CALIFORNIA SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT BOARD

HOMELESSNESS AMONG REGISTERED SEX
OFFENDERS IN CALIFORNIA:
THE NUMBERS, THE RISKS AND
THE RESPONSE
DECEMBER

2008

MEMBERS OF
THE CALIFORNIA SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT BOARD

SUZANNE BROWN-McBRIDE

TOM TOBIN, PH.D.

CASOMB CHAIR

CASOMB VICE-CHAIR
CALIFORNIA COALITION ON SEXUAL OFFENDING

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

SHARPER FUTURE

CALIFORNIA COALITION AGAINST SEXUAL ASSAULT

CATHERINE M. DUGGAN

GERRY D. BLASINGAME, MA

DIRECTOR

LICENSED MARRIAGE AND FAMILY THERAPIST

CRIME VICTIMS' ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

CALIFORNIA COALITION ON SEXUAL OFFENDING

VENTURA COUNTY
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE

THE HONORABLE PETER ESPINOZA
JUDGE

DAVID R. GERARD

Los ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

CHIEF, SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENT PROGRAM
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

MICHAEL D. JOHNSON
COUNTY ADMINISTRATOR

JANET NEELEY

SOLANO COUNTY

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SOPHIA McBETH-CHILDS
DETECTIVE

PAMELA KING

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT

SAN BERNARDINO PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

ROBERT AMBROSELLI
DEPUTY DIRECTOR

NANCY O'MALLEY

DIVISION OF ADULT PAROLE OPERATIONS

CHIEF ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

ALAMEDA COUNTY

CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

JERRY POWERS

ApPOINTMENT PENDING

CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER

UNDERSECRETARY, OPERATIONS

STANISLAUS COUNTY

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

DIANE WEBB
DETECTIVE

ANGELA THOMPSON

SEX OFFENDER PROGRAM COORDINATOR

PROBATION OFFICER

Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT

Los ANGELES COUNTY PROBATION

RESEARCHERS
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
RUSSELL LOVING, J.D.

ASSOCIATE INVESTIGATORS
JENNIE K. SINGER, PH.D.
MARY MAGUIRE, PH.D.

DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, SACRAMENTO

THE CALIFORNIA SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT BOARD
In 2006, the California Sex Offender Management Board (CASOMB) was created
when Assembly Bill (AB) 1015 was passed by the California State Legislature
and signed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. CASOMB is comprised of
17 appointed members representing various agencies that play a critical role in
sex offender management. Five of the appointees come from state agencies,
eight from local government (county or city) and four from the non-government
sector.
Under AB 1015, CASOMB has been charged with providing the Governor and
the California State Legislature with an assessment of current sex offender
management practices, a progress report on the Board’s work and a final report
with recommendations. To accomplish these tasks, CASOMB meets monthly as
a full Board and has broken up into Committees that meet during the interim
period between Board meetings. The work by CASOMB connects with its
mission and vision.
Vision
The vision of the CASOMB is to decrease sexual victimization and
increase community safety.
Mission
This vision will be accomplished by addressing issues, concerns, and
problems related to community management of adult sexual offenders by
identifying and developing recommendations to improve policies and
practices.
CASOMB’s role in state government is to make recommendations, using
evidence based practices as examples, to those who do have the authority to set
policies and determine practices for the systems that manage sex offenders.
CASOMB also serves as a resource for state legislators and other policymakers.
WANT MORE INFORMATION?
Monthly CASOMB meetings are open to the public and time is made available for
public comment. CASOMB’s web site (www.casomb.org) is the best source for
meeting dates, agendas, minutes, and other resources including Board
publications as well as national research.

i

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

OVERVIEW AND OUTLINE OF CONTENTS

5

SINCE THE IMPLEMENTAION OF RESIDENCY

7

RESTRICTIONS, THE NUMBER OF SEX OFFENDERS
REGISTERING AS TRANSIENT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASED.

PART II

HOMELESSNESS INCREASES THE RISK THAT

15

SOMEONE WHO HAS OFFENDED SEXUALLY MAY
COMMIT ANOTHER SEX CRIME.

PART III

THE RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS AMONG SEX

21

OFFENDERS REQUIRES A CREATIVE AND
COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO CREATE STABLE AND
SUITABLE HOUSING.

PART IV

APPENDIX A:

CONCLUSIONS

27

REFERENCES

29

CALIFORNIA TRANSIENT SEX OFFENDER

33

DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTY

APPENDIX B:
S:

LOCAL ORDINANCES REGULATING RESIDENCE AND

35

PRESENCE OF SEX OFFENDERS

APPENDIX C:

RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS:
FUTURE HOLD?

iii

WHAT DOES THE

37

iv

HOMELESSNESS AMONG REGISTERED SEX OFFENDERS IN CALIFORNIA:
THE NUMBERS, THE RISKS AND THE RESPONSE
NOVEMBER 2008
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Why should our community care about issues related to homelessness
among registered sex offenders? In the wake of the passage of state law and
local ordinances restricting the residency of sex offenders, the number of sex
offenders who registered as transient has risen significantly. Among all registered
sex offenders (parolees, probationers and unsupervised), the number of sex
offenders registering as transient has increased from 2050 in June 2007 to 3,267
by August 2008 – an increase of 60%. The only population of sex offenders
where the residency restrictions of Proposition 83 has been consistently enforced
has been parolees. Among parolees (parolees constitute approximately 15% of
all registered sex offenders), the number of sex offenders registering as transient
increased from 88 in November 2006 (prior to the passage of Proposition 83) to
1,056 by June 29, 2008 – an increase of over 800%. Currently, only the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, U.S. Probation and a few counties
are enforcing Proposition 83.

The Board anticipates that the number of sex
offenders registering as transient will increase to a greater extent should other
entities decide to enforce residency restriction laws. To better understand the
significance of this rise in sex offenders registering as transient, the Board
examined the events surrounding the increase in homelessness among sex
offenders and how that increase may impact community safety.
Among all registered sex offenders (parolees, probationers and
unsupervised), the number of sex offenders registering as
transient has increased from 2050 in June 2007 to 3,267 by
August 2008 – an increase of 60%. The only population of sex
offenders where the residency restrictions of Proposition 83 has
been consistently enforced has been parolees. Among
parolees (parolees constitute approximately 15% of all
registered sex offenders), the number of sex offenders
registering as transient increased from 88 in November 2006
(prior to the passage of Proposition 83) to 1,056 by June 29,
2008 – an increase of over 800%.
It can be no coincidence that the rise in homelessness among registered
sex offenders corresponds with recent changes regarding residency restrictions
1

imposed on registered sex offenders. California imposes various limitations on
where a registered sex offender may live depending on whether the offender is a
High Risk Sex Offender (HRSO), a sexually violent predator (SVP) or a person
required to register under Penal Code section 290 as the consequence of a
conviction for any specified sexual crime. Local governments have also imposed
their own residency restrictions, usually directed toward all Penal Code section
290 registrants. In addition, this state’s registration and notification laws have
provided communities with the ability to locate sex offenders within their
neighborhoods. An unintended and collateral effect of this state’s registration and
community notification laws was the mobilization of neighborhoods to oust sex
offenders. As a result, the housing options for sex offenders have diminished
significantly. With fewer options available, the number of sex offenders
registering as transient has increased.
Common sense leads to the conclusion that a community cannot be safer
when sex offenders are homeless. In this case, the empirical evidence supports
common sense. Lack of stability is a primary contributing factor to an increased
risk of reoffending, including sexual reoffending. Residential instability leads to
unstable employment and lower levels of social support. Unstable employment
and lack of social support lead to emotional and mental instability. Emotional and
mental instability breaks down the ability to conform and leads to a greater risk of
committing another sex crime.
The Board believes that the rise in homelessness among sex offenders
needs attention because it is so closely associated with an increased level of
threat to community safety. Based on its examination of the available evidence,
the Board makes the following findings:
•

•
•

The evidence shows an unmistakable correlation
between the implementation of residency restrictions and
the increase in homelessness among registered sex
offenders.
The evidence shows that homelessness increases the
risk that a sex offender may reoffend.
Partnerships between different levels of governments
and between government and the public to make stable
and appropriate housing available to sex offenders
provide the strongest hope for reducing the transient sex
offender population and the associated risk of future
sexual victimization.

2

The following report will examine more closely each of the elements noted
in this summary and will provide information about the research which supports
each of the statements made and conclusions drawn by the Board.

3

4

OVERVIEW
To understand the events leading to the increase in sex offenders
registering as transient and the impact this increase may have on community
safety, the Board explored the numbers, the risks and the response to this
increase.
Part I of this report looks at the number of sex offenders registering as
transient. The data is viewed by examining the increase in homelessness among
all registered sex offenders and sex offenders who are on parole. It also sets out
the historical events correlating with the rise in sex offenders registering as
transient. More importantly, this part identifies the numerous federal, state and
local laws limiting where sex offenders may live.
Part II examines the risk that transient sex offenders may pose to
community safety. It begins with an exploration of the factors affecting the risk of
reoffending, looks at the destabililizing affects of homelessness and reaches the
conclusion that transiency increase the risk of reoffending.
Part III looks at the response and lack of response to the increase in
transiency among sex offenders. It begins with a look at the methods used by
other states to provide housing for sex offenders and concludes with a summary
of Governor Schwarzenegger’s “California Summit for Safe Communities.”
Part IV gives the conclusions of the Board. The Conclusions section
identifies factors that may increase or decrease the level of homelessness
among sex offenders. It concludes with specific findings as supported by
available evidence.
OUTLINE OF CONTENTS
Part I.

Part II.

SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS,
THE NUMBER OF SEX OFFENDERS REGISTERING AS
TRANSIENT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED.
a. Among all registered sex offenders, the number of sex offenders
registering as transient has increased by sixty percent.
b. Registration and notification laws have impacted where sex
offenders may live.
c. The housing options for sex offenders are limited by federal, state
and local laws.
HOMELESSNESS INCREASES THE RISK THAT SOMEONE WHO
HAS OFFENDED SEXUALLY MAY COMMIT ANOTHER SEX CRIME.
a. What are the factors that increase a sex offender’s risk of
committing another sex crime?
5

b. Homelessness, a dynamic risk factor, destabilizes the sex offender
and increases the risk of committing another sex crime.
c. Housing helps the sex offender to stabilize and reduces the risk of
re-offending.
d. Housing leads to stable employment and social support, which are
factors reducing the risk of re-offending.
Part III.

THE RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS AMONG SEX OFFENDERS
REQUIRES A CREATIVE AND COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO
CREATE STABLE AND SUITABLE HOUSING.
a. Efforts to reduce homelessness among sex offenders have led to
innovative approaches to housing.
i. Shared Living Arrangements
ii. Secure Community Transition Facility for sexually violent
predators
iii. Mobile trailers as transition housing
iv. Leased Unit Model
v. Private landlords with informal agreements with the
government
vi. Funding for construction of homes for the homeless
b. The solution to the problem of housing sex offenders begins with
examining and developing a state-wide housing policy.

Part IV.

CONCLUSIONS

6

Part I.

SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS,
THE NUMBER OF SEX OFFENDERS REGISTERING AS
TRANSIENT HAS SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED.
a. Among all registered sex offenders, the number of sex offenders
registering as transient has increased by sixty percent.

Since the implementation of Proposition 83, there has been a surge in the
number of sex offenders who register as transient.

The most notable increase
has been among paroled sex offenders. Paroled sex offenders are under close
supervision and the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(hereafter CDCR) has been the primary agency that has enforced Proposition
83.1 The Board anticipates that, if residency restrictions were enforced against
all registered sex offenders, including those on probation and those who are
unsupervised, the number of sex offenders registering as transient would further
increase.
The majority of registered sex offenders are not supervised. The California
data base that contains information on those individuals who are required to
register as sex offenders under Penal Code 290 is managed and maintained by
the California Department of Justice (DOJ) under the State Attorney General.
Data is submitted to DOJ by the various law enforcement agencies throughout
the state who receive such information directly from the registrants.
Approximately 70 - 80% of all sex offenders living in the community are not under
the direct authority of the criminal justice system and are, therefore, under no
formal supervision. Selected individuals may be kept under some level of
observation by local law enforcement, particularly with regard to registration
residency information. The other 25% are under the authority of either state
parole or county probation. The distribution of supervised and unsupervised
registered sex offenders is represented below in Chart 1-1.

1

U.S. Probation and a few counties in California have also enforced Proposition 83.
7

Chart 1-1: Sex Offender Registrants in the Community
(Source: CASOMB Initial Report 2008)

o fo al slJpervision
(approximately 75% of of
:xlsa squired to
isler as
sax offenders are l u de
any type of fo al
S'

pe

s.on)

o Stale Parole

'l'ilh 0'
n of
Adult Pa ole Ope-alions

(app

oxima~ely 30

desig~led

o

'

as High Ris

eooe'S)

OSu::>srvised Country
ProbaliC)
Probalio

49'79

oU,S.
oU.S.
(C1Jrrenl sex
u.s. P obation
obalion (currenl
(current
s;:>8cific ederal
ecleral coo'"
coo,,'
v' ions
s::>scific
'ons
or con'l'ictions
oonvic 'ons ",ith
'l'ith
sex
convictions
vilh ·sex
o e sa elated cond
co d lions)
tions)
50 0 58 cou lles
lies
~es

California voters passed Proposition 83 on November 6, 2006. In August
2007, CDCR established a procedure for implementing Proposition 83 (CDCR
Policy No. 07-36, Aug. 17, 2007). The Memorandum directed unit supervisors to
locate the current listing of all public and private schools and parks within their
communities. Parole agents were then instructed to serve all affected parolees
with a “Modified Condition(s) of Parole Addendum” (MCOPA) and/or a Notice to
Comply instructional letter. The MCOPA and Notice to Comply advised the
affected parolees of Proposition 83. Parolees were given 45 days after service to
comply. Parole agents were to advise affected parolees that non-compliance will
result in arrest and referral to the Board of Parole Hearings. Parole agents were
to utilize a Global Positioning System (GPS) device to measure the proximity of
the primary entrance of the affected parolee’s residence from the exterior
boundary of the prohibited school or park. Parole agents were to consider any
parolee who absconds from parole supervision to avoid compliance with
Proposition 83 as a Parolee-At-Large (PAL) and to request a warrant.
Parolees who declare themselves as transient had to comply with
additional requirements. Penal Code section 290.011 provides that “’transient’
means a person who has no residence. ‘Residence’ means one or more
8

addresses at which a person regularly resides, regardless of the number of days
or nights spent there, such as a shelter or structure that can be located by a
street address, including, but not limited to, houses, apartment buildings, motels,
hotels, homeless shelters, and recreational and other vehicles.” Transient
parolees are required to contact their parole agent daily via telephone or in
person. Once each week, they must report in person to the Parole Unit.
The rise in the number of sex offender parolees registering as transient
rose significantly after enforcement of Proposition 83. On November 6, 2006
(prior to the passage of Proposition 83), 88 sex offenders on parole registered as
transient. By June 29, 2008, the number had increased to 1056 – an increase of
over 800 percent.
Chart 1-2: Changes in
In Homelessness among Paroled Sex Offenders
Data provided by the California
Callfomla Department of Corrections
CorrectIons and RehabllitalJon
Rehabilitation
RehabilftaUon

l
J ne 29, 2008

1056

.~
~

88

Nove ber 6, 2006

,~
.
~

-

-

o

-

200

Nu

er of sex

--400
4-00

0

800

600

enders on pa ole

-

W 0

1000

1200

regis ered as trans ent

When looking at all registered sex offenders (those on parole, those on
probation, and those who are unsupervised), a similar pattern of a notable
increase can be found. In June 2007, 2050 sex offenders registered as transient.
By August 2008, the number had risen to 3,267 – an increase of sixty percent.
(See Appendix A for the distribution by county of all registered sex offenders and
9

sex offenders registering as transient.) As noted above, the Board anticipates
that, if residency restrictions were enforced against sex offenders on probation
and unsupervised sex offenders, the number of sex offenders registering as
transient would further increase.
Chart 1-3: Changes in Homelessness among All Registered Sex Offenders
Data provided
provIded by tho
the California Department of Justice

3500
3267
3000

2500

2000
2050
1500

1000

500

o
Jul-07
Jul-O? A g-07 Sep-m
Sep-07
SeP"'o7 Oct-07
Oct-OJ Nov-07
Nov-Q7
ov-D7 Dec-07
Dec-O? Jan-08
Jan-Q8 Feb-08 Mar-08
Mar-DB Apr-OB
Apr-DB May-DB
May-OB J n-08
n-oB J 1-08 Aug-OB
Aug-DB
-Nu
-Number
ber of sex 0 enderseglste
enders egiste ing
ng as trans
tran
trans"ent
ent

b.

Registration and notification laws have impacted where sex
offenders may live.

Sex offender registration is not new. In 1947, California implemented the
nation’s first sex offender registry. However, the public’s attention focused on sex
offending when the media publicized particular incidents of sex attacks on
children. Responding to public outcry, other states enacted sex offender laws.
The incentive for all states to pass registration and notification laws came
when the federal government passed three laws: the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act (1994), Megan’s
Law (1996) and the Pam Lynchner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification
Act (1996). Collectively, these federal laws required all states to establish
registration and notification programs. For example, the Jacob Wetterling Act
prohibits states from receiving ten percent of the funds allocated to a state under
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 should the state fail to
10

implement a notification program. Congress continued to draw attention to sex
offenders when, in 2006, it passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006. Among other provisions, the Act establishes a national database of
sex offenders and allows public access to information regarding sex offenders
released from prison.
In response to public outcry concern as well as federal mandate,
California enacted the Child Protection Act of 1994. The Act created a Child
Molester Identification Line 900 Number, which provided the public with the
ability to call and inquire whether an individual was registered as a sex offender.
In support of the Act, the California Legislature declared that sex offenders posed
a high risk of re-offending, that there was a “necessary and compelling public
interest” for the public to have access to information regarding sex offenders, and
that convicted sex offenders had a reduced expectation of privacy. The system
which provides such information to those citizens who take the initiative to inquire
is sometimes called “passive notification.”
Two years later, California amended the Child Protection Act of 1994 to
include the means for “active” community notification. Commonly known as
“Megan’s Law,” the amendments authorized local law enforcement to take the
initiative to disclose offender information when deemed necessary for public
safety. The amendments also provided for registration information to be made
available to the public through CD-ROM and other electronic media. Members of
the public would need to go in person to a special “kiosk” computer at a local
police station to obtain the information.
The current version of California’s registration and notification laws is
found in the Sex Offender Punishment, Control, and Containment Act of 2006.
The Department of Justice is required to make available to the public “via an
Internet Web site” certain identifying information regarding persons required to
register pursuant to Penal Code section 290 (Cal. Penal Code, § 290.46).
Megan’s Law continues to permit local law enforcement agencies to notify their
communities about the presence of designated registered sex offenders who
pose a risk in their area. Local law enforcement may use “whatever means the
entity deems appropriate, when necessary to ensure the public safety” (Cal.
Penal Code, § 290.45).
Notification laws provide communities with the ability to protect
themselves by informing them where sex offenders live. However, one of the
unintended and collateral effects of registration and community notification is that
neighborhoods may attempt to oust the offender.
For example, earlier this year when they learned from the DOJ website
about a “concentration” of 290 registrants in their neighborhood, residents of
Long Beach mobilized to move out sex offenders living at a halfway house in
11

Alamitos Beach (Long Beach, 2008). Similarly, the Riverside Press-Enterprise
reported that an angry mob picketed the home of a sex offender (as cited in FryBowers, 2004). The mob’s intimidating actions forced the offender to move away.
In Hayward, CDCR had placed seven sex offenders at the Island Motel.
However, the manager had all seven leave after area residents called and said
they were outraged that sex offenders were living in their neighborhood (Graham,
2006). Last year in Lake County, the Megan’s Law website may have led to the
killing of a sex offender (Megan’s Law, 2007). When a resident of a trailer park
learned that a sex offender had moved in, the resident allegedly killed the sex
offender because the resident was concerned that a child molester had moved
into the neighborhood. The resident was wrong. The sex offender had raped an
adult. Thus, though not intended to limit where registered sex offenders may live,
registration and community notifications laws have impacted the availability of
housing for registered sex offenders.
c.

The housing options for sex offenders are limited by federal, state
and local laws.

Housing of known sex offenders is closely regulated. The fundamental
statutory requirement for all parolees is that a parolee shall be returned to the
county that was the parolee’s last legal residence (Cal. Pen. Code, § 3003, subd.
(a)). On rare occasions, the parolee may be returned to another county if
returning to another county is “in the best interest of the public” (Cal. Pen. Code,
§ 3003, subd. (b)). When making such a decision, the paroling authority must
give the greatest weight to the protection of the victim and the safety of the
community.
A second restriction is imposed on parolees who committed certain
enumerated violent crimes (Cal. Pen. Code, § 3003, subd. (f)). The parolee may
not reside within 35 miles of the actual residence of the victim or witness to the
crime. The enumerated sex crimes are:
•
•
•
•

Rape (Cal. Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. (a)(2) & (a)(6) & 262, subd.
(a)(1) & (a)(4) );
Sodomy (Cal. Pen. Code, § 286, subd. (c) & (d));
Oral copulation (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288a, subd. (c) & (d)); and
Lewd or lascivious act (Cal. Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a) & (b))

State residency restrictions directed specifically to sex offenders fall under
two broad categories: (1) Offenders who were released from prison and would be
subject to parole supervision, and (2) offenders who were required to register
under Penal Code section 290. Regarding the second category, whether the
offender is, or is not, under supervision as a parolee or probationer does not
matter. Chart 1-4 lists the state statutes that restrict where sex offenders may
live.
12

Chart 1-4: State statutes restricting the residency of sex offenders
Statute

Pen. Code, §
3003.5,
subd. (b)

Pen. Code,
§ 3003.5,
subd. (a)

Pen. Code, §
3003, subd.
(g)

Restriction

2000 feet of
any public or
private
school, or
park where
children
regularly
gather
Yes
Yes

With
another
registered
sex offender
in a single
family
dwelling*

¼ mile from
any
public/private
school,
grades K-12

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

All registered sex offenders
Registered sex offenders
who are on parole
High Risk Sex Offenders
who
(1) Are on parole and
(2) were convicted of
violating either Pen.
Code, §§ 288 (Lewd
and Lascivious Acts) or
288.5 (Continuous
Sexual Abuse of a
Child)
Sexually Violent Predators
who
(1) are on parole and
(2) either have had
(a) a previous
conviction for
violating Pen.
Code, § 288.5,
subd. (a) & (b) or
Pen. Code, § 288,
subd. (c)(1)
or
(b) a finding by a court
that the parolee has
a history of
improper sexual
conduct with
children.

Welf & Inst.
Code, §
6608.5,
subd. (f)
¼ mile from
any
public/private
school,
grades K-12

Yes
Yes

Yes

* Penal Code section 3003.5 provides an exception for persons legally
related by blood, marriage or adoption to the parolee. This section also
states that a “’single family dwelling’ shall not include a residential facility
which serves six or fewer persons.”
13

Proposition 83 also permits local jurisdictions to enact ordinances
restricting sex offender residency (Cal. Pen. Code, 3003.5, subd. (b)). As of
October 2008, seventeen cities and three counties had enacted ordinances
limiting where sex offenders may live. (See Appendix B for a list of the local
jurisdiction imposing its own residency restrictions.) To the knowledge of the
Board, no local jurisdiction is enforcing its ordinances limiting where sex
offenders may live.
Federal law further limits where sex offenders may live. 42 U.S.C. §13663
prohibits federally assisted housing from admitting any person who is subjected
to lifetime registration under a state sex offender registration program. Penal
Code section 290 provides that sex offenders must register for life. As such,
registered sex offenders in California cannot live in low-income subsidized
housing.
To determine the impact of Proposition 83’s 2,000 foot residency
restriction, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office used Geographic Information
Systems (GIS) to assess the law’s impact on San Diego County (Wartell, 2007).
The researchers extracted out the residential parcels in San Diego County and
overlaid the 2,000 foot buffers extending from schools and parks. The analysis
revealed that fewer than 28 percent of the residential parcels were available for
housing sex offenders. The analysis did not consider whether any of the housing
in the available parcels was affordable to sex offenders.
The combined effects of federal, state and local residency restrictions,
state registration and notifications laws, and public sentiment have significantly
reduced the housing options for sex offenders. One result of these limitations is
an increase in the number of sex offenders registering as transient.

14

Part II.

a.

HOMELESSNESS INCREASES THE RISK THAT SOMEONE
WHO OFFENDED SEXUALLY MAY COMMIT ANOTHER SEX
CRIME.
What are the factors that increase a sex offender’s risk of
committing another sex crime?

There are several empirical risk factors that raise the risk that an offender
will re-offend sexually. These include deviant sexual preference (such as a
desire for young children); an antisocial lifestyle (such as a propensity to violate
rules); employment instability; and reckless, impulsive behavior (Hanson &
Bussiere, 1998; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005). Other important
factors include young age at time of offense, number of prior offenses, single
marital status, failure in treatment, a preoccupation with sexual fantasy and poor
interpersonal relationships (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005).
Dynamic risk factors are extremely important to assess because they are
changeable over time. Static factors (such as age at time of offense and number
of prior offenses), while easier to assess empirically, do not change from month
to month or day to day. Therefore, monitoring them does not yield any helpful
information in assessing current risk for re-offending (Harris, 2006). There are
empirically-derived questions that can be used. Systems—such as the STABLE
2000 and the ACUTE 2000, which are used for evaluating changes in dynamic
risk factors (Craig, Browne, & Beech, 2008)—can be assessed via a structured
dynamic interview by a well-trained practitioner (Cauley, 2007; Harris, 2006).
Stable dynamic risk factors may change over time, usually months or
years (Harris, 2006). Key dimensions are significant negative social influences;
intimacy deficit feelings of rejection or loneliness; attitudes supportive of sexual
assault or of hostility towards women; lack of cooperation with supervision; poor
regulation of deviant sexual interests and general self-regulation, such as
managing impulsive behaviors (Craig, Browne, & Beech, 2008; Hanson, Harris,
Scott & Helmus, 2007).
Acute dynamic risk factors may change over more limited periods of time,
such as weeks, days or hours (Harris, 2006). Key dimensions include sexual
interests/ frequency of sexual fantasies; cooperation with treatment; clinical
symptoms such as negative mood and substance use; and contextual factors
such as isolation, unemployment, poor social influences, low levels of social
support, relationship problems and access to potential victims (Craig et al.,
2008).
Hanson and Harris (2000) reported an increase in acute dynamic factors
offenders in the month prior to a sexual re-offense, specifically:

15

•

An increase in negative mood or anger

•

A decrease in physical appearance

•

A decrease in compliance with supervision.

Hanson and Harris (2000) also cite an emotional crisis; a collapse of
previous social supports; contextual factors such as hostility, substance abuse,
and sexual preoccupations; and a unique trigger for the offending behavior such
as a date or anniversary, health problem or homelessness. Both stable and
acute dynamic factors have been found to be reliable predictors of sexual
recidivism (Hanson, 2005), although they are most accurately used in a
predictive capacity when combined with static factors (Hanson, et al., 2007).
b.

Homelessness, a dynamic risk factor, destabilizes the sex offender
and increases the risk of committing another sex crime.

Levenson and Cotter (2005) surveyed sex offenders in Florida under 1000
foot residency restrictions and found that most sex offenders felt that decreased
stability and increased financial hardship were the result of not being able to live
with or near family members. Most felt an increased risk of re-offending due to
the resultant isolation. Burchfield and Mingus (2008) interviewed sex offenders
and found that sex offenders have limited housing options, and have difficulty
finding landlords who are willing to rent to a registered sex offender. Although
there is no known study that empirically examines the risk of homelessness on
sexual re-offense, Willis and Grace (2008) examined a group of released sex
offenders who had completed a 32-week prison-based treatment program
between 1990 and 2000, and were convicted of a sexual re-offense since
February 2001. In evaluating the sample of 81 ex-offenders, Willis and Grace
found that accommodation was a significant predictor of sexual recidivism, even
when controlling for dynamic risk factors such as anger and other deviant
thinking.
Despite the lack of large empirical studies, many researchers and policy
makers are of the strong opinion that lack of housing in a sex offender population
will lead to higher levels of risk and will decrease public safety. The United
Kingdom sees finding appropriate accommodations for registered sex offenders
to be a very high priority in reducing risk, and questions the helpfulness of putting
too many restrictions on sex offenders with the concern that it could “backfire and
encourage sex offenders to hide their activities. The potential for reduction or
withdrawal of restrictions on the other hand was seen as a motivator, enabling
the sex offender to demonstrate change and achieve targets” (Managing Sex
Offenders in the Community, 2005, p. 29).

16

Durling (2006) states: “Low income sex offenders face a severe housing
problem when they are released from prison because residency restrictions can
dramatically limit where an offender can live…and prevent offenders from living
in the areas closest to jobs and public transit” (p.334). Durling (2006) also states
that even though residency restrictions are meant to protect communities, they
may instead “banish” the sex offender, which may lead to higher levels of risk (p.
335).
Unstable housing has been linked with a lack of social support and with
difficulty finding employment, both dynamic risk factors for sexual re-offense
(Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005). Similarly, Levenson, Zgoba, and
Tewksbury (2007) argue that helping sex offenders locate stable housing will
increase not only their levels of social support but also their success at finding
lasting employment, thereby reducing their risk of re-offending. Residency
restrictions have the unintended consequence of increasing homelessness and
creating more transient sex offenders, “making them difficult to track and monitor”
(Levenson et al., 2007, p.4). Data from Iowa in 2006 is cited by Levenson and
her colleagues, stating that once residency restrictions were passed, the number
of registered sex offenders who could not be located doubled, putting the sex
offender registry validity and reliability in doubt, and raising community risk.
Additionally, the creators of the COMPAS, a risk assessment instrument
now being validated for the State of California, found that parolees who have a
high score on residential instability are at higher risk of recidivism (Brennan,
Dieterich, Ehret & Beate, 2007). Using the COMPAS Matrix-R, a secondary
assessment for parolees once they have been out on parole, Brennan et al.
found that California parolees with the highest levels of recidivism had higher
scores on residential instability and also had vocational and educational
problems.
c.

Housing helps the sex offender to stabilize, and reduces the risk of
re-offending.

Finding housing is a serious issue; in addition, helping returning offenders
find housing can be a way of keeping communities safe (Rodriguez & Brown,
2003). Housing options for returning prisoners who do not stay with family
members or friends are very limited (Clark, 2007; Returning Home, The Urban
Institute, 2008). There are few housing options in general, but options are
particularly limited for sex offenders who are unable to receive any federally
subsidized housing assistance such as special needs housing through HUD, or
to live in group situations, common re-entry housing plans for returning offenders
(Returning Home, 2008).
Financial challenges may push sex offenders into poorer neighborhoods.
Neighborhood characteristics can affect recidivism rates. Kubrin and Stewart
17

(2006) found that for 5,002 released offenders living in Oregon, living in a
disadvantaged neighborhood was a risk factor for recidivism, while living in a
resource rich neighborhood performed an important protective factor in reducing
re-offending.
“Stable housing is an essential component of safe reentry and is
a key to success” for high-risk sex offenders.
Aylward (2006) stated that in the State of Washington, “Stable housing is
an essential component of safe reentry and is a key to success” for high-risk sex
offenders (p. 77). Aylward also saw finding stable employment with an adequate
wage as a key to maintaining housing, and having a good relationship with a
significant other as a pro-social influence in keeping sex offenders from reoffending.
Other countries see re-entry and homelessness as a growing problem. An
Australian report issued by the Department of Family and Community Services
(2004) found that housing is a key factor that influences re-offending. In their
2004 report the Department of Family and Community Services reported many
specific housing recommendations to prevent ex-offenders from becoming
homeless, stating, “Research suggests that the availability of housing with
support post-release has a positive impact on successful reintegration” (p. 20).
The report also cites the lack of housing options for ex-offenders as a problem,
because surveys and a needs analysis of ex-offenders found that many
offenders attribute repeat offending to unemployment, homelessness, and lack of
family support upon release (Department of Family and Community Services,
Australian Government, 2004). The United Kingdom is concerned with creating
local strategies and protocols in providing housing for high-risk sex offenders,
which is seen as an important strategy to decrease community risk (Managing
Sex Offenders in the Community, 2005).
When examining research focused on offenders who are convicted of a
variety of criminal offenses, there have been many studies demonstrating that
homelessness and incarceration are factors that are intertwined. Individuals who
have been incarcerated tend to be homeless for longer than those who have not
been incarcerated (Phelan & Link, 1999). Metraux and Culhane (2004, 2006)
found that a significant portion (about one fourth) of individuals staying at a New
York City Shelter had been incarcerated at a New York State prison or New York
City Jail in the previous two years. Shelter stays among recently released
prisoners are more likely a transitional stage than a long-term pattern of
homelessness, and this transition may cause an increase in recidivism (Metraux
& Culhane, 2004). In a study by DeLisi (2000), jail inmates who came from one

18

year or more of chronic transiency were more violent and had longer criminal
histories than jail inmates who were domiciled in the year prior to arrest.
In numerous interviews with 25 repeat offenders ages 15 to 24, a lack of
stable housing and accommodation emerged as a key theme in their re-offending
behaviors (Halsey, 2007). Halsey found that the lack of stable housing increased
their stress levels, decreased the likelihood of a supportive family environment,
and decreased their likelihood of remaining out of prison. Roman and Travis
(2004) found that when prisoners have no place to go upon release they are
more likely to violate their parole conditions or to be rearrested. Meredith, Speir,
Johnson and Hull (2003) found that each time a parolee moved, his or her
likelihood of re-arrest increased by 25%. In California, Williams, McShane, and
Dolny (2000) found that having unstable living arrangements was the most
important factor in determining whether a large sample of parolees absconded
from supervision.
d.

Housing leads to stable employment and social support, which are
factors reducing the risk of re-offending.

Unstable employment or unemployment has been seen as an important
risk factor for all types of offenders reentering the community. Finding and
maintaining employment upon release from prison has been seen as a way of
reducing recidivism (Returning Home, The Urban Institute, 2008). Employment
and vocational programs both in and out of prison including job linkage and
placement services are classified as “what works” in corrections (Aos, Miller &
Drake, 2006; The Little Hoover Commission Report, 2003; MacKenzie &
Hickman, 1998). Tarlow and Nelson (2007) found that released offenders who
start work immediately upon leaving prison have lower recidivism rates.
Released offenders who were unable to find work, and who returned to
disadvantaged neighborhoods with low levels of social support and economic
problems, were more likely to be rearrested (McBride et al., 2005).
Visher (2007) of the Urban Institute states that finding employment is the
single largest concern reported by men and women before they are released
from prison. Over 75% of soon-to-be-released prisoners said that finding a job
would be an important factor in keeping them from returning to prison, and 88%
reported that they needed job training or more education (Visher, 2007).
Petersilia determined in her report on Governor Schwarzenegger’s Rehabilitation
Strike Team (2007) that employment causally contributes to successful reentry
outcomes, because it signals that an individual has embraced a pro-social
lifestyle, has money, makes positive social connections, and has social controls
that prevent criminal behavior. She estimates that between 60% and 80% of
parolees are unemployed one year after release from parole. Petersilia (2007)
cites the California Legislative Analyst’s 2007 report as stating that parolees who

19

have stable housing and who find and maintain a steady job are more likely to
avoid re-offense and to successfully complete their parole.
Social stability and support is also seen as an important factor in
reintegrating into society and enhancing public safety (Petersilia, 2003). The
Urban Institute’s Returning Home Project cited family support as the most
important factor in ex-offenders keeping out of prison (McBride, Visher, &
LaVigne, 2005). Since most returning prisoners live with a family member, close
friend, or significant other, it is a major problem if the offender is unable to live
with these supportive individuals due to some conflict or legal restriction (Roman
& Travis, 2004).
In summary, sex offenders are more likely to be faced with legal
restrictions, preventing them from returning to social supports and homes due to
current residency restriction laws in many states, including California.
Homelessness, unemployment, and lack of social support may end up being
factors facing many sex offenders, both those who are re-entering California
communities and those who are continuing registered sex offenders. These
factors increase dynamic risk and therefore may increase re-offending behaviors.

20

Part III.

THE RESPONSE TO HOMELESSNESS AMONG SEX OFFENDERS
REQUIRES A CREATIVE AND COLLABORATIVE EFFORT TO
CREATE STABLE AND SUITABLE HOUSING.
a. Efforts to reduce homelessness among sex offenders have led to
innovative approaches to housing.

States such as Washington and Colorado have employed innovative
housing methods such as (1) shared living arrangements, (2) secure community
transition facilities, (3) mobile trailers as transition housing and (4) the leased unit
model. Sex offender housing is also provided by private landlords in a special
agreement with parole authorities in Washington State.
Of these innovative housing methods, only the shared living arrangement
has been studied to determine its effects on the level of violations by paroled sex
offenders. Based on a 2004 study, Colorado has determined that high-risk sex
offenders living in shared living arrangements had significantly fewer violations
than those in other living arrangements (living alone or with family or friends).
i.

Shared Living Arrangements

Shared Living Arrangements (“SLA”) are based on the Therapeutic
Community Treatment modality (Colorado Dept. of Public Safety, 2004).
Therapeutic Community Treatment differs from other treatment approaches
principally in its use of a community, comprising of the treatment staff and the
recipients of the treatment, as key agents of change. In other words, peer
influence is used to help participants learn and assimilate social norms which
include not re-offending sexually.
SLA is used exclusively by Colorado. SLA consists of two or three sex
offenders living together. They rent or own the house. The offenders are
financially responsible for the housing. The treatment provider incurs no housing
costs.
The location of the residence must be approved by the supervising officer
and the treatment provider. The supervising officer ensures that the residence is
not located within sight of a “school, playground, or next-door to a residence that
has ‘child-type’ items (for example, a swing set).”
The residents hold each other accountable for their actions. They also
have a responsibility to report certain high risk behavior such as returning home
late or having contact with children. There are no treatment providers or
supervising officers living on the premises. Instead, both the treatment provider
and supervising officer conduct frequent site checks.

21

A study of SLA revealed that:
•
•
•
•

SLA was occupied by higher risk offenders than those not living in SLA.
Those living in SLA had fewer violations (reoffended or technical) than
those living alone or with family or friends
Those living in SLA who violated their conditions of parole were caught
more quickly than those living alone or with family or friends (because the
roommates reported the violations).
Proximity of sex offender residency to where children regularly congregate
had no impact on recidivism.
Based on the study, the Colorado Sex Offender Management Board found

that:
•
•
•

SLA functions as an effective containment modality for high risk sex
offenders.
Policies restricting a sex offender from living with another sex offender did
not enhance community safety.
Restrictions prohibiting sex offenders from residing near where children
regularly congregate did not enhance community safety.
ii.

Secure Community Transition Facility for sexually violent
predators

A "secure community transition facility" (“SCTF”) is the Washington State
statutory name for a less restrictive alternative residential facility program
operated or contracted by the Department of Social and Health Services. A “less
restrictive alternative” placement is defined in the state law as a living
arrangement that is less restrictive than total confinement.
The SCTF has on-site supervision and lock-down security. It also provides
or ensures the provision of sex offender treatment services. The program offers
24-hour intensive staffing and line-of-sight supervision by trained escorts when
residents leave the facility.
SCTF houses only court-approved, civilly committed sexually violent
predators. The offender must first complete his prison term and then successfully
complete a rigorous treatment program at the Washington State MacNeil Island’s
Special Commitment Center. Only a civil court can decide whether to transfer the
offender from the confinement of the Special Commitment Center to the less
restrictive SCTF.
At the SCTF, the resident will continue with treatment and will learn how to
reintegrate into society. The residents attend weekly individual and group therapy
sessions. The focus of the sessions is to teach and reinforce positive behavior.
22

Residents are required to maintain a journal and share the journal with their
treatment providers.
Residents may leave the SCTF for trips. However, a community
corrections officer must first determine that the destination is safe before
approving the trip. The resident may then leave the SCTF in the company of a
trained escort.
To date, no study has been completed to show the effects of this housing
arrangement on reducing re-offending and on increasing community safety. Of
significance, SCTF serves a very small community – sexually violent predators
transferred by a court. For example, the SCTF in the SODO neighborhood of
Seattle is equipped for only six residents.
iii.

Mobile trailers as transition housing

Officials in Suffolk County, New York are experimenting with mobile
trailers as transitional housing for sex offenders (Suffolk County, 2007). Each
trailer houses eight sex offenders. The trailers are parked on county lands away
from residential areas. Under county law, the trailers cannot be placed within
1,000 feet of schools, churches, daycare centers or nursing homes. A curfew is
imposed on the residents from 8 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.
These trailers are moved from one part of the county to another part every
one to three weeks. The continuous movement “avoids having to burden any
single neighborhood with a permanent shelter for [sex offenders]” (Suffolk
County, 2007). The movement also prevents too many sex offenders from
settling into the same area. By constantly moving the trailers, the county
distributes the offenders throughout the county.
The trailers are not intended as permanent residences. Instead, they
serve as transition housing for those sex offenders who have yet to find
permanent housing. To motivate sex offenders to find housing, the trailers have
minimum comforts.
During the daytime, a van transports the sex offenders to work or to
agencies providing referrals for permanent housing and other services. The
operating cost is approximately $85 per person per night.
To date, no study has been completed to show the effects of this housing
arrangement on reducing re-offending and on increasing community safety. The
literature suggests that its primary purpose is to reduce fear in the community
and not to reduce recidivism.

23

iv.

Leased Unit Model

In 2004, the Partnership of Community Safety in Washington State
recommended a pilot project called the “Leased Unit Model” (Restricted
Transition Housing, no date). The key concept of a Leased Unit Model (LUM) is
that the government enters into a contract with private landlords to lease to sex
offenders. The housing provided in the recommended model is structured with
supervision by corrections officers; participation in treatment by the offenders;
assistance for the offender to find employment, permanent housing and a
supportive social network; and coordination with local law enforcement. The
participant is expected to pay $400 for monthly rent and program costs. The
remainder of the rent is subsidized by the state.
As of this report, it is unknown if the LUM has been adopted by
Washington State. As such, its impact on recidivism and on community safety is
unknown.
v.

Private landlords with informal agreements with the
government

In Washington State, approximately one dozen landlords have agreed to
house sex offenders (Homes, 2003.) The landlords feel safe since corrections
officers are constantly visiting the premises. Washington officials believe that
housing sex offenders together increases community safety because “They can
pick up on signs and behavior” and “are the first ones to tell on each other” (pg.
11). The state does not compensate the landlords. Instead, the offenders pay the
entire rent.
As an example of private landlords providing housing to sex offenders,
Linda A. Wolfe-Dawidjan owns and manages the New Washington Apartments.
She rents to 39 sex offenders and 15 other tenants with criminal backgrounds.
Because of her reputation, she has a waiting list of sex offenders desiring to live
at her apartment. Four of her tenants work as her office managers in exchange
for rent. She describes her tenants as timely with rent, quiet in demeanor and
stable as renters.
vi.

Funding for construction of homes for the homeless

Funding to build new homes for the homeless can come from the
community. In Minnesota, the McKnight and Blandin Foundations provided $32.5
million to help construct 3,000 units of affordable housing for the homeless (Safe
Homes, 2001).

24

b. The solution to the problem of housing sex offenders begins with
examining and developing a state-wide housing policy.
States are beginning to look at their policies regarding the housing of sex
offenders. From 2000 until 2004, a Washington State multidisciplinary group
entitled “The Partnership for Community Safety” met to identify the barriers and
solutions to housing high risk sex offenders. This partnership was composed of
the Washington State Department of Corrections, the Washington Coalition of
Sexual Assault Programs, the Washington Association of Sheriffs and police
Chiefs, state legislators, victim advocacy organizations and others.
On March 19, 2007, Governor Schwarzenegger hosted the “California
Summit for Safe Communities.” The summit was “a gathering of state and local
stakeholders to discuss the challenges that communities face regarding the
release and placement of high risk sex offenders and sexually violent predators”
(California Summit). The report from the summit may be found at
www.casomb.org/docs/SUMMIT%20FINAL%20REPORT.pdf. During the
brainstorming session, the participants were asked to identify both gaps and
solutions related to the housing of HRSOs and SVPs. The result of the summit
was an extensive list of suggestions on how to provide housing to sex offenders
while maintaining community safety.
One of the gaps identified was “finding appropriate housing” (p. 39). The
commonality among the many suggested solutions is the need for a collaborative
partnership between each level of government (state, county and city), between
government and private businesses (landlords, treatment facilities), and between
government and the public. One focus was to improve communication between
the partners.
Some of the suggestions are to:
(1) “meet and confer (six months prior to anticipated release) between
state and local agency,” (pg. 39)
(2) “educate the community about housing and plan proactively,” (pg. 40)
and
(3) “create private-public partnerships to include city and county input on
location” (pg. 39).
Another focus was to provide sex offenders with transitional housing.
Some of the suggestions related to transitional housing are to:
(1) “review [the] halfway house model of the 1970’s and 1980’s and
connect them to day reporting programs,” (pg. 39)
(2) change the “transitional housing setting to include work furlough
program,” (pg. 40) and
25

(3) “establish licensed board and care/group home facilities that provide
24 hour supervision, treatment and vocational training” (pg. 39).
The suggested solutions also focus on providing incentives to local
governments and private entities to participate in housing sex offenders. “Liability
protection for private landlords and possible incentives such as tax break,”
“incentives for local government to develop long term/short term housing for sex
offenders,” and “state mandate coupled with state funding for housing in each
county” were suggested (pg. 39).

26

Part IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The substantial rise in numbers of transient sex offenders cannot be
ignored. Among paroled sex offenders and all registered sex offenders, the
number of sex offenders registering as transient has significantly increased.
Though it is difficult to predict whether the current increase will continue,
the factors affecting the number of sex offenders registering as transient can be
identified:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The number of landlords willing to rent to sex offenders
Enactment of more local ordinances restricting residency
High media coverage of sex crimes
Passage of more state statutes restricting residency
Lack of funding for low-income housing open to sex offenders
Low availability of stable employment
Mobilization of neighborhoods to exclude sex offenders

(For a list of additional factors that may affect the number of sex
offenders registering as transient, see Appendix C.)
Based on its examination of the available evidence, the Board makes the
following findings:
•

•

The evidence shows an unmistakable correlation between the
implementation of residency restrictions and the increase in
homelessness among sex offenders.
o The number of sex offenders registering as transient has
increased 60% among all registered sex offenders since the
implementation of Proposition 83.
o The combined effects of federal, state and local residency
restriction, and neighborhoods mobilizing to exclude sex
offenders, have severely limited the housing options for sex
offenders.
The evidence shows that homelessness increases the risk that a
sex offender may re-offend.
o Lack of stability is a primary contributing factor to an
increased risk of re-offending. Residential instability leads to
unstable employment and lower levels of social support.
Unstable employment and low levels of social support lead
to emotional and mental instability. Emotional and mental
instability breaks down the ability to conform and leads to a
greater risk of committing another sex crime.
o Stable housing fosters stable employment and social
support. Stable employment and social support lead to
27

•

emotional and mental stability and a reduced risk that the
sex offender will commit another sex crime.
Partnerships between different levels of governments and between
government and the public to make stable and appropriate housing
available to sex offenders provide the strongest hope for reducing
the transient sex offender population and the associated risk of
future sexual victimization.
o As identified during the 2007 California Summit for Safe
Communities, improved communications between partners,
incentives for local governments and private parties, and
innovative thinking on creating stable housing for sex
offenders are necessary for an effective housing policy.

Partnerships between different levels of governments and
between government and the public to make stable and
appropriate housing available to sex offenders provide the
strongest hope for reducing the transient sex offender
population and the associated risk of future sexual victimization.
the public to make stable and appropriate housing available to
sex offenders provide the strongest hope for reducing the
transient sex offender population and the associated risk of
future sexual victimization.

28

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32

APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA TRANSIENT SEX
OFFENDER DISTRIBUTION BY COUNTY
Prepared by the California Coalition on Sex
Offending
June 2008

COUNTY
ALAMEDA
ALPINE

SEX REGISTRANTS IN THE
COMMUNITY

REGISTERED TRANSIENTS

2,453

147

1

0

AMADOR

70

1

BUTTE

697

33

CALAVERAS

88

0

52

1

1,362

97

151

0

COLUSA
CONTRA
COSTA
DEL NORTE
EL DORADO

335

8

2,338

31

GLENN

70

3

HUMBOLDT

454

38

IMPERIAL

221

3

INYO

50

3

KERN

2,128

50

KINGS

353

1

LAKE

269

0

LASSEN

81

0

15,249

620

MADERA

378

4

MARIN

151

0

MARIPOSA

63

1

MENDOCINO

265

24

MERCED

703

30

MODOC

41

0

MONO

12

1

MONTEREY

692

36

NAPA

189

12

FRESNO

LOS ANGELES

NEVADA

167

8

ORANGE

2,878

177

PLACER

558

19
33

PLUMAS

42

2

RIVERSIDE

3,159

127

SACRAMENTO

5,173

164

103

2

3,787

166

SAN DIEGO
SAN
FRANCISCO

3,941

354

1,144

193

SAN JOAQUIN
SAN LUIS
OBISPO

1,775

59

461

55

779

57

715

64

SANTA CLARA

3,475

261

SANTA CRUZ

408

36

SHASTA

777

25

SIERRA

8

0

SISKIYOU

185

6

SOLANO

863

62

SAN BENITO
SAN
BERNARDINO

SAN MATEO
SANTA
BARBARA

SONOMA

803

56

1,280

59

SUTTER

225

2

TEHAMA

275

6

STANISLAUS

TRINITY

64

0

TULARE

1,009

22

167

5

1,110

70

YOLO

404

22

YUBA

281

6

Totals

64,932

3,229

TUOLUMNE
VENTURA

34

Chula Vista
El Centro
El Monte
Folsom
Galt
Grover
Beach
Hesperia
La Mesa
Long Beach
Loomis
National
City
Palmdale

Riverside
Los
Angeles
San Diego
Imperial
Los
Angeles
Sacramento
Sacramento
San Luis
Obispo
San
Bernardino
San Diego
Los
Angeles
Placer
San Diego

Porterville
San Diego

Los
Angeles
San Luis
Obispo
El Dorado
Los
Angeles
Tulare
San Diego

San Marcos
Santa Ana
Santee
Shafter

San Diego
Orange
San Diego
Kern

South Lake
Tahoe

El Dorado

Paso
Robles
Placerville
Pomona

Y

Y

Being Locally Enfoced by Local
Jurisdiction
No

500 ft.

No

1

NONE
300 ft.
300 ft.

Y
Y
Y

NONE
NONE
1000
ft.
4000
ft.
NONE
2000
ft.
NONE
NONE

300 ft.
300 ft.
NONE

Y
Y
Y

3000
ft.
1320
ft.
NONE
s
NONE
2000
ft.
300 ft.
NONE
NONE
2000
ft.
2000
ft.

Other

No

Y
500 ft.

Multi-family Dwelling

Single Family Dwelling

From Another Sex Offender

Children’s Facility

Y

Church or Place of Worship

Y

Skate Park

Library or Museum

300 ft.

Sports Facility

2000
ft.
NONE

Play Ground or Park

Y

Swimming Pool

500 ft.

Child/ Day Care

NONE

Bus Stop

School for Children

San
Bernardino

Loitering or Being

CITY
Apple
Valley
Baldwin
Park
Canyon
Lake
Cerritos

Residence

In which County

Type of
Restriction

Arcade or Amusement Center

APPENDIX B: LOCAL ORDINANCES REGULATING RESIDENCE AND
PRESENCE OF SEX OFFENDERS
AS OF OCTOBER, 2008
Prepared by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

No
No
No
No

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

No
No
No

500 ft.

No

300 ft.
300 ft.

Y
2
Y

300 ft.
300 ft.

Y

300 ft.

Y

NONE

Y

300 ft.

Y

300 ft.
300 ft.

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

300 ft.
300 ft.
300 ft.
300 ft.

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

300 ft.

Y

Y

Y

3

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y*

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

4

Y
Y

Y

Y

No
No

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

No
No
Y

Y

Y
Y

No
No
No
No

Y
Y
Y

Y

35

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

No
No

Y
Y

Y

Y

No
No
No
No
No

Y

No

NONE

1000
ft.
300 ft.

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

No

Being Locally Enfoced

Y

Other

Y

Multi-family Dwelling

Y

Single Family Dwelling

Arcade or Amusement Center

Y

From Another Sex Offender

Sports Facility

Y

Children’s Facility

Play Ground or Park

School for Children
Y

Church or Place of Worship

Swimming Pool

Loitering or Being
300 ft.

Skate Park

Child/ Day Care

Residence

In which County

None

Library or Museum

Bus Stop
Y

Type of
Restriction

CITY
Stockton
Suisun City

San
Joaquin
Solano

Taft

Kern

Victorville

San
Bernardino
Kern

Wasco
Weed
West
Covina
Fresno
County
Kern
County
Sacramento
County
San
Bernardino
County *
San Diego
County

Siskiyou
Los
Angeles

2000
ft.
2000
ft.
2000
ft.
NONE
2000
ft.
3000
ft.
2000
ft.
NONE
2640/
2000

Y

No

300 ft.

No

300 ft.

Y

Y

Y

300 ft.
300 ft.

Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

No
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Yes

Y

Y

Y

No

Y

300 ft.

Y

300 ft

Y

300 ft.

Y

Y

No
No

No

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

1

K-8
K-12
1
School bus stop
1
K-1
Y = YES
1

36

Y

Y

No
No

Y

No

APPENDIX C: RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Even though it is not possible to predict future turns of events, it would be remiss not to
not at least take note of a number of factors which could have an impact on the situation
related to sex offender residence restrictions and their consequences. It should not be
assumed that the following list is exhaustive, nor that the descriptions apply equally to
every area of the state: opinions differ considerably about some of the issues noted.
• The California Supreme Court appears likely to hear a case in the Fall of 2008
which centers on residence restrictions. The court could view the matter broadly
and render a decision which could range from overturning the entire set of
restrictions on constitutional grounds to declaring that no elements of the law
violate constitutional rights. Observers, however, anticipate a more narrowly
focused ruling that addresses only the specific situations of the petitioners.
Depending upon the decision, appeals or other court challenges could follow.
• County authorities and county probation departments may move forward with
decisions about whether and how to interpret and enforce residence restrictions
as they apply to individuals on probation. Since there is approximately the same
number of sex offenders on county probation as there is on state parole, the
number of affected sex offenders could approximately double if counties decide
to take an approach similar to that taken by state parole officials. Counties
appear to vary, at present, with regard to their interpretation and application of
the law and some appear to be waiting for legal clarification.
• Law enforcement agencies may clarify their policies and strategies with respect
to enforcement of the residence restrictions as they apply to sex offenders who
are no longer on parole or probation. At this time there does not appear to be
uniformity around the state in the way this population is responded to. Since the
restrictions are not being viewed as retroactive, they will only be applied to those
who are completing their parole term and, possibly, those completing probation.
This population is relatively small at present but will only continue to grow.
• CDCR’s Division of Adult Parole Operations may modify the level of assistance
they are able to provide--both financial assistance and assistance in locating
suitable housing—to paroled sex offenders who are at risk of being homeless.
Such assistance may increase or may decrease and so may result in either more
or fewer transient sex offenders.
• Local jurisdictions appear likely to continue to enact their own residence
restrictions, in many cases imposing even more stringent requirements which will
reduce even further the current pool of potential housing options.
• The number of parolees and—depending on county decisions as noted
previously—probationers who are technically “subject to” housing restrictions can
be expected to continue to increase as new offenders are released from prison or
jail, or move through the court system. Since the residence restrictions will apply
for the duration of the offender’s life, the numbers will continue to swell for many
years until all registered sex offenders are covered under the restrictions.
• The amount of housing actually available to sex offenders will continue to shrink
as the limited supply of legal available units is absorbed through being occupied
37

•

by “new” sex offenders emerging from prison or jail or—again depending on local
interpretation—placed on local probation supervision.
Legislation which would allow landlords to freely exercise their own discretion in
refusing to rent to anyone listed as a registered sex offender may be
reintroduced and could become law. The impact on the pool of housing
realistically available to sex offenders could only be expected to be reduced by
such a policy. (Currently the information on the Megan’s Law website may not be
used to discriminate against registrants.)

38