THOMAS J. VILSACK, GOVERNOR
SALLY J. PEDERSON, LT. GOVERNOR

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
GARY D. MAYNARD, DIRECTOR

Iowa Results Website (www.resultsiowa.org)

Website (www.doc.state.ia.us)

Good

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On the evening of November 14, 2005 during routine security rounds of the lower
yard of the Iowa State Penitentiary, a Correctional Officer found a make shift rope
made of upholstery webbing tied to a conduit on top of the maintenance shop. The
Correctional Officer estimated the upholstery webbing was about 4 inches wide and
20 feet long and had fallen from the roofline of the maintenance shop building and
was loosely hanging when found. Security checks were immediately started, the
Industries Building was searched, and offenders Robert Legendre and Martin Moon
were discovered unaccounted for.
The Department of Corrections Office Of Inspector General was requested to
undertake an immediate independent investigation into the factor(s) that allowed two
maximum-security offenders to escape from the Iowa State Penitentiary.
This investigative report contains the following sections:
 Background of the Iowa State Penitentiary
 Background of the Offenders that Escaped
 Escape Timeline
 Escape Planning and Materials
 Findings Related to Tool Control and Inventory
 Findings Related to Offender Counts
 Findings Related to Offender Searches
 Findings Related to Post Orders/Policies
 Findings Related to Security Coverage
 Findings Related to Reporting of Critical Incidents
 Findings Related to Classification of Offenders
 Department of Corrections Response
 Executive Branch Response
 Conclusion
 Appendix
There were a number of errors made the evening of November 14, 2005 that
caused a breakdown of security and allowed the two offenders to escape without
immediate detection. Three categories of problems combined to allow the pair an
undetected and well-planned escape. The breakdown of security fell into three
rather broad categories: 1). Accountability of offenders; 2). Accountability of tools
The mission of the Iowa Department of Corrections is to:
Protect the Public, the Employees, and the Offenders
(Office) 515-242-5702. 420 Watson Powell Jr. Way. Des Moines, Iowa 50309. (FAX) 515-281-7345

and materials; and 3). Inadequate institutional procedures and lack of adherence to
existing procedures.
Corrective action undertaken by the Department of Corrections to address
these issues include:
 New Iowa State Penitentiary Leadership – new Warden put in place.
 New Security Leadership – new Security Director and Assistant Security
Director put in place.
 New Management Team - now consists of the Warden, Deputy Warden,
Security Director, Treatment Director, Business Manager, Clinical Care Unit
Administrator, Executive Officer, Personnel Officer, and the Prison Industries
Manager, which meets on a daily basis.
 Union Leadership - the Warden met with four members of the AFSCME local
to discuss concerns and exchange of ideas.
 Staff Input – E-mail was sent out to all staff asking for their comments and
recommendations regarding operations of the institution as the Iowa State
Penitentiary begins the process of coming off lockdown.
 Offender Movement - There will be no offender movement during the hours of
darkness except in cases of emergency.
 Prison Industries will no longer work any overtime during hours of darkness.
 Reinstatement of Duty Officers - effective immediately, the practice of having
duty officers has been reinstated. A total of 14 administrators will take duty
one week at a time for 24-hour readiness.
 Reassessed Supervisory Coverage - the captains and lieutenants are now
responsible for a certain number of correctional officer staff with the plan that
by doing so there will be more accountability and clarification of security
reporting lines.
 Towers – the Iowa State Penitentiary has returned to the pre-2003 staffing
levels (before the taut wire system was installed) in the towers. A Tower is
being remodeled in order to be staffed, and that project should be completed
by the end of the year. Another Tower (unused and won't be) will have its
steps removed. In addition, the Iowa State Penitentiary is compiling a book
of photos of escape risks for the tower officers.
 Reviews of Policies - in the process of reviewing the following policies:
Perimeter Security; Counts; Inmate Movement; Tool Control; Receiving and
Discharge; and, all Prison Industry policies.
 Review of Post Orders - all post orders are being reviewed and re-written to
an understandable format that does not exceed 3 pages in length, with
maximum input from assigned staff. In addition, it was found that the
perimeter vehicle officer's post was worked off a memo from the Security
Director and a post order is being written for that post.
 Cell House # 297 Hobby Craft/Maintenance Building - have begun the
process to demolish Cell House # 297 (old death row house), which is the

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building rooftop where the offenders threw the grappling hook to the west
wall.
Hobby Craft/Maintenance Building - evaluating the Hobby Craft/Maintenance
Building for possible demolition due to its proximity to the wall.
Searches - have, or are in the process of, conducting searches of Prison
Industry, Library, Habitat for Humanity, Hobby Craft, the living units/cell
houses, and John Bennett Prison Industry operation.
Conducting inventories of all Prison Industry tools.
Securing Windows - in the process of securing windows in the Prison Industry
and the Hobby Craft area.
Lighting - addressing lighting concerns and blind spots. A study will be done
regarding the installation of high mast lights.
Staffing Patterns - reviewing staffing patterns, in light of additional tower
coverage, for the entire complex.
Captain/Lieutenant Meetings - communication with this important group of
supervisors needs improvement and there are plans being discussed to have
more scheduled meetings.
Hobby Craft Purchases - during shakedowns of the area, material such as
was used in the escape was found in an offender’s hobby locker, so items
and purchasing of items will be reviewed.
Classification - all offenders assigned to the minimum-security Farms and the
medium-security John Bennett Unit were reviewed to see whether they were
properly classified to their assignments.
Classification - all offender workers in maximum-security will be reviewed
to ensure that they are properly classified to that particular assignment prior
to being released from the lockdown. The Treatment Director will now
oversee all classification recommendations and personally approve them.
Identification Badge - all offenders will be required to wear their ID at all
times, so that it is visible to staff.
Security – the Iowa State Penitentiary is reminding everyone, regardless of
position, that security is everyone's responsibility.
Security Review of all Prisons - both internal and external security audits
were immediately conducted at all nine institutions in the Department of
Corrections using the 36 standards of the Department’s security audit system
relative to perimeter security.
Prison Industry Building Shakedowns - a shakedown search of Prison
Industry operations, both traditional industry and on grounds private sector
employers, was conducted at each prison in the Department of Corrections.
All Prison Industry plant managers reviewed all institutional policies and post
orders that have to do with Prison Industry operations to ensure compliance.
The National Institute of Corrections (NIC). NIC was asked, in cooperation
with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), to provide consultants for reviewing the security system at the
Iowa State Penitentiary and other prisons. The American Correctional
Association (ACA) standards for security should be imposed immediately.
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The Department of Corrections is currently in the process of being certified
under ACA standards, which will result in higher standards for the control of
tools, keys, and security.
Search and shakedown procedures - are being rewritten and strengthened to
allow for scheduled and random searches of buildings and areas, as well as
random and routine searches of offenders. A highly randomized search
system will be used to avoid the possibility that offenders would be able to
predict when and where searches would be made.
The National Institute of Corrections (NIC). NIC was asked, in cooperation
with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), to provide consultants for reviewing the staffing analysis of all
institutions and central office and will be conducted as soon as possible to
determine proper and safe staffing levels. If there are special second-shifts,
such as was the case on November 14, 2005; a correctional officer should be
assigned to make the necessary counts and searches. There are currently
two correctional officers assigned to the Prison Industries area on the dayshift
to make offender checks, counts and conduct periodic and random
shakedowns and searches of storage areas and offenders.
Iowa State Penitentiary Work Programs - a study of Iowa State Penitentiary
offender work programs will be initiated to determine if current security levels
can properly support the amount of work activity.
Security Enhancements - High Mast lighting should be installed, or a
significant upgrade made to the current lighting fixtures to include perimeter
walls, interior buildings and yards. Security screens will be installed on the
windows on the first two floors of the Prison Industries building immediately.
Razor wire will be installed on the top of the plumbing/electrical building since
it is within 30 feet of the main prison wall. The height of the Taut Wire system
on the perimeter wall will be discussed with the manufacturer. Currently, it is
installed half way up the wall and consideration should be given to placement
higher up nearer the top. If the Taut Wire system is not raised higher, then
razor wire will be placed closer to the top of the wall.
Tower Coverage - a study will be conducted immediately to determine which
towers should be staffed including days and times. Solid walls or
obstructions in towers should be replaced with security glass, and post orders
should be simple and precise as to what the orders are for the assigned
correctional officer. The Iowa State Penitentiary is currently looking at cost
savings in other areas that might allow for increases in tower staffing.
Security Training for all staff - a back-to-basics security training program for
all staff is being developed with the assistance of the Department of
Corrections Director of Training and Professional Development.
Leadership Development Training - a weeklong leadership developmenttraining program is being planned for late winter/early spring for all managers
and supervisors at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Training consultants from the
National Institute of Corrections have already been contacted to begin the
planning.

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BACKGROUND OF IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
The Iowa State Penitentiary was opened in 1839, sits on approximately 20 acres, and is
the oldest operating prison west of the Mississippi River. Its classification is maximumsecurity and also includes the Clinical Care Unit, and the John Bennett medium-security
unit1. The Iowa State Penitentiary also has two minimum-security farms, which are not
part of the main institution. The Penitentiary has an annual appropriation of
$41,667,569 that funds 573 full-time employees consisting of administrative, security,
treatment/counseling, medical and support staff2 .
The Iowa State Penitentiary provides housing for all three custody levels. The
maximum-security section inside the walled compound encompasses approximately 11
acres and includes cell house row, made up of cell house 18, 19, and 20, which were
constructed between 1907 and 1920, with a combined capacity of 597. The maximumsecurity part of the prison currently houses 566 offenders with an additional 403
offenders housed in the John Bennett Unit, Clinical Care Unit and the prison farms3.
The medium security John Bennett Unit is located adjacent to the maximum-security
institution and was established in 1978 and houses 152 offenders.
The Clinical Care Unit located immediately south of the walled compound was
dedicated in September 2003 and houses those offenders in the Department of
Corrections with a diagnosis of mental illness. The Clinical Care Unit has a capacity of
200 offenders.
The minimum-security farms, established in 1952, are located near Augusta and
Montrose, and have a combined total of 1015 acres and a capacity for 180 offenders.
The Iowa State Penitentiary underwent extensive renovations of its maximum-security
cell houses in 1982. Each cell house, 18, 19 & 20, was divided into smaller living units
to more easily manage the offender population. In 1984, a visitor center and infirmary
were completed.
As Iowa’s main maximum-security prison, the Iowa State Penitentiary houses Iowa’s
most violent offenders. As of December 2005, the Iowa State Penitentiary currently
housed 277 offenders serving a life sentence. Approximately 84% of the offender
population is serving time for violent crimes against a person.
The Iowa State Penitentiary has a stone and concrete wall, approximately 40 feet high,
which surrounds the entire perimeter of the maximum-security unit. Armed towers
provide surveillance of the maximum-security unit. The wall contains taut wire,
1

See aerial photograph (attachment #1).
st
See HF 811, Justice Systems Appropriations, 81 General Assembly, which took effect on July
1, 2005 (attachment #2).
3
See attached Department of Corrections Daily Statistics of December 23, 2005 (attachment #3).
2

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electronic surveillance, and a climbing barrier. Regular perimeter surveillance is
provided by foot and vehicle patrols from dusk to dawn. The reception area officer, and
the Master Control station along with Tower and Stockade personnel, maintains strict
control over all pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Cameras are mounted at strategic
locations around the perimeter wall, which are monitored by Master Control personnel.
Lights are mounted on the inside and outside perimeter of the wall, approximately fifty
feet apart, to ensure no blind areas exist. Six major official counts are conducted of
offenders during a 24-hour period in the maximum-security unit and informal counts
occur as directed.

BACKGROUND OF OFFENDERS

Robert Legendre #6899908.4
Offense Information:
Was convicted of Homicide, Kidnapping and Weapons Offense in the State of Nevada
and placed in Iowa as a Compact Transfer case in December 2004 as a GP 1 5
offender. This offender reports the incarcerating offense pertains to the Robbery of a
cab driver. While the cab was moving, Robert Legendre grabbed the cab driver and
pulled him into the back seat and held a wire around the victim’s neck and robbed him.
He also reports that a co-defendant struck the cab driver with a hammer. They then
dropped the driver out of the taxi and drove away.
The transfer to Iowa was due to Robert Legendre having serious problems with the
Skinheads and Aryan Nation inmates. He was assaulted as he refused to join either of
these two security threat groups. Also, in 2001, he was found in possession of a
grappling hook and 30 feet of rope in his cell while being housed in disciplinary
segregation.
Prior Record:
Information includes juvenile arrests for petty theft, possession of a weapon at school,
burglary, simple assault, shoplifting, concealing stolen property, theft, probation
violation, aggravated assault, aggravated escape, and possession of stolen property.
He was charged in 1995 with the aggravated assault and escape charge when he was
in a juvenile correctional facility and assaulted a youth correctional officer with a sock
loaded with a pool ball, with the intent to escape or, if unsuccessful, to do something so
bad that he would be transferred to a different facility.
Personal Information/History:
Robert Legendre is a 27 year-old white male, 5’11” and weighs 178 pounds. Offender
reported that he has one half-sister and is the only child born to his parents, who
divorced when he was four or five years of age. Legendre describes himself as single,
4
5

See Offender Robert Legendre information (attachment #4).
See explanation of the offender level system (attachment #5).
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having never been married and having fathered one child. He acknowledges having no
GED or high school diploma, having last completed the 9th grade. He denied having
any special education services. Legendre has spent his entire adult life locked up and
reports only one job, having worked at a fast food restaurant for 9 or 10 months. He
denies any history of drug or alcohol abuse.
Discipline History:
Since arriving in the Iowa Department of Correction in December 2004, Robert
Legendre has received one disciplinary report dated January 1, 2004 for being loud in
his housing unit late at night. Robert Legendre was found guilty by the Administrative
Law Judge for obstructive/disruptive conduct and received a suspended sentence of 30
days of Disciplinary Detention and a suspended sentence of 16 days loss of earned
time.
Classification:
A Classification Review was completed at the Iowa State Penitentiary on March 24,
2005 in which Robert Legendre was placed in GP 2 status6 since he was found to have
adjusted adequately since his arrival from the State of Nevada. Mr. Legendre reported
he needs to work as he has no support from the outside and has no enemies. On April
7, 2005 Robert Legendre was reviewed by the Classification Committee, which gave
approval for job placement to Prison Industries.

Martin Moon #1005809.7
Offense Information:
On April 26, 1999, authorities in rural Clarke County found the skeletal remains of a
man in a cistern near an abandoned house just several miles southwest of Osceola,
Iowa. These remains were discovered from information received several days earlier
from a confidential informant. Apparently, Casey Brodsack had taken this informant to
the scene of this body three years earlier. Brodsack showed the body to the
confidential informant and told him the story of how he (Brodsack) and two other men
had killed this victim back in August 1990. Clarke County authorities detained Brodsack
for questioning and Brodsack testified that he and Martin Moon and another unnamed
individual went with the victim to this abandoned house on August 1, 1990 to complete
a drug deal. Brodsack claims he stayed in the car while Moon and the other man shot
the victim several times. The men then placed the body in the cistern and covered it
with rocks and other items. Martin Moon was arrested and charged with Murder 1st. As
a result of his testimony, Casey Brodsack was allowed to plead to Murder 2 nd. Moon
was found guilty of Murder 1st in a jury trial and given a life sentence. He was admitted
to the Iowa Medical & Classification Center on July 6, 2000.

6
7

See Attachment # 5 for explanation of Offender Level system.
See Offender Martin Moon information (attachment #6).
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Prior Record:
Martin Moon has a lengthy criminal history both as a juvenile and an adult. He had
done time at Eldora and served a previous prison term in Iowa from July 1992 until his
discharge in September 1996 – this was a 10-year concurrent sentence for two counts
of Burglary 2nd. Moon was also doing time in the State of Tennessee at the time of
arrest on the present charge. That charge was for Tampering with Evidence.
In early June 2000, an incident occurred at the Clark County Jail. A friend of Martin
Moon had sent some personal items, including some hacksaw blades, through the mail
from Tennessee. Moon was able to use the hacksaw blades to file through some cell
door bars and windows. He had concealed the cuts using some toothpaste. Jail
officials discovered these cuts. According to documents, the bars could have been
knocked out with a hard jolt. As a result, Moon was transferred to the Iowa Medical &
Classification Center as soon as possible due to his potential escape risk.
Personal Information/History:
Martin Moon is a 34 year-old white male, 6’0’’ and weighs 185 pounds. Offender Moon
reports that he was born in Des Moines and raised in Osceola, Iowa. He reports
receiving his GED through the Iowa Training School for Boys in Eldora in 1986,
although there is no Pre-Sentence Investigation report to verify this. Martin Moon is
single and has fathered no children. His only employment history consists of some
construction work. He denied any physical or mental health problems.
Discipline History:
Martin Moon committed the following disciplinary rule infractions since being sentenced
to the custody of the Iowa Department of Corrections on July 6, 2000:
 March 13, 2003. Found guilty for the exchange of money between offenders.
He received 30 days of disciplinary detention and loss of 16 days of earned time.
 May 25, 2004. Found guilty for sniffing glue in the Prison Industries building. He
received 30 days of disciplinary detention and loss of 16 days of earned time.
 May 26, 2004. Found guilty for being in possession of another offender’s watch.
He received a suspended sentence of 10 days of disciplinary detention and loss
of 16 days of earned time.
Classification:
On May 21, 2003, Martin Moon was seen by the Classification Committee and
approved for job placement in Prison Industries. The Classification Committee last saw
him on July 28, 2005, which found his domicile evaluation above average and his detail
evaluation outstanding. No specific programming was recommended.

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ESCAPE TIMELINE
According to the institutional blotter8 and staff testimony, the following is a timeline of
the escape on November 14, 2005:
Offenders Robert Legendre and Martin Moon were in a work assignment at Iowa Prison
Industries at the time of their disappearance. Offenders Legendre and Moon were part
of a work crew consisting of 20 offenders that were being supervised on the 4th floor of
the Industries Shop by a Prison Industries supervisor. This crew of offenders was
working a special second shift from 2:30 p.m. to 6:25 p.m. due to production deadlines
for a work order. There was no other production work being performed during this
timeframe on floors 1, 2 or 3 of the Prison Industries building. Since this was a special
second shift work project, there were no correctional officers being utilized and
supervision was left to the responsibility of the Prison Industry supervisor.
November 14, 2005:
 3:00 p.m. – Shift Captain clears the institutional count (all offenders accounted
for).
 5:18 p.m. – Camera in the Industry Building shows the 4th Floor stairwell door
opening.
 5:19 p.m. - Camera in Prison Industry Building shows three offenders coming
down the stairwell on the 3rd floor landing.
 5:19 p.m. – Camera in Prison Industry Building shows offenders on 2nd Floor
landing.
 5:19 p.m. – One offender appears to be going back up the stairs, other
offender seems to be trying to hide under the camera.
 5:26 p.m. – Three offenders observed by Industry Building cameras entering
the 1st Floor.
 5:29 p.m. – One offender back on the 1st Floor and goes up the stairwell back
to the 4th Floor at 5:30 p.m.9
 5:30 p.m. – Perimeter vehicle officer begins patrol on outside of the Iowa State
Penitentiary perimeter.
 5:35 p.m. – Two Fort Madison residents at ATM Machine just west of the prison
grounds observed two males exit the creek bed and head west
crossing highway 61, going in the direction of Avenue E in the City
of Fort Madison. One of the males is observed limping and being
helped by the other male.
 6:10 p.m. - Offenders working on 4th Floor of Prison Industry Building begin
checking in their tools and finishing their second shift work.

8

Blotter is a written chronology of events and activities at the Iowa State Penitentiary during a 24-hour
period.
9
There was a third offender who assisted with planning the escape and partially participated in the escape
before making the decision not to escape.
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 6:25 p.m.  6:32 p.m.  7:01 p.m. -

 7:19 p.m.  7:40 p.m.  7:40 p.m. –

 7:50 p.m.  7:55 p.m.  8:00 p.m.  8:00 p.m. 

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8:08 p.m. 8:09 p.m. 8:15 p.m. 8:15 p.m. -

 8:17 p.m.  8:22 p.m.  8:23 p.m. –
 8:25 p.m. -

Prison Industry workers are released to eat dinner or go back to
their cell house.
Ft. Madison Police Department receives report of a stolen Pontiac
Bonneville vehicle (This information was not known by the Iowa
State Penitentiary staff until 8:35 p.m.).
During routine security rounds of the lower yard of the Iowa State
Penitentiary, a Correctional Officer reported to the K-910 Unit that a
makeshift rope made from burlap was found tied to a conduit on
top of the maintenance shop. The Officer estimated the burlap
material was about 4 inches wide and 20 feet long, which was
hanging from the roofline of the maintenance shop building when
found. The Shift Captain advises the Correctional Officer to fling
the rope onto the top of the building and also advises that Deputy
Warden be notified. The Correctional Officer radios the K-9 Officer
to view the makeshift rope.
K-9 Officer views the burlap found by the Correctional Officer.
Cell house 419 reports they are unable to locate Offender Robert
Legendre #6899908.
Shift Captain orders three to four Correctional Officers to search
the Prison Industry Building where offender Robert Legendre was
working and to search the lower yard of the Iowa State
Penitentiary.
Cell house 218 reports they are unable to locate Offender Martin
Moon #1005809.
Shift Captain orders an emergency count to be taken of the Iowa
State Penitentiary.
All Towers and the Perimeter Patrol Vehicle are notified of the two
missing offenders. The Security Director notified.
Shift Captain orders the Perimeter Patrol Vehicle to Monitor Towers
three and four11.
Security Director advised for the Warden to be notified.
Security Director arrives at the institution.
Warden arrives at the institution.
The emergency count ordered at 7:55 p.m. clears verifying
Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre missing.
Deputy Warden arrives at the institution.
Correctional Emergency Response Team (CERT) notified.
Internal affairs division at the Iowa State Penitentiary notified.
Warden orders all K-9 Officers be called to the institution.
Correctional Officers and Deputy Warden discover grappling hook
and burlap tied off from building 297 to the west wall12.

10

K-9 Officers are correctional officers assigned to a specially trained dog.
See aerial photograph outlining Towers three and four (attachment #7).
12
See photograph of building 297 and west wall metal railing (attachment #8).
11

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Begin cell and property search of Offenders Robert Legendre and
Martin Moon.
8:31 p.m.Deputy Warden orders additional Correctional Officers positioned
on the ground outside of the Iowa State Penitentiary west wall.
8:35 p.m. - Ft. Madison Police Department notified. Police advised they had a
report of a stolen Pontiac Bonneville vehicle at 6:32 p.m. in the City
of Ft. Madison. The vehicle had approximately a half tank of fuel
and contained no cash or credit cards. A bike taken in the City of
Ft. Madison was found at the scene of the missing vehicle.
8:42 p.m. – Department of Corrections Duty Officer notified by Iowa State
Penitentiary. Director of Department of Corrections notified.
8:43 p.m. – Department of Corrections Duty Officer notifies Governor’s Office
Duty Officer.
9:15 p.m. - Conference call with Governor’s Office, Department of Corrections
Director, Department of Public Safety, and Iowa State Penitentiary.
Press release will be formulated and circulated for review.
10:00 p.m. – Press release issued by the Department of Corrections to the
Cedar Rapids Gazette newspaper.
10:01 p.m. – Press release issued by the Department of Corrections to the Des
Moines Register newspaper.
10:04 p.m. – Press release issued by the Department of Corrections to the
Associated Press.
10:15 p.m. – Press release issued by the Department of Corrections to WHOTV in Des Moines, Iowa.
10:15 p.m. – 10:39 p.m. - Conference call with Governor’s Office staff,
Department of Corrections Director and staff, Department of Public
Safety staff, and Iowa State Penitentiary staff for an update on
status of the escape and apprehension.

November 15, 2005:
 8:15 a.m. – 9:05 a.m. - Conference call with Governor’s Office staff,
Department of Corrections Director and staff, Department of
Safety staff, and Iowa State Penitentiary staff to update on
of escape and apprehension.
 10:30 a.m. –11:00 a.m. - Conference call with Governor’s Office staff,
Department of Corrections Director and staff, Department of
Safety staff, and Iowa State Penitentiary staff to update on
of escape and apprehension.

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Public
status

Public
status

ESCAPE PLANING AND MATERIALS
According to the offender that changed his mind about escaping, Offender Martin
Moon, Offender Robert Legrendre and himself had planned this escape for some time.
They
had
done
several
things
in
preparation
for
the
escape
 The offenders had tested the strength of the burlap material by securing it in the
Prison Industries building and walking on it to ensure it would hold their body
weight13.
 Each of the offenders had gradually smuggled food, bottled water and first aid
items into the Prison Industry Building to take with them after escaping. They
had made two pouches out of sweat pant material to hold these items and there
was a rope connecting the two pouches that could be slung around their neck.
This was confirmed by a search of the First Floor Industry building where the
offender who changed his mind about escaping indicated he left behind his
pouches.
 Each offender agreed to make a small guiding hook, which was to be used in
helping them get across the burlap material to the top of the wall – this devise
would have been necessary due to the offender’s bodyweight and the weight of
the food pouches. The plan was to loop their pant belt thru the guiding hook and
fasten around their chest. This would have then allowed the offenders to place
the burlap material thru the guiding hook and pull themselves along the burlap
material that was used to get up and over the taut wire system on the west
wall14.
 The grappling hook was fabricated out of metal piping and air nozzle tips that are
common in the Prison Industries building15. According to the offender that
changed his mind about escaping, the grappling hook was assembled on the
evening of November 14, 2005 by Offender Martin Moon at his workstation and
carried down the stairwell.
 The burlap material is also common material in the Prison Industry building and
was secured to the grappling hook with a knot and some black electrical tape.
 Cameras in the stairwell recorded offenders Robert Legendre, Martin Moon and
the offender that changed his mind and did not complete the escape, walking out
of the 4th floor of the Prison Industries Building and going down the stairwell to
the 1st Floor at 5:18 p.m. 16 The Prison Industries Building windows are not
13

See photograph of burlap material (attachment #9).
See photograph of the west wall and taut wire system (attachment #10).
15
See photograph of the grappling hook (attachment #11).
16
The institutional procedures require that two officers in the control room issue keys, handcuffs,
flashlights and other materials, while at the same time, opening a number of electronically controlled gates
throughout the prison, and also observe the activities of 178 cameras on ten television monitors. The post
order requires more than the officers can do, and as a result, the officers out of necessity, monitor the
high traffic areas during their shift. At the time of the movement of the escapees in the Industries building,
the observation of the officers was on traffic gates, and the dining hall where most of the offender activity
was occurring.
14

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









17

within range of the security cameras but testimony of the offender that changed
his mind indicates the offenders exited thru a window on the 1st Floor of the
Industries Building17.
All three offenders walked approximately 50 feet to an 8-foot chain link fence that
contains strands of razor wire on top. One of the offenders threw their prisonissued denim jacket on top of the razor wire to assist with avoiding injuries when
climbing over this fence and razor wire 18.
Once on top of this chain-line fence and razor wire, Offenders Martin Moon and
Robert Legendre threw the grappling hook and their supplies to the top of the
maintenance-building roof19. The offenders then jumped some 20 feet to the
maintenance building roof. It is believed this is where Offender Robert Legendre
injured his foot. Testimony of the offender that changed his mind about escaping
was that he heard a loud popping sound right after Offender Robert Legendre
jumped.
The offender that changed his mind about escaping goes back through the First
Floor Prison Industry building window and back up the stairwell to the 4th Floor.
Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre walked across the roof of the
maintenance building and tied the burlap to a wooden clamp obtained in the
Prison Industries building, which is then secured to an electrical conduit piping.
The burlap material is then used to lower them to the ground20.
Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then proceed to building 297,
which is the old lifers unit located by the west wall21. There is an old steel cell
that surrounds a door to building 297, which the offenders climbed to gain
access to the roof of building 297.
The grappling hook and burlap is then thrown to the top of the metal railing on
the catwalk area that connects Towers #4 and #522. Once the hook is attached
to the metal railing and any slack in the burlap removed, the burlap is tied to a
wooden clamp and secured to a vent pipe coming out the top of building 29723.
Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre then utilize the guide hook
attached to their belt, and secured around their chest, to pull themselves along
the burlap from the top of building 297 to the top of the west wall catwalk area.
The grappling hook is left in place. Once successfully returning to the 4 th Floor of
the Prison Industries Building after changing his mind about escaping, the
offender testified watching Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre pulling
themselves along the burlap from building 297 to the catwalk area.
Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre proceed down the catwalk to
Tower #4 and tie a 35 foot piece of burlap to the metal walkway railing and lower
themselves to the ground outside of the Iowa State Penitentiary24.
st

See photograph of 1 Floor Prison Industry building window (attachment #12).
See photograph of offender denim jacket on top of chain link fence and razor wire (attachment #13).
19
See photograph of maintenance building rooftop (attachment #14).
20
See photograph of wood clamp and burlap secured to electrical conduit (attachment #15).
21
See attached photograph of building 297 (attachment #16).
22
See photograph of grappling hook secured to metal railing (attachment #17).
23
See photograph of burlap secured to vent pipe on roof of building 297 (attachment #18).
24
See photograph of Tower railing used to secure burlap (attachment #19).
18

- 13 -

 Offenders Martin Moon and Robert Legendre proceed to the first residential
house and take a bicycle that was in the yard.
 Offender Martin Moon takes the bicycle in search of a vehicle since Offender
Robert Legendre is injured.
 Offender Martin Moon discovers an unoccupied, running vehicle several blocks
away and steals the vehicle. Testimony of the vehicle owner indicates the car
was left running while in a friend’s house.

Findings Related to Tool Control and Inventory
The Prison Industry Supervisor wrote a statement and relayed to the Prison Industry
Plant Manager and the Warden about last seeing offenders Robert Legendre and
Martin Moon at 6:10 p.m. while they were checking in their tool carts at the end of their
shift on the evening of November 14, 2005. The Prison Industry Supervisor would have
been responsible for ensuring all work tools were accounted for and it was later
discovered that a small utility knife and a few air nozzle tips were missing from the
offender work carts that were checked in.
Recommendation –
Tool Control and Inventory. Security and Prison Industry need to ensure staff is aware
of Tool Control procedures as this impacts the safe, secure and orderly operation of the
Iowa State Penitentiary by ensuring offenders don’t take away tools or material from
Prison Industry operations. As mentioned above, the Prison Industry Supervisor would
have been responsible for ensuring all work tools were accounted for. It was later
discovered that a small utility knife and a few air nozzle tips were missing from the
offender work carts the Prison Industry Supervisor checked in.
Corrective Action –
Iowa State Penitentiary has, or is in the process of, conducting searches of Prison
Industry shops, Library, Habitat for Humanity, Hobby Craft, the living units, and John
Bennett Prison Industry shop.
The Iowa State Penitentiary is also conducting inventories of all Prison Industry tools.
Review of Policies. The Iowa State Penitentiary is in the process of reviewing the
following policies: Perimeter Security; Tool Control & Inventory; Counts; Inmate
Movement; Receiving and Discharge; and all Iowa Prison Industries.
New Security Leadership, by way of a Security Director and Assistant Security Director,
has been put in place.
All employees have been told that, regardless of position, that security is everyone’s
responsibility.

- 14 -

Security Training for all staff - a back-to-basics security training program for all staff is
being developed with the assistance of the Department of Corrections Director of
Training and Professional Development.

Findings Related to Offender Counts
The Prison Industry Supervisor testified that he did not perform a head count of the
offenders prior to leaving the 4th floor of the Prison Industries Building at the end of their
work shift. The offenders were then told by the Prison Industry Supervisor to walk down
the stairwell to the 1st floor and to meet there because the Prison Industry Supervisor
would be taking the freight elevator down to the 1st Floor. The Prison Industry
Supervisor testified taking the freight elevator, so the Prison Industry Supervisor could
see if any offenders would have left the 1st floor staging area25. However, this raises a
security concern for an offender being able to remain behind on the 4th floor or to exit
the stairwell onto floors 3 and 2 on their way down to the 1st floor.
Recommendation –
The Deputy Warden, who supervises the Security Director, needs to ensure that staff is
aware of Post Orders/Policies and to work with Prison Industries on security issues. By
policy, the Security Director is to make inspections of the institution at least weekly and
it appears this was not being done. Security and Prison Industries need to meet and
communicate on security issues and expectations when Prison Industry staff supervises
offenders, which was not being done. There are two correctional officers inside the
Prison Industry building during the day shift of 6:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m. and have Post
Orders available to them, but there was no indication this information was shared with
Prison Industry staff. There is also no indication that Prison Industry staff sought out
the Post Order information from the Correctional Officers or the Security Director.
Testimony revealed uncertainty by several staff on timeframes throughout the day of
when formal counts are supposed to be conducted and the times of those counts.
Again, clear communication of post order/policy requirements will address this issue.
Corrective Action –
The Iowa State Penitentiary Management Team made a decision there would be no
offender movement during the hours of darkness except in cases of emergency. Iowa
Prison Industries Deputy Director has directed there would no longer be any overtime in
Iowa Prison Industries during hours of darkness.
A New Management Team was established that now consists of the Warden, Deputy
Warden, Security Director, Treatment Director, Business Manager, Clinical Care Unit

25

The staging area is the entrance to the Prison Industry building where offenders are searched and
counted before going into or leaving the building.
- 15 -

Administrator, Executive Officer, Personnel Officer, and Iowa Prison Industry Manager,
which meets on a daily basis to discuss operational issues.
The Iowa State Penitentiary is in the process of reviewing the following policies:
Perimeter Security; Offender Counts; Tool Control; Offender Movement; Receiving and
Discharge; and, all Iowa Prison Industry policies.
New Security Leadership, by way of a Security Director and Assistant Security Director,
has been established at the Iowa State Penitentiary. All employees have been told
that, regardless of position, that security is everyone’s responsibility.
Security Training for all staff - a back-to-basics security training program for all staff is
being developed with the assistance of the Department of Corrections Director of
Training and Professional Development.
Leadership Development Training - a weeklong leadership development-training
program is being planned for late winter/early spring for all managers and supervisors
at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Training consultants from the National Institute of
Corrections have already been contacted to begin the planning.

Findings Related to Offender Searches
Once the offenders working the second shift were down on the 1st Floor of the Prison
Industry building, the Prison Industry Supervisor had the offenders remove their jackets
and walk through the metal detector since the metal buttons on the jackets would
activate the metal detector. The Prison Industry Supervisor then conducted a pat
search of each offender’s jacket.
Recommendation –
This practice raises a security concern since no pat down search was conducted of the
offender’s body or their outer clothing, which could have concealed contraband items
such as wood or plastic items the metal detector would have missed. Testimony of
other staff reaffirmed this was an improper pat search that was conducted. The Prison
Industry Supervisor testified a head count of offenders was not completed prior to
letting them out of the building on the first floor, nor verifying that each offender had
their picture Identification Card.
During an investigative search of the Industries Building on November 17, 2005, the
picture Identification Cards belonging to offenders Robert Legendre and the offender
that changed his mind about escaping were found. This raises a security concern of
how the offender who had changed his mind about escaping was able to get out of the
Prison Industries Building or go back to his cell house without his picture Identification
Card. Testimony of Prison Industry and Security Staff revealed different accounts of
whether the offender picture Identification Card is to be displayed or whether an

- 16 -

offender is only responsible to have the picture Identification Card available upon
request by staff.
Once offenders are released from the Prison Industries Building, they are to be pat
searched by a Correctional Officer and escorted to the main yard where offenders can
go to the dining hall or back to their cell house if they choose not to eat dinner.
Testimony of both Prison Industry Staff and Security Staff revealed that a Correctional
Officer is not always made available to search Prison Industry offenders or to escort
them to the main yard. Much of the time, it is the Prison Industry Supervisor who
escorts the offenders to the main yard. On November 14, 2005, the Prison Industry
Supervisor waived to a Correctional Officer who was stationed near the Shift Captain’s
Office (this practice of waiving is called “highballing” which indicates all offenders are
accounted for). The Shift Captain indicates that Prison Industry offenders could be pat
searched by a Correctional Officer if they go to the dining hall to eat dinner. However,
this pat search is sometimes not done at all or done randomly due to staff shortages.
This raises a security concern with contraband items for those Prison Industry offenders
who do not eat dinner and go directly back to the cell house without being pat searched.
Corrective Action –
Reassessed Supervisory Coverage - the captains and lieutenants are now responsible
for a certain number of correctional officer staff with the plan that by doing so there will
be more accountability and clarification of security reporting lines and for ensuring
proper accountability and searching of offenders.
Identification Badge – all offenders will now be required to wear their ID at all times, so
that it is visible to all correctional staff.
Captain/Lieutenant Meetings - communication with this important group of supervisors
needs improvement and there are plans being discussed to have more scheduled
meetings.
The Iowa State Penitentiary is reviewing staffing patterns, including that of additional
tower coverage, for the entire complex.
Security Training for all staff - a back-to-basics security training program for all staff is
being developed with the assistance of the Department of Corrections Director of
Training and Professional Development.

Findings Related to Post Orders/Policies
The Prison Industry Supervisor verified the Iowa State Penitentiary Post Order for the
Industry Building #700-01 was not followed. This post order requires that Prison
- 17 -

Industry staff be responsible to account for their assigned offenders prior to escorting
the offenders from their respective floor assignments. The Iowa State Penitentiary
policy on Tool Control and Accountability was not followed. The Prison Industry
Supervisor conducted an improper pat search.
Recommendation –
There are no policies or post orders issued from the Prison Industries Plant Manager on
security procedures for Prison Industry staff to follow when supervising offenders.
However, please keep in mind there was a Post Order dated February 15, 2005 and
signed by the Security Director and the Warden outlining security and searching
procedures for offenders working in the Prison Industry building. The Prison Industry
Plant Manager testified about never receiving a copy of this Post Order nor were they
consulted with by the Security Director or Warden when this Post Order was being
developed. If they had, the Prison Industry Plant Manager testified their signature
would have been included on this Post Order. Security acknowledges this Post Order
would have been sent to the Correctional Officers assigned to the Prison Industry
Building from the 6:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m. shift. The real question then is “what is the
Security Director’s responsibility to get this Post Order communicated to the Prison
Industry Plant Manager or was the Prison Industry Plant Manager supposed to contact
the Security Director and inquire if there were any policies or post orders that would
impact Prison Industry staff supervising offenders?” There appears to be a real
communication gap that exists between Security and Prison Industries at the Iowa State
Penitentiary. The question that arises is: “Who is responsible for security?” The Office
of Inspector General would recommend a coordinated communication effort between
the Security Director and the Prison Industry Plant Manager on Post Orders and
Policies. Once finalized, this information needs to be available to all staff working with
and supervising offenders in the Prison Industry building. The Office of Inspector
General would also recommend reviewing the training requirements for Prison Industry
staff. Currently, all staff receives 40 hours of new employee orientation and 40 hours of
annual refresher training locally at the Iowa State Penitentiary. There was some
confusion though on whether Prison Industry staff attended the 120-hour Department of
Corrections Training Academy for new employees and whether all the courses would
be relevant for some Prison Industry employees and other job classes.
Corrective Action –
A New Management Team was established that now consists of the Warden, Deputy
Warden, Security Director, Treatment Director, Business Manager, Clinical Care Unit
Administrator, Executive Officer, Personnel Officer, and Iowa Prison Industry Manager,
which meets on a daily basis to discuss operational issues.
The Iowa State Penitentiary is in the process of reviewing the following policies:
Perimeter Security; Offender Counts; Offender Movement; Receiving and Discharge;
and, all Iowa Prison Industry policies.

- 18 -

New Security Leadership has been established at the Iowa State Penitentiary. All
employees have been told that, regardless of position, that security is everyone’s
responsibility.
Review of Post Orders - All post orders are being reviewed and re-written to an
understandable format that does not exceed 3 pages in length, with maximum in-put
from assigned staff.
Staff Input. An e-mail was sent out to all staff asking for their comments and
recommendations regarding operations of the institution as they begin the process of
coming off lockdown.
AFSCME Union Leadership - the Warden met with four members of the AFSCME local
to discuss concerns and exchange of ideas.
Prison Industry staff are currently members of the Department of Corrections Training
Consortium and are working on specific training for Prison Industry staff for the 40
hours of annual refresher training.
The Department of Corrections Director of Training and Professional Development will
be working with Prison Industry staff and other job classes such as medical and
administrative support on attending the 120-hour Department of Corrections Training
Academy for new employees and whether all the courses would be relevant for the
particular job classes.

Findings Related to Security Coverage
Tower 5 was staffed at the time of the escape and the Correctional Officer reports, that
due to darkness and poor visibility, the person was unable to see the area where the
escape was reported to have taken place. The Correctional Officer’s supervisor is the
Shift Captain. Tower #5 Correctional Officer testified about being focused on the
Clinical Care Unit offenders being escorted to the gymnasium for exercise at 5:45 p.m.
The Daily Log (Blotter) kept by the Shift Captain indicates the Clinical Care Unit
offenders were not escorted to the gym until 5:45 p.m., which is 15 or more minutes
after the offenders escaped occurred at 5:30 p.m. The exercise yard in front of this
Tower #5 was closed and no activity was taking place at 5:30 p.m. Therefore, the
Correctional Officer should have been looking down the wall and should have seen
offenders Robert Legendre and Martin Moon atop building 297 when they threw the
grappling hook and burlap material to the top of the wall. There would have been a
loud noise when contact was made with the metal-pipe grappling hook and the metal
walkway railing that connects the Towers at the Iowa State Penitentiary, which should
have been heard by the Tower #5 Correctional Officer. The offenders then climbed
across this burlap one at a time until they reached the main wall. The offenders then
left the grappling hook and burlap in place and went to Tower #4 where they tied the

- 19 -

burlap from the catwalk railing, which they used to climb down to the outside of the Iowa
State Penitentiary and escaped. The Correctional Officer did not see any of this.
The burlap was hanging from the roof of building 297 to the Iowa State Penitentiary
west wall from 5:30 p.m. until about 8:25 p.m. and was never noticed by the Tower #5
Correctional Officer. Post Orders for the Tower was not followed because the
Correctional Officer never made any entries about the escape and the grappling
hook/burlap once it was brought to the Correctional Officer’s attention around 8:25 p.m.
The Correctional Officer also testified about feeling that offenders Martin Moon, Robert
Legendre and John Graves were “casing” the Correctional Officer for some time by
watching the Tower or watching the lower yard for long periods of time from the Prison
Industry building and from the exercise track. Yet, this activity was never reported to the
Shift Captain nor entered into the logbook by the Tower #5 Correctional Officer.
The outside perimeter of the Iowa State Penitentiary is monitored by a vehicle patrol
from sunset (5:00 p.m.) to 5:30 a.m. A Correctional Officer began perimeter vehicle
duty at 5:25 p.m. on November 14, 2005 and testified about completing a pass around
the perimeter of Iowa State Penitentiary five to six times per hour. The burlap from the
Tower #4 railing over the exterior wall of the Iowa State Penitentiary was approximately
35 feet in length (the exterior wall is 40 feet high) and was discovered at 8:30 p.m. by
Correctional Officers. However, the Perimeter Officer was contacted by the Shift
Captain at 8:00 p.m. about the missing offenders and instructed the perimeter vehicle to
station itself to monitor Towers #3 and #426. The vehicle was stationed in the gravel
parking lot across from Tower #4 and the burlap still was not seen. The perimeter
vehicle would have passed the burlap hanging from Tower #4 around 12-14 times
between 5:25 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. and was never discovered. Additionally, the
Correctional Officer when specifically positioned to monitor, did not see the burlap
hanging from Towers #3 and #4 between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m. Correctional officers
inside of the Iowa State Penitentiary were the ones that discovered the burlap material.
The perimeter vehicle officer testified about being issued a handheld spotlight to shine
on the wall and that the Correctional Officer never utilizes the spotlight. There was also
some confusion between security and administration on whether the perimeter vehicle
should be going in only direction around the Iowa State Penitentiary or changing
directions to avoid offenders picking up on a routine of the vehicle. There is a
memorandum directive from 2003 issued by the Security Director, which specifies that
the vehicle is to go only one direction. Yet, other officers have taken it upon themselves
to go both directions. The Deputy Warden and Warden were unaware of this
memorandum.
Recommendation - The Perimeter Vehicle needs to go in both directions around the
Iowa State Penitentiary and to utilize the spotlight that is issued to them. The use of the
spotlight can assist with improving security operations.
26

See attachment #7.
- 20 -

Corrective Action –
Towers - The Iowa State Penitentiary has returned to the pre-2003 staffing levels (when
the taut wire was installed) in the towers. A Tower is being remodeled in order to be
staffed, and that project should be completed by the end of the year. Another Tower
(unused and won't be) will have its steps removed. In addition, the Iowa State
Penitentiary is compiling a book of photos of escape risks for the tower officers.
The Perimeter Vehicle is now going in both directions around the exterior perimeter of
the Iowa State Penitentiary.
Staffing Patterns – the Iowa State Penitentiary is reviewing staffing patterns, in light of
additional tower coverage, for the entire complex.
Captain/Lieutenant Meetings - communication with this important group of supervisors
needs improvement and there are plans being discussed to have more scheduled
meetings.
Review of Post Orders - all post orders are being reviewed and re-written to an
understandable format that does not exceed 3 pages in length, with maximum input
from assigned staff. In addition, it was found that the perimeter vehicle officer's post
was worked off a memo from the Security Director and a post order is being written for
that post.
Staff Input - an e-mail was sent out to all staff asking for their comments and
recommendations regarding operations of the institution as we begin the process of
coming off lockdown.
AFSCME Union Leadership - the Warden met with four members of the AFSCME local
to discuss concerns and exchange of ideas.
Lighting - The Iowa State Penitentiary is addressing lighting concerns and blind spots,
but a study needs to be conducted regarding the installation of high mast lights.
Cell House # 297 and Hobby Craft/Maintenance Building - The Iowa State Penitentiary
has begun the process to demolish Cell House # 297 (death row) and is evaluating the
Hobby Craft/Maintenance Building for possible demolition due to its proximity to the
wall.
Securing Windows - The Iowa State Penitentiary is in the process of securing windows
in the Prison Industries Building and the Hobby Craft area.
Security Training for all staff - a back-to-basics security training program for all staff is
being developed with the assistance of the Department of Corrections Director of
Training and Professional Development.
- 21 -

Leadership Development Training - a weeklong leadership development-training
program is being planned for late winter/early spring for all managers and supervisors
at the Iowa State Penitentiary. Training consultants from the National Institute of
Corrections have already been contacted to begin the planning.

Findings Related to Reporting of Critical Incidents
Testimony revealed there is not a designated weekly duty officer at the Iowa State
Penitentiary. Administration testified this practice was stopped several months ago due
to concerns of ineffectiveness. Instead, all administration were to be on-call and
available to their staff by cell phone. Concerns were raised with the practical problems
of having staff on constant standby with a cell phone instead of having one designated
duty officer for one-week periods. Staff made suggestions of avoiding confusion and
streamlining the notification process if just one designated duty officer was utilized.
Notification was timely in this escape incident and this was just more of a suggestion by
line staff.
Recommendation – The Iowa State Penitentiary has its own Critical Incident Policy
along with the Department of Corrections statewide policy. Concerns were raised with
the language in the Iowa State Penitentiary policy saying the “Duty Officer” should be
notified and as discussed above, there is no designated duty officer as a single point of
contact. Confusion existed between Shift Captains and Administration on who has
responsibility for filling out a Critical Incident Form and submitting the information to the
Department of Corrections Central Office. The Shift Captain felt it was Administration’s
responsibility and Administration felt it was the Shift Captain’s responsibility. The
escape occurred on November 14th and a Critical Incident Report was not submitted to
the Department of Corrections Central Office until 9:30 p.m. on November 21st.
Clarification on reporting of critical incidents needs to occur.
Escape Checklist. Requires notification to local law enforcement, but does not mention
notifying the Department of Public Safety. There is some uncertainty of whether the
Department of Public Safety notification should have been completed by local law
enforcement or by the Department of Corrections Central Office. Once reviewed and
determined, this should be placed in policy and the escape checklist.

Corrective Action –
New Management Team - now consists of the Warden, Deputy Warden, Security
Director, Treatment Director, Business Manager, Clinical Care Unit Administrator,
Executive Officer, Personnel Officer, and Iowa Prison Industry Manager, which meets
on a daily basis.
- 22 -

Reinstatement of Duty Officers - effective immediately, the practice of having a duty
officer has been reinstated. A total of 14 administrators will take this duty one week at
a time.
Department of Corrections and the Department of Public Safety have developed an
escape checklist notification form. A series of statewide meetings with local law
enforcement will take place at each prison location, so that the Department of
Corrections and the Department of Public Safety along with local and state law
enforcement are briefed and aware of the procedures that will take place when an
escape occurs.
Findings Related to Classification of Offenders
The classification of lifers and those offenders with an escape history should be
reviewed. The reception report for Offender Robert Legendre notes a prior history of an
escape attempt in the State of Nevada with a grappling hook and a 30-foot rope and
consideration should be given before placing an offender with an escape history into
the Prison Industry work program for possible access to escape items.
The reception report for Offender Martin Moon notes an escape attempt while he was
housed in the Clarke County Jail, where he filed through some cell door bars and
windows with hacksaw blades that were mailed to him in the county jail. Current
practice is that Prison Industries receives a list of qualified offender workers from the
main Iowa State Penitentiary institution, which is then used by Prison Industries staff to
select workers.
Recommendation –
Review classification of offenders with an escape history for work assignments.
Corrective Action –
All offenders assigned to the farms and John Bennett Unit were reviewed to see
whether they were properly classified to their assignments. Also, all offender workers in
maximum-security will be reviewed to ensure that they are properly classified to that
particular assignment prior to being released from the lockdown. The Treatment
Director will now oversee all classification recommendations and personally approve
them.

- 23 -

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RESPONSE
1.

Lockdown (offenders are allowed out of their cell only to shower).
A.

November 14, 2005. An immediate lockdown of the Iowa State
Penitentiary was initiated once a determination was made an escape
occurred.

B.

November 24, 2005. No offender movement after dark authorized.
 Farms. Farms one and three were returned to normal operations.
 John Bennett Medium-Security Unit. Normal visiting was restored.
Two hours of yard time provided in the morning and two hours of yard
time provided in the afternoon during daylight hours.
 Clinical Care Unit. Normal visiting was restored. Transfers to the
Clinical Care Unit are being allowed, so other Department of
Corrections Institutions do not have to treat dangerous special need
offenders. Doctor appointments allowed in keeping offender
medications current. Offender workers resumed sanitation duties and
laundry operations at the Clinical Care Unit under staff supervision.
Library, education and hobby craft allowed under staff supervision.
Meals brought in bulk, set up on the atrium, and offenders served trays
one pod at a time.
 Maximum-Security Unit. Normal visiting was restored. Offenders will
be escorted one at a time both to and from the visiting room.
 Other. Beginning on Monday, November 28, 2005 Warden Ault and
staff began working on recommendations for the next level of step
down from lockup status. The goal is a daylight operation only for
inside the maximum-security unit.

C.

December 12, 2005. Requests for utilization of Farm one and three
offenders for work assignments at the main Iowa State Penitentiary
approved. Duties included cleaning the Administration Building, cleaning
the main yard and to work in maintenance, Powerhouse Building, laundry,
snow removal, offender clothing room and to assist with meal preparation
in the kitchen. Ten maximum-security offenders, who were requested by
the Food Services Director and reviewed by the Treatment Director, were
also approved to work in the dietary operation. Begin feeding some lower
risk offenders lunch in the Dining Hall and giving them the opportunity to
make a telephone call and have an authorized cigarette before returning
to their cell house. Goal is to feed general population offenders in the
Dining Hall for all three meals, but will proceed slowly on this transition.

D.

December 16, 2005. Begin feeding general population and Clinical Care
Unit offender’s lunch in the Dining Hall. Informal count completed when
offenders return to cell house after lunch. New formal and informal count

- 24 -

times initiated. All work supervisors are responsible for maintaining an
accurate count of offenders.
E.

December 20, 2005. Begin feeding general population offenders evening
meal in the dining hall. Allow GP 1 offenders time for exercise. Expand
offender workers in the Hospice program. More offender workers
assisting with institutional cleaning and sanitation. Currently estimate the
Iowa State Penitentiary is at 30% of normal operations. Goal is to
continue evaluating institutional operations that will allow for gradual
increase of offender reintegration opportunities.

2.

Security Review of all Prisons. Both internal and external security audits were
immediately conducted at all nine institutions in the Department of Corrections
using the 36 standards of the Department’s security audit system relative to
perimeter security.

3.

Prison Industry Building Shakedowns. A shakedown search of Prison
Industry operations, both traditional industry and on grounds private sector
employers, was conducted at each prison in the Department of Corrections. All
Prison Industry plant managers reviewed all institutional policies and post orders
that have to do with Prison Industry operations to ensure compliance.
Conducting inventories of all Prison Industry tools. Securing Windows - in the
process of securing windows in the Prison Industry and the Hobby Craft area.
Iowa State Penitentiary Work Programs - a study of Iowa State Penitentiary
offender work programs will be initiated to determine if current security levels can
properly support the amount of work activity. Reviewing training requirements for
Prison Industry and other job classes. Prison Industries will no longer work any
overtime during hours of darkness. Classification - all offender workers in
maximum-security will be reviewed to ensure that they are properly classified
to that particular assignment prior to being released from the lockdown. The
Treatment Director will now oversee all classification recommendations and
personally approve them. New Management Team - now consists of the
Warden,
Deputy
Warden,
Security
Director,
Treatment
Director,
Business Manager, Clinical Care Unit Administrator, Executive Officer, Personnel
Officer, and the Prison Industries Manager, which meets on a daily basis.

4.

The National Institute of Corrections (NIC). NIC was asked, in cooperation
with the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), to provide consultants for reviewing the security system at the Iowa
State Penitentiary and other prisons. The American Correctional Association
(ACA) standards for security should be imposed immediately. The Department of
Corrections is currently in the process of being certified under ACA standards,
which will result in higher standards for the control of tools, keys, and security
operations.

5.

Search and shakedown procedures. Are being rewritten and strengthened to
allow for scheduled and random searches of buildings and areas, as well as
- 25 -

random and routine searches of offenders. A highly randomized search system
will be used to avoid the possibility that offenders would be able to predict when
and where searches would be made.
6.

Staffing Analysis. The NIC was asked, in cooperation with the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), to conduct a
staffing analysis of all institutions and central office as soon as possible to
determine proper and safe staffing levels. If there are special second-shifts,
such as was the case on November 14, 2005; a correctional officer should be
assigned to make the necessary counts and searches. There are currently two
correctional officers assigned to the Industries area on the dayshift to make
checks and counts and conduct periodic and random shakedowns and searches
of storage areas and offenders.

7.

Iowa State Penitentiary Work Programs. A study of Iowa State Penitentiary
offender work programs will be initiated to determine if current security levels can
properly support the amount of work activity.

8.

Security Enhancements. High Mast lighting should be installed, or a significant
upgrade made to the current lighting fixtures to include perimeter walls, interior
buildings and yards. Security screens will be installed on the windows on the first
two floors of the Prison Industries building immediately. Razor wire will be
installed on the top of the plumbing/electrical building since it is within 30 feet of
the main prison wall. The “death house” or building 297 will be demolished,
which is the building rooftop where the offenders threw the grappling hook to the
west wall. The height of the Taut Wire system on the perimeter wall will be
discussed with the manufacturer. Currently, it is installed half way up the wall
and consideration should be given to placement higher up nearer the top. If the
Taut Wire system is not raised higher, then razor wire will be placed closer to the
top of the wall.

9.

Tower Coverage. A study will be conducted immediately to determine which
towers should be staffed including days and times. Solid walls or obstructions in
towers should be replaced with security glass, and post orders should be simple
and precise as to what the orders are for the assigned correctional officer. The
Iowa State Penitentiary is currently looking at cost savings in other areas that
might allow for increases in tower staffing.

10.

Legislative Leaders. The Department of Corrections participates on a
conference call December 1, 2005 between Legislative Leaders and the
Department of Corrections on the escape and corrective action being
undertaken. The Department of Corrections appears at a public meeting before
the Government Oversight Committee on December 15, 2005 to discuss the
escape and respond to questions from legislators.

11.

Training. Security Training for all staff - A back-to-basics security training
program for all staff is being developed with the assistance of the Department of
Corrections Director of Training and Professional Development. Leadership
Development Training - a weeklong leadership development-training program is

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being planned for late winter/early spring for all managers and supervisors at the
Iowa State Penitentiary. Training consultants from the National Institute of
Corrections have already been contacted to begin the planning.

EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONSE
Governor Thomas J. Vilsack publicly states the Department of Corrections has a
responsibility to protect the public – at all of their locations throughout the state. He
directs the Department of Corrections to immediately undertake a comprehensive
system-wide review of all security and safety measures. He announces new
leadership and the ordering of security enhancements at the Iowa State Penitentiary
including:
 Announces arrest of offender Martin Moon on November 17, 2005 in Chester,
Illinois. Martin Moon was captured after prison officials at the Menard State
Penitentiary noticed him sleeping in a stolen car.
 Announces arrest of offender Robert Legendre on November 18, 2005 in
Steele, Missouri. Robert Legendre was captured at a truck stop with a stolen
pickup.
 Names John Ault as the Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary. John Ault was
serving as Warden of the Anamosa State Penitentiary.
 Adding a correctional officer to the Prison Industries Building when offenders
are present on special work shifts.
 Providing re-training to all staff on security procedures and protocols.
 Adopting more frequent shakedowns and searches of all places and people.
 Securing windows and doors that lead to locations that cannot be seen at all
times by correctional officers.
 Analysis of additional lighting needs.
 Working with the National Institute of Corrections to conduct security audits and
staffing analyses in cooperation with the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees (AFSCME).
 Directed the Board of Corrections and the Director of the Department of
Corrections to evaluate whether a new facility to replace the Iowa State
Penitentiary is needed, whether to invest in upgrades at the prison, or move
maximum-security offenders to other state prisons. The Board of Corrections
conducts a public meeting on December 2, 2005 at the Iowa State Penitentiary.
A four-member subcommittee is established to begin their work.
 A report examining the cost and efficiencies of a new prison will be submitted to
the Governor within 30 days of its request.

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 Coordinates a conference call on December 1, 2005 between Legislative
Leaders and the Department of Corrections on the escape and corrective action
being undertaken.
 Requests the Department of Public Safety to undertake statewide escape
protocol policy with local and state law enforcement personnel at each
correctional facility in the state. The new policy will involve the Department of
Corrections notifying local law enforcement and the Department of Public Safety
upon an initial determination of a potential escape prior to a formal offender
count being completed. Notification will also take place upon the Department of
Corrections discovering material or supplies that could be used for an escape.
This readiness alert notification will maximize civilian safety, protection and
awareness while allowing law enforcement to get needed state resources
placed on standby response status including, but not limited to, aerial search
and surveillance, K-9 tracking, road blocks, tactical team searches, establishing
an incident command post and other mobile command posts and reverse 911
recorded telephone messages27. Current practice was for the Department of
Corrections to notify local law enforcement and the Department of Public Safety
when an actual offender escape was confirmed.

27

A reverse 911 call is conducted by local law enforcement to a specified block of identified citizens,
usually in the vicinity of the correctional facility, alerting them of the escape incident.
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CONCLUSION
There were a series of errors made the evening of November 14, 2005 that caused a
breakdown of security and allowed offenders Robert Legendre and Martin Moon to
escape from the Iowa State Penitentiary without immediate detection.
The escape of these offenders brought to light several inefficiencies and problem areas
of the Iowa State Penitentiary. Even though both escapees have been returned to
custody, several procedures have already been changed, and others are in the
planning. Actions have been taken against some staff members and a new warden has
been assigned.
The breakdown of security falls into three rather broad categories: 1). Accountability of
offenders; 2). Accountability of tools and materials; and 3). Inadequate institutional
procedures and lack of adherence to existing procedures.
1.

Accountability of Offenders—The Industries supervisor did not properly count
the offenders during the time offenders were working that evening. Offenders
were not counted out to the dining hall or cell house at the end of the workday
at approximately 6:25 p.m.

2.

Accountability of Tools and Materials—The escaped offenders used a variety of
tools and materials to affect the escape. These materials were gathered over
an undetermined period of time with some of the materials pre-positioned for
use on the evening of November 14, 2005. Half-inch pipe and fittings from the
Prison Industry shop were used to fashion the grappling hook. Upholstery
webbing was used as a rope to scale buildings, and ultimately the wall. The
webbing was used to drop over the perimeter wall outside the prison. Carpenter
clamps were used to secure the strapping to the buildings. The offenders had
makeshift packs to carry materials.

3.

Inadequate institutional procedures and lack of adherence to those
procedures—The current institutional procedures regarding counts, inventories,
shakedowns, tool and inventory control, and escort and observation of
offenders was inadequate. The count procedures do not require adequate
accountability over time. There was confusion on the requirement for offenders
to be counted during the special overtime shift, and whether an offender count
was required to be reported to the central control. Procedures regarding the
inventory of tools, equipment and materials were inadequate to ensure proper
accounting. These policies will need to be strengthened to require beginning
and ending inventories of Industries and maintenance materials on a daily
basis.

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The two escapees transported the materials of escape on their person without being
detected. Escape materials were allowed to be hidden within the Prison Industries
building without detection over an undetermined period of time.
The officer in Tower 5 did not observe the offenders climb up the wall of building 297 or
throw the grappling hook to the guard railing on top of the exterior prison wall or
observe the offenders climb across the upholstery webbing to the exterior wall or
observe the offenders drop over the outside of the wall. Even though it was dark at the
time, the lighting in the southwest corner of the prison was good enough to see the
inmates had the CO been positioned in the tower to observe this area.
The perimeter vehicle officer did not observe the 35 feet of burlap hanging from the
guard railing near Tower #4 even though numerous passed had been made in the
vehicle. The spotlight that is issued to the perimeter vehicle officer to view the wall was
not utilized.
The institutional procedures require that two correctional officers in the control room
issue keys, handcuffs, flashlights and other materials, while at the same time, opening
a number of electronically controlled gates throughout the prison, and also observe the
activities of 178 cameras on ten television monitors. The post order requires more than
the officers can do, and as a result, the officers out of necessity, monitor the high traffic
areas during their shift. At the time of the movement of the escapees in the Industries
building, the observation of the officers was on traffic gates, and the dining hall where
most of the offender activity was occurring.
Tower #4 in the southwest corner of the main yard was staffed from 7-3 during the
week to cover the movement of offender’s on that side of the yard, to include
observation of offenders working in Prison Industries. Offenders normally ended work
at approximately 2:30 pm. An extension of the workday for Prison Industries was
requested by Prison Industries and granted by Security to allow the offenders to work
until 6:25 pm. However, consideration was not given to staffing Tower #4 during this
period and offenders were allowed to work after dark without proper coverage in Tower
#4.
The Department of Corrections and the Board of Corrections have been asked by
Governor Thomas J. Vilsack to study the feasibility of replacement of the Iowa State
Penitentiary for a more secure and cost effective facility.
This concludes the Independent review by the Office of Inspector General related to the
escape of two offenders from the Iowa State Penitentiary on November 14, 2005.
Thank you.

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