219
Utah 54, 55, 59, 149

Kansas 54, 59, 106, 148, 159, 160, 162, 170, 171, 219

Vermont 54, 59, 148, 160, 169, 219

Kentucky

Virginia 44, 46, 54, 59, 63, 67, 74, 78, 95, 148, 150, 152, 153, 160, 166, 219

68, 76, 106, 124, 148, 159, 160, 161, 166, 167, 176, 187, 219

Louisiana 25, 54, 55, 58, 67, 92, 96, 97, 101, 115, 120, 123, 125, 127,
131, 141, 148, 150, 152, 153, 159, 160, 165, 166, 176, 199, 219

Washington 9, 20, 34, 39, 54, 59, 67, 85, 86, 93, 110, 111, 115,
118, 120, 141, 146, 148, 151, 160, 161, 170, 172, 212, 219

Maine 35, 54, 59, 93, 149, 160, 178, 179, 183

West Virginia 9, 54, 98, 106, 148, 150, 159, 160, 166, 167, 176, 219

Maryland

Wisconsin 54, 57, 59, 63, 104, 148, 160, 161, 166, 176, 219

37, 54, 59, 60, 67, 77, 86, 148, 160, 161, 162, 163, 166, 219

Massachusetts 24, 43, 54, 59, 73, 74, 113, 114, 135,
148, 160, 161, 162, 166, 176, 194, 219
Michigan 9, 24, 32, 44, 46, 47, 54, 55, 56, 67, 94, 97, 111, 116, 219
Minnesota 9, 54, 55, 59, 60, 100, 117, 143, 148, 159, 160, 161, 166, 176, 219
Mississippi 9, 54, 55, 59, 64, 85, 86, 87, 93, 108, 115, 127,
128, 130, 144, 149, 154, 155, 160, 161, 178, 219

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Wyoming 54, 148, 160, 169, 219

Appendices

Appendix C: State Statutes
Establishing Public
Defense Programs
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.85.010–18.85.180 (2008))
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-4301–414302 (West Supp. 2008))
Arkansas (Public Defender Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 1687-101–16-87-307 (West Supp. 2008))
California (Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 15400–15404 and §§ 15420–15424
(West 1992 & Supp. 2008) (State Public Defender);
§§ 68660–68666 (Habeas Corpus Resource Center))
Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-1-101–21-1-106 (West 2005))
Connecticut (Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 51-289–51-300 (2007))
Delaware (Model Defender Act, Del. Code Ann.
tit. 29, §§ 4601–4608 (West 2007))
Florida (Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 27.50–27.562 (West Supp. 2008))
Georgia (Georgia Indigent Defense Act of 2003, Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 17-12-1–17-12-80 (West Supp. 2008))
Hawaii (Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 802-1–802-12 (LexisNexis 2007))
Idaho (State Appellate Public Defender Act, Idaho Code
Ann. §§ 19-867–19-872 (West 2007))
Illinois (State Appellate Defender Act, 725 Ill. Comp.
Stat. 105/1–11 (2006 & Supp. 2007))
Indiana (Ind. Code §§ 33-40-5-1–33-40-5-5 (2008))
Iowa (Iowa Code §§ 13B.1–13B.11 (2007 & Supp. 2008))
Kansas (Indigents’ Defense Services Act, Kan. Stat.
Ann. §§ 22-4501–22-4529 (2007))
Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31.010–31.219
(West 2006 & Supp. 2008))
Louisiana (Louisiana Public Defender Act, La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 15:141–15:183 (Supp. 2009))
Maryland (Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. §§ 16101–16-403 (West Supp. 2008))
Massachusetts (Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 211D,
§§ 1–15 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008))

Mississippi (Mississippi Capital Defense Litigation Act, Miss.
Code Ann. §§ 99-18-1–99-18-19 (2007); Mississippi
Capital Post-Conviction Counsel Act, §§ 99-39-101–9939-119; § 99-40-1 (Office of Indigent Appeals))
Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 600.011–600.101 (2007))
Montana (Montana Public Defender Act, Mont. Code
Ann. §§ 47-1-101–47-1-216; § 2-15-1028
(Public Defender Commission) (2007))
Nebraska (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3923–29-3933 (1995 & Supp. 2006))
New Hampshire (N.H Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 604B:1–8 (2001); 494:1–7 (1997))
New Jersey (N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:158A-1–2A:158A-25
(West 1985 & Supp. 2008))
New Mexico (Public Defender Act, N.M. Stat. Ann.
§§ 31-15-1–31-15-12 (West 2003 ))
North Carolina (Indigent Defense Services Act of 2000, N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. §§ 7A-498–7A-498.8 (2004 & Supp. 2008))
North Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code §§ 54-61-01–54-61-04 (2008))
Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 120.01–120.41
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008))
Oklahoma (Indigent Defense Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22,
§§ 1355–1369 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008))
Oregon (Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 151.101–151.505 (2007))
Rhode Island (R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 12-15-1–12-15-11 (West 2006))
South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 17-3-5–173-550 (1976 & Supp. 2008))
Tennessee (Post-Conviction Defender Commission Act, Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 40-30-201–40-30-210 (West 2008))
Texas (Tex. Gov’t. Code Ann. §§ 71.051–71.063
(Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008))
Vermont (Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 §§ 5201–5277 (West 2007))
Virginia (Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.2-163–19.2-163. 8 (LexisNexis 2008))
Washington (Wash. Rev. Code §§ 2.70.005–2.70.050 (2008))
West Virginia (W.Va. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-1–29-21-21 (West 2002))
Wisconsin (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 977.01–977.085 (West Supp. 2008))
Wyoming (Public Defender Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-6101–7-6-114 (West 2007 7 Supp. 2008))

Michigan (Appellate Defender Act, Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 780.711–780.719 (West 2007))
Minnesota (Minn. Stat. §§ 611.14–611.35 (2008))

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The National Right to Counsel Committee is a bipartisan
committee of independent experts representing all
segments of America’s justice system. The Committee was
established in 2004 to examine the ability of state courts to
provide adequate counsel, as required by the United States
Constitution, to individuals charged in criminal and juvenile
delinquency cases who are unable to afford lawyers.

The Constitution Project is an
independent think tank that promotes
and defends constitutional safeguards.
The Project creates coalitions of
respected leaders from across
the political spectrum who issue
consensus recommendations for policy
reforms, and conducts strategic public
education campaigns to transform this
consensus into sound public policy.
The Constitution Project
1200 18th Street, NW, Suite 1000
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