FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE CLOSURE OF

STATE INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES

FINAL REPORT

November 1, 2009

Christopher Murray & Associates
Davis Deshaies LLC
Berk & Associates
Ambia – Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STUDY OVERVIEW
Report Organization......................................................................................................................... i
Study Mandate and Requirements ................................................................................................... i
The Consultant Team...................................................................................................................... ii

PART 1 – Department of Corrections
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................1.01
Background and Context.............................................................................................................1.05
Closure Options ..........................................................................................................................1.20
The Effect of Closures ................................................................................................................1.47
Conclusions and Recommendations ...........................................................................................1.60
Implementation Plan ...................................................................................................................1.67

PART 2 – Juvenile Rehabilitation
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................2.01
Background and Context.............................................................................................................2.04
Closure Options ..........................................................................................................................2.14
The Effect of Closures ................................................................................................................2.31
Conclusions and Recommendations ...........................................................................................2.41
Implementation Plan ...................................................................................................................2.44

PART 3 – Developmental Disabilities
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................3.04
Scope of Contract .......................................................................................................................3.10
Project Approach ........................................................................................................................3.10
Criteria to Determine Options.....................................................................................................3.11
National Perspective ...................................................................................................................3.14
State of Washington Perspective ..............................................................................................3.18
Stakeholder and Survey Comments ............................................................................................3.42
Study Findings ............................................................................................................................3.44
RHC Options .............................................................................................................................3.47
Recommendations…………………………………………………....... ....................................3.48
Implementation Steps..................................................................................................................3.52
Community, Employee, and Life-Cycle Impact ........................................................................3.59

DOC APPENDIX (bound separately)
JRA APPENDIX (bound separately)
DD APPENDIX (bound separately)
TECHNICAL APPENDIX (bound separately)
Economic and Fiscal Impacts to Affected Communities
Impacts to Affected Employees
State Lifecycle Costs

STUDY OVERVIEW
REPORT O RGANIZATION
This report is divided into three parts:
PART 1 – Department of Corrections Facilities
PART 2 – Juvenile Rehabilitation Facilities
PART 3 – Developmental Disabilities Facilities
Each part includes a cover page, table of contents and executive summary. Pagination is by
section: PART 1 begins with page 1.1; PART 2 with page 2.1; PART 3 with page 3.1.
There are also three appendices which are bound separately.
DOC Appendix
JRA Appendix
Technical Appendix
The technical appendix includes additional information for each of the three areas of study – the
Department of Corrections, Juvenile Rehabilitation, and Developmental Disabilities. Information
in the Technical Appendix was prepared by the team economists, Berk & Associates. It includes
detailed information on economic and fiscal impacts to affected communities, impacts to
affected employees, and analysis of state lifecycle costs.
STUDY MANDATE AND REQUIREMENTS
In the 2009 legislative session, the Washington State Legislature directed the Office of Financial
Management to contract with consultants to conduct “a study of the feasibility of closing state
institutional facilities and a plan on eliminating beds in the state institutional facility inventory.”
The proviso from Engrossed Substitute House Bill (ESHB) 1244 noted that:
“In conducting this study, the consultants shall consider the following factors as
appropriate:
i.
The availability of alternate facilities including alternatives and opportunities for
consolidations with other facilities, impacts on those alternate facilities, and any
related capital costs;
ii.
The cost of operating the facility, including the cost of providing services and the
cost of maintaining or improving the physical plant of the facility;
iii. The geographic factors associated with the facility, including the impact of the
facility on the local economy and the economic impact of its closure, and
alternative uses for a facility recommended for closure;
iv.
The costs associated with closing the facility, including the continuing costs
following the closure of the facility;

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v.
vi.

Number and type of staff and the impact on the facility staff including other
employment opportunities if the facility is closed;
The savings that will accrue to the state from closure or consolidation of a
facility and the impact any closure would have on funding the associated
services; and
For residential habilitation centers, the impact on clients in the facility being
recommended for closure and their families, including ability to get alternate
services and impacts on being moved to another facility.”

vii.

The legislature further directed that “the office of financial management and consultants shall
consult with the department of social and health services, the department of corrections,
stakeholder organizations and groups that represent the people served in these institutions, labor
organizations that represent employees who work in these institutions and other persons or
entities with expertise in the areas being studied.”
THE CONSULTANT TEAM
The firm of Christopher Murray & Associates of Olympia, Washington was chosen through a
competitive selection process as the lead consultant for the feasibility study. Subconsultants on
the team include:
Davis Deshaies, LLC (analysis of residential habilitation centers),
Berk & Associates (economic impact analysis), and
Ambia, Inc (architectural and engineering requirements and costs).

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FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE CLOSURE OF

STATE INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES

Part 1: Department of Corrections Facilities
November 1, 2009

Christopher Murray & Associates

DRAFT – October 1, 2009

Page 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................1.1
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Study Requirements Specific to DOC ..........................................................................................1.5
Adult Corrections Terminology Used in this Report ....................................................................1.5
The Capacity of DOC Institutions ..............................................................................................1.10
Population History and Forecast .................................................................................................1.12

CLOSURE OPTIONS
What are the Options and How Were They Selected?................................................................1.20
Why Isn’t Full Closure of McNeil Island an Option?.................................................................1.21
Why are there No Options for Female Offenders? .....................................................................1.22
Downsizing Occurs in a Changing Environment........................................................................1.23
A Hypothetical Baseline .............................................................................................................1.23
Description of the Options ..........................................................................................................1.25
Scenario 1..............................................................................................................................1.25
Scenario 2..............................................................................................................................1.27
Scenario 3..............................................................................................................................1.28
Cost Analysis ..............................................................................................................................1.31
Life Cycle Cost ...........................................................................................................................1.41
Alternative Uses..........................................................................................................................1.45

THE EFFECT OF CLOSURES
The Effect of Closure on Employees ..........................................................................................1.47
The Effect of Closure on the Host Community ..........................................................................1.52
Programmatic Impacts ................................................................................................................1.57

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusions.................................................................................................................................1.60
Recommendations.......................................................................................................................1.64

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN......................................................................................1.66
DOC APPENDICES (bound separately)
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

Disaggregation of Population Projection
Detailed Description of Closure Options
Staffing Impact Analysis
Capital Cost Calculations
Cost per Offender by Custody Level

TECHNICAL APPENDICES (bound separately)
A. Economic and Fiscal Impacts to Affected Communities
B. Impacts to Affected Employees
C. State Lifecycle Costs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the 2009 legislative session, the Washington State Legislature directed that a feasibility study
of closing state institutional facilities be conducted. The proviso specifically requires study of
Department of Corrections (DOC) institutions and a plan to eliminate 1,580 adult corrections
beds. Accompanying budget language assumes that closure of these beds will save $12 million in
fiscal year 2011.
THE FEASIBILITY OF CLOSING ADULT CORRECTIONS BEDS
After decades of almost continuous growth in the prison population, actions taken by the 2009
legislature are expected to result in a decrease of more than 1,100 inmates. While underlying
factors will cause the prison population to return to 2009 levels within less than five years, this
temporary decrease in the number of inmates presents an opportunity to save taxpayer dollars. In
subsequent years the number of inmates will remain approximately 1,100 below what it would
have been absent the 2009 law changes. This represents an ongoing opportunity to avoid costs
that otherwise would have occurred. This is illustrated in the following chart.
Actual and Projected DOC Population
With and Without the Effect of Bills Passed in 2009 Legislative Session
22,000

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

Jul-18

Jul-17

Jul-16

Jul-15

Jul-14

Jul-13

Jul-12

Jul-11

Jul-10

Jul-09

Jul-08

Jul-07

Jul-06

Jul-05

Jul-04

Jul-03

12,000

DOC operates a number of prison facilities to house adult offenders who require confinement
under different conditions ranging from minimum to maximum security. This study disaggregated
the prison population forecast by gender and the projected security level needs of the inmate
population. The disaggregated forecast was then compared to the current funded capacity of DOC
institutions. This analysis resulted in the following key findings.

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Key Findings from Analysis of the Population Projection and DOC Bed Capacity
1. There are more funded prison beds than inmates, but surplus capacity is not evenly
distributed. Most importantly:
 Almost all of the surplus capacity is at medium security for male inmates.
 DOC cannot eliminate beds at higher security levels. In fact, DOC will need additional
higher security beds for male inmates in the near future.1
2. DOC closed minimum security beds for female offenders this summer. There are no
additional opportunities to eliminate prison beds for female offenders.
3. The opportunities for closing beds occur within a dynamic environment. While there are more
savings than costs, there will be increased costs (including capital costs) at some locations.
In addition to surplus funded beds, there are closed living units at several DOC institutions. These
non-staffed, non-funded, beds represent additional built capacity. DOC’s built capacity for male
offenders exceeds funded capacity by almost 2,000 beds. Most of these beds are medium security.
Built capacity for women exceeds funded capacity by nearly 400 beds. All of these beds are
minimum security. This surplus built capacity greatly reduces, but does not eliminate, the capital
requirements of the Department of Corrections over the next ten years.
CLOSURE SCENARIOS
A variety of closure options were considered, not all of which proved feasible. Foremost among
those found infeasible is full closure of the McNeil Island Corrections Center. For a variety of
reasons – most of which relate to the presence of the Special Commitment Center2 on the island –
there are compelling reasons to maintain at least some DOC presence there.
Significant savings from facility closure or downsizing only occur if an entire institution, or major
component thereof, can be closed. Major savings also accrue if the security level of an institution
is downgraded. The scenarios considered in this study do both.
After reviewing the options, three closure scenarios were developed for detailed study. These are:
Scenario 1
Downsize the McNeil Island Corrections Center
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and move the program to Monroe
Close one living unit at the Larch Corrections Center for six years
Scenario 2
Close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and move the program to Monroe

1

There is a projected deficit at “close security,” an intermediate level between medium and maximum security.
The Special Commitment Center is a facility for civilly committed sexually violent predators operated by the
Department of Social and Health Services.
2

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Scenario 3
Close the Main Institution (within the old prison walls) at the Washington State Penitentiary
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and move the program to Monroe
Close one living unit at the Larch Corrections Center for three years
These scenarios are mutually exclusive – that is, they cannot be done simultaneously. It is
possible, however, to do them sequentially.
KEY F INDINGS
All Three Scenarios Generate Substantial Savings
All of the scenarios save more than $12 million per year in operating costs as assumed in the
budget assumptions related to this study – but not in the first year. Each scenario also creates
long-term capital cost savings by reducing or eliminating the need for maintenance and
preservation projects related to old buildings. These savings are substantial for Scenarios 2 and 3.
Scenario 3 – which includes closing the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary –
generates the greatest savings but requires approximately $41 million in up-front capital
expenditures.
Even greater savings can be achieved by sequencing Scenarios 1 and 3. This strategy has
additional advantages, including reducing adverse impacts to the City and County of Walla Walla
and postponing the lay off of staff at the Penitentiary until a time when there are more transfer
opportunities within the agency.
The following table summarizes cumulative FTE, operating, and capital cost savings for the three
scenarios plus the effect of sequencing Scenarios 1 and 3.
Summary of 10 Year FTE, Operating, and Capital Budget Savings by Scenario
(MICC = McNeil Island Corrections Center; WSRU = Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe;
MI-WSP = Main Institution at the Penitentiary)

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

Scenario 3

(MICC)

(WSRU)

(WSP-Main)

Staff Years Eliminated
2,259
2,741
2,855
Operating Budget Savings
Current Dollars $137,700,000 $169,000,000 $173,900,000
Net Present Value $73,500,000 $84,200,000 $97,100,000
Capital Budget Savings
Current Dollars
$9,705,000 $24,787,000 $77,221,000
Net Present Value
$4,900,000 $18,800,000 $64,100,000

Sequencing
Scenarios 1 & 3
3,632
$215,844,000
(not calculated)
$82,421,000
(not calculated)

Additional Steps are Needed if 1,580 Beds are to be Eliminated
When the target of eliminating 1,580 prison beds was first developed, it was assumed that
population reduction bills under consideration in the 2009 legislative session would reduce the
prison population by approximately this amount. However, not all of the law changes under
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consideration passed. Those that did pass are projected to reduce the population by about 1,100.
While this generates the ability to achieve significant bed reductions and dollar savings, without a
further decrease in prison population it is not possible to close 1,580 beds at this time.
The estimated impact of the bills not passed in the last legislative session is 452 beds. Additional
steps to eliminate DOC beds can be taken if these, or similar, population reduction measures are
adopted in the future.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Sequencing Scenario 1 (downsizing the McNeil Island Corrections Center) and Scenario 3 (close
the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary) achieves the greatest savings.
Assuming that capital funds are available, this is the recommended alternative. If capital funds are
not available, it is recommended that Scenario 1 (downsizing the McNeil Island Corrections
Center) be implemented.
If additional closure of beds is required, it is recommended that additional close custody inmates
be moved to out of state rental beds and that the highest cost close security housing units3 be
closed. If additional steps are taken to reduce the number of lower risk offenders in prison, it is
recommended that the Larch Corrections Center (downsized under Scenarios 1 and 3) be fully
closed.
Finally, it is recommended that additional detailed study be made of the Washington State
Reformatory Unit at Monroe and the buildings within the walls of the Washington State
Penitentiary to determine which, if any, buildings should be preserved for future use and to create
master plans for future development of both sites.

3

The highest cost close security housing units are located at the Washington State Penitentiary

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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
STUDY REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIC TO THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (DOC)
In the 2009 legislative session, the Washington State Legislature directed the Office of Financial
Management to contract with consultants to conduct “a study of the feasibility of closing state
institutional facilities and a plan on eliminating beds in the state institutional facility inventory.”
Proviso language requires that the report provide a recommendation and a plan to eliminate 1,580
DOC beds. Budget language assumes that closure of these beds will save $12 million in fiscal
year 2011.
The work plan for the study of DOC facilities involves the following major activities:
1. Review of the facilities, mission, and population of DOC facilities
2. Analysis of the population forecast and projected future needs for DOC facilities by
gender and security level
3. Identification of the capacity of DOC facilities to accommodate the needs of the projected
future population
4. Estimation of the impact on staff of facility closure and redistribution of offenders,
including effects of the Reduction in Force (RIF) process, job loss, and opportunities for
reemployment
5. Estimation of the capital costs and savings associated with facility closure and
redistribution of offenders
6. Identification of programmatic impacts and other considerations related to facility closure
7. Identification of the impact of facility closure on the host community, including direct and
indirect job loss and local purchases
To accomplish these tasks, the consultant reviewed data and information provided by DOC and
others; toured facilities and talked with staff; conferred with headquarters staff; met with
community groups; conferred with labor organizations and with representatives from the
Washington Association of Counties, the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs,
and the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. The consultant team’s extensive
experience and knowledge of adult corrections in Washington and other states facilitated
understanding of the issues and informed their analysis.
THE ROLE OF DOC
The Department of Corrections is responsible for administering adult corrections programs
operated by the State of Washington. This includes state correctional institutions and programs
for offenders supervised in the community. This study is confined to analysis of the feasibility of
closing and/or consolidating DOC’s institutions.
ADULT CORRECTIONS TERMINOLOGY USED IN THIS REPORT
The terminology used to describe adult corrections institutions and operations means little to
those who have not already been introduced to the subject. This section may be skipped by those
already familiar with adult corrections but may be useful to those who are not.
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Classification and Security
The Department of Corrections uses a classification system to divide inmates into various
categories that relate to two primary factors: 1) the danger they pose to staff, other inmates and
the public and, 2) the amount of supervision they require while incarcerated. Inmates receive an
initial classification when they are first committed to DOC. They are periodically reclassified
based on a classification review schedule or for cause. Initial classification is largely based on
static factors like criminal history, escape history, age, gender, etc. While static factors continue
to play a role, reclassification takes into account the inmate’s behavior while incarcerated: good
behavior can result in a less restrictive classification level, bad behavior the opposite.
The Washington Department of Corrections classification system is relatively complicated but,
for all practical purposes, there are five classification levels. When applied to inmates, these
levels are called “custody designations.”
The department also has a five level system to identify the physical security provided by
buildings and correctional facilities. When applied to buildings, these are called “security levels.”
Custody designations and security levels look very much alike but use different suffixes. The
term “custody” refers to inmates; “security” refers to buildings.
Table 1: “Custody” and “Security” is Not the Same Thing
“Custody” applies to inmates
Maximum Custody
Close Custody
Medium Custody
Minimum Custody
Work Release

“Security” applies to buildings
Maximum Security
Close Security
Medium Security
Minimum Security
Work Release

Maximum, close, and medium security facilities have high security, armed perimeter fences or
walls. Minimum security facilities typically have a single fence. Work release facilities may have
a fence, but not one that provides real security.
Maximum custody inmates require the most supervision by correctional officers; have the
greatest restriction on their freedom of movement and interaction with others; and require single
occupancy cells in the most secure buildings. Higher custody inmates are typically housed in “wet
cells” – i.e. a cell with a toilet and wash basin. At lower custody levels the amount of supervision
decreases; freedom of movement and association increases; and the physical construction of cells
and buildings changes. Some medium security, and virtually all minimum security, cells are “dry
cells” – i.e. they have no plumbing fixtures.
While the distinction between custody and security may seem minor, it is one we try to adhere to
in this report: inmates have custody; buildings have security. Its importance relates to a cardinal
rule of corrections: an inmate may be held in a facility which has a security level equal to or
greater than his or her custody designation – but not one that is lower. Hence, a medium custody
inmate may be held in a medium, close, or maximum security facility, but not a minimum
security or work release facility.

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Other Terminology
There are several other terms used in this report that merit explanation.
 MI3 is a subset of minimum custody. This custody designation is used to refer to an
inmate who, because of good behavior,4 scores minimum custody on the classification
instrument, but for other reasons (e.g. risk of escape or danger to the community) needs to
be confined behind a medium security perimeter. There are a large number of MI3
inmates in DOC institutions. The department has taken advantage of this by sometimes
building less secure (and therefore less costly) housing units inside medium security
perimeters and staffing them (at less expense) at minimum security staffing levels.
 Reception: the Department of Corrections operates two reception centers for newly
committed inmates – one for men and one for women. Inmates in reception, and buildings
used for reception, constitute additional categories of inmates and buildings. It is in
reception that inmates receive their initial custody classification. Prior to classification a
newly committed inmate is counted as unclassified. Buildings used for reception may be
designated close or medium security but they are referred to as “reception beds.”
 Intensive Management Unit (IMU): An intensive management unit is a maximum security
building located within a secure perimeter. DOC does not operate any maximum security
institutions – only maximum security buildings. DOC often uses the acronym IMU
instead of the term “maximum security.”
 Multi-custody Facility: Except for work release facilities and stand-alone minimum
security camps, all DOC institutions are designed to hold inmates of more than one
custody level. Some institutions have maximum, close, medium and minimum security
beds at the same site. Buildings housing higher custody inmates are inside one or more
security perimeter. Minimum security beds are typically outside the security perimeter.
When a minimum security facility and secure facility share the same site they are said to
be “collocated.”
DOC Institutions and Their Acronyms
DOC operates eight major correctional institutions and four stand-alone minimum security
facilities for men. Four of the major men’s institutions have minimum security facilities on the
same site. There are also three institutions for women, two of which are stand-alone minimum
security facilities. DOC also operates 15 work release facilities. Of these, two are for women.
DOC correctional institutions are listed in Tables 2A and 2B along with their acronyms. Their
locations are shown in Figure 1. Whenever possible the full name of an institution is used in this
report. However, in some tables and charts where space is at a premium, the acronym may be
substituted for the full name.

4

“Good behavior” includes, but is not limited to, the absence of bad behavior. MI3 inmates are typically willing to
work and to participate actively in treatment programs, education, etc.
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Table 2A: DOC Institutions for Men
Major Institutions / Units
Airway Heights Corrections Center
Minimum Security Unit
Clallam Bay Corrections Center
Coyote Ridge Corrections Center
Minimum Security Camp
McNeil Island Corrections Center
Monroe Correctional Complex
Intensive Management Unit
Special Offender Unit
Twin Rivers Unit
Washington State Reformatory Unit
Minimum Security Unit
Stafford Creek Corrections Center
Washington Corrections Center
Intensive Management Unit
Training Center
Reception Center
Washington State Penitentiary
Intensive Management Unit
West Complex
Main Institution
BAR (Baker/Adams/Rainier) Unit
Minimum Security Unit
Stand Alone Minimum Security Facilities
Athanum View Corrections Center
Cedar Creek Corrections Center
Larch Corrections Center
Olympic Corrections Center

Acronym
AHCC
AHCC-MSU
CBCC
CRCC
CRCC-MSC
MICC
MCC
MCC-IMU
MCC-SOU
MCC-TRU
MCC-WSRU
MCC-MSU
SCCC
WCC
WCC-IMU
WCC-TC
WCC-RC
WSP
WSP-IMU
WSP-WC
WSP-MI
WSP-BAR
WSP-MSU
Acronym
AVCC
CCCC
LCC
OCC

Table 2B: DOC Institutions for Women
Institution
Washington Corrections Center for Women
Mission Creek Corrections Center
Pine Lodge Corrections Center

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Acronym
WCCW
MCCC
PLCC

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EXHIBIT 1: LOCATION OF DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS INSTITUTIONS

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THE CAPACITY OF DOC INSTITUTIONS
The capacity of a correctional institution is usually expressed in terms of a number of beds – as in
“the Cedar Creek Corrections Center is a 500-bed minimum security facility.” It seems like it
should be a simple matter to state institutional capacity – it is, however, somewhat complicated.
In this report we refer to four types of capacity:





Operational Capacity
Emergency Capacity
Funded Capacity
Built Capacity

The operational capacity of a facility is the number of beds at which the facility normally
operates. The number of persons in each cell is consistent with constitutional minimum
requirements; utilities, programs, and support services are adequately sized to serve the number of
inmates in the institution. The amount of tension and friction within the institution varies within
normal limits. Operational capacity can change based on funding. (See “funded capacity,”
below.)
Emergency capacity generally involves placing more inmates in certain larger cells – thereby
increasing the number of inmates in the institution. The number of persons in each cell remains
within constitutional minimum requirements but utilities, programs and/or support services may
sometimes be stretched thin. Tension and friction can – and if continued for long enough – will
increase. Not all DOC institutions have emergency capacity. The legislature generally provides
no additional funding for DOC to operate facilities at emergency capacity.
Funded capacity is determined by the number of staff supported by appropriations for that
purpose. DOC uses a staffing model to determine the required number of staff for each living unit
and institution it operates. Consequently, it is possible to fund operation of an institution at less
than its normal operational capacity. This is done by closing individual living units and not
staffing them. Closing living units may also result in staff reductions in other parts of the
institution.
Built capacity is equal to the maximum operational capacity of an institution when it is fully
funded. Built capacity is therefore equal to the number of non-funded beds at a facility.
Table 3, on the next page, summarizes the October 2009 funded capacity of DOC institutions
security level.

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Table 3: Funded (Emergency) Capacity of DOC Institutions by Security Level
Institutions for Men
Reception Maximum
Airway Heights CC
Clallam Bay CC
62
Coyote Ridge CC
McNeil Island CC
Monroe Corr Complex
136
Stafford Creek CC
72
Washington CC
1,068
62
Washington State Pen
158
Athanum View CC
Cedar Creek CC
Larch CC
Olympic CC
Subtotal – Men
1,068
490
Work release (various locations)
Institutions for Women Reception Maximum
Wash CC for Women
63
0
Mission Creek CC
Pine Lodge CC
Subtotal - Women
63
0
Work release (various locations)

Close
458

72

1,116

1,646

Close
101

101

Medium5 Minimum
1,574
600
380
768
300
1,017
256
1,862
480
1,900
228
852
189
120
505
480
376
8,581
3,306
Total - Men
Medium Minimum
305
315
187
172
305
674
Total – Women

Total
2,174
900
1,068
1,273
2,550
1,972
1,358
2,315
120
505
480
376
15,091
567
15,658
Total
784
187
172
1,143
107
1,250

DOC also has funded capacity in out of state rental beds. It is expected that by the end of calendar
year 2009 only 40 to 50 close custody inmates will still be in out of state beds.
One final capacity category has to do with violators. Violators are offenders on community
supervision who violate a condition of their term of supervision. DOC has agreements with many
county jails in Washington State to hold violators. While some of the most difficult violators are
returned to prison, most are held in jail. If DOC didn’t have these agreements, many more
violators would be in prison and there would be fewer beds available for committed offenders.
There are closed beds for men at three locations: the Washington Corrections Center (80
reception beds), McNeil Island (43 maximum security beds), and especially Coyote Ridge (1,024
medium beds and 300 minimum beds). There are closed beds for women at the Washington
Corrections Center for Women (30 close beds), Mission Creek (100 minimum beds) and Pine
Lodge (242 minimum beds). System-wide built and funded capacity for men and women is
summarized in Table 4 on the next page.

5

Medium security facilities can also house MI3 inmates.

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Table 4: DOC Operational, Emergency, Funded, and Built Capacity by Security Level
Security Level
Reception
Maximum
Close
Medium
Minimum
Work Release
Subtotal - Men
Security Level
Reception
Maximum
Close
Medium
Minimum
Work Release
Subtotal - Women

Operational
948
490
1,646
8,107
3,242
567
15,000
Operational
63
0
101
305
632
107
1,208

Capacity for Men
Emergency
Funded
120
1,068
0
490
0
1,646
474
8,581
64
3,306
0
567
658
15,658
Capacity for Women
Emergency
Funded
0
63
0
0
0
101
0
305
42
674
0
107
42
1,250

Built
1,148
533
1,646
10,140
3,606
567
17,640
Built
63
0
131
305
1,016
107
1,622

POPULATION HISTORY AND FORECAST
Over the last decade the number of offenders in Washington’s prisons has increased by more than
3,500 – reaching an all-time high of over 18,600 this summer. This follows years of largely
uninterrupted growth dating form the 1980’s.
Legislative Action to Reduce the Number of Offenders in Prison
During the 2009 legislative session six bills were considered, and four passed, that would reduce
the number of offenders in prison. The four bills which passed were:
 SB 5525 – Concerning rental vouchers to allow release from prison
Historically, some prisoners in DOC custody have been held past their earned early
release date for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a sponsor or living arrangement.
This bill allows DOC to provide rental vouchers to an offender for a period up to three
months, if rental assistance will enable the offender to have an approved release plan.
 SB 6167 – Concerning crimes against property
The monetary amounts differentiating the various degrees of property crimes in
Washington were established in 1975 and have never been adjusted. This bill directs the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission to review the threshold amounts differentiating the
various degrees of property crimes in Washington to determine whether they should be
modified.

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 SB 2194 – Modifying provisions relating to medical placement of offenders
This bill changes the eligibility conditions for extraordinary medical placement of
incarcerated offenders. An offender is eligible if: 1) he or she has a medical condition that
is serious and is expected to require costly care or treatment; 2) the offender poses a low
risk to the community because the offender is currently physically incapacitated due to
age or a medical condition or is expected to be so at the time of release; and 3) it is
expected that granting the extraordinary medical placement will result in a cost savings to
the state.
 Budget Initiative – Increasing DOSA beds
Based on testimony from judges and DOC it is estimated that an additional 115 Drug
Offender Sentencing Alternative (DOSA) beds can be funded without saturating the
market for this alternative. Savings from a reduced demand for prison beds exceeds the
costs associated with this initiative.
The two bills which did not pass were:
 SB 6183 – Relating to the early deportation of illegal alien offenders
Under current law, conditional release of alien offenders may only be allowed with the
approval of the sentencing court and the prosecuting attorney of the county of conviction.
Under this bill placement of an offender on conditional release status and transfer to the
custody of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement would no longer require the
approval of the sentencing court and the prosecuting attorney.
 SB 6160 – Concerning criminal justice sentencing
This bill would have amended the sentencing grid to allow judges greater discretion in
addressing mitigating and aggravating circumstances that may allow the imposition of a
sentence above or below the standard sentence range.
Estimated Effect of Bills to Reduce the Number of Offenders in Prison
The cumulative impact of these six bills was estimated to reduce the number of offenders in
prison by 1,589 by FY11 and 1,630 thereafter. The cumulative impact of the four bills which did
pass is estimated to reduce the number of offenders by 1,137 by FY11 (with no appreciable
change thereafter).
Exhibit 2, below, shows population growth in DOC institutions from January 2001 through the
present along with the population forecast prepared by the Caseload Forecast Council in June
2009. The June 2009 forecast takes into account the anticipated effect of bills passed in the last
legislative session. As Figure 2 clearly illustrates, there is expected to be a sizeable, and relatively
rapid, decline in prison populations due to these recent changes in state law.

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Exhibit 2: Population History and Forecast for DOC Institutions
22,000

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

Actual

Exhibit 2 also shows that this decline is temporary
and that, after an initial decrease, population growth
resumes – more or less following the trajectory
interrupted by these law changes.

Jul-19

Jul-18

Jul-17

Jul-16

Jul-15

Jul-14

Jul-13

Jul-12

Jul-11

Jul-10

Jul-09

Jul-08

Jul-07

Jul-06

Jul-05

Jul-04

Jul-03

Jul-02

Jul-01

12,000

June 09 Forecast

The DOC population projection has
two important implications:
1. The opportunity to reduce prison
beds is temporary.

There are two important implications of the
2. Long term savings will be avoided
population forecast. First, the opportunity to reduce
costs – not cost reductions.
beds is temporary – four to five years at most.
Second, after the prison population returns to its current level, future savings will be in the form
of avoided costs, not actual cost reductions.
Implications for ESHB 1244 Objectives
The estimated impact of the six bills introduced in the last legislative session is believed to be the
origin of the ESHB 1244 requirement to develop a plan to eliminate 1,580 DOC beds. Since the
estimated impact of the bills that passed is about 450 less than this, eliminating 1,580 beds is only
possible if the combined impact of population reductions plus currently funded excess capacity
totals at least 1,580. Excess funded capacity is addressed on the following pages. However, it is
first important to understand how much capacity will be needed.

POPULATION FORECAST AND THE NEED FOR BEDS BY G ENDER AND SECURITY LEVEL
The detailed forecast for DOC prison inmates developed by the Caseload Forecast Council is
disaggregated by gender and crime type. The detail from this forecast is used in something called
the “Capacity Needs Assessment Model,” originally developed by one of the members of the
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consultant team. The Capacity Needs Assessment Model translates the detail of the caseload
forecast into a forecast by gender and custody level. At any given time the projected total number
of offenders in each custody level can be compared to the current or planned capacity at the
corresponding security level to determine if there is enough, not enough, or too much capacity at
each security level. We call the overall percentage distribution of offenders by custody level the
“custody profile” of the prison population.
Exhibits 3 and 4 illustrate the
projected average custody profile
for men and women in DOC
institutions over the next ten years.
These charts also show the average
percentage of violators projected to
be in county jails during this time.

Figure 3: Approximate Custody Profile: Men
60%
50%

50%

40%
30%
20%
3%

7%

3%
Work
Release

M inimum

M edium

Close

Maximum

Reception

0%

Work
Release

Minimum

Medium

Close

Reception

M aximum

These averages obscure small, but
important, changes over the decade.
Because of the changing nature of
the offender population, the
Figure 4: Approximate Custody Profile - Women
percentage of offenders requiring
47%
higher security is projected to
50%
40%
increase, and the percentage
30%
requiring lower security decrease,
23%
20%
over the decade. For men there is
8%
6%
5%
10%
about a 1.4 percent shift to higher
0%
0%
security levels. For women the shift
is a little less than one percent.
These changes are consistent with
the law changes enacted in the last
legislative session which focused on lower risk offenders.

Ja il
(v iolators)

8%

12%

Jail
(violat ors)

10%

19%
10%

The methodology used to calculate these percentages is fairly complex. A technical description
can be found in the appendix to this report.
Exhibits 5 through 12 show
the projected male offender
population in comparison
to current funded capacity.
In each chart the solid line
represents funded capacity
and the dashed line represents the projected number
of male offenders.
“Current funded capacity”
includes returning all out
of state inmates except
close custody and opening
one additional medium
Christopher Murray & Associates

FUNDED CAPACITY vs FORECAST: MEN
Exhibit 5
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Total
20,000
19,000
18,000
17,000
16,000
15,000

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

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security living unit at
Coyote Ridge during
FY10.

Exhibit 6
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Reception
2,500

Exhibit 5 illustrates how an
overall 1,800 bed surplus
reduces to zero in eight
years.

2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2010

2011

Except for Exhibit 5, from
the bottom of the vertical
scale to the top represents
2,500 beds/inmates in each
chart. This makes the size
of surpluses and deficits
visually comparable
between security levels.

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2017

2018

2019

2017

2018

2019

Exhibit 7
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - IMU
2,500
2,000

Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 indicate
there is no possibility for
eliminating reception, IMU
or close security beds over
the next ten years. In fact,
despite an overall surplus
of beds, DOC will need
additional close security
beds soon.

The preponderance of
surplus capacity at
medium security means
that is where the opportunities to close unfunded beds will be
found.

1,500
1,000
500
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Exhibit 8
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Close
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2010

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Exhibit 9
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Medium / MI3
10,000
9,500
9,000
8,500
8,000
7,500

Exhibits 9, 10, and 11
show that almost the entire
surplus of male beds is in
medium security, minimum
security, and work release.
In fact, nearly threequarters of all the surplus
capacity is in medium/MI3
security.

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2017

2018

2019

2018

2019

Exhibit 10
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Minimum
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Exhibit 11
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Work Release
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2010

The capacity of jail beds
for male violators is
somewhat arbitrary. DOC
has contracts for 1,224 jail
beds for this purpose. Most
contract beds can be used
for either men or women.
For purposes of this
analysis, 86% of the beds
are allocated to men and
14% to women.

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Exhibit 12
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Jail (violators)
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

The projected deficit of jail rental beds for violators may present a problem for DOC. This
analysis assumes that additional jail beds can be rented. But many local jurisdictions are now
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looking for additional beds. It may be that some jurisdictions will stop renting beds to DOC or
that price increases will make them a less desirable alternative for DOC violators.
A similar analysis was also done for female offenders. For technical reasons, disaggregation of
the female offender population projection by security level is based on the recommendations of
the 2007 Female Offender Master Plan prepared for DOC.
For female offenders, the
distance from the bottom
of the vertical scale to the
top represents 300 beds or
inmates in each chart. As
with male offenders, this
makes the size of surpluses
and deficits visually comparable between security
levels. Of course, since
there are far fewer female
than male offenders, the
charts for females cannot
be visually compared to
those for males.
Exhibit 13 shows there will
soon be a deficit in female
prison beds – although it
takes ten years for this
deficit to reach 100 beds.

FUNDED CAPACITY vs FORECAST - WOMEN
Exhibit 13
Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Total
1,500
1,400
1,300
1,200
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

Exhibit 14
Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Reception
300
200
100
0

Exhibits 14 through 16
show no significant need
for female offender beds at
higher security levels anytime during the next ten
years.

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Exhibit 15
Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Close
300
200
100
0
2010

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Exhibit 16
Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Medium / MI3
400
300
200
100
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2017

2018

2019

2018

2019

2018

2019

Exhibit 17
As Exhibit 17 illustrates,
virtually the entire projected deficit for female
offenders is expected to be
at minimum security. This
is fortunate. Construction
of a hundred beds at Mission Creek Corrections
Center for Women near
Belfair will be completed
in the near future (and is
counted at Build Capacity
in Table 4, above). Additional surplus capacity is
also available at the Pine
Lodge Corrections Center
in Medical Lake.

Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Minimum
1,000

900

800

700
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Exhibit 18
Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Work Release
300

200

100

0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Exhibit 19
As noted for males, the
capacity of jail beds for
violators somewhat
arbitrarily allocates 86% of
the beds to men and 14%
to women. For the most
part, any surplus capacity
could be used by either
gender.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Forecast vs Funded Capacity - Jail Rental Beds
300

200

100

0
2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

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CLOSURE OPTIONS
WHAT ARE THE O PTIONS AND H OW WERE THEY SELECTED?
A variety of closure/consolidation options were evaluated for this study. We have combined five
options into three scenarios. They are:
 Scenario 1
- Downsize the McNeil Island Corrections Center
- Close and relocate the Ahtanum View Corrections to the Monroe Correctional Complex
- Temporarily close half of the Larch Corrections Center
 Scenario 2
- Close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex
- Close and relocate the Ahtanum View Corrections to the Monroe Correctional Complex
 Scenario 3
- Close the Main Institution (the old walled institution) at Washington State Penitentiary
- Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center in Yakima
- Temporarily close half of the Larch Corrections Center
Downsizing the McNeil Island Corrections Center was included as an option for two reasons: 1) it
is expensive to operate, and 2) there was widespread discussion of this option during the last
legislative session.
Closing the Washington State Reformatory Unit (the old walled institution) was included because
of high operating and capital costs. On a per inmate basis, Cellhouse 1 and 2 at the Washington
State Reformatory Unit are among the most expensive in the state. While subsequent analysis
reduced this amount substantially, initial review of DOC’s 10-year capital plan identified nearly
$60,000,000 in preservation projects for the Washington State Reformatory Unit. Since Cellhouse
1 and 2 are based on a building design concept that is at least 100 years old, this may not be the
best use of capital dollars.
The reasons for selecting the Reformatory also apply to the Main Institution (the old walled
institution) at the Washington State Penitentiary. Six, 7 and 8 Wing at WSP are the most
expensive medium security beds in the state. In addition, initial review of DOC’s 10-year capital
plan identified well over $100,000,000 in preservation projects for the old Penitentiary.
In addition to these major options, closure of the Ahtanum View Corrections Center (AVCC) in
Yakima is included with all scenarios. Ahtanum View is a small specialized facility which houses
elderly, medically challenged, and disabled offenders. The high medical costs for this population
would follow them wherever they are located, but the facility is also expensive on a per capita
basis because it is so small. While the other options can only be implemented sequentially, this
option can be implemented in conjunction with any of the major options.
The ability to temporarily close approximately 240 minimum security beds became apparent
during study of the various closure/consolidation options. The choices for temporarily closing this
many minimum security beds are limited. Ultimately, the consultant team selected Larch

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Corrections Center for temporary downsizing through a process of elimination. That process
included the following observations.
Collocated minimum security living units at the Airway Heights Corrections Center are too large;
those at the Penitentiary, Monroe, McNeil Island, and Coyote Ridge are essential to the operation
of their respective facilities. Ahtanum View is already recommended for closure. That leaves
Cedar Creek, Olympic, and Larch Corrections Centers
For minimum facilities not collocated with a major institution, Cedar Creek’s living units are the
least expensive – on average about $5,000 less per inmate per year than the average for either
Larch or Olympic. Since the driving force behind closing or downsizing institutions is primarily
financial, no additional consideration was given to downsizing Cedar Creek.
It is possible to achieve the goal of closing 240 minimum security beds by closing one living unit
at Larch. The two largest living at Olympic would have to be closed to achieve the same result. If
this were done, only a very small (and very costly per inmate) facility would be left at Olympic.
A second reason for selecting Larch instead of Olympic is because – for the same reasons that
downsizing the Washington State Penitentiary has a much bigger impact on the Walla Walla
economy than similar sized reductions do in larger communities – downsizing Olympic
Corrections Center would impact the west Jefferson County economy much more than a similar
change at Larch would impact the Clark County economy.
The study team also considered closing the Pine Lodge Corrections Center for Women but, for
reasons discussed below under “Why are there No Alternatives for Female Offenders?” this
option was not analyzed in depth.
WHY ISN’T FULL CLOSURE OF THE MCNEIL ISLAND CORRECTIONS CENTER AN OPTION?
There are four important reasons why full closure of the McNeil Island Corrections Center is not
considered feasible:
1. If the corrections center were closed, the high cost of operating a prison on an island
would be eliminated but the cost to the state would go up. This is because of the presence
of the DSHS Special Commitment Center (SCC) on the island. The SCC houses sexually
violent predators who have been civilly committed following completion of a term of
confinement in a DOC facility. It presently has 308 beds but plans for expansion to
approximately 400 beds have been developed. Without the prison there might be fewer
ferry and barge trips to and from the island, but there would still be a fleet of vessels to
maintain and crews to operate them. Other costs, such as having your own fire
department, fresh water system, and wastewater treatment facility, would all remain.
2. Maintenance of vessels, roads, power lines, buildings and grounds all over the island is
done with minimum security inmates working under the direction of DOC staff. Trained
inmates also serve as firefighters, deckhands on vessels, and assistants in the steam plant,
wastewater treatment facility and elsewhere. These inmates receive a stipend of 42¢ per
hour and, except for inmate firefighters, cannot receive more the $55 per month. There are
149 minimum security inmates serving in jobs solely related to island operations. At
maximum stipend, the total cost for this inmate labor is about $100,000 a year.
Discounting for shortened work hours and that fact that some inmate jobs are part time, it
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is estimated that it would take approximately 110 state employees to do the same work.
Using the middle step of the salary range for the appropriate job classes plus 35 percent
for benefits, the annual cost of state employees doing the same work would be more than
$5.4 million. The net increase in cost of using non-inmate labor is therefore approximately
$5.3 million. This does not include supervisory personnel who would have to remain.6
3. The quitclaim deed transferring McNeil Island from the federal government to the State of
Washington stipulates that the property “shall be used and maintained as a correctional
facility in perpetuity and that the … property shall not be sold, leased, mortgaged,
assigned or otherwise disposed of, except to another Government agency for the same
purpose …” The quitclaim deed goes on to say “in the event of breach of this covenant …
all right, title and interest in and to the … property, including all improvements thereon,
shall revert to … the United States of America.” While there might be a alternative
solution to this problem, there is a formal process for disposal of surplus federal property
and competing claims for some, or all, of the island might arise.
4. We are informed there is no job classification in the Department of Social and Health
Services that allows an employee to carry or use a firearm. All island security, including
armed response when there is an incident at the Special Commitment Center, is provided
by DOC. There were reportedly multiple times last year when DOC placed armed
correctional officers around the perimeter of the SCC facility. Without DOC, someone
else would have to fulfill this role.
WHY ARE THERE NO CLOSURE OPTIONS FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS?
DOC closed Unit 2 at the Pine Lodge Corrections Center for Women in June of this year. This
building has an operational capacity of 242 minimum security beds and its closure is counted
toward the 1,580 bed target mandated by ESHB 1244. Downsizing of facilities for female
offenders has already occurred. The population forecast and the
Elimination of beds
projected future need for beds by security level does not permit
for female offenders
closing additional beds. In fact, rather than additional closures, it will
has already occurred.
be necessary to open additional minimum security beds for women in
the near future.
DOC has two options for additional minimum security beds for female offenders: 1) opening a
new 100-bed minimum security unit nearing completion at the Mission Creek Corrections Center
for Women or, 2) reopening beds at Pine Lodge. Assuming DOC receives funding, the consultant
team recommends opening the new unit at Mission Creek. There are two reasons for this
recommendation. First, the new unit at Mission Creek will be staff efficient, safer, and need no
capital improvements for many years. Second, a smaller Pine Lodge is consistent with the
recommendations of the DOC Female Offender Master Plan completed in 2007. At its current
level of operation, Pine Lodge is appropriately sized to house minimum security women from
Eastern Washington. This reduced size improves opportunities for maintaining family and
community ties – an important consideration for all offenders but especially for female offenders
with children.

6

Assumptions and calculations of the value of inmate labor can be found in the appendix to this report.

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DOWNSIZING O CCURS IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
The analysis of capacity and projected demand by security level discussed earlier shows not only
that the opportunities for eliminating beds in DOC are mainly at medium security, it also shows
that DOC will need additional beds at some security levels over the next ten years. The
implications of this for female offenders were just discussed. For men, the disaggregated
population projection indicates a need for additional beds at close security in the relatively near
future.
The result of this dynamic is that, while DOC downsizes at one or more locations, it will increase
elsewhere. Some increases are consequences of downsizing; others will need to occur regardless
of the downsizing option or even a decision to downsize. This context needs to be described so
the effects of downsizing can be better understood.
A HYPOTHETICAL BASELINE
In order to isolate the effects of changes strictly related to downsizing, it was first necessary to
identify changes that are likely to occur anyway. We call this a “hypothetical baseline” because
the issues can be addressed in multiple ways. We did not confer with DOC on this. DOC might
have other, perhaps better, ideas. This is not a recommendation; it is an illustration that activities
which increase cost – including capital construction – will likely be required even while steps are
being taken to reduce costs.
One approach to a hypothetical baseline might be to continue business as usual and not close (or
open) anything until it is needed. All medium security facilities would continue operation as usual
and – according to the population projection – no additional units at Coyote Ridge Corrections
Center would open until FY2016. However, because there are medium beds in the system now
which are far more expensive to operate than those sitting vacant at Coyote Ridge, this is not a
realistic baseline. The hypothetical baseline we suggest is closure of higher cost medium beds in
FY11 (without closing whole institutions or medium security compounds) followed by opening
medium beds at Coyote Ridge at a pace to keep up with demand.
Unless (or until) there are significant changes in the caseload forecast for male offenders it is
expected that initiatives similar to the following will take place over the next ten years
independent of downsizing:
 FY2010
Return all medium and minimum custody inmates from out of state contract beds
Open one medium security living unit at the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center in Spring
2010
 FY2011
Close up to 850 higher cost medium security beds, including 512 at McNeil Island and
the remainder at either the Main Institution at the Penitentiary or Cellhouse 1 or 2 at the
Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe
Begin design and construction of 198 close security beds at the Penitentiary
Reopen 80 reception beds at the Washington Corrections Center
Increase jail contract beds for violators
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 FY2012
Open 256 medium security beds at Coyote Ridge
Increase the out of state contract for close custody inmates
Continue construction of close security beds
 FY2013
Open 256 medium security beds at Coyote Ridge
Increase jail contract beds for violators
 FY2014
Open 256 medium security beds at Coyote Ridge
Complete construction and open 198 close security beds at the Washington State
Penitentiary
Return all close custody inmates from out of state contract beds
 FY2015
Increase jail contract beds for violators
 FY2016
Reopen 256 medium security beds at McNeil Island
Reopen 44-bed IMU at McNeil Island
 FY2017
Increase jail contract beds for violators
 FY2018
Open 256 medium security beds at Coyote Ridge
Expand work release beds
 FY2019
No changes
Under this hypothetical baseline, capacity and demand in the critical category of medium security
will be more or less in balance by 2011 and look something like the following chart over
subsequent years.
Exhibit 20: The “Hypothetical Baseline” Scenario and Medium/MI3 Security
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Medium / MI3
9,500
9,000
8,500
8,000
7,500
7,000
2009

2010

2011

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The possible steps outlined in the hypothetical baseline scenario keep the system more or less in
balance at each security level throughout the next ten years. The year by year effect of these steps
is summarized in the next chart.
Exhibit 21: The “Hypothetical Baseline” Scenario and Overall Capacity vs Demand
Funded Capacity vs. Forecast - Total
20,000
19,000
18,000
17,000
16,000
15,000

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTIONS
DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO 1
Downsize the McNeil Island Corrections Center
Counting segregation and emergency capacity, the McNeil Island Corrections Center has 1,328
beds. Currently there are 1,249 funded beds at McNeil Island. This includes 97 medium security
beds, 896 MI3 beds, and 256 minimum security beds. Among other things, minimum security
offenders provide the labor force for island related inmate jobs outside the security perimeter of
the institution.
For the reasons outlined in the section titled “Why Isn’t Full Closure of the McNeil Island
Corrections Center an Option?” the study team concluded that full closure of the prison on
McNeil Island is not a feasible option. McNeil Island can, however, be downsized and converted
to a 512 minimum security facility. While not its highest and best use, this option can produce
significant cost savings. In the future, when the need for medium security beds exceeds otherwise
available capacity, closed parts of McNeil Island could be reopened as medium security.

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This option involves the following steps:





Keep the current minimum security unit at McNeil Island open (256 beds)
Close 737 medium security beds at McNeil Island
Convert one 256-bed medium security unit at McNeil Island to minimum security
Move 256 minimum security inmates to McNeil Island and close a similar number of
minimum security beds elsewhere. (See “Temporary Closure of Minimum Security
Beds,” below.)
 Open a 256-bed medium security unit at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center
After these steps are taken, McNeil Island is a 512 bed minimum security facility. Minimum
security offenders fill all island related inmate and correctional industries jobs.
Other than timing related to minimum security, and where medium security beds are opened in
later years, future steps closely parallel the hypothetical baseline scenario. However, because
there is a projected need for the currently closed IMU beds at McNeil Island by 2016, under this
scenario MICC would reopen one 256 bed medium housing unit in 2016. Opening a medium
security housing unit would be accompanied by adding custody and other staff needed for a
facility with medium custody inmates – a necessary step if IMU inmates are also at McNeil
Island.
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and Move it to the Monroe Correctional Complex
The Ahtanum View Corrections Center is located about six miles west of downtown Yakima. The
main building was gutted and remodeled in the late 1990’s. All structures are in good condition.
The Ahtanum View Work Release facility is located on the same 7.5 acre site. The latter occupies
a 1930’s vintage building constructed by the Works Progress Administration. It is in need of
capital improvements, including changes to meet ADA requirements, replace doors and windows,
and upgrade the HVAC system. The work release facility is operated under contract for DOC by a
private contractor.
The Ahtanum View Corrections Center program for medically fragile and disabled offenders –
most of them elderly – is the only one of its kind in DOC. Under this proposal the program would
be moved to an existing minimum security building at Monroe. This building would require
minor physical changes – some of which would reduce the bed capacity of the unit – to
accommodate this population. FTEs and dollars associated with the special needs of these inmates
would follow them to their new location.
After moving the program to Monroe, it is recommended that Ahtanum View Work Release
move into the vacated Ahtanum View Corrections Center. This saves future capital dollars
otherwise needed to upgrade the existing work release facility.
Closure of Ahtanum View takes 120 minimum security beds permanently off line. In addition,
modifications to an existing living unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex to accommodate the
extra space requirements of disabled inmates results in permanent elimination of another 54
minimum security beds.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.26

Temporarily Close Minimum Security Beds
If the McNeil Island Corrections Center is converted to minimum security, there is an opportunity
to close approximately 240 minimum security beds for at least two years. This can be extended to
up to six years if temporary excess capacity at medium security associated with opening units at
the Coyote Ridge Corrections Center is used to house overflow minimum custody inmates.
Large savings occur when you can close an entire institution or compound. Smaller savings occur
when you close an entire living unit. Negligible savings occur if you downsize multiple existing
living units in lieu of closing whole units.
Since there are no male minimum security facilities as small as 240 beds, it is not possible to
close an entire minimum security facility. It is possible, however, to temporarily close one or
more living units. As discussed above under, “What are the Options and How Were they
Selected,” it is recommended that one living unit at Larch Corrections Center be temporarily
closed as part of Scenario 1.

DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO 2
Close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex
The Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe is the old Washington State Reformatory. It is
one of five compounds that make up the Monroe Correctional Complex. The other units are the
Twin Rivers Unit (TRU), Special Offender Unit (SOU), Minimum Security Unit (MSU) and
Intensive Management Unit (IMU). Each unit has a security perimeter appropriate to the security
level of its respective compound.
Including emergency capacity, there are 772 medium security beds in two large cellhouses at the
Washington State Reformatory Unit. All of these beds are currently funded. These two cellhouses
are physically part of the wall of the old Reformatory. There are many other buildings inside the
wall, including a hospital and kitchen. The hospital serves the entire correctional complex. The
kitchen prepares food for all of the facilities except the Twin Rivers Unit. Because of the role
they play, these two buildings would have to continue operation even if the remainder of the
Reformatory were closed.
Under this option, no inmates would live inside the walls of the old Reformatory. Housing units
would be closed and all custody posts associated with medium security would be vacated.
Minimum security inmates from the adjacent Minimum Security Unit would work in the kitchen.
In effect, the old walled institution would become minimum security. However, since the hospital
would continue to operate, and inmates of any custody level may be in the hospital, the hospital
would have to operate like a jail – with the building itself constituting the security perimeter.
With permanent closure of the Washington State Reformatory Unit, all available medium security
beds in the system are filled by 2018. It would therefore be necessary to construct new medium
security beds somewhere in the system to come on line by 2018.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.27

Unlike Scenario 1 and 3 where new minimum security capacity is created by conversion of
existing medium security housing to minimum, no new minimum capacity is created by Scenario
2. Consequently, it will be necessary to open approximately 100 additional minimum security
beds in 2013 and another 100 in 2016. It is recommended that this be done by phased expansion
of the Minimum Security Camp at Coyote Ridge.
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and Move it to the Monroe Correctional Complex
The issues and steps relating to closing the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and moving the
program to Monroe are the same as in Scenario 1.

DESCRIPTION OF SCENARIO 3
Close the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary
The old walled institution at the Washington State Penitentiary is now commonly referred to as
the Main Institution. It is one of four compounds at Penitentiary. The others are the West
Complex, the Minimum Security Unit and two collocated IMUs.
There are a number of buildings inside the walls, including 852 funded medium security beds.
Inmates in the Main Institution include kitchen workers and workers in Correctional Industries.
The West Complex is entirely close security. The compound was built to be expanded but has a
kitchen that, because of space limitations, can only provide food service to the West Complex.
The IMUs and the Main Institution continue to rely on the old central kitchen at the Main
Institution for food preparation. The logistics of food service and (to a lesser extent) the needs of
correctional industries – affect the strategy and timing for implementing this option.
Under this option, one housing unit at the Main Institution would be converted to house
approximately 240 minimum custody inmates. All other housing units would be closed and all
custody posts required for medium security would be vacated. Like the option to close the old
Reformatory, the old walled institution at the Penitentiary would become minimum security. The
minimum security inmates at the Main Institution would be kitchen and Correctional Industries
workers until such time as the West Complex kitchen is expanded and a new medium security
unit is constructed at the Penitentiary.
The following steps are involved in this option:
 Close 648 medium security beds at the Main Institution
 Convert one medium security living unit at the Main Institution to minimum security
 Move 240 minimum security inmates to the Main Institution and close a similar number
of minimum security beds elsewhere. (See “Temporary Closure of Minimum Security
Beds,” below.)
 Begin design and construction of a 256-bed medium security unit at the Penitentiary.
(Alternatively, DOC could replicate the current close security design and operate the new
building as medium security. This option would be faster.)
 Begin design and construction of a kitchen expansion at the West Complex.
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 Once construction of both projects is complete, move medium security inmates into the
new living unit and minimum security inmates out of the Main Institution and into other
minimum security facilities in the system. The medium security inmates in the new West
Complex living unit become the kitchen and correctional industries workers.
 Close the Main Institution
It should be noted that under the baseline scenario, a new close security housing unit is
constructed at the Washington State Penitentiary. This construction should take place at the same
time as construction of the medium security unit described above.
It should also be noted that the Main Institution at the Penitentiary houses the execution chamber.
This facility would have to be maintained or relocated if the Main Institution is closed.
Except for some timing issues, the remainder of this option is essentially the same as the
hypothetical baseline scenario.
Proposed new construction at the Washington State Penitentiary is illustrated on the following
page.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.29

EXHIBIT 23: SITE PLAN OF THE WASHINGTON STATE PENITENTIARY SHOWING PROPOSED CHANGES

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.30

Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and Move it to the Monroe Correctional Complex
The issues and steps relating to closing the Ahtanum View Corrections Center and moving the
program to Monroe are the same as in Scenario 1.
Temporarily Close Minimum Security Beds
Like Scenario 1, there is an opportunity to close approximately 240 minimum security beds if the
Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary is temporarily converted to minimum
security. In this case, closure would last three years. It is recommended that one living unit at the
Larch Corrections Center be closed for three years as part of Scenario 3.

COST ANALYSIS
The tables on the following pages summarize the projected FTE, operating and capital cost
impact of each of the Options, including the impact of closing minimum security beds. Because
closures cannot take place immediately, all savings in FY11 are reduced to reflect partial savings.
In most cases, full savings are realized in the second year.
Avoided capital costs are based on DOC’s ten year capital plan. The projects for each potentially
affected facility were reviewed by the consultant team architects. Those projects that would not
be needed if the facility closed were eliminated. In some cases part of a project (that part
associated with the closed portion of the institution) was eliminated.
All dollars amounts in these tables are in current (2009) dollars.
Documentation of how FTE impacts and capital and operating costs/savings were calculated can
be found in the appendix to this report.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.31

SCENARIO 1
Scenario 1 includes downsizing of the McNeil Island Corrections Center, relocating the Ahtanum View Corrections Center program to
Monroe, and closing one living unit at Larch Corrections Center for six years. The FTE, operating and capital cost implications are
shown in the following tables.
Table 5A
Downsize McNeil Island Corrections Center
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION
CUSTODY
Captain
-0.5
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
-10.6
Correctional Officer
-83.5
NON CUSTODY
-24.4
HEALTHCARE
-13.8
Cumulative change from 2009
-132.8
Change per year
-132.8
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Salaries and benefits
-$7,691,000
Warm closure costs
$46,406
Restart Cost
Total
-$7,644,594

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-1.0
0.0
-21.2
-167.0
-48.8
-27.5
-265.5
-132.8

-1.0
0.0
-21.2
-167.0
-48.8
-27.5
-265.5
0.0

-1.0
0.0
-21.2
-167.0
-48.8
-27.5
-265.5
0.0

-1.0
0.0
-21.2
-167.0
-48.8
-27.5
-265.5
0.0

0.0
0.0
-2.6
-41.3
-17.0
-8.5
-69.4
196.1

0.0
0.0
-2.6
-41.3
-17.0
-8.5
-69.4
0.0

0.0
0.0
-2.6
-41.3
-17.0
-8.5
-69.4
0.0

0.0
0.0
-1.5
-18.9
-5.0
-4.0
-29.4
40.0

0.0
0.0
-1.5
-18.9
-5.0
-4.0
-29.4
0.0

-$15,382,000 -$15,382,000 -$15,382,000 -$15,382,000
$76,493
$76,493
$76,493
$76,493
-$15,305,507 -$15,305,507 -$15,305,507 -$15,305,507

-$3,890,000
$38,246
$0
-$3,851,754

-$3,890,000
$38,246

Total

-$1,703,000
$19,123

-$1,703,000
$19,123

-$3,851,754

-$3,890,000
$19,123
$2,507,000
-$1,363,877

-$1,683,877

-$1,683,877

-$84,295,000
$486,240
$2,507,000
-$81,301,760

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
None
Subtotal

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

Capital Cost Avoidance
Project list in appendix
Subtotal

-$450,750
-$450,750

-$1,502,500
-$1,502,500

-$1,282,900
-$1,282,900

-$770,500
-$770,500

-$589,300
-$589,300

-$166,500
-$166,500

-$164,700
-$164,700

-$160,500
-$160,500

-$112,350
-$112,350

$0
$0

-$5,200,000
-$5,200,000

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$450,750

-$1,502,500

-$1,282,900

-$770,500

-$589,300

-$166,500

-$164,700

-$160,500

-$112,350

$0

-$5,200,000

Scenario 1 continued on next page.

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Scenario 1 continued
Table 5B
Close Ahtanum View Corrections Center & Relocate Program to Monroe
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION AT AVCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
-0.3
Sergeant
-1.3
Correctional Officer
-7.8
NON CUSTODY
-6.5
HEALTHCARE
-3.5
Cumulative change from 2009
-19.3
Change per year
-19.3
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE INCREASE AT MCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
0.0
Correctional Officer
0.2
NON CUSTODY
3.0
Cumulative change from 2009
3.2
Change per year
3.2
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Close AVCC
-$1,755,200
One time medical transport cost
$23,000
Warm closure - AVWR facility
$32,075
Additional MCC MSU staff
$169,250
Non staff health care dollars - Transfer
from AVCC to MCC
$261,557
AVWR contract adjustment1
$24,788
Total
-$1,244,531

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
-58.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
9.7

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

Total

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

-$64,942,400
$23,000
$203,466
$6,262,250

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$9,677,600
$917,138
-$47,858,946

$89,100
$89,100

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$89,100
$89,100

Capital Cost Avoidance
Replace AVWR windows & doors
Renovate AVWR
Replace AVWR HVAC system
Subtotal

$0
-$171,500
-$221,100
-$392,600

-$66,800
-$1,372,000
-$1,326,600
-$2,765,400

-$534,400
-$171,500
-$663,300
-$1,369,200

-$66,800
$0
$0
-$66,800

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

-$668,000
-$1,715,000
-$2,211,000
-$4,594,000

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$303,500

-$2,765,400

-$1,369,200

-$66,800

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

-$4,504,900

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
Modify MSU building & site
Subtotal

1

The AVCC currently provides food service and maintenance for the AV Work Release facility. This adjustment approximates what would be needed to offset the loss of AVCC services

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.33

Scenario 1 continued
Table 5C
Close One Living Unit at Larch Corrections Center for Six Years
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION AT LCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
-1.6
Correctional Officer
-17.6
NON CUSTODY
-10.8
Cumulative change from 2009
-30.0
Change per year
-30.0
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Salaries and benefits
-$1,650,600
Warm closure costs
$6,357
Restart Cost
Total
-$1,644,243

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
-4.3

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
0.0

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
0.0

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
0.0

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
34.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

-$1,899,000
$19,043

-$1,899,000
$19,043

-$1,899,000
$19,043

-$1,899,000
$19,043

-$1,879,957

-$1,879,957

-$1,879,957

-$1,879,957

-$949,500
$0
$1,612,000
$662,500

Total

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

-$10,196,100
$82,531
$1,612,000
-$8,501,569

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
There are no capital budget impacts associated with temporary closure of a living unit at LCC

Table 5D
SUMMARY - SCENARIO 1
FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

NET CHANGE IN FTES per YEAR
McNeil Island Corrections Center
Ahtanum View Corrections Center
Monroe Correctional Complex
Larch Corrections Center
Total per year
Cumulative change from 2009

-132.8
-19.3
3.2
-30.0
-178.8
-178.8

-132.8
-58.0
9.7
-4.3
-185.4
-364.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-364.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-364.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-364.3

196.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
196.1
-168.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
34.3
34.3
-133.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-133.9

40.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
40.0
-93.9

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-93.9

Estimated Operating Budget Impact

-$10,533,367

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

Christopher Murray & Associates

-$754,250

-$22,364,843 -$22,364,843 -$22,364,843 -$22,364,843
-$4,267,900

-$2,652,100

-$837,300

-$589,300

Total

-$8,368,633

-$9,031,133

-$6,543,256

-$6,863,256

-$6,863,256

-$137,662,276

-$166,500

-$164,700

-$160,500

-$112,350

$0

-$9,704,900

Page 1.34

SCENARIO 2
Scenario 2 includes closing the Washington State Reformatory Unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex and relocating the Ahtanum
View Corrections Center program to Monroe. The FTE, operating and capital cost implications are shown in the following tables.
Table 6A
Close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION
CUSTODY
Captain
0.0
Lieutenant
-2.5
Sergeant
-8.4
Correctional Officer
-85.9
NON CUSTODY
-17.5
Cumulative change from 2009
-114.3
Change per year
-114.3
FTE Increases
Hospital custody staff
Cumulative change from 2009
Change per year

2.7
2.7
2.7

Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Salaries and benefits
-$6,414,500
Warm closure costs
$115,957
Total
-$6,298,543

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-35.0
-228.5
-114.3

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
-3.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

0.0
-5.0
-16.7
-171.8
-38.0
-231.5
0.0

5.3
5.3
2.7

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

5.3
5.3
0.0

Total

-$12,829,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000 -$12,993,000
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
$212,213
-$12,616,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787 -$12,780,787

-$123,187,500
$2,025,870
-$121,161,630

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
None
Subtotal

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

Capital Cost Avoidance
Project list in appendix
Subtotal

-$813,300
-$813,300

-$2,711,000
-$2,711,000

-$2,950,100
-$2,950,100

-$3,508,000
-$3,508,000

-$3,385,750
-$3,385,750

-$3,100,500
-$3,100,500

-$2,416,800
-$2,416,800

-$821,500
-$821,500

-$410,750
-$410,750

-$164,300
-$164,300

-$20,282,000
-$20,282,000

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$813,300

-$2,711,000

-$2,950,100

-$3,508,000

-$3,385,750

-$3,100,500

-$2,416,800

-$821,500

-$410,750

-$164,300

-$20,282,000

Scenario 2 continued on the next page.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.35

Scenario 2 continued
Table 6B
Close Ahtanum View Corrections Center & Relocate Program to Monroe
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION AT AVCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
-0.3
Sergeant
-1.3
Correctional Officer
-7.8
NON CUSTODY
-6.5
HEALTHCARE
-3.5
Cumulative change from 2009
-19.3
Change per year
-19.3
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE INCREASE AT MCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
0.0
Correctional Officer
0.2
NON CUSTODY
3.0
Cumulative change from 2009
3.2
Change per year
3.2
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Close AVCC
-$1,755,200
One time medical transport cost
$23,000
Warm closure - AVWR facility
$32,075
Additional MCC MSU staff
$169,250
Non staff health care dollars - Transfer
from AVCC to MCC
$261,557
1
AVWR contract adjustment
$24,788
Total
-$1,244,531

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
-58.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
9.7

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

Total

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$7,020,800
$0
$19,043
$677,000

-$64,942,400
$23,000
$203,466
$6,262,250

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$9,677,600
$917,138
-$47,858,946

$89,100
$89,100

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$89,100
$89,100

Capital Cost Avoidance
Replace AVWR windows & doors
Renovate AVWR
Replace AVWR HVAC system
Subtotal

$0
-$171,500
-$221,100
-$392,600

-$66,800
-$1,372,000
-$1,326,600
-$2,765,400

-$534,400
-$171,500
-$663,300
-$1,369,200

-$66,800
$0
$0
-$66,800

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

-$668,000
-$1,715,000
-$2,211,000
-$4,594,000

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$303,500

-$2,765,400

-$1,369,200

-$66,800

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

-$4,504,900

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
Modify MSU building & site
Subtotal

1

The AVCC currently provides food service and maintenance for the AV Work Release facility. This adjustment approximates what would be needed to offset the loss of AVCC services

Scenario 2 continued on the next page.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.36

Scenario 2 continued
Table 6C
SUMMARY - SCENARIO 2

NET CHANGE IN FTES per YEAR
WSRU at Monroe Corr Complex
MSU at Monroe Corr Complex
Ahtanum View Corrections Center
Total per year
Cumulative change from 2009

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-111.6
3.2
-19.3
-127.7
-127.7

-111.6
9.7
-58.0
-159.9
-287.7

-3.0
0.0
0.0
-3.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-290.7

Estimated Operating Budget Impact

-$7,543,074

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$1,116,800

Christopher Murray & Associates

-$17,796,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167 -$17,960,167
-$5,476,400

-$4,319,300

-$3,574,800

-$3,385,750

-$3,100,500

-$2,416,800

-$821,500

-$410,750

-$164,300

Total

-$169,020,577
-$24,786,900

Page 1.37

SCENARIO 3
Scenario 3 includes temporarily converting the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary into a small minimum security
facility, constructing new housing and other relocating the Ahtanum View Corrections Center program to Monroe, and closing one
living unit at Larch Corrections Center for six years. The FTE, operating and capital cost implications are shown in the following
tables.
Table 7A
Close the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION
CUSTODY
Captain
-0.5
Lieutenant
-2.5
Sergeant
-6.7
Correctional Officer
-89.5
NON CUSTODY
-13.5
Cumulative change from 2009
-112.7
Change per year
-112.7
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Salaries and benefits
-$6,497,666
Warm closure costs
$140,503
Total
-$6,357,163

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-1.0
-5.0
-13.4
-178.9
-27.0
-225.3
-112.7

-1.0
-5.0
-13.4
-178.9
-27.0
-225.3
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-13.4
-178.9
-27.0
-225.3
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
-3.4

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
0.0

-1.0
-5.0
-12.5
-177.2
-33.0
-228.7
0.0

Total

-$12,995,333 -$12,995,333 -$12,995,333 -$13,152,333 -$13,152,333 -$13,152,333 -$13,152,333 -$13,152,333 -$13,152,333
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
$118,451
-$12,876,882 -$12,876,882 -$12,876,882 -$13,033,882 -$13,033,882 -$13,033,882 -$13,033,882 -$13,033,882 -$13,033,882

-$124,397,663
$1,206,562
-$123,191,101

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
Construct 198 close security beds
Construct 256 medium securitybeds
Expand W Complex kitchen
Subtotal

<- part of baseline - there is an additional $18.8 million capital cost not attributable to the closure scenario
$2,345,202
$3,702,988
$7,387,281
$4,354,381 <- assumes fast track schedule
$477,833
$754,480 $1,505,151
$887,201 <- assumes fast track schedule
$2,823,035
$4,457,469
$8,892,433
$5,241,582
$0
$0
$0

Capital Cost Avoidance
Project list in appendix
Subtotal
Estimated Capital Budget Impact

$0

$0

$0

$17,789,853
$3,624,665
$21,414,518

$0
$0

$0
$0

-$2,812,125
-$2,812,125

-$9,373,750 -$14,738,050 -$27,254,750 -$21,452,675
-$9,373,750 -$14,738,050 -$27,254,750 -$21,452,675

-$7,914,500
-$7,914,500

-$6,704,300
-$6,704,300

-$3,880,500
-$3,880,500

-$94,130,650
-$94,130,650

$2,823,035

$4,457,469

$6,080,308

-$4,132,168 -$14,738,050 -$27,254,750 -$21,452,675

-$7,914,500

-$6,704,300

-$3,880,500

-$72,716,132

Scenario 3 continued on the next page.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.38

Scenario 3 continued
Table 7B
Close Ahtanum View Corrections Center & Relocate Program to Monroe
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION AT AVCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
-0.3
Sergeant
-1.3
Correctional Officer
-7.8
NON CUSTODY
-6.5
HEALTHCARE
-3.5
Cumulative change from 2009
-19.3
Change per year
-19.3
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE INCREASE AT MCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
0.0
Correctional Officer
0.2
NON CUSTODY
3.0
Cumulative change from 2009
3.2
Change per year
3.2
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Close AVCC
-$1,755,200
One time medical transport cost
$23,000
Warm closure - AVWR facility
$32,075
Additional MCC MSU staff
$169,250
Non staff health care dollars - Transfer
from AVCC to MCC
$261,557
1
AVWR contract adjustment
$24,788
Total
-$1,244,531

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
-58.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

-1.0
-5.1
-31.3
-25.9
-14.1
-77.4
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
9.7

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.8
12.1
12.9
0.0

Total

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

-$7,020,800

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

$19,043
$677,000

-$64,942,400
$23,000
$203,466
$6,262,250

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$1,046,227
$99,150
-$5,179,380

$9,677,600
$917,138
-$47,858,946

$89,100
$89,100

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$89,100
$89,100

Capital Cost Avoidance
Replace AVWR windows & doors
Renovate AVWR
Replace AVWR HVAC system
Subtotal

$0
-$171,500
-$221,100
-$392,600

-$66,800
-$1,372,000
-$1,326,600
-$2,765,400

-$534,400
-$171,500
-$663,300
-$1,369,200

-$66,800
$0
$0
-$66,800

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

$0
$0
$0
$0

-$668,000
-$1,715,000
-$2,211,000
-$4,594,000

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

-$303,500

-$2,765,400

-$1,369,200

-$66,800

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

-$4,504,900

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
New Capital Initiatives
Modify MSU building & site
Subtotal

1

The AVCC currently provides food service and maintenance for the AV Work Release facility. This adjustment approximates what would be needed to offset the loss of AVCC services

Scenario 3 continued on the next page.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.39

Scenario 3 continued
Table 7C
Close One Living Unit at Larch Corrections Center for Three Years
FY11
OPERATING COST IMPACT - FTE REDUCTION AT LCC
CUSTODY
Lieutenant
0.0
Sergeant
-1.6
Correctional Officer
-17.6
NON CUSTODY
-10.8
Cumulative change from 2009
-30.0
Change per year
-30.0
Estimated Operating Budget Impact per Year
Salaries and benefits
-$1,650,600
Warm closure costs
$6,357
Restart Cost
Total
-$1,644,243

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
-4.3

0.0
-1.8
-19.5
-13.0
-34.3
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
34.3

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

-$1,899,000
$19,043
-$1,879,957

-$949,500
$9,522
$1,612,000
$672,022

Total

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0
$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

$0

-$4,499,100
$34,922
$1,612,000
-$2,852,178

CAPITAL BUDGET IMPACT
There are no capital budget impacts associated with temporary closure of a living unit at LCC

Table 7D
SUMMARY - SCENARIO 3

NET CHANGE IN FTES per YEAR
Washington State Penitentiary
Ahtanum View Corrections Center
Monroe Correctional Complex
Larch Corrections Center
Total per year
Cumulative change from 2009

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14

FY15

FY16

FY17

FY18

FY19

FY20

-112.7
-19.3
3.2
-30.0
-158.7
-158.7

-112.7
-58.0
9.7
-4.3
-165.3
-324.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-324.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
34.3
34.3
-289.8

-3.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
-3.4
-293.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-293.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-293.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-293.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-293.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-293.2

Estimated Operating Budget Impact

-$9,245,937

Estimated Capital Budget Impact

$2,519,535

Christopher Murray & Associates

-$19,936,218 -$17,384,240 -$18,056,261 -$18,213,261 -$18,213,261 -$18,213,261 -$18,213,261 -$18,213,261 -$18,213,261
$1,692,069

$4,711,108

-$4,198,968 -$14,738,050 -$27,254,750 -$21,452,675

-$7,914,500

-$6,704,300

-$3,880,500

Total

-$173,902,225
-$77,221,032

Page 1.40

LIFE CYCLE COSTS
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
In the preceding section, operating and capital cost savings are expressed in current dollars with
each scenario described as if it occurred in isolation from anything else that might otherwise take
place in the adult corrections system. While this is a valid way of evaluating these scenarios, it
has several limitations, specifically:
 Treating all costs and savings in current dollars ignores that fact that spending or saving a
dollar today is not the same thing as spending or saving a dollar next year.
 Assuming that each scenario takes place in isolation from the rest of the adult corrections
system exaggerates savings because it assumes that DOC would continue to operate
partly full facilities and take no steps to economize if none of the scenarios were
implemented.
Life cycle cost analysis is a method whereby these limitations can be neutralized and each
scenario’s effectiveness measured in a way that allows them to be directly compared.
What is Life Cycle Cost Analysis?
Life cycle cost analysis takes into account the concept of the time value of money. A few
examples can illustrate what this means and why it is important. If I were to say, “which would
you prefer: $1,000 today or $1,000 a year from now?” most people would have no difficulty
making a quick decision. On the other hand, if I were to say, “which would you prefer: $1,000
today or $100 a month for the next 12 months?” most people might pause and think a bit before
answering. But if I were to say: which is the better deal: Scenario 1 – where you save more
during the first five years than any other scenario but less after that, or Scenario 2 or 3 – where
you save less at first but more later?” the answer is not so obvious.
Life cycle cost analysis discounts future costs and savings in a systematic way to determine what
those costs and savings are worth today. Adding together costs and savings from this year to
discounted costs and savings from years 2, 3, 4, and so forth results in what is called the “net
present value.”
In the life cycle cost analysis presented here, the three scenarios are not compared directly one to
another but to the “hypothetical baseline” described in the section above titled, “Downsizing
Occurs in a Changing Environment.” How each scenario differs from the baseline is a directly
comparable measure of the relative financial performance of each scenario.
These two elements of the life cycle cost analysis – discounting future costs and savings and
comparing each scenario to the hypothetical baseline – eliminates the limitations noted above
and provides an apples-to-apples comparison the three scenarios.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 1.41

Methodology and Limitations
To measure net savings, the team economists, Berk & Associates (BERK), compared each
scenario with a hypothetical baseline scenario—an assumed state-of-the-world that describes
how the system might reasonably be expected to operate if none of the contemplated actions
were pursued.
The hypothetical baseline scenario assumes that the DOC will pursue relatively modest steps
towards making full and efficient use of the resources that it now has at its disposal. In particular,
the DOC baseline assumes that the Department would take advantage of the newly completed
medium-security Coyote Ridge Correctional Center. The primary actions in the hypothetical
baseline involve closing higher cost medium security living units at several institutions and
opening lower cost units at Coyote Ridge as they are needed. These steps would improve the
cost-efficiency of the department by reducing the per-inmate cost below 2009 levels.
Each of the three scenarios analyzed in this report represent further, more aggressive, actions that
DOC might take to save even more money. The life cycle cost analysis presented here calculates
how much more the State might save over ten years (beyond savings embedded in the
hypothetical baseline) if policy makers pursue these more aggressive actions. All Findings are
presented in terms of “Net Present Value.”
There is one important limitation that pertains to the calculation of the net present value of
capital expenditures and savings. Whenever one is talking about capital investments, it is
important to recognize that most such investments generate value that extends beyond the 10year timeframe of this analysis. Because of data limitations, we were not able to calculate this
residual value. However, as will be seen in the discussion below, in the context of the alternative
scenarios we evaluated, alternative ways at looking at this issue make it moot.

Net Present Value of Operating Cost Savings
From the perspective of operating cost reduction, Scenario 3 – Closure of the Main Institution at
WSP offers the greatest prospect for savings over the ten years from 2011 through 2020 (see
Table 8). In present value terms, Scenario 3 offers savings of $97 million, versus savings of $84
million under Scenario 2 – Closure of WSRU at MCC, and $74 million under Scenario 1 –
Downsizing MICC.7

7

Net Present Values are calculated using a discount rate of 4.2%, a rate that reflects projected future costs of State
bonded debt. In effect, this discount rate reflects the cost the State pays to move money forward through time.
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Table 8: Present Value of 10-Year Operating Savings (in Millions)
Relative to Hypothetical Baseline
(Savings Presented in Year-of-Expenditure Dollars)
Net Present
Value of
Savings
(2011)
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020
Scenario 1 Downsize MICC

$2.39 M

$13.19

$13.63

$14.26

$13.34

$6.21

$8.99

$5.59

$6.16

$6.31

$73.5 M

Scenario 2 - Close
$5.17 M
WSRU at MCC

$9.27

$9.41

$9.71

$8.95

$10.46

$13.66

$13.42

$13.75

$14.08

$84.2 M

Scenario 3 - Close
Main Institution $6.96 M
at WSP

$12.82

$11.18

$12.33

$12.40

$11.92

$13.30

$13.62

$13.95

$14.29

$97.1 M

Source: BERK

Net Present Value of Capital Cost Savings
Comparisons of capital cost savings are somewhat less straightforward to interpret. Among the
three scenarios, the scenario that offers the greatest capital “savings” is Scenario 3 – Closure of
the Main Institution at WSP. The reason this scenario is associated with the greatest savings is
that closing the Main Institution means that the State can avoid spending nearly $100 million in
renovations for the facility (a savings that is offset in part by a newly-constructed housing and
kitchen expansion that is envisioned in the scenario).
However, as noted above, whenever one is talking about capital investments, it is important to
recognize that most such investments generate value that extends beyond the 10-year timeframe
of this analysis. If it is the case that DOC will need additional capacity to house inmates in
coming decades, then the large investment to renovate the Main Institution generates some
ongoing value. One way to measure this value is to consider how much the State has spent in
recent years to expand capacity. The recently constructed 2,048 bed medium security facility at
Coyote Ridge cost of nearly $230 million.8 This suggests that the per-bed cost of constructing a
facility is roughly $112,000. Applying this per-bed value to the 852 beds and associated facilities
at the Main Institution results in a capacity value of $96 million (if one assumes that the $94
million investment [in 2009 dollars] results in a like-new facility).
On the other hand, another way to think about the value of a given facility investment is to
consider the degree to which the investment affects the ability of the Department to provide costeffective services. If the Department had the choice between two $100 million facilities, but one
of the two was configured to save the department $5 million per year due to more efficient
operations, the latter facility would have a much greater true value to the State than the former.
8

Construction costs are for a facility constructed in 2006, 2007, and 2008 in a favorable bidding market. This large
facility also benefited from economies of scale that would not necessarily be present for other DOC expansion
projects. The current bidding climate is, however, considered to be at least as favorable as was the case for Coyote
Ridge.
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(Over a 25-year time-span, the more efficient facility would save the department nearly $100
million in operating costs [in present-value terms] when compared with the less efficient
facility.)
When one takes into consideration the operational-efficiency differences between the two
facilities, one could say that the efficient facility is truly worth $100 million, but the less efficient
option is worth the $100 million construction cost minus the present value of the additional
operating costs it would require. Under the scenario where the less-efficient facility translates to
$5 million more in operating costs each year, (assuming the facility had a 25-year useful life) the
accumulated additional costs of operation would come close to $100 million (in present value
terms). This, in turn, means that the true value of the less efficient facility from the perspective of
DOC would be close to zero.
In fact, the numbers for a rebuilt Main Institution at WSP are even more unattractive than the
above hypothetical discussion. The costs of operating the Main Institution as it is configured are
roughly $20,000 per-bed per-year higher than costs of modern facilities in the DOC.9 Multiplied
by 852 beds, this translates to a cost inefficiency of $17 million per year. This large cost
inefficiency suggests that, from a lifecycle perspective, rebuilding the Main Institution is a very
bad investment.
This discussion highlights two points: (1) assessing the “value” of a given capital investment is
challenging; and (2) without considering the complexities, a straight-up comparison of capital
expenditures among scenarios is of only limited value.
Having noted the limitations, Table 9 summarizes the net present value of capital cost savings
associated with the three action scenarios.
Table 9: Present Value of 10-Year Capital Savings (in Millions)
Relative to Hypothetical Baseline
(Savings Presented in Year-of-Expenditure Dollars)
Net Present
Value of
Savings
FY2011 FY2012 FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020
(2011)
Scenario 1 Downsize MICC

$0.45 M

$1.56

$1.38

$0.86

$0.67

$0.19

$0.19

$0.19

$0.14

$0.00

$4.9 M

Scenario 2 - Close
$0.82 M
WSRU at MCC

$2.82

$3.18

$3.89

$3.85

$3.59

$2.85

$0.99

$0.50

$0.21

$18.8 M

($6.55)

$4.59

$16.75

$31.58

$25.31

$9.50

$8.21

$4.85

$64.1 M

Scenario 3 - Close
Main Institution ($2.85) M ($4.64)
at WSP

Source: BERK

9

See appendix for calculations of cost per bed by institution and housing unit.

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ALTERNATIVE USES
It is difficult to find alternative uses for correctional facilities. Furthermore, it is not
recommended that any DOC property be fully vacated and disposed of. Consequently, any
alternative use would have to be fully compatible with an adjacent correctional use.
Any alternative use that is not correctional in nature would require new occupancy permits and
modification to buildings as required by the new occupancy type. Changes of this magnitude
would require the buildings be brought up to all modern code requirements. Under these
circumstances, with buildings as old as the ones at Monroe and Walla Walla, it is generally
cheaper to demolish and replace buildings rather than upgrade them.
Each closure option also has limitations, particularly those for McNeil Island and Monroe. As
noted above (“Why Isn’t Full Closure of McNeil Island and Option?”), the deed conveying the
island to the State of Washington explicitly requires the property be used as a correctional
facility in perpetuity or else revert to the federal government. At Monroe, even if the reformatory
is closed for purposes of housing inmates, the hospital and kitchen would still be in operation.
The entire Reformatory property is, in effect, within the boundaries of a minimum security
facility. Finally, the financial advantages of the options for Monroe and Walla Walla include
large capital cost avoidance. Continued use of these facilities would require additional capital
expense.
Renting Beds
Many correctional agencies – federal, state and local – contract for beds from other jurisdictions
or private operators. DOC contracts for space in county jails to house offenders who violate
terms of their community supervision. DOC also rents prison beds in other states and is expected
to continue to do so, at least for close custody inmates, for some years. On the other hand, DOC
doesn’t need to rent medium security beds because it has surplus capacity at that security level.
Since it has surplus capacity, couldn’t DOC go into the business of renting prison bed?
DOC has, in fact, rented beds to the federal government and other jurisdictions in the past.
Keeping facilities open by renting them to other jurisdictions would save jobs and eliminate
adverse economic impacts to local communities.
The major closure options discussed here save substantial dollars by nature of their size and
through downgrading the security level of the institutions. Offsetting those savings would require
renting more than 700 medium security beds for any of the three scenarios. If fewer beds are
rented, the cost per bed increases dramatically because the living unit and, more importantly,
everywhere outside the living unit, must be staffed for medium security.
There is a competitive national market for renting prison beds and renting beds must be
justifiable on a financial basis. DOC currently rents close custody beds from the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA) for $68.24 a day. This is less than $25,000 per inmate per year.
DOC cannot breakeven at this price point.
With a federal court order to reduce prison population in California by 40,000, the demand for
prison rental beds may soon become dramatically larger. A larger demand could drive up prices.
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On the other hand, California has been paying bills to vendors with IOUs lately. We recommend
caution before going down this path.
In conclusion, renting prison beds appears to be the only possible alternative use for closed DOC
facilities. However, unless a large customer with cash emerges, we believe it is unlikely that
DOC can rent enough beds at a high enough rate to make financial sense.

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THE EFFECTS OF CLOSURE
THE EFFECT OF CLOSURE ON E MPLOYEES
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
There are two important issues to understand as we examine the effect of each scenario on DOC
employees: (1) how employees are categorized and (2) the process by which employees may
continue employment with DOC.
Employee Job Classifications and Categories
The project team estimated the changes in FTEs by state job class for each closure or downsizing
component of each scenario. While estimated changes for every job class are included in the
appendix, three summary job class categories were created for more streamlined discussion here.
Each of these categories includes multiple positions, classes, and series. The categories are:
•

Custody: Custody employees fall under four specific job classes: Captain, Lieutenant,
Sergeant, and Correctional Officer.

•

Non Custody: Employees in this category provide a number of services, including
administration, business functions, offender programs, and facility maintenance.

•

Healthcare: Healthcare employees provide inmates with medical, dental, and mental health
services. This category includes healthcare professionals (such as nurses, mental health
counselors, and dental hygienists) as well as management and administrative support for
healthcare activities.

It should be noted that correctional Industry (CI) employees are not included in this analysis
because there is no change in CI employment due to the scenarios studied.
All Scenarios Result in Layoffs of DOC Employees
In the DOC scenarios studied employees and employment opportunities are affected in different
ways. While employment increases at some locations, on balance, there are net job losses. The
following changes occur:
•

Elimination of FTEs as a result of partial facility closure

•

Elimination of FTEs as a result of a full facility closure

•

Creation of new FTEs at institutions as a result of relocating inmates from a downsized or
closed facility

The Formal Option Process
Closures of DOC facilities will result in a reduction in positions and employee layoffs. By civil
service rules and union agreements, these employees have different options available to them for

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continued employment within DOC. This section presents an overview of the types of processes
used for continued employment opportunities.
Under the State layoff process the State is under obligation to find and offer employment
opportunities for permanent employees laid off in a facility closure or downsizing. This is called
the formal option process. In this process, permanent employees being laid are offered a
comparable position for which they have the required job skills within a designated “layoff unit.”
A layoff unit is the geographic boundary used for determining available positions. There are
three tiers of layoff units:
 County: Employees are first considered for positions for which they are eligible in their
current county of employment.
 Region: If there are no eligible positions in the county, the process extends to a regional
level. These regions are defined by the agency and are illustrated in Exhibit 24.
 State: If there are no eligible positions in the region, the process then extends statewide.
Exhibit 24: DOC Regions

Within each successive layoff unit (first county, then regional, then statewide), employees are
considered for the following types of positions in the following order:
•

A funded vacant position in the same job class

•

A funded position in the same job class that is currently filled by a more junior employee

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•

A funded vacant or filled position in a job class held by the employee in the past

This process is illustrated in Exhibit 25 and described in the Technical Appendix to this report.
Exhibit 25: The Formal Option Process

A Note about DOC Facilities and Divisions
DOC operates 15 State prisons in Washington. Employment options through the processes
described below may be offered at any of these facilities. In addition, permanent employees may
also be offered employment at DOC Headquarters, in the DOC’s Community Corrections
Division (which supervises offenders in the community), or in work release facilities across the
State. Community Corrections is comprised of six regions: (1) King County, (2) Pierce County,
(3) East Section 1, (4) East Section 2, (5) the Northwest Region, and (6) the Southwest Region.
There is, however, little overlap in the job classes employed at state prisons and the job classes
employed at Headquarters and Community Corrections; employees most likely to receive
employment options at Headquarters or Community Corrections generally serve in non-custody
roles.
Summary of Employee Impacts
The numbers of FTEs reduced and created under Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 – as well as the net
change in FTE count – are summarized in the following table.

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Table 10: Summary of Changes in FTE Counts, FY11 and FY 12
Scenario

DOC Staff Reduced
at Closed and
Downsized Facilities

Demand for Staffing
10
Created Elsewhere

Net Change in
DOC FTE Count,

-357.8 FTE

67.2 FTE

-290.6 FTE

-268.3FTE

57.5 FTE

-210.8 FTE

-317.6 FTE

67.2 FTE

-250.4 FTE

FY09 to FY12

Scenario 1:
- Downsize MICC
- Close AVCC
- Downsize LCC

Scenario 2:
- Close WSRU at MCC
- Close AVCC

Scenario 3:
- Close MI at WSP
- Close AVCC
- Downsize LCC

As Table 10 demonstrations, over the first two years, Scenario 1 causes the largest number of
FTE reductions and results in the largest net reduction of staff. Scenario 2 has the fewest
employee impacts over the same period. While employment under Scenario 1 increases in later
years at McNeil Island, this increase is sufficiently delayed so there would be no benefit to staff
laid off during the first two years of scenario implementation.
Exhibit 26, on the following page, summarizes employment options for laid off employees
within and outside of DOC and highlights the following key findings:


Under all three scenarios, laid off staff who cannot “bump” into a position at the institution
being downsized would most likely have to relocate if they were to stay employed by DOC.
Some exceptions might occur with Scenario 1 where more senior staff might be able to
obtain employment at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. At Ahtanum View,
where the entire facility is closed, relocation (or a very long commute) is probably the only
option.



Very laid off employees will be eligible for newly created positions at the regional level.
These instances include: Washington State Penitentiary employees eligible for Coyote Ridge
Corrections Center positions (Scenario 3), Ahtanum View Corrections Center employees
eligible for positions created at Coyote Ridge (Scenarios 1, 2, and 3), and Larch Corrections
Center employees eligible for positions at the Washington Corrections Center (Scenarios 1
and 3).



At the statewide level, vacant positions will be scarce because of system-wide reductions.
Opportunities to bump more junior employees will depend upon seniority, work history, and
skill set. Almost all such options would require relocation and would likely result in the
displacement of more junior staff.

10

It is projected that additional staff will be needed at Coyote Ridge, the Washington Corrections Center, and the
Monroe Correctional Complex during FY11 and FY12. See Exhibit 16.
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In terms of employment outside of DOC, employees at McNeil Island (Scenario 1) and Monroe
(Scenario 2) have relatively easier access to large job markets. Employees at the Washington
State Penitentiary (Scenario 3), Ahtanum View Corrections Center (Scenarios 1, 2, and 3), and
the Larch Corrections Center (Scenarios 1 and 2), are more likely to have to accept long
commutes or relocation to find employment outside of DOC.
Exhibit 26: Summary of Employment Options
Scenario & FTE
Reductions (FY1112)
Scenario 1:
- Downsize MICC
- Close AVCC
- Downsize LCC

357.8 FTE reduced

Within DOC
Newly
"Bumping” Opportunities
Created Positions
Coyote Ridge Corrections
Center (35.2 FTE)
Monroe Correctional
Complex (12.9 FTE)
Washington Corrections
Center (22.3 FTE)
All newly created
positions are farther than
reasonable commutes
from closing/downsizing
facilities (most are 100 to
200 miles away), other
than WCC, which is
approx. 40 miles from
MICC (Steilacoom)

MICC staff may receive
options at WSP or CRCC,
both requiring relocation and
possibly bumping more
junior staff.
AVCC staff may be offered
options to new positions at
WSP or CRCC, or may
bump less senior employees
at these facilities. Either
would require relocation and
CRCC would likely be
undesirable because the
employee would lose union
seniority in the “post and
bid” process
LCC staff may receive
options at a number of
facilities, including for new
positions at WCC.
Relocation would be required
and options other than new
positions at WCC may
displace junior staff.

Scenario 2:
- Close WSRU at MCC
- Close AVCC

268.3FTE reduced

Coyote Ridge Corrections
Center (35.2 FTE)
Washington Corrections
Center (22.3 FTE)
All newly created
positions are farther than
reasonable commutes
from closing/downsizing
facilities (100-200 miles)

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More senior MCC staff may
receive options at Clallam
Bay or Olympic Corrections
Centers, requiring relocation
and, in the case of filled
positions, displacing more
junior staff.

Outside DOC
MICC employees have
relatively easy access to large
job markets in the
Olympia/Tumwater/Lacey
area as well as Tacoma (15
miles) and Seattle (45 miles)
AVCC staff seeking
employment outside of DOC
will be challenged by the
region’s relatively higher
unemployment and the lack of
large employment centers
within easy commuting range
LCC employees may need to
drive 30-40 miles to access
larger job markets; the area
has relatively higher levels of
unemployment

MCC employees have access
to Everett, the Eastside, and
Seattle within 30 miles of
driving
See Scenario 1, above, for
AVCC

See Scenario 1, above, for
AVCC

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Scenario & FTE
Reductions (FY1112)
Scenario 3:
- Close MI at WSP
- Close AVCC
- Downsize LCC

317.6 FTE reduced

Within DOC
Newly
Created Positions
Coyote Ridge Corrections
Center (35.2 FTE)
Monroe Correctional
Complex (12.9 FTE)
Washington Corrections
Center (22.3 FTE)
All newly created
positions are farther than
reasonable commutes
from closing/downsizing
facilities (80-335 miles)

"Bumping” Opportunities
Senior WSP employees
would be eligible for new
positions created at CRCC,
and others may fill vacant
positions or bump more
junior staff. Acceptance of an
option at CRCC would
require relocation.
See Scenario 1, above, for
AVCC and LCC

Outside DOC
WSP employees have
relatively fewer nearby
options than other DOC
employees: the region has
relatively higher
unemployment and outside of
Walla Walla itself, large job
markets are reached only with
a considerable drive
See Scenario 1, above, for
AVCC and LCC

THE EFFECT OF CLOSURE ON THE H OST COMMUNITY
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
Purpose
Significant downsizing and/or closures of state facilities would have economic and fiscal impacts
on the local communities that are home to these facilities. The primary impacts would be a result
of lost employment, lost purchases of goods and services within the community, and the loss of
taxes paid to the host jurisdiction.
As a result of shifting the populations from closed or downsized facilities to other locations,
“receiving communities” will experience some positive economic and fiscal impacts from
increased employment, additional purchases of goods and services, and increased tax revenue to
the host jurisdiction. Because the State is considering making these changes in an effort to
improve efficiency and ultimately decrease spending, one would expect the increased
expenditures (and impacts) in the receiving communities to not fully offset the losses in the
communities where facilities are closed or downsized.
The purpose of this analysis, which is represented in more detail in the accompanying Technical
Appendix, is to:
•

Estimate the direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts on the local region from the
changes in employment and purchases of goods and services for communities either losing or
gaining economic activity associated with the studied facilities

•

Estimate the fiscal impacts (change in tax revenue) to the local jurisdictions losing economic
activity associated with the studied facilities

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Methodology and Limitations
An assessment of economic impacts concerns itself with effects on patterns of commerce. What
shift in economic activity (business activity, income, or wages) can be attributed to a given
action or investment? An economic impact is characterized by a net new change in economic
activity, that is, economic activity that would otherwise not occur.
Our goal in this analysis is to estimate 1) the full impact on the regional economy of the change
in economic activity if a facility were closed or downsized, and 2) the full impact of additional
economic activity in receiving communities.
IMPLAN (short for IMpact Analysis for PLANning) software was used for this analysis.
IMPLAN is an input/output model that uses county-level data to trace the ripple effects (direct,
indirect, and induced effects) of an expenditure that occurs within the economy.
One of the limitations of this analysis is that it is performed as a snapshot in time. It compares
the impacts of a facility’s current expenditures with the likely impacts under a contemplated
scenario. Although many of the scenarios discussed in this report transition over a period of time,
for the economic analysis we have a chosen a future point in which the changes are anticipated to
have been completed and the facility’s operations are relatively static. All dollars used in this
portion of the analysis are 2009 dollars.
Another important issue to note is that these analyses describe the economic impacts to the local
region, not the local jurisdiction, because the facility may draw employees, goods, and services
from the larger area. The impacts to the local jurisdiction may be much greater relative to its
local economy than that shown for the larger region. In some of the scenarios analyzed in this
report, employees and residents of a facility are assumed to move to other locations within the
same study region, minimizing the economic impacts shown in our analysis. However, they may
be moving outside of the local jurisdiction, which can have significant impacts to that local
community. The ripple effects from the loss of employees and residents at the facilities can have
a profound impact in particular on cities of smaller size. If employees and residents relocate, the
indirect and induced effects from the lost spending of wages and facility purchases can be
devastating on a small local economy. The importance of this issue as it pertains in particular to
smaller communities that currently host facilities being considered for downsizing or closure
should not be underestimated by the reader.
Reading the Economic Impact Tables. Each economic impact discussion in this report includes
a table showing the results of the analysis similar to the one shown in Table 11 below. The
information highlighted in gray comes directly from the facilities or work done by the project
team for this study. The remainder of the table, in white, is a result of the analysis done with
IMPLAN. The title of each table contains the region analyzed for that facility.
The table begins on the left with the expenditure categories. The second column shows expected
change in facility expenditures due to the system changes being considered in the scenario. The
third column shows the estimated direct impacts to economic output resulting from these
expenditures (or reduction of expenditures), i.e. those dollars spent by the facility that are
assumed to be local to the study region. The multiplier in the next column accounts for the
indirect and induced impacts and is used to estimate the total impacts to economic output in the
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study area. The estimated number of jobs supported within the community by these expenditures
is shown in the sixth column, followed by impacts on labor income. Estimated jobs in the
Facility Salaries/Benefits category (and School District category for the JRA analysis) include
the actual number of FTEs to be laid off and/or gained at a facility plus induced jobs resulting
from the change in household spending (there are no indirect jobs in this spending category since
there is no industry purchase occurring in the economy here, only wages being spent).

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Table 11: Example of the Annual Economic Impact Tables Used in this Report
Expenditure
Categories
Food
Goods
Services
Utilities
Salaries/Benefits
Capital (Annual Avg)
Total

Annual Reduction
in Expenditures
$
244,463
$
848,033
$
825,046
$
215,436
$
7,476,080
$
676,320
$
10,285,379

Output
Output
Output
Total Community
Direct Impact Multiplier Total Impact
Job Loss
$
68,278
1.55 $
106,028
1.2
$
214,265
1.54 $
329,601
3.9
$
462,603
1.65 $
761,155
9.4
$
215,436
1.67 $
359,276
2.0
$
7,476,080
1.48 $ 11,077,502
166.8
$
676,320
1.61 $
1,088,864
7.8
$ 9,112,983
1.51 $ 13,722,427
191.1

Total Labor
Income Lost
$
46,940
$
145,061
$
332,078
$
120,049
$
7,932,450
$
453,172
$
9,029,749

Fiscal Impacts: In addition to the impacts on the local and regional economy, the downsizing
and/or closure of state facilities will have a direct impact on the host jurisdiction’s finances. The
Technical Appendix of this report discusses each of the following potential revenue sources in
more detail: utility and sales taxes, State shared revenues (including Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax,
Liquor Board Profits and Excise Tax, and Criminal Justice Revues), Criminal Justice Sales Tax,
and Public Safety Sales Tax.
With the exception of the Gas Tax, the revenues discussed above are generally part of each city’s
General Fund. To give a sense of the impact of lost revenues we have shown the portion of total
General Fund revenues estimated to be lost through closure or downsizing of each facility.
It is important to note that each facility studied in this report has a unique relationship with the
jurisdiction in which it is located. In many cases the facilities function as an integral part of the
local community and there is a mutually beneficial relationship that exists. Throughout the
discussion of impacts to the communities we have tried to characterize some of the ways in
which the facilities interact with their local communities. However, these relationships are
complex and varied and the scope of this analysis does not capture the full extent of the
interaction and mutual reliance between each facility and its community
Summary of Economic Impacts
Table 12 summarizes the estimated annual loss of economic activity in the local communities
affected by facility closures or downsizing in the three scenarios. This table takes into account
both direct job loss from facility closure or downsizing as well as induced job loss due to the
effect such a change has on the local economy. Detailed descriptions may be found in the
appendix to this report.
In instances in which a facility closure or downsizing results in the transfer of inmates to a
facility not listed below, the positive economic impacts of this transfer have not been calculated.
These impacts would occur because of the increased staffing and spending needed to support the
increase in the local prison population.

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Table 12: Summary & Comparison of Annual Estimated Economic Impacts
All Scenarios
Scenario/Area Definition
Scenario 1 – Downsize MICC
King, Kitsap, Mason, Pierce &
Thurston
Scenario 2 – Close WSRU at Monroe
King & Snohomish
Scenario 3 – Close MI at WSP
Walla Walla (1 st 4 years)
Walla Walla (after 4 years)
Scenarios 1, 2, 3 – Close AVCC
Kittitas & Yakima
Scenarios 1 & 3 – Downsize LCC
Clark

Output
Total Impact

Total Community
Job Change

Total Labor
Income Change

$ (27,193,730)

(354)

$

(18,369,474)

$ (27,554,993)

(318)

$

(16,266,532)

$ (14,103,564)
$ (21,322,511)

(237)
(302)

$
$

(12,501,675)
(15,162,675)

$ (12,947,578)

(139)

$

(8,592,289)

$ (2,899,213)

(45)

$

(1,999,130)

Losses in total economic output are similar for the downsizing of McNeil Island Corrections
Center and the closure of Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe. The initial impact of
Scenario 3 on Walla Walla is reduced by the positive effect of new construction associated with
this scenario. The impact on Walla Walla County increases once construction is completed.
Even though the job loss and other indicators are less in Walla Walla County when compared to
the other major closure/downsizing options, because the local economy is small, loss of 302 jobs
represents an increase in county unemployment of 1.1 percent. For Pierce and Snohomish
Counties, the increase in unemployment is less than 1/10 of 1 percent. Even this exaggerates the
impact of Scenarios 1 and 2 because the regional economy extends beyond the county line for
both of these scenarios.
Because Ahtanum View and Larch Corrections Centers are smaller facilities, the impacts of
changes to these facilities are also smaller. The closure of Ahtanum View would cause an
estimated total economic output loss of approximately $13 million annually and the reduction of
139 jobs within the study area. The downsizing of Larch Corrections Center would cause an
estimated loss in total economic output of approximately $3 million annually and a reduction of
45 jobs within the study area. The annual impacts from changes at Larch Corrections Center
would be seen for six years in Scenario 1 and three years in Scenario 3.
Summary of Fiscal Impacts
Table 13 shows the comparison of the estimated revenue loss to each jurisdiction’s operating
funds for all facility options included in the three scenarios.

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Table 13: Summary and Comparison of Estimated Annual Fiscal Impacts
All Scenarios

Scenario 1 – Pierce County
Scenario 2 – City of Monroe
Scenario 3 – City of Walla Walla

Estimated Reduction
in Revenue
$57,100
$118,600
$112,700

Percent of General
Fund
0.02%
1.10%
0.40%

The City of Monroe is estimated to see the greatest loss in revenue from the downsizing of MCC
with an impact of approximately 1.4% on its General Fund. The fiscal impacts to Pierce County
and the City of Walla Walla are small, with Walla Walla (the larger of the two) experiencing a
General Fund impact estimated at approximately half of one percent.

PROGRAMMATIC IMPACTS
Downsize the McNeil Island Corrections Center
One of the major concerns expressed by staff regarding the potential closure of the McNeil
Island Corrections Center is preservation of the mental health program. The McNeil Island
Corrections Center has a unique program in that mentally ill inmates can progress from
maximum security all the way to work release. Mental health staff members are in direct contact
with the staff of the Rap/Lincoln work release facility that specializes in mental health offender
re-entry services.
It should be noted that the mental health staffing is preserved in the closure scenarios for McNeil
Island Corrections Center. This way, if the facility is down-sized, the program can remain. It
should also be mentioned that the McNeil Island Corrections Center has a long standing
relationship with the University of Washington nursing program and currently has two doctoral
level interns: One in Pharmacy and one in mental health. Although these programs could be
transferred, they took years to develop.
The McNeil Island Corrections Center also supports a number of other correctional facilities. For
example, it provides healthcare and dental services for the Rap/Lincoln work release and
provides pharmacy services for the Washington Correction Center for Women. It also serves as
back-up for suicide prevention of inmates from the Washington Correction Center in Shelton.
Close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe
The Monroe Correctional Complex has an active and positive association with the community.
This are nearly a thousand volunteers who work at the complex, a unique program called the
University Behind Bars, and the Matthew House. The latter is an apartment where families of
inmates can stay while visiting an inmate. Matthew House has also developed a transportation
service for families to visit inmates around the entire state of Washington.
Although there would be no reason that these services would not continue at the other facilities
within the complex, the volunteer representatives we spoke with mentioned that the proximity to
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Seattle is what makes these programs possible. For example, the Monroe Correctional Complex
has the ability to draw from large universities where professors are willing to donate teaching
time, from groups in Seattle such as the Black Prisoners Caucus that requires inmates involved in
the program to “hold each other accountable as active parents”, and for the ability to connect
with teachers of children of inmates in the Seattle School District. If hundreds of inmates were
transferred from Monroe, they would lose these services and volunteers who have developed
personal relationships with specific inmates might stop coming to Monroe.
Other qualitative issues that were expressed in a community meeting in Monroe include concerns
about the impact on the local school district and children of inmates who attend school there, the
belief among many that the quality of volunteer programs makes the community safer through
reduced recidivism, and the fact that the community has already been hit hard by the economic
down-turn. It is believed that the further loss of quality local jobs would likely cause additional
businesses to close.
Close the Main Institution at Washington State Penitentiary
The Washington State Penitentiary currently has the full range of security levels. Closing the
Main Institution would temporarily eliminate all medium security beds and produce a gap
between close and minimum security. This would require that inmates transfer when they reach
medium security. This is contrary to a department initiative expressed by the Prisons Director
which is to reduce the number of transfers throughout the system. It costs less and is more family
friendly if an offender does not move during his/her incarceration. In some cases, it means their
children do not have to change schools. Staff also expressed the belief that having medium
security beds on site is an incentive for close custody inmates to behave properly and worked
towards the lower security levels.
Closure of the Main Institution would also adversely affect the education program and the
employees who work there.
Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center
The programmatic issues facing the closure of the Ahtanum View Corrections Center are
primarily focused on the quality of life of the inmates. The Ahtanum View Corrections Center
has an environment unlike any other in DOC. It is more like a geriatric nursing environment than
a typical prison environment. This is likely due to the fact that, with the exception of the 30
healthy inmate workers that support the facility, the Ahtanum View Corrections Center’s entire
inmate population is somewhat medically fragile. If the program is transferred to Monroe, the
Ahtanum View inmates, while they would have their own living unit and separate outdoor area,
would share the compound with the general population. They would also utilize the infirmary at
Washington State Reformatory Unit where there are inmates of all security levels and criminal
sophistication.
The Ahtanum View staff interacts with these medically fragile inmates in ways not seen at other
correctional facilities. For example, inmates with Alzheimer’s disease are able to move within
the building. This would not be the case if they could wander to areas where there are general
population inmates. In another environment they might need to be confined to their rooms more
often. Also, almost every inmate at Ahtanum View is considered capable of working. One
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example seen when visiting the facility was a mentally challenged inmate whose job is to clean
doorknobs all day. This reduces idleness, promotes daily functioning and probably contributes to
the hygiene of the facility.
The Ahtanum View Corrections Center also has a strong component of community volunteers
that are interested in this specialized population. Although the Monroe Correctional Complex
also has a huge contingency of volunteers, a program for this specific population will need to be
developed.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Significant savings from facility closure or downsizing only occur if an entire institution, or
major component thereof, can be closed. Major savings also accrue if the security level of an
institution is downgraded. The options considered in this study do both.
The opportunities for eliminating beds are mainly found at medium security. DOC cannot reduce
beds at higher security levels and will, within a short period of time, need additional close
security beds. DOC has already closed beds for female offenders. There are no additional
opportunities for closing female prison beds.
We do not recommend complete closure of the McNeil Island Corrections Center. The presence
of the Special Commitment Center on the island makes this an undesirable alternative.
Cost Savings are Temporary – Cost Avoidance Permanent
By reducing the need for prison beds, a window of opportunity is created during which real cost
savings are possible. Over time that window closes. After that, the number of offenders in prison
remains lower than it otherwise would have been – thereby permanently reducing future costs.
Exhibit 27
Actual and Projected DOC Population
With and Without the Effect of Bills Passed in 2009 Legislative Session
22,000

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

Jul-18

Jul-17

Jul-16

Jul-15

Jul-14

Jul-13

Jul-12

Jul-11

Jul-10

Jul-09

Jul-08

Jul-07

Jul-06

Jul-05

Jul-04

Jul-03

12,000

All Major Options Save at Least $12,000,000 in Operating Costs per Year
After the first year, all of the scenarios save at least $12,000,000 per year. First year savings are
less because full closure is not realized immediately. Second year savings range from
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approximately $18 million for Scenario 2 (primary action: close the Reformatory Unit at
Monroe) to $22 million for Scenario 1 (primary action: downsize the McNeil Island Corrections
Center). At nearly $20 million, second year savings for Scenario 3 (primary action: close the
Main Institution at the Penitentiary) are between those for Scenarios 1 and 2.
Eliminating 1,580 DOC Beds
As of the date of this report, DOC has already closed 267 beds. This includes 187 at the Pine
Lodge Corrections Center for Women and 80 reception beds at the Washington Corrections
Center.
The projected decrease in prison population is smaller than anticipated when ESHB was passed.
Population reduction bills in the last legislative session are projected to reduce the population by
about 1,100. While significant bed reductions and dollar savings are possible, without a further
decrease in prison population it is not possible to close 1,580 beds at this time.
The following table summarizes what the three scenarios are able to accomplish. It is important
to note that, other than the beds associated with closing Athanum View and moving its program
to Monroe, none of the minimum security beds are permanently closed. Under Scenario 1,
medium security beds are eventually reopened at McNeil Island. Because Scenarios 2 and 3
permanently close medium security beds, both of these options require additional construction of
medium security beds by 2018. While none of the major options can be done simultaneously,
they could be done sequentially.
Table 14: Eliminating 1,580 Adult Corrections Beds

Beds Closed by DOC since the legislation passed
Close Unit 2 at Pine Lodge
Close R-2 at WCC
Impact of Evaluated Options
Close medium security beds
Close minimum security beds
Impact of Athanum View Closure
Close AVCC
Reduce capacity at MCC-MSU
Subtotal
Additional steps dependent upon policy changes
(See Recommendation 3, below)
Total

Scenario 1
Downsize
MICC

Scenario 2
Close WSRU
at MCC

Scenario 3
Close MI at
WSP

187
80

187
80

187
80

481
240

772
0

648
240

120
54
1,162

120
54
1,213

120
54
1,329

456

480

324

1,618

1,693

1,653

The estimated impact of the bills not passed in the last legislative session is 452 beds. Additional
steps to eliminate DOC beds can be taken if these, or similar, population reduction measures are
adopted in the future.

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Long-Term Capital Savings are Significant for Some Options
The options to close the Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe and, especially, the Main
Institution at Penitentiary, result in avoidance of significant capital dollars that otherwise would
have to be spent to maintain outdated structures that have long outlived their expected useful life.
For example, in current (undiscounted) dollars, the 10-year net capital savings under Scenario 2
is nearly $25 million while the savings for Scenario 3 is more than $77 million.
With Some Options it Takes Money to Save Money
If a large number of medium security beds are permanently closed – as would be the case with
both the Monroe and Walla Walla options – all medium security beds (including the new Coyote
Ridge Corrections Center) will be full by 2018. Under both of these scenarios it would be
necessary to build a new 256 bed medium security unit for occupancy in 2018. In today’s dollars,
this is estimated to cost approximately $18 million. This amount nearly offsets the projected
capital cost savings from closing the Reformatory Unit at Monroe.
Summary of Savings over Ten Years
Table 15 summarizes the finding of the financial analysis. As can be seen from this table,
Scenario 3 generates the greatest savings in FTEs, operating costs, and capital costs.
Table 15: Summary of 10 Year FTE, Operating, and Capital Budget Savings by Scenario
Scenario 1
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Staff Years Eliminated (10 year total)
2,259
2,741
2,855
Operating Budget Savings (10 year total)
Current Dollars $137,700,000 $169,000,000 $173,900,000
Net Present Value $73,500,000 $84,200,000 $97,100,000
Capital Budget Savings (10 year total)
Current Dollars
$9,705,000 $24,787,000 $77,221,000
Net Present Value
$4,900,000 $18,800,000 $64,100,000
It is also possible to sequence Scenarios 1 and 3. If this were done, construction required for
Scenario 3 could be completed prior to closing the Main Institution at the Penitentiary.
There are several advantages to this approach in addition to increasing overall savings. First, the
effects of closing the Main Institution are delayed. While essentially the same number of
employees would be laid off, delayed closure could coincide with opening new close security
beds in the West Complex – thereby increasing opportunities for continued local employment by
more senior DOC employees. Similarly, the effect of layoffs on the Walla Walla economy would
be delayed and, because of employment generated by construction at the Penitentiary, there
would actually be an increase in local economic activity for the first four years.
A second advantage to sequencing Scenarios 1 and 3 is there would never be a time when the
Penitentiary was without medium security beds. The ability to house all custody levels at the
Penitentiary has important programmatic and management advantages to DOC.

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While we did not evaluate the life cycle costs of sequencing Scenarios 1 and 3, we can estimate
the operating and capital cost savings in current dollars. Table 16. Summarizes the savings
associated with this strategy.
Table 16: 10-Year FTE, Operating, and Capital Budget Savings
Sequencing of Scenarios 1 and 3

Staff Years Eliminated
Operating Budget Savings (current dollars)
Capital Budget Savings (current dollars)

Sequencing of
Scenarios 1 & 3
3,632
-$215,844,000
-$82,421,000

Effect on DOC Employees
Under the State layoff process permanent employees being laid are offered a comparable
position for which they have the required job skills within a designated “layoff unit.” There are
three tiers of layoff units: the county, region, and state.
Under all three scenarios, laid off staff who cannot “bump” into a position at the institution being
downsized would most likely have to relocate if they were to stay employed by DOC. Some
exceptions might occur with Scenario 1 where more senior staff might be able to obtain
employment at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. At Ahtanum View, where the
entire facility is closed, relocation (or a very long commute) is probably the only option. The
number of staff who would have to relocate due to closing the Main Institution at the
Penitentiary would be somewhat less if Scenarios 1 and 3 are sequenced and closure is delayed
until construction of additional close security beds at the Penitentiary is completed.
Very few laid off employees will be eligible for newly created positions at the regional level.
Some laid off employee at the Washington State Penitentiary or Ahtanum View could be eligible
for Coyote Ridge Corrections Center positions. Some employees at the Larch Corrections Center
could be eligible for positions at the Washington Corrections Center.
At the statewide level, vacant positions will be scarce because of system-wide reductions.
Opportunities to bump more junior employees will depend upon seniority, work history, and skill
set. Almost all such options would require relocation and would likely result in the displacement
of more junior staff.
In terms of employment outside of DOC, employees at McNeil Island (Scenario 1) and Monroe
(Scenario 2) have relatively easier access to large job markets. Employees at the Washington
State Penitentiary (Scenario 3), Ahtanum View Corrections Center (Scenarios 1, 2, and 3), and
the Larch Corrections Center (Scenarios 1 and 2), are more likely to have to accept long
commutes or relocation to find employment outside of DOC.
Effect on Host Communities
The economic effects on the host community of the major closure/downsizing options are
similar. Direct and induced local job loss range from 302 in Walla Walla County to 354 in the
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areas affected by downsizing of the McNeil Island Corrections Center. Smaller job losses and
associated economic effects would occur in relation to closure of the Ahtanum View Corrections
Center of downsizing of the Larch Corrections Center. However, because the Walla Walla
economy is so much smaller than the economies potentially affected by downsizing the McNeil
Island Corrections Center or closing the Washington State Reformatory Unit at Monroe, the
impact would be much greater. In the case of Walla Walla County, losing 302 jobs means an
increase in unemployment of more than one percent. Loss of 354 jobs associated with
downsizing the McNeil Island facility would increase regional unemployment by approximately
2/100th of one percent. A similarly small impact would be felt if the Reformatory Unit at Monroe
is closed.
If closing the Main Institution at the Penitentiary is delayed until construction associated with
this option is completed, there would be a four year increase in employment in Walla Walla
County.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Completion of the community impact analysis has caused us to modify the recommendations of
the draft report to include an option to sequence Scenarios 1 and 3. Our final recommendations
are as follows:
1. Our first recommendation depends on the availability of capital dollars and the priorities of
the executive and legislature. We recommend:
a. If capital dollars are not available to make the necessary improvements at the Washington
State Penitentiary it is recommended that Scenario 1 be implemented.11 This scenario
includes downsizing the McNeil Island Corrections Center, closing the Ahtanum View
Corrections Center, relocating the Ahtanum View program to Monroe, and a six year
closure of one living unit at the Larch Corrections Center.
In current dollars, this alternative would save the state approximately $138 million in
operating costs, and a little less than $10 million in capital expenditures, over ten years.
b. If capital funds are available for a new medium security housing unit, West Complex
kitchen expansion, and close security housing unit at the Washington State Penitentiary,
it is recommended that Scenarios 1 and 3 be implemented sequentially. Under this
strategy, the Main Institution at the Penitentiary would continue operation as a medium
security facility until construction of the elements listed above was completed. After that,
the Main Institution would close. In current dollars, the cost of these three projects is
estimated to be approximately $41,000,000. Not all capital dollars would be needed
immediately – it would be possible to begin with an appropriation for design, engineering
and site work and follow with a larger appropriation for the remainder of the project.

11

Approximately $18.8 million for close security housing at the Penitentiary is needed even if none of the scenarios
are implemented.
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This alternative achieves the greatest savings. In current dollars it is estimated that
sequential implementation of Scenarios 1 and 3 would save the state over $215 million in
operating cost, and over $82 million in capital expenditures, over ten years.
c. If for some reason it is decided that Scenario 1 should not be implemented, it is
recommended that Scenario 3 be implemented. This scenario includes the temporary
downsizing of the Main Institution at the Penitentiary, closing the Ahtanum View
Corrections Center, relocating the Ahtanum View program to Monroe, and a two year
closure of one living unit at the Larch Corrections Center.
In current dollars, this alternative would save the state approximately $174 million in
operating costs, and $77 million in capital expenditures, over ten years.
2. Additional recommendations are necessary in order to reach the legislative mandate to close
1,580 adult corrections beds. We want to strongly emphasize that – absent policy changes –
the following recommendations are not feasible.
With Scenario
1 – Downsize MICC

Rent Out of State Close
Custody Beds
WSP – close two BAR12
Units (216 beds)

Take Action to Reduce
Minimum Custody Population
LCC - close second living unit
(240 beds)
LCC – close facility (480
beds)

WSP – close three BAR
Units (324 beds)

No further action needed

2 – Close WSRU at MCC
3 – Close MI at WSP

The BAR Units (Adams, Baker, Rainier) at the Washington State Penitentiary are the most
expensive close security beds in the state. On a per inmate basis, they cost approximately
twice as much as DOC currently pays for out of state beds. A significant complication in
closing these units is that they primarily house mentally ill and protective custody inmates.
Vendors who rent prison beds will not take inmates with significant mental health issues.
Consequently, in order to close these units it would be necessary to identify other close
custody inmates who could be sent out of state and rearrange how close security living units
are used so that one to two 198-bed living units in the West Complex could be used by the
inmates currently occupying the BAR units.
3. We recommend that a highest and best use study be conducted to determine the future of the
Washington State Reformatory and the Main Institution at the Washington State Penitentiary.
This study should include an architectural, engineering, and programmatic evaluation of all
buildings within the walls at both institutions to determine which, if any, should be preserved
for future use. A long-term plan for additional development of the Monroe Correctional
Complex and the Penitentiary Complex should be included in the high and best use study.

12

The BAR Units are Adams, Baker and Rainier in the South Complex at WSP

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IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
This implementation plan assumes that the caseload forecast for adult corrections inmates
remains reasonably accurate for the years covered by this implementation plan. It further
assumes that capital dollars are available for required construction at the Washington State
Penitentiary and that there are no impediments to downsizing the McNeil Island Corrections
Center.
FY 2010
1. Request and obtain funds for design, engineering, and site work for construction of 256
medium security beds, 198 close security beds, and expansion of the West Complex kitchen
at the Washington State Penitentiary. For maximum savings, consultant selection and all
subsequent work should be fast tracked.
2. Hire and train staff and open a fourth living unit at Coyote Ridge in spring 2010 as planned.
3. Prepare half of one minimum security housing unit at the Monroe Correctional Complex to
receive disabled and medically fragile inmates from Ahtanum View Corrections Center.
FY 2011
4. Hire and train staff and open a fifth living unit at Coyote Ridge no later than the end of
calendar year 2010.
5. Relocate all McNeil Island medium custody/MI3 inmates to Coyote Ridge and other vacant
medium security beds throughout the system. This will require used of most emergency beds
as well as all funded medium security operational capacity.
6. Move 256 minimum security inmates to a living unit at McNeil Island. Relocate minimum
custody inmates as necessary and close one living unit at the Larch Corrections Center.
7. Move Ahtanum View inmates to the converted living unit at Monroe.
8. Close the Ahtanum View Corrections Center. Move the Ahtanum View Work Release into
the vacated corrections center building. Close the old work release facility.
9. Begin site work at the Washington State Penitentiary
10. Request and obtain funds for construction of projects at the Penitentiary. Bid projects and
begin construction when site work is completed.
FY 2012
11. Hire and train staff and open a sixth living unit at Coyote Ridge
12. Reopen R2 at the Washington Corrections Center
13. Increase out of state rental beds for close custody inmates as necessary
14. Continue construction at the Washington State Penitentiary
FY 2013
15. Hire and train staff and open a seventh living unit at Coyote Ridge
16. If necessary, temporarily house excess minimum custody inmates in MI3 beds
17. Increase out of state rental beds for close custody inmates as necessary
18. Continue construction at the Washington State Penitentiary
FY 2014
19. Complete construction at the Washington State Penitentiary

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20. Open 198 close security beds at the Penitentiary and return all out of state close custody
inmates
21. Open 256 medium security beds at the Penitentiary. Move all medium custody inmates out of
the Main Institution at the Penitentiary to the new medium security living unit and other
available beds in the system.
22. Close the Main Institution at the Penitentiary
FY 2015
No changes necessary
FY 2016
23. Reopen 256 medium security beds, and 44 IMU beds, at McNeil Island
24. Begin reopening minimum security beds at the Larch Corrections Center
FY 2017
25. Complete reopening of minimum security beds at the Larch Corrections Center

Throughout this period it will likely be necessary to increase jail rental beds for violators from
time to time. Additional work release beds may be needed towards the end of the decade.

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FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE CLOSURE OF

STATE INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES

Part 2: Juvenile Rehabilitation Facilities
November 1, 2009

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Page 68

TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION

PAGE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................2.1
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Study Requirements Specific to JRA............................................................................................2.4
Population History and Forecast ...................................................................................................2.5
JRA’s Diverse Population.............................................................................................................2.6
The Current Capacity of JRA Facilities........................................................................................2.8
Can Green Hill and Maple Lane Youth be Housed at the Same Facility? .................................2.10

CLOSURE OPTIONS
Option 1 – Close Maple Lane School .........................................................................................2.14
Option 2 – Close Green Hill School ...........................................................................................2.22
Life Cycle Cost Analysis ............................................................................................................2.29

THE EFFECT OF CLOSURES
The Effect of Closures on Employees ........................................................................................2.31
The Effect of Closures on the Host Community.........................................................................2.36

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................2.41
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN ..........................................................................................2.44
JRA APPENDIX (bound separately)
Disaggregation of Population Projection
Detailed Description of Closure Options
Operating Cost Calculations
Capital Cost Calculations

TECHNICAL APPENDIX (bound separately)
Economic and Fiscal Impacts to Affected Communities
Impacts to Affected Employees
State Lifecycle Costs

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the 2009 legislative session, the Washington State Legislature directed that a feasibility study
of closing state institutional facilities be conducted. The proviso specifically required study of
Maple Lane School and Green Hill School and a plan to eliminate 235 beds in Juvenile
Rehabilitation Administration (JRA) facilities.
ISSUES AFFECTING THE FEASIBILITY OF CLOSING 235 JRA BEDS
JRA currently has 243 vacant or underutilized beds in its institutions. This includes 112 beds in
vacant buildings and 131 non-funded beds in partially occupied buildings with reduced staffing.
Combining this surplus capacity with a projection of a smaller number of youth in JRA residential
facilities suggests it should be easy to eliminate 235 JRA beds. Unfortunately, there are a number
of complicating factors.
The first complicating factor is the location of surplus capacity. All of the vacant beds, and more
than half the non-funded beds, are at two facilities: Maple Lane and Echo Glen. Closing Maple
Lane eliminates more than one-third of the currently vacant and non-funded beds in the system.
Furthermore, all non-funded beds at Echo Glen are in cottages for females and younger males
which consequently cannot be used by older males. Since Maple Lane and Green Hill only house
older males, youth displaced due to closure of either facility can’t make use of Echo Glen’s nonfunded capacity. Including the limitation at Echo Glen, if Maple Lane were closed there would be
only 123 vacant and potentially usable non-funded beds in the system. The situation is a little
better if Green Hill were closed, but there would still only be 165 vacant and non-funded beds in
the system – far fewer than elimination of 235 beds as required by the proviso.
A second complicating factor is the diverse nature of the youth in JRA institutions. We found
compelling objective evidence from multiple sources – including sources outside JRA – that there
are significant differences between youth at Maple Lane and Green Hill. This diversity means
there are a variety of subpopulations within JRA which should not be housed together. This does
not mean that diverse youth can’t reside at the same institution; it simply means they should not
be in the same living unit or, in some cases, the same classroom or other common area. In
addition to separating youth by gender and not housing older and younger youth together, it is
necessary to keep youth with significant mental health problems and youth in sex offender
treatment in separate living units. Accommodating these different needs reduces flexibility in how
bed capacity can be used.
A third complicating factor is that specialized high security buildings – JRA’s Intensive
Management Units (IMU) and Intake Units – are located at both Green Hill and Maple Lane.
Currently there is sufficient IMU and Intake capacity for all older males in the system. If one of
these institutions is closed, additional high security buildings would have to be constructed at the
institution that remains open.
A fourth complicating factor is that the number of youth in JRA institutions currently exceeds
funded capacity. In the discussion above, non-funded capacity is treated as surplus capacity.
However, because the current population exceeds funded capacity, some non-funded beds are

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already occupied. It is one thing to eliminate a vacant bed. Eliminating an already occupied bed
means you have to find another bed elsewhere.
The last major complicating factor is the population projection itself. The analysis in this study is
based on the long range population forecast for JRA updated in June 2009. To work, the closure
plans outlined in this report require use of all vacant and usable non-funded beds plus the decline
in residential population as projected in the June forecast. Unfortunately, these closure plans no
longer work with the November 2009 caseload forecast.13 In this latest forecast, the average JRA
residential population is 27 higher for FY2010, and 84 higher for FY2011, than the June forecast.
With caseloads increasing, rather than decreasing, closure of Green Hill or Maple Lane anytime
in the foreseeable future is not possible. In fact, rather than closing an institution, the state may
have to open one or more currently closed living units.
CONCLUSIONS
1. JRA’s residential population is diverse, but there are ways to accommodate this diversity at a
single institution. JRA has long argued Maple Lane and Green Hill youth are significantly
different and that they cannot be housed at a single institution. We agree with the first half of
this statement, but not the second. There are challenges in combining populations at one
institution but these challenges can be met by having separate living units, separate
classrooms, and time separations in the use of common spaces.
2. Closing either Maple Lane or Green Hill would result in fewer staff and create significant
savings. Closing Maple Lane School would result in an estimated net reduction of 111 FTEs
and an annual savings in salaries and benefits of approximately $7.1 million. Closing Green
Hill School would result in 89 fewer FTEs and approximately $5.4 million per year savings.
From this we conclude that it is not possible to save $12 million per year as assumed in
budget language associated with the proviso to close 235 JRA beds.
3. Closing either institution would require significant capital expenditure. Closing either
institution requires in excess of $35 million in new capital expenditures. Some of this cost is
offset by eliminating the need for future capital projects at the closed facility. When avoided
future capital costs are taken into consideration it is somewhat less expensive to close Maple
Lane than Green Hill.
4. The need for capital construction means full closure and associated savings cannot occur for
at least three years. Even if aggressive fast track schedules are followed for the various
capital projects needed due to closure of either facility, full closure could not occur before FY
2013.
5. Closing Maple Lane School results in greater job loss than closing Green Hill School. Maple
Lane employees are relatively less senior than other JRA employees and may be less able to
bump into filled positions elsewhere in the agency than employees from Green Hill. Local
school districts would also lose teachers and other staff.
6. Lewis and Thurston Counties would experience economic loss with closure of either facility.
Closing Green Hill School could have a significant impact on the City of Chehalis and
immediately surrounding area. Economic gains would occur elsewhere due to more youth
13

The November caseload forecast was released after all of the analysis in this report was completed.

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being housed at Echo Glen Children’s Center (King County) and Naselle Youth Camp
(Pacific County).
7. Overall, the facts do not support closure of either facility. It is our conclusion that the data do
not support closing either Green Hill or Maple Lane. Without new construction there is
insufficient capacity in the rest of the system to accommodate all youth and closure of either
facility would be accompanied by a significant probability of doing serious harm to a quality
program. The closure plans outlined in this report are not compatible with the November 2009
caseload forecast for the JRA residential population.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Legislative language mandating this study requires that “the report shall provide a
recommendation and a plan to eliminate … 235 beds from juvenile rehabilitation facilities.”
While we believe the facts do not support closing either facility and that such an action would be
a bad idea, if a facility is to be closed, the logical choice is Maple Lane School. There are three
reasons for selecting Maple Lane over Green Hill: 1) closing Maple Lane reaches the target of
eliminating 235 beds (whereas closing Green Hill does not), 2) closing Maple Lane saves more
FTEs and therefore achieves a greater savings in operating costs, and 3) net capital expenditures
are somewhat less if Maple Lane is closed.

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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
STUDY REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIC TO JRA
In the 2009 legislative session, the Washington State Legislature directed the Office of Financial
Management to contract with consultants to conduct “a study of the feasibility of closing state
institutional facilities and a plan on eliminating beds in the state institutional facility inventory.”
Proviso language specifically identifies Green Hill School (GHS) and Maple Lane School (MLS)
as the juvenile rehabilitation facilities to be studied. The bill further requires that the report
provide a recommendation and a plan to eliminate 235 JRA beds. Budget language assumes that
closure of these beds will save $12 million in fiscal year 2011.
The work plan for the study of JRA facilities involves the following major activities:
1. Review of the facilities, mission, and population of JRA facilities
2. Analysis of the population forecast and projected future needs for JRA facilities
3. Identification of the capacity of JRA facilities to accommodate the needs of the projected
future population
4. Identification of ways in which youth can be safely redistributed to remaining facilities
after closure of either Green Hill or Maple Lane
5. Estimation of the impact on staff of facility closure and redistribution of youth, including
effects of the Reduction in Force (RIF) process, job loss, and opportunities for
reemployment
6. Estimation of the capital costs and savings associated with facility closure and
redistribution of youth
7. Identification of programmatic impacts and other considerations related to facility closure
8. Identification of the impact of facility closure on the host community, including direct and
indirect job loss and local purchases
To accomplish these tasks, the consultant reviewed data and information provided by JRA and
others; toured facilities and talked with staff and youth; conferred with labor organizations and
with representatives from the Washington Association of Counties, the Washington Association
of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, and the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys. The
consultant team’s extensive experience and knowledge of juvenile justice in Washington and
other states facilitated understanding of the issues and informed their analysis.
THE ROLE OF JRA
JRA is responsible for the care and custody of youth committed to it by the juvenile courts of
Washington, both in state institutions and, for some, on juvenile parole. JRA also houses youth
adjudicated as adults until their 21st birthday or the expiration of their sentence, whichever occurs
first. This latter group is commonly referred to as “youthful offenders.”
No discussion of juvenile rehabilitation in Washington is complete without an acknowledgement
that the State of Washington operates one of the finest juvenile justice systems in the country.
From the local level, with the use of evidence-based programs and validated risk/needs
assessment in every part of the state, to JRA with its widely acclaimed skill building system (the
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Integrated Treatment Model), Washington is a nationally recognized leader. JRA facilities are
routinely visited by juvenile justice professionals from many parts of the country and even
internationally – not for its buildings, but for what JRA does for youth.
While JRA is a national leader, it is far from the most expensive state system. That dubious
distinction undoubtedly falls to California where the cost per youth in state institutions is more
than $200,000 a year.
Given what exists in Washington, the first principle in considering how to consolidate and
downsize JRA institutions should be to do no harm. This does not, of course, mean that
improvements can’t be made or taxpayer dollars used more efficiently.
POPULATION HISTORY AND FORECAST
The number of youth in JRA facilities has steadily decreased for many years. The long-range
population projection prepared by the Caseload Forecast Council forecasts that this trend will
continue for a few more years, flatten out, and then increase slightly. 14
Figure 1: JRA Actual and Projected Residential Population
July 1996 – June 2019
1,500
1,400
1,300
1,200
1,100
Actual

Projected

1,000
900
800
700
600
Jul-18

Jul-17

Jul-16

Jul-15

Jul-14

Jul-13

Jul-12

Jul-11

Jul-10

Jul-09

Jul-08

Jul-07

Jul-06

Jul-05

Jul-04

Jul-03

Jul-02

Jul-01

Jul-00

Jul-99

Jul-98

Jul-97

Jul-96

500

The average monthly population in JRA facilities in FY09 was 707. The lowest average monthly
population forecast for the next decade is 615, a reduction of about 90 youth. The period of
lowest demand is projected to occur during FY13 and FY14. After that, the population is
expected to slowly increase and reach an average monthly population of about 640 ten years from
now.

14

The long range forecast was last updated in June 2009.

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This is important because it is current excess institutional capacity, plus the projected decrease in
population, that provides – and limits – the opportunity to consolidate JRA institutional
operations.
JRA’S DIVERSE POPULATION
JRA institutions house male and female youth between the ages of 12 and 21. Almost all females,
and younger males, are housed at Echo Glen Children’s Center in east King County. Together,
females and younger males constitute about 20 percent of the JRA institutional population. A
little less than 10 percent of JRA youth are in community residential facilities.
Almost all older males are housed at JRA’s other major facilities: Maple Lane School, Green Hill
School, and Naselle Youth Camp. JRA’s basic training camp, Camp Outlook, houses about a
dozen older males and four to five females.
With a little less than 10 percent of the population in community residential facilities (CRFs), this
implies that during the lowest years of the population projection, approximately 555 youth will be
in institutions and 60 in CRFs. Following the same logic, by the end of 10 years, there will be
approximately 578 youth in institutions and 62 in CRFs. Table 1 shows how this is projected to
be distributed between older males and the female/younger male population.
Table 1: Projected Population by Cohort and Facility Type
Time Period
Low 2 years
2019

Older Males
Institutions
CRFs
431
49
449
51

Females/Younger Males
Total
Institutions
CRFs
Institutions
CRFs
124
11
555
60
129
11
578
62

Figure 2 shows there are a large number of treatment and other groups that make up the older
male population, none of which is particularly large. Similar diversity is found in the female and
youthful male population.

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Figure 2: Composition of the Older Male Population in JRA Facilities
Basic Training Camp, 2.4%
Intensive Management Unit,
10.1%

Intake, 12.4%

Sex Offender Treatment,
20.9%

Core Treatment Program,
24.5%

Residential mental health,
6.1%

Drug & Alcohol Treatment,
11.6%
Extended mental health,
12.0%

This diversity significantly reduces flexibility for relocating JRA youth. Youth in many programs,
including sex offender treatment, residential and extended mental health, Intensive Management
Unit (IMU), and most youth in intake require single cells/rooms. Those in the most intensive
mental health program (Residential Mental Health) cannot be safely housed with most other
youth – although there is no bright line between Residential Mental Health and Extended Mental
Health youth. Gang involved youth are an increasing problem in JRA but it has not yet become
the very difficult issue it is for adult corrections in Washington or juvenile programs in some
other states.
Another group of older males is the youthful offender population. As noted above, these are youth
who have been convicted as adults but serve at least part of their sentence in a JRA facility. This
group is a growing part of the JRA institutional population. In the current cohort of youthful
offenders, more than three-quarters of them will finish their sentences prior to turning 21.
When JRA first assumed responsibility for youthful offenders the prevailing belief was that they
would have to be separated from other JRA youth. Experience has proved this assumption wrong.
As of July 1, 2009 there were 61 male youthful offenders – all housed at Green Hill School.
There they participate in education and other programs and activities along with the rest of the
population.
There are good reasons for retaining these youth in JRA facilities, particularly if they will
complete their confinement sentence before age 21. Legal requirements for sight and sound
separation between youthful and older offenders and the requirement to provide educational
services are factors that make accommodating the younger portion of this population difficult and
expensive in adult prisons. Furthermore, while the Department of Corrections offers programs to
help offenders turn their lives around, there is no question that the chances for rehabilitating these
youth are much greater if they remain with JRA and avoid adult prison.

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THE CURRENT CAPACITY OF JRA F ACILITIES
The ability to close a JRA facility is dependent upon the capacity of the system to appropriately
house the current and projected population. Capacity, in turn, depends on the standards used to
measure it.
Given the principle of “do no harm” articulated above, capacity in this analysis is measured
according to American Correctional Association (ACA) standards. While more youth can be
accommodated in the same space if these standards are exceeded, at some point crowding leads to
more violence and worse outcomes. Where does one draw the line? In this study, we rely on the
consensus of juvenile justice experts as expressed in the ACA standards.
Even using ACA standards does not entirely simplify the calculation of system capacity. By ACA
standards – and common sense – there are certain youth who should not be in multiple occupancy
rooms (e.g. sex offenders and particularly vulnerable youth). Consequently, the capacity of a
living unit is, in part, dependent upon the type of youth who are housed there.
With this caveat, the maximum capacity of JRA institutions is 837. This includes 594 funded
beds, 112 beds in vacant buildings and 131 non-funded beds in partially occupied buildings with
reduced staffing.15 JRA also has 95 beds in six community residential facilities. This includes 69
funded beds, 16 beds in a vacant building, and 10 non-funded beds. Since the downsizing of
community residential facilities following a rape and murder by a JRA youth in 1997, JRA has
been unable to keep these facilities fully occupied.
Figure 3 shows the consultant team’s calculation of the ACA capacity of each of JRA’s major
institution: Maple Lane School, Green Hill School, Echo Glen Children’s Center, and Naselle
Youth Camp.16

15

This total includes 16 beds at Camp Outlook, JRA’s basic training camp. The basic training camp does not lend
itself to capacity measurement by ACA standards so its funded capacity is used instead. There are also 16 non-funded
beds in a building at Naselle Youth Camp which are excluded because the building has been recommended for
demolition in multiple studies.
16
These calculations represent the maximum capacity of JRA facilities. Certain types of youth (e.g. significantly
mentally ill youth and sex offenders) require single occupancy cells. If a living unit has some cells/rooms large
enough for two occupants but is used for these types of youth, its capacity would be less.
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Figure 3: ACA Capacity of JRA Institutions
(Including vacant buildings and non-funded capacity)
300

268

250

224

224

200
150
105

100
50
0
Maple Lane

Green Hill

Echo Glen

Naselle

The number of beds at Maple Lane and Green Hill presents a challenge for closing either
institution. If Maple Lane is closed, the system has a maximum of 569 beds. If Green Hill is
closed, there are 613 beds. As shown in Table 1, there is projected to be 555 youth in institutions
in 2013/2014 and 578 by the end of ten years.
There are two other complicating factors. The first has to do with Echo Glen. Despite the fact
there is projected to be only 124 to 129 females and younger males in the system over the next ten
years, this cohort will require nine of the 13 living units at Echo Glen throughout this time period.
(Some of which will have non-funded but unusable beds.) This is due to the diverse needs of this
population – such as the need to keep young male sex offenders away from females. This leaves
only four 16-bed living units at Echo Glen – 64 beds in total – that could be used by older males.
Taking Echo Glen needs into account, if Maple Lane is closed, there will be 393 beds for older
males (224 at Green Hill + 105 at Naselle + 64 at Echo Glen). If Green Hill is closed, there will
be 437 beds for older males (268 at Maple Lane + 105 at Naselle + 64 at Echo Glen).
The second complicating factor is the youthful offender population. This cohort must be confined
in a secure environment. If Green Hill is closed, this leaves Maple Lane as the only secure JRA
institution. The necessity of providing 60 to 70 secure beds at Maple Lane severely restricts what
can be done with other parts of the facility.
The conclusion of this analysis is that closing either Maple Lane or Green Hill will require
finding or building additional capacity elsewhere.

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CAN GREEN H ILL AND M APLE LANE YOUTH BE HOUSED AT THE SAME F ACILITY?
In addition to the challenge of finding space for displaced youth if one of these facilities is closed,
there is the question of mixing the two populations. In the past JRA has maintained that the youth
at the two facilities are sufficiently different that they cannot be safely mixed. There are actually
two questions here: 1) are the youth really different, and 2) can they be safely housed at the same
facility?
Information was obtained from three different sources which address the first question. This
included data from JRA on incidents of aggression, mental health target population, suicide
precaution events, Integrated Treatment Plan target behaviors, and the number of youth on
psychotropic medication. We also looked at the results of diagnostic mental health screenings that
are done primarily at the county level, and at data on special education students as reported by the
Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction (OSPI). All of these measures show significant
differences between youth at Maple Lane and Green Hill.
Incidents of aggression in
JRA’s data system include
fights, assaults, group
disturbances, sexual
misconduct, and threats of
violence. When total
incident rates are compared,
Maple Lane looks more
violent than Green Hill.
However, total incidents at
Maple Lane look high
because of threats of
violence. Green Hill has
more acts of violence than
Maple Lane. (See Figure 4)
JRA uses a hierarchy to
identify the most important
negative behaviors to be
targeted in a youth’s
treatment plan. At the top of
the list is self-injurious
behavior (suicide ideation,
suicide attempts, selfmutilation). Aggressive
behavior is second. These
are followed by escape
ideation and other factors.

Figure 4
Acts of Violence & Threats of Violence per 100 ADP
July 2008 - June 2009
300

280

276

250

210

200
142

150
100
50
0
Acts of Violence

Threats of Violence
Green Hill

Maple Lane

Figure 5
% of Youth by Treatment Hierarchy Target Behavior
July 2008 - June 2009
75%

80%
70%

Green Hill

60%

Maple Lane

50%
44%

50%
40%
30%
20%

19%
6%

10%

5%

0%
Parasuicide

Aggression

Other

Target Behavior

Consistent with the incident data in Figure 4, aggression is the number one target behavior at
Green Hill. While aggression is also a significant target behavior at Maple Lane, Figure 5 shows
that suicide and other self-injurious behavior are much higher at Maple Lane than at Green Hill.
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Identification of mental
health issues in the JRA
population begins with the
Diagnostic Mental Health
Screen (DMHS). This
screening tool is used to
triage potential mental health
needs. The higher the level,
the higher the probability the
youth needs mental health
services. Except in smaller
counties (where JRA staff do
the screening) the DMHS is
administered by juvenile
court personnel prior to the
youth’s transfer to JRA. Even
at this early stage, there is a
clear difference between the
mental health needs of the
Maple Lane youth and those
at Green Hill. (see Figure 6)

Figure 6
Percentage of Admissions by DMHS Level by Facility
July 2008 - June 2009 (Excludes YOP)
90%

82%

80%
70%
60%

59%

50%
40%
27%

30%
20%

18%

14%

10%

0%

0%
DMHS Level 1

DMHS Level 2

Green Hill

DMHS Level 3

Maple Lane

Figure 7
Mental Health Target Population as Percent of ADP
July 2008 - June 2009
90%
76%

80%
70%
60%
50%

Consistent with the differences identified in the preliminary screening, a higher
percentage of youth at Maple
Lane meet the criteria used
by JRA to identify its target
mental health population.
This is illustrated in Figure 7.

40%

35%

30%
20%
10%
0%
Green Hill

Maple Lane

Figure 8
As shown in Figure 8, these
differences are also seen in
the percentage of youth on
psychotropic medications.
JRA reports that youth who
start out at Maple Lane and
respond well to medication
will often be transferred to
Green Hill. Conversely, if a
Green Hill youth decompensates, he may be transferred
to Maple Lane until he is
stable again.

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Percent of Youth on Psychotropic Medication
Jan 2009 - July 2009
45%

41%

40%
35%
30%
25%

20%

20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
Green Hill

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Suicide precaution events are
those occasions when special
procedures are invoked by
JRA staff because a youth
presents a heightened risk of
self-harm. In the most dangerous situations, (Level I)
there is constant one-on-one
supervision for a period of
time. As Figure 9 shows, the
frequency of these events is
much greater at Maple Lane.
(It should be noted that one
individual can be involved in
multiple suicide precautions
during a year. There are not
hundreds of suicidal youth at
Maple Lane.)
In addition to aggression and
mental health, youth at the
two facilities have other
demonstrable differences
relating to special needs. The
data for the chart at the right
comes from the Office of the
Superintendent of Public
Instruction. As these data
show, there are nearly three
times as many special education students at Maple Lane
than Green Hill.

Figure 9
Number of Suicide Precaution Events by Facility by Level
July 2008 - June 2009
300

275
258

250
200
150
91

100

64

50

16

20

3

0
Level I

Level II
Green Hill

Level III

Level IV

Maple Lane

Figure 10
Percent of Students in Special Education
3 Year Average (2006 - 2009)
40%
35%

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%

13%

10%
5%
0%
Green Hill

Maple Lane

The conclusion of this analysis is there are clearly important differences between youth at the two
facilities. The frequent characterization by JRA that youth at Green Hill are generally more
sophisticated and aggressive, and youth at Maple Lane generally less mature and more
vulnerable, is supported by evidence from JRA, county juvenile courts, and OSPI.
The second issue, can youth from the two facilities be housed at the same institution, is a different
question. While it is clear that that the two groups should not come into close or regular contact,
there are different ways to accomplish this. Separating them by miles – as is currently done – is
obviously an effective solution. Another example is the method used by the Department of
Corrections. DOC routinely houses different groups and individuals at the same institution who
might otherwise harm or even kill one another. This is done through physical design, movement
control, and time separation.
We are not advocating that JRA become more like DOC. In fact, JRA does some of this now. For
example, the most seriously mentally ill youth at Maple Lane – those in the residential mental
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health program – eat meals in their living unit rather than in the central dining hall. Passing times
between classes in some of JRA schools are staggered so that youth in one classroom don’t come
into contact with youth in another.
In short, there are logistical challenges – not insurmountable impediments – in housing the two
populations in close proximity. In some circumstances these challenges can require additional
cost – including new capital construction. The bottom line is: are there other solutions that can
safely address this issue at less cost than operating two separate facilities? This brings us to the
central question of the feasibility study.

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CLOSURE OPTIONS
OPTION 1 – CLOSE M APLE LANE SCHOOL
Relocation of Youth
Under this option, it is recommended that all of the Maple Lane youth in the residential mental
health program, and most of the youth in extended mental health, go to Echo Glen. There they
would occupy four 16-bed cottages at the south end of the campus that are currently (or will soon
be) vacant. This relocation would require renovation of the cottages and construction of ancillary
space as described below.17 The remainder of the residential mental health population would be
relocated to a new building constructed at Green Hill.
Maple Lane youth in sex offender and drug and alcohol treatment programs would be
consolidated at Green Hill and Naselle. This option requires the use of all living units at Naselle
(excluding Eagle Lodge which is recommended for demolition). Mariner Lodge, currently vacant,
would have to be renovated for this purpose.
Intake and IMU youth would be relocated to Green Hill School where an additional IMU facility
would have to be built.
JRA reports that Camp Outlook (the basic training camp) will likely cease operation at its current
location after Fiscal Year 2011.18 If this is the case, a replacement facility for the basic training
camp would be constructed at Green Hill.
The option to close Maple Lane School assumes that funded capacity at the Community
Residential Facilities will be increased by nine.
Because of the need to renovate other facilities and construct new buildings, Maple Lane School
would remain in operation at least until 2013. A 2013 closure date is only possible if aggressive
fast track scheduling is used for all required capital improvements. Less aggressive schedules or
unforeseen complications could delay full closure until 2014 or later.
Capital Costs
There are both capital costs and future capital savings associated with this option. The capital
costs include the following. All estimates are for total project costs in 2009 dollars.

17

It should be noted that relocation of older males with significant mental health issues to Echo Glen provides
additional challenges in managing crisis episodes for these youth. Currently, acute care is provided at Maple Lane in
a portion of the Maple Lane IMU. The only capacity available for this function at Echo Glen would be two secure
rooms in the clinic where there are nurses and security officers 24 hours a day.
18
Camp Outlook is operated by Pioneer Human Services under contract with JRA. It is reported that Pioneer Human
Services is unwilling to continue the contract at the current location due to cost.
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Echo Glen Children’s Center Capital Improvements
 Cottages 1 – 4 are located at the southern end of the EGCC site and can be isolated from
the rest of the institution. Unlike most of the other cottages, these buildings have not been
renovated. Renovation includes hardening of the walls, doors, and locks; construction of a
secure “time out” room in each building; and other renovation required due to the age of
the buildings. JRA’s estimated cost for renovating these four cottages is exceptionally
high (in excess of $580 per square foot). If they cannot be renovated for their replacement
cost ($1,722,800 per “maximum security” cottage according to DSHS’s fixed asset
inventory), they should be demolished and replaced. We use the replacement cost (4 x
$1,722,800 = $6,891,000) as the estimated cost of this work.
 Youth in the residential mental health program require “self-contained classrooms.” Selfcontained classrooms are classrooms that can be operated independent of the regular
school. They are generally in, or adjacent to, the living unit. Rather than youth going to
the teacher, the teacher comes to the youth. Because all of the youth transferred from
Maple Lane would be older males, it is recommended that stand-alone classroom space be
provided for all four cottages. The estimated project cost for an 8,450 sq foot building
with six classrooms is $2,646,000.
These capital improvements are illustrated in the following figure.
Figure 11: Proposed Capital Improvements at Echo Glen

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Green Hill School Capital Improvements
 The infrastructure at Green Hill School was constructed for a population of 400. Two
building sites exist on the campus with utilities already in place. A 32-bed IMU and 24bed Extended Mental Health unit would be constructed on one of these sites. A 20-bed
Basic Training Camp would be constructed elsewhere on the campus along with adjacent
parade ground and outdoor challenge course. The Basic Training Camp is a dormitory
facility with one dorm for males and a smaller one for females. The structure also includes
office, classroom, program, and other support space. The estimated project cost for these
three buildings is $20,664,000.
These improvements are illustrated in the following figure:
Figure 12: Proposed Capital Improvements at Green Hill

Naselle Youth Camp Capital Improvements
 Mariner Lodge is a currently vacant 6,268 square foot building constructed in the late
1970’s. The estimated project cost for renovating this building is $1,750,000.

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Capital Cost Avoidance
There is a fairly lengthy list of capital projects for Maple Lane School in DSHS’s Ten Year
Capital Plan. This includes four major projects plus a number of preservation and maintenance
projects that could be postponed or eliminated if the facility were closed. However, because we
are recommending a warm closure – i.e. preservation of the facility for possible future use – some
preservation and maintenance projects would still be required at Maple Lane even if the facility is
closed.
There are 83 major projects in DSHS’s Ten Year Capital Plan. Except for a proposed acute care
facility (priority 24), all of the major capital projects listed for Maple Lane have relatively low
priority. These lower priority projects include renovation/expansion of the Health and Essential
Services Building (priority 44), a new Entry, Security, and Visitation Building (priority 73), and
Renovation of the Recreation Building (priority 76). There is only one major capital project
identified for Green Hill School during this time period. That project, Renovation of the
Recreation Building at Green Hill in FY17 is identified by DSHS as priority 78.
DSHS’s Ten Year Capital Plan also includes funds to renovate the four Echo Glen cottages
discussed above, albeit at a somewhat later date than proposed in this plan. In theory, renovating
these buildings earlier should result in an avoided capital cost later. However, the long range
forecast for JRA residential population used in this analysis does not support the need for these
buildings anytime during the next ten years for the female and younger male population
historically served at Echo Glen. In other words, unless part of Echo Glen is used for older males,
there is no compelling need to renovate these buildings. Consequently, we assume no avoided
future capital cost at Echo Glen if these cottages are renovated as a consequence of closing Maple
Lane School.
Given the lower priority numbers for Maple Lane and Green Hill projects it is assumed for
purposes of this analysis that none of the major projects at these two facilities will be funded
during the next ten years with or without facility closures. Consequently, we assume no avoided
capital costs associated with major projects resulting from closure of Maple Lane School.
Because the Basic Training Camp at Connell is scheduled to close in FY2011, replacement of this
facility is necessary with or without facility closures. Consequently, the $4.7 million DSHS has in
its Ten Year Capital Plan for this purpose is an avoided future cost due to its accelerated
replacement under this option at Green Hill School.
While there are few avoided capital costs from major projects, the same is not true for minor
capital/preservation projects. While some of this is offset by the preservation projects needed for
warm closure of Maple Lane School, all future minor projects at Maple Lane could be postponed
or eliminated if Maple Lane were closed. The cost of cumulative cost of these minor projects is
approximately $5,246,000. These projects are listed in the appendix.
Preservation Projects at Maple Lane and Green Hill
Projects necessary to prevent the rapid deterioration of buildings at Maple Lane that may be
needed in the future are limited to roofing and other projects to prevent water damage. In
addition, several minor projects, including elimination of code deficiencies in the kitchen and
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.17

replacement of ceiling tiles in the dining room, should go forward because the facility will
continue to be occupied for at least three years. The total cost of these minor/preservation projects
is approximately $560,000.
All minor capital/preservation projects would continue at Green Hill School.
Summary of Capital Costs – Incurred and Avoided
Table 2A summarizes the capital costs for new construction, renovation, and facility preservation
required by closure of Maple Lane School. Table 2B summarizes avoided capital costs if Maple
Lane is closed. Additional detail on these capital costs may be found in the appendix.
Table 2A: Capital Costs: Option 1 – Close Maple Lane School19
DESCRIPTION
EGCC Renovate 4 Cottages
EGCC – Construct 6 classroom education
building
NYC - Renovate Mariner Lodge
GHS-Construct 32 bed IMU
GHS – Construct 24 bed extended mental
health unit
GHS – Construct 20 bed basic training
facility (dorms)
Subtotal
Preservation Projects
Green Hill School
Maple Lane School
Subtotal

2011
$1,378,240

FISCAL YEAR
2012
2013
$5,512,960
$0

TOTAL

2014
$0

$6,891,200

$529,200

$2,116,800

$0

$0

$2,646,000

$700,000
$2,942,800

$1,050,000
$5,885,600

$0
$5,885,600

$0
$0

$1,750,000
$14,714,000

$1,327,200

$1,990,800

$0

$0

$3,318,000

$1,052,800

$1,579,200

$0

$0

$2,632,000
$31,951,200

$1,413,500
$560,000

$1,534,500
$0

$342,000
$0

$0
$0

TOTAL

$3,290,000
$560,000
$3,850,000
$35,801,200

Table 2B: Capital Cost Avoidance: Option 1 – Close Maple Lane School
DESCRIPTION
Replace Basic Training Camp
MLS Minor Projects
TOTAL COST AVOIDANCE

2011
($940,000)
($2,975,900)

FISCAL YEAR
2012
2013
($1,880,000) ($1,880,000)
($1,810,000)
($280,000)

2014
$0
($180,000)

TOTAL
($4,700,000)
($5,246,000)
($9,946,000)

The net capital cost for this option is therefore $25,855,200 ($35,801,200 minus $9,946,000)

19

Readers familiar with the draft report on JRA facility closure will note significant differences between the capital
costs shown here and those in the earlier draft. While some of these differences are due to refinements, there were
errors made in the draft report that have been corrected here.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.18

Closure Costs
If a facility is closed and utilities disconnected for an extended period of time, two things will
happen: (1) the buildings will deteriorate more rapidly and eventually become unusable, and (2)
the authority having jurisdiction may invoke its abandoned building ordinance and require
everything be brought up to current code requirements if the facility is reopened. The latter,
particularly for an institution like Maple Lane that has a number of older buildings, would
significantly delay reopening and substantially increase costs. Both of these negative
consequences can be minimized or avoided if the facility is closed but preserved. This includes
maintaining minimum heat, periodically operating mechanical, electrical and plumbing systems
so they do not rapidly deteriorate, and continuing essential preservation projects (like reroofing)
as needed. Then, if the facility is reopened sometime in the future for the same purpose, the
question of occupancy permit should not arise. Because of this, we recommend a “warm closure”
of Maple Lane School – at least until it is absolutely clear that the facility will never be needed by
JRA again.
There are one time and on-going warm closure costs for Maple Lane School. One time costs
include deactivation expense and costs associated with installing remote monitoring and operating
systems so that on-site staffing costs can be reduced to a minimum. On-going costs include
significantly reduced utility costs, yearly recertification of critical systems, and one maintenance
staff. These costs are summarized in the following table.
Table 3: One Time and On-going Costs of Warm Closure of Maple Lane School
Description
Site Access: Police, Fire, Etc.
Remote Keyless Entry - In or Out - Sally Port
Sally Port Equipment
Water Supply:
Drain, Deactivate & Store all Non-Essential
Water Systems
Water/Sewage Usage (12% of normal)
Fuel Tanks: Evacuation & de-activation
Garbage Refuse
Wildlife & Insect Control
Fire System:
Remote Monitoring
Yearly Recertification:
Electronic System
Fire & Water Side
Fire Marshall Inspections
Central Plant:
Projected Gas Use (48% of normal)
Projected Electrical (21% of normal)
Central Plant Remote Monitoring
Emergency Generator
Phone system conversion
Required Additional Electronic Cooling:
Auxiliary Cooling Units for Electronic Racks
Deactivation & Storage of Chillers:
Central Kitchen:

Christopher Murray & Associates

One Time
Costs

On-going
Costs

$5,000
$1,000
$4,000
$12,000
$3,000
$1,800
$2,400
$2,500

$5,000
$8,000
$1,500
$500
$127,000
$44,000
$10,000
$5,000

$5,000
$6,000
$3,000

Page 2.19

One Time
Costs

Description
Evacuate all Refrigerant Systems
Secure and Isolate all Gas/Fire Systems
Neutralize Hood Fire Suppression System
Drain, Open & Lay-Up Dining Water System
Gymnasium/ Recreation:
Drain & Winterize Swimming Pool
Maintenance Staff (1 FTE including benefits)20
Total

On-going
Costs

$3,000
$1,500
$500
$1,500
$5,000
$69,360
$109,361

$69,360
$287,561

Operating Cost Implications
Because some JRA facilities currently house more than their funded capacity, adjustments were
made to current staffing levels so that assumed full staffing levels following relocation of youth
due to closure of Maple Lane School are compared to full staffing in the present. The following
table summarizes the estimated change in staffing levels at each institution by fiscal year as
compared to the adjusted staffing level for August 10, 2009.
Table 4: Net Change in FTEs & Salaries/Benefits: Option 1 – Close Maple Lane School
JRA Institution

Aug 10, 2009
Actual
Adjusted

Maple Lane School
275.5
Green Hill School
234.0
Echo Glen Children’s Center
190.5
Naselle Youth Camp
114.0
Community Residential Facilities
75.4
Net Change in FTEs – JRA
889.4
Estimated Annual Savings in Salaries & Benefits

School Personnel
Maple Lane
Green Hill
Echo Glen
Naselle
22
Community Residential Facilities
Net Change - Schools

283.5
235.0
199.0
118.0
76.9
912.4

09/10 School Year
26
21

Change from Aug 10 Adjusted
2011
2012
2013
-8.3
8.0
4.1
-13.3 21
0
-9.5
$646,638

-148.3
9.5
79.1
7.6
3.0
-49.1
3,124,503

-283.5
82.5
79.1
7.6
3.0
-111.3
$7,126,493

Change from 09/10 School Year
-1
2
2
0
NA
3

-15
2
9
3
NA
-1

-26
8
9
3
NA
-6

Program Implications
Every JRA facility has a number of fine programs. Maple Lane has programs specifically
designed for older youth experiencing serious mental and emotional problems. The staff is trained
20

In the preliminary draft report there were 2 FTE listed for one-time and on-going costs of warm closure. Upon
further review, including how the Department of Corrections proposed to handle warm closure at its facilities, it was
concluded that one FTE would be sufficient. If additional help (or coverage during vacations, sick leave, etc) were
needed, this could be provided by maintenance staff from Green Hill School.
21
Staffing at Naselle goes down temporarily because one living unit is closed while it is being remodeled.
22
Youth at Community Residential Facilities attend local public schools. In no case is the population increase at an
individual CRF more than three youth. This will not affect staffing levels at local schools.
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Page 2.20

to observe and intervene in behavior that may be leading toward self-harm or mental
decompensation. Closing Maple Lane would require additional training for the staff of receiving
facilities. Maple Lane also has a large inpatient chemical dependency program that would have to
be replicated elsewhere.
Potential Alternative Uses
The consultant team was unable to find any suitable alternative uses for Maple Lane School. All
of the housing units at Maple Lane are too small for efficient jail or other adult corrections use.

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Page 2.21

OPTION 2 – CLOSE G REEN HILL SCHOOL
Relocation of youth
A significant complicating factor for closing Green Hill School is the need to have a secure
facility for housing the youthful offender population. If Green Hill is closed, the only possible
location for these youth is Maple Lane. This requirement, however, adds to the cost of this option
and extends the time before full savings could be realized.
Like the Maple Lane option, if Green Hill is closed it is recommended that all Maple Lane youth
in the residential mental health program, and most of the youth in extended mental health, go to
Echo Glen. There they would occupy four 16-bed cottages at the south end of the campus. This
relocation would require renovation of the cottages and construction of ancillary space as
described for Option 1 and repeated below. The remainder of the residential mental health
population would remain at Maple Lane.
Baker and Chelan at Maple Lane are identical maximum security units that share classroom space
and other support services. Currently, Baker is used for intake and Chelan for IMU. Under this
option, Baker would be converted to IMU and a new intake building constructed at Maple Lane.
All Green Hill IMU youth would be relocated to Baker and Chelan. Maple Lane and Green Hill
intake youth would be consolidated in the new intake building at Maple Lane.
Green Hill youth in sex offender and drug and alcohol treatment programs would be consolidated
at Maple Lane and Naselle. Mariner Lodge at Naselle is currently vacant. It would have to be
renovated for this purpose.
Youthful offenders at Green Hill would be relocated to Maple Lane. Cascade, a currently empty
living unit at Maple Lane would be reopened. Youthful offenders would be distributed to this and
other living units at Maple Lane.
The option to close Green Hill School assumes that funded capacity at the Community
Residential Facilities will be increased by six.
As noted under the Close Maple Lane School option, Camp Outlook (the basic training camp)
will likely cease operation at its current location after Fiscal Year 2011. If this is the case, it is
recommended that Spruce (a currently vacant and uninhabitable building at Maple Lane) be
renovated as a replacement for the Camp Outlook program.
If Green Hill is closed, Maple Lane would become larger and be the only facility for older males
that is reasonably accessible to most of the state. Because of this, major capital projects at Maple
Lane given lower priority before would, we believe, become very important. This includes
construction of an entry/security and visiting facility and renovation and expansion of the health
and essential services building.

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Page 2.22

Capital Costs
There are both capital costs and future capital savings associated with this option. The capital
costs include the following. All estimates are for total project costs in 2009 dollars.
Echo Glen Children’s Center Capital Improvements
 Cottages 1 – 4 are located at the southern end of the EGCC site and can be isolated from
the rest of the institution. Unlike most of the other cottages, these buildings have not been
renovated. Renovation includes hardening of the walls, doors, and locks; construction of a
secure “time out” room in each building; and other renovation required due to the age of
the buildings. JRA’s estimated cost for renovating these four cottages is exceptionally
high (in excess of $580 per square foot). If they cannot be renovated for their replacement
cost ($1,722,800 per “maximum security” cottage according to DSHS’s fixed asset
inventory), they should be demolished and replaced. We use the replacement cost (4 x
$1,722,800 = $6,891,000) as the estimated cost of this work.
 Youth in the residential mental health program require “self-contained classrooms.” Selfcontained classrooms are classrooms that can be operated independent of the regular
school. They are generally in, or adjacent to, the living unit. Rather than youth going to
the teacher, the teacher comes to the youth. Because all of the youth transferred from
Maple Lane would be older males, it is recommended that stand-alone classroom space be
provided for all four cottages. The estimated project cost for an 8,450 sq foot building
with six classrooms is $2,646,000.
Figure 11 (in the section discussing closure of Maple Lane School) illustrates the
proposed capital improvements at Echo Glen.
Maple Lane School Capital Improvements
 If Baker and Chelan are both used as an IMU there will be a need for an intake facility to
accommodate youth from both Maple Lane and Green Hill. Most rooms in the intake
facility should be single occupancy and many of them should be wet cells (i.e. have a
toilet and lavatory). A new building is needed for this purpose. The estimated cost of this
40-bed facility is $4,662,000.
 Spruce, now vacant, should be gutted and remodeled as a replacement for Camp Outlook.
This program requires two dormitories – one for males and a smaller one for females. A
classroom, program room, and office space would be part of this remodel. Adjacent land
would be turned into a parade ground and challenge course for the program. The estimated
cost of this remodel is $2,576,000.
 A new gatehouse/visiting center (similar to that which currently exists at Green Hill)
should be constructed on an accelerated schedule. The estimated cost of this building is
$5,659,000.
 The health and essential services building should be remodeled and expanded. The
estimated cost of this work is $5,550,000.
Proposed capital improvements at Maple Lane are illustrated in Figure 13, below.

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Page 2.23

Figure 13: Proposed Capital Improvements at Maple Lane

Naselle Youth Camp Capital Improvements
 Mariner Lodge is a currently vacant 6,268 square foot building constructed in the late
1970’s. The estimated project cost for renovating this building is $1,750,000.
Capital Cost Avoidance
For the same reasons noted in the discussion for Option 1 – Close Maple Lane School, the only
major capital cost avoided because of closure of Green Hill School would be planned replacement
of the Basic Training Camp.
With the exception of one minor project that should be implemented because the facility will
remain open for at least three years, all other future minor projects at Green Hill could be
postponed or eliminated if Green Hill were closed. The cost of cumulative cost of these minor
projects is approximately $3,290,000. These projects are listed in the appendix.
All minor capital/preservation projects would continue at Maple Lane School.
Summary of Capital Costs – Incurred and Avoided
Table 5A summarizes the capital costs for new construction, renovation, and facility preservation
required by closure of Green Hill School. Table 5B summarizes avoided capital costs if Green
Hill is closed. Additional detail on these capital costs may be found in the appendix.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.24

Table 5A: Capital Costs: Option 2 – Close Green Hill School23
DESCRIPTION
EGCC Renovate 4 Cottages
EGCC – Construct 6 classroom education
building
NYC - Renovate Mariner Lodge
MLS - new Intake Unit
MLS - renovate Spruce for BTC
MLS - Health/Essential Services Building
MLS - Entry/Security/Visiting Building
Subtotal
Preservation Projects
Green Hill School
Maple Lane School
Subtotal

2011
$1,378,240

FISCAL YEAR
2012
2013
$5,512,960
$0

TOTAL

2014
$0

$529,200

$2,116,800

$0

$0

$700,000
$932,400
$1,030,400
$1,110,000
$1,131,800

$1,050,000
$3,729,600
$1,545,600
$2,220,000
$2,263,600

$0
$0
$0
$2,220,000
$2,263,600

$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

$170,000
$2,975,900

$0
$1,810,000

$0
$280,000

$0
$180,000

TOTAL

$6,891,200
$2,646,000
$1,750,000
$4,662,000
$2,576,000
$5,550,000
$5,659,000
$29,734,200

$170,000
$5,245,900
$5,415,900
$35,150,100

Table 5B: Capital Cost Avoidance: Option 2 – Close Green Hill School
DESCRIPTION
Replace Basic Training Camp
MLS Minor Projects
TOTAL COST AVOIDANCE

2011
($940,000)
($1,413,500)

FISCAL YEAR
2012
2013
($1,880,000) ($1,880,000)
($1,534,500)
($342,000)

TOTAL

2014
$0
$0

($4,700,000)
($3,290,000)
($7,990,000)

The net capital cost for this option is therefore $27,160,100 ($35,150,100 minus $7,990,000)
Closure Costs
For the same reasons as discussed for Maple Lane, we recommend a “warm closure” of Green
Hill School if it is closed.
There are one time and on-going warm closure costs for Green Hill School. One time costs
include deactivation expense and costs associated with installing remote monitoring and operating
systems so that on-site staffing costs can be reduced to a minimum. On-going costs include
significantly reduced utility costs, yearly recertification of critical systems, and one maintenance
staff. These costs are summarized in the following table.

23

Readers familiar with the draft report on JRA facility closure will note significant differences between the capital
costs shown here and those in the earlier draft. While some of these differences are due to refinements, there were
errors made in the draft report that have been corrected here.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.25

Table 6: One Time and On-going Costs of Warm Closure of Green Hill School
Description
Site Access: Police, Fire, Etc.
Remote Keyless Entry - In or Out - Sally Port
Sally Port Equipment
Water Supply:
Yearly Backflow Recertification
Drain, Deactivate & Store all Non-Essential
Water Systems
Water/Sewage Usage (11% of normal)
Fuel Tanks: Evacuation & de-activation
Garbage Refuse
Wildlife & Insect Control
Maintenance/Repairs (roofing issues)
Fire System:
Remote Monitoring
Yearly Recertification:
Electronic System
Fire & Water Side
Fire Marshall Inspections
Central Plant:
Projected Gas Use (51% of normal)
Projected Electrical (37% of normal)
Central Plant Remote Monitoring
Emergency Generator
Required Additional Electronic Cooling:
Auxiliary Cooling Units for Electronic Racks
Deactivation & Storage of Chillers:
Central Kitchen:
Evacuate all Refrigerant Systems
Secure and Isolate all Gas/Fire Systems
Neutralize Hood Fire Suppression System
Drain, Open & Lay-Up Dining Water System
Laundry:
Secure and Isolate all Gas to Dryers
Drain, Open & Lay-Up Laundry Domestic Hot
Water System
Drain & De-Activate Chem Injection System
T Building - Recreation:
Upgrade air handling & exhaust to protect
new gym floor
Drain & Winterize Swimming Pool
Miscellaneous Required Inspections
Maintenance Staff (1 FTE including benefits)24
Total

One Time
Costs

On-going
Costs

$5,000
$1,000
$1,300
$4,000
$12,000
$3,000
$1,800
$2,400
$15,000
$2,500

$5,000
$8,000
$1,500
$500
$127,000
$69,000
$10,000
$5,000

$6,000
$3,000
$3,000
$1,500
$500
$1,500
$500
$1,500
$1,000
$20,000
$5,000
$69,360
$127,361

$5,000
$69,360
$333,861

24

In the preliminary draft report there were 2 FTE listed for one-time and on-going costs of warm closure. Upon
further review, including how the Department of Corrections proposed to handle warm closure at its facilities, it was
concluded that one FTE would be sufficient. If additional help (or coverage during vacations, sick leave, etc) were
needed, this could be provided by maintenance staff from Maple Lane School.
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Page 2.26

Operating Cost Implications
Because some JRA facilities currently house more than their funded capacity, adjustments were
made to current staffing levels so that assumed full staffing levels following relocation of youth
resulting from closure of Green Hill are compared to full staffing in the present. The following
table summarizes the estimated change in staffing levels at each institution by fiscal year as
compared to the adjusted staffing level for August 10, 2009.
Table 7: Net Change in FTEs & Salaries/Benefits: Option 2 – Close Green Hill School
JRA Institution

Aug 10, 2010
Actual
Adjusted

Green Hill School
234.0
Maple Lane School
275.5
Echo Glen Children’s Center
190.5
Naselle Youth Camp
114.0
Community Residential Facilities
75.4
Net Change in FTEs - JRA
889.4
Estimated annual savings in Salary & Benefits

School Personnel
Green Hill
Maple Lane
Echo Glen
Naselle
27
Community Residential Facilities
Net Change - Schools

235.0
283.5
199.0
118.0
76.9
912.4

09/10 School Year
21
26

Change from Aug 10 Adjusted
2011
2012
2013
-31.0
31.5
4.1
26
-13.3
0
-8.7
$604,591

-128.0
25
9.9
44.1
7.6
0
-66.4
$4,056,429

-235.0
57.4
79.1
7.6
2.0
-88.9
$5,395,745

Change from 09/10 School Year
0
0
2
0
NA
2

-12
6
5
3
NA
2

-21
11
9
3
NA
2

Program implications
Every JRA facility has its complement of fine programs. Perhaps the most exceptional programs
at Green Hill School are in vocational education. This includes computer technology, light
machine fabrication, vehicle maintenance and restoration, landscaping, welding, and the Juvenile
Vocational Industries Program (JVIP). Youth in the JVIP program are taught organizational
learning skills while manufacturing screen printed fabric products that are sold. In talking with
youth in the vocational programs they expressed pride in what they produce and hope that the
work experience will help them upon re-entry into the community.
The quality of the vocational program is a function of the space and instructors. Programs like
these take years to develop in correctional settings. Consequently, even with appropriate space,
these programs could not be replaced once they were lost.

25

Staffing at Maple Lane goes down in 2012 because mental health youth from four living units are moved to Echo
Glen. Three of these units are then occupied by less staff intensive youth and one is permanently closed. Staffing
goes up in 2013 as new units are brought on line at Maple Lane.
26
Staffing at Naselle goes down temporarily because one living unit is closed while it is being renovated.
27
Youth at Community Residential Facilities attend local public schools. In no case is the population increase at an
individual CRF more than three youth. This will not affect staffing levels at local schools.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.27

Staff at Green Hill are trained and experienced to recognize and intervene in gang related
behavior. This enables the population to remain integrated. Closing Green Hill would likely
require additional staff training at the remaining JRA facilities.
Potential Alternative Uses
The consultant team was unable to find any suitable alternative uses for Green Hill School. All of
the housing units at Green Hill are too small for efficient jail or other adult corrections use.

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.28

LIFE CYCLE COST ANALYSIS
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
What is Life Cycle Cost Analysis?
Life cycle cost analysis takes into account the concept of the time value of money by discounting
future costs and savings in a systematic way to determine what those costs and savings are worth
today. Adding together costs and savings from this year to discounted costs and savings from
years 2, 3, 4, and so forth results in what is called the “net present value.”
In the life cycle cost analysis presented here, the two options are not compared directly to one
another but to the “hypothetical baseline” where neither facility is closed. The hypothetical
baseline is what would occur in the absence of change. How each option differs from the baseline
is a directly comparable measure of the relative financial performance of each scenario.
These two elements of the life cycle cost analysis – discounting future costs and savings and
comparing each scenario to the hypothetical baseline – provides an apples-to-apples comparison
of the two options.
Net Present Value of Operating Cost Savings
From the perspective of operating cost reduction, Option 1 (Close Maple Lane School) offers the
greatest prospect for savings over the ten years from 2011 through 2020 as shown in Table 5. In
present value terms, Option 1 offers savings of $31 million, versus savings $21 million under
Option 2 which closes Green Hill School.28
Table 5:
Present Value of 10-Year Operating Savings (in Millions) Relative to Hypothetical Baseline
(Savings Presented in Year-of-Expenditure Dollars)

FY2012

Net Present
Value of
Savings
(2011)
FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020

($0.67) M

$1.44 M

$4.37 M $4.62 M

$4.78 M $4.95 M

$5.12 M

$5.24 M $5.37 M

$5.50 M

$31.2 M

($0.69) M

$2.41 M

$2.77 M $3.01 M

$3.11 M $3.23 M

$3.34 M

$3.42 M $3.51 M

$3.59 M

$21.4 M

FY2011
OPTION 1:
CLOSE MAPLE LANE
OPTION 2:
CLOSE GREEN HILL

Source: BERK

Comparisons of capital cost savings are somewhat less straightforward to interpret. Both options
are fairly similar in terms of capital impacts, with both options resulting in a negative net present
value as shown in Table 6. The negative net present values reflect the fact that with closure of
either facility, there would be initial capital costs to renovate existing buildings or build additional
units for housing the displaced population. Either option would result in similar capital costs to
the State over the 10-year time horizon.

28

Net Present Values are calculated using a discount rate of 4.2%, a rate that reflects projected future costs of State
bonded debt. In effect, this discount rate reflects the cost the State pays to move money forward through time.
Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.29

Table 6: Present Value of 10-Year Capital Savings (in Millions)
Relative to Hypothetical Baseline
(Savings Presented in Year-of-Expenditure Dollars)

FY2011

FY2012

Net Present
Value of
Savings
(2011)
FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 FY2018 FY2019 FY2020

OPTION 1:
CLOSE MAPLE LANE

($4.79) M ($15.33) M ($3.40) M $1.98 M

$2.64 M $1.68 M

$1.65 M

$0.00 M $0.00 M

$0.00 M

($15.4) M

OPTION 2:
CLOSE GREEN HILL

($4.74) M ($15.91) M ($1.84) M $1.81 M

$2.64 M $1.68 M

$1.65 M

$0.00 M $0.00 M

$0.00 M

($14.6) M

Note: There are no reliable capital cost data for fiscal years 2018 through 2020. Given the similarity of capital expenditures
between the two options for FY 2011 to FY2017, our analysis assumes that there would be no differences between the two options
between FY 2018 and FY 2020.
Source: BERK

Christopher Murray & Associates

Page 2.30

THE EFFECT OF CLOSURES
THE EFFECT OF CLOSURE ON E MPLOYEES
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
There are two important issues to understand as we examine the effect of each scenario on JRA
employees: (1) how employees are categorized and (2) the process by which employees may
continue employment with JRA or DSHS.
Employee Job Classifications and Categories
The project team estimated the changes in FTEs by state job class for each closure option. While
estimated changes for every job class are included in the appendix, three summary job class
categories were created for more streamlined discussion here. Each of these categories includes
multiple positions, classes, and series. The categories are:
•

Social Services. Employees in these jobs provide social services functions at the JRA facility
such as counseling, program management, and security.

•

Support Services. Employees in this large category provide a spectrum of support services,
including: administration and management, medical and dental care, housekeeping support
(food preparation and laundry), and buildings and grounds maintenance.

•

Education. The teachers, principals, vice principals, and support staff included in this
category educate JRA residents, but are employees of local school districts and not JRA.

Both Options Result in Layoffs of JRA Employees
With either closure option, employees and employment opportunities are affected in different
ways. While employment increases at some locations, on balance, there are net job losses. The
following changes occur:
•

Full closure of an institution, resulting in the elimination of all job positions at that facility

•

Creation of new FTEs at institutions as a result of relocating youth from a closed facility

The Formal Option Process
Closing a JRA institution will result in a reduction in positions and employee layoffs. By civil
service rules and union agreements, these employees have different options available to them for
continued employment within JRA and DSHS. This section presents an overview of the types of
processes used for continued employment opportunities.
Under the State layoff process the State is under obligation to find and offer employment
opportunities for permanent employees laid off in a facility closure or downsizing. This is called
the formal option process. In this process, permanent employees being laid off are offered a
comparable position for which they have the required job skills within a designated “layoff unit.”

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A layoff unit is the geographic boundary used for determining available positions. There are three
tiers of layoff units:
 County: Employees are first considered for positions for which they are eligible in their
current county of employment.
 Region: If there are no eligible positions in the county, the process extends to a regional
level. These regions are defined by the agency and are illustrated in Exhibit 14.
 State: If there are no eligible positions in the region, the process then extends statewide.
Exhibit 14: DSHS Regions

Within each successive layoff unit (first county, then regional, then statewide), employees are
considered for the following types of positions in the following order:
•

A funded vacant position in the same job class

•

A funded position in the same job class that is currently filled by a more junior employee

•

A funded vacant or filled position in a job class held by the employee in the past

This process is illustrated in Exhibit 15 and described in the Technical Appendix to this report.

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Exhibit 15: The Formal Option Process

Summary of Employee Impacts
The numbers of FTEs reduced and created under each closure option – as well as the net change
in FTE count – are summarized below. As Table 8 illustrates, closing Maple Lane School results
in a larger number of FTE reductions and a greater net reduction of staff than closing Green Hill
School.
Table 8: Summary of Changes in FTE Counts

Option
Option 1:
Close Maple
Lane School

JRA Staff Affected at
Closed Facility
283.5 FTE
(between FY09 and
FY13)

Option 2:
Close Green
Hill School

235.0 FTE
(between FY09 and
FY13)

Christopher Murray & Associates

JRA Employees
Demand for Staffing
Created Elsewhere

Net Change in JRA
FTE Count

School District FTEs
Net Change

172.1 FTE

-111.4 FTE

-26 FTE

146.1 FTE

-88.9 FTE

-21 FTE

Page 2.33

Tables 8A and 8B summarize employment options within and outside of DSHS for the two
closure options. Key findings including the following:
 Permanent JRA employees facing layoffs as a result of Option 1 or Option 2 are eligible to
participate in the transfer, formal option, and informal option processes, which may place
affected employees in new DSHS positions.
 Closure of Maple Lane School would eliminate 283.5 FTEs by FY13. At nearby Green Hill
School, demand for approximately 80 FTEs would be created, enabling some employees to
shift locally. Approximately seven positions would also be created at Naselle, about 100 miles
away. However, Maple Lane employees are relatively less senior than other JRA employees
and therefore may be less able to bump into filled positions elsewhere in the agency.
 Closure of Green Hill School would eliminate 235 FTEs by FY13. At nearby Maple Lane
School, demand for approximately 57 FTEs would be created, enabling some employees to
shift locally. Approximately 7 positions would also be created at Naselle, about 100 miles
distant. Green Hill employees are relatively more senior than other JRA employees and so
may be more able to bump into filled positions elsewhere in the agency.
 Laid off employees from either school who are unable to find other employment options
within JRA would benefit from relatively easy access to the regional job markets of
Centralia/Chehalis or Olympia/Tumwater/Lacey. However, job skills that are specific to JRA
institutional needs may not be readily transferable to other fields.
Table 8A: Summary of Employment Options – Close Maple Lane School
Within JRA

Option
Option 1:
Close Maple
Lane School

JRA Staff
Reduced at
Closed
Facility
283.5 FTE
(between
FY09 and
FY13)

Newly Created
Positions
Green Hill
School
82.5 FTE
Naselle Youth
Camp
7.6 FTE

Formal Option Process
Maple Lane staff in Social
Services job classes will be
unlikely to be offered options
within Thurston County; greater
opportunities for employment
within may exist for
administrative and maintenance
staff

Outside JRA

Employment options
within 35 miles include
the economic centers of
Chehalis/Centralia and
Olympia/Tumwater/Lacey

More senior staff will be eligible
for newly created positions at
Green Hill School, and senior
employees may bump more junior
staff at this and other facilities
Statewide, opportunities will be
limited by the reduction of
approximately 110 FTEs under
this Option. Bumping
opportunities will be limited as
well, as MLS employee are on
average less senior than JRA staff
in other institutions

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Table 8B: Summary of Employment Options – Close Green Hill School
Within JRA

Option
Option 2:
Close Green
Hill School

JRA Staff
Reduced at
Closed
Facility
235.0 FTE
(between
FY09 and
FY13)

Newly Created
Positions
Maple Lane
School
57.4 FTE
Naselle Youth
7.6 FTE

Formal Option Process
No options will exist at the county
level as GHS constitutes nearly
all DSHS jobs in Lewis County.
Within Region 6, more senior
staff will be eligible for newly
created positions at Maple Lane
School, and senior employees
may bump more junior staff at
this and other facilities

Outside JRA

Employment options
within 35 miles include
the economic centers of
Chehalis/Centralia and
Olympia/Tumwater/Lacey

Statewide, opportunities will be
limited by the reduction of
approximately 90 FTEs under this
Option. Some bumping will
occur, as GHS employee are on
average less senior than JRA staff
in other institutions

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THE EFFECT OF CLOSURE ON THE HOST COMMUNITY
This section is a summary of findings described in detail in Appendix 2 to this report.
Purpose
Closing either Maple Lane or Green Hill School would have economic and fiscal impacts on the
local communities that are home to these facilities. The primary impacts would be a result of lost
employment, lost purchases of goods and services within the community, and the loss of taxes
paid to the host jurisdiction.
As a result of shifting the populations from closed facilities to other locations, “receiving
communities” will experience some positive economic and fiscal impacts from increased
employment, additional purchases of goods and services, and increased tax revenue to the host
jurisdiction. Because the State is considering making these changes in an effort to improve
efficiency and ultimately decrease spending, one would expect the increased expenditures (and
impacts) in the receiving communities to not fully offset the losses in the communities where
facilities are closed or downsized.
The purpose of this analysis, which is represented in more detail in the accompanying Technical
Appendix, is to:
•

Estimate the direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts on the local region from the
changes in employment and purchases of goods and services for communities either losing or
gaining economic activity associated with the studied facilities

•

Estimate the fiscal impacts (change in tax revenue) to the local jurisdictions losing economic
activity associated with the studied facilities

Methodology and Limitations
An assessment of economic impacts concerns itself with effects on patterns of commerce. What
shift in economic activity (business activity, income, or wages) can be attributed to a given action
or investment? An economic impact is characterized by a net new change in economic activity,
that is, economic activity that would otherwise not occur.
Our goal in this analysis is to estimate 1) the full impact on the regional economy of the change in
economic activity if a facility were closed or downsized, and 2) the full impact of additional
economic activity in receiving communities.
IMPLAN (short for IMpact Analysis for PLANning) software was used for this analysis.
IMPLAN is an input/output model that uses county-level data to trace the ripple effects (direct,
indirect, and induced effects) of an expenditure that occurs within the economy.
One of the limitations of this analysis is that it is performed as a snapshot in time. It compares the
impacts of a facility’s current expenditures with the likely impacts under a contemplated closure.
Although both options discussed in this report transition over a period of time, for the economic
analysis we have a chosen a future point in which the changes are anticipated to have been

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completed and the facility’s operations are relatively static. All dollars used in this portion of the
analysis are 2009 dollars.
Another important issue to note is that these analyses describe the economic impacts to the local
region, not the local jurisdiction, because the facility may draw employees, goods, and services
from the larger area. The impacts to the local jurisdiction may be much greater relative to its
local economy than that shown for the larger region. In some cases, employees and residents of a
facility are assumed to move to other locations within the same study region, minimizing the
economic impacts shown in our analysis. However, some movement will occur outside the local
jurisdiction, which can have significant impacts to the local community. The ripple effects from
the loss of employees and residents at the facilities can have a profound impact on cities of
smaller size. The importance of this issue as it pertains to smaller communities that currently host
facilities being considered for downsizing or closure should not be underestimated by the reader.
Fiscal Impacts: In addition to the impacts on the local and regional economy, closing either
Maple Lane or Green Hill School would have a direct impact on the host jurisdiction’s finances.
The Technical Appendix of this report discusses each of the following potential revenue sources
in more detail: utility and sales taxes, State shared revenues (including Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax,
Liquor Board Profits and Excise Tax, and Criminal Justice Revues), Criminal Justice Sales Tax,
and Public Safety Sales Tax.
Summary of Economic Impacts
Table 9 compares the economic impacts of the two closure options for each region studied.
Because the study areas are the same for both options, it is possible to make direct comparisons
between the impacts. The key points of comparison are:
 The annual economic impacts are similar between the two options. This applies to the
communities experiencing losses as well as those experiencing gains.
 The main difference between the two options comes from one-time construction costs.
Scenario 1, the closure of Maple Lane School has more positive one-time impacts than
Scenario 2.
It should be noted that positive impacts to the community are a direct result of spending by the
State, putting the economic and fiscal benefit to the community in opposition to cost savings for
the State. This can be seen by contrasting the results of this study’s economic and fiscal impact
analyses with the lifecycle cost conclusions.
Under both closure options there is a net increase of youth at Echo Glen Children’s Center (King
County) and Naselle Youth Camp (Pacific County). One time and on-going positive economic
effects would be experienced in both counties and, in the case of expansion at Naselle,
Wahkiakum County. Under both closure options, Lewis and Thurston Counties would experience
gains and losses, with losses outweighing gains due to an overall reduction of youth in JRA
facilities in the two counties.

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Table 9: Summary and Comparison of Estimated Economic Impacts of Closure Options
(Includes both Direct and Induced Job Loss/Gain and other Economic Impacts)
Area Definition
Losses
Scenario 1 - Close MLS
Lewis & Thurston Co.
Scenario 2 - Close GHS
Lewis & Thurston Co.
Gains - Annual
Scenario 1 - Close MLS
King County
Pacific & Wahkiakum Co.
Total
Scenario 2 - Close GHS
King County
Pacific & Wahkiakum Co.
Total
Gains - One Time
Scenario 1 - Close MLS
Lewis & Thurston Co.
King County
Pacific & Wahkiakum Co.
Total
Scenario 2 - Close GHS
Lewis & Thurston Co.
King County
Pacific & Wahkiakum Co.
Total

Output
Total Impact

Total Community Total Labor
Job Change
Income Change

$

(21,196,550)

(263.3) $

(13,191,910)

$

(21,297,904)

(262.9) $

(12,629,884)

$
$
$

4,957,285
1,609,465
6,566,750

75.4 $
31.3 $
106.7 $

3,535,991
2,129,675
5,665,665

$
$
$

5,286,688
1,691,710
6,978,397

81.0 $
32.7 $
113.7 $

3,264,470
2,387,031
5,651,501

$
$
$
$

21,598,075
9,968,310
1,829,105
33,395,490

175.6
81.1
14.9
271.6

$
$
$
$

8,496,272
3,921,344
719,535
13,137,151

$
$
$
$

7,565,179
9,968,310
1,829,105
19,362,595

61.5
81.1
14.9
157.5

$
$
$
$

2,975,998
3,921,344
719,535
7,616,877

Summary of Fiscal Impacts
Table 10 compares the estimated revenue loss to each jurisdiction’s operating funds.

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Table 10: Summary and Comparison of Estimated Annual Fiscal Losses of Closure Options
Est. Revenue
% of
Reduction General Fund
Option 1
Thurston County
Option 2
City of Chehalis

$

8,600

0.01%

$

40,900

0.50%

The City of Chehalis is estimated to have a greater loss in revenues from the closure of Green Hill
School than Thurston County would experience from the closure of Maple Lane School. This
discrepancy is due to the differing tax structures of cities and counties.
An important point of consideration when comparing the fiscal impacts is the size of each
jurisdiction’s budget. Thurston County has a General Fund that is roughly ten times that of the
City of Chehalis – but the City of Chehalis is expected to see a revenue loss nearly five times
greater than Thurston County. That being said, the estimated impact on the City’s General Fund is
still relatively small, at half of one percent of the General Fund.
In addition to the impacts quantified above, Green Hill School contracts with the City of Chehalis
for fire protection services at a cost of $44,000 annually. When an entity contracts for fire service
it generally pays for its “fair share” of providing that service on an average cost basis. However,
from an incremental cost perspective, it is unlikely that the fire service provider will experience
reductions in the overall costs of providing services to the service area should the contract should
go away. For small cities in particular, there can be a loss of economies of scale along with a loss
in users of the service. Therefore, there may be a marginal increase to the City in the cost of
providing service to the remaining users.
From a community impacts perspective, the closure of Maple Lane School appears to have more
positive one-time economic impacts and fewer negative fiscal impacts than the closure of Green
Hill School.
Impacts to the Rochester School District
The economic impacts modeled above incorporate the loss of approximately 26 jobs in the
Rochester School District which administers the Maple Lane High School.
In a letter dated July 26, 2009 addressed to the Office of Financial Management, the
Superintendent of Rochester School District states that, “Maple Lane High School is a vital part
of the Rochester School District.” He later states that a “symbiotic relationship” exists between
MLHS and the rest of the Rochester School District” and cites the following examples:
•

“MLHS staff and administration are active members of district committees, and both
receive and provide crucial district-wide services”

•

Professional development opportunities received by MLHS are shared with the rest of the
District

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•

MLHS houses the District print shop, which saves outside printing costs

Superintendent Anderson further notes that with closure of the Maple Lane School, certificated
teachers at MLHS would lose all rights to employment within the District.
Impacts to Chehalis School District
Closing Green Hill School would result in the loss of 21.3 FTE in the Chehalis School District.
A letter expressing the District’s concerns was submitted by Dr. Greg Kirsch, Superintendent, to
the Office of Financial Management on July 16, 2009. This letter raises a strong concern related
to the potential timing of facility closure, stating that if closure were to be announced after May
15, the District would be contractually obligated to pay for staff and equipment for the Green Hill
Academic School for remainder of the year which total approximately $1.9 million a year
according to the District’s figures. Dr. Kirsch’s letter concludes by asking for “consideration in
the budget for funding the cost of continuing contracts through the end of the academic year in
which the facility closes.”
The Superintendent also states that, as the teachers working at GHS are on average more senior
than the District’s other teachers, closure of GHS would result in Green Hill Academic School
staff bumping and displacing more junior staff in the District’s elementary, middle, and secondary
schools. Dr. Kirsch further states that this process would result in disruption and misalignment of
teacher qualifications and classroom needs.

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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS
There is No Room for Error
In order to close either Green Hill or Maple Lane it
The November 2009 caseload forecast for
is necessary to use virtually all available capacity at the JRA residential population was
the remaining institutions and build new buildings
released just prior to completion of this
to replace lost capacity. Even if this were done, this
report. Instead of fewer youth, the
poses significant risk if the population projection is
November forecast projects a small
low. If the population stabilizes or goes up, JRA
increase in JRA residential population. If
facilities would become crowded and it is likely that the institutional population increases, the
program outcomes would deteriorate. If crowding
state will be faced not with closing a JRA
were to become severe, closed facilities would have institution, but with opening closed living
to be reopened or additional new buildings
units to accommodate more youth.
constructed. And, in fact, the November 2009
caseload forecast estimates the average daily JRA residential population will be 27 higher in FY
2010, and 84 higher in FY 2011, than the forecast used for this analysis.
There are only 224 beds at Green Hill School; there are 268 at Maple Lane. If Green Hill were
closed, it would be necessary to close additional beds elsewhere. If a single facility is closed, only
closure of Maple Lane reaches the requirement to eliminate 235 beds.
Potential Changes in FTEs, Operating Costs and Capital Expenditures
Both options potentially save a substantial number of FTEs, but not nearly enough to save
$12,000,000 following full closure of one of the facilities – much less by FY 2011. However,
there is a somewhat larger decrease in FTEs if Maple Lane is closed. And, while the capital cost
difference between the two alternatives is much smaller than calculated in the draft report, from a
capital standpoint it is still somewhat more advantageous to close Maple Lane. Overall, Table 11
shows that the financial advantage of closing Maple Lane School is greater than that associated
with closing Green Hill.
Table 11: Summary of Potential 2013 Savings in FTEs, Salaries & Benefits,
and Change in Capital Expenditures

Net Savings in FTEs by 2013
Annual savings in salaries & benefits
Net Present Value (over 10 years)
Additional Capital Costs
Avoided Capital Costs
Net capital costs (additional + avoided)
Net Present Value (over 10 years)

Christopher Murray & Associates

Close GHS
-89
$5,396,000
$31,200,000
$35,150,000
-$7,990,000
$27,160,000
-$15,400,000

Close MLS
-111
$7,126,000
$21,400,000
$35,801,000
-$9,946,000
$25,855,000
-$14,600,000

Page 2.41

The Need for Construction Delays Closure
Even with aggressive timetables, the need to build new buildings under both options delays
implementation of full closure and therefore savings. While it may once have been possible to
obtain quicker cost savings associated with more modest changes – such as consolidations and
closure of individual living units – that possibility no longer exists with the revised numbers from
the November 2009 caseload forecast.
Effect on Employees
Closing Maple Lane School results in a larger number of FTE reductions and a greater net
reduction of staff than closing Green Hill School.
Maple Lane employees are relatively less senior than other JRA employees and so may be less
able to bump into filled positions elsewhere in the agency than employees from Green Hill.
Terminated employees from either school who are unable to find other employment within JRA
or DSHS would benefit from relatively easy access to the regional job markets of
Centralia/Chehalis or Olympia/Tumwater/Lacy. However, job skills that are specific to JRA
institutional needs may not be readily transferable to other fields.
Senior teachers and staff laid off in the Chehalis School District would likely “bump” more junior
staff in the district’s other schools. In contrast, there are no seniority rights in the Rochester
School District and, if Maple Lane closes, certificated teachers at Maple Lane High School would
lose all rights to employment within the District.
Effect on Host Communities
The annual economic impacts of closures are similar for both options. This is true for
communities experiencing losses and communities experiencing gains. The main difference
between the two options comes from one-time construction costs. Option 1, closing Maple Lane
School has more positive one-time impacts than Option 2, closing Green Hill School. On balance,
however, both Lewis and Thurston Counties would experience net job loss and other economic
loss. Concentrated effects in the City of Chehalis could be significant. Net gains would occur in
communities where JRA institutions experience population growth.
Closure of either facility would have an adverse impact on the local school district with a loss of
21 jobs in the Chehalis School District, if Green Hill closes, and loss of 26 jobs in the Rochester
School District, if Maple Lane School closes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The proviso in ESHB 1244 states that “the report shall provide a recommendation and a plan to
eliminate … 235 beds from juvenile rehabilitation facilities.”
It is our conclusion that the data do not support closure of either Green Hill or Maple Lane.
Without new construction there is insufficient capacity in the rest of the system to accommodate
the youth who would be left and closure of either facility would be accompanied by a significant
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probability of doing serious harm to a quality program and leave little or no room for error in the
caseload forecast for JRA institutions.
However, because the proviso requires a recommendation and plan to eliminate 235 JRA beds,
the logical choice is to close Maple Lane School in 2013 following further declines in the number
of youth in JRA institutions and completion of needed capital improvements. Closing Maple Lane
reaches the target of eliminating 235 beds, saves more FTEs and requires somewhat fewer capital
dollars. While we want to make it clear that we think this is a bad idea, in conformance with the
proviso, an implementation plan to close Maple Lane School is provided.

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IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
This implementation plan assumes that the number of youth in JRA residential facilities will
continue to decrease as indicated in the long-range forecast updated in June 2009. This plan will
not work if the population fails to go down by at least the amount projected at that time or if the
recommended capital improvements identified in this report are not completed. If the population
does continue to go down, and if a decision is made to close Maple Lane School, we recommend
the following steps be followed.
1. Request and obtain funding for the capital initiatives described under the option to close
Maple Lane School.
2. Fast track all capital projects, including completing consultant selection and contract
negotiations to coincide with the availability of funds in July 2010.
3. In FY 2011, reduce population levels in Maple Lane living units by taking advantage of
declining admissions and maximizing the use of available beds at Green Hill School. Reduce
living unit staffing consistent with traditional staffing ratios as population levels decline.
4. In FY 2012, complete fast track renovation of cottages at Echo Glen and Mariner Lodge at
Naselle. Move all residential mental health youth, and up to 32 extended mental health youth,
from Maple Lane to Echo Glen. Close Laurel, Birch, and either Pacific or Rainier at Maple
Lane. Convert Spruce at Green Hill to all sex offender treatment; move core treatment
program youth out of Spruce to Naselle; move youth from the Olympic sex offender treatment
program at Maple Lane to Green Hill. Close Olympic at Maple Lane. Temporarily relocate
the Basic Training Camp from Connell to a vacant unit at Maple Lane.
5. In FY 2013, complete fast track construction of IMU, extended mental health, and basic
training camp beds at Green Hill. Move all remaining youth from Maple Lane to Green Hill.
Implement first year warm closure actions at Maple Lane. Close Maple Lane.
Additional materials on the implementation plan can be found in the appendix.

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419

FEASIBILITY STUDY FOR THE CLOSURE OF

STATE INSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES

FINAL REPORT
Part 3: Residential Habilitation Centers
November 1, 2009

T ABLE OF CONTENTS
1. E XECUTIVE SUMMARY …………………………………………………….

3.04

2. SCOPE OF CONTRACT………………………………………………………

3.10

3. PROJECT APPROACH ……………………………………………………...

3.10

4. C RITERIA TO DETERMINE OPTIONS ………………………………………..… 3.11
5. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE …………………………………………………..

3.14

6. STATE OF WASHINGTON PERSPECTIVE ………………………………….…….

3.18

7. STAKEHOLDER AND SURVEY C OMMENTS………………………………………. 3.42
8. STUDY FINDINGS …………………………………………………….......

3.44

9. RHC O PTIONS ………………………………………………………......

3.47

10.

RECOMMENDATIONS………………………………………………….......

3.48

11.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS….………………………………………………..

3.52

12.

C OMMUNITY, E MPLOYEE, AND LIFE-C YCLE IMPACT ……………………………..
3.59

DD APPENDIX (bound separately)
TECHNICAL APPENDIX (bound separately)

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3.2

LIST OF TABLES
TABLE #1 – COMPARISONS OF RHC BED REDUCTIONS & PER CAPITA COST ………………………….
3.14
TABLE #2 – STATE INSTITUTION CLOSURES SINCE 2000 ……………………………..…………. 3.14
TABLE #3 – DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMERS AND STAFF BY SNF & ICF/MR PROGRAMS ……………....
3.18
TABLE #4 – OVERALL CURRENT DIRECT CARE STAFF RATIOS ………………………………………. 3.19
TABLE #5 – HISTORICAL RHC RESPITE & EMERGENCY USE (2000 TO 2009) ……………………….. 3.19
TABLE #6 – CURRENT & PROJECTED RHC BEDS WITH NO CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY..…….…………
3.20
TABLE #7 – CURRENT & PROJECTED RHC PER CAPITA EXPENSES WITH NO CHANGE IN CURRENT POLICY ….
3.20
TABLE #8 – AGE CHARACTERISTICS OF PEOPLE CURRENTLY LIVING IN RHCS ………………………… 3.21
TABLE #9 – LENGTH OF STAY FOR PEOPLE LIVING CURRENTLY LIVING IN RHCS ……………………… 3.21
TABLE #10 – AGE AT ADMISSION TO RHC…..………………………………………………..
3.21
TABLE #11 – CURRENT FACILITY CAPACITY V. JUNE 2009 OCCUPANCY……………………………..
3.22
TABLE #12 – FHMC - AGE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT FACILITY ……………………..………………..
3.22
TABLE #13 – FHMC – LENGTH OF STAY ……………………………………………………..
3.23
TABLE #14 – FHMC – AGE AT ADMISSION …………………………………………………..3.23
TABLE #15 – FHMC – CAPITAL BUDGET PLAN ………………………………………………...
3.23
TABLE #16 – FIRCREST – AGE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT SNF ……………………………………….. 3.25
TABLE #17 – FIRCREST – AGE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT ICF/MR …………………………………… 3.25
TABLE #18 – FIRCREST - LENGTH OF STAY - SNF ………………………………………………
3.26
TABLE #19 - FIRCREST - LENGTH OF STAY – IF/MR ……………………………………….…... 3.26
TABLE #20 – FIRCREST – AGE AT ADMISSION - SNF……………………………………………
3.26
TABLE #21 – FIRCREST – AGE AT ADMISSION – ICF/MR……………………………………….. 3.26
TABLE #22 – FIRCREST – CAPITAL BUDGET PLAN……………………………………………….
3.26
TABLE #23 – LAKELAND – A GE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT SNF ……………………………………… 3.29
TABLE #24 – LAKELAND – A GE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT ICF/MR ………………………………….. 3.29
TABLE #25 – LAKELAND – L ENGTH OF STAY – SNF …………………………………………….
3.29
TABLE #26 – LAKELAND – L ENGTH OF STAY – ICF/MR ………………………………………… 3.29
TABLE #27 – LAKELAND – A GE AT ADMISSION – SNF ………………………………………….
3.30
TABLE #28 – LAKELAND – A GE AT ADMISSION – ICF/MR ……………………………………… 3.30
TABLE #29 – LAKELAND – C APITAL BUDGET PLAN ……………………………………………... 3.30
TABLE #30 – RAINIER – AGE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT FACILITY ………………………..…………… 3.32
TABLE #31 – RAINIER – LENGTH OF STAY …………………………………………………… 3.32
TABLE #32 – RAINIER – AGE AT ADMISSION ………………………………………………… 3.32
TABLE #33 – RAINIER – CAPITAL BUDGET PLAN ………………………………………………
3.33
TABLE #34 – YAKIMA VALLEY – A GE OF PEOPLE LIVING AT FACILITY……………………………….
3.35
TABLE #35 – YAKIMA VALLEY – LENGTH OF STAY ……………………………………………...
3.36
TABLE #36 – YAKIMA VALLEY – A GE AT ADMISSION …………………………………………..
3.36
TABLE #37 – YAKIMA VALLEY – C APITAL BUDGET PLAN ………………………………………... 3.36
TABLE #38 – NUMBER OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS ……………………………………………...
3.38

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FEASIBILITY STUDY REPORT
FEASIBILITY STUDY EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 2009 Washington Legislature passed HB 1244 directing the Governor’s Office of Financial
Management (OFM) to conduct a study of the feasibility of closure of state institutions. In
response, OFM contracted with a consultant team to conduct the assessment. This summary
focuses on findings and recommendations regarding the DSHS Division of Developmental
Disabilities-run residential habilitation centers (RHC).
HOW WAS THE STUDY CONDUCTED? The team considered information from four sources:
1. Previous studies conducted by JLARC, DSHS, and the Department of General
Administration. These studies provided information on property values, strategic plans,
and closure plans for Fircrest School and Yakima Valley School.
2. Current financial, program policy, and quality assurance data provided by DSHS Aging
& Disability Services Administration. Data for this study is current to June 2009 unless
otherwise noted.
3. Stakeholder focus group and survey findings from over 800 people including people with
disabilities, their families, advocates, and providers.
4. Current RHC individual service plans and June 2009 personnel payroll data which was
collected specifically for this study.
WHAT DID THE TEAM FIND? There are seven key findings.
1. Nationally, Washington State is behind the current trend in its dependence on RHCs.
States are getting out of the business of state-operated large facility-based long term care.
No state is expanding its institutional care system. Washington has more RHC beds per
citizen than most other states. States that closed facilities recently were primarily
addressing one of three major issues:
 Buildings were wearing out and too expensive to replace.
 Class-action litigation settlements required closure.
 Federal Department of Justice investigations found civil rights violations.
2. RHCs are expensive to operate. There are three primary reasons.
 Buildings and other RHC capital assets are more expensive to maintain than
leased homes in community neighborhoods.
 State employee compensation for direct care workers is higher than private
agency direct care workers’ compensation.
 Short-term respite & crisis emergency residential services provided by an RHC on
campus have the single highest per capita cost (in state funds) of any DDD
service.
3. People who live at the RHCs and their families are highly satisfied, do not want to leave
and will strongly and actively resist community placement. Their concerns and

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convictions must be respected and considered. A significant number of people have lived
in the RHCs for a majority of their life-time and are wanting to age-in-place at the RHCs.
4. A significant number of people currently residing in RHCs were admitted at young ages
and have lived at the facilities in excess of thirty years. Leaving the RHCs for these
people is difficult. Recently in the past two years, RHCs have been admitting children
because community alternatives have not been available. This practice has the potential
to create a new generation of long-term RHC residents.
5. The community service system currently lacks adequate respite and emergency / crisis
residential capacity. Regional case managers, people and families, and community
providers heavily depend on RHCs for crisis residential back-up support because of a
lack of existing community options. Increased community respite services are imperative
to support people and families in their own homes and deter future admissions to RHCs.
Without these respite resources, RHCs will experience continued pressure to admit
people as the only option.
6. Intensive supported living services and day programs would be the primary community
option for people leaving RHCs. The current supported living provider net work and
county programs will require increased financing and capacity to meet the health, safety,
and critical care needs of these people.
7. States are directly operating community-based supported living programs for people who
present complex health needs and / or community risks. In Washington, community
programs also support people with similar needs, but are not required to accept referrals
unconditionally. States that operate community supported living programs use them as
their “zero reject” safety net services for people who are in transition between homes. In
Washington, only RHCs have a requirement to accept all referrals.
8. Valuable clinical and program expertise is concentrated at the RHCS and generally not
available to people and families in need in the community. There was overwhelming
concern from all stakeholders that these critical resources would be lost if the RHCs were
closed.
WHAT OPTIONS WERE CONSIDERED AND WHAT EVALUATION CRITERIA WERE APPLIED? The team
considered five future options for the RHCs.
1. Maintain the current status and change nothing.
2. Close all state-operated services and campuses, and place all people with community
private providers.
3. Close the skilled nursing facility (SNF) only and place people with a combination of
small state-operated or privately-operated community supported living programs.
4. Close the intermediate care facility (ICF/MR) only and place people with a combination
of small state-operated or privately-operated community supported living programs.
5. Convert the RHCs from long-term care programs to community resource centers offering
respite, clinical outreach, and crisis intervention.

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In considering these recommendations, the team applied four criteria.
1. Maintain quality of care: will people and families receive equal or better services and
supports than they are currently receiving?
2. Future service demand: Are there people in the future who will need these services and
supports?
3. Regulatory and policy environment: To what degree are there federal and state
regulatory and policy pressures for various alternatives?
4. Financial impact: What are the current and projected future fiscal impacts of various
alternatives?
WHAT ARE THE TEAM’S RECOMMENDATIONS? The recommendations address both the questions of
the feasibility of reducing 250 beds in the near term, and the future of the RHCs in the next ten
years. The team’s recommendations are:
Recommendation #1: No later than 2013, Washington can reduce 250 beds from the
RHCs by closing FHMC and 13 cottages on other RHC campuses. Because of the current SNF
and ICF/MR bed mix and because the RHCs are recommended to be closed by 2019, it is not
feasible to consolidate people and increase the census at various campuses without creating
multiple moves for people within a short period of time. The team is experienced with the high
degree of stress people experience when moving and recommends that DSHS proceed in a
respectful and patient manner that minimizes multiple moves. The recommended actions to
accommodate the 250 bed reduction are:






Close FHMC and vacate the campus
Close seven (7) cottages at Rainier School
Close two (2) cottages at Fircrest School
Close one (1) cottage at Yakima Valley School
Close two (2) cottages at Lakeland Village

Recommendation #2: As part of the reduction of 250 beds, Washington should
immediately place children currently living at the RHCs into state-operated children’s intensive
care homes. This action can be accomplished by transferring the current Fircrest staff and
resources to a community supported living setting.
RECOMMENDATION #3: No later than 2019, Washington can close all but a few RHC beds
and convert Lakeland, Fircrest, and Yakima Valley into three small community support centers
which provide emergency crisis support and ambulatory care / clinical outreach services. Each
center would have clinical expertise to support people with autism and their families. These three
centers would also retain a small number of SNF beds to honor the state’s commitment to allow
people and their families to age-in-place. These centers would focus on providing geographically
accessible services for eastern, western, and central Washington respectively.
Recommendation #4: Washington should expand its community supported living
network to include a “zero-reject” state-operated residential option which focuses on people with
complex health needs or who present significant community risks. To accomplish significant
RHC closure, a publicly operated safety net of residential supports which must accept all people
is essential.
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Recommendation #5: The community supported living provider network requires
substantial refinancing and increased capacity in order to support people leaving the RHCs in an
equal or better fashion. That financial support should be directed specifically to increasing direct
care compensation and also to increasing the overall number of providers and bed capacity.
HOW MUCH WILL THESE RECOMMENDATIONS COST OR SAVE THE STATE’S OPERATIONS & CAPITAL
BUDGETS?
•

The reduction of 250 beds in the RHCs will initially cost $1,815,363 more in the first year
operations budget than SFY 2010 current level in order to cover provider start-up and
consumer transition expenses. Assuming a start date of July 2010, cost savings and
expenditures will break even by January 2013. The state will experience net savings of
$4,346,750 per year thereafter from the reduction of 250 RHC beds.

•

Assuming cold closure of the Frances Haddon Morgan facility and the associated cottages
involved in the 250 bed reduction, an additional $1,875,000 of building expenses can also be
avoided in future Capital budget minor works. Heartland Alternative #3 for FHMC (sale of
excess properties) would provide the state with $1.2 million from the sale. Capital budget
impact is not considered part of the operating budget impact.

•

Should the state decide to close its remaining ICF-MR beds and restructure its nursing home
and clinical supports (e.g. Recommendation #3), the state will experience a net savings of
$116,138,316 for the period of SFY 2011 through SFY 2018, and per annum savings of
$41,982,957 per year starting in SFY 2019. A summary of operating budget savings per
state fiscal year (SFY) and the bed closure schedule are provided in the tables below.

•

Summary of operating budget savings and expenses per SFY for Recommendation #3 (RHC restructure)
SFY
2011
Community Ongoing Expense

$3,224,030

SFY
2012

SFY
2013

SFY
2014

SFY
2015

SFY
2016

SFY
2017

SFY
2018

$16,703,04

$28,438,31

$40,226,27

$67,282,36

$92,466,08

$110,515,4

$112,838,1

2

1

0

8

1

15

40

$1,012,000

$1,104,000

$1,288,000

$2,495,500

$2,403,500

$1,092,500

•

$595,884

$1,191,768

$1,787,652

$1,787,652

$1,787,652

$1,787,652

0

$1,645,080

$1,645,080

$1,645,080

Community
$736,000

One-time

0

Expense
Increase SOLA
Mgt
•

•

0

•

0

•

0

•

0

Clinical
Outreach /

•

0

•

0

•

Crisis Response

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SFY
2011

SFY
2012

SFY
2013

SFY
2014

SFY
2015

SFY
2016

SFY
2017

SFY
2018

$184,273

$437,649

$714,059

$1,036,538

$1,661,340

$2,263,107

$2,536,636

$2,536,636

$18,152,69

$30,852,25

$43,742,57

$73,226,86

$100,565,4

$117,57,28

$118,807,5

2

4

6

0

21

6

11

$19,413,47

$34,410,69

$50,120,49

$80,182,78

$119,126,8

$156,833,5

$160,790,4

4

4

9

7

48

09

68

$1,260,782

$3,558,440

$6,377,923

$6,955,927

$18,561,42

$39,256,22

$41,982,95

7

3

7

Teams

Placement

•

Transition
Teams
•

TOTAL
EXPENSES

RHC REDUCTION
SAVINGS

DIFFERENCE

$4,144,304

$2,328,940

($1,815,363

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)

Page 3.8

•

Summary of the RHC bed closure and community transition budget impact by fiscal year for Recommendation
#3 (RHC restructure)
State
Fiscal
Year
(July to
June)

SFY 2011
SFY 2012
SFY 2013
SFY 2014
SFY 2015

SFY 2016

SFY 2017
SFY 2018

RHC Action

FHMC: close 2 cottages
Fircrest: close 2 cottages
FHMC: close facility
Rainier: close 3 cottages
Yakima: close 1 cottage
Lakeland: close 2 cottages
Rainier: close 4 cottages
Fircrest: close 2 cottages
Lakeland: close 1 cottage
Rainier: close 4 cottages
Fircrest: close 4 cottages
Lakeland: close 4 cottages
Rainier: close 4 cottages
Yakima: close 2 cottages
Fircrest: close 3 cottages
Lakeland: close 4 cottages
Rainier: close 6 cottages
Yakima: close 1 cottage
Lakeland: close 3 cottages
Rainier: close 3 cottages
Actions complete

TOTAL
IMPACT
through
SFY 2018
FHMC: closed facility
Fircrest: ICF/MR
Fircrest: SNF
Lakeland: ICF/MR
Lakeland: SNF beds
Rainier: closed facility
Yakima: SNF

TOTAL

29

Number of
people
moving from
RHCs

number of
people moving
to Private
Community
Residential
programs

Number of
people moving
to Stateoperated
supported
living
programs

32
32 29
24
48
16
32
64
32
16
64
57
64
64
32
41
64
88
16
36
59

16
16
24
48
0
16
64
16
16
64
41
64
64
8
32
64
88
0
36
59

16
16
0
0
16
16
0
16
0
0
16
0
0
24
9
0
0
16
0
0

Remaining
RHC Capacity

Total increase in
private
community
programs

Total increase
in stateoperated com.
programs

0
0
48
0
26
0
38

40
105
0
180
16
387
8

16
16
41
0
16
0
56

112

736

145

Net Savings
or (Loss) for
Biennium (End
of last SFY)

($1,815,363)
$1,260,782
$3,558,440
$6,377,923

$6,955,927

$18,561,427
$39,256,223
$41,982,957

Total Net
Savings from
SFY 2010
through SFY
2018

$116,138,316

Fircrest to move all children to state-operated intensive care home in 2011

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SCOPE OF PROJECT :
This section of the report is focused on the feasibility of closing 250 beds at the residential
habilitation centers (RHC) operated by the Department of Social and Health Services / Aging
and Disability Services. Additionally, OFM requested that the consultants provide a long-term
(10 year) context for the future of the RHCs. Study requirements specific to the developmental
disabilities are listed:
 The impact and interest of people currently living in the RHCs who would be relocated to
other residential programs to include both community programs as well as other RHCs
 The availability of alternative community long-term care supports and services if various
RHCs were to close
 The opportunities for consolidation of RHC services and capacity
 Various financial considerations to include:
o Current and future operations and capital costs for various RHC closure options
o On-going facility-related costs associated with closure of all or portions of RHC
facilities to include both “warm” and “cold” closure options
o The number and type of RHC staff who would be affected by closure
o Savings accrued by closure and / or consolidation
o Additional transitional and long-term support costs associated with the relocation
of people currently residing in RHCs
o The economic and social impact on various local communities in which RHCs are
located
 Stakeholder opinions and perspectives to include people living at the RHCs and their
families, staff who work at the RHCs, consumer advocates, labor, county government,
and provider organizations
 Policy and operational issues that must be addressed prior to closure or consolidation
This portion of the study was conducted by Davis Deshaies LLC and Berk & Associates under a
sub-contract agreement with Christopher Murray & Associates.
PROJECT APPROACH
A team of former state developmental disabilities program directors from Arizona, Texas,
California, Maine, Alabama, Louisiana, and Washington were selected to conduct a review and
analysis of RHC options and future directions, and provide a written set of recommendations to
OFM. This feasibility study team established and worked from a set of existing values and
beliefs. These values drove the actions and practice of the study, and are as follow:
 All people have the right to choose and direct their personal supports.
 All people have the right to accurate and objective information to make choices, and
should expect that the information is presented in an understandable fashion.
 All people have the right to know the limits of available public support in order to make
appropriate choices.

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Within the context of the study values and beliefs, the RHC feasibility study team initiated five
activities. First, a comprehensive review of previous national and Washington state studies and
analyses was completed. Second, focus group discussions with potentially effected people,
families, and RHC staff were conducted. Additionally, meetings with labor organizations,
community advocate organizations, association of counties human services board coordinators
and community residential services providers were held. Third, financial, performance outcome
and program data were examined and used to build alternative RHC models. Fourth, individual
support teams and placement officers for each RHC provided prospective placement plans for
each person residing in each RHC. Finally, select discussions with key elected and DSHS
officials were conducted. Results from these activities are detailed in the subsequent sections of
this report. All data listed in this report is current as of June 2009 and was provided by DSHS
and / or OFM unless otherwise noted.
CRITERIA TO D ETERMINE O PTIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
The feasibility study team applied four test criteria in its deliberations of various RHC alternative
options. These test criteria are listed in order of priority. Specifically, if the first test is not met,
the alternative is not considered further. All recommended alternatives must meet all test criteria
in order to be considered for recommendation to the Governor and Legislature. The RHC
alternative test criteria are:
1. Maintain quality of care: will people and families receive equal or better services and
supports than they are currently receiving?
2. Future service demand: Are there people in the future who will need these services and
supports?
3. Regulatory and policy environment: To what degree are there federal and state
regulatory and policy pressures for various alternatives?
4. Financial impact: What are the current and projected future fiscal impacts of various
alternatives?

Quality of Care Criteria: To determine quality of comparable care levels, the study team
examined current levels of RHC support as well as the outcomes and resource needs of people
who have either previously left the RHCs during the past twenty-four (24) months or who
possess similar support needs to people currently in the RHCs. Five primary sources of
information were used.
1. Current RHC direct care support levels were determined by a review of June 2009
personnel payroll documents. Staff and residents were identified for each RHC cottage /
home.
2. Individual support teams and placement officers provided the most recent assessments of
individual behavior and health support needs, as well as prospective community support

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needs and last known individual and family interest in placement. All RHC placement
officers noted that placement plans are dated and will need to be updated and refreshed.
3. Community support plans and associated costs for people with comparable needs who
recently left RHCs were provided by DSHS / DDD30. In all instances, people leaving the
RHC were considered to need a minimum of 1staff per 2 people during the day and 1
staff per 4 people at night. In addition to direct care staff support, additional clinical
resources were assigned to people based upon the RHC team assessments.
4. Quality assurance outcome studies and mortality reviews conducted by DSHS/DDD were
also examined. Both RHC staff and families of people living in the RHCs expressed
significant concern that comprehensive and thorough planning and training occur prior to
placement of people with serious health issues.
5. The feasibility study team also reviewed “usual and customary” service levels used by
people with similar needs who moved from state institutions in other states. Specifically,
current experiences from State of Indiana Muscatatuck Center and Fort Wayne Center
which involved people with significant behavioral support needs (2005 & 2007 closures)
and State of California Agnews Center which involved people with significant health and
medical needs (2008 closure) were examined. Program designs and increased community
supports used in both states have been incorporated into the Options and
Recommendations section.

Future Service Demand: Three trends were examined to determine future demand for RHC
services. First, the overall national and state population growth and associated growth in the
numbers of people with developmental disabilities was projected through calendar year 2020.
Data sources used in these projections included: the U.S. Census Bureau American Community
Survey, December 2008; U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census of Population; and selected
journal articles 31. Second, specific trends involving people with autism spectrum disorders32,
people with fetal alcohol syndrome / fetal alcohol effect, and people with chronic conditions due
to aging33 were examined to determine their potential impact on residential service needs. And
third, data on consumers waiting to receive residential supports 34 was compared to the overall
population growth trend.
Regulatory & Policy Environment: The purpose of the regulatory and environmental scan is to
determine the extent to which national and state litigation, and federal regulations and oversight
will affect the future delivery of residential services. To assess the current policy environment,
two primary aspects were examined. First, current national and state litigation trends and
subsequent court rulings were reviewed. Second, both current and pending Title XIX Medicaid
30

Sherman, Ron. “Roads to Community Living Rates”, worksheet prepared at request of feasibility team, Department of Social & Health
Services, July 24, 2009.
31
Mickel, Amy and Stan Taylor, “Active Status Population Growth Analysis”, California State University, College of Business Administration,
Sacramento, California.2008.
32
Autism and DD Monitoring Network, “Prevalence of Autism Spectrum Disorders”, February 2007.
33
Stallard, Eric, “Estimates of the Incidence, Prevalence, Duration, Intensity and Cost of Chronic Disability Among the U.S. Elderly
Population”, National Institutes of Aging, January 2008.
34
Prouty, R.W., Smith G., & Lakin, K.C. (2007). “Residential services for persons with developmental disabilities: Status and trends through
2006”, University of Minnesota, 2007.

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regulations, interpretive guidelines, and HCBS waiver models were considered. The sources of
these judicial and federal findings are the updated reports from the National Association of State
Developmental Disabilities Directors, and the experiences of feasibility team members who
serve as federal court monitors and / or sit on CMS regulatory advisory committees.

Financial Impact: Once the criteria for quality of care, future service demand, and political and
policy environment have been met, financial impact is determined. The basis for calculating
financial impact involves these steps.
1. Determine RHC fixed and variable costs.
2. Determine individualized service plans and associated reimbursement rates for each
person leaving an RHC.
3. Apply implementation phase-in schedules and associated transition expenses.
4. Determine cost of community capacity-building activities necessary to accommodate
RHC placements.
5. Define critical path to include dependent activities which must occur prior to community
placement from an RHC.

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N ATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
This section presents a historical perspective of the creation and evolution of state-operated
facilities in the United States. Additionally in this section, key future national trends are
discussed. Both historical and future perspectives are provided as a context for understanding
future change.
National History of State-Operated Residential Programs:
David Braddock from the University of Colorado and others provide a history of state-operated
residential programs in their book, Disability at the Dawn of the 21st Century and the State of the
States35. The first institution for people with disabilities, Perkins School for the Blind, was
opened in 1848 in Boston, Massachusetts. The original intent of the Perkins School was to
provide short-term education and training and then return people back to their communities. The
first full-time residential facility opened in Illinois in 1865 at the urging of Dorothea Dix, a noted
advocate. Other states followed suit and constructed large residential campuses with buildings
specifically designed for people with disabilities. Growth of these facilities accelerated
significantly through World War II (1945) but leveled by the early 1960’s. They remained
virtually unchanged until the early 1970’s. Inappropriate conditions were noted in the news
press and the first class action law suit (Wyatt v. Stickney) focused on community alternatives
was filed in 1972 at Partlow State School in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. From that litigation and
subsequent settlement, the term “least restrictive environment” was introduced into federal
Medicaid regulation.
Prior to 1972, the source of funding for state-operated residential services was state-fund only.
No federal monies were dedicated to these institutions. With the authorization of the Title XIX
Medicaid Intermediate Care Facility / Mental Retardation (ICF/MR) program, Washington and
other states converted their state institutions and select community programs to receive federal
matching funds. In 1981, the Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver
program was introduced and has emerged as the primary funding source for smaller
individualized community living settings. Nationally, the number of individuals served in
community homes smaller than six beds grew from 4,000 people in 1960 to 376,567 in 2006.36
During the 16-year period 1990-2006, the state-operated residential population nationally
declined 55.9%. During that same period, Washington State’s institutional population declined
by 46.3%. When comparing the number of state-operated institution beds to the general
population of the state, Washington maintains a higher ratio of RHC beds per 100,000 citizens
than the national average. The following table compares Washington State’s bed ratio to
neighboring or select other states 37 with similar services.

35

Braddock, David, editor, Disability at the Dawn of the 21 st Century and The State of the States, , American Association on Mental retardation,
Washington D.C. 2002.

36

Braddock, David, and R.Hemp, M. Rizzolo, The State of the States in Developmental Disabilities – Seventh
Edition, American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, September 2008.
37

Prouty, Robert, K. Alba and C. Lakin, “Residential Services for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: Status and Trends through 2007”,
Research and Training Center on Community Living, University of Minnesota. July 2008.

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Table #1: Comparisons of RHC bed reductions, per capita costs, and beds / 100,000 citizens

Percent Change in Stateoperated Bed Capacity
1990 to 2007

State
Washington State
Oregon
Idaho
Montana
California
Arizona
Florida
Wisconsin
National Average

-46.3%
-95.1%
-55.7%
-68.9%
-57.9%
-63.1%
-34.4
-70.4%
-55.9%

Average Daily
Expenditures by
38
Resident (2007)
$505.13
$745.34
$681.00
$511.02
$706.32
$379.00
$356.75
$577.70
$482.81

Ratio of RHC Average Daily
Residents to 100,000 State
Citizens
15.7
1.1
6.3
8.2
8.3
2.1
6.8
9.9
12.9

Since 1970, 40 states have closed 140 state-operated DD institutions (Braddock et al., 2008). Ten
states and DC have no state-operated DD institutional services at this time: Alaska, Hawaii,
Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West
Virginia. Table 2 summarizes information on the nation’s 26 institutions that have closed since
2000.
Table #2: State Institution Closures since 2000
State

Name of Agency

Alabama
Alabama
Alabama
California
California
Florida
Florida
Georgia
Georgia

Brewer-Bayside
Tarwater
Wallace
Agnews
Napa
Landmark
Gulf Coast center
Bainbridge
Augusta RC

Georgia

Gracewood

Illinois
Indiana
Indiana
Louisiana
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
New York
North Carolina

Lincoln
Fort Wayne
Muscatatuck
Leesville
Columbia
Dever
Southgate
Fergus Falls
Eastmont
Sunmount
Black Mountain
Ctr.
Apple Creek
Springview
Fairview
Altoona

Ohio
Ohio
Oregon
Pennsylvania
38

Year
Opened
1964
1976
1970
1885/1966
1875/1967
1965
1960
1967
Not
reported
Not
reported
1877
1887
1920
1912/1964
1967
1940/1946
1977
1888/1979
1969/1979
1922/1965
1883/1977
1931
1910/1975
1907
1975

Year
Closed
2003
2003
2003
2008
2001
2005
2001
2001
2003

Corrections
Corrections
Corrections
Undetermined
MI use only
Revert to county
Undetermined
Corrections
Undetermined

93

2003

Undetermined

MR Facility
MR Facility
MR Facility
High School
MR Facility
POW Camp
MR Facility
MI
MR Facility
TB Hospital
MI Facility

153
120
87
20
14
294
55
38
29
503
77

2004
2007
2005
2004
2004
2001
2002
2000
2003
2003
2005

Vacant
To be demolished
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Higher Ed Ctr.
Undetermined
Regional MH Ctr.
SNF
DD specialty unit
SNF

MR Facility
TB Hospital
MR Facility
MR Facility

178
86
327
90

2005
2004
2000
2008

Undetermined
Undetermined
Housing
Undetermined

Previous Use
MR Facility
MR Facility
MR Facility
MI Facility
MR/MI Facility
MR Facility
MR Facility
WW II Air Force base

Bed
Census
67
74
80
411
30
256
306
129
438

Current Use

Ibid.

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State
Wisconsin

Name of Agency
Northern
Wisconsin Ctr.

Year
Opened
1897

Previous Use
MR Facility

Bed
Census
173

Year
Closed
2005

Current Use
Short-term dual
diagnoses

Key National Trends:
Previous studies by DSHS and national research have documented significant changes in
caseload growth. Specifically, the prevalence of autism spectrum disorders is rapidly increasing
and is now estimated at 1:150 children. For other people, the impact of public education and
community inclusion programs combined with various family support initiatives have allowed
people to remain in their own homes with the support of those families. Supportive family
members are now getting older and are in some instances unable to continue to provide supports.
A survey in Arizona found that 62% of family care givers were over the age of 60 years.
Additionally, the impact of federal IDEA, Headstart, Child Find, and other early intervention
programs have identified children in need of service. These early identification efforts have
increased the demand for services. Finally, people graduating from public school are expecting
residential supports and employment. Again similar to the early intervention group, the
prevalence of public school graduates has not increased in recent years but early identification
and personal expectations have increased the demand for public service.
Correspondingly, service delivery systems have experienced significant changes. Community
residential supports have shifted from group living situations to individual homes and apartments
which are well integrated into neighborhoods and communities. Increased focus on familysupport and personal care has encouraged people to continue to live with their families.
Likewise, service providers have evolved from parent-sponsored group homes to private forprofit business corporations. Several states have experienced a decrease in the number of small
providers due to economy-of-scale financial constraints. Large workshop and facility-based
activity programs have been replaced with supported employment initiatives. A number of states
have initiated creative options such as family cooperatives, circles of supports, and microenterprises to encourage individualized services.
The role of state government in the delivery of services is becoming increasingly variable
among states. Several states have outsourced case management and support coordination (e.g.
Florida, Arizona, Indiana, Montana) to private providers. Florida and Arizona also have made
case management an optional service. People and their families may choose to waive case
management and use the associated funds to support other needs in their service plans. Stateemployee operated HCBS supported living programs are now available in 17 states. These
programs focus on supporting people who present community risks or are medically-fragile as
well as providing back-up / “fail safe” care as needed. HCBS waivers are becoming more
consumer-driven / self-directed and allow for wider ranges of individual supports. Several states
have initiated “independence-plus” waivers which emphasize self-directed services. Wisconsin
and California have used HCBS waivers to transform their state institutional facilities into
clinical resource centers (Southwestern Wisconsin Center and Agnews Center).

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All states have experienced significant fiscal growth in public developmental disabilities
programs39 . Overall budget expenditures as well as cost per consumer have risen in the past six
years40 . Highest per capita costs have occurred in state-operated institutions, although costs in
community residential programs have also seen substantial increases. As cost containment
methods, Medicaid CMS has encouraged the use of published fee schedules for provider
reimbursement and standardized consumer allocations to control future fiscal growth.
Legally, states continue to experience class action litigation as well as federal Department of
Justice actions. Recent court actions have focused on state implementation of the Olmstead Act
(8 states), people on waiting lists (13 states), and access to care issues (9 states). State
appropriations have not kept pace with court mandates and settlement agreements. As a result,
states are faced with the pressure to “take” needed resources from one set of consumers in order
to “give” needed resources to class members. Almost all states face a two class system of “have
and have-not” consumers.
Based upon the key trends described previously, the forecast for the future suggests the
following directions:
1. State-operated long-term care in large settings (specifically ICF/MR) will decrease, and
will be replaced by state-operated crisis / urgent care centers (funded by HCBS).
2. State-employee operated supported living programs will increase and focus on people
with dual diagnoses and / or community risk.
3. The use of privately-provided extended family models, host homes, and adult family
homes will increase.
4. A combination of state and privately-operated supported living homes focused on people
with intense health needs will increase as alternatives to generic skilled nursing facilities
(SNF).
5. People and their families will receive individual resource allocations which set limits on
the amount of public funds available for support.

39
40

Kaiser Family Foundation. “Trends in State Medicaid Funding”, KFF. April 2009.
National Association of State Budget Directors, “Fiscal State of the Nation – July 2008”, July 2008.

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STATE OF W ASHINGTON P ERSPECTIVE
The State of Washington Aging and Disabilities Administration / Division of Developmental
Disabilities (DDD) operate five (5) residential habilitation centers (RHC) with a current occupied
capacity of less than 1000 consumers. The DDD portion of the “Feasibility Study for the Closure
of State Institutional Facilities” calls for the examination of a 25% (250 beds) reduction in RHC
capacity. Historically, RHC reductions occurred through natural or planned attrition with the
exception of the closure of Interlake School in 1994. Current DDD practice is to provide respite
supports as bed vacancies occur. Several recent Executive and Legislative initiatives have
focused on the future use of RHC assets. DSHS has initiated extensive stakeholder discussions
resulting in the publication of “Division of Developmental Disabilities Strategic Plan 2004 –
2009” in August 200241 , “Strategies for the Future Long-Range Plan Report Phase 3: Final
Report” in December 200242, “DSHS Centers Alternative Analysis” in December 2003 43,
“Planning for the Future of DDD Residential Habilitation Centers” in 2003 44, “Preliminary
Transition Plan Planning for the Downsizing and Closure of Fircrest School: A State Residential
Habilitation Center” in January 200445 , “Aging and Disability Administration – Strategic Plan
2006 to 2011” in May 200446, and “Fircrest Excess Property Report - Land Use Options and
Recommendations” in January 200847 , and “Frequently Asked Questions Yakima Valley
Proposed Closure and Transfer of Residents” in February 200948. Subsequent legislative
discussions have included the proposed closure of Fircrest School in Seattle and Yakima Valley
School in Selah. Finally, DDD finds its caseload growth exceeding the state’s fiscal budget
capacity.
Statistically, of children born in Washington St ate, 1.6% are born with a developmental
disability. Only two-tenths of one percent (0.2%) of children aged 0-10 are assumed to
require state-paid waiver services 49. For special populations, trends will follow the
national experience with two significant differences. While the prevalence of people with
disabilities will remain at 1.58% of the general population, the mix of diagnoses is
changing. California State University, Sacramento, found that the national incidence of
people with autism and autism spectrum disorder (ASD) has mirrored California’s
experience. Autism in California has increased from 1999 to 2003 at a rate of 9.1% per
year, while the incident rate of people with mental retardation is decreasing at a rate of

41

Braddock, Dennis, “Division of Developmental Disabilities Strategic Plan 2004-2009 ”, Washington State Department of Social and Health
Services, August 2002.
42

Division of Developmental Disabilities, “Strategies for the Future Long-Range Plan Report Phase 3 – Final Report”, Washington State
Department of Social and Health Services, December 2002.
43
Heartland, “State of Washington Centers: Alternative Analysis”, Heartland Corporation, December 2003. NOTE: DSHS Building & Lands
Division provided additional comment and updated data regarding adjustments to the Heartland findings.
44
Division of Developmental Disabilities, “Planning for the Future of DDD Residential Habilitation Centers”, Washington State Department of
Social and Health Services, September 2003.
45

Aging and Disability Administration, “Preliminary Transition Plan Planning for the Downsizing and Closure of Fircrest School: A State
Residential Habilitation Center”, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, January 2004.
46

Aging and Disability Administration, “Strategic Plan 2006 -2011”, Washington State Department of Social & Health Services, May 2004.

47

Lands & Building Division and Aging and Disability Administration, “Fircrest Excess Property Report – Land Use Options and
Recommendations”, Department of Social and Health Services, January 2008 .
48
Rolfe, Linda, “Frequently Asked Questions: Yakima Valley School in Selah”, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services,
February 2009
49

Division of Developmental Disabilities, “Strategies for the Future Long-Range Plan Report – Phase 3”,
Department of Social and Health Services, December 2002.
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Page 3 .18

8.3% per year50. In addition to the changes in mix of diagnoses, two age groups are also
increasing significantly. Children at risk of developmental disabilities are predicted to
increase by 7.8% per year for the next five years. Likewise, adults and seniors in need of
long term care are projected to increase by 12.2% by 2013.51

Current RHC Status: Currently, RHCs consist of a mixture of 249 skilled nursing facility
(SNF) beds and 743 intermediate care facility / mental retardation beds for an overall total of 992
beds. Rainier and FHMC offer ICF/MR services only. Yakima Valley offers SNF services only.
Fircrest and Lakeland Village offer both ICF/MR and SNF services. An estimated 60 people
(15%) who currently reside at Rainier would otherwise qualify for SNF care should Rainier
provide it52 . Table #3 lists the number of people using each of the RHCs as of June 200953 and
the number of state staff employed as of June 200954. There were 2,726 full-time equivalent
(FTE) paid staff in June 2009. For this report, the types of staff are divided into direct care staff
(DCS), clinical staff (Clinical), administrative and program support staff (Admin & SS). FTE
counts are based upon June 2009 personnel payroll reports, and do not include overtime or
annual leave costs. For determination of current status, all RHC clinical and administrative /
support service staff levels are projected to remain constant. RHC direct care staff are projected
to increase based upon the increase in short-term emergency admissions.
Table #3: Distribution of consumers and staff by SNF and ICF/MR program

RHC

Consumer Data

Number & Type of Staff

Current
census

SNF
Beds

ICF/MR
Beds

Frances Haddon Morgan Center
Fircrest
Lakeland Village

55
210
238

0
89
58

55
121
180

Direct
Care
Staff
total
81.73
351.36
369.3

Rainier
Yakima Valley
TOTAL

387
102
992

0
102
249

387
0
743

740.92
138.81
1682.12

Clinical
total

Admin &
SS total

Current
Staff FTE
Total

20.03
123.65
117.74

37.35
133.2
92.93

139.11
608.21
579.97

172.68
49.47
483.57

241.33
55.83
560.64

1154.93
244.11
2726.33

RHC direct care staff ratios are expressed in two ways. For shift coverage, basic RHC staff ratios
are assumed to be 1 direct care staff per 4 people (1:4) during waking hours. Shift coverage for
short-term emergency direct care staff ratios are assumed to be 1 staff per 2.5 people (1:2.5). For
every bed that is converted from long-term care to emergent care, basic coverage direct care staff
is projected to increase by 0.3 FTE to1staff for 2.2 people. RHC staff ratios can also be described
as overall coverage. Overall direct care staff-to-resident ratios for each of the RHCs are included
50

Mickel, Amy and Stan Taylor, “Active Status Population Growth Analysis”, California State University, College
of Business Administration, Sacramento, California, 2008.
51
Manton, Kenneth, “Recent Declines in Chronic Disability in the Elderly U.S. Population: Risk Factors and
Future Dynamics”, Annual Review of Public Health, April 2008.
52
DDD, “Planning for the Future of DDD Residential Habilitation Centers”, Department of Social and Health
Services, September 2003.
53
Aging and Disability Services Administration, “DDD EMIS Report June 2009”, Department of Social and Health
Services, June 2009.
54
Personnel payroll record data from June 2009 from each RHC.
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Page 3 .19

in Table #4. As reference, larger numbers in staff ratios mean that there are more direct care staff
for each RHC resident.
Table #4: Overall current direct care staff ratio to RHC resident

Overall Direct Care Staff Ratio to RHC Resident
Number of Full-time DC staff (June 2009)
Number of RHC Residents (June 2009)
Overall DC Staff to RHC Resident ratio (# of staff to 1
person)

Fircrest

Yakima

FHMC

351.65
210

Rainier
740.92
387

Lakeland
369.3
238

138.81
102

81.73
55

1.67

1.91

1.55

1.36

1.49

In addition to the SNF and ICF/MR services, each RHC also provides planned respite and shortterm emergency residential supports. Table #5 lists the current (June 2009) and average historical
capacities for these services. Use of the RHCs increased significantly after FY 2006. Rainier and
Fircrest experienced increased respite admissions; people using respite service represented an
annual average of 10% of the RHC recipients. For select months, respite admissions reached a
maximum of almost 15% of people served by RHCs. Should these trends in respite use continue,
respite admissions will represent an estimated 30% of all people served by RHCs by 2020. All
RHCs will experience significant pressure to admit people for respite. Short-term emergency
admissions are generally more expensive than long-term admissions due to the need for
immediate crisis intervention and staff intensity.
Table #5: Historical RHC Respite and Emergency use (July 2000 to June 2009)

Average Respite / Emergency Use per Month
Average / month since 2000 (July 2000 to June 2009)
Average / month prior to 2006 (July 2000 to June 2006)
Average / month since 2006 (July 2006 to June 2009)
Percent of Current Bed Capacity v. last 3 year average
Maximum per month since 2006
Minimum per month since 2006

Fircrest

Rainier

Lakeland

Yakima

FHMC

10
4
21
10%

8
6
11
3%

4
3
6
3%

11
12
10
10%

4
4
3
5%

32
13

15
6

13
3

14
3

6
1

The RHC bed census has slowly decreased over time, and is directly related to the growth of the
community supported living (SL) program. While DSHS offers a wide range of service options
for people with disabilities such as Medicaid personal care, adult foster care, and family
supports, the complexity and nature of the needs of people currently residing in RHCs suggests
that intensive supported living services would be the primary community option for people
leaving RHCs. For projection purposes, the RHC bed census history is provided for January
2003 to June 2009, and projected forward to June 2019. RHC capacity includes respite and shortterm admissions. These projections assume no change in current funding policy and are
calculated using a linear regression formula as referenced in footnote 28.

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Page 3 .20

55

Table #6: Current and Projected RHC beds with no change in current policy
RHC
RHC
Percent
change

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009*

2014

2019

1,055

1,017

989

984

1,003

989

976

922

872

-

-3.6%

-2.8%

-0.5%

1.0%

-1.4%

-1.3%

-5.5%

-10.6%

*(Calendar year 2009 = January 2009 through June 2009)

Average per capita annual expenditures in the RHCs, however, will increase over time with no
change in current policy. Increases in RHC annual per capita costs are projected as the
percentage of short-term emergency admissions increases. Table #7 provides historical and
projected costs for the RHC programs. RHC expenditures are calculated from the June 2009
Aging and Disability EMIS report. RHC expenditures and caseload include costs related to
respite and short term admissions. Projections are calculated using a linear regression formula.28
56

Table #7: Current and Projected RHC per Capita Expenses with no change in current policy

RHC
RHC
Percent
Change

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009*

2014

2019

$399.15

$413.14

$435.73

$457.41

$490.76

$538.37

$543.22

$679.03

$810.76

-

3.5%

5.5%

5.0%

7.3%

9.9%

0.7%

18.4%

41.3%

*(Calendar year 2009 = January 2009 through June 2009)

Key Characteristics of People Currently Residing in the RHCs:
The study team examined various demographic and clinical data from DSHS which described
people currently residing at the RHCs57. Also, demographic studies from Illinois58, Indiana, and
Canada59, were reviewed. In brief, the study team found that because of their size, RHCs have a
large concentration of people with significant support needs. Similar people with significant
support needs are also well-served in community residential programs. Key to providing
successful care in both RHC and community settings is the presence of a highly individualized
person-centered support plan. There are two conditions, however, that will affect the future RHC
census.
First, many people have lived in the RHCs for a significant portion of their lives. A significant
percentage (49%) of these people was admitted as children under the age of 15 years, and have
lived in the RHCs for over 40 years. Attachment #1 provides descriptive statistics and scatter
gram charts of consumer age and length of stay. Table #8 presents a summary of that data.
55

Aging and Disability Services, “EMIS Report – June 2009”, Department of Social and Health Services, June
2009.
56

Linear regression formula: a+bx where
and
Kohlenburg, Elizabeth and B,Wang, R. Calhoun. “Community Institution Cost Comparison Example: RHC to
DDD Community Care”, Research & Data Analysis, Department of Social and Health Services, August 2004.
58
Braddock, David and R.Hemp. “Services and Funding for People with Developmental Disabilities in Illinois: A
Multi-State Comparison”, University of Colorado, Department of Psychiatry. May2008.
59
Lemay, Raymond. “Deinstitutionalization of People with Developmental Disabilities: A Review of the
Literature”, Canadian Journal of Community Mental Health volume 28.no.1, Spring 2009.
57

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Page 3 .21

Table #8: Age characteristic of people currently living in RHCs (does not include respite & short-term emergency admissions)

Age

Fircrest Rainier
0

Lakeland

YVS

FHMC

Grand Total

0

0

1

4

Under 15 years

3

16 – 21 years

19

0

0

2

8

29

22 – 45 years

49

65

54

35

46

249

46 – 64 years

106

243

140

49

2

540

65 years and older

28

71

34

2

0

135

Grand Total

205

379

228

88

57

957

Table #9 presents RHC length of stay data as of June 2009. Fircrest and FHMC have
proportionally more people who have been in the RHC for less than five years. Length of stay for
Lakeland and Fircrest is impacted by people transferring from Interlake. Those people show up
in the 10 – 20 year group; their time spent at Interlake is not considered in this analysis.
Table #9: Length of Stay (in Years) for people currently living in RHCs (does not include respite & short-term emergency)

Length of Stay
Under 5 years

Fircrest Rainier

Lakeland

YVS

FHMC

Grand Total

20

5

18

131

44

44

05 - 10 years

4

36

7

8

4

59

10 – 20 years

16

18

58

8

9

109

20 – 30 years

34

55

16

16

13

134

30 – 40 years

28

61

41

19

10

159

Over 40 years

79

166

88

32

0

365

Grand Total

205

380

230

88

54

957

Table #10 describes the age of admission to the RHC as of June 2009. People entered Rainier
and Lakeland at the youngest ages, and in general have longest length of stays. There is a strong
indication that the younger someone is admitted to an RHC, the longer their length of stay. Data
for Lakeland and Fircrest reflects the transfer of people from Interlake in 1993/1994. These
transfers were treated as new admissions and their age of admission to Interlake is not included.
Table #10: Age at Admission to RHC (does not include respite & short-term emergency)

Lakeland

YVS

FHMC

Grand Total

Under 5 years

Age at Admission

6

19

28

16

1

70

05 - 10 years

36

100

37

29

15

217

10 – 20 years

84

107

65

19

26

301

20 – 30 years

43

48

48

11

10

160

30 – 40 years

22

53

33

8

0

116

Over 40 years

14

53

19

5

2

93

Grand Total

205

380

230

88

54

957

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Fircrest Rainier

Page 3 .22

Capital assets:
As RHC’s continued to reduce the number of people served on a long-term basis, 20% of the
existing licensed beds have been closed. Table #11 compares the current RHC licensed bed
capacity with the June 2009 actual occupancy.
Table #11: Current Facility Capacities v. June 2009 occupancy
RHCs
Certified
beds
Current
Occupancy

Rainier

Fircrest

Lakeland

Yakima

FHMC

Total

450

298

305

128

56

1,237

387

210

238

102

55

992

Difference

63

78

67

26

1

245

While this table suggests that RHC consolidation may be feasible, the mix of SNF and ICF/MR
beds within each of the RHCs does not create sufficient capacity to close a facility. The
exception is FHMC. People living at FHMC could be accommodated at Fircrest and Rainier
School within existing capacity.

RHC DESCRIPTIONS
A description of each of the RHC’s is provided below. Information regarding the age, length of
stay, and age of admission for people living at each center is listed. Additionally, capital budget
and alternative land use study findings are presented. Finally, feedback from the various
stakeholder focus groups is outlined, and RHC legal concerns are included.
Frances Haddon Morgan Center:
Frances Haddon Morgan Center (FHMC) is located in Bremerton at the site of the former
Olympic Center. The capacity has remained constant at 56 beds since the early1980’s and the
occupancy has been 99% for the past six year period. FHMC was initially designed as a shortterm treatment center for children with autism under the age of 14 years. As the number of
children with autism increased statewide, alternative community resources were unable to keep
pace with the population growth and the 14 year-old age limit was removed. FHMC is certified
as an ICF/MR under Medicaid regulations. From the August 2009 RHC Consumer database for
FHMC, age and length of stay data is presented in the following table.
Table #12: Current age of people living at FHMC (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Davis Deshaies LLC

Age in Years
31.6
33.3
49.1
12.8

Page 3 .23

The oldest person is 49 years old and the youngest person is 12 years old. The average age of
people living at FHMC is 31.6 years old.
While FHMC is relatively small in comparison to the other RHCs, it provides on average 5% of
its capacity to people needing short term emergency supports. Length of stay and age of
admission data are presented in the following tables. The FHMC population generally divides
into two groups: people who have been at FHMC over 20 years and people who have resided at
the facility for less than 5 years.
Table #13: FHMC Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
30.1
35.1
49.7
1.0

The average age at admission for a person at FHMC was 15.6 years. The youngest person
admitted was 4 years old and the oldest was age 45.
Table #14: Age at Admission for people living at FHMC
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
15.6
15.1
45.2
4.8

FHMC maintains approximately 97,461 sq ft of building space and sits on 12.8 acres of land.
The campus includes three residential cottages, a lodge, and a main office building which makes
up approximately two thirds of the building space. In addition to FHMC, other state agencies
also use approximately 60% of the Main Building space for office and administrative purposes
unrelated to FHMC. All buildings appear to be in general good repair. Utility systems and
facility maintenance are scheduled for upgrades. Review of the 2009-2011 Omnibus
Preservation Capital Budget and Minor Works Capital Budget dated June 9, 2009, contains the
following requests:
Table #15: DSHS Capital Budget Plan – June 2009 (FHMC)

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Main Building Electrical Sub-Panel
Improvements
Site ADA Pedestrian Pathway
Burwell Cottage Kitchen Renovation
Exterior Recreational Equipment
Exterior Recreational Equipment
Exterior Recreational Improvement
Main Building HVAC Upgrades
Main Building Indoor Gymnasium Upgrade

Davis Deshaies LLC

2009 2011
$155,000

2011 2013
0

2013 –
2015
0

2015 –
2017
0

2017 2019
0

$215,000
0
$150,000
$150,000
$200,000
$270,000
$650,000

0
$750,000
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Page 3 .24

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Main Building Interior Upgrades
Main Building Window Replacement
Secondary Sewer Improvement
Main Building Sewer Improvements
Main Building Sewer Improvements
TOTAL

2009 2011
0
0
$100,000
$100,000
$100,000
$2,090,000

2011 2013
$535,000
$590,000
0
0
0
$1,875,000

2013 –
2015
0
0
0
0
0
0

2015 –
2017
0
0
0
0
0
0

2017 2019
0
0
0
0
0
0

The Heartland study of alternative uses for RHC capital assets assumes that DSHS would cease
all or part of operations at FMHC. The FHMC site is currently zoned as PS, Parks and Schools.
The Heartland study for FHMC presented three alternatives.
Heartland Study
Options

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Description
Alternative I assumes that FHMC ceases operations entirely at the Bremerton site and
people and staff are relocated elsewhere and the entire campus is sold “As-Is”. In this
instance, it is assumed that Main Building office space leased to other state agencies
would be vacated and these agencies relocated to different sites. Both the residential
portion of the campus (three cottages, lodge building and associated land) and the
administrative offices (main building) would be sold “as-is”. Heartland estimated the
probable net present value of all the Olympic Center properties at $1.1 million. The
cost of relocation of other state tenants was not considered in this estimate.
Alternative II also assumes that FHMC ceases operations at the Bremerton site and
that current tenants are relocated to different sites. In this alternative, existing
buildings are demolished and the property is sold as “raw land”. Heartland estimates a
probable net present value of $200,000.
Alternative III assumes that FHMC and all current tenants continue to operate at the
Olympic Center site, and that excess properties are sold. Heartland estimates the
probable net present value to be $1.2 million.

Focus group discussions with FHMC employees revealed a talented and dedicated staff.
Specifically, all staff interviewed and observed were well experienced and confident in their
support of people with significant behavior management needs and / or autism spectrum
disorders. Clinical and program support staff expressed a high degree of interest in transitioning
from a long-term facility-based residential program to a short-term crisis support model with
extensive home-based intervention teams. Staff identified a decentralized model of supports with
“autism clinical outstations” in Vancouver and the Pasco / Kennewick / Richland areas. Staff
also expressed interest in replacing the current FHMC cottages with state-operated supported
living programs operating in Vancouver, Olympia, and Pasco / Kennewick/Richland. FHMC
placement staff recommended that all but one person currently living at FHMC could
successfully live in intensive community supported living settings, with the presence of adequate
clinical supports and trained direct care staff.
Focus group discussions with families revealed a concerned and anxious group of parents
around the future plans for FHMC. Discussions focused on earlier attempts in 1997 to close
FHMC. Families expressed that the current community resources continue to be insufficient to
support their family members. Also parents expressed concerns that family members, especially
those with autism spectrum disorders, would not tolerate relocation well. Thirty-six (36) percent
of the families contacted by FHMC staff indicated an interest in community placement. Forty-

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3 .25

two (42) percent of families expressed strong objection to community placement, and twentytwo (22) percent indicated no interest in community placement at this time.
In terms of legal status, FHMC was under review by the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) at
the time of this study. To date, no findings or citations have been issued. Study team members
did not contact DOJ and have no opinion on the outcome of their investigation. Medicaid
ICF/MR certification was intact at the time of the study. A review of legal tort claims against
DSHS / FHMC revealed 10 cases filed from July 2000 to September 2009. Of these ten cases,
nine of them were tort claims by employees and one was a tort claim filed by a person living at
FHMC.

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Page 3 .26

Fircrest:
Fircrest is located in Shoreline on the site of the former U.S. Naval Hospital. The capacity has
declined since the early1980’s from 500 beds to 210 beds as of June 2009. Occupancy has been
95% for the past six year period. Fircrest was opened in 1957 and the first people to live there
were transferred from Rainier. Fircrest was the first RHC to replace ward buildings with smaller
14 bed cottages in the mid 1970’s. Medicaid decertification occurred in 1989 and was reestablished in 1990. Fircrest now operates under a dual certification. Approximately 30% of
Fircrest is certified as skilled nursing facility (SNF), and the remaining 70% of the beds are
certified under the ICF/MR requirements. Fircrest maintains strong relationships with the
University of Washington and clinical staff hold adjunct faculty appointments which allow them
to mentor medical, nursing, and psychology students. The SNF program at Fircrest was rated
“exceptional” by state and national nursing home consumer review associations at the time of
this study. Recently in the past two years, Fircrest has admitted children; a new and highly
unusual practice for RHCs. From the August 2009 RHC Consumer database for Fircrest, age and
length of stay data for both the SNF and ICF/MR are presented in the following tables.
Table #16: Current age of people living at Fircrest SNF (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
51.5
51.9
83.1
15.0

Table #17: Current age of people living at Fircrest ICF/MR (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
45.8
49.9
89.0
10.2

The oldest person currently residing at Fircrest SNF is 83 years old and the youngest person is
15years old. The average age of people living at Fircrest SNF is 51.5 years old. The oldest
person currently residing at Fircrest ICF/MR is 89 and the youngest person is 10 years old. The
average age of people living at Fircrest ICF/MR is 45.8 years old.
Fircrest provides on average 15% of its capacity to people needing short term emergency
supports. Length of stay and age of admission data are presented in the following tables. The
Fircrest ICF/MR population generally divides into two groups: people who have been at Fircrest
over 20 years and people who have resided at the facility for less than 5 years. It should be noted
that thirteen people currently residing in the SNF program transferred from Interlake School in
1994. Their length of stay data represents only their time at Fircrest.
The average length of stay at Fircrest is 33.8 years for people residing in the SNF program and
23.4 years for people residing in the ICF/MR program.
Table #18: Fircrest SNF Length of Stay

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Page 3 .27

Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
33.8
37.0
50.6
1.0

Table #19: Fircrest ICF/MR Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
24.4
29.2
50.6
0.1

The average age of admission for a person at Fircrest was 19.7 years. The youngest person
admitted was 2 years old and the oldest was age 65.
Table #20: Age at Admission for people living at Fircrest (SNF)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
17.7
13.8
61.4
2.3

Table #21: Age at Admission for people living at Fircrest (ICF)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
21.4
18.8
65.5
0.6

Fircrest maintains approximately 700,000 sq ft of building space and sits on 86.8 acres of land.
This land is shared with other tenants. The Fircrest campus includes 57 buildings. Primary
structures include two apartment complexes currently used for administrative and program
offices, six nursing home buildings, and ten residential cottages. In addition, other major
buildings include an activities / pool / gymnasium building, food services building, adult training
building, and other associated maintenance and commissary / warehouses. Long-term tenants
also using the land include Food Lifeline and the Department of Health Public Health
Laboratory. All buildings appear to be in general good repair and receive regular maintenance.
Utility systems and facility maintenance are scheduled for upgrades. Review of the 2009-2011
Omnibus Preservation Capital Budget and Minor Works Capital Budget dated June 9, 2009,
contains the following requests:

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3 .28

Table #22: DSHS Capital Budget Plan – June 2009 (Fircrest)

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Fircrest Campus Master Plan – Reappropriation
500 Building HVAC Controls Upgrade
500 Building Roof Replacement
Activity Building Pneumatic Control
Replacement
ADA Door Hardware
Boiler Controls Replacement
Duplexes Heat Exchanger Replacement
Duplexes Interior Finishes Replacement
Duplexes Window Replacement
Duplexes Air Handling Unit Replacement
Site Electrical Feeder Replacement
Site Steam Condensate Lines Replacement
Steam Plant Economizer Replacement
Y Buildings Air Conditioning
Y Building Electrical Upgrades
Y Building Interior Finish Replacement
Y Building Window Replacement
TOTAL

2009 2011

2011 2013
0
$65,000
0
$115,000

2013 –
2015
0
0
0
0

2015 –
2017
0
0
0
0

2017 2019
0
0
0
0

0
0
$115,000
0
0
$380,000
0
0
0
$795,000
0
$125,000
$225,000
$900,000
0
0
0
$2,540,000

$145,000
0
$685,000
$610,000
$755,000
0
$610,000
0
0
0
$910,000
$400,000
$850,000
$5,145,000

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

The Heartland study of alternative uses for RHC capital assets assumes that DSHS would cease
all operations at Fircrest. No alternative use is presented by Heartland that continues DSHS
operations of Fircrest. The Fircrest site is currently zoned as R-6 Residential 6DU/Acre. The
campus is divided between two public agencies; part of the land (36 acres) is owned by DSHS
and part of the campus (51 acres) is managed by Department of Natural Resources and is subject
to the conditions of the Charitable Education Penal and Reformatory Institutions Trust. DSHS
holds a 55 year lease on the DNR property. The Heartland study of Fircrest presented four
alternatives.

Heartland Study
Options

Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Davis Deshaies LLC

Description
Alternative I involves the partial sale / partial lease of the property. This option
assumes that Fircrest ceases operations entirely at the Shoreline site and people and
staff are relocated elsewhere. In this instance, it is assumed that 26 acres of land
owned by DSHS would be sold “As-Is”. The remaining DSHS and DNR land and
buildings would be converted to long-term ground leases. Heartland estimated the
probable net present value of the Fircrest properties at $12.4 million in 2003. The cost
of relocation of other state tenants was not considered in this estimate.
Alternative II also assumes that Fircrest ceases operations at the Shoreline site and
that people and staff are relocated elsewhere. This alternative is similar to Alternative
I with the exception that all buildings would be demolished and DNR land would be
converted to long-term leases and the DSHS land sold for development. This option
provides DSHS with on-going lease revenue from the DNR property and one-time sale
of land income from the DSHS property. Heartland estimates a probable net present
value of $14.2 million in 2003.
Alternative III assumes that Fircrest ceases operations at the Shoreline site and that
people and staff are relocated elsewhere. In this alternative, all buildings are
demolished. DSHS-owned property and DNR property are converted to income
producing uses. Heartland estimates the probable net present value to be $4.0 mil.

Page 3 .29

Heartland Study
Options
Alternative IV

Description
Alternative IV assumes that Fircrest ceases operations at the Shoreline site and that
people and staff are relocated elsewhere. In this alternative, all buildings are
demolished and DNR land is transferred to DSHS and all property is sold. This
alternative provides the highest net cash revenue to the state. Heartland estimates a
probable net present value of $15.7 million.

Focus group discussions with Fircrest employees revealed a clinical and program support staff
with exceptional skills recognized both within the state and nationally. The relationship to the
University of Washington and the Seattle metropolitan area has allowed Fircrest to recruit and
retain staff with medical, dental, nursing, behavioral, communications, and therapeutic expertise.
In discussions with regional and county staff, Fircrest clinical supports were sought to address a
variety of community support needs. Until recently, Fircrest provided clinical outreach supports
to the western Washington area. This practice was recently discontinued due to financial
considerations.
Fircrest clinical and program staff expressed a high degree of interest in transitioning from a
long-term ICF/MR residential program to a short-term crisis support model with emergent care
beds and community outreach teams. Staff also expressed interest in replacing the current oncampus cottages with state-operated supported living programs operating in Seattle, Everett, and
Bellingham.
Fircrest staff expressed concern about their recent experience with placements into community
SNF programs, and felt that future placement efforts would require substantially more planning
and support. Fircrest placement staff recommended that 28% of the people currently living in
Fircrest could be referred for community placement, while only fourteen parents indicated
interest in placement. In 2004, Fircrest conducted extensive and often painful placement
planning with people and families who were resistant to moving. As such, Fircrest has developed
individualized plans in anticipation of closure. However, staff report that individual and family
resolve has stiffened since the 2004 placement initiative.
Focus group discussions with families revealed a concerned and anxious group of parents
around the future plans for Fircrest similar to the other RHC parent groups. Discussions focused
on earlier attempts in 2004 to close Fircrest. Families expressed that the current community
resources continue to be insufficient to support their family members. Also parents expressed
concerns that family members, especially those with serious medical and health conditions,
would not tolerate relocation well. Parents presented information on ten people who recently
moved from Fircrest and died or experienced serious health setbacks. Parents sited this
information as an example of their concerns.
In terms of legal status, Fircrest was not under review by any state or federal agency at the time
of this study, and to date, no findings or citations are outstanding. Medicaid ICF/MR and SNF
certifications were intact at the time of the study. A review of legal tort claims against DSHS /
Fircrest revealed 21 cases filed from July 2000 to September 2009. Of these twenty-one cases,
eleven of them were tort claims by employees and eight were tort claims filed by people living at
Fircrest. Two cases involve claims by citizens who neither work nor live at Fircrest.

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3 .30

Lakeland:
Lakeland Village is located outside of Medical Lake and adjacent to Eastern State Hospital. The
current capacity is 238 and has been gradually decreasing since 1980. In 1994, a number of
people transferred to Lakeland Village as a result of the closure of Interlake School. The
occupancy of Lakeland has been 93% for the past six year period. Prior to the arrival of people
from Interlake, Lakeland supported people with significant daily living support needs. Shortly
after 1994, Lakeland was divided into SNF and ICF/MR programs. These programs were
continuing at the time of the study. Lakeland also has recently provided emergency and short
term admissions especially for people with co-existing conditions of mental illness and
disability. As these emergency admissions occur, however, they require that direct care staff be
redirected from existing duties. From the August 2009 RHC Consumer database for Lakeland
Village, age and length of stay data is presented in the following table.
Table #23: Current age of people living at Lakeland SNF (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
51.4
50.0
83.2
21.5

The oldest person receiving SNF supports at Lakeland is 83 years old and the youngest person is
21 years old. The average age of people is 51.4 years old.
Table #24: Current age of people living at Lakeland ICF/MR (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
53.0
53.0
82.4
24.9

The oldest person receiving ICF/MR supports at Lakeland is 82 years old and the youngest
person is 24 years old. The average age of people is 53.0 years old. Lakeland Village provides on
average 3% of its capacity to people needing short term emergency supports. Length of stay and
age of admission data are presented in the following tables. The Lakeland Village population
reflects the transfer of people from Interlake School in 1994. Almost all people receiving SNF
services at Lakeland have been in a Washington State RHC for over 30 years.
Table #25: Lakeland SNF Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Davis Deshaies LLC

Length of Stay in Years
25.9
15.5
76.0
1.3

Page 3 .31

Table #26: Lakeland ICF/MR Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
37.9
38.3
72.7
0.4

The average age of admission for a person at Lakeland was 19.7 years old. The youngest person
admitted was 10 months old and the oldest was age 63.
Table #27: Age at Admission for people living at Lakeland (SNF)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
25.5
27.2
55.0
2.1

Table #28: Age at Admission for people living at Lakeland (ICF)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
15.6
15.1
45.2
4.8

Lakeland maintains approximately 493,000 sq ft of building space and sits on 636 acres of land
located in or adjacent to Medical Lake. The campus includes residential cottages, training and
health care facilities, and administrative and program offices. Lakeland also maintains south
campus apartments which are used for non-program purposes. Lakeland shares services with
Eastern State Hospital through the Consolidated Support Services program. All buildings appear
to be in general good repair. Utility systems and facility maintenance are scheduled for upgrades.
Review of the 2009-2011 Omnibus Preservation Capital Budget and Minor Works Capital
Budget dated June 9, 2009, contains the following requests:
Table #29: DSHS Capital Budget Plan – June 2009 (Lakeland Village)

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Bath House and Outdoor Pool Upgrades
Carpenter / Paint Shop Roof Replacement
Elevator & Electrical Improvements
Five Cottages Roof Replacement
Food Svc. & Gym Foundation Waterproofing
Food Services HVAC Replacement
Habilitation Ctr. Roof Replacement
Main Kitchen New Blast Chiller

Davis Deshaies LLC

2009 2011
0
0
$395,000
$390,000
0
$450,000
$420,000
$75,000

2011 2013
$370,000
$90,000
0
0
$200,000
0
0
0

2013 –
2015

2015 –
2017
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2017 2019
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Page 3 .32

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project

2009 2011

Mason Building HVAC Replacement
Pavement Replacement – Phase 1
Pavement Replacement - Phase 2
Pavement Replacement – Phase 3
Pavement Replacement – Phase 4
Sewer Lagoon Sludge Removal
Site Irrigation Improvements
Site Sidewalk Repairs
TOTAL

0
$780,000
0
0
0
$265,000
0
$100,000
$2,875,000

2011 2013
$945,000
0
$485,000
0
0
0
$780,000
0
$2,870,000

2013 –
2015

2015 –
2017

0
0
0
$680,000
0
0
0
0
$680,000

0
0
0
0
$520,000
0
0
0
$520,000

2017 2019
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

The Heartland study of alternative uses for RHC capital assets assumes that DSHS would cease
all or part of operations at Lakeland. Most of the Lakeland site is currently zoned as Institutional
with 228 acres zoned as Rural Conservation. The Heartland study of alternative uses for
Lakeland presented three alternatives.
Heartland
Study
Options
Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Description
Alternative I assumes that Lakeland ceases operations entirely at the Medical Lake
site and people and staff are relocated elsewhere and the entire campus is sold “AsIs”. In this instance, it is assumed that all buildings would remain and be sold “as-is”.
Heartland estimated the probable net present value of all Lakeland properties at
$1.2 million.
Alternative II also assumes that Lakeland ceases operations at the Medical Lake site
and that people and staff are relocated elsewhere. In this alternative, existing
buildings are demolished and the property is sold as “raw land”. Heartland
estimates the probable net present value to be (-$697,000). The cost of building
demolition exceeds the value of the land.
Alternative III assumes that Lakeland continues to operate at the Medical Lake site,
and that excess properties not related to the program service delivery are sold.
Heartland estimates the probable net present value to be $2.27 million.

Focus group discussion with Lakeland employees revealed dedicated and experienced staff.
Specifically, all staff interviewed and observed were well trained and confident in their support
of people with significant behavioral and health needs. Staff were especially proud of the quality
of Lakeland’s SNF program. Regional staff also stated that Lakeland provides critical backup
and emergency support for people leaving Eastern State Hospital. Clinical and program support
staff expressed the belief that long-term residential services were scarce in eastern Washington
and that Lakeland would continue to be a viable option for many families living in small rural
communities which lacked community residential supports.
Staff expressed an interest in expanding Lakeland’s short-term crisis support model. Staff also
expressed interest in replacing some of Lakeland’s current cottages with state-operated supported
living programs operating in Wenatchee and other parts of eastern Washington. Lakeland
placement staff recommended that 18% of the people currently living at Lakeland could
successfully live in intensive community supported living settings, with the presence of adequate
clinical supports and trained direct care staff.

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3 .33

Focus group discussions with families provided comments similar to those offered by other
RHC parent groups. Because people currently living at Lakeland have been there a long time and
entered when they were young, parents shared their concerns that the trauma of moving would be
substantial. Like other places, RHC families expressed that the current community resources
continue to be insufficient to support their family members. Also parents expressed concerns that
family members, especially people who are older would not tolerate relocation well. Only one
family member contacted by Lakeland staff indicated an interest in community placement.
In terms of legal status, Lakeland was not under review by any state or federal agency at the
time of this study, and to date, no findings or citations are outstanding. Medicaid ICF/MR and
SNF certifications were intact at the time of the study. A review of legal tort claims against
DSHS / Lakeland revealed 6 cases filed from July 2000 to September 2009. Of these six cases,
four of them were tort claims by employees and two were tort claims filed by people living at
Lakeland.

Davis Deshaies LLC

Page 3 .34

Rainier:
Rainier is located in Buckley at the base of Mount Rainier. The capacity has decreased from
approximately 1,000 beds since the early1960’s to its current capacity of 386 beds. Occupancy
has been 94% for the past six year period. Rainier together with Lakeland Village were the first
state facilities for people with developmental disabilities and served as the foundation for later
creation of Fircrest, FHMC, and Yakima Valley. Rainier went through a significant rebuilding
effort in the late 1970s / early 1980s and as a result reduced their capacity to 500 beds as part of
a comprehensive community placement effort. Further reductions in Rainier have occurred over
time. Rainier is currently certified as an ICF/MR. During the mid 1980’s, Rainier faced
decertification sanctions from Medicaid. At present, the federal Department of Justice is
conducting ongoing investigations of Rainier. From the August 2009 RHC Consumer database
for Rainier, age and length of stay data is presented in the following table.
Table #30: Current age of people living at Rainier (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
54.5
55.7
91.0
21.7

The oldest person is 91 years old and the youngest person is 21 years old. The average age of
people living at Rainier is 54.5 years old.
Rainier provides on average 3% of its capacity to people needing short term emergency supports.
Length of stay and age of admission data are presented in the following charts. The Rainier
population generally divides into two groups: people who have been at Rainier over 30 years and
people who have resided at the facility for less than 5 years. The average length of stay at Rainier
is 33.3 years
Table #31: Rainier Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
33.3
36.2
69.9
0.1

The average age of admission for a person at Rainier was 21.3 years. The youngest person
admitted was 6 months old and the oldest was age 65. A significant number of people entered
Rainier as children.
Table #32: Age at Admission for people living at Rainier
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Davis Deshaies LLC

Age of Admission in Years
21.3
15.7
65.5
0.6

Page 3 .35

Rainier maintains approximately 867,890 sq ft of building space and sits on 1,109 acres of land.
The campus includes 68 buildings including residential cottages, activities and program support
facilities, and administrative and maintenance buildings. All buildings appear to be in general
good repair. Utility systems and facility maintenance are scheduled for upgrades. Review of the
2009-2011 Omnibus Preservation Capital Budget and Minor Works Capital Budget dated June 9,
2009, contains the following requests:
Table #33: DSHS Capital Budget Plan – June 2009 (Rainier)

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Building 2010 & RHC Door Replacements
Building 2010 Transformer Replacement
Central Kitchen HVAC Replacement
Condensate Pump Replacements
Cottages Fire System Backflow Protection
Domestic Water Line Replace. -Phase 1
Domestic Water Line Replace. - Phase 2
Drainage Repair
Electrical Transfer Switch Replacements
Flooring Covering Replacement
Gym Drain Replacements
High Voltage Feeder Cable Replacement Phase 4
High Voltage Feeder Cable Replacement Phase 5
Hot Water Heater Replacements
HVAC Unit Replacements
Kitchen & RHC Chiller Unit Replacement
Kitchen Fleet Dishwasher Replacement
Kitchen Pots & Pan Washer
Kitchen Quarry Tile Flooring Replacement
Laundry Door & Window Replacement
Laundry Equipment Replacement
Laundry Lint Collection & Dryer
Laundry Mechanical System Repairs
Laundry Roof Replacement
Living Units Floor Covering Replacement
Living Units Resident Bathrooms Repair
Living Units Window Replacements
Motor Pool Building Renovation
Power House Air Compressor Replace.
Power House Equipment Replacements
Power House Smoke Stack Removal
Quinault Court Two Resident Bldg. Repair
Ray Peel Building Renovation
Siding Replacement
Site Covered Walkway Roof Repairs
Site Domestic Water Line Replacement
Site Domestic Water Supply System
Renovation
Site Energy Management System Upgrade
Site Exterior Lighting Upgrade
Site Exterior Walkway Canopy Repair
Site High Voltage Feeder Cable Replace.

Davis Deshaies LLC

2009 2011
$85,000
$85,000
0
$100,000
$250,000
0
0
$280,000
0
0
0
0

2011 2013

0
0
0

2017 2019
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
$325,000
0
0
$725,000
0
0
$225,000
$250,000
$75,000
$300,000

0
0
0
0
0
0
$800,000
0
0
0
0
0

0

0

$275,000

0

0

$150,000
0
0
$120,000
$50,000
0
0
$155,000
$155,000
0
$240,000
$200,000
$280,000
$150,000
0
$40,000
$45,000
0
0
0
0
$130,000
$850,000
$50,000

0
$175,000
$135,000
0
0
$80,000
$65,000
0
0
$90,000
0
0
0
0
$400,000
0
0
$150,000
$890,000
$500,000
$100,000
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$200,000
0
0
$500,000

0
$70,000
$70,000
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

2013 – 2015

2015 –
2017
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Page 3 .36

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
2009 2011

Project
Site Pavement Repairs
Site Power House Air Compressor
Replacements
Site Powerhouse Underground Fuel Tank
Replacement
Site Well #5 Relocation
Storm Drainage System Upgrade
Superintendent's House Renovation
Swimming Pool Roof Replacement
Various Buildings Staff Duress System
Various: Electrical Panels Replacement
Various: Roof Replacements
Waste Water Treatment Plant
Decommission
Water Reservoir Electrical Cable
Replacement
Water Reservoir Electrical Upgrade
TOTAL

0
0

2011 2013
$150,000
$40,000

0
0

2015 –
2017
0
0

2017 2019
0
0

$250,000

0

0

0

0

$250,000
$175,000
0
0
$500,000
0
0
$70,000

0
0
$225,000
$185,000
0
$120,000
$250,000
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

$30,000

0

0

0

0

0
$5,390,000

$25,000
$5,620,000

0
$1,075,000.00

0
0

0
0

2013 – 2015

The Heartland study of alternative uses for RHC capital assets assumes that DSHS would cease
all or part of operations at Rainier. The programmatic portion of the Rainier site is currently
zoned as Public. The Heartland study of alternative uses for Rainier presented three alternatives.
Heartland Study
Options
Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Description
Alternative I assumes that Rainier ceases operations entirely at the Buckley site and
people and staff are relocated elsewhere and the entire campus is sold “As-Is”. In
this instance, it is assumed that all buildings would be vacated and sold “as-is”.
Heartland estimated the probable net present value of the all Rainier properties at
$2.0 million.
Alternative II also assumes that Rainier ceases operations at the Buckley site and
that people and staff are relocated to different sites. In this alternative, existing
buildings are demolished and the property is sold as “raw land”. Heartland
estimates the probable net present value to be (-$0.2 million). The costs of
demolition exceed the value of the land.
Alternative III assumes that Rainier continues to remain in operation as is. Excess
land would be sold. Heartland estimates a probable net present value of $6.8
million.

Focus group discussion with Rainier employees revealed a veteran staff who had established
valued long-term relationships with the people living at Rainier. All staff interviewed and
observed were well experienced and confident in their support of people with significant
behavior management needs and / or co-existing mental health conditions. Clinical and program
support staff expressed a high degree of interest of expanding their short-term crisis supports
with extensive home-based intervention teams. Staff identified various decentralized models of
extended supports to community providers supporting people with significant behavior
conditions and / or who presented community risks. Also staff expressed a desire to provide
backup support to SOLA staff. Rainier placement staff recommended that 47% of people
currently living at Rainier could successfully live in intensive community supported living
settings, with the presence of adequate clinical supports and trained direct care staff.

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Focus group discussions with families revealed a group of parents who were highly supportive
of Rainier. For many families of older people who were admitted during the 1950’s and 1960’s,
Rainier presented the only viable option of services at their time of need. Rainier families
expressed concern that people who had not faced their choices may not understand their support
for Rainier. Families reminded the study team the beginnings of the community movement in
Washington began at Rainier with the creation of ARC and the group home program.
Discussions focused also on the need to provide short term emergency support for people in
transition between homes and families. Similar to families at other RHCs, families at Rainier
expressed that the current community resources continue to be insufficient to support their
family members. Also parents expressed concerns that family members, especially those who
had lived at the RHC in excess of 30 years, would not tolerate relocation well. Three (3) percent
of the families contacted by Rainier staff indicated an interest in community placement. Ninetyfive (95) percent of families expressed strong objection to community placement, and two (2)
percent indicated no interest in community placement at this time.
In terms of legal status, Rainier was under review by the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) at
the time of this study. To date, no findings or citations have been issued. Study team members
did not contact DOJ and have no opinion on the outcome of their investigation. Medicaid
ICF/MR certification was intact at the time of the study. A review of legal tort claims against
DSHS / Rainier revealed 33 cases filed from July 2000 to September 2009. Of these thirty-three
cases, twenty-seven of them were tort claims by employees and five were tort claims filed by
people living at Rainier. One tort claim was filed by a person who neither lived nor worked at
Rainier.

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Yakima Valley:
Yakima Valley is located in the city of Selah at the site of a former tuberculosis hospital. The
capacity has decreased from 150 beds in the early1980’s to its current capacity of 102 beds.
Occupancy has been 99% for the past six year period. Yakima has always been designed to
support people with complex health conditions. Many of the people who initially moved to
Yakima in the early 1960’s continue to live at the facility. In the mid 1980’s, residential cottages
were constructed on the campus. Prior to that time, people resided in the five-story hospital
building. In the early 2000’s, short-term emergency beds were funded at Yakima. From the
August 2009 RHC Consumer database for Yakima, age and length of stay data is presented in
the following table.
Table #34: Current age of people living at Yakima Valley (as of September 2009)
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age
Median Age
Oldest Age
Youngest Age

Age in Years
45.2
45.8
80.4
16.4

The oldest person is 80 years old and the youngest person is 16 years old. The average age of
people living at Yakima Valley is 45.2 years old.
Yakima provides on average 10% of its capacity to people needing short term emergency
supports. Length of stay and age of admission data are presented in the following charts. The
Yakima population generally divides into two groups: people who have been at Yakima
approximately 40 years and people who have resided at the facility for less than 20 years. The
average length of stay at Yakima Valley is 30.1 years.
Table #35: Yakima Valley Length of Stay
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Length of Stay
Median Length of Stay
Longest Length of Stay
Shortest Length of Stay

Length of Stay in Years
30.1
35.1
49.7
1.0

The average age of admission for a person at Yakima Valley was 15.1 years. The youngest
person admitted was 1 years old and the oldest was age 65.
Table #36: Age at Admission for people living at Yakima Valley
Statistical Measure
Mean Average Age at Admission
Median Age at Admission
Oldest Age at Admission
Youngest Age at Admission

Age of Admission in Years
15.1
9.6
65.1
1.1

Yakima Valley maintains approximately 144,860 sq ft of building space and sits on 30 acres of
land. The campus consists of twelve buildings including seven residential cottages, several
program and support buildings, and the original main office building. All buildings appear to be
in general good repair. Utility systems and facility maintenance are scheduled for upgrades.
Review of the 2009-2011 Omnibus Preservation Capital Budget and Minor Works Capital
Budget dated June 9, 2009, contains the following requests:

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Table #37: DSHS Capital Budget Plan – June 2009 (Yakima Valley)

DSHS Capital Budget Plan
Project
Main Building Elevator Refurbishing
Basement Refrigerator/Freezer Replacement
Campus Road & Cul-de-Sac Improvements
Cottages - New Wardrobe Units in Bedrooms
Cottages Porches and Steps Repair
Kitchen Freight Elevator Decommissioning
Laundry Room Renovations and Upgrade
Main Bldg. Front Entrance Walkway Repairs
Main Building Coffee Bar & Cafeteria
Maintenance Shop/Storage Bldg. Replacement
New Recreation Pavilion & Landscaping
Parking Upgrades
Patio Canopy Replacement
Seven Cottages Fire Alarm System Upgrades
Cottages Exterior Door & Window Replacement
TOTAL

2009 2011
$65,000
0
$300,000
0
$45,000
$40,000
0
$65,000
$175,000
0
0
$250,000
0
$200,000
$155,000
$1,295,000

2011 2013
0
$250,000
0
$115,000
0
0
$910,000
0
0
$750,000
$750,000
0
$150,000
0
0
$2,925,000

2013 –
2015
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2015 –
2017
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2017 2019
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

The Heartland study of alternative uses for RHC capital assets assumes that DSHS would cease
all or part of operations at Yakima Valley. The Yakima site is currently zoned as One-Family
Residential. The Heartland study of alternative uses for Yakima presented three alternatives.
Heartland Study
Options
Alternative I

Alternative II

Alternative III

Description
Alternative I assumes that Yakima ceases operations entirely at the Selah site and
people and staff are relocated elsewhere and the entire campus is sold “As-Is”. All
buildings would be vacated and the property would be sold “as-is”. Heartland
estimated the probable net present value of the Yakima Valley properties at $0.5
million.
Alternative II also assumes that Yakima ceases operations at the Selah site and that
people and staff are relocated to different sites. In this alternative, existing buildings
are demolished and the property is sold as “raw land”. Heartland estimates a
probably net present value of $200,000.
Alternative III assumes that Yakima Valley continues to operate at the Selah site,
and that excess properties are sold. Heartland estimates the probable net present
value to be $0.5 million.

Focus group discussion with Yakima employees revealed an energized and enthusiastic staff.
Specifically all staff interviewed and observed were well experienced and confident in their
support of people with complex health care needs. Yakima Valley most recently (April 2009)
had been the subject of a legislative debate to close the facility, which eventually contributed to
this feasibility study. As such, much of the focus group discussion involved a review of that
decision. Clinical and program support staff expressed interest in transitioning from a long-term
facility-based residential program to a short-term crisis support model with extensive homebased intervention teams. Staff identified a decentralized model of supports with clinical
outstations in the Richland area and other parts of eastern Washington. Staff also expressed
interest in opening state-operated supported living programs operating in
Pasco/Kennewick/Richland and the Yakima valley area. No people were recommended by

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Yakima placement staff for private community supported living settings, regardless of the
amount of clinical supports and trained direct care staff.
Focus group discussions with families revealed an angry and determined group of parents
around the future plans for Yakima. Discussions focused on recent attempts in the last legislative
session to close Yakima. Many families had visited the community SNF programs which were
recommended, and these families expressed that the current community resources continue to be
insufficient to support their family members. Also parents expressed concerns that family
members, especially those with complex health care needs, would not tolerate relocation well.
No families contacted by Yakima staff indicated an interest in community placement, and all
families expressed strong objection to community placement at this time.
In terms of legal status, Yakima was not under review by any state or federal agency at the time
of this study, and to date, no findings or citations are outstanding. Medicaid ICF/MR and SNF
certifications were intact at the time of the study. A review of legal tort claims against DSHS /
Yakima revealed 3 cases filed from July 2000 to September 2009. Of these three cases, two of
them were tort claims by employees and one tort claim was filed by a person living at Yakima.

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STAKEHOLDER AND S URVEY COMMENTS
Both in person and written input was solicited from stakeholders with the goal of understanding
each perspective, the positives and concerns, and any suggested approaches to meeting the
legislative proviso. In total, input was received from about 1,000 individuals in these ways:
 28 focus groups were held at the 5 RHC’s with groups of parents, guardians and staff,
and interviews were held with some consumers at each RHC. Since closing beds has
great impact on these groups, the face-to-face meetings focused on understanding and
respecting various perspectives and concerns.
 One statewide advocate forum was held with 73 individuals attending from around the
state, and an open microphone for individuals to express their opinions.
 One statewide county board forum was held and attended by 21 people.
 One statewide meeting was held with approximately 30 community residential providers.
 Four meetings with legislators and local community officials were held.
 A survey was provided in three formats: web-based, electronic and paper for interested
family, consumers, guardians, community leaders, advocates or interested people that
were not part of the other meetings. To date, 697 individuals have responded to the
survey.
o This survey was made widely available through the DDD mailing list to the
RHC’s and advocate groups; however, it was not designed to capture a
statistically valid sample of individuals. The data is being used in conjunction
with information gathered in the other discussions and meetings to capture all
perspectives, concerns and options.
The number of survey responses are listed in the following table:
Table #38: Number of Survey Stakeholder respondents by Role (unduplicated count)
Role of Respondent
Person receiving services from an RHC
Person receiving DD service but not from an RHC
Family member or guardian of person
Guardian (non-family) of a person
RHC direct care staff
RHC clinical staff
RHC administrative and support staff
DSHS / DDD Regional staff
Interested person – Advocate / Provider / Community leader
Other
TOTAL

Number of
Respondents
5
3
220
9
89
58
113
56
137
7
697

Specific comments and findings from electronic survey responses are contained in Attachment
#2 – Stakeholder Survey Findings. In summary, there were six key findings from the combined
stakeholder input:

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1. Parents and family members of people currently residing in RHCs strongly objected to
community placement. Strongest feelings were from parents of people who had lived in
the RHC for over 30 years. Sixty (75) percent of all RHC family members responding to
the survey expressed strong resistance to community placement. Family focus groups
expressed similar comments at all RHCs. Primary concerns included past history of failed
placement, staff turn-over, and a lack of provider stability and clinical expertise
2. Families and consumers currently using RHCs for long and short term care rated their
experiences at the RHC very positively on 10 of 12 measures including safety, services,
staff, and activities. Family focus groups also confirmed their satisfaction with current
services.
3. For families and advocates who were not using RHC services, the majority responded
that RHCs should be closed by 10 years from now.
 For parents/consumers not using RHC’s, 55% indicated RHC’s would be replaced
by community providers; and an additional 15% selected replacing RHC’s with
other options like SOLA’s or having RHC’s provide only emergency, respite or
clinical outreach services.
 For advocates, 46% indicated RHC’s would be replaced by community providers;
and an additional 35% selected replacing RHC’s with other options like SOLA’s
or having RHC’s provide only emergency, respite or clinical outreach services.
4. For families of young children or staff who were providing supports to family members,
25% of the focus group respondents indicated that the RHCs should be retained until
additional community resources became available. These families expressed concern that
RHC resources would be eliminated without an increase in other viable alternatives.
5. DSHS regional staff indicated that RHCs provided invaluable short-term and emergency
supports which were otherwise unavailable. In the survey, 54% of regional staff indicated
that closure of RHC beds will negatively affect their work by removing a critical part of
the DD safety network.
6. From the focus group discussions, 87% of RHC program support and clinical staff
indicated that RHC future services should focus on providing clinical outreach and
behavioral and health emergency response supports.
7. From the focus group discussions, 93% of the RHC direct care staff indicated an interest
in continuing to provide supports in a state-operated community-based program. From
the survey, the majority of current RHC staff indicated that if their RHC closed they
would prefer employment in state-operated programs or other RHCs.

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Study Findings:
During the stakeholder process and review of previous studies and information, a variety of
viable and thoughtful options and approaches were presented. In addition, the diversity and
passion of opinion about the future of the RHC’s was extremely evident. Conversations with
people, families, staff, and advocates were candid and honest, and it is evident that there exist
strong differences in positions regarding the future of the RHCs. It is evident that there is not a
consensus of thought within the stakeholder community. It is also evident that the current RHC
environment cannot continue to exist in its current form without significant consequences. The
following findings from the study review and stakeholder process are listed.
1. Short-term emergency residential service provided by an RHC on campus has the single
highest per capita cost of any DDD service. There is, however, significant support from
all sectors: families, RHC staff, DD Regional staff and advocates, to maintain respite and
emergency placement capacity at the RHC’s as well as providing other specialized
supports to people living in the community.
2. The community service system currently lacks adequate respite and emergency / crisis
residential capacity. Regional case managers, people and families, and community
providers heavily depend on RHCs for crisis residential back-up support because of a
lack of existing community options. Increased community respite services are imperative
to support people and families in their own homes and deter future admissions to RHCs.
Without these respite resources, RHCs will experience continued pressure to admit
people as the only option.
3. A significant number of people currently residing in RHCs were admitted at young ages
and have lived at the facilities in excess of thirty years. Leaving the RHCs for these
people is difficult. Recently in the past two years, RHCs have been admitting children
because community alternatives have not been available. This practice has the potential
to create a new generation of long-term RHC residents.
4. At this time, RHCs are the only agencies that have a zero reject policy and are required to
accept admissions from the DD regions. This policy means that RHCs cannot reject
regional referrals; private providers however may reject a DD regional referral. The zero
reject policy was especially important to the DD regions who described difficulty finding
emergency admission for people with complex needs. For private providers to extend
zero reject supports, current contracts and reimbursement systems will need to be
restructured.
5. Regional case managers and community providers depend on RHCs for back-up support;
the amount and availability of current community resources appears insufficient to meet
emerging need.
6. Clinical and program expertise is concentrated at the RHCS and generally not available
to people and families in need in the community.
7. The current supported living provider net work lacks sufficient capacity and financing to
accommodate people moving from the RHCs.
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8. Based upon individual and family interviews, a significant number of people have lived
in the RHCs for a majority of their life-time and are wanting to age-in-place at the RHCs.
9. A significant number of stakeholders felt that RHCs of the future should become clinical
support centers with short-term emergency residential capacity and a decentralized
network of state-operated community homes.
10. Washington’s HCBS Waiver can be expanded to cover Clinical Support Centers and
State-operated Community Nursing Facilities
11. Washington has an over-reliance on Residential Habilitation Centers. Washington
continues to have a higher ratio of RHC beds per 100,000 citizens than the national
average.
12. Washington allocates comparatively limited resources for community residential supports
in comparison with other states, and currently ranks 36 th nationally in 2008.60
13. There is firm and significant resistance from current RHC families to move out of the
RHC setting. Based on survey responses, safety, 24 hour supervision, and
knowledgeable, trained staff were the most important conditions that must be present in
any residential setting. RHC families felt that community providers lacked consistent
trained staff. Community advocates felt that RHC staff were limited in their perceptions
about community living.
14. Most (90%) advocates and other interested people responding to the survey felt strongly
that the RHC’s should be replaced by other options including community providers or
state operated homes. Some also indicated that RHC’s should continue to provide
emergency and respite services and/or health and behavioral outreach services.
15. Other states have successfully implemented state employee-operated supported living
programs for individuals served in RHC’s. This concept fits with several messages from
the stakeholder survey:
 Most RHC staff indicated that the most important aspect of their current job is
working with the people with disabilities; state operated options allow staff to
either move with the people they support, or stay employed working with this
group. One of several advantages of this is that this workforce is already trained
and skilled.
 RHC staff also indicated that their first choices of work, if their RHC was closed,
is in state funded programs/positions.

60

Braddock, David, and R.Hemp, M. Rizzolo, The State of the States in Developmental Disabilities – Seventh
Edition, American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, September 2008.

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 Families indicated that if the RHC were closed, their first preference for a home
for their family member is another RHC, or if that is not possible, most indicated
a state operated program with strong health supports as their next choice.
 A very high percent of RHC families reported that current RHC staff were
knowledgeable of the needs of their family member, and that they liked working
with them.
16. Although a 10 year timeframe was used in focus group discussions and on the survey to
think about the future of RHC’s, the experience in many other states was that significant
change could occur in five years once decisions were made.
17. While all states, including Washington, have experienced significant fiscal growth in
public DD programs over the past 6 years, the highest per capita costs have occurred in
state operated institutions.
18. The complexity and nature of the needs of people currently residing in RHC’s in
Washington suggests that intensive supported living services would be the primary
community option for people leaving RHC’s.

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RHC Options
The feasibility study team considered both long-term (10 year) and short-term (3 year) strategies
for the future utilization of the RHC staff and campus resources. Within these time frames, five
options were explored.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Maintain the current status
Close all RHCs and expand existing community system
Close SNF program and expand community capacity and diversity
Close ICF/MR program and expand community capacity and diversity
Retain RHC short-term / respite capacity and clinical outreach services and shift RHC
resources to state-operated community residential supports

Much of the information and data in this analysis was obtained from previous studies conducted
by DSHS, General Administration, and JLARC. In all since 1999, there were ten (10) RHC
studies and strategic plans prepared by various state agencies, and four (4) national studies which
were considered in this report. These studies were comprehensive and references are footnoted to
indicate source of data. Updated data from DSHS / ADSA is used as available. In addition, the
feasibility study includes three new data sets.
 First, individual service plans and select behavior and health needs for people living in
the RHCS were provided to the study team. This data allowed the team to build
individual allocation assumptions for each person.
 Second, RHC personnel payroll data and ancillary turn-over / training / tenure
information was available to the study team. This data was used to calculate the cost
associated with staff reductions and / or redeployment.
 Finally, focus group and survey data from RHC people and families, staff, and advocates
assisted the team to understand the interest and concerns associated with moving from the
RHCs.
A description and analysis of each option is provided in Attachment #3 – Description and
Analysis of RHC Options. This analysis led the study team to make the following set of
recommendations.

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Recommendations:
Recommendations are organized into three primary groups: 1) future role and direction for the
RHCs, 2) related community capacity-building actions needed to accommodate the changing role
of RHCs, and 3) DSHS and legislative actions necessary to implement future RHC changes.
Each of these recommendations are inter-related and should be considered together rather than as
separate options. A summary of the bed capacity of RHCs and related services is contained in the
Implementation Section. Cost impact for each of the recommendations is described in
Attachment #6. Respectfully, the feasibility team recommends the following.
Future Role of the RHCs

Recommendation #1: No later than 2013, Washington can reduce 250 beds from the
RHCs by closing FHMC and 13 cottages on other RHC campuses. Because of the current SNF
and ICF/MR bed mix and because the RHCs are recommended to be closed by 2019, it is not
feasible to consolidate people and increase the census at various campuses without creating
multiple moves for people within a short period of time. The team is experienced with the high
degree of stress people experience when moving and recommends that DSHS proceed in a
respectful and patient manner. The recommended actions to accommodate the 250 bed reduction
are:
 Close FHMC and vacate the campus
 Close seven (7) cottages at Rainier School
 Close two (2) cottages at Fircrest School
 Close one (1) cottage at Yakima Valley School
 Close two (2) cottages at Lakeland Village
Recommendation #2: As part of the reduction of 250 beds, Washington should
immediately place children currently living at the RHCs into state-operated children’s intensive
care homes. This action can be accomplished by transferring the current Fircrest staff and
resources to a community supported living setting.
RECOMMENDATION #3: No later than 2019, Washington can close all but a few RHC beds
and convert Lakeland, Fircrest, and Yakima Valley into three small community support centers
which provide emergency crisis support and ambulatory care / clinical outreach services. Each
center would have clinical expertise to support people with autism and their families. These three
centers would retain a small number of SNF beds to honor the state’s commitment to allow
people and their families to age-in-place. These centers would focus on providing geographically
accessible services for eastern, western, and central Washington respectively. By the end of SFY
2019, the RHC capacity is recommended to be:
 Frances Haddon Morgan Center – closed
 Fircrest School – 48 SNF beds
 Lakeland Village – 26 SNF beds
 Rainier School – closed
 Yakima Valley School – 38 SNF beds
Recommendation #4: Washington should expand its community supported living
network to include a “zero-reject” state-operated residential option which focuses on people with
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complex health needs or who present significant community risks. To accomplish significant
RHC closure, a publicly operated safety net of residential supports which must accept all people
is essential. While privately-operated community programs also support people with similar
needs, current DSHS contracts do not require or adequately compensate these providers to accept
referrals unconditionally. States that operate community supported living programs use them as
their “zero reject” safety net services for people with community risk or intense medical needs
when privately operated programs are not available. In Washington, only RHCs have a
requirement to accept all referrals.
Recommendation #5: The community supported living provider network requires
substantial refinancing and increased capacity in order to support people leaving the RHCs in an
equal or better fashion. That financial support should be directed specifically to increasing direct
care compensation and also to increasing the overall number of providers and bed capacity.
Additional Comments on RHC Recommendations: The following comments are added to
further explain the study team’s recommendations.
 Washington should eliminate ICF/MR long-term care from the RHCs and relocate people to
state and privately operated homes. Long-term ICF/MR care programs at the RHCs should
be eliminated by 2018 or before. This level of care can be provided more effectively in a
combination of private and state-operated community supported living settings. Likewise, the
location of future residential services can be better customized to the geographical locations
of families. The current locations of the RHCs for the most part are not conveniently located
for people and families in the northwestern and southwestern parts of the state.
 Washington should reduce SNF long-term care at the RHCs and relocate people to state and
privately operated homes. Long-term SNF care programs at the RHCs should be reduced to
112 beds by 2015 or before. This timeline should allow the state to maintain its commitment
to the care of people and families who accessed RHC’s at a time in the early 1970’s when
community programs were unavailable. The current community SNF program does not
appear sufficient for people residing in the RHC’s. As such, these existing community SNF
programs should not be viewed as viable options for community placement without
substantial increases in program expertise and financial compensation. People who have
resided at RHCs in excess of thirty (30) years should continue to have the choice of aging in
place. For future people with complex health care needs, a combination of private and stateoperated community nursing facility settings funded under the HCBS waiver should be
developed. Similar to the ICF/MR discussion, the location of future residential services can
be better customized to the geographical locations of families. This recommendation assumes
that DSHS will amend its HCBS waiver to create supported living homes for people who
have significant long-term health care needs, such as have been created in other states. For
purposes of this study, these homes are titled state-operated community nursing facilities and
are referenced as SCNF in this study.
 Washington should establish Regional Clinical Outreach and Emergency Crisis Response
Centers at the remaining RHCs, and specifically focus on providing supports to people with
autism, and / or complex behavioral and medical needs. A critical part of building
community capacity is the retention and use of existing clinical expertise and experience.
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Clinical staff at Lakeland, Yakima Valley, and Fircrest would conduct diagnoses, training,
and treatments, as well as ambulatory care clinics. These services would be provided in the
health clinics currently located on the RHC campuses, as well as through home and
community visits. Specifically, these centers would focus on the provision of supports to
people with autism, complex behavior and health support needs, and early intervention
supports to families. These centers would also provide the administrative support and
program supervision to the state-operated community nursing facilities and supported living
programs.
Community Capacity-Building actions necessary for the future of RHCs

Recommendation #1: Strengthen the community direct care staff capacity by
increasing direct care reimbursement rates to providers. In almost all instances, people
and their families shared experiences of losing dedicated direct care service staff due to
inadequate compensation. A review of community residential provider compensation practices
revealed that Washington direct care workers are compensated at the 35th percentile of market
valued competitive wages. Nationally, state reimbursement rate schedules generally set targets
between the 50 th and 75th percentiles of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics wages.
Recommendation #2: Increase the number and diversity of community support
programs. A few states have issued RFPs for new providers and limited contracts to four
people or less. This action has increased the number of new providers and has encouraged
growth in remote geographical locations. Washington should consider issuing a new RFP for
supporting people leaving RHCs.
Recommendation #3: Continue implementation of the recommendations in the
Governor’s Report on Alternative Service Models for Children with Serious Behavior
Problems. The Oregon Children’s Intensive In-Home Service Model works well and is key to
Oregon’s ability to close its state institutions. The recent practice of admission of children to
RHCs strongly suggests that aggressive alternatives need to be put in place. Otherwise, families
will continue to request RHC placement when no other alternatives appear available. Two
previous efforts (e.g. SIBS and Voluntary Placement Program) were described by parents as
effective. Reinstatement of these programs should be considered
Recommendation #4: Washington should address the critical need for out-ofhome respite support for people living with their families. While RHCs are responsive
and provide a quality service to families in need of out-of-home planned respite, they are not cost
effective or conveniently accessible. Other states have created smaller respite facilities which are
geographically and culturally responsive to the diversity of the state. Washington should
continue and expand the use of their SOLA and state-operated special health care homes to
provide planned and emergency respite. Additional private agencies should also be encouraged
to provide similar services in order to expand access to rural and remote areas.

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Strengthening DSHS Infrastructure

Recommendation #1: Add community special health care home program to HCBS
waiver service. Community residential health care options need to be expanded for people
who have been receiving RHC SNF care. HCBS waiver amendment language will need to be
developed and approved by CMS. This model of residential health supports involves homes of
four or fewer people with 24 hour staff and medical supports. In order to accommodate
reductions in RHC SNF levels, a viable intensive community supported living program is
critical. A further explanation of the program is described in the implementation section of this
report.
Recommendation #2: Add clinical outreach services to HCBS waiver service.
HCBS waiver language from other states should be considered for inclusion into the waiver. The
current ICF/MR requirements are prohibitive to providing clinical outreach services. In almost
all instances, and especially in eastern Washington, people and families expressed major
concerns that critical health and behavioral care would not be available. Without clinical
outreach supports, it will be very difficult to achieve the RHC reduction targets. A further
explanation of the program is described in the implementation section of this report.
Recommendation #3: Encourage and expand DDD quality assurance efforts.
Reviews of the current DDD Quality Assurance process find it to be among the better systems
nationally. Even though the state faces serious budget constraints, the community quality
assurance system is critical to ensuring safety and building confidence for people and families
leaving RHCs.
Recommendation #4: Establish a comprehensive RHC pre-placement process with
significant attention to managing personal and family stress related to moving. The
recent “Preliminary Transition Plan for Downsizing Fircrest” describes an excellent process and
should be adopted. Specifically, attention should be provided to ensuring that friendships and
relationships are maintained, and that familiar and trusted staff are retained. To ensure a
comprehensive placement process, a Placement Transition Team is recommended.

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Implementation Steps:
The implementation section is provided in three parts. The first part describes the schedule for
meeting the legislative proviso to reduce 250 beds. This schedule focuses on the steps necessary
to close Frances Haddon Morgan Center and select cottages at other RHCS. Second, a schedule
to close all but 112 RHC beds is presented. This information is intended to provide an overview
of RHC future directions. Finally, a description of key strategies essential to address the needs of
people moving from RHCs, and associated implementation steps are described.

Implementation of 250 bed reduction option
This option includes the closure of Frances Haddon Morgan Center and other selected RHC
cottages. It also includes the development of state-operated homes for 64 people and privatelyoperated homes for 184 people. The Gantt chart below provides an overview of the timing of
various RHC reductions. Gray bars represent placement planning activities and red bars
represent actual move dates and cottage closures.
SFY & Quarter (start July 2010)
RHC & Task

1st
Qtr

SFY 2011

2nd
Qtr

3rd
Qtr

4th
Qtr

1st
Qtr

SFY 2012

2nd
Qtr

3rd
Qtr

4th
Qtr

1st
Qtr

SFY 2013

2nd
Qtr

3rd
Qtr

4th
Qtr

FHMC & Fircrest complete individual pre-placement
assessment & service plans, provider recruiting and trial
visits
FHMC & Fircrest place 32 children into children SOLA’s
and close two cottages (1 @ FHMC & 1 @ Fircrest)
FHMC & Fircrest place 32 adults into adult SOLA’s and
close two cottages
(1 @ FHMC & 1 @ Fircrest)
FHMC place 24 adults into private provider community
supported living programs and close remaining facility.
(FHMC closes on October 2011)
Rainier, Lakeland Village, and Yakima Valley complete
individual pre-placement assessment & service plans,
provider recruiting, and trial visits
Yakima Valley place 16 people into state-operated
special health needs home and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Rainier place 16 people into private community
supported living programs and close one cottage
Lakeland Village place 8 people into state-operated
special health needs homes and 8 people into private
community supported living programs; close one cottage
Lakeland Village place 8 people into state-operated
special health needs homes and 8 people into private
community supported living programs; close one cottage

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A schedule is presented below which outlines dates, affected RHC, description of task, number
of people moving, and staff responsible for completing the task.

Date

RHC

Task Description

7/1/2010 – 7/31/2010

FHMC & Fircrest

8/1/2010 – 9/30/2010

FHMC & Fircrest

10/1/2010 - 12/31/2010

FHMC & Fircrest

Initiate individual placement planning process & identify
community options for each person
Placement Transition Team procure housing options for
people moving to state-operated programs
Initiate individual placement planning process & identify
community options for each person. Placement Transition
Team procure housing options for people moving to state
and privately operated programs
Move 32 people into state-operated programs

1/1/2011 - 3/31/2011

FHMC & Fircrest

Move 32 people into privately-operated programs

4/1/2011 – 6/30/2011

FHCM

7/1/2011 – 9/30/2011

Yakima Valley

10/1/2010 – 12/31/2010

Rainier, Lakeland,
and Yakima Valley

Move 24 people into privately-operated programs,
relocate employees, and initiate cold closure of campus
Move 16 people into state-operated programs

10/1/2011 – 12/31/2011

Rainier

Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

1/1/2012 – 3/31/2012

Rainier

Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

4/1/2012 – 6/30/2012

Rainier

Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

7/1/2012 – 9/30/2012

Rainier

Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

7/1/2012 - 9/30/2012

Lakeland

Move 8 people into state-operated programs and 8 people
into privately-operated programs
Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

10/1/2012 – 12/31/2012

Rainier

7/1/2012 – 12/31/2012

Lakeland

1/1/2013 – 3/31/2013

Rainier

Move 8 people into state-operated programs and 8 people
into privately-operated programs
Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

4/1/2013 – 6/30/2013

Rainier

Move 16 people into privately-operated programs

Davis Deshaies LLC

Number
of People
Moving
0
0

0

32
32
24
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16
16

Responsibility
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team

Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team
Placement
Transition Team

Page 3 .53

Implementation of Recommendation #3 (reduce RHC capacity to 112
SNF beds and create ambulatory care/crisis outreach clinics)
An implementation schedule for Recommendation #3 is provided below. This recommendation
includes the closure of Frances Haddon Morgan Center, Rainier School, all ICF/MR beds at
Fircrest and Yakima Valley, and half of current RHC SNF beds. Additionally, this option
restructures the RHC clinical services to expand coverage to people living in community
settings. The schedule assumes a start date of July 1, 2010 and an end date of June 2018. All
dates in the table are expressed in state fiscal year (SFY) quarters (3 month periods). This
schedule incorporates the bed closures described in the above 250 bed reduction option and
expands to include the remaining RHCs reductions.

State Fiscal Year (SFY)

SFY
2011

SFY
2012

SFY
2013

SFY
2014

SFY
2015

SFY
2016

SFY
2017

SFY
2018

Start date – July 2010 Initiate actions
FHMC – move 16 people to state -operated homes & 16
people to privately operated homes
Fircrest – move 16 people to state-operated homes & 16
people to privately operated homes
FHMC – move 24 people to privately -operated homes
and close facility
Rainier – move 48 people to privately -operated homes
Yakima Valley – move 16 people to state-operated
homes
Lakeland – move 32 people to state and privatelyoperated homes
Rainier - move 64 people to privately-operated homes
Fircrest – move 32 people to state and privatelyoperated homes
Lakeland Village – move 16 people to privately-operated
homes
Rainier – move 64 people to privately -operated homes
Fircrest – move 57 people to state and privatelyoperated homes
Lakeland – move 64 people to privately-operated homes
Rainier – move 64 people to privately -operated homes
Yakima Valley – move 32 people to state and privatelyoperated homes
Fircrest – move 41 people to state and privatelyoperated homes and close ICF/MR program
Lakeland – move 64 people to privately-operated homes
Rainier – move 88 people to privately -operated homes
Yakima Valley – move 16 people to state-operated
homes
Lakeland Village – move 36 people to privately-operated
homes and close ICF/MR program
Rainier – move 59 people to privately -operated homes
and close facility
End date – June 2017 Actions completed

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Implementation of other key strategies
A significant part of the study recommendations involve restructuring state services to provide a
broader array of choices and service options for people and their families. There are three key
actions suggested in the study report.
1. Create placement transition teams to ensure safe and coordinated transitions for people
moving from RHCs
2. Develop state-operated, community based special health care homes
3. Develop ambulatory care / crisis outreach centers
Members of the consultant team have had recent experience establishing similar programs in the
states of California and Indiana. Implementation steps outlined below reflect that experience.

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Placement Transition Team program
In its earlier 2004 study “Fircrest Preliminary Transition Plan planning for the Downsizing and
Closure of Fircrest School, A State Residential Habilitation Center”61, DSHS outlined a detailed
placement transition team approach. The consulting team found that approach to be thorough and
complete, and it serves as the basis for the recommended Placement Transition Team program.
The Placement Transition Team consists of DDD case managers, RHC habilitation plan
administrators (HPA), DDD resource development / service brokers, and DSHS human resource
professionals who will assist people and their families to successfully move from RHCs into new
homes. The purpose of the team is to coordinate the design and implementation of community
placement activities related to the RHC restructuring initiatives. To accomplish this task, there
are five key steps.
Steps
Identify people leaving the RHCs
and their departure schedule

Construct individual service plans

Develop community placement
resources based upon individual
friendships, interests and needs

Assist people to move to new
homes

Assist RHC employees with
relocation

Action
Each RHC has a projected schedule of people moving into
community programs and associated cottage closures. Team
staff need to administer the CARES / SIS assessment to ALL
people currently residing in RHCs and construct a master
schedule for community movement.
Using person-centered planning principles, RHC and case
management staff need to identify community resources
necessary to meet individual support plans. Two aspects of
the plan are critical. First all plans should maintain
friendships and meaningful relationships. Second, all plans
must ensure the continued provision and delivery of
essential health care and monitoring.
Case management resource development staff should
recruit and train qualified providers to meet individual
support plans. This task includes provider recruitment,
certification, contract negotiation, and training in individual
support needs for people scheduled to be moved from
RHCs.
During this phase, people leaving the RHC should make trial
visits to their prospective new homes and identify any
changes needed to ensure comfort. Also, people should
exercise choice in the staff that are paid to support them.
Finally, all clinical supports and care plans necessary to
ensure health and safety should be in place prior to final
relocation
DSHS Human Resource staff should identify state
employment options for RHC employees who will be
affected by the RHC closures. These options should include
reduction-in-force rights, early retirement programs, job retraining programs, and small business start-up loan
programs. The employee relocation program should be
initiated at the start of the RHC downsizing. As permanent
staff vacancies occur in the RHCs as downsizing efforts
progress, temporary replacement staff should be retained in
their place.

Responsibility
People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; RHC HPAs;
DD Case managers

Timeline
Start Day 1
through Day 30

People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; RHC HPAs;
DD case managers

Start Day 20
through Day 60

People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; DD
resource
development and
case managers;
RHC clinical staff
People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; RHC direct
care staff and
clinical staff; DD
case managers;

Start Day 30 and
continue
through project

DSHS human
resource staff; RHC
supervisors

Start Day 30 and
continue
through project

Start Day 60 and
continue
through project

61

DSHS / DDD, “Preliminary Transition Plan Planning for the Downsizing and Closure of Fircrest School, A State
Residential Habilitation Center”, Department of Social & Health Services, Olympia, Washington. January 2004
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Page 3 .56

State-operated community special health care homes program
Washington State has an extensive network of community SNF nursing homes facilities. There
was consensus among the team that these community SNF programs were not an appropriate
option for the majority of people moving from the RHCs and were unable to meet individual
needs without a major increase in provider reimbursement rates. There was also a concern within
the consulting team that these licensed residential options were not really homes but rather
medical facilities. Respectfully, the team is recommending that DSHS establish a Medicaid
Home and Community-Based Service (HCBS) option under its 1915 (c) waiver to create
supported living homes for persons with special health care needs. Included in this
recommendation, DSHS should establish certification and regulatory controls for these homes.
Examples of health care services to be provided in these special health care need homes include:
gastrostomy feedings and hydration, renal dialysis, special medications including injections,
management of insulin dependent diabetes, catheterization, indwelling urinary catheter
management, pain management, nutritional support including total parenteral nutrition, and
palliative care. The addition of palliative care and hospice is intended to ensure that people can
stay in their homes as long as possible. The special health care need homes require licensed and
trained staff 24 hours per day, the development and updating of individual health care plans and
routine monitoring visits from state RN staff. Steps to implement are:
Steps
Define special health care
residential programs
Construct Medicaid state plan
revisions
Obtain Medicaid approval

Action
Review other state special health care home programs,
evaluation reports, and associated licensing and regulatory
requirements. Determine program design option.
Determine Medicaid HCBS definitions and amendments and
associated reimbursement fee schedules
Submit Medicaid HCBS plan amendments

Selection of participants

Identify people to move to homes and construct individual
service plans

Recruit and train providers

Identify and train state employees to operate special health
care need homes. Assign clinical staff to ensure individual
service needs.
People leaving the RHC should make trial visits to their
prospective new homes and identify any changes needed to
ensure comfort. Also, people should exercise choice in the
staff that are paid to support them. Finally, all clinical
supports and care plans necessary to ensure health and
safety should be in place prior to final relocation

Assist people to move to new
homes

Davis Deshaies LLC

Responsibility
DSHS HCBS waiver
staff; RHC clinical
work group
DSHS HCBS waiver
staff
DSHS HCBS waiver
staff
People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; RHC HPAs;
RHC clinical staff;
DD case managers
RHC clinical and
program staff
People residing at
the RHCs and their
families; RHC direct
care staff and
clinical staff; DD
case managers

Timeline
Start Day 1
through Day 30
Day 30 through
Day 60
Day 60 through
Day 150
Day 90 and
continue
through project

Day 90 and
continue
through project
Day 150 and
continue
through project

Page 3 .57

Ambulatory Care / Crisis Outreach program
The consulting team is recommending that outpatient ambulatory care clinics be established
using the existing Fircrest, Yakima, and Lakeland health care facilities. These clinics would be
licensed as free-standing entities under a Medicaid state plan amendment, and related
reimbursement schedule amendment. These clinics would provide primary care, psychiatry,
behavior management, medication and clinical pharmacological consultation, nutrition
counseling, speech and communication therapy, and physical and occupational therapies. A
primary function of these clinics is to ensure that sufficient clinical supports are available to
people leaving the RHCs as well as people living in the community. In addition, the clinics
would operate crisis outreach teams which would provide autism supports, behavior
interventions, in-home supports, and family-training to people in all living situations. Steps to
implement are:
Steps
Define ambulatory care and clinical
outreach programs
Construct Medicaid state plan
revisions
Obtain Medicaid approval

Action
Review other state ambulatory care and clinical outreach
programs and associated licensing and regulatory
requirements. Determine program design option.
Determine Medicaid state plan definitions and amendments
and associated reimbursement fee schedules
Submit Medicaid state plan amendments

Restructure RHC licensed staff to
provide crisis response and
outreach services

Clinical staff should be identified for relocation to the
regional ambulatory care and crisis outreach centers.
Medicaid invoicing and medical records systems, and clinic
practice policies and procedures will need to be established.
Follow-up monitoring and assessment of individual clinical
treatment programs.

Enroll consumers in outpatient clinic
service plan

Identify consumers and associated service plans and
implement treatment and monitoring schedules

Davis Deshaies LLC

Responsibility
DSHS HCBS waiver
staff; RHC clinical
work group
DSHS HCBS waiver
s taff
DSHS HCBS waiver
staff
DD regional
administrative
staff; RHC clinical
staff; DDD HCBS
waiver unit; DSHS
Human Resource
staff
RHC clinical staff

Timeline
Start Day 1
through Day 30
Day 30 through
Day 60
Day 60 through
Day 150
Day 60 through
Day 150

Day 150

Page 3 .58

COMMUNITY IMPACT , EMPLOYEE IMPACT , & LIFE-CYCLE ANALYSIS
This section of the study summarizes the approach used in calculating the impact of various
RHC closure options. The first part of this section describes the methodology to determine the
economic impact to communities in which RHCs are located. The second part of this section
outlines the methodology to determine the impact to RHC employees. And the third part of this
section provides a description of the life-cycle cost approach used in the study. Findings for each
of the analyses is detailed in Technical Appendix prepared by Berk & Associates and attached to
the study. Also, a summary of select findings for affected employee impact is contained in
Attachment #4 of this document.

Assessing Impact to communities with RHCs
Significant downsizing and/or closures of state facilities would have economic and fiscal impacts
on the local communities that are home to these facilities. The primary impacts would be a result
of lost employment, lost purchases of goods and services within the community, and the loss of
taxes paid to the host jurisdiction.
As a result of shifting the populations from closed or downsized facilities to other locations,
“receiving communities” will experience some positive economic and fiscal impacts from
increased employment, additional purchases of goods and services, and increased tax revenue to
the host jurisdiction. Because the State is considering making these changes in an effort to
improve efficiency and ultimately decrease spending, one would expect the increased
expenditures (and impacts) in the receiving communities to not fully offset the losses in the
“giving” communities.
The purpose of this analysis, which is represented in more detail in the accompanying Technical
Appendix, is to:
 Estimate the direct, indirect, and induced economic impacts on the local region from the
changes in employment and purchases of goods and services for communities either
losing or gaining economic activity associated with the studied facilities
 Estimate the fiscal impacts (change in tax revenue) to the local jurisdictions losing
economic activity associated with the studied facilities

Methodology and Limitations

Economic Impacts
An assessment of economic impacts concerns itself with effects on patterns of commerce. What
shift in economic activity (business activity, income, or wages) can be attributed to a given
action or investment? An economic impact is characterized by a net new change in economic
activity, that is, economic activity that would otherwise not occur.
Our goal in this analysis is to estimate 1) the full impact on the regional economy of the change
in economic activity if a facility were closed or downsized, and 2) the full impact of additional
economic activity in receiving communities. IMPLAN (short for IMpact Analysis for
PLANning) software was used for this analysis. IMPLAN is an input/output model that uses
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Page 3 .59

county-level data to trace the ripple effects (direct, indirect, and induced effects) of an
expenditure that occurs within the economy.
One of the limitations of this analysis is that it is performed as a snapshot in time. It compares
the impacts of a facility’s current expenditures with the likely impacts under a contemplated
scenario. Although many of the scenarios discussed in this report transition over a period of time,
for the economic analysis we have a chosen a future point in which the changes are anticipated to
have been completed and the facility’s operations are relatively static. All dollars used in this
portion of the analysis are 2009 dollars.
Another important issue to note is that these analyses describe the economic impacts to the local
region, not the local jurisdiction, because the facility may draw employees, goods, and services
from the larger area. The impacts to the local jurisdiction may be much greater relative to its
local economy than that shown for the larger region. In some of the scenarios analyzed in this
report, employees and residents of a facility are assumed to move to other locations within the
same study region, minimizing the economic impacts shown in our analysis. However, they may
be moving outside of the local jurisdiction, which can have significant impacts to that local
community. The ripple effects from the loss of employees and residents at the facilities can have
a profound impact in particular on cities of smaller size. If employees and residents relocate, the
indirect and induced effects from the lost spending of wages and facility purchases can be
devastating on a small local economy. The importance of this issue as it pertains in particular to
smaller communities that currently host facilities being considered for downsizing or closure
should not be underestimated by the reader.

Reading the Economic Impact Tables
Each economic impacts discussion in this report includes a table showing the results of the
analysis similar to the one shown in Exhibit 1 below. The information highlighted in gray comes
directly from the facilities or work done by the project team for this study. The remainder of the
table, in white, is a result of the analysis done with IMPLAN. The title of each table contains the
region analyzed for that facility.
The table begins on the left with the expenditure categories. The second column shows expected
change in facility expenditures due to the system changes being considered in the scenario. The
third column shows the estimated direct impacts to economic output resulting from these
expenditures (or reduction of expenditures), i.e. those dollars spent by the facility that are
assumed to be local to the study region. The multiplier in the next column accounts for the
indirect and induced impacts and is used to estimate the total impacts to economic output in the
study area. The estimated number of jobs supported within the community by these expenditures
is shown in the sixth column, followed by impacts on labor income. Estimated jobs in the
Facility Salaries/Benefits category (and School District category for the JRA analysis) include
the actual number of FTEs to be laid off and/or gained at a facility plus induced jobs resulting
from the change in household spending (there are no indirect jobs in this spending category since
there is no industry purchase occurring in the economy here, only wages being spent).

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Exhibit 1
Example of the Annual Economic Impact Tables Used in this Report
Expenditure
Categories
Food
Goods
Services
Utilities
Salaries/Benefits
Capital (Annual Avg)
Total

Annual Reduction
in Expenditures
$
244,463
$
848,033
$
825,046
$
215,436
$
7,476,080
$
676,320
$
10,285,379

Output
Output
Output
Total Community
Direct Impact Multiplier Total Impact
Job Loss
$
68,278
1.55 $
106,028
1.2
$
214,265
1.54 $
329,601
3.9
$
462,603
1.65 $
761,155
9.4
$
215,436
1.67 $
359,276
2.0
$
7,476,080
1.48 $ 11,077,502
166.8
$
676,320
1.61 $
1,088,864
7.8
$ 9,112,983
1.51 $ 13,722,427
191.1

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Total Labor
Income Lost
46,940
145,061
332,078
120,049
7,932,450
453,172
9,029,749

Fiscal Impacts
In addition to the impacts on the local and regional economy, the downsizing and/or closure of
state facilities will have a direct impact on the host jurisdiction’s finances. This Technical
Appendix of this report discusses each of the following potential revenue sources in more detail:
utility and sales taxes, State shared revenues (including Motor Vehicle Fuel Tax, Liquor Board
Profits and Excise Tax, and Criminal Justice Revues), Criminal Justice Sales Tax, and Public
Safety Sales Tax.
With the exception of the Gas Tax, the revenues discussed above are generally part of each city’s
General Fund. To give a sense of the impact of lost revenues we have shown the portion of total
General Fund revenues estimated to be lost through closure or downsizing of each facility.
It is important to note that each facility studied in this report has a unique relationship with the
jurisdiction in which it is located. In many cases the facilities function as an integral part of the
local community and there is a mutually beneficial relationship that exists. Throughout the
discussion of impacts to the communities we have tried to characterize some of the ways in
which the facilities interact with their local communities. However, these relationships are
complex and varied and the scope of this analysis does not capture the full extent of the
interaction and mutual reliance between each facility and its community.

IMPACT ON CURRENT STATE EMPLOYEES AT RHCS
When examining the employee impact for each of the scenarios that follow, two pieces hold true
for all DDD scenarios: (1) how the study categorizes and talks about DDD employees and (2)
how an employee may continue his or her employment with DSHS.

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Employee Job Classifications and Categories
Davis Deshaies estimated the changes in FTEs by State job class titles, and in addition, created
three overarching job class categories which include several positions, classes, and series. These
categories are:
•

Direct Care Services. Employees in this category provide resident care and include the job
classes of Attendant Counselors and the Adult Training Specialists.

•

Clinical Support. Employees in this category provide a spectrum of health, dental, and
mental health care. This category includes licensed healthcare professions, including the job
classes of Physicians, Psychologists, Physical Therapists, Registered Nurses and Habilitation
Plan Administrators among others.

•

Administrative and Support. Employees in this category provide manage and provide
administrative support at the RHCs. Sample job classes include the RHC Superintendent,
Secretary, and Medical Records Technician.

Employment Options with DSHS
Closures of DDD facilities will result in a reduction in positions and employee layoffs. These
employees have different options available to them for continued employment within DSHS.
This section presents an overview of the types of processes for continued employment
opportunities.
In the DDD scenarios studied, the following actions which affect employees and employment
opportunities are explored:
 Elimination of FTEs as a result of a full or partial facility closure
 Creation of new state FTEs at new state operated living facilities (known as “StateOperated Living Alternatives” (SOLAs)
 Creation of FTEs based out of identified RHC facilities that provide administrative
oversight of the new SOLAs
The DDD options are different from DOC scenarios and JRA options for two reasons. First,
resident populations affected by closures can move into privately run facilities. This means that
(a) there are fewer state FTEs created as a result of shifting residents from closing facilities; and
(b) there may be FTEs created in privately-run community facilities. Second, each option
includes the creation of new State-Operated Living Alternatives, or SOLAs.
Staffing the New SOLAs. Given the hypothetical nature of these options, how the new SOLAs
would be staffed has not yet been determined. Were implementation to occur, it would be
expected that DOC management would work closely with unions in shaping the staffing process;
the final authority with regard to implementation rests with management. The following
mechanisms could be used alone or in combination to staff the new SOLAs:
•

Reassignment. Management may reassign FTEs from other DDD facilities to the new SOLA.
Reassignment of FTEs from one facility to another means the following for the actual affected:
 If reassignment is within a “reasonable commute” (defined as 35 miles from the current
place of employment in collective bargaining agreements), the employees are reassigned
to the new facility
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 If reassignment is outside of a “reasonable commute,” employees have a choice; they can
take the reassignment or participate in the layoff formal option process
•

Voluntary Transfer. Management may ask for volunteers to transfer to the newly-created
(vacant) positions. Management is given the discretion to accept or not accept an employee.
Factors that affect an employee eligibility for and likelihood of obtaining a position include
job class, skill sets, and seniority.

•

Formal Layoff Process. Given that these positions are created during a time of agency
layoffs, management may choose to fill all or a portion of the new positions via the formal
layoff process.

Another consideration in staffing the new SOLAs unique to DDD is positive relationship than
can exist between residents and their direct caregivers. FTE reductions at RHCs and FTE
increases at the State SOLAs are directly linked to the transfer of residents from RHC cottages to
SOLAs. We’ve heard anecdotally from DD specialists that many direct caregivers would likely
want to move with the residents they have cared for. Moreover, this continuity in caregivers
would help the transition process for some DD residents. This also may factor into the staffing
process for the Direct Care FTE positions.
Employees facing a layoff may continue employment in DSHS through the transfer process and
the layoff process. Here we focus on the formal option process, a component of the State layoff
process, as the State is under obligation to find and offer employment opportunities for
permanent employees laid off in a facility closure or downsizing. In this process, permanent
employees being laid off will be offered a comparable position within a designated layoff unit, in
which they have the required job skills. A layoff unit is the geographic boundary used for
determining available positions. There are three tiers of layoff units:
1. County: Employees are first considered for positions which they are eligible in their current
county of employment.
2. Region: If there are no eligible positions in the county, the process extends to a regional
level. These regions are defined by the agency and can be seen for DSHS in the map below.
3. Statewide: If there are no eligible positions in the region, the process then extends statewide.

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DSHS Regions

Within each successive layoff unit (first county, then regional, and then statewide), employees
will be considered for the following types of positions in the following order, as described in the
Technical Appendix.
 A funded vacant position in the same job class
 A funded position in the same job class that is currently filled by a more junior employee
 A funded vacant or filled position in a job class held by the employee in the past

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