UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION

BETTY LOU HESTON, individually and
ROBERT H. HESTON, individually as
the personal representatives of ROBERT C.
HESTON, deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
CITY OF SALINAS and SALINAS
POLICE DEPARTMENT, SALINAS
POLICE CHIEF DANIEL ORTEGA,
TASERINTERNATIONAL, INC., and
DOES 1 to 10,
Defendants.

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Case No.: C05-03658JW
[James Ward, United States District
Judge]
Expert Report

John G. Peters, Jr., M.B.A., Ph.D., CLS
John G. Peters, Jr. & Associates
1550 West Horizon Ridge Parkway
Suite A, #337
Henderson, Nevada 89012
Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2), I, John G. Peters, Jr., hereby submit my report that
contains a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the bases and reasons
therefore; the data and other information I considered in forming the opinions; the
exhibits or list of references I used as a summary of or support for the opinions; my
qualifications, including a list of all publications authored within the preceding ten years;
the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases
in which I have testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.

Signed:
Date:

,.Jo{~
0.re ~ j f-.
JohnG.Peters,Jr.,Ph.D.,M.tA., cci

Ph ,u

December 1, 2006

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ABSTRACT
At approximately 1:39 p.m. on Saturday, February 19, 2005, Salinas (CA) Police
Department (SPD) police officers were dispatched to 139 Rodeo Drive, Salinas, CA
regarding a domestic dispute involving Robert C. Heston, age 40, and his father, Robert
H. Heston, age 66. The elder Mr. Heston wanted his son to leave the residence, but told
the six responding officers that his son lived there. The officers observed the younger
Mr. Heston acting strangely, but he was not making any threatening statements or
committing crimes. Mr. Robert H. Heston told the officers that his son had thrown some
furniture, but did not break anything, had not struck anyone, and that he felt safe. The
officers also learned his son was on parole, but attempts to contact his son’s parole officer
failed. The scene sergeant advised the elder Mr. Heston there was nothing the police
could do, and the officers left the property.
At approximately 2:20 p.m. the officers were again dispatched to 139 Rodeo
Drive for crimes in progress. Upon arrival at the address, officers observed the younger
Mr. Heston throwing items through the front door of the residence. Mr. Robert C. Heston
violently resisted the officers taking him into custody after he was placed under lawful
arrest, and at one point in time, threw a piece of wood at an officer, striking him in the
chest area. Fearing for their safety and the safety of others, the officers deployed their
departmentally-issued TASER® electronic control devices (ECDs or devices) in efforts
to capture Mr. Robert C. Heston, so he could then be controlled and restrained. The
initial deployments of the TASER ECDs appeared to not affect Mr. Robert C. Heston.
Officers observed him pulling the ECD probes from his chest area, neutralizing the
effects of the TASER ECDs.
Eventually, the officers were able to get Mr. Robert C. Heston onto the floor of
the residence, even though he continued to forcefully and violently struggle. Shortly
after getting him handcuffed, the officers noticed that he had stopped breathing.
Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was immediately begun by the officers, until
paramedics arrived and transported him to Natividad Medical Center for emergency
medical care.
At 7:46 p.m. on Sunday, February 20, 2005, he was pronounced dead. A
subsequent autopsy and two post-mortem case reviews were conducted, resulting in the
following findings as causes of death: multiple organ failure due to cardiac arrest, due to
agitated state, due to methamphetamine intoxication, plus left ventricular hypertrophy
and dilation, TASER application and struggle with police. This legal action is an
outgrowth from the death of Mr. Robert C. Heston.

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EXHIBITS
The exhibits or list of references used as a summary of or support for the opinions in this
report specifically include each illustration, graphic, chart, video in this report, referenced
in this report, or included in any of the references to this report, as well as any
documents, or portions thereof, referenced or cited, or any compilation of documents, are
to be considered exhibits to this report and may be utilized as exhibits at deposition
and/or trial. These exhibits specifically include, but are not limited to: any document,
information, illustration, PowerPoint, lesson plan, drawing, graphic, video, compilation,
etc., that is on, or included in, any of the TASER International, Inc. (TASER) training
CDs/DVDs (versions 1 through the current release – which is presently version 13), as
well as the TASER Research Compendium, the Sudden In-Custody Death Research
Compendium, TASER ECD Field Data and Risk Benefit PowerPoints and Analyses, the
TASER website (including updates and additions), etc. Exhibits also include an
ADVANCED TASER M26, TASER Cartridges, TASER probes, a Van de Graff
generator, eight (8) AA cells, TASER Cartridge wire, a stack of 25,000 and 100,000
sheets of paper, vehicle battery jumper cables, and 110 V AC electrical cords/cables.
Exhibits also include any information on the Institute for the Prevention of In-Custody
Death website (www.ipicd.com), sudden and in-custody death videos, statistical
comparisons and analogies, etc.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1.

Summons and Complaint For Damages, September 2, 2005;

2.

Declaration of Robert Henry Heston RE Commencement of Action by
Successor in Interest (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.32), August 5, 2005;

3.

Plaintiffs’ Certification of Interested Entities or Persons, September 9,
2005;

4.

Answer of Defendant TASER International, Inc. to Plaintiffs’ First
Amended Complaint; Demand for Jury Trial, July 7, 2006;

5.

Answer of City of Salinas, Salinas Police Department, Salinas Police
Chief Daniel Ortega, Michael Dominici, Craig Fairbanks, James
Goodwin, Lek Livingston, Valentin Paredez, Juan Ruiz, and Tim
Simpson to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, July 21, 2006;

6.

Defendant TASER International, Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories
Propounded to Plaintiffs (Set No. One) [Betty Lou Heston], August 16,
2006;

7.

Defendant TASER International, Inc.’s First Set of Interrogatories
Propounded to Plaintiffs’ (Set No. One) [Robert H. Heston], August 16,
2006;

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8.

Defendant TASER International, Inc.’s Request for Production of
Documents and Things to Plaintiff (Set No. One) [Betty Lou Heston],
August 16, 2006;

9.

Defendant TASER International, Inc.’s Request for Production of
Documents and Things to Plaintiff (Set No. One) [Robert H. Heston],
August 16, 2006;

10.

First Set of Interrogatories By Plaintiff Robert Heston to Defendant
TASER International, Inc. August 21, 2006;

11.

First Set of Requests for Production of Documents by Plaintiff Robert
Heston to Defendant TASER International, Inc. August 21, 2006;

12.

Radio Traffic 911 Calls: 1st Call, Audio Tracks, 1-79;

13.

Radio Traffic 911 Calls: 2nd Call: Audio Tracks, 1-76;

14.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Chris Swinscoe, February
20, 2005;

15.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Masahiro Yoneda,
February 20, 2005;

16.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Todd Swiscoe, February
20, 2005;

17.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Neil Herrier, February 20,
2005;

18.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Chris Rodolfo Roman,
February 20, 2005;

19.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Michael Cupak, February
20, 2005;

20.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Tim Simpson, February
20, 2005;

21.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Jeffrey Alford, February
20, 2005;

22.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Michael Rivera, February
21, 2005;

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23.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Neil Herrier, February 21,
2005;

24.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Kenneth Schwener,
February 22, 2005;

25.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Chris Stark, February 22,
2005;

26.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Henry Gomez, February
23, 2005;

27.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Henry Gomez, February
24, 2005;

28.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Todd Swincoe, February
26, 2005;

29.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: C. Cornelison, March 2,
2005;

30.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Chris Lane, March 3,
2005;

31.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Neil Herrier, March 3,
2005;

32.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: C. Cornelison, March 4,
2005;

33.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Michael Groves, April 9,
2005;

34.

City of Salinas Police Department, Police Report: Dana C. Cornelison,
April 26, 2005;

35.

Robert C. Heston Criminal History, April 28, 2005;

36.

D. Flippo’s Investigation Report, November 21, 2005;

37.

MCT Message Traffic (12 documents), February 19, 2005;

38.

Memo to Wayne Schapper from Diana Kelley, Request for MCT Message
Traffic, February 23, 2005;

39.

391 Photos: Autopsy & Damage to Heston Home;

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40.

American Medical Response Service, Report: Robert C. Heston, February
19, 2005;

41.

Monterey Emergency Medical Services, Form, February 19, 2005;

42.

Department of Justice, Bureau of Forensic Services, Toxicology Report:
Robert Heston, May 13, 2005;

43.

John R. Hain, M.D., Monterey County Sheriff-Coroner Case Review and
Opinion: Robert Heston, Jr., July 27, 2005;

44.

Monterey County Sheriff’ Coroner, Office of the Coroner, Coroner’s
Report: Robert Clark Heston, Jr., August 12, 2005;

45.

EMT Kevin Crane, Care Record: Robert Heston, February 19, 2005;

46.

Central Valley Toxicology, Inc., Toxicology Results: Robert Heston, Jr.,
February 28, 2005;

47.

Terri L. Haddix, M.D., Monterey County Sheriff-Coroner Postmorten
Examination: Robert Heston, Jr., July 12, 2005;

48.

Steven B. Karch, M.D., Post-Mortem Review Letter to Cmdr. Greg Clark:
Robert Heston, Jr., August 8, 2005;

49.

TASER downloads for Officers Ruiz, Fiarbanks, Dominici, Livingston, and
Godwin;

50.

Letter to Sgt. Mike Groves from Mark Johnson of TASER International, Inc.,
Analysis of TASER M26 Data Download;

51.

Officer T. Swinscoe, Diagram of Inside of 139 Rodeo Drive, Salinas, CA,
February 19, 2005;

52.

Dispatch record, 139 Rodeo Drive @13:33:38 hours, February 19, 2005;

53.

Dispatch record, 139 Rodeo Drive @14:19:53 hours, February 19, 2005;

54.

Salinas Police Department, Crime Scene Investigation Log: N. Herrier,
February 19, 2005;

55.

Officer Rivera, Salinas Police Department, Property Record: Urine Samples
of Sgt. Dominici, Officers Livingston, Fairbanks, Ruiz, Paredez, and
Godwin, February 19, 2005;

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56.

Officer Rivera, Salinas Police Department, Property Record: TASERS, Sgt.
Dominici, Livingston, Fairbanks, Ruiz, and Godwin, February 19, 2005;

57.

Officer Schwe, Salinas Police Department Property Record, Crime Scene log,
February 19, 2006;

58.

Crime Scene Measurements by N. Herrier, February 19, 2005;

59.

Salinas Police Department, Crime Scene Investigator’s Log: N. Herrier,
February 22, 2005;

60.

Michael Groves, E-mail to TASER and others, In-custody Death in
Salinas, March 15, 2005;

61.

Salinas Police Department policy, 3.10 M26 Advanced TASER
Deployment, June 30, 2003;

62.

Salinas Police Department policy, 3.01 Use of Force, July 17, 2001;

63.

Dispatch call printouts, February 19, 2005;

64.

Salinas Police Department Property Record, Printout of two calls to CHP
Communications Center, February 23, 2005;

65.

Officer Gomez, Salinas Police Department Property Record, CD containing
MCT talk traffic for Monterey County users (2/19/05), February 23, 2005;

66.

Officer Criswe, Salinas Police Department Property Record, Cassette Tape
Interview with Kastner;

67.

Officer T. Swinscoe, Salinas Police Department Property Record, Brass
colored Grandfather clock; TASER probe; Long piece of wood; TASER
blast doors/TASER AFIDS; TASER wire; TASER cartridge and wire;
TASER probe; TASER probe; Protective mask; Blood sample from
suspect; Clothing from suspect; blue jeans; pair blue/grey tennis shoes;
TASER cartridges/probes/wires removed from suspect;

68.

D. Cornelison, Salinas Police Department Property Record, February 20,
2005;

69.

Officer Herrier, Salinas Police Department Property Records, February 22,
2005;

70.

M. Groves, Salinas Police Department Property Record, April 9, 2005;

71.

Certificate of No Records re: Betty Heston, July 17, 2006;

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72.

K. Schwerer, Salinas Police Department, Crime Scene Log Entry;

73.

Monterey County Sheriff-Coroner, Office of the Coroner Autopsy Report:
Robert Clark Heston, Jr., August 8, 2005;

74.

Deposition transcript of Kurt Kastner, June 1, 2006;

75.

Deposition transcript of Robert Heston, June 2, 2006;

76.

Deposition transcript of Robert Heston, July 24, 2006;

77.

Deposition transcript of Juan Alberto Ruiz, August 30, 2006;

78.

Deposition transcript of Clifford Satree, June 1, 2006;

79.

Deposition transcript of Misty Kastner, July 24, 2006;

80.

Deposition transcript of James Goodwin, August 30, 2006;

81.

Deposition transcript of Michael Groves, August 30, 2006;

82.

DVD, Interview of Clifford Satree;

83.

CD, Individual Salinas Police Officer Interviews;

84.

Natividad Medical Center, Interdisciplinary Patient Admission
Assessment: Robert Heston, February 19, 2005;

85.

Sasson, Physician’s Orders: Robert Heston, February 20, 2005; and,

86.

Sasson, Physician’s Orders—Seclusion or Restraint: Robert Heston,
February 19, 2005.

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SUMMARY OF FACTS
Evidence-based Personal History of Robert C. Heston
Historical evidence and information are critical ingredients to understanding the
behavior and physical collapse of Robert C. Heston on the afternoon of Saturday,
February 19, 2005 and his ultimate death on Sunday, February 20, 2005.
Mr. Heston’s Prior Criminal Record
Mr. Heston’s criminal record is extensive dating back to 1986 (City of Salinas
Police Department, Person Summary: Robert Clark Heston, 4.28.05). The
following table depicts his arrest and/or citation record.
Table 1 Robert Clark Heston Arrest and/or Citation History
Arrest and/or Citation
Date(s)
Under the influence of a controlled substance
2.7.93; 4.18.94; 6.27.96; 7.1.99;
4.1.00; 2.25.01
Driving under the influence
4.13.86; 4.1.00
Battery Vs custodial officer
7.1.99
Obstruct/resist Executive officer
7.1.99; 6.8.02
Drunk and disorderly
5.5.96; 1.25.98; 9.22.98
Resist/delay officer
8.30.03
Battery
9.9.95
Adw on peace officer
6.8.02
Harm peace officer dog/horse w/likely injury
6.8.02
Source: City of Salinas Police Department, Personal History: Robert Clark Heston, 4.28.05, pp. 1-3.

Table 1 does not include Mr. Heston’s aggravated battery of a police officer, great
bodily harm/dependent adult, resist or delay an officer, parole violations, and being
under the influence of a controlled substance on February 19, 2005, nor does it
include his prior field and other contacts with law enforcement officers. Overall, there
were 18 crime reports involving Mr. Heston, 37 arrest/citations, 6 field interviews,
and 2 crime vehicle listings (pp. 1-3). According to Monterey County District
Attorney, Dean Flippo, Mr. Heston was arrested at least 19 times since 1985 (Letter
to Chief Dan Ortega, November 21, 2005, p. 14).
Mr. Heston’s Prior Violent Incidents Involving Controlled Substances
April 18, 1994 Confrontation and Arrest
Mr. Robert C. Heston had an extensive history of being physically violent with
those around him, including family members, first responders, and others. Examples
include the April 18, 1994 confrontation with police officers and first responders,
when being under the influence of drugs, he irrationally thought first responders were
going to shoot him, and became physically violent. “Police had to physically restrain
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and handcuff Mr. Heston to get him on a gurney and to the hospital,” where he tested
positive for amphetamines (Letter to Chief Dan Ortega, November 21, 2005, p. 14).
June 27, 1996 Mr. Heston Arrest
On June 27, 1996, officers were called to a motel where Mr. Heston was
irrationally yelling and pounding on vehicles. When officers attempted to frisk him
for weapons, Mr. Heston became violent, wrestling with the officers, and becoming
combative. “Mr. Heston later admitted to snorting crank and drinking heavily”(Letter
to Chief Dan Ortega, November 21, 2005, p. 14).
July 1, 1999 Violent and Combative Behavior and Arrest
In yet another example of his violent and combative behavior, on July 1, 1999,
Mr. Heston tried to grab an officer’s pepper spray from his duty belt, and bit an
officer on the hand and on the bicep. It took four people to place Mr. Heston into
restraints. According to his father, Robert H. Heston, his son was “loaded on drugs”
(Letter to Chief Dan Ortega, November 21, 2005, p. 15; Robert H. Heston deposition,
30:6, 9, 22, 25; 31: 14, 21,; ).
Monterey District Attorney Flippo discussed 10 separate incidents involving Mr.
Heston where he was on drugs and/or alcohol. These incident summaries describe the
deviant and violent behaviors of Mr. Heston, whether it be breaking furniture or
fighting with first responders. Many of these incidents also describe one or more
behavioral cues demonstrated by Mr. Heston that are common in individuals who are
in an “excited delirium” state such as sweating profusely, engaging in physical
activity for long periods of time, running wildly, paranoia, superhuman strength,
insensitivity to pain, etc. (Peters, 2006).
Mr. Heston’s Prior Illegal Substance Use/Abuse – Starting 1993
As previously discussed, Mr. Robert C. Heston had prior arrests beginning in
1993 for being under the influence of controlled substances (Davidson, Coroner’s
Report: Robert Clark Heston, Jr., 8/12/05, p. 14).
Mr. Heston’s father testified that he recalled several incidents where his son was
acting bizarre and did damage to furniture, etc. while under the influence of drugs
(Robert H. Heston deposition, 30:9, 22: 33:14; 34:10; 39:5). In one instance, Robert
C. Heston struck his mother (39:5), giving her two black eyes (40:3) while being on
drugs. According to Mr. Robert H. Heston, he did not notice his son had a drug
problem while he was in his middle to late 20s (24:4, 7).
It is clear from reading the incident reports about Robert C. Heston’s bizarre and
violent behavior that he was engaged in chronic drug abuse from at least 1993 to the
time of his death. The medical literature surfaces that chronic drug abuse often alters
the human brain, which can lead to a state of excited delirium. Such chronic drug
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abuse can also cause one or more potentially fatal medical conditions (Peters, 2006;
DiMaio & DiMaio, 2006; Chan, 2006; Karch, 2002).
Mr. Heston’s Pre-existing Medical Condition
Mr. Heston’s autopsy revealed that he had an enlarged heart (left ventricular
hypertrophy with dilation) which in the absence of hypertension (high blood pressure)
probably represents the effect of chronic abuse of methamphetamine or similar drug
(Hain, Monterey County Sheriff-Coroner Case Review and Opinion, July 27,
2005, p.2). The medical literature also confirms that an enlarged heart can be the
result of chronic stimulant abuse, absent other factors, which can lead to sudden death
(DiMaio & DiMaio, 2006; Chan, 2006; Karch, 2002).
Another pre-existing condition of Mr. Heston is his having methamphetamine
onboard. Again, the medical and sudden death literature surfaces that
methamphetamine can cause cardiac arrest, leading to sudden death (Peters, 2006;
DiMaio, 2006; Chan, 2006; Karch, 2002). According to the toxicology report
regarding Mr. Heston, he had 0.64 mg/L of d-Methamphetamine and 0.06 mg/L of dAmphetamine, which levels are potentially toxic (Barbour and Posey, Central Valley
Toxicology, Inc.: Robert Heston, Jr., February 28, 2005, p. 1). The results show
Mr. Heston was over the “Potentially Toxic” area for the Blood Methamphetamine
Range (p.1).
A portion of Mr. Heston’s brain was subjected to a neurochemical analysis. The
analysis found “abnormal elevation of synaptic dopamine levels and a defect in the
uptake of dopamine (Haddix, July 12, 2005, p. 14). These findings are similar to
those in “victims of fatal agitated cocaine delirium” (p. 14).
911 Call for Officer Assistance: 13:33:38 Hours: February 19, 2005
At approximately 1:34 p.m. on Saturday, February 19, 2005, Salinas police
officers were dispatched to 134 Rodeo Drive, Salinas, CA for a father-son domestic
incident (Dispatch log, p.1; Masahiro, Police Report, p. 1). The two individuals
were Robert H. Heston (the father), age 66, and his son, Robert C. Heston, age 40.
According to dispatch records, this residence was “flagged”, requiring a minimum 3
police officer response (Radio log, p. 1). Officer Masahiro responded to the Heston
residence, and upon arrival met fellow Salinas Officer Paredez, and later Officer
Godwin (Masahiro, Police Report, p. 1). Officer Paredez stood in the doorway of the
Heston residence and engaged the son to exit the residence (p. 1). The son refused to
exit the residence, even though his father pleaded with him to leave (p. 1). Each time
an officer would attempt to convince the younger Mr. Heston to leave, he would
change the topic and not leave the residence (p. 1).
Approximately 20 minutes later, Salinas police Sergeant Dominici arrived at the
scene and spoke to the senior Mr. Heston about what had and was taking place at the
residence (Masahiro, Police Report, p. 2). The father told Sergeant Dominici that he
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wanted his son to leave the property (p. 2). Sergeant Dominici asked the father if his
son had broken anything, and the father replied that he had not broken anything, but
had removed a furnace filter (p. 2). Because the son had not broken anything,
Sergeant Dominici told the father the police could not force the son to leave the
premises (p. 2). The sergeant also advised the father regarding the process for
eviction, and also how to obtain a restraining order (Flippo, 2005, p. 2).
Prior to leaving, Salinas Officer Livingston ran a check on the son, and found he
was on CDC parole (p. 2). Although the officers tried to locate the son’s parole
officer, they could not make contact with him (p. 2). The officers left the residence
and the area (p. 2).
Officers Left 139 Rodeo Drive
A short time after advising the father that the police could not force his son to
leave the premises, another person who was now at the residence asked the police to
leave, as they were, in his opinion, causing the son to become more agitated
(Masahiro, Police Report, p.2). The person explained that he and the father thought
they could talk the son into leaving the residence, if the police would leave the area
(p. 3). The Salinas police officers then left the area (p. 3).
911 Call for Officer Assistance at 139 Rodeo Drive: 14:19:53 Hours: February
19, 2005
Approximately 2:19 p.m., a very short time after the officers had left the residence
they were again dispatched to the residence and told that an assault had taken place
(Masahiro, Police Report, p.3). Salinas Sergeant Dominici and Officer Fairbanks
were the first two officers to return to 139 Rodeo Drive (Flippo, 2005, p. 2). County
Communications advised officers that the father, Robert H. Heston, had been
assaulted by his son, and that his son was throwing items from the home (Masahiro,
Police Report, p.3; Heston photographs, #001-003). Sergeant Dominici requested
additional units respond to the premises “Code 3”, and that units with TASER ECDs
also respond (p. 3).
Mr. Heston’s Confrontation with Officers
Sergeant Dominici and Officer Fairbanks saw a different scene than the one they
had left a few minutes earlier, “with debris strewn all over the front yard, on the
sidewalk, and even across the street (Heston photographs, # 001-003; 032-037; 044050; 078-159; 172-189). Debris included a smashed grandfather clock on the front
lawn, picture frames, pictures, a cane, clothing, and pieces of shattered wood”
(Flippo, 2005, p. 2). It appeared to the officers that Robert C. Heston was completely
out of control, as he hurled items through the front door of the residence (p. 2). It
appeared that he had punched holes in the ceiling of the house (Heston photographs, #
067-076).

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Mr. Heston Battered Sergeant Dominici
To get a closer look at what was going on inside the residence, Sergeant Dominici
approached the front door. He could hear items being broken inside, and saw the
senior Mr. Heston on the living room floor, being dragged by the arm across the room
by his son (Flippo, 2005, p. 2). Fearing that the son might harm or kill the father,
Sergeant Dominici moved closer to the residence so he could deploy his TASER
ECD (p. 2). As he was positioning himself, the younger Mr. Heton threw a rod,
javelin-style, toward Sergeant Dominici, striking him in the chest area (p. 2; Heston
photographs, # 190-195). The bullet resistant vest stopped the rod from injuring the
officer, but the impact left a mark on Sergeant Dominici’s uniform shirt (p. 2; Heston
photographs, # 190-195).
ADVANCED TASER M26 ECD Deployment
Sergeant Dominici deployed his TASER ECD at Robert C. Heston from a
distance of 12 to 15 feet (Flippo, 2005, p. 2). Even though Sergeant Dominici
believed the TASER ECD probes made contact with Mr. Heston and administered a
shock to him, the rampaging son failed to go to the ground (p. 2). This surprised both
Sergeant Dominici and Officer Fairbanks (p. 2).
Officer Fairbanks deployed his TASER ECD and it appeared to have some effect
on Mr. Heston as he became somewhat rigid (Flippo, 2005, p. 3), but again he did not
go to the ground, and then it appeared that one of the two probes dislodged, no longer
making contact with the son’s body (p 3).
Sergeant Ruiz and Officer Livingston Arrived
Sergeant Ruiz and Officer Livingston arrived at the scene, and attempted to
engage the younger Mr. Heston (Flippo, 2005, p. 3). Attempting to engage Mr.
Heston in conversation, the younger Mr. Heston was initially non-responsive, but
then using a Frisbee motion, threw a heavy cylindrical weight from the grandfather
clock at Sergeant Ruiz, forcing him to evade the oncoming object or be struck with it
(p. 2). Sergeant Ruiz and Officer Livingston both fired their departmentally-issued
TASER ECDs at Mr. Heston, but again with very little, if any, effect (p. 3).
Officer Goodwin had arrived on the scene, and had drawn his TASER ECD
(Flippo, 2005, p. 3). Watching as Sergeant Ruiz attempted a second 5-second
TASER ECD application with no result (p. 3). Sergeant Ruiz’s TASER ECD
crackled, which is indicative that it had not made a good connection with the target,
or that a wire may have been broken. Seeing and hearing these events, Officer
Goodwin deployed his TASER ECD striking Mr. Heston (p. 3). Officer Livingston
also began a second 5-second TASER ECD application (p. 3).
The two TASER ECD applications finally had affected Mr. Heston, who reacted
by falling to the ground (p. 4). As he fell, Mr. Heston struck his head on an end table,
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and then rolled onto his stomach with both hands placed underneath his body (Flippo,
2005, p. 4). Ignoring the officers’ commands to show his hands, Mr. Heston
continued to keep his arms and hands clenched underneath his body (p. 4). Although
officers were trying to remove Mr. Heston’s hands from under his body, they were
unsuccessful (p. 4).
Efficacy of the TASER ECD Applications
When Officers Livingston and Godwin saw Mr. Heston attempt to get off the
floor, Officer Livingston administered a total of three TASER ECD cycles to him, but
without effect (Flippo, 2005, p. 4). Officer Godwin also administered two TASER
ECD cycles to Mr. Heston, before disconnecting his cartridge and replacing it (p. 4).
All the officers were surprised at the non-effect of the TASER ECD deployments on
Mr. Heston, as it appeared he was immune to the TASER devices (p. 5).
Controlled and Restrained
Having replaced his TASER ECD cartridge, Officer Godwin told the other
officers to clear, as he was going to deploy his TASER ECD again (Flippo, 2005, p.
5). Shooting the TASER ECD probes into Mr. Heston’s back area, Mr. Heston’s
arms came free (p. 5). According to witnesses, there were no other TASER ECD
applications other than Officer Godwin’s (p. 5).
With his arms free, the officers immediately controlled and restrained Mr. Heston
with metallic handcuffs (Flippo, 2005 p. 5). During the control and restraint process,
Mr. Heston continued to resist the officers’ efforts (p. 5).
Paramedic Intervention
After handcuffing Mr. Heston, the officers noticed that he was not breathing
(Flippo, 2005, p. 5). Until emergency medical technicians arrived a few minutes
later, officers began cardiopulmonary resuscitation (p. 5). Mr. Heston did regain a
pulse, prior to being transported to the hospital (p. 5).
Arrival at Hospital
According to American Medical Response (AMR), paramedics arrived at 139
Rodeo Drive at 2:34 p.m. and began rescue efforts on Mr. Heston, including but not
limited to, administering fluids, medications, plus continuing CPR and rescue
breathing. They were successful in retrieving a pulse on Mr. Heston for
approximately 10 minutes (Davidson, 2005, p. 6). Paramedics departed this location
at 2:45 p.m. with Mr. Heston, arriving at Natividad Medical Center Emergency Room
at 2:49 p.m. (Service Report, February 19, 2005, p. 1). Upon arrival at the hospital,
medical personnel administered medical care. Mr. Heston’s admission assessment
data indicate that his temperature was 101º (taken rectally), with attending physician
orders to use a “cooling blanket to keep [Mr. Heston’s] temperature at 97.5º
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(Natividad Medical Center, Interdisciplinary Patient Admission Assessment:
Robert Heston, February 19, 2005, p. 1; Sasson, Physician’s Orders—Seclusion or
Restraints: Robert Heston, February 19, 2005, p. 9). Laboratory studies showed the
“presence of a severe acidosis and elevated sodium, potassium, creatine, and creatine
phosphokinase levels (Davidson, 2005, p. 6). “A preliminary urine toxicology test
detected amphetamines and ethanol in the decedent’s system,” but a Computerized
Axial Tomography (CAT) scan failed to show signs of trauma, skull fracture,
hemorrhage, or injuries to the head and/or neck areas (p. 6). On Sunday, February 20,
2006, Dr. Nick Sassoon pronounced Mr. Heston dead at 7:46 p.m.
Terri Haddix, M.D. Autopsy
Terri Haddix, M.D. conducted an autopsy on Mr. Heston, and made the following
diagnoses:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Agitated state associated with methamphetamine intoxication;
Applications of TASER devices with multiple sites of contact on trunk and
extremities;
Cardiopulmonary arrest: diffuse hypoxic/ischemic encephalopathy,
rhabdomyolysis, renal and hepatic insufficiency, and acute
bronchopneumonia;
Mild four chamber cardiac dilation and hypertrophy;
Cutaneous contusions and abrasions on arms and legs;
Cutaneous contusions, abrasions and incised wounds on both hands; and,
Medical therapeutic intervention including oral endotracheal intubation,
orogastric tube, EKG pad, pulse oximetry probe, Foley catheter, indwelling
vascular catheters, needle puncture marks and rectal tube.

Dr. Haddix determined Mr. Heston’s cause of death to be as follows:
•
•
•
•

CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple Organ System Failure
DUE TO: Cardiopulmonary Arrest
Agitated State Associated with Methamphetamine intoxication and
Applications of TASER (Davidson, 2005, p. 10).

John Hain, M.D. Post-Mortem Review
A post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr John Hain, M.D. at the request
of Salinas Police Department Chief Daniel Ortega. Dr. Hain determined Mr.
Heston’s cause of death to be as follows:
•
•

Multiple organ failure due to cardiac arrest due to agitated state due to
methamphetamine intoxication;
CONTRIBUTING CONDITIONS: Left ventricular hypertrophy and
dilation; TASER application; and, struggle with police (p. 10)

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Steven Karch, M.D. Post-Mortem Review
A second post-mortem examination was conducted by Dr. Steven Karch, M.D.
after it was ordered by Monterey County Sheriff Mike Kanalakis. Dr. Karch
determined Mr. Heston’s cause of death to be as follows:
•
•
•
•

CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple organ system failure
DUE TO: Cardiopulmonary arrest
DUE TO: Chronic methamphetamine toxicity; excited delirium; left
ventricular enlargement and fibrosis
CONTRIBUTORY CAUSES: Rhabdomyolysis, second to multiple
TASER application (p. 11)

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OPINION METHODOLOGY
The following opinions were developed using one or more of the following
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, in addition to my education, training,
experience, and literature review. These research methodologies include Historiography,
Content Analysis, Phenomenology, Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Case Study.
The documents reviewed are classified in the social sciences as archival records.
According to Graziano and Raulin (1997), archival records are “records that already
exist” (p. 135). Archival records are one type of unobtrusive measure available to
researchers and/or experts. The review and analysis of archival records is an accepted
research methodology in the social sciences, and applies to law enforcement research.
While not as exacting as experimental research where there are control and experimental
groups, conducting interviews and examining archival records, plus conducting
observations are methodologies that are generally accepted and used in the social
sciences.
PRE-INCIDENT OPINIONS
Pre-Incident Opinions are those professional opinions that focus on Mr. Heston’s
personal history and behaviors, product warnings, and training services of TASER
International, Inc. (TASER) prior to the instant matter. I reserve the right to amend these
opinions based upon additional testimony and/or discovery documents.
1.

Robert Clark Heston had a history of deviant, threatening, and/or
illegal behavior for at about two decades prior to his death in 2005.

Mr. Heston’s criminal record is extensive dating back to 1986 (City of Salinas Police
Department, Person Summary: Robert Clark Heston, 4.28.05). The following
table depicts his arrest and/or citation record.
Table 1 Robert Clark Heston Arrest and/or Citation History
Arrest and/or Citation
Date(s)
Under the influence of a controlled substance
2.7.93; 4.18.94; 6.27.96; 7.1.99;
4.1.00; 2.25.01
Driving under the influence
4.13.86; 4.1.00
Battery Vs custodial officer
7.1.99
Obstruct/resist Executive officer
7.1.99; 6.8.02
Drunk and disorderly
5.5.96; 1.25.98; 9.22.98
Resist/delay officer
8.30.03
Battery
9.9.95
Adw on peace officer
6.8.02
Harm peace officer dog/horse w/likely injury
6.8.02
Source: City of Salinas Police Department, Personal History: Robert Clark Heston, 4.28.05, pp. 1-3.

Table 1 does not include Mr. Heston’s aggravated battery of a police officer, great
bodily harm/dependent adult, resist or delay an officer, parole violations, and being under
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the influence of a controlled substance on February 19, 2005, nor does it include his prior
field and other contacts with law enforcement officers. Overall, there were 18 crime
reports involving Mr. Heston, 37 arrest/citations, 6 field interviews, and 2 crime vehicle
listings (pp. 1-3). According to Monterey County District Attorney, Dean Flippo, Mr.
Heston was arrested at least 19 times since 1985 (Letter to Chief Dan Ortega, November
21, 2005, p. 14).
2. Mr. Robert C. Heston had an extensive illegal substance abuse history
prior to his death in 2005.
Mr. Robert C. Heston had prior arrests beginning in 1993 for being under the
influence of controlled substances (Davidson, Coroner’s Report: Robert Clark Heston,
Jr., 8/12/05, p. 14). Mr. Heston’s father testified that he recalled several incidents where
his son was acting bizarre and did damage to furniture, etc. while under the influence of
drugs (Robert H. Heston deposition, 30:9, 22: 33:14; 34:10; 39:5). In one instance,
Robert C. Heston struck his mother (39:5), giving her two black eyes (40:3) while being
on drugs. According to Mr. Robert H. Heston, he did not notice his son had a drug
problem while he was in his middle to late 20s (24:4, 7). It is clear from reading the
incident reports about Robert C. Heston’s bizarre and violent behavior that he was
engaged in chronic drug abuse from at least 1993 to the time of his death.
3. The training resources offered by TASER in 2005 were not deficient or
defective, and were not a product that was sold to Mr. Heston.
A review of TASER instructional lesson plans, specifically Versions 11 (January
2004) and 12 (January 2005) fails to identify TASER as having a deficient or defective
training or training service. As a law enforcement program instructional designer,
certified online instructor, certified online instructional designer, and former professor
who has taught instructional design at the college level, in my professional opinion, the
TASER instructor training, Versions 11 and 12 meet and/or exceed the criteria of
reasonable training content, product warnings, and outcome-based training. Versions 8.0
(August 2002), 9.0 (May 2003), 10 (July 2003), and 10.1 (November 2003) of the
TASER instructional lesson plans were also reviewed with the same findings. As a
general matter, I am familiar with all TASER instructional lesson plans and training
materials for the TASER M26 and X26 ECDs.
According to Dick, Carey, and Carey (2001), there are three domains of learning
that are to be included in the instructional design of a reasonable training program, such
as TASER’s: intellectual skills (p. 39), attitudes (pp. 40-41), and psychomotor skills (p.
40). Intellectual skills include the “forming of concepts, applying rules, and solving
problems” (p. 39). The authors’ note that “with these skills the learner can classify things
according to labels and characteristics, can apply a rule, and can select and apply a
variety of rules in order to solve problems” (p. 39). Versions 11 and 12 of the TASER
instructor training program include the development of intellectual skills through the
teaching of the historical development of TASER devices, electronic control device
(ECD) technologies, stun versus neuro-muscular incapacitation (NMI), basic concepts of
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electricity, including, but not limited to TASER waveforms, coulombs, voltage, amperes,
watts, power, joules, etc., common effects of NMI, TASER M26 and TASER X26
operation, dataport downloads, probe and drive stun deployments, probe placement
techniques, probe trajectory, weapon management, use-of-force, tactical considerations,
causes of limited effectiveness, medical studies, policy considerations, controlling and/or
cuffing under power, drive stun, animal use, “excited delirium,” sudden death,
emotionally disturbed persons, suicidal persons, wet environments, pacemakers, probe
removal, potential injuries, etc. (Instructor Certification Course, Lesson Plan v.11.0,
2004; safety rules, pp. vi, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, 57, 59, 60, 66, 70, 117, 155; puncture
wounds, skin irritation, pp. 29, 32, 36,37, 38, 153, 154, 155; head/face shots, pp. 32, 36,
70, 141, 153; throat, groin, pp. 36, 70, 153; common effects of EMD, pp. vi, vii, 30, 32,
35, 36, 37; embedded probes…groin, pp. 37, 38, 153, 154, 155; excited delirium, incustody death, pp. 127, 128, 129, 130; deployment cycles, pp. 116, 138 147; follow-up
commands, pp. 139, 147; Instructor Certification Lesson Plan and Support Material,v.
12.0 [January 2005]; safety rules, pp. viii, ix, x, xii, 12, 42, 44, 47, 50, 53, 54, 61, 62, 85,
87, 159, 208, 209, 210; puncture wounds, skin irritation, pp. 38, 39, 42, 50, 87, 104, 190,
196; head/face shots, pp. 42, 90, 91, 190; throat, groin, pp. 42, 90 91; common effects of
EMD, pp. 38, 39, 42, 47, 196; embedded probes…groin, pp. 44, 50, 87, 209, 211; excited
delirium, in-custody death, pp. 175,176, 177, 178; deployment cycles, pp. 157, 187, 199;
follow-up commands, pp. 187, 188, 198, 199).
The TASER instructor-candidate must also take a written examination, which is
another form of testing of the learner’s intellectual skills (see M26 and X26 written
assessment instruments). The learner is also required to be able to explain information
about the TASER ECDs (Instructor Certification Course, Lesson Plan v. 11.0, 2004; see
also Lesson Plan v. 12.0, January 2005).
Attitude, or affective domain, is contained throughout the TASER 2004 and 2005
Lesson Plans in a variety of locations and formats. In short, affective domain focuses
upon the learner’s attitude regarding classroom rules, safety, respect, etc.
Psychomotor skill characteristics generally require the learner to execute
muscular actions, with or without equipment, to achieve special results (Dick, Carey, and
Carey, 2001, p. 40). The 2004 and 2005 Instructor Certification Course, Lesson Plans v.
11.0 and 12.0, have several psychomotor skills requirements, including, but not limited
to: an aiming drill, a first firing drill, a live fire drill, live simulation training, and a
reloading drill. The Lesson Plans also requires the learner to demonstrate these
psychomotor skills through the use of objectives.
The instructor and other training offered by TASER is a service that it provides to
law enforcement rather than a product. It is well known by trainers and training providers
that training is a service and not a product, and thus not subject to strict products liability.
As additional background, TASER has several layers of TASER ECD instructor:
Lead Instructor, Director of Training, Training Board, Senior Master Instructors, Master
Instructors, Advanced Instructors, and Instructors. TASER has published 16 versions of
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its training program (currently up to Version 13), with Version 13.1 being developed for
release in early 2007. TASER also publishes Training Bulletins on an as-needed basis.
The substance of these Training Bulletins is published on TASER’s website
(www.taser.com), and is incorporated into the succeeding training program version.
TASER provides a current training CD(s) or DVD(s) with every TASER ECD shipped
(as well as a Product Manual), and every TASER ECD instructor receives a CD or DVD
and a manual as part of the training program. With each Training Bulletin or training
version release, TASER either emails, faxes, or mails Training Bulletins and training
CDs or DVDs to all currently certified instructors in its database (over 30,000).
Instructors are required to go to TASER’s Website and ensure latest version training and
updates prior to presenting a training program. TASER also requires its instructors to
repeat its instructor programs every two years for updates and refreshers.
Additionally, TASER sponsors other TASER device training opportunities,
including, but not limited to: annual conferences, armorers programs, risk management
and executive programs, etc.
4. Salinas, California is a sophisticated use-of-force user and a learned
intermediary.
Government entities that purchase law enforcement equipment investigate such
equipment, conducting research and evaluation on it prior to investing public monies on
such products. As a former law enforcement administrator, town finance committee
member, former president of a municipal Civil Service Commission, and seminar
presenter on public budgeting, few, if any, government entities spend large amounts of
public monies without first conducting product reviews, comparing similar products,
obtaining information, studies, and data from sources other than the manufacturer, etc.
prior to putting a product bid out for response. This extensive process educates the
government entity about the product, including its primary and secondary features,
benefits, limitations, utilities, risks, warnings, etc.
Law enforcement agencies have many research resources available to them,
including, but not limited to: law enforcement publications (there are many), numerous
specifically devoted to law enforcement products (e.g., Police, Law and Order, The
Police Chief, Law Enforcement Technology); law enforcement organizations, including
international, national, state, and local organizations (e.g., International Association of
Chiefs of Police, Fraternal Order of Police, National Sheriff’s Association); law
enforcement advisory groups (e.g, International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Americans for Effective Law Enforcement); law enforcement training organizations and
groups (e.g., American Society for Law Enforcement Training, International Law
Enforcement Educators and Trainers Association, International Association of Law
Enforcement Firearms Instructors, and many others); groups critical of law enforcement,
especially critical of law enforcement use of force; state standards and training
organizations, boards, or groups; the Internet and Websites specifically devoted to law
enforcement (e.g., www.police.com, www.officer.com, www.policeone.com ); legal
research databases (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Findlaw); and many other resources.
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Since many of the products, services, and training programs purchased by
government entities focus on use-of-force equipment and techniques (e.g., handguns,
rifles, machineguns, shotguns, ammunition, impact projectiles and launchers, batons,
chemical irritants, chemical weapons, special team weapons systems, defense and arrest
tactics, lateral vascular neck restraints, pressure point control tactics, specialty restraint
systems and/or equipment, etc.), these government entities have extensive knowledge
about use-of-force equipment and techniques, their operations, tactics, benefits,
limitations, and risks, because they have a duty to conduct such research and analyses,
and know that no use-of-force product, technique, or option always works, is free from
limitations, or is risk free. Therefore, the extensive available literature strongly supports
my professional opinion that government entities are sophisticated use-of-force users and
thus learned intermediaries. Government entities know far more about use-of-force
equipment, its operations, etc., than the general public and even more than other
departments operating within the government entity, for which the equipment was not
purchased. This knowledge enables government entities to know that any use-of-force
has the capability of causing, resulting in, or contributing to, or being temporal to death
or serious bodily injury.
5. Salinas, California Peace Officers are sophisticated use-of-force users.
I am familiar with law enforcement training that is conducted within the State of
California, and the types of training California peace officers receive regarding use-offorce, techniques, weapons, tactics, options, incident realities, etc. based upon literature
review, interviews, and having taught many law enforcement officers both inside the
State of California and outside of it. California peace officers receive specialized training
in use-of-force, use-of-force equipment, such as handguns, rifles, pepper spray, TASER
ECDs, etc., and use-of-force tactics and techniques, and therefore, in my professional
opinion, are sophisticated use-of-force users when it comes to the application of force.
California peace officers know that any use-of-force has the risk of causing or
contributing (in some way to) death or serious bodily injury, such as spraying a person
with pepper spray who then walks in front of a passing motor vehicle and is struck and
killed or seriously injured. These law enforcement officers also know that any use-offorce event is multifactorial, unpredictable, usually rapidly evolving, and often filled with
numerous unknown, or unverified, factors and conditions. These officers also understand
that everyone they deal with is different, with a different set of factors, and may have
varying degrees of special susceptibilities and/or conditions.
6. TASER provided reasonable and sufficient warnings about its products
to the purchasers and users of its products.
TASER has provided reasonable and sufficient warnings about its products to the
people who and governmental entities that purchase and use them. This opinion is
partially based upon my knowledge about and experience in writing product warnings for
law enforcement equipment and techniques, an extensive review of like law enforcement
use-of-force equipment and techniques warnings, and finally based upon a content
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analysis of TASER’s product warnings. TASER has provided written, audio-visual,
demonstrative, and experiential warnings about its products in the TASER device Product
Manual, on TASER’s Website, and extensively in the TASER training programs, and has
also provided verbal, visual (including video and audio examples), demonstration, and
other warnings, which supplement and reinforce the written warnings, during instructor
training classes (see X26 and M26 written warnings; training CDs/DVDs; Product
Manuals; TASER’s Website – www.taser.com; and Instructor Certification Course).
Also, TASER training materials and Website include extensive research and other
information, Lesson Plans 11 and 12 (January 2004 and January 2005, respectively] as
previously listed and discussed.
I have conducted a content analysis of the very limited warnings provided by the
manufacturer of the following use-of-force products supporting the conclusion that
TASER’s myriad of warnings are far more thorough, focused, and complete than those
reviewed.
NOVA XR-5000 Series Stun Gun, NOVA Spirit L.E.S. II, and NOVA Electronic
Riot Shield
NOVA National Training, Inc. and NOVA Law Enforcement Division have
produced a training manual about the reasonable uses of the NOVA stun gun products.
While the 1987 training manual contains a history of stun gun technology, including
safety data and medical research, it is far below the information provided by TASER
about its electronic pulse technology products. The 1987 NOVA manual only contains
four pages on these three topics (NOVA Law Enforcement Training Manual &
Operational Guide in the Use of Electronic Non-lethal Control Devices, 1987, pp. 1821).
Regarding “location of application”, the 1987 NOVA manual identifies the areas
where the NOVA products can be applied, but fails to separate out the NOVA hand-held
devices from the NOVA electronic shields (NOVA Law Enforcement Training Manual &
Operational Guide in the Use of Electronic Non-lethal Control Devices, 1987, p. 41), and
also fails to explain why the rationale and medical implications of those areas of the body
are designated “unacceptable”.
DO-RITE Sticks
Manufactured by the DO-RITE® Corporation, the DO-RITE sticks are designed
as a non-lethal, temporary restraining device, resembling martial art nunchakus. The
undated (late 1980s) training brochure only depicts how the sticks can be used, without
any written warning(s) about its misuse, or ability to seriously injure or kill a person.
Flex-Baton Police Nunchaku
The 1990 training manual on the Flex-Baton Police Nunchaku provides limited
warnings on page 6. Specifically, the warning advised the reader to “avoid head contact”
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with the Flex-Baton. Although the manual is chocked-full of pictures that demonstrate
how to use the Flex-Baton, the warning(s) are very limited, and fail to provide the reader
with reasonable warnings about this product that can cause serious bodily injury or death.
The BodyGuard Restraining Systems Owner’s Manual and Instructions for Use
This undated, five-page, typed Owner’s Manual and Instructions (approx. mid
1990s) fails to identify potential injuries to the person on whom the device is placed.
Although there is a mention on page 3 about positional asphyxiation, the manual fails to
explain it, etc.
Manufactured by BioGuardian Systems, Inc., the undated four-page Training
Outline fails to provide any warnings about the inherent or potential dangers and/or risks
to the use of this product on “violent subjects” (p. 2).
SABRE H2O Series and Dual Propellant System (pepper spray)
While this 2005, eight-page product brochure discusses company history,
formulations, advantages, consistency, other products, and electronic immobilization
device compatibility, it fails to provide any warnings about its product to the potential
purchaser.
ASP Tactical Handcuffs
The 2004 brochure about this product does contain information about avoiding
handcuff neuropathy by double-locking the handcuffs, which should prohibit the
handcuffs from being over tightened. The product brochure also warns against striking
the edge of the targeted wrist with a double-locked handcuff, because the wrist might
fracture. Finally, the brochure warns against over tightening handcuffs because they can
cause soft tissue or nerve damage. There is also mention of how an uncontrolled subject
can use the handcuffs as a weapon against the officer.
ASP Baton Basic Certification Course Syllabus
Approximately one-half page of this 1996 44-page book (excluding appendices),
discusses “target areas” with the metal baton (ASP Basic Certification (ABC) Course
Syllabus, 1996, p. 36). The book is only specific about its warning not to strike the head,
neck, spine, sternum, or groin (p. 36).
Tuff Tie Restraint
The undated (approx. 1990), one-page “Directions for Use” only says that “it is
almost impossible to cut off circulation at the wrists” regarding the use of this handcufflike device. No other warnings are provided regarding the device’s potential injury.
The Immobilizer Restraint Device
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The 1981, 25-page training manual fails to warn of potential injury to the user or
others. Even though this device is used to wrap around a person’s legs and then
forcefully throw the person to the ground, there are no warnings of any kind in the
training manual, which was produced by the manufacturer.
FLEX-CUF Restraining Tie Instruction Manual
This undated (approx. 1970s), eight-page instruction manual fails to provide
warnings about the potential injury to those people who have the plastic “handcuffs”
applied to them. There is no mention of potential wrist injury, arm, back, etc. injury.
The WRAP
This undated (approx. 1995), five-page Basic Application Manual contains
limited warning on its first page. Only one specific warning focuses on the shoulder
harness system: “The shoulder harness system should never be over tightened to the point
that it interferes with the subject’s ability to breathe freely” (p. 1).
RIPP Restraint for the Law Enforcement, Corrections & Medical Fields
This undated (approx. 1980s), 11-page booklet identifies several pieces of
restraint equipment, while also providing instruction on how they can be applied. The
only so-called “warning” is a disclaimer that tells the buyer that (s)he assumes all liability
about the use of the various products. No other warnings are provided about these
restraint products.
The Source
The instructor’s manual provides very limited warnings to the user about the use
of this device. One of the first electronic “stun” technology devices, there are very few
warnings about the use of the “stun” section of the flashlight, which is advertised as a
“non-lethal weapon.” The only “warning” found in Universal Safety Corporation’s
Instructions for maintenance and use, is the following: “Do not touch lamp with fingers
for several minutes until cool.” The lesson plan only warns users against using The
Source as follows: “Source should not be used against neck for choking.” “Do not use
Source to strike at the head or throat.” (Smith, undated, no page).
Electronic Batons
Similar to cattle prods, these devices were manufactured in the United States in
the 1980s, and failed to have any warnings associated with them. There was no medical
testing of these devices, and the devices were used solely at the risk of the buyer and his
or her agents.
TALON Glove
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Another electronic device enclosed in a glove, it failed to provide reasonable
warnings about its use. The device is no longer manufactured.
Metallic Restraints
Most handcuff and metallic restraint directions that come with the product fail to
warn against the over tightening of the handcuffs and/or metallic restraints, and the
potential injuries that can be caused. This is true for most handcuffs and leg irons. Few,
if any, mention of potential injury warnings are found in product literature or directions.
Kel-Lite
The first heavy-duty flashlight manufactured primarily for law enforcement use,
there were no warnings that came with the product regarding how it should be used.
When the Kel Lite Manual of Defensive Tactics (cir. 1970) was published, the only
warning given to the reader was “Head blows should definetly [sic] be avoided” (p. 21).
Lamb Baton
The Lamb Method of Baton was developed by former Boston Police Officer,
Arthur Lamb. It essentially involved two basic movements, so it was a very popular
baton method in the 1970s. In A Handbook for Use of the Baton: The Lamb Method
published by Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (1977), the only pseudo-warning is found on
page 12: “From the kneecap, the baton is swung with a wide circular motion backhand,
striking the opponent’s collarbone. It should be stressed here that the collarbone is a
secondary target. Though in this instance a blow to the collarbone would probably not
result in permanent injury, the risk of injury is greater than a blow to the knee. Therefore,
it should be resorted to only when necessary” (Smith, 1977, p. 12).
The SX-24 Police Baton Owner’s Manual
Published by Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc., the Owner’s Manual fails to tell
the user the areas of the body to avoid when using the baton. However, there is one
warning to the user: “The SX-24 police baton was not designed for use against such
things as trees, telephone poles, concrete structures or other extremely rigid objects.
Such intentional abuse could result in an immediate or latent component failure of the
baton. Use against such extremely rigid and hard objects constitutes intentional abuse
since it goes far beyond the normal and reasonable conditions relating to training and/or
practices or activity associated with law enforcement, security or correction. If the SX24 police baton is subjected to such abuse a failure in its function is possible and could
result in an injury to the user or bystander. Such abusive usage of the SX-24 police baton
is strongly discouraged by Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc.” (Monadnock Lifetime
Products, Inc., November 1988, inside front cover).

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The PR-24X Police Baton Owner’s Manual
Published by Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc., this manual offers the same
basic “warning” to the user as contained in the previous entry. Again, there are no
warnings to the user about what target areas of the body are to be avoided, etc.
Clubs
Published by Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc. the training manual offers very
limited warnings, and advocates the use of the baton for air chokes and other potentially
lethal techniques. While the training manual does note the “temple” as a very susceptible
vital spot which if struck with sufficient force may cause unconsciousness or death”
(Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc., 1968, p. 4), it fails to instruct the user not to strike a
person in this area. It does teach to use a short baton, known as a yawara, to strike the
head or neck (p. 8), when the opponent attempt to punch.
In Section V. Techniques with the Baton, the training manual teaches how to apply
a “Japanese strangle” (baton placed alongside the neck) and the “American strangle”
(baton placed across the throat) (Monadnock Lifetime Products, Inc., 1968, p. 18). In the
latter technique, there is no warning to the user that it this technique, even when applied
correctly, can cause serious bodily injury or death.
After conducting primary content analysis research on the above-referenced
product literature and/or training documents, it surfaces that TASER has extensive
warnings about the potential effects and injuries its products may cause through
reasonable use. No other manufacturer’s product literature, research, or supporting
documentation, about electronic use-of-force products has the extensive international
safety documentation, studies, warnings, etc. as that of the TASER-brand products. This
also is true, in most every case, for non-electronic use-of-force products. Therefore,
based upon the foregoing content analysis research, in my professional opinion, the
warnings provided by TASER are not only reasonable, but also some of the most
complete warnings and support documentation and information provided by any
manufacturer of use-of-force products, techniques, or systems.
7. TASER does not set policy for agencies regarding TASER ECD training
and/or policies or procedures.
Each law enforcement agency is expert in and responsible for its own use-of
-force deployment and post-deployment policies and procedures (Instructor Certification
Course, Lesson Plans versions 11 and 12 (see p. 216, v. 12). Each law enforcement
agency that adopts TASER products has a duty to establish its own policy, procedure,
training, etc. regarding the electronic device(s). This is not only reasonable, but also
responsible for the manufacturer, as it does not have any ministerial authority over the
government entity or the law enforcement agency or the user of the product. A
reasonable government entity administrator or board member knows that the entity, or
employer, has a duty to train its employees in core tasks, and also to regulate employee
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discretion about a product through the use of written policies, procedures, and/or other
guidelines. A reasonable administrator or board member also knows that guidance in the
format of sample policies and other documents can be obtained from such organizations
as the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), including the National Institute of
Justice (NIJ), the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS), and the Civil Rights Division), the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the National Sheriffs’ Association
(NSA), Americans for Effective Law Enforcement (AELE), FBI National Academy (FBI
NA), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), state Peace Officer Standards and Training Boards
(including the Ohio Peace Officer Standards and Training), professional consultants, and
similar organizations, and institutions of education and training. In my professional
opinion, TASER has no duty to set policies for agencies that purchase its products.
Further, government entities and law enforcement agencies have a duty to develop such
policies and directives to reasonably guide user discretion and to also provide reasonable
guidance about the electronic device.

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INCIDENT OPINIONS
Incident Opinions are those opinions that focus on the actions of the parties
during the incident under review. I reserve the right to amend or supplement these
opinions.
8. Mr. Robert Clark Heston had a responsibility to not break the law by
knowingly and intentionally consuming illicit substances, specifically
methamphetamine.
“A preliminary urine toxicology test detected amphetamines and ethanol in the
decedent’s system,” (Davidson, 2005, p. 6). Drs. Haddix, Hain, and Karch independently
ascertained that Mr. Heston had toxic and potentially lethal amounts of
methamphetamine in his system at the time of his death, which in my professional
opinion, is prima facie proof that he had consumed illicit substances, specifically
methamphetamine. Additionally, Mr Heston’s chronic abuse of stimulants contributed to
the effects on his body and the excited delirium episodes.
9.

Mr. Robert Clark Heston had a responsibility to not break the law by
intentionally battering Sgt. Dominici, by battering his father, and by
not resisting officers when being taken into custody.

Sergeant Dominici saw the senior Mr. Heston on the living room floor, being
dragged by the arm across the room by his son (Flippo, 2005, p. 2). Fearing that the son
might harm or kill the father, Sergeant Dominici moved closer to the residence so he
could deploy his TASER ECD (p. 2). As he was positioning himself, the younger Mr.
Heston threw a rod, javelin-style, toward Sergeant Dominici, striking him in the chest
area (p. 2; Heston photographs, # 190-195). The bullet resistant vest stopped the rod
from injuring the officer, but the impact left a mark on Sergeant Dominici’s uniform shirt
(p. 2; Heston photographs, # 190-195).
To attempt to capture and control Mr. Heston, Sergeant Dominici deployed his
TASER ECD at him from a distance of 12 to 15 feet (Flippo, 2005, p. 2). Even though
Sergeant Dominici believed the TASER ECD probes made contact with Mr. Heston and
administered a shock to him, the rampaging son failed to go to the ground (p. 2). This
surprised both Sergeant Dominici and Officer Fairbanks (p. 2).
Officer Fairbanks deployed his TASER ECD and it appeared to have some effect
on Mr. Heston as he became somewhat rigid (Flippo, 2005, p. 3), but again he did not go
to the ground, and then it appeared that one of the two probes dislodged, no longer
making contact with the son’s body (p 3).
Sergeant Ruiz and Officer Livingston arrived at the scene, and attempted to
engage the younger Mr. Heston (Flippo, 2005, p. 3). Attempting to engage Mr. Heston in
conversation, the younger Mr. Heston was initially non-responsive, but then using a
Frisbee motion, threw a heavy cylindrical weight from the grandfather clock at Sergeant
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Ruiz, forcing him to evade the oncoming object or be struck with it (p. 2). Sergeant Ruiz
and Officer Livingston both fired their departmentally-issued TASER ECDs at Mr.
Heston, but again with very little, if any, effect (p. 3).
Officer Goodwin had arrived on the scene, and had drawn his TASER ECD
(Flippo, 2005, p. 3). Watching as Sergeant Ruiz attempted a second 5-second TASER
ECD application with no result (p. 3). Sergeant Ruiz’s TASER ECD crackled, which is
indicative that it had not made a good connection with the target, or that a wire may have
been broken. Seeing and hearing these events, Officer Goodwin deployed his TASER
ECD striking Mr. Heston (p. 3). Officer Livingston also began a second 5-second
TASER ECD application (p. 3).
The two TASER ECD applications finally had affected Mr. Heston, who reacted
by falling to the ground (p. 4). As he fell, Mr. Heston struck his head on an end table,
and then rolled onto his stomach with both hands placed underneath his body (Flippo,
2005, p. 4). Ignoring the officers’ commands to show his hands, Mr. Heston continued to
keep his arms and hands clenched underneath his body (p. 4). Although officers were
trying to remove Mr. Heston’s hands from under his body, they were unsuccessful (p. 4).
In my professional opinion the rampaging confrontation caused by Mr. Heston
would have ended, had he complied with the officers’ requests and had cooperated with
them.
10.

TASER did not have a relationship with Mr. Robert Clark Heston.

Mr. Heston was not the buyer or the end user of the TASER product. Neither Mr.
Heston nor anything in the Complaint suggests that the TASER ECD was sold to him.
The Complaint does allege that the product was sold to defendant, Salinas, California.
There is no indication that any alleged sales transaction between TASER and Salinas,
California intended to benefit persons such as Mr. Heston. In contrast, TASER’s
electronic control products are designed specifically to protect the safety of law
enforcement officers performing their official duties in arresting or otherwise taking into
custody, capturing, or controlling unpredictable, resisting, assaultive, and/or potentially
violent criminal suspects or those in need of being controlled. In my professional
opinion, TASER did not have a relationship with Mr. Heston.
11.

TASER had no control over the actions taken by Salinas Police
Department Officers toward Mr. Heston.

As aforementioned, each law enforcement agency is expert in and responsible for
its own use-of-force deployment and post-deployment policies and procedures (Instructor
Certification Course, Lesson Plan v. 11.0, 2004];v. 12.0 [2005]. Each law enforcement
agency that adopts TASER products, or any use-of-force tool, technique, or system, has
a duty to establish its own policy, procedure, training, etc. regarding the electronic
device(s). This is not only reasonable, but also responsible for the manufacturer, as it

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does not have any ministerial authority over the governmental entity or the user of the
product.
In my professional opinion, Mr. Heston’s alleged injuries and death came from
independent conduct that was not controlled by TASER, specifically, Mr. Heston’s longterm life’s choices and conditions, his consumption of illegal drugs and substances, the
resistive, violent, and assaultive conduct engaged in by Mr. Heston, causing reactive
actions to be initially taken by Sergeant Dominici, and subsequently by the other
responding officers who were dealing with him. No representative of TASER was at the
scene, and there is no indication that that the TASER electronic control device did
anything other than what it was designed to do with proper use. In fact, there is ample
discussion and evidence that the TASER electronic control device did work on Mr.
Heston as intended, because he continued to resist, which forced officers to cycle the
ECDs. Because of his continued violent and assaultive conduct, officers cycled the ECDs
multiple times.
Scientific and other research indicates that TASER electronic control device
products have been used to save lives, rescue hostages, and reduce injures to law
enforcement officers, suspects, and others (Instructor Certification Course, Lesson Plans
versions 11 and 12, respectively; medical studies and other research studies and results
disclosed by TASER). Aside from the scientific findings, from a moral and philosophical
perspective, when a comparison is made between Mr. Heston who was engaging in
criminal conduct, resisting, and acting violently, and TASER that develops electronic
capture devices that enhance the safety of law enforcement officers, suspects, and the
public, any alleged harm to a person acting as Mr. Heston is far outweighed by the
benefit to law enforcement and the public. (See TASER’s collection of risk reduction,
risk utility surveys, research, and documentation.)
Public policy is also important to this discussion. Scientific and other surveys
conducted by TASER and others indicate that the public supports the use of the TASER
ECDs at the discretion of law enforcement officers (see TASER research and survey
results). TASER’s electronic control devices are designed to assist law enforcement in
capturing criminal suspects when necessary without the use of a firearm. Without such
an effective and non-lethal tool (as defined by the United States Department of Defense),
officers would be faced with the choice of firing bullets at a potentially dangerous
offender or allowing for his escape. If forced to choose between the risk to a criminal
suspect and the safety of law enforcement officers and the public, public policy strongly
supports the use of TASER electronic control devices.
In my professional opinion, based upon scientific and other research, public
policy strongly and unequivocally supports TASER electronic control devices when used
in a lawful manner. Mr. Heston’s long-term life’s choices, and his decisions to ingest
illegal substances, to assault Sergeant Dominici, and to resist lawful efforts to take him
into custody are what precipitated the use of a TASER electronic control devices, and Mr.
Heston should not recover on a cause of action for alleged injuries based upon his own
illegal and resistive acts.
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12.
Mr. Heston’s behavior and medical issues are consistent with
being in a state of “excited delirium”.
As the author of several articles about excited delirium and sudden death,
the author of several training aids including instructor- and user-level workbooks and
presentations about excited delirium and sudden death, and the author of an
internationally-recognized training program on these topics, in my professional opinion,
Mr. Heston exhibited the behavioral cues that are consistent with an individual being in
an excited delirium state.
Excited delirium is a descriptive phrase that historically has not been a
recognized medical or psychiatric condition or diagnosis (Peters, 2005, p. 12). The term
“excited delirium” was coined by Dr. Fishbain, and popularized in the early 1980s by
doctors Fishbain and Wetli. Excited delirium usually involves, but is not limited to, the
use of illicit drugs such as cocaine, methamphetamine Ecstasy, PCP, and/or LSD (p. 13).
Behavioral cues include, but are not limited to: extreme agitation, violent
or bizarre behavior, running wildly, screaming, incoherent speech, naked or stripping off
clothing, disorientation about place, time, purpose, and even him-herself, superhuman
strength, diminished sense of pain, violent resistance during control and restraint,
delusions of grandeur, easily distracted, lack of focus, scattered ideas about things, acute
onset, and/or makes people feel uncomfortable (Peters, 2006; Peters, 2005, pp. 25-27;
Larson, 2006).
The following chart compares Mr. Heston’s manifested behaviors to the
behavioral cues that are contained in peer-reviewed literature and texts about people who
have been later identified as having been in an excited delirium state.
Behavioral Cue*
Acute onset
Psychotic in appearance
Stripping off clothing
Hyperthermic
Violent/Bizarre behavior
Paranoid
Breaks glass, mirrors, shiny objects
Running wildly/Extreme agitation
Incoherent speech
Screaming
Disorientation about place, time, purpose, himself
Unstoppable
Superhuman strength
Diminished sense of pain
Delusions of grandeur
Easily distracted, lack of focus
Makes people feel uncomfortable

Mr. Heston’s Behavior
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No/Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

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Yes
Violent resistance during control and restraint
* (Peters, 2006c; Peters, 2005, pp. 24-27)
In my professional opinion, Mr. Heston exhibited several behavioral signs
evidencing he was in an excited delirium state. His rapid physical decline after violently
struggling with and then being handcuffed by police officers is consistent with what the
literature surfaces regarding a sudden death following behaviors associated with a person
being in a state of excited delirium. Specifically, the literature reports four excited
delirium phases. They are:
Phase
I
II

III
IV

Clinical
Hyperthermia (not always present)
Delirium

Behavioral Cue
Strips off clothing
Aggression; yelling;
violent; bizarre behavior;
yelling and screaming;
unfocused; etc.
Respiratory arrest
Goes limp; stops breathing;
strength loss
Death
Heart stops
(Henry, 2005, p. 140; Peters, 2005, p. 32; Karch, 2002, p. 120)

In my professional opinion, Mr. Heston appears to have gone through each phase
of excited delirium, resulting in his death. Phase 1, hyperthermia, was present, as the
hospital admission record for Mr. Heston contains an order to use a “cooling blanket” to
keep his temperature at 97.5º F, if his temperature remains greater than 101º F (Sasson,
Physician’s Orders—Seclusion or Restraint: Robert Heston, February 19, 2005, pp.
1, 9). “Hyperthermia is an increase in body temperature above 99º F, but most often the
term is used to refer to a dangerously high body temperature” (Beers and Jones, 2004,
Section 3, Chapter 19). Because many of the people who are in this state die, it is difficult
to scientifically study. However, the literature surfaces that the individual builds up
lactate during the fight or flight mode, and from continued resistance, which can prohibit
the person from ridding himself of CO2, resulting in a gas exchange respiratory problem.
Further, the literature identifies many researchers and medical doctors that
hypothesize that profound metabolic acidosis leads to cardiac arrest, particularly in those
individuals who have used and/or abused stimulants such as methamphetamine or ecstasy
(Peters, 2005; Ho, Miner, Lakireddy, Bultman, & Heegard, 2006, p. 5; Jeffrey D. Ho,
M.D., personal communication).
13.

It was reasonable and consistent with suggested protocols that at least
four Salinas peace officers attempted to manage Mr. Heston’s violent
and bizarre behavior.

Limmer, O’Keefe, Grant, Murray, and Bergeron (2001) direct emergency medical
technicians to “approach [the aggressive and violent person] with four persons…” (p.
456). They also note that “your first concern must be your own safety” (p. 455). Bledsoe,
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Porter, and Shade (1994) support Limmer, et al. by directing emergency responders as
follows: “There should be at least four persons available to restrain the patient” (p. 1024).
The authors’ note in their 2001 text: “Many argue that physical restraint is clearly a
police responsibility and EMS should not be involved” (p. 627).
Violent patient management literature surfaces that most hospitals and psychiatric
facilities recommend or have policies that when physical restraint of an individual is
necessary, that approximately six staff be used to perform the restraint (DiMaio &
DiMaio, 2006, p. 125).
In my professional opinion, the management of Mr. Heston’s aggressive, hostile,
violent, and combative struggle by using at least five law enforcement officers is not only
reasonable, but also consistent with the medical and psychiatric literature regarding the
management of violent individuals.

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POST-INCIDENT OPINIONS
The next category of opinions discuss scientific research, cause and effect
research, human subject research limitations, and future research issues are in response to
innuendo, claims, etc. made by the Plaintiff in the Complaint. I am prepared to speak
about various scientific research methodologies that have been used to study the safety of
the TASER electronic control devices. In addition to being academically trained in
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies, descriptive and inferential statistics,
I have experience teaching these subjects to graduate level learners, including doctoral
students. Often an untrained person will attempt to substitute common sense or
correlation for cause and effect, and/or as a substitute for the scientific method. Often
times, these substitutions are the bases for generalizations, misinterpretation of data,
activity, and so forth. These unscientific observations often result in the creation of
simple, but erroneous “cause and effect” associations and conclusions of the TASER
device being the direct cause of some seemingly unexplainable event.
14.

Scientific research has been used in the majority of research studies
regarding TASER electronic control devices.

Graziano and Raulin (2000) say “science uses systematic, disciplined thinking to
gain knowledge about nature. It placed heavy demands on the adequacy of its
information and on the processes applied to that information” (p. 7). “In short, science is
concerned with things that can be publicly observed and tested. If propositions or
questions do not contain implications for such public observation and testing, they are not
scientific questions” (Kerlinger, 1964, p. 5). “Research is systematic inquiry that uses
disciplined methods to answer questions or solve problems” (Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 3).
Most individuals have limited knowledge, and often phobias (irrational fears),
about electricity. Many individuals remember being shocked when inserting a piece of
metal or coin into an electrical outlet, or touched the spark plug of a car or lawn mower.
These unpleasant experiences are usually recalled when discussing electricity, but
applying such experiences to the use of TASER electronic control devices is not the use
of scientific research, but is merely examples of one way of generalizing or attempting
knowing about things.
The literature surfaces six “ways of knowing”. They are:
ƒ

Tenacity: a willingness to accept ideas as valid because they have been accepted
for so long or repeated so often that they seem true.

ƒ

Intuition: accepting ideas as valid because they ‘feel’ intuitively true.

ƒ

Authority: accepting ideas as valid because some respected authority asserts that
the ideas are true.

ƒ

Rationalism: developing valid ideas using existing ideas and principles of logic.

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ƒ

Empiricism: gaining knowledge through observation.

ƒ

Science: a process that combines the principles of rationalism with the process of
empiricism, using rationalism to develop theories and empiricism to test the
theories. (Graziano & Raulin, 2000, p. 9)

Many individuals naively attempt to argue (without scientific bases) that because
a scientific study was funded by a particular company, individual, or by the government,
that it is somehow inherently non-scientific, and the knowledge gained is somehow
unreliable. While unethical researchers may attempt to skew research findings toward a
particular pre-determined outcome, when the steps of the scientific method are rigorously
followed, such unethical findings are more easily identified and such practices are greatly
minimized. Also, many product manufacturers (including drug manufacturers) fund
most, if not all, of their own research. When compared with the vast array of
independent studies conducted on TASER ECDs, it is easily seen that TASER has only
conducted a fraction of the studies. And, many of the most detailed and exhaustive
studies were completed by government entities in the United States and other countries,
including the United Kingdom and Canada.
Scientific research, according to Kerlinger (1964) “is systematic, controlled,
empirical, and critical investigation of hypothetical propositions about the presumed
relations among natural phenomena” (p. 11). Accordingly, there are specific steps to the
scientific research model. They are:
ƒ

Initial idea

ƒ

Problem definition

ƒ

Procedures design

ƒ

Observation

ƒ

Data analysis

ƒ

Interpretation, and

ƒ

Communication (Graziano & Raulin, 2000, p. 44).

These seven steps outline the phases of a research project. “The essence of the
scientific method is the insistence that all propositions be subjected to an empirical test.
Only after this has been done does the scientist decide to accept or reject a proposition”
(Cozby, 1981, p. 5). These phases generally apply to both quantitative and qualitative
research designs, although Cresswell (1994) notes that “the format is much less
standardized in qualitative designs than quantitative designs” (p. 13).

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Peters (2002) notes “the quantitative design permits the investigator to view
reality as being objective, and something that can be objectively measured” (Week 2, p.
1). A quantitative study “. . .is an inquiry into a social or human problem, based on
testing a theory composed of variables, measured with numbers, and analyzed with
statistical procedures, in order to determine whether the predictive generalizations of the
theory hold true” (Cresswell, 1984, p. 2). In contrast, a qualitative study “is defined as
an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on building a
complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants, and
conducted in a natural setting” (pp. 1-2). “Unlike the quantitative approach where the
investigator remains distant from the study and eliminates his or her values, the
investigator in the qualitative approach interacts with those studied, and admits his or her
values and biases” (Peters, 2002, Week 2, p. 1). Quantitative studies have been used in
the majority of TASER device research.
Regardless of the type of research study, qualitative or quantitative, theories play
an important role. Graziano and Raulin (2000) define theory as “a formalized set of
concepts that organizes observations and inferences and predicts and explains
phenomena” (p. 37). “In a theory, concepts are knitted together into a coherent system to
describe or explain some aspect of the world” (Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 29). TASER
device studies generally include theories about electricity, the heart, injury, and so forth.
Variables are also used in quantitative studies.
“Concepts are generally referred to as variables” (Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 29).
Nachmias and Nachmias (1981) note “. . . to move from the conceptual to the empirical
level, concepts are converted into variables” (p. 58). There are several classifications of
variables. Graziano and Raulin (2000) identify six classes of variables: behavioral,
stimulus, organismic, independent, dependent, and constant (p. 59). For purposes of this
opinion, only independent variables, dependant variables, and constant variables will
be discussed.
Independent variables are those variables that are “actively manipulated by the
researcher to see what [their] impact will be on other variables” (Graziano & Raulin,
2000, p. 59). Dependent variables are those variables that the investigator hypothesizes
“will be affected by the independent-variable manipulation” (p. 59). A constant is “any
variable that is prevented from varying (i.e., held constant)” (p. 59). Polit and Beck
(2004) provide the following example of a constant: “If it rained continuously and the
temperature was always 70° F, weather would not be a variable, it would be a constant”
(p. 29).
“The investigator’s concepts first appear as variables, and ultimately as
hypotheses” (Peters, 2002, Week 2 pp. 1-2). “A hypothesis is a statement of the
researcher’s expectations about relationships between the variables under investigation:
Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 49). An example of an hypothesis is: A human being who is
standing in water when shocked by the M26 TASER (independent variable) will be
electrocuted (dependent variable). Most quantitative research studies would then be

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conducted to confirm or disprove this hypothesis using statistical analysis and
procedures.
Although there are other important aspects to the conducting of scientific research
(e.g., data analysis, validity, reliability, sampling, research design, etc.), purpose, time,
and space prohibit them from being discussed. I am prepared to speak about various
scientific research methodologies that have been used to study the safety of the TASER
electronic control devices either at deposition or trial, if so requested.
The foregoing discussion about scientific research serves as part of the bases for
my professional opinion that the majority of TASER-brand weapon research has been
done according to the rigorous standards of the scientific method.
15.

Correlation of TASER-brand electronic control device application to
a part of the human body followed by the person’s dying from alleged
heart or respiratory arrest does not scientifically establish causality.

Does a rooster crowing (cause) make the sun to come up (effect) in the morning?
The answer is “no”. While a rooster’s crowing prior to a sunrise has a temporal
dimension to it, the crowing does not cause the sun to rise. While this clearly
demonstrates what “cause and effect” is not, it also demonstrates the concept of
correlation.
“Correlation is a statistical technique that is used to measure and describe a
relationship between two variables” (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1999, p. 389), and “simply
describes a relationship between two variables” (p. 398). “One of the most common
errors in interpreting correlations is to assume that a correlation necessarily implies a
cause-and-effect relationship between the two variables” (p. 399). Miniun, King, and
Bear (1993) are to the point: “correlation does not establish causation” (p. 158).
Researchers and others are warned, “do not draw causal inferences from correlational
data” (Graziano & Raulin, 2000, p. 171; Graziano & Raulin, 1997, p. 175).
Plaintiff appears to have fallen into the common error of confusing correlation
(TASER electronic control device application followed by death at a different point in
time) as cause-and-effect. This error and confusion are often solely or partially based
upon the reading and reliance of published media or special interest group comments
such as: “[c]oroners have indeed found tasers to have directly contributed to the deaths of
individuals”; “[w]hen targets have been restrained, bound at the wrists or ankles, the use
of taser devices has proved particularly dangerous and life threatening”; and/or,
“[a]pproximately 103 people are reported to have died in the USA and Canada after being
struck by M26 or X26 stun guns”. The instant matter is a classic example of this incorrect
and inappropriate confusion.
Recalling that a scientific researcher manipulates an independent variable to
observe the effect, if any, on the dependent variable, the examples used by Plaintiffs’
make it all but impossible to ascertain “cause-and-effect”. The reason: too many
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independent variables being included in their claims. Specifically, when referring to the
restrained targets, they identify several independent variables: (1) person bound at the
wrists; (2) person bound at the ankles; and, (3) use of a TASER electronic control device.
Plaintiff’s fail to provide a complete description of the person restrained, as the medical
literature and restraint literature often includes other independent variables such as,
cocaine, methamphetamine, PCP, neuroleptic medications, enlarged heart, heart disease,
high blood pressure, and so forth, all which confound the situation, and make it
impossible to conduct a scientific study.
Dr. Jeffrey D. Ho and his colleagues found in a 12 month surveillance study of
162 people who died in police custody that in 22 such events, the police used no force
and that the TASER device “was never associated with instantaneous death (0/50, p =
0.001) (Ho, Miner, Heegaard, & Reardon,). Admittedly there were limitations to this
study, but it finds the TASER electronic control device was not associated with any
person’s instantaneous death. This study is an important example to keep in mind as
cause-and-effect research is discussed.
The fact that “A” precedes “B” does not mean that “A” caused “B” (Peters, 2006,
forthcoming). The researcher must examine causality to determine if there is any “cause
and effect” that can be ruled out when comparing and interpreting the causal inference.
Cook and Campbell (1979) note that causal inference depends upon three factors: First,
“the cause has to precede the effect in time; second, the cause and effect have to be
related; and third,” (p. 18). The United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC) has issued field guidelines regarding causality and inferring cause using criteria
of causation.
The IASC identifies several criteria of causation, which include:
ƒ

Temporality—the cause must always occur before the outcome.

ƒ

Strength of association—How much does the causative variable and the outcome
move together?

ƒ

Consistency—Is the relationship between cause and outcome found over and
over, among different groups or countries?

ƒ

Specificity—Does the cause lead to the same particular outcome over and over,
or does it instead lead to different outcomes?

ƒ

Plausibility—Is there a reasonable explanation available as to how the variable is
linked to the outcome? Is it a plausible linkage? (United Nations, n.d., p. 2)

The United Nations’ criteria is supported by the research literature. Rubin (1983)
defines a causal theory as “one that attempts to explain why certain propositions are true
and how the variables within the propositions are interconnected. Three criteria must be
met to establish a causal theory:
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1.

There must be a set of interdependent propositions. This is often a set of
laws. . .

2.

There must be an indication of the ordering and the linkages between the
variables in the separate propositions.

3.

A mechanism—why something happens—must exist that explains how
such linkages operate. (p. 71)

The “law” that Rubin (1983) makes reference to is scientific law. “A set of laws
is a collection of propositions that seems to be true within a single policy area” (p. 70).
Put another way, the law does not change, and remains constant, such as Newton’s law of
gravity. Supporting Rubin is Polit and Beck (2004). They define a law as “a theory that
has accrued such persuasive empirical support that it is accepted as true” (p. 722).
There have been several rigorous scientific studies where one or more TASER
electronic control devices have been used on subjects without injury and/or death.
Therefore, any suggestion that a TASER electronic control device application to a human
“causes” death (effect) has, at this time, no scientific basis. If there were truly a scientific
cause and effect (TASER electronic control device application, then death) then this
would happen every time according to a “law”, and/or the “cause” leads to the “effect”
when the independent variable (TASER electronic control device) is manipulated to
observe its affect and/or effect on the dependent variable (death of human subject).
There have been tens of thousands of TASER electronic control device
applications on human subjects during training and no deaths have been reported.
Currently there is statistical analysis of thousands of field use and voluntary exposures to,
in part, examine outcome and efficacy of the TASER-brand devices. Also, numerous
entities, including some law enforcement agencies, have extensively studied and analyzed
TASER device deployments, risk-utility analyses, etc.
Based upon the foregoing bases, in my professional opinion, there is no scientific
cause-and-effect research study that has statistically found TASER electronic control
devices to be the direct or proximate cause of death in human subjects. Rather, the
scientific studies that have been conducted have shown the relative safety of the devices,
given the ethical and legal constraints that are imposed on such studies. As one example,
the extensive study by the Canadian Police Research Centre concluded that “"[d]efinitive
research or evidence does not exist that implicates a causal relationship between the use
of CEDs and death." (Review of Conducted Energy Devices, Canadian Police Research
Center, Technical Report TR-01-2006, August 22, 2005.)
Based upon her autopsy report, Dr. Haddix appears to have confused
“temporality” with “cause” when she noted that the TASER ECD contributed to Mr.
Heston’s death based solely on the temporal proximity of its use to his collapse.

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In my professional opinion, Dr. Haddix appears to have misapplied the underlying
definition of causation with respect to the TASER ECD. She appears to be confusing
“causation” with association, and temporality; in short, confusing causation with “risk”.
The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (NICHHD) notes, risk,
as defined by epidemiologists, “refers to the probability that an outcome will occur given
the presence of a particular facts or set of factors. . .Scientifically identified associations
between risk factors and outcomes do not necessarily denote causality.” (NICHHD,
undated, p. 8).
According to the National Safety Council’s analysis of national death statistical
data for 2003 from the National Center for Health Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau , the
following are examples of the odds of dying over a lifetime:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Total odds of dying any cause
Heart attack
Cancer
Stroke
Motor vehicle accident
Suicide
Falling
Firearm assault
Drowning
Air/space accident
Hot weather
Hornet, wasp, or bee sting
Legal execution
Lightning
Earthquake
Flood
Fireworks discharge

1 in 1
1 in 5
1 in 7
1 in 24
1 in 84
1 in 119
1 in 218
1 in 314
1 in 1008
1 in 5051
1 in 13729
1 in 56789
1 in 62468
1 in 79746
1 in 117127
1 in 144156
1 in 340733 (www.nsc.org)

There is no mention in any of the three medical reports regarding the death of Mr.
Heston the probability of dying from a TASER ECD application when on illicit drugs,
etc. The calculation of probabilistic causation contains an element of “chance” that is
predicated upon scientific research methodology and findings. In contrast, a “belief,”
especially one founded in bias or ignorance (a lack of knowledge), is not a scientific basis
for developing an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and/or scientific
certainty. In my professional opinion, often medical examiners appear to be relying, in
part, upon a post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy that only demonstrates a non-scientific
temporal relationship (i.e., timing), which is insufficient, and by itself provides no
scientific basis or evidence of causation.

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16.

Newspaper, magazine, tabloid, and/or electronic articles, radio,
television, and electronic news reports, editorials, memos, and other
non-scientific reports, and opinions about medicine, health issues,
causes of death, electricity, TASER ECDs, TASER, and law
enforcement tactics and procedures are not bases for, or proof of,
causation.

The fallacy that “if it’s in print, it must be true,” is an old axiom that research
studies confirm most people believe (Better Business Bureau, 1993, December, p. 1).
Most recently, this “belief” has been extended to “[i]f it is in the paper it must be true,”
(Card, 2006, March 24), and “[i]f it’s on the Internet, it must be true” (Napoli, 2005).
Unless a literature review is conducted to scientifically confirm or refute the information
contained in articles that people read or sound bites that they hear, the information gets
passed along or retained and often times is wrongly accepted as “true”. This is also true
for textbooks.
Most people are aware of the poem, “[t]he Midnight Ride of Paul Revere”, which
tells of his ride through the Boston countryside to warn people that the British were
coming. The poem’s story has been accepted by many people as true, but in reality,
Revere was stopped and detained by British soldiers outside Boston and never completed
his alleged infamous ride. Mr. William Dawes completed the journey that is wrongly
attributed to Paul Revere.
In earlier times, most people believed the world to be flat, or that the sun revolved
around the earth. Science has shown the fallacy of these two beliefs, but during their
time, those who were advocating a different belief were often called heretics and in some
cases even put to death for challenging these “truths” that were eventually scientifically
shown to be fallacies.
In today’s environment, vitamins serve as one example of how many people
believe in what a store clerk, newspaper article, or other publication tells them about the
efficacy of the vitamin they are considering taking or are taking. In many cases, there is
no rigorous scientific study conducted on the vitamin using statistical analysis and
rigorous research methodology to determine whether or not the claims about a particular
vitamin(s) are valid.
When a literary device that attempts to convince an audience by using words that
conceal a dubious claim, this is known as a slanter (Epstein, 2002, p. 195). Epstein
(2002) argues “slanters are bad because they try to get us to assume a dubious claim is
true without reflecting on it” (p. 195). Examples include, but are not limited to such
sensational headlines such as “Another Taser death,” “Another pepper spray death,” etc.
Often the story that follows is comprised of witness interviews and other non-scientific
information that is used for what is known as proof substitute.
According to Epstein (2002), “a proof substitute is a word or phrase that suggests
the speaker has a proof, but no proof is actually offered” (p. 199). When slanters or
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proof substitutes are used, it shifts the burden of proof to the other party. The other party,
say, the first person to claim that the world is round, is now faced with the monumental
task of “disproving” the opposition’s claim. As scientific researchers know, it takes more
evidence to disprove a claim, than to prove it. As Epstein notes, “It’s easier to ask for a
disproof of your claims than to prove them yourself” (p. 219).
For example, if someone made the claim, “There are purple mice on the dark side
of the moon eating black cheese,” most people would say the claim is false. However,
when the claimant demands the non-believers to “prove him wrong”, the burden of proof
has now shifted to the people who are sure he is wrong, but cannot scientifically prove it.
This is analogous to electricity, TASER, and TASER electronic control devices, plus
other tactics, techniques, and equipment used by law enforcement officers throughout the
world.
Many times people will generalize from their personal experiences (Epstein,
2002, p. 277). “For science, especially the health sciences, generalization along with
analogy dominates reasoning from experiments” (p. 277). If people who read a
newspaper or hear a sound bite about a death attributed to a TASER ECD, even though
there are other intervening variables, they may conclude a claim about the electronic
control device, TASER, law enforcement, or the tactics used by law enforcement officers
and then generalize to make their argument. Generalizations are arguments, such as
“electricity kills”, where people make an analogy to other forms of electricity, which are
different than the electricity output of TASER ECDs.
Reasoning by analogy is quite common because “we have a desire to be
consistent in our lives, to see and apply general principles” (Epstein, 2002, p. 251). When
people reason by analogy, they are beginning with a comparison. In the aforementioned
example, the analogy may be comparing household current or lawn mower or automobile
engine coil wire current to TASER ECD current. While analogies have their place,
usually they are not made explicit enough to serve as good arguments. While
comparisons are very suggestive, they are often incomplete arguments lacking scientific
evidence to support the claim(s).
Since many people, including lawyers, medical professionals, and members of the
judiciary, only know about TASER products based on what they read in a newspaper,
magazine, Internet, or from what they hear on the radio or television, in my professional
opinion, it is very easy for them to develop non-scientific conclusions based upon
analogies and generalizations about electricity, the efficacy of TASER ECDs, and
causation issues, which are not based upon scientific research or scientific findings.
17.

Human subject research guidelines prevent researchers from
conducting unethical research.

Over time, human subjects were the target of “scientific” research that harmed
them, in some cases fatally. Examples include, but are not limited to: German research in
World War II; Japanese research in World War II; and syphilis research conducted on
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Black American subjects by the United States government in the middle of the 20th
Century. These relatively recent research atrocities, in the name of furthering scientific
research, have given rise to human subject research guidelines that govern researchers
and protect human rights.
The American Psychological Association (APA) was one of the earliest groups to
establish human subject guidelines, and ethical standards for the reporting and publishing
of scientific information (American Psychological Association, 2001, pp. 387-396).
Additionally, “most hospitals, universities, and other institutions where research is
conducted have established formal committees and protocols for reviewing proposed
research plans before they are implemented” (Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 156). The name for
such committees is “Institutional Review Board” (IRB). As a former faculty member in a
school of psychology and supervisor of doctoral dissertation and master thesis research, I
am familiar with human subject guidelines on the protection of human rights.
If the institution or researcher is the recipient of federally funded or sponsored
research, the researcher and/or IRB is/are subject to the strict guidelines for the
evaluation of research on human subjects according to the Code of Federal Regulations,
1991, § 46.111. The following is a summarization of the main requirements:
ƒ

Risks to participants are minimized.

ƒ

Risks to participants are reasonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, and
the importance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result.

ƒ

Selection of participants is equitable.

ƒ

Informed consent will be sought, as required.

ƒ

Informed consent will be appropriately documented.

ƒ

Adequate provisions are made to protect participants’ privacy and confidentiality
of the data.

ƒ

When vulnerable subjects are involved, appropriate additional safeguards are
included to protect their rights and welfare. (Polit & Beck, 2004, p. 156)

Rather than provide medical, scientific, or electrical engineering evidence that
supports their unfounded opinion, Plaintiff inappropriately implies that TASER and/or
other independent and qualified researchers have failed to conduct scientific research on
non-healthy individuals. While no generic definition has been suggested for the term
“non-healthy”, limited research is being conducted by Jeffrey D. Ho, M.D. on the effects
of the TASER electronic control devices on the heart, respiratory process, and blood
chemistry. Although the human subjects are law enforcement officers, the initial
screening of the human subject volunteers found that many were not in perfect health or
youthful in age.
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Forcing a human subject who is paranoid schizophrenic (independent variable 1)
to ingest cocaine (independent variable 2), drink alcohol (independent variable 3),
vigorously exercise to simulate fighting with law enforcement officers (independent
variable 4), and then being thrown down on the floor by another during the “exercise”
(independent variable 5), next being restrained by handcuffing the hands behind the back
(independent variable 6) while the human subject is told to forcefully resist (independent
variable 7), even though the human subject has extreme heart disease (independent
variable 8) to see whether or not the human subject dies or is seriously injured (dependent
variable), would not be permitted under the current ethical guidelines for human subject
research as aforementioned. Therefore, those opposed to electronic control devices, such
as the TASER-brand of weapons, are asking researchers to disprove a “negative” that
TASER electronic control devices are unsafe and will cause death.
Although scientific research and field usage of the electronic control devices finds
that it is rare when a person dies after having an electronic control device applied to him
or her, and no research has found that death has been instantaneous as one would expect
to find given the large amount of research on electrocution, opponents ignore, dismiss, or
are ignorant of these studies. Admittedly, it takes more scientific research to disprove a
hypothesis such as TASER electronic control devices are unsafe, but extant scientific
studies have clearly shown these devices are not unsafe when used in a reasonable
manner. In my professional opinion, the basis or bases for scientific opinion is not on
what research has not yet been conducted, but on what research has been conducted and
published.
Based upon the foregoing, in my professional opinion, many individuals want
scientific research conducted on human subjects that would violate existing ethical and
legal guidelines. Often ignoring or downplaying extant scientific research, opponents
often claim that such research always calls for additional research and in some way this
implies that existing scientific research studies are flawed and unreliable. They often rely
upon wording from opposition analysts such as “may increase the risk”, “could have
contributed”, “future research. . .is needed, “possible”, and “there is not enough proof
either way. . .” to undermine the validity and reliability of extant scientific research
studies.
18.

Statements such as “further research is needed” appearing in peerreviewed journal articles or research reports are consistent with
scientific research article and report format and do not imply that the
research findings are flawed and/or unreliable.

The following sentence from an article about electronic control device scientific
research in the medical journal Lancet: “the authors found that ‘future research on what
other cardiac effects tasers and related devices would have in people with pacemakers is
needed’” is an example of what often times opponents cite to imply that because “future
research” is stated as needed, this questions the validity and reliability of the reported
scientific research study. In my professional opinion, language and phrases such as
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“future research is needed” is consistent with scientific research methodology, training,
and scientific research article writing, and can even be found in high school science fair
reports.
The bases for this opinion are several. First, research texts that are commonly
used in the education and training of scientific researchers instruct such learners to
identify areas for future research based upon the limitations of their research study.
Silverman (2000) advised readers to identify “future research that might follow from your
findings, methods, or concepts used” (p. 254). Francis (1988) advises scientific writers to
include “[w]hat new research will have been made possible by your having done the
study” and “what further research may be suggested” (p. 73). Graziano and Raulin
(2000) write: “Suggesting directions for future research is a natural part of any well
designed, well-executed research project” (p. 370). Educational institutions also publish
standard scientific research paper components.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (n.d.) identifies a standard
component of a scientific research paper as “recommend areas for future study and
explain your choices” (p. 6). Columbia University in its publication Writing A Scientific
Research Article, advised writers to include in their discussion section of the article
“What further research would be necessary. . .” (p. 2). It is recommended this phrase be
included in high school research projects (http://corporate/britannca.com/library).
In my professional opinion, authors who include “future research” issues are not
implying that the validity or reliability of their research findings are inferior; rather, they
are including a standard component of a scientific research paper. To infer anything else
is contra to what is written by the researchers.
19.

The TASER ECD is a safe device for the capturing of an individual
such as Mr. Heston.

TASER-brand ECDs have been independently tested by medical research groups
and professionals, and to date, all scientific data indicate they will not cause the heart to
go into dysrhythmia, thereby causing death (Peters, 2006). The TASER M26 has 50,000
(peak open circuit arcing voltage, with 5,000 peak loaded voltage) volts (V), 3.6
milliamperes (mA) (or .0036 amperes [A]), with an energy pulse of 1.76 joules (J)
(nominal at peak capacitor, and 0.5 J delivered into load). The TASER X26 has 50,000
(peak open circuit arcing voltage with 1,200 peak loaded voltage) V, 2.1 mA (or .0021
A), with an energy per pulse of 0.36 J (nominal or peak capacitor, and 0.07 J delivered
into load.
In contrast, external cardiac defibrillators typically generate approximately 400 J,
which further illustrates the safety of TASER-brand devices with regard to the human
heart (Gibault, 2006, p. 2). To see one's hair stand up, many people have placed a hand
on a Van de Graaff generator, which can generate up to 25 million V.

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Other scientific studies that support the safety of TASER-brand ECDs include,
but are not limited to: Maier, Nance, Price, Sherry, Reilly, Klauenberg, and Drummond,
2005; Orange County (FL) Sheriff's Office, 2004; British Columbia Office of the Police
Complaint Commissioner, 2004; Bleetman and Steyn, 2003; United Kingdom Defence
Scientific Advisory Council, 2002; Stratbucker, Roeder, and Nerheim, 2005; Biomedical
Engineering, 2004 (TASER X26); Biomedical Engineering, 2003 (TASER M26); Ho,
Miner, Heegaard, & Reardon, (2006)1. These studies are in addition to the numerous
medical and electrical engineering publications on similar electrical outputs and products
or much higher output systems, products, and/or injuries.
According to Dr. Mark Kroll, when an individual is exposed to a TASER ECD,
(s)he receives a very small amount of energy delivered into the body. A TASER X26 is
powered by two, thee-volt photo cells. The 50,000 volts is the peak open-circuit arcing
voltage to get electricity through the clothing. The voltage delivered into the person
from, say, a TASER X26 is 1,200 V. It gives 19 (very short duration) pulses per second.
Dr. Kroll notes that the current is ZERO 99.8% of the time. Or, to put it another way,
one TASER X26 pulse is "on" for only 1/10,000ths of a second, times 19 PPS equals
19/10,000ths of a second. Given the average current is about .0021 A, the average voltage
is about 2/3 of one volt, less than a AA penlight cell (Kroll, 2006, pp. 5-6). An
ADVANCED TASER M26 is only on for 1/25.000th of a second per pulse, and more
importantly only 1/100,000th of the primary phase of each pulse (each M26 pulse is 40 µs
with the primary phase of each pulse being only 10 µs in duration).
When a TASER ECD is used in drive stun (or touch stun) mode (without the
barbs), it usually will cause friction abrasions, or low grade burns. These are usually
harmless, unless the individual picks at any scab that may form, which can cause an
infection (Peters, 2006).
In my professional opinion, the TASER ECD applications to Mr. Heston were
eventually efficacious in capturing him.
20. TASER International, Inc. did not have a responsibility to provide
training or warnings on what did not occur, and/or on what it did not
cause.
First, medical, scientific, or electrical research did not exist in February 2005 that
would have created a causal link of the application of a TASER ECD with a person’s
death. To the contrary, in disproving the negative allegations, the contemporary scientific
and medical literature surfaces that TASER ECDs do not cause ventricular fibrillation
(VF) (which was not found in Mr. Heston), respiratory arrest, or significantly cause
rhabdomyolosis in humans. In addition to the contemporary scientific and medical
literature, Drs. Panescu, Evans, Kroll, Ideker, and DiMaio, opinions parallel the scientific
and medical findings. Nothing in the medical reports suggested that Mr. Robert Heston
was in VF, consistent with the medical and scientific literature that repeatedly
demonstrated that TASER ECDs do not cause VF.

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It is also clear from reading the documents in this matter that Mr. Heston was a
chronic stimulant abuser and had also ingested an illicit substance, methamphetamine,
and that TASER did not produce it, or provide it to him. Based upon my knowledge of
extant medical studies and research, the levels of methamphetamine in Mr. Heston’s body
were above lesser lethal amounts that were found in others who died from
methamphetamine overdose. In my professional opinion, and in addition to Opinion #6,
TASER did not have a responsibility to conduct training, produce training materials, or
provide warnings about something it did not cause (e.g., intentional ingesting an illicit
substance in lethal doses). There are social agencies that have repeatedly warned
individuals about the dangers of ingesting illicit substances, such as methamphetamine,
cocaine, etc. It would be ludicrous for companies that harvest lumber, such as
Weyerhaeuser, to produce training materials and/or warning to end users, such as
churches and schools regarding the threat of dying from arsonists who may intentionally
set fire to the building while it is inhabited. Similarly, TASER was not required, in my
professional opinion, to conduct training or produce training materials or provide
warnings on issues that are clearly outside of what it could reasonably and/or
scientifically control.
21. TASER did not produce a defective ECD, did not cause Mr. Heston’s
excited delirium, respiratory arrest, rhabdomyolosis, and/or fatal
cardiac arrhythmia.
Based upon my knowledge of extant medical studies and existing scientific
research regarding TASER ECDs, there is no scientific or medical evidence that confirm
TASER ECDs to cause VF or rhabdomyolosis. In my professional opinion, the TASER
ECD was not defective, and worked as designed. However, because Mr. Heston had
intentionally ingested methamphetamine or numerous occasions and was a chronic
substance abuser, the TASER ECD was not as efficacious as when used on a person who
was not as psychologically and physically impaired as Mr. Heston. Mr. Heston’s violent
and bizarre behavior is consistent with what the extant literature surfaces regarding
individuals who are in an excited delirium state (Peters, 2006). Further, TASER ECDs
did not cause Mr. Heston’s respiratory arrest or VF based upon extant medical studies. As
aforementioned, there is noting in the medical reports to suggest that Mr. Heston was in
VF. Finally, Dr Evans’ review of the most recent medical literature clearly shows that
the ECDs did not cause Mr. Heston’s rhabdomyolosis, which is consistent with my
review and understanding of such literature.
Curriculum Vitae
Pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2) my current Curriculum Vitae containing a list
of my relevant formal education, training, experience, publications authored, and a listing
of any cases in which testimony (deposition and/or trial) as an expert has been taken is
attached hereto and made an integral part hereof.

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Compensation
I have been paid my published and customary flat fee of $5000.00 that includes
initial retainer, materials review, report generation, etc. Deposition testimony is invoiced
at a flat daily rate of $2000.00 per day, if the deposition is taken at my location, or
$2750.00 if taken other than at my location, plus direct expenses. On-site visits are
invoiced at $2750.00 per day, plus direct expenses. Time for trial testimony is invoiced
at $2000.00 per day at my location, or $2750.00 per day other than at my location, plus
direct expenses.
Respectfully submitted,

~o~~.'R

~I

J R)

John G. Peters, Jr., M.B.A., Ph.D., CLS
December I, 2006

P4,ro

'

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Limmer, D., O’Keefe, M. F., Grant, H. D., Murray, Jr., R. H., & Bergeron, J.D. (2001).
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sudden and in-custody deaths: Instructor workbook v.2.0. Henderson, NV:
Institute for the Prevention of In-custody Deaths, Inc.
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APPENDIX A
CURRICULUM VITAE
JOHN G. PETERS, JR., Ph.D., CLS
(rev. 12.03.06)

EDUCATION:
Post-Graduate Courses: TASER® Master Instructor Course (non-instructor, 2006) ■
Non-disciplinary Employment and Labor Law (AELE, 2006)■ Jail and Prisoner
Legal Issues (AELE, 2006)■Discipline and Internal Investigations (AELE,
2005■Criminal Justice Agency Compliance & Auditing, (AELE, 2005 ■ Police
Civil Liability and the Defense of Citizen Misconduct Complaints (AELE, 2005 ■
Current Issues in Less Lethal Technology (IACP), 2005 ■ Legal Developments in
Use of Force, with Special Emphasis on TASERS (IACP), 2005 ■ Open
Discussion on Police Suicide, 2005 ■ TASER Use and Law Enforcement: Medical
and Legal Issues (IACP), 2005 ■ TASER Master Instructor Course (noninstructor), 2005 ■ Sudden & In-Custody Death, Restraint Asphyxia Medical
Update (E.R. physician seminar), 2005 ■ Fundamentals of Effective Online
Teaching, 2003, Walden University ■ Employment and Labor Law in
Pennsylvania, 2002, Lorman Educational Services ■ Competency-Based
Curriculum Development in Professional Psychology, Capella University, 2001■
Practicum in On-line Graduate Teaching in Professional Psychology, Capella
University, 2001 ■ Mentoring Graduate Students in Professional Psychology,
Capella University, 2001 ■ On-line Teaching and Training in Professional
Psychology, Capella University, 2001 ■ Intellectual Property in Cyberspace
2000, Berkman Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School ■ Violence
Against Women 2000, Center for Internet & Society, Harvard Law School ■
Certified On-Line Instructor, Walden Institute, 2000 ■ Governmental Accounting
and Finance, Suffolk University, Boston, MA, 1979 ■ Research Methodology,
Criminal Justice Management, University of Baltimore, Baltimore, MD, 1975.
Doctor of Philosophy (Applied Management & Decision Sciences), Walden University,
Minneapolis, MN, 1999. Dissertation: The Patterns, Practices, and Managerial
Impact of Sexual Harassment in a Southern Sheriff’s Department with a
Comparative Analysis to the United States Merit Systems Protection Board
Findings. (Accredited by North Central Association of Colleges)
Master of Business Administration (Marketing/Management), With Distinction,
Graduate School of Management, Babson College, Wellesley, MA, 1978.
(Accredited by New England Association of Colleges)
Master of Science (Public Relations), School of Public Communication, Boston
University, Boston, MA, 1976. (Accredited by New England Assoc. of Colleges)
Bachelor of Science (Criminal Justice), Summa Cum Laude, University of Baltimore,
Baltimore, MD, 1975. (Accredited by Middle States Assoc. of Colleges)
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Associate in Applied Science (Police Science), Cum Laude; Certificate in Corrections,
Cum Laude, Northern Virginia Community College, Annandale, VA, 1972.
(Accredited by Southern States Assoc. of Colleges)
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:
2005 – Present. Institute for the Prevention of In-Custody Deaths, Inc. Henderson,
NV. President, Chief Learning Officer. Administrative, teaching, plus curricula design,
operational guidance, and implementation of in-custody death identification, prevention,
and investigative programs (including jail suicide) for criminal justice, emergency
responders, correctional, and medical agencies across the globe. Developer of
informational video, text, instructor and basic training materials, etc. for training classes,
in addition to identifying and synthesizing the literature on sudden and in-custody deaths
(e.g., metabolic acidosis, agitated delirium, “excited delirium”, asphyxia issues, etc.).
Sponsored first international sudden death, excited delirium Conference in November
2006.
1982 - Present: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc. Henderson, NV. Founder, Vice
Chairman, Chief Operating Officer, and senior instructor. President, 1982 - 1995.
Administrative, marketing, public relations, financial, curricula design, teaching, plus the
design, implementation and evaluation of less-than-lethal and non-lethal instructor and
basic training programs for criminal justice agencies across the globe. Develop policies,
procedures, rules and regulations for agencies on use-of-force training and equipment.
Programs include, but are not limited to: prisoner restraint and transport; in-custody
death; cultural diversity; sexual harassment; tactical handcuffing; TACTICAL OC®,
defensive tactics, expandable & straight baton, firearm disarming and retention, tactical
flashlight™, instructor development, Kubotan®, Kubotai®, edged weapons, and others.
1982 - Present: John G. Peters, Jr. & Associates, Las Vegas, NV. International
Consultant and project manager. Consulting areas include police, correctional, security,
and municipal practices; criminal justice products; civilian use-of-force; management
studies; organizational diagnosis of criminal justice agencies; and, sexual harassment
surveys and studies. Sexual harassment database is the largest identified that focuses
upon criminal justice agencies. Statistical data analysis of TASER® voluntary selfexposures and field uses. Consulted in over 200 legal cases as an expert witness.
1982: United States Secret Service Defensive Tactics Advisory Panel, Washington,
D.C. Member. One of four defensive tactics instructors in the United States appointed to
this pioneering panel. The Panel’s purpose was to design and update existing selfdefense tactics for the U.S. Secret Service (including the Presidential Protection Detail,
and the Uniformed Division).
1982 - 1995: Reliapon Police Products, Inc., Albuquerque, NM. Founder. President.
Former Chairman of the Board, and Vice President of Marketing and Communications
(1983 - 1994). Responsibilities included the overseeing of administrative, marketing,
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public relations, financial, and senior management matters of this specialized mail order,
wholesale, video production, and publishing firm. Recruited and managed nationwide
sales representatives. Products sold in the United States and abroad. Sold the company in
1994. Supervised six people.
1992 - 1994: Institute for Liability Management, Gallagher-Bassett Services, Inc.,
Itasca, IL. Senior Associate. Responsible for the conducting of police department
Liability Assessment Profile Surveys (LAPS), the review of LAPS, plus the consultation/
implementation of LAPS; the development and review of high-risk policies; the teaching
of courses including: Use-of-Force Instructor, Supervisory Responsibility and Liability
Management, Pursuit Liability and Management, etc.; and, criminal justice practices
consultation.
1989 - 1991: Impact Productions, Inc. and Impact Duplications. Albuquerque, NM.
Co-founder. Served in the capacity of Writer-Producer for video productions and scripts.
Wrote and produced two criminal justice informational videos: ASP Tactical Baton and
Defensive Tactics With Electronic Restraints.
1982 - 1985: Tri-Sector Professional Development Institute, Inc. Albuquerque, NM.
Founder. Administrative, marketing, public relations, and other duties, including
curricula design and teaching, consulting, plus the design, implementation, and
evaluation of management and related training programs for governmental, corporate,
and non-profit agencies. Programs included: public budgeting, criminal investigation
management, management by objectives, first-line supervision, discipline, civil liability,
and the writing of policies, procedures, and rules and regulations.
1979 - 1982: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., Braintree, MA. President and
founder. Administrative duties, training, plus the design, implementation, and evaluation
of the PR-24 baton, Kubotan®, and other defensive tactics programs for criminal justice
agencies. Instructed the Los Angles Police Department, the California Highway Patrol,
the North Carolina Highway Patrol, the Las Vegas Metro Police, plus others. Edited and
published an international newsletter for instructors. Hosted the first PR-24 International
instructor seminar.
1978 - 1979: Public Systems Evaluation, Inc., Cambridge, MA. Senior Research
Associate. Responsibilities included the conducting of literature reviews, attitudinal
surveys, and topic area leadership in a project designed to assess and extend research
findings in the area of police field services. Became one of the nation’s leading
authorities in the management of criminal investigations. Visited major California police
departments in 1979 to obtain research and management reports on criminal investigation
management.
1977 - 1978: Braintree Police Department, Braintree, MA. Staff Executive. In this
new position, reported to, and assisted the Police Chief. Director of both the
Administrative Bureau (7 divisions), the Planning and Research Unit, and liaison to the
Auxiliary Police. Functionally reorganized the police department within the first three
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months. Responsible for the department budget (excess of $1 million). Tasks included
writing, editing, and implementing policies, procedures, rules and regulations, Special
Orders, General Orders, special investigations, interviewing applicants, discipline, etc.
6/77 - 12/77: Waltham Police Academy, Waltham, MA. Consultant. In this new
position, assisted the Academy Director with planning, organizing, coordinating,
scheduling, and teaching.
1973 - 1977: York County Sheriff’s Department, York, PA. Deputy Sheriff.
Assignments included all areas of the criminal justice system: courts, corrections, and
police. Assigned to the District Attorney’s Fugitive Squad in 1974. Extensive
experience in investigations and security techniques and applications.
1972 - 1973: Northern York County Regional Police Department, Dover, PA. Police
officer (self-defense specialist). Pennsylvania’s first regional police department.
Conviction rate: criminal arrests--100%; traffic arrests--95%. Designed and instructed
self-defense programs, including the PR-24 baton.
3/72 - 7/71; 6/69 - 6/70: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C. Clerk.
Assigned to the Files and Communications Division. Received extensive training in
public speaking. Instructed FBIRA Judo Club. Received a Letter of Commendation from
then FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover.
ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE:
2005-2006: Neumann College, Aston, PA. Adjunct faculty. Responsible for teaching in
the Master of Leadership degree program. Designed and taught online facilitator course
for undergrad and graduate faculty.
8/00- 12/04: Millersville University, Millersville, PA. Adjunct faculty. Responsible for
the teaching of public speaking. Nominated for Faculty of the Year, 2001 by Student
Senate.
5/03 – 8/04: Walden University, Minneapolis, MN. Adjunct Faculty, School of
Management/Public Administration. Supervise doctoral students in public administration
areas, including but not limited to criminal justice, public safety, etc.
6/02 – 8/03: Regent University, Alexandria, VA. Assistant Professor. Responsible for
the teaching of management, leadership, research, statistics, human resource
management, independent study, and other business management courses; also, On-line
course development. Serve on Admissions Committee and Curriculum Committee, in
addition to advising students. Integral part of the SACS review for program accreditation.
3/00 – 9/01: Walden Institute, Bonita Springs, FL. Faculty. Responsible for teaching
the Institute’s on-line Certified Online Instructor Course.
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9/00 – 6/02: Regent University, Alexandria, VA. Adjunct faculty, Degree Completion
Program. Responsible for teaching orientation, management, and statistics courses in
Regent’s new Degree Completion Program (DCP). Lead instructor for Groups #1A, 5A
and 9A. On-line course developer for the Regent DCP.
1/01 – 3/02: Capella University, Minneapolis, MN. Core Faculty. First, full-time core
faculty in organizational psychology. Responsible for teaching doctoral- and masterlevel courses in organizational psychology, statistics, research methods, personnel, and
psychology of leadership in the School of Psychology. Served on doctoral- and masterlevel dissertation/thesis and comprehensive examination committees. Coauthored,
rewrote, and updated organizational psychology on-line course. Primary designer of
Police Psychology certificate program, including police organizational culture course.
1/01 – 5/01: Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, PA. Adjunct faculty. Responsible
for teaching Organizational Training & Design, and Advanced Public Relations.
2000 – 1/01: Capella University, Minneapolis, MN. Adjunct Faculty. Responsible for
teaching doctoral- and master-level courses in organizational psychology, statistics,
research methods, personnel, and psychology of leadership in the School of Psychology.
Serve on doctoral and comprehensive committees.
1998 –1/01: Eastern College, St. Davids, PA. Affiliate faculty. Responsible for
teaching MBA courses (statistics foundations, business research methods, issues in
management, strategic thinking I & II) and undergraduate courses (research methodology
& statistics; leadership; human resources, ethics, marketing; etc.) in the School of
Professional Studies. Designed, Information and Business Process Systems, as an onground and on-line course in the Management of Information Systems program and the
Adult Intensive Track. Primary instructor for DCP Group # 208.
8/99-5/00: Millersville University, Millersville, PA. One-year, full-time, temporary
faculty appointment. Responsible for teaching three undergraduate courses: introduction
to public relations, public relations writing (writing lab), and public speaking.
1996 - 1998: University of Alabama--Tuscaloosa. Adjunct faculty. Responsible for
teaching criminal justice courses in the Advanced Police Academy.
1978 - 1980: Northern Essex Community College, Haverhill, MA. Lecturer.
Responsible for teaching four courses: Senior Seminar (Police/Security Management);
Security Administration; Principles of Loss Prevention; and Introduction to Security.
Subject areas included the analysis, the design, the management, and the implementation
of police-security programs via a systems approach. Received the highest faculty
evaluation of both full-time and part-time faculty.

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PROFESSIONAL COMMUNITY EXPERIENCE:
2000 - 2005: Civil Service Commission, Millersville, PA. Appointed January 2000 to
serve a six-year term by the Millersville Borough Council. Elected president in April
2000.
1989 - 1994: Academy Estates Residents’ Association, Inc., Albuquerque, NM.
Elected President in 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1994 and Vice President, 1992 by members of
the Association.
1988 - 1991: Sunport Optimist Club, Albuquerque, NM. Chairperson, Finance
Committee, 1988 - 1989. Within six months, guided the Club from a negative to a
positive cash flow. Also served as co-editor of the Club’s weekly newsletter.
1979 - 1982: Town of Braintree (MA) Finance Committee. Member, General
Government Sub-Committee. Responsible for the review and analysis of general town
government budgets. Voted on all town budgets, including schools, police, fire, and
highways. Served during pre- and post-Proposition 2 ½ (similar to California’s
Proposition 13).
1979 - 1982: Town Meeting Member, Braintree, MA. Elected position. Voted on all
financial, administrative, and other matters that affected the Town of Braintree. Town
Meeting members approved all budgets, etc.
OTHER PROFESSIONAL:
Training Advisor:

AMTRAK® Police Department (1996 - present). Instruct and
consult on various police management and training issues (e.g.,
sexual harassment and instructor development).
El Paso County (CO) Sheriff’s Department.
Routt County (CO) Sheriff’s Department (1991 - 1994). Draft,
review, and recommend policies, rules, regulations, plus conduct
training.
Fairbanks (AK) Police Department.
Pulaski County (AR) Sheriff’s Department.

Member:

International Association of Chiefs of Police; Justice Research &
Statistics Association; Faculty, Americans for Effective Law
Enforcement; Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences; Malignant
Hyperthermia Association of the United States; American
Correctional Association (professional member); International

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Police Association (professional member); Who’s Who in the East;
Beta Gamma; Wilson Honor Society; Phi Theta Kappa; Lambda
Alpha Epsilon; United States Combat Judo Association; United
States Judo Association; and, United States Judo Federation.
Consultant:

Various federal, state, city, county, local, and international
criminal justice agencies including, but not limited to: Department
of Energy Central Training Academy, Winnebago County Sheriff’s
Police (IL), Seattle Police Department, Oregon State Police,
Tuscaloosa Police Department, plus corrections, security, and
military agencies. Consulted with agencies in Canada, United
Kingdom, and Australia. Former Advisory Board member to the
Northern Essex Community College Criminal Justice Program.

Academic Awards: Dissertation nominated for academic award (1999).
M.B.A., With Distinction, Babson College. Second highest grade
point average certificate, College of Liberal Arts, University of
Baltimore; B. S. awarded, Summa Cum Laude; A. A. S. and
Certificate in Corrections awarded, Cum Laude, Northern Virginia
Community College.
Elected into Beta Gamma, Wilson, and Phi Theta Kappa National
Honor Societies.
Professional
Awards:

Certified Litigation Specialist: police liability, correction liability;
public employment liability; Certificates of Appreciation: U. S.
Secret Service; Fairbanks (AK)Police Department; University of
Alabama; U. S. Coast Guard; Escambia County (FL) Sheriff’s
Department; MSG, U. S. Marine Corps; plus more.
Letters of Commendation: Albuquerque (NM) Police Department;
Bureau of Indian Affairs; Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission;
California Highway Patrol; University of Alabama--Tuscaloosa;
plus many more.
Honorary Citizen: Louisville, KY; Fairbanks, AK
Captain, Belle of Louisville; Kentucky Colonel

Professional
Skills:

Certified On-Line Instructor; Software programs: Word,
WordPerfect, Excel, PowerPoint, SPSS, BlackBoard, WebCT;
Hypnotist (clinical and investigative); WordPerfect; typing; Jiu-

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Jitsu (holder of a third degree black belt); Judo (holder of a first
degree black belt); International Instructor-Trainer in several lessthan-lethal and non-lethal impact tools, defensive tactics, and
tactics.
Presentations:

PATC, Western Training Conference—Las Vegas, NV (November
2006)
TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management, and Legal Strategies
Conference—Oakland, CA (November 2006)
TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management, and Legal Strategies
Conference—Colorado Springs, CO (August 2006)
TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management, and Legal Strategies
Conference—Portland, OR (July 2006)
PRIMA Conference—Las Vegas (June 2006)
FBI National Academy Graduates—Utah (May 2006)
TASER® Annual Conference (May 2006)
TASER® Master Instructor Program (May 2006)
Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc. (April 2006)
AELE Lethal and Less-Lethal Force (February 2006)
TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management, and Legal Strategies
Conference—Scottsdale, AZ (January, 2006)
TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management, and Legal Strategies
Conference—Scottsdale, AZ (December, 2005)
Michigan Sheriff’s Conference (October, 2005)
Intercourse (PA) Merchants Association (February, 2004)
PRIMA Conference—Reno (May 2003)
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Boston, MA (Feb., 2003)
Civil Air Patrol, Leola (PA) Elementary School (November, 2002)
PRIMA Conference—San Antonio (May 2002)
Wisconsin Sheriff’s Conference (January 2001)
Walden University (December 1998)
Pennsylvania Sheriff’s Conference (July 1998)
Walden University (March 1997)
Walden University (July 1997)
Milwaukee (WI) County Chief’s Association (1995)
Texas Narcotics Officers Association Conference (1988, 1989)
Waltham (MA) Police Academy (March 1982)
Boston University (October 1979)
Waltham Police Department (October 1979)
PR-24 International Instructor Conferences (1979, 1980, 1981)
Boston University (February 1979)
Westwood (MA) Police Department (February 1979)

Panelist:

“Sexual Harassment Research Findings in Local Government.”
PRIMA’s 26th Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV, June 12, 2006.

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©2006. A.R.R

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“Legal, Psychological and Biomechanical Aspects of OfficerInvolved Lethal and Less Lethal Force.” Americans for Effective
Law Enforcement, Las Vegas, NV, February 2006.
“Interactive Mock Trial” (municipal government employment
practices). PRIMA’s 24th Annual Conference, Reno, NV, May 22,
2003.
“Officer-Assisted Suicide: Liability, Training, and Municipal
Concerns.” Milwaukee, WI: Lorman Educational Services,
December 5, 2002.
“Interactive Mock Trial” (employment practices). PRIMA’s 23rd
Annual Conference, San Antonio, TX, May 16, 2002.
“Sexual Harassment: Research Findings In The Law Enforcement
Workplace”, Milwaukee, WI. Lorman Educational Services,
December 4, 2001.
“Police Liability in Wisconsin”, Milwaukee, WI. Lorman
Educational Services, December 14, 2000.
“To Protect and Serve.” KNME Channel 5, Albuquerque, NM:
July 10, 1991. Invited panelist: police “use-of-force”program.
PUBLICATIONS:
Texts:
1.

Official Kubotan® Techniques (with Takayuki Kubota). (1981). Ventura, CA:
Reliapon Police Products, Inc.

2.

Realistic Defensive Tactics. (1981). Ventura, CA: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc.

3.

Official Kubotan Techniques--Civilian (with Takayuki Kubota). (1982).
Braintree, MA: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc.

4.

Defensive Tactics With Flashlights. (1983). Ventura, CA: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc.

5.

Afraid of the Dark? Lite Your Way To Safety (with Laurie A. Peters). (1984).
Ventura, CA: Reliapon Police Products, Inc.

6.

Tactical Handcuffing for Chain- and Hinged-Style Handcuffs. (1989). Ventura,
CA: Reliapon Police Products, Inc.

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©2006. A.R.R

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7.

Prevention and Management of In-Custody Deaths (with A. David
Berman). (1997).Millersville, PA: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc.

8.

Tactical OC®. Ventura, CA: Reliapon Police Products, Inc. (forthcoming 2006).

9.

Identification, Prevention, Management, and Investigation of Sudden and In
-Custody Deaths. Las Vegas, NV: 702 Visual Communications, Inc.
(forthcoming 2006).

ARTICLES, NEWSLETTER, and HANDBOOKS
1.

BLURB. Lancaster: Lancaster (PA) Judo Club, January 1976.

2.

"Search: the Elevated Lying Position." The Sentinel, Spring 1976, pp. 44-45.

3.

"Massachusetts Prison Furlough System. A Failure?" (with George Sacco) The
Advocate, Spring 1976, pp. 2-9.

4.

BLURB. Lancaster: Lancaster (PA) Judo Club, February-March, 1976.

5.

"Massachusetts Prison Furlough System. A Failure?" (with George Sacco) The
Sentinel, Summer 1976, pp. 61-64.

6.

Warren Hall Handbook. Boston: Boston University Press, 1976.

7.

BLURB. Lancaster: Lancaster (PA) Judo Club, April-May, 1976.

8.

"Massachusetts Police Association's Position On Firearms." (with George
Sacco) The Sentinel, Fall 1976, pp. 41-44.

9.

"Management vs Media." The Sentinel, Fall 1976, pp. 63-64.

10.

"Escape From A Full Nelson." The Sentinel, Fall 1976, pp. 63-64.

11.

BLURB. Lancaster: Lancaster (PA) Judo Club, September-October, 1976.

12.

Massachusetts Police Association's 1976 Convention Report (with Bill Brooks,
et al.) Peabody: Massachusetts Police Association, 1976.

13.

"Dealing With Recidivism." The Sentinel, Winter 1976, pp. 57-62.

14.

"This Way Please." The Sentinel, Winter 1976, pp. 49-50.

15.

"Breaking A Front Choke Hold." The Sentinel, Winter 1976, pp. 48-49.

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16.

BLURB. Lancaster: Lancaster (PA) Judo Club, November-December, 1976.

17.

"Pinned On Your Back: Now What?" The Sentinel, Spring 1977, pp. 55-56.

18.

"Bartley-Fox: Is It Working?" (Part I with W. Brooks) The Sentinel, Spring
1977, pp. 51-54.

19.

A Descriptive Study To Determine The Salutation Preference of Massachusetts'
Drivers. Wellesley: Babson College Press, 1977.

20.

"Self-Defense Tips For Women." The Sentinel, Summer 1977, pp. 51-53.

21.

"Bartley-Fox: Is It Working?" (Part II with W. Brooks) The Sentinel, Summer,
1977, pp. 47-50.

22.

"First Names: Should They Be Used During Traffic Stops?" (with R. Goulet)
The Sentinel, Summer 1977, pp. 15-20.

23.

"You Want Me Out, Take Me Out." The Sentinel, Fall 1977, pp. 33-34.

24.

Northern Essex Hospital. Haverhill: Northern Essex Community College, 1977.

25.
26.

"Escape From A Crushing Bearhug." The Sentinel, Winter 1977, p. 27.
"Shoplifting: Its Impact On You." (with D. Slifka). The Sentinel, Winter
1977, pp. 31-32.

27.

"The PR-24: An Answer To The Grey Area." The Sentinel, Spring 1978, pp. 1921.

28.

Hypnosis: An Evaluation of its Impact on Learning In A Police Recruit Class.
Boston: Massachusetts Criminal Justice Training Council, 1978.

29.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., AugustSeptember 1979.

30.

"Defensive and Offensive Blocking: How A New Type of Baton Can Work For
You." Law Enforcement Communications, August 1979, pp. 47-51.

31.

"Police Field Studies: A Review of Evaluation Research." ( with Michael Cahn,
and Edward Kaplan). How Well Does It Work? Review of Criminal
Justice Evaluation, 1978. Washington National Institute of Law
Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1979, pp. 205-236.

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32.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., OctoberNovember, 1979.

33.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., DecemberJanuary, 1980.

34.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., February-March,
1980.

35.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., April-May,
1980.

36.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., June-July,
1980.

37.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., AugustSeptember, 1980.

38.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., OctoberNovember, 1980.

39.

The Connection. Braintree: PR-24 International Institute, Inc., DecemberJanuary, 1981.

40.

"Kubotan: New Police Impact Tool." The Sentinel, Winter 1981, pp. 23-26.

41.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Tri-Sector Professional Development
Institute, Volume 84 No 1, 1984.

42.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Tri-Sector Professional Development
Institute, Volume 84 No 2, 1984.

43.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Tri-Sector Professional Development
Institute, Volume 84 No 3, 1984.

44.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Tri-Sector Professional Development
Institute, Volume 84 No 4, 1984.

45.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Tri-Sector Professional Development
Institute, Volume 85 No 1, 1985.

46.

Instructor Handbook: Use of Force. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1985.

47.

"Tactical Handcuffing Part I." Police and Security News, January-February
1988, pp. 6-23.

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48.

"Tactical Handcuffing Part II." Police and Security News, March-April 1988,
pp. 2-19.

49.

"Mini-Flashlights: More Than An Illumination Device." Police and Security
News, July-August 1988, pp. 3-14.

50.

Tactical Handcuffing: Instructor Handbook. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1988.

51.

Tactical Handcuffing: Test Administrator Manual. Albuquerque: Reliapon
Police Products, Inc., 1988.

52.

"Officer Survival Tip When Using the Beretta 92-F and the H & K 9mm Auto
Pistols." Police and Security News, September-October 1988, pp. 3-14.

53.

"The Truth About Electronic Restraints." Police and Security News,
November-December 1988, pp. 3-14.

54.

"The Expandable Baton: Your Less-Than-Lethal Sidekick." Police and
Security News, January-February, 1989, pp. 5-16.

55.

"Use of Force: Making the Intangible, Tangible." Police and Security News,
March-April 1989, pp. 5-23.

56.

Electronic Restraint Lesson Guide. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1989.

57.

Electronic Restraint Test Administrator Manual. Albuquerque: Reliapon
Police Products, Inc., 1989.

58.

"Reduce Your Training Liability With Performance- and Situational-Based
Testing. "Police and Security News, May-June 1989, pp. 5 - 25.
"Eight Areas Of Potential Negligence For Criminal Justice Trainers,
Supervisors, and Administrators." Police and Security News, JulyAugust 1989, pp. 7 - 30.

59.

60.

"Restraining Prisoners: An Historical View." Police and Security News,
September-October 1989, pp. 6-9.

61.

Firearm Disarming Instructor Guide. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1989.

62.

Firearm Disarming Test Administrator Manual. Albuquerque: Reliapon
Police Products, Inc., 1989.

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63.

Tactical Flashlight Instructor Guide. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1989.

64.

Tactical Flashlight Test Administrator Manual. Albuquerque: Reliapon
Police Products, Inc., 1989.

65.

"Corrective Discipline for the 1990s." Police and Security News, March-April
1990, pp. 14-31.

66.

"Mini-Flashlights Revisited." Police and Security News, July-August 1990,
pp. 5-27.

67.

"Kubotai: New Restraint Tool." Police and Security News, July-August 1990,
p. 40.

68.

"New Restraints For The 1990s." Police and Security News, SeptemberOctober 1990, pp. 12-35.

69.

"Your Whistle: An Important, But Often Overlooked Officer Survival Tool."
Police and Security News, November-December 1990, pp. 3-27.

70.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., Volume
91 No. 1, 1991.

71.

"The Expandable Baton: More Than A Defensive Striking Tool." Police and
Security News, January-February 1991, pp. 5-39.

72.

Tactical Handcuffing Review: Standing Face To Face No. 1 Poster.
Albuquerque: Reliapon Police Products, Inc., January 1991.

73.

Tactical Glove Review. Poster. Vermont: Dakota Corp., March 1991.

74.

"Flashlights: The Ersatz Baton: Part I." Police and Security News, March-April
1991, pp. 10 - 25.

75.

"Rechargeable Flashlights: The Most Cost-Effective Tools You Can Use On
The Job." Police and Security News, May-June 1991, pp. 10-33.

76.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., Volume
91 No. 2, 1991.

77.

"Tactical Gloves: A Must For The Street-Wise Officer." Police and Security
News, September-October 1991, pp. 18-31.

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78.

Chemical Aerosol Spray Instructor Guide. Albuquerque: Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1991.

79.

"Heroes Behind The Badge: National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial."
Police and Security News, November-December 1991, pp. 43-45.

80.

Chemical Aerosol Spray Workbook. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics
Institute, Inc., 1991.

81.

Defensive Tactics Instructor Workbook. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics
Institute, Inc., 1991.

82.

"Selected Medical Implications of Handcuffing." Police and Security News,
January-February 1992, pp. 24-27.

83.

Tactical Flashlight Instructor Workbook. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics
Institute, Inc., 1992.

84.

Kubotan Instructor Workbook. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute,
Inc., 1992.

85.

Side-Handle Baton Instructor Workbook (with Steven Shockley).
Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., 1992.

86.

"Americans With Disabilities Act: Its Affect On Criminal Justice and Security
Agencies." (with Michael Brave, J.D.) Police and Security News, MayJune 1992, pp. 3-63.

87.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., Volume
92 No. 1, 1992.

88.

"OSHA's Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens Standard: How it
Can Cave Your Life! Part I of 2." (with Michael Brave, J.D.) Police and
Security News, July-August 1992, pp. 28-41.

89.

"Americans With disabilities Act: An End to Disability discrimination by Law
Enforcement." (with Michael Brave, J.D.) CVMC Risk Management Case
Study VII, July 1992.

90.

"Why OC? (Oleoresin Capsicum)." (with Michael Brave, J.D.) CVMC Risk
Management Study V, July, 1992.

91.

"Managing The Use of force Through Policies and Procedures." (with Michael
Brave, J.D.) Legal Defense Manual, Brief 92-3, pp. 12-19.

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92.

"New Technology--Oleoresin Capsicum Spray; Policy and Procedure." (with
Michael Brave, J.D.). Legal Defense Manual, Brief 9203, pp. 12-19.

93.

"Electronic Restraint Devices--Policy and Procedures." (with Michael Brave,
J.D.). Legal Defense Manual, Brief 9203, pp. 19-23.

94.

"OSHA's Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens Standard: How It
Can Save Your Life--Part II." (with Michael Brave, J.D.). Police and
Security News, September-October 1992, 20-56.

95.

Edged Weapons Instructor Workbook (with Steven Shockley).
Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., 1992.

96.

Crowd Control Instructor Workbook (with Steven Shockley). Albuquerque:
Defensive Tactics Institute, inc., 1992.

97.

DTI Training Review. Albuquerque: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., Volume
92 No 2, 1992.

98.

"Stop Exposing Yourself." Hatch Gloves Newsletter. Ventura: Hatch Gloves,
Volume 92 No 4, 1992.

99.

Electronic Restraints. Sample Policy (with Michael Brave). Albuquerque:
Reliapon Police Products, Inc., 1992.

100.

Aerosol Sprays. Sample Policy (with Michael Brave). Albuquerque: Reliapon
Police Products, Inc., 1992.

101.

"OSHA's Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne pathogens Standard: How it
Can Save Your Life! (with Michael a. Brave), CVMC Risk Management
Case Study IX, December, 1992.

102.

"New Information On Aids That Can Save Your Life!" (with Michael A. Brave)
Police and Security News, January-February 1993, pp. 13-39.

103.

"Legal Constraints On Human Restraints." The Police Chief, March 1993, pp.
28-35.

104.

"What's Your Use Of Deadly Force Standard?" (with Michael A. Brave) Police
and Security News, May-June 1993, pp. 9-51.

105.

"The Problem With Off-Duty Employment." (with Michael A. Brave) Legal
Defense Manual, Brief 93-2, pp. 3-8.

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106.

"Secondary Employment: Sample Policy and Procedure." (with Michael A.
Brave) Legal Defense Manual, Brief 93-2, pp. 8-12.

107.

"General Use-of-Force Considerations: Sample Policy and Procedure." (with
Michael A. Brave) Legal Defense Manual, Brief 93-2, pp. 25-29.

108.

"Deadly Force: More Than Just Firearms." (with Michael A. Brave) Police and
Security News, September-October 1993, pp. 16-28.
"OC Aerosol Spray Update." (with Michael A. Brave) Police and Security News,
January-February 1994, pp. 13-28.

109.
110.

"Flashlights and Police Liability." (with Michael A. Brave) The Police Chief,
May 1994, pp. 46-49.

111.

"New Study Says OC Sprays Safe." (with Michael A. Brave) Police and Security
News, May-June 1994, pp. 55-58.

112.

"Written Policy: Foundation for Officer Accountability." (with Michael A.
Brave) Legal Defense Manual, Brief 94-2, pp. 3-8.

113.

"Street-Proven, Life-Saving Equipment." The European Government Journal,
Volume 2 No. 4 [1994], pp. 107-111.

114.

"OC Training: Are Facial Sprays Necessary?" Police and Security News,
September-October 1996, pp. 57-61.

115.

Prevention and Remediation of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace.
Millersville, PA: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc., 1996.

116.

“Prevention and Remediation of Sexual Harassment In The Criminal Justice
Workplace—Part I.” Police and Security News, January - February,
1997, pp. 15 - 50.

117.

“Prevention and Remediation of Sexual Harassment In The Criminal
Justice Workplace—Part II.” Police and Security News, March - April,
1997, pp. 3 - 7.

118.

“Hogtying: Take It Off Your Restraint Menu.” Police and Security News,
May - June 1998, pp. 52 - 57.

119.

“Hogtying: Take It Off Your Restraint Menu.” CVMC Risk Management Case
Study #83, July 1998.

120.

“Sexual Harassment: What Can Your Agency Do To Minimize Liability?”
(with G. Gunta). (1998, November) The Police Chief, p. 10.

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©2006. A.R.R

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121.

The Patterns, Practices, and Managerial Impact of Sexual Harassment in a
Southern Sheriff’s Department with a Comparative Analysis to the United States
Merit Systems Protection Board Findings. (1999). Ann Arbor, MI: UMI, Inc.

122.

“Sexual Misconduct: The No Win Lawsuit.” (with G. Gunta). (2001, July).
CVMIC Update, Vol. 11 No.3, pp. 2-3.

123.

“National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial: 10th Anniversary.” Police and
Security News, November-December 2001, p. 78.

124.

“Sexual Harassment: Research Findings in the Law Enforcement Workplace.”
(2001). Police Liability in Wisconsin. Eau Claire: Lorman Education Services, pp.
129-148.

125.

“Great Cause, Great Night.” American Police Beat, December 2000, p. 38.

126.

“Officer-Assisted Suicide: Liability, Training, and Municipal Liability.” (2002).
Police Liability in Wisconsin. Eau Claire: Lorman Education Services, pp. 143169.

127.

“Suicide-by-Cop: Liability, Training, and Municipal Concerns. Police and
Security News, January-February, 2003.

128.

“1754-2004 Hall of Fame: Village of Intercourse, PA.” (2004). Amish Country
News, Volume 15, Issue 2, 17-19.

129.

Identification, Prevention, Management, and Investigation of Sudden and InCustody Deaths, Instructor Workbook v.1.0. (2005, July). Henderson, NV:
Institute for the Prevention of In-Custody Deaths, Inc..

130.

Identification, Prevention, Management, and Investigation of Sudden and InCustody Deaths, Instructor Workbook v.2.0. (2005, October). Henderson, NV:
Institute for the Prevention of In-Custody Deaths.

131.

“Operationalizing Theory Into Practice: Sudden and In-Custody Deaths.” (2005,
December). TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management and Legal Strategies for
Chiefs, Sheriff’s Risk Managers, and Legal Advisors. Scottsdale, AZ: TASER®
International, Inc.

132.

“Force Continuums: Three Questions.” (2006, January). The Police Chief, 8-9.

133.

“Force Continuums: Are They Still Needed?” (2006, January). Police and
Security News.

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134.

“Operationalizing Theory Into Practice: Sudden and In-Custody Deaths.” (2006,
January). TASER® Use of Force, Risk Management and Legal Strategies for
Chiefs, Sheriff’s Risk Managers, and Legal Advisors. Scottsdale, AZ: TASER®
International, Inc.

135.

“Sudden and In-Custody Deaths.” (2006, February). AELE legal, psychological
and biomechanical aspects of officer-involved lethal and less lethal force
workshop workbook. Park Ridge, IL. Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.

136.

“Sudden death, ‘excited’ delirium, and issues of force: Part I.” (2006, MarchApril). Police & Security News, 104-107.

137.

“Sudden death, ‘excited delirium, and issues of force: Part II--TASER® and
EMDs.” (2006, May-June). Police & Security News.

138.

“Sudden death, ‘excited delirium,’ and issues of force: Part III: Behavioral Cues
and Response Plan for Sudden and In-Custody Deaths.” (2006, July-August).
Police & Security News, 44-49.

139.

“Highlights From the 2006 TASER Conference.” (2006, July-August). Police &
Security News, 56-59.

140.

“Sudden Death, ‘Excited Delirium,’ and Issues of Force: Part IV: A Blueprint for
Forensic Investigators.” (2006, September-October). Police & Security News.

141.

“Management Issues in law Enforcement Litigation.” (2006, October). AELE
Police Civil Liability. Park Ridge, IL: Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.

142.

“In-Custody Death and Injuries.” (2006, October). AELE Police Civil Liability.
Park Ridge, IL: Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.

143.

“The Aftermath of an Event.” (2006, October). AELE Police Civil Liability. Park
Ridge, IL: Americans for Effective Law Enforcement.

144.

“Sudden Death, ‘Excited Delirium,’ and Issues of Force: Part V: Preventing
Jail Suicide.” (2006, November-December). Police & Security News.

SCRIPTS:
1.

Defensive Tactics With Flashlights. Produced by Alan Popkin. Directed by
Drew Michaels. 45 min. Wild Wing Productions, 1986. Videocassette.

2.

Tactical Handcuffing: Part I. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick
Eisleben. 60 min. M & C Productions, 1986. Videocassette.

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3.

Tactical Handcuffing: Part II. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick
Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1986. Videocassette.

4.

Basic Defense With Flashlights. Produced by Alan Popkin. Directed by Drew
Michaels. 20 min. Wild Wing Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

5.

Basic Tactical Handcuffing: Part I Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

6.

Basic Tactical Handcuffing: Part II. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

7.

LaChoy: Menu of Fortune. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick
Eisleben. 45 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

8.

Realistic Firearm Disarming: Part I. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed
by Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

9.

Realistic Firearm Retention: Part II. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

10.

Defensive Tactics With Mini-Flashlights. Produced by Marc Knutson.
Directed by Rick Eisleben. 90 min. M & C Productions, 1987.
Videocassette.

11.

Realistic Side-Handle Baton Techniques: Part I. Produced by Marc Knutson.
Directed by Rick Eisleben. 60 min. M & C Productions, 1987.
Videocassette.

12.

Realistic Side-Handle Baton Techniques: Part II. Produced by Marc Knutson.
Directed by Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987.

13.

Mission Possible. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick Eisleben.
M & C Productions, 1987.

14.

Basic Firearm Disarming. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick
Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

15.

Basic Firearm Retention. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by Rick
Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

16.

Basic Mini-Flashlight (Kubotan) Techniques: Part I. Produced by Marc
Knutson. Directed by Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987.
Videocassette.

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17.

Basic Mini-flashlight (Kubotan) Techniques: Part II. Produced by Marc
Knutson. Directed by Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987.
Videocassette.

18.

Basic Side-Handle Baton: Part I. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

19.

Basic Side-Handle Baton: Part II. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

20.

Basic Side-Handle Baton: Part III. Produced by Marc Knutson. Directed by
Rick Eisleben. 30 min. M & C Productions, 1987. Videocassette.

21.

REFAST Dynamic Tactical Firearms Training System: Promotional Video
Tape. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by Rick Eisleben. 30
min. Impact Productions, Inc., 1989. Videocassette.

22.

REFAST Dynamic Tactical Firearms Training System: Operational Video
Training Manual. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by Rick
Eisleben.45 min. Impact Productions, Inc., 1989. Videocassette.

23.

ASP Tactical Baton. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by Susan
Sherman. 60 min. Impact Productions, Inc., 1989. Videocassette.

24.

Defensive Tactics With Electronic Restraints. Produced by John G. Peters,
Jr. Directed by Susan Sherman. 45 min. Impact Productions, Inc., 1989.
Videocassette.

25.

Kubotai. Produced by Takayuki Kubota. Directed by Val Malochevic. 30
min. International Karate Association, 1990. Videocassette.

26.

Tactical Flashlight: An Introduction. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr.
Directed by Susan Sherman. 90 min. Impact Productions, division of
Reliapon Police Products, Inc. 1991. Videocassette.

27.

Defensive Tactics With Chemical Aerosol Sprays. Produced by John G.
Peters, Jr. Directed by Susan Sherman. 50 min. Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1992. Videocassette.

28.

BodyGuard: Personal Protection with Chemical Aerosol Sprays. Produced by
John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by Susan Sherman. 30 min. Reliapon Police
Products, Inc., 1992. Videocassette.

29.

Stop Exposing Yourself: Reducing Personal Risk Through Leather Gloves.

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Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by Susan Sherman. 30 min.
Reliapon Police Products, Inc., 1992. Videocassette.
30.

Pneu-Gun, Ballistic Baton: An Introduction. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr.
Directed by Susan Sherman. 10 min. Reliapon Police Products,
Inc., 1992. Videocassette.

31.

Prevention and Management of In-Custody Death. Produced by John G.
Peters, Jr. Directed by John G. Peters, Jr. and Mark Myers. 45 min.
American Handcuff Co, Inc., 1998. Videocassette.

32.

Response to Sexual Harassment: Organizational Victory or Checkmate? Produced
by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by David A. Donovan and John G. Peters,
Jr. 42 min. Millersville University, 2002. Videocassette.

33.

The Old Woodshed. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by David A.
Donovan and John G. Peters, Jr. Commemorative Intercourse, 2004.
Videocassette & DVD.

34.

Commemorative Intercourse (PA):1754-2004. Produced and written by John G.
Peters, Jr. Directed by David A. Donovan and John G. Peters, Jr.
Commemorative Intercourse, 2004. Videocassette & DVD.

35.

Intercourse (PA) 250th Celebration & Heritage Parade. Produced by John G.
Peters, Jr. Directed by John G. Peters, Jr. Commemorative Intercourse,
2004. Videocassette & DVD.

36.

Intercourse (PA) 200th Celebration: 1954. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr.
Directed by Alvin Smoker and John G. Peters, Jr. (forthcoming, Winter
2005). Videocassette & DVD.

37.

Tactical OC®. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by David A. Donovan
and John G. Peters, Jr. (forthcoming, 2006). DVD.

38.

Identification, Prevention, Management, and Investigation of Sudden and InCustody Deaths. Produced by John G. Peters, Jr. Directed by John G.
Peters, Jr. (forthcoming, 2006). DVD.

Cassette Recordings:
1.

Berman, A. David, & Peters, Jr., John G. (Speakers). (1995). Officer safety
update. Millersville, PA: Defensive Tactics Institute, Inc.

2.

Berman, A. David, & Peters, Jr., John G. (Speakers). (1995). Lesson guides

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and performance-based testing. Millersville, PA: Defensive Tactics
Institute, Inc.
3.

Adams, J. T., & Peters, Jr., John G. (Speakers). (1998). Prevention and
Management of Sudden In-Custody Death. Millersville, PA: Defensive
Tactics Institute, Inc.

On-line Course Development:
1.

“Certified Online Facilitator .” Neumann College, 2006.

2.

“Developing Online Courses.” Neumann College, 2006.

3.

“Master Syllabus: Emergency Management.” Walden University, 2004.

4.

“Critical Thinking.” (Course Developer.) Regent University, 2003.

5.

“Police Organizational Culture.” (Course Developer with Dr. Julian Timothy
Adams). Capella University, 2002.

6.

“Vocational Psychology.” (Course Developer with Dr. Wayland Secrest).
Capella University, 2002.

7.

“Organizational Psychology.” (Course Collaborator with Dr. Karen Yasgoor).
Capella University, 2001.

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APPENDIX B

John G. Peters, Jr. & Associates
1550 West Horizon Ridge Parkway
Suite A, #337
Henderson, Nevada 89012
John G. Peters, Jr., M.B.A., Ph.D., CLS has testified in the following cases during the last
four years (2003, 2004, 2005, 2006):
2003

Deposition

Trial

Hong Kong, SAR v. Lawrence

X

Dasher, et al. v. Reidy, et al.

Daubert Hearing

Dasher, et al. v. Reidy, et al.

X

Debebe v. Prince Georges County, et al.

X

2004
2005
Stiebling v. Sheriff Harry Lee, et al.

X

Shah v. District of Columbia

X

X

2006
Workman v. Tangue Verde Unified
School District, et al.

X

Nunez v. San Joaquin County, et al.

X

X

Adams v. West Coast Protection
and Patrol, et al

X

X

Quinette v. Henry Lee, et al

X

Calhoun v. City of Chicago, et al.

X

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Zivonivich v. Leon County Sheriff’s Dept. X

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