United States

A Costly Move
Far and Frequent Transfers Impede Hearings for Immigrant
Detainees in the United States

H U M A N
R I G H T S
W A T C H

A Costly Move
Far and Frequent Transfers Impede Hearings for
Immigrant Detainees in the United States

Copyright © 2011 Human Rights Watch
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
ISBN: 1-56432-783-3
Cover design by Rafael Jimenez
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June 2011

1-56432-783-3

A Costly Move
Far and Frequent Transfers Impede Hearings for
Immigrant Detainees in the United States
I. Summary ......................................................................................................................... 1
II. Recommendations .......................................................................................................... 6
III. Background ................................................................................................................. 10
ICE Internal Policy on Transfers ...................................................................................... 10
The Impact of Transfers on Detainees’ Rights................................................................. 12
IV. Data on Detainee Transfers ........................................................................................... 17
Number, Gender, and Nationality of Transferred Detainees............................................ 17
Transfers over Time ....................................................................................................... 17
Geographical Distances Covered ................................................................................... 19
Intra- and Inter-Federal Circuit Court Transfers .............................................................. 22
Facility Type .................................................................................................................. 24
Length of Detention .......................................................................................................25
Deportation or Termination of Detention for Transferred Detainees ................................27
Cost Analysis ................................................................................................................ 28
V. Methodology ................................................................................................................ 32
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 35

I. Summary
The transfers are devastating, absolutely devastating. [Detainees] are loaded
onto a plane in the middle of the night. They have no idea where they are, no
idea what [US] state they are in.
—Rebecca Schreve, immigration attorney, El Paso, Texas, January 29, 2009
Every year, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detains hundreds of thousands
of immigrants, including legal permanent residents, refugees, and undocumented persons,
while their asylum or deportation cases move through the immigration courts. Detainees can
be held for anywhere from a few weeks to a few years while their cases proceed. With close
to 400,000 immigrants in detention each year, space in detention centers, especially near
cities where immigrants live, has not kept pace. In addition, ICE has built a detention
system, relying on subcontracts with state jails and prisons, which cannot operate without
shuffling detainees among hundreds of facilities located throughout the United States.
As a result, most detainees will be loaded at some point during their detention onto a
government-contracted car, bus, or airplane and transferred from one detention center to
another: 52 percent of detainees experienced at least one such transfer in 2009. And
numbers are growing: between 2004 and 2009, the number of transfers tripled. In total,
some 2 million detainee transfers occurred between 1998 and 2010.
This report updates Human Rights Watch’s 2009 report, Locked Up Far Away, with recent
data analysis that tracks the beginning and ending points of each immigrant’s detention
odyssey from 1998-2010. It shows that over 46 percent of transferred detainees were moved
at least two times, with 3,400 people transferred 10 times or more. One egregious case
involved a detainee who was transferred 66 times. On average, each transferred detainee
traveled 370 miles, and one frequent transfer route (between Pennsylvania and Texas)
covered 1,642 miles. Such long-distance and repetitive transfers have dire consequences for
immigrants’ rights to fair immigration proceedings. They can render attorney-client
relationships unworkable, separate immigrants from the evidence they need to present in
court, and make family visits so costly that they rarely—if ever—occur.
Few Americans or their elected representatives grasp the full scope of immigration detention
in the US. Even fewer are aware of the chaos that ensues when immigrant detainees are

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

moved around, sometimes repeatedly, between distant detention centers at great cost to
themselves, their families, and US taxpayers.
Human Rights Watch estimates that the transportation costs alone for the 2 million transfers
that occurred in the 12 years covered by this report amounted to US$366 million. However,
transferred detainees spend on average more than three times longer in detention than
immigrants who are not transferred, suggesting that the most significant financial costs may
come from court delays and unnecessarily long periods of detention.
Detainee transfers, a seemingly mundane aspect of the widespread detention of immigrants
in the US, happen so regularly and across such large distances they raise serious human
rights concerns that intensify as transfers become more common and happen repeatedly to
the same person. Indeed, several important rights are being lost in the shuffle, including:
•

The right to access an attorney at no cost to the government: Under US and international
human rights law, detained immigrants have the right to have an attorney of their choice
represent them in deportation hearings, at no cost to the US government. Immigrants
have a much better chance of finding a low-cost attorney when they stay close to their
communities of origin. Once transferred, many volunteer or pro bono attorneys must
withdraw from a case because representation across such large distances becomes
impossible. In addition, many detainees cannot find an attorney prior to transfer. Their
chances of securing representation are often worse in their new locations: the largest
numbers of interstate transfers go to Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, states that
collectively have the worst ratio of transferred immigrant detainees to immigration
attorneys in the country (510 to 1).

•

Curtailing the ability of detainees to defend their rights: Under US and international
human rights law, detained immigrants have the right to present evidence in their
defense. But when they are transferred, immigrants are often so far away from their
evidence and witnesses that their ability to defend themselves in deportation
proceedings is severely curtailed. One transfer is enough to wreak havoc on a detainee’s
ability to defend his rights in court.

•

Undermining the fairness with which detainees are treated: Fairness is at stake when
detainees are transferred from one jurisdiction with laws that are more protective of their
rights, to another where the laws are more hostile. The Federal Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit (covering Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) has jurisdiction over the largest
number of detainees (about 175,000) transferred between states. These transfers are of

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particular concern because that court is widely known for decisions that are hostile to
non-citizens.
•

Impeding detainees’ ability to challenge detention: International human rights and US
law require that persons deprived of their liberty should be able to challenge the
lawfulness of their detentions. Transfers often occur before a detainee has had a bond
hearing, where a court determines whether detention is necessary in a particular case.
One of the primary methods by which a detainee can show he should be released from
detention is presenting evidence of family relationships and community ties that will not
make him a risk of flight from court. But after transfer detainees are often so far away
from such witnesses that they cannot convince the court of their intentions to cooperate
with immigration authorities and appear for their hearings. Transferred detainees spend
on average three times longer in detention than those who are never transferred, and
they are less likely to prevail in their bond hearings.

ICE’s current internal policy on transfers, called the Performance Based National Detention
Standards (PBNDS), states that “the determining factor in deciding whether or not to transfer
a detainee is whether the transfer is required for [ICE’s] operational needs.”1 According to
ICE, any limits on its power to transfer detainees would curtail its ability to make the best
and most cost-effective use of the detention beds it can access nationwide.
Even so, starting in October 2009, ICE has announced several reforms intended to alleviate
some causes and manifestations of immigrant detainee transfers, including moving towards
a more “civil” detention system that decreases reliance on subcontracting with state jails
and prisons, locating facilities in regions where they are needed, and reducing transfers.2
In a time of fiscal challenges, the efficiency concerns expressed by ICE are important but
should not come at the expense of basic human rights. This is especially true for detainees
with attorneys to consult, defenses to mount in their deportation or asylum hearings, and
witnesses and evidence to present at trial. Some detainees may not have such issues at
stake. But for those who do, the US government and its immigration enforcement agency
must act with restraint.

1

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Operations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention Standards,” part 7,
chapter 41, December 2, 2008, http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008 (accessed May 11, 2011), p. 2.

2

For example, ICE circulated information at the Northeast Detention Briefing, Stakeholders Meeting, indicating objectives to
“consolidat[e] and realign detention resources to keep detainees closer to families and legal resources,” to “reduce or
eliminate the transfer of detainees from one geographic area to another due to the lack of detention resources,” and proposed
a plan to increase bedspace in Essex County, New Jersey. US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Northeast Detention
Briefing, Stakeholders Meeting, December 20, 2010 (on file with Human Rights Watch).

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Moreover, with the exception of ICE’s plans to expand bed space in a criminal jail and
residential facility in New Jersey, such reforms have yet to be implemented. Nor have they
curbed the rising tide of detainee transfers. Even the New Jersey plans rely heavily on an
existing state criminal jail and criminal residential facilities, which has long been associated
with increased transfers: as the state’s need to house criminal inmates ebbs and flows,
immigrant detainees are shuffled around accordingly. In fact, data in this report show that
most (57 percent) detainee transfers occur to and from such subcontracted state jails and
prisons. Such jails and prisons are not under the direct management of ICE, which means
that the agency has less control over the conditions in which immigrants are held, and less
ability to resist when a state jail warden asks that detainees be transferred out.3
Despite its stated intention to alter its reliance upon detainee transfers, ICE has also so far
rejected recommendations to place regulatory or legislative constraints on its transfer power.
Some transfers are inevitable: any governmental authority that holds people in custody,
particularly one responsible for detaining hundreds of thousands of people in hundreds of
institutions, will sometimes need to transport detainees between facilities. For example,
inmate transfers are relatively common, even required, in state and federal prisons to
minimize overcrowding, respond to medical needs, or properly house inmates according to
their security classifications.
However, transfers in state and federal prisons are much better regulated and rightsprotective than transfers in the civil immigration detention system, where there are few, if
any, checks on the decisions of officials to move detainees. The different ways in which the
US criminal justice and immigration systems treat transfers is doubly troubling because
immigration detainees, unlike prisoners, are technically not being punished.
In addition, while any plan to reduce transfers will undoubtedly require better allocation of
detention space near the locations where immigrants are apprehended, there are also good
reasons to use alternatives to detention and avoid curtailing liberty whenever possible.
Reducing detainee transfers is not justification for increasing overall numbers of detainees.
As an agency charged with enforcing the laws of the United States, ICE should not operate a
system of detention that is completely dependent upon widespread, multiple, and longdistance transfers: in other words, it should not rely on a system of detention that violates

3

For a more detailed discussion of the way that subcontracting detention space can increase transfers, see Human Rights
Watch, Locked Up Far Away: The Transfer of Immigrants to Remote Detention Centers in the US, December 2, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/12/02/locked-far-away-0, p. 21

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detainees’ rights. If ICE worked to emulate the best practices on inmate transfers set by state
and federal prison systems, it would reduce the chaos and limit harmful rights abuses.
Transfers do not need to stop entirely in order for ICE to uphold US and human rights law:
they merely need to be curtailed through the establishment of enforceable guidelines,
regulations, and reasonable legislative restraints imposed by the US Congress. In a time of
budget constraints, if state and local prisons can handle inmate transfers without putting
basic rights to fair treatment at risk, the federal government ought to be able to do the same.

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

II. Recommendations
To the United States Congress
•

Place reasonable checks on the transfer authority of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) by amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to require that the
Notice to Appear be filed with the immigration court nearest to the location where the
non-citizen is arrested and within 48 hours of his or her arrest, or within 72 hours in
exceptional or emergency cases.

To the Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
•

Promulgate regulations requiring ICE detention officers and trial attorneys to file the
Notice to Appear with the immigration court nearest to the location where the non-citizen
is arrested and within 48 hours of his or her arrest, or within 72 hours in exceptional or
emergency cases.

•

Promulgate regulations prohibiting transfer until after detainees have a bond hearing.

•

Reduce transfers of immigration detainees by:
o

o

o
•

Building new detention facilities or contracting for new detention bed space in
locations close to places with large immigrant populations, where most
immigration arrests occur.
Ensuring that new detention facilities are under ICE’s full operational control so
that the agency is not obliged to transfer detainees from sub-contracted local
prisons or jails whenever the facility so requests.
Requiring use of alternatives to detention such as monitoring of released
detainees when and where possible.

Address deprivation of access to counsel that is caused by transfers by:
o

o

A Costly Move

Building new detention facilities or contracting for new immigration detention
bed space in locations where there is a significant immigration bar or legal
services community.
Revising the 2008 Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS) to
require ICE/Detention and Removal Operations (ICE/DRO) to refrain from
transferring detainees who are represented by local counsel, unless ICE/DRO
determines that: (1) the transfer is necessary to provide adequate medical or
mental health care to the detainee; (2) the detainee specifically requests such a

6

o

o

o

•

Remedy interference with detainees’ bond hearings caused by transfers by:
o

o
•

transfer; (3) the transfer is necessary to protect the safety and security of the
detainee, detention personnel, or other detainees located in the pre-transfer
facility; or (4) the transfer is necessary to comply with a change of venue ordered
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Amending the “Detainee Transfer Checklist” appended to the PBNDS to include a
list of criteria that ICE/DRO must consider in determining whether a detainee has
a pre-existing relationship with local counsel, and requiring that ICE/DRO record
one or more of the four reasons enumerated above for transfer of a detainee with
retained counsel and communicate the reason(s) to that counsel.
Reinstating the prior transfer standard that required notification to counsel “once
the detainee is en route to the new detention location,” and require that all such
notifications are completed within 24 hours of the time the detainee is placed in
transit.
Collaborating with the Executive Office for Immigration Review to pilot new
projects providing low-cost, pro bono, and/or government-appointed legal
services to immigrants held in remote detention facilities.

Amending the Detainee Transfer Checklist appended to the PBNDS to include a list
of criteria that ICE/DRO must consider in order to determine whether a detainee
has received a bond hearing, or has been found ineligible for such a hearing by an
immigration judge, or has consented to transfer without such a hearing.
Pursuing placement of the detainee in alternative to detention programs prior to
transfer.

Reduce interference with detainees’ capacity to defend against deportation caused by
transfers by:
o

o

Revising the PBNDS to require ICE/DRO to refrain from transferring detainees who
have family members, community ties, or other key witnesses present in the
local area, unless ICE/DRO determines that: (1) the transfer is necessary to
provide medical or mental health care to the detainee; (2) the detainee
specifically requests such a transfer; (3) the transfer is necessary to protect the
safety and security of the detainee, detention personnel, or other detainees
located in the pre-transfer facility; or (4) the transfer is necessary to comply with
a change of venue ordered by the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Amending the Detainee Transfer Checklist appended to the PBNDS to include
designation of one or more of the four reasons enumerated above for transferring

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

detainees away from family members, community ties, or other key witnesses
present in the local area.
•

Ensure that transfer of detainees does not interfere with the ability of counsel and family
members to communicate with detainees by:
o

•

Revising the PBNDS to provide that if a detainee who has been transferred is
unable to make a telephone call at his or her own expense within 12 hours of
arrival at a new location, the detainee is permitted to make a domestic telephone
call at the federal government’s expense.

Improve agency accountability and management practices, as well as accurate
accounting of operational costs involved in transfers by:
o

o

Requiring detention operations personnel to promptly enter the date of transfer,
originating facility, receiving facility, reasons for transfer, and counsel
notification into the Deportable Alien Control System, or any successor system
used by ICE to track the location of detainees.
Including costs associated with inter-facility transfers of detainees as a category
distinct from transfers made to complete removals from the US in the agency’s
annual financial reporting.

To the Assistant Secretary for ICE, and the Director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR)
•

Address interference with counsel and other detrimental legal outcomes caused by the
transfers of unaccompanied minors by:
o

Providing age-appropriate Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) facilities for all
unaccompanied minors near their counsel or in locations where there is access
to counsel, and, in the case of unaccompanied minors who have resided in the
US for longer than one year, near their former place of residence in the US.

To the Executive Office for Immigration Review
•

Issue guidance for immigration judges requiring them to allow appearances by
detainees’ counsel via video or telephone whenever a detainee has been transferred
away from local counsel, family members, community ties, or other key witnesses.

•

Issue guidance for immigration judges that prioritizes in-person testimony, but when
such testimony is not possible, requires judges to allow video or telephonic
appearances by detainees themselves, family members, and other key witnesses. Any

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decision to disallow these types of appearances should be noted on the record along
with the reason for the decision.
•

Issue guidance requiring immigration judges who are considering change of venue
motions to weigh whether a requested change of venue would result in a change in law
that is unfavorable to the detainee.

•

Maintain statistics on the total number of motions to change venue filed by the
government versus those filed by non-citizens, and the number granted in each category.

•

Issue guidance for immigration judges that strongly discourages them from changing
venue away from a location where the detainee has counsel, family members,
community ties, or other key witnesses, unless the detainee so requests or consents, or
unless other justifications exist for such a motion apart from ICE agency convenience.
Such guidance should also encourage changes of venue to locations where the detainee
has counsel, family members, community ties, or other key witnesses.

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

III. Background
ICE Internal Policy on Transfers
As an agency responsible for the custody and care of hundreds of thousands of people, it is
clear that ICE will sometimes need to transfer immigrant detainees. The question is whether
all or most of the 2.04 million transfers that have occurred over the past 12 years were truly
necessary, especially in light of how transfers interfere with immigrants’ rights to access
counsel and to fair immigration procedures.
While ICE has repeatedly indicated willingness to reduce its reliance on transfers, it has not
made any official policy changes to translate those intentions into reality—other than a plan
to increase immigration bed space at criminal facilities in Essex, New Jersey.4 And the
agency has remained staunchly opposed to placing regulatory or legislative checks on its
transfer power, which would be enforceable through the courts.5
In August 2009 ICE announced a range of policy reforms intended to shift away from the
punitive model for immigration detention towards a more “civil” system. The agency
indicated its intention to:
…move away from our present decentralized, jail-oriented approach to a
system wholly designed for and based on ICE’s civil detention authorities.
The system will no longer rely primarily on excess capacity in penal
institutions. In the next three to five years, ICE will design facilities located
and operated for immigration detention purposes.6
A report issued in October 2009 amplified the rationales for ICE detention reform. In that
report, Special Advisor to ICE Dora Schriro recommended that “[d]etainees who are

4

US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Northeast Detention Briefing, Stakeholders Meeting, December 20, 2010 (on file
with Human Rights Watch).

5

For a detailed discussion of ICE’s transfer power, see Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Far Away,
http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/6.

6

US Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, “2009 Immigration Detention Reforms,” Fact Sheet, August 6,
2009, http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?bc=1016%7C6715%7C12053%7C26286%7C31038%7C29726 (accessed April
29, 2011).

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represented by counsel should not be transferred outside the area unless there are exigent
health or safety reasons, and when this occurs, the attorney should be notified promptly.”7
While many organizations concerned about immigration detention welcomed such
recommendations, ICE made no internal policy reforms in line with these statements that
would stem the tide of detainee transfers.
In December 2009 Human Rights Watch published Locked Up Far Away, which documented
1.6 million transfer movements of immigrant detainees. We intensified advocacy efforts with
ICE, asking it to impose some reasonable limits on the transfers of immigrant detainees by
changing the agency’s internal policies on transfers. While enforceable regulatory or
legislative checks on the use of transfers would be the most protective solutions to this
problem, ICE has refused to promulgate enforceable regulations on detention conditions and
operations.8 Congress has not acted either. We therefore pressed ICE to make internal policy
reforms to its PBNDS.
On February 22, 2010, three months after publication of Locked Up Far Away, ICE wrote to
Human Rights Watch announcing the agency’s intention to “minimize the number of
detainee transfers to the greatest extent possible.”9 The agency made similar
announcements in various meetings with advocates around the country, suggesting that it
would reduce its reliance on transfers. Subsequently, in July 2010, ICE implemented an
important reform for transferred detainees: it established an online detainee locator
system.10 This reform was recommended in our previous report and had been a chief goal of
immigrants’ rights advocates around the country for years. Before, attorneys and family
members would spend stressful hours and days searching for clients and loved ones after a
transfer. This online system now allows detainees to be located relatively quickly, and is an
important rights-protective achievement for ICE. However, while detainees can now be
located more readily, we remain concerned that the agency has still not made any formal

7

Dr. Dora Schriro, special advisor on ICE Detention and Removal, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration
Detention Overview and Recommendations,” October 6, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf (accessed May 11, 2011).

8

Letter from Jane Holl Lute, deputy secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, to Michael Wishnie and Paromita Shah,
July 24, 2009,
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/Immigration%20Enforcement%20and%20Raids/Detention%20Sta
ndards%20Litigation/DHS%20denial%20-%207-09.pdf (accessed May 11, 2011) (denying the “Petition for Rulemaking to
Promulgate Regulations Governing Detention Standards for Immigration Detainees”).

9

“Update: ICE Agrees to Reduce Detainee Transfers,” Human Rights Watch news release, March 29, 2010,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/03/29/update-ice-agrees-reduce-detainee-transfers.

10

“ICE Announces Launch of Online Detainee Locator System,” Detention Watch Network news release, July 23, 2010,
http://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/node/2703 (accessed May 11, 2011).

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

internal policy changes aimed at reducing detainee transfers, other than repeatedly
announcing its intention to do so.
Therefore, with the assistance of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at
Syracuse University (TRAC), we filed a follow-up request for data about detainee transfers
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in February 2010. We specifically requested
data that would allow us to determine the starting and ending location for each transferred
detainee. In November 2010 we received data from ICE in response to our request.
As we commenced analyzing data, we continued to press ICE to change its policies on
detainee transfers. In November 2010 we wrote to ICE and to the labor union representing
government workers in detention centers, after ICE alleged that contract bargaining issues
with the union were delaying improvements to ICE’s detainee transfer policies.11
Subsequently, in February 2011, we wrote to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano to ask for an improved policy on transfers. While ICE continues to signal that
improvements to its internal transfer policies are forthcoming, almost two years after the
initial promise of reform, no significant policy changes have been made.

The Impact of Transfers on Detainees’ Rights
The current US approach to immigration detainee transfers interferes with several important
detainee rights. To understand the conditions immigration detainees face, it is instructive to
compare their situation to that of federal and state prisoners.
In the US criminal justice system, pretrial detainees enjoy the right, protected by the Sixth
Amendment to the US Constitution, to face trial in the jurisdiction in which their crimes
allegedly occurred.12 Immigrant detainees enjoy no comparable right to face deportation
proceedings in the jurisdiction in which they are alleged to have violated immigration law,
and are routinely transferred far away from key witnesses and evidence in their trials. In all
but rare cases, a transfer of a criminal inmate occurs once an individual has been convicted
and sentenced and is no longer in need of direct access to his attorney during his initial
criminal trial. Immigrant detainees can be, and often are, transferred away from their
attorneys at any point in their immigration proceedings.
11

Letter from Human Rights Watch to ICE Director John Morton and American Federation of Government Employees National
President John Gage, November 3, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/03/us-immigration-system-should-meetinternational-human-rights-obligations.
12

US Constitution, Sixth Amendment (“…in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law.”).

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Immigrant detainees, unlike criminal defendants, have no right to a court-appointed
attorney. In 2010, 57 percent of non-citizens appeared in immigration court without
counsel.13 In some urban areas, immigrants can benefit from an active cadre of attorneys
willing to represent them at low or no cost, in other words on a pro bono basis. While it is
beyond this report’s scope to draw a direct causal relationship between transfers of
detainees and their inability to secure counsel to represent them in immigration court, it is
clear that detainees are often transferred hundreds or thousands of miles from families and
home communities before they have been able to secure legal representation.
Almost invariably, there are fewer prospects for finding an attorney in the remote locations to
which they are transferred. Our data analysis shows that detainees are transferred, on
average, 369 miles, with one frequent transfer pattern crossing 1,642 miles. Detainees
transferred long distances must therefore often go through the entire complex process of
defending their rights in immigration court without legal counsel.14 One detainee told Human
Rights Watch:
In New York when I was detained, I was about to get an attorney through one
of the churches, but that went away once they sent me here to New Mexico....
All my evidence and stuff that I need is right there in New York. I've been
trying to get all my case information from New York ... writing to ICE to get my
records. But they won't give me my records; they haven't given me nothing.
I'm just representing myself with no evidence to present.15
A detainee who was transferred 1,400 miles away to a detention facility in Texas after a few
weeks in a detention center in southern California said the difference for him was “like the
difference between heaven and earth.” He said: “At least in California I had a better chance.
I could hire a[n] attorney to represent me. Now, here, I have no chance other than what the
grace of God gives me.”16
For the relatively fortunate detainees who can afford attorneys or secure pro bono attorneys,
transfers severely disrupt the attorney-client relationship because attorneys are rarely, if

13

Executive Office of Immigration Review, “FY 2010 Statistical Year Book,” http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf
(accessed May 11, 2011), p. 23.
14

For a detailed discussion of the impact of transfers on detainees ability to secure or retain counsel, see Human Rights Watch,

Locked Up Far Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/8.
15

Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Kevin H. (pseudonym), Otero County Processing Center, Chaparral, New
Mexico, February 11, 2009.
16

Human Rights Watch interview with Michael M. (pseudonym), Pearsall Detention Center, Pearsall, Texas, April 25, 2008.

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

ever, informed of their clients’ transfers. Attorneys with decades of experience told us that
they had not once received prior notice from ICE of an impending transfer. ICE often relies on
detainees themselves to notify attorneys, but the transfers arise suddenly and detainees are
routinely prevented from or are otherwise unable to make the necessary call. As a result,
attorneys have to search the online detainee locator for their clients’ new locations. Once a
transferred client is found, the challenges inherent in conducting legal representation across
thousands of miles can completely sever the attorney-client relationship. This is especially
true when the same person is transferred repeatedly. Data analyzed in this report show that
46 percent of detainees experience two or more transfers. As one attorney said:
I have never represented someone who has not been in more than three
detention facilities. Could be El Paso, Texas, a facility in Arizona, or they send
people to Hawaii.... I have been practicing immigration law for more than a
decade. Never once have I been notified of [my client’s] transfer. Never.17
Even when an attorney is willing to attempt long distance representation, the issue is
entirely subject to the discretion of immigration judges, whose varying rules about phone or
video appearances can make it impossible for attorneys to represent their clients. In other
cases, detainees must struggle to pay for their attorneys to fly to their new locations for court
dates, or search, usually in vain, for local counsel to represent them. Transfers create such
significant obstacles to existing attorney-client relationships that ICE’s special advisor, Dora
Schriro, recommended in her October 2009 report that detainees who have retained counsel
should not be transferred unless there are exigent health or safety reasons.18
Although most detained non-citizens have the right to a timely “bond hearing”—a hearing
examining the lawfulness of detention (a right protected under US and human rights law)—
our research shows that ICE’s policy of transferring detainees without taking into account
their scheduled bond hearings interferes with those hearings.19 In addition, transferred
detainees are often unable to produce the kinds of witnesses (such as family members or
employers) that are necessary to obtain bond, which means that they usually remain in
detention. In fact, data contained in this report show that transferred immigrants spend on
average three times as long in detention as their counterparts who are never transferred.
17

Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Holly Cooper, immigration attorney and clinical professor of law, University of
California Davis School of Law, Davis, California, January 27, 2009.
18

Dr. Dora Schriro, special advisor on ICE Detention and Removal, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Immigration
Detention Overview and Recommendations,” October 6, 2009, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/icedetention-rpt.pdf, p. 24 (accessed May 11, 2011).

19

For a detailed discussion of how detainee transfers violate the right to a bond hearing and to fair venue, see Human Rights
Watch, Locked Up Far Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/9.

A Costly Move

14

Once they are transferred, most non-citizens must proceed with their deportation cases in
the new, post-transfer location. Some may ask the court to change venue back to the pretransfer location, where evidence, witnesses, and their attorneys are more accessible.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult for a non-citizen detainee to win a change of venue motion.
Transfers can also have a devastating impact on detainees’ ability to defend against
deportation, despite their right to present a defense.20 The long-distance and multiple
transfers documented in this report often make it impossible for non-citizens to produce
evidence or witnesses relevant to their defense. A legal permanent resident from the
Dominican Republic who had been living in Philadelphia but was transferred to Texas said:
I had to call to try to get the police records myself. It took a lot of time. The
judge got mad that I kept asking for more time. But eventually they arrived. I
tried to put on the case myself. I lost.21
In addition, the transfer of detainees often literally changes the law applied to them. This is
because, prior to transfers, ICE often does not serve detained immigrants with charging
documents (known as an NTAs, or Notices to Appear), thus establishing the law and court to
hear their case. While NTAs are generally supposed to be filed within 48 hours, in practice
there is no legally enforceable deadline, illustrated by the “many detainees identified by
NGOs and attorneys who are sitting in detention for days, weeks, and sometimes months at
a time without having received an NTA.”22
Thus, immigrants taken into custody in one place, for example, Pennsylvania, may spend
days or weeks there before being transferred to, for example, Texas: if ICE waits until after
transfer to file the NTA, not just the detainee, but the entire matter—including the law
applied to the detainee’s case—is transferred to Texas. This can have a devastating impact
on a detainee’s ability to defend against deportation because the act of sending a detainee
from one jurisdiction to another can determine whether the law applied to her case will
recognize her status as a refugee or permit her to ask an immigration judge to allow her to
remain in the United States.23 As the data analysis in this report shows, most interstate

20

For a detailed discussion of how detainee transfers violate the right to defend against deportation, see Human Rights Watch,

Locked Up Far Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/10.
21

Human Rights Watch interview with Miguel A. (pseudonym), Port Isabel Service Processing Center, Los Fresnos, Texas, April
23, 2008.

22

Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, “Under Arrest: Immigrants’ Rights and the Rule of Law,” University of Memphis Law Review, vol.
38, Summer 2008, p. 853.
23

For a detailed discussion of how transfer can alter the outcome of a particular detainee’s deportation case, see Human
Rights Watch, Locked Up Far Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/11.

15

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

transfers end up in states within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is
known for its decisions hostile to the claims of immigrants.
Transfer can pose unique problems for detainees who are children, without a parent or
custodian to offer them guidance and protection.24 ICE is required to send these
unaccompanied minors as soon as possible to a specialist facility run by the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) that is the least restrictive, smallest, and most child-friendly
facility available. Placing children in these facilities is a laudable goal, and one that protects
many of their rights as children. Unfortunately, there are very few ORR facilities in the US.
Therefore, children are often transferred even further than their adult counterparts, away
from attorneys willing to represent them and from communities that might offer them
support. The delays and interference with counsel caused by these long-distance transfers
of children can cause them to lose out on important immigration benefits available to them
only as long as they are minors, such as qualifying for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,
which would allow them to remain legally in the United States.
Finally, the long-distance transfer of immigrants to remote locations takes an emotional toll
on detainees and their loved ones.25 Physical separation from family when immigrants are
detained in remote locations, impossible for relatives to reach, creates severe emotional and
psychological suffering. A sister of a transferred detainee told Human Rights Watch:
Ever since they sent him there [to New Mexico], it’s been a nightmare. My
mother has blood pressure problems…. [His wife] has been terrified. She
cries every night. And his baby asks for him, asks for “Papa.” He kisses his
photo. He starts crying as soon as he hears his father’s voice on the phone
even though he is only one.... Last week [my brother] called to say he can’t
do it anymore. He’s going to sign the paper agreeing to his deportation. 26
Given the serious implications for the fair treatment of detainees created by transfers, it is
disturbing that the practice of transfers of immigrant detainees, including multiple and longdistance transports, continues unabated. Our analysis of data on the scope and frequency of
detainee transfers follows.
24

For a detailed discussion of how transfers affect unaccompanied minor children, see Human Rights Watch, Locked Up Far

Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/13.
25

For a detailed discussion of the emotional burden that transfers place on detainees and their loved ones, see Human Rights
Watch, Locked Up Far Away, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/86760/section/12.

26

Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Georgina V. (pseudonym), sister of detainee, Brooklyn, New York, January 23,
2008.

A Costly Move

16

IV. Data on Detainee Transfers
Number, Gender, and Nationality of Transferred Detainees
The data represent all 2,271,911 non-citizens held in ICE detention between October 1, 1998
and April 30, 2010. These non-citizens account for 2,869,323 episodes of detention, as
some individuals were detained by ICE multiple times. The data show that 1,159,568, or 40
percent of all detainees, experienced at least one transfer during their detention (they are
referred to here as “transferred detainees”). Over 46 percent of transferred detainees
(505,787 detainees) were transferred two or more times. We found that 16.7 percent of
transferred detainees experienced three or more transfers, with over 3,400 detainees
experiencing 10 or more transfers. One detainee was transferred between facilities 66 times.
Most (1,045,620) transferred detainees were male, 113,814 were female, and 134 were listed
as unknown gender. Most transferred detainees were from Mexico (511,945), Honduras
(133,062), and Guatemala (131,691). Shockingly, 38 were from the United States (2 females,
36 males). Why so many of those transferred were listed as being United States nationals is
beyond the scope of our analysis. However, we note that previous analysis performed by
Human Rights Watch on ICE datasets has revealed serious problems with ICE data
management.27 Moreover, our recent research into the experiences of detainees with mental
disabilities revealed several troubling cases of US citizens who were kept in immigration
detention for years, and experienced multiple transfers during their time in detention,
despite the fact that their US citizenship should have negated any ICE involvement.28

Transfers over Time
As shown in Figure 1, below, transfers have increased steadily over time. Cumulatively,
between the beginning of fiscal year 1999 and April 2010, 41 percent of all detention
episodes included at least one transfer between facilities. In fiscal year 1999, 23 percent of
detention episodes included one or more transfers between facilities, but in fiscal year
2009, 52 percent of detention episodes included one or more transfers. Figure 2 illustrates
the percentage of detention episodes experiencing transfer between 1998 and 2010. Table 1
shows the total number of transfer movements for each year between 1998 and 2010.

27

Human Rights Watch, US: Forced Apart (By the Numbers): Non-Citizens Deported Mostly for Nonviolent Offenses, April 15,
2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82159/section/6.

28

Human Rights Watch, Deportation by Default: Mental Disability, Unfair Hearings, and Indefinite Detention in the US
Immigration System, July 25, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/07/26/deportation-default-0.

17

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Figure 1

Figure 2

Table 1 – Total Transfer Movements by Fiscal Year
Total Transfer Movements by Fiscal Year
1999
46,914
2000
74,077
2001
83,361
2002
94,243
2003
112,098
2004
124,899
2005
141,321
2006
157,560
2007
244,901
2008
340,385
2009
405,544
2010 (10/2009-04/2010)
214,800
FY 2010 Estimate
380,196
Total
2,040,103
* These are only transfers between facilities. Additionally, there were 99,687 movements identified in the dataset as transfers,
but which were actually intra-facility movements in which the detainee never left a particular detention facility.

A Costly Move

18

In February 2009 ICE wrote to Human Rights Watch to state its intention to minimize detainee
transfers. As shown in Figure 3, below, other than a peak in March 2010, which also saw an
overall increase in detention episodes, the number and rate of detention episodes utilizing
transfers has decreased slightly since ICE stated its intention to reduce transfers in February
2009. While this may show an informal commitment to reducing the practice, there have been
no official policy reforms aimed at reducing transfers. This very slight decrease is therefore
unlikely to indicate a continuing trend.
Figure 3

Geographical Distances Covered
The dataset contained a total of 2,040,103 movements of detainees between detention
facilities (referred to here as “transfer movements”), corresponding to 1.07 million individual
transferred detainees.29 Of these transfer movements, 564,209 (27 percent) were interstate.
Perhaps the most important finding of our data analysis is the ongoing use of long-distance
transfers for detainees. As Table 2 below shows, transfers between Pennsylvania and Texas
were the third most frequent type of transfer used, requiring detainees to travel 1,642 miles.
In addition, large numbers of detainees were moved between North Carolina and Georgia,

29

We are not including within our total transfer movements the 99,687 movements identified in the dataset as transfers, but
which were actually intra-facility movements in which the detainee never left a particular detention facility.

19

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

between Pennsylvania and Louisiana, and between southern California and Arizona. Such
long-distance transfers cannot realistically be accomplished without use of an airplane. The
99 longest transfer segments originated or ended in Guam, Hawaii, Alaska, or Puerto Rico.
The longest continental US transfers occurred between Florida and Washington.
Table 2 — Ten Most Frequent Interstate Transfer Movements30
Originating
# of
Transfers

Facility

Receiving
State

Circuit

15,959

MECKLENBURG CO JAIL

NC

4th Cir.

11,581

LOS CUSTODY CASE
HOLDING FAC., SAN PEDRO

CA

9th Cir.

11,363

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

3rd Cir.

8,806

VARICK STREET SPC

NY

2nd Cir.

NC

4th Cir.

CA

9th Cir.

7,320
7,060

ALAMANCE CO. DET.
FACILITY
LOS CUSTODY CASE
HOLDING FAC., SAN PEDRO

6,529

PORTLAND DISTRICT OFFICE

OR

9th Cir.

5,553

OTERO COUNTY PRISON
FACILITY

NM

10th Cir.

5,350

EL PASO SPC

TX

5th Cir.

5,074

COLUMBIA COUNTY JAIL

OR

9th Cir.

Facility
STEWART
DETENTION CENTER
ELOY FEDERAL
CONTRACT FAC.
HARLINGEN
STAGING FACILITY
YORK COUNTY JAIL
STEWART
DETENTION CENTER
FLORENCE STAGING
FACILITY
NORTHWEST DET.
CENTER
EL PASO SPC
OTERO COUNTY
PRISON FACILITY
NORTHWEST DET.
CENTER

Distance

State

Circuit

Miles

GA

11th Cir.

315.44

AZ

9th Cir.

394.82

TX

5th Cir.

1642.28

PA

3rd Cir.

124.13

GA

11th Cir.

414.51

AZ

9th Cir.

400.98

WA

9th Cir.

115.73

TX

5th Cir.

19.65

NM

10th Cir.

19.65

WA

9th Cir.

98.56

Since many detainees were transferred multiple times during each period spent in
detention, transfers are best counted and measured per detention episode. For all
transferred detainees, the average distance transferred per detention episode was 369.81
miles. As shown in Figure 4, there is what approximates a bell curve when examining
distance as related to the number of transfers, where distance traveled seems to peak
around 10 transfers. It is unknown why average distance moved decreases when detainees
experience more than 10 transfers. It is possible that when detainees experience this
number of transfers, they are being frequently transferred over short distances.

30

If two facilities were in the same city and we could not distinguish separate longitude and latitude values, we used a proxy
distance estimate of 1 mile to estimate the distance between facilities.

A Costly Move

20

Figure 4

Table 3 – Top 10 Facilities Utilizing Transfers
# of Facilities
Transferring
To

Total
Outbound
Transfers

# of
Facilities
Receiving
From

Total
Inbound
Transfers

State

Circuit

Total
Transfer
Actions

CA

9th Cir.

283,218

301

150,200

251

133,018

AZ

9th Cir.

205,673

212

120,744

271

84,929

TX

9th Cir.

179,190

181

112,890

197

66,300

CA

9th Cir.

119,118

97

56,433

94

62,685

FLORENCE SPC

AZ

9th Cir.

111,553

141

28,508

150

83,045

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

3rd Cir.

100,776

184

42,869

225

57,907

TX

5th Cir.

97,040

66

29,585

102

67,455

TX

5th Cir.

76,069

126

59,627

165

16,442

TX

5th Cir.

74,023

92

17,780

194

56,243

TX

5th Cir.

71,456

141

25,507

314

45,949

Originating
Facility
LOS CUSTODY
CASE HOLDING
FACILITY, SAN
PEDRO
FLORENCE
STAGING FACILITY
HARLINGEN
STAGING FACILITY
MIRA LOMA DET.
CENTER

WILLACY COUNTY
DETENTION
CENTER
LAREDO
CONTRACT DET.
FACILITY
SOUTH TEXAS
DETENTION
COMPLEX
HOUSTON
CONTRACT DET.
FACILITY

21

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Table 4 shows the variation between the states that received transfers and those from which
transfers originated. Only Pennsylvania, Texas, New York, and Alabama were in the top ten
states for both receiving and sending transfers. Louisiana received 19 percent while
California sent 12 percent of interstate transfers.
Table 4 – Top Ten Originating/Receiving States for Detainee Transfers
# of
Tranfers

% of
Originating
Transfers

CALIFORNIA

70,002

12%

LOUISIANA

104,703

PENNSYLVANIA

42,166

7%

ARIZONA

79,030

Originating State

Receiving State

# of
Transfers

NEW YORK

37,978

7%

TEXAS

77,784

NORTH CAROLINA

35,299

6%

GEORGIA

48,383

TEXAS

28,452

5%

PENNSYLVANIA

35,827

ALABAMA

26,689

5%

WASHINGTON

27,172

OREGON

23,751

4%

ALABAMA

26,765

NEW JERSEY

22,923

4%

NEW MEXICO

23,158

FLORIDA

22,043

4%

NEW YORK

15,646

LOUISIANA

19,146

3%

ILLINOIS

15,160

% of
Receiving
Transfers
19%
14%
14%
9%
6%
5%
5%
4%
3%
3%

Intra- and Inter-Federal Circuit Court Transfers
Most transfers (84.8 percent) were between facilities within the jurisdiction of the same
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals (which defines the applicable law for each detainee’s case).
For example, of the 483,425 transfers originating in the Fifth Circuit, 93 percent were to other
Fifth Circuit facilities. As shown in Table 5, most circuits originate and receive about the
same percentage of transfers.
However, when examining only interstate transfers, shown in Figure 5 below, we find the
Fifth Circuit receives, by a large margin, the most interstate transfers. Originating circuits are
color-coded.

A Costly Move

22

Table 5 – Transfers Originating in, and Received by, Each Circuit Court

D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Unknown

Originating
Number
Percent
189
0%
31,378
2%
41,541
2%
108,344
5%
47,509
2%
617,586
30%
45,035
2%
51,993
3%
43,422
2%
756,531
37%
90,677
4%
205,895
10%
3
0%

Received
Number
Percent
89
0%
40,143
2%
66,287
3%
126,855
6%
104,738
5%
483,457
24%
73,624
4%
47,177
2%
58,927
3%
760,606
37%
90,898
4%
187,275
9%
27
0%

Total

2,040,103

2,040,103

Court Circuit

Figure 5 – Interstate Transfers by Circuit Court

23

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Table 6 below shows that the Fifth Circuit is the federal circuit court district with the worst
ratio in the country (510:1) for immigration attorneys to received transferred detainees (as
measured by the number of attorneys in the circuit who are members of the American
Immigration Lawyers Association).
Table 6 – Ratio of Attorneys to Transferred Detainees by Federal Circuit Court Districts
Circuit

Rank by
Transferred
Detainee to
Attorney Ratio

Received Transfers
1998 – 2010

AILA Members as of
May 2011

Transferred Detainee to
AILA Member Ratio

12

483,457

947

510.51

9th

11

760,606

2674

284.45

10th

10

90,898

424

214.38

3rd

9

126,855

634

200.09

11th

8

187,275

1242

150.79

8th

7

58,927

455

129.51

4th

6

104,738

812

128.99

6th

5

73,624

646

113.97

7th

4

47,177

633

74.53

1st

3

40,143

557

72.07

2nd

2

66,287

1576

42.06

D.C.

1

89

307

0.29

5th

Source for AILA membership numbers: email from Amanda Walkins, Member Outreach Associate, American Immigration
Lawyers Association to Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2011.

Facility Type
More than half of all transfers involved a facility that has an Intergovernmental Service
Agreement with ICE to hold immigration detainees. These facilities are most commonly state
or local criminal jails and prisons, intended to house people awaiting criminal trial or
persons serving criminal punishments. After analyzing transfers by facility type, Table 7
shows that the breakdown of facilities involved in transfers is almost identical between
originating and receiving facilities.

A Costly Move

24

Table 7 – Number of Transfers by Facility Type
# of
Transfers

% of
Transfers

Intergovernmental Service Agreement
(state or local jail or prison)

1,155,342

57%

Holding/Staging Facility

599,309

29%

ICE Service Processing Center

190,792

9%

Contract Detention Facility

62,958

3%

Federal Bureau of Prisons

12,541

1%

Juvenile Facility

11,478

1%

Other Facility Type

7,683

0%

Facility Type
Originating

Receiving

Total

2,040,103

Intergovernmental Service Agreement
(state or local jail or prison)

1,131,567

55%

Holding/Staging Facility

414,006

20%

ICE Service Processing Center

264,813

13%

Contract Detention Facility

172,612

8%

Federal Bureau of Prisons

33,320

2%

Juvenile Facility

14,242

1%

Other Facility Type

9,543

0%

Total

2,040,103

Length of Detention
The length of detention was determined using the dates on which detainees entered (were
booked into) and left (were booked out of) detention. Individuals that experienced transfers
were held on average over three times as long as those that were never transferred, either
measured by the mean or median days in detention, as illustrated in Table 8.31

31

The mean is our common perception of average. The median is the value in the middle of a data set. When there are outliers,
they will drive the mean up or down but will have less effect on the median. Both numbers tell a story regarding length of
detention. When the mean is higher than the median, it can result from a few people that were held for a long time, thus driving
the mean higher. But it can also indicate that many people were held for a short time (i.e., 0-1 days), which may result in a
median that is lower than the mean.

25

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Table 8 – Length of Detention for Transferred and Never-Transferred Detainees
Mean Days in
Detention

Median Days in
Detention

19.77
64.9

5
28

Never Transferred
One or More Transfers

Female detainees (median: 13 days, mean: 33 days) and male detainees (median: 14 days,
mean: 39 days) were held in detention for similar lengths of time. When examining length of
detention by nationality, Table 9 shows that there were clear differences, as citizens of
countries such as Vietnam and Haiti were held for over five times as long as Mexican
nationals. This is likely a result of diplomatic and humanitarian problems causing delays in
deportations to those countries.
Table 9 – Length of Detention by Country
Length of Detention by Country (n > 10,000 Detainees)
Mean
Days in
Detention

Median
Days in
Detention

# of
Detainees

Vietnam

153.32

108

11,040

Haiti

117.25

48

23,238

Jamaica

106.99

58

27,865

China

98.69

38

40,392

India

87.35

29

11,996

Philippines

82.44

34

10,924

Cuba

78.51

5

66,530

Nicaragua

63.77

37

19,341

Peru

51.56

30

12,931

El Salvador

51.29

33

185,377

Columbia

48.99

27

34,304

Dominican Republic

47.90

22

62,705

Ecuador

42.79

29

24,994

Brazil

41.70

30

42,888

Guatemala

38.80

24

209,182

Honduras

38.14

24

224,879

Mexico

22.10

6

1,595,735

Nationality

A Costly Move

26

Deportation or Termination of Detention for Transferred Detainees
The dataset contained a variable coded as “release reason,” which described the reason for
each detainee’s departure from immigration detention. Of the 2,271,911 detainees contained
in the dataset (both transferred and never transferred), 62 percent, or 1,413,500, were
ultimately deported.32
The next most common reason for the termination of detention was voluntary departure, in
which 343,557 people agreed to leave the US voluntarily. Another 421,538 people were
released to undergo their immigration court proceedings outside of the confines of
detention, either on bond, on an order of recognizance, or on an order of supervision.33
Some 44,110 people had their cases terminated. Many things can lead to termination of a
case. One documented in our previous research is the termination of the cases of people
with mental disabilities who have been transferred multiple times between detention
facilities over many months or years. Ultimately, some of these cases are terminated by
judges who decide they cannot continue with the deportation of someone with serious
disabilities.
For another 33,439 detainees, their odyssey in immigration detention did not end during the
time period. This group lacked a book-out date, or release code, or had a final movement
recorded as another transfer. Of this group, 35 percent had already experienced at least one
transfer during their current stay in immigration detention.
Finally, 206 immigrant detainees died, and 940 escaped from immigration detention.34
As shown in Table 10, detainees who were never transferred had more favorable reasons for
their release from detention than those who experienced one or more transfers. Among
detainees who were never transferred, 54 percent were ultimately deported, whereas 74
percent of transferred detainees were deported. In addition, a larger percentage of
immigrant detainees who were never transferred (16 percent) were released on orders of
voluntary departure, as compared with 6 percent of those who were transferred.
32

Some people were deported multiple times: 1,413,500 deportees experienced 1,754,443 deportations.

33

The ICE District Director has discretion to issue an “order of release on recognizance or supervision,” which releases an
immigrant from detention, subject to certain conditions as determined by the Director, such as regular reporting to the ICE
district office. See Immigration and Naturalization Act, Section 236.
34

While there has been significant press coverage of the deaths of immigrant detainees, including information provided by ICE
itself, we were unable to locate any public information provided by ICE nor any press reports documenting instances of escape
from immigration detention.

27

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Finally, a larger percentage of detainees who were never transferred (16 percent) as
compared with those who were transferred (14 percent) benefitted from bond or other forms
of release from detention while their immigration court proceedings were still ongoing. The
ability to remain near communities of support may help explain why more detainees who
were never transferred were able to benefit from release from detention while their court
cases were still underway. Judges may only order release for persons who are not considered
at risk of absconding from proceedings, and this is often proved through strong ties to the
community, which transferred detainees rarely have in their post-transfer locations.
Table 10 – Release Reason for Transferred Detainees Compared with Never Transferred35
Never
Transferred

% of Never
Transferred

Experienced One
or More
Transfers

% of Transferred

Deported/Removed

910,818

54%

840,254

74%

Voluntary departure

274,685

16%

68,872

6%

Released with Proceedings
Ongoing

270,074

16%

151,464

14%

U.S. Marshals or Other
Agency

87,832

5%

25,580

2%

Paroled

64,748

4%

17,144

2%

Outstanding Detention
Hanging Closure

39,365

2%

12,469

1%

Proceedings Terminated

25,241

1%

18,869

2%

Withdrawal

11,443

1%

747

0%

Release Reason

Cost Analysis
ICE provides no publicly available analysis of the savings or costs associated with detainee
transfers. There is no public accounting for the costs of bed space in every part of the
country in which ICE operates or subcontracts for detention space. The agency also does not
provide information on the rationales for transfers in particular cases, which might help the
agency and others to better understand the savings or costs associated with its practices.

35

This table only includes the most common release reasons and excludes cases with data entry issues ( ~0.3 percent).

A Costly Move

28

For example, although none of the detainees interviewed for our 2009 report Locked Up Far
Away had been transferred for medical reasons, it is certainly the case that some percentage
of transfers are completed in order to provide immigrant detainees with necessary medical
care, and that providing such care prevents illness, loss of life, and costly lawsuits. However,
there is no way to estimate these savings since the agency does not make public, or even
record in a centralized database, the reasons for detainee transfers.36
Therefore, while we have no way to estimate savings associated with transfers, we can
roughly estimate some transportation costs associated with transfers, based on information
provided to Human Rights Watch by the US Marshals Service and the IRS. Two cost estimates
were used, assuming air travel was used for transfers greater than 475 miles and ground
transportation used for transfers less than 475 miles. Further details on the information used
for these calculations can be found in the Methodology section.
According to our estimates, the over two million transfers that occurred between October
1998 and April 2010 cost approximately $366,832,842 in total. We believe that these
transport costs only represent a fraction of the total costs of transfers: since transferred
detainees spend on average more than three times longer in detention than those who are
not transferred, the most significant financial costs may come from court delays and
unnecessarily long periods of detention.
As illustrated in Table 11, the most costly transfer “segment” has been from York County Jail
in Pennsylvania to Harlingen Staging Facility in Texas. Over 11,000 transfers have been sent
the 1,642 miles from Pennsylvania to Texas, costing an estimated $13.2 million. The most
costly single transfer movements have occurred between Guam and the continental US.
These transfers are nearly 8,000 miles long and likely cost several thousand dollars per
detainee. Figure 6 provides the costs of transfers originating from each of the 50 states.

36

Even if one accepts the notion that transfers for medical care provide cost savings to the agency, it is also true that transfers
for medical care are not adequately addressing detainee medical needs, since ICE’s failure to care for the medical needs of
non-citizen detainees (resulting in deaths in several cases) has been the subject of numerous lawsuits, press investigations,
and congressional action. See, e.g., “ACLU Sues U.S. Immigration Officials and For-Profit Corrections Corporation Over
Dangerous and Inhumane Housing of Detainees,” ACLU press release, January 24, 2007,
http://www.aclu.org/prison/conditions/28127prs20070124.html (accessed May 11, 2011); “ACLU Sues Over Lack of Medical
Treatment at San Diego Detention Facility,” ACLU press release, June 13, 2007,
http://aclu.org/immigrants/detention/30095res20070613.html (accessed May 11, 2011); Dana Priest and Amy Goldstein,
“Careless Detention: System of Neglect,” Washington Post, May 11, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/specials/immigration/cwc_d1p1.html (accessed May 11, 2011); “In Custody Deaths,” New York Times,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/immigration_detention_us/incustody_deaths/index.html
(accessed May 11, 2011) (collecting articles published by the New York Times about immigrant detainee deaths and failure to
provide medical care from 2005 to 2009); U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, “Hearing on Problems with Immigration Detainee
Medical Care,” June 4, 2008, http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_060408.html (accessed May 11, 2011).

29

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

Table 11 – Most Costly Transfer Segments
Originating
State

Receiving Facility

Receiving
State

# of
Transfers

Length
(mi.)

Cost per
Transfer

Cost for all
Transfers

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

HARLINGEN
STAGING FACILITY

TX

11,363

1,642.28

$ 1,169.55

$ 13,289,596.65

MECKLENBURG CO.
JAIL

NC

STEWART
DETENTION
CENTER

GA

15,959

315.44

$ 325.95

$ 5,201,836.05

LOS CUSTODY CASE
HOLDING FACILITY,
SAN PEDRO

CA

ELOY FEDERAL
CONTRACT FAC

AZ

11,581

394.82

$ 407.98

$ 4,724,816.38

LOS CUSTODY CASE
HOLDING FACILITY,
SAN PEDRO

CA

MIRA LOMA DET.
CENTER

CA

50,289

66.13

$ 68.33

$ 3,436,247.37

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

PINE PRAIRIE
CORRECTIONAL
CENTER

LA

3,957

1,192.02

$ 848.90

$ 3,359,097.30

ALAMANCE CO. DET.
FACILITY

NC

STEWART
DETENTION
CENTER

GA

7,320

414.51

$ 428.33

$ 3,135,375.60

MIRA LOMA DET.
CENTER

CA

LOS CUST CASE

CA

45,879

66.13

$ 68.33

$ 3,134,912.07

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

JENA/LASALLE
DETENTION
FACILITY

LA

3,815

1,136.78

$ 809.56

$ 3,088,471.40

LOS CUSTODY CASE
HOLDING FACILITY,
SAN PEDRO

CA

FLORENCE
STAGING FACILITY

AZ

7,060

400.98

$ 414.35

$ 2,925,311.00

YORK COUNTY JAIL

PA

OTERO CO.
PROCESSING
CENTER

NM

2,246

1,804.73

$ 1,285.24

$ 2,886,649.04

OSBORN CORR.
INST.

CT

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

1

7,925.57

$ 5,644.21

$ 5,644.21

HOWARD COUNTY
DET. CENTER

MD

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

1

7,914.54

$ 5,636.36

$ 5,636.36

DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH AFFAIRS

GUAM

BERKS COUNTY
FAMILY SHELTER

PA

1

7,883.01

$ 5,613.90

$ 5,613.90

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

BERKS COUNTY
FAMILY SHELTER

PA

1

7,881.05

$ 5,612.51

$ 5,612.51

LA

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

3

7,705.43

$ 5,487.44

$ 16,462.32

DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH AFFAIRS

GUAM

SOUTHWEST
YOUTH VILLAGE

IN

1

7,496.3

$ 5,338.51

$ 5,338.51

HOUSTON
CONTRACT DET.
FAC.

TX

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

7

7,429

$ 5,290.58

$ 37,034.06

DEPARTMENT OF
YOUTH AFFAIRS

GUAM

IL

9

7,361.82

$ 5,242.74

$ 47,184.66

GARVIN COUNTY
JAIL

OK

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

1

7,179.42

$ 5,112.84

$ 5,112.84

JEFFERSON COUNTY
JAIL

OK

DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS

GUAM

2

7,158.41

$ 5,097.88

$ 10,195.76

Originating Facility

Most Costly Transfer Segments (per Segment)

NOL D D & P

A Costly Move

JUVENILE
FACILITY/
HEARTLAND

30

Figure 6

As noted above, our conservative estimate of $366 million dollars for detainee transfers
between 1998 and 2010 does not include other costs that may be associated with transfers,
such as flights made by carriers more costly than the Justice Prisoner and Alien
Transportation System (JPATS); personnel time spent on paperwork or other administrative
tasks; costs of additional court time, court delays, or lengthened detention caused by
transfers; costs associated with needless transfers of persons who are found to be eligible
for bond and therefore are unnecessarily detained; or costs associated with duplicative
medical screenings or tests. Therefore, without better public information on ICE’s
operational budget related to transfers, it is impossible to conclude whether transfers result
in net costs or savings for the agency.

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Human Rights Watch | June 2011

V. Methodology
The data provided in response to the original Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
arrived from ICE on a single data disc and contained 5,061,411 comma-separated value
records, comprising 1.16 GB of data.
ICE did not provide a data key or code book for deciphering the data. After exploring the
database, researchers determined that of the 18 included variables, five variables were
either completely empty or contained major data entry flaws. For example, the variable
“Apprehension Date” has a large percentage of entries (over 120,000 people) with the same
date of apprehension: 1/1/2001. This is clearly a result of a data management error such as a
wrongly labeled bulk import.
Researchers found that each row of data was based upon a single action (transfer or
deportation or other release) or segment of someone’s detention, not a single person’s
history. After further analysis, researchers were able to use consistencies among several
variables to determine the ordering of the database. With the ordering of the database
known, we were able isolate individuals’ histories within ICE detention by identifying the
individual non-citizen that corresponded to each row of data.
Our analysis relied on descriptive statistics, including frequencies and cross-tabulations.
Distance estimates were developed by determining latitudes and longitudes of each
detention facility and computing the distance between each facility. Cost estimates were
developed using data provided by the US Marshals Service on cost per flight hour per seat
for transfers conducted by the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation System (JPATS). The
US Marshals Service provided six years of estimates for flights using different sizes of
airplane frames. We averaged these estimates to produce an average per transfer cost.
The last date included in the database was May 25, 2010, which corresponds to 64 percent
of fiscal year 2010. Therefore, we developed estimates for the remainder of FY2010.
Estimated FY2010 will be labeled “Estimated.” Because the volume of ICE actions follows an
annual pattern, with drops in enforcement actions around the fiscal year changeover, we did
not use a linear rate for estimates. Rather, estimates were developed by using rate ratios
determined using data from 2007 through 2009 in an attempt to improve accuracy. These
ratios compared the volume of ICE detentions, transfers, and deportations from October
through April to May through September. A ratio of 1:1 would mean that the volume from
October to April would equal the volume from May to September. The averaged ratio of the

A Costly Move

32

previous three fiscal years was applied to the October through April 2010 data to estimate
the aggregate sums for the remainder of 2010.
For cost estimates, two formulas were used to calculate the approximate cost per transferred
detainee:
•
•

For each ICE detainee transferred 475 miles or more, we assumed air travel and
calculated the cost as:37 cost = [(C / 525) x $373.88 ].
For each detainee transferred under 475 miles, the following formula was applied: 38
cost = [(mileage traveled / 60) x $32 per hour for 2 guards] + (mileage traveled x $0.50
per mile).

Data that the Department of Homeland Security provided has not been altered for our
analysis. Any errors within the dataset, including user-generated errors such as mislabeling
37

Formula explanation:

C = distance (over 475 miles) traveled by each detainee. The 475-mile cut off is based on a comparison between the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) standard mileage rate for automobiles in FY 2010, which was $0.50 per mile
(http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=216048,00.html), and flights on commercial carriers between a variety of
destinations, to determine at what distance a prudent decision-maker might choose to transport detainees by plane as
opposed to over land (see table below). Some of the flight costs were based on rates that included one stop-over, since the US
Marshalls described using stopovers while transporting immigrant detainees. Email from Steve Blando, US Marshals Service
Headquarters, to Human Rights Watch, May 30, 2008 (“On average an alien may move 1.4 times before reaching final
destination”).
FROM NEWARK, NJ TO (miles)

Over land

By commercial carrier

Philadelphia (77 miles)

$ 38.50

$ 183

Washington, D.C. (197 miles)

$ 98.50

$ 145

Richmond, VA (283 miles)

$ 141.50

$ 169

Detroit, MI (474 miles)

$ 237

$ 162

Charlotte, NC (526 miles)

$ 263

$ 173

Atlanta, GA (735 miles)

$ 367.50

$ 130

New Orleans, LA (1,163 miles)

$ 581.50

$ 199

525 = number of miles traveled per flight hour. (The “typical cruise speed” of a Boeing 737 at 35,000 feet is about 525 mph).
The Boeing Company, “Commercial Airplanes: 737 Family,”
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737family/pf/pf_800tech.html (accessed May 11, 2011).
$373.88 = price per flight hour per seat charged by Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation Service (JPATS) of the US Marshals
Service to ICE, on average between fiscal years 2006 and 2011 and among all types of aircraft frame. Letter from William E.
Bordley, Associate General Counsel/FOIPA Officer, US Department of Justice, United States Marshals Service, to Human Rights
Watch, regarding freedom of information/privacy act request no. 2011USMS17132, March 3, 2011.
38

The formula is a rough estimate based on the following assumptions. A transfer requires the presence of at least two guards.
In 2007 guards were compensated at a rate of $16 per hour. See Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract between
ICE and Lincoln County, Troy, Missouri, “The purpose of this modification is to add Article XVIII (Guard/Transportation Services)
to this agreement,” August 23, 2007 (“At least two (2) qualified law enforcement or correctional officer personnel employed by
the Service Provider under their policies, procedures and practices will perform services.”). In addition, billing for
transportation costs is based on the IRS standard mileage rate for automobiles of $0.50 per mile in FY 2010
(http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=216048,00.html). Depending on the number of detainees transported in a
transfer, more than two guards may be required. In addition, hourly rates for guards may have increased since 2007. Therefore,
we believe that these estimates for ground transportation costs are conservative.

33

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

in data entry, would have occurred before the dataset was received. Because original files on
each deportee are not accessible, it is impossible to double check the data entry for errors.
Therefore the analysis uses data that ICE provided, regardless of any potential errors.

A Costly Move

34

Acknowledgments
This report was researched and written by Alison Parker, director of the US program of
Human Rights Watch. The data analysis contained in the report was performed by Brian
Root, consultant to the US program, and Enrique Piraces, senior online strategist for Human
Rights Watch. The report was edited by Antonio Ginatta, advocacy director of the US
program; Clive Baldwin, senior legal advisor; and Danielle Haas, senior editor. Layout and
production were coordinated by Grace Choi, publications director, Fitzroy Hepkins, mail
manager, and Elena Vanko, US program associate.
Human Rights Watch is enormously grateful to Sue Long and David Burnham at the
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse at Syracuse University for their extraordinary
expertise and professionalism in helping us to prepare the FOIA request, and to consider
best approaches in analyzing the data. Finally, we would like to thank ICE for sending us the
data we requested.

35

Human Rights Watch | June 2011

H UMA N R I G H TS WATCH
350 Fifth Avenue, 34 th Floor
New York, NY 10118-3299

H U M A N

www.hrw.org

W A T C H

A Costly Move
Far and Frequent Transfers Impede Hearings for Immigrant Detainees in the United States
Detained immigrants facing deportation in the United States, including legal permanent residents, refugees, and
undocumented persons, are being transferred, often repeatedly, to remote detention centers by US Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
Transfers separate detained immigrants from the attorneys and evidence they need to defend against
deportation, which can violate their right to fair treatment in court, slow asylum or deportation proceedings, and
prolong the time immigrants spend in detention.
With close to 400,000 immigrants in detention each year, space in US detention centers, especially near cities
where immigrants, their families, and attorneys live, has not kept pace. As a result, ICE has built a system of
detention—relying on subcontracts with state jails and prisons—that cannot operate without transfers.
A Costly Move shows that between 1998 and 2010, 1 million immigrants were transferred 2 million times. Forty-six
percent of transferred detainees were moved two or more times: in one egregious case, a detainee was transferred
66 times. On average, each transferred detainee traveled 370 miles, with one frequent transfer pattern (from
Pennsylvania to Texas) covering 1,642 miles. Such long-distance and repetitive transfers can render attorneyclient relationships unworkable, separate immigrants from evidence they need in court, and make family visits so
costly they rarely, if ever, occur.
An agency charged with enforcing US laws should not establish a system of detention that is literally inoperable
without widespread, multiple, and long-distance transfers. ICE would reduce the chaos and limit harmful human
rights abuses if it worked to emulate best practices on inmate transfers set by state and federal prison systems.
Transfers do not need to stop entirely in order for ICE to respect detainees’ rights; they merely need to be curtailed
through the establishment of enforceable guidelines, regulations, and reasonable legislative restraints.

Immigrants aboard an ICE flight between
Chicago and Harlingen, Texas, May 25, 2010.
© 2010 L.M. Otero/ Associated Press

R I G H T S