A brief from

Aug 2015

Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring
High Cost, Low Return
Penalty increases enacted in 1980s and 1990s have not reduced drug use or recidivism

Overview
More than 95,000 federal prisoners are serving time for drug-related offenses—up from fewer than 5,000 in
1980.1 Changes in drug crime patterns and law enforcement practices played a role in this growth, but federal
sentencing laws enacted during the 1980s and 1990s also have required more drug offenders to go to prison—
and stay there much longer—than three decades ago.2 (See Figure 1.) These policies have contributed to
ballooning costs: The federal prison system now consumes more than $6.7 billion a year, or roughly 1 in 4 dollars
spent by the U.S. Justice Department.3
Despite substantial expenditures on longer prison terms for drug offenders, taxpayers have not realized a
strong public safety return. The self-reported use of illegal drugs has increased over the long term as drug
prices have fallen and purity has risen.4 Federal sentencing laws that were designed with serious traffickers in
mind have resulted in lengthy imprisonment of offenders who played relatively minor roles.5 These laws also
have failed to reduce recidivism. Nearly a third of the drug offenders who leave federal prison and are placed on
community supervision commit new crimes or violate the conditions of their release—a rate that has not changed
substantially in decades.6

Figure 1

Average Prison Sentence for Federal Drug Offenders Rose 36%
Sentences for all other offenders declined 3%
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

74.2

Months

54.6

Months

Average sentence length
for drug offenders

1980

2011

48.9

Months

47.3

Months

Average sentence length
for all other offenders

Notes: Figures were calculated using weighted
average sentences of drug offenders and nondrug
offenders. Averages do not include sentences of
probation. In 2012, the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts began calculating average sentence
length using median months rather than mean
months. As a result, comparable historical data are
available only through 2011. In 1992, the end of the
federal fiscal year changed from June 30 to Sept. 30.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts Series, Table D-5,
1980-2011
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

More imprisonment, higher costs
Congress increased criminal penalties for drug offenders during the 1980s—and, to a lesser extent, in the
1990s—in response to mounting public concern about drug-related crime.7 In a 1995 report that examined
the history of federal drug laws, the U.S. Sentencing Commission found that “drug abuse in general, and
crack cocaine in particular, had become in public opinion and in members’ minds a problem of overwhelming
dimensions.”8 The nation’s violent crime rate surged 41 percent from 1983 to 1991, when it peaked at 758 violent
offenses per 100,000 residents.9
Congress increased drug penalties in several ways. Lawmakers enacted dozens of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws that required drug offenders to serve longer periods of confinement. They also established
compulsory sentence enhancements for certain drug offenders, including a doubling of penalties for repeat
offenders and mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those convicted of a third serious
offense. These laws have applied broadly: As of 2010, more than 8 in 10 drug offenders in federal prisons were
convicted of crimes that carried mandatory minimum sentences.10
Also during the 1980s, Congress created the Sentencing Commission, an appointed panel that established strict
sentencing guidelines and generally increased penalties for drug offenses. The same law that established the
commission, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, also eliminated parole and required all inmates to serve at least
85 percent of their sentences behind bars before becoming eligible for release.
Federal data show the systemwide effects of these policies:
•• Probation has all but disappeared as a sanction for drug offenders. In 1980, federal courts sentenced 26
percent of convicted drug offenders to probation. By 2014, the proportion had fallen to 6 percent, with judges
sending nearly all drug offenders to prison.11 (See Figure 2.)
•• The length of drug sentences has increased sharply. As shown in Figure 1 above, from 1980 to 2011 (the latest
year for which comparable statistics are available), the average prison sentence imposed on drug offenders
increased 36 percent—from 54.6 to 74.2 months—even as it declined 3 percent for all other offenders.12
•• The proportion of federal prisoners who are drug offenders has nearly doubled. The share of federal
inmates serving time for drug offenses increased from 25 percent in 1980 to a high of 61 percent in 1994.13
This proportion has declined steadily in recent years—in part because of rising prison admissions for other
crimes—but drug offenders still represent 49 percent of all federal inmates.14
•• Time served by drug offenders has surged. The average time that released drug offenders spent behind bars
increased 153 percent between 1988 and 2012, from 23.2 to 58.6 months.15 This increase dwarfs the 39 and
44 percent growth in time served by property and violent offenders, respectively, during the same period.16
The increased imprisonment of drug offenders has helped drive the explosive overall growth of the federal prison
system, which held nearly 800 percent more inmates in 2013 than it did in 1980.17 One study found that the
increase in time served by drug offenders was the “single greatest contributor to growth in the federal prison
population between 1998 and 2010.”18
Growth in the prison population has driven a parallel surge in taxpayer spending. From 1980 to 2013, federal
prison spending increased 595 percent, from $970 million to more than $6.7 billion in inflation-adjusted
dollars.19 Taxpayers spent almost as much on federal prisons in 2013 as they paid to fund the entire U.S. Justice
Department—including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and all U.S.
attorneys—in 1980, after adjusting for inflation.20

2

Figure 2

Probation Has Virtually Disappeared as a Sanction for Federal
Drug Offenders
Courts sentenced nearly all convicted drug defendants to prison in 2014
1980

2014

73
26

% Prison
% Probation

94
6

% Prison
% Probation

Note: In 1980, 1 percent of convicted drug offenders received other sanctions, such as fines. In 1992, the end of the federal
fiscal year changed from June 30 to Sept. 30.
Source: Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts Series, Table D-5, 1980-2014
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

Increased availability and use of illegal drugs
Measurements of the availability and consumption of illegal drugs in the United States are imprecise. Users may
be reluctant to share information about their illegal behavior, and national surveys may not capture responses
from specific populations—such as homeless or incarcerated people—who may have high rates of drug use. Drug
markets also vary considerably from city to city and state to state, and among different drugs.
Despite these limitations, the best available data suggest that increased penalties for drug offenders—both at the
federal and state levels—have not significantly changed long-term patterns of drug availability or use:
•• Illegal drug prices have declined. The estimated street price of illegal drugs is a commonly cited measure
of supply. Higher prices indicate scarcity while lower prices suggest wider availability. After adjusting for
inflation, the estimated retail prices of cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine all decreased from 1981 to
2012, even as the purity of the drugs increased.21
•• Illegal drug use has increased. The share of Americans age 12 and older who said in a national survey that
they had used an illicit drug during the previous month increased from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 9.2 percent—or
nearly 24 million people—in 2012.22 (See Figure 3.) An increase in marijuana use helped drive this trend, more
than offsetting a decline in cocaine use.
Just as enhanced criminal penalties have not reduced the availability or use of illegal drugs, research shows that
they are unlikely to significantly disrupt the broader drug trade. One study estimated that the chance of being
imprisoned for the sale of cocaine in the U.S. is less than 1 in 15,000—a prospect so remote that it is unlikely to
discourage many offenders.23 The same applies for longer sentences. The National Research Council concluded

3

in a 2014 report that mandatory minimum sentences for drug and other offenders “have few if any deterrent
effects.”24 Even if street-level drug dealers are apprehended and incarcerated, such offenders are easily replaced,
ensuring that drug trafficking can continue, researchers say.25
To be sure, many criminologists agree that the increased imprisonment of drug offenders—both at the federal
and state levels—played a role in the ongoing nationwide decrease in crime that began in the early 1990s. But
research credits the increased incarceration of drug offenders with only a 1 to 3 percent decline in the combined
violent and property crime rate.26 “It is unlikely that the dramatic increase in drug imprisonment was costeffective,” one study concluded in 2004.27

Figure 3

Illegal Drug Use Has Increased

Share of population 12 and older reporting
use of any illegal drug within previous month

Nearly 1 in 10 reported using an illegal drug in the past month
14%
12%

9.2%

10%
8%
6%
4%

6.7%

2%
0%
‘90

‘92

‘94

‘96

‘98

‘00

‘02

‘04

‘06

‘08

‘10

‘12

Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2014, Table 2, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndcs_data_supplement_2014.pdf
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

Penalties do not match roles
The federal government is responsible for combating illegal drug trafficking into the United States and across
state lines. As a result, traffickers represent the vast majority of the drug offender population in federal prisons.28
Federal sentencing laws have succeeded in incarcerating kingpins and other serious drug offenders for whom
prison is the appropriate option. At the same time, however, they have resulted in the lengthy imprisonment of
many offenders who played relatively minor roles in drug trafficking.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 demonstrates this trend. The law established a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence for “serious” drug traffickers, defined as those convicted of crimes involving a minimum amount of

4

illegal drugs, including 100 grams of heroin or 500 grams of cocaine. The
law also created a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence for “major”
traffickers—those convicted of crimes involving larger amounts, including
1 kilogram of heroin or 5 kilograms of cocaine.29 Under the law, mandatory
minimum sentences double from five to 10 years—and from 10 years to
20—for second offenses.
Although the law was intended to separate offenders into lower and
higher degrees of culpability based on the amount of drugs involved in
their crimes, these distinctions have not always captured individuals’ true
roles in drug distribution networks. “The quantity of drugs involved in an
offense is not as closely related to the offender’s function in the offense as
perhaps Congress expected,” the Sentencing Commission concluded in a
special report to Congress in 2011.30
Historical data limitations make it difficult to assess whether the drug
traffickers incarcerated in federal prisons today are more or less serious
than those of three decades ago. But the Sentencing Commission’s report
underscores that federal resources have not been directed at the most
serious drug traffickers.31 According to the report, in 2009:

The quantity of
drugs involved in
an offense is not
as closely related
to the offender’s
function in
the offense as
perhaps Congress
expected.”
U.S. Sentencing
Commission, 2011

•• Those sentenced for relatively minor roles represented the biggest
share of federal drug offenders. More than a quarter of federal drug
offenders—and two-thirds of federal marijuana offenders—were
“couriers” or “mules,” the lowest-level trafficking roles on a culpability
scale developed by the commission.32 (See Figure 4.) The average
sentences for couriers and mules—defined as those who transport
illegal drugs either in a vehicle or on their person—were 39 and 29
months, respectively.
•• Nearly a fifth of federal drug offenders were street dealers. Offenders
defined as “street-level dealers”—those who distributed an ounce or
less of illegal drugs directly to users—made up 17 percent of federal
drug offenders and nearly half of federal crack cocaine offenders.33 The
average sentence for these individuals was 77 months.
•• The highest-level traffickers represented a comparatively small share
of federal drug offenders. Those defined as “high-level suppliers” or
“importers”—the top function on the culpability scale—represented
11 percent of federal drug offenders. The average sentence for these
offenders was 101 months.
•• Sentence lengths did not always align with offenders’ functions.
Although lower-level functionaries generally received much shorter
average sentences than higher-level offenders, there were notable
exceptions: Midlevel “managers,” for example, received an average
sentence of 147 months, or nearly four years longer than the 101-month
average sentence imposed on the highest-level traffickers.

5

Figure 4

Nearly Half of Those Sentenced for Drug Crimes in 2009 Were
Street-Level Dealers or Below
Suppliers and importers represented just 11%
High-level supplier or importer
Organizer or leader
Grower or manufacturer

10.9%
3.1%
4.0%

Wholesaler

21.2%

Manager

1.1%

Supervisor

1.1%

Street-level dealer
Broker

17.2%
3.1%

Courier
Mule

23.0%
4.8%

Note: Statistics represent a 15 percent sample of all drug offenders sentenced in federal courts in 2009. Categories do not
add up to 100 percent because they omit 10.5 percent of offenders—those who carried out roles defined as “secondary” or
“miscellaneous,” such as lookout, pilot, and bodyguard.
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System
(October 2011), Appendix D, Figure D-2, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/
mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

It is important to note that federal law permits two exemptions to mandatory minimum sentences that frequently
benefit many lower-level drug traffickers.34 One allows sentence reductions for those who provide prosecutors
with “substantial assistance” during the course of an investigation. The other, known as the “safety valve,” applies
to offenders who meet five specific criteria, including a limited criminal history and a nonleadership role in the
drug trade.
Although these sentence reduction tools are intended to—and generally do—benefit low-level traffickers the
most, there are exceptions. More than half of offenders deemed to be high-level suppliers or importers, for
example, received relief from mandatory minimum penalties in 2009, compared with less than a third of those
classified as street-level dealers—despite the much lower culpability level of the latter group.35

6

Post-prison outcomes unchanged
Research has found little relationship between the length of prison terms and recidivism rates generally—a
pattern that holds among drug offenders at the federal level.
Of the more than 20,000 federal drug offenders who concluded periods of post-release community supervision
in 2012 (the latest year for which statistics are available), 29 percent either committed new crimes or violated
the conditions of their release.36 This proportion has changed little since the mid-1980s, when sentences and time
served began increasing sharply.37
Conversely, targeted reductions in prison terms for certain federal drug offenders have not led to higher
recidivism rates. In 2007, the Sentencing Commission retroactively reduced the sentences of thousands of crack
cocaine offenders.38 A follow-up study on the effects of this change found no evidence of increased recidivism
among offenders who received sentence reductions compared with those who did not.39 (See Figure 5.) In 2010,
Congress followed the Sentencing Commission’s actions with a broader, statutory reduction in penalties for crack
cocaine offenders.

Figure 5

Sentence Reductions Did Not Increase Recidivism Among
Federal Crack Cocaine Offenders

Those who received retroactive relief through 2007 policy change fared
slightly better than those who did not
50%
40%

43.3%

48.0%

30%
20%
10%
0%
Offenders receiving
sentence reductions

Offenders not receiving
sentence reductions

Note: Recidivism is defined as rearrest, reconviction, or revocation of an offender’s release within a five-year period after
imprisonment.
Source: U.S. Sentencing Commission, Recidivism Among Offenders Receiving Retroactive Sentence Reductions: The 2007 Crack
Cocaine Amendment, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/
miscellaneous/20140527_Recidivism_2007_Crack_Cocaine_Amendment.pdf
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

7

Timeline
Congressional Actions Sparked Dramatic Rise in Federal
Inmate Count

Series of laws over 30 years increased prison terms for drug offenders
Sources: Congress.gov; U.S. Sentencing Commission; U.S. Justice Department; Bureau of Justice Statistics; and Bureau of Prisons
© 2015 The Pew Charitable Trusts

1995

100,250
inmates

1990

65,526
1985
1980

24,363

inmates

40,223
inmates

inmates

1984

1986

1988

1994

Congress passes the
Sentencing Reform Act,
which abolishes federal
parole and requires all
inmates to serve 85% of
their sentences. The law
also establishes the U.S.
Sentencing Commission,
which sets guidelines
that federal judges
must follow when they
sentence offenders.

Congress passes the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, establishing 5-year
and 10-year mandatory minimum
sentences for “serious” and “major”
drug offenders, respectively, based
on the weight of drugs involved in
their crimes. One provision of the law
requires crack cocaine offenders to
serve the same mandatory minimum
sentence as offenders whose crimes
involved 100 times more of the same
drug in its powder form.

Congress passes the second AntiDrug Abuse Act, which creates
mandatory minimum sentences
for drug-trafficking conspiracies
and a 5-year mandatory
minimum penalty for simple
possession of crack cocaine. The
law also denies federal benefits
to those convicted of drugtrafficking offenses and sets a
national policy goal of creating a
drug-free United States by 1995.

Congress passes the
Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement
Act, which increases
penalties for a variety
of crimes but also
establishes a “safety
valve” that allows
federal judges to
depart from mandatory
minimum sentences for
certain drug offenders.

8

2010

209,771

2005

inmates

187,618

2015

207,339
inmates

inmates

2000

145,416
inmates

2010

2011

2013

2014

Congress passes the Fair Sentencing
Act, which reduces crack cocaine
penalties by increasing the amount
of the drug needed to trigger
mandatory minimum sentences.
The law also eliminates the 5-year
mandatory minimum sentence
for the simple possession of crack
cocaine, marking the first time
since the Nixon administration that
Congress has repealed a mandatory
minimum penalty.

After congressional passage
of the Fair Sentencing Act,
the Sentencing Commission
makes corresponding,
retroactive changes in
federal cocaine sentencing
guidelines. The commission
estimates that the new
policy could reduce
sentences for as many as
12,000 offenders by an
average of 37 months.

Then-U.S. Attorney General
Eric Holder announces
creation of the Justice
Department’s “Smart on
Crime Initiative,” a multiyear
effort to prioritize federal
prosecutorial resources for
high-level drug offenders
and move away from the
use of mandatory minimum
penalties for lower-level
offenders.

The Sentencing Commission
amends federal sentencing
guidelines to retroactively
reduce the penalties for
most drug-trafficking
offenses. The commission
estimates that the change
could affect as many as
46,000 drug offenders,
reducing sentences by an
average of 19%, or more
than 2 years.

9

Conclusion
The federal government has a uniquely important role to play in the fight against the illegal drug trade: It is
responsible for preventing the trafficking of narcotics into the United States and across state lines. In response
to rising public concern about high rates of drug-related crime in the 1980s and 1990s, Congress enacted
sentencing laws that dramatically increased penalties for drug crimes, which in turn sharply expanded the
number of such offenders in federal prison and drove costs upward. These laws—while playing a role in the
nation’s long and ongoing crime decline since the mid-1990s—have not provided taxpayers with a strong public
safety return on their investment.
The availability and use of illegal drugs has increased even as tens of thousands of drug offenders have
served lengthy terms in federal prisons. Recidivism rates for drug offenders have remained largely unchanged.
Meanwhile, federal sentencing laws that were designed to focus penalties on the most serious drug traffickers
have resulted in long periods of imprisonment for many offenders who performed relatively minor roles in the
drug trade.
In response to these discouraging trends, federal policymakers recently have made administrative and statutory
revisions that have reduced criminal penalties for thousands of drug offenders while maintaining public safety
and controlling costs to taxpayers.

Endnotes
1	

For the current figure, see “Inmate Statistics - Offenses,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, accessed June 29, 2015, http://www.bop.gov/about/
statistics/statistics_inmate_ offenses.jsp. For the 1980 figure, see University at Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, Table
6.57, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t657.pdf.

2	 Nathan James, The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Overview, Policy Changes, Issues, and Options (Washington: Congressional Research
Service, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf.
3	

The Pew Charitable Trusts, “Federal Prison System Shows Dramatic Long-Term Growth” (February 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/
media/Assets/2015/02/Pew_Federal_Prison_Growth.pdf.

4	 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2014, Tables 1 and 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndcs_data_supplement_2014.pdf. Pew used the 1990-2012 period to capture all available
yearly data.
5	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October
2011), Chapter 8, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimumpenalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf.
6	 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics Statistical Tables Series 2005-2012, Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics Series 19842004, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=65.
7	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, Chapter 2, http://www.ussc.gov/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/special-report-congress.
8	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, Chapter 6, http://www.ussc.gov/report-cocaine-and-federalsentencing-policy-2.
9	 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting data tool, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov.
10	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011),
Chapter 8, 165, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimumpenalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf.
11	 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts Series, Table D-5, 1980-2014, http://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts. The 1980 report is available in print only. In 1992, the end of
the federal fiscal year changed from June 30 to Sept. 30.

10

12	 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the U.S. Courts Series, Table D-5, 1980-2011. The 1980 report is available in
print only. Figures calculated using weighted average sentences of drug offenders and nondrug offenders. Average does not include
sentences of probation. In 2012, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts began calculating average sentence length using median
months rather than mean months. As a result, comparable historical data are available only through 2011. In 1992, the end of the federal
fiscal year changed from June 30 to Sept. 30.
13	 University at Albany, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 2003, Table 6.57, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t657.pdf.
14	 “Inmate Statistics - Offenses,” Federal Bureau of Prisons, accessed June 29, 2015, http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_
inmate_offenses.jsp.
15	 For the 1988 figure, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Criminal Case Processing, 1982-93, Table 18, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/
pdf/Fccp93.pdf; for the 2012 figure, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 2012—Statistical Tables, Table 7.11, http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf. Pew used the 1988-2012 period to capture all available yearly data.
16	 Ibid.
17	 The Pew Charitable Trusts, “Federal Prison System Shows Dramatic Long-Term Growth.”
18	 Kamala Mallik-Kane, Barbara Parthasarathy, and William Adams, “Examining Growth in the Federal Prison Population, 1998 to 2010”
(September 2012), Urban Institute, http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412720-Examining-Growth-inthe-Federal-Prison-Population--to--.PDF.
19	 The Pew Charitable Trusts, “Federal Prison System Shows Dramatic Long-Term Growth.”
20	 Ibid.
21	 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2014, Tables 66, 67, and 68, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndcs_data_supplement_2014.pdf.
22	 Office of National Drug Control Policy, National Drug Control Strategy: Data Supplement 2014, Tables 1 and 2, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/ondcp/policy-and-research/ndcs_data_supplement_2014.pdf. Pew used the 1990-2012 period to capture all available
yearly data.
23	 David Boyum and Peter Reuter, An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug Policy, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (2005),
57, http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/-an-analytic-assessment-of-us-drug-policy_112041831996.pdf.
24	 National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences (2014), 83, http://www.nap.
edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-states-exploring-causes.
25	 Mark A.R. Kleiman, “Toward (More Nearly) Optimal Sentencing for Drug Offenders,” Criminology & Public Policy 3, no. 3 (2004):
435–440, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6taQDF0rdAwYnJNTDU2bDVBNFU/edit.
26	 Ilyana Kuziemko and Steven D. Levitt, “An Empirical Analysis of Imprisoning Drug Offenders,” Journal of Public Economics 88 (2004):
2043–2066, https://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/ikuziemko/papers/kl_jpube.pdf.
27	 Ibid.
28	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, 2014 Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, Table 12, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table12.pdf.
29	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy, Chapter 6, http://www.ussc.gov/report-cocaine-and-federalsentencing-policy-2.
30	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011),
Chapter 12, 350, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimumpenalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_12.pdf.
31	 Unless otherwise indicated, all data about offender roles are drawn from U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011), Appendix D, Figure D-2, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf; and Figure 8-12, 173,
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtcpdf/Chapter_08.pdf.
32	 For share of marijuana offenders considered mules or couriers, see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011), Appendix D, Figure D-34, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf.
33	 For share of crack cocaine offenders considered street-level dealers, see U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory
Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011), Appendix D, Figure D-22, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Appendix_D.pdf.

11

34	 Charles Doyle, “Federal Mandatory Minimum Sentences: The Safety Valve and Substantial Assistance Exceptions” (Washington:
Congressional Research Service, 2013), https://www.hsdl.org/?%20view&did=746019.
35	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System (October 2011),
Chapter 8, 170, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimumpenalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf.
36	 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics 2012—Statistical Tables, Table 7.5, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf.
37	 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics/Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics Series, 1984-2012, http://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbtp&tid=65&iid=1. Data not available for 1987, 1991, 1992, and 2005.
38	 U.S. Sentencing Commission, “U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for Crack Cocaine
Offenses” (Dec. 11, 2007), http://www.ussc.gov/news/press-releases-and-news-advisories/december-11-2007.
39	 Kim Steven Hunt and Andrew Peterson, “Recidivism Among Offenders Receiving Retroactive Sentence Reductions: The 2007
Crack Cocaine Amendment” (May 2014), U.S. Sentencing Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-and-surveys/miscellaneous/20140527_Recidivism_2007_Crack_Cocaine_Amendment.pdf.

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pewtrusts.org/publicsafety

Contact: Darienne Gutierrez, communications
Email: dgutierrez@pewtrusts.org
Project website: pewtrusts.org/publicsafety

The Pew Charitable Trusts is driven by the power of knowledge to solve today’s most challenging problems. Pew applies a rigorous, analytical
approach to improve public policy, inform the public, and invigorate civic life.

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